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**THE RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TRAIT
OF PERSUASIBILITY AND EGO INVOLVEMENT IN
PREDICTING OPINION CHANGE.**

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THE RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TRAIT OF PERSUASIBILITY
AND EGO INVOLVEMENT IN PREDICTING OPINION CHANGE

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY






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Norman, Oklahoma

1965

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APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The general problem of the rhetorician is to find the most effective means of presenting a communication to an audience so that the purpose of the communication is accomplished. Often by observing the activity of speakers and the reactions of audiences effective means of persuasion can be discerned. Another approach to finding effective means of persuasion is to study the nature of the audience. Essentially, the audience determines what the effective means of persuasion are because covert or overt audience response of some kind is the purpose of any persuasive communication. Understanding the individuals who make these responses may aid in explaining why known methods of persuasion work and may point the way toward even more effective methods of persuasion. In attempting to understand the audience the rhetorician can usefully study and apply the methods, tools, and theories of psychology, because in psychology the basic unit of study is the individual. However, different branches of psychology take different approaches in studying the individual. For example, social psychologists tend toward studying the individual as he is

related to other individuals and toward how different groups and individuals relate to other individuals, groups, and objects. On the other hand, personality theorists tend toward studying the individual and attempting to determine how the individual is organized within himself, toward finding stable organizations of characteristics or traits that are common to all individuals in varying degree or are unique to certain individuals. From these different approaches toward study of the individual two concepts may be derived which are potentially useful to the rhetorician in understanding the individuals who comprise audiences and understanding how they react to communications.

The concept of ego involvement grows out of social psychology and has led to a line of research relating to attitude and opinion measurement. Ego involvement as used in such a context refers to the degree with which a person identifies with or how strongly he takes a position, either favorable or unfavorable, concerning an attitude object or within a given attitude domain. The concept of a personality was derived from the personality theory approach. Essentially, persuasibility as a personality trait refers to an individual's general susceptibility to influence from others irrespective of communication bound predispositional factors. These communication bound factors include content, media, communicator, and situation factors. Thus, here, persuasibility refers to a relatively constant degree of susceptibility to a variety of communications on diverse topics. The trait is a general predisposition of certain individuals to be more susceptible to persuasion than other individuals.

Both the concept of persuasibility and the concept of ego

involvement lead to predictions of the probable amount of opinion change when individuals are presented persuasive communications. Investigation of the relative effectiveness of the two concepts in predicting amount of opinion change should aid in the development of rhetorical theory.

Significance of the Concepts

The concepts of ego involvement and of a personality trait of persuasibility may provide useful new dimensions of study in rhetorical theory and in the analysis of the rhetorical situation.

Ego Involvement

The number of experiments directly relating ego involvement to opinion change¹ is not large. For example, Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif² demonstrated that groups of subjects who were known to be highly involved

¹In order to avoid unnecessary confusion a clarification of terms is in order. The terms "attitude" and "opinion" often are used interchangeably, but they also often are used to refer to different concepts. Usually the specific meaning of the terms is a function of the theoretical system of the user. In this study the terms will be used appropriately to the theoretical orientation of the research being cited and should be so interpreted by the reader. But, in all other cases this study will follow the terminology suggested by Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, and Harold H. Kelley in Communication and Persuasion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 6-10. Both opinion and attitude refer to implicit responses and are intervening variables. Opinion designates a broad class of anticipations and expectations which can be observed as verbalized responses and these are intimately related to attitude which designates a deeper level of implicit, nonverbal responses that are oriented toward approaching or avoiding a given object, person, group, or symbol.

²Carl I. Hovland, O. J. Harvey, and Muzafer Sherif, "Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Reactions to Communication and Attitude Change," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LV (1957), 244-252.

in the issue. Comparable results were found in a study by Sherif and Hovland.³

If, as the studies indicate, degree of ego involvement is a factor in amount of opinion change following persuasive communication then degree of ego involvement is an important factor to be considered in assessing the rhetorical situation. The speaker would be well advised to determine as nearly as possible the degree of ego involvement of his audience relative to the particular attitude domain of his speech. For example, considering the time available, the ultimate goal desired, and the potential audiences the speaker might decide to limit the specific purpose of his speech or to speak only to certain audiences. If the potential audiences were not equally ego involved then the best return in opinion change would be expected from the less ego involved audiences. If, however, the available audience of the speech was highly ego involved and unfavorable to the speaker's objective then a reduction in amount of opinion change which the speaker attempted to elicit would be a factor in planning construction of the speech. Potentially, the concept of ego involvement offers new insights to the rhetorical theorist and rhetorical critic.

³Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 167.

Persuasibility

In current psychological literature much attention has been directed toward the relationship of persuasibility of ease of opinion manipulation with other personality factors. For example, Zolik and Westland⁴ found a positive relationship between amount of change in child-rearing attitudes and high authoritarian-low anxiety subjects. Rowland⁵ found a negative relationship in small children between persuasibility and aggression conflict. Centers and Horowitz⁶ demonstrated that other-directed people are more susceptible to persuasion than inner-directed people. Ward⁷ found a positive relationship between need autonomy and opinion change. Suedfeld⁸ testing after non-optimal levels of environmental stimulation found complex (conceptually complex) subjects less susceptible to persuasive communications than concrete (conceptually simple) subjects. Carrier⁹ found (1) positive relationships between

⁴Edwin S. Zolik and Eugene Westland, "Changes in Parental Attitudes as a Function of Anxiety and Authoritarianism," Journal of Social Psychology, LX (1963), 293-300.

⁵Alan Rowland, "Persuasion in Young Children as a Function of Aggressive Motivation and Aggression Conflict," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LXVI (1963), 454-461.

⁶Richard Centers and Miriam Horowitz, "Social Character and Conformity: a Differential in Susceptibility to Social Influence," Journal of Social Psychology, LX (1963), 343-349.

⁷William D. Ward, "Persuasibility as Related to Need Autonomy," Psychological Reports, XIII (1963), 357-359.

⁸Peter Suedfeld, "Attitude Manipulation in Restricted Environments: I. Conceptual Structure and Response Propaganda," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LXVIII (1964), 242-247.

⁹Neil A. Carrier, "Need Correlates of Gullibility," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LXVI (1963), 84-86.

"gullibility" and high achievement, high deference, and high introception males, (2) positive relationships between "gullibility" and high introception and high abasement females, and (3) a negative relationship between "gullibility" and high endurance females.

The studies mentioned above may lead to the recognition of easily recognized personality factors which are closely associated with high persuasibility. Knowledge of these factors would be of considerable assistance to rhetoricians in assessing the rhetorical situation and in criticizing a rhetorical effort. For example, when preparing a speech for an individual or for a fairly homogenous organization the speaker could use a derived index of persuasibility to aid in determining what could possibly be accomplished with the speech and in the selection of specific objectives of the speech.

Purpose of the Study

Although stemming from different theoretical orientations, both the concept of a personality trait of persuasibility and the concept of ego involvement might lead to predictions of the probable amount of opinion change when an individual is exposed to a persuasive communication. When presented with a persuasive communication the highly persuasible individual is expected to show relatively more opinion change than the less persuasible individual and the highly ego involved individual is expected to show relatively less opinion change than the less ego involved individual. The potential utility of these concepts to the rhetorician is apparent. However, as will be discussed more fully in later chapters, there are some problems in determining how the

concepts relate to previous literature in the field of opinion change and in resolving potential conflicts between the concepts themselves.

Because of the newness of the opinion measures used in both the ego involvement and persuasibility research there is no reliable yardstick to aid in the assimilation of the results of these studies with other literature in the opinion change field. Exploratory studies relating the two concepts to more widely used measures of attitude are needed to facilitate this assimilation. In line with the fact that each of the theories originates from a different theoretical approach, the concepts appear to operate in different planes with ego involvement varying among attitude domains of the individual and persuasibility varying among individuals. There is difficulty in determining which of the concepts would be operationally predominant at a given time. Comparative studies would aid in determining whether one or the other of the concepts is more reliable in predicting opinion change. One theory might be able to account for a relatively large amount of opinion change while the other could account for only a small amount. Indeed, there are few guides which would aid the prospective researcher in deciding whether research in one or the other areas would be more fruitful.

This study was an exploratory study directed toward investigating the problems mentioned above. Specifically, the purpose of the study was to evaluate the relative effectiveness of ego involvement and the personality trait of persuasibility in predicting opinion change.

In the study a measure of opinion change was made using commonly employed opinion change technique and the semantic differential as a measure of opinion. Measures of the degree of ego involvement

accomplished by a sorting task and the degree of persuasibility accomplished by the Janis and Field test of persuasibility were conducted and statistical tests were performed to determine how the two measures related to opinion change.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM

Prior to stating the problem investigated in this study the lines of research suggesting the relationships of ego involvement and persuasibility to opinion change will be discussed.

Previous Research

Ego Involvement

For the purposes of discussion the research relating ego involvement to opinion change can be divided into three areas. One area concerns the proposition that an individual's opinion affects the way in which he sorts or categorizes statements. The second area relates to the proposition that sorting behavior provides an index of ego involvement. Finally, the third area concerns the proposition that the higher the degree of ego involvement the less will opinion change be produced by a persuasive communication.

In the latter part of the 1920's Thurstone suggested that attitudes could be measured by the application of psychophysical principles to social values. Using these principles he constructed an attitude scale based on how a group of judges placed a series of statements into categories. In construction of the scale the assumption was made that

the scale would transcend the group measured. Or, as Thurstone stated, "Until experimental evidence may be forthcoming on this point, we shall make the assumption that the scale values of the statements are independent of the attitude distribution of the readers who sort the statements,"¹

The first major test of this assumption was made by Hinckley.² He gave students a six question measure of attitude toward the Negro. Then he selected two groups, those who were extremely favorable to the Negro and those who were extremely unfavorable to the Negro. Following the Thurstone technique he had the subjects in both groups sort a carefully compiled set of 114 statements concerning the social position of the Negro. Subjects placed the statements into one of eleven categories on the basis of how favorable or unfavorable the statements were toward the Negro. Subjects were discarded from the study when the experimenter felt that the subject did not understand the questions thoroughly or when the subject demonstrated carelessness by sorting thirty or more statements into any one category. For both the favorable and unfavorable groups the frequency with which each statement had been placed in each category was tabulated and the median category value of each statement was computed. Comparison of the median scale values of statements derived from the favorable group and the unfavorable group yielded a Pearson correlation coefficient of .980. Hinckley arrived at the

¹Louis L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," American Journal of Sociology, XXXIII (1928), 547.

²E. D. Hinckley, "The Influence of Individual Opinion on Construction of an Attitude Scale," Journal of Social Psychology, III (1932), 283-296.

conclusion that prior attitude of the judges did not affect the placement of statements in categories.

Following criticism of his technique Hinckley replicated the study³ using a slightly different technique. In answer to the criticisms, no subjects were excluded from the experiment. In the replication he found that the Pearson correlation coefficient comparing the median scale values of statements derived from the favorable and unfavorable groups was .9437. Results similar to Hinckley's were found in studies by Pintner and Foriano⁴ and Eysenck and Crown.⁵

In 1952 Hovland and Sherif⁶ used groups of subjects with known extreme opinions to judge the statements and found marked differences in the scale values of statements sorted by extreme groups. They used the equal-appearing intervals procedure suggested by Thurstone and followed by Hinckley. The 114 statements prepared by Hinckley were presented to the subjects for sorting into eleven categories. The study differed from Hinckley's original study in that subjects were not eliminated if they placed more than thirty statements in any one category. Further, rather than using an attitude test, the groups of

³E. D. Hinckley, "A Follow-up Study on the Influence of Individual Opinion on the Construction of an Attitude Scale," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LXVII (1963), 290-292.

⁴R. Pintner and G. Foriano, "The Influence of Attitude Upon Scaling of Attitude Items," Journal of Social Psychology, VIII (1937), 39-45.

⁵H. J. Eysenck and S. Crown, "Experimental Study in Opinion and Attitude Methodology," International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research, III (1949), 47-86.

⁶Carl I. Hovland and Muzafer Sherif, "Judgmental Phenomena and Scales of Attitude Measurement: Item Displacement in Thurstone Scales," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVII (1952), 822-832.

subjects were selected on the basis of their known behavioral differences relative to attitudes towards Negroes. The groups were composed of (1) fairly mature Negro students enrolled in a recently desegregated state university, (2) younger Negro students enrolled in an all Negro university, (3) pro-Negro white subjects who had participated in anti-segregation activities, (4) "average" or unselected available white subjects, and (5) anti-Negro white subjects selected on the basis of attitude tests administered after the sorting task. Group 1 was considered highly involved in the issue and to have very strong attitudes. Degree of involvement and extremity of attitudes decreased down to the unselected group which was considered fairly neutral and increased again with the anti-Negro group. Sherif and Hovland found that the frequency distribution of statements placed in the eleven categories varied widely across the experimental groups. Selecting eleven statements which were approximately equidistant on the Hinckley scale they compared the median scale scores of the different groups on the eleven items. Scale values for the two Negro and the pro-Negro white groups varied widely from the scale values of the average white subjects and from the anti-Negro white subjects. Thus, the attitudes of the sorters did appear to affect how the statements were sorted.

Several studies conducted since 1952, with the exception of the 1963 Hinckley study, have yielded results which lend support to the proposition that opinions do affect sorting behavior. Several of the studies are briefly discussed below.

Fishman and Lorge⁷ selected 27 "judges" or sorters, and three each of the judges were affiliated with one of nine culture groups ranging from Egyptian to Japanese. The subjects ranked 117 statements of human faults along a continuum from least damaging or neutral through most damaging or most severely negative. When the average within-culture group item rankings were converted to linear scale values the item values derived from one culture group were found to differ substantially from the item values derived from all other culture groups.

In 1955 Granneberg⁸ selected two attitudinally distinct groups on the basis of personality and behavioral criteria. One group was very religious and one group was not religious. Subjects sorted 130 items relating to religion under the Thurstone conditions. While the item evaluations of the two experimental groups were found highly correlated they were also found significantly different.

During the 1956 invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain, and France Prothro asked Arab students with strong Arab sentiments to sort items which described Arabs. He found that "the results suggested the generalization that when there is a strong personal involvement with items sorted, those items which the judge accepts as true shift in the favorable direction and those which the judge rejects as false shift in the unfavorable direction."⁹

⁷ Joshua A. Fishman and Irving Lorge, "The Role of the Culture-Group Affiliation of the 'Judge' in Thurstone Attitude Scale Construction," American Psychologist, IX (1954), 368-369.

⁸ Ralph T. Granneberg, "The Influence of Individual Attitude and Attitude-Intelligence Interaction upon the Scale Values of Attitude Items," American Psychologist, X (1955), 330-331.

⁹ E. Terry Prothro, "Personal Involvement and Item Displacement on Thurstone Scales," Journal of Social Psychology, XLV (1957), 196.

Upshaw¹⁰ conducted a study which was devised to determine which of several different theories best accounted for the apparent influence in judges' values on the scale values of sorted statements. He essentially replicated the Hovland and Sherif study with the exception that the range of the item series or statements was also treated as an independent variable along with judges' attitudes. Three sets of statements were prepared: (1) all of the 114 Hinckley items, (2) the Hinckley statements with the 28 most favorable items removed, and (3) the Hinckley statements with the 28 most unfavorable items removed. Five hundred subjects were randomly partitioned into three groups with each group receiving one of the three sets of items. Following the sorting task all subjects accomplished the Murphy-Likert Scale of attitude toward the Negro. For each of the three experimental groups three subgroups were constituted on the basis of Murphy-Likert scores, with the most unfavorable quintile forming the anti group, the middle quintile forming the neutral group, and the most favorable quintile forming the pro group. Thus, nine groups were formed which varied along the dimension of attitude toward the Negro and along the dimension of range of items sorted. For each of the nine groups equal-appearing interval scale values of the items were computed. Then, using a non-parametric analogue of analysis of variance the main effects and interaction effects of judges' attitudes and item series were calculated. Considering all items, the main effects of subject attitude, item series, and interaction were significant.

¹⁰Harry S. Upshaw, "Own Attitude as an Anchor in Equal Appearing Intervals," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LXIV (1962), 85-96.

Zavalloni and Cook¹¹ explored the possibility that the sorting behavior of subjects might be used as an indirect measure of attitude. Their study was a modified replication of the Hovland and Sherif study. Two substudies were carried out, one using known groups and one using groups selected on the basis of attitude tests administered after the sorting task. The five known groups ranged from an extremely equalitarian group of Negro students active in integration organizations to an extremely anti-Negro group of pledges of fraternities known to have led a campaign against the admission of Negroes to a university. The groups in the other substudy were formed by dividing subjects on the basis of quintiles of the attitude test scores. Testing procedure was similar to that used by Hovland and Sherif. Hinckley statements were sorted and for analysis of results were classified as unfavorable, intermediate, or favorable on the basis of item scores derived in the Upshaw study. Mean ratings of the unfavorable, intermediate, and favorable items were computed for all experimental groups. In both the known group substudy and the substudy using groups selected by attitude test, ratings of the unfavorable and intermediate items were significantly different across the groups having varying attitudes toward the Negro.

Thus, the results of current experimental studies support the proposition that subjects' opinions do affect how the subjects categorize statements in a sorting task. With this proposition established the possibility of determining degree of ego involvement by response on a sorting task can be discussed.

¹¹Marisa Zavalloni and Stewart W. Cook, "Influence of Judges' Attitudes on Ratings of Favorableness of Statements about a Social Group," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, I (1965), 43-54.

In 1953 Sherif and Hovland¹² conducted a study in which the subjects were allowed to select the number of categories they would use in the sorting task. The Hinckley statements were used and Hinckley procedure was followed with the exception that the subjects were allowed to select the number of categories they would use. The subjects were those used in the 1952 Hovland and Sherif study and an additional 61 white subjects. For the subjects used in the previous study order of presentation was varied with some of the subjects sorting under the imposed categories condition first and some of them sorting under the own categories condition first. The 61 additional subjects sorted only under the own categories condition. As pointed out earlier the subjects were divided into five experimental groups on the basis of known behavioral differences concerning attitudes toward Negroes. These groups ranged from highly ego involved Negro subjects to less ego involved pro-Negro white subjects to fairly uninvolved "average" white subjects to ego involved anti-Negro white subjects. Of interest here were the results of a comparison of the number of categories selected under the own categories procedure by the Negro and white judges. Of 82 Negro judges (high ego involvement) and 142 average white judges (low ego involvement) 67.1% of the Negro judges selected four or less categories and 45.1% of the white judges selected four or less categories. The

¹²Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, "Judgmental Phenomena and Scales of Attitude Measurement: Placement of Items with Individual Choice of Categories," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVIII (1953), 135-141.

difference between these percentages was significant at the .002 level and the experimenters stated that

the results support the hypothesis that when individuals are allowed to choose the number of categories they consider appropriate to distinguish a series of statements ranging from pro to con, the number of categories which they adopt is affected by their own position on the issue. Intensely involved individuals with an extreme position are more likely to adopt a constricted scale (with few categories). Correspondingly, individuals not so intensely involved in an issue are more likely to choose an extended scale (with many categories).¹³

Thus, the possibility exists that degree of ego involvement can be determined by the number of categories selected, with degree of ego involvement varying inversely with number of categories selected. The results of the following studies support this possibility.

LaFave and Sherif¹⁴ selected by pretest five representatives for each of the following classes of items: (1) very integrationist, (2) integrationist, (3) moderate, (4) segregationist, and (5) very segregationist. The subjects who sorted the items under the own categories condition were very integrationist (95 Negro students), moderate (144 average white students), and very segregationist (78 members of southern Greek-letter fraternity). For the groups they found that: (1) of the very integrationist group--92% used four or less categories, (2) of the moderate group--46% used five or more categories, and (3) of the very segregationist--77% used four or less categories.

¹³Ibid., 137.

¹⁴The study by L. LaFave and Muzafer Sherif, "Reference Scales and Placement of Items with the Own Categories Technique," was presented as a paper to the 1962 Annual Meeting of The American Psychological Association at St. Louis, Missouri. The only published summary of the study may be found in the following source. Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), pp. 113-116.

In a portion of a study conducted by Vaughn¹⁵ two groups of subjects were compared, one was an uninvolved group from a university in North Texas where there was little exposure to Latins and the other was an involved group from South Texas where there was frequent exposure to Latins. Both groups sorted sixty statements under the own categories procedure. The statements were selected on the basis of pretests and ranged from items extremely unfavorable to Latins to items which were clearly favorable to Latins. Over 85% of the involved subjects used three or fewer categories and almost 92% of the uninvolved subjects used four or more categories.

Using a sorting procedure in which the instructions varied from those used in the studies previously reviewed Glixman¹⁶ had 32 subjects sort three groups of statements. The instructions differed mainly in that the subjects were to place the statements in groups which seemed to belong together. The statements pertained to three meaning domains. Taken in order from least to most personally significant the meaning domains were relatively neutral objects, reactions to nuclear war, and self-statements. The order of presentation of meaning domains was counterbalanced across subjects. Among other results Glixman found that the largest number of categories was associated with the least personally significant meaning domain.

¹⁵Kathryn R. Vaughn, "A Disguised Instrument for the Assessment of Intergroup Attitudes" (unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Psychology, Texas College of Arts and Industries, 1961).

¹⁶Alfred F. Glixman, "Categorizing Behavior as a Function of Meaning-Domain," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (to be published).

The results of the studies reviewed above support the proposition that sorting behavior can provide an index of ego involvement. The highly ego involved individuals select fewer categories than less ego involved individuals.

The studies discussed below relate to the proposition that the higher the degree of ego involvement the less likely will opinion change be produced by a persuasive communication.

Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif¹⁷ selected subjects on the basis of known pre-attitudes toward the topic of prohibition in Oklahoma. Subjects comprised three groups--183 known dries, 25 known wets, and 290 known moderates. The dries were selected from members of the Women's Christian Temperance Union and from Salvation Army workers. The wets were selected on the basis of their known stand on the issue, and the moderates were average college students. An opinion measure was constructed which consisted of nine statements ranging from extreme wet to extreme dry positions. Opinion was scored using the location of the statements with which the subject agreed and disagreed on a nine-point scale of statements. Three 15 minute communications were prepared, one advocated an extreme dry stand, one an extreme wet stand, and one a moderately wet stand. One to three weeks following the initial opinion measure the wet communication was presented to the extreme dry subjects and the unselected subjects. The dry communication was presented to the extreme wet and the unselected subjects. Following the communications the opinion measure was again accomplished and opinion change determined. One of the findings of the study was

¹⁷ Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif, 822-832.

"that the predominant response among Ss holding extreme positions is to remain uninfluenced by the communication."¹⁸

Sherif and Hovland¹⁹ conducted a study on the 1956 presidential campaign which was similar in procedure to the study on prohibition. In this case the opinion measure consisted of nine statements ranging from extreme Republican partisanship to extreme Democratic partisanship and was scored in a manner similar to the prohibition measure. The 277 subjects were taken from known groups--Young Republicans (pro-Republican), League of Young Democrats (pro-Democrats), and dormitory units (moderates). One of three fairly equivalent 15 minute speeches (strongly pro-Republican, strongly pro-Democrat, and neutral) were presented to subgroups of each of the three initial attitude groups. Opinion measures were taken before and immediately after the speeches. Analysis of the results indicated that subjects with extreme stands on the issue demonstrated the least change of opinion.

The studies just discussed clearly involved groups with different levels of ego involvement. The studies discussed below are not directly related to ego involvement but they yield support for the idea that people with extreme attitudes (and therefore assumed increased levels of ego involvement) are less apt to be swayed by a communication than are people with less extreme stands.

For example, following the research in the development of the semantic differential (which is discussed in Chapter III) Osgood and

¹⁸ Ibid., 831.

¹⁹ Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, Social Judgment, pp. 131-176.

Tannenbaum derived corollaries to their theory of congruity. One of these corollaries was that "attitude change toward an object of judgment is an inverse function of intensity of original attitude toward that object."²⁰ In a study which was designed to change subjects' value satisfaction levels for attitude objects Carlson²¹ found that subjects with extreme initial attitudes were not influenced by the tasks designed to change value satisfaction levels, while subjects with less extreme attitudes were influenced by the task.

Thus, subjects who have extreme attitudes, subjects who are ego involved in an issue are less apt to demonstrate opinion change following a persuasive communication than are subjects who have less extreme attitudes and are less ego involved.

In summary, the studies reviewed thus far lend support to three general propositions: (1) An individual's attitude affects the way in which he sorts or categorizes statements. (2) Sorting behavior can provide a measure of ego involvement. (3) The higher the degree of ego involvement the less likely will opinion change be produced by a persuasive communication.

There is some difficulty, however, in resolving just how the results of the studies might be assimilated with contemporary opinion change literature. The measures of opinion used in the Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif prohibition study and the Sherif and Hovland presidential

²⁰Charles E. Osgood and Percy Tannenbaum, "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," Psychological Review, LXII (1955), 53.

²¹Earl R. Carlson, "Attitude Change through Modification of Attitude Structure," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LII (1965), 256-261.

campaign study were unique measures. They have not been compared with any of the more widely used measures of opinion and while they appear to be unidimensional no equal-interval scale has been established. Whether these tests might measure the same variable or a different variable from that measured by more widely used opinion tests, or whether they measure the same variable with differing accuracy, remains to be explored.

Also, the utility of measuring ego involvement by a sorting task needs further exploration. The tendency of known highly ego involved subjects to select a small number of categories under the own categories technique is clear. But, no study using the number of categories selected by subjects of unknown involvement to determine their degree of involvement has been conducted. If such a measure can be used it would greatly aid and reduce the expense of researchers who were doing attitude change studies and wanted to include the ego involvement variable.

Persuasibility

The first suggestion of a trait of persuasibility to be followed by fruitful research was made by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley.²² They referred to studies by Fiske,²³ Richards and Simmons,²⁴ Layman,²⁵

²²Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, pp. 174-214.

²³Donald W. Fiske, "Consistency of the Factorial Structure of Personality Rating from Different Sources," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LXIV (1949), 329-344.

²⁴T. W. Richards and Marjorie P. Simmons, "The Fels Child Behavior Scales," Genetic Psychology Monographs, XXIV (1941), 259-301.

²⁵Emma M. Layman, "An Item Analysis of the Adjustment Questionnaire," Journal of Psychology, X (1940), 87-106.

Ferguson,²⁶ and Brogden and Thomas²⁷ and suggested that there were general factors of responsiveness to social influence. Janis followed up the suggestion by studies directed toward finding personality correlates of persuasibility and in the process took the first steps toward devising a generalized test of persuasibility.

Janis²⁸ exposed 78 male college students to the same set of three persuasive communications. During the experimental session each student read the communications without being aware that the experimenter was interested in observing opinion change. Then, using a standardized exposure procedure each subject presented one of the communications orally and listened to an oral presentation of the other two communications. Giving a slanted presentation of factual arguments to convince the audience, the communications resembled magazine articles or editorials. One communication dealt with the prospective failures in the theater business, the second dealt with the future availability of meat, and the third dealt with the probable date of the discovery of a cure for the common cold. Four weeks prior to the test session the subjects' initial opinions on the topics had been determined in an opinion survey. None of the prior opinions agreed with the positions advocated in the communications. Another opinion measure was taken after the presentation of the communications. On each item it was found

²⁶ Leonard W. Ferguson, "An Analysis of the Generality of Suggestibility to Group Opinion," Character and Personality, XII (1944), 237-244.

²⁷ Hubert E. Brogden and William F. Thomas, "The Primary Traits in Personality Items Purporting to Measure Sociability," Journal of Psychology, XVI (1943), 85-97.

²⁸ Irving L. Janis, "Personality Correlates of Susceptibility to Persuasion," Journal of Personality, XXII (1954), 504-518.

that approximately two-thirds of the subjects changed in the direction of the communications. The group was divided into three persuasibility categories: (1) high--32 subjects influenced by all three communications, (2) moderate--21 subjects influenced by two communications, and (3) low--25 subjects who were influenced by one or none of the communications. Data derived from analysis of the subject's personality inventories and related to persuasibility rating tended to support two propositions: (1) persons with acute symptoms of neurotic anxiety tend to be more resistant to communications than others, and (2) persons with low self-esteem tend to be more readily influenced than others.

Janis conducted another study to test the above mentioned propositions.²⁹ The subjects took a disguised opinion test, read a set of five communications on five different topics, and took the opinion test again. Awarding a plus score on the number of questions showing opinion shift of the individual in the direction of the communication Janis placed the subjects in categories of high, moderate, or low persuasibility. Correlation of persuasibility with results from an anxiety questionnaire yielded a non-significant trend to support the hypothesis that high neurotic anxiety makes low persuasibility. The results (at the 10% level) supported the hypothesis that feelings of personal inadequacy make for high persuasibility.

²⁹Irving L. Janis, "Anxiety Indices Related to Susceptibility to Persuasion," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LI (1955), 663-667.

King³⁰ constructed a persuasibility measure using a different testing technique. In the "Before" questionnaire the subject indicated his opinions on 45 opinion items by checking on each item one of seven possible answer categories ranging from agree strongly to disagree strongly. The opinion items covered a wide variety of areas including political issues, aesthetic preferences, economic policies, academic affairs, scientific progress, and parent-child relationships. Twenty-one days later the "After" questionnaire was given to the subject. Included in the questionnaire were the communications which consisted of a check mark placed next to one of the seven possible response positions on each of the 45 items. The subject was informed that the checks signified the majority opinions of one of three groups. The groups were said to be composed of either parents, students, or teachers. The order in which the sources were combined with the opinion items was systematically varied so source was balanced across all items. On 38 of the 45 questions the check marks were at the extreme positions of the possible response scale (at agree strongly or disagree strongly). The results on seven remaining filler questions were not used in the analysis of data.

The experimental group consisted of 254 subjects, and 45 subjects comprised the control group (which received no communications on the "After" questionnaire). The change of opinion scores were the

³⁰Bert T. King, "The Relationship between Persuasibility and Parental Domination" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Psychology, Yale University, 1955). For the convenience of the reader further citations will refer to the shorter form of the study published in Personality and Persuasibility, ed. Carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 207-221.

differences between the before and after responses to a given item. Possible range of change for each item varied from plus 6 steps to minus 6 steps, with changes in the direction of communication designated as plus changes. The subject's total change score consisted of the algebraic sum of the steps of change on the 38 opinion items. For the experimental groups the mean total opinion change score was plus 37.5 and mean total opinion change score for the control group was 4.4 (significantly different at the .001 level). Consistency of susceptibility to opinion change by each individual was computed by dividing the items into odd and even halves and determining the split-half reliability. Corrected for length the split-half reliability was .67 which was significant beyond the .01 level. Thus, the data supported the concept of a trait of susceptibility to majority opinion communications. Analysis of the item change scores with respect to internal consistency and size of experimental effect resulted in the decision to refine the scale by selecting 20 items from the 38. Each of the 20 items produced an experimental effect significant at or better than the .01 level, and each item was significantly consistent with the original total change scores. Corrected for length the new 20-item scale yielded a split-half reliability coefficient of .70 and constitutes the "Susceptibility to Majority Opinion Scale." In subsequent use of the scale King defined the large opinion change members of the experimental group as those who changed 21 or more steps in the 20-item scale.

Of interest in his description of the data is King's statement that

methodological checks indicate that initial position (distance from the stand advocated by the communications) of the subject does not account for any large part of the variance in the change scores and also that initial distance is not related to any of the sorting variables used in this study.³¹

King followed the persuasibility tests with the Bell Adjustment Inventory. From correlations with the persuasibility test scores and selected items from the inventory King found that (1) for boys perception of high parental domination was not related to persuasibility, but for girls the reverse was true, and (2) there was no consistent relationship between opinion change and parental aggression.

Linton and Graham³² conducted a study using an opinion change measure similar to the one developed by Janis. They tested 52 male college students and among other procedures established a measure of persuasibility. In one of the early experimental sessions the subjects answered three questions relative to movie theaters, atomic powered submarines, and antihistamines. Opinions were rated on an eight-point scale ranging from very certain through very uncertain. The topics were selected to be in areas that the subjects would have previously formed opinions, but such that the opinions would not be of central importance. From a day to a week later the subjects were asked to read articles on the three topic areas. The articles were designed to appear impartial but concluded by taking definite stands on the issues.

³¹Ibid., p. 213.

³²Harriet Linton and Elaine Graham, "Personality Correlates of Persuasibility," in Personality and Persuasibility, ed. Carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 69-101.

The movie theater article was attributed to Fortune Magazine, the atomic submarine article was attributed to Dr. Robert J. Oppenheimer, and the article on antihistamines was attributed to a New England Journal of Biology and Medicine. The article on movie theaters was eliminated from tabulation of the data as subsequent procedures revealed that Fortune Magazine was not regarded as a source of high credibility by the subjects. Immediately after reading the articles each subject answered the three questions again.

Degree of opinion change was evaluated by taking the subject's initial opinion into account. As an eight-point scale was used opinion change could be from zero to seven units. For each issue the influence of the article was measured by a fraction whose numerator was the number of scale positions the subject changed in the direction favored by the article, and whose denominator was the possible units of change in that direction. Averaged for both articles the scores "ranged from +100% to -100%, with a mean of 25.15% and a sigma of 39.30."³³

The sample of subjects was divided into three groups:

(1) changers--18 subjects with positive change scores of 36% to 100%, (2) nonchangers--21 subjects with change scores ranging from +33% to -8%, and (3) negative changers--8 subjects with negative change scores ranging from -9% to -100%. On the basis of evaluation of relationships between opinion change and a large group of other variables Linton and Graham came to these conclusions:

The person who is easily persuaded is likely to guide his behavior by external standards in other situations as well, to have values that favor conformity, to have an immature and weak

³³Ibid., p. 75.

concept of himself, to be unimaginative, and to have a limited range of interests.³⁴

The person who is comparatively unaffected by the persuasive communications is likely to be little affected by external standards in other kinds of situations, to have a mature and strong self image, to value subjective feelings and have a relatively rich inner life, to examine himself and his role in life to an extent that may include marked self-criticism, and to be independent without being rebellious.³⁵

The pattern of negative changers suggests that they are engaged in a struggle to win out over what they perceive as hostile, potentially engulfing forces.³⁶

Persuasibility is not an isolated phenomenon, but is rather the product of certain underlying attributes of the personality. Personality patterns apparently make a person more or less susceptible to influence in a wide variety of situations, whether the influence arises from the structure of the external field, from another person, or from a written communication.³⁷

Of the several different tests of persuasibility the test developed by Janis and Field³⁸ appears the most sophisticated. Their test includes a variety of communications which emphasize different methods of persuasive appeal on diverse topics. The subject fills out the Initial Questionnaire which measures opinion on 15 items. Divided into five groups of three items each, the individual opinion group specifically measures opinion on one of five topic areas. Following the initial measure of opinion the subject completes Booklet I in which he reads five short communications: (1) pro public participation in the civil defense effort, (2) pro expansion of cancer research, (3) pro

³⁴Ibid., p. 73.

³⁵Ibid., p. 96.

³⁶Ibid., p. 97.

³⁷Ibid., p. 101.

³⁸Irving L. Janis and Peter B. Field, "A Behavioral Assessment of Persuasibility: Consistency of Individual Differences," in Personality and Persuasibility, ed. Carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 29-68.

General Von Hindenburg, (4) con classical music, and (5) con a new TV comedian. Each of the five communications is followed immediately by a repetition of the group of three opinion items which refer to the topic area of the communication. So, in the Initial Questionnaire each subject's initial opinion is tested and in Booklet I the subject reads the five communications and his opinion is re-tested immediately following each communication. One week following Booklet I the subject completes Booklet II which is composed of five communications espousing diametrically opposite positions on each of the five topics. Again, immediately following each communication is the appropriate group of three opinion items. Thus, the opinion of the subject is tested three times on each of the five topics.

Topics for the communications were chosen so as to provide a wide variety and avoid confounding dimensions such as consistent "intellectual" or "liberal" positions. Each pair of communications on a topic was designed to emphasize a particular type of appeal (e.g., fear arousing, logical argument, stereotyped characteristics, social incentives, and hedonic incentives). Each of the ten communications upheld a position on the topic which was sufficiently extreme to assure that very few of the subjects would initially agree with the position advocated by the communication. Also, the communications varied considerably on the range of previous knowledge the subjects would have on the five topics. For example, the students would be expected to have some opinions and knowledge about classical music but few predilections about a fictitious TV comedian. Subjects were informed that the communications were taken from a professional news service. Each communication was preceded by a headline and a fictitious by-line.

On the basis of successive pretests items for the opinion test were selected which would differentiate subjects who were influenced by the communications from those who were not. Roughly described the items included belief type items such as

How long do you think it will be before a really effective cure is found for cancer?

About _____ years from now.

and preference type items like

How do you think Jack O'Keefe would compare with most of the comedians on TV today? (Check one)

- _____ Better than any other comedian on TV
- _____ Much better than the average comedian on TV
- _____ A little better than average
- _____ About average
- _____ A little worse than average
- _____ Much worse than average
- _____ Worse than any other comedian on TV.

The persuasibility test was administered to approximately 185 high school juniors. A persuasibility score was computed on the basis of opinion change as shown on the second and third opinion tests. In Booklet I changes were scored by direction of change. If the response to an item on the second test varied in the direction of the communication from the initial item response position a score of one was given. If the response to an item on the second test did not vary or varied in the direction opposite that of the communication, a score of zero was awarded. Scoring opinion change on the third attitude test accounted for the possibility of regression. If the response to an item on the third test was the same as the response on the first test, or beyond the response in the first test in the direction of the second communication a score of one was given. If the response to an item on the

third test was not the same as, or was not beyond the response on the initial opinion test in the direction of the second communication a score of zero was awarded. Thus, the possible persuasibility score ranged from 0 to 30 with 15 points possible after the second opinion test and 15 more points possible after the final opinion test.

Using a subsample of approximately 100 students the split-half reliability coefficient of the test when corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula was .81. Item analysis of the score of each item versus the sum total persuasibility scores revealed that 23 out of 30 items were related to the total score at the .10 confidence level, and only 3 of 30 items were weakly correlated (above the .20 confidence level). Tetrachoric correlations among persuasibility subscores from each communication were positive in 39 out of 45 cases with only 6 small and nonsignificant negatives. On a centroid factor analysis computed from the tetrachoric correlations three factors were found necessary to account for the entire set of intercorrelations. The proportion of communality which entered into the first factor was .60. On oblique rotation two common factors were found which positively correlated and account for the majority of variance among the three factors. On the two rotated factors both pro and con communications on the same topic had similar loadings. "The analysis indicates that there is a tendency for individuals to change either both ways on a given topic or neither way."³⁹

Thus, from the tetrachoric correlations and the factor analysis evidence was found showing a strong positive relationship between

³⁹Ibid., p. 45.

changes in opinion following opposing communications on the same topic. Janis and Field interpret these results as evidence for rejecting the hypothesis that opinion change is exclusively determined by topic-bound predispositions. However, the tendency of individuals either to change both ways or neither way on a given topic might be interpreted in other theoretical systems so as to suggest something other than a general trait of persuasibility.

Using the results of personality questionnaires administered three weeks after the persuasibility test Janis and Field found that there was a consistently low magnitude of correlation between the persuasibility scores and the personality questionnaire items. They did suggest, however, that sex was a significant factor in persuasibility and that different generalizations concerning personality correlates of persuasibility might be required for males and females.⁴⁰

Of the different tests of persuasibility reviewed the Janis and Field measure appears to most closely approximate the rhetorical situation and to be the most sophisticated in terms of measurement procedure and statistical analysis of results. However, some problems exist in assimilating the test results with other opinion change literature and in evaluating the test itself. The test (1) differs from the more commonly used opinion measures in that it is not unidimensional, (2) does not meet the full requirements of the concept of a personality trait of persuasibility in that only one type of source was used, and (3) does not include topics on which subjects have extreme opinions.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 65-66.

Janis and Field scored their test by awarding a one on shifts in the direction of the communication on the second test and by awarding a one on shifts in the third test which extended to or beyond the subject's initial opinion position, providing the shift was in the direction of the second communication. Scores of zero were awarded to all other conditions. Neither the scoring system nor the method of constructing the questions suggests any approach to unidimensionality or an equal-interval scale. The method of evaluating the data and the method of test construction is very different from the more commonly used opinion measures such as the Thurstone, Likert, Guttman, or semantic differential scales.

In discussing the factors which are important in assuming a general trait of persuasibility Hovland and Janis⁴¹ describe communication-bound and communication-free factors. The object of the persuasibility test is to determine if there is a communication-free predisposition within the individual which is constant regardless of communication-bound factors such as topic, source, style of argument, etc. However, the Janis and Field test uses only sources identified by name but all from a professional news service. The dependence on one general type of source does not meet the requirements of eliminating possible bias from communication-bound factors from influencing the results. Further, if the Janis and Field test is to be accepted as demonstrating a consistent personality trait then the selection of the topics for the communications should be wide enough to avoid bias due to topic. Yet,

⁴¹Carl I Hovland and Irving L. Janis, Personality and Persuasibility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 1-21.

the communications for the test "took a sufficiently extreme position to ensure that practically none of the subjects would initially agree with the position advocated by the communication."⁴² If the communications were more extreme in direction than the initial opinions of the subjects then apparently each of the topics selected for the communications was such that none of the subjects had strong predispositions toward the topics. As suggested in a preceding section of this paper, an individual's responses to persuasive communications may be affected by how strongly he feels about the topic.

Statement of the Problem

As pointed out in Chapter I the concepts of ego involvement and a personality trait of persuasibility are of potential importance in aiding the rhetorician in his search for the most effective means of persuasion. However, there are some problems in determining how the concepts relate to the present literature in the field of opinion change and in resolving a potential conflict between the concepts themselves.

The experiments which show the relationship of ego involvement to opinion change have been conducted using known groups and the measures of attitude change have been developed in new theoretical systems. Whether the experimental tools suggested to determine the degree of ego involvement will work when known groups are not available or cost makes their use prohibitive remains to be demonstrated. In the experiments with the known groups the measures of opinion change have not been

⁴²Janis and Field, p. 35.

demonstrated to be unidimensional nor has an equal-interval scale been established. The opinion measure has not been compared with other more widely used measures. Attempts to reconcile and re-evaluate previous opinion change research in light of the results of the ego involvement research and attempts to reconcile and evaluate the ego involvement research in light of previous opinion change research would be facilitated if exploratory studies employing both measures of ego involvement and more widely used measures of opinion change were conducted.

The experiments designed to explore the trait of persuasibility have also used new measures of opinion change and these are subject to the same questions as the measures used in the ego involvement studies. Further, the opinion change questions used in the persuasibility measure were especially selected because they were very sensitive to change. These conditions make both evaluation of the results of persuasibility studies and re-evaluation of previous studies difficult.

Also, as ego involvement and the trait of persuasibility are representatives of different theoretical approaches they seem to operate on different planes and a difficulty arises in reconciling the two concepts. What are the relationships of persuasibility and ego involvement? Would the effects of ego involvement outweigh the effects of the trait of persuasibility or would the reverse be true? Putting the problem on a less abstract level, what would happen if a highly persuasible person were exposed to a persuasive communication on a topic in which he was highly ego involved? More importantly, there have been no comparative studies which would aid in determining whether one or the other concept is more useful in predicting amount of opinion change. One

theory might be able to account for a large percent of observed opinion change while the other could account for only a small percent. Comparative studies would also yield useful guides toward the most fruitful theoretical orientation of future research.

The preceding questions were raised to suggest some of the difficulties in assimilating and reconciling the concepts of ego involvement and persuasibility with previous opinion research. To fully utilize the concepts the rhetorician needs to explore the criticisms and attempt to answer the questions. This study was an exploratory study designed to provide leads to the solution of some of the problems raised. The specific problem investigated in this study was to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the trait of persuasibility and ego involvement in predicting opinion change. Inherent in the major purpose of the study is (1) examination of the relationship of opinion change as measured on the semantic differential and persuasibility as measured on the Janis and Field test, and (2) examination of the relationship of attitude change as measured on the semantic differential and ego involvement as measured by a sorting task. Along with the major purpose of the study was the subordinate purpose of examining the results of the study with an eye toward aiding further research in the area. For example, the measure of ego involvement used in the study was not accomplished through known groups but by use of a sorting task. Ad hoc comparisons of ego involvement scores and persuasibility scores were made. The relationships of ego involvement score and intensity of opinion were examined.

A discussion of the specific procedures used in the study follows.

CHAPTER III

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE

In order to investigate the relative effectiveness of persuasibility and ego involvement in predicting amount of opinion change an experiment was designed and the three variables measured. During the first four weeks of the experiment the subjects sorted 114 statements into categories to establish a measure of ego involvement on the issue of the social position of Negroes. On the fifth week the subjects accomplished an initial opinion test concerning the social position of Negroes, read a persuasive communication, and accomplished a final opinion test. The difference between the first and second opinion test scores was the amount of opinion change. Using a random distribution procedure some of the subjects read a communication favorable to improving the social position of Negroes and some of the subjects read a communication against improving the social position of Negroes. Finally, to establish a measure of persuasibility, on the sixth and seventh week the subjects took the Janis and Field test of persuasibility.

Thus, for each subject there was a measure of ego involvement, a measure of opinion change, and a measure of persuasibility. Correlations were conducted to determine the relationship (1) of opinion change scores to ego involvement scores, and (2) of opinion change scores to

persuasibility scores. Then further tests were conducted to explore more fully the relationship of opinion change to the two variables.

A detailed discussion of the subjects, measure of ego involvement, measure of opinion change, and measure of persuasibility follows.

Subjects

A total of 207 subjects were involved in one or more phases of the experiment. Thirty subjects, who participated in the pilot study to evaluate the effectiveness of the communications used in the attitude change measure, were not included in the main experiment. Of the 177 subjects involved in the main experiment 63 were excluded from the tabulation of results because they did not participate in three measures taken or failed to complete the sorting task in the time they had available. Thus, 114 subjects comprised the sample used in the tabulation of data in the main experiment. These subjects were 69 male and 45 female students enrolled in Speech 131 Fundamentals of Speech at The University of Houston. The average subject age was 19.9 and ages ranged from 17 to 32. Appendix B presents a breakdown of subjects by group, section, and score on the three measures.

Measure of Ego Involvement

The measure of ego involvement was conducted during the first four weeks of the experiment. One week prior to the beginning of the sorting task the subjects were informed by their regular instructors that they were being asked to assist in a research project conducted by The National Institute of Scientific Research. The subjects were urged to cooperate fully in the experiment.

Starting the following week groups of from three to eight subjects at a time performed the sorting task. The same spacious, well-lighted room was used by all subjects to perform the sorting. Each subject was assigned a desk which had a surface area of over 1,200 square inches and faced into the wall. No subject was seated within ten feet of any other subject. One male experimenter conducted all the sorting sessions. Subjects filled out a data questionnaire which included their name, sex, age, classification, and major. Following the questionnaire subjects read the instructions for the task and then the experimenter read the instructions aloud. Reproduced in Appendix A, the instructions are a truncated version of the instructions used by Sherif and Hovland.¹ Essentially the students were told to sort the 114 statements into any number of piles which they thought necessary so that each pile of statements represented a different stand on the issue of the social position of the Negro. The statements were the 114 Hinckley² statements which were individually typed on 3 x 5 cards and randomly distributed before each sorting. As described earlier, the statements ranged from extremely favorable toward the Negro to extremely unfavorable toward the Negro and included a large number of "middle of the road" or fairly ambiguous neutral statements. At the end of the sorting session the subjects were thanked and requested not to discuss what they had done in the experiment until the results of the study were made available. The number of piles or categories selected by each subject was recorded for use in the statistical analysis.

¹Sherif and Hovland, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 136.

²The author wishes to thank Dr. E. D. Hinckley for making the statements available.

Measure of Opinion Change

Opinion change was measured during the fifth week of the experiment. A detailed discussion of the experimental conditions, communications, and opinion tests follows.

Experimental Conditions

The opinion change portion of the experiment was identified to the subjects as part of a regional survey concerning the meaning of words conducted by the Southern Semantics Association. Given to the subjects in their regular classes the test booklets were administered by the regular classroom instructors. Subjects first filled out their name and section numbers and read the instructions for the semantic differential. Then the instructor read the instructions aloud. Each subject filled out sixteen scales of the semantic differential rating the concept of "Raising the social position of Negroes in our society," read a communication, and again rated the concept on the semantic differential scales. The test booklet including the instructions, communications, and semantic differential scales are reproduced in Appendix A.

Communications

Approximately one-half the subjects read a communication in favor of raising the social position of Negroes (favorable) and one-half read a communication against raising the social position of the Negro (unfavorable). Both communications were composed by the experimenter and were presented to the subjects without mention of source or author of the communication. The experimenter attempted to incorporate the major issues of the integration question into the speeches and make

them highly persuasive in their respective directions. However, no attempt was made to make the communications equal. A pilot study was conducted under the conditions described above to determine the relative amount of attitude change produced by each communication. Fifteen subjects read the favorable communication and demonstrated a mean opinion shift of -5.54 and 15 subjects read the unfavorable communication and demonstrated a mean opinion shift of 3.46. Fifteen subjects comprised a control group which received an unrelated communication. They demonstrated a mean opinion change of .23 which was significantly different from both the pro and anti mean change scores.

Attitude Tests

The attitude measuring instrument was the semantic differential described by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum.³ Devised as a measure of meaning, the semantic differential is based on the postulation of a semantic space which is Euclidian and includes a minimum number of orthogonal dimensions or axes. The meaning of a concept is differentiated by the subject when he judges the concept against a series of scales, e.g.,

good _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ bad

This judgment localizes the concept to a point of semantic space. The point has the properties of direction and distance from origin which may be likened to quality and intensity.⁴ On the basis of several

³Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957).

⁴Ibid., pp. 25-26.

studies⁵ using factor analysis at least three dominant semantic space dimensions were elaborated--evaluation, potency, and activity.

In terms of measurement operations attitude was defined as follows:

We have defined the meaning of a concept as its allocation to a point in the multidimensional semantic space. We define attitude toward a concept as the projection of this point onto the evaluative dimension of that space.⁶

Studies have been conducted which support the reliability⁷ and validity⁸ of use of the evaluative dimension of the semantic differential in opinion or attitude measurement. Results of the validity studies show high correlations with Thurstone and Guttman scales.

In the present study ten scales highly loaded on the evaluative dimension were used and six filler scales were included but not used in the compilation of data. The scales and their respective factor loadings are illustrated in Table I.

In mathematical operations the scales were treated as equal-interval scales.⁹ There were seven units on each scale and total attitude scores were summed over the ten scales yielding a possible range of from 10 to 70, with 10 being least favorable and 70 most favorable. The final test score for each subject was subtracted from the initial test score to arrive at a measure of opinion change. Thus, a negative change demonstrated a more favorable opinion toward the social position

⁵Ibid., pp. 31-75.

⁶Ibid., p. 190.

⁷Ibid., p. 192.

⁸Ibid., pp. 192-195.

⁹The assumption of equal intervals has been supported in a study by Messick. Samuel J. Messick, "Metric Properties of the Semantic Differential," Educational and Psychological Measurement, XVII (1957), 200-206.

of Negroes. A negative change reflected a change in the direction of the pro speech and a positive change reflected a change in the direction of the anti speech.

TABLE I
FACTOR LOADINGS* FOR SCALES USED
IN THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL

Experimental scales	Evaluation	Potency	Activity
kind-cruel	.84	.06	.07
fragrant-foul	.84	-.04	-.11
valuable-worthless	.79	.04	.13
sacred-profane	.81	.02	-.10
nice-awful	.87	-.08	.19
fair-unfair	.83	.08	-.07
honest-dishonest	.85	.07	-.02
clean-dirty	.82	-.05	.03
beautiful-ugly	.86	.09	.01
sweet-sour	.83	-.14	-.09
Filler scales			
wet-dry	.08	.07	-.03
hard-soft	-.48	.55	.16
deep-shallow	.27	.46	.14
rich-poor	.60	.10	.00
thick-thin	-.06	.44	-.06
sharp-dull	.23	.07	.52

*Factor loadings based on analysis I. Centroid Factorization, Graphic Method.

Measure of Persuasibility

During the sixth and seventh weeks of the experiment the subjects took the Janis and Field test of persuasibility.

Experimental Conditions

The subjects were informed that the persuasibility test was a part of a study conducted by the University Opinion Analysis Center of New Haven. Administered by the regular instructors in the regular classrooms, the tests were divided into two sections. The first section was administered on the sixth week. Prior to the test the subjects were assured that their answers would be kept strictly confidential. Instructions for the test were the same, with appropriate changes of names, as the instructions used by Janis and Field¹⁰ and are reproduced in Appendix A. Essentially the instructions pointed out that personal opinions were sought and that there were no "right" or "wrong" answers to the questions. Subjects answered the 15 questions initially and then answered repetitions of the appropriate questions after reading each of the communications. During the seventh week the second section of the persuasibility test was administered. Instructions similar to those above were used and the idea that the communications might express differing points of view was stressed.

Persuasibility Tests

As described in Chapter II the persuasibility test consisted of an initial questionnaire of fifteen questions with a group of three questions pertaining to each of five topic areas. Following the

¹⁰Janis and Field, pp. 36-38, 281-299.

questionnaire the subjects read short communications on each of the five topics and immediately after each communication answered the appropriate three questions again. One week later the subjects read short communications on each of the five topics; these communications took opposite sides of the issues which were discussed in the first five communications. Again, following each communication the appropriate three questions were answered.

Persuasibility scores were computed in the following manner. If the response to an item on the second test varied in the direction of the communication from the initial item response position a score of one was given. If the response to an item on the second test did not vary or varied in the direction opposite that of the communication, a score of zero was awarded. If the response to an item on the third test was the same as the response on the first test, or beyond the response in the first test in the direction of the second communication, a score of one was given. If the response to an item on the third test was not the same as, or was not beyond the response on the initial opinion test in the direction of the second communication, a score of zero was awarded. Thus, the possible persuasibility score ranged from 0 to 30 with 15 points possible after the second opinion test and 15 more points possible after the final opinion test.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The purpose of the statistical procedure was to determine whether a measure of ego involvement or a measure of persuasibility was the better predictor of the measure of opinion change. Thus, (1) the relationship of opinion change to ego involvement, and (2) the relationship of opinion change to persuasibility were analyzed. Prior to these analyses t tests were conducted to determine that the speeches had produced a significant effect on the opinions of the subjects. As demonstrated by difference scores between the first and second applications of the semantic differential a significant change of opinion (.05 level) was produced by both speeches. The correlation ratio (E^2) and the Pearson product moment coefficient (r) were selected to evaluate the relationships between the variables. Cruder investigation of how ego involvement and persuasibility relate to opinion change was conducted by constituting levels of ego involvement and levels of persuasibility and performing an analysis of variance of the opinion change on these levels. In those cases where the analysis of variance produced a significant F ratio the means of the levels were compared by the test of the critical difference of the means.

A discussion of the grouping of subjects for statistical analysis and a detailed presentation of results follows. Raw scores for each subject are reproduced in Appendix A.

Grouping of Subjects

As shown in Table II the differences in response by males and females to the measures of ego involvement, opinion change, and persuasibility were not large. The 30 females who heard the speech for improving the social position of Negroes had a mean ego involvement score of 8.10, a mean opinion change of -2.06, and a mean persuasibility score of 14.17.

TABLE II
MEAN SCORES OF EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS

	Female Pro	Male Pro	Female Anti	Male Anti
N	30	54	15	15
Ego Involvement	8.10	7.55	7.80	8.33
Opinion Change	-2.06	-1.96	4.13	5.60
Persuasibility	14.47	10.89	14.93	14.33

For the 54 males who heard the favorable speech the mean ego involvement score was 7.55, the mean opinion change score was -1.96, and the mean persuasibility score was 10.89. The 15 females who heard the speech against improving the social position of Negroes had a mean ego involvement score of 7.80, a mean opinion change score of 4.13, and a mean persuasibility score of 14.93. For the 15 males who heard the anti speech the mean ego involvement score was 8.33, the mean opinion change score was 5.60, and the mean persuasibility score was 14.33. Of the subjects

hearing the favorable speech the only significant difference (.05 level) between male and female scores was in the persuasibility scores ($t = 11.73$). For the subjects hearing the anti speech there was no significant difference between the male and female scores on any of the three criterion measures. Therefore, the subjects were grouped into three groups for statistical analysis: (1) females who heard the persuasive speech favoring improvement of the social position of Negroes (female pros, $N = 30$); (2) males who heard the pro speech (male pros, $N = 54$); (3) males and females who heard the anti speech (anti group, $N = 30$).

Relationship of Opinion Change to Ego Involvement

Correlation ratios¹ of opinion change on ego involvement were derived for each of the three experimental groups to evaluate the relationship of opinion change to ego involvement. None of the three groups demonstrated a significant correlation ratio. As shown in Table III the E^2 for the female pros was .48 with an F ratio of 1.12, the E^2 for the male pros was .34 with an F ratio of 1.20, and the E^2 for the anti group was .36 with an F ratio of .91.

Pearson product moment coefficients of opinion change on ego involvement were also derived.² None of the three groups demonstrated a significant correlation coefficient. As shown in Table IV the r for the female pro group .30, for the male pro group .12, and for the anti group .10.

¹All computations of E^2 were conducted using the method described by Helen M. Walker and Joseph Lev in Statistical Inference (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1953), pp. 296-298.

²All computations of r were conducted using the method described by Walker and Lev, p. 234.

TABLE III
CORRELATION RATIO OF OPINION CHANGE ON EGO INVOLVEMENT

	Female Pros	Male Pros	Anti Group
N	30	54	30
E ²	.48	.34	.36
F	1.12	1.20	.91
P	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.

TABLE IV
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT OF OPINION CHANGE
ON EGO INVOLVEMENT

	Female Pro	Male Pro	Anti Group
N	30	54	30
r	.30	.12	.10
p	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.

Cruder investigation of the relationship of opinion change to ego involvement was carried out by dividing the opinion change scores across levels of ego involvement and conducting an analysis of variance.³ For each of the groups the number of opinion change scores in each level, the range of ego involvement in the level, and the mean opinion change scores in the level are illustrated in Table V. In the female pro group the data suited a quartile division with level 1 containing 8 opinion

³All computations of analysis of variance were conducted using the method described by E. F. Lindquist in Design and Analysis of Experiments in Psychology and Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), pp. 54-58.

TABLE V
OPINION CHANGE AT LEVELS OF EGO INVOLVEMENT

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Total
FEMALE PRO					
N	8	6	8	8	30
Range of ego involvement	1-4	5-6	7-10	11-21	1-21
Mean opinion change	-2.25	-3.83	-1.35	-1.25	-2.07
MALE PRO					
N	17	18	19	. . .	54
Range of ego involvement	1-4	5-7	8-26	. . .	1-26
Mean opinion change	-2.65	-2.56	-.63	. . .	-1.96
ANTI GROUP					
N	8	7	7	8	30
Range of ego involvement	1-4	5	6-8	9-30	1-30
Mean opinion change	5.50	-.43	8.28	5.87	4.87

change scores, a range of 1 to 4 in ego involvement and a mean of -2.25. Level 2 consisted of 6 scores, had a range 5 to 6, and a mean of -3.38. Containing 8 scores, level 3 had a range of 7 to 10, and had a mean of -1.38. Level 4 consisted of 8 scores with a range of 11 to 21 and a mean of -1.25.

For the pro males the distribution of scores did not readily accommodate a quartile division so three levels were selected. Containing 17 scores, level 1 had a range of 1 to 4 and a mean of -2.65. Including 18 scores, level 2 ranged from 5 to 7 and had a mean of -2.56. Level 3 consisted of 19 scores, had a range of 8 to 26, and had a mean of -.63.

The anti group was divided into quartiles with level 1 containing 8 scores over a range of 1 to 4 and had a mean of 5.50. Level 2 consisted of 7 scores, included the subjects who used 5 categories, and had a mean of -.43. Containing 7 scores, level 3 ranged from 6 to 8 and had a mean of 8.28. Level 4 contained 8 scores, covered a range of 9 to 30, and had a mean of 5.87.

As shown in Table VI the analysis of variance of opinion change across levels of ego involvement was not significant for any of the three groups. The female pros had an F ratio of 2.47, the male pros had an F ratio of 1.84, and the anti group had an F ratio of 1.41.

TABLE VI
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OPINION CHANGE
ACROSS LEVELS OF EGO INVOLVEMENT

Source of Variation	Degrees of Freedom	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F	P
FEMALE PRO					
Levels	3	28.16	9.38	2.47	N.S.
Within groups	26	603.71	23.20		
Total	29	631.87			
MALE PRO					
Levels	2	36.19	18.10	1.84	N.S.
Within groups	51	1701.79	33.37		
Total	53	1737.98			
ANTI GROUP					
Levels	3	289.45	98.48	1.41	N.S.
Within groups	26	3534.02	135.92		
Total	29	3823.47			

Thus, in this experiment the results of the correlation ratios and of the analyses of variance do not support the expectation that high ego involvement score (which means low degree of ego involvement) would be associated with high opinion change. None of the correlation ratios were significant and different levels of ego involvement did not differ significantly in amount of opinion change.

Relationship of Opinion Change to Persuasibility

As previously done with ego involvement, correlation ratios of opinion change on persuasibility were conducted. Of the three experimental groups the correlation ratio of only one group, the male pro, was significant at the .05 level. Table VII illustrates the results.

TABLE VII
CORRELATION RATIO OF OPINION CHANGE ON PERSUASIBILITY

	Female Pro	Male Pro	Anti Group
N	30	54	30
E ²	.37	.53	.57
F	.83	2.15	1.23
P	N.S.	<.05	N.S.

For the female pros the E² was .37 and the F ratio was .83, for the male pros the E² was .53 and the F ratio was 2.15, and for the anti group the E² was .57 and the F ratio was 1.23.

Pearson product moment coefficients of opinion change on persuasibility were also derived. None of the three groups demonstrated a significant correlation coefficient. As shown in Table VIII the r for

the female pro group was .26, for the male pro group .24, and for the anti group .33.

TABLE VIII
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT OF OPINION CHANGE ON PERSUASIBILITY

	Female Pro	Male Pro	Anti Group
N	30	54	30
r	.26	.24	.33
p	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.

For the analyses of variance the opinion change scores were divided on levels of persuasibility. The number of subjects in each level, the range of persuasibility scores included in each level, and the mean opinion change on each level may be found in Table IX. In the female pro group the data suited a division into three levels with level 1 containing eight opinion change scores, covering a persuasibility range of from 1 to 12, and having a mean opinion change of -.63. Level 2 consisted of 12 scores, had a range of 13 to 16, and had a mean of -2.17. Containing ten scores, level 3 had a range of 17 to 21 and a mean of -3.10. For the male pros three levels were selected. Level 1 consisted of 19 scores across a persuasibility range of 1 to 9 and had a mean of .53. Including 18 scores, level 2 covered a range of 10 to 12 and had a mean of -3.28. Level 3 included 17 scores across a range of 13 to 21 and had a mean of -3.35. With the anti group a quartile division was made with level 1 containing seven scores, covering a range of 1 to 10, and having a mean of 3.28. Including seven scores,

TABLE IX
OPINION CHANGE AT LEVELS OF PERSUASIBILITY

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Total
FEMALE PRO					
N	8	12	10	. . .	30
Range of persuasibility	1-12	13-16	17-21	. . .	1-21
Mean opinion change	-.63	-2.17	-3.10	. . .	-2.07
MALE PRO					
N	19	18	17	. . .	54
Range of persuasibility	1-9	10-12	13-21	. . .	1-21
Mean opinion change	.53	-3.28	-3.35	. . .	-1.96
ANTI GROUP					
N	7	7	8	8	30
Range of persuasibility	1-10	11-13	14-18	19-24	1-24
Mean opinion change	3.28	-2.28	3.87	13.50	4.87

level 2 ranged from 10 to 12 and had a mean of -2.28. Level 3 consisted of eight scores, had a range of 14 to 18, and had a mean of 3.87. The fourth level included eight scores, ranged from 19 to 24, and had a mean of 13.50.

Visual comparison of the means within each group reveals that with few exceptions mean opinion change tends to regularly increase as persuasibility increases. Note, however, that level 2 of the pro males and the anti group are exceptions to this regular increase.

Results of the analyses of variance of opinion change on persuasibility levels for each of the three groups are shown in Table X.

TABLE X
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF OPINION CHANGE
ACROSS LEVELS OF PERSUASIBILITY

Source of Variation	Degrees of Freedom	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F	P
FEMALE PRO					
Levels	2	27.43	13.72	1.63	N.S.
Within groups	27	604.44	22.39		
Total	29	631.87			
MALE PRO					
Levels	2	201.67	100.84	3.35	N.S.
Within groups	51	1536.26	30.12		
Total	53	1737.93			
ANTI GROUP					
Levels	3	979.73	326.58	2.99	N.S.
Within groups	26	2843.74	109.37		
Total	29	3823.47			

The male pro and the anti group produced F ratios significant at the .05 level while the pro female group did not. The female pro group had an F ratio of 1.63, the male pro group had an F ratio of 3.35, and the anti group had an F ratio of 2.99. A test of the critical difference of the means within the male pro and the anti group was conducted using the method suggested by Lindquist.⁴ The results are illustrated in Table XI. For the male pros the mean of level 1 was significantly different (at the .05 level) from the means of level 2 and level 3. Among the anti group

⁴Ibid., pp. 90-95.

the mean of level 4 was significantly different (.05 level) from the means of level 1, level 2, and level 3.

TABLE XI
DIFFERENCES OF MEAN OPINION CHANGE
AT LEVELS OF PERSUASIBILITY

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3
MALE PRO			
Level 2	3.81*		
d	2.56		
Level 3	3.88*	.75	
d	2.58	2.62	
ANTI GROUP			
Level 2	5.56		
d	8.13		
Level 3	.59	6.15	
d	7.89	7.89	
Level 4	10.22*	15.78*	9.63*
d	7.87	7.87	7.62

*Significant difference.

d = Critical difference at .05 level.

Thus, with two exceptions, visual comparison of the mean attitude change across levels or persuasibility revealed a tendency for mean attitude change to increase with increased persuasibility. For the male pro group a significant correlation ratio was found. In the analyses of variance significant F ratios were found in the male pro and the anti groups. Tests of the significance of the difference of

means in the male pro and the anti groups demonstrated significant differences between means. The differences are attributable to the means of the extreme levels of persuasibility (level 1 for the male pros and level 4 for the anti group). These results lend limited support to the expectation that increased opinion change would be associated with increased persuasibility.

Relationship of Opinion Change to Ego
Involvement and Persuasibility

In this experiment neither ego involvement nor persuasibility were found to demonstrate consistent statistically significant relationships to opinion change. None of the correlation ratios or correlation coefficients of opinion change on ego involvement were significant. Only for the male pro group was a significant correlation ratio of opinion change on persuasibility found. None of the correlation coefficients of opinion change on persuasibility were significant. In order to determine whether ego involvement or persuasibility was more highly correlated with opinion change the correlation coefficients of opinion change on ego involvement and the correlation coefficients of opinion change on persuasibility were tested for significant difference.⁵ As shown in Table XII there was no significant difference between the correlation coefficients of any of the three experimental groups. The z score for the female pro group was .14, for the male group .59, and for the anti group .78.

⁵ Computations of the differences of correlation coefficients were conducted using the method described by Walker and Lev, pp. 255-256.

TABLE XII
DIFFERENCES OF CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

	r of opinion change on ego involvement	r of opinion change on persuasibility	z	P
Female Pro	.30	.26	.14	N.S.
Male Pro	.12	.24	.59	N.S.
Anti Group	.10	.33	.78	N.S.

Thus, no significant differences were found between the correlation coefficients of opinion change on ego involvement and the correlation coefficients of opinion change on persuasibility. Considering all the statistical tests conducted in this study there was a slight non-significant tendency for persuasibility to be a better predictor of opinion change than was ego involvement.

Summary

This study was directed toward determining whether ego involvement or persuasibility was the better predictor of opinion change. The relationships (1) of opinion change to ego involvement and (2) of opinion change to persuasibility were investigated. No significant relationships between opinion change and ego involvement were found. The correlation ratios of opinion change on ego involvement and the correlation coefficients of opinion change on ego involvement were not significant for any of the three experimental groups. Analyses of the variance of opinion change on different levels of ego involvement within the three groups were not significant. Thus, no support was found for

the expectation that higher opinion change scores would be associated with decreased ego involvement.

Some significant relationships between opinion change and persuasibility were found. In one group out of three a significant correlation ratio of opinion change on persuasibility was found. The significance was found in the male pro group which had an E^2 of .53 and an F ratio of 2.15. None of the correlation coefficients of opinion change on persuasibility were significant. Analyses of the variance of opinion change on different levels of persuasibility within the three groups produced two significant F ratios (male pro group and anti group). Among the male pro group the mean opinion change of the lowest level of persuasibility was significantly different from the mean opinion changes of the higher levels of persuasibility, and among the anti group the mean opinion change of the highest level of persuasibility was significantly different from the mean opinion changes of the lower levels of persuasibility. The results give limited nonsignificant support to the expectation that increased attitude change is associated with increased persuasibility.

There were no significant differences between the correlation coefficients of opinion change on ego involvement and the correlation coefficients of opinion change on persuasibility in any of the three experimental groups. Considering all the statistical tests there was a nonsignificant tendency for persuasibility to be a slightly better predictor of opinion change than was ego involvement.

A discussion of the results follows in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

As suggested in Chapter I the concepts of a personality trait of persuasibility and of ego involvement potentially offer the rhetorical theorist and critic new insights into the rhetorical situation. The review and discussion of previous research brought out the idea that assimilation of these concepts into contemporary opinion change theory was difficult because testing of each of these concepts made use of new opinion measures and the relationships of these measures to more widely used measures of opinion was not clear. This study was directed toward examining the relative effectiveness of persuasibility and ego involvement in predicting opinion change. The expected relationships between opinion change and the two independent variables did not clearly materialize. Below is a discussion of the results of the study followed by presentation of a summary, the conclusions, and suggestions for further study.

Discussion

Opinion Change

Several aspects of opinion change which served as the dependent variable in the experiment merit discussion.

The topic area of the stimulus speeches was selected because observation of student discussions led the experimenter to believe that wide variations of attitude toward the social positions of Negroes existed in the student population. Some of the subjects appeared to be quite concerned with the race question and displayed extreme opinions both for and against the civil rights movement. Other students seemed almost oblivious to the question. As the location of the University of Houston would suggest, many of the subjects were products of a Southern culture. Also, as the city is part of a rapidly growing industrial area there were many representatives of Northern culture. The mean initial opinion of all subjects who completed the attitude measure was 46.16 (fairly neutral) and ranged from 10 (extremely unfavorable) to 70 (extremely favorable). Further, the range of categories selected by the subjects was quite wide. Probably the topic did provide a wide enough range of initial attitudes for evaluating different levels of ego involvement.

As shown in the pilot study the stimulus speeches did produce a significant change of opinion. But the amount of opinion change produced in the experimental groups, while significant, was not as large as that produced in the pilot study. Obviously, any relationships of persuasibility and ego involvement to opinion change would have more chance of showing up in the statistical analysis if the stimulus had produced larger amounts of opinion change. One explanation for the smaller shift of opinion in the experimental groups is that the racial question was given considerable attention in all the public news media during the time of the experiment. The marches at Selma, Alabama, were

conducted just as the study was beginning. During the period preceding the measure of opinion change the subjects were exposed to massive doses of propaganda on both sides of the race issue. Quantitatively, the experimental stimulus was a small part of the total communications that the subjects received on the race issue. The total exposure probably reduced the effectiveness of the stimulus material.

Another factor which could affect both the measure of opinion change and the measure of persuasibility was order effects. The nature of the test of persuasibility precluded an experimental design which allowed variations in order of presentation. By the time a subject finished all the pro and con speeches of the persuasibility test and the numerous measures of opinion he could be expected to be "test wise" to opinion testing procedures. So, the order effects had to be accepted if the same group of subjects was to be used throughout the experiment. The possibility exists, however, that the sorting task did sensitize the subjects and affect the amount and nature of opinion change produced following the stimulus speech.

The experiment was conducted in the classroom. Whether the subjects would respond the same way in different environmental situations is open to speculation. Indeed, perhaps the subjects attempted to demonstrate what they believed the experimenter (a teacher) wanted them to demonstrate. This "good student" tendency would most likely affect the measure of persuasibility and the measure of opinion change more than the measure of ego involvement. However, identifying the attitude measure as a study of word meanings, including non-evaluative filler scales, and the disguised nature of the semantic differential

should have frustrated some of the potential effects of a "good student" tendency on the measure of opinion change. On the other hand, the persuasibility measure was not disguised.

Interpretation of the amount and nature of opinion change produced in this study is subject to the potential limitations of the intense publicity, the potential order effects, and the specific environmental conditions particular to this experiment. Still, in the study two things remain clear. First, in this experiment significant opinion change was produced as measured by the semantic differential which has been shown to be a reliable measuring device that yields results which are similar to the results of other widely used measures of opinion. Second, in this study the measure of opinion change was not clearly related to either the measure of ego involvement or the measure of persuasibility in anything approaching the degree that previous research would lead one to expect. Thus, there is the possibility that the measures of opinion used in ego involvement and persuasibility research (1) were more sensitive or less sensitive than the semantic differential, or (2) measured different variables than the variable measured by the evaluative scales of the semantic differential, or (3) were conducted under significantly different environmental conditions than those of this study, or (4) yielded spurious results in respective examinations of the relationships to measures of ego involvement or persuasibility.

Ego Involvement

Based on review of the previous research the expected result in this study was that high ego involvement would be associated with

relatively small opinion change. In other words, the subjects who utilized a small number of categories in the sorting task were expected to demonstrate less opinion change than those subjects who utilized many categories. The expected relationships were not found either in the correlation ratios, in the correlation coefficients, or in the analyses of variance of opinion change across levels of ego involvement. Surprisingly, even those subjects who used four or fewer categories did not demonstrate significantly less opinion change than those who selected five or more categories. In fact, the mean opinion change for those selecting four or fewer categories was larger than the total mean opinion change of each of the experimental groups.

Within the present study three interpretations of the relationship of opinion change to ego involvement appear plausible:

(1) There is no relationship between the measure of opinion change and the measure of ego involvement. (2) The measure of opinion change was inadequate. (3) The measure of ego involvement was inadequate. The second alternative has been discussed previously. Perhaps the third alternative can explain why in this study the results were indicative of no relationship between opinion change and ego involvement. In previous research groups of known levels of ego involvement have been used and in the present study ego involvement was measured by the number of categories selected. In the Sherif and Hovland, La Fave and Sherif, and Vaughn studies highly involved subjects selected fewer categories than less involved subjects. However, the constriction of category range might not be a sufficiently reliable indicator of differences in degree of ego involvement. In each of the studies some of the highly

involved subjects did not use a constricted category range and some of the less involved subjects did use a constricted range. The overlap of the two groups might obscure any relationship that exists between level of ego involvement as measured by number of categories selected and opinion change. Perhaps, as suggested by Sherif and Hovland¹ and by Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall,² the constriction of categories and skewness of distribution of statements within categories would provide a better index of level of ego involvement.

Interestingly, for a randomly selected group of 151 subjects who read either the pro or anti speech, an ex post facto analysis of variance of the amount of absolute opinion change across levels of initial opinion was not significant. The mean absolute opinion change by subjects whose initial opinion, as measured on the semantic differential, ranged from 10 to 29 (unfavorable) was 6.00, for those whose initial opinion ranged from 30 to 50 (neutral) the mean was 5.20, and for those whose range was 51 to 70 (favorable) the mean was 3.43. However, for a randomly selected group of 156 students an ex post facto analysis of variance of the number of categories across levels of initial opinion was significant at the .05 level ($F = 9.19$). The mean number of categories selected by subjects whose initial opinion ranged from 10-29 was 13.13, for those whose range was 30-50 the mean was 6.45, and for those whose range was 51-70 the mean was 9.09.

¹Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 121-122.

²Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: the Social Judgment-Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), pp. 111-112.

To explore the possibility that direction of opinion change relative to the direction of the stimulus speeches might be a factor masking the relationship of ego involvement and opinion change contingency tables were constructed. For each experimental group ego involvement scores were divided into quartiles and opinion change scores were divided into two sections: (1) opinion change in the direction of the speech and (2) no opinion change or change opposite the direction of the speech. None of the chi squares in the three 2 x 4 contingency tables were significant.

In any event, the results of this study revealed no significant relationship between opinion change and ego involvement.

Persuasibility

While no strong relationship between persuasibility and opinion change was found, the results tended to support the relationship. None of the correlation coefficients were significant, but for the male pro group a significant E^2 of .57 was found and in the analyses of variance of opinion change on levels of persuasibility the F ratios for the male pro group and for the anti group were significant. The significant differences among the mean changes of opinion on the different levels of persuasibility in the two groups were attributed to the extreme levels of persuasibility in each case. For the male pro group mean opinion change on the lowest level of persuasibility was significantly less than mean opinion change on the other levels in the group and for the anti group mean opinion change on the highest level of persuasibility was significantly larger than mean opinion change at lower levels

of persuasibility. Thus, the expected relationship of high persuasibility and high opinion change did appear, but not to a degree which would lead to accurate prediction of opinion change.

Four factors might explain the less than expected relationship of opinion change to persuasibility. (1) The persuasibility test given in the experiment differed from the Janis and Field test in that regular instructors rather than unknown experimenters administered the tests. (2) The source of the communication used in the opinion change measure was not identified. (3) Order effects may have influenced results of either the opinion tests or the persuasibility tests. (4) The persuasibility test may be more sensitive or less sensitive, or measure a different variable or variables than the variable measured by the evaluative scales of the semantic differential. Alternatives two, three, and four appear most likely and future research might be directed toward clarifying their importance.

To explore the possibility that direction of opinion change relative to the direction of the stimulus speeches might be a factor masking the relationship of opinion change and persuasibility contingency tables were constructed. For each of the experimental groups persuasibility scores were divided into thirds and opinion change scores were divided into two sections: (1) opinion change in the direction of the speech and (2) no opinion change or change opposite the direction of the speech. None of the chi squares in the three 2 x 3 contingency tables were significant.

Another comparison of interest was made in the study. Gardner

and Schoen³ have suggested that categorizing behavior is associated with field-dependence and field-independence. One would expect that those people who tend to use fewer categories were field-independent and those who tend to use many categories were field-dependent. The study by Linton and Graham found that high persuasibility was correlated with field-dependence. Following this line of reasoning one would expect that the subjects who selected a larger number of categories would be more easily persuaded than those who selected a small number of categories. This relationship is similar to the relationship derived from ego involvement studies, but the reasoning leading to the relationship is very different.

The main differences in procedure used in the ego involvement studies and the categorizing behavior studies lie in the areas of sorting procedure and nature of things sorted. In the categorizing studies no suggestions are offered the subjects to indicate how the statements or objects are to be sorted while in the ego involvement studies the subjects are instructed to sort according to degree of favorableness of the statements. Also, the statements sorted in the ego involvement task could be ordered along a dimension while the statements or objects sorted in the categorizing task displayed little if any homogeneity.

The results of an ex post facto comparison of persuasibility scores on ego involvement scores is presented in Table XIII. None of the E²s were significant. Table XIV presents the number of subjects, range of ego involvement, and mean persuasibility at each of the four

³R. W. Gardner and R. A. Schoen, "Differentiation and Abstraction in Concept Formation," Psychological Monographs, LXXVI (1962), No. 41.

TABLE XIII
CORRELATION RATIO OF PERSUASIBILITY ON EGO INVOLVEMENT

	Female Pro	Male Pro	Anti Group
N	30	54	30
E ²	.56	.39	.41
F	1.59	1.49	1.16
P	N.S.	N.S.	N.S.

TABLE XIV
PERSUASIBILITY AT LEVELS OF EGO INVOLVEMENT

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Total
FEMALE PRO					
N	8	6	8	8	30
Range of ego involvement	1-4	5-6	7-10	11-21	1-21
Mean persuasibility	15.13	16.00	14.25	12.88	14.48
MALE PRO					
N	17	13	14	10	54
Range of ego involvement	1-4	5-6	7-10	11-22	1-22
Mean persuasibility	11.24	12.62	8.29	11.70	10.33
ANTI GROUP					
N	8	7	7	8	30
Range of ego involvement	1-4	5	6-8	9-20	1-20
Mean persuasibility	15.00	12.86	16.57	14.13	14.63

levels of ego involvement. As shown in Table XV none of the analyses of variance of persuasibility across levels of ego involvement were significant.

TABLE XV
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF PERSUASIBILITY
ACROSS LEVELS OF EGO INVOLVEMENT

Source of Variation	Degrees of Freedom	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F	P
FEMALE PRO					
Levels	3	38.23	12.74	1.00	N.S.
Within groups	26	331.24	12.74		
Total	29	369.47			
MALE PRO					
Levels	3	142.23	47.41	2.46	N.S.
Within groups	50	963.10	19.26		
Total	53	1105.33			
ANTI GROUP					
Levels	3	51.51	17.17	1.39	N.S.
Within groups	26	621.46	23.90		
Total	29	672.97			

Summary

The general purpose of the rhetorician is to find the most efficient means of presenting a communication so that the purpose of the communication is accomplished. Potentially, the concepts of a trait of persuasibility and ego involvement offer the rhetorician new insights to understanding the audience of a persuasive communication. Ego involvement as used in the context of opinion change research refers to the degree to which a person identifies with or how strongly he takes a position concerning an attitude object or within an attitude domain. The personality trait of persuasibility refers to an individual's general

susceptibility to influence from others irrespective of communication bound predispositional factors.

Each of the concepts leads to predictions of probable opinion change in response to a persuasive communication. Review of previous research prompts the expectation that high ego involvement would be associated with relatively small opinion change and that high persuasibility would be associated with relatively large opinion change. However, as the research relating each of the concepts to opinion change made use of new measures of opinion, there was some difficulty in assimilating and reconciling the concepts with previous opinion change research.

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the relative effectiveness of persuasibility and ego involvement in predicting amount of opinion change in response to a persuasive communication. An experiment was conducted in which 114 subjects performed a sorting task, took an opinion test, read a persuasive communication, took another opinion test, and accomplished the Janis and Field test of persuasibility. Thus, three scores were derived for each subject: (1) ego involvement--number of categories selected in the sorting task, (2) opinion change--difference between scores on first and second opinion tests, and (3) persuasibility--score on the Janis and Field test of persuasibility.

Statistical analysis of the scores revealed that there were no significant correlation ratios or correlation coefficients of opinion change on ego involvement and no significant F ratios of analyses of variance of opinion change across levels of ego involvement. While none of the correlation coefficients were significant, one correlation

ratio of opinion change on persuasibility (male pro group) was significant and two of three F ratios of analysis of opinion change on persuasibility (male pro group and anti group) were significant. Of the two groups demonstrating significant F ratios the mean opinion change of the lowest level of persuasibility in the male pro group and the mean opinion change of the highest level of persuasibility in the anti group were significantly different from the means of the other levels of persuasibility within the respective groups. No significant differences between the correlation coefficients of opinion change on ego involvement and the correlation coefficients of opinion change on persuasibility were found. Thus, neither ego involvement nor persuasibility were found to be statistically reliable predictors of opinion change.

The results were discussed in terms of the nature of measuring devices, possible order effects, environmental conditions, and other alternative explanations of the results. An ex post facto comparison of ego involvement and persuasibility scores was discussed and suggestions were offered for future research.

Conclusions

Subject to the limitations of this experiment the following conclusions are presented.

1. No significant correlation ratios or significant correlation coefficients of opinion change on ego involvement were found. No significant F ratios of analyses of variance of opinion change across levels of ego involvement were found.

2. In only one group of three (male pro group) was a significant correlation ratio of opinion change on persuasibility found. No significant correlation coefficients of opinion change on persuasibility were found. In two groups of three (male pro and anti group) significant F ratios of analyses of variance of opinion change across levels of persuasibility were found.

3. Of the two groups demonstrating significant F ratios the mean opinion change of the lowest level of persuasibility in the male pro group and the mean opinion change of the highest level of persuasibility in the anti group were found significantly different from the means of the other levels of persuasibility within the respective groups.

4. No significant differences were found between the correlation coefficients of opinion change on ego involvement and the correlation coefficients of opinion change on persuasibility.

Suggestions for Further Study

Several problems and questions occurred to the experimenter during the course of this study. The suggestions listed below seemed worthy of consideration for further research.

1. This same problem might be profitably investigated using a different topic area and stimulus speeches which might produce a larger mean opinion change.

2. More reliable methods of determining degree of ego involvement in randomly selected groups need to be developed.

3. The degree of correlation of scores on opinion measures used in ego involvement studies with scores on other measures of attitude should be determined.

4. The degree of correlation between persuasibility scores and scores on other measures of opinion should be determined.

— 5. Further investigation of the relationship of persuasibility scores and indexes of sorting behavior should be conducted.

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APPENDIX A

TEST MATERIALS

Ego Involvement

The following statement was read to the subjects one week prior to the sorting task.

We have been asked to assist the National Institute of Scientific Research on a research project. During the next three weeks from four to eight members of the class will leave class during each class period to participate in the project. You are asked to cooperate fully and not to discuss what you do on the project with other students in your class or other classes.

Immediately preceding the sorting task the subjects read the following instructions silently and then the investigator read them out loud.

Instructions:

You are given a number of statements expressing opinions in regard to the social position of Negroes. These cards are to be sorted into different piles

You will find it easier to sort them if you look over a number of cards, chosen at random, before you begin to sort.

You are to sort the cards into the number of piles that may seem necessary to you so that the stand expressed on the issue of the social position of Negroes will be different from the other pile or piles. You may sort into any number of piles which in your judgment is necessary so that each pile of cards represents a different stand on the issue. Put statements into the same pile which belong together

in terms of their relative stand on the issue, that is, favorable, unfavorable, etc. This should determine how many piles you have when you finish sorting.

This means that when you are through sorting, you will have different piles of statements arranged in order from low or lowest to high or highest.

If you complete the sorting before others, please remain quietly in your seat until final announcements are made by the experimenter.

The statements used in the sorting task were the 114 statements of attitude toward the social position of the Negro prepared by Dr. E. D. Hinckley. These statements are available from Dr. Hinckley at P. O. Box 2007, Gainesville, Florida.

Opinion Change

The following statement was read to the subjects immediately preceding the initial test of opinion.

This is part of a survey by The Southern Semantic Association concerning the meanings of words to different people at different times. It is not a test, you will not be graded. Please pay close attention to the instructions and give your full cooperation.

I will pass out the booklets--please fill in your name and section number and read the instructions on the first two pages. Do not leaf through the booklet and do not turn past the second page.

After a three minute interval the instructor read the following instructions aloud.

INSTRUCTIONS:

The purpose of this study is to measure the meanings of certain things to various people by having them judge these things against a series of descriptive scales. In taking this test, please make your judgments on the basis of what these things mean to you. On each page of this booklet you will find a concept to be judged and beneath it a set of scales. You are to rate the concept on each of these scales in order.

Here is how you are to use these scales:

If you feel the concept at the top of the page is very closely related to one end of the scale, you should place your check-mark as follows:

fair ✓ : : : : : : : unfair
 fair : : : : : : : ✓ unfair

If you feel that the concept is quite closely related to one or the other end of the scale (but not extremely), you should place your check-mark as follows:

strong ✓ : : : : : : : weak
 strong : : : : : : : ✓ weak

If the concept seems only slightly related to one side as opposed to the other side (but not really neutral), then you should check as follows:

active : : ✓ : : : : : : : passive
 active : : : : : : : ✓ : : : : : passive

The direction toward which you check, of course, depends upon which of the two ends of the scale seem most characteristic of the thing you are judging.

If you consider the concept of judgment to be neutral on the scale, both sides of the scale equally associated with the concept, or if the scale is completely irrelevant, or unrelated to the concept, then you should place your check-mark in the middle space:

safe : : : ✓ : : : : : : : dangerous

IMPORTANT: (1) Place your check-mark in the middle of spaces, not on the boundaries:

THIS NOT THIS
 : ✓ : : : : : : : ✓ : :

(2) Be sure you check every scale for every concept--
do not omit any scale.

(3) Never put more than one check-mark on a single scale.

Sometimes you may feel as though you have had the same item before on the test. This may be the case, but do not look back. Do not try to remember how you checked similar items earlier in the test. Make each item a separate and independent judgment. Work at fairly high speed through this test. Do not worry or puzzle over individual items. It is your first impressions, the immediate "feelings" about the items,

that we want. On the other hand, please do not be careless, because we want your true impressions.

Thank you.

Then the students were instructed to fill out the scales on the following page of the booklet and to complete the remainder of the booklet. Preceding and following the stimulus speeches were the following semantic differential scales.

Raising the Social Position of the Negro in Our Society

wet _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ dry

hard _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ soft

cruel _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ kind

deep _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ shallow

foul _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ fragrant

rich _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ poor

worthless _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ valuable

sacred _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ profane

nice _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ awful

unfair _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ fair

honest _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ dishonest

thick _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ thin

clean _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ dirty

beautiful _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ ugly

dull _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ sharp

sour _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ : _____ sweet

Pro Speech

During the Korean conflict an American soldier received the highest honor this nation can bestow, the Medal of Honor. Despite his sacrifice on the field of battle, when this citizen returned home he was denied admittance to the college of optometry in his home state. When he attempted to register to vote his life was threatened. Good enough to risk his life for our democracy, this soldier-citizen was a Negro and as such considered just a second-class citizen by many less valiant Americans. They felt that he should not enter "public" restaurants, should not have a room in the "nice" hotels. The Medal of Honor winner was supposed to ride in the back of the bus and use the back door of public establishments. As a youth he had not been allowed to take advantage of his superior mathematical ability and attend accelerated classes because accelerated classes were offered only in the "white school" in his district. Like the Medal of Honor winner, the rights of millions of American citizens are being trampled on each day. The practice of segregation, of treating some citizens as second-class citizens, is morally wrong, unjust, and indefensible.

The practice of segregation violates the principles of freedom and equality guaranteed in the Constitution of the United States. Negroes are entitled to life, liberty, property, and equal protection of the law just as white citizens. The Constitution does not provide for second-class citizens. But, many Americans violate the principles and laws of our land. Each of us, as individuals, needs to examine our attitude toward the Negro and attempt to live within the ideals and laws of our government.

Segregation cannot be justified. The most often stated reason given in support of maintaining segregation is that treating the Negro as a "first" class or regular citizen violates a "way of life" or social custom of the South; however, just because something has been custom does not make it right or defensible. Infanticide, child marriage, and dueling also used to be social custom, but we no longer believe in them nor practice them. Similarly, we can learn to respect each citizen on his own merits and not on his skin color. Another shopworn argument is that individuals have the right to discriminate, even in public facilities, who shall be their associates. From this premise, justification of segregated housing, schools, and public entertainment follows. But, the individual has the right to discriminate only to the point that his discrimination does not violate the rights of other citizens. What white person would not consider his rights violated if he had to sit only in the rear of the bus or use only the back entrance? Even providing separate-but-equal facilities violates the rights of the minority. The Supreme Court pointed out that to separate Negro children "from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. . . . In the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.

Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Segregation is unjust, cruel, illegal, and immoral.

Further, treating the Negro as less-than-equal imposes excessive economic burdens. Most states cannot afford the funds for adequate parks, libraries, and other public facilities. The cost of creating duplicate "white" and "Negro" facilities is beyond the capabilities of local communities and states. In education the cost of duplicate facilities is even more prohibitive. Since few localities can provide adequate facilities and teachers for regular schools, they certainly cannot afford to provide separate improvements in the areas of special education and advanced levels. In many states there are barely enough funds and students to support a single graduate school in fields such as law, medicine, optometry, physics, chemistry, and dentistry. Attempting to duplicate these already inadequate facilities in order to provide "separate-but-equal" facilities is foolhardy and impossible. Even if we wanted to follow the morally wrong ideas of segregation and second-class citizenship we cannot afford to do so. To maintain our present level of social and educational development we must accept the Negro as an equal.

Another important and demanding reason for eliminating second-class citizenship lies in the area of national security and international affairs. If we are loyal Americans we must measure the effect of our actions beyond the limits of our own house, city, state, or nation. Over fifty percent of the nations of the world are not white. Over two-thirds of the people in the world are not white. From the Congo to India people are listening to the evil promises of communist tyranny and the honorable promises of American liberty. Presently, our own news releases on the civil rights struggle support the communist lies. How do we look in the eyes of foreign people, people who are becoming more and more international political and economic forces, when we have second-class Negro citizens? Soon, the underdeveloped nations will wield much more power and influence; then the white people of the world will be the minority. We must learn to live together with mutual respect for all races before our own bigotry creates a climate of hate among races which will lead to our downfall.

All Americans need to re-evaluate their attitudes. It is morally wrong and illegal to treat the Negro as a second-class citizen. Further, we cannot afford to provide separate public and educational facilities for different races. We must improve our relations with all the colored races of the world if America is to maintain her prominence and power in the world of the future. Treat the Negro as he is, a fellow citizen.

Anti Speech

Presently our nation is suffering the pangs of internal strife, violence, and open defiance of the law. People have been divided into opposing camps, those for and those against a change in the role of the

Negro in our society. Both the white and Negro races have suffered the effects. Homes, churches, and businesses have been bombed. Men, women and children have been beaten, maimed, and murdered. Racial mobs have rioted, destroying, burning, and stealing property. Enforcement of current legislation and Supreme Court decisions in the area of civil rights has brought this difference of public opinion to a head.

People have differing values and beliefs about what is right. A case can be made for the Southern point of view on the racial question. They believe that an employer has the right to select those employees which he prefers, feels he would work best with, and which he thinks will be the most presentable and acceptable to his customers. Presently the age-old right of the employer to fix the requirements for his own employees is being challenged. Yet the employer is the one paying the salary and the one who will go broke if his employees drive away business. They believe that young children should not be forced to endure a daily bus ride of several miles just to ensure attendance at an integrated school when adequate facilities are available within the neighborhood. They don't want children of different races attending school, playing, dancing, and dating with each other, and perhaps intermarrying. They believe in the right of the individual to pick his own associates and the associates of his children. Often, the individual has moral reasons for wishing to select his companions, co-workers, and schoolmates. There are millions of religious people who have been taught the one road to salvation revealed by their particular faith. One's religious views are a restriction on him and if he is to be free to exercise his religion as expressly guaranteed in our Constitution he must be free to restrict his associations in accordance with his convictions. Yet some agitators want to force each person into associations which are repulsive to the individual and to his faith. We are all free to be different in our choice of religions, cars, and soap. We should be free in choosing our friends and the pattern of personal and family life. The agitation to keep people from selecting their associates means that Americans would be forced to spend their working life with undesirable associates, send their children to schools, eat in restaurants, live in hotels and attend all amusements in the company of those whose company was not voluntarily chosen. Let us not forget that the freedom of association is one of the most precious of all our liberties.

The white southerner believes in the right of the individual to pick his own and his children's associates. He cannot look at this problem as a philosophical question to be resolved. He must make decisions and live with the results. Put yourself in his shoes. Look at the facts and consider what you would do in his situation.

Should your children be the ones to bear the brunt of integration with a group of students who are behind in educational level? U.S. News and World Report has pointed out that Negro children are, on the average, two academic grades behind white children. Do you want your children to go to class where most of the pupils will be considerably behind and very different in social and cultural backgrounds?

This mingling will lead to lowered educational standards for all children.

Remember, also, that not only white cultural values will rub off on the Negroes, but that Negro cultural values will rub off on the whites. As a group, Negroes do have different cultural values. Statistics show that an average of one southern Negro in five is illegitimate. The incidence of venereal disease is more than four times as high among Negroes than among whites. These facts are evidence of the rather casual moral regard which most Negroes have toward the institution of marriage. The crime rates of misdemeanors, felonies, and homicides are considerably higher for Negroes than for whites. Are you anxious to have your children attend school, mingle with, and socialize with a group of individuals who come from such a poor moral and educational background?

The accelerated plans to eliminate separation of the races have tended to emphasize the differences in the background of the two races and to increase the incidence of violence. The people of the south need only to look at the blackboard jungles of New York City, St. Louis, Brooklyn, and Kansas City to see some of the tangible results of integrating the races. In New York City alone, some forty-two schools had to request police protection due to incidents of a racial nature. Often these incidents involved the knifing or slashing of white teachers and white students. Some people find it difficult to think of this as social progress. The same result occurs in cases of integrated housing. Last year some three hundred policemen had to be assigned to preserve order in a non-segregated Chicago housing development that contained no more people than a southern village where a single policeman was sufficient to maintain peace. Would you like to go to school in a school like one of those in New York or live in a housing development like the ones in Chicago? Southerners rightfully do not want their children or their families exposed to such conditions.

The races are not the same. Negroes, as a group, are different in physical characteristics, in moral background, and in educational attainment. We are not going to raise the already lowered moral standards of our nation's youth by mixing whites and Negroes; rather, we would end up lowering the standards of the whole nation. We are not going to improve educational standards by mingling the academically slow Negro students with white students. Instead we would lower the educational standards and increase the probability of racial violence and tension among all the children. We should protect each individual's right to associate with those he desires to associate with, and force no man or child to mingle with groups which are undesirable or repulsive to his moral or religious teaching. Before the Negro can be accepted as an equal member of the social community he must take advantage of the opportunities he has and raise his moral and educational levels to a par with the rest of the nation.

Persuasibility

The persuasibility test was identified to the subjects as a study conducted by the Opinion Analysis Center of New Haven. The test materials and instructions were the same as those described by Janis and Field in Personality and Persuasibility, Appendix A.

APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF RAW SCORES

Female Pro Group

Section	Ego Involvement	Attitude Change	Persuasibility
608	5	-4	13
608	3	-2	17
608	9	3	12
608	11	-1	17
608	5	-5	19
608	5	0	19
604	15	3	13
604	21	4	11
604	5	-2	13
604	7	-6	21
605	3	-2	14
605	6	-9	17
605	13	-4	11
602	7	-5	12
610	10	-7	17
610	4	5	10
610	4	-4	16
610	19	3	13
610	12	0	9
614	3	5	20
614	4	-7	13
617	4	-8	12
617	10	4	14
617	6	-3	15
613	4	-5	19
613	12	0	13
613	8	0	5
613	7	1	16
611	10	-1	17
611	11	-15	16

Male Pro Group

Section	Ego Involvement	Attitude Change	Persuasibility
608	7	-3	3
608	4	-6	5
608	12	-2	6
608	13	-2	9
608	3	2	8
604	4	-6	14
604	8	5	4
604	7	1	9
604	9	-3	10
604	5	-18	12
604	10	-1	10
604	2	1	8
605	7	0	11
605	7	-5	13
605	2	-1	13
605	10	-1	8
605	8	-1	5
605	6	-17	10
605	26	-6	11
605	15	1	19
602	18	1	10
602	5	-1	11
602	11	8	7
602	6	0	11
602	7	-1	11
610	3	2	11
610	4	0	7
610	4	-9	12
610	4	0	8
610	5	1	16
610	6	0	11
610	8	1	1
610	5	3	11
610	9	-4	3
610	9	-3	13
610	5	0	5
614	6	-13	21
614	12	-15	14
614	3	-4	20
614	12	-4	17
614	4	-1	6
614	3	0	19
614	4	-5	15
614	10	1	15

Male Pro Group

Section	Ego Involvement	Attitude Change	Persuasibility
617	22	-3	17
617	6	9	17
617	4	-4	16
617	6	0	12
617	4	-1	7
613	21	13	7
613	5	-6	16
611	3	0	10
611	5	4	11
611	4	-13	12

Anti Group

Females

602	8	-2	13
602	5	-4	18
617	7	3	18
617	5	-3	16
617	20	-1	8
617	6	5	13
613	5	4	6
613	4	22	20
613	9	11	21
613	12	0	8
613	4	-1	13
611	7	34	19
611	6	0	22
611	5	-6	10
611	14	0	19

Males

608	3	23	9
604	7	12	17
604	4	4	24
602	5	1	17
602	4	17	15
614	4	-23	12
617	4	-3	8
617	19	1	12
617	36	0	12
613	4	5	19
613	9	32	21
613	5	6	9
611	7	6	14
611	9	4	12
611	5	-1	14