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**FORESHOCKS OF REVOLUTION:
THE 1960 VALDIVIA EARTHQUAKE,
AN ENVIRONMENTAL ROAD TOWARD SOCIALISM**

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**FORESHOCKS OF REVOLUTION:
THE 1960 VALDIVIA EARTHQUAKE,
AN ENVIRONMENTAL ROAD TOWARD SOCIALISM**

**A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY**

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Abstract

The 1960 Valdivia earthquakes set the stage for drastic change in the city of Valdivia, southern Chile, and eventual larger ramifications on the Nation. In 1969, the people of Chile accomplished the impossible, they elected the first Socialist President, Salvador Allende in a democratic election. From a macro perspective the election of Allende was indeed a revolution, but by examining the election through Valdivia's natural environment, the election was part of evolutionary politics grounded in Chile's natural environment. Focusing on the city of Valdivia and its progressive changes from its economic downturn in the 1950s to its massive earthquake in 1960, there is an advancement of changes that led to the election of Salvador Allende. When the 9.5 earthquake struck in 1960 it only heightened the need for change and the integration of the marginalized: working class, rural farmers, and indigenous people. The two previous presidents, Jorge Alessandri and Eduardo Frei took on the task of fixing these social issues, including housing, and attempting to incorporate southern Agriculture into the Nation's Economic development as the nation leaders fought against inflation. For over a decade the issues did not change: housing, economic development, and integration of the marginalized. Their efforts of reconstruction and integration led to many of the rural population migrating to the city seeking both shelter and work. By focusing on Valdivia, the election of Salvador Allende could be better understood as an evolution rather than a revolution grounded in Valdivia's natural environment and the 1960 earthquakes.

Dedicated to my Partner

Athena Arias

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This journey started in Jerez de García Salinas, Zacatecas, México, where my father pointed out the environmental degradation behind my grandparent's *ejido* ranch; a place that used to be known as a beach, was now filled with black waters. My parent's journey to the United States was not by choice, but due to indirect result of the Green Revolution, the Cold War, and technological advancements that forced many to move, looking for opportunities elsewhere. As a teenager, my father asked me what I wanted to do with my life, I responded I wanted to be a cook just like him. All he asked of me was to find a job where I would not have to use my hands. A few words in these two moments led me to pursue a dissertation on how environmental events such as the 1960 Chilean earthquake impact the working class. I am forever indebted to my father, Pablo Del Rio, and my always loving and caring mother, Ramona Del Rio.

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Introduction

Foreshocks of Revolution:

The 1960 Valdivia Earthquake, An Environmental Road Toward Socialism

Introduction and Main Argument

Chile's 1960s political transformation can be better understood as an evolution rather than a revolution. This political evolution was not imitated, but rather highlighted by the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, since many of the issues that came to a head in that decade had already been plaguing Chilean society.¹ By looking at this transformation on a micro level, Chile's political "revolution", which gave way to the first democratic elected Socialist, Salvador Allende, can be better understood. Therefore, in this dissertation, I argue that the 1960 Valdivia earthquake brought social issues such as housing, economy, and the need to incorporate the south and the working-class to a head. These issues had been debated since the turn of the twentieth century, but earthquake after earthquake legislation had failed to fix these issues. This is why the 1960 Valdivia earthquake is exceptional and provides an insight into the transformative politics that occurred in Chile during the 1960s.

Introduction

In the first weeks of May 1960, a series of strong tremors rattled southern Chile. It started with a 7.75 on the moment magnitude scale [M_w], near the city of Concepción on May 21 at 6:06 a.m. Although accustomed to near constant seismic activity of this type, residents of the region had little indication of what followed thirty-three hours later. At 3:11 p.m. on a Sunday afternoon, May 22, a far more powerful tremor struck just northeast of the port city of Valdivia, some 350 miles south of the Chilean capital of Santiago. Not only was the ten-minute quake the strongest ever to strike Chile, a country known for its intense earthquakes, but, at 9.5 on the moment magnitude scale [M_w], it remains the most powerful earthquake ever recorded. An hour

¹ Historically in Chile, it is officially called the 1960 Valdivia earthquake. The documents at the time called it *los sismos de 1960*. From an outside perspective, it is called the 1960 Chilean earthquake or the 1960 Great Chilean earthquake. Specifically in chapter 4 I referenced the earthquake as the 1960 earthquake. Also, for lack of confusion, I referenced it as singular instead of plural.

after the quake, Chilenos in the southern port cities dealt with a twenty-six-foot tsunami wave that struck the Chilean coast between Concepción and Chiloé. The earthquake and its ensuing tsunami had global ramifications, killing people in Hawaii and Japan. In fact, it is the reason why there is a global tsunami warning system today. An estimated 5,700 people died; many of them went missing during the tsunami.² Two days later, the volcano Puyehue erupted along with immediate aftershocks that ranged between 6.75 and 7.0. This disaster and the environmental dangers that followed transformed Chilean society. The effects of the earthquake were correspondingly devastating to the citizens of Valdivia and Southern Chile.

Devastation of the built environment through this natural disaster left two million people homeless and without immediate resources. The earthquake rattled urban infrastructures: forty to eighty percent of buildings were destroyed or deemed inhabitable in southern cities. Valdivia did not recover until the 1980s. Jorge Alessandri cancelled the May 21 naval holiday celebration and enacted a state of emergency. In addition, twenty-six bulldozers from various companies relieved the San Pedro River from overflowing waters caused by major landslides in the wake of the devastating earthquake. The action from these companies saved many lives and towns from major flooding. The earthquake had a profound impact on cities, the region, and the nation; but, in particular, the earthquake acted as a catalyst to change the political, social, and environmental landscape of Valdivia.

In this study, I explore the shifting relationships between the public, the environment, and the Chilean political order in the wake of the catastrophic 1960 Valdivia earthquake. Utilizing what Robert Darnton termed “incident analysis,” I seek to use the earthquake as an avenue into

² Heriberta Castaños and Cinna Lomnitz, *Earthquake Disasters in Latin America: A Holistic Approach* (Dordrecht; New York: Springer, 2012), 16, <http://public.ebib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=886185>.

the larger political movements and social transformation that occurred in the subsequent decade.³ This study therefore asks the following questions: How did the 1960 Valdivia earthquake shape the political arena during this pivotal decade in Chilean political history? To what degree did the earthquake contribute to the demographic and social changes sweeping the Chilean south in these years? How did the earthquake and reconstruction afterwards influence Chilean urban planning and popular perceptions of the built environment? Finally, how did the earthquake affect the network of relationships between these political, social, and environmental changes in 1960s Chile?

The earthquake and subsequent events brought to light the centrality of the Chilean state even during a conservative president's term. It tested the new administration of Jorge Alessandri, who had taken office just eighteen months earlier, having defeated his opponents Salvador Allende and Eduardo Frei, both who ran on a reformist platform, by the narrowest of margins in the September 1958 elections. The 1960 earthquake drove home the way in which a centralized state was "natural" in Chile, in part because of the constant devastating earthquakes and the need for the government to be more actively involved in peripheral cities. This did not determine, but instead, reinforced the trend for an increasingly strong, state-directed form of economic development—either of a strongly reformist type (Eduardo Frei Montalva, Radomiro Tomic Romero), or socialist (Salvador Allende Gossens). While the Chilean people elected Alessandri, the last conservative president of the twentieth century, electoral trends and legislation before the earthquake pointed toward a more centralizing state and a populist president. The combination of a centralized state sector as a consequence of earthquakes, plus a broadly fair and functioning electoral system with expanding suffrage, made a free-market

³ Charles F Walker, *Shaky Colonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Ssunami in Lima, Peru, and Its Long Aftermath* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 11–12.

(conservative) reform essentially incompatible with democracy. I argue that the devastation brought on by the 1960 earthquake can explain electoral trends and people's needs that called upon a more centralizing state. After the earthquake, a struggle ensued between the national government and *Valdivianos* over the future of the city.⁴

The May 22 earthquake and its aftershocks transformed the relationships between the people, the political class, and the environment, and it did so at a time of already dramatic social change. During the 1930s Great Depression, tension grew between two ruling groups as the urban legislators infused the country with foreign loans while the rural elites cultivated only one fifth of all Chilean land.⁵ Brian Loveman identifies the rural landlord's inability to support the country's nutritional needs during the 1940s and 1950s as the reason the long standing alliance broke between urban and rural elites.⁶ Furthermore, Loveman states that "a mounting press campaign by leftist and reformist newspapers and intellectuals slated the landowners politically and identified them in the public mind as the group largely responsible for Chile's social and economic backwardness."⁷ Urban elites and left-leaning coalitions instituted reforms during the 1950s that shifted population from haciendas into industrial positions in the city.⁸ The working class benefited from these reforms and prospered as industrial leaders infused the city with jobs and infrastructure making Valdivia a leading industrial city during the 1950s, only behind

⁴ Samuel Martland, "Reconstructing the City, Constructing the State: Government in Valparaíso after the Earthquake of 1906," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 87, no. 2 (May 2007): 222, <https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-2006-129>. Samuel Martland's article on the 1906 Valparaíso earthquake echoes the restructuring of government hierarchy after a natural disaster.

⁵ Simon Collier and William F Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-2002* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 230.

⁶ Brian Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 268.

⁷ Loveman, 268.

⁸ Women gained suffrage in 1949; 1958 congress passed electoral reform that brought back the Communist party, and in 1962, congress further simplified and streamlined both voter registration and ballots. The 1962 law took away the *Haciendado's* ability to control any eligible worker's vote.

Concepcion and Santiago. With a weakened hacienda system in the countryside and opportunity in the city, rural migration into cities became a fact beginning in the 1940s. Breweries, sawmills, and factories provided jobs, political voice, and new opportunities, thus depleting the rural elite's political and economic power. Before the earthquake, the working class prospered in the city, however, the natural devastation influenced the government to revert Valdivia back to an agricultural hub. This changed the dynamics of the city. While new communities were being built in the city, many others commuted to other nearby towns and agricultural centers for work as many industries left the city of Valdivia. I would like to emphasize, that while I do focus on the working class in this project, I do not address the issue of race, ethnicity, and indigenous peoples in my dissertation. These are important issue, but developing these themes was beyond the scope of the project at the dissertation state and I plan to address it later on in my manuscript.

The centralization of the Chilean government, however, had roots in another natural event—the 1939 Chillán Earthquake. Twentieth century Chilean democracy commonly functioned as a centralized state which became vital during disasters such as the 1960 Valdivia earthquake. One of the most important institutions for disaster management was CORFO (Production Development Corporation).⁹ In 1939, Pedro Aguirre Cerda instituted CORFO as an answer to many of Chile's economic and social problems. Earthquakes provided the driving motive behind CORFO's inception. Therefore, since 1939, CORFO had been a major arm of the Chilean government during disasters and a driving economic tool. During the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, CORFO became the major rebuilding apparatus that developed new Chilean cities—such as Temuco to the north and Puerto Montt to the south—with the working-class as their main beneficiaries. Therefore, the reconstruction process of Valdivia fell into the hands of the central

⁹ It goes without mentioning that Richard Walters and Samuel Martland both have studies on early twentieth century Chile and how the state became involved in city planning.

state. They not only built housing and public structures, but also controlled the means to create industries and boost the economy. The magnitude of the 1960 Valdivia earthquake reinforced the logic for state action and its need to streamline both the rebuilding process and preserve Chilean democracy.

Historiographical Background and Explanation of Natural Disasters

Environmental events such as earthquakes have the power to change not only urban landscapes, but also the social and political structure of nations. Jürgen Buchenau and Lyman Johnson argue in their edited book, *Aftershocks*, that the ramifications of earthquakes “force political institutions and political actors to demonstrate their legitimacy and efficacy in new and challenging ways.”¹⁰ Furthermore, Buchenau and Johnson state that “this predictable, even inevitable, connection between earthquakes and politics originates in the material interface of nature and human society, the built environment.”¹¹ Still, many historians ignore the natural environment, characterizing it as a passive actor in politics and society. Instead, I want to further this historiography on “natural disasters” by arguing that the natural environment, especially after an event like an earthquake, became part of the 1960s Chilean political and social history. There is a relationship between politics, society, and the natural environment that evolves into long term relief in the form of public works projects, politics, and economic development in the urban environment.¹² In the case of the Valdivia, although the earthquake stunted industrialization, it continued and accelerated the social progress that had begun in the 1950s. I do not consider the earthquake to be the main reason for the “Revolution in Liberty” (the name

¹⁰ Jürgen Buchenau and Lyman L Johnson, eds., *Aftershocks: Earthquakes and Popular Politics in Latin America* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 5.

¹¹ Buchenau and Johnson, 5.

¹² Louis A Pérez, *Winds of Change: Hurricanes and the Transformation of Nineteenth Century Cuba* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 2001), 135.

of Eduardo Frei's Christian Democrats' political reform), but nevertheless, the earthquake highlighted the need for the centralization of the government and the social reforms that unfolded in the 1960s.

Natural events can become sources of national movements and identity. The fact that the earthquake occurred at the cusp of a peaceful but populist-driven political climate should not be ignored. Scholars Paul J. Dosal, Virginia Garrad-Burnett, and Louis E. Walker have written studies on what I call "revolutionary earthquakes" that toppled regimes in Latin America. While these regimes did not fall moments after the earthquakes occurred in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and México, the leaders' reaction to devastation proved fatal to their political reign. The 1960 Valdivia earthquake helped spur a popular movement that benefited the Christian Democrats and leftist parties. While Chileans and historians have called the 1960s revolutionary, I believe it is better described as evolutionary since many right-wing politicians also participated in these reforms. The right never toppled, but instead was part of Chilean democracy as the Radicals, Liberals, and Conservatives all debated legislations in congress. The earthquake and the ensuing reforms initiated by the conservative Alessandri government created space and opportunity for the working class to rebuild their lives under a state-aided rebuilding effort that reconfigured Valdivia into an increasingly agrarian city. While the earthquake de-industrialized the city, the constructions of roads made the city home to many agrarian workers as the central state built public housing for the displaced. Thus the earthquake centralized the working class into towns and cities in the province of Valdivia through housing projects and the agrarian reform effort that started in 1962.

These "natural disasters" changed the course of Chilean history, but the "disasters" also occurred partially because of human structural error. Scholars have called natural events, such as

earthquakes, and their ramifications “natural disasters.” I disagree with the name as well as with the treatment of these studies. These “natural disasters” are social disasters because if these natural events do not affect humans, they go unnoticed. When Cinna Lomnitz discusses the common perception of describing events as natural disasters, he attributes its ramifications beyond the natural environment to the consequences of a socially fabricated urban environment.¹³ Mark Healey furthers this idea and states that earthquakes are usually rendered small and if no one is killed, unimportant.¹⁴ Earthquakes do not pose any danger until the built environment fails to sustain its structural integrity. Governments do not have the power to stop these natural events from happening, but they do have the ability to mitigate the damage to their society and deter harm to the legitimacy of their governments and economies, as the Chileans administrations were trying to do in the aftermath of the 1960 earthquake.

The environment can also become a medium between the working class and the government. Mark Carey studies the working class in the Peruvian Andes and how they harnessed both the natural environment and Peruvian politics for their own economic purpose in the wake of melting glaciers during the 1970s. He shows a relationship between nature, politics, and society. Carey argues, “the history of climate change and glacier control, I contend, is thus a history of power struggle – not just between humans, and the physical environment, but among various social groups.”¹⁵ In my study on the Valdivia earthquake, the same relationships between humans and environment are formed. The earthquake transformed the environment

¹³ Mark Alan Healey, *The Ruins of the New Argentina: Peronism and the Remaking of San Juan after the 1944 Earthquake* (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2011), 12.

¹⁴ Healey, 12.

¹⁵ Mark Carey, *In the Shadow of Melting Glaciers: Climate Change and Andean Society*, 1 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 6.

which forced the government and the people to negotiate the future of both the city and the province of Valdivia.

In this study of the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, I move away from previous studies that have made the environment a pivot point of a social movement and instead make it the center of my study. I argue that the government's rebuilding efforts in the province of Valdivia after the earthquake considered the rising influence of the working class and the environment. Therefore, the state's reconstruction of the city accounted for the possibilities of future earthquakes, undermining the industrial status of the city of Valdivia. The state recognized the province's natural potential and sought to fix Chile's food problems by making Valdivia and the south into an agricultural center which became the model for the agricultural reform movement in the 1960s.

My dissertation seeks to add to the thin conversation of 1960s Chilean politics by adding the environment, not as a catalyst, but as an important factor in the development of southern Chilean economics and politics. I agree with Jürgen Buchenau and Lyman Johnson who argue in their edited volume, *Aftershocks*, that environmental events have to be considered as cause for social movements and transformations. My study is considerably inspired by Mark Healey's work on the Argentine Earthquake in Mendoza, but instead of leaving the city, I center my study on the city and region that it most affected. I see the environment as a strong factor in 1960s Chilean politics, culture, and economics just like Louis A. Pérez Jr. who argues in his book, *Winds of Change*, that hurricanes were a key factor in the development of modern Cuba. Chile will always have to consider the ramifications of earthquakes as they are a stark reality that occur every few years and have a damning effect almost every decade. I am most importantly in conversation with Magdalena Gil-Ureta who wrote a sociological dissertation entitled,

“Catastrophe and State Building.” Gil-Ureta studies the ever-increasing government expansion after the 1906 Valparaíso, 1939 Chillán, and 1960 Valdivia earthquake. For Valdivia, she argues that the central government created a safer city, but she does not go as far to detail how it reconfigured society as important legislation, voting, and agriculture changed the dynamics of the city even as many people arrived looking for “techo y trabajo.” It is not only an expansion of the central government, but the incorporation of the working class as they are needed to rebuild and produce for the national economy. I am also adding to southern Chilean studies of Jody Pavilack, *Mining for the Nation*, Thomas Klubock, *La Frontera*, and the most recent work of Marian Schlotterbeck, *Beyond the Vanguard*. It goes without mentioning Samuel Martland’s important study on the 1906 Valparaíso Earthquake, *Reconstructing the City, Constructing the State*, as he highlighted the state’s struggle to build adequate housing as it became a right for the working class, especially those working in the cities. This was a problem that the Chilean Government struggled to fix for the rest of the century. Valdivia’s and the south’s environment are an important factor to the development of the region, first for its agricultural importance and second for its natural beauty. Ultimately, I believe that “natural disasters,” such as the current pandemic, should be considered not only as a static event, but as events that have long consequences, even if those changes are not seen right away.

Historical Background

A major part of this dissertation is to evaluate some of the perceptions of Chilean history. These misconceptions came to a head during the 1960s as a new group emerged, the working class; not only was the working class a factor, but the elites needed the working class to rebuild and industrialize the nation as its economy struggled amid the earthquakes. Simply put, if these elites did not fix the many ailments of the nation, the economy and sprawling mushroom

communities, they stood to lose their power and influence. Some of the misconceptions of Chilean history include an uninterrupted democracy since the 1930s, the generalization of the hacienda system, and peaceful democratic rule. While this stability was only possible because the right-wing parties: Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals, all held majority rule in congress and presidency. Democracy only applied to middle-class men and elites until 1952 when certain women gained suffrage. The Communist and Socialist parties were also banned for the better part of two decades, the 1940s and 1950s. Also, as I will show in chapter one, the generalized hacienda system applied mostly to the Central Valley, land ownership in the south was much different and better thought of as cooperatives. The 1960 earthquake highlighted these problems as Chile's fertile lands failed to feed its population, house its working class, and have truly democratic elections when so many were disenfranchised. The 1960 Valdivia earthquake allowed for the incorporation, harnessing, and the development of southern Chile and its people.

Chile has a dynamic political history that is defined by its natural environment. Understanding this puts into perspective the political ramifications of the 1960s and the shockwaves of the earthquake. It is no coincidence that the capital of Chile, Santiago, is situated in the Central Valley, about a hundred miles off the coast and under the towering Andes Mountains, where politicians ruled the nation, far from its northern borders and southern wilderness. After independence, there was a period of instability until Diego Portales took the reins of the nation. Portales never became president, but instead worked behind the scenes as minister of various departments. It is important to know that he was an entrepreneur, so he organized the relatively new nation with tools for the elites to prosper off its natural resources—minerals, agriculture, and livestock—by focusing on commerce between Valparaíso, Chile's main port seventy-one miles west, and Santiago. This established a trade route between the

banks, warehouses, and haciendas, in the Central Valley. Portales was also instrumental in establishing the constitution of 1833 and settling territorial disputes in the north, fought over by Chile, Bolivia, and Perú. While the north was environmentally defined as a high desert, called the Altacama, it was important for Chile because it was rich in minerals.¹⁶ To the east lay the towering Andes Mountains, second tallest only to the Himalayan range; these mountains provided a buffer from the expansion of the Argentine Caudillos and the ever-increasing strength of the main Caudillo, Juan Manuel de Rosas, who ruled Argentina in various forms for most of the nineteenth century.

With Argentina's ever-expanding territory, the south became a liability for the Chilean government. While the Andes still stretched out to the south, they were less volatile to cross, and some Indigenous groups made the trek yearly from Chilean Patagonia to the Pampas. The Mapuche was the dominate tribe in the south, but other tribes included the Pechuenches, Huilliches, Cuncos Puelches, Poyas, and Aonikenk. The Chilean government needed to establish towns and cities in the south and under the President Manuel Montt, German immigrants settled in the south, reinvigorating the city of Valdivia and founding the town of Puerto Montt, among many other towns and cities.

The latter half of the nineteenth century can be perceived as a nationally economic progressive era but filled with political turmoil. The two main characters during this period were Pedro Montt, son of Manuel Montt, and José Manuel Balmaceda—both presidents of the nation. Balmaceda largely had conflict with his Congress and gained the presidency only with the help and approval of his predecessor, Domingo Santa María. Balmaceda, a Liberal, was highly opposed by the Conservatives. Once in office, he granted large contracts for public works. To

¹⁶ It is important to note that during the Cold War, the north became internationally important because of copper, as it is the best conductor of electricity and important for the new technology and military complex.

further his political mission, he also supported his fellow party members in the elections, igniting the 1891 Chilean Civil War. At the turn of the century, one of Balmaceda's cabinet members, Pedro Montt propelled the country economically forward with the construction of railroads but at the cost of the working class, especially in the northern mines. While successful in his economic development of the country, Montt ruled with a heavy hand and ignored social issues. During this time, Valdivia experienced its golden age, as the railroad arrived to the city.

In the early twentieth century, most of the country benefited from internal manufacturing and export trades. This was largely driven by the north's nitrate, advancement of copper extraction, and the 1918 tariff law "which increased the levies on imported goods by 50 to 80 percent."¹⁷ During the 1920s, "Chilean factories were able to satisfy 97 percent of the country's consumer needs."¹⁸ This created prosperity and jobs for the working class, but their conditions never improved; social issues such as lack of housing in the industrial centers plagued the Chilean government for most of the century. In the 1920s, President Arturo Alessandri tried to advance the country, but congress rejected many of his proposals. At the time, the Radicals held control of the congress, (seven senators, thirty-seven deputies in 1924) and along with the Conservatives, opposed Alessandri. Congress accused him of personalism as he campaigned for members of his Liberal Party to get elected while pushing for reforms that favored the working class, an issue that had also plagued Balmaceda. This period was defined as a struggle between congress and the president—while the president was forward-looking, congress was unwilling to act on his proposed reforms. All this came to a head at the end of 1924, and in January 1925, a military coup took over the government; Chile's political system needed reform. After ninety-two years, Chile wrote a new constitution, thus ending the Diego Portales Constitution of 1833.

¹⁷ Collier and Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-2002*, 160.

¹⁸ Collier and Sater, 230.

This created major political reforms, staggered presidential and congressional elections, separated church and state, and granted rights for the working class, allowing them to organize. This constitution would last until 1973, but political stability did not.

The 1925 constitution settled political infighting and the economy thrived amongst the turmoil. In 1927, Carlos Ibáñez was elected to the presidency. As a military man, he took a stern approach to reform and created a repressive state under his administration. Coupled with the global economic crisis, Ibáñez failed to keep peace. Rather than incite violence, he fled to Argentina, behind the Andes, and the military regained power of the state. Then for a two-week period, twelve days to be exact, the country became the Socialist Republic of Chile, under another military personal, Marmaduke Grove.¹⁹ The major political parties did not stand for this and reinstated Arturo Alessandri as the president. Between 1932 until 1973, Chile experienced an era of what is perceived as political stability. The Great Depression reverted the nation to becoming economically independent and Chile thrived until the end of World War II.

The Cold War changed the internal dynamics of Chile as the US revamped up its fight against Communism. This is seen in Gabriel González Videla's presidency (1946-1952) as he imposed the *Ley Maldita* or Damned Law, formally known as the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy, declared the Communist Party "an illegal organization, disenfranchised its members and sympathizers, prevented them from holding public positions, and established a battery of procedures to impression political dissenters as well as to control and repress the labor movement."²⁰ While the working class was still disenfranchised before this law, it further

¹⁹ A trivial note, Grove is the cousin of Salvador Allende and a Socialist.

²⁰ Carlos Huneeus, *La guerra fría chilena: Gabriel González Videla y la ley maldita* (Penguin Random House Grupo Editorial Chile, 2014), i; Marianne Gonzalez Le Saux, "The Paradox of Apolitical Professionalism: The Bar Association and Political Repression in Chile, 1920s-1950s," *The American Journal of Legal History* 61, no. 1 (2021): 2, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ajlh/njaa028>.

disassembled the “democratic” hopes and equal opportunities for them. This was after a glimmer of hope under the Radical rule of Pedro Aguirre Cerda, who died during his presidency because of illness. Cerda’s presidency will be discussed further in chapter one where I will detail how under the disaster of the 1939 Chillán earthquake, he further expanded the central state to the south and founded one of the most important institutions, CORFO, The Corporation for Development and Promotion. The Damn Law lasted a decade but was repealed by Carlos Ibáñez, on his way out, during his second presidency in 1958. While it is true that Chile had held democratic elections since the 1930s, voting was only opened to a selected few. Therefore, the 1960s and the political ramifications of the 1960 Valdivia earthquake are so important. The issues that arise in the 1960s are not new, but date back since the turn of the century: lack of housing, worker’s rights, and voting rights. These issues worsened as the economy and population boomed with no proper planning done for the incoming population looking for work and housing. As I have detailed in the previous paragraphs, politics played a critical part in the lack of solutions. This is why I argue that the 1960 Valdivia earthquake highlighted the fragile society and warranted a strong central government response to incorporate not only the people of southern Chile but also the environment for the betterment of the nation. This is also why social reforms were possible during the 1960s as all parties, right, center, and left, agreed that these problems needed to be resolved, no matter the political ideology behind those solutions. While not harmonious, the legislators of the 1960s drove home the need to reform society and incorporate the southern environment.

The Natural Environment as an Agent for Change

Natural events are part of the evolution of land where nation states develop societies. These events and the natural environments provide the means for nation state building, in this

case forcing the Chilean government to focus national economic plan that now requires a reconstruction and incorporation of the south. The 1960 Valdivia earthquake is unique at the same time an example of how natural events influence society, in this case the democratic election of the Socialist, Salvador Allende, in the background of the Cold War. Some environmental events take thousands of years to impact societies, in Chile's case, it took ten years. While natural events maybe catastrophic, they have been agents of change as modern societies have rebuilt cities, leaving behind very few, if any remanence of these events. Tokyo, San Francisco, Los Angeles, México, Valparaíso and Santiago, have all rebuilt after disasters and in many instances, society changed. Valdivia itself has survived countless earthquakes, tsunamis, and fires, including the 1575 earthquake that closely resembled the 1960 earthquake because of the landslides caused at the same points and the 1909 fire that engulfed and burned most of the city's structures. However, Valdivia's situation after the earthquake differs from these other cities because it never fully recovered to its golden age of the early twentieth century. Therefore, I argue that the earthquakes and tsunami, even though placed as a bookmark by many historians, is rather a continuation of natural events in Valdivia that occurred in the 1950s as it intensified the government's need to solve social issues. The change, and the rebuilding came in the form of the city's economic, political, and social transformation. The people that could leave migrated to Santiago, but the working class from within and other provinces migrated to Valdivia as they sought opportunities, further changing the dynamic of Valdivia's politics.

Goals

This study first and foremost will argue that reconstruction in the wake of the 1960 Valdivia earthquake was a significant factor in bringing the Chilean working class into the forefront of politics. The reconfiguration of Valdivia created a bond and identity in both the

rural and urban working class as they struggled in shaping the direction of the province.

Working class migrants had an active involvement in building a space in both the urban and rural environment with a political future in the aftermath of the strongest earthquake in history. In the years that followed, the people of Valdivia voted for center to left leaning politicians. I contend that migration into the city brought together the working class in a struggle for a space and place in Chilean politics.

In Chile, the 1960s is largely considered as a class struggle that occurred in both the urban and rural environment.²¹ I argue that the 1960 Valdivia earthquake provided the opportunity for the working class to create a space in both Chilean politics and both the urban and the rural environment. As the working class roamed the devastated cities, they initiated a political process driven by elite anxieties of getting the working class off the street.²² The Valdivia earthquake and 1960s politics created a multi-class conflict as the working class found their place in the reconfigured province and reconstructed their lives in the new Chilean environment.

Rather than calling earthquakes natural disasters, scholars should consider the aftermath a social disruption of normality. In Valdivia, the state evacuated most of the population until the natural threats subsided. Instead of separating environmental events from societal events, I contend that during the 1960s, the rebuilding of the Valdivian landscape helped shape the political process that elected left-leaning presidents. The 1960 Valdivia earthquake are fundamental in the political movement that ensued the following decade, because some of the issues of that plagued Valdivia figured also in Chile's national politics. Therefore, the earthquake is not an afterthought in this study, but instead, is an integral part of 1960s Chilean politics.

²¹ I am referring to the agrarian and copper expropriation in the rural environment.

²² Carey, *In the Shadow of Melting Glaciers*, 46. Carey calls this a "social disaster."

The Valdivia earthquake changed the political dynamics between Santiago and Valdivia. The Chilean state sent the military and engineers to Valdivia in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. The Alessandri administration depended on CORFO (La Corporación de Fomento de la Producción), ENDESA Chile (Empresa Nacional de Electricidad Sociedad Anónima) and the Minister of Public Works to maintain order in the wake of the earthquake and to start the process of recovery. While these actions may seem necessary and innocuous, they brought Valdivia and southern Chile closer to the central state. The earthquake created necessary relationships and communication between the most affected—the working class—and the central government.²³ With the rising political movement of the 1960s, it also gave the working class an opportunity to share their visions of modernity as they helped shape the reconstruction of Valdivian society. Not only did the earthquake bring the Chilean state to Valdivia, but it also brought working class campesinos closer to the state through housing projects and reindustrialization. The Valdivian earthquake accelerated the social movement of the 1960s because aid was centered mostly in urban areas of southern Chile.

This study will focus on the province of Valdivia which included the city of Valdivia and its surrounding communities. By decentralizing the narrative away from Santiago, the capital of Chile, a different story will emerge that is more holistic and explains the social economic conflict and struggles of the 1960s that lead to this revolutionary moment. Valdivia is an example, and a microcosm of Chilean society, of how small cities struggled during the decade. While Santiago welcomed many industries, other cities lost opportunities as parliament and presidents reconfigured Chilean society through legislation and development. Santiago's legislators used

²³ Martland, "Reconstructing the City, Constructing the State," 223. Samuel Martland's study on the 1906 Valparaíso earthquake underlines the opportunity for a national government to implement various versions of modernity.

the earthquake as an opportunity to harness the south's natural environment to better facilitate the nation's social economic means. Instead of decentralizing industrialization, Santiago politicians centralized factories in the cities which forced some cities to develop secondary industries such as sugar beet processing and other agriculture. This played a large role in the development of the province of Valdivia and its cities, taking away the power of many capitalist conservatives and opening the door to the working class.

Sources

A few words are needed about my sources and my approach to this study. My dissertation fits in the regional historiography that is emerging in Latin American History in the United States. Marian Schlotterbeck in her book, *Beyond the Vanguard*, focuses on the roots of the MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement) in the southern city of Concepción. She takes a regional approach to a national history, giving a powerful and different perspective to Chilean history by decentralizing Latin American history from the nation's capital city. I seek to add to this regional historiography by focusing on the everyday lives of *Valdivianos*. I do this through an examination of the local newspaper, *El Correo del Valdivia*, with the intent to understand regional and local concerns as the inhabitants of Valdivia navigated the rebuilding and eventual transformation of their city. While conservative in perspective, the evolution of politics is seen in their frustration with the conservative and then moderate central governments. I felt it was important to stay away from the national newspapers or the ones headquartered in Santiago in order to get the true regional struggle of the rebuilding process. Although *El Correo del Valdivia* did have affiliations with *El Mercurio* and SUPERSUR, the equivalent to the Associated Press but for the south, *El Correo* mostly concerned itself with news that affected its citizens and its futures.

Legislation was a driving force behind the change in national politics and economic development after the 1960 earthquake. The Chilean Library of Congress provided ample documents as well as historical background in the evolutions of laws. Chileans believe in technocrats and legislation, as I will show throughout the dissertation, therefore many studies and ensuing legislation are mentioned throughout the chapters. I have also used Ministry documents to shed further light on the transformation of Chilean politics. In doing so, I have relied on the Ministry of the Interior, Agriculture, Economy and Reconstruction, Public Works, and Sanitation. Ultimately, legislative documents and *El Correo* will provide a holistic story of the struggles the region experienced during the reconstruction process.

I have added texture to these sources by respecting the scholarship of my Chilean counterparts. The secondary sources are rich and add a different perspective of the magnitude of the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, including regional agricultural, geological, and sociological perspectives. There are two important scholars that helped shape this study: the southern Chilean historian Fabián Almonacid Zapata, and the geologist, Carlos Rojas Hoppe, both at the University of Chile Austral in Valdivia. Hoppe is not only a local, born and raised in Valdivia, but he lived through the earthquake as an infant and experienced the rebuilding and rebranding of the city. These two, along with other Chilean scholars, helped me to arrive at the importance of the 1960s as not only a regional transformation, but as a national shift in politics once thought impossible.

It was impossible to ignore the international perspective as many institutions, countries, and technocrats became involved and fascinated by the earthquake. Much of these sources come from the United States' Library of Congress since much of the aid came from the United States' Alliance for Progress program and the United Nations' various humanitarian institutions.

Another archive that was instrumental in getting the international perspective was the California State Archives in Sacramento. California developed a pilot program that focused on sending technocrats (including academics and businessmen) rather than money to Chile which created a direct line of communication between institutions in California and Chile. Chapter three will discuss in more detail California's involvement. I also looked at US Department of Agriculture records to get insight into the various solutions the United States offered in managing, fixing, and developing plans for the south's agriculture. Chile was an important country for the United Nations and the United States, therefore, the United Nations established institutions such as CEPAL (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) headquartered in Santiago, Chile, and sent many FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) researchers. Their archives have also helped provide a fruitful array of expert's views on the earthquake and the reconstruction process of the south. Although there were other institutions involved in the reconstruction process, limited time and funds prevented me from exploring their archives. However, I believe that the primary documents I have chosen to use within this study provide strong support for both my argument and the conclusion that I reach; any other sources would have only added to the dissertation. It is my expectation that any other sources not yet examined will be useful in further research for developing my monograph.

Chapter Outlines

Chapter 1 - Becoming Part of the Nation: Transforming Valdivia's Environment

In chapter one I discuss the importance of Valdivia as an industrial, lumber, and cultural center of the south as it helped the central state colonize the region. I also detail the struggle between Valdivia and Central Valley politicians and industrialists as they fight for power and show how Santiago became the economic and political center of the nation. I argue that

Santiago is the center of Chile because of its strong politicians and lobbyists that hindered the decentralization and development of other regions, in this case, the south. Valdivia was once an important city that had direct international trade routes with Perú, Germany, and the United States.

Chapter 2 - Rattling Chile: Showing the Fragility of Chilean Society

In this chapter I detail the sheer magnitude of the earthquake and show how unprepared the central government was in responding to this disaster. I argue that the 1960 Valdivia earthquake and ensuing natural events showed the fragility of Chilean society and warranted a strong central government to respond to this event. The 1960 Valdivia earthquake set the stage for the changing political landscape that developed in Chile. While Alessandri was in his second year of his six-year presidential term and already building housing developments all over the nation, including Valdivia, the 1960 Valdivia earthquake reinforced the need for social economic development and allowed a clean slate for the Chilean central government to develop the region to the needs of the entire nation.

Chapter 3 - A Cold War Earthquake: The International Response to the 1960 Valdivia earthquake

Chapter three looks at the international aid that arrived in Chile following the earthquake. The earthquake became an international event because it not only affected the United States and Japan, but it also occurred during the Cold War. Reconstruction and development figured into the Cold War ideological battle as US Allies, such as West Germany, Japan, and even US states became involved in international events, such as the 1960 Valdivia earthquake and reconstruction, in order to ward off the communist threat. This chapter will also show that this effort was a lost cause for the US and its Allies since aid did not reach the most in need nor

helped the migrating communities arriving from cities damaged from the earthquake. I argue that foreign aid hardened the working-class, left-leaning politics as the right offered no answer to their growing need of “Techo y trabajo,” or “Roof and work.”

Chapter 4 - Alessandri's Presidency and Reforming Chile: The Need for Change

In Chapter four I show how Alessandri and his administration changed its stance on development as it passed a series of laws unheard of before the earthquake. The 1960 Valdivia earthquake made both the Agrarian Reform and the Voting Reform a reality. The Chilean right needed to adapt to the growing needs of its people to survive and stay in power. The Radicals, Liberals, and Conservatives all had to grant concessions to the Communists, Socialists, and a rising party, the Christian Democrats, to pass laws that the nation needed to recover and reconstruct. Focusing on the reconstruction of Valdivia, I show how the slow reconstruction process and the exodus of industries led to a political change in a once conservative city. With most of the development and housing communities built in Valdivia, many people arrived looking for homes, but were left without work. Alessandri's administration failed the province and city of Valdivia, the one hit the hardest by the earthquake and ensuing tsunami and flooding, while other southern cities, such as Temuco, Osorno, and Puerto Montt became rising cities and took on responsibilities once held by Valdivia.

Chapter 5 - Transition of Power and Electoral Shift

The failures of Alessandri's government and the strong Marxist candidate, Salvador Allende, gave way to Eduardo Frei Montalva, a Christian Democrat, in the 1964 elections. A new party, born in the 1940s, Frei and his administration took on the task of developing the nation through his rallying call of “Revolution in Liberty.” In the first part of the chapter I detail the shifting politics of Chile and the reason why the right-leaning candidate, Julio Duran, failed

to make a showing in the elections. I also show how Frei figured into the evolution of 1960 Chilean politics. Four years removed from the earthquake, Frei offered Valdivia the promise of a better chapter in their long history of industry, trade, and development. Instead, Frei failed to develop the city. While Frei championed many reforms to help the social economic develop of the nation, such as the decentralization of administrative office, revised Agrarian Reform, and the amendment of the 1925 Chilean Constitution that allowed for the expropriation of land, he failed to change the everyday lives of people still struggling to make a living. Instead of decentralizing the nation, Santiago gained industrial strength and worsened the “challampa” or mushroom communities in the cities.

Chapter 1

Becoming Part of the Nation: Transforming Valdivia's Environment

Chapter 1 introduction

The city and the province of Valdivia were developed in a manner that was drastically different from the development of the Central Valley. In this chapter, I detail the differences as well as show how the natural environment influenced both the city's and the province's development. I also show how a difficult relationship with the central government stunted a fast-developing region. The vast generalization in Latin American and Chilean history is that large *haciendas* developed and controlled the nation. Valdivia and the south focused on industrial factory processing and its farms were characterized by small-to middle-sized landholdings run by cooperative. By describing the intricacies of Valdivia and the south, this chapter helps to create a better understanding of the consequences of 1960 Valdivia earthquake.

Chile's development of the south during the early twentieth century was predicated on disaster and legislation. Global events such as the Great Depression and the Second World War along with national environmental disasters such as the 1939 Chillán Earthquake and “environmental accidents” during the 1950s, shaped Chilean politics—especially in Valdivia during the first half of the century. Valdivia, the province and city, was colonized and flourished under German entrepreneurship and gained global trade through their lumber industry at the turn of the twentieth century. This success, by the Valdivian leaders and industrialists, caught the attention of central Government legislators creating the impetus for state development and infringement of the south. What seemed like development and aid by Santiago legislators—train track building and the creation of institutions such as CORFO (The Production Development Corporation or Corporación de Fomento de la Producción de Chile)—created avenues for ultimate control and integration of the south in Chile's national economy. The story of Valdivia in the early twentieth century is that of economic ingenuity, development, and eventual decline

through national integration. The Chilean government's mismanagement of Valdivia's natural environment through national economic integration led to the province's dependence on the national market. This led to a relationship that had to be maintained more and more as Valdivia declined and Chile sought development of its internal social economy.

This chapter explores the colonization and development of the province and city of Valdivia. As Valdivia's economic importance took shape in the early twentieth century, policies from Santiago shaped the relationship between the environment and its people. By chronicling Valdivia's early history through Chilean and global history, I show how the Chilean central government began to hinder the development of the city. As Valdivia declined during the 1930s and 1940s because of the Great Depression, the Second World War, and Import Substitution Industrialization, it opened an opportunity for the Chilean government to integrate not only Valdivia, but the entire nation into its national economy. This integration created a population boom that developed into social economic problems and required the central government's implementation of social reforms such as housing. As the Cold War set in and Chile opened to global trade, Valdivia became an international case study for Chile's stagnant economy. While Valdivian historians bookend this era with the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, the earthquake further highlighted the social economic problems already occurring in the south and Valdivia.

Environmental Beginnings and Colonization

The development of Valdivia, a city and a province holding vast natural resources in southern Chile at the entrance of the Chilean Patagonia, was molded by two environments: the political (Santiago legislators) and the natural (geographical). In 1832, Diego Portales established a constitutional government that helped foster private enterprise and economic growth. This set the tone for how the Chilean government involved itself in society as it

navigated economic development and natural disasters. Furthermore, shifting populations and earthquakes only favored a closer relationship between *Chilenos* and *la Patria*. At the turn of the twentieth century, migration impacting Santiago and Valparaíso forced the Chilean government to deal with a housing crisis that only worsened throughout the twentieth century. Additionally, three massive earthquakes in the same century, 1906, 1939, and 1960, heightened the need for a stronger centralized government. It is only fitting that the Chilean government “naturally” developed into a centralized state that dictated and molded the development of each provinces.

The natural environment made it difficult for Santiago politicians to ignore the province’s rich natural resources. However, they also hindered, and even sabotaged Valdivia’s development. As Fabian Almonacid Zapata argues in his seminal work, *The agricultura Chilean discriminada (The Discriminated Agrarian South)*, southern agrarian development was more efficient, prosperous, and lucrative than the Central Valley’s *haciendas*; but Central Valley *hacendados*’ ability to lobby politicians against developing southern agricultural pitted Valdivia against Santiago, both economically and politically, until the Great Depression.²⁴ The autonomy that Valdivia experienced from 1845 until 1930 cultivated the city’s economic growth causing it to become the third most industrial city in Chile.

The city and province of Valdivia, Chile, is located 527 miles south of Santiago on a river with the same name. Its location inland, with river access to what would become a port named Corral, made it desirable for the Spanish colonizer and its founder Pedro Guitiérrez de Valdivia. He proudly named the city after his home city’s patron saint in Spain, Santa María la Blanca de Valdivia, in 1552.²⁵ Situated near the Pacific Ocean, the city of Valdivia stood as a Spanish

²⁴ Fabián Almonacid Zapata, *La agricultura chilena discriminada (1910-1960): Una mirada de las políticas estatales y el desarrollo sectorial desde el sur* (Editorial CSIC - CSIC Press, 2009), 12,15.

²⁵ A common misperception is that Pedro named the city after himself; in a way it is true, but in reality, he gave homage to his city and his patron saint from back home in Valdivia, Spain.

stronghold with a fort system that reached up to ten forts at one point. For any invader trying to conquer the city, this meant enduring a brutal battle at the entry point. To the east, the Spanish faced the Huilliche people, the indigenous population living in present day Valdivia province all the way south to the Chiloé Archipelago.²⁶ At the height of the Spanish Empire, the Spanish colonizers abandoned and re-occupied many southern towns such as Valdivia, Concepción, Villarica, and Imperial “during the chronic Indian wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”²⁷ The struggle between the Mapuche and Spanish endured throughout Valdivia’s history, but the true difficulty for the Spanish was the region’s brutal environment. Valdivia’s location on the Pacific Rim has made it an important trading post since colonial times; its global importance started diminishing in the twentieth century only after the opening of the Panamá Canal.²⁸ However, its environment made it crucial in Chile’s modernization and industrialization effort during the twentieth century.

Valdivia’s environment is notorious in Chile, owning the nickname “lluvaldivia,” because of its abundant average rainfall. The city is situated at a valley opening out to the sea within a coastal range that is much older than the Andes mountains, putting the city at the entrance of inclement weather coming from the South Pacific.²⁹ Strong winds and an abundance of precipitation pummels the coastal region and the city, making it the primary reason for the area’s sparse population.³⁰ However, this precipitation has also given the province ample natural resources, including forest and agriculture, creating the catalyst for industry. These coastal

²⁶ Luis Hernan Villanueva Barra, *La poblacion de Valdivia y su influencia en la economia de la provincia*, Universidad de Chile: Escuela de Derecho (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, S.A., 1955), 25.

Raúl Grothe Nannig, *Hitos: historia y desarrollo de la Región de Los Ríos* (Osorno, Chile: Editorial Impresure Ltda, 2013), 57.

²⁷ Donald E Worcester and Wendell G Schaeffer, *The Growth and Culture of Latin America* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), 83–84.

²⁸ Nannig, *Hitos*, 197.

²⁹ Nannig, 27.

³⁰ Nannig, 28.

mountain ranges protect the province's two valleys, the Mariquina and Los Llanos Valley's de La Unión and Río Bueno. The valleys, once clear cutting gave way to rich flatland, became vital to the development of Chilean agriculture as one of the main producers of wheat and livestock. Valdivia's Central Valley agriculture is irrigated by both rain and glacial lakes.³¹ Yet, the most important natural resource from Valdivia historically is lumber, as it provided housing for thousands of families during the twentieth century housing crises.

Valdivia's damp countryside and dense forests made it difficult for a massive Chilean colonization effort. A 1950 United Nations report conducted by the Economic Commission for Latin America or CEPAL (La Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe) described Valdivia province in the nineteenth century as sparsely populated with only three centers: Valdivia, La Unión, and Osorno.³² The report also stated that,

there were no roads, and the rivers were the only means of communication and transport. Cultivation was limited to the vicinity of the towns, and the numerous apple orchards planted by the Spaniards had been allowed to grow wild. By far the greatest part of the territory was covered with tracts of tangled forest which had no authentic owners and the fruits of which were common property.³³

The dense forests represented Valdivia's greatest environmental resource as its two mountain ranges, coastal and Andean, along with its valley provided a building block for the nation as the city gained importance in the twentieth century.

Valdivia's history took a major turn in 1845 when President Manuel Bulnes and his Minister of Interior, Manuel Montt, signed the "Colonies of Natives and Foreigners" initiative that granted land to anyone willing to colonize the southern territory.³⁴ The state took an active

³¹ Nannig, 28.

³² NU CEPAL, "Inmigración En Chile = Immigration in Chile" (Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, May 1, 1950), 58, <http://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/29025>.

³³ CEPAL, 58.

³⁴ NO ESPECIFICADO, "LEY-S/N 18-NOV-1845 NO ESPECIFICADO," Ley Chile - Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, November 18, 1845, <https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1062510&buscar=1845+>.

role overseas to entice immigrants to the region, specifically by German-born sergeant-major of the Army engineers, Don Bernado Eunom Philippi. German immigrant families arrived in southern Chile, but the colonization effort almost failed in Valdivia.³⁵ This same colonization law also granted Chilenos land so that when German immigrants arrived, large plots had already been claimed by either Chilean citizens or Mapuche. One early settler, Colonel Don Benjamin Viel, an “old soldier of Napoleon’s, who had become a naturalized Chilean citizen, [and owned the] island of Teja, opposite Valdivia” gave the eighty five arriving German families the island, firmly establishing a German colony in Valdivia.³⁶

In 1850, Manuel Montt charged Vicente Pérez Rosales with the duty of furthering the immigration effort in Valdivia. By the time Pérez Rosales retired in 1870, his colonization effort had settled 1,768 German immigrants in the province and established towns such as La Unión and Osorno, farm centers that later became important for the livestock industry.³⁷ Chilean immigration policy and the vast Valdivian resources offered ample opportunities for the German families. For their part, these families brought important cultural tools that changed the countryside. As Donald E. Worcester explains, “The Germans who settled around Valdivia in southern Chile introduced dairy farming on a sizable scale.”³⁸ The natural environment provided the Germans the resources to build the city, but ultimately the city’s and province’s future lay in the hands of the central government.

Twentieth Century Industrialization

The arrival of the railroad started an economic connection between Santiago and Valdivia, taking the city out of national isolation in the twentieth century. While train tracks

³⁵ CEPAL, “Inmigración En Chile = Immigration in Chile,” 57.

³⁶ CEPAL, 59.

³⁷ CEPAL, 59.

³⁸ Worcester and Schaeffer, *The Growth and Culture of Latin America*, 175.

arrived in the region in 1899, they did not connect directly to national tracks until 1920. After decades of isolation, train tracks created incentive for industries to relocate and build their factories in Valdivia near resources such as coal, lumber, and agricultural products.³⁹ The railway provided the main communication and transportation line directly to Santiago, instead of going from port to port through Corral and Valparaíso.⁴⁰ This changed the dynamics between Valdivia and Santiago. Before, Valdivia industrialists ran their businesses with total autonomy; however, with the arrival of the train tracks, Santiago became involved in the national distribution of goods. This meant anything sold within the nation had to go through Santiago before arriving to market. The rest of the province still depended on primitive means of transportation including horse or wagon as all-weather roads were non-existent. However, the river system became the trusted mode of transportation for industrial interests becoming the main channel for heavy industrial transports, especially lumber.⁴¹

Immigration, railways, and the natural environment set Valdivia on an industrial path at the beginning of the twentieth century. Valdivia's population growth and industry before the 1940s relied on the lumber industry as its number one product. At the height of Valdivia's industrialization, the city served as an industrial pole for the local and regional economy as the river system provided the perfect means of transportation. For example, the *balseros*, men who built makeshift rafts out of the same lumber they transported, used the river system to deliver the product to factories in Valdivia. In addition to the transportation system, the river Calle-Calle was bi-directional and *balseros* used their knowledge of ocean tides to ride the stream back and

³⁹ Daniel Espinoza Guzmán and Antonio Zumelzu Scheel, "Valdivia Y Su Evolución Post-Terremoto 1960: Enfoques, Factores Escalares Y Condicionantes," *Urbano*, no. 33 (2016): 19.

⁴⁰ Nannig, *Hitos*, 20.

⁴¹ Nannig, 20.

forth from Valdivia into the inner parts of the provinces.⁴² Once the lumber arrived in Valdivia the factories processed and sold the lumber, as it was one of the few cities that had the machinery and sawmills to process wood. Additionally, the city's location also made it favorable for many factory owners to process and sell from one location. The river acted as an economic highway and proved vital to the factory owners.⁴³ For much of the early twentieth century, Valdivia's lumber industry first produced for northern Chile's mining industry and then exported the rest to Germany and Perú.⁴⁴ Valdivia's lumber industry operated virtually autonomously until the 1930s, when the central government attempted to take an active role in curtailing the fast degrading forest and environment. As Thomas Klubock argues, "conservation, forestry, and forestry science served as a tools for extending state governance into a frontier territory often referred to as Chile's 'Wild West.'" Here, Klubock is speaking about the province to the north of Valdivia, Cautín. Valdivia during the early 1920s was in a totally different state of affairs.

By 1920, Valdivia was the third most economically important city in Chile, only behind Santiago and Valaparíso. In some instances, Valdivia was more modern than Valaparíso, as the city gained electricity almost at the same time as Santiago in the early twentieth century because of the regional coal mines. Valdivia's industries flourished as the railroad arrived; but it was the natural resources, geography, and infrastructure centered in the city that made Valdivia the industrial center of southern Chile. This success did not go unnoticed by Santiago legislators, and as the Great Depression hit the global market, the Chilean economy became reoriented making Valdivia more a part of the internal economy. Import substitution industrialization

⁴² Leonardo Antonio Moya López, *Continuidad y cambio en la historia forestal: relatos de balseros de los Ríos San Pedro y Calle-Calle: 1930-1960* (Valdivia: Dirección de Bibliotecas Archivos y Museos, 2010), 103.

⁴³ Moya López, 64.

⁴⁴ Moya López, 31.

provided mixed results for Valdivia as they gained more internal economic opportunities, but allowed for the central state to change the fabric of Valdivia's entrepreneurship.

Valdivia stood as an anomaly in southern Chile: as Valdivia industrialized and exported goods globally, the rest of the south relied on a small regional economy. Other southern Chilean cities depended solely on a rural economy, and not on the agro-industry that defined Valdivia.⁴⁵ That industrial power is seen by the businesses born in the city. For instance, in 1924, Valdivian businessmen began a joint venture and created the first private power company in Chile, calling themselves *Compañía Electro-siderúrgica e Industrial de Valdivia* or ESVAL.⁴⁶ The ingenuity by *Valdivianos* and their use of the environment led to Valdivia being ranked as the third busiest port in Chile by 1929, behind only Valparaíso and San Antonio.⁴⁷ While legislation and the railroad attempted to connect Valdivia to Santiago, most of Valdivia's economy depended on global exports; but this reliance on exports also hindered its development.⁴⁸

Global events shifted Valdivia's economy toward production for domestic consumption. The two World Wars undermined Valdivia's global reach. The First World War started to direct Valdivia's economy toward a domestic economy as its development continued to grow until the crisis of 1929 after which Valdivia experienced the "slow but sure process of incorporation into the central region of country, State, Santiago."⁴⁹ In 1930, with the global economic collapse, Chile changed economic policy from orthodox liberal to Import Substitution Industrialization

⁴⁵ Moya López, 31.

⁴⁶ Gabriel Guarda, *Nueva Historia de Valdivia*, 1. ed, Investigaciones (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 2001), 704.

⁴⁷ Moya López, *Continuidad y cambio en la historia forestal*, 45.

⁴⁸ Guarda, 690 Valdivia specialized in spirits, beers, lumber, salted meats, ham, wool, cheese, agriculture, and leather goods, exporting most of them to Perú and Germany; Zapata, *La agricultura chilena discriminada (1910-1960)*, 38. According to Fabián Almonacid, Cautín and Valdivia only received a share of 12.2 percent of the national budget for transportation in 1929. Second worse to only Aysén and Magallanes who only received 2.3 percent of the national transportation budget.

⁴⁹ Guarda, *Nueva Historia de Valdivia*, 690.

(ISI).⁵⁰ Under the ISI economic model, economic growth became reliant on domestic consumption to boost the economy instead of external markets that producers relied on under the orthodox liberal economic model. Under these circumstances, the Chilean central government started incorporating southern Chile and its forests, including Valdivia, into the national market. During the 1930s, Valdivia lost some control of its lumber industry through legislative measures and economic reforms coming from Santiago.⁵¹ The tradeoff, however, was a short boost in the lumber industry, and the province experienced its apex during the 1930s.⁵² Incorporation into the national market required greater investment in southern Chilean infrastructure.

Integration

Import substitution industrialization integrated Valdivia more closely into the national economy and provided some growth for the city. In May of 1931, the Ministry of Land and Colonization put into effect the *Ley de los Bosques* (forestry law), an overhaul of its previous 1925 law. The law protected and incentivized forestry, but it prevented any expansion of agriculture. Article 1 which replaced Article 1 and 2 of the decree law number 656 of October 17, 1925, stated that any land suitable for forestry and not in use would be designated as forest for the interest of the nation.⁵³ The state also provided a tax exemption of thirty years to forest owners which prevented the growth of agriculture because it also incentivized farmers to grow trees instead of crops. As the law stated, “land suitable for agricultural cultivation that is intended for plantations of trees usable in industry and in constructions will also be exempt from the payment of taxes provided that they occupy an area not less than three hectares.”⁵⁴ The law

⁵⁰ Moya López, *Continuidad y cambio en la historia forestal*, 27.

⁵¹ Moya López, 31.

⁵² Moya López, 63.

⁵³ Ministerio de Tierras y Colonización and Ministerio de la Propiedad Austral, “Decreto con fuerza de ley N.O 265” (Gobierno de Chile, May 26, 1931), 1, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, <https://www.bcn.cl/leychile>.

⁵⁴ Ministerio de Tierras y Colonización and Ministerio de la Propiedad Austral, 2.

also protected great agriculture land as it outlawed the cutting of any trees “400 meters above the springs that are born in the hills and those located less than 200 meters from its banks.”⁵⁵ This law changed the dynamics of the forest industry because before 1930 the lumber industry did not need to replant trees nor mind the tree’s location.⁵⁶ The lumber industry highly criticized the law, viewing it as an infringement on their industry from the legislators and ministries far away in the center of Chile as it now prevented them from simply clear cutting a farmer’s forest.⁵⁷ However, although the law did slow down the growth of agriculture and the lumber industry, it did not do much in the conservation effort as it lacked a sufficient forest agency with funds to regulate the extraction of resources.⁵⁸

In contrast, the “container” Law of 1932 created another boom in the lumber industry, producing growth for the city as Chile’s plan for ISI sought the incorporation of Valdivia into its national economy. This law proclaimed that all produce, except meat, had to be stored and transported in wooden barrels.⁵⁹ Therefore fruits, sugars, potatoes, and beer, all products from the city, benefitted from the local lumber and agricultural industry. These two laws, the forest conservation and the container law, set in motion the incorporation of the forest industry into the nation’s economy as the city’s exports fell due to the global depression. The Great Depression, in some ways, benefited Valdivia as its lumber industry enjoyed the height of its industrial output in the early 1930s. However, integration into Chile’s national economy came at a price as Valdivia lost its political and economic autonomy.

⁵⁵ Ministerio de Tierras y Colonización and Ministerio de la Propiedad Austral, 2.

⁵⁶ Moya López, *Continuidad y cambio en la historia forestal*, 130–31.

⁵⁷ Moya López, 142.

⁵⁸ Moya López, 142.

⁵⁹ Ministerio de Fomento, “Decreto 3324 Fija El Texto Definitivo de Las Leyes N°s. 5,092 y 5,291, de 18 de Marzo de 1932 y 20 de Octubre de 1933, Respectivamente,” January 22, 1934, <https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=194710>.

While government measures created in Santiago intensified Valdivia's lumber output, it also took away the city's and the province's economic and industrial power.⁶⁰ During the 1930s, Santiago's legislation began to affect Valdivia's industrial potential as some of Valdivia products shifted north; Santiago factories eventually processed many of the region's raw resources.

According to Fabián Almonacid,

Santiago increased its national monopoly between 1937 and 1957, reaching more than half of all the total industrial employment. Per items, Santiago was even more remarkable. Among the traditional industries, its trade was decisive, especially in textiles, clothing and leather, footwear and helmets. It was somewhat smaller in beverages, lumber, and furniture, but employed half national in some form or fashion outside Valdivia. The way in which industrial growth occurred, particularly industrial development policies and the conditions of the productive infrastructure, made many provinces lose industrial importance during 1950s. Valdivia for example, in 1937, was the fourth in industrial strength with 5 percent employment. By 1950 it had fallen to 3.29 percent. While industrial specialization existed in Valdivia (shipping, metallurgical, furniture, food and wood) which satisfied southern demand, [Santiago's industrial growth] stalled Valdivia's as it lacked markets and the competition of the main industrial cities.⁶¹

Almonacid highlights the troubling relationship between Santiago and Valdivia, as Santiago's factories took away the city's output and diminished Valdivia's ranking as an industrial powerhouse in the south. Valdivia had all the possible means to become an expansive city: environment, private capital, and geography; but its biggest adversaries lay in Chile's Central Valley and Santiago legislators. Ironically, a natural event, the 1939 Chillán earthquake, laid the foundation for Santiago's management of Valdivia's economic viability.

Government Initiative

Born out of the 1939 Chillán earthquake, a new institution—Chile's most important Government entity CORFO (The Production Development Corporation or Corporación de

⁶⁰ Moya López, *Continuidad y cambio en la historia forestal*, 181.

⁶¹ Moya López, 182.

Fomento de la Producción de Chile)—helped Chileans solve the social economic problems plaguing the nation. The Chillán earthquake was by no means one of the strongest in Chilean history, but at 8.3 on the richter scale it remains the most destructive as it killed an estimated 28,000 people and left ninety five percent of the buildings in rubble. At this time, Chile had been struggling with a housing crisis and the earthquake only heightened that problem.

Located about five hours south of Santiago in a snowcapped mountain community, the Chillán earthquake affected then-president Pedro Aguirre Cerda's plan for social reforms designed to help the working class and poor. Aguirre Cerda had been elected under a political umbrella named the Popular Front that combined members of the Radical, Socialist, Communist, Democratic and Radical Socialist Parties into an antifascist coalition. With the earthquake striking in the middle of his presidency, Aguirre Cerda made a deal with congress to set his social reforms aside and create CORFO instead. The idea for an institution like CORFO had been in the works since the 1928 Talca earthquake. Congressional debates over such a government entity began in all seriousness in 1935. The Chillán earthquake made it a necessity, and Congress quickly passed legislation to create the institution.⁶² It is difficult to explain CORFO's far reaching responsibilities and projects, but its main purpose was to cut through bureaucratic red tape and help the nation through its social economic problems such as the housing issue. Established in 1939 and still functioning today, CORFO studied the various Chilean social problems, such as housing and economy, offering concrete solutions. One of these studies included the stagnant agriculture and forest economy in the south.

In fact, during the 1940s and 1950s, due to Santiago legislator's great concern for economic output, Valdivia and southern Chile became the focus of an international study on

⁶² Ricardo Lagos Escobar, "Terremotos: ¿una oportunidad para avanzar la agenda de cada gobierno?," *Revista Anales*, Séptima, 1 (May 2011): 64.

forest management and development. Irvine T. Haig from the Forest Service subdivision of the US Department of Agriculture in collaboration with CORFO took on the project of surveying Chile's forest for the first time in government history. The initial survey began in 1944 with the report finally released in December of 1946 under the name *Forest Resources of Chile as a Basis for Industrial Expansion*. The report stated, "the volume of sound wood in Chilean forests and woodlands totaled 65,095 million cubic feet."⁶³ The richest were the Provinces in Group 4 (Arauco and Malleco to and including Llanquihue) containing 46 percent of the nation's lumber, and Province Group 5 (Chiloé and Aysen) contained 38 percent.⁶⁴ The forested group of Chiloé and Aysen had double the forested area as the group of Arauco and Malleco to Llanquihue, with Valdivia in the middle of the latter group's region.⁶⁵ However, area does not represent density; as far as volume, Group 4, the group Haig assigned Valdivia, held a total of 65,095 million cubic feet of lumber, which represented 46 percent of Chile's potential timber output.⁶⁶ Group 5, Chiloé and Aysen, had a different type of forested land, less dense and subalpine, representing 38 percent of Chile's potential timber output.⁶⁷ When geographic considerations of rivers, accessible terrain, and ports were added to these statistics, it became clear that the further south one travelled, the less accessible these forest were to the nation and market.

Haig's study showed that Valdivia and Puerto Montt held the best potential for the future of Chilean lumber as it provided the environment to support a sustainable industry. Haig stated that the problem with the Chiloé and Aysén region lay with the forest location. As he explained,

[The] forest is confined by the rugged character and high elevations of the country to a broad coastal strip and extensive areas along the main river valleys.

⁶³ United States Forest Service and Irvine T. Haig, *Forest Resources of Chile as a Basis for Industrial Expansion* (Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture in cooperation with Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion, 1946), 15.

⁶⁴ Haig, 15.

⁶⁵ Haig, 10.

⁶⁶ Haig, 15.

⁶⁷ Haig, 15.

Gradually, toward the south, the character of the forest changes, lighter and more scattered stands verging gradually into scrubby woodland and broad areas of grazing land and unfertile, rocky, or snow-clad ridges (Plate 4) until at about the Rio Baker sawtimber stands disappear, to be seen again in forests of commercial importance only in sheltered, favorable sections near the Straits of Magallanes.⁶⁸

While Chiloé and Aysén had much potential and forested area, its geography posed logistical problems in transporting logs. Magallanes, also economically viable, was simply too far from Santiago, Valaparíso, and San Antonio, the capital and the two main port cities that processed and utilized the lumber. In contrast, Valdivia had a railroad connection to Santiago since the turn of the century and Puerto Montt had a natural bay, making them the two most viable regions for a sustainable lumber industry. Valdivia and Puerto Montt, respectively in the regions of Los Ríos (rivers) and Los Lagos (lakes) had distinctive environmental features that made transportation from forests to their regional centers easier. The province just north of Valdivia, Cautín, had a promising timber industry that paralleled Valdivia's, but it had fewer rivers and lakes. Thus, the sustainability of the Chilean lumber industry depended on Valdivia and Puerto Montt.

Haig concluded that Valdivia offered the basis for the most promising lumber industry in Chile. At the time Valdivia had a seventy-peso per thousand board feet advantage over Puerto Montt in transportation cost to Santiago.⁶⁹ Valdivia had both the railroad and bay, although its bay in Corral had been deteriorating and needed work; the river's sediments had made the bay shallow.⁷⁰ Haig pointed out another characteristic of Valdivia: the landownership disparities. Haig referenced the surprising statistic that "public ownership is most prevalent in the Province

⁶⁸ Haig, 7.

⁶⁹ Haig, 58.

⁷⁰ Mission to Study the Agricultural Development of Chile, *The Agricultural Economy of Chile: Joint Mission to Chile of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations* (Washington, 1952), 43.

of Aysén, where 84 percent of the sawtimber forest is so owned; in contrast 96 percent in Valdivia and Osorno is privately owned.”⁷¹ The sharp contrast between the two most forested areas in Chile meant that the government had to work with private landowners instead of boosting the timber economy itself. However, without a doubt, Valdivia in 1946 had the most promising lumber industry, with unforested land on the Valdivia River with potential of future easy harvest, cheap transportation outlets, a city with vast resources, and, most importantly, an environment perfect for the sustainability of the lumber industry.

The existence of the study shows the Chilean government’s interest in Valdivia and its viable natural environment. While Haig’s study was the first of its kind, it was not the last; it set the precedent for future studies on the country’s natural resources seeking solutions to further boost the national economy. The Haig Mission was vital and the first survey of Chile’s forests, giving the United Nations and the Chilean government vast information on their natural resources. Until then, a survey such as the Haig Mission was unheard of in Latin America, and even revolutionary. Taking a note from the Haig Mission, CORFO reevaluated Chile’s forest stock in 1952, updating the status of raw material resources in Chile, specifically in Valdivia. By the 1950s the UN established the FAO agency, Food and Agriculture Organization.

Various reports done by the FAO and the Chilean government in the 1950s showed the importance of Valdivia’s environment and economy. For instance, a study titled *The Agricultural Economy of Chile: Joint Mission to Chile of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations*, offered answers to the economic stagnation of Valdivia. The report stated that the region’s biggest obstacle to sustained economic growth surrounded the issue of transportation.

⁷¹ Haig, *Forest Resources of Chile as a Basis for Industrial Expansion*, 166.

The authors of the report explained that “the railroad does not efficiently handle all goods offered for transportation, the farm-to-station roads are in very poor shape, and the port of Valdivia is badly silted up. If no drastic measures are taken, agricultural development and economic progress in general will be endangered by transport limitation.”⁷² This echoed the same sentiment the Haig Mission held years earlier. As for the lumber industry, the report further highlighted the importance of Valdivia. As stated by the experts, “Valdivia is already the center of a woodworking industry, which can be greatly expanded. Any such development must be founded, however, on proper forest care and management, aiming at a sustainable yield.”⁷³ The importance of the report grew as Egbert de Vries, the director of the study, gave conference speeches specifically on Valdivia and the importance of Chile’s economic plan.

Egbert de Vries called for the industrialization of the Valdivia province as the main means of boosting Chile’s agricultural economy. In addition to the report’s advice to upgrade the Corral/Valdivia port and fix the transportation issues, Vries also called for financing, education, and diversification. Vries believed that Valdivia had pigeonholed their agriculture into a few products such as wheat, lumber, and cattle. Those were all important, but in an increasingly globalized economy in the middle of the Cold War, diversification meant more trading partners and Valdivia had the environment to meet the national housing, food consumption, and product demands. Another part of Vries plan included a social aspect that involved credit, capital, and education. He called for an adequate rural educational system, which Valdivia lacked. Valdivia also needed more credit and capital to improve production and attract more workers into the region. Lastly, Vries asked the landowners to form associations

⁷² Mission to Study the Agricultural Development of Chile, *The Agricultural Economy of Chile: Joint Mission to Chile of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations*, 91.

⁷³ Mission to Study the Agricultural Development of Chile, 44–45.

and cooperatives to become the leaders of these changes. In a province where 95 percent of the land was privately owned, he believed that change depended on the landowners. However, at the time, the FAO did not believe that the current land-owning structure impeded agricultural development, therefore they did not call for an agrarian reform.⁷⁴ This tone greatly changed later in the 1960s as Valdivia became one of the top provinces with the most expropriated land under Frei's agrarian reform. The FAO report did not paint the entire picture of Valdivia, as historian Fabian Almonacid Zapata has argued. Most of the blame did not rest on the landowners, but on central government's legislation which had impeded the region's growth since the 1930s.⁷⁵

By the 1930s, Valdivia's environment had been incorporated by the central state's mission of Import Substitution Industrialization. However, this did not mean prosperity for the region generally, nor for the landowners specifically. Fabian Almonacid explains that, in 1937 Valdivia ranked fourth in national industrial employment by employing 5 percent of the national workforce. By 1950, this figure had fallen to 3.29 percent.⁷⁶ The promise of investment also fell short as clearly seen by the dearth of paved roads. In 1950, Valdivia province only had 10 kilometers of paved roads; between 63.4 and 70.1 percent were covered with gravel.⁷⁷ This industrial jewel in the south had been hindered by Central Valley politics as incorporation into Chile's national market spelled stagnation and underdevelopment. Incorporation into the national economy did not necessarily mean prosperity and this is one of the main reasons why the FAO, US, Chile, and CORFO saw southern Chile throughout the 1950s as a case study of a stagnant agricultural economy. However, these reports had one single flaw: the assumption that landownership in the south was the same as in the Central Valley—large haciendas with a single

⁷⁴ Zapata, *La agricultura chilena discriminada (1910-1960)*, 422, 425.

⁷⁵ Zapata, 15.

⁷⁶ Zapata, 249.

⁷⁷ Zapata, 268.

absentee owner and large parcels unused. To better understand southern Chilean agriculture and its problems during the 1950s, it is essential to understand how landownership formed in Valdivia during the early twentieth century.

Valdivia Politics and Landowners

Landowning practices in the south differed from Chile's Central Valley. Fabian Almonacid explains that, "In the south, the predominate farmer held medium-sized properties whose lands had been acquired in the last decades and exploited them as a company; workers were better paid, most of their salary was received in money instead of goods; the small farm landowner were settlers established by the state; and then there were the indigenous communities, with little land and little capital. It was a different agrarian world [compared to the Central Valley]." ⁷⁸ Many of the landowners were foreigners, including José Charles, a Frenchman with property in Los Lagos, in the valley province of Valdivia between the coastal and Andes Mountains. His property measured 614 hectares with 280 head of cattle, eighty of them for milking purposes; 500 hectares planted with grass; sixty-three hectares planted with wheat; five tenants; and thirty employees. This was a typical farm in southern Chile, managing the farm by himself. ⁷⁹ This style of land tenure stood in contrast to the practices of the Central Valley where landowners were mostly absentee, and the farms were viewed as a status symbol rather than an important source of income for the estates. This had to do with the relative time the landowners had owned the land. In the Central Valley, many of the landowning elites had established their roots since the Spanish colonial age. In the south, colonization was relatively recent and colonization laws changed land occupancy practices. The colonization effort by the state allowed for people to take hold of land as long as they protected it and could prove

⁷⁸ Zapata, 17–18.

⁷⁹ Zapata, 180.

ownership. Therefore, landowners were present in southern Chile, as they protected and showed ownership of their land.

Another difference was the relationship between landowners and legislators; as previously stated, that relationship was strong in the Central Valley. The landowners in the Central Valley depended on legislation and government for help and economic opportunity. This tradition dated back to Diego Portales, the business owner turned politician who consolidated and shaped Chilean politics in the early republic. The farmers in the south, as for much of their history, were mostly autonomous from Central Valley politics and the farms operated as a cooperative community rather than as a business. This fact did not mean that the southern Chilean landowners did not have a relationship with the Central Valley politicians, but this relationship differed because of distance from the political center. In some instances, the legislator and the Central Valley landowner were one and the same.

In the south, the cattle, vegetable, fruit, and the lumber industry all operated through large cooperatives and family landowning practices. The vast environment and distance from Chile's main economic center, Santiago, forced the lumber industry to work in cooperatives. These landowning cooperatives started during the colonization effort in the middle of the nineteenth century when Germans immigrants arrived in southern Chile. Because many of these German immigrants came as families, they helped each other in joint ventures such as the purchasing of large land holdings and industrial machinery for their lumber industry. These machines and operations were expensive because of the remoteness of the region. Therefore joint ventures and cooperatives were necessary for them to turn a profit. In addition to the Germans, Basques were prominent in Valdivia's lumber industry and operated in much the same fashion. Companies such as Huílo Huílo and MAGOSA (Compañía Maderera Gonzáles Hermanos S.A) hired many

seasonal and permanent workers in the lumber industry.⁸⁰ While this partnership accounted for how elites ran their business in the south, this comradery also translated into societies that had the goal of progressing the city. Valdivia had the second oldest society, the *Cámara de Comercio e Industrias*, founded in 1907, along with the *Asociación Mútua de Industriales* in 1918 and the *Cámara Industrial del Sur* in 1920. In all, seventeen societies were established in Valdivia by the 1920s.⁸¹

The natural environment had an adverse effect on the colonization laws in southern Chile, which in turn shaped the relationships between businesses, society, and politics. Unlike in the Central Valley, southern landowners had a close relationship with the peasants and workers of their region. The ruralness of Valdivia and southern Chile created a dependency between the two classes and many times there was more work than laborers for the expanding economy. Therefore, these two politically-synched classes found common political ground in the expansion of the regional economy. The two classes also enjoyed relative autonomy from Central Valley politics. As a result, the city and province of Valdivia were a stronghold for conservative politics until the 1960s when devastating earthquakes and tsunamis struck the city.⁸²

However, there was a point in the first half of the twentieth century that Valdivia's politics seemed contradictory. Specifically, the 1946 elections were a great oddity in Valdivia's twentieth-century political history because in that year *Valdivianos* simultaneously voted in one of the more conservative presidents and chose one of the most progressive senators to represent their province. In 1946, Gabriel González Videla ran under the Radical Party ticket and with

⁸⁰ Moya López, *Continuidad y cambio en la historia forestal*, 110-111.

⁸¹ Guarda, *Nueva Historia de Valdivia*, 691.

⁸² Ben G Burnett, *Political Groups in Chile: The Dialogue between Order and Change* (Austin: Published for the Institute of Latin American Studies by the University of Texas Press, 1970), 226.

strong support from *Valdivianos*, won the election outright.⁸³ Once in office, amid Cold War politics, Videla banned the Communist Party. That same year Salvador Allende successfully ran for senator under the Socialist Party ticket and represented Valdivia and the rest of the southern provinces from 1946 until 1952. When Allende ran for president in 1952, *Valdivianos* once again took the conservative route and voted for Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, although, this may have been due to a sense of familiarity since he had been president from 1927 to 1931. Allende only had 1,248 votes in Valdivia, while in Cautín, the heavily industrialized province just north of Valdivia along with a large Mapuche population, Allende beat Ibáñez. That drastically changed in 1958, when Jorge Alessandri won outright in Cautín, while in Valdivia, Alessandri narrowly beat Allende by less than 1000 votes.⁸⁴ During the 1940s and 1950s, Valdivia struggled with its political identity, while conservative in nature, it failed to find a candidate that would suit their wants and needs during two tortuous decades. These politics changed in the 1960s for various reasons that will be discussed in the next chapters, but at the heart of this change were environmental pressures that created social unease.

Valdivia's Boom and Bust Years

Relative isolation from the Central Valley created unique social relationships and economic opportunities in Valdivia. Until the global economic collapse of 1929, Valdivia had been one of the more industrial cities in Chile without the help of Santiago, but the central government started consolidating its national reach in the early twentieth century. Every time an environmental disaster occurred, the national government's reach extended further to outlying

⁸³ Zapata, *La agricultura chilena discriminada (1910-1960)*, 238. Something to point out, Videla actually had the support of the Communist Party that year, he tried to reform the Democratic Alliance, an political alliance that included the Radical, Socialist, Communist, Democratic and the Workers' Socialist Party. He failed to do so, but gain the presidential office.

⁸⁴ Zapata, 249.

provinces, especially in southern Chile. One example of Santiago's political consolidation was the city of Valparaíso. In 1906, Valparaíso suffered a devastating earthquake. The city had been the closest and most important port for Santiago since the colonial age, but the Valparaíso municipal government operated and planned autonomously until the earthquake. After the earthquake, as Samuel Martin argued, "the central government used Valparaíso's extreme need as an excuse to increase national intervention in a theoretically autonomous municipality" directly shaping the city's post-earthquake urban development.⁸⁵ With that help, however, Valparaíso lost most of its autonomy and economic power as the national government started expanding the neighboring city of Viña del Mar, making it lucrative for wealthy merchants to move into that new city. Santiago's political expansion also started reaching south into Concepción and Chillán after they suffered from an earthquake in 1939. As previously mentioned, the Chillán earthquake finalized the need for an institution concerned with Chile's economy and society; the Chillán earthquake gave birth to CORFO and Santiago's ability to influence the national economy.

CORFO's mission was simple: to aid regional governments by fixing social economic issues hindering Chile such as employment and housing. Housing shortages had plagued Chile since the start of the twentieth century. As the population grew, local governments lacked the resources to build appropriate housing for the working class. The national government first sought to fix this problem after the 1906 Valparaíso earthquake with the *Consejos de Habitaciones para Obreros* (the Housing Commission for Laborers). Between 1906 and 1936, the Chilean administration created other institutions that sought to help Chilean industry and workers such as the *Caja de Crédito Agrario y Minero*, (the Institution of Agrarian Credit and

⁸⁵ Samuel Martland, "Reconstructing the City, Constructing the State: Government in Valparaíso after the Earthquake of 1906," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 87, no. 2 (May 2007): 243.

Mining) and the *Ministerio de Fomento* (The Ministry of Industrial Promotion) in 1927; the *Instituto de Crédito Industrial* (the Institution of Industrial Credit) in 1928; and in 1936, the *Consejos de Habitaciones para Obreros* became the *Caja de Habitación Popular* (Popular Housing Fund). All these institutions proved inadequate. CORFO streamlined these institution's mission by cutting through the bureaucracy to solve these social economic problems. For instance, after the 1939 Chillán earthquake Valdivia's lumber industry came into national focus because it offered a solution to the housing crisis with its raw material, lumber. CORFO acted as a link between the *Caja de Habitación Popular* and *el Ministerio de Fomento* by buying lumber to build communities for the Chilean government.

By the 1940s and 1950s, Valdivia's natural resources and industrial economy became part of a direct solution to Chile's social economic problems. The once autonomous Valdivian government and economy became part of a national project of providing housing for the working class. CORFO's mission of seeking solutions to Chile's social economic problems created a direct political and economic link between Valdivia and Santiago. This link, while taking some autonomy away from *Valdivianos*, created a boom for the province and the city.

Known for both its initiatives and its liberation from Chilean bureaucracy, CORFO advocated for social transformation through enterprise. The institution did this by opening their own factories in provinces and areas where they were most needed. For instance, CORFO opened its own lumber mill in Valdivia in 1940 instead of working with the already established lumber industries.⁸⁶ CORFO looked at the larger picture and beyond just helping the lumber industry process trees, the factory also became essential for the housing industry. This is an example of how CORFO sought to fix not only economic issues, but also social issues; every

⁸⁶ Virginia Vásquez Fierro, ed., *Diagnóstico Del Patrimonio Cultural: Región de Los Ríos Programa Puesta en Valor del Patrimonio*, 1st ed. (Ministerio de Obras Públicas Chile, 2010), 120.

initiative had national ramifications and looked beyond just economic stagnation. Housing, once a controversial topic of debate, became an obligatory necessity championed by the central government as CORFO became the “left hand” institution that fostered the natural resources for this immense project.⁸⁷ Through CORFO, while independent from Chile’s central government, worked to fix Chile’s social economic issues by championing industry.

Driving this need for housing was a population boom between 1935 and 1960 which made it urgent for the national government to fix the housing problem. Fabián Almonacid explains that this population boom had to do with “the improvements in the state-sponsored health, education, and housing services, [which] helped these growth rates.”⁸⁸ This population boom created a larger labor pool for the industrial cities such as Valdivia while at the same time requiring resources for housing projects. Under these circumstances—economic collapse, ISI, and the population boom—the Chilean central government incorporated Valdivia and its forest into its national social economic mission.⁸⁹

CORFO had a national vision that moved, initiated, and produced resources to solve national economic social problems. One example was CORFO’s investment in Valdivia’s steel company. In 1940, CORFO’s first initiative involved an investment in the privately owned *Compañía Electro-Siderúrgica e Industrial de Valdivia*, or the Valdivia Electro–Steel Company (ESVAL).⁹⁰ This investment not only helped ESVAL to modernize its outdated steel factory, but it also helped CORFO start another steel company in Concepción. CORFO’s venture into

⁸⁷ Lagos Escobar, “Terremotos: ¿una oportunidad para avanzar la agenda de cada gobierno?,” 65. I say left hand because of the Institution’s political initiatives lean toward the left.

⁸⁸ Zapata, *La agricultura chilena discriminada (1910-1960)*, 279.

⁸⁹ Moya López, *Continuidad y cambio en la historia forestal*, 30.

⁹⁰ Lagos Escobar, “Terremotos: ¿una oportunidad para avanzar la agenda de cada gobierno?,” 65; NU CEPAL, “Desarrollo Industrial de Chile = Industrial Development in Chile” (Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, 1950), 30, <http://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/29019>; Ricardo Nazer Ahumada, “La corporación de fomento a la producción y la modernización económica de Chile. 1939-1970,” *Revista de Gestión Pública* V, no. 2 (July 2016): 301.

Valdivia's steel industry produced a study which concluded that Chile needed a larger, national steel industry. On April 27, 1946, CORFO contributed capital to a group of private investors and created the Pacific S.A. in Huachipato near Concepción.⁹¹ As Ricardo Nazer Ahumada explains, "With available steel and energy, CORFO advanced national industrialization by contributing capital or providing technical and credit assistance to dozens of industries that were developed in a framework of economic protectionism and industrial development."⁹² For Valdivia, this meant a boost in the regional economy while helping the central government find solutions to social economic problems such as food and housing. CORFO's venture in Valdivia's industry started boom and bust years for both the province and the city during the 1940s and 1950s; these were also the years that Valdivia lost its industrial and political autonomy.

The national government became even more interested in the province's resources during the 1940s as Valdivia's industry had fallen stagnant. In 1944, the Chilean government created the *Sociedad Agrícola y Ganadera de Valdivia*, or the Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Society (SAVAL).⁹³ Located on the island of Teja, just across the river from the city, the society had two purposes. First, it held yearly expositions that highlighted Valdivia's natural resources in the hopes of drawing investors and companies into the region. Its main purpose, however, involved scientific experiments, as both the society and the government sought to find other products and ways to improve agricultural output from the region. The Chilean government also created similar institutions in Temuco, just north of Valdivia, and Osorno, just south of Valdivia.⁹⁴ The creation of SAVAL came at the tail end of Chile's Import Substitution

⁹¹ Ahumada, "La corporación de fomento a la producción y la modernización económica de Chile. 1939-1970," 301.

⁹² Ahumada, 301.

⁹³ Guarda, *Nueva Historia de Valdivia*, 681.

⁹⁴ Zapata, *La agricultura chilena discriminada (1910-1960)*, 355.

Industrialization era and the beginning of Chile's re-entry into the international economy; with the Second World War over, Valdivia's blacklisted German business owners hoped to become a part of the promising economy.

1950s Studies for Hope

While the Valdivian historiography utilizes the 1960 earthquake as delineating marker in the province's history, the 1950s economic and environmental struggles set the stage for Valdivia's transformation in the 1960s. During the 1950s, southern Chile and Valdivia captured the attention of the Chilean central government and the United States. Valdivia's natural resources and Chile's industrial success during the 1930s and 1940s then its sharp decline during the 1950s became a case study for US scholars during the Cold War. US scholars sought to understand why Chile suffered sudden national stagnation during the 1950s. However, it was Chile's success as a nation during the global economic collapse (The Great Depression) that was the very reason for Valdivia's economic decline that started in the 1930s. The intensification of industry in Santiago and the harnessing of natural resources along with consolidation of industries throughout the nation to Valaparíso and Concepción, led to the decline of Valdivia. The concentration of industry, shipping, and factories in these three cities left the south behind in production. By the 1950s, Chile experienced a population boom due to its own success, yet this growth highlighted a lack of product for internal consumption and revealed the reason for governmental interest in southern Chile and Valdivia's agriculture.

The expansion of industry led to the population growth. However, that growth also caused the maneuvering of industry and resources to different parts of the nation. The thought behind this was that Valdivia and Chile did not need to trade externally since their rapidly growing population was large enough to consume internally what was being produced.

Unfortunately, the problem lay in the Chilean government's ability to produce enough for national consumption without the need to import. It is important to understand that Valdivia's industries depended on internal consumption rather than international trade, as had been the case during the height of Valdivia's golden age. In the context of Cold War food race theory, the Chilean historian Enrique L. Marshall, explained that population growth was important in "the development of its national economy . . . [because] its racial background, its culture, their technical capacity, are circumstances that influence the degree of economic progress a country may reach by its people at any time of its history."⁹⁵ However, it was this population boom and the lack of the central government's ability to harness the population's capacity for industrialization that hindered Chile's development during the 1950s. The Chilean government eventually took action to remedy these deficiencies in Valdivia by the end of the 1950s, but it was only after "climatic accidents" struck the region.⁹⁶

The environmental events that started mid-decade created a tenuous struggle over the future of the region. The FAO, the University of Chile, and CORFO expanded on their study of forest conservation in 1955, investigating the management and development of regional lumber products. This project became known as the Llanacura Reserve. Decree N. 1831 of August 27, 1946 set aside land for the reserve just north of the river Río Bueno, east of the city La Unión, and at the edge of the Valdivian/Osorno Province.⁹⁷ The study sought to take Valdivia back to its glory days, when it was at its height of economic development with lumber as its number one product. One researcher, Manuel R. Ortiz Cespedes stated that "the conservation and good

⁹⁵ Villanueva Barra, *La poblacion de Valdivia y su influencia en la economia de la provincia*, 17.

⁹⁶ The office of Senator Julio Durán used the phrase "climatic accident" to describe the destructive weather in southern Chile starting in the mid 1950s.

⁹⁷ Ramón Silva Muñoz, "Informe y proyecto de ordenacion parcela experimental, reserva forestal de Llanacura" (Santiago, Chile, Universidad de Chile, 1955), 1, INFOR, <http://biblioteca.infor.cl/index.asp?param=o%AD%88%92bp%99%91p&Op=12>.

management of our forest resources are of capital importance for our country and warrants a reserve that offers a diverse potential in our national economy.”⁹⁸ Part of the study included an FAO contribution of 130,000 dollars for the purchase of logging equipment and sawmill machinery.⁹⁹

However, from the beginning, this research had flaws as it focused on an overmature virgin forest beyond its harvesting years and on the coastal mountain range. The head researcher, C.W. Scott, argued that “The average soil is much better in the Andes, and perhaps there is less wind It would be well to supplement the work in the Llanacura Reserve by work in the Andes, also, if only on a modest scale, as soon as possible.”¹⁰⁰ The reports mentioned the droughts and the recent wildfires, attributing them to human transgression designed to change the landscape into agricultural or pastoral lands.¹⁰¹ In the end, the researchers found that the forest had passed its prime and was only useful for small, economic development such as regional charcoal production rather than for larger, long-term projects. Nevertheless, the coastal mountains and the reserve did not hold Valdivia’s hardwood saw-timber, which constituted twenty-nine percent of Chile’s lumber production.¹⁰² This case study of inventory and management provided a necessary process that eventually led to development. In this situation, the team advised the commission to provide further education to the public on forest and wildfires, in addition to road access to combat fires and transport resources.

⁹⁸ Manuel R. Ortíz Cespedes, “Inventario Forestal y Plan de Ordenación Para La Reserva Forestal Llanacura.” (Santiago, Chile, Universidad de Chile, 1957), viii., INFOR, <http://biblioteca.infor.cl/index.asp?param=o%AD%88%92bp%99%91n&Op=12>.

⁹⁹ C.W. Scott, “Provisional Working Plan for the Llanacura Forest Reserve, Valdivia, Chile (1957-67)” (FAO, 1957), 1, INFOR, <http://biblioteca.infor.cl/index.asp?param=o%AD%88%92bh%91%89te&Op=12>.

¹⁰⁰ Scott, 11.

¹⁰¹ Ricardo Romero Alpe, “Informe y proyecto de ordenacion parcela experimental, reserva forestal de Llanacura” (Santiago, Chile, Universidad de Chile, 1956), 14–15, INFOR, <http://biblioteca.infor.cl/index.asp?param=o%AD%88%92bp%99%91o&Op=12>.

¹⁰² Scott, “Provisional Working Plan for the Llanacura Forest Reserve, Valdivia, Chile (1957-67),” 6.

The “Climatic Accidents” of the 1950s

By the 1950s, Valdivia had been fully incorporated into Chile’s national economy. The province had become part of the national housing effort due to its lumber industry, the province’s vast resources had drawn the attention of the United Nations, and the city’s importance grew in the context of the Cold War as it became a case study for development in third world countries. Additionally, in the 1950s, Chile also abandoned its Import Substitution Industrialization plan and under Carlos Ibáñez de Campos’ second presidency, the Chilean government turned to the Klein-Saks economic model for economic development.¹⁰³ Chile’s emerging economic troubles created social pressures across the country, intensifying migration into Santiago; but more locally, Valdivia’s environment also put pressure on the province. Drought, wildfires, a volcanic eruption, and frost during the spring months wreaked havoc on *Valdivianos*’ livelihood and were destructive environmental stressors that were only bookended by the 1960 earthquake.

Valdivia faced an environmental transformation that threatened its culture, economics, and its politics. Climate became the number one issue hindering Valdivia’s recovery since its golden age. Drought first struck the region in 1953, damaging the Chilean minister’s, the UN’s, and the nation’s plan for economic development in the region. In a letter to the Minister of Agriculture, the Vice President of the National Society of Agriculture called the season a cruel and irregular climatic situation, referring to the drought and frost that affected the southern farmlands. He asked the minister to prepare the nation for a shortage of food in the next coming months. He also asked for an increase in credits to help the farmers recover the harvest. The data collected from the Ministry of Agriculture signaled a transformation that threatened to become catastrophic if the climatic conditions persisted. Many cattle and sheep had already been

¹⁰³ This is a US Plan to help countries with inflation problems through loans and exports; a precursor to the neoliberal economic of the 1970s and 80s.

reported in either bad shape or dead, further emphasizing that these conditions would persist over the spring and summer months, surely costing great economic harm to the industry and the nation.¹⁰⁴

Unfortunately, the volcanic eruption of Nilahue further amplified the drought. The Nilahue Volcano, also known as the Carrán Volcano, put additional stress on the Valdivian environment and its people. The Nilahue Volcano is located in the Andean region of Valdivia Province; however, its rurality, including its lack of roads, made it difficult to assess the extent of the eruption. The volcano started showing activity at the beginning of August of 1955. While its eruption was mostly limited to ash, it damaged many crops and left an already drought-stricken environment with further damage. The office of Senator Carlos Acharán Arce wrote a letter to the Ministry of Agriculture stating that the ash mostly affected wheat and fruit farms, and the forest industry.¹⁰⁵ The volcanic eruption also gave Senator Acharán the opportunity to emphasize the need to ask for help to finish various projects the government started some time ago, including a much needed road between Ranco and Riñihue in the province's interior.¹⁰⁶ Three days later, agricultural engineer Sergio Alcayaga Casani from the Department of Conservation and Resource in the Ministry of Agriculture assessed the damage and estimated that 3,000 hectares from the point of the eruption would be able to recover only after many years.¹⁰⁷ Casani also offered good news, stating that the rest of the area would immediately recover. However, the most impacted were the small farmers, who would need the most help to

¹⁰⁴ Luis Alberto Fernández and Ministerio de Agricultura, "Letra de la Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura al ministro de Agricultura" (Ministerio de Agricultura, August 12, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

¹⁰⁵ Ministerio de Agricultura, "Letra al ministro de Agricultura sobre las observaciones de Senador Señor Carlos Acharán Arce" (Ministerio de Agricultura, August 10, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

¹⁰⁶ Agricultura.

¹⁰⁷ Ministerio de Agricultura, "Radiograma 211. Int. Valdivia cuenta de nuevas erupciones volcánicas en Nilahue." (Ministerio de Agricultura, August 13, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

recover.¹⁰⁸ In total, between twenty-five and thirty square kilometers had been affected by the volcanic eruption with an estimated ten to fifteen centimeters of ash on the ground in the affected areas.¹⁰⁹ The Ministry of Agriculture mostly accounted for the economic loss in land value, not in crops or displaced humans and animals with the long term ramifications of finding them new land and homes.

The volcanic eruption created a logistical nightmare for the government as officials sought to move people and valuable livestock out of the underdeveloped rural environment. The eruption displaced around sixty families totaling 251 people, and another 150 small farmers permanently lost their property to ash.¹¹⁰ While the eruption did not cause a lot of harm to the people of Valdivia, it reconfigured landownership in the Andes. This is relevant in that many indigenous properties did not have domain titles. In all, there were about forty titles claiming land in the affected areas.¹¹¹ CORFO brought in tractors to specifically help clear indigenous land in the Llifén area, where sixty Mapuche families asked for aid and subsistence.¹¹² Other agencies, such as Social Security Services, established a fund for the lumber workers in Los Lagos.¹¹³ The government also sent five million pesos to the Mayor of Valdivia to use at his

¹⁰⁸ Agricultura.

¹⁰⁹ Ministerio de Agricultura, “Informe sobre perjuicios ocasionados por erupciones volcán Riñihue” (Ministerio de Agricultura, August 4, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD; Ministerio del Interior, “Radiograma 2166. Jefe Zona Emergencia Valdivia infor. Sobre necesidades zonalita y Riñihue” (Ministerio del Interior, August 16, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

¹¹⁰ Interior, “Radiograma 2166. Jefe Zona Emergencia Valdivia infor. Sobre necesidades zonalita y Riñihue”; Ministerio del Interior and Carlos Ferrer F, “Telog. 2270. 23-8-55. Jefe Zona Emergencia Valdivia sol. Se ordena empleo personal mecanizado de la CORFO en distrito Riñihue” (Ministerio del Interior, August 24, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

¹¹¹ Interior and Ferrer F, “Telog. 2270. 23-8-55. Jefe Zona Emergencia Valdivia sol. Se ordena empleo personal mecanizado de la CORFO en distrito Riñihue.”

¹¹² Ministerio del Interior, “El Jefe de la Zona de Emergencia de provincia de Valdivia, por telegrama N°2270 26 de Agosto en curso, dice a este Ministerio” (Ministerio del Interior, August 30, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

¹¹³ Interior.

discretion in the recovery effort.¹¹⁴ Various agencies feared that the displaced population would become impatient and establish “callampas” or shantytowns as the housing situation intensified.¹¹⁵ While the eruption was small and limited to ash, it came at an economic cost and further degenerated an environment suffering from drought.

Agencies worked to limit this cost as they transported livestock out of the region. The volcanic eruption created a mass exodus of livestock and disrupted both the environment and regional economies. According to the Department of Veterinary Medicine in La Unión, the eruption put 15,000 head of cattle in danger as it disrupted their water and food sources.¹¹⁶ In the most affected areas, 3,000 head of cattle and 2,000 head of sheep needed evacuation while another 7,000 head of livestock would be fine as long as rain cleared the area.¹¹⁷ By the end of August, agencies and the government allowed many of the families to return while CORFO and CORVI, *Corporación de Vivienda* or housing corporation, worked to find accommodations for the families that had lost their land. However, evacuating livestock continued to be a concern long into September of 1955, as the Ministry of Agriculture asked the railways to lower their transportation costs in order to help evacuate animals out of the affected region.¹¹⁸ While the financial costs are uncertain, the environmental change caused shifts in the relationship between the central government and *Valdivianos*.

¹¹⁴ Ministerio del Interior and Carlos Ferrer F, “Por Decreto Supremo N° 2319, de 9 de Agosto del año en curso” (Ministerio del Interior, August 16, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

¹¹⁵ Interior and Ferrer F, “Telog. 2270. 23-8-55. Jefe Zona Emergencia Valdivia sol. Se ordena empleo personal mecanizado de la CORFO en distrito Riñihue.”

¹¹⁶ Ministerio de Agricultura, “Informa sobre erupciones volcánicas” (Ministerio de Agricultura, August 10, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

¹¹⁷ Agricultura.

¹¹⁸ Ministerio de Agricultura, “Rebaja en el transporte de forrajes zona afectad por erupciones volcánicas” (Ministerio de Agricultura, September 21, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

The Cold War: National and International Security

Chile's economic incorporation of Valdivia's ecology since the 1930s created a relationship that now had to be maintained. Helping Valdivian farmers was not a humanistic issue, but rather economic, and a matter of national security. In the context of the Cold War, the environmental events of the 1950s hindered the UN's plan for Chile's economic development. One of the lasting issues during this era was the constant plea by Valdivian farmers for credits from the national government. On the surface, farmer solicitation for credits seemed excessive, but understanding environmental pressures warranted these urgent calls and provided important resources for the recovery of Valdivia's agricultural economy.

The Nilahue volcanic eruption was only one of many environmental events that called for financial assistance for the region. As previously mentioned, Senator Carlos Acharán Arce used the volcanic eruption as a platform to lobby for credits for an already failing agricultural economy. Valdivia had already been experiencing a drought, but worse were the abnormal frosts that affected the harvest seasons. When the volcanic eruption struck in August of 1955, the farmers had been recovering from a frost that hit during the 1953-1954 season.¹¹⁹ Frost further persisted into the harvest season of 1955-1956. In January of 1956, Senator Julio Durán Neumann from the province of Cautín, just north of Valdivia, called these environmental events a "climatic accident."¹²⁰ The persistent drought, unseasonal frosts, and volcanic eruption had caused vast amounts of damage and disrupted the agricultural livelihoods of southern Chilean farmers.

¹¹⁹ Fernández and Agricultura, "Letra de la Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura al ministro de Agricultura."

¹²⁰ Ministerio de Agricultura and Aníbal León Bustos, "Al señor presidente de la honorable Cámara de Diputados" (Ministerio de Agricultura, Enero 1956), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

The 1956 season proved even worse for the farmers as they combated the worst drought year on record according to the local newspapers. In an article published in *El Correo de Valdivia* on January 3, 1957, the reporter stated that 1956 had been the driest year in the last 105 years.¹²¹ In a December 7, 1956 report to the Ministry of Agriculture, an agricultural engineer named Mario Astorga Cartes described the frost as affecting potatoes, beans, and worst of all, the wheat harvest.¹²² Durán lobbied the state bank to grant both economic aid and credit for the agriculturalist in the region affected by the *accidente climatérico* or “climatic accident.”¹²³

These “climatic accidents” started a slow process of change of the political landscape in southern Chile. Two years before the presidential elections, Jorge Larraín Valdiviso, President of the National Association of Wheat Producers, published an article in *El Mercurio*. While not mentioning the environmental events that had affected southern Chilean farmers, Valdiviso voiced his concern over the lack of aid and credits legislators had granted to the region. He called upon the farmers to act, stating:

as citizens of a democratic nation, we have the obligation to act, within the constitutional channels, guiding the action of political parties. Parliamentary elections are approaching and with them the opportunity for farmers across the country to influence their vote on the election of future Legislators. We will have to analyze with much attention the ideas and actions of the candidates...time has come for national Agriculture to act in a spirit of body, defending its right to live and to produce with tranquility the food that Chile needs.¹²⁴

¹²¹ *El Correo de Valdivia* (Valdivia: Impr. El Correo de Valdivia, 1895), col. “1956 ha sido el más seco de los últimos 105 años.” Jan 3, 1957.

¹²² Ministerio de Agricultura and Mario Astorga Cartes, “Perdidas ocasionadas por las heladas en el Ramal de Freibe a Cunco” (Ministerio de Agricultura, December 7, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

¹²³ Ministerio del Obras Públicas and Aníbal León Bustos, “Letra de ministro de Agricultura. Aníbal León Bustos, al señor presidente de la honorable Cámara de Diputados.” (Ministerio de Obras Públicas, August 24, 1955), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

¹²⁴ Ministerio del Obras Públicas and Jorge Aravena Carrasco, “Letra de Jorge Aravena Carrasco al señor director del Darío ‘El Mercurio.’” (Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Diciembre 1956), Archivo Nacional de la Administración ARNAD.

In addition to Valdiviso's complaints, The National Agricultural Society publicly denounced a recent tax reform that further overwhelmed the region which had already been damaged by the environmental events. During the 1955 fiscal year, Valdivia was the fifth most heavily taxed city in the nation. With 622,000 inhabitants and 15,968 taxpayers, the province paid the state two billion pesos to the government.¹²⁵ The president of the society stated that the government had not fully considered the magnitude of the effects of environmental change which had occurred in the 1955-1956 season, as the region suffered a drought and low production. He further emphasized that the government did not take into consideration the difficulties the farmers had faced in the last few years, especially in dealing with the prolonged drought.¹²⁶ Environmental events put stress on society and these complaints by the agricultural societies highlighted the intensified struggle between locals and national government institutions.

Wildfires became the costliest effect of drought during the 1957 summer season and brought further attention to the region. Between January and March, several wildfires put heightened pressure on Valdivia's economy, politics, and population. By January, there was an estimated loss of 500 million pesos from the 1955-1956 season.¹²⁷ The heatwave that struck the region in the summer of 1957 dried up reservoirs and hurt shade-providing trees, both important resources for the cattle industry.¹²⁸ This heatwave fueled the various wildfires had been punishing the province since late January. The wildfires, along with burning forest, also burned wheat fields. The cost was substantial, as one report from *El Correo de Valdivia* stated that one

¹²⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Quinto lugar de importancia ocupa Valdivia en rendimiento de diversos impuesto enrolados." Jan 1, 1957.

¹²⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Transfers to agricultural production due to the 40% increase in agricultural appraisals." Jan 2, 1957.

¹²⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Diputado Weber expone el grande problema a los poderes públicos en STGO." Jan 7, 1957.

¹²⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Efectos del calor en los cerdos." Jan 7, 1957.

farmer took a loss of five million pesos.¹²⁹ Even more damaging was the news that a train, one of the more important economic mobilizers, sparked one of the many wildfires adding to the irony of a region struggling to recover its economic power.

By March of 1957 tensions reached their peak as compounding environmental events put an immense amount of pressure on society. On March 14, the Minister of Agriculture, Jorge Araveno Carrasco, met with the presidents of the Agricultural Societies from Cautín, Valdivia, Osorno, and Llanquihue. Araveno promised credits for the regions affected by the recent environmental events and stated that his department was pushing for legislation that would create new lines of credits for those affected by these environmental events.¹³⁰ This new credit, however, came with bad news: the Minister had called the meeting to inform them that the nation was also looking into importing products to help with the agricultural deficit.

By the middle of the 1950s, government plans for economic development in the south changed directions towards an import economy. As Chile struggled with inflation during Ibáñez's second presidency, the US stepped in and offered the Klein Saks Mission to help the struggling economy. The Klein Saks Mission lasted between 1955-1958, as Osvaldo Sunkel and Aníbal Pinto Santa Cruz, Chilean associates who worked for the Economic Commission for Latin America, studied ways to curtail Chile's inflation problem.¹³¹ Many historians credit the Klein Saks Mission as a precursor to 1980's neoliberal economic policies in Chile. There was an indirect connection between the Klein Saks Mission and southern Chilean agriculture. As Chile's economy struggled with inflation and losing production, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations offered loans along with imported goods. Amid Southern Chile's

¹²⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Están ardiendo siembras de trigo en la provincia." Jan 20, 1957.

¹³⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Hoy resolverán créditos para los agricultores de zona sur." Mar 14, 1957.

¹³¹ Warren Samuels, *The Economy as a System of Power: Corporate Powers* (Routledge, 2017), 39.

struggle to rebuild the regional economy, they asked the government for credit at the same time imports undercut their ability to turn a profit.

On March 14, 1958, *Valdivianos* received the news that the province did not meet the requirements issued by the by the Klein Sacks Mission.¹³² These requirements included the need for provincial wheat growers to upgrade their outdated wheat mills, which they failed to do, and a willingness to take their wheat to the market, which many were reluctant to do because of government-set prices. The wheat farmers were also required to use the seed and fertilizer provided by the state; but because of climatic conditions that plagued Valdivia throughout the 1950s, the farmers failed to meet government quotas.¹³³ Valdivian farmers were stuck in a bind between international, state, and regional policies that hindered their economic development. Therefore, when Araveno met with the presidents of the southern agricultural societies, he delivered complicated and bittersweet news as environmental events had destroyed their ability to make progress in recovering the regional agricultural economies.

Valdivia's population displayed its discontent with the national government in the 1958 presidential elections. In the 1952 election, 31,734 *Valdivianos* voted in the presidential elections. Overwhelmingly, *Valdivianos* voted for Carlos Ibáñez del Campo. The left-leaning Salvador Allende in the same election received only 1,248 votes.¹³⁴ With its mostly rural population, capitalistic impulse, and conservative politics, Valdivia's voting pattern in 1952 was not surprising. By 1958, Valdivia had 50,514 registered voters with 39,461 turning out to vote in the presidential elections. Jorge Alessandri narrowly beat Allende in Valdivia, winning 12,387

¹³² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Agricultores piden al Gobierno otorgue facilidades en los descuentos de letras." Mar 14, 1958.

¹³³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Agricultores piden al Gobierno otorgue facilidades en los descuentos de letras." Mar 14, 1958.

¹³⁴ Zapata, *La agricultura chilena discriminada (1910-1960)*, 242.

of the votes to Allende's 11,559, a difference of just 828 votes.¹³⁵ Most importantly, the regionally strong Radical Party finished last in Valdivia.¹³⁶ Experts have attributed these election results to inflation and economic downturn, but they are missing the fact that Valdivia's province faced environmental events that impeded the agricultural economy and influenced voting.¹³⁷

Valdivia's series of environmental events that started during the 1953-1954 harvest season came at a substantial cost. By June 13, 1957, Valdivia's forest industry had lost an estimated 200 million pesos due to drought and wildfires alone in that year.¹³⁸ In the livestock industry, a news report estimated that no less than 30,000 head of sheep and cattle had died due to the lack of hay in both fields and farms.¹³⁹ The drought also depleted the soil of both minerals and root systems essential to proper water absorption. In late May of 1957, heavy rain brought much needed relief to the area ending the drought. Yet years of drought left a trail of damage, including lack of vegetation to absorb excess water which caused floods at the first sign of rain. These floods cost the region an additional 263 million pesos in damages to road infrastructure, a necessary tool that many experts believed crucial for the future development of Valdivia.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ Zapata, 249.

¹³⁶ Zapata, 248.

¹³⁷ Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, *Economic Reforms in Chile: From Dictatorship to Democracy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2002), 3, https://www.press.umich.edu/17208/economic_reforms_in_chile. Ffrench does state that agriculture stagnation is responsible for some of the economic downturn but does not mention anything about the situation of the south. This is partly what I am trying to convey in my dissertation, to decentralize focused from the Santiago perspective and put light in the historical events that have attributed to Chile's economic problems.

¹³⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Incendios de bosques causaron 200 millones de pérdidas en la provincial de Valdivia." Jun 13, 1957.

¹³⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "No menos de treinta mil animales morirán en provincial de Valdivia." Aug 21, 1957.

¹⁴⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "\$263.000.000 en daños en los caminos ha sufrido la provincial de Valdivia." May 24, 1957.

The Hope of a New President in Office

When Jorge Alessandri assumed the presidential office in late 1958, he appeared to be the perfect fit to help Valdivia and the nation emerge from economic recession. Alessandri believed in free market competition and wanted to decentralize the national government, both principles that Valdivian entrepreneurs highly supported.¹⁴¹ He also came from a proud political family; Chile had elected his father, Arturo Alessandri, as President twice. Ironically, Jorge took the reins from his father's political enemy, Carlos Ibáñez. Jaime Hernández Ojeda, a Valdivian historian, puts Alessandri's presidency in the context of his profession and background as a civil engineer and son of a former president. Alessandri sought to run the government as an inherited item, and with highly skilled technocrats.¹⁴² Alessandri took social cues of the era and addressed the growing needs of the working class. Once in office, he championed social projects, including housing. In 1959 he delivered the housing community "Gil de Castro," giving 350 homes to the working-class community in Valdivia.¹⁴³ Additionally, just one day before the earthquake, another población, the Servicio del Serguo Social de Valdivia, or SSS, delivered 156 homes to the people.¹⁴⁴ While Alessandri tried his best to fix Valdivia's social problems, his free market orientation meant that *Valdivianos* and the province's farmers still voiced frustration over the lack of aid and their degenerating society as they demanded better living conditions and infrastructure.

Socioeconomic problems on the eve of the 1960 earthquake hindered Valdivia's recovery. In 1958, there was a 100 percent increase in the number of prisoners in Valdivia's jail

¹⁴¹ Jaime Hernández Ojeda, *1960: memorias de un desastre*, 1a. ed (Valdivia: Arte Sonoro Austral Ediciones, 2011), 20.

¹⁴² Hernández Ojeda, 18.

¹⁴³ Hernández Ojeda, 25.

¹⁴⁴ Hernández Ojeda, 26.

system as socioeconomic conditions pressured the working class to find criminal means to survive.¹⁴⁵ About 20 infants died daily in the city because the lack of potable water.¹⁴⁶ In January of 1959, two large well drills arrived in the province looking for potable water that would sustain Valdivia's community and revive the wheat industry, which had been hurt by the recent "climatic accidents."¹⁴⁷ While the city's central communities fared well during this period, outlying communities lived in shambles, such as the Cartico Park neighborhood. A community of 298 families, Cartico Park is located in the southern western most part of the city. Its infrastructural problems included a lack of electricity, streetlights, and potable water. Much of the community still had to fight through the riverbank brush to wash their clothes.¹⁴⁸ In the communities of Küllmer and Geiwitz, directly south of Valdivia, the working class walked daily through mud filled alley ways.¹⁴⁹ Since 1952, mushroom communities had steadily grown in the city, centering around Francke, Catrico, and Geiwitz, Beneficencia, and El Pantano. This translated to 35 percent of Valdivia's family population living in bad conditions, consisting of 20,000 people.¹⁵⁰

These social and economic problems also plagued the port city of Corral, located southwest of Valdivia, at the mouth of the Valdivia River. Corral dealt with different issues, including the closing of its most valuable asset, its iron furnaces. On June 28th, 1958, the furnaces shut down, the most complete metal processing furnace in Chile that was run solely by

¹⁴⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "100 % aumentó la población en la Cárcel de Valdivia." Jan 8, 1958.

¹⁴⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "El agua de Valdivia es nociva: Diariamente mueren más de 20 lactantes. Se ha comprobado que solo el 35% de la población consume agua en estado potable." Jan 23, 1958.

¹⁴⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Agua para Valdivia." Jan 5, 1959.

¹⁴⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Grave Peligro entraña la falta de luz para Población Catrico: El problema es para mi embros de 298 families." Aug 5, 1959.

¹⁴⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Paso al progreso: Desaparecerá población levantada en una calle." Aug 21, 1959.

¹⁵⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "20 mil personas viven bajo techo miserable en Valdivia: Lo señalan datos estadísticos actualizados del censo nacional del año 1952." Apr 8, 1959.

Chileans, leaving 380 unemployed.¹⁵¹ To counteract this loss of jobs, an organization named *El Centro para el Progreso del Puerto* asked authorities to make the port a free trade center in hopes of creating new avenues for labor.¹⁵² This was quickly met with frustration as the Director of General Ports released little information on the research they had done on Corral's economic viability.¹⁵³ Many residents of Corral feared their town being labeled unworthy for development, therefore they waited impatiently on the study's finding in hopes that the Chilean government and international organization gave importance to the port.

Alessandri barely won Valdivia, but many hoped that his outside perspective as a civil engineer and businessman would solve Valdivia's problem. Many *Valdivianos* held the president to his promises as the reconstruction started after the earthquakes. Alessandri sought to deliver on his campaign promises, boosting the economy and giving people proper homes, while running the country on the principles of private enterprise. First and foremost, Alessandri was a businessman and *El Correo de Valdivia* highlighted this in their news articles. In an October 1959 article, one reporter declared that the government had changed the face of the country with the construction of half a million homes. Alessandri's government specifically focused on the eradication of *callampas* or mushroom communities, a term used for settlements of rural homeless people on abandoned lots in the cities. The vice-president of the Corporación de Vivienda (COVRI), Ernesto Pinto Lagarrigue, said that for the first time COVRI had tackled this problem with economic sources, technicians, and elements that they never had before and that "Chilean workers are experts in the constructing homes for their community." COVRI also

¹⁵¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Hoy apagan fuegos del Alto horno de la usina del Corral: Su Cierre producirá la cesantía más grande que se registra en la historia del puerto." Jun 28, 1958.

¹⁵² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Corral pide creación de Puerto libre industrial: En acto público se insistió en necesidad de nuevas fuentes de trabajo." Nov 13, 1958.

¹⁵³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Paralizados estudios de Corral en el Laboratorio de Peñaflor." Jan 6, 1959.

could count on efficient engineers and architects, along with industrial accessories and material. Nationally, with the rhythm of growth, the national government needed to build between 20 to 30 thousand homes per year. This quota had not been accomplished and by 1960; instead, the national government had only built around 10,000 homes per year under Ibáñez and Alessandri. By the end of the decade, they missed their quota of building a million homes.¹⁵⁴ These numbers did not please Alessandri.

Alessandri's frustration centered on Valdivia's number one industry, lumber. In an October 1959 article in *El Correo*, Alessandri aired frustration with Chile's stagnant economy. He states, "in that last year, very little progress has been made, although Chile has abundant timber, it seems to be ignored that its essential employment is the construction of houses, and more attention has been paid to other derivative industries. In the USA, an immensely richer country, it is estimated that 90 percent of the homes are built from that material."¹⁵⁵ Alessandri's main objective was to create incentives for private companies to build more homes faster and at lower construction cost. However, the lumber industry hindered this development as it struggled to produce enough for the national government's housing project because of Valdivia's destructive environmental events of the last decade. Valdivia could play a part in reviving Chile's stagnant economy, furthermore the region proved important in the nation's housing project and global Cold War. During the 1950s, there had been many studies done in the region to provide Chile with economic solutions and more important fight against the communist threat, making southern Chile a lab to address socioeconomic issues. Therefore, when the earthquake struck, it meant the continuation of Valdivia's struggle with its natural environment and an

¹⁵⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Gobierno transformará la faz del país con medio millón de viviendas." Oct 1, 1959.

¹⁵⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "S.E. impulse iniciativa privada para abaratar la construcción: Estrecha acción coordinada con el estado organismo ejecutivo." Oct 1, 1959.

opportunity for the central government to directly address these socioeconomic issues long hindering Valdivia.

The End of a Decade

As the decade ended, “climate accidents” left the region with heartache, but the UN brought hope. First, the FAO and the various ministries proposed a plan to develop southern Chile that would start in 1957 and last until 1965, prioritizing the building of the longitude road that would connect Santiago to Puerto Montt. The plan also sought to further the development of southern Chile’s agriculture.¹⁵⁶ The national government proposed new housing projects and roads, including a road between Valdivia and the port town of Ñiebla. All over the nation, the Chilean government started operation “San Gregorio” which sought to eradicate “mushroom” communities.¹⁵⁷ Locally, the operation included a plan to build one of the biggest housing communities, named “Gil de Castro,” on the eastern outskirts of the city, providing 450 homes to the people of the region. This project brought both housing and jobs to the local community as Valdivia’s industry closed 1959 with an unfavorable manufacturing balance.¹⁵⁸ As Valdivia faced the reality of losing its industrial status, the *Correo de Valdivia* reminded readers that the city still proved important to many companies, as its natural resources and a natural port carried much opportunity for the city’s future.¹⁵⁹

In April of 1960, the central state created an institution within CORFO to take on the agricultural problems of the south. This new entity came at an opportune time, as a month later it took on the reconstruction process of Valdivia as it recovered from the 1960 earthquake. The

¹⁵⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia* September 30, 1958

¹⁵⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia* August 21, 1959.

¹⁵⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia* January 2, 1960. I can only speak of Valdivia’s situation, but housing projects were well underway in other cities, such as Concepción.

¹⁵⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia* March 16, 1960.

earthquakes along with the decision of CORFO to take on the agricultural problems of the south created the impetus for finally modernizing the south in accordance with the central state's needs.¹⁶⁰ In the 1960s, the region drastically changed, as politics shifted, and industries moved out of Valdivia. The earthquakes ignited new problems for the city of Valdivia, but it also forced the region to transform its economy, from industrial to service, with tourism leading the way as the new industry. For Valdivia's scholars and citizens, the 1960 Valdivia earthquake signified the end of an era, but the steady decline of the region had started a decade before the rumbling of the earth. All these natural events—drought, wildfires, earthquakes—transformed the region's politics, and the people overwhelmingly propelled this process of change, which continued into the 1960s, through their voting choices.

Chapter 1 Conclusion

After the earthquake struck on May 22, 1960, the central government was not looking to rebuild only the south. For *Valdivianos*, the earthquake provided an opportunity to rebuild the city back to its glory days at the turn of the century that many remembered. However, for the central government, the earthquake provided an avenue to fix social issues—such as the lack of jobs and housing—plaguing the nation. Rebuilding the south quickly became politicized as anything from misinformation to flooding created material for Alessandri's opposition. The 1960 Valdivia earthquake quickly went from a natural disaster to a social disaster as a lack of aid created chaos and turmoil.

¹⁶⁰ Zapata, *La agricultura chilena discriminada (1910-1960)*, 445.

Chapter 2

Rattling Chile:

Showing the Fragility of Chilean Society

Chapter 2 Introduction

The 1960 Valdivia earthquake was not a natural disaster, but rather a social disaster that highlighted the many problems Chile had been struggling with since the end of World War II. All parties, including the President, co-opted the southern recovery effort for the development of the national economy, undermining southern needs. The integration of southern agriculture into national economic planning reconfigured the south, creating a plan that would eventually transform Valdivia from an industrial center to a tourist destination. Therefore, the politics of southern reconstruction evolved into the politics of Chile's national economic future. The remnants of the earthquake were not only in the rubble of the south, but in the political battle over the economic development of the nation.

Chapter 2: *El Temblor de los Pobres*, The Earthquake of the Poor.¹⁶¹

The 1960 earthquake sent shockwaves beyond Valdivia, as a variety of political and economic interests politicized the catastrophe for partisan gain. Following a decade of degeneration and economic turmoil, the earthquake encouraged many Valdivian residents, politicians, industrialists, and regional leaders to view the devastation as a clean slate, an opportunity to rebuild the city structurally and economically. In the national context, politicians used the devastation to argue for an economic model that fit their politics and would incorporate all of Chile. President Jorge Alessandri promoted private enterprise working for the public interest in rebuilding the city. The Cold War ambiance even swept into Valdivia as communist aid, particularly from Cuba, arrived showing solidarity for the working class and their towns. Marginalized groups in and around Valdivia seized the opportunity wrought by the devastation

¹⁶¹ This was a headline used by the Newspapers *Clarín* and *El Siglo*, signifying that it had affected the working class more than other groups. I think, without realizing it, they also believed that based on the timing of this earthquake and other social issues plaguing the nation, drastic change would come from this disaster.

for political mobility and to change their condition. For Valdivia, the earthquake furthered its industrial degradation that had begun during the Cold War and highlighted the need for the region to come to grips with its natural environment. For the Nation, the earthquake helped set in motion a political transformation of Chilean society that culminated in the election of Salvador Allende as president in 1970.



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¹⁶² "South," accessed September 16, 2019,
http://www.personal.ceu.hu/students/08/Szandra_Gonzalez/South.html.

The Context of Valdivia before the Earthquake

Near the small fishing village of Puerto Saavedra, located in southern Chile on the Pacific coast, three indigenous Mapuche leaders gathered in early June 1960. While the 1960 earthquake caused the most destruction in the city of Valdivia, Puerto Saavedra was actually the epicenter of the three earthquakes that struck on May 22. After two weeks of strong aftershocks that measured in the 7.0s (M_w) and repeated destructive tsunamis, the Mapuche elders decided to act. According to Mapuche legend, to stop these tremors a major sacrifice had to be made. An animal would not suffice; it had to be an albino child. After searching, they settled on José Quinmen Paineur: not albino, nor white or blonde, but he had been chosen because his mother supposedly had abandoned him.¹⁶³ In reality, José's mother was in Concepción working as a house maid. When the earthquakes struck, the destruction made it near impossible to travel overland in southern Chile so she took almost a month to reach her village and check on her child.¹⁶⁴ Unfortunately for José, he had either been mutilated or drowned at sea; the elders offered his body to the ocean to stop the tsunamis and the earthquakes.

While the Valdivia earthquakes may have only killed 6,000 as opposed to the more destructive Chillán earthquake of 1939 which killed 30,000, the death of this one child fascinated the Chilean people, anthropologists, legislators, and even the world.¹⁶⁵ Sonia Montecino, a prominent Chilean anthropologist, reacted to the death of José by stating, that "it is not easy to accept that, a short distance from Santiago and in the middle of the atomic era, there are Chileans

¹⁶³ Sonia Montecino, "Mito, sacrificio y políticas de la diferencia: El terremoto del 60 en el lago Budi," in *Terre/Mare/Moto*, ed. Sonia Montecino Aguirre, Séptima 1 (Santiago, Chile.: Universidad de Chile, 2011), 218, <http://www.catalonia.cl/revista-anales-terremaremoto-p-2944.html>.

¹⁶⁴ Montecino, 217.

¹⁶⁵ Ministerio de Planificación et al., "Plan de reconstrucción terremoto y maremoto del 27 de febrero de 2010, Resumen ejecutivo," August 27, 2010, 5, <http://localhost:80/xmlui/handle/2012/489>.

who live so far beyond progress and culture.”¹⁶⁶ The death of José Quinmen Paineur impacted people more than the fact of 6,000 dead because it meant that barbarity was still alive in Chile.

In fact, while many scientific advancements had been made by the 1960s, global understanding of earthquakes was not much more advanced than the Mapuche’s insights into these natural phenomena. The nation’s fascination with the boy’s death and the earthquake came from the fact that many Chilenos themselves did not understand earthquakes. In actuality, neither did the scientific world. The idea of tectonic plates had been debated for over fifty years and still only a few scientists in the geological community accepted this theory as well as the relationship between earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, it is not surprising that many Chileans accepted a combination of science, religious punishment, and Mapuche myth to understand the turmoil. As Carlos Rojas Hoppe argues,

myths have been one of the means commonly used by societies to interpret creative forces, natural phenomena, and events beyond their control. They offer a vision of the human condition and constitute a source of inspiration and consolation when human beings face the unknown and apparently unrecognizable, such as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes.¹⁶⁸

Maybe even metropolitan Chilenos wanted or needed to believe in this child’s sacrifice to keep them sane during the many weeks of strong tremors. Many urban Chilenos believed that they lived in a modern world where law and order ruled under a long-standing democracy, a sign of modernization. Puerto Saavedra lay just north of the third most industrial city in Chile—Valdivia, a city with some of the strongest global, economic connections in the nation. The earthquake furthered that international link as engineers, scientists, and aid from all over the world arrived to help and study southern Chile’s recent earthquakes. However, the death of José

¹⁶⁶ Montecino, 215.

¹⁶⁷ Carlos Rojas Hoppe, *Valdivia 1960: Entre Aguas y Escombros* (Valdivia, Chile: Ediciones Universidad Austral de Chile, 2018), 26.

¹⁶⁸ Hoppe, 48.

Quinmen Paineur stood at the apex of these events as it reminded Chilenos that there was not only an indigenous population, but also a large portion of the working class that lived in the outskirts of Chilean society. The 1960 Valdivia earthquake became the link between the disenfranchised and the central government, initiating some of the most progressive politics in Chilean history that incorporated the working class into Chilean society.

For many Chileans, proud of their advanced democratic politics, the horrific death of José Quinmen Paineur meant that there was a need for incorporation of these rural provinces into Chile's modern political system. The earthquake provided an opportunity for this incorporation, which also signaled a change of Valdivia's role in the country. The politics of reconstruction took on an integrative ideology which seemed hopeful for *Valdivianos* but created mixed results. The Valdivia earthquake reminded politicians that much of southern Chile had not been fully incorporated into Chilean economy and politics. While international aid poured into the southern provinces and Santiago legislators tried to help *Valdivianos*, southern Chile was still not synced up with the national economic mission. Therefore, the 1960s marked an era where Santiago's legislators, within the context of the Cold War and the need to rebuild southern Chile, not only took the opportunity to modernize the nation, but sought to also integrate southern Chile into the national political and economic engine. Southern Chile's economy became part of the national plan for economic development thus changing the political atmosphere of the 1960s era.

Before the Earthquake Struck

On May 21, 1960, an earthquake measuring 8.1 in the movement magnitude scale (M_w) awoke the city of Concepción (about 207 miles north of Valdivia) in southern Chile. In the immediate aftermath, *El Correo* reported 150 deaths.¹⁶⁹ While this earthquake was almost as violent as the 1939 Chillán earthquake, it produced far less damage thanks to the new construction codes that had been developed after that devastating quake two decades earlier.¹⁷⁰ During the next hours, the citizens of Valdivia felt five more earthquakes all measuring 7 M_w and above.¹⁷¹ These earthquakes lasted between 30 seconds and 2 minutes; they left most southern Chilenos rattled, setting the tone for the coming months. The constant rattling and fear of earthquakes forced people to live their days with extreme precaution, thus saving a vast number of people in the process. Luckily, because of the fear and the events surrounding Valdivia that day, many citizens stood alert.


This fear helped dispel a common myth that small temblors help avert major earthquakes. While there is some truth to this theory, major earthquakes exert drastically more energy compared to tremblors, for a major earthquake to be averted many small earthquakes would have

¹⁶⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia* (Valdivia: Impr. El Correo de Valdivia, 1895), col. “Concepción epicentro del terremoto: Numero de muerto es superior a 130. Daños materiales son aún imprecisables. Tembló durante diez horas en la zona.” May 22, 1960. In this chapter I use a variety of Ministries and Government sources. However, the predominate source I use in this chapter is the newspaper *El Correo de Valdivia*. The newspaper documents the day-to-day struggle of Valdivianos enduring the city’s evacuation, encampments, and eventual releasing of the waters from Lake Riñihue’s “tacos.” I also consulted other local newspapers, including the national conglomerate, *El Mercurio*. In doing so, I found that they all shared information through an associated source called the *Sociedad Periodística de Sur* (SOPESUR). Even though known as a more conservative newspaper, *El Correo* became the number one source of information for Valdivianos as well as a champion for the people that stayed behind, as the newspaper became the only source of public communication and advocacy for the city. Most importantly, day-to-day reporting discredited the idea of a unified nation under duress as journalists and opinion editors detailed the deliberation in the Chilean Congress while legislators, ministers, political parties, and the President argued over the future of southern Chile and the nation’s economic development.

¹⁷⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Más violento que el de 1939 fue el terremoto, pero menos las víctimas: En Concepción se ordenó demolición de las ruinas.” May 22, 1960.

¹⁷¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Alarma en Valdivia causo la intensidad del sismo: Cinco Temblores se registraron en la Mañana.” May 22, 1960.

to occur to release the energy produced by a major earthquake.¹⁷² For example, the difference between a 7.1 and 7.2 earthquake³ is 3.1 energy released; this slight jump on the richter scale causes far more damage from the latter quake than the former. When the 1960 Valdivia earthquake struck on May 22, 1960 at three in the afternoon, it released 20,000 times more energy than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima and released 4.34 times more energy than the Concepción earthquake from the previous morning.¹⁷³ The immediate aftermath created chaos, confusion, and both short and long-term political ramifications.



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¹⁷² Hoppe, *Valdivia 1960*, 69.

¹⁷³ Hoppe, 25.

¹⁷⁴ Earthquake Hazards, "EQ Magnitude, Energy Release, and Shaking Intensity," U.S. Geological Survey, accessed March 20, 2022, <https://www.usgs.gov/media/images/eq-magnitude-energy-release-and-shaking-intensity-5>.

Cuando Pasó el Temblor When the Earthquake Struck

Luis Wilfredo Gómez Carvajal and his family lived in Corral Bay, just downstream on the Valdivia River from the city. Situated near the entrance of the Pacific Ocean, the town of Corral was a working-class port city. Many of the port workers belonged to the union and often were members of the Communist Party.¹⁷⁵ Although small, the town was highly populated with many homes situated on the hillsides. The coastal mountains created the town's steep geography and bay. When the earthquake struck, Luis's sister had just gotten home from school in Valdivia. Traveling to and from Valdivia on boat was a daily routine, and, being a port city, many people had sea legs, including Luis' father, who was on the *Carlos Haverbeck* ship when the earthquake struck. Luis' sister reacted to the earthquake with calm and poise; he attributed this to the cultural shifts occurring during the 1960s as a strong feminized movement emerged in Chile.¹⁷⁶

The dogs were the first ones to climb the steep hills as the entire town expected the threat of an impending tsunami as they had lived through this drama many times. Many of the buildings were not affected by the earthquake in Corral. Yet, as many experts have emphasized repeatedly, the tsunamis were the most damaging part of the earthquakes. Ten minutes after the earthquake, the sea level began to drop by up to one meter. Then, at 3:25 p.m., the bay began to fill with sea water and a wave came pushing through with intense velocity.¹⁷⁷ At 3:50 p.m., the second wave hit Corral and along with the waves, it pushed the two ships, *Canelos* and *Carlos Haverbeck*, towards the town, then back to sea. The most violent wave arrived at 4:25 p.m.,

¹⁷⁵ Hernández Ojeda, 1960, 84.

¹⁷⁶ Luis Wilfredo Gómez Carvajal and Wilfredo Luis, *Cuando el mar visitó mi pueblo* (Temuco, Chile: Graphik Chile, 2008), 18.

¹⁷⁷ Steven Benedetti, *El terremoto mas grande del la historia: Cuando la tierra y el mar bramaron 9,5 richter*, Origo ediciones (Santiago, Chile, 2010), 135.

destroying Corral's last standing structures and walls. According to the Hydrological and Oceanography Service, that wave reached a height of nine meters. In Valdivia, the sea level fluctuated between three to six meters as the water rose and fell slowly.¹⁷⁸ In Corral, the tsunami produced violent waves that reached about thirty-seven kilometers per hour.¹⁷⁹

The earthquake and tsunami were not a surprise for many of the residents, but in a seismological culture, this event has become central to Chilean identity.¹⁸⁰ In southern Chile, the earthquakes and tsunami were part of an ongoing struggle with the environment that for the past decade had hindered Valdivia's development and transformed its relationship with the National Government. The May 21 earthquake that struck Concepción brought fear to the citizens of southern Chile; therefore, when the 9.5 earthquake struck near Valdivia at 3:10 p.m. the following day, many already roamed the streets staying away from structures.¹⁸¹

Another factor that saved thousands of lives was the abnormally dry weather. The dry weather during the rainy season allowed for many to be on the streets. Various reports stated that while southern Chile was in the middle of the rainiest season, people enjoyed clear skies and comfortable temperatures, which was odd for the season.¹⁸² The long-time Valdivian resident and seismologist, Carlos Rojas Hoppe, further echoed this sentiment of great weather, emphasizing that, "On a Sunday afternoon, May 22, much of the population was in the city centers and streets taking advantage of a rare day of sunshine in the autumn period. The good

¹⁷⁸ Hoppe, *Valdivia 1960*, 139–40.

¹⁷⁹ Benedetti, *El terremoto mas grande del la historia: Cuando la tierra y el mar bramaron 9,5 richter*, 136.

¹⁸⁰ Bárbara Silva and Alfredo Riquelme, *Una identidad terremoteada: Comunidad y territorio en el Chile de 1960* (Ediciones Universidad Alberto Hurtado, 2018), 26–27.

¹⁸¹ Benedetti, 68.

¹⁸² Edgardo Villalobos Chaparro, *Puentes aéreos : "alas de esperanza"* (Santiago, Chile: Fuerza Area de Chile, 2010), 42.

weather was fortunate for the thousands of victims of the Saturday quake.”¹⁸³ Another local, this time a radio news reporter by the name of Hernán Olave Verdugo, stated that it was customary that the kids went to the movies for a matinee showing while the adults stayed in the city’s plaza to talk.¹⁸⁴ These precautionary measures, paranoia, and great weather for socializing saved many lives as strong tremblors and earthquakes battered the region for the next three months.

The tsunami and earthquakes reminded the region and the nation that they lived in relation to, and at the mercy of, the natural environment. As the national government and foreign entities tried to make Valdivia and the region an example of prosperity, the region struggled with natural events; the strength of the tsunami and earthquake showed how nature could diminish any development in a matter of moments. Luís explained the horrors of the tsunami as, “the houses floated like boxes over the strong water currents . . . many of which had people still in them.”¹⁸⁵ The once tranquil Corral Bay turned into a violent whirlpool, created by the rocks in the middle of the harbor.¹⁸⁶ Seeing nature in these extremes overwhelmed Luís, as he explained, “I felt personally affected by the situation as if someone had taken my favorite toy away from me.”¹⁸⁷ For Luís, seeing nature easily pick up his home and town felt and looked like a large hand taking all that mattered to him and the only world he knew. To his surprise he heard his dad yelling orders to save the cows while onboard the steamship *Carlos Haverbeck*, which was lodged on a large rock in the bay. Minutes later, another wave struck the bay pushing the boat afloat, effortlessly towing it towards the town.¹⁸⁸ The last and most destructive wave

¹⁸³ Hoppe, *Valdivia 1960*, 97.

¹⁸⁴ Hernán Olave Verdugo, “*Horas de tragedia*” o *el cataclismo de Valdivia* (Ed. Prensa Latinoamericana S.A., 1961), 14.

¹⁸⁵ Gómez Carvajal and Luis, *Caundo el mar visitó mi pueblo*, 23.

¹⁸⁶ Gómez Carvajal and Luis, 27.

¹⁸⁷ Gómez Carvajal and Luis, 28.

¹⁸⁸ Gómez Carvajal and Luis, 44.

arrived at 4:25 p.m., but before the wave reached what was left of the town, Luis saw another horrific sight; many able-bodied people rushing down the hills towards the town. These people perished as the last wave crashed into the town. Luís believed that “perhaps they did this in part to commit suicide . . . sunken into the discouragement of knowing that the sea took from them, in one swoop, a life’s work and in addition to their loved ones, they did not hesitate to offer as a final offering of their painful misfortune, the only thing they had left—their own lives.”¹⁸⁹ Luís’ story has a miraculous ending, however. His father survived onboard the *Haverbeck*, and while many assumed he had perished in the violent waves, he went into town to inform them of his current situation.¹⁹⁰

As the earth and waves settled for the day, the long-term social disaster came into perspective. “Natural disasters” do not harm people, but rather the built environments that produce order, structure, and “progress,” disregarding the possibilities of natural events. Corral had struggled with many financial hardships and Valdivia’s declining economy during the previous decade. The tsunamis and earthquakes only amplified all that *Valdivianos* had already lost since many did not have faith in the central government’s ability to help Valdivia’s economy grow in the 1950s.

The intensity and damage produced by this earthquake and tsunami, compounded by the natural events of the 1950s, further amplified the fragility of society and the need for social change on the hollow grounds of Valdivia. Carlos Rojas Hoppe debunks many of the earthquake’s myths, both as a scientist and resident of Valdivia, and his study details the reason the earthquakes and tsunami were so damaging to the city’s infrastructure. He argues that much

¹⁸⁹ Gómez Carvajal and Luis, 47.

¹⁹⁰ Gómez Carvajal and Luis, 85.

of the city of Valdivia was—and still is—built upon hollow ground so that many of the buildings could be perched above the riverbanks of the Valdivia river. As Rojas Hoppe describes, “According to the results of some research, the surface occupied by artificial fillings of different types exceeds 5% of the urban area.”¹⁹¹ Hoppe further emphasizes that it does not take a strong earthquake, but rather the right kind of tremor, to cause vast amounts of damage.¹⁹²

It was the tsunami waves that caused long-term effects in the city, leaving much of the city with knee-high flooding, mud, and dilapidated streets and roads.¹⁹³ Once the tsunami waves reached the city of Valdivia, it flooded the streets up to three meters.¹⁹⁴ Besides the tsunami waters, the city also flooded as the earthquake shaking ruptured underground wells; many people reported seeing water coming from below the ground.¹⁹⁵ Anything made out of brick remained stable, including the pillars of bridges, though damage on the sides of the bridges made crossing unsafe.¹⁹⁶ Water became a constant issue in the city as it lacked potable water at the same time that flooding kept threatening the city. After the earth settled and the water filled the low-lying parts of the streets, fires erupted, burning many structures. Valdivia’s cultural reliance on coal and lumber as building, heating, and cooking agents fueled many of the fires in town.¹⁹⁷ While *Valdivianos* experienced a break in the weather over the weekend, which saved many lives, torrential downpours arrived as scheduled for the next two months, making the recovery effort miserable.

¹⁹¹ Hoppe, *Valdivia 1960*, 84; Hernández Ojeda, *1960*, 66. Other studies suggest more and till this day, artificial filling still occurs.

¹⁹² Hoppe, *Valdivia 1960*, 54.

¹⁹³ Hoppe, 101;. Puerto Montt, also suffered the same fate as much of its low-lying areas near their port were also artificially filled

¹⁹⁴ Hoppe, 99.

¹⁹⁵ Hoppe, 121.

¹⁹⁶ Hoppe, 123.

¹⁹⁷ Hernández Ojeda, *1960*, 69.

Another tragedy lay in the dissemination of information as *El Correo de Valdivia* accused the central government of not knowing about the devastation of the city and region. For four days, many in the central government, specifically the Minister of the Interior, Sótero del Río, was under the impression that Valdivia was unharmed, or at least fared better than the other cities, sharing that there were forty homes destroyed and seven dead.¹⁹⁸ They remained unaware that the epicenter converged in Valdivia and the city's Mayor, Sr. Kunstmann, who was out of town when the earthquake struck, passed on misinformation to government officials.¹⁹⁹ Mayor Kunstmann reported that Valdivia had not been affected much by the earthquake. For this reason Osorno, an inland town south, southeast of Valdivia, and not Valdivia, received immediate help.²⁰⁰ Representative, Dr. Adolfo Moreno, arrived to Santiago from Valdivia on May 23, 1960 and spoke with *El Siglo* about the devastation, stating that more than half the buildings had fallen and most of the population occupied public spaces.²⁰¹ The newspaper, *Clarín*, also reported the same, stating that their colleagues from *El Correo* and the *Carabineros* had informed them of the state of the city.²⁰² It is uncertain what and when Alessandri's administration found out about Valdivia's state of affairs, but certainly *Valdivianos* and other newspapers accused the central government of ignoring the city. Alessandri could not afford to make further mistakes, which is probably the reason why Alessandri demoted Mayor Kunstmann and named General Alfonso

¹⁹⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La catástrofe no tiene precedentes: El país desconoce que Valdivia soporta un azote peor que Concepción, Temuco y Osorno." May 26, 1960.

¹⁹⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, May 26, 1960.

²⁰⁰ Jaime Hernández Ojeda, *1960: memorias de un desastre*, 1a. ed (Valdivia: Arte Sonoro Austral Ediciones, 2011), 135.

²⁰¹ *El Siglo: Periódico Para El Campo*. (Santiago: Impr. El Siglo, 1940), col. "Islas enteras a la deriva en Valdivia." May 24, 1960.

²⁰² *Clarín*, *Diarios Chilenos Chile Santiago* (Santiago, Chile: s.n., 1954), col. "Terror y destrucción hubo en Valdivia: la mitad en el suelo." May 23, 1960.

Cañas Ruiz Tagle *El Jefe de la Plaza*, placing him in charge of the Province's immediate recovery and disaster prevention effort.²⁰³

Province representatives Nicanor Allende and Inés Henriques along with Senator Aniceto Rodríguez arrived by plane to the city on Wednesday, May 25.²⁰⁴ Hernán Olave Verdugo, at the time a local news reporter and radio host and eventually a local politician, stated that, “yes, the official information said so little that it seemed that nothing had happened. Broadcasters in the capital released long lists of names of people asking for people from Castro, Chiloé, Puerto Montt, Osorno, Temuco and Concepción. For Valdivia, maybe one or two people were listed.”²⁰⁵ The recovery effort to come would prove even more disastrous, filled with empty promises and a slow reconstruction process.

The Damage Done

Valdivia was in total darkness for the first few days, both in figurative and literal terms.²⁰⁶ The earthquake caused damage to the city's infrastructure, leaving large slabs of cement blocking roads and streets. Forms of communication, including radio and telegraph proved inaccessible.²⁰⁷ For three days, *Valdivianos* were isolated from the rest of the world in a total apocalyptic sense. One rural *Valdiviano* farmer even believed an atomic bomb had dropped and the third World War had started. Hoppe, the geological expert, details the story of the

²⁰³ *El Siglo: Periódico Para El Campo*, col. “General Canas asume toda la autoridad en Valdivia.” June 5, 1960.; Froilán Ramos Rodríguez, “Ejército y coyuntura: acción militar en el terremoto de Valdivia de 1960,” 2017, 153, <https://idus.us.es/handle/11441/63404>. “General Alfonso Cañas Ruiz-Tagle led the search and evacuation of the civilian population and the containment of lake Riñihue until the end of 1960. The action of the Army during this catastrophe meant three relevant points: a) he restored the importance of the institution in response to disasters, just at a time of questioning its usefulness in the country; b) It allowed management to use the Army to shift work social development. In sum, despite prove useful in the atomic age the Chilean Army continued with a limited budget that prevented their material modernization and socio-economic assistance.”

²⁰⁴ Verdugo, “*Horas de tragedia*” o *el cataclismo de Valdivia*, 26.

²⁰⁵ Verdugo, 27.

²⁰⁶ Verdugo, 22.

²⁰⁷ Verdugo, 21.

twenty-two-year-old José Argomeda, who worked on a farm outside of Muallín, about 160 kilometers south of Valdivia. “That afternoon he was riding on his horse,” Hoppe recounts,” when the Earth began to tremble so strongly that he had to dismount. He rushed to his bedroom to listen to the news of the World from his small radio. Recalling the confrontation between the US and the USSR, Mr. Argomeda thought that a nuclear war had begun.”²⁰⁸ While José was wrong about the nuclear war, the earthquake did release 20,000 times more energy than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.²⁰⁹ Without communication, *Valdivianos* awaited aid, in need of the very resource they had the most of—water.

After the earthquake, the weather in Valdivia held steadily with sun until Tuesday, May 24. The earthquake had ruptured potable water lines and the tsunami had made most of the surrounding water unpotable without boiling it first. Many felt cursed because there was plenty of water around them, but they could not drink it.²¹⁰ Seasonal storms arrived on Tuesday, May 24. the seasonal storms arrived, becoming what *Valdivianos* coined as “*noche de perros*,” or “night of the dogs,” since many slept outside, wet, in the middle of the street away from structures in the late fall, early winter season, the rain having extinguished the fires that had kept them warm during the first few nights.²¹¹

Radio communication saved the city from further isolation. Then journalist Hernán Olave and a companion ventured out of Valdivia the next morning to find a working radio transmitter to alert authorities of Valdivia’s devastation. When they finally communicated with the rest of the nation, Valdivia was the last city reached by the central government on Thursday,

²⁰⁸ Carlos Rojas Hoppe, *Valdivia 1960: Entre Aguas y Escombros* (Valdivia, Chile: Ediciones Universidad Austral de Chile, 2018), 68.

²⁰⁹ Hoppe, 25.

²¹⁰ Verdugo, “*Horas de tragedia*” o el cataclismo de Valdivia, 23–25.

²¹¹ Verdugo, 25.

May 26. By this time, much of the nation's military had already been deployed to other parts of southern Chile. Mayor Kunstmann had informed government officials that the city was not too damaged from the quake. As a result, when Alessandri finally sent troops to distribute aid, the only troops left were young cadets and recently reenrolled soldiers to help Valdivia in its search for survivors and in moving the population to shelters under the command of General Alfonso Cañas Ruíz Tagle. When they arrived, these men described the city as if it was part of the Second World War, destroyed by bombing.²¹² The people of southern Chile endured three more months of disaster; however, this time the disaster was caused by the lack of aid.

The true tragedy during the recovery effort was that much of the aid never made it to the people who needed it the most. Shipments often got lost en route to the affected areas.²¹³ When the evacuation orders were given, children and women arrived in Valparaíso from Corral and Valdivia without shoes or coats. This meant that a month after the earthquake struck, many of the affected areas had not received aid.²¹⁴ In the Congressional meetings, the central government promised to deliver ninety tons of aid through Temuco that, as the newspapers pointed out, never arrived.²¹⁵ Instead, as Socialist Senator of Temuco, Galvarino Palacios González, explained, that aid was stopped by the Mayor of Los Ángeles and redistributed within that province and region.²¹⁶ This perception put a bad light on government officials while volunteers received the praise as the real heroes in the recovery effort as they passed out milk and other necessities. For instance, wealthy people from Santiago welcomed women into their homes, homes the humble

²¹² Hernández Ojeda, 1960, 133.

²¹³ Hernández Ojeda, 160.

²¹⁴ Hernández Ojeda, 160.

²¹⁵ Senado, "Sesión 06, Ordinaria, En Miércoles 8 de Junio de 1960." (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, June 8, 1960), 230, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, https://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/36135/1/S19600608_06.pdf.

²¹⁶ Senado, 232.

people from Valdivia could never imagine ever living in or even existing.²¹⁷ Many rural people went into nearby cities or larger haciendas near water, where they built makeshift homes from ruins. Others waited for aid to arrive while they fished in the streams or ocean for sustenance; this mostly occurred in Chiloé, but also in Valdivia as many rural people and the poor stayed behind to protect their belongings.²¹⁸

While the Valdivia earthquake remains the most powerful ever recorded, the destruction that it caused was surprisingly moderate, given the intensity of the quake. There are a few factors that created this dichotomy. First, as I mentioned, the Concepción earthquake of May 21, already put the Chilean population on alert, scaring many to stay away from structures when possible. Second, the abnormal weather and events surrounding the National Holiday pushed many people to be in city centers and in open spaces. Third, the earthquake struck in sparsely populated areas; Valdivia and southern Chile had dealt with economic stagnation for over a decade which had already forced many people to leave the region for more prosperous regions. The 1939 Chillán earthquake, an earthquake that struck at 8.3 in the movement magnitude scale, was far more deadly: killing 28,000 and destroying half the city at the epicenter. The 1939 Chillán earthquake led lawmakers to create CORFO and imposed stricter construction methods. Further, Valdivia had been previously rebuilt after a fire in 1909 had destroyed 92,000 square meters of the city center; after the Great Depression there was also a short boom within the city that had fostered the construction of new buildings under the new codes.²¹⁹ Under the Carlos Ibáñez and Alessandri administrations, as both governments sought to address the nation's social economic problems by constructing new homes, Valdivia saw new neighborhoods appear during

²¹⁷ Hernández Ojeda, 1960, 162.

²¹⁸ Hernández Ojeda, 163.

²¹⁹ Gabriel Guarda, *Nueva Historia de Valdivia*, 1. ed, Investigaciones (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 2001), 580.

the 1950s. The fact that an estimated 6,000 people died, does not lessen the importance of the Valdivia earthquake on Chilean society. Rather, just like the Chillán earthquake, the national government had to reinforce its legislation to strengthen its preparedness to these natural events. Institutions born out of the Chillán earthquake, CORVI and CORFO, lessened the social disaster and death count because of their quick response. CORFO had responded to the Riñihue flooding, and before the Valdivia earthquake, CORVI was already working on the housing issue.²²⁰ The real ramifications came after the fact: in the long reconstruction process that sought the integration of southern agriculture into the nation's economic development and reconfigured of Chilean society. Furthermore, the earthquake was only part of the ongoing struggle *Valdivianos* dealt with in relation to the natural environment—earthquakes, weather, lakes, waterways, and other natural features combined with the urban environment to make Valdivia a unique city. The natural environment would further be a part of Valdivia's development.

The May 22 earthquake continued an ongoing trial with the natural environment that lasted until July. The Deputy Director of the Institute of Seismology of the University of Chile, Edgar Kausel, declared “that between May 21 and the first of June, nine earthquakes were recorded with epicenter in [southern] Chile, to which certainly added the devastating tsunami that occurred shortly after 4:00 p.m. on the 22nd of May.”²²¹ There were nine earthquakes that all measured above 7.0 in the movement magnitude scale; however, in total 90 aftershocks were recorded of which twenty-eight were characterized as earthquakes.²²² Chileans consider

²²⁰ To be clear, CORVI was not an institution born directly from the Chillan earthquake, but an institution that eventually became CORVI was legislated after the Chillan earthquake. I explain this further in another footnote.

²²¹ Ricardo Lagos Escobar, “Terremotos: ¿una oportunidad para avanzar la agenda de cada gobierno?,” *Revista Anales*, Séptima, 1 (May 2011): 66.

²²² Guarda, *Nueva Historia de Valdivia*, 581.

anything over 7.0 on the movement magnitude scale an earthquake.²²³ These earthquakes produced small tsunamis that repeatedly disrupted coastal living. Later seismologists determined that these earthquakes, starting with Concepción, were part of the Liniñe-Ofqui fault, which lies at the crossroads of three tectonic plates—the Southern American, Antarctica, and the Nazca.²²⁴ During the quakes two new volcanos appeared and the Puyehue-Cordón Caulle Volcano erupted.

That was only the beginning. Throughout the following month, earthquakes activated eight more volcanos and created a new one in Riñihue.²²⁵ These volcanos appeared after May 27, when a small temblor measuring 5.6 shook the Andean region at 7:29 a.m. The earthquakes disrupted communication and travel between the already rural mountain communities of Southern Chile's Andes. These volcanos were further agitated by the record setting tremblors that shook the region, on May 30, 1960 when 170 tremblers were recorded in Valdivia.²²⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia* reported that the newly formed volcano near Lake Riñihue released only smoke; because of its proximity to the lake, it took on its name, becoming Volcano Riñihue.²²⁷ At the time, the volcano reached one hundred meters high with a circumference of forty-six kilometers. This same phenomenon occurred near Lake Ranco; however, not much more information on that volcano came to light at the time. The *Carabineros*, the national police, reported these findings to the Minister of the Interior.²²⁸ The lack of information caused chaos

²²³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Al parecer han nacido 2 o 3 nuevos volcanes en esta zona.” May 30, 1960. In Chile, stating an earthquake has occurred is highly political and many times the public pushes for this characterization because it forces the central government to react and release resources to the public. The debate if it is an earthquake or simply a temblor is played out daily on local news outlets when an earthquake occurs.

²²⁴ Luz María Fariña, Cristián Opat, and Paulina Vera Puz, *Impactos ambientales del terremoto y tsunami en Chile: Las réplicas ocultas del 27f*, ed. Paulina Vera Puz (Fundación Terram, 2012), 15.

²²⁵ Guarda, *Nueva Historia de Valdivia*, 580.

²²⁶ *Clarín*, col. “170 temblores en una sola noche en Valdivia.” May 30, 1960.

²²⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Al parecer han nacido 2 o 3 nuevos volcanes en esta zona.” May 30, 1960.

²²⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Al parecer han nacido 2 o 3 nuevos volcanes en esta zona.” May 30, 1960.

and confusion as *El Correo* reported eight to nine volcanic eruptions along with possibly three more.²²⁹ In fact, Puyehue, Carral, Peulla, Caulle, and the new volcano near Riñihue all showed signs of smoke, but only Puyehue posed significant danger, sending smoke 700 meters up in the air.²³⁰ In total, the shaking in the south activated eight volcanos and threatened the recovery efforts of the national government.²³¹ On May 24, another earthquake along with strong eastern winds spewed smoke 9,000 meters into the air, sending ash into Argentina.²³²

While the earth shook every couple of hours within the span of three weeks, nothing was certain until the earth stood still and scientists could deliberate on this once-in-a-life time natural phenomenon. For global seismologists, the 1960 Valdivia earthquake settled debates on the relationship between tectonic plates, volcanos, and tsunamis. In Chile, it seemed political since every authority figure either attempted to save face with the public as they struggled to deliver resources to Valdivia, or, worked on the more urgent matter of what became known as “*El Riñihuazo*.”

El Riñihuazo

El Riñihuazo was the situation caused by the landslides that blocked Lake Riñihue’s water and posed the greatest ongoing danger to the Province of Valdivia and the city after the earthquake. The May 22 earthquake caused three landslides, one near the mouth of Lake Riñihue and two further down in the San Pedro River. Lake Riñihue is located eighty kilometers east of Valdivia; water from the lake flows first through the San Pedro River, then the Calle-

²²⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Al parecer han nacido 2 o 3 nuevos volcanes en esta zona.” May 30, 1960.

²³⁰ Benedetti, *El terremoto mas grande del la historia: Cuando la tierra y el mar bramaron 9,5 richter*, 89.

²³¹ *El Siglo: Periódico Para El Campo*, col. “8 Volcanes entraron en erupción en el sur.” May 25, 1960.

²³² Benedetti, 94.

Calle River and eventually arrives in the city, at which point it becomes the Valdivia River.²³³

Lake Riñihue is the last of a network of lakes in the Andean Subalpine region that expand into Argentina. Lake Calafquén, Lake Prihueico, and Lake Panguipulli all feed into Lake Riñihue; the water comes mostly from snowmelt, but the lake reaches its maximum water level during the months of June, July, and August, corresponding to the region's rainy season.²³⁴ Authorities from the national electric company (ENDSA), the Ministry of Public Works, and CORFO were the first to notice the landslides when the earthquakes occurred. These three agencies acted quickly to strengthen the landslides into levees to prevent premature ruptures that might cause flooding in Valdivia and throughout the province. After their initial measure, their strategy consisted of controlling the waterflow and preventing a violent rush of water and debris from further devastating the towns down river. *El Riñihuazo* became a two-month emergency that captivated all Chilenos as their nation recovered from recurring tremors.

El Riñihuazo put *Valdivianos* and Chileans' struggle with the environment at the forefront of the recovery and prevention efforts. The three agencies averted much of the damage produced by landslides because of the levees they built which became known as "tacos." The first levee measured 650 meters long and 300 meters wide; this was the smallest of the three and was situated two kilometers from the mouth of Lake Riñihue.²³⁵ The second measured twenty-four meters tall and was one kilometer long and half kilometer wide. The last "taco" measured twenty-eight meters tall, two kilometers long and more than one kilometer in width.²³⁶ While

²³³ Leopoldo Castedo, *Hazaña del Riñihue: el terremoto de 1960 y la resurrección de Valdivia : crónica de un episodio ejemplar de la historia de Chile* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Sudamericana, 2000), 59, <http://books.google.com/books?id=oQBfAAAAMAAJ>.

²³⁴ NU CEPAL, "Los recursos hidráulicos de Chile y su aprovechamiento" (Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, March 15, 1959), 71, <http://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/14895>.

²³⁵ Castedo, *Hazaña del Riñihue*, 64.

²³⁶ Castedo, 64.

this situation may have seemed new to *Valdivianos*, in reality, later studies have unearthed that the 1575 earthquake had created almost the same situation.²³⁷ Personal and government letters depicting the 1575 earthquake provide the evidence that landslides had blocked Lake Riñihue before. The most telling natural history evidence lay with “taco” three as its shape indicated a past landslide.²³⁸ Valdivian’s success and livelihood relied on managing the natural environment, most importantly, in this case, water. The journalist Leopoldo Castedo, who was in the Valdivia the day after the earthquake, covered the entire *Riñihuazo* situation. He stated that,

Life in Valdivia was conditioned by the imperative imposed by the direct action of water. Flooding had sunken neighborhoods; Oppressive water by incessant rains; a fear of water from the specter of the tsunami. And soon, water, a lot more water because of the threat of the millions of cubic meters accumulated day by day in the last landslide of the enormous Lake basin.²³⁹

Days after the catastrophe, *Valdivianos* suffered the most because they lacked potable water.²⁴⁰

This was part of the Valdivian curse, surrounded by the great economic potential of its natural resources, while that same beauty hindered Valdivia’s economic potential. The Chilean government charged engineer Raúl Sáez and his assistants Fernando Martínez, Edgardo Palma, and Marino Olivos with the enormous task of *El Riñihuazo*.²⁴¹ Their task consisted of constructing channels to release the water slowly once the levels reached the top of the tacos.

²³⁷ Castedo, 18; Cristian Araya-Cornejo, Marcos Cisternas, and Nicolas Gorioitia, “DESLIZAMIENTOS GENERADOS POR EL TERREMOTO GIGANTE DE CHILE DE 1960 EN EL RÍO SAN PEDRO, REGIÓN DE LOS RÍOS: ANTECEDENTES HISTÓRICOS Y DATACIÓN GEOMORFOLÓGICA DE SUS PREDECESORES,” 2013, 25, https://www.academia.edu/14266678/DESLIZAMIENTOS_GENERADOS_POR_EL_TERREMOTO_GIGANTE_DE_CHILE_DE_1960_EN_EL_R%C3%8DO_SAN_PEDRO_REGI%C3%93N_DE_LOS_R%C3%8DOS_ANTECEDENTES_HIST%C3%93RICOS_Y_DATACI%C3%93N_GEOMORFOL%C3%93GICA_DE_SUS_PREDECE SORES.

²³⁸ Araya-Cornejo, Cisternas, and Gorioitia, “DESLIZAMIENTOS GENERADOS POR EL TERREMOTO GIGANTE DE CHILE DE 1960 EN EL RÍO SAN PEDRO, REGIÓN DE LOS RÍOS,” 29.

²³⁹ Castedo, *Hazaña del Riñihue*, 67.

²⁴⁰ Castedo, 67.

²⁴¹ Castedo, 71.


They would then explode parts of the levees to slowly release more water. This method would be repeated until the water reached levels that they deemed safe. At first, Public Works employees used bulldozers and earthmovers to strengthen the three levees and then carve out the channels.²⁴² This was all to stop the natural drainage of the many interconnected lakes that started at Lake Lácar, just inside Argentina, at an elevation of 2,067 feet, and ended with the last lake, Riñihue at 354 feet. The city of Valdivia lay at sixteen feet. The rainy season forced engineers to close off passages from Lake Calafquén to Lake Panguipulli, which fed into Lake Riñihue. The water from Lake Calafquén to Panguipulli traveled through a stream that was twenty-five meters wide which was not easy to block. The river, Río Enco, discharged its water from Lake Panguipulli to Lake Riñihue at 900 cubic meters per second. All this effort resulted in the reduction of five meters of water in Lake Riñihue.²⁴³ The arrival of the rainy season created a muddy situation forcing the engineers to use 450 men with shovels to finish the job of strengthening the “tacos.”²⁴⁴ Shoveling mud from one step to the other highlighted, as Castedo emphasized, “the permanent Chilean struggle [having] with such a beautiful and difficult nature.”²⁴⁵ Many *Valdivianos* accepted this fact and stayed behind to protect their property.

²⁴² Leopoldo Castedo, *La Respuesta - Terremoto en Valdivia 1960*, Digital; Youtube, Documentary (Universidad de Chile, 1961), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6FicH3IJmsk>.

²⁴³ Castedo, *Hazaña del Riñihue*, 85.

²⁴⁴ Castedo, *La Respuesta - Terremoto en Valdivia 1960*.

²⁴⁵ Castedo, *Hazaña del Riñihue*, 86.



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The management of the Riñihuazo ordeal turned political as Alessandri's government and opposition parties jockeyed to leave an imprint in fixing the nation's issues in the midst of this natural disaster. Leopoldo Castedo emphasized that "Operation Riñihue became an artificial political clash between right-wingers and their opponents, the leftist."²⁴⁷ Alessandri's government tried all that it could to avoid additional destruction in an attempt to further downplay the lackluster response—by July 20 only 159 residents had been evacuated from the city—to the situation in Valdivia.²⁴⁸ Most of the evacuees consisted of women and children headed to Santiago and Valparaíso where organizations such as Movimiento Nacional Cristiano, la Católica, and the Universidad de Chile housed the displaced.²⁴⁹ Many of them arrived to the homes of family members who had previously migrated to Santiago. After the churches and

²⁴⁶ Joaquín Barañao, *English: Drainage Basin of Valdivia River*, August 10, 2009, August 10, 2009, Own work I (Dentren) created this work entirely by myself., https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cuenca_rio_Valdivia.png.

²⁴⁷ Leopoldo Castedo, *Hazaña del Riñihue: el terremoto de 1960 y la resurrección de Valdivia : crónica de un episodio ejemplar de la historia de Chile* (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Sudamericana, 2000), 93, <http://books.google.com/books?id=oQBfAAAAMAAJ>.

²⁴⁸ Guarda, *Nueva Historia de Valdivia*, 583.

²⁴⁹ Hernández Ojeda, 1960, 160, 179.

universities filled up, the Red Cross, the Boy Scouts, the Student Federation, and various other groups of volunteers provided aid.²⁵⁰ The evacuation was both a political and a precautionary measure. As Hernandez Ojeda states, “the aim of the evacuation was to keep those who were most vulnerable from danger and the harsh reality of the bleak panorama: a city destroyed, flooded and without permanent basic services.”²⁵¹ Not all went to Santiago; some went to Puerto Montt, Temuco, and Concepción where government officials and volunteers set up services and kept the evacuees until they could settle the situation in Lake Riñihue.²⁵²

El Riñihuazo proved to be a race against time. With the rainy season, the rising water level eventually reached the baring limit of the tacos. In only one month from when work had started on *El Riñihuazo*, the lake rose fourteen meters. The plan also involved creating new river ways to divert water from damaging towns downstream.²⁵³ The citizens of the province endured one more month of uncertainty as the men worked to secure their homes and families that stayed behind struggled for aid.

The Politics of Reconstruction and National Economic Planning

Central state authorities drove the narrative for the need of reconstruction immediately after the earthquake, but Valdivian private enterprise did not see the viability of rebuilding in Valdivia. As the damage became clear to authorities and the citizens of southern Chile, not everyone was optimistic that Valdivia could rebuild its industrial complex. Valdivia’s Commerce and Industry Commission named Victor Vogt as their President and their first task involved reviewing a study on “Reconstruction of Affected Industries.”²⁵⁴ By May 30, the

²⁵⁰ Hernández Ojeda, 177.

²⁵¹ Hernández Ojeda, 177.

²⁵² Hernández Ojeda, 179.

²⁵³ Castedo, *Hazaña del Riñihue*, 111.

²⁵⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Industria de Valdivia estudia ya la forma del total reconstrucción: Un comité que preside el señor Víctor Vogt inicia encuesta que afectados deben responder hoy.” May 30, 1960.

independent study had been completed. According to an article published in *El Correo del Valdivia*, the Commission concluded that the reconstruction of the City's economy was impossible without the help the national government.²⁵⁵ This fact was especially true for the smaller factories with scarce capital, barely able to support everyday operations. When the earthquake struck on May 22, 1960, the industrious state of Valdivia had been on the decline after a decade filled with environmental challenges; many of these companies operated on day-to-day capital and were only making ends meet when the earthquake struck. Factories, such as textile, lumber mills, beer, and shipbuilders had to decide whether to rebuild or to move their operations to cities less affected on the Pan-American Highway, a promising new direct channel to Santiago. A journalist for *El Correo de Valdivia* remained optimistic and hoped that when the committee reunited for their next meeting, they would rethink their conclusion. The journalist expressed hope that the industries would recover and stop the flight of workers and employees leaving Valdivia to other zones with better opportunities.²⁵⁶

The industrial losses were both substantial and difficult to estimate. The Committee on Valdivia's Reconstruction (Comité de Reconstrucción de la Industria valdiviana) estimated that Valdivia's industry lost around six billion pesos in damages as seventy-six industries were severely affected by the earthquakes.²⁵⁷ This estimate did not include the land value or the cost of new lands to rebuild these industries since many of the factories' foundations had either sunk or proved too dangerous to rebuild upon. Reconstruction required geological surveys to

²⁵⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Vamos a reconstruir una ciudad mejor dijo el Ministro de Finanzas Sr. Roberto Vergara." May 30, 1960.

²⁵⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Industria de Valdivia estudia ya la forma del total reconstrucción: Un comité que preside el señor Víctor Vogt inicia encuesta que afectados deben responder hoy." May 30, 1960.

²⁵⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Alrededor de los 6 mil millones de pesos suman perdidas de industrias valdiviana: Pero reconstruirla requiere inversión mejor y facilidades en el pago de los compromisos y tributos." June 2, 1960. The article states 6 billion pesos, but at the time the nation had switched to Escudos, which held the same value as the US dollar at the time.

determine the integrity of some of the river's banks. Another study considered relocation costs and suitable land for the prosperity of the factories. Land loss was one of the biggest issues plaguing the reconstruction planning commission. The central state, Santiago, would have to take on the task of expropriating land as it continued its ongoing integration of the south.

The reconstruction of Valdivia and the south became a national issue as much of the funding, in the context of the Cold War, came from the US, and required Chile to show economic progress in order to continue receiving this funding.²⁵⁸ This became a point of contention for the Communist Party as they criticized the national government for leaning on the United States for reconstruction aid. In the communist newspaper, *El Siglo*, the Party laid out the deal Chile would receive from the United States, stating that it would “request some 100 or 200 million dollars with five years interest free and the amortization of the foreign debt along with the demand that the copper companies return, in the space of two years, the total value of its exports.”²⁵⁹ The Communist Party believed it was a bad deal because the terms, “would yield more than double the hypothetical sum that it plans to obtain as loans, further aggravating the circumstance and draining foreign exchange” and increasing inflation.²⁶⁰ Ultimately, they believed that Chile's and Alessandri's blind desire to negotiate only with the United States put their economy in a dangerous situation.

A deal with the United States also spelled doom for the southern farmers desperate for a commercial restart. The city of La Unión sits fifty-three miles southeast of the city of Valdivia and just within the province's border; it was the agricultural center for the province. Its local newspaper, named *La Unión*, reported the announced importation of six thousand tons of flour

²⁵⁸ Much of this international funding politics is discussed in chapter 3.

²⁵⁹ *El Siglo: Periódico Para El Campo*, col. “De espaldas a la reconstrucción.” June 4, 1960.

²⁶⁰ *El Siglo: Periódico Para El Campo*, col. “De espaldas a la reconstrucción.” June 4, 1960.

from the United States, striking a big blow for their economy, which was in shambles, not because of the lack of a harvest, but because of the lack of roads to transport the harvest.²⁶¹ A journalist for the newspaper put it in terms that affected the nation, not just the region, stating that “it is not that we are guided by a regionalist passion [but also] look at problems according to a common denominator: national progress.”²⁶² The journalist of *La Unión* offered a solution stating that “the trade of the south must, in these critical days, receive the homage of the Government, granting it the necessary lines of credits to rise up from its rubble and thus continue contributing to the progress of Chile.”²⁶³ This meant that the city of La Unión wanted to be reconstructed and incorporated into Chile’s national economic plan.

The earthquake also advanced Santiago’s incorporation of the south, a process that began with the global Great Depression. Because of the need for land, reconstruction entailed a reconfiguration of society according to the new environment presented by the earthquake. This became apparent starting in 1962 when various forms of an agrarian land reform went into effect and Valdivia experienced one of the largest redistributions of land (41.6 percent), second only to Santiago (44.6 percent).²⁶⁴ With the ensuing flooding from lake Riñihue, any plans for releasing the waters were purely based on theory and no concrete reconstruction plan could be promoted until surveys were completed and legislation settled.

Alessandri responded to the various concerns from the Commission with assurance after a meeting on June 3. The province’s representative and most public figure, Nicanor Allende, was present at the Valdivia Commerce and Industry Commission’s meeting with Alessandri.

²⁶¹ *La Unión* (La Unión, Chile: La Unión : [s.n.], 1936), col. “Orto golpe al sur: Se autorizaría la importación de seis mil toneladas de harina.” July 12, 1960.

²⁶² *La Unión*, “Importación de harina es duro golpe al progreso.” July 14, 1960.

²⁶³ *La Unión*, col. “El comercio y una tragedia.” June 6, 1960.

²⁶⁴ Cristian Guerrero Yoacham and María Soledad Valdés Leal, *Historia de la reforma agraria en Chile*, ed. José Garrido Rojas (Santiago, Chile: Universitaria, 1988), 176, <http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/602/w3-article-9095.html>.

The President of the State Bank, Pedro Ibáñez, also attended the meeting. He stated that Valdivia's industrial rehabilitation was secure, and that his bank would grant the necessary loans to rebuild.²⁶⁵ In reality, the meeting created mixed feelings; while the Commission found support for reconstruction in Santiago, the national government only offered temporary solutions. Valdivia's reconstruction committee hoped for a definitive reconstruction solution along with thirty percent of the total lines of credits to start the reconstruction process.²⁶⁶ These lines of credits would help start the reconstruction process along with normalizing the social and economic zone in the city; many politicians put the emphasis on renormalizing society in the city.

This concern about the future of industry in Valdivia had national ramifications. The Chilean Minister of Finance, Roberto Vergara, boasted to the newspapers, "We are going to Rebuild a better city." It is uncertain how much he believed in this phrase, but the reconstruction of Valdivia and the south was both a national and global political concern. First, Alessandri and his cabinet wanted to express to Chilean citizens that they had the best intentions, even though many *Valdivianos* felt slighted with most of the aid being directed to Puerto Montt instead of Valdivia, which only received 14,000 pounds of aid as opposed to 48,000 pounds to Puerto Montt.²⁶⁷ Chile and its legislators also had to impress upon its global partners, most importantly, the United States, their ability to manage both the recovery effort as well as continue paying the national debt which was estimated at 411 million dollars at the time.²⁶⁸ The Minister of Justice,

²⁶⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "El Presidente dijo: La industria valdivianan puede tener seguridad de su rehabilitación." June 4, 1960.

²⁶⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Comité de reconstrucción industrial encontró apoyo en sus peticiones en el gobierno y esferas de producción." June 8, 1960.

²⁶⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Solo 14,000 libras de abastecimientos han sido enviadas a nuestra ciudad." May 28, 1960.

²⁶⁸ Rodrigo Caputo and Diego Saravia, "The Monetary and Fiscal History of Chile: 1960-2016," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2018, 8, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3238188>. Alessandri's administration had recently

Julio Phillippi, echoed Minister of Economics, Roberto Vergara's sentiment when he said, "we will be an example for the world that Chile is Alert." Minister Vergara and Phillippi both wanted to emphasize that the government was doing everything possible for the citizens of Valdivia and Chile. As Phillippi toured Valdivia, he stated to one journalist that,

The important thing is that we don't give an example to the world that we are crushed, instead that Chile is united and working together; the Government is concerned about reconstruction and will soon get the necessary help; this will happen much sooner than you imagine; the important thing is not to buckle, these are the cases in which we must all help each other. There is no doubt that the situation in Corral is quite serious, which is why I announce all possible help from the Government. For the current week's problems, we are already taking the appropriate measures.²⁶⁹

The Communist Party publicly stated that the nation should stop payments of its national debt. To combat this the Minister of Finance emphasized to foreign creditors that the nation would continue paying its 411-million-dollar national debt, which in 1960 had reached 58.3-million-dollars in that year alone. He further added that it was more than important to pay the debt to show the lenders confidence so that Chile could borrow more to reconstruct the south.²⁷⁰ This would be a big point of contention as reconstruction legislation went through both houses of Congress. The Ministers lobbied both its citizens and its global partners since aid was not guaranteed. Additionally, with the recent national economic crisis and battle with inflation, foreign aid was an ambiguous proposition.

The politics of reconstruction were also Alessandri's politics of economic development. Ricardo Lagos Escobar, the economist then turned President from 2000-2006, wrote an article

switched from pesos to escudos to combat Chile's inflation problem, as is apparent by many documents and newspapers interchangeable use of escudos and pesos.

²⁶⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Daremos ejemplo al mundo que está pendiente de Chile." May 31, 1960.

²⁷⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Precios de articulos esenciales fueron congelados por el gobeirno." May 28, 1960.

entitled, “An Opportunity to Advance the Agenda of each Government,” where he argues that “natural disasters,” such as earthquakes, provide Chilean presidents the opportunity to push their political agenda. With Alessandri, Lagos is correct, but it was something he had already been practicing before the earthquake since Alessandri had already delivered many homes to the people of Chile utilizing his economic model of private enterprise working with public entities. However, Lagos overstates the unity behind the organizing around the heads of state, in this case Alessandri.²⁷¹ Lagos points to this idea based on a political truce citing the example of the “Communist Party which had filed a constitutional indictment against President Alessandri’s Ministers of Economy and Hacienda,” who then resigned for the sake of national unity.²⁷² In fact, political parties jockeyed to express their political ideology on reconstruction and national economy, such as a strong state that also controlled the economy like the socialists, or a government that was hands off and pro-business like Alessandri tried run the nation before the earthquake.

A closer examination of the day-to-day newspaper coverage shows a political struggle on these topics. The main debate within the first few weeks after the Valdivia earthquake centered on an integral plan for southern Chilean reconstruction and fixing the national economy. In an editorial by journalist Carlos Sepúlveda, he announced that an “integral economic plan of the devastated zone will be considered in a national economic plan.”²⁷³ Sepúlveda criticized the political parties and the media for using the reconstruction effort to push their political ideologies on, what seemed more concerning, the national political economic plan. As he stated, “it is

²⁷¹ Ricardo Lagos Escobar, “Terremotos: ¿una oportunidad para avanzar la agenda de cada gobierno?,” *Revista Anales*, Séptima, 1 (May 2011): 59. Also note that Lagos was part of the Radical Party, but left in 1961 in part to his opposition to Jorge Alessandri.

²⁷² Lagos Escobar, 59.

²⁷³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “La planificación integral de la economía de la zona azotada por el sismo tendrá concordancia con la economía nacional.” June 9, 1960.

understandable that there have been some drawbacks whose extent has been exaggerated by certain sensationalist press organizations or parliamentary members that now want to take advantage of an unfortunate situation to try to capitalize electoral sympathies exploiting the anguish and need.”²⁷⁴ Reconstruction of the south became a political tool to implement party politics on national issues such as economic development and inflation.

Political infighting hindered the immediate recovery and reconstruction planning effort. The FRAP, *Frente de Acción Popular* or Popular Action Front, a coalition formed between the Chilean Socialist and Communist Parties disagreed on reconstruction politics. Their internal committee, called the Institute of Professionals and Technicians, drafted a sixty-eight-article law to be presented to congress. However, they delayed that presentation because the Communists openly pronounced themselves against an integrated economic plan, advertising that they were not willing to give the corresponding support and votes to this government. The Communist Party wanted a strict reconstruction plan, “without inflation, without submission and without indebtedness.”²⁷⁵ More importantly, the Communist party expressed that,

At the same time, the country needs to rebuild the south, make all industry work at full capacity, create new industrial companies and develop existing ones, put an end to the disastrous agrarian situation, substantially increase the country's exports and import capacity, in short, to mobilize the entire productive force of the nation. Only in this way can the work of reconstruction become a reality and only in this way can a new rise in inflation be avoided.²⁷⁶

The Communists also “also opposed giving power to the Executive (Alessandri), to go to the agriculturalist and declare lands public utility in order to feed the public,’ they cautioned, ‘be

²⁷⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “La planificación integral de la economía de la zona azotada por el sismo tendrá concordancia con la economía nacional.” June 9, 1960.

²⁷⁵ *El Siglo: Periódico Para El Campo*, col. “700 mil millones para el sur propone el PC: Un plan efectivo y nacional para la reconstrucción.”

²⁷⁶ *El Siglo: Periódico Para El Campo*, col. “700 mil millones para el sur propone el PC: Un plan efectivo y nacional para la reconstrucción.”

careful not to fall into the liaison collaboration,” meaning that Socialists should not collaborate with the president and other parties.²⁷⁷ The Communist Party believed that tackling reconstruction alone would have a larger effect on the other national problems such as inflation and economic development. If tackled along with national issues, eventually the reconstruction of the south would fall by the wayside and further leave the south in economic shambles. The Communists did not have faith that Alessandri would use public resources for the national good; additionally, they were afraid of privatization as Alessandri believed in an economic model that blended private enterprise with public utilities.

By June 8, FRAP had agreed on a plan and it was presented by Salvador Allende in a thirty-minute conference. Allende took into account the natural environment, as he stated that “Their geography has been drastically reconfigured, and it should be taken into account when rebuilding.”²⁷⁸ He pointed at monopolies and the importation of 100 million dollars of produce to feed Chileans while the nation had fertile land to grow its own. Importation and monopolization of the distribution of food had led to the stunting of the nation’s agriculture. Therefore, the FRAP plan called for agrarian reform. Salvador Allende ultimately offered hope by saying that, “what nature destroyed in six minutes . . . we intend to rebuild in six years.”²⁷⁹ The Christian Democrats offered a slightly different perspective.

The Christian Democrats agreed on a holistic plan that not only rebuild the south, but also the national economic crisis. In an interview with *Clarín*, Eduardo Frei, stated that “rebuilding the south means rebuilding not just housing, but an economic reconstruction plan. This is the

²⁷⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Diferencias entre los Socialistas y Comunistas atrasan presentación del proyecto de reconstrucción del FRAP.” June 15, 1960.

²⁷⁸ *Clarín*, col. “Allende: ‘un Chile nuevo debe emerger de catástrofe; no podemos reconstruir la miseria.’” June 9, 1960.

²⁷⁹ *Clarín*, col. “Allende: ‘un Chile nuevo debe emerger de catástrofe; no podemos reconstruir la miseria.’” June 9, 1960.

great opportunity to economically rebuild the south.”²⁸⁰ Frei further expressed the underdevelopment of the nation, explaining that the earthquake exposed “the delay of twenty-five to thirty years in that area, lack of roads, airports, madhouses, agriculture poverty.”²⁸¹ Frei certainly believed that the earthquake did not create new problems, but highlighted the infrastructural impoverishment of the south and the need for the Central Government to integrate and develop the south. His reconstruction plan called for the creation of a new ministry, run by a committee of ten to fifteen officials, without bureaucratic constraints. The committee would be made up of members of other ministries, including the Ministry of Public works along with CORVI, ENDESA, and the Ministry of Economy.²⁸² Every party had some variation on the reconstruction plan, but the idea that concerned Valdivia and the Communists the most was a plan that tackled both reconstruction and economic stagnation.

The Liberal Party sought to lessen the concerns of citizens and economists who were wondering how southern reconstruction would affect the national economy. In an open letter written by the Liberal Party leader, Senator Gregorio Amunátegui, to the President, they stated that their economic plan did not interfere with the economic stabilization of the country, and that reconstruction of the south would be in accordance to the national economic plan.²⁸³ This statement fell in line with what many believed was the solution for the nation rather than caring solely about the reconstruction of the south. Integration became the most pronounced message by politicians, economists, and the President. Some weary southern leaders did not agree with

²⁸⁰ *Clarín*, col. “La catastrophe en el Sur ha sido peor de cuanto se ha informado.” June 1, 1960.

²⁸¹ *Clarín*, col. “La catastrophe en el Sur ha sido peor de cuanto se ha informado.” June 1, 1960.

²⁸² *Clarín*, “La catastrophe en el Sur ha sido peor de cuanto se ha informado.” June 1, 1960.

²⁸³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Planes para la reconstrucción no interferían con la estabilización: Dice S.E. en una comunicación al presidente del Partido Liberal.” June 15, 1960.

this ideology and among the agriculturalists, they debated over the next move for the southern economy, as agriculture stood at the center of southern production.

The Agricultural Economy

Alessandri's plan for economic development involved the integration with the south's number one economic activity, agriculture. While in theory this may have seemed like a solid economic plan, this undermined the blueprint for southern industry, as I have emphasized in Chapter One. Almonacid argues that integration spelled stagnation like Valdivia had experienced since the Great Depression.²⁸⁴ By June 16, 1960, the US and Chile reached an agreement that would send aid; in exchange, Chile agreed to import agriculture from the US.

While necessary and done out of urgency, this became the third agricultural surplus agreement between the US and Chile. This deal gave Chile ten million dollars in emergency line of credit. The US would then also make twenty million available by October of 1960. In exchange, Chile would import "surplus agricultural commodities valued at twenty-nine million" under the Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480).²⁸⁵ This was the first agreement signed since 1956; the original agreement had been signed on January 27, 1955 and the second on March 13, 1956. Between the first two deals, the US invested 38.5 million dollars in various enterprises, including minerals and manufacturing. In exchange Chile had agreed to buy agricultural products as laid out by the terms of the second deal.²⁸⁶ The third

²⁸⁴ Fabián Almonacid Zapata, *La agricultura chilena discriminada (1910-1960): Una mirada de las políticas estatales y el desarrollo sectorial desde el sur* (Editorial CSIC - CSIC Press, 2009), 11.

²⁸⁵ *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. XLIV, 1123 (Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1961), 492. It is truly ironic that it is called the Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act, because as I argue, it is exact deal that has hindered the growth and development of southern agriculture. At the most crucial time that the south needed assistance, the Chilean government revamped the deal that hindered the south's growth. There are some discrepancies in the years, but this could simply because Chile probably signs it first and then sends it to the United States for final approval. These are all certainly the same deals.

²⁸⁶ Carolina Salcedo and Michèle E. M. Akoorie, "Foreign Direct Investment in Chile: Historical Process, Changing Political Ideologies and the Responses of MNEs," *AD-Minister*, no. 23 (December 2013): 116. The article does not specify the deal, but states that this was the trend for US investment during this time. While private

deal did not set an exact loan amount (it would increase according to need), valued the loan at forty-five percent of all products purchased by Chile, set a twenty-year term, and indicated that the loan was to be specifically used on the housing plan. This agreement did not help the farmers' cause since they needed money to rebuild infrastructure to transport their goods to the nation.²⁸⁷

Journalist Carlos Sepúlveda raved about this deal and touted that the agreement allowed for a leveling of prices while providing funds that would benefit crucial reconstruction projects in the south.²⁸⁸ On the surface, this may have looked like a much-needed deal, receiving a steady supply of food and capital, but southern agriculture was not all destroyed. The Director of Agriculture and Fishing, Virgilio Mannarelli, described to reporters that while the agriculture sector between Valdivia and Llanquihue was seriously damaged and corresponded to sixty-two percent of the country's potato and wheat production, along with fifty-seven percent of beet production, most of the crops remained unharmed.²⁸⁹ The real damage lay in the infrastructure: bodegas, tenant farming homes, roads, and railroads—not in the seed or harvest, although some fields were flooded and damaged. Farmers all over the south had a healthy potato harvest and 30,000 cattle ready for market.²⁹⁰ The more urgent matter involved reconstructing transportation

companies, such as Ford and Anaconda and Kennecott, did not make investments, the investment made by the United States Government created an opening for these companies to enter Chilean markets. The article goes on to argue that the Alliance for Progress did the opposite, the US government regressed in investments and private companies took on the direct charge in investing in various Chilean enterprises. Chilean presidents, such as Carlos Ibáñez and Jorge Alessandri, had made these deals with the United States government which in exchange Chile increased agriculture imports from the US, hurting the growth of Chilean agriculture and more specifically, southern Chilean agriculture since the 1950s. It goes without saying, this was part of US policy against the communist threat in Latin America during the Cold War.

²⁸⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Tercer convenio de excedentes agrícolas finiquito el Gobierno: fondos para plan de viviendas." June 6, 1960.

²⁸⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La planificación integral de la economía de la zona azotada por el sismo tendrá concordancia con la economía nacional." June 9, 1960.

²⁸⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Sector agrícola más gravemente dañado es el ubicado entre Valdivia y Llanquihue: La agricultura puede tener recuperación en base a plan de desarrollo." June 11, 1960.

²⁹⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Danos experimentados por actividad agrícola recaen en bienes de capital." June 29, 1960.

infrastructure to move the produce into the much-needed areas; therefore, this deal contradicted the government's push to integrate the south as it undermined the products of southern Chile and the growth of the nation's economy. The earthquake had only produced moderate damage to the agricultural sector, however, the national government sought to import produce. The Directive of the Consortium of Southern Agricultural Societies reacted to this deal and reiterated Mannarelli's point.

Two Societies, the Society for Agricultural Development or Sociedad de Fomento Agrícola (SAGO) and Society for Agriculture and Livestock of Osorno or la Sociedad Agrícola y Ganadera de Osorno (SAGO) formed in the early twentieth century to counteract the power of the National Society of Agriculture (SNA) dominated by central valley agricultural interest.²⁹¹ These societies did not form as a union, but rather as an organization to voice their concerns directly to the government. In an article published in 1963 on the eve of the Chilean Land Reform, James Becket described these societies as a mixture between individualistic and collective.

To make a broad categorical distinction, one can distinguish views of agricultural organization on an individualistic or a collectivist basis. The typical *inquilinos* are collectivized in that they are not affected either by the risks or benefits of ownership, respond to a centralized control and work on land owned by one legal person and entity. The main thrust of the ideals of

²⁹¹ Fabián Almonacid Zapata, "La agricultura del sur de Chile (1910-1960) y la conformación del mercado nacional" (info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, Madrid, Spain, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2005), 90, 161, Universidad Complutense de Madrid Biblioteca, <https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/7265/>. I discuss to some extent the differences between the Central Valley and southern agriculture societies. Just to reiterate, the Central Valley agricultural societies and its members (SNA) are very traditional, have ties with the right leaning political parties: Conservative, Liberal, and Radical. They are also absent landowners and many of them are either strongly politically tied or practicing politicians. The southern agricultural societies and landowners are anticommunist, smaller and believe in ending latifundios and large haciendas. They believe that Central Valley landowners are the cause for Chile's stagnant economy. Many of them may belong to the traditional right leaning parties but are open in creating and joining new parties, such as the Partido Agrícola formed between 1931 and 1932. Fundamentally, they believe in a strong Central government to help them development southern agriculture and are against imports. They want to develop a self-sufficient agriculture that would not only feed Chile, but also have a surplus to export. These agriculturalists are medium size in wealth (middle class) and have been asking for loans from the central government since the 1950s, a issue I have covered in chapter one extensively.

the society as expressed in the constitution and party platforms is in individualistic terms.²⁹²

By no means did they represent the working class, but rather somewhere in between the middle class and wealthy as there were a large variable in land ownership as well as different types of societies according to region and type of agriculture, many times distinguished between livestock and crop. Between 1930 and the 1940s, SAGO – The Agricultural and Livestock Society of Osorno, struggled against the control of SNA. By the end of 1940s, SNA consolidated power over the southern Chilean Agricultural Societies and rather than gaining a stronger voice over the central government, as historian Fabian Almonacid describes, “Regional demands were silenced. Possibly, lack of unity among the southern farmers themselves and the support of many of them to the ‘national’ interests that were raised from the center to eliminate regionalisms, caused that regional force to weaken.”²⁹³

Therefore, the 1960 Valdivia earthquake along with Alessandri’s national economic plan of integration opened the doors for the Southern Agricultural Societies to gain political influence. The Southern Agricultural Societies seized this opportunity, just like the political parties and Alessandri, to push their agenda as they wanted inclusion in the national economic plan. For much of the 1950s, agricultural production in the south stagnated particularly in the province of Valdivia. Much of the national economy focused on Chile’s central valley’s agriculture, and northern copper mines. There had been much interest nationally and internationally to make southern agricultural economically viable, but the earthquake offered both a pause and an opportunity.

²⁹² James Becket, “Land Reform in Chile,” *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 5, no. 2 (1963): 204, <https://doi.org/10.2307/164809>.

²⁹³ Zapata, *La agricultura chilena discriminada (1910-1960)*, 17.

On June 14, 1960, a committee by the name of the Directive of the Consortium of Southern Agricultural Societies made a public exposition to the country. The committee expressed that they suffered from the disaster, and it was impossible for the central government to ask for new sacrifices from the agriculturalists in the southern zone. Their infrastructure had been destroyed, but in turn, most of the harvest was salvaged along with many of the animals. Therefore, the nation could count on a healthy food harvest during the winter and spring months. Politically, the consortium was strongly against those that raised prices on products in the marketplace. They acknowledged the need for external help, but only in material goods for reconstruction. They wanted the national government to integrate southern agriculture in the reconstruction and economic development process because the current conditions of the south made it difficult to transport their agricultural goods.²⁹⁴

For the farmers of southern Chile, integration was a necessity for the recovery and viability of the south. The newspaper of the agricultural center of the province, *La Unión*, believed that, “the trade of the south must, in these critical days, receive the homage of the Government, granting it the necessary lines of credits to rise up from its rubble and thus continue contributing to the progress of Chile.”²⁹⁵ *La Unión* implied the integration of the south into the national economy. This was further echoed in a meeting in Osorno, the cattle capital of Chile, where two agriculturalist organizations met: the Directive of the Consortium of Southern Agricultural Societies and the Delegation of the Executive Committee of the National Farmers Consortium. Their main message to the nation, the central government, and regional leaders was that the southern Chilean economy was reliant on agriculture. They emphasized that

²⁹⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Adecuada política agraria debe ser base para la reconstrucción: Exposición publica hizo al país el Consorcio de Sociedades Agrícolas.” June 14, 1960.

²⁹⁵ *La Unión*, col. “El comercio y una tragedia.” June 6, 1960.

due to the dispersed nature of agricultural enterprises, is generally ignored in cases of calamities such as the one we regret to be in. It is necessary in fact to inform the nation that the highest percentage of damage resulting from the earthquake is in agriculture, which has experienced the destruction of the cellars, stables, silos, sheds, houses of staff and owners, farmland, etc.²⁹⁶

The farmers did not want to be forgotten in the reconstruction project and, even though their harvest and animals were virtually unharmed, the lack of infrastructure had been and was an issue in helping develop the national economy.

A bullet point presentation depicted by *El Correo de Valdivia* listed some of the discussed points at the meeting. The Committee viewed it as a positive that the central government had recognized the need to rehabilitate southern agriculture and had advanced the necessary legislation to develop the nation's agriculture. Further, they were glad that reconstruction and rehabilitation of the southern economy focused on agriculture. The committee reiterated that most of the damage to their economy had been in the way of lack of infrastructure that made farming and distribution possible, dispelling the idea that the earthquake and tsunami destroyed crops or killed animals. While they may not have approved of the agreement with the US, the agricultural organization believed that it was necessary to make reconstruction possible. The last point drew attention to the lumber industry, as the committee stated that there should be a focus on the lumber industry which should have a large basis in the reconstruction of the south since it was a low-cost building material and important for southern economic development.²⁹⁷ This agricultural meeting sought to make it clear to the entire nation that they were united with the central government and ready to help the nation both to rebuild the south and to join the recovering national economy.

²⁹⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La agricultura del país." June 22, 1960.

²⁹⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La agricultura del país." June 22, 1960.

Nicanor Allende emerged as the most outspoken southern voice against the government's plan of economic integration. As a politician elected in the 1950s and a long-time resident of the province, he witnessed the decline of Valdivia's economy. Nicanor Allende accused the national government of using aid to help the economic development of the nation and not the areas affected by the earthquake.²⁹⁸ Ricardo Lagos emphasized this point in his 2011 study, "Earthquakes: an opportunity to advance the agenda of each government?," stating that "at the same time, [Alessandri] understood that the reconstruction was entangled with the broader development of the country, and with that train of thought he created COPRER (Comité de Programación Económica y de Reconstrucción), and integrated with the ministries of Economy, Hacienda, Public Works, Mining, Agriculture, Vice President and General of CORFO, the Vice President of Housing and the Director of Budget."²⁹⁹ Nicanor expressed this further and emphasized Sepúlveda's point that while the nation dealt with the disaster and loss of life, many people in Congress jockeyed to improve their electoral situation. Nicanor concluded by stating that, "we do not ask for anything that does not correspond to us; only to have the help we need to continue working, to conquer with our own efforts what nature has taken away from us in a misfortune that has affected all of Chile."³⁰⁰ There was a fine line between reconstruction and the development of the nation. The south simply did not want to be forgotten in the development of the entire nation.

²⁹⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Denuncian que existe propósito de aprovecharse de la desgracia ajena: Discurso del Diputado Don Nicanor Allende en la cámara." June, 14, 1960.

²⁹⁹ Lagos Escobar, "Terremotos: ¿una oportunidad para avanzar la agenda de cada gobierno?," 68.

³⁰⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Denuncian que existe propósito de aprovecharse de la desgracia ajena: Discurso del Diputado Don Nicanor Allende en la cámara." June 14, 1960.

A Clear Picture of the Devastation

As the government evacuated Valdivia's residents and more experts arrived, a holistic picture came together of the sudden environmental change that the city and province had endured. The situation at Lake Riñihue created hesitation by many administrators and politicians to propose a complete reconstruction plan. However, the political debates continued during the recovery and preventive period of the ensuing months. Early statistics of the devastated zones showed that Concepción suffered the most damage, with 57,488 homes destroyed in the urban areas and 16,931 in the rural region. In total, Valdivia was the fourth most affected province behind Ñuble, and Cautín, with 15,934 homes in the urban section, and 24,461 in the rural zones, totaling 40,395.³⁰¹ In addition to the destroyed homes, a devastated infrastructure system made Valdivia almost uninhabitable. The earthquakes destroyed most of the city's sanitary and potable water infrastructure. The sanitary department tried to remedy the situation but could only repair two kilometers out of the seven damaged; the ensuing earthquakes and tremblors made it difficult to work on the pipes.³⁰² While the government evacuated most of the city's population, many agencies worked tirelessly to help those still in the area.

By June 10, many agencies had gotten the situation under control and the earthquakes had lessened to small tremblors. *El Correo* stated that "since yesterday, potable water only existed for 50 percent of the population," signaling a declining situation even though the shaking has stopped.³⁰³ CORVI (the Housing Corporation, a government institution) built 5,000 units of rustic housing for 25,000 people and the Director of Architecture inspected the public buildings

³⁰¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Estadísticas de viviendas en las zonas devastadas." June 10, 1960.

³⁰² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "De difícil solución son los danos en obras sanitarias: de los 7 y medio kilómetros de la red se llevan recorridos dos y medio." June 3, 1960.

³⁰³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Desde ayer existe suministro de agua potable para el 50% de la población." June 11, 1960.

as work continued, cleaning the city along with disposing of the rubble.³⁰⁴ To combat the potable water problem, most water was delivered by truck. The train functioned in a limited capacity, leaving people and supplies at the Mariquina Station, a rural farming town forty-five kilometers northeast of Valdivia. All this amounted to a truly horrible few months for the people who stayed behind—mostly rural people who had come from the outskirts of society seeking help and men from the city. Below is a map of the province separated by communes.



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³⁰⁴ Senado, “Sesión 15, Ordinaria, En Martes 12 de Julio de 1960.” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, July 12, 1960), 810, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, https://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/36148/1/S19600712_15.pdf.

³⁰⁵ Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, “Región De Los Ríos,,” Government, Región De Los Ríos, 2022, Región De Los Ríos.

Those not evacuated from the region received emergency homes out of harm's way from the rising Riñihue flood waters. Two government agencies, CORFO and CORVI, worked outside the bureaucratic limits of the central government. The latter, CORVI, evolved out of the 1906 Valparaíso and 1939 Chillán earthquakes, morphing into a permanent bureau focused on housing by 1953.³⁰⁶ Many people believed that bureaucracy hindered the immediate recovery and reconstruction planning effort. When *El Correo de Valdivia* announced that "CORVI applies practical executive measures in the southern zone," they expressed both praise and frustration with the central government. CORVI's habitational effort took an aggressive approach to getting people into homes after the earthquake. Part of CORVI's plan involved delivering homes that were in livable condition to their owners; right before the earthquake struck, the ceremony to inaugurate the CORVI community was set for May 21, the Naval Glories Day, a national holiday.³⁰⁷ CORVI allowed families to occupy the almost completed homes, although many of these homes would lack electricity and indoor plumbing for most of the decade. In addition, easing the immediate housing crisis, CORVI ordered bodegas to receive construction materials. CORVI went beyond addressing the housing situation by offering lines of credit amounting to 100 escudos with a loan terms of 90 days for food and construction material. The last emergency measure was an order for emergency homes to be built; in total

³⁰⁶ Rodrigo Hidalgo Dattwyler, "La Vivienda Social en Chile: la acción del Estado en un siglo de planes y programas," *Scripta Nova Revista Electrónica de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales*. 45, no. 1 (August 1, 1999), <http://www.ub.edu/geocrit/sn-45-1.htm>. *La Corporación de Reconstrucción* and *la Caja de Habitación Popular* became CORVI in 1953. *La Corporación de Reconstrucción* was one of the institutions created after the Chillán earthquake in 1939. *La Caja de Habitación Popular* was another institution created after a disaster, the 1906 Valparaíso earthquake under the Law *Ley de Habitaciones Obreras*. *La Caja de Habitación Popular* was specifically created to build homes for the working-class people migrating to the cities and working in factories in cities such as Concepción, Santiago, and Valparaíso. During the 1950s and 60s, CORVI's main mission was to build homes and solve the long problem of housing the working class and ridding mushroom communities.

³⁰⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "En el Día de Glorias Navales serán inauguradas 506 viviendas en Valdivia." May 20, 1960; *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "5 mil casas para el pueblo construirá el Gobierno de Alessandri en Valdivia." May 21, 1960. Up until 1959, CORVI delivered 350 homes to Valdivia's general population. CORVI was about to deliver a large community to the city and the people right before the earthquake struck.

they expected the construction of 2,400 homes as soon as possible.³⁰⁸ Outside of Valdivia, just southeast in Río Bueno, CORVI built 10 barracks designed to be expanded, fitting up to eighty families if necessary.³⁰⁹ These dwellings quickly filled as many rural inhabitants seeking aid reached out to authorities. In the days after the quakes, CORVI exemplified the power behind an agency with no bureaucratic strings in their ability to deliver emergency homes to the people in need.

Other agencies used internal excuses as a form of suppressing aid. While many Chilean banks were private in the 1960s, Alessandri's economic plan sought to mingle private enterprises with public agencies to solve Chile's social problems: housing crisis, inflation, and now the recovery from these devastating earthquakes. One month after the largest earthquake struck, the banks refused the release of any loans before additional information could be gathered on the cataclysm. *El Correo de Valdivia* published an article detailing the frustration, reporting that "the banks do not need CORVI's report to grant loans," as they had the capacity to grant loans without any obstacles.³¹⁰ By the end of July, the banks once again echoed this same sentiment of lacking information to grant immediate emergency loans. The Coordinator of the Reconstruction Committee, the Mayor of the Valdivia Commune, Victor Vogt, gave public notice of their activity on July 22. The committee stated that the emergency loans were not enough to plan a complete reconstruction of the city. The money was available to start the reconstruction process to some extent, however, the banks waited on CORFO's complete assessment of the damages to make the loans available.³¹¹ While it may be understandable that many agencies wanted a

³⁰⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Medidas ejecutivas y practicas aplica la Corvi en la zona sur: Construirá viviendas de dos piezas que ampliará más adelante." June 6, 1960.

³⁰⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Población de barracones levanta Corvi en Río Bueno." June 17, 1960.

³¹⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Los Bancos no necesitaran informe de la Corvi para otorgar préstamos." June 29, 1960.

³¹¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Comité Coordinador de Reconstrucción dio cuenta pública de sus actividades." July 22, 1960. This is a local committee of politicians and businessmen, they included a man by the

comprehensive picture of the destruction, the fact is that much of the rest of the southern region was rebuilt while Valdivia awaited its fate from the consequential flood waters of lake Riñihue.

CORFO used its independence from bureaucratic politics to provide the necessary material to the people. For the southern farmers, CORFO stepped in a dynamic and efficient manner; the institution was created in response to the 1939 Chillán earthquake and had the immediate capability to help those affected by the Valdivia earthquakes. Unlike CORVI, which focused on housing, CORFO was not limited in its ability to deliver aid nor specialized in specific projects. It was heavily involved in *El Riñihuazo*. In Valdivia, CORFO focused on helping farmers avoid having their seed and products go to waste in the southern zone. The agency offered to move the product to market for farmers. *El Correo* gave CORFO high praise as the headlines read, “Special Committee of ‘CORFO’ Will Service Orders of Farmers' Warehouses.”³¹² Furthermore, their plan for “rehabilitation” started even before the rest of the government’s plan, as they installed loan offices. By July 22, CORFO had extended lines of credit to the devastated zones as well as to other agencies, but these were only for funding large amounts needed for the complete reconstruction.³¹³ However, because they were funded by the central government, their plan involved the stabilization of southern Chile in accordance with the nation’s plan for reconstruction.

The consensus among *Valdivianos* was that the central government had not done enough for the city. As a *La Unión* article put it, the May 22 earthquake “showed the other tragedy shaking; the other earthquake that had been shaking this long-suffering town of Chile for many

name of Boroschek and the Mayor of the city, Kunstmann. Their man task was to have communication with the various ministers and entities working on lake Riñihue and the reconstruction of the city.

³¹² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Comité especial de ‘CORFO’ atenderá pedidos de galpones de agricultores.” June 29, 1960.

³¹³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “La Comisión de Hacienda de la Cámara despacho el Proyecto de Reconstrucción: Consta de 115 artículos transitorios y ocho permanentes.” July 22, 1960.

years,” meaning the various social issues plaguing the nation.³¹⁴ The most prominent outspoken local critic was Lu s Alfaro Segovia, the director of *El Correo de Valdivia*. In an “Open Letter to the President of the Republic,” he expressed a sense of betrayal stating that during his presidential campaign, Alessandri had personally visited him and stated that they were friends even before he had become president.³¹⁵ However, Alessandri had not rushed to the devastated zone and instead stayed in Santiago. This frustrated Segovia and he pressed the president to tell the truth about the reconstruction plan for Valdivia, “because this way he feels more secure with his own life and his poor assets.”³¹⁶ He further criticized the bureaucratic entanglements that hindered the recovery effort as he expressed that the “Executive General cannot, however, resolve anything without consulting, Mr. President.”³¹⁷ Salvador Allende pointed out that an unmentioned Minister spent only twenty-four hours in Valdivia, when in fact, a minister should remain permanently during times of emergency.³¹⁸ Segovia pointed to an example that the Executive General, Ca a, had to travel to Santiago to contract 1,000 men to finish 5,000 barracks so people could shelter until Valdivia was deemed safe. He further explained that the General should have the authorization to grant whatever was necessary for Valdivia, especially in their time of need.³¹⁹

³¹⁴ *La Uni n*, col. “Lo que ha mostrado y demostrado el cataclismo.” July 12, 1960.


³¹⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Carta abierta a S.E. El presidente de la Republica.” June 17, 1960.

³¹⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Carta abierta a S.E. El presidente de la Republica.” June 17, 1960.

³¹⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Carta abierta a S.E. El presidente de la Republica.” June 17, 1960.

³¹⁸ Senado, “Sesi n 11, Ordinaria, En Martes 28 de Junio de 1960” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, June 28, 1960), 590, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, https://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/36189/1/S19600628_11.pdf.

³¹⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Carta abierta a S.E. El presidente de la Republica.” June 17, 1960.



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Those that Stayed Behind

Journalists became some of the strongest activists as they experienced firsthand the government's day-to-day operation in the city. Not all the citizens of Valdivia were evacuated. Many from rural areas and people living beyond the outskirts, including an entire neighborhood of Las Animas, a working-class town directly north and across the Calle-Calle River from Valdivia, remained. It was estimated by the Minister of Finance, Roberto Vergara, that there were 100 thousand people in direct danger of the flooding who could not be evacuated.³²¹ Many citizens of Las Animas did not have faith in the Government's ability to protect their property.

³²⁰ Rodrigo Hidalgo et al., "ARRIBA DEL CERRO O SOBRE EL HUMEDAL: PRODUCCIÓN DE NATURALEZA Y EXPANSIÓN INMOBILIARIA EN CIUDADES MARINAS Y FLUVIALES. EL CASO DE VALPARAÍSO Y VALDIVIA, CHILE," *Diálogo Andino*, no. 56 (August 2018): 87–100, <https://doi.org/10.4067/S0719-26812018000200087>.

³²¹ *Clarín*, col. "No hay como evacuar a las 100 mil personas en Valdivia; es muy grave." June 5, 1960; Hernández Ojeda, 1960, 168.

As the journalist Gouthe remarked, one citizen stated that there was no monetary value to his home, but rather “his house is worth to him thirty-three years of work.”³²² Whatever aid came their way, if any, went beyond monetary value; they risked losing lifelong investments in experiences and memories that could not be repaired or rebuilt with currency. Gouthe also said that Las Animas residents praised the newspaper *El Correo de Valdivia* stating that the publishers had been helpful by only relying on official sources when reporting on the situation that endangered so many of their lives.³²³ *El Correo de Valdivia* went beyond being an informative source, it emerged as an office for aid as many felt that the central government and officials were unreachable.

Other families besides the residents of Las Animas stayed, including a small group of neighbors just south of the city. Approximately 500 men, women, and children were evacuated from Goycolea Street at the end of Guillermo Frick Street, but fifty-five families decided to stay in their neighborhood located just south of Valdivia, off the riverbanks of the Valdivia River. For them, and in the Valdivian spirit, staying provided a sense of pride and independence from the central government—they did not want help from authorities in their evacuation efforts, nor did they want to leave behind their life’s work. The reporter Geothe quoted one Animas resident: “Just as Valdivia is not going to die because an earthquake destroyed her, we, the *Animeños*, do not flee because of the impending flood waters of Lake Riñihue. The same permanent values that make the city of Valdivia eternal, will be the city of Valdivia, will be gravitating in favor of ‘Las Animas.’”³²⁴ The residents lived in rough and unsanitary conditions, lacking proper medication and water. These conditions forced some of the family members to

³²² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Mi barrio de ‘Las Animas.’” June 29, 1960.

³²³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Mi barrio de ‘Las Animas.’” June 29, 1960.

³²⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Mi barrio de ‘Las Animas.’” June 29, 1960.

visit the newspaper headquarters to ask for help. They were unlucky in their efforts and left the headquarters without supplies, but they gained a meeting with the *Jefe de la Plaza*, General Caña.³²⁵ Central government aid seemed inaccessible; these families lost faith in the ability of the government to help them reconstruct their homes.

General Caña felt public pressure as he publicly defended himself and the government's efforts in Valdivia. In an article published in *El Correo de Valdivia*, General Caña stated that "from the first instant, there has been aid for the public."³²⁶ General Caña went on to list the many ways the government and military had aided the people of Valdivia and the immense effort it had undertaken to achieve this level of aid, including passing out wooden stoves to keep the people warm during the cold, brutal months.³²⁷ He reminded readers that they had evacuated over 40,000 people, who had traveled north to either Valaparíso or Santiago. Additionally, Camp No. 11 of the Caupolicán regiment lay at the center of Valdivia's recovery efforts; it took in people that stayed behind and distributed aid from that locale.³²⁸ For many, frustration stemmed less from General Caña's efforts and more from the city seemingly being forgotten in the first four days after the large quake, a decade of natural events, and the lack of a solid reconstruction plan as congress endlessly discussed funding for reconstruction.

³²⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "55 familias viven abandonadas en sitio eriazo de calle Gmo. Frick." June 29, 1960.

³²⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Desde el primer instante se auxilió a la población: Damos la segunda parte del Amplio reportaje al General don Alfonso Cañas." July 11, 1960.

³²⁷ Bernarda Aucapan Mallaquipai, *Los Terremoteados de La Población Menzel (1960-2007). Memoria Del Desarrollo Habitacional de Valdivia Desde Sus Pobladores*. (Valdivia, Chile: Gobierno Regional Región de los Ríos y SERPA, 2010), 48–49.

³²⁸ Senado, "Sesión 11, Ordinaria, En Martes 28 de Junio de 1960," 589; *El Correo de Valdivia*, "Desde el primer instante se auxilió a la población: Damos la segunda parte del Amplio reportaje al General don Alfonso Cañas." July 11, 1960.

Ending the Tragedy

The disaster ended after draining the excess water from Lake Riñihue on July 24 in an uneventful manner. This allowed government agencies to finally assess the total damage done by the earthquakes, tsunami, and landslides. By June 28, the government and engineers had devised a plan to release Lake Riñihue's waters. Inevitably, the release of these waters brought more damage to the Province of Valdivia and the city; however, it also signaled the end of the catastrophe. The water levels in the lake had risen 17.90 meters (58.72 ft) or two billion cubic meters above its normal level by June 27, 1960.³²⁹ Engineers were also almost finished with "Taco 2" and the newspaper gave notice that it would give a forty-eight-hour signal before the release of the waters.³³⁰ Communication had always been a concern since most of the means to deliver information had been destroyed with the earthquake, including telegraphs, roads, etc. The newspaper provided the best, and many times the only, form of communication. A June 29 article in *El Correo de Valdivia* stated that "The Flooding will be Slow and Progressive, but it will cover All Lower Sectors with Mud." The engineers expected that all low-lying areas from five to eight meters above the water level would be affected by the rising flood waters. The flow would mostly be tanked in "Taco 3" which retained a lot of water; "Taco 4" made artificially with dynamite would also help control the flow. Panguipulli was the town most in danger, with the expected water level rising to at least eighteen meters in the area.³³¹ This was a very delicate situation, because in all, as the Minister of Finance Roberto Vergara estimated, the Lake Riñihue situation put about hundred thousand people in danger.³³²

³²⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La alarma para la evacuación de la ribera se dará 48 horas antes del desagüe del lago." June 28, 1960.

³³⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La alarma para la evacuación de la ribera se dará 48 horas antes del desagüe del lago." June 28, 1969.

³³¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La inundación será lenta y progresiva, pero cubrirá de barro todos los sectores bajos." June 29, 1960.

³³² *Clarín*, col. "No hay como evacuar a las 100 mil personas en Valdivia; es muy grave." June 5, 1960.

Under public scrutiny, the central government and engineers took extra measures to avoid another disaster. Regional evacuations and housing started on June 7 and lasted until June 18. CORVI rehoused 22,000 people from the lower parts of Valdivia and Las Ánimas.³³³ On June 30, the engineers working on the Lake Riñihue situation detonated twelve tons of dynamite to form “Taco 4,” this resulted in moving 20,000m³ of earth.³³⁴ The government further evacuated the last remaining souls from the city and rural communities, placing 10,250 people in camp “Caupolicán.”³³⁵ At this point, the government had been chastised for having forgotten Valdivia and for the lack of direct government aid sent to the citizens. In total, Luís Sands Brángier, Captain and associate boss of the Department of Information of the Emergency Zone reported that they had aided 48,000 people in the city and 100,000 people in the province. Sands Brángier explained that, with the massive relief effort and the uniqueness of the situation, blunders in distributing aid were inevitable.³³⁶

Political efforts continued during the month of July as the waters from Lake Riñihue overflowed the mud dams. A commission formed in the Chamber of Deputies studied different recovery and reconstruction plans. The President’s Article 4 Executive Order created this commission with supporting votes from the Liberals and Conservatives. Their main objective was short- and long-term loans as well as finding national and international institutions that they could rely on for loans and technical support. The central government relied on CORFO to focus on the regional problems in the affected zone. Legislators also approved Executive Action Article 5 which allowed the use of international money and products to come into the nation

³³³ Hernández Ojeda, 1960, 170–71.

³³⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “12 tones de dinamita formaron taco No 4.” June 30, 1960.

³³⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “12 tones de dinamita formaron taco No 4.” June 30, 1960.

³³⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “12 tones de dinamita formaron taco No 4.” June 30, 1960.

without surpassing 500 million dollars, the amount Congress had authorized Alessandri to take on in debt.³³⁷

As the date neared for the releasing of Lake Riñihue's waters, the Chilean Congress settled on a preliminary reconstruction plan. On July 22, Senator Gregorio Amunátegui and Chamber of Deputies members, Juan Puentes, Nicando Allende, and other distinctive Liberals from Valdivia met with the Director of *El Correo* and announced that they would activate and open the Offices of Reconstruction. Senator Amunátegui stated that "the Liberals do not want to speculate with the misfortune of the south for political proselytizing; we are focused at the moment on something very concrete and positive: the rapid dispatch of the reconstruction project."³³⁸ For Senator Amunátegui and the rest of the politicians, it was important to get the people back to Valdivia and living their normal lives since he viewed the lack of population as a danger that would further influence the exodus of industry and commerce from the city. Senator Amunátegui stated his vision for Valdivia's future:

The urban planning of the new Valdivia should be projected with a broad spirit of rectifications, that is, not rebuild what was bad before, without building again, improving and modernizing, solving errors, taking advantage of and capitalizing on the experience suffered and structured in general, an urban and architectural planning that makes the normal development of commerce and industry easier and more expeditious and contributes in this way to give a definitive boost to the economy of the Province.³³⁹

Amunátegui was proposing not a reconstruction, but rather a rebirth of the city, creating a new Valdivia that took advantage of the new environment created by the earthquake, including the river that now allowed for large ships, up to 5,000 tons to dock near the

³³⁷ Lagos Escobar, "Terremotos: ¿una oportunidad para avanzar la agenda de cada gobierno?," 67.

³³⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Parlamentarios Liberales activan el despacho de ley de reconstrucción: Declaraciones formula anoche el Senador Don Gregorio Amunátegui." July 22, 1960.

³³⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Parlamentarios Liberales activan el despacho de ley de reconstrucción: Declaraciones formula anoche el Senador Don Gregorio Amunátegui." July 22, 1960.

city.³⁴⁰ The decisions of reconstruction depended heavily upon the approval and the decisions of the central state and not *Valdivianos*.

This was a far cry from the economic autonomy that Valdivia held in the early twentieth century when *Valdivianos* had developed and promoted a city for their own needs. An anonymous editorial, printed on the same date the Valdivian politicians released their reconstruction plan, criticized local politicians for being absent during the recovery effort. The writer stated that the local politicians had not been involved in the reconstruction decision making, but instead had followed instructions and orders from Santiago.³⁴¹ The author's main criticism was that there had been an over centralization in the response to the cataclysmic event. Further, the editorialist explained, "The same centralization is seen in the local officials who are not native to the region but instead are using their elected office as a stage in their administrative career."³⁴² Finally, the editorialist articulated that the only way to feel the full extent of the devastation in the provinces was by being present and invested in the many aspects of the region to the extent that it could be considered as their own.³⁴³ This was in response to the lack of public officials in Valdivia and the misinformation that impeded the recovery effort. The author of the Op Ed made it clear that the only people that understood the needs of Valdivia were *Valdivianos*.

From the first tremblors, the earthquake and reconstruction provided a political stage for the various parties. Salvador Allende and Eduardo Frei visited Valdivia the week after the earthquake destroyed the city. Allende arrived on June 2, traveling with the President of the

³⁴⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "En marcha plan de reconstrucción de dirección de obras portuarias: Antes de fin de año se terminarán muelles en Valdivia, Niebla y Corral." July 31, 1960.

³⁴¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "El centralismo y el terremoto." July 22, 1960.

³⁴² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "El centralismo y el terremoto." July 22, 1960.

³⁴³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "El centralismo y el terremoto." July 22, 1960. This portion of the quote did not translate very well in english.

Medical College of Cuba, Dr. Fernández Melo, who represented a group of doctors helping the injured in the region.³⁴⁴ Ministers and local politicians traveled back and forth assuring the citizens that they were trying their best to provide all that was needed during the state of emergency. Locals expressed dismay over the way the Liberal and Conservative parties, the political pact behind Alessandri's presidential election, handled the earthquake. There had been complaints by Valdivian citizens that they felt they were being policed under military rule and that the central government was infringing on their city in a manner that did not help. A year away from the congressional elections, the Liberals and Conservatives in control of the *Comisión de Hacienda* approved a law indicating that every political party was prohibited from releasing political propaganda until one month before the 1961 elections.³⁴⁵ As previously mentioned, the FRAP, the Socialist and Communist Party pact, had been working on reconstruction legislation of their own to express their political ideology publicly. Carlos Sepúlveda Vergara criticized this move as theatrical politics, but the fact is that the FRAP at least had a formable reconstruction plan as opposed to the Liberal Party, whose leaders were still debating the terms and conditions of reconstruction.³⁴⁶ Much of the public responded with a Chilean saying, "*otra cosa es con guitarra*" or "another thing is with a guitar," as they believed all the parties were guilty of talk and no action.³⁴⁷ Up until the end of the July, the Liberals had not prepared a complete reconstruction plan, only releasing preliminary numbers of loans it would grant to the public.

The FRAP's reconstruction plan influenced the public's perception of how the reconstruction process should develop. The publication of FRAP's plan for reconstruction put public pressure on politicians; instead of being legislated behind closed doors, its terms were

³⁴⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Senador Salvador Allende llegó a Valdivia ayer." June 3, 1960.

³⁴⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Comentario de la semana política." July 24, 1960.

³⁴⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Comentario de la semana política." July 24, 1960.

³⁴⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Comentario de la semana política." July 24, 1960.

negotiated in the public arena. While the Liberals, the party in control of congress, sorted out the fine print behind the loans, *El Correo de Valdivia* suggested that the working class should take priority. As the article suggested, the central government struggled with creating a strict regimen of prioritizing certain reconstruction processes. It was difficult to give one solution to all the problems of the affected zones since each region had its own unique problems, and as some progressed faster than others. The journalist stated, that in their opinion, the priority of reconstruction should be “Roof and Work,” “*Techo y Trabajo*.” It was important to give people homes and jobs through the development of factories and commerce.³⁴⁸ This mantra of roof and work was a continuation of political pressure put on Alessandri’s government by both Frei’s and Allende’s 1958 political campaign promises of providing housing to the working class which had then further evolved in the atmosphere of 1960s Chilean politics. The FRAP’s plan for reconstruction had immediate support from the public, preempting Conservatives from developing their own plan since the general consensus suggested that reconstruction would come from the ground up, focusing on the working class’s needs to rebuilt the region and develop the nation’s economy.

The Hacienda Finance Commission released their own reconstruction project on July 22. The plan consisted of 115 transitional articles that would help the south recover, and eight permanent articles that would stay in place for the long-term future. The commission was run by senators in the central government. The national authorized loan was set at forty-four million, of which eighteen million would go to public works, six million to the Sub-secretary of transportation, five million for CORFO and fifteen million for CORVI.³⁴⁹ Also, another

³⁴⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “El proceso de la reconstrucción.” July 23, 1960.

³⁴⁹ The loan would come directly from the United States, but through various channels, such as the United Nations and the Inter-American Development Bank, which was just starting to get its operations in order along with its first president, being the Chilean, Felipe Herrera.

resolution consisted of CORVI having priority in rebuilding Puerto Montt, Toltén, Queule, Corral, Acnud, and Castro. The plan offered one million in loans for small industries and businesses.³⁵⁰ This was a small resolution, but not the final reconstruction plan as the recovery period of the disaster ended and reconstruction started.

The End of the Catastrophe

The engineers decided to release Lake Riñihue waters on July 26.³⁵¹ Many people did not accept the evacuation orders, and instead, they fought government officials to stay behind and protect their homes. These holdouts resided in the towns of Huelletlhue, Los Lagos, and Anitlhue, all working-class people who did not have faith in the central government's ability to recover their life's work.³⁵² People tied log poles to their homes or set them up on stakes with the hope that the river current would either not wash away their homes or at least allow them to float away to safety. Others put logs under their homes, thinking they would be able to raft their homes downstream with the strong currents.³⁵³ For the residents of Los Lagos, the rushing current only caused flooding, while the other two towns experienced homes washing away.³⁵⁴ In Valdivia, because of the directional arc of the river, the water jumped the bank and entered the city. However, the up-to-fifteen-foot wave that was predicted by the engineers arrived instead as a steady stream and flooded the city slowly.³⁵⁵ The citizens of Valdivia named the releasing of the waters "La Riñimoto," as the earth shook one last time while the waters traveled through the watershed.³⁵⁶ Along with the flooding and seasonal rain, the city stayed flooded for a few days.

³⁵⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La Comisión de Hacienda de la Cámara despacho el Proyecto de Reconstrucción: Consta de 115 artículos transitorios y ocho permanentes." July 22, 1960.

³⁵¹ Verdugo, "*Horas de tragedia*" o *el cataclismo de Valdivia*, 122–23.

³⁵² Castedo, *Hazaña del Riñihue*, 103.

³⁵³ Castedo, 104.

³⁵⁴ Castedo, 115.

³⁵⁵ Castedo, 116.

³⁵⁶ Castedo, 118.

The flood proved manageable with one gas station taking this situation in stride and posted a sign reading “free water.”³⁵⁷ This officially ended the catastrophe that started two months earlier and spelled the start of a new era for Valdivia and the south.

The earthquake reconfigured the political and natural environment of southern Chile. Silva Bárbara and Alfredo Riquelme argue in their book that, “in our opinion, the earthquake of May 1960 was decisive for the representation of Chile during the sesquicentennial reinforcing the centrality and relevance of the territorial image of the nation.”³⁵⁸ The earthquake occurred during an interesting time in Chilean political history when social issues took precedence during a conservative presidency. The earthquake only amplified the need to address these issues and integrate the south. The 1960 earthquake affected the history of Chile and its construction of the nation.³⁵⁹ As a consequence, “the tragedy of the South must be the starting point of a great popular movement that, around the innovative forces of the Chilean Left, definitively breaks the colonial structure of Chile and establishes, with completeness and courage, the real foundations of a new society, just, legitimate and progressive.”³⁶⁰ This new social cause developed out of the reconstruction of Valdivia and the south, giving legislators in Santiago both the natural and political environment to create change.

Chapter 2 Conclusion

In true Latin American and Chilean tradition, technocrats from all over the world arrived to study the strongest earthquake ever recorded in human history. Beyond the study and subsequent advising, the technocrats sought to steer Chilean politics, pushing for capitalistic development over marxist ideology. While communist aid was far less than US and its allies, the

³⁵⁷ Castedo, 119.

³⁵⁸ Silva and Riquelme, *Una identidad terremoteada*, 37.

³⁵⁹ Silva and Riquelme, 26.

³⁶⁰ Silva and Riquelme, 170.

very notion of Russia and Cuba helping created a dichotomy on the ground, both sides seeking to win over the working class. Foreign aid influenced Chilean reconstruction and development policies as loans directly correlated to deals between Chile and US allies.

Chapter 3

A Cold War Earthquake: The International Response to the 1960 Chilean Earthquake

Chapter 3 Introduction

The 1960 Valdivia/Chilean earthquake was an international incident that sent tsunami waves across the Pacific. It reminded governments that the natural environment transcends political borders and could affect anyone, even people across vast distances.³⁶¹ In this case, nature became political as aid became a weaponized tool to combat the threat of communism in Chile. While countries poured out their grief and support for the Chilean people, the catastrophe allowed the United States and its allies to continue its ideological battle against communism. The 1960 Chilean earthquake and tsunami occurred in the middle of the Cold War and while there was an ease in tensions between Russia and the US at the time, the battle advanced through other means—in this case, aid. Aid had its political purposes. On one side, the United States and its allies helped Chile as a sign of solidarity for the “democratic” community. On the other side was the Soviet solidarity with Chinese, Cuban, and Soviets sending aid as a sign of working-class unity to the group most affected by the earthquake and tsunami, the working class. There was also a third group, the global scientific community, that fetishized the earthquake and the disaster it wrought, seeking to learn more about seismology and settling an emerging theory about tectonic plates. While not politically charged, scientist/technocrats from Japan and the United States further advanced the Cold War battle as they offered capitalistic solutions to Chile’s underdeveloped agriculture and industries. Therefore, the 1960 Chilean earthquake went beyond being just a natural event to become a Cold War affair that helped shape Chile’s 1960s political revolution/evolution.

³⁶¹ In Chile, the 1960 Valdivia earthquake was referred to as *los sismos de 1960* in legislative documents and newspapers. Historically, Chileans refer to the earthquake as the 1960 Valdivia earthquake. Internationally, it is known as the The Great Chilean Earthquake. Because this is a chapter that deals with the earthquake from an international perspective I will refer to it as the 1960 Chilean earthquake.

The Bridge between Public Knowledge and Scientific Advancements

In the morning of May 22, 1960, the Chilean, Armando Cisternas, arrived at his seismology class at California Technical Institute in Pasadena. He was not the first Chileno to attend Cal Tech, as the now famous Chilean seismologist, Cinna Lomnitz, recently graduated in 1957 and was hard at work at La Universidad de Chile at the time. This interchange of students was to the advantage the global scientific community as Chile needed native experts to have the most advance training to deal with Chile's seismic reality, one of the most active in the world. Armando, sitting at his desk ready for lecture saw Dr. Frank Press rush into the classroom, stating that "there has just been a great earthquake in Chile and for the first time it will be possible to measure the lowest oscillation period of the earth."³⁶² While Dr. Press showed his excitement at the same time he saw Armando sitting in his chair and then proceeded to say, I am sorry.³⁶³ This was only the start of the earthquake's global reach.

Overseas deaths did not occur because the lack of technology or alarms, but because of the lack of understanding of earthquakes and tsunamis. The mid twentieth century earthquakes, along with technological advancements and theories, offered scientists the most advanced understanding in seismological science. These earthquakes included the 1939 Chillán, 1946 Aleutian, and the 1960 Chilean earthquake. In 1949 the United States found the tsunami warning system in the Pacific Ocean, which was first named the Seismic Sea Wave Warning System after the 1946 Aleutian Island tsunami claimed 165 lives in Hawaii and Alaska.³⁶⁴ On

³⁶² Armando Cisternas, "El país más sísmico del mundo," in *Terre/Mare/Moto*, ed. Sonia Montecino Aguirre, Séptima 1 (Santiago, Chile.: Universidad de Chile, 2011), 26, <http://www.catalonia.cl/revista-anales-terremaremoto-p-2944.html>.; The 1960 Chilean earthquake produced the deepest waves in the earth, which fascinated the scientific community.

³⁶³ Cisternas, 26.

³⁶⁴ "1946 Aleutians Tsunami," Western States Seismic Policy Council, accessed October 17, 2019, <https://www.wsspc.org/resources-reports/tsunami-center/significant-tsunami-events/1946-aleutians-tsunami/>; Steven Benedetti, *El terremoto mas grande del la historia: Cuando la tierra y el mar bramaron 9,5 richter*, Origo ediciones (Santiago, Chile, 2010), 121.

May 21, 1960, the first earthquake struck Concepción at 6 am; the Department of Navigation and Hydrology within the Chilean Armada notified the Tsunami Alert System of the Pacific in Honolulu, Hawaii. Simultaneously, the Magnetic Observatory in Honolulu and California Institute of Technology also observed the earthquake through their monitors. The alarm sounded within 45 minutes, at 6:45am, all United States agencies warned the entire Pacific of the impending tsunami danger. The warning ended at 10:49pm after it was clear that the earthquake did not produce a tsunami.³⁶⁵ The system worked according to its original intention, sending clear communication across vast regions of the Pacific to warn people and governments of impending danger. Luckily for the Pacific Rim community, only Valparaíso registered waves between 20 and 30 centimeters. Many people believed the worse had past and did not expect a stronger earthquake the following day.

On May 22, 1960, at 3:38pm Chilean time, the Magnetic Observatory in Honolulu, Hawaii recorded another earthquake and communicated with Valparaíso.³⁶⁶ By 4:30pm, the Department of Hydrology and Oceanic services of Chile informed Honolulu of a tsunami that had already created much damage in southern Chile.³⁶⁷ The first tsunami wave struck Hawaii at 12:47 am local time. It took 14 hours after the earthquake struck to travel 11,000 kilometers.³⁶⁸ The waves arrived at the altitude of 12 meters, partially destroying Hilo, drowning 61 people and injuring 300.³⁶⁹ Officials from all over the Pacific signaled ample warnings and took the necessary precautions. The science was not far behind from today's understanding, but scientist needed more data, meaning more earthquakes, to better understand the relationships between

³⁶⁵ Benedetti, *El terremoto mas grande del la historia: Cuando la tierra y el mar bramaron 9,5 richter*, 124.

³⁶⁶ Benedetti, 125.

³⁶⁷ Benedetti, 125.

³⁶⁸ Benedetti, 117.

³⁶⁹ Carlos Rojas Hoppe, *Valdivia 1960: Entre Aguas y Escombros* (Valdivia, Chile: Ediciones Universidad Austral de Chile, 2018), 136.

earthquakes, volcanos, tsunamis, and tectonic plates. The 1960 Chilean earthquake provided scientist the opportunity to make the most advancements in seismology, hence the global fascination.

Every earthquake and tsunami offered experts a better understanding of these natural events. One such scientist, Jerry Eaton and four of his colleagues from the U.S. Geological Survey's at the Hawaiian Volcano Observatory on the Island of Hawai'i loaded their equipment on a Ford Station Wagon and raced down the 30-mile road to Hilo. They could barely hold their excitement as they hoped to measure the tsunami, expecting its arrival just past midnight.³⁷⁰ Their measurements had scientific and engineering purpose as it would help identify risk areas from future tsunamis. After notifying local police officers about their location, they positioned themselves at a bridge. Right after 1 am "Mr. Eaton recalls that they then heard an ominous noise, a faint rumble like a distant train, that came from the darkness far out in Hilo Bay. Two minutes later, they began to see the source of the noise, a pale wall of tumbling water, caught in the dim lights of Hilo. The wave grew in height as it moved steadily toward the city, and the noise became deafening."³⁷¹ As they went through their exit strategy gaining high ground, they looked back just in time to see a 20-foot vertical wave hit the bridge, they were just standing on. After the water receded, they returned to the bridge to take more measurements. The 1960 Chilean Tsunami represented a moment to advance their understanding of a natural phenomenon that was difficult for the public to comprehend at that point, resulting in many deaths.

Deaths occurred on the Pacific Rim because the lack of the public's understanding of tsunamis. Countries established clear communication lines between agencies, warning the

³⁷⁰ "Surviving A Tsunami—Lessons from Chile, Hawaii, and Japan," *Https://Pubs.Usgs.Gov/Circ/C1187/*, no. 1187 (1999): 7, <https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/c1187/>.

³⁷¹ "Surviving A Tsunami—Lessons from Chile, Hawaii, and Japan," 7.

general population. Scientist even had the advanced knowledge of tsunamis to the extent that they could even calculate a tsunami's wave speed and estimate the time it would hit ashore, however, this is always unpredictability in nature. With all this date, The United States government sounded the tsunami alarm through their Civil Defense System, but they were uncertain if the tsunami would affect Hawaii.³⁷² Steven Benedetti states that in Hilo, Hawaii “the first wave, a little over a meter high, came a few minutes after midnight. It had traveled about 6,665 miles in just over fourteen hours, at an average speed of 785 miles per hour. The sea level slowly receded for the next half hour to a minimum of one meter below normal. A lot of people thought the threat had passed. Most of those who had not left their homes, continued there and many of those who had fled, returned.”³⁷³ Even though the residents of Hilo had plenty of time to prepare and ample warnings, 61 people perished in the 1960 Chilean tsunami.³⁷⁴ The state of emergency was lifted at 6:11am Hawaiian local time.³⁷⁵

Confusion caused many people's lives night. One example is the 16-year-old Carol Brown and her family, who took the necessary precautions. As they evacuated, they met with a police officer, who he himself stated that the danger had passed after a small wave hit after 12 midnight. Carol states that “around 1:00 a.m., they began to hear a low rumbling noise that soon became louder and was accompanied by sounds of crashing and crunching. Moments later, a wall of water hit the house, floating it off its foundations. When the house came to rest, Hilo was dark because the powerplant had been knocked out by the same wave.”³⁷⁶ Carol Brown and her family survived the tsunami without serious injuries. Many people “interpreted the sirens

³⁷² Benedetti, *El terremoto mas grande del la historia: Cuando la tierra y el mar bramaron 9,5 richter*, 82.

³⁷³ Benedetti, 159.

³⁷⁴ Edgardo Villalobos Chaparro, *Puentes aéreos : “alas de esperanza”* (Santiago, Chile: Fuerza Area de Chile, 2010), 41.

³⁷⁵ Benedetti, *El terremoto mas grande del la historia: Cuando la tierra y el mar bramaron 9,5 richter*, 128.

³⁷⁶ “Surviving A Tsunami—Lessons from Chile, Hawaii, and Japan,” 6.

differently.” The USGA study on “*Surviving a Tsunami*” states that “Although nearly everyone heard the sirens, only about a third of them thought it was a signal to evacuate without further notice. Most thought it was only a preliminary warning to be followed later by an evacuation signal. Others in Hilo were unsure of how seriously to take the warnings because several previous alerts had been followed by tsunamis that did little damage.”³⁷⁷ Scientist and agencies certainly understood the dangers of tsunamis, however, having a sufficient warning system and the public’s education of the emergency alerts system lacked far behind.

In Japan, the tsunami caused more damage and more casualties than in Hawai’i. Chilean Semiologist, Armando Cisternas, reiterates the strength of the Valdivia earthquake explaining that, “the energy generated was so great that the maximum wave height reached about 10m in Japan, 17,000 km away and after traveling a whole day.”³⁷⁸ The tsunami affect mainland Japan and the island just to the north, Hokkaido.³⁷⁹ The first signs of a tsunami arrived in Japan at 4 am, a day after the earthquake with a wave reaching 4 meters high. Some towns and cities fared better than others, depending on the few authorities in charge of watching for such dangers. For example, the citizens of Onagawa, just north of Tokyo, escaped with no deaths because of the actions of fireman, Kimura Kunio. His job, specifically, was to look out for dangerous waves; when he noticed the ocean water receding, he alerted the entire town and evacuated everyone just in time.³⁸⁰ Preliminary reports had the death count at around 30 people, 70 people missing, with 16,000 structures damaged or destroyed and 146,000 people evacuated.³⁸¹ In fact, Japan was the country most affected by the 1960 Chilean Tsunami, outside of Chile. The Japanese authorities

³⁷⁷ “Surviving A Tsunami—Lessons from Chile, Hawaii, and Japan,” 6.

³⁷⁸ Cisternas, “El país más sísmico del mundo,” 60.

³⁷⁹ Benedetti, *El terremoto mas grande del la historia: Cuando la tierra y el mar bramaron 9,5 richter*, 84.

³⁸⁰ Benedetti, 160.

³⁸¹ Benedetti, 84.

took great interest in studying a country on the opposite end of the Pacific Ocean because while thousands of miles apart, the Pacific Rim connected them.

The anxiety of the Cold War and fear of an atomic war had people from all over the world on alert. The Russians, even though not affected, had their eyes on the global event that affected various parts of the Pacific Rim. On May 31, 1960 *El Correo de Valdivia* had headlines that read “It was not an Earthquake, it was a Cataclysmic Event of Universal Proportion.”³⁸² According to the newspaper reporter, this declaration was broadcasted over the radio waves in Moscow, Soviet Union by a so called famous scientist, “Felovav.”³⁸³ The Journalist went on to emphasize the importance of the 1960 Chilean earthquake to the scientific community stating that “many global scholars are preparing to come and study the events that will serve as the basis for the story that writes the life of our planet in its infinite existence.”³⁸⁴ While tragic both in economic and human loss, the earthquake and tsunami offered scientists an opportunity to study the planet, energy dispersion, and above all else, the natural environment, that by now showed the connection between people on opposite sides of the world. As the information became clearer, experts from Japan, Germany, and all over the United States arrived in Chile and particularly in Valdivia to study this global phenomenon. The Japanese were the first scientists to Valdivia; their mission was to offer their expertise on recovery.

³⁸² *El Correo de Valdivia* (Valdivia: Impr. El Correo de Valdivia, 1895), col. “No fue un terremoto: fue un cataclismo de proporción universal.” May 31, 1960.

³⁸³ Jaime Ojeda Hernández in his book *1960: Memoria de un desastre* also references this newspaper article along with the Soviet Scientist. I have crossed referenced Felovav and did not find a trace nor his full name. My best guess is that they meant Sergei Korolev, the famous aeronautic scientist who was involved in the space race during the 1950s and 1960. He has been known to give radio addresses in the Soviet Union.

³⁸⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “No fue un terremoto: fue un cataclismo de proporción universal.” May 31, 1960.

The Scientific Community and Technocrats

An event such as the 1960 Chilean earthquake, proved important for the scientific community as they flocked to Chile in hopes of learning, contributing to science, and admire the power of the natural environment. The earthquakes and tsunamis provided the scientific community an opportunity to prove lingering theories and further learn about looming dangers. Just like Armando's professor at California Technical institute, Dr. Frank Press, many scientists expressed excitement over the potential break throughs and the data the 1960 Chilean earthquake offered scientist. The tsunami affected the Japanese community the most outside Chile, making their authorities and scientists the most crucial and eager to learn about an earthquake 17,000 kilometers away.

Japanese technocrats and scientist arrived in Chile by mid-June to offer their expertise and study the earthquake. Geologist and Professor at the University of Tokyo, Hisaschi Sato lead the group of Japanese scientists, along with representatives from the Tokyo Radio and Television.³⁸⁵ They studied the effects of the earthquake and made recommendations on the recovery effort. For the Japanese, this study constituted only the first of two research missions; the second, the research mission of 1961 made more of an impact on the reconstruction process of Valdivia as they recommended a concrete fortified boardwalk, transforming Valdivia's iconic cityscape. The Japanese scientist finished their preliminary research by June 25.³⁸⁶ However, this group could not make any recommendations until seismological activity calmed down as it lasted late into 1960, leaving the future of Valdivia uncertain.

³⁸⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Geólogo japonés se encuentra impresionado de la magnitud del cataclismo que azotó al sur." June 17, 1960.

³⁸⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Completo estudio en zona sur efectuaron científicos japoneses." June 26, 1960.

Various countries that offered technocratic aid had its political roots in the Cold War. Japan's willingness to help Chile came from its strong alliance with the United States, as they extended their expertise in harbor reconstruction to the Chilean government. This was their main contribution to the reconstruction of Valdivia and the primary focus of the 1961 Japanese Mission, as they studied the viability of Valdivia's port. The technocrats concluded that Valdivia's natural environment was still transforming from the 1960 earthquake and had to take precautionary measures to evolve with the ongoing transformations. As they stated,

The opinion of the Japanese research mission in 1961 was that, with high probability, sooner or later the river would return to its previous condition, because, despite the modifications caused by the earthquake, such as the deepening of the cause and the sinking of the 'Riberas' there can be no major changes in essential aspects such as rainfall, flow and geological characteristics of the watershed.³⁸⁷

While ideas spawned on building an extensive port in Valdivia or further up, in the Calle-Calle River, the Japanese suggested building a port in Las Mulatas, directly south of the city on the Valdivia River. The experts advised that in the sector called Las Mulatas, "the Valdivia River had sufficient depths and also increased its flow by the considerable contributions of the river Cruces, which flows into its right bank a little higher."³⁸⁸ These recommendations had radical effects on the province of Valdivia, changing its port dynamics and taking away Corral's main industry, shipping, as it never recovered its maritime importance while the main shipping port now stood closer to the city. This form of aid: technocratic expertise, bridged social issues with science and technology as government officials sought to fix problems plaguing their society through scientific methods. Technocrats had the best intentions to fix social economic problems; while minimally invasive, technocratic advice had profound effects on society.

³⁸⁷ Hoppe, *Valdivia 1960*, 133.

³⁸⁸ Hoppe, 134.

Latin America and Chile have an extensive relationship with technocrats as they played a major role in shaping 20th century politics and society. Generally, I define technocrats as professionals in various fields, from economics to science and medicine. They are not public figures nor have any interest in politics but closely work with politicians to fix social issues through social engineering.³⁸⁹ For Chile, technocrats gave the central government the knowledge, tools, and reason to expand the state into regions less developed and economically harness these rural landscapes. The earthquake created an avenue and a blank slate for the government to fix southern Chile's long stagnant economy and change its society. As, Patricio Silva in his study, *In the Name of Reason: Technocrats and Politics in Chile*, argues, "technocrats also played a leading role in the industrialization process promoted by the state from 1939 on after the foundation of the Corporación de Fomento, which became the main tool to give shape and implement the industrialization-based development strategy."³⁹⁰ This technocratic element has a strong foreign influence through various channels, such as foreign educated, expertise, and association with multinational organizations. Silva furthers this idea of multinational associations as he explains that technocrats served as ideologist in Chile, calling for active role of the State, under the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), an independent organization founded in 1948 and headquartered in Santiago, Chile.³⁹¹ The ECLA formed under the principle that Latin America had a strong enough internal economy to support itself, it rejected colonial dependency while utilizing aid, education, experts and organizations that still held ties with the United States and its allies. ECLA became one of many

³⁸⁹ Technocrats use their expertise to "better" society, intentional or not, they change and shape society, sometimes having negative effects. Their ideas are many times paternalistic and often affect the working class the most. From Mexico to Chile, technocrats in Latin American, along with politicians have tried to develop their nations by shaping society.

³⁹⁰ Patricio. Silva, *In the Name of Reason: Technocrats and Politics in Chile* / Patricio Silva. (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008).

³⁹¹ Silva.

multinational organizations that provided technocrats and aids to Chile during the reconstruction and development of southern Chile. Through technocratic aid the United States sought to shape the reconstruction of southern Chile.

In late July, two US professors arrived in Santiago offering their expertise to government officials in the recovery and reconstruction effort of southern Chile. The first, Professor Rudard Jones, from the University of Illinois was one of these technocrats.³⁹² His mission, as an expert in housing issues, was to collaborate with local housing authorities including the University of Chile and CORVI. Lack of housing plagued Chile since the 1906 Valparaíso earthquake and fire; Alessandri had been steadily solving these issues as his government inaugurated housing communities around Valdivia and southern Chile right before the earthquake and tsunami devastated the area. Another professor, Stanley Davies from Stanford University gave a lecture on Hydrology at the Post-Graduate school of engineering at the University of Chile with Professor Julio Cariola. These professors offered valuable knowledge to think tanks and governmental institutions of Chile. While these academics did not have any political agenda, their background and association to the United States offered a biased perspective in solving social problems, one that figures into the Cold War narrative. The time and place of the earthquake made this natural phenomenon into a political event and while aid may have seemed humanitarian in nature, countries made it their mission to steer Chile away from communism. Another example of a US ally providing aid, the Western German technocrats, took the lead in studying the entire region, contributing a lengthy study to the recovery and reconstruction of southern Chile.

³⁹² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Viene expert de la Universidad Illinois." July 22, 1960.

The West German Influence

The Western Germans offered a more thorough examination of the damages and the recovery of the natural event. Technicians, scientist, and officials arrived in Chile on July 27, 1960, staying until October. Their first order of business included assessing the damage as studies provided crucial information for government officials as they determined their approach on reconstruction. The West German official figured that the earthquake and tsunami affected 40,429 people in the agricultural industry in Valdivia, only behind Ñuble and Cautín, out of the 180,282 people living in the rural areas.³⁹³ These people also permanently lost 12,000 hectares of land used for agriculture, along with 20,000 hectares in state of repair, and 4,000 hectares of minor agricultural importance, totaling 36,000, representing 167 million dollars.³⁹⁴ The 12,000 hectares were lost in the province of Valdivia and resulted in 500,000 annual loss of income.³⁹⁵ The team concluded that Osorno and Valdivia were the most in need of reconstruction.³⁹⁶ Osorno represented the center of the meat and agricultural industry while Valdivia identified as the industrious center of southern Chile. According to CORFO, the agricultural sector lost 156.7 million in housing and buildings, 1 million dollars in machines, 3.4 million in livestock, and 6 million in lost of land to floods.³⁹⁷ The earthquake and tsunami only highlighted the issues Valdivia and the south had been struggling with since the 1950s. These technocrats collected data that went beyond just being information, but constituted an important tool for reconstruction of Chile and Valdivia for the Cold War US allies.

³⁹³ P Canisius, “Informe: sobre los resultados de las investigaciones hechas por la Comisión de expertos Alemanes enviada a Chile después del terremoto de 1960,” n.d., 275, 276.

³⁹⁴ Canisius, 36–37.

³⁹⁵ Canisius, 36–37.

³⁹⁶ Canisius, 225.

³⁹⁷ Canisius, 408.

The earthquake and tsunami signaled a time for a more aggressive approach in harnessing the south's natural resources that would better develop ideologies against the threat of communism. Since the 1950s, the US had tried to jumpstart Chile's economy. In 1954 the central government initiated the "plan de ocho años" or the eight year plan which sought to integrate southern agriculture and make Chile self-sustainable.³⁹⁸ The "plan de ocho años" hoped to fix the glaring problem of Chile having to import 28.9 percent of its agriculture.³⁹⁹ The 8 year plan overlapped with the 1960 Chilean earthquake, so reconstruction figured into the last two years of this plan. Aside from the social issues, the most important matter to be addressed was the construction and rebuilding of roads. The German technocrats, adding to the 8 year plan, explained that "in this way it will be possible to take advantage of natural wealth that could not be reached, or, where appropriate, arrived, with enormous difficulties."⁴⁰⁰ Along with the roads, in particular with Valdivia, it is also important for the waterways to be cleared and utilized to harness the economic potential of the region. As they made clear, "the transport by waterways will become increasingly important, especially considering that in the very near future it will be necessary to transport the heavy construction machines and the large quantities of materials necessary for the reconstruction work...in Valdivia, for example, this capacity has been greatly reduced by the loss of two large ships of 3,650 and 5,000 tons respectively from a local Shipping Company..."⁴⁰¹ The German official strongly believed that for the central state to harness and incorporate southern Agriculture, new transportation lines needed immediate attention. This would not only help to bring the central state closer to the people, but also create more jobs for the now displaced. It was this displaced working-class population that posed the most danger to

³⁹⁸ Canisius, 411.

³⁹⁹ Canisius, 413.

⁴⁰⁰ Canisius, 443–44.

⁴⁰¹ Canisius, 444.

the United States as communist and left-leaning ideologies appealed to them as most other options had been stripped by the natural events of May 1960.

The German committee emphasized the need for Chile to harness its natural environment. Chile had a wealth of lumber, coal, minerals, and agricultural land that did not produce. Instead of pointing at age-old monopolies, the German emphasized modernization and less capitalist constraints. They specifically blamed bureaucracy for a stagnate energy sector as they stated that for long time, the central government has limited its profits margins and has not allowed for growth, however, a new law focusing on electric utilities, Ley General de Servicios Eléctricos, opened the doors for further development.⁴⁰² In the same breath they also touted how independent ENDESA operated with the financial help of CORFO, compared to west German. They recommended further passive capitalist ideology proposing that the Chilean government give the electric companies more leeway in their push to produce more electricity as well as modernize their power plants from vapor and coal to hydro power plants. The German committee's approach to reconstruction took the form of modernization, as the earthquake and tsunami, provided a clean slate to address the social and economic issues plaguing southern Chile. While much of the aid was passive in nature there were always reminders to their allies that reconstruction constituted a battle against communism. As the years progressed, many US entities reported that foreign aid did not help the fight against communism as social progress and reconstruction ignited a popular movement within the working class.

Construction Against Communism

In 1961 John F. Kennedy initiated the Alliance for Progress as a joint economic development cooperation between the United States and Latin America. The roots of this

⁴⁰² Canisius, 317.

program grew in the aftermath of the 1960 Chilean earthquake as not only the United States, but many other countries sought to boost its ally's economy in a struggle against communist and socialist tendencies seeping into society. The West Germans, directly in the battle against communism in their homeland, took this battle to Chile. A report from the West Germans studying the effects of the earthquake stated that "as a Commemorative Monument of the 150th Anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Chile, the 'Berlin Foundation' was created in September 1960."⁴⁰³ They started a new community, "between Valparaíso and Viña del Mar," which was supported by "prestigious neighbors, employers of German origin, [who] have taken over the honorary leadership and have donated [land and money] in order to perform a good work for Chileans."⁴⁰⁴ This foundation had already acquired a large plot of land with a "magnificent panorama over the sea." They worked with Architect Eduardo Vargas, who studied at the Ulm and Kassel School of Architecture in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. Their mission, as they stated in the report, consisted in, "just as West Berlin has the mission of opposing communism, so is the 'Berlin' in Valparaíso will oppose communist ideas. In the community named, colony one, [they] will feel one in his own house and before the pride of knowing himself owner and lord of his own house there is no communist idea."⁴⁰⁵ All forms of development took on the context of the Cold War as the fight against communism figured into the reconstruction effort of Chile as it recovered from the 1960 Chilean earthquake and struggled against a failing economy, housing issues, and a now migrating working-class community into cities.

⁴⁰³ Canisius, 236.

⁴⁰⁴ Canisius, 236.

⁴⁰⁵ Canisius, 236.

The West German took special interest in the reconstruction of Valdivia because of its German culture. Valdivia had over a hundred-year history of German immigrants establishing and being prominent figures of the city. Names such as Anwandter and Kunstmann rivaled those of Hernández and Martínez as the German immigrants helped the Chilean government establish southern Chile since the mid-1800s into industrial and agricultural prominence. West German officials took an active role in Valdivia's reconstruction effort as they promised to help its German community. By June 1, the Interior Minister of West Germany, Gerhard Schroeder, and other West German delegates toured Valdivia with Chile's Interior Minister Dr. Sótero del Río. They paid special attention on the reconstruction of the Local German school, the German Institute Carlos Anwandter, the San Francisco Convention, the German Hospital and the Phoenix Arena. Their aid for Valdivia amounted to 100,000 German Marcos while another 900,000 went to southern Chile.⁴⁰⁶ West German effort aimed at helping *Valdivianos* reconstruct symbols of their German identity, which in part lay in the capitalistic entrepreneurship that helped the Chilean government establish southern Chile. During the Cold War, even benign forms of aid such as this generous grant from the West Germans, took on forms of small aggressions against marxist ideology.

US AID

Aid from the US came from various entities and showed a united front to rebuild and confront the redevelopment of southern Chile. Donations arrived in many forms and from different people. For example, the president of IBM, or the International Business Machines Corporation, Arthur K. Watson personally donated fifty thousand dollars to Alessandri and Chile

⁴⁰⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Alemania planificará reconstrucción de Valdivia con Ayuda de su pueblo." June 1, 1960.

to help reconstruct the damaged areas.⁴⁰⁷ Some US cities adopted Chilean cities to concentrate aid as in the case of the city of Lansing Michigan, which adopted Valdivia. The Mayor of Lansing, Ralph Cregg, put a plan in place to send money, cloths, medicine, and other necessary items for the city as the local Red Cross and Churches collected items to send to Valdivia.⁴⁰⁸ While the city of Lansing Michigan adopted Valdivia as a sign of human compassion, other entities, including industrial companies used aid as an investment. On August 3, 1960, Walter Muelle, Chilean ambassador to the US, sent a list to the minister of foreign affairs of companies that sent aid to Chile in the following months after the earthquake and tsunami. These companies included The Anaconda Company, Anglo-Lautaro Nitrate Corporation, Braden Copper Company, Chemical Bank New York Trust Co, and First National Bank of Boston to name a few. These innocuous gestures of aid had purpose in the context of the Cold War; they signaled interest in development in Chile as well aggression against communist ideology. With Alessandri at the helm of the Chilean state, these companies hoped that these symbols of giving would jockey them in front of the line to any future assets Alessandri and Chile would relieve from their control. The individual and personal outpouring tackled development in a benevolent fashion that sought to conceal sides during a bipolar era, while in fact aid formed part of the Cold War narrative.

Multinational organizations found ways to aid Chile through bilateral channels that negated the Cold War narrative. For example, in April 1959, the Organization of American States agreed on establishing the Inter-American Development Bank which sought to aid developing countries through indirect loans to internal institutions. It was opportunist that when

⁴⁰⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "El presidente Alessandri recibió Ayuda de la IBM." June 3, 1960.

⁴⁰⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Ciudad de Lansing, EE. UU. adoptó a Valdivia para volcar su ayuda." June 22, 1960.

the earthquake and tsunami struck, the then newly elected President of the bank, Felipe Herrera, was also Chilean. However, as Herrera states “The Interamerican Bank will not lend its support to Chile in its task to reconstruct.”⁴⁰⁹ Instead, the Bank’s reconstruction loan would arrive in a package to other institutions as credit and will not arrive until after October first, 1960, when the Inter-American Development Bank officially starts its banking operation. This was a great disappointment to Alessandri and his government that needed the funds as soon as possible to start the reconstruction process. However, it was the Interamerican Bank and structure to help countries through banking institutions, which became highly political and further stagnated reconstruction as shown in later chapters. The bank’s financial structure consisted of 1 billion dollars, which Latin America invested 60 percent and the United States 40 percent. At the Press Conference, President Herrera emphasized that the bank could invest in private and public capitals to promote economic development. Southern Chile’s stagnant agriculture and now in the aftermath of the earthquake proved as a great candidate for these developmental loans. Instead, the Inter-American Development Bank was to develop countries through education, housing, medical, and infrastructure. At the end of the press conference, President Herrera expressed that he wants to see southern Chile reconstructed and economically stabilized as soon as possible.⁴¹⁰ In a more direct form of immediate aid, US Ambassador to Chile Walter Howe announced that the US granted ten million dollars in loans that would help with the aftermath.⁴¹¹ In the context of the Cold War, the US politicians believed that economic development meant that a country would less likely become communist. With a natural event such as the 1960 Chilean earthquake,

⁴⁰⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “El Banco Interamericano no prestara su apoyó al chile en la tarea de la reconstrucción.” June 2, 1960.

⁴¹⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “El Banco Interamericano no prestara su apoyó al chile en la tarea de la reconstrucción.” June 2, 1960.

⁴¹¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Ayuda a industrias otorgaran las instituciones de crédito.” June 16, 1960.

it gave United States the opportunity to inject their economic development plan and influence Chile's development.

Communist Aid

Most of this aid arrived from Cuba, as Fidel Castro sent top medical professionals, nurses, and medical supplies to help. *El Siglo* reported that “a plane has arrived with Cuban women ready to help.”⁴¹² With them, they brought 13,5000 lbs of medications and news that a Cuban ship carrying 3.5 tones in cloths will arrive next week.⁴¹³ *Clarín* reported different figures, stating that steamboat *La Habana*, was reportedly on its way with 700 tons of aid, including sugar.⁴¹⁴ Whatever, the correct amount may be, it was direct aid by the Cubans and its government. Fidel Castro himself was directly involved in the Communist effort as Manuel Zamorano, reporter, and a professor of journalism at the University of Chile reported, stated that Fidel worked for three hours helping box relief packages for Chile.⁴¹⁵ Salvador Allende visited Valdivia and other parts of the region with the President of Medical College of Cuba. Dr. Fernández Melo traveled and represented a group of doctors helping the injured in the region.⁴¹⁶ The aid from Cuba continued well into September of 1960 as congressional records indicated that the Minister of the Interior was at the port of Valparaíso, waiting to greet the steamboat *La Habana*, as it brought another load of aid for those affected by the events in the south.⁴¹⁷ Optics, instead of reality, fueled the cold war narrative as aid became politized.

⁴¹² *El Siglo: Periódico Para El Campo*. (Santiago: Impr. El Siglo, 1940), col. “Llego avión con ayuda de las mujeres cubanas.” May 30, 1960.

⁴¹³ *El Siglo: Periódico Para El Campo*., col. “Llego avión con ayuda de las mujeres cubanas.”

⁴¹⁴ *Clarín*, Diarios Chilenos Chile Santiago (Santiago, Chile: s.n., 1954), col. “Gigantesca ayuda ha enviado Fidel y su pueblo: Emociona amistad Cubana.” June 1, 1960.

⁴¹⁵ *Clarín*, col. “Cuenta el periodista Manuel Zamorano: ‘Tres horas estuvo Fidel Castro haciendo paquetes para chilenos.’”

⁴¹⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Senador Salvador Allende llegó a Valdivia ayer.” June 3, 1960.

⁴¹⁷ Senado, “Sesión 39, Ordinaria En Miércoles 7 de Septiembre de 1960” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, September 7, 1960), 2719, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, https://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/36164/1/S19600907_39.pdf.

Even with Cuba's extensive help, right-wing politicians criticized communist aid to downplay its impact. On June 8, 1960, *La Unión* reported that "A serious incident occurred between the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Luis Corvalán, and the deputy, Antonio Zamorano, when the parliamentarian criticized the Soviet Union because it had arrived late with his help, and the communist politician replied."⁴¹⁸ Corvalán tried to answer Zamorano, but those present in the meeting ended the situation and separated the two. Communist aid was not uniformly delivered, arriving when it can. As aforementioned, Cuba was the biggest aid contributor to Chile, but China also tried to help in their own ways, even if small and modest.

Other Communist countries also sent aid, but to a lesser extent, showing solidarity with working class. The tsunami and the earthquake of May 22 affected the working class the most, as it hindered many people's ability to earn a living as they struggled to find homes for their families. On June 24, 1960 Chinese Mariners arrived in the port of Corral, which at that point had started functioning normally. The Chinese sailed on the nationalist ship, "Unión Bancker," and unloaded 500 tons of fertilizer for southern agriculture. For the "Unión Bancker," the routine docking at Corral was repeated every two to three months; this time the shipmates were surprised to see the destruction and knowing that Corral had been hit, they brought with them a small donation of three sacks of cloths for the people in need.⁴¹⁹ While not significant in aid, they showed solidarity to their comrades in Corral, which many residents leaned towards the left and formed part of unions. While more perception than reality, communist aid made an impact on Valdivia and the working class as representatives from the left-wing parties arrived to not only access the situation, but also direct aid.

⁴¹⁸ *La Unión* (La Unión, Chile: La Unión : [s.n.], 1936), "Se enviará el proyecto el sábado próximo al Congreso: así se acordó en sesión de esta mañana con S.E." June 8, 1960.

⁴¹⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Marineros chinos ayudan en Corral." June 25, 1960.

Communist aid fared way less than aid from the United States and its allies, but in the context of the Cold War, any form of aid materialized into a politicalized weapon against the opposing side, in this case Alessandri and his economic model. In the larger context of the Cold War, Alessandri's economic model represented the ECLA, US interest, and capitalism as he championed private enterprise as a driving force behind development. While communist aid did not rival the amount the US and its allies, along with the variety and longevity of the aid, its optics had a longer term affect on the population.

The People-to-People Program

The recovery and reconstruction of southern Chile continued into the decade solidifying it as a political battle ground between capitalism and communism. Technocrats from California took a leading role in rehabilitating southern Chile and Valdivia as they took on the call from Washington. On October 28, 1960, the San Francisco Mayor, George Christopher welcomed a group called the Chilean Earthquake Rehabilitation Committee.⁴²⁰ In a letter written by the Chilean Consul, Manuel Tello T. to the Minister of External Affairs, Carlos Martinez Sotomayor, Tello states that San Francisco had become interested in Valdivia by the various newspaper articles Donald Canter published throughout the year.⁴²¹ A Boston Industrialist who had made his fortune in plastics, Mark Bortman, headed the committee as well the "People to People Program."⁴²² The People to People program started under Eisenhower's administration, proposing collaboration between developing countries and the United States through an interchange of intellectuals, or better identified, technocrats. The program under Eisenhower had

⁴²⁰ "Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile - USA" (Santiago, Chile, n.d.), October 28, 1961, Fondo Países, <https://minrel.gob.cl/archivo-general-historico/biblioarchivo/2010-05-24/134117.html>.

⁴²¹ "Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile - USA," October 28, 1960.

⁴²² United States Congress, *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ... Congress* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 11353.

its official purpose of pacifying and easing tensions through a cultural exchange. President Kennedy believed that this program “Through personal relationships – people to people – curiosity can be fulfilled by a sense of knowledge, cynicism can give way to trust, and the warmth of human friendship can be kindled.”⁴²³ During the 60s the program further developed and after many bureaucratic hurdles within the US, California eventually got its chance to help Chile and Valdivia. It was without a doubt, while peaceful in nature, it was a direct attack on communist ideology spreading in Chile as it was made clear at the San Francisco meeting, when Bortman referenced Russia as an adversary. The Chilean Consul, Tello, described Mr. Bortman as a magnificent speaker, but expressed a “strange subtlety,” which during the meeting, he stated “that while Russia reached physical heights, the United States conquered spiritual heights,” ending his improvisation by offering all his influences and collaboration from Washington.⁴²⁴ As Tello witnessed in the meeting, unbeknownst to Chilean officials, receiving aid from foreign countries involved them in the Cold War.

Rehabilitating southern Chile after the 1960 Chilean earthquake and tsunami went beyond Chilean politics. Foreign aid opened the doors to ideologically driven forms of reconstruction that conformed to western ideology of economic capitalistic development. However, at the core of reconstructing southern Chile involved the centering of the working class in the cities. Concentrating likeminded people in housing communities provided the means for unification and opportunities voicing their opinions toward politicians that cared. There is a dichotomy of reconstruction in southern Chile; while technocrats hoped to engineer a Valdivia

⁴²³ Congress, 11353.

⁴²⁴ Manuel Tello T, “Departamento administrativo sub-departamento de Comunic. Informa sobre reunión Comité Rehabilitación Terremoto de Chile.” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, October 28, 1960), October 28, 1960, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, <https://minrel.gob.cl/archivo-general-historico/biblioarchivo/2010-05-24/134117.html>.

and southern Chile with an ability to produce, it also afforded the working class an opportunity to unite. Rehabilitation also meant a reconfiguration of the city, population, and the politics of southern Chile.

The Struggle over the Chile-California Program

California did not get involved in the immediate recovery effort as US politics stalled what was then the “People to People Program.” The idea of the “Chile-California Program” had its infancy in early 1961 as Lionel Steinberg, a successful California farmer and then Cochair of the Democratic Farmers Advisory Committee of California wrote a personal letter to President Kennedy discussing interest getting involved in foreign relations. Steinberg concerned himself with the image of the United States, believing that in “too many parts of the world the United States image is of a nation obsessed with the fear of Communism.”⁴²⁵ He proposed a new program entitled “Department for World Development,” or the “World Development Agency,” with the “expressed goal of bringing half the world from the Middle ages into the twentieth century.”⁴²⁶ Chile was perfectly suited for this type of aid because its familiarity with technocrats, as well having an underdeveloped, and underperforming agricultural sector. Opposite to Chile lay California, the perfect candidate to provide non-ideological, nonintrusive technical assistance because of its geographical similarities and its economic successes.⁴²⁷ One adviser overstated this fact as Mr. Fulton “believed that Chile and California shared more common problems and had greater historical ties than any two areas on earth, thus presenting the

⁴²⁵ Lionel Steinberg, “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Letter to President Kennedy from Lionel Steinberg” (Farmers for Kennedy - Johnson, January 26, 1961), 1, California Archives.

⁴²⁶ Steinberg, 1.

⁴²⁷ Dick Kline, “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Report to Governor Brown by Dick Kline,” March 11, 1963, 8, California Archives.

perfect combination for a pilot program.”⁴²⁸ Steinberg characterized this program as a way of revitalizing “our efforts toward offering underdeveloped nations the services of our technicians, scientist, administrators, and engineers to help nations willing to participate in over-all progress to build up their own resources and productivity.”⁴²⁹ However, he does not underlay the fact that this project is still a mission against communism as he largely wants this to be about “peace and freedom.”⁴³⁰ The idea of the Chile-California mission is to put non-threatening capitalistic minds on the ground, working side by side with rural farmers. Steinberg hoped that “many Americans who spent their lives in a competitive economic society have an unfulfilled missionary-like desire,...to contribute some small part of themselves to mankind...[he was] certain we would receive thousands of qualified applicants.”⁴³¹ This program had the same idea as the “people-to-people” program, however, it paired a country to a state similar to its environment and economy, this is what became known as the “Chile-California Program.”

The letter for Steinberg to President Kennedy gave birth to the “Chile-California Program,” taking over three years to develop. The program lay dormant for over three years as the Alliance for Progress took shape and the “people-to-people” program made little strides. Both programs faulted because of their scope and size; Alliance for Progress was too large in general, helping many Latin American countries with financial aid. It also had the stigma as a form of fighting communism with financial ties to the United States. The small and little known “people-to-people” program faired too small to make an impact, nevertheless, it was the precursor to the Chile-California program.

⁴²⁸ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. Feburary - December 1963; Historical Report,” March 31, 1965, 1, California Archives.

⁴²⁹ Steinberg, “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. Feburary - December 1963; Letter to President Kennedy from Lionel Steinberg,” 2.

⁴³⁰ Steinberg, 1.

⁴³¹ Steinberg, 2.

A few of California's advisors highlighted the struggling efforts the United States had in Chile, as the country slowly leaned left. In a report, written by the Chief Deputy Directory of the State Department of Agriculture, W.J. Kuhrt in March of 1963, he depicted the flaws of various U.S. programs in Chile while also characterizing the social landscape. He references the massive migration from rural to city as "many of these workers have moved away from the large farms and gone to the large cities, especially Santiago and Valaparíso."⁴³² He emphasized the danger that migration brought to US interest as "this group of people – about 140,000 around Santiago – also are being actively worked on by Communist agents and our own Peace Corps people, but the Communist, by selling the idea of a better life, are quite a bit ahead so far, according to the statements by the Peace Corps people."⁴³³ According to Kuhrt, the communist threat extended to urban areas, as many small farmers with low economic status had been approached and "actively influenced by Communist agents."⁴³⁴ For Kuhrt, the communist influence directly affected the productivity of these new landed farmers, stating that "as a result, there is a low productivity per worker, a great deal of malingering, and in many cases they do not constitute a reliable and efficient work force."⁴³⁵ While the Chile-California program tried to change the facade of US foreign relations, its mission stayed the same: fight communist threat. This was certainly a reminder that while aid sought to truly help people, on the ground, there was still an ideological battle between communism and capitalist. Dick Kline echoed this sentiment as he cautioned California's, Governor Brown about the risk of approving the Chile-California Program. Kline stated that "it is predictable that the Communist will seize upon the Californians

⁴³² W.J. Kuhrt, "Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Report on Trip to Chile February 23, 1963 - March 7, 1963.," March 7, 1963, 6, California Archives.

⁴³³ Kuhrt, 6.

⁴³⁴ Kuhrt, 5.

⁴³⁵ Kuhrt, 6.

for vituperative attack.”⁴³⁶ Furthermore, “this has been the experience of the past when the active Chilean Communist jumped upon specialized U.S. missions such as ours.”⁴³⁷ The 1960 earthquake and the changing political environment opened opportunities for the working class as they gained concessions in the years following the earthquake. For the United States, the Chile-California program matured into a pilot program that sought to soften the strides the left made in the aftermath of the earthquake, however, their mission took on a long approach.

The Chile-California program went through many people, studies, and negotiations before the United States and California approved and implemented the program. In a seminar on agrarian reform, the report identified two major problems hindering southern agricultural development; first was the lack of a sufficient tax collection from the big landed farmers and a transportation network of roads between rural areas and city centers. The report stated that “the southern zones assume greater importance in direct proportion to development of roads and improvement of transportation system since poor communications and inaccessibility during several months out of each year have served to retard development.”⁴³⁸ While the report does not have a publication date, it can be assumed that it was written around 1961 as the National Agricultural Organization of Chile geared up for an agrarian reform. The Chilean government push for an agrarian reform signaled an opportunity for California to get involved in foreign relations, but there was a lot of hesitation because of the program’s novelty.

California’s hesitation in the involvement of the Chilean project steamed from Chile’s ambiguous future and US autocratic hold on Chilean aid. In Kuhrt’s field reports of March 7,

⁴³⁶ Dick Kline, “Chile-California Program Records: Preliminary and Master Contract Records. 1963-1966: Dick Cline Letter to Governor Brown,” February 18, 1963, 5, California Archives.

⁴³⁷ Kline, 5.

⁴³⁸ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Latin American USOM: Seminar on Agrarian Reform,” n.d., 2, California Archives.

1963, he emphasized the communist gains in the countryside and in the city. He further this notion by stating that “it is difficult to know what could be done on a short run basis to improve the political situation, and to prevent a communist victory in the election next year.”⁴³⁹ For Kuhrt, the US mission overseas was still to beat the Communist and the US foreign aid failed to repulse the left. In a letter written to Governor of California, Pat Brown, advisor Dick Kline stated that “The United States has provided Chile with \$650,000,000 in foreign aid,” adding, “is Chile any great a friend of the United States now and are the Chilean people any better off economically?”⁴⁴⁰ Kline is critical of the United States AID Mission, Agency of International Development, which he states is being “carried out in Chile in a clumsy and ineffective manner” while being ranked 3rd in US aid recipients.⁴⁴¹ Kline agreed with Kuhrt’s analysis, even further emphasizing that “Chile is drifting closer to Communism and the people are no better off, in some respects worse off. In fact, “the nation may go Communist at its next elections,” referring to the 1964 presidential elections.⁴⁴² More damaging to US efforts is the lack of recognition of the strides US aid made in bettering Chilean’s lives. Kline notes that there is no pro-America and any time Chileans are asked about the Alliance for Progress it “draws a blank stare.”⁴⁴³ Many Chileans believed that the United States Catholic organizations instead of the US government donated the food to them; leaving many advisors to understand that Chileans do not believe that the United States has made an impact in their daily lives.⁴⁴⁴ Both Kline and Kuhrt reaffirmed that aid from the US and its allies had the opposite effect on Chileans, rather than

⁴³⁹ Kuhrt, “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Report on Trip to Chile February 23, 1963 - March 7, 1963,” 15.

⁴⁴⁰ Kline, “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Report to Governor Brown by Dick Kline,” 2.

⁴⁴¹ Kline, 2.

⁴⁴² Kline, 2.

⁴⁴³ Kline, 6.

⁴⁴⁴ Kline, 6.

opposing communism, they were further helping the leftist cause. While many projects were in the works and slated to start in the following years, they were not far enough along to “represent sufficiently convincing political arguments,” for the working class.⁴⁴⁵ Kuhrt further indicated that “there have been so many plans and promises in past years that did not develop to fruition, that many people will not be easily persuaded.”⁴⁴⁶ The 1960 earthquake and tsunami further heightened the many problems Chile tried to fix since the 1950s, housing, jobs, and food production. Therefore, both the working and middle class needed change, the left offered the most promising solutions. The Chile-California program was one of the US’s last ditch effort on making an economic and political impact on an already left-leaning society.

US foreign aid in Chile failed to accomplish any of their purpose as many programs either failed or strengthened leftist politics. Previous reports further prove that if anything, the financial aid was helping left-leaning politics gain ground in the political arena. US Aid only helped the Chilean government stay afloat as “the United States aid program does not consist of much more than providing huge transfusion of dollars for the Chilean budget in an effort to stave off bankruptcy.”⁴⁴⁷ In particular, southern Chile alone received 100,000,000 in loans for the reconstruction effort.⁴⁴⁸ Furthermore, Alessandri’s political economic structure hindered aid from reaching the most impoverished because as Kline insinuates, the money ended up in the pockets of the rich and left the country “for the comfort of overseas banks.”⁴⁴⁹ Moreover, he identifies the most blatant atrocity in the misuse of foreign aid as Kline explains that much of the food aid distributed by the Chilean Catholic Relief is given to people not entitled to it, such as

⁴⁴⁵ Kuhrt, “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Report on Trip to Chile February 23, 1963 - March 7, 1963,” 15.

⁴⁴⁶ Kuhrt, 15.

⁴⁴⁷ Kline, “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Report to Governor Brown by Dick Kline,” 13.

⁴⁴⁸ Kline, 13.

⁴⁴⁹ Kline, 13.

inmates of penal institutions, members of the clergy, and students at wealthy boarding school while the poor are required to pay for it and attend mass.⁴⁵⁰ These foreign aid programs did little to accomplish their mission of developing third world countries, helping the working class, and fending off the threat of communism; instead US foreign aid incinerated the leftist politicians as they won more seats in the government, promising to appease the public's demand for public services.

Last Ditch Effort in Chile

President Kennedy understood that their efforts in Chile made little impact in the lives of the Chileans and the development of the country. In early 1963, President Kennedy expressed this view and pronounced that US foreign aid in Chile were "largely unsatisfactory and unsuitable."⁴⁵¹ For the President, the Chile-California program represented, "a bold new plan in the field of foreign relations whereby certain states within the United States might form special partnerships with selected countries for the purpose of providing more effective technical assistance to cooperative, developing nations and creating warmer, more productive and more personal human relationships."⁴⁵² During 1963, the Chile-California program went through negotiations between representatives of California and President Kennedy. The main opposing view lay on the leadership of the program as the President and the AID Mission refused to relinquish control of the program while California wanted to directly hire and work with the staff. In addition to the public funding afforded to them by the US government, the Chile-California program also had private California funding from businesses. As the report stated, "in

⁴⁵⁰ Kline, 16.

⁴⁵¹ "Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Historical Report," 1.

⁴⁵² "Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Historical Report," 1.

the mid-1964, Silbaugh established the California-Chile Fund, a non-profit corporation with tax-exempt status, with the hope the fund could be used to implement social impact projects unrelated to the official aspects of the program.”⁴⁵³ After three task force committees visited the White House, the Chile-California became a joint venture, financed by the United States and the Chilean Government, on a dollar per dollar match basis.⁴⁵⁴ The state of California would not have to contribute any money, however, they were granted their main wish of administering and staffing the programs with only native Californians. Months after its approval, President Kennedy’s assassination resulted in major changes to the program and its originally intended leadership as California struggled to keep control of the program.

The death of President Kennedy changed the character of the Chile-California program as US government official sought to regain control of the program. A report indicated that “there is no doubt that the death of President Kennedy virtually eliminated the top-level support of the program’s quasi-independent status since such independence and flexibility was a part of the late Presidents’ personal concept of the program and unusual interest in Latin America.”⁴⁵⁵ As the program gained momentum so did its interest by the US foreign AID department. The biggest problem for California and the program was one foreseen by administrators: foreign aid people in both Washington and Chile became interested.⁴⁵⁶ The administrators complained that Washington AID had not kept their promise of letting California independently run the program as they hired personnel and added administrative detail which hindered the California

⁴⁵³ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Historical Report,” 9.

⁴⁵⁴ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Historical Report,” 9.

⁴⁵⁵ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Historical Report,” 11.

⁴⁵⁶ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Historical Report,” 12.

administration flexibility.⁴⁵⁷ Furthermore, “an attempt was made by AID/Chile to enfold California technicians into the AID structure through communications and conferences to which the Director was not a part of and was never apprised.”⁴⁵⁸ California wanted to prove that a “decentralization” of foreign assistance could inject a more personal approach to foreign relations.⁴⁵⁹ AID fought against the decentralization and in many cases sought to control and maneuver technicians towards programs they worked on in Chile. AID had already failed and as one AID official admitted, “the Chile-California Program was planned as a last ditch effort to test an entirely new concept, a new approach – even an amateur approach, if you will – to our foreign relations problem....”⁴⁶⁰ Certainly by 1964, the Chile-California program was threatened by Washington interest while the Chile-California gained minor success of recruiting talented people willing to make a personal difference in Chilean’s lives. The program almost lost its original purpose and vision Kennedy and California officials proposed, but California administrators sought, not to change Chile, but help its development. California’s primary aim focused on changing Chilean agriculture.

The United States number one threat in the rehabilitating southern Chile and its fight against communism lay in the issue of agriculture. California was well equipped to help Chilean agricultural develop as California agreed that this was the main issue plaguing Chile’s economic development.⁴⁶¹ The third California task force held the unanimous “opinion that the agricultural

⁴⁵⁷ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Historical Report,” 13.

⁴⁵⁸ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Historical Report,” 14.

⁴⁵⁹ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Historical Report,” 15.

⁴⁶⁰ Kline, “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Report to Governor Brown by Dick Kline.”

⁴⁶¹ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Chile-California Program of Technical Cooperation Report of Third California Task Force,” January 1964, 1, California Archives.

economy of the country must be immediately vitalized if Chile is to attend her deserved place in the sun within the near future.”⁴⁶² The California task force believed that while the problem was grounded in agriculture, it also extended into “education, transportation, water resources development, law enforcement, financing, and governmental policy relating to such things as taxes, tariffs, and land reform.”⁴⁶³ They decided to tackle agriculture through three focused areas that consisted of marketing, production, and education and culture. California experts argued that marketing was the main thing hindering Chile’s development at home and abroad, as monopiles “controlled marketing conditions and prevented growers from receiving just prices for their product.”⁴⁶⁴ The California task force also sought to organize farmers, while culturally, Chilean farmers had a tradition of working independently. However, Chilean organization already starting forming cooperatives through CORFO, Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario (INDAP), the Instituto de Educación Rural (IER), and the Corporación de la Reforma Agraria (CORA) to combat old institutional orders that hindered agricultural growth.⁴⁶⁵ Chile’s economic future and the United States fight against communism strongly lay in the development of southern Chile’s agriculture as it recovered from the devastating 1960 earthquake and tsunami, and sought to incorporate the downtrodden rural people into its cities and government.

California held the expertise to help southern Chile develop into an agricultural machine. An advisor to Governor Brown took a trip in February 1963 to study Chile’s struggling economy. Dick Kline pointed to the rural development in Chile as the basis for California’s

⁴⁶² “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Chile-California Program of Technical Cooperation Report of Third California Task Force,” 1.

⁴⁶³ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Chile-California Program of Technical Cooperation Report of Third California Task Force,” 1.

⁴⁶⁴ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Chile-California Program of Technical Cooperation Report of Third California Task Force,” 3.

⁴⁶⁵ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Chile-California Program of Technical Cooperation Report of Third California Task Force,” 4. The ability of further organizing farmers was a main point of contention in Frei’s Agrarian Reform.

development. Kline argued that California could offer different assistance than AID, as AID already had many technicians on the ground, but California offered talent in “management, operation, and development of resources, both human and natural, to help the Chilean people.”⁴⁶⁶ One of Kline’s lasting advise to Governor Brown was on tourism as southern Chile, became centers for eco-tourism. Kline viewed Chile as an endless opportunity for tourism, with the natural environment that could become national parks with the help of the state. These tourist dollars, Kline emphasized, “of course, are just as golden to Chilean economy as exports dollars.”⁴⁶⁷ He hoped that the California mission would keep the public interested in Chile by encouraging California tourist to the country and hopefully resulting in private investment.⁴⁶⁸ Chile’s and California similar natural environments gave California the best knowledge and tools to help Chile’s struggling economy.

The Chile-California Program may not have made an immediate impact, but it did leave an impression. The program survived the 1964 presidential elections and gained private funding after Eduardo Frei took office. James. P. Wilson touted in January of 1965 that “nearly every mail form Chile now brings in new business proposals to be placed before California businessmen,” while Californian businessmen are sending their proposals to their Chilean counterparts.⁴⁶⁹ As interest loomed from various industries, such as agriculture and even the film industry, there was still a trade deficit between Chile and California.⁴⁷⁰ California, at the time, was sending goods valued at 7 million, while Chile was only sending 1 million.⁴⁷¹ The fact

⁴⁶⁶ Kline, “Chile-California Program Records: Preliminary and Master Contrac Records. 1963-1966: Dick Cline Letter to Governor Brown,” 2.

⁴⁶⁷ Kline, 3.

⁴⁶⁸ Kline, 4.

⁴⁶⁹ James P. Wilson, “Chile-California Program Records: Advisory Committee Files 1964 - 1966; Memorandum: Data for Advisory Committe Meeting,” January 19, 1965, 2, California Archives.

⁴⁷⁰ Wilson, 2,3.

⁴⁷¹ Wilson, 5.

remained, the initial problems California set out to fix, non-efficient marketing, inadequate supplies, and “no concerted export expansion program” still plagued the Chilean market by 1965.⁴⁷² However, the Chile-California program did make a positive contribution to US foreign affairs as it represented only 1 percent of U.S. aid to Chile, while drawing much attention and “capturing the imagination, were maybe more important over the long run than dollar contribution alone.”⁴⁷³ The Chile-California program was established as a lasting remedy that sought to bring change to the agricultural industry and southern Chile. The fact is that the 1960 Chilean earthquake roused the need of the rural working class as opportunities dwindled and the central state needed to change the agricultural structure to repair their failing economy. While, in 1970 it was certainly not a forgone conclusion that Chile was going to elect their first Communist President, the Chile-California Program further highlight the fact that for Chile, left-leaning ideologies provided better opportunities for a country dealing with many social issues, including the ramifications of the 1960 Chilean earthquake and tsunami. The California advisers understood that communism was a real option for the Chilean people.⁴⁷⁴

Reconfiguring Construction.

Reconstruction took on the form of reconfiguration of the region and the city. After the 1960 earthquake and tsunami, Valdivia transformed into a different city that took on a secondary role in southern Chile. From an international aspect, Valdivia showed its appreciation and influences as the sector Huachocopihue became Abraham Lincoln. Immediately after President Kennedy was assassinated, officials renamed it Kennedy, which also became the location of the

⁴⁷² Wilson, 5.

⁴⁷³ Robert B. Keating, “Chile-California Program Records: Advisory Committee Files 1964 - 1966; Progress Report: Accomplishments of the Chile-California Program - May 1964 through February 1966.,” March 1, 1966, 24, California Archives.

⁴⁷⁴ Kline, “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Report to Governor Brown by Dick Kline,” 2.

new general hospital.⁴⁷⁵ Jamie Ojeda argues that reconstruction started with the finishing of the new “La Costanera,” Boardwalk. The Japanese had a large part in planning the reconstruction; government officials replaced the old wooden structure with a modern cement boardwalk bringing a new façade to the city and signaling the start of a new era in the city’s life.⁴⁷⁶

Reconstruction also meant the social reconfiguration of the people in the region. With public works concentrated in the city, Valdivia became a center for many campesinos who migrated to the city for resources and homes. The broader centralization of the state also meant a physical centralization of people in the city as many southern Chileans migrated to cities looking for work, homes, and a new life. However, this also afforded the working class an opportunity to unite, and with their newly granted voting rights, passed in 1962, the city along with the nation started leaning towards the left. The following chapters details this transformation, leading to the eventual election of Salvador Allende, an accomplishment for the working class and the eventual result of the 1960 Chilean earthquake.

Chapter 3 Conclusion

The reconstruction of southern Chile generally affected Valdivia’s working class, the factory, port, and agricultural workers that eventually came to the city looking for housing and opportunities. The middle class in Valdivia consisted of small business and factory owners who eventually had the means to move their operation and families out of the city and even the province after the earthquake. With the flight of the middle class, working class needs became more urgent as Valdivia transformed from a hub of industry into an agricultural center; they received housing from the central government and commuted to work wherever they found it, in

⁴⁷⁵ Jaime Hernández Ojeda, *1960: memorias de un desastre*, 1a. ed (Valdivia: Arte Sonoro Austral Ediciones, 2011), 190.

⁴⁷⁶ Hernández Ojeda, 190.

or outside the province. The 1960 earthquake provided an opportunity for President Jorge Alessandri to implement his plan to address the nation's inflation and economic downturn with the incorporation of the working class into Chilean society.

Chapter 4

Alessandri's Presidency and Reforming Chile: The Need for Change

Chapter 4 Introduction

Alessandri's reconstruction effort took on the integration of the Chilean south into the national project by attempting to use the south's land for national economic development and its people to create a true democracy. It is at this time that the politics of Valdivia and the nation started to shift. Specifically in Valdivia, the industrious middle class began to lose power as the working class, from the rural areas, arrived looking for state housing and work. The middle class could not rebuild as the central state lagged on the rebuilding of the south's infrastructure; many companies moved to other cities closer to the Pan-American Highway, either to Temuco, Osorno, or the newly emerging Puerto Montt as it became the new port capital of the south. While Alessandri pushed for left-leaning legislation such as an agrarian reform and suffrage for all, right-leaning parties lost popularity. In fact, the story of Salvador Allende's election in 1970 started during Alessandri's reconstruction of the south as he passed legislation that incorporated the working class into Chile's economy and politics.

The Reconfiguration of Chilean Society

The 1960 Valdivia earthquake started a process of reconfiguration of Chilean society as the earthquakes shattered its urban environments. Working-class Chileans living at the margins of the city or in the rural outskirts, were now compelled not just into the state project of reconstruction through the massive housing developments, but also into Chile's political system. The people that did not have the privilege to evacuate, the poor, relocated to tent cities or barracks; these camps became the new *poblaciones* of the working class and, in most cases, of the struggling, jobless poor. These neighborhoods and the reconfiguration of the city united people with the same socioeconomic background and created a basis for political mobilization. These Valdivian *pobladores* pushed national politics forward towards the progressive politics of

the 1960s, electing Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Communists as their representatives and eventually with the election of Salvador Allende in 1970 as president. The earthquake and the issues surrounding reconstruction emerged as the regional basis for the political revolution, seen in the micro level in southern Chile, most notably in Valdivia. The wants and needs of the working class were magnified by the 1960 Valdivian earthquake and became a crucial and under-examined factor in Chile's 1960 political evolution toward the left.

The earthquake became the basis for the political battle over the nation's future. In the ensuing months after the releasing of Lake Riñihue's waters, political attention turned to the reconstruction effort. When the recovery months were over, May through August when the central state assessed the situation, bodies were counted, the working class found homes in the rumble of old haciendas or, if lucky, the central state and foreign aid provided food and shelter through military camps. The reconstruction of Valdivia and the south became known as the "rehabilitation period," because the earthquake and tsunami were only a microcosm of the economic and environmental problems that plagued Chile, leaving the nation in a troubling state. Alessandri dealt with the rehabilitation of the south and the economic hardship for the rest of his tenure as president. Between 1960 and 1964 the political atmosphere changed as the working and middle classes thrust themselves to the forefront of the economic issue as they looked for "techo y trabajo," (roof and work).⁴⁷⁷ This right, "techo y trabajo," could no longer be ignored due to the many men who roamed the streets of Santiago having made the trek to the capital, leaving their women and children to stay in makeshift shelters in the south. Alessandri spent the remaining years of his administration instilling laws that were once thought impossible, the

⁴⁷⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia* (Valdivia: Impr. El Correo de Valdivia, 1895), col. "El proceso de reconstrucción." July 23, 1960.

agrarian and voting reforms, but now deemed necessary as refugees entered the spheres of elites and politicians both in Santiago and other cities across Chile.

The City after the Draining of Lake Riñihue

The earthquake, tsunami, and flooding caused both an environmental and political transformation. Local studies hinted at the brighter side of the damage as a local professor, Dr. Otto Vogel of Austral University of Chile in Valdivia, suggested that the tsunami waters spread clay and slime along with thick sand, helping many agricultural lands.⁴⁷⁸ He stated that the flooding from the waters of Lake Riñihue added to the richness of already fertile soil with large amounts of organic matter and vegetation spread through the area. In the Calle-Calle region, the magnesium and potassium levels doubled. Dr. Vogel argued that overall, the earthquake caused a neutral reaction, changing the environment. However, many agricultural fields remained flooded and banks of rivers eroded from both the floods waters and tsunami. Dr. Vogel presented his study to Mr. Charles Wright of the FAO and at the Second National Congress of Agronomy, which took place between September 22 and 28 in Santiago.⁴⁷⁹ Dr. Vogel's findings showed an optimistic approach as other studies revealed the extensive damage to the agricultural sector.

According to Charles Wright of the FAO, a total of 40,000 hectares of land were lost to environmental factors caused by the 1960 Valdivian earthquake. While Dr. Vogel was more concerned about the quality of the land, the central state, FAO, and farmers viewed the earthquake damage in terms of land loss. The loss of land put political pressure on Alessandri's administration as they sought to get a grip on the agricultural deficiency and, at the same time,

⁴⁷⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La agricultura de la zona se benefició de los sedimentos: concluyó un estudio realizado por el profesor universitario Sr. Otto Vogel." Aug 21, 1960.

⁴⁷⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La agricultura de la zona se benefició de los sedimentos: concluyó un estudio realizado por el profesor universitario Sr. Otto Vogel." Aug 21, 1960.

jump start the national economy. The Department of Conservation and Technical Assistance from the Ministry of Agriculture completed their study by late September 1960.⁴⁸⁰ The study included all affected areas, but in particular the Department of Conservation focused on Lake Pelleifa in the province of Valdivia, where another landslide had changed the dynamics of the landscape. Soil experts stated that “the loss of this national soil [used for agriculture] is not disconnected from previous land use policies, [flexibility] has allowed the development of agricultural colonization in the outskirts of vicinities in very unstable soil types, even under natural conditions.”⁴⁸¹ They added that further research into the new soil matter would have to be studied before implementing new agricultural designations, such as being used either for lumber, livestock, or vegetable farming. The experts from the FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture concluded that the earthquake changed the natural environment of the south, meaning that both the political and social sphere needed to adjust to these environmental changes to make the south economically viable.

The legislative struggle over the law of reconstruction continued into October 1960 as both the left and the right fought not only over the reconstruction for the south, but over an economic plan that could fix Chile’s economy. A law of reconstruction had been in the works since early June 1960, but political struggle over legislation stagnated the law until October. The citizens and politicians of Valdivia concerned themselves with this law since their recovery process started two months after other cities, making them anxious over funding, available machinery, and the possibility of their own reconstruction. On October 3, 1960, the Minister of Economy and Reconstruction, Julio Philippi, visited Luis Alfaro, the director of *El Correo de*

⁴⁸⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Se han perdido casi 40.000 Hectáreas de tierra en el Sur.” Sept 21, 1960.

⁴⁸¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Se han perdido casi 40.000 Hectáreas de tierra en el Sur.” Sept 21, 1960.

Valdivia, and senator Nicanor Allende, to reassure the citizens of Valdivia that the law “will be a powerful instrument in the development and execution of the multiple tasks involved in the reconstruction of the devastated area.”⁴⁸² Unlike the 1939 Chillán Earthquake laws, this law did not seek to create new agencies, but to strengthen, harness, and centralize the exiting agencies to better utilize the granted funds and fulfill all the citizen’s needs. Minister Philippi promised a legislation that would “raise these beautiful and rich regions to a level higher than they had before the catastrophe.”⁴⁸³ While Chile dealt with economic chaos and the ruins in the south, the law sought a careful search for funding from both internal and external sources.

In Santiago, a battle between the left and right raged on in congress over internal taxes while the executive branch pushed for more external loans to help rehabilitate the south. Fundamentally, this battle existed before the earthquake, but the destruction in the south made it imperative for legislators to quickly address all the nation’s problems. Housing shortages, economic stagnation, and infrastructure shortcomings all plagued the nation, and while the earthquake further accentuated these issues, it also accelerated the need for solutions. The Minister of Economy and Reconstruction, Julio Philippi, highlighted some of the proposed changes in the articles of the law in his interview with the director of *El Correo de Valdivia*, Luis Alfaro Segovia. Philippi stated that the law empowered the President to seek new loans abroad while hoping that this funding would “prepare properly the projects of investments and plans of industrial development.”⁴⁸⁴ He further emphasized that the law would strengthen the possibility

⁴⁸² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Observadores de los ejecutivos creen que debe haber más ajustes y cambios a la Ley de Reconstrucción.” Oct 3, 1960.

⁴⁸³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Observadores de los ejecutivos creen que debe haber más ajustes y cambios a la Ley de Reconstrucción.” Oct 3, 1960.

⁴⁸⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Observadores de los ejecutivos creen que debe haber más ajustes y cambios a la Ley de Reconstrucción.” Oct 3, 1960.

for credit for CORFO, CORVI, and the pension institutions.⁴⁸⁵ This law also gave municipalities power to expropriate land for new housing projects, government buildings, and municipal services.⁴⁸⁶ It also included important measures to support industries damaged by the earthquake.⁴⁸⁷ Minister Philippi lastly promised that the law “would contain rules on the aid of the municipalities, Fire Brigades, Trade Unions, etc., and establishes many other provisions of general interest, which will be too long to list.”⁴⁸⁸ Without specificity to the effects of this law on Valdivia, Minister Philippi promised a comprehensive reconstruction that would not only fix the south, but the entire nation.

The destruction of the south created an opportunity to fix the nation’s problems as tax reform and foreign loans provided new funding sources not available before the earthquake. Legislators concentrated on a national perspective instead of focusing on simply rehabilitating the south. The legislation for an agrarian reform, just like the Ley de Reconstrucción, evolved into a legislation that sought to incorporate and boost the national economy instead of fixing the long failing agricultural sector. More specifically, Chile’s Agrarian Reform sought to provide jobs and feed the nation instead of importing many of its food which it had done since the 1950s. At the cusp of introducing an agrarian legislation, the Minister of Agriculture Mr. Manuel Casaneuva addressed the national concern of inflation expressing that “nobody ignores that inflation has affected agriculture and the country’s economy, it is why the Government has made it a policy of achieving stabilization as the only possibility of establishing a certain basis for solid

⁴⁸⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, “Observadores de los ejecutivos creen que debe haber más ajustes y cambios a la Ley de Reconstrucción.” Oct 3, 1960.

⁴⁸⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Observadores de los ejecutivos creen que debe haber más ajustes y cambios a la Ley de Reconstrucción.” Oct 3, 1960.

⁴⁸⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Observadores de los ejecutivos creen que debe haber más ajustes y cambios a la Ley de Reconstrucción.” Oct 3, 1960.

⁴⁸⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Observadores de los ejecutivos creen que debe haber más ajustes y cambios a la Ley de Reconstrucción.” Oct 3, 1960.

development in all national activities.”⁴⁸⁹ Mr. Casaneuva implied that agriculture and the nation’s economy were tied together and that one could not be fixed without the other.

Agriculture in Chile was concentrated in the center; the south had been unharnessed for decades, since the strongest agricultural lobbyists mostly advocated for the Central Valley.

Rehabilitation of the south opened the doors to integrating southern agriculture into the nation’s economy. Reconstruction meant harnessing the south’s agriculture as the earthquake gave the central government an opportunity to aggressively involve itself in the restructuring and reconfiguration of the south through expropriation of land and building infrastructure.

Alessandri’s reconstruction project aimed at providing homes for the region’s displaced in the city of Valdivia and creating jobs to fix the national economic stagnation. The Intendent (Mayor) of Valdivia, Victor Vogt, reiterated the idea of “techo y trabajo” not only as a motto for Valdivia, but rather for the entire nation. In late October, Intendant Vogt updated the public on the progress of the reconstruction planning. He highlighted two main points: the need to construct more homes for those stuck in the camps and streets, and the reconstruction of infrastructure to draw businesses into the city. Valdivia’s sluggish and uncertain reconstruction drove many companies away. Intendant Vogt particularly stated that the beer companies did not promise to rebuild in Valdivia, but rather eyed construction in Osorno and Concepción instead.⁴⁹⁰ Infrastructure and housing became imperative to the reconstruction of the city as it dealt with the conundrum of people arriving while businesses left.

⁴⁸⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Gobierno trabajará en una Reforma Agraria con Mirada Nacional.” Oct 16, 1960.

⁴⁹⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Techo y Obra reflejan los problemas vitales de Valdivia.” Oct 30, 1960.

Ley 14.171

Legislators in Santiago agreed, after a lengthy public battle, on a reconstruction law in late October of 1960, hoping the law would both rehabilitate the south and address Chile's economic problems. The reconstruction law, Ley 14.171, was officially signed and released to the public on October 26, 1960. The main objective of this law set forth the powers of the president to acquire more external loans and renamed the Ministry of Economy to the Ministry of Economy, Development, and Reconstruction. The new role for the Ministry of the Economy would incorporate the economy into the reconstruction process.⁴⁹¹ Under this umbrella, CORFO and CORVI lost some autonomy as both agencies now had to work with this newly renamed ministry for funding. Sociologist Magdalena Gil-Ureta argues, "this was more of a way to hide state growth than actually to avoid it...but it was also a way to control the effect of the quake in state bureaucracy."⁴⁹² Alessandri's government did create one new organization named the Committee of Economic Cooperation and Reconstruction (*Comité de Cooperación Económica y Reconstrucción*, COPERE). This was a committee led by the Minister of Economics and Ministry of the Treasury, joined by the Minister of Public Works, Minister of Mining and Agriculture, along with the Vice President and the CEO of CORFO, and Vice President of CORVI and the Director of Budgets who also had seats on the committee.⁴⁹³ These moves all fell in line with the government's attempt to create a stronger central government while integrating all of Chile, meaning people and territory, into its politics and economy. The battle over funding stalled the approval of the law as the left fought to lower external debt and to tax

⁴⁹¹ Magdalena Sofia Gil-Ureta, "Catastrophe and State Building: Lessons from Chile's Seismic History" (Columbia University, September 2016), 132, Phd Diss, <https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8H995DN>.

⁴⁹² Gil-Ureta, 132.

⁴⁹³ Gil-Ureta, 134.

the rich. In the end, the left had to give up one major concession to the president for the approval of the reconstruction law—the taking on national debt.

The Law of Reconstruction allowed President Alessandri more financial power to deal with both the earthquake and the economic reconstruction of the country. Title II, Article 7 gave the president the power to incur more national debt, a contentious issue in national politics. As the president of the nation, the law gave Alessandri permission to “directly make contracts with foreign governments, state organizations, or with banking or financial institutions both foreign or domestic, short- and long-term loans.”⁴⁹⁴ The Central Bank of Chile would be directly in charge of distributing these loans; however, they would be limited only by the contracts it received and could not exceed 500 million dollars.⁴⁹⁵ To put this amount into perspective and to show the severity of the earthquake damage, in 1960, Chile held a GDP of 4.11 US billion dollars and a national debt of 58.3 million. Therefore, allowing Alessandri to take on an additional debt of 500 million US dollars was an exorbitant amount during extraordinary times.⁴⁹⁶ In addition to these powers, article 10 allowed for the president to forgive taxes on companies importing needed material during the earthquake.⁴⁹⁷ The Law of Reconstruction also permitted loans to be granted in foreign currency as the domestic economy battled with national inflation.⁴⁹⁸ The Central Bank issued loans in US dollars to at least have a currency that was stable to reconstruct the south, but United States and its financial institutions also emerged as the main lenders.

⁴⁹⁴ Ministerio de Hacienda, “Ley 14.171 - Ley de Reconstrucción” (Gobierno de Chile, October 26, 1960), 3, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, <https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=27714>.

⁴⁹⁵ Ministerio de Hacienda, 3.

⁴⁹⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Los precios de los artículos esenciales han sido regulados por el gobierno.” May 28, 1960.

⁴⁹⁷ Ministerio de Hacienda, “Ley 14.171 - Ley de Reconstrucción,” 44.

⁴⁹⁸ Ministerio de Hacienda, 3.

US aid developed into a combative issue that also affected national politics and reconstruction. US aid arrived in Chile with the purpose of helping citizens rebuild their homes and cities. However, contextualizing this amid the Cold War, even during a cooling-off period between Russia and the United States, tensions still existed. As mentioned in the previous chapter, aid evolved into forms of aggression between communists and capitalists as both sides sought to help the most in need. Many struggling citizens took aid from the US with a grain of salt; rather than seeing it as a humanitarian mission, they viewed it as propaganda against communist ideology, intensifying the Cold War in the day-to-day processes of rebuilding not only their homes, but in their lives. Further, the right was able to negotiate article 16, which allowed for the president to accept donations and foreign government aid.⁴⁹⁹ While the President won many concessions, the ability to take on a large national deficit and accept foreign aid was a huge win for the right. However, under this law, left-leaning political groups in return were able to curtail blatant abuses of the rich by utilizing their wealth to rebuild the country through reformed tax laws.

The Law of Reconstruction put responsibility on the wealthy to contribute their part in the reconstruction of the south and the general expansion of the Chilean economy. On May 10, 1954, the national government imposed a tax of five percent on land and income; however, its collection of the tax had been largely inefficient. In the midst of this emergency, Congress imposed another tax increase on land and income, this time eighteen percent under Title III, article 19 of the Law of Reconstruction.⁵⁰⁰ Furthermore, Congress also instituted article 20, which went after large land owners, forcing them to rent or lease their land for only twelve

⁴⁹⁹ Ministerio de Hacienda, 6.

⁵⁰⁰ Ministerio de Hacienda, 6.

percent of the market value.⁵⁰¹ For the consumer, article 21 increased sales tax from ten to fifteen percent.⁵⁰² Unlike previous changes to tax laws, Congress took tax collection seriously as both the south started reconstruction and the President tried to fix the national inflation problem. To help with tax collection, they also implemented a tax penalty under article 28, which stated that if the citizens of Chile did not pay the adjusted tax within sixty days, they would be charged a thirty percent surcharge.⁵⁰³ However, landowners affected by the earthquake and tsunami from Ñuble to Chiloé were exempted from the tax fines.

The Law of Reconstruction set in motion an evolutionary change in politics. Congress wrote into law a remedy that both sought to rehabilitate the south and reinvigorate the national economy. The Law also set a timeline for Alessandri to mend the many ailments of the nation with the large concessions Congress gave him under this legislation. The law was a seminal document because it gave Alessandri the rest of his term without many constraints to fix the housing and economic problems plaguing the nation. The earthquake's destruction tested Chile's right-wing groups and Alessandri's ability to run the country, a nation that now had the southern working class in the streets. Rather than seeing Eduardo Frei's presidential win in 1964 as a revolutionary turn in Chilean politics, it is better to call it an evolutionary turn, as Alessandri's and the right's failure became an opportunity for the center and the left to administer the country with their own ideologies. Working-class frustration over housing and work morphed into legislation and when the Law of Reconstruction failed to answer working-class needs, the old guard fell, leaving room for the left to fill those spots in political offices, congress, and the presidency.

⁵⁰¹ Ministerio de Hacienda, 7.

⁵⁰² Ministerio de Hacienda, 7.

⁵⁰³ Ministerio de Hacienda, 8.

A Legacy of Problems

Valdivia and the rest of southern Chile was not only recovering from the 1960 earthquake, but also reconstructing its society from decades of political neglect. Previous political decisions had mostly involved the upper middle class, the rich, and capitalists. While Santiago elites and their political allies portrayed a picture of democracy, much of the working class, small farmers, and southern Chile had in fact been left out of the decision making in Santiago. The 1960 earthquake showed the fragility of the nation as most, if not all, power was concentrated within Santiago and the elites. With inflation, housing issues, and an economic catastrophe boiling in Santiago, the Chilean government needed to incorporate not only its working class but also the southern Chilean farmers. Earthquakes and natural events are inevitable; The Chilean state needed to become stronger and more centralized to deal with the next natural event.

At the start of 1961, small farmers in southern Chile suffered from extensive rain, compounding the struggles they were already facing with their own reconstruction. The summer dry months provided farmers opportunity to plow their land and prepare for the rainy season. However, January 1961 brought abnormal rainfall, resulting in eleven consecutive days of rain, bringing fifty-four million liters of water per square kilometer in the Valdivia region.⁵⁰⁴ Farmers in the south faced harsh environmental conditions, but economic conditions, mainly inflation, had also hindered their ability to produce at lower prices than imports. From 1955 until 1960 industrial agricultural products had risen 298 percent, but at the same time agricultural prices had increased up to 249 percent, not allowing for the farmers who had increased production to make

⁵⁰⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La primera quincena de enero se ha vuelto catastrófica para el agricultor." Jan 19, 1961.

a profit.⁵⁰⁵ While the government stepped in with loan packages as aid for the farmers, the loans became useless with uncertain conditions and a lack of a guarantee for agriculture profitability.⁵⁰⁶ Loans from the central government were rather a show of support while agriculture imports sold at lower prices than national products. These issues came to a head in the ensuing elections.

The March congressional elections served as a barometer for the Alessandri government's handling of the economy and southern reconstruction. Jorge Benijerodi, a conservative journalist for *El Correo de Valdivia*, proclaimed "With Transformation or Against It," signaling that many people believed change needed to occur to handle the two national crises: economy and southern reconstruction. Benijerodi stated that "it is no longer about epidermal issues. . .and it is no longer a solution, not even apparent, to try to stop the consequent price increases with decrees and resolutions of the authority, accompanied by judicial prosecution for the case of infringement that does not remedy the shortage."⁵⁰⁷ He concluded that free trade would demand a "readaptation of industry and agriculture that will be synchronized with the ten-year development program."⁵⁰⁸ There was a need for a social and economic reconfiguration of Chilean society as past legislation had further stagnated the nation's economy.

The need for change became apparent in March 1961 as Chilean citizens voiced their concerns at the ballot box. Their main gripe was obvious: the political party's poor handling of both the national economy and the reconstruction effort in the south. While voting was still

⁵⁰⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "El aumento de la producción agrícola es ineficiente en el clima adverso que están enfrentando." Jan 20, 1961.

⁵⁰⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "El aumento de la producción agrícola es ineficiente en el clima adverso que están enfrentando." Jan 20, 1963.

⁵⁰⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Con la transformación o en contra." March 5, 1961.

⁵⁰⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Con la transformación o en contra." March 5, 1961.

limited to a certain few, mostly elites and middle class, left-leaning parties started making headway over the Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals who were better known as the Democratic Front of Chile, a coalition between the traditional parties against the emerging left-leaning parties. Right-leaning reporters, such as Carlos Sepulveda Vergara, defended Alessandri's and the right's efforts on the national distress in the national newspapers. He touted Chilean democracy as a "traditional independence and civic faith" and stated that "with that characteristic political maturity, the Chilean people will go to the polls today responsibly to elect their representatives in the National Congress."⁵⁰⁹ Sepulveda viewed this election as a confrontation not between the political parties, but between the established government and the many adversaries criticizing the central state. He stated "this election, [is] more than the struggle between eleven parties; [it] is a confrontation of two positions: Government and opposition, defined by the political entities that support the restorative and constructive action of the central power headed by President Alessandri and by those others that deny all merit to tangible achievements in their concrete effects and possibilities."⁵¹⁰ He expressed his support for Alessandri whom he states had eradicated many mushroom communities that were at the margins of the cities and was well underway in developing a pacified agrarian reform. While praising Alessandri's accomplishments, Sepulveda showed, at the same time, the immense public and political pressure put on the government, describing the underlying discontent through his defense of the President. The elections brought no real surprises, reelecting incumbents such as Nicanor Allende, and other right-leaning candidates. This would be the last time that Chilean politics was dominated by the center right, hereafter it would sway towards the center left as the

⁵⁰⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Comentario a la Semana Política." March 5, 1961.

⁵¹⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Comentario a la Semana Política." March 5, 1961.

working class gained their voice in politics. Drastic legislation, such as the agrarian and voting reforms, changed the political and physical landscape, empowering the working class.

Voting Reforms

The 1960 earthquake had a ripple effect on the elections through law and bureaucracy. An ongoing process of strengthening Chilean democracy had been in the works since 1949 when women first gained suffrage. Through ongoing legislation, voting rights were secured for more citizens, specifically in the rural, southern communities. Part of that process occurred before the end of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo tenure as president, between 1955 and 1958. President Ibáñez helped pass two seminal laws, 12.927 and 12.922; the first reinstated the Communist Party and its allies into national politics that involved many Communist Party voters; the latter laid out a plan to register new voters.⁵¹¹ This law was a revision of the Permanent Defense of Democracy Law, initiated in 1948 by President Gabriel González Videla. However, it is important to note that Ibáñez used this law repeatedly against unions and organizing before he repealed it at the end of his term. A continuation of expanding voting rights for the nation then came on May 14, 1962 when Alessandri made it obligatory for all citizens to register to vote with Law 14.853.⁵¹² However, Article 23 of Ley 14.853 presented a caveat that would make it difficult for many: they had to be literate.⁵¹³

The 1960 earthquake created an unintentional loophole in this law. It initiated a consolidation of rural land and people through reconstruction, economic recovery, and data

⁵¹¹ Ministerio del Interior, “Ley 12922; Decreto 4919 Fija el texto definitivo de la ley general, sobre inscripciones electorales” (Ministerio del Interior, August 14, 1958), Article 14, 15, 16, 69, 70, 71, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, <http://bcn.cl/215o7>.

⁵¹² Ministerio Del Interior, “Ley 14853; Decreto con Fuerza de Ley 1001; Fija el texto definitivo de la ley general sobre inscripciones electorales.” (Gobierno de Chile, May 14, 1962), Article 4, 22, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, <http://bcn.cl/215p4>.

⁵¹³ Ministerio Del Interior, Article 23.

collection. While the sociologist Magdalena Gil-Ureta argues that the 1960 Valdivia earthquake was one of the catastrophes that “unleashed mechanisms of state-building similar to what has been argued for the case of Western Europe and the effects of war,” she underestimates the power of the emerging working class and their rightful gain of voting rights.⁵¹⁴ While I agree that the 1960 Valdivia earthquake did further the growth of the central state, it also empowered the working class, mobilizing them to influence change through the voting in of left-leaning politicians that catered to their needs, i.e. housing and land. One of the most important aspects of Chilean political culture that ran through many of its reconstruction missions was the surveying its land and its people. Much of Valdivia’s reconstruction process stalled as intensive studies were done by the state and foreign countries and academics. Therefore, while Chile granted many of its citizens the right to vote, Article 15 in the August 1962 Law 14.853 demonstrated the extensive documentation of its citizens through the process of voter registration and other aspects of the reconstruction effort.⁵¹⁵ Article 23, the need for voting citizens to have the ability to read and write, was circumvented through Chile’s housing project and the Agrarian Reform. For citizens to participate in these state programs and receive any aid including housing, they already had to have documentation. The Chilean political historian, Joaquín Fernández Abara, highlighted this loophole in registering voters:

On the other hand, the mandatory nature of the electoral registration was established, since without the certification of the act, many non-political procedures could not be carried out. For example, in its Article N ° 66 the law adds that ‘Banks, public or private credit institutions, the Corporation for the Promotion of Production, Social Security Institutions, Municipalities and fiscal, semi-fiscal, autonomous entities or organisms or autonomous administration, to process any application for credit or loan or any operation to be carried out through them, they must require the applicant to prove their registration in the Electoral Registries. Notaries may not authorize any instrument without the

⁵¹⁴ Gil-Ureta, “Catastrophe and State Building: Lessons from Chile’s Seismic History,” 5.

⁵¹⁵ Ministerio Del Interior, “Ley 14853; Decreto con Fuerza de Ley 1001; Fija el texto definitivo de la ley general sobre inscripciones electorales,” Article 15.

appearing party (s) verifying that they are registered in the Electoral Registries.⁵¹⁶

This law had a resounding effect on voter registration, and along with the state aided project in the south, it made it easy even for those that could not read nor write to register as voters.⁵¹⁷

Fernández Abara goes on to show that

between the parliamentary elections of 1961 and the municipal elections of 1963, there was a strong increase in registered voters, from 23.6% to 31.3% of the total population. Likewise, between 1961 and 1973, the electoral population (registered) and the effective voters multiplied by 2.4 and 2.6 times, respectively, while the population did so only by 1.4 times. This participation was present above all in the governments of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970), and Salvador Allende Gossens (1970-1973).⁵¹⁸

While much of the study shows an increase in voter registration through legislative reform, it does not consider the effect that the 1960 earthquake had on developing documentation for the rural people of the south.

The 1960 earthquake brought the central state to the rural people. The ever-increasing involvement of the central state in people's everyday lives, most noticeably the poor and rural farmers, incorporated them into the national economy and politics. These people received benefits and with these benefits came a paper trail that included signatures, registrations, and most importantly, voter registration. They were no longer just inhabitants of their rural landscape, but were now part of the nation with a voice and a right to vote. The Agrarian Reform furthered this process of national incorporation. An agrarian reform was no longer a

⁵¹⁶ Joaquín Fernández Abara, "Sobre la obligatoriedad del voto: ¿conveniente para quiénes?," *El Mostrador* 18 (2010), https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=es&user=21o8FRMAAAAJ&cstart=20&pagesize=80&citation_for_view=21o8FRMAAAAJ:uJ-U7cs_P_0C.

⁵¹⁷ It is uncertain how many Chileans were illiterate in 1962, however, according to page 51 of the 1960 Chilean Census, out of 4,452,597 people, 750,833 people never had formal education. There would not be another census until 1970.

⁵¹⁸ Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, "Ley N°14.853, Establece La Obligatoriedad Del Voto.," Congressional Records, bcn.cl, n.d., https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/elecciones/detalle_eleccion?handle=10221.1/63071&periodo=1925-1973.

question but an ever-increasing necessity during the reconstruction of the south and the national economic recovery.

The Evolution of The Agrarian Reform, Ley 15020

Alessandri's Agrarian Reform was important and pivotal for Chile amid the political climate of the Cold War. However, his Agrarian Reform was only a precursor to a more revolutionary reform legislated by Frei and his administration. The 1960 Valdivian earthquake pressured Alessandri's conservative government to legislate for an agrarian reform. The once unthinkable not only became a necessity, but a primary tool to reconstruct the south and recover the national economy. For decades, Chile had imported more produce than it exported, despite its vast fertile lands. Two factors hindered Chile's inability to produce food for its people: the Central Valley hacendado's lobbying power, and the south's broken agricultural system.⁵¹⁹

An agricultural reform had been in question since the 1950s when the US-backed FAO studied the ailing southern agriculture. In 1951, *La Mision Agricola del Banco Mundial-FAO* embarked on a four-month study on southern agriculture; at the time the FAO did not believe that the current land-owning structure impeded agricultural development, and therefore they did not call for an agrarian reform.⁵²⁰ However, the 1960 earthquake destroyed much of the south's infrastructure, therefore economic recovery largely hinged on agricultural production both in the south and Central Valleys. Reconstruction of the south thus went hand in hand with the Agrarian Reform. Alessandri's government needed to go beyond reconstruction; it needed to reconfigure Chile, as its traditional society had proved ineffective and caused economic stagnation. The

⁵¹⁹ Chapter one details the complicated agricultural system in the south that was mainly run by cooperatives and is also detailed by Fabián Almonacid Zapata.

⁵²⁰ Fabián Almonacid Zapata, *La agricultura chilena discriminada (1910-1960): Una mirada de las políticas estatales y el desarrollo sectorial desde el sur* (Editorial CSIC - CSIC Press, 2009), 421, 425.

1960 earthquake only highlighted the fragility of the situation: beyond reconfiguration, Chile needed a revolution. That revolution would develop in the form of the Agrarian Reform.

The 1960 earthquake also provided Chile and its government with the means to carry out its agrarian reform. The global interest and aid that arrived with the earthquake brought many experts and resources to Chile, specifically from the United States, Germany, and Japan. Carlos Sepulveda Vergara, a political commentator, believed that unlike previous agrarian reforms, such as México's, Bolivia's and Cuba's, Chile's Agrarian Reform could be had without violence.⁵²¹ He promoted Alessandri's work in agriculture and offered a plan, stating that "agriculture is a focus of the administration," and that "the goal is to first help industry meet the internal supply needs, that it can feed the seven million inhabitants that populate the country: then promote exports and diversify production: deriving it to the stages of industrialization more intensive."⁵²² For Sepulveda, Alessandri had the country headed in the right direction, a nod to the opposition that highly criticized his government. It was not a matter if an agrarian reform was necessary, but rather when they would implement an agrarian reform.⁵²³

The Cold War and the global aid Chile received after the 1960 earthquake made the Chilean Agrarian Reform an international affair. After Sepulveda's political commentary, President Kennedy signaled a land distribution plan for Latin America through a new program called the Alliance for Progress.⁵²⁴ On May 9, 1961, the CEPAL-FAO Center headquartered in

⁵²¹ Arturo Navarro, *El Sistema de Prensa En Chile Bajo El Gobierno Militar (1973-1984)* (Santiago, Chile: CENECA (Centro de Investigación y Expresión Cultural y Artística), 1985), 15, <https://libros.uchile.cl/files/presses/1/monographs/955/submission/proof/15/#zoom=z>. Carlos Sepulveda Vergara was a militant of the Christian Democrats and a reporter for *La Nación*. When the 1973 coupe occurred, the military regime changed *La Nación* to *La Patria* and made Sepulveda the President and Director of that newspaper as well as the reporter's union. It is fair to say his politics lie right of center.

⁵²² *El Correo de Valdivia* (Valdivia: Impr. El Correo de Valdivia, 1895), col. "Comentario a la Semana Política." March 5, 1961.

⁵²³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Comentario a la Semana Política." March 5, 1961.

⁵²⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Consideraciones sobre nuestra Estructura Agraria." March 29, 1961.

Santiago invited delegates from Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, and the United States; they all met with World Federation of Trade Unions. Jorge Alcázar Ampuero, the resident agricultural expert at CEPAL-FAO and Secretary of the Committee, led the talk and urged a redistribution of land in all of Latin America; at the same time, he also insisted that the Chilean government start a development program with agriculture at the center of its economic development plan.⁵²⁵ The Chilean union representative, Juan Vargas Puebla, explained that “both the latifundio and the minifundio are the enemies of the economic development of the region. It is a fact—I add—that the lack of purchasing power of the agricultural worker prevents Latin American industry and economy from growing.”⁵²⁶ Representative from the US, William V. Turnage, stated that the United States would help with this agrarian reform first through the Interamerican Bank for Development and then by sending US agricultural experts to Latin American countries.⁵²⁷ Turnage added, “that it would be convenient for the ECLAC (CEPAL) and the FAO to be more precise regarding land redistribution systems in Latin America and the policy that should be followed regarding the tax payments,” warning, “that drastic means will only harm the western world and increase Soviet influence.”⁵²⁸ The Chilean agricultural reform did not happen in a vacuum; Chilean, Latin American, and United States leaders understood that

⁵²⁵ CEPAL stands for Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. In English it translates to the acronym ECLAC, or the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.

⁵²⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Imprescindible Reforma Agraria autorizo relación CEPAL-FAO.” May 9, 1961; BCN Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, “Juan Diógenes Vargas Puebla. Reseñas Biográficas Parlamentarias,” Text, bcn.cl (BCN. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2020), https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Juan_Diógenes_Vargas_Puebla. He was a Representative for Valparaíso y Quillota between 1945 and 1949 under the Communist Party. He later worked for the FAO and CEPAL as a Representative for the World Federation of Trade Unions after a long career working for Unions.

⁵²⁷ “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V - Office of the Historian,” accessed January 5, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/persons>. Deputy Director, Office of International Finance and Development, Department of State, until October 1959; Acting Director, October 1959–February 1960; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from November 1959.

⁵²⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Imprescindible Reforma Agraria autorizo relación CEPAL-FAO.” May 9, 1961.

an agrarian reform had the potential to both boost economies and negate Soviet influence. The CEPAL delegates concluded their meeting with the consensus “that the Agrarian Reform constitutes a magnificent platform where any type of economic progress could be solidly built for the underdeveloped regions.”⁵²⁹ The CEPAL meeting gave Alessandri’s government the financial and technocratic support for a peaceful agrarian reform.

While all parties agreed on the need for an agrarian reform in Chile, legislation stalled in Congress. By the beginning of 1962, three factors kept the Chilean government from instilling an agrarian reform: political polarization, foreign currency, and foreign perception. A *Correo de Valdivia* newspaper article blamed the left for the lack of an agreement as they signaled that “the entry of radicalism [Marxist ideals] directly in the government’s mission” had thrown legislation into disarray.⁵³⁰ The government needed to take measures to “prevent the drainage of foreign currency, its use in the economic development of the country, and save the possibility of a monetary devaluation.”⁵³¹ Alessandri and his political allies believed in a legislative agrarian reform, with compensation, therefore the value of Chilean currency was important in the purchasing of land.⁵³² Lastly, the Chilean government tried to create favorable conditions that would give the United States confidence which was in the midst of creating a new program called the “Alliance for Progress.” As the article stated, “the agreement between the Radical, Liberal and Conservative Parties to carry out, despite the difficulties, agrarian reform and

⁵²⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Latifundio, Minifundio y Reforma Agraria.” May 10, 1961.

⁵³⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “La Reforma Agraria Constituye el Hecho de Mayor Trascendencia para Nuestro País.” Jan 1, 1962.

⁵³¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “La Reforma Agraria Constituye el Hecho de Mayor Trascendencia para Nuestro País.” Jan 1, 1962.

⁵³² Many of these landowners, especially in the Central Valley, held political ties, therefore they expected to get maximum value for their land from their political affiliation under Alessandri’s tenure. Keep in mind that while Jorge Alessandri comes from a political family, he was a businessman with no political experience before he became president. The Agrarian Reform under Alessandri would be very conservative by past standards (México, Bolivia, and Cuba) but it would evolve under Eduardo Frei’s tenure as president.

realizing not only an urgent need to avoid social tensions, but especially to create those with the required conditions so that Chile receives the benefits of the Alliance for Progress.”⁵³³ The politics of the Chilean Agrarian Reform were not confined within Chile’s borders. In the age of the Cold War, internal factors weighed heavily on global politics, in this case, the Alliance for Progress.

The Alliance for Progress created the impetus for the Chilean Agrarian Reform.⁵³⁴ As reference earlier, the US-backed FAO did not believe in a Chilean Agrarian Reform in the early 1950s. The 1960 Valdivia earthquake changed the conditions, not only in the south, but in the entire nation. The Kennedy administration and the conservative government of Alessandri now believed that part of the south’s reconstruction and a national economic recovery depended on an agrarian reform. An agrarian reform, once thought as a radical idea, now made the most sense as a tool for the many ailments plaguing Chile.

President John F. Kennedy and the United States initiated the Alliance for Progress to address the kinds of social tensions that they felt had produced the Cuban Revolution. On March 13, 1961, President Kennedy “outlined a ten-point program to mobilize the resources of the United States and Latin America to bring about both economic development and social change.”⁵³⁵ More specifically, the Alliance for Progress “called for a 2.5% per capita yearly growth rate, and more equitable distribution of income, trade diversification, improved agricultural production, needed agrarian reform, elimination of adult illiteracy, low-cost housing, price stability, improved tax collection, domestic savings, and the influx of \$20 billion in

⁵³³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, “La Reforma Agraria Constituye el Hecho de Mayor Trascendencia para Nuestro País.” Jan 1, 1962.

⁵³⁴ Arturo Olavarria Bravo, *Chile bajo la Democracia Cristiana* (Santiago de Chile: Nascimento, 1967), 10.

⁵³⁵ Albert L. Michaels, “The Alliance for Progress and Chile’s ‘Revolution in Liberty,’ 1964-1970,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 18, no. 1 (1976): 76, <https://doi.org/10.2307/174817>.

external capital.”⁵³⁶ This program was in response to communist success around the world, including the Cuban revolution. Instead of the US going on a military defense, the Alliance for Progress created an economic offense that distributed tools to Latin American governments in the hope that Marxism could be weeded out internally. According to Michael Albert, “the strength of the Chilean left led by the large Communist and Socialist Parties made Chile a critical testing ground.”⁵³⁷ The United States invested a large number of resources: in 1962, that amount reached almost 200 million in dollars and machinery just for Chile, including tractors for Chilean farmers.⁵³⁸ To be more precise, in the Inaugural Address to the Nation, John F. Kennedy emphasized a long history of investment from 1946 to 1961 totaling 512.7 million dollars.⁵³⁹ “The economic aid [in 1961, after the earthquake] includes Export-Import Loans of \$282.9 million and a \$100 million loan for reconstruction and rehabilitation after the earthquakes of 1960.”⁵⁴⁰ US aid to Chile did not start after the earthquake, instead the US had a long interest in Chile’s agriculture and economy as its failure in Latin America could mean danger by Marxist ideology. Chile also proved a good testing ground because of its stagnant economy, inefficient agriculture, “democratic tradition,” and the 1960 Valdivian earthquake. These factors gave the United States and Chile a clean slate to reconfigure society in the south for the purpose of the

⁵³⁶ Michaels, 76.

⁵³⁷ Michaels, 79.

⁵³⁸ Michaels, 79.

⁵³⁹ United State Congress, “Inaugural Address of John Fitzgerald Kennedy: President of the United States of America.” (U.S. Government Printing Office, January 20, 1961), 24, <https://books.google.com/books?id=WM4jAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA8-PA24&lpg=RA8-PA24&dq=jorge+alessandri+10+year+plan&source=bl&ots=cBVM-7DZQI&sig=ACfU3U3cd3zPNXcEdbiLeEQ9Oe4K93SDAw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjX2ozTjLz1AhVMIEQIHWIABYsQ6AF6BAGNEAM#v=onepage&q=jorge%20alessandri%2010%20year%20plan&f=false>.

⁵⁴⁰ United State Congress, 24. This numbers do not add up and they will never add to a certain amount because there is covert, private business, and also other funds funneled through Chile through backdoors. However, it is safe to say US aid to Chile was substantial, not only for the sake of humanitarian effort, but also to stop the threat of communism in Chile and Latin America. Catastrophes allow

nation.⁵⁴¹ The Agrarian Reform, supported by US's Alliance for Progress became a tool to fight Marxist ideology in the age of the Cold War.

By November 1962, national and legislative conditions proved ripe for the passing of an agrarian reform. On November 15, 1962, Alessandri, his ministers, and a small number of political allies initiated Ley 15020, the Chilean Agrarian Reform. The law itself was modest and conservative, but a start and truly a reformist victory for the left in Chile. As stated by Jennifer M. Toolin, "although Law 15020 enumerated elaborate provisions regarding categories of expropriated land, it did not provide clear criteria as to when and under what circumstances expropriation could be applied."⁵⁴² The law's innovation came by a Chilean way of fixing problems: creating institutions, such as the "Corporacion de Reforma Agraria (Agrarian Reform Corporation or CORA), and the Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario (Institute of Agricultural Development or INDAP)."⁵⁴³ The *Correo de Valdivia* highlighted the stakes of the Agrarian Reform when it stated, "the concept of an agrarian reform, which implies fundamental variations in the right of land tenure and which also compromises new socio-economic forms for its exploitation, has not been imposed peacefully in the world."⁵⁴⁴ Alessandri's government believed it had the formula to peacefully enact a successful agrarian reform, but it had one major flaw—the inability to force the sale, possession, and transfer of land to those most in need and farmers. Chile was the first country to implement a peaceful agrarian reform and many foreign

⁵⁴¹ As I have argued previously, the 1960 earthquake gave Chile and its legislators the opportunity to reconstruct the south towards helping the national economy. Also, "democratic tradition" is in quotes because there is a long debate on Chilean democracy and if it truly practiced democracy since the 1930s. Elections reforms in 1958 and 1962 proved that Chilean democracy was without its exceptionalism.

⁵⁴² Jennifer M. Toolin, "Law and Development Theory: A Case Study of the Chilean Land Reform Efforts," *The Fletcher Forum* 8, no. 1 (1984): 182.

⁵⁴³ Toolin, 182.

⁵⁴⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La Reforma Agraria." Nov 16, 1962.

observers looked to Chile as a model. The article goes on to explain the major difference of the Chilean Agrarian Reform saying,

It is this: when the Reform is applied in a practical way, it must have a broad and popular campaign for its actions. The People must know how their leaders and legislators favor them, in order to form their own judgments and not to believe at length the passionate and interested negative preaching of the anti-democratic elements who opposed, with their speeches and with their obstructionist votes, that the State give land to those who work it, without infringing any acquired rights and without asking in exchange for it, the full surrender of political freedom, as Marxist countries do with their agrarian reforms.⁵⁴⁵

It cannot be overstated that beyond being a tool to fix the many problems Chile experienced after the 1960 earthquake, at the heart of it, the US-backed Chilean Agrarian Reform was a tool against Marxist ideology. The Chilean Agrarian Reform, backed by all political parties in Chile, began as conservative legislation, but eventually evolved in a more radical direction through Chilean elections and under Frei's administration.

The Agrarian Reform offered Alessandri and his administration a multipurpose tool that they hoped would remedy the south and the nation. Beyond being an agrarian reform, the law also opened opportunities for tourism. As Chile started implementing the law, the *Correo de Valdivia* viewed this law and global events as an opportunity for Valdivia's growth. In an opinion article, an anonymous journalist stated that Valdivia has an opportunity to become the country's central attraction. He also stated that Fidel Castro's 'closing' of Cuba had left opportunities for other countries to welcome tourist from around the world. Finally, the author hoped that the Articles in the Agrarian Reform would open an opportunity for the development of tourism in the region.⁵⁴⁶ And in fact, the Agrarian Reform opened the pathway for Valdivia to become a region centered on tourism.

⁵⁴⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La Reforma Agraria." Nov 16, 1962.

⁵⁴⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "El Fomento Turístico." Jan 2, 1963.

Tourism as the New Valdivian Industry

Tourism as it has evolved today in Valdivia, sprouted from Alessandri's Agrarian Reform and the need to expand the city's and the region's economy. The legislation brought hope to politicians and citizens believing it would help both the region's reconstruction effort and its economic reconfiguration. On January 4, 1963, a *Correo de Valdivia* article announced some of the Agrarian Reform's bylaws that offered opportunities for the tourism industry. As stated in the newspaper, "an important legal provision is included in the Agrarian Reform and it refers to forestry, small farmers' crafts and peasant inns."⁵⁴⁷ Article 56 did two things: first, it protected trees on the most scenic places in the region, "to one hundred meters from public roads and the banks of rivers and lakes,"⁵⁴⁸ and second, it created clear guidelines for the conservatorship of natural environments for the promotion of tourism. The trees now became national assets for the greater good of the nation, giving the south's environment the title of conservation for the sake of tourism wealth.⁵⁴⁹ In addition to this conservation effort, Article 61 allowed small farmers to become part of the tourist industry through artisanal craftsmanship and hospitality. The law stated,

The utilities, benefits or income obtained by the owner of a small agricultural property derived from his handicraft work established on the property, including the exploitation of 'Posadas' that meet the requirements of regulations and are authorized by the Tourism Directorate of the Ministry of the Economy, Development and Reconstruction, shall be understood to be included in the profits, beneficiaries or income derived from the agricultural exploitation of the property.⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Disposiciones en favor del fomento turístico consulta Reforma Agraria." Jan 4, 1963.

⁵⁴⁸ Ministerio de Agricultura, ed., "Ley 15020 Reforma Agraria" (Gobierno de Chile, November 27, 1962), Article 56, Ministerio de Agricultura, <https://www.bcn.cl/leychile>.

⁵⁴⁹ They referred tourism conservation to conservation for tourism wealth, which seemed awkward, so I changed it to tourism conservation.

⁵⁵⁰ Agricultura, "Ley 15020 Reforma Agraria," Article 61. In this sense, they refer to "Posadas" as inns.

This meant that the tourism industry was now integrated into the Agrarian Reform because it provided necessary production and protection for Valdivia's and the nation's natural environment. The Agrarian Reform enabled the necessary protection of Valdivia's natural beauty and promoted the production of the agrarian lands for artisanal purposes: culinary culture and scenic farms.⁵⁵¹ Tourism in Valdivia depended now on the province's natural protection of its environment, both for the national economy and the local tourist economy.

Tourism and agriculture went hand in hand as industries sought to draw people and resources. Both Articles established new opportunities and assurances for the tourism industry. Most importantly, Article 61 referred to established "posada campesinas," or peasant inns, thus allowing farmers the ability to use their homes as hostels in the beautiful countryside without any need to establish it as a proper hostel and free from paying taxes and services.⁵⁵² Under Alessandri's Agrarian Reform, any money earned from their newly established land was solely for the farmer's benefit to produce more capital through agriculture and tourism.

The idea of promoting a tourism industry had been in the works since the late 1950s as the region suffered from a slow and economic decline followed by the shattering events of the 1960 earthquake. Regional officials touted Valdivia as a paradise for tourism, even hosting the Confederación Organizaciones Turísticas de América Latina (COTAL) in 1959.⁵⁵³ At that time, the Chilean government's push for a tourism industry amounted to the creation of the subsidiary Corporación de la Sur para el Fomento del Turismo under CORFO and the creation of the Directive of Tourism in April 6, 1960.⁵⁵⁴ While the Directive of Tourism took a national

⁵⁵¹ Valdivia was and is now known for its beer production, meats, cheeses, and fishing.

⁵⁵² Agricultura, "Ley 15020 Reforma Agraria," Article 61.

⁵⁵³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Valdivia es el paraíso para el turismo." April 11, 1959.

⁵⁵⁴ Ministerio de Hacienda, "DFL 355 Crea Dirección de Turismo" (Gobierno de Chile, April 6, 1960), Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, <https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=5501&idVersion=1960-04-06>.

approach, the Corporación de la Sur took charge of tourism for four provinces, from Cautín to Llanquihue, including Valdivia. The newly created organization sought to sell the natural beauty of the provinces and promote the region's agricultural produce such as beer, cattle, vegetables, fish, and lumber.⁵⁵⁵ Tourism was thought of as a secondary industry to support its ailing agriculture and manufacturing industry. Alessandri's Agrarian Reform revamped the idea of tourism and agriculture, making it a priority to maximize the land in all economic aspects.

The Agrarian Reform refocused the Valdivia region on its tourist potential as reconstruction geared towards that industry instead of manufacturing. Time and again, articles mentioned and pushed for the tourism potential in the south. An *El Mercurio* article, republished in *El Correo*, mentioned that there was no place in all of Latin American that had more lakes, volcanos, and forest as well as immense natural beauty than southern Chile. The article went on to suggest that there should be a plan in place to build more hospitality amenities to expand tourism in southern Chile—to use its natural beauty not only as a natural resource, but as an economic motor through tourism.⁵⁵⁶

Southern legislators had advocated for a tourism plan since the start of reconstruction. In an article in *El Correo*, a journalist criticized the government for its lack of tourism planning. He believed that the central government had focused too much on the reconstruction of the south, while missing a key component of the economy: tourism. As the article stated, “if Chile as a whole still lacks a vast permanent tourism promotion plan because many programs have been lost while others are devised and while the effective means do not appear, in the south this activity is called to a broad economic role.”⁵⁵⁷ In the southern cities, local leaders called for

⁵⁵⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Valdivia es el paraíso para el turismo.” April 11, 1959.

⁵⁵⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “El Desarrollo del Turismo en el Sur,” Feb 17, 1961.

⁵⁵⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Para la promoción del Turismo.” Jul 29, 1962.

hotel planning in key locations. Valdivian politicians and boosters also emphasized the fixing of roads and building new ones to get to rural areas, such as Ñiebla and the Lake Regions. As Andrew Grant Wood argues in his edited volume, “improved access provided by motor vehicles of course played a central role in tourist industry development across the Americas.”⁵⁵⁸ He goes on to tell the example of Argentina and quotes Melina Piglia’s study of the automobile in Argentina, a country whose tourism flourished after the Great Depression, as government-developed roads expanded from “approximately 2,000 kilometers in 1932 to around 110,000 in 1943.”⁵⁵⁹ The regional leadership for years had advocated for a comprehensive tourism plan that welcomed tourists from Europe and catered to their needs. Now with reconstruction underway, southern politicians and leaders wanted tourism to be part of the government’s plan for national economic planning and southern reconstruction.

Regional Reconfiguration

As tourism became part of both reconstruction and the national economic plan, a struggle ensued over the unofficial capital of the region. Valdivia once held the title as the gem of the south, but its golden age ended in 1920. Concepción became an industrial center in the 1940s, and Puerto Montt started emerging as the next big city during the 1960s reconstruction effort. Puerto Montt’s rise as the south’s unofficial capital under Alessandri’s government was coincidental as the city’s location made it easier to deliver aid and rebuild the city. In contrast, it took Valdivia two years to clear the rubble and plan for its future.⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁵⁸ Andrew Grant Wood, ed., *The Business of Leisure : Tourism History in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2021), 8.

⁵⁵⁹ Melina Piglia, “Viaje Deportivo, Nación y Territorio. El Automóvil Club Argentino y Los Orígenes Del Turismo Carretera. Argentina, 1924-1938.” *Mudos Nuevos*, September 16, 2008, para. 12, <http://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/40923>; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/nuevomundo.40923>.

⁵⁶⁰ This is detailed more thoroughly in the next chapter, however Puerto’s Montt’s emergence starts during Jorge Alessandri’s Presidency.



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Puerto Montt's emergence as the new capital of the south started unintentionally as politicians in Santiago along with Alessandri's administration funneled resources to the port city

⁵⁶¹ Unknown, "Chile Frente al Mundo: Zona Sur (Área Litoral Región de Los Lagos Del Sur = Araucanía, de Los Ríos y de Los Lagos)," Blogspot, November 1, 2013, <http://turismogeojury.blogspot.com/2013/11/zona-sur.html>.

while Valdivia was still in its planning phases.⁵⁶² The map above gives an idea of the geographic location and accessibility of Puerto Montt in comparison to Valdivia. The main road in grey is the Pan-American Highway; its route was disputed during the 1960s as the Valdivian government wanted it to make a turn towards and run by Valdivia.⁵⁶³ Puerto Montt is not geologically in a better position than Valdivia. A relatively new city, founded by German settlers in 1853, Puerto Montt, for most of its history, has existed as a small town “at the end of the intermediate depression of Chile,” sitting on a deep slope and touching the waters of the Gulf of Ancud.⁵⁶⁴ Osorno, just north of Puerto Montt, held more importance as a cattle town where local farmers took their livestock for slaughter and transportation to the north into the Central Valley. The Chilean geographer at the University of Austral in Valdivia, Adriano Pinto, argues that, before 1970, Puerto Montt lay as a secondary city while Osorno and Valdivia took on the role of centers of the northern and central areas of the Lagos Regions.⁵⁶⁵

The 1960 earthquake reconfigured society and the Chilean population migrated to be closer to resources provided by the central government. There are two reasons why the Alessandri and Frei administration accelerated the reconstruction of Puerto Montt after the

⁵⁶² At first, this was purely coincidence, as Puerto Montt was ready to rebuild, Frei’s Administration made Puerto Montt officially the capital of the south during his administration.

⁵⁶³ Jerrold M. Holmes, “The Pan American Highway,” *The Journal Of Geography* LXII, no. 4 (April 1963): 151, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00221346308982184>; Isidora Urrutia Steinert, “Mobility and Materiality: Contesting National Integration on Chile’s Route 5 – MMB Latin America,” *Migration Mobilities Bristol Latin America*, June 17, 2021, <https://mmblatinamerica.blogs.bristol.ac.uk/2021/06/17/mobility-and-materiality-contesting-national-integration-on-chiles-route-5/>. Various sources state that the Pan American Highway was planned in 1932, paved in the 1950s, going through Valdivia, but that changed in the 1960s. After much research, there is not clear nor good history of how the 1960 earthquake changed the Pan American Highway. According to the rumblings in *El Correo*, it was certainly highly contested during the reconstruction of the south. As of the late 1960s, the Pan American Highway did not run through Valdivia, which has taken away much potential in its tourism industry.

⁵⁶⁴ Adriano Rovida Pinto, “Puerto Montt: El paso de ciudad menor a centro de desarrollo interregional en una ciudad del sur de Chile,” *Espacio y desarrollo (Lima, Peru : 1989)*, no. 12 (2000): 87.

⁵⁶⁵ Adriano Rovida Pinto, 88. Before Frei’s decentralization plan, Los Lagos encompassed a region just past Temuco all the way to Puerto Mont. It was then split into two administrative regions under Frei, Región de los Ríos and Los Lagos.

earthquake—the first was location. Government aid depended on geography and the ability of that city to deliver resources to general areas. Therefore, a city with accessible roads, working ports, and running trains benefitted from government aid before Valdivia. Aid was never the issue; it was getting that aid to the cities that plagued the reconstruction effort. The Chilean administration could not let aid just sit at the Valaparíso port and in Santiago warehouses. This fact, along with the planning and reconstruction of the Pan-American Highway put Puerto Montt at the forefront of the rebuilding process; and while this may be overstated by Valdivian politicians, it also put Puerto Montt on the map for Santiago politicians as the new center of the south.⁵⁶⁶ The second reason for Puerto Montt's ascension to the capital came because of migration from the island of Chiloé. Pinto hints that the 1960 earthquake had a profound affect in how both the Alessandri and Frei administrations privileged Puerto Montt over Valdivia, when he states that a “second break [in population patterns] was registered as of 1960, associated with the state action [as] it undertook the reconstruction of the city seriously damaged by the 1960 earthquake.”⁵⁶⁷ He further explains that, “in addition to [reconstruction] the Frei administration took on the policy of elimination of urban marginalization and responded to the protest movements of the settlers;” these settlers, largely indigenous, came from the island of Chiloé.⁵⁶⁸ It is during the 1960s that Puerto Montt became more of an urban center while the city of Valdivia became more rural.⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁶ For many of the Metropolitan Santiago population, Concepción and Chillan was the south; Temuco, Valdivia, and Puerto Montt were considered the extreme south at the time, because of the struggle to get there.

⁵⁶⁷ Adriano Rovida Pinto, “Puerto Montt,” 89.

⁵⁶⁸ Adriano Rovida Pinto, 89.


⁵⁶⁹ Valdivia's population increased after the 1960 earthquake, but this did not mean everyone stayed or worked there. While still a bustling city after the earthquake and reconstruction, Valdivia became known more for its agriculture, both food and lumber. Puerto Montt took on the salmon industry from Chiloé while Osorno became the meat processing center and Temuco was purely industrial.

Immediate Solutions for Valdivia

Promoters and legislators emphasized Valdivia's rich history as another reason for the city to become the south's tourist center. During a meeting of Valdivia's tourism committee on March 7, 1963, experts from different fields voiced their opinion on the direction of the tourism industry. Valdivia's colonial past had a global reach and importance, as it was one of the southernmost strongholds for the Spanish empire as demonstrated by the various forts built by the empire. One delegate of the committee, Mrs. Carmen Castillo de Aravena, stated that "the need to promote tourism through the historical channels, in the restoration of the relics of the forts, the formation of museums and the creation of a school to prepare experts or technicians for this activity, as well as the introduction of a more accurate hotel policy."⁵⁷⁰ She stated that it was important to also restore the five forts, Niebla, Mancera, Corral, Amargos and San Carlos, which until 1820, had made Valdivia impenetrables since they were part of Valdivia's conquistador history and the three centuries of foreign history in the region. Lastly, she explained that "she would like to create a school that will focus on the historical significance of Valdivia."⁵⁷¹ Castillo de Aravena believed that education and the history of Valdivia's colonial past was the best way to boost international and internal tourism. At the time, this was the most abstract idea as most citizens and leaders focused on nature and reconstruction as part of their plan to boost the tourism industry. Below is a map of the forts in region of Valdivia.

⁵⁷⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Los Fuertes Constituyen una Lección del Pasado y Una Fuente de Enseñanza Futura." March 8, 1963. On a side note, the rebuilding of the forts did not come into fruition until the 21st century. Till this day, Chile and Valdivia are putting the finishing touches on the various forts in the Bay.

⁵⁷¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Los Fuertes Constituyen una Lección del Pasado y Una Fuente de Enseñanza Futura." March 8, 1965.



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Others in the tourism committee that meet on March 7, 1963 believed that camping and the reconstruction of the city geared toward tourism provided the best solution to the stagnant economy. Aldo Morales emphasized in the meeting the need to rebuild the central market as not only as the center of Valdivia, but also as the magnet for the city's tourism. Another member, Fernández, believed the region needed to highlight its natural beauty and draw tourists through camping facilities. Fernández further claimed that the city had done its best to promote tourism in the region, however "Valdivia week" was a disappointment, and he blamed its own citizens. Both the article and Fernández never went into detail in the matter, but did say that the citizens

⁵⁷² "Valdivia Puerto Corral Chile Cruise Port," Commercial, Whatsinport.com: Your Cruise Guid to 1200 Ports of Call, accessed January 19, 2022, <https://www.whatsinport.com/Valdivia-Puerto-Corral.htm>.

had sabotaged the tourism industry, in particular “Valdivia week.”⁵⁷³ This only highlighted the ongoing tensions between the citizens and leaders of the city that had been boiling since the earthquake.⁵⁷⁴ Fernández and Morales take a more direct approach in promoting tourism, while other leaders used technocratic methods and viewed the positive progress made in the region as hope for a tourism boost.

Valdivia had all the necessary means to create a booming tourist economy, but it lacked leadership and politicians that advocated for the city. Carlos Matamala, the President of the Committee for Reconstruction and Progress in Valdivia stated that “tourism is a valuable industry that must be stimulated effectively.”⁵⁷⁵ Matamala urged the use of local resources such as students at the University of Austral de Chile for regional economic research on how to boost local tourism. He further emphasized the need to focus on camping immediately because as he stated, “this would allow people who come to Valdivia, to enjoy some comforts, to settle in the most beautiful places, in safe places with water, electricity and the most needed services. In this regard, I know that there are people interested in offering their land and with minimal use of services. The tourists are thus well cared for and guided.”⁵⁷⁶ Matamala argued that creating a camping culture in Valdivia utilized the least number of resources and need for facilities during their reconstruction phase of the city. He looked upon European models on tourism as influence stating that the tourist industry needed a modern concept to develop the industry in this day in

⁵⁷³ “Valdivia Week” is the celebration of both the city and the region. Takes place on the Isla de Teja where farmers bring in their livestock and produce to show off. Really is a carnival and fair; they also have rodeo exhibitions.

⁵⁷⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Problema del Turismo abordó ayer en sesión Municipalidad de Valdivia.” March 8, 1963.

⁵⁷⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “El Turismo es una industria Valiosísima que hay que estimularla efectivamente.” March 17, 1963.

⁵⁷⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “El Turismo es una industria Valiosísima que hay que estimularla efectivamente.” March 17, 1963.

age. He hoped that the almost completed Pan-American Highway would further draw tourists to Valdivia, along with the new airport being built in Pichoy, north of Valdivia and south of the farming town of San José de Mariquina. Lastly, he emphasized the importance of the newspaper, *El Correo de Valdivia*, in its promotion of the city. While *El Correo* had mostly a regional readership, its association with SUPERSUR created a far reaching readership within the southern region and up into the Central Valley.⁵⁷⁷ Valdivia offered much in the way of tourism, but it needed its citizens and politicians to jumpstart the industry.

Organizations started mobilizing their resources to make Valdivia a tourist destination. The Yate Club (also known as Auto Boats) of Valdivia decided to build a picturesque casino for the promotion of the city's tourism. Started in 1951, the well-to-do yacht club had such prominent members as Ricardo Otto Weber Kunstmann, the Congressional Representative for Valdivia between 1953-1957.⁵⁷⁸ For members of the club, the casino was also their contribution to the city's reconstruction effort. They planned on building the casino on what, for many years, had been called the Wisse Beach. This location was approximately next to the Calle-Calle Bridge, located southeast of the city center. The group's main goal was to attract both European and national tourists to Valdivia and create a social center for gatherings of both citizens and tourists.⁵⁷⁹ Outsiders also contributed their perspective on how Valdivia could better improve and promote the city's tourism industry.

⁵⁷⁷ SUPERSUR, Sociedad Periodística del Sur S.A., is the equivalent of the Associated Press in the United States. Anything of importance printed within the southern region of the country or the Central Valley was shared and published in *El Correo de Valdivia*.

⁵⁷⁸ Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, "Reseña Biográfica Ricardo Otto Weber Kunstmann - Reseñas biográficas - Historia Política - Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile," Government, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile: Historia Política, accessed January 22, 2022, https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Ricardo_Otto_Weber_Kunstmann; Julio C. Avendaño, "Historia de Valdivia - Chile: Historia & Genealogía," blog, Historia de Valdivia, accessed January 19, 2022, <https://historiadevaldivia-chile.blogspot.com/2016/02/noche-valdiviana.html>.

⁵⁷⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Pintoresco Casino entregara Club Autobotes Para Fomento Turismo." April 5, 1963.

The Auto Club of Chile gave *Valdivianos* hope and an outside perspective into what the region needed for its tourism development. In an excursion from Santiago to Puerto Montt, covering 3,000 kilometers, the Auto Club of Chile drove through the province. They touted the beautiful scenery and specifically the lakes in the region. However, the Auto Club members did complain about the lack of roads which left many of the beautiful lakes unreachable. Hotels, paved roads, and most importantly signs were needed both to attract and to direct visitors to lesser-known towns.⁵⁸⁰ These well-to-do Auto Club members specifically asked for an infrastructure meant for the upper middle class and the wealthy. However, for tourism to become both a nationally viable industry and attractive to the more modest foreign travel, the national government had to promote a more inclusive policy for all tourists.

Many experts and politicians in Chile understood that for tourism to become an industry it had to evolve to involve the working class in this new economy. Involving the working-class tourist had to go beyond the opportunities and additional income Alessandri's Agrarian Reform offered. Policy makers realized that the proletariat had to also contribute monetarily to the tourist economy and to vacations. *El Diario de la Sociedad Periodística del Sur S.A* or SUPERSUR, published an article in August 1963 arguing for tourism with an authentic social context. They stated that,

it is unquestionable that now a tourism policy is urgent, mainly so that the great mass of workers, and as much as possible with their respective families, can enjoy an annual vacation without the heavy burden of economic worries that currently means such an accomplishment, already considered by thousands of citizens as an adventure of dangerous and even dramatic financial consequences.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁸⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Hoteles, Carreteras y Señalización." May 10, 1963.

⁵⁸¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Turismo de Auténtico Contenido Social." Aug 5, 1963.

SUPERSUR and policy makers referenced other developed and neighboring nations in relation to tourism development. Tourism experts from Europe, North America, and South America urged Chile to not only construct luxury hotels, but more importantly, to establish hostels and campgrounds to accommodate the national working-class vacationers.⁵⁸² This idea alone—the need to involve the working class into the consumer society—was part of Chile’s evolving social political idea of making the working class part of the nation in all aspects of its society, from its politics to economy. While this idea may have started in the 1940s (with import substitution industrialization), strengthened in the 1950s (women’s suffrage), by the 1960s, it had become an urgent necessity after the earthquake and especially during the evolution of Chilean politics. Simply put, after the 1960 Valdivian earthquake, reconstruction effort, and national economic recovery, Chilean society needed to involve the working and middle class in both political and economic society to survive the turmoil it was suffering. As many, mainly right-wing politicians failed, politicians turned to radical policies once thought leftist and marxist, but now normalized in a time of urgent need for change.

In early September 1963, many Valdivian economists and leaders concluded that the future of Valdivia’s economy would rely on tourism. CORFO and former banking executives helping with the reconstruction effort of Valdivia decided “that to a large extent the economic progress of Valdivia will lie in the materialization of a well-organized tourism policy, without postponing, of course, the economic potential that rests in our industries, our commerce, our agriculture and our shipyards, the latter just becoming more dynamic in valuable naval construction specially made for the fishermen in northern ports.”⁵⁸³ This group decided to tackle

⁵⁸² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Turismo de Auténtico Contenido Social.” Aug 5, 1963.

⁵⁸³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Reconstrucción de Fuertes y Promoción Social; El Turismo Valdiviano debe ser Integral.” Sep 4, 1963.

the tourism question through the once abstract idea presented earlier in the year by Mrs. Carmen Castillo de Aravena, part of Valdivia's tourism committee, of reconstructing the forts and accentuating Valdivia's rich history. They believed that the fort of Niebla was fundamental to tourism and needed to be restored for its historical significance. Looking to Switzerland as a model, they wanted to work with the national Tourism Board (*Consejo desarrollo de la costa* or CODECO) to make Valdivia a famous tourist attraction in Chile.⁵⁸⁴ This group of former bankers along with CORFO believed that Valdivia's economic rebirth should rely on this new movement towards a tourist economy. Beyond the confines of the city of Valdivia, a historical study of Niebla, Corral, and Mancera was needed to attract visitors and further create patriotism for the nation.⁵⁸⁵

Valdivian leaders took on the call to make tourism a central focus of their economic reconstruction. As tourists traveled through the south, many times skipping the once vibrant city because of the rerouting of the Pan-American Highway, authorities and officials concluded that there was a lack of promotion of Valdivia's beautiful environment, history, and offerings. They believed that there must be a cohesive effort made by farmers, fishermen, hotel owners, social clubs, restaurant owners, etc. to promote tourism in Valdivia. CODECO, CORFO, and *la Sociedad Agrícola y Ganadera de Valdivia* (SAVAL) all promised to help in Valdivia's new tourism effort. SAVAL, an important organization, brought many farmers with their livestock and agriculture to Valdivia every year to show off their yearly work and officially mark the start

⁵⁸⁴ During President's Carlos Ibáñez del Campo tenure, he conceptualized general social tourism movement, but it was not able to crystallize and become a reality.

⁵⁸⁵ It is important to emphasize that during the 1960s, not just in Chile, technocratic ideology was the driving force in many county's policy making, especially Chile. Anything from a digging a water well to large city planning involved long expert studies before even a machine could arrive at the job site. I have highlighted the technocratic nature of this era in chapter 3.

of the summer vacationing season, also known as Valdivia Week.⁵⁸⁶ In September 1963 the mayor of Valdivia decided to call a meeting with various regional leaders, business owners, and CODECO to finally develop a plan to promote tourism as their main industry.⁵⁸⁷ This was a pivotal turning point for the future of Valdivia and its citizens as leadership finally came to grips that Valdivia had lost its ability to become an industrial city and needed to divert its economic reconstruction effort towards tourism.

On September 12, 1963, the participants of the meeting created a definitive plan for Valdivia's tourism industry. They planned on creating various committees focused on different groups to draw tourists. The first would study a long plan for tourism; the second would study the immediate needs to create a tourist industry as well as to fix any problems foreseen for the next summer season. Another committee would study the prospects of bringing global tourists to Valdivia. With the looming high season soon arriving, another committee directed their energy to the 1963-1964 summer vacation crowd. They also published a long list of things they would investigate which included social events, ferry boats, hotels, camping sites, tourist zones, and dividing the province into Mountains, Lakes, Rivers, and Sea.⁵⁸⁸ Later that month, Valdivia's city government initiated its plan along with CORFO and COPRODE.⁵⁸⁹ CORFO's regional delegate, Julio Segovia, spoke about CORFO's and Valdivia's plan for tackling the tourism

⁵⁸⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Reconstrucción de Fuertes y Promoción Social; El Turismo Valdiviano debe ser Integral." Sep 5, 1963; *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Cinco días para planificar el turismo." Sep 5, 1963. CODECO (*Consejo desarrollo de la costa*) translates to Coastal development council and SAVAL (*la Sociedad Agrícola y Ganadera de Valdivia*) is the Agricultural and Livestock Society of Valdivia. While these are small municipal organizations, during the 1960s they were strong advocates and movers of what eventually would become Valdivia's primary economies: tourism and agriculture.

⁵⁸⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Plena Vibración de Nuestras Autoridades: Turismo Debe Alforar Como Potencial Económico." Sep 5, 1963.; *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Cinco días para planificar el turismo." Sep 5, 1963.

⁵⁸⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Recomendan Plan Definitivo de Turismo para Valdivia." Sep 12, 1963.

⁵⁸⁹ I could not find COPRODE, but I believe it is either a Valdivia or international agency that helped countries boost their tourism economy.

issue. He stated that they planned on focusing on all aspects of tourism, including hotels, hostels, and transportation. Segovia emphasized that “everything makes us imagine that the aforementioned Institute will take office this year for the benefit of tourists and Valdivians, and for the prestige of a city that must base its prosperity on the exploitation of its singular wealth which constitutes an organized tourism with good care and comforts.”⁵⁹⁰ Segovia made it clear that in order for Valdivia’s economy to survive, it needed to change course from a manufacturing city now to a tourism center, accentuating its natural beauty along with building facilities catering to this new industry.

Regional Tourism

Tourism created economic opportunities for cities in the entire nation, putting these cities in direct competition for resources. While other cities gained a head start in the reconstruction process, Valdivia’s city government still fought for aid and planned its city’s urban infrastructure. As an opinion editorial stated, “Valdivia should be Considered,” for all the tourism economic planning CORFO was pushing in other places. In particular, the author pointed to CORFO, which had worked on hostels in Ovalle, San Felipe, Castro, Chañal, and Ancud, investing 508,000 escudos in that year.⁵⁹¹ He argued that Chilean tourism was not very well coordinated and that while the government should have been pushing for construction of hostels and hotels in Valdivia these plans were being postponed when Valdivia was “the area most deserving of being favored with this type of construction.”⁵⁹² This is one of the reasons why Valdivia experienced a political shift in the 1960s after the earthquake; many citizens believed its legislators and leaders had not done enough to lobby in Santiago for aid, leaving the

⁵⁹⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Este Año entrará en funciones el Instituto de Promoción Turística.” Sep 25, 1963.

⁵⁹¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. Editorial de Opinión. “Valdivia debe ser considerado.” Sep 29, 1963.

⁵⁹² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. Editorial de Opinión. “Valdivia debe ser considerado.” Sep 29, 1963.

city and region behind. Valdivia already had international notoriety because of the earthquake and its long colonial history; many foreigners had visited the city in the recent year. The opinioned editorial suggested that if tourism was to become a viable industry in Valdivia, CORFO needed to plan and build hostels. Tourism as an economic opportunity was also pushed in other parts of the province.

Neighboring towns also posed opportunities for Valdivia's new endeavor, tourism. Ñiebla, a small fishing town southwest of the city of Valdivia, "lost nothing of its beauty except its beach as a result of the tsunami."⁵⁹³ Ñiebla had a beautiful natural forest and beaches that needed repair to attract the summer national tourists. The town also needed people since most of it was abandoned; without the people, there would be no infrastructure nor service workers for the tourist industry. Only the locals that had no families in other cities or long-standing roots remained in Ñiebla. Both its fishing industry and its natural beauty offered the town and the province an opportunity to exploit the tourist economy.

Corral experienced a spike in tourism after the 1960 Valdivia earthquake. Corral already had natural beauty and vistas that gained notoriety all over the nation and the world as many arrived in ships and docked in the bay. In 1963, more tourists visited Corral that year than the previous years since as Fray Juan B. Nuñez noted, many visitors still curious about the 1960 earthquake, no longer feared the possibility of any more tremblors or earthquakes.⁵⁹⁴ While tourists still arrived to visit the historical Gunship Port and enjoy the views, there were still remnants of the 1960 earthquake and tsunami. The streets were still filled with spooky legends and the large ovens for steel work lay abandoned and ruined, a sign of a once bustling port town.

⁵⁹³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Nada de su belleza perdió Ñiebla como balneario debido a maremoto." June 20, 1961.

⁵⁹⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Corral, 'El Puerto Artillado'" May 2, 1963.

The centerpiece of many a tourist's visit to Corral was the fort, San Sebastian Castle. At the entrance, posted signs asked people not to litter nor let animals in; many of those pleas had been ignored according to Nuñez. He described the fort, built in 1616, as being in shambles, with little respect paid to its history and its magnificent setting. However, these forts were protected as the Institute for Commemorative History of Chile named the fort a National Monument in 1960.⁵⁹⁵ Additionally, CORFO had also stepped in to help Valdivia's tourism industry by creating an ocean transportation system that roughly transported 200 people at a time from Valaparíso to Valdivia.⁵⁹⁶ Nuñez echoed many of the sentiments other leaders on the tourism board had already expressed before: Valdivia had to promote its natural environment and history as having a place both in Chile's past and future. But natural environment and history alone could not create a tourism buzz for Valdivia, it also desperately needed infrastructure.

In the commune of Marquina, just north of Valdivia, authorities planned their own tourism economy. The industrialist Jorge Andueza met with the regional tourism board of Valdivia and discussed the needs for San José de Marguina's tourism industry.⁵⁹⁷ For the board, the focus on camping in their rural beach town of Mehuín, a secluded reserve located twenty-six kilometers from San José de Marquina and on the Lingue River, would be the key to attract tourists.⁵⁹⁸ They believed their best advantage was to focus on camping as they had the natural environment and a reserve already in place. Another advantage was its proximity to Pichoy, the site of the planned national airport. Andueza also touted their accommodations in the area:

⁵⁹⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "E 175 mil para fuerte de Corral." September 24, 1969.

⁵⁹⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Corral, 'El Puerto Artillado'" by Fray Juan B. Nuñez Nieto. May 2, 1963.

⁵⁹⁷ By all accounts and many websites, Jorge Anueza Fouque, was a businessman from southern Chile. At the height of his career, Anueza became vice president of a lumber company, but also worked in the other business ventures, including energy. As previously mentioned, through the Agrarian Reform, tourism and lumber became intricately involved as Valdivia and the south needed both industries to coexist and flourish.

⁵⁹⁸ South of Mehuín, directly south is Niebla and Corral bay but the terrain makes it costly to construct a road from those towns.

Mehuín operated one hostel, while San José had two, Hotel Las Vegas and Río Bueno. He hoped that a loan from CORFO would help develop another hostel in Pelchuquin, a small town near the airport.⁵⁹⁹ Andueza advocated for the agriculture community stating that the Lingue river had great banks perfect for walks and boat rides. Mehuín, while it already had a camping site, needed more space as they filled quickly during the summer months, leaving many travelers to look elsewhere. He, like many of the experts before, also requested the pavement of roads between San José and Mehuín, and between the Cautín province to Mehuín. Paving and creating new roads became a common theme in the long list of detractors for the tourist economy. Another town in the province, Panguipulli, showed lots of potential for the tourist industry, but also needed paved roads and planning to flourish.

Panguipulli became an example of how the natural beauty of the region could create one of the most successful towns in southern Chile through tourism and agriculture. Panguipulli, located east of Valdivia, is on the border next to Argentina, in the Andean Lakes region. The town, established around 1939, started with one *Carabinero* (state police) post on a road with only three homes; it quickly flourished into a town focused on livestock and exports. Its fruit canning factory and livestock processing plant created a fluctuating population based on seasonal work. The town had a population of roughly eight thousand people, and its commerce was a direct result of its geography. Panguipulli, infamously located just north of Lake Riñihue, faced ongoing flooding and constant rising water from the lakes as the old dams from the 1960s earthquake did not allow for proper water flow. This resulted in millions of dollars in losses, as the rising water infringed on livestock lands and fruit orchards. These same lakes that caused problems, also created an influx of tourism, generating an urgent need for not only a road from

⁵⁹⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Camping en Mehuín, Necesidad Urgente: Fuerte Impulso Al Turismo Desea Darse en La Comuna de Marquina." Oct 10, 1963.

the interior of Chile, but also an international road to Argentina.⁶⁰⁰ The lobbying of San José and Panguipulli for a structural tourism plan was part of a larger push to bring tourism not only to the province, but to the south as an economic avenue toward recovery and development.

Solidifying the Tourist Industry

The authorities of the southern provinces decided to meet in the beginning of November 1963 and devise a plan for a tourist economy. The mayors of Malleco, Cautín, Valdivia, Osorno, and Llanquihue along with the Comité de Programación Económica y de Reconstrucción (Committee for Economic Programming and Reconstruction or COPERRE) gathered in Temuco to create the Southern Institute of Tourism.⁶⁰¹ This institute functioned as both a public and private enterprise to emphasize the region's rich flora, fauna, and hydrography to show Chileans the marvel of their country and to draw in international tourists as well.⁶⁰² Raúl Norambuena, executive secretary of COPERRE added, "that this area has similar physiographic factors, such as climate, flora, fauna, relief, hydrography, elements such as spas, ski slopes, sport fishing, natural beauties, customs, traditional hospitalities; all suitable for tourism."⁶⁰³ As others have emphasized, planning and organization were both warranted and key for a suitable tourist industry. Loans and financing were also necessary to build the needed infrastructure and hotels for the industry, but that could be integrated into the Reconstruction Law and CORFO was already contributing. However, Norambuena added something new, stating that they needed a solidified tourist route, offering tourists a guide for places to visit and stay. Tourism quickly

⁶⁰⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Panguipulli Clama Por la Solución de Problemas." Nov 30, 1963.

⁶⁰¹ *Development Research Review* (Research Evaluation and Planning Assistance Staff, Agency for International Development, 1962), 17.

⁶⁰² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Se Reunieron en Temuco Intendentes de 5 Provincias: Fue Acordada la Creación del Instituto de Turismo del Sur." November 2, 1963.

⁶⁰³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Se Reunieron en Temuco Intendentes de 5 Provincias: Fue Acordada la Creación del Instituto de Turismo del Sur." November 2, 1963.

became not only a viable industry for the south's reconstruction effort, but a necessary industry that provinces organized for their piece of the tourist economy.

Camping provided the province and the city of Valdivia the most immediate tourist opportunity, without much infrastructure or planning. For Chileans at the time, camping was a foreign word, but many planners and foreigners had introduced camping to Chilean society, and it quickly became the most viable form of immediate tourism. As the province prepared for the summer months, city officials took advantage of this new form of lodging. As officials stated, "the 'campsites' are campsites listed on the basis of their own individual or collective tents or provided by land acquired by the State Tourism Directorate and where the Municipalities will have the solution to carry out complementary works, such as hygienic services, entertainment parks, etc."⁶⁰⁴ Without any need for much infrastructure or facility, the province of Valdivia was able to welcome campers and promote a tourist economy that was not thought of or available before the 1960 earthquake. While tourism provided optimism and a potential band-aid for the Valdivian economy, the city needed more change than just its reconstruction and regional economic reconfiguration; the province of Valdivia needed political change that would better suit the ever-changing city instead of trying to recoup the past.

A Political Tidal Wave.

The early signs of a tectonic shift in Chile's political environment came in the municipal election of 1963. For three years, Alessandri and his allies in Santiago tried to reconstruct the south and the national economy. In Valdivia, the political leaders failed to advocate for their constituents and as the city recovered, many citizens left the region as opportunities and industries decided to rebuild elsewhere. It is important to point out that this dwindling hope of a

⁶⁰⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "El camping será la base de la promoción turística." December 20, 1963.

prosperous economy had been apparent since the 1950s, but the 1960 Valdivian earthquake revealed the economic fragility of the city and province. Valdivian legislators, many times, acted too late and many opportunities often went to other provinces, most notably Cautín to the north, and Llanquihue to the south.

The citizens of the province and the city of Valdivia voted for change in the 1963 municipal elections. This proved the first test for Alessandri and his legislative allies in both Santiago and the south. On April 7, 1963, 72,856 voters turned out in the city of Valdivia, among them 10,331 newly registered. Specifically, there were 47,733 men, 24,438 women, and 685 foreigners that voted in these municipal elections. Nationally, women outnumbered men in voter registration with 474,259 to 365,768 men. The *Correo de Valdivia* proudly made a note of all the women running for office, as the Christian Democrats led nationally with 143. In Valdivia, the Radical had six female candidates, Liberals five, Socialists four, Communists three, National Democrats three, and Christian Democrats two. While these were municipal elections, they were revolutionary in themselves because of the large voter registration and multiple female candidates—an indication of where things were headed.⁶⁰⁵ On April 8, the new officials were announced: the Radical Party maintained its seats, Conservatives and Liberals lost seats, and the other parties gained seats. The Socialists and Christian Democrats were the biggest winners in the city of Valdivia, with the Socialist getting 5,558 votes and three candidates and the Christian Democrats getting 4,560 votes and two candidates.⁶⁰⁶ The Christian Democrats elected Teodoro Segovia Rivera and Walter Neumann Gebauer.⁶⁰⁷ The Socialists elected Dr. Jorge Sabat Gozalo,

⁶⁰⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “47.733 varones, 24.438 mujeres y 685 extranjeros votan hoy en la Provincia.” Apr 7, 1963.

⁶⁰⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Jorge Sabat, T. Segovia, E. Villarroel, J. Huaquin Matamala, Espinoza, Neumann, Ochoa y Prochelle. Estos son los nuevos funcionarios electos del Municipio de Valdivia.” Apr 8, 1963.

⁶⁰⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Jorge Sabat, T. Segovia, E. Villarroel, J. Huaquin Matamala, Espinoza, Neumann, Ochoa y Prochelle. Estos son los nuevos funcionarios electos del Municipio de Valdivia.” Apr 8, 1963.

Carlos Espinoza Espinoza, and Noé Ochoa Coronado.⁶⁰⁸ This was a highly contested election with a lot at stake; the mayor of Valdivia thanked the citizens for keeping the civility of the election and city.

The political parties of the right were not pleased with the result. However, they respected what they called the Chilean Civic Culture, that is, democracy. The large turnout in the municipal election had to do with both the new law that allowed for more voters as well as the understandable frustration by much of the citizens with the slow reconstruction process. As the commentator in the newspaper stated,

In the national political structure for the new municipalities, the negative result of the extreme leftist forces does not escape citizen observation. It is a demonstration of the national democratic maturity and its vision in the face of dangerous overflows. It is possible that the new Municipalities arose dynamically, with new ideas and powers, with the composition that was given to them yesterday at the polls.⁶⁰⁹

El Correo de Valdivia leaned towards the conservative side on the political spectrum and the political commentator writing this article certainly pointed out the loss the right took during this election. While he did state that the rise of the left and the ability of people to vote in a large number of left-leaning candidates were part of the national democratic maturity, I instead choose to call it the evolution of 1960 Chilean politics, a peaceful and slow transition to nationally left-leaning politics. The congressional elections signaled a change. This evolution in Chile's political system was further demonstrated in the presidential elections when Julio Durán Neumann and Eduard Frei Montalva started their run in late 1963.

The rise of the moderates and the left in these municipal elections signaled an immediate change in the province and city. For Valdivia, reconstruction started too late and under Frei's

⁶⁰⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Jorge Sabat, T. Segovia, E. Villarroel, J. Huaquin Matamala, Espinoza, Neumann, Ochoa y Prochelle. Estos son los nuevos funcionarios electos del Municipio de Valdivia." Apr 8, 1963.

⁶⁰⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Cultura Cívica Chilena." Apr 8, 1963.

administration, the city and province took a step back while the newly elected president further reconfigured southern Chile for the betterment of the nation. This period between the earthquake and the next presidential elections, while stagnant for Valdivia's development, is an example of the microcosm of the larger political changes and reasons why Chile turned toward more left-leaning policies. Policies that seemed impossible and radical at the start of Alessandri's administration were now warranted, needed, and necessary for the survival of Valdivia, the south, and the nation. The earthquake that struck southern Chile on May 22, 1960 did not revolutionize Chile's politics alone, but instead showed the fragility of Chilean society and the need for the expansion of the central state and the incorporation of the working class to better prepare for further disasters.

Chapter 4 Conclusion

Eduardo Frei continued Alessandri's effort of incorporating the south. He sought to expand the Agrarian Reform and decentralize the central government by strengthening local agencies. This led to further weakening Valdivia as the unofficial capital of the south because the central government poured more money into Puerto Mont, Osorno and Temuco. This created havoc for Valdivia's leadership as they lost hope of reindustrializing the city; leaders started to consider tourism as a possible alternative for economic development. Valdivia's natural environment played a key role in the decisions made by both the central government and the leaders as they believed industrialization should be developed elsewhere for efficiency and transportation purposes.

Chapter 5

Transition of Power and Electoral Shift

Chapter 5 Introduction

Jorge Alessandri initiated the Agrarian Reform as a mild revolutionary answer to the south's reconstruction effort and attempt to fix the national economy. Eduardo Frei Montalva entered the 1964 presidential elections with his own radical answer encompassed in his campaign slogan, "Revolución en Libertad," or Revolution in Liberty. This slogan signaled an urgent need for change in Chilean society. While the nation was four years removed from the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, problems still persisted—highlighting the fragility of Chilean society.⁶¹⁰ The fact that Frei's presidential campaign slogan was so widely accepted by Chilean citizens proved unsettling to the right-leaning political parties who had once held office but had only demonstrated an inability to make real changes to the ailing nation. Frei took over a country not only ready for change, but for revolutionary transformation. Ultimately, his failure to understand the concept of revolution while the working class looked for "techo y trabajo," led to one of the most democratic nations electing their first socialist president, Salvador Allende, in 1970. The political aftershocks of the 1960 Valdivia earthquake only signaled the foreshocks of the revolutionary change Chile yearned for as Frei, like Alessandri, blundered in his attempt to create change in the nation for the betterment of the now politically charged working class.

Transition of Power and Electoral Shift

Jorge Alessandri initiated the Agrarian Reform as a mild reformist answer to the south's flagging reconstruction effort and attempt to fix the national economy. Eduardo Frei Montalva entered the 1964 Presidential Elections with his own, more radical answer, encompassed in his campaign slogan, "Revolución en Libertad," or Revolution in Liberty. This slogan or the popularity of it, certainly created an appeal for change in Chilean society. While the nation was

⁶¹⁰ I make a compelling argument how the earthquake disrupted Chilean society and showed its fragility in Chapter 4.

4 years removed from the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, the problems persisted, highlighting the fragility of Chilean society.⁶¹¹ The fact that Frei's presidential campaign slogan was so widely accepted by the Chilean citizens proved unsettling to the conservatives who once held office and demonstrated their inability to make real changes to the ailing nation. Frei took over a country ready not just for change, but revolutionary transformation. Ultimately, his engagement with the rhetoric of revolution while the working class looked for "techo y trabajo" led to one of the most democratic nations to elect the first socialist president, Salvador Allende, in 1970. The political aftershocks of the 1960 earthquake signaled a foreshock of the revolutionary change many Chileans yearned for, as Eduardo Frei, like Alessandri, failed to change the nation to the satisfaction of the now politically charged working and middle classes.

1964 signaled as a pivotal year for Valdivia and the nation, as voters helped elect a new president and made important decisions that helped keep them on par with neighboring regions. Much of the south, but more so Valdivia, was still recovering and rebuilding from the earthquake and tsunami. In addition, Alessandri's mismanagement of the nation's economy created problems for the conservatives, and his coalition of Liberal, Conservative, and Radical parties could no longer defend him or the next candidate if they sought a chance to win the 1964 Presidential election. While Puerto Montt, Concepción, Temuco, and the rising town of Osorno fared well during the initial recovery from the 1960 earthquake, Valdivia still lacked basic infrastructures such as roads, potable water, sewage system, and electricity in their newly built communities largely financed and planned by CORVI and CORFO. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the south and the nation united to reconstruct their society. However, as the elections loomed, that unity dwindled into a fight for resources and aid. All this spelled drama,

⁶¹¹ See Chapter 4.

conflict, and protest in both the city and in parliament as *Valdivianos* sought to regain the industry and prestige the city once held during its golden age in the early twentieth century.

Eduardo Frei's accession to presidency came from years of struggle in Chilean politics. Eduardo Frei, along with Salvador Allende, tried to gain the presidential seat in 1958, but Jorge Alessandri won because he was the son of former Chilean President, Arturo Alessandri, and ran as an independent drawing support from mainly the right-leaning parties in a nation tired of party politics at the time.⁶¹² Alessandri narrowly won with 31.6 percent, Allende came in second with 28.8 percent, and Frei last with 20.7 percent.⁶¹³ Between 1958 and 1964, Chilean legislators tried to fix many of the social ailments plaguing the nation, making it part of the reconstruction process, legislators passed reform, as many citizens gained the right to vote, were given the opportunity to own homes, and initiated the first peaceful Agrarian Reform all while the nation struggled to develop an economy that fostered jobs and growth. In 1964, Frei seemed to provide hope and safety for Chilean citizens, for both the left and right, while still touting the need for revolutionary transformation in the nation. Simultaneously, Allende made headway, coming in second with 38.9 percent of the vote and triple the votes he gained in 1958.⁶¹⁴ However, these numbers do not tell the entire story of how Frei won and Allende narrowly lost.

The earthquake and Alessandri's failed tenure created the conditions for Frei's win and Salvador Allende's loss. Besides the earthquake and the inability of Alessandri to regain control of the stagnant economy, three variables opened the door for structural reform. First, Chile incorporated the working class and rural population through voter registration and

⁶¹² J. Samuel Valenzuela, "The Origins and Transformations of the Chilean Party System" (Notre Dame, Ind.: Kellogg Institute: The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1995), 40.

⁶¹³ Dieter Nohlen and Professor of Political Science Dieter Nohlen, *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook: Volume 2 South America* (OUP Oxford, 2005), 262.

⁶¹⁴ Nohlen and Nohlen, 262.

reconstruction in the south.⁶¹⁵ Second, Allende's coalition, the *Frente Acción Popular* (Popular Action Front or FRAP), gained popularity and political seats in many cities, including Valdivia and Santiago. Last, the momentum that the FRAP gained frightened the conservative parties, putting their efforts in Eduardo Frei's candidacy instead of Julio Durán's campaign. Eduardo Frei's victory is more of a testament to the momentum and popularity the Socialist Party and Communist Party gained during the four years since the earthquake than to Frei's campaign promises. For the conservatives, Frei was a lesser threat than Allende.

The situation in 1964 Chile allowed for Frei and the Christian Democrats to take office. The Christian Democrats rose out of the 1940s as an answer to social needs. With a Catholic background paving the way for their political ideology, they grounded their beliefs in fixing social issues by helping the working class. Paternalistic in nature, socially progressive Christian Democrats took the opportunity to hold office in 1964 as the conservatives ran out of answers and the FRAP gained support. Criticism of Alessandri's government eroded support for the established right. In an editorial piece published on January 10th, 1964, criticized the government for "inflationism and economic disarticulation." The author of the piece insisted on "a stronger and more tenacious opposition to the exaggerated pressure from groups, to contain the inflationary train." Further explaining that "it will be necessary to meditate deeply on new tax deals, formulas and impositions to remedy an evil that is acquiring relief of unsuspected magnitude."⁶¹⁶ The author goes on to add that Alessandri's government had been opportunistic and lacked real solutions to "problems that are known to be acute, serious, socially, economically, morally and humanely."⁶¹⁷ While it is true that there was much progress made by

⁶¹⁵ Much of this is discussed at length in Chapter 4.

⁶¹⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia* (Valdivia: Impr. El Correo de Valdivia, 1895), col. "Inflacionismo y desarticulación económica." Jan 10, 1964.

⁶¹⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Inflacionismo y desarticulación económica." Jan 10, 1964.

the Allesandri administration, they had barely made a dent in the larger problems plaguing the south and the nation; Valdivia was a microcosm of these various problems.

Community Activism

A nonpolitically affiliated group emerged out of this frustration called the Committee for Unity in January of 1964. This group made up of union leaders, industrialist, capitalist, and agriculturalist first met on January 15th, 1964 to discuss plans on how they would garner national attention to the various ailments Valdivia was experiencing. This evolved into a call for a work stoppage of the entire city on the 17th, of January. At 3 pm, all commercial activities, including office and industrial paused so people could focus their attention to the Plaza de Pedro de Valdivia, where activists spoke about the future of the province. The Committee for Unity organized this work stoppage, which they stated to be an “expression of the anguish that afflicts a whole people in the face of pressing problems that have not had the resonance expected from the respective authorities.”⁶¹⁸ They invited all parliamentary representatives and senators to come and speak about the actions they would take for the province. Those who gathered then marched to public places, including parks and political offices, as well as associations and unions to show support. Many members of smaller towns arrived to also show their frustration and displeasure with the current government’s action. While Alessandri could not run for a consecutive second term, this was also a show of political force to any incoming administration, as 1964 was an election year. Valdivian politicians from Santiago arrived for this political rally; this included senators Exequiel Gonzalez Madariaga (Radical Party) and Carlos Contreras Labarca (Communist Party), along with Representatives Inés Enriquez (Radical Party), Gastón Da Bove (Radical Party) and Carlos Altamirano (Socialist Party). This was an addition to Julio

⁶¹⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Lo Motiva la Aflictiva Situación Económica: Valdivia Paraliza Actividades.” Jan 17, 1964.

von Mühlenbrock, Senator Sergio Sepúlveda, and Aniceto Rodríguez along with Nicanor Allende who were already in the region. Members of Central Unica de Trabajadores also attended the rally. While this rally was planned as a single event, the committee members scheduled monthly meetings to talk about the ongoing problems and find solutions. It was the actions of this committee, not the politicians, that pushed and lobbied for change for Valdivia.

This rally sought to highlight the specific problems Valdivia faced, as they were complex and intertwined with the Alessandri government's reconstruction of the south. An Op-ed piece, published two days after, stated that "the labor forces of commerce, industry and agriculture...stop to raise their voice in their belief that they will be heard in their just aspirations for better treatment, better prospects for their concern and eagerness for progress."⁶¹⁹ The author goes on to state that

Fundamentally, these problems constitute: the judicial collection for delinquent debts of taxes, contributions and impositions in the pension funds; CORVI dividend readjustment; readjustment of CORFO loans: loans from victims to private, public and worker employees; judicial executions in the Department of Río Bueno and throughout the province; the adjustments in dollars of the internments of taxi drivers, bus drivers, truckers and taxi drivers, etc.⁶²⁰

Institutions such as CORVI and CORFO had been integral in rebuilding the south and helping the working class get back into proper homes; however, these institutions had not adjusted to the stagnating economy and growing inflation. On the other side of the spectrum, the central government kept charging and collecting taxes from industrialists who had not recovered from the 1960 earthquakes. A statistic referenced by the op-ed author, he/she stated that out of the thirty industries in the area, only fourteen were currently active. Before the earthquake, five thousand people worked to sustain themselves and maintain their commerce. They asked that

⁶¹⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Un clamor angustioso de la provincia." Jan 17, 1964.


⁶²⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Un clamor angustioso de la provincia." Jan 17, 1964.

the government finish the large public works projects, stop the collection of taxes until it had and found a way to boost reconstruction of the local economy, create new jobs, construct the new IANSA, *Industria Azucarera Nacional*, plant and fishing the port.⁶²¹ Valdivianos did ask for special treatment, as they had fallen behind the rest of the region in the reconstruction process.

The work stoppage and rally signaled a turning point in Valdivia's long struggle for reconstruction as citizens demanded action on all problems plaguing the province. Santiago Hube organized the successful rally and parade, which brought together many citizens and politicians; however, the committee had always stated it was leaderless and strictly a committee. As Hube explained, simply put "it was intended, in this way, to make public a protest against the difficult situation that the city is experiencing in all kinds of donations that have not been normalized since the 1960 earthquake."⁶²² In all, the rally lasted from 3 until 8pm, when the leaders along with local politicians participated in a round table to discuss the problems and find solutions. These leaders, not known by their names, but as a committee, further pushed for progress throughout the following years, taking multiple trips and gaining meetings with prominent politicians, along with soon-to-be President Eduardo Frei.

⁶²¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Un clamor angustioso de la provincia." Jan 17, 1964.

⁶²² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Un clamor angustioso de la provincia." Jan 18, 1964.



Two politicians that took notice of the public outcry were senator Julio von Mühlenbrock and representative Nicanor Allende Urrutia. Both elected to office in 1961, part of the Liberal Party, and the Democratic Front Coalition, respectively; they quickly acted once they met with the Committee for Unity. Their first order of action included taking a stand in favor of reindustrializing Valdivia. Senator von Mühlenbrock became the main proponent of this plan as he met with party members, legislating a plan for Valdivia. He gained support by all the legislators from the liberal party and the region. Both von Mühlenbrock and Nicanor Allende started meeting with institutions such as CORFO, to legislate deals such as rejuvenating the fishing industry in Corral as well as rebuilding the Rudloff shoe factory.⁶²³

⁶²³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Impulsan Nuevas Industrias: FD Respalda a Fuerzas del Trabajo de Valdivia." Jan 22, 1964.



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The Valdivian legislators gained momentum after a month of lobbying in parliament and with institutions. Under Carlos Guzmán and Julio von Mühlenbrock, they celebrated an important session with the Democratic Front coalition, made up of the Liberal, Radical, and Conservative parties, representing Valdivia. The regional coalition agreed on a few tasks to tackle in the coming months. First, they wanted to open the Caja de Provision de Empleadores Particulares (Bank of Private Sector Employees) also de Empleados Publicos y Periodistas (Public Workers and Journalists). They also planned on going directly go to the president of the Bank of Chile and lobby to focus on the city of Valdivia. In a statement released to the public, they explained that they wanted “to reiterate the National Command of the FD (Democratic Front), the requests formulated in the memorandum sent lately in order to find a prompt solution to the problems of our province.”⁶²⁴ Nicanor Allende met with the Minister of Public Works and asked for attention on Valdivia. He mostly asked the Minister to finish work on roads and the

⁶²⁴ Galaz Eduardo and Cristóbal McIntosh, “Ruinas Fábrica Rudloff,” Huella Isla Teja, accessed March 20, 2022, <https://huellaislateja.cl/ruinas-fabrica-rudloff/>.

⁶²⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “En actividad parlamentario del bloques: El Frente Democrático impulsara la instalación de Fabrica Fertilizantes.” Feb 22, 1964.

construction of a gym for the community of Gil de Castro, an important public space for the working-class community built mostly after the 1960 earthquakes.⁶²⁶ This all happened in the midst of the presidential election year, while the Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Communist Parties gained strength in the public arena. As local politicians looked towards the national government to blame for Valdivia's degrading economy, others blamed institutions such as banks, CORFO and CORVI.

Starting in March of 1964, Banks, CORFO, and CORVI adjusted, stopped, and in some cases refused to grant anymore credit, paralyzing much of Valdivia's economy and society. At the heart of the problem lay the lack of currency circulation as many could not make deposits, let alone pay debt because of the lack of jobs in the regions. In an anonymous editorial published in *El Correo* and *SUPERSUR*, the author explained the dire need for the flow of credit. As stated, there was an urgent need for national credit as Valdivia ran out of money. This happened because "despite the urgent need to give more credit so that the financing of the working man is not paralyzed, we have that commercial banks have been unable to serve their customers because deposits and loans have remained stationary."⁶²⁷ Further aggravating this situation was the fact that, "once the one-year term that was granted had expired, the transfer to the Banco del Estado of the funds maintained by the municipalities had to be fulfilled."⁶²⁸ This would essentially leave Valdivia with absolutely no cash in its banks. While on the surface the nation seemed to progress since the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, and progress was truly being made, this so-called progress and the mismanagement of Alessandri's government exacerbated underlying conditions such as credit flow, a problem Valdivia faced since 1950s.⁶²⁹ More than ever, during

⁶²⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Recaba soluciones diputado Nicanor Allende." Feb 23, 1964.

⁶²⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Clamor por mejores condiciones crediticias." Mar 1, 1964.

⁶²⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Clamor por mejores condiciones crediticias." Mar 1, 1964.

⁶²⁹ I detail this ongoing problem in my first chapter.

an election year, government institutions were criticized as Alessandri's reconstruction effort had failed to provide adequate relieve to the working class and rural population.

Emerging Working Class and Political Turmoil

Working-class empowerment was felt and seen in voter registration leading up to the 1964 Presidential Elections. In less than one year alone, since June of 1963, 6,974 women registered to vote in Valdivia alone.⁶³⁰ Margret Power in her article, "The Engendering of Anticommunism and Fear in Chile's 1964 Presidential Election," makes a compelling argument stating that the U.S. used "ideas about femininity and masculinity into its efforts to oppose Allende, [in a] U.S.-sponsored propaganda campaign [that] engendered anticommunism in Chile," that lead to Frei's victory in September of 1964.⁶³¹ From an internal micro perspective, looking only at Valdivia as an example, while the notion that women did push Frei over Allende toward victory is valid, Power's uncertainty on the "quantifiable" effectiveness of US paid propaganda makes it is especially important to look at the local problems, rumblings, and politics. This is especially important in the south such as a province and city as Valdivia which was four years removed from the the earthquakes and also empowered at the same time dissapointed by Alessandri's reforms and not influenced by a foreign nation.⁶³² If anything, both the middle and working class of the south would have some a problem with the US as its aid infringed on their ability to get fair prices in their own Chilean markets.⁶³³ The main problem with Power's argument, as admitted, these propaganda campaigns targeted the conservative elite

⁶³⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Mayor Numero de Mujeres." Mar 14, 1964.; Margaret Power, "The Engendering of Anticommunism and Fear in Chile's 1964 Presidential Election," *Diplomatic History* 32, no. 5 (2008): 931-53.

⁶³¹ Power, "The Engendering of Anticommunism and Fear in Chile's 1964 Presidential Election," 931.

⁶³² Power, 951.

⁶³³ There is a variety of problems, including the lack of credits that is somewhat dependent on the US, while funneled by the United Nations, as well as its lack of industrialization, which many US companies decide to build factories in Santiago and not in the south.

and the middle class.⁶³⁴ Left out of the conversation were the new voters, the working class and rural population, benefiting from Alessandri's push for progress, through the Agrarian Reform and reconstruction, who do not have access to the mediums employed by the US in their quest to defeat Salvador Allende in 1964. From an internal standpoint, what changed between January and September of 1964 were the change of positions from the middle class, the elites, and its local politicians, such as Julio von Mühlenbrock and Nicanor Allende, both part of the Liberal Party and Democratic Front Coalition. Instead of praising Alessandri's reconstruction progress, they criticized it and the government's institutions, while seeking deals with Eduardo Frei instead of the Radical Party Candidate, Julio Durán.

On March 17, 1964, Julio Durán rattled the nation with his announcement that he submitted his withdraw from the 1964 presidential elections. On the surface, as Margret Power explains and the national media emphasized, a FRAP (Frente de Acción Popular) socialist candidate, Óscar Gastón Naranjo Arias won a special congressional election in Curicó in a landslide held in March 1964, replacing his father, who had just died in 1963, "in a district long considered to be the preserve of the conservative, land-owning elite;" this became known as "El Naranjazo."⁶³⁵ However, this does not account for the political tidal wave building after the 1960 Valdivia earthquake.

As I argue in the pervious chapter, the emergence of the working class and rural population as political actors with demands around voting, land, and human rights, propelled a

⁶³⁴ Power, "The Engendering of Anticommunism and Fear in Chile's 1964 Presidential Election," 939.

⁶³⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Julio Durán entregó la renuncia a su postulación presidencial." Mar 17, 1964; Power, "The Engendering of Anticommunism and Fear in Chile's 1964 Presidential Election," 933; BCN Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, "Oscar Gastón Naranjo Arias. Reseñas Biográficas Parlamentarias," Text, bcn.cl (BCN. Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2020), https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Oscar_Gastón_Naranjo_Arias. Power referenced his name as Jamie Naranjo, but as I crossed referenced him with newspapers and congressional records, his actual name is Óscar Gastón Naranjo Arias.

political push for a more leftist government. Many political allies, including Valdivia's very own legislators, gave up on Alessandri's administration, leaving Valdivia in shambles and without an industry four years after the earthquake and tsunamis. Julio Durán, senator from Cautín, just north of Valdivia, had seemed like the perfect candidate to take on the reconstruction efforts in the south and tackle the struggling economy. The new voting population had made their voices heard, not just in Curicó, but in many regional and national elections. Their backgrounds as working class and rural people is why Power's argument of US aided propaganda seemed useless in the face of the more than 1.5 million newly registered voters who may have not had access to any of these mediums.⁶³⁶ As one critical journalist argued, "the main lesson [learned from Curicó was] that the Marxist forces have managed to penetrate the rural masses and also the city using the ignorance and the difficult economic situation of vast sectors of the people who demand a change and do not care if it is at the price of losing their freedom."⁶³⁷ The anonymous journalist was very concerned blaming duplicitous communism and not the conditions in the nation for the tide of political change.

This is precisely why it is important to account for the physical and political damage the 1960 Valdivia earthquake took on the nation. The 1960 Valdivia earthquake was only a foreshock pushing Chilean elites and politicians toward social change that Alessandri implemented softly, leading to electoral reforms, Agrarian Reform, and the continuous call for further social economic reforms. These political voices in the newspapers supported the more conservative politicians to do the same job and legislate for the same laws that had not worked, but further put the working and rural people into debt. In the following months, only the Radical Party of Valdivia stood behind Julio Durán, who they convinced to come back and run for

⁶³⁶ Donald W. Bray, "Chile Enters a New Era," *Current History* 48, no. 281 (January 1965): 23.

⁶³⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Dramática encrucijada plantea el comunismo." Mar 17, 1964.

president. The Liberal and Conservatives parties vote stood in support of Eduardo Frei in the 1964 presidential election, fearful of an Allende victory.

The fallout of the Curicó elections showed the disconnect between legislators and the new rural political voice. For over a month, a political battle ensued in the newspapers, with Nicanor Allende defending Julio Durán and Salvador Allende answering questions about the government he would instill if elected. As Salvador Allende stated in the national newspaper, his government would be “democratic, popular, and national.”⁶³⁸ Later in March of 1964, in an opinion editorial in *El Correo de Valdivia*, one writer stated that “the result of the electoral outcome in Curicó marked urgency of [fixing the agrarian reform], since it was felt that the [working-class] were the voice of the figures failed, it was not so much in the urban radius of the head of the province, but in the rural tables.”⁶³⁹ The result of the Curicó elections showed the need to further the Agrarian Reform, in particular the power of the working-rural class, who now had a strong voice in politics. The author of the piece, rather than asking to roll back the Agrarian Reform, suggests rather a push for the expropriation of more land, showing the need and effect of the legislation. The author further states that “the peasant voter, more than the one who lives and works in the city, yielded to the Marxist-inspired sermons that offered him heaven on earth and, first and foremost, the distribution of land.”⁶⁴⁰ In this case, the conservatives, led by Alessandri, needed to change the narrative and show these rural farmers who was actually fighting and legislating for them in Santiago. It is difficult to pinpoint how these rural people were influenced, but certainly the results of the Curicó election showed the power of the emerging rural working farmer that wanted an expanded Agrarian Reform.

⁶³⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “El recurso de Allende.” Mar 21, 1964.

⁶³⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Reforma Agraria Interna.” Mar 23, 1964.

⁶⁴⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Reforma Agraria Interna.” Mar 23, 1964.

Part of the working-class voting trend can be explained by the migration of those displaced in the south, traveling to cities looking for work. One of the theories of the spread of Marxist ideology came from foreign aid field workers in the communities called “callampas” in larger cities such as Valparaíso and Santiago.⁶⁴¹ In a task force report, taken from the preliminary studies for the Chile-California program, a field worker stated that “this group of people [callampa dwellers] – about 140,000 around Santiago – also are being actively worked on by Communist agents and our own Peace Corps people, but the Communist [made headway], by selling the idea of a better life, are quite a bit ahead so far.”⁶⁴² Under Alessandri, while people were granted many concessions, lagging public works projects had not given southern provinces the economic boost to rebuild a strong industrial economy, leaving many to abandon their province and migrate to major cities looking for work. Therefore, the 1964 Presidential elections became a pivotal political year for the newly registered voters as for the first time in Chilean history, they have been given a voice and a vote to influence their future. This was the birth of their chance for social economic equality and the power to shape the trajectory of their province.

Battle for IANSA

The CORFO backed IANSA, *Industria Azucarera Nacional*, sugar beet processing factory became one of the most sought-after public works projects in the southern region.⁶⁴³ The IANSA factory had benefits far reaching beyond its ability to employ citizens of the provinces. It also added value to any land surrounding the factory, provide further economic independence for the nation by potentially reducing sugar imports, and create more opportunities for public

⁶⁴¹ Callampas are mushroom communities of workers coming from rural parts of the nation or other cities, in particular the south, looking for works in other cities such as Concepción and Santiago.

⁶⁴² W.J. Kuhrt, “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Report on Trip to Chile February 23, 1963 - March 7, 1963.,” March 7, 1963, 6, California Archives.

⁶⁴³ Joshua Frens-String, *Hungry for Revolution: The Politics of Food and the Making of Modern Chile* (Univ of California Press, 2021), 99–100.

work as needed, such as roads accessing rural areas. As the Christian Democrat Deputy stated in the Chamber, Luis Papic Ramos, as he made the case for Valdivia to get the IANSA plant, “this was especially important in the south and would bring much benefit for those affected by the 1960 earthquake.”⁶⁴⁴ The planning and push for the sugar beet factory started long before the 1964 Chilean Presidential elections, but the next president eventually had the final say on which province would gain a new industry and factory.

Valdivianos started lobbying for the new IANSA factory in May of 1963, believing that the provinces provided ample advantages to IANSA. The proposed plant in the south would be the fourth sugar beet plant in the nation. Héctor Núñez, President of the Bank of Valdivia, spoke to a reporter from *El Correo de Valdivia*, highlighting that the province had been producing plenty of milk and beef, proving itself a productive region. Núñez further argued that building the sugar plant in the province, would not only benefit Valdivia, but also the nation, as it drew more industries to the recovering region. For Valdivia, the IANSA sugar beet factory represented more opportunities, as he said, “its importance, at the moment, is vital, since it allows us to go on discovering new fields that were once prosperous for the province and that nature snatched in full development.”⁶⁴⁵ Núñez referenced the earthquake as a major turning point for Valdivia industrial development. For Valdivia, the IANSA factory was a beacon of hope for development in a province eager for industry.

In June of 1963, the Committee for the Recuperation and Progress of Valdivia traveled to Santiago to lobby directly for the construction of the IANSA sugar processing factory. Two

⁶⁴⁴ Cámara de Diputados, “Sesión 11, Ordinaria, En Miércoles 19 de Junio de 1963” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, June 19, 1963), 758, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, https://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/8254/1/C19630619_11.pdf.

⁶⁴⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Valdivia offers exceptional advantages for the IANSA factory.” May 31, 1963.

important members of that committee included Santiago Menz, a beet farmer from Paillaco, and Hector Núñez, the president of the Bank of Valdivia. Menz “documented in an exposition that Valdivia has one of the most favorable environments for the cultivation of the root,”⁶⁴⁶ while Núñez extolled the potential economic benefits to both the region and the nation. The committee members also read a letter from Walter Reccius, the representative of the Lions Club, emphasizing the “historical, technical, economic, statistical, geographical, social reasons [along with] sentimental and promotional reasons,” for putting the factory in Valdivia.⁶⁴⁷ It is notable that it was not political representatives that were lobbying for the IANSA sugar beet factory, but working-class people and members of the community. After three years of hoping for change brought by the politicians, the citizens of Valdivia took it upon themselves to bring change to the city, region, and the province. For Valdivia, the IANSA sugar beet factory became a struggle to rejuvenate its industrial complex as other surrounding cities, such as Puerto Montt, Temuco, and Osorno gained concessions while Santiago legislators reconfigured the south for the economic development of the nation.

Chile’s venture into the beet sugar industry had started with research in 1942 with the help of CORFO and the inception of IANSA.⁶⁴⁸ IANSA, started a decade earlier in 1953 with the help of the United States’s Joint Mission to Chile of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United

⁶⁴⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Commission will Travel to Santiago to ask for the building of the IANSA Factory.” June 1, 1963.

⁶⁴⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Commission will Travel to Santiago to ask for the building of the IANSA Factory.” June 1, 1963.

⁶⁴⁸ “Chile-California Program Records: Task Force Records. February - December 1963; Chile-California Program of Technical Cooperation Report of Third California Task Force,” January 1964, 9, California Archives.

Nations. In 1952, The United States released a report recommending that two sugar mills would be considered in Los Ángeles, Temuco, or Osorno.⁶⁴⁹ The experts of this mission considered

sugarbeets a very worthwhile addition to crop rotation and the fodder resources of the country. Recognizing this, the Chilean Government has already begun establishment of one sugar factory in Los Angeles. This may possibly be followed by a second unit near the end of the period of the program; Temuco and Osorno offer the best sites. Total investment in this industry by the end of 1960 is estimated at 800 million pesos, half of it in foreign exchange.⁶⁵⁰

Therefore, beet sugar offered Chile an alternative to cane sugar, grown in the Caribbean or more humid areas. It also provided Chile with an opportunity to enter the sugar export business. The next sugar beet factory meant a lot for any province and the nation, therefore becoming a highly sought-after industry.

The building of the next sugar beet factory created competition as provinces and its legislators lobbied for this opportunity. The province of Ñuble, directly north of Concepción and just in the southern region of the nation, had one such strong opponent in Tomás Pablo, who wanted the factory in his province.⁶⁵¹ Competition became fierce by June of 1964 as representatives from Curicó lobbied for the next IANSA processing plant.⁶⁵² With so much competition, Valdivianos started getting anxious over the possibility of losing the factory to another province. It became pivotal, even though the decision would more than likely come down to the next president, to lobby directly for the IANSA plant. A call to action was put publicly through an opinion editorial in *El Correo de Valdivia*. The author stated that it was time that for senators and representatives to do all that they could to get the IANSA plant built in the

⁶⁴⁹ Mission to Study the Agricultural Development of Chile, *The Agricultural Economy of Chile: Joint Mission to Chile of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations* (Washington, 1952), 60.

⁶⁵⁰ Mission to Study the Agricultural Development of Chile, 233.

⁶⁵¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “¿En qué quedamos?” Feb 7, 1964.

⁶⁵² Senado, “Sesión 03, Ordinaria, En Martes 16 de Junio de 1964” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, June 16, 1964), 117–19, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, https://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/62860/1/S19640616_03.pdf.

province to boost the agriculture in the region. The plant meant the possibility of more production, as the “crop also means more meat, more milk, more wheat, more purchasing power of the agricultural worker to at least double their income would give, more nutritive value of the soil ensuring a promising future for the self-sufficiency of food in the country, giving the basis to all plans CORFO, such as the promotion of livestock, dairy, pigs, pastured, etc.”⁶⁵³ The significance of the IANSA plant for the future of Valdivia cannot be overstated. The author reminds readers that IANSA was created to promote the development of agriculture and in its very nature and ideology, IANSA fit well in the province of Valdivia and its current mission of development.⁶⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the IANSA sugar beet factory represented an opportunity that many provinces yearned for at the end of Alessandri’s presidency.

As the presidential elections neared lobbying for the IANSA plant intensified. In August of 1964, The Valdivian Committee of Commerce and Industry, SAVAL, the Association of Industry, The Committee for Unity (the group that created that work stoppage), Agronomic Center of Valdivia, Center for Progress of Paillaco, and other organizations joined forces to lobby CORFO to bring the sugar refinery plant to Valdivia as their fight for Justice for Valdivia and bring back the productivity the province had before the 1960 earthquakes.⁶⁵⁵ In a congressional session in April of 1964, Senator Von Mühlenbrock reminded the President, the House, and Chamber that CORFO estimated on June 21, 1960, the province of Valdivia had lost the most in terms of industry, estimated at the value of 8.642.595 escudos.⁶⁵⁶ Von Mühlenbrock reminded the house that these were early estimates and things had drastically changed for the

⁶⁵³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Justa aspiración de agricultores valdivianos.” Apr 1, 1964.

⁶⁵⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Justa aspiración de agricultores valdivianos.” Apr 1, 1964.

⁶⁵⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Comisión de Agrónomos evacuará informe técnico.” Aug 4, 1964.

⁶⁵⁶ Senado, “Sesión 40, Especial, En Jueves 2 de Abril de 1964” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, Abril 1964), 3189, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, https://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/62860/1/S19640616_03.pdf. Concepción hovered at a close second with 6.546.487 escudos; all the other southern provinces hovered around 1 million escudos.

worse. Therefore, Von Mühlenbrock and other interest groups from Valdivia started to actively lobby the soon-to-be president Eduardo Frei in hopes he would bring change to dire situation in Valdivia.

Frei's Betrayal

Eduardo Frei brought hope for many *Valdivianos*, who believed that he would be an ally in the rebuilding process. Frei continued the reconfiguration of Chile by reorganizing the south for the betterment of the economy and the struggling classes of Chile. This meant putting cities like Puerto Montt, Osorno, and Temuco at the forefront of the south's industrial complex. *Valdivianos* did not want to be left behind in this reindustrialization of the south, therefore; *Valdivianos* offered support and certain victory to Frei in exchange for the IANSA sugar beet factory.

The construction of the IANSA sugar beet plant in Valdivia was one of the promises Frei made to the citizens of Valdivia and its legislators. Immediately after Frei's victory over Allende, Patricio Recabarren Valenzuela, the General Secretary of the National committee under Frei's newly elected administration, stated that one of Frei's first objectives would be the IANSA plant in Valdivia. More specifically, he oversaw the south's development, from O'Higgins region to Aysén. Leading up to the election he had traveled throughout the south and put particular attention on Valdivia. "My job," he stated, "consisted mainly of giving political orientation to the campaign; to help the provincial directors and to help solve the problems of the area and the last month he remained in Valdivia, responding to that weakness that emerged."⁶⁵⁷ He calculated that he and his team gained between 4 to 5 thousand votes in the province of Valdivia.⁶⁵⁸ Reflecting Margaret Power's argument of the magnitude of women's voting power,

⁶⁵⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Patricio Recabarren analiza plan básico de obras." Sept 9, 1964.

⁶⁵⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Patricio Recabarren analiza plan básico de obras." Sept 9, 1964.

Recabarren stated that women “offered us [their] unconditional support in magnitude that exceeded the most optimistic calculations.”⁶⁵⁹ Most importantly, they wanted to focus on improving the lives of the working class, which in the urban level, had very low population; most of the working class lived and worked in the rural setting. He and his team noted three things that Frei need to do to win the elections in Valdivia: first, intensify the agricultural reform and development, including building the IANSA plant; second, build more industrial facilities, and accelerate road development.⁶⁶⁰ Finally, he stated that “within the national development plan, [they] estimate that Valdivia should be an expansion center to which zonal production flows, and its subsequent distribution to the north and south, between the south of the Malleco province and even the inclusive province of Osorno so that they can channel its exploitation through Valdivia’s port.”⁶⁶¹ Patricio Recabarren and his team helped put Valdivia on Frei’s radar, as they made the Christian Democrats understand the importance of a seemingly forgotten province that once held the key to the South’s industrial power.⁶⁶²

On September 4, 1964, the citizens of Chile voted Eduardo Frei as their next president. The 1960 earthquake and its resulting reconstruction legislation paved the way for civil rights of hundreds of thousands disenfranchised Chileans. While the US and its allies supported Chile and its reconstruction of the south with ample aid, the effects of these influences are complicated and it’s better to look at this election internally.⁶⁶³ There are two ways of looking at Frei’s victory over Allende. First, Frei won because Allende’s opponents consolidated behind Frei to

⁶⁵⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Patricio Recabarren analiza plan básico de obras.” Sept 9, 1964.

⁶⁶⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Patricio Recabarren analiza plan básico de obras.” Sept 9, 1964.

⁶⁶¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Patricio Recabarren analiza plan básico de obras.” Sept 4, 1964.

⁶⁶² This is certainly a strong statement, but Fabián Almonacid and I have argued the importance of Valdivia’s industry during its golden age in the early twentieth century; my first chapter centers on this argument.

⁶⁶³ James Lockhart, “How Effective Are Covert Operations The CIA’s Intervention in Chile, 1964-73,” *Marine Corps University Press Quantico United States*, May 15, 2019, 30. Lockhart provide in great detail about the ineffectiveness of US aid on the 1964 election. He does not mention the 1960 earthquake nor the legislative reforms that allowed for so many of the working class the ability to vote.

stop what looked like a likely Allende victory, especially after the Curicó municipal elections and four years of slow reconstruction in the south. Second, Frei promised and hoped to provide the next step in the reforms that Alessandri had initiated, one in line with all classes of Chilean society. There are strong cases to be made for both views, but certainly there is a mix of the two and only the voters who went to the ballot boxes that day will truly know. But the fact remains, more voices were heard in the 1964 elections than any of the nation's previous elections, making it truly a democratic victory.⁶⁶⁴

Frei's victory did not mean a guarantee for the IANSA plant in Valdivia. Lobbying continued well after the presidential elections. Another group involved in the negotiations and lobbying for the IANSA was the Agronomic Center of Valdivia, which argued that Valdivia's current situation, with much land and farmers, gave Valdivia an advantage for getting the IANSA plant built in the provinces.⁶⁶⁵ This group did recognize Alessandri's contribution to the south and the national economy recovery, stating that "the Government of President Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez has fought to provide the population with a higher rate of mass consumption, and it is necessary that his successor does not waste the great effort that has already been made."⁶⁶⁶ President Frei agreed with this statement, but also believed that there was a big debt owed to the people of the provinces after the economic collapse following the 1960 earthquakes.⁶⁶⁷ While Frei publicly touted these projects and promised change in the south, his policies and cabinet proved problematic, putting at risk the IANSA plant and the provinces.

⁶⁶⁴ "Chile: International IDEA," International IDEA Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, accessed March 20, 2022, <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/79/40>. According to the website, the 1964 elections had a 86.8 % turnout with 2,915,121 registered to vote and 4,585,680 eligible.

⁶⁶⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Campaña por una Planta 'IANSA' en la Provincia." Oct 6, 1964.

⁶⁶⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Campaña por una Planta 'IANSA' en la Provincia." Oct 6, 1964.

⁶⁶⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Interés del Presidente Frei: Próximo Año se Inicia Construcción de la Planta IANSA en La Provincia." Dec 9, 1964.

Frei offered hope and renewed energy in providing progressive legislation to the country. However, the six years of his presidency opened the door for Salvador Allende to gain the presidential seat in 1970. Frei's inconsistencies first started with his administration rejecting the financial plan for Valdivia's IANSA plant. This occurred just a month after he was inaugurated into Chile's Presidential office, as Valdivia's legislators, spearhead by Nicanor Allende and Julio von Mühlenbrock along with a joint budget committee, came up with the finances needed for the IANSA sugar beet factory. This budget was quickly turned down by the Minister of Finance, Sergio Molina, leaving the legislation in doubt.⁶⁶⁸ Both Allende and von Mühlenbrock called on parliament to reject the veto and go along with building the plant at the same time fearing that Frei would formally veto the budget plan.

On January 7th, 1965, the congress overrode President Frei's veto of the budget that included the IANSA plant. Once again Julio von Mühlenbrock and Nicanor Allende Urrutia were at the forefront of overriding the veto that the newly elected President exercised. The IANSA plant was estimated to cost 2.5 million escudos, but it had far reaching implications for the region, as the IANSA plant signaled an investment that included infrastructure and a guaranteed desirable product.⁶⁶⁹ Senator von Mühlenbrock explained that "An IANSA factory not only employs the personnel who work in it, but it expands and prolongs agricultural work, stimulates transportation, and due to its incidence in livestock and dairy, it occupies a number no less than ten thousand people, when it is in full gear."⁶⁷⁰ Senator von Mühlenbrock went further, stating that "the province of Valdivia has no other economic solution if it is not the sugar

⁶⁶⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "En comisión mixta de presupuestos – Ministro de Hacienda vetó moción para financiar la planta IANSA." Dec 31, 1964.

⁶⁶⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Memorable y Laboriosa fue gestión Parlamentario para rechazar veto al aporte de la planta 'IANSA.'" Jan 8, 1965.

⁶⁷⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Memorable y Laboriosa fue gestión Parlamentario para rechazar veto al aporte de la planta 'IANSA.'" Jan 8, 1965.

industry through the cultivation of beets.”⁶⁷¹ He emphasized that apart from livestock, Valdivia’s only other agriculture is “condemned” to the monoculture of wheat, a commodity that was struggling to survive in the unseasonal rain and with the new prices set by politicians and not considering the market, it seemed that it was leading to a “definitive crisis.”⁶⁷² Unfortunately, von Mühlenbrock was proven correct, after further unseasonal torrential rain ruined wheat crops while any wheat already harvested could not get to the markets because floods had washed away dirt roads. This further proved that for Valdivia to have a successful economy, it needed paved roads, a necessity sought for many years, while the IANSA factory in its larger plan would create a network to bring the product to the factory. Senator von Mühlenbrock thanked the newspaper *El Correo de Valdivia* for their informative and persuasive push in the region as well as all parliament members across party lines that rejected President’s Frei veto.⁶⁷³ This was the start of a three-year battle between the citizens of Valdivia and Frei over the budget of the IANSA plant and many other issues in the struggle to redevelop the region.

The struggle for the IANSA plant in Valdivia illustrates Frei’s mission to develop the country under constrained budget as the nation faced inflation and economic downturn. On Sept 6, 1965 Frei ordered Raúl Sáenz of CORFO to study the cost of the IANSA plant in Valdivia while at the same time allowing 500,000 escudos to go to the planning of the factory.⁶⁷⁴ This created conflict and competition within the region as towns argued for their right to have the factory. In particular, representatives from Mafil argued that it should have the sugar beet processing factory because since 1962, the area northeast of Valdivia had been producing the

⁶⁷¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Memorable y Laboriosa fue gestión Parlamentario para rechazar veto al aporte de la planta ‘IANSA.’” Jan 8, 1965.

⁶⁷² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Memorable y Laboriosa fue gestión Parlamentario para rechazar veto al aporte de la planta ‘IANSA.’” Jan 8, 1965.

⁶⁷³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Memorable y Laboriosa fue gestión Parlamentario para rechazar veto al aporte de la planta ‘IANSA.’” Jan 8, 1965.

⁶⁷⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Frei Ordeno estudios de una Planta IANSA para Valdivia.” Sept 2, 1965.

root. It was also the number one producer of sugar beet with 70 percent of the region's production.⁶⁷⁵ CORFO was generous with its funding of the IANSA plant in Valdivia, as it granted 6 million escudos for the project.⁶⁷⁶

Frei became the main opponent of the IANSA plant in the Valdivia, as legislators across party lines all backed the plant. Frei went against the funding of the IANSA as he rejected both the 1965 and 1966 budget: while Senators Senator Julio Mühlenbrock and Nicanor Allende successfully lobbied for the passing of both budgets; Frei formally vetoed it in January of 1966. Frei wanted the IANSA plant built with only 40 percent of the proposed budget, dwindling it down to 1 million Escudos.⁶⁷⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia* reported that "the vetoes were rejected with the votes of Senators Luis Bossay, from the Radical Party, Julio von Mühlenbrock of the Liberal Party, Julieta Camposano, of the Communist Party and Carlos Altamirano of the Socialist Party."⁶⁷⁸ This was not a battle between parties, since most of them offered support and approval of the budget for the region, but rather regional versus centralism, one of the very problems Frei sought to fix during his administration. The main proponent of this project, Senator von Mühlenbrock, attacked the Christian Democrats for not advocating for the IANSA plant. CORFO, in fact, had even lowered its budget and offered 2 million dollars in 1965 and 1966 to fund the IANSA plant and Frei vetoed it twice.⁶⁷⁹

After much struggle, on January 27, 1966 Frei announced that the IANSA plant would be built in Valdivia along with a new hospital in Osorno.⁶⁸⁰ While it might have been seen as a

⁶⁷⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Mafil Comienza Batalla por la Planta 'IANSA.'" Sept 24, 1965.

⁶⁷⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "6,000,000 Escudos destinara CORFO a la Planta IANSA." Sept 29, 1965.

⁶⁷⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Algo es Algo: Veto Recorto 60% de suma original." Jan 14, 1966.

⁶⁷⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Algo es Algo: Veto Recorto 60% de suma original." Jan 14, 1966.

⁶⁷⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Frei confirmó Planta IANSA: En Audiencia al Senador Sepulveda." Jan 27, 1966.

⁶⁸⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Frei confirmó Planta IANSA: En Audiencia al Senador Sepulveda." Jan 27, 1966.

victory, it was only partial as the Congress originally approved the project for 2.5 million escudos, only to be cut to 1 million escudos.⁶⁸¹ The project formally broke ground on July 2nd, 1966 in Rapaco, near the town of La Unión, closer to the city of Osorno than to Valdivia.⁶⁸² This was much needed for La Unión, as many had started calling it a ghost town while many people left looking for work elsewhere. Each year, Senator Julio von Mühlenbrock took charge in pushing for more funding for the IANSA plant, as well as getting other projects approved, including a fertilizer factory. The IANSA plant was eventually inaugurated on August 6, 1970, a month before the presidential elections.

Frei ran on a progressive platform of social reform, but his budgetary politics leaned to the conservative side. All over the nation, there was a sharp decrease of public works following the election of Frei. His own Ministers pointed at this fact as many of them struggled to keep their own projects going. The Minister of Finance, Sergio Molina, and Vice-President of CORVI, stated that “the decrease in State investment in Public Works and housing...constitutes a wake-up call and recognition of the current serious financial crisis...”⁶⁸³ They referenced inflation as the root of the financial crises, which did fluctuate up to 35 percent, only a 4 percent increase since Alessandri’s government. However, there was also great economic progress, all be it not evenly throughout the nation, with many factories concentrated in Santiago.⁶⁸⁴ In addition, the national treasury had money as taxes had gone up 187 percent between 1960 and 1966, collecting 143,400,000 million in 1966 alone, up only collecting 50 million in 1960.⁶⁸⁵ A 1967 Op Ed in *El Correo* further reenforces this fact, explaining that “indeed, never had there

⁶⁸¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Se construirá con crédito Aleman.” Apr 11, 1966.

⁶⁸² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Primeras paladas en trabajos de la planta en Rapaco.” July 2, 1966.

⁶⁸³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “El país reclama un gobierno nacional austero y progresista.” Aug 4, 1966.

⁶⁸⁴ *Chile: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994), Economic Policies, 1950-70, <http://countrystudies.us/chile/>.

⁶⁸⁵ It is important to note the one of Alessandri’s reform was the efficiency and ability to collect taxes. Before the reforms, Chile lagged far behind tax collection, it is why the sharp increase in taxes and collection.

been greater tax revenue than that has been taxed and collected in recent years; just as Chile never had more abundant inflows than those obtained by copper during 1965 and 1966, revenues that allow us to predict [it will surpass previous years.]”⁶⁸⁶

While inflation may have prevented Frei from further investing in the nation, there was certainly no lack of money in the treasury. But the conservative economic approach by Frei can be explained by long view plan of his administration, which included expropriating more land for his expanded Agrarian Reform in the center and south and the Copper Mines in the north. There were even some projects externally funded by multinational organization that Frei refused to fund, one of them was the UNESCO school for shipbuilding in Valdivia.

UNESCO and the Naval School for Shipbuilding

The UNESCO School for Shipbuilding was conceived during Alessandri’s administration and had the backing of the United Nations. UNESCO approved the school for Valdivia during the 1963 meetings in Buenos Aires. Valdivia was a fitting city to have the school because of its centuries-old tradition of being a hub for ships, as Pedro de Valdivia, for which the city was named after his name’s sake, stumbled upon the region during the sixteenth century.⁶⁸⁷ This meant that the city of Valdivia would have the first shipbuilding school in South America, a great boost to the city’s profile. The school would be built in conjunction with the ever-expanding new Universidad Austral, as it added to the decade-old institution. As Alessandri’s administration transitioned to Frei’s Presidency, there were rumblings to cut the project entirely. CORFO was the first to reject UNESCO’s plan; Enrique Vial Clark of CORFO believed that there was no demand for the institution but would consider it years later.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Nuevas Obras Públicas en la Provincia?” Feb 7, 1967.

⁶⁸⁷ In my first chapter, I went into detail about the long trading tradition and importance of Valdivia.

⁶⁸⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “CORFO rechaza en Valdivia creación de Centro de Construcción Naval Regional.” Oct 7, 1964.

Once again, the Committee of Unity of Valdivia stepped in and planned to lobby parliament for the creation of the school.⁶⁸⁹ At first, Frei supported the building of the school and informed the Minister of Foreign Relations, Gabriel Valdes, to give UNESCO the go ahead to start researching locations. This was an internationally backed project that had most of its funding in line and “it was also clarified that if UNESCO lacks funds for the construction of the naval base, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has allocated funds for these types of companies.”⁶⁹⁰ Just like the IANSA plant, the UNESCO-backed shipbuilding school of Valdivia became a long affair between Frei’s administration and the city of Valdivia, an unfortunate bureaucratic battle for a region and a city struggling to develop its economy and repair its identity.

The Frei administration cited lack of funding for why the internationally backed shipbuilding school almost never came to fruition. In September of 1966, 3 years after the school was approved, the Minister of Finance stated that “Chile does not have money for the Shipbuilding Center,” needing to contribute 1.5 million to the project.⁶⁹¹ This put a definitive hold on the UNESCO project and the Director of the Valdivia School, and the State Technical University stopped communication entirely on this matter. Even with UNESCO largely funding the project, the Chilean government could not afford the 1.5 million contribution to build the school. For two years, the citizens of Valdivia lobbied the parliament and the government, while many experts scouted locations for the school, nothing was concrete until December of 1969 when the Chilean government broke ground on the Pruetias Canal, as the first stone was

⁶⁸⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Con apoyo parlamentario Valdivia defenderá su creación.” Nov 16, 1964.

⁶⁹⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Frei apoyara creación del centro de construcción Naval en Valdivia.” Nov 20, 1964.

⁶⁹¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Chile no tiene plata para el Centro de construcción naval.” Sept 27, 1966.

placed.⁶⁹² However, many Valdivianos struggled with good news because, as one saying goes, “The first stone placed there will not be like many others in Chile, as it is customary to bury without the buildings ever being erected.”⁶⁹³ That school has become part of the Universidad Austral system and is located near the new port of Valdivia, Las Mulatas, just south of the city in the Miraflores area.

The IANSA plant and UNESCO Shipbuilding School are two examples of the struggle Valdivia and Southern Chile experienced during the Frei administration. While I only focus on Valdivia, they are not the exception, but examples of the struggles southern cities experienced during Frei’s administration. Frei exacerbated this situation through his legislative goal to decentralize the national state and federalize the regions in order to speed up development and bypass the bureaucratic entanglement of Santiago. As Frei stated, “the basic principles of this plan are constituted by functional decentralization applied to public services, whose organic statutes will be modified, based on the territorial division by zone, not by provinces.”⁶⁹⁴ This divided the southern provinces in their quest to develop the region as it put them in direct competition with each other for government money, fighting for centers, funds, and public work projects. Frei’s regional decentralization effort reshaped the south, making Puerto Montt the shipping, Osorno the agriculture/livestock, and Temuco the industrial centers of the south, leaving Valdivia to rethink its future, no longer as the unofficial capital of the south.

Decentralizing the Nation

The citizens of Valdivia fought for the right to be the administrators of their own fate and to develop the city without interference from Santiago’s bureaucracy. Part of Frei’s political

⁶⁹² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Canal de Pruetias del centro de construcción Naval.” Dec 6, 1969.

⁶⁹³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Canal de Pruetias del centro de construcción Naval.” Dec 6, 1969.

⁶⁹⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Reunión hoy en la intendencia: Valdivia, Sede piloto en plan de descentralización Administrativa.” Nov 21, 1964.

platforms was to decentralization administrative services, hoping that this would help accelerate development in troubled regions such as the south. As he stated, “The basic principles of this plan are constituted by functional decentralization applied to public services, whose organic statutes will be modified, based on the territorial division by zone, not by provinces.”⁶⁹⁵ While decentralization had been a topic for decades, Frei brought in a plan to create smaller administrative zones, instead of having provincial administration, allowing some small provinces to become part of a zone and have more direct control over public services. Frei described this administrative decentralization as, “a regional administrative council that will advise the zonal mayor, made up of the mayors of the provinces and the heads of the zonal services. A representative board next to the aforementioned institution will be composed of the delegates of the communes of the area.”⁶⁹⁶ This did not create anything new, but rather a new dominion, like it was recently done in Uruguay. This created a scramble to claim administrative authority in the south.

As soon as Frei started preparing to take office rumors began flying that Osorno, an agriculture/livestock city southeast of Valdivia, had been lobbying the new administration to have the post of the Inspector of internal taxes and administration of the fourth zone of the state railways move to their city. Valdivia had held this office since 1902 as it had one of the leading economies in the nation. Transferring that office to Osorno would decentralize the southern region and put more power in Osorno rather than Valdivia. Valdivia had five inspectors and Osorno only one, as Valdivia was in charge of Río Bueno, La Unión, Los Lagos, and Lanco, all towns within its province. In addition, Valdivia had 215,000 residents in its province while

⁶⁹⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Reunión hoy en la intendencia: Valdivia, Sede piloto en plan de descentralización Administrativa.” Nov 21, 1964.

⁶⁹⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “La Descentralización Territorial.” Dec 2, 1964.

Osorno only had 70,000, not warranting the move.⁶⁹⁷ There was a regional power struggle for resources and offices in the region even four years removed from the earthquake and tsunami, when the fight to rebuild was still the priority in many towns and cities. This is one example of the decentralization and recentralization the earthquake caused. Lobbyists were strong at work in Santiago and the city was only as strong as its politicians and lobbyists. The lack of business ventures and capitalists hindered Valdivia's ability to lobby Frei's government.

Frei delivered another blow to the development of Valdivia in February of 1965 by granting Temuco the new center of Public Works of the region with Presidential Decree 26.074.⁶⁹⁸ Valdivia and its citizens were not happy, leading to *El Correo de Valdivia*, the local newspaper, once again becoming a social activist as it alerted its citizens of the changes facing and harming them. In an editorial, an anonymous writer spelled out the importance of becoming the center for Public Works. Becoming the capital of the region offered many administrative advantages, including having control of much of its internal revenue and spending and promotion of culture and industry.⁶⁹⁹ Decentralization also offered the region the ability to simplify its administrative necessities and streamline its public works projects, but it also created many dangers and Valdivia became an example of how decentralization can both positively and negatively affect a city.

Frei making Temuco the regional center for Public Works drowned *Valdivianos* hopes of recovery. They believed that this was "unfair Government Treatment for Valdivia," while in the larger scheme of things, this was part of Frei's plan to decentralize the administrative duties of

⁶⁹⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Otro Atentado se prepara contra intereses de Valdivia." Oct 20, 1964.

⁶⁹⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Ciudadanía se unifica y prepara para luchar por la injusticia del Gobierno." Feb 28, 1965. Not much else was said of Presidential Decree 26.074, nor was it searchable in the Chilean Law website.

⁶⁹⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Valdivia y la Descentralización Administrativa." Jan 27, 1965.

Santiago and give them to the regions.⁷⁰⁰ However, while this brought the decision making closer to home, it also put Valdivia at a disadvantage as they now had to apply for public works projects in a competing city. During Alessandri's administration, the centralization of government in Santiago united the southern provinces in their recovery effort. While some cities and provinces recovered faster than others, having suffered less damage and helped by the rerouting of material, the province leaders still thought of themselves as a united region as seen in many of their planning meetings, more specifically tourism. This move by Frei made each city and province competitors vying for aid and projects. More than ever, citizens and legislators fought for the interests of the province and the city.

Potentially taking away public work projects created anxiety in the population as the future now seemed bleak. Public works is a social economic tool that provides infrastructure for a city to function. Without the essentials -- portable water, paved roads, silo containers, and the boardwalk -- a city falters and hope dwindles. As an Op Ed put it in *El Correo de Valdivia*, Valdivia needs social planning for its economic recovery.⁷⁰¹ The writer goes on to state that "no intensification of public works and the crisis facing construction, practically paralyzed with the termination of the populations;" termination in the sense of laying off and population migration from rural, city, eventually capital or a prospering industrial city such as Temuco, Puerto Montt, Concepción, Valparaíso, or Santiago.⁷⁰² The social development projects started by Campos, intensified by Alessandri, and furthered by Frei were supposed to provide opportunities for people in their home province and cities. Instead, they had the opposite effects, creating displacement and furthering the growth of "callampa" communities in industrial cities. While it

⁷⁰⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Injusto Tratamiento Gubernativo para Valdivia." Feb 28, 1965.

⁷⁰¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Planificación Económico – Social Necesita Valdivia." Feb 24, 1965.

⁷⁰² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Planificación Económico – Social Necesita Valdivia." Feb 24, 1965.

is true that there had been much progress made since the earthquakes, by 1965 reconstruction had stalled under the reshuffling and legislations under Frei's administration. For instance, Valdivia still waited on various road projects, an old issue the citizens advocated for since the earthquakes.

Valdivia's history as a strong economic center made it a target of other cities trying to gain administrative power over the region. Some feared that Valdivia's reputation as an industrial city and cultural center created a perception of a city fully recovered and no longer suffering from the 1960 earthquakes. Most damaged, with most housing project and building projects, leaders of other cities believed Valdivia was on its way to becoming an economic powerhouse. One Senator explained that Valdivia was a "victim of misinformation, [people] believe[ing] that we are in a flourishing stage."⁷⁰³ He goes on to add that "there are many people, including parliamentarians, who are convinced that Valdivia completed its reconstruction with full success and that it is now in a stage of full production and development, a fact that does not agree with reality."⁷⁰⁴ It was therefore imperative to talk to President Frei and fight to restore Valdivia's place as a regional center.

Decentralization put the progress of Valdivia in danger, as the new regions proposed grouped Valdivia with provinces that had different environments and economic abilities.⁷⁰⁵ The new proposed regional zone would encompass Valdivia and the provinces to the north of it, including Malleco, Cautín, and Osorno. While Osorno is southeast of Valdivia, the city is in a Valley, north of Puerto Montt, and is known for its exceptional livestock. The Op Ed writer

⁷⁰³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Declaro senador Carlos Contreras." June 7, 1965.

⁷⁰⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Declaro senador Carlos Contreras." June 7, 1965.

⁷⁰⁵ I go in length in my first chapter about the unique environment Valdivia possess, including have a rich forest, being at the beginning what is naturally known as the Patagonia, and having the ability to grow certain vegetation, such as sugar beets.

argued that “Valdivia is far from these regions and has its own distinctive production along with its slow recovery after the 1960 earthquakes, Valdivia is more varied and brings together other perspectives for a future that will not be very distant.”⁷⁰⁶ Provincial reform of administrations put Valdivia in danger of further becoming obsolete while undercutting industries struggling to restart.

Valdivia became known as the ‘sick city,’ as it struggled to develop back into the industrial city of the 1950s. While the nation changed and developed to include the south, it left Valdivia behind. Many of the laws passed to develop Valdivia after the earthquake benefited neighboring cities, including these in the central zone. While Frei’s legislative push for the decentralization of government services looked to benefit Valdivia, in reality it encouraged rival cities to seek great administrative power at Valdivia’s expense. As stated in *El Correo de Valdivia*, “It is a general opinion that this climate of regionalist obstruction will fade from the roots...the province's own parliamentarians who lead the concerns and stop the advance of the virus of ambition that corrodes the spiritual forces of a large part country.”⁷⁰⁷ The decentralization project under Frei to create regional centers further slowed down the reconstruction project, as Valdivia’s political leaders now focused on gaining administrative titles or parish into obscurity.

Frei’s legislation called for decentralizing government services, but the real problem lay in the centralization of economic development in Santiago. Decentralization was a topic that had been discussed since the 1925 constitution, but the constitution’s authors judged the country not ready because it needed economic solutions for the entire nation, something that was warranted also in the 1960s. Valdivia’s main problem lay in its economic stagnation, not in the

⁷⁰⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Movimiento que debe respaldar la Provincia.” Dec 18, 1965.

⁷⁰⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Qué hay contra Valdivia?” June 11, 1966.

centralization of the national administration. The 1960 earthquakes drew international attention of Cold War allies, who helped Chile recover through economic aid. Unfortunately, most of that economic development centered in Santiago, while the north focused on copper for export and the south on agriculture for domestic consumption. There was simply no diversification and decentralization of economic development. A columnist specifically argued this point, stating, “we need to convince that Santiago's centralism not only has an administrative physiognomy, but that it is above all an economic centralism that has much more serious and transcendent projections, since it draws from the provinces not only their working capital, but also their monetary capital and potential investors.”⁷⁰⁸ Certainly, Frei focused on the partial nationalization of copper mines and redistribution of agricultural land for the base of those regional economies, and then hoped diversification would come later, but most of the existing factories and industrial growth was centered in Santiago. For example, during the 1960s Santiago held 70 percent of the nation’s industry, while new projects were in the works, such as the newly built airport and a Firestone tire factory, centered economic development in one region which in turn did little to alleviate the social and economic hardship of the men and women traveling from the north and south looking for “Techo y Trabajo.”⁷⁰⁹ The north and south had many basic structure to install industries, with great land available and the ability to contribute to a community, in Santiago, a new factory is just another factory, one columnist argued.⁷¹⁰ This frustrated the citizens of Valdivia and industrialist, while the city had housing, did not have jobs for its citizens.

⁷⁰⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “El Crecimiento Regional” Sept 16, 1966.

⁷⁰⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Descentralización industrial.” Feb 15, 1968; Simon Collier and William F Sater, *A History of Chile, 1808-2002* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 318.

⁷¹⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Descentralización industrial.” Feb 15, 1968.

ODEPLAN and Economic Decentralization

Frei answered frustrations over economic centralization with the creation of ODEPLAN, or the Offices of National Planning. With the approval of parliament, Frei and the Minister of the Interior created ODEPLAN in 1967 as an institution that would be “functionally decentralized, with its own patrimony and legal personality of public law, subject to the direct supervision of the President of the Republic, whom it will advise on all those matters that are related to the process of economic and social planning.”⁷¹¹ While the main offices were located in Santiago, regional centers were set up in provinces as Frei proposed through his regional administrative decentralization plan. In addition to the decentralization aspect, ODEPLAN also was allowed to use external funding for projects proposed under Article 3 letter I, giving the program vast funding options, not hindered by internal economic situations.⁷¹² Frei’s ODEPLAN legislation became the lifeline for Valdivia’s struggling economy.

The creation of ODEPLAN created hope for the citizens of Valdivia, as much of the city’s administrative power was lost to other provinces and cities. Before ODEPLAN was officially passed, Valdivia lost many important administrative offices, including the Ministry of Agriculture to Osorno, which took away Valdivia’s lure as the capital of the region and created uncertainty for the city. However, in the same breath, the office of ODEPLAN would stay in Valdivia, making it the center of regional planning.⁷¹³ The editor of *El Correo* stated that “this indicates that the socioeconomic development possibilities of this province have been thoroughly studied and are not claims of illogical regionalism.”⁷¹⁴ Valdivia was the most in need of

⁷¹¹ Ministerio Del Interior and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional Ley Chile, “Ley 16635 Crea Oficina de Planificación Nacional” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile/Ley Chile, July 14, 1967), 1, Ministerio del Interior, <http://bcn.cl/2nvt5>.

⁷¹² Ministerio Del Interior and Ley Chile, 2.

⁷¹³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “El Progreso Impone Vigilia Permanente.” Nov 5, 1966.

⁷¹⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “El Progreso Impone Vigilia Permanente.” Nov 5, 1966.

economic development as many men and women left their homes behind looking for work.

Valdivia became known as a place to find homes in the many communities built by the Alessandri and Frei administrations, but still lacked industry to provide jobs.

This became evident as ODEPLAN gave Valdivia the second highest priority in planning only behind Concepción. ODEPLAN started talks with the national government and an automotive company to build a new factory just outside of Valdivia, believing this would be a patch to the many problems facing Valdivia. The ODEPLAN technician further saw “lumber, livestock and the tourism industry as possible to exploit at an industrial level.”⁷¹⁵ While the city of Valdivia received measures of expectations for the reconstruction of the city after the 1960 earthquakes, its industry had been stagnant while, the city had been under constant population growth as much of new housing communities were built surrounding the city. Two ODEPLAN representatives stated that Valdivia’s concentration of its population made it an attraction for industry; however, they did not know of any “industrialization projects that could be destined, for the moment, to Valdivia.”⁷¹⁶ The reality was that Alessandri’s reconstruction plan and Frei’s regional reconfiguration left Valdivia behind.

Valdivianos therefore asked for more decentralization, pushing for legislation that would create regional organizations for development that might favor the city. One of the organizations that Valdivian legislators proposed was CORFO-Austral, which would be, like ODEPLAN, but primarily focused on the south. By this time, CORFO had become a powerful organization that the national government did not have influence on. There were talks of even splitting CORFO into three organizations, one each in the north, central, and austral, the south. Functionaries from CORFO and ODEPLAN strictly opposed this idea, stating that the “creation of regional

⁷¹⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Segun ‘ODEPLAN.’” Apr 9, 1968.

⁷¹⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Segun ‘ODEPLAN.’” Apr 9, 1968.

development agencies is the proliferation of these organizations that, as they have territorial powers, serve certain areas, and gradually limit CORFO's scope to a part of the national territory ...[as they try to create] economic integration of the country.”⁷¹⁷ CORFO saw itself as a national organization that not only developed regional economies, but also integrated those industries with the nation by coordinating a production from the south to the north. While ODEPLAN strictly worked on regional development and studied the needs of the city and the citizens, this regional division would essentially undermine the organization’s work. Adding to Valdivia’s pressure was a bad farming season, which left it vulnerable and once again politicking for decentralization.

Any economy depending on weather and climate is prone to bad years. This was the case for the 1968 farming season, which left the region devastated.⁷¹⁸ Once again, Senator Julio von Mühlenbork was involved in the lobbying for exceptional laws for the region. He stated that “the southern region does not have notable expectations in agriculture; the influence of the soul, the geographical configuration, the lack of irrigation in most of the properties force us to abandon the crops and think about who we are: an essentially livestock area.”⁷¹⁹ This is what he argued in front of parliament as he sought approval for Stimulus Law and the creation of the CORFO-Austral Institute specifically maybe 279 “as a decentralized body with headquarters in Valdivia.”⁷²⁰ This followed the recommendations of ODEPLAN, which stated that the creation of CORFO-Austral would have a direct and positive effect on the rebuilding the south’s

⁷¹⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “CORFO se opone a medida que favorecen a Valdivia.” Aug 9, 1968.

⁷¹⁸ I will not go into detail of how a bad year looks like in Valdivia, but my first chapter describes environmental disasters during the mid-1950s.

⁷¹⁹ Senado, “Sesión 07, Ordinaria, En Miércoles 6 de Noviembre de 1968” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, November 6, 1968), 286, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, https://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/36148/1/S19600712_15.pdf.

⁷²⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “ODEPLAN Reconoce la crisis del sur. Denuncia del Senador von Mühlenbrock en el Congreso.” Nov 12, 1968.

economy. Both requests were lobbied for over a year in Santiago by Valdivia's parliamentary representatives; the Mayor, José Huaquín, also sent a memorandum delivered to congressmen on June 14, 1969 asking for news on the Stimulus Law along with answers on its Tourism plan, CORFO Austral, the construction of the Naval Shipbuilding School, and the operation of Las Mulatas port.⁷²¹ The only thing they accomplished was the Naval Shipbuilding School, which did not start construction until after the end of Frei's term. While Frei hoped that his plan for regional administrative decentralization would fix many of Valdivia's and other provinces' problems it instead further centralized Santiago as the administrative hub of the country; lobbyist, politicians, and the nation's economy were still centered, created, and influenced from Santiago.

Frei's Agrarian Reform

Frei's attempt to decentralize the nation's economy hinged on his version of the Agrarian Reform. Frei's struggle with the Agrarian Reform stemmed from two principal problems: first, that Alessandri's Agrarian Reform did not create the economic boost many expected, especially in the south; second, the constitution did not allow for the expropriation of land. As Peter Winn and Cristobal Kay state, Alessandri's agrarian reform "simply enacted a law for the expropriation of inefficiently worked holdings, created the CORA (Agrarian Reform Corporation) and INDAP (Institute for Agrarian Development) to implement it."⁷²² Furthermore, the law was rarely enforced by Alessandri, really having not much impact on the problems plaguing the nation, one being, importing the food that could be grown in the nation.⁷²³ Frei needed to convince his

⁷²¹ Senado, "Sesión 22, Ordinaria, En Martes 9 de Julio de 1968" (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, July 9, 1968), 904, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, https://www.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=recursoslegales/10221.3/36148/1/S19600712_15.pdf.

⁷²² Peter Winn and Cristobal Kay, "Agrarian Reform and Rural Revolution in Allende's Chile," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 6, no. 1 (1974): 136.

⁷²³ Winn and Kay, 136.

parliament that his legislation would fix the Agrarian Reform, but the biggest hurdle was to reform the constitution, a more difficult task. Politically, the Christian Democrats had made a limited alliance with the Socialists and Communists, not terribly strong, but all three parties had many of the same short-term goals for the nation.

The Radicals, Conservatives, and Liberals were all reeling from the 1964 presidential elections along with the 1966 congressional elections. For instance, the prominent Valdivian Senator, Julio Von Mühlenbrock, left the Liberal Party in 1966 and joined the newly formed National Party the same year. The formation of the National Party was in direct response to the Christian Democrat sweep in most of the political arenas. The new party used scare tactics in their doctrine published in 1966 and specifically referenced the Christian Democrats and Marxist parties, stating

faced with the possibility of being displaced, be ready to apply the system of "scorched earth", considering not only the spoils of war, not only the fiscal funds and the farmers they have enjoyed, but also the savings and the work of thousands and thousands of Chileans, whose massive extortion is currently being prepared through various legal initiatives promoted by the Christian Democrats and the Marxist parties.⁷²⁴

They referenced the 1970 presidential elections as critical for the liberty of Chile and used this time to prepare to defend the nation's economy from what they claimed as totalitarian legislation and constitutional reform.⁷²⁵

Alessandri implemented an Agrarian Reform, but it did not meet expectations because of its limited scope the lengthy legal battles necessary to acquire land for the farmers. Frei sought to fix that, but standing in the way were "legal and institutional limitations for the acquisition of

⁷²⁴ Partido Nacional, ed., *Ha llegado la hora de defender la libertad - Memoria Chilena*, 2nd ed. (Santiago, Chile: Partido Nacional, 1969), 3, <http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/602/w3-article-9121.html>.

⁷²⁵ Nacional, 1,2.

land and distribution of financing sources.”⁷²⁶ Legislators from both sides of the political spectrum argued over Frei’s Agrarian Reform. One report stated that the new agrarian reform would be the death of the Chilean oligarchy, expropriating properties larger than 80 hectares.⁷²⁷ This was more of a modernist perspective because the journalist sarcastically goes on to state that the government views the Agrarian Reform from a “distorted vision,” as “from Bío Bío to the south is the largest planted agricultural area, but we have never heard of the slightest influence of the oligarchy.”⁷²⁸ While this is largely true about the south, Frei’s government and the parliament prepared itself to expropriate legally the Central Valley’s generationally-held land, and properly buy land in the south.⁷²⁹ The difference between Alessandri’s and Frei’s agrarian reform lay in the way it acquired land: Alessandri’s government bought land that was for sale, while Frei sought expropriate large tracts of land not for sale. For Frei’s Agrarian Reform to be successful it needed to deal with the issue of the power to expropriate land, a big factor that Alessandri missed.

The right-wing political groups attacked Frei’s agrarian reform by insinuating that it was a copy of Alessandri’s and it was destined to fail. The Radical Party stated that Frei’s Agrarian Reform only repealed “10 articles from the previous Government’s law,” which would not really make a difference in invigorating the nation’s agriculture.⁷³⁰ Other critics, such as President of the Commission of Associated Agriculturalist, Pedro Enrique Alfonso, stated that the “project is

⁷²⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Grave Problema analizado por el consejo regional: Notable baja acusa industria de construcción en Valdivia.” June 11, 1964.

⁷²⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “La Nueva Reforma Agraria: ¿Muerte de la Oligarquía?” Nov 24, 1965.

⁷²⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “La Nueva Reforma Agraria: ¿Muerte de la Oligarquía?” Nov 24, 1965.

⁷²⁹ Chapter 1 goes in length discussing land holding in the south, which is very different from the Ventral Valley.

⁷³⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Radicales dicen que Frei copio reforma agraria de Alessandri.” Nov 27, 1965.

beginning to produce a real earthquake, it is intended to legislate without constructive sense and, instead, national unity would be destroyed.”⁷³¹

Other criticism of Frei’s Agrarian Reform came from ex-presidential candidate and Radical Party member, Julio Durán from Cautín. In a letter sent to the Young Radical Party, Durán criticized Frei and his government specifically over the issue of private land, which had caused some confusion and debate over the Agrarian Reform. Specifically, he argued that Frei’s conception of Agrarian Reform was overly broad and conceived from a Marxist ideology, “with Jesuit criteria, it is intended to define an agrarian reform with statist concepts or socialists who hide deep down the spirit of an overbearing predominance of a homogenic state.”⁷³² Durán argued that Frei’s Agrarian Reform was in reality a Marxist reform, further trying to impose the state authority over the liberties of the Chilean people. He further depicted the Radical Party as an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary party, and that the Christian Democrats were simply “cafeteria, or office revolutionary.”⁷³³ In a sense, Durán was correct as defining its party as evolutionary rather than revolutionary, however, this defined 1960 Chilean politics, as Alessandri’s policies and now Frei’s failed to get ahead of the wants and needs of the Chilean people to fix the nation. Chileans needed solutions to their growing needs: housing and work, or “Techo y Trabajo.”

The right tried to slow Frei’s Agrarian Reform by demanding that the government’s right to expropriate land be written into the constitution and not into an expanded Agrarian Reform law. This was much more of a way to stall the legislative process to instead of halting it, as the Christian Democrats, Communists, and Socialists, held a majority in the Chilean parliament.

⁷³¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Exposición de Pedro Enrique Alfonso: ‘La Reforma Agraria nos llevará al derrumbe económico y social.’” Jan 5, 1966.

⁷³² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Durán: El PDC hace Gárgaras con la Palabra Revolución.” Feb 9, 1966.

⁷³³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Durán: El PDC hace Gárgaras con la Palabra Revolución.” Feb 9, 1966.

Ley 16615 paved the way for Frei's Agrarian Reform, giving the administration the appropriate tools to implement the law (passed on January 18, 1967). With the Christian Democrats and the left combining for a majority in parliament, it did not take much to pass a resolution that would allow for the expropriation of land. The law did take two years of negotiations, with most of the resolution written by November of 1966. Signed into law on January 20, 1967, Ley 16615 allowed the federal government, in the interest of the national community, "the exclusive domain of natural resources, production goods or others, which it declares of preeminent importance for the economic, social or cultural life of the country."⁷³⁴ In addition to this, "it will also tend to the convenient distribution of the property and the constitution of the family property; allowing for the expropriation of land."⁷³⁵ The right made this the only requirement, almost a dare, for Frei to implement its Agrarian Reform, and with some struggle, the parliament amended Article 10 of the 1925 Constitution that would change land rights in Chile, a problem plaguing agricultural development.

The effects of this law were seen even before the new Agrarian Reform was agreed upon and passed. On May 12, 1967, almost 7 years after the earthquakes struck southern Chile and 4 years after Alessandri's administration passed the first Agrarian Reform, the first 4 titles were handed to small farmers in Valdivia.⁷³⁶ This shows how ineffective Alessandri's Agrarian Reform was in the countryside: while these small farmers had been promised physical possession of the land they worked, they still had not been given the proper title until Frei signed Law 16615. This meant that at any moment, if the state or any other entity wanted, could forcefully

⁷³⁴ Ministerio De Justicia and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional Ley Chile, eds., "Ley 16615 Modifica la Constitución Política del Estado" (Ministerio de Justicia, January 20, 1967), 1, Ministerio de Justicia, <http://bcn.cl/2mnh0>.

⁷³⁵ De Justicia and Ley Chile, 1.

⁷³⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Saneados los primeros 4 títulos de pequeños agricultores de Valdivia" May 12, 1967.

take over the land from these small farmers. Frei not only needed to pass this revised Agrarian Reform, but accelerate the expropriation and documentation of land titles.

The need to revise Alessandri's Agrarian Reform was apparent, with the right the only critics. The United States government and its institutions were committed to the Chilean Agrarian Reform and, while the United States had pulled most of its direct aid after the election of Frei, other institutions still funneled money to Chile.⁷³⁷ On May 30th, 1967, the Agency for International Development, (AID) made 20 million dollars accessible for the Agrarian Reform, a sign the US backed Frei's administration in its quest to make Chilean agriculture more productive.⁷³⁸ Later that year, in July of 1967, Eduardo Frei presented his Agrarian Reform with international representatives from organizations including BIRF, CEPAL, FAO, and the OEA.⁷³⁹ The 1967 Agrarian Reform [Ley 16640] came with two very important changes that altered Chilean society. The first is detailed in the first chapter of the law, Articles 2-15, furthering the constitutional modification law 16615, allowing the state to expropriate land. As the law states, "rural (rustic) properties owned by a natural person, whatever his location in the national territory and the categories of its land that, individually or together, have an extension that exceeds 80 hectares of basic irrigation."⁷⁴⁰ Article 3 specifically broke up large estates. This was most important in the Central Valley where much of the land was held by families for centuries.⁷⁴¹

⁷³⁷ Philip O'Brien, "La Alianza Para El Progreso y Los Préstamos Por Programa a Chile," *Estudios Internacionales* 2, no. 4 (8) (1969): 462.

⁷³⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Fondos para desarrollo Agrícolas." June 5, 1967.

⁷³⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Promulgada ley de la Reforma Agraria." July 17, 1967.

⁷⁴⁰ Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional and Ministerio De Agricultura, "Ley 16640 Reforma Agraria" (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile/Ley Chile, July 28, 1967), 1, Ministerio de Agricultura, <http://bcn.cl/2n06i>.

⁷⁴¹ It is very important to note that much of the land in the south were public holdings or owned by large cooperatives in the lumber industry. It was not out of the realm of possibility that there were some large landowners, but this law mostly targeted the Central Valley.

The other important aspect of Frei's Agrarian Reform lay in the formation of cooperatives. One of the main problems of Alessandri's Agrarian Reform was the creation and isolation of the small farmer. This farmer was left with few resources, leaving them to find funding and avenues to get the product to market. There were national agriculture organizations, but they were too big to reach out to these small southern farmers. Frei's Agrarian Reform aimed to remedy this by organizing small farmers into cooperatives. Legislators approved a slew of Articles, making it important to join cooperatives. Article 83, which organized newly expropriated land into cooperatives instead of independent small farmers, stated, "the allocation of land [will be handed to] agrarian reform cooperatives..."⁷⁴² Article 191 further illustrates the importance of cooperatives under Frei's administration as it details the bylaws of joining cooperatives along with the power and relationship that these cooperatives would have with the government.⁷⁴³ The last benefit in joining a cooperative came with Article 168, which stated that tax exemption established in Title 1 of law No. 12.120, "will operate only when the Agrarian Reform Corporation acts as a taxpayer of said taxes and provided that the respective contracts are entered into with companies that are formed between the Corporation and peasants, or cooperatives of peasant women, with peasant members of a settlement, with peasant assignees."⁷⁴⁴

Frei's goal was to make agriculturalists more efficient in not only producing, but also in communicating their needs. The Agrarian Reform sought to fix an age-old problem of stagnant farmland that was not used or produced. In a speech given in 1967, Frei reassured farmers in Osorno that "the Agrarian Reform is not a threat to those who work well, it is not a threat against

⁷⁴² Nacional and De Agricultura, "Ley 16640 Reforma Agraria," 30.

⁷⁴³ Nacional and De Agricultura, 91–93.

⁷⁴⁴ Nacional and De Agricultura, 62.

legitimate property rights, but it opens the door in a necessary, essential way...to the possibility that many thousands of honest and hardworking peasants earn through their efforts the right to be the owner of cooperatives, to join the life of the nation."⁷⁴⁵ Frei's Agrarian Reform sought to integrate, even more, the farmer into Chilean society and national economy.

The failure of Frei's administration not only to decentralize administration but also industry complicated Christian Democrats' prospects in the 1970 Presidential elections. Valdivia and the south needed more than a revised Agrarian Reform; they needed factories and industry to boost employment and become less reliant on the environment and weather. The 1967 growing season made clear the harsh reality of the region's dependency on agriculture. One report explained that "The climatic accidents, the uncertainties of the agrarian reform, the labor unrest, the high costs that are readjusted more quickly than the prices, are factors that not only harm the agricultural entrepreneurs but also harm the well-being of each one of the inhabitants of the country."⁷⁴⁶ CORA, the Corporación de la Reforma Agraria, had done its part in expropriating and delivering land to the people; one year after the modification to the 1925 Chilean Constitution Cora expropriated 601 estates, totalling 1.221.118.400 hectares, or 20 percent of all possible cultivated land in the nation.⁷⁴⁷ Certainly, the Agrarian Reform was necessary for the nation as two million people constituted farmers, farm workers, and their families while the rest six million Chileans had the right to consume food grown in their country instead of imported produce.⁷⁴⁸ However, Frei did not disperse more credit, promote local industry, or lower wheat prices for consumers. The main problem still lay in Santiago, as most of the produce still had to

⁷⁴⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Frei en Osorno: 'La Reforma Agraria no es una amenaza.'" Mar 4, 1967.

⁷⁴⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La situación agrícola." July 31, 1967.

⁷⁴⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Fracaso de la Reforma Agraria." Feb 10, 1968.

⁷⁴⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "La situación agrícola." July 31, 1967.

travel to the capital for processing and then come back to where it was grown for the consumption of the people and market.

By the end of Frei's administration, Valdivia looked like a city in decline after leaders had exhausted all efforts to redevelop the city. Certainly, Frei did not totally fail Valdivia; even with its struggling development plan, the city did transform between the 1964 and 1970. Frei's administration built many schools, completed more roads, amended the Agrarian Reform, delivered a finished IANSA plant, and built many housing communities. But the problem remained with the industrial redevelopment of the region.⁷⁴⁹ That was the biggest failure for Frei, who like Alessandri, had not restore Valdivia to its industrial prominence, an identity residents held dearly. Journalist, Otter Wendler Sch, characterized the city as in decline, even with all of Frei's accomplishments. He stated that while Frei had done a great job beautifying the city of Valdivia, it had also cursed it, by failing to address production and employment:

The growth of this city is like a cancer, whose population increase corresponds to the pathological development of diseased cells, which should be understood as such by individuals and family groups who arrive when they settle in a city that does not produce. And the new populations are rising to make room for that huge number of potential unemployed.⁷⁵⁰

Frei had failed on delivering new industries to the city of Valdivia and with many rural and migrant communities coming to the city looking for housing, they were left without any employment opportunities. Senator von Mühlenbrock stated that unemployment reached 25,000 in 1968, in the city of Valdivia alone.⁷⁵¹ The only hope that Valdivia had was the sixty days out of the year when the weather turned perfect in the region and a slew of tourists arrived to enjoy

⁷⁴⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Parte de las obras realizadas en la provincia de Valdivia en el Gobierno del presidente Eduardo Frei." Aug 7, 1970.

⁷⁵⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Valdivia ¿Ciudad en Decadencia?" Jan 17, 1969.

⁷⁵¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Dijo von Mühlenbrock en el Senado: 'Ha quedado probada la crisis del sur.' Agrego: la desocupación alcanza ya al 25,000 cesantes." Nov 18, 1968.

the natural scenery and beautiful city. For Valdivia to survive as a hub it needed to let go of its industrial identity and develop its tourist industry, as well as accept its fate as an educational center in the south with the growth of the Universidad de Austral and other institutions establishing themselves in the region, eventually transitioning to a service industry.

The Rise of Tourism

As Frei's plans failed to reinvigorate Valdivia's industry, tourism became the answer for the city's lack of industry. By 1967, Valdivia had lost fifty percent of its purchasing power, a city that once ranked fourth in the nation in production and capital.⁷⁵² The city took drastic measures and arranged a meeting where all the mayors of the provinces came together to speak about the future of the city, something not done since 1952. It became clear that road building lagged in the provinces and prevented the city from expanding all of its industry, as they stated, "road construction is the basis for the exploitation of another primary industry, which is tourism."⁷⁵³ The mayors all agreed that Valdivia was without a doubt one of the most beautiful provinces that Chile has to offer; however, it lacked roads to even promote these places, and lacked tourism infrastructure, such as hotels and hostels. If tourism was the answer, it also needed planning and development.

While tourism was a viable option for the development of Valdivia, nothing flourished until toward the end of Frei's administration. Valdivian Senator, Sergio Sepúlveda Garcés, pushed for a definitive project to boost the tourism industry, while ODEPLAN started plans to make this a reality.⁷⁵⁴ There were other government institutions that also pushed for this,

⁷⁵² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Valdivia ha perdido 50% de su poder adquisitivo. Seis Municipalidades estuvieron presentes en reunión de alcaldes." Nov 18, 1967.

⁷⁵³ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Valdivia ha perdido 50% de su poder adquisitivo. Seis Municipalidades estuvieron presentes en reunión de alcaldes." Nov 18, 1967.

⁷⁵⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Sepúlveda garces a la Cabeza. Políticos dispuestos a dar impulso al turismo." Mar 13, 1968.

including the Ministry of Public Works, but bureaucracy and legislation prevented the money from getting to Valdivia, the very problem Frei sought to fix with his administrative decentralization effort. An engineer for Public Works, Alfonso Díaz Ossa, stated that “about five years ago there had been plans to construct a tourism pavilion, beautification and urbanization of the boardwalk with funds from the 'Alliance for Progress,' which had allocated one hundred million dollars for the reconstruction of the provinces devastated by the earthquake of 1960.”⁷⁵⁵ However, the boardwalk and many other projects were still unfinished. For years, there had been talks about developing tourism, but nothing had solidified.

There were a few things that went in Valdivia’s way that paved the way for tourism in Valdivia. In late 1969, the citizens of Valdivia once again petitioned Frei to make Valdivia the home of an administrative office, this time the headquarters of the Regional Tourism Council. They mentioned that they were still feeling the effects of the 1960 Valdivia earthquake and that Valdivia had a natural environment that made tourism a viable industry.⁷⁵⁶ They were granted this request on September 26, 1969 under the Law 17.109, which effectively made Valdivia the center of tourism, controlling the tourist economy in both Valdivia and Osorno.⁷⁵⁷ Another law, 17.169 passed on August 8, 1969, gave regional tourist centers more power to develop their local tourist economies.⁷⁵⁸ This law gave Valdivia and ORPLAN, the Regional Office of Planning, the ability to ask for loans from the Inter-American Development Bank, which sought money for two regional tourism projects, one for the conservation of historical and archaeological locations,

⁷⁵⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Municipio solicita pronunciamiento sobre el pabellón de turismo.” Aug 1, 1968.

⁷⁵⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Al primer mandatario: Valdivia Solicito sede del consejo regional de turismo.” Sept 13, 1969.

⁷⁵⁷ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Valdivia, sede del consejo regional de turismo.” Sept 26, 1969.

⁷⁵⁸ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. “Fomento al Turismo.” Nov 30, 1969; Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Reconstrucción., “Ley 17169” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, August 1969), Article 1, <https://www.leychile.cl/navegar?idNorma=28813>.

and the other for the maintenance and development of intra-regional transportation.⁷⁵⁹ In addition to these two projects, ORPLAN also asked for thirteen million escudos for the development of Puyehue National Park, in the lakes region of Valdivia. ORPLAN argued that the development of the National Park had important international implications as it would also connect Argentina's Bariloche recreational area with Chile. It was suited for winter sports as well for summer tourist, as it also has hot springs. Puyehue is easily accessible to the rest of the nation, and not much needed to be done as far as roads. This was a two-part project, integrating the Park and making the Villa Gol Gol habitable. Villa Gol Gol is part of the Agrarian Reform properties, and there was work to be done to turn that hacienda into an ecotourist hotel.⁷⁶⁰ This was part of the regional tourism planning that created an economy for the entire province, not just the cities. As the Mayor José Huaquin Valdivia stated, this gave the citizens of Valdivia the spirit of progress, something that had not been seen in many years.⁷⁶¹

The last project that solidified Valdivia as a tourist economy came with the creation of the tourism institute. Valdivia had already been getting a reputation as a university city, with the Universidad Austral and the creation of the UNESCO Shipbuilding Naval School. In November of 1970, Universidad Técnica del Estado or The State Technical University announced that it "has requested from the Council of that Corporation of Higher Studies the creation of the academic program in Tourism."⁷⁶² By having Valdivia the center for tourism studies, it will help develop regional tourism. They also hoped that with the building of hotels, they would attract

⁷⁵⁹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Turismo regional busca apoyo en dólares del BID." Dec 6, 1969. Please Note that ODEPLAN and ORPLAN are the same institution, just one is national and the other one is regional.

⁷⁶⁰ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Proyecto para Puyehue." Dec 8, 1969.

⁷⁶¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Mientras no haya colaboración, esta ciudad no progresará." Nov 22, 1969.

⁷⁶² *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Ingeniero de Ejecución en Turismo." Nov 17, 1970. It is now known as the University of Santiago de Chile

and study European and American tourism, so they can better develop the region and national tourist economy.

The Elections of 1970

The talks about tourism development were not enough to help the Christian Democrats win the 1970 elections. The Christian Democrats were not a viable option in the 1970 Chilean presidential elections because of their insufficient transformative social economic reforms. The Christian Democrats had failed to give Chileans work and homes, as some cities saw intensified struggles with *callampas* and *tomas*.⁷⁶³ Alessandri's and Frei's governments had built many homes for the people of Valdivia and incoming migrants from within the province and outside, but they were still not enough. Valdivia had lost its identity as an industrial city as Frei reconfigured the south, dispersing responsibilities to cities such as Temuco, Osorno, and the rising city of Puerto Montt. Alessandri's campaign called for change, or, as he put it, "a profound change, not the so-called structural reforms, nor a change in the economic and social regime that does not suit the spirit of the Chileans."⁷⁶⁴ Adding to this were the newspapers calling the Alessandri campaign a "political earthquake."⁷⁶⁵ It was the 1960 Valdivia earthquake that had revealed the fragility of Chilean society, the need for change, and Alessandri had started those changes. Frei took the baton and furthered this change and some of the right-wing critics even stated that Frei's Agrarian Reform was only a revision of Alessandri's. Therefore, Chilean politics were evolutionary rather than revolutionary as one political spectrum failed after another. The push to further that political evolution could also be seen in the Christian Democratic

⁷⁶³ Angela Vergara, "Revisiting Pampa Irigoin: Social Movements, Repression, and Political Culture in 1960s Chile," *Radical History Review* 2016, no. 124 (January 1, 2016): 43–54, <https://doi.org/10.1215/01636545-3159951>; Edward Murphy, *For a Proper Home: Housing Rights in the Margins of Urban Chile, 1960-2010*, 1st edition (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015).

⁷⁶⁴ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Alessandri: Chile necesita un cambio realmente profundo." May 1, 1970.

⁷⁶⁵ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "¡ Chile Limita al norte y al sur con Alessandri!" July 23, 1970.

candidate, Radomiro Tomic, who had to be convinced to run against Allende and who leaned left and towards the Socialists and Communists Parties. Valdivia and the nation wanted accelerated change, not to regression.

On September 4, 1970, *El Correo de Valdivia* declared Alessandri the Presidential winner of the Province of Valdivia. However, this was not the entire picture. In the entire province Alessandri received 27,654 votes, Allende, 26,347, and Tomic 20,693. However, in the city, Allende won by a much greater margin, with 19,863 votes, followed by Alessandri with 16,002 votes.⁷⁶⁶ This was a drastic change since the elections of 1958, when Alessandri marginally beat Allende in the city, with the difference of less than 1000 votes. In 1970, it was a difference of four thousand votes.⁷⁶⁷

Part of understanding the change between 1958 and 1970 is the shift in demographics and the concentration of people in the city. In 1960 the province of Valdivia had 114,146 people in urban areas as opposed to 145,648 people in its rural territories.⁷⁶⁸ With the earthquake and the socio-economic reforms from Alessandri and Frei those statistics changed. The 1970 Chilean census showed that out of 253,809 residents of the province 223,380 had stayed within the province.⁷⁶⁹ In total, 26,726 people left the province of Valdivia and were living in other places. Most of the people that migrated out of Valdivia did follow the trends of going to Santiago, with 21,934. *Valdivianos* also went looking for homes and work in neighboring provinces such as

⁷⁶⁶ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Alessandri Gano en la Provincia." Sept 4, 1970.

⁷⁶⁷ Remember that in 1958 the Province of Valdivia was recovering from "climatic accidents." This time, they were not only still rebuilding from the 1960 earthquake, but also dealing with the inability of the central government to reindustrialize the city.

⁷⁶⁸ Direccion de Estadisticas y Censos, *Poblacion Del Pais: Caracteristicas Basicas de La Poblacion (Censo 1960)*, ed. Moises Mellado Guajardo (Santiago Chile: Gobierno de Chile, 1964), 1.

⁷⁶⁹ The 1970 census focused more on employment, migration, and age rather than rural vs. urban for each province. However, this shows that many people stayed and it can be inferred, with the large housing communities built in the cities and towns there was a large migration to these centers.

Cautín (10,981) or Osorno (10,507) people respectively.⁷⁷⁰ These statistics show that there was a total of around 43,000 people that left Valdivia because of its lack of industry.

Nevertheless, Allende's national victory signaled a new era in Valdivia's and the nation's history. For Valdivia, the future looked bright, even though *Valdivianos* had struggled and lost their industrial identity. The IANSA plant had finally been finished, the boardwalk was complete, and other projects were on their way, including institutional projects that would solidify Valdivia as a hub for education and tourism. Allende offered a glimmer of hope at the beginning of his presidency, as the new Director of Tourism made his project known, what he called "social tourism." He stated that "To men of this good sense, the Directorate of Tourism intends to ensure that Chileans are not fatally limited by the low purchasing power of their income to take vacations in adequate conditions, and can leave urban centers in those months to turn to spas and places of interest."⁷⁷¹ Under Allende, Tourism was a given right to all the workers and part of his social economic reforms, with Valdivia as a potential major beneficiary.

Chapter 5 Conclusion

The political repercussions of the 1960 earthquake ended with the election of Salvador Allende. Alessandri's push for an agrarian reform, consequential registering of people during the reconstruction effort, and the housing of many rural people all lead to the incorporation of the rural working class of the south both economically and politically. Frei continued this trend by

⁷⁷⁰ Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, *Republica de Chile: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas: Poblacion Total Pais* (Santiago Chile: Gobierno de Chile, 2012), 18, https://web.archive.org/web/20120414164441/http://www.ine.cl/canales/usuarios/cedoc_online/censos/pdf/censo_1970.pdf.

⁷⁷¹ *El Correo de Valdivia*, col. "Turismo Social." Dec 17, 1970.

further advancing the Agrarian Reform and incorporating the south into Chile's national economy. While the city of Valdivia declined as an industrial city during the 1960s, it still housed many workers and their families. Workers either worked in neighboring cities, such as San José Marquina, Río Bueno, or even commuted to Temuco, a city at the border of the Province of Valdivia and the Cautín Province. Large public housing communities such as *Gil de Castro*, *Sociedad de Seguro*, *Población Bueras* and *Población Menzel* sprawled throughout the City of Valdivia. While the earthquake spelled the end of Valdivia as an industrial city, it also gave new life to many, as these homes represented their acceptance into Chilean society. The horrific death and sacrifice of a Mapuche child, like José Quinmen Paineur, could never happen again, not because of a lack of cultural misunderstanding or perceived ignorance, but because while still Mapuche, many rural people could now call themselves Chilean citizens with the right to *Techo y Trabajo*. While the historiography on 1960s Chilean politics has largely focused on the middle class as the catalyst for a shift in politics, the real change occurred with the incorporation of the working class and the south. The rumblings of the 1960 Valdivia earthquake could still be felt in 1970 Chile.

Conclusion

The election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile brought hope to the working class and stress to many *Valdivianos*. The middle class and elites wanted a mix of autonomy and support from the central government—help to rebuild industry, as well as letting them flourish under laissez-faire conditions. The nation and southern Chile could not function that way any longer. Alessandri and Frei both developed and passed legislation that strengthened the central government in order to solve the many ailments that stalled Chile’s development; still, the country struggled. Allende did not get the same opportunities as the previous two presidents since politicians, the middle class, elites, and the military ignored his call for unity to fight inflation and other economic troubles. The Cold War came to a head in Chile during Allende’s administration (1970-1973), destroying the reforms created in the aftermath of the 1960 Chilean earthquake.

This struggle was seen in Valdivia. As the working class stood behind Allende’s administration and sought to help with his mandates to distribute food and supplies to the people, the opposition sought to bring down his administration by further stalling economic development. Unlike other cities like Puerto Montt and Concepción, Valdivia did not experience many incidents of “tomas,” or land takeovers. The city still suffered a housing shortage, but many of the working class either stayed and found housing or left to the next city looking for work and a better future for their families. In 1973, “tomas” did begin to occur in Valdivia, not because of the lack of housing, nor because the Allende administration was failing, but rather for the sake of supporting the President.

One famous occupation was that of the COPRESUR (the Cooperative for Southern Products) market place located at the cross sections of General MacKenna and Victorino

Lastarria, on Holzapfel N° 665, in the middle of the *Población Gil de Castro*.⁷⁷² This occurred “when merchants went against the Allende Government and started hoarding and smuggling merchandise.” The community reacted, deciding “to occupy the market and thus normalize the distribution and supply of products to the community.”⁷⁷³ The occupation of the market lasted four weeks, as the occupiers put on cultural shows, distributed food, and cooked for the community.⁷⁷⁴ The occupation of the market ended on September 11, 1973, when the Chilean military took over the national government in Santiago in a coup that ended Chilean democracy. From then on, these *poblaciones* on the outskirts of the city came under constant surveillance by the state police (Carabineros) and the military, ending a moment in time when the working class truly held popular power through votes and a combination of the ballot box and street mobilizations.

The 1973 military coup had two larger ramifications for the city of Valdivia and its people. First, the city further lost industries as the nation and the region diversified for the sake of the national economy.⁷⁷⁵ Second, while many in the disenfranchised working-class population had gained the right to vote and proper homes, they also lost their freedom to organize, protest, and vote for the people that most concerned themselves with those rights, the left. The 1960 Valdivia earthquake accelerated the tendency for the central government to fix the social ailments that plagued the nation and stagnated its economy. In the aftermath of the earthquakes, Alessandri turned to left-leaning reforms to reconstruct and integrate the south. Frei

⁷⁷² Bernarda Aucapan Mallaquipai, *Los Terremoteados de La Población Menzel (1960-2007). Memoria Del Desarrollo Habitacional de Valdivia Desde Sus Pobladores*. (Valdivia, Chile: Gobierno Regional Región de los Ríos y SERPA, 2010), 112.

⁷⁷³ Aucapan Mallaquipai, 114. JAP is an organization the Committee for the control and regulation of prices or Junta del Abastecimiento y Control de Precio

⁷⁷⁴ Aucapan Mallaquipai, 114–15.

⁷⁷⁵ The military government also began a general period of deindustrialization, therefore, Valdivia was not the only province and city that experienced this trend.

subsequently sought to further Alessandri's reforms by extending the Agrarian Reform and making the expropriation of land easier. In both administrations, the right, center, and the left, even through struggle, worked to pass this legislation. This changed with Allende's election: congress, the elites, and much of the middle class opposed his reforms. While actors from across the political spectrum had accepted or even promoted left-leaning reforms under conservative and right-leaning administrations, the forces of the right and center strongly opposed them under Allende—as the example of the COPRESUR show—because he was a Marxist politician during the Cold War. The progress made in the aftermath of the 1960 Valdivia earthquake diminished because of the inability for the elites and middle class to accept the will of the people, at the cost of their own democracy.

This dissertation has shown that natural events such as the 1960 Valdivia earthquake have social consequences and have the power to transform societies. The earthquake had three large ramifications on the south and the nation. First, it built momentum for an agrarian reform. Although an agrarian reform had been discussed since the early 1950s, it was not until after the 1960 earthquake that legislation was passed as part of a plan of reconstruction for the south's economy. Under Alessandri's administration, this reform was moderate, providing the impetus to start the harnessing of the south. Under Frei, the Agrarian Reform took a more assertive approach in expropriating land after the modification of the constitution. It was no longer a question, but rather a necessity for agriculture to produce for the nation, thus changing the dynamics of the south's role in the national economy.

The earthquake created conditions for the broader incorporation of the working class into Chilean society. The reconstruction process involved the documentation of rural, working-class people allowing them to gain access to bank accounts, notaries, and other legal state

documentations. When Alessandri and Congress passed suffrage for all those who are literate, the documentation for public services in the wake of the 1960 earthquake and rebuilding allowed for the working class to vote, even if illiterate. This accelerated the process favoring significant reform, as the working class showed up to the ballot box and exerted its influence in the national elections. Many right-leaning politicians took note of the rising influence of the working-class vote, adjusting to the times.

Finally, my dissertation has shown that the earthquake reconfigured society and the region. The 1960 Valdivian earthquake created a greater impetus for the central government to go into southern Chile and harness its natural resources for the sake of the national economy. As I have shown, Valdivia was once an industrial powerhouse, but diminished through the years due to Concepción taking over many industries because of its proximity to Santiago, and the south's more hostile natural environment as it suffered throughout the 1950s. The 1960 earthquake made deindustrialization a reality, especially with the central government redirecting commerce to Puerto Montt, Osorno, and Temuco, cities along the Pan-American Highway. This led to *Valdivianos* rethinking their future as a vacation destination with tourism as their main industry rather than manufacturing. This also led to demographic shifts—much of the middle class and rich moved to more prominent cities, such as Santiago or Puerto Montt, while the surrounding rural population moved into the city of Valdivia. Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, Valdivia as a tourist city was further developed under Allende and the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. It is my hope that my research serves as a foundation for further study of the south during the dictatorship of Pinochet by providing insights into how Valdivia was transformed from an industrial city to a tourist destination.

Cataclysmic natural events, such as the 1960 Valdivia earthquake, provide a lens into the dynamics of the societies they help. Chile initiated such a transformation through legislation and created pathways for the incorporation and empowerment of the working class. More than ever, in the age of the coronavirus pandemic and increasing effects of climate change, politicians and society at large need to pay attention to these stressors that have the power to change society, maybe not in their immediate aftermath, but further down the line in the scope of five to ten years. Natural events occur in moments, days, and lasting up to months or even years, as was the case for the 1960 Valdivia earthquake. However, the social and political reactions create reminders of these natural events in the form of legislation, in hopes of fixing some of society's ailments that were highlighted during the "disaster" period. Ultimately, natural events do not create, but highlight social problems that plague society.

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