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IMPACT OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION
ON COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

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Norman, Oklahoma
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IMPACT OF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION
ON COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM	12
The Essence of Mao Tse-tung's Thought	15
Mao Tse-tung and Chinese Communist Party Power Structure	22
Nature of Communist China's Political Process. .	27
III. THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION DOMESTIC ASPECTS	31
Background of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution	33
Mao's Strategy of Preparation for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution	43
Conflict Behavior of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution	53
Aftermath of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution	84
IV. COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN CONFLICT BEHAVIOR DURING THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION	94
A Brief Review of Communist China's Foreign Policy From 1949 to 1965	95
Communist China's Foreign Policy During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution	112
Trends of Communist China's Foreign Policy During the Post-Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Period	190
V. CONCLUSION	201

Chapter	Page
Domestic Convulsion Leads to Foreign Conflict	201
Foreign Conflict tends to be Provocative rather than Actual War	208
A Generalization: Domestic Convulsion and Foreign Conflict Behavior	209

APPENDIX

I. Sources for Table 1	215
II. Development of Communist China's Diplomatic Relations 1949-1973	217
BIBLIOGRAPHY	219

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.	Conflict Issues	58
2.	General Trends and Major Events of Communist China's Domestic and Foreign Policy Since 1949	102
3.	Communist China's Foreign Conflict Behavior During The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution	125
4.	Causes of Communist China's Foreign Conflicts During The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution	127
5.	Ebb and Flow Between Domestic Convulsion and Foreign Conflict	206

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has had tremendous repercussions not only on Communist China's internal affairs, but also on its international behavior. Domestically, a complicated power struggle under the name of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had caused nationwide turmoil. In foreign affairs, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it had quarrelled in one way or another with fifty countries. All of these events seem to indicate that there must be some relationship between these forms of internal and external conflict behavior which deserves analysis.

The traditional scholarly assumption in foreign policy analysis generally suggests that a nation experiencing internal disorder will tend to engage in external conflict either to divert the people's attention from serious problems or to justify repressive governmental measures against domestic opponents. Some observers even regard external conflict as largely determined by domestic difficulties. Marx and Lenin, for example, characterized foreign policy in

general as the continuation of domestic politics.¹ Quincy Wright asserted that a ruler prevents sedition by making external war.² Richard N. Rosecrance, Ernest B. Haas, and Allen Whiting's assumptions were generally in agreement with Wright's.³ Finally, according to Henry A. Kissinger,

Many of the leaders of the new nations use foreign policy as a means to escape intractable internal difficulties and as a device to achieve domestic cohesion. The international arena provides the leaders of developing states an opportunity for dramatic foreign measures that are impossible at home.⁴

However, recent studies have generated conflicting findings on the validity of these assumptions.⁵ For example, Rudolph J. Rummel conducted an investigation of the relationships between domestic and external conflict utilizing nine domestic indicators such as assassinations, strikes, guerrilla warfare, purges, riots, revolutions, etc., and thirteen foreign conflict indicators such as anti-foreign demonstrations,

¹Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Internal Politics and Foreign Behavior in the Soviet System," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrel (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 212.

²Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 140.

³Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International System in Perspective. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 218-283; Ernest B. Haas and Allen Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 61-62.

⁴Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, expanded edition (New York: Norton, 1974), p. 41

⁵Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidences (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1976), pp. 102-141.

protests, expulsion or recall of ambassadors, threats, military actions, etc., for over seventy-seven nations for the years 1955-1957. He found that "foreign conflict behavior is generally unrelated to domestic conflict behavior."⁶

Assuming, however, that there might be a time lag between the incidence of domestic violence and its expression in foreign policy, Raymond Tanter replicated some of Rummel's work and added more extensive data of his own. His study generally confirmed Rummel's conclusion.⁷ Jonathan Wilkenfeld suggested that Rummel's arrival at his conclusion was facilitated by the fact that he did not differentiate between the nations under consideration. He classified seventy-four from Rummel's seventy-seven nations into three groups: personalist (fifteen, most of which are Latin American countries), centrist (twenty-five, including all Communist countries) and polyarchic (thirty-three, mostly Western countries). He also took time lags, and types of internal and external conflict into account. He found that for centrist states there is a relationship between revolutions, number killed in domestic conflict, purges, and general strikes on the one hand,

⁶Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimension of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, ed. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (New York: David McKay, 1973), pp. 59-106.

⁷Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-1960," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (March, 1966), pp. 41-64.

and all types of external conflict behavior after a lag of either one or two years. In personalist states, all types of internal strife yield only certain types of foreign-conflict behavior such as expulsion of ambassadors and officials from other states, and troop movements. For Polyarchic states, there is a statistically significant relationship between anti-government demonstrations, riots, and government crisis on the one hand, and all types of external conflict behavior on the other, for all time periods.⁸

Wilkenfeld's findings have not been verified by others which focused on a single centrist country. In the case of Communist China, most scholars agree that domestic factors have played a determinant role in its foreign behavior. Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin stated that "the key to the understanding of Communist China's foreign policy lies in Mao's revolutionary strategy and its projection abroad."⁹

Gavin Boyd asserted that "the projection of the regime's dynamism into the outside world is clearly felt to be necessary for its own vitality and stability; total commitment to Maoist values must be expressed--externally as well as domestically ... The intended linkages between domestic

⁸Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign Conflict," in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, ed. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (New York: David McKay, 1973), pp. 107-123.

⁹Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior," American Political Science Review, vol. 59, No. 1 (March, 1965), p. 99.

and external activity, however, are affected by problems which the ruling elites faces in its efforts to generate popular support and maintain its authority."¹⁰ Many others also believe that Communist China has used a sense of external threat to reinforce many of its policies of mobilization and control at home.¹¹

However, disagreement about Communist China on the issue continues. A recent study undertaken by Andres D. Onate revealed findings quite different from those just mentioned. Generally following Rummel's scheme, he collected data on Communist China's external and internal conflict behavior for the period 1950-1970. His findings showed that "there was a very moderate relationship between total amount of weighted internal conflict and total amount of weighted external conflict."¹²

These various contrasting findings suggest that the relationship between internal and external conflict behavior

¹⁰Gavin Boyd, "China," in Asia and the International System, ed. Wayne Wilcox; Leo E. Rose and Gavin Boyd (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1972), pp. 18, 21.

¹¹See the testimonies of A. Doak Barnett, John Lindbeck and David Rowe in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on U.S. Policy toward Communist China, 89th Cong. 2nd Sess. March, 1966 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966); V.P. Dutt, China and the World: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 1; Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest (New York: MacMillan, 1970), p. 296.

¹²Andres Onate, "The Conflict Interaction of the People's Republic of China, 1950-1970," Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 18 (December, 1974), pp. 578-594.

may be even more complex than initially thought and need further examination, particularly regarding the identification of data and definition of terms. As Tanter once confessed, for example, there may be a causal relationship which is being obscured by other phenomena.¹³ Rummel also indicated that, contrary to his general findings, there may well be situations in which the domestic political elites of a nation will foment foreign conflict as a means of quieting internal squabbling.¹⁴ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.'s comment went even further:

... One may find himself, ... in the absence of an adequate weighting scheme, ... comparing the number of revolutions, strikes, and demonstrations with the number killed in foreign wars... added deficiencies may arise from a failure to distinguish adequately between violent and symbolic conflict, anomic and organized or structured violence, between non-political and politicized conflict, between extragovernmental and governmental activity, between outside stimulated internal conflict and insider stimulated external conflict.¹⁵

In the case of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Communist China's domestic nationwide turmoil was internal conflict with sources from both governmental and societal origins. It was an officially directed mass movement

¹³Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior," ibid., p. 60.

¹⁴Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior," ibid., p. 92.

¹⁵James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Lippincott, 1971), p. 236.

which was purposefully manipulated by a coalition of ruling elites to purge their opponents in power through intensified ideological indoctrination, but it also involved the emergence of factionally oriented violence which was often condemned as "holding the red flag to oppose the red flag." External conflict existed but it also was varied and somewhat unique. It consisted of positively launched provocative actions throughout the world which was mainly the projection of Mao Tse-Tung's Thought abroad; but this was combined with self-restraint regarding military involvement in the Vietnam War where there was significant competition with the Soviet Union. This in turn had direct influence on the domestic power struggle in Communist China. In the post-Cultural Revolution period, the domestic power struggle was even more acute and complicated, although probably not as violent as before. After Liu Shao-Chi was purged, Mao's three-sided coalition, which included radicals, bureaucrats and the military, collapsed. In the autumn of 1971, Lin Biao was purged. Mao and Chou En-lai finally reached the point of direct confrontation with each other. During this period, in foreign affairs, Communist China seemed to want to recover or establish amicable relations with almost all countries irrespective of their political character except the Soviet Union and its faithful socialist friends.

All of these events, as mentioned above, might be too complex to be codified according to broad indicators, and the

relationships between domestic and foreign conflict behavior might also be obscured due to macro type analysis. As Michael Sullivan pointed out:

... a generalized link between various measures of internal conflict and foreign policy is not supported. [However], When linkages were specified - either in terms of types of conflict, types of countries, regions of the world, or when several variables of internal stress were combined - more significant relationships appeared with foreign conflict.¹⁶

In addition to this, he also suggested that

... the type of foreign conflict most consistently linked to internal disruption was either verbal or low-level physical conflict; in no instance was war, warlike acts, or serious physical violence related to the internal situation.¹⁷

According to the foregoing analysis, one is led to suspect that Andres Onate's longitudinal study might have missed the unique characteristics of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the complications of its conflict behavior, therefore obscured its external impact. Sullivan's suggestion of placing emphasis on the type of regime and the specification of conflicts may provide a useful guideline to find out whether or not Communist China's provocative foreign behavior during Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was directly related to its internal conflict.

Thomas W. Robinson pointed out that

... Sino-Soviet relations shifted with the twists and turns of the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese used

¹⁶Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations, pp. 135-136.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 136

the Soviets as a bete noire and, to change the metaphor, as a convenient lightening rod to direct energies away from insoluble domestic problems during times of high tension.¹⁸

Throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the Maoists' slogan of "down with the Chinese Khrushchev" and an excessive stress on anti-imperialism, anti-revisionism, and violent world revolution suggested strong international implications stemming from its domestic turbulences. Therefore, in order to understand the Cultural Revolution's impact on Communist China's foreign behavior, it is necessary to analyze its processes in order to find out why, how, and for what the Cultural Revolution was fermented and carried out. As William J. Filstead observed, to describe or predict behavior the researcher must understand the complex processes, which consists of attitudinal, situational, and environmental factors, that precipitated human interaction.¹⁹ So the methods of this research is basically qualitative or historical. It tries to analyze the relevant factors that caused Mao Tse-tung to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its inherent anti-foreign nature that seemed to antagonize the whole world.

Chapter II will deal with the nature of Communist China's

¹⁸Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes," American Political Science Review, LXVI, No. 4 (December, 1972), p. 1176.

¹⁹William J. Filstead, Qualitative Methodology (Chicago : Markham Publishing Co., 1970), p. 7.

political system, stressing those essential characteristics that condition Communist China's domestic as well as foreign behavior. It intends to provide a general view for the understanding of Communist China's political behavior. The third chapter emphasizes the processes of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It will analyze Mao Tse-tung's intention, strategy, and various aspects of the conflicts in order to identify factors that influenced Communist China's foreign activities. The fourth chapter focuses on Communist China's foreign behavior throughout the Cultural Revolution. In addition to a brief review of Communist China's foreign policies since 1949, the main focus will be on the ebb and flow of the relationship between domestic turmoils and externally bellicose activities. It had quarrelled with fifty countries. The external issues will be described and classified and the degree of their relevance to domestic conflicts will be analyzed. The final part of this chapter will briefly deal with Communist China's foreign policy during the post-Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution period. The last chapter, the conclusion is the syntheses of the research summarizing the foreign behavior patterns of a totalitarian regime during domestic crisis.

Since the main theme of this research is the impact of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution on foreign behavior, and the emphasis is put on the relationship between domestic and foreign conflict behavior, the details of the Great

Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its foreign activities other than those relevant to the subject will perforce be skipped over. The main material sources of the research come largely from Selection from China Mainland Magazines, Survey of China Mainland Press, Communist China Digest, Year Books on Chinese Communism, Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works, Peking Review, Wen-hui Pao (Hong Kong), People's Daily, The New York Times, Fact on File. Other reference sources from books, monographs, and article in periodicals are listed in the bibliography.

CHAPTER II

CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

Regarding the political system factor, most scholars of comparative politics used the democratic and authoritarian (including totalitarian)¹ or open and closed² dichotomy, and place Communist countries including Communist China into the totalitarian or closed category, a classification that will be followed in this research.

A totalitarian political system, according to Gabriel A. Almond, is "a tyranny with a rational bureaucracy, a monopoly of the modern technology of communication, and a monopoly of the modern technology of violence."³ It possesses six features, as suggested by Friedrich and Brzezinski.

An official ideology, a single mass party led typically by one man, a system of terrorist police control, near-complete party control of all means of

¹Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp. 255-298.

²James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-92.

³Gabriel A. Almond, Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 43.

effective mass communication, similar control of all means of armed combat, and a central control and direction of the entire economy."⁴

The behavior of a totalitarian system in foreign relations, according to R. Barry Farrell, reflects a greater emphasis on ideological factors and its leaders are often a prisoner of dogma about foreign policy. Governments of this type can maintain secrecy and, by manipulating public opinion, can more easily arouse widespread support. Moreover, because decision making is limited to a few ruling elites, often cut off from objective analysis of internal and external conditions, there will be strong imperatives to undertake high-risk policies and a greater likelihood of sudden change in basic policies. Since many dictatorships are based on weak foundations, top leaders may also undertake foreign adventures to consolidate their position.⁵ However, actual totalitarian systems may vary from the above due to the different structural and cultural characteristics of particular countries. Therefore, Almond and Powell further classified totalitarian system into radical and conservative, and labeled communist system as radical totalitarian.⁶ However, it should be noted that the totalitarian political system of Communist China shows many

⁴Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 22.

⁵R. Barry Farrell, "Open and Closed System," ibid., pp. 155-166.

⁶Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Political Development, pp. 272-273.

deviations from the conservative and radical models, for example, because of its elite factions' contradictions and power struggle, its relatively decentralization and local communization after 1957, and its political purge, indoctrination and supervision through party directed mass movement.

Howard H. Lentner, focusing on the factor of the size of the chief executive, classified authoritarian political systems into either dictator or junta type. Dictators are in a better position to enforce their will upon the political elites and in the extreme case, such as Stalin's regime, members of the political elite either submit to the dictator's will or are repressed. In the junta, although one person is generally more powerful than other junta members, his position is not so secure as that of the dictator. He will attempt to make his position increasingly secure until he is a dictator while his colleagues will attempt to replace him. Lentner referred to Communist China as an authoritarian junta.⁷ His classification seems to be accurate in interpreting the process of power struggle among Chinese Communist ruling elites, but may be too simplistic to permit an adequate description of the whole political system.

James R. Townsend summarized most core elements of developing country models into a single syndrome which comprises three features:

⁷Howard H. Lentner, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 31, 162-168.

a single political party that monopolizes {military} and political power, and penetrates all other politically significant organizations; an explicit, official ideology that legitimizes and sanctifies revolutionary goals; a determination to politicize and mobilize the citizenry, characteristically through party-led mass movement.⁸

In essence, this model is generally similar to Friedrich's six-feature syndrome. The difference is that, as Townsend argued, it places the dominant political party in a significant context, and identifies the social context more accurately. It seems closer to Communist China's reality, especially during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. According to this model, the key elements of Communist China's political system should be ideology, party, and mass movement. Since the mass movement is often strictly directed by the party to serve the needs of ruling elites, it generally exerts little influence on central government decision making process, especially on the field of foreign affairs. Therefore, in this research, the analysis will focus on ideology and the power structure of the party in order to find out what role it plays in domestic and foreign affairs.

The Essence of Mao Tse-tung's Thought

Communist China's official ideology, as enacted in both National and Party Constitutions, is that the nation or the Party "takes Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Tse-tung's

⁸James R. Townsend, Politics in China (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 18.

Thought as the theoretical basis guiding its thinking."⁹ But the dominant one of the three is Mao Tse-tung's Thought which generally consists of Mao Tse-tung's personal interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and his own experience of Chinese communist revolution. As the Party Constitution adopted by the Ninth Party Congress asserted:

Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the Marxism-Leninism of the era when imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing towards worldwide victory.¹⁰

The contents of Mao Tse-tung's Thought, for analytical convenience, can generally be classified into two categories: the vision of establishing a communist society and the notion of world revolution. In its formula for the building of a communist society, Mao was convinced that the "poor and blank" Chinese people could be easily mobilized and reformed according to his designs. As he confidently declared:

Apart from their other characteristics, the outstanding thing about China's 600 million people is that they are "poor and blank." This may seem a bad thing, but in reality it is a good thing. Poverty gives rise to the desire for change, the desire for action, and the desire for revolution. On a blank sheet of paper free from any mark, the freshest and most beautiful characters can be written, the freshest and most beautiful pictures can be painted.¹¹

⁹"Communist China's Constitution Draft (1970)," in 1972 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, P. VI-6; "The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Adopted by the Ninth Party Congress, 1969," in The China Quarterly, (July-September, 1969), p. 164; "The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Adopted by the Tenth Party Congress, 1973," The China Quarterly (October-December, 1973), p. 819.

¹⁰ibid.,

¹¹Mao Tse-tung, "Introduction a Co-operative," in Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), p. 403.

Thus, in his grand designs for the construction of a paradise China, Mao puts great emphasis on the need to build up revolutionary will and a fighting spirit among party members as well as on the part of all people on the basis of continual renewals of personal and collective dedication to the ideals proclaimed by Marx and Lenin. According to Mao's conviction, under a proletarian dictatorship led by the communist party, a classless or an egalitarian society without any kind of exploitation or distinction between physical and mental labor, city and rural can be reached through violent revolution, permanent class struggle, and constant mass indoctrination.¹² Since Mao believed that "the subjective creates the objective,"¹³ he was firmly convinced that politics, ideology, and manpower were definitely superior to technology, machines and specialization. Therefore, in the domestic arena, Mao put foremost importance on class struggle, ideological purity, and revolutionary fervor.

¹²There are varieties of analysis on Mao Tse-tung's Thought and its deviations from Marxism-Leninism. See Yeh Ch'ing, Inside Mao Tse-tung's Thought, trans. & ed. Stephen Pan, T. H. Tsuan, and Ralph Mortensen (Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press, 1975); Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, 2nd ed. (New York: Fredrick A. P. Praeger, 1969), pp. 132-144; Richard M. Pfeffer, "The Pursuit of Purity: Mao's Cultural Revolution," Problems of Communism (November-December, 1969), pp. 12-25; Lloyd Eastman, "Mao, Marx, and the Future Society," Problems of Communism (May-June, 1969), pp. 21-25; "What is Maoism? A Symposium," Problems of Communism (September-October, 1966), pp. 1-30; Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy," Ibid.

¹³Quoted from Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p. 136.

But as China is a large¹⁴ and underdeveloped country, effective development of the economy and coordination of different interests, both geographically and socially, will inevitably cause differentiation and specialization in the social sector, and a strengthening of the power of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the Chinese people are poor, but it is absurd to say that they are "blank." As Chalmers Johnson observed:

Such a presumption of blankness suggests the often fatal error of the political leader who believes that a grant of authority is a carte blanche; such a leader does not understand that authority rests on a belief system shared by leaders and the led alike.¹⁵

What the Chinese people really need might be production, education and freedom. Mao's imposed political indoctrination and radical reforms would inevitably generate controversy within his Party and opposition from the people. These contradictions between vision and reality which Mao treated as a struggle between socialism and capitalism or revisionism have never been solved.

Mao's concept of world revolution is basically a projection abroad of his own revolutionary experiences mixed with his own interpretation of Marx and Lenin's concepts of

¹⁴As China is a large country, the principles of interest group theories developed in these classical works such as Madison's Federalist Paper No. 10, Arthur F. Bentley's The Process of Government, and David B. Truman's The Governmental Process can be helpful to understand why Mao's radical reforms often caused disasters in the process of national construction. For example, the catastrophic failure of Great Leap Forward, and the ultimate failure of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution when Mao's widow Chiang Ching was purged immediately after Mao's death.

¹⁵Chalmers Johnson, "The Two Chinese Revolutions," The China Quarterly, No. 39 (July-September, 1969), p. 23.

capitalism, imperialism, and proletarian internationalism.

As Gavin Boyd pointed out:

The Chinese regime's ideological perspective reflects the doctrinal evolution of its Communist movement. The concept of interconnected national and international revolutionary struggles, derives from Marxism-Leninism, long established as the basic philosophy of the Chinese Communist Party ... To meet the theoretical demands of the regime's new role, as the main center of inspiration for genuine Communist movements, Mao Tse-tung's strategy for revolutionary struggle has been given higher status than Marxism-Leninism principles which it applied to conditions in China.¹⁶

According to Mao's conviction, the contradictions between socialist revolutionary forces and capitalist-imperialist reactionary forces are fundamental and irreconcilable.¹⁷ The best weapon against imperialists and reactionaries' exploitation, oppression, and aggression is violent revolution. As Mao once clearly pointed out:

The seizure of power by armed forces, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally, for China and for all other countries.¹⁸

A country wants independence; a nation wants liberation; a people wants revolution; as Mao asserted, it is an irresistible trend of modern history. All those who think that

¹⁶Gavin Boyd, "China," ibid., p. 4.

¹⁷Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," in Mao Tse-tung Selected Works, 1937-1938, vol. 2 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), pp. 13-52.

¹⁸Quoted from Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" Peking Review, No. 36 (September 3, 1965), p. 23.

such contradictions can be resolved peacefully or co-exist peacefully are revisionists. Modern revisionists are even more ferocious than the old imperialism.

In his analysis of the current world revolutionary situation, Mao's framework was generally based on his long developed notion of "intermediate zone theory."¹⁹ He stated that between the imperialist United States and revisionist Soviet Union there exists a vast zone including many capitalist, colonial, semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America. As an article in the Red Flag pointed out:

The two slices of bread with meat between them, the two super powers-- Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism-- are trying to sandwich other countries in various parts of the world... Thus, between these two overlords and the socialist countries, there exist two broad intermediate zones. The first intermediate zone includes the Asian, African and Latin American countries which have suffered from colonist and imperialist aggression and oppression in the past and are today carrying on a valiant struggle against imperialism and colonialism and especially against the two superpowers. The second intermediate zone includes the major capitalist countries both in the West and in the East except the two super powers. These countries too, are subject to the control, intervention and bullying of the two overlords to varying degrees, and the contradiction between these countries and the two super powers are daily developing.²⁰

¹⁹ Mao Tse-tung first used the term intermediate zone in 1946, then in 1958. See John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 144, 218-219. It appeared again in 1964. See "All The World Forces Opposing U.S. Imperialism, United!" Peking Review, No. 4 (January 24, 1964), p. 7.

²⁰ "On Studying Some History of the National-Liberation Movement," Peking Review, No. 45 (November 10, 1972), p. 8.

Based on his domestic revolutionary experience of "encircling the cities from the countryside and then capturing the cities strategy," Mao believed that the two world lords could also be defeated by encircling them through the united struggle of the two vast intermediate zone countries.²¹ According to his paper tiger theories, it is the people who are really powerful and not the imperialists and reactionaries. The reactionary forces are outwardly strong, but inwardly brittle; although imperialists and revisionists have atomic bombs, they are doomed inevitably to perish in history because all of them are either alienated from or hated by their people.²² Therefore, Mao was firmly convinced that, in conducting world revolution, Communist China's revolutionary experiences had universal validity and should be considered a model for all revolutionary forces to emulate. As Lin Piao once declared:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's War has been proved by long practice of the Chinese revolution to be in accord with the objective laws of such wars and to be invincible. It has not only been valid for China, it is a great contribution to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world.²³

The relative simplicity of Mao's radical world outlook that the transformation of the outside world could be achieved

²¹Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," *ibid.*, pp. 9-30; Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy," *ibid.*, 81-90.

²²Ralph Powell, "Great Powers and Atomic Bombs are Paper Tigers," *The China Quarterly*, No. 23 (July-September, 1965), pp. 55-63.

²³Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" *ibid.*, p. 23.

according to his own national experience of violent revolution would unavoidably lead him to be disinclined to investigate closely all the external factors that affect the prospects for his grand design. It is why Communist China has been always in a bellicose mood in internal affairs. As Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin stated:

The Chinese Communists' projection of their revolutionary strategy abroad is a more systematic and self-conscious expression of the general tendency of many peoples to project their way of life abroad, to judge foreign things by their own standard, and to understand foreign affairs in terms of their image of themselves. This general tendency usually creates disturbances in international politics and has at one time or another brought about difficulties of some sort for the originators themselves.²⁴

Mao Tse-tung and Chinese Communist Party

Power Structure

The Chinese Communist Party both legally, as indicated in the national and Party Constitution,²⁵ and practically, as in actual policy making, possesses a dominant position within Communist China's political system as a whole. As Stanley Karnow pointed out:

With Mao as its Chairman, the Communist Party was the locus of power, exercising authority through its own apparatus as well as through the government and Army. Party representatives operate within state

²⁴Tang Tsou and Morton H. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy," ibid., p. 99.

²⁵See footnotes 26 and 27.

agencies, factories, and schools and, as commissars, inside every Chinese military unit. By liquidating a million or more landlords in the early 1950's, the Communists destroyed the rural gentry, thereby permitting the party hierarchy to reach from the supreme Politburo in Peking down to the lowest village cadre. The Party also directed a formidable array of labor, youth, artistic, and other nationwide federations, each with millions of members, designed to manipulate public opinion. The entire population was consequently exposed to continual study sessions, meetings, demonstrations, and rallies. Combined with "thought reform" programs and vast mobilization movements, these exercises were essentially calculated to create a new environment in which ... the individual could not escape absorption into the "Masses."²⁶

Although the Party structure had been nearly completely destroyed during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it was clear that the only legitimate power which enabled Mao to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was that he was the Chairman of the Party. However, although Mao Tse-tung, as Chairman of the Party, wielded great power, he did not possess the degree of absolute power enjoyed by Stalin or Hitler. He could always keep himself from being defeated in countless power struggles, but he was often openly challenged and frustrated. The case was unique because of China's specific situation. The Chinese Communist Party had fought various kind of wars and struggles more than twenty years before it achieved success in 1949. All of the ruling elites on the top had their own power bases, both military and political, established during the revolutionary period.

²⁶ Stanley Karnow, Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1972), pp. 58-59.

Their power position was established by their own bitter struggle against their common enemies, not merely due to Mao's personal favor. Therefore, either for power seeking or self-defensive reasons, they dared to challenge Mao's radical initiatives which often caused serious disasters to the nation. But Mao possessed immense prestige as a leader over all factions. His long carefully cultivated nationwide personal worship made him the symbol of his Party, and his monopoly over ideology (which provided the foundation of legitimacy of his regime both spiritually and legally), made him superior among his comrades. As Parris Chang observed:

The formation of a strong personal cult of Mao gradually turned Mao into an institution, and the thought of Mao became "a new standard of legitimacy and correctness with which the actions and opinions of many top leaders were to be judged." Other Party leaders were thus disarmed from opposing or attacking Mao publicly, inasmuch as Mao had become the source of authority and correctness and they could not base a claim to legitimacy in opposition to Mao.²⁷

Furthermore, as Chairman of the Party, although he could not always carry the day as he wished, there was always enough room for him to maneuver and manipulate throughout the whole political system. Among the various power bases or factions he could shrewdly control or aggravate the contradictions among them to act as a balancer and arbitor. Power struggle is always a life and death matter in a Communist political system. As Kissinger once pointed out:

²⁷Parris H. Chang, Power and Policy in China, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), pp. 172-173.

Leaders rise to the top by eliminating--sometimes physically, always bureaucratically--all possible opponents...Suspiciousness is inherent in their domestic position.²⁸

Therefore, Mao could easily identify the contradictions to eliminate his opponents by isolating one through uniting the other.²⁹

In theory, the location of power in the Chinese Communist Party is that the final authority rests with the Party Congress and then the Central Committee. According to the Party Constitution, the two should be assembled within a definite period of time. But Mao could manipulate the meeting time until the situation was in his favor. The daily power center and the most important one was the Politburo. All important national and Party decisions came from this organ. But Mao still could manipulate. When opposition arose, he could bypass it to seek support elsewhere.

To project his will, Mao often engaged in politicking to seek wider support and used various maneuvers to overcome his opposition. In July, 1955, for example, Mao appeared directly to provincial leaders, over the heads of his colleagues on the Politburo, to gain support of a radical collectivization policy... In the late 1950's when Mao was promoting his Great Leap programs, he actively enlisted the backing of provincial leaders and used such support to overcome resistance at the center.³⁰

²⁸Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 271.

²⁹Lin Piao, "Outline of the Five-Seven-One Project," in The Search for A new China, ed. Winberg Chai (New York: Capricorn Books, 1975), pp. 226-230.

³⁰Parris H. Chang, ibid., p. 182.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, he turned for support to the People's Liberation Army and the teen-age school boys--the Red Guards.

In an extreme case, he could dissolve the Politburo and establish a provisional organ to serve his needs. As in the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, he established the Central Cultural Revolution Group which consisted of his wife Chiang Ching, his son-in-law Yao Wen-yuan, and his secretary Chen Po-ta. This Group, under Mao's personal command, had become the de facto power center of the Party throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

As Stuart Schram has written, Mao never really perceived the Party in the full Leninist sense to be a strong, self-sustaining central organization. Nor did he, like Lenin, view the Party's vocation to be the essentially political task of mobilizing and guiding the proletariat. Based on his experience that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Mao attached enormous importance to the army, without which, in his words, "the people have nothing." If the Party commands the gun, it was a Party that he considered to be his personal instrument. The Party line was his line. Allegiance to the Party signified obedience to him as the author of the correct ideology.³¹

³¹Stuart Schram, "The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology," The China Quarterly, No. 38 (April-June, 1969), pp. 2-3.

Nature of Communist China's

Political Process

Different political systems have different processes to solve their political problems in time. In Western democracy, when political disputes arise, it generally stresses on consensus building through accommodation and reconciliation. As Roger Hilsman observed:

... Politics implies a diversity of goals and values that must be reconciled before a decision can be reached. It is not just a question of whether this or that value should be pursued, but what mixture of values should be pursued. It also implies alternative means of achieving values whose precise effects may be in dispute.³²

But in Communist China, different political orientations among ruling elites are customarily dichotomized as irreconcilable contradictions between two lines, and they often results in a life and death power struggle. The existence of such phenomenon depends very much on their convictions of the nature of politics.

In the literature of political science, there is a variety of definitions of politics,³³ but Mao Tse-tung differed from those by defining politics as a struggle between

³²Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 136.

³³The mostly quoted definitions of politics such as Harold Lasswell, Charles Merriam, Hans Morganthau, V.O. Key, David Easton, Gabriel Almond, Talcott Parsons' etc., are briefly summarized by Rogers Hilsman, ibid. See also James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 81.

classes. "Politics, whether revolutionary or counter-revolutionary, is the struggle of class against class."³⁴

Yao Wen-yuan, Mao's son in law, elaborated Mao's definition of politics even more militantly.

Politics is the struggle to consolidate or overthrow the political power of this or that class, the struggle to safeguard or destroy this or that system of ownership, the struggle to seize or preserve the interests of this or that class (group).³⁵

Because the politics is the struggle between opposite classes, compromise and accommodation are alien to Communist China's political processes. Therefore, when he was determined to launch his cherished large scale purge and to kindle the flame of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao repeatedly advocated the importance of class struggle in communist revolution.

Throughout the period of transition there exist class contradictions, the class struggle between the two roads of the socialism and capitalism. If we forget this fundamental theory ... we will go astray.³⁶

In spite of the fact that the real controversy in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was over how to build a communist society or over the issues of revolutionary

³⁴Mao Tse-tung, "Talks at the Yen-an Forum on Literature and Art," republished in Peking Review, No. 22 (May 22, 1967), p. 13.

³⁵Yao Wen-yuan, "Comments on Tao Chu's Two Books," Peking Review, No. 37 (September 8, 1967), p. 10. In this article, Yao attacked Tao's definition of politics as trying "to bring about counter-revolutionary capitalist restoration."

³⁶Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the National Working Conference, January, 1965," Peking Review, No. 41 (October 7, 1966), p. 16.

dogmatism versus pragmatic socialism,³⁷ all of the Maoist official propaganda unequivocally treated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as an irreconcilable class struggle. For example, a Red Flag editorial clearly wrote:

All class struggles are political struggles. The present Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is, in the final analysis, a life and death struggle between the socialist system and capitalist system... It is an extremely fierce, extremely sharp, and extremely deep-going class struggle, a struggle for the proletariat to prevent the restoration of capitalism, a struggle to prevent imperialism and modern revisionism from carrying out their subversive plots and peaceful evolution in our country.³⁸

Since class struggle is to "consolidate or overthrow the political power of this or that class," behind the ideological disputes, the struggle for the seizure of power will be inevitable, and this is certainly a struggle of life and death. The People's Daily's advocacy of mass movement for the seizure of power clearly pointed out the central theme of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and revealed the nature of Communist China's political processes.

The basic question of revolution is political power... Right from the beginning, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been a struggle for the

³⁷Chalmers Johnson, Ibid., p. 28; Harry Harding, "China: Toward Revolutionary Pragmatism," Asian Survey, No. 1 (January, 1971), p. 52; Parris Chang, Power and Policy in China, p. 177; Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development," The China Quarterly, No. 29 (January-March, 1967), pp. 1-35.

³⁸Red Flag Editorial, "A Programmatic Document of the Great Proletarian Revolution," Peking Review, No. 34 (August 19, 1966), p. 18.

seizure of power. This Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution means precisely the arising of hundreds of millions of people to liberate themselves and to seize power from the handful of people within the Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road ... of all the important things, the possession of power is the most important! Such being the case, the revolutionary mass, with a deep hatred for the enemy, clench their teeth and, with steel-like determination, make up their mind to unite, form a great alliance, seize power! seize power!! seize power!!! All the Party power, political power, and financial power usurped by the counter-revolutionary revisionists... must be recaptured ... The proletarian revolutionaries ... "have their eye on seizing power, think of seizing power, and act to seize power" ... for the sake to let the great thought of Mao Tse-tung take possession of all positions.³⁹

In Communist China's totalitarian political system, power for the ruling elites means everything, and the ideological deviants irrespective whether they are labeled capitalists or revisionists, are taken for granted as the greatest sin. Therefore, power struggle and purge under the pretext of struggle between two lines become a permanent phenomenon in Communist Chinese politics.

³⁹People's Daily Editorial, January 19, 1967, in Peking Review, No. 5 (January 27, 1967), pp. 7-9.

CHAPTER III

THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

- Domestic Aspect -

In studying the relationships between domestic and external conflict behavior, scholars classify domestic conflict behavior in terms of the following indicators: assassination, general strike, guerrilla war, major government crisis, purge, riot, and anti-government demonstration, revolution, and numbers killed in domestic violence. These nine indicators are further classified into two categories. The first is turmoil, which includes anti-government demonstration, general strike, riot, and assassination. It represents an unorganized spontaneous type of conflict behavior. The second category is internal war, and includes revolution, guerrilla war, governmental crisis, purge, and number killed in domestic violence. This category represents an organized violent type of domestic conflict behavior. A general characteristic of the nine indicators is that they are conflicts between the rulers and the ruled. The turmoil and violence, whether organized or unorganized, are generated

either from the revolts of the ruled or from the suppression of the rulers.¹

Although these categories of domestic conflict behavior are useful for classifying type of domestic conflict behavior in most situations, they seem inadequate when applied to Communist China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution did generate fierce "turmoils" and violent "internal wars" with elements of mass involvement for or against the government. However, basically the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was not a conflict between the rulers and the ruled, but among the rulers themselves. Although the nationwide turbulences did provide the common people with chances to express their grievances, the whole process of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was primarily a power struggle among different factions of the ruling elites through strictly Party directed mass movements and intensive political indoctrination. It was an unprecedented large scale reversed purge by which an underdog faction attempted to seize power from the dominant faction in authority within the Party by means of ideological purification and manipulation of factional contradictions.

¹For definitions of the nine indicators see Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimension of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," ibid.; Rummel classified the nine indicators into three dimensions of turmoil, revolutionary and subversive. Tanter and Wilkenfeld combined Rummel's revolutionary and subversive dimension into internal war. For details see Rudolph J. Rummel, Raymond Tanter and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ibid.

Another unique feature of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution stemmed from Mao's excessive stress on anti-imperialism, anti-revisionism and violent world revolution for the cultivation of revolutionary fervor and the uglification of his opponents. This made Communist China seem willing to antagonize the whole world. Therefore, the conflict generated by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution not only was different from traditional forms of conflict behavior, but there were strong international implications right from the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This chapter will trace the origins and analyze the processes of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution trying to find out the essential characteristics of its conflict and its impact on Communist China's foreign relations.

Background of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was not a sudden and inexplicable phenomenon. Its roots could be traced back as far as the Khrushchev policy of de-Stalinization in early 1956 and the effort within the Chinese Communist Party to relegate Mao's position in the Eighth Party Congress later the same year. But the more direct cause was the failure of various Maoist programs - the General Line for Building Socialism, the Great Leap Forward, and the People's Commune movements in 1958. Despite later official arguments claiming

success, harsh realities proved the movements to be failures causing not only economic disasters, controversy within the party, but also further deterioration in China's relations with the Soviet Union. At the Lushan Conference, an enlarged Politburo meeting convened in the Summer of 1959, Peng Teh-huai, then National Defense Minister, boldly attacked Mao's radical, unrealistic Great Leap Forward as "petty bourgeois fanaticism." In his "Letter of Opinion," he directly pointed out that revolutionary fervor could not perform miracles in economic production:

In the view of some comrades, putting politics in command could be a substitute for everything... But putting politics in command is no substitute for economic principles, much less for concrete economic measures. ²

In addition to his criticisms of Mao's domestic policies, Peng also showed his dissatisfaction with Mao's foreign performance, advocating instead programs which called for Soviet Union military, economic, and technical assistance. As the People's Daily editorial indicated on July 1, 1966:

At the Lushan meeting of the party in 1959, a handful of ambitious bourgeois careerists and schemers... who had the support of the Khrushchev revisionist launched a ferocious attack on the party's Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. They put forward a thoroughly revisionist programme intended

²Peng Teh-huai, "Letter of Opinion," 1968 Yearbook on Chinese Communism (Taipei: Institute For the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1968), p. 783; the quarrel between Mao and Peng over other issues see "The Great Revolutionary Criticism," 1969 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, pp. III-6-14.

to replace the party's general line for building socialism.³

However, because the consequences of Mao's radical economic policies of 1958 were not fatally serious at the time Peng launched the attacks due to prior modification,⁴ and partly because of the emerging Sino-Soviet ideological conflict, Mao weathered the challenge and purged Peng and his followers in September 1959. Lin Piao, then Mao's faithful general and an enthusiastic proponent of Maoism became Minister of National Defense. But Mao's victory over Peng was, in substance, a superficial one. Developments from 1960 to 1962 demonstrated in important respects that, in the Lushan debate, Peng Teh-huai had been right and Mao Tse-tung had been wrong. The combined effects of Mao's irrational economic policies, successive natural calamities, and the Soviet sudden withdrawal of all technicians in mid-1960, brought forth severe economic disruptions, serious famine, and almost starvation throughout the country. Most of Mao's comrades, who had supported him, began to doubt his infallible wisdom and gradually merged in opposition to him. For example, in 1962, Liu Shao-chi revised and republished a series of lectures he delivered in Yanan in 1939 as a book entitled "On Self-Cultivation," which was widely circulated throughout the country. It clearly showed

³People's Daily Editorial, "Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought," Peking Review, No. 27 (July 1, 1966), p. 6.

⁴Peng Teh-huai, "Letter of Opinion," ibid., p. 782.

his dissatisfaction with Mao's leadership:

For a time in the past, certain representatives of dogmatism... regard themselves as China's Marx or Lenin in the Party, and shamelessly asked our Party members to respect them as such to support them as "leaders" and to show them devotion and passion... It is beyond doubt that this kind of people within the Party should be opposed, exposed and buried in oblivion by our Party members.⁵

Confronted with the threat of economic and political collapse, the government and the Party, led by Liu Shao-chi, succeeded Mao as National Chairman in 1959, and Teng Shiao-ping, Secretary General of the Party, introduced incentive principles into economic affairs and adopted a drastic measure called the "three freedoms and one guarantee" to boost the peasants incentives for production. Under this measure, the peasants were allowed to farm limited private plots, to pursue their own handicrafts, and to sell their products in the free market, so long as they fulfilled the grain and raw material output quota recommended by the state. Politics and ideology were temporarily put aside. As Liu Shao-chi said:

The peasants have gained nothing from the collective economy in the last few years.
Don't be afraid of capitalism amoke, the free markets should continue to exist.⁶

Teng Shiao-ping echoed Liu in the same way:

⁵Quoted from Selection From China Mainland Magazines, No. 651 (April 22, 1969), p. 19. (Later referred as SCMM).

⁶Editorial Department of People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily, "Struggle Between the Two Roads in China's Countryside," Peking Review, No. 49 (December 1, 1967), p. 15.

Private farming is all right, so long as it raises output, just as it does not matter whether the cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice.⁷

Tao Chu even went further:

You are afraid of capitalism, but not malnutrition... You are afraid of this or that, but not of people's starvation... Capitalism is much better than starvation-ism and malnutrition-ism. Give the peasants a piece of land, some seeds, let peasants escape with life.⁸

Along with the moderation of economic measures, the Party also relaxed its stringent control over the society allowing a relative liberalization in the cultural and ideological spheres. Partly disaffected by the widespread sufferings caused by the Great Leap Forward and partly encouraged by the ruling elites then in authority, the intellectuals, most of whom were noted party officials, carried on a veiled political campaign in allegorical form or academic discussion against Mao. The topics of their criticism ranged from Mao's arrogant personality, his radical political and philosophical theories, to all of Mao's irrational policies including such crucial questions as his unjust purge of Peng Teh-huai and his attitude toward the Soviet Union. As the "Essential Points for Propaganda and Education in Connection with the Great Cultural Revolution" pointed out:

⁷ Ibid., p. 15

⁸ Nankai University Wei Tung Red Guard Headquarters, "How the Evil Wind of Going It Alone Is Stirred Up in Honan," Wei Tung (May 20, 1967).

Over a long period, however, a handful of representatives of the bourgeoisie within and outside the Party countered Chairman Mao's brilliant ideas with a black anti-Party and anti-socialist line of their own... In 1959, the right opportunists in the Party attacked the Party's Central Committee at Lushan meeting. Coordinating with them both before and after this event, the "Three-Family Village" sinister gang attacked the Party without let-up for several years, bring out Hai Jui Scolds the Emperor and Hai Jui Dismissed From Office and then publishing their Evening Chats at Yenshan and Notes from Three-Family Village in the fortnightly Qianxian (Frontline), Beijing Ribao (the Peking Daily) and Beijing Wan-bao (the Peking Evening News). Monsters and demons came out of their lairs in other cultural fields, too, and we waged tit-for-tat struggle against them. The current great cultural revolution represents the continuation and deepening of these struggle.⁹

For example, in the opera Hai Jui Dismissed From Office, which was labeled a big poisonous weed during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Wu Han voiced complaints and grievances about Peng Teh-Huai's dismissal in the words "It's unjust to relieve me of my post," and encouraged him "not to give in or lose heart" and "to make a fresh start after defeat."¹⁰ Liu Chao-chi echoed Wu Han in 1962 by declaring that the purge of Peng was an erroneous struggle that overstepped the limits.¹¹ In the latter half of 1965, when Mao fermented his large scale final counter-attacks, he clearly pointed out:

⁹"Essential Points for Propaganda and Education in Connection with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Peking Review, No. 29 (July 15, 1966), p. 16.

¹⁰Yao Wen-yuan, "On Three Family Village-the Reactionary Nature of 'Evening Talks at Yenshan' and 'Note from Three Family Village'," Peking Review, No. 22(May 27, 1966), p. 7.

¹¹See SCMM, No. 651 (April 22, 1969), pp. 38-39; and No. 652 (April 28, 1969), pp. 28-31.

The crux of Hai Jui Dismissed From Office is the question of dismissal from office. The Emperor Chia Ching dismissed Hai Jui from office. In 1959, we dismissed Peng Teh-huai from office. And Peng Teh-huai is Hai Jui too.¹²

In the Notes from Three-Family Village and Evening Chats at Yenshan, Teng To and Liao Mo-sha joined Wu Han to attack Mao's personality by implying that Mao suffered from a form of insanity that led him to irrational behavior and decisions. They suggested that he take a complete rest promptly. Otherwise, "he will make a lot of trouble." Regarding foreign affairs, they criticized Mao's alienation of the Soviet Union and the loss to China of Russian aid by warning that "if a man with a swelled head thinks he can learn a subject easily and then kicks out his teacher, he will never learn anything." In addition to these, Mao's famous dictum "the East Wind will prevail over the West Wind" was also ridiculed as "just hackneyed phrases without much meaning," and they advocated instead reconciliation with the Soviet Union -- "learning from and united with countries stronger than our own."¹³

In addition to literature, there was opposition in philosophy. Yang Hsien-chen, an elderly Chinese Communist philosopher, expounded a theory of "combining two into one" or "harmony of opposites" in direct opposition to Mao's thesis

¹²Quoted from Red Flag Editorial, "Two Diametrically opposed Documents," Peking Review, No.223 (June 2, 1967), p. 22.

¹³Yao Wen-yuan, "On Three Family Village," ibid., pp. 7-13.

of "one divides into two" which stressed the need of constant struggle between the contending aspects of contradiction, and served as the philosophical foundation of his permanent revolution doctrine.¹⁴ More significantly, there were also disputes in the military. Despite Lin Piao's enthusiastic advocacy of "creative application of Mao Tse-tung's Thought," and "politics taking command," a faction led by Lo Jui-ching, the Chief of General Staff, openly ridiculed Mao's "People's War" doctrine by stressing the importance of technology, modernization of weaponry, and favoring rapprochement with the Soviet Union for military assistance.¹⁵

All of these so called Khrushchev-type developments after 1959 not only directly challenged Mao's personal prestige and authority, but also challenged his alleged vision of how to build his brand of a true egalitarian communist state. No doubt he was frustrated at the time; however, he never gave up. As soon as economic conditions gradually stabilized and showed a promising sign in mid-1962, he began to assert himself. At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in September 1962, Mao reiterated his long cherished

¹⁴Red Flag Correspondent, "New Polemic on the Philosophical Front," Peking Review, No. 37 (September 11, 1964), pp. 9-12.

¹⁵Red Flag Editorial, "The Proletariat Must Take A Firm Hold of the Gun," Peking Review, No. 32 (August 4, 1967), pp. 36-39; "The Great Revolutionary Criticism," 1969 Yearbook On Chinese Communism.

notion, "never forget class struggle," and warned his comrades against the danger of the development of revisionism. Following the Plenary, Mao pushed the Party to launch a Socialist Education Campaign aimed at correcting the growing revisionist trends. But most senior members of the Party obviously regarded his warnings and demands as irrelevant to Chinese reality. They felt that many measures termed revisionist or capitalist were indispensable for economic recovery after 1959. Therefore, despite Mao's repeated warnings and interventions, the Socialist Education Campaign never met Mao's wish. They played, in Mrs. Mao's words, "dual tricks," While they payed lip service to Mao's demands, in practice they emasculated the essence of his directives -- the importance of class struggle.¹⁶ As Liu Shao-chi said in July 5, 1963:

We must not define the classes. We must investigate the bad elements... The policy must give people hope. The landlord have not incurred blood debts. They have been taking part in labor for the past decade and more and have reformed themselves properly. They may also change their class status ... Children of landlords must be judged by their own behavior. Marx had said: "The process of forming the proletariat is the process of transforming other classes."¹⁷

Even further, they tried to block Mao's radical suggestions and to prevent him from rocking the boat again by isolating him from daily state affairs. As Mao confessed in 1966.

¹⁶"Carrying Out the Four Clean-Up Line Which Is Left in Form and Right in Substance, and Sabotaging the Socialist Education Movement," SCMM, No. 652 (April 28, 1969), pp. 32-39.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 35.

Now there are independent kingdoms. I have not been consulted on many things...

Teng Shiao-ping was so deaf. At each meeting he used to sit far away from me. Since 1959, he has not reported to me for six years.

... At the time the 23-point decision was made, Peking had no way to cope with the situation, nor had the Party Center... I then felt that Peking did not carry out my suggestions. Why was the criticism against Wu Han not initiated in Peking? Why was it started in Shanghai? Because nobody in Peking was willing to start it.¹⁸

Mao apparently believed that unless some drastic measures were taken to eliminate all these renegades, the tricks played by Khrushchev on Stalin would be replayed by these revisionists on him someday after or even before his death. This kind of fear was revealed by official comments during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

After the establishment of socialist relations of production, the Soviet Union failed to carry out a proletarian cultural revolution in earnest. Bourgeois ideology ran rife, corrupting the minds of the people and almost imperceptibly undermining the socialist relations of production. After the death of Stalin, there was a more blatant counter-revolutionary moulding of public opinion by Khrushchev revisionist group. And this group soon afterwards staged its "palace" coup to subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat and usurped Party, military and government power.

Bourgeois ideas spreading unchecked inevitably leads to the ... emergence of such representatives of the bourgeoisie as Khrushchev, who will seize political power through a "palace" coup or a military coup or a combination of both. If the dictatorship of proletariat is to be consolidated... the ideological

¹⁸"Chairman Mao on the Question of Liu Teng-Tao," SCMM, No. 651 (April 22, 1969), p. 1.

roots of revisionism must be pulled out completely, and the roots... of Mao Tse-tung's Thought must be firmly implanted.¹⁹

However, at the same time, Mao was keenly aware that, due to the harsh reality, he could not get ascendancy over his opponents by challenging them on substantive policy issues, he turned the struggle instead to the ideological level. This might be the reason, according to Chalmers Johnson, why Mao "was living in an entirely different universe, one dominated by Marxism-Leninism and Sino-Soviet dispute."²⁰

Mao's Strategy of the Preparation for the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

The strategy led Mao's way to the final showdown with his revisionist opponents was shrewd and foxy. It combined, along with vigilance and perseverance, ambiguity and deception. As Parris Chang observed:

When situations were unfavorable, before he could be certain of victory, Mao would temporize, wait for "suitable climate and soil," and avoid hasty action. Behind the scene, however, Mao carefully prepared the ground for a decisive assault- he formed the coalition and recruited political allies ... and organized his supporters into action. His tactics of "divide and rule" and "take one at a time" kept his targets politically isolated and prevented them from taking concrete action. Such clever maneuvers often misled his opponents and kept them in dark as to his true intent,

¹⁹Red Flag Editorial, "Long Live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Peking Review, No. 25 (June 17, 1966), p. 8. Emphasis added.

²⁰Chalmers Johnson, "The Two Chinese Revolutions," The China Quarterly, No. 39 (July-September, 1969), p. 22.

thus enabling him to concentrate his strength to strike at them one by one.²¹

Mao believed all his life that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." But the new situation made him also realize that the pen had equal importance in eliminating his enemies within the Party. As he said in 1962:

To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary, first of all, to create public opinion, to do work in the ideological sphere. This is true for the revolutionary class as well as for the counter-revolutionary class.²²

Therefore, Mao worked to gain support of both the gun and the pen before he launched his overall attack.

Get Hold Of The Gun

In military realm, because of his successful manipulation of factional contradictions, Mao had won temporarily fullhearted support of Lin Piao. Under Lin's command, the People's Liberation Army, in addition to the intensive and continuous political indoctrination movement under the slogan of "creative study and application of Mao Tse-tung's Thought," launched a nationwide mass campaign of the whole nation to learn from the People's Liberation Army" in early 1964.²³

²¹Parris H. Chang, Power and Policy in China, p. 175.

²²Quoted from "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Peking Review, No. 33 (August 12, 1966), p. 6.

²³People's Daily, February 1, 1964; John Gittings, "The Learn from the Army Campaign," The China Quarterly (April-June, 1964), pp. 153-159.

Following the campaign, a network of political work departments, staffed largely by military officers, was established throughout the social, political, economical and educational organs at all levels.²⁴ This measure enabled the People's Liberation Army to extend its influence into the operations of the government as well as the Party. The other crucial event which enabled Mao and Lin to hold the People's Liberation Army for the support of domestic purge was their victory in the debate over Communist China's role in the Vietnam war. During 1965, when the escalation of the United States military involvement in Vietnam seriously threatened Communist China's security and challenged Mao's position of supporting world revolution, an intense argument arose within the Party. Superficially it was a debate over peace and war; in essence, it was a controversy over the question of whether the United States or the Soviet Union should be considered the primary enemy at the time. One faction, represented by Lo Jui-ching, the Chief of General Staff, with the support of Liu Shao-chi, advocated active intervention to defeat the United States imperialists through united action with the Soviet Union. The other, headed by Lin Piao and backed by Mao, favored a people's war strategy which would forego direct military confrontation with the United States unless China was attacked. The latter

²⁴"Political Work Is the Lifeline of All Work," Red Flag (March 31, 1964); People's Daily, May 18, 1965.

faction firmly refuted Lo's suggestion of reconciliation with the Soviet Union believing that the modern revisionists were even more dangerous than U.S. imperialists. Mao and Lin won the battle. Lo Jui-ching was purged and Lin Piao's subordinate Yang Cheng-wu succeeded him as acting Chief of General Staff. In June 1966, Fu Tsung-pi, a long time aide to Yang, was appointed to take over Command of the Peking Garrison.²⁵ Therefore, before Mao unleashed his little revolutionary generals, he generally could hold the People's Liberation Army as his obedient weapon against his opponents, at least at the central level.

The significance of this crucial debate in the subsequent domestic power struggle was clear. Had Lo Jui-ching won, Communist China's primary enemy at that time would have been the United States, and a reconciliation with the Soviet Union for united action in Vietnam would have been expected. Furthermore, in effective preparation for the confrontation with the United States imperialists, all the existing domestic pragmatic policies would have been justified as indispensable. In such case, Mao would lose all bases to launch a large scale purge. But Mao won. Ironically, with the cooperation of President Johnson's limited Vietnam war policy,²⁶ Mao not only

²⁵Michael Yahuda, "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965-66," The China Quarterly, No. 49 (January-March, 1972), pp. 32-75; Uri Ra'anan, "Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate,' 1965-1966," and Donald S. Zagoria, "The Strategic Debate in Peking," in China in Crisis, Tang Tsou, ed., Vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 23-71, 237-268; Stanley Karnow, Mao and China, pp. 150-151.

²⁶Stanley Karnow, ibid., p. 152.

could reserve the People's Liberation Army to employ at a crucial point to defeat his domestic enemies, but also could manipulate public anti-Soviet feeling, both ideologically and patriotically, to support his oppressive measures.

Creation of Public Opinion

In the creation of public opinion, Mao's strategy to whip up the sentiments and feelings inimical to his opponents was very clear with the benefit of hindsight, but was ambiguous to his opponents and outside observers at the beginning.

Escalation of Sino-Soviet Disputes

In addition to the nationwide political indoctrination sponsored by the People's Liberation Army and the Socialist Education Campaign, both designed to strengthen the cultivation of Mao's personality cult and to recover public confidence in the infallibility of Mao's wisdom which had been greatly damaged after the Great Leap Forward, Mao deliberately escalated the Sino-Soviet disputes through the criticism of Soviet revisionism to convince the Chinese public that his intended Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution would be an inevitable development of China's "genuine" communist revolution. The documents of his open polemics with the Soviet Union clearly indicated Mao's double-edged strategy of combating foreign revisionists to prevent revisionism at home. While he ostensibly attacked Khrushchev as "a negative example of world

communist movement," Mao actually insinuated that his domestic opponents were Khrushchevites.²⁷ For example, in the course of his criticism of Khrushchev, Mao also diagnosed an equally dangerous situation in China that had developed since 1959.

In "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World -- Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (9)," made the point in this way:

Is our society today thoroughly clean? No, it is not. Classes and class struggle still remain, the activities of the overthrown reactionary classes plotting a comeback still continue ... There are also cases of degeneration in a few primary organizations; what is more, these degenerates do their utmost to find protectors and agents in the higher leading bodies. We should not in the least slaken our vigilance against such phenomenon but must keep fully alert.²⁸

It was obvious that the protectors and agents in the higher leading bodies were Liu Shao-chi and his followers.

Along with the escalation of Sino-Soviet disputes, Mao purposefully launched a nationwide mass campaign of training revolutionary successors from the younger generation.²⁹ Mao's purpose in this campaign can be clearly understood through his

²⁷"Seven Letters Exchanged between the Central Committee of the C.P.C. and the C.P.S.U., "Peking Review, No. 19 (May 8, 1964), pp. 7-18; "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," Peking Review, No. 30 (July 26, 1963), pp. 10-26; "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World," Peking Review, No. 29 (July 17, 1964), p. 7-28.

²⁸"On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism," ibid., p. 24. Emphasis added.

²⁹People's Daily Editorial, "Training Millions of Successors to Proletarian Revolution," Peking Review, No. 32 (August 7, 1964), pp. 12-15.

announced criteria of the revolutionary successors. Part of the criteria were:

They must be genuine Marxist-Leninist and not revisionist like Khrushchev wearing the cloak of Marxism-Leninism.

They must be proletarian statesmen... they must especially watch out for careerists and conspirators like Khrushchev and prevent such bad elements from usurping the leadership of the Party and Government at any level.

They must be modest and prudent... They must not cover up their errors like Khrushchev, and claim all the credit for themselves and shift all the blame on others.³⁰

By organizing the youngsters to participate in actual class struggle at all political levels and encouraging them to revolt against authority,³¹ this campaign proved to be a psychologically successful exploitation of the idealistic, patriotic and impulsive characteristics of the youth. It not only stirred up the youngster's revolutionary fervor and anti-revisionist feeling, but also paved the way for the Red Guard movement at the outset of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Cultural Reform

Mao's other measure for molding public opinion was cultural reform. Beginning in late 1962, Mao made great

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 13-14; "On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism," ibid., pp. 26-27.

³¹ "Training Millions of Successors to Proletarian Revolution," ibid., p. 15

efforts to rectify the ideological and cultural fields where there had existed a "black line" running against him since the failure of the Great Leap Forward. But the results generally did not meet his wish. As he said in a speech in June 1964:

In the past 15 years, these [literary and art] associations and most of their publications for the most part had not carried out policies of the Party and had acted as high and mighty bureaucrats... In recent years, they had even slid to the verge of revisionism.³²

In concert with the escalation of the Sino-Soviet disputes, Mao, in the same speech, firmly asked the Party that serious steps be taken to remold all of these literary and art associations. Otherwise, he warned that "they were bound at some future date to become groups like the Hungarian Petofi Club."³³ Thereafter, from July 1964 to August 1965, a relatively thorough rectification campaign was carried out. Most of the revisionist views such as class harmony and bourgeois humanism were widely attacked. Consequently, many literary figures, including noted communist intellectuals like Tien Han, Yang Han-sheng and Yang Hsien-chen, were seriously criticized.³⁴ However, in Mao's mind, the campaign still had not gone far enough, because the most notorious revisionists were spared.

³²Quoted from "Essential Points for Propaganda and Education in Connection with the Great Cultural Revolution," Peking Review, No. 29 (July 15, 1966), p. 17.

³³Ibid., p. 17

³⁴Ibid., p. 16; Red Flag Editorial, "Love Live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Peking Review, No. 25 (June 17, 1966).

Thus, in September 1965, at a Central Committee meeting, Mao directly singled out Wu Han and his play "The Dismissal of Hai Jui from Office" as the representative of bourgeois and reactionary thinking, and suggested that it should be publicly condemned.³⁵ All of Mao's opponents at the meeting were obviously alarmed. They immediately discerned that Mao's real target was not Wu Han, the deputy mayor of Peking, but Wu's boss Peng Chen. And they probably were also aware of the dire consequences if Peng Chen was attacked. Therefore, Mao's demand met a united boycott. It made Mao realize that his suggestions could not be implemented in Peking.³⁶ So he was forced to seek support elsewhere. In Shanghai, with the assistance of Mrs. Mao, an article "On the New Historical Drama Hai Jui Dismissal from Office," under the signature of Yao Wen-yuan, was finally published in Wen Hui Pao on November 10, 1965. It directly accused Wu Han's play as a "poisonous weed," which viciously advocated the reactionary views of those who sought to demolish the People's commune by favoring bourgeois economic programs. Due to Mao's active maneuvering behind the scene, Yao's article gradually received greater publicity and finally aroused a nationwide fervor of "counter-attack Wu Han and a handful of other anti-Party elements and

³⁵"Essential Points for Propaganda and Education in Connection with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," ibid., p. 18.

³⁶"Chairman Mao on the Question of Liu Teng-tao," SCMM, No. 651 (April 22, 1969), p. 1.

their supporters," It was described by the official news media:

{The article} was the opening shot in the criticism of Wu Han and his ilk... Rapidly, and with irresistible power, the great cultural revolution swept forward and attained a high tide of unprecedented magnitude.³⁷

On June 3, 1966, the Peking Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was reorganized. Peng Chen and his followers were purged.³⁸ The Maoists finally recaptured all of the news media in the Capitol that had been controlled by the bourgeois representatives for so long a time.³⁹

As Lin Piao repeatedly advocated during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution:

The pen and the gun: these are the two props on which one relies in seizure of political power. And in carrying out subversive activities, the bourgeoisie also gives first place to ideology, first of all, to confuse people ideologically. Another measure is to get hold of armed forces, to get hold of the gun. By co-ordinating the cultural and military fronts they hope to control both public opinion and the gun, thus making it possible for them to stage a counter-revolutionary coup.⁴⁰

³⁷"Essential Points for Propaganda and Education in Connection with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," ibid., p. 18.

³⁸People's Daily Editorial, "New Victory for Mao Tse-tung's Thought--Decision of C.C.P. Central Committee to reorganize the Peking Municipal Party Committee," Peking Review, No. 24 (June 10, 1966), pp. 3-4.

³⁹Ibid.; "To Be Proletarian Revolutionaries or Bourgeois Royalists?" Peking Review, No. 24 (June 10, 1966), pp. 14-15.

⁴⁰Quoted from Red Flag Editorial, "The Proletariat Must Take a Firm Hold of the Gun," Peking Review, No. 32 (August 4, 1967), p. 39.

Now Mao could get hold of both the gun and pen. The days of his opponents, the capitalist roaders within the Party or the Chinese Khrushchevs, were surely numbered!

Conflict Behavior of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution

From August 1 to 12, 1966, Mao convened the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eight Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. In the course of the Plenum, two important decisions were made. One was the Sixteen-Point Decision concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The other was the reorganization of the Politburo. In the new Politburo, Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh and Chen Yun were demoted from their post as vice chairman of the Party. Lin Piao was elevated to be Mao's only deputy. Although the legal nature of the Plenum was questionable⁴¹ and the decisions were made only by a marginal majority,⁴² it admitted Mao's plan of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and lent legitimacy to his large scale purge.

⁴¹Chinese Communist Party Constitution stipulated that only the Party Congress has the authority to make structural change such as the number of vice Party chairmen. The attendants of the Plenum were unknown to outsiders. In addition to a large number of revolutionary teachers and students, no mention was made in the Plenum Communique of the number of the members of the CC who attended the Plenum. Tokyo World Weekly (No. 37, 1966) reported that only 46 percent of the total members actually attended the Plenum.

⁴²Mao Tse-tung, "Talk to Foreign Visitors," Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 4200, p. 2. (Later referred as SCMP).

One week after the Plenum, on August 18, Mao ceremoniously met a million organized young students at Peking Tien-anman Square. Thereafter, a storm called the Red Guard movement shook the whole country. The excitable youngsters took very seriously their designation as the revolutionary successors who would not succumb to the "sugar-coated bullets" of enemies at home and abroad. Under the slogan of struggle against old ideas, culture, customs and habits, they rampaged about the country to do almost everything they pleased. They attacked everyone, both civilian and officials, whom they thought to be reactionaries or revisionists. They broke into every place to destroy or confiscate anything which they thought to be ancient, foreign, or bourgeois. "To rebel is justified." The revolutionary fire was wildly kindled, and the whole country was plunged into serious tumult. "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Now, with the gun behind him, Mao was trying to use the masses to defeat his enemy within the Party. But the enemy within the Party, in some aspects, might be even more tenacious than any enemy Mao had encountered before. The masses might not be as faithful and manageable as the gun.

{T}otalitarian leadership tends to overestimate the basis of its strength and to be misled by the appearances of universal support which it requires from all the citizens as their normal everyday standard of behavior. Thus it may fail to realize that its real support is dwindling away, until the very structure of the system begins to crumble and crash.⁴³

⁴³Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 15-16.

Thus, a fierce power struggle along with widespread social disturbance began.

Struggle of Ideology

The Sixteen Point Decision pointed out that the objectives of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution were:

to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road; to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois literature and ideology:
to transform... the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.⁴⁴

According to this document, it was clear that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution involved two aspects: one was the struggle of ideology, and the other, the struggle of seizing political power. Though the ideological dispute might be only a "smoke screen," it played an important role throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

It sets the standards for determining the gravity of the alleged offenses and it helps to place the deviators from revealed truth in a position of social and political ostracism. In all cases the elimination of "sinners," of "heretics," find a rationale in the doctrinal certainty provided by the official code of the system. And the leadership's unique monopoly on "truth" permits dogmatic censure of actions which only yesterday might have been called most orthodox and loyal.⁴⁵

⁴⁴"Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Peking Review, No. 33 (August 12, 1966), pp. 4-12.

⁴⁵Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge, p. 33

Theoretically, the Maoists treated the ideological disputes as a struggle between two lines; but its fundamental tasks were to study and apply Mao Tse-tung's Thought and let Mao Tse-tung's Thought to take hold of all positions.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is to vigorously destroy bourgeois ideology and establish proletarian ideas. To establish proletarian ideas is to spread Mao Tse-tung's Thought extensively and make Mao Tse-tung's Thought penetrate the people's minds still further.⁴⁶

The justification of giving prominence to Mao Tse-tung's Thought varied in different situations. The central point was that,

Precisely because Comrade Mao-Tse-tung is on all occasions supremely skilled at applying Marxist-Leninist dialectical and historical materialism in summing up the new experiences in all kinds of revolutionary struggles. Mao Tse-tung's Thought has been and is the sole correct guiding principle in different stages of the Chinese revolution and a powerful ideological weapon of revolution in the hands of the oppressed people and oppressed nations against imperialism, modern revisionism and all reactionaries.⁴⁷

For this reason, the Maoists believed that this struggle affected not only "the destiny and future" of Communist China, but also "the destiny and future of world revolution."⁴⁸ As the official document stated:

⁴⁶Red Flag Editorial, "Victoriously March Forward Along the Road of Mao Tse-tung's Thought," Peking Review, No. 35 (August 26, 1966), p. 18.

⁴⁷The People's Daily Editorial, "Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought," Peking Review, No. 27 (July 1, 1966), p. 5.

⁴⁸Red Flag Editorial, "Long Live the Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Peking Review, No. 25 (June 17, 1966), p. 7.

The first socialist country, the Soviet Union, was dragged by Khrushchev revisionism on to the road of capitalism. Now all the oppressed people and oppressed nations of the whole world placed their hopes on the revolutionary New China... Our Party has become the base of the world revolution. Our Party has become the standard bearer of the world revolution. Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the beacon of the world revolution. If these anti-Party and anti-socialist elements made China change its color who can say how many more of the oppressed people in all countries would die, how many much more suffering they would have to endure, and by how many years the victory of the world revolution would be delayed.⁴⁹

Therefore, Mao Tse-tung's Thought was considered the soul of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that must be applied as the sole criterion of the distinction between right and wrong, revolution and anti-revolution.

Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the yardstick distinguishing the genuine revolutionary from the sham revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary, the Marxist-Leninist from the revisionist. Anyone who opposes Mao Tse-tung's Thought, now or in the future, will be a mortal enemy of the revolution and the people and will be condemned by the whole Party and denounced by the whole nation.⁵⁰

The differences between the two lines in substantial issues could be summarized as Table 1.

The major technique Mao employed in the field of the ideological struggle was the "extensive democracy under the leadership of Proletariat." It meant "mobilizing hundreds of millions of people under the command of Mao Tse-tung's Thought to launch a general attack on the enemies of socialism and,

⁴⁹"Essential Points for Propaganda and Education in Connecting with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Peking Review, No. 29 (July 15, 1966), pp. 20-21.

⁵⁰The People's Daily Editorial, "Long Live Mao Tse-tung's Thought," Peking Review, No. 27 (July 1, 1966), p. 8.

TABLE 1
CONFLICT ISSUES*

Category	Mao's Radicalism	Liu's Pragmatism	Mao's Criticism of Liu's Pragmatism
Philosophy	One divides into two	Two combines into one	Revisionism, bourgeois world outlook.
Politics	Permanent class struggle. Reformation of Party and bureaucracy through mass movement.	Dying out of class struggle. Assertion of Party leadership. Rectification based on solving practical problems.	The same approach Khrushchev used in usurping the leadership of Party and state in Russia.
Economy	Politics taking command. Collectivization and self-reliance.	Material incentives. Emphasis on differentiation and technology.	Restoration of capitalism.
Literature	Political Guidance	Liberalization	Preparing public opinion for a Khrushchevite counter-revolutionary coup.
Education	Egalitarian	Specialization	Bourgeois, revisionism.
Military	Politics taking command. People's War. Self-reliance.	Modernization. Technology first.	Revisionist and reactionary.
Foreign Affairs	Militant	Peaceful coexistence	Three capitulations and one extinction. Three Reconciliations and one reduction.**

* Material source of this Table see Appendix I.

** Three capitulations and one extinction: Capitulation to the imperialists modern revisionists and reactionaries of different countries, and stamping out of the flames of revolution around the world. Three reconciliations and one reduction: Peaceful relations with the imperialists, reactionaries and modern revisionists, reduction of assistance and support to the revolutionary struggle of other peoples.

at the same time, criticize and supervise leading organs and leading cadres at all levels." It was obvious that this so called "extensive democracy" was only a "means," not an "end," and it was conditioned only by submitting to Mao's personal will. As was pointed out:

Chairman Mao teaches us: "Democracy sometimes seems to be an end, but it is in fact only a means." What we aim to achieve by means of extensive democracy is the carrying out of the great proletarian cultural revolution and the development of the cause of socialism. If we depart from the interests of the proletariat and other laboring people, from socialism and from the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao, we shall not be able to have extensive proletarian democracy, and the result can only be the oppression of the revolutionary masses by a small number of persons.⁵¹

Therefore, like all other dictators have done in history, Mao's "extensive democracy" for conducting his ideological struggle was in substance a "hate campaign." As Brzezinski observed:

The "hate campaign" is highly characteristic of modern totalitarian regimes... all problems, all dissatisfactions and tensions immediately become issues with which the leadership must be vitally concerned. Hence it tries to anticipate hostility so that it can cope with it. It must create artificial outlets within the state for the dissatisfaction which inevitably develops... It is interesting to note ... that purge provokes a somewhat favorable popular response when directed against administrative and party personnel.⁵²

Because of Mao's successful manipulation of this situation, while the fire of the Cultural Revolution was officially

⁵¹People's Daily and Red Flag Editorial, "Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Through to the End," Peking Review, No. 1 (January 1, 1967), p. 13

⁵²Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge, pp. 33-34.

kindled, the violence quickly submerged the whole country even beyond Mao's expectation. Numerous demonstrations against "capitalist roaders" were staged by enthusiastic masses with different motivations. All real or imagined reactionary or anti-revolutionary elements within the Party and government were dragged out for mass judgement, ranging from public humiliation such as struggle meetings, public tirals, parades with dunce's caps and attacks by big character posters, to personal torture such as forced self-criticism, Kangaroo courts, and physical injuries. Some of the victims who could not bear the torture committed suicide. Most of them suffered repugantly.

This ideological "hate campaign" against domestic opponents was further intensified and justified by connecting them with psychologically created external enemies. "The external foe is the greatest internal friend of the totalitarian dictator."⁵³ Because so called revisionism and capitalism were logically associated with foreign imperialists, and China's grievances in the past semicolonial time could be easily manipulated especially in the closed Communist Chinese society, the "extensive democracy" was carried out with a purposeful cultivation of blind hatred for imperialists. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, in April 1967, Chi Pen-yu, a young radical in the Central Cultural Revolution Group, whom Mao had appraised so high then, published an article

⁵³Ibid., p. 34

"Patriotism or National Betrayal-- Criticism on the Film of the Inside Story of the Ching Court" which appeared in most of Communist China's important news media. In the article the Boxer (Yi Ho-tuan) Uprising of late nineteenth century, which Chinese historians had condemned, was fullheartedly praised.

In his great works, Chairman Mao highly appraises the Yi Ho-tuan and extols its heroic deeds again and again. He regards Yi Ho-tuan movement as an important stage in the development of China's bourgeois democratic revolution.⁵⁴

He regarded the film Inside Story of the Ching Court, which condemned the Boxers, as reactionary and alleged that it was supported from behind by a handful of revisionists.

But the reactionary and thoroughly traitorous film, Inside Story of the Ching Court, praised by a handful of counter-revolutionary revisionists and the top Party person in authority taking capitalist road supporting them from behind, expresses a deep-rooted class hatred for the anti-imperialist revolutionary mass movement of the Yi Ho-tuan, and does its best to defame and slander it. The film portrays the revolutionary action of Yi Ho-tuan against imperialism as a sort of barbarous turmoil. It tries its utmost to smear the Yi Ho-tuan, maliciously attacking it as "mad mobs" who "committed murder and arson," and as "ignorant people" who engaged in "witchcraft." ⁵⁵

Therefore, these revisionists were labeled as outrageously anti-Chairman Mao.

Chairman Mao teaches us that before the wild beasts of imperialism revolutionary people must not show the slightest timidity. But in the eyes of the scenarist and those who praised the film, there is no alternative but to surrender helplessly to imperialist aggression--all this is naked national capitulation, the philosophy of traitors.⁵⁶

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 7.

The results of this "hate campaign" against imperialism was clearly revealed in Red Guards wild actions of beating priests, burning churches and foreign diplomatic buildings. And its influence on Communist China's foreign behavior was profound. (For details see the following chapter).

Struggle of Seizing Power

The process of seizing power was not only violent but also complicated. It was a conflict not only between the Maoist coalition and its opponents, but also within the Maoist coalition itself. It was not only a factional conflict at the central, but also at the local levels which partly was fermented by the central elites of certain factions and partly by the local elites for their own interests. In addition to official factional struggles, there were spontaneous civil uprisings. These complicated power struggles, most of the time completely out of the track of ideological lines, resulted in almost total disruption of the society and brought the whole country near the brink of civil war.

Struggle Between Maoists and Anti-Maoists

Mao's nationwide struggle against his opponents encountered unexpectedly strong and varied opposition from the ruling government as well as Party bureaucracy at all levels. Those of Mao's intended victims who were actually in authority

refused to submit tamely to the Maoist purge. They employed every possible means at their disposal to fight back while Maoist revolutionary rebel groups rampaged about the country and attacked the Party and government authorities. The most effective weapon the anti-Maoist cadres employed was what the Maoists condemned as economism. At first, they used "taking hold of production" as a pretext to repress the Maoist Red Guards.⁵⁷ Later, they tried hard to damage the economy in order to sabotage the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The seriousness of the situation in late 1966 was described by the official condemnation.

The reactionary elements freely squander the wealth of the state, arbitrarily increase wages and benefits, wantonly distribute all kind of funds and materials and stir up the masses to take over public buildings by force and use them as their own. They instigate violent struggles, create incidents, incite a number of workers to desert their posts in production, thus bringing some factories to a standstill and disrupting railway and road traffic. They even incite harbor personnel to stop work. Some leading members of the railway departments use similar means to disrupt rail transport in a vain attempt to sabotage the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.⁵⁸

The second anti-Maoist cadre's tactic was to incite the masses to struggle against each other. They organized their own Red Guards and red worker's militias within their

⁵⁷Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, "Notice on Anti-Economism, January 11, 1967," in 1967 Yearbook on Chinese Communism.

⁵⁸People's Daily and Red Flag Editorial, "Oppose Economism and Smash Latest Counter-Attack by the Bourgeois Reactionary Line," Peking Review, No. 4 (January 20, 1967), pp. 13-14.

own power area and stirred up the local populace's resentment of outsiders. The Maoist little revolutionary generals who came in from the outside were sometimes cruelly attacked, beaten up and jailed by these local rebel groups. These methods were vehemently condemned by the Maoists:

(Those) who stubbornly persist in the bourgeois reactionary line are not reconciled to their defeat... They have secretly organized and manipulated some people and mass organizations, whom they have hoodwinked, to suppress revolution, protect themselves, and to provoke conflicts in which coercion or force are used in a vain attempt to create confusion. They spread rumors turned black into white and shifted the blame for the evil they had done behind people's back on to the proletarian revolutionaries, labelling the latter with the bourgeois reactionary line.⁵⁹

The third kind of struggle between Maoist and anti-Maoist was the fake seizure of power. Some anti-Maoist cadres pretended to be Maoist revolutionaries. They welcomed the Maoist revolutionary groups but manipulated to control them. As Red Flag Editorial denounced:

In some place, these reactionary elements have resorted to the method of worming their way in (to ranks of the revolutionaries) and pulling people out of the revolutionary ranks in a vain attempt to split up the great alliance of the proletarian revolutionaries, and usurp the leadership of the revolutionary rebel organizations. In this way they hope to shift the general orientation of the struggle.⁶⁰

⁵⁹People's Daily and Red Flag Editorial, "Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Through to the End," Peking Review, No. 1 (January 1, 1967), pp. 9-11.

⁶⁰Red Flag Editorial, "On the Proletarian Revolutionaries Struggle to Seize Power," Peking Review, No. 6 (February 3, 1967), p. 11.

Finally, the anti-Maoists counter-attack included the creation of social dislocation. They induced or permitted the youths and other urban elements, who had been sent to the countryside (hsia-feng), to return to the cities. Thus, the transportation system was jammed and cities were swamped with the so called "black elements." These tricks greatly aggravated an already disrupted society.⁶¹

Struggle Within Maoist Coalition

When Mao found that his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was virtually stalled by his opponents' unexpectedly formidable and tenacious counter-attack, he decided to act resolutely. By the end of January 1967, Mao ordered the Liberation Army to intervene on the side of Maoist revolutionaries in the newly launched campaign of an overall seizure of power.⁶² The intervention of the Liberation Army quickly changed the nature of the battle, but not exactly in favor of the Maoist revolutionaries as Mao had expected. The harsh reality revealed that the Liberation Army was not solidly united behind the Defense Minister, and was still divided by divergent regional allegiances, political nuances, historical

⁶¹Chalmers A. Johnson, "China: The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective," Asian Survey (January, 1968), p. 6.

⁶²"The People's Liberation Army Firmly Backs the Proletarian Revolutionaries," Liberation Army Daily, January 25, 1967; Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power," The China Quarterly, No. 34 (April-June, 1968), p. 8.

factional loyalties and professional aspirations.⁶³ Therefore, the struggle for power became even more complicated.

Power struggles among ruling elites in a totalitarian regime, as previously pointed out, is constantly a matter of life and death. At the beginning of 1967, Liu-Teng's authority was generally crushed, though their policy lines were in reality still alive. While the on going seizure of power would determine the future distribution of power and would fatally influence the destiny of each faction within the Maoist triangular coalition,⁶⁴ the contradictions among them became acute. The radicals, led by Mrs. Mao and Chen Pao-ta, had a vested interest in continuing turmoil for the enhancement of their power position. But the bureaucrats or pragmatists, led by Chou En-lai, generally favored law and order for the consolidation of their long established status. The senior military officers, especially Lin Piao and his associates, often found themselves uniting expediently with Chou to protect themselves. The two sides fought a tug of war with neither of them gaining total ascendancy. As Edward E. Rice observed:

Each sought to gain the upper hand, and the relative

⁶³William Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 37 (January-March, 1969), pp. 1-30; Jurgen Domes, "The Role of the Military in the Formation of Revolutionary Committees, 1967-68," The China Quarterly (October-December, 1970), pp. 116-132.

⁶⁴The coalition consisted of Chou En-lai's bureaucrats, Chiang Ching and Chen Po-ta's radicals, and Lin Piao's militarymen. See James R. Townsend, Politics in China, pp. 280-283.

positions of the two sides appeared to shift back and forth as the ebb and flow of events lent new strength first to this side and then to the other.⁶⁵

From January Storm to the Adverse Current of February

Following Mao's call for the overall seizure of power in January 1967, which was dubbed the "January Storm,"⁶⁶ the radicals, in defiance of Chou En-lai's insistence that power seizure within the central government might not be conducted by outsiders, launched an indiscriminate attack on almost all old senior cadres and an overall invasion of ministries of State Council. It not only seriously jeopardized Chou En-lai's power base, but put all of the remaining officials in charge of central government offices in a danger of immediate purge. Thus, in mid-February 1967, the senior bureaucrats who, in Chen Yi's words, "tried to save each other and formed a group," headed by Vice Premier Tan Chen-lin with the indirect encouragement of Chou En-lai,⁶⁷ launched a united attack against the Maoist radicals' assault. This so called "Adverse Current" apparently frustrated the radicals initial seizure of power at the center. In the struggle for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, in the period of January Storm, the

⁶⁵Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 322-323.

⁶⁶For detail see Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power," ibid., p. 8.

⁶⁷Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way, pp. 318-336; "Tan Chen-lin in the February Adverse Current," SCMP., No. 4196 (May 2, 1968), p. 7.

radicals had set up a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Revolutionary Rebel Station to carry out revolution and supervise the work of foreign affairs. The Station not only interfered with the Ministry's ordinary operations, but purged most of its senior officials. As Chen Yi complained:

All of my heads of department have been moved. What sort of Minister am I, anyway?⁶⁸

By the end of January, Chen Yi was forced to make a self-criticism.⁶⁹

After the "Adverse Current" the Station was removed, and Chen Yi could fully reassert his power.⁷⁰ In surveying the situation, Chen Yi remarked:

If my advice had been followed earlier, things would not have come to this. Now the Foreign Ministry is in a mess, without organization, without discipline, and confidential material about foreign affairs had been taken off.⁷¹

In a mood of repugnance against the Cultural Revolution, he regretfully expressed his emotion with tears in eyes. "I have been a revolutionary for more than 40 years; I never thought that it would come to this."⁷² But his return to

⁶⁸Hung Wei Chan Pao (Red Guard Newspaper), April 8, 1967.

⁶⁹Chen Yi made self-criticism on January 24, 1967. The full text of his self-criticism was translated in Chinese Law and Government, No. 1 (Spring, 1968).

⁷⁰For details see Melvin Gurtov, "Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in China's Cultural Revolution," Rand Corporation, No. 5934 (March, 1969), pp. 17-23.

⁷¹Hung-Wei Chan Pao (Red Guard Newspaper), Peking, April 8, 1967.

⁷²Ibid.

power lasted only temporarily. When the "Adverse Current" had been reversed, Chen Yi was doomed to trouble again.

The Rise and Fall of the May 16 Group.⁷³

The bureaucrats counter-attack lasted approximately only a month. In March 1967, Vice Premier Tan Chen-lin and those who cooperated with him in launching the "Adverse Current" were finally purged by Mao. Chen Yi, the troubled foreign Minister, escaped barely by a hair's breadth. Tan's purge obviously encouraged the radicals within the Central Cultural Revolution Group. In their renewed struggle against the State Council, these radicals were alleged with having formed a shadow cabinet with Wang Li as Premier and Kuan Feng as Vice Premier and Foreign Minister.⁷⁴ Gradually, obviously with the support of Mrs. Mao and Chen Po-ta, they secretly organized themselves into a group which was later called the May 16 Conspiracy. From April on, most of the remaining Ministers, Vice Ministers, and many senior cadres were attacked again.⁷⁵ Under the slogan that "the current struggle is one

⁷³It was a small group of the young radicals in the Central Cultural Revolution Group. The leading members were Wang Li, Kuan Feng, Chi Pen-yu, Mu Hsin, Lin Chich and Chao I-ya. They named their group from Mao's May 16, 1966 Circular. The Circular urged full implementation of the Cultural Revolution and pointed out that the revisionists in the army should be criticized and repudiated.

⁷⁴1970 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, p. II-7.

⁷⁵Donald Klein, "The State Council and the Cultural Revolution," The China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), pp. 78-95.

between the new cultural revolution group and the old government," the radicals now even pointed their spearhead directly at Chou En-lai. As the Red Guards publication wrote:

Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping have fallen, and Chou X X has become the general representative of all reactionary forces in China.⁷⁶

In the Foreign Ministry, the attacks against Chen Yi were renewed. On April 8, 1967, the Rebel Group Liaison Station for seizing power was set up again in his Ministry. Thereafter, countless demonstrations against Chen Yi were staged, accusing him of having stubbornly executed Liu Shao-chi's bourgeois reactionary foreign policies of "three capitulations and one extinction," and "three reconciliations and one reduction."⁷⁷ Despite Chou En-lai's efforts to protect him, the radicals attacks continued. It reached its peak in August 1967 while Yao Tung-shan⁷⁸ and other radicals, with Mrs. Mao and Wang Li behind them, actually controlled the operations of the Ministry for almost half a month. The situation of the Foreign Ministry under radical control was described by Chou En-lai.

⁷⁶Quoted from Barry Burton, "The Cultural Revolution's Ultraleft Conspiracy: The May 16 Group," Asian Survey (November, 1971), p. 1040.

⁷⁷See SCMP., No. 3939, p. 7.

⁷⁸Yao Teng-shan had been a Charge d' affaires ad interim in Indonesia. On April 28, 1967, he was declared personae non gratae by the Indonesian government and ordered to leave the country. Upon his return to Peking, he was declared "red diplomatic fighter" and given heroes' welcome on April 30.

When the Foreign Ministry went to the brink, I held a meeting... I was directly responsible for running the Foreign Ministry and as a result they seized power from me. They sent telegrams directly to foreign embassies. As a result they were sent back. Yao Tung-shan went everywhere making reports and creating trouble. He went to the Ministry of Foreign Trade once. His report to the Ministry of Foreign Trade was... very provocative.⁷⁹

After this, Yao Teng-shan immediately faded from public sight and was blamed as a schemer of the Khrushchev type who was "mad with ambition and blinded by the lust for gain."⁸⁰

While the radicals worked hard to seize power at the center, they also kept an eye on the local levels. At the outset of the Liberation Army's intervention, most of regional commanders and officers were apparently motivated less by a conviction in the righteousness of Maoism or the Cultural Revolution than by the more common inclination of soldiers to impose stability on the untidy situation in their country. In most areas, due to the lack of clear criteria from the Maoist central for distinguishing between right and wrong, and the wild activities of the revolutionary rebels, the army sometimes found it necessary to suppress rampaging Maoists as well as anti-Maoists for the sake of preserving law and order and their own political objectives.⁸¹ The radicals were

⁷⁹Quoted from Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs," ibid., p. 55.

⁸⁰"Drag out Yao Teng-shan, Big Political Pickpocket," in SCMP (Supp), No. 218 (December 13, 1967), pp. 4-5.

⁸¹Ellis Joffe, "Chinese Army in the Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Intervention," Current Scene, VIII, No. 8 (December 7, 1970); Jurgen Domes, "The Role of the Military in the Formation of Revolutionary Committees, 1967-1968," The China Quarterly (October-December, 1970), pp. 116-132.

obviously dissatisfied with what they considered to be the army's conservative or anti-Maoist attitude.⁸² After the Wuhan military mutiny in July 1967,⁸³ the radicals within the Central Cultural Revolution Group (labeled the May 16 Group) decided to exploit the incident by launching a provocative campaign of "drag out the handful of capitalist roaders in the army."⁸⁴ The "drag out" campaign was in full sway in the August and provoked the army generals at all levels. Considering the seriousness of the lessons of the Wuhan crisis and influenced by the united pressures from Lin Biao and Chou En-lai,⁸⁵ Mao could not but sacrifice the radicals in order to please his Great Wall - the Red Army.⁸⁶ Beginning in September of 1967, all of the conspirators in the May 16 Group were purged. Mrs. Mao was saved apparently because of her husband's protection. Even so, she found herself compelled to denounce her followers and to pay attribute to the role of the military in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.⁸⁷

⁸²See Barry Burton, "The Cultural Revolution's Ultra-left Conspiracy: The May 16 Group," ibid.

⁸³For the details of Wuhan military mutiny see Thomas W. Robinson, "The Wuhan Incident: Local Strife and Provincial Rebellion During the Cultural Revolution," Rand Corporation, December, 1970.

⁸⁴Red Flag Editorial July 30, 1967, "The Proletarian Must Take a Firm Hold of the Gun," Peking Review, No. 32 (August 4, 1967), pp. 36.

⁸⁵See Edward E. Rice, Mao's Way, pp. 411-412.

⁸⁶See Mao's speech in SCMP, No. 4060 (November 15, 1967), pp. 1-2.

⁸⁷"Chronicle Documents," The China Quarterly (October-December, 1967), pp. 212-216.

After the purge of the May 16 Group, the strength of the radicals was greatly weakened. At the outset, in August 1966, the Central Cultural Revolution Group consisted of 18 members. Little more than one year later, 13 among them were purged. The five survivors were Chen Po-ta, Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng, Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Chun-chiao.

With the retreat of Maoist radicals, the pragmatists once again got ascendancy. Beginning in September 1967, Chen Yi resumed his authority in Foreign Ministry though his health was greatly damaged due to mental strain. Mao personally argued that the rebel groups' accusation against Chen Yi was not true and ordered that all propaganda posters about the slogan "Down with Liu Teng Chen should be banned."⁸⁸

The Purge of General Yang, Fu, Yu, and the Denunciation of Rightist Reversal of Verdict

After the purge of the May 16 Group, a new trend toward law and order was discernable, especially following Mao's trip to a number of disrupted provinces.⁸⁹ Since September 1967, the army was authorized to take a firm hand with the Red Guards.⁹⁰ Throughout the fall and winter of 1967, with

⁸⁸ SCMP, No. 4060 (November 15, 1967), pp. 3-6.

⁸⁹ The significance of Mao's trip see Edward E. Rice, *ibid.*, pp. 413-432.

⁹⁰ People's Daily, September 17, 1967; Liberation Army Daily, September 17, 1967; "Order Issued by CCP Central Committee and Central Cultural Revolution Group Forbidding Seizure of Arms, Equipments and Military Supplies from PLA," in SCMP No. 4026, pp. 1-2.

the establishment of the three-way alliance revolutionary committee at the local level, the army played a decisive role and most of the new established revolutionary committees were dominated by the conservative military representatives and rehabilitated old cadres. This suggested the enhanced power of military and bureaucratic factions within the Maoist coalition in Peking.⁹¹ It was obviously not what Mao wanted. After approximately a half year's retreat, the surviving radicals within the Central Cultural Revolution Group began to reassert themselves in the spring of 1968. In late March 1968, three of Lin Piao's subordinates, Yang Chen-wu, the Acting Chief of Staff, Fu Chung-pi, Peking Garrison Commander, and Yu Li-chin, the Political Commissar of the Air Force, were purged. They were accused of collecting black materials against Mrs. Mao.⁹² It was apparently a struggle between Lin Piao and Mrs. Mao. When Mrs. Mao called for the dragging out of the black backstage boss of General Yang, Lin Piao retorted immediately: "His black backstage boss cannot be I."⁹³

After Yang, Fu and Yu's purge, a denunciation of the rightist reversal of verdicts and counter-revolutionary

⁹¹Winberg Chai, "The Reorganization of the Chinese Communist Party, 1966-68," Asian Survey (November, 1968), pp. 901-910; Richard Baun, "China: Year of the Mongoes," Asian Survey (January, 1969), pp. 5-9.

⁹²"Chronicle Documents," The China Quarterly (July-September, 1968), p. 177; Edward E. Rice, *ibid.*, pp. 443-458.

⁹³1970 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, p. II-7.

restoration were followed,⁹⁴ and Mrs. Mao significantly increased her public prominence and power.⁹⁵ Moreover, the leftist factionalism was praised and encouraged⁹⁶ that had been condemned in the winter of 1967. Thereafter, Factional violence intensified again and almost reached the level of 1967's.⁹⁷ Once again, Mao could not but turn to the army for help. Beginning in the fall of 1968, the Red Guards were disbanded, the radicals were forced temporarily into oblivion, and the whole country was actually ruled by military officers.

Red Guards Factional Internecine Struggle

One of Mao's alleged purposes was to train and temper through struggle a new generation of proletarian revolutionary successors. Despite Maoist continuous and intensive indoctrination, the Red Guards and other rebel groups did not live up to Mao's version of selfless new socialist men. Throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, these corruptible youngsters and adults were more inclined to win and enjoy power for themselves than to build a true Maoist communist society. As Mao painfully confessed in the middle of 1968.

⁹⁴People's Daily, April 10 and May 16, 1968; Red Flag, May 16, 1968.

⁹⁵On May Day appearance Mrs. Mao was placed in 9th leadership position instead of 19th on Oct. 1, 1967.

⁹⁶People's Daily, April 19, and 27, 1968.

⁹⁷For detail see the following paragraph.

Previously I had the intention to foster successors among the intellectuals but now this plan is far from desirable. The intellectuals including young undergraduates inside and outside the Party in the main continue to embrace the bourgeois world outlook... (Bourgeois ideas had) been infused into their blood. What they demonstrated was a propensity for factionalism. It is very important to rally under one banner, under Marxist slogan: Proletariat of the world, unite! However, they don't. They seem to favor a small group, with fewer people the better.⁹⁸

Beginning with Mao's call for the overall seizure of power in January 1967, the Red Guards and other mass revolutionary rebels soon developed factions and fought each other bitterly for division of the spoils and engaged ostensibly in disputes over who represented the Cultural Revolution and genuine Maoist ideology. The true aspects of Red Guards factional development can be vividly illustrated by Chen Yi's description of the Red Guards in his two foreign language institutes.

Originally there were twenty one units, but after a week, over seventy. Over four thousand people in over seventy units make seventy cliques. The ocean are vast to behold: this is truly one hundred flowers blooming and one hundred schools of thought contending.⁹⁹

At the provincial level, the situation was not any better. In most provinces there were hundreds of factions.¹⁰⁰ Taking Shanghai for example, by January 24, 1967, there were

⁹⁸ SCMP., No. 4201 (January, 1968), p. 5.

⁹⁹ Hung Wei Chan Pao, April 12, 1967.

¹⁰⁰ "Mass Factionalism in Communist China," Current Scene (May 15, 1968), pp. 1-13; The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), p. 217; People's Daily, May 22, 1967; 1968 and 1969 Yearbook on Chinese Communism.

111 rebel groups.¹⁰¹ The factional struggle for seizing power was even more confusing. As Chou En-lai observed when Mao Tse-tung asked him how the taking over of power was doing.

In some units, power is taken over by one group, and then another, and passes backward and forward.¹⁰²

The actual scene of the battle field of these mass struggles were the most horrible and depressing. Because of the accumulation of feuds as the struggle went on, the off and on intervention of the army, and the influence and encouragement of the central leadership's factional interests, these internecine struggles quickly degenerated into violent battles throughout the country and culminated in the Wuhan military mutiny in July 1967. The weapons the participants used ranged from traditional spears and daggers to machine guns and artillery; in a few occasions, even armored tanks. The fierceness of the struggle ranged from small group skirmishes to battles involving thousands of persons. For example, in one struggle in Changchow, Honan, "four hundred rebels were burned alive in a multibuilding."¹⁰³ Savage violences were also accompanied with cruelty. According to numerous reports, in addition to kangaroo courts and a variety of spiritual tortures, the gouging out of eyes, cutting off ears and noses,

¹⁰¹"Mass Factionalism in Communist China," ibid.

¹⁰²Quoted from Edward E. Rice, ibid., p. 325.

¹⁰³Chalmers A. Johnson, "China, The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective," Asian Survey (January, 1968) p. 10.

and burning, burying, or drowning people alive become frequent occurrences.¹⁰⁴ These nationwide violences were temporarily subdued by strict control measures through military intervention. But the second surge of these mass struggles renewed in mid 1968 were even worse, and the most violent in Southern China. According to The New York Times report, savage fighting among factions with modern weapons and ammunition in Southern China in the first half of 1968 cost the lives of participating groups of more than 100,000 people.¹⁰⁵ The violence was revealed by the hundreds of floating corpses that washed ashore in Hong Kong and Macao. Savage battles along with serious social crimes and disruptions as well as the destruction of railroads left thousands of houses burned out and Soviet military and economic supplies to North Vietnam waylaid and looted.¹⁰⁶

The fierce factional fightings across the country had greatly damaged Communist China's economy and brought the whole society near total disruption. Chou En-lai gloomily deplored the situation in Mao's name.

¹⁰⁴Union Research Services, XLVIII (August 8, 1967), pp. 152-153; Far Eastern Economic Review, LVII (August 24, 1967), p. 361.

¹⁰⁵The New York Times (September 22, 1968), p.11.

¹⁰⁶"Notice of CCP Central Committee, State Council, Military Commission of Central Committee and Central Cultural Revolution Group, July 1968," in SCMP., No. 4232 (August 6, 1968), pp. 1-13; The New York Times (June 28, 1968), p. 1 and (July 10, 1968), p. 1, 8; Stanley Karnow, Mao and China, pp. 338-443.

Chairman Mao said a few days ago that we are like a country divided into eight hundred princely states.¹⁰⁷

Even Mao himself could not but regret that "I think this is a civil war," when he personally toured the battle field.¹⁰⁸ It was obvious that Mao was completely disappointed with his revolutionary little generals whom he had previously praised highly. According to Stanley Karnow's report in the Washington Post, August 14, 1968, on the early morning of July 28, 1968, Mao personally summoned Peking Red Guard leaders and blamed them gloomily with tears in his eyes that their violent factional struggle was responsible for provoking the trend toward military rule. "You have let me down," he told them, "and what is more, you have disappointed the workers, peasants, and soldiers of China."

Thereafter, the importance of workers and peasants was emphasized¹⁰⁹ and the destiny of the Red Guards was doomed. In August 1968, the Liberation Army was given full power to suppress Maoist factional fightings and to restore order.¹¹⁰ Disciplinary squads of soldiers, workers, and peasants, called Mao Tse-tung's Thought Propaganda Team were organized to take over schools to curb the undisciplined youngsters and

¹⁰⁷Far Eastern Economic Review, LXVI (October 2, 1969), pp. 34-35.

¹⁰⁸SCMP., No. 4070 (November 30, 1967), p. 6.

¹⁰⁹People's Daily, August 18, 1968; Yao Wen-yuan, "The Working Class Must Exercise Leadership in Everything," Red Flag (August 15, 1968).

¹¹⁰People's Daily, August 18, 1968.

radical intellectuals.¹¹¹ Furthermore, the Hsia-Fang movement was in full swing in September 1968. Hundreds and thousands of little revolutionary generals were sent to the countryside and border regions.¹¹² The bloody Red Guards internecine struggle was now officially put to an end in tragedy.

Spontaneous Civil Anti-Government Revolts

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was in everyway an officially directed nationwide turmoil. Although spontaneous civil anti-government uprisings did exist, it seemed difficult to distinguish them clearly from those officially sponsored violences. However, some obvious clues still could be found with careful examination.

In a brief review of communist rule since 1949, its strict control, numerous mass movements and indoctrinations, serious economic disasters, and bureaucratic corruption had had caused widespread dissatisfaction within the society. Although the persevering and industrious ordinary Chinese people and humanistic minded intellectuals had taken all of these hardships silently, they never abandoned the hope for a chance to express themselves.¹¹³ Mao's Great Proletarian

¹¹¹Peking Review, (August 9, 1968), pp. 5-6.

¹¹²Peking Review, (October 4, 1968), pp. 14-15.

¹¹³Livio Maitan, Party, Army and Masses in China (London: NLB, 1976), pp. 52-61.

Cultural Revolution against his opponents was possible largely because of his manipulation of such mass grievances. He skillfully laid the blame on his opponents and acted as a savior. As Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out, a dictator often uses scapegoat strategy either to eliminate his opponent or to consolidate his position.¹¹⁴ Throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, most of the Maoist propaganda could be summarized into this pattern: Had Chairman Mao known, things would not be so bad; or had Chairman Mao's policy line been followed, China would be a paradise already. Thus, the Cultural Revolution provided the Chinese people a chance to demonstrate their long subdued grievances.

Workers Strike

It was true that the so called economism in early 1967 was initially agitated by some Party cadres who gave the workers some bonus in an attempt to win their support. But later incidents proved that the widespread dockers, railroaders and other factory workers' strikes and revolts were largely prompted by their accumulative genuine grievances. They were motivated more by their own benefits such as higher wages reasonable working hours and better life than by Maoist revolutionary causes. All these worker revolts virtually resulted in the disruption of foreign trade, confusion of transportation,

¹¹⁴Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge, pp. 34-35.

and the standstill of most factories¹¹⁵ that seriously damaged the Chinese economy.

Minority Groups Uprising

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution also provided a pretext for different segments of China's population to vent their grief.¹¹⁶ The most extraordinary incident was the revolt of Muslim Hui residents in Peking. On January 18, 1967, some four hundred Muslim Huis, under the name of the Cultural Revolution, stormed a police station in the Hsuanwu District of Peking, where their community was located, and injured several policemen. While the police arrested their leaders responsible for the attack, a larger Muslim Huis crowd returned to attack the police station again. "Crush the dog's head of the police," they shouted as they broke windows and smashed furnitures. This incident was an obvious protest against communist religious persecution and strict police control. Although this Huis revolt lasted only two weeks and finally suppressed by reinforced police strength, the official allegation could not but recognize that the anti-Maoist "dark

¹¹⁵Neale Hunter, "Port in a Storm," Far East Economic Review (June 22, 1967) pp. 663-667; Jan S. Prybyla, "Communist China: The Economy and the Revolution," Current History (September, 1968), pp. 135-137; The New York Times (January 17, 1969), p. 64.

¹¹⁶June Dreyer, "China's Minority Nationalities in the Cultural Revolution," The China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), pp. 96-109.

forces" were still powerful.¹¹⁷

Guerrilla Warfare

In extreme cases, the grievances of the depressed people found expression in guerrilla warfare. They formed into bands fighting in the hills and mountains in direct defiance of Maoist authority.¹¹⁸ For example, such "counter-revolutionary" guerrilla activities were so serious in Szechwan mountains that the local general asked for reinforcements to suppress them. In order to villify these counter-revolutionaries, the Maoist propaganda was compelled to accuse them as the remnants of Nationalist troops.¹¹⁹

Social Crimes

In addition to various kinds of organized revolts against official authority, there were also widespread serious crimes that almost tore apart the whole social fabric. A Notice issued by the central Maoist leadership clearly revealed the seriousness of these crimes.

The counter-revolutionaries in various regions were robbing banks and warehouses, burning or blowing

¹¹⁷Peking Daily, "Drag out the Handful of Counter-Revolutionaries in the 'Hui Nationality Rebel Regiment' to Face the Public," in SCMP (Supp) ., No. 177 (April 19, 1967), pp. 29-32.

¹¹⁸Thomas Mathews, "The Cultural Revolution in Szechwan," (Unpublished paper, June 1971).

¹¹⁹Ibid.

up public buildings and private homes, stealing automobiles and trucks, disrupting railtraffic, killing soldiers and polices and seizing their weapons, and refusing to obey Peking directives.

While threatening the guilty with severe punishment, the Notice also added a sweetening promise that those who had been coerced or hoodwinked into committing crimes would be pardoned.¹²⁰ Because of the restrictions of a closed society, the accurate statistics of these crimes could not be obtained. But the Notice clearly illustrated not only the extent of anarchy, but the degree to which central authority had been damaged.

Aftermath of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

In October 1968, an Enlarged Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held. Liu Shao-chi was officially dismissed from all his Party as well as government posts.¹²¹ The preparation for the reestablishment of central Party organization was under way immediately after the Plenum. Five months later, in early April 1969, the Ninth Party Congress was convened in Peking. A new Party Constitution suggested by the Twelfth

¹²⁰"Notice of the Central Committee, State Council, Military Commission and Central Cultural Revolution Group, July 24, 1968," in SCMP., No. 4258 (September 16, 1968), pp. 1-3.

¹²¹See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," The China Quarterly, No. 37 (January-March, 1969), pp. 150-173.

Plenum was adopted without significant change. In the new Party Constitution, Mao's absolute position was reaffirmed and Lin Piao was designated as Mao's apparent successor. The Ninth Central Committee was elected and, following its First Plenum, a new Politburo and its Standing Committee were organized.¹²² Now the tumult of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was officially to an end, and the whole nation was set on the path back to restoration of stability and reconstruction.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, in *The Permanent Purge*, has argued that the purge in a totalitarian political system is not necessarily always as a negative sign of evil. It often performs useful functions. By eliminating opponents, the purge serves to provide an element of security for the leadership; to foster efficiency and discipline in the bureaucracy; to promote upward social mobility; and to provide an outlet for accumulated social dissatisfactions.¹²³ Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution did fulfill some of these functions, but its success was far from unqualified. Although through the large scale purge, Mao had almost indiscriminately

¹²²See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *The China Quarterly*, No. 39 (July-September, 1969), pp. 144-168; *1970 Yearbook on Chinese Communism*, pp. II-8-9 and II-23-45.

¹²³Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge*, pp. 33 and 168.

eliminated most of his real or imagined opponents¹²⁴ and achieved nearly absolute dictatorship, the results generally did not meet Mao's expectations. The problems, both old, inherited from the political system itself, and new, generated from the three year tumult, remained even more serious than before. During the Cultural Revolution, some people¹²⁵ did seize a chance to express their accumulated grievances, but soon they found themselves suffering an even poorer life and harsher control. It not only frustrated Mao himself, but, in Mao's own words, "disappointed the worker, peasants and soldiers" as a whole.

The obvious adverse effects of the Cultural Revolution were the paralysis of Party and government apparatus, military control of Party and government affairs at all levels,¹²⁶

¹²⁴In 1966, 127 prominent cadres in all fields were purged. In 1967, another 316 of 170 members of the Eighth Central Committee, only 53 survived. Out of 45 provincial first and second Party secretaries, only nine were known to be active in 1968. See The Great Cultural Revolution in China (Hong Kong: Asian Research Center, 1967), pp. 116-193; 1969 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, Vol. II, pp. IV-13-26; The New York Times, June 24, 1968.

¹²⁵The people that belonged to the so called Five-Black-Class were under even much stricter control throughout the Cultural Revolution.

¹²⁶In Ninth Central Committee, 46% of its members were from the military. In the Politburo, nearly half the members were generals. In 29 provincial revolutionary committees, 19 were chaired by military officers. See James R. Townsend, Politics in China, pp. 261-271.

serious regression of economy in all fields,¹²⁷ disappointment of youths,¹²⁸ and the continuous disorder of society.¹²⁹

Livio Maitan provided the following assessment:

The failure to smash the old state machine and replace it with entirely new bodies had a particularly adverse effect on developments after the seizure of power. Instead, there developed a hybrid form, which meant the old structure, methods and personnel continued to exercise an important influence... Real organs of workers' and peasants' democracy were not set up and dominant apparatus drew away from the masses. This resulted in the formation of privileged strata, the slowing down of the rate of economic growth, the appearance of distortions and imbalances in the development of the economy and a failure to

	127			
	Agric.	Indus.	Per	Foreign
	Index	Index	Capita	Trade
Year	1950=100	1950=100	US \$	US\$ in Mil.
1966	115.66	230.71	189.50	4,070
1967	123.49	201.90	180.03	3,770
1968	115.66	222.10	177.77	3,655
1969	117.96	364.62	191.73	3,610

See U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, China: A Reassessment of the Economy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 42-43, 645.

¹²⁸The youths were generally kept out from ruling circle. For example, among 279 members of the Ninth Central Committee only two were Red Guard leaders; and of the chairman and first vice chairman of 29 provincial committees, none of them were mass representatives. See James R. Townsend, Politics in China, pp. 261-271. Millions of youths who were sent to the countryside could not bear the harsh life and strict discipline. They illegally drifted back to the cities living in an underworld, engaging in activities ranging from black-marketeering, theft, to prostitution. Hundreds of them were arrested and executed. See The New York Times, (June 18, 1970), p. 8, and The Baltimore Sun (December 27, 1970), p. 6.

¹²⁹The New York Times, (June 7, 1970), p. 12; Richard Hughes, "Mao Makes the Trials Run on Time," The New York Times Sunday Magazine (August 23, 1970), pp. 23, 67-68.

the economy and a failure to make full use of all the potential inherent in the new mode of production.¹³⁰

In addition to all these, the more serious problem was the intensification of factional feuds and struggles. During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, certain formula labeled as revisionist broke down, but not before a new consensus or compromise had been made. In the post-Cultural Revolution period, a new power center was established; but the ascendancy of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army Group completely tipped the old balance of power among factions. This situation plus the factional feuds accumulated during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution would inevitably lead to successive power struggles.

It was obvious that at the outset of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao's coalition triangle, which consisted of radicals, bureaucrats and militarymen, was an expedient united front strategy. Chou En-lai's policy orientation was never quite identical with Mao's unrealistic radicalism and contradictory to Liu Shao-chi's except certain contradictions of personal power position.¹³¹ Mao had never

¹³⁰ Livio Maitan, Party, Army and Masses in China, pp. 350-351.

¹³¹ On July 22, 1961, Teng To used historical events to attribute communist China's corruption to the lack of an "intelligent and capable prime minister at the top." It was reported that Liu Shao-chi's group intended to promote Peking Mayor Peng Chen as premier in the replacement of Chou En-lai. See Yao Wen-yuan, "On Three Family Village," ibid., p. 10; 1969 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, Vol. I, p. V-11.

really trusted Lin Piao, even at the time when the coalition was formed, due to Lin's personal power ambitions.¹³² Therefore, when Lin Piao united with Chen Po-ta to achieve victory at the Ninth Party Congress,¹³³ a new power struggle immediately began.¹³⁴ Mao united with Chou En-lai, purged Chen Po-ta immediately after the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee in the fall of 1970, and then Lin Piao in September 1971 after Lin's abortive coup against Mao. Along with Lin, all his other five associates in the Politburo--Yeh Chun, his wife, Huang Yung-sheng, chief of the General Staff, Wu Fe-hsien, Air Force Commander in Chief, Li Tso-peng, Naval Commander in Chief, and Chiu Hui-tso, Commander in Chief of Logistic--were purged. In addition, nearly a hundred other

¹³²See "Mao Tse-tung's Private Letter to Chiang Ching, July 1966," in The Search for a New China, Winberg Chai, ed. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1975), pp. 222-225.

¹³³In the Ninth Central Committee, military members were 46 percent. In the powerful Politburo, of twenty one full members five were from Fourth Field Army faction. Including Chen Po-ta and Lin Piao's wife Yeh Chun, one third of the Politburo members belonged to Lin Piao's faction. See James R. Townsend, Politics in China, p. 267.

¹³⁴Chou En-lai, "Talks with Delegation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors Visiting China on Question of Lin Piao, October 7, 1972," in The New York Times, October 12, 1972; "Document of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chung-Fa No. 24, 1972," and "Evidence of the Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique's Attempt to Launch a Counter-revolutionary Coup, 1971," in Winberg Chai, The Search for a New China pp. 241-249.

generals were removed from office.¹³⁵

This post Cultural Revolution power struggle between Lin and Mao-Chou, which led to the elimination of Lin Piao's faction, has had tremendous repercussions on Communist China's domestic politics as well as foreign policies. After the Ninth Party Congress, Lin Piao's strategy for keeping his prominent position was the advocacy of Maoist radicalism at the expense of other conservative military factions as well as Chou En-lai's bureaucrats. During the period from 1969 to 1970, there were marked leftist trends in domestic politics. Material incentives were discouraged and importance was given to political attitudes in deciding payments for workers and farmers. Private plots were criticized. Redness was emphasized in the selection of new leaders, especially in the rehabilitation of old cadres. This enabled Lin Piao to keep away his opponents while "infiltrating his partisans into the key organs of state power."¹³⁶ In addition, military expenditures for the procurement of new weapons were increased,¹³⁷ and the questions

¹³⁵Ibid.; Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao," The China Quarterly, No. 55 (July-September, 1973), pp. 450-477; Jurgen Domes, "New Course in Chinese Domestic Politics: The Anatomy of Readjustment," Asian Survey (July, 1973), pp. 633-646. Henry S. Bradsher, "China: The Radical Offensive," Asian Survey (November, 1973), pp. 989-1009; Yin-mao Kau and Pierre M. Perrolle, "The Politics of Lin Piao's Abortive Military Coup," Asian Survey (June, 1974), pp. 558-577.

¹³⁶John Burns, "Mao is Quoted As Saying Lin was killed in Crash," The New York Times, July 28, 1972. Mao and Lin's disagreement on cadre policy see Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao," ibid., pp. 452-455.

¹³⁷China: A Reassessment of the Economy, pp. 460-464.

of Sino-U.S. rapprochement as well as Communist China's role in Indochina War were under disputes.¹³⁸ In ideological perspective, Mao seemed to have no reason to purge Chen Po-ta or Lin Piao, but power counted more than ideology. Philip Bridgham observed that the reasons for the purge of Lin Piao appeared to be the same as for the origin of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

As Liu Shao-chi was charged with corrupting the Party and state apparatus with a form of rightist revisionism in the early 1960's, so Lin Piao is now charged with corrupting the administration apparatus with a form of leftist revisionism, the end result in each case being the sabotage and failure of Mao's policies.¹³⁹

Therefore, after the purge, Lin Piao was accused of being a political swindler or sham Marxist and of pursuing an ultra-leftist line in opposition to Mao's Thought. He was a traitor maintaining illicit relations with the Soviet Union. From the fall of 1971 on, Chou En-lai's power and influence in Communist China's politics greatly increased. There was an obvious rightist tendency in both domestic and foreign affairs. Old cadres who were purged or criticized during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated in a large scale, especially those generals of the Third, Second, and a relatively small number of the First Field Army factions.¹⁴⁰ Most

¹³⁸ See footnote 135.

¹³⁹ Philip Bridghma, "The Fall of Lin Piao," ibid., p. 450.

¹⁴⁰ Jurgen Domes, "New Course in Chinese Domestic Politics," ibid., pp. 637-640.

economic policies returned again toward pre-Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution pragmatism. Expenditure on military procurement declined sharply. In international affairs, peaceful coexistence with all kinds of countries except Soviet Union was stressed, and rapprochement with U.S. and Japan was accelerated. But Chou En-lai's pragmatic game had never won Mao's fulhearted appreciation. When Chou's power increased, Chou's trouble followed. After Lin Piao's fall, the remnant of the radicals, under the leadership of Mrs. Mao, began gradually to assert themselves. By the end of 1972, along with criticism of Lin Piao, a nationwide campaign of criticizing Confucious was launched. This campaign proved to be a purposeful preparation of public opinion against Chou En-lai. But the serious domestic as well as external problems generated by the tumultuous Cultural Revolution and the Lin Piao crisis made Chou En-lai indispensable to Mao's rule. As Donald Klein observed:

At a broader level, we might begin with the proposition that China could exist without a Communist Party, but it could not exist without a central civil bureaucracy.¹⁴¹

This probably was the main reason why Chou was attacked, but he finally survived and exerted great influence throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and Lin Piao crisis. However, Mao seemed never to give up his determination

¹⁴¹ Donald W. Klein, "The State Council and the Cultural Revolution," The China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), p. 94.

to purge Chou's bureaucracy. Yet, this might be the most difficult mission in Mao's life. As David Apter pointed out:

Civil servants, through their expertise and modes of organization, comprise the single most important group for the translation of government policy into social practice. But they are difficult group for political leaders to deal with or assimilate because they are generally better educated than the politicians.¹⁴²

It could be the reason why Mao was so regretful in his declining years that he failed to reach the peak of his revolution. As his last letter to Mrs. Mao revealed:

In the struggle of the past ten years (1966-1976) I have tried to reach the peak of revolution, but I was not successful. But you could reach the top. If you fail, you will plunge into a fathomless abyss. Your body will shatter. Your bones will break.¹⁴³

Mao's prediction proved to be correct, and the factional feuds intensified as successive purges continue.

¹⁴²David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 167.

¹⁴³Roxanes Witke, "Comrade Chiang Ching Tells Her Story," Time Magazine (March 21, 1977), p. 59.

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN CONFLICT BEHAVIOR DURING THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Rudolph J. Rummel's three-dimensional scheme for measuring foreign conflict behavior consists of thirteen indicators. The diplomatic dimension includes the indicators of expulsion and recall of ambassadors, expulsion and recall of lesser officials, troop movements, protests, threats, and accusations. Stopping short of violence, it represents a nonviolent form of foreign conflict. The war dimension includes the variables of war, military action, mobilization, and number killed in foreign conflict. The third is the belligerency dimension, containing severance of diplomatic relations, negative sanctions, anti-foreign demonstrations, and expulsion and recall of lesser officials (this indicator overlaps the diplomatic dimension).¹ It is conflict behavior that conveys on an actively hostile mood. Rummel explained the reason for the extraction of a belligerency dimension

¹For definition of the thirteen indicators, see Rudolph J. Rummel, *ibid.*, pp. 69-70 and 102-105. There are some differences between Rummel and Wilkenfeld as well as Tanter in their classification of the thirteen indicators. This research followed Wilkenfeld's. For details see Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *ibid.*, pp. 113-114.

independent from war and diplomatic dimension:

War and diplomatic conflict behavior both may be calculated coldly rational at one time and at another be underlain with considerable belligerency. The emergence of the third dimension indicates, however, that there are kinds of foreign conflict behavior that one may identify as being particularly of a belligerent nature.²

All of these indicators seem applicable in describing Communist China's foreign conflict behavior during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. But, as a revolutionary regime, in addition to all these traditional forms of conflict behavior, Communist China had put great emphasis on the advocacy and support of subversive activities in those countries which it thought unfriendly. Although the support of national liberation has been Communist China's habitual foreign policy, it seemed to be carried out in an extremely irrational, provocative, and dysfunctional manner during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution period. The case of Burma illustrates this vividly. Therefore, it can be grouped as belligerent conflict behavior. The focus of this Chapter is on the question of whether Communist China's provocative foreign activities during the period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution were generated from the domestic issues and turmoil.

A Brief Review of Communist China's Foreign Policy from 1949 to 1965

The primary objectives of Communist China's foreign

²Rudolph J. Rummel, ibid., p. 83.

policy that have remained constant throughout its brief history were to ensure the security of the state of China according to Mao Tse-tung's perception and to ensure the continued authority of the Chinese Communist Party within the state.³ Its basic strategy for achieving these objectives was world revolution. Superficially, Mao's world revolution doctrine⁴ seemed to be an altruistic concern for oppressed peoples and a defensive attitude towards the danger of Western imperialists and modern revisionists' aggression. In reality, it was a skillful exploitation of both Chinese and third world peoples' feelings of historical humiliation imposed on them by colonial powers, including Tsarist Russia and major Western powers, to serve the internal as well as external interests of the Maoist regime. Domestically, it could psychologically create a sense of threat and a vision of future greatness to convince the Chinese people of the universality and infallibility of Mao Tse-tung's Thought which was the sole source of legitimacy of the regime, and to mobilize the populace in support of Maoist oppressive control and radical reforms. It was probably this nearly religious sentiment that could make the Maoist slogan of "sacrificing this generation for the

³For reference to this observation, see Hans J. Morgenthau, in Defense of the National Interests (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), Harold and Margaret Sprout, An Ecological Paradigm for the Study of International Politics (Princeton: Center for International Studies, 1968).

⁴For details see Chapter II Mao Tse-tung's concept of world revolution.

glory of the future" acceptable to the Chinese people.

Externally, because of the imbalance between Communist China's limited resources⁵ and its ambitiously proclaimed role in international communist movement, Mao's advocacy of world revolution, which stressed will power and self-reliance and called for a united struggle of the third world countries against imperialism and revisionism, was primarily to serve Communist China's strategic needs for the exclusion of the United States and Soviet Union from Asia, and of the competition with the United States and Soviet Union for the expansion of Communist China's influence in Africa and Latin America. So, when John G. Stoessinger carefully examined Communist China's activities in the United Nations, he found that Communist China's foreign behavior has been more Machiavellian than its self-proclaimed Maoism or Marxism.⁶ Alan Hutchison's observation of Communist China's Revolution in Africa yielded the same conclusion. He pointed out that, like British ruling elites, the only permanent interest that the Communist China

⁵U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, China: A Reassessment of the Economy; Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade: Implications for U.S. Policy (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966); Samuel B. Griffith, II, "Communist China's Capacity to Make War," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January, 1965), pp. 217-236; Alice Langley Hsieh, "China's Nuclear Missile Program: Regional or International," The China Quarterly, No. 45 (January-March, 1971), pp. 85-99; King C. Chen, The Foreign Policy of China (Roseland, N.J.: East-West Who? Inc., 1972), pp. 167-171.

⁶John G. Stoessinger, "China and the United Nations," in Sino-American Detente, ed. Gene T. Hsiao (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 102.

recognized was the survival of the state,⁷ of which the Chinese Communist Party was the sole representative. Therefore, from the outset Communist China's foreign activities were constantly conditioned by its domestic political factors. Taking the "lean to one side" policy for example, when Mao perceived the victory of the Chinese communist revolution to be only a matter of months, he unequivocally declared on July 1, 1949:

{A}ll the Chinese people, without exception, must lean either on the side of imperialism or on that of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do; nor is there a third road... Not only in China, but throughout the world, all the people, without exception, must lean either on imperialism or on socialism. Neutrality is merely a camouflage; a third road does not exist... Internationally we belong to the side of anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and so we can only turn to the side for genuine and friendly help, not to the side of the imperialist front.⁸

Mao's declaration might be based on his perception of the bipolar nature of the post World War II international political structure. But his view of the world as merely an arena of conflicts between two ideologies, two forms of society and two international systems was basically determined by the needs of his domestic situation.

⁷Alan Hutchison, China's African Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), p. 3; See also Samuel S. Kim, "The People's Republic of China in the United Nations," World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 3 (April, 1973), pp. 299-330.

⁸Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1959), pp. 8, 11.

...We are firmly convinced that in order to achieve victory and consolidate it we must lean on one side... Only by drawing a sharp line between reactionaries and revolutionaries... by raising our own morale while deflating the enemy's prestige, can we isolate the reactionaries, defeat them or oust them... We should all realize it is none other than the imperialists and their jackals who are hindering us from doing business as well as establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries. When, by uniting all domestic and international forces, we have beaten the reactionaries inside and outside the country, we can do business and shall find it possible to establish diplomatic relations with all foreign countries on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.⁹

In practice, in concert with the oppressive and radical measures of domestic consolidation, at the very inception of his regime, Mao was determined not only to root out all the Western imperialist influences, but actually to remove their physical presence. By the end of 1949, through a virulent anti-imperialist campaign, the Maoist regime appeared to be willing to do everything possible in defiance of the established conventions of international law to humiliate major Western powers, especially the United States.¹⁰ It was made impossible for European business enterprises and religious institutions to operate, and Western diplomatic installations were forced to withdraw, according to A. M. Halpern, under spectacular conditions.¹¹ In addition to its militant policy

⁹Ibid., pp. 8-9. Emphasis added.

¹⁰The People's Liberation Army invaded the U.S. Embassy in Nanking, jailed Consul General Angus Ward and his four associates in Mukdon, and seized U.S. Consular properties in Peking.

¹¹A. M. Halpern, "China in the Postwar World," The China Quarterly, No. 21 (January-March, 1965), p. 24.

against imperialists, Communist China's attitudes toward Asian neutral countries was also inimical. Indian Premier Nehru tried to be friendly to his new giant communist neighbour from the outset, but he was merely referred as a "sham" and an "imperialist lackey." Communist China called Pakistan a puppet of the capitalist world and warned the leaders of Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos that they would have to "lean to one side." But its relations with the Soviet Union were quickly strengthened. By the end of 1949, Mao Tse-tung went to Moscow personally and in February 1950 economic agreements and a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance were signed. The Russians were allowed to participate in the economic development of Manchuria and Sinkiang and were permitted to use Port Arthur as a naval base. The two sides agreed to mutual assistance in the event that either was attacked by Japan or a power in concert with Japan, an obvious reference to the United States. "Only by drawing a sharp line between reactionaries and revolutionaries," as Mao pointed out, could the Chinese Communist Party achieve victory over its domestic enemy and consolidate it, so at that time Communist China's foreign activities in theory and practice were unequivocally identifying the United States as its number one enemy and the Soviet Union as its "genuine" friend. This sharp line became more and more distinct after the outbreak of the Korean War and remained without significant change until Sino-Soviet disputes become more serious.

Therefore, in a review of Communist China's brief history, it can be easily seen that there is a suggestive parallel between Communist China's domestic policy and foreign affairs. As Vidya P. Dutt pointed out, "the hard line, as it is called, in foreign relations was preceded by equally tough internal policies."¹² As indicated in Table 2, (General Trends and Major Events of Communist China's Domestic and Foreign Policy Since 1949), while Communist China's domestic measures during the consolidation and Great Leap Forward periods were oppressive and radical, its foreign activities were accordingly militant and aggressive, and more violent world revolution and insurrectionary activities from below were advocated and encouraged. While domestic policy was relatively pragmatic during the First Five Year Plan and the retreat of the Great Leap Forward period, its foreign behavior was also relatively moderate, and peaceful co-existence and governmental relations from above were emphasized. Although there were some deviations in each period, the general trends that dominated Communist China's domestic and foreign behavior were clear. But in the period of New Socialist Education Campaign which led to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Communist China faced a new situation both internally and externally. After a retreat since the failure of the Great Leap Forward, beginning in late 1962, Mao was struggling

¹²Vidya P. Dutt, China and the World (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 1.

TABLE 2

GENERAL TRENDS AND MAJOR EVENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1949

Domestic Politics	Period	Foreign Affairs
Radical	Consolidation 1949-1952	Militant
Establishment of PRC	1949	Declaration of "lean to one side." Humiliation of Western diplomats
Land reform. Marriage Law. Resist U.S. - Aid Korea Campaign	1950	Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty. Intervention in Korean War. Condemnation of neutralism.
Suppression of Counter- revolutionaries. Three-Anti, Five-anti and Thought Reform Campaigns.	1951	
	1952	
Pragmatic	First Five Year Plan 1953-1957	Peaceful Coexistence
First Five Year Plan	1953	Korean War Armistice.
First National People's Congress. Adoption of New Constitution.	1954	Geneva Conference on Indo-China. Sino-India announcement of five principles of peaceful coexis- tence. Sino-U.S. consular-level talks.
	1955	Bandung Conference. Sino-U.S. talks elevated to ambassadorial-level.
Eighth Party Congress. Relegation of Mao's position.	1956	Soviet de-Stalinization. Chou En-lai's tour of eight South and Southeast Asian countries.
Mao's speech on the Correct Handling of Contradictions among People. "Hundred Flowers" fol- lowed by Anti-Rightist campaign.	1957	Moscow Conference and Sino-Soviet disputes began.
Radical	Great Leap Forward 1958-1959	Militant
Great Leap Forward in full swing. People's Communes established.	1958	Heavy bombardment of Kinmen and Matsu.
Second National People's Congress. Liu Shao-chi elected as National Chair- man. Purge of Peng Te-huai.	1959	Renewed attack on neutralism. Border disputes with India and Burma. Quarrel with Indonesia and UAR. Khrushchev visit to Peking after his tour of America. Advocacy of anti-U.S. imperialism immediately after Khrushchev left Peking.
Pragmatic	Retreat from GLF 1960-1961	Moderate
Emphasis on Material incen- tives in economy and liberali- zation in literature.	1960	Publication of "Long Live Leninism." Negotiation with India. Border agreement with Burma. Restoration of good relations with Indonesia and UAR. Soviet withdrawal of technicians.
	1961	
Mixture	New Socialist Education 1962-1964	Toward Militancy
New Socialist Education Campaign	1962	Border war with India.
	1963	Open disputes with Soviet Union. Mao's statement on the support of American Negroes struggle.
Cultivation of Revolutionary Successors Campaign. Third National People's Congress. First atomic explosion.	1964	Chou En-lai's tour of Africa. Recognition of France. Gulf of Tonkin incident.
Fomenting of Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.	1965	Publication of Lin Biao's "Long Live People's War."

*For reference to the division of the periods, see James Townsend, Politics in China, and 1967 Yearbook on Chinese Communism.

for a comeback and was trying to steer his Party back toward the road of the radical line. So in domestic policy, as pointed out in Chapter III, there was an obvious mixture of a great intensification of political indoctrination and purge and a less extreme line in the economy. Moreover, in line with domestic political trends, after a string of disruptive events such as de-Stalinization, the Great Leap Forward, the purge of Peng Te-huai, Khrushchev's tour of the United States in 1959, the Soviet withdrawal of technicians, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Sino-Soviet rift was escalated to open polemics in 1963. In combating revisionism internally as well as externally, Communist China's foreign policy gradually turned more radical and provocative. Because of the alleged betrayal of Marxism-Leninism by the first socialist country-the Soviet Union. Communist China now believed itself to be the only standard bearer of a genuine communist world revolution movement. As Gavin Boyd observed:

The belief in Peking's entitlement to leadership of the global process of violent change has developed out of zealous opposition to perceived Soviet betrayals of the revolutionary cause through excessive interest in co-existence with the West, that, it is claimed, has meant holding back support for communist insurgencies, especially the one in Vietnam.¹³

Facing this new situation, there was an obvious change from its previous world view. The international political

¹³Gavin Boyd, "China," in ibid., p. 4.

system was viewed as no longer bipolar but pluralistic. The contradictions in world politics were not merely limited to the two camps, but included those between socialist countries and imperialist states, between imperialist states themselves, between the peoples of developing areas and their oppressors, and between the working classes and their rulers in the advanced capitalist countries.¹⁴ For effective exploitation of these contradictions in the eventual establishment of a Peking-centered communist world order, the intermediate zone theory and people's war doctrine¹⁵ were enthusiastically advocated. So the grand strategic design of Communist China's foreign policy at the time was one of trying to strengthen its governmental relationships from above with all pro-Peking third world countries, even including the Western middle powers such as France that had disputes with the United States, to form an alliance of anti-U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists, and to foment violent struggle of insurrectionaries in the pro-United States and pro-Soviet countries, which regimes Peking regarded as reactionary. This so-called "alliance and struggle method" in foreign relations was obviously intended to overcome tacitly recognized weaknesses, and it did help Communist China initially break U.S. encirclement in various areas and compete with the Soviet Union for influence in the third world. Within four years, from 1962 to 1965, Communist

¹⁴"A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," ibid.

¹⁵See Chapter II .

China won twelve countries' diplomatic recognition.¹⁶ Its relations with Cuba were strengthened and its influence in Latin America consequently began to increase. Peking's long preparation for the Second Afro-Asian Conference which was scheduled to be held in Algiers in June 1965 seemed destined to bear the fruits of increased Afro-Asian militancy against U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. The war of national liberation in Vietnam was going well for the rebel side before the 1964 U.S. Presidential election. Moreover, the advocacy of external violent struggle against imperialism and revisionism greatly encouraged domestic revolutionary fervor. But this high tide proved shortlived. Despite Communist China's firm conviction that "the world revolution is favorable to the struggle of the peoples to win and preserve independence and freedom and unfavorable to imperialism and new and old colonialism,"¹⁷ the reality did not turn out as expected. As President Bourguiba of Tunisia frankly told Chou En-lai:

You come to Africa as the enemy of the capitalist states, of the West, of the socialists, of the neutralists and the non-aligned, of India, of Tito, of Khrushchev, of everybody. You haven't chosen a policy of facility, I'll say that.¹⁸

The Nigeria Daily Times' Commentary might be more accurate in pointing out the real needs of the third world and the real failure of Mao Tse-tung's Thought.

¹⁶For details see Appendix II.

¹⁷New China News Agency, January 24, 1964.

¹⁸Middle East Review, London, April 3, 1964.

China, like most communist countries, believes religiously that Africa and Africans are the victims of imperialism, plagued by abject poverty and clamped in chains. This image has been so successfully conjured up for them by their propagandists that there is total blindness in communist countries to the realities of underdeveloped world... What Africa wants is bread, freedom from ignorance, eradication of disease and speeded enlightenment. Africa does not need guns, bullets and bombs... We should have given Chou En-lai ample opportunity to see for himself and understand that Africa does not necessarily have to solve its problems by adopting Chinese methods.¹⁹

Thus Communist China's militant foreign policy seemed destined to be frustrated. Beginning in 1965, a string of diplomatic setbacks proved Maoist violent world revolution to be wishful thinking. In Asia, the escalation of American military involvement in Vietnam after February 1965 and Communist China's unwillingness and inability to step in and turn the tide made Communist China suffer a loss of prestige before the world. Despite Communist China's advocacy of a protracted guerrilla war based on self-reliance which was intended to hold American in a people's war quagmire, to embarrass the Soviet Union, to undermine the Soviet-U.S. detente, and to justify Mao's ongoing advocacy of extreme domestic policies, the continuous American bombing had begun to diminish the effectiveness of North Vietnam's communication and logistic support to the Viet Cong, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of the Viet Cong's guerrilla attacks. Furthermore, because of Communist China's inability to render any effective help

¹⁹Quoted from Alan Hutchison, ibid., p. 69.

against U.S. heavy military pressure both from the air and the land, Hanoi was actually more and more dependent on Moscow for sophisticated weapons and Communist China found itself helpless when the hated Soviet revisionists gradually increased influence in its backyard. Largely because of Communist China's position on the Vietnam War, North Korea changed its pro-Peking stance to neutrality in Sino-Soviet disputes. After Kosygin's visit to Pyong yang in February 1965, Soviet-North Korean relations improved. It was an obvious loss to Communist China. But the most heavy blow came from the Indonesian Crisis in October 1965. As a result of Partai Komunis Indonesia's abortive coup, the rightist Indonesian Army quickly took over the government and, on the base of alleged Chinese Communist involvement in the coup, moved swiftly to curtail Peking's influence in the country.²⁰ Consequently, the relations between the two countries was strained to a breaking point and Communist China's expectation of a Peking-Djakarta axis was finally ruined. Its relations with India further deteriorated due to the Indo-Pakistani War over Kashmir. But generally it maintained calm and friendly relations with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia and Ceylon. Toward other South and Southeastern Asian countries such as the Philippines, Malaya, and Thailand, which had no diplomatic relations with it, Communist China's attitude was hostile, and it supported

²⁰ Arthur J. Dommen "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," The China Quarterly, No. 25 (January-March, 1966), pp. 144-170.

subversive activities in all of these countries. Its relations with Japan were complex. Though Communist China was antagonistic to the conservative Liberal-Democratic Party administration and vehemently attacked Japanese militarism,²¹ its trade with Japan greatly increased from 46 million in 1961 to 631 million in 1966.²²

In Africa, Communist China's frustration was the most striking. In addition to Burundi's expulsion of Communist China's diplomatic delegation and Communist China's unsuccessful operations in Kenya, Congo, and Niger, the building by Houphouet-Boigny of a French-speaking coalition against Nkrumah and other radical African leaders sharply moved the African political climate from the left to the right. Moreover, most of the African states were unfavorably impressed by Communist China's willingness to sacrifice everything to the struggle against the Soviet Union in the preparation for the Second Afro-Asian Conference. Therefore, upon the pretext of Algiers' coup that occurred just ten days before the opening day of the Conference, they combined to boycott it. Despite Communist China's efforts and insistence that the Conference should be held on schedule, it was postponed and finally cancelled. Following the cancellation of the Algiers Conference, in early

²¹For the development of Sino-Japanese relations, see Edwin O. Reischauer, "China and Japan: Rival or Allies?" In China and the Great Powers, edited by Francis O. Wilcox (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp. 31-46.

²²U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, China: A Reassessment of the Economy, p. 650.

1966, Dahomey and the Central Africa Republic expelled Communist China's diplomats. After a brief success in 1964, Communist China's influence in Africa sharply declined in 1965. Before the convulsion of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, its influence in Africa was confined almost only to Brazzaville and Tanzania.²³

Communist China's limited influence in Latin America also declined in early 1966 when Soviet-Cuban relations became close and Castro made an unprecedented attack on Communist China at the Tri-Continental People's Solidarity Conference in Havana for allegedly reneging on its trade agreements and interfering in Cuban internal affairs.²⁴

Its relations with the United States remained antagonistic. But Communist China was cautious to avoid the probability of military confrontation with the U.S. over the Vietnam War. As late as May 1966, Chou En-lai's statement continuously reiterated that "China will not take the initiative to provoke a war with the United States."²⁵ The communications between the two countries at the Warsaw Talks were continuing, though without constructive results.

The Sino-Soviet disputes in mid-1966 became more sharper

²³For details see Alan Hutchison, ibid.; Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa 1949-1970 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

²⁴"Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation-China and Cuba," The China Quarterly, No. 26 (April-June, 1966), p. 220.

²⁵Peking Review, No. 20 (May 13, 1966), p. 5.

and acrimonious. Competition for influence in international politics was acute, a military build-up of both sides along the border areas gradually increased and trade sharply declined from the peak of 2,730 million dollars in 1960 to 620 million dollars in 1965 (including Eastern European countries).²⁶ But the disputes generally were confined to polemics and diplomacy centered on the themes of peaceful co-existence, peaceful transition to socialism, the party and state of the entire people, and de-Stalinization versus violent world revolution, permanent class struggle and personality cult. There were few demonstrations or violent actions. Although the border questions were mentioned by Communist China in early 1963, there were no serious border clashes until 1969. In general, the Sino-Soviet rift before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was provocative but not violent.

Communist China maintained relatively cordial relations with the advanced Western middle powers. One remarkable event was that its trade with these countries greatly increased from 319 million in 1962 to 875 million in 1966,²⁷ compensating for what it had lost from the Soviet Union.

In sum, Communist China's foreign relations in 1965 and early 1966 were largely frustration and failure. But it seemed reluctant to learn from these bitter experiences. The

²⁶U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, China: A Reassessment of the Economy, p. 648.

²⁷Ibid., p. 649.

Maoists were willing to believe that the setbacks were caused by the death-bed counter-attacks of imperialism. As Chen Yi declared when a Japanese reporter asked him whether the cancellation of the Algiers Conference and Indonesian crisis meant China was becoming more isolated.

Although some adverse currents have appeared in certain areas in Asia and Africa, the general situation in these countries is excellent... the surging revolutionary struggles of the Asian and African peoples against imperialism are the main current in the situation in Asia and Africa... Although certain individuals in Afro-Asian countries have joined the imperialists' anti-Chinese chorus because they have entered into the service of imperialism, and although the modern revisionists are also supporting the anti-Chinese hullabaloo, they are after all a small handful.²⁸

So the recent reversals were the inevitable result of the sharpening of the class struggle and the final victory would doubtlessly belong to the revolutionaries.

Facts have proved and will continue to prove that no force on earth can impede or check the revolutionary movement of the oppressed peoples and nations, which will continue to leap forward despite the twists and turns in the road to advance.²⁹

This sounded like illusive "big talk," but it did serve to raise still higher the completely closed Chinese people's political consciousness. It was upon this international scene that the Communist China entered into the convulsive Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

²⁸New China News Agency, January 4, 1966.

²⁹People's Daily, March 1, 1966.

Communist China's Foreign Policy During The
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

Despite Communist China's advocacy of people's war and violent world revolution, it still paid great attention to governmental relations with most of the neutral countries before the outbreak of the turmoil of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, as evidenced by official visits during March and April of 1966 by Liu Chao-chi and Chen Yi to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Burma.³⁰ But it seemed deliberately to turn inward from the last quarter of 1966 and its foreign activities appeared to have become little more than a reflection of domestic events and the struggle going on within Communist China's borders. The basic assumptions of Communist China's foreign policy at the outset of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution seemed willing to ignore completely the harsh reality of the world situation and to distort all possible facts to justify its domestic upheavals. As the Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China declared on August 12, 1966:

The present situation as regards the struggle of Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people throughout the world against imperialism, reaction and modern revisionism is excellent. We are now in a new era of world revolution. All political forces are undergoing a process of great upheaval, great division and great reorganization. The revolutionary movement of the people in all countries, and particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, is surging

³⁰Peking Review, No. 14, 15, 16, 17 (April 1, 8, 15, 22, 1966).

vigorously forward. Despite the inevitable zigzags and reversals in the development of the international situation, the general trend of imperialism heading for total collapse and socialism advancing to worldwide victory is unalterable.³¹

In justifying its struggle against domestic revisionism through mass movements, the Communique took opposition to Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism, and the support of the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries as the imperative mission of Communist China's foreign policy.

The Plenary Session maintains that to oppose imperialism, it is imperative to oppose modern revisionism. There is no middle road whatsoever in the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism. A clear line of demarcation must be drawn in dealing with the modern revisionist groups with the leadership of the C.P.S.U. as the centre, and it is imperative resolutely to expose their true features as scabs...

The Plenary Session points out that proletarian internationalism is the supreme principle guiding China's foreign policy. The session warmly supports the just struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples against imperialism headed by the United States and its stooges and also supports the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries.

We must unite with all the people in the world who are against imperialism and colonialism, and carry the struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys through to the end.

Together with all the revolutionary Marxists-Leninists of the world, we must carry the struggle against modern revisionism through to the end and push forward the revolutionary cause of the international proletariat and the people of the world.³²

³¹"Communique of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eight Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," The China Quarterly, No. 28 (October-December, 1966), p. 171. Emphasis added.

³²Ibid., pp. 172-174. Emphasis added.

For the needs of the suppression of domestic "anti-revolutionary" forces at the inception of the Chinese Communist regime, Mao declared his "lean to one side" policy. Now in combating domestic revisionist opponents, Mao announced that "a clear line of demarcation must be drawn in dealing with the modern revisionist groups." In the consolidation period, most Western capitalist powers' embassies and personnel in China were harassed. During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, all countries which the Maoists considered to be unfriendly were condemned and their diplomats in Peking were humiliated. The New York Times correspondent Charles Mohr reported that foreign diplomats in Peking would be physically assaulted and their houses burned if the governments they represented did not behave as the Maoists thought they should.³³ It was obvious that the Maoists attempted to use anti-foreignism, anti-revisionism and anti-imperialism to mobilize nationalist sentiment against their revisionist opponents as well as to undermine revisionist alternatives to the Maoist program for Communist China's domestic development, and therefore, to help legitimize and support Mao Tse-tung's claim to power in China.

General Characteristics of Communist China's

Foreign Behavior During the GPCR

- Quasi-Isolation and Quasi-Involvement -

Robert A. Scalapino pointed out that Communist China's

³³The New York Times, August 25, 1967, p. 7.

foreign policy usually consisted of twin forces of exclusiveness and universalism. These tendencies seemed strikingly apparent during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In one aspect, it enthusiastically encouraged anti-foreignism and deliberately turned inward, but in another, it appeared indiscriminately to export Mao Tse-tung's thought for world revolution. However, its export of Maoism seemed in every aspect to be almost exclusively in the support of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution at home. This strange combination of the two contrasting elements characterized its foreign behavior throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as what Scalapino called "quasi-isolation and quasi-involvement"³⁴ and made it contradictory with almost the whole world.

Quasi-Isolations: Antiforeignism and Turn Inward

It was inevitable that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution would lead to anti-foreignism with its slogans of anti-revisionism and anti-imperialism, and its glorification of Mao Tse-tung's Thought. As the Sixteen-Points of Decision declared:

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs

³⁴Robert A. Scalapino "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy," in the Foreign Policy of China, ed. King C. Chen (Roseland, N. J.: East-West Who? Inc., 1972), pp. 86-95.

and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavor to stage a come-back. The proletariat must do just the opposite, it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society.³⁵

Thus, after the outbreak of the Red Guard movement in late August of 1966, roving gangs of teenagers covered Peking and most of Chinese large cities with large-character posters proclaiming an ultimatum: all bourgeois remnants must be destroyed within a week.³⁶ Shopkeepers were ordered to stop selling cosmetics and clothing of "outlandish" western fashions. Women were sent home to straighten out permanent waves and men were ordered to cut Hong Kong-style long hair and slash narrow trousers. Restaurants were told to simplify menus. Taxis, denounced as bourgeois, were ordered to go to the countryside to help the peasants. And all over the major cities, signs were torn down from shop fronts and street corners, and odious imperialist symbols were altered. The Legation Street, the thoroughfare that formerly housed foreign embassies were changed to Anti-Imperialist Street, the Eternal Peace Boulevard to East is Red Boulevard, the Street of Prince's Well, where the Soviet Embassy is located, to Anti-Revisionist Street, and it was urged that the name of Hong Kong be changed

³⁵"Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," The China Quarterly, No. 28 (October-December, 1966), p. 158.

³⁶New China News Agency, August 23, 1966.

to Oppose Imperialism city.³⁷ Amid this ferment, the young rebels demanded that traffic lights be revolutionized so that red would signal "go" and green "stop."³⁸ They even demanded drill order be "eyes left" not "eyes right," contended the latter is a reactionary command.³⁹ Day by day, the violence of the Red Guards mounted. They turned against churches, covered them with posters and red flags, painted over bible scenes, took over the Roman Catholic convent in Peking, daubed the seized convent with cartoons of Pope Paul, and destroyed furniture and religious monuments. Then the raids spread to mosques and Buddhist temples and to private homes. The Red Guards, following posted directions, broke into houses of so-called opponents of Mao and tossed jewelry, antiques, ancestor tablets, classic books and other bourgeois possessions into the streets for burning or confiscation.⁴⁰ Eight European nuns who were seized by Red Guards and kept under custody were officially deported from Communist China. The New China News Agency reported the expulsion on August 31, 1966:

At the demand of Peking's Red Guards and revolutionary masses and to safeguard China's security and

³⁷The China Quarterly, No. 28 (October-December, 1966), pp. 178-179; New China News Agency, August 23, 1966; The New York Times, August 22, 1966, p. 9 and September 11, 1966, p. 9.

³⁸Stanley Karnow, Mao and China, p. 207.

³⁹The New York Times, August 28, 1966, p. 1.

⁴⁰The New York Times, August 25, 1966, p. 8; August 24, p. 4; August 27, p. 1. and p. 11; August 28, p. 2; The China Quarterly, No. 28 (October-December, 1966), p. 178-179.

the interests of the people, the Peking Municipal People's Council announced the banning of the Franciscaines Missionnaires de Marie and took over L'Ecole Sacre Coeur run by the mission on August 26, [1966].

After liberation, at the baton of its headquarters in Rome and under the cloak of religion, the mission used the running of the school as a cover, secretly colluded with a number of counter-revolutionaries in the catholic churches in Peking, Hopei, Shansi, Inner Mongolia and Harbin, undertook espionage of information about China, printed reactionary documents, fabricated and spread rumors, instigated counter-revolutionaries to engage in plots to create riots and committed acts of sabotage seriously detrimental to China's sovereignty.⁴¹

Because of serious abuses and torture by the Red Guards, one of the nuns fainted at the Hong Kong border and the other one died in Hong Kong Hospital.⁴²

These Red Guards violent activities won enthusiastic support of the Maoist leadership. In an editorial titled "Its Fine," the People's Daily specifically applauded the changing of street names and the destruction of "bourgeois remnants."⁴³ In the hightide of the Cultural Revolution in the summer of 1967, the notorious episodes of the Boxer Uprising were officially applauded and the youngsters were encouraged to emulate the Boxers and to rebel against foreigners

⁴¹See The China Quarterly, No. 28 (October-December, 1966), p. 182; The New York Times, August 29, 1966, p. 3.

⁴²The New York Times, August 31, 1966, p. 8; September 1, 1966, p. 3; September 4, 1966.

⁴³The People's Daily Editorial, "It's Fine," Peking Review, No. 35 (August 26, 1966), pp. 21-22; The People's Daily Editorial, "Workers, Peasants and Soldiers Must Firmly Support the Revolutionary Students," Peking Review, No. 35 (August 26, 1966), pp. 18-19.

bravely.⁴⁴ This ferment of antiforeignism was obviously a deliberate Maoist design for the cultivation of revolutionary fervor in order to defeat Mao's domestic opponents who were blamed as "capitalist roaders" in authority.

In addition to antiforeignism, many factors indicated that Communist China seemed also deliberately turned inward during the Cultural Revolution. Up to 1966, Communist China had dispensed approximately one billion dollars in foreign assistance and aid.⁴⁵ By the end of 1967, except for some commitments already underway, new Communist Chinese foreign aid had fallen to almost zero. In 1966, there were approximately 1,000 foreign and 2,000 overseas Chinese students in the country.⁴⁶ On September 20, 1966, all of these students were ordered out of China and there were practically no foreign students in the country until the end of 1968.⁴⁷ Most of the Chinese students studying abroad were called back to participate in the Cultural Revolution. By the end of 1965, Peking had diplomatic representation in forty-eight countries (for details see Appendix II). At the beginning of 1967, all its ambassadors abroad, with the solitary exception of Huang Hua in Cairo, were recalled back to Peking for ideological

⁴⁴See Chapter III.

⁴⁵Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 306-307.

⁴⁶Robert A. Scalapino, "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, "in The Foreign Policy of China, ed. King C. Chen (Roseland, N. J.: East-West Who? Inc., 1972, p. 92.

⁴⁷The New York Times, September 22, 1966, p. 3; October 2, 1966, p. 3.

revision.⁴⁸ In a Foreign Affairs Red Flag article of June 1967 entitled "Thoroughly Smash the Foreign Affairs Ministry' Privileged Stratum," the foreign diplomats are accused of visiting night clubs, going to Western films, depicting nude women, driving around in Cadillacs, and even commanding subordinates to massage them. While this "privileged stratum lives extravagantly abroad drinking to their hearts' content" their working-class compatriots at home "brave the rigor of the elements to create social wealth." They are castigated as so "afraid of waging struggle and making revolution," and so "scared that they dare not spread the thought of Mao Tse-tung and distribute the revolutionary booklet Quotations from Chairman Mao." They "establish connections with the ruling groups of the countries in which they are stationed, flattering them and applauding them as much as they can."⁴⁹ The withdrawal of the ambassadors and other senior embassy officials left Communist China's embassies abroad operated by junior embassy staffs. In the absence of timely guidance from the troubled Foreign Ministry, these relatively inexperienced men took their cue from events within their homeland, and acted anxiously and fervently in their host countries to demonstrate their revolutionary loyalty to the demi-god Chairman and to his Revolution. In many cases, conflicts with the countries to which they were assigned would be inevitable.

⁴⁸The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), p. 249.

⁴⁹See SCMP, No. 4004 (August 18, 1967), pp. 10-14.

These might not be intended by the Maoist leadership in Peking but it seemed to be an unavoidable development of the Cultural Revolution. Having unleashed a violent mass attack on the status quo at home, the Maoists could not fail to give at least some encouragement to Maoist adherents making revolution abroad and it did have harmful consequences.

Quasi-Involvement: Export of Mao Tse-tung's Thought for World Revolution

In combating revisionism both internally and externally, the Maoists excessively enthusiastic advocacy of the universal infallability of Mao Tse-tung's Thought was the corollary of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, the propagation of Mao Tse-tung's Thought abroad became the foremost mission of Communist China's foreign activities during the period. Taking Peking Review foreign language edition for example, from August 19, 1966 on, a full page picture of Mao was printed in every issue and acclaim of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution became its overwhelming subjects. Beginning on February 10, 1967, a special column of two to three pages appeared in every issue entitled "The World's People Love Chairman Mao." From March 31, 1967, the column changed its title to "Mao Tse-tung's Thought Lights the Whole World" and continued until April 12, 1968. The type of eulogies carried in the column as well as in other Maoist presses is vividly illustrated by this passage:

The world has entered a new revolutionary era, one which has Mao Tse-tung's Thought as its great banner. It is an era when all revolutionaries look to the red sun that rises in the east; their hearts turn to the greatest leader of the people of the world, Chairman Mao. They hope day and night and see the great teacher of the world revolution. From the bottom of their hearts people sing his praises and sing in praises of Mao Tse-tung's Thought. They say that the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung is the very soul of the revolutionary people of the world.⁵⁰

In 1967, according to official announcement, there were published and distributed around the world 86,400,000 sets of "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," 350 million copies of "Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung," over 47,5000,000 copies of "Selected Readings From the Works of Mao Tse-tung" and over 57 million copies of "Chairman Mao's Poems."

The 1967 figure is seven and a half times the aggregate total printed in the 15 years before the great proletarian cultural revolution... To meet the urgent needs of the revolutionary people in creatively studying and applying Chairman Mao's works, these treasured red books were distributed as fast as they came off the press... to 148 countries and regions throughout the world... The extensive circulation of Chairman Mao's Works at home and abroad gives a powerful impetus to both the advance of the great proletarian cultural revolution in China and the revolutionary struggles in all the parts of the world.⁵¹

In addition to voluminous publication of Mao Tse-tung's works, Communist China's foreign broadcasting was also greatly increased during the Cultural Revolution. Its propaganda had been broadcasted to all parts of the world in 33 languages for a total of 1,103 hours per week.⁵²

⁵⁰ Peking Review, 1966-1968.

⁵¹ "Mao Tse-tung's Great Thought lights the Whole of China and the World," Peking Review, No. 1 (January 3, 1967), pp. 14-16.

⁵² Robert A. Scalapino, ibid., p. 101.

As Foreign Minister Chen Yi once said: "Speaking about fixed notions, the thought of Mao Tse-tung is just one big fixed notion... This Mao Tse-tung's Thought is downright Chinese stuff; let's not take it abroad."⁵³ Therefore, Communist China's excessive export of Mao Tse-tung's Thought as well as the Cultural Revolution which basically advocated rebellion and violence against the status quo would inevitably cause malaise and repugnance in other countries. However, any government that attempted to interfere in this missionary-like propagation was to be damned as reactionary or fascist. It was obviously an intolerable disturbance in other country's domestic affairs and conflicts between Communist China and these countries ensued.

Anti-Revisionism, Anti-Imperialism,
Support of the Revolutionary Struggles
of the People of all Countries
- Overall Conflict-

From provocative propaganda to antagonistic actions, throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Communist China seemed willingly to fight against the whole world. According to The China Quarterly Documentation, there were "demonstrations nearly every week in Peking outside some foreign embassy" and it "openly incited revolutionaries in

⁵³SCMP, No. 4007 (August 23, 1967), p. 1.

countries throughout the world, especially Southeast Asia, to follow the path of armed struggle outlined by Mao and overthrow their governments by force."⁵⁴ Michael B. Yahuda observed that Communist China could list as its friends during the convulsive period only two countries, the one was Albania and the other North Vietnam.⁵⁵ But relations even with these two countries were not without unpleasant events. North Vietnam implicitly complained of the Cultural Revolution because Soviet supplies were delayed and looted due to Red Guards violent interneicine fighting in Southern China, and Communist China had frankly expressed its indignation at North Vietnam's acceptance of peace talks in Paris. Two Albanian correspondents were accidentally harassed in a tumultuous anti-Soviet revisionism demonstration.

In addition to the United Nations, Communist China had been actually involved in quarrels of varying magnitude with fifty-one countries during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Its conflict behavior ranges from violent demonstrations, accusations, protests, expulsion and recall of diplomats, severance of diplomatic relations, support of subversive activities, to threats and war. The details are shown in Table 3. The issues that caused the conflicts with

⁵⁴The China Quarterly, No. 31 (July-September, 1967) p. 212.

⁵⁵Michael B. Yahuda, "China Foreign Policy After 1963: The Maoist Phases," The China Quarterly, No. 36 (October-December, 1968), p. 103.

TABLE 3

COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN CONFLICT BEHAVIOR DURING
THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Conflict Behavior	Target Countries
Demonstration	Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, Burma, Cambodia, Portugal, Britain, India, Indonesia, France, Nepal, Ceylon, Italy, Tunisia, Kenya, United States, Israel.
Expulsion and Recall of Lesser officials	Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Burma, Britain, France, Tunisia, Kenya, Japan, Netherland.
Support of Subversion	Burma, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, South Vietnam, Tunisia, Kenya, Israel.
Negative Sanction	Soviet Union, Mongolia, Burma, Portugal, Britain, Indonesia. * * *
Accusation	Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, North Korea, Cuba, Burma, Portugal, Britain, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, South Vietnam, France, Nepal, Ceylon, Italy, Tunisia, Kenya, Vatican, Spain, West Germany, United States, Israel, Japan, Ivory Coast, Singapore.
Protests	Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, Burma, Portugal, Britain, India, Indonesia, France, Nepal, Ceylon, Italy, Tunisia, Kenya, Switzerland, Denmark, United States, Netherland, Norway.
Expulsion and Recall of Ambassadors	Burma, Indonesia, Tunisia. (Not including those called back for ideological revision).
Break Relations	Indonesia, Tunisia.
Threats	Soviet Union, Burma, Portugal, Britain, India, Indonesia. * * *
Troop Movement	
Mobilization	
Casualties	There were reports of casualties in its military conflicts with the Soviet Union, Burma and India but without any exact record. It was estimated not to be over 1,000.
Military Action	Burma, India.
War	Soviet Union

SOURCE: The New York Time Index, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969; The China Quarterly No. 27 to 38; For details see the following sections of this chapter.

all of these countries, according to the Eleventh Plenum Communique, can be classified into four categories. The first is anti-revisionism, which is focused mainly on the Soviet Union and extended to most of the other communist countries. The second is anti-imperialism, directed mainly at the United States. The third is the support of the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries, comprising the support of armed revolution in the developing countries and the support of mass struggle in most capitalist nations. The last one is the spillover of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, including countries ranging from third world to Western middle powers. For details see Table 4.

In order to understand whether Communist China's external conflicts were related to the internal turbulence of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it is necessary to analyze the processes of the conflicts.

Anti-Revisionism

The major target of Communist China's anti-revisionism had been the Soviet Union from its very inception. However, despite the disputes between the two giant communist countries being a long story and complicated by a variety of factors,⁵⁶ the provocative and violent anti-Soviet revisionism behavior

⁵⁶ Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Disputes (Cranbury, N. J.: Associated University Press, 1976); William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-65," The China Quarterly, No. 25 (January-March, 1966), pp. 3-143; Thomas W. Robinson, "Sino-Soviet Border Disputes: Development and the March 1969 Clashes," ibid.

TABLE 4

CAUSES OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN CONFLICTS DURING
THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Cause of Conflict	Countries Involved
Anti-Revisionism	Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, North Korea, and Cuba.
Anti-Imperialism	United States, Portugal, Britain Israel.
Support of People's Armed Revolution	India, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines Malaysia, Burma, South Vietnam.
Support of World Mass Struggle	United States, France, Britain, Italy, Spain, West Germany.
Instigation of GPCR	Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Tunisia, Kenya.
Propagation of GPCR	Nepal, Afghanistan, Morocco, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Senegal.
Extremism of GPCR	Japan, Italy, Switzerland, Denmark, Iraq, Algeria, France, Sweden, Vatican, Ireland.
Others	Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Singapore.

throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was obviously unprecedented in the previous records of the ten-year Sino-Soviet dispute. Two days after the outbreak of the Red Guard movement on August 20, 1966, a massive demonstration against Soviet revisionism was organized outside the Soviet

Embassy on Anti-Revisionist Street. It lasted nearly a week and caused a strong Soviet official protest on August 20, 1966.⁵⁷ But Communist China seemed completely ignored Moscow's warnings. On the same day, another three-day anti-Soviet revisionism mass rally around the Soviet Embassy was staged.⁵⁸ The vociferous Red Guards, waving little red Maoism quotations, shouting anti-Soviet slogans, and hoisting enormously huge portraits of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin, in effect blocked all the passages of the Embassy. The extremely large loudspeakers which kept up a day and night din of anti-Soviet abuses were virtually a spiritual torture to the Russian diplomats. Along the streets leading to the Embassy, leaflets and poster were pasted up and slogans written on house walls, sidewalks, and driveways, hostile to the Soviet Union and calling for hatred and violence against Soviet Revisionism. The Embassy cars attempting to leave were stopped and the Embassy personnel were in reality confined. These furious anti-Soviet revisionism demonstrations were further stimulated when Moscow officially ousted all Maoist students from the Soviet Union in early October 1966 in reprisal for Communist China's expulsion of Soviet students the earlier month.⁵⁹ Thereafter, the Red Guard demonstrations before the Soviet Embassy were turned off and

⁵⁷The New York Times, August 28, 1966, p. 3; August 29, 1966, p. 1.

⁵⁸The New York Times, August 30, 1966, p. 1.

⁵⁹The New York Times, October 8, 1966, p. 1.

on routinely and the exchange and rejection of protests between the two governments were recorded with remarkable frequency.⁶⁰ On December 16, 1966, three of six Russian correspondents were ordered to leave China before Christmas, accused spreading rumors and slanders about the Cultural Revolution. The ensuing Soviet protest of the expulsion of the three newsmen strongly hinted at a threat that Chinese correspondents in Moscow might be expelled in retaliation.⁶¹ Because of Communist China's deliberate stimulation of anti-Soviet sentiment both internally and internationally, the already strained Sino-Soviet relations quickly deteriorated. The Soviet military forces were reportedly rallied to back their government against China and to increase vigilance.⁶² According to a Japanese correspondent in Peking, leaflets were also distributed throughout China reporting Mao's warning of Soviet troop mobilization along the Sinkiang border and announcing the alert of the People's Liberation Army stationed along the border.⁶³ But the notorious anti-Soviet revisionism campaign did not stop here; the Maoists seemed to determined to provoke their formal number one ally and to force it, with every suggestion, to break diplomatic relations.

⁶⁰The New York Times, October 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, November 2, 5, 7, 22, 28, December 6, 1966.

⁶¹The China Quarterly, No. 29 (January-March, 1967), pp. 194-195; The New York Times, December 17, 1966, p. 5. and December 24, 1966, p. 3.

⁶²The New York Times, January 11, 1967, p. 3.

⁶³The New York Times, February 12, 1967, p. 1.

As the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution reached a new phase in the seizure of power in mid-January of 1967, the fury against Soviet revisionism was also mounting. On January 25, 1967, a group of Communist Chinese students studying in East Europe were on their way home to participate in the Cultural Revolution. They arrived in Moscow and staged a demonstration to show their anti-revisionist revolutionary spirit at Lenin and Stalin's tombs, and a clash between them and the Soviet police ensued. Sixty-nine students were beaten, according to the Maoist charges, and eight of them were so badly injured that they were unable to resume their trip the next day. The next day the Communist Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a protest, denouncing the incident as "fascist atrocities committed by the Soviet revisionist clique which sent out troops, police and plainclothes special agents to savagely suppress the Chinese students studying in Europe who were going to lay wreaths at Lenin's mausoleum and Stalin's tomb."⁶⁴ On January 27, 1967, the People's Daily published an abusive editorial under the title "Hit Back Hard at the Rabid Provocations of the Filthy Soviet Revisionist Swine." It wrote:

Listen, you handful of filthy Soviet revisionist swine! The Chinese people, who are armed with Mao Tse-tung's Thought, are not to be bullied! The debt of blood you owe must be paid! We will hit back resolutely at your provocations!⁶⁵

⁶⁴Peking Review, No. 6 (February 3, 1967), pp. 21; The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), p. 241; The New York Times, January 26, 1967, p. 1. January 28, 1967, p. 2 and January 29, 1967, p. 3.

⁶⁵Peking Review, No. 6 (February 3, 1967), p. 23.

But the Soviet spokesman openly rejected the Maoist claims of injuries as largely imaginary. According to an eyewitness report, one of the students who acted injured tore off his bandage and revealed no damage at all.⁶⁶

However, despite these different accounts, the incident did pour oil on the flames of the Maoist anti-Soviet revisionism fervor. Beginning January 27, 1967, massive anti-Soviet rallies were held throughout China, and mammoth demonstrations in front of the Soviet Embassy lasted for almost three weeks. The armed forces were called to participate. Foreign observers called the demonstration outside the Soviet Embassy the biggest one ever held in Peking against a foreign embassy. Vociferous Red Guards shouted slogans about frying, burning or hanging the Soviet revisionist swine. Posters were plastered on the walls and windows of the Embassy and the Tass office one layer after another. Shops and restaurants refused to serve Soviet diplomats and their families.⁶⁷ Harassed day and night by hostile demonstrators and blaring loudspeakers, the Soviets finally determined to send their diplomats' dependents home. The bus which took the dependents from the Embassy was stopped by the Red Guards and the children were made to repeat pro-Mao slogans. At the airport, the wives were forced to crawl under portraits of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin

⁶⁶The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), p. 242.

⁶⁷The New York Times, January 29, 1967, p. 3; January 30, 1967, p. 3.

before being allowed to board their plane.⁶⁸ The frightened Soviet personnel tried to take refuge in other embassies, only to be told that their safety would be not guaranteed if they did not stay in their own compound. This made the Soviet diplomats virtual prisoners in Peking.⁶⁹ This boisterous anti-Soviet movement was not confined to China only. In Iraq, ten students went to the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad to deliver a protest about the Moscow incident and, according to New China News Agency, they were "savagely beaten" by the Soviet Embassy personnel.⁷⁰ In France, on January 27, 1967, some forty-nine Maoist Chinese students tried to march on the Soviet Embassy in Paris, but were prevented by the French government; this caused great trouble for the French Embassy in Peking. Anti-Soviet demonstrations were also reported in Algiers, Hanoi and Sana but without violence.⁷¹ In Russia, Communist China's Embassy in Moscow posted offensive propaganda about the January 25 incident in showcases mounted near the street. The Soviet Foreign Ministry demanded that they be removed and the Maoist insisted that they should stay. A fracas between the Maoists and Soviet police ensued and thirty-one Maoists allegedly were beaten.⁷²

⁶⁸The New York Times, February 5, 1967, p. 1.

⁶⁹The New York Times, February 8, 1967, p. 8.

⁷⁰The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), p. 242.

⁷¹The New York Times, February 1, 1967, p. 2.

⁷²The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), p. 243; The New York Times, February 4, 1967, p. 1.

Such a continual, widespread and provocative anti-Soviet mass movement would inevitably cause antagonistic governmental actions between the two giant communist countries. The official protests accusing each other were sent and rejected more than once every other day throughout the three-week period.⁷³ The Soviet Union repeatedly warned the Mao-Lin regime to halt the campaign of violence and humiliation against the Soviets in Peking or face retaliatory action,⁷⁴ and through propaganda the Maoists continuously instigated the Soviet people to "rise in rebellion against the revisionist rulers, dismiss them from office, seize power from them and smash the revisionist rule to smithereens."⁷⁵ On February 12, 1967, after an exchange of accusations, the visa accords which permitted nationals to travel without visas between the two countries were abrogated.⁷⁶ Most possibly due to the influence of the "February Adverse Current," on February 11, 1967, Chou En-lai publicly demanded that the demonstrations be halted and the Soviet diplomats guaranteed the protection

⁷³The New York Times Index, 1967, pp. 549-550; 1968 Yearbook on Chinese Communism; The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), pp. 240-244; Peking Review, No. 5, 6, 7, 8, 1967.

⁷⁴The New York Times, February 5, 1967, p. 1; February 10, 1967, p. 1 and 3.

⁷⁵Peking Review, No. 5 (February 3, 1967), p. 23 and No. 6, 7, 8, 1967.

⁷⁶The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), p. 243.

essential to performance of their duties.⁷⁷ The next day on February 12, the three-week anti-Soviet revisionism demonstrations finally ended.

But the "February Adverse Current" was quickly reversed and the abatement of anti-Soviet demonstrations lasted only temporarily. On March 12, 1967, Communist China expelled two Soviet diplomats because of their refusal to allow Chinese employees who had struck in protest against "the bloody incident in Red Square" to return to work in the Soviet Embassy. The Soviets retaliated by declaring two Maoist diplomats personae non gratae for the part they played in their Embassy's anti-Soviet revisionism demonstrations before the Soviet Embassy flared up again. A Soviet Embassy car was attacked and diplomats in the car were detained for more than six hours. A Pravda correspondent was expelled for slandering the Chinese people.⁷⁹ When the radical Maoists in the Central Cultural Revolution Group got ascendancy and seized power within the Foreign Ministry in favor of the radicals, the anti-Soviet revisionism campaign became more and more violent. On August 11, 1967, the Soviet merchant ship Svirsk was detained in Dairen. The tumultuous Red Guards rampaged aboard the ship and forced the captain and the crew to wear Mao Tse-tung Badges.

⁷⁷Current Scene, No. 20 (December 1, 1967), p. 7; Peking Review, No. 8 (February 17, 1967), pp. 11-14, 19.

⁷⁸The New York Times, March 12, 1967, p. 1 and March 19, p. 1.

⁷⁹The New York Times, March 13, 15, 28, May 5, 21, 1967.

When the seamen refused to obey, the Red Guards jailed the captain, beat up the crew, and then paraded the captain through town with the second ranking navigator who had thrown the Mao badge into the water. Moscow protested immediately to Communist China's Chargé d'Affaires and the next day Kosygin sent a personal demand to Chou En-lai for the release of the Svirsk and the protection of the crew. On August 13, Communist China protested at what it termed the insults to Mao Tse-tung. But the ship was released on the same day and left the port smeared with numerous anti-Soviet inscriptions and plastered posters. However, in the following days tens of thousands of Red Guards demonstrated before the Soviet Embassy with banners proclaiming "support for China in Svirsk incident." On August 17, the Red Guards broke into the Soviet Embassy compound in Peking, smashed the consular furniture and windows and burned records. Two Soviet diplomats were manhandled for three hours and their car set on fire. The Soviet Union strongly protested against these provocations as engaging in an "hysterical anti-Soviet campaign" apparently aimed at breaking remaining diplomatic ties.⁸¹ Largely because of the purge of the May 16 Group and the frustration of the radicals seizing power in the Foreign Ministry, these provocative anti-Soviet demonstrations abated

⁸⁰The China Quarterly, No. 32 (October-December, 1967), p. 223; The New York Times, August 12, 13, 14, 1967.

⁸¹The New York Times, August 18, 1967, p. 1; August 19, 1967, p. 1.

thereafter. According to Moscovs accusations throughout the period, in addition to verbal offenses, Peking had committed "more than 200 hundred provocative acts against Soviet institutions and representatives."⁸²

Although the massive and provocative anti-Soviet revisionism demonstrations abated, the tension and animosity between the two countries remained. Accusations against each other continued and became even more and more acrimonious. The disputes over the principles of building a communist society gradually turned from pre-Cultural Revolution ideological arguments such as peaceful transition versus permanent class struggle, etc.,⁸³ to castigations of each other's domestic policies. Each accused the other ruling elites, calling them counter-revolutionaries and fascist dictators, and instigated the other people to revolt against their rulers. The typical Maoists accusations against Soviet ruling elites may be illustrated by the following passages.

The Soviet revisionist clique is an out-and-out counter revolutionary clique... All revolutionary people in the world, including Soviet people, will sweep away this gang of dirty and shameless renegades and scabs and throw them into the garbage heap of history!⁸⁴

It is you renegades (Breghnev, Kosygin and company) who have trampled underfoot the great banner of Leninism, betrayed the cause of dictatorship of the

⁸²Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (Cranbury, N. J.: Associated University Press, 1967), p. 237.

⁸³See Chapter III; Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (Cranbury, N. J.: Associated University Presses, 1976), pp. 123-230.

⁸⁴The People's Daily, June 26, 1967.

proletariat and, under the signboard of the "Party of the entire people" and "state of the whole people, turned the Communist Party of the Soviet Union... into a bourgeois party, turned dictatorship of the proletariat... into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie which suppresses the laboring masses... The Soviet people have been denied the right to be their own masters and are again under oppression and enslavement by a group of despicable scabs - a new privileged bourgeois stratum.⁸⁵

Brezhnev is Khrushchev the second... "The Soviet Union today is under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie... a dictatorship of the German fascist type, a dictatorship of the Hitler type." ... In the Soviet Union to-day special agents and spies run amuck and reactionary laws and decrees multiply. Revolution is a crime, and people are everywhere being jailed on false charges... Large numbers of revolutionaries and innocent people have been thrown into concentration camps and "mental hospitals."⁸⁶

The Soviets retorts were not in the slightest gentle. Podgorny called the Maoist regime a reactionary military and bureaucratic dictatorship. Brezhnev attacked the Cultural Revolution as a national tragedy for the Chinese people and the Communist Party.⁸⁷ The Soviet official press, including Pravda, Izvestia, and Kommunist, repeatedly condemned Mao's leadership and urged he be overthrown.⁸⁸ These retorts accompanied by

⁸⁵Joint Editorial of Red Flag, the People's Daily, and Liberation Army Daily, in The China Quarterly, No. 33 (January-March, 1968), p. 172.

⁸⁶Joint Editorial of Red Flag, the People's Daily, and Liberation Army daily, in The China Quarterly, No. 43 (July-September, 1970), pp. 185-186.

⁸⁷See The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967) p. 244.

⁸⁸For example, see Pravda, February 15, 1967, in the New York Times, February 16, 1967, p. 3; Kommunist, No. 7 (May, 1968), pp. 103-114, summarized in the China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), pp. 197-198; Pravda, January 11, 1969, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 21 (No. 2, 1969), p. 3.

other Soviet tit-for-tat retaliation for Mao's irrational anti-Soviet campaign would inevitably produce repercussions on Communist China's politics. Combating revisionism abroad to stir up revolutionary fervor of the Chinese masses for the purge of revisionists at home was one of the fundamental tactics of Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Thus while Soviet reprisals became severe, Mao encouraged his people in this self-assertive way:

Why does this handful of Soviet revisionist renegades fear? In a word, they are afraid that the impact of the great proletarian cultural revolution in China and Mao Tse-tung's Thought will hasten the Soviet people's awakening to rise in rebellion against them, to seize their power, to make them the targets of the revolution, to shatter their revisionist order and break up their cannibal feast! ... The more violently the Soviet revisionists oppose the great proletarian cultural revolution, the more conclusive is the proof that we have done the right thing and done it well... And the more violently they oppose the great thought of Mao Tse-tung, the more conclusive is the proof that Mao Tse-tung's thought is revolutionary truth and therefore we must hold still higher the great banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought.⁸⁹

In the international communist movement, Mao continuously accused the Soviet Union of collusion with U.S. imperialists for world domination. In Mao's eyes, the Soviet revisionist ruling clique was a "pack of hardened renegades" betraying the people of the world and was "the heinous accomplice" of the U.S. imperialists in trying to put out the flames of world revolution, especially of the Vietnamese revolutionary

⁸⁹The People's Daily Editorial, "Hit Back Hard at the Rabid provocations of the Filthy Soviet Revisionist Swine!" Peking Review, No. 6 (February 3, 1967), pp. 23-24.

struggles.⁹⁰

The Soviet revisionist leading clique has all along pursued the counter-revolutionary policy of U.S.-Soviet collaboration for world domination, since Glassboro talks, not to mention anything earlier, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism has struck a series of dirty deals on such important questions as Vietnam, the Middle East and the prevention of nuclear proliferation... In fact, Soviet revisionism has long become the No. 1 accomplice of U.S. imperialism in its aggression against Vietnam and the rest of the world.⁹¹

In retaliation, the Soviet Union accused Communist China of trying to provoke a nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to be able to sit on the mountain and to watch the battle of the tigers, and of obstructing Soviet military supplies to Vietnam.

When the Cultural Revolution was drawing to the end, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968 resulted in further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. Communist China's fulminations against the Soviet Union became more and more vehement and venomous. Now the Soviet revisionists were not only the accomplice of U.S. imperialism but were themselves "a gang of social-imperialists and social-fascists." Communist China regarded the Soviet invasion as being the inevitable result of great power chauvinism and national egoism,

⁹⁰The People's Daily Commentator, "The More They White-wash, the Dirtier the Image of the Soviet Revisionist Renegades Becomes," Peking Review, No. 25 (June 16, 1967), pp. 17-18.

⁹¹Chou En-lai's speech on Rumanian National Day on August 23, 1968, in The China Quarterly, No. 36 (October-December, 1968), p. 75.

as practiced by the Soviet revisionist clique. The Soviet leadership was trying to create puppets with guns and the crimes they committed were not in the slightest different from Hitler's past aggression against Czechoslovakia and U.S. imperialism's aggression against Vietnam.⁹² The so called Brezhnev doctrine which aimed at the justification of the invasion was no doubt under fire. It was fulminated against as "sheer fascist theories" that had been fabricated by a "bunch of out-and-out fascist gangsters" in the Kremlin. It was merely a "shopworm junk" picked up from the ideological arsenal of Russian tsars and fascists and imperialists of all descriptions. The only difference was that the Soviet leaders gave it a "socialist" fig leaf.⁹³

In addition to vociferous condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, a more significant development was Communist China's official protest on September 16, 1968 against twenty-nine Soviet intrusions into China's airspace over the Tunghua area of Heilungkiang province between August 2 and 29, 1968. The protest noted that "These intrusions were wholly engineered by the Soviet government in an organized and planned way in support of the atrocities of aggression against Czechoslovakia." It also claimed that 119 intrusions by Soviet aircraft into China's airspace had been recorded in 1968.⁹⁴

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ For details see Peking Review (February 7, 1969), pp. 15-16; and (March 28, 1969), pp. 23-25.

⁹⁴ Peking Review, No. 38 (September 20, 1968), p. 41.

Together with Chou En-lai's warning of Soviet massive military deployment along its east border and armed provocations against China, it sounded as if the Communist Chinese leaders had a sense of an eventual Soviet invasion of China.⁹⁵ However, China was not Czechoslovakia in every aspect, especially in strength and in geographic position. It seemed logical to point out that while tensions had been created in the West, the Soviets should be shrewd enough to avoid major troubles, such as war with China, in the East. But, a sense of threat was helpful to Communist China's domestic politics at the time. This could be illustrated by Chou En-lai's speech to a rally on September 7, 1968.

It is... certain that our proletarian socialist revolution is advancing to worldwide victory. However, before the advent of victory, the enemies throughout the world will surely put up last-ditch struggles and launch counter-attacks. Therefore, our present great proletarian cultural revolution is a most extensive, thorough-going and all round political and military mobilization. Should enemies from abroad dare to invade China, we will, in response to the call of our great leader Chairman Mao, wipe them out, resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely!⁹⁶

In addition to border disputes,⁹⁷ there were reports

⁹⁵The New York Times, September 30, 1968, p. 17.

⁹⁶Chou En-lai's speech to a Peking mass rally on September 7, 1968, in The China Quarterly, No. 36 (October-December, 1968), p. 168.

⁹⁷Border disputes could be traced to Khrushchev's first visit to China when Mao brought up the question of the Outer Mongolian border. The border incidents started roughly in 1959, stepped up their frequency in 1962, and further increased during the Cultural Revolution. Open border disputes started after the Cuban Missile Crisis while a People's Daily Editorial, dated March 8, 1963, condemned the Soviet occupation of Chinese territory due to unequal treaties in the past two

of border clashes along the Ussuri and Amur Rivers during the Cultural Revolution. According to Communist China's later statement, the Soviets had provoked 4,189 incidents between late 1964 and early 1969.⁹⁸ According to the Soviet Union the Chinese Communists had committed wild provocations against the Soviet Union along the borders in connection with the excesses of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.⁹⁹ The actual scene of the clashes is illustrated by a UPI correspondent's report from Moscow in July 1967.

Anti-Soviet demonstrations have been conducted along the border between Manchuria and Soviet Union. Pravda charged that groups of Red Guards numbering from several hundred to a thousand crossed the frozen Ussuri River south of Khabarovsk, in trucks and on foot, shouting slogans, persistently trying to overrun Soviet border guards, and calling on them to rebel against their revisionist masters. The account suggested that fighting broke out between the demonstrators and the

centuries. Sino-Soviet border negotiations began in late May 1963 and broke down on October 15, 1964, largely because of Communist China's insistence on Soviet's admission that the present border was imposed on China by tsarist Russian imperialism through unequal treaties. For details see Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Disputes: Development and the March 1969 Clashes," ibid; pp. 1175-1202; U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, Sino-Soviet Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965). John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

⁹⁸"Statement of the Government of China, May 24, 1969," Peking Review, No. 22 (May 30, 1969), pp. 3-9.

⁹⁹See "Reports and Comments on Chinese Border Incidents," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXI, No. 11 (April 2, 1969), pp. 3-10 and 18. Soviet reported border clashes in January, December 7-9, 23, 1967 and late January 1968. The New York Times, February 14, 1967, p. 9 indicated that there were border clashes along Ussuri River in early February of 1967.

border guards who had to display considerable fortitude and tenacity in order to hold their ground without having recourse in firearms.¹⁰⁰

Although there were minor border incidents, as the accusations from both sides indicated, there was no official protest from either side until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The most serious incidents in the records of the Sino-Soviet border disputes were the border wars of March 2 and 15, 1969, over Chenpao Island (Damanski) in the Ussuri River. Casualties of the two clashes listed ninety-six dead (including a colonel) and twelve wounded on the Soviet side, and were estimated at over eight hundred in the second clash alone for Communist China. Both sides accused the other of initiating the violence, and the news of the incidents was greeted by huge mass demonstrations in both countries. But, in Communist China, the demonstrations appeared to be unprecedentedly massive and widespread. It was reported that 260 million people participated in demonstrations between March 3 and 7 throughout China.¹⁰¹ Although the mystery of who initiated the March 2

¹⁰⁰Published in Hong Kong Standard, July 20, 1967. For the description of the clash scene see also ibid. The author have seen a Communist China's documentary movie of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the border area. It proved the UPI report to be exact.

¹⁰¹For details of the incidents see "Communist China Statement," Peking Review, No. 10 (March 7, 1969), pp. 5 and 7; Peking Review, No. 12 (March 21, 1969), pp. 7-22; "The Soviet-Chinese Border Clash on Damansky Island," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXI, No. 10 (March 26, 1969) pp. 4-10; The China Quarterly, No. 38 (April-June, 1969), p. 191-195; "Hundreds of Millions of Armymen and Civilian Throughout China Angrily Denounce Soviet Revisionist Armed Provocation," Peking Review, No. 10 (March 7, 1969), pp. 8-11.

war still remained undocumented, the facts of the situation convinced most scholars that Communist China provoked the war in order to unify the severely disrupted society and subdue the warring factions while the Ninth Party Congress was preparing to convene on April 1, 1969. "With the de facto end of the GPCR in October 1969, however," said O. Edmund Clubb, "Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants needed an issue that might promise to strengthen their position in the upcoming party congress."¹⁰² In essence, border problems had never been the core issues in the development of Sino-Soviet disputes, but they were effectively exploited while other disputes became serious. As Thomas W. Robinson keenly observed:

Border problems did not occupy a major place in either state's attitude toward the other until relations began to deteriorate for other reasons.¹⁰³

But the frequency and seriousness of the border incidents could serve as a barometer in measuring Sino-Soviet revisionist campaign, the border wars certainly brought the tensions between the two countries to a climax. It seemed reasonable to assume that from the second clash of the March border wars Communist China might have experienced some bitter lessons. The forbearance of Soviet Union was limited and the Red Guard style of diplomacy could work no more. Furthermore, the Maoists

¹⁰²O. Edmund Clubb, China And Russia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 500; see also ibid., and footnote 97.

¹⁰³Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute Development and the March 1969 Clashes," ibid., p. 1201.

could also be shocked by the striking 60 to 800 ratio of March 15 border war casualties. They might understand that though the greatest Mao Tse-tung's Thought was invincible, it still could not resist the fires of Soviet revisionist modern arms.

Communist China's anti-revisionist movement was not confined to attacks on the Soviet Union alone; it was extended to all other communist countries with the sole exceptions of Albania and Rumania. Throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Communist China had quarrelled with East Germany, Mongolia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Cuba. The fundamental reasons for the quarrels were either because of these countries pro-Soviet positions in Sino-Soviet disputes or due to their disagreement with Communist China's radical lines in both world revolution and domestic politics. The direct causes that generated all of the conflicts were exclusively out of the excesses of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. When the violence of the Red Guards reached its first apex during the period of "January Storm," the rampagous young rebels' provocative activities against all of these countries' embassies such as staging vociferous demonstrations, humiliating and beating their diplomats, detaining and burning their embassy cars, and venomously smearing their political leaders, certainly

had caused panic among foreign diplomatic circles in Peking.¹⁰⁴
On February 9, 1967, following the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia

¹⁰⁴East Germany: On August 29, 1966, East Germany protested Red Guards beating and insulting its diplomats in Peking. February 19, 1967, Communist China protested East Germany smashing its Embassy showcase and insulting Mao Tse-tung. The New York Times, August 30, 1966, p. 4; 1968 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, p. 1047

Mongolia: On January 30, 1967, Mongolia protested against Red Guards demonstration outside Mongolian Embassy and detention of its diplomats' cars. Communist China accused Mongolian of insulting Mao. Mongolia expelled three Chinese teachers. Communist China counter-attack with massive demonstrations outside the Mongolian Embassy in Peking, beating the diplomats and burning their cars. The New York Times Index, 1967, p. 753; Peking Review, No. 34 (August 18, 1967), p. 36, and No. 35 (August 25, 1967), p. 25.

Poland: In early February, 1967, Red Guards attacked Polish Embassy and its diplomats. Polish government protested. The New York Times, February 7, 1967, p. 8.

Czechoslovakia: In February 1967, two Czech diplomats were attacked by Red Guards. On July 27, 1967 Czechoslovakia expelled Communist Chinese students because of their distributing anti-Soviet propaganda, and Communist China retaliated with strong protest accusing Czech of insulting Mao and massive demonstrations outside Czech Embassy in Peking. On December 27, 1967, Czech reporter was expelled from China. Peking Review, No. 32 (August 4, 1967), p. 54; The New York Times, February 4, 1967, p. 6, and July 29, 1967, p. 7.

North Korea: In January 1967, Red Guards attacked Kim Il-sung as a "fat revisionist and Khrushchev's disciple, accused him of slandering Cultural Revolution, and spreading rumors that Kim was overthrown by a coup. North Korea rebuffed the rumor as sheer Chinese fabrications. The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), p. 247; 1968 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, p. 1045 and 1047.

Yugoslavia: On January 27, 1967, the showcase housing Mao's portraits and Cultural Revolution propaganda of Communist China's Embassy in Belgrade was smashed. Following the incidents, Protests were exchanged. Red Guards demonstrations were staged and Tito's effigies were burned outside Yugoslov Embassy. Peking Review, No. 6 February 3, 1967, p. 31; The New York Times, January 30, 1967, p. 3 January 31, 1967, p. 3.

Hungary: On November 9, 1966, Hunagry expelled Communist China's students for their propagating Maoism and anti-revisionism. In November 1966 and again in January 1967, Red

withdrew its Embassy dependents. At the same time, the dependents of the Bulgarian, Polish, Hungarian, and East German embassies reserved their transportation and were preparing to leave for home.¹⁰⁵

It was interesting to note that Communist China's justification of the creation of all these unprecedented turbulences in its foreign relations was mainly based on these countries' hostility to Chairman Mao and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. As its repeated official protests and public accusations against all of these countries revealed:

Owing to its reactionary class nature, the... revisionist leading clique had consistently followed Soviet revisionism and served as its pawn. With deep hatred for the mortal fear of the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung and China's unprecedented great proletarian cultural revolution, it had engineered a series of anti-China incidents.¹⁰⁶

Guards demonstrations were staged outside Hungarian Embassy in Peking. Protests against each other exchanged. Peking Review, No. 48 (November 25, 1966), p. 5 and No. 50 (December 9, 1966), pp. 34-35; The New York Times, January 31, 1967, p. 5; 1968 Yearbook On Chinese Communism, p. 1045.

Bulgaria: On May 29, 1967, Bulgaria expelled three Communist Chinese students because of their anti-Bulgarian activities. Communist China announced a strong protest against Bulgarian revisionist clique's cooperating with Soviet revisionists and pursuing anti-China policy. Peking Review, No. 25 (June 16, 1967), p. 40.

Cuba: See The China Quarterly, No. 32 (October-December, 1966), p. 221. New China News Agency accused Cuban Government of anti-Negro and Racist. The New York Times, August 28, 1966, p. 4.

¹⁰⁵1968 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, p. 1046.

¹⁰⁶"Protest Against Mongolian Embassy Staff Members Provocation," Peking Review, No. 34 (August 18, 1967), p. 36.

In particular the insult and attack on the photographs of Chairman Mao is an insult and attack on the People's Republic of China and the 700 million Chinese people, and this is something which the Chinese people absolutely cannot tolerate.¹⁰⁷

If you revisionist leading clique continue to viciously attack Chairman Mao, the great leader of the Chinese people and red sun in their hearts, to act the anti-China pawn of the Soviet revisionists and persist in being hostile to the... Chinese people... you will surely come to no good end.¹⁰⁸

The central theme of the protests seemed to focus more on the Soviet Union than on the accused countries themselves, and the contents sounded much more as if addressed to the audiences of the Chinese people rather than to the countries condemned.

Anti-Imperialism

Communist China's anti-imperialism campaign during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, as it had been before, was directed mainly at the United States. But due to the expansion of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the hatred of imperialism was also spread to Portugal and Britain, largely because of their colonies in Macao and Hong Kong, the symbol of the old imperialism legacy in China.

¹⁰⁷"Strong Protest Against Yugoslavia's Political Provocation," Peking Review, No. 6 (February 3, 1967), p. 30.

¹⁰⁸"Chinese Foreign Ministry Protests Against Bulgaria's Anti-China Action," Peking Review, No. 25 (June 16, 1967), p. 40. See also protests against Hungary, Peking Review, No. 48 and No. 50, 1966, and protests against Czechoslovakia, Peking Review, No. 32, 1967, p. 54.

With regard to the United States, the controlling themes that dominated the campaign at the time were focused on the Vietnam War, the Middle East Crisis and American mass struggle,¹⁰⁹ and the basic strategy in the conduct of the campaign followed strictly the principle of antagonism without direct military confrontation, which Mao and his colleagues had formulated when they determined to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.¹¹⁰ According to Mao's conviction, the United States' intervention in the third world national liberation struggles would inevitably stimulate the fighting spirits of the revolutionary people and would finally be defeated by "People's War" without the need of Communist China's direct military involvement. As it was said in a People's Daily Editorial "Doom of U.S. Imperialism" on August 30, 1966:

The tying down of large numbers of United States troops by the Asian people creates a favorable condition for the further growth of the anti-United States struggle of the people in other parts of the world. With all the people rising to attack it, one hitting at its head and the other at its feet, United States imperialism can be nibbled up bit by bit.

¹⁰⁹Although the Taiwan question, the problem of Communist China's membership to the United Nations, and the U.S. military presence in Asia had been long the subjects of conflicts between Communist China and United States, during the Cultural Revolution, all the subjects seemed temporarily to be submerged by the Vietnam War and the Middle East Crisis. They generally occupied much less publicity in Communist China's news media and official announcements. But Communist China's support of armed struggle in many South East Asian countries might be regarded as part of its anti-U.S. imperialism designs.

¹¹⁰For details see Chapter III.

So, following this basic strategy, the tactics of Communist China's struggle against U.S. imperialism over the above mentioned issues were aimed at subverting the will of the United States people and their support of foreign military involvement through the creation of pressures of public opinion against U.S. imperialism both within the United States and in the international community. These tactics also involved support of self-reliant protracted armed struggle to trap the U.S. imperialists in a people's war quagmire and opposition to peaceful settlements of all international problems that would increase the two super powers' influence or benefit their detente. In these objectives, communist China intended not only to aggravate the contradictions between the two super-powers and combat both of them at the same time without risking direct military confrontation with any of them, but also to prove the universal infallibility of Mao's revolutionary doctrines and to stir up revolutionary fervor of the Chinese masses for combating "capitalist-roaders" at home. Thus the conflict behavior of Communist China's anti-U.S. imperialism campaign throughout the period of domestic convulsion was characterized by venomous accusations of U.S. aggressive atrocities and its collusion with Soviet revisionists in domination of the world; provocative advocacy of armed struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression; emotional instigation of mass struggle against U.S. imperialist oppression and cautious restraint from radical and substantial involvement in any concrete situation.

In the Vietnam War, Communist China had kept up constant attacks on the U.S. imperialists' military crimes and expressed its firm support of the brave Vietnamese struggles either through official statements or by numerous huge mass demonstrations. It was true that for the needs of the domestic power struggle its expressions of anti-U.S. feelings were real and fierce, but its official support was limited to repeated cliches without substance:

The people of China and Vietnam are truly comrades-in-arms and brothers... The 700 million people of China will back the Vietnam people to the hilt; the vast expanse of China's territory is their reliable rear area... In the common struggle, the Chinese and Vietnamese people support and cooperate with each other, and have forged an unbreakable militant friendship. The 700 million people of China, armed with Mao Tse-tung's Thought, will unswervingly stand by the Vietnamese people and will make all out efforts for the defeat of vicious U.S. imperialism.¹¹¹

In contrast to these feverish statements of supports, Communist China's substantial contribution to its Vietnamese comrades was limited. For example, according to U.S. official announcements, up to August 1966, there were only "50,000 uniformed troops in North Vietnam, engaged mainly in repairing supply routes between Hanoi and military bases in China."¹¹²

¹¹¹"Chou En-lai Speech at a Mass Rally on November 19, 1967," The China Quarterly, No. 33 (January-March, 1968), pp. 172-173; The same expression of support had appeared in Liu Shao-chi's speech to a one million people rally at Tien An Men Square on July 22, 1966

¹¹²Congressional Quarterly Service, China and U.S. Far East Policy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1967), p. 194.

Furthermore, it was also interesting to note that Communist China's reaction to U.S. accidental air invasions of Chinese territory bordering Vietnam was comparatively cautious and restrained. When the incidents happened, huge Red Guards anti-U.S. imperialism demonstrations were vociferously organized throughout China but its official protests were only blank curses.

We sternly warn the U.S. aggressors: The heroic Chinese people who are armed with the great thought of Mao Tse-tung fear no war threats of any kind. We are in full battle array. If you must have a test of strength, then come on! The Iron fists of 700 million Chinese people will definitely crush all aggressors to pulp.¹¹³

In comparison with the one it sent to the Government of Denmark threatening grave consequences because of a cartoonist's mocking caricature of Mao in the newspaper, these protests seemed to be the same or even milder.

However, its opposition to peaceful negotiations over the war was vehement and fierce. It continuously accused the suggested peace talks of sham, fraud, swindle, and U.S.-Soviet collusion in the extinction of Vietnamese revolutionary flames. Thus, when the Paris Talks were finally arranged in April 1968, Communist China felt no reluctance in expressing its strong opposition, and showing its indignation to the Hanoi regime. On May 8, Chou En-lai frankly told the Vietnamese delegation

¹¹³Peking Review, No. 39 (September 23, 1966), p. 26; The China Quarterly, No. 28 (October-December, 1966), p. 190.

to the Paris talks that "In Mao Tse-tung's opinion the talks were a mistake." According to The China Quarterly Documentation, in June 1968, there were demonstrations staged outside the North Vietnamese consulates at Canton, Nanning and Kunming. These demonstrations were said to have been ostensibly in support of the Vietnamese but in practice a protest at the acceptance by North Vietnam of talks in Paris. It was reported that the consulate in Nanning had been ransacked by demonstrators.¹¹⁴

In the Middle East, the Israeli-Arabian confrontation had been the habitual subject of Communist China's anti-U.S. imperialism movement. It had repeatedly pointed out that "the Arab people's struggle against United States imperialism and Zionism was an important component of the world-wide struggle against imperialism."¹¹⁵ So, when the Six-Day War broke out, it quickly electrified the already intensified anti-U.S. imperialism feelings throughout China. In a government statement on June 7, 1967, Communist China vehemently denounced the Israeli attack as a "towering crime" against the Arab people and castigated U.S. imperialism for this aggression as a grave provocation against the people of Africa, Asia and the whole world.¹¹⁶ Three days following the statement,

¹¹⁴The China Quarterly, No. 45 (July-September, 1968), p. 199. ¹¹⁵"Chinese Government Statement, May 27, 1967," Peking Review, No. 23 (June 2, 1967), p. 29.

¹¹⁶"Chinese Government Statement: Firm Support for Arab People's Fight Against U.S. Israeli Aggression," Peking Review, No. 24 (June 9, 1967), p. 8.

there were 1.2 million people in Peking and countless masses in other cities throughout China pouring out into the Streets to demonstrate their "staunch support" for the Arab people's brave struggles against U.S. imperialism and Israeli Zionism.¹¹⁷ The subsequent ceasefire agreements and peaceful settlement talks brought endless attacks from Communist China. It regarded all of these arrangements exclusively as examples of U.S.-Soviet collaboration in trying to put out the flames of world revolution and stressed the line that the united armed struggle of the Arab people was the only way to liberate themselves.¹¹⁸ However, it is ironical to note that, despite Communist China's announced "staunch support" and its accusation of Soviet betrayal of the Arab people during and after the Six-Day War, whereas Moscow offered real weapons, advice and diplomatic assistance, Peking promised intermittently only the help of

¹¹⁷"We Firmly Stand by the Arab People," Peking Review No. 25 (June 16, 1967), pp. 12-14.

¹¹⁸"Big Betrayal at Hollybush," Peking Review, No. 28 (July 7, 1967), pp. 23-25; "Big Counter-Revolutionary Collusion of U.S. imperialisms and Soviet Revisionism in Middle East Events," Peking Review, No. 31 (July 28, 1967), pp. 24-27; "Lessons of the Arab War Against Aggression," Peking Review, No. 37 (September 8, 1967), pp. 22-27; "Resolutely Foil U.S.-Israeli War Provocations Against the Arab Countries," Peking Review, No. 45 (November 3, 1967), pp. 24-25; "U.S.-Soviet Conspiracy to Strangle Arab People's Anti-imperialism Struggle," Peking Review, No. 24 (June 14, 1968), pp. 25 and 29, and "To Strengthen Unity and Persist in Struggle Means Victory," pp. 23-24; "Persistence in Armed Struggle Means Victory," Peking Review, No. 21 (May 24, 1968), pp. 33-34, and "Palestinian People Have Found the Way to Free Their Homeland," Brilliant Battle Results," pp. 35-37.

700 million people armed with Mao Tse-tung's Thought. As the government statement declared.

Armed with Mao Tse-tung's Thought, the 700 million Chinese people who are victoriously carrying on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will not allow the U.S. imperialists and their collaborators to ride roughshod and commit aggression everywhere.¹¹⁹

While combating U.S. imperialism internationally, Communist China also instigated the struggle against U.S. imperialism within the United States proper. In late 1965, its official news media had paid great attention to "the mounting tide of the American people's struggle against the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam" and asserted that the "great awakened American people will be the gravediggers of U.S. imperialism."¹²⁰ Thereafter, Communist China had never slackened this attack. But its public campaign against U.S. imperialism within the United States during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was mainly in the form of the support of the Afro-American struggle against oppression.¹²¹ After the Middle East Six-Day War, when Black Americans rioted in Detroit on July 23, 1967, Communist China published a series of articles in its news media and held a variety of mass rallies denouncing the Johnson

¹¹⁹Peking Review, No. 24 (June 9, 1967), p. 14.

¹²⁰The People's Daily Editorials November 29, and Oct. 8, 1965, in The China Quarterly, No. 25 (January-March, 1966), p. 250. For Communist China's lobbies in the United States see China and U.S. Far East Policy, pp. 23-28.

¹²¹It could be traced to 1963 when Mao Tse-tung first issued his personal statement in support of the Afro-American struggle against U.S. imperialist oppression. During the Cultural Revolution, the campaign was carried on with much greater enthusiasm.

"reactionary" Administration's "ferocious and ruthless suppression of Afro-Americans revolutionary struggle." It asserted that "the powerful, surging Afro-American armed struggle against racial oppression is of great significance not only to the American people fighting the reactionary rule of the U.S. monopoly groups but also to the struggle of the people of the world against U.S. imperialism."¹²² These accusations and the demonstrations had continued intermittently and finally triggered a new nationwide "Support of World Mass Struggle Against Oppression Campaign" in April 1968 that will be treated later.

In addition to all these conflicts, Communist China's cultivation of hatred of U.S. imperialism among the Chinese people was also intensive. Besides numerous anti-U.S. mass rallies and demonstrations, travellers could see anti-U.S. banners and posters everywhere in Chinese cities and villages. To hit at the effigies of U.S. ruling elites became common practice, from militia shooting drills to kindergarten children's games.¹²³ In all the text books, even including mathematics

¹²²"Afro-Americans Pit Revolutionary Violence Against Reactionary Violence," Peking Review, No. 32 (August 4, 1967), pp. 46-47 and 51; The People's Daily Editorial, "Afro-American's Just Struggle Will Triumph," Peking Review, No. 34 (August 18, 1967), pp. 29-30; "Condemn Johnson's Intimidation and Deception of Afro-Americans," Peking Review, No. 33 (August 11, 1967) pp. 26-27.

¹²³For pictures and descriptions see Louis Barcata, China: in the Throes of the Cultural Revolution (New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1968).

and physics, anti-imperialism was the main subject.¹²⁴ However, fortunately because of the complete absence of American missions in Peking, this vehement anti-U.S. imperialism campaign was carried on without the distressful complications of diplomatic incidents. And it is also important to note that throughout the convulsive period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks, despite all of the quarrels and accusations, continued at Warsaw without complete disruption.

The flames of anti-Portuguese imperialism and anti-British imperialism campaigns were kindled exclusively because of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the distressful scenes of the ensuing conflicts such as bloody mass fightings, vociferous demonstrations, beating of diplomats, venomous accusations and numerous exchanges of protests seemed to differ little from the attacks against Soviet revisionism. In Macao, beginning in mid November 1966, the Red Guards violent activities were widespread over the small island. Their vociferous behavior could be illustrated by one of their protests delivered to the Portuguese authorities in Macao.

We are Red Guards led personally by Chairman Mao and also the powerful reserves of the Chinese people's Liberation Army. We are the revolutionary rebels armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought who dare to scale a mountain of swords and brave a sea of fire. We

¹²⁴For details see 1973 Yearbook on Chinese Communisms, pp. II-165-II-175. For example, in the Mathematics text books, the questions usually were written in this way. "The U.S. imperialists have five airplanes; four of them were shot down and one was wounded by the brave Vietnamese guerrillas; how many airplanes do the U.S. imperialists have now?"

want to rebel in a big way against imperialism and against modern revisionism and the reactionaries of all countries. If, instead of reigning on the brink of a precipice and acknowledging your guilt, you, the Portuguese authorities in Macao, obstinately insist on being hostile to the Chinese people, we Red Guards will take all necessary revolutionary actions to rebel against you. We mean what we say.¹²⁵

The bloody mass fightings among Maoist Red Guards, anti-Maoist people and Portuguese police in Macao, and numerous demonstration in support of "brave overseas Chinese people against Portuguese imperialist suppression " On the China Mainland lasted more than two months. The Portuguese authorities finally submitted. On January 29, 1967, Governor Carvalho in Macao signed an agreement in which the Portuguese admitted guilt and apologized to the families of the eight Maoists killed during the riot and to the injured and those detained and to all the Chinese residents of Macao, promising payment of £125,000 in compensation and the release of sixty-two Maoist rioters held under arrest. This probably could be considered the only victory of the numerous Red Guards' struggles against foreign countries.¹²⁶

In Hongkong, the struggle against British imperialism was even more fierce. On May 6, 1967, the Hongkong police intervened in an artificial plastic flower factory labor disturbance and arrested twenty-one rioting Chinese workers.

¹²⁵"Chinese People Armed with Mao Tse-tung's Thought Are Not Be Trifled With," Peking Review, No. 51 (December 16, 1966), pp. 16-17.

¹²⁶For details of the conflicts see Peking Review, No. 50 (December 9, 1966), p.35; The New York Times Index, 1966, 1967; The China Quarterly, No. 29, p. 197 and No. 30, p. 248

This kindled the Maoist revolutionary flames and violence. On May 15, 1967, Peking announced a governmental statement in full support of the "Chinese patriotic struggle" against British imperialism. It condemned the "sanguinary atrocities perpetrated by the British authorities in Hong Kong" against the Chinese people as committed sheerly out of their "mortal fear and bitter hatred of China's great proletarian cultural revolution." These atrocities were a component part of the British government's scheme of collusion with United States imperialism against China. It demanded that the British authorities in Hong Kong "immediately and unconditionally set free all the arrested persons and stop all fascist measures." Finally it warned that "should the British Government and the British authorities in Hong Kong cling to their perverse course, they must be held responsible for all the grave consequences arising therefrom." The next day, massive Red Guards demonstrations in support of the Hong Kong people against British imperialism were staged throughout China. The British consulate in Shanghai, after a Red Guards attack, was ordered to close down and its personnel were withdrawn in a miserable spectacle--all of them were kicked and daubed with glue when Red Guards forced them to run the gauntlet at the Shanghai airport. But the British seemed not so easily bullied as the Portuguese and the provocative struggle against British imperialism both in Hong Kong and the China Mainland lingered on, reaching its climax when the Red Guards burned the British

Legation in Peking and humiliated its charge d' affaires in mid-August 1967. After this, the anti-British imperialism fervor abated and passed into oblivion with the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.¹²⁷

Support of the Revolutionary Struggles of the People of All Countries

It was well known that the advocacy of world revolution had been Communist China's habitual foreign behavior. However, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, it appeared to be particularly enthusiastic and provocative in the support and encouragement of people's armed revolution and mass struggle all over the world, even in those countries whose friendship it had anxiously courted before.

Support of People's Armed Revolution Against Reactionaries

Although Communist China's relations with India and Indonesia were lukewarm and unfriendly and it was historically hostile toward these "reactionary regimes" in Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia before the eruption of the Great

¹²⁷"Chinese Government Lodges Most Urgent and Strongest Protest With British Government, May 16, 1967," Peking Review, No. 21 (May 19, 1967), pp. 14-15; "Chinese People Condemn Outrages by British Authorities in Hong Kong," Peking Review, No. 22 (May 26, 1967), pp. 50-53; The People's Daily Editorial, "Resolutely Rebel British Imperialist Provocations," Peking Review, No. 24 (June 9, 1967), pp. 11-12; The China Quarterly, No. 31, pp. 212-217, No. 32, pp. 221-223, No. 33, pp. 175-177, and No. 34, pp. 189-190.

Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the excesses and extremism of the Revolution did flame up the feud and worsen the situation. Sino-Indian relations had remained diplomatically conflicting and antagonistic since the Sino-Indian Border War in 1962 and further deteriorated after the Indo-Pakistani War in September 1965. However, despite Communist China's charges that, in 1966, India had intruded into Chinese territory seventy-three times by foot troops and seventy-one by airplanes,¹²⁸ there were comparatively few provocative incidents in either border disputes or diplomatic dealings. Beginning in 1967, the situation quickly changed. Bloody minor border clashes happened with remarkable frequency, especially in the summer. Expulsion and recall of diplomats, exchange of protests, and mass demonstrations with smashing of embassies and beating of diplomats became the habitual way of diplomatic expression in both Peking and New Delhi.¹²⁹ Moreover, accompanying the deterioration of diplomatic relations, India became Communist China's main open target for the support of people's armed revolution, and the Indian Communist Party's armed struggle against Mrs. Gandhi's administration won Peking's fullhearted public support.¹³⁰ Though the Indian Foreign

¹²⁸"Strong Protest Against Indian Intrusion in 1966," Peking Review, No. 6 (February 3, 1967), p. 29.

¹²⁹The New York Times Index 1966, p. 521, 1967, pp. 536-537, and 1968, pp. 649-650; 1967, 1968, 1969 Yearbook on Chinese Communism; The China Quarterly, No. 26-37.

¹³⁰The People's Daily Editorial, "Spring Thunder Over India," Peking Review, No. 29 (July 14, 1967), pp. 22-23; The People's Daily Commentator, "Let the Peasants' Revolutionary Storm in India Strike Harder," Peking Review, No. 9 (March 1, 1968), pp. 25-30.

Minister declared on August 30, 1967, that India would not break diplomatic relations with Communist China,¹³¹ he did reveal that Sino-Indian relations had reached their lowest point since 1962.

The deterioration of Sino-Indonesian relations was obvious since the Indonesian October Crisis of 1965 and the ensuing quarrels between the two countries in the following two years appeared to have little to do with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. But it seemed reasonable to assume that the Maoist zealots and other radicals' seizure of power in the Foreign Ministry had changed the situation from bad to worse.¹³² After Sukarno was removed from office in

¹³¹1968 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, p. 1079.

¹³²The main theme of the radicals criticism of Chen Yi and Liao Chen-chih, Chairman of Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, was "three capitulations and one extinction." The radicals specifically accused Chen and Liao of prohibiting overseas Chinese from making revolution in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's Thought and of not giving enough support to the Indonesian Chinese against Suharto's persecution. For details see Red Guards, "Criticizing Liao Combat Newspaper," in Communist China Digest, No. 42 (October 16, 1967), pp. 74-77. Therefore, while the radicals got ascendancy over the Foreign Ministry, especially after Yao Tung-shan's return from Indonesia Communist China's reaction to Indonesian anti-Communist China measures became more provocative. The April 26, 1967 Communist China's government statement illustrates this observation. For details see "The Strongest and Most Emphatic Protest Against the Reactionary Indonesian Government's Anti-China Violence," Peking Review, No. 19 (May 5, 1967), pp. 11-13 and also other documents in pp. 13-18; Red Flag Editorial, "People of Indonesian, Unite and Fight to Overthrow the Fascist Regime," Peking Review, No. 29 (July 14, 1967), pp. 15-17, and other anti-Indonesia documents, pp. 18-22; The People's Daily Commentator, "The Indonesian People Have Raised the Torch of Armed Struggle," Peking Review, No. 35 (August 25, 1967), pp. 16-17.

March 1967, the Communist China's excessive advocacy of the Indonesian and overseas Chinese armed struggle led by the Maoist Indonesian Communist Party against the "Suharto fascist military dictatorship" and the tit-for-tat diplomatic retaliations such as venomous accusations, massive anti-Indonesian demonstrations, harassment of the Indonesian Embassy, and the expulsion of Indonesian diplomats, etc., on all Indonesian anti-Communist China provocations finally brought about the complete severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries in October 1967. The Communist Chinese government statement on the suspension of diplomatic relations provides a useful clue to the understanding of Communist China's radical manner in dealing with the Indonesians.

Although the relations between China and Indonesia have been temporarily suspended as a result of disruption by the Indonesian reactionaries, we firmly convince that no force on earth can destroy the militant friendship between the two peoples. Always following the teaching of their great leader Chairman Mao, the Chinese Government and people will unswervingly and firmly support the revolutionary struggle of the Indonesian people and do their best to fulfil their proletarian internationalist duty to the Indonesian people.¹³³

Communist China had no diplomatic relations with Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia. It had supported the people's armed revolution led by the pro-Maoist communist parties against the "reactionary" governments of all these

¹³³"Chinese Government Statement," Peking Review, No. 45 (November 3, 1967), pp. 5-6. See also the People's Daily Editorial, "Monstrous Crimes of Indonesian Reactionaries in Disrupting Relations Between China and Indonesia," ibid., pp. 6-8.

countries with a variation of ebb and flow in parallel with its domestic political trends since the inception of the Chinese Communist regime, and it had continued its support throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The notable significance is that Communist China's support of these countries people's armed revolution throughout the Cultural Revolution appeared to be more open and particularly provocative. It seemed to put the emphasis more on the justification of the universal infallibility of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and indiscriminate hostility to U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism than on the actual revolutionary situation and the real wishes of the people of these countries.¹³⁴ For example, in an article entitled "Flames of People's War Raging Like a Prairie Fire in Thailand," the Peking Review wrote in this self-assertive manner:

¹³⁴Thailand: "Thai Reactionary Denounced," Peking Review No. 5 (January 27, 1967), p. 29; "U.S. Imperialism in Thailand," Peking Review, No. 13 (March 24, 1967), p. 29; "Message of the Communist Party of Thailand to the People of the Whole Country," Peking Review, No. 7 (February 10, 1967), pp. 26-27; "Resolute Support for Armed Struggle Led by Communist Party of Thailand: CCP Central Committee Greet Thailand Communist Party 25th Anniversary," Peking Review, No. 50 (December 8, 1967), p. 8.

Philippines: "Philippine Countryside: Vigorous Guerrilla Warfare," Peking Review, No. 38 (September 15, 1967), p. 38 "Under the Light of Mao Tse-tung's Thought - Excellent Revolutionary Situation in Asia, Africa and Latin America," Peking Review, No. 43 (October 20, 1967), pp. 28-31; "Puny Counter Revolutionary Alliance," Peking Review, No. 34 (August 18, 1967), pp. 6-7.

Malaysia: "Malaya National Liberation League's 18th Anniversary," Peking Review, No. 7 (February 10, 1967), p. 29; "Renegade and U.S. Pawn," Peking Review, No. 16 (April 14, 1967), p. 28; "Under the Light of Mao's Thought," ibid.,: "Puny Counter-Revolutionary Alliance," ibid.

The most important factor in the rapid development of the revolution in Thailand lies in the fact that the Communist Party of Thailand, the core leading the revolution, has been holding aloft the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, and adhering to the revolutionary road of using the country side to encircle the cities and seizing political power by armed force. It resolutely opposes Soviet Modern revisionism and stresses that the brilliant thinking of the great teacher Chairman Mao -- "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" is the guide to the revolutionary struggle of the people the world over.¹³⁵

In addition to India, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, Communist China's advocacy of people's armed revolution or national liberation movements in other areas during the Cultural Revolution consisted largely of wishful thinking and pep talks to its domestic readers centered on the omnipresence of the Maoism and the invincible influences of the Cultural Revolution. As was repeatedly propagandized in its official news media.

The world has entered upon a new era which has Mao Tse-tung's Thought as its great banner... The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has ushered in a new era of proletarian socialist revolution... greatly inspired all the peoples in their revolutionary struggle... In Asia, Africa and Latin America... people in an increasing number of countries have come to see the truth the political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, and have taken correct road of armed struggle... The influence on the peoples of the world of the triumphant road traversed by the Chinese revolution is irresistible.¹³⁶

¹³⁵Peking Review, No. 2 (January 12, 1968), pp. 20-21. See also in the same issue, "Historic Turning Point in the Indian Revolution," pp. 21-23; "Important New Start in the Indonesian Revolution," pp. 23-24; "Burmese People's Armed Struggle: a Red Flag for the People's Revolution," *ibid.*, pp. 17-20.

¹³⁶"Excellent Situation: East Wind Prevails Over the West Wind," Peking Review, No. 43 (October 20, 1967), pp. 26-28; See also Peking Review special column "Mao Tse-tung's Thought lights the Whole World," from March 1967 to April 1968.

But it is important to note that Communist China's attitude toward the people's armed revolution in those countries, which did not follow the Maoist model, was particularly lukewarm or even hostile. For example, the insurrection led by Ernesto Chi Guevara in Bolivia in 1967 had courted worldwide attention, but Communist China mentioned it briefly only twice in the Peking Review and the central themes were focused more on the evils of imperialism and the restless situation in Bolivia rather than on the insurrection itself.¹³⁷ Guevara's Guerrilla warfare: A Means was published in the Peking Review in full on January 10, 1964, but after Guevara failed and was killed on October 9, 1967, in a Bolivia jungle, the Peking Review as well as The People's Daily did not have even one word to mention his name and the incident. The reason can only be traced to the fact that Guevara's revolutionary theory and strategy were almost exclusively derived from Castro's Cuban revolution and they surely would not add to "Chairman Mao's credit."¹³⁸ Therefore, seizing the occasion of the Ninth Ceylonese Communist Party Congress, the Peking Review published a long commentary on June 21, 1968 in which, after an excessive

¹³⁷ See Peking Review, No. 18, 1967, p. 38 and No. 43, 1967, p. 31.

¹³⁸ For Castro and Guevara personal relationship and Guevara's revolution doctrines see Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes, ed., Che: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1969); Andrew Sinclair, Che Guevara (New York: Viking Press, 1970). Sino-Cuban relations has deteriorated since early 1966 and Castro had directly attacked Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese Communist leaders. See The New York Times, March 14, 1966, p. 8 and March 15, 1966, p. 1.

admiration of Mao Tse-tung's Thought, it obliquely but vehemently attacked Cuban revolutionary theory and Guevara's views on guerrilla warfare as romantic and petty-bourgeois ideology completely opposed to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's Thought, and Guevara's insurrection forces as "a band of swashbuckling three musketeers type of bravadoes."¹³⁹

Support of World Mass Struggle Against Oppression and Exploitation

In early summer of 1968, when the "Denunciation of Rightist Reversal of Verdict," which had once again incited bloody struggles among mass factions, began to gain momentum, Mao Tse-tung deliberately fomented a feverish nationwide movement in support of World mass struggle against oppression and exploitation. On April 16, 1968, by virtue of the incidents of the American Black riots after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Mao issued a new personal statement calling on "the workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals of all countries and all who are willing to fight against U.S. imperialism {and its accomplices} to take action and extend strong support to the struggle of the Black people in the United States."¹⁴⁰ There immediately followed huge mass rallies and demonstrations throughout China. The spectacular scene was described in Peking Review:

¹³⁹Peking Review, No. 25 (June 21, 1968), pp. 12-14.

¹⁴⁰Peking Review, No. 16 (April 19, 1968), pp. 5-6.

Millions upon millions of the revolutionary people all over the country most enthusiastically uphold Chairman Mao's statement in support of the Afro-American struggle against violent repression...In the last few days, millions and millions of civilians and soldiers held huge rallies and demonstrations over wide areas from Peking... to the border areas, from the cities to the countryside, and in factories, mines, government organizations and schools. ¹⁴¹

The United States, which "commits aggression abroad and subjects the people at home to oppression and exploitation" was accused of being the "most ferocious enemy of the people both in the United States and the whole world, and Mao's doctrine of violent struggle was advocated as the only way for the oppressed people to achieve their own freedom and emancipation."¹⁴² However, "to combat imperialism, it is imperative to combat revisionism." And so Soviet revisionism did not have the good fortune to be spared in the fervent anti-U.S. imperialism campaign. It was, in addition, accused of being the number one accomplice of U.S. imperialism in suppressing the Afro-American struggle.

The Soviet revisionist clique...has wantonly vilified the current wave of the Afro-American struggle and strenuously tried to absolve the U.S. imperialists from their crime of cold blooded suppression of Black Americans...The Soviet revisionist clique, out of its intense hatred for the revolutionary awakening of the Afro-Americans and their revolutionary violence, hastily came forward to support the counter-revolutionary dual

¹⁴¹"The Nation's Civilians and Armysmen Set off Mighty Revolutionary Wave in support of Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression," Peking Review, No. 17 (April 26, 1968), pp. 3-5.

¹⁴²"Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression Hit Hard at US Imperialism," Peking Review, No. 16 (April 19, 1968), pp. 13-14; "Fight On, Heroic Afro-American Brothers," Peking Review, No. 15 (April 12, 1968) pp. 20-21.

tricks of U.S. imperialists and tried to mislead the Afro-American movement on to the course of non-violence. 143

The targets of the movement were quickly extended to most of the countries in Europe and many other areas around the world, and central attention was specifically focused on France, Britain, Italy, Spain and West Germany. An article in Peking Review entitled "Student Movement Merges with Worker's Movement in West Europe and North America: Spearhead of Struggle Directed against U.S. Imperialism" pointed out that:

The sweeping waves of the progressive student movement in West Europe and North America have been pounding the already shaky reactionary rule of the monopoly capitalist class in many countries... {They} first broke out in such centres of the main capitalist countries as Paris, New York, Bonn and Rome...and then caused repercussions in other capitalist countries. Even in Spain under reactionary dictatorship and in Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and Luxembourg, where the movement was relatively quiet, the students have gone into action. 144

All the evils of these countries, which were regarded as the inevitable development of capitalism, were elaborately "exposed" and the ruling elites in these countries accused of being either

¹⁴³"Soviet Revisionism-No. 1 Accomplice of US Imperialism in Suppressing Afro-American Struggle," Peking Review, No. 20 (May 17, 1968), pp. 26-28; "Soviet Revisionists Intensify Collaboration With Asian, African, and Latin American Reactionaries," ibid., pp. 24-26.

¹⁴⁴Peking Review, No. 22 (May 31, 1968), p. 12.

Fascists, reactionaries or collaborators of the Soviet revisionists.¹⁴⁵ When the French student riots broke out on May 6, 1968, Communist China greeted the incident with an overwhelming enthusiasm and took the "French Great Storm" as a symbol of the movement. Huge mass demonstrations under the name of support of the people of France and other European and North American countries were organized. According to an article "Mighty Support" in Peking Review, from May 21 to 26, there were "twenty million revolutionary Chinese people" participating in the demonstrations throughout China. But this time, unlike those in 1967, the French and other embassies in Peking were spared and few violent activities against foreign diplomats were reported, except for the official expulsion of a French correspondent.¹⁴⁶ However, it is interesting to note, despite Communist China's enthusiastic support of the just struggle of the oppressed people of France as well as of other Western European countries, that spontaneous demonstrations by the so-called "oppressed people" against Communist China before

¹⁴⁵"Raging Waves of Strikes Sweeps North America and Western Europe," Peking Review, No. 19 (May 10, 1968), pp. 23-25; "Powerful People's Movement in Europe and North America," No. 21 (May 24, 1968), pp. 21-24; "West Germany and West Berlin: New Heights in People's Anti-Fascist Struggle," Peking Review, No. 23 (June 7, 1968), pp. 29-31; "1968 in Review: Revolutionary Mass Movement Surges Forward in West Europe and North America," No. 52 (December 27, 1968), pp. 17-19.

¹⁴⁶"Mighty Support," Peking Riview, No. 22 (May 31, 1968), pp. 10-15; "A Great Storm," ibid., pp. 9-10; The China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), pp. 194-195.

its Embassy were reported in Norway on May 8 and in France on May 13, 1968. The incident in France seemed more serious.

As Peking Review reported:

Several hundred reactionary elements gathered in front of the Chinese Embassy in France on the evening of May 13 and made a political provocation by shouting anti-China slogans. Several hooligans even climbed on the balcony of the Embassy, beat up staff members, smashed windows with stones and took away the Embassy's metal plate.

According to Communist China, after its strong protests, both French and Norwegian governments had "expressed regret over the incidents," so they did not incite further troubles. ¹⁴⁷

The fervor of the support of the world mass struggle against oppression and exploitation had been maintained throughout the summer and was apparently abating in the fall of 1968 when the Red Guards were disbanded and sent to the countryside and the "Workers' Mao Tse-tung's Thought Propaganda Teams" were dispatched into colleges and schools.

In review in these events, the original purpose of the campaign for support of the world mass struggle, which was certainly not necessary in terms of Communist Chinese foreign policy, may be easily ascertained. Although anti-capitalism has long been Communist China's official policy, this emotional movement launched at the juncture of "Denunciation of Rightist Reversal of Verdict" was obviously designed both to prove the

¹⁴⁷"Norwegian Government Express Regret Over Anti-China Provocation by Pro-US Reactionaries," Peking Review, No. 21 (May 24, 1968), p. 39; "French Government Expresses Regret Over French Reactionaries Provocation Against Chinese Embassy," ibid.

inevitable development of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which was being subverted by the conservatives at the time and to rekindle the revolutionary fervor of the masses in serving the needs of the renewed power struggle at home. At the hightide of the movement, the publication of a joint editorial by People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily entitled "An Epoch-Making Document" in commemoration of the second anniversary of the issuance of the "May 16 Circular," which was mainly designed to stir up the mass fervor to revolt, clearly revealed the truth behind the scenes. It said:

With inveterate class hatred, the handful of class enemies, facing their last days but unreconciled to their doom, are frantically opposing the revolutionary mass movement and trying in vain to negate the tremendous victories of the great proletarian cultural revolution. But the law of history is inexorable and operates independent of their will. No matter... how much they may stir up the evil right deviationist trend of trying to reverse correct decisions, they will end up crushed by the revolutionary mass movement.

The influence of the tremendous victories in our great proletarian cultural revolution over the past two years has spread throughout the world, inspiring the militant will of the revolutionary people of all countries... The great proletarian cultural revolution which is guided by Mao Tse-tung's Thought, has inspired the heroism of the revolutionary people the world over in daring to struggle and to win. It has won enthusiastic support from Marxist-Leninists and the revolutionary masses throughout the world.¹⁴⁸

Spillover of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was by nature

¹⁴⁸ Peking Review, No. 21 (May 24, 1968), p. 11.

subversive and anti-status quo. Its excesses and extremism that reflected on Communist China's domestic as well as foreign affairs would inevitably incite conflicts with other countries and the distressful diplomatic complications generated from these conflicts were certainly not imaginable in a normal situation.

Instigation of Cultural Revolution Against Unfriendly Foreign Regimes

The conflicts between Communist China and Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Tunisia, Kenya were generated mainly because of Communist China's instigation of Cultural Revolution among the people of these countries against their governments. It might be either Communist China's intended measures against the regimes of these countries that it thought unfriendly or just its expressions of revolutionary fervor in its foreign activities while the power struggle within the Foreign Ministry was at its fiercest. In Burma, with the departures of the ambassador and most of his staff from Rangoon in March 1967 and the returning of a Charge d'affaires and reportedly some Red Guards in May, Communist China's Embassy enthusiastically encouraged the overseas Chinese Community to undertake some Cultural Revolution-type activities such as wearing Mao badges, learning Maoism quotations, singing Maoist songs like "Mao is the Red Sun in Our Hearts," and organizing groups patterned after the Red Guards, completely in defiance of the disapproval of the Burmese government. These quasi-subversive activities would inevitably lead to repugance on the

part of the Burmese government. In the last week of June 1967, bloody clashes between Maoist Chinese and Burmese students broke out. The rioting anti-Communist China Burmese brought under attack hundreds of Chinese owned shops and homes as well as Communist China's Embassy. These incidents immediately incited Communist China's fervid reaction. Beginning with a strong protest by the government on June 29, 1967, an intensive "anti-Burmese reactionary government" campaign was launched throughout China. According to New China News Agency's report, over "one million Chinese" took part in the first four-day demonstrations in Peking and in front of the Burmese Embassy which was seriously stoned. Thereafter, official protests were delivered to the Burmese Government or its Embassy in Peking with a frequency of almost once a day throughout July. The Ne Win government was accused of being "counter-revolutionary military dictatorship," "a gang of fascist hangmen," and "a bunch of insatiable blood-suckers." The armed struggle of the Communist Party of Burma (White Flag) against Ne Win's rule was openly encouraged and supported. On August 11, 1967, Communist China strongly protested a Burmese border intrusion and warned that military provocations would be seriously punished. According to the New York Times later report, there were over five thousand People's Liberation Army forces deployed in Northern Burma by 1969. All these incidents culminated in Communist China's announcement on June 29, 1967 that it had decided not to send its ambassador

back to Rangoon, and Burma's expulsion of all Communist China's New China News Agency correspondents and withdrawal of its ambassador and all Burmese students from Peking in September. Sino-Burmese relations were, for all intents, suspended.¹⁴⁹

The same situation occurred also in Cambodia. In resistance to the Communist Chinese Embassy's efforts to propagandize the Cultural Revolution and support of pro-Communist China leftists' subversive activities, the Cambodian government was forced to crack down on the Chinese school system, impose controls over their curricula, and disband the Cambodian-Chinese Friendship Association in the summer of 1967. Communist China's defiance of these orders and Red Guards harassment of the Cambodian Embassy in Peking, led Prince Sihanouk to the decision on September 13, 1967 to withdraw his embassy staff from Peking. Probably because the Indo-China war was going on and the radicals in the Central Cultural Revolution Group were purged at the time, the Sino-Cambodian

¹⁴⁹"Chinese Government Statement," and "The Nation Denounces Burmese Government's Anti-China Atrocities," Peking Review, No. 28 (July 7, 1967), pp. 17-21; The People's Daily Editorial, "Ne Win Reactionary Government is Courting Doom by Madly Opposing China," Peking Review, No. 29 (July 14, 1967) pp. 30-33; The New York Times Index, 1967, pp. 175-176; The China Quarterly, No. 31, pp. 213-214, No. 32, p. 224, and No. 34, pp. 190-191. For the Chinese military deployment see the New York Times, November 8 and 23, 1969. For the development of Sino-Burmese Relations see Frank N. Trager, "Sino-Burmese Relations: The End of the Pauk-Phaw Era," Orbis, Vol. XI, No. 4 (Winter, 1968), pp. 1034-1054; John H. Bradgley, "Burma's China Crisis: The Choices Ahead," Asian Survey, No. 11 (November, 1967), pp. 753-761; Robert A. Holmes, "The Sino-Burmese Rift: A Failure for China," Orbis, No. XVI, No. 1 (Spring, 1972), pp. 211-236.

quarrel did not generate further violence. After Sihanouk announced his decision, the next day on September 14, Chou En-lai assured the Cambodian ambassador that his staff would be protected and emphasized Communist China's desire to maintain friendly relations with Cambodia. In view of this, on September 17, 1967, Sihanouk changed his formal decision but banned circulation of the New China News Agency bulletin in Cambodia.¹⁵⁰

The conflicts with Ceylon began on August 15, 1967, when Communist China lodged a protest with the Ceylonese Ministry of Defense and External affairs, alleging that the Government of Ceylon had connived at the theft of goods and destroying of Mao's works, Quotation and badges from a chartered Chinese ship docked in a Ceylonese harbor and had impounded in customs a consignment of Mao badges which had been declared as cultured pearls. The protests considered such perpetration as a serious provocation and absolutely intolerable. On August 20, 1967, Red Guards demonstration were staged outside the Ceylonese Embassy in Peking and the Ceylonese Government was condemned as reactionary. But the Ceylonese Government frankly rebuffed the groundless accusations and hinted that it was an interference in Ceylonese sovereignty and domestic affairs. Later on September 8, the Ceylonese Government informed the Communist Chinese Embassy

¹⁵⁰The New York Times Index 1967, pp. 181-182; The China Quarterly, No. 32 (October-December, 1967), p. 224.

in Colombo that the distribution of Mao badges should stop. During the same period, Communist China had also accused Ceylon of adopting "two Chinas" policy because of a Ceylonese private invitation to Nationalist Girl Guides to attend a conference in Colombo. The Ceylonese Government rejected the protest in an official statement that "it was recognizing Peking."¹⁵¹

Although Sino-Tunisian relations had never been particularly warm and the severance of diplomatic ties might have a variety of reasons such as Tunisia's position on the "two Chinas" policy and President Bourguiba's public denunciations of Communist China's foreign intentions, the fervor of the Cultural Revolution doubtless had aggravated the situation and brought relations between the two countries to a total disruption. Since early 1967, the Communist Chinese Embassy in Tunisia, led by Militant Chargé d' affaires after the recall of the ambassador, seemed willing to do everything with a flaming revolutionary spirit to provoke the Tunisians. It was reported to have financed the disorders in Tunis University in March, to have instigated demonstrations in support of Arab struggles against U.S. imperialism after the June Six-Day War, and to have disseminated Mao Tse-tung's Thought and Mao badges. In order to control all of these

¹⁵¹The China Quarterly, No. 32, p. 225; "Ceylon Must Stop Anti-China Provocations," Peking Review, No. 35 (August 25, 1967), p. 26; 1968 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, pp. 1078-1080.

subversive activities, beginning in July, the Tunisian Government imposed restrictions on the activities of the Communist Chinese Embassy staff and prohibited it from distributing news bulletins which the Tunisian Government regarded as subversive and likely to incite people to riot. But the Communist Chinese Embassy defied all of these Tunisian regulations, resulting in the detention of a Communist Chinese diplomat and a table tennis coach by the Tunisian authorities. On September 14, 1967, in a strong protest to the Tunisian Government, Communist China categorically rejected the restrictions placed on the activities of its diplomatic staff; announced immediate withdrawal of the four tennis coaches whom it sent to Tunisia under a physical education agreement; and accused President Bourguiba attacking China and slandering "Chairman Mao, the great leader of the Chinese people and the other peoples of the world." Furthermore, the protest directly predicted the fall of the Tunisian Government in venomous language which it seemed probable no government would be able to accept.

By attempting to use its opposition to China to divert the attention of its people and cover up its own crime of entering further into the service of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism and selling out the interests of the Tunisian and other Arab peoples, The Tunisian Government will certainly come to no good end.

The Tunisian Government demanded an unreserved apology for this statement, failing which all Chinese Communist diplomats in Tunisia would be declared *personae non gratae*. Finally on

September 26, 1967, Communist China announced that it was closing its Embassy in Tunis.¹⁵²

Sino-Kenyan lukewarm diplomatic relations had gone from bad to worse since the beginning of 1967. Starting in January, in protesting the excessive propagation of the Cultural Revolution and Mao Tse-tung's Thought, a crowd of Kenyan students demonstrated before the Communist Chinese Embassy in Nairobi and smashed its two information windows bousing Mao's portraits and other political propaganda. On June 29, 1967, the Kenyan Government expelled the Communist Chinese Chargé d'affaires in Kenya because of his subversive activities. In retaliation, Communist China ordered Kenyans to leave Peking at the same time. In the last quarter of August, following the Kenyan Government's prohibition from Kenya of all Maoist propaganda material and Vice President Moi's public denunciation that "seditious pamphlets" purporting to come from "friends of China" had been distributed in Kenya, successive Red Guards demonstrations were staged before the Kenyan Embassy in Peking. The Embassy was stoned and its windows smashed. Sino-Kenyan relations were soured and at their nadir.¹⁵³

¹⁵²"Protest Note of Chinese Foreign Ministry to Tunisian Foreign Ministry," SCMP, No. 4025 (September 21, 1967), pp. 31-32; "Chinese Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Closing of Chinese Embassy in Tunisia," SCMP, No. 4031 (September 29, 1967), pp. 33-35. For Background information see Bruce D. Larkin, China and Africa 1949-1970 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

¹⁵³"Kenyan Unjustifiably Declares Chinese Chargé d'affaires Personae Non Gratae," Peking Review, No. 28 (July 7, 1967) pp. 37-38; 1968 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, p. 255; The China Quarterly, No. 32, p. 226.

Export of the Great Proleatrian Cultural Revolution

Communist China's massive distribution of Mao's works and badges and the encouragement of Red Guard style activities among the youths would surely bring about the local countries' indignation and prohibition. In Nepal, since the beginning of 1967, the Communist Chinese diplomats, correspondents and other personnel in Nepal, in defiance of Nepalese Government disapproval, had energetically disseminated Mao Tse-tung's Thought and encouraged Nepalese students to wear Mao badges and carry Little Red Books. These activities unavoidably proved repugnant to the Nepalese and finally caused an anti-Communist China demonstration before Communist China's photo exhibition hall in Kathmandu on July 1, 1967. In addition to the demand that Mao's portraits in the hall be replaced by portraits of the King, the demonstrators angrily stoned the Communist Chinese Embassy's cars, wounded one of its diplomats and finally rushed inside the hall, tore down the posted slogans and burned some Maoist books on display. The incident brought about a series of protests and accusations from Communist China against the Nepalese "reactionary atrocities." One of the protests warned seriously that if the Nepalese Government "allows imperialism, revisionism and reactionism to carry on their evil ways in Nepal or even following them in opposing China, then the Nepalese Government must bear full responsibility for all the serious consequences arising

therefrom."¹⁵⁴

In Afghanistan, Morocco, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi and Senegal, though Communist China had paid great attention to the cultivation of friendly relations with most of these countries before the Cultural Revolution, its excessive exporting of the Cultural Revolution and Mao Tse-tung's Thought caused great malaise among all these governments and made them perforce take countermeasures. The Afghanistan Government insisted that anti-Soviet and anti-U.S. propaganda be removed from Communist Chinese Embassy showcases in Kabul; Morocco dockers refused to unload a Communist Chinese freighter carrying Mao's works and other political propaganda material; Zambia could not help but to clamp down on Cultural Revolution propaganda because of its instigation of increasing restlessness among Zambians; Malawi banned absolutely the importation of all Communist Chinese publications; and Senegal expelled two New China News Agency correspondents due to their subversive activities. But, unlike the cases in other countries, these unfriendly actions for one reason or another did not incite public retaliation from Peking.

The Excesses and Extremism of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

Communist China's conflicts with Japan, Italy,

¹⁵⁴"Protest Against Nepalese Government Connivance at Anti-China Outrage," Peking Review, No. 29 (July 14, 1967), p. 39; "Nepalese Government Must Stop Anti-China Activity," Peking Review, No. 31 (July 28, 1967), p. 29; The China Quarterly, No. 32, p. 225.

Switzerland, France and many other countries were, for the most part, triggered by the excesses and extremism of the Cultural Revolution. With Japan, the relations between the two countries, following Japan's advocacy of the doctrine of separation of politics and economics, were historically characterized by political antagonism and some degree of economical cooperation.¹⁵⁵ During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Communist China's attitude toward Japan was especially preoccupied with mixed feelings of anti-U.S. imperialism, anti-Soviet revisionism, and anti-reactionism. Although the rapidly deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations made Communist China increasingly anxious for Japanese advanced technology and industrial products, the Japanese Government's continuous strengthening of relations with the United States and Nationalist China and negotiations for cooperation with the Soviet Union inevitably antagonized Communist China and aroused the fear of encirclement. Furthermore, its quarrel with the Japan Communist Party especially complicated the situation. All of these things would surely pour oil on the flames of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and bloody mass fighting and distressful diplomatic incidents ensued.

¹⁵⁵David B. Brown, "Chinese Economic Leverage in Sino-Japanese Relations," Asian Survey, Vol. XII, No. 9 (September, 1972), pp. 753-771; Edwin O. Reischauer, "China and Japan: Rivals or Allies?" in China and Great Powers, edited by Francis O. Wilcox (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 31-46.

A series of conflicts between the two countries was triggered by the quarrels of the two communist parties. Because of the Japan Communist Party's pro-Soviet stand in Sino-Soviet disputes, its representative in Peking doubtlessly could not avoid miserable harassments. On September 16, 1966, a group of Red Guard-like Japanese radicals in Peking, instigated by the Maoists, went to the lodgings of Junichi Konno, a newly arrived correspondent of the Japan Communist Party newspaper Akahata, beat him up and then tortured him by pouring water down his nostrils. Again on October 27, eight representatives of the Japan Communist Party, who had come to attend the third anniversary of the China-Japan Friendship Society, were dragged from their bus on the road to Peking from the airport and were warned of serious consequences if they continued to follow the revisionist line, including physical as well as spiritual torture.¹⁵⁶ These violent incidents finally incited repercussions in Japan. Beginning in January 1967, Akahata published a series of reports and comments, denounced the Red Guards as "subversive elements in the international communist movement," delivered direct attacks on Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders, declared that Communist China's attempt to spread the thought of Mao was an "intolerable interference" in the affairs of other communist parties, and announced the expulsion from the party of

¹⁵⁶For details see China News Summary, No. 148 (December 1, 1966), p. A5.

ten radical members living in Peking.¹⁵⁷ In retaliation, Communist Chinese personnel in Tokyo instigated Maoist overseas Chinese students to daub the Japan Communist Party sponsored Japan-China Friendship Association with posters charging that the Japan Communist Party members were Soviet revisionists' jackals. A four-day bloody mass fracas between the two parties broke out. Intervention by the Tokyo police finally subdued the turmoil. After the incident, both the Japan Communist Party and the Japanese Government were castigated in Communist China's protests and commentaries as revisionists, fascists, and reactionaries.¹⁵⁸

On September 7, 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's tour of Nationalist China was no doubt a repugnant thing to Peking. The trip was relentlessly fulminated against as:

a component part of a big anti-China, anti-Communist, anti-people and counter-revolutionary conspiracy that is being vigorously hatched by the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists in Asia... Sato's trip to Taiwan was obviously intended to serve the scheme of U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists to form a ring of encirclement against China.¹⁵⁹

The official castigation was also accompanied with unpleasant diplomatic incidents. The next two days after Sato's departure, the Japanese anti-Communist China demonstration and Communist Chinese counter demonstration outside Communist

¹⁵⁷The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), p. 247.

¹⁵⁸Peking Review, No. 12 (March 17, 1967), pp. 24-25 and 30.

¹⁵⁹"The Sato Government Is Treading Tojo's Old Road," Peking Review, No. 38 (September 15, 1967), p. 32-33.

China's trade mission in Tokyo provoked other bloody mass violence. When the disturbances were finally subjugated by the Japanese police, on September 10, the New China News Agency called the incident "serious anti-China fascist outrage" on the part of Japan. Consequently, Peking retaliated by expelling three Japanese correspondents.¹⁶⁰

Thereafter, the collusion among Japanese reactionaries, U.S. imperialists, and Soviet revisionists in the conspiracy of the encirclement of Communist China became Peking's constant topics for fulminations against Sato's "fascist administration,"¹⁶¹ and Japanese citizens in Peking were living in unpredictable circumstances. According to a Mainichi report on June 25, 1968, there were ten Japanese who had been arrested by Communist China for unclarified reasons and many had just disappeared. The report concluded that the number of Japanese businessmen in Communist China had gone down from two hundred in early 1967 to twenty at the time when the report was published.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰"Sato Government Calls Out Police and Hooligans to Assault Chinese Personnel in Japan," in ibid., pp. 33; The China Quarterly, No. 32 (October-December, 1967), p. 227; "Three Japanese Correspondents Ordered to leave China," Peking Review, No. 39 (September 22, 1967), p. 29.

¹⁶¹"Criminal Plans Devised at U.S.-Japan Talks," The People's Daily, November 21, 1967; "Another Anti-China Crime by the Sato Government," The People's Daily (December 10, 1967); "Japanese Militarists' Yes-men," The People's Daily, February 16, 1968; "Counter-Revolutionary Collusion Between Soviet Revisionist Renegades and Japanese Reactionaries," Peking Review, No. 52 (December 27, 1968), p. 20. "Protest Against Sato Government for Denying Chinese Delegation Entry into Japan," Peking Review, No. 35 (August 25, 1967), p. 31.

¹⁶²Documented in The China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), p. 197.

The quarrel with Italy arose in this way. On August 13, 1967, a Communist Chinese freighter Li Ming carrying huge posters of Mao's quotations, portraits, and other political propaganda was docked in Genoa, Italy. According to local law, the foreigners were prohibited from the distribution of political propaganda. The port authorities asked the captain to remove all the posters or leave the port. Upon the refusal of the captain, a series of disputes ensued. On August 15, the head of an Italian trade mission in Peking was detained in his office as a reprisal and on the next day Red Guards demonstrations against Italy were staged and the detained Italian was made to face the demonstrators and accused of being a fascist. Getting support from the local Chinese Communists, the crew became even more recalcitrant and set up fresh banners on the ship in protest. After twenty-three days of blockade, the ship was finally allowed to take on new provisions and began unloading cargo when an agreement was reached that the protest banners be removed from the ship but the crew would be allowed to keep the disputed poster of a quotation from Mao. The subsequent Communist Chinese official news reports treated this as a supreme victory of Mao Tse-tung's Thought of which the Italian reactionary authorities were most afraid.¹⁶³

¹⁶³"Strong Protest Against Political Provocation by Italian Authorities," Peking Review, No. 36 (September 1, 1967) pp. 36-37;"Chinese Crew Smashes Anti-China Provocation by Italian Authorities," Peking Review, No. 38 (September 15, 1967), p. 39; The China Quarterly, No. 32, pp. 226-227.

Switzerland fell afoul of Communist China on July 29, 1967, because of a ceremony held to lay a cornerstone for a Tibetan Institute in Switzerland. On July 30, and August 5-6, Communist China sent three notes accusing Switzerland of supporting Tibetan refugees. The vituperative tone of the notes revealed the typical style of Communist China's Cultural Revolution diplomacy. One of them declared:

This reveals more clearly the reactionary features of the Swiss Government which, in collusion with imperialism, revisionism and reactionism, makes itself an enemy of the Chinese people. The Chinese people who are armed with Mao Tse-tung's Thought, are not to be trifled with.

Switzerland rejected the notes and said that while it "desired friendly relations with China, it was not responsible for help given to Tibetan refugees by private Swiss citizens."¹⁶⁴

The most striking illustration of the extremism of the Cultural Revolution as an influence on its foreign activities was Communist China's quarrel with Denmark. In mid-August 1967, the Denmark government-owned newspaper Akluel published a cartoon which satirized Mao Tse-tung as a farce. The event caused a strong reaction from the Communist Chinese Embassy in Copenhagen. The Embassy immediately lodged a strong protest with the Danish Foreign Ministry threatening Denmark with "grave consequences" if the cartoonist continued to ridicule "Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the red sun in the hearts

¹⁶⁴The China Quarterly, No. 32 (October-December, 1967), p. 227; Communist China Digest, No. 190 (October 16, 1967).

of 700 million Chinese people." Denmark naturally rejected the accusation.¹⁶⁵

Anti-Soviet revisionism demonstrations in their host countries by Chinese Communist students studying abroad caused Communist China a series of conflicts with Iraq, Algeria,¹⁶⁶ and France. Of the three, the conflict with France was especially fierce. The fracas between the anti-Soviet revisionism Maoist students in Paris and the French police on the road to the Soviet Embassy on January 27, 1967 incited not only official protests from Communist China but massive Red Guards demonstrations before the French Embassy in Peking. As vociferous and provocative as their demonstrations against Soviet revisionism, the young rebels posted the walls of the Embassy building and the grounds outside with numerous slogans: "Down with imperialism," "Rebel against whoever is hostile to the Chinese people!" and "Bash in the French thugs' heads!" The Embassy car was stopped and its diplomats were dragged out from the car and made to stand almost seven hours in the cold outside the French Embassy while the demonstrators shouted at them.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵The New York Times, August 22, 1967, pp. 33.

¹⁶⁶Peking Review, No. 6 (February 3, 1967), pp. 29-30; 1968 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, p. 253; 1968 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, p. 1026.

¹⁶⁷Peking Review, No. 6 (February 3, 1967), p. 30 and No. 7 (February 10, 1967), p. 29; The China Quarterly, No. 30 (April-June, 1967), pp. 248-249.

The repercussions of the Red Guards violent activities had also contributed to Communist China's conflicts with many other foreign countries. The manhandling by the Red Guards of a Swedish cultural attaché in Peking caused a strong protest from the Government of Sweden. But Communist China rejected the protest as a deliberate distortion.¹⁶⁸ After the Red Guards attacked the Catholic Churches in China, Pope Paul regretfully commented that such violent actions were a "sign of death, not a sign of life." For the same reason, the Irish Government lodged a strong protest with Peking against the Red Guards' torture of an Irish nun who died in Hong Kong after her expulsion from China.¹⁶⁹ But the Maoist leadership completely supported of this Red Guard violence. In a commentary, the theoretical magazine Red Flag polemically ridiculed Pope as the "mouthpiece of the reactionary classes."¹⁷⁰

Besides the foregoing recorded conflicts related to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, in varying degree, Communist China had, in addition, quarreled with Belgium, the Netherlands, Ivory Coast, and Singapore, and severed diplomatic relations with Ghana.¹⁷¹ But the conflicts with these countries

¹⁶⁸See Robert A. Scalapino, "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy," ibid., p. 93.

¹⁶⁹Canberra Broadcasting, in 1967 Yearbook on Chinese Communism, p. 1926.

¹⁷⁰The New York Times, August 27, 1966, p. 11 and September 20, 1966, p. 18; Red Flag Commentary, "In Praise of the Red Guards," Peking Review, No. 39 (September 23, 1966), p. 16.

¹⁷¹Belgium: The China Quarterly, No. 35, p. 193; The Netherlands: The China Quarterly, No. 28, pp. 192-193 and No. 29, p. 197.

generally had nothing to do with the Cultural Revolution. For example, the severance of diplomatic relations between Ghana and Communist China in late October 1966 appeared to be an inevitable development after the fall of President Nkrumah by a military coup in February the same year. There was little evidence that the convulsion of the Cultural Revolution had directly caused the incident.

All of the above mentioned Communist Chinese indiscriminately provocative and disruptive foreign conflict behavior throughout the three-year period of the convulsion of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution appeared to have few precedents in modern diplomatic history, and surely did great harm to its substantial national interests. However, Communist China never felt regret at the time. For example, in a review of international situation at the end of 1967, after a series of diplomatic ruptures, Feng Piao, Director of the Information Department of the People's Daily, asserted that "severance of relations can do us no harm... Severance of relations will only make a mess of things politically and economically for a given country, since we can then support the people of that country to make revolution."¹⁷² While

Ivory Coast: "Chen Yi Statement," Peking Review, No. 29 (July 14, 1967), p. 78.

Singapore: Peking Review, No. 34 (August 18, 1967), pp. 39-40; The China Quarterly, No. 32, p. 221.

Ghana: Peking Review, No. 45 (November 4, 1966), pp. 5 and 38.

¹⁷²Current Background, No. 850 (January 24, 1968).

it was certainly not true that the severance of diplomatic relations did not worry the Maoists, the statement did reveal the intended Maoist militancy and the subversive nature of Communist China's foreign behavior at the time, and proved the validity John H. Badgley's observation in his analysis of the Sino-Burmese Crisis that Communist China was willing to "sacrifice everything in the pursuit of the inner logic surrounding the Cultural Revolution and the Red Guard movement."¹⁷³

Trends of Communist China's Foreign Policy During the
Post-Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Period

The nightmare of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was at last drawing to an end when the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was convened on April 1, 1969. However, despite official optimistic assertions that "the enemy rots every passing day, while for us things are getting better daily,"¹⁷⁴ evidence of the dire consequences of the three-year convulsive foreign behavior could be seen everywhere. In addition to the serious decline of foreign trade, the precipitous drop in international prestige, and the self-

¹⁷³John H. Badgley, "Burma's China Crisis: The Choices Ahead," ibid., p. 757-758.

¹⁷⁴Lin Piao, "Political Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," Peking Review, No. 18 (April 30, 1969), p. 31.

tormenting alienation from the world community,¹⁷⁵ its fervent anti-Soviet Union posture had brought the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations almost to a breaking point. There were increasing evidences that the Soviet Union was determined to strengthen its military buildup along the 7,000 mile Sino-Soviet borders¹⁷⁶ and to maneuver in the international arena for

¹⁷⁵Details of the decline of foreign trade see chapter III. The drop of prestige could be evidenced by the following factors: (a) The support for its membership to the United Nations dropped from 47 (40%) pros vs. 47 (40%) cons with 20 abstention in 1965 to 44 (35%) pros vs. 58 (46%) cons with 23 abstention in 1968, see Samuel S. Kim, "China in the United Nations (Table 1)" *ibid.*, p. 302; (b) In Africa, at the end of 1965, there were 18 out of 36 independent countries recognized Communist China, but this number was declined to 13 out of 43 in 1968, see Alaba Ogunsenwo, China's Policy in Africa (Table 7), *ibid.*, p. 247; (c) There were 470 delegations visited Communist China in 1966 and the number dropped to 68 in 1968, see Year-book on Chinese Communism, 1967, pp. 1642-1710, 1968, pp. 971-990 and 1969, pp. 11:245-269; In Africa alone, the delegation to Communist China dropped from 114 in 1965 to 57 in 1967 and to 12 in 1968. See Alaba Ogunsenwo, *ibid.*, p. 270 Table 2; (d) In addition to the criticism of the most hostile countries, many neutral leaders openly expressed their repugnance. For example, Ceylonese Prime Minister declared that "the Chinese people absolutely cannot tolerate" and "Ceylon would not be bullied or badged," See Communist China Digest, No. 190 (October 16, 1967), pp. 12-15; Sihanouk said "the Chinese leaders in Peking must be out of mind." In a Japanese leading public opinion poll, Communist China was listed as the most disliked nation in the world. Jiji Poll, Tokyo, September, 1967. For alienation from world community see previous sections.

¹⁷⁶Chou En-lai complained that the Soviets had stationed 1.2 million troops along the frontier. See Le Monde September 24, 1971, in The China Quarterly, No. 49 (January-March, 1972), p. 201; Britain's Institute of Strategic Studies reported that Soviet military strength in Sino-Soviet borders rose from 30 divisions in 1971, in Strategic Survey, 1971.

combating the recalcitrant Communist Chinese mavericks. A series of developing international events in early 1969 such as U.S.-Soviet detente, the advocacy of a European Security Conference, and increasing Soviet political as well as military activities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans made Communist China, both in reality and psychologically, feel fear of being isolated and encircled.¹⁷⁷ Alarmed by the unfavorable international situation, the leaders in Peking now appeared to have pragmatically experienced the bitterness of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution diplomacy, and announced their intention to turn to moderation in foreign affairs. In the Ninth Party Congress, the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which had long been in oblivion and had never been mentioned in the Eleventh Party Plenum, were unequivocally reaffirmed:

The foreign policy of our Party and Government is consistent: It is: to develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation with socialist

¹⁷⁷For example, some of the events which caused Communist China's serious concern were the solidarity of Indo-Soviet relations, and Soviet-Japanese negotiations for economic and political cooperation; see "Counter-Revolutionary Collusion Between Soviet Revisionist Renegades and Japanese Reactionaries," and "Renegade Features of Soviet Revisionists Once Again Exposed," Peking Review, No. 52 (December 27, 1968), pp. 20-22; the Soviet's striving for influence in Southeast Asia as evidenced by the establishment of Soviet-Malaysian diplomatic relations in late spring of 1967; see "Soviet Revisionism and Malaysia: Renegade and U.S. Pawn," Peking Review, No. 16 (April 14, 1967), p. 28; North Vietnam's acceptance of Paris peace talks, and increasing Soviet influence in Indonesia; see "Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique - Sworn Enemy of the Revolutionary Indonesian People," Peking Review, No. 47 (November 22, 1968), pp. 24-25; see also Lin Piao's "Political Report" in which he bitterly condemned U.S.-Soviet collusion in trying to isolate and encircle Communist China, ibid., pp. 32 and 34.

countries on the principle of proletarian internationalism; to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed people and nations; to strive for peaceful coexistence with countries having different social systems on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, and to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war.¹⁷⁸

However, the contradiction here was that, although coping with the unfavorable international situation demanded practical measures, domestic problems, such as consolidation of the disrupted society and subjugation of the warring factions, were even more urgent in needing greater stimulation to mobilize the whole country for effective solution. According to Georg Simmel, "Continued conflict being a condition of survival for struggle groups, they must perpetually provoke it."¹⁷⁹ After the hasty conclusion of the Cultural Revolution, the foreign enemy was still indispensable to Communist China for the diversion of the widespread public grievances and the strengthening of the weakened and conflict-laden Maoist regime following the unprecedented large-scale purge. And it is also true that "Social systems lacking social solidarity are likely to disintegrate in the face of outside {military} conflict, although some unity may be

¹⁷⁸ Lin Piao, "Political Report," ibid., p. 33.

¹⁷⁹ Georg Simmel, Conflict, trans. Kurt H. Wolf (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), pp. 97-98. The Quotation was Lewis A. Coser's Observation. See Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956), p. 98.

despotically enforced."¹⁸⁰ This awkward situation prompted Communist China perforce to reassess its long upheld anti-U.S. imperialism and anti-Soviet revisionism stance. "The closer the relationship, the more intense the conflict."¹⁸¹ Mao and Chou finally decided to continue the combat against the Soviet Union and to improve relations with the United States as a balance. The significance of the change is noted by Claude A. Buss:

... steps on the part of Communist China toward better relations with the United States did not indicate any abandonment of revolutionary principles or reduction in opposition to American "imperialistic schemes"... It seemed advisable for China to lessen tension with the United States for two reasons: first to release its energies and assets to concentrate on Russia; and second, to offset the growing rapprochement between the United States and Russia.¹⁸²

So the characteristics of Communist China's foreign activities in the post Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution period were marked by the hybrid of staunch anti-Soviet revisionism and a fanatic drive to normalize relations with all other countries possible.

After the Ninth Party Congress, in May 1969, Communist China began gradually to redeploy its ambassadors and senior diplomats to their foreign posts. By the end of 1970, it had assigned twenty-nine ambassadors abroad. This obviously

¹⁸⁰ Lewis A. Coser, ibid., p. 94.

¹⁸¹ ibid., p. 98.

¹⁸² Claude A. Buss, China (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1974), p. 64.

indicated that it was determined to mend its diplomatic relations with countries with which they had been marred during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and to reassert its influence in world affairs. With the Soviet Union, hostile accusations continued. Although the border talks were resumed immediately after Chou En-lai and Kosygin's brief meeting in the Peking airport in September and warlike tensions between the two countries that had been further intensified by an additional series of border incidents in the summer were thereafter somewhat relaxed, Communist China's announced principles in dealing with Sino-Soviet boundary questions¹⁸³ doomed the border talks to the status of a Marathon of fruitless diplomatic struggles. Criticism of U.S. imperialism was continued without any signs of being toned down throughout 1969 and 1970. However, its relations with the two super powers had undergone a contrasting change after the purge of Chen Po-ta in the fall of 1970 that signified the inevitable and imminent showdown between the Mao-Chou coalition and Lin Piao, the alleged illicit collaborator of the Soviet revisionists. In early spring of 1971, while the Soviet Union was vehemently attacked as "social-imperialism and social-fascism," in a joint editorial of the People's Daily of May 17, 1971, headed "Long Live the Victory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," an American table-tennis

¹⁸³"Foreign Ministry Document," Peking Review, No. 41 (October 10, 1969), p. 15.

team was unprecedentedly invited to tour Communist China on April 12, 1971. In a reception speech, Chou En-lai expressed to the team:

Your visit to China on invitation has opened the door to friendly contacts between the people of the two countries.¹⁸⁴

Thereafter, the Sino-American rapproachment went on steadily. After the purge of Lin Piao in September 1971, it was further speeded up and climaxed by President Nixon's visit to Peking on February 21, 1972. Following Nixon's visit, Liaison Offices were quickly set up in the capitals of both countries in early 1973.

While Sino-American rapproachment was quickly developing, Communist China also launched a fanatic drive to normalize relations with many other countries, almost irrespective of their political leanings. From October 1970 to September 1973, within three years, in addition to being seated in the United Nations in late 1971, it had established diplomatic relations with thirty-nine countries and resumed disrupted ties with two. Among these thirty-nine countries were included Japan and almost all important Western democratic middle powers; even West Germany and Spain were not excluded.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, its friendship was also generously extended to the Yugoslavians, whom it had criticized as the most vicious revisionists since 1958. In addition to the normalization of diplomatic

¹⁸⁴"Premier Chou En-lai Meets Table Tennis Teams," Peking Review, No. 17 (April 23, 1971), p. 5.

¹⁸⁵For details see Appendix II.

relations, Communist China had also invited a strikingly varied group of foreign officials and delegations to Peking to discuss trade, aid and other mutual relations, and a large number of them were treated to private audiences with Mao Tse-tung. For example, in 1973, there were almost two foreign delegations in Peking every day.

Despite all these efforts at returning to more pragmatic and more moderate forms of conducting foreign policies, Sino-Soviet relations remained as antagonistic as ever. The animosity and suspicion between the two countries is vividly described by Leonid Brezhnev's speech on December 21, 1972 at a meeting to celebrate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the U.S.S.R.

Peking's foreign policy today amounts to absurd claims to Soviet territory and to malicious slander of the Soviet social and political system and of our peace-loving foreign policy... It amounts to unprincipled alignments on anti-Soviet grounds with any, even the most reactionary forces-the most rabid haters of the Soviet Union from among the British Tories or revenge-seeking elements in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Portuguese colonialists or the radicalists of South Africa.¹⁸⁶

Brezhnev's attack may contain some exaggerations, he did point out Communist China's fierce and irretrievable anti-Soviet positions.

Besides militant anti-Soviet revisionism, Communist China's support of armed revolt against the governments of India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, and of some black

¹⁸⁶Quoted from the China Quarterly, No. 53 (January-March, 1973), pp. 202-203.

people's guerrilla warfare in Africa showed little signs of being slackened.¹⁸⁷ The middle East problems and the Vietnam War were still Communist China's favorite topics in its advocacy of people's war and World revolution against both imperialism and revisionism. Its conflicts with the United States in many important international problems continued.¹⁸⁸

Thus, these varied expressions of moderation and militancy in its foreign activities during the post Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution period seemed to have only slight influence on Communist China's basic foreign objectives. Its anti-U.S. imperialism and anti-Soviet revisionism orientation had remained without fundamental change, despite the quick Sino-U.S. rapprochement. This observation could be evidenced by Communist China's repeated reassertion of the intermediate zone theory before and after President Nixon's tour of Peking.¹⁸⁹ Communist China seemed to have been fully aware that the deepest and essential contradictions in modern

¹⁸⁷The New York Times, November 8, 1970, p. 6 (E); The Washington Post, February, 26, 1971, p. 23.

¹⁸⁸For example, see Chou En-lai, "Political Report to Tenth Party Congress," in The China Quarterly, No. 56 (October-December 1973), pp. 811-812; "Medium-Sized and Small Nations United to Oppose Two Super Powers Hegemony," Peking Review, No. 4 (1972), pp. 14-16.

¹⁸⁹"United to Win Still Greater Victories," Peking Review, No. 1 (January 7, 1972), pp. 8-9; "Strive for New Victories," Peking Review, No. 40 (October 6, 1972), pp. 9-11; "On Studying Some History of the National-Liberation Movement," Peking Review, No. 45 (November 10, 1972), p. 8. See also ibid., and Chapter II.

world politics were and will continue to be the contradictions between the two super powers,¹⁹⁰ especially their mutual threat to each other's national security in a military sense. Knowing its militarily and economically regional power status, Communist China was equally aware that its position among the super powers' scrambles could be only counted as a negative force. This meant that, although its defensive ability plus its huge territory and population made the super powers, especially the Soviet Union, reluctant to risk heavy costs for launching an invasion, its offensive strength in every aspect could not independently become a positive and major threat to any of the two super powers, unless it should form a close alliance with one against the other, as in the period of "lean to one side." However, a close alliance with either one, in addition to the resulting influence on its power-struggle-laden domestic politics, would inevitably further antagonize and provoke the other, damage its established image as the champion of revolutionary forces, and limit its freedom of maneuver in world politics. These consequences were certainly not desirable. This is probably the explanation of why Communist China's relations with the two super powers during the post-Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution period was characterized by the strange combination of conflict and relaxation. Thus it seems obvious

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

that the intermediate zone theory or the three-world doctrine¹⁹¹ will continue to be taken as the basic guideline of Communist China's foreign policy. Communist China will strive to unite all developing countries as well as Western middle powers, either in the form of peaceful coexistence or through the support of people's revolution in order to compete with the the two super-powers for international influence. The Red Guards diplomacy might not appear again. Its relations with the two super powers will continue to be a delicate balance of what Thomas C. Schelling called "precarious partnership" and "incomplete antagonism."¹⁹² It may prefer some limited relaxation with one or both at times out of expediency, but it will be reluctant to relate so closely to either one that serious suspicion and malaise would be incited in the other. Any super power that wants to court Communist China's close friendship in order to balance the other, even with the sacrifice of some fundamental interest, appears to have little chance to be succesful.

¹⁹¹The Three-World doctrine was first advocated by Teng Hsiao-Ping in his speech to the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on April 10, 1974. Full Text in Peking Review, special supplement to No. 15 (April 12, 1974); for later developments see "Chou En-lai's Report on Work of the Government," Peking Review, No. 4 (January 24, 1975), pp. 21-25; see also "Earth-Shaking Struggle," Peking Review, No. 1 (January 10, 1975), pp. 23-25. In essence, the Three-World doctrine was developed from the intermediate zone theory.

¹⁹²Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 15.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the frenzied instigation of mass movements, the bloody power struggle, the excessive propagation of Mao Tse-tung's thought, the hysteric hatred of imperialism and revisionism, and provocative advocacy of people's armed revolution brought to Communist China not only nationwide domestic turbulence but also worldwide foreign conflicts. Why did things happen this way? In summary, the answer can be traced both to the nature of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and to the process of powerful struggle.

Domestic Convulsion leads to Foreign Conflict

In regard to the nature of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, its inherent international implications were certain to lead to foreign conflicts. This can be shown from the following points:

The first is the spillover of ideological struggle. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is by nature an intra-party power struggle in the form of a directed mass

movement. And the unique characteristics of this power struggle are marked by a large scale "reversed purge" wherein a minority faction of ideological prominence under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung attempted to seize power from the majority in authority. In these circumstances, a corrolary is the underdog minority's "evangelization" of an idealistic vision for fomenting mass frenze to upset the status quo and then to force their majority opponents at bay. Thus, throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, in order to stir up masses revolutionary fervor, to rationalize nationwide turbulent power struggle, and to legitimize Mao's return to power, the reassertion of ideological purity and the propagation of Mao Tse-tung's thought had become the foremost missions. In an totalitarian political system, the ideology is usually the sole source of legitimacy of rule and conflict about it is often all-encompassing, excessive and irreconcilable. Conditioned by Communist China's habitually self-asserted role in the world communist movement, the spillover of this fierce ideological struggle to foreign affairs appears to be an inevitable development. Despite Chiang Ching's confession that "ideological struggle is only a smoke-screen of personal animosity,"¹ it did play a predominant role in justifying Mao's unprecedented "reversed purge" and contribute a major part to Communist China's foreign conflict.

¹Roxanes Witke, "Comrade Chiang Ching Tells Her Story," Time Magazine (March 21, 1977), p. 59

In many cases, in its foreign activities, Communist China appeared willing to sacrifice everything just for a propagation of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

The second point regarding the Cultural Revolution's foreign conflict nature relates to Mao's tactics against his opponents. Mao was fully aware that to combat the alleged revisionists, whose pragmatic policies had contributed greatly to the recovery from the calamities of his radical economic plans in the late 1950's, simply with domestic issues would be doomed to failure. Therefore, Mao shrewdly maneuvered the domestic power struggle into international significance in a roundabout way. In fomenting the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao deliberately related his opponents to designated foreign enemies. So the "Chinese Khrushchev" and the "capitalist roaders in authority" became the standard accusation against his disfavored old comrades. Furthermore, in order to reinforce the animosity and to stimulate the mass fervor against Mao's opponents, a frenzied hatred campaign against Soviet Revisionism and U.S. imperialism was carried on along with the tumultuous mass movements throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and numerous foreign conflicts inevitably ensued.

The third point relates to the repercussions of the mass movement itself. When Mao was determined to launch his large scale purge, he keenly understood that the widespread mass grievances and feelings against the status quo, which were generated from the long communist totalitarian rule and successive

radical reforms, could be exploited as effective weapons against his opponents in authority. Under the thrilling propaganda of the glorious, prosperous and paradise-like future of China based on the Maoist vision and fierce hatred of imperialism and revisionism, Mao did successfully mobilize the masses and stir up their revolutionary fervor and temporarily defeat his major opponents. For example, numerous mass anti-this or support-that demonstrations often brought out millions of participants. Demonstrations in support of the French student riot were staged with over twenty million people, and the fiercest anti-Soviet "invasion" of Chenpao Island allegedly increased the number of participants to 260 million. However, the masses are often "extremist, intolerant and violence-prone."² Once their emotion is stirred up, the violence ensues. Most of the distressful diplomatic incidents, such as beating of foreign diplomats, smashing of foreign embassies, and burning of foreign diplomatic buildings, could be traced to the extremities of the mass violences. These, to be fair, might not have been wholly intended by the Maoist leadership. However, to foment still higher revolutionary spirit for the combat of domestic revisionist enemies, the Maoists could not but render support to these revolutionary actions. Thus the foreign conflicts mounted.

In addition to the inherent foreign conflict nature of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the processes

²Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy, third ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 166-167.

of the turbulent domestic power struggle had also contributed to most of the foreign conflicts. As Table 5 indicates throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, there is an obvious parallel between the ebb and flow of the radicals' seizure of power and foreign conflicts. When the radicals' seizure of power ran amok, the foreign conflicts mounted; when the radicals were checked or purged, the foreign conflicts somewhat abated. This parallel may not necessarily mean that there were fundamental changes in Communist China's foreign policies. It does reveal the fact that, for the most part, Communist China's foreign conflicts stemmed from its domestic convulsion. This observation can be vividly illustrated by the tug-of-war-like power struggle between the radicals and the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is well known that, since the very inception of the Chinese Communist regime, Chou En-lai had always been the central figure in shaping and conducting of Communist China's foreign policy, despite his close friend Chen Yi being the Foreign minister at the time. Thus, the criticism of the established foreign policies was an obvious detriment to Chou's prestige, or can be viewed as attacks on Chou directly. Therefore, when the radicals were determined to take over the State Council and Chou En-lai's Premiership, they had paid much greater attention to the struggle against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the seizure of power there appeared particularly fierce and tenacious. In late July and early August of 1967, when the radicals got hold of the

TABLE 5

EBB AND FLOW BETWEEN DOMESTIC CONVULSION AND FOREIGN CONFLICT

Period	Major Domestic Conflicts	Major Foreign Conflicts
Initial Stage of Red Guards Aug.-Dec. 66	Destroy Four Olds. Struggle between Maoists and Anti-Maoists.	Anti-foreignism Anti-Soviet revisionist Demonstrations. Macao incidents.
January Storm Jan.-Mid Feb. 67	Overall seizure of power. Power struggle in FAM.	Three week Anti-Soviet demonstrations. Conflict with India. Conflict with all unfriendly Communist Countries. Anti-Soviet revisionist abroad-conflict with France, Iraq, Algeria.
Feb. Adverse Current Mid Feb.- Mid Mar. 67	Radicals power struggle frustrated.	Anti-Soviet demonstrations ended. Foreign incidents reduced.
Rise of May 16 Group Mid Mar.-Mid Aug. 67	Radicals control of FAM. Bloody mass fightings. Wuhan military mutiny.	Overall foreign conflicts. British legation was burnt and Soviet Consulate smashed in August.
Purge of May 16 Group. Late Aug. 67-Late Mar. 68	Radicals seizure of power at the center completely frustrated. Bureaucrats got ascendancy.	Chou issued order to forbid attacks on foreign diplomats. Foreign incidents dropped.
Denunciation of Rightist Reversal of Verdict. Apr.-Aug. 68	Fierce power struggle in local level. Bloody mass fightings.	Support of world mass struggle against oppression without harassment of foreign diplomats.
Ending of GPCR Sept. 68- Apr. 69	Disband of Red Guards. 12th Party Plenum. 9th Party Congress.	Sino-Border War in March 1969. Stress on peaceful coexistence.

Ministry, they, in concert with the nationwide power seizure campaign, actually perpetrated with their new power position and revolutionary fervor worldwide foreign incidents in order to stir up the mass fighting spirit still higher, to upset the status quo, to humiliate the established bureaucracy, and finally, to take over the whole State Council. Probably the radicals seizure of power went too far and their doom was thus sealed. The purge of the May 16 Group finally brought the bureaucrats to power again and the radicals' seizure of power at the central level at last was completely frustrated, and distressful foreign incidents consequently abated. The later "Denunciation of the Rightist Reversal of Verdict" was largely a power struggle at the local level and the simultaneous "Support of World Mass Struggle against Oppression" was managed with comparatively fewer foreign incidents, though both were as fierce and provocative as before.

From the nature of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to the processes of power struggle, it appears obvious that there are close relationships between Communist China's Domestic convulsion and foreign conflicts. Throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Mao seemed willing to create as many foreign incidents as possible either to mobilize public support of his return to power or to justify his oppressive and tumultuous measures against his opponents. The domestic convulsion led inevitably to foreign conflicts.

Foreign Conflict tends to be Provocative
Rather than Actual War

Communist China's domestic convulsion led to foreign conflicts, but its foreign conflicts in a situation of domestic convulsion tended to be provocative rather than actual war. Throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Communist China had provocatively quarrelled with fifty countries but it always stopped short of provoking any direct military confrontations, especially with the two super powers. According to Rummel and Welkenfeld's three-dimension model of foreign conflict behavior, as indicated in Table 3, all of these foreign conflicts are mainly centered on their "diplomatic" and "belligerency" dimensions and with particularly remarkable frequency and violence on the later. It appears that the Maoists were never reluctant to send a strong protest, to iterate a venomous accusation, or to stage a vociferous demonstration against a country or a foreign leader that showed some signs of insult or repugnance at Mao or at the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Among these numerous foreign conflicts, limited war is also a notable phenomena. The Sino-Soviet March 1969 Border War is generally attributed to Communist China's initiation. But the War provoked at the end of the Revolution when Mao had already seized the state power, and was plotted largely to create a sense of threat for consolidation during the aftermath of the Revolution. Furthermore, the war was fought by troops mostly under the camouflage of militia

and there were few signs of actual military mobilization or troop movements that implied intentions to support a large scale war. This provocative rather than actual war tendency can also be illustrated by its attitudes toward the Vietnam War which actually threatened its national security and world prestige. However, though it had habitually expressed its firm support, it cautiously avoided substantial involvement that might provoke a direct military confrontation with the most ferocious enemy in the world, the United States. These contrasting phenomena appear strange but are the unique characteristics of Communist China's foreign conflict behavior in a situation of domestic convulsion. It is clear that foreign conflict is exploited only for its symbolic value in the service of solving domestic problems and not because there are some vital national interests involved. Most of the time, it is willing to provoke foreign incidents at the expense of basic national interests without reluctance just for suppressing domestic enemies.

A Generalization: Domestic Convulsion
and Foreign Conflict Behavior

The traditional scholarly general assumption in foreign policy analysis suggests that a nation experiencing internal disorder will tend to engage in external conflict either to divert people's attention from serious problems or to justify repressive governmental measures against domestic

opponents. The facts of Communist China's internal and external conflict behavior throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution strongly confirm this observation. The provocative, tumultuous worldwide foreign conflict behavior appears to have no other explanation. More specifically, Jonathan Wilkenfeld suggests that for central states, domestic "turmoil" correlates with the foreign conflict factors "war," "diplomatic " and "belligerency;" and "internal war" is related to "War." Although the sources of domestic conflict of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution do not correspond to what Wilkenfeld's domestic conflict indicators represent, the happenings do support his first findings. Actually, Michael Sullivan's suggestion appears more suitable to describe a nation's conflict behavior while in a situation of domestic crisis. He says:

... the type of foreign conflict most consistently linked to internal disruption was either verbal or low level physical conflict; in no instance was war, warlike acts, or serious physical violence related to the internal situation.³

But Wilkenfeld's second finding that "internal war" is related to "war" needs further explanation in order to understand its validity, due to the unique characteristics of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Wilkenfeld's indicators of "internal war" are generally turbulences with source from

³See Chapter I and Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Sharpino, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 75-91.

below. It is true that a government may wage external war to suppress the organized dissidents at home. However, the domestic conflicts of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution for the most part, resemble what Wilkenfeld's "internal war" variables indicate, but they are different in nature. They are conflicts among the rulers, not between the rulers and the ruled. Thus, from the conflicts of the Cultural Revolution, we may draw these valid generalizations.

1. In a totalitarian political system, when the intra-party power struggle occurs, each of the conflicting factions prefers to have foreign enemies in order to suppress the other. Thus the dominant faction in authority prefers external war in order to frustrate the discontented underdog faction by diverting the nation's attention to outside conflict.

2. In contrast, the underdog faction prefers symbolic external enemies but not war in order to encourage the masses to concentrate on domestic problems and so pave the way for the seizure of power.

These observations are supported by the Liu-Teng factions' preference for military confrontation with the United States in the Indo-China War at the outset of the Cultural Revolution, and by the Maoists' provocation of the Sino-Soviet Border War at the end of the Cultural Revolution for suppressing internally warring factions when Mao had already seized the state power. Though the one failed at the outset and the other succeeded, the nature of the two is the

same. Therefore, Wilkenfeld's findings may not be a sufficient interpretation of a totalitarian regime's intra-party conflict and its foreign behavior. In this respect, Quincy Wright's general assumption seems more credible:

In the process of building political unity, a nation may acquire aggressive tendencies as the leadership uses military preparedness, fear of invasion, pride in national prestige, and expansionist sentiments to build national solidarity.⁴

In addition, Wilkenfeld's time lag theory is generally irrelevant to the foreign conflict behavior of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. All of the conflicts, both domestic and foreign, happened simultaneously. The Sino-Soviet Border War broke out in the closing phase of the Revolution and cannot be viewed as a postnatal development.

Wilkenfeld also suggests that foreign conflict behavior varies with the type of regimes. R. Barry Farrell points out that totalitarian political system tends to stress the importance of ideology and to be willing and relatively free to undertake provocative or high-risk policies. This appears to reflect exactly the foreign conflict behavior of Communist China throughout the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The following generalizations based on Communist China's foreign conflict behavior during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution can provide more concrete patterns in understanding

⁴Quoted from Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 83.

a totalitarian political system, especially a revolutionary totalitarian regime's foreign conflict behavior while in the situation of domestic crisis.

1. Ideology plays a dominant role in its foreign policy decisions. The ruling elites tend to project their revolutionary ideals abroad in order to elevate their authority internally; and they tend to distort the defects of their ideological enemies and to exaggerate the triumph of revolutionary forces around the world in order to help justifying the universal infallibility of their revolutionary ideology.

2. When disputes arise over ideology, because they involve the ruling elites' prestige and legitimacy both externally and internally, they will be considered fundamental and will tend to spill over into other issue areas.

3. When a domestic power struggle arises and involves ideological issues, the dominant ruling elites tend to create a foreign counterpart of their domestic opponents and, by either manipulating nationalism, creating a sense of external threat, or using a revolutionary/anti-revolutionary dichotomy, they will attempt to arouse a sense of moral superiority in order to stimulate revolutionary fervor and to mobilize support for either maintaining domestic cohesion or combating internal enemies.

4. Due to their high degree of isolation from the outside world, ruling elites tend to create their own

psychological environment involving a distorting of the real world situation according to domestic needs. Low level elites, sensitive to their security, will follow ideological guidelines and avoid submitting objective analysis.

5. There are contradictions between revolutionary totalitarian regimes due to nationalism. The dominant revolutionary totalitarian regime tends to impose its revolutionary experiences or doctrines with its revolutionary fervor on other revolutionary regimes or forces, and the ensuing conflicts are often provocative and subversive.

APPENDIX I

SOURCES FOR TABLE 1

Philosophy	"New Polemic on the Philosophy Front," <u>Peking Review</u> , No. 37 (September 11, 1964), pp. 9-12.
Politics	"Along the Socialist or the Capitalist Road?" <u>Peking Review</u> , No. 34 (August 18, 1967), pp. 10-18; "Exposing a Big Scheme for Restoring Capitalism," <u>Peking Review</u> , No. 38 (September 15, 1967), pp. 23-24; "The Crimes of China's Khrushchev in the Socialist Education Movement," <u>Peking Review</u> , No. 38 (September 15, 1967), pp. 25-27.
Economy	"Two Diametrically Opposed Lines in Building the Economy," <u>Peking Review</u> , No. 37 (September 8, 1967), pp. 12-14; "Struggle Between Two Lines on Transforming Capitalist Industry and Commerce," <u>Peking Review</u> , No. 29 (July 19, 1968), pp. 22-25; "The Anti-Revolutionary Revisionist Heresy of 'Interest Taking Command' and 'Material Incentive' Must Be Criticized," <u>People's Daily</u> , July 9, 1968.
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APPENDIX II

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1949-1973

COUNTRY	DATE OF REC.	COUNTRY	DATE OF REC.
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES			
Soviet Union	Oct. 2, 49	Yugoslavia	Jan. 2, 55
Bulgaria	Oct. 3, 49	E. Germany	Oct. 27, 49
Romania	Oct. 3, 49	N. Vietnam	Jan. 15, 50
Hungary	Oct. 4, 49	N. Korea	Oct. 4, 49
Czechoslovakia	Oct. 5, 49	Mongolia	Oct. 6, 49
Poland	Oct. 5, 49	Cuba	Sept. 28, 60
Albania	Nov. 21, 49		
ASIAN COUNTRIES			
Burma	Dec. 16, 49	Nepal	Aug. 1, 55
India	Dec. 13, 49	Syria	July 2, 56
Pakistan	Jan. 5, 50	Indonesia	April 13, 50*
Ceylon	Jan. 7, 50	Iraq	July 18, 58
Afghanistan	Jan. 12, 50	Cambodia	July 24, 58
Yemen	Aug. 21, 56	Laos	Sept. 7, 62
South Yemen	Jan. 31, 68	Lebanon	Nov. 9, 71
Kuwait	March 22, 71	Cyprus	Dec. 14, 71
Turkey	Aug. 4, 71	Japan	Sept. 29, 72
Iran	Aug. 16, 71	Maldives	Oct. 14, 72
AFRICAN COUNTRIES			
Egypt	May 30, 56	Kenya	Dec. 14, 63
Morocco	Nov. 1, 58	Tunisia	Jan. 11, 64
Sudan	Nov. 30, 58	Congo B.	Feb. 22, 64
Guinea	Oct. 4, 59	Zambia	Oct. 29, 64
Mali	Oct. 14, 60	Mauritania	July 19, 65
Somalia	Dec. 14, 60	Burundi	Dec. 23, 63**
Tanzania	Dec. 9, 61	Dahomey	Nov. 12, 64*
Algeria	July 3, 62	Central Africa	Sept. 29, 64*

COUNTRY	DATE OF REC.	COUNTRY	DATE OF REC.
Uganda	Oct. 18, 62	Ghana	July 5, 60**
Togo	Sept. 25, 71	Zaire	Nov. 24, 72
Ethiopia	Nov. 24, 70	Uper	
Equatorial		Volta	Sept. 15, 73
Guinea	Oct. 15, 70	Nigeria	Feb. 10, 71
Mauritius	April 15, 72	Cameroon	March 26, 71
Rwanda	Nov. 12, 71	Chad	Nov. 28, 72
Senegal	Dec. 7, 71	Malagasy	Nov. 6, 72
Sierra Leone	July 29, 71		

WESTERN COUNTRIES

Britain	Jan. 6, 50	Sweden	Jan. 14, 50
Norway	Jan. 7, 50	Switzerland	Jan. 17, 50
Denmark	Jan. 9, 50	France	Jan. 27, 64
Finland	Jan. 13, 50	Iceland	Dec. 8, 71
Austria	May 28, 71	Spain	March 9, 73
W. Germany	Oct. 11, 72	Malta	Feb. 25, 72
Italy	Nov. 6, 70	Luxemberg	Nov. 10, 71
Netherlands	May 16, 72	Canada	Oct. 13, 70
Belgium	Oct. 25, 71	Australia	Dec. 21, 72
Greece	June 5, 72	New Zealand	Dec. 21, 72

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Chile	Dec. 15, 70	Mexico	Feb. 14, 72
Peru	Nov. 2, 71	Guayana	June 27, 72
Argentina	Feb. 16, 72	Yamaica	Nov. 21, 72

* Diplomatic relations severed.

** Diplomatic relations resumed after severance before 1973.

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