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**AN ANALYTICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET
UNION AS ADAPTED FOR USE IN SAUDI ARABIA**

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AN ANALYTICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SOVIET UNION AS ADAPTED FOR USE IN SAUDI ARABIA

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BY
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DEDICATION

To His Royal Highness Prince Nauf ibn Abdul Aziz,
the Saudi Arabian Minister of the Interior and the President
of the Higher Council of Information, with the sincere hope
he will find this study helpful in guiding the Kingdom's
future development of international communication.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study attempts to provide a different type of perspective on the international communications efforts made by the United States and the Soviet Union and to carry that perspective one step further by undertaking the task of developing an international communication system for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia--an effort which has never been attempted by Saudi Arabian scholars. Most research efforts must overcome a number of problems, and this one is no exception. This dissertation could not have been completed without the assistance of a number of persons who sincerely desired to see this attempt succeed.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This study is designed to provide an analysis of the international communication goals, techniques, and effectiveness of the United States and the Soviet Union and to create a plan to permit the Saudi Arabian government either to develop new techniques or improve existing ones in its international communication system. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would be well advised to consider and possibly implement changes in its international communications system to keep abreast of both social development inside the Kingdom and other nations' improvement of their communication systems. Evidence of a worldwide interest in social and economic change has been evinced for more than a quarter century. In 1958, the United Nations' General Assembly ". . . called for a program of concrete action to build up press, radio,

broadcasting, film, and television facilities in countries in the process of economic and social development."¹ During the last twenty years, conferences have been conducted at the University of Hawaii's East-West Center to discuss the process of development, the strategies for change as used in developing countries, and the role of mass communications in furthering that change. All countries, in a sense, are developing countries. Development is the method by which a society gains the ability to improve the quality of life for its people. Development cannot come solely from outside a nation; it must come from the residents living there, although any developing country can accept assistance from other, more affluent nations. Since World War II, the concept that more affluent nations could help those who are less fortunate has gained worldwide acceptance.²

However, development cannot occur in a well devised, coherent manner without some sort of strategy for planned change, and two of the most common employ a capital-intensive strategy on the one hand, or a labor-intensive strategy on the other. This useful distinction is developed more fully in Schramm and Lerner's Communications and Change, (1976) and is useful in this analysis of change. Though different in approach, these two broad theories of development both depend heavily upon communications. Before we specify the role of communications, we will review briefly these two approaches to development and their relevance to Saudi Arabia.

An urban-based, capital-intensive strategy is based on the theory that industrialization and its new technology will be located in urban areas where there are a sufficient number of educated people to provide the labor necessary to use the modern technology. Stated differently, these industries would use advanced machines, requiring a great deal of financial outlay to build and install but would require very little labor to run them. There was a demand for skilled workers, but not a large one. And if the gross national product increased by about two or three percent per year, the benefits would eventually trickle down to all segments of the population.³

As a result, many underdeveloped countries--including Saudi Arabia--began to employ high tariffs, overhaul their financial systems so industries could buy machinery and raw materials, provide tax exemptions and government subsidies and ". . . concentrated on the construction of roads, utilities, buildings, and the like in the large cities and established schools and training centers that turned out workers with skills needed for the new industry."⁴

However, there is a problem with this type of development strategy. Those nations implementing this type of strategy and their leaders often do not realize that sustained growth cannot occur by using modern technology only in central areas and ignoring rural areas or smaller villages. The reason the strategy often fails is that for it to succeed, demand

for whatever product the new technology is producing must continue to increase. Skilled laborers and planners find their incomes rising, while other segments of the population find their incomes lowered--and in many cases, discover they are worse off than before "progress" began.

In contrast, the aim of a rural-based, labor-intensive strategy is to create more jobs and to produce more food. The labor-intensive strategy depends upon ". . . integrated rural development, agricultural intensification, appropriate technology . . . small industry promotion, health development and so forth."⁵ In short, development cannot occur if there is not an interrelation between technological advances and social changes.⁶ Underdeveloped countries can go only a short way with capital-intensive projects. However, labor is plentiful; thus labor-intensive projects must play a prominent part in an overall development strategy.

Saudi Arabia finds itself in the unusual situation of being viewed as a developing nation, but the Kingdom increasingly assumes the characteristics of more developed countries. Since its creation in 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been a developing country. Since then it has emerged from a nation struggling to catch up with the developments of the Twentieth Century into a major world power, capable of utilizing the most advanced forms of technology to meet the needs of its people. During the early stages, a capital-intensive development strategy was used. In latter

stages, a combination of both capital-intensive and labor-intensive strategies have been utilized to bring the Kingdom to where it is today. Obviously, the mix of these two types of strategies will depend upon a nation's degree of underdevelopment, the extent of labor surplus, the availability of natural resources and other natural endowments, such as money. It is important to realize that the role of mass communication is greatly enhanced in a labor-intensive strategy because more people with less education in remote regions must be reached than in a capital-intensive strategy. Because Saudi Arabia has developed into a major world power, capable of using the most advanced forms of technology to meet its people's needs, the next phase of Saudi Arabian development probably ought to include the continued use of technology to establish a sophisticated communications system to interpret the Kingdom's foreign policy, cultural, and religious heritage, social traditions, economic development and political stability to the rest of the world. However, before the need for an effective Saudi Arabian communications system can be explained, it is necessary to understand some basic facts about the Kingdom.

The Saudi government, which has been in power since 1932, has directed political, economic, and social choices to ensure the country's evolution from an underdeveloped nation to a modern one in a careful, measured combination of capital-intensive and labor-intensive strategies. In

1964 in his book Mass Media and National Development, Schramm defined underdeveloped or developing countries as those

". . . in which the annual per capita income is \$300 or less."⁷

The rising power of the oil nations since 1973 and their suddenly increased wealth, has given a sudden boost to their development efforts. Previously, almost all of the "Third World" countries were poor. Now about 250 million people in oil-exporting countries . . . have the economic requisites for rapid development. Some observers divided the old Third World countries into two (rich/poor) by splitting off a "Fourth World" of forty countries with about 900 million people (about one-third of the world's population) averaging a per capita income of less than \$150 per year. The Fourth World is concentrated in the Indian subcontinent, sub-Saharan Africa and in pockets within Latin America. . . . Oil power has set back the pace of development in those resource-poor nations, who are now faced with rapidly rising energy and food prices and a scarcity of foreign exchange.⁸

Political decisions regarding ways of improving a peoples' quality of life can be made in a country's capital. But they must be carried out on the local level. If a country has a poor transportation system, or if most of its people seldom travel more than a few miles from their home village, as was the case in Saudi Arabia, then, ". . . mass communications must be relied on to transmit information and education in a two-way flow from the center to the hinterland and vice versa."⁹ In addition, it is important to realize that there are often small, but very powerful groups, which may be opposed to change of any type. Because of their power, they can cause confusion and block any progress. Therefore, their viewpoints must be considered during any discussions provided through the mass media, and those in power must make the

effort to persuade them of the necessity of such change. Thus, the role of mass communications is greatly expanded in a labor-intensive strategy because more people with less education in remote regions must be reached than in a capital-intensive strategy. If social values are to be changed, the people need to know more about all aspects of their culture, recreation, leisure and living patterns of people in all walks of life if mass communications are to be both informative and persuasive.¹⁰

In 1958 Saudi Arabia was listed as an underdeveloped country with a per capita income of \$101 (SR 336)¹¹ to \$300 (SR 993). Clearly, Saudi Arabia with its per capita income of almost \$7,000 (SR 23,980)¹² per year in 1975 no longer fits that category, although the report included almost all the Middle East in its classification of underdeveloped countries.

Certainly the discovery of oil has played a vital role in the Kingdom's development, providing a solid economic foundation from which the country can operate. Oil power has set back the pace of development in other, more resource-poor nations, which are now faced with rapidly rising energy and food prices and a scarcity of foreign exchange. Another factor contributing to Saudi Arabia's advancement is the unique blend of government and religion. The Kingdom, with its holy cities of Mecca and Medina, is regarded by the world's some 700 to 800 million Muslims as the center of the Islamic

faith. Government and religion are even more closely related in the Kingdom's use of the Holy Koran as a national constitution. Saudi Arabia's location in the strategically important Middle East has made it a country which must be taken into consideration by other nations when formulating their own foreign policy.

Therefore, considering the magnitude of its responsibilities, its prestigious international standing, and its significant role in domestic, Arab, Islamic and world affairs, and its careful blend of capital-intensive and labor-intensive development strategies, it seems only natural that the Saudi Arabian government probably ought to have the most up-to-the-minute methods of communications now used in more advanced countries.

This conclusion is based on the reality of the vital and far reaching influence of information in its wider sense and upon the political realities of leading affairs of state. As mentioned earlier, a mass communications system can be most helpful in carrying out social change, particularly if a small but powerful group is opposed to change of any type. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the small but powerful group consists of religious leaders, which the government cannot ignore, simply because of the tradition of the close relationship between government and religion which will be explained in detail in Chapter Two. However, this group can cause confusion and block any progress, and Schramm quoting Dr. Harry Oshima at the 1975 East-West conference elaborated.

labor must be re-educated and manpower training reoriented. . . . New institutions and organizations in the rural areas must be established, while old values must be modified and new values promoted. . . . The key problem of the new strategy is implementation, so that its success may depend very much on the ability of mass media to inform, persuade, and educate. Mass communication may turn out to be the most important medium of education, whether formal or informal . . .¹³

Purpose of the Study

The ultimate purpose of this study is to suggest improvements in Saudi Arabian international outreach efforts. Since there is little precedent for this in the Kingdom, I propose to compare the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and adapt from their strategies those approaches which might serve to benefit the Saudi Arabian effort. It is ironic to note that two of the major Allies in World War II, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, are now engaged in a bitter battle for world supremacy. However instead of using atomic submarines or intercontinental ballistic missiles, the war is waged on an entirely different battleground--within the minds of those persons throughout the entire world, whom both superpowers wish to convince of the correctness of their political philosophies. Therefore, I have first analyzed both the United States' and the Soviet Union's international communication systems in terms of Western mass communication theories. Next, I have examined the techniques, goals and effectiveness

of the United States International Communication Service; the techniques, goals and effectiveness of the Soviet Union's international communication service and the techniques, goals, and effectiveness of Saudi Arabia's international outreach efforts. The ultimate objective of this study is to determine which goals and techniques to achieve them will be most effective for use by Saudi Arabia. Studying the superpowers provided the information about communication techniques, and the study of the Kingdom's international outreach efforts pinpointed some of the flaws therein.

Obviously, acquiring the data necessary to create an entirely new international information dissemination system for Saudi Arabia was more difficult in some areas than in others. For example, it was relatively easy to determine mass communication theories which applied to both the United States and the Soviet Union. It was also relatively easy to determine the United States' communication goals and although determining the effectiveness of the efforts proved to be another problem. It was also possible to study other scholars' analyses of Soviet communication techniques, but the Russian government's tendency to secrecy made it possible to determine only a general goal--to enhance the Soviet Union's reputation among people of other nations. And, as with the United States, an accurate measurement of Russian propaganda techniques is not possible. Therefore, it was necessary both to study other scholars' general conclusions concerning

the probable specific goals and the success or failure of Soviet communication strategies and to observe the physical results of these efforts, that is, actual Russian use of the mass media. In sharp contrast, information about the recently renamed United States International Communications Agency is easily available, making U.S. communications strategies more readily adaptable for use in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this study, which will be conducted in the tradition of action research, is designed to serve both academic and practical purposes. The main objective, then, is to create a program to provide an integrated, advanced use of international communications activities so that the Saudi Arabian government can derive all possible benefits from it at domestic, Arabic, Islamic, and especially world levels. This study will reflect an analysis of theories of both the United States and Russia as influenced by the cultural needs and social traditions of both superpowers as well as the communications need and social traditions of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Related and Previous Investigations

This study is the first of its kind to focus on a Saudi Arabian international communications system. Although relatively little has been written about the mass media in Saudi Arabia, at least two studies have been completed, but only one of these by a Saudi Arabian. The first academic

study, conducted by Dr. Abdulrahman S. Shobaili, the former director general of television, in his masters thesis which centered on the development of a television broadcasting system within the Kingdom and emphasized the influence of the Saudi Arabian government. Dr. Shobaili continued to develop his research in his doctoral dissertation for the University of Ohio, emphasizing Saudi Arabian mass media in a four-part work. Three of the chapters discussed the developments of the print media, including privately owned newspapers and the government's radio and television systems. The fourth section discusses informational activities, the print media, and the development of radio and television systems. The section on television was taken from the 1969 thesis, but it was updated.¹⁴ Although I could not find any other record of any thesis or dissertation, there were two books which were extremely helpful in providing information about the Kingdom's mass media. These are The Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia by Norman C. Walpole and King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia, edited by Willard Beling.

Douglas A. Boyd, in his dissertation, concentrates on the continued development of a Saudi Arabian television system, particularly in terms of the effect of American influence on the system. Boyd's work also examines the underlying reasons why the Saudi Arabian government elected to establish a government-operated system.¹⁵ However, the

discussion of the development of television and governmental influence is more helpful in Beling's collection of articles.

Other references to the mass media, although not scholarly or useful as academic references were available in articles in the Christian Science Monitor, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the London Times, the Wall Street Journal, TV Guide, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, and Saudi Arabian newspapers and news magazines. Other scholarly articles have discussed American influence on the development of Saudi Arabian television, and there are numerous works on the use of the mass media as a tool for political, sociological, and political development, hence the need for an interdisciplinary approach. All of these works are informative, important, and useful as an integral part of this research. But no matter how much background perspective these readings might provide, they do not speak to the main research goal of this study--devising an effective international communications system for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the main thrust of this research is not intended solely to examine the mass media in the role of a domestic communications system in the Kingdom. Rather, it is designed to concentrate on how the Saudi Arabian government could use these media in conjunction with other sources to communicate wisely and effectively at the international level.

Organization of the Study

Chapter Two is historical in nature. It traces the history of Saudi Arabia and also includes a brief history of the Kingdom's cultural, educational, economic, religious, and political systems, but only insofar as these factors affect the development of a Saudi Arabian international communications system.

Chapter Three briefly analyzes the significant differences in the international communications services of the two major powers--the United States and the Soviet Union, focusing on those particular characteristics, policies, and communications procedures which can be adapted to fit Saudi Arabian needs.

The decision to focus on the democratic and communist superpowers was not made lightly. Early readings showed that in the free world, the British, French, and West German international communications systems receive less money and reach a smaller audience because the United States possesses the fortunate combination of freedom of information, guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States' Constitution, personnel with the proper training in mass communications technology, and sufficient funds and the inclination to finance a worldwide operation. Additionally, preliminary research revealed that any international outreach attempts made by the communist satellite nations are largely controlled by and therefore patterned upon the Soviet Union's efforts.

Communist China was excluded because most of its international outreach is concentrated upon other Asian nations.

Thus the two countries having the most effective international communications systems, and therefore more worthy of a scholarly observation of goals and strategies used to achieve those objectives are the United States and the Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, the United States International Communications Agency was the easier of the two to study, mainly because it makes its goals and strategies to achieve them public as required by law. The Soviet Union's international communications efforts were observed and then analyzed, although the task was more difficult.

This study focuses on those particular techniques and goals which were adapted and applied to Saudi Arabian needs. The next step, undertaken in Chapter Four, was to review and evaluate the existing domestic and international communications systems in Saudi Arabia, including a brief history of the Ministry of Information and the Higher Council of Information. The necessity for this is developed early in Chapter Four.

Chapter Five summarizes and focuses on why Saudi Arabia needs an international communications system and proposes a workable plan for its establishment, which could be modified for use in other Third World countries.

Methods of Research

The methods of research used in this study are historical, descriptive, analytical, and a relative newcomer to the field of scholarly research endeavors--action research. The method of research for Chapter Two is historical, concentrating on the background and history of Saudi Arabia as these factors pertain to the need for and the requirements of an international communications system for the Kingdom. In Chapter Three, there is first an analysis of Western mass communications theories, followed by analyses of the U.S. International Communications Agency's worldwide information dissemination efforts and the goals to achieve those communications objectives. Information for the Soviet strategy was analyzed by studying the work of other scholars and examples of Soviet international outreach efforts. Thus in this study, information about the Soviet Union was related both to historical and current political, sociological, and psychological literature concerning communications and systems theories. Using the action research perspective developed in the United States, the end result was the determination of which communications strategies were adaptable for use in Saudi Arabia and why. Chapter Four will be an historical analysis of the Ministry of Information and a descriptive analysis of the Saudi Arabian international and domestic communications system and an explanation of the Higher Council

of Information and its role in international outreach efforts. Chapter Five will be an analysis of the need for and proposal of a plan for an international communications system for the Kingdom.

I expected the observations in Chapter Four to show numerous gaps in the Kingdom's existing international communications system, and these gaps will be pinpointed and defined as the first step in establishing Saudi Arabia's need for such a system. Once the need for an international communications system is established, analysis focused on how Saudi Arabia could attain its international outreach goals through modifying and utilizing selected American and Soviet strategies. This plan will reflect Saudi Arabian goals, philosophies, specific communications techniques, and the technology most appropriate for use on an international level.

Utility of the Study

This study is designed to provide a comparison of international communications strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union which are adaptable for use in Saudi Arabia. An additional by-product was an interpretation of the impact of information on Saudi Arabia's foreign policy. Stated differently, it was possible to determine how mass communications theories could be practically applied to translate Saudi Arabia's most positive aspects to the rest

of the world. Additionally, this study presents a practical design for a sophisticated international communications system for Saudi Arabia. The proposed system's policy and goals, function and organization, foreign and civil service personnel, and proposed international outreach projects are also included. Finally, this study can be used as background information for and to stimulate communications research in Third World countries--a subject which has heretofore received little academic attention.¹⁶

CHAPTER ONE

ENDNOTES

¹Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in Developing Countries. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1964, in Unesco Foreword, p. vii.

²Kleinjams, Everett, Foreword in Communication and Change: The Last Ten Years--And the Next. Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner, eds., published by the East-West Center, the University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1976, p. ix.

³Harry T. Oshima, "Development and Mass Communication--A Re-Examination," in Communication and Change: The Last Ten Years--And the Next. Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner, eds. Published by the East-West Center, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1976, p. 18.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 23.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Schramm, Mass Media and National Development, p. 9-10.

⁸Everett M. Rogers, "The Passing of the Dominant Paradigm--Reflections on Diffusion Research," in Communications and Change: The Last Ten Years and the Next. Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner eds., An East-West Center Book, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1976, p. 51.

⁹Oshima, The Last Ten Years--And the Next, p. 26.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 26-27.

¹¹Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, United Nations, 1963. Note: \$1.00 equals approximately Saudi Riyals 3.40.

¹²Second Development Plan 1975-1980. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1975, p. 20.

¹³Schramm, The Last Ten Years--and the Next, p. 5.

¹⁴Abdulrahman Shobaili, An Historical and Analytical Description of the Mass Media in Saudi Arabia. An unpublished dissertation, University of Ohio, Columbus, Ohio, 1972.

¹⁵Douglas Boyd, An Historical and Descriptive Analysis of the Evolution and Development of Saudi Arabian Television: 1963-1972. An unpublished dissertation, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1972.

¹⁶Schramm, Mass Media and National Development, p. 44.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND OF SAUDI ARABIA

It is impossible to understand Saudi Arabia's need for an international communications service without understanding something about the Kingdom's background--its inter-related cultural, educational, economic, religious, and political systems--which exert a direct and powerful influence upon any plan to devise an international communications service. Any idea, designed to improve the Kingdom's position in world affairs, cannot be designed independently of these factors; however, only a clear understanding of a few basic concepts is required.

Understanding Saudi Arabian culture requires a brief recitation of the country's history up to the reign of His majesty King Abdul Aziz. Rentz traces the beginning of modern Saudi Arabia:

. . . back to the first century of Islam, or the seventh Christian century, when the Prophet Muhammed presided in Medina over the original Islamic state. The Prophet administered the Supreme Law, those divine revelations he had received which were incorporated into the Koran, the Book of Allah. He was also the commander-in-chief of the State's military forces whose primary function was the Jihad, "The

endeavor in the path of Allah" often regarded as the sixth pillar of Islam. By missionary zeal and martial powers the new religion spread rapidly, greatly enlarging the number of believers who accepted the rule of the Prophet over the Ummah, the Islamic community.¹

After the Prophet's death, the state was governed by a series of caliphs who sought to rule according to precedents the prophet had set. But although there was no continued Islamic expansion under one political leader, Hitti (1966), explains how the religion continued to spread:

. . . ruled an empire, extending from the Atlantic to central Asia. From their subsequent capital of Baghdad, they spread their translations and renditions of Greek, Persian, and Indian philosophy, science and literature throughout the vast domain. From Muslim Spain, Sicily, and crusading Syria, some of these intellectual treasures passed on to Europe to become a vital force in a modern renaissance.²

It was nearly 1,000 years after the Prophet Muhammed that the House of Sa'ud chose to create the first Islamic state as a political model, and it was not until 1744 (1164) that Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammed ibn Sa'ud united their talents to create an Islamic state. A new era of religious reform and territorial expansion began.³ The spread of religious reform slowed somewhat, and it was not until 1803 (1223) that reformation forces led by Sa'ud ibn Sa'ud entered Mecca for the first time. The Holy City was returned to Islamic domain in 1805 (1225).

Other secular rules in the Middle East became worried about the expansion of Islamic religion and reform. However, in 1824 (1244) Turki ibn Sa'ud established Riyadh as the

capital of the new state--where he lived until his assassination only a few short months later.⁴

With the death of Muhammed ibn Sa'ud, the tradition of father-to-son succession of government control was established. Leadership eventually passed into the hands of his son Faisal, and once again, the state's boundaries were expanded. A period of civil strife ensued after Faisal's death.

By 1891 (1311) Abd al-Rahman, youngest of the sons of Faisal ibn Turki, was the only one remaining in Riyadh, but in that year was forced to capitulate and go into exile. With him he took his son Abdulaziz, then only a stripling.⁵

The young man, Abdul Aziz, never forgot his homeland. His ambition was to return to Najd and reassume leadership of the province. By the time he was seventeen, he was ready to take action.

He had had enough of idling. For six years he had sat in Kuwait, eating out his heart, listening to the hopeless grumbles of the exiles. . . . He was sure of himself and of the people of Najd. If he gave them the lead, they would rise and join him and throw out the Rashid.⁶

By January 1902, Abdul Aziz was able to return to Riyadh,⁷ and thereafter the reformation continued to spread unhindered. By 1932 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as it is known today, was well established. And, it is also interesting, as well as important, to note that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was able to maintain its independence and was never included in the 1926 British mandate settlements.

After 1932 the Kingdom was to embark upon a new era,

and it is also essential to understand this particular period of history if one is to understand how Saudi Arabia was to arrive at the position it holds in the world today.

Having grown up during the lean years . . . and having wandered with Bedouins in the days of exile, Abdul Aziz remained throughout his life imbued with the democratic spirit. . . . He held daily sessions in his council chambers, receiving callers from the lowest as well as the highest degrees. . . . As the Kingdom grew, it became no longer possible for Abdul Aziz to know all his subjects firsthand, but he never wavered in his concern for the welfare of each and every one of them.⁸

The most important aspect of his reign was that Abdul Aziz was always willing to promote change, so long as it benefitted the population and so long as it did not contradict Islamic law--a tradition which was to continue under later rulers.

Abdul Aziz legitimized the present government's claim to leadership by regaining control of territory which had been governed, with only two interventions, by his family since the early eighteenth century. Abdul Aziz emphasized his belief that the government had both obligations to and control over traditional tribal and village governments because his family represented both a lawful Arab and Islamic leadership.

And thus began the real development of a modern nation. As a result, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has continued to cherish its religious principles and, at the same time, adapt the use of modern technology for the increased comfort and

good of its people.

Abdul Aziz died November 9, 1955, and it was at this point that succession to the throne changed. When Sa'ud assumed leadership after the death of his father, Abdul Aziz's second son, Faisal, was named Crown Prince. From that day to this, the line of succession has been from brother to brother, a concept which has promoted stability while permitting a special kind of growth. And the House of Sa'ud, following the traditions of Islamic and Arabic democracy, assumed the social responsibility of providing for the population's needs by increasing government services for the people.

Further political and social development began when Faisal was Crown Prince and continued throughout his lifetime. The Kingdom was finally organized in 1932 after thirty years of regional wars, but it soon became apparent that unification marked the achievement of only one goal--the consolidation of sheikdoms into a national entity.

The 1940's marked the beginning of the transition from old to new. Government income was raised primarily by tax levies on Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca during the Hajj, but the oil production promised the potential of a new and better way of life. By the 1950s the Kingdom was enjoying a new source of income, modest in comparison to today's standards, from the commercial production of oil. Unfortunately, development projects created a new set of problems. There was no executive branch of government to

supervise decisions regarding which projects should be attempted, which ones should receive top priority, or to oversee the disbursement of monies required to plan and carry out these projects.

The transition from near poverty to economic affluence was not easy.

The Saudi nation-building process underwent several major stages of revolution. First came the consolidation of the fragmented sheikdoms into a cohesive national entity. Then came the creation of a number of institutions and systems to implement the objectives and programs of the new nation. Unlike most governments of the Third World, and particularly in this region, the Saudi bureaucracy evolved in absence of a colonial legacy. It grew largely from local resources and in response to local needs.⁹

It became necessary for government to become more centralized and for the general population to learn to accept this type of government. This stage of development emphasized the creation of centralized institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1930, and the Ministry of Finance, 1931.¹⁰ Because of its adherence to the tenets of social responsibility, the Saudi Arabian government was determined to invest its new financial increases in income from oil to improve the general population's quality of life. However, achieving that objective was complicated by the perceived need for vast reform which had to be implemented in a relatively short time. The two hurdles were the lack of an efficiently organized executive branch of government and the lack of training of civil service employees to implement the changes.

The government had to decide whether to continue its social development programs while at the same time trying to develop an executive branch of government to supervise administrative details or whether to shift its emphasis to the development of management concepts and skills which would eventually facilitate both development and implementation of such projects. The result was a combination of both. By the 1950's the government agencies were increased in record numbers; the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of the Interior in 1951, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and the Ministry of Communications in 1952, the Ministeries of Education, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry in 1953, and the Ministry of Petroleum in 1954.¹¹ Much of the credit for this development belongs to the late King Faisal. He received his education from his grandfather--a noted religious scholar--and practical governmental experience while serving as Viceroy, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Finance, President of the Consultative Council, and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He learned firsthand the problems and pitfalls of inaugurating religious and governmental reforms.

He ruled only eleven years--from 1964-1975--but he began to direct governmental affairs, through the offices listed above, long before he assumed the throne. Faisal's influence on the Kingdom's development encompasses more than fifty years, and nearly all of Saudi Arabia's modern history. His leadership answered the need for Islamic unity because

leadership is always a critical factor if a nation is to grow and change and yet retain its stability.

Stability becomes an even more critical factor if one of the goals for improvement is the development of, first, a domestic communications system, and later, the development of an international communications service. First, it is only logical to assume that a communications system could never be established without a stable government to maintain its continuity. A constant change of government would mean a constant change in the perception of the role of communications. Constant changes in perception would almost certainly result in constant changes of policy. Constant policy changes would require those in charge of developing a communications system to spend more time implementing policy changes and less time developing the system. And without a pre-established domestic communications system, any plan for creating an international communications system would be doomed to failure.

. . . [in] a developing nation, two concepts which are usually dealt with separately, will be joined together. These are the need for vigorous, dynamic leadership and the equally critical need for a system of belief or values, a 'consensus of sentiment', which holds a nation together, giving it a sense of form, cohesion, community, and an overreaching purpose.¹²

Faisal was successful because he was able to incorporate social change with religion and social, cultural, and historical traditions. The first example, as will be seen later in this chapter, is the establishment of educational institutions

for girls. The second example would be the establishment of the Saudi Arabian television system. In both cases, Faisal utilized the power strategy of change. He was able to show religious leaders who opposed these changes that they could be implemented with little or no damage to religious traditions. King Faisal was well aware there was little social acceptance of the need for these changes; but he was willing to have his wife advocate education for girls and spend the Kingdom's funds to create the best possible television system. He knew in advance that certain religious groups would oppose these changes, and in the example of the television system, he used the psychological device of explaining to religious leaders how television could be used to increase the general public's knowledge and understanding of religious beliefs and practices.¹³

However, the initiation of government reform and social change were not made easily. The increase in the numbers of governmental ministries and employees created a number of administrative problems:

--The number of agencies and employees were increasing, but there seemed to be no increase in the output of work being done;

--Existing agencies continued to grow, but not in relation to program requirements because the new employees were not always qualified to implement the new programs;

--Planning was not always coordinated, even though

there were agencies designed to handle exactly those problems;

--Outdated procedures were still being used, and

--Agency functions were ill-defined and authority overlapped.¹⁴

Al-Sadhan summed up some of the government's difficulties:

There were many reasons for this situation. Most importantly, education of the type required in sophisticated societies was introduced very late in the country. There has not been enough educated and trained personnel available to do all of the things which need to be done by a modern government. Students have been sent abroad in increasing numbers since a small initial group was sent out in 1954. But with very few exceptions, when they return, they are without practical experience in the development and operation of systems of the kind required.¹⁵

As a result, job slots in the executive branch were filled by a migration of unskilled and poorly educated portions of the general population who were enticed by the availability of jobs in the capital.

To make matters worse, achievements often fell below predictions for a variety of reasons:

--Objectives were unspecifically defined;

--Rational planning was curtailed by the absence of stated objectives to achieve goals;

--Budgets were designed only to continue the existence of a pre-existing agency and not to fulfill the purpose for which the ministry was established, and

--Most importantly, because there was no government

ministry "responsible for information gathering, reporting and control, procedure evaluation and improvement."¹⁶

Fortunately, the government was well aware of the problems and more than willing to seek new and innovative solutions. Reform of the executive branch became of prime importance and suddenly it was linked to the need for social and economic reforms.

Without improvement of the executive branch, the goals of social reform could not be achieved. Thus by the autumn of 1963, the Administrative Reform Program was launched. A team of management experts from the World Bank were called in to evaluate the problems and needs of promoting political, social, and economic growth. Team members pointed out the need for modernizing the executive branch before other developments could occur. Also that same year, a management specialist from the United Nations was called in to evaluate administrative problems.¹⁷ As a result, the Institute of Public Administration, formed to educate civil service employees, was established.

However, even this solution was not without its problems, as a three-man team from the Ford Foundation, assigned in the summer of 1963 to analyze the operations of the Kingdom's government, soon discovered. There were few civil servants the management team could discuss problems with, and those who did speak English lacked the authority to solve problems or suggest solutions. To make it worse, the Ford team had

no experience in Saudi Arabian government processes. The Ford team suggested formation of a special advisory group to aid in organization and management, planning, budgeting, accounting, public works, personnel and training.¹⁸ Despite some mistakes along the way, definite improvements resulted, and because management development is a continuous process, continued improvements were made. This list of governmental reforms leading to social changes such as improved educational systems, better health care delivery programs, better roads and telegraph service are important factors contributing to Saudi Arabia's need for an international communications service because these types of reforms led to today's climate-- one which is more likely to accept and understand the need for further improvement of the Kingdom's domestic and international communications systems.

Another important perspective which must be understood is the close relationship between government and religion. Thus, as Oswald Spengler defines the Islamic world, it

embraces the whole of the world-cavern, here and the beyond, the orthodox and the good angels and spirits, and within the community the State only formed a smaller unit of the visible side, a unit, therefore, of which the operations were governed by the major whole.¹⁹

Although it cannot be empirically measured by traditional political science research methods, this Islamic unity, based on emotional, religious, and ideological forces, must be taken into account in any scholarly discussion of the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The close relationship between government and religion is not a transitory phenomenon. Rather, it is based on the traditions of military victories coupled with missionary fervor.

Islamic law includes both religious and secular obligations, and it is sanctioned and enforced by the Saudi Arabian government. Law is divided into two parts, the Shariah, which is religious, and Regulations, which enforce the commands and implement government projects designed for the good of the general public. There are four sources of regulation in the Shariah:

--Most important is the Koran, which Muslims believe is God's Word as given to Muhammad, the Prophet, by the Angel Gabriel;

--Al-Sunnah, a school of thought, which includes traditions of the Prophet, that is, the things he said and did as well as his approbation or censure of actions in a specific situation;

--Al-Ijma, a ". . . consensus of learned scholars on particular problems whose solutions are not directly found in either the Koran or the Sunnah,"²⁰ and

--Al-Qiyas, another scholarly consensus of reasoning by analogy, which means that principles explained in the Koran, Sunnah and Al-Ijma can be applied to any problems or situations not dealt with in the first three sources.²¹

The Shariah Courts have full jurisdiction over all

administration of justice. Because the government issues regulations for the good of the people, Saudi Arabia has been able to achieve political, social, and economic development. At the same time, other regulations were issued controlling business activity, financial enterprises and economic development, labor, and welfare programs.

However, none of these reforms could have been successful unless the Saudi people were educated to accept them, and a system of education was carefully planned. Public schools were established for young boys and young men, and attendance through at least the high school level became mandatory. But the Kingdom's accommodation of the demands of social and economic development, while maintaining its unique social, cultural, and political heritage, is best illustrated by the development of an educational system for women. "Education has traditionally been the initial point of departure in the movement of any social group to alter its status and opportunities."²² A misconception, popular among Westerners, has been the notion that the Islamic religion forbade the education of women. According to one source, the Prophet Muhammed called the search for knowledge a requirement for all Muslims--men and women.²³ Thus the early Saudi Arabian prejudice against the education of women was the result of pre-established cultural attitudes and not the result of religious percepts. The government was well aware of what the general public's prejudiced response to

this new idea in the realm of education would be. The public would accept change only if the resulting benefits were presented to them in a logical manner.

Government planners determined the best way to present the information to the people was to utilize the demonstration technique of the persuasive strategy for change. Because the government wanted the concept of education for girls. ". . . to be introduced in a low-key manner, perhaps because of its potential for stimulating unwanted conflict, an explicit, persuasive strategy . . ." ²⁴ was not used.

If a persuasive strategy can be developed that is not obvious, it indeed may be very effective in creating an openness to change or at least a receptivity to information about change. ²⁵

It was determined to show Saudi Arabian citizens that education for girls would not harm the fabric of society. Establishment of a modern school for girls, if handled improperly, would have generated a strong negative reaction from the public. To overcome this expected resistance, an experimental project was launched. The government established a home and school for orphaned girls in Jiddah. The orphanage orientation was used as a basis for the gradual introduction of the methods of modern education for women.

The Dar Al-Hannan--the House of Affection--opened in 1956, but a first, even the orphaned girls refused to attend. The government recruited several orphaned students, and eventually encouraged families also to enroll their

daughters in the school. A 1957 newspaper article explained the goals of the new school in relation to preparing young girls to become better wives and mothers as a result of studying the Islamic religion and receiving additional modern education about moral, social, and intellectual subjects.²⁶ The school grew steadily as more and more female pupils were enrolled and curriculum was expanded for intermediate and secondary levels, with the first high school class graduating during the 1964-65 academic year.

Four years after the founding of Dar Al-Hannan, in 1960, the government assumed responsibility for introducing a system of public schools for girls throughout the Kingdom. Despite the fact that the Government delegated this sensitive assignment to a conservative group of religious leaders governed by a respected Sheikh, there were isolated cases of opposition. The most famous of these occurred in Buraidah, where certain elements of the population claimed that the planned establishment of a school for girls would produce demoralization and destroy the foundation of the family. A public demonstration erupted, and Government troops were dispatched to restore order. At this time, the Amir Faisal was Prime Minister, and he was adamantly opposed to eliminating plans for the projected school. He insisted that the school would open even if no one chose to attend. He selected a well-respected, highly educated woman from Jiddah to serve as Directress, and the school was opened. During the first year of its operation, however, the daughter of the Directress was the sole student in attendance.²⁷

And today, there are women's divisions at the University of King Sa'ud, formerly the University of Riyadh, King Abdul Aziz University in Jiddah, and King Faisal University in Damman. In addition a managerial school to produce qualified female administrators, directors and managers to assume positions of authority with the system of segregated institutions--

That is, women are permitted to assume administrative positions only in girls schools, women's hospitals, banks and colleges, and as social workers providing social services only for women--were established.

However, NONE of these advances would have been possible without the solid economic foundation provided by the Kingdom's income from its most abundant natural resource--oil.

The discovery of oil in 1938²⁸ with its accompanying revenues provided an economic base for contemporary power. Petroleum wealth and its power are therefore relatively new to Saudi Arabia, but the government has long been aware of its potential. When King Abdul Aziz met U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II, the Saudi Arabian leader said "Whoever controls the untapped oil fields of the Middle East will have power to make peace or war."²⁹

Saudi Arabia has many unique characteristics which set the Kingdom apart from other oil-producing nations. In one of his public addresses, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yemani, Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources, explained the basis for Saudi Arabia's importance in today's oil market.

(i) Since Saudi Arabia is an Arab oil-producing country, it is connected with other Arab oil-producing countries in a number of specific ways. Within this context, Saudi Arabia is wholly committed to the Arab cause and does its best to serve that cause with the Palestine question central to that cause. Because this interest is within a political framework, it does not include such oil-producing countries as Iran, Indonesia or Venezuela.

(ii) Saudi Arabia has the largest surplus oil reserves in the world; 27 percent of the world's proven oil reserve is located there. This means that its prospects for the future extend farther than any other country. For example, Iran, which also has large oil reserves, has a much shorter outlook due to the amount of present production relative to its reserves. This in turn places the Kingdom in a more strategic position in international relations within the realm of politics and economics, than the positions of Algeria and Venezuela.

(iii) Saudi Arabia produces more oil than necessary to fulfill its financial obligations resulting in currency surplus. The financial power coupled with its political power also derived from oil, places Saudi Arabia at an advantage over its neighbors and other OPEC members.

(iv) Saudi Arabia is an oil-producing country that considers itself as politically belonging to the group of nations referred to as the 'free world.' This distinguishes it from neighboring countries who fly a revolutionary flag, but who share the spirit of Arab nationalism.

(v) Unlike other oil-producing countries, Saudi Arabia produces several different types of oil. These include: light Arab oil, medium Arab oil, heavy Arab oil, and a very light oil that is known as El Barri oil. Other types of oil are now being discovered and will soon be produced and exported. This gives Saudi Arabia a unique position in the economics of oil and will serve to enhance its role in pricing.

(vi) Saudi Arabia has not reached the level of development that other developing countries have. For this reason, its outlook for pricing oil and the future of energy differs from other more developed nations. During the next generation government officials have to work continuously to develop the country, develop the land, establish industries, and look for new sources of national income that would substitute oil in the future.

(vii) Saudi Arabia is an Islamic oil-producing country. Approximately 70 percent of the world's oil reserves are owned by Islamic countries, but it should be noted that Islamic power has not appeared in the world petroleum game and, as yet, has not been used to influence oil strategy.³⁰

Saudi Arabia's vast oil reserves are largely responsible for the Kingdom's economic power and therefore also for its international political viewpoint. The financial power provides a sound economic foundation for Saudi Arabia's social development, and for improving foreign relations with other countries.

Henceforth, Saudi Arabia has assumed a leading position in Middle Eastern affairs by supporting the states confronting Israel and in world affairs by influencing the politico-economic conditions of many countries through its immense wealth. In effect, Saudi foreign policy at the regional and international levels, represents the greatest development in the Middle East and in the world today.³¹

Examples of the effectiveness of the use of oil as a bargaining tool already abound. The Arab-Israeli conflicts and 1973 oil boycott, Crown Prince Fahd's plan for peace in the Middle East, proposed in late 1981, and the United States' 1982 sale of sophisticated AWACS bombers to the Kingdom are only a few.

Because of the booming oil revenues, the Kingdom has been able to draft and implement a series of five-year plans to use the income in the best possible manner to bring about the necessary social changes to improve the quality of life for its people.

Saudi Arabia's petroleum wealth assumes still more importance in light of its potential use as leverage to encourage other nations to assist in a system of disseminating international information.

Only a few Third World countries have been blessed by nature with raw materials, such as oil, that can be used as a weapon in bargaining with industrial-country customers or used indirectly to accumulate financial assets which can enhance their bargaining position.³²

Provisions for assistance in providing accurate information about Saudi Arabia, through a variety of methods ranging from word of mouth to influencing local, state or national officials to agree to permit establishment of information centers, could be included in foreign project contracts.³³ More will be said about this in Chapter Five. Since most nations or industries outside the Kingdom are eager to provide technology or goods and services to improve the balance of trade, it is highly unlikely such contract provisions would be refused. And any nation or private industry could as always, retain the option of refusing to accept such contract provisions; however, if Saudi Arabia were to adopt a policy of refusing contracts with uncooperative nations or industries, it is reasonable to assume refusals to assist in the task of providing information would become few and far between.

As we have seen, the Kingdom's cultural, social, and economic development all have had an effect on the development and use of domestic and international communications systems. According to a United Nations' General Assembly report, "information media have an important part to play in education and in economic and social progress generally and that new techniques of communication offer special

opportunities for acceleration of the development process."³⁴

The philosophy expressed in the preceding quotation is particularly applicable to Saudi Arabia because the pace of the Kingdom's further development will probably be largely dependent upon the development of an effective international communications system.

The background information discussed in this chapter provides an excellent perspective from which to study the international communication system of the United States and the Soviet Union. Without such a perspective, it would be impossible to determine which of the two superpowers international communication strategies and techniques, to be discussed in Chapter Three, are adaptable for use in Saudi Arabia.

CHAPTER TWO

ENDNOTES

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²⁶Abu Mazin, "The Mother is a School if You Prepare Her," Abas. No. 2557, Sept. 25, 1957.

²⁷Parssinen, King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia, p. 159.

²⁸Al-Farsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development. Stacey International, London, England, 1978, p. 43.

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of Saudi Arabia. Willard Beling, ed., Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980, pp. 204-205.

³¹Ibid., p. 202.

³²Seymour Brown, Oil and World Power: Background to the Oil Crisis. Penguin Books, Baltimore, Maryland, 1974, p. 147.

³³A more thorough discussion of how this economic strategy can be utilized is provided in Chapter Five.

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CHAPTER THREE

AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

This chapter is designed to explain both superpowers' efforts in the area of international outreach in terms of western mass communication theories: a second step will be an explanation of the two countries' international communication goals, the strategies and techniques to achieve them; and the third step will be a comparison and contrast of the Russian and American efforts. A literature search has shown that no one from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has ever attempted such an analysis. The scholarly works on mass communication written by Saudi Arabians focus mainly on the use of the mass media within the country itself. This effort is entirely different. Not only will it analyze the international outreach efforts of both superpowers in terms of Western mass communication theories, it will provide the basis for Chapter Five, which will include an explanation of which techniques--Communist or American--will be most effective for use in Saudi Arabia.

No matter whether one is talking about the United States or the Soviet Union, there is a basic truth in the types of international information disseminated by both governments, and that is the fact that there is a discrepant world of difference between "official facts and realities."¹ Propaganda can be considered a metaphor for the created facts provided by governmental organizations, and may therefore be considered a function of some of a government's international outreach efforts. Contemporary society regards modern government records as constructed events. Mankind, no matter where he lives, is usually only aware of what happens around him. Real events which he cannot see for himself must be reported to him. Suddenly public records become a performance for a specific audience and not a matter of reality.²

However, it is important to remember the ways of recreating the world through information, either reported or through government records, are often very subtle. Altheid and Johnson, (1980) explain the implications of government information, which they call propaganda.

Propaganda as a social scientific concept, has not been well understood. . . Propaganda . . . has profound implications for current understanding, bureaucracy, formal organization, and mass communication. . . . We believe that propaganda, like all social phenomena, is not unique to one sphere of social life, although it has been treated as though it were.³

They also point out two specific aspects of organizing propaganda.

What the members of the organization understand to

be the practical significance of certain information for a particular audience and the actual procedures used in constructing official reports to reflect what the audience expects from any legitimate organization, and they discrepancies between the official view and what many members know to be the truth.⁴

The most significant aspect of this theory is the medium of communication through which this information is shared. Even in the United States, where freedom of information is so highly touted, people have only those documents "being read or shown or interpreted, and we seldom have the inside knowledge available to check on them. We must simply take someone else's word for it."⁵ For example, during the 1973 oil embargo, in the United States, the general public was recognized as the audience to be communicated with and there was no need to develop sophisticated communications techniques. Long lines at gasoline stations were proof enough of the reality. Government pleas for observation met with unqualified endorsement, and, in general, the American public was willing to do its part to help win the energy war. All government pronouncements were intended for public consumption via the mass media.⁶

Unfortunately, the problem with this is that official reports often convey only one reality. There is one definition of propaganda which can be applied to the information supplied to the world by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The deliberate attempt by some individual or group

to form, control or alter the attitudes of other groups by use of the instruments of communications with the intention that in any given situation the reaction of those so influenced will be those desired by the propagandist.⁷

It is important to understand why anyone would want to influence another person or group of people with propaganda, because the process involves interaction between a communicator and a target audience.

Modern use of propaganda is a refined, deliberate way to influence. "One does not win an argument with scholars with emotional appeals."⁸ It was the emergence of public opinion as a legitimate and essential political fact of life that pushed propaganda toward the depth it has today.

Until the idea of the public was recognized as a relevant audience to be communicated with, there was no need to develop sophisticated techniques for manipulation; rulers simply did what they and their supporters deemed necessary.⁹

Hans Speier defined public opinion as the peoples expectation that the government will explain its decisions to them.¹⁰

This definition probably can be applied to Saudi Arabia.

The government is not concerned that adverse public opinion will force them to change official policies; rather, the government provides information to ensure that no other information which might cause the people to challenge its policies would be released. However, it is different for the United States and the Soviet Union. Altheide and Johnson have explained that bureaucratic propaganda is often targeted to reach "a specific segment of the population."¹¹ Thus,

both the Russians and the Americans find it necessary to pick and choose the specific audience for which specific information is geared. In short, targeted audiences receive the same information in different ways. Perhaps before a more complete analysis of the two superpowers' propaganda efforts is made, an explanation of why the Soviet Union and the United States are engaged in a propaganda conflict would be in order.

It is interesting to note that World War II, the last physical conflict for one nation's control of the world, ended more than 40 years ago. And during that global conflict, the United States and the Soviet Union were allies. Ironically, the two former allies are now engaged in a bitter struggle for supremacy over the countries in the rest of the world. However, there is a major difference. Excluding the violent and often underhanded actions of either superpowers' intelligence agencies, this battle is fought on an entirely different area. Although the struggle for physical control of certain geographical areas still continues--Cuba and the Middle East, for example--this struggle is waged mostly in the minds of the general population of the rest of the world. Modern atomic technology has made the concept of a nuclear war almost, but not quite, ridiculous. Both countries have more than enough nuclear power to decimate each other's populations more than a hundred times over. That power alone is self-defeating. What good is territorial

control if there is no one left alive to carry out either political doctrine? Therefore the struggle, although just as bitter, is waged on an entirely different area--within the minds of men and women. The best way to establish control and still have enough of the population remaining to exert that control over is to convince the general population of a given country that a particular political philosophy is the only correct one. In the past, the major pawns in this struggle have been the United States' Western European allies and the Soviet Union's Eastern European satellites. However, the scarcity of petroleum as a natural resource, and the Middle Eastern countries' control of most of the reserves of that valuable asset, have changed the battle somewhat. The war for the allies and the satellites still continues, but the war for supremacy in the Middle East has escalated considerably. Control of Middle Eastern oil is a step toward control of the entire world, and none of the Arab nations will tolerate such an event. Therefore, it is incumbent upon nations such as Saudi Arabia, which already enjoys an enormous measure of international prestige, as explained in Chapter Two, to exert its own influence.

Another example of the propaganda struggles between the United States and the Soviet Union is the situation occurring in Poland during the winter of 1981-81. It serves as a perfect example to illustrate the mass communication conflict between the two superpowers. The number of Voice

of America broadcasts to Poland were increased with the intention of presenting the true facts to the Polish people about what was really happening in their own country. The broadcasts were aired simply to counteract Soviet propaganda efforts. American policymakers did not want the Polish people to become susceptible to Soviet propaganda and misinformation and therefore accept the Russian perspective of events.¹²

The Polish situation is not only a microcosm of communication battles between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is also a perfect microcosm of the communication problem in Saudi Arabia. The difference is that both the American and Russian communication strategies are enjoying a large degree of success on a worldwide basis, while Saudi Arabian international communication strategies do not. The United States, with its Associated Press and United Press International, and the Soviet Union, with its news agency, Tass, control most of the information disseminated throughout the world. The man living in a small village in Nigeria, Algeria, or any other Third World country is FORCED to believe the information fed to him by one superpower or the other, because they are the main source of international news. Local news, of course, comes from his own country. The list of these kinds of communication battles between the two superpowers is endless. There are only two results: either the people do not believe either nation's propaganda, or what is more likely, they end up believing information from one

superpower or the other. There can be no victors in a war such as this.¹³

Communication Constructs

In understanding the communication strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union, several works were especially helpful. The main sources used in the section on the United States are L. John Martin's International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control, Leo Bogart's Premises for Propaganda: The United States Information Agency's Operating Assumptions During the Cold War, and John Henderson's The United States Information Agency. For information about the Soviet Union, I relied heavily on Lee Ann Johns' Soviet Life: Totalitarian Public Relations, Frederick Baghoorn's Soviet Foreign Propaganda, and David L. Altheide's and John M. Johnson's Bureaucratic Propaganda.

I will begin an analysis of the two information systems by highlighting a few Western models or constructs which serve to provide a basis for consistent comparison between the American and Russian communication strategies. These tools are most useful in understanding both the United States' and the Soviet Union's international communication tactics. In this section I will show how communication by natural sign, the three dimensions of communication, the DeFleur-Ball-Rokeachs and the Westley-MacLean theories of communication are used. I will also explain which communication

models are most effective for both the United States and the Soviet Union in their international outreach efforts.

According to Altheide and Johnson, international outreach efforts contain four major components: target, medium, purpose, and truth.¹⁴ The target is usually a mass audience.

After World War II social scientists believed that technology and urbanization had stripped away the stabilizing influence of "family, religion, and friends."¹⁵ As a result the mass audience was really a group of isolated persons, "Susceptible to a variety of stimuli that could drive them one way and then another."¹⁶ Early attempts to influence a targeted mass audience depended on the mass media as the most direct method of manipulating public opinion. And the main purpose was to deliberately alter attitudes.

Any international outreach effort will encounter certain inherent problems. Any communication attempt can be considered a system involving the sender, the message, the content, the target audience, the medium used to transmit the message, the purpose of the message and the circumstances under which the receiver gets the message. Each of these components of the system affects the most important goal of communication--the interpretation of the message. It is well known that no two persons, each bringing their own personal biases, will interpret the same message in the same way. Because of these components and the individual interpretation, it becomes impossible to measure with complete accuracy

the effectiveness of either nation's international communications attempts:

. . . beyond the knowledge that some works and some does not, remarkably little is known of how propaganda really affects audiences or effects its results. The very nature of political propaganda, its frequent attempt to be all things to all people means that for it to be analyzed a scholar would first have to master all data on human behavior.¹⁷

However, it is possible to discuss at least one of the types of communication used in both superpowers' propaganda efforts, and that is communication by natural sign. Almost everyone is familiar with the notion of the pecking order established among a flock of chickens. These pecks are simplified acts which come to stand for dramatic behavior associated with victory or defeat in battle. On the human level, this can be defined as a gesture--that is, if the beginning of an action serves to trigger the same response in an individual that would be triggered if the entire action were completed. Stated differently, the individual receiving the message has acquired a learned response. However, only when two organisms have developed a set of learned responses that are coordinated so that a response from one can serve as a stimulus to the other, can communication by natural sign be said to occur.¹⁸

For humans, it would seem that an example of this type of communication could be illustrated by what have been popularly called buzzwords, that is, those words which elicit a certain emotion from the person hearing them. Hence, the

Soviet Union's continued use of the words "peace," "American aggression," and "American imperialism."¹⁹ The Americans, on the other hand, employ such words as "personal freedom," "Democracy," "equality," and "Soviet aggression."²⁰

Verbal symbols can be approached in several ways. The syntactic, which studies the relation of signals, functioning as symbols and their referents, is concerned with structural meaning. Signals are treated as signs which denote but do not connote. The pragmatic, which studies how signals, functioning either as signs or symbols are related to human behavior, is concerned with behavioral meaning. The concern is with how signals treated either as signs or symbols, influence human behaviors. And the semantic, which is the study of the relation of signals, functioning as symbols and their referents, is primarily concerned with symbolic meaning. The signals are treated as symbols that have both denotative and connotative powers.²¹

The Russian interested in providing his nation with the best possible international outreach effort, would, most likely, be more interested in the pragmatic and semantic dimensions of information theory. Using the pragmatic dimension would permit him to devise a message which would influence the behavior of those receiving the message--perhaps to attend a Russian exhibition or a lecture concerning the Communist party theories. He would be concerned with the semantic dimension if the message's main goal was to create a more

favorable attitude toward the Soviet Union. American international outreach efforts would probably also include the pragmatic and semantic dimensions, but it would further include the use of the syntactic dimension. The syntactic approach permits the creation of a message in which symbols are used to denote, but not necessarily connote, specific meanings. This dimension is essential for the United States' technique of telling the truth in an unbiased manner whenever possible and for the utilization of credibility techniques.

By using some general theories about how communication takes place, that is, by explaining how the person hearing the symbolic word or seeing the gesture, received the intended message and therefore has the appropriate reaction, it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of both superpowers' international outreach efforts. An excellent explanation of how this event occurs is offered by Melvin L. DeFleur and Sandra Ball-Rokeach.

The first general component of this system is a source. It is the function of the source to formulate "meaning" into message, that is, to select appropriate, significant symbols "message" with which to express the internal responses "meanings" the communicator wishes to present to the audience. The transformation of meaning to message makes the former externally available in the form of significant symbols.²²

This is a good description of exactly what the Russian propaganda writer is trying to do in his international outreach efforts. It does not matter what medium he uses--newspapers, television, radio, film, or books. He wants to choose exactly

the right symbols to give exactly the right meaning to the message he wants to communicate. The Americans also utilize this theory, but not as frequently as the Soviets.

The second component in this abstract scheme is the transmitter. Its function is to encode--to transform the message into information. Information will be defined as some type of event in the physical world which will permit movement over space. Electrical impulses traveling along a wire, electromagnetic radiations in the air, printed visual stimuli on paper and agitations of the air molecules are all examples of information. It is these events in the physical world that conquer distance between distinct individuals.²³

Stated differently, both the superpowers' international outreach efforts must select the medium or media which will most effectively convey their message.

A third component in this system is some form of channel.²⁴ This can be compared to Soviet and American actual use of the medium or media to convey the message.

Linked with the channel in this system is the receiver. This component has the function of receiving the information and decoding it--transforming the physical events of the information back into a message.²⁵

In both the Soviet and American international communication efforts the receivers are the people to whom the communication is addressed. Whether mediated through the Voice of Moscow or the Voice of America broadcasts or other media, the message reaches the listeners' ears which hear the message or if the printed word is involved, the receiver's eyes which see the symbols, and finally, his brain which provides the meaning.

Once the message "set of symbols" has been perceived, the final component, namely the destination, responds to these with the denotative and connotative internal experiences we are calling meaning. Thus the function of the destination is to interpret message into meaning.²⁶

In the case of both the Soviet Union's and the United States' efforts, the person abroad who is receiving the propaganda is the destination. It is important to remember that both superpowers are reaching a variety of destinations with a variety of messages in a variety of ways.

After these components have functioned, if the meaning of the destination is isomorphic with the meaning of the source which originated the act, then communication can be said to have taken place. Thus, communication amounts to achieving a parallel in the structure of the internal meaning responses of both a source and a destination.²⁷

In other words, if the Soviet propagandist uses the words American imperialism, and the person receiving the message understands those words to mean that the United States wants to rule the world, then the Soviet propagandist can be said to have successfully communicated. However, if the person receiving the message hears the words and decides inwardly, "it's nothing more than the same old lies again," then the Soviet propagandist has NOT communicated effectively. The same examples applies to the United States. If the Voice of American newscaster characterizes the people of a Third World country who disagree with United States' policy as radicals, and the receiver takes it to mean those people are extremists who cannot be reasoned with, the American propaganda effort can be considered successful. If, on the

other hand, the person receiving the message decides, "These people are nationalists, defending what they believe to be their country's way of life," then the American effort has failed.

It is important to note here that there is one aspect of this particular communication theory which neither the Soviet nor the American propagandist has ready access to, and that is the feedback component.

Another component of the system is the producer of content. This component's primary link is with the financial backer or sponsor component and with the distributor. . . .²⁸

In the Russian system, the producer would be the Ministry of Russian Foreign Culture and Agitrop which determines party policy to be included in propagandistic statements, and the sponsor supplying the funds is the Soviet Presidium. In the United States, the producer would be the United States International Communication Agency and the sponsor would be the U.S. Congress, and the Executive Branch.

Another mass communication theory which might be correctly applied to the two superpowers' propaganda efforts is the one constructed by H.H. Westley and M.S. MacLean, Jr. They begin with the premise that there is a vast difference between face-to-face communication and mass communication.

First, face-to-face communication involves more sense modalities than mass communication. Visual cues, paralinguistic cues, olfactory cues, and kinesthetic cues are available to the participants in face-to-face communication situations.

Second, in face-to-face communication the participants have access to immediate feedback from

the receiver whereas in mass communication the feedback is delayed if present at all.²⁹

Their model of mass communication is designed to point out these two major theories. It is based on the concept that if a person cannot receive information about other persons and objects he needs so that he can understand his relationship to his own environment, then he must depend on a gatekeeper:

[The gatekeeper will] select relevant information from the environment and pass it on to him. The gatekeeper in this model is the mass media, and it functions to select and transmit information otherwise unavailable to [the person. . . .] In a sense, the function of the mass media is to extend selectively people's information environment.³⁰

Both the Russians and the Americans utilize this mass communication theory. They provide information to people in underdeveloped countries to play up the virtues of either Marxism-Lenninism or of democracy. Unless the other nation has launched a similar propaganda effort in the same country, the first message received is usually the one the receiving person believes. However, if the American effort happens to include telling both sides of a story--which it frequently does--then the receiver has the chance to decide for himself which country is telling the truth.

In addition to these two theories of mass communication, there are also communication models based on the mechanistic, psychological, interactional and pragmatic perspectives which help to understand the superpowers' international communication

efforts. Of the four, only the mechanistic model probably would not apply to the United States or the Soviet Union. The mechanistic perspective is based on the assumption that the focus is based on the channel of communication and that there is a constant flow of information between the source and the receiver.³¹ Neither the Russians nor the Americans have any way of receiving accurate immediate feedback on their propagandistic activities, and thus, the model would not apply. But the other three approaches to describing communication can certainly be used.

The psychological model assumes that people exist in a stimulus field or information environment but there are too many for the person to process each stimulus. The communicator produces information in the form of signs and symbols in an organized manner which easily identifies the message as a body of information. As the interpreter receives the message, they are automatically processed through conceptual filters which can be described as ". . . attitudes, beliefs, motives, drives, images, cognitions, self-concepts, precepts, or orientations. . . ."³² Once these conceptual filters have acted upon the information, the interpreter responds by producing additional stimuli, which is called a behavioral response.

It is easy to see why this particular perspective would be applicable to the Soviet international outreach effort. In fact, given the success of the Soviet approach,

it is fairly safe to assume that exactly this type of thinking is often used in constructing propaganda messages, although it probably would not be recognized by this name. To a lesser extent, the Americans rely upon this model as well. Both superpowers have to be aware of those internal beliefs and attitudes through which their information must be filtered before they can design a message which will have any measure of success as a means of mass communication.

The interactional perspective is also employed by both the United States and the Soviet Union, although the Russians use it more frequently in their strategies of interpersonal contacts, friendship societies and international organizations.

According to this communication model, the communicator is a person who has developed his potential as a human with social interaction with other humans.

The communicator in the interactional model is thus performing or acting a role. Part of his role behavior involves role taking. The communicator views self from this perspective of other as well as the other from the perspective of self. The communicator, then, can adapt her behaviors to the other person by aligning those actions with those of the other person.³³

The pragmatic perspective of communication is based on the behaviors of the persons involved. "Communication in the pragmatic perspective begins with the behaviors of the persons involved in communication. The most fundamental unit of communication, then is the act . . . which are then

categorized into the various functions performed by communication."³⁴ The acts of communication occur in a continuous chain of events and thus the very order in which the act is repeated becomes significant. These interactions of one communication act to another will change over time. In other words, ". . . the communications system leaves one phase of interaction and enters another. . . ." ³⁵

Here again, the Soviets make better use of this model than does the United States. The Russians have shown their ability to take advantage of any event which can be turned to their own purposes, and usually, although the mode or channel of communication remains the same and occasionally even the approach, the signs and symbols are changed to communicate on a current basis.

In the next section we will see how the superpowers use and fail to use these communication dimensions, theories and models by studying first the United States' international outreach efforts and then those of the Soviet Union.

U.S. International Outreach Efforts

This section is designed to explain why any nation undertakes an international outreach effort and more specifically why the United States government felt compelled to launch such a project. It also includes an analysis of the United States International Communication Agency, including

its goals and objectives, the strategies and techniques used to achieve them, and the effectiveness of the United States' efforts to alter public opinion on a worldwide basis. The need for an international outreach effort on the part of the United States has never been disputed by either political party. For the Americans, it was necessary to discount Soviet propaganda which described the American people as enemies of all eastern European countries and represented the Soviet Union as the only superpower interested in the common man and in maintaining world peace. The need for international outreach is a commonly agreed upon fact, although the two political parties in the United States often disagree on the strategies to be used or the amount of funds to be spent. Both parties have made their agreement clear since 1964.³⁶

Earlier, the idea of peacetime propaganda by the United States had not been considered so favorably. But in 1964 the Democratic position was that, "The United States Information Agency has been transformed into a powerful, effective, and respected weapon of the Free World. The new nations of the world have come to know an America that is not afraid to tell the truth about itself--and so can be believed when it tells the truth about Communist imperialism."

That same year, the Republican party declared, "We will take the cold war offensive on all fronts, including, for example, a reinvigorated USIA. It will broadcast not our weaknesses but our strength. It will mount a psychological warfare attack on behalf of freedom and against Communist doctrine and imperialism."³⁷

By 1967, for the first time in history, more than half of the people in the world could both read and write. That

meant that only four adults out of every ten were still classed as illiterate. "In these new circumstances, public opinion among the masses, as distinct from attitudes of government, has become a preoccupation of world leaders as never before."³⁸

However, this attitude did not come easily. It was not until World War II that the United States began a major international outreach effort. Before then, efforts were limited to such things as the 1936 Buenos Aires convention in which 21 nations, all friendly to the United States, met for the promotion of cultural relations and the creation of exchange students and university professors programs. Then in 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt set up an Inter-Departmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics, which was later renamed to Committee on Scientific and Cultural Co-operation.³⁹

The first real attempt at international information dissemination began in 1942 with the creation of the Office of War Information, headed by Elmer Davis. This initial effort served to teach Americans the importance of psychological warfare, and it was under the aegis of this agency that the Voice of America broadcasts first began. Information offices, providing documentary films, book translations, radio broadcasts, photo displays, libraries, public speakers bureaus, news releases, press photographs, magazine articles, posters, film strips, and pamphlets were established in western Europe.⁴⁰

After Harry S. Truman became president, these activities were decreased to the bare minimum. Truman realized the effort was too important to be abandoned entirely, but he was not willing to continue to allocate large amounts of federal funds to continue the program at its previous level. But then, after a 1948 congressional junket, American leaders were made aware of the fact that foreign propaganda activities were even stronger than the United States' efforts in some of the countries in which the United States was spending the most money with the Marshall Plan. The result was the establishment of the U.S. Information and Education Act, which provided increased funding for American international outreach efforts. The USIA was formally established and Theodore C. Streibert was named to be the first director.⁴¹

By the time Streibert resigned, President Dwight D. Eisenhower was able to write to him, assessing his effectiveness favorably:

You and your colleagues have developed the United States Information Agency into a strong arm of our country in our struggle for world freedom. It has now been firmly established. It presents the truth about the United States and our foreign policy factually to all the world which is free to hear its voice, and many behind the curtain who are not free have managed to hear it also. The pioneering work which you have done has proved the validity of our concept in creating the Agency three years ago.⁴²

It is necessary to backtrack for a moment, and study the first United States international outreach effort established during World War II. Veteran newsman Elmer Davis

assumed leadership of the War Information office, and thanks to him, American leaders began to believe in the effectiveness and psychology of propaganda both at home and abroad. Davis did not hesitate to use international sources such as The Voice of America or domestic sources, such as local newspapers, to disseminate the information he wanted to reach the public. The Office of War Information began to produce news reels for use in theaters and began to translate books dealing with the negative aspects of the communist party. He did not let any propagandistic opportunity pass him by. Davis utilized pamphlets, films, newsreels, the newspapers, posters, billboards, or any other communications methods which would counteract communist propaganda efforts.⁴³ Although Truman was not willing to supply as large an amount of money, he did establish the temporary International Information Office with the goals of disseminating information about the United States to the U.S. Armed Forces and persons working in foreign embassies during the war. However, Truman's attitude underwent a gradual change, when, as mentioned earlier, it was discovered that foreign nations' propaganda efforts were even stronger in Marshall Plan countries. Truman began to believe the United States should include foreign propaganda activities as part of its foreign policy. In April 1950, in a national speech, Truman attacked American newspapers, telling the editors and publishers that American propaganda must be placed around the world in every area where Soviet

propaganda was already established.⁴⁴

When Streibert assumed leadership, he said it was time for the American International outreach strategy to change. The United States could no longer disseminate mere propaganda; instead it would concentrate on providing real information. The U.S. Information Office began with radio broadcasts to democratic Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and it was responsible for the United States' information efforts in the Fifties as well as for the activities of the Voice of America. Since the Russians did not permit U.S. broadcasts from Radio Berlin, the Americans built still more powerful radio transmitters, especially after technicians in East Berlin began jamming some of the weaker stations.⁴⁵ Also during the Fifties, Eisenhower was also encouraging the development of private organizations to provide positive information about the United States in the belief that this effort might be even more believable since it did not come from the government. He endorsed programs such as People to People and Radio Free Europe. One of the advantages was that these private efforts utilized subtle psychological tactics against communist countries and that it did not pretend to be an official voice of the United States such as the Voice of America.⁴⁶

There has been one scholarly study of the USIA made by Leo Bogart in 1954, but it was not released until 1973.⁴⁷ Agency personnel told Altheide and Johnson ". . . the avowed

purpose of the USIA [was] to sell America to the world, especially to those countries most susceptible to communist influence."⁴⁸ The problem was that agency efforts were thwarted by the democratic process itself ". . . congressional, approval, funding, selecting men and women for various jobs, and resolving disputes about the best way to convince them their operatives and legislative overseers they were doing a good job."⁴⁹ In other words, USIA personnel had to spend more time creating propaganda to ensure continued congressional funding than they spent creating propaganda to sell America to the rest of the world.

Part of the effort . . . to ensure future funding was to maintain the appearance at all times of a fairness, probably because some [people] did not understand that you cannot fight black shirts and brown shirts and red shirts with stuffed shirts . . . Idealists who don't believe in hitting below the belt. USIA operators also had to convince their audiences overseas they were being fair.⁵⁰

Leo Bogart stated the assessment a little differently.

We have to maintain the appearance at all times of fairness. We are news reporters, and a reporter does not go out and get just one side of the thing. If you are telling a story, you want to be telling a comprehensive story, even though it's slanted in the sense that you show us in a better light.⁵¹

Once the effectiveness of the USIA was established during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, its importance was even more valued as the Cold War became even colder.

By 1962 when Edward R. Murrow took over as head of the agency almost a de facto cabinet status.⁵² More than

anyone else, Murrow was able to maintain close personal contacts with congress and heads of other government agencies. Finally, by 1968, the information agency was considered completely respectable, had achieved independent status and could be considered a permanent part of America's international outreach effort. In fact, its importance was recognized as early as 1966 when the Advisory Commission on Information summarized the development of the information program to that point.

From its inception, the information program faced difficult problems in management and organization, policy, and programs, facilities and construction personnel and evaluation, and the evolution of its role in the government's structure. Compounding these problems have been the difficulty of establishing an adequate financial and appropriations base and the domestic political controversies concerning its activities which have periodically raged in Congress and in the press. A succession of six directors in the last 12 years--each with a different idea of the mission--did not provide continuity and stability to the Agency's direction and leadership.

Improvement in the program's operation came slowly. Thanks to congressional investigations and hearings, public criticism, executive level self-examination, and the periodic reports issued by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, the role of U.S. information became better defined, a sense of professionalism in the area of foreign communications began to emerge, purposes and objectives were clarified, confidence in its methods grew gradually, and in more recent days there are encouraging signs that management and administration are improving. This has taken some 17 years of effort, of trial and error, of mixing and meeting short-range crises with long-range considerations.⁵³

By 1979 the agency's role was so well accepted and its need so well recognized that President Jimmy Carter was willing

to broaden its scope of international outreach activities and as a result renamed the information disseminating entity the United States International Communications Agency.

International events have shaped the main objectives of the agency as much as legislative and executive actions of the U.S. government. The agency's main concern is, of course, the advancement of United States foreign policy interests by informing and persuading other nations of the United States' intent and actions. At times, it has also acted as a sort of public relations consultant for the president and his advisors, and today its role is a sort of compromise; it does more than try to project a positive national image of the United States, but it is not a full-fledged instrument of psychological warfare.

It is interesting to note that while USICA objectives are set out in policy statements and official government documents they are often interpreted in different ways by field operators.

To succeed at propaganda requires leaving a broad residual effect, which means that the propagandist must first decide what residual effect he wants to leave. Accordingly, neither Congress nor the USIA administration has ever clearly set down what the function of American propaganda is supposed to be. . . .⁵⁴

There are, however, some clear objectives. Showing mutuality of interest is one. The USICA wants its international outreach efforts to make the people overseas feel that their good fortune and well being are clearly linked to the good

fortune and well being of the United States. But perhaps the agency's main objective is to fight communism.

USIA is in business to fight communism. Its prime and only objective is a strong, dynamic, anti-communist program. This firmly held view within USIA ranks is supported by the contention that Congress, especially appropriations committees, believe this to be USIA's most important mission--even its sole one.⁵⁵

Friendship is another important objective. In other words, the main task of persuasion is like the Soviet Union's, the USICA needs to create a favorable opinion of the United States in foreign countries. The underlying reasoning is that there will be more confidence in foreign policy if the United States is admired and approved of. Listeners are always more receptive to propaganda efforts in a friendly atmosphere. Another objective is to strengthen the United States' chief foreign policy aims, including the strengthening of democratic unity in the free world as well as the institutions of democracy. Thus, it becomes important to support governments of American allies.⁵⁶

The USICA's Office of Policy does not form or change political policy. Its job is to translate government policy into "understandable terms, bringing to bear on the problems background information from the wire services, foreign broadcasts, intelligence, and State Department telegrams and information policy statements."⁵⁷ The office should determine the kind of emphasis an event should receive, and the types of media to be used to achieve that emphasis.

According to Henderson, the USICA has four major goals to be achieved through six major strategies. The goals are:

- the vital need for supporting and furthering the aims of the United States foreign policy;
- the necessity for maintaining and strengthening friendly relations between the United States and other countries;
- the imperative need for counteracting the inspired flood of misrepresentation as to the United States' aims and policies abroad, and
- the necessity and the wish to cooperate with other nations in attaining world freedom of information and to further the objectives and programs of the United Nations.⁵⁸

The main strategies are:

- tell the truth;
- explain United States' motives;
- bolster morale and extend hope;
- give a true and convincing picture of American life, methods and ideals;
- combat misrepresentations and distortion, and
- aggressively interpret and support U.S. foreign policy.⁵⁹

U.S. Communication Techniques

However, none of these goals and strategies are realized without specific techniques of achievement. One of the most important techniques is the selection of media. All media are valuable in the United States' international outreach efforts. All media can be used in each country in which the USICA seeks to achieve its major objectives, and these efforts must be coordinated. However, it should be remembered that coordination is no easy task. Each medium

can be used to supplement or complement the others.

Radio complements motion pictures. The centers serve as a repository of more detailed information to supplement the operations of other media . . . Leaflets given out at film showings or exhibits can address themselves to specific points that complement the presentations of the broader issues. They will be passed along to provide a permanent reminder of the themes.⁶⁰

Media selection must, of course, be geared to the individual audience. If most of the audience is illiterate, films and radio broadcasts are the best media, and publications should be used only sparingly. Films are most effective in areas where radio broadcasts cannot penetrate. Local radio, films and leaflets are most effective in contacting hostile or neutral targets--particularly because they can be used to reach an audience which has gathered for another purpose. There is one important restriction to keep in mind.⁶¹

A specific target audience cannot always be reached through a specific medium. It is impossible to break down specific targets by the media used to reach them. A combination must be used to reach specific key groups, varying from country to country. For a broad target, it is better to reach many different people with one medium than to reach a few many times through different media.⁶²

The USICA is faced with the formidable problem of appealing to a variety of audiences in a variety of cultures. Information must be adapted to and presented in such a way so that it will appeal to the audience receiving it. This includes both the content of the message as well as the media used to deliver it. But no matter whom the audience, the USICA person providing and disseminating the information

must identify himself as well as the information with the ". . . interests, outlooks, and even the familiar media format and language. . ." ⁶³ of those he is seeking to persuade.

The most effective tone for an information statement is a matter-of-fact presentation of facts. People are more likely to believe an information source that is calm and factual rather than one that is constantly haranguing them with emotional outbursts. However, it should be remembered that facts and emotions can be combined effectively. For example:

--News stories should be written and combined so that they produce a cumulative emotional effect;

--Some emotional buzzwords can be used, so long as the information officer is certain the audience will not consider them too propagandistic;

--It is perfectly acceptable to use existing hostilities and play upon those; and

--In broadcasts, voice and inflection should be both expressive and when the need arises, strongly emotional. ⁶⁴

The tone of the message is only one of the techniques which can be used in effective international outreach. Bogart suggests a number of ways to ensure the credibility of USICA statements:

--stressing a simple, well-known fact that is easily recalled;

--avoiding an explicit conclusion;

--generalizing to imply that no one in the world would sincerely challenge a particular statement or theme;

--delivering a message in a calm, sober tone of voice;

--including self-criticism that produces the impression of honesty;

--admitting self interest;

--pursuing the same line on a subject in different ways;

--distinguishing clearly between news and commentary, and

--organizing facts so logically the audience draws the desired conclusion.⁶⁵

The USICA is probably the most effective weapon the United States can wield against communist propaganda. However, stating the truth is not enough. There are several techniques which can be used to counteract Soviet propaganda.

--The Communist accusations are never referred to directly. For example, if the Russians decide to exploit something they know other people will see as an evil in American life, there is no point in attacking Soviet evils. Instead, it is better to simply contrast the democratic and socialist systems. In other words, the assault should be round-about and not frontal.

--Or the communist charge can be mentioned only as a starting point. In other words, the charge should be stated accurately, but not so that it might indeed appear truthful

and any mention should be kept to a minimum. Constant repetition of communist charges against America serves only to help the Soviets and hurt the United States. In short, there is no point in doing their work for them.

--It is possible to tell BOTH sides, which is often the most effective technique of all. A balanced account is most effective, especially if the audience is hostile to begin with or it is important to remember NOT to distort the original charge. That would result in decreased credibility if the original charge were ever discovered.⁶⁶

Another technique for adapting a message to a target audience is the use of unofficial American media or individuals who can sometimes be more credible than government officials. Sometimes non-Americans, not necessarily nationals of the target country, can also be effective. Occasionally it is a good idea NOT to attribute certain ideas to U.S. government agencies because if that were to be done, the target audience might very likely regard those statements as biased. That is the time when nonofficial American sources that closely resemble the target audience carry more impact than an official spokesman's.

This theory is based on several assumptions:

People can be appealed to through a common bond rather than nationality. Therefore, information from a non-official American source that resembles the target is more acceptable than output coming directly from USIA.

A statement by a well known American, such as a newspaper editor, and not a government

official, carries more impact than an official spokesman's.

USIA should try to get prestigious American organizations abroad to adapt statements supporting its themes and objectives so that, whenever possible, expressions of opinion are attributed to some other non-official source. Anti-communist material emanating from American labor organizations is especially effective.

An important aspect of utilizing private individuals to spread the governmental word is that once they are started, many of them continue independently. Being unofficial, they can spread information about American capitalism more effectively than the U.S. government. To induce private American firms and industries operating abroad to supplement USIA activities, the agency should convince them that "it is their patriotic duty." USIA's 'big mistake' is not sufficiently exploiting these potential resources.⁶⁷

Still another effective technique is that of interpersonal contact. Word of mouth is one of the most effective ways to influence other people's attitudes. It has the advantage of providing an enormous return on a very small investment.

A person is apt to believe another person. There is a certain warmth of relationship, a certain credibility that you get, more than from a printed piece of material. . . It isn't what you said . . . it's the confidence you've gained. When you get home, you can do a hell of a lot more because you have the prestige, the backing.⁶⁸

Contact provides still another advantage. If the information provider has contact with people in his target audience, he will be able to communicate more effectively through the mass media. But it is important to remember that interpersonal contacts require special planning and special techniques, including such things as card files identifying those

to be contacted according to their professions, business purposes, or interests. The most important aspect of interpersonal contact is, of course, kindness and friendship by the right USIA personnel. It is ". . . worth many times the equivalent effort expended on formal and official media for selling ideas."⁶⁹

The crossover area between films, motion pictures and television is another excellent technique. USICA productions range from how-to-do-it educational films to documentaries promoting the beauty and virtues of the American way of life. It is a fairly well established fact that all types of films and video tapes reach an enormous audience abroad, particularly in places where the number of radio receivers capable of bringing Voice of America broadcasts or American publications are limited. Films seem to be the most effective medium of communication in poorer areas where the literacy rate is low. The use of television has increased rapidly over the recent years. Television audiences were, at first, made up of those persons who were economically well off enough to be able to purchase a set. But now the price of television is coming within reach of all but those at the lowest economic levels. The result is that the United States has an advantage over the Communists in this respect because English has become the most widely used language in the world.⁷⁰ Because films are expensive to produce and because many underdeveloped countries have either no film industry

or only a small one at best, there is a huge market for U.S. films and tapes, despite the fact that many countries restrict the number of television or motion pictures which can be imported within a given period of time. These films are distributed through American overseas theatrical distributors, and arrangements between public affairs officers and local theater distribution outlets. The USICA also sponsors on its own, the showing of films or loans them to groups or organizations interested in sponsoring showings. Most information offices as well as U.S. embassies have screening rooms and public showings of these films and television programs are regularly scheduled. There are even mobile vans equipped to show these programs which can be used to reach people in remote locations. Most of the USICA programs are documentaries, designed to help achieve long-range goals and seeking to balance and offset some of the distortions of American life portrayed in Hollywood motion pictures.

The United States does not hesitate to use other devices and strategies including off-the-record interviews, information exchange programs, cultural outreach, providing or refusing to provide economic or technical assistance and traditional public relations techniques. The exchange of persons between countries has always been one of the USICA's major functions. The agency is responsible for handling the arrangements for and promoting international tours for creative and performing artists as well as athletes. In

addition, the agency arranges for U.S. participation in international trade and art fairs and exhibitions.⁷¹

One of the most popular forms of information exchange has been through the use of specially produced magazines. For example, in 1955 the United States proposed, via a note from its embassy in Moscow, the circulation of a Russian language magazine, "cultural and non-political in character, devoted to an objective presentation of various aspects of American life."⁷² The Soviet government accepted the proposal, but in return they insisted they should have the right to circulate a magazine of the same type in the United States. By October 1957 the first issue of what was later called Soviet Life appeared on American newstands while America Illustrated began a circulation in the Soviet Union.⁷³

Another little known technique for achieving basic goals is the USICA's research function. Its goal is to conduct "special studies overseas to determine communications patterns, foreign attitudes toward the United States and its policies, target audiences, and the effectiveness of USICA programs."⁷⁴ In addition, this section analyzed field reports publications from all over the world to determine specific information and projects for specific areas.

Cultural activities also play an important role. Most of the material distributed under this division includes books, music, educational materials and materials relating to other aspects of American culture. "Its primary purpose

is to plant the seeds of understanding, respect and friendship for future harvest, rather than to influence attitudes on current issues."⁷⁵ This division supports libraries and reading rooms, exhibits and provides USICA field officers with advice and information on the best way to use these materials. In addition, research assists foreign publishers with translations and arranges for publications of English editions of the books to be sold at very low prices. There are even some English teaching programs designed to promote mutual understanding.

Other forms of American international outreach include people-to-people programs ". . . such publicly supported projects as hospital ship HOPE, involving the conversion of a U.S. Navy hospital ship into a privately financed and operated mercy-training demonstration mission to Asia, Latin America, and Africa."⁷⁶ Providing or refusing to provide technical or economic assistance is still another method, ". . . and the selection of projects to assist can be powerful political instruments abroad."⁷⁷

But perhaps one of the most important functions of the USICA, which encompasses many of those mentioned earlier, is to serve as a public relations agency for the U.S. government.

From the point of view of the agency, the public relations function may be considered the most important of all the five main assignments. . . Unless public relations considerations can be taken into account in policymaking, and unless

communications technicians have time in which to prepare for major developments, all other efforts of the Agency are likely to be nullified. Yet, to be fully effective, this function must be thoroughly understood throughout government, and its usefulness must be completely accepted.⁷⁸

If the USICA does not report government officials' speeches or government agencies' actions, the commercial news services and foreign correspondents will. And if these government actions are ill considered, badly timed, or phrased in offensive terms, sending news of them abroad only magnifies their ill effects. The agency can attempt to put them into context, but it cannot ignore them.⁷⁹ However, this aspect of the agency's role is often not understood or appreciated at home. In contrast, the agency's public relations work abroad is highly valued.

The chief of a USIS post is the advisor to the American ambassador. His responsibility includes advice and supervision of dissemination of information. He has the rank of minister at the largest posts and of counselor at other principal missions. By executive order of December 11, 1965, the Agency is specifically designated to perform all public information functions abroad with respect to foreign assistance and development programs of the United States. Also at most international conferences abroad, the USIS officer is detailed as official spokesman for the delegation in its dealings with press, radio, and television. USIA also provides a public affairs staff for the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, and often the public affairs advisors within the Department of State are USIA officers on temporary detail.⁸⁰

But despite all these efforts, the question of how effective they are remains. No one, not even USICA personnel themselves, is really quite sure of the effectiveness of the

organization's international outreach efforts.

There is no single answer or common agreement on criteria of what effectiveness is. Without such a definition, no efforts can be evaluated. The marvelous naivete of this last statement makes it worth noting that it was uttered by one of the top officials of the agency.⁸¹

Agency personnel explained the problem to Bogart:

My basic criticism comes from seeing those guys develop plans for proceeding in their countries and then reading what they have done and getting an impression of great undirected activity ultimately justified by occasional bread-and-butter letters from high government officials saying "You are doing a good job." An assessment of what they do can be made only if they first determine what they intend to do.⁸²

Another problem is that a general definition of effectiveness could not possibly be applied to all projects. There should be specific measures of effectiveness for each specific task. As one agency staff member told Bogart:

We have not got any clear-cut impression throughout the world about what we are, who we are, what we are like, and what we stand for. It sometimes seems incredible that there are tens of millions of people in this world who don't know that we are the war party. There it is. It seems to me that unless you start out with a master blueprint and then cut that up into sections and have considerably more criteria, you will go on hoping that the coincidence of a thousand ideas will inspire confidence.⁸³

Bogart also points out that agency personnel have a tendency to confuse activity with effectiveness. He quotes another staff member, saying people in an organization knock themselves out in the belief that if they don't, the world will fall apart and if they do, the world will be saved. It's bad because it tends to distort the actual situation. A

man comes into a country with a population of 10 million, and he's there with a couple of people. He works frantically. He tends to confuse his activities without output and output with impact and impact with results. He feels that because he is very busy then things must be happening, but that attitude gets everything out of focus.⁸⁴ Of course, this problem of associating cause and effect is characteristic of all social change efforts.

Effectiveness of U.S. Communication Techniques

Despite these criticisms, it does not mean that USICA activities cannot be evaluated. It has specific influence upon specific actions such as the surrender of troops after leaflets have been dropped or in the election of a candidate favorably disposed to the United States. In areas where both superpowers have international outreach efforts, Russian failures can be considered American successes. "In Norway, the campaign to show American cooperation with the Norwegians worked so well that some Communist publications had to stop printing. Others had to get subsidies from Russia."⁸⁵

It is important to remember that the numbers of people reached are not always an indication of success. Any information campaign, such as the establishment of a library, might reach a large number of people without

reaching the priority target group, and just because a program reaches people, it does not follow that they are affected either adversely or positively by that program. However, a population's liking for a project's output can be considered a measure of effectiveness or popular reaction to the cessation of a specific USICA activity. Informed local reactions are another indication of a project's effectiveness. "The value of a film used in the Philippines is shown by the fact that a local priest said it was worth a thousand sermons."⁸⁶ Bogart also suggests that complimentary letters from high government officials in which a project is launched can also be considered a measure of success.

Communist reactions to programs are another way of determining effectiveness.

If the Communists object to something USICA is doing, this is prima facie evidence that its ends are being accomplished. Communist press and radio attacks upon Voice of America prove the effectiveness of Voice of America broadcasts. If anyone found with USICA materials is ordered killed by the Communists, this is also proof. Under the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, the success of USICA posters was demonstrated by the fact that newsboys were arrested for passing them out.⁸⁷

Modification of a Communist attitude and mail received by the Voice of America are also good indications. This is particularly important because knowing what the audience is thinking serves to provide data which may be useful in countries where other data is not available. It is possible to infer psychological bent, and the range of interests of

those who listen regularly.

However, Bogart says there are two theories regarding USICA success. One is that the agency's success can be determined by the cumulative effect of its routine accomplishments. As one agency staff member told Bogart of this problem:

It's almost impossible to go down to technical evaluations of the effectiveness of a film. The best evidence we have of effectiveness is that over a period of time something else has happened. The contrasting view is that USICA effectiveness will be proved by having a few striking successes.

Basically the conception has been that if things flow properly, if they're planned to flow properly, you have a minimum of disruption, therefore, you are doing a good job. That's not the basis of good propaganda. It doesn't matter that it's chaotic and that it doesn't flow right if somewhere in it occasionally there are people with a spark and the spark itself emerges.⁸⁸

Thus, the United States can safely assume its international outreach efforts are most successful in those countries which continue to regard Western treatment of themselves and Western actions toward other countries as acceptable.

One of the major problems faced by the USICA is the need to retain a flexible strategy and tactics to implement it in the face of surrounding domestic and foreign political pressures. In many ways, the agency's freedom to act is curtailed by the many governmental decisions which are beyond its control. For example, some policy decisions are so broad that no one agency could possibly influence them. All the USICA can do is deal with these decisions

and effects as best it can. The Vietnam conflict provides an excellent example. The conflict was so unpopular in many foreign countries, and USICA efforts to get a friendly audience to listen to the United States' point of view were greatly hindered. Personnel were compelled to defend American actions without creating additional hostility, ". . . a difficult assignment in such a country as Yugoslavia, for example."⁸⁹

Another example is the 1957 launching of a Russian manmade satellite ". . . the impact on other countries was sensational. Revolutionary changes in education, science, research, and technology resulted in the United States. A frantic race to catch up in the space race and recoup lost prestige began."⁹⁰ The Russian space victory was a propaganda defeat of the utmost magnitude for the United States.

According to the theory of the directive approach, the direction in which information is aimed or the type of information disseminated should not be a decision which is left to the persons working in the field offices--as it sometimes is today. All planning, that is, the strategies to be used and the techniques to achieve goals, should be done in the headquarters office. Field office personnel should simply carry out those instructions. Chapter Five will elaborate on this recommendation.

U.S.S.R. INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH EFFORTS

This section will explain Russia's need for an international communication system, the system's goals and strategies, the media channels used to disseminate information and the credibility of that information. It will also include a case study of actual propagandistic materials aimed at persons living in the United States. Finally, it will seek to determine the effectiveness of the Soviet effort.

Russia's international outreach efforts are more complex than those used by any other country. The reason for this is fairly simple. Although the Soviets are quite willing to use physical conflict to spread their ideology, they are well aware that acceptance of Communist doctrine must come from the general public--the man on the street. Soviet leaders are also well aware of the fact that international outreach efforts are most effective when aimed at the man on the street; thus the dissemination of international information about the Soviet Union and Communist doctrine became a natural weapon. The Soviet diplomatic corps carries out its share of international outreach. Sometimes the ambassador will direct these activities; sometimes it is the press attache and a group of communication specialists as well as communist sympathizers among the local residents.

There is also international radio propaganda, and

for a time, the Soviets led the United States in the number of hours of foreign language broadcasts. For example in 1953 ". . . the Soviet Union broadcast 78 hours a week to the United States while Voice of America broadcasts to Russia in ten different languages totaled 52 and one-half hours."⁹¹ Of course, there are other methods of international outreach as well, which will be discussed more fully later. For now, it is sufficient to note that political works and general books of fiction and nonfiction are also distributed. Weekly, biweekly and monthly publications, featuring expensive four-color photography are circulated. Tass, the official news agency, provides information about Russia to non-communist countries and communist satellites. Films are often distributed, and in some countries, such as India, the Soviet Union will rent a theater for a year, specifically for the purpose of showing these films and movies. There are also Soviet exchange programs--and this program is often called the best method of propaganda. The difference between Soviet and American exchange programs is that Soviet nationals abroad remain under close governmental supervision while Americans do not. Finally, the Russians frequently use the western press for their own propaganda purposes--through news releases from TASS.⁹²

Before studying Russian international outreach efforts, it will be useful to understand something of the history behind them. As is well known, the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics is comprised of a group of different states; however, most of the population is concentrated in Soviet Russia itself along with the capital, Moscow. And it is in Moscow that national strategies for both national and international communications are developed. It is also well known that all communications media in Russia are state-owned and subject to strict government regulations.

In his book What Is To Be Done?, Lenin insisted that all communists should react to all forms of social injustice and they should seek to merge all individual propaganda efforts into one formidable stream of power.⁹³

Despite the fact that the Soviet Union has a highly organized international propaganda operation it is still based largely on Leninist principles. Lenin explained the importance of having ". . . the ability to make all necessary compromises, to tack, to make agreements, zigzags, retreats and so on" ⁹⁴ Only a small portion of the population, about 10 percent, is an active minority with the remaining 90 percent, a passive majority. The active minority is receptive to a sophisticated informational approach; the others will understand only a direct one. ⁹⁵ These principles can be applied both to international and domestic outreach efforts. With regard to capitalistic democracy, Lenin advocated that those guiding international outreach efforts to focus the audiences' attention on

injustices,

engendered by the contradictions inherent in capitalism and will endeavor to rouse mass discontent and indignation against the crying injustice, leaving to the propagandist the responsibility of giving a complete explanation for the contradictions. This is why the propagandist works principally through the written word and the agitator through the spoken word.⁹⁶

However, after Lenin's death, no other leader with the same imaginative use of propaganda has emerged.

Since Lenin's death, contributions to Communist press theory have been negligible, and recent statements echo his principles. Stalin was inferior to both Lenin and Krushchev as a propagandist and made no original contribution to press theories.⁹⁷

However, the belief in propaganda continued, and by 1966 Nikita Krushchev was obviously committed to the importance of propaganda:

We believe in our social system, and we prove and will prove our belief not by means of war, but by peaceful competition, by developing cultural and economic contacts with others. We will fight for our ideas not by means of war, but by struggling for man's mind. And man's mind can be conquered only if man himself understands which idea is better.⁹⁸

U.S.S.R. Communication Techniques

The main goal behind any Russian international outreach effort is to encourage belief in communist theories of government. Thus, Communist leaders use their international efforts to convince peoples of other countries that their main goal is to achieve peace throughout the

world. Their goals are based on the philosophy that the more people in other nations who understand Marxist goals and philosophy, the more sophisticated will be their political understanding of that philosophy, and thus, the more likely those people will be to embrace Russian political ideas. This approach is based on the assumption that Communist party doctrine is the most effective bridge between party leaders and the general public. This effectively eliminates those who would seek unauthorized leadership--simply because the people have been schooled to look to party leadership for the correct interpretation of party doctrine. Thus Lenin hoped that communist sympathizers in democratic nations would arrange for scandals in government, industry, and other areas, so that the people would become aware of the selfish intentions of democratic leaders.⁹⁹

In fact Lenin believed the average worker would not be able to picture himself in the office of any communist party leader. However a worker could envision himself in a real-life situation in his own country or in those situations which Communist propaganda could make him believe existed in his own country. This is the basic example of Marxist theory--educating the public to become aware of its social mistreatment. Any problems in a particular society should be focused on by the media writer and he should not concentrate on information concerning what is happening in the rest of the world.

For example, communist propaganda would tell persons in a given country that the reason barbershops are empty is because the common man does not even have enough money to eat or for the other necessities of life--let alone the money for a haircut. This makes the point by saying that working people's salaries should be raised so they can afford haircuts. This may ignore the possibility that they don't have enough money simply because the government is taking their money in taxes to establish its own military supremacy. Most westerners believe that Soviet propaganda is designed to misinform them: in reality, the Soviet intent is just the opposite. The goal of Soviet propaganda is to show how Communist government and theories will make their lives better than what they now have under democratic rule.

It is not enough to merely tell persons in democratic countries what should be. The effort must go further to include communicating with the people of a nation and convincing them of the correctness of the communist approach so they will organize in an effort to force the government to give them those things they believe should be theirs. However, it must be remembered that propaganda cannot be effective without a "news peg," that is, it must be based on current events within the country itself. Communist communication specialists are quick to take advantage of political or social unrest based on information from

different sources--usually the people most closely involved such as farmers, factory workers, etc. Thus Stalin believed that the working classes in democratic countries were naive enough to accept the words of those in power; however, that acceptance could be increased if propaganda could be used to appeal to their very real needs--achieving a comfortable life. For this reason, a situation of this type gives Russian communications experts the opportunity to take advantage of any unrest in democratic nations and continue to use it until the people force democratic leaders to listen to them. Additionally, Russian propagandists are not content merely to point out the problems; they will not use the information unless they can show the people how the government has made mistakes in dealing with the problem. Thus, Communist propaganda must combine with a country's own political and economic difficulties if it is to influence the thinking of the common man. In short, there can be no revolution if there are no social pressures dictating the need for revolutionary activities.

With this philosophy in mind, Soviet propaganda goals become a logical method of extending the governmental theory.

On the international level, communist propaganda's main tasks were defined in a resolution of the Party's Central Committee.

The chief task of party propaganda is to explain the ideas of Marxism-Leninism profoundly and comprehensively, to show the successful implementation of these ideas in the course of the party's struggle for the victory of socialism and communism . . . to teach people to use in their practical activity and to creatively develop the theoretical wealth amassed by the party, to rouse the working people to struggle for implementation of the party's policy and to rear active and staunch fighters for communism.¹⁰⁰

Nikolai G. Plaganov, director of Tass, explained it a little differently to Moscow University journalism students.

News must be organized . . . else it is news of mere events and happenstance . . . news must not merely throw light on this or that fact or event--it must pursue a definite purpose . . . News is agitation via facts. In selecting the news topic, the writer of the news story must proceed above all from the realization that not all facts and not just any event should be reported in the press.¹⁰¹

Bogart identified the Soviet propaganda goals and practices more specifically:

--The communist propaganda effort describes the United States as an imperialist power eager to make war on the rest of the world.

--United States' political leaders are described as persons who do not understand Europe, its people, its problems or its needs and must go to war to save the declining U.S. economy.

--The Communists never miss a chance to show that the United States does not practice the democracy it appears to sell to the rest of the world. "All violations of civil liberties and minority rights"¹⁰² are magnified.

--All capitalist countries are headed for economic

disaster.

--The United States has no real culture--all it has to offer is money, and U.S. films and books are perfect examples of its lack of culture.

--Americans will do anything to achieve their own goals; hence, American soldiers are always accused of committing atrocities.¹⁰³

Remembering that the Soviet Union's international communications strategy is a direct result of Lenin's philosophy which equates the power of a Soviet worldwide information system with the military power of the strongest army in the world, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union continues to spend large sums of money in its war of communication against the Western world.¹⁰⁴

For example, during the 1960's, one of the Russians' most effective methods of attracting international attention was to insist upon wide publicity of any international conference. The technique worked. Thus, Soviet propagandists could emphasize their country's desire for world peace if only the other governments involved would understand and support the Russian proposals. One of the reasons for the success of this technique is that the Soviet government can make the foreign policy decisions in advance and in complete secrecy while other foreign policy makers in democratic nations must contend with the almost certainty that some snooping member of the mass media is sure to ferret out

U.S. strategy before the meeting begins and blast the so-called secret information all over the world. Thus it is obvious the Soviets can demand and receive as much publicity as they wish for any meeting of heads of state.¹⁰⁵

In many other ways, Soviet propagandists and their artistic, scholarly, and scientific collaborators have in recent years attracted the attention of various world audiences. Among the devices are exhibitions, participation in international trade fairs, foreign performances by Soviet athletes, dancers, and singers, and the export of books, periodicals, musical scores, and films.¹⁰⁶

Another effective Soviet tactic is to try to reach any world audience which information communication specialists deem appropriate while at the same time, denying to foreign communicators all but the most limited access to Soviet communication media. And all foreigners, even those from communist countries, are forbidden from having an unchaperoned face-to-face interview with the average Soviet citizen. This includes such individuals as Soviet authors, philosophers and other intellectuals.¹⁰⁷

Another strategy seems to indicate that the Russians are seeking innocence by association, especially in terms of the familiar Russian device of quoting out of context excerpts from the popular press of free countries and making them appear to support Soviet policies. They also seek to "associate respectable, non-communist political, business, or cultural leaders with Soviet or communist causes and movements."¹⁰⁸

Soviet policy is linked both to the complaints as well as the hopes and aspirations of all types of social, national, and ethnic groups. There are a number of methods by which it succeeds, according to Martin and other American scholars. Instead of using specific examples, only vague references to an event or philosophy are used, even while citing creditable sources. A small number of ideas are repeated over and over again. Perhaps one of the best known techniques is distortion. Certain aspects of Communist realities in the Soviet Union are deliberately withheld from foreign audiences. The Soviets also rely upon character assassination as well as other techniques which will arouse the hatred of class enemies. They feel no qualms about indulging in the blatant political forgeries. Their main goal is to discredit the United States and its allies to nations in the non-western world, to make U.S. allies suspicious of the Democratic Giant and finally to discourage acceptance of U.S. ideas among other countries. Nor are the Russians insensitive to the thoughts and philosophies of the group of people they are trying to reach. Very often, Soviet information aimed at a specific country shows a great deal of tact and understanding toward the attitudes, hopes and beliefs of the target audience. Thus, they are often able to attract Third World countries into their orbit by playing upon the people's desires for the better things in life while seeking to maintain their own customs,

and traditions. In short, Soviet communicators are taught thoroughly about the languages and cultures of the foreign countries at whom their messages are aimed.

Thus far, I have discussed Soviet techniques in a general way; perhaps it would be helpful to look at them more closely. As mentioned earlier, the Soviets limit the flow of information into and out of their country. Tass, the Soviet news agency, serves as a gatekeeper. Tass correspondents are located in most foreign capitals, but only a small portion of the information these reporters collect is used in Moscow's mass media:

(Tass is) practically the sole supporter of Soviet information for foreign consumption, though this monopoly situation is changing. Its broadcasts are made in a number of different languages and dialects. Tass's overseas radio bulletin contains the daily Pravda leader and selected articles from the Soviet press representing a guide on world affairs for foreign Communist organizations. It also carries cultural and economic information of propagandistic value selected from the Tass internal service.¹⁰⁹

The Russians frequently employ the technique of double talk, which uses both Communist party jargon and words with double meanings. There is a double bonus to this technique; it is meaningless to the casual reader and avoids ordering people about the way they should feel or think about a subject, and this does not create a sense of alarm or invite official notice.

Nor do they have a problem distributing the materials they prepare--they have organizations and party members in

every country. Another favorite technique is the "slide in" effort, in which they begin by taking a factual news item or event and then slide into a factual sounding statement which actually distorts the truth but it is so subtle that the average reader is not aware of what has been done. Other strategies include bribing foreign newspaper editors, handling propaganda so that it does not violate foreign censorship codes and using blackmail and threats to force loyalty from people.¹¹⁰

However, the main Soviet propaganda techniques are deception, guilt by association, repetition and deliberate misuse of sentiment. Some of these are conventional techniques for persuading other people to accept a point of view, and some have been developed exclusively by the Russians. The most common method is the use of news items without quoting any source of information. The only sources mentioned are usually unnamed western sources. Of course, these deceptions are not always outright lies--instead the effort is more effective if it is based on a partial truth. When using the guilt by association technique, Moscow sometimes indirectly accuses a country of masterminding a terrorist attack against itself. Often this blame is only implied--the propagandists prefer the reader or audience to draw its own conclusion. Repetition is one of the most effective and oldest propaganda devices. It is based on the belief that if something is repeated often enough, the

person hearing the message will eventually begin to accept it as truth. Thus the Russians repeat the same slogans over and over. Repetition is also used to promulgate the Soviet notion of one simple solution to a problem. This leads those hearing the information to believe that no other solution exists and allows the Soviets to provide well known words with a new, pro-communist connotation.

The Soviets do not hesitate, especially when providing misinformation to Middle Eastern countries, to rely on the technique of deliberate misuse of sentiment. But perhaps the Russians' most effective strategy is to talk to their audiences in terms of immediate problems to be solved or goals to be achieved.

A lot of our criticism of Communist regimes, though meaningful to us, is meaningless to the people we are addressing. They can accept a lot in the way of horror and self-deprivation, government interferences in their daily lives, without being shocked by it. If you come up to them with two separate ideologies, they're more inclined to accept the one that offers them something concrete in the next couple of years rather than in the next generation or two. You go to the villages of Indonesia and an official comes along in a Buick. We come along and say, "In a generation or two, your children will drive around in Buicks like that." The Communist says, "Let's knock off the bastard and take his Buick." He's going to appeal to them.¹¹¹

It is impossible to understand the international propaganda of any nation, let alone the Soviet Union's, without understanding the facilities most nations use to carry out those informational or propagandistic efforts. Obviously consular and diplomatic embassy personnel carry

out a certain propagandistic function for any nation, usually in the form of newsletters about their own country. These are usually prepared by an information officer within the embassy or consulate. Books, maps, posters, pamphlets or brochures about the nation are also available for distribution by diplomatic personnel. These items are usually written for the specific purpose of international outreach. These are distributed at no charge as are documentary films, photographs, magazines and newspapers. And finally, the embassy may arrange for speaking engagements for their own countrymen visiting the nation, and libraries and reference rooms for the general public's use are sometimes provided. Sometimes a nation will use a government department designed to be in sole charge of international outreach activities. Most frequently, it is the ministry of education, or propaganda, or information, or culture. These departments invite students from other nations to come and study in their country. In addition, if a foreign policy or public opinion maker visits, the ministry will arrange guided tours, often with all expenses paid, or they might send special ambassadors abroad to create goodwill for their nation. Other activities include sponsoring international conventions, encouraging communication between people living in their own country and those of the same nationality living abroad or with persons of other nationalities. Another effective information distributor is the news agency--

whether it be owned by the government or private individuals. Also, colleges and universities, clubs and other organizations, and businessmen are also effective means of distributing international information. However, there is one channel of communication that is probably the most effective of all. "Radio is probably the most universal medium of international propaganda. The radio stations that engage in international propaganda are largely government-owned and operated, though some are semiofficial, and others are privately owned or operated."¹²²

Soviet information is no exception. International information is disseminated through a worldwide system of interlocking organizations and channels which can be divided into several main categories. The main portion of the propaganda distribution system is located in Moscow under the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, Agitrop, which directs both domestic and international communications systems. One of the most frequently used media is radio, and thus, a brief discussion of its development within the Soviet Union is essential.

The first radio station was built in Moscow in 1914. Although it had the strength of only one hundred kilowatts, it was used extensively as part of the revolutionary communications strategy. Eventually it came to be known as the October Revolution Radio Center.¹¹³ By 1918 the

government established a laboratory to continue developing radio as a communications medium, and the project received Lenin's full support. The success of the experimental station was such that by August of 1922, the first regularly broadcasting radio station was launched, and by September 1, the first radio concert was aired.¹¹⁴ The Russian people quickly accepted the new form of entertainment and musical programs continued to increase in popularity. However, government officials were not unaware of the importance of radio's political usefulness both at home and abroad.¹¹⁵ During the second World War, radio stations were used only for military purposes, but by the time the war had ended, there were approximately six million radio sets in Russia. After the war ended, research and development continued. More broadcasting facilities were built throughout the country.¹¹⁶

Soviet efforts to develop their broadcasting system did not stop within their own country. The Russians were more than willing to provide technical assistance and facilities to neighboring communist countries. Russian broadcasts were used in Rumania, Poland, Hungary, and North Korea.¹¹⁷ Emery quotes the deputy chairman of Soviet Radio, Andreyev, explaining the extent of post-war broadcast efforts in 1956.

The organizational structure of the Soviet radio tends toward satisfying the demands of listeners

living in different parts of the country and speaking different languages.

At present the average daily air time is 125 hours. Three parallel programmes are broadcast for the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. Apart from that, special programmes are devised for listeners living in the Far East, Siberia, Ural and in Central Asia. . . .

Broadcasting is carried on in more than 85 languages spoken in the USSR and abroad. Not only in the union and autonomous republics but also in small national districts and areas, programmes are broadcast in languages spoken in the respective areas Even such numerically small nationalities as the Evenks, Sakha and others who until the October revolution had no written language of their own now hear programmes in their mother tongue.

The activities of the Soviet Radio are extensive and varied in character. It informs listeners about the most significant events of home and international life, disseminates the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the most important decisions of the CP of the USSR, reports on experiences of outstanding workers and farmers and on achievements in culture, science and art¹¹⁸

The Soviet Union has not hesitated to take advantage of the freedom of information extended to Western nations or even those countries with authoritarian forms of government which do not attempt to control what their people listen to over the air waves. In 1973 some 14,000 hours of broadcasting were directed toward Western European countries.¹¹⁹

In 1976, the Soviet Union's broadcasts to foreign audiences totalled nearly 2,000 hours per week in 84 languages, almost equal to the combined hours of Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe. About 11 percent of Soviet external broadcasts, or about 221 hours, are directed to the Western hemisphere. The Middle East received approximately 186 hours per week.¹²⁰

Soviet interest in communication has increased as

its prestige as a world power increased.

Thus, Leonid F. Ilichev, deputy minister of foreign affairs, stated at a Moscow conference in 1960 that the party had now made "ideological work and the Communist education of the working peoples the central task, and the success of communism as a movement depended largely upon the abilities of the Communists as communicators. Soviet leaders also saw opportunities in new regions, among new nations and in new conflicts and uncertainties of interest.¹²¹

Despite its heavy reliance upon radio, the Soviet Union also makes excellent use of other channels of communication.

Here again, this information is a combination of techniques listed and defined by Martin, Johns and other American scholars. Other types of international outreach efforts include cultural agreements, friendship societies, front organizations, films, exhibitions, literature, sports, the performing arts, and tourism. Cultural agreements with various nations throughout the world are related to science, education, literature, the graphic arts, music, sports, and disaster relief. These activities are controlled from Moscow, as are all Soviet information efforts. By the end of 1973, the Russians had negotiated cultural agreements with 120 countries. This does not include Russian participation in cultural organizations. Some 17,000 cultural workers visit foreign countries annually. Although these agreements are made with other communist countries, western countries, and Third World nations, agreements with the West are usually very specific about what kinds of cultural

exchanges will take place, when and for what length of time. Agreements with Third World countries are somewhat more interesting in that they go beyond what can accurately be termed a cultural agreement and includes such things as the guarantee of Soviet freedom to conduct any propaganda efforts it believes to be necessary. In turn, Third World countries usually send students or journalists to Moscow--which also aids Russian propaganda efforts.

Another channel of communication is the friendship societies. These groups scattered throughout the world are designed to develop and strengthen the friendship, mutual understanding, confidence and cultural cooperation of the Soviet with that of people in foreign countries. These friendship societies are governed by the All Union Conference, which meets once every four years. This Union in turn cooperates with cultural organizations, and delegates from all over the world attend. Within their home countries, these groups serve to provide and promote Soviet interests, including friendship with the Soviet Union; assisting in negotiation of cultural agreements, promoting the Soviet Union's interests in international politics, promoting the study of Russian abroad, and recruiting and organizing those persons who are in sympathy with Soviet policy and theory.

Front organizations are groups which are international in scope and sponsored by the Soviets, although

they do not appear to have any direct connection with the main Soviet international outreach effort. They are designed to organize common groups and to hide the fact that they are sponsored by the Russians as well as the fact that their real purpose is to provide more information about the Soviet Union. All of these groups are sponsored by international celebrities and include prominent Communist party members. Obviously, these groups have a very close resemblance to the friendship societies.

As usual it was Lenin who understood the potential of film as an effective means of international outreach. After the revolution, one of the first things the new Communist regime did was to nationalize and therefore gain control of the film industry. The making of propaganda films began at once, and the Russians immediately began to seek foreign markets. To ensure dissemination of these films, international film weeks are frequently organized.

Exhibitions provide the perfect opportunity to publicly demonstrate Soviet achievements in art, science, and industry. The theme of the exhibitions usually determines which party, governmental, or public organization will assist in assembling the exhibit and presenting it to other countries. Of course, additional informational activities such as lectures or discussion groups are also included as part of the exhibition.

Another channel of communication is literature which has always been considered one of the prime methods of learning about the lives of people in another country. Soviet foreign language publications usually include lists of new Soviet books for sale in that particular country's bookstores. Books are usually advertised as the perfect gift. Another drawing card is the price. Soviet books are among the cheapest in the world.

Sports is one of the most important activities to the Russians, but the reason for this emphasis is purely political. These athletes can often reach audiences which are unaffected by other types of information dissemination. To this end, the Russians try to organize as many international sports events as possible.

Although the physical activities are different, from a propaganda standpoint, there is no difference between sporting events and performing arts tours. Once again, these performances attract audiences which remain unaffected by other types of Soviet propaganda. Performers are considered ambassadors of a superior social system--a fact which makes the defection to the United States of premier danseur Mikhail Baryshnikov doubly embarrassing to the Russians.

Magazines are also an important aspect of Soviet international outreach. Soviet Life has a format similar to the old Life magazine published in the United States.

There are 50,000 copies of Soviet Life published each month.

Half are mailed to subscribers and the other 25,000 are sold on newsstands. Some 2,000 free copies are distributed to government officials and politicians as well as to libraries in the United States.¹²² The editors of Soviet Life believe

its reader to be ". . . intellectuals, students, and school children, and the material is directed at those groups."¹²³

The magazine's Moscow office branch in the Russian Embassy is responsible for details of printing and circulation.

The staff is small, and most of the articles are written by freelance writers, usually persons who specialize in writing about the arts. Additional articles are provided by the Novosti Press Agency, and both photos and stories are purchased on an as-needed basis.¹²⁴ The Soviet Union pays for

publication, and during its early days, the Kremlin spent \$27,000 to \$40,000 per issue.¹²⁵ The publication's goal is for its readers to develop positive attitudes toward the Soviet Union in both political and nonpolitical areas.

Another international outreach magazine is Soviet Union, a monthly propaganda magazine published in 11 different languages, including Chinese, English, French, German, Spanish, Korean, Japanese, Finnish, Hindi, Urdu, and Arabic.

All of these international outreach messages sent along the previously discussed channels of communication are designed to combine all aspects of life--economic, military, political and psychological. The idea is to use

simplified images, combined with information slanted to fit communist party needs. The result is to produce diametrically opposed values, for example, communist virtues versus Western vices, and most of the hostility or bad guy image-- is blamed on the United States. However, today's Soviet international outreach appeals are becoming more democratic and liberal, thus generating even more acceptance from groups which do not necessarily have any direct relationship to the Communist philosophy. The messages are indirectly targeted to increase already existing frustrations. The technique is one of psychological coercion rather than logical persuasion.¹²⁶

Given the total amount of information about the Soviet Union produced by the Soviet Union, it would be impossible to analyze each article or publication on a case-by-case basis. The easiest method, the most efficient for the purpose of this study is to explain briefly and analyze Soviet international outreach efforts directed toward English speaking peoples. The best way to do this is through a brief glimpse of articles published in the Soviet News and studying a series of publications explaining different aspects of life in the Soviet Union. This series published by Novosti Publishers, written in the Soviet Union, and printed in the United States, will illustrate some of the techniques used to achieve the Kremlin's primary information

goal--that of altering peoples attitudes toward the Soviet Union.¹²⁷

I made an unscientific sampling of articles published in the Soviet News from March 6, 1979 to December 11, 1979. The types of articles published include:

--an accusation that the United States has not withdrawn from Asia despite its repeated promises to do so;

--facts and figures on United States' military bases abroad;

--crucial problems listed on the agenda of the United Nations;

--a world disarmament conference;

--a commentary on the relationship between the United States and Iran--shortly after the Americans serving at the U.S. embassy in Tehran were taken hostage;

--an analysis of the difference between Soviet and western aid to developing countries;

--an accusation that a NATO decision has destroyed any basis for nuclear disarmament talks, and

--a commentary about why Western propaganda seeks to deceive other people in other countries.¹²⁸

Although most of the seven previously mentioned articles are relatively short in length, it is not necessary to enter into a detailed explanation of each article's content. Instead, general conclusions common to all articles, are sufficient to illustrate the techniques used in this

particular international outreach effort. For example, nearly all of the articles are based on a grain of truth, then amplified to suit Soviet propaganda aims. The article dealing with the United States' failure to withdraw from Asia suggests that while U.S. leaders agreed to withdraw the American presence from Asia, they have not lived up to their promise to do so. The implication of the article is that Americans had agreed to withdraw ALL types of influence--not just the fighting troops, which was the only portion of American influence which U.S. policymakers said would be withdrawn. The United States never had any intention of withdrawing such personnel in advisory positions or its foreign aid, yet that is the implication of the article. That insinuation coupled with the information that American presence continues is designed to discount credibility in governmental leaders' statements. The same slanting techniques are used in other articles with the goal of discrediting the United States; however, it is important to note that at the same time there is little mention of the Soviet Union's superiority. Another article concerning the relations between the United States and Iran, published after the U.S. hostages were taken, suggests that it is the United States and not the Iranians who are increasing the tension in the area. And finally, in a counteractive measure, the article regarding Western propaganda's attempt

to deceive people suggests that Western democratic newspapers are trying to lull their readers into a false sense of security by suggesting that most Soviet international outreach efforts are merely bluff.

The other most evident Soviet international outreach effort in the Western world is a series of booklets--not inexpensive pamphlets, but small books--printed on expensive paper stock and using four color photographs and psychologically appealing cover pictures. These books deal with such subjects as industry, farming, science, power industry, welfare, housing, and economics. I have analyzed a number of these booklets.

For example the book dealing with Russia's Eleventh Five-Year Plan features a composite photo of a mother and child, a Soviet welder, a Russian wedding, and some type of scientific installation. Other covers feature pictures of children, for the education book; some type of complicated device which one assumes to be used for scientific purposes in the book for science; a child picking flowers in the book about the Ukraine; men in hardhats working in some type of industrial complex with an inset of personnel wearing the special type of protection characteristic of nuclear facilities; a beautiful portrait of high rise condominiums overlooking a blue, pollution-free river in the book on housing; a field of golden, waving wheat (similar to those

of the Oklahoma panhandle), in the book on farming; a beautifully sculpted stone statue of a horse and rider on the book about Armenia; and the pastoral scene of pink clouds over green and blue mountains overlooking a blue lake bordered by flowers in the book about Kazakhstan. This is obviously the soft-sell technique at its most sophisticated. There is nothing threatening about any of the cover photos, and each piques the reader's curiosity to open the covers for a further glimpse of what's inside.

Unfortunately, this is where the Soviet effort fails. The contents are often stylistically inferior and the material content contradictory.

The language is often stiff. For example, in the beginning of the book about the state of Kazakh, the date of the country's origin is described as its date of birth instead of the date of its establishment. The writers attempt to talk to the readers in a folksy manner, and in this particular publication, point out in the first paragraph that they are both village lads themselves with illiterate parents. The implication is clear. If poor Russian peasant lads can become authors--what potential there must be for others living in Russia, willing to work hard and make something of themselves! However, this concept is never directly stated--it is only the clever use of words to leave the implication.¹²⁹

The book on farming, while emphasizing the most up-to-date agricultural machinery, attempts to explain the food shortage by elaboration on the difference between soil productivity and seeks to lend credence to its statement by purporting to quote Russian farmers from each of the areas.¹³⁰

In the introduction on the book on housing, the author quickly explains that

Where housing is a commodity that can be bought or sold, the right of citizens to housing is just so many words . . . But the fact is that in the Soviet Union, the state provides flats for its citizens free of charge. They go not to those who have the most money, but to those who need better living conditions.¹³¹

The impression is that all Soviet citizens are well housed, and yet the section beginning on page 15 discusses rent and the family budget.¹³²

The book on power industry--which can be translated as energy--discusses development of the oil and gas industries as well as the practical application of nuclear, thermal, and solar energies. The Russians do not hesitate to make much of the fact that they are the number one oil producers in the world. What the book does not mention is that several Middle Eastern countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, could have that number one ranking, if the countries' leaders had not decided to carefully husband their production of this non-renewable resource.¹³³

The book on education stresses the excellence of

Soviet educational systems and the available opportunities for everyone--yet goes on to explain the requirements for receiving a high school education.¹³⁴

And finally, the book on economics begins with the explanation that at one time, the Soviet Union lagged far behind other nations such as the United States, then goes on to stress economic growth and how that growth benefits Soviet citizens.¹³⁵ All of the publications contain beautiful black and white as well as four-color photographs, and none of them contain statements that could be construed as the least bit threatening to Western democracies. However, the educated person who has seen both the United States and the Soviet Union for himself will not be easily fooled by the rhetoric.

Effectiveness of U.S.S.R. Communication

Techniques

These goals, strategies and techniques and channels of communication are some of the most important and frequently used methods developed by the Russians to disseminate information and shape world political opinion. However, measuring the degree of that belief, or in other words, the effectiveness of the Soviet international outreach effort is an almost impossible task. It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of either of the superpowers'

international outreach efforts for the simple reason that effectiveness varies not only from place to place and from time to time, but also from strategy to strategy. In limited ways, Soviet propaganda can be said to help create political parties, topple governments and restructure the social order of a developing country. It has a distinct nuisance value because it can influence or convert those intellectuals who have become disillusioned with democratic processes. And it is definitely an important supplement to Soviet foreign policy, reinforcing Soviet military, economic and diplomatic policies. Soviet international outreach efforts cannot, of course, be given major credit for communist seizures of power, but it is certainly a vital part of Soviet power. It has helped convert people to communism or at least taught them enough about communism to ensure they will remain neutral in any disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. And others, who might ordinarily accept communist ideology, have innocently believed Russian promises or mistakenly thought they could use the communists instead of being used by them. The most important aspect of Soviet international information is that it has fostered the attitudes of fear of war, anti-colonialism and anti-western nationalism. Soviet propaganda in the areas of education, scientific progress, economic development and its proposed solutions to what Russians have

termed the nationality problem has proposed to people in Third World countries that Soviet methods are the most effective way to bring their nation the good life. In many Third World countries, Soviet propaganda has reinforced the attempts of local governments to take advantage of the lower class's problems of poverty and hunger. In addition, there have been a number of world crises--most notably in the Middle East in the confrontations between Arab nations and occupied Palestine--and Moscow has done its best to fan the flames in these instances.¹³⁶

In the early 1960's the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda was limited to a certain extent because, although the Soviets talked a lot, they did little to provide the aid necessary to effect a change to a communist form of government. Now, of course, that strategy has changed, and Moscow supplies aid, even when the population of a country might not want it. Also, Soviet embassy personnel were reluctant to associate with persons in their host country. However, they began to relax and participate in informal social activities and quickly learned the value of face-to-face contact . . . that it is even more effective than the broadcast or printed word. However, the communist totalitarian philosophy places some limitations on the effectiveness of this personal contact. In the old days, the Soviets recited the party line almost like a phonograph record--until they

found that most people viewed these recitations as more irritating than persuasive. And the old Russian fear of intimacy with foreigners often blocked the transmission of a message from the sender to the receiver.¹³⁷ As a result, the Soviets determined their most effective propaganda efforts resulted from propaganda spectacles--such as youth festivals--simply because of the failure of the United States and other free world countries to stage similar shows to illustrate the value of democracy. Moscow's more dramatic spectacles are also good for propaganda mileage, and the Russians do not hesitate to use that as well.¹³⁸

Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies on the effectiveness of Russian information to produce the necessary descriptive, historical or analytical explanation of the impact of Soviet international outreach efforts on different areas of the world and different classes of people. It is almost impossible to determine the accurate relationship between a particular political occurrence and a given Russian information stimulus. No one can determine whether any of the four main propaganda measures of effectiveness--responsive action, participant reports, observer commentaries and indirect indicators--can be applied to an analysis of Soviet international information dissemination.¹³⁹

Throughout the world, mass communications experts recognize the importance of a nation's superiority in the field of

mass communications, and it is also interesting to note that several experts also believe that the Russian international communication system surpasses that of the United States.

Often the main goal of a Soviet propaganda project is to increase tensions, considering the effort a success if world attention is focused on a particular issue. It would also be reasonable to assume the Soviet international outreach efforts will be most successful in those countries where the Russians have had the opportunity to lay their own foundations--that is, in nations which have not received large amounts of other nations' propaganda, particularly from the United States, before the Soviet effort was begun. Stated differently, if the Soviets get there first, their propaganda has the most effect. Other countries which seem to be the most receptive to Soviet international outreach efforts are those in which nationalism and the desire for self-determination seem to outweigh the Western tenets of democracy and freedom. Even if the United States launches its most sophisticated counterpropaganda campaign in these countries, it is the Soviet information which is more likely to be believed.¹⁴⁰

Bogart states the Soviet propaganda strengths differently.

Communist strength is ideological. Communism is a religion to millions of people, which means that it carries an emotional force. At the basis of any totalitarian system is a set of concepts which must be propagated and believed . . .

Communist strength is organizational. Communists in democratic countries are organized into a political machine which operates on the ward level of patronage and benevolence. Their voters are much more disciplined than any others. This highly organized political character of the Communist movement has very little to do with ideology.¹⁴¹

Even USICA personnel have a high regard for the effectiveness of the communist efforts. The basic strategy of Communist propagandists is to launch a worldwide program with specific objectives and centralized direction. They are experts, knowing immediately the correct tack to use for a given event and can even control certain events to further their own international outreach goals. Nor do they forget the weaknesses of the United States' international outreach efforts and they do not hesitate to exploit those weaknesses at every opportunity. They can push a given campaign on any number of different levels using different media--all aimed at achieving one major goal--such as the exploitation of symbols as the Picasso dove of peace, and they continue to hammer at such simple themes as peace over and over again.¹⁴²

Another effective stratagem is based on the communists' use of flexibility in their campaigns. They have no qualms about deviating from the truth if the truth will not serve to reach a specific goal.

Convenient falsification, concealed omission, manufactured evidence, and spurious inconsistency have been powerful weapons . . . The Soviets freely distort history and the developing news. They can make black white (show that the South Koreans started the Korean War, for example), distort or edit the meaning

official U.S. statements or take sentences out of context and use them to ridicule the United States.¹⁴³

However, it is important to remember that Soviet propaganda efforts did not always enjoy the success they do now. Despite all their positive effects, there are some drawbacks to Soviet propaganda techniques which serve to decrease its effectiveness. Because of its sheer volume and the emotional content of many of its messages, there is reason to believe the Soviets feel threatened by the United States propaganda efforts as well as the popularity of democracy. Also, it is a generally accepted fact that official Communist media are seldom believed in the communist satellite countries. Also, nations with a disposition to be friendly toward the United States, frequently disbelieve the distortions much of the communist propaganda contains. These drawbacks are only minor considerations and pale in comparison to the volume of Soviet international outreach efforts.

Now that we have seen the goals, strategies, and techniques to achieve them and the relative effectiveness, insofar as it can be assessed, it will be helpful to compare and contrast the two superpowers' international information systems before determining which goals, strategies and techniques are suitable for adaptation for use in Saudi Arabia. Understanding the many similarities as well as the many differences between the United States' and the Soviet Unions' international communication systems in general as

well as serving to pinpoint successful strategies and unsuccessful failures.

The two superpowers have several points in common in their international outreach efforts. Both superpowers utilize the most sophisticated communication techniques to transmit believable information or disinformation about the other countries' policies and about their own. American messages encourage Eastern European nations to view the Russians as a danger to freedom and Soviet supremacy as a means of stifling their independence, while the Soviet Union tries to convince Western European countries that the United States' only aim is economic exploitation. They both use the same media to transmit these messages, including television, books, radio, newspapers, magazines, films, and exhibitions. Both the Americans and the Russians have basically the same general goal--to alter people's attitudes to become more favorable toward themselves, and finally, both nations' propaganda campaigns are closely aligned to their own foreign policy, and both spend large amounts of money to continue international outreach efforts.

However, this is where the similarity ends. For example, even though both nations spend large amounts of money, the amount each spends is sharply different. During the 1960's, no one was exactly sure how much money the Russians were spending on their international outreach efforts. But all indications were that the amounts spent

were very large and ". . . in quantities not matched by the West."¹⁴⁴ One estimate from the West German Ministry of Defense in 1962 put the figures at \$2 billion annually, meaning the Russians were able to spend about \$2 for each person in the world. At the same time, the United States was spending about 1-1/4 cents for each person in the world for its international outreach efforts.¹⁴⁵ However, it is important to remember that the United States and its European allies did not sit idly by while the Russian efforts were occurring. U.S. budgets were also increased. For example, the Voice of America has an annual budget of \$500 million and some 7,500 employees working to counteract Soviet propaganda.¹⁴⁶

In addition, the United States owns and operates several radio stations in Europe, including Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio in the American Sector in West Berlin, and the American Forces Network in Europe. These stations broadcast a variety of programs, depicting the good life in the United States. They also broadcast any American official's comment on and explanation of events in communist controlled countries. These broadcasts are sent both to the United States Western European allies and Soviet satellite nations.¹⁴⁷

Government control of Soviet international outreach efforts results in a well planned propaganda campaign, and

an agency which is capable of conducting several campaigns at once. Although USICA can and does conduct several campaigns at once, government control makes for more disorganization and hampers more than helps international outreach efforts. The United States has an additional advantage in that while the USICA is controlled to a certain extent by the U.S. Congress, it is allowed considerable latitude in its actions.

Another difference is that with any Russian government operation, the goals and strategies to achieve propaganda aims are kept secret. In contrast, the USICA is required to make most of its goals and aims public since it is financed through taxpayers' money. The Americans take an in-the-long-run approach, while the Soviets take a more immediate one. Recall the example of the Indonesian government official and his Buick discussed earlier in this chapter.

The Soviets have friendship societies and front organizations while the United States does not. This is not to say that the United States does not have delegates on several international organizations; however, their public relations duties are secondary.

There is one final and most important difference.

Soviet propagandists can and do lie outrageously when doing so suits their interests. Most of these falsehoods have to do so in one way or the other with the United States and its policies. This, of course, affects the worldwide credibility of Soviet propaganda, but because no one within the Soviet Union will openly challenge a false statement by

the government, it is impossible for press and radio to send abroad a viewpoint that the government would consider distorted.

In the United States, the open nature of society precludes the United States International Information Service [now USICA] to spend much of its time clarifying an image distorted by commercial news and other media. The commercial media of the United States are usually readily available for use by Communist states. Communist media, however, are, for the most part unavailable to the United States, except for distribution of American self-criticism, which is plentiful.¹⁴⁸

With this comparison and contrast of the two superpowers' international outreach efforts, the lengthy task is completed. Communication approaches have been illustrated in Western and Soviet efforts, the United States International Communication Agency's goals, techniques, and strategies to achieve them and the effectiveness of the American effort have been discussed. The same procedure has been attempted for the Soviet Union. However, background information providing the necessary perspective for devising a Saudi Arabian international communication system remains incomplete. The material in Chapter Four will describe both domestic and international communication efforts in the Kingdom.

Thus, as background data for suggesting a Saudi Arabian information effort, we will have information on the two largest such efforts in the world and an analysis of current Saudi Arabian capabilities (largely internally targeted to date) to draw upon.

CHAPTER THREE

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER FOUR

SAUDI ARABIAN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

Before an international communication system for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can be proposed, it is first necessary to understand why the development of the mass media is important to any emerging nation and a little bit of how the media developed within Saudi Arabia. Although our primary purpose is the proposal of an international communication strategy, it cannot be voiced realistically in isolation from communication efforts and techniques within the Kingdom. As we have indicated, little scholarly study now exists of Saudi Arabia's current capability. Any international development will be built on capabilities and technologies already used domestically with appropriate expansion. We will also note that some media such as radio began with a domestic audience in mind, they soon evolved into the beginning of an international outreach effort. We will also review the structure of the Ministry of Information, survey the domestic communications system, that is, the mass media--press, radio, and television

as well as information centers and, finally, survey the international communications department and review the activities of the Higher Council of Information.

We can best discuss Saudi Arabian domestic communications initially in the light of a few basic principles regarding the development of any thpe of mass communications in Thrid World countries. New states, seeking to bridge economic and technological gaps, often seek to shorten what can be called development time by seeking help from more highly developed nations. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is no exception; the nation has relied heavily upon the United States, and more recently, European nations to bridge the communications technological gap. However, unlike other underdeveloped nations, Saudi Arabia, thanks to its vast oil deposits, has not had to seek the financial aid which usually accompanies technology. And yet, despite the fact that the Kingdom does not require financial aid, the two superpowers, that is, the United States and the Soviet Union, have, and will continue, to compete for communications influence in the Middle East. Both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to provide a dominating influence in strategically important Saudi Arabia to protect their own self-interest. Their competition also reflects the ". . . revival, on a considerable scale, of a world conscience."¹

Everywhere there has been a remarkable flood of mass media coverage of the new countries. There has been a great increase in travel from the highly developed

countries, and . . . the stationing of troops overseas, often in out of the way places, has made it possible for otherwise untraveled young men to see how other people live. Educational systems in many advanced countries have shifted their emphasis from the past toward the present, and as a result, are doing a better job of covering today's world.²

As a result, two new perspectives have developed. The first is the willingness to share scientific advancements. Scientists themselves have been most instrumental in furthering this particular perspective. Because technical scientific knowledge is different from land, gold, or even oil, both superpowers are willing to share that information in exchange for influence. Still another perspective has also contributed to the advancement of underdeveloped nations:

[since] a few trouble spots may upset a far wider balance . . . it is now clear that potential problems must be handled where they are. The United Nations has given the underdeveloped countries a new voice and importance in world affairs, and an opportunity to state their problems and to build up friendships and alliances.³

Social change is no longer a mysterious or suspect activity. If problems in less developed societies are gigantic, the tools, skills and knowledge which can be applied to solving those problems are also substantial. Reported firsthand observations have made general knowledge of the fact that modern communications exert a monumental influence on isolated communities in developing countries. Something as relatively unsophisticated as a simple radio receiver placed in a remote Middle Eastern village has proved conclusively that knowledge is power. The radio owner had

immediate status--simply because he was the first to know any information and could control who else knew it. Thus, there is little doubt that modern communication can be influential in a developing culture.⁴

There are four functions of communication which are information, persuasion, entertainment, and transmission of the culture because mass communications are the pipeline of a social heredity from history to prosperity.⁵ Schramm's reasoning for a worldwide development of the mass media is equally applicable to Saudi Arabia.

. . . people know more about the problems. Vastly extended communication has made the situation clear. Roads have come to villages. Automobiles have taken people over the roads. Jet airplanes have connected nations and cities. Mass media have reached down from the cities to the villages. In many ways, therefore, the men and women in the villages have been able to compare their ways of living with those of the city people, and the underdeveloped states to compare their standard with that of the economically developed states.⁶

Less privileged people in underdeveloped nations now have the opportunity to do something about their status. Saudi Arabia does not have economic problems--rather technological problems.

Part of Saudi Arabia's problem when the government sought to establish a mass communications system was that many of its people were illiterate and isolated. Yet their modernization process was inevitable:

It may be that they would have been happier not participating in the struggle for national development or marching to the parade of modern life, but this

is unrealistic . . . if they try to hide from it, they will have nothing to say about what form it takes, and it will seek them out in the form someone else has given it.⁷

Those nations, such as Saudi Arabia, which sought almost immediate development, had to have the cooperation of the people. The government realized that modernization required an adequate flow of information and proper education. "And the only way the [Saudi Arabian government] can do it . . . is to make full use of modern communications."⁸

Saudi Arabia had a relatively small population scattered across an enormous area, and given the state of the art at that time, radio was not capable of reaching all of them. This same factor, coupled with the low literacy rate, meant that newspapers were also an ineffective medium. The Kingdom was fairly isolated from the rest of the world by geographical barriers and lack of communications systems until the Fifties. Since very few Saudi Arabians had ever left the Kingdom, and thus had no basis for comparison of their own nation's use of mass communications to other nation's, there was no internal cultural pressure to improve the media. Few ever ventured very far from their own communities, and news was spread via the spoken word. However, Saudi Arabians living in Jiddah, Mecca, and Medina had been less isolated due to the yearly contact with religious pilgrims during the Hajj, so it seems logical that early development of the mass media would occur there. The government, aware

of its responsibility as protector of the Holy Cities, wanted radio broadcasts to emanate from the same provinces in which those cities are located. The stimulating environment of the central cities fostered encouragement for the venture of establishing newspapers for the exchange of religious and literary ideas, and later for dissemination of news and information.⁹

In Saudi Arabia the mass media played a paradoxical role. On the one hand, they can be viewed as a conservative factor and at the same time served as promoters of social change. The media's role in preserving the status quo can be described in several ways:

(A) All media are either owned and operated by the government or are under government supervision and consequently supportive of government policies;

(B) The media were used to unify the Kingdom psychologically since it was not until the 1960s that a feeling of Saudi Arabia patriotism began to replace traditional community loyalties;

(C) The general public's awareness of belonging to a national community began to flourish with the improvements in road and air transportation which allowed movement about the country and with the expanding centralized government which touched their lives more frequently by providing more and better services to meet their needs, and

(D) Development of the mass media taught them more

about their own country than they ever had had the opportunity to learn before.¹⁰

These functions are typical of the role of media:

Information media usually perform five basic functions for any society, providing the following to a mass audience--information, opinions, reinforcement of social norms, entertainment, and advertising.¹¹

During the eleven years from 1964 to 1975, there were numerous changes in media which had a tremendous impact on society. However, existing social constraints also played a vital role in shaping the media. Commentaries do appear in Saudi Arabian media but only in a highly restricted form. Editorials are run in daily newspapers, but almost no opinions are aired on radio and television. Support for government policies is automatic; however, the media does provide the public with intellectual stimulation through a presentation of news events, people and places. All of the media reinforced cultural traditions. Pictures of Saudi Arabian women are not run in newspapers, nor do they appear as actors or broadcasters for radio and television. Saudi Arabian intellectual expression is fostered by the use of domestically produced radio and television plays, poetry recitations, musical concerts, talks, and religious sermons. Imported programs are carefully screened and censored to conform to traditional social values. References to any other religions, consumption of alcoholic beverages, displays of affection between men and women are edited out. Both words and pictures chosen

for use in the media provided an accurate reflection of the majority of the general public's attitudes. The amount of information made available by the mass media to the general public increased dramatically during the Sixties, particularly in providing news about the government.¹² This tradition carried over into the Seventies with the creation of the Saudi Arabian news agency in 1971. The electronic media provided most of the entertainment for the general public. Night-time television programs were entertainment-oriented, while most radio broadcasts were devoted to music and entertainment. Unfortunately, the Kingdom's lack of an entertainment industry meant that in the early stages of development, both radio and television had to rely on foreign programs. There was almost no advertising function for the media, mainly because no economic basis for advertising existed. Newspapers carried paid advertisements from government ministries and only a few commercial ads.

Ministry of Information

The mass media are controlled by the Ministry of Information. Some background as to the ministry's growth and mission will be useful. The Ministry of Information is organized according to directorates for press, radio, television, and technical affairs with each division headed by a director general. There are three deputy ministers to

assist the Minister of Information in financial and administrative, informational, and engineering matters. Although the central office of the Ministry is located in Riyadh, there are branch offices scattered throughout the Kingdom. The Ministry of Information controls and finances domestic and international information dissemination, radio and television broadcasts, and supervises the printed media, including publication of books and documentary films portraying the culture of Saudi Arabia.

During the process of centralizing the government, the Directorate General of Broadcasting, Press, and Publications was established by royal decree.¹³ This marked the beginning of a policy of censorship and information control and not dissemination of information in the present sense of the phrase. By 1963 the directorate had become a full ministry, and a program of expanding broadcast facilities began, with the goal of providing clear radio signals to all parts of the Kingdom:¹⁴

(A) spreading the tenets of the Islamic religion both to Arabic speaking countries and to other nations as well;

(B) using the dissemination of information as a tool to abolish illiteracy and to increase the educational levels of Saudi Arabian people;

(C) providing Saudi Arabians with media information about national and international events;

(D) providing information about the Kingdom's moderate and logical approach to problems between Islamic nations and thus working to promote Islamic unity, and

(E) using Saudi Arabian influence to play a major role in promoting peace throughout the world.¹⁵ The first Minister of Information was Mr. Jamil Hojallan, the second was Mr. Ibraheem Al-Angary, who assumed office in 1970, and he in turn was succeeded by Dr. Muhammed Abdu Yemani, the present Minister of Information.

Survey of Existing Domestic Communications

Government use of the printed media began slowly, but eventually newspapers, magazines, and other printed materials became an important channel for communicating government policy. During the early years of their development, newspapers had little influence on the general public's attitude. The first newspapers were established in Al-Hijaz in 1908, but all of them were run by people of other nationalities. It was not until 1924 that the Jiddah Barid Al-Hijaz, written by Saudi Arabians, was founded, and it folded after less than a year. Between 1924 and 1932 the only newspaper in the country was the government-established Umm al-Qara in Mecca.¹⁶ It featured mostly religious and literary articles. During the early days of its existence, it was edited by Syrians, although later operation of the paper was handed

over to Saudi Arabians. It was a four-page, handprinted weekly. Several other newspapers, most of which continued the tradition of printing religious and literary articles, were founded during the Thirties. Among them were Sawt Al-Hajaz, 1932; Al Nida Al-Islam, Mecca, 1937; and Al Manhal and Al-Madina al-Munawara, both in Medina in 1937. The latter publication was the only one which made any attempt to cover the news. And none of them lasted very long. Publication was suspended by the government during World War II because of the paper shortage, but after the end of the war, newspaper expansion continued. In 1946 one newspaper, the former Sawt Al-Hijaz, resumed publication under the new name of Al-Bilad Al-Saudiya, beginning first as a literary magazine and then later changed to a newspaper. Al-Madina-Al-Munawara resumed publication in 1947. Both became daily newspapers during the Fifties. Headquarters for both publications were in Jiddah, and coverage focused on local news events, including political and social development.¹⁷

As the Kingdom's economy expanded, due to increased oil revenues in the Fifties, both newspapers then publishing in the Kingdom resorted to the more formal and expanded structure of government by hiring new, young writers and increasing concentration on covering hard news and public affairs. Those young writer's were to become the Kingdom's ". . . first generation of real journalists."¹⁸ A third newspaper, Al-Nadwa was established in 1958, but it did not

join the ranks of the dailies until 1960. In 1953, Sheikh Hamed Al-Jusir established the first publication in Riyadh, Al-Yamama, a literary magazine, and 1956, the only new monthly publication, Al-Izaa wa Tilvizyawn, a broadcast magazine published by the government, was founded in Jiddah.

The information media began a rapid expansion in the early Sixties, and newspapers were no exception. As previously mentioned, Al-Nadwa became a daily newspaper. Al-Nadwa, Al-Biald, and Al-Madina had a combined circulation of less than 25,000.¹⁹ The situation did not remain static for long. Three more dailies were established. Okaz began publication in Jiddah in 1960 and by 1964 began publishing daily issues. Al-Riyadh was established as a daily in 1965. Another newspaper, Al-Jazeera, was founded in Riyadh in 1964, but it did not begin daily publication until 1971. In Dammam Al-Yawm was founded in 1965 and became a daily in 1969. The number of weekly and monthly publications also increased. Two new weeklies commenced publishing during that decade: The Saudi Weekly Newsletter, a government published news sheet for foreigners, was established in 1961 in Jiddah, and in 1964 Al-Dawa, a conservative, religious newspaper, was founded in Riyadh. Four new monthly publications also came into existence:

(A) 1960, Al Tijara, the Jiddah Chamber of Commerce's magazine, published in Jiddah;

(B) 1963, Rabitat Al-Alam Al-Islam, a Muslim World League publication aimed at persons living outside Saudi Arabia, published in Jiddah;

(C) 1965, Tijaret Al-Riyadh, Riyadh Chamber of Commerce Magazine, published in Riyadh, and

(d) 1967, Sawt Al-Haq, a literary magazine, published in Jiddah. In fact the number of printed publications increased faster than the literacy rate.²⁰

In 1965 King Faisal explained why the government began to exert more control over the printed media.

Two years ago our press started discussing socialism and other subjects. Some writers were in favor and others against. When the discussion developed into what we feared might compromise certain governments of leaders, we advised our friends of the press to avoid discussing this subject. We did this out of anxiety to maintain the friendly and brotherly relations with friends, [the Egyptians] but they ascribed this to our strong opposition to socialism. We believe only in Islam, but we do not interfere in the affairs of others. . . 21

One problem with the press was the large number of foreigners working for the daily newspapers who tended to sympathize with the Egyptian president Gamal Abd Al-Nasser. The government probably did not want to control the privately owned print media, but it soon became obvious that government supervision was the only way to ensure that the press and the government remained on good terms and loyal to Saudi ideals. At that time, the government wanted a politically inactive press; one which would avoid controversial issues and not stir up society unnecessarily. However, there were

times when the government wanted and needed the newspapers to issue strong statements--the conflict with Egypt for example.

The government also took several steps to help develop the print media including (1) training Saudi Arabian journalists so as to eliminate dependence on foreigners for newspaper production; (2) establishing a Ministry of Information in 1962, as has been mentioned earlier, and (3) developing the 1964 Press Code which gave the government more authority to intervene. However, the code was also intended to strengthen the newspapers by broadening ownership and setting minimum standards. The code's provisions included the establishment of a board of directors, comprised of 15 Saudi Arabian citizens and requiring each daily paper to have at least five editors, two foreign language translators, a photographer, and three correspondents in three major capitals. Newspaper publishers did not like the code, but the general public did because it held the potential for improving the quality of newspapers. The three daily newspapers promptly conformed to the code's requirements so publication could continue. The dailies also hired and trained Saudi Arabians for staff work, funded by the government's purchase of some 2,000 subscriptions for Civil Service employees and embassy personnel abroad. Newspapers did improve some, but not all of the code requirements had been fulfilled by the end of the Sixties because

most publications continued to suffer financial difficulties. Finally, in 1969 when financial burdens threatened to force one of the dailies to suspend publication, the government began a subsidizing program which continues today.²²

Although the first newspaper was issued in 1908, it was not until 1932, the year of the Kingdom's establishment, that development of the electronic media began. Although use of radio began rather late, the Kingdom was able to catch up quickly because the government was willing to support such a major effort. This section describes the history, development and governmental use of radio as a medium of domestic communications. In 1932 Abdul Aziz had established a private radio network so that government officials in major cities and towns could keep him abreast of local affairs. However, broadcasts for the general public did not begin until 1949 with the establishment of a government-operated shortwave radio station in Jiddah.²³ Abdul Aziz encountered some opposition from conservative religious groups to the establishment of this first radio station, but he had a ready answer. Abdul Aziz told his critics that since radio was not specifically mentioned in the Koran, it was safe to assume the Islamic religion did not prohibit its use, and he was quick to remind the religious leaders that the medium could be used to transmit the word of God.²⁴ Accordingly, the first broadcast was aired in October 1949 on the first day of the Hajj when pilgrims were worshipping

at Mecca, approximately 25 kilometers to the east. His Royal Highness, who was then Crown Prince, Saud ibn Abdul Aziz spoke to the people during the opening ceremonies of the first broadcast, welcoming those who had made the pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. However, the agreement authorizing the first broadcast was not signed by His Majesty King Abdul Aziz and officials of International Telephone and Telegraph until May of that year. Terms of the agreement included transmission and technical administration of the radio station with the goal of serving Saudi Arabians and other Arab and Islamic nations. Other terms included establishing another station in Jiddah as well as facilities in Mecca and other locations. His Royal Highness King Faisal, then Prince of the Hijjaz oversaw station operations and a Royal Decree describing government policy regarding broadcasting and aims and uses of the medium was issued.²⁵ Although the government invited experts from abroad to assist in establishment of the system, it also arranged for training courses both in Saudi Arabia and abroad so that Saudi Arabian nationals could get instructions in all fields of broadcasting.

Early programming included religious and social talks, discussions of Arab culture, poetry, and literature. The only music allowed was military marches provided by the Saudi Arabian Army Band, and it was not until 1950 that a woman was allowed to sing, act, or announce on radio. But after 1956 a steady change in program development began.

Radio broadcasts were scheduled three times daily from 7:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m.; 2:30 p.m. to 5 p.m.; and 8:30 p.m. to 10 p.m.²⁶ Most Friday broadcasts originated in Mecca. Programming included readings from the Holy Koran--12 percent; news, including local social activities and news commentary--25 percent; lectures from authors and historians--13 percent; entertainment--30 percent; and cultural programs, including educational, women's and children's programs,--20 percent.²⁷

However, the real golden age of radio broadcasting did not begin until 1961 when Kin Faisal assumed power. As mentioned earlier, cultural and economic development began in earnest during his reign. Information in general and broadcasting in particular were given special emphasis. When the decade began, there was only one radio station, less than 200,000 receivers and only approximately half a million listeners. By 1975 there were broadcast stations scattered throughout the Kingdom, the number of receivers had increased to 1 million, and the number of listeners was estimated at 2.5 million.²⁸ Programming was increased from seven to 17 hours per day, and variety broadcasts, including programs for workers, women and children, and even military and security forces were added to the air schedule. Saudi Arabians assumed roles as announcers; female singers from neighboring Arab states provided recordings; and tunes were allowed broadcast time during each quarter of the year. Currently songs comprise at least 32 percent

of daily broadcasting. Technical advances also continued. By 1967 a second broadcasting station was built in Riyadh, and eventually a network of transmitters provided broadcasts to western, central, and eastern regions of the Kingdom. Transmission time was increased to 20 hours per day, and still more and more powerful transmitters were built in Jiddah, Riyadh, and other important areas to provide both short and medium wavelength broadcasts.²⁹

The use of foreign language broadcasts also began early. Programs in Urdu for the people of India and Pakistan began in 1949. Foreign language transmissions were increased from 15 minutes to one hour per day, and the languages included Swahili, Persian, Turkish, English, and French. Due to the confrontation with Egypt and inflammatory broadcasts by Cairo's Voice of the Arabs radio, the Saudi Arabian government became aware of the potential use of the mass media, particularly radio, to provide counteractive information both inside the Kingdom and abroad. The Voice of Islam was established with broadcasts from Riyadh and Jiddah. Program schedules included excerpts from the Holy Koran, programs targeted for specific audiences and European Service programs. Currently programs, including those with religious themes, news, songs, drama, and other types, are alternately broadcast from Riyadh and Jiddah. Voice of Islam broadcasts originate from Mecca just prior to the Magrib prayer call at 6 p.m. and continue until the end of the Isha prayer call

at approximately 8:15 p.m. Broadcasts include specific news about the Islamic World and general news about the Arab world. Programming has been increased to approximately 20 hours daily and future plans include broadcasts in Bulgarian, Yugoslavian, Hebrew, Chinese, Russian, and Japanese with about the same diversity of programming as national broadcasting. There are also programs relating to the Holy Koran broadcast from Riyadh and Mecca. Broadcasts from Riyadh begin at 6 a.m. and continue until noon. Programs resume at 4 p.m. and continue until midnight. These broadcasts reach as far south as northern and southern Asia and northern and central Africa. This type of broadcasting began in 1972.³⁰

These international broadcasts are used to reach a variety of different audiences. The main goal was to ". . . combat subversive ideas and mind invasion."³¹ The programming is aimed at Muslims all over the world and includes:

- (A) Persian Section: Broadcasts from 6 a.m. to 8 a.m. with religious, information, cultural, and songs and musical programs;
- (B) Turkish Section: Broadcasts from 7 a.m. to 9 a.m. with the same type of programs as the Persian section;
- (C) Indonesian Section: Broadcasts from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m. also with the same type of programming;
- (D) Bengali Section: Broadcasts from 4 p.m. to

5 p.m. with most of the programs related to religion;

(E) Urdu Section: Broadcasts from 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. and again, most programming has a religious theme;

(F) Swahili Section: Broadcasts from 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. again with emphasis on religious programming, and

(G) Somali Section: Broadcasts from 8 p.m. to 9 p.m. with emphasis on religious programming.

In addition there are European transmissions broadcast in two languages--French and English. "The English Service transmits 37 hours weekly each from the Riyadh and Jiddah stations, while the French Service broadcasts 28 hours weekly."³² However, it is important to note that all of these efforts are under the supervision of the Ministry of Information's Assistant Deputy Minister of Radio and Television--a domestic information service. Thus, as we indicated earlier in this chapter, it is not easy to deal with international communication without noting its domestic origins.

If the early 1960s marked the beginning of the golden age of radio, then the mid-Sixties can be considered the beginning of the golden age of television. After he became Prime Minister in 1962, Faisal authorized " . . . an ambitious plan to create a national television system for the Kingdom."³³ Television had existed in Saudi Arabia since 1957 with ARAMCO's provision of television service to its employees in Dhahran. Unfortunately, this programming was seen only in the Eastern Province, and then only by a few

Saudi Arabians. But in January 1964 Faisal signed an agreement with ". . . National Broadcasting Company (NBC) International, New York, to build a national network with the first test transmissions beginning July 17, 1965 in Jiddah and Riyadh."³⁴ And by 1975 there were transmitters in Jiddah, Taif, Medina, Riyadh, Burayda, and Dammam, approximately 600,000 television sets and an estimated 1.5 million viewers.³⁵ This section outlines that development.

All radio and television stations are government-owned and operated, thus the rapid expansion of electronic broadcasting facilities were the direct result of the government's program to improve existing internal communications. The reason for the program was to increase the sense of domestic unity and national awareness among a widely scattered general population with very little knowledge about one another. There was also a need to modernize the communications industry to keep pace with political, social, and economic development.

There were, of course, some problems. Those Saudi Arabians who had studied and traveled abroad, wanted the Kingdom to have interesting and entertaining radio and television programs, but there was also a very conservative segment of the population which set the standards for public behavior, and these people were doubtful of television programs ". . . value and propriety. . ."³⁶ However, once again the government was able to demonstrate how the new

medium could be used for religious instruction and education. Another reason for rapid expansion might also have been the tense diplomatic situation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Egyptian radio, Voice of the Arabs, broadcast from Cairo, enjoyed a wide listening audience, and many of the programs attacked the Saudi Arabian government as ". . . a despotic and reactionary . . . regime."³⁷ The goal of these broadcasts was to unite all Arabs, including Saudi Arabians, to resist their governments.

The Saudi Arabian government provided for ". . . a very deliberate and controlled liberalization, undertaken slowly, and designed in such a way as to avoid antagonizing the conservative groups."³⁸ Despite conservative opposition, the government did not hesitate to develop the medium. However, the content of the programs broadcast took the conservative concerns into consideration. For example, Saudi Arabian women do not appear at all, and a large portion of broadcast time is devoted to instructional and religious programming. The media's rapid development meant that much of the programming was foreign. This spread new concepts, ideas, and sources of information among the general population. Television provided ". . . a window on the world"³⁹ for Saudi Arabians. They received information about other countries which had never been provided before. Saudi

Arabians began to learn about social and cultural behavior which was different from their own, thus creating new attitudes. Another change wrought by television affected time. Traditional time, which was always changing because it was determined by sunset, was abandoned and international broadcast time standards were adopted so more foreign audiences could be reached. However, most of the changes cannot be measured empirically. The general population was abruptly inundated with information about other people and their accepted values and beliefs. These affected the Saudi Arabians' previously held perceptions.

The beginning of these changing perceptions can be marked by the first Saudi Arabian television signal which was broadcast simultaneously from Riyadh and Jiddah on July 17, 1965. Neither station was very powerful--having only two kilowatts of power and reaching an area of approximately 100 square kilometers. But during the next decade, broadcast areas and the number of television studios were increased. Saud Arabians were trained to work as engineers, technicians, and producers. Broadcast time was also increased, and more and more locally produced television programs have been added to the broadcast schedule. Additionally, the number of programs designed to provide information about Saudi Arabian culture to be broadcast both domestically and internationally have also increased. For example, between 1965 and 1975, five new broadcasting stations were constructed,

one each in Riyadh and Jiddah, and two more in Medina and Qassim. The largest station of all was built in Dammam, having the largest coverage area and the best and most modern television equipment. To supplement these facilities, relay stations were built to boost reception throughout the Kingdom.

At the same time both the quality and the quantity of television broadcasts were improving, and broadcast hours increased from 10 hours to almost 50 hours per week. And by 1982, programming had been increased to approximately 72 hours per week. These figures do not include special broadcasts of Kingdom occasions, religious occurrences such as the pilgrimages or sporting events. As a result, the number of persons employed in the television industry grew from 64 persons in 1965 to 428 in 1975 and the number of employees continues to increase.⁴⁰ When technology for worldwide satellite transmission of television signals became available, the Kingdom seized the opportunity to use the medium to bring still more information about the rest of the world to Saudi Arabians. Between 1975 and 1977, color television was introduced, and the transition from black and white programming began. Still more facilities and equipment were provided by the government to utilize this new development. Pooling facilities were established in Riyadh and Jiddah, and other stations' production capabilities were upgraded. A sixth station was built in Abba, and a series of relay stations constructed to serve the

southern section of the country. And eventually a backbone cable connecting all broadcasting facilities, was completed. The first color broadcast was aired on September 24, 1976-- the National Day of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and after a six-month test period, regular color transmissions using the French SECAM 3B system began. The French system was chosen because it could be used for both color and black and white transmissions. However, the station in Dammam was equipped with both the SECAM system and the German PAL system so that viewers in other Arabian Gulf states could also pick up the transmissions.

Perhaps the Abba station can be used as the best example of the establishment of a television system in Saudi Arabia. It was built, fully equipped, and on the air in less than a year and began its first color broadcasts on August 15, 1977.⁴¹ The Abba station has the most sophisticated equipment and all engineering equipment is twinned to avoid problems with technical difficulties. The station also boasts a spare transmitter and a complete television film production unit, including montage units, voice studios, and other necessary facilities.

In addition, the scale of television broadcasting was increased between 1965 and 1975. The project, designed to provide better coverage of most of the western area of the Kingdom was necessary since this is the area in which hundreds of thousands of Islamic pilgrims visit yearly

during the Hajj. In addition, the government's summer headquarters and the resort area of Taif are also located in this area. Four more relay stations are being built in the eastern province in Abgaig, Rastanura, Ruhaima, Jubail, and mobile transmitters are used to provide broadcast signals to the northern area of the Kingdom.

The most recent project still under construction is the Central Television Complex, with a cost of approximately SR1,600 million or \$450 million. The facility, located in Riyadh, will occupy a 40,000 square-meter area and house several studio and auditorium facilities:

(A) Transmission studio buildings include 13 studio units with telecinema, video and control rooms. Programs will be broadcast on two channels and there is a possibility a third channel will be added later if it is needed. The ten-story building will also house three news studios and offices for video, film, and general administration.

(B) The three-story production studio building includes five production studios with dressing rooms, workshops and stage set storage rooms.

(C) The film building will feature three stories of production studios, technical rooms, film processing laboratories, and a production and exhibition hall.

(D) A TV outside broadcasting building will house a garage for mobile units and direct transportation, special workshops and a maintenance laboratory.

(E) The theater, designed to seat 700 persons, will include reception halls, and dressing rooms, and

(F) The 170-meter high transmission tower will feature a diamond-shaped, glass-walled restaurant. Smaller versions of the complex are under construction in Jiddah, Dammam, and Qassim.⁴²

Due to improved technical facilities, local programming has improved. These broadcasts are designed to continue providing information about Saudi Arabian culture, enlightenment and entertainment. Percentage of programming types shows:

- (A) religious and cultural programs--25 percent;
- (B) variety and musical programs--22 percent;
- (C) film and non-Arabic serials--8 percent;
- (D) local and Arabic dramas--15 percent;
- (E) target audience programs (directed toward children women, etc.)--15 percent, and
- (F) news and information programs--15 percent.⁴³

These numbers reflect the same number of transmission hours, however, airtimes are flexible to allow the stations to sign on and off the air at different times. Total broadcast hours remain the same largely because of the lifestyle of the Saudi Arabian people. Both work and school hours begin early in the morning and continue until mid-afternoon, interrupted only by the noon prayer. Thus, most broadcasting begins at approximately 4 p.m., and continues until midnight,

except on weekends--Wednesday night and Thursday--when no work or school days are scheduled. Broadcast time is increased from one to two hours on weekends. And during the summer vacation, three additional hours of air time are broadcast. These programs are usually directed toward women and children. Thus during the summer months, broadcast hours are increased to 78 per week and during the month of Ramadan, broadcast time is increased to as much as 100 hours weekly because of the month's religious importance. During the Hajj, the month of the pilgrimage, transmission time is increased to 12 hours daily when the most important pilgrimage rituals are broadcast live from the Holy Cities. Ramadan prayers were broadcast for the first time in 1977 and carried by satellite to most parts of the world. Hundreds of millions of viewers of different religions and nationalities were able to see two prayers transmitted live from the Holy Mosque in Mecca from 100 different television stations. Today live broadcasts of these holy religious occasions have become a yearly event in ordinary programming.

Construction of television stations was also considered complementary to foreign policy. Due to the confrontation with Egypt and inflammatory broadcasts by Cairo's Voice of the Arabs radio, the Saudi Arabian government became aware of the potential use of the mass media, particularly radio, to provide counter active information both inside the Kingdom and abroad. The early ". . . focus in foreign

broadcasting" was on the entire Islamic world, especially as Faisal, protector of the Holy Cities, began to develop his Islamic solidarity policy."⁴⁴ Local broadcasts could be used to counteract foreign propaganda by providing different sources of news as well as entertainment. In some border areas of the Kingdom, the general public could pick up some foreign broadcasts but not Saudi Arabian programming. Persons living near the Eastern border received programs from Kuwait, Iran Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar. The largest television tower in the Middle East was installed at Dammam in 1969 as a counteractive measure. Saudi Arabians enjoyed better television reception, and the new tower provided the power to reach other Gulf States.⁴⁴

Survey of Existing International Communication

Thus far, I have discussed the press, radio and television, the traditional forms of mass media. But these are not the only communication media employed by the Saudi Arabian government. Like the two superpowers, the Kingdom's government recognizes the importance of information centers. Information materials is a vague all encompassing term which can include anything from books and periodicals to television broadcasting equipment. In this section, informational materials will be defined as books, periodicals, films, pamphlets, posters, models, maps, charts, teaching equipment, audio

visual presentations, or any material which can convey political, economic, religious, social, or cultural information about the people of one country to the people of another. Original domestic and international outreach efforts actually began within the Kingdom's own border. Information about the Kingdom, printed in Arabic and foreign languages, has been available for several years from the Ministry of Information's Press and Publications Department. However, as the Kingdom developed, more and more foreign guests entered, and the Ministry of Information saw the need to provide still more information about Saudi Arabia both to Saudi Arabians and to foreigners. As a result, information centers were established in Riyadh, Jiddah, and Mecca, providing posters, maps, booklets and other types of information to Saudi Arabian citizens and to foreign guests adjusting to life in the Kingdom. The Ministry of Information also plans to establish still more information centers in other cities.⁴⁶

These information centers are supervised by the Assistant Deputy Minister for Internal Information. Three major goals were defined:

(A) to present information about government activities concerning further development of the country and about the work the government ministries are doing to aid in that development;

(B) to unite the past with the present by providing

cultural and social information designed to increase Saudi Arabians' sense of patriotism, and

(C) to educate, enlighten and encourage the general public to work toward the Kingdom's further development.⁴⁷

The main thrust of these information centers is providing an information service both to Saudi Arabian citizens and foreign guests living in the Kingdom--either through their visits to the centers or by contacting them through their schools, clubs, or places of business. The information centers feature publications, film and audio visual libraries providing information about Saudi Arabian life and the Islamic religion. These materials are available either for use at the center or loaned out for presentations. The centers also maintain a speaker's bureau in which ministers and other high government officials discuss government policies. All of these resources are available to clubs, schools, and other educational institutions, including those providing military training. Department personnel include translators, legal and public relations consultants from other ministries, authors, and philosophers from the Kingdom's major universities. There are several divisions, including:

(A) archives to provide more specific information about people or subjects relating to Saudi Arabian life or the Islamic religion;

(B) research and study which reviews publications and approves them for use in international outreach efforts;

(C) a clipping service to keep track of articles published about Saudi Arabia;

(D) a press division to provide subscriptions to Saudi Arabian publications to those requesting them and maintains a file of newspapers and magazines received in the Kingdom.

A subscription division to obtain subscriptions of foreign publications to be sent to government officials and to accept and approve requests for circulation of foreign publications inside the Kingdom. Other activities include making contact with other information centers in foreign countries and arranging for the circulation and distribution of Saudi Arabian materials; honoring requests from foreigners to provide information about Saudi Arabia; covering the conferences of information of other Arab nations; and cooperating with the Ministry of Commerce to produce international exhibition. The public relations division arranges for transportation and accommodations for foreign correspondents visiting Saudi Arabia. The yearly operating budget is SR 8,000 or about \$2.35 million in 1981.⁴⁸

One of the most important aspects of international outreach are the activities undertaken during the Hajj--the month of pilgrimages to the holy shrines in Mecca and Median. International outreach efforts include publishing guidebooks and information about the pilgrimage itself in nine different languages, inviting foreign correspondents and information experts from about 40 different countries to cover the

religious activities, providing cassettes in Urdu with more religious information as well as slide films to foreigners interested in the event. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the international outreach efforts during the Hajj is that all government ministries cooperate in the effort as well as students from the Communications Department of Riyadh University.⁴⁹ But despite all these activities, up to the present time, there has been no concentrated, coordinated, serious international outreach effort beyond these religious awareness efforts.

The Higher Council of Information

To solve some of these problems of domestic and international information dissemination, recognized boty by government officials and Saudi Arabian citizens, the Minister of Information requested the creation of the Higher Council of Information with himself as President and 10 additional members. Other members included the Deputy Minister of Information, the Deputy Minister of the Interior, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Higher Education, three faculty members from any of the Kingdom's institutions of higher learning and three famous Saudi Arabian authors or philosophers. Dr. Yemani's request was approved in a letter from Crown Prince Fahd.⁵⁰ The council's first meeting was July 7, 1977 (1397), and Dr. Yemani defined the main goals.

The council was to make both domestic and international information policies for the Kingdom. These policies would not become official until they were approved by the King or the Crown Prince. The council met only once a month, and no new creative policy recommendations were made.⁵¹ However, in 1981 His Majesty King Khalid issued a royal decree reorganization of the higher council and assigning Prince Naif ibn Abdul Aziz, the Minister of the Interior to serve as President. During the first meeting, Prince Naif defined the council's new goals of formulating a new communications policy and ordering council members to determine new agenda items to be studied during the council's subsequent meetings.⁵² With this perspective of Saudi Arabian mass communications and its existing domestic and international communication efforts, the necessity for improving domestic and international outreach efforts exists. Specific suggestions for improvement will be discussed in Chapter Five.

CHAPTER FOUR

ENDNOTES

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⁵Frederick C. Whitney, Mass Media and Mass Communication in Society. William C. Brown Co., Dubuque, Iowa, 1975, p. 18.

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⁹William A. Rugh, "Saudi Mass Media and Society in the Faisal Era," in King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia. Willard A. Beling, ed., Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980, p. 128.

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¹⁴Royal Decree Number 43 dated 9/10/1382 (1962) Umm Al-Qara Number 1912 dated 10/17/1382 3/23/62.

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¹⁶Norman C. Walpole, et. al., Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966, p. 177.

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¹⁹Ibid., p. 129.

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²¹Gerald Deguary, Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia. Arthur Barker Publishing Co., London, England, 1966, pp. 158-163.

²²Rugh, King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia, pp. 133-134.

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²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

³³Rugh, King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia, p. 130.

³⁴Walpole, Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia, p. 185.

³⁵Ministry of Information Report on the Development of Television issued by the Department of Assessment and Research, Ministry of Information, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1980.

³⁶Rugh, King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia, p. 134.

³⁷Ibid., p. 132.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 139-140.

³⁹Ibid., p. 138.

⁴⁰Ministry of Information Report on the Development of Television.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Al-Riyad, No. 4946 dated 12/6/1401 (April, 1981), p. 9, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

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⁴⁴Rugh, King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia, p. 132.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 133.

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⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Al-Jazeera, 2991, 10/15/80, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, p. 6.

⁵⁰A letter of approval, dated 6/15/1396 (1976) obtained by this student from the Ministry of Information, Office of the Deputy Minister of Information, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Sept. 1981.

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⁵²Al-Jazeera, No. 3272 8/12/1981, p. 1, 22.

CHAPTER FIVE

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will explain why Saudi Arabia would benefit from having its own international communications system and propose a plan for the development of the system. To illustrate the need for such a system we will review the weaknesses of the Kingdom's current efforts in the field of international communication and propose a workable plan for establishing a Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency. The plan will include proposed policies and goals for the Saudi Arabian effort, drawing on the adaptations of strategies and techniques from the United States' and the Soviet Union's international communications system. We will suggest an organization and structure for the new agency and the type of personnel required to staff it, and finally, offer some examples of international outreach efforts.

Although it is sometimes interrupted by cataclysmic events, the flow of information between nations throughout the world is reasonably predictable because it is governed by a few basic facts. There are only five major worldwide

news agencies, and these are owned either by the government or private citizens of only four countries. Telecommunications facilities, while not quite so severely restricted, remain limited. Fewer than one-third of the world's nations produce and control an estimated two-thirds of both technology and technical information necessary for what we call a modern society. A concentration of wealth in certain countries makes it easier for their people to travel, to support the communications industry and its endeavors and to produce advanced equipment.¹

Information has exerted an enormous impact and played an important role in the overall changes in global balance. The importance of communications is highlighted in a statement from the president of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty:

The Soviet Union is leading a concerted international campaign with the enthusiastic support of a large number of Third World countries to put the dead hand of the bureaucrat at the throttle of the worldwide communications transmission system. The campaign has already mobilized such support that we are now approaching a crisis in international communications, perhaps more serious than anything we have seen since the Second World War. . . . By using such catch phrases as "development of support communications," and "communications imperialism," . . . [they appeal] to the defense of indigenous interest and culture against the historic "dominance of the West."²

W.G. Harley cites still another example from U.N. documents.

At the 19th General Conference of UNESCO. . . November [1976] at Nairobi, there were two and a half days of heated debate on the international role of the media. Sopkesmen for the Third World deplored the West's overwhelming dominance of the world's news and assailed its global news agencies for assorted sins of omission and commission.³

The Need for a Saudi Arabian International
Communication System

Saudi Arabia is now in the second year of its third five-year economic plan. During the first two plans, there were no coordinated, effective domestic and international communications systems. Because of the increased importance of worldwide communications systems, because there was no coordinated international outreach efforts during the first two five-year plans, and because the third plan is designed to increase Saudi Arabia's role in world leadership, it seems essential that an effective international communication system complement the third plan and its objectives as well as all future plans for progress. To fill this gap, I believe we must reorganize the entire flow of information both domestically and internationally. We have seen in Chapter Four that during the last decade, the Ministry of Information, despite its efforts, has done little in the area of international outreach. The problem has not been lack of money: the problem is a lack of qualified personnel with an understanding of the practical application of mass communications techniques. And since there are adequate funds, it is possible to hire qualified personnel from outside the Kingdom until enough Saudi Arabians can be trained to assume these positions. This policy of hiring foreigners until Saudi Arabian citizens can be trained is a policy which has been followed by almost all of the government ministries.

A brief study of domestic and international communications systems in the Middle East shows them to be practically nonexistent for a variety of reasons. Most Middle Eastern countries face social, political, and economic problems which require immediate government attention, and there is little time left for thought about the needs of establishing an effective communications system. However, Saudi Arabia does not fit into that category as many of its Middle Eastern neighbors do. This is not to say the Kingdom has not had its share of problems in adjusting from an underdeveloped nation into a developed one, but the problems have been less pressing, thanks to the Kingdom's political stability and sound economic foundation.

It is part of human nature throughout the entire world to attack those who have special advantages. Saudi Arabia is not exempt from this type of attack. The Kingdom controls vast oil deposits as well as the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina and becomes a fair target for slings and arrows both from its Arab neighbors and from other nations. So, although the Kingdom has the opportunity to develop an effective domestic communications system, it has not been able to create an international outreach system with specific goals and policies to achieve them. Thus, there has been no policy either to counteract unfavorable information by providing other information which would create a favorable attitude toward the Kingdom or to counteract adverse publicity and impressions

by providing more favorable and accurate information. An information system will utilize every possible avenue of communication.

Any situation in which information is presented, assessed, and decisions rendered should not be overlooked as an important medium susceptible to manipulation. . . . The results, findings, and recommendations of these "media" may find their way into newsrooms and then be disseminated via the mass media. But what the mass media do with these reports depends upon their . . . needs and not on direct manipulation by government and other organizations . . . that provide official reports to fulfill their interests may rely on reporters who know little about the substance of the report to present the sanctioned image to the public.⁴

In Saudi Arabia's case, these reporters are mostly foreign and are ". . . constrained [to fulfill] the requirements of news work. Both parties involved in the propaganda process, and the medium each uses must be understood."⁵

Propaganda is simply a contrived and artful way of presenting some facts and interpretations as though they were truthful.⁶ Saudi Arabia could present the most truthful and useful facts without any contrivance. Successful government information specialists are well aware that the people cannot be consistently lied to or they will begin to realize the lie, the effort will boomerang, and damage credibility. A perfect example exists in Saudi Arabia. Very frequently, the Ministry of Information bans certain publications or movies, and the reaction of the general public is to decide they want to read the book or see the movie for themselves before making a decision. In a word, the general public's

reaction is distrust.

There is a body of analytical literature on the development of Saudi Arabia which consists of something like twenty-five scholarly articles and perhaps an equal number of books. This reveals a scholarly aridity comparable to the Rub Al-Khali, that vast empty quarter of Arabian desert rarely traversed by man. Yet this state of affairs has not constrained writers and journalists from making generalizations about the Kingdom which at best are lacking the modesty which should be the scholar's cloak and at worst casts Saudi Arabia in an unfavorable light.⁷

Prince Sultan, Minister of Defense, explained the problems generated by the lack of an effective international communications system when the United States Congress was voting on the sale of AWACS planes to the Kingdom.

The disheartening truth is that the world press lacks an understanding of Saudi Arabians. People are unaware of events in Saudi Arabia and regard the entire Kingdom as one person who has made a mistake and from that make fictionalized generalizations. In Saudi Arabia . . . [there are] some of the most sophisticated military schools. . . . By the end of this year [1981], F-15 planes will arrive, and they will be piloted by 20 recently trained Saudi Arabians. However, the AWACS are only an airplane which any pilot of Saudi Arabian Airlines could fly. What remains for them to learn is the operation of the sophisticated radar equipment. And by the time the AWACS are delivered, we will have Saudi Arabians capable of using that equipment as well . . .⁸

At this time, Saudi Arabia has no method of organizing available information and data as background for all subjects which might be of potential interest to the government. The establishment of an international communication system with a division designed to serve this purpose would be an invaluable reference library.

An international communication system would never presume to make Saudi Arabian foreign policy. It should serve as a complement to foreign policy by influencing public attitudes on a worldwide basis and by informing the government of the implications of foreign opinion toward Saudi Arabian foreign policies, programs, and official government statements, such as the informations services of the two superpowers do. International outreach efforts can create public support abroad if the goal is one of creating a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system, so long as it does not interfere with or threaten the freedom of others. The rest of the world does not view the Kingdom as a strong dynamic nation, qualified for leadership in world affairs. An effective international communication system could correct that misimpression.

One of the reasons for these misimpressions is that Saudi Arabia does not employ sophisticated techniques and strategies of communication. Another reason for the problem is the overlapping authority of government ministeries. Both the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regard dissemination of information relating to Saudi Arabian foreign policy as their own purview, and, as a result, no real information is released. The Saudi Arabian effort does little to bolster morale or extend hope. It does not succeed in giving a true and convincing picture of Saudi

Arabian life or culture to combat misrepresentations and distortions or to aggressively interpret and explain Saudi Arabian foreign policy or its social, political, economic and cultural affairs.

The medium of publishing books is also not used effectively. The Ministry of Information produces a large, expensive book about the Kingdom. And yet, using the same money--and finances are not even a serious consideration--smaller booklets which would appeal to more people could be produced.

Finally, and the most serious problem of all, particularly in the Ministry of Information, is that personnel with specialized training in one field are frequently assigned to areas in which they have no education background, or practical experience. Political patronage has been and continued to be a problem. Government jobs are provided to personnel who lack the expertise to work in a specific area. High government positions are given to personnel who, while they may be well educated, lack the expertise to work in that specific field.

In addition to the weaknesses listed above, there are several other problems created because the Ministry of Information controls the international communication system. To those who may argue that an international communication service falls within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Information, the following facts should be considered. First,

the Ministry of Information through its owner-operation of the radio and television and supervision of the press system, focuses only on a small segment of international service; although the Ministry of Information established an international information department in 1979, as Chapter Four demonstrated, there have been no serious efforts to provide any type of international outreach; although the Ministry of Information is the government entity charged with providing information to the Kingdom, it does not handle public relations information from other ministries or official establishments. Stated differently, the role of the Ministry of Information is a generalized one; however, this plan to establish an international communication agency has specific goals and strategies to achieve them. The content and nature of this plan is much more appropriate for providing effective international outreach than the Ministry of Information's present procedure.

System Goals and Policies

Although the proposed international communication agency will rely on modern communications techniques to achieve the major goal of creating a favorable impression of the Kingdom throughout the world, a delineation of specific goals and the policies to be used is needed.

However, there is one important caveat which must

be kept in mind before those policies and goals can be stated. The headquarters office of any international communication agency would not, nor should it be, allowed to form or change foreign policies created by the nation's leaders. This axiom also applies to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The main job of the proposed Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency will be to translate the foreign policy decisions made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the rest of the world. The main function of the headquarters office will be to decide whether a particular event or decision should be given international emphasis, the type of emphasis it should be given, and the media which will most effectively achieve that emphasis. As will be seen in a later section of this chapter, the proposed international communication agency will have geographical information centers scattered throughout the world. Personnel in these centers will not be allowed to determine the type of information to be disseminated. All planning that is determining the strategies to be used to disseminate information will be done in the headquarters office, and the job of the media representatives in the geographical centers will be to implement those strategies.

The Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency should have two main goals. The first is to defend the Islamic religion by counteracting any false propaganda spread about it. As shown in Chapter Two, the goals of both the Islamic

religion and the Saudi Arabian government have been throughout the Kingdom's history, and remain today, closely intertwined. Therefore communications strategies useful for promoting Islamic interests are equally useful both to the Saudi Arabian government and its people and the reverse is also true. The proposed agency's second goal is to provide information to other governments, international institutions, and general populations of other countries so they will have a clearer understanding of Saudi Arabia and its role in solving domestic problems for its own people and international problems for the world community. For example, few people throughout the world are aware of Saudi Arabia's moderating influence among OPEC nations to stabilize oil prices. Nor is the world in general aware of Saudi Arabia's cooperation with the superpowers to create stability in the Middle East through such things as Crown Prince Fahd's plan for a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem. Finally, most people are unaware of Saudi Arabia's cooperation with the World Bank to help finance loans to underdeveloped countries.

Some of the problems the Kingdom has had to face because of the lack of an effective international communication system will illustrate the need for a plan such as that proposed in this chapter. After each of the problems is explained, specific policies to provide solutions will be discussed.

In the past, Saudi Arabia has had a bad image, especially among Western nations, mainly due to the success of Zionist

and Communist propaganda. This misinformation depicts negative aspects of Saudi Arabian life and the Saudi Arabian people. Thus, one of the international communication agency's key policies will be to take counteractive measures against this propaganda by using a positive international outreach effort which will result in polishing the Kingdom's tarnished image, and emphasize the positive aspects of Saudi Arabian culture. As a result, many Saudi Arabians and people of other Arab nations believe that Westerners are biased against them. International outreach policies will include strategies to break down these prejudices and create a more favorable attitude toward the Middle East in general.

Saudi Arabia has many powerful friends serving as policymakers in their own countries who understand and appreciate the Kingdom's role in world affairs; yet these friends have never been utilized in any international outreach effort. One of the major policies will be to foster still further cooperation with these people, within the limits of protecting their own nation's self-interest, by providing them with accurate information about the Kingdom they have not heretofore received. The government's reaction to any adverse publicity is to expel any reporters and forbid circulation of the newspaper or magazine or broadcasts of the radio or television program. An effective international communication agency policy will include contacting the source of adverse publicity and pointing out any inaccuracies and

requesting the correct information be disseminated. If the reporter or his medium refuses to do so, the agency could then arrange for distribution of the correct information on its own.

The Saudi Arabian government's policy has been to remain silent in the face of world criticisms. An example is the 1980 occupation of the mosque in Mecca. In an interview with the late editor-in-chief S. El-Lozi of Al-Hawadess a famous Lebanese news magazine, His Royal Highness Crown Prince Fahd explained the dangers of allowing adverse publicity to remain unanswered. He said that when a worldwide audience is permitted to make its own assumptions because the true facts about the incident were not provided, people use their imaginations to create the news and describe the event as worse than it was. His recommendation was that the Kingdom should provide accurate information, even if it might appear at first that releasing the information would do more harm than good.⁹

An effective international communication agency would have a policy to increase cooperation with worldwide news agency correspondents so they can easily enter the Kingdom and receive firsthand information they need to file their stories. An additional effective policy will be to allow the international communication agency to serve as the sole official voice of the government. This would also solve the problem of conflicting reports coming from several

government spokesmen.

However, it is not enough to assert these policies ought to exist. Additional strategies and goals must be outlined to carry out these ideas. There are several strategies for disseminating information being used by the United States which are also useful for Saudi Arabia. This plan for a Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency will be designed to avoid some of the pitfalls suffered by the United States International Communication Agency which were discussed in Chapter Three. For example, it will be necessary for the system to have specific goals for specific areas, and no one working in the Kingdom's international outreach effort must ever be allowed to confuse activity with effectiveness. Administrative personnel in the Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency will remember that more is not always better. This will entail considerable training of personnel and a clear articulation of their duties.

Adaptations from the United States
and the Soviet Union

The United States' techniques of selecting media and the tone of the message to be transmitted, as explained in Chapter Three, can be adapted wholesale for use in Saudi Arabia. In addition to adapting the U.S. strategies of bolstering morale and interpreting and explaining Saudi Arabian foreign policies, there are a number of techniques and

strategies used by the United States which can also be used effectively in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom's international communication agency could use the technique of explaining Saudi Arabian motives using the strategies of information exchange and research. The Kingdom can exchange information about its development plans to assist underdeveloped countries. The agency could conduct special studies overseas to determine communication patterns, foreign attitudes toward Saudi Arabia and its policies, to define target audiences and to assess the effectiveness of the agency's programs. As mentioned earlier, the agency could provide a true and convincing picture of Saudi Arabian life, methods, and ideals.

Strategies for this technique would include films and interpersonal contacts. Saudi Arabia can produce how-to-do-it educational films and documentaries promoting the beauty and virtues of the Kingdom's way of life. Films seem to be the most effective medium of communications, especially in areas where the literacy rate is low. Interpersonal contact is also an effective strategy. Word of mouth is one of the most effective ways to influence other people's attitudes. It has the advantage of providing an enormous return on a very small investment.

One of the goals to create a more favorable attitude toward the Kingdom and an effective strategy to achieve that goal is combatting misrepresentations and distortions. The U.S. rebuttal techniques provide an effective means of carrying

out this strategy. Communist or Zionist propaganda need not be referred to directly. Or the accusation or distortion can be mentioned only as a starting point. Or it is possible to tell both sides, which is often the most effective technique of all. The most important strategy any international outreach effort can pursue is that of telling the truth.

There is one additional important note to be considered here. Not all of the United States' credibility techniques are applicable for use in Saudi Arabia by virtue of the Kingdom's culture. Although basic, true facts are used in the message, the appeal is as emotional as it is intellectual. U.S. strategies which can be used in Saudi Arabia are:

- (A) stressing a simple, well-known fact that is easily recalled;

- (B) generalizing to imply that no one in the world would sincerely challenge a particular statement or theme;

- (C) delivering the message without undue bombast or emotionalism, whether it be spoken or written;

- (D) not always pursuing the same line on a subject;

- (E) clearly distinguishing between news and commentary, and,

- (F) organizing facts logically so that the audience draws the desired conclusion.

However, the United States is not the only super-power with effective communication techniques. Because the Communist method of government does not stress freedom--

particularly freedom of information--it is tempting to dismiss Soviet techniques as not being useful. But this would be a serious mistake. As shown in Chapter Three the Russians are masters at the propaganda game, and there are several strategies and techniques as well as media channels which can be used to improve Saudi Arabia's international outreach efforts. It would be effective to adapt the Soviet Union's philosophy and equate the power of a worldwide information system with the strength of being the center of the Islamic religion, the Kingdom's political stability and its solid economic foundation. The Soviet technique of innocence by association could be modified to quote excerpts from articles in the popular press which are in support of Saudi Arabian policies. The technique of repeating a small number of ideas over and over again can be utilized. Saudi Arabian communicators must be sensitive to the thoughts and philosophies of the group of people they are trying to reach. The Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency can serve as the gatekeeper--as the official voice of the government and avoid the problem of conflicting stories from government officials. The Soviet technique of bribing newspaper editors can be greatly modified into an interpersonal contact strategy. Office managers at the geographical centers will be required to get acquainted with editors and reporters of all newspapers and magazines in their areas--possibly by providing luncheon or dinner invitations or developing friendships

with their families. Like the Soviets, the Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency will be permitted to operate in secrecy, unhampered by the requirement of reporting all of its activities to the general public.

And finally, one of the most important strategies to be borrowed from the Soviet Union is to approach those living in other lands on an immediate basis. Recalling the quoted incident in Chapter Three in which the Americans tell the people of Indonesia that in a generation or two their children will be able to enjoy the same standards of living as a government official, and the communists suggest they knock off the government official so they could have a car immediately, it will be a vital part of Saudi Arabian strategy to show recipients of international outreach efforts the immediate benefits and rewards of a close friendship with the kingdom. The Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency will address its audiences in terms of their immediate problems to be solved and explain what the Kingdom is doing or can do to help provide a solution.

There are also several adaptations from the Soviet Union's use of media channels which can be used to benefit Saudi Arabia. They are:

(A) cultural agreements with nations throughout the world related to Islamic religion, science, education, literature, the graphic arts, music, sports, and disaster relief;

(B) exhibitions to publicly demonstrate Saudi Arabian achievements in art, science, and industry;

(C) literature written in the target audience's native language to provide one of the best ways of learning about the lives of people in other countries, and

(D) participation in athletic events to create goodwill. However, carrying out these goals, strategies, and techniques will require a carefully designed agency. Of course the United States uses some of these tactics, but it does not place as high a priority on some of them.

Organization and Procedure

The organizational structure of the Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency will be adapted from a combination of the organizational structures of the United States International Communication system and the Soviet Union's international communication service to accommodate the Kingdom's governmental organization and its culture. First of all, the agency will require an upper-echelon administrative structure. The top-ranking officials in the Saudi Arabian agency will be the president, vice president, and the president's administrative advisors. The president will hold the rank of a full minister, thus his authority to oversee the agency's activities will come directly from the King or the Crown Prince. The agency's president will be a member

of the Council of Ministers, the Council of Higher Information and serve as a special advisor to the King in all communication matters, including the implications of foreign opinion regarding Saudi Arabian policies, programs, and official statements. He will also attend meetings with the Minister of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Interior as well as meetings of Saudi Arabian intelligence agencies. The president will actively participate in helping other departments of the executive branch of government in providing international information about their particular Ministry's activities.


The president will have two advisors, one for domestic communications and one for international communication. They will be answerable directly to him. Their primary responsibilities will be to supervise the activities of the directors general of domestic and international communication to ensure strict adherence to agency policy. The second-ranking official will be the agency's vice president. He will be directly responsible to the president, and his major function will be to serve as a gatekeeper between the directors general, whose functions will be discussed more thoroughly in a later section, and the president. The president and other executive officers will have an executive secretariat. These personnel will serve as administrative assistants to the president, vice president, the two advisors for domestic and international communication and the directors general of the six major divisions. (The functions of these divisions

are explained in the following paragraph). In addition, there will be an office administration section responsible for supervising the day-to-day operations of the department. It will also be responsible directly to the president.

The third-ranking officials will be the directors general of the six major divisions--assessment and research, security, worldwide exhibitions, data and information, domestic, and international communication. All directors general will be responsible directly to the vice president and will be permitted to unofficially consult with both presidential advisors. Their primary responsibility will be to oversee the day-to-day operations of the departments and implement the communication strategies developed by the president.


The Division of Research and Assessment will have several responsibilities. It will study and evaluate all of the agency's communication efforts to determine whether the agency is achieving its major communication goals. It will conduct sample surveys as well as using other methods of research to provide data on foreign opinions regarding Saudi Arabian foreign policy and suggest the channels of communication most likely to reach target audiences of other countries. It will also conduct further surveys to determine what foreign audiences perceive to be their most immediate problems. The division will determine how well the nationals of a specific area understand international events and what their perceptions of those events mean to the Kingdom. For

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example, if they seem to understand a particular event fairly well, it might not be necessary for the agency to provide any additional information; however, if there appears to be little or no understanding, agency personnel will be alerted to the need for an intensive campaign.

In addition, division personnel will keep track of articles printed in foreign publications regarding Saudi Arabian actions and policies and report on the activities of foreign news services within the Kingdom. This will provide high-ranking agency officials with an understanding and evaluation of other international news agencies' efforts in the Kingdom. The division will also be responsible for selecting the most important subjects relating to current events and compile all related published material. It will prepare a half-hour cassette summarizing the news of the day for the specific use of all high ranking government officials. The mention of all relevant news items on the cassette should be brief, but additional complete background information should be instantly available to any government official requesting it.

The security division of the Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency will be of utmost importance. Its functions will be patterned after those of the United States International Communication Agency's security department, and it is important to explain how the United States uses this department. Until 1971 Radio Free Europe and Radio

Liberty received most of their funding from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. When the source of this funding was confirmed, legislation was passed to force an end to CIA funding and provided for the continuation of radio broadcasts through separate appropriations.¹⁰ However, the cooperation between the Voice of Liberty and Radio Free Europe and the CIA continued.

Although the CIA did not use radio personnel as agents to collect secret intelligence, we sometimes were able to provide the radios with significant information that they would not otherwise have had access to. It was part of our job to cull the intelligence flowing in from defectors for factually accurate items that could be used by the radios in their daily reporting on internal developments.¹¹

Stated differently, the United States' major intelligence agency cooperated with the nation's main form of international information--radio broadcasts.

The same type of cooperation in Saudi Arabia is essential to the effectiveness of any international outreach effort. The Saudi Arabian Intelligence Agency should be required to supply any information which might be necessary to develop information policies and programs. The security division should also seek the cooperation of other international intelligence agencies, asking them to provide information both to the communication agency and the Propaganda Intelligence Agency, regarding any event or the activities of any person which may be of interest or assistance to the Kingdom. The president of the Saudi Arabian International

Communication Agency must have access to confidential information which should not be made public or circulated beyond the confines of His Majesty's office, so that the most effective information program possible can be initiated. The security division will also have other responsibilities. It will be responsible for the physical safety of personnel, materials, and equipment of international information centers both at home and abroad. It can also serve as an investigative arm by providing background information about all employees wishing to work for the Saudi Arabian agency. The security division can be used to conduct other investigations unrelated to the employment studies. It can be used to gather information about visitors to the Kingdom through cooperation with other international intelligence agencies as well as with Saudi Arabia's own intelligence network.

The director general of the Worldwide Exhibition division will be responsible for recognizing potential situations in which an exhibition within a given country could be staged. He will be responsible for obtaining clearance, both from his own agency and government, to sponsor the exhibition, determining the type of exhibition to be held, and the type of materials necessary for it as well as supervising production of those materials by the subdivision directly responsible for producing for a given medium.

The division of Organization of Data and Information will be responsible for computer storage and correlation

for easy retrieval of all information required by the agency, ranging from payroll information to background histories of foreign press personnel to results of studies conducted by the Assessment and Research division. Computer programs to store the types of information programs aimed at specific target audiences at specific times and any survey results regarding the reactions to and effectiveness of those programs will be designed. In addition, the computers will store past articles written about Saudi Arabia as produced by the Division of Assessment and Research. Terminals for providing detailed information, except in those areas which the President has been told are too sensitive for general dissemination, should be located in all highranking government officials' offices so ^{that} they will have instant access to all necessary information. Terminals will, of course, be installed in the offices of the agency's president, vice president, presidential advisors, directors general, geographical centers, and Saudi Arabian embassies throughout the world.

The Training Division will have two primary responsibilities; first, it will be recruiting qualified experts to work in each of the agency's sections, and secondly, for negotiating agreements with major universities, four of the major international news agencies--Agence France Presse, Reuters, Associated Press, and the United Press International--as well as major public relations agencies throughout the world to provide specialized training programs for Saudi

Arabians. In addition, the Training Division will set the qualifications for employment for each job in each section and cooperate with the security division in conducting pre-employment investigations. It will be responsible for locating foreign authors who might be commissioned to write favorable materials about Saudi Arabia for distribution by the agency's international and domestic communication division. Training officers will be responsible for the promotion and career development of section employees. Employees will be given the opportunity to receive additional or advanced training, either devised by this section, on its cooperation with Saudi Arabian universities or through the previously mentioned international training agreements.

The Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency will have three subdivisions--radio, television and film, and a foreign press section. The three subdivisions will be responsible for the actual production of materials to be distributed locally and by the geographic centers. Each will specialize in its own channel of communications and will use the specific techniques for communicating a specific bit of information to a specific audience as outlined by the agency president and his advisors.

These three subdivisions will perform much of the agency's technical work. All sections must include technical personnel for actual physical production of the materials and professionals to do the writing, editing, creating the

scripts, and planning the films and television and radio programming. These subdivisions will establish foreign press centers within the Kingdom to assist foreign correspondents in reporting accurately about Saudi Arabia. These centers will provide reference services, assist in arranging interviews with government officials, and provide photos and background information.

The two most important divisions are domestic and international communication. These two divisions must cooperate closely with each of the others. They will be responsible for all information dissemination both inside the Kingdom and abroad. For example, the general director of Domestic Communications will need to have access to strategies used to reach target audience abroad whose nationals will be expected to visit the Kingdom during the Hajj or foreign guests holding jobs in Saudi Arabia. But most importantly, the two will be responsible for implementing strategies and techniques for communication developed by the president and his advisors. They will supervise the production of this material and submit it to the president for his approval before distribution. This includes foreign radio broadcasts and newspapers aimed at audiences living outside the Kingdom and foreign guests living inside Saudi Arabia. These two departments will be responsible for all communication targeted for any foreign audience. All of these divisions will be located within the Kingdom, but the Saudi Arabian

International Communication Agency will also have locations abroad.

The geographic centers of the agency will be very similar to those maintained by the United States. Each center will have libraries of books, magazines, and audio visual programs providing information about the Kingdom as well as free maps and posters and guidebooks to provide still more information. Centers will be scattered throughout the world in major cities such as London, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Tokyo, Mexico City, Toronto, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, Houston, New York City, Tunis, Beirut and Cairo.

Personnel

After reading the preceding section on organization, it may appear at first glance that the proposed Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency will add large numbers of employees to the government's payroll. This is not the case for two reasons; first, the system will be a highly sophisticated one, relying on computers to do much of the work, and secondly, since few Saudi Arabians are trained to staff an international communication center, much operational work will be contracted with other nations to provide both initial staffing for the agency and to train Saudi Arabians to eventually assume those positions. Finally, the wise use of both civil and foreign personnel will decrease the number of employees, at least initially.

The quality of employees sought to staff the agency will be important. Civil Service personnel will include all the agency's high ranking officials, extending to the managers of the several geographical centers. In the headquarters office, qualified Saudi Arabians will be given preference in the lower echelon jobs. Although the geographical centers will be managed by Saudi Arabians, it will be the manager's job to recruit nationals from each country or geographical section in his area to help write some of the desired information, thus achieving the goal of sensitivity to and an understanding of a given target audience's responses to messages. Most importantly, the manager will locate qualified public relations agencies to conduct the creation of and dissemination of information about Saudi Arabia, using the most sophisticated media campaigns for that particular area.

All agency personnel hired to work directly for the Saudi Arabian government must have several things in common. Obviously, they must be experts in their fields. No international outreach effort can succeed without competent writers who understand the basics of communication theories. Those writings must be supported by technical personnel capable of producing the best material possible in each of the media. The training section can devise programs to educate many agency employees, and as mentioned earlier, further training can be provided through international agreements

as well as from foreign corporations hired to implement the agency's plans. Personnel serving in the geographical centers must, of course, understand the agency's goals and policies as well as the strategies and techniques to implement them. They must be politically sensitive both to Saudi Arabian goals and to the political goals of the country or area in which they serve. Their political awareness should be equal to that of their counterparts serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Another essential requirement is the ability to communicate with the people they are trying to persuade in their own language. This is particularly important because while many of the people the agency is trying to reach do speak two or more languages, they think in their native tongue, and it is the agency's primary task to influence its audience's thinking. To be more specific:

(A) The geographical center director must understand both Saudi Arabian objectives, the policies used to achieve those objectives, and the reasons why the Kingdom is pursuing a particular strategy.

(B) It is not necessary for him to have access to the same information as the upper echelons of government; he should be permitted access to information on a need-to-know basis.

(C) He must also understand the thinking patterns of the people he is trying to influence as well as the

average citizen's aspirations, fears, prejudices, and the methods he used in the decision-making process.

(D) He must project Saudi Arabia to the people in the area or nation in which he is stationed in such a way that they will gain an understanding of who Saudi Arabians are and why they think the way they do.

(E) He must be flexible enough to adapt to a way of life in a strange country, and, if he has a wife, she must also be able to do so.

(F) Finally, he must believe in the Saudi Arabian goals so he will have the courage to speak out about them, even if the effort seems fruitless at the time. He must be able to think in terms of long-run as well as short-run benefits.

Examples of International Outreach Projects

Up to this point, the discussion of the agency's international outreach efforts have been relatively technical and focused on organization and general goals. However, the agency cannot succeed without some specific types of international outreach efforts. Although the Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency programs will vary from country to country, the following activities, some of which have been touched on earlier in specific examples, can be used as part of the international outreach effort;

1. Personal contact with government officials, editors,

writers, educators, business executives, and other public opinion makers in the country;

2. Preparing press, photo, radio and television coverage of special events in Saudi Arabia;

3. Producing and providing TV program materials to be placed on domestic and international television stations;

4. Supplying news and feature materials to the local and international press, news agencies, and foreign and local groups in support of Saudi Arabian objectives;

5. Producing and distributing magazines, pamphlets, leaflets, posters, and official photo displays to local and foreign interest groups through mailing lists;

6. Producing documentary films and showing them through public outlets, including projection rooms within the geographical centers or through the use of multi-media vehicles or through the loan of audio visual equipment;

7. Operating information centers, reading rooms, and extension services in selected cities in Saudi Arabia to conduct lectures and discussion programs and Arabic language instructions.

8. Providing international exhibits to interpret Saudi Arabian foreign policy and the Kingdom's scientific, economic, cultural, and social development;

9. Assisting local publishers to produce books about Saudi Arabia in translation and encouraging local authors to

prepare books which focus on Saudi Arabia culture and interest;

10. Selecting appropriate books and periodicals to be presented to key institutions and individuals;

11. Providing financial aid and assisting foreign universities and other institutions in countries in which Arabic is not the native language to establish courses in Arabic and Islamic studies, and

12. Inviting foreigners to visit the Kingdom. Once a person has visited Saudi Arabia, at the Kingdom's expense, and has invested a portion of his time as a guest professor in a university, for example, that person will have a greater understanding of what the Kingdom is trying to achieve and is more likely to remain friendly toward Saudi Arabia.

There is also another important aspect of international outreach which has not so far been discussed. In an article for ARAMCO World Magazine, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yemani, the Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources, pointed out that in 1980 alone, ARAMCO contracted with the Saudi Arabian government for SR 8.6 billion or \$2.2 billion. These contracts are with completely owned Saudi Arabian companies or with corporations in which Saudi Arabia owns considerable shares. All companies licensed to conduct business in the Kingdom are established under the name of a Saudi Arabian national.¹² If just one corporation, such as ARAMCO, can spend this much money, the sums paid to other companies including Exxon, Mobil Oil,

Standard Oil, Phillips Petroleum Co., Philip Holzmann, Lockheed, Boeing, McDonnell Douglass, Sony, Mitsubishi, IBM, Thompson, Three M and Honda--to mention only a few--is stupendous. It seems only reasonable that before the Saudi Arabian government awards a contract to do business in the Kingdom, the corporation should agree to a contract clause requiring the company to assist in the Kingdom's international outreach efforts in its home nation by sponsoring newspaper, radio and television advertising designed to provide information about Saudi Arabia.

In fact an excellent example is the full-page newspaper advertisements which ran in the Daily Oklahoman and the Oklahoma City Times, published October 13, 1980. It is worth noting that the ad says the same advertisement had "...been published over the past several days in eleven major newspapers."¹³ The ad's headline reads, "A Message Worth Repeating," and describes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as "far more than oil."¹⁴ The main purpose of the advertisement was to encourage the American public's support for the sale of the U.S. AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, and the ad points out that while,

...there has been a flood of commentary on the political and military aspects of the President's proposals, but hardly a word on their economic implications. We would like to briefly outline the profound and rapidly growing economic partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia.¹⁵

According to the ad;

More than 700 American companies are now doing business with Saudi Arabia.... The enterprises

involved extend to 42 states.... Even without regard to ARAMCO and the large U.S. oil companies, American business now holds well in excess of \$35 billion in contracts for work with Saudi Arabia.¹⁶

The body copy of the ad concludes with the statement, "Saudi Arabia is far more than oil--it means trade for America, jobs for Americans and strength for the dollar."¹⁷ The second box of body type includes a partial list of the 700 companies doing business in the Kingdom.

While there have been no studies to determine the effectiveness of this particular series of advertisements, the fact remains--the American public opinion gradually came to favor the sale of the planes and an agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia was eventually signed. Corporate executives authorized the expenditures because they honestly believed it was in the best economic interest of the United States to provide the American public with the necessary information about the benefits Saudi Arabia provides to this country. If such advertisements, even on a smaller scale, were required of all foreign corporations, the international impact would be most effective. Of course, the companies could always retain the option of refusing to provide such media efforts, and the Kingdom could always retain the option of granting contracts to corporations willing to cooperate. Or if the corporations were not willing to bear the entire cost of a media effort, perhaps an agreement could be worked out wherein both Saudi Arabia's government and the corporation shared the expense.

This might also benefit companies recruiting Americans or people of other nationalities for their Saudi Arabian enterprises.

At this point, it might be helpful to review the promised parameters of this study as outlined in Chapter One and to briefly illustrate how these promises have been kept. In Chapter One the problem of utilizing only a capital-intensive strategy and the advantage of using a combination of both capital-and labor-intensive strategies for development in Saudi Arabia were explained. I have shown how the role of mass communications is greatly enhanced by combining the two planning strategies. Chapter Two explained how the Kingdom's interrelated cultural, educational, economic, religious, and political systems both influence any plan to devise an international communication system as well as contribute to the understanding of why the Kingdom needs such a system. Chapter Three was designed to explain and illustrate several communication theories or strategies as they are used by the United States and the Soviet Union in their international outreach efforts. The United States felt the need to begin a project of international outreach during World War II and eventually this led to the establishment of the United States International Communication Agency. In contrast, since Lenin's time, the Russians have understood that the spread of communism depends on the general public's acceptance of it as a viable political doctrine. Soviet leaders have also been well aware

that international outreach efforts are most effective when directed at the general public, and thus, it became a logical conclusion for international information to become the natural weapon for creating favorable attitudes toward Communist doctrine. Chapter Four explained the development of the mass media in Saudi Arabia, the structure of the Ministry of Information, surveyed domestic and international outreach efforts, and the functions of the Higher Council. Chapter Five provided an explanation of the role of the Ministry of Information from an international communication perspective. Chapter Six discussed the processes of the Kingdom's international communication efforts. Chapter Seven discussed the Ministry of Information's policies and techniques. Chapter Eight discussed the Soviet Union were adapted with logical policies. Chapter Nine discussed a proposed organization. Chapter Ten discussed the organizational characteristics were of the international communication agency.

Conclusions

As a result of the preceding chapters of work, I have reached the following conclusions:

- (A) The Saudi Arabian International Communication

that international outreach efforts are most effective when directed at the general public, and thus, it became a logical conclusion for international information to become the natural weapon for creating favorable attitudes toward Communist doctrine. Chapter Four explained the development of the mass media in Saudi Arabia, the structure of the Ministry of Information, surveyed domestic and international outreach efforts, and explained the functions of the Higher Council of Information. This chapter provided an explanation of how Saudi Arabia, could benefit from an international communication program. In addition, weaknesses of the Kingdom's current efforts to establish an international communication system and the weaknesses of the Ministry of Information were also explained. Finally, strategies and techniques from both the United States and the Soviet Union were adapted for use in Saudi Arabia and combined with logical policies and goals to meet Saudi Arabian needs. A proposed organization chart and description of personnel characteristics were combined to create an international communication agency staff.

Conclusions

As a result of the preceding chapters of work, I have reached the following conclusions:

- (A) The Saudi Arabian International Communication

Agency needs to be established according to the design described in this chapter.

(B) Establishment of such an agency could correct many of the weaknesses of the current international outreach efforts and solve many of the problems of disseminating world-wide information about the Kingdom. It must be clearly understood that the proposed international communication agency would be in charge of all domestic and international communication efforts which are aimed toward foreigners as a target audience. This means a certain amount of the agency's activities will, of necessity, occur within the Kingdom's borders.

(C) If the Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency is established according to this plan, the only remaining duties of the Ministry of Information will be the operation of radio and television stations broadcasting programs aimed at a target audience of Saudi Arabians and supervision of newspapers also aimed at Saudi Arabian readers.

(D) International exhibitions have always been under the direction and control of the Ministry of Commerce, and I propose that since these are basically international outreach efforts, responsibility for these exhibitions be transferred to the proposed international communication agency.

(E) Finally, and most importantly, while it should be remembered that the president of the international communication agency would be a member of the Higher Council of

Information and responsible to it, it should also be remembered that the council formulates domestic and international communication policies for the Ministry of Information.

(F) Therefore, I propose that control of all mass media aimed at a target audience of Saudi Arabians be transferred directly to the Higher Council of Information and the Ministry of Information abolished in that its functions would be incorporated and executed by other units in the overall plan.

If this plan were to be followed, the Saudi Arabian International Communication Agency would be a mirror of the Saudi Arabian way of life; it would present a favorable picture of the Kingdom; and quite possibly, challenge other Third World countries to emulate Saudi Arabian accomplishments. Application of the plan could turn the use of information into a fruitful and driving power which could fulfill priceless achievements.

CHAPTER FIVE

ENDNOTES

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⁹Al-Hawadess, Arabian news magazine, No. 210, Jan. 11, 1980, pp. 108-112.

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