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THE PRIVATE ZONE: A DEVELOPMENT IN SOVIET POLITICAL
COMMUNICATION SINCE STALIN

The University of Oklahoma

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GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE PRIVATE ZONE: A DEVELOPMENT IN SOVIET
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION SINCE STALIN

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
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degree of
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BY
JONATHAN GREENFIELD MARK

Norman, Oklahoma

1981

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THE PRIVATE ZONE: A DEVELOPMENT IN SOVIET
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION SINCE STALIN

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THE PRIVATE ZONE: A DEVELOPMENT IN SOVIET
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION SINCE STALIN

INTRODUCTION

SCOPE AND PURPOSE, ORGANIZATION,
AND DEFINITIONS

This study deals with an issue in contemporary Soviet life. It seeks to demonstrate the process by which certain members of Soviet society have, on occasion, gained news information from sources outside regime control, and how this information has circulated in a society which nominally operates according to norms prescribed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).^{*} The purpose of the study is to suggest that the prescribed norms do not always dictate Soviet reality. Though the party press of the Soviet Union normally presents the point of view the regime intends the citizenry to adopt on important issues, the evidence developed in the course of this investigation suggests that many Soviet citizens have a long-standing distrust of official information and

^{*}See pages 16-17 of chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of societal norms and behavior prescribed by the CPSU.

have actively sought out alternative sources. Though the regime nominally controls the information environment, it appears that at least some Soviet citizens have actively communicated information from alternative, unofficial sources with ease and confidence. The prime alternative source of unofficial information appears to have been shortwave radio broadcasts from the western nations.

This is not to say that the Soviet Union has become an open society, but that it may not longer be a completely closed society as far as western broadcasts are concerned. Many of these broadcasts were permitted by the regime to penetrate Soviet airspace unimpeded for extended periods in the 1960s and 1970s. It seems fair to suggest that these broadcasts were instrumental in providing news to a certain public quite ready to listen, and that the regime often acted with apparent restraint during the period as information of a different, sometimes conflicting nature to that provided by the controlled, party press circulated in the Soviet information environment. The reasons why the regime apparently decided to permit some Soviet reception of western broadcasts are not entirely clear. It seems likely that they were at first related to the process of de-Stalinization and later to the adjustment process the CPSU attempted to make to the policy of detente. But, in general terms, it seems that the CPSU, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, was attempting to adapt to change. Change, in this sense, was the product of those

socio-cultural forces at work in the modern world, which required the CPSU to alter either its structure or its policies.¹ According to Karl Ryavec, as an institution of cultural and social control, the CPSU has responded to change in a selective fashion:

. . . [the Soviet leadership circles] emphasiz[e] the maintenance of existing political principles and practices while at the same time [they] attempt to modernize Soviet society and economy, particularly stressing efficiency and high-quality products. The leaders seem to be trying to return to the political situation which existed during the mid-1950s, the period just before the appearance of political opposition, widespread samizdat, political neutralism among professionals (such as scientists), and implicitly antiregime theses in literature and theater. The CPSU would, in this respect, seem to be culturally and ideologically conservative or static, while at the same time trying to be economically and scientifically progressive. Stated otherwise, there is an attempt to create a more developed economy and a more educated population, while still holding to a type of politics that existed during an earlier period. . . . The critical question here is what CPSU adaptations become necessary to deal with pressures arising from newly created and energetic social and cultural elites and new social and economic progress.²

In general terms, it seems that during the periods in the 1960s and 1970s when western broadcasts were not jammed, they were permitted by the CPSU for at least two reasons: First, permitting Soviet listeners to receive them probably did not appear to the CPSU to adversely effect its own control of the political situation. Second, permitting them could have appeared to the CPSU as a progressive step, one which might be well received by the social and cultural elites to which the CPSU has increasingly turned since World War II for

execution of its policies and programs. It is important to stress that this process of adaptation can sometimes leave an apparent gap between CPSU principle and CPSU policy. In the case of information, the CPSU may claim total control of information, both in principle as well as fact, but CPSU policy, as in the case of western broadcasts, may have permitted the flow of information to Soviet audiences over which the CPSU has exercised no control. As a result, many Soviet citizens during the 1960s and 1970s may have been relatively free to acquire and communicate unofficial information such as that provided by foreign radio broadcasts. In doing so, they may have experienced a form of privacy not traditionally associated with life in a totalitarian society. The totalitarian model* stresses collective obedience to authority and control, yet it seems that some Soviet citizens, by listening to foreign broadcasts, have been acting as individualists in communications matters. Perhaps we can go so far as to say that such people have been behaving as if they had a "private zone" around themselves in which they felt reasonably comfortable to acquire and communicate information from unofficial sources. This is both the hypothesis and central concern of this investigation.

A major part of this study is taken up with the communications behavior in the Soviet Union of Soviet Jewish emigres who now live in the United States. During the period

*See page 16 of chapter 1 for a more complete expression of this concept.

June-September 1980, 104 emigres were interviewed about their reaction to the news of the 1973 Middle East war (the Yom Kippur War), an event which occurred while they still lived in the Soviet Union. One can reasonably expect that many Soviet Jews would have an interest in security matters relating to Israel, and the evidence developed in the course of interviewing showed that the emigre respondents were active users of information about the war from both the Soviet press and western radio broadcasts. The communications behavior of the emigres in reaction to the war may be suggestive of that which is hypothesized to exist on the part of all Soviet citizens experiencing the phenomenon of the private zone. Though the Soviet press backed the Arab cause in print and word, and though the regime clearly did not wish Israel to humiliate the Arabs in 1973 as she had done in the 1967 war, many Soviet Jews apparently held views quite counter to those held by the regime. These Soviet citizens actively sought out news which did not support development of a collective point of view on the matter of the war. Insofar as many felt reasonably free to set themselves apart from the collective, regime-sponsored point of view, these people may have been exhibiting characteristics of the private zone.

This work is divided into four parts. The Introduction sets forth the scope and purpose of the project, defines several important terms and concepts, and outlines the organization of the piece. Part I is more lengthy.

It provides a literature review, it offers a theoretical perspective, and it concludes with the statement of hypothesis. During the preparation of part I, it became clear that these three concerns were integrated and that they were best presented not in isolation or in sequence, but in tandem--in their joint context--as if on three parallel tracks. Part I consists of eight chapters which lay a basis in literature and theory for an excursion into the contemporary Soviet communications environment. In any of these eight chapters, the reader may find elements of literature review, theory or hypothesis; but I trust that this tandem approach, while possibly appearing a bit unstructured, will actually move the reader along at a more rapid pace, and to a more thorough grasp of my thinking than might another approach which treats these matters as segregated in intellectual or written form.

Chapters 1 and 2 of part I deal with political communication in totalitarian society. The emphasis in these chapters is on western literature and theory, produced in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, which have both analyzed the goal of mass communication in societies under totalitarian rule and have described mass communication as a tool in the hands of totalitarian leadership--a tool used to achieve social conformity and obedience to political authority. In these chapters, it becomes clear that the individual retains certain capabilities to resist the efforts of totalitarian leadership to influence and control him through use of the mass media. Even

during Stalin's day, certain "islands of separateness" such as the family, the university and the church may have provided some refuge from the relentless efforts of the regime to monopolize the political communication environment. Some observers have also taken note of the phenomenon of "privatization," a psychological device by which people under totalitarian rule have been able to appear outwardly conformist and obedient, while actually being ambivalent or harboring hostility to the principles and methods of the regime.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of part I deal with a number of systemic, institutional and group considerations which appear to be important in the evolution of the private zone. Among the systemic considerations are two having to deal with the consequences of modernization: industrialization and urbanization. These are coupled with several group considerations which may have collectively produced a class cleavage of significant proportions in post-war Soviet society. In short, there appears to have developed since the war a new "middle class" with a "technological outlook" which is too sophisticated and politically aware to any longer accept the principles, methods and objectives of the Party at face value. The emergence of this class appears to constitute the dilemma which was described above in the quotation from Karl Ryavec: The Party contributed to the creation of new cultural and social elites for its own reasons, but it appears that the Party now has no interest in the type of social and cultural progress that these elites apparently desire.

In addition to these systemic and group considerations there are a number of institutional ones. The political agitator, as the prime vehicle of party ideas and policy at the local and working levels, appears to have been largely displaced in the 1960s and 1970s by electronic media. The advance of technology has allowed the Party to place politically "correct" television and radio programming in the homes of millions of Soviet people, some of whom might otherwise be out of reach. But, while the political agitator could not be ignored without risk, or "turned off" with the flick of a wrist, electronic media can be turned off or mentally "tuned out" in riskless ways. Similarly, foreign radio broadcasts, with their wholly uncontrolled and frequently "anti-Soviet" programming can only be stopped from reaching Soviet ears by electronic jamming which is becoming more expensive each year in material and political terms. On top of all this, there seem to be a number of post-Stalin developments in the Soviet legal system which have apparently contributed to a reduction in levels of fear on the part of people who wish to engage in non-conformist activities such as listening to foreign radio stations.

The objective in chapters 1 through 5 is to lay a theoretical, legal, philosophical and historical groundwork for the emergence of the private zone since the death of Stalin. The purposes of the remaining chapters in part I--chapters 6, 7 and 8--is to provide the mechanism by which the existence

and dimensions of the private zone might be determined.

I introduce the Soviet Jewish population as a target for the study of these issues in chapter 6. Since 1967, over 200,000 Soviet Jews have emigrated, many to the United States.

Chapter 7 deals with antisemitism, assimilation and acculturation--factors which might either facilitate or inhibit the use of Jewish opinion to derive conclusions about the state of the contemporary Soviet political communication environment. Chapter 7 concludes with the determination that, as members of a highly-educated and urbanized minority group, Soviet Jews might offer opinions highly suggestive of the new Soviet technical intelligentsia, the new "middle class" with the "technological outlook."

Chapter 8 is concerned with framing the hypothesis in formal terms. It asserts that the literature permits the conclusion that there are certain distinct social, cultural and political differences between the Soviet Union of the early 1970s and that of Stalin's day. It asserts that the private zone exists and that it is just one manifestation of the difference between the two periods. Chapter 8 concludes with the presentation of a device for the testing of the hypothesis--that of surveying recent Soviet Jewish emigrants to the United States on their attitudes toward Soviet mass media and on their personal behavior within the Soviet political communication environment.

Part II is entitled "Procedures, Respondent Testimony and Statistics." It consists of chapters 9, 10, 11 and 12, each of which is intended to explain how data gathered from the 104 Soviet Jews interviewed relates to the matter of the private zone. Chapter 9 deals with the research methods I employed with the Soviet Jewish emigres whom I interviewed in Dallas, Houston and Kansas City during the summer of 1980. It also lists the demographic characteristics of the sample and advances the judgment that these 1980 respondents conform demographically to both the parent Soviet Jewish population, and to a sample developed by Professor Zvi Gitelman of the University of Michigan who performed a similar project with Soviet Jewish emigres in 1976. For these reasons I believe that my respondents are qualified, on one hand, to offer views representative of the parent population on matters of political communication, and on the other, views useful as a guide to assessing the opinions and behavior of Russian members of the new Soviet technical intelligentsia in the same issue area.

Chapter 10 involves reporting of the news gathering habits of the respondents during the period of the 1973 Middle East War (the Yom Kippur War). The reaction of the respondents to this event is intended to be the test which shows their attitude toward Soviet mass media and toward the Soviet political communication environment. It also establishes the dimensions of the private zone. The period of the Yom Kippur War was chosen for two reasons. First, as Jews, it was anticipated

that the respondents would have paid close attention to dramatic news concerning the survival of Israel, and that they would still have clear memories of their news gathering habits, even after seven years and the trauma of having engaged in the emigration and resettlement processes. Second, by 1974, some of my respondents had already left the Soviet Union and would not be able in 1980 to comment first-hand on events in the Soviet Union which took place after 1973. In chapter 10, it becomes clear that the Soviet press was generally mistrusted as a source of reliable and complete news about the Yom Kippur War. Foreign radio stations appeared to be the principal source of war news during the war because the foreign stations were perceived to be much more truthful and objective than the Soviet press when the reporting of both sources was compared side by side.

Chapter 11 deals mainly with statistics derived from the tabulation of responses to questions about how confidently the respondents shared the news of the war from foreign radio stations with other people. The issue was posed in terms of "discussion partners": respondents were asked to remember how confidently they talked about the war with members of their own family, friends, co-workers, acquaintances and strangers. The tables containing the statistics show that all the respondents talked confidently with their own families but showed high degrees of caution when talking with acquaintances or strangers. In mid-range interpersonal situations,

most respondents were comfortable discussing the news about the war from foreign radio with friends, but the greatest variation in response occurs in relation to co-workers. Respondents were offered five choices of response: "always," "mostly," "sometimes," "seldom" and "never." In regard to co-workers, no choice is totally disregarded. Because the "discussion dimension" of co-workers seems to be the one where confidence about discussing news from an unofficial source such as foreign radio appears to yield to caution and discretion, it seems that the private zone encompasses the individual, his family and friends; but not necessarily co-workers, and certainly not acquaintances or strangers.

Chapter 12 is the final chapter in part II and the final chapter in the body of this work. It is built around statistical tables which are produced by crosstabulating the demographic characteristics of the respondents with their responses to questions about how confidently they talked about foreign radio with five types of discussion partner--family, friends, co-workers, acquaintances and strangers.

Age proves to be an important factor since older respondents seem to show more caution and discretion than younger people in all dimensions of discussion. Women seem to be slightly more cautious than men, particularly in the discussion dimension of co-workers. Jews from "western" areas of the Soviet Union (western Ukraine, western Byelorussia and other regions which came under Soviet rule as late as 1939-1944)

seem to be slightly more confident about communicating information from an unofficial source in the workplace than "heartland" Jews (those from "core" or "central" areas of the Soviet Union which have been under nominal Soviet control since 1917). Respondents with advanced technical educations in the Soviet Union and occupations which would mark them as likely members of the new Soviet technical intelligentsia seem to be somewhat more comfortable about discussing information from foreign radio about the Yom Kippur War than the respondents with no more than high school educations and non-intelligentsia occupational positions in the Soviet Union. In all cases, willingness to communicate information from foreign radio, particularly in the workplace, is believed to be positively correlated with the presence of the private zone.

The purpose of the Conclusion is to resolve a question about the origin of the private zone. As discussed earlier, the private zone may have developed because of basic change in the Soviet political system--change away from the totalitarian model--toward the kind of industrial pluralism often associated with the western social democracies. The communications behavior of the new Soviet technical intelligentsia, of which many of my respondents were members at one time, may be indicative of such systemic political change.

On the other hand, the private zone may be a more transient phenomenon, an interesting but historically

impermanent development caused by certain changes in the post-Stalin political atmosphere. Such a change might be caused, easily enough it seems, by a regime decision to get away from the kind of large-scale, coercive and politically costly techniques of social control which were commonplace under Stalin. In this view, the regime accepts the private zone on sufferance, but retains the privilege and power to reassert at any time the kind of Stalinist techniques of social control which could obliterate it.

Thus, the private zone may have evolved because of change in the nature of the Soviet system, because of a reaction to a change in political atmosphere, or perhaps for some other set of reasons. But in any event, it seems that many Soviet citizens in recent years have been left well enough alone in the handling of their personal communication matters, that those who so choose seem to possess a private zone. And this alone seems no small thing, given that it appears to have occurred in a country with the history of the Soviet Union.

PART I

LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVE, HYPOTHESIS

CHAPTER 1

CONSIDERATIONS OF INDIVIDUALISM

Perhaps the best known expression of the totalitarian model was contained in Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.³ The authors contended that all totalitarian dictatorships possess common features:

1. an unofficial ideology consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man's existence to which everyone is supposed to adhere, at least passively . . .;
2. a single mass party led typically by one man, the "dictator," and consisting of a relatively small percentage of the population (up to ten percent) of men and women, a hard core of them passionately and unquestioningly dedicated to the ideology . . .;
3. a system of terroristic police control . . .;
4. a technologically near-complete monopoly of control, in the hands of the party and its subservient cadres, of all means of effective mass communication such as press, radio, motion pictures;
5. a similarly technologically near-complete monopoly of control (in the same hands) of all means of effective armed combat;
6. a central control and direction of the entire economy . . .;⁴

For Friedrich and Brzezinski, the objective seems to have been to specify the organizational requirements for the achievement

of total control of society.⁵ The objective of total control can be expressed in any number of ways but Professor Pool seems to have done it elegantly enough: the dream of every totalitarian movement has been to make the whole nation into a loyal devoted family dedicated to the ideals of the leader or party.⁶ One of the main features which seems to separate a totalitarian dictatorship most clearly from the authoritarian state is the tools it chooses to use to get and keep power. Professor Fainsod assigned terror the preeminent role, describing it as the lynchpin of modern totalitarianism.⁷

However, Hannah Arendt wrote that there is a complex and invidious relationship between terror, propaganda and indoctrination to the totalitarian state.⁸ She allowed that in totalitarian countries, terror and propaganda present two sides of the same coin, quoting among others, E. Kohn-Bramstedt. Kohn-Bramstedt's explanation of the relationship is that "terror without propaganda would lose most of its psychological effect, whereas propaganda without terror does not contain its full punch."⁹ And Arendt advances the point by stating that wherever totalitarianism possesses absolute control, it replaces propaganda with indoctrination and uses violence not so much to frighten people (this is done only in the initial stages when political opposition still exists) as to "realize constantly its ideological doctrines and practical lies."¹⁰ In the years just before the death of Stalin, a technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of effective mass

communication (described by Friedrich and Brzezinski as common feature number four above) was hard at work in the Soviet Union trying to make reality out of just this kind of ideological doctrine and just these kinds of practical lies. Violence, of course, was indispensable to the process.

The operational code of mass communication in Stalinist Russia, a product of a totalitarian doctrine, was clearly described by Professor Inkeles.¹¹

1. The entire system of communication is oriented toward a single goal. Both it and its control apparatus serve as instruments through which the Party and government mobilize the mind and will of the population; they must see to it that what ought to be done is done, what ought to be thought and felt is felt. (author's emphasis)
2. The ends to which mass communication must be put are justified in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory. The practical effect of this is that the media is to be used primarily to strengthen the Party's leadership in its self-assigned role as leader, teacher and guide to the Soviet people.
3. Soviet control of communications is not designed to facilitate or improve the free exchange of ideas among men. Indeed the Soviet leaders clearly regard such a free flow of ideas as dangerous and as likely to impede the attainment of the Party's goals.
4. The state establishes for the media, specific, concrete and practical goals, which are treated much like production norms set for Soviet industry. The media are conceived of as tools or instruments for effecting the purposes of the Party.
5. Soviet control of the mass media is absolute. There can be no competition for the message of the central authorities, not even for small meetings, or for that matter, from private conversations between individuals. All must be harnessed for attainment of the greater goal of party leadership.¹²

It seems right to suggest that Inkeles was correct in principle but was referring to a state of affairs which had evolved considerably after the passing of Stalin and Beria, Stalin's secret police chief. This is not to say that the operational code of the mass media was changed, but that the goals implicit in the code were no longer attainable if they ever were. The code implies that the media operate in a non-competitive environment, without losing any eyes, ears or hearts to secondary sources of information. But insofar as Professor Fainsod correctly described terror as the lynchpin of modern totalitarianism, only the memory of mass terror remained as the lynchpin after Stalin was gone. For many years this memory served to support the realization of doctrine by the mass media. But the effectiveness of the memory declined with each passing year.

Within the literature of totalitarianism itself are occasionally found qualifications to the generalizations made about the features of totalitarian dictatorships. Friedrich and Brzezinski, still writing in Totalitarian Dictatorships and Autocracy, held out hope for certain "islands of separateness" in totalitarian society.¹³

. . . even within the grip of a total demand for total identification with such a regime, some people manage to maintain themselves aloof, to live in accordance with their personal convictions, . . . Among these islands of separateness, we propose four which have proved to be of particular tenacity: the family, the churches, the universities and the military establishment. . . ."

Friedrich and Brzezinski seem to be saying that there always have been certain areas where the Party competes for personal loyalty with other institutions and does so with very mixed results. Brzezinski and Huntington suggested that the interests of parents in socializing their children seldom, if ever, coincide with those of the Party--that the family can never be a "transmission belt" for the Party because it will always be partially a rival.¹⁴ Parents need and demand the affection and loyalty of their children and the totalitarian state demands the same. The child wants to know whom he can really trust and it would seem that the state normally takes second place in this kind of contest. Even during the height of the Terror, according to Friedrich and Brzezinski:

The family has proved a haven for the persecuted, and has served to counteract the tendency of our time to isolate and to collectivize the individual. . . . Members of families have been encouraged to testify against other members and such betrayal of the most intimate relationships has been praised as "patriotism" and loyalty to the totalitarian leadership* . . . [yet] the family became the sole refuge where anticommunist sentiments were freely voiced and where religious rites were maintained. Many Soviet emigres recall that their parents attempted to counter the official propaganda to which the children were exposed in the schools and the communist youth organizations.¹⁵

*The Pioneers is the mass communist organization of school children in the Soviet Union. It was founded in 1922 as a result of the Party's concern over child-rearing practices and its desire to limit familial influence in the interests of indoctrination (Reshetar, 1978: 155). The classic Pioneer hero and martyr is Pavlik Morozov, a fourteen-year old who, in 1932 reported on his own father for hiding grain from the state during the harsh period of collectivization. The father was shot and villagers then killed the son in vengeance (Smith, 1974: 162; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956: 244; Reshetar, 1978: 156n).

All of this tends to suggest that even in a totalitarian state, total control of society has not yet been achieved. Perhaps it is because all human beings are not capable of perfect obedience to authority. A major force in the prevention of such obedience is the phenomenon of "privatization," or escape into the self.¹⁶ Privatization seems to take on at least two forms in the Soviet case; on one hand it permits a person to develop ritualized ways of appearing politicized, and on the other, it equips a person to strain out political messages he does not want to hear. Often privatization involves extreme methods. Many Russians "do not drink for fun or merely as an outlet; they drink to get drunk--to blot themselves out."¹⁷ But perhaps Hedrick Smith best described privatization in terms of what he viewed as a dichotomy in Russian behavior:

. . . In their authoritarian environment, from childhood onward Russians acquire an acute sense of place and propriety, of what is accepted and what is not, of what they can get away with and what they had better not attempt. And they conform to their surroundings, playing the roles that are expected of them. With a kind of deliberate schizophrenia, they divide their existence into their public lives and their private lives and distinguish between "official" relationships and personal relationships. This happens anywhere to some degree, of course, but Russians make this division more sharply than others because of political pressures for conformity. So they adopt two very different codes of behavior for their own lives. . . . In one, thoughts and feelings are held in check. . . . In the other, emotions flow warmly, without moderation.¹⁸

The implication of privatization for the Soviet mass media seems clear. It makes the achievement of what Professor

Inkeles cited as the single goal of the official communication system appear quite impossible. That goal, to include the dictum that what ought to be thought and felt is felt, can never be achieved as long as great masses of Russians present only their "official" faces to the state. When the state sees only "official" faces it knows not, and may no longer care, which ones hide minds and hearts which are fully privatized. Smith believes that the entire system of propaganda has left the population completely indifferent to the form and content of the political message. He takes note of the ever-present signs and banners in the Soviet Union which proclaim "Communism Will Win!," "Lift High the Banner of Proletarian Internationalism!," "Glory to the Soviet People, Builders of Communism!," and on ad infinitum.

Once during a trip arranged by the Soviet Foreign Ministry, several of us [sic] Western newsmen were grimacing at the array of slogans in the city we were visiting. Later a Russian translator for another correspondent approached me discreetly and advised me in a low voice: "I heard you talking about these slogans. They are like the trees. They are part of the scenery. We don't pay any attention to them."¹⁹

Perhaps at this point it is helpful to reiterate the point made by Kohn-Bramstedt and Arendt about the relationship of terror and propaganda: "Terror without propaganda loses most of its psychological effect; propaganda without terror does not contain its full punch." But now it also seems clear that indoctrination without the presence of violence may very well leave the state incapable of implementing its ideological

doctrine and with the population indifferent to its lies. At the time Smith was writing (circa 1974), it appears that the Soviet political communications environment had arrived at precisely this point. "Communism Will Win!" was the slogan. But apparently Soviet political communications no longer had any meaningful ability to compel belief in such a statement because mass terror and the memory of political violence had become so remote in the lives of so many people. As early as 1967, John A. Armstrong concluded that "the Soviet Union can no longer be called a police state in the usual sense of the term."

High police officials do not exert major influence on policy decisions and the police as an institution is not a major factor in political struggles. Terror, in the sense of wholesale punishment for political offenses is ended, at least for the time being.²⁰

According to Armstrong, a police state has at least three characteristics and the Soviet Union no longer had any of them:

1. Pervasive clandestine surveillance. Under Stalin, the aim was to "enfold all of Soviet society in a web of surveillance. . . . Soviet indoctrination stresses the need for universal vigilance against foreign and domestic enemies of the regime. . . . Occasionally volunteers step forward to be informers, motivated by patriotic fervor, ideological zeal. . . . The average Soviet citizen, and especially party members, are obliged to report suspicious circumstances to the police but there is considerable evidence that many Soviet citizens hate the role of informer. . . . [As a result, the police rarely lack an informer where they need to have one but they must either pay him money, give him privileges or coerce him into doing the job.]
2. Secret arbitrary arrest and condemnation. The departure of Stalin and Beria brought sweeping changes. Very soon after Stalin died, the Soviet

regime began to emphasize use of the open judicial system as opposed to secret police boards. [This is not to say that the system became "fair," just that it began to emphasize procedural as opposed to summary justice.]

3. Confinement to concentration camps. These have largely been eliminated. At the height of the Terror, as many as 20 million people may have been incarcerated. But as many as 80 percent of all inmates were probably released by 1956. Political prisoners--members of nationalist undergrounds, religious leaders, dissident intellectuals--still exist but these categories contain far fewer prisoners than existed in 1953.²¹

To the extent that Armstrong was correct in 1967 in saying that the Soviet Union was no longer a police state, it seems clear why Soviet media and indoctrination services by 1974 had probably failed to achieve the single goal which Professor Inkeles had cited as the primary one. The communication system had failed to mobilize the mind and will of the population principally because it could not persuade masses of people through its own voice and it no longer had mass terror as an ally with which to coerce belief.

But it may be true that by 1967, the Party was no longer placing quite the same emphasis on persuasion, indoctrination and coercion to produce belief, tools that Arendt and Kohn-Bramstedt had in an earlier day said were indispensable to produce belief. Paul Hollander has written of what he calls the shift to less coercive policies which he says occurred after Stalin's death.²² He focuses on what he feels is an official desire to foster conformity through value-oriented as opposed to coercive measures. This desire

he finds codified in the "new Program of the CPSU," promulgated as the Moral Code of the Builder of Communism at the 1961 22nd Party Congress. The Moral Code, according to Hollander, is described by its author as a series of "scientifically formulated precepts which govern the conduct of man who builds the new society." The Moral Code consists of these principles:

1. Devotion to the Communist cause; love of socialist motherland and of other socialist countries.
2. Conscientious labor for the good of society--he who does not work, neither shall he eat.
3. A high sense of public duty; intolerance of action harmful to the public interest.
4. Concern on the part of everyone for the preservation and growth of public wealth.
5. Collectivism and comradely mutual assistance; one for all and all for one.
6. Human relations and mutual respect between individuals--man is to man a friend, comrade and brother.
7. Honesty and truthfulness, moral purity, modesty and unpretentiousness in social and private life.
8. Mutual respect in the family and concern for the upbringing of children.
9. An uncompromising attitude to injustice, parasitism, dishonesty, careerism and money-grubbing.
10. Friendship and brotherhood among all people of the USSR; intolerance of national and racial hatred.
11. An uncompromising attitude to the enemies of Communism, peace, and the freedom of nation.
12. Fraternal solidarity with the working people of all countries, and with all peoples.²³

According to Hollander the historic significance of the Moral Code may not be readily apparent since little or nothing in its content differs sharply from the moral prescriptions of the past. But he suggests that Soviet leaders may have found significance in the document, and made it public policy, because it places the longstanding political values within the context of The Moral Life. Hollander believes that this represents more than just wishful thinking on the part of Soviet leaders and he quotes from the preamble to the Moral Code to make his point about the official view of the state of development of Soviet society:

In the course of transition to communism, the moral principles of society become increasingly important; the sphere of action of the moral factor expands and the importance of administrative control of human relations diminishes accordingly.²⁴

Here then is one explanation the state has used to justify its monopoly of control over such institutions as the mass media, while at the same time explaining away the need in modern times for massive use of police state methods. It is a brilliant lie because it both asserts the fiction that communism has produced a more moral man in only four decades than had been produced in all of preceeding human history, while at the same time it confirms the need for the immoral use of terror which produced him in the first place. But more than this, the Party seems to be saying to the people, "We need total control over mass communications (as well as economic planning, the police and armed forces, etc.) because this

arrangement jointly supports our political requirements and your moral precepts. The Moral Code seems to show how hard the Party has tried to produce a controlled society without using the old, discredited, Stalinist methods of control.

In addition to claiming that morality is on the side of Communism, the Party has made active use of peer pressure to induce conformity. Alfred G. Meyer has written of the extensive experimentation made by the Party to transfer certain police and/or judicial functions from the formal administrative agencies of government to informal groups at the grass-roots or community levels.²⁵ The first such experiment involved "Comrades' courts" which were formed by residential neighborhood assemblies or by the employees at a place of work. The second involved the "squads" (druzhiny) of Young Communist (Komsomol) activists who acted as auxiliary police and arbiters of taste, propriety and behavior. The "Comrades' courts," set up formally in 1961, were entitled to hand out minor punishment or refer a case deserving serious punishment to higher authorities. Meyer reports that they were concerned mostly with such matters as petty theft, unsatisfactory work discipline, wife-beating, drunkenness, malicious gossip and the like. Apparently, the main function of this court was to produce a more positive attitude toward the type of values promulgated by the Moral Code.

But of greater concern to Meyer appears to be the Komsomol "squads," whose members were supposed to use

persuasion, warnings or adverse publicity against petty offenders and non-conformists or to turn them over to the formal authorities for legal action. As soon as they were created, it became clear that the "squads" would frequently overstep the limits of their authority, taking the law into their own hands.²⁶ Mostly because they included "roughnecks" with "narrow, prying minds," Meyer reports that they often induced "violent resistance" to their activities.²⁷

In both the case of the Comrades' courts and the Komsomol "squads," the Party apparently wished to exercise a form of coercion and intimidation without resort to use of the official police apparatus. According to Meyer, Soviet commentators regarded the introduction of these devices as evidence of "the withering away of the state and the blossoming of true democracy."²⁸ It remains, however, as evidence of the effort to produce a controlled society by making terror a "popular institution."²⁹ And to the extent that they were experiments which occasionally embarrassed the state, they are one result of its failure to persuade commensurate with its unwillingness to exercise terroristic methods on an official and mass basis.

CHAPTER 2

INDIVIDUALISM AND INFORMATION

Professor Pool has addressed the subject of public opinion and communication in totalitarian societies and offered a number of generalizations:

1. Totalitarian regimes are highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to effect it.
2. The controlled communications put out by totalitarian regimes--designed more for effects than for truthfulness--tend to become highly formalized and stilted.
3. Eventually the public becomes sated with such propaganda material and grows inattentive, apathetic and apolitical.
4. Despite that, the public has a hunger for trustworthy and credible information.
5. In seeking the facts, the public learns to read between the lines. It becomes accustomed to interpreting clues to the truth that are buried in the unreliable information available to them.
6. The kind of unity and cohesion created by totalitarian methods is fragile. When the structure of controls breaks down, the apparent unanimity collapses quickly. . . .³⁰

Perhaps the most important of these generalizations to a study of contemporary public opinion in the Soviet Union is number

four: the failure of the official communications to generate interest or belief in what it says does not prevent the public from having an intense interest in news from sources it can trust. This point was driven home by Inkeles and Bauer in The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society.³¹ Published in 1959, the work encompasses a series of several thousand interviews with former Soviet citizens who were displaced by World War II and found themselves in the West. All of the interviewing was completed by 1952. The authors included a fair number of questions dealing with the reaction of the respondents to Soviet mass media specifically and the information environment in the Soviet Union in general. Inkeles and Bauer were able to show that the Soviet public not only had a hunger for trustworthy and credible information, it had some ways of getting it.

Inkeles and Bauer framed several conclusions about the process of getting credible news information in a totalitarian society. Their conclusions say as much about the people who were seeking it as they do about the information environment itself. And Inkeles and Bauer were able to document that there was a secondary network of communications at work in Soviet life and that this secondary net was vital to these people as a source of credible information.

1. The communications policy of the regime . . . was to make even its supporters dissatisfied with the coverage of news, and the reliability of news they got through covert means. As a result there grew up parallel to the official system of communications an unofficial one including word-of-mouth communication, personal observation and

a pattern of interpretive inferences as applied to official media.

Inkeles and Bauer were able to determine that many respondents used inferential methods to squeeze credible information out of the Soviet media. This process is sometimes known as "reading between the lines." The techniques for reading between the lines were based on a combination of a degree of mistrust for the official media and a series of implied assumptions about the Soviet system and its communications policy. For example, it was suggested by a respondent that one should believe exactly the opposite of whatever it was that the Soviet press apparently wanted the audience member to believe, i.e., "The Soviet press interprets events in Korea as American aggression, when in actual fact the contrary is true and it is Soviet aggression," or "If they wrote that our enemies abroad were arming for war, I knew that the Soviet Union was arming." Another method of reading between the lines was to assume that the Soviet government would always attempt to prepare the populace in advance to accept unpleasant developments: "If there was going to be a famine in the Ukraine, we always would hear that there was hunger in Germany and Austria, and that children were picking food out of garbage cans. When I saw such examples, I knew that soon we would have a famine." Respondents were also able to glean facts from Soviet press reports that the state had no intention they learn. For example, one respondent recalled a Soviet press

report about a workers' strike in an American factory. He correctly assumed that the American workers were striking because they had the right to strike, a right not enjoyed by Soviet workers.³²

2. The special characteristics of Soviet communications policy, including a monopoly over the media and a militant one-sided presentation of the official point of view, particularly fosters this unofficial system and it has reached distinctive proportions.³³

It seems that this second finding by Inkeles and Bauer is most significant for it establishes something which contrasts with the earlier work of Professor Inkeles himself. Inkeles, in Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, concluded that "Soviet control over the mass media is absolute. There can be no competition for the message of the central authorities, not even from small meetings, or for that matter from private conversations between individuals." This is not to say that Inkeles was overstating the case in his presentation of the operational code of the Soviet media. But it does seem clear that his later work shows the benefit direct contact with former Soviet citizens provides in helping to see the Soviet communications environment in more than one dimension. Inkeles and Bauer also reached some important conclusions about demographics and media:

3. Distrust of the official media is a function of attitude toward the regime, however, some degree of mistrust of the official media does not, per se, necessarily mean that one is disaffected from the system. All media, both official and unofficial, are most extensively used by those higher in education and/or occupational status. Such a

person needs all kinds of information, both from overt and covert sources to survive and advance, and the higher his position in society, the higher his ability to obtain information from both systems.³⁴

It should be emphasized that the interviews conducted by Inkeles and Bauer were completed before the death of Stalin and reflect the communications behavior of people who had faced the full force of the Terror. Yet the hunger for credible news information, even under such circumstances, seems irresistible. Table 1 illustrates the degree, according to Inkeles and Bauer, to which members of several levels of Soviet society, as of the late 1940s, depended on both covert and overt sources of news.

Table 1

Social Class Patterns of Exposure
to Communications Media

Type of Media	Intelligentsia	White-Collar	Peasants
Official Mass Media			
Exposure			
High	52%	38%	3%
Medium	45	47	21
Low	3	15	76
Covert Mass Media			
Exposure			
High	20	11	1
Medium	26	25	12
Low	54	64	87
Total Respondents	642	679	387

SOURCE: Inkeles and Bauer, The Soviet Citizen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 167.

The authors defined official mass media information as newspapers and magazines, books and Soviet radio. Covert media were defined as discussion with friends, rumor and foreign radio. It should be emphasized that, according to Inkeles and Bauer, use of covert sources of news did not automatically identify a person disaffected from the Soviet system. Conversely, it appears that persons deeply loyal to the system might still be active users of covert media. This suggests the interesting possibility that neither group of people, both loyal and disaffected, fully trusts Soviet media and neither group ever has. The nature of Soviet life seems to make it possible for many people to wholeheartedly support the system with their words and deeds yet behave in ways which show an altogether different attitude. Perhaps it is a function of the dichotomy in Russian behavior described above by Hedrick Smith. Inkeles and Bauer obtained data about use of communications in Soviet life which also illustrated this point. (See table 2, p. 35) Inkeles and Bauer used such terms as "anti-Soviet sentiment" in a general sense and they felt that the meaning of their use should be clear in the context of the immediate issue. In this context, an anti-Soviet sentiment "score" was derived from the expression of varying degrees of hostility toward such Soviet institutions and policies as state ownership of heavy industry, collectivization and so on.)

Even though Inkeles and Bauer assumed that their sample is more anti-Soviet than the parent population,³⁵

Table 2

Percent Frequently Using Various Communications
Media by Social Group and Anti-Soviet
Sentiment Score

<u>Communications</u> <u>Media</u>	<u>Social Group and Anti-</u> <u>Soviet Sentiment</u>					
	Intelligentsia		White- Collar		Collective Farmers	
	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Soviet Radio	68	57	59	48	15	6
Soviet News- papers/Mag.	87	77	77	64	27	13
Foreign Radio	14	13	12	8	1	1
Rumors	30	30	21	19	7	10
Friends	33	22	24	19	5	7
Median Respondents	422	177	370	263	93	215

SOURCE: Inkeles and Bauer, The Soviet Citizen,
p. 169.

they still felt that the members of their sample were far from totally disaffected from Soviet life as a group. It can be seen from the data in table 2 that within the intelligentsia and white-collar groups there is not a significant difference between persons with low and high anti-Soviet sentiment scores in their use of various communications media. For example, among the intelligentsia, 14 percent of the low anti-Soviet respondents and 13 percent of the high anti-Soviet respondents used the covert news provided by foreign radio. Among the white-collar respondents, 59 percent of the low anti-Soviet respondents and 48 percent of the high anti-Soviet respondents used the news provided by Soviet state radio. These are not especially meaningful differences in terms of percentage, and they tend to suggest that sentiment toward the regime is not a major factor in determining the penetration of either overt or covert communications into the information environment of different social groups. What does seem to be meaningful is the extent to which covert sources of information had penetrated among the intelligentsia and white-collar respondents. For example, approximately one-third of the intelligentsia and one-fifth of the white-collar respondents reported relying on rumors and friends for information. More than one-tenth of the members of both groups reported relying on foreign radio. This is noteworthy in a society which had earlier been described as one in which there can be no competition for the message of the central authorities.

Dual networks of communication exist in the Soviet Union and it seems clear that both have been there for some time. Gayle Hollander eventually produced a functional comparison of the two³⁶ and her conclusions are worth presenting in detail because they are comprehensive.

1. The official system is monopolistic and highly controlled; the alternative system is pluralistic. In contrast to the official system, the extra-official system involves many different strains of dissent (national, ethnic and various political interpretations) and is accessible to anyone who dares to obtain the necessary means and become involved in it. There is no one ultimate interpreter of the truth.
2. The official system is extremely hierarchical, paralleling the party apparatus and monitored by it at all levels; the alternative network is non-hierarchical. Since there is no one political organization among dissenters, no one ideology or set of goals, no one form of communication, there can be no way of setting up a hierarchy that encompasses the entire movement.
3. Official communications are portrayed with a massive top-to-bottom flow of content; the extra-official network operates on a horizontal plane. In the legitimate network, there is very little bottom-to-top communication (letters to newspapers, readers' conferences, secret police informers, etc.). Horizontal communication among groups below the elite level is severely restricted and purposefully curtailed, inhibiting the development of any competing world-view or any serious modification of the elite version of reality except within the elite itself. Among participants in the extra-official network, by and large, the flow of information among various groups or individuals is on a more or less equal basis. There is no organized hierarchy to create and maintain control of the information flow.
4. Soviet mass media and the agitation-propaganda apparatus carry content that is primarily prescriptive; the unofficial system is concerned more with description and interpretation. The official system presents all material in a

didactic manner with clearly defined implications for citizen reaction and behavior. Information in the unofficial system is notable for its straight-forward factual information and the meticulous care with which the information is presented. Its interpretations of reality are clearly at variance with the official versions.

5. The official version is dualistic and highly co-ordinated; the alternative one is multi-form and relatively uncoordinated. The official system makes use of the two-step flow process by which information reaches the masses through certain influential persons (agitators, news commentators, etc.) acting as agents of the state. The unofficial system makes use of both interpersonal contacts and printed materials as well as broadcasts (mainly foreign and some illegal domestic ham stations). However these are not well coordinated. There is much duplication and waste of energy and effort.³⁷

To build her comparative statement of the two networks of communication, Gayle Hollander had the benefit of knowledge of some thirty-five years which had elapsed since Inkeles and Bauer began work on The Soviet Citizen. In these thirty-five years, the Soviet Union had proceeded through de-Stalinization and turmoil in leadership, and it had entered into detente with the West. These are important considerations for a study of the contemporary Soviet communications environment. But there is at least one more individualistic consideration which should be covered. Hollander wrote with specific knowledge of the modern dissenter's movement in the Soviet Union. Inkeles and Bauer wrote that "distrust of the official media is a function of attitude toward the regime; however, some degree of mistrust does not necessarily mean that one is disaffected from the system." Though dissenters may be the most

active users of the covert communications network, it does not seem to follow that one becomes a dissenter by using it.

There may be at least one analyst who does not share this point of view. A. Y. Shtromas has identified a category of "potential dissent" to include "dissent" which is rarely expressed politically but which is manifested in psychological and behavioral terms.³⁸ Shtromas believes that:

Everyone in Soviet society today finds political change desirable and yet, at the same time, feels himself an impotent prisoner of the inertia imposed by the existing political system. One way or another, every Soviet citizen feels like a dissident and to a certain extent is a dissident in real terms.³⁹

Shtromas prefaces his remarks to say that dissent should be considered to include anything constituting refusal to assent to an established or imposed set of values, goals or ideas.⁴⁰ Therefore, it seems possible to suggest that using the covert communications network, because one finds the official one to be inadequate, might make a person a dissenter in "potential" terms (potential in the terms used by Shtromas). In the sense that one turns to covert sources of information because he finds the official sources unreliable or untrustworthy, it seems fair to say that he is refusing to assent to an imposed set of values, goals and ideas. To the extent that he spreads news from covert sources among his family, friends and co-workers, the scope of his "potential" dissent expands. It would be difficult to say at what point potential dissent becomes "actual" dissent, but perhaps highly active use of

covert communications makes an individual feel like a dissenter of sorts, and as Shtromas suggests, makes even a loyal Soviet citizen feel like a dissenter "in real terms."

CHAPTER 3

SYSTEMIC CONSIDERATIONS

There are a number of systemic considerations which also should be considered under the rubric of totalitarianism. The first one involves the role industrialization may have had in producing a "liberalizing" effect on Soviet political life. Specifically, industrialization is identified as the principal force behind the putative convergence of the Soviet and Western systems. Convergence theorists have not always explicitly formulated the concept,⁴¹ but it seems that industrialization and urbanization, as consequences of modernization, have contributed to making Soviet life appear more liberal, hence Western, than it appeared in Stalin's day. Brzezinski and Huntington cited three perceived consequences of industrialization which have been suggested as leading to convergence:

1. . . . Industrialization and urbanization, it is said, give rise to a common culture found in all modern societies. The industrial process imposes uniformities in equipment, skill, technique and organization. Managers in separate societies develop similar outlooks and similar ways of life. Eventually this culture will produce similar political institutions. This is to say, anti-Soviet Marxism: The forces of production

will shape the social context of production, which in turn will shape the political superstructure.

2. Industrialization produces increasing diversity and complexity in society. An industrial society is necessarily pluralistic because physical scientists, medical experts, pedagogues, military strategists, engineers, even economic planners must be free to use their skills and expertise. The laws of economics, physics, military strategy . . . are universally true and must be respected by all modern societies, hence ideological and political claims must be limited. The function of the Party will no longer be to impose new demands on the system itself but to play a mediating, brokerage role. . . .
3. Industrialization creates affluence. Affluence undermines the discipline and ideological orthodoxy. The historical function of the Communist Party was to industrialize the Soviet Union. It could justify its monopoly of power only so long as sacrifice was required to achieve this end. Now sacrifice is no longer necessary economically and hence, the Communist Party is no longer necessary.⁴²

The convergence thesis suggests an explanation for increased use of covert communications in contemporary Soviet life. Industrialization produces complexity, complexity produces problems requiring solutions, and solutions require information. Convergence would seem to suggest that technicians, administrators and specialists all over the world are seeking ever greater freedom to find that information. In the Soviet Union, seekers of all kinds of information may be finding the official communications network to be increasingly inadequate because the political control exercised over the official system appears anachronistically restrictive. In terms taken from Gayle Hollander, perhaps today's Soviet

problem solvers at all levels of society feel they need information which is less prescriptive, less didactic-- information which is more descriptive and interpretative. Therefore, the consequences of modernization and convergence theory, which are derived from them, do seem helpful in identifying several characteristics of the modern Soviet audience; the audience possesses a higher degree of sophistication, awareness and curiosity than ever before. And it seems clear that the Party and mass media are having difficulty coming to grips with this reality.

Convergence theory is also deeply rooted and it has implications for civil liberty questions in both the USA and USSR. Pitirim Sorokin was one analyst who felt that totalitarianism was a political reaction caused by some great "emergency" such as war, famine or depression and that totalitarian tendencies in political life tend to recede as the emergency passes.⁴³ The breadth and depth of his views, the comprehensiveness with which he applied them, and the assurance with which he expressed them, induces a degree of skepticism in this writer. Yet, they seem to be suggestive and worthy of mention:

Each time in a given society there appears an important emergency in the form of war or threat of war, or great famine, or great economic depression, or devastating epidemic, or earthquake, or flood, or anarchy, or unrest and revolution, or some other major emergency, the amount and severity of government regimentation invariably increases and society's economy, political regime, way of life and ideologies experience a totalitarian conversion; and the greater the emergency the greater the totalitarian transformation. Conversely, each time a society's major

emergency decreases, the amount and severity of its political, ideological and cultural systems undergo a de-totalitarian reconversion toward less regimented and more free ways of life; and the greater the decrease of the emergency, the greater the reconversion to freedom.⁴⁴

Sorokin was more than happy to allow people to think that the West was moving in the direction of greater authoritarianism at the same rate the Soviet Union was receding from totalitarianism. Putting it in a blunt, if not grandiose fashion, Sorokin wrote, "In Soviet Russia, especially after Stalin, these liberties [civil] have been slowly expanding while in this country [USA] they have tended to contract in various--overt and covert--ways."⁴⁵

Sorokin has not been alone in entertaining these kinds of views. In The New Industrial State, John Kenneth Galbraith presents a contemporary view of the state of civil liberties in political systems undergoing convergence. Unlike Sorokin who had spent roughly half his life in Russia and half in the United States, Galbraith's perspective on convergence is more certainly Western. He is quite open to the question of whether convergence increases the chances for freedom of expression in the Soviet Union while decreasing the chances for such freedom in the United States. But, Galbraith addresses the issue by dividing it:⁴⁶ Whose freedom are we talking about?--the working man's or that of the business leader who does the most talking about freedom? Galbraith then focuses on what he sees as the failure of the business leader and

manager in the West to use the freedom he has for fear of losing his position in a system which has made him affluent:

The president of Republic Aviation is not much more likely to speak critically, or even candidly of the Air Force than is the head of a Soviet combinat of the ministry to which he reports. No modern head of the Ford Motor Company will ever react with the same pristine vigor to the presumed foolishness of Washington as did its founder. . . . The high executive who speaks fulsomely of personal freedom carefully submits his speeches on the subject for review and elimination of controversial words, phrases and ideas as befits a good organization man. . . . The danger to liberty lies in the subordination of belief to the needs of the industrial system. . . .⁴⁷

Galbraith seems to be saying that in both Soviet and American systems, as "mature" industrial states, the question of individual liberty is the same. The man who wishes to speak out, to be different, to oppose the status quo faces the same kind of risk. The man who steps out from the crowd faces the same kind of life in both countries--a life deprived of the material rewards and satisfactions which the system is prepared to deliver to him in abundance if he conforms. By implication Galbraith seems to suggest that in the modern Soviet Union, now that it has "left behind" its totalitarian past, the sanctions today for being out of step and speaking out are somehow more benign.

Both Sorokin and Galbraith have been taken to task by Bertram D. Wolfe.⁴⁸ Mr. Wolfe feels that Sorokin's own career as an academic militates against many of the more extravagant aspects of his formulation of convergence.

According to Wolfe, Sorokin held influential positions first in Saint Petersburg as a professor of sociology before the Revolution, and then at Harvard. Before he came to the United States, Sorokin, through his own writing, had fully branded himself as a "political reactionary," and only the personal intervention of Lenin saved him from execution. Lenin instead, writes Wolfe, ordered him stripped of his Soviet citizenship and exiled.

. . . and that is how Sorokin found his way alive to America and to Harvard. By the time he wrote America and Russia [sic] (his very popular 1944 book which widely disseminated his views on convergence), Professor Sorokin had not only forgiven the fact that Lenin stopped him from writing, teaching, engaging in political activity, and living in the land of his birth, but he seemed to forget that Stalin, less "polite," would have taken his life along with his honor.⁴⁹

Wolfe, though he can be accused of engaging in hyperbole, nevertheless poses a problem for Sorokin and his thesis. Presumably Sorokin would agree that his ejection from Russia occurred during a period of extreme emergency conditions there. Presumably this should have produced a totalitarian transformation sufficient to have produced the elimination of Sorokin himself. But he escaped and so did many others. Sorokin handles this kind of detail through tortured elaborations of his thesis which lack the breezy tone of his basic formulation.⁵⁰

Wolfe also goes after Galbraith with the same kind of evidence. He finds Galbraith to have directly addressed the issue of civil liberties in converging societies in an

interview with New York Times correspondent Anthony Lewis. The interview was published in the magazine section of the Sunday, December 18, 1966 edition of the paper. The concluding question and answer of the interview got to the heart of the matter:

Lewis: Are you suggesting that as the two societies converge, the Communist society will necessarily introduce greater political and cultural freedom?

Galbraith: I'm saying precisely that. The requirements of deep, scientific perception and deep technical specialization cannot be reconciled with intellectual regimentation. They inevitably lead to intellectual curiosity and to a measure of intellectual liberalism.⁵¹

Wolfe's response to this exchange is important and worth quoting at length because it seems to sum up the problem faced by those who suggest that systemic developments have produced wholesale change in the information environment of the Soviet Union today:

All of the technological similarities imaginable and all of the Bills of Rights that paper will put up with will not alter the intellectual barbed wire represented by the absolute monopoly of the means of communication and of all the devices, paper, presses, meeting halls, publishing houses, reviews, reviewers, formulations, even vocabularies by which men communicate and know each other and themselves. The rulers own and control the journals and organizations that might criticize their mistakes, their stupidities and cruelties. Harvard Professor Galbraith could not be a professor in a Soviet university. A.D.A. leader Galbraith could not be a political leader, author Galbraith could not get a book published if it maintained that the two systems are getting to be indistinguishable. If he could steal a bit of paper and use an off-hour mimeograph machine to set down his views, he would be hauled into court for anti-Soviet propaganda, tried by a judge who knew in advance what

the verdict was to be and how to make the crime fit the punishment. The courtroom would be packed with secret police masquerading as intellectuals and working men who would testify that his views were intolerable to them, corrupted their children, endangered public safety. He could not get friends, relatives or admirers of his wit into the courtroom. The "audience" would drown the words of the accused and his witnesses with jeers and clamor for punishment. If he persisted he would run the danger of going to a sanitarium for the mentally deranged as has been the case with Yessinin-Volpin, Bukovsky, Tarsis, Batashev, Vishnevskaya, and General Grigorenko. . . . To sum up: the convergence theory will not stand up. . . . The likelihood is that they [the two countries that are supposed to be converging] will continue to move [each] toward its own future under the influence of its own heritage, traditions and institutions, a heritage that will both be conserved and altered more by the actions of men than by the weight of things. . . .⁵²

Mr. Wolfe would seem to have the last word on whether or not the Soviet and American systems were converging as of the late 1960s. Clearly, each retained certain features to distinguish it. In regard to the Soviet case, several of these institutional and group features will be taken up in the next two chapters. However, it does seem for the moment that within the varied, sometimes exotic literature dealing with systemic considerations are to be found views which can contribute to the notion that the Soviet political system and its post-war political communication environment have not developed in a vacuum. The forces of industrialization and urbanization have worked their will on both Soviet and Western societies. The results have not necessarily been the same, but it does seem fair to suggest that these systemic forces have contributed to a certain change in the political atmosphere on the Soviet side. Whether one describes the

atmosphere as more "liberal," more "Western," or less "Soviet" than in Stalin's day, it does seem changed at least in small part because of forces at work in the world which ignore political boundaries.

CHAPTER 4

INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Mark W. Hopkins and Gayle Hollander, writing separately and at separate times nevertheless share a perspective on the problems Soviet mass media have had in getting and keeping hold on its audience.⁵³ Both see the Soviet media as an inflexible institution for the most part, one which is trying hard to come to grips with technical and conceptual problems caused by forces of modernization. For example, Hopkins suggests that the political press of the Soviet Union has only recently (since the middle 1960s) shown real concern for the interests and tastes of the Soviet audience.

As a generalization, what happened was that the Soviet press, being managed by a centralized political group, tended toward satisfying the political management rather than the mass audience. Because during Stalin's years very little attention was paid to public opinion, a sort of intellectual incest took place. Editors structured content according to what the political leadership considered the most effective form in propagandizing national goals and thoughts. The political leadership concurred in what was disseminated; but no one bothered to discover whether the message was reaching the audience. As a consequence, the managed press engendered indifference, disbelief and cynicism among the audience.⁵⁴

Hopkins may have a point. He hints at a distance which he feels has opened up between the political management and the mass audience. The distance seems to have grown wider, as the ability of the political management to reach the mass audience has grown greater over the years. The modern technology of mass media, just as industrialization in general, has proved to be a double-edged sword for the Party. The more the Party is capable of reaching the mass audience through television, radio, newspapers and a host of other media, the more the audience seems to have availed itself of unofficial and covert sources of information.

Gayle Hollander has addressed this matter directly:

As accessibility to the media has increased, exposure has become more and more privatized. The artificially supportive context of earlier days, collective listening and the agitator who guided discussion after programs or newspaper readings has gradually begun to disappear. As people have less and less contact with officials who try to guide their exposure patterns and reactions, they become somewhat freer in their choices regarding official media. To some extent liberated from official scrutiny, people can now more easily choose not to expose themselves to media, and they can react to political messages in private or in the company of trusted friends. Such inter-personal support is an important condition for resisting and supplementing official interpretations.⁵⁵

A study of contemporary Soviet public opinion should include reference to the work done by the Soviets to find out what Soviet people think about public issues and the mass media which supplies them the bulk of their news information. Unfortunately, information of this type is quite scarce. There is evidence that the state is quite concerned with what people think; however, for reasons that are not entirely

clear, it has chosen to let very little evidence of the research it has done into the question get out of its hands.

During the 1960s, however, several studies came to light which suggest that there were a few attempts to determine public opinion through survey research methods. A major effort was made by the editors of Komsomol'skaya pravda, the official organ of the Komsomol.⁵⁶ Researchers went out to ask a single question, "Will mankind succeed in averting war?" On May 19, 1960, the publication presented the opinions of 1,000 respondents noting that only 21 answered "no" and only 11 answered "indefinite."⁵⁷ Komsomol'skaya pravda eventually opened a "Public Opinion Institute" which was shortlived and there is evidence that a few additional "institutes" operated openly until 1971.⁵⁸ However, it appears that both the results of the work of these institutes and the need for their existence were questioned by powerful forces in the political bureaucracy.⁵⁹ It is easy to see by the nature of the questions the institutes investigated and the information acquired that their presence was not always innocuous.

For example, Walter D. Connor suggests that the work of the institutes during the 1960s can be divided into three research areas: public attitudes toward politics and political participation, attitudes toward law and social control, and attitudes toward labor and productivity.⁶⁰ It is not to suggest that the institutes discovered anything revolutionary in their inquiries into these matters. Rather, the reasons for their demise seem diffuse. Perhaps the main reason

open research into matters of public opinion is today circumscribed in the Soviet Union is because researchers during the 1960s found out things about the Party that the Party leadership would just as well not see publicized--as in April 1965, when disconcerting information turned up concerning the political awareness of large numbers of Communist Party members. Party members are charged to develop a long-range perspective, it is not sufficient just to be knowledgeable about current Party and state decrees. Yet,

a poll was taken of 13,000 Communists in order to ascertain what they had studied in the system of political education since 1956 and what questions of Marxist-Leninist theory they would like to study further. It turned out in the course of ten years 29 percent of those questioned had not studied the history of the CPSU, 73 percent--political economy, 87 percent--philosophy. In the system of political education, there were basically studied [only] current Party and state documents.⁶¹

As a result, large numbers of Communist Party members in the 1960s may have been capable of only the most shallow discussion of important ideological matters. Perhaps this is the kind of reason public opinion research today in the Soviet Union is all but invisible. Apart from occasional, innocuous poll reports, the kind of information which appeared in the 1960s is no longer published.⁶²

In addition to public opinion studies, Soviet researchers in the 1960s also accomplished and published a number of studies related to the listening and viewing habits of Soviet radio and television audiences. Mark Hopkins and Gayle Hollander, again in separate work, both refer to an important study

conducted by Boris Firsov probably in 1966-67.⁶³ Firsov and his colleagues produced a sample of 1,916 television viewers in Leningrad, a city home to many of the most sophisticated citizens of the Soviet Union. With high concern for the demographic characteristics of his sample, Firsov was able to identify the major television viewing habits and preferences of the Leningrad audience. For example, Firsov identified the most popular and unpopular categories of television programming. Ranking highest in popularity were films, variety shows and a program involving quiz questions directed at a panel. Ranking lowest were shows on the history of the government, shows on economic themes and shows regarding what was being taught in the schools.⁶⁴ Once again, as with the work of the public opinion institutes, it probably brought little comfort to the political bureaucracy to know that the audience had such low regard for the programs which conveyed the highest political content and had such high regard for what probably seemed the most trivial.

Mark Hopkins has provided additional evidence which shows a more fundamental dissatisfaction than that which afflicts television programs with political or economic themes. In 1967, Soviet researchers investigated the reaction of Soviet audiences to information about foreign news developments which reached Soviet radio and television audiences through the official mass media.⁶⁵ Developing a sample of 5,232 respondents from both rural and urban regions of the

Soviet Union according to a statistical model of the Soviet population, the researchers first inquired into the sources of daily information on foreign news developments. Results indicated that the printed press was the prime source, followed by radio, then television and finally lectures by political agitators. Then the researchers turned to the attitudes of the audience toward the news coverage of foreign events as covered by Soviet radio and television. They chose three categories of information on which to question respondents: timely, immediate information; factual news dispatches (not necessarily timely); and commentary and interpretation. Then they rated the popularity of the radio and TV programs which corresponded to these categories. Apparently the idea was to see whether it was most important to people to have their foreign news information correct, or fast, or appropriately interpreted, and then what they thought of the official services in "satisfying" these requirements. The results of Hopkins survey are shown in table 3.

Hopkins believes that the most significant conclusion to be drawn from these data is that there was an apparent dislike for interpretation and commentary and a dissatisfaction with the coverage of foreign news in general.⁶⁶ Except for collective farmers, all groups seemed less than pleased. The Party relies on interpretation and commentary as the principal means of getting across its point of view in foreign news matters; yet, it appears that no group favors

Table 3

International Information: Preference of
Radio/Television Audience
(in percentages) *

<u>Groups</u>	<u>Factual Dispatches</u>		<u>Interpretation and Commentary</u>		<u>Timely Information</u>	
	Preference	"Satisfied" with Program	Preference	"Satisfied" with Program	Preference	"Satisfied" with Program
Workers	49.0	29.0	28.9	28.1	56.6	25.2
Engineers- Technicians	62.9	18.0	40.2	18.0	72.4	23.4
Collective Farmers	40.0	60.2	27.5	46.6	49.3	52.7
Students	53.8	21.6	38.7	22.1	74.9	27.8
CPSU and Govt. Officials	61.3	28.7	55.0	36.2	81.2	40.0

SOURCE: Zhurnalists 8 (August 1968), p. 62, as quoted in Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 328.

*Percentages do not add up to 100 percent because respondents checked more than one category.

interpretations and commentary over factual dispatches and timely information, and no group decidedly felt that the official news network covers international news well in any category of consideration. Once again, the information contained in this survey appears to be the type of information that the political bureaucracy would prefer not to see published in an open publication such as Zhurnalist. Perhaps this is again the reason why the audience research data such as the type developed by Firsov and others have virtually disappeared from public view since 1971.

A major source of information with which Soviet audiences have been able to supplement the official news and news information has been Western radio broadcasts. Analysis of recent data obtained from emigrants of the Soviet Union shows that 95 percent of them listened to Western radio broadcasts before departing for abroad.⁶⁷ To be sure, many of these emigrants are urban, educated and white-collar people, but their exposure to Western radio shows that outside-originating, unofficial news information is readily available in the Soviet Union. Of course the degree to which these people actually understand and believe what they hear on Western radio stations is something yet to be determined. For many years the broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) and the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) have been available to any Soviet listener equipped with a suitable short-wave radio and the requisite motivation to listen. Analysis of recent data

obtained from Soviet emigrants (table 4) shows that listening to foreign stations has been widespread. For five years, from June 1963 to August 1968, the Soviets stopped jamming almost all foreign broadcasts.⁶⁸ Jamming commenced again with the invasion of Czechoslovakia but it stopped again almost entirely in September 1973. From September 1973 until August 1980, and the onset of the Polish workers' strikes, jamming of almost all the foreign stations was quite rare.

In addition to jamming, the Soviet authorities have used other methods from time to time to curtail listening to foreign stations. Gayle Hollander has identified two--imitating the broadcast sound and style of the foreign stations on a Soviet station, and launching propaganda campaigns in the Soviet press against foreign stations in general.⁶⁹ In 1964, the Soviets put on the air a station known as Mayak or Beacon. It broadcast news, commentary and popular music in the fashion of several foreign stations and it operated on the same frequencies as some of them. It was a most innovative form of jamming. Before 1963 and after 1968 when jamming was resumed, Soviet newspapers also actively combatted the influence of foreign radio with words. Pravda on July 31, 1968, several weeks before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, published the following article:

In this collective the working day began with an account by Engineer B. of the "latest news" he had heard the previous evening over foreign radio broadcasts. It is noteworthy that even before the Party committee intervened, his own colleagues explained to him that he had become a sort of extended

Table 4

Overall Listening to Foreign Radio (Emigrants)

Station	1976-77	1978	1979
	n=1,605	n=960	n=890
	%	%	%
VOA	89	91	94
BBC	74	57	63
Deutsche Welle (DW)	53	44	52
Radio Liberty (RL)	39	24	24
Radio Free Europe (RFE)*	17	21	22
Radio Peking	8	21	16
Radio Canada	21	18	14
Radio Sweden	17	19	14
Radio Vatican	7	11	10
Radio Monte Carlo	5	8	7
Radio Luxembourg	3	2	2
Radio France	4	2	1
Radio Japan	1	1	1
Radio Italy	3	-	-
Radio Finland	2	1	-
Radio Iran	2	1	-
All India	1	1	-
Other	3	-	1

Totals exceed 100% due to multiple stations of listening.

SOURCE: "Listening to Western Radio by Emigrants from the USSR in 1979," Analysis Report #3-80, in Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research, RFE-RL, Inc., June 1980.

*Listeners to RFE in the 1979 survey group were primarily resident in the Ukraine (40%), the Baltic Republics (18%), Moldavia (14%) and Byelorussia (11%). Languages of listening were mainly Polish and Romanian.

communications line for a foreign radio station, which with his help was disseminating false reports about events taking place in the world.⁷⁰

But the authorities have also tried to discredit the foreign radio stations by connecting them to alleged espionage activities by the foreign governments which sponsor them. Even though the state may or may not intend to make good on the threat, it has tried to make Soviet listeners feel they are at risk by listening openly to the foreign station and that the risk increases by publicly acknowledging the station as the source of news information. For example, two articles in Izvestiya in December 1968 linked the BBC with the British Secret Intelligence Service:

To put it bluntly, in its forty-six years on the banks of the Thames, it [BBC] has accumulated considerable experience in ideological sabotage, which has always been directed against the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries. . . . The BBC, the mouthpiece of rabid anti-Communism in the British Isles, has been taking a very active part in several extremely ugly S.I.S. operations. This is confirmed by a number of documents in our possession. . . . London's radio spies cooperate with the S.I.S. in other fields as well. For instance, British intelligence has long been interested in the extensive mail the BBC receives from its listeners, primarily from the European socialist countries and the Soviet Union. . . . In connection with all this another document has come to light; it states that "an agreement exists with the BBC to turn over to the S.I.S. all letters sent to the BBC from listeners in the socialist countries. The addresses of the letterwriters are also to be handed over."⁷¹

It seems clear that the Soviet Union is no longer a completely closed society, though the authorities may attempt to close it from time to time. Outside information can and does get through on a regular basis. Even the jamming of a

foreign radio station does not eliminate the possibility that a persistent listener will hear bits and pieces of the forbidden broadcast and spread the news to his friends. The Soviet Union may no longer be an effectively closed society to foreign broadcasts, but the on-again, off-again history of jamming suggests that it is a troubled society as both the Party and mass audience try to fix the boundary line which separates what the audience is permitted to know from what it is forbidden to know and talk about. Earlier in this chapter, reference was made to the conclusion in 1967 by John A. Armstrong that the Soviet Union was also no longer a police state in the usual sense of the term. Perhaps there have been some additional later institutional developments which have reduced the tendency of the police apparatus to draw the line between what one is permitted to talk about and what one is not. In 1971, Professor Barghoorn speculated on this matter.

The party apparatus and its police allies still dominate Soviet Russia, but their dominance is not as overwhelming as it once was. They are forced to take into account, sometimes yield at least partially to the demands of other groups in society, such as scientists and writers, for a measure of autonomy and independence far greater than Stalin would have permitted. . . . It is significant and encouraging to those who regard individual and professional freedom as precious values, that liberal Soviet jurists have, in the post Stalin era, added their voices to the curtailment of arbitrary and extra-legal administrative behavior. There has developed an alliance, or at least a parallelism of professional interests which may yet curb the excesses of police power. . . . The police agencies can almost certainly be counted on to resist. . . .⁷²

In Western, perhaps American terms, the ability of an individual to acquire and disseminate all kinds of information is normally considered a civil right. Professor Feldbrugge writes that Soviet legal science usually distinguishes between four groups of civil rights: social-economic rights, such as the right to work; equality, as in the rights and duties of citizens in the economic, social-political and cultural spheres of life; personal rights, as in the inviolability of the person and the home; and finally political rights, such as freedom of speech, press, assembly and conscience.⁷³

All of these [political] liberties are severely limited by what is called "the interests of the working class." Every political activity which would encroach upon the objectives of the political leadership, which alone knows what the interests of working people are, is inadmissible.⁷⁴

Nevertheless, the remarks of Professor Barghoorn would suggest that some Soviet jurists in recent years may have contributed to a climate in which some Soviet citizens may have felt more free than in earlier years to acquire and distribute information outside of regime control and approval. Soviet jurists have long had at their disposal Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code to limit the speech activities of persons who would speak in a fashion harmful to "the interests of the working class." Article 70 defines "Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda" as one of ten "Especially Dangerous Crimes against the State."⁷⁵ It ranks with treason and espionage, both of which are punishable by death. A person found guilty of violating Article 70 may be punished by "deprivation of

freedom for a term of six months to seven years, with or without additional exile for a term of two to five years."⁷⁶ Article 70 seeks to prohibit "agitation and propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime (vlast') . . . or the circulation, for the same purpose, of slanderous fabrications which defame the Soviet state and social system. . . ."⁷⁷ In 1966, after a trial of four days, Soviet philosopher Andrei Siniavsky and poet Iulii Daniel' were convicted of "Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda" under Article 70. Siniavsky received a sentence of "seven years imprisonment in a corrective labor colony of the most severe kind." Daniel' received five years imprisonment under the same conditions.⁷⁸ These cases received wide press coverage in the West.

In 1966, Article 70 was supplemented by Article 190-1: "Circulation of Fabrications Known to Be False Which Defame Soviet State and Social System." Article 190-1 is listed in the Criminal Code of the RSFSR as one of over two dozen "Crimes Against the System of Administration."⁷⁹ It ranks with such matters as "Desecration of State Emblem or Flag" (Article 190-2) and "Resisting Policeman or People's Guard (Article 191-2). Specifically, Article 190-1 forbids "the systematic circulation in oral form of fabrications known to be false which defame the Soviet state and social system, and likewise, the preparation or circulation in written, printed or other forms of works of such content."⁸⁰ The penalty for conviction under

Article 190-1 is listed as "deprivation of freedom for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding 100 rubles."⁸¹

It is unclear whether Soviet lawmakers intended the introduction of Article 190-1 to make it harder or easier to deal with people who speak out against the regime. On the surface, it would seem to be harder because the introduction of 190-1 apparently made it possible for people to express criticism of particular institutions or policies within the system, though not of the system as a whole. And there is evidence that conviction under Article 190-1 deals with a lower level of offense than 70. For example, John Hazard et al. recount the case of one X. Teshaev who was convicted on August 7, 1970, by the Judicial Division for Criminal Cases of the Tadzhik SSR Supreme Court. Citizen Teshaev had committed a variety of offenses. Among them was violation of Article 203-1 (distribution in oral form of deliberately false fabrications harming the Soviet State). Article 203-1 was identical to Article 190-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. It seems that Teshaev, while working in a factory in the city of Dushanbe in 1968-69, had spoken in a fashion offensive to persons of a certain ethnic origin in Tadzhikistan. He was convicted therefore of distributing "deliberately false fabrications" and "intentionally slanderous rumors." In overturning the verdict of the Tadzhik SSSR Supreme Court in 1971, the Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet stated that Teshaev was

convicted "without foundation" under Article 203-1 because he "failed to harm the Soviet State" (my emphasis) in a deliberate, systematic fashion.⁸²

The introduction of Article 190-1 in 1966 suggests that the regime found itself under-equipped to deal with "offenses" involving speech when it had to rely principally on Article 70. The regime apparently felt that it had many more "Tesdaevs" on its hands than "Siniavskys" or "Daniels." The regime apparently felt that Article 70 was intended to deal with a much more "dangerous" person than the likes of Teshaev, whose most dangerous quality was his bigotry. Nevertheless, it still chose to find Teshaev not guilty of violating Article 203-1 (identical to Article 190-1) on the grounds of insufficient evidence. The case of Teshaev is hardly definitive, but it does suggest that, by the early 1970s, the regime was ready to look closely at cases involving speech, and to reserve the harshest penalties for persons who had violated the letter of the strictest law.

There would seem to be at least two levels of interest in these matters: practical and juridical. On the juridical level, there is interest in whether or not the regime, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, had decided to deal with acts of political non-conformism through procedural as opposed to summary justice. Cases involving internationally known figures such as Siniavsky or Daniel', or a virtual unknown such as Teshaev, might turn out more or less well for the

accused. And, of course, we have no way to know with certainty how many people may have run afoul of the law during this period for speaking out, and who were imprisoned or punished by police authorities in a summary fashion. However, the fact that the regime did choose to try some political non-conformists in open court, against the standard of the criminal code, with acquittal possible, would tend to support Professor Barghoorn's view that some forces have been at work attempting to curtail the exercise of arbitrary and extra-legal police power. This would seem to be an important institutional development, one which would seem able to contribute to a certain reduction of fear in the heart of the person who desires to acquire and distribute information from sources outside of regime control.

On the practical level, a Soviet person might ask himself a direct question about speech: What can I get away with, and what had I better not try? Professor Jerry Hough has recently written of a Soviet future in which "liberalization" and "democratization" occur at the expense of "authoritarianism."⁸³ While his conclusions seem premature at best, he does offer some interesting opinions on the practical aspects of speech. He has developed a short list of speech activities which may be free from any sanction:

Criticism in a personal diary is not covered by the law for there is no intent to spread the "falsehood," and a critical remark provoked by personal difficulties or by delays in the supply system is also exempt, for there is no deliberate attempt to subvert the system. [The same reasoning applies to a

political joke repeated for reasons of humor.] Moreover, if persons are to be prosecuted, they must know that their "slander is slanderous. Even repetition of "Voice of America" accusations is not punishable unless the state proves knowledge and intent.⁸⁴

It appears, then, that the regime in the 1970s was prepared to see expressed a good deal of alienation, in a variety of spoken forms. But alienation is not the same thing as resistance to authority. It would seem, therefore, that the regime was prepared to discriminate between the two, to acquiesce in one case and punish in the other. But still, it may be that the regime was ready to employ a host of informal sanctions against a political non-conformist, even one who was resistant to authority, before it arrested and prosecuted him. According to Professor Hough:

In practice, the post-Stalin regimes generally have instituted legal proceedings only as a last resort, preferring to use a number of lesser penalties as warnings. The line between acceptable and unacceptable speech is a fuzzy one, but anyone in the vicinity will be given full notice of the precariousness of his or her position. If the warnings are not heeded, the sanctions can be progressively tightened; first, denial of permission to go abroad, reduced size in the edition of a book or postponement of its publication; loss of an administrative post or the possibility of one; then total rejection of manuscripts, secret police searches of apartments. If the dissident abandons his political activity, he generally is permitted to resume a normal life.⁸⁵

Hough appears to have had in mind leading artists, scientists and writers when he wrote the remarks directly above. Unless he was being overly optimistic, it would seem that the regime in recent years was prepared to see some of its leading citizens distribute a relatively high amount of unofficial

information before it took them strictly to task. And the flexibility with which the regime apparently was prepared to handle serious cases of political non-conformism on the part of high-ranking persons would seem to suggest that the information activities of persons of lower social standing was of even more modest concern. The answer to the question, "What can I get away with?" for most Soviet people could be the following: "In comparison to Stalin's time, quite a lot."

CHAPTER 5

GROUP CONSIDERATIONS

As Professor Hough has noted, the line between acceptable and unacceptable speech is a "fuzzy" one. In November 1970, not long after the publication of his Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?, Soviet historian Andrei Amalrik was brought to trial and convicted.¹ Amalrik indirectly addressed the matter of the "fuzzy" line in this book. Amalrik took a position related to that of the convergence theorists in that he saw, in the post-Stalin era, the development of a new "middle class," a class of "specialists." The commitment of the state to the development of specialists for the achievement of state goals, and the growth in numbers of specialists, were seen by Amalrik as producing a new group of people which was taking on mass character. This new middle class was seen as enjoying a high standard of living by Soviet standards, as having achieved a certain level of respect in Soviet society, and as having the ability to assess more or less accurately its own position in society and that of society as a whole.²

Amalrik appears to be a proponent of the technocracy thesis in his 1970 book; however, the technocracy thesis did not originate with him. It has its roots in James Burnham's The Managerial Revolution (1941) in which rule by a new elite of managers was foreseen.³

The bureaucrats of today and tomorrow may think, in their own minds, that they pursue an independent course; but their projects, their wars and displays and manipulation of mass sentiment, all require enormous resources. In practice, these can be assured only through their collaborating with, and in the end subordinating themselves to those who are actually directing the processes of production, to the manager. The sources of wealth and power are the basic instruments of production; these are to be directed by the managers; and the managers are then, to be the ruling class.⁴

According to A. Y. Shtromas, a recent Soviet emigrant, Amalrik was also preceeded in advancing a technocracy thesis by Soviet samizdat author F. Znakov (pseudonym) who argued as early as 1966 that the main force for political change in Russia was the struggle between the "partocratic upper class" and the "technocratic middle class."⁵ Znakov reportedly developed the concept out of his reading of George Orwell's 1984. Orwell's fictional and futuristic society involved a party split between "Inner" and "Outer" factions--the Inner members administrators and the Outer members specialists. Orwell fantasized about a world in which the machine had produced wealth and abundance, but also about a world in which shortages of material goods had to be artificially created to preserve certain "natural" distinctions between people;

By the standards of the early twentieth century, even a member of the Inner Party lives an austere,

laborous kind of life. Nevertheless, the few luxuries that he does enjoy--his large well-appointed flat, the better texture of his clothes, the better quality of his food and drink--his private motorcar or helicopter--set him in a different world from a member of the Outer party, and members of the Outer party have a similar advantage in comparison with the submerged masses whom we call "the proles."⁶

W. W. Rostow in Dynamics of Soviet Society (1954), added his voice to those which had spoken of Soviet society as factionalized by technological influences. Rostow highlighted what he called "the technological outlook" and he speculated about its political significance:

The bulk of the bureaucracy is now professionally trained in one or another field of specialization where criteria for efficient performance are rationally evolved. . . . The outlook of the good technician with his built-in standards of order and efficiency is bound to conflict with the workings of a system where the arbitrary and apparently irrational exercise of power intrudes on the normal business of life. Whether openly articulated or not the conception of a more orderly and rational organization of society is altogether likely to develop; and it might become politically meaningful should the instruments of high power split or operate less strongly on the bureaucratic chain of command.⁷

However, there are good reasons to downplay the role group conflict may be playing in the creation of political change in the Soviet Union. First, even though the technical intelligentsia has essential skills, and it may also possess the outlook described by Rostow, it still faces a bureaucratic-political elite with a monopoly of control on the forces of coercion in Soviet society.⁸ Secondly, even though the party apparatus may appear to be just one of several competing interest groups in Soviet politics, it is the party apparatus

which acts as a supreme, unifying, "superbureaucracy," which "holds the whole totalitarian structure together."⁹ These considerations are mentioned for reasons of comprehensiveness and are not intended to take anything away from Amalrik whose views are suggestive and worth pursuing a little further.

Amalrik had noted that his "middle class" had taken on "mass character" and he felt that this new class was in opposition to the bureaucratic elite.¹⁰ Both sides "show marked passivity" in pursuit of their interests. This situation is reported as confusing for both sides, and the party seems to be particularly confused because it no longer seems to understand why it needs to hold on to power. It no longer appears confident in its service of doctrine, leadership or tradition. The principal aim of the regime seems just to preserve itself in power.¹¹

The regime is thus no longer on the attack but on the defensive. Its motto is "Don't touch us and we won't touch you." Its aim: "Let everything be as it was." . . . It is now evident that in Soviet Law there exists, if I [Amalrik] may use the term, a broad "gray belt"--activities that the law does not formally forbid but which are, in fact, forbidden in practice. For instance: contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners; a concern over non-Marxist philosophies or [taking a position] inconsistent with notions of socialist realism; attempts to put out typewritten literary collections; spoken or written criticism not of the system as a whole, which is forbidden under Articles 70 and 190-1 of the Criminal Code, but of particular institutions within the system.¹²

Professor Hough, writing with knowledge of Soviet life in the 1970s, reported that criticism, not of the system as a whole, is possible in practical terms because of the nature of

Article 190-1. Amalrik, in his 1970 book, reported that it was not possible in practical terms because such criticism was part of a "gray belt." Perhaps any difference of opinion is related, in part, to a ten-year difference in historical perspective. On the other hand, it would seem more likely that the location of the "fuzzy line" between what is acceptable and unacceptable speech to the regime has not moved with the passage of ten years' time, that it lies where it has always done so since the introduction of 190-1 in 1966. What separates acceptable from unacceptable speech to the regime are probably qualitative criteria. Such criteria include the intent of the speaker in making speech of a politically non-conformist nature, and the forum in which he chooses to make it.

Any confusion about what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable speech to the regime is probably due to the regime itself. The degree to which one enjoys the "protection" of Article 190-1 (protection in the sense that under it one may express alienation against certain state agencies or policies, but not of the system as a whole) seems to depend on whether or not a person shows himself to be without "subversive" intent. The degree to which a person shows himself to be without subversive intent seems to be a measure of how few of the non-judicial sanctions (warnings, travel restrictions, lost job promotions, etc.) must be applied against him before he desists from making precisely the kind of criticisms

that he apparently can make under Article 190-1. This would mean that his right to make such criticisms exists, but it is not absolute. It is an encumbered right, if that is not a contradiction in terms, the weight of the encumbrance depending on such factors as the persistence of the speaker in making known his unconventional views, and the level of interest that the authorities take in making him stop. It would appear to be a dynamic, even ideosyncratic sort of thing. In this view, there is no dichotomy between Amalrik and Hough about the nature of the "protection" provided by Article 190-1.

In addition to the question of intent would seem to be the question of the audience. Professor Hough offers another opinion which seems to be helpful in this context: The Soviet leadership behaves as if controlling the audience which is exposed to the idea is more important than controlling the idea itself.¹³ The key to the question becomes the setting in which the idea or information is expressed. The family and the universities were identified earlier by Friedrich and Brzezinski as two "islands of separateness" even in Stalin's day. Others may have developed since his death. For example, Hough reports that the greatest freedom of expression seems to be permitted in more or less private gatherings--at a party, with a group of colleagues at work, in a bar. Among professional and scholarly groups, discussions may be quite "free-swinging," and "the regime does not usually seem to impose severe punishment on the transmission of quite

radical views directly to the authorities."¹⁴ The regime has also been "semi-tolerant" of highly "illegitimate" communications that are confined to the samizdat network with its individual reproduction of documents by either hand or by typewriter.¹⁵

William Taubman has written of his days in 1965-66 as an exchange student in the Department of Administrative Law at Moscow State University.¹⁶ As an American he reports with seeming wonderment the type of frank exchanges about political matters which seemed commonplace among students and their professors. Even when a guest lecturer appeared, a member of the Communist Party Central Committee, the students barraged him with sharp questions and cynical rejoinders to his responses.¹⁷ The students seemed to have a passion for getting behind party rhetoric and straightening out slanted facts. This is not to say that the students were behaving disloyally, just with intense objectivity and skepticism. Perhaps Taubman was witness to no more than a manifestation of de-Stalinization which was still in flower in 1965; perhaps something more.

Taubman was thoroughly impressed by the degree to which the professors and the party leaders went toward meeting the students on their own terms. They seemed to believe that "youth will be served" insofar as they gave direct answers to direct questions most of the time, even when the topic was sensitive to the Party. Often their answers did not satisfy many of the students, but in the case personally

observed by Taubman, the member of the Central Committee continued to patiently explain things until most of the students ceased their objections.¹⁸ Taubman felt that the Party was trying to convince the students that despite what appeared to be conflicting points of view on important matters, the young people and the Party had no difference which could not be openly addressed and resolved.¹⁹

The simple truth is that Soviet indoctrination has backfired. It has ended in doubt and dissent. And Soviet education, perhaps in spite of itself, has produced a generation that questions all kinds of philosophical and political assumptions. We delude ourselves when we persist in the notion that this is a nation of sheep. We must recognize that the Party today does not equate all ideological non-conformity with criminal delinquency, that far from penalizing outspoken students, it encourages them to be frank.²⁰

The reason the Party wanted the students to be frank, according to Taubman, was because their frankness served as a kind of feedback mechanism--the Central Committee of the Communist Party regularly sent officials to debate current issues with the students to determine the actual levels of their cynicism and disbelief.²¹ Insofar as the students suffered no damage to their careers or reputations by speaking out freely, it does appear that the regime had induced a kind of "freedom of expression" among members of this specialized group. The progenitor of this "freedom" was not without its ulterior motive, but thirty years ago when Stalin was in command what Taubman observed at Moscow State University in 1965 would have been unthinkable.

Of course, it is possible to make too much out of Taubman's report. It would be very interesting to retrace his steps in 1981 to see if students are still speaking out with the same impunity. But I suspect that Taubman was witness to an important but transient phenomenon. The literature does not contain consistent, continuing evidence of the type developed by Taubman that the level of free expression he witnessed in 1965 carried on into the 1970s. Perhaps because de-Stalinization had given way to detente by the mid-1970s, some more determined measure of social control was reasserted by the regime.

A noteworthy exception to this point of view would be the recent writings of Professor Hough. Hough would seem to be saying, among other things, that the type of political communication observed by Taubman in 1965 is not to be considered all that rare in the 1970s. He refers to "private gatherings"²² --a party, colleagues talking at work, working men in a bar. These, in addition to the "free swinging" debates which Taubman observed in an academic setting, have some important things in common. In all of these cases, the number of people present is relatively small; the people present generally know each other by name, and the efforts to communicate "illegitimately" are either informal (as in Hough's "private gatherings") or they serve a larger party purpose (as in Taubman's example). The people in all of these settings may well be under surveillance by the regime as they use information from unofficial

sources (such as foreign radio stations), but these people are normally not punished for doing so.

To the extent that Hough is correct about private gatherings in the 1970s, people were probably more comfortable about communicating information from an unofficial source, and expressing unconventional views, because general levels of fear had fallen among Soviet people since the passing of Stalin. It seems that people were less worried in the 1970s about what might happen to them for failing to conform to party-determined patterns of behavior than they were when Stalin was alive. Perhaps Taubman, in 1965, was witness to a period since Stalin when levels of fear were at a particularly low level. I suspect that they grew again somewhat into the 1970s because observers of the Soviet Union over the last five to seven years, except mainly Professor Hough, appear to have had difficulty finding anything approximating what Taubman found easily in 1965. But viewed against the backdrop of the last thirty years, the Soviet political atmosphere has certainly changed, if the political communications behavior of Soviet people in the 1970s can be used as a measure. It seems to have changed dramatically, though the rate of change has not been consistent and the state of the change is not necessarily permanent.

The development of the private zone would seem to be evidence of a changed political atmosphere since Stalin. In chapters 6 through 8, I outline a way that the presence and

dimensions of the private zone can be determined empirically. In short, I propose to establish a test case. I propose to use data obtained from an examination of recent Soviet Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union to establish the presence and dimensions of the private zone in the political communications environment of a certain Soviet nationality group during the early 1970s. Using members of such a group for this kind of purpose poses certain opportunities and problems. These are dealt with in chapter 7. Finally, in chapter 8, we see how the private zone has evolved and how it may actually be one manifestation of the difference between the general political atmosphere of Stalin's day and that of the early 1970s.

CHAPTER 6

THE CURRENT EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS

Though the Soviet Union may no longer be a completely closed society, it has certainly not become open to the degree that an American researcher might freely go around inside the Soviet Union making inquiries about political attitudes. Since it appears that the Soviet authorities are reluctant to permit serious and open research into political attitudes by even Soviet analysts, there seems to be little point in imagining it being done by non-Soviet parties. Since it also appears that current Soviet citizens generally exhibit what Hedrich Smith viewed as a dichotomy of behavior (separating the world into "official" and "personal" spheres), the responses to direct questions on sensitive subjects by Soviet citizens in the Soviet Union might depend on what the respondent thinks the interviewer wants to hear as much as on what he actually thinks. This is not to say that survey research methods are inappropriate with all Soviet subjects, only that the setting in which such methods are used may be at least as important as the nature of the people who are being asked the questions.

For example, Inkeles and Bauer produced credible results by administering questionnaires to former Soviet citizens who were displaced by war. In this way, people who had permanently left the Soviet Union and who were on their way to new lives in other countries were able to provide responses suggestive of general Soviet attitudes, without exhibiting the complete dichotomy of thought and behavior which they might have exhibited were they still living in the Soviet Union. Since World War II, there has been no displacement of people in central Europe to match the massive one which produced the pool of subjects studied by Inkeles and Bauer. However, constant movement of people through the "Iron Curtain," and more to the point, legal emigration from the Soviet Union, have continued to place in the West limited numbers of people who possess pertinent information about the Soviet Union and who can reflect attitudes identical with those generally held there.

During the 1970s, most legal emigrants of the Soviet Union were Jews or close relatives of Jews. Many of these people now live in the United States. The number of recent Jewish emigrants is not large when measured against the number of people in all of Europe who were displaced by World War II, but enough Soviet Jews have now emigrated so that making them the object of survey research methods is thinkable in statistical terms. Large-scale emigration began in the second half of 1971 and by the end of 1978 more than 170,000 Jewish emigrants had left the Soviet Union.²³

Table 5

Jewish Emigration from the USSR,
1976-78, by Republic

Republic	1976	1977	1978	Total Number	1976-78 Percentage	Percentage of Jewish Population 1970 Census
Total	14,261	16,745	28,858	59,864	100.00	100.00
RSFSR*	3,323	3,116	4,742	11,181	18.7	37.6
Ukraine	6,446	7,598	13,891	27,935	48.7	36.1
Moldavia	1,481	2,467	3,827	7,775	13.0	4.6
Uzbekistan	333	781	1,657	2,771	4.6	4.8
Azerbaijan	957	683	1,023	2,663	4.4	1.9
Georgia	643	572	1,055	2,270	3.8	2.6
Byelorussia	308	413	1,118	1,839	3.1	6.9
Latvia	358	514	747	1,619	2.7	1.7
Lithuania	266	349	371	986	1.6	1.1
Tadzhikistan	94	154	335	583	1.0	0.7
Kazakhstan	30	57	33	120	0.2	1.3
Estonia	16	24	40	80	0.1	0.2
Kirgiziya	2	14	19	35	0.1	0.4
Armenia	4	3	0	7	0.0	0.0
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0	-	0.2

SOURCE: Yoel Florsheim, "The Demographic Significance of Jewish Emigration," Soviet Jewish Affairs 10 (February 1980): 7. Florsheim obtained above data and data in table 6 from the Aliyah Department of the Jewish Agency. The Jewish Agency is the semi-official Israeli agency responsible for the emigration of Jews to Israel.

*RSFSR stands for Russian Socialist Federated Republic, also known as the Russian republic.

The data in table 5 indicate that almost half of all the 1976-78 emigrants came from the Ukraine, even though, according to the 1970 Soviet census, the Ukrainian republic had only 36.1 percent of all Soviet Jews. The Moldavian republic supplied 13.0 percent of all the emigrants during the period, even though it was home to less than 5 percent of all Soviet Jews in 1970. Conversely, the Russian republic, which was home to 37.6 percent of the Jews in 1970, supplied only one-fifth of the emigrants during the years 1976-78. Perhaps there are historical reasons for the relatively heavy emigration from the Ukraine and lighter emigration from the Russian republic. Perhaps the urge to emigrate is retarded by forces which tend to assimilate Jews into Russian society on the one hand and spurred by the forces of antisemitism on the other. Perhaps the authorities at the local level are more or less receptive to emigration applications at different times. It seems that all of the factors have been important in determining the demographic characteristics of the emigrant community, and each will be considered more deeply. But for the moment, it seems clear that the majority of the Jewish emigrants in recent years have come from the two most populous republics of the Soviet Union (Russian and Ukrainian), but the numbers of emigrants from all republics does not conform to the geographical distribution of Soviet Jewry as it was recorded in the 1970 census.²⁴

The mechanics of emigration are complex. Ostensibly the Soviet authorities have been open to the subject of Jewish emigration for some time. Premier Kosygin observed at a press conference in Paris on December 3, 1966, that "As regards the reunion of families, if any families wish to come together or wish to leave the Soviet Union, for them the road is open and no problem exists here."²⁵ However in practice, the Soviet Union regards emigration for any reason to be a very serious matter. A person wishing to emigrate must first request a vyzov, an affidavit inviting him and specified family members to join a relative abroad, usually in Israel. As many as 469,188 "original vyzovy" (excluding repeats and renewals) may have been sent to Soviet Jews between 1967 and 1978.²⁶ Igor Birman, a emigre, has detailed some of the steps required to get out of the Soviet Union:

The invitations (vyzovy) almost never come without a request by the individual concerned; they are obtained by sending the necessary information (names, relationships, etc.) to Israel, most commonly with persons departing. . . . Even under normal circumstances, the time lag between requesting the invitation and its receipt is a couple of months (I waited three). . . . Having received an invitation, people will frequently decide not to apply (for an exit visa). For instance, a husband requests an invitation and then the wife strenuously opposes the move. . . . An invitation is officially valid for only one year. It then becomes necessary to extend the term of the invitation at the Dutch Embassy in Moscow (which represents the diplomatic interests of Israel) or request another invitation. . . .

Most potential emigrants think long and hard before requesting an invitation. And that is not the decisive step. The decisive and "totally irrevocable"²⁷ decision is made when a person

makes an application to emigrate with the Visa and Registration Department (OVIR) of the Soviet government Ministry of the Interior. The prospective emigrant must then submit a number of additional items in addition to the vyzov:

1. An application and questionnaire, executed in duplicate, for each person departing, sixteen years of age and older. The questionnaire forms are issued by OVIR upon presentation of the vyzov and they must be returned with the responses typed in.
2. An autobiography, at the end of which must be indicated the identification of the foreign relative the applicant intends to join.
3. A "reference" from the place of residence (the Housing Office, the Apartment House Office, the Housing Management Office, etc.) indicating the number and relationship of members of the family, at the end of which it must be stated that it was issued for presentation to OVIR.
4. A statement to OVIR from each of the applicant's remaining parents, consenting to the applicant's departure for permanent residence in Israel. The signatures of the parents must be certified by the Housing Office at their place of residence. If the parents are deceased, their death certificates must be submitted to OVIR.
5. A statement to OVIR from the other parent of a minor child, if that parent remains in the USSR, consenting to the applicant's departure. That parent's signature must be certified by the Housing Office at his or her place of residence.
6. Eight photographs, 4 by 8 centimeters, of the applicant are to be provided to OVIR for documentary purposes.
7. A receipt from the USSR State Bank certifying the payment of a fee of forty rubles for "exit visa processing."
8. A postcard with the applicant's current address for subsequent notification purposes.²⁸

From time to time various other information sheets, character references and miscellaneous certifications have also been required. There has also been the matter of the so-called "education tax."

On April 3, 1972, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet decreed "An Edict on Repayment by USSR Citizens, Emigrating Permanently, of State Expenditures for Education (1972, Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 52, item 519).²⁹ The objective of the Edict was to require "Citizens of the USSR, emigrating permanently abroad (except those emigrating to socialist countries)" to "repay state expenditures for study in higher educational institutions, in graduate schools, in computer programming schools, in adjunct teaching positions (etc.). . . ." Persons effected were instructed to repay the state according to a schedule calculated to reflect the "value" of their degree, or the cost of their higher education in terms of the number of years of education provided by the state. The price of this "education tax" to a potential emigrant could run from 900 rubles for one year of study in economics, law or pedagogical science to as much as 12,800 rubles for a person who had received the academic degree of doctor of science.³⁰ This decree ultimately became a general issue in Soviet-American diplomatic relations and relations between the American Congress and President.*

*In January 1975, President Ford signed the Trade Reform Act which extended Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to the Soviet Union as well as extensive trade credits. Attached to this Act was the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which, since 1972, had

Once the prospective emigrant has completed the lengthy application procedure, elements of the Committee for State Security (KGB) became actively involved in his case, even though the KGB may also register the names of persons who request invitations from Israel.³¹ (A vyzov must be validated by the Finnish embassy in Tel Aviv, which represents Soviet interests in Israel, before it can be used to apply for an exit visa from the Soviet Union.) The KGB routinely reviews the applications to emigrate, and local units make contact with the applicant's employer, review his personal history statement, call in selected applicants for "interviews" and make recommendations regarding approval or disapproval of individual applications.³² Naturally, this process takes time and is psychologically difficult for an applicant. Birman continues:

The process is difficult firstly because quite frequently (though not always) submitting an application means automatic loss of employment and therefore one's livelihood. Everything depends on just what kind of

attempted to link American trading policy with the Soviet Union to Soviet human rights policy particularly in regard to the emigration of Soviet Jews. Despite the strong reservations of President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, Senator Henry Jackson ultimately succeeded in linking the two. Specifically, Jackson proposed denying MFN or trade credits to any country which "(1). denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate; (2.) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or other documents required for emigration (Congressional Record, April 10, 1973, p. 11550). The decision of the Soviet authorities not to insist on payment of the "education tax" in April 1973 was commensurate with the introduction in the Senate of the Jackson amendment, and may have been in response to it (Orbach, 1979: 138). Similarly, the Jackson-Vanik amendment has been in effect while over 100,000 Soviet Jews have received exit visas and it has been at least a minor factor in their emigration.

employment it is and on the attitudes of the local authorities. . . . Secondly, and most importantly, the individual takes a great risk in submitting the application. It cannot be known in advance whether permission will be granted or denied. . . . The official position of the authorities is that they grant the opportunity to leave to all who wish to be reunited with relatives in Israel--if such permission does not conflict with the interests of the state. However, just what these "state interests" are has never been defined. . . . From what is said when permission is denied (this is never done in writing), one can assume that in the vast majority of cases the excuse is that the individuals concerned were engaged in sensitive work and after leaving might divulge a state secret. . . . There are no formal rules for this terrible "game." . . . It is quite possible that the authorities purposefully act to keep the regulations from becoming public knowledge thereby denying people the opportunity to act accordingly.

It should be clear by this point that the average prospective emigrant is not average in terms of motivation and perseverance. He raises a flag and identifies himself to the authorities as a malcontent, at least. He subjects himself to personal scrutiny and ridicule which might not otherwise occur. Until he actually departs the Soviet Union, he is in deep limbo. But if he applies, he has some reason to hope that his application will be approved because, according to Birman:

. . . [I]t is quite uncommon for application to be rejected for no reason at all. Years of experience have demonstrated that for a family which has neither a well known personality (such as a major dissident, or an internationally known artist, writer, performer, etc.) nor a member who had contact with classified information (while a member of the Soviet military or defense research establishment, for example) the probability of refusal, and the actual number of refusals is quite low. . . . How much time passes before a person learns his fate? I am aware of record cases of only two-three weeks and others took eight-nine months. On average, however, the period was generally about three months (usually longer if the application is rejected). About a year ago (1978), this situation changed significantly; the waiting time now averages six months or longer. . . .³³

Once a person receives his exit vist, he is free to go more or less whenever he chooses. But before he actually departs, he is supposed to turn over to the authorities the following items:

his internal passport, birth certificate, diplomas from educational installations, labor record book, military service records, retirement certificate, diplomas and certificates for learned degrees and titles, membership certificates of creative artists' unions, and a statement from the "Housing Operations Office" that the applicant's living space has been vacated and that no claims were registered against the applicant in that regard. (The applicant can, however, have these documents authenticated for the purpose of giving them legal validity abroad.)³⁴

Jews normally depart by train from Vienna, Austria through Budapest, Hungary, but some fly Aeroflot (the Soviet state airline) direct from Moscow.³⁵ Between 1971 and the 1973 Middle East War, emigrating Soviet Jews were processed through an Israeli-run facility at Schoenau Castle, near Vienna, but after a Palestinian terrorist attack on an emigre train bound for Vienna a few days before the war broke out, the Austrian government closed the Schoenau facility. Schoenau was controlled by the "Jewish Agency," the semi-official group responsible for the emigration of Jews to Israel, but the new processing facility is controlled by Austrian parties.³⁶ It was at Vienna, particularly during the years 1976-78, that the phenomenon of neshira ("dropping-out") began to grow sharply.

There is no way to know if an applicant for an exit visa, or even a person who takes the initial step of requesting

a vyzov from Israel, actually intends to live in Israel, to live in a second country, or if he is not at all certain where he intends his final destination to be. At Vienna, he can halt the chain of events which will normally deposit him in Israel by requesting to go somewhere else. Jews seeking resettlement in a Western country other than Israel are placed under the care of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) which sends them on to a HIAS center in Rome, Italy. The average stay in Vienna is only several days at most, but in Rome the stay can last as long as three weeks to six months, depending on the bureaucratic machinations of the country in which the emigrant wishes to live.³⁷ At this point the average emigrant is again the object of forces he cannot control, and with only life experience in the Soviet Union and little or no skill in a western language, he is again in limbo. As a noshrim (derivative of neshira) he has "dropped out" and must take his chances. There is evidence that noshrim are more likely to come from certain Soviet cities than olim (emigrants who choose to continue to Israel). That is to say, that during the years 1976-78 emigrants from the major cities of the Ukrainian and Russian republics were more likely to emigrate to a country other than Israel (see table 6).

Naturally, the phenomenon of neshira is of concern to the Soviet, Israeli and American governments. The Soviet government seems to treat the matter as an open secret. It issues exit visas to go to Israel knowing full well that many

Table 6
Emigration in 1976-1978 by Principal
Place of Origin

City	Republic	Emigrants (in absolute numbers)	<u>Olim</u>	<u>Noshrim</u>	Emigrants	<u>Olim</u> (in percentages)	<u>Noshrim</u>	<u>Neshira*</u>
Total		59,864	27,509	32,355	100.00	100.00	100.0	100.0
Group A		31,031	3,946	27,085	51.8	14.3	83.7	87.3
Odessa	Ukraine	10,695	497	10,216	17.9	1.7	31.6	95.5
Kiev	Ukraine	6,757	637	6,120	11.3	2.3	18.9	90.6
Leningrad	RSFSR	4,787	1,154	3,630	8.0	4.2	11.2	75.9
Moscow	RSFSR	4,286	955	3,331	7.2	3.5	10.3	77.7
Krarkov	Ukraine	2,319	256	2,063	3.9	0.9	6.4	89.0
Lvov	Ukraine	2,190	465	1,725	3.7	1.7	5.3	78.8
Group B		2,639	1,045	1,594	4.4	3.8	4.9	60.4
Riga	Latvia	1,576	721	855	2.6	2.6	2.6	54.3
Minsk	Byelorussia	1,063	324	739	1.8	1.2	2.3	69.5
Group C		11,758	10,388	1,370	19.6	37.8	4.2	11.7
Kishinev	Moldavia	4,644	3,857	787	7.8	14.0	2.4	16.9
Chernovtsy	Ukraine	3,204	2,836	386	5.4	10.3	1.1	11.5
Baku	Azerbaijdzhan	1,612	1,435	177	2.7	5.2	0.5	11.0
Derbent	RSFSR	1,260	1,257	3	2.1	4.6	0.0	0.2
Beltsy	Moldavia	1,038	1,003	35	1.7	3.6	0.1	3.4

SOURCE: Florsheim, "Demographic Significance," p. 13.

*Noshrim as percentage of emigrants.

of them will never set foot in the country. The government of Israel is concerned because neshira not only affects the prestige of Israel, but it also deprives the country of human energy and skill it can ill afford to lose. The American government is concerned because the United States is the overwhelming choice of the noshrim. Of the 4,110 Soviet Jews assisted by HIAS in 1974, the following choices were made: the United States, 84.9 percent; Canada, 9.6 percent; Australia/New Zealand, 2.9 percent; Western Europe, 2.2 percent; Latin America, 0.3 percent. Of the 3,490 Soviet Jews landing in the United States in 1974, 45 percent settled in the New York metropolitan area and the remainder in some thirty-three states and the District of Columbia. Of the 5,502 Soviet Jews assisted by HIAS in the first nine months of 1975, 4,681, or 85 percent of the total, went to the United States. During the first nine months of 1977, HIAS assisted 6,358 Soviet Jews and 5,615 reached the United States, or 88 percent of the total.³⁸ There would seem to be at least three general reasons for neshira:

1. The nature of the Jews emigrating in the early years (1967-1972) was not the same as that of the Jews emigrating in the later years (1976-1978).
2. Israel was a diminished attraction for the Jews who tended to emigrate in the later years.
3. The United States was an enhanced attraction in the later years for these same people.

University of Michigan Professor Zvi Gitelman has analyzed the backgrounds of various Soviet Jewish groups and

shown how background factors may have influenced members of these groups in their choice of destination.³⁹ Gitelman divided the Soviet Jewish emigrants into three groups:

1. Zapadniki ("Westerners")--those Jews emigrating from the Baltic states, the western Ukraine, western Byelorussia and Moldavia--people from areas which came under Soviet control as late as 1939-1944.
2. "Heartlanders"--including Jews emigrating from areas of the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics which have been under nominal Soviet control since 1917.
3. Asians--including Jews emigrating from Georgia and all other locations in the Soviet Union.

Of the three groups, Gitelman found that the majority of recent emigrants to the United States were "heartlanders." He contended that, in the "heartland," Jewish culture and consciousness (hence, Zionist conviction) were much weaker than in the "western" areas which had supplied the bulk of the emigrants who, in the early years, had generally gone directly to Israel.⁴⁰

In the summer of 1976, Gitelman and his colleagues interviewed 132 recent Soviet Jewish emigrants who had settled in the area of Detroit, Michigan. The emigrants were found to be a highly educated, urbanized group which was heavily composed of "heartlanders" (see tables 7 and 8). Gitelman also found that the Detroit "heartlanders" enjoyed higher incomes in the Soviet Union than zapadniki and they also enjoyed jobs with higher status. For example, among the zapadniki there were more skilled workers and among the "heartlanders" more engineer-economists (table 9).

Table 7

Detroit (1976) Immigrants: Last Place
of Residence in USSR

Origin		Cities	
Zapadniki	24 (18.2%)	Odessa	29
"Heartlanders"	79 (59.8%)	Moscow	7
Georgia	6 (4.5%)	Lvov	13
Central Asia	1 (0.8%)	Leningrad	7
Undetermined	22 (16.7%)	Kiev	5

Table 8

Detroit (1976) Immigrants:
Levels of Education

Education	Jews in the USSR Labor Force, 1970		Detroit (1976) sample*		
	RSFSR	Moldavia	"Heartlanders"	<u>Zapadniki</u>	Total**
Elementary & incomplete					
secondary	16.3%	34.0%	24.1%	33.3%	23.5%
Secondary	13.9	23.3	26.6	29.2	27.3
Tekhnikum	17.3	16.1	12.7	16.7	13.6
Incomplete higher	4.1	3.8	3.8	4.2	5.3
Higher	46.8	18.4	32.9	16.7	30.3

*Fourteen (10.6 percent) were not in the labor force in the year before their emigration.

**Includes twenty-two people whose place of origin in the USSR is not certain.

Table 9
 Detroit (1976) Immigrants: Occupation in the USSR

Occupation	Total %	<u>Zapadniki</u> %	"Heart." %	Male %	Female %
Worker	3.0	4.2	3.8	2.9	3.2
Skilled Worker, Technician	26.5	33.3	26.6	35.7	16.1
Clerk, Hairdresser, Employee	23.5	25.0	24.1	7.1	41.9
Engineer-Economist	31.1	8.3	36.7	32.9	29.0
Foreman, Assistant Director	2.3	0.0	2.5	4.3	0.0
Professional	5.3	4.2	3.8	7.1	3.2
Student, Pensioner, Housewife	3.0	8.3	0.0	4.3	1.6
No Answer	5.3	16.7	2.5	5.7	4.8

Gitelman found that levels of Jewish identification among the Detroit immigrants also varied according to whether one was a "heartlander" or not. For example, the 1970 census showed that 17.7 percent of the Jews of the Soviet Union considered a Jewish language (mainly Yiddish, says Gitelman) to be their native tongue. While 41.7 percent of the zapidniki identified Yiddish as their native tongue, only 12.7 percent of the "heartlanders" in the Detroit sample did the same. Fully 87.3 percent of the "heartlanders" and only 37.5 percent of the zapidniki identified Russian as their native tongue. According to Gitelman, this should not be surprising when it is considered that as late as 1939, Jewish culture and schools thrived in many parts of Moldavia (then part of Rumania), the western Ukraine and western Byelorussia (then parts of Poland), as well as in the Baltic states, while the Russian language became prevalent among Jews of the "heartland" at an earlier time--the 1920s and 30s when industrialization and urbanization were sweeping through many areas of the Soviet Union. To amplify this point, Gitelman asked the Detroit respondents to characterize the atmosphere in their childhood homes, to characterize it as "more or less Jewish." Again, for reasons which tended to emphasize the use of Yiddish among zapidniki and de-emphasize its use among "heartlanders," the "more Jewish" homes were found among the zapidniki and "less Jewish" homes among the "heartlanders" (see table 10). Presumably, the respondents characterized their childhood homes on the

Table 10

Detroit (1976) Immigrants: Atmosphere
in Childhood Homes

	"Not Jewish"	"Partially Jewish"	"More/Less Jewish"	"Wholly Jewish"	N.R.
Zapadniki	0.0%	25.0%	29.0%	45.8%	--
"Heartlanders"	12.7	34.2	30.4	20.3	2.4
Georgians and Central Asians	28.6*	14.3**	14.3	42.9***	--
Indeterminate	13.5	18.2	27.3	40.9	--

*n = 2; **n = 1; ***n = 3.

basis of whether the family observed Jewish holidays, holiday and Sabbath ritual, and whether synagogue attendance was frequent. But it seems that a respondent could use any other standard as he wished. It could be argued that social and political pressure artificially reduced synagogue attendance and observance of Jewish ritual, particularly in the childhood homes of "heartlanders." But Gitelman observes that there was no sharp rise in such practices among the Detroit emigrants once they had established homes in the United States.

Gitelman's work seems to provide some insight into the phenomenon of neshira, and coincidentally into the characteristics of the people who make up the bulk of Soviet Jewish emigration reaching the United States. Dr. Thomas Sawyer, formerly a Russian language officer with the U.S. Foreign Service, has also investigated these matters. He offers the following generalizations about the apparent tendency of neshira among Jews from the Soviet "heartland."

. . . These "core" ("heartlander") Jews apparently have little if any cultural affinity with the State of Israel, having been cut off from Jewish traditions for most of their lives . . . their motivation for leaving the Soviet Union appears to be that of wanting to get away from the Soviet system . . . rather than a desire to go to [author's emphasis] the Jewish "national homeland." Also, since many of the new Jewish emigrants are professional persons, there is a greater ambition and need to pursue individual careers in the most advantageous environment--for many that means going to the United States, the "center of world capitalism." In addition, a sizable number of emigrants are accustomed to the cold Russian climate and consequently are apparently hesitant to resettle in the temperate Israeli zone. Also, there are those who are opposed to the "socialist" system of government in Israel. . . . Others are worried about the volatile Middle East situation, Israel's inflation, reported serious housing shortage, alleged unemployment situation (particularly for skilled and professional labor), necessity to learn Hebrew, currency devaluation, and general economic difficulties. . . . Israeli realities (or perceived realities) are transmitted regularly to would-be emigrants from relatives and friends who have already resettled in Israel.⁴¹

The picture of today's noshrim contrasts sharply with popular images of the modern Jewish emigrant. Many Americans remember the characters shaped by Leon Uris in his 1958 novel Exodus. Exodus depicted the dramatic struggle of Jews to reach Israel from war-devastated Central Europe in the aftermath of the Holocaust. Uris wrote about people with an intense spiritual and emotional commitment to the Jewish state. The noshrim do not appear to have this commitment.

In his 1976 Detroit interviews, Gitelman compared the attitudes and opinions of his respondents toward the United States and Israel and the impression of both countries was generally favorable. Part of what the Detroit respondents knew about the two countries came from exposure to unofficial

sources of information while they still lived in the Soviet Union; foreign radio broadcasts, occasional encounters with foreigners, letters from abroad, and conversations with other Soviet citizens who appeared to have knowledge of the United States and Israel. But the intense anti-Israel propaganda campaign conducted by the Soviet mass media may have produced some negative impressions,⁴² and overall, the opinion of Israel as a place to live was lower than that of the United States. Gitelman found that 70 percent of his respondents considered Israel a "religious" rather than a secular state and that this was seen as an "undesirable" characteristic. Though they did not accept the position of Soviet propagandists that Israel was a warlike and aggressive state, they apparently accepted the notion that Israel was "a theocracy guided by religious, and hence anti-modern, anti-scientific values."⁴³

Even though the Detroit immigrants did have a generally favorable impression of both countries, the United States seemed to have a special "pull" on the basis of ideological and practical considerations. In spite of Soviet propaganda, many had been able to develop favorable impressions of American culture, technology and economy. Many expressed admiration for the size and power of the United States, suggesting that as former Soviet citizens, they did not want to "trade down" to a much smaller country like Israel--a regional power, at best. Others expressed admiration for the democratic values present in America. Gitelman felt that these attitudes cannot

be allocated by group among his respondents, that they are generalized among them all--zapadniki, "heartlander," those of high education and low. In this sense, even though "heartlanders" in recent years are more likely to go elsewhere than Israel, noshrim emigrating to the United States seem to go there simply because they believe life in the United States is the most attractive, and life in the Soviet Union is the least attractive of all the opportunities available to them.

CHAPTER 7

SOVIET JEWS: CONSIDERATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM, ASSIMILATION AND ACCULTURATION

It seems clear that both the parent Soviet Jewish population and the emigrant Jewish population contain people from different groups which in turn have marginally different social characteristics and experience. Nevertheless, according to Theodore Friedgut:

. . . [T]he overwhelming majority of today's Soviet Jews have a common recent past and a common social profile. Over three quarters of Soviet Jews are true "heartlanders," living in areas which for two generations have been under Soviet rule. They are overwhelmingly urban (though dispersed among many cities in the Soviet Union) and, in most cases, are already second generation urbanites living in the larger urban centers. . . . They are far better educated than the non-Jews around them, and are therefore concentrated in the intelligentsia occupations, many of which have large and disproportionate percentages of Jews. This puts the Jews largely into the upper socio-economic levels of Soviet society.⁴⁴

Friedgut concludes that the Soviet Jewish community is an urbanized, educated and dispersed minority with more in common than not. This seems to be a reasonable appraisal. The differences between Soviet Jews, those which divide zapadniki

from "heartlanders" in terms of geography and experience, are important in shedding light on matters such as neshira. It also seems important to know that the majority of emigrants in the United States are "heartlanders" who, among all Soviet Jews, have been subjected to the most persistent and longstanding pressures to assimilate into Soviet society. But no Soviet Jewish emigrant, whether he chooses to live in Israel, the United States or a third country, has wholly escaped assimilation pressures. It is these pressures which have probably left today's Soviet Jews with more in common than not. And because of the intense nature of these pressures, there are good reasons to believe that most members of this urbanized, educated and dispersed minority have acquired many Russian attitudes and behavior patterns.

Professor Vernon Aspaturian wrote of three processes which have worked to shape the multinational state which is the modern Soviet Union: Sovietization, Russianization and Russification.⁴⁵ Sovietization is defined as the process of modernization and industrialization within the Marxist-Leninist norms of social, economic and political behavior. Russianization is defined as the process of internationalizing Russian language and culture within the Soviet Union. Russification, on the other hand, is a more limited process; it is defined as "the process whereby non-Russians are transformed objectively and psychologically into Russians and is more an individual process than a collective one." Aspaturian concluded that

Russianization is a prerequisite to Russification and Russianization has been an important instrument of Sovietization. Gitelman found among the Detroit immigrants that only 45.8 percent of the zapadniki and 20.3 percent of the "heartlanders" felt their childhood homes had been "wholly Jewish" in atmosphere. Similarly, he found that 87.3 percent of the "heartlanders" who made up almost 60 percent of his sample considered Russian to be their native tongue. This kind of evidence would tend to suggest that Gitelman's respondents were heavily Russianized in Aspaturian's terms. Some of the Detroit immigrants may have been at least partially Sovietized as well insofar as their reasons for leaving the Soviet Union did not reflect complete disfavor on the country of their birth.

Gitelman determined that family reasons, antisemitism and political alienation were the most important reasons why his respondents decided to take advantage of the opportunity to emigrate. Family reasons included those cited by persons wishing to join relatives in other countries, who had children whom they felt could have better lives in other countries, or who found that they would be left behind by close relatives who had made up their minds to leave if they did not also decide to go. Antisemitism, as a reason to emigrate, includes the host of official and unofficial acts of discrimination which have plagued Soviet and European Jews for generations. Political alienation involves dissatisfaction with the Soviet

system and perhaps also one's personal involvement within it. Gitelman compared these reasons for leaving with how satisfied, in general, his respondents were with life in the Soviet Union (see table 11). It appears that 63 percent of the people citing family reasons for emigration were at least partially satisfied with their lives in the Soviet Union. Of those citing antisemitism, 30.3 percent were still at least partially satisfied, as were 33.3 percent of those citing political alienation. Gitelman reports that zapadniki and less-educated respondents were more likely to cite family reasons and "heartlanders" were more often motivated to emigrate by antisemitism and political alienation. But significant portions of both groups, despite their decision to emigrate, still found their lives as Soviet citizens to be at least more or less satisfactory. If one accepts that a person would have to be at least somewhat sovietized to find life in the Soviet Union satisfying to any degree, then Gitelman's respondents may have been not only heavily Russianized, but partially sovietized as well.

The policy of the Soviet government toward the Jews has varied widely and the objective of the policy has never been particularly clear except in the most general of terms. At times since the Revolution, it appears that the party and the state have intended the Jews to become completely assimilated--Russified--and at other times they have taken steps which would appear to make this impossible. Technically,

Table 11

Detroit(1976) Immigrants: Satisfaction in
USSR and Motivation for Emigration

Emigration motive	Completely dissatisfied	Not fully satisfied	More/less satisfied	Completely satisfied	Don't know
Family	2.5%	30.0%	47.5%	15.0%	5.0%
Antisemitism	33.3	36.4	18.2	12.1	--
Political alienation	33.3	29.2	25.0	8.3	4.2
Other	17.6	50.0	26.5	5.9	--

SOURCE: Data in tables 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 from Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Jewish Emigrants: Why Are They Choosing America?," Soviet Jewish Affairs 7 (1977): 33-42.

Jews represent one of the four major nationality groups inside the Soviet Union of which states of the same nationality are located outside the territory of the Soviet Union. Of the other three--Germans, Poles and Moldavians--Poland and Moldavia (as part of Rumania) are today incorporated into the Soviet sphere. As for the Germans, they were largely rounded up during World War II, deported to regions of Siberia and Central Asia and there is no evidence that they have been permitted to regroup in any numbers in any area of European Russia. Therefore, of the twenty-two major nationalities of the Soviet Union, only the Jews today:

1. live almost exclusively in European, metropolitan areas of the Soviet Union;
2. share a cultural and religious heritage with millions of persons living in countries outside of direct Soviet control;
3. represent a small minority of persons in each of the significant political subdivisions of the Soviet Union in which they live.

The status of the Soviet Jewish community is thus highly irregular in Soviet terms, showing the countervailing effects of the attempts to assimilate and segregate the Jews over the years.

The British scholar Jacob Miller attempted to generalize Soviet theory on the Jews.⁴⁶ He wrote:

These are logical and simple in principle but the more they are pursued in detail the more complex and self-contradictory they become. . . . So far as the theory of national minorities is concerned, this problem has been solved by the construction of socialism, which ends the exploitation of minor nationalities by abolishing the exploiting classes of all Soviet nationalities,

which now consist of state industrial workers, kolkhoz [collective farm] peasants, and intellectuals, working harmoniously, irrespective of nationality, in the common aim of constructing communist society. Socialism encourages, for strictly socialist purposes, the flowering of national cultures, but in mature communist society the national cultures will be absorbed in a common culture to which all will have contributed. In the meantime, each nation has its own state [a Union or autonomous republic within the USSR]. . . . As for religion, this is a set of irrational beliefs and practices deriving from the need to make life tolerable in the conditions of alienation and exploitation of class society. . . . The Jews satisfy the theory of religion, but not that of nationality, since they live scattered throughout Soviet territory and thus cannot have their own state. In any case, for that same reason, they are undergoing rapid assimilation and therefore do not need a national state within the USSR. It has been, and is open to Soviet Jews to dwell in a compact territory of their own within the USSR, namely the autonomous region of Biro-Bidzhan,* but they have not so far chosen to do so. (The existence of the State of Israel is irrelevant, except that, as an arm of American and British imperialism, it seeks to subvert Soviet Jews.)**

In reality, Jews have never been a favored group either under the Tsar or his Communist successors. But immediately after the Revolution, the new Soviet government took steps which were progressive. The government

. . . took steps to stamp out antisemitism, accorded the Jews recognition as a separate nationality with rights of cultural autonomy, legalized the use of

*In 1934, the Soviet government declared the establishment of a "Jewish Autonomous Region" located in a remote area of the Soviet Far East along the marshes of the Amur River which separates the Soviet Union from China. In 1941, this region, also known as Biro-Bidzhan, had a population of 114,000 of whom 30,000 were Jews. In 1958, Khrushchev "admit(ed) failure of the Region's aim of 300,000 Jews, blam(ing) the failure on "Jewish individualism." By 1976, only 12,000 Jews remained in the Region, forming only one-fifteenth of the total population (Gilbert, 1976: 37).

**Miller's remarks were published in 1970, before the most recent wave of Jewish emigration had reached its crest. But even so, the existence of the State of Israel would

Yiddish as the language of instruction in schools located in centers of Jewish population, and encouraged and supported a Yiddish press and theater. . . . Despite a cultivation of a Jewish nationality centered around the Jewish language, most Soviet Jews were on the road to voluntary assimilation before the war.⁴⁷

Professor John Armstrong has contended that Jews represented a "mobilized diaspora" which possessed special talents. During the 1920s and 30s, when modernization trends took sharp hold in the Soviet Union, Jewish talents in "negotiation, commerce and administration" were rare and in demand.⁴⁸ During this period, Jews in good number were able to get into higher education, into the skilled professions, and a few even rose to prominent positions in the Party and state.⁴⁹ But World War II produced the first of two developments which were to dramatically change the status of Soviet Jews. The Nazi occupation "succeeded in rekindling the ancient and latent antisemitism of the Ukrainians and Russians which had been submerged by Soviet policies."⁵⁰ World War II may also have brought a rekindling of antisemitism in Stalin himself. Svetlana Alliluyeva, Stalin's daughter, wrote that Stalin may have believed that the death of his son Yakov in a German prisoner-of-war camp was due to the fact that he was betrayed to the Germans by his Jewish wife Yulia.⁵¹ Stalin may also have believed that encounters between Jewish troops in the Red Army and Jews of other Allied nations enhanced

probably still be considered irrelevant in this kind of a Soviet analysis because emigration is permitted solely "for the reunification of families," not for religious or political reasons.

the pro-Western sentiments of the Soviet Jewish soldiers.⁵² In any event, the general position of Soviet Jews began to rapidly deteriorate. In contrast to the marked upward mobility of Jews in the 1920s and 30s, by the beginning of World War II, quotas setting upward limits on the numbers of Jews in Party and government posts, in the art and professions and in higher education were secretly promulgated.⁵³ Official antisemitism reached a fever pitch in January 1953 when nine prominent doctors, six of them Jews, were accused of conspiracy to murder Soviet leaders.⁵⁴ Even though the death of Stalin averted a trial and caused the "Doctors Plot" to be exposed as a fabrication, at least two of the doctors died while being tortured to produce confessions.⁵⁵

The second of the two developments which radically changed the status of Soviet Jews was the creation of the modern state of Israel. Initially, Stalin favored the Jewish state with moral and material support--the Soviet Union was the first country to extend official recognition to Israel and Stalin arranged for certain arms shipments to be made to Israel by Czechoslovakia.⁵⁶ However, his ardor soon cooled, probably because the establishment of Israel had an electrifying effect on Soviet Jews and this indicated to a suspicious Stalin the possibility of a psychological attachment incompatible with Soviet ideological and foreign policy objectives.⁵⁷ The death of Stalin and the consolidation of power under Khrushchev produced only a temporary improvement and by 1958,

a virulent campaign against Jewish cultural and religious institutions was underway. Despite a constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion in the Soviet Union, many synagogues were closed or set on fire, and many worshipers were beaten up or arrested.⁵⁸ Anti-religious campaigns against most denominations were intense under Khrushchev, but the antisemitic campaigns of 1958-1959 and 1961-1963 were particularly harsh. Martin Gilbert reports that the local press of the Western Ukraine contained many foul accusations and slander during these years. For example:

14 December 1958 . . . Lvov . . . The local edition of Pravda describes Judaism as a religion of hatred towards other religions and of enmity towards all nations.

18 March 1959 . . . Drogobych . . . The local paper attacks Jewish "crooks" for having "stripped clothing off the dead" during the war to sell to the Gestapo.

28 September 1958 . . . Stanislav . . . The local Pravda compares Jews to ticks, describing them as "loathsome and filthy creatures."⁵⁹

During the early 1960s, Khrushchev launched a campaign against so-called economic crimes which included cases of alleged pilferage, bribery and currency speculation.⁶⁰ During the period July 1961 to March 1963, at least 110 death sentences were imposed for economic crimes, and of these 110, at least 68 were Jews.⁶¹ In the Ukraine, where 2 percent of the population were Jews, Jews accounted for 83 percent of the condemned and shot.⁶² The charges involved "embezzlement of food-stuffs," "counterfeiting of coins," "speculation in fruit," and the like.⁶³

Since the dark days of 1958-1963, and beginning with the lightning victory of Israel in the June 1967 Middle East War, Soviet policy under Brezhnev and Kosygin apparently has been to downplay official antisemitism and to strike hard at the "threat" posed by Zionism and the state of Israel. According to Kosygin, "antisemitism" is something "absolutely alien to and incompatible with our ideology."⁶⁴ In the early 1970s, the Soviet press, particularly that directed at foreign audiences, actively attempted to paint a picture of the Soviet Union as a multinational society in which all groups, especially the Jews, were treated fairly.⁶⁵ But the anti-Zionist positions were often difficult to distinguish from antisemitic ones. For example, Zionist ideology was described by a Soviet reporter as "a mixture of Judaistic mysticism, nationalistic hysteria, shameless social demogogy and racist concepts of the superiority of 'God's' chosen people over all other peoples."⁶⁶ Against this kind of post-1967 background grew much of the pressure, both inside and outside of the Soviet Union, to permit significant numbers of Soviet Jews to emigrate.

The point of all these campaigns and attacks seems not to have been to do battle with Judaism as a religion, or with Zionism as a political manifestation of a religion, but to oppose both as forces which might unite Jews as a distinct cultural group within Soviet society. In this sense, Jews have been subject to the same kind of pressures to assimilate,

to Russify, as have many of the twenty-two other major nationality groups; it seems only that the pressures were particularly severe and consistent in the Jewish case. The severity of the pressures seemed due to the fact that the general status of Soviet Jews was so irregular in Soviet terms --Jews were particularly dispersed and vulnerable because of their small numbers. And these measures to forcibly assimilate Jews may have produced some success in that countless Soviet Jews today are Jewish only insofar as they happen to have two Jewish parents and therefore must carry an internal passport which identifies them as Jews. For them, there is no spiritual or cultural distinction, no heritage to pass on to children.

Many Jews belong to the Party, though they probably are aware that they need not aspire to the highest leadership positions. There may be many Jews in the middle and lower echelons of the Red Army, but there are probably few in the conventional combat units and probably more in the highly specialized units where technical expertise is required.⁶⁷ Certainly Jews fought effectively as Soviet soldiers and partisans during World War II⁶⁸ and were still making major military contributions into the 1960s. For example, in 1967, a Soviet military publication, Voyenno-Istoricheski-Zhurnal revealed the names of two radar operators who had spotted the American U-2 aircraft shot down over the Soviet Union in May 1960. The men--Lieutenant E. E. Feldblum and Sergeant E. Shuster--were both Jews and they were commended for doing a

"masterful piece of work."⁶⁹ Perhaps in reaction to foreign criticism, the Soviet press has occasionally published articles identifying prominent Jews in Soviet life. Lists of Soviet officials can be culled, revealing names which probably identify people as Jewish. In both cases, a surprising number of Jews has been known to turn up.⁷⁰ The number of such people is probably not large in the aggregate, but it does seem to suggest that there are more than a few Soviet Jews who are completely committed to the system and enjoying its rewards. Though Jews (with rare exceptions) are excluded from key decision-making positions, they nevertheless have been well represented in technical specialties and have enjoyed many material perquisites.⁷¹ According to Igor Birman:

. . . [T]he main thing is that the Jewish intelligentsia still occupies a very important position in many vital areas and to force them out too quickly could well cause the most serious consequences for the regime. . . . There is no way we can know how the "Jewish problem" has been discussed at the very top levels or what decisions have been taken. But we can guess at those decisions from what has actually happened:

1. Jews have already been displaced in a number of areas of employment including the Party and state apparatus, the KGB and militia, foreign service, foreign commerce and the armed forces command.
2. Restrictions are placed not only on admission to higher educational institutions, but also on employment and career advancement in practically all fields. Something akin to percentage quotas is applied to accomplish this.
3. In a limited number of cases, the recruitment of staff and professional advancement are facilitated if the Jewish applicant is either very good or an irreplaceable specialist.
4. It is much easier for a Jew to be named assistant chief than chief.

5. Those already employed are very seldom dismissed simply because they are Jews.

6. While the authorities have, in principle, permitted emigration, they are also clearly impeding the emigration of the scientific and technical intelligentsia.⁷²

As a group, the status of Soviet Jews is low and probably growing lower. Soviet reality prohibits Jews from practicing Judaism, from expressing interest in their cultural heritage, all unless they are willing to forego the best material and professional advantages the system has to offer. Even the many Jews who choose to live in the Soviet mainstream find that their personal possibilities are limited. The nature of the predicament has been described by Zvi Gitelman:

The contradictory trends of national assertion and attempts to assimilate [among Soviet Jews] can be seen as equally "natural" or "logical" outcomes of a situation wherein the individual finds himself in a peculiar kind of unstable equilibrium, and is driven to reduce dissonance and stabilize his own personal situation by propelling himself to one of the two polar modes of behavior: assimilation or nationalism, the latter, at present almost always leading to attempts to emigrate. The Soviet Jew finds himself in this position because the policies of the USSR have created an environment around him which can be understood as an unstable equilibrium, producing psychological dissonance, and, of course, attempts to resolve it. This unstable equilibrium is created by the government-determined inability of Soviet Jews to creatively [sic] express themselves culturally as Jews, and hence the necessity to become acculturated into non-Jewish, almost always Russian culture, and at the same time, the refusal of Soviet society and the Soviet government to allow the Jew to assimilate completely into the Russian culture and assume Russian identity. Thus Soviet Jews are acculturated--they have adopted the culture of another social group--but they are not assimilated--they have not adopted that group's culture to such an extent that they no longer have any characteristics identifying them with their former culture and no longer have any loyalties to their former culture. Most Soviet Jews consider themselves to be culturally Russian. However, since their

internal passports designate them officially as Jews, and since the surrounding society tends to regard them as Jews rather than Russians, they are in the curious position of being culturally Russian, but legally and socially Jews⁷³ (underlining added)

It seems fair to suggest that almost all Soviet Jews who emigrate, whether to Israel, the United States or somewhere else, are culturally Russian in the sense described above by Gitelman. The Jews who have chosen to remain in the Soviet Union and pursue the benefits of assimilation are probably no more culturally Russian than those who have chosen to emigrate. By the same token, emigration would not seem to take away the acculturated emigre's Russian attitudes on many issues. This is not to say that all Soviet Jews have the same political and social attitudes, or exhibit the same political and social behavior as all ethnic Russians. But it does seem possible that the behavior of Soviet Jews, particularly in regard to communications matters, may be quite similar to that of Soviet Russians. This would seem to be particularly true of Jews from the "heartland" where Soviet rule has been in place for so many years. During much of Soviet history, certainly through World War II and during the entire reign of Stalin, the fate of Jews and Russians was intertwined. Both suffered in commensurate terms from the turmoil of the Civil War and the Terror, and while inordinate losses were probably suffered by Jews during the Nazi occupation, the remainder of Soviet society was far from untouched. Both have advanced, though mostly in material terms, as a result of the

industrialization and modernization of the Soviet Union. So it would seem that the relatively recent arrival of the state of Israel as an issue in Soviet domestic and foreign affairs has been the major factor in unraveling this loose Russian-Jewish axis. As Gitelman has pointed out, the Soviet Jew now has a choice, to stay or to emigrate--a choice not open to Russians. It is a difficult choice, but a choice nonetheless. The existence of this choice is perhaps now one of the most important psychological differences between the acculturated Soviet Jew who can leave and the Soviet Russian who has to stay behind whether he wants to stay or not. The fact that some Soviet Jews chose to exercise the choice and now live in the United States would not seem to make much of a difference in how they sought and acquired information while they still lived in the Soviet Union. There is no particular reason to suspect that they handled their information matters, both official and unofficial, in any way radically different from the way the Russians handled theirs.

CHAPTER 8

THE PRIVATE ZONE AS A "WHITE BELT" PHENOMENON

Lev Navrozov is a journalist and an emigre who left the Soviet Union in October 1971. He describes the typical emigrants simply as "people who have exhausted the possibilities of Soviet life."⁷⁴ It also seems worth suggesting that members of the current wave of emigration may be representative of the broad, new "middle class," identified by Andrei Amalrik as the class of "specialists" which is in opposition to the bureaucratic elite. Surely their high level of education and technical expertise make most of the emigrants specialists. Their desire to emigrate would tend to suggest they did not share all the goals of the bureaucratic elite. Amalrik wrote of the "gray belt"--the area encompassing activities which the law does not formally forbid, but which are, in fact, forbidden because they are too risky to be practiced. For years the act of emigration was probably a "gray belt" activity, but now for many Soviet Jews it appears to be a "white belt" activity--one both formally and practically permissible.

Navrozov has described the same situation in terms of what he feels are the "socio-civic" differences between pre-1953 and post-1953 Russia. Before 1953, any desire to leave the Soviet Union, he wrote, would have been regarded as "political trespass" punishable by whatever arbitrary sanctions the "organs of state security" cared to impose. After 1953 and before 1967 when the current wave of emigration began, expressing a desire to emigrate would have still constituted a "political trespass," but the conviction of such a "trespass" would have required "the furnishing of proof that would hold up under official inspection" (procedural as opposed to summary justice). After 1967, and certainly after 1973 (a year in which almost 35,000 Jews emigrated), the desire to emigrate for Jews was no longer "political trespass" but now part of "what you can do."⁷⁵

In this sense, Soviet Jews as representative of the new "middle class" in Soviet life have benefitted from the expansion of the area around themselves which has been referred to in the previous chapters as the "private zone." In the years since 1953, Soviet Jews have seen emigration turn from a "gray belt" activity into a "white belt" one. Not all persons desiring to leave have been permitted to leave, but for the over 200,000 Soviet Jews who have successfully emigrated, the Soviet authorities apparently have treated their personal desire to leave as a matter of personal conscience, so to speak--a matter for the private zone. Of course, these

personal desires have profound implications for the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union. But it does seem possible to say that the Soviet authorities have been following a line of policy on the emigration issue which, despite its consequences, has permitted a large number of Soviet citizens to freely exercise their personal convictions and permanently depart the Soviet Union.

Of course, the matter might be very much in doubt for a prospective emigrant until he actually receives his exit visa. The state reserves the privilege to deny exit visas to whomever it chooses, sharply reducing the dimensions of the private zone for such persons. Until he actually departs, the prospective emigrant is subject to intimidation and harrassment, thereby also limiting the dimensions of the private zone but probably to a lesser degree. But no potential emigrant can make an intelligent choice as to whether or not to apply for an exit visa without reliable information about the world outside the Soviet Union. It appears that this kind of information circulates freely enough among Soviet Jews, those who eventually emigrate and those who do not. There are apparently two reasons for this phenomenon. The first involves the growing importance of unofficial communications media in the Soviet Union in recent years. The second involves the strength and persistence of the private zone in relation to communications matters during the same period. Information regarding the state of Israel--its possibilities

for living, and, most importantly, its military and political security--would seem to be especially important for Soviet Jews considering emigration. Even the noshrim who may intend to live in the United States know that they must at least apply for emigration to live in Israel. Without Israel, there is no emigration to anywhere, at least for now. Therefore, it seems particularly pertinent to make a test of the existence and dimensions of the private zone in regard to communications matters by asking former Soviet citizens, who happen to be Jewish, what information they were able to get about Israel from all communications channels and how freely they were able to make use of it inside the Soviet Union.

In this way, some of the characteristics of the private zone may become apparent. For example, we might expect the zone to be of a certain circumference, one which traces a territory of circular shape. Inside this territory we might expect to find the individual and the family members, co-workers, and other associates with whom he feels he can safely share information from unofficial sources. We might expect the circumference of the zone to vary, always including the individual, almost always including family members, but excluding other categories of people, and particular members of categories according to psychological, demographic and historical criteria. For example, we could expect the zone to be larger for persons who feel no desire to acquire and spread large amounts of unofficial information--a person who spreads

only official information needs to take less care with whom he speaks and any unofficial information which is conveyed has less chance of falling into the hands of an untrustworthy party if it is conveyed by a person who deals infrequently with unofficial information. By the same token, we could expect the zone to be smaller for persons who choose to be active communicators of unofficial information, because such persons know from personal experience that they can trust some but not all of the people they know. Demographically, since the activities of persons who have high education and status may be more evident to the political authorities than those of lower status persons, the zone may be larger for persons who are lower in education and status and smaller for persons of higher education and status. For historical reasons related to those which are responsible for the phenomenon of neshira, persons living in the Soviet "heartland" may generally have a smaller zone than do persons living in western or Asian cities of the Soviet Union. This might be similar to saying that communications freedom is greater in a city such as Riga in Latvia than it is in an eastern Ukrainian city such as Kiev or in Moscow itself.

This test of the private zone involves asking Soviet Jews now living in the United States questions of how they acquired certain information about Israel from both official and unofficial sources while they still lived in the Soviet Union. In October 1973, before many of them had considered

applying for an exit visa, there occurred the fourth and most recent of the Arab-Israeli wars. The outcome of this war (also known as the Yom Kippur War because the Arab attack commenced on the highest of Jewish holy days) was in doubt for several weeks. The initial, successful Arab attack was thoroughly reported in the Soviet press leaving many Soviet Jews to question the survival of Israel. After several weeks, Israel recovered the military initiative and drove the Arabs back, but this information was slowly and inaccurately reported by the Soviet press.

To get news they felt they could trust about an event of exceptional interest, Soviet Jews turned to unofficial sources, particularly foreign radio stations. Rumor, word-of-mouth, contact with foreigners, mail from abroad and many other sources of unofficial information eventually supplemented the news supplied by foreign radio. In time, the whole unofficial information network was activated and continuously tapped by people hungry for reliable news. This unofficial information was widely shared and compared with that from official sources. "Reading between the lines" was rampant. In short, the Yom Kippur War was an unprecedented communications event. It can show the dimensions of the private zone both in terms of the individual and the nationality group to which he belongs.

PART II

PROCEDURE, RESPONDENT TESTIMONY, STATISTICS

CHAPTER 9

RESEARCH METHODS AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

The 104 Soviet Jews interviewed in the course of this investigation were initially contacted by mail and asked if they would like to participate in a study concerning mass communications in the Soviet Union. A letter of introduction in Russian (appendix A) was accompanied by a response form (appendix B) by which a potential respondent could indicate his interest in the study to the researcher. A total of 405 letters of introduction were placed in the hands of Soviet Jewish families now living in Dallas, Kansas City and Houston. The intermediation of the local Jewish Family Service agency was most helpful in this regard. Approximately 150 positive responses were received, a response rate of 37 percent. It appears that the nature of the study, and the carefully phrased and competent Russian used in the letter of introduction, are at least partially responsible for the good rate of response. The response form contained the address and phone number of the respondent and instructions as to the best time to call. When I arrived in the city, I proceeded to call all of the

respondents who had indicated an interest in the study and to schedule interview appointments.

The interviews almost always took place in the home of the respondent. In most cases other family members were present and the family head, usually a man, spoke for the group. The interviews took place mostly in English and partly in Russian. Many of the respondents had been in the United States for more than two years and were quite skillful in English. Many of the more recently arrived respondents were also sufficiently skilled in English to answer questions in that language. Most of the remainder wished to use English as much as possible and resorted to Russian for the purpose of elaborating an answer, or when using English became fatiguing. In all cases, the respondents were cordial and in many cases, hospitable as well.

I expected that many respondents would be curious about my work but might not respond by mail because of shyness, suspicion or other reasons. As it turned out, some people who had received my letter but not responded eventually agreed to be interviewed--after I had conducted an interview with a neighbor or friend. In each of the three cities I found that the longer I remained, the easier it became to interview people on a referral basis. Some of my respondents told me that they knew other Soviet Jews who had received my letter but were reluctant to talk to me. When it became clear after several days that my questions and methods were innocuous

enough, I received additional informal invitations to come over and talk. As a result, my total response rate is somewhat higher than 37 percent.

The interviews averaged forty minutes in length. The questionnaire (appendix C) contained forty-two questions. Interviewing time did not include the period before the interview began in which I attempted to get acquainted with the respondent. Nor did it include the time after the questioning which normally was social in nature. The shortest interview was conducted in ten minutes, with a respondent who was on her lunch break from a factory job. The longest interview, four hours, occurred with an elderly respondent who had been a teacher and philosopher in the Soviet Union and who was interested in discussing the purpose and theoretical significance of each of my questions. Many of the respondents, as intelligent, highly-educated professional persons were also interested in Soviet communications matters and expressed an interest in seeing the results of my work when it was finished. Overall, my respondents seemed especially cooperative, pleasant and sincere.

Of the 104 respondents, 68 (65.4 percent) were male and 36 (34.6 percent) were female. The fact that the sample is overabundant with males does not reflect an imbalance of the sexes in either the Soviet Jewish population in the Soviet Union, or in the Soviet Jewish emigre population in the United States. Rather it seems to reflect the fact that

Soviet Jews have tended to resettle in the United States in family units and a male seems to speak most often for the family. Additionally, it seems that unmarried males more often responded to my letter of introduction than did unmarried women. As a result I found myself talking more often to men than women in this category. In families in which the husband and wife were not married in October 1973 (the month the Yom Kippur War started), or were living in separate households, I interviewed both husband and wife. Most often, however, and particularly with older couples, there was only one interview per family.

Table 12
Age of Respondents in 1980

Age	Count	Percentage
Over 20	1	1.0
21-30	12	11.5
31-40	36	34.6
41-50	43	41.3
51-60	8	7.7
61-70	3	2.9
Over 70	<u>1</u>	<u>1.0</u>
Total	104	100.0

The data in table 12 show that the bulk of the sample is composed of persons under 50 years of age. Only one person under 20 years was interviewed because he had an exceptional

memory regarding his personal experience with the Soviet communications environment in 1973, a year in which he passed his thirteenth birthday. No other person under 20 was capable of responding to the interview questions with specificity. Only four persons over the age of 60 were interviewed. Many of the available persons in this age bracket had virtually no capability in English or were infirm. As a result, most of my respondents are between 21 and 50 years of age. Differentiation according to age is considered to be a very important factor in this research. For the purpose of crosstabulating age with the responses to specific interview questions, the respondents were grouped into three categories according to the amount of their lives spent in the Soviet Union prior to the death of Stalin in 1953. In this way it is felt that experience or lack of experience with life in a model totalitarian state might reflect itself (see table 13).

Table 13

Age at the Time of Stalin's Death

Age in Years in 1953	Count	Percentage
Unborn to 13	49	47.1
14-23	43	41.3
24-53	12	11.5
Total	104	100.0

Professor Gitelman's 1976 Detroit sample of 132 Soviet Jewish emigres¹ was composed of 18.2 percent zapadniki or "westerners," 59.8 percent "heartlanders," and the remainder "Asian" Jews or Jews of indeterminate geographical origin.* I followed Gitelman's lead, using his essentially geographic guidelines to identify a respondent as a heartlander, Westerner or Asian (including Georgian) Jew. My 1980 sample suggests that the flow of noshrim, heartlander Jews has not slackened in the interim and may actually have increased. My respondents, in keeping with the overwhelmingly urban disposition of Soviet Jewry, represented eighteen cities in the Soviet Union (table 14). Based on the location of the respondent in October 1973, which was normally inside the region of the Soviet Union where he or she grew up, the classification results are shown in table 15.

The respondents were asked to consider the number of years of education they had experienced in the Soviet Union. The data in table 16 indicate that as a group, these people were quite educated in terms of exposure to Soviet schools and universities. Further, the data in table 17 shows the relative level of education for all of the Soviet nationality groups according to the 1959 and 1970 census figures. The table indicates that Jews have a history as the most highly educated of all the nationality groups in the Soviet Union.

*"Westerners" are Jews emigrating from areas of the western Ukraine, western Byelorussia, the Baltic republics and other regions which came under Soviet control in 1939-1944. "Heartlanders" are Jews emigrating from areas under nominal Soviet control since 1917. "Asian" Jews include those emigrating from Soviet Georgia.

Table 14
City of Residence in October 1973

City	Count	Percentage
Moscow	25	24.0
Kiev	23	22.7
Leningrad	15	14.4
Odessa	9	8.7
Riga	8	7.7
Lvov	7	6.7
Minsk	4	3.8
Kishinev	2	1.9
Tashkent	2	1.9
Kharkov	1	0.9
Murmansk	1	0.9
Vinnitsa	1	0.9
Zmerimke	1	0.9
Voronezh	1	0.9
Chernovtsy	1	0.9
Sukhumi	1	0.9
Perm	1	0.9
Viborg	<u>1</u>	<u>0.9</u>
Total	104	100.0

Table 15
Geographical Origin of Respondents

Region	Count	Percentage
Asian	3	2.9
Heartland	83	79.8
Western	<u>18</u>	<u>17.3</u>
Total	104	100.0

Table 16
Years of Education in the Soviet Union

Years	Count	Percentage
Less than 10	1	1.0
10-12	23	22.1
13-15	24	23.1
16-18	38	36.5
More than 19	16	15.4
No response	<u>2</u>	<u>1.9</u>
Total	104	100.0

Table 17

Percent of Population Aged Ten and Over Having
Higher and Secondary Education (Complete and
Incomplete) by Major Nationality
1959 and 1970

Nationality	1959	1970
Russians	37.8	50.8
Ukrainians	35.3	47.6
Jews (RSFSR)	76.4	82.4
Jews (Ukrainian SSR)	65.2	74.7
Belorussians	31.1	43.8
Uzbeks	31.1	41.2
Kazakhs	26.8	39.0
Georgians	47.4	57.8
Azeri	36.0	42.4
Lithuanians	20.8	35.3
Moldavians	21.2	33.8
Latvians	42.6	48.8
Kirgiz	29.9	40.0
Tadzhiks	29.9	39.0
Armenians	44.3	51.8
Turkmens	36.3	43.0
Estonians	35.8	46.2
Tatars (RSFSR)	32.9	44.2
Tatars (Uzbek SSR)	43.6	53.5

SOURCE: 1970 Census, as quoted in Robert A. Lewis et al., Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR: An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897-1970 (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 340.

The Soviet pattern of education is quite standard. High School is completed after the tenth year and many students then terminate their formal education with an additional two years of trade or technical school. The degree "candidate of science," roughly equivalent to the American Ph.D., is normally not awarded until after the eighteenth or nineteenth year of education. When all formal school is taken into account, including continuing education, night and correspondence courses, an individual may have more than nineteen years of education to his credit. A comparison of the data in tables 16 and 17 indicates that the respondents, as a group, were considerably better educated than any other Soviet nationality group and were somewhat better educated than Soviet Jews at large. Whereas 82.4 percent of Soviet Jews in the Russian republic had been exposed to at least secondary education according to the 1970 census, approximately 97 percent of the respondents had received at least secondary education prior to their departure from the Soviet Union in the years 1973-1980. Differentiation according to education is considered to be an important factor in this research. For the purpose of tabulating educational level with responses to specific interview questions, the respondents were grouped into three classes: those of low, medium and high education. (table 18).

Since many of the respondents had received university educations, or portions thereof, the respondents were asked

Table 18
Educational Level

Level	Count	Percentage
Low (up to 12 yrs)	24	23.1
Medium (13-18 hrs)	62	59.6
High (above 19 yrs)	16	15.4
No Response	<u>2</u>	<u>1.9</u>
Total	104	100.0

to identify their major field of study. The data in table 19 show that a broad range of fields are represented though there is a distinct preponderance of scientific and technical disciplines, such as engineering. This tendency toward the technical is probably related to the general Soviet emphasis on academic training which can contribute directly to the campaign for modernization through industrialization. Differentiation according to field of study is also considered to be an important factor in this research. Therefore, the fields listed above have been grouped according to whether or not training in a particular field helps to identify a respondent as a former member of the Soviet intelligentsia and, more to the point, whether the respondent has an education indicative of a member of the technical intelligentsia. Hence, the fields in table 20 have been grouped into three classes: technical intelligentsia (coded in table 17 as 1), non-technical intelligentsia (coded as 2),

Table 19
Major Field of Study

Field	Count	Code	Percentage
Mechanical Engineering	20	1	19.2
Electrical Engineering	9	1	8.7
Math/Computers	7	1	6.7
Music	6	2	6.8
Other*	6	3	5.8
Physics/Biology	5	1	4.8
Engineering (all other)	5	1	4.8
Economics	4	1	3.8
"General"**	4	3	3.8
Medical Doctor	3	1	2.9
Chemistry	3	1	2.9
Elementary Education	3	2	2.9
English Language	3	2	2.9
Journalism/Editing	2	2	1.9
Accounting/Bookkeeping	1	2	1.0
Law	1	2	1.0
Nursing	1	3	1.0
Geology	1	1	1.0
Psychology	1	1	1.0
Architecture	1	1	1.0
Library Science	1	2	1.0
Fashion Design	1	3	1.0
Physiology	1	1	1.0
Humanities	1	2	1.0
Philosophy	1	2	1.0
No Response***	<u>13</u>	-	<u>12.5</u>
Total	104		100.0

*Other includes primarily non-technical, non-professional specialties such as hairdressing, waiting on tables, cosmetology, truck driving, etc.

**"General" primarily includes respondents with limited or no university training but who claimed exposure to general topics such as math, history, physical culture, etc.

***No response primarily includes respondents with some or incomplete university training who did not claim knowledge of any technical or academic subject.

Table 20
Major Fields of Study
(Classified)

Class	Count	Code	Percentage
Technical Intelligentsia (TI)	60	1	57.7
Non-Tech. Intelligentsia (NTI)	24	2	23.1
Non-Intelligentsia (NI)	14	3	13.5
No Response*	6	-	5.8

*After additional analysis, seven of the thirteen "No Response" indications were re-allocated to NTI and NI fields of study.

and non-intelligentsia (coded as 3). Table 20, above, displays the grouping of the fields into the three classes. These groupings will be used later in this chapter for the purpose of crosstabulating major field of study with the responses to specific interview questions.

Each respondent was asked to identify his or her occupation in October 1973. In most cases, and almost in every case involving a member of the technical intelligentsia, a technical education in a particular field led to a career or job in that field. The data in table 21 shows that the respondents held a wide range of jobs, but once again, there is an abundance of specialists in the technical fields. When these occupations are grouped and classified according to the criteria used to develop table 20, a similar product results which can be used in chapter 12 for crosstabulation purposes.

Table 21
Occupation in October 1973

Occupation	Count	Code	Percentage
Mechanical Engineer	20	1	19.2
Factory Worker	11	3	10.6
Elementary/Secondary Education Teacher	10	2	9.6
Electrical Engineer	9	1	8.7
Mathematician/Programmer	8	1	7.7
Research Scientist	7	1	6.7
Musician	6	2	5.8
Engineering (all other)	5	1	4.8
Other*	5	3	4.8
University Student	4	2	3.8
Medical Doctor	3	1	2.9
Accountant/Bookkeeper	3	3	2.9
Language Translator	2	2	1.9
Journalist/Editor	2	2	1.9
Lawyer	1	2	1.0
Economist	1	1	1.0
Fashion Designer	1	3	1.0
Geologist	1	1	1.0
Architect	1	1	1.0
Soldier	1	3	1.0
Total	104		100.0

*Other includes primarily non-technical, non-professional occupations such as taxi driver, beautician, waiter, etc.

Table 22

Occupations in October 1973
(Classified)

Occupation	Count	Code	Percentage
Technical Intelligentsia (TI)	55	1	52.9
Non-Tech. Intelligentsia (NTI)	25	2	24.0
Non-Intelligentsia (NI)	<u>24</u>	3	<u>23.1</u>
Total	104		100.0

The demographic characteristics of my 1980 respondents seem to conform quite closely to the demographic characteristics of Professor Gitelman's 1976 Detroit sample²--except for a slightly higher proportion of heartlanders, and a slightly lower proportion of persons older than fifty in my group. Although my respondents seem to be slightly better educated than Soviet Jews as a group, there are no other demographic differences which seem in any way significant to this research. The 1980 sample also seems to conform to the assessment of Theodore Friedgut³ that Soviet Jews today are overwhelmingly urban, far better educated than the non-Jews around them and disproportionately concentrated in the intelligentsia occupations. It would seem then that these 1980 respondents are qualified to speak in a fashion representative of all Soviet Jews about issues in contemporary Soviet life such as those concerning information and mass communications. It would also seem that these respondents are able to speak in a fashion suggestive of the members of other groups of Soviet people--

groups principally composed of members of the Russian majority in which levels of education are high, urban living is the norm, and technical intelligentsia occupations are well represented.

CHAPTER 10

LISTENING HABITS AND "READING BETWEEN THE LINES"

The data contained in tables 23 and 24 show the main sources of news used by the respondents in 1973, first during "normal" news conditions and second during conditions of international crisis. Respondents were first asked "There was a war in the Middle East in October 1973 between Israel and the Arab countries. It started very quickly and without warning. How did you first find out that this war had started?" The idea was to determine which news sources, both official and unofficial, had the attention of Soviet Jews at a time when they had no particular reason to expect news of a special event. It should be remembered that the jamming of foreign radio stations, which was introduced with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, was lifted in September 1973. Even though the reception of foreign stations had been quite difficult for five years due to the jamming, within a month or less after subsiding, it appears that the foreign stations were perhaps the third most popular source of news to the Soviet Jewish audience. When the war began,

Table 23

First Source of News about the War

Source	Count	Percentage
Soviet Radio	26	25.0
Soviet Television	8	7.7
Soviet Newspaper	24	23.1
Someone at Work	1	1.0
Someone in Family	3	2.9
Foreign radio	21	20.2
A Friend	10	9.6
Other/Don't Remember		
Don't Know	11	10.6
Total	104	100.0

many respondents recalled that the official Soviet sources cut loose a barrage of propaganda, reporting that Israeli "aggressor" forces were being defeated by an "heroic" Egyptian attack. Some respondents recalled that news of the war through official sources (Soviet radio, television and newspaper) seemed delayed for hours, and even days in some cases, as if the authorities were trying to "formulate" the facts. Others felt that the news came quickly through official sources because Egypt enjoyed early success in the war and the authorities were only too happy to report it.

Respondents were asked, "While the war was going on, until the time it was over, how did you get most of the news about the war?" The idea behind this question was to determine which sources the Soviet Jews relied upon to obtain the

Table 24

Main Source of News about the War

Source	Count	Percentage
Soviet Radio	12	11.5
Soviet Television	4	3.8
Soviet Newspaper	13	12.5
Someone at Work	1	1.9
Someone in the Family	2	1.9
Foreign radio	55	52.9
A Friend	6	5.8
Other/Don't Remember/ Don't Know	<u>11</u>	<u>10.6</u>
Total	104	100.4*

*Percentage exceeds 100 percent because of rounding.

most trustworthy and complete information about an event of exceptional importance. In table 24 above, the popularity of the foreign stations seems almost striking. When the war started, it appears that listening to foreign stations increased almost 200 percent, this at the expense of Soviet radio, newspapers and television whose audiences declined approximately 50 percent each. During the first week of the war, the period of the Arabs' greatest battlefield success, many respondents recalled that the official sources tended to provide a high degree of detail in their reporting. Much was made of numbers of Israeli planes shot down, Israeli tanks

destroyed and Israeli soldiers killed. As the war went into the second and third weeks, the official reporting became more and more general. In contrast, foreign radio stations appeared to have less detail at the start and more as the war went on. This situation probably contributed to somewhat increased listening to the foreign stations, though it does not appear that the respondents wholly abandoned the official sources for the foreign stations at any time during the war. Rather, the official media became the supplementary source of news information as the foreign stations became the primary. One respondent recalled that the official sources created a problem for themselves at the start of the war when they reported with much fanfare that the Arabs were definitely defeating the Israelis. In the end, it became clear, both in the official sources and in the foreign radio news reports, that much of the Egyptian army was surrounded and cut off in the desert by the Israeli counterattack. As a result, the official sources looked somewhat foolish.

The data in tables 25 and 26 below indicate which foreign radio stations were the most popular among the respondents. They were asked to name the foreign radio station to which they listened most often, and second most often, when receiving news about the war. Table 25 clearly shows that VOA was the dominant first choice among the respondents in the reporting of news about the war. BBC and RL were popular second choices (see table 26). Though

Table 25

Most Popular Foreign Radio Service

Service	Count	Percentage
Voice of America (VOA)	74	83.1
British Broadcasting Company (BBC)	8	9.0
Radio Israel	4	4.5
Deutsche Welle (DW)	2	2.2
Radio Liberty (RL)	<u>1</u>	<u>1.1</u>
Total	89*	100.0

*Fifteen of the 104 total respondents reported that in 1973 either they did not listen to any foreign radio station as a general rule, or they were not listening at the time of the war.

Table 26

Second Most Popular Foreign Radio Service

Service	Count	Percentage
BBC	30	37.5
RL	19	23.7
DW	11	13.7
VOA	11	13.7
Radio Israel	7	8.7
Radio Canada	1	1.2
Radio Free Europe	<u>1</u>	<u>1.2</u>
Total	89	100.0

65 percent of the respondents reported that some jamming interfered with the reception of their favorite service, 67 percent of the respondents found that their favorite service was audible at least half the time. Very few of the respondents could recall the exact month (September 1973) when jamming subsided so it seems possible that their memory of jammed programming related to a period earlier than October 1973. If this is so, then it seems likely that most of the most popular foreign stations were audible to even more than 67 percent of the respondents.

Respondents tended to have strong feelings about the character of the various foreign radio services. VOA was generally praised for objective news reporting, although many respondents detected a "cautious," circumspect approach to its reporting of the war. Some respondents felt that VOA seemed to be "trying too hard" to seem objective in spot news reporting, as if they were attempting to be as "objective" as they perceived the Soviet official sources to be "biased" and "non-objective." Many more, however, felt that VOA was a neutral, highly credible service that provided just the facts in spot news reporting and left the listener to draw his own conclusions about the facts. BBC was almost universally praised for its reporting. Some respondents detected a relaxed, highly "professional" tone about BBC, a tone sometimes perceived as lacking in VOA reports. Several respondents criticized VOA for using announcers who seemed to

possess less than "perfect" capabilities in spoken Russian. In this case, announcers who did not seem to possess perfect pronunciation and accent were seen as slightly lowering the generally positive image of the station. In this regard, BBC announcer Alexei Maximovich Goldberg was mentioned by name and praised by several respondents for presenting the most objective, "professional" reporting on any of the foreign radio stations. Radio Liberty, a U.S. government-operated service based in Germany, seemed to provoke the sharpest differences of opinion among the respondents. Some reported that they liked the "sharp" nature of the news reporting, particularly in regard to Soviet affairs. Some liked the way RL seemed to be "hard" on the Soviet regime. Others, however, felt that the tone of RL reporting was "angry" and likely to be poorly received by many Soviet listeners. Additionally, one respondent felt that "too many World War II Russian refugees work here [RL]," and he offered that some of them were "known" to be "co-operated with the Germans during the war." In any event, Radio Liberty was widely believed among the respondents to be among the most jammed stations in the Soviet Union. It seems to share this distinction with Radio Israel and the shortwave broadcasts coming out of the Peoples Republic of China. Tables 27 and 28 indicate a measure of how objective the foreign stations were perceived to be as a class in their reporting of news about the war.

Respondents were also asked to consider their opinion of the objectivity of Soviet official newspaper and broadcast

Table 27

Was the Foreign Station Objective?/
Most Popular Service (VOA with
74 Percent of the Respondents)

	Count	Percentage
Always	41	47.1
Mostly	34	39.1
Sometimes	12	13.8
Seldom	0	0.0
Never	0	0.0
No Response	2*	--
Total	89**	100.0

*Includes respondents who had no opinion on the issue of objectivity with their first choice foreign radio station.

**Fifteen of the 104 total respondents reported they were not listening to foreign radio in October 1973.

Table 28

Was the Foreign Station Objective?/Second Most
Popular Service (BBC, with 30 Percent of
Respondents, RL with 19 Percent)

	Count	Percentage
Always	23	42.6
Mostly	18	33.3
Sometimes	12	22.2
Seldom	1	1.9
Never	0	0.0
No Response	26*	--
Total	80	100.0

*Includes respondents who listened to only one foreign radio station or had no opinion on the issue of the objectivity of their second choice station. In addition to these 80 respondents in table 28, 24 more were either listening to no foreign station in October 1973, or only one and had no opinion as to the objectivity of that station, or they failed to respond for other reasons such as "don't know," "don't remember," etc.

reports about the war. Some respondents seemed surprised at the question, as if the answer were self-evident. Some were quick to respond, "they lie all the time, doesn't everyone know that?" and with other responses to this effect. Many, however, became reflective and conceded that there were times and circumstances under which Soviet reporting could be fully in accordance with the facts--those being the circumstances under which reporting the facts accurately and completely served the interest of the authorities. When considering the official Soviet reporting of the Yom Kippur War, several respondents closely echoed the sentiments of the one who said, "They [the Soviet press] told the truth only as long as the Egyptian forces were winning. Then, when Israel began to counterattack and win, the old pattern of reversing the facts and ignoring the truth began again. It is strange, but as long as the Soviet press was lying, we were unconcerned about Israel. It was only when they told the truth that we became worried."

Some respondents offered views reminiscent of those offered to Inkeles and Bauer some thirty years ago by emigres who thought they knew how to interpret the Soviet press: "Simply believe that the view 180 degrees in opposition to the view of the authorities is the true one," I was told. "It's called putting the facts on their feet." One respondent felt that today's Soviet press is under more constraint than the press of Stalin's day to report the facts objectively.

As he put it, "They [the authorities] have got to tell a little bit of truth nowadays, because, even though the country is not free, it is no longer locked up tight as if there was a wall around it. Besides, the best lie is the one which contains a little bit of truth." Another said, "They lie as long as possible, until the true facts cannot be denied. Then, they tell the truth and they don't seem to care about how ridiculous they look." Table 29 tabulates the variety of opinion on this question.

Table 29

Was the Soviet Press Reporting Objective,
Did They Tell the Truth about the War?

	Count	Percentage
Always	1*	1.0
Mostly	3	3.0
Sometimes	22	22.0
Seldom	38	38.0
Never	36	36.0
No Response	<u>4</u>	<u>--</u>
Total	104	100.0

*This respondent seemed quite sincere.

Respondents were ready to give specific examples of how they "read between the lines," "put the facts on their feet," and used similar procedures to squeeze what they felt was the truth out of both the official and unofficial news sources available to them:

In reading about "growing tensions" in the Middle East in the Soviet press, when they said that "Israeli provocations" were continuing, I took it to mean that the Arabs were getting ready to attack.

When the war began to turn in Israel's favor (after her counterattack had crossed the Suez canal and trapped the Egyptian 3rd Army in the Sinai Desert), the Soviet press reporting went something like this . . . "Israeli aggressors, well-equipped by the American imperialists are attacking the heroic Egyptian defenders, who though not as well-equipped are resisting and are inflicting great losses on Israel. . . ." I took all this to mean the following: 1. Israel is advancing. 2. The Egyptians are close to collapse.

At times the lying in the Soviet press is very obvious. For example, in 1977, an Israeli bus was hijacked by PLO terrorists, and before it was over, 27 Israeli civilians had been killed. TASS [the Soviet news reporting service] said that PLO "partisans" had killed 37 Israeli "soldiers." VOA also reported the event, but reported the truth about it. I became sure of the truth when I caught a broadcast on Radio Israel. They commented on the TASS report about the "37 Israeli soldiers" killed by PLO "partisans." They said (sarcastically) that most of these "soldiers" were only nine to thirteen years old.

I remember official reports about Israeli aircraft losses. We were told by the Soviet press that the Egyptians had shot down many Israeli Phantoms and Mirages. At that time, I had friends who had worked on Soviet military aircraft sent to the Arab countries. Also, I had friends who had met Arab military officers who had come to [name of city deleted] for their political education at the political school for foreign military officers. The reports of my friends led me to believe that these people [the Arabs] were not smart enough nor dedicated enough to completely defeat the Israelis.

One respondent recalled an event which occurred in 1976 to illustrate a point he wanted to make about the relationship of simple facts to the reporting of the Soviet press. It concerned the defection of a Soviet Air Force pilot, who flew

his exotic, late-model fighter plane to Japan and in doing so, handing the West a propaganda victory of immense proportions:

When Belenko [the pilot] took his Mig [the plane] to Japan, I was in the Caucasus at the time. Two or three hours after he landed, VOA had a report about it. Then they reported updates about it every two hours. Pravda took nine days to report the first word. I was in the Soviet Union so I could not be sure if VOA was telling the truth. But I did know that it took the authorities nine days to decide how to report the event. Even a one or two day delay for Pravda to decide how to write about it would have seemed understandable to me at the time. But to tell the truth takes no time, you just tell it. You don't have to take time to think about how to tell it unless you plan to say something untrue about it.

Most of the respondents had a particularly dim view of the reliability of the Soviet press and a particularly favorable one of the news reports they received from foreign radio. But in follow-up discussions, it became clear that one could readily find Soviet news information to be incredulous but still act as if one believed it wholeheartedly. A respondent put it this way:

Listeners to Soviet radio and Soviet newspaper readers may not believe what they hear and read but they are still under the influence of it. Russians have a native respect for the written word. Russia is a reading nation. Lenin said "literature without propaganda does not exist," so everything they [the regime] write or say is propaganda. First, they train people to respect what is in print, and then they say whatever they want. They don't care what people may really think, because it doesn't make any difference. Everyone is trained and conditioned to act as if they believe.

This respondent seemed to want to make a point similar to the one made by Hedrick Smith regarding Soviet codes of behavior.

Smith referred to the division of Soviet life into public and private spheres. Listening to foreign radio broadcasts is certainly behavior which is part of the private sphere, even though many people may now be listening and reporting what they hear in a somewhat public way. The point is that, as a personal activity which is part of the private zone, listening to foreign radio does not constitute entertainment in the sense that an American listener listening to American radio might be entertained. There are at least two reasons. First, the Soviet listener may feel a measure of guilt for listening, guilt associated with fear of sanction for being caught. But secondly, and more to the point, the Soviet listener is not going to feel "good" for having foreign radio prove to him on a regular basis that his own government lies to him.

In its own way, listening to foreign radio might be likened to the host of illicit activities now apparently prevalent in the Soviet Union, activities to which millions of ordinary people seem to be resorting just to get by in their daily lives. Countless people seem to be engaged in barter, exchanging favors, bribery and similar devices to short circuit the normal, "above ground," "socialist" system of commodity supply because the official system seems to be exceedingly inefficient. In no real way can Soviet people feel "good" about engaging in these "underground" activities and getting information from foreign radio may appear to Soviet listeners

to be an equally illicit but necessary activity. If one can judge from the 1980 respondents, Soviet listeners to foreign radio listen wholly without self-righteous feelings. My respondents reported that after listening, they felt just a little better-informed and a little more alienated from Soviet life. In this sense, operating within the private zone as a listener to foreign radio did not make any of my respondents feel "free," only a little more distant from the life prescribed as correct by the authorities. Listening to foreign radio changed nothing fundamental in their lives. They may have been able to get more and better information about the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, but it did not change the fact that they still had to live in the Soviet Union.

Only one respondent, a particularly intelligent and resourceful man, seemed to be proud about the way he obtained information he could rely on. For him, it had nothing to do with illicit listening to foreign radio.

Ninety-nine percent of Russian public news is disinformation. You have to be very smart and hardworking to find out the truth. I wanted to find out the truth about the United States (for example) so I went to the Central Library. It was 99 percent lies. I know because I compared the 110 books they had on America with each other and I got the one percent that was true about America in each of them. At this time I was out of a job because I had applied for my exit visa and I eventually had seven months to spend on researching America. I found out what I wanted to know. I found out how to find a job in the United States, about its schools, its political system and political parties; about my profession in America, U.S. income taxes, medical care and life insurance. It was all in the Russian language in a Soviet library. The first time you read, you do not know what is a lie and what is the truth. If you read all 110 of the

books it is hell, but after a while the true information repeats itself and is confirmed in the other books. The KGB, of course, makes a list of who looks at these books. A KGB man took the chair next to me and watched all the time I was reading. But it shows that it can be done. All of the biggest cities in the Soviet Union have this kind of library. . . .

This respondent was perhaps the only one out of the 104 who seemed to feel confident and self-righteous about the way he had obtained information outside of regime control. As he told his story, it seemed that his life during his last months in the Soviet Union had taken place in only one sphere instead of the usual two: public and private. He admitted that the risks he took by living and behaving in this open way were great, but he felt that they were mitigated by the fact that the authorities knew he had applied for an exit visa. Since he had already identified himself as a non-conformist by applying, he felt he could do himself no further harm behaving as one. Practically no other respondent wished to openly appear as a non-conformist, no matter what applications he may have filed with the government. It seems that even up to the moment of emigration, almost no respondent felt he could listen to foreign radio and discuss what he had heard in the private zone, without feeling at least some small measure of insecurity or guilt.

Though the 1980 respondents showed a rather thorough skepticism about the objectivity and truthfulness of the Soviet press, and though listening to foreign radio probably failed to make most of them less depressed about themselves

and their lives in the Soviet Union, many of them allowed that humor was important to them in adjusting to Soviet life. Within the private zone, people often tell jokes and anecdotes which mock the official media and power structure while at the same time suggesting that unofficial media have a good deal of respect from average people. Jokes are meant to be told, not read, but some of the respondents were so quick to tell a joke to illustrate a point, and they were so good at telling them, that it seems worth trying to repeat some of the best jokes here.

The Soviet press is full of reports about food production; how good it is this year, how much better it will be next year. I guess I should stop trying to find food in the state stores and just hold my bag under the radio!

At a recent politburo meeting, Kosygin found that he had to visit the men's room. Three times in three hours he asked the other members if he could be excused. Each time the other members voted, "No!" Finally, there was a knock at the door. It was the guard who came in and said, "The Voice of America wants to know why Kosygin can't go!"

During a recent speech on Soviet television, Brezhnev talked endlessly about the achievements of Communism. I got bored and changed the channel, but he was on the second channel and I changed it again. But Brezhnev was still talking so I changed it again to the fourth and final channel. Brezhnev just looked up from his text, fixed me right in the eye and said, "I'd like to see you try that again!"

Humor seems to be an important ingredient in helping to maintain a sense of perspective on the part of a person who is operating within his private zone. It seems to act as an antidote to the feelings of guilt, insecurity and alienation which might otherwise arise as a result of engaging in the

practice of listening to foreign radio. Humor seems also to help ward off the depression which might occur as a result of feeling that things in Russia are hopeless compared to things in other parts of the world. Of course, it is foreign radio which provides much of the best, and most reliable information about other countries and world events. In this sense, possession of a private zone, and engaging in a private zone activity such as listening to foreign radio, may make an individual feel better informed. But it does not necessarily make him feel happier or self-satisfied.

CHAPTER 11

DISCUSSION VARIABLES AND THE PRIVATE ZONE

I have postulated that the presence of the private zone is determined by the degree to which the individual seems willing to discuss information from unofficial sources with relative confidence that he will not suffer at the hands of the authorities for doing so. A willingness to acquire unofficial information is also believed to be correlated with the presence of the zone. I have postulated that the dimensions of the private zone might vary among people given differences in the nature of their personal contacts, demographic characteristics and separate personalities. But, in general terms, it is believed that the zone is circular in shape and encompasses the individual and those persons with whom he felt he can safely share information from unofficial sources. The respondents were asked to recall if they felt free to discuss news about the war, obtained from foreign radio stations, with different categories of people--family members, close friends, co-workers, casual friends or acquaintances, and finally, strangers. These categories of people might be

perceived as being arranged as five concentric circles with the individual at the center and the fifth ring, strangers, outermost. The data in tables 30 through 34 show how willingly or unwillingly they shared their information about the war from foreign radio with people in each of these categories.

Table 30

"Did You Discuss News from Foreign Radio with Other Members of Your Immediate Family?"

	Count	Percentage
Always	79	78.2
Mostly	4	4.0
Sometimes	3	3.0
Seldom	0	0.0
Never	0	0.0
Not listening to foreign radio	15	14.9
No Response	<u>2</u>	<u>--</u>
Total	104	100.0

As shown in table 30, respondents indicated a high degree of confidence in discussing news of the war from foreign radio with family members. Friedrich and Brzezinski referred to the family as an "island of separateness" in a totalitarian sea, one which had "proved to be of particular tenacity." The data in table 30 would seem to indicate that this is true as of the 1973 time period. None of the

respondents seemed to fear that one of his own children might turn out to be a Pavlik Morozov, someone who would turn in his own parent for engaging in "anti-Soviet" or "anti-socialist" behavior. One respondent did indicate that he did not talk about "these things" (such as news from foreign radio) in front of his young son, not because he was afraid his son might turn him in, but because he did not want the boy to get into trouble for following his father's "example" of "talking freely." At home, news of the war from foreign radio seems to have been very freely shared, and it appears that the war was the main topic of Jewish family conversation during the time that it was the major news story of the day.

Table 31

"Did You Discuss News from Foreign
Radio with Your Friends?"

	Count	Percentage
Always	53	51.5
Mostly	25	24.3
Sometimes	7	6.8
Seldom	3	2.9
Never	0	0.0
Not Listening	15	14.6
No Response	1	--

At this point--table 31--the outer dimensions of the private zone are beginning to make themselves apparent. The

ring composed of family members is clearly within the zone. Most personal friends also appear to be in a ring within the zone, but the confidence with which the respondents discussed this type of unofficial information with friends does not appear to be as high as it seems to be with family members. Whereas 78 percent of the respondents reported that they "always" talked with family members, only 51 percent felt they could "always" trust their friends with the same kind of information. Fifty-one percent is still a high measure of trust in the aggregate, but when compared to 78 percent it does seem to reflect a measure of diminished confidence. Part of the reason the level of trust has remained high in the aggregate is because respondents felt, in answering this question, that "a friend" is a person known for an extended period of time and in whose life one felt a personal involvement of significant proportions. Normally, a person would know the family of his friends as well as the friend. Very few of the respondents felt that they had more than four or five of such "friends" in the course of a lifetime. Most of the respondents, particularly the older ones, observed that their friends were usually Jewish as were they themselves. Jewish friends were normally trusted as family, but some reported that they had Russian and Ukrainian friends as well. Russian or Ukrainian friends did not always seem to be trusted at the level of Jewish friends. The presence of non-Jewish friends seems to be the primary factor in reducing the high

level of trust accorded to family, to the still high but somewhat diminished level of trust accorded to friends. In this regard, the second ring was generally colored by the ethnic element.

Table 32

"Did You Discuss News from Foreign Radio with Your Co-workers, the People at Work?"

	Count	Percentage
Always	6	5.9
Mostly	13	12.9
Sometimes	24	23.8
Seldom	16	15.8
Never	27	26.7
Not listening to foreign radio	15	14.9
No Response	<u>3</u>	<u>--</u>
Total	104	100.0

In table 32, it appears that we are reaching the outer limits of the private zone. The last possible of the concentric rings around the individual, composed of people with whom the individual might confidently share information from unofficial sources, appears to be the one containing co-workers. Whereas 75 percent of the respondents reported that they could talk "always" or "mostly" with friends, only 19 percent could do the same with co-workers. At the other end of the spectrum, only 2.9 percent of the respondents reported they would talk

only "seldom" or "never" with friends, but fully 43 percent "seldom" or "never" discussed news about the war with co-workers. There seem to be several reasons for this contrast: the public nature of the workplace, the increased opportunities for surveillance in the workplace of people by the authorities, and the presence in the workplace of many unsympathetic Russians and Ukrainians. Whereas 71 percent of the respondents said that most (50 percent or higher) of their personal friends were Jewish, in the workplace non-Jewish workers made up most of the workforce 86 percent of the time, according to the respondents themselves.

Many of the respondents chose to talk with confidence to a person at work because the co-worker was also a good Jewish friend. But one could not always be sure of such things because, as one respondent put it, "a lot of Jews are Communists, too!" Almost all of the respondents showed a high degree of caution about the workplace because informers and provocateurs were presumed to be present. Several respondents offered the going assumption that one out of every ten workers performed such functions for the KGB. Another said that the ratio could be higher, perhaps one in five in high-level scientific or research institutions. Some respondents did not talk politics at all in the workplace because they felt an honest disinterest in the subject. Another reported, "I worked all day from 9 a.m. to 7 p.m. each day. I had enough to do without making idle talk." But many said that they

could, and would, talk "politics" (meaning news from unofficial sources, jokes and anecdotes about government and party leaders, etc.) on the job, depending on the type of politics at issue, the identity of the other discussants, and whether or not they might be overheard:

I could talk to some of the Russians at work about the general political situation, but I could not talk to them about Israel. These are two different things.

My Russian friends said that since I was in the Soviet Union I should believe what the Russian press said, not foreign radio. But, it was a friendly sort of thing. My Russian friends were well-educated. They knew that their press lied but they still believed it.

The "crap" the Soviet press puts out does alienate quite a few people. If someone were to repeat something from the [Soviet] press that was "crap," you might see a little smile from some of my friends. Maybe there would be a wink, but no words. It is still real communication though, as if to say, "That crap is just not worth any discussion."

In our plant there was no special place where we could talk. Sometimes just at lunch over the table. Sometimes in back of the machines when they were running.

Russians at work would listen to VOA and ask me if I heard the news? I would always answer, "No." I may have to work, but I do not have to talk.

Above are some of the comments of respondents who tended to show average amounts of discretion and caution about communicating information from unofficial sources in the workplace. Other respondents were either bolder themselves or were in a position at work to see others who were.

I worked in the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] organization. I had to be careful about expressing myself on political matters. But I worked with some clever Russians who also had their own point of view.

I could talk to them about politics, even some who were party careerists. In 1968, when the army went into Czechoslovakia, one of these young men said to me, "you see, my friend, it is because Russian must have safe borders." I responded, "Where does this border have to be, at the Atlantic Ocean?"

Everyone drinks. You can speak out and abuse the government just as long as they can say you were drunk. If an officer in the Soviet army does not get drunk and abuse the government, his name is in a special file. He is automatically suspected of being a spy or part of some subversive organization.

Everyone is dissatisfied. Especially workers. It is expected and understood. You can talk about the failures of society, but just don't say you heard about it on VOA.

I was a school teacher. We were talking about the [Yom Kippur] war. One of my students, a thirteen-year old boy, stood up and said that the reporting was different in the Soviet press and on VOA. He must have been listening with his parents. On that day, the director of the school was observing me. After class he ordered me to tell the boy that he could no longer listen to VOA because it was from a capitalist country and was not capable of telling the truth.

I talked about the war all the time with my co-workers who were Jewish--especially when we were at the collective farm. There was nothing else to do.

Respondents were asked to consider their attitude toward discussing news from unofficial sources with acquaintances or casual friends. Use of the term "friend" in this context required some explanation to some of the respondents. As one respondent put it, "In Russia, there is family, there are friends, and then there is everyone else." But the issue was clearly understood in terms of acquaintanceship--a person met for only the second or third time at a party, or in a school class, or as the new neighbor in the apartment house. The point was to determine to what degree the private zone might

extend itself to interpersonal situations in which the political disposition of the other person is not automatically suspect, but neither can it be known with any degree of certainty. The data in table 33 suggests that most of the respondents approached acquaintances with interest, but with a great deal of caution.

Table 33

"Did You Discuss News from Foreign Radio
with Casual Friends or Acquaintances?"

	Count	Percentage
Always	2	2.0
Mostly	3	2.9
Sometimes	17	16.7
Seldom	23	22.5
Never	42	41.7
Not listening to foreign radio	15	14.7
No Response	2	--
	104	100.0

Since over 50 percent of the respondents "seldom" or "never" discussed the war news from foreign radio with acquaintances, it would seem that the private zone would not normally include people in this category. Most of the respondents indicated that they would be naturally suspicious of any outgoing, overly-talkative person. If an acquaintance were to be introduced to the respondent by a trusted mutual

friend, then the suspicion might be lessened. Otherwise, though, discretion would be the order of the day:

The best thing to do under this kind of situation is to keep your mouth shut. Let the other person offer his views first. His views might be more or less dissident than your own. If his views were more dissident than yours, or at least equally dissident, then you might feel safe about talking to him. But this still could be a provocation.

Some respondents were categorical in their unwillingness to talk about the war, or matters relating to Israel with acquaintances because they found it difficult or distasteful to engage in the kind of verbal shadow boxing the previous respondent said was necessary:

I just was never in the mood to talk politics with people I did not know well because until you know them, it is like talking to the wall.

Ninety-nine percent of the time, if someone does not know you, you will be told only what he thinks you want to hear.

Others found it less difficult to talk about political matters with acquaintances but they would reveal only facts or points of view which had been well disseminated in the official Soviet press:

I never want to be on record with anyone I do not know well that I am a listener to foreign radio. Today it may be no problem for people to know this about you. But ten years from now, a Stalin may be in power and I will be in big trouble for something meaningless which happened ten years earlier. You just never know and you can't be too careful. They keep such records forever.

You don't talk too loosely about VOA and such things, except with the closest friends--not because they may think you are anti-Soviet (they may be more anti-Soviet than you are)--but because you do not

want to get a reputation as a careless talker.
If you do, no one will ever tell you anything
worth knowing.

But some respondents indicated that there were circumstances under which they could be fooled. During the Yom Kippur War, the Moscow synagogue became a gathering point for Jews who wished to share the latest information about the war, discuss emigration, trade jokes and anecdotes or discuss other political matters. The authorities were aware of these activities and sent informers and provocateurs to mingle with the crowd outside the synagogue. One respondent, a young college student at the time, was part of the crowd and he found himself provoked into speaking "anti-Soviet slander."

I met a man at the synagogue. He said he was from Kishinev in Moscow on business. We talked about some political things, not many. Later, somebody called my university and asked for information about me. The man at the university who took the call happened to be a friend of my father. He told my father, and my father told me that I should not go to the synagogue for a while if I wanted to get my university diploma.

This respondent allowed that he had learned an important lesson. But as an intelligent and friendly man, he felt that the solution to his problem was not to stop meeting people and attempting to make new friends, but learn how to "read" people better. A number of other respondents felt the same way and offered thoughts on how to tell if an acquaintance or stranger was actually an informer or provocateur. Several remarked that an acquaintance who has a good sense of humor might be a good bet as a safe person to talk to about politics or the news from unofficial sources:

Ask the person a question such as, "So, where are you from?" He might say, "Irkutsk." Then you respond, "So how is the food situation out there?" If he says, "Great! It couldn't be better," or "Terrible! Those damn Communists are starving us to death!" then you should just talk about the weather with this person. But he might answer your question with "Great! Last month I only had to wait two hours for sausage and they even had two kinds!" or with "Great! There were no lines at all last month. Of course all the stores were closed because they were empty!" If a person shows this kind of humor, you might be able to talk to him about things that really matter.

Another respondent, a self-described "dissident"

(referring to his own political activities before he left for the Soviet Union) felt that he had a "trained eye" when it came to spotting people who were most likely to be safe to talk with about matters such as the latest news from foreign radio. The first good sign, he said, was if the other person was Jewish:

Jews in Russia are not normally conformists. A conformist is the person who will turn you in, not the non-conformist. So, look for a person who expresses himself in an original way. For example, the Theory of Evolution is gospel in the Soviet Union. If a person were to say that he questioned any part of it, he is probably not someone who would turn you in for saying you heard something on foreign radio. . . . If a person shows signs of material success in life, if he wears fashionable western clothes or a smart western watch, be careful what you say. Such people are conformists and will probably turn you in. . . . The true "anti-Soviet" person seems to have an "insolent" look in the eye. This is a person who looks like he is feeling the pressure of having to live his life in the Soviet Union. This person looks ready to challenge, to question. You could probably talk to this person. . . .

It would seem, then, that casual friends and acquaintances can only be considered part of the private zone when

the individual is satisfied that a person is reliable according to standards which he alone can set for himself. Some people seem to be quicker than others to come to a conclusion that a given person is reliable. A substantial portion of the respondents, 42 percent, indicated that they "never" discussed news from foreign radio about the war with any casual friend or acquaintance. These respondents are probably representative of the Soviet Jews who have the highest degree of caution and the strictest standards for judging reliability. Another 23 percent of the respondents reported that they "seldom" discussed war news from foreign radio with acquaintances. Since 65 percent of the respondents fall into these two most restrictive categories, restrictive in the sense of willingness to communicate information from unofficial sources, it would seem that the outer reaches of the private zone fall somewhere short of including the ring composed of casual friends and acquaintances.

The data in table 34 show the degree of continuing caution exercised by the respondents in the handling of their communications matters with people outside of the private zone. In this case, respondents were asked to consider how willingly they discussed news about the war with strangers--people met for the first time and about whom nothing was known. Such encounters might occur on a train or airplane trip, on a vacation at a resort or rest camp, or in a city park next to home.

Table 34

"Did You Discuss News from Foreign
Radio with Strangers?"

	Count	Percentage
Always	0	0.0
Mostly	1	1.0
Sometimes	4	4.0
Seldom	6	5.9
Never	75	74.3
Not listening to foreign radio	15	14.9
No Response	<u>3</u>	<u>--</u>
Total	104	100.0

The very few respondents who indicated any willingness to talk about the news from foreign radio with strangers reported that they did so because of highly individualistic reasons:

I was free to speak openly, more or less, because I was involved in absolutely no illegal commercial activities (speculation, bribing, hoarding, exchanging favors, etc.) as were many people I knew well. If I were going to get into trouble, it would be for selling American blue jeans on the black market, not for talking about the news on foreign radio.

There is no reason to be silent or to worry about provocateurs. If they want to put me in jail, they will just do it. Why worry about it?

It is impossible to disguise yourself and your true feelings from all the people you might meet. People tend to want to share their sorrows with me. I must have a sympathetic face.

But many more respondents indicated that restraint and discretion were the general rule in making comments in front of

strangers and in hearing such comments from unknown persons:

Sometimes on a train going to the country or some other remote location a person will make an anti-Soviet remark because he is getting off at the next stop. But if you look, you will see all the other passengers with their heads bowed, trying to look like they did not hear.

Once, I was standing in line for hours to buy chicken. They ran out just before I got into the store. I said out loud, "Crazy Russian government, can't even feed people chicken!" People looked at me and were afraid. I even scared myself.

In chapter 4, reference was made to recent developments in Soviet criminal law and procedure which suggest that there have been certain developments since the mid-1960s in the area of social control in the Soviet Union. Though the substance of his general thesis is new and not accepted by Soviet specialists, it may be worthwhile nevertheless to recall what Professor Hough had to write about this issue. He had attempted to chart the course of the "fuzzy line" which separated acceptable from unacceptable speech as far as the regime was concerned in the 1970s. He classified as "acceptable" in the eyes of the regime the telling of political jokes, complaining about inefficiency in the supply system, even repeating "VOA accusations" if it was not done for the purpose of subverting the Soviet system as a whole. This posed in my mind a rhetorical question: What, in fact, can the average Soviet person get away with in terms of his own communications activities; how far can he go in obtaining and disseminating information from unofficial sources such as foreign radio? I posed this

question directly to some of the respondents. For most, the rule of thumb was to say nothing that might be in any way controversial in front of a stranger. For others, saying more was possible:

You can say things like, "I don't like our international political policy. We give too much away." Or you can even say, "We should support Israel more and the Arabs less." But you can only criticize, never blame. You can criticize in the form of a joke, or an anecdote or an indirect comment. But you can never say that the whole system just is not working and say who is responsible for the mess. You cannot blame the failure of the system on anybody, especially not on the Party or the party leadership.

You can say that Brezhnev is stupid, Khrushchev was a fool and Stalin was a beast. But you can never say that [President] Carter is better than any of them.

Many of the respondents seemed quick to offer that simply listening to VOA, or most of the other foreign radio stations, no longer seems to automatically land someone in jail or earn them an interview with the KGB. Respondents recalled incidents where they heard VOA programming coming from open windows and when one man was in the hospital recovering from an operation, he heard VOA for hours at a time coming from some unseen location elsewhere in the ward. Young people were seen in public carrying portable radios tuned to rock music programming on VOA as early as 1968. Portable radios tuned to foreign stations have been played openly in front of strangers on the beach at resorts on the Black Sea. Apparently, listening to foreign radio for one's personal use today carries no official sanction for most people. One respondent had an interesting experience in this context:

In our building, a local Communist Party big-shot lived directly above us and a local KGB big-shot directly to the side. My son used to listen to the foreign stations all the time and I would say to him, "Shut the door. They will hear it!" One day, my son did not shut the door. He just said instead: "Father, it makes no difference. They have better radios than we have, and I can hear VOA better from their radios than our's."


But almost all of the respondents agreed that it was a far different matter to make political conversation with a stranger in which one reveals non-conformist tendencies or interests. Another respondent, who admitted that he broke one of his own strongest rules on the subject, learned the nature of the risk one takes in talking to strangers:

I was making a train trip to Moscow to apply for exit visas for myself and my family. I was sitting next to a high-level engineer from [name of city deleted] who was Jewish and going to Moscow for some important meeting. We got to talking about Jewish matters and I told him of my plan to go to the Netherlands embassy to process our applications to leave. I told him that I had my son's diploma as a mathematician in hope that this would help us get out. When we arrived in Moscow hours later, a KGB man met me at the train and simply asked for my son's diploma. They held it while I went to apply for the visas and gave it back to me when I returned to the station to go home. But it all could have been much worse.

The data in table 35 attempt to summarize and depict graphically the most important information contained in tables 30 through 34. The median score is used to provide a measure of response, low to high, corresponding with how willingly the respondents collectively communicated news from an unofficial source (foreign radio) about a specific event (the Yom Kippur War) in five cases involving separate categories of people. Each of the five categories--family, friends,

Table 35

Median Scores--Discussion Variables as
a Function of the Private Zone



co-workers, acquaintances and strangers--is meant to represent a measure of distance from the individual when these categories are considered in sequence starting with family. It can be seen that somewhere between the categories of friends and co-workers, the degree of willingness to communicate unofficial information shifts decidedly in the direction of caution and discretion. But when the same kind of act occurs between family and friends, the emphasis seems to be on openness and trust. In this sense, it appears that the private zone, measured by how willingly the respondents discussed information from an unofficial source about the war, did certainly not extend out past the category (or ring) of co-workers, and with many of the respondents it probably did not extend beyond the select company of a few good friends. In these people, the power of the ethnic element appears to have been particularly strong.

There may be some good reasons why the private zone appears to extend out as far as the dimension of co-workers in some cases. These reasons will be considered more deeply below. But, at the moment, there seems to be little doubt why the private zone appears to fade out with Soviet Jews in the same vicinity. The legacy of the Terror, the Doctor's Plot, the 1958-1962 campaign against "economic crime," and the mushrooming of anti-semitism in the wake of the 1967 Six-Day Middle East War have conspired to make Soviet Jews security conscious when dealing in matters of personal communication.

It seemed worthwhile to try to determine how much the respondents had experienced adverse contact with the authorities over unofficial communications, both first hand or by association with a family member, friend or co-worker. The idea was to get a feeling for the nature of the pressures the regime may have placed on the individual over the years, pressures which might have acted to curtail either the private zone, or the activities within it.

For the purpose of differentiation, the question was divided into halves. First, respondents were asked if they, or anyone else to their personal knowledge, had experienced adverse contact with the authorities for acquiring or communicating information from an unofficial source during the period of time between the 1967 Six-Day Middle East War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This "crime" was defined for the respondents as including such acts as listening to foreign radio, repeating news from foreign radio, telling political jokes or anecdotes, writing a letter containing an "anti-Soviet" statement or remark, signing a petition of protest, engaging in any kind of demonstration not sponsored by the regime, and so on. The meaning of "adverse contact" will become clear in the context below. Since some of the respondents had made plans to leave the Soviet Union by 1973, or were gone within a year or two afterwards, the period involving the Yom Kippur War is the latest one that the respondents could reflect upon as a group. The second half of the

question involved the same issue, but related to a different time period--the one involving the entirety of a respondent's life in the Soviet Union, up to, but not beyond, the time of the 1967 war. The idea here was to obtain two measures of how extensively the coercive power of the regime had been exercised in the area of personal and political communication. The reasons why the year 1967 was chosen to mark the dividing line between the two periods will be mentioned in detail below.

Respondents dealing with the first half of the question generally found that they were hard pressed to come up with first-hand evidence of adverse contact with the authorities over communications matters between 1967 and 1973. Of the 104 respondents, only 10 (12.2 percent) could remember the details of an event. But many more were certain that even though they could not cite evidence of people getting into trouble for speaking out, or behaving in a non-conformist fashion, they were positive that it could happen. As one respondent put it, "Just because you don't read about these things in the newspaper does not mean they don't happen." Evidently, what evidence of adverse contact did get out was helpful in instilling a good deal of caution in Soviet Jews:

During 1968, I made a joke that I was a "brother" of Moshe Dayan in the sense that all Jews are brothers. I also said that Gold Meir was my "aunt." The next morning I was called to the office of the local party organization. After the "investigation," I lost my job and all my pay for six weeks. I was ordered to remain in town so they could keep an eye on me.

A girl, a music student in my conservatory, danced with some of the Jewish people who were dancing in front of the synagogue. She was photographed and later expelled from the conservatory.

In 1968, there were two young men who were local Komsomol leaders, each about 25 years old. One was Jewish, one Russian. Both of them had been reading Marx and Lenin very closely and had begun to develop doubts about Communism (that it was old fashioned, obsolete, etc.). Since they were Komsomol leaders, they had an audience to which they expressed their doubts. The Jew was sent to jail for three years. The other man was not there when they came to arrest him. We think that he escaped. Since he was Russian, they probably just forgot about him.

There were some teenage boys who were children of the faculty members at our institute. One year, exactly on May 1st, two of them hung a black flag (as opposed to a red one) from the top of the institute. The father of one of the boys, who was a professor, was fired. I do not know what happened to the boy.

In 1973, I was a soldier stationed in the army at [a remote location in Asia]. At a political agitation meeting, one of our soldiers who had been listening to Chinese radio in the Russian language repeated to the political officer some of the anti-Soviet propaganda he had heard. We were only about 200 miles from the China border and the officer was furious. He reprimanded the soldier in front of all of us and ordered him not to do it again. Then the soldier was given extra duty (KP) in the kitchen as punishment.

In 1968 or 1969, I went on a vacation trip to Poland. When I returned to work a woman there asked me, "How did you like the trip?" I responded "I want to go back to Poland," meaning to say that I had a good time on my vacation. I was reported [by her?] to the "special office" for saying that life in Poland was far freer and better than in Russia. The man at the special office told me that "You must never say what you don't like about this country. You could be sent to prison. Now you must thank me for keeping you from getting into big trouble in the future."

My job was on a small fishing ship. It was an old, dirty, slow and smelly ship. We never fished far outside the inland waters of Russia. As a Jew, I did not think that I would ever be assigned to one

of the newer, bigger, more comfortable fishing ships. The new ships are often assigned to fish in the Atlantic and sometimes they make calls at western ports. Sometimes, if you work on one of these ships you can buy foreign goods or get dollars [hard currency] to buy foreign goods in Russia. Russians who had sailed in the Atlantic, and who listened to VOA told political anecdotes [and the like], were punished by being re-assigned to my ship. I never listened to VOA in my life and was already there.

When I was in the army in 1973, one time I was listening to a Ukrainian language program on Radio Canada. Somebody turned me in. I could have gone to jail. I was ordered to report to a major in "Department Number Eight [Secret Service]," and he talked to me for hours and hours. I tried to stall--to be ambiguous. But he had my file in front of him; he had my whole life story. He saw that I had only A's in school and I guess he decided that I was not a truly bad man. In the end, he allowed me to write a letter of explanation to the commander. He suggested that I say that I had been misguided when I was a listener to foreign radio, and that I had learned that I was wrong, and that I would never do it again; that I fully believed in the Communist Party and would behave by all the rules in the future. I think the major was happy with this simple solution. But I could have gone to jail. The papers were ready. . . .

There seem to be several themes running through this testimony about the 1967-1973 time period. First, the authorities seem quick to respond to unmistakable evidence of listening to foreign radio and talking about it publicly, or expressing jokes, anecdotes or other evidence of non-conformist sentiment in an overly public forum or manner. (No one during this period seems to have been compromised by a family member or friend. Only once does it appear that someone might have been turned in by a co-worker.) Secondly, the authorities seem quick to reprimand, scold, threaten and implore people to behave, but there seems to be limited

evidence that serious punishment (such as a jail term) was regularly handed out. Thirdly, when punishment was administered for engaging in an "anti-Soviet" act of communication, it seemed to go much harder on Jews than non-Jews. One respondent felt that he had a comprehensive view on these matters. Perhaps his view puts the 1967-1973 period into a helpful perspective:

There are no firm rules about these matters--what you can do and what you can get away with. But my friends and I operated under the following assumptions: You can listen to foreign radio for your own use. It is no problem. But if you have relatives in another country, or you try to contact foreign visitors and you listen to foreign radio, then they will put you under surveillance. If you continue your activities, they will call you in and threaten you with the consequences. Only one in one hundred has the courage to continue after this point. Some do. They continue to talk to foreigners, talk about the news from foreign radio, read Time magazine, and so on. At this point they put you away [in jail]. It's a form of suicide. You have to be very strong and believe in what you are doing. . . .

Respondents were asked to deal with the second half of the question concerning adverse contact with the authorities over personal communications matters and related issues. In the second half, they were asked to consider the period of time before the 1967 war, all the way back as far as they could remember. When one considers that this period is likely to include the Terror, the Doctor's Plot and the 1958-1962 campaign against "economic crime," it does not seem surprising that so many of the respondents reported that they had experienced adverse contact first hand or by association with a family member, friend or co-worker. Of the 104 respondents, 50 (49.5) reported such contact:

In 1938, my father-in-law was arrested and killed. He had been a student in Germany in 1918 and this was taken as evidence that he was against the Communist Party.

In 1938, my aunt went to a concentration camp. She never had the faintest idea why she was arrested and held for eight years.

In 1938, my uncle was a party member and general manager of a big factory. He was held in a camp for several months. There were no charges. All his teeth were knocked out. They were trying to get him to confess to something. He never had any idea what this was

In 1952-1953, when Stalin was still alive, we listened to foreign radio with closed doors and were very careful. I was very young, but I know that I never heard a political anecdote until after Stalin died.

In 1952, my friend was arrested. He was charged with three things: "Listening to the Voice of America," "Liking Kipling [the British writer]," and "Waiting for American Bombers." He was sent to prison for four years.

In 1950 or 1951, I had a cousin who was a college student at the time. They thought he told a joke. There was a portrait of Stalin at the university which was hanging crooked on the wall. He said out loud, "Look! Stalin is hanging wrong!" He meant that someone should come and straighten the picture. But someone reported him for saying that Stalin should be hanging, not as a portrait on the wall, but as a real man with a rope around his neck. This is just an average story for that time. My cousin got eight years.

Specific first-hand recollections about adverse contact with the authorities, in particular over communications issues, became less numerous as the respondents considered the years after the death of Stalin. However, the penalties for non-conformism did not necessarily become less severe:

Sometime in the late 50s or 60s, a girl I knew got fired because she had been typing copies of Exodus for distribution to people who wanted to take the risk of reading it. Her uncle turned her in to the KGB. She refused to tell them who she had been typing it for.

In the early 1960s, I had a friend who talked too much in an anti-Soviet way. He was sent to a psychiatric ward. As a psychologist, I felt that when he got out, he was positively schizophrenic. It must have been the medication. They kept him there for three years.

In 1964, Khrushchev changed the price of meat. My friend put a placard of protest on his back. He got only two blocks before he was arrested. He was a talented young engineer who was sent to exile in Middle Asia for ten years. He lost his career, his wife divorced him, and he became an alcoholic.

The year 1967 was chosen to mark the dividing line between the two period for several reasons. First, some line had to be drawn if any basis for comparison within the body of the political communication experience of the respondents was to be established. Secondly, 1966 was the year that Siniavsky and Daniel received sharp prison sentences for violating Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Article 190-1 was also introduced in 1966, and as I discussed in chapter 4, this development seems to be indicative of a certain change in the legal-procedural approach of the regime to matters of social control. By 1967, this change may have taken hold and have been contributing to a certain "loosening" of controls within portions of the Soviet political communications environment relating to the private zone. Thirdly, 1967 was the year of Israel's greatest military victory and the year that the current wave of Soviet Jewish emigration began. Both

events seemed to contribute to a rise in anti-semitism in the Soviet Union, and this rise might have contributed to repression of the unauthorized political communications activities of Soviet Jews were it not for the apparent fact that the legal-procedural developments mentioned above were in the process of taking hold in the post-1966 time period. In other words, except for the emergence of the private zone in the post-1966 period, Soviet Jews may have had at least as much adverse contact with the authorities over political communications matters after 1966 as before. But, the testimony above seems to show that this was not the case. For the Soviet political communications environment in general, and the private zone activities of Soviet Jews in particular, the year 1967 seems to have been a watershed.

Of course, the authorities showed high sensitivity to acts of "anti-Soviet" political communication both before and after 1967, but they seemed quicker to punish non-conformists with instantaneous jail terms, internal exile and physical maltreatment before 1967 than after. Death, as the ultimate penalty, was not out of the question in either case, but it seems to have been a more likely punishment in the earlier period. And the possibility of being betrayed or denounced by a family member or friend seems to have been higher in the earlier period because so many more people had family members and friends subjected to more extreme forms of adverse contact. Naturally, all of these generalizations

are made with the greatest caution. They have been drawn from the experiences of only 104 people who belong to only one Soviet nationality group. The matter is further complicated by the fact that many of my respondents were under thirty years of age. As a result, first-hand and mature recollections of conditions in the Soviet political communications environment before 1967 are less abundant than those relating to the period after 1967.

But it still seems fair to suggest that there is a correlation between the apparently less intense, marginally less coercive attitude of the authorities in the post-1966 period toward communication of information from unofficial sources and the apparent expansion of the private zone outwards from the vicinity of the individual to the vicinity of co-workers by the time of the early 1970s. To the degree that the private zone may actually have expanded since that day in 1932 when Pavlik Morozov turned in his father for hoarding grain, it may have grown in some part because of a certain evolution in the attitude of the authorities toward the handling of matters of social control. But there seems to be no mystery why the private zone, as of the early 1970s, appears to extend out no further than the dimension of co-workers. The experience of the respondents during all of the trying times, both before, during and after 1967, seems to have been too dark for them to have permitted themselves to be comfortable in more than marginal increases in the scope of their

own unofficial communication activities--this, no matter what changes in the attitude of the authorities may have occurred.

CHAPTER 12

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AND THE PRIVATE ZONE

It has been postulated that the presence and scope of the private zone may vary according to the demographic characteristics of the respondents, and the general characteristics of the population from which they have come. At the start of part II, these respondent demographics were presented in tables 12 through 22 and it was advanced that the respondents are reasonably representative of the Soviet Jewish population. The data in table 35 summarizes the evidence supporting the case that the private zone exists among these respondents, at least to a given extent. The data in tables 36 through 40 below are included to amplify and expand this evidence. They have been produced by crosstabulating the demographic variables of age, sex, place of residence (Asian, heartland, or western), educational level (low, medium, or high), and occupation (technical intelligentsia, non-technical intelligentsia, non-intelligentsia) all with the discussion variables associated with the dimensions of the private zone: family, friends, co-workers, acquaintances and strangers.

The amplified and expanded evidence produced by these crosstabulations seems to suggest some interesting variations in the presence and extent of the private zone according to demography.

The data in table 36 demonstrate that the presence of the private zone seems to vary among the respondents according to age. Of the 104 respondents, between 15 to 18 are not reflected in this table because they were not listening to foreign radio at the time of the war, or they did not respond for some other reason such as "don't know," "don't remember." Thus, N varies from between 84 and 88 respondents depending on the dimension of discussion considered. Almost all the respondents, of all age groups, agreed that they "always" discussed the news about the war on foreign radio with family and quite a few of all ages also were "mostly" comfortable discussing this information with friends. At the other end of the response scale, age also does not seem to be a factor in whether respondents were more likely or not to report that they "never" discussed this information with strangers. Members of all age groups seem especially cautious with strangers. But when we focus on the middle dimension of co-workers, the dimension where the private zone seems to taper off, there is clear differentiation of response on the basis of age.

The first thing to note in this regard is that no respondent in the 51+ age group offered that he ever talked

Table 36
Discussion Variables by Age

Count Column Pct. Age group	Dimension of Discussion														
	Family			Friends			Co-Workers			Acquaintances			Strangers		
	20-40	41-50	51+	20-40	41-50	51+	20-40	41-50	51+	20-40	41-50	51+	20-40	41-50	51+
Always	34 89.5	35 94.6	10 90.9	24 61.5	21 56.8	8 66.7	2 5.3	4 10.8	0 0.0	1 2.6	1 2.7	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0
Mostly	2 5.3	1 2.7	1 9.1	10 25.6	11 29.9	4 33.3	9 23.7	4 10.8	0 0.0	2 5.1	1 2.7	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 2.7	0 0.0
Sometimes	2 5.3	1 2.7	0 0.0	3 7.7	4 10.8	0 0.0	10 26.3	10 27.0	4 36.4	8 20.4	8 21.6	1 9.1	2 5.3	2 5.4	0 0.0
Seldom	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	2 5.1	1 2.7	0 0.0	6 15.8	9 24.3	1 9.1	13 33.3	9 24.3	1 9.1	4 10.5	1 2.7	1 9.1
Never	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	11 28.9	10 27.0	6 54.5	15 38.5	18 48.6	19 81.8	32 84.2	33 89.2	10 90.9
Column Count	38	37	11	39	37	12	38	37	11	39	37	11	38	37	11
Row Pct of Col Count	44.2	43.0	12.8	44.3	42.0	13.6	44.2	43.0	12.8	44.8	42.5	12.6	44.2	43.0	12.8
N=	86			88			86			87			86		

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"always" or "mostly" with co-workers. By contrast, 29 percent of the 20-40 year olds and 20 percent of the 41-50 year old group respectively responded that they "always" or "mostly" talked with co-workers. Over 50 percent of the 51+ group, responding about co-workers, indicated that they "never" talked with them as opposed to 29 and 27 percent of the other two younger groups respectively. The higher apparent level of caution among members of the oldest group seem to be repeated in the dimension of acquaintances. Once again, no member of the oldest group offered that he ever talked "always" or "mostly" with acquaintances and fully 81 percent of the oldest group said they "never" talked with acquaintances about the war news from foreign radio. By contrast, a few of the two younger groups did say that they talked "always" or "mostly" with acquaintances about foreign radio and less than 50 percent (39 and 49 percent respectively) indicated that they "never" talked with acquaintances.

As described earlier in this chapter, the age grouping used in this table reflects relative years of life experience in the Soviet Union under Stalin. No member of the 20-40 age group was older than 13 years when Stalin died. Evidence from the comments made by respondents in this group indicates that, even as children, many of them were deeply affected by the Stalinist atmosphere in the early development of their attitudes toward official and unofficial communications. However, the same kind of evidence seems to indicate

that members of the two older groups were even more deeply and personally affected. Members of the middle group, 41-50 years old in 1980, were 14-23 years old when Stalin died and members of the oldest (51+) group were between the ages of 24 and 53. It would seem rather clear from the data in table 36 that age is a factor in whether a person is likely or not to feel the presence around himself of the private zone. In younger people, caution and discretion in the handling of unofficial communications seems to set in later and in the most distant interpersonal situations than appears to be the case with older persons. In members of the oldest group, openness and trust seem more clearly restricted to the closer interpersonal contact of family and friends.

Table 37 presents the data produced by crosstabulating the discussion variables by the sexes of the respondents. Once again, there are some differences in response which suggest that the presence of the private zone may vary among men and women. Respondents of all ages tended to share information from the unofficial source of foreign radio freely with family and friends and sparingly, or not at all with strangers, and this pattern seems also to occur among respondents on the basis of sex. However, once again, the differentiation is to be found within the dimension of co-workers and acquaintances. With co-workers, men seem to be somewhat more free in their discussion of the war news from foreign radio than are women with theirs. Fifty-six percent

Table 37
Discussion Variables by Sex

Count Column Pct. Sex	Dimension of Discussion									
	Family		Friends		Co-Workers		Acquaintances		Strangers	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Always	53 89.8	26 96.3	39 63.9	14 51.9	5 8.2	1 4.0	2 3.3	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0
Mostly	4 6.8	0 0.0	15 24.6	10 37.0	10 16.4	3 12.0	3 4.9	0 0.0	1 1.7	0 0.0
Sometimes	2 3.4	1 3.7	4 6.6	3 11.1	20 32.8	4 16.0	12 19.7	5 19.9	4 6.7	0 0.0
Seldom	0 0.0	0 0.0	3 4.9	0 0.0	13 21.3	3 12.0	18 29.5	5 19.2	4 6.7	2 7.7
Never	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	13 21.3	14 56.0	26 42.6	16 61.5	51 85.0	24 92.3
Column Count	59	27	61	27	61	25	61	26	60	26
Row Pct of Column Count	68.6	31.4	69.3	30.7	70.9	29.1	70.1	29.9	69.9	30.2
N =	86		88		86		87		86	

of the women responding said that they would "never" discuss news from foreign radio, as opposed to only 21 percent of the men who said "never." In the dimension of acquaintances, 62 percent of the women said "never," as opposed to only 43 percent of the men who said "never." This kind of evidence would seem to suggest that the private zone extends out slightly further for men than women when this question and this type of measurement scheme is used. With men, caution and discretion seem to set in at a slightly later point than they do with women. Women seem to show less openness and trust than men about co-workers, the workplace in general, and with acquaintances found in all locations.

Table 38 presents the data obtained by crosstabulating the discussion variables with the geographic origin of the respondents. Once again, it should be mentioned that all of the crosstabulations represent the views of 84 to 88 of the 104 respondents because a few did not respond in some dimensions of response or were not listeners to foreign radio at all in October 1973. In the table, "A" stands for "Asian" Jews (including respondents originating in Georgia), "H" for "heartlander," and "W" for "western." These designations are those which Professor Gitelman used to group his 1976 respondents on the basis of geographical origin. "Heartland" Jews are those emigrating from areas of the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics which have been under nominal Soviet control since 1917. Western Jews, or "westerners" are those

Table 38

Discussion Variables by Geographical Region of Origin in the USSR*

Column Column Pct Region	Dimension of Discussion														
	Family			Friends			Co-Workers			Acquaintances			Strangers		
	A	H	W	A	H	W	A	H	W	A	H	W	A	H	W
Always	3 100.0	63 92.6	13 86.7	2 66.7	40 56.3	11 78.6	0 0.0	5 7.4	1 6.7	0 0.0	1 1.4	1 6.7	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0
Mostly	0 0.0	4 5.9	0 0.0	1 33.3	22 31.0	2 14.3	1 33.3	8 11.8	4 26.7	0 0.0	2 2.9	1 6.7	0 0.0	1 1.5	0 0.0
Sometimes	0 0.0	1 1.5	2 13.2	0 0.0	6 8.5	1 7.1	0 0.0	20 29.4	4 26.7	1 33.3	14 20.3	2 13.3	0 0.0	4 5.9	0 0.0
Seldom	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	3 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	13 19.1	3 20.0	0 0.0	20 29.0	3 20.0	1 33.3	5 7.4	0 0.0
Never	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	2 66.7	22 32.4	3 20.0	2 66.7	32 46.4	8 53.4	2 66.7	58 85.3	15 100.0
Column Count	3	68	15	3	71	14	3	68	15	3	69	15	3	68	15
Row Pct of Col Count	3.5	79.1	17.4	3.4	80.7	15.9	3.5	79.1	17.4	3.4	79.3	17.2	3.5	79.1	17.4
N =		86			88			86			87			86	

*A stands for "Asian," including respondents originating in Georgia;
H stands for "Heartland";
W stands for West.

Jews emigrating from the Baltic republics, the western Ukraine, western Byelorussia and Moldavia--areas which came under Soviet control as late as 1939-1944.

The heavy concentration of heartlanders in the sample makes it a little difficult to differentiate among respondents on the basis of geographical origin. For example, in the bellweather dimension of co-workers, there are sixty-eight heartlanders and only fifteen westerners reporting. Nevertheless, it does seem that westerners might be slightly more comfortable about communicating news from an unofficial source in the workplace than heartlanders. Thirty-three percent of the westerners reported that they "always" or "mostly" discussed news about the war with co-workers as opposed to only 19 percent of the heartlanders who reported that they did so "always" or "mostly." Similarly, only 40 percent of the westerners said that they discussed the war news from foreign radio "seldom" or "never" with co-workers as opposed to 52 percent of the heartlanders who said they did so "seldom" or "never." However, westerners seem more reticent about discussing this kind of information with strangers than heartlanders. Eighty-five percent of the heartlanders said that they "never" discussed war news with strangers as opposed to 100 percent of the westerners. It would seem, therefore, that westerners are slightly more at home discussing information from an unofficial source with co-workers and slightly less likely to take a chance on a stranger than a heartlander

might be. Perhaps the later arrival of Soviet control in the western areas, and the fact that heartlanders felt the full force of the Terror, make the westerner feel a little more comfortable about communicating unofficial information in his workplace than the heartlander is in his. Perhaps since so much time had passed since the Terror, and since forceful consolidation of Soviet control in many western areas came some years after that, some heartlanders may have felt a little bolder in recent years about making jokes, complaints and communicating other forms of unofficial information in front of strangers than did westerners. But because the private zone does not seem to extend to the dimension of strangers in any case, and because the westerners seem to be a little more comfortable about communicating unofficial information in the workplace than heartlanders, it would seem that the private zone has a slightly stronger presence among westerners.

The data in table 39 represents the crosstabulation of discussion variables with the relative educational levels of the respondents. As a whole, the respondents were a highly educated group. Most possessed the equivalent of an undergraduate or higher degree. Respondents with less than thirteen years--that is, the group with the lowest level of education--seem to show the highest levels of confidence in their family and friends, and at the other end of the discussion scale--strangers. Respondents with the highest

Table 39

Discussion Variables by Educational Level

Count Column Pct Level in Years	Dimension of Discussion														
	Family			Friends			Co-Workers			Acquaintances			Strangers		
	0-12	13-18	19+	0-12	13-18	19+	0-12	13-18	19+	0-12	13-18	19+	0-12	13-18	19+
Always	17 100.0	47 90.4	13 86.7	10 55.6	34 63.0	7 50.0	0 0.0	4 7.7	2 13.3	1 6.3	1 1.9	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0
Mostly	0 0.0	2 3.8	2 13.3	7 38.9	15 27.8	3 21.4	4 23.5	6 11.5	3 20.0	0 0.0	2 3.7	1 6.7	1 5.9	0 0.0	0 0.0
Sometimes	0 0.0	3 5.8	0 0.0	1 5.6	4 7.4	2 14.3	4 29.4	16 30.8	2 13.3	4 25.0	9 16.7	3 20.0	1 5.9	2 3.8	1 6.7
Seldom	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 1.9	2 14.3	1 5.9	10 19.2	4 26.7	4 25.0	16 29.6	2 13.3	2 11.8	4 7.7	0 0.0
Never	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	7 41.2	16 30.8	4 26.7	7 43.8	26 48.1	9 60.0	13 76.5	46 88.5	14 93.3
Column Count	17	52	15	18	54	14	17	52	15	16	54	15	17	52	15
Row Pct of Col Count	20.2	61.9	17.9	20.9	62.8	16.3	20.2	61.9	17.9	18.8	63.5	17.6	20.2	61.9	17.9
N=	84			86			84			85			84		

level of education, nineteen or more years, seem to be the most comfortable about communicating information from an official source in the workplace. Thirteen percent of these respondents with the highest level of education reported that they "always" communicated news about the war from foreign radio with co-workers while no respondent with less than thirteen years education answered "always" in this regard. Perhaps not coincidentally, persons with the least formal education show the highest apparent reluctance to communicate information from an unofficial source in the workplace: 41 percent of the least-educated said they "never" talked to co-workers about the war news from foreign radio as opposed to 31 and 27 percent of the respondents in the next two most highly-educated groups seem to have greater reluctance to communicate information from an unofficial source with acquaintances than persons with the lowest level of education: 60 percent of the respondents with more than nineteen years education said that they would "never" discuss news from foreign radio with an acquaintance as opposed to only 42 percent of the respondents with less than thirteen years who said "never" with an acquaintance.

The data in table 40 seem similar in disposition to that in table 39. The data in the latter table cross-tabulate discussion variables by occupational level: non-intelligentsia (NI), non-technical intelligentsia (NTI) and technical intelligentsia (TI). Not surprisingly, there

Table 40

Discussion of Variables by Occupational Level*

Count Column Pct		Dimension of Discussion														
		Family			Friends			Co-Workers			Acquaintances			Strangers		
Level		NI	NTI	TI	NI	NTI	TI	NI	NTI	TI	NI	NTI	TI	NI	NTI	TI
Always		16 94.1	21 95.5	42 89.4	13 76.5	13 56.5	27 56.4	0 0.0	1 4.5	5 10.6	1 6.3	1 4.5	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0
Mostly		0 0.0	1 4.5	3 6.4	3 17.6	7 30.4	15 31.3	4 23.5	2 9.1	7 14.9	1 6.3	1 4.5	1 2.0	1 6.3	0 0.0	0 0.0
Sometimes		1 5.9	0 0.0	2 4.3	1 5.9	2 8.7	4 8.3	3 17.6	8 36.4	13 27.7	2 12.5	3 13.6	12 24.5	1 6.3	2 9.1	1 2.1
Seldom		0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 4.3	2 4.2	1 5.9	4 18.2	11 23.4	3 18.8	6 27.3	14 28.6	1 6.3	3 13.6	2 4.2
Never		0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	9 52.9	7 31.8	11 23.4	9 56.3	11 50.0	22 44.9	13 81.3	17 77.3	45 93.8
Column Count		17	22	47	17	23	48	17	22	47	16	22	49	16	22	48
Row Pct of Col Count		19.8	25.6	54.7	19.3	26.1	54.5	19.8	25.6	54.7	18.4	25.3	56.3	18.6	25.6	55.8
N=		86			88			86			87			86		

*TI stands for "Technical Intelligentsia"; NTI stands for "Non-technical Intelligentsia"; NI stands for "Non-Intelligentsia."

seems to be a correlation between these occupational levels and the low, medium and high educational levels reflected in table 39. Respondents with NI occupations, as do those with the lowest level of education, seem to have the highest levels of confidence communicating information from an unofficial source with family and friends and the lowest level of confidence in their co-workers. Respondents with NTI, and particularly TI occupations, seem to have a somewhat higher level of confidence in their co-workers than do respondents with NI occupations, as do those with the two highest levels of education. There seem to be a number of reasons why respondents with high education and technical intelligentsia occupations in particular might feel more comfortable about communicating information from an unofficial source in the workplace than those of lower educational and occupational status. These reasons are essentially systemic and group-oriented and they will be addressed in the Conclusion. But for the moment, it does not appear that willingness to communicate information from an unofficial source such as foreign radio is higher among respondents with either high education or technical intelligentsia occupations because the workplace of these respondents are staffed with higher levels of Jewish workers.

Table 41 presents the data obtained by crosstabulating information about the educational levels of the respondents with information about their work environments. Respondents




Table 41

Educational Level by Percentage
of Jews in Workplace

Count Column Pct.	Level in Years		
	0-12	13-18	19+
Mostly Jewish	5 20.8	6 10.3	1 7.1
Mostly Not Jewish	19 79.2	52 89.7	13 92.9
Column Count	24	58	14
Row Pct. of Column Count	25.0	60.4	14.6

were asked, "In October 1973, at your job, university or school, were most of the people who worked (studied) there Jewish or not Jewish?" If less than 50 percent of the persons in the workplace were Jewish, respondents were instructed to answer "mostly not Jewish." Table 42 presents the data obtained by crosstabulating information about the occupational level of the respondents with information about their work environments.

In all cases, the percentage of Jews in the workplace is far less than 50 percent. But the greatest percentage of Jews shows up where respondents with the lowest level of education work (20.8 percent mostly Jewish as opposed to 7.1 percent mostly Jewish in the workplace of the respondents with the highest level of education). Similarly, the

Table 42

Occupational Level by Percentage
of Jews in Workplace

Count Column Pct.	Level		
	NI	NTI	TI
Mostly Jewish	4 17.4	3 12.0	7 14.0
Mostly Not Jewish	19 82.6	22 88.0	43 86.0
Column Count	23	25	50
Row Pct. of Column Count	23.5	25.5	51.0

workplaces of non-intelligentsia respondents have mostly Jewish workers more of the time than the workplaces of NTI and TI respondents (17.4 percent as opposed to 12 and 14 percent respectively). In presenting these data, I do not presume to suggest that the persons with whom the NTI and TI respondents talked candidly in the workplace were invariably, or even normally, non-Jews. But the statistical relationship between lower levels of Jews in the workplace and higher apparent levels of candor in the workplace suggests in the aggregate that the ethnic element which seemed to strongly color the choice of discussion partner in the dimension of friends may be working less strongly in the dimension of co-workers, particularly for NTI and TI respondents. In NTI and TI workplaces, institutional, systemic and

group-oriented considerations may have contributed to higher levels of candor, helping, in turn, to push the private zone to its outer limits. Therefore, we are ready to return to these considerations to conclude this analysis.

CONCLUSION

In chapter 8, I concluded the development of my hypothesis. I contended that there had been, since the death of Stalin, certain developments in the Soviet political communications environment. These developments were believed to be centered within the apparently high levels of interpersonal communication practiced by some groups of Soviet people in recent years. What made this communication noteworthy was that it appeared to be inconsistent, both in content and in execution, with the norms of behavior and the societal goals prescribed by the Party. Since the Party had not relinquished the power to reassert the kind of Stalinist techniques of social control which could have easily curtailed this kind of communication, nor had it apparently changed any of its societal goals or codes of behavior, I contended that the Party had chosen to acquiesce in the fact of these developments for reasons that were unclear and remain so to this point.

Accordingly, I hypothesized that there existed around the average Soviet person a private zone in which he was free,

in practical terms, to communicate information from unofficial sources to people within certain categories of association, without fear of immediate and arbitrary punishment at the hands of the regime. Among these categories of association were members of the person's immediate family, his close friends, and possibly his co-workers. It appeared that news information from foreign radio stations was a popular subject for discussion, and I followed the path of some of this information through the interpersonal communications network of a sample group of former Soviet citizens to determine the presence, boundaries and durability of the private zone.

The results of my investigation seem to show that the private zone was very much present in the political communications environment of my respondent group while they lived in the Soviet Union. The zone clearly encompassed the individual, his family and his good friends. In some of the demographic subgroups, mostly those containing respondents with high levels of education and technical intelligentsia occupations, the zone appeared to stretch out a little further, to include the dimension of co-workers. But in no case did it appear that the private zone encompassed either acquaintances or strangers.

Most of the 1980 respondents appeared to be former members of the new Soviet technical intelligentsia. The fact that they seem to have a private zone which is slightly larger than that of non-technical intelligentsia respondents is theoretically significant in my view. Though members of all

demographic subgroups seemed more willing to discuss news from foreign radio with members of their own ethnic and minority groups rather than with members of the Russian or Ukrainian majority, the bonding effect of this kinship appears to be less strong in the workplaces of technical intelligentsia respondents than in the workplaces of non-technical intelligentsia respondents. A possible explanation for this finding is advanced several paragraphs below.

In chapters 3, 4 and 5, I introduced a number of systemic, institutional and group considerations to set the stage for an excursion into the private zone. Foremost among the systemic considerations were those recounted by Brzezinski and Huntington as growing out of the industrialization and urbanization of modern Soviet society.⁴ Globally, these systemic forces constituted convergence, which was further advanced as giving impetus to certain forms of change in the Soviet Union--change away from political discipline and orthodoxy--change in the direction of industrial pluralism.⁵ Brzezinski and Huntington described this process as one in which the Party is perceived to yield (de facto) some measure of control over the social context of production to the technical experts upon whom it depends, more deeply every year, to carry out its programs of industrial development.

In chapter 5, a number of group considerations were introduced to help explain how the development of a modern technical intelligentsia may have contributed, in recent years,

to a certain departure from political orthodoxy and discipline at the upper levels of Soviet society. Of importance in this discussion were the views of Andrei Amalrik, particularly his notion of the new Soviet "middle class," the "class of specialists." It seemed possible to suggest that members of Amalrik's "middle class" might find the workings of the party-controlled Soviet press to constitute precisely the kind of arbitrary and apparently irrational exercise of power that people with a modern, "technological outlook"⁶ might find anachronistic. I hypothesized that such people would actively seek out information from unofficial, uncontrolled sources such as foreign radio for the purpose of filling the large gaps in the coverage provided by the official media, and for the purpose of making rational comparisons between the two.

The political communications behavior of the respondents as a group clearly confirmed the basic hypothesis: the private zone existed as of the early 1970s and it had verifiable boundaries which varied according to demographic criteria. Since so many of my respondents were former members of the Soviet technical intelligentsia, it seems that the behavior of this demographic subgroup can bear on some of the theoretical questions raised by the systemic, institutional and group considerations introduced in chapters 3, 4 and 5.

The political communication behavior in the private zone of the technical intelligentsia respondents strongly

suggests that Amalrik was correct in his belief that there existed, in the late 1960s, a middle class which was "in [passive] opposition to the bureaucratic elite." Certainly, the high levels of listening to foreign radio stations in 1973 by technical intelligentsia respondents suggests that the party-press which served the bureaucratic elite did not hold the undivided loyalty of an important segment of Soviet society. The strong desire of these respondents to obtain a balanced picture of the world, through access to both foreign and party-controlled news sources, suggests that they did have a modern, "technological outlook," an outlook defined by W. W. Rostow as one in which "standards of efficiency are rationally (as opposed to politically) evolved." In passive opposition to the stated objectives of the regime for the party-press, and in passive opposition to the norms of behavior prescribed by the Party, the presence of the private zone appears to have allowed the respondents, as a group, to acquire and disseminate enough balanced news information to maintain, inwardly at least, a view of an important world event which was rationally evolved and not totally controlled by the regime.

Because they seemed to show less confidence about communicating information from an unofficial source in the workplace, respondents who were not former members of the Soviet technical intelligentsia appeared to have a smaller, less persistent private zone. It would seem that the "technological outlook," which they were less likely to have,

encouraged candor in the workplaces of the technical intelligentsia respondents, and it extended the private zone for these respondents as much as one whole dimension further than the dimension of friends. Ethnicity and kinship appeared to have been major factors encouraging candor in both the dimension of friends and in the dimension of co-workers. But it appears that the bonding effect of the ethnic element worked no more strongly in the dimension of co-workers to encourage candor than did a common technological outlook.

The behavior of the respondents in the private zone may be indicative of a certain change in the social context of production since Stalin--a type of change addressed by Brzezinski and Huntington in their treatment of convergence. Or, it may be that the former members of the technical intelligentsia showed the highest level of confidence in discussing information from an unofficial source in the workplace because they felt the highest degree of sensitivity to a change in the political atmosphere since Stalin, not to any change in the social context of production.

Such a change could easily have been produced by the apparent decision of the regime to curtail the kind of large-scale, extra-legal behavior on the part of the police agencies which was countenanced, if not encouraged, in Stalin's day. Therefore, the private zone may not be a reaction to political change in the direction of industrial pluralism, just a response to an evolution in the party doctrine of social control. This seems to be the most likely impetus for the private zone.

In either case, for these or other reasons, the private zone seems to represent territory where some people were relatively free, as of the early 1970s, to exercise their natural sophistication, awareness and curiosity in ways at variance with the norms of behavior prescribed by the Party. This seems to be a most noteworthy development since it appears to have taken place in a country with a notorious totalitarian record. But there is no guarantee that the private zone has become a permanent feature of the Soviet scene because it does not seem to be firmly linked to any form of fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet political system. Indeed, as of August 1980 and the labor troubles in Poland, large-scale, systematic and continuous jamming of western radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union began again. The private zone may already be history.

Notes

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- ⁵⁰Aspaturian, "Non-Russian," p. 155.
- ⁵¹Svetlana Alliluyeva, Twenty Letters to a Friend (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 161.

⁵²Ronald I. Ruben, ed., The Unredeemed: Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), pp. 29-30.

⁵³Armstrong, Ideology, p. 133.

⁵⁴Martin Gilbert, The Jews of Russia (National Council for Soviet Jewry of the United Kingdom) (Cambridge, England: Burlington Press, 1976), p. 55; and Shaffer, Treatment, pp. 11-12.

⁵⁵Ibid.; and Gerard Israel, The Jews in Russia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), p. 212.

⁵⁶Shaffer, Treatment, p. 13.

⁵⁷Aspaturian, "Non-Russian," p. 155.

⁵⁸Gilbert, Jews, p. 57.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Shaffer, Treatment, p. 19.

⁶¹Gilbert, Jews, p. 59.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Quoted by Deputy USSR Chief Prosecutor, Nikolai Zhogin, in Solomon Rabinovich, Jews in the Soviet Union (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1967), p. 21, in turn quoted from Shaffer, Treatment, p. 29.

⁶⁵For example, see Joseph Brajinsky, "Jews in the USSR--Equals Among Equals," Soviet Life, no. 6 (June 1973), p. 49; "How Jews Live in the Soviet Union," Soviet Life, no. 7 (July 1971), pp. 36-41; and particularly Ruvim Groyer, "Soviet Jews As They Are," Soviet Life, no. 12 (December 1973). These articles stress the "fully equality" of Soviet Jews in terms of political, occupational, and cultural rights and emphasize their "high rate of assimilation."

⁶⁶V. Bolshakov, Anti-Communism: The Main Line of Zionism (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1972), pp. 6-7, as quoted in Shaffer, Treatment, p. 30.

⁶⁷Ben Ami, Between Hammer and Sickle (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of American, 1967), p. 131.

⁶⁸An excellent treatment of this matter is contained in Reuben Ainsztein, "Soviet Jewry in the Second World War," in Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917, ed. Kochan, pp. 26-287. Also see Gilbert, Jews in Russia, pp. 44-54.

⁶⁹Boris Smolar, Soviet Jewry Today and Tomorrow (New York: Macmillan, 1971), p. 63; and Ami, Between, p. 132.

⁷⁰See "Cross Section of Prominent Jews in the USSR," in Shaffer, Treatment, pp. 55-58; and Smolar, Today and Tomorrow, pp. 63-66.

⁷¹John A. Armstrong, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Anti-Semitism," in Perspectives on Soviet Jewry (New York, 1971), pp. 70-71, as quoted in William Korey, The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia (New York: Viking, 1973), pp. 62-63.

⁷²Birman, "Emigration," p. 52.

⁷³Zvi Gitelman, "Assimilation, Acculturation, and National Consciousness among Soviet Jews" (prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, New Orleans, December 1972, pp. 2-3, as quoted in Sawyer, Minority, pp. 60-61.

⁷⁴Lev Navrozov, "Getting Out of Russia," Commentary, October 1972, p. 51.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 52.

Chapters IX - XII

¹Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Jewish Emigrants: Why Are They Choosing America?," Soviet Jewish Affairs 7 (1977): 31.

²Ibid., pp. 31-36.

³Theodore H. Friedgut, "Soviet Jewry: The Silent Majority," Soviet Jewish Affairs 10 (May 1980): 2.

⁴Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 78-9.

⁵Ibid.

⁶W. W. Rostow, The Dynamics of Soviet Society (New York: Mentor, 1954), p. 187.

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
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APPENDIX A

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION



(RUSSIAN)

The
University of Oklahoma at Norman

Department of Political Science

Разрешите мне представить себя и наш Университет.

Я профессор кафедры политических наук Университета Оклахомы в Нормане, Оклахома, и я занимаюсь изучением проблем Советского Союза в течение многих лет. Я обращаюсь к Вам, так как Вы жили в Советском Союзе и я верю, Вы можете помочь нам в работе нашей кафедры.

Один из наших аспирантов занимается изучением жизни в Советском Союзе. Предмет его интереса-советские газеты, радио и телевиденье, и он хочет выяснить, что советские люди в самом деле думают о них.

Моего аспиранта зовут Джон Марк. Я знаю его в течение нескольких лет, и он один из лучших студентов нашей кафедры. Он хотел бы встретиться с Вами и задать Вам несколько вопросов о Вашем мнении относительно проблемы информации в Советском Союзе. Д.Марк говорит немного по-русски, но он предпочел бы общаться с Вами по-английски, если это Вам не трудно.


В это письмо вложено обращение к Вам от Д.Марка, которое, он надеется, Вы отправите ему в прилагаемом конверте.

В этом обращении Вы сможете сказать Джону, хотите ли Вы встретиться с ним, и когда это было бы удобным для Вас.


Д.Марк получил Ваш адрес только потому, что он работает над данной проблемой. Вся информация, которую Вы сможете сообщить ему будет абсолютно конфиденциальной. Когда же исследование будет завершено, оно не будет содержать имен людей, беседовавших с Джоном.

Так как контакты с людьми, жившими в Советском Союзе - лучший путь получить объективную информацию о Советском Союзе, мы будем чрезвычайно благодарны Вам за помощь и поддержку, выражающуюся в Вашей готовности встретиться с аспирантом нашей кафедры Д.Марком.

С уважением


В.Стенли Вардис

Профессор



(ENGLISH)

The
University of Oklahoma at Norman

Department of Political Science

Dear _____

Please allow me to introduce myself and our University to you.

We are the University of Oklahoma, located in Norman, Oklahoma. I am a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma and I have studied Soviet affairs for many years. I am writing to you because you have lived in the Soviet Union and because I believe that you can help us in the work of our department.

One of our graduate students is working on a study about life in the Soviet Union. He is studying Soviet radio, newspapers and television and he wants to find out what Soviet people really think about them.

The name of my student is Jon Mark. I have known him for several years and he is an excellent student in our department. He would like to meet you and ask you several questions about your opinions on the subject of communications in the Soviet Union. Mr. Mark speaks a little Russian, but he would prefer to speak to you in English if that is not difficult for you.

Enclosed in this letter is a note from Mr. Mark which he hopes you will mail back to him in the envelope provided. On this note, you will be able to tell Mr. Mark if you will meet with him, and when it might be convenient for you to do so.

Mr. Mark has received your name and address only because he is working on this study. All information which you may give him will be kept strictly confidential. When his study is completed, it will contain no names and no one will be able to find out who talked to him.

Since talking to people who lived in the Soviet Union is the best way to get objective information about the Soviet Union, we would greatly appreciate your help and assistance in meeting personally with Mr. Mark.

Respectfully

V. Stanley Vardys
Professor

APPENDIX B

RESPONSE FORM FROM POTENTIAL RESPONDENT

(RUSSIAN)

Пожалуйста, ответьте на эти вопросы и отправьте Ваш
ответ в прилагаемом почтовом конверте. Заранее благода-
рю Вас.

Хотите ли Вы помочь мне? Да _____ Нет _____

Если да, то какая из форм наиболее удобна для Вас?

Ответить на вопросы, связанные с исследованием, в
личной беседе _____

Ответить на вопросы письменно/в форме анкеты/ _____

Если Вы предпочтете личную встречу, могу ли я позвонить Вам?

ДА _____ Нет _____

Если да, какое время наиболее удобно для этого? _____

И пожалуйста, дайте мне Ваш номер телефона _____

Если у Вас есть какие-либо вопросы относительно моего иссле-
дования, я с удовольствием отвечу на них письменно, по телефо-
ну или в личной беседе.

Пожалуйста, напишите Ваши вопросы ниже по-русски или по-
английски.

С уважением Джон Марк.

(ENGLISH)

Please fill in the answers to the questions and return by mail in the envelope provided. Thank you very much.

Will it be possible for you to help me? Yes _____ No _____

If you can help me, what form is most convenient for you?

To answer questions about the study in person _____

To answer questions about the study in writing
(to fill out a questionnaire) _____

If it is convenient for your to meet me, may I call you on the telephone?

Yes _____ No _____

When is the best time to call you on the telephone? _____

Please give me your telephone number so that I can reach you _____

If you have any questions about my study, I will be pleased to answer them in writing, on the telephone, or in person. Please write any questions below in either English or Russian. _____

Respectfully,

231

Jon Mark

APPENDIX C

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE - Media Attitudes and the Yom Kippur War

Interview Number _____

1. Age _____ 2. Sex _____
1 2

3.4. Place of Residence in the Soviet Union in Oct., 1973?

(city/town) Union republic 3 45. Years of formal education in the Soviet Union? _____
56. Major field of study? _____
67. Occupation in the Soviet Union? _____
78. There was a war in the Middle East in October, 1973 between Israel and the Arab countries. It started very quickly and without warning. How did you first find out that this war had started? From . . .
8Soviet Radio _____ Soviet Television _____ Newspaper _____
1 2 3Someone at Work _____ Someone in the family _____ Foreign Radio _____
4 4 6A Friend _____ Someone on the Street _____ Other _____
7 8 9Do Not Remember _____
109. While the war was going on, until the time it was over, how did you get most of the news about the war? From . . .
9Soviet Radio _____ Soviet Television _____ Newspaper _____
1 2 3Someone at work _____ Someone in the family _____ A Friend _____
4 5 6Foreign Radio _____ Other _____ Do Not Remember _____
7 8 9

10. At that time (October 1973), was it your habit to listen to foreign radio broadcasts (frequently, as a general rule, etc.)? _____
10

Yes _____ No _____
1 2

11. (If "yes" on #11) Did you receive news about the war from foreign radio broadcasts? _____
11

Yes _____ No _____
1 2

12. (If "yes" on #12) What foreign radio broadcasts did you listen to most often? _____
12

BBC _____ VOA _____ Deutsche Welle _____ RL _____
1 2 3 4

Kol Yisroel _____ RFE _____ Other _____
5 6 7

13. What foreign radio broadcasts did you listen to second most often? _____
13

BBC _____ VOA _____ Deutsche Welle _____ RL _____
1 2 3 4

Kol Yisroel _____ RFE _____ Other _____
5 6 7

Was it easy to hear the broadcasts (was the reception good) in #12? _____

14

. . . and in #13? _____

15

14. (13) Always _____
1

Mostly _____
2

Sometimes _____
3

Seldom _____
4

Never _____
5

15. (14) Always _____
1

Mostly _____
2

Sometimes _____
3

Seldom _____
4

Never _____
5

If reception was not always good, what was the main reason? _____

16

16.(12) Weather, Seasonal
(natural) reasons _____

1

Jamming/Intrusion _____

2

Bad Radio Receiver _____

3

Had to have low volume _____

4

Other _____

5

17.(13) Weather, Seasonal
(natural reasons) _____

1

Jamming/Intrusion _____

2

Bad Radio Receiver _____

3

Had to have low volume _____

4

Other _____

5

When you listened to the news about the war on Soviet radio
(watched Soviet television, read Soviet newspapers, did you
think they were telling the truth about the war? Do you think
they were objective about the war? _____

18

18. Radio

19. Television

20. Newspapers

19

Always _____

1

Always _____

1

Always _____

1

20

Mostly _____

2

Mostly _____

2

Mostly _____

2

Sometimes _____

3

Sometimes _____

3

Sometimes _____

3

Seldom _____

4

Seldom _____

4

Seldom _____

4

Never _____

5

Never _____

5

Never _____

5

When you listened to news about the war on (the foreign broadcast
service mentioned in #12) did you think they were telling the truth
about the war? Do you think they were objective about the war?

21. Always _____

1

...and for service
in #13?

22. Always _____

1

21

Mostly _____

2

Mostly _____

2

22

Sometimes _____

3

Sometimes _____

3

Seldom _____

4

Seldom _____

4

Never _____

5

Never _____

5

23.(18) For the Arabs _____ <u>1</u> For Israel _____ <u>2</u> Were Neutral _____ <u>3</u> Don't Know _____ <u>4</u> Don't Remember _____ <u>5</u>	24.(19) For the Arabs _____ <u>1</u> For Israel _____ <u>2</u> Were Neutral _____ <u>3</u> Don't Know _____ <u>4</u> Don't Remember _____ <u>5</u>	25.(20) For the Arabs _____ <u>1</u> For Israel _____ <u>2</u> Were Neutral _____ <u>3</u> Don't Know _____ <u>4</u> Don't Remember _____ <u>5</u>
26.(12) For the Arabs _____ <u>1</u> For Israel _____ <u>2</u> Were Neutral _____ <u>3</u> Don't Know _____ <u>4</u> Don't Remember _____ <u>5</u>	27.(13) For the Arabs _____ <u>1</u> For Israel _____ <u>2</u> Were Neutral _____ <u>3</u> Don't Know _____ <u>4</u> Don't Remember _____ <u>5</u>	_____ 23 _____ 24 _____ 25 _____ 26 _____ 27

28. Family member(s)	29. Close friend(s)	30. Co-workers
Always _____ 1	Always _____ 1	Always _____ 1
Mostly _____ 2	Mostly _____ 2	Mostly _____ 2
Sometimes _____ 3	Sometimes _____ 3	Sometimes _____ 3
Seldom _____ 4	Seldom _____ 4	Seldom _____ 4
Never _____ 5	Never _____ 5	Never _____ 5

31. Casual friend/
Acquaintance(s)
- Always 1
- Mostly 2
- Sometimes 3
- Seldom 4
- Never 5
32. Persons on the Street/
Strangers
- Always 1
- Mostly 2
- Sometimes 3
- Seldom 4
- Never 5
- 28
- 29
- 30
- 31
- 32
33. At the time (October, 1973), do you know of a case in which a
person got into trouble with the Soviet authorities because he
said something about foreign radio?
- Yes 1 No 2
- 33
34. At any time while you lived in the Soviet Union, do you know
of a case in which a person got into trouble with the Soviet
authorities because he said something about foreign radio?
- Yes 1 No 2
- 34
35. Why did you decide to leave the Soviet Union? What is the
main reason?
- Discrimination against Jews 1
- To find freedom for political beliefs 2
- To be able to practice Judaism freely 3
- To have a higher standard of living 4
- To have better opportunities in my occupation/profession 5
- To join other members of my family 6
- Other 7
- 35

36. Do you consider yourself a religious person?

36

Yes, very 1 Yes, somewhat 2

No, not very 3 No, not at all 4

From your personal experience in the Soviet Union, how would you describe the level of discrimination against Jews (anti-semitism)?

37

37. High 1 38. Growing 1

Moderate 2 Static 2

38

Low 3 Diminishing 3

39. In October, 1973, at your job, university or school, were most of the people who worked (studied) there . . .

39

Jewish 1 or Non-Jewish 2

40. If most of the people were not Jewish, what percentage of the people were Jewish?

40

Less than 10% 1

10% to 25% 2

25% to 50% 3

41. In October, 1973, were most of your personal friends . . .

41

Jewish 1 or Non-Jewish 2

42. If most of your friends were not Jewish, what percentage were Jewish?

42

Less than 10% 1

10% to 25% 2

25% to 50% 3