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MEASURING THE IMPACT OF A TELEVISED POLITICAL PROGRAM:
COMBINING THREE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES

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ABSTRACT

It is the proposal of this study that the three major areas of research in current mass communication study (direct effects, agenda-setting, and uses/gratifications) are not contradictory, but rather contribute to a functional model of mass communication effects. The study examined the functions and effects of a single televised program by a political candidate, looking for persuasive effect, ability of the speech to set the public's agenda, and the relationship of the function to the effect, attempting to integrate the concepts. A 25-minute televised campaign speech by Ronald Reagan, major competitor for the Republican presidential nomination in 1976, was employed as the stimulus. Telephone interviews before and after the broadcast were conducted using a randomly selected sample.

Results indicated no direct effects of viewing on attitude change, although the lack of change is not attributable to selective exposure. Neither predisposition toward the candidate nor political party (Republican, Democrat) affected viewing behavior. Also, subjects who were not committed to either Democratic or Republican party (independents) were the ones who watched the most.

Exposure to the program did not cause any significant agenda change, although the change is moderate and is toward the stimulus agenda.

The reason of the viewer for watching the program seemed to intervene between message and the effect. Post-exposure candidate evaluation was significantly higher for subjects who watched "a lot" for personality reasons than for those who watched "a little" or "not at all" for that reason. In addition, subjects who watched "a lot" to learn more about the issues recalled significantly more issues than those who watched "a little" or "not at all" for those reasons. Thus the suggestion of this study that the function of the media for the consumer is an important variable in the effects process is supported.

Overall, the results support the possibility and need for an integrated model of mass communication effects.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In modern mass communication research it is often asserted that study of media effects is not particularly fruitful (Blumler and Katz, 1974). This assertion seems to be reflective of the beginnings of a shift not only of research areas, but from a narrowly behavioral paradigm. Rather than assume even the somewhat cognitive model of stimulus-intervening variable-response, many mass communication researchers seem to be reaching for an even more cognitive approach. The individual is seen as an information seeker, selecting those stimuli which affect him, and thus controlling to a great extent his own actions and reactions. The purpose of the individual in his conscious selection of media stimuli, the attention he gives to it, and the use he makes of the information are all primary foci of this approach (Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch, 1974; Lundberg and Hulten, 1974).

It seems important, however, to examine more closely what one means in stating that it is no longer helpful to

look for mass media effects. For the most part, scientists seem to be referring to persuasive effects--an adaptation of attitude change research with the addition of a mass channel. One has only to look at the classic research in the area (Lazarsfeld, 1949; Klapper, 1960) to see that studies do indicate that immediate attitude change does not take place, but rather, effects are in the form of reinforcement, mobilization, or subtle changes in cognition. The diffusion research tradition (Rogers, 1962) suggests that the mass media may make people aware of innovations and may arouse interest but has little effect in actual adoption, or conversion. All this has led to the concept of the "limited effects" model.

Because it is "known" that the media have little direct effect, many current researchers advocate that a "functional" approach be employed, asking such questions as "How do people use the media?" and "What are the relevant media functions in society?" Consistent with the cognitive paradigm, the active individual or active selective society is assumed. Stinchcombe (1968) posits the following definition of functionalism: "a functional explanation is one in which the consequences of some behavior or social arrangement are essential elements of the causes of that behavior." A diagram further illustrates Stinchcombe's concept of a functional arrangement:



"S" represents the structure or behavior which has a causal impact on "H". "H" is the consequence, or system that is maintained. "H" selects those "S's" which maintain it. "T" represents other forces which have potential to change "H". The selection forces for "S" (caused by need for competition, satisfaction, reward, etc.) are stronger when H is not naturally maintained, i.e., when "T" is higher.

The basic view, then, is of an individual system or social system, which, though it is unconsciously affected by some stimuli, consciously seeks out much of the stimuli which affect it, especially (in Stinchcombe's diagram) in the form of maintenance. Study questions become "How does this happen?" "For what reasons is the information sought?" "To fulfill what needs?" How do the cognitive changes take place?" In addition other kinds of effects must be examined, particularly those resulting from the study of functions. For example, it has been posited that the mass media raise the salience of issues, contribute to the establishment and maintenance of norms and fads, have an "agenda-setting" function, provide learning opportunities, provide "play" or "pleasure" or entertainment for viewers, depending on how they are used.

Even though the terms being used are somewhat different, many of the things actually being looked at were

part of the early effects research. The concern for functions of the media is obvious in Lasswell's description of the four basic functions served by the media in American society (surveillance, correlation, transmission of heritage, and entertainment). Also, from the uses and gratification perspective, Blumler and McQuail (1969) and others are hypothesizing that people use the media to meet particular needs, and the use of the media by the individual will interact with its effects on him. For example, if a person watches a political advertisement because he could not avoid it (it came on while he was watching another program), its effect on him may be different from on the person who chooses to watch to gain information. Various reasons for watching are being discovered in this area of research, though empirical testing of the effects of the reason for attending has not been done. Early voting studies described the "selectivity processes," indicating that the individual actively exposes himself to stimuli which support or maintain his preconceptions. His need of reinforcement causes his use of the media for that purpose.

The work by McCombs, et al. (1972, 1975) in agenda-setting ("the media may not tell us what to think, but they are very successful at telling us what to think about"--Cohen, 1963) has roots in the findings by diffusionists that media create awareness which may aid in the modernization process. Lazarsfeld, et al. (1948) found from the

Erie County study that "insofar as mass media of communication led to conversion at all, it was through a redefinition of issues. . . Issues about which people had previously thought very little or had been little concerned took on a new importance as they were accepted by campaign propaganda." Many of the gatekeeping studies, though principally concerned with how the information flowed, were looking at an end result of what issues the public were aware of.

In modern agenda-setting research, the attempts to get at the nature of mass media effects has focused on broad topics of public agenda. Only a few have looked at the ability of a political program to set the public's agenda of issues. Results are inconsistent, and further research needs to be conducted to determine in which situations the agenda-setting function is operant.

Purpose of the Study

In attempting to study either functions or effects of mass communication, no one to this point has considered a combined approach of the three research areas outlined. Work has been done in each area, studying direct persuasive effects, agenda-setting effects, and describing functions of the media for viewers. It seems that these approaches should not be contradictory, but complementary, and that much could be gained in establishing a broad research perspective for mass communication studies by looking at the totality of their implications. If such a combination of

thinking should prove workable, time and effort now being spent studying isolated and over-simplified questions could be directed toward a more complete comprehension of both functions and various types of effects of mass communication.

In addition, these theories need to be tested together in a situation in which one can control for other variables and yet maintain as non-artificial a setting as possible. The area of political mass communication offers potential for this kind of testing and control, and provides attitude objects, issue information, agendas of relevant issues, and wide exposure of messages. Also, the question of effects is of primary importance in a political situation. Although concerns with functions, gratifications and agenda-setting effects are now at the forefront of political mass communication research, belief in the direct persuasive effects model has not been abandoned totally. Political campaign researchers and strategists in particular, are reluctant to agree that media advertising has no persuasive effect.

This study will examine the functions and effects of a single televised speech by a political candidate, looking for persuasive effect, ability of the speech to set the public's agenda, and the relationship of the function to the effect. It will use a field quasi-experimental procedure, employing as stimulus a 25-minute televised campaign speech by Ronald Reagan, a major competitor for the

Republican presidential nomination in 1976. Telephone surveys before and after the broadcast will attempt to determine agenda of issues, attitudes toward the speaker, demographic and political involvement information, reasons for viewing behavior, and recall of issues discussed.

Although the study deals with only one medium (television) and therefore results cannot be unconditionally generalized across mediated communication situations, the study should provide information on the areas outlined. If the results seem fruitful, further research can be done with the introduction of various media types as relevant variables. Analysis of the televised political message and viewing behavior outlined will add to information concerning functions and effects of televised political messages, and implications for a research model can be considered.

Description of Following Chapters

Chapter II will review literature related to the research questions and will present specific hypotheses to be tested. Chapter III will describe experimental procedures, measuring instruments, and methods of statistical analysis. Chapter IV reports data collected in the study and results of analysis of that data. Chapter V includes discussion of the findings, limitations of the study, and directions for future research.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Determining the effects produced by exposure to a single televised political program requires incorporation of the findings of previous research to provide a broad understanding of the concepts involved. Three major areas of research provide the most significant theoretic frameworks and contribute most to scientific inquiry concerning media effects. First is the literature investigating direct persuasive effects of the media. A second body of literature suggests that the effects of the media are primarily in establishing an agenda of issues for the public to think about. The final area of significance is the research tradition involving functions of the media for consumers and the influence of the function on the effect.

This chapter relates these areas of research and discusses their implications to this study's hypotheses concerning specific functions and effects of televised political advertising.

Direct Effects

Researchers who conducted the earliest voting studies were surprised to find that the effects of the media in voting decisions were strictly limited (Lazarsfeld, 1944; Lazarsfeld, et al., 1948). Rather than making a decision individualistically or from direct media influence, voters seemed to be highly influenced by interpersonal communication, particularly by "opinion leaders" (Lazarsfeld, 1944). The Erie County study (1948) discovered that these "opinion leaders" are highly attentive to media campaign messages and use the information to help make their own decisions. Other voters get their information from these people rather than attending to and making voting decisions directly from media messages. The study also indicated that exposure is a result of interest in the campaign messages that support voters' predispositions toward the candidates. The Erie County study outlines three major effects of campaigns on voters: the campaigns reinforce partisanship, activated the indifferent and converted only those who were not firmly committed (Lazarsfeld, et al., 1948). Berelson (1954) found similar effects, noting however, that the more exposure voters had to the mass media campaign, the more correct was their information on the position of the candidates on the issues. Tendency to change position was negatively correlated with high media exposure, however.

The University of Michigan Survey Research Center's classic studies are widely considered to be the best indication that all inputs into the voting decision are translated into partisan attitudes toward one side or the other. In Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954) and The American Voter (Campbell, et al., 1964) the same questions were used to determine partisan attitudes. The attitudes correlated highly with Presidential preference in the 1952 and the 1956 elections. Overall, the Survey Research Center studies conclude that party identification is the single greatest vote determinant, and that issues and image stimuli are filtered through the selective bias of party affiliation.

These and other early direct effect studies are synthesized by Klapper (1960); Weiss, in Lindsey and Aronson (1969); and Nimmo and Savage (1976). The findings have come to be termed the "law of minimal effects" and have been widely accepted by scholars of mass communication. Nimmo and Savage (1976) point out, however, that evidence suggests that this "law" has definite qualifications. Five major qualifications will be discussed here.

First, most of the classic voting research used to support the minimal effects model pre-dates the dominance of television as a source of political information. Kraus (1974) indicates that not only do the studies predate the television era in politics but most fail to consider mass media as serious variables.

Second, although much of the research done in the area has been survey research, there are some experimental studies which contradict the survey findings by indicating that media campaign exposure may affect people of varying interest levels to change perception of candidates and issues. In addition, the media exposure may even influence voting decisions. (Most of these studies are discussed further under specific research areas.) (See Brownstein, 1971; Kaid, 1975; Donahue, 1972; Davis, Dyson, and Scioli, 1976.)*

Third, research indicates that even when a direct influence on voting decision is not present, the media may serve to affect people's images of political candidates (McClure and Patterson, 1974). In a study of the 1972 presidential election, McClure and Patterson interviewed

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*A number of early studies reported moderate to high attitude change as a result of communication in experimental conditions (for synthesis, see Hovland, 1954). It has been suggested, however, that the discrepancy in results reported by experimental studies and survey research may be a product of the research design itself (Hovland, 1959). For example, the people who expose themselves to the communication message of an experimental study are not the same people who would expose themselves to mass media messages. The size of the communication unit (an entire program or campaign of communication versus a specific message) may also be a factor. In a typical experiment, the effect is usually observed shortly after the communication treatment, whereas in survey research the time interval between communication exposure and effect measurement is usually somewhat longer. Another possible contributing factor is the interpersonal contact available in survey research. Experimental studies have found that communication in a situation in which group membership is salient is met with more resistance to counternorm influence than it is under conditions of low salience. Thus, although experimental research contradicts the "law of minimal effects" to some degree, the contradiction may be explainable in light of design differences.

subjects in Syracuse, New York, examining influence of the media in changing beliefs about the candidate rather than only looking for attitude change. Results showed that although television news had little effect in changing voters' beliefs, television advertising did directly affect voters' beliefs about the candidates, even among subjects with little interest in the campaign. To study effects on attitude change, McClure and Patterson measured attitudes before and after three "Democrats for Nixon" advertisements were shown. In two of the three spots attitudes changed in the direction of the ads, though in the third case they changed in the opposite direction.

Recent studies by Nimmo and Savage (1976) and Davis, Dyson, and Scioli (1976) investigate components of candidate image. Using hypotheses based on previous research on image voting, the Davis, Dyson, and Scioli research indicates that candidate images are probably not formed strictly on the basis of candidate-provided information. They report interplay between voter predispositions, issue positions, and the information provided by the candidates on personal attributes, issue positions, and philosophy of government. (See also O'Keefe and Sheinkopf, 1974).

A fourth problem with the law of minimal effects is that the lack of effects is often dependent on the strong partisan commitment of the voters. DeVries and Tarrance (1972) found that approximately one-third of those who vote

do not vote a straight party ballot. A portion of those who do not vote straight party tickets are "independents" in the traditional definition (they do not identify with any party, have low interest in politics, and are low users of media). Another portion, however, is comprised of "ticket-splitters"--differing from independents in that they do identify to some extent with a party, but are not bound by it; they are highly interested in politics and are high users of media. Pool (1971) states that although decline in party identification is a fact, it indicates rising interest in a new kind of politics, rather than a lack of political interest. The use of mass media, especially television, is making a change in political activity and interest, a change toward concern with image and issues as opposed to party identification.

A final factor which may alter the wide-spread belief in the limited effects model is the questioning of the validity of the selective exposure concept. Although field research (Lazarsfeld, et al., 1948) reports that people tend to expose themselves to political messages which support their predispositions, very little empirical evidence is available to substantiate the concept. The majority of work in the area has been done by social psychologists interested in the cognitive consistency models, and these results are inconsistent as Sears and Freedman (1967) report in a summary of research in the area. A group of

studies have shown evidence that subjects prefer supportive information to non-supportive information (Ehrlich, Guttman, Schonbach, and Mills, 1957; Adams, 1961; Mills, Aronson, and Robinson, 1959; Rosen, 1961). Other researchers report that no clear preference exists for either supportive or non-supportive information (Feather, 1962; Mills and Ross, 1964; Sears, 1966; Sears and Freedman, 1965). Two studies have reported evidence of a preference for non-supportive materials (Sears, 1965; Freedman, 1965a).

Sears and Freedman (1967) address the subject of selective exposure in political communication by carefully reviewing the Elmira (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954) and Erie County (Lazarsfeld, et al., 1948) studies which originally reported the phenomenon. They state that selective exposure has been operationalized in the studies as any systematic bias in audience composition, unusual agreement about a matter of opinion, or preference for supportive over non-supportive information. They suggest that the evidence reported in the early studies is for some kind of "de facto" selectivity. For example, in the Lazarsfeld, et al. (1948) study, respondents had been predominantly exposed to propaganda supporting their predispositions, but this only held for Republicans. Democrats were equally divided in exposure. Content analysis showed a greater percentage of Republican propaganda available for consumption. In addition, the measuring devices may have contributed

to the findings. Interviews are post-hoc, therefore they may have measured selective exposure or they may have measured attitude change. "After only" measures maximize the probability of obtaining de facto selectivity, since any attitude change is likely to reduce the discrepancy between communicator's and respondent's position, rather than increase it. Also, Sears and Freedman point out that retrospective self-report may yield information that is a biased product of selective retention. Direct or immediate observation would be more accurate.

Several studies have tested selective exposure to a series of political messages (Trenaman and McQuail, 1961; Stempel, 1961; Greenberg, 1965; Rhine, 1967; Grupp, 1970; Bartlett, Drew, Fahle and Watts, 1974) with inconsistent results. Very few studies have examined selective exposure to a specific political message. Schramm and Carter (1959) studied the effects of a 20-hour telethon by a candidate for the office of governor of California in 1958. Interviews conducted four days after the telethon indicated that approximately 10 per cent of the sample watched any of the program. Republicans, comprising 25 per cent of the sample, represented 50 per cent of the viewing audience. The percentage of Democrats viewing was about the same as the percentage represented in the sample. Republicans watched twice as long as Democrats and were more likely to have watched during non-prime time hours. Republicans were also

more likely than Democrats to have tuned in by design rather than by accident.

Kaid and Hirsch (1973) investigated three research questions: (1) Are those who come to hear a political candidate speak favorably predisposed toward him? (2) Does a single appearance of a political candidate produce a favorable shift in his image? (3) If there is a favorable shift in his image, will it persist over time? Using a 1972 appearance of Senator Edmund Muskie at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale, Illinois, the researchers obtained demographic information and pre-test, post-test, and delayed post-test measures of candidate image for respondents who attended the address by Muskie. Findings indicated that 47.17 per cent of the sample were not of the same political party as the speaker. The single appearance of the candidate resulted in a significantly favorable shift in his image, and that shift persisted over time although the factors comprising the image changed somewhat. In general the study did not support either the selective exposure concept or the traditionally accepted idea that a single campaign appearance has little effect.

Several recent studies have indicated that televised political messages tend to overcome any tendency to select partisan exposure (Atkin, 1973; Sheinkopf and O'Keefe, 1973; Mendelsohn and O'Keefe, 1976), partially as a result of program format. "Spot" commercials (30 second, 60 second,

or five minutes in length) have the potential to reach the entire viewing audience rather than a predisposed group, and studies indicate that voters do get some issue information from exposure to spot commercials (Atkin, et al., 1973; Sheinkopf and O'Keefe, 1973; Shaw and Bowers, 1973; Kaid, 1975; Patterson and McClure, 1974). Although no direct link to voting behavior has been found, some subjects report that their vote decisions are influenced by commercials. Since most of this work has been done with spot commercials, very little can be said about its application to advertisements of longer length.

Direct Effects Summary

Although the "limited effects" model has been widely accepted, several factors outlined above may mitigate those findings. First, most of the research used to support the minimal effects model pre-dates the dominance of television as a source of political information. Second, although much of the research done in the area has been survey research, some experimental studies contradict these findings, reporting direct persuasive effects. Third, there is evidence for mass media effects on formation of image of the political candidates. Fourth, the lack of effects has been attributed partly to strong partisan commitment of the voters, and that commitment may be declining rapidly. Fifth, the selective exposure thought to hinder direct influence may not actually be operant.

Additionally, recent literature concerning spot commercials indicate some influence on both issue information gain and voting decision.

Given these limitations, it seems that the question of direct effects is again open. The contradictory evidence concerning direct persuasive effects and image formation, coupled with the change in partisan identification, suggests that it would be helpful to re-examine effects of a televised political advertisement, with attempts to avoid the design limitations present in several of the studies cited. Because the findings concerning selective exposure are so inconsistent, especially in the area of political research, it too needs to be tested. Use of a before-after design will eliminate the possibility of the "de facto selectivity" suggested in former research.

Hypotheses

H_1: There will be a significant change in attitude toward the speaker as a result of exposure to the televised political commercial.

H_2: Respondents who are initially predisposed toward Reagan will be more likely to watch the broadcast than those respondents who are not predisposed toward Reagan.

H_3: A significantly greater number of Republicans than Democrats will watch the broadcast.

Agenda-Setting

Early findings that the media alter cognitions, raise salience of issues, and help users anticipate events

in their environment (Schramm, 1957) rather than cause persuasive effects provide the base for the development of the agenda-setting hypothesis. Further evidence comes from the gatekeeping studies (White, 1950; Tannenbaum, 1963; Martin, O'Keefe and Nayman, 1972; Donohew, 1967; Gieber, 1956) which indicate that types of stories, amount of coverage, and kind of coverage are varied according to decisions of the people handling the news. Therefore, through dictates of personal judgment and mechanical necessities, certain material is selected for presentation to news consumers. Thus an agenda of issues is established by the media. The recent studies in agenda-setting go a step further by comparing the media agenda of issues with the public issue agenda, using various operationalizations.

The general concept of the agenda-setting hypothesis is that there is a direct relationship between the media's coverage of issues and the public's perception of which issues are important. The relationship is theorized to be causal: the media set the public's agenda by the amount and type of coverage given to the issues. The first empirical testing of the agenda-setting hypothesis was done by McCombs and Shaw (1972) in their interview of "undecided" voters in the 1968 presidential election. Major campaign news sources in the area were content-analyzed and news content was categorized into "major" and "minor" items. Correlations between item emphasis on the campaign issues

carried by the media and voters' perceptions of what were the important issues were high for both major and minor items (+.967, +.979). The high correlations must be considered, however, in light of the exclusion of voters whose decisions had already been made. Thus the operation of the agenda-setting function in this case is consistent with the "limited effects" model which would hold that influence is more likely to take place where there are few predispositions toward any particular position.

A study of television news and voter behavior in the 1972 presidential election (McClure and Patterson) found few direct effects of exposure to television news coverage of the campaign issues. The issues which received coverage correlated with the voters' perceptions about the importance of the issue to the candidates, though it did not increase the salience of the issue to the individual. When subjects were controlled for interest level in political affairs, the high and moderate levels were unrelated to change of belief or salience of issues. With low interest subjects, strong change occurred on two items concerning George McGovern, though no change was recorded on items concerning Nixon. The authors speculate that because McGovern was a relatively unfamiliar figure to many people, the media were able to provide information about him. The study indicates that in this situation the agenda-setting function was operant only for low interest subjects considering a

candidate for whom they had little familiarity and therefore few predispositions.

Weaver and Spellman (1974) found moderate support for a relationship between media use for political information and the increase in salience of the Watergate issue over time regardless of predispositions toward political party or candidate. Four hundred registered voters, chosen randomly and controlled for economic and racial variation, were interviewed in person in June and October, 1972, and by telephone in November, 1972 and May, 1973 by trained interviewers (n size dropped to 163 by the final interview). The dominant newspaper of the city was content analyzed during weeks of heaviest interviewing for references to Watergate. Thus predispositions did not affect the operation of the agenda-setting function when political information was actively sought through the media.

Tipton, Haney, and Baseheart (1975) studied agenda-setting in local and statewide elections in Kentucky. In addition to hypothesizing that the media set the public's agenda, the study suggested that the media agenda-setting should be strongest among individuals who are the least interested in the campaign. A panel study consisting of three interview points determined the issues of the public agenda, and the media agenda was established by content analysis. Only correlations with newspaper agenda showed statistical significance, with newspapers having been the

primary source of campaign information named by voters. As expected, the higher the interest of voters in the campaign, the less change in salience of issues over time.

McCombs, Becker and Weaver (1975) examine the question of time in agenda-setting. As it is indicated that some agenda-setting does take place in some circumstances, their concern is how long it takes for the public to learn the press' agenda and over what period of time the learning of salience takes place. For preliminary information the authors cite an analysis of the 1973 Syracuse study (Stone, 1975) and the 1972 Charlotte voter study (Shaw and Bowers, 1973). Statistical analysis indicates that a four month period extending from six months to two months prior to the interview period is the maximum time frame during which the media agendas best match the public agenda.

Another study concerned with time effects is an analysis of order effects of Watergate developments (Weaver, McCombs, and Spellman, 1975). Using cross-lagged panel correlation techniques of analysis, the authors state that while there is some evidence that the media reflect community concerns, the correlations are much stronger in the opposite direction: the media agenda affects the public agenda. Similar findings are reported by Stone (1975).

Studies discussed to this point have examined the ability of the media to set the public's agenda through news presentation. Several studies, however, have been

concerned with the agenda-setting functions of political advertising. A 1973 study by Bower analyzed political advertising in the two largest newspapers in each of 23 states which held both senatorial and gubernatorial elections in 1970. In examining advertisements by the two major political parties in the 15 days immediately preceding the election, significant differences were found between the issues advertised by the two parties. Rank order correlation between voter emphasis on issues and the composite advertising emphasis on issues was +.97. Correlations were also high between voter emphasis of issue and advertising emphasis for each individual party and at senatorial, gubernatorial, and state representative levels. Bowers explains the high correlation with the fact that most candidates for major office now consult opinion polls to determine which issues voters hold important. Campaign strategies are outlined from this information. Thus, Bowers suggests that if there is a causal link, it may be in the opposite direction from that posited by the agenda-setting theory. That is, the voters may set the agenda for the media. One consideration is that Harris poll data was used, which gives opinions on a national level. The study was done in a regional situation, which may mean that the emphasis placed on issues im each area may have been somewhat different from the national opinion.

In an investigation assessing the relationship of television and radio advertising exposure with several variables during a congressional campaign, Atkin and Heald (1974) found low support for the agenda-setting function. A random telephone sample of 323 Michigan voters were asked an open-ended question about the issues they considered most important in the election. They also responded to items asking the relative importance of (1) the candidate's positions on several issues and (2) the candidate's qualities. The overall agenda correlated at +.18 with the advertising exposure index and at +.18 with the news media exposure index. When advertising exposure is controlled for news and interpersonal exposure, previous familiarity, and campaign interest, the correlation is reduced to +.12. A group of "control" issues (not emphasized in the advertising) were slightly negatively correlated with advertising exposure. The authors suggest that because the issues given priority in the commercials were perceived by exposed voters as important, and no difference by exposure was found for the control issues, the relationship between the candidate and voter agendas is present, though slight. They hypothesize that the direction of causality is from advertising to agenda.

Shaw and Bowers (1973) found that with high exposure to television ads, the agenda of items stressed in the ads correlated highly with the agenda of items subjects

reported recalling from the ads. Correlations were +.962 for Nixon and +.947 for McGovern. Data was collected in Charlotte, N.C. with person-to-person interviews of 246 subjects. Bowers (1975), however, found a low correlation between the agenda of issues stressed in the ads and the agenda of issues considered most important by the voters.

Within the large body of literature available on the agenda-setting theory, the majority of research examines the influence of media agendas over time. The McCombs, Becker and Weaver study cited above claims that a several month time span is required for items to move to the public's agenda from the media, although they grant that in some cases like the Mid-East war an issue may move more quickly onto the public agenda. In addition, correlation seems to depend somewhat upon the specificity of categories (Murdoch, 1975). More specific categories seem to decrease the correlations between media and public issue agendas.

Kaid, Hale, and Williams (1976) suggest that the overall power of the agenda-setting theory as an "effects" predictor is significantly lessened if a general, long-term setting is a qualification for its operation. They attempt to narrow the focus of the agenda-setting theory to particular political events by studying the campaign visit of President Gerald Ford to Oklahoma City in 1974. Coverage of the event in newspapers and on radio and television was monitored and analyzed. A random sample of 166 subjects

were interviewed by telephone in the 72-hour period following the event and were asked an open-ended question concerning what issues the President had stressed in his speech. In addition, the subjects were questioned concerning their sources of information about the event. Correlations were moderate (+.64), but not statistically significant between the combined media agenda and the agenda of issues recalled by the public. Correlations between specific media and public issue agendas ranged from +.53 to +.62, but again were not significant. However, the issue agenda of the subjects who received information about the event from more than one medium correlated at +.79 (p. .05) with the media agenda. Although no widespread support was found for the hypothesis that the agenda-setting theory is operant in a specific event, correlations are high enough to suggest that the subject warrants further investigation.

Summary

In the studies cited above, a good deal of support has been reported for the existence of some type of relationship between the media's coverage of issues and the public's perception of which issues are important. Two major questions remain unanswered concerning the agenda-setting hypothesis, however. First, in which direction is the relationship? The media may set the public's agenda, or the knowledge of public interests may dictate which issues the media cover. Secondly, is the agenda-setting function

operant only with issues of very broad, national concern, or does it apply to specific events?

This study will investigate the question of the media's ability to set the public's agenda in the situation of a specific political event. It will differ from past research in its narrower focus of time and its use of a field experimental design. If a relationship is found, the before-after measurement of public issue agenda should verify the direction of the relationship.

Hypotheses:

H_4: "Exposure to a single televised political broadcast will result in a significant change in public issue agenda in the direction of the stimulus agenda."

H_5: "The post-test agenda for viewers will be more closely correlated with the stimulus agenda than will be the post-test agenda for non-viewers."

Uses and Gratifications

In the move away from the question "what do the media do to the audience," the question has become "what do the audience do with the media?" (Katz). Although gratification research was present to some extent in the earliest empirical studies, its recent resurgence indicates a definite shift in perspectives. Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1973) state that modern gratification research may be characterized by (1) the social and psychological origins of (2) needs which generate (3) expectations of (4) the mass

media or other sources, which lead to (5) differential patterns of media exposure (or engagement in other activities), resulting in (6) need gratifications and (7) other consequences, perhaps mostly unintended ones.

The basic set of assumptions on which past uses and gratification research has been done is outlined by Lundberg and Hulten (1974). First, an active audience is assumed. Media consumption is goal directed, not completely passively encountered. The audience mediates any direct effects, and part of this mediation lies in the audience needs and resulting media exposure. In addition, the media compete with other means of gratification of audience needs. Because of the view of man as an actor with some degree of rationality, self report is seen as a useful and valid means of gathering data.

From the definition given by Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch, and based on the assumptions outlined by Lundberg and Hulten, research may be directed at several areas of investigation. Possibilities include typologies of audience gratifications (psychological needs), source of media gratification (whether content, exposure, or social content), attributes of individual media which make them adequate for specific need satisfactions, versatility of sources of gratification, and interaction of the use with the effect. Although much is offered for examination which concerns media functions and non-effect oriented research, the uses and

gratifications paradigm obviously offers in addition another means of getting at the problem of effects. Although the general assumptions of the functionalist position still hold, the function may be viewed as an intervening variable between the stimulus and the response.

The question of interaction of use with effect was present in much of the early media/violence research. Work by Bailyn (1959); Himmelweit, Oppenheim, and Vince (1958); Maccoby (1951, 1954) and others suggested that the effect of violent television fare on children was dependent on motivation for watching, personality, and social/physical aspects of the environment. A particularly thorough investigation was made by Schramm, Lyle, and Parker (1961) in their three-year research program involving children and television. From this research they suggest probable uses of television by children as well as effects of television on learning, social relationships and behavior. Research methods employed are primarily in the range of field studies. In the process of eleven studies, most of the techniques are descriptive. Some field experiments are conducted to test hypotheses formulated in the earlier studies, but the study is primarily exploratory. A summary of their report suggests that effects of media fare depend on the viewer's motivation, personality, and ability, as these effect his receptivity to the information and the likelihood of his using it. A whole series of violence research studying the

effects of prior frustration, alienation, anxiety on reaction to media violence is available (Maccoby, Levin, and Selya, 1956; Berkowitz, 1964; Bandura, 1971; Feshbach, 1961; Walters and Thomas, 1963).

Other than in the tradition of media violence research, very little has been done concerning the role of audience motivation in the effects process. A 1970 study by Blumler, Brown and McQuail examined the English audience of a long-running daytime radio serial, finding that a major gratification for listeners was the program's tendency to uphold traditional family values. Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1973) state that this finding is a possible answer to the question of attitude change versus attitude reinforcement through the media; it depends in part upon whether the listener is seeking reinforcement.

The question of gratification and effects has also been studied by Kline, Miller and Morrison (1974) in a media campaign concerning family planning information. The authors conducted a field experiment in two midwestern American cities; one serving as the experimental group, the other as the control. After interviews with a random sample of respondents in each city, the experimental group received a campaign of radio messages aimed at an adolescent audience. The control group received no treatment. After the campaign, interviews were again conducted with each original sample as well as with an independent sample

in each city. Total n size was 600. Specific need states in the audience are posited to be associated with differential effects from mass media. The effects are seen to be gratifications of the need states.

The state of need of subjects for family planning information are suggested to be dependent upon age and sex, as well as the individual's orientation toward his primary group. Questions were asked which determined how much knowledge each subject had relative to the information held by his relevant referent group. Need states of congruent, incongruent (ahead), and incongruent (behind) were established. Interpersonal discussion is further suggested to contribute to effects, so each need state is divided into a "talking" and "non-talking" group. Effects of these independent variables on knowledge and message discrimination are measured. Analysis indicates that subjects in the congruent and behind states as well as those in the nontalking condition gained information from the campaign. The adolescents in these conditions had not reached the point at which it was difficult to add new information. The aheads and talkers had already reached this point, and therefore did not gain at the same rate as the others. In a discussion of the meaning of their findings, Kline, Miller and Morrison (1974) state that the traditional mass communication reports of "no significant effects" is inaccurate because of lack of consideration of relevant

dependent variables. The needs of people were shown in this study to enhance or inhibit media effects. Although no significant effects of knowledge were apparent in the overall analysis, control for need states indicate their mediating effects.

The study of political uses of media during campaigns is another area in which study of the relationship of gratification and effects has been neglected, according to Garrett O'Keefe (1975). Although several studies have considered functions of media during election campaigns, O'Keefe states that the extent to which early-sought gratifications are fulfilled by mass media and other communication sources over the campaign should be investigated. He suggests the possibility that anticipation of using the media for surveillance may yield greater learning during the time of the campaign.

A 1969 study by Blumler and McQuail used the context of the 1964 British general elections to study the gratifications people derive from media consumption and the uses to which the materials are put. The authors were also concerned with the problem of how the persuasiveness of a political message depends, if it does, upon an individual's motivation for receiving it. A set of eight items suggesting reasons for watching political broadcasts and nine items representing reasons people avoid the broadcasts were developed from prior interviews with groups of voters in the area. In the

study, respondents were asked to indicate which items applied to them, and strength of motivation was determined by a comparison of reasons for watching with reasons for avoiding. Strength of motivation was shown to be related to the number of broadcasts the voters reported viewing during the campaign and to interact with campaign exposure in affecting knowledge gain and shift in party attitudes during the campaign.

Mendelsohn and O'Keefe (1975) employed a uses-gratifications approach to study the relationship of mass communications behaviors in voter decision-making. The event studied was the 1972 presidential election, and panel data was collected over a four month period before and after the election. A final sample of 618 potential voters received all five interviews in the Summit County, Ohio, area. Results of the study indicate that the subjects may be broken down into five major groups behaviorally. People who make a decision early in the election to refrain from voting are for the most part unexposed to campaign media and are therefore not subject to campaign influence. Others intend to vote, but for various reasons fail to do so. Persons who decide early in the election to vote for a particular candidate seem to limit their own use of the media for information gain, and therefore hold dogmatically to their initial position. They may be exposed to counter-propaganda, but since they are already committed and do not

anticipate media influence, there is little possibility of conversion. Three-fourths of all voters interviewed in this study fell into this category. Voters who decide to support a candidate but change their minds at some point in the campaign tend to report low political interest, moderate attention to the campaign, but high anticipated and reported influence of the media on their voting decisions. Similar to this group are voters who decided on their choice late in the campaign; these people were highly exposed to several sources of influence including the media, but were less likely than the "switchers" to anticipate media influence. Thus it would seem that those voters most likely to be influenced by the media are those who have low political interest and have made a tentative commitment or none at all, and expose themselves to various kinds of media influence whether or not that influence was anticipated.

McLeod and Becker (1974) attempt to test the validity of self-report measures used by Blumler and McQuail (1969) as well as examine additive effects of gratification and avoidance in media use. Again using the 1972 presidential election, the authors construct a very broad study, the partial purpose of which is to identify media effects from gratifications. Personal interviews were conducted with 356 respondents before and after the election. The sample was stratified according to voter age and education. Measures were taken of media exposure, gratifications and avoidances,

and political effects. Exposure measures included number of hours watching television per evening, kind of programs watched, and time spent watching public affairs programs. Gratification/avoidance measures were those used by Blumler and McQuail with some variation to fit the American political situation. Political effects measures included in the pre-test are issue accuracy, probability of voting, interest in the campaign, campaign activity, convention viewing, advertisement viewing, selectivity in vote prediction, and perceived differences between candidates. Political effects measures on the post-election interviews include accuracy of recall of vote outcome, political discussion, election night media use, campaign special viewing, selectivity in special viewing, and voting intent change. Controll for several media-connected variables (general political interest, political media dependence) was established.

Results of the study analysis indicate that even with exposure variables held constant in regression analysis, gratification and avoidance dimensions were able to explain significant amounts of additional variance in over half the comparisons. The authors suggest that although they have shown additive effects of gratifications and avoidances in a linear regression mode, there remains a need to examine possible interactive effects of combining two gratification dimensions or a gratification and avoidance dimension. Also, theoretically, there is high possibility of an

interaction effect between a specific message and the gratification sought at the time of that message. Further study in this area is suggested.

Summary

The work in the uses and gratifications paradigm has resulted primarily in descriptions of audience typologies, sources of media gratification, and functions served by the media. The question of the relationship of the use to the effect is suggested by several authors as necessary for future research, although only one study (Blumler and McQuail, 1969) attempts to test for the interaction. The positive results of that study, coupled with reports from the media/violence literature indicating similar interactive possibilities, suggest that a study of that relationship could contribute significantly to scientific knowledge of media effects.

Hypotheses:

H_6: "Respondents who watched the broadcast for 'personality' reasons will evaluate the candidate significantly higher after viewing the program than will respondents who watched for other reasons."

H_7: "Respondents who watched to gain issue information will be able to recall significantly more issues than will respondents who watched for other reasons."

Chapter Summary

In examining the question "what are the effects of the media?" and particularly "what are the effects of a political media message?", it is imperative that one pursue an eclectic approach to such a broad issue. To insist upon one research concern (e.g., agenda-setting) to the exclusion of others is to fail to recognize the complementary aspects of the approaches. To insist that the question of media effects has been answered is to deny recent contradictory research and to overlook social, cultural, and political change which may mitigate the findings of earlier studies.

It is the proposal of this study that the three major areas of research in current mass communication study are not contradictory, but rather contribute to a functional model of mass communication effects. Adapting the Stinchcombe model and applying the concepts of the research in agenda-setting, uses and gratifications, and direct effects, one might propose the following inter-relationship:

"H", or the individual seeks out much of the stimuli ("S") which affects it. "H"'s reason for seeking the stimulus will determine in part its effect on him. At other times, unsolicited stimuli ("T") reach the individual, and the effects of those stimuli may include attitude change, information gain, the establishment of an issue agenda, etc. However, if "H" tends to seek out those "S's" which maintain it, the possibilities for effect by "T" is lessened.

To determine whether the correlation of these aspects of research may contribute to knowledge of the effects of a single televised political advertisement, seven hypotheses will be tested:

Restatement of Hypotheses

H_1: "There will be a significant change in attitude toward the speaker as a result of exposure to the televised political commercial."

H_2: "Respondents who are initially predisposed toward Reagan will be more likely to watch the broadcast than those respondents who are not predisposed toward Reagan."

H_3: "A significantly greater number of Republicans than Democrats will watch the broadcast."

H_4: "Exposure to a single televised political broadcast will result in a significant change in public issue agenda in the direction of the stimulus agenda."

H_5: "The post-test agenda for viewers will be more closely correlated with the stimulus agenda than will be the post-test agenda for non-viewers."

H_6: "Respondents who watched the broadcast for 'personality' reasons will evaluate the candidate significantly higher after viewing the program than will respondents who watched for other reasons."

H_7: "Respondents who watched to gain issues information will be able to recall more issues than will respondents who watched for other reasons."

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Chapter three will discuss procedures, data-gathering instruments, design, and data analysis.

Procedures

To test the research hypotheses previously outlined, this study will employ a quasi-experimental field procedure using a single televised political message as the stimulus. The message chosen was a 25-minute campaign speech by Ronald Reagan, a major competitor for the Republican nomination in the 1976 presidential election (text of the speech is included in Appendix C). The message was broadcast at 8:00 p.m. in the state of Texas on Wednesday, April 29, 1976, just prior to the Texas primary on Saturday, May 2, of the same week (The Texas Republican Party eventually gave all 100 delegate votes to Reagan at the Republican National Convention). The speech itself was a replay of a live speech given by Reagan while campaigning in Texas, and while not heavily advertised, was listed in the television schedule of the local newspapers.

This particular speech was chosen for use as the stimulus for several reasons. First, it had a single exposure on television, providing some of the control necessary for a before-after design. In addition it was widely available in the area, being broadcast statewide. Thirdly, since Reagan was a serious competitor for the Republican nomination in Texas, a presentation of several of his issue positions aired so close to the Texas primary had high likelihood of attracting local interest. This significantly increased the value of the speech as stimulus material. Finally, very little research has been done using any political advertisements other than "spot" commercials. This 25-minute program provided a test of political programs containing substantive issue information.

On Monday (April 27) and Tuesday (April 28) evenings before the speech was aired, trained student interviewers administered a pre-test by telephone to 100 subjects above voting age in the residential section of Dallas, a large southwest metropolitan area.* Subjects were selected by

*Although the sample size is average for laboratory experiments, it is fairly small for survey research. Since the methodology of this study is somewhat a combination of the two methods, adequate sample size is questionable. According to Simon (1969), the strength of a relationship is the same regardless of the sample size, although a small sample will yield a less accurate estimate of the strength than will a large sample. However, if only a very faint relationship exists between 2 variables, the relationship would appear significant in a large sample, but not in a small sample because the chance variation of a small sample masks the effect. Therefore, error produced by small sample size will be Type II.

random generation of numbers, using the Dallas area prefixes. Prefixes reserved for downtown businesses were excluded. A series of four digit numbers drawn from a table of random numbers was attached to each prefix. (For discussion of this procedure, see Hauck and Cox, 1974.) The same subjects were given a post-test by telephone interview in the three days following the televised speech (April 30, May 1, May 2).

Pre-test

In addition to general demographic information, the pre-test sought to determine a) the agenda of issues held by subjects, and b) attitudes toward Ronald Reagan as measured by a 12-item semantic differential scale. Other information concerning interest in the election, political party affiliation, and current preference for the Republican nomination was included.

Post-test

After the broadcast of the speech, post-tests were administered to determine a) viewing behavior, b) reasons for watching or not watching, c) agenda of issues held by subjects, d) attitudes toward Reagan (as measured by a 12-item semantic differential scale), and e) recall of issues and positions supported by Reagan in the speech.

Sample

Final sample consisted of 89 subjects who were contacted in both the pre-test and post-test. (For sample

description, see Appendix D.) The remaining ten subjects could not be re-contacted in the post-test. After the post-test, subjects were divided into comparison groups on the basis of whether they watched or failed to watch the program. Final sample distribution was as follows:

Group I: 30 (watched program)

Group II: 59 (did not watch program)

Respondents were told at the beginning of the pre-test that they were being asked to participate in a political survey not sponsored by any particular candidate. Exact wording was as follows:

> Hello, I'm a student at the University of Oklahoma and I'm conducting a survey on the 1976 presidential election as part of class project. I am not affiliated with any political party or candidate, but I'd like to ask you a few questions about some of the candidates and issues.

Data-Gathering Instruments

A survey questionnaire to be conducted by telephone was prepared to collect measurable data on the variables to be studied (see Appendices A and B for exact wording of questionnaires). The questionnaire included:

1. A semantic differential to measure candidate image. The semantic differential used in this study is a 12-item, five point scale consisting of dichotomous adjective pairs (exact scales are in the appendix). The scale has been successfully used in actual political campaign situations to test candidate image (Russell, 1971; Hirsch, 1972;

Kaid and Hirsch, 1973; and Miller and Jackson, 1973). It was derived from a 29-item semantic differential administered to 626 subjects in a statewide sample in Texas in 1968. The scales measured the subjects' images of the ideal governor and images of the Democratic and Republican candidates for that office. Data were collapsed and factor analyzed. The 12 scales used in this study are the scales with the highest loadings.

2. Agenda of Issues. The agenda of issues was determined by the question "What do you think are the most important issues in the election?" This sort of open-ended question is the type used in most agenda-setting research and is described by McCombs (1972, 1975). Although some agenda-setting research has asked subjects to rank-order five or six issues, this method is chosen to avoid supplying the subject with an agenda he may not already have. Another approach, that of having the subjects select and rank five or six issues from a list of 20 or more issues is not pragmatic given the circumstance of the data collection, i.e., the telephone survey.

3. Reasons for watching and not watching were established by an adaptation of the scales used by Blumler and McQuail (1969) in their uses and gratification research (copy is in appendix). For each of several reasons suggested, the respondent is asked to determine whether that reason applies to him "a lot," "a little," or "not at all."

4. Recall of issues discussed by speaker. Subjects' recall of issues was determined by the question "What issues do you recall Reagan stressing in his speech?"

Data Analysis

The research hypotheses were tested as follows, with significance level set at .05 for all questions:

Hypothesis 1 (Change in attitude toward Reagan)--The twelve-item semantic differential was used to measure candidate evaluation before and after the message for both viewers and non-viewers. An overall mean for each subject was obtained by summing the ratings on each scale of the semantic differential. Mean scores for each group (viewers, non-viewers) on both pre-test and post-test were tabulated and compared using a t-test.

Hypothesis 2 (relationship of pre-tests attitudes toward Reagan to viewing behavior)--Mean ratings on the five point semantic differential were categorized "high" or "low" for all subjects according to whether their mean score was above or below the group mean. Viewers and non-viewers were compared at both levels by means of a chi square (x^2) for independence of variables.

Hypothesis 3 (frequency of Republicans versus Democrats who watched the broadcast)--Significance of frequency differences were determined by x^2.

Hypotheses 4, 5 (change of agenda of issues)--Aggregate agendas of issues for pre-test and post-test were

established by a frequency count of issues mentioned by viewers and non-viewers. Content analysis of the stimulus material was conducted to establish an agenda of issues for the Reagan speech, using the sentence as the unit of analysis. A panel of judges analyzed the material independently (using the sentence as the unit of analysis) by frequency of mention of each of six items established from the respondents' agendas. Intercoder reliability was computed at .88. Specific correlations were determined by the Spearman Rho test for association.

Hypotheses 6, 7 (relationship of reason for watching to stimulus effect)--Reasons for watching the Reagan broadcast were divided into two broad categories: (1) personality, or image reasons, and (2) issue, or informational reasons. The semantic differential scale used in the study was designed to tap candidate image, so it was used as the measure of respondent reactions to the candidate as a person. The mean score of the post-test semantic differential was computed for respondents who said they watched "a lot" for the purpose of "getting to know Reagan better as a person". A mean score on the same scale was computed for a group comprised of those who watched "to get to know Reagan better as a person" "a little" and "not at all." Mean scores were compared by means of a t-test. For the second category (issue reasons for watching, levels of application were compared to number of item recalled (0, 1, 2, 3 or more)

from the Reagan speech, using x^2. Distribution of cells was uneven, however, invalidating the x^2 analysis. Number of issues recalled was collapsed into two categories, 0, and one or more, and significance of difference was determined by Fisher's Exact Test.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

This chapter presents data collected in the study and statistical analysis of that data according to the methods described in the preceding chapter.

H_1: There will be a significant change in attitude toward the speaker as a result of exposure to the televised political commercial.

Results of the tests of H_1 are reported in Tables I and II.

Table I presents the comparison of candidate evaluation mean scores of viewers and non-viewers at both pre-test and post-test. Pre-test mean of viewers on the semantic differential scale was 3.84, and pre-test mean of non-viewers was 3.86. Post-test mean of viewers was 3.77, and post-test mean for non-viewers was 3.90. A correlated t-test showed that neither difference was statistically significant (alpha = .05).

TABLE I

Viewers Vs. Non-viewers

Comparison of Candidate Evaluation Mean Scores

	Mean	t-value	d.f.	Prob.
Pre-test				
Viewers	3.84	-0.13	51.94	.45
Non-viewers	3.86			
Post-test				
Viewers	3.77	-1.08	52.92	.14
Non-viewers	3.90			

Table II reports change in candidate evaluation mean scores from pre-test to post-test for both viewers and non-viewers. For viewers, the pre-test mean score on the semantic differential was 3.84. Post-test mean was 3.77. A t-test indicates the difference is not significant (alpha = .05). The non-viewer pre-test mean was 3.86, and the post-test mean was 3.90. Again, there is no significant difference. The results do not support Hypothesis 1.

TABLE II

Viewers Vs. Non-viewers

Change in Candidate Evaluation Mean Scores

	Mean	t-value	d.f.	Prob.
Viewers				
Pre-test	3.84	-0.85	29	.20
Post-test	3.77			
Non-viewers				
Pre-test	3.86	-0.78	58	.23
Post-test	3.90			

H_2: 'Respondents who are initially predisposed toward Reagan will be more likely to watch the broadcast than those respondents who are not predisposed toward Reagan."

Table III presents the number of viewers who rated Reagan "high" and the number rating him "low" on the semantic differential compared to the number of non-viewers rating him "high" and the number rating him low. (The "high" group consists of those respondents who rated Reagan above the mean of the entire sample; the low group includes those who rated him below the sample mean.) Of those who rated Reagan high on the pre-test semantic differential, 34 did not watch and 16 did watch the program. Of those respondents who rated Reagan low on the pre-test scale, 25 did not watch the program and 14 did watch.

The relationship between the evaluation of the candidate and subsequent viewing behavior does not reach significance level ($x^2 = 0.02559$). Thus H_2 is not supported.

TABLE III

Effect of Prior Evaluation on Exposure

	High Evaluation (Above 3.86)	Low Evaluation (Below 3.86)
Did Not Watch Program	34	25
	57.6%	42.4%
	68.0%	64.1%
Did Watch Program	16	14
	53.3%	46.7%
	32.0%	35.9%

$x^2 = 0.02559$ d.f. = 1 (n.s.d.)

H_3: A significantly greater number of Republicans than Democrats will watch the broadcast.

Table IV presents results of a complex chi square test for relationship between political party preference (Republican, Democrat, or Independent) and viewing behavior. Of 27 respondents who listed the Republican party as their preference, 10 watched the program, 17 did not. Of the 27 respondents preferring the Democrat party, 5 watched, 22 did not. A total of 35 respondents considered themselves Independent; 15 of these watched the program, 20 did not.

Findings are not statistically significant ($x^2 = 4.23277$). Successive simple chi square tests indicated that although Republicans were no more likely to view the program than were Democrats ($x^2 = 2.3$) or Independents ($x^2 = .2108$), Independents were significantly more likely to watch than Democrats ($x^2 = 4.1316$, $p<.05$). H_3 was not supported.

TABLE IV

Effect of Partisan Identification on Exposure

	Republican	Democrat	Independent
Did Not Watch Program	17 28.8% 63.0%	22 37.3% 81.5%	20 33.9% 57.1%
Did Watch Program	10 33.3% 37.0%	5 16.7% 18.5%	15 50.0% 42.9%

Chi square = 4.23277 d.f. = 2 (n.s.d.)

H_4: Exposure to a single televised political broadcast will result in a significant change in public issue agenda in the direction of the stimulus agenda.

H_5: The post-test agenda for viewers will be more closely correlated with the stimulus agenda than will be the post-test agenda for non-viewers."

Results of tests of these hypotheses are presented in Tables V and in Figures 1 and 2. Table V presents a correlation matrix of viewer, non-viewer, and stimulus agendas.

Relationships of the agendas are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.

TABLE V

Correlation Matrix of Viewer and Non-Viewer Agendas, Stimulus Agenda

Pre Viewer	Pre-Viewer	Pre-Nonviewer	Post-Viewer	Post-Nonviewer	Reagan
Pre-Viewer	--	+0.8800	+0.814286	+0.709523	-0.5286
Pre-Nonviewer	+0.8800	--	+0.9000*	+0.94285*	-0.25713
Post-Viewer	+0.814286	+0.9000*	--	+0.928572*	-0.0142
Post-Nonviewer	+0.709523	+0.94285*	+0.928572*	--	-0.0857
Reagan	-0.5286	-0.25713	-0.0142	-0.0857	--

*Indicates significance ($p < .05$) by Spearman Rho correlations.

FIGURE 1

Comparison of Viewer Agendas

Pre-test Agenda —— -0.5286 —— Reagan Agenda —— -0.0142 —— Post-test Agenda

+0.814286

Spearman rho correlations, n.s.

FIGURE 2

Comparison of Non-Viewer Agendas

Pre-test Agenda	-0.25713	Reagan Agenda	-0.0857	Post-test Agenda

+0.94285 ($p < .05$)

Spearman rho correlations.

The pre-test viewer agenda correlates with the post-test viewer agenda at +0.814286 by Spearman Rho test for association. The correlation is high, though not statistically significant, indicating some change as a result of the stimulus. When compared to the Reagan (or stimulus) agenda, the viewer pre-test agenda is correlated at -0.5286, and the viewer post-test agenda is correlated with the Reagan agenda at -0.0142. Neither correlation is significant, though the post-test is more similar to the Reagan agenda than is the pre-test.

The pre-test non-viewer agenda correlates significantly (+0.94285, $p < .05$) with the post-test non-viewer agenda, indicating no change of agenda from pre-test to post-test. The pre-test non-viewer agenda is correlated with the stimulus agenda at -0.25713 (n.s.) and the post-test agenda of non-viewers correlates with the stimulus agenda at -0.0857 (n.s.). Again the post-test is slightly

more similar to the stimulus agenda than is the pre-test even for non-viewers. The viewer group changed more from pre-test to post-test than the non-viewers, and the post-test is more closely correlated to the Reagan agenda than is the pre-test, though none of the correlations are significant. Results do not indicate support for either hypothesis at a significant level.

H_6: Respondents who watched the broadcast for "personality" reasons will evaluate the candidate significantly higher after viewing the program than will respondents who watched for other reasons.

Table VI presents the importance of "personality" reasons for watching to subsequent candidate evaluation. The post-test semantic differential mean score for respondends who watched "a lot" for the purpose of "getting to know Reagan better as a person" was 3.9861. The post-test semantic differential mean for respondents who watched "a little" or "not at all" for that reason was 3.7222. A t-test indicates the difference is significant ($p < .05$). Hypothesis 6 is supported.

TABLE VI

Importance of "Personality" reasons for Watching to Candidate Evaluation

	$\bar{X}$	t-value	df	1-Tail Probability
Group 1 (a lot)	3.9861	1.90	27.56	.0335
Group 2 (a little, not at all)	3.7222			

H_7: Respondents who watched to gain issue information will be able to recall significantly more issues than will respondents who watched for other reasons.

Table VII presents results indicating the importance of "issue" reasons for watching to number of issues recalled. Of respondents who watched "a lot" to find out more about the issues, only 1 person could recall no issues. However, 13 could recall 1 issue, 3 respondents recalled 2 issues, and 2 recalled 3 or more. Of the 11 respondents watching either "a little" or "not at all" for the issue reason, 4 recalled no issues, 7 respondents recalled 1 issue, and no respondents recalled 2 or more issues.

TABLE VII

Importance to Issue Recall if "Issue" Reason for Watching

	Relevance of "Issue" Reason for Watching	
	Group 1 (a lot)	Group 2 (a little, not at all)
Number of issues recalled from Reagan's speech.		
0	1	4
1	13	7
2	3	0
3 or more	2	0
Number of issues recalled from Reagan's speech (categories collapsed to increase cell size)		
0	1	4
1 or more	18	7

Fisher's Exact Test = $p < .04399$.

Due to the uneven distribution of cells, categories had to be collapsed to subject data to statistical analysis. Of respondents watching "a lot" for the issue reason, 1 could recall no issues, and 18 could recall 1 or more issues. Of those respondents watching "a little" or "not at all" for the issue reason, 4 could recall no issues, and 7 could recall 1 or more. A Fisher's Exact Test indicates significant difference ($p < .05$). Hypothesis 7 is thus supported.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

In this chapter, data pertaining to each of the three research areas outlined (direct effects, agenda-setting, and uses/gratifications) are discussed and combined implications for the proposed model are considered. Suggestions for future research are made and limitations are discussed.

Direct Effects

Attitude Change

Results of tests of the direct effects hypothesis indicate that exposure to the political message did not result in attitude change toward the speaker (see Tables I and II). Although the lack of significant difference in the pre-test mean scores of viewers and non-viewers is expected given a random sample, the absence of significant difference in the post-test means indicates failure to support the expectation that exposure to the political message would cause higher evaluation of the candidate than non-exposure.

Further lack of support for the direct effects hypothesis is evident in Table II. A non-significant t-test between the pre-test mean of viewers and post-test

mean of viewers indicates that viewers did not change in their evaluation of Reagan as a result of viewing the broadcast. As expected, there was no significant difference in the pre-test mean and post-test mean of non-viewers.

A comparison of viewer pre-test and post-test mean scores on the individual scales of the semantic differential is presented in Table VIII. Significant change ($p < .05$) is indicated in the sophisticated-unsophisticated scale, with viewers rating Reagan significantly more sophisticated after having seen his presentation (viewer pre-mean = 3.70, post-mean = 4.03). The mean score on the calm-excitable scale (pre-mean = 3.50; post-mean = 3.17) and the saver-spender scale (pre-mean = 3.60; post-mean = 3.17) changed considerably, though not significantly, in the opposite direction. Two of the three scales indicated (sophisticated-unsophisticated, calm-excitable) reflect personality or image concerns which were possibly affected by exposure. One scale, the saver-spender item, possibly reflects change in viewer concept of Reagan's position on a particular issue.

TABLE VIII

Comparisons of Semantic Differential Scales for Viewers

(n=30)

Scale	Pre-test Mean	Post-test Mean	t-value
Qualified	3.77	3.77	.00
Sophisticated	3.70	4.03	-1.84*
Honest	4.27	4.07	1.24
Serious	4.10	4.07	.19
Sincere	4.33	4.17	.90
Modern	2.87	2.73	1.07
Successful	4.10	4.37	-1.22
Handsome	3.83	3.83	.00
Friendly	4.37	4.33	.21
Conservative	3.73	3.60	.58
Calm	3.50	3.17	1.33
Saver	3.60	3.17	1.56

*Significant at .05.

Although the changes discussed are possibly due to exposure to the stimulus, results are questionable due to findings concerning non-viewer changes (see Table IX). Change in one item (sincere-insincere) among non-viewer evaluations was significant (pre-mean = 4.07; post-mean = 4.25; $p < .05$). Since this represents a change favorable to the candidate among respondents who did not hear him speak, some extraneous factors are likely to have influenced subjects' perceptions. The item analysis for non-viewers indicated change on two other items (modern-old fashioned, pre-mean = 3.53, post-mean = 3.37; saver-spender pre-mean =

3.58, post-mean = 3.41) although this change was not significant.

TABLE IX

Comparisons of Semantic Differential Scales for Non-viewers (n=59)

Scale	Pre-test Mean	Post-test Mean	t-value
Qualified	3.73	3.83	-1.06
Sophisticated	3.86	4.00	-0.93
Honest	3.95	4.08	-1.16
Serious	3.59	3.54	.39
Sincere	4.07	4.25	-1.90*
Modern	3.53	3.37	1.32
Successful	4.46	4.49	-0.38
Handsome	3.81	3.92	-1.10
Friendly	4.17	4.12	.42
Conservative	3.92	3.97	-0.38
Calm	3.71	3.85	-1.07
Saver	3.58	3.41	1.32

*Significant at .05.

Again, occurrence of these changes among non-viewers indicates other causal factors. The fact that the study was conducted during the week preceding the Texas primary suggests information from other media sources as a possible explanation. Support or non-support for this suggested explanation is not available from the data.

However, other variables which may have intervened can be examined. A point which should be considered in the explanation process is whether non-viewers were higher media consumers in general than viewers. To gain some indication of the relationship of general media use to viewing behavior, viewers and non-viewers were compared by number of hours per day they reported viewing television and by their primary source of information about the presidential election.

Results indicate that 60 per cent of those who watched the program reported watching more than three hours of television per day. Of non-viewers, 42.3 per cent watched 3 or more hours per day. Although a chi square test indicates no significant difference ($x^2 = 3.18792$), viewers of the Reagan speech generally watched more television per day than non-viewers. Thus these results do not contribute to an explanation of the slight change among non-viewers on the individual semantic differential scales, since non-viewers were not particularly heavy viewers of the television medium.

A comparison of viewers and non-viewers by primary source of election information indicates, however, that only 32.2 per cent of non-viewers received most of their election news from television. Another 52.5 per cent cited newspapers as their primary source of election information. By contrast, 50 per cent of viewers claimed television as their primary source of election and 40 per cent cited newspapers.

Thus, although it cannot be stated that either group (viewers vs. nonviewers) are heavier users of media in general than the other, it is evident that viewers were somewhat heavier users of television for election information, and non-viewers were somewhat heavier users of newspapers for that purpose. Findings are not statistically significant, however ($x^2 = 2.79944$).

Another possible variable to be considered is degree of interest in the election. If non-viewers were shown to be more interested in the election than viewers, it might be expected that information gained through that interest would result in change equivalent to that caused by the stimulus material. Results indicate that of viewers, 3 respondents (10%) reported "not much" interest in the election, 8 (26.7%) said they were "somewhat interested," and 19 (63.3%) said they were "very interested" in the election. Of non-viewers, 10 respondents (16.9%) were "not much" interested, 19 (32.2%) were "somewhat interested," and 30 (50.8%) were "very interested." Findings are not statistically significant ($x^2 = 1.42160$). There is very little difference between the two groups regarding interest in the election. Therefore difference in interest in the election did not affect attitude change.

In general, the tests of attitude change indicate no direct effects of the stimulus material. Although there is some change evident in both viewer and non-viewer groups

on the individual semantic differential items, these results do not seem to be due to differences among the groups on either amount of media use, primary media source, or interest in the election.

Selective Exposure

The results reported in Table III indicate no significant relationship between the evaluation of the candidate and subsequent viewing behavior. Respondents who rated Reagan high on the pre-test semantic differential were no more likely to watch the program than respondents whose initial evaluation of Reagan was low. Therefore, although there were no direct effects of the political message on attitude, the lack of effect was not produced by the selective exposure traditionally held at least partially responsible for the lack of media influence. A possible explanation is that the before-after measures employed in the study controlled the possibility of the "de facto" selectivity previously discussed (p. 14) and often reported in field studies. Thus, any selective exposure found would seem to indicate real preference for supportive information, and this is not indicated by the data.

A second possible explanation is that the stimulus used is a single political message rather than the series of messages or entire campaign communication often studied. Selective exposure has not been consistently found to be

operant in one-time political messages and is certainly not supported by the data in this study.

In addition, the concept of selective exposure according to partisan identification fails to be supported, as Table IV indicates. Although it was expected that respondents initially predisposed toward Reagan because of partisan affiliation would be more likely to watch the broadcast than those not so predisposed toward Reagan, an initial complex chi-square test showed no relationship between political party preference (Republican, Democrat, or Independent) and viewing behavior. Simple chi squares showed a slight distinction. Republicans were no more likely to view the program than were Democrats or Independents, so H_3 was not confirmed. However, Independents were significantly more likely to watch than Democrats. These data provide further confirmation for the absence of selective exposure.

If viewed in light of the selective exposure concept, one would expect Republicans to be most likely to view, then Independents, and Democrats the least likely. It traditionally has been reported that those most likely to expose themselves to political messages are those least likely to be affected because they have already taken a position. Traditionally, too, the converse is true: those who have not taken a position are those least likely to be exposed to a political message. The findings of this study indicate the opposite. Independents were significantly more

likely than Democrats to watch, and were more likely to watch than Republicans, though not significantly. In addition, Independents comprise a larger per cent of the sample than either Democrats or Republicans.

Therefore, although there were no direct effects of viewing on attitude change, this lack of change is not attributable to selective exposure, since neither predisposition toward the candidate nor political party (Republican, Democrat) affected viewing behavior. Thus, viewers did not seek stimuli which "maintained" or reinforced them.

Agenda-Setting

The agenda-setting paradigm was used in this study as a means of examining effects of political media exposure on a type of information gain. Viewers were expected to change the agenda of issues they believed to be important in the direction of the agenda of issues presented in the stimulus. Support of the agenda-setting hypothesis would have indicated some effects of media on either information gain, or more specifically, on salience of particular issues.

Results of statistical tests (presented in Table V and Figures 1 and 2) show a significant correlation between pre-test and post-test agendas for non-viewers, while the correlation between pre-test and post-test agendas for viewers is high but not significant. This indicates that there was some change in viewers' agenda as a result of exposure to the message, and almost no change for those

respondents who did not see the program. However, when the Spearman correlation is computed between the respondents' agendas and the agenda of the stimulus, only negative correlations occurred. The pre-test agenda of non-viewers correlates negatively with the Reagan agenda, and the post-test is slightly less negatively correlated. The pre-test agenda of viewers is negatively correlated with the Reagan agenda and the post-test agenda is less negatively correlated. The correlations are not significant, although the viewers' agenda changed more than the non-viewer agenda. Thus although the issue agendas for both viewers and non-viewers were very different from the agenda stressed by the Reagan speech, both groups moved somewhat in the direction of the Reagan agenda (see Figures 1 and 2). The non-viewer group changed only slightly (from -0.25714 to -0.0857) while the viewers changed moderately (from -0.5428 to -0.0142). The viewer change should be attributable to exposure to the stimulus material, while the slight non-viewer change may be due to a number of external factors (e.g., other media sources, interpersonal discussions, personal circumstances). While there is no statistically significant support for the agenda-setting hypotheses, the results are in the direction expected.

More of the relationships present can be observed by fitting the correlations into a cross-lag correlation diagram. Figure 3 shows that the effect seems to be

that viewers' agendas seemed to move in the direction of non-viewer agendas. The pre-test viewer agenda was correlated with the pre-test non-viewer agenda at +0.8800, and the post-test viewer agenda correlated with the post-test non-viewer agenda at +0.928572 ($p < .05$). However, since the non-viewer agenda was initially more closely correlated with the Reagan agenda (-0.25713) than was the viewer agenda (-0.5286), it is reasonable that the change is in that direction. The agendas of viewers and non-viewers at the final measure point were approximately the same in relation to the Reagan agenda (viewers, -0.0142; non-viewers, -0.0857), but the starting point was different. A possible interpretation of this is that agenda change occurred among information seekers (those who watched) although that change did not bring their agendas into close correlation with the stimulus agenda due to the extreme distance between the agendas at the first measuring point. An empirical test of this possibility is not feasible from the data, however.

FIGURE 3

Correlations of Viewer, Non-Viewer, and Reagan Agendas



*Indicates significance ($p < .05$) by Spearman rho correlations.

A particular problem in the research is that tests for rank-order data tend to be tests of association rather than tests of difference, or change. The findings would be considerably more important if one could test for significant difference among agenda correlations. A possible solution for further research would be the fitting of the correlations into a cross-lagged correlation, or some other form of time-order series.

Uses and Gratifications

Personality, or Image

From the uses and gratifications perspective, this study proposed that the effects of the media are dependent in part upon the use of the media by the consumer. Respondents who watched purposefully for personality reasons should respond to "image" impressions by the stimulus message. Those who watched for issues reasons would be more likely to be affected in the area of issue information gain.

The results of the uses and gratifications hypotheses can be better understood if placed in the perspective of overall reasons for viewing and not viewing. Table X presents reasons viewers watched the program. The reason "getting to know the candidate better as a person" was a major reason for watching for 20 per cent of the sample. Another 36.6 per cent said it was "not at all" a factor. "To get information on the issues in the campaign" was "a lot" the reason for viewing for 63.3 per cent of the viewers. Also, 30 per cent of the viewers claimed to have watched "a lot" for the purpose of getting assistance in making a voting decision.

By self-report, reinforcement was a strong motivation for watching the program, as 43.3 per cent stated that they watched "a lot" to remind themselves of their candidate's strong points. Also, 43.3 per cent watched "a lot" because the program "came on while they were watching

television," although 50 per cent of the viewers stated that this was "not at all" a reason they viewed the program.

TABLE X

Reasons for Watching the Program

	A Lot	A Little	Not at All
1. To get to know Reagan better as a person.	6 (20%)	13 (43.3%)	11 (36.6%)
2. To get more information on the issues in the campaign.	19 (63.3%)	6 (20%)	5 (16.6%)
3. To find out Reagan's qualifications.	10 (33.3%)	10 (33.3%)	10 (33.3%)
4. To help me decide who to vote for.	9 (30%)	8 (26.6%)	13 (43.3%)
5. To get ammunition to use in discussions of the election with others.	9 (30%)	3 (10%)	16 (53.3%)*
6. To enjoy the excitement of the presidential race.	3 (10%)	11 (36.6%)	10 (33.3%)
7. To remind me of my candidate's strong points	13 (43.3%)	9 (30%)	8 (26.6%)
8. It came on while I was watching tv.	13 (43.3%)	2 (6.6%)	15 (50%)

*Information is missing from the data in two cases on this particular item.

Table XI presents reasons of non-viewers for not watching the broadcast. Of the non-viewers, 42.3 per cent indicated that a very important ("a lot") reason for not watching the program was that they did not know the program was on. No other reasons for not watching were cited by more than 13.5 per cent of non-viewers as a major reason for their failure to view. Conflict with other television shows was "not at all" a reason for not watching for 64.4 per cent of non-viewers. Also 71.1 per cent indicated that although they did not watch the program, the reason was "not at all" that they had "already made up their minds." Over half of the non-viewers denied any influence ("not at all") of each of the other reasons listed (lack of interest in politics, 64%; lack of trust in what politicians say on television, 59.3%; and preference for relaxing while watching television, 69.4%).

TABLE XI

Reasons for Not Watching the Program

	A Lot	A Little	Not at All*
1. Because I didn't know it was on.	25 (42.3%)	9 (15.2%)	20 (33.8%)
2. Because the program conflicted with another show I was watching.	8 (13.5%)	8 (13.5%)	38 (64.4%)
3. Because my mind is already made up.	5 (8.4%)	7 (11.8%)	42 (71.1%)
4. Because I'm not much interested in politics.	7 (11.8%)	9 (15.2%)	38 (64.4%)
5. Because you can't always trust what politicians say on tv.	6 (10.1%)	13 (22%)	35 (59.3%)
6. Because I prefer to relax while watching tv.	4 (6.7%)	9 (15.2%)	41 (69.4%)

*Information is missing from the data in five cases on all items. Therefore, 8.4% of the non-viewing sample is not represented.

Hypotheses 6 and 7 attempt to test the relationship of two of these reasons for watching to message effect. Results shown in Table VI indicate that the semantic differential mean score of the group which watched "a lot" to "get to know Reagan better as a person" was significantly higher than the mean of the group watching "a little" and "not at all" for that reason. Thus those who watched

primarily for personality reasons were more positive toward the candidate after his message than were those who watched for other reasons. This supports the expectation that reasons for viewing relate to the effect of viewing.

There is a possibility, however, that the hypothesis is not the best (or at least only) operationalization of the concept of relationship of use to effect. One who watched for personality reasons might be affected by the personality cues given in the stimulus, but they may not necessarily be positive reactions. Therefore perhaps it should be hypothesized that the difference in candidate evaluation for "personality" viewers will be significantly higher or lower than candidate evaluation of respondents who watched for other reasons, or that the change in evaluation for the "personality" group should be greater than for the "other reasons" group. To test this, a comparison of change in candidate evaluation was made between respondents who watched the program "a lot" for the personality reason and respondents who watched "a little" or "not at all" for that reason. Mean difference on the semantic differential for the "a lot" group between pre-test and post-test was -0.1944, and mean difference for the "a little, not at all" group was -0.0417. Although findings were not statistically significant, both changes are in a negative direction. Thus the "personality" group did not change significantly more than the "other reasons" group, and the slight change was

not in favor of the speaker. This indicates that perhaps those who watched for personality reasons were already more positive toward Reagan than those who watched for other reasons.

Issue, or Information

Another test of the relationship of use to effect concerned whether respondents who watched to gain issue information would be able to recall more issues than respondents who watched for other reasons. To test this, the number of issues from the speech recalled by respondents who watched "a lot" to "learn more about the issues" was compared to the number of items recalled by respondents who watched either "a little" or "not at all" for that reason. The relationship between reasons of respondents for viewing and number of items recalled was significant ($p < .05$). Of respondents who watched "a lot" to find out more about the issues, only 1 person could recall no issues, compared with 4 respondents in the "a little, not at all" group recalling no issues. A total of 18 respondents in the "a lot" group recalled 1 or more issues, and 7 respondents in the "a little, not at all" group could recall 1 or more issues. The interesting comparison comes, however, in consideration of the number of issues recalled before the categories were collapsed. Of those watching "a little" or "not at all" for the issue reason, 4 recalled no issues, 7 recalled 1 issue, and no respondents recalled more than

1 issue. By contrast, of those respondents watching "a lot" for the issue reason, only 1 could recall no issues, 13 recalled 1 issue, 3 recalled 2 issues, and 2 recalled 3 or more. It is obvious, then, both by the statistical test for significance and by examination of the categories that those who watched "to learn more about the issues" recalled more issues than did respondents who did not watch for that reason.

Purposive versus Non-Purposive Viewing

In light of the relationships found in Hypotheses 6 and 7, it seemed advisable to explore other gratification measures more fully. In addition to the specific tests of the hypotheses, comparisons were made concerning the more general question of effects of purposive versus non-purposive viewing. Respondents who stated that a major (a lot) reason for viewing the Reagan broadcast was that "it came on while I was watching television" were designated non-purposive viewers (n=13), i.e., they did not specifically choose to watch. Respondents who stated that that reason was only "a little" or "not at all" responsible for their decision to view were designated "somewhat purposive" viewers (n=17). The two groups were compared according to number of issues recalled from the speech, post-mean candidate evaluation, and change in candidate evaluation.

Results of the test for issues recalled indicated that no one who watched non-purposefully could recall more

than one issue, and 23.1% could recall no issues at all. Of the "somewhat purposive" group, 29.4% recalled more than one issue, and 11.8% recalled none. Due to low n size, data could not be subjected to statistical tests for significance.

The post-mean of non-purposive viewers on the semantic differential was 3.7756, and the post-mean of "somewhat purposive" viewers was 3.7745. A t-test indicated no significant difference between the two. Mean difference between semantic differential pre-test and post-test for each group was also compared. For "non-purposive viewers, the mean difference, or change in candidate evaluation was 0.0321, and mean difference for "somewhat purposive viewers was -0.1520. A t-test showed findings are not significant.

An overview of findings of this study in the uses and gratification area indicates that the reasons of the viewer for watching seemed to intervene between message and the effect. Post-exposure candidate evaluation was significantly higher for subjects who watched "a lot" or "not at all" for that reason. In addition, subjects who watched "a lot" to learn more about the issues recalled considerably more issues than those who watched "a little" or "not at all" for those reasons, although the difference is not significant.

Combined Implications

In general, after examining the effects of media on image (image formation or attitude change) and issue

(information gain about the issues, change in salience of issues, i.e., agenda establishment or change), this study does not support the assumption of any substantial effect. There is more support for effects on issue information gain (as measured by the ability of the media to set the public's agenda in a one-time political message) than for attitude, or image change, although need for maintenance (selective exposure) is not responsible for the lack of effect.

The proposal of this study that use intervenes between stimulus and effect has some support and bears further investigation. In terms of the Stinchcombe model, "H" does seek information from "S" as a result of some need motivation. His reasons, or need for watching will influence the effect of the stimulus, functioning as an intervening variable between source and receiver. If a motivation for seeking the stimulus is need for maintenance, possibility of effect by "T" (unsought stimuli) is lessened. However, results here indicate that the need for maintenance, or reinforcement, was not an important reason for seeking the stimulus. By self-report, a large number of viewers (43.3%) watched the program to "remind them of their candidate's strong points," but the remaining 56.7 per cent of viewers said that such reasons affected them "a little" or "not at all." The measures of attitude change showed selective exposure not at all operant in the effects process, as politically, those who viewed the most were those who had no position to maintain.

Because of the lack of need for maintenance, and because 43.3 per cent of those who watched the program indicated that non-purposive viewing was "a lot" responsible for their viewing behavior, it is obvious that "T" or unsought stimuli do reach "H" and have potential for image effects (image formation, attitude change) and issues effects (information gain, agenda change). Therefore one cannot expect "reasons for seeking" stimuli to answer the entire question, since much of the stimuli received is unsought. However, this study indicates that there was a great deal of purposive viewing, and that when viewing was done for a particular reason, the effects tended to correspond with that reason for viewing.

An adapted model coming as a result of this study might suggest the following



A reason, or need, prompts H to seek a stimulus which will fulfill that need. The effects will correspond with the reasons for viewing, either positively or negatively. This study showed that desire for issue information was a primary

reason for viewing and analysis showed that those respondents watching "a lot" for this reason recalled more issues than those who watched "a little" or "not at all" for this reason. The overall measure of information gain, the agenda-setting hypotheses, indicated some positive effect, but not at a significant level.

A second reason for watching examined by this study is image, or personality reasons. When personality was "a lot" the reason for watching for viewers, candidate evaluation was significantly higher than for respondents who did not watch for that reason. Thus viewing for that reason produces some kind of "personality" effect. The overall test of attitude change in candidate evaluation as a result of the stimulus is not supported.

Reinforcement was not shown to be a primary reason for watching, as has been discussed previously.

When stimulus seeking behavior is high, possibilities for effect of unsought stimuli should be low. This study provides no real comparison of sought versus unsought stimulus, so only speculation can be made that high seeking behavior was responsible for the low attitude change and agenda change in the overall analysis.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

The schema outlined is merely suggested by the results presented here. Further study needs to be done to better operationalize the concepts and test the hypotheses.

Specifically, a larger sample size would provide more possibilities for analysis. The sample size here has produced a particular problem in the uses and gratifications section of this study, as some of the analysis intended could not be conducted. Information is therefore descriptive in one case.

This study used the McLeod and Becker revision of the University of Leeds gratifications measures, and this seems a questionable instrument in light of a post hoc factor analysis of the reasons for watching (see Table XII). A varimax rotated factor matrix shows three of the reasons for watching loading of Factor 1, which can be labeled a combined vote guidance and candidate personality factor. Reasons for watching which loaded high on Factor 1 are "to get to know Reagan better as a person" (0.68746), "to find out Reagan's qualifications" (0.84404), and "to help me decide who to vote for" (0.77083).

TABLE XII

Factor Analysis of Gratification Measures

	Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
1. To get to know Reagan better as a person.	0.68746*	0.12416	0.00031
2. To get more information on the issues in the campaign.	0.51403	0.71178*	0.00351
3. To find out Reagan's qualifications.	0.84404*	0.05648	0.11013
4. To help me decide who to vote for.	0.77083*	-0.05304	0.18178
5. To get ammunition to use in discussion of the election with others.	-0.08746	-0.10103	0.67983*
6. To enjoy the excitement of the presidential race.	0.35750	0.27627	0.50881*
7. To remind me of my candidate's strong points.	0.41493	0.16011	0.51591*
8. It came on while I was watching tv.	0.11307	-0.78112*	-0.05099

*Indicates those items which loaded highest on each factor.

A second factor included "to get more information on the issues in the campaign" (0.71178) and "it came on while I was watching television" (-0.78112). These two reasons for watching seem intuitively to be opposed to

each other, possibly at opposite extremes of some kind of "purposeful issue information factor." However, even though the factors are opposite in directionality, this interpretation is merely speculative, since negatively loadings are usually ignored in factor analysis. Also, the reasons "to get more information on the issues in the campaign" loaded on Factor 1 at 0.51403, so perhaps it actually falls somewhere between the two factors.

The third factor which emerged seems to reflect a kind of reinforcement. It included "to get ammunition to use in discussions of the election with others" (0.67983), "to enjoy the excitement of the presidential race" (0.50881), and "to remind me of my candidate's strong points" (0.51591).

The result of this kind of examination of the gratification measure suggests that perhaps there is not equal opportunity to measure all three factors. A particular discrepancy seems to exist between measurement of what this paper has called "issue" reasons and "image" reasons. Although the uses/gratification analysis in this study employed only the obvious issue and image reasons for watching ("to get to know Reagan better as a person" and "to get more information on the issues in the campaign"), one should be able to make the same predictions employing all issue measures and all image measures. According to the factor analysis described, there are three measures of image, but only one strong measure of issue reasons. The negatively

loaded reason "it came on while I was watching television" is difficult to interpret and cannot be considered a similar measure of issue. Some measures of gratification need to be developed which are less biased in the direction of image and which will give a more equal measure of reasons for watching.

In the overall analysis (direct effects on attitude and agenda change without the consideration of use as an intervening variable) a semantic differential was used to measure attitude change, and the agenda-setting paradigm was used to tap effects on issue or information gain. In the analysis involving reasons for media use, the semantic differential measuring candidate evaluation was compared to personality reasons for watching, but the measure of issue reasons for watching are compared to items recalled from the speech rather than to post-viewing agendas. A more consistent approach to this kind of analysis would be possible if individual agendas were available for study. This research employed aggregate agendas (frequency of mention of issues by respondents) as is generally done in agenda-setting research. To get these individual agendas, however, the respondents would have to either be able to list several issues (many respondents in this study could only name one or two issues) or would have to be allowed to rank issues given to them by the researcher. In this latter case, respondents may be credited with having an agenda they did

not already have, thus making results questionable. (This problem is discussed by Murdoch, 1975.) An ideal solution, that of having respondents select and rank five or six issues out of a list of 25 or 30 issues, is not feasible given the circumstances of this research, i.e., the telephone survey. Cooperation of respondents in a personal interview situation might eliminate this problem and provide more usable data than the methods presently being employed.

Contributions of the Study

The major findings of the study reported make several contributions to the area of mass communication research.

First, in spite of the possible qualifications outlined which have potential to mitigate the traditional "law of minimal effects" (dominance of television as a source of political information, contradiction of findings by experimental studies, evidence for effects on image formation and change, declining partisan commitment, questioning of the selective exposure concept, and evidence of effect from "spot" commercials) no direct major effect of the one-time political exposure on candidate evaluation was observed. However, other findings such as lack of selective exposure, some agenda-setting effects, and effects related to uses may indicate need to continue reconsideration of its general application.

Secondly, the research extends the body of knowledge concerning selective exposure in political situations,

finding that selective exposure was not operant either by general predisposition or by partisan commitment. Although short spot commercials are now being widely used to overcome the problem of selective exposure, and research reports that they are effective in doing so, this 25-minute program was not hampered by that phenomenon. Instead, more of a relationship existed between general media habits and likelihood of viewing than between predisposition and viewing behavior.

Thirdly, the research contributes to the body of knowledge surrounding the agenda-setting concept, particularly in the situation of a particular political event. Like the few former studies in the area, this study did not find significant correlation of post-test agenda of viewers with the stimulus agenda. However, quite a large change occurred between pre-test and post-test of viewers' agenda in the direction of the stimulus agenda, although significance of the change cannot be determined by procedures used here. Interpretation of the findings suggests some agenda-setting among information-seekers, a concept that needs to be operationalized and tested in light of the uses and gratification hypotheses proposed by this study.

Fourth, the study makes a contribution in its attempt of an empirical test of the relation of use to effect. At least for "issue" and "image" reasons for watching (as defined by this study), the hypotheses are supported.

The interpretations of the agenda-setting literature, added to these findings, suggest that function of the media for the consumer is an important variable in the effects process, a concept that has been neglected in empirical research to this point.

Finally, and possibly most important, this study is a first attempt to combine some important research perspectives, trying to establish a more total research paradigm. The study provides not only a theoretic rationale for the combination, but also tests for the major concerns of each theory within the same research project. Results indicate that a complementary approach is both workable and necessary for future research in mass communication.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

PRE-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE

1. First of all, I'd like to ask you where you get most of your information about the presidential election--from newspapers, radio, television, or other people? (mark only one)

_____newspapers _____radio _____television _____other people

2. About how many hours a day do you watch television?

less than 1 1-2 3-4 over 4

3. Generally how interested would you say you are in the presidential election?

very interested somewhat interested not much interested

4. What do you think are the most important issues in the presidential election?

5. Now, I'd like to ask you a few questions about your reactions to Ronald Reagan. I'd like for you to rate him on a few scales. First, in terms of qualified--do you feel that he is very qualified, somewhat qualified, neutral, somewhat unqualified, or very unqualified?

	1	2	3	4	5	
QUALIFIED:	___	___	___	___	___	:UNQUALIFIED
SOPHISTICATED:	___	___	___	___	___	:UNSOPHISTICATED
HONEST:	___	___	___	___	___	:DISHONEST
SERIOUS:	___	___	___	___	___	:HUMOROUS
SINCERE:	___	___	___	___	___	:INSINCERE
MODERN:	___	___	___	___	___	:OLD-FASHIONED
SUCCESSFUL:	___	___	___	___	___	:UNSUCCESSFUL
HANDSOME:	___	___	___	___	___	:UGLY
FRIENDLY:	___	___	___	___	___	:UNFRIENDLY
CONSERVATIVE:	___	___	___	___	___	:LIBERAL
CALM:	___	___	___	___	___	:EXCITABLE
SAVER:	___	___	___	___	___	:SPENDER

6. Finally, I'd like to ask you just a few questions about yourself:

Age:_____ Education (last grade completed)_____

Sex: Male Female

Political party: Republican Democrat Independent

Who is your current preference for the Republican Presidential nomination?

Gerald Ford Ronald Reagan

Would it be okay if I call you back in a few days to get some more of your opinions?

Yes No

APPENDIX B

POST-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE

1. First, what do you feel are the most important issues in the presidential election?

2. Did you happen to see Ronald Reagan's 25 minute broadcast at 8:00 last night (or Wednesday night)? yes no
(If yes, go to #3; If no, go to #4)

3. I'd like to read you a list of reasons other people have given for watching the Reagan broadcast. For each reason, would you tell me whether it applies to you a lot, a little, or not at all.

a lot	a little	not at all	
_____	_____	_____	1. To get to know Reagan better as a person.
_____	_____	_____	2. To get more information on the issues in the campaign.
_____	_____	_____	3. To find out Reagan's qualifications.
_____	_____	_____	4. To help me decide who to vote for.
_____	_____	_____	5. To get ammunition to use in discussion of the election with others.
_____	_____	_____	6. To enjoy the excitement of the presidential race.
_____	_____	_____	7. To remind me of my candidate's strong points.
_____	_____	_____	8. It came on while I was watching tv.

4. I'd like to read you a list of reasons other people have given for not watching the Reagan broadcast. For each reason, would you tell me whether it applies to you a lot, a little, or not at all.

a lot	a little	not at all	
_____	_____	_____	1. Because I didn't know it was on.
_____	_____	_____	2. Because the program conflicted with another show I was watching.
_____	_____	_____	3. Because my mind is already made up.
_____	_____	_____	4. Because I'm not much interested in politics.
_____	_____	_____	5. Because you can't always trust what politicians say on tv.
_____	_____	_____	6. Because I prefer to relax while watching tv.

5. Now, I'd like to ask you a few questions about your reactions to Ronald Reagan. I'd like for you to rate him on a few scales. First, in terms of qualified--do you feel that he is very qualified, somewhat qualified, neutral, somewhat unqualified, or very unqualified?

	1	2	3	4	5	
QUALIFIED:	___	___	___	___	___	:UNQUALIFIED
SOPHISTICATED:	___	___	___	___	___	:UNSOPHISTICATED
HONEST:	___	___	___	___	___	:DISHONEST
SERIOUS:	___	___	___	___	___	:HUMOROUS
SINCERE:	___	___	___	___	___	:INSINCERE
MODERN:	___	___	___	___	___	:OLD-FASHIONED
SUCCESSFUL:	___	___	___	___	___	:UNSUCCESSFUL
HANDSOME:	___	___	___	___	___	:UGLY
FRIENDLY:	___	___	___	___	___	:UNFRIENDLY
CONSERVATIVE:	___	___	___	___	___	:LIBERAL
CALM:	___	___	___	___	___	:EXCITABLE
SAVER:	___	___	___	___	___	:SPENDER

(If the respondent did not see the broadcast, go to Question 9. Otherwise, continue. . .)

6. After watching the Reagan broadcast, do you feel you are more likely than before to:

a.	contribute money to his campaign?	yes	no
b.	volunteer to work for him?	yes	no
c.	encourage others to support him?	yes	no
d.	vote for him yourself?	yes	no

7. What issues do you recall Reagan stressing in his broadcast speech?

8. What were his positions on these issues?

9. Who is your current preference for the Republican presidential nomination?

Gerald Ford Ronald Reagan

APPENDIX C

TEXT OF POLITICAL BROADCAST

Ronald Reagan

Candidates, officials of my own support organization and of the Republican Party, fellow Republicans, and I know there have to be a great many Democrats and Independents out there who are aspiring to a better life. Last week on television I listed some of the things, some of those disagreements that I had with those in power. Among them my belief that you cannot have a solid economic recovery that the administration says we're having when that so-called recovery is based on increasing the national debt at a faster rate than ever in our history. We aren't eliminating recession or unemployment on any lasting or permanent way. We're increasing the temperature of a very sick nation with deficit spending and we're trying to stop the fever by breaking the thermometer. The Prime Minister of England, the new one, a Socialist in that now almost entirely Socialist country, just recently said there can be no lasting improvement in your living standards until it can be achieved without going deeper and deeper into debt. That is a warning from someone who has been helping lead a nation down the same road that we have embarked on for too many years. Today this country is $95 billion deeper in debt than it was one year ago today, and it took this country 166 years to accumulate a total debt of $95 billion in the middle of

World War II. This is on top of a tax burden that is taking almost half of every dollar we earn. Forty-four cents is the tax collectors share and in your family budget how ever concerned you may be about inflation, this particular item goes up faster than any other cost and it amounts to more than you spend for food, shelter and clothing for your entire family all put together.

Now there has been an issue introduced in this campaign that there are no real differences between the two Republican candidates. There are differences, great differences. The inference was, however, that if you would accept that there were no differences then why not just say with the status quo. That's Latin for the less mess we're in. Well, I believe one of the first differences has to do with our different experiences in government. Mr. Ford has been a member of the Washington establishment for more than a quarter of a century. He was a congressman for that long, representing a single congressional district, then appointed Vice President by Richard Nixon and 19 months ago became President. I am not a part of the Washington establishment. I've spent most of my adult life in the private sector, but I have spent 8 years as governor of California. California if it were a nation would be the 7th ranking economic power in the world, but when I became Governor, California was on the verge of bankruptcy, insolvent and in just about the same condition as New York City is today, and the only difference between New York City and Washington, Washington

has a printing press. I told about this on the air and I won't go into the actual figures and details except to tell you that our state was spending $1.5 million a day more than it was taking in and that was only one of the many financial problems confronting us. Well, my faith was in the people. As I explained on the air I wasn't quite sure how I had become governor. I had never intended to seek public office and I thought of myself as being there temporarily to represent the people against the institution of government, and so I turned to the people for the answers to our problems. For those that I could appoint to high positions in government I sought those who did not want a career in government. I also turned to the people of California to the private sector where there was so much expertise and managerial skill and talent and I asked them to volunteer their efforts to serve in a plan that we had, and we outlined the plan. Enthusiastically more than 250 of them volunteered. They gave an average of 117 days a piece full time at no cost to the taxpayer, away from their jobs and their professions and their businesses. Organized into task forces based on their particular expertise they went into every area of state government and came back with more than 1,800 recommendations as to how modern business practices could be put to work to make government more responsive, more efficient and economical. We implemented more than 1,600 of their recommendations, and the result was that a little over a

year ago an incoming administration in California was the first in a quarter of a century to inherit a balanced budget, in addition a $500 million surplus, and during the 8 years we returned $5,761,000,000 to the people of California in the form of tax cuts and tax rebates.

I believe that what was done in California can be done at the national level, that the people of this country are just as willing to serve. One of the things that I have thought about and talked about right now was Social Security facing great problems, an imbalance actuarially of $2½ trillion. I have thought that a president of the United States could turn to the private sector, to the experts in pension and insurance and actuarial statistics, and appoint a citizens' task force while there is still time to put this program on a sound basis so that no American need live with the fear that they might not someday get their payments. Incidentally, when I'm about Social Security you know not too long ago in New Jersey on disability payments received a letter from Social Security telling him he was dead. He read it, he didn't believe it, so he went down to see them. There he was, talking to them. Would you believe it? They couldn't argue with the computer. They couldn't figure out a way to reinstate his payments, so they looked at the rule book and they finally found a regulation that helped him for awhile. They gave him $700 to pay for his funeral. But when Washington tries to do things that are the proper

privince of the people, that the people should be doing for themselves, Washington without fail is a colossal failure. So far all the Establishment can do when they fail is come up with another even more expensive failure on top of the first one. No program ever disappears. A government program once started is the nearest thing to Eternal Life that we'll ever see on this earth. Some examples: for 20 years they have been trying to build low-cost housing for the poor. To date their score of 3½ houses destroyed for every one built. I was in North Carolina recently and in Gaston county last winter the government gave them $21,000 to buy heating oil for the homes of the poor who couldn't keep their homes warm. Now they're trying to find out why $20,500 of that went for administrative salaries and expenses and only $500 would up buying oil for the poor. And they're also trying to find out of the 268 gallons they bought what happened to 128 of them because they can't find where they went nor who got them. In Chicago in Welfare they have just uncovered what has to be the world's record-holder. A woman on Welfare under 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers, collecting under all of them and her take is estimated at $150,000 a year tax free. Three years ago you and I were lined up at the gas stations to fill our tanks with gas--the Arab boycott was on. A half a million workers in this country lost their jobs because there wasn't fuel to keep the factories running. Project Independence was launched

with great fanfare in Washington. We were going to increase the domestic production of oil and natural gas so that never again would we be subject to blackmail of this kind. Then for three years the most irresponsible congress in the memory of anyone of us did nothing but talk. If we could have harnessed that hot air, we wouldn't have had to turn down the thermostats. Finally, with three years gone, they passed an energy bill which almost every person with any common sense believed the President would veto--indeed he said he would veto it--except that Zarb (his own appointee) helped draft it and then it was signed into law. It is a disaster. It never should have been signed. Drilling rigs, exploring for new oil, have closed down all over the country because there is no longer any incentive to develop domestic sources. A few weeks ago for the first time in our history we imported more than we produced. And we are producing less than we were three years ago when the embargo was slapped on us. What happens when there is another embargo now? The energy bill should be repealed and the government should get out of the way and let the free enterprise system produce .... (applause drowned it out).

I take no pleasure in saying this, but in a time of great trouble when we are threatened with economic disaster at home and aggression from abroad, we seem to have had in place of leadership vacillation and decisions that are based on election year expediency. In North Carolina, for

example, Mr. Ford said that he was against gun control, but in Washington his Attorney General pushes a 7-point gun control measure before the Congress. I have never believed that gun control is an answer to crime if it means making it impossible for the law abiding to get a gun while it does nothing to keep the criminals from getting them. So no one can say I am just against things I think we have a couple of laws in California that provided the answer to this. We have what I think are proper gun control laws. If someone is convicted of a crime and when he committed that crime he had a gun in his possession whether he used it or not add five to fifteen years to the prison sentence. And the second law says that no judge can find a man guilty if he was carrying a gun and turn him back out on the street on probation--he must serve a mandatory prison sentence.

We are hearing great talk now of economy in Washington. They're going to reduce the postal services--what services are left--and the post offices, they're going to be reduced in number. But Congress has just decided to increase our subsidy to the United Nations. We're going to add $44 billion to the $188 billion we are already paying. Now the payroll of the United Nations is 3/4 of the budget and the U.N. employees are drawing salaries that are 15% higher than our own government employees. Right now we are paying 1/4 of the total budget for the United Nations. Senator Dewey Bartlett of Oklahoma has proposed that we

reduce the 1/4 to only 15% over a five year period. His proposal hasn't been adopted, but I would suggest that Mr. Ford tell his new Ambassador to the United Nations to start negotiating with the officials of the U.N. on that basis.

Since 1973 Washington has been negotiating the give-away of the Panama Canal Zone. The military dictator, General Omar Torillos, who seized power with the overthrow of the duly elected government 8 years ago, has made this demand and apparently the only people or the only ones who aren't aware of the give-away that's being planned are the real owners of the Canal, the people of the United States. Now we are told that the negotiations are going to slow down and no decision will be made until after the elections. Well, the Panama Canal Zone is sovereign United States territory. It is every bit as much American soil as is the land the states were carved out of the Gadston Louisiana Purchases and as is the State of Alaska, and in my opinion what we should be saying to that tinhorn dictator is, "We bought it, we paid for it, if we built it it's ours, and we intend to keep it." I made a rather blunt statement a little while ago about political expediency. In one of the recent primaries Mr. Ford declared because I have been talking on this subject and demanding an answer to it flatly that he does not intend to give away the Panama Canal. Just today we learned that he has issued written instructions to the State Department to do just that. Congressman Gene Snyder

of Kentucky has released testimony given to the House Panama Canal Subcommittee by Ambassador Elsworth Bunker, the Chief Negotiator, on April 8. Although the testimony was originally secret Congressman Snyder obtained unanimous approval of the subcommittee to release his line of questioning of Bunker. The following excerpt of that record makes it quite clear just what Mr. Ford's intentions are about this sovereign United States territory. Ambassador Bunker said: "Mr. Congressman, we're proceeding to negotiate under guidelines established by the President, both by President Nixon and President Ford." Congressman Snyder says, "I do not think that is responsive to my question. I want to know what directive or directives the State Department has received from President Ford to do this." Ambassador Bunker says, "We have been directed to proceed with the negotiations on the basis of the guidelines." "To give it up, to give up the Canal Zone over a period of time?" And Bunker, "To give up the Canal Zone after a period of time, that is correct." "And the Canal over a longer period of time?" And Mr. Bunker said, "A longer period of time." Congressman Snyder said, "A longer period of time, and what are the directives? Are they written memorandums?" Bunker said, "The directives are in written memorandums." "Signed by the President?" "Signed by the President." "Under what date?" "Under varying and various dates." So the negotiations will be slowed down until after the election and then they will proceed to give away sovereign United States

territory. This leads to what I believe is the most important problem confronting us, our foreign policy and the basis of our national security.

Earlier this year Dr. Kissinger said there was no alternative to detente, as yet during these years of detente, a word that Mr. Ford no longer uses, that balance of power has been shifting in favor of the Soviet Union. The Soviets' annual investment in weapons runs from 50% greater than ours. The Secretary of the Army, Martin R. Hoffman, has told the Senate Armed Forces Committee recently, if we were to go to war tomorrow the army could equip only half of its 16 divisions. The Army Chief of Staff, General Fred Wien, has said to the House Armed Services Committee, "In the event of conflict our army deployments would be too little and too late." This is what I believe former Secretary Schlessenger was trying to tell us, that we're No. 2 in a world where it is fatal to be second best, and I believe that's why Dr. Schlessenger was fired. But the situation goes beyond just an imbalance in weaponry. The real issue is one that's all too typical of that little band of elite that sit on the shores of the Potomac. That is their inability to trust the people of this country. Dr. Kissinger has said that he does not believe the American people have the will or the stamina to keep this nation in No. 1 position. Well, I don't believe there is any problem with the lack of will on the part of the American people. I think

the problem is a lack of information of the problems confronting us because they haven't trusted us with knowing the truth. Now, I know that Mr. Ford has asked the Congress for more money for defense, and I am aware, as I said before, of the irresponsibility of the Congress. And I can understand his having faith in the Washington Establishment's ability to solve the problems because of his long association with that Establishment. I don't share that faith. I don't believe that those who have been associated with the build-up of the problems over a long period of time are necessarily the best qualified to solve those problems. We can no longer afford politics as usual with the preservation of the buddy system. Believe me, those who believe in their own omnipotence, big government makes small people, and what's needed today are big people making government small. Why should anyone fear our ability or the lack of will on the part of living Americans today? Americans of today have fought harder, paid a higher price for freedom, and done more to advance the dignity of man than any people who ever lived on this earth. We've known 4 wars in my own generation and a Great Depression that toppled governments and changed the national boundaries of countries. No self-anointed elite in the nation's capital need be fearful of our ability to hear the harsh, blunt truth about any problem. Mr. Ford expressed an idea that in support of his candidacy we should have a continuity of government in Washington. Do you

really want to continue what's been going on in Washington? I don't. I think it is time to turn a number of things that Washington has been doing back to states at local levels closer to the people. I think that we . . . (applause)

Based on our own experiences in California where we reformed and reduced Welfare by hundreds of thousands of recipients and saved billions of dollars for the taxpayers, I think Welfare should be back closer to the people in its management. Joe Doakes is drawing welfare and drinking beer and gambling down at the corner poolhall with his welfare check, his neighbors are paying the bill, if they have a little more voice in government, he would have to undergo a change in lifestyle.

We built the greatest public school system the world has ever seen, and we built it at the local levels. I think that education should be given back to the local school districts and to the parents and who knows, that might even result in God getting back into the classroom.

When I made my decision to seek our party's nomination, victory was the most important consideration, not victory for me in the nomination of the primary, victory for our party come next November. No Republican is going to win without getting the support of millions of Independents and Democrats. The problems confronting us cross party lines. Now in '72 we had that kind of support. Millions of people ignored party lines. I don't claim that they voted necessarily

for us. They voted against what they understood for the first time was the policy of the leadership of the Democratic party and they didn't want to follow that leadership. Well, this time I think we can give them something to vote for. They're still out there; they're still looking for a banner around which to rally. I believe the people of this country are hungry to feel once again a pride within themselves and in their government. I believe that they want to believe once more in the moral values upon which this nation was founded. So let's tell them that, yes, we're a party that has compassions. We'll take care of the needy, but we will give all those who are needy and ablebodied an opportunity to work at useful community projects in return for their welfare money. (?) Let us tell them that we intend to restore fiscal sanity by balancing the budget and ending the inflation which robs us of our earnings and mortgages the future of our children. Let's tell them that we believe that this nation will do whatever has to be done to be strong that no other nation will ever be tempted to break the peace and test that strength. And while we're at it let's tell them there was an immorality committed by this nation's government in recent years that will never be repeated. But if ever again we ask young Americans to fight and die for their country, it will be for a cause we intend to win.

Just yesterday morning I went over where they're opening the mail that had come in from the broadcast I

mentioned, and they handed me some letters to read, and they were very humbling and they were very touching. And one of those letters I think I'll share with you. He said, "I left Hungary in 1956, away from the brutal Bolshevik rape of that brave county. I saw Communism in action. I know what is in store for the world. I was shocked by the inaction of America and the Western world in 1956 and equally shocked at the total ignorance of decent and good Americans about the true face of Communism. Penniless 20 years ago, today I have a small business, have never been on welfare, never received a handout. I only work and use the opportunity this country gave me to choose my own course in life. I feel I have come close to the American dream, to be free, independent, and proud. I never stopped thanking God for giving me this change." This is what this election is all about--to restore and keep that American dream, to keep the kind of peace and freedom in our country. I mentioned victory a little while ago. If I did not believe in my heart that I offer our party the best chance of victory in next November, I would not be here asking for your vote and your support, and I do ask for your vote and your support.

APPENDIX D

DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE

A breakdown of the entire sample indicates that the mean age for respondents was 40.112, and mean education level is 13.4, or one and one-half years of college. A total of 28 males (31.5%) and 61 females (68.5%) comprised the sample although precautions were taken to make the interviews during evening hours to maximize the likelihood of getting an even distribution. Distribution by political party was close, with 27 Republicans (30.3%), 27 Democrats (30.3%) and 35 Independents (39.3%). Also, 38 (42.7%) respondents preferred Gerald Ford for the Republican nomination, 39 (43.8%) preferred Ronald Reagan, and 12 (13.5%) expressed no preference. By self-report interest in the election was high, with 49 (55.1%) respondents stating that they were "very interested" in the election. A total of 27 (30.3%) said they were "somewhat interested," and 13 (14.6%) reported "not much" interest in the election. Average hours of television viewing per day was 2.5. Data concerning the source of the respondents' information about the election indicates that 43 respondents (48.3%) got most of their information from newspaper. Television ranked second as a source, with 34 respondents (38.2% stating that they got most of their election information from television. Only 7 (7.9%) respondents named radio as their primary source, and 5 (5.6%) respondents named other people.