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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

DIMENSIONS OF JUDGMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISPLACEABLE STATEMENTS IN THE DISGUISED-STRUCTURED INSTRUMENT FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POOR

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

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GEORGE ALLEN WOODWARD

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DIMENSIONS OF JUDGMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISPLACEABLE STATEMENTS IN THE DISGUISED-STRUCTURED INSTRUMENT FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POOR

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DIMENSIONS OF JUDGMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISPLACEABLE STATEMENTS IN THE DISGUISED-STRUCTURED INSTRUMENT FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POOR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

It was the primary purpose of this study to examine various dimensions of judgment associated with the use of the disguised-structured instruments for the assessment of attitudes. The disguised-structured instrumentation approach lends itself well to subject evaluation of statements describing a stimulus situation; thus tapping the subject's position or stand on the issue involved. A possible problem associated with this technique has been the tendency of subjects to shift the dimension of judgment from the evaluative categories of favorable and unfavorable to other evaluative categories. Other possible evaluative categories include the true-false dimension, complimentary-critical, and beneficial-harmful. This study was concerned with examining the various dimensions of judgments utilized by subjects judging the

items on the disguised-structured poor scale (Peterson, 1967).

Need for the Study

Since the basic work of Hovland and Sherif (1952) and Sherif and Hovland (1953) in the development of the disguised-structured technique for the assessment of attitudes, several theoretical issues have emerged for additional study and investigation. These theoretical issues include the stimulus situation, categorization patterns, frames of reference, ego-involvement, own categories, dimensions of judgment, latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment, and assimilation-contrast effects. Little attention by investigators has been directed toward the dimension of judgment and problems associated with subjects changing their dimension of judgment during the judging task.

Many of the studies and investigations of the stimulus situation from the standpoint of context, anchors, set, arrangement and ordering of the statements, range of the series of statements, and place, time and sequence have contributed to focusing upon the possible problem of shifting dimensions of judgments. Diab (1963) studied the role of statement arrangement and order in the social judgment process. His work was done with various national groups. The data suggested that when persons rate various national groups it does make a difference as to how they are arranged and which of the groups are included in the stimulus situation. Another finding of the study was that highly ego-involved

subjects tend to be unaffected by statement arrangement patterns. Another variation of the arrangement phenomenon is the range of a series of statements. Sherif and Hovland (1961) and Upshaw (1962) found that by varying the range of a series of items it was possible to alter the subject's placement patterns.

Sherif and Cantril (1947) investigated the role of set and other factors as variables associated with the stimulus situation. They found that when the stimulus situation is highly vague, set and other factors are greatly magnified. Nevin (1964) studied the effect of the placement of negative clauses in the stimulus situation or item structure. The data indicated that the placement of a negative clause at the end of a statement did influence the judgment process. Subjects tended to judge the items or stimulus situation more negatively than when the statements terminated with a positive clause. It has been found that "neutral" type items or stimulus situations do tend to define a position on the scale; thus subjects do not tend to displace these as often as the more vague and ambiguous statements (La Fave, Szczesiak, Yaquinto, & Adler, 1963); and Zavalloni and Cook (1963). It would appear that a statement's susceptibility to displacement is generally a function of the distance it represents from the extreme position or anchors. Generally, research efforts have not indicated the types and degrees of verbal ambiguity in an item or statement that makes it a highly displaceable item.

Much more research is needed to determine what

> characteristics are conducive to systematic displacements of items as a function of attitude. So far, it is clear that extreme positions can usually be stated more explicitly and hence are frequently judged the same by different respondents; the potentiality of indeterminancy, of alternative interpretations according to subject's attitude, is greater in the intermediate range. Further, for maximum effect of the individual's attitude, the two studies just summarized suggest that adjectives or other terms with generally recognized connotations (good or bad) are less subject to systematic differences in placement than statements avoiding strong evaluations or terms with connotative ambiguity (e.g., "aggressive," which can be interpreted as good or bad). The most indeterminate verbal statement is, as nearly as possible, a tabula rasa requiring the individual to furnish both denotative and connotative interpretation without violating the rules for declarations considered meaningful in ordinary conversation. (Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, 1965).

Fehrer (1952) demonstrated that judgment can be changed by altering a scale's context. The data indicated that when a scale's context is changed judgment of mildly biased items is affected; that is, subjects tend to shift the direction of their rating. Weiss (1961) experimented with the effect upon judgment when anchor items are changed. The data indicated that if a definite or strong middle position of the scale was included, subjects tended to rate statements within the middle range of the rating scale. Similar effects were observed when a strong negative statement was introduced on the scale; that is, the subjects tended to displace or rate the statement toward the positive end of the scale. In the psychophysical area of research Sherif, Taub, and Hovland (1958) found that the intensity of anchors (anchors placed at increasing distances from the end points of the scale) caused displacement

away from the anchors making the scale more constricted.

Other studies investigating the function of place, time and sequence have contributed to focusing upon the possible problem of shifts in the dimensions of judgments. Early psychophysical studies suggested the importance of the sequence of stimuli as a variable in perceiving (Long, 1937; Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954). Studies have indicated that the extent and direction of displacement can be changed by the sequence of statements in varying situations of judgment. Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (1965, pp. 145-147) have also emphasized the importance of keeping the stimulus situation (place and time) current with the times, so as to insure maximum relevancy for the subjects.

These studies concerning the stimulus situation appear to have made a significant contribution to furthering understanding about the process of social judgment. The studies, however, offer little by way of describing the relationship of a stimulus situation type to changes in the subject's dimension of judgment. There yet remains the task of defining precisely what factors within the stimulus situation contribute directly to changes or shifts in the dimension of social judgment. Questions remain, such as: What properties associated with the item or stimulus situation tend to be most conducive to the subject's shifting from a favorable-unfavorable to a true-false dimension of judgment? Does the arrangement of items within the scale or components within an item relate in any way to shifts in the dimensions of judgment? Do

strong anchors within the stimulus situation tend to create more possibilities for changes in the dimension of judgment?

Another area of focus, that appears to be relevant to the study of shifts in dimensions of judgment appear to be those factors that the subject brings to the judgment situation. These factors could possibly include his own anchors on an issue, the degree of ego-involvement, reference group affiliation, various frames of references, etc. Studies have explored these factors in recent years, but yet have not focused upon how they might relate to changes in dimensions of judgment.

The work of McGarvey (1943) and Volkmann (1951) explored quite dramatically how anchors serve to guide responses during social judgment experiences. Their data indicated that end stimuli tend to govern or determine the placement of other stimuli in a series, the closer a stimulus is to the end point or extremes the more accurate the discrimination or judgment; stimuli that are farthest away are judged with the most error during placement of items, and if the anchors are moved excessively beyond the end of the stimulus series, the entire scale is considerably constricted. Anchors then appear to play a major role in contributing to assimilation and contrast effects (summarized in Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall, 1965, pp. 127-167) that have been observed and studied by several investigators.

The studies done on ego-involvement and social judgment have generally suggested that highly involved subjects use their own stand

for an anchor. Tajfel (1959) demonstrated that when stimuli have some personal value or meaning, indicating a stand on an issue, this stand serves as an anchor for the judgment process. Pilisuk (1962) demonstrated that individuals have hierarchies of ego-involvements. Subjects tend to perceive some issues as more important than others. The data suggested that each individual has groups of attitudes which are stable anchors when presented with new information; that is, these anchors tend to hold regardless of the content of the stimulus situation presented. Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (1965, pp. 173-176) concluded that individuals order stands or positions on issues into a system of priorities which serve as anchors for social judgment.

Frames of reference would also appear to have a possible relationship to shifts in dimensions of judgment. It is well established in the literature that reference groups play a major role in social judgment. Within the context of reference groups, the subject brings to the judgment situation his anchors which serves as guides for placement of stimuli. As the individual's frames of reference change and various anchoring referents are re-ordered, so are his anchors altered for social judgment. The work of Diab (1962); La Fave and Sherif (1962); Koslin (1963); Loza (1963); and Reich and Sherif (1963) generally support the major role that frames of reference play in the social judgment situation.

As in the case of studies on the stimulus situation, the work done

on the factors subjects brings to the social judgment situation have thus far not focused upon the shifts in dimensions of judgment issue. There are no studies showing the relationship of degrees of ego-involvement to shift in dimensions of judgments. The work on anchors and frames of reference contribute little to an understanding of their role in creating shifts in the dimension of social judgment. There appears to be great need for additional studies designed to explore these avenues for possible relationships with shifting dimensions of judgment.

It would appear that additional study and investigation related to possible subject alteration of the dimension of judgment could contribute to the development of more sophisticated instruments styled in the general tradition of the Sherif and Hovland, disguised-structured approach to the assessment of attitudes. For example, if it were found that subjects do change dimensions of judgment, then it would be necessary to determine under what conditions such changes in judgment occur. This could very well open other avenues of investigation related to the structure of the stimulus situation and variables related to perceiving the stimulus situation. It was with these general kinds of questions in mind that this experimenter determined to explore the possibility that subjects use varying dimensions of judgment when judging items on the disguised-structured poor scale. To summarize, the literature reveals a need for study and investigation to determine if and to what extent subjects tend to shift dimensions of judgment from

unfavorable-favorable to true-false, complimentary-critical, or beneficial-harmful.

Theoretical Background of the Study

Many definitions of the concept "attitude" have been developed by a wide variety of investigators. These various definitions have in part been a result of the various approaches that have been developed for studying attitudes. The following are some definitions of attitudes which appear to be typical of those found in the literature:

> A social attitude is (or is evidenced by) consistency in response to social objects (Campbell, 1959, p. 31).

> Attitudes are formed in relation to situations, persons, groups with which the individual comes into contact in the course of his development. Once formed, they determine that the individual reacts in a characteristic way to these or related situations, persons, groups (Sherif & Sherif, 1956, p. 490).

> As the individual develops, his cognitions, feelings, and action tendencies with respect to the various objects in his world become organized into enduring systems called attitudes (Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachecy, 1962, p. 139).

> Attitudes refer to the stands the individual upholds and cherishes about objects, issues, persons, groups or institutions (Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965).

Sherif and Sherif (1956) developed the following propositions to clarify the significance of the concept "attitude."

> 1. Attitudes are not innate. They are formed or learned in relation to given objects, persons, groups, and events. This criterion differentiates an attitude from biogenic motives. ... The initial appearance of an attitude is dependent on learning.

> 2. Attitudes are more or less lasting. This criterion literally means more lasting or less lasting. The implication is that, since they are learned, attitudes are not immutable. They are subject to change under given conditions and influences....
>
> 3. Attitudes always imply a subject-object relationship. In other words, attitudes are not formed in thin air. They are formed or learned in relation to an identifiable referent, be it a person, a group, an object, an institution, an issue, or an event. ...
>
> 4. The referent of an attitude may encompass a small or large number of items. The referent may consist of one item or a large number of items falling under one classification. When members of a gang develop a negative attitude toward a rival gang and consider that gang treacherous, the six or eight individuals in that gang will be seen as treacherous. When members of a given group are handed down by their elders the dictum: "The X nation is aggressive," any individual out of millions composing the X nation is likely to be seen as aggressive. Such a stand, which encompasses millions of items, is possible on the basis of the development of generalized concepts. This implies the process of generalization, which is the essential process of concept formation. ... The generalizations in question are not simply sensory generalizations; they cut across sensory modalities....
>
> 5. Attitudes have motivational-affective properties. This criterion differentiates an attitude from other learned items in the psychological make-up of the individual. ... The affective value of an attitude is due either to the intrinsic, direct, or "instrumental" motivational appeal of the stimulus (such as food, a sex object, mother, milk bottle, a period of romance) or to the socially invested stamp of value on the stimulus (Sherif & Sherif, 1956, pp. 494-495).

It would appear that attitudes develop in relationship to the wide variety of social stimuli with which the individual comes into contact. This contact provides the individual with the opportunity for

developing reference scales, which make possible the development of anchors and referents that play a major role in the shaping of his attitudes. These attitudes then serve to guide his behavior with respect to the various types of responses that he makes toward given situations. For purposes of this study attitudes are considered to be functional states of readiness which have formed as a result of various contacts with social stimuli. These encounters with social stimuli have been ordered by the individual; thereby, producing a hierarchy of anchors and referents that are available for making judgments within social situations.

Campbell (1959) has grouped the various instrumentation approaches for the assessment of attitudes as follows: (1) disguised-nonstructured; (2) nondisguised-nonstructured; (3) nondisguised-structured; and (4) disguised-structured. This categorization represents an attempt at classifying attitude instruments based upon their approach to the subject (disguised or undisguised referring to whether or not the subject is informed that his attitudes are being studied) and the type of stimulus situation that is provided for the subject to judge. The following is a cursory review of each instrumentation approach and some illustrative attitude instruments, with major emphasis upon the disguised-structured approach, as this is the primary focus of this study.

The disguised-nonstructured instruments are very similar to the projective techniques utilized in the study of human personality.

Primary characteristics of these instruments are their concealment from the subject that his attitudes are being studied and the measurement of attitudes in group settings or in some type of intense, social interaction setting. Picture methods have been developed for studying attitudes via this method by Proshansky (1943) and Johnson (1949). Subjects are instructed to describe what they see in various pictures. Judges and various systems of ratings have been developed for scoring the responses. Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood and Sherif (1961) developed a bean pick-up contest for subjects engaged in intergroup conflict. The contest was used as a device for measuring attitudes toward the out-group members. Subjects were required to make estimates of their own group members' performances and the out-group members' performances; thereby providing the experimenters with a measure of performance based upon attitudes toward the out-group. Harvey (1953) developed a listening situation for the study of attitudes associated with intergroup relations. Subjects were required to listen to tape recordings of intra- and intergroup sessions. During these listening sessions subjects were instructed to list names of cities, later they were asked to estimate the number of cities recorded by all other subjects. A rating scale of adjectives from unfavorable to favorable was provided for purposes of judging the members of the two groups.

The nondisguised-nonstructured instruments consist of essay type questions, open-ended statements, and nonstructured interviewing

techniques. Little effort is made to conceal the purpose of the task from the subject. Emphasis is given to creating a situation in which the subject will respond freely to the stimulus situation. Newcomb (1929) developed a technique for observing and recording group behavior. Observers were used for purposes of evaluating subject's attitudes in group situations. Semi-structured questionnaires were developed by Feshback and Singer (1957) to measure social prejudice. The questionnaire was used to measure social prejudice under various types of experimental conditions. Moreno (1934) contributed the sociometric approach to the measurement of relationships within social groups. A process of rank-ordering subject relationships emerged from this method; thereby, contributing a measure of the attitudes held by members of the group toward each other. A leaderless group discussion technique was developed b y Bion (1946). Observers rated subjects involved in a fluid group situation via various pre-selected behavioral categories. The observers ratings provide a measure of the subject's attitudes toward such variables as goal facilitation, sociability, sensitivity, responsiveness, etc. Bales (1951) contributed a categorization procedure for describing various types of behavior patterns. Observers classified behavior into 12 categories yielding a measure of the subject's behavior for each of the categories. Subjects could then be compared by ratings received within the various categories.

The nondisguised-structured instruments include direct rating

scales, point-blank questioning, and public opinion polling. A primary feature of this approach are the quantification advantages of studying attitudes with structured stimulus situations. Subjects are generally aware that their attitudes are being measured which is in contrast to the disguised type attitude instruments. Thurstone and Chave (1929) contributed many of the basic techniques for this approach. His method consists of presenting the subject with a series of statements describing a stimulus situation, subjects are instructed to rate the statement on a scale from favorable to unfavorable. The rating scale yields a measure of the subject's attitude or stand on the issue or stimulus situation under study.

Likert (1932) modified the Thurstone technique somewhat and introduced a rating scale device for measuring subject position on an issue and the intensity of his stand. Subjects respond to various statements describing a social stimulus by choosing from such alternatives as strongly approve, approve, undecided, disapprove, and strongly disapprove. A scaling procedure is employed for purposes of weighting various items and computating a subject's scale-score value.

A social distance scale was developed for measuring social distance among groups (Bogardus, 1924-1925). The scale consists of a list of national and ethnic groups, subjects are instructed to rate the groups via a seven statement scale that describes varying degrees of social intimacy or distance. This scale yields a measure of the

subject's attitudes (social distance) toward various groups.

Adorno et al (1950) developed a series of scales designed to measure attitudes toward social, political, and economic issues. These scales required subjects to indicate a degree of agreement or disagreement with statements describing various social issues which yielded a measure of the subject's attitude toward an issue.

Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) developed a scale designed to measure evaluative, potency, and activity dimensions of attitudes toward various social issues. Subjects are required to rate stimuli by a number of bipolar adjectives. This process yields a measure of the subject's understanding or meaning attached to the stimuli; thus, the scale was named the "Semantic Differential instrument."

The disguised-structured instrumentation approach utilizes the advantage of concealing from the subject that his attitudes are being studied and the quantification merits of the structured stimulus situation. Hammond (1948) is generally credited with one of the first contributions toward instrument development with the disguised-structured approach. His technique was a questionnaire employing several sets of answers and was termed the error choice method. All answers were equally wrong, but subjects were instructed to select the answer that appeared to be most correct. This technique was used for measuring attitudes toward labor and Russia. From these studies, it was

established experimentally that concealing the purpose of the attitude instrument from the subject was a variable that contributed to judgment patterns.

Hovland and Sherif (1952) and Sherif and Hovland (1953) initiated preliminary studies to develop a disguised-structured instrument for the assessment of attitudes toward Negroes. Their original work began with testing some assumptions of the Thurstone technique. Thurstone and his colleagues while developing the Thurstone scales eliminated judges or subjects that sorted many statements in one or the other of the extreme categories. This decision was made as it appeared these subjects were "careless" in their usage of the 11 point scale. Another assumption of the Thurstone technique that was questioned concerned whether or not subjects were actually able to serve as judges of social stimuli (statements) apart from their biases on assumption implicit in the Thurstone scales. With these two assumptions under examination a strategy was developed for designing the first disguised-structured instrument utilizing the card sort technique for the assessment of attitudes toward Negroes.

Sherif and Hovland used the same statements that Hinkley (1932) had used in his original work with the Thurstone scales. Statements describing Negroes were printed on 3 x 5 cards and subjects were asked to sort the cards under two conditions: (1) an imposed categories system (11 categories) ranging from unfavorable to favorable and (2)

an own categories system in which the subject was free to select his own categories from unfavorable to favorable for a rating system. Subjects were not told that their attitudes were being studied, but were simply asked to serve as judges in roles of determining which statements were favorable and unfavorable in varying degree toward Negroes.

Sherif and Hovland tested the following hypotheses: (1) subjects with extremely strong stands (pro- and anti-Negro attitudes) will place statements in fewer categories; (2) subjects with high ego-involvement in the issue will reject more of the statements (they will displace more statements toward the end of the scale opposite their stand); and (3) displacement will be greater for "neutral" statements than for statements indicating a definite, extreme stand on the issue.

The data indicated that subjects with strong stands on the Negro issue used fewer categories for judgment than did the neutral subjects. Subjects with high ego-involvement in the Negro issue demonstrated a tendency to displace more statements toward the end of the scale that they rejected. It was also generally confirmed that "neutral" or ambiguous type statements tend to displace more frequently than do statements suggesting a definite stand or point of view on the issue. The experimenters concluded that judges do bring a degree of bias to social judgment situations and subjects using few categories are not careless in the judgment process, but more ego-involved, and they hold a more extreme stand on the issue being judged.

The categorization patterns of subjects have in recent years been studied at length. The basic finding of Sherif and Hovland's work appears to stand; mainly, that subjects with extreme stands and high ego-involvement on an issue tend to use fewer categories during judgment of social stimuli. Studies conducted by Vaughan (1961); La Fave and Sherif (1962); Parrish (1964); Host (1964); Nevin (1964); and Fisher (1965) all tend to support this general finding of Sherif and Hovland. Their studies have generated further support for the tendency of highly involved subjects to displace more statements toward the end of the scale opposite their stand. The less involved subjects or those subjects holding more neutral positions on an issue tend to use more categories and their judgments are more evenly distributed.

The own categories issue at this point seems to be rather unclear. This technique has been used by several investigators for the study of attitudes. McGarvey (1943) and Frawley (1948) found repeated conflicts between the individuals' own categories and their attempts to adapt to the categories imposed upon them by the research instructions. Vaughan (1961) and Parrish (1964) developed experimental conditions similar to those of Sherif and Hovland for testing the relative merits of own categories over the imposed 11 categories system of judgment. Their data did lend further support to the tendency for subjects with extreme stands to use fewer categories than subjects with more neutral positions on an issue. Their findings also confirmed that subjects with

highly ego-involved stands on an issue tend to displace more statements toward the end of the scale that is opposite their stand.

A general problem with the Sherif and Hovland technique has been measuring the subject's degree of involvement (intensity) on a specific stand. An approach to this problem has been the attempt to measure the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment of subjects. Sherif, Sherif and Nebergall (1965, p. 24) define these concepts as follows:

> Latitude of acceptance is the position on an issue (or toward an object) that is most acceptable, plus other acceptable positions.
>
> Latitude of rejection is the most objectionable position on the same issue, plus other objectionable positions....
>
> Latitude of noncommitment, defined as those positions not categorized as either acceptable or objectionable to some degree.

The latitude concept is used to define the subject's range or dimension of acceptance, rejection, or noncommitment of a given social stimulus. Studies have generally indicated that subject's with strong commitments to a position have lower thresholds of rejection and higher thresholds of acceptance. Diab (1965) modified the Sherif and Hovland technique to get at the problem of measuring intensity within a given latitude. Diab developed a technique in which subject's were instructed to indicate before each statement the terms very strongly, strongly, or mildly as a measure of the degree of their involvement (intensity). The measurement techniques of a subject's range or dimension of acceptance, rejection, or noncommitment and intensity (involvement) will require

additional instrumentation and testing.

Theoretical issues related to the stimulus structure and its effect upon attitude measurement were reviewed earlier in this chapter. Also, the theoretical issues of ego-involvement, assimilation-contrast effects, and frames of reference were discussed as they might possibly relate to shifts in dimensions of judgment. As related earlier in this chapter, experimenters have not focused upon the possible problem of subjects' shifting their dimension of judgment; consequently, research concerning the Sherif-Hovland technique is nonexistent with respect to this concern.

Several Sherif and Hovland type disguised-structured instruments for the assessment of attitudes have been developed for the measurement of attitudes toward a variety of issues. Vaughan (1961) developed an instrument for the assessment of attitudes toward Latin-Americans. Parrish (1964) developed contemporary items for a scale for the assessment of attitudes toward Negroes. Nevin (1964) developed a multi-dimensional instrument for the assessment of attitudes toward religion. Fisher (1965) departed from the typical social issues focus and contributed an instrument for the assessment of attitudes toward self and reference group.

Peterson (1967) developed an instrument for the assessment of attitudes toward the poor which is the particular instrument under examination by this experimenter. The disguised-structured instrument

for the assessment of attitudes toward the poor is a 40 statement instrument. The statements describe the poor and various social issues affecting them. Subjects are asked to judge the statements as to the degree to which they are favorable or unfavorable toward the poor. An imposed, 11-categories system of judgment was used for the development of this instrument; however, the own categories system of judgment can be used as an alternative assessment technique as is possible in all the Sherif-Hovland, disguised-structured type instruments.

Peterson (1967) compared the responses of one criterion group of 54 Pro-poor subjects to those of another criterion group of 27 Anti-poor subjects. He found that Pro-poor subjects placed significantly more statements toward the end of the scale opposite their own position, that is, toward the unfavorable end of the scale and that Anti-poor subjects placed significantly more statements toward the end of the scale opposite their own position, that is, toward the favorable end of the scale. Peterson's (1967) data indicated, therefore, that the poor scale did significantly differentiate judgment patterns of the Anti-poor subjects from the Pro-poor subjects. Thus, the poor scale was standardized for purposes of measuring attitudes toward the poor for subjects with extreme stands (Anti-poor and Pro-poor). One focus of the present study was to extend this standardization of the instrument to include subjects with attitudes intermediate to those of extreme Pro-poor and extreme Anti-poor subjects.

To summarize, one focus of this study was to determine to what extent, if any, subjects tend to shift their dimensions of judgment during the process of using the disguised-structured instrument for the assessment of attitudes toward the poor. Specifically, the experimenter was interested in exploring possible shifts in judgment dimensions from the traditional unfavorable-favorable dimension to a true-false dimension. The study attempted to determine which items on the poor scale tend to be judged in the true-false dimension as opposed to the instructed favorable-unfavorable dimension. This would make possible further study concerning variables (ego-involvement, stimulus structure, frames of reference, etc.) and their relationship to shifting dimensions of judgment. The second focus of the study was to identify those statements that were most useful in differentiating among the two extreme groups, Pro-poor and Anti-poor, and a group of subjects holding intermediate attitudes.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Adjectival Scale Procedure

One hundred and twenty subjects were presented with booklets containing the 40 statements (Peterson, 1967) concerning poor people and were asked to judge each of the statements on each of four bipolar, 11-point, adjectival scales. The 40 statements in the booklets were those used in a card-sorting procedure by Peterson (1967) in the development of a disguised-structured instrument for the assessment of attitudes toward poor people (see Appendix A).

Experimental Design

The purpose of this first testing was to establish the degree of ambiguity in the scale "favorable-unfavorable." Two scales "beneficial-harmful" and "complimentary-critical" were used to tap the two most common meaning dimensions of "favorable-unfavorable." A third scale "true-not true" was included in order to assess the degree of contamination between truth value and favorableness referred to in the previous chapter. Finally, the scale in question, "favorable-unfavorable" was included in order to obtain this response from each subject for a basis

of comparison with each of the others.

Standard instructions for the card sort procedure include the phrasing "favorable toward the poor," and "unfavorable toward the poor." It was felt that it was necessary to include some qualifying phrase such as "toward the poor" after each of the scale adjectives listed under each of the statements in the booklet. The task of each subject was to read a statement and then to make four (hopefully) separate judgments about the statement and then to repeat this process on each of the other 39 items. Added to this complexity of the task was the distinct possibility that the content of a particular statement or subset of statements would create a particular response set that would influence subsequent judgments by the subject. The exact format of the four scales as it appeared directly under each statement was as follows:

UNFAVORABLE toward the poor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	FAVORABLE toward the poor
NOT TRUE of the poor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	TRUE of the poor
HARMFUL to the poor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	BENEFICIAL to the poor
CRITICAL toward the poor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	COMPLIMENTARY toward the poor

As an example of the potential confusion in the judgment task, the adjective "beneficial" without the qualifying phrase "to the poor" might come to be used by some subjects as "beneficial to me" or "beneficial to

society" rather than "beneficial to the poor" as was intended. "Not true of the poor" was used instead of "false of the poor" in order to insure clearer meaning.

Ordering of the Statements

In the standard instructions used in the card-sort procedure the subject is asked to read several of the statement cards before beginning the judgment process of placing them into piles. In this way the subject encounters a variety of statements including some anchor items and thus becomes aware of the range of the scale which he will be using. In order to accomplish the same end in the present study using the booklet procedure, the statements were arranged in a systematic order. The ten statements which were anchor items were inserted into positions within the statement order of the booklet that would insure (1) an immediate initial contact with anchor statements defining each extreme end of the scale to be used and (2) continued contact with both types of anchor items at fairly regular intervals throughout the first and middle portions of the booklet. The unfavorable anchor statements were inserted in the following positions: 1, 5, 14, 21, and 34. The favorable anchor items were inserted in the following positions: 2, 7, 9, 18, and 29. The 30 displaceable statements were assigned to the remaining positions in the order of the booklet by a process that was without design except for the following qualification: displaceable items having

similar medians in the pre-test data of Peterson (1967) were not assigned adjoining positions in the order.

Subjects

The booklet containing the 40 statements and the four 11-point scales used to judge each statement was administered to a total of 120 subjects who were students enrolled in Introductory Psychology at the University of Oklahoma during spring semester, 1967. Three sections containing 32, 42, and 46 students respectively comprised the sample.

Test Instructions

Students in the three sections of Introductory Psychology came to class without previous knowledge that they were to be asked to participate in a research endeavor. In each case, the regular instructor was present at the beginning of the 50 minute period, made a few announcements regarding the course, and introduced the experimenter by name and indicated that he was gathering data for a doctoral dissertation. The experimenter assured the subjects that the task was neither long, difficult, nor offensive, and proceeded to pass out the booklets to the students in an obviously unsystematic way.

After passing out the booklets the experimenter gave the following instructions with references to his notes:

> First of all you will notice that there is no place on the booklet for your name or any other information of that sort. You will not be asked to put

your name on these booklets. Now, let me tell you something about the task. This is a judgment task. You are to read each statement and then to judge that statement with each of the four scales that are listed under it. The set of four scales is the same for each statement. There are 40 statements, ten pages with four statements on each. Now look at the first page. I will now read to you the first eight statements so that you can get an idea of the range of statements included in the booklet. Experimenter read the first eight statements. Now you have an idea of the range of statements in the booklet. Now look at the first statement. "The poor care little if anything about their own families." If you think that that is a statement that is extremely unfavorable to the poor, then you should circle the "1." If you think that it is a statement that is extremely favorable toward the poor, then you should circle the "11." If you think that it is a neutral statement, that is, exactly in between favorable and unfavorable, then you should circle the "6." And if you think it falls somewhere between the two extremes, then you should circle the appropriate number. As you go through the booklet judging each of the statements with each of the four scales, try to use each scale separately, that is, focus upon the particular pair of adjectives that you are using at that time in judging the statement. Are there any questions about how you are to do this? - - - please begin.

Card-Sort Procedure

A second group of subjects, 53 unselected undergraduates, were administered the card-sort version of the poor scale in order to obtain attitudinal data that could be compared to data obtained by Peterson (1967) from extremely pro-poor and anti-poor subjects. It was assumed that these undergraduate subjects would hold positions intermediate to those of the two extreme groups.

The data concerning response patterns on each of the 40

statements of each of the three groups using the card-sort procedure were then analyzed in conjunction with the information obtained from the 120 subjects using the booklet procedure.

The card-sort procedure used was identical to that of Peterson (1967). The following general instructions were given:

> We would like for you to assist us by serving as judges. We have collected a series of 40 statements describing poor people. We are uncertain as to whether or not they are favorable or unfavorable statements toward the poor. It will be your task, as judge, to read each statement carefully and decide whether or not the statement is favorable or unfavorable toward the poor.
>
> You now have a deck of 40 statements describing poor people. Also, you have 11 cards numbered from 1 to 11. You will notice that card 1 has the word unfavorable below it and card 11 has the word favorable below it. Cards 2 through 10 represent degrees of unfavorableness and favorableness. Spread the 11 cards out before you from 1 to 11.
>
> Once you have judged a statement, please record your judgment by placing the card in the appropriate card (1 to 11) you now have before you. Continue to follow this procedure until you have judged the complete deck of statements. For example, if you find a statement that appears to be extremely unfavorable toward the poor you will probably place it in card 1 or if you find a statement that appears to be extremely favorable toward the poor you will probably place it on card 11. Where you place the statement card will indicate your judgment decision. To summarize, read a statement on the individual statement card, judge the statement as to whether or not it is favorable or unfavorable toward the poor, record your judgment by placing the statement on the response slot card of your choice.
>
> Please be careful that your dimension of judgment is in terms of whether or not the statement is favorable or unfavorable toward the poor. You will find it easy to judge the statements in terms of a true and false dimension. Your task is <u>not</u>, I repeat--<u>is not</u> to decide if the statements are true or false, but if they are favorable or unfavorable toward the poor.

> Take as much time as you would like. When you have completed judging the statements, please leave them in the various response slot cards. I will collect them.

The subjects obtained for this card sort procedure were 53 undergraduates living in two university dormitories, 30 in one and 23 in the other. Subjects were given test instructions as they arrived in twos and threes at a meeting room near their dorm. The room contained several tables; two or three subjects were assigned to each table.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Responses of the 120 subjects on the 40-statement, four-scale booklet were punched into IBM cards. A 4 x 4 correlation matrix was computed on the four scales as they were used across all 40 statements by the 120 subjects. Appendix B shows scale means for each statement. Appendix C shows correlations among the four scales on each statement. Table 1 shows the correlation coefficients among the four scales. A factor analysis using the principal components analysis method was performed upon the correlation matrix. Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation for each scale and the factor loading of each scale on the single factor which the analysis yielded.

Extremely high correlations emerged among three of the scales, "unfavorable-favorable," which was the standard scale used in the card-sort procedure, and "harmful-beneficial" and "critical-complimentary" which were included in the booklet as alternative synonym scales. Because of the near equivalency of these three scales as revealed in the correlation matrix and reflected in a factor loading of at least .900 for each scale, the "harmful-beneficial" and "critical-complimentary" scales were dropped from further analyses to avoid redundancy. Means

Table 1

Correlation Coefficients Among Four Scales on the Adjectival Scale Procedure

	Unfavorable Favorable	Not True True	Harmful Beneficial	Critical Complimentary
Unfavorable-Favorable	1.000	0.452	0.765	0.775
Not True-True	0.452	1.000	0.476	0.423
Harmful-Beneficial	0.765	0.476	1.000	0.788
Critical-Complimentary	0.775	0.423	0.788	1.000

Table 2

Means, Standard Deviations, and Factor Loadings of Four Scales on the Adjectival Scale Procedure

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Factor Loading
Unfavorable-Favorable	4.77	3.25	0.900
Not True-True	5.30	3.32	0.651
Harmful-Beneficial	4.81	3.06	0.911
Critical-Complimentary	4.62	3.10	0.901

and correlations derived from the "unfavorable-favorable" and "not true-true scales were included in the analysis of each statement response pattern which follows.

The responses of the 53 unselected undergraduate subjects who were administered the poor scale card-sort procedure were compared to those of the 54 Pro-poor and 27 Anti-poor subjects tested by Peterson (1967). See data in Appendix D. Figure 1 shows graphic comparison of the three groups. Comparisons were made among the three groups for each of the 40 statements by the Mann-Whitney U test (Siegel, 1956). The 120 U tests yielded three z scores for each of the 40 statements, one for each of the following comparisons: Anti-poor vs. Unselected subjects, Pro-poor vs. Unselected subjects, and Anti-poor vs. Pro-poor subjects.

The use of the z scores in the overall analysis of the statements was not to establish a significant difference in the response patterns of any two groups to any individual statement. No such claim is made. Neither the intent nor the possibility of such a claim of significance was built into the experimental design. The establishment of .05 as the size of the Type I error is the conventional procedure for an individual test of significance, but the performing of 120 tests of significance makes the finding of several spuriously "significant" values inevitable and the interpretation of any single value dubious.

The z scores, therefore, were used in a descriptive manner as




Figure 1. Percentage of Statements (30) in each Category for Pro-poor, Anti-poor, and Unselected Subjects

a criterion for grouping the 40 statements into five sets of statements. Each set of statements had a characteristic response pattern as defined by the z scores criterion. Grouping the statements involved comparing each one to an ideal response pattern for a displaceable item which was defined as (1) having a mean for the Anti-poor group which was high relative to the other two groups, a mean for Pro-poor group which was low relative to the other two groups, and an intermediate mean for the Unselected subjects (2) having a significant ($z \geq 1.96$) z score for each of the three between-groups comparisons. The five sets of statements are as follows: (1) the ten anchor statements, (2) six statements which met all of the above criteria fully, (3) five statements which approached the above criteria, (4) nine statements which clearly differentiated the Anti-poor group from the other two groups but failed to differentiate between the other two, and (5) the remaining ten statements which failed to meet several of the criteria.

Table 3 shows means for each of the three groups and Mann-Whitney z scores for each of the between-groups comparisons for the ten anchor statements which are as follows:

Unfavorable Anchors

#31 Poor people are merely lazy people.

#32 The homes of the poor should be segregated from the rest of the community.

#33 The poor care little if anything about their own families.

Table 3

Criterion Group Means and z Scores for Ten Anchor Statements on the Card-Sort Procedure

Statement #	Group AP[1] Mean	AP vs U[2] z Score	Group U Mean	U vs PP[3] z Score	Group PP Mean	AP vs PP z Score
31	3.22	3.14	1.68	0.02	1.72	3.15
32	3.07	0.26	2.43	2.24	1.85	1.79
33	1.89	1.77	1.55	1.38	2.57	0.39
34	1.93	0.51	1.66	0.29	2.19	0.21
35	1.70	0.50	1.81	0.03	2.04	0.54
36	9.81	2.97	8.04	1.50	7.13	3.95
37	8.85	0.11	8.58	1.63	9.20	1.24
38	8.15	2.47	9.36	0.30	9.00	2.14
39	9.85	1.89	9.02	0.60	9.04	1.43
40	8.63	0.92	8.26	2.39	9.19	0.87

AP[1] = Anti-poor subjects (n = 27)

U[2] = Unselected subjects (n = 53)

PP[3] = Pro-poor subjects (n = 54)

#34 The poor only want to own things; they have no feeling for people.

#35 The poor do not want their children to learn to speak properly.

Favorable Anchors

#36 The poor, too, have obligations to uphold.

#37 There is no conceivable reason why poor people should not be integrated into our society.

#38 The poor are morally right in their cause, and equality cannot and should not be denied them.

#39 There should be no legal restrictions on physical and social contacts of the poor with others.

#40 The poor should be brought into the main current of society for the good of all concerned.

Table 4 shows the mean on the "unfavorable-favorable" scale, the mean on the "not true-true" scale, and the correlation between responses on those two scales for the 120 subjects using the adjectival scale procedure on the same statements as in Table 3.

Table 5 shows means for each of the three groups and Mann-Whitney z scores for each of the between-groups comparisons for the six statements which fully met the ideal displacement criteria. The statements are as follows:

#3 Many poor people can honestly say that they have never encountered crude forms of discrimination.

#4 Poor people always laugh and sing and never seem to have a care or worry.

#5 It is up to the poor to take advantage of the opportunities around them to become real equals.

#16 A person who wants to work can find a job.

#18 All poor people should be treated in about the same way because they are members of one class.

#21 The poor have their own way of doing things and generally wish to keep it.

Table 4

Scale Means and Correlations for Ten Anchor Statements on the Adjectival-Scale Procedure

Statement #	Favorable Mean	True Mean	Favorable-True Correlation
31	2.11	3.34	.20
32	1.96	3.82	.37
33	2.64	3.21	.51
34	2.13	2.32	.55
35	2.21	2.26	.45
36	7.51	9.61	.27
37	8.68	6.97	.38
38	7.90	6.84	.43
39	8.84	8.25	.48
40	7.94	6.95	.46

Table 5

Group Means and z Scores for Six Statements Which Fully Met the Criteria on the Card-Sort Procedure

Statement #	Group AP Mean	AP vs U z Score	Group U Mean	U vs PP z Score	Group PP Mean	AP vs PP z Score
3	8.11	2.72	6.25	2.20	5.00	3.85
4	8.26	3.18	5.57	2.88	3.70	4.63
5	9.89	5.34	6.36	2.34	5.09	6.28
16	10.04	5.83	5.21	3.44	3.30	6.99
18	9.26	6.43	3.36	2.57	2.50	6.84
21	8.78	5.27	5.06	2.15	4.20	5.67

Table 6 shows the mean on the "unfavorable-favorable" scale, the mean on the "not true-true" scale, and the correlation between responses on those two scales for the 120 subjects using the booklet procedure on the same statements as in Table 5.

Table 7 shows means for each of the three groups and Mann-Whitney z scores for each of the between-groups comparisons for the five statements which approached the criteria. The statements are as follows:

Table 6

Scale Means and Correlations for Six Statements Which Fully Met the Criteria on the Card-Sort Procedure

Statement #	Favorable Mean	True Mean	Favorable-True Correlation
3	6.46	5.02	.43
4	4.95	2.32	.22
5	6.77	8.13	.41
16	5.51	6.60	.26
18	3.42	3.04	.62
21	3.91	4.91	.32

Table 7

Group Means and z Scores for Five Statements Which Approach the Criteria on the Card-Sort Procedure

Statement #	Group AP Mean	AP vs U z Score	Group U Mean	U vs PP z Score	Group PP Mean	AP vs PP z Score
12	9.33	4.41	6.32	1.55	5.44	4.92
13	5.30	3.46	2.94	1.67	2.78	3.66
17	7.15	5.77	2.34	1.50	2.04	6.15
22	7.81	5.93	3.06	1.30	2.72	6.13
25	8.78	4.95	5.25	1.29	4.78	4.78

#12 Public schools should be attended strictly in terms of the area in which a family lives.

#13 The poor are pushing too hard and want too much too soon.

#17 Poverty is a result of moral weakness.

#22 The poor insist on special privileges, yet they wish to be treated as equals.

#25 The poor are as familiar a part of the city as buses and street lights.

Table 8 shows the mean on the "unfavorable-favorable" scale, the mean on the "not true-true" scale, and the correlation between responses on those two scales for the 120 subjects using the booklet procedure on the same statements as in Table 7.

Table 8

Scale Means and Correlations for Five Statements Which Approach the Criteria on the Card-Sort Procedure

Statement #	Favorable Mean	True Mean	Favorable-True Correlation
12	4.97	6.93	.44
13	3.86	4.69	.23
17	2.41	3.73	.34
22	3.30	5.21	.38
25	4.45	7.66	.23

Table 9 shows means for each of the three groups and Mann-Whitney z scores for each of the between-groups comparisons for the nine statements which clearly differentiated the Anti-poor group from the other two groups but failed to differentiate between the other two groups. The statements are as follows:

#2 Poor people would not know what to do with higher pay if they had it.

#6 Family life and morals among poor people are both different and lower than among the wealthy.

#7 Poor people are treated as second-class citizens because all too often that is what they are.

#9 There are a few poor people who would not know what to do with higher pay if they had it.

#11 The general population must protect itself from the potentially degrading influence of the poor.

#15 Poverty is the result of a lack of intelligence.

#19 Most poor people would not know what to do with higher pay if they had it.

#20 If the poor seem backward, it is because they have not taken advantage of their opportunities to advance.

#27 Most poor people have no sense of obligation or responsibility.

Table 10 shows the mean on the "unfavorable-favorable" scale, the mean on the "not true-true" scale, and the correlation between responses on those two scales for the 120 subjects using the booklet procedure on the same statements as in Table 9.

Table 9

Group Means and z Scores for Nine Statements Which Differentiate the Anti-Poor Group from the Other Two Groups but Fail to Differentiate between the Other Two Groups on the Card-Sort Procedure

Statement #	Group AP Mean	AP vs U z Score	Group U Mean	U vs PP z Score	Group PP Mean	AP vs PP z Score
2	8.44	6.40	2.64	-0.33	2.98	6.09
6	6.81	3.66	3.19	-0.32	3.56	3.30
7	8.44	5.52	3.28	-0.64	3.39	5.47
9	9.44	5.14	5.21	0.54	4.83	5.65
11	7.81	6.35	1.96	1.66	2.00	6.46
15	5.44	5.14	2.25	-1.83	3.02	3.83
19	9.81	7.00	2.92	-0.51	2.94	6.69
20	10.15	7.22	3.64	0.18	3.61	7.22
27	8.81	6.90	2.06	-0.30	2.30	6.51

Table 10

Scale Means and Correlations for Nine Statements Which Differentiate the Anti-Poor Group from the Other Two Groups but Fail to Differentiate between the Other Two Groups on the Card-Sort Procedure

Statement #	Favorable Mean	True Mean	Favorable-True Correlation
2	2.86	4.31	.42
6	3.09	5.34	.46
7	2.84	5.53	.45
9	4.84	7.61	.26
11	2.15	3.65	.45
15	2.80	4.22	.54
19	2.69	4.55	.38
20	3.54	5.32	.45
27	2.38	3.93	.25

Table 11 shows means for each of the three groups and Mann-Whitney z scores for each of the between groups comparisons for the remaining ten statements which failed to meet several of the criteria.

The statements are as follows:

#1 Poor people have few recreation places and these are not adequate nor well-equipped.

#8 The poor are hungry for a bigger share in the American plenty.

#10 The main difference between the poor and others is a way of life or cultural difference.

#14 The arguments for and against subsidized housing for the poor in middle class neighborhoods are about equal.

#23 There is one thing about the poor; they know their place and keep it.

#24 The poor stubbornly refuse to give up their way of life, and yet they are willing to give their lives to protect their country.

#26 It is only right that the poor should enjoy country clubs and other facilities along with the wealthy.

#28 When a poor person needs money, a businessman or banker will loan it to him.

#29 The poor are kindly, honest people who only want to lead their lives without interference from others.

#30 Poor people can be counted on to be good, trusted, friends.

Table 12 shows the mean on the "unfavorable-favorable" scale, the mean on the "not true-true" scale, and the correlation between responses on those two scales for the 120 subjects using the adjectival scale procedure on the same statements as in Table 11.

Table 11

Group Means and z Scores for Ten Statements

Which Failed to Meet Several of the Criteria

on the Card-Sort Procedure

Statement #	Group AP Mean	AP vs U *z* Score	Group U Mean	U vs PP *z* Score	Group PP Mean	AP vs PP *z* Score
1	6.44	1.64	5.08	-2.14	6.56	-0.06
8	5.96	-0.53	6.34	1.45	5.35	0.69
10	5.78	-0.32	5.94	-1.56	6.74	-1.18
14	5.48	-0.11	5.60	2.02	4.67	1.11
23	5.41	1.58	4.04	2.64	3.02	3.06
24	7.00	0.92	6.25	1.38	5.44	2.21
26	3.67	-4.32	7.21	-1.45	8.07	-5.13
28	6.41	0.16	6.32	2.40	4.85	1.91
29	5.19	-3.57	7.96	3.43	5.76	-0.90
30	6.19	-3.61	9.62	4.89	6.07	0.29

Table 12

Scale Means and Correlations for the Ten Statements Which Failed to Meet Several of the Criteria on the Card-Sort Procedure

Statement #	Favorable Mean	True Mean	Favorable-True Correlation
1	4.68	7.91	.15
8	6.49	7.81	.34
10	5.41	6.80	.55
14	6.17	5.66	.53
23	3.53	4.58	.33
24	7.08	5.67	.50
26	7.43	4.03	.13
28	5.72	2.62	.12
29	7.24	4.75	.23
30	7.90	5.93	.32

Table 13 summarizes some of the information presented on each group of statements in Tables 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11. Two conclusions can be drawn from Table 13: (1) anchor statements serve about equally well as anchors for all three groups, (2) large differences between Anti-poor means and Unselected means and large differences between Anti-poor

means and Pro-poor means are found in the statements groups of Tables 5, 7, and 9, but only in the statement group of Table 5, and to a lesser extent in Table 7, are there any consistent differences to be found in the means of the Pro-poor and Unselected subjects.

Table 13

Group Means and Mean Differences from

Tables 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11

Statement Group from Table #	Group AP Mean	AP vs U Diff.	Group U Mean	U vs PP Diff.	Group PP Mean	AP vs PP Diff.
Favorable Anchors (Table 3)	9.06	0.41	8.65	-0.06	8.71	0.35
Unfavorable Anchors (Table 3)	2.36	0.53	1.83	-0.24	2.07	0.29
"Ideal" Statements (Table 5)	9.06	3.76	5.30	1.33	3.97	5.09
"Almost Ideal" Statements (Table 7)	7.67	3.69	3.98	0.43	3.55	4.12
"Extreme" Statements (Table 9)	8.35	5.33	3.02	-0.16	3.18	5.17
"Miscellaneous" Statements (Table 11)	5.75	0.69	6.44	-0.21	5.65	0.10

Table 14 summarizes some of the information presented on each group of statements in Tables 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12. Three conclusions can be drawn from Table 14: (1) means of individual statement groups on the "unfavorable-favorable" scale of the four scale booklet administered to 120 undergraduates were very similar to means of individual statement groups on the card-sort instrument administered to 53 Unselected subjects (see Table 13), (2) means of individual statement groups on the "not true-true" scale revealed no consistent pattern in relation to the criteria of statement grouping, (3) correlations between the "unfavorable-favorable" scale and the "not true-true" scale revealed no consistent pattern in relation to the criteria of statement grouping.

Table 15 shows, for each group of statements as grouped in Tables 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 the percentage of responses placed into each of the 11 categories by the Pro-poor, Anti-poor, and Unselected subjects respectively. The following conclusions can be drawn from Table 15: (1) anchor statements (Table 3) tend to be placed into the two most extreme positions at each end of the scale by all groups of subjects, (2) the ten miscellaneous statements (Table 11) which failed to meet several of the criteria are, as a group, without consistent patterns except for an above average use of the middle category 6.

Excluding the anchor items of Table 3 and the ten miscellaneous items of Table 11, the following observations can be made about the use

Table 14

Means and Correlations from Tables

4, 6, 8, 10, and 12

Statement Group from Table #	Favorable Mean for Statement Group	True Mean for Statement Group	Median of Favorable-True Correlations for Statement Group
Favorable Anchors (Table 4)	8.17	7.72	.43
Unfavorable Anchors (Table 4)	2.21	2.99	.45
"Ideal" Statements (Table 6)	5.17	4.87	.365
"Almost Ideal" Statements (Tab le 8)	3.80	5.64	.34
"Extreme" Statements (Table 10)	3.02	4.94	.45
"Miscellaneous" Statements (Table 12)	6.17	5.58	.325

of the 11 categories by the three subject groups (Pro-poor, Anti-poor, and Unselected subjects) regarding the groups of statements in Table 5 ("Ideal" statements), Table 7 ("Almost ideal" statements), and Table 9 ("Extreme" statements):

Table 15

Percentage of Statements Placed in Each Category by Pro-poor, Unselected, and Anti-poor Subjects Using Each of Five Statement Groups

		Response Category										
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Favorable "Anchors" (Table 3)	PP	3.3	1.9	3.7	2.6	4.1	7.4	6.7	4.4	5.2	19.3	41.5
	U	4.5	1.5	1.5	3.4	1.9	5.7	6.4	7.5	14.7	22.6	30.2
	AP	2.2	1.5	1.5	3.0	0.0	3.7	6.7	14.8	10.3	15.6	40.7
Unfavorable "Anchors" (Table 3)	PP	60.4	20.4	8.5	2.2	1.5	0.7	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.4	4.1
	U	57.0	22.6	14.7	2.3	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.4
	AP	51.9	18.5	11.1	8.1	3.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	3.0
"Ideal" (Table 5)	PP	25.6	13.9	12.7	13.3	9.6	6.5	4.3	3.1	3.7	4.3	3.1
	U	9.1	13.5	10.3	12.6	10.1	11.3	8.2	5.7	6.9	5.7	6.6
	AP	4.3	.6	.6	1.9	1.2	6.8	8.0	6.2	6.8	17.9	45.7
"Almost Ideal" (Table 7)	PP	37.4	14.1	10.7	5.9	7.8	10.7	1.5	1.5	2.2	5.2	3.3
	U	22.6	15.1	14.3	9.8	9.1	10.9	7.2	3.0	3.8	1.9	2.3
	AP	5.9	4.4	.7	3.7	8.2	14.8	7.4	6.7	11.1	6.7	30.4
"Extreme" (Table 9)	PP	37.2	17.5	13.4	7.4	7.0	3.9	2.7	3.1	2.7	2.3	2.9
	U	33.8	21.0	15.9	9.0	5.7	4.4	3.8	1.9	1.9	1.5	1.7
	AP	4.5	2.9	3.3	5.8	4.5	1.7	9.1	7.8	10.3	11.1	39.1
"Miscellaneous" (Table 11)	PP	18.2	6.9	8.9	5.0	8.2	13.0	6.9	6.7	7.0	10.2	9.3
	U	7.0	5.5	9.3	10.2	8.5	12.5	6.8	7.4	9.6	10.6	12.8
	AP	15.2	5.6	7.8	8.5	8.2	23.0	2.3	4.1	3.7	4.4	16.3

Category 1 (most unfavorable). Pro-poor subjects use category 1 more than Anti-poor subjects with all three statement groups and more than the Unselected subjects with all three but especially with "Ideal" and "Almost ideal" statements. Unselected subjects use category 1 more than Anti-poor subjects with all three statement groups but especially with "Almost ideal" and "Extreme" statements. Category 1 is the category most commonly used by Pro-poor subjects with all statement groups (25.6%, 37.4%, and 37.2%) and by Unselected subjects with "Almost ideal" and "Extreme" statements (22.6% and 33.8%). Use of category 1 by Unselected subjects with "Ideal" statements is average (9.1%) and by Anti-poor subjects is below average with all three statement groups (4.3%, 5.9%, and 4.5%).

Category 2 (second most unfavorable). Use of this category is similar for Pro-poor and Unselected subjects. It is the second most commonly used category by Pro-poor subjects with all three statement groups (13.9%, 14.1%, and 17.5%). Category 2 is also the category second most commonly used by Unselected subjects with "Almost ideal" and "Extreme" statements (15.1% and 21.0%) and most commonly used with "Ideal" statements (13.5%). Anti-poor subjects use category 2 infrequently (0.6%, 4.4%, and 2.9%).

Category 3. This category is used with an above average frequency by Pro-poor (12.7%, 10.7%, and 13.4%) and Unselected subjects (10.3%, 14.3%, and 15.9%). Anti-poor subjects use this category

infrequently (0.6%, 0.7%, and 3.3%).

Category 11 (most favorable). Use of this category provides the most striking of the between-groups comparisons. Anti-poor subjects use this category more than any other (45.7%, 30.4%, and 39.1%) while Pro-poor (3.1%, 3.3%, and 2.9%) and Unselected subjects (6.6%, 2.3%, and 1.7%) use it infrequently.

Category 10 (second most favorable). Like category 11, this category is used more by Anti-poor subjects (17.9%, 6.7%, and 11.1%) than by Pro-poor (4.3%, 5.2%, and 2.3%) or Unselected subjects (5.7%, 1.9%, and 1.5%).

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The Adjectival Scale Booklet

One of the two major attempts of this study to examine in detail the individual statements of a standardized attitude instrument was the adjectival scale procedure. This procedure yielded results which were largely non-significant, statistically, although, perhaps, quite significant substantatively. The alternative synonym scales "harmful-beneficial" and "critical-complimentary" proved to be almost equivalent to "unfavorable-favorable" scale. The high correlations found among these three scales may have been due to an equivalency of definitions as these scales functioned for these subjects; or the high correlations may have been due to an antifact of this procedure which induced a certain response set; or some combination of these two factors may have been at work.

As revealed in the Results section, the sizes of the correlations between "not true-true" and "unfavorable-favorable" varied widely from item to item, although all 40 correlations were positive. However, no pattern emerged regarding the relation of these correlations to the statement groupings based upon displaceability. Successfully displaceable

statements were found along a wide range of the truth scale. Here, the point can be stated again that the 120 undergraduate subjects using the adjectival scale procedure judged the three groups of statements in a manner very similar to that of the Unselected subjects using the card-sort procedure. The evidence of these two groups, similar in subject composition and similar in patterns of responses to the same statements, argues for the basic equivalency of the card-sort and adjectival scale procedures.

Card-Sort Procedure

Examination of three of the statement groups, the "Ideal," "Almost ideal," and "Extreme" statements, provides the major focus of this discussion. These three groups of statements consist of 20 definitely displaceable statements in this disguised-structured instrument for the assessment of attitudes toward the poor. The ten remaining displaceable items, classified as "Miscellaneous" in the Results section, were of less value in discriminating among the three groups of subjects whose card-sort data were analyzed in this study. The ten anchor statements, complete the list of 40 statements used in the card-sort procedure. Of the three subject groups the Pro-poor subjects judge the three groups of statements in the most consistent manner. Their judgments ranged from slightly above (more favorable) a midpoint (3.5) between most unfavorable (1) and neutral (6) for the "Ideal" statements to slightly below that same midpoint for "Extreme"

statements. The Anti-poor subjects were only slightly less consistent in their judgments of the three statement groups. Their judgments ranged from slightly above the favorable midpoint (8.5, between 6 and 11) for "Ideal" statements to somewhat below that same midpoint for "Almost ideal" statements. The Unselected subjects displayed greatest variability in their judgment of the three groups of statements. "Extreme" statements were placed slightly below the unfavorable midpoint; "Almost ideal" statements were placed slightly above that same midpoint; and "Ideal" statements were placed at a point only slightly below the neutral point. This same pattern of variability was found among undergraduate subjects using the adjectival scale procedure and thus among both "non-extreme" groups of subjects.

The argument is simply that the Anti-poor subjects and the Pro-poor subjects both tend to displace, away from their own positions, statements which cover a wide range of the unfavorable-favorable scale. In contrast, the Unselected subjects, by all evidence less extreme in their own stands, find it easier to displace statements that are more ambiguous, more neutral, and less harshly critical of the poor. Examination of the phrasing of the "Ideal" statements reveals such themes as "there is no problem," "they are able to do it for themselves," and "they prefer the status quo." Many Unselected subjects were able to displace these items toward the favorable end as did the Anti-poor. In contrast, the "Extreme" statements reveal such themes as "poverty

is due to lack of intelligence and/or "not using opportunities," "they wouldn't know what to do with higher pay if they had it," "they have no sense of obligation or responsibility," "they have low morals," and finally "they are a potentially degrading influence on us, we must protect ourselves from them." Surely more than the bias of the writer is involved in pronouncing these themes as critical. Few Unselected subjects, in contrast to many Anti-poor subjects, were able to displace these "Extreme" statements toward the favorable end of the scale. Explanation of the displacement by Anti-poor subjects of even these "Extreme" items forces the writer into speculation. If a statement is seen as true, if it is seen as an objective and accurate evaluation of the poor, if it is seen as a fair and just description of the situation as it really is, then the meaning of favorable becomes blurred. Favorable "to the poor" becomes favorable in the more general sense of being true, objective, revealing, and/or agreeable; and the judge can righteously categorize as favorable even a highly critical statement. In conclusion, the more ambiguous statements, the more neutral statements, and those statements reflecting the stereotypic characteristics of the poor, "known by everyone to be true," are the more sensitive statements, offering the possibility of displacement to subjects whose own position falls anywhere on the scale.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY

This study focused upon the dimensions of judgment involved in the use of the disguised-structured instrument for the assessment of attitudes toward the poor developed by Peterson (1967) and upon the characteristics of statements that served as displaceable items in that instrument.

One hundred and twenty subjects, enrolled in sections of Introductory Psychology, were presented with booklets containing 40 statements concerning poor people and were asked to judge each of the statements on each of four bipolar, 11 point adjectival scales. The 40 statements in the booklets were those used in the card-sorting procedure in the development of a disguised-structured instrument for the assessment of attitudes toward poor people. The scales were: "unfavorable-favorable," "not true-true," "harmful-beneficial," and "critical-complimentary."

A second group of subjects, 53 Unselected undergraduates, were administered the card-sort version of the poor scale in order to obtain attitudinal data that could be compared to data obtained by Peterson from extremely Pro-poor and Anti-poor subjects. It was

expected that both of these groups of undergraduate subjects would hold positions intermediate to those of the two extreme groups.

The data concerning response patterns on each of the 40 statements of each of the three groups using the card-sort procedure were then analyzed in conjunction with the information obtained from the 120 subjects using the adjectival scale procedure. A 4 x 4 correlation matrix was computed on the four scales as they were used across all 40 statements by the 120 subjects. A factor analysis using the principal components analysis method was performed upon the correlation matrix. Only one factor emerged. Means and correlations derived from the "unfavorable-favorable" and "not true-true" scales were included in the analysis of each statement response pattern.

The responses of the 53 Unselected undergraduate subjects who were administered the poor scale, card-sort procedure were compared to those of the 54 Pro-poor and 27 Anti-poor subjects of Peterson (1967). Comparisons were made among the three groups for each of the 40 statements by the Mann-Whitney U test. The 120 U tests yielded three z scores for each of the 40 statements, one for each of the following comparisons: Anti-poor vs. Unselected subjects, Pro-poor vs. Unselected subjects, and Anti-poor vs. Pro-poor subjects. The z scores were used in a descriptive manner as a criterion for grouping the 40 statements into five sets of statements. Each set of statements had a characteristic response pattern as defined by the z scores criterion.

Grouping the statements involved comparing each one to an ideal response pattern for a displaceable item which was defined as (1) having a mean for the Anti-poor group which was high relative to the other two groups, a mean for Pro-poor group which was low relative to the other two groups, and an intermediate mean for the Unselected subjects (2) having a significant ($z \geq 1.96$) z score for each of the three between-groups comparisons. The five sets of statements that resulted from this grouping are as follows: (1) the ten anchor statements, (2) six statements which met all of the above criteria fully, called "Ideal" statements, (3) five statements which approached the above criteria, called "Almost ideal" statements, (4) nine statements which clearly differentiated the Anti-poor group from the other two groups but failed to differentiate between the other two, called "Extreme" statements, and (5) the remaining ten statements which failed to meet several of the criteria, called "Miscellaneous" statements.

Findings of the study were as follows: (1) The alternative synonym scales "harmful-beneficial" and "critical-complimentary" proved to be almost equivalent to "unfavorable-favorable" scale. (2) The sizes of the correlations between "not true-true" and "unfavorable-favorable" varied widely from item to item, although all 40 correlations were positive. However, no pattern emerged regarding the relation of these correlations to the statement groupings based upon displaceability. Successfully displaceable statements were found

along a wide range of the truth scale. (3) The 120 undergraduate subjects using the adjectival scale procedure judged the three groups of statements in a manner very similar to that of the Unselected subjects using the card-sort procedure. The evidence of these two groups, similar in subject composition and similar in patterns of responses to the same statements, argues for the basic equivalency of the card-sort and adjectival scale procedures. (4) Anchor statements serve about equally well as anchors for all three groups. (5) Large differences between Anti-poor means and Unselected means and large differences between Anti-poor means and Pro-poor means are found in the "ideal," "Almost ideal" and "Extreme" statements, but only in the "Ideal" statement group, and to a lesser extent in the "Almost ideal" statement group are there any consistent differences to be found in the means of the Pro-poor and Unselected subjects. The Anti-poor subjects and the Pro-poor subjects both tend to displace, away from their own positions, statements which cover a wide range of the unfavorable-favorable scale. In contrast, the Unselected subjects, by all evidence less extreme in their own stands, find it easier to displace statements that are more ambiguous, more neutral, and less harshly critical of the poor. Such statements, and those reflecting the stereotypic characteristics of the poor, "known by everyone to be true," are the more sensitive statements, offering the possibility of displacement to subjects whose own position falls anywhere on the scale.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Poor Scale Statements with Card-Sort and Booklet Code Numbers

Card-sort code number	Booklet code number	Statement
67	1	The poor care little if anything about their own families.
62	2	The poor should be brought into the main current of society for the good of all concerned.
11	3	Poor people always laugh and sing and never seem to have a care or worry.
26	4	The poor are hungry for a bigger share in the American plenty.
42	5	Poor people are merely lazy people.
54	6	The poor have their own way of doing things and generally wish to keep it.
32	7	The poor are morally right in their cause, and equality can not and should not be denied them.
51	8	Most poor people would not know what to do with higher pay if they had it.
34	9	There should be no legal restrictions on physical and social contacts of the poor with others.
49	10	All poor people should be treated in about the same way because they are members of one class.

APPENDIX A (Continued)

29	11	The main difference between the poor and others is a way of life or cultural difference.
31	12	The general population must protect itself from the potentially degrading influence of the poor.
9	13	Many poor people can honestly say that they have never encountered crude forms of discrimination.
50	14	The homes of the poor should be segregated from the rest of the community.
1	15	Poor people have few recreation places and these are not adequate nor well-equipped.
35	16	Public schools should be attended strictly in terms of the area in which a family lives.
47	17	Poverty is a result of moral weakness.
19	18	There is no conceivable reason why poor people should not be integrated into our society.
44	19	A person who wants to work can find a job.
84	20	When a poor person needs money, a business man or banker will loan it to him.
68	21	The poor only want to own things; they have no feeling for people.
28	22	There are a few poor people who would not know what to do with higher pay if they had it.
59	23	There is one thing about the poor; they know their place and keep it.
88	24	Poor people can be counted on to be good, trusted friends.
36	25	The poor are pushing too hard and want too much too soon.

APPENDIX A (Continued)

20	26	Poor people are treated as second-class citizens because all too often that is what they are.
86	27	The poor are kindly, honest people who only want to lead their lives without interference from others.
52	28	If the poor seem backward, it is because they have not taken advantage of their opportunities to advance.
5	29	The poor, too, have obligations to uphold.
13	30	It is up to the poor to take advantage of the opportunities around them to become real equals.
61	31	The poor are as familiar a part of the city as buses and street lights.
80	32	Most poor people have no sense of obligation or responsibility.
57	33	The poor insist on special privileges, yet they wish to be treated as equals.
69	34	The poor do not want their children to learn to speak properly.
43	35	Poverty is the result of a lack of intelligence.
16	36	Family life and morals among poor people are both different and lower than among the wealthy.
66	37	It is only right that the poor should enjoy country clubs and other facilities along with the wealthy.
60	38	The poor stubbornly refuse to give up their way of life, and yet they are willing to give their lives to protect their country.
37	39	The arguments for and against subsidized housing for the poor in middle class neighborhoods are about equal.
4	40	Poor people would not know what to do with higher pay if they had it.

APPENDIX B

Scale Means for Each Statement Used in the Adjectival Scale Procedure

Statement #	Favorable Mean	True Mean	Beneficial Mean	Complimentary Mean
1	2.64	3.21	3.11	2.39
2	7.94	6.95	8.39	7.53
3	4.95	2.32	5.08	5.56
4	6.49	7.81	7.17	6.24
5	2.11	3.34	2.41	1.93
6	3.91	4.91	3.75	3.66
7	7.90	6.84	7.41	7.56
8	2.69	4.55	3.42	2.68
9	8.84	8.25	8.41	7.84
10	3.42	3.04	2.74	3.08
11	5.41	6.80	4.75	5.09
12	2.15	3.65	2.42	2.04
13	6.46	5.02	6.24	6.31
14	1.96	3.82	2.38	2.36

APPENDIX B (Continued)

15	4.68	7.91	4.08	4.80
16	4.97	6.93	5.09	5.16
17	2.41	3.73	2.92	2.60
18	8.66	6.97	8.42	7.94
19	5.51	6.60	6.04	4.57
20	5.72	2.62	5.28	5.36
21	2.13	2.32	2.54	2.01
22	4.84	7.61	4.91	4.57
23	3.53	4.58	3.50	3.68
24	7.90	5.93	7.80	8.50
25	3.86	4.69	3.95	3.69
26	2.84	5.53	3.17	2.85
27	7.24	4.75	6.34	7.22
28	3.54	5.32	3.48	3.09
29	7.51	9.61	7.80	7.50
30	6.77	8.13	7.50	6.43
31	4.45	7.66	4.26	4.37
32	2.38	3.93	2.82	2.45
33	3.30	5.21	3.63	2.80
34	2.21	2.26	2.23	1.84
35	2.80	4.22	2.88	2.56

APPENDIX B (Continued)

36	3.09	5.34	3.28	3.07
37	7.43	4.03	6.61	7.37
38	7.08	5.67	6.42	6.95
39	6.17	5.66	6.20	6.21
40	2.86	4.31	3.40	2.89

APPENDIX C

Correlations Among Four Scales for Each Statement Used in the Adjectival-Scale Procedure

Statement #	Favorable-True Correlation	Favorable-Beneficial Correlation	Favorable-Complimentary Correlation	True-Beneficial Correlation	True-Complimentary Correlation	Beneficial Complimentary Correlation
1	.51	.32	.49	.23	.44	.22
2	.46	.65	.43	.39	.13	.34
3	.22	.61	.65	.24	.17	.72
4	.34	.53	.71	.37	.31	.63
5	.20	.37	.40	.30	.24	.43
6	.32	.41	.39	.37	.26	.65
7	.43	.73	.73	.51	.39	.61
8	.38	.33	.48	.09	.26	.45
9	.48	.74	.66	.64	.35	.67
10	.62	.79	.70	.62	.51	.77
11	.55	.56	.55	.36	.37	.75

APPENDIX C (Continued)

12	.45	.73	.70	.51	.35	.73
13	.43	.57	.59	.53	.40	.72
14	.37	.65	.60	.47	.43	.74
15	.15	.50	.39	-.05	.07	.51
16	.44	.80	.71	.55	.50	.75
17	.34	.60	.51	.30	.47	.59
18	.38	.70	.65	.49	.43	.74
19	.26	.68	.72	.48	.29	.66
20	.12	.64	.65	.26	.16	.79
21	.55	.52	.52	.35	.39	.55
22	.26	.66	.73	.12	.19	.80
23	.33	.56	.62	.39	.38	.64
24	.32	.48	.58	.39	.26	.70
25	.23	.72	.61	.23	.27	.69

APPENDIX C (Continued)

26	.45	.64	.69	.53	.41	.63
27	.23	.63	.70	.38	.17	.71
28	.45	.45	.51	.31	.41	.68
29	.27	.64	.59	.28	.23	.66
30	.41	.54	.73	.52	.43	.67
31	.23	.57	.60	.29	.25	.63
32	.25	.45	.55	.46	.34	.59
33	.38	.63	.37	.33	.33	.48
34	.45	.69	.46	.39	.40	.65
35	.54	.69	.54	.48	.43	.63
36	.46	.42	.49	.30	.41	.60
37	.13	.55	.61	.25	.17	.61
38	.50	.74	.73	.55	.48	.80
39	.53	.64	.68	.46	.41	.71
40	.42	.52	.64	.32	.48	.64

APPENDIX D

Distribution of 30 Displaceable Statements Over

11 Categories by Individual Unselected Subjects

Subject #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1	20					4			3	1	2
2			4	7	6	4	1	1	2	1	4
3	7	5	6		6	2			3	1	
4	1	1	4	5	3	5	4		5	2	
5	7	4	4	4	2	1	2	2	1	1	2
6	1	3	1	1	4	3	5	4	2	3	3
7	13	3	5			1	1		2	1	4
8	4	4	4	6	2	3	1	2	1		3
9	3	4	5	6	3		2	4	1	1	1
10	3	8	4	6	2	2		1	2	1	1
11	14	3	3	1	2	3	1		1	1	1
12	4	2	7	7	3	3	1	1	2		
13	7	4	3	3	4		1	1	3	4	
14		9	6	4	1	3	1	2		2	2
15	15			4		5			2		4
16	2	3	4	2	4	6	4	1	1	1	2

APPENDIX D (Continued)

17	8	2	2	5	1	3	2	1	2	2	2
18		3	5	6	3	4	3	3	2	1	
19	3	4	3	2	2	7	2		1	1	5
20	4	5	5	2	4	4				3	3
21	6	1	2	3	5	2	6	2	2	1	
22		8	5	5	1	4	1	2	1		3
23	8	4	4	3	3	2		1	2	2	1
24	2	3	4	1	1	4	4	3	3	2	3
25	5	4	2	3	2	2	2	3	3	2	2
26	9	6	2	3	1	2	2	1	2	2	
27	1	6	5	4	2	1	2		4	2	3
28		5	4	5	5	4	3		1	2	1
29	1	2	5	4	1	3	2	5	3	3	1
30	3	4	4	3	2	3	5	1	2	2	1
31	7	6	1	1	1	5	1	2	2	3	1
32	9	5	2	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
33	4	4	5	2	2	1	3	2	1	3	3
34	1	2	8	4	2	3	2	2	3	3	
35	5	5	7	1	1	4	1	2	1	1	2
36	8	4	2	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	2
37	5	4	5	2	1	4	3	2	1	3	
38	6	4	4	3	1	4	3	1	1	1	2

APPENDIX D (Continued)

39	2	7	6	2	3	2		1	2	2	3
40	7	8	4	1	3	2	1		1	1	2
41	4	6	1	5	4	6		1		2	1
42	9	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	1	1
43	6	3	6	4	3	3		1	1	1	2
44	7	10	2		7		1			1	2
45	7	1	2	3	2		3	3	1	3	5
46	8	4	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	4
47	3	6	5	3	2	1	2	1	2	3	2
48	10	2	4	2	3	4	2	1			2
49	2	2	3	3	4	2	4	4	1	3	2
50	12	4	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	4
51	6	2	6	3	1	3	2	2	4	2	
52	2	5	4	3	1	6	4		2	2	1
53	6	7	1	3	2	2	1	1	3		4
All	287	212	196	163	128	151	100	74	92	84	103