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ASPECTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN
THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST: 1947-1957, WITH
EMPHASIS ON UNITED STATES-EGYPTIAN RE-
LATIONS.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1964
Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

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1965

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

ASPECTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ARAB
MIDDLE EAST: 1947-1957, WITH EMPHASIS ON
UNITED STATES-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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Norman, Oklahoma

1964

ASPECTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ARAB
MIDDLE EAST: 1947-1957, WITH EMPHASIS ON
UNITED STATES-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my deepest gratitude and sincere appreciation to Professor Rufus G. Hall, Jr. for the interest, untiring patience, time, and guidance which he so willingly gave to the preparation of this dissertation. Also, I wish to thank my wife for helping me throughout this undertaking. Thanks are also extended to Dr. E. Taylor Parks, Chief Research Guidance and Review Division, Historical Office of the Department of State, Washington, D. C., the members of the dissertation committee, and Miss Opal Carr of the University of Oklahoma Library, for their assistance and cooperation in this undertaking.

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PREFACE

Since the end of the Second World War the Arab Middle East¹ has been one of the main areas of conflict between the United States and the Western allies on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. A major factor in this contest has been Soviet success and American failure in understanding Arab nationalism and attitudes.

American policies in the Arab Middle East seem to be inconsistent. During the period under study, the record shows that there has been wide divergences between particular U.S. policies on the one hand and U.S. objectives on the other. Failure to co-ordinate policy and objectives has been the result of American formulation of policy on ad hoc basis. This characteristic of U.S. -Arab policy has weakened American dealing with Arab nationalists like President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.

The emphasis that is placed on American-Egyptian relations is due to the political and strategic position of Egypt which has been and

¹ There is no common agreement on the precise geographical definition of the term Middle East. However, for the purpose of this study, the term Middle East is used to designate only the following countries: Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

continues to be a major factor in the defense and security of the region. Politically, Egypt has exerted and continues to exert considerable influence on the members of the League of the Arab States. Egyptian statesmen were instrumental in the creation of the Arab League on March 22, 1945, in Cairo. The Egyptian Government has been able to use the League as a vehicle in the service of Egypt's interests in the Arab Middle East and Arab North Africa. Strategically, Egypt as well as the other Arab countries provides a link between Europe, Asia, and Africa.

This study is an attempt to describe American-Arab relations since 1947, to analyze the underlying rationale behind American policies, and to emphasize American efforts to prevent Soviet intrusions in the Arab Middle East. However, American policy towards Egypt and the other Arab countries is handicapped by two factors: United States unequivocal support to the state of Israel and lack of unity and cooperation between the Western Big Three.

The manner in which United States Palestine policy affected its relations with Egypt can be seen in Egypt's refusal to adhere to the proposed Middle East Defense Organization with Britain, France, the United States, and Turkey; its adamant refusal to join the "northern tier" pact, now the defunct Baghdad Pact; and its advocacy of the policy of positive neutrality in the East-West conflict. A thorough examination is made of the conditions that led to the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms

deal. In this section an attempt is made to describe and analyze the courses of action available to the Eisenhower Administration.

Primary emphasis is placed upon American policy towards Egypt during the Suez debacle. A thorough examination is also made of America's attempt to reach a peaceful settlement of the Suez Canal dispute. Analysis of the rift between the United States and her traditional Western allies on the Suez question and the conditions that limited America's actions are carefully delineated.

Further, this study surveys the rationale and assumptions behind the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Arab reaction to the Doctrine in the light of their policy of non-alignment. The need for a new American Middle East policy is pointed out and additional comments are made relative to the weaknesses of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

This study endeavors to show that Egypt's interests and Egyptian attitudes are neither understood nor considered by the West with the seriousness which the political importance of the country demands. The resulting stress and strain in Egyptian-American, or Arab-American relations in general, were to be relaxed by the Eisenhower Doctrine. Unfortunately, the Doctrine was aimed at a situation which did not exist. The Doctrine has patently failed to force the Arabs into alliance, so that a revision of the American Middle East policy has become an urgent and evident necessity.

The nature of the subject under study creates certain difficulties with regard to the accessibility of vital materials. For instance, important information which might have contributed immeasurably to the analysis of American-Egyptian, or American-Arab relations was deleted from the

published United States committee hearings. It should be understood, therefore, that certain existing sources were not used, and thus qualifications may be made concerning some aspects of the conclusions.

Part of this research was done in the Library of Congress and the Historical Office of the Department of State, Washington, D.C. Use was made of the materials sent by the United Arab Republic Information Department in Cairo. Effort was made to use the Truman and Eisenhower Libraries and the National Archives and Records Service. Unfortunately, the records dealing with American-Egyptian or American-Arab relations during the period under study are not yet accessible to researchers.

In Washington, D.C., contact was made with Dr. E. Taylor Parks, Chief Research Guidance and Review Division, Historical Office. An interview was also conducted with some official members of the United Arab Republic Embassy in Washington, D.C.

It should be noted at this juncture that part of the records is kept secret for security reasons and thus a comprehensive study and analysis of American-Egyptian or American-Arab relations remains all but incomplete. However, the available documents and materials are indeed instructive.

This work initially follows the historical approach with emphasis upon critical analysis of American-Egyptian diplomatic relations in particular and American-Arab relations in general.

ASPECTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ARAB
MIDDLE EAST: 1947-1957, WITH EMPHASIS ON
UNITED STATES-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Development of United States Policy
in the Arab Middle East

Prior to and immediately following World War II, the United States occupied a unique position in the Arab Middle East. Her prestige and influence were high. The peoples of the area realized that the United States had no territorial interests and had no vested political rights in the region. Friendship and good will towards the United States developed among the peoples of the region, mainly as a result of a century of U. S. missionary, educational, and philanthropic efforts. The position that the United States occupied was, to be sure, shared by none of the other members of the United Nations.¹ As Harvey P. Hall succinctly remarked:

¹Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 1499. Used by permission of the publisher.

It was our philanthropic activity that continued to spell America to the peoples of the Middle East. And there is no doubt that many Americans thought about the Middle East - if we thought about it all - in terms of philanthropic ventures. Whatever the advantages of this concentration on social and cultural welfare, it left us mentally and morally unprepared for the responsibilities that World War II has thrust so rudely upon us.²

Professor Nadav Safran maintained that until President Woodrow Wilson's brief excursion into international politics during World War I and following it, United States activities in the Middle East region were confined to educational, missionary, and philanthropic endeavors which were carried out by U.S. citizens in that area of the world. The activities of the U.S. Government in connection with these nonpolitical interests benefited both the Arabs and the Jews.³

In 1919, President Woodrow Wilson made his unequivocal support of the Balfour Declaration known to the British Government. President Wilson stated his approval of the Balfour Declaration in the following terms:

I am, moreover, persuaded that the Allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our Government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth.⁴

However, due to the failure of Wilson's internationalism plus the return to the policy of isolationism, the U.S. Government became disinterested

²Harvey P. Hall, "American Interests in the Middle East," Headline Series, No. 72 (November-December, 1948), 14.

³Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 36.

⁴Carl Hermann Voss, The Palestine Problem Today: Israel and Its Neighbors (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953), p. 11.

in the political destiny of Palestine and the Middle East and once more directed its efforts to the help of private American citizens in the area. It should be noted at this juncture that these interests began to include economic interests of great importance. Early in 1920 American oil companies appealed to their government to obtain an "Open Door" policy in the Middle East. Acting upon this appeal the U. S. Government obtained for several American concerns a 23.75 per cent interest in Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC).⁵ Also, concessions were gained from Saudi Arabia in the 1930's. In 1924 the Anglo-American Mandate Treaty was concluded. According to this Treaty the United States recognized British mandateship over Palestine as entrusted to the latter by the League of Nations. This treaty provided for equal treatment in commercial matters; protection of U.S. property rights; grant of authority to Americans to build and maintain religious, educational, and philanthropic institutions in Palestine; and equal treatment with other foreign nationals.⁶

In the interwar period, America's foreign policy towards Egypt and other Arab countries seemed to be based upon support of the Arab national movement and Arab struggle for independence. America's sympathy with the objectives of the Arab leaders was ostensibly expressed

⁵Safran, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

⁶Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, and Agreements between The United States of America and Other Powers; 1923-1937, 75th Congress, Third Session, Senate, Document No. 134, Vol. IV, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 4227-4234.

by President Wilson by stating in the twelfth of his Fourteen Points that:

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.⁷

Similarly, the attitude of the State Department towards Arab aspiration

for unity and independence was expressed on October 26, 1943, as follows:

This Government desires to see the independent countries of the Near East retain their freedom and strengthen their economic and social condition, and fully sympathizes with the aspirations of other Near Eastern countries for complete liberty.

If the peoples of the Near East should find it advantageous to unite of their own free will, it naturally follows from this Government's basic attitude that such a development would be viewed with sympathy, always on the understanding that it should take place in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and in harmony with the declarations of Secretary Hull, notably those of July 23, 1942, and September 12, 1943.⁸

America's interest in and sympathy with Arab aspirations and freedom was parallel to its interest in the question of the Jewish National Home in Palestine.⁹ American sympathy coupled with continuous Zionist

⁷Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, Third Edition (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950), p. 626.

⁸Hull, op. cit., pp. 1546-1547.

⁹Taking cognizance of the barbaric Nazi persecution of European Jews, Representatives James A. Wright, of Pennsylvania, and Ranulf Compton, of Connecticut, introduced on January 27, 1944, Resolutions 418 and 419 which called for U.S. support to the establishment of "a free and democratic" Jewish commonwealth and the use of U.S. good offices to have the doors of Palestine opened for unrestricted entry of Jews. These resolutions were not passed by the House. United States House of Representatives, Report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 78th Congress, Second Session, Report No. 1997, "The Jewish National Home in Palestine," p. 1.

agitation in the United States brought notes of protests from various Arab centers. The Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri el Said Pasha, protested to the United States Minister at Baghdad about "the pro-Zionist statements emanating from the United States." Similar protest was made by the Egyptian Minister Mahoud Hassan Bey. Mr. Hassan Bey expressed his Government's reaction pointing out 'the deplorable effect on the Arab and Mohammedan world' of the continuous U.S. Zionist activities and to their probable impact upon Allied war efforts.¹⁰

Active United States support of a Jewish state, however, aroused Arab hostility and suspicions. This hospitality was openly expressed from Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, and other Arab capitals. Here the United States found itself faced with two different claims and aspirations. The magnitude of this difficult position was best described by Secretary Cordell Hull in the following terms.

FEW PROBLEMS of a more delicate nature faced us during the war than the question of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. On the one hand we had the burning aspirations of a great percentage of the Jews to establish a state for their people in Palestine, coupled with the fact that the barbaric Nazi persecution was forcing the Jews to flee the charnel house of Central Europe. On the other hand we had the fierce opposition of the Arabs to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, plus the fact that the decision in the case was the function of the British Government, not ours. We were constantly being pressed for action by the nearly five million Jews in the United States, while at the same time our representatives in the Near Eastern Arab countries, plus our own military officials here, were informing us of the

¹⁰Hull, op. cit., pp. 1531-1532.

danger of antagonizing the sixty million Arabs there at a moment when their help in a strategic area of the war was so vital.¹¹

Prelude to The Partition of Palestine

One of the immediate and far-reaching results of the Second World War was the emergence of the Arab countries and especially Egypt as a center of great powers struggle. Inter-Arab conflict and Arab-Israeli mutual hostility rendered American efforts to create a peaceful atmosphere in the Middle East very difficult. Constant turmoil, unrest, suspicion, and manifold controversies characterized the relationships among the nations of the area and the great powers.

Since the end of the Second World War, to be sure, the United States, as the leader of the Western camp, inherited new responsibilities in the region and hence was impelled to formulate and implement policies towards a region which was traditionally considered within the British sphere of influence. The rise of the United States as a leader of the free nations in the West suddenly thrust upon it new responsibilities. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, alluded to this drastic change in unmistakable terms:

Our own emergence as a leader in the free world, and the inherent responsibilities thereof, coupled with the fact that we see for the first time a continuing and grave threat to our security, make it inevitable that we should attempt to be a factor leading toward progress and stability across the entire Middle East. This is a trend of historical significance which has an important bearing

¹¹Ibid., p. 1528.

upon our approach to, and concern over, each of the factors of instability in the Middle East.¹²

In an address delivered on April 9, 1954, before the Dayton World Affairs Council, Dayton, Ohio, Mr. Byroade remarked:

We have reluctantly inherited a position where every action or lack of action, every word spoken or left unsaid, is of significance to one or all of these nations, and it has become necessary to weigh carefully the effect in one part of the world of an attempted action in another.¹³

During and immediately following the Second World War strong Zionist pressure was brought to bear upon Congress and the White House. American policy began to reflect a deep interest in and sympathy for the Zionist aims. This interest and sympathy were manifested in American diplomatic pressures upon Britain to open the doors of Palestine for free entry of European Jews.

On August 31, 1945, President Harry S. Truman appealed to Britain's Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, to permit one-hundred-thousand of Europe's persecuted Jews into Palestine. President Truman expressed United States attitude towards Europe's persecuted Jews as follows:

It was my attitude that America could not stand by while the victims of Hitler's racial madness were denied the opportunities to build new lives. Neither,

¹²Henry A. Byroade, "Facing Realities in the Arab-Israeli Dispute," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXX, No. 776, Publication 5454, (May 10, 1954), 709.

¹³Henry A. Byroade, "The Middle East in New Perspective," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXX, No. 774, Publication 5437 (April 26, 1954), 633.

however, did I want to see a political structure imposed on the Near East that would result in conflict. My basic approach was that the long-range fate of Palestine was the kind of problem we had the U.N. for. For the immediate future, however, some aid was needed for the Jews in Europe to find a place to live in decency.¹⁴

On October 19, 1945, the British Prime Minister presented a proposal which called for the creation of a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. The British proposal indicated that the British Government viewed with importance 'that Jews should be enabled to play an active part in building up the life of the countries from which they came' together with other national groups of these countries. Furthermore, the proposal called for the immediate creation of a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to examine the situation of the Jews in Europe and to consider all possible means of help to alleviate their position. It suggested that the joint committee would be empowered to make a careful examination on the spot of the economic, political, and agricultural conditions which were believed to have restricted free entry into Palestine.¹⁵

On December 10, 1945, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine was created. It started its public hearings in Washington early in January, 1946. Investigations were held in various countries in Europe and in the Near East. Following exhaustive deliberation the

¹⁴Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), p. 140.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 141-142.

committee unanimously recommended the immediate admission of one-hundred-thousand Jews into Palestine. As for the Palestine question, the committee suggested the following principles:

- I. That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine.
- II. That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state.
- III. That the form of government ultimately to be established shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and the Moslem and Jewish faiths.¹⁶

On receiving the committee's report, President Truman asked Prime Minister Atlee to speed up the implementation of the recommendations embodied in the report. However, the British reaction to the report was not encouraging. Also, the use of force to carry out the recommendations of the Inquiry Committee was ruled out on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the use of force would tend to jeopardize Western interests in the area.¹⁷

Failing to reach modus vivendi between the Arabs and Jews, Britain decided to refer the Palestine problem to the United Nations. Thus, on May 15, 1947, the U.N. began its study of the Palestine problem by appointing a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). After a preliminary study, the committee unanimously advocated the termination of the British mandate in Palestine. The majority of the

¹⁶Ibid., p. 145.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 148-149.

committee, however, recommended the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states linked together by an economic union and the internationalization of the City of Jerusalem.¹⁸

The stage, be it noted, was set for the partition debate in the General Assembly of the United Nations, with the United States supporting partition. In spite of strong Arab opposition and protestations, the General Assembly by two-thirds voted to recommend the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states.

The Aftermath of the Partition of Palestine

Following the November 29, 1947, decision to partition Palestine, the Arab states were determined to deter the implementation of the General Assembly's partition recommendation by the use of force if necessary. By March 1948, the Arab-Israeli conflict reached new proportions and hence the United States viewed the partition plan as unworkable, and proposed that the United Nations establish a trusteeship over Palestine. Thus, on March 19, 1948, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Warren Austin, announced to the U.N. Security Council that his Government would favor U.N. trusteeship for Palestine.

. . . my Government believes that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations to maintain the peace and to afford the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, who must live together, further opportunity to reach an agreement regarding the future government of that country. Such

¹⁸Ibid., p. 154.

a United Nations trusteeship would, of course, be without prejudice to the character of the eventual political settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay. In our opinion, the Security Council should recommend the establishment of such a trusteeship to the General Assembly and to the Mandatory Power. This would require an immediate special session of the General Assembly, which the Security Council might call under the terms of the Charter. Pending the convening of the special session of the General Assembly, we believe that the Security Council should instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed partition plan.¹⁹

The trusteeship proposal failed to satisfy the parties concerned except the United States. The Arab leaders were adamant in their demand for the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine. The Zionist on the other hand rejected the proposal and called it a major retreat from the partition plan which was voted on November 29, 1947.

The reaction of the Jewish Agency for Palestine was expressed by the late Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver as follows:

Up to the last few days, the spokesman for the United States delegation has told the Security Council that the United States Government firmly stands by partition. Both the President of the United States and the Secretary of State have repeatedly within recent weeks maintained that the position of the United States on partition remained unaltered. We are at an utter loss to understand the reason for this amazing reversal which will bring confusion, is likely to lead to increased violence in Palestine and will incalculably hurt the prestige and authority of the United Nations, for the effectiveness of which the President of the United States pleaded again as recently as Wednesday last.²⁰

¹⁹United Nations, Security Council Official Records, Third Year, 271st meeting, March 19, 1948, p. 167.

²⁰Ibid., p. 169.

This apparent change in America's Palestine policy was dictated by several factors. On the one hand there was the British unsympathetic attitude towards the partition plan and refusal to effectuate it. On the other, there was the strong Arab opposition to the partition. And finally, there was the disinclination of the War and State Department officials to commit American forces in the Middle East. President Truman alluded to the advice of the War and State Department officials in the following:

In the Palestine situation the military kept talking about two things: our inability to send troops to Palestine if trouble should break out there and, secondly, the oil resources of the Middle East. Secretary Forrestal spoke to me repeatedly about the danger that hostile Arabs might deny us access to the petroleum treasures of their countries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on several occasions, submitted memoranda to show that we could not afford to send more than a token force to the area.²¹

While the United Nations was debating the trusteeship proposal, Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948. President Truman immediately extended de facto recognition to the new born state. Thus, the trusteeship proposal of March 19, 1948, became a dead issue.

The United States, to be sure, sought to promote stability and peace between nations of the region within and without the United Nations. It sought a durable peace between the Arab states and Israel. To achieve this end, it looked with favor upon the United Nations mediation and resolution of May 14, 1948, which called for the appointment of U.N. mediator. Likewise, the United States gave its unequivocal support to

²¹Truman, op. cit., p. 162.

the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, which called for the creation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Furthermore, the United States showed interest in the promotion of the armistice agreements between the Arab states and Israel. Thus, under the leadership and direction of Dr. Ralph Bunche, armistice agreements were concluded in 1949 between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria on the other. The United States, since 1949, has given its support to the implementation of these armistice agreements.²²

The Palestine Problem and American-Egyptian Relations

In spite of the United States economic and technical assistance to certain Arab states and efforts to reach Arab-Israeli rapprochement, the U.S. recognition of the Jewish State left bitter feelings among the defeated Arab states and peoples. These bitter feelings and suspicion have yet to be dissipated.

Egypt's involvement in the Palestine war of 1948 and the problems that emerged therefrom have to a considerable degree affected its relations with the United States. The Palestine issue, to be sure, produced frustration and a state of distrust and suspicion between the two nations. Furthermore, the shameful humiliation of the Egyptian Army in the Palestine war uncovered Egypt's weakness and disclosed the corruption,

²²Harry N. Howard, "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951; A Historical Note: Part II," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXV, No. 648, Publication 4416, (November 26, 1951), 839.

treason, and bribery among high Egyptian officials. This, be it noted, led in part to the July 23, 1952 Revolution. Also, the Palestine war brought the Suez Canal into the international scene. Egypt, as a party in the Arab-Israeli conflict, interrupted Israeli shipping through the Canal. United States support to Israel, in principle at least, made it the prime target of Egyptian criticism and vehement attacks. Likewise, United States pro-Israeli policy, as Egyptian leaders believed, tended to drive Egypt towards the East at a time when the United States, Britain, and France were soliciting Arab support, especially Egypt's as the recognized leader of the Arab states, to organize a defensive perimeter against possible Soviet aggression in the Middle East. United States support to Israel seemed to have impelled the Egyptian Government to follow a neutralist policy in the East-West struggle for power. This course of action was indeed shown when Egypt declared its neutrality in the Korean conflict. United States involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has a direct bearing upon the security of the free world, forced it to proceed under a major obstacle in building up a security system in the Middle East.

American-Egyptian relations had been frequently less than cordial. The Egyptian Government had become increasingly aware of the fact that without United States support to the November Resolution of 1947 the present state of affairs might not have existed. The Egyptian Government, as well as the other members of the Arab League, made no secret of their opposition to the United Nations partition plan which was supported by the United States.

America's deep involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict brought about stress and strain in American-Arab relations. In an address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on December 5, 1952, Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs stated:

The people of the Arab States have cried out against this policy of the United States. The birth of the tragic Arab-refugee problem out of the Palestine conflict has added to the real and deep-seated bitterness toward Americans throughout the Arab world, a bitterness which replaced, to some extent at least, an earlier faith in the United States. The emotions which surround this problem in the Middle East are so tense that any immediate or dramatic solution of the problem is impossible. Even progress toward solution of any segment of the problem is at best exceedingly difficult.²³

It seems all the more clear that as long as the Palestine issue remains unsettled some Arab leaders will certainly use it to seek popularity by alleging that Israel is the vehicle of American and British imperialism. The defeat in Palestine can largely be blamed on weak and corrupt regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and other Arab states that participated in the 1948 Palestine war.

²³Henry A. Byroade, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXVII, No. 703, Publication 4820 (December 15, 1952), 932.

CHAPTER II

MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

The Four-Power Proposals

In the immediate post World War II period, the Middle East was still considered as primarily within the British sphere of influence. However, due to an enfeebled British economy, internal instability in the Middle Eastern area, a possible Soviet threat, and the Arab-Israeli problem, the onus of solving these intricate problems developed primarily upon the United States. American effort to solve some of these problems was manifested in the Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947, which pledged unequivocal American support to all nations resisting subjugation by outside pressures. Likewise, American policymakers attempted to solve some of these problems by extending economic and technical assistance to Middle Eastern countries under the so-called Point Four or Technical Assistance Program. To be sure, a major American effort to ward off Soviet intrusion into the Mid-East climaxed in 1952 when Greece and Turkey became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

American policy appeared to be firmly disposed toward continued economic assistance and military build up of the Middle East. Hence, Anglo-American cooperation in solving the perennial problems of the region seemed to be all the more desirable. It was hoped that British experience coupled with abundant American resources would be directed towards Middle Eastern development and defense.

It should be noted at this juncture that while American and British interests in the Middle East appeared to be basically much alike, the fact remains that a few divergences have occurred in the methods of pursuing such interests. While Britain was prone to favor the status quo, the United States appeared to support economic and political self-determination. This considerable divergence, to be sure, drove a wedge in Anglo-American solidarity vis-a-vis their policies towards the Middle East.

When the Wafd party came to power early in 1950, it never hesitated to provoke nationalistic fervor against alleged British menace to Egypt's sovereignty. In what seemed to be a desperate gamble, Prime Minister Mustafa Nahas Pasha presented to the Egyptian Parliament on October 8, 1951, a series of bills abrogating the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Sudan Condominium Agreement of 1899.¹

¹The full text of these bills may be found in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1951, selected and edited by Denise Folliot (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 464-466.

The decision of the Egyptian Prime Minister was hailed by students and workers who demonstrated in Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said. The motto of the demonstrators was 'Down with Britain!' and at times, 'Down with America!'²

The decision to terminate Egypt's obligations under the 1936 and 1899 Agreements was received with great satisfaction by the Egyptian people. To be sure, psychologically and politically the decision became all the more imperative. Observers believed that the development of events in Iran and the quiet withdrawal of Britain from Abadan made the Nahas decision all but necessary. Similarly, Egypt's action was approved by the Council of the Arab League. The Egyptians seemed to believe that they had advanced another step towards achieving their national aspirations.³

On October 10, 1951, the Egyptian Parliament unanimously approved the Nahas decision to abrogate the 1936 Treaty and the Condominium Agreement of 1899. Egypt's action to the contrary notwithstanding, the British Foreign Office made it all the more clear that Britain was unwilling to part with her treaty rights until a 'satisfactory agreement' was reached with the Egyptian Government. The British Foreign Office, to be sure, based its hopes upon United States support

²New York Times, October 10, 1951, p. 8.

³Ibid.

for a new offer which envisaged Egypt as an equal participant with Britain, France, Turkey and the United States in a Middle East Command.⁴

The United States gave its unequivocal diplomatic support to Britain vis-a-vis her position in Egypt. The underlying reason behind United States support was not hard to find. Washington was reluctant to see British troops evacuate the Suez Canal, the bastion of Western defense structure in the region.

On October 10, 1951, United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, stated that neither the 1936 Treaty nor the 1899 Agreement provides for unilateral abrogation. Mr. Acheson expressed the hope that the Anglo-Egyptian dispute could be solved through the four-power proposals which were to be submitted to Egypt on October 13, 1951. The Secretary of State hoped that a solution could be had whereby not only the interests of the parties concerned might be served but also might contribute to the defense of the free world.⁵

When Secretary Acheson expressed hope that Egypt reconsider her action, he added:

The U.S. Government must reaffirm its belief that the action of the Egyptian Government with respect to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the agreements of 1899 regarding the Sudan is not in accord with proper

⁴Ibid., p. 1.

⁵"Egypt Invited to Participate in a New Middle East Command; Statement by Secretary Acheson," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXV, No. 643, Publication 4393 (October 22, 1951), 647. See also New York Times, October 11, 1951, p. 1.

respect for international obligations. For its part, the U.S. Government considers the action of the Egyptian Government to be without validity.⁶

In undertaking the establishment of strong defense bases and stability in the Middle East, a measure of Anglo-American cooperation and understanding became all the more imperative. Thus, in the face of ever increasing Soviet threat to the Middle East, the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, by Britain, France, and the United States on the inviolability of frontiers, came into force. Furthermore, the four-power proposals by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey were submitted to Egypt on October 13, 1951.⁷ It was hoped that the contemplated four-power proposals would create a Middle East Defense Command which might enable the United Kingdom to solve her dispute with the Egyptian Government in regards to the Suez Canal Zone and the Sudan problem.⁸

⁶U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy: 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 2183.

⁷The full text of the four-power proposals may be found in Appendix A.

⁸"Article 8 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 had authorized the maintenance of a limited number of British troops in the Suez Canal Zone 'until such time as the . . . Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure, by its own resources, the liberty and entire security of navigation of the canal'. Article II continued the administration of the Sudan under the condominium agreement of 1899, both parties agreeing that 'the primary aim of their administration in the Sudan must be the welfare of the Sudanese'. The treaty was to be of 20 years' duration, but might be revised after 10 years with the consent of both parties." British Information Services, Middle East Background, (London: Cox and Sharland Ltd., 1959), p. 5.

In offering Egypt an opportunity to participate in a wider partnership with the United States, Turkey, France, and Britain, the Western powers seemed to assume that Egypt's interests were fundamentally and precisely the same as those of the four powers. The overriding important issue to the four-powers was the defense of the Mid-East against probable Soviet threat. To Egypt, however, the prevailing issue was the eviction of British troops from its territory. The presence of such troops, was viewed as a derogation of Egypt's sovereignty. While the Western powers called upon Egypt to honorably associate with them in the creation of collective Middle East defense command, the latter viewed the presence of British forces on its soil as no more than an occupation in the old imperialistic sense of the term.

It should be noted at this juncture that the four-power proposals of October 13, 1951, were presented at a time when the Nahas Government had already recommended to its Parliament the unilateral abrogation of the 1936 and 1899 agreements.

The proposals on defense presented to the Nahas Government on October 13, 1951, considered that "Egypt belongs to the free world and in consequence her defense and that of the Middle East in general is equally vital to other democratic nations." Other salient features of the proposals presented to Egypt by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey were to wit: first, the present Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 should be replaced by a new multilateral agreement for

the establishment of an Allied Middle Eastern Command. Second, Egypt would be invited to become an equal founding member of this contemplated Allied Command, along with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Third, Egypt would become the base of the Allied Mid-Eastern Command Headquarters, where the protection of Egypt and Allied bases would be directed.⁹

When the Western powers presented their plan to Egypt, the United States indicated its willingness to participate in the defense of the Middle East. Furthermore, the United States Government viewed the proposals presented to the Egyptian Government as no more than meeting Egyptian insistent demand for strengthening the defense of the strategic Middle East. Under the proposed Allied Middle East Command, the U.S. expressed readiness to contribute to the defenses of the area in general and Egypt in particular.¹⁰

Thus, it was hoped that the new proposals would provide a general framework whereby the Middle East Command could be linked with the North Atlantic organization. In addition to these principles sponsored by the four powers, the United Kingdom made certain suggestions to Cairo in regards to the future of the Sudan. These suggestions were to wit: first, any political change of the status quo of the Sudan must be

⁹American Foreign Policy . . . , op. cit., pp. 2180-2182.

¹⁰New York Times, October 12, 1951, pp. 1, 7.

made with the free consent and approval of the Sudanese people. Second, the Sudanese must be allowed to freely determine their ultimate destiny. And finally, they must be helped to govern themselves.¹¹

Egypt's Rejection of the Four-Power Defense Proposals

On October 13, 1951, the ambassadors of the four powers were received by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Salah ed-Din Pasha. The Egyptian Foreign Minister issued a statement in which he indicated that Egyptian consideration of the proposals was not tantamount to acceptance nor would it affect the previous Egyptian termination of the 1936 Treaty.¹² Two days later the Egyptian Government summarily rejected the proposals. The rationale behind Egypt's rejection was not hard to seek. In Document B, Technical Annex, section 1, parts (a) and (b) of the four-power proposals, Egypt, as a member, was asked to provide the same facilities and assistance provided for by the 1936 Treaty.¹³

¹¹New York Times, October 14, 1951, pp. 1, 18.

¹²Ibid., p. 18.

¹³Section 1 (a) "Egypt will agree to furnish to proposed Allied Middle East Command Organization such strategic defense and other facilities on her soil as are indispensable for the organization in peacetime of the defense of the Middle East."

Section 1 (b) "that she will undertake to grant forces of the Allied Middle East Command all necessary facilities and assistance in the event of war, imminent menace of war, of apprehended international emergency including the use of Egyptian ports, airfields and means of communication." Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 426. See also American Foreign Policy . . ., op. cit., pp. 2181-2182.

Hence, acceptance by the Egyptian Government of any compromise which was apt to retain foreign forces on Egyptian territory could only have meant political suicide and perhaps a revolution. The Egyptian Government dismissed the four-power proposals as no more than an attempt to perpetuate British domination and occupation in a new guise. It believed that the defense of Egypt and the area as a whole should emanate from the will of the people and not from the will of any foreign nation or group of nations. The Nahas Government simply considered such arrangement with foreign powers as merely a type of intervention and domination and hence an infringement upon Egypt's sovereignty. Egypt was unwilling to substitute British occupation forces for American, French, Turkish, and a certain number of British troops that were already on Egyptian soil.

Western statesmen, to be sure, by insisting on a defense organization seemed to be oblivious of the political facts of life. Erskine B. Childers described the four-power proposals succinctly when he remarked:

It was symptomatic of the gulf between Western ideas and Arab realities that the proposal included a warning that British evacuation of the Canal Zone would be considered only if the MEDO proposal were accepted by Egypt.¹⁴

In a statement released to the press on October 17, Secretary of State Dean Acheson expressed "genuine regret" and noted with "surprise"

¹⁴Erskine B. Childers, The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations (London: McGibbon and Kee, 1962), p. 97.

Egypt's rejection of the proposals for Middle East Command. "These proposals," stated Secretary Acheson, "were formulated by the nations interested in the welfare and security of the Middle East after the most intensive and thorough consideration" of the particular problems of the region. Secretary Acheson viewed the invitation presented to the Egyptian Government to join with the other states in the defense of the free world against probable aggression as entirely consistent with the sovereignty and independence of Egypt.¹⁵

Egypt's rejection of the Western proposals notwithstanding, Britain was adamant in regards to her rights in the vital Suez area and in the Sudan. Furthermore, France and the United States exhibited willingness to support Britain in keeping her forces on Egyptian soil. Likewise, the United States had shown great concern about the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. This concern was expressed by Secretary Acheson on October 21 in unmistakable terms when he remarked:

What we are trying to do now is to make sure that what happens in this part of the world doesn't jeopardize the security of all the rest of us. These people live in an area that is of critical importance to the security of the rest of the whole world.

In the trouble between Egypt and Britain, we think and say that the Egyptian Government can't throw its international obligations overboard.

Over the past few months, we've been working with France, Britain and Turkey on a Middle East

¹⁵"Egypt Rejects Proposals for Middle East Defense Command; Statement by Secretary Acheson," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXV, No. 644, Publication 4396 (October 29, 1951), 702.

Command. Egypt has been offered an equal partnership in this Command. We still have hopes that the Egyptians will go along with us on this proposal. This will not only help to settle the dispute; it will also put the defense of this whole area on a stronger basis.¹⁶

Secretary Acheson, to be sure, seemed to have left the door open for Egypt's voluntary association with other sovereign nations in the MEDO. Mr. Acheson appeared to hope that the Egyptian Government might reconsider its action so that her interests might be served by associating with the other free nations in Middle East Command.

While Western diplomatic pressures increased on Cairo, the Egyptian press called for a united Arab stand and urged the Arab states to eschew any defense treaty with the West. Al Misri (the Egyptian), for example, wrote:

Today, Egypt has become the target of hostile imperialistic forces concentrated against her. Will events fulfill the hopes of such imperialistic powers by succeeding, as they did in the last stage of the Palestine war, in isolating her and letting her struggle alone, while the other Arab states become mere spectators? We believe, however, that no Arab state will ever abandon Egypt, or betray her at this moment of distress.¹⁷

The appeal for unity by the Al Misri was by no means unique. The Nationalist party leaders, the communists and their sympathizers urged unity and warned the people against any defense alliance with the West.

¹⁶Secretary of State Dean Acheson, "Where Do We Stand in the World Today?" U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXV, No. 644, Publication 4396 (October 29, 1951), 686.

¹⁷New York Times, November 1, 1951, p. 11.

Although the Nahas Government had rejected the proposals, the United States, together with the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and also with Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, pushed forward with their Middle East Command project. In an explanatory statement on November 10, 1951, the four powers reiterated their objectives. Among other things, they aimed at the establishment of a joint command for the defense of the area. They did not purport to create an organization which would interfere in disputes arising within the region. The existing arrangements, notably the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, by Britain, France, and the United States on the inviolability of frontiers or armistice arrangements, would not be affected. The primary task of the new Command was to plan, train, and advise. A Supreme Allied Commander for the Middle East would have forces placed at his disposal in time of exigency or war. However, no member of the organization would be obliged to place forces at his disposal in time of peace. Movement of troops to or within a state can only be had by agreement with or consent of states concerned.¹⁸

The Anglo-American aim in regards to the Middle East in general and to Egypt in particular was expressed in a joint communique released after President Harry S. Truman and Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill exchanged views early in January 1952. The communique vividly stated the resolve of the two leaders to unify their policies

¹⁸Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., pp. 427-429.

towards the Middle East. The communique read:

Our Governments are resolved to promote the stability, peaceful development, and prosperity of the countries of the Middle East. We have found a complete identity of aims between us in this part of the world, and the two Secretaries of State will continue to work out together agreed policies to give effect to this aim. We think it essential for the furtherance of our common purposes that an Allied Middle East Command should be set up as soon as possible.

As regards Egypt, we are confident that the Four Power approach offers the best prospect of relieving the present tension.¹⁹

Similarly, a close Anglo-American unity was urged by Sir Winston Churchill in his address to a joint meeting of the two Houses of Congress on January 19, 1952. The British Prime Minister called upon the United States to share the responsibility for protecting the Suez Canal. Sir Churchill stated that even token forces of the Command members in the Canal Zone would enhance Britain's position and would symbolize Western unity and purpose.²⁰

The Free Officers and the Anglo-Egyptian Dispute

The denunciation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1899 Condominium Agreement led to an ever increasing agitation against the

¹⁹"The President Exchanges Views with Prime Minister Churchill; Joint Communique," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXVI, No. 656, Publication 4467 (January 21, 1952), 84.

²⁰U.S. Congressional Record, House, 82d Congress, Second Session, LXXXVIII, Part 1 (January 8, 1952 to February 25, 1952), 278.

continued presence of the British forces in the Suez Canal Zone. Egypt's intransigent attitude became centered around unconditional evacuation of British forces and the unity of the Nile Valley - the unity of Egypt and the Sudan. Vigorous nationalism manifested itself, in part to be sure, in extensive guerrilla campaigns against British troops in the Suez Canal Zone and in mob attacks on British and American Embassies. Organized guerrilla activities coupled with mob agitation culminated in "Black Saturday" on January 26, 1952, when Cairo succumbed to uncontrolled mob violence and disorder. Egyptian rioters, inspired by extreme elements like the Socialist party, the Communist party and the Moslem Brotherhood attacked and set on fire numerous commercial, cultural, and social establishments. Such landmark places as the Sheppard Hotel, the British Turf Club and every symbol of foreign and pasha rule were either totally or partially destroyed with loss of lives.

The "Black Saturday" ushered in the end of the Wafdist rule and subsequently, be it noted, the downfall of the Egyptian Monarchy. The inability of the Nahas Government to maintain public order gave King Farouk an opportunity to dismiss the veteran politician and his cabinet on January 27, 1952, and appoint Aly Maher Pasha to head a new Government. The dismissal of the Nahas Government was viewed with relief in the West. Secretary Acheson, for example, stated that the four-power proposals were still open for Egypt to become co-partner with Britain, France, and Turkey in a MEDO.²¹

²¹New York Times, January 21, 1952, p. 8.

During the subsequent six months, Egypt witnessed successive ministries some of which pledged to achieve Egypt's national aspirations, ejection of British forces, the unity of the Nile Valley, and promotion of governmental reforms. These proclivities to the contrary notwithstanding, the various ministries were unable to embark upon any of the promised reforms. The reason behind this might be attributed to Palace intrigues, interference with politics, rule by decrets-lois, and corruption. On the other hand, some ministries fell unquestionably under the influence of the old order and thus were unable to carry out any reform.

Following the dismissal of the Nahas Government, however, the American Ambassador in Cairo, Mr. Jefferson Caffery was alleged to have urged British recognition of Egypt's sovereignty over the Sudan. Likewise, Sir Anthony Eden wrote in his memoirs that the United States had brought pressure to bear on Britain to hasten her negotiation with Egypt. Sir Anthony Eden added "An immediate start on the withdrawal of our forces from Egypt was urged upon us."²²

During the night of July 22-23 a dissident group of Army officers under the leadership of Major General Mohammed Naguib seized control of the Government in a bloodless coup d'etat. The one-day-old cabinet of Prime Minister Ahmed Naguib El Hilali resigned.²³ The underlying reason behind the Army's move was vividly stated by General Naguib.

²²Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 258. Used by permission of the publisher.

²³New York Times, July 24, 1952, p. 1.

The purpose of the military is not to govern but to defend those who govern from their enemies, foreign and domestic. There have been times in the history of almost every country, however, when it has become impossible for the military to remain aloof from politics. To serve its purpose, the military must be given a worthy government to defend. If the government it is asked to defend is manifestly indefensible, as it was in Egypt, the military must either resign itself to the prevailing corruption or intervene in civil affairs long enough to establish a government that will respond to the legitimate needs and desires of the nation.²⁴

Following the military coup d'etat General Naguib was quick to establish cordial relations with Mr. Jefferson Caffery, American Ambassador in Cairo. To many American observers the July Revolution seemed to offer a new hope for removing the barriers which had hitherto prevented the association of many Middle Eastern countries in a defensive alliance with the West against probable Soviet threat. Secretary of State Acheson expressed this sentiment of hope at a press conference on September 3, 1952:

There have been some encouraging developments in Egypt since we last met together, including the reform program announced by the Egyptian Government. We are following events with much interest and we wish Prime Minister Ali Maher and his civilian and military colleagues every success in their efforts to solve the internal problems of their country.

Relations between the United States and Egypt remain most friendly and cooperative. I am hopeful that in the interest of our two countries these relations, as well as those between Egypt and all the nations of the free world, will be increased and strengthened. We look forward to

²⁴Mohammed Naguib, Egypt's Destiny (London: Victor Gollancz LTD, 1955), p. 13.

an era in which new areas of cooperation and mutual benefit can be brought into being.²⁵

Once the military junta established itself in power, Britain proposed the creation of a planning group for Middle Eastern defense. The British proposal called for a limited Middle Eastern defense alliance with headquarters on the former colony of Cyprus. The British Government viewed the new Mid-East plan as more tentative than the November 1951 proposals, and one which left the door open for Egypt and other interested Mid-Eastern states to join.²⁶ The State Department's reaction to Britain's defense suggestion was less than favorable. The State Department indicated that its primary interest was to promote the stability and strength of the Mid-East countries. This interest was all the more evident when in November 1951, the United States, together with Britain, France, and Turkey, expressed its deep desire to participate in the establishment of a Mid-Eastern defense organization which would encompass both Middle Eastern countries and other countries substantially interested in the defense of the region. The United States stated that it would welcome any genuine plan that would 'give effect to the four-power declaration of November 1951'.²⁷

²⁵"Developments in Egypt; Press Conference Statement by Secretary Acheson, " U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXVII, No. 690, Publication 4706 (September 15, 1952), 406.

²⁶New York Times, August 6, 1952, p. 4.

²⁷New York Times, August 7, 1952, p. 4.

Thus, while Britain stressed the creation of planning machinery, without Egypt if necessary, the United States placed conspicuous emphasis on genuine cooperative efforts. The underlying reason behind the new British plan was the belief that the Middle Eastern states were apt to adhere to a 'going concern' than to join something which had not yet come into being. The United States, meanwhile, tended to reason that even under the most favorable circumstances the proposed Middle East defense organization would be rejected by the Arab States. The United States seemed to have envisaged three main obstacles in the way: (1) lack of confidence by the Arab states towards the West; (2) open animosity and ill-will between the Arab states and Israel; and (3) the important question of 'what's in it' for the Arabs.²⁸

But on the other hand, there had been favorable speculation that Major General Mohammed Naguib, as a professional soldier, might be prone to join the plan. Moreover, Naguib's desire to equip his Army with modern American weapons might attract Cairo to participate in regional defense arrangements with Western nations.²⁹

In an interview with C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times General Naguib expressed the desire to participate in a Middle East defense organization provided that Egypt's national aspiration were met first. General Naguib added that the very concept of a joint defense

²⁸New York Times, August 8, 1952, p. 3.

²⁹Ibid.

organization implied lack of confidence in Egypt. However, Naguib went on to state:

We realize that nowadays no country can stand alone in the world. There are only three possible courses for a free Egypt: to remain neutral - that is at the very least extremely difficult, if not impossible; to join the Eastern bloc, which is out of the question as we are not Communist; or to join the West. It is our natural inclination to work with the West whose people we know. ³⁰

In spite of the fact that the Egyptian premier continued to display his anti-Communist feelings, he could not envisage Egypt joining a Western-sponsored alliance while British forces were still stationed in the Suez Canal Zone.

A country prepared to defend itself is surely a better ally than a country that must be defended by the armed forces of another country. I realize that it will take a number of years before Egypt and the other Arab countries can be so strengthened as to be able to defend themselves successfully. But unless the effort is made I fear that American plans for defending the Middle East will fail. I repeat: it is only as free peoples capable of defending our freedom that we shall be able and willing to ally ourselves with the West, if the occasion should arise. A regional defense pact on any other terms would merely perpetuate the explosive conditions that now exist. The Americans, instead of gaining allies, would merely inherit the enmity left behind by the British and the French. ³¹

³⁰ New York Times, December 11, 1952, p. 14.

³¹ Naguib, op. cit., pp. 260-261.

The Eisenhower Administration and
the Anglo-Egyptian Dispute

Although General Naguib insisted upon unconditional withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal Zone, he was willing to continue to work for an agreement with Britain. Negotiations between the British and the Egyptians were held and both parties moved closer towards a solution in regards to the Sudan problem. On February 12, 1953, an agreement was concluded. The Anglo-Egyptian accord of February provided for an early election of a Sudanese Parliament as a first measure towards self-determination and self-government. The contemplated election was to be conducted under the supervision of a Mixed Electoral Commission. The Commission was to be made up of representatives from Egypt, India, Sudan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Furthermore, the February agreement provided for a transitional period not to exceed three years during which the administration of the Sudan would be carried by the British Governor-General with the assistance of a five-man commission. The mixed commission was to be composed of two Sudanese, one Egyptian, one British, and one Pakistani.³²

The February accord was a prelude to agreement on the Suez Canal Zone problem. It paved the way for new talks on the Canal problem. However, Sir Anthony Eden's visit to Washington on March 4,

³²Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1953, selected and edited by Denise Folliot (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 315-318.

1953, to elicit American support, gave rise to uneasiness in Cairo and to public agitation for unconditional evacuation of British forces. Egyptian suspicions were further increased by the next move. On March 14, 1953, the United States Government formally participated in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations concerning the evacuation of the British forces from the Canal Zone. United States Ambassador Jefferson Caffery formally joined the British Ambassador Sir Ralph Stevenson and General Naguib and his Foreign Minister Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi. The underlying reason behind U. S. participation was to insure the creation of a Middle East defense organization which would fill in the power vacuum which might result from British withdrawal. The meeting was characterized by the Egyptian Foreign Minister as 'the second phase' of the negotiations concerning the Suez Canal Base. The first phase of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations was concluded on February 12, 1953, when both parties agreed to grant the Sudan the right to determine its own political future.³³

During the negotiations, be it noted, Britain was willing to depart from Egyptian soil only if some kind of Mid-Eastern defense organization was to be established and the military bases in the Suez were to be used by Allied forces in time of war.³⁴

³³New York Times, March 15 1953, p. 1.

³⁴Mr. Eden's ideas for general settlement of the Suez dispute were to wit: "1. A phased withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. 2. Maintenance of a military base in the canal zone in peace under conditions which would enable us and our allies to have immediate use of it in war. 3. An Anglo-Egyptian organization for the air defense of Egypt. 4. Egypt's participation in a Middle East defense organization. 5. A programme of military and economic assistance to Egypt by the United Kingdom and the United States." Eden, op. cit., pp. 274-275. Used by permission of the publisher.

On March 15, 1953, following a joint meeting of the cabinet and the Council of the Revolution, the Naguib Government objected to United States participation in the Anglo-Egyptian discussions. The Egyptian Government, to be sure, tended to believe that Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Suez Canal Base might turn into a three-power discussion about the Middle East defense. Ambassador Caffery indicated that the United States did not wish to participate but added that his Government was ready at any time to take part in the discussions if invited by both parties.³⁵

The Egyptian Government, meanwhile, was adamant in its demands upon unconditional evacuation of the British forces and was unwilling to discuss regional defense arrangements with Britain. The rift between Egyptian demands and British ideas of general settlement was pointed out by General Naguib:

. . . Great Britain took the position that Egypt must first agree to some sort of military alliance before it could safely evacuate the Suez Canal Zone. The Council of the Revolution, for its part, took the position that Egypt would have to be given its independence before it could agree to any sort of alliance with the West. The government of an occupied country, as I have often remarked in public, is no more able to negotiate a treaty of alliance with the government of an occupying power - or, for that matter, with an allied power like the United States - than a prisoner is able to negotiate with his jailers, or their intermediaries, the terms of his parole.

³⁵ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents . . . 1953, p. 345. See also Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CXV (1953), 887. New York Times, March 19, 1953, p. 19.

And negotiation, as the British well know, is essential to every alliance worthy of its name. I must therefore say to our British and American friends: Give us our freedom before you invite us to negotiate an alliance until we can do so as free and equal partners.³⁶

The prospects of Anglo-Egyptian rapprochement were not improved. Egypt appeared unwilling to make any commitment in regard to the maintenance and availability of military bases in the Canal Zone. Equally adamant was the British stand. Britain appeared reluctant to evacuate her troops without any assurance that the military bases on Egyptian soil would be available in international exigency or war. Furthermore, there had been rumbling of discontent about American attitude towards British position and policy in Egypt. C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times, aptly described the prevalent British attitude towards American intercession in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute when he wrote:

The British have never been 100 per cent confident of American support in their Suez stand. These doubts, temporarily erased by the Washington accord, have revived. They do not believe that Washington is making its support of Britain sufficiently plain to Cairo.³⁷

Mr. Sulzberger's observation was by no means unique. Anglo-American differences in regards to the Egyptian dispute were made all the more clear in the British Ambassador's report from Cairo. In Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson's view, American policy appeared to be based upon the belief that Egypt was the prey of British imperialism,

³⁶Naguib, op. cit., p. 251.

³⁷New York Times, March 26, 1953, p. 12.

thus deserving American sympathy. Furthermore, it seemed to be conditioned by a desire to come to a quick solution at any price with the assumption that once an agreement was concluded "all would be well." These factors coupled with the fear of losing popularity and influence with the ruling Egyptian military junta, especially the fear of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, resulted in withholding wholehearted American support to a North Atlantic Treaty ally. American indecisiveness, the report continued, was thus exploited by the Egyptian Government.³⁸

The rift between Britain and Egypt, however, appeared to have come to an end when Egypt's second strongman, Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser³⁹ made the following statement to a correspondent of the London Observer, thus:

What we really want is amicable relations with Britain so that Egypt can look forward to a period of progress free forever of this running sore - her dispute with Britain.

You ask. What is our policy? It is evacuation - complete independence. But we also want the Canal Zone base to function efficiently and we are willing to discuss how its efficiency can be preserved as an Egyptian base.

We are soldiers and we are realists. We know that we cannot maintain such an immense base as we are now. We know that we will want technicians and since it is British equipment in the base we will need British technicians.

³⁸Eden, op. cit., pp. 284-285.

³⁹New York Times, April 13, 1953, p. 6. On September 1953, General Mohammed Naguib was removed from office due to a power struggle between him and the Free officers under the leadership of Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. General Naguib was no more than a titular head of the Revolutionary Government established by the young Army officers on July 23, 1952.

Nasser's willingness to retain British technicians to the contrary notwithstanding, he shunned any formal military ties with the West. Nasser's statement, however, seemed to suggest a basis for mutual understanding with Britain and to point out Egypt's ostensible need for British aid and technicians. Egyptian leaders were willing to commence discussions, although resolved to maintain their intransigent positions. British and Egyptian negotiators commenced their talks on April 27, 1953. Following several meetings the discussions were suspended. The position of the Revolutionary Government, as Erskine B. Childers observed, "was a compromise, but not necessarily a compromising one."⁴⁰

On May 9, 1953, Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and Director for Mutual Security, Mr. Harold Stassen, toured twelve Asian countries - Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece, and Libya. On his departure Secretary Dulles stated that he had no plans or programs and was not seeking decisions; rather he wanted to listen intently and dispel any misunderstanding about American position and policy.⁴¹

During his visit to Egypt on May 11, 1953, Secretary Dulles issued the following statement in regards to the Canal Zone:

⁴⁰ Childers, op. cit., p. 103.

⁴¹ "Secretary's Visit to Near East and South Asia," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII, No. 725, Publication 5057 (May 18, 1953), 708.

The Administration of President Eisenhower gave prompt consideration to the defense of the Middle East and discussed with the British Government prior understandings which had been reached between the British Government and President Truman's Administration. We also had discussions relative to this matter with representatives of the Egyptian Government, both in Cairo and Washington.

The defence and well-being of this important part of the world are inevitably of great concern to the United States Government. We came to the conclusion that there should be a solution consistent with full Egyptian sovereignty, with a phased withdrawal of foreign troops - all to be arranged however so that the important base in the canal area, with its depots of supplies and systems of technical supervision, should remain in good working order and be available for immediate use on behalf of the free world in the event of future hostilities.⁴²

On his return, Secretary Dulles delivered an address to the nation over radio and television networks. In his address Mr. Dulles observed that a Middle East Defense Organization was "a future rather than an immediate possibility" because the Arab States were so engrossed in quarrels with Israel, the United Kingdom, and France and paid very little regard to the Soviet menace.⁴³

The lack of "immediate" hope for the creation of a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) was all the more apparent in the failure of the various attempts throughout 1952 and at the beginning of 1953. Secretary Dulles seemed to throw cold water upon the idea of Middle

⁴²Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents . . . 1953, op. cit., pp. 341-342.

⁴³"Report on the Near East; Address by Secretary Dulles," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII, No. 729, Publication 5090 (June 15, 1953), 835.

East Defense Organization, temporarily at least, and work towards separate defense arrangements with any Middle East country which might be desirous to enter into such defense arrangements. Thus, Secretary Dulles emphasized that while awaiting the establishment of a defense organization, the United States could substantially augment the interrelated defense of those states which desired strength, not against the West or each other, but to repel the common threat to all independent and free peoples.⁴⁴

It should be noted at this juncture that the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the future of the Suez Canal Base, which proceeded intermittently throughout 1952 and 1953, reached a new state in 1954. New strategic considerations made the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Base possible on October 19, 1954. It became all the more evident for U.S. and British strategists that the defense of the Middle Eastern countries would call for several bases in the northern region. Also, the existence of nuclear striking weapons made the need for dispersal all the more imperative. Furthermore, there was the need to build up the defense of the "northern tier" countries who were concerned about the probable Soviet threat. Thus, under these circumstances, a new approach to the Suez Canal Base dispute became possible. Discussions were resumed on July 10, 1954. On July 27, the basic provisions were agreed upon but the formal Agreement was not signed until October 19,

⁴⁴Ibid.

1954.⁴⁵ The main provisions of the October Agreement provided for the following: first, the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal Zone within twenty months; second, the termination of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936; third, the maintenance of certain installations by civilian technicians on behalf of the British Government; fourth, the use by the United Kingdom of Egyptian ports and such needed facilities for putting the Base on a war footing and operating it effectively in case of armed attack upon any member of the Arab League or Turkey; fifth, a close consultation between Britain and Egypt in case of a threat by an outside power on any member of the Arab League or Turkey; sixth, the recognition of the international importance of the Suez Maritime Canal, "which is an integral part of Egypt" (Article 8) and the unequivocal determination by both parties to uphold the 1888 Constantinople Convention; and seventh, the agreement to be in force for seven years.⁴⁶

That the U. S. A. played a role in bringing about the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of October 19, 1954, certainly cannot be doubted. Mr. Jefferson Caffery, U. S. A. Ambassador in Cairo, unquestionably played

⁴⁵British Information Services, op. cit., p. 6. The full text of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement regarding the Suez Canal base of October 19, 1954, may be found in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents . . . 1954, op. cit., pp. 248-254. The full text of the Heads of Agreement of July 27, 1954, may be found in Survey of International Affairs, 1954 pp. 194-195.

⁴⁶Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents of International Affairs, 1954, selected and edited by Denise Folliot (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 248-254.

a significant part in the Anglo-Egyptian discussions. The considerable role that Ambassador Caffery played was by no means appreciated by right-wing members of the British Parliament. Captain Rt. Hon. Charles Waterhouse, for example, stated:

For many years we have had a little American lamb bleating in Cairo, not helping and if anything hindering in most things. Well, he has got his way, but whether or not this will be to the lasting advantage of the Americans any more than to us is a very different consideration.⁴⁷

The protestations of some right-wing British parliament members notwithstanding, the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was viewed with satisfaction in the United States and Britain.

Both President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles expressed gratification at the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement concerning the Suez Canal Base, the latter characterizing it in a press release on July 28 as:

. . . a major step in the evolution of the relations between the states of the Near East and the nations of the West. This agreement eliminates a problem which has affected not only the relations between the United Kingdom and Egypt but also those of the Western nations as a whole with the Arab States.⁴⁸

Secretary Dulles hoped that the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement would usher

⁴⁷Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CXXXI (1954), 744.

⁴⁸"Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Base; Statement by Secretary Dulles," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXI, No. 789, Publication 5563 (August 9, 1954), 198.

in "the beginning of a new era of closer collaboration between the states of the Near East and those of the West."

Thanks to this agreement a new and more permanent basis has been laid for the tranquility and security of the Near East. The United States welcomes in particular Egypt's decision to make the Suez Base available to the United Kingdom in case of aggression against the area. The United States is also pleased to note the recognition by the two parties of the importance of the Suez Canal and the determination to uphold the Convention of 1888, which guarantees freedom of navigation through this vital artery.⁴⁹

In a press release dated August 3, 1954, Secretary John Foster Dulles extended his "heartiest congratulations" to Britain's Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Egypt's Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Foreign Minister Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi. All parties seemed to share Dulles' view that the Anglo-Egyptian accord would make a real contribution both to the establishment of an atmosphere of friendship and stability of the Near East. Secretary Dulles expressed confidence that the agreement would:

. . . establish the foundation for even closer collaboration between our countries on the problems affecting the Near Eastern area, and in the long run the Agreement will produce greater stability and defensive strength in the area.⁵⁰

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰"Settlement of Suez Controversy," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXI, No. 790, Publication 5564 (August 16, 1954), 234.

CHAPTER III


THE BAGHDAD PACT AND AMERICAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

The United States and the Baghdad Pact

Since 1945 the United States Government has shown great interest in the defense of the Near and Middle East in these various ways: economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947; support of the accession of those two States into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and establishment of a Middle East Command during 1951-1952 with Britain, France, and Turkey. However, in the latter their joint efforts failed to materialize largely due to local disputes among the countries of the area on the one hand and to disputes with and distrust of the West on the other.¹

Following his Near and Middle East visit in May 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reported that the United States was all the more willing to strengthen the defense of the northern tier countries (see map on the following page) in order to repel any possible Soviet

¹Harry N. Howard, "The Development of U. S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955, " U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIV, No. 874, Publication 6309 (March 26, 1956), 510.



encroachment.² United States expressed its unequivocal approval of the joint Turco-Pakistani agreement signed at Karachi on April 2, 1954.³ In fact, the United States viewed the Turco-Pakistani entente as an indispensable step towards maintaining the defense of the free world.⁴ Similarly, the United States Government viewed with approval the Turco-Iraqi Mutual Cooperation Pact⁵ which was concluded at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, the adamant attacks of certain Arab countries - Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia - to the contrary notwithstanding. Despite the existence of certain gaps in the Turco-Iraqi and the Turco-Pakistani pacts, the United States believed that the grouping of Near and Middle Eastern countries under such regional defensive arrangements unquestionably provided a shield against a possible thrust from within or without.⁶

Adherence to the Baghdad Pact by Pakistan on September 23, 1955, was looked upon favorably by the United States when it expressed:

²Ibid.

³The New York Times reported that "Such pacts have been encouraged by quiet American diplomacy. The U.S. - impelled by our able Ambassador in Turkey, Avra Warren - conceived the thought of using Turkish initiative to break up the Middle East logjam. To this effect a Turkish-Pakistani alliance was encouraged." New York Times, January 19, 1955, p. 26.

⁴New York Times, April 3, 1954, p. 4.

⁵The full text of the Baghdad Pact is found in Appendix B.

⁶Howard, op. cit., pp. 510-511.

" . . . sympathy with the desire of these nations to provide for their legitimate self-defense through a collective arrangement within the framework of the United Nations. . . ."⁷ The same sentiment was also expressed when the United States described Iran's decision to adhere to the Pact as: " . . . further evidence of the desire and ability of the Middle East to develop regional arrangements for collective self-defense within the framework of the charter of the United Nations."⁸

The United States looked upon these Middle East arrangements as no more than an attempt to promote the well-being, peace, and security of the area. In no way, to be sure, were these associations deemed to be a threat against any other states.⁹

In addition to these regional associations bilateral military aid agreements existed and are still in effect between the United States on the one hand and Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey on the other. The only military obligation placed upon each recipient was and still is to refrain from unprovoked aggression and to help in its own defense. This obligation was made clear in the Mutual Security legislation which stipulated, among other things, that such military assistance:

⁷"U.S. Welcomes Pakistan's Adherence to 'Northern Tier' Pact," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIII, No. 849, Publication 6005 (October 3, 1955), 534.

⁸"U.S. Welcomes Iran's Adherence to 'Northern Tier' Pact," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIII, No. 852, Publication 6044 (October 24, 1955), 653.

⁹Ibid.

. . . Shall be made available solely to maintain the internal security and legitimate self-defense of the recipient nations, or to permit it to participate in the defense of its own area or in collective security arrangements and measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The President shall be satisfied that such equipment and materials will not be used to undertake any act of aggression against any nation. . .¹⁰

In a final communique issued at the second Ministerial Council session of the Baghdad Pact held at Teheran, Iran, on April 19, 1956, the Council cordially greeted the active participation of the United States in the Military and Economic Committees of the Pact. The United States reaffirmed her continuous support to the member states in order to attain the defensive, political, and socio-economical objectives of the organization.¹¹

On March 1957 the United States expressed the desire to become a full member of the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact upon the invitation of the member states. As a result of such an invitation she became a full member and was represented at the third Ministerial Council session of the Baghdad Pact held at Karachi, Pakistan, on June 3, 1957, by General Nathan F. Twining and Deputy Under Secretary

¹⁰John D. Jernegan, "Middle East Defense," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXII, No. 823, Publication 5805 (April 4, 1955), 567.

¹¹"Second Meeting of Council of Baghdad Pact Organization," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIV, No. 880, Publication 6331 (May 7, 1956), 755.

of State Loy W. Henderson.¹²

In an opening statement at the fourth Ministerial Council session of the Baghdad Pact held at Ankara, Turkey, on January 17, 1958, the United States declared that she stood:

. . . firmly behind the resolve of all Middle East nations to remain free and to reinforce the peace. We wholeheartedly support the Baghdad Pact. The United States knows, as must all fair-minded men, that the Pact threatens no one. It obstructs no legitimate and constructive national aspirations of any people or group of people. Its purpose is to promote cooperation in self-defense, a right specifically acknowledged in article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It offers the hand of friendship to all like-minded nations of the Middle East and also recognizes the right of each nation to choose fully and freely its own road to security.¹³

At the closing session, January 30, 1958, Secretary Dulles remarked:

We harbor no aggressive design or purpose whatsoever, seeking only peace and security for ourselves and indeed for the entire area of the Middle East. Our deliberations avoid interference in each other's internal affairs in accordance with article 3 of the Pact.¹⁴

¹²General Nathan F. Twining and Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson, "U. S. Delegation to International Conferences; Baghdad Pact Council and Military Committee," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVI, No. 938, Publication 6504 (June 17, 1957), 989.

¹³"Fourth Session of Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council; Statements by Secretary Dulles," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, No. 973, Publication 6595 (February 17, 1958), 251.

¹⁴Ibid., 254.

A Critique of the United States Position

John F. Kennedy, then a Senator (D-Mass.) remarked that the expressed desire on the part of the United States to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, as announced during the Eisenhower-Macmillan talks at Bermuda¹⁵ illustrated "another curious twist to the Nation's zigzag path through the Middle East." In addition he elucidated that the United States had assumed all responsibilities of a full membership except that of a formal membership. As to the rationale behind the United States repeated refusal to join the Pact formally he referred to Secretary Dulles' words that the Pact was:

. . . too controversial as among Arab countries. . .
We did not think it wise to cast in our lot with part of
countries of the area in terms of a pact which was
divisive. . . We do not want to become involved in
Arab politics,

Mr. Kennedy contended that even though the United States did not become a formal member of the Pact, the mere fact that she assumed membership on all the committees of the Pact aroused anxiety, suspicion, and irritation among the very Arab countries whose confidence she hoped to gain.¹⁶

Kennedy's criticism was by no means unique. Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) aptly observed:

¹⁵ See New York Times, March 25, 1957, p. 5.

¹⁶ U.S. Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, CIII, Part 4, 4276-4277.

Earlier we had found that the Eisenhower doctrine was meaningless, so far as Lebanon was concerned. For many months we have also known that America's participation in the Baghdad Pact is half in and half out - in just enough to cause irritation; out just enough to make us ineffective.¹⁷

Another remark was made by a United States senior diplomat thus:

It was impossible to know where the United States stood as long as it refused to join the pact, although the State Department periodically proclaimed its support to the alliance.¹⁸

Under Egypt's direction criticism also came from the Soviet bloc and "neutralist" countries. They resented bitterly America's support of the Baghdad entente. Le Jour criticized the United States link with the Baghdad Pact as follows:

America has picked up on her own account the Arab policy of England and the confusion that has always characterized it. The adhesion of the United States to the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact will bring no answer to the questions considered as of first order by the Near Eastern States. On the contrary, it will give an additional arm to the adversaries of the Eisenhower Plan.¹⁹

It should be noted, however, that the United States refusal to join the Baghdad Pact as a formal member alarmed and irritated the member States who had organized in the hope to deter Communist aggression. To be sure, the member countries - Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan,

¹⁷U.S. Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, CIV, Part 10, 13604.

¹⁸New York Times, April 9, 1956, p. 3.

¹⁹New York Times, March 25, 1957, p. 3.

and Turkey - believed that the failure or success of the Pact hinged upon the active participation and membership of the United States.

The patent absurdity of the United States position provoked, privately, the not unjustified criticism of Sir Anthony Eden. The British Prime Minister deplored America's refusal to join the Baghdad Pact in the following statement:

In recent years the United States has sometimes failed to put its weight behind its friends, in the hope of being popular with their foes. The practical consequences of this uncertain diplomacy are illustrated by United States treatment of the Baghdad Pact. Having played a leading part to inspire the project, the United States Government held back while Britain alone of the Western powers joined it. Worse still, they tried to take credit for this attitude in capitals like Cairo, which were hostile to the Pact. Then, by a series of hesitant steps, they drew nearer the Pact, sending an observer and spending money, but still not joining it. An ounce of membership would have been worth all the hawing and saved a ton of trouble later on.²⁰

Mr. Eden felt that it was difficult to understand America's coolness towards the Pact which was aimed at the closest solidarity among all countries sincerely dedicated to shield the area against possible Communist aggression.

Nor could I understand the prolonged coolness of American policy towards the Baghdad Pact in its most critical period, when the inspiration for the unity of the northern tier certainly seemed to us to have been

²⁰ Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle, the Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 374-375. Used by permission of the publisher.

shared by Washington.²¹ . . . it would have been helpful if the United States had shown more friendliness towards it, and I thought it urgent that we should review all this in Washington. The visit of Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev to India and Burma had not helped us. Western leadership had been put on the defensive by the anti-colonial manifesto they had flourished there. It was necessary that we and the United States should draw closer together on this prickly topic and find words to express a common philosophy.²²

Thus, the United States indubitably incurred the ill will of both friends and foes. Any realistic appraisal of the American position in regard to the Baghdad Pact could only lead to the salient conclusion that the Eisenhower Administration had overemphasized the ideas of military grouping while little of anything was done to solve the perennial problems of the Near and Middle Eastern area. It is appropriate at this juncture to allude to General Eisenhower's own observation when he wrote:

Wherever popular discontent is founded on group oppression or mass poverty or the hunger of children, there Communism may stage an offensive that arms cannot counter. Discontent can be fanned into revolution, and revolution into social chaos. The sequel is dictatorial rule. Against such tactics exclusive reliance on military might is vain.²³

If the Baghdad Pact had been formed with the hope of shielding the Middle East against Soviet penetration, certainly this hope failed to materialize. Contrary to the expectations of the member States, the

²¹Ibid., p. 71.

²²Ibid., p. 370.

²³Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), p. 476.

Pact proved to be of extremely "little value" in deterring Soviet gains as well as influence in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. In an editorial the New York Times aptly wrote:

The original idea of forming a military barrier across the gap in the Soviet bloc's frontiers between NATO and SEATO proved of little value when the Russians moved over it to make deals and gain great influence with Egypt and then Syria. It became obvious that the major uses of the Baghdad Pact would have to be economic and the countering of Russian tactics of subversion.²⁴

The Role of Great Britain

Despite bitter Soviet attack the United Kingdom adhered to the Baghdad Pact on April 5, 1955, and concluded a special agreement with Iraq.²⁵ According to this bilateral agreement, which terminated the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 30, 1930, Iraq assumed thereafter the full responsibility for guarding the defense installation within its territorial limits. The air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba, once occupied by the Royal Air Force, passed under Iraqi control. Furthermore, British forces were to be progressively withdrawn according to plan and as stipulated in the agreement between Her Majesty's Government and Iraq.

Former British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, conceived the Baghdad Pact as a channel through which the activities of the member States would be sustained and supported by the United States and Britain.

²⁴New York Times, December 31, 1957, p. 16.

²⁵The full text of the Special Agreement Between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Iraq - 4th April 1955 is found in Appendix C.

To be sure, Sir Anthony Eden saw the Pact as the matrix through which confidence and peace could be had and as the way by which the region could be shielded against International Communism.²⁶

In the April issue of Etudes, Mr. Maurice Ferro pointed out the British Government's attitude towards the Baghdad Pact when he remarked that for Britain 'the Baghdad Pact is essentially a trump card designed to restore British influence in the Middle East.' Therefore, it was all the more understandable that Britain insisted that the United States should join the Pact, thus strengthening it.²⁷

In the House of Commons, on April 4, 1955, Sir Anthony Eden delineated the British Government's purpose in adhering to the Baghdad Pact vividly when he remarked:

Our purpose in acceding to this Pact was a very simple one. I think that by doing so we have strengthened our influence and our voice throughout the Middle East. I believe in my country whatever its Government may happen to be. My Government's purpose is to try to bring about relaxation and easing of tension in the world. I am in favour of any arrangement which has the result of increasing the influence of my country.²⁸

Despite attacks from the Opposition party, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Anthony Nutting, believed that there

²⁶Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), DXLVII (1956), 957.

²⁷"Baghdad Pact - Yes or No?," America, April 28, 1956, 99.

²⁸Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), DXXXIX (1955), 897.

was nothing in the alliance that tended to weaken, threaten, or cause anxiety to any State in the Near East. However, concerning the accession of the State of Israel to the Baghdad Pact he elucidated that under Article 5²⁹ accession was open:

. . . to any member state of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties.

As to this special and categorical exclusion of the State of Israel, Mr. Nutting added that the State of Israel was afforded a guarantee under the provisions of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Likewise, he stated that "this Pact and these arrangements are in no way incompatible with Israel's interests and threatens no one - Israel or any other State in the area."³⁰

The protestations of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs concerning the State of Israel to the contrary notwithstanding, the Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, interpreted the situation with grave apprehension when he remarked:

The conclusion of military assistance and mutual defence agreements by the West with the Arab States has altered the political balance with the region to our detriment, and is aggravating the dangers with which the problem of our security is in any case fraught. The Western Powers who have inspired this treaty cannot

²⁹See Appendix B.

³⁰Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), DXXXIX (1955), 835-836.

divest themselves of responsibility for the document itself or for its consequences. If they take the initiative in organizing the region for purposes of defence, they thereby make themselves responsible for the effects of this activity on the position of each State within the region.³¹

Attempting to dispel Israel's fears, Sir Anthony Eden underlined his Government's obligation under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, paragraph 3 which gave this undertaking:

The three Governments should they find that any of these States was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as Members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.³²

Jordan and the Baghdad Pact

Great Britain's attempts to draw Jordan into the Pact were fought by the anti-Pact forces directed from Cairo.³³ Her Majesty's Government

³¹Ibid., 845.

³²Carol Ann Fisher and Fred Krinsky, Middle East in Crisis: A Historical and Documentary Review (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1959), p. 126.

³³"From the Egyptian point of view, the prospect of Jordan joining the Baghdad Pact meant another Arab country renouncing her leadership and placing itself under that of Iraq. She accordingly concentrated all her efforts on preventing Jordan's adherence. Passionate appeals were directed to the people of Jordan, particularly the Palestinians. The fact that Egyptian propaganda stated that the Baghdad Pact was primarily intended to help Israel gives some idea both of the gullibility of the Arab public and of the distortion of facts which was practised by the Egyptian radio stations. So effective was the campaign that crowds rioted in the cities of Jordan, and the government in alarm abandoned its intention of joining the Pact." Sir John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years, 1908 to 1958 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 321.

sent Sir Gerald Templer to Amman in December 1955 to offer the desert Kingdom planes and heavy arms for the Arab Legion as a price for adhering to the Pact. His appearance in Amman aroused popular agitation and intensified Egyptian and Saudi anti-Pact propaganda. Also in December 1955 the Government of Said el Mufti resigned and King Hussein called upon Hazza el Majali, a staunch advocate of the Pact, to form a new government. It should be noted, however, that the Majali Government was unsuccessful in drawing Jordan into the Pact due to the following factors: first, the opposition from a number of leading officers in the Arab Legion; second, opposition from the ministers of the previous Mufti Government; third, popular fulmination against the Pact (especially from the western bank of Jordan); and finally, the intensive Egyptian-Saudi propaganda and financial aid to anti-Pact elements.

Under the impact of popular anti-Pact agitation and the inability of the Majali Government to enter into any negotiations with Britain, the King dissolved the Parliament and named Ibramin Hashim as caretaker Premier. A popular election was held so that the electorate would express its views on the Baghdad Pact. The new Parliament was comprised of a majority of extreme nationalists and pro-Egyptian sympathizers who vehemently opposed the Pact. Thus, all efforts to draw Jordan into the Pact came to naught.³⁴

³⁴Benjamin Shwadran, Jordan, A State of Tension (New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959), pp. 324-334.

The Jordan crisis of 1955-1956 culminated in the dismissal of Lieutenant General John Bagot Glubb from the Arab Legion on March 1, 1956, and in due course the abrogation of the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty under which the British Government subsidized the economic stability of Jordan.

The termination of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948 was made possible only by the concrete financial offer from Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.³⁵ Furthermore, the Syro-Egyptian-Saudi camp called upon King Hussein to join them in the coordination of military plans in the face of their common enemy - Israel.³⁶

While Nasser was attempting to draw Jordan into his camp, the United States and Britain were actively and deeply interested in keeping Jordan aloof from the Syro-Egyptian axis. To preserve Hussein's shaky rule the United States extended \$30 million in economic and \$10 million in military aid to Jordan from May to December, 1956. Furthermore, the United States Sixth Fleet was promptly dispatched to the area.

Western interference coupled with Jordan's Western leanings appeared to be incompatible with Cairo-Damascus purposes. Consequently, they informed King Hussein that due to the circumstances they considered themselves no longer obligated to carry out their January 19, 1956,

³⁵ See Appendix D.

³⁶ The full text of the messages from King Saud, President Quwatli, and Colonel Nasser to King Hussein and the latter's reply are found in Appendices E and F.

commitment.³⁷

A Critique of the British Position in Jordan

The Soviet paper Pravda characterized the British attempt to draw Jordan into the Baghdad Pact as asking Jordan "to jump from the frying pan into the fire."³⁸

In the House of Commons on December 21, 1955, the Rt. Hon. Albert Robens questioned the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord John Hope, thus: Does not the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in the Middle East show a total bankruptcy? Is it not evident that the Baghdad Pact and the appearance of Sir Gerald Templer in Amman to induce Jordan to adhere to the Pact have gone astray, and consequently leaving Her Majesty's Government in a precarious situation in which she must resort to forcing the Baghdad Pact upon the unwilling Jordan people.³⁹

Mr. Robens' criticism was not left unanswered. Lord Hope ostensibly objected to such an insinuation as being unfair, irresponsible and reckless. He concluded his remark in a statement which was perhaps

³⁷J.S. Raleigh, "The Middle East in 1957 - A Political Survey," Middle Eastern Affairs, IX, No. 3 (March, 1958), 92. See also Appendix C.

³⁸The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VII, No. 51 (February 1, 1956), p. 20.

³⁹Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), DXLVII (1956), 2030.

a classic: ". . . what is now happening in Jordan will pass over."⁴⁰

Nasser's Reaction to the Baghdad Pact

In an official State visit to Cairo Premier Adnan Menderes of Turkey urged the Egyptian Government to participate in regional defense arrangements in the Middle East. The Turkish Premier hoped that other Arab States would join such regional groupings without abandoning the Arab League.⁴¹ On January 6, 1955, Premier Menderes paid a similar visit to Baghdad. The underlying purpose behind the visit was to induce Iraq to join Turkey in a Middle East defense system. On January 12, 1955, the two Governments announced their decision to form a regional defense alliance and expressed hopes that other Middle Eastern states would join. In a joint communique issued in Baghdad they stated that the Pact would serve as a vehicle to deter any aggression from within or from without.⁴²

Following the issuance of the joint Turco-Iraqi communique, Nasser called an emergency meeting of the Arab Premiers at Cairo to discuss the Iraqi decision. During the Arab Premiers Conference the economic department of the Egyptian Foreign Office pointed out the extent of Turkey's trade transaction with Israel. The apparent rationale underlying this memorandum was to persuade and convince the Arab

⁴⁰Ibid., 2032.

⁴¹New York Times, November 6, 1954, p. 3.

⁴²New York Times, January 13, 1955, p. 11.

States deeply concerned about Israel - namely Syria and Jordan - that the Turkish Government was unworthy to be trusted as an Arab ally.⁴³

Nasser made frantic attempts to elicit a unified opposition to the Pact. However, he was able to obtain unconditional support only from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Lebanon remained uncommitted; Jordan, Syria, and Libya were unwilling to make any decision. Consequently, Nasser's efforts were doomed to failure.⁴⁴

It should be noted at this juncture, however, that responsible Egyptian statesmen privately approved the proposed defensive alliance but added it was premature.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Egyptian leaders professed that the Ankara-Baghdad axis ipso facto posed a clear and imminent danger to Egyptian leadership in the Arab Middle East.

Despite strong opposition from some Arab League members during the Arab Premiers Conference, Dr. Fadhil el Jamali (M.P. and the representative of the late Premier Nuri el Said) succinctly and firmly stated:

As far as we are concerned, we are ready to do anything the others want to strengthen the Arab League and the Arab collective security pact; but we must take what steps we feel are necessary to provide a secure defense for Iraq.⁴⁶

⁴³New York Times, January 23, 1955, p. 15.

⁴⁴New York Times, February 7, 1955, p. 8.

⁴⁵New York Times, January 23, 1955, p. 15.

⁴⁶New York Times, January 29, 1955, p. 5.

Dr. Jamali believed that the security of Iraq derived from the Turkish alliance was tantamount to the security of the Arab States League. Dr. Jamali vindicated his Government's action under Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter which recognize such regional groupings and the right of a member state to take individual or collective self-defense pending appropriate action by the United Nations Security Council.⁴⁷

Egypt's overt opposition to the Baghdad Pact to the contrary notwithstanding, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, assured Mr. G. Lewis Jones, United States Charge d'Affaires, and Sir Ralph Stevenson, British Ambassador, that even though his Government opposed the projected Turco-Iraqi alliance, it would nevertheless stand with the West.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸New York Times, January 18, 1955, p. 6. It should be mentioned here that this view was expressed in a 'background paper' by the Revolutionary Command Council, a group of ten military officers who ruled Egypt. The paper unequivocally expressed hostility toward International Communism and mutual interest with the West. The statement declared 'There seems to be no doubt that Egypt today stands in every respect with the West.' (New York Times, September 3, 1954, p. 1) The Egyptian position was vividly stated in the following: 'It is only by a period of complete independence during which mutual trust is built up between Egypt and the Western powers that Egyptians will be able to look without suspicion on any closer ties between this country and other powers. Cooperation based on trust and friendship, even though it is not specified by any written agreement, is better than a treaty that is regarded suspiciously by the average Egyptian.' The statement was concluded by an implied plea to the Western powers to understand the prevailing mood of public opinion susceptibility and to give the Arabs an ample time to establish a defensive system against Communist encroachment. (Ibid., p. 7)

The underlying reasons behind Premier Nasser's attack on the Baghdad Pact are not far to seek. First, British accession to the Pact was viewed as no more than a vehicle to be used by Britain to regain her lost political influence in Egypt and, likewise, to ensure herself "a continuing voice" in the strategic Middle East. Nasser's deep-seated fear appeared to have been based upon Eden's statement in the House of Commons on April 4, 1955:

Our purpose in acceding to this Pact was a very simple one. I think that by doing so we have strengthened our influence and our voice throughout the Middle East. . . I am in favour of any arrangement which has the result of increasing the influence of my country.⁴⁹

Second, the Baghdad Pact appeared to have undermined Nasser's bid for future Arab leadership. According to New York Times correspondent Robert C. Doty, who interviewed Nasser in April, 1955, the Egyptian leader was irritated and disillusioned and had implied in his statements that Great Britain and the United States had abridged a 'gentlemen's agreement' which envisaged an Arab defense pact under Egyptian direction and leadership unhampered by outside powers.⁵⁰ Finally, Nasser's attack on the Pact appeared to have been based on his distrust of Turkey, erstwhile master of the Arab lands, which had concluded a commercial

⁴⁹Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), DXXXIX (1955), 897.

⁵⁰New York Times, April 4, 1955, p. 9. See also Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers 1960), pp. 221-222.

treaty with Israel on July 4, 1950. Nasser was quick to point out that Iraq, contrary to the Arab interests, had indirectly associated herself with an unholy alliance with Israel.⁵¹

Nasser's unfavorable reaction towards Iraq's adherence to the Pact was neither surprising nor new. Cairo's view, influenced by the long British occupation of Egypt, was that the Arabs should shun Western alliances and build their own collective security system within the framework of the League. Similar views were held by Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The Baghdad Pact, to be sure, did not create new hostilities among the Arabs; it merely crystallized existing ones. Syria and Saudi Arabia had long practiced anti-Iraqi policies, and the Egyptian vehement opposition to the Pact caused them to fall naturally in line. Despite Cairo's opposition, the Turco-Iraqi Pact was concluded and signed on February 24, 1955. The immediate reaction in Cairo was unfavorable. The Egyptian Government protested that the Iraqi action was in flagrant violation of the spirit of the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League which forbade any member state to conclude any treaty with another outside power if that treaty contradicted the Arab Pact.⁵²

⁵¹H. G. Martin, "The Soviet Union and the Middle East," Middle Eastern Affairs, VII, No. 2 (February, 1956), 52.

⁵²Article 10 of the said treaty stipulates: "The Contracting States undertake to conclude no international agreements which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty, nor to act, in their international relations, in a way which may be contrary to the aims of this Treaty," Basic Documents of the League of Arab States (New York: The Arab Information Center, April 1955), p. 23.

The Baghdad Pact was followed by the signing on October 20, 1955, of a counter-agreement between Egypt and Syria to which Saudi Arabia and possibly other Arab States were expected to join. On a later date Egypt did draw Syria and Saudi Arabia into what amounted to a tripartite counter-alliance to the Baghdad Pact.⁵³

In perspective, one of the most striking features of the period between 1955 and 1957 was change and instability in the Arab Middle East. The Arabs' foreign policy was divided between the pro-Western and neutralist schools of thought. During this period the Kings of Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the Imam of Yemen conducted their foreign policy on the line of the neutralists - Syria and Egypt. Bilateral and multilateral pacts of mutual defense were concluded among the governments of these five countries in 1955 and 1956.

Nasser seemed to believe that the Arab States, wedged in between the United States and the Soviet Union, must endeavor to avoid being engulfed by either. The Arab States must try to form a united federal Arab State. Yet, in spite of this distant hope for a united Arab nation, a great danger was ever lurking behind the loose association of the Arab States under the so-called Arab League which came into being in 1945. It would be idle to deny that the drive for a closer Arab union was not

⁵³The full texts of the Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Pact, October 20, 1955, and the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Mutual Defense Pact, October 27, 1955, may be found in the Middle East Journal, X, No. 1 (Winter, 1956), 77-79.

based upon the external fear of the State of Israel. Very similarly, it was based upon passionate yearning of some demagogues like Nasser, Kassim, or Hussein for Arab leadership and political control. Recent political upheavals in Yemen served to illustrate that the Arab leaders involved were animated only by personal gains and selfish motives. Nasser of Egypt attempted to extend his influence to the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula on the one hand, while Kings Saud of Saudi Arabia and Hussein of Jordan were hoping to restore the status quo ante bellum.

Soviet Attacks On the Baghdad Pact

Western-sponsored military groupings in the Middle East aroused bitter Soviet attacks and accelerated their anti-Western propaganda in the Arab World. On March 20, 1954, Moscow issued a note to the Turkish Government in which it stated that the Turco-Pakistani alliance could only mar the good neighborly Soviet-Turkish relations. Moscow alleged that the projected pact would endanger Soviet security and hence, Turkey could not be oblivious of the consequences thereof. To be sure, Moscow charged that the Turkish-Pakistani pact was conspicuously linked with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Further, the pact was viewed as an aggressive attempt on the part of the United States and Britain to extend their military bases to the detriment of the security and interests of Middle and Near Eastern countries.⁵⁴

⁵⁴New York Times, March 20, 1954, p. 3.

Similarly, in a formal note to the Iraqi Government, then a prospective member of the alliance, on March 26, 1954, the Soviet Government indicated that the Iraqi participation in such military groupings in the Middle East would be incompatible with Russian interests and hence a hostile and unfriendly act. The Soviet Government informed Arab leaders that it vehemently opposed the ill-fated Middle East Defense Command of 1951 sponsored by Britain, France, Turkey, and the United States.⁵⁵

One of the most striking features of Soviet attacks on the military arrangements in the Middle East was directed against Iran which occupied a unique position in regard to the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet Union was quick to call the attention of the Iranian Government to the alleged talks between Premier Fazlollah Zahedi and United States Ambassador Loy W. Henderson, held at Teheran, Iran, ' . . . in the course of which allegedly there were given on behalf of Persia (Iran) certain assurances concerning the participation of Persia in the military measures of the U. S. A. in the Near and Middle East.'⁵⁶ The Soviet Government also alluded to Article 3 of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of October 1, 1927, which provided that neither of the contracting parties should undertake either formally or actually to participate in political arrangements

⁵⁵New York Times, March 27, 1954, p. 4.

⁵⁶New York Times, July 10, 1954, p. 2.

directed against the independence, security, integrity, or sovereignty of the other contracting party.⁵⁷

The Soviet Government attempted to persuade the Teheran Government to shun any military association with her neighbors. Moscow appeared willing to settle the territorial disputes and financial issues with Iran on conditions acceptable to the latter. However, should this soft policy fail the Soviet Union was prepared to use Article 3 of the 1927 Treaty as a reminder to the Teheran Government of its obligations. It should be noted that Iran accepted the concession made but was adamant in resisting Soviet attempt to elicit an official pledge restricting its future adherence to a Mid-East defense pact.⁵⁸

While rejecting Soviet demands to shun Middle Eastern sponsored alliance, Iran stated firmly that she would participate 'publicly and in good faith' in such regional arrangements within the United Nations Charter if such groupings were found to be in Iran's national interest. In her reply to the Soviet Government, the Iranian Government made it all too evident that Iran was 'entitled to take all measures that it judges desirable with a view to insuring its security and the defense of its independence and integrity.' The Iranian Government vigorously denied the Soviet's alleged charges that Iran was drawn into aggressive pacts

⁵⁷Ibid. See also The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VII, No. 48 (January 11, 1956), p. 23.

⁵⁸New York Times, July 11, 1954, p. 5.

directed against any other nation.⁵⁹

In a speech delivered before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Iranian Senate, Foreign Minister Abdullah Entezam stated:

We do not pursue a secret, devious policy, and are anxious to have cordial relations with our neighbors . . . We have not joined any pacts or alliances, but the views of the Government change on this score according to circumstances.

It should be noted at this juncture that the Iranian Government indicated its willingness to study the question of adhering to the Turco-Pakistani alliance after final settlement of the Iranian oil dispute which was in the offing.⁶⁰

In a statement issued on April 16, 1955, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the security of the Near and Mid-East aptly pointed out that the U. S. S. R. could not view with indifference the setting up of military groupings in the area of the Near and Mid-East, since such military blocs have an immediate bearing upon Soviet security. The note stated that the Soviet attitude should be made clear since the U. S. S. R. was situated in close proximity of the so-called "northern tier" countries.⁶¹

⁵⁹New York Times, July 19, 1954, p. 1.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 1-2.

⁶¹Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs 1955, Selected, Edited, and Introduced by Noble Frankland assisted by Patricia Woodcock (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 303.

Similarly, the U. S. S. R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated officially in Pravda, April 17, 1955, that the military groupings in the Near and Middle Eastern countries were needed only by American aggressive circles which were attempting to enslave the peoples of the region. Likewise they were needed by the aggressive British circles which were endeavoring to utilize such regional groupings in order to maintain and restore their dwindling position, without due regard to the vital interests of the peoples in the Near and Middle East.⁶²

In its protestation against the Baghdad Pact in general and Iran's adherence to the Turco-Iraqi-Pakistani Alliance the Soviet Government stated:

The conclusion of the Baghdad pact meant the formation of a military grouping in the Near and Middle East, which is an instrument of certain aggressive circles that are not interested in the consolidation of peace and international security.

The creation of such an alignment has, at the same time, the aim of preserving and re-establishing the colonial dependence of countries of this region.

The accession of Iran to this military alignment is incompatible with the interests of consolidating peace and security in the region of the Middle and Near East and contradicts the good-neighborly relations between Iran and the Soviet Union and certain treaty obligations of Iran.⁶³

⁶²The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VII, No. 16 (June 1, 1955), p. 18.

⁶³New York Times, October 13, 1955, p. 10. See also Middle Eastern Affairs, VI (November, 1955), 345.

On October 13, 1955, in an editorial entitled "Whither Iran?", Pravda claimed that the drawing of Iran into the Pact could only illustrate the insincere conduct of the Western powers. Likewise, the editorial pointed out it was inconsistent with the 'spirit of Geneva.' Furthermore, the action of these Western powers could only be interpreted to mean their desire to pursue their 'cold war' policy which would intensify rather than ease international tensions. In another statement Moscow raised the following question:

For what kind of 'regionality' can there be when, in addition to the three Near and Middle Eastern countries, Britain, a European country, openly belongs to the Baghdad pact, and when the United States, which is several thousand kilometers from this area, intends to join it? How can the Baghdad pact be called 'defensive' if it is to act as the 'bridge' between the aggressive European military bloc - NATO - and the aggressive Southeast Asian military bloc - SEATO - while its members are obliged to provide territory for setting up foreign military bases directly against the Soviet Union?⁶⁴

Very similarly, on April 1, 1957, the Soviet Government charged that the Bermuda Conference increased the threat of war. The Soviet Foreign Ministry alleged that the Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting demonstrated the profound intent of the two Western Governments to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. The official Foreign Ministry statement added that the United States desire to provide Britain with

⁶⁴The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VII, No. 41 (November 23, 1955), p. 18.

long-range guided missiles 'increased international tension and the threat of war.' The Soviet Union, the statement declared, viewed such decision with grave seriousness.⁶⁵ Alluding to the Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting the U. S. S. R. Foreign Ministry remarked:

The chief result of this discussion has been the agreement that the United States would de facto participate in the work of the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact.

Thus the United States has become a participant in this bloc, colonialist and aggressive in its nature, which was created for the purpose of enslaving the peoples of the East.

This is further proof of the aggressive nature of the foreign policy pursued by the United States in the Near and Middle East as expressed in the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine.

While hitherto the United States has tried to keep formally aloof from the colonial policy pursued by Britain in this area and to present itself as a adversary of the colonialist order now the legend of the anti-colonialism of the United States, which American propaganda has been eagerly spreading, has come to an end.⁶⁶

Soviet attack on the Bermuda Conference was by no means unique.

Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, British Labor party leader fulminated against Macmillan's report during a debate in the House of Commons. The Labor party demanded the cessation of British hydrogen bomb tests and insisted upon an investigation of charges of secret accord among Britain, Israel, and France. However, it should be noted that the Opposition leader did not call for a vote of confidence on the conduct of

⁶⁵New York Times, April 1, 1957, p. 1.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 4.

the Government's foreign policy.⁶⁷

Conclusion

Following the withdrawal of Iraq from the Pact on March 24, 1959, the remaining Muslim members - Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan - were taken aback. New assurances were given by the United States to northern tier members. Thereafter, the Pact's general headquarters were moved from Baghdad to Ankara, Turkey, and the defunct Pact became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

The Baghdad Pact was not without a flaw. To be sure, three of its members - Britain, Iran, and Turkey - viewed it as a shield against any possible Soviet aggression, while Iraq and Pakistan insisted that the chief danger to their security emanated from Israel in the case of Iraq and from India in the case of Pakistan. The United States, who remained a semi-official member, clung to the former conception.

This apparent diffusion of common interest was alluded to by Secretary Dulles after the conclusion of his mission to the Near and Middle East in an address delivered to the Nation over television and radio on June 1, 1953, in which he aptly stated:

There is vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.⁶⁸

⁶⁷New York Times, April 2, 1957, p. 4.

⁶⁸"Report on the Near East," (Address by Secretary Dulles), U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII, No. 729, Publication 5090 (June 15, 1953), 835.

The common destiny to which the Secretary alluded cannot be found while the Arab states are still engrossed with their quarrel with the State of Israel. Nor can it be found in the perennial dispute between India and Pakistan over the State of Kashmir. Furthermore, to the Arabs the common menace is Israel and not International Communism; to Pakistan it is apparently India and not Chinese aggression. Pakistan's fear of U.S. military aid to India in the recent Indian-Chinese undeclared war is a case in point.

Hence, a common consensus as to what constitutes a common danger is evidently lacking. John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, succinctly and rightly observed: "There is as yet no unanimity among the States of the Middle East with regard to the nature of the danger."⁶⁹

One of the most striking features of the first Eisenhower Administration in relation to the Near and Middle East was the determination to erect a cordon sanitaire against possible Communist aggression in the region. Thus the late Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, announced the "northern tier" policy. Esmond Wright ascertained that Dulles' conception of the northern tier was no more than an extension of Kennan's policy of containment.⁷⁰

⁶⁹Jernegan, op. cit., p. 567.

⁷⁰Esmond Wright, "Defence and the Baghdad Pact," The Political Quarterly, XXVII, No. 2 (April-June, 1957), 162-163.

While Secretary of State Dulles tended to believe that the Pact was a "major triumph" in arresting Soviet aggression and penetration into the Near and Middle East, other Western diplomats privately were inclined to regard the Pact as no more than a "major blunder." The all too obvious result in pressing the Pact was to intensify the armament race between Egypt and Iraq on the one hand and the Arab League members and Israel on the other.⁷¹

The weakness of the Baghdad Pact is not far to seek. Instead of containing Soviet intrusion into the Middle East, it served as a vehicle to give Egypt, Syria, and Yemen a pretext to enter in a military alliance with each other and to establish rapprochement with the U. S. S. R.

During the Baghdad Pact Council meeting at Ankara early in 1958, the Economist noted:

The scene suggested that the pact is not yet the instrument its champions hoped it would become. For it is neither America's original 'northern tier' nor an extension of Nato able to look to Nato powers, nor yet a local pact made of the solid stuff of purely regional interests. So far, it has served as little more than a friendly and stimulating military and economic club.⁷²

Paris diplomats contemptuously remarked: 'pactomania.' Some European newspapers commented: 'Empty threat,' and 'needless

⁷¹Michael Straight, "Dry Tinder in the Middle East," New Republic, CXXXIV (January 30, 1956), 9.

⁷²"Friends Though Divided; Baghdad Pact," Economist, CLXXXVI (February 1, 1958), 385.

provocation of Russia.⁷³

Thus, unquestionably, Dulles' preoccupation with the immediate objective of exploiting the northern tier idea to counter Soviet's expansionist aims in the Near and Middle East caused him to place great emphasis on the military aspects of the Pact at the expense of other objectives.

⁷³"To Prevent Aggression: Filling a Gap," Newsweek, XLVI (December 5, 1955), 36.

CHAPTER IV

THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN-EGYPTIAN ARMS DEAL

Major Events Leading to the Czech Arms Deal

The year 1955 opened a stormy chapter in American-Egyptian relations. The conclusion of the Baghdad Pact between Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey prompted Nasser to reappraise his pro-Western policies. When the United States gave its blessing to the Pact and adhered to most of its committees, Nasser commenced a withering cross-fire against the United States. Furthermore, the accession of Iraq to the "northern tier" alliance was viewed by Cairo as no more than a deliberate Western move to undermine Arab unity. Nasser resolved to reassert his leadership by calling upon the Arab states to shun any military alliance with the big powers. He envisaged the Pact as an unprecedented attempt by the West to strengthen Iraq as a competitor to Egyptian leadership and isolate Egypt in the region. Nasser, to be sure, had alluded to this Egyptian leadership rather pointedly when he stated in his book: Egypt's Liberation; The Philosophy of the Revolution:

We cannot look stupidly at a map of the world not realising our place therein and the role determining

to us by that place. Neither can we ignore that there is an Arab Circle surrounding us and that this Circle is as much a part of us as we are a part of it, that our history has been merged with it and that its interests are linked with ours. These are actual facts and not mere words.¹

The second major event that led to the deterioration of Egyptian-Western relations was the Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip on February 28, 1955. The Israeli armed attack on Egyptian-held territory in Gaza was condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission and later by the unanimous vote of the Security Council. The Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission emphasized that the attack was prearranged and planned by Israeli authorities. The violent and premediated attack inside the Egyptian controlled territory caused many casualties including thirty-six military personnel and two civilians dead, and twenty-nine military personnel and two civilians wounded.²

It should be noted that the Egyptian commandos, Fedayeen, had on many occasions crossed the armistice demarcation line and penetrated deep into Israeli territory. Thus, one might surmise that such frequent violations of the General Mixed Armistice Agreement of 1949 had led in part to the Gaza raid. The commandos incursions, murders, and sabotage activities were terrifying to Israeli citizens - quite as

¹Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Egypt's Liberation; The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo, U. A. R.: Information Department), pp. 52-53.

²United Nations, Security Council Official Records, Tenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March, 1955, Document S/3373, Annex III, pp. 60-61.

terrifying as the atrocious Israeli aggression against the Arabs.

The Gaza incident occurred at a time when relative tranquility prevailed along the Egyptian-Israeli frontier. In his report to the Security Council on the Gaza incident on March 17, 1955, General E. L. M. Burns stated that:

The number of casualties prior to the Gaza incident reflects the comparative tranquility along the armistice demarcation line during the greater part of the period November 1954 - February 1955.³

In a draft resolution submitted to the Security Council on March 28, 1955, France, Britain, and the United States condemned the 'prearranged and planned attack ordered by Israeli authorities' as a vivid violation of the General Armistice Agreement of 1949. The three Western powers requested the Chief of Staff of the U. N. Truce Supervision Organization to continue his consultation with both Egypt and Israel in the hope that both parties would comply with their obligations under the 1949 Armistice Agreement. Furthermore, the Western powers called upon the belligerent parties to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in his undertaking to preserve security in the area of the demarcation line between the parties.⁴

In spite of the urgent call by the Security Council upon both parties to put an end to their border disturbances and adhere to the

³United Nations, Security Council Official Records, Tenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March, 1955, Document S/3373, p. 36.

⁴United Nations, Security Council Official Records, Tenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1955, Document S/3379, p. 96.

principles of the Charter, the appeal was not heeded and peace did not prevail along the Gaza border. Egypt and Israel were both condemned repeatedly by the United Nations Security Council for official and unofficial retaliation along the demarcation line. Continued acts of aggression persisted despite the obligations imposed upon both parties by the General Armistice Agreement of 1949, and the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

In his unique interpretation of the Gaza incident of February 28, 1955, Mr. Arslan Humbaraci maintained that it was engineered to set a trap for Colonel Nasser. He stated that Israel hoped that if the incident did not bring about the downfall of Nasser's regime, it would undoubtedly impel him to search for security in the West, for only by doing so could he obtain the urgently needed arms for protection against Israel. Humbaraci believed that this was the prevalent reasoning of the West as well as the Turks, Iraqis, and Israelis. Israel was concerned about the British evacuation of the Suez Base and deemed it essential for its security that Egypt should adhere to a Western alliance. Only in this way could the West ensure that any arms delivered to Egypt would not be used against Israel.⁵

Humbaraci maintained that:

⁵Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment: From the Truman Doctrine, the Soviet Penetration and Britain's Downfall to the Eisenhower Doctrine (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1958), pp. 196-197.

The charge of anti-Egyptian collusion can be levelled in this case both at the West and the East. The West did nothing to prevent it, because it thought it would help the anti-Nasser campaign. The Russians did nothing because it suited their own particular game.⁶

Egypt, to be sure, blamed the Gaza incident upon the United States.

The Egyptians seemed to argue that Israel would never have engineered such an attack without assessing its effects upon the United States.

Ostensibly, Egypt remembered the repeated and unequivocal American refusals to provide her with modern weapons unless she adhered to a mutual security pact. Nasser was the man who categorically refused to submit to repeated political pressure and humiliation, and the U. S. and the West in general were unrealistic in assuming that they were the sole potential source of arms supply. Thus, the Gaza incident of February 28, 1955, was undoubtedly an important factor in impelling Nasser to move away from the West.⁷

Anglo-American Offer to Mediate
the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The situation along the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice line deteriorated rapidly. The danger of an Arab-Israeli war became greater. War fever, to be sure, was gaining momentum along both sides of the uneasy frontier. It was at this juncture that Britain and the United States offered to mediate in this emotionally charged conflict. In a statement to the

⁶Ibid., p. 197.

⁷Ibid., pp. 198-199.

House of Commons on April 4, 1955, Sir Anthony Eden alluded to Western obligations under paragraph 3 of the 1950 Tri-Power Declaration which read:

The three Governments, should they find that any of these States was proposing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as Members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.⁸

Mr. Eden viewed the words of paragraph 3 as "far-reaching" and expressed doubt if "it could be possible to devise in a treaty or anywhere else anything which carried more extensive obligations than they do."

The British Foreign Secretary added in unquestionable confidence that France and the United States equally shared his interpretation of the said Declaration and that they endeavored to fulfill their undertaking.

Mr. Eden suggested that should Israel and the Arab States reach an agreement, Her Majesty's Government would be ready to venture into a new form of guarantee. Such a settlement, he stated, would have to include the following issues: first, frontiers; second, the Jordan waters; and finally, the refugees. Her Majesty's Government would be all the more willing to lend its influence and assistance if desired. Furthermore, it would be willing to join into agreements in order to lend support to the agreement that might be reached.⁹

⁸Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), DXXXIX (1954-55), 899-900.

⁹Ibid., 900-901.

Secretary of State Dulles likewise discussed the Middle East problems on August 26, 1955, in an address delivered before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City. In his address Secretary Dulles suggested the following measures with the authority of President Eisenhower: first, an international loan to Israel so that it might be able to repatriate the Arab refugees and thus enable them to resume a life of self-respect and dignity. Second, the President of the United States would recommend U.S. participation in such an international loan for such an objective. Third, the President would recommend U.S. contribution to projects for water development and irrigation which would enable the uprooted refugees to find a permanent home. Secretary Dulles believed any solution which tended to end the plight of the refugees would undoubtedly help in eliminating the frequent incidents which had increased the tension along the demarcation line. Fourth, with the authority of President Eisenhower, Mr. Dulles stated that given a solution to the abovementioned problems he (the President) would be all the more willing to recommend that the U.S. enter into formal treaty arrangements to prevent any attempt by either side to change by force the boundary lines. Secretary Dulles expressed the hope that other countries would enter in such a security agreement, and that it would be under the auspices of the United Nations. By such a security guarantee, Secretary Dulles believed that the state of tension prevailing along the demarcation line and the acute fear would be relieved. Finally, the United States would

be willing to help in the quest for a solution of the existing frontier lines if requested by the parties concerned. Secretary Dulles, be it noted, attempted to delineate the possibilities that existed for a considerable measure of improvement. He stated pointedly that the U.S. was willing to further these possibilities by financially helping both parties if they so desired.¹⁰

On August 27, 1955, the British Foreign Office issued a statement in which it showed concern over the grave consequences which might result from the serious situation along the armistice line. Her Majesty's Government indicated readiness to help in bringing about more security across the armistice line. Furthermore, it expressed willingness to join in a formal treaty, as previously stated by Sir Anthony Eden in the House of Commons on April 4, with Israel and her neighbors concerning any territorial settlement that they might reach. The British Foreign Office welcomed American willingness to substantially contribute to an international loan to assist Israel to compensate the uprooted Arab refugees. The British Government also indicated its willingness to contribute to such an objective and hoped that the parties concerned would carefully examine the possibilities of a settlement.¹¹

¹⁰"The Middle East; Address by Secretary Dulles," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIII, No. 845, Publication 5984, September 5, 1955, 378-380.

¹¹New York Times, August 28, 1955, p. 3.

On November 9, 1955, in an address at the Lord Mayor's Banquet at the historic Guildhall, Sir Anthony Eden offered to mediate and use the good office of Her Majesty's Government in search for Arab-Israeli settlement. Mr. Eden asserted forcefully 'if there is anything, anything that we can do to help, we will gladly do it for the sake of peace.' Sir Anthony Eden went on to assail the Soviets for supplying war weapons to the Arabs only. Mr. Eden in his forceful speech warned that certain Arab countries might be submerged into the Communist bloc due to Communist subversive tactics. He urged the Arabs and the Israelis to reach a compromise in their boundary claims and asserted that Britain would be all the more willing to give a formal guarantee to such boundary agreement that might be reached by both parties. Mr. Eden suggested a careful consideration of the proposals made by Secretary Dulles on August 26, 1955.¹²

Egyptian-Czechoslovakian Arms Deal

After the Gaza incident on February 28, 1955, there was intense pressure in Egypt for acquisition of arms. Egypt's national interest demanded that prompt and decisive steps be taken to strengthen its armed forces. In an interview at Cairo with John D. Law, Regional Editor of the U.S. News & World Report, Premier Nasser showed bitterness towards Western continued assistance to the State of Israel and added:

¹²New York Times, November 10, 1955, p. 8.

I could be patient until Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip last February 28, but after that I could no longer be so. I am responsible for all of Egypt's interests, which include the defense of its territory as well as all the other things. So I got arms where I could get them, without conditions.¹³

It should be noted at this juncture that following the Egyptian Revolution, a military mission was dispatched to Washington to discuss with American officials the purchase of tanks, artillery and other heavy military equipment. Egypt signed a document - "the short form" - in which it consented that the arms purchased would be used only for defensive purposes. The conclusion of such an agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, the promises of arms delivery were broken or delayed. Prime Minister Nasser stated that his government was again assured of arms pending a settlement of the Suez Base dispute with the United Kingdom.¹⁴ The Egyptian Premier alluded to the fact that after the conclusion of the Heads of Agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom, President Eisenhower assured Major General Naguib that 'simultaneously' with the conclusion of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement, the United States would enter into 'firm commitments' with Egypt for economic assistance and for strengthening its armed forces so that they would be able to discharge their increasing responsibilities.¹⁵

¹³"Interviews With Prime Ministers of Egypt and Israel; Where War Threatens Now," U.S. News & World Report, XXXIX, No. 19 (November 4, 1955), 48.

¹⁴Ibid., 49.

¹⁵New York Times, July 31, 1954, p. 2.

The Gaza incident demonstrated that the Israeli army enjoyed supremacy in arms. This incident enhanced Egypt's search for arms. When the West showed reluctance to supply Egypt with the needed arms, the Egyptian Government found it necessary in June of 1955 to seek defensive weapons from certain Soviet bloc countries. The Egyptian decision to seek arms from the East came three months after the first Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip, and a little less than three years since Egypt's first request to the United States. Cairo's first request was addressed to Washington. Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser reiterated that Washington was informed in June that Egypt would obtain arms from the Soviet bloc if the U.S. would not be willing to supply them. 'It seems that they did not believe me,' Nasser stated. 'I suppose they thought it was a bluff. But it was not a matter for bluffing,' Nasser pointed out. 'I needed the arms and I had no alternative but to supply myself from the East.'¹⁶ Colonel Nasser insisted that Egypt had no aggressive aim towards the State of Israel. He pointed out that Egypt's search for arms was not prompted so much on Israel's present actual preponderance of power but rather on what that military preponderance would become in the ensuing year. Thus he stated:

I have sources of information in Paris, Athens, Rome, Brussels and Cyprus, and I know what Israel has contracted to receive in the next months. I am thinking of Israel's Army not as it is today but what it will be tomorrow.

¹⁶New York Times, October 6, 1955, p. 1.

For example, Israel is receiving delivery of an order for 100 French light tanks with a 75-millimeter, heavy-velocity gun. France agreed to sell us the same number but they stopped delivery. Worse than that, what was scheduled for shipment to us is now on the way to Israel.¹⁷

Similarly, Britain and France were also requested by Egypt for arms. They not only promised to deliver arms to Egypt, but even accepted payment in advance for certain orders of arms. Nevertheless, these two powers subsequently halted their delivery of the promised and paid-for arms, each for certain reasons of its own. On September 27, 1955, Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser criticized the Western powers when he announced that Egypt agreed to buy weapons from Czechoslovakia. Nasser stated that the United States offered to supply Egypt with arms only if she would sign an agreement under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 and that the arms would not be used for offensive purposes. Nasser pointed out that Egypt rejected such conditions because 'we refused arms at the expense of our freedom.' As to France, the Egyptian Premier remarked that she offered to supply Egypt with arms if Egypt would refrain from criticizing French North African policy.¹⁸ And as to Britain, Nasser stated that she:

. . . agreed to supply us with arms only if we did not oppose the Baghdad Pact. We said that we refused arms with conditions attached and we obtained unconditional supplies from the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia. We

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 1, 4.

¹⁸New York Times, September 28, 1955. p. 4.

also announced that our policy was against imperialism and the Baghdad Pact and military bases. By doing so, we were seeking the realisation of one of the goals we had announced - the building of a strong national army.¹⁹

With the announcement that Czechoslovakian arms were to be supplied to Egypt, Nasser emphasized the purely commercial nature of the agreement. He constantly repeated that the agreement was neither accompanied by any political alliance nor preceded by any political conditions. This agreement, Nasser stated, "stipulates that Egypt shall pay for these weapons with products such as cotton and rice." The unwarranted fear expressed in Washington and London to the contrary notwithstanding, Nasser repeatedly declared that this commercial transaction without restriction did not open the path for foreign or Soviet influence. He emphasized that Egypt was resolved to eradicate foreign influence; to build up a strong national army; and to become strong and independent and hence be able to achieve peace as was preached at Bandung.²⁰

The question of equipping the Egyptian Army with American weapons, however, marked a bitter chapter in American-Egyptian relations. In a hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign

¹⁹"Speech delivered by President Gamal Abdel Nasser on the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the Revolution" (Cairo: Information Department, July 22, 1962), p. 9.

²⁰Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1955, Selected, Edited, and Introduced by Noble Frankland assisted by Patricia Woodcock (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 371-372.

Relations and Committee on Armed Services, Ambassador Henry Byroade maintained that the United States did not turn down Nasser's request for arms when it was made in June. On the contrary, it was under consideration when Prime Minister Nasser accepted the Soviet offer. However, when Ambassador Byroade was questioned by Senator J. W. Fulbright as to why Egypt went to the Russians instead of the United States, he answered that the problem of arms sale undoubtedly led Nasser to the conclusion that there was no real hope of eliciting real support from the West nor could the security of Egypt be entrusted to the Western powers. American reluctance to supply Egypt with arms, Ambassador Byroade believed, led Nasser to fear a possible Western embargo on his line of supply in the event of war with the State of Israel. Furthermore, Nasser seemed to have reached the conclusion that as a matter of policy and principle, the West could not and would not permit imbalance of arms to exist between Israel and her Arab neighbors.²¹ Also, American insistence that Nasser sign a military aid agreement appeared to the Egyptian leader as no more than substituting American power with British power before the latter even withdrew from the Suez Canal Zone.²² In addition, the Egyptian Government appeared to have reached the

²¹U. S. Congress. Senate. The President's Proposal on the Middle East, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, 85th Congress, First Session, on S. J. Res. 19 and H. J. Res. 117, Part II, February 5, 6, 7, 8, and 11, 1957 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 715.

²²Ibid., p. 730.

conclusion that it could not, through any sort of negotiation, purchase the weapons it desired through the West.²³ It should be noted at this juncture that prior to Nasser's deal with the Soviet bloc countries, Ambassador Henry Byroade on several occasions recommended to the Department of State to make a reasonable agreement with Nasser in order to prevent Russian arms from entering into the region.²⁴

Likewise, in a hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Jefferson Caffery, U.S. Ambassador to Cairo, stated that "He (Nasser) wanted military assistance without any conditions, and we had conditions."²⁵ Also, in answer to Senator Hubert Humphrey's question, "Is it not true that the Egyptians offered to buy arms from the United States, and we offered to sell, but our price was too high?," Admiral Arthur Radford, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked:

I don't think that was the real reason. What they wanted to buy, as I recall them, were types of weapons we did not want them to buy.

Maybe the price had something to do with it, but in my opinion it was not really the controlling factor.²⁶

²³Ibid., p. 737.

²⁴Ibid., p. 728.

²⁵Ibid., p. 783.

²⁶U. S. Congress. Senate. "The President's Proposal on the Middle East," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, 85th Congress, First Session, on S. J. Res. 19 and H. J. Res. 117, Part 1, January 14, 15, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30; February 1 and 4, 1957 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 438.

Also, Secretary John Foster Dulles contended that the rationale behind the Egyptian-Czech arms deal was that the prices demanded by the United States were too high, and that Nasser found that he could purchase military weapons from the Soviet camp more cheaply, and on the basis of a barter of rice and cotton.²⁷

Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser explained his country's position in an address at a reception given by Vice-President Abdel-Hakim Amer at the Huckstep Barracks on the occasion of the completion of the annual training of the Third and Fourth Army Divisions on March 30, 1959, when he vividly stated:

The British forces were evacuated from this country, while we were only armed by our faith in God, and faith in ourselves. We were in need of arms, but we did not want to bind ourselves with conditions. We wanted to buy arms which we could use, but not that which would convert us into serfs.

We therefore refused to obtain arms with strings attached to them; and we objected to join imperialist or foreign alliances. We also refused to convert our country into a base for imperialism or a base for aggressive forces. We strongly rejected that our country be included in any zone of foreign influence. We insisted that we should be free and that our country should be absolutely independent.²⁸

Similarly, the New Times (Moscow) wrote:

²⁷U. S. Congress. Senate. Situation in the Middle East, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th Congress, Second Session, February 24, 1956 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 17.

²⁸Gamal Abdel-Nasser, President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's Speeches and Press-Interviews (Cairo, U.A.R.: Information Department, 1959), p. 194.

In pursuance of their 1950 declaration, the Western Powers refuse to sell arms to Middle East countries that do not adhere to their military alliances. One of these countries is Egypt; its leaders have been vigorous in their opposition to the Baghdad pact and refused American arms on shackling conditions. The Nasser government, guided by the interests of the nation, concluded a commercial deal with Czechoslovakia last year and received the weapons required for defense. This agreement, to which no conditions were attached, helped to fortify Egypt's independence.²⁹

By concluding the Czech arms deal, Nasser was not oblivious of the fact that his action was no more than a calculated risk. The Soviet arms deal with Egypt seemed to seriously threaten the balance of power in the Middle East and make an Arab-Israeli war more probable. Furthermore, the arms deal appeared to satisfy Nasser's Army upon whom the Egyptian Premier depended.

Nasser's calculated risk, be it noted, was given unequivocal support by the Council of the Arab League when it held Egypt's right to equip its armed forces with weapons purchased from any country. Statements of support came from various centers. The Egyptian Army and police commands, the Egyptian Bar Association, and the Chamber of Commerce expressed their support. Likewise, the rector of Al Azhar University expressed his full support and congratulations. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador to Egypt, Sheikh Abdullah el Fadl, stated to reporters that he saw 'no reason why all other Arab states should not follow Egypt's example' in procuring arms from Czechoslovakia or any

²⁹New Times (Moscow), June 14, 1956, p. 4.

other place where they could obtain them.³⁰

The Arab support for Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia was by no means unique. The Soviet Union expressed its support in the following terms:

For its part, the Soviet government holds the view that every state has the lawful right to provide for its defence and to buy arms for its defence needs from other states on the usual commercial terms, and no foreign state has the right to interfere in this or to present any unilateral claims that would infringe the rights or interests of other states.³¹

American Reaction to the Soviet Arms Deal with Egypt

With the announcement that Czechoslovakian arms were to be supplied to Egypt and other Arab states, the United States Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary stated that their governments had been in close consultation with each other and with other states concerning arms supply policies in the Middle East and that they were in complete accord on this matter. Both governments, they remarked, based their policies on the hope that internal security in the Middle East might be had on the one hand and arms race might be avoided on the other. The two statesmen expressed the hope that other states would

³⁰New York Times, October 2, 1955, p. 7.

³¹Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents . . . 1955, op. cit., p. 375.

"be guided by these principles."³²

On September 28, 1955, the Department of State sent George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, to Cairo to look into the problem of the announced Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms arrangement. Secretary Dulles described Allen's mission to Cairo as 'only a more or less routine visit that Assistant Secretaries make to the region for which they are accountable.'³³ On his mission Mr. Allen was expected to warn the Egyptian Government that the purchase of heavy military equipment from the Soviet bloc was unquestionably a matter that would be considered with grave seriousness by the West.³⁴ Official Western resentment towards the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal seemed to be primarily based upon the following assumptions: first, that the purchase of Soviet arms would tend to create imbalance of armaments, thus undermining what the West had attempted to do under the 1950 Declaration. Second, that the Soviet Union would take the opportunity to widen the rift that existed between certain Arab states and the West and thereby undermine Anglo-American influence in the Middle East. Third, that the arms arrangement with the Soviet bloc would ostensibly tend to weaken the Southern flank of

³²"Policy on Supplying Arms to Countries of the Middle East," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIII, No. 850, Publication 6015 (October 10, 1955), 560.

³³New York Times, September 29, 1955, p. 10.

³⁴Ibid.

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The avowed purpose of the Allen mission appeared to be aimed at the minimization of the effect of the Egyptian-Czech contact rather than at its cancellation. Ostensibly, the United States seemed to have accepted the arms-cotton barter arrangement as fait accompli. At the conclusion of his sudden mission to Cairo, the United States diplomat stated that he gained vivid understanding of Egypt's policy. While the U.S. was not in full agreement with the Egyptian policy, he said, the United States policy could henceforth be based upon a more realistic grounds.³⁵

In answer to a question pertaining to Mr. Allen's progress in his talks with Colonel Nasser during a news conference, Mr. Dulles stated:

He has had a very good talk, indeed two rather full talks, from which I think he has gained an insight as to the Egyptian motives in this matter, and I think that Colonel Nasser has gained an insight as to our attitude toward the matter. There is better understanding than there was before. I think in substance that is the result of his trip and that was the purpose of his trip.³⁶

In a separate press release, however, Secretary Dulles made two important observations. First, that the Arab states were independent

³⁵New York Times, October 4, 1955, p. 18.

³⁶"Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIII, No. 851, Publication 6037 (October 17, 1955), 604.

and hence free to act as they desired in this matter. Second, that from the standpoint of Soviet-American relations, the delivery of arms to the Middle East would not contribute to easing tensions. Secretary Dulles stated that "those two observations stand today" and added:

It is difficult to be critical of countries which, feeling themselves endangered, seek the arms which they sincerely believe they need for defense. On the other hand, I doubt very much that, under the conditions which prevail in the area, it is possible for any country to get security through an arms race. Also it is not easy or pleasant to speculate on the probable motives of the Soviet bloc leaders.³⁷

In a statement issued from the temporary White House in Denver, Colorado, on November 9, 1955, President Eisenhower reaffirmed the principles embodied in the Tri-Power Declaration of May 1950. The President stated that while the United States was willing to consider demands for legitimate defensive arms, it did not intend to contribute to an arms race in the Middle East. The policy of the United States which President Eisenhower believed would contribute significantly to the security of the peoples of the region was expressed in the Tripartite Declaration. "This," President Eisenhower declared, "still remains our policy."³⁸

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸U. S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy 1950-1955: Basic Documents, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 2238. See also New York Times, November 10, 1955, p. 1.

Under the Tri-Power Declaration of May 1950, it was the avowed policy of the United States, Britain, and France to prevent any forcible change in the Armistice line of 1949 by either side. Furthermore, it was the primary aim of these three powers to restrict the flow of arms into the area.

Following a three day visit to the United States early in 1956, British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden and President Eisenhower issued a joint statement pertaining to the situation in the Middle East. In this joint statement the two leaders declared their willingness to contribute to a settlement that might be reached between Israel and her Arab neighbors by helping financially in solving the refugee problem and by guaranteeing agreed boundaries. Furthermore, they expressed the belief that the security of countries in the region cannot be based solely upon arms but rather upon friendly relations among neighboring states and upon due regard to international law. In addition, they viewed the shipment of arms from the Soviet bloc to certain Middle East states as a potential threat to peace and security in the area. And finally, they expressed their full support for the efforts of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization to maintain peace along the demarcation line.³⁹

The problem of arms supply was further complicated by Soviet promises to extend technical and economic assistance to certain Middle

³⁹"Text of a Joint Statement, " U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIV, No. 868, Publication 6286 (February 13, 1956), 233.

Eastern countries. Soon the situation became more grave. In a news conference held on October 18, 1955, Secretary Dulles indicated that there might be informal discussion in regard to the supply of arms to some Arab States with the Soviet Foreign Minister at the Geneva Conference. In his answer to the questions of whether or not the Western powers were committed under the Tri-Power Declaration of May 1950 to supply Israel with arms, Secretary Dulles replied that one could not draw "very certain conclusions merely from the terms of the declaration itself." Nor could Mr. Dulles yet assess the military importance of the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal, since the "business of secondhand arms" was "very difficult to appraise accurately." The value of discards, stated the Secretary, was not always easy to evaluate.⁴⁰

In spite of the apparent agreement on the 1950 Declaration, British and American differences in regards to its terms and clarity remained evident. While Mr. Anthony Nutting, British Minister of State, considered it as "a far more automatic document than most international agreements and documents of today,"⁴¹ Secretary John Foster Dulles seemed to consider it very vague when he stated in a press conference on October 18, 1955: "I do not think that one can draw very certain

⁴⁰"Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIII, No. 853, Publication 6049 (October 31, 1955), 688-689.

⁴¹Great Britain. House of Commons. 5 Parliamentary Debates, DXLV (1955-56), 673.

conclusions merely from the terms of the declaration itself."⁴² Also, one might point out the lack of coordination of arms shipments between the Tripartite bloc to the Middle East countries. In answer to Senator Hubert Humphrey's question, "In view of the tripartite agreement of 1950, can you tell us what coordination there is between Britain and France and the United States on the shipment of arms to Near Eastern countries?", Secretary Dulles stated: "Well, there is a, what I would say was a, loose cooperation. We, neither of us, exercise a veto power over the other."⁴³

The London Economist described succinctly the impact of Egypt's decision upon the 1950 Declaration in the following terms:

From the western angle, far the most serious angle of Egypt's decision is the upset it causes in the delicate balance on the Palestine frontier. So far, the western powers' supply of arms to Israel and the Arabs has been governed by their declaration of May, 1950, and the clause in it which binds the Middle Eastern states not to use for aggression the weapons they buy from the West; that clause now loses its value, and Anglo-American policy is being reshaped accordingly. The reshaping, however, is somewhat one-sided, for Israel has since 1948 been buying armaments wherever it can get them from behind, as well as in front of, the Iron Curtain.⁴⁴

⁴²"Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference," October 31, 1955, op. cit., 689.

⁴³U. S. Congress. Senate. "Situation in the Middle East," op. cit., p. 49.

⁴⁴"Russian Arms for Egypt," The Economist, CLXXII, (October 1, 1955), 20.

The Egyptian-Czechoslovakian arms deal was ostensibly an apparent propaganda victory for the Soviet Union. The important questions, however, were could the West have arrested the Czech arms deal? How should the Western powers counter Soviet apparent propaganda victory? and what was the rationale behind the Soviet move? The answers to such questions are not hard to seek. First, one might argue that the United States could have reached a "reasonable" arrangement with Egypt had it wished to do so. Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (Public Law 665) stipulated:

Of the funds made available under this Act, not to exceed \$150,000,000 may be used in any fiscal year, without regard to the requirements of this Act or any other Act for which funds are authorized by this Acts, in furtherance of any of the purposes of such Acts when the President determines that such use is important to the security of the United States.⁴⁵

Second, the West could have pursued the following courses of action.

It could have increased arms supplies to the State of Israel on the one hand, or it could have requested the United Nations supervision of arms traffic entering the Middle East. However, neither Britain nor the United States took action along these suggested courses. Instead, the two Western powers were prompted to make a major bid for rapprochement with Egypt. One aspect of this rapprochement was all too evident

⁴⁵United States Statutes at Large, 83rd Congress, Second Session, 1954, LXVIII, Part 1, Public Laws and Reorganization Plans (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 843.


when Britain and the United States assured Mr. Abdel Monein El Kaissouni, Egyptian Minister of Finance. in December 1955 that they were willing, subject to legislative authority, to support construction of the High Aswan Dam project. Finally, the rationale behind the Russian move might be interpreted as a calculated effort to counter the Baghdad Pact which was formed early in 1955. Furthermore, the move might well indicate Russia's deliberate attempt to weaken traditional Western influence in the region, by offering economic and technical assistance allegedly without conditions attached.

CHAPTER V

AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE SUEZ CRISIS

The Aswan Dam Affair

During the month of December of 1955, Mr. Abdel Moneim El Kaissouni, Egyptian Minister of Finance, met with Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins, and World Bank President Eugene Black. Their discussion centered on the possibility of assisting Egypt in building the High Aswan Dam (see map on the following page). The United States joined with the United Kingdom and with the World Bank in an offer to assist the Republic of Egypt in the construction of the High Aswan Dam on the Nile. The inestimable importance of this project was: the development of the Egyptian economy and the improvement of the lot of the Egyptian people. The United States and British Governments extended unequivocal assurance to Mr. Kaissouni to the effect that such aid to help finance the early stages of the work would be forthcoming. Further assurance was given to Egyptian Minister of Finance that the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom would consider sympathetically further support to help



finance the later stages to supplement World Bank financing.¹

The contemplated December, 1955, offer by the United States and United Kingdom was to be withdrawn on July 19, 1956, when the State Department issued the statement which was to wit: (a) the Republic of Egypt had not reached an agreement with Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda on the question of Nile water rights; (b) considerable doubt was cast upon the Egyptian readiness and ability to concentrate its economic resources upon this vast construction program as "developments within the succeeding seven months have not been favorable to the success of the project." Thus, the United States Government reached the conclusion that it was all the more unfeasible under the present circumstances to grant aid to help finance the contemplated project. The United Kingdom, too, revoked its support of the Aswan scheme.²

The rationale behind the abrupt cancellation of the offers to build the Aswan High Dam was not far to seek. United States and British policymakers tended to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the Egyptian government had mortgaged much of her national income in Czech arms deals, had increased her trade with the satellite countries, and had recognized Communist China. In addition, Egypt had not reached an

¹"Discussions Concerning Financing of Egyptian Dam Project," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIII, No. 861, Publication 6220 (December 26, 1955), 1050-1051.

²"Aswan High Dam," Middle Eastern Affairs, VII, No. 809 (August-September, 1956), 298-299.

agreement with Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda on the question of Nile water rights.

Siegbert J. Weinberger maintained that the underlying reason which led the United States to abruptly revoke its offer was

. . . that President Gamal Abd an (sic) Nasser of Egypt had played a successful undercover game involving the East and West in a struggle of competitive bids for Egyptian favor, with the Egyptian ruler acting as sole umpire.³

Similarly, John Robinson Beal wrote:

The choice was between letting him down easily, through protracted renegotiation that came to nothing, or letting him have it straight. Since the issue involved more than simply denying Nasser money for a dam, a polite and concealed rebuff would fail to make the really important point. It had to be forthright, carrying its own built-in moral for neutrals in a way that the ormolu of applied propaganda would not cheapen.

As a calculated risk the decision was on a grand scale, comparable in the sphere of diplomacy to the calculated risks of war taken in Korea and Formosa.

It risked opening a key Middle East country, one whose territory bracketed the strategic Suez Canal, to Communist economic and political penetration. It risked alienating other Arab nations, controlling an oil supply without which Western Europe's mechanized industry and military defenses would be defenseless.

Dulles' bet was placed on his belief that it would expose the shallow character of Russia's foreign economic pretensions and that most nations would accept the thought that there comes a time when tolerance must give way to firmness. He risked the prestige of the United States on those beliefs, knowing it would bring reaction on a commensurate scale, and counting on U.S. power and resourcefulness to cope with the change and movement in Middle East and cold-war politics

³Siegbert J. Weinberger, "The Suez Canal Issue 1956," Middle Eastern Affairs, VIII, No. 2 (February, 1957), 46.

which it would bring about. His experience at sailing in diplomatic waters convinced him the breeze would be better if he took a new and independent tack. Nasser reacted one week later, almost to the hour, by seizing the Suez Canal - but not, surprisingly, by turning immediately to Russia for aid on the dam. The future of that project remained for the moment obscure, an unknown quantity in the maneuvering that was to follow.⁴

If the rationale behind Dulles' decision appeared to show intolerance of so-called Nasser's positive neutrality and to "expose the shallow character" of Soviet economic offensive in the Middle East, subsequent results, be it noted, illustrated the antithesis of the expectation.

The question that one might pose at this juncture is whether or not Dulles' daring risk was either desirable or necessary. Also, one might ask whether it was based upon the alarms of the ostensible Soviet presence and influence in the Middle East. Whatever conclusion one might arrive at one salient fact remains all too evident. The late Secretary of State could have left the door open for negotiation with the Egyptian Government. Evidence appeared to show that the passionate judgments precluded effective discussion of the issue and of the practical means of resolving it.

Mr. Dulles put himself in a position which permitted no retreat. Thus, compromise became all the more difficult. Also, it seemed that any retreat would henceforth incur a serious loss of prestige. In

⁴John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles, a Biography (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1957), pp. 260-261. Used by permission of the publisher.

retrospect, Dulles' intransigent refusal to extricate himself from that untenable position of negotiating with Nasser earmarked incompetent diplomacy.

The Egyptian reaction in Cairo was manifested in angry statements which depicted the American action as a calculated effort to destroy Nasser's prestige in the area. The Egyptian Government rejected American insinuations that Egypt would not be able to carry her share of financing the Aswan High Dam scheme. The Egyptian President had taken it upon himself to do his part to carry out the planned project, the alleged accusations of the United States and Britain notwithstanding.

The United States-British abrupt cancellation provided a pretext for Nasser to seize and nationalize the Universal Suez Maritime Company, whose concession had still twelve years to run. In his nationalization decree Gamal Abdel Nasser stated:

The Suez Canal Maritime Company, S. A. E., is nationalized. All money, rights and obligations of the company are transferred to the State. All organizations and committees now operating the company are dissolved.

Shareholders and holders of constituent shares shall be compensated in accordance with the value of the shares on the Paris Stock Market on the day preceding the enforcement of this law.

Payment of compensation shall take place immediately. The State receives all the assets and property of the nationalised company . . . ⁵

⁵Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1958), p. 226. See also Carol A. Fisher and Fred Krinsky, Middle East in Crisis: A Historical and Documentary Review (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1959), pp. 134-136, and The United Arab Republic Year Book, June 1959 (Cairo, Information Department), p. 70.

The unilateral action of the Egyptian President gave rise to violent attacks from different quarters. Nasser was depicted as the "Hitler of the Nile." Christian Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, stated that the news from Cairo was 'of a nature to make one think Colonel Nasser is at bay.'⁶ American condemnation was by no means less severe. An editorial in the New York Times described Nasser's action as no more than "blackmail, lies and bluff" which must be countered by "reason, economics and law."⁷ The State Department announced on July 27, 1956, that the seizure of installations of the Suez Canal carried "far-reaching implications" and that the United States Government was "consulting urgently with other governments concerned."⁸

An official in the State Department viewed the situation with due seriousness from the outset. On July 28, 1956, Acting Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., met with the Egyptian Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Ahmed Hussein, to discuss with him the recent developments that wedged a rift in United States-Egyptian relation. The Acting Secretary of State protested against the unwarranted, inaccurate, and misleading statement made by President Nasser in his Alexandria speech

⁶Weinberger, op. cit., p. 48.

⁷New York Times, July 28, 1956, p. 16.

⁸"Seizure of Installations of Suez Canal," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXV, No. 893, Publication 6378 (August 6, 1956), 221-222.

on July 26, 1956.⁹ The State Department protestation was by no means unique. The United Kingdom viewed the nationalization of the Suez Canal as a "serious threat to the freedom of navigation on a waterway of vital international importance."¹⁰

On July 28, President Nasser circulated a statement among foreign governments declaring: that the Universal Suez Canal Company was nationalized, the opposition by some governments to the contrary notwithstanding. This opposition, namely by Britain and France, the President maintained, was devoid of any rational basis since the canal was situated in Egyptian territory and had always been considered an Egyptian company, like any other Egyptian company liable to be nationalized. This nationalization, Nasser asserted, did not affect Egypt's international commitments. The circular assured the foreign governments of Egypt's determination to honor her international obligations and to continue the operation of the canal as guaranteed both by the October 29, 1888, convention and the October 19,

⁹ Ibid., 222. The full text of the Alexandria speech may be found in Carol A. Fisher and Fred Krinsky, Middle East in Crisis: A Historical and Documentary Review (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1959), pp. 136-140. In this latter source Nasser was quoted as saying "We shall work, produce and step up production despite all these intrigues and these talks. Whenever I hear talk from Washington, I shall say, 'Die of your fury.' We shall build up industry in Egypt and compete with them. They do not want us to become an industrial country so that they can promote the sale of their products and market them in Egypt. I never saw any American aid directed towards industrialization as this would cause us to compete with them. American aid is everywhere directed towards exploitation."

¹⁰ "Aswan High Dam," op. cit., 299-300.

1954, Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Base.¹¹

While the Western Big Three (United States, United Kingdom and France) considered Egypt's unilateral action as contrary to international law, the Soviet Union and Communist China announced their unequivocal support of Egypt's nationalization as a legal act. Thus, on July 31, 1956, Premier Nikita Khrushchev appealed to the Western powers to be moderate and cautious in reacting towards Nasser's action. The Soviet Union, to be sure, insisted that Egypt's sovereignty and rights should be guaranteed and safeguarded.¹² Furthermore, the New Times (Moscow) stated that Nasser's action did not affect the peoples of any country, whether France, Great Britain, or the United States. To be sure, it was only the former Suez Canal Company that was deprived of the possibility to exploit the canal at Egypt's expense. Any attempt to denationalize the Suez Canal by force in order to recover the privileges of the defunct company, the New Times expressed, was no more than colonialism in disguise.¹³

In a joint statement issued by the governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States on August 2, 1956, the following remarks were made:

¹¹Mideast Mirror, August 4, 1956, 16.

¹²Public Affairs Institute, Regional Development for Regional Peace: A New Policy and Program to Counter the Soviet Menace in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Institute, 1957), p. 142.

¹³New Times, August 9, 1956, pp. 4-5.

(We) do not question the right of Egypt to enjoy and exercise all of the powers of a fully sovereign and independent nation, including generally recognized right, under appropriate conditions, to nationalize assets, not impressed with an international interest, which are subject to its political authority.

But the present action involves far more than a simple act of nationalization. It involves the arbitrary and unilateral seizure by one nation of an international agency which has the responsibility to maintain and to operate the Suez Canal so that all the signatories to, and beneficiaries of, the treaty of 1888 can effectively enjoy the use of an international waterway upon which the economy, commerce, and security of much of the world depends.¹⁴

Behind the vigorous protestation of the Western powers was, however, the fact that President Nasser's nationalization speech at Alexandria, July 26, 1956, posed a direct challenge to them. The United States' protest to Egypt was primarily against the tone and content of his statements rather than the nationalization action.¹⁵ The governments of Great Britain and France took joint action in order to safeguard the assets of the Suez Canal Company which were valued at about 50 million pounds of which over half was in Britain.¹⁶

¹⁴"London Conference on the Suez Canal," Middle Eastern Affairs, VII, No. 10 (October, 1956), 340. See also Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1956, Selected, Edited, and Introduced by Noble Frankland assisted by Vera King (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 138.

¹⁵For the full text of United States' protest to Egypt see U.S. Department of State, The Suez Canal Problem, July 26 - September 22, 1956: a documentary publication (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 33.

¹⁶Mideast Mirror, August 4, 1956, 2-3.

These protestations on the part of the Western powers were not left unchallenged. Egypt made reference to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Article VIII, which stipulated that the Suez Canal was an "integral part of Egypt." Similarly, the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Base of October 19, 1954, stated:

The two Contracting Governments recognize that the Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on 29th October 1888.¹⁷

The fact that the Suez Canal was an "integral part of Egypt" made it all the more evident that it was Egypt's incontestable right as a sovereign state to nationalize a public utility lying wholly within its territorial jurisdiction. Dr. Fayez A. Sayegh believed that the incontestable Egyptian status of the Canal refuted the claim that it was "international." Dr. Sayegh based his belief upon a memorandum submitted by the British Government itself in 1939 to the Mixed Court of Appeals of Alexandria. The memorandum stated:

It would be a legal anomaly to consider the Company at one and the same time Egyptian and non-Egyptian, i. e., universal. Such definition contradicts the general principle of law . . . The Suez Canal Company is a legal person in accordance with Egyptian law. Its nationality and character are solely Egyptian. It is therefore subject to the Egyptian laws. It is true that the Company is given the name of

¹⁷The British Information Services, The Security of the Middle East (New York: The British Information Services, August 1956), Appendix 4, p. v.

'The Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal.' This appellation, however, has no legal significance and no legal effects can be derived from the mere designation of the Company. There is no doubt that this designation cannot deprive the Company of its Egyptian nationality. The Company is Egyptian in accordance with the established general principles of law and in particular with the principles of private international law and the provisions of the Company's organic law. It is Egyptian because it is granted a concession which has for its object Egyptian public assets and because its legal principle center is in Egypt.¹⁸

British and French Government hoped to enlist the support of the United States to place the Suez Canal under the supervision of an international body in order to insure free passage as pledged by the Convention of 1888. Also, it was hoped that the United States would support the use of force to safeguard the Canal and if possible to get rid of Nasser. To be sure, President Eisenhower made it clear that the use of force should be averted at all costs when he stated that the American objectives and policies 'were formulated at the beginning of this thing. We sat down and we were determined to pursue a course that would not lead to war. We were certain a negotiation could settle this problem.'¹⁹

Throughout the troubled weeks that followed the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the United States endeavored to prevent the conflict from

¹⁸Fayez Abdullah Sayegh, Notes on the Suez Canal Controversy (New York: Arab Information Center, November 7, 1956), p. 6.

¹⁹Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs 1956 (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 260. Used by permission of the publisher.

degenerating into an open armed hostility on the one hand, while seeking to maintain and recognize Western solidarity and vital interests on the other.

The London Conferences

On August 2, 1956, a twenty-four-power international conference was officially called for the 16th. The cardinal objective of the conference was to substitute negotiation for the use of force and to safeguard future navigation through the Canal. The object of this procedure, according to the Three-Power communique issued August 2 was to wit:

. . . to establish operating arrangement under an international system designed to assure the continuity of operation of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention of October 29, 1888, consistently with legitimate Egyptian interests.²⁰

The British and the French Governments agreed to settle the problem by peaceful means while reserving the right to use force if the negotiation procedures failed. It should be noted, at this juncture, that the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pointed out that the United States agreed with Britain and France that the unilateral action of Egypt merited severe censure, but that the United States would have to refrain from committing itself to support them in any steps they

²⁰M. Abou Nouseir and et al., The Suez Canal, Facts and Documents (Cairo: The Selected Studies Committee Select No. 5, n.d.), p. 239. The text of the Three-Powers on August 2, 1956, may be found also in the "Text of Tripartite Statement," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXV, No. 894, Publication 6379 (August 13, 1956), 262-263.

deemed necessary to take in case the conference failed. "We would hope," stated Secretary Dulles, "that out of this would come a solution which all the nations, including Egypt, will respect so that the danger of violence may be averted."²¹

The forthcoming London Conference was viewed as a vehicle for solving the problem. The Egyptian Government officially rejected the invitation to participate in the deliberation of the conference. The underlying reason for the Egyptian rejection was not far to seek. President Nasser made it clear that Egypt had no sympathy for the attempt to set up an "international system" for the supervision and control of the Canal. Furthermore, international control, Nasser said, was no more than a collective colonialism and would affect the sovereignty of Egypt. Thus on August 12, 1956, President Nasser made the following statement:

. . . As regards the invitation to the conference, the Egyptian Government is most surprised that Britain decided to call a conference in order to discuss the Suez Canal, which is an inseparable part of Egypt, without consulting the Egyptian Government, who is directly concerned in the canal. The British Government alone decided to invite the twenty-four governments to attend this conference, fully aware that forty-five countries used the canal during 1955.

Therefore the Egyptian Government is convinced that this conference and the circumstances in which it was called cannot be regarded in any way as international and it is not entitled to take decisions.

This conference has no right in any way to discuss any issue concerning the sovereignty of any of her

²¹"Arrival Statement by Secretary Dulles," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXV, No. 894, Publication 6379 (August 13, 1956), 262.

parts. Therefore the invitation to such a conference cannot be accepted by Egypt.²²

Furthermore, the Government of Egypt alluded to the conspicuous provocative and ominous statement made by Sir Anthony Eden in the House of Commons on August 2, 1956, to wit: that certain precautionary military measures were taken by Her Majesty's Government in order to cope with any new situation in the Mediterranean. Such measures entailed the deployment of certain Air Force, Army, and Navy units into the region and the recall of reserve officers.²³

Such was the atmosphere under which Egypt concluded that important positive results could not be had. The Egyptian Government viewed that the threat of force or the direct use of force by Britain and France was no more than a vivid violation of the high principles embodied in Article 2, Paragraphs 3 and 4²⁴ of the United Nations Charter and offensive to Egypt and Egyptian sovereignty. Coercive measures formulated by Britain and France were considered to prejudice a final just and equitable solution.

²²U.S. Department of State. The Suez Canal Problem. . . op. cit., pp. 51-52.

²³Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons) DLVII (1956), 1606.

²⁴Paragraph 3 of Article 2 stipulates: "All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."

Paragraph 4 of Article 2 states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

Under such circumstances the conference proceeded to work out some plan that might serve as a basis for negotiation with the Egyptian Government. Secretary of State Dulles immediately proceeded to delineate the proposals of the three Western powers for a four-point plan for settling the matter. This plan which was outlined by Mr. Dulles and subscribed to by eighteen Western-oriented nations stipulated: first, the operation of the Suez Canal should be made the responsibility of an international board set up by treaty and associated with the United Nations. Egypt would have a representative on the board but the board would be constituted in such a manner that no single nation would dominate it. Furthermore, it would be the sole responsibility of the board to discharge its duties without political considerations in favor of or in prejudice against any of the users of the Canal. Second, Egypt would have "the right to an equitable return" which would take into consideration "all legitimate Egyptian rights and sovereignty." Third, fair and just compensation would be paid to the Universal Suez Company. Finally, any difference over the provisions of the last two points would be referred to an arbitral commission designated by the International Court of Justice.²⁵

The Dulles plan was by no means the only one submitted at the Conference. V.K. Krishna Menon, the Indian representative, produced a plan which was adhered to by Indonesia, Ceylon, and the Soviet Union.

²⁵Dulles, John Foster, "London Conference on Suez Canal," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXV, No. 896, Publication 6383 (August 27, 1956), 338.

The Indian Plan called for: first, the acknowledgment of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Egypt; second, "the recognition of the Suez Canal as an integral part of Egypt and as a waterway of international importance"; third, the insistence upon free navigation for all nations in accordance with the 1888 Convention; fourth, the collection of equitable and just transit tolls without any discrimination; fifth, the maintenance of the Canal in proper condition at all times; and, sixth, the recognition of the users' interests.²⁶

Both the Dulles and Indian plans took cognizance of the legitimate Egyptian rights and sovereignty as well as of the international interests involved. Yet, despite these similarities, it was only the Western plan which called for an international board to control and supervise the operation of the Canal. Unlike the majority plan, the minority plan would have left the control and operation of the Canal in Egypt's hand, accepted Nasser's pledge to carry out his international obligations, and acknowledged the users association under Egyptian management.²⁷

The objections of the Soviet and Indian delegates notwithstanding, the eighteen powers supporting the majority plan called on Egypt to negotiate an agreement for the international control of the Canal. In order to insure that the principles set forth in the plan would be observed on a permanent and reliable basis the following were suggested: (a) the

²⁶Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 174.

²⁷Stebbins, op. cit., p. 263.

establishment of a Suez Canal Board to insure an efficient operation of the Canal. Membership on the Board would be in such a manner agreed upon by members of the Convention. It would be the duty of the Board to submit periodic reports to the United Nations. (b) the establishment of an Arbitral Commission to settle any dispute arising under the provisions of equitable return to Egypt and fair compensation to the Universal Suez Canal Company, or other matters pertaining to the operation of the Canal. (c) the use of sanctions for the violation of the Convention by any member state or any other state. Also, it was noted that any use or threat of force that might interfere with the operation of the Canal would be considered as a threat to peace and violation of the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. (d) the necessity of providing for the suitable association and review within the United Nations.²⁸

A five-man committee²⁹ under the chairmanship of Premier Robert G. Menzies of Australia presented the Dulles proposals to the Egyptian Government. The proposals were rejected in their entirety. The Egyptian position remained adamant on the question of "international control." Egypt's rejection of the proposals was hailed by the Soviet Union as 'another blow against colonialism.'³⁰ This diplomatic mission

²⁸Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., pp. 176-177.

²⁹The five-man committee consisted of the representatives of the governments of Australia, Ethiopia, Iran, Sweden, and the United States of America.

³⁰Public Affairs Institute, op. cit., p. 142.

failed to produce any tangible results.

In a letter to Prime Minister Robert G. Menzies dated September 9, 1956, President Nasser was unable to accept the proposals delivered by the five-man committee. The underlying reasons were to wit: such proposals were apt to be viewed by the Egyptian people as hostile and as encroaching upon their sovereignty and rights, the sum of which tends to preclude any genuine cooperation. President Nasser warned that any effort to superimpose such international system on the Suez Canal would undoubtedly be the beginning of incalculable struggle which would put the Canal in the midst of politics, instead of being insulated from political interference. The success of any system to operate the Canal, he believed, hinged upon the cooperation and willingness of the Egyptian people.³¹

After rejecting the proposals delivered by the five-man committee, the Egyptian Government submitted a memorandum to the signatory powers of the 1888 Convention and to the United Nations Secretariat which stipulated as follows: first, that Egypt was all the more willing to sponsor, in conjunction with the Constantinople Convention signatories of 1888, a conference to review the convention and consider an agreement guaranteeing free navigation; second, the Government of Egypt expressed hope that a solution could be had on the questions of free navigation in

³¹U. S. Department of State. The Suez Canal Problem,
op. cit., p. 319.

the Canal, its improvement to meet future needs of navigation, and the establishment of fair and equitable duties and tolls.³²

By September 9, 1956, the question had again been reduced to whether to fight or talk in the next phase of the dispute with Egypt over the Suez Canal. The situation was succinctly described in an editorial in the New York Times thus: "The Suez Canal situation is moving with dramatic suddenness into a crisis whose outcome cannot be foreseen at this moment. It is like a battle that is just beginning."³³

A Suez Canal Users' Association was set up at a second conference in London on September 12, 1956. The cardinal objectives of this body, whose membership would include the Big Three and many others, would be to employ its own pilots, to collect transit tolls (part of which would be paid to Egypt), and to try to enlist Egyptian cooperation in maintaining the free use of the Canal for all nations at all times. It was hoped at this conference (September 19-22) that the cooperation of the Egyptian authorities would be forthcoming and provisional de facto arrangements would be formulated until final agreements could be had.

The attempts of the Second London Conference to seek a just and peaceful solution of the Suez question were undermined by the following statement issued by the Soviet Government on September 15, 1956:

³²United Nations Security Council, Official Records, 11th Year, 736th meeting (October 8, 1956), pp. 3-4.

³³New York Times, September 13, 1956, p. 34.

The attempts of certain states to force on Egypt, in the name of the London conference, the proposal to withdraw the Suez Canal from the control and sovereignty of Egypt, failed. The conference took only one decision - ~~to convey to the Egyptian government a complete verbatim report of the conference.~~ The sponsors of the resolution in favour of international operation of the Suez Canal, however, decided to act separately, outside the framework of the conference, setting up for this purpose the so-called 'five-power committee.' This committee was set up for the obvious purpose of trying to force on Egypt the so-called 'Dulles plan,' which provides for transferring the Suez Canal to foreign control.³⁴

In a Cairo speech, September 15, 1956, President Nasser rejected the proposal for a Canal Users' Association:

Today they are speaking of a new association whose main objective would be to rob Egypt of the canal and deprive her of rightful canal dues. Suggestions made by Eden in the House of Commons which have been backed by France and the United States are a clear violation of the 1888 convention, since it is impossible to have two bodies organizing navigation in the canal.

It is equally impossible for the proposed organization to remain abroad and continue to collect dues. If this were permissible we for our part would form an organization for users of the port of London - a situation which would spell international anarchy and the end of international law and relations.

We instructed our Ambassador to Washington to tell America's Foreign Secretary that America is helping Britain excite people in Egypt and engage them in a new war. The American President has been speaking of maintaining peace, so why does America support this proposal for the formation of an association which they call an association for users of the canal but which is in truth one for declaring war?³⁵

³⁴Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 224.

³⁵U.S. Department of State, The Suez Canal Problem . . ., op. cit., p. 348.

Nasser's insistence to restore to Egypt her pride, dignity, and independence at all costs became in his mind a fundamental principle, allowing for no modification or exception. Such a fundamental principle was all the more explicit when he urged the Egyptian people to work towards the creation of a new Egypt that would be economically and politically independent. President Nasser denounced the past imperialist exploitation and called for a new strong and independent Egypt, be it noted, standing squarely on the best Wilsonian ideal of self-determination.

The United Nations Consideration

At this juncture an agreement on basic Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) aims was followed by a joint British-French request on September 23, 1956, for a United Nations Security Council study of the Suez Canal crisis.³⁶ Also, Egypt presented its counter charges to the Security Council for consideration alleging that the joint British-French military build-up in the Mediterranean was endangering international peace and security and was consequently a clear violation of the United

³⁶United Nations Security Council, Official Records, 11th year, 734th meeting (September 26, 1956), p. 2. The reason underlying the joint Anglo-French request for the United Nations Security Council to study the Suez crisis was viewed by New Times (Moscow) as no more than a tactical method of forcing Egypt to negotiate on the basis set forth at the London Eighteen Power Conference and to recognize the Users' Association. The joint Anglo-French move was thwarted by the adamant refusal of the United Nations Security Council to approve the policy of pressure and of ultimatum. The New Times, October 25, 1956, p. 12.

Nations Charter.³⁷ In the meantime the Suez Canal Users' Association was formally established October 1, 1956, at the opening session of the Third London Conference.

On October 5, 1956, a joint Anglo-French Resolution on the Suez issue was submitted to the Security Council for consideration. The joint draft resolution charged Egypt as subjecting the operation of the Canal to the Egyptian national interest and exclusive control, the interests of other nations concerned to the contrary notwithstanding. The said resolution called upon Egypt to negotiate on the basis set forth at the London eighteen-power conference and to recognize the Users' Association pending a permanent settlement.

As was to be expected in the Security Council deliberations on the Suez matter the Russian delegate, Dmitri T. Shepilov, strongly denounced the attempts to internationalize the Suez Canal as no more than the work of "reactionary elements" attempting "to force Egypt to its knees" and "serve as a lesson to other peoples of the East."³⁸

America's vacillation coupled with the Soviet's veto of all the operative parts of the resolution left Messers Selwyn Lloyd and Christian Pineau no alternative but to accept the remaining six principles of their resolution. It was mutually understood that any settlement of the Suez

³⁷United Nations Security Council, . . . , 11th year, 734th meeting . . . , p. 16.

³⁸United Nations Security Council, Official Records, 11th year, 736th meeting (October 8, 1956), p. 17.

question must be governed by the following requirements:

- (1) there should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert - this covers both political and technical aspects;
- (2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
- (3) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country;
- (4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users;
- (5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development;
- (6) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due.³⁹

On October 15, 1956, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, addressed a letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council.

In his letter the Egyptian Foreign Minister accepted on behalf of the Government of Egypt the six principles which were adopted unanimously by the Security Council on October 13, 1956. Mr. Fawzi alluded to his Government's acceptance of the said principles as contributing to future negotiations on the question of the Suez Canal.⁴⁰ It should be noted that the six principles were agreed upon during exploratory conversations on the Suez Canal question between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, and Egypt. These six principles comprised the first part of the joint Anglo-French resolution.

³⁹United Nations Review, III, No. 5 (November, 1956), p. 19.

⁴⁰U. S. Department of State. United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956 - June 1957 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 120-121.

The second part was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

Following the adoption of the six principles, Secretary Dulles stated:

I regret that it has not been possible for the Council to agree on more than the principles, the requirements, of a settlement; but that already is much. I think, of course, it is understood that the Council remains seized of this matter and that the Secretary-General may continue to encourage interchanges between the Governments of Egypt, France and the United Kingdom - a procedure which has already yielded positive results.⁴¹

Similarly, the late Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, commented that the resolution which was unanimously approved by the Security Council reflected the accord reached on the six principles between Britain, France, and Egypt during their private talks. The late Secretary-General believed that the resolution passed by the Security Council might well be considered as a valuable step in the exploration of a possible avenue to find a peaceful and just solution to the Suez Canal problem.⁴²

On October 30, 1956, a significant episode in the sequence of events took place. Israeli armed forces penetrated inside the Sinai Peninsula. Thus the Arab-Israeli conflict served as a pretext for Britain and France to send an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, giving both twelve hours to agree to a ceasefire. This ultimatum was promptly rejected

⁴¹United Nations Review, III, No. 5 (November, 1956), p. 59.

⁴²Ibid.

by Egypt. As a result of Egypt's rejection of the ultimatum, British and French forces moved from Cyprus and invaded the Canal Zone and moved into Port Said and Port Fuad on November 5-6, 1956.

The immediate reaction of the United States was to put the matter before the Security Council to consider steps for immediate cessation of military activities against Egypt. It was during the meeting of the Security Council on October 30, 1956, that the resolutions opposing military action were vetoed by Britain and France. It should be noted here that it was the first time that Britain had exercised the veto power, and it was also the first time that the Soviet Union and the United States had been incidentally allied against Britain and France. The American-sponsored resolution called for: first, immediate cease fire; second, withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the established armistice lines; and third, nonassistance of the United Nations which might otherwise prolong the hostilities. The American action, to be sure, was based upon the provisions of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 by which the Western Big Three committed themselves to guarantee existing Arab-Israeli borders, or in other words, to maintain the status quo. Nevertheless, with Australia and Belgium abstaining, the vote on the American resolution was 7-2; Britain and France cast the negative votes.⁴³

⁴³ United Nations Security Council, Official Records, 11th year, 749th meeting (October 30, 1956), Draft Resolution S/3710, p. 31.

In an address to the Security Council on October 31, 1956, Sir Pierson Dixon, the British delegate on the Security Council, contended that the overriding purposes of the intervention was to safeguard the Suez Canal and to prevent disastrous conflagration throughout the area. It was all the more imperative, the British delegate continued, to take such a measure in the absence of any effective United Nations action and to restore peace and order in such extreme exigency.⁴⁴

The Soviet delegate submitted a compromise resolution which called for immediate cease fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egypt but omitted recommendations that other members of the United Nations refrain from intervention. The Soviet resolution was defeated (7-2); France and Britain cast the negative votes while Belgium and the United States abstained.⁴⁵

The defeat of the American and Russian sponsored resolutions in the Security Council by British and French vetoes, prompted that body on October 31, 1956, to call the General Assembly into emergency session under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 (proposed by former United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson).

On November 1, 1956, the General Assembly met in a special session and approved an agenda (62-2) which called for debate on the

⁴⁴Fisher, op. cit., pp. 148-150.

⁴⁵United Nations Security Council, Official Records, 11th year, 750th meeting (October 30, 1956), Draft Resolution S/3713, Rev. 1, p. 5.

Egyptian-Israeli fighting.⁴⁶ The United States presented a resolution which called on "all parties now involved in hostilities in the area" to "agree to an immediate ceasefire" and "halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area."⁴⁷ The United States resolution was approved by the General Assembly (64-5) on November 2, 1956.⁴⁸

The following day (November 3) the cease-fire appeal made by the General Assembly was rejected by Britain and France. The rationale behind the rejection was based on the assumption that police action must go forward to halt the hostilities threatening the Suez Canal and that only police action could facilitate a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁴⁹ Britain and France insisted that a halt to military action could only be had on the condition that: (1) both belligerents agree to accept the United Nations force to maintain and protect the peace; (2) the United Nations maintain such a force until an Arab-Israeli peace settlement is reached and until satisfactory arrangement had been agreed upon in regard to the Suez Canal; and (3) until a United Nations force was ready, permit limited detachments of Anglo-French troops be stationed between the combatants.⁵⁰

⁴⁶New York Times, November 2, 1956, p. 3.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸United Nations Review, III, No. 6 (December, 1956), p. 8.

⁴⁹New York Times, November 4, 1956, p. 1, 18.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 18. See also United Nations Review, III, No. 6 (December, 1956), p. 24.

Continuing its emergency session on the Middle East crisis, the General Assembly considered a Canadian proposal for an emergency United Nations force to secure and supervise a cessation of hostilities in the Middle East. On November 5, 1956, the General Assembly approved the Canadian resolution (57-0 with 19 abstentions) creating a United Nations Command Force under Major-General E. L. M. Burns of Canada who was directed to begin "the recruitment for the Command."⁵¹

The unfolding drama at the United Nations Headquarters took a new turn on November 6, 1956. The Secretary General disclosed at a press conference that Britain and France had ordered their forces to observe the cease-fire. The following day (November 7) the General Assembly approved a resolution sponsored by nineteen Afro-Asian nations calling for immediate withdrawal of the invading forces from Egypt. American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., informed the United Nations that the United States would aid the United Nations Force as regards airlifts, shipping, transport and supplies.⁵²

It was at this juncture that Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin addressed a letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower in which he stated that the United States and the Soviet Union as permanent members of the Security Council and possessors of "modern types of weapons, including

⁵¹United Nations Review, III, No. 6 (December, 1956), p. 9. See also New York Times, November 5, 1956, p. 1.

⁵²Ibid.

atomic and hydrogen weapons," bore "special responsibility for stopping the war and restoring peace and tranquillity in the area of the Near and Middle East."⁵³ Bulganin suggested that if American and Soviet air and naval forces were combined in the Middle East, "on a decision of the United Nations," it would insure a guarantee "for ending aggression against the Egyptian people."⁵⁴ Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of the United States called the Soviet suggestion an "unthinkable suggestion that Soviet military forces, together with those of the United States, should be sent into the fighting in Egypt unless the fighting stops within twelve hours."⁵⁵ Similarly, Dr. E. Ronald Walker of Australia remarked "on the Soviet move as 'an act of odious and heartless effrontery . . . a blatant attempt to inject Soviet power into the Middle East in its most naked form.'"⁵⁶ On November 5, 1956, the Security Council refused to consider the Soviet resolution calling for joint U. S. - Soviet action under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter. The United States viewed the Soviet proposal as counter to "everything the General Assembly and the Secretary-General are doing."⁵⁷

⁵³Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 293.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵United Nations Review, III, No. 6 (December, 1956), p. 38.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

On November 22, the late Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld stated that the United Kingdom, France, and Israel had declared their intention to withdraw their forces as soon as the United Nations Emergency Force was able to assume its tasks. An Afro-Asian resolution was adopted by the Assembly, (63-5 with 10 abstentions), calling upon the United Kingdom, France, and Israel to 'comply forthwith' with the Assembly resolutions. In compliance with Assembly resolutions Israel informed the Secretary-General of its intent to withdraw its forces by December 3, 1956. The following day Britain and France assured the United Nations that they would 'continue the withdrawal' of their military forces from Egypt without delay.⁵⁸

Following the withdrawal of the British, French, and Israeli forces, the United Nations Emergency Force units were advanced into the Sinai. Likewise, United Nations operations to clear the Suez Canal of obstructions resulting from the Anglo-French ill-fated invasion were initiated full speed on December 31, 1956, in cooperation with the Egyptian authorities.

The Aftermath

One of the basic problems that occupied the attention of the London Conference centered on the effective and uninterrupted operation of the Suez Canal. To be sure, the exercise of Egypt's sovereign rights was

⁵⁸United Nations Review, III, No. 7 (January, 1957), p. 1.

not questioned. Thus, in order to secure control over the operations of the Canal, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles desperately searched for a formula that would establish a new system of international control and management of the Canal. The rationale behind such a diplomatic maneuvering was not far to seek. It was the cardinal objective of the Western powers to establish an "international system" of control in order to maintain freedom of transit through the Canal. Nasser regarded such a plan as no more than collective imperialism designed to deprive Egypt of her sovereign rights. But, doubtful that Nasser would accept any kind of international system, the British and French Governments were impelled to assert themselves. The United States made it clear that any use of force would be opposed. This opposition to the use of force was conspicuously manifested when the United States joined the Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian countries in denouncing the tripartite invasion as a wanton act of aggression. No time was lost in the United Nations to call upon Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw their forces from Egypt. The position of the United States could hardly have been doubted. The President emphatically stated that the United States would not involve itself in military operations in the Middle East:

There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we work to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends.

The society of nations has been slow in developing means to apply this truth. But the passionate longing for peace on the part of all peoples of the earth compels

us to speed our search for new and more effective instruments of justice.⁵⁹

The tragic situation in the Middle East left the United States in a dilemma. Confronted with the prohibition of the United Nations Charter against the use of force, world opinion, Communist breakthrough in the Middle Eastern area, and Arab-Asian bloc friendship, the United States stressed the importance of immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of the invading forces from Egypt. America's action dismissed the interests of its NATO allies. The most obvious immediate consequence of America's indifference to her Western allies was the breakdown of the West's solidarity. To be sure, the Suez fiasco highly damaged Western prestige and awakened the latent fears of the Asian peoples of ruthless Western imperialism. The use of force to bring Nasser to his senses seemed to admit a lack of statesmanship and bankrupt policy on the one hand and miscomprehension of the real forces in the Middle East on the other.

The United States found it exceedingly difficult to accept the Anglo-French approach to Nasser. It was feared that all Asia would be alienated in the cold war struggle to Russia who appeared as their self-proclaimed protector and champion against twentieth century Western imperialism.

⁵⁹"Developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East; Address by President Eisenhower," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXV, No. 907, Publication 6414 (November 12, 1956), 745.

Alfred Grosser has succinctly remarked: ". . . one can afford to be uncouth towards those on whose allegiance one can count, whereas one has to be far more careful with those who might switch to the other side."⁶⁰

President Eisenhower aptly expressed the American policy when he made the following pertinent statement:

In all the recent troubles in the Middle East there have indeed been injustices suffered by all involved. But I do not believe that another instrument of injustice - war - is the remedy for these wrongs . . . We cannot, in the world any more than in our own nation, subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong, one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us. There can be only one law.⁶¹

Settlement of the Suez Canal question, the United States believed, hinged upon the acceptance of the six basic principles set forth by the Security Council resolution.⁶²

Recognizing its interests and international responsibility, the Egyptian Government issued a unilateral declaration on April 24, 1957, as follows: reaffirmation of its determination to uphold the Constantinople Convention of 1888, namely, the freedom of navigation. It stated that the transit tolls would remain substantially unchanged and made provisions for partial negotiation on this matter. Disputes with the signatories

⁶⁰ Alfred Grosser, "Suez, Hungary and European Integration," International Organization, XI, No. 3 (Summer, 1957), 474.

⁶¹ "The Greater Purposes; Eisenhower's Declaration of Independence on Foreign Policy," Time, LXVIII, No. 20 (November 12, 1956), 29.

⁶² See United Nations Review, II, No. 5 (November, 1956), p. 19.

of the 1888 Convention concerning its provisions would be submitted to the International Court of Justice. Finally, the declaration was registered with the United Nations Secretariat.⁶³

The declaration failed to include the six principles emphasized by the United States and adopted by the Security Council. It failed to insulate the operation of the Suez Canal from politics, and the provision pertaining to transit tolls fell short of the principle enshrined in the Resolution. These defects notwithstanding, the declaration maintained the status quo ante and tended to make the international community participate in fixing the transit tolls.⁶⁴

In spite of the provisional acquiescence of the declaration by most members of the Security Council, France considered it to be "in flagrant contradiction to the six principles unanimously approved by the

⁶³Joseph A. Obieta, S.J., The International Status of the Suez Canal (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 108. In this source is a letter dated July 18, 1957, and addressed to the Secretary-General. In it the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt stated: "I, Mahmoud Fawzi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Egypt, declare on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Egypt, that, in accordance with art. 36 (2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and in pursuance and for the purposes of paragraph 9 (b) of the declaration of the Government of the Republic of Egypt dated 24 April 1957 on 'the Suez Canal and the arrangements for its operation,' the Government of the Republic of Egypt accept as compulsory ipso facto, on condition of reciprocity and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal disputes that may arise under the said paragraph 9 (b) of the above declaration dated 24 April 1957, with effect as from that date." Ibid., p. 127 (Appendix D).

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 108.

Security Council in October 1956.⁶⁵ At this juncture, the Philippines representative observed that 'The United Nations must continue to seek a final solution, while giving the interim arrangements a chance to work out without injury to the interests of any of the nations involved.'⁶⁶

The last step in the settlement of the compensation of the Suez stockholders was reached on July 13, 1958, when the final agreement was signed in Geneva at the United Nations European Office. It was due to the tireless efforts of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that a final settlement was reached. Acting as a fiscal agent, the Bank was to collect the payment from the then United Arab Republic.⁶⁷

Thus, one may conclude from this study that in launching their military operations against Egypt, Britain and France failed in their objectives. The tripartite attack on Egypt in the autumn of 1956 resulted only in an upsurge of sympathy for Egypt and revulsion against Britain, France, and Israel. Copious evidence of such sympathy for Egypt and support throughout the world could be seen in the repeated appeals addressed by the U. N. General Assembly to Britain, France, and Israel to put an immediate end to the war against Egypt and withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory.

⁶⁵United Nations Review, IV, No. 1 (July, 1957), p. 39.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷United Nations Review, V, No. 2 (August, 1958), p. 2.

It should be noted that while the withdrawal of Britain and France was prompt and unconditional in response to the U. N. demands, Israel attempted to use her military victory as a strategem designed to gain free passage through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. Israeli withdrawal was obtained, however, under repeated pressure from the United States coupled with assurance of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and U. N. control of the Gaza Strip pending a definite agreement in regard to the future of the territory.

One of the main tasks of the United States policy following the Anglo-French withdrawal from Egypt should have been to overcome the shock suffered by Western attack. Nothing could have been more conducive to better American-Egyptian relations than the de-emphasis on all out crusading against International Communism in the Middle East. It is, henceforth, on this problem that American-Egyptian priorities became incompatible. To the Egyptian Government the overriding issue was not communism but eradication of Western influence and the problem of Palestine. To American foreign policymakers the issue seemed to be that Egypt, in her quest for freedom and place among the community of nations, was apt to overlook the real dangers of communism. Thus, the real indictment of American failure to cope satisfactorily with Egypt's raison d'etre led to stress and strain in their relations and culminated in the rejection of the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine. No soothing statements were able to abridge the rift between rising chauvinistic

Egyptian nationalism, pride, and fear of alien domination on the one hand, and America's deep concern over Soviet intrusion in the Middle East on the other.

Egypt's political and psychological triumph, her military defeat to the contrary notwithstanding, seemed to have supplied an intransigent fervor against Western powers. Egypt's foreign policymakers diametrically opposed the proposed American doctrine, however sincere it may have been. Similarly, public opinion in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab states seemed, unavoidably, to demand non-entanglement with either Washington or Moscow. As a political doctrine the Eisenhower Doctrine is treated in the following two chapters which attempt to survey the rationale and assumptions behind the doctrine; the Arab reaction to the Doctrine in light of their policy of non-alignment; and point out the need for a new American Mid-East policy.

CHAPTER VI

THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

The Containment of International Communism

On January 5, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a resolution to Congress authorizing him to use military action to prevent possible Communist aggression in the Middle East. On January 30, 1957, the House voted 355 to 61 in favor of the President's Resolution.¹ On March 5, 1957, the Senate by a vote of 72 to 19 passed the amended version of the Resolution which limited the discretionary power of the President. On March 7, 1957, the House by a vote of 350 to 60 favored the amended Resolution.² In his special message which was delivered

¹"The Administration's New Mid-East Doctrine," Congressional Digest, XXXVI, No. 3 (March, 1957), 73. The proposed resolution was introduced as House Joint Resolution 117, 85th Congress, First Session, January 5, 1957, by Representative Thomas S. Gordon (Illinois) Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to the message of that date by the President to the Congress. U.S. Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East: September 1956 - June 1957 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 23.

²U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy; Current Documents, 1957 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 829.

before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives on January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower expressed his deep concern about the new and critical situation in the Middle East. He stated that Communization of the Middle Eastern nations would be a tragedy to the Middle East countries and a great threat to the Western powers. This serious situation could have disastrous effects on American political and economic life. Stressing the immense strategic importance of the Middle East, the President pointed to the following facts:

1. The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, would today be prized more than ever by International Communism.
2. The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not scruple to use any means to gain their ends.
3. The free nations of the Mideast need, and for the most part want, added strength to assure their continued independence.³

In his special message to Congress, President Eisenhower proposed joint Congressional and Executive action in regard to the Middle East. The proposed action can be summarized as follows: (1) cooperation with and assistance to the nations of the Middle East in their economic development and the maintenance of their national independence; (2) the initiation of "region programs of military assistance and cooperation" with the

³Dwight D. Eisenhower, "President Asks for Authorization for U. S. Economic Program and for Resolution on Communist Aggression in Middle East; Message of the President to Congress, " U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVI, No. 917, Publication 6436 (January 21, 1957), 85.

Middle Eastern nations which so desire; and (3) the use of American armed forces "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism."⁴

The Eisenhower proposal is indicative of the strategic importance the United States attaches to the Middle East and of its determination not to tolerate Communist aggression. The premise on which Eisenhower's proposal rests appears to be the same as that underlying ex-President Harry Truman's policy concerning Greece and Turkey stated as follows in his message to a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, ". . . totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."⁵

In his State of the Union Message to Congress, January 10, 1957, President Eisenhower referred to his request of Congress for certain declarations and actions with respect to the Middle East. The President was referring to the threat of International Communism in the area when he stated:

. . . I say again that this matter is of vital and immediate importance to the Nation's and the free world's security and peace. By our proposed

⁴Ibid., 86.

⁵Harry S. Truman, "Recommendations on Greece and Turkey; Message of the President to Congress," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XVI, No. 409A, Publication 2802 (May 4, 1947), 831.

programs in the Middle East, we hope to assist in establishing a climate in which constructive and long-term solutions to the basic problems of the area may be sought.⁶

The Proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the determination of the United States to protect the Middle East against International Communism left no doubt in the minds of the Russian leaders that their attempts to Communize and control the Middle East nations would be met by counteractions and if necessary by force. The position of the United States is well summed up in the President's message to Congress on January 5, 1957. In his message the President stated:

The policy which I outline involves certain burdens and indeed risks for the United States. Those who covet the area will not like what is proposed. Already, they are grossly distorting our purpose. However, before this Americans have seen our nation's vital interests and human freedom in jeopardy, and their fortitude and resolution have been equal to the crisis, regardless of hostile distortion of our words, motives, and actions . . . The occasion has come for us to manifest again our national unity in support of freedom and to show our deep respect for the rights and independence of every nation - however great, however small. We seek not violence, but peace. To this purpose we must now devote our energies, our determination, ourselves.⁷

The Eisenhower Doctrine, stated Ambassador James P. Richards at the conclusion of his mission to the Middle East on May 9, 1957, is

⁶Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The State of the Union; Message of the President to the Congress (Excerpts)," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVI, No. 918, Publication 6441 (January 28, 1957), 125.

⁷Eisenhower, "President Asks for Authorization . . . , op. cit. 87.

not designed to form a new alliance, to seek new military bases or a sphere of influence in the Middle East but is to help protect the independence of the peoples of the area against Soviet aggression.⁸ On January 7, 1957, John Foster Dulles testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, that the purpose of the new "American Doctrine," as the State Department officials like to call it, is the promotion of peace and internal stability. Mr. Dulles stated the purpose is:

. . . precisely the same purpose that animated us in the action we took at the time of the armed attacks first by Israel and then by the United Kingdom and France in the area. We were motivated of course, in the first instance by our respect for the undertakings we had assumed in the Charter of the United Nations, and by our various treaties, such as the North Atlantic Treaty, which opposed the use of force against the territorial integrity of any country, and we opposed the use of force against the territorial integrity of one of the Middle East countries, when that was involved. We sought through the United Nations to help maintain the independence of one of those countries. That is precisely what we intend to do by this program; to help protect the territorial integrity of those countries and to help build up and strengthen their independence. As that is realized I think they will realize this is a reenforcement of the policies which they respected and admired when we carried them out in the early days of November, and that is a continuity of United States policy which they will welcome.⁹

⁸ Ambassador James P. Richards, "Ambassador Richards' Mission to the Middle East," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVI, No. 935, Publication 6497 (May 27, 1957), 841.

⁹ "The Administration's New Mid-East Doctrine," op. cit., 80.

During a debate in the House, on January 29, 1957, on the House Joint Resolution 117, United States Representative Robert B. Chipfield of Illinois and a ranking Republican member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom and France from the strategic area of the Middle East created a power vacuum. Under such circumstances it became necessary to act on the Eisenhower Resolution to preserve national security and to shield the Middle East against Communist aggression both from within and from without.¹⁰ Commenting on the usefulness of the Eisenhower Doctrine John C. Campbell wrote:

The Eisenhower Doctrine is designed to accomplish certain things it was necessary to do, above all to make the Congress and the American people aware of the seriousness of the Soviet Union threat in the Middle East and to put their weight behind the President in his future efforts to keep the area free of Soviet domination. It constitutes a clear warning to the Soviets. And it is a useful, even necessary, statement of the American purpose to be pondered by the peoples of the Middle East.¹¹

It is evident that what President Eisenhower wanted was not a constitutional authorization which was already vested in him by the United States Constitution (Article 11, Sections 2 and 3), but popular support and more foreign aid to the countries of the Middle East. Furthermore, the President wanted to make it clear that the United States was


¹⁰Ibid., 94.

¹¹John C. Campbell, "From 'Doctrine' to Policy in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, XXXV, No. 3 (April, 1957), 446.

not indifferent to Communist penetration of the area. The Eisenhower Doctrine provided for \$200 million a year for economic aid to the countries of the Middle East if they so desired. This provision indicates the Administration's willingness to counterbalance Soviet economic aid to some of the Middle East nations. Through the new doctrine the United States attempted to fill the power vacuum which had been created by the British withdrawal from the Arab countries. The American move into the Middle East was approved across the Atlantic, but it was met with irritation and uproar in the Arab centers.

The Strategic Importance of Middle East

The importance of the Middle East lies in its position, its resources, and its people. The Arab Middle East is the link between Europe, Asia, and Africa; and, therefore, sometimes it is named the "Land of the Five Seas." (For location and names refer to the map on the following page.) Formerly the seat of great empires were the Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, and the Ottoman Turks. The Middle East is the center of communications between the Far East and Europe. It ties Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey with the Western world and facilitates the movement of economic and military requirements for the security of the Western bloc. Despite modern weapons and space communications, the Middle East has always been and continues to be one of the most strategic areas in the world. It facilitates armed movements from Western Europe to



the Far East and provides a supply center for the Western forces in the Middle East. This strategic importance was acknowledged in 1951 by General Dwight D. Eisenhower.¹² Former President Harry S. Truman in 1946 expressed the same view concerning the importance of the area. "This area contains vast natural resources. It lies across the most convenient routes of land, air, and water communications. It is consequently an area of great economic and strategic importance, the nations of which are not strong enough individually or collectively to withstand powerful aggression."¹³ However, the geostrategic questions that have often been asked since the end of World War II still remain to be answered. It is still uncertain whether the Middle East will be a stepping stone for an unfriendly nation or nations or whether the peoples of the Middle East will become Communist.

In a statement before the Committee of Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Armed Services, General Alfred M. Gruenther, President of the American National Red Cross and former Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, pointed to the great strategic and military value of the Middle East:

. . . The Middle East is a historic crossroads; that fact prevails today in spite of modern communications.

¹²Ernest Jackh, Background of the Middle East (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 13.

¹³Harry S. Truman, ". . . We Can Attain a Lasting Peace," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XIV, No. 354, Publication 2508 (April 14, 1946), 623.

The Middle East abuts on the flank of our defensive alliance in Western Europe; it constitutes a possible avenue for military action against that flank; it possesses important air facilities and port installations on the Mediterranean; it is a link with Africa. The Middle East possesses natural resources that are important in world trade. These resources are varied, but most significant among them, of course, is oil. All of these considerations amount to compelling reasons why there must be a free and friendly political and economic relationship between the Middle East and other areas of the free world; the need for this is mutually important.¹⁴

General Gruenther's statement indicates that the armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are largely dependent on Middle Eastern oil and bases. The security of the right flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is dependent on the flow of Arab oil. The Middle East forms the southern flank of the NATO and offers an approach by sea and air to the heart of the Soviet Union. Townsend Hoopes believes that the maintenance of overseas bases tends to prevent the Soviet Union from launching global war. Strong military bases would serve as a deterrent by forcing a diffusion of the Soviet air-atomic power. Carefully selected bases along the Sino-Soviet periphery would facilitate approaches from all directions and complicate the Soviet strategy.¹⁵

¹⁴U. S. Congress. Senate. The President's Proposal on the Middle East. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services. U. S. Senate. 85th Congress, First session on S. J. Res. 19 and H. R. Res. 117, 1957 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office), p. 907.

¹⁵Townsend Hoopes, "Overseas Bases in American Strategy," Foreign Affairs, XXXVII, No. 1 (October, 1958), 70.

Since the Middle East lies close to the Sino-Soviet periphery it could serve as a deterrent to any Soviet attack. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, clearly indicated the significance of the Middle East in the following statement:

The importance of the Middle East to the free world can hardly be overestimated militarily and economically. First, its huge oil reserves now supply most of the requirements of Europe, and their loss would be disastrous. Second, its geographical location is astride the lines of communications between West and East. And, third, it is only in this area that the Soviets have no satellite buffer states.¹⁶

The Safety of Vital Oil

Middle East oil is a major factor in the economics of Western Europe and the Arab countries. In the Arab countries, where society is basically feudal in structure and conservative in outlook, it is one of the most important forces of material progress. In spite of the progress in the atomic field, the Middle East oil remains one of the major elements in the West European industries and armed forces. It is vitally important for the defense of the Western alliance whose security is greatly dependent on the continuous supply of oil from the Arab Middle East.¹⁷

¹⁶U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Arab Refugees and Other Problems in the Near East. Report of the special study mission to the Near East. February 8, 1954, 83rd Congress, Second Session (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 14.

¹⁷Halford L. Hoskins, The Middle East (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), p. 231. Used by permission of the publisher.

Oil is power in time of peace and in time of war. 'Whoever controls the still untapped oilfields of the Middle East will have power to make peace or war,' said the late King Ibn Sa'ud to the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, when they met during World War II in 1945.¹⁸ Ibn Sa'ud's statement to President Franklin D. Roosevelt is but a restatement of Georges Clemenceau's characterization of oil as the powerful last word in matters of peace and war.¹⁹ With no less emphasis on the vital importance of oil Henri Berenger remarked that he who owns oil will control the high seas, the air, and the land; he who owns oil will control his fellow men economically.²⁰

Even though King Sa'ud, Georges Clemenceau, and Henri Berenger's statements may be considered outdated, Middle Eastern oil still remains vital to the Western world. Without the Arab's oil the wheel of industry will slow down and the movement of Western armed forces will become partially paralyzed. Acknowledging the vital importance of oil to the Western world, P. T. Piotrow in an article entitled "Middle East Oil" wrote:

Recent atomic energy studies indicate that while nuclear power may supplement power generated by conventional fuels, it cannot altogether replace it.

¹⁸"Jackh, op. cit., p. 18.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 19.

²⁰Harvey O'Connor, The Empire of Oil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1955), p. 259.

A National Planning Association report concluded in July 1958 that 'substantial increases in requirements of solid, liquid, and gaseous fuels, as well as electric energy, besides the projected requirements for nuclear energy' were to be expected in the next 25 years. 'Since no single energy source will be able to satisfy all of the projected needs, it follows that nuclear energy cannot be considered as providing, by itself, a long-run solution to our expanding energy requirements.'

Even if atomic energy were developed to supply propulsive power for all railroads and ships, the petroleum industry would lose only 3 to 4 per cent of its current markets. Where most petroleum products are used - up to 45 per cent in the United States and a sizable proportion in Europe - is to fuel automobiles and aircraft. Utilization of atomic power in these areas appears remote.²¹

Oil became the prime industrial and military necessity in the twentieth century. The control of foreign oil fields became not only the main concern of private companies but of the foreign offices as well. It came to be considered as a fundamental factor in the national interest and security. The insurance of uninterrupted oil supplies from the Middle East to the West is essential for the European industry and security. Failure to secure this would mean the loss of the key center of communication between Europe, Africa, and Asia. It would mean Russian domination on the Mediterranean and eventually supremacy of the Soviet Union not only in the Middle East but in Africa also.

At the present the economies of Western European countries require Middle East oil. Without it, the costs of oil would rise, the

²¹P. T. Piotrow, "Middle East Oil," Editorial Research Reports, XI, No. 10 (September 10, 1958), 692. Used by permission of Richard M. Boeckel, Editor.

fabulous Western revenues decline, and the military forces become weak.²² Middle Eastern oil is indispensable to the Western powers both economically and militarily.

The significant fact is that the Middle East is a veritable 'power house' of oil where wells often produce at an almost miraculous rate as compared with most of those in other areas. Oil is there in such quantities as possibly to be a determining factor in the shape of things to come.²³

Today more than two-thirds of the free world's reserves of crude oil are contained in the oil fields of the Middle East. They produce one-quarter of the Western world's supplies. Since the end of World War II, the estimated reserves in the Middle East have increased from 19 billion barrels, or 38% of the non-Communist world's total, at the end of 1945, to 126 billion barrels, or 71%, at the end of 1955. By the end of 1958 the estimated crude oil reserves increased to about 80% of the world's total. Middle East oil output has risen from 696,000 barrels per day in 1946 to 3,200,000 barrels per day in 1955. A full 23% of the non-Communist world's production now comes from the Middle East. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran rank after Venezuela and the United States as the non-Communist world's largest producing countries. Today Middle Eastern oil provides 95% of the crude oil imported into

²²New York Times, April 2, 1957, p. ME-1.

²³Emil Lengyel, World Without End (New York: The John Day Company, 1953), p. 317. Used by permission of the publisher.

Western Europe.²⁴ The great increase in crude oil production and reserves in the Middle East took place in the last decade. The sharp increase in the Middle East's crude oil production can be seen from the following chart.

TABLE I
MIDDLE EAST CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION^{*25}

	First 6 Months 1959	First 6 Months 1958	% Change	First 6 Months 1957
Bahrain	45.1	38.1	18.4	30.1
Iran	895.0	809.5	10.6	688.0
Iraq	807.0	662.6	21.8	377.6
Israel	2.0	1.2	66.7	1.2
Kuwait	1,425.0	1,364.7	4.4	1,030.1
Neutral Zone	108.0	70.3	53.6	46.6
Quatar	171.3	171.3		125.6
Saudi Arabia	1,040.0	991.3	4.9	893.9
Turkey	<u>6.5</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Total	4,499.9	4,115.3	9.3	3,158.7

*Daily average in thousands of barrels.

²⁴New York Times, September 9, 1956, p. 2.

²⁵Oil and Gas Journal, LVII, No. 31 (July 27, 1959), 131.

Middle East oil output reached its highest peak in 1959 with almost 4.5 million barrels daily. Middle East's oil supplies have been reaching Western Europe, South America, the Far East, Africa, and the United States of America with a continuous flow. Although the Middle East's present rate of production is 4.5 million barrels per day, its potential oil reserves will dominate the global energy outlook for the rest of the century.²⁶ Middle East oil remains a necessity for the security of the Western bloc. To evaluate the importance of the Middle East as a supplier of oil, it should be borne in mind that today the oil fields in the Middle East contain 126.2 billion barrels of crude oil reserves whereas oil fields in North America, South America, West Europe, and the Far East contain 34.1, 13.6, 1.5, and 3.0 respectively.²⁷ Therefore, the Middle East is likely to remain the major source of oil supplies to the Western world. In fact, the rationing scheme adopted throughout Western Europe during the Suez debacle illustrated European dependence on Middle Eastern oil supplies. Should oil supplies from the Middle East be denied to the West European countries and their allies in the case of war, the West European industry and arms movement would be seriously paralyzed, the cost of living rise sharply, the sterling value decline rapidly, the means of transportation become idle,

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Arabian American Oil Company, Middle East Oil Development, 4th edition (March, 1956), p. 11, 39.

and the defensive strength become weak. Consequently, the Middle East's oil remains a determining factor in the present relative balance of power between the two world giants. Thus, the protection of the sources of Middle Eastern oil is one of the major concerns of American foreign policy.

The Assumptions Behind the Eisenhower Doctrine

The Soviet economic offensive in the Middle East became one of the principal problems facing the Eisenhower Administration. A careful study of this economic offensive would reveal why President Eisenhower believed it constituted a grave danger to the peoples of the area and to the nations outside the Communist orbit.

The Soviet economic offensive in the Middle East has been aimed at the following objectives: 1. the elimination of Western influence from the Middle Eastern countries; 2. the liquidation of Western strategic positions in the area; 3. the denial of Middle Eastern oil supplied to Western industries and armed forces; 4. the prevention of the Arab countries from entering into alliances and defensive pacts with the Western powers; and 5. the opening of a new frontier for International Communism in the rising nations of Africa.

In pursuing these objectives the Soviet Union appeared on many occasions as the self-appointed guardian of the Arab states in their anti-colonial feelings. Time and again the Kremlin has charged the Western Big Three with direct aggression against the sovereignty and independence

of the Arab states. On many occasions the Soviet Union has accused the West of planning to divide the Middle Eastern countries into colonies so that they may serve as instruments for their imperialist pursuits.

In the midst of the rising spirit of nationalism and anti-Western feelings among the Arab countries, the Soviet Union increased its propaganda and stressed its anti-Western agitation among the Arab peoples.

In its statement of April 16, 1955, the Soviet Foreign Ministry declared:

It is easy to see that the policy of creating military groupings in the Near and Middle East, like that of creating aggressive military groupings in South-east Asia (the so-called SEATO), springs from the desire of certain Western powers to bring these countries under colonial enslavement. In order to enrich their big monopolies, the Western powers want to continue exploiting the people of Near and Middle Eastern countries and predatorily exploiting the natural resources of these countries. . .²⁸

The Soviet Union has stressed the fact that it cannot view with indifference the political developments in the Near and Middle Eastern countries since the installation of Western military bases on Arab soil has a direct bearing on the national security of the Soviet Union and her satellites.²⁹

The Soviet Union has charged that the actions of the Western powers in the Middle East have been contrary to the national interests

²⁸Isaac London, "1950-1956, Evolution of the U. S. S. R. 's Policy in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Affairs, VII, No. 5 (May, 1956), 172.

²⁹Ibid.

of the countries of that region and jeopardized world peace. The Soviet Government has denounced the attempts of the Western powers to solve the problems of the area as endeavors to increase tensions and, therefore, a threat to world peace. By thus undermining the efforts of the Western powers to find a reasonable solution of the problems of the Middle East Soviet propaganda has found resonance among the discontented Arab masses. Furthermore, the Soviet Union seemed to have appeared as the true and sincere defender of the cause of peace, freedom, independence, and non-interference in the internal affairs of the Near and Middle East countries.

Today the Soviet Union is using trade, soft diplomacy, propaganda, subversion, sabotage, bribe, easy money loans, and even tanks and planes to strengthen its foothold on the Arab soil and extend its ideology to all Asia-African peoples. Recently, the Soviet Union has done everything possible to strike out from Arab memories its earlier favors to the new state of Israel, and in particular the arms which Czechoslovakia had sent to the Israeli forces. To this end the Soviet Union offered Egypt \$250,000,000 worth of arms at a cutrate price, payable in cotton. These arms were delivered to wipe out the memory of the 1948-49 Egyptian defeat in Palestine. Also, during the Suez crisis Russia warned Israel that its existence as a state was at stake. On November 5, 1956, it declared:

We appeal to you, the Parliament, the working people of the state of Israel, to the entire people

of Israel: Stop the aggression, halt the bloodshed, withdraw your troops from Egyptian territory.

In view of the situation which has arisen the Soviet Government has decided to advise its ambassador in Tel-Aviv to leave Israel and return immediately to Moscow. We hope that the Government of Israel will duly understand and appreciate our warning.³⁰

The long list of grievances of the Arabs against the Western powers - the partition of Palestine, the oil rights, the Suez invasion, the French-Algerian war in North Africa, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the landing of the marines in Lebanon and the British troops in Jordan - has influenced them to seek a rapprochement to the Soviet Union and to turn their back to the West. The bitterness created by these grievances created a mood of revulsion and anti-Western sentiment among the Arab peoples.³¹ It also made many of the countries receptive to Russian overtures.³²

Thus, while the Arab-Western relations were growing from bad to worse and Western prestige and influence were fading slowly but surely in the Arab Middle East, the Soviet Union moved in to fill the power vacuum in the area. It moved in under the guise of the strong protector

³⁰ The Public Affairs Institute, Regional Development for Regional Peace (Washington, D. C.: The Public Affairs Institute, 1957), p. 134.

³¹ Bernard Lewis, "The Middle Eastern Reaction to Soviet Pressures," The Middle East Journal, X, No. 2 (Spring, 1956), 130.

³² Ibid., 136.

of the weak states. Unable to resist these pretensions and sympathies some of the Arab states have welcomed the professed brotherly aid of the Russians comprising credits, advisors, technicians, and trainees, while at the same time they have suppressed local Communist activities.³³

It is evident that the Soviet Union has succeeded in claiming a place in the Middle East through its intransigent anti-Western propaganda and psychological appeals to the frustrated, dissatisfied, and emotional peoples of the Middle East whose inherent political and economic weaknesses have rendered them easy prey to specious humanitarian professions. The Russian strategy has been aided by the absence of a previous record of imperialism in the Middle East. The nature of the Communist penetration into the Middle East and the danger which their presence has created is well summarized by Hanson Baldwin in the July 1957 issue of Foreign Affairs in which he writes that what constitutes the gravest danger in the Middle East is the underground Soviet penetration aided by local agents who in turn are supplied with Soviet funds, propaganda experts, and political directions. Local Communists have lost no time in exploiting the political and economic discontent of the masses. Their continued activities reveal that the real and apparent danger lies in their increasing influence which may soon transcend local concerns. Communist slogans and techniques have found fertile soil in

³³J. S. Raleigh, "Middle East Politics: The Past Ten Years," Middle Eastern Affairs, X, No. 1 (January, 1959), 16.

a Middle East inflamed by Arab nationalism and Arab-Israel enmity. Russian support of the Arabs against Israel no doubt has been a major factor in helping her own position in the area.³⁴

It is a matter of record that the Soviet Union lost no time in taking advantage of the unpopularity of the Western powers in the Middle East and that it took steps to assure the Arabs of their sympathy and support in order to establish a foothold in the Middle East which they had so long desired even during the Tsarist's times.

Concerning Soviet action in the area President Eisenhower made the following statement:

I now want to talk about the strength we need to win a different kind of war - one that has already been launched against us.

It is the massive economic offensive that has been mounted by the Communist imperialists against free nations.

The Communist imperialist regimes have for some time been largely frustrated in their attempts at expansion based directly on force. As a result, they have begun to concentrate heavily on economic penetration, particularly of newly developed countries, as a preliminary to political domination.

This nonmilitary drive, if underestimated, could defeat the free world regardless of our military strength. This danger is all the greater precisely because many of us fail or refuse to recognize it. . .

Admittedly, most of us did not anticipate the psychological impact upon the world of the launching of the first satellite. Let us not make the same

³⁴Hanson W. Baldwin, "Strategy of the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, XXXV, No. 4 (July, 1957), 661-662.

kind of mistake in another field, by failing to anticipate the much more serious impact of the Soviet economic offensive.³⁵

The Soviet economic offensive in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa was stepped up after the death of Stalin in 1953. In his challenge to the West Premier Nikita Khrushchev declared, 'We will make war on you through peaceful trade to see which system is best.'³⁶ This economic offensive has been alarmingly effective in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa, the extent of which can be seen in Table II on the following page.

Soviet economic assistance to the U.A.R., Yemen, and Iraq indicates the implicit tendency to deprive the West of its traditional influence in these countries and accounts for much of their present success in other neutral countries. The three-pronged program of Soviet aid, trade, and technical assistance which attracted most of the Afro-Asian nations was described by a Soviet representative at the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference at Cairo in the following terms:

We do not seek to get any advantages. We do not need profits, privileges, controlling interest, concession, or raw-material sources. We do not ask

³⁵Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The State of the Union," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, No. 970, Publication 6585 (January 27, 1958), 117.

³⁶Douglas Dillon, "Foreign Investment and Economic Development," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, No. 970, Publication 6585 (January 27, 1958), 139-140.

TABLE II

ESTIMATED SINO-SOVIET BLOC AID TO LESS DEVELOPED

COUNTRIES, 1955-1957 AS OF DECEMBER 30, 1957*

(Millions of U. S. dollar equivalents)

Country	Total
Afghanistan	\$ 145
Cambodia	22
Ceylon	20
Egypt	480
India	270
Indonesia	110
Nepal	13
Syria	280
Yemen	10
Yugoslavia	465
Other	70
Total	1,885

* Credits except for grants of \$22 million to Cambodia, \$13 million to Nepal, \$16 million to Ceylon, and \$5 million to Egypt. Burma is receiving several "gift" projects but will make a return gift of rice to the U. S. S. R. over an extended period.

(Source: "Soviet Bloc Economic Offensive in Less Developed Areas," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, No. 970, Publication 6585 (January 27, 1958), 145.

you to participate in any blocs, reshuffle your governments or change your domestic or foreign policy. We are ready to help you as brother helps brother, without any interest whatever, for we know from our own experience how difficult it is to get rid of need. Tell us what you need and we will help you and send, according to our economic capabilities, money needed in form of loans or aid . . . to build for you institutions for industry, education, and hospitals . . . We do not ask you to join any blocs . . . our only condition is that there will be no strings attached.³⁷

The danger of the Soviet economic offensive became clear to President Eisenhower when many Middle Eastern and Asian countries became receptive to the extensive economic package of Soviet trade, aid, and technical personnel. The offensive appeared all the more alarming in view of the Communist doctrine that there can be no economic motives free from political implications. President Eisenhower assumed that any Soviet gain in the Middle East would be a great peril to Western security and prosperity and a threat to the nations outside the Communist orbit. Consequently, he felt compelled to adopt a policy of protecting the Western interests in Arab countries which were endangered by Soviet attentions.

Unlike the Truman Doctrine, which provided protection to nations friendly towards the United States, the Eisenhower Doctrine was aimed at the protection of the Arab states, none of which were bound by defensive pacts or agreements with the United States (Iraq at that time

³⁷ Douglas Dillon, "Economic Activities of the Soviet Bloc in Less Developed Countries," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, No. 978, Publication 6614 (March 24, 1958), 470.

was the only exception since it was a member of the Baghdad Pact). It was designed to enlist the aid of uncommitted Arab states in the endeavor to contain International Communism and stem Communist subversive activities. However, the general Arab reaction to the American doctrine was passive and disappointing.³⁸

The reasons are not far to seek. The circumstances that led to the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the American intervention in the Berlin blockade are unlike those circumstances that exist in the Arab world today. First, none of the Arab countries shares the views of the State Department that Soviet expansion represents a threat to its independence. Consequently, the Eisenhower Doctrine has little relation to the Arab situation and little or no value in the Arab political thinking. Second, unlike the Arab countries which refused American protection against International Communism and subversive activities, West Germany, Turkey, Greece, and many other European countries gave their full backing and appreciation to the American protection. American intervention in Europe after World War II was supported by all governments concerned as well as by the American and European peoples.³⁹ Third, unlike the Western oriented

³⁸"The President's Plan," Spectator, CXCVIII, No. 6706 (January 4, 1957), 3-4.

³⁹Geoffrey Barraclough, "Middle East: End of a Road," The Nation, CLXXXIV, No. 9 (March 2, 1957), 187-189.

countries of Greece, Turkey, and Iran, the Arab Middle Eastern countries have had little experience with Russian imperialism. They remember the years they spent under British and French colonial rule. They remember the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in the fall of 1956, which they consider one of the biggest blunders of the Western world in the Arab Middle East since the close of World War II.

If the United States had taken into account the disappearance of the British and French influence in the Middle East and thence formulated the doctrine, the American move would appear to indicate a desire to fill the vacuum created by the departure of the British and the French from the area. Also, if the United States was concerned about Communist infiltration, economic pressure, and subversive activities the President's statement to Congress is unclear. Challenging the detachment of the Eisenhower Doctrine from the political realities in the Middle East, former President Harry S. Truman wrote: 'It is naive and fantastic to hope that we can achieve any kind of peace in the Middle East as long as there are bitterness and open clashes between the Arabs and Jews.'⁴⁰

A careful analysis of the Eisenhower Doctrine reveals that it is far from being a new bold program but rather an outgrowth of the Tri-Power Declaration of the United States, England, and France on May 25,

⁴⁰"The Evolving Doctrine," The New Republic, CXXXVI, No. 3, Issue 2199 (January 21, 1957), 3.

1950.⁴¹ The Tri-Power Declaration indicates the willingness of the United States government and her two major North Atlantic Treaty Organization members to take immediate action in the Middle Eastern countries if Egypt attempts to attack Israel or if Israel attempts to expand her frontiers eastward. The Declaration of 1950 was designed to preserve the political status quo. The Eisenhower Doctrine seven years later attempted to achieve the same purposes as the Declaration of 1950. In 1957 the State Department became alarmed by the Egyptian-Syrian-Russian relations and the activities of Communist agents in these two Arab states. To hold Communist activities and further penetration on the one hand and to maintain the status quo on the other, the United States Government took the full responsibility of maintaining peace and security and blocking Russian expansion into the area. The underlying motive for such a move on the part of the United States was the result of the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Russian propaganda victory in the Arab world, and the moral defeat of Britain and France.

⁴¹ For the full text see Appendix G.

CHAPTER VII

THE ARAB REACTION TO THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

The Arab Policy of Non-Alignment

The desire for neutrality is stronger today in the Middle East than it has ever been. Most Arabs prefer to see their country free from all kinds of foreign alliances, pacts, agreements, or associations. The advocates of neutrality view entanglements as maneuverings on the part of the big powers and fear that resulting tensions will inevitably lead the world to the brink of catastrophe. These neutralist proclivities stem from the feeling of military and economic weakness on the one hand and from the inability to influence the course of world events on the other.

This attitude of the Arab neutralists is based on the long past experience with foreign tutelage which is coloring Arab thinking to this day. Professor Majid Khadduri¹ views Arab neutralism as the product of many complex motives which may be summarized as follows: (1) the

¹Majid Khadduri is the Professor of Middle East Studies at the Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, and Director of Education and Research of the Middle East Institute.

Arabs are determined to eliminate the roots of imperialism while the West and the East are competing to win them to their side; (2) the Arabs are utilizing the cold war period to gain the utmost material advantage by playing off the United States against the Soviet Union; and (3) the Arabs are very proud of their newly won independence and share this feeling with other Asian and African nations which adhere to the principle of non-identification to maintain a balance of power between East and West.²

Even though the Arab neutralists have asserted the policy of non-identification, their statesmen time and again declare that they would defend their countries against any foreign invader. The question remains whether or not the Arab states are capable of defending themselves without Western support.³ Many Western politicians and statesmen have criticized this policy as dangerous because it allows considerable latitude to local Communist parties and thus furthers Soviet penetration of the area. Neutrality may indeed be a fatal policy for the Arab states while they are militarily and economically weak and politically divided among themselves.

Arab neutralism is the by-product of colonialism which has created an intense anti-Western feeling among the newly emancipated

²Majid Khadduri, "The Problem of Regional Security in the Middle East: An Appraisal," The Middle East Journal, XI, No. 1 (Winter, 1957), 19.

³Ibid.

peoples of the Middle East as well as the peoples of Africa. It is not surprising that one of the results of the post World War II emancipation of the Asian peoples was the evolution of a neutral policy, as was amply demonstrated by the debate over the Korean question at the United Nations in 1950.⁴

The underlying motives are well summarized by Leland W.

Goodrich and Anne P. Simons:

Under the leadership of India, this group of Asian and African states, with special interests of their own and anxious to avoid not only war but any irrevocable commitment to either side in the struggle, exercised their influence to achieve a peaceful adjustment of the Korean problem and of great power relations in the area, on a basis that would assure to Asian peoples the maximum opportunity to determine their own future without interference from the outside.⁵

The Afro-Asian nations in general have demonstrated a desire not to participate in collective measures against either East or West. Their aloofness of the present global conflict has been a greater source of irritation to the big powers than their military weakness would suggest in view of the present endeavors to confine the struggle within the framework of the United Nations in whose General Assembly the vote of the small powers may have a decisive influence.

⁴Georgiana G. Stevans, "Arab Neutralism and Bandung," The Middle East Journal, XI, No. 2 (Spring, 1957), 140.

⁵Leland Matthew Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1955), p. 57.

The present policy of the so called Afro-Asian neutral bloc - and therein lies their seemingly disproportionate importance for the cold war balance of power - is to maintain the status quo between the United States and the Soviet Union. While its commitment to either side may be decisive in altering the existing balance, the neutralist bloc considers non-identification with either the East or the West the safer path than a firm alignment. Aside from considerations of their own interest, the neutralist states feel that they can contribute to the maintenance of world peace. The reasons for their timidity can be easily understood. The newly emancipated peoples of Africa and Asia are fearful of a third war in view of the alarming proportions of the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the conquest of outer space, the development of Atom bombs and long-range missiles. The uncertainty of future developments makes it appear unwise for them to be identified too closely with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Moreover, many of these neutralist nations which are situated close to the Sino-Soviet periphery live in constant fear of Soviet retaliation for any policy which might offend the latter's sensibilities. Their fear is aggravated by a lack of confidence in the presence of effective American aid in the moment of need caused by the well-known American reluctance to resort to war or to use the major weapons. Consequently, the safest course seems to be one that endeavors to escape attack in the

event of war between the two major powers.⁶ Another reason for non-alignment is that many of the Asian and Arab states have come into existence only recently. They are extremely jealous of their newly won independence and sovereignty. Therefore, neither the Arab states nor the emancipated peoples of Asia and Africa are willing any longer to tolerate the protection and the guardianship of stronger nations. After many centuries of subordination to foreign powers they are highly suspicious of foreign influence and doctrines of any kind. Moreover, they are convinced that only in peace will they be able to develop their resources and raise their standard of living. Hence their desire for peaceful cooperation with both world powers stops short of a definite political commitment, a course which seems all the more compelling in the light of their ever-present fear that the victory of either side would be followed by the restoration of imperial rule from which they have just been emancipated.

These are the predominant motives of the Afro-Asian states including many of the Arab states. However, the latter are by no means in complete agreement concerning the desirability of a neutral foreign policy. On the issue of collective security versus non-entanglement the members of the Arab League are divided. While Lebanon and Jordan

⁶U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy and Mutual Security . . ., December 24, 1956 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 58.

favor close association and friendship with the Western camp, the United Arab Republic (UAR), Saudi Arabia, and Yemen adhere to what President Gamal Abdel Nasser calls "positive neutrality." Eminent Arab intellectuals have taken issue with the basic fallacy of "the illusion of neutralism." For example, Dr. Charles Malik of Lebanon has this to say:

. . . an adequate revolution in science and technology is not something that can be simply wished or easily bought; it requires intimate association with the living sources of science and technology. There are only three such living sources: the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and North America. Egypt, to be able to face her fundamental issues, must (and this applies in varying degrees to all underdeveloped countries) associate herself equally with one or a proper combination of these three sources. So long as the cold war in any form continues, Egypt cannot associate herself equally with all three. Essentially, therefore, neutralism is impossible for Egypt; at best it is fraught with greatest dangers.⁷

Similarly, Professor Majid Khadduri supports the view that the Arabs cannot be neutral in the cold war for the following reasons:

Neither the Islamic doctrine of war nor the traditional attitude of the Middle Eastern people support a neutralist attitude, since the use of violence for the defense of Islam, no less than for achieving certain specific objectives, was not opposed by classical Islamic doctrine. Unlike the Indians, the Arabs of the Southern Tier have never believed in pacifism. In the past the Arabs of the desert have been in a constant state of warfare with their neighbors, and their habitual and favorite pastime was to engage in inter-tribal raids.

⁷Charles Malik, "Call to Action in the Near East," Foreign Affairs, XXXIV, No. 4 (July, 1956), 645.

Arab neutralism, accordingly, is neither dictated by a religious creed, nor an expression of a traditional behavior pattern, since neither on doctrinal or emotional grounds do the Arabs refrain from the use of violence to achieve religious and political ends. . . .⁸

The great danger to the West of Arab neutrality is the impossibility of obtaining assurances that their policies will not be dictated from Moscow or other Communist centers. Clearly, their complete independence of power blocs is an illusion. In spite of their determination to achieve political independence, neutral Arab countries, just like other neutralists such as India for example, are painfully aware of the need for economic aid from either the United States or the Soviet Union if their ambitious political undertaking is to be successful. It is hoped that such aid can be had without any strings and will not provide a lever for interference by the donors in their internal and external affairs. The determination of Arab neutralists to realize these hopes has been recognized by some Western observers and cannot be overlooked by policymakers. On this question William Yale remarked:

It would seem evident that a country in Egypt's position would be obliged to remain neutral in a 'Cold War' world if it were to retain any degree of real freedom of action with respect to both its domestic and foreign affairs. Apparently, this is not understood in the West. . . . The United States takes the position that 'he who is not for us is against us.' . . . Various groups . . . are attempting to brand neutralism as a pro-Russian, pro-Communist manifestation. They seek to

⁸Khadduri, op. cit., 18.

discredit the Arab nationalist leaders, particularly Nasser, as Communists and to misrepresent nationalistic activities as forms of Communism.⁹

Failure to appraise the Arab position has led to confusion and chaos. It is as untrue as it is unwise to brand the Arab stand as anti-Western and pro-Communist, since such superficial judgment can only alienate Arab states which resent being considered centers of International Communism. Fallacious appraisal has in fact resulted in a serious decline of American prestige in the Arab countries and increasing difficulty in the relations between Arab nationalists and the United States.

The Effects of the Eisenhower Doctrine

The Eisenhower Doctrine has not added anything tangible to the solution of the complex problems of the Middle East. It has failed to arouse any enthusiasm among Arab nationalists and statesmen. (Lebanon was the only Arab state to adhere to the Eisenhower Doctrine.) To the Arabs the menace in the area is not the threat of International Communism; it is Israel. The Doctrine has failed to attain its purpose because it has bypassed a public opinion aroused, to the exclusion of all other issues, by the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt. Nationalism engaged in a holy war (jihad) against Britain and France has produced a ferment in the Arab countries. Dana Adams Schmidt aptly analyzed the effect of the Eisenhower Doctrine:

⁹William Yale, The Near East (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), pp. 455, 461, 462.

The Doctrine, which had seemed for a time to be consolidating pro-Western forces, boomeranged against the United States. The Lebanese Government now faces a rising demand by opposition groups that Lebanon disavow the United States program. The Iraqi Government, according to diplomatic reports, is carefully evading all mention of its association with the Doctrine. King Saud of Saudi Arabia has permitted reports to be published denying that he ever endorsed the Doctrine. The Jordanian regime, in deference to anti-Western forces in the country, had steered clear of any association with the Doctrine from the start.¹⁰

The Eisenhower Doctrine has failed to offer any solution to the deep rooted problems of the Arabs. Nor has it offered any promise for the Arab refugees or for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The firm guarantee of the existence of Israel by the United States together with the Anglo-French attack on Egypt has contributed to the Arab denunciation of the military aspects of the Doctrine.

Not only was the American declaration received with indifference, but it also produced active resentment. The mobs in the streets of Amman, Cairo, Baghdad, and Damascus denounced it as a new form of Western imperialism. Incapable of eradicating the memories of the British and French attack on Egypt, the Eisenhower Doctrine could not deter the formation of a solid front under Communist auspices at a time when the United States was rallying to the support of unpopular regimes in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. In so doing the American Government repeated the earlier errors of the United Kingdom. The

¹⁰ New York Times, October 15, 1957, p. 3.

lessons of the British experience in the Middle East were clearly wasted on American foreign policymakers in their dealings with the emotional peoples of the area. American support of unpopular regimes of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon was born out of a misjudgment of Arab aspirations and thinking on the one hand and the wishful thinking of some of the Western diplomats on the other.

The economic side of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which provides \$200 million annually for the economic development of the Middle East, fared no better than its military part. It failed to specify the recipients, the amount each country was to receive, the allocation to be made to arms, and the purposes for which the aid was to be used. Concerning these shortcomings Senator Ellender remarked:

. . . this Middle East Resolution, insofar as its economic-aid features are concerned, boils down to nothing more than the beginning of a new Marshall plan, a Marshall plan for the Middle East, a Marshall plan with no specific objectives, no cutoff date, no limitation on expenditures, no set goals, and no firm purposes for its initiation.¹¹

The Eisenhower Doctrine, if it is to be realistic policy towards the Middle East rather than an 'invitation to Congress to devise one,' must face the actual political forces that are moving the Middle East today.¹²

¹¹Senator Allen Joseph Ellender, "Promotion of Peace and Stability in the Middle East," Congressional Record, Senate, 85th Congress, First Session, CIII, Pt. 2 (February 27, 1957), 2692.

¹²Robert C. Good, "Power of the Purse," The Commonwealth, LVI, No. 8 (May 24, 1957), 200.

Unfortunately, it is no more than an echo in a deep valley. It has been described by many American editors as a "move against a danger that doesn't exist because we don't know what to do about the danger that does exist."¹³

If the United States is to recover the prestige that it has lost in the Arab world since the end of the Suez crisis of 1956, it must appraise realistically the Arab national movement, which is vitally concerned with the social and economic improvement of the Arab countries. Yet the United States speaks to the Arab Middle East in a language which is neither understood nor appreciated by the peoples of that area. It speaks of force, or the threat of force, of the need to contain International Communism and to prevent internal subversion.¹⁴ The Eisenhower Doctrine appears to impose alliances on the Arab Middle East while it rejects a powerful and unpredictable nationalism. Criticizing the Eisenhower Doctrine Senator Michael J. Mansfield wrote:

Our use of military force in the Middle East may be a positive act, but a positive military act is not to be confused with a positive foreign policy. On the contrary, it is the antithesis of such a policy. The use of military force signifies the absence of

¹³"New Doctrines - Old Windmills," The Nation, CLXXXIV, No. 2 (January 12, 1957), 31.

¹⁴Geoffrey Barraclough, "Doctrine for Mideast Disaster," The Nation, CLXXXIV, No. 6 (February 9, 1957), 119-120. The author is the successor to Arnold Toynbee as Professor of International Affairs at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the author of History in a Changing World.

policy or the break-down of policy. In this case it is the former. We have not had a Middle eastern policy or, at best, we have had only the generalities of such a policy.¹⁵

The Eisenhower Doctrine aims at remote possibilities which are unlikely to occur. Senator Humphrey rightly remarked that it makes no provisions for counteracting Soviet political infiltration, or Soviet co-operation with native agents. Nor does it tend to stop the flow of Soviet money, arms, and technicians to some of the Arab countries.¹⁶ Eric Johnston says: "What we have failed to see in the Middle East, I think, is the need to set our own priorities, our own policies, through our own policies, through our own initiative - instead of merely reacting to the actions of somebody else, whether a Khrushchev or a Nasser."¹⁷ In a testimony given January 10, 1957, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dean Acheson, former U.S. Secretary of State, criticized the "Eisenhower Doctrine" on the grounds that:

It is not a statement of a policy but an invitation to devise one. It does not present conclusions, but suggests beginnings. Clearly these beginnings deserve encouragement. But the problem which confronts

¹⁵Senator Michael J. Mansfield, "Beyond the Middle East Crisis," Congressional Record, Senate, 85th Congress, Second Session, CIV, Pt. 13 (August 8, 1958), 16644.

¹⁶Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, "Our Policy in the Middle East," Congressional Record, Senate, 85th Congress, First Session, CIII, Pt. 1 (January 7, 1957), 291.

¹⁷Eric Johnston, "Formula for a Mideast Settlement," New York Times Magazine (August 10, 1958), 46.

the Congress is not whether to support the President, but what it is which the Congress is asked to support; not whether the United States should have a policy toward the Middle East, but what that policy should be.

He quite properly says that the knowledge throughout the world that the President and the Congress are united on a Middle Eastern policy would, in itself, be important. This leads to two suggestions: first, that a policy should be formulated before it is announced; and, second, that there may be better ways than through legislation to announce policy in this situation. One has to do with substance; the other with form or method. A policy cannot be legislated; its execution can, and must, be legislated; its execution can, and must, be legislated as occasion arises. Legislation is not only unnecessary but undesirable, and Congress must play a very considerable part in formulating what it wishes to say. For the President has himself said "this program will not solve all the problems of the Middle East." Conservatively speaking, that is the outstanding understatement of 1957.¹⁸

The former Secretary of State called the Administration's new Mid-East Doctrine vague, uncertain, and inadequate, offering no new methods or guides for the Administration to follow. Nor has it contributed to an understanding of the Arab attitude towards the present ideological and political conflict between East and West, or to the solution of many problems that are essential to peace and stability in the area.

The Arab countries see the policy as an attempt to replace the dominion of the United Kingdom and France, suspecting it of being a new adaptation of imperialism to twentieth century conditions. Proposing unilateral action outside the framework of the United Nations

¹⁸"The Administration's New Mid-East Doctrine," Congressional Digest, XXXVI, No. 3 (March, 1957), 77.

while pretending compliance with the United Nations Charter by using the escapes of Article 51, it appears a singularly disingenuous device for the perpetuation of Western control. As United States Representative Chet Holifield (D-California) once remarked: "The adherence to the U.N., in the President's resolution, is more a matter of form than of substance."¹⁹ Not only does the Eisenhower Doctrine not offer a remedy for the political and economic ills of the Middle East, but, on the contrary, tends to increase the fervor of an emotion-charged Arab nationalism opposing American policy. In fact concern has been caused in nationalist quarter by the uncertainty of the concrete course of action inspired by the Eisenhower Doctrine. The American desire to protect the Middle East from the threats of International Communism does not necessarily preclude American support of France in Algeria and of the United Kingdom in South Arabia. Nor does the Doctrine permit any inference as to the course the United States would follow in case of Soviet political penetration and collaboration with some native leaders. Happenings in Iraq early in 1959 are a case in point. The Communists joined hands with the National Democratic Party and led the country to the brink of civil war. Since the Communist-inspired situation in Iraq constituted technically an internal problem, the Eisenhower Doctrine was not applicable. Dr. Farid Zeinedine, Ambassador of Syria to the United States, attacked

¹⁹ Ibid., 95.

the foundation of the Eisenhower Doctrine by stating:

Under the terms of the United Nations Charter, a country can use its armed forces for other than its national purposes only if those forces are placed under United Nations command.

Here Ambassador Zeinedine questions the unilateral action of the United States in regard to the Middle East.²⁰ Also, in an article entitled "Middle East Policy: II - The Reasons for Action," C. L. Sulzberger writes:

. . . the Eisenhower policy for the Middle East seems essentially a crash program. That is to say, it deals more with immediate outside threats to the area than with fundamental internal problems. In effect the President seeks again to shore up the faltering Baghdad Pact - without joining it. He wants Congressional authority to help frustrate, if not to intervene against, demonstrably communistic coups d'etats. And he appears to desire advance permission to dispatch United States combat teams to the Levant, if this is wished by any local Government. What is encouraging about these demands is their demonstration of Washington's awareness of the need to forestall chaos benefiting only Russia. What is lamentable is that it took so long to see the necessity for drastic action. But the region, unlike China, has not yet vanished down the drain. American Middle Eastern policy has been so confused since World War II that one might call it non-existent.²¹

Although the Eisenhower Doctrine has attempted to demonstrate America's awareness of Soviet propaganda and attempts to communize the Middle Eastern nations, the fact remains that it has not changed the conditions which have permitted Soviet agitation and propaganda.

²⁰New York Times, January 1, 1957, p. 1.

²¹New York Times, January 9, 1957, p. 30C.

The Eisenhower Doctrine has not succeeded in rendering the Arab states immune to Soviet advances. In fact it can be more accurately said that it has intensified the political division of the area created earlier by the Baghdad Pact.²² The State Department has relied on some of the Arab kings and heads of states to accept and spread the Eisenhower Doctrine. The latter's support proved to be fatal. The Western orientation and thinking of Nuri es Saïd and his adherence to the Baghdad Pact in disregard of popular opposition cost him his life. The Western sympathies of King Saïd of Saudi Arabia cost him his throne and prestige.

American policymakers have failed to take cognizance of the fact that the framework of the old political order in the Arab countries is collapsing. They have failed to recognize the emerging new political order. They have failed to take cognizance of the fact that the implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine is viewed with suspicion by the Arab states who were attacked by America's allies - Britain and France - not by Soviet Russia or Communist China. They have failed to take cognizance of the fact that what is needed in the Middle East is not a doctrine against the imaginary threat of direct Communist aggression and penetration but a doctrine which combats poverty, disease, political instability, suspicion, and fear - all of which provide an opportunity for

²² Richard Poate Stebbins (ed.), The United States in World Affairs 1957 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 175.

Marxist ideology and propaganda.²³

The Communists and their Arab agents did not fail to impress the Arab masses with the presumed aggressive tendencies inherent in the Eisenhower Doctrine, claiming that the shaft was aimed directly at their freedom, independence, and sovereignty. The United States, they contended, was imposing its guardianship on free people in order to safeguard its monopolies and national interests. The President's message was characterized as "the voice of war, not the voice of peace,"²⁴ and the American program accused of aggravating tensions, decreasing the possibilities of peace in the Middle East, and violating the United Nations Charter.

Expressing her views on the American intervention in the Middle East, Doris A. Graber, a member of the Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy at the University of Chicago, writes:

. . . the Eisenhower and Truman doctrines should be clearly brought into conformity with, or rescinded in favor of, the traditional non-intervention doctrine because, as policy expressions, they have failed to deter Soviet aggression, failed to boost the morale of the pro-Western Powers, and, in the case of the consent provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine, failed to clear the United States of the charge of imposing its policies on unwilling non-Communist countries. Instead, the excessive claims, even though they have not been put into practices, have been misunderstood

²³ Esmond Wright, "Defence and the Baghdad Pact," The Political Quarterly, XXVIII, No. 2 (April-June, 1957), 167.

²⁴ "The Tass Statement on Eisenhower's Mideast Doctrine," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, IX, No. 2 (February 20, 1957), 18-19.

and distorted as evidence of bellicose intentions, and the sincerity of the consent provisions of the Eisenhower doctrine has been questioned when it seems obvious that there may be implied reservations.²⁵

The American policy in the Arab countries has signally failed to produce mutual sympathy and understanding. It would in fact appear that the aims of both sides are mutually exclusive. While the Arab states desire full freedom of action, the United States endeavors to extend its net of comprehensive alliances and pacts. In view of these conflicting policies, the Doctrine was reduced to ineffectiveness as a means of preventing Communist "peaceful" penetration on the one hand and establishing peace and security on the other. Professor Alfred J. Hotz rightly believes that the Eisenhower Doctrine neither defines the American interests in the Middle East nor provides for comprehensive economic planning. He considers it a complete "tragedy, not a triumph."²⁶

The Need for a Basic Change in American Policy

An accurate appraisal of American interests would seem to reveal the need for a new policy if the Middle East is to be saved from the threats of International Communism. In a hearing held before the United

²⁵Doris A. Graber, "The Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines in the Light of the Doctrine of Non-Intervention," Political Science Quarterly, LXXIII, No. 3 (September, 1958), 334.

²⁶Alfred J. Hotz, "Eisenhower Doctrine: Triumph or Tragedy," Congressional Record, Senate, 85th Congress, Second Session, CIV, No. 2 (January 27, 1958), A664. Alfred J. Hotz is a professor of political science at Western Reserve University.

States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Harold B. Minor, President of the American Friends of the Middle East, in fact urged the adoption of a new policy and a changed attitude towards the peoples of the area, which would take account of their rising expectations. New ways and means, he added, must be sought to win and capture the hearts of the masses. If disaster is to be avoided a bold, concrete policy should be developed to meet the hostility between the state of Israel and its Arab neighbors.²⁷ Similarly, Representative Omar Burleson (D-Texas) feels the urgent need for a drastically changed policy, believing that the continuation of the present policy will lead to far graver dangers than those which exist at present.²⁸

Before criticizing the American policy in the Middle East it will be necessary to enumerate the specific problems confronting the United States in that area, which include the conflict between the Arabs and Israel, the fate of the Palestine refugees, universal poverty, and Soviet penetration. The West is primarily concerned with the subversive activities of the Communists assuming the form of support to the Arab national movement, anti-Zionist propaganda, attacks on Western policy

²⁷ U. S. Congress. Senate. Review of Foreign Policy, 1958. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 85th Congress, Second Session on Foreign Policy (February 3 - March 10, 1958), (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 565.

²⁸ Omar Burleson, "Middle East Policy Proposal," Congressional Record, House, 85th Congress, Second Session, CIV, Pt. 14 (August 20, 1958), 18853.

and motives, and alleged unrestricted loans and technical help. The Western concern seems fully vindicated by the drastic effect which the loss of the Middle East and its oil would have on the global balance of power. It is the Middle East that serves as an essential front for the containment of International Communism and as a vital base for a Western defensive and counter offensive in case of war.²⁹

A new policy is all the more imperative because of the lack of foresight and coherence of the present American Middle Eastern policy, which has been unable to cope with emergencies requiring decisive action.

Describing the present American policy in the Middle East in vivid terms, Deputy Under Secretary Robert D. Murphy said:

The key to our Middle Eastern policy is not so much resistance to direct outside aggression as it is support of healthy internal development. But here again we work between extremes. In giving our support to the free nations there, we must not, in fact or appearance, interfere with their private affairs. In seeking to safeguard their sovereign independence we must be cautious lest we infringe it. It is a delicate line and a challenging one.³⁰

In the same vein, Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, led off with a speech in the Senate entitled "On the Brink of Disaster," in which he remarked that the American foreign policy is

²⁹ Baldwin, op. cit., 663.

³⁰ Deputy Under Secretary Robert D. Murphy, "The Need for Balance in U.S. Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXIX, No. 1014, Publication 6732 (December 1, 1958), 879.

based on a false conception of world events and an erroneous understanding of what should be done to cope with these events. The present American policy in the Middle East reflects apathy and an unwillingness to face the realities of life.³¹ Looking at the situation realistically, Dean Acheson took a critical view of the Eisenhower Administration's policy in the Middle East labeling it as vague, meaningless, and dangerous.³²

Constructive criticism of the American foreign policy in the Middle East was offered by C. L. Sulzberger in an article entitled "Lessons of Logic and Its Lack":

The only steady aspect of our Middle Eastern policy is confusion. During a decade that saw creation of Israel, Nasser's rise, the Suez war and a drumfire of coups and assassination, the United States never managed to define its own fundamental attitudes. This observation applies to two American administrations. Our Levantine follies have been gloriously bipartisan.

Three dilemmas perplexed Washington from the start. We could not resolve our determination to sponsor Israel with our craving for Arab friendship. Therefore, we wallowed in a trough of indecision. We found ourselves unable to reconcile prejudices against colonialism with a need to support our strongest ally, Britain. And we muddled our analysis of Arab nationalism by always regarding its development in rigid anti-Communist terms.

The consequences led to diplomatic chaos. We have ended up supporting outdated regimes and opposing history's trend. Of our principal friends concerned with the Middle East, Britain and Turkey are widely disliked because of imperialist memories; and equally

³¹Thomas N. Schroth, "Around the Capitol," Congressional Quarterly, XVI, No. 33 (August, 1958), 1067. Used by permission of Mr. Buel F. Weare, publisher of the Congressional Quarterly.

³²New York Times, January 11, 1957, p. 1.

detested France has been excluded from the area; Israel is hated and Iran is weak and uneasy.³³

To be effective, any formulation of a new policy should take into account the needs of the Middle Eastern peoples. Superiority, contempt, and suspicion must be abandoned to a sense of equality, friendship, and trust. The negative attitude of the West towards Arab neutrality can bring forth nothing but poor results and a chain of reaction and criticism.

The success of any Western policy depends largely on the development of common interests and common understanding with the Arab states and peoples. As Senator Ralph E. Flanders remarked:

. . . our whole Middle East policy is based on the endeavor to form alliances with persons. We have had two assassinations of persons on whom we based the presumed strength of our position in the Middle East. Let me suggest that if an assassin had a 6-shooter, he would not have to use more than 4 of his 6 bullets to wreck completely our Middle East policy. What kind of a policy is this? I can only say what I have said many times on this floor, that to trust to rulers and governments is vain as compared with a trust in people. Governments come and governments go. Rulers are born, flourish, and die natural or violent deaths. The people remain.³⁴

American foreign policy in the Middle East would profit immeasurably from an orientation towards the aspirations of the peoples rather than of unpopular governments.

³³New York Times, July 19, 1958, p. 14.

³⁴Senator Ralph E. Flanders, "We are off the Summit - Let Us Strengthen the Foundations," Congressional Record, Senate, 85th Congress, Second Session, CIV, Pt. 13 (August 6, 1958), 16324.

To maintain stability and peace in the area it is essential to create a basis for friendship and fair dealing between the state of Israel and her Arab neighbors. The success of this policy rests on the totality of public opinion, press, aid, armaments, and the personality of the policymakers. Nothing would undermine Soviet plans for the conquest of the Middle East more effectively than peace and stability. Only in the state of turmoil can the Soviet Union reach its objectives.³⁵

Alfred M. Lilenthal remarked that it is a mistake to assume that any political dissatisfaction in the pro-Western Arab states is of necessity inspired by Nasser and that any political movement supported by Nasser must be inspired by Russia. Also, Lilenthal contended that Arab neutralism will ultimately serve the Western purposes to a greater extent than endeavors to impose a pro-Western policy. The alternative for the West is either to follow the policy of friendship to Arab neutralists or continue their past policy which history has disproved.³⁶

In summing up the situation it could be said that there is a need for a new, vigorous policy in the Middle East to counter the Russian propaganda, aid, and friendship. In addition there is a need for a sincere effort on the part of the United States to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is one of the prime roots of the present instability.

³⁵Parker T. Hart, "Tensions and U. S. Policy in the Near and Middle East," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XL, No. 1038, Publication 6820 (May 18, 1959), 717.

³⁶Burleson, op. cit., 18853.

There can be no stability in the area unless the present Arab-Israeli stalemate is resolved and the fear which hangs over Arabs and Israelis alike dispelled. Both sides are anxious for a reasonable and fair solution, but neither is willing to yield an inch. Admittedly, the joint Western policy expressed in the May 25, 1950, Tripartite Declaration (Appendix G) has failed to provide a solution of the Arab-Israeli stalemate. The declaration of May 25, 1950, was not a constructive measure to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, but represented a holding action. If no positive steps towards a solution are taken, peace in the foreseeable future is beyond possibility.

Concern over the Middle East may well induce the United States to initiate negotiations between the State of Israel and her Arab neighbors to convert the precarious armistice into a real peace, on which depends the welfare of both parties. At the present time, the United States may find it profitable to work with the United Nations Mixed Armistice Commission to prevent border violations, guerrilla raids, and retaliations until a final settlement is reached. Also, it may be desirable to urge the Arab states to work out a solution to the refugees problem. Furthermore, it may be necessary for the United States to indicate to the Arab countries that its substantial assistance to the refugees cannot continue indefinitely. Meanwhile, it may announce its willingness to assist in the development of the host countries which are willing to assimilate the refugees and grant them equal rights and privileges with their citizens.

The United States may seriously question the advisability of granting economic aid to countries which defy the United Nations resolutions and directions. Also, it may seriously consider the problems involved in the armament race and armament balance between Israel and her Arab neighbors. It may be necessary to urge Israel to reimburse the refugees for the property of which they have been dispossessed. It may be profitable for the United States to press for lifting the blockade of Israel by Arab states.³⁷ The influence of the United States in the United Nations, Israel, and some of the Arab countries can bring about a peace discussion between the parties concerned. What is important to resolve the present stalemate is that a start be made.

Today, the stalemate in the Arab-Israeli dispute seems no nearer to solution than it did seventeen years ago. The uncompromising demands of Zionism and Arab nationalism make the solution to the problem more difficult than ever. It is in this unfortunate situation that the United States finds itself extremely handicapped in underwriting any constructive regional plans of economic and political nature. It is hoped that in the long run both parties would be able to make the necessary adjustments so that peace might prevail.

³⁷U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Arab Refugees and other Problems in the Near East. Report of the Special Study Mission to the Near East. February 8, 1954, pp. 5-10.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The American policy in the Middle East has met a series of dilemmas. Among them are the conflicting interests of the Western powers, the rise of the Arab national movement under the direction of Cairo and its search for national heroes and leadership, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Each poses a problem for American foreign policy. The reconciliation of Arab aspirations for national self-determination with Western interest in the area - if at all attainable - requires more than ordinary diplomatic skills; equally difficult is the attainment of an Arab-Israeli settlement; but perhaps the greatest problem of all is posed by the need to pacify the struggle between democracy and dictatorship in the Middle East. The United States cannot expect to strengthen its position in the area through a poorly defined and vacillating policy. On the contrary, a deterioration of the Arab-American relations must inevitably follow. American support of the state of Israel seems to have jeopardized American relations with the members of the Arab League; American support of Britain in her conflict with Egypt or elsewhere in the Middle East would necessarily appear as a move in support of

colonialism; unilateral action on the part of the United States would be suspect of a desire to become the successor of the now defunct British power; any attempt to freeze the status quo would be resented by both Arabs and Jews; attacks on Arab nationalism would drive the Arab nations into a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Any action has to be viewed against the background of the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for the domination of the area. By raising the hatred of Western imperialism to a high pitch, the gates can easily be opened for International Communism and Soviet propaganda. Social and economic unrest among peasants and urban workers can be provoked without difficulty and the way paved for revolutionary movements damaging to the interests of the Western powers.

A close examination of the record reveals a decline of American prestige in Egypt as well as in some other Arab countries. This was evident at the time when the United States gave its unequivocal support to the proposed Middle East Defense Organization. In offering Egypt an opportunity to participate in a wider partnership with the United States, Turkey, France, and Britain, the Western powers seemed to assume that Egypt's interests were fundamentally and precisely the same as those of the four powers. The West, to be sure, by insisting on a defense organization that would replace British troops in the Suez Canal Zone, seemed to be oblivious of the political facts in Egypt. The Egyptian Government, be it noted, dismissed the four-power proposals as no more

than an attempt to perpetuate British domination and occupation in a new guise. It believed that the defense of Egypt and the area as a whole should emanate from the will of the people and not from the will of any foreign nation or group of nations. Furthermore, it considered such arrangement with foreign powers as merely a type of intervention and domination and hence an infringement upon Egypt's sovereignty. Ostensibly, Egypt was unwilling to substitute British occupation forces for American, French, Turkish and a certain number of British troops that were already on Egyptian soil.

American prestige in Egypt and some other Arab states met another decline at the time of the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The now defunct Baghdad Pact was initiated by the United Kingdom and supported by the Eisenhower Administration. The United States assumed membership and responsibility on its major committees even though it was not a formal member. America's refusal to join the Baghdad Pact as a formal member alarmed and irritated the member states who had organized in the hope to deter Communist aggression. To be sure, the member states - Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey - believed that the failure or success of the Pact hinged upon the active participation and membership of the United States.

It should be noted, however, that the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact created strains and stresses in American-Egyptian relations. From the Egyptian point of view, the Pact ipso facto posed a clear and imminent

danger to Egyptian leadership in the Arab Middle East. The Baghdad Pact was followed by the signing on October 20, 1955, of the counter-agreement between Egypt and Syria which Saudi Arabia and possibly other Arab states were expected to join. On a later date Egypt did draw Syria and Saudi Arabia into what amounted to a tripartite counter-alliance to the Baghdad Pact.

Nasser's protestations appeared to be based upon the belief that the Arab States, wedged in between the United States and the Soviet Union, must endeavor to avoid being engulfed by either. The Arab States must try to form a united federal Arab State. Yet, in spite of this distant hope for a united Arab nation, preferably under Egyptian leadership and direction, a great danger was ever lurking behind the loose association of the Arab States under the so-called Arab League which came into being in 1945. It would be idle to deny that the drive for a closer Arab union was not based upon the external fear of the State of Israel. Very similarly, it was based upon passionate yearning of some demagogues like Nasser, the late Kassim of Iraq, or Hussein for Arab leadership and political control. Recent political upheavals in Yemen served to illustrate that the Arab leaders involved were animated only by personal gains and selfish motives. Nasser of Egypt attempted to extend his influence to the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula on the one hand, while Kings Saud of Saudi Arabia and Hussein of Jordan were hoping to restore the status quo ante bellum.

The absurdity of the American-sponsored alliance in the Middle East is not difficult to find. Instead of preventing Soviet penetration into the region, it served, to be sure, as a vehicle to give Egypt and Syria a pretext to enter into a military pact with each other and to open the door for rapprochement with the Soviet camp. Concerning the defunct Baghdad Pact, Robert Endicott Osgood observed:

In the light of the most probable military contingencies in the Middle East there would seem to be little military advantage to be gained by supporting an alliance like the Baghdad Pact (formed by Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Great Britain), which the United States sponsored but failed to join. For this defense pact purports to establish a line against direct Soviet invasion, whereas the real deterrent to an invasion, as in western Europe, must be America's capacity for strategic retaliation. (There may be political advantages in supporting the Baghdad Pact, in terms of promoting a particular balance of power in the area; but there are also political disadvantages. So far the Pact seems only to have strengthened the ambitious hand of Egypt and facilitated Soviet penetration.)¹

United States policy, which appeared unduly to emphasize military pacts in the Arab Middle East, contributed little if any to the containment of the Soviet Union in the area. While the United States Government hoped to elicit Egyptian good will and cooperation, the Baghdad Pact provoked bitter Egyptian attacks.

The Middle Eastern turmoil was intensified on February 28, 1955, when the Israeli forces attacked the Gaza Strip and inflicted considerable

¹Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 267.

losses among Egyptian military personnel and civilians. Egypt's pride made it all the more imperative upon Nasser to bolster the military power of his country.

Nasser promptly sought military arms from the United States. However, due to certain conditions attached to the sale of arms Nasser turned to the East, the recommendations of Ambassador Henry Byroade to the Department of State to make a reasonable agreement with Nasser to the contrary notwithstanding. The Egyptian-Czechoslovakian arms deal was ostensibly a propaganda victory for the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it seriously threatened the already precarious balance of power in the Middle East. Despite the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian arms barter, the United States and Britain sought to prevent Soviet intrusions into the region by extending economic aid to Egypt for the construction of the first stage of the Aswan Dam. However, the aid was withdrawn on July 19, 1956, seemingly because of the Egyptian policy of neutrality and anti-Western statements. A further decline in American prestige was caused by the abrupt withdrawal of the offer to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam. America's freezing of Egyptian assets following the nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, and failure to renew the Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere, Inc. (CARE) program during the Suez episode in 1956-1957, brought American prestige in Egypt to a low ebb. The situation was no different when the Eisenhower Doctrine was promulgated in January, 1957. These and

similar actions of the State Department - no matter what their intrinsic merit may have been - caused fear and alarm throughout the Arab world.

Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, the United States sought to restrain Britain and France from using force or the threat of force in order to bring Nasser to his senses. From the beginning of the crisis the United States ruled out the use of force and sought to impose an international control over the Canal. On August 3, 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated that "We do not, however, want to meet violence with violence."² Also, on a radio-television report by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles on August 3, 1956, Secretary Dulles stated:

Now, there were some people who counseled immediate forcible action by the governments which felt themselves most directly affected. This, however, would have been contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and would undoubtedly have led to widespread violence endangering the peace of the world.³

The United States attempted vigorously to reach a peaceful solution to the Suez question through the London Conferences and the United Nations. It attempted to restrain her allies, whose interests were most affected, from using force or the threat of force. It felt that peaceful processes of the United Nations had by no means been fully exhausted. Secretary

²U. S. Department of State, The Suez Canal Problem, July 26 - September 22, 1956; A Documentary Publication, (Washington, D. C. : United States Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 37.

³Ibid., p. 40.

Dulles directed his efforts to secure international control over the internationally important Canal. This seemed to be his primary objective. British and French interests, however, appeared to transcend American concern over free transit. For the British, the Suez Canal was the remaining symbol of British power in Egypt. The British Government sought to put an end to Nasser's anti-British propaganda in the Arab Middle East. France sought to put an end to Egyptian moral and material assistance to the Algerian rebels. Furthermore, both Britain and France showed great concern over the assets of the Suez Canal Company which were valued at about fifty million pounds of which over half was in Britain.

Different objectives and approaches to the Suez Canal question characterized the policies of the three Western powers. In a news conference held on October 2, 1956, Secretary of State Dulles foreshadowed the later American policy of disassociating itself from the colonial policies and interests of Britain and France.

Now there has been some differences in our approach to this problem of the Suez Canal. This is not an area where we are bound together by treaty . . . There are also other problems where our approach is not always identical. For example, there is in Asia and Africa the so-called problem of colonialism. Now there the United States plays a somewhat independent role . . . and that perhaps makes it impractical for us, as I say, in every respect to identify our policies with those of other countries on whichever side of that problem they find their interests.⁴

⁴U. S. Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956 - June 1957 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 103-104.

American efforts at restraining Britain and France from using force came to an end in late October, 1956. On October 30, 1956, the Israeli armed forces, fearful of Egypt's military power and desiring to put an end to the fedayeen raids, penetrated inside the Sinai Peninsula. Britain and France, without prior consultation with the United States, moved their forces from Cyprus to occupy the Suez Canal Zone. Concerning this action President Eisenhower stated on a radio and television address on October 31, 1956, that "the United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance."⁵

In the same address President Eisenhower stated:

Now there were some among our allies who urged an immediate reaction to this event by use of force. We insistently urged otherwise, and our wish prevailed - through a long succession of conferences and negotiations for weeks - even months - with participation by the United Nations. And there, in the United Nations, only a short while ago, on the basis of agreed principles, it seemed that an acceptable accord was within our reach.⁶

American foreign policymakers found it exceedingly difficult to accept the Anglo-French approach to the Suez Canal problem. United States foreign policymakers were cautious lest they lose Arab confidence and endanger American position and interests in the region. It was feared that all Asia would be alienated in the cold war struggle to Russia who appeared as their self-proclaimed protector against

⁵Ibid., p. 149.

⁶Ibid.

twentieth century Western colonialism.

This diversity of purpose and approach among the three Western powers drove a temporary wedge into the Western alliance. This disunity among the Western powers permitted Nasser to reap a political and psychological victory from a military defeat. American abandonment of her traditional allies contributed to the rapid deterioration of British prestige and influence in the Arab countries.

American determination to deter any possible Soviet threat in the Middle East was manifested in the promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine early in 1957. The Eisenhower Doctrine had sought to rehabilitate the dwindling Western influence through, first, the creation of an alliance for the containment of International Communism; second, the arming of the Middle Eastern nations enabling them to protect themselves against possible Russian aggression and internal subversion; third, the extension of economic aid to the nations of the Middle East in order to strengthen their weak economies and, consequently, eliminate conditions conducive to the acceptance of Communism; fourth, the restoration of peace and stability. However, it was met with indifference and in some Arab circles with hostility.

The reasons for the indifference towards the Eisenhower Doctrine by the Arab states - with the exception of the Republic of Lebanon - can be traced to previous experience with the Ottoman, British, and French domination for the past five centuries; to a feeling of inferiority; to

jealousy; to geographical location between the East and West; and to the America's close association with Britain and France. The Arab states - contrary to the United States - see the primary threat to their interests as emanating from Israel rather than the Soviet Union. Thus the American bid to arm the Arab states with guns and tanks against Soviet aggression seems irrelevant to the Arab nationalists and provides ample opportunity for Russia to exploit the American gesture. The Arab nationalist sees in the Eisenhower Doctrine nothing but an unreasonable American concern with Soviet aggression and expansion, oil fields, air bases, and investments. By contrast, Russia appears to offer aid without conditions, friendship without military alliance, support of unity among the Arabs, and aid against Israel.

Since the United States has regarded the Middle East as vital to its national interest, security, and world peace, it has felt it necessary to seek cooperation and friendship of the Arab states. It was quite unnecessary nevertheless to cloud relations by the assumption that Arab neutrality is basically evil and should be fought or, in any event, condemned.

It should be noted that the Arab leaders to date have not become adherents of International Communism or pawns of the Kremlin even though they showed resentment towards the Eisenhower Doctrine. George Lenczowski rightly remarked that it is hazardous to assume that by embarking upon arms-aid deals with the Soviet Union, the Arab world has

embraced International Communism.⁷ Egyptian-Soviet relations have not thus far implied commitment to the cause of International Communism or a rejection of amicable relations with the United States. The Arab states have no illusions concerning the role that the Soviet Union played during the Suez crisis. They are alert to the Soviet scheme to play out Arab nationalism against the allegedly imperialistic motives of the United States. It is the Arab contention that the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably lead the world to the brink of war. The welfare of the poverty-stricken peoples of the Middle East is not the issue for the Arab leaders. The Arabs' resistance to International Communism has put them on the alert against subversive activities of the agents of Moscow who exert a growing influence among the workers and peasants.

The imaginary threat of an overt military attack on the Middle Eastern countries by the Soviet Union seems to vanish with the realization that it would be unnecessary for the Soviet Union to attempt open military aggression on the defenseless, small nations of the Middle East. It would rather appear that the only utility in conjuring up this unlikely contingency has been to enable the Eisenhower Administration to squeeze a few more dollars from Congress for military aid rather than to provide an effective and comprehensive economic policy to prevent Soviet advances into the region.

⁷George Lenczowski, "The Evolution of Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East," The Journal of Politics, XX, No. 1 (February, 1958), 185.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

B. DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS AND FACILITIES

Middle East Command Negotiations

4. Proposals Presented to the Government of Egypt by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey, October 13, 1951.

Document A.

Point I

Egypt belongs to the free world and in consequence her defense and that of the Middle East in general is equally vital to other democratic nations.

Point II

The defense of Egypt and of other countries in the Middle East against aggression from without can only be secured by the cooperation of all interested powers.

Point III

The defense of Egypt can only be assured through the effective defense of the Middle East area and the coordination of this defense with that of adjacent areas.

Point IV

It therefore seems desirable to establish an Allied Middle East Command in which the countries able and willing to contribute to the defense of the area should participate. France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States are prepared to participate with other interested countries in establishing such a Command. Invitations to participate in the Command have been addressed to Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, who have indicated their interest in the defense of the area and who have agreed in principle.

Point V

Egypt is invited to participate as a founder member of the Middle East Command on a basis of equality and partnership with other founder members.

Point VI

If Egypt is prepared to cooperate fully in the Allied Command Organization in accordance with the provisions of the attached annex, His Majesty's Government for their part would be willing to agree to supersession of the 1936 Treaty and would also be willing to agree to withdraw from Egypt such British forces as are not allocated to the Allied Middle East Command by agreement between the Egyptian Government and the Governments of other countries also participating as founder members.

Point VII

As regards armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Allied Middle East Command and the provision to that Command of the necessary strategic defense facilities, such as military and air bases, communications, ports, etc., Egypt will be expected to make her contribution on the same footing as other participating powers.

Point VIII

In keeping with the spirit of these arrangements Egypt would be invited to accept a position of high authority and responsibility with the Allied Middle East Command and to designate Egyptian officers for integration in the Allied Middle East Command Headquarters staff.

Point IX

Facilities to train and equip her forces will be given to Egypt by those participating members of the Allied Command in a position to do so.

Point X

The detailed organization of the Allied Middle East Defense Organization and its exact relationship with the N. A. T. O. have yet to be worked out in consultation between all the powers concerned. For this purpose it is proposed that all founding members of the Allied Middle East Command should send military representatives to a meeting to be held in the near future with the object of preparing detailed proposals for submission to the governments concerned.

Document B

Technical Annex

(1)

In common with other participating powers who are making similar contributions to the defense of the area.

(a) Egypt will agree to furnish to proposed Allied Middle East Command Organization such strategic defense and other facilities on her soil as are indispensable for the organization in peacetime of the defense of the Middle East

(b) that she will undertake to grant forces of the Allied Middle East Command all necessary facilities and assistance in the event of war, imminent menace of war, or apprehended international emergency including the use of Egyptian ports, airfields and means of communication.

(2)

We should also hope that Egypt would agree to the Allied Supreme Commander's Headquarters being located in her territory.

(3)

In keeping with the spirit of these arrangements, it would be understood

(a) that the present British base in Egypt would be formally handed over to the Egyptians on the understanding that it would simultaneously become an Allied base within the Allied Middle East Command with full Egyptian participation in the running of this base in peace and war

(b) that the strength of the Allied force of participating nations to be stationed in Egypt in peacetime would be determined between the participating nations including Egypt from time to time as progress is made in building up the force of the Allied Middle East Command.

(4)

It also would be understood that an air defense organization including both the Egyptian and Allied forces would be set up under the command of an officer with joint responsibility to the Egyptian Government and to the Allied Middle East Command for the protection of Egypt and Allied bases.

U. S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy 1950 - 1955; Basic Documents, Vol. II (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office), 1957, pp. 2180-2182.

APPENDIX C

SPECIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ - 4th APRIL 1955

Article 1

The two Contracting Governments shall maintain and develop peace and friendship between their two countries and shall co-operate for their security and defence in accordance with the Pact of Mutual Co-operation.

Article 2

The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Iraq, signed at Baghdad on June 30, 1930, with annexure and Notes exchanged, shall terminate from the date when the present Agreement comes into force.

Article 3

The Government of Iraq by the present Agreement undertake no obligations beyond the frontiers of Iraq.

Article 4

The Government of Iraq assume full responsibility for the defence of Iraq and will command and guard all defence installations in Iraq.

Article 5

In accordance with Article 1 of the Pact, there shall be close co-operation between the competent authorities of the two Governments for the defence of Iraq. This co-operation shall include planning, combined training and the provision of such facilities as may be agreed upon between the two Contracting Governments for this purpose and with the object of maintaining Iraq's armed forces at all times in a state of efficiency and readiness.

Article 6

The Government of the United Kingdom shall, at the request of the Government of Iraq, do their best

- (a) to afford help to Iraq
 - (i) in creating and maintaining an effective Iraqi Air Force by means of joint training and exercises in the Middle East; and

- (ii) in the efficient maintenance and operation of such airfields and other installations as may from time to time be agreed to be necessary:
- (b) to join with the Government of Iraq in
 - (i) establishing an efficient system of warning against air attack;
 - (ii) ensuring that equipment for the defence of Iraq is kept in a state of readiness; and
 - (iii) to make available in Iraq personnel of the British forces for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of paragraph (a) and (b) of this Article.

Article 7

Service aircraft of the two countries shall enjoy staging and over-flying facilities in each other's territories.

Article 8

In the event of an armed attack against Iraq or threat of an armed attack which, in the opinion of the two Contracting Governments, endangers the security of Iraq, the Government of the United Kingdom, at the request of the Government of Iraq, shall make available assistance, including if necessary armed forces to help to defend Iraq. The Government of Iraq shall provide all facilities and assistance to enable such aid to be rapid and effective.

Article 9

(a) The present Agreement shall come into force on the date on which the United Kingdom becomes a party to the Pact.

(b) The Agreement shall remain in force so long as both Iraq and the United Kingdom are parties to the Pact.

APPENDIX D

CAIRO ACCORD ON JORDAN

The Governments of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Republic of Syria, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Egypt, being aware of the grave responsibilities falling on them for preserving Arab existence and independence, in response to the wishes of their peoples and their belief in solidarity for the liberation of the Arab homeland, in their appreciation of the fact that the realization of this solidarity constitutes a positive step toward the desired Arab union, and in order to participate in safeguarding peace and security in accordance with the principles of the Arab League Charter and the United Nations Charter, and in their desire to conclude an agreement for the promotion of cooperation and coordination of efforts for the fulfillment of these objectives, have appointed and delegated the following representatives:

On behalf of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, His Majesty King Hussein I and Premier Suleiman Nabulsi; on behalf of the Syrian Republic, Premier Sabri al-Asali; on behalf of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, His Majesty King Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz; on behalf of the Republic of Egypt, President Gamal Abdel Nasser; who after the exchange of credences giving them full powers which were found correct and satisfactory, agreed on the following:

Article 1

The contracting Governments affirm their faith in the need to maintain solidarity and cooperation for bolstering Arab nationalism and independence. They declare that they appreciate the need to participate in the responsibilities resulting therefrom.

Article 2

The Governments of the Republic of Syria, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Republic of Egypt, shall share in the expenditure emanating from the obligations falling on the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as a result of the policy of cooperation and solidarity for bolstering Arab existence and independence, of the total amount of 12,500,000 Egyptian pounds annually, or their equivalent. This amount will come under the "Arab obligations" heading. The supplement of this agreement, which is a complementary part of it, organizes the distribution of the aid offer among the participant Governments and regulates its presentation.

Article 3

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall devote the Arab aid to the Jordanian Hashemite armed forces including the National Guard forces.

Article 4

This agreement is concluded for ten years from the date it becomes effective. If the agreement is not amended before the expiration of this period under agreement by the contracting Governments, it will remain in force until the expiration of this validity. After this date, the treaty will continue unless a year's notice regarding its termination is served by one of the contracting Governments on the other Governments through diplomatic channels.

Article 5

This agreement will be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures in force in each of the contracting states. It will come into force from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which should take place in Cairo. In testimony thereof, the abovementioned accredited delegates sign this agreement. This agreement was written in Arabic in Cairo on the eighteenth day of the second month of Jumada, 1376, corresponding to Jan. 19, 1957. The agreement was made in five copies, each contracting Government keeping one copy. The last copy will be deposited in the Arab League General Secretariat.

SUPPLEMENT

The Governments that are signatories to the Arab solidarity agreement in Cairo on the eighteenth day of the second Jumada, 1376, corresponding to Jan. 19, 1957, agree to the following:

Article 1

The share of each state participating in the Arab obligations heading provided in Article 2 of the said agreement shall be as follows: the Republic of Syria, 2,500,000 pounds or the equivalent; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 5,000,000 Egyptian pounds or the equivalent; the Republic of Egypt, 5,000,000 Egyptian pounds or the equivalent.

Article 2

Each Government will pay its share of the abovementioned obligation in two equal installments. The first installment shall be paid when the agreement becomes effective and the second installment six months after the maturity of the first installment, and so on.

Article 3

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan promises to purchase all requirements of the armed forces when equipment becomes available in the countries of the contracting parties from their own production. The cost of such purchases will be entered in special accounts to be deducted from the Arab obligation heading.

Article 4

It is agreed that the Arab obligations stipulated in Article 2 of the agreement are intended to replace the sundry annual grants offered by the British Government to the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the armed forces, including the National Guard, under agreements concluded between them in this respect.

Cairo, the eighteenth day of the second Jumada, 1376
(January 19, 1957)

APPENDIX E

Message from King Saud, President Quwatli, and Colonel Nasser,
12 March 1956

H. M. King Hussein

Peace on you and the mercy of God and his blessings.

In appreciation of the supreme Arab interests for liberation and defence against Israel and the Jewish threat, the Saudi Arabia Kingdom, Syria and Egypt confirm previous written and oral messages regarding the offer of aid to Jordan to replace the British subsidy to the Arab Legion and the National Guard in the event of the stoppage of the British subsidy. The aid to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue for a period of not less than 10 years.

At the same time we express our readiness to coordinate military cooperation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and consider any aggression on Jordan as directed against any other Arab State, and the armistice lines of all Arab States as one line.

Please accept our greetings etc.

March 12th, 1956.

(Sgd)

Saud

Shukri Kuwatly

Jamal Abdul Naser

Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1956, Selected, Edited, and Introduced by Noble Frankland assisted by Vera King (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 35-36.

APPENDIX F

Reply by King Hussein, 17 March 1956

H. M. King Sa'ud

H. E. President Shukry Kuwatly

H. E. Premier Jamal Abdul Naser

Peace on you and the mercy of God and his blessings.

I received with thanks and appreciation your message which says that the three sister States, the Saudi Arabia Kingdom, Syria and Egypt, have offered aid to Jordan to replace the British subsidy to the Arab Legion and the National Guard in the event of the stoppage of the British subsidy, and that the aid will be extended to the Hashemite Kingdom for a period of not less than 10 years.

I wish to express my great thanks and appreciation for the noble brotherly sympathy shown by this noble offer. I do not doubt the noble Arab spirit of this offer which is a true guarantee to our hopes of realising the ties of cooperation and dignity to our noble nation.

However, the subsidy which the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan obtains from Britain in accordance with the provisions of the existing treaty between the two countries is part of Britain's commitments according to the treaty. On this basis, Jordan has the full right to request the British side to fulfil them so long as the treaty remains in power, but I welcome any aid you offer to my country.

At the same time, my country declares that she is ready to coordinate military plans among ourselves in the face of the common enemy and reiterate what I have previously said that the armistice lines of all Arab States are one and I am glad that you have the same views, as already confirmed by your side.

Greetings etc.

March 17th, 1956

(Sgd) Hussein Ibn Talal

Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1956, Selected, Edited, and Introduced by Noble Frankland, assisted by Vera King (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 36.

APPENDIX G

D. Operation of the Arab-Israeli Armistice Regime

Tripartite Declaration Regarding the Armistice Borders

26. Statement by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, May 25, 1950.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab states and of Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these states, have resolved to make the following statements:

1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connection the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security Council on August 4, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel.

2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances will be requested from any other state in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

U. S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy: 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Vol. II (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 2237.