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A CASE STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY APOLOGIA: THE SELF-DEFENSE RHETORIC OF RICHARD NIXON

The University of Oklahoma PH.D. 1981

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

A CASE STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY APOLOGIA: THE SELF-DEFENSE RHETORIC OF RICHARD NIXON

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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Norman, Oklahoma

1981

A CASE STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY APOLOGIA:

THE SELF-DEFENSE RHETORIC OF RICHARD NIXON

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

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CHAPTER I

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SELF-DEFENSE RHETORIC OF RICHARD NIXON

> Within the last three decades, Richard Nixon, Adlai Stevenson, Harry Truman, and Edward Kennedy stood trial before the bar of public opinion regarding the propriety of some public or private action; each chose to take his case to the people in the form of an apologia, the speech of self-defense.[1]

Ware and Linkugel (1973) refer to the speech of self-defense as a "custom of Occidental culture firmly established by Socrates, Martin Luther, Robert Emmet, and thousands of lesser men."[2] Although the rhetorical ritual of apologia has been used since ancient Greece, the study of the apologetic genre has been limited. In this study I propose to (1) establish

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[1]B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (October 1973), 273.

[2]Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," p. 273.

the importance of the apologetic genre, (2) identify Richard Nixon as the most appropriate case study in contemporary apologia, and (3) examine a useful analytic method to apply to the apologetic genre.

In the many examples of apologia throughout history, there is one common element, that is, in each case the accused chose to face his/her accusers and to speak in defense of himself/herself. The witnesses to such self-defenses seem satisfied only with the most personal of responses by the accused. The actual speech of self-defense is thus defined by Ware and Linkugel as a "personalized defense by an individual of his morality, motives, and reputation."[3] Other scholars concur with this definition. Butler (1972) refers to the apologia as speakers' attempts to "repair their ethos."[4] Kruse (1981) concluded that apologetic discourses are "similarly structured in that logos and pathos function principally to support ethos."[5]

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[3]Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," p. 274.

[4]Sherry Devereaux Butler, "The Apologia, 1971 Genre," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 37 (Spring 1972), 287.

[5]Noreen Wales Kruse, "The Scope of Apologetic Discourse: Establishing Generic Parameters," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 46 (Spring 1981), 290.

Isolated public utterances of Richard Nixon provide an excellent focal point for the study of the contemporary apologetic genre. Considering the critical rhetorical demands of the apologetic situation, Nixon is certainly a rhetor capable of "rising to the occasion." Jablonski (1979) regarded Nixon as having a reputation for being "unflaggingly combative in crisis situations,..."[6] Gibson and Felkins (1974) concluded that Nixon's "concern through life has been to master the panic stirred within him by crisis, to be, when the moment arrived, calm, balanced, objective."[7] In deference to his mastery of crisis rhetoric, Hart (1976) went so far as to refer to Nixon as "one of the coolest rhetorical customers this nation has known."[8] I contend that Nixon is as well equipped an apologist as one will view in recent history, and his reliance on the

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[6]Carol J. Jablonski, "Richard Nixon's Irish Wake: A Case of Generic Transference," Central States Speech Journal, 30 (Summer 1979), 164.

[7]James W. Gibson and Patricia Felkins, "A Nixon Lexicon," Western Speech, 38 (Summer 1974), 190.

[8]Roderick P. Hart, "Absolutism and Situation: Prolegomena to a Rhetorical Biography of Richard M. Nixon," Communication Monographs, 43 (August 1976), 226.

apology was, perhaps, unsurpassed in modern politics.[9] Consequently, selected self-defense discourses of Richard Nixon are analyzed for the primary concern of examining contemporary apologia. The purpose of this study is to analyze modern apologia and to illustrate its various strategies. The self-defense rhetoric of Richard Nixon thus serves as a case study in contemporary apologia.

Apologia as a Rhetorical Genre

The speech of self-defense indeed has been an important concern of past as well as contemporary society. The recurrent theme of accusation followed by apology is certainly prevalent in the history of public address.[10] In fact, the apology played a large part in Greek oratory. Examples of the ancient art of self-defense in the "Golden Age of Greece" are apparent in Socrates' "Apology"; Isocrates' "On the Antidoses"; and Demosthenes' "On the Crown."[11] As Kruse (1981) noted, "the

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[9]Jackson Harrell, B. L. Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, "Failure of Apology in American Politics: Nixon on Watergate," Speech Monographs, 42 (November 1975), 245.

[10]Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," pp. 274-74.

[11]George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 149, 181, and 229.

apologia as a genus is as ancient as rhetoric itself."[12] Some contemporary examples of the ritual of self-defense are the following discourses: Douglas MacArthur's "Address to Congress"; Harry S. Truman's "Television Address on Harry Dexter White"; Adlai Stevenson's "The Hiss Case"; and Edward Kennedy's "Chappaquiddick Address."[13]

The traditional rhetorical form of the apology as it was used by the ancients has not significantly deviated in the contemporary practice of apologia. Specifically, the four following rhetorical tasks are often undertaken by the ancient as well as the contemporary apologist:

1. A statement of the case at hand is given
2. Then, a refutation of the charges and often a counterattack are advanced
3. The self-defense explanation unfolds, particularly stressing the rhetor's fine character
4. Finally, a summation/conclusion is given reasserting the apologist's own moral integrity.[14]

Although the rhetorical critic's interest in apologia has been considerable, Ware and Linkugel's (1973) article was

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[12]Kruse, "The Scope of Apologetic Discourse," p. 279.

[13]Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," p. 275.

[14]Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, p. 151.

the first contemporary scholarly endeavor to both grant apologia a generic status and detail its common elements.[15] Since Ware and Linkugel's self-defense criteria constitute the method of analysis employed in this study, their system will be examined in a forthcoming section of this chapter. Following Ware and Linkugel's study, several journal articles addressed the ramifications of apologia as a rhetorical genre.

Kruse (1977) pursued an expanded definition of apologia focusing on underlying motivational factors.[16] She conceptualized apologia as "Public discourse produced whenever a prominent person attempts to repair his character if it has been directly or indirectly damaged by overt charges, or rumors and allegations, which negatively value his behavior and/or his judgment."[17] Kruse concluded that the critic must understand

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[15]Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," pp. 273-73. Examples of criticism of apologetic rhetoric include James H. Jackson, "Plea in Defense of Himself," Western Speech, 20 (Fall, 1959), 185-95; Bower Aly, "The Gallows Speech," Southern Speech Journal, 34 (Spring 1969), 204-213; and David A. Ling, "A Pentadic Analysis of Senator Edward Kennedy's Address 'To the People of Massachusetts,' July 25, 1969," Central States Speech Journal, 21 (Summer 1970), 81-86.

[16]Noreen W. Kruse, "Motivational Factors in Non-Denial Apologia, Central States Speech Journal, 28 (Spring 1977), 13-23.

[17]Kruse, "Motivational Factors," p. 13.

both the rhetorical situation of apologia and the motives of the apologist.[18]

Crable (1978) examined the basis of the genre of apologia.[19] He stated, "The history of questions of accountability is a study of the ways in which people-as-political constituents argue the extence of impropriety and the ways in which politicians-as-people argue the propriety of their conduct."[20] According to Crable, ethics, law, politics, and communication are all involved in this clash.[21] Utilizing Burkeian concepts, he pointed out that the essence of accountability through apologia is the fact that the actor/politician has exercised his own moral choice in his conduct, and that such conduct may at any time become the subject of ethical challenge.[22]

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[18]Kruse, "Motivational Factors," p. 23

[19]Richard E. Crable, "Ethical Codes, Accountability, and Argumentation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64 (February 1978), 23-32.

[20]Crable, "Ethical Codes," pp. 23-24.

[21]Crable, "Ethical Codes," p. 24.

[22]Crable, "Ethical Codes," pp. 25-26.

In sum, Crable paraphrased Burke and stated, "Politics above all is drama, and the enactment of roles can be judged."[23]

Finally, Gold (1978) believed that recent presidential campaigns are particularly reliant of the type of character defense inherent in apologia.[24] As a result of the Watergate scandal, Ford and Carter in their 1976 presidential campaign clearly stressed the integrity of their character. In light of the Chappaquiddick incident, Edward Kennedy was faced with a similar character defense in his 1980 campaign for the presidency. Gold's view of the exigencies that require apologia are worth noting. She stated, "Any attack casting suspicion upon one's moral character may hinder one's ability to achieve goals and, unless deflected, may destroy the ability to function as a public leader."[25] Gold thus stressed that contemporary practice is such that the aspirant's personal qualities are

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[23]Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1941), p. 310, quoted in Crable, "Ethical Codes," p. 26.

[24]Ellen Reid Gold, "Political Apologia: The Ritual of Self-Defense," Communication Monographs, 45 (November 1978), 306-316.

[25]Gold, "Political Apologia," p. 307.

greatly emphasized and the media's interest in exploring these personal attributes only heightens this emphasis. Hence, apologetic strategies can serve to sustain a candidacy. As a final observation Gold stated, "Aspiring Presidents can literally be made or broken on their ability to practice the ritual of self-defense."[26]

In review of these studies by Kruse, Crable, and Gold, several observations can be made concerning the present status of generic criticism of apologia. Clearly, the critic of self-defense rhetoric needs to be concerned with motivational factors or what really prompted the apologia. Since one's moral choices can be challenged, the essence of apologia is conflict generally between public sentiment and the apologist's conduct. Such a conflict often involves ethical, legal, political, and communicative considerations. Finally, as a result of recent political scandals and the media's ability and interest in revealing them, the ritual of apologia is often critical to the contemporary political scene.

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[26]Gold, "Political Apologia," p. 316.

Nixon as a Subject for Rhetorical Study

The rhetoric of Richard Nixon lends itself well to rhetorical scrutiny: (1) he was a well-schooled rhetor;[27] (2) rhetoric, particularly self-defense rhetoric, was instrumental to his political career;[28] and (3) the longevity of his national political career provides "ample opportunity for observing his discourse in varying rhetorical situations."[29] Nixon's use and awareness of rhetoric were quite apparent even at an early age. One of his biographers, David Abrahamsen, noted the emergence of Nixon's speech skills at an early age:

> Even as a little boy talking to his classmates, Richard was trying to impress others with his knowledge of politics, although he was too young and inexperienced to speak with authority. Still, he enjoyed observing the dramatic impact of his rhetoric on his young peers. With rhetoric, an

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[27]David Abrahamsen, Nixon vs. Nixon (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1976), p. 70.

[28]Hart, "Absolutism and Situation," p. 205.

[29]Donald P. Cushman, "The Effects of Richard Nixon's Rhetorical Style on the Climate of the Controversies in Which He Participates," paper delivered at the annual Convention of the Speech Communication Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1974, p. 1.

> insecure (and poor) boy would wield a great deal of power; he was more powerful than his peers because he could confront them and persuade them. That he was able to arouse their interest meant he was also able to mobilize their feelings and win them over.[30]

Another biographer, William Costello, observed Nixon's unusual talent in debate:

> Richard's shyness in boyhood gave way to a new self-confidence when he acquired what was to be a life-long interest in debating. From the first he was outstanding....
> His high-school debating coach, Mrs. Norman Vincent, remembers she used to feel 'disturbed' at his superiority over his teammates. 'He had this ability,' she said, 'to kind of slide round an argument instead of meeting it head on, and he could take any side of a debate.'[31]

In high school and in college, Nixon won numerous awards in oratory, extemporaneous speaking, and debate.[32] As an undergraduate at Whittier College from 1930 to 1934 he did well as a student majoring in history; however, his special distinction was that of being a top-notch debater.[33] Thus, years

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[30]Abrahamsen, Nixon vs. Nixon, p. 68.

[31]William Costello, The Facts About Nixon (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1960), pp. 23-24.

[32]Abrahamsen, Nixon vs. Nixon, p. 70.

[33]Costello, The Facts About Nixon, p. 23.

before Nixon's political career was launched in 1946, he demonstrated considerable ability in public speaking. However, Washington Post journalist Lou Cannon concluded that there were substantive flaws in Nixon's speaking style:

> Debate developed both Dick Nixon's education and his career, but it broadened him rather than deepening him. He developed a quickness, a facility, an ability to argue both sides of every question. He also developed the dozen little debater's tricks that still mar his speeches, especially the ability to plausibly refute an argument his opponent has never made.[34]

The analyses by Nixon's more favorable biographers should also be noted. Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess evaluated Nixon's rhetorical style as reflective of a good debater:

> Nixon's public style is that of the college debater. He debates well, controlling his material and his environment as a good debater must. Like most good debaters, he learned the techniques young, and its habits are almost impossible to shake. The debater strives for points, not images.[35]

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[34]Lou Cannon, "The Forces That Forged the Future: 'He Didn't Want to Stay in Yorba Linda,'" in The Fall of a President, ed. Haynes Johnson (New York: Delacorte Press, 1974), p. 44.

[35]Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess, Nixon: A Political Portrait (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 7.

Nixon himself valued his debate training:

> College debating in those days was a serious pursuit and a highly developed art, and it provided me not only experience with techniques of argument but also an intensive introduction to the substance of some issues I would deal with in later years.[36]

Although judgments about Nixon's actual skills in public speaking are subject to much interpretation, all evaluations indicate that Nixon used rhetoric at an early age, was fairly well-schooled in the art of persuasion, and was most aware early in life of the potential impact of rhetoric.

In a personal letter to me, Nixon staff assistant Kenneth L. Khachigian indicated that Nixon definitely considered his skill in public speaking a significant factor contributing to his political career (see Appendix A).

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[36]Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 17. Although Nixon was obviously aware of the importance of his speech background, he made only brief references to his speech training in his first two books (i.e., his 1962 book, Six Crises and his 1978 memoirs). In the former publication, Nixon's only reference to his background in speech was as follows: "I won my share of scholarships, and of speaking and debating prizes in school, not because I was smarter but because I worked longer and harder than some of my more gifted colleagues." Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1962), p. 295.

In reference to Nixon's first political election, his 1946 Congressional campaign, Khachigian made the observation that Nixon's debate skills were crucial to his election:

> In his first political campaign, it was the debates with his better-known opponent that were so important to President Nixon's victory. His presentation was sharp, concise, and reflected substantial preparation. His opponent's presentation was methodical, plodding, technical and much more boring. The difference between the challenger's abilities and the experienced five-term incumbent's less effective presentation was telling.[37]

Khachigian stated that the following speech situations were also examples which revealed that Nixon's skill as a public speaker was a crucial factor in his political success: (1) his speeches in his 1950 Senate campaign against Helen Douglas, (2) his famous 1952 Fund speech, (3) his speech in 1952 before the New York State Republican dinner, and (4) his speeches leading to his political comeback in 1968. In addition,

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[37]Letter received from Kenneth L. Khachigian, 10 August 1978. After Nixon left office in 1974, Khachigian was frequently a spokesman for Nixon in the press, lived at San Clemente with the Nixon family, and was noted as a principal assistant in the writing of Nixon's memoirs. See, for example, Nixon's acknowledgement of Khachigian's aid in RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. xii.

Khachigian disclosed that Nixon had a formulated theory of rhetoric that dominated his political speaking. He stated that Nixon found the six following components essential to a good speech: (1) preparation, (2) addressing the audience, (3) brevity, (4) anecdotes, quotations, and stories, (5) newsworthiness, and (6) the peroration.

It is my contention that Nixon is a particularly significant subject for rhetorical study because his use of rhetoric had such a strong influence on his political career.[38] Roderick Hart indeed argues that Nixon's entire political career was shaped by his use of rhetoric:

> The sheer quantity of Nixon's rhetorical efforts reveals how deeply he depended upon public suasion. He rose to prominence because of his savage rhetoric (in 1946) and avoided political limbo because of his melancholic rhetoric (in 1952). He first tasted defeat because of his mediated rhetoric (in 1960), regained momentum because of his tireless rhetoric (in 1964), and gathered in the garlands because of his managed rhetoric (in 1968). Until the summer of 1974, his was a career which spun dizzingly on the fulcrum of public discourse.[39]

Rhetoric, particularly self-defense rhetoric or apologia, was crucial to the political career of Richard Nixon, and his long and influential national political career

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[38]See Cushman, "The Effects of Richard Nixon's Rhetorical Style," p. 1.

[39]Hart, "Absolutism and Situation," p. 205.

was clearly affected by the successes and failures of his self-defense discourses. Referring to Nixon's 1952 apologia, the "Checkers" speech, Lawrence Rosenfield (1968) stated that "with a single speech Richard Nixon won a decisive initiative for his party."[40] In 1957, Barnet Baskerville observed that Nixon was regarded by many as the best political speaker in America. Furthermore, Baskerville believed that Nixon's popularity--or lack of it--was based largely on his speaking ability.[41] Theodore White (1975) advanced a somewhat more critical evaluation of Nixon's rhetoric, when he stated, "Already by the late fifties his stump ferocity had made him an object of hatred to millions of liberals."[42] In reference to much later in Nixon's political career, Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel (1975) implied that if anyone could conceive of a successful apologia for Watergate it would be Nixon, "who

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[40]L. W. Rosenfield, "A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Nixon-Truman Analog," Speech Monographs, 35 (November 1968), 436.

[41]Barnet Baskerville, "The New Nixon," in "Rhetoric and the Campaign of 1956," ed. Donald C. Bryant, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 43 (February 1957), p. 41.

[42]Theodore H. White, Breach of Faith (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1975), p. 89.

used apologia on a scale unprecedented in the history of American politics."[43] An analysis of Nixon's rhetoric in terms of critical self-defense situations could prove revealing to the art of apologia in modern politics.

Method of Analysis

There are obviously a number of analytic methods to chose from when undertaking the task of rhetorical criticism. For example, traditional methods can be applied to the rhetorical genre in question, such as an application of the Aristotelian modes of proof--ethos, pathos, and logos--or the Ciceronian canons--invention, organization, style, and delivery. Although these are the most familiar and at one time the classic standards applied to persuasive discourse, these traditional categories lack operationalized definitions which are necessary for the generic criticism of apologia. Thus, the traditional canon of invention, for example, has taken on a multitude of meanings such that the critic lacks a discrete definition of that concept.

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[43]Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel, "Failure of Apology," 245.

A number of nontraditional critical methods could be used in this study. An example of a nontraditional approach is Stephen Toulmin's model which can be easily applied to argumentative speeches.[44] In Toulmin's scheme there are six elements contributing to any argument: the evidence, the warrant, the claim, the support for the warrant, the reservation, and the qualifier. While this method can be used effectively in dissecting the logical framework of argumentative discourses, it does not account for the ethical appeals which, by definition, constitute the important foundation of the critical system actually used in this study.

Another popular nontraditional method of analysis is Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pentad focusing on five key elements of the rhetorical situation: scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose.[45] Although Burke's Dramatistic Pentad does well in examining motivational factors and subsequent enactment of roles in rhetorical situations, it does not provide sufficient

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[44]Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (London: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

[45]Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

focus on the strategies that distinguish the apologetic genre.

The method of analysis employed in this study is the self-defense criteria explicated by Ware and Linkugel (1973).[46] While there are a number of available analytic tools, this method is specifically tailored for the genre of apologia. As previously noted, Ware and Linkugel define apologia as a personalized defense by an individual of his morality, motives, and reputation.[47] In their own words, their critical system attempts to accomplish two goals: "to discover those factors which characterize the apologetic form" and "to discover the subgenres or the types of discourses within the genre."[48] Ware and Linkugel acknowledge that they borrow concepts and terminology from Robert P. Abelson's (1959) psychological theory pertaining to the resolution of belief dilemmas.[49] However, they note that they freely adapted Abelson's meanings and terms for better usage in speech criticism.

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[46]Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," pp. 273-283.

[47]Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defens," p. 274.

[48]Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," p. 274.

[49]Robert P. Abelson, "Modes of Resolution of Belief Dilemmas," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3 (December, 1959), 343-352, cited in Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," p. 275.

Ware and Linkugel posit that four primary "factors" or strategies consistently appear in self-defense rhetoric: denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence. The denial strategy amounts to a disavowal by the speaker of any participation in, relationship to, or positive sentiment toward that which has repelled the audience. Bolstering efforts are the speaker's attempts to identify himself with something viewed favorably by the audience. The differentiation strategy is the speaker's particularization of the charges at hand--moving the audience toward a new and less abstract perspective. Finally, transcendence is the speaker's means of moving the audience away from the particulars of the charges at hand and toward a more abstract and general view of his character. Identifying these strategies and noting their frequency and implications in selected apologia thus constitutes the foundation of this analysis.[50]

Ware and Linkugel assert that the self-defense rhetor combines reformative and transformative strategies in his discourse. Reformative strategies involve merely revising the cognitions of the listener. Conversely, transformative

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[50]See Figure 1 for a detailed examination of these four strategies of apologia.

FIGURE 1

FOUR "FACTORS" OR STRATEGIES THAT CHARACTERIZE THE APOLOGETIC FORM*

	Denial	Bolstering	Differentiation	Transcendence
Overall goal	Attempts to negate charges (divisive)	Seeks identification (cohesive)--obverse of of denial	Makes a distinction (divisive)	Joins elements (cohesive)--obverse of differentiation
Tactics used	Denies alleged facts, sentiments, objects, or relationships	Reinforces the existence of a fact, sentiment, object, or relationship	Separates some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship from larger context	Joins some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship with some larger object
Strategic utility	Useful strategy if negations do not distort reality or conflict with audience's beliefs	Useful strategy if speaker has an especially strong means of identification	Useful strategy if the old and new meanings lend themselves to radically different interpretations by audience	Useful strategy if the manipulated attribute(s) proves to be congruent with the new context in the minds of the audience
Speaker's task	Speaker disavowals any participation in, relationship to, or positive sentiment toward that which has repelled audience	Speaker identifies himself with something viewed favorably by the audience	Speaker particularizes the charges at hand--moving the audience toward the less abstract and placing repelling aspects of accused in a new perspective	Speaker moves audience away from the particulars of the charge at hand and toward some more abstract, general view of his character
Impact on audience	This is a "reformative" strategy since it merely revises or amends audience's cognitions	This is a "reformative" strategy since the speaker does not invent identification but is limited to the reality the audience perceives	This is a "transformative" strategy since the old context is divided into two or more new constructions of reality and results in a change of the audience's meaning	This is a "transformative" strategy since it attempts to change audience's cognitive identification and meaning
Examples	Marcus Garvey's 1923 "Address to the Jury" was a denial of intent (versus a denial of action) as he did not deny that the people were defrauded but stated that his intentions were good	Edward Kennedy's 1969 "Chappaquiddick" address used bolstering as he attempted to reinforce a feeling of belonging between the public and the Kennedy family	Edward Kennedy (1969) used differentiation between his normal and crisis self (regeneration)	Eugene Debs' 1918 "Speech to the Jury" used transcendence as he justified his opposition to WWI by identifying the attacks against him with opposition to American people and their Constitution. Clarence Darrow's "They Tried to Get Me" speech used this as he represented himself as a hero, his accusers as wicked

*This chart represents my synthesis of some of the concepts discussed in the following article: B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (October 1973), 273-73. The examples of historical speeches used here are taken directly from this article. Ware and Linkugel acknowledge (on page 275) that they borrow concepts and terminology from Robert P. Abelson's psychological theory pertaining to the resolution of belief dilemmas. However, they note that they have freely adapted Abelson's meanings and terms for better usage in speech criticism. Robert P. Abelson, "Modes of Resolution of Belief Dilemmas," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3 (December 1959), 343-352.

strategies attempt to change the cognitions of the listener. The two reformative strategies of apologia are denial and bolstering. The two transformative strategies are differentiation and transcendence. Ware and Linkugel believe that the speech of self-defense needs to contain both reformative and transformative elements and thus results in any combination of one strategy from each category.[51] Consequently, this method of analysis requires that the rhetorical critic discern the most crucial reformative and transformative strategies operating in the selected apologia.

Ware and Linkugel further contend that these combined strategies result in four "subgenres" or types of discourses within the genre of apologia: (1) absolution--combining primarily denial and differentiation strategies, (2) vindication--using essentially denial and transcendental strategies, (3) explanation--highly dependent upon bolstering and differentiation strategies, and (4) justification--based mostly on bolstering and transcendental strategies.[52] In the address of absolution, the speaker seeks acquittal from those charges

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[51]Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," p. 282.

[52]Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel, "Failure of Apology," p. 252.

levied against his character. The rhetor in the speech of vindication seeks to preserve his reputation especially relative to the worth of his accusers. In the address of explanation, the speaker seeks to eliminate condemnation by providing the audience with a clearer understanding of the situation. Finally, in the speech of justification, the rhetor seeks the audience's understanding and approval for what he has done. Thus, categorizing selected apologia into specific "subgenres" is another task of this analysis.[53]

While Ware and Linkugel's system was published relatively recently, their four strategies of apologetic rhetoric have definite historical roots. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses four strategies of proof in demonstrative speeches which became the basis of the classical stasis system:

> The duty of the Arguments is to attempt demonstrative proofs. These proofs must bear directly upon the question in dispute, which must fall under one of four heads. (1) If you maintain that the act was not committed, your main task in court is to prove this. (2) If you maintain that the act did no harm, prove this. If you maintain the (3) act was less than is alleged, or (4) justified, prove these facts, just as you would prove the act not to have been committed if you were maintaining that.[54]

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[53]See Figure 2 for a detailed examination of these four subgenres of apologia.

[54]Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. by W. Rhys Roberts, Poetics, trans. by Ingram Bywater (New York: The Modern Library, 1954), p. 1417b.

FIGURE 2

FOUR "SUBGENRES" OR TYPES OF DISCOURSES FOUND WITHIN THE GENRE OF APOLOGIA*

	Absolution	Vindication	Explanation	Justification
Speaker's task	Speaker seeks acquittal from those charges levied against his character More specific than vindicative address	Speaker seeks to preserve his reputation, and also, his greater worth relative to the worth of his accusers	Speaker seeks to eliminate condemnation by providing audience with a clearer understanding of the situation More defensive than justification address	Speaker seeks audience's understanding and approval for what he has done
Key strategies	Resulting from the union of primarily "denial" and "differentiation" factors	Resulting from the union of "denial" and especially "transcendental" factors	Resulting from the union of "bolstering" and "differentiation" factors	Resulting from the union of "bolstering" and "transcendental" factors
Appropriate forum	Could involve legal, extra-judicial, or public opinion proceedings Used by S. Houston, M. Garvey, and R. Nixon	Could involve a multitude of public proceedings Used by Socrates and H. S. Truman	Could involve a multitude of public proceedings Used by M. Luther and A. Stevenson	Could involve a multitude of public proceedings Used by S. B. Anthony and D. MacArthur
Tactics used	Accused denies any wrongdoing and differentiates any personal attribute in question from that which repels audience	Accused is permitted greater ease in going beyond the specifics of a given charge	Accused assumes that if audience understands his motives, beliefs, or whatever, they will not be able to condemn him	Accused often alludes to some "higher ethic" as he attempts to gain understanding and approval
Overall goal	Concern here is essentially "clearing one's name" by focusing upon the particulars of the charge	Concern here is not only on the preservation of the accused's reputation, but also his greater worth as a human being relative to his accusers	Concern here is in increasing audience's understanding and consequently lessening condemnation of accused individual	Concern here is not only in increasing audience's understanding of the situation, but also gaining their approval
Examples	Example of this was Robert Emmet's 1803 "My Country Was My Idol" when he considered the nature of treason in great depth	Example of this was Clarence Darrow's "They Tried to Get Me" when he used transcendental strategies in comparing his character with his persecutors'	Example of this was Edward Kennedy's 1969 "Chappaquiddick" address as he sought to disclose further details to his audience	Example of this was Eugene Debs' 1918 "Speech to the Jury" as he sought to establish the basis of his own actions as concerned with human dignity and rights

*This chart represents my synthesis of the four types of discourses found within the genre of apologia as discussed by Ware and Linkugel (1973). The examples of historical speeches used here are taken directly from this article. After examining some twenty-seven examples of self-defense rhetoric, Ware and Linkugel concluded that two "factors" (see Figure 1) were generally combined to produce one of the above "subgenres" or "subcategories" of apologia.

The Aristotelian concept of stasis thus represents the turning point of an issue or the central point being disputed, consisting of one or more of these four points: (1) act not committed, (2) act not harmful, (3) harm less than reward, and/or (4) act justified.[55] To a large extent, these four points correspond with Ware and Linkugel's four apologetic strategies: (1) denial, (2) bolstering, (3) differentiation, and (4) transcendence.

Dieter (1950) observed that the term stasis actually evolved from Aristotle's physical philosophy and was conceptualized as the anti-thesis of "kinesis" to "stand still."[56] As previously noted, in Aristotle's Rhetoric the term referred to "the turning point of an issue."[57] Finally, the Roman definition of stasis was essentially "the main question in debate."[58] Accordingly, the status of any case could be determined by asking certain questions: (1) whether a thing is (fact), (2) what it is (definition), (3) of what kind it

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[55]James L. Golden, Goodwin F. Berquist, and William E. Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, 2nd ed. (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1978), p. 62.

[56]Otto Alvin Loeb Dieter, "Stasis," Speech Monographs, 17 (November 1950), 369.

[57]Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, p. 62.

[58]Dieter, "Stasis," p. 369.

is (quality), and (4) is it before the proper tribunal (place).[59]

In sum, the Aristotelian notion of stasis represents the classical foundation of Ware and Linkugel's critical system. Aware of the contemporary theorist's indebtedness to classical rhetorical theory, I use Ware and Linkugel's system because of its apparent applicability to apologia in modern politics. Moreover, it is the only detailed method of analysis relative to the genre of apologia in contemporary politics. As noted, a number of previous studies have analyzed instances of self-defense rhetoric, but none has formulated a classificatory schema beyond classical rhetorical theory.[60] Ware and Linkugel's system offers critics an opportunity to assess modern self-defense rhetoric in accordance to developed standards of apologia. Additionally, their system has been used quite effectively in subsequent apologia criticism.[61] Finally, my own initial/exploratory use of

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[59]Golden, Berquist, and Coleman, The Rhetoric of Western Thought, p. 68.

[60]Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," pp. 273-74.

[61]See, for example: Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel, "Failure of Apology," pp. 245-261; Kruse, "Motivational Factors," pp. 13-23; and Gold, "Political Apologia," pp. 306-316.

this system on Nixon's apologia appeared to produce insightful analysis.

Thus, the method of analysis employed in this study is a three-fold process: (1) the four key strategies of apologia are noted, (2) the most crucial reformative and transformative strategies are pinpointed, and (3) the self-defense discourse is categorized into one of four subgenres.

Selection of Speeches

Four critical rhetorical situations in the national political career of Richard Nixon produced noteworthy examples of self-defense rhetoric. These speeches were the following: "My Side of the Story" (1952), "A Vietnam Plan" (1969), "Cambodia" (1970), and "The Watergate Affair" (1973). Although a number of rhetorical analyses have been done on each of these famous speeches, developed self-defense criteria have not been applied to them to note patterns and recurring apologetic strategies. A brief rationale for using each of these self-defense discourses will follow.

"My Side of the Story" was delivered by Nixon on September 23, 1952, and is often referred to as the "Checkers"

or Fund speech.[62] In this famous speech Nixon, then the Republican Vice-Presidential candidate, explained his use of an $18,000 special campaign fund. Rosenfield (1968) labeled this apologia "one of the most controversial public addresses of modern American history."[63] Nixon went so far as to refer to this self-defense as the event which made possible his election as vice president.[64] This discourse was quite successful in ending the controversy at hand, and represents a classic example of effective apologia. Moreover, it reveals a number of detailed strategies to cope with exigences of the moment. Thus, this early address will provide a good starting point for assessing the contemporary practice of apologia.

Nixon's "A Vietnam Plan" was delivered on November 3, 1969, and has been labeled the "silent majority" speech.[65]

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[62]Richard M. Nixon, "My Side of the Story," Vital Speeches of the Day, 19 (October 15, 1952), 11-15. See Appendix B for a complete text of this address.

[63]Rosenfield, "A Case Study," p. 435.

[64]Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 125-29, cited in Rosenfield, "A Case Study," pp. 446-47.

[65]Richard M. Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," Vital Speeches of the Day, 36 (November 15, 1969), 66-70. See Appendix C for a complete text of this address.

When Nixon delivered this speech, he had been in office for approximately ten months and as Newman (1970) pointed out, "the political honeymoon was over."[66] Congressional criticism and the antiwar sentiment of the public were beginning to close in on Nixon. Hence, his promised "plan for peace" was being awaited rather impatiently. Nixon believed that this address was an overwhelming success in terms of the polls and subsequent congressional support for his Vietnam policies. In fact, he stated in his memoirs that this address was one of the very few speeches that actually influenced the course of history.[67] Critics have viewed this speech as one of Nixon's most revealing addresses relative to his handling or mishandling of the Vietnam War.[68] I would thus argue that this discourse offers an excellent view of Nixon's Vietnam War apologia.

Nixon's address on "Cambodia" was delivered on April 30, 1970, and was necessitated by the "incursion" of American and South Vietnamese troops across the Cambodian border.[69]

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[66]Robert P. Newman, "Under the Veneer: Nixon's Vietnam Speech of November 3, 1969," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (April 1970), 169.

[67]Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), pp. 409-410.

[68]Newman, "Under the Veneer," p. 169.

[69]Richard M. Nixon, "Cambodia," Vital Speeches of the Day, 36(May 15, 1970, 450-52. See Appendix D for a complete text of this address.)

Since Nixon had actually made this decision prior to delivering this speech, his rhetorical task was one of providing a rationale for his action.[70] Considering Ware and Linkugel's actual definition of apologia as a personalized defense by an individual of his morality, motives, and reputation,[71] I would justify the apologetic nature of this discourse--as well as the Vietnam speech--with two arguments. First, the nature of this war was such that it was, in fact, a moral issue. Specifically, America's continued involvement in this "undeclared" war became a very unpopular and moralistic issue.[72] Second, Nixon had so personalized the Presidency that his critical war rhetoric became a personal defense of his military policy decisions.[73] That is, the personalized tone of

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[70]Richard B. Gregg and Gerard A. Hauser, "Richard Nixon's April 30, 1970 Address on Cambodia: The 'Ceremony' of Confrontation," Speech Monographs, 40 (August 1973), 169.

[71]Ware and Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense," p. 274.

[72]J. Anthony Lucas, Nightmare: The Underside of the Nixon Years (New York: The Viking Press, 1976), p. 12.

[73]See, for example, Ruth M. Gonchar and Dan F. Hahn, "The Rhetorical Predictability of Richard M. Nixon," Today's Speech, 19 (Fall, 1971), 3-13.

these addresses is quite identifiable.[74] I would therefore categorize these war speeches as apologia, encompassing Nixon's highly personalized defenses of a crucial moral issue--the Vietnam War.

"The Watergate Affair" was delivered by Nixon on April 30, 1973, and was followed by a series of similar apologetic discourses ending only with his resignation from the Presidency on August 8, 1974.[75] This speech was in response to mounting pressure on Nixon to finally confront the Watergate affair in terms of explaining his role in this scandal to the American people. Much of this pressure resulted from the fact that four key members of the White House staff--Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Kleindienst, and Dean--were implicated by March of 1973 in this scandal.[76] Clearly, Watergate events had unfolded in such a way that Nixon's earlier blanket claims

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[74]Gonchar and Hahn, "The Rhetorical Predictability," p. 3. It is interesting to note that Nixon uses the word "I" a total of 134 times in these two discourses.

[75]Richard M. Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," Vital Speeches of the Day, 39 (May 15, 1973), 450-52. See Appendix E for a complete text of this address.

[76]Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel, "Failure of Apology," p. 253.

of White House innocence could not be supported. Consequently, this address would be an attempt to explain all of these seemingly incriminating events to the satisfaction of the American people. Although Nixon made apologetic-like statements prior to this discourse, Ling (1977) observed that this was "Nixon's first public address specifically directed to the issues of Watergate."[77] Furthermore, Cheseboro and Hamsher (1976) stated, "In this speech, the foundation for perceiving all strategies used by Nixon can be discerned."[78] Thus, this address was, perhaps, Nixon's most crucial Watergate self-defense.

In conclusion, I believe that these four discourses represent some of Nixon's most significant self-defense efforts. Moreover, these four rhetorical situations provided

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[77]David A. Ling, "Nixon, Watergate and the Rhetor of Agent," in "A Pentadic Analysis of Richard Nixon and Watergate," ed. Charles U. Larson, Speaker and Gavel, 15 (Fall 1977), 7. In his memoirs, Nixon also referred to this speech as "the first time I formally addressed the American people specifically on Watergate." Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 849.

[78]James W. Chesebro and Caroline D. Hamsher, Orientations to Public Communication (Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1976), p. 14.

Nixon with, perhaps, the largest audiences of his political career. In his 1952 "Checkers" speech Nixon addressed the largest television audience to that time, sixty million people.[79] Strategically using prime time television, Nixon reached a television audience of seventy-two million people in his 1969 Vietnam address, and over sixty million in his 1970 address on Cambodia.[80] Finally, Nixon's April 30, 1973 address on Watergate reached a large percentage of his prime time audience of nearly one hundred million viewers.[81] Consequently, all four of these discourses can be categorized as truly mass-media apologia. The common exigencies of mass-media apologia can provide an excellent basis for strategic comparisons. As noted by Rosenfield, such surface similarities allow the critic to compare the speeches "in such ways that each address serves as a reference standard for the other."[82]

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[79]Rosenfield, "A Case Study," p. 436.

[80]Newton N. Minow, John Bartlow Martin, and Lee M. Mitchell, Presidential Television (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 59-61, cited in Denis S. Rutkus, "Presidential Television," Journal of Communication, 26 (Spring 1976), 77.

[81]Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, Portraying the President (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 240.

[82]Rosenfield, "A Case Study," p. 435.

Additionally, these addresses provide an interesting cross-section of modern apologia--from early in Nixon's political career (1952) to nearly the end of his presidency (1973). Hence, this study will analyze these critically important examples of Nixon's frequently used ritual of self-defense.

Summary

This first chapter offered a rationale for analyzing contemporary apologia as manifested in selected self-defense discourses of Richard Nixon. Apologia or the speech of self-defense was viewed as a crucial tool for the rhetor who chooses to extricate himself/herself from charges of impropriety. Since Richard Nixon was a frequent practitioner of such a rhetorical tool, four of his critical self-defense addresses were selected for analysis. Ware and Linkugel's (1973) self-defense criteria were viewed as the most appropriate critical system to apply to this apologia. The ultimate goal of this system, as it will be used in this study, will be to pursue the following research questions:

1. What are the subgenres of apologia apparent in Nixon's rhetoric?
2. What are the key apologetic strategies manifested in Nixon's rhetoric?
3. What are the recurring and/or significant apologetic tactics found in Nixon's rhetoric?
4. What influence did Nixon have on the contemporary apologetic genre?
5. What is the utility of Ware and Linkugel's critical system?

Chapter II will provide a detailed analysis of selected self-defense rhetoric. Based on the Ware and Linkugel analytic schema, the final chapter will (1) explore the rhetorical implications of this generic criticism of apologia, (2) assess Nixon's influence on contemporary apologia, (3) critique the analytic method selected for this study, and (4) suggest possible subsequent research.

CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SELF-DEFENSE RHETORIC

This chapter will examine four of Richard Nixon's most significant self-defense discourses. Specifically, Ware and Linkugel's (1973) critical system will be applied to each address, and the following method of analysis will be undertaken:

1. Relevant previous rhetorical analyses will be noted.
2. The four following strategies of apologia will be applied to each speech: denial, bolstering, differentiation and transcendence.
3. Each discourse will be categorized into one of the following subgenres of apologia: absolution, vindication, explanation, or justification.
4. After all four speeches have been analyzed in accordance to the preceding criteria, the findings will be synthesized in summary form.

My Side of the Story

This address was delivered by Nixon on September 23, 1952, and is frequently labeled the "Checkers" or Fund speech.[1]

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[1]Richard M. Nixon, "My Side of the Story," Vital Speeches of the Day, 19 (October 15, 1952), 11-15. See Appendix B for a complete text of this address.

There have been several rhetorical analyses of this address, and a brief review of this research will follow. Baskerville (1952) believed that Nixon's dominant device of portraying himself as a "common man" effectively obscured what should have been the essential goal of the address: a defense of a position.[2] Assessing the initial reaction of a large partisan crowd, Gunderson (1952) noted that Nixon spellbound his audience into a pro-Nixon rally.[3] McGuckin (1968) explained the success of Nixon's speech by noting the frequency with which he identified with American values.[4] Rosenfield (1968) observed that Nixon's use of personal revelations, although quite effective at the time, could have jeopardized his long-term political credibility.[5] Finally, Gibson and Felkins (1974)

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[2]Barnet Baskerville, "The Nixon Affair," in "The Election of 1952: A Symposium," ed. Frederick W. Haberman, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 38 (December 1952), 406-408.

[3]Robert Gray Gunderson, "Eisenhower on Courage: The General at Cleveland," in "The Election of 1952: A Symposium," ed. Frederick W. Haberman, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 38 (December 1952), 400-402.

[4]Henry E. McGuckin, Jr., "A Value Analysis of Richard Nixon's 1952 Campaign-Fund Speech," Southern Speech Journal, 33 (Summer 1968), 259-69.

[5]L. W. Rosenfield, "A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Nixon-Truman Analog," Speech Monographs, 35 (November 1968), 435-50.

pointed out that Nixon used an extremely redundant, simple, and potentially emotional form of language in this speech.[6] Thus, this previous research suggests that this address was emotion-packed, quiet effective as an immediate apologia, yet somewhat lacking in logical proof. However, how does this speech measure up when viewed from the genre of apologia? Since this address has not been analyzed in terms of developed self-defense criteria, I will assess this speech relative to standards of apologia.

A frequency count of the strategies used in this address reveals the following tabulation: one denial strategy, nine bolstering strategies, fourteen differentiation strategies, and four transcendental strategies.[7] According to Ware and Linkugel, one reformative strategy--either denial or bolstering--and one transformative strategy--either differentiation or transcendence--should constitute the essential strategic

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[6]James W. Gibson and Patricia K. Felkins, "A Nixon Lexicon," Western Speech, 38 (Summer 1974), 190-98.

[7]See Appendix B for a specific breakdown of these strategies.

focus of apologia.[8] My analysis would tend to verify their observation. That is, the two key strategies of this speech are denial and differentiation. This address thus falls into the subgenres of absolution apologia.[9] This does not mean, however, that bolstering and transcendental strategies do not play a role in this address.

Nixon does use bolstering strategies to identify himself with the following positive concepts:[10] The Veteran's Administration (no. 7), the not so well-to-do (no. 9), the heroic World War II American soldier (no. 13), patriotic Americans (no. 14), courageous individuals who willingly confront adversities (no. 15), Abraham Lincoln (no. 17), the Alger Hiss Case (no. 20), the image of Eisenhower (no. 22), and people with fighting spirit, such as the Irish (no. 27). Furthermore, his transcendental strategies rhetorically join Nixon with the following elements: the great office of the

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[8]B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (October 1973), 282.

[9]See Figure 2 for a specific breakdown of these subgenres of apologia.

[10]The numbers in parenthesis that will follow note the number of the strategy as it is listed in Appendix B. This notational system will be used throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Vice-Presidency and the necessity of its holder to have the confidence of the American people (no. 2), an individual who has been subjected to unfair attacks by the media (no. 21), peaceful prosperity and honest government (no. 25), and part of a ticket that will be good for America (no. 28). As McGuckin (1968) has suggested, Nixon does align himself with what he believes to be important American values. Obviously these bolstering and transcendental strategies are fairly significant rhetorical devices; however, the main thrust of this address is most apparent through Nixon's denial and differentiation strategies.

After delineating the charges against him, Nixon attempts to deny these charges of impropriety directly:

> And now to answer those questions let me say this: Not one cent of the $18,000 or any other money of that type went to me for my personal use.... It was not a secret fund....
> And third, let me point out, and I want to make this particularly clear, that no contributor to the fund, that no contributor to any of my campaign, has ever received any consideration that he would not have received as an ordinary constituent.[11]

Although these denials encompass only one section of Nixon's address, they are a definite negation/denial of the charges

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[11]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12.

and thus constitute the essential reformative strategy of this discourse. I would argue further that whenever there is a clear denial in a self-defense speech that such an obvious confrontation of the charge would necessitate its role as the main reformative strategy.

The crucial transformative strategies of this address are found in Nixon's use of differentiation. These differentiation efforts demonstrate that Nixon rhetorically separates himself from the following elements: The Truman Administration (no. 1), the false charges (no. 3), any personal use of political funds (no. 6), improper use of taxpayer's money (no. 8), the wealth of Stevenson (no. 16), Stevenson's and Sparkman's questionable conduct and lack of disclosure (nos. 18 and 19), Stevenson's soft stand on communism (no. 24), and the war and dishonesty of the present Democratic administration (no. 26). From the previous investigation of bolstering and transcendental strategies, it was apparent that Nixon sought to associate himself with selected American values. In the analysis of differentiation efforts, however, Nixon generally disassociates himself from certain elements. I believe that it is this disassociation--coupled with his blanket denials of wrongdoing--that comprise the most telling rhetorical strategies here. Moreover, it is not so much what Nixon likens himself

to, but with what and whom he distinguishes himself from. Essentially, there are two forces with which Nixon seeks distinction from: (1) the opposing Democratic party and the conduct of its leaders, such as Truman, Stevenson, and Sparkman, and (2) any false charges of impropriety.

In the second sentence of this address Nixon clearly begins to draw the battle lines between himself and the Democrats. Thus, in the following passage he challenges the integrity of the Truman Administration:

> The usual political thing to do when charges are made against you is to either ignore them or to deny them without giving details.
> I believe we've had enough of that in the United States, particularly with the present Administration in Washington.[12]

In contrast to this, Nixon states, "The best and only answer to a smear or to an honest misunderstanding of the facts is to tell the truth."[13] Subsequently, Nixon tells you his "side of the case."

Nixon becomes even more specific in his use of differentiation strategies as he distinguishes between his conduct and that of his Democratic counterpart, John Sparkman.

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[12]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 11.

[13]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 11.

In discussing how politicians pay for their political expenses, Nixon states:

> Another way that is used is to put your wife on the payroll. Let me say, incidentally, my opponent, my opposite number for the Vice Presidency on the Democratic ticket, does have his wife on the payroll. And has had her on his payroll for the ten years--the past ten years.
> And I'm proud to say tonight that in the six years I've been in the House and Senate of the United States, Pat Nixon has never been on the Government payroll.[14]

It is interesting to note this differentiation/counter-attack strategy that Nixon somehow alludes to in the midst of his own self-defense. The Democratic Presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson is also subjected to such differentiation techniques. In fact, Stevenson is Nixon's most frequent target. The wealth of the Stevenson family and his affiliation with the Truman Administration make him a particularly attractive subject for Nixon's differentiation purposes. After disclosing his own rather modest financial situation, Nixon takes a passing differentiation shot at Stevenson:

> I believe that it's fine that a man like Governor Stevenson who inherited a fortune from his father can run for President. But I also feel that it's essential in this country of ours that a man of modest means can also run for President.[15]

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[14]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12.

[15]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 14.

Furthermore, Nixon distinguishes the actions that an Eisenhower-Nixon Administration would take from those which Stevenson and Sparkman would pursue relative to their ties with the Truman Administration:

> You wouldn't trust a man who made the mess to clean it up--that's Truman. And by the same token you can't trust the man who was picked by the man that made the mess to clean it up--and that's Stevenson. And so I say, Eisenhower, who owes nothing to Truman, nothing to big city bosses, he is the man that can clean up the mess in Washington.[16]

Considering the significance of the issue of Communism in the early 1950s, Nixon certainly was not going to pass up the opportunity to make distinctions between Stevenson and Eisenhower on that subject:

> I say that a man who like Mr. Stevenson has pooh-poohed and ridiculed the Communist threat in the United States--he said that they are phantoms among ourselves; he's accused us that have attempted to expose the Communists of looking in the Bureau of Fisheries and Wildlife--I say that a man who says that isn't qualified to be President of the United States. And I say that the only man who can lead us in this fight to rid Government of both those who are Communists and those who have corrupted this Government is Eisenhower, because Eisenhower, you can be sure, recognizes the problem and he knows how to deal with it.[17]

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[16]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 14.

[17]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 14.

The last differentiation strategy relative to Nixon's opposition is contained in his challenge to his opponents. After disclosing his own complete financial history, Nixon questions the propriety of some of Stevenson's and Sparkman's financial matters. Consequently, Nixon makes the following recommendation to his Democratic counterparts:

> I would suggest that under the circumstances both Mr. Sparkman and Mr. Stevenson should come before the American people as I have and make a complete financial statement as to their financial history. And if they don't it will be an admission that they have something to hide.[18]

Nixon thus differentiates his actions from the actions that his opponents should pursue. Overall, Nixon's differentiation strategies separate him from his Democratic rivals in four essential aspects: (1) they are affiliated with the ineffective Truman Administration, while he and Eisenhower are not; (2) they (especially Stevenson) are wealthy while he is of modest means; (3) they are soft on Communism while he and Eisenhower are not; and (4) they refuse to answer charges of impropriety while he has the courage to do so.

Next, are the distinctions that Nixon makes relative to the charges against him. Nixon uses differentiation

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[18]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 14.

strategies as he separates the legal and especially moral wrongness of the charge into three categories:

> I say that it was morally wrong if any of the $18,000 went to Senator Nixon for my personal use. I say that it was morally wrong if it was secretly given and secretly handled. And I say that it was morally wrong if any of the contributors got special favors for the contributions that they made.[19]

As previously noted, following this delineation of the charges at hand, Nixon makes clear denials of each issue in question. Within these denials, Nixon makes an important differentiation between personal use of these funds and using them for political expenses. He states, "Every penny of it was used to pay for political expenses that I did not think should be charged to the taxpayers of the United States."[20] Moreover, Nixon offers a detailed differentiation between proper and improper senatorial use of taxpayer's money. He concludes, "The taxpayers shouldn't be required to finance items which are not official business but which are primarily political business."[21] Finally, Nixon differentiates between

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[19]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12.

[20]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12.

[21]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12.

deceiving the taxpayers into paying for primarily political business, and what he has done--using willing contributors' money.[22]

Thus, Nixon separates the wrongness of the charges against him into three categories which he then denies in terms of any personal wrongdoing. His distinction between personal and political expenses is worth noting. According to Nixon all he did was to allow willing contributors to pay for these political expenses so as not to burden unwilling taxpayers.

In sum, this 1952 apologia can be categorized as an address of absolution in which the speaker seeks acquittal of those charges levied against his character. Although bolstering and transcendental devices were used in this speech, Nixon relied primarily on denial and differentiation strategies. After differentiating the charges against him, Nixon denied them rather directly. After these initial denials, Nixon used a series of differentiation strategies that separated him from the charges and especially his Democratic opposition. Moreover, the most noticeable device of this

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[22]Nixon, "My Side of the Story," p. 12.

address seemed to be that of differentiation through comparison, that is, they are in the wrong while we are in the right. Rosenfield (1968) noted this phenomenon as he observed "Nixon's habit of joining off-handed insults of the opposition with knight-in-shining-armor depictions of him and his."[23] In conclusion, this apologia can be labeled as an example of the "rhetoric of contrast." For although bolstering, transcendental, and denial methods are used, the essential strategy is differentiation in terms of separating or distinguishing Nixon from his opposition.[24]

A Vietnam Plan

This address was delivered by Nixon on November 3, 1969 and is often referred to as the "silent majority" speech.[25] A brief review of relevant previous rhetorical analyses will follow. Newman (1970) did not believe that Nixon met the higher standards that Presidential addresses demand and that neither his rhetorical strategies nor his substantive arguments

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[23]Rosenfield, "A Case Study," p. 441.

[24]This speech could also be viewed as somewhat of an address of vindication since Nixon often alludes to his greater worth relative to the worth of his accusers. See Figure 2 for further distinctions within the subgenres of apologia.

[25]Richard M. Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," Vital Speeches of the Day, 36 (November 15, 1969), 66-70. See Appendix C for a complete text of this address.

were sound.[26] Stelzner (1971) assessed Nixon's "quest for peace" theme in this address as a failure because his ideas were unimaginative and did not confront the key issues.[27] King and Anderson (1971) characterized this discourse as representative of Nixon's rhetoric of polarization, that is, attempting to create a solidarity while also creating a common foe.[28] Campbell (1972) accused Nixon of misrepresenting his opposition and avoiding the real issues that confront America.[29] However, Hill's (1972) neo-Aristotelian analysis found Nixon's address to be quite successful in choosing the available means of persuasion.[30] Therefore, this previous research suggests that this address was possibly lacking in substance, somewhat of a polarizing phenomenon, out of touch with some of the crucial

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[26]Robert P. Newman, "Under the Veneer: Nixon's Vietnam Speech of November 3, 1969," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (April 1970), 168-178.

[27]Herman G. Stelzner, "The Quest Story and Nixon's November 3, 1969 Address," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 57 (April 1971), 163-172.

[28]Andrew A. King and Floyd Douglas Anderson, "Nixon, Agnew, and the 'Silent Majority': A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Polarization," Western Speech, 35 (Fall 1971), 243-55.

[29]Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 50-57.

[30]Forbes Hill, "Conventional Wisdom--Traditional Form--The President's Message of November 3, 1969," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58 (December 1971), 373-85.

issues, but perhaps successful in terms of Aristotle's notion of persuasion. The diversity of this research--particularly the discrepancy in Campbell and Hill's findings--is further proof of the need for more objectivity and consistency in one's critical method. I believe that the Ware and Linkugel system relies less on subjectivity and more on the rigor of their critical method. Accordingly, I will assess this address by analyzing specific strategies of the genre of apologia.

A frequency count of the strategies used in this address reveals the following tabulation: five bolstering strategies, sixteen differentiation strategies, and thirteen transcendental strategies.[31] Clearly, the key reformative strategy in this address is that of bolstering. Since there are no clear denials of charges in this address, this is an easy decision to reach. However, the key transformative strategy is somewhat more difficult to discern. Although there are almost as many transcendental strategies as differentiation strategies, Nixon's essential strategic focus is again best viewed through his use of differentiation. Nixon's transcendental strategies

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[31]See Appendix C for a specific breakdown of these strategies.

are noteworthy, but they serve to provide fairly common patriotic appeals.

More specifically, Nixon's transcendental efforts rhetorically join him with the following concepts:[32] the future peace and freedom of the world (nos. 2 and 15), promoting confidence in American leadership (no. 7), loyalty to friends in need (no. 9), halting world conquest, violence, and more war (no. 9), preventing future Vietnams (no. 14), protecting the American spirit (no. 21), the historical strength of our nation in times of crisis (no. 22), concern with our historical principles of freedom (no. 24), and continuing to lead the United States in providing hope for the free world (no. 30). Although these transcendental strategies are interesting, they are commonly used rhetorical ploys appealing to freedom and Americanism. I would argue that it is through Nixon's differentiation strategies that the main thrust of his message is revealed. These differentiation strategies will be examined after analyzing Nixon's use of bolstering. Since the two key strategies of this address are bolstering

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[32]The numbers in parenthesis that will follow note the number of the strategy as it is listed in Appendix C.

and differentiation, this speech can be categorized as explanative apologia.[33]

Nixon's essential reformative strategy of bolstering serves to identify him with four important elements: those who have been critical of the way the war was conducted--particularly by the Johnson Administration (no. 5), an administration with fewer war casualties (no. 26), past Presidents of the United States (nos. 8 and 33), and the actual office of the Presidency (no. 34). As Nixon identifies himself with those who have been critical of the way the war was conducted, he rhetorically becomes somewhat of a victim of circumstances:

> Now many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong, and many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.
> But the question facing us today is--now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it.[34]

By using this bolstering strategy and identifying himself with those who have been critical of the previous administration's war policies, Nixon attempts to enhance his credibility by making the Vietnam War Johnson's war and not his.

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[33]See Figure 2 for a specific breakdown of these subgenres of apologia.

[34]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 66.

In fact, Nixon points out he was indeed critical of the handling of the war and that all he can do now is to try and rectify these wrongs. Thus, Nixon rhetorically creates himself as a rather tragic figure thrust into a bad situation that he had nothing to do with. Nixon further attempts to bolster his image by identifying his administration with fewer war casualties. When discussing the sorrow of reconciling American war casualities, Nixon ingeniously alludes to a bolstering device:

> This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office.[35]

In this passage, Nixon makes it clear to his audience that the war was much worse before he took over. Hence,Nixon emerges from a tragic figure to a heroic figure who is trying to save American lives.

Although Nixon plainly disassociates himself from Johnson, he also identifies with Johnson and other Presidents when it fits his bolstering purposes. In the following passage Nixon identifies his conclusions on the Vietnam

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[35]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 69.

situation with those reached by previous Presidents Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Johnson:

> Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done. In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said we want to see a stable Government there, carrying on the struggle to maintain its national independence.... President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.[36]

Here, Nixon seems to be bolstering his decision-making ability by identifying his conclusions on Vietnam with those of his predecessors. I can understand his use of bolstering/identification efforts relative to Kennedy and Eisenhower. However, Nixon clearly indicts Johnson's Vietnam policy and then turns around and identifies with his conclusions on Vietnam. This would seem to constitute inconsistent use of bolstering/identification strategies, that is, shifting association and disassociation when rhetorically convenient. Nevertheless, Nixon demonstrates obvious bolstering strategies as he seeks to identify his plight with that of Woodrow Wilson and other peace-seeking American Presidents:

> Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which

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[36]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 67.

> caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: 'This is the war to end wars...' I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated--the goal of a just and lasting peace.[37]

Finally, Nixon expands his bolstering technique of presidential association as he alludes to his own presidential responsibilities, and thus identifies himself with this most powerful office. In concluding this address, Nixon reasserts the importance of America's goal for peace and states, "As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path for that goal and then leading the nation along it."[38]

The most significant transformative strategies of this speech are apparent in Nixon's use of differentiation. An analysis of these differentiation devices reveals that Nixon rhetorically separates himself from the following elements: the easy course of action--immediate withdrawal (nos. 1 and 19), preoccupation with his own re-election (no. 3), compromising the freedom of the South Vietnamese (no. 10), the uncooperative nature of the North Vietnamese (no. 11), the individuals responsible for the failure to negotiate--the North Vietnamese (no. 13),

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[37]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," pp. 69-70.

[38]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 70.

the approach taken toward the Vietnam War by the Johnson Administration (no. 16), threat appeals to the North Vietnamese (no. 18), nonconstructive pursuits of the youth (no. 28), the vocal minority (no. 31), and dissension among Americans leading to a self-inflicted defeat (no. 32). Nixon thus disassociates himself from a number of diverse issues. I will attempt to illustrate some of Nixon's more noteworthy disassociations.

One of the first apparent differentiation strategies of this discourse is Nixon's attempt to disassociate himself with taking the easy way out of the Vietnam dilemma:

> In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him--and come out as the peacemaker.
> Some put it to me quite bluntly: this was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war. But I had a greater obligation...[39]

Nixon thus differentiates between the easy course of action that some people have told him to pursue--immediate withdrawal

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[39]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 66.

of all American forces--and what he believed to be his greater obligation--the future of peace and freedom in the world. Later in this address Nixon once again alludes to the difficulty of his task, "I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way."[40] In many ways, Nixon rhetorically personifies the basic Puritan work ethic, that is, if it is easy it can't be worthwhile.

Additionally, Nixon differentiates here between the importance of being re-elected and his greater obligation relative to world peace. After acknowledging the fact that a complete withdrawal would be the popular political thing to do, Nixon states:

> But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.[41]

Hence, Nixon tells his audience that it is more important for him to do what is right than to do what is politically popular--thus insuring his re-election. Nixon's point here is to distinguish between the right course of action and mere

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[40]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 69.

[41]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 66.

political appeasement. However, as a differentiation strategy this is a counter-productive device. Moreover, Nixon is calling attention to the fact that he has thought about the 1972 election. In spite of his attempt to differentiate political considerations from the proper course of action, the nature of this distinction itself indicates that Nixon is most aware of its political ramifications. Furthermore, when this speech was delivered, Nixon had only been in office for a mere ten months. Consequently, any reference to his upcoming re-election influencing his decision-making would seem quite inappropriate and thus motivationally suspect.

In terms of specific target groups that Nixon seeks to distinguish himself from, there are three worth noting: (1) the uncooperative North Vietnamese, (2) the Johnson Administration, and (3) the "vocal minority." First Nixon clearly differentiates between the cooperativeness of the United States and the uncooperativeness of North Vietnam:

> At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.[42]

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[42]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 67.

Nixon goes one step further and differentiates the question as to who is at fault for the failure of negotiations. He believes that he has demonstrated that it is not the United States, not the South Vietnamese, but the North Vietnamese. He states, "The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace."[43] In addition to this, Nixon reads a letter that he sent to Ho Chi Minh expressing his strong desire for peace. Nixon summarizes the response from Ho Chi Minh, "It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative."[44] Obviously, Nixon views North Vietnam's attitude as the ultimate obstacle in his quest for peace. Moreover, his differentiation strategies definitely portray them as opposing his sincere efforts for peace.

Another important differentiation strategy that Nixon pursues is that of distinguishing the approach that was taken toward the Vietnam war by the Johnson Administration from the

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[43]Nixon, " A Vietnam Plan," p. 68.

[43]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 67.

approach taken by his Administration. In explaining his Vietnamization plan Nixon states:

> In the previous Administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace. The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.[45]

Nixon seems to be reminding his audience once again that this bad Vietnam situation was really perpetuated by his predecessor and that Nixon is trying to turn it around. Again, it's Johnson's war, not Nixon's war. That is, Nixon has been put into a bad situation not of his own making. His rhetorical response, however, to this bad situation is "peace with honor" by letting the South Vietnamese fight instead of Americans. Nixon's differentiation from the Johnson Administration relative to his self-serving manipulation of language is seemingly unfair. For example, he characterizes the previous administration as "Americanizing the war in Vietnam." Conversely, Nixon's administration is "Vietnamizing the search for peace."

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[45]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 68.

This is an interesting linguistic differentiation that somehow chastises his predecessor while exonerating Nixon.

Having directed his blame-placing differentiation strategies toward the North Vietnamese and the Johnson Administration, Nixon differentiates public reaction to the situation at hand. This is Nixon's famous appeal to the "great silent majority" versus the "vocal minority." In discussing antiwar activists, "who hold that point of view and try to impose it on the nation by mounting demonstrations in the street," Nixon states:

> If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society.... So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support.[46]

There are several things worth noting here relative to previous research. As King and Anderson (1971) point out, this sort of differentiation of public reaction clearly creates a polarizing phenomenon within Nixon's audience.[47] The antiwar protestors are viewed as the "vocal minority;" everyone else is a part of Nixon's "great silent majority." This is a

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[46]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 69.

[47]King and Anderson, "Nixon, Agnew, and the 'Silent Majority,'" pp. 243-55.

curious distinction. In a participatory democracy such as the United States, silence or lack of involvement is not generally looked upon as a positive quality. In fact, sometimes silence or apathy is seen as just the opposite. However, in Nixon's conceptualization of the "great silent majority," these are the silent unsung heroes who constitute the will of the majority. Again, Nixon's differentiation strategies are interesting, but not altogether convincing or realistic to the discerning listener.

Campbell's (1972) observation that Nixon misrepresented his opponents is also applicable here.[48] Specifically, is it fair to say that all antiwar protestors "impose" their will on others? Are they not merely exercising their particular freedom of expression? Of course, acts of violence can be viewed as an imposition on others, but not the mere war demonstrations that Nixon often alludes to in this address.

Nixon's final differentiation effort distinguishes the possible reasons for an American defeat in Vietnam: "Let us be united against defeat. Because let us understand--North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States.

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[48]Campbell, Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric, pp. 50-57.

Only Americans can do that."[49] In this differentiation, Nixon expands his scolding of the "vocal minority." Moreover, if they do not "toe the line" they, in fact, will cause America's ultimate downfall as a result of internal dissension. This is another rather perplexing appeal for a democratic society. Is Nixon suggesting that Americans should close their eyes and totally acquiesce to his Vietnam solutions? If not, according to Nixon, Americans themselves will cause their own defeat or humiliation. The rhetorical tone of Nixon's differentiation of defeat thus assumes an almost threatening stance. This appears to be an inappropriate and ineffective tone for such an important Presidential address.

In summary, this 1969 speech on the Vietnam War can be categorized as an explanative address in which the speaker seeks to eliminate condemnation by providing a clearer understanding of the situation. Although patriotic transcendental strategies were used in this speech, Nixon relied primarily on bolstering and differentiation. Nixon's bolstering strategies attempted to enhance his credibility by identifying him with those who have been critical of the way Johnson mishandled

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[49]Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," p. 69.

the war, and he also identifies himself with his own powerful office of the presidency. Nixon's differentiation strategies serve two general purposes. First, they serve to aggrandize his decision-making ability by distinguishing the proper Vietnam decision from the easy or politically motivated decision. Second, these strategies direct the blame-placing of the Vietnam situation on the Johnson Administration, the uncooperative North Vietnamese, and dissenting Americans labeled the "vocal minority." In this discourse, as in the previous 1952 Nixon address, it would appear that differentiation is once again Nixon's most telling apologia strategy. Moreover, Nixon spends considerable time and effort distinguishing his Vietnam decisions from the actions of his predecessors and his opposition.

Cambodia

This address was delivered by Nixon on April 30, 1970, and was necessary following Nixon's decision to send American troops into Cambodia.[50] There have been several rhetorical

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[50]Richard M. Nixon, "Cambodia," Vital Speeches of the Day, 36 (May 15, 1970), 450-52. See Appendix D for a complete text of this address.

analyses of this speech, and a brief review of their findings will follow. Gonchar and Hahn (1971) believed that Nixon's great personal kinship with the office of the Presidency and his very strong concept of leadership were especially apparent in this speech.[51] Gregg and Hauser (1973) concluded that Nixon's fundamental strategies of humiliation and self-pity had no place in the announcement of a military undertaking.[52] Cushman (1974) observed that Nixon's so-called public justification for committing troops to Cambodia did not really reveal the grounds for his decisions.[53] Carpenter and Seltzer (1974) asserted that Nixon's militaristic tone in this address could have been influenced by his fascination with the motion picture Patton.[54] Finally, Church (1977) contended that this speech

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[51]Ruth M. Gonchar and Dan F. Hahn, "The Rhetorical Predictability of Richard M. Nixon," Today's Speech, 19 (Fall 1971), 3-13.

[52]Richard B. Gregg and Gerard A. Hauser, "Richard Nixon's April 30, 1970 Address on Cambodia: The 'Ceremony' of Confrontation," Speech Monographs, 40 (August 1973), 167-181.

[53]Donald P. Cushman, "A Comparative Study of President Truman's and President Nixon's Justifications for Committing Troops to Combat in Korea and Cambodia," DAI, 36 (1975), 7429A (The University of Wisconsin--Madison).

[54]Ronald H. Carpenter and Robert V. Seltzer, "Nixon, Patton, and a 'Silent Majority' Sentiment About the Vietnam War: The Cinematographic Bases of a Rhetorical Stance," Central States Speech Journal, 25 (Summer 1974), 105-110.

was representative of Nixon's crisis rhetoric which was generally based on highly valued principles and blame-placing devices.[55]

Thus, this previous research suggests that this speech was dependent upon a highly personalized view of the Presidency, inappropriate appeals, illusive reasoning, a militaristic tone, and numerous value judgments especially relative to blame-placing. Again, the purpose of the forthcoming analysis will be to assess this address in accordance to developed self-defense criteria. In other words, what are the key strategies of this address when viewed from the genre of apologia? Therefore, it is my intention to possibly replicate these previous findings but perhaps also go beyond them in discerning specific apologia strategies.

A frequency count of the strategies used in this address reveals the following tabulation: four bolstering strategies, twelve differentiation strategies, and eight transcendental strategies.[56] Obviously, the key reformative strategy in this

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[55]Russell T. Church, "President Richard M. Nixon's Crisis Rhetoric, 1969-1970," DAI, 37 (1977), 7402A-7403A (Temple University).

[56]See Appendix D for a specific breakdown of these strategies.

speech is that of bolstering. As in the previous speech, there are no actual denials of charges in this address. Since there are a significant number of both differentiation and transcendental devices, the key transformative strategy is a bit more difficult to pinpoint. Although there are a near comparable number of differentiation and transcendental strategies in this address, Nixon differentiation efforts prove to be the most revealing of his fundamental strategic focus. Once again, Nixon's transcendental strategies provide interesting but fairly common patriotic appeals.

Specifically, Nixon's transcendental strategies rhetorically join Nixon with the following notions:[57] winning a just peace (no. 5), defending the security of American military men (no. 10), making decisions that go beyond all the diverse opinions on the Vietnam situation (no. 22), and the future of peace and freedom for the world (no. 23). The preceding transcendental strategies are worth noting; however, they do represent well-worn patriotic appeals for peace and freedom. Clearly, it is through Nixon's differentiation efforts that

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[57]The numbers in parenthesis that will follow note the number of the strategy as it is listed in Appendix D.

the audience can truly gain insight into his essential rhetorical strategies. These differentiation strategies will be discussed following an analysis of Nixon's use of bolstering. Since this address relies primarily on bolstering and differentiation strategies, it can be categorized as explanative apologia.[58]

Nixon's fundamental reformative strategy of bolstering serves to identify him with following elements: slowing down the war (no. 6), commander and chief of American armed forces (no. 11), a President who keeps his promises (no. 17), and other decision-making Presidents (no. 18). After describing the war in southeast Asia as he sees it and his decision to send American troops into Cambodia, Nixon alludes to bolstering strategies as he identifies the peace-seeking initiatives of his administration:

> Let's look again at the record.
> We stopped the bombing in North Vietnam. We have cut air operations by over 20 percent. We've announced the withdrawal of over 250,000 of our men. We've offered to withdraw all of our men if they will withdraw theirs.[59]

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[58] See Figure 2 for a specific breakdown of the subgenres of apologia.

[59] Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.

Although Nixon is also attempting to show that the United States is slowing down the war while North Vietnam refuses to do so, Nixon plainly identifies himself as a sincere peace-seeker. However, Nixon does not hesitate to identify himself as the United States' number one peace-defender. Nixon bolsters his image as a powerful leader as he states, "I shall meet my responsibility as commander in chief of our armed forces to take the action I consider necessary to defend the security of our American men."[60] Thus, Nixon's bolstering strategies reveal that he will be conciliatory to a point, but that he has the Presidential power to take military action if necessary.

Nixon makes an attempt at another bolstering device as he identifies himself as a President who keeps his promises:

> During my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to bring Americans home from Vietnam. They are coming home. I promised to end this war. I shall keep that promise. I promised to win a just peace. I shall keep that promise.[61]

Considering that Nixon has just announced an American military invasion of sorts into Cambodia, I am rather perplexed as to

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[60] Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.

[61] Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.

why he also chose to remind Americans of his campaign promise of peace. Perhaps this sort of ineffective bolstering served to further instigate the numerous antiwar protests that occurred after the delivery of this address.[62] Nixon's seemingly empty appeals could have totally frustrated his already discontent antiwar audience.

Nixon completes his bolstering efforts as he identifies his decision with other significant decisions made by former Presidents:

> In this great room, Woodrow Wilson made the great decision which led to victory in World War I.
> Franklin Roosevelt made the decisions which led to our victory in World War II.
> Dwight D. Eisenhower made decisions which ended the war in Korea and avoided war in the Middle East.
> John F. Kennedy in his finest hour made the great decision which removed Soviet missiles from Cuba and the western hemisphere.[63]

Obviously, Nixon has carefully selected those Presidents whom he wishes to identify himself with. By doing so, Nixon subtly

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[62]Students and faculty involved in the May 4 Kent State tragedy specifically mentioned Nixon's speech when trying to analyze the causes leading to that event. See James Michener, Kent State: What Happened and Why (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 13, 135, and 253, cited in Gregg and Hauser, "Richard Nixon's April 30, 1970 Address," p. 168.

[63]Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.

reminds his audience and himself that he, in fact, is now the holder of this powerful office. Also, this mode of Presidential association adds a sense of historical dignity to Nixon's decision-making situation at hand. This particular bolstering strategy appears to be a recurring device in Nixon's rhetoric.

The crucial transformative strategies of this discourse are found in Nixon's use of differentiation. These differentiation strategies rhetorically separate Nixon from the following elements: North Vietnam's lack of respect for the neutrality of Cambodia (no. 1), an actual invasion of Cambodia (no. 3), and expanded war into Cambodia (no. 4), negotiating the freedom of the South Vietnamese (no. 7), the uncooperative attitude of the North Vietnamese (no. 8), humiliation at the conference table (no. 12), those who doubt his decisions (no. 20), and the easy political path (no. 21). These diverse differentiations serve essentially four rhetorical functions: (1) they identify North Vietnam as our uncooperative foe; (2) they attempt to show that Nixon's actions are necessary and geared toward ending this war; (3) they pinpoint the freedom of the South Vietnamese as the crucial issue at hand; and (4) they explore the ramifications of Nixon's decision.

First, Nixon's differentiation strategies clearly identify North Vietnam as America's unrelenting enemy. Moreover, Nixon differentiates between America's respect for the neutrality of Cambodia and North Vietnam's lack of respect:

> American policy since then [the Geneva Agreement of 1954] has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people. We have maintained a skeleton diplomatic mission of fewer than 15 in Cambodia's capital, and that only since last August...North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutrality. For the past five years, as indicated on this map, as you see here, North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam.[64]

Nixon expands this differentiation of the enemy's actions as he acknowledges America's continued efforts for peaceful negotiations versus North Vietnam's uncompromising stance:

> The answer of the enemy has been intransigence at the conference table, belligerence at Hanoi, massive military aggression in Laos and Cambodia and stepped-up attacks in South Vietnam designed to increase American casualities. This attitude has become intolerable.[65]

This differentiation strategy is completed as Nixon states that America will be patient and conciliatory, but not humiliated or defeated as it works for peace:

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[64]Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 450.

[65]Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.

> The action I have announced tonight puts the leaders of North Vietnam on notice that we will be patient in working for peace. We will be conciliatory at the conference table, but we will not be humiliated. We will not be defeated.[66]

This passage is one which provoked considerable ire from critics.[67] First of all, Nixon is attesting to America's conciliatory efforts; yet, he somehow threatens both North Vietnam and America that humiliation and defeat are intolerable. This notion of "humiliation" is obviously grounded in some controversial value judgments. To many Americans at this time nothing could be more humiliating than expanding this unwanted war.[68] Also, one is prompted to ask: How can Nixon be truly seeking peace without allowing for the possibility of defeat? These sorts of dangling questions definitely weaken Nixon's attempt to differentiate the United States from its North Vietnam foe.

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[66]Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.

[67]See, for example, Gregg and Hauser, "Richard Nixon's April 30, 1970 Address," p. 172.

[68]The findings of the Gallup Opinion Index show that during the May 1 to May 4 time period, only 25% of those polled approved Nixon's decision to send troops into Cambodia, while 59% disapproved. Report no. 60, June 1970, p. 6, cited in Gregg and Hauser, "Richard Nixon's April 30, 1970 Address," p. 168.

Nixon's differentiation strategies emphasizing the necessity and peace-seeking nature of his actions are worth noting. His first rhetorical move here is to distinguish his decision to send troops into Cambodia--later labeled an "incursion"--from an actual invasion of Cambodia.

> This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw.[69]

Nixon thus views his military undertaking as one of necessity and not of conquest. More specifically, America is merely trying to drive the enemy forces out of these agreed upon Cambodian sanctuaries. Hence, Nixon conceptualizes American forces in Cambodia as defensive forces and not offensive forces. This differentiation of motive is continued as Nixon distinguishes the underlying goal of his military decision: "We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam, and winning the just peace we all desire."[70]

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[69]Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.

[70]Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.

Again, Nixon's rhetorical obsession with "winning" and "not being defeated or humiliated" weaken his attempts for viable differentiation. Moreover, "winning a war" while actually seeking a "just peace" are often incompatible goals--particularly in the circumstances surrounding the Vietnam War. Thus, one might doubt the sincerity of Nixon's peace-seeking motives since he is only willing to view peace in light of victory.

A most crucial issue that Nixon differentiates in this address concerns the freedom of the South Vietnamese. In discussing his continued attempts to negotiate with North Vietnam, Nixon differentiates one issue that is simply not negotiable: "We've offered to negotiate all issues with only one condition: and that is that the future of South Vietnam be determined, not by North Vietnam, and not by the United States, but by the people of South Vietnam."[71] I would be hard pressed to attack such a seemingly altruistic motive. Hence, this differentiation appears to be effective, at least, in personifying the image of American foreign policy in Vietnam as the "concerned big brother only seeking to protect free choice."

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[71] Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 451.

Perhaps Nixon's most telling differentiation strategies are apparent in his attempts to explore the ramifications of his decision on Cambodia. Nixon attempts to delineate what is at stake in the situation at hand:

> It is not our power but our will and character that is being tested tonight.
> The question all Americans must ask and answer tonight is this: Does the richest and strongest nation in the history of the world have the character to meet a direct challenge by a group which rejects every effort to win a just peace, ignores our warnings, tramples on solemn agreements, violates the neutrality of an unarmed people and uses our prisoners as hostages?[72]

It is interesting that Nixon equates a willingness to expand active combat with the nation's "will and character." Does it not take "will and character" to walk away from a hopeless fight? Nixon's comparison thus forces the question: What do "will and character" have to do with stepping up an unwanted war? Nixon's portrayal/differentiation of the enemy does evoke the audience's contempt. However, his notion that it "takes character to stand up to such a bully" precludes the the effectiveness of this differentiation. That is, the

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[72]Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.

consequences of actualizing that notion in this situation were generally undesirable to his audience.[73]

Nixon's differentiation, however, does not stop here. He goes on to reflect on some of the crucial decisions of previous Presidents. Nixon chastises the dissenters in his audience as he differentiates his predecessor's decisions from his:

> But between those decisions and this decision, there is a difference that is very fundamental. In those decisions the American people were not assailed by counsels of doubt and defeat from some of the most widely known opinion leaders of the nation.[74]

Nixon's logic here prompts the observation that perhaps the reason for this "fundamental difference" in sentiment was that his predecessors' decisions were more reasonable and effective than his. Obviously, Nixon does not consider this possibility. Rather, he chooses to scold his audience for not uniting behind him as Americans did for Wilson, Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Kennedy in their crucial hour of decision. Nixon thus

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[73]See Gallup Opinion Index, Report no. 60, June 1970, p. 6. That is, 59% of Nixon's audience did not agree with his decision on Cambodia. Cited in Gregg and Hauser, "Richard Nixon's April 30, 1970 Address," p. 168.

[74]Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.

presents an interesting Presidential decision-making comparison; however, his unwillingness to deal with dissent and his all powerful view of his position could serve to antagonize his audience rather than persuade them.

Finally, Nixon differentiates the easy political path from the right one. According to Nixon, "It is tempting to take the easy political path, to blame this way on previous Administrations, and to bring all of our men home immediately..."[75] However, Nixon does not succumb to this easy temptation because its consequences would be defeat for the United States, desertion of the South Vietnamese people, and a peace of humiliation: "To get peace at any price now, even though I know that a peace of humiliation for the United States would lead to a bigger war or surrender later."[76] Thus, Nixon's differentiation of the consequences reveals that politically it would be easy to withdraw American troops from Southeast Asia, but morally this would be a wrong decision. Again, Nixon alludes to his fundamental military rationale that defeat and humiliation are intolerable. This rationale is quite revealing of Nixon's

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[75] Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.

[76] Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.

value systems; however, does he have the right to impose these values on Americans--particularly in terms of troop commitments? Moreover, I would suggest that his notions of defeat and humiliation are not only highly value-oriented, but essentially self-inflicted. Nixon is creating his own dreaded alternatives. Hence, he uses self-imposed standards to differentiate right from wrong. The obvious strategical shortcoming here is that those standards were not necessarily shared by his audience.[77]

Nixon's last noteworthy differentiation strategy in this address concerns his political future. Similar to his 1969 Vietnam speech, Nixon emphasizes here that he has "rejected all political considerations in making his decision."[78] More specifically, he states that the Republican party gains or loses in the 1970 election and his own re-election in 1972 must not influence him and thus prompt a politically expedient decision. Nixon therefore believes that political self-interest must take a back seat to the cause of peace and freedom. His most succinct statement of this philosophy is contained in

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[77]See Gallup Opinion Index, p. 6.

[78]Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.

the following passage: "I would rather be a one-term President and do what I believed was right than to be a two-term President and to see this nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history."[79]

The essential differentiation strategy here distinguishes the politically expedient decision from the politically sound decision. Yet, there seems to be a rhetorical contradiction here. Nixon tells his audience that he is not concerned with political considerations and yet he obviously is. If not, why would he even choose to focus on the 1970 and 1972 elections in the midst of an address concerned with an important military undertaking? Nixon thus "protests too much," and these protestations seem to give him away in spite of his altruistic self-portrayal. Consequently, this amounts to another differentiation strategy that can, in fact, be counter-productive.

In sum, this 1970 address on Cambodia can be categorized as an explanative speech in which the speaker seeks to eliminate condemnation by providing a clearer understanding of the situation. Although patriotic transcendental appeals for

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[79]Nixon, "Cambodia," p. 452.

peace and freedom were used in this address, Nixon relied primarily on bolstering and differentiation strategies. Nixon's bolstering efforts served to identify him with his own effective and powerful use of the office of the presidency. Also, these strategies attempted to identify Nixon with other presidents--particularly in terms of their crucial decision-making efforts. Nixon used differentiation in this address to pinpoint North Vietnam as the foe who was trying to defeat and humiliate America and South Vietnam as a friend in need. Furthermore, these strategies examined the public's response to Nixon's sincere and politically selfless efforts for peace. In retrospect, it is especially worth focusing on Church's (1977) observation that this speech was most dependent on value judgments.[80] However, Nixon's highly value-oriented conceptualization of "peace with honor" was not as widely accepted as Nixon had evidently anticipated.

The Watergate Affair

This address was delivered by Nixon on April 30, 1973 and was the first time Nixon formally spoke to the American

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[80]Church, "President Richard M. Nixon's Crisis Rhetoric," pp. 7402A-7403A.

people on Watergate.[81] This discourse justifiably received considerable rhetorical scrutiny, and a brief review of these findings will follow. Baudhuin's (1974) empirical study indicated that this address and subsequent Nixon apologia on Watergate did not appear to help Nixon's credibility which significantly dropped relative to trustworthiness, authoritativeness, and interpersonal attractiveness.[82] Gibson and Felkins (1974) observed that this was a typical Nixon speech in its highly personalized style; however, it was atypical of Nixon's rhetoric as it lacked his often used strategy of associating himself with others.[83] Eiland (1974) noted that journalistic reaction to this discourse--as well as all of Nixon's Watergate apologia--was generally unfavorable.[84]

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[81]Richard M. Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," Vital Speeches of the Day, 39 (May 15, 1973), 450-52. See Appendix E for a complete text of this address.

[82]E. Scott Baudhuin, "From Campaign to Watergate: Nixon's Campaign Image," Western Speech, 38 (Summer 1974), 182-89. I would concur that Nixon's personalized style is apparent in this speech. In fact, this short two page address contains the word "I" eighty-one times.

[83]James N. Gibson and Patricia K. Felkins, "A Nixon Lexicon," Western Speech, 38 (Summer 1974), 190-98.

[84]Millard F. Eiland, "Journalistic Criticism of Richard Nixon's Watergate of 1973," DAI, 36 (1975), 27A (The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College).

Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel (1975) viewed this address as unsuccessful and misdirected explanative apologia relying on questionable differentiation of the facts as they were revealed to Nixon and ineffective bolstering of his presidential image.[85] Finally, Ling (1977) pointed out an important contradiction in this speech, that is, although Nixon asserted responsibility for what occurred, he rejected any guilt for it because he implied that guilt rested on those who betrayed him.[86]

This previous research thus suggests that this address was seemingly ineffective in restoring Nixon's credibility, highly personalized though lacking association strategies, unfavorably received by many journalists, rather unsuccessfully adapted for his audience and situation, and contradictory in terms of blame-placing. With the exception of the

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[85] Jackson Harrell, B. L. Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, "Failure of Apology in American Politics: Nixon on Watergate," Speech Monographs, 42 (November 1975), 245-61. These authors cite (on page 255) a Gallup Poll finding that 40% of those polled did not think that Nixon had told the whole truth in his April 30 address while only 30% thought that he did. Gallup Opinion Index, Report no. 95 (May 1973), pp. 9-10.

[86] David A. Ling, "Nixon, Watergate and the Rhetoric of Agent," in "A Pentadic Analysis of Richard Nixon and Watergate," ed. Charles U. Larson, Speaker and Gavel, 15 (Fall 1977), 7-9.

Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel (1975) research, these findings resulted from diverse methods of analyses rather independent of the genre of apologia. The 1975 findings of Harrell et al. were in conjunction with developed self-defense criteria; however, they encompass only a brief and somewhat conclusionary section in their article. Therefore, the forthcoming analysis will attempt a thorough explication of this discourse relative to standards of apologia.

A frequency count of the strategies used in this speech reveals the following tabulation: five bolstering strategies, nine differentiation strategies, and seven transcendental strategies.[87] Since there are no personal denials of charges in this address, the key reformative strategy is clearly bolstering. Although somewhat more difficult to pinpoint, the most crucial transformative strategies are apparent in Nixon's use of differentiation. Nixon's transcendental strategies are worth noting, but once again his use of differentiation offers the critic the best insight into his essential strategic focus. Nixon's transcendental strategies rhetorically join Nixon with

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[87]See Appendix E for a specific breakdown of these strategies.

the following concepts:[88] selflessness--as he ignores personal considerations (no. 2), clean politics (no. 9), the more important duties of his office (nos. 12 and 14), a goal of new standards for future election (no. 19), and hope for the free world (no. 21). The preceding transcendental strategies thus portray Nixon as sincerely wanting to get to the bottom of Watergate and other campaign abuses while not neglecting his other pressing presidential responsibilities. In his 1978 memoirs, Nixon acknowledged the futility of such transcendental efforts: "I talked in terms of responsibility and the fact that 'the man at the top must bear the responsibility....I accept it.' But that was only an abstraction and the people saw through it."[89] These particular rhetorical attempts by Nixon to enhance his credibility are interesting but not nearly as revealing as his differentiation techniques. These differentiation strategies will be examined following an analysis of Nixon's use of bolstering. Since this address

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[88]The numbers in parenthesis that will follow note the number of the strategy as it is listed in Appendix E.

[89]Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 851.

relies primarily on bolstering and differentiation efforts, it can be categorized as explanative apologia.[90]

Nixon's fundamental reformative strategy of bolstering serves the sole purpose of identifying Nixon with the office of the Presidency. More specifically, Nixon's bolstering strategies attempt repeatedly to identify Nixon with his powerful office which he viewed as a "sacred trust" (no. 5), having many responsibilities beyond mere campaigning (no. 7), too important to be consumed by this political scandal (no. 13), an office that can accomplish great things (no. 15), and vital to the hope of the world (no. 20). As Gibson and Felkins (1974) have pointed out, Nixon did not resort to his usual rhetorical device of associating himself with others.[91] Instead, Nixon chose to associate or identify himself with his office. The whole Watergate scandal and Nixon's alleged involvement in it evidently represented such an embarrassing and unprecedented turn of events that Nixon could not find any strong grounds for identification with anything or anyone except his presidential power. As this address unfolds, Nixon's bolstering

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[90]See Figure 2 for a specific breakdown of these subgenres of apologia.

[91]Gibson and Felkins, "A Nixon Lexicon," pp. 190-98.

strategies attempt to build this identification to the point of conceptualizing Nixon as inseparable from his powerful office. Thus, Nixon's first bolstering effort emphasizes the sanctity of his office: "This office is a sacred trust, and I am determined to be worthy of that trust."[92] Furthermore, Nixon believes that the tremendous responsibilities of this "sacred trust" often go above and beyond mere campaigning for an election: "And that is why I decided as the 1972 campaign approached that the President should come first and politics second."[93] Herein lies Nixon's crucial explanation for Watergate. He explains that his overwhelming presidential obligations necessitated his delegating authority for his 1972 campaign to others. Nixon insists that he "sought to delegate campaign operations to remove the day-to-day campaign decisions from the President's office and from the White House."[94] Hence, these subordinates "may have done wrong in a cause they deeply believed to be right."[95] In sum, these initial

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[92]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.

[93]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.

[94]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.

[95]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.

bolstering devices attempt to so strongly identify Nixon with his office that any wrongdoing by his subordinates was actually beyond his control--since he was so dedicated to his more important task of leadership. Clearly, Nixon wanted his audience to conclude with him that he was not to blame for Watergate, and that he was merely trying to remove politics from his sacred office.

Having made this explanation, Nixon chooses to look to the future:

> Whatever may now transpire in the case, whatever the actions of the grand jury, whatever the outcome of any eventual trials, I must now turn my full intention--and I shall do so--once again to the larger duties of this office. I owe it to this great office that I hold, and I owe it to you, to my country.[96]

Thus, Nixon suggests that his great office is much too important to be totally consumed by this "senseless illegal action."[97] In retrospect, Nixon's "largest duty" was, in fact, to extricate himself from the Watergate affair. Nixon further develops this bolstering strategy of presidential association as he

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[96]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.

[97]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 450-51.

insists that his presidency can accomplish great things: "When I think of this office, of what it means, I think of all the things that I want to accomplish for this nation, of all the things I want to accomplish for you."[98]

Finally, Nixon asks for his audience's help so that he can accomplish his presidential goals:

> I looked at my own calendar this morning up at Camp David as I was working on this speech. It showed exactly 1,361 days remaining in my term. I want these to be the best days in America's history because I love America....I know that in the quality and wisdom of the leadership America gives lies the only hope for millions of people all over the world....
> Tonight, I ask for your prayers to help me in everything that I do throughout the days of my Presidency to be worthy of their hopes and of yours.[99]

This bolstering strategy ingeniously alludes to the notion that Nixon's effective leadership throughout the remainder of his term is the only hope for the world. The irony here is that Nixon did not have 1,361 days remaining in his term; he had much less. I would contend that the ineffectiveness of the preceding bolstering strategies significantly weakened Nixon's apologia. Nixon's essential self-defense for Watergate was grounded in a presidential association that was very meaningful

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[98] Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 452.

[99] Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 452.

to him relative to his strong view of the presidency.[100] However, this association was not particularly strong or convincing to his audience--especially in light of incriminating evidence from the Watergate hearings.[101]

The most significant transformative strategies of this address are found in Nixon's use of differentiation. These differentiation strategies indicate that Nixon rhetorically separates himself from the following elements: early reports on the Watergate scandal (no. 1), releasing Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kleindienst because of wrongdoing on their part (nos. 3 and 4), the 1972 campaign and the Watergate break-in (no. 6), the easy and cowardly thing to do relative to Watergate blame-placing (no. 8), excessive reaction to Watergate (no. 11), and any whitewash at the White House (no. 16). These diverse differentiation devices serve three main rhetorical functions: (1) they attempt to extricate Nixon from actual impropriety; (2) they pinpoint Nixon as ultimately responsible for his subordinates' actions; and (3) they explore the aftermath of Watergate.

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[100] Gonchar and Hahn, "The Rhetorical Predictability," pp. 3-13.

[101] See Gallup Opinion Index, (May 1973), pp. 9-10.

Nixon's first differentiation efforts are directed toward separating himself from any alleged improprieties. Specifically, Nixon's initial strategic focus is on distinguishing between the early reports he received about Watergate and those he received later:

> Until March of this year, I remained convinced that the denials were true and that the charges of involvement by members of the White House were false....
> However, new information then came to me which persuaded me that there was a real possibility that some of these charges were true....[102]

Nixon's differentiation of the information he received on Watergate is worth noting. Clearly, this strategy helps to portray Nixon as being just as surprised and appalled by these "senseless, illegal actions" as were the American people. Nixon thus becomes the typical outraged citizen who could not have been a part of these crimes since he found out about them at the same time that everybody else did. Additionally, Nixon used this differentiation to explain his earlier claims of blanket White House innocence which now could not be supported. The ultimate purpose here is to persuade the audience that he had not consciously lied to them in his earlier statements, for he had been misinformed.

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[102]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 450.

Nixon further attempts to separate himself from any wrongdoing as he differentiates the resignations of three key members of his staff:

> Today, in one of the most difficult decisions of my Presidency, I accepted the resignations of two of my closest associates in the White House, Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, two of the finest public servants it has been my privilege to know. I want to stress that in accepting these resignations I mean to leave no implication whatever of personal wrongdoing on their part....
> Attorney General Kleindienst, though a distinguished public servant, my personal friend for 20 years, with no personal involvement whatever in this matter, has been a close personal associate of some of those who are involved in this case, he and I both felt it was also necessary to name a new Attorney General.[103]

It is clear that Nixon's attempts to separate Haldeman, Erhlichman, and Kleindienst from personal wrongdoing are also attempts to separate himself from the same condemnation. Interestingly enough, Nixon chose to stress his close association with these individuals while, in effect, firing them. In turn, Nixon chose to disassociate them from actual wrongdoing.

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[103]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451. In his memoirs, Nixon admits the self-serving nature of accepting Haldeman and Erhlichman's resignations: "I had always prided myself on the fact that I stood by people who were down. Now I had sacrificed, for myself, two people I owed so much." Nixon, RN, p. 849.

However, two problems arise here. First, if they are not guilty, why is Nixon accepting their resignations? This certainly is inconsistent with Nixon's notice of "standing up for one's friends." Nixon's anticipated response to such inquiries is the following: "I wanted to be fair, but I knew that in the final analysis the integrity of this office--public faith in the integrity of this office--would have to take priority over personal considerations."[104] Thus, these "innocent" victims are betrayed by their close friend because of the sanctity of Nixon's office. The discerning public obviously would have great difficulty in accepting such questionable reasoning. The second problem of Nixon's initial explanation of these resignations is that of "guilt by association." In other words, if Nixon is so closely associated with these individuals, couldn't he also be associated with the underlying reasons for their resignations? Hence, these inherent problems lead one full circle to the fact that Nixon needed to disassociate Haldeman, Erhlichman, and Kleindienst from wrongdoing. Moreover, whether Nixon stated it or not, the audience was probably aware of their close association with Nixon.

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[104] Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 450.

Another important device relative to Nixon's attempts to remove himself from actual improprieties can be found in his differentiation of the 1972 campaign from his previous campaigns:

> Political commentators have correctly observed that during my 27 years in politics, I've always previously insisted on running my own campaigns for office.
> In both domestic and foreign policy, 1972 was a year of crucially important decisions, of intense negotiations, of vital new directions....
> And that is why I decided as the 1972 campaign approached that the Presidency should come first and politics second. To the maximum extent possible, therefore, I sought to delegate campaign operations....[105]

An important distinction that is alluded to in the preceding passage is that Nixon was not the President during his previous campaigns and thus could afford to spend time on campaign operations. The implication here is that Nixon can not really be held accountable for illegal campaigning actions committed while he was in the midst of pursuing his presidential responsibilities. The President is a very busy man and he simply cannot do and see everything. Nixon's priorities were such

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[105]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.

that the 1972 campaign operations were delegated to others. Having made this distinction clear, Nixon turns around and states that he is ultimately responsible for his subordinates' actions:

> For the fact that alleged improper actions took place within the White House or within my campaign organization, the easiest course would be for me to blame those whom I delegated the responsibility to run the campaign. But that would be a cowardly thing to do. I will not place the blame on subordinates, on people whose zeal exceeded their judgment.... In any organization the man at the top must bear the responsibility. That responsibility, therefore, belongs here in this office. I accept it.[106]

Once again Nixon resorts to his differentiation of the easy or cowardly action versus the proper action. On the surface, this self-imposed courage appears to be an admirable and selfless trait. However, closer scrutiny demonstrates just the opposite. Prior to this "acceptance of responsibility" Nixon had already placed the real blame for Watergate elsewhere with his only fault being his preoccupation with the duties of his office. His strategy is much like the attorney who puts forth an incriminating question and then willingly

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[106]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.

withdraws it, knowing that his point has been made. Following this, another questionable aspect of this strategy becomes apparent as Nixon pledges, "I will do everything in my power to insure that the guilty are brought to justice...."[107] This pledge for justice prompts the question: If Nixon is really accepting blame for Watergate, how can he truly pursue those who are guilty? More specifically, how can the guilty earnestly pursue the guilty, particularly when they are closely associated with one another? Obviously, Nixon does not really accept the blame for Watergate, and his blame-placing differentiation becomes a rather transparent and self-serving attempt for credibility.

Nixon's last differentiation strategies explore the aftermath of Watergate. The initial differentiation effort here is to distinguish proper from excessive reaction to Watergate:

> It is essential that we let the judicial process go forward, respecting those safeguards that are established to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty.

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[107]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.

> It is essential that in reacting to the excesses of others, we not fall into excesses ourselves. It is also essential that we not be so distracted by events such as this that we neglect the work before us....
> Since March, when I first learned that the Watergate affair might in fact be far more serious that I had been led to believe, it has claimed far too much of my time.[108]

According to Nixon, Watergate is now a judicial matter. Nixon's essential distinction here is that there is a right and wrong way of dealing with such matters. The right way is to let the courts do what is necessary; the wrong way is to be so preoccupied with it as to cripple America and particularly Nixon's leadership task. Unfortunately for Nixon, the American people did not view his alternatives as being mutually exclusive. Hence, this differentiation strategy failed its essential purpose of particularizing the charges at hand.[109]

Finally, Nixon uses differentiation as he delineates the needed reform in our political system:

> We must reform our political process, ridding it not only of the violations of the law but also of the ugly mob violence and other inexcusable campaign practices that have been too often practiced and

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[108]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 451.

[109]See Figure 1 for a complete analysis of the components of differentiation strategies.

> too readily accepted in the past including those that may have been a response by one-sided [sic] to the excesses or expected excesses of the other side....
> And both of our great parties have been guilty of such tactics.[110]

Although Nixon professes to be seeking improved campaign practices, one senses that he is really alluding to the fact that Watergate-like incidents are not that uncommon in politics. Moreover, Nixon implies that his Democratic counterparts are not strangers to such activities. This Nixon counterattack is reminiscent of the predominant style of his "Checkers" speech. In fact, I would suggest that this address might have been more effective if Nixon were to have relied more openly on such a differentiation strategy. Instead, early in his speech, Nixon chose to assume the role of the shocked and appalled leader as he referred to Watergate as a "senseless, illegal action" and a "sordid affair."[111] Having taken such a position, it would have been rather difficult for Nixon to completely admit to his audience that such "sordidness" was a common part of the American political process. He relied instead on brief innuendo. Thus, Nixon attempted to

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[110]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," p. 452.

[111]Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," pp. 450-51.

play both the outraged leader and subtle counterattacking political realist. In light of the circumstances, Nixon's dual roles proved to be mutually exclusive and thereby weakened the efficacy of both strategies.

In summary, this crucial 1973 speech on Watergate can be categorized as an explanative address in which the speaker seeks to eliminate condemnation by providing a clearer understanding of the situation. Although Nixon's transcendental strategies interestingly allude to his sincere efforts to deal with Watergate while not neglecting his presidential obligations, Nixon relied primarily on bolstering and differentiation strategies. Nixon's fundamental reformative strategy of bolstering serves the sole purpose of identifying Nixon with the office of the Presidency. Within this strategy is Nixon's essential explanation for Watergate. Specifically, his presidential responsibilities necessitated his delegating authority for his 1972 campaign to others who, in turn, "may have done wrong." Nixon's most significant transformative strategies of this address are apparent in his use of differentiation. These strategies function to separate Nixon from actual wrongdoing, to differentiate his acceptance of responsibility from cowardly blame-placing, and to explore the aftermath

of Watergate. Overall, this Watergate defense was dependent upon a presidential association and a very unconvincing separation of facts. The ultimate failure of this address--as well as subsequent Watergate apologia--can be attributed to the audience's unwillingness to accept the notion of presidential omnipotence and the contradictory and highly incriminating testimonies that would continue to surface.

Summary

In review of this chapter, four of Nixon's most crucial self-defense discourses were analyzed in accordance to the apologia criteria set forth by Ware and Linkugel (1973). I have attempted to synthesize this analysis in terms of a comparison of the key strategies used in these speeches (see Figure 3). The rhetorical implications of these findings will be addressed in Chapter III.

FIGURE 3

A STRATEGIC COMPARISON

	1952 "Checkers" Speech	1969 Vietnam Speech	1970 Cambodia Speech	1973 Watergate Speech
Subgenre of apologia	Absolutive address using primarily denial and differentiation strategies	Explanative address using primarily bolstering and differentiation strategies	Explanative address using primarily bolstering and differentiation strategies	Explanative address using primarily bolstering and differentiation strategies
Key denial strategies	Nixon denies personal use, secretive nature, and giving special favors relative to $18,000 contributions	None	None	None
Key bolstering strategies	Nixon identifies with American values of patriotism, humility, courage, and anti-communism	Nixon identifies himself with those critical of Johnson's handling of Vietnam, and Nixon also identifies with his own office of the presidency	Nixon identifies himself as an effective President and identifies with other Presidents and their crucial decision-making efforts	Nixon's sole tactic here is to identify himself with the office of the Presidency
Key differentiation strategies	Nixon distinguishes himself from his opposing Democratic party leaders and any false charges of impropriety	Nixon emphasizes his decision-making ability while placing blame on the Johnson Administration, North Vietnam, and the "vocal minority"	Nixon pinpoints North Vietnam as the foe, South Vietnam as a friend in need, and the public's response to his selfless efforts for peace	Nixon separates himself from actual wrongdoing, differentiates his acceptance of responsibility from cowardly blame-placing, and explores the aftermath of Watergate
Key transcendental strategies	Nixon uses appeals to American values, such as political integrity, the victimized underdog, and peaceful prosperity	Nixon uses fairly common patriotic appeals for freedom and Americanism	Nixon uses broad patriotic appeals for peace and freedom	Nixon alludes to his sincere efforts to deal with Watergate while not neglecting his presidential responsibilities

CHAPTER III

RHETORICAL IMPLICATIONS

This chapter will explore the rhetorical implications of the findings that were reached in the preceding chapter. Specifically, the following research questions will be addressed:

1. What are the subgenres of apologia apparent in Nixon's rhetoric?
2. What are the key apologetic strategies manifested in Nixon's rhetoric?
3. What are the recurring and/or significant apologetic tactics found in Nixon's rhetoric?
4. What influence did Nixon have on the contemporary apologetic genre?
5. What is the utility of Ware and Linkugel's critical system?

Subgenres and Key Strategies

The two key strategies of an apologetic discourse are combined and result in a specific subgenre of apologia. With the exception of the 1952 "Checkers" speech, all of the addresses examined relied primarily on bolstering and differentiation strategies for their persuasive impact, and therefore can be placed in the subgenre of explanative apologia. Although the "Checkers" speech made use of bolstering, its

essential strategies were focused on denial and differentiation and thus is categorized as absolutive apologia. This speech was the result of a very specific charge against Nixon's character, that is, he was accused of illegal use of campaign funds.[1] Hence, Nixon viewed his alternatives as either being removed from the Republican ticket or denying this charge directly.[2] His use of differentiation in this address attempted to reinforce his denial by particularizing the charge and those who probably made it.[3]

The 1969 Vietnam address relied mainly on bolstering and differentiation strategies. As noted, mounting antiwar sentiment appeared to prompt this speech. The underlying charge of impropriety that this discourse addressed itself to was implied more than clearly stated by specific accusers. Nonetheless, the essential accusation was that President Nixon

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[1]Richard M. Nixon, "My Side of the Story," Vital Speeches of the Day, 19 (October 15, 1952), 11.

[2]Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 98.

[3]Rosenfield (1968) noted that Nixon never really pinpointed his accusers. Instead, he alluded to the misdeeds of his democratic counterparts and thereby implied that they were in no position to accuse him of wrongdoing. L. W. Rosenfield, "A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Nixon-Truman Analog," Speech Monographs, 35 (November 1968), 446.

had not ended the Vietnam War as he had promised to do so in his campaign rhetoric. Since this was an implied charge, Nixon was not quite forced into the position of either offering a definite denial or losing his office. Thus, Nixon chose to bolster his image versus direct denial. Additionally, Nixon's differentiation strategies sought to reinforce this bolstering by particularizing those who were truly responsible for America's Vietnam dilemma.

Nixon's 1970 Cambodia address also relied primarily on bolstering and differentiation strategies. In this speech, he attempted to explain his decision to send American troops into Cambodia. The apparent force that prompted this discourse was the implied charge that Nixon was, in fact, stepping up a war that he had promised to end. Since Nixon could retain his position as president without directly denying this charge, he relied more on bolstering his presidential image than direct denial. Furthermore, Nixon's use of differentiation served to particularize his obstacles in seeking peace.

Finally, Nixon's 1973 Watergate address also proved to rely essentially on bolstering and differentiation strategies. However, the charge that necessitated this speech was quite clear.

In fact, Nixon admitted that the charge at hand was involvement of his staff in the Watergate affair.[4] Thus, the specificity of the accusation was similar to that of the "Checkers" speech. Yet, Nixon's strategic approach here was noticeably different. Instead of attempting a confrontation or denial of the charge, Nixon chose to seek refuge in bolstering by clearly identifying himself with his office. In addition to this strategy, Nixon sought to reinforce this identification by separating his presidential responsibilities.

In sum, Nixon's fundamental self-defense strategies were fairly consistently bolstering and differentiation and thus resulted in explanative apologia. However, use of these strategies in his crucial Watergate speech resulted in especially ineffective apologia. Nixon's administration was accused of specific and incriminating deeds. Rather than confronting these accusations, Nixon chose to reassert his presidential position through bolstering and differentiation. In assessing Nixon's Watergate apologia, Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel stated, "Rhetorical critics face the task of explaining why in the case

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[4]Richard M. Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," Vital Speeches of the Day, 39 (May 15, 1973), 450.

of Richard Nixon, who used apologia on a scale unprecedented in the history of America politics, apology failed."[5] Perhaps Nixon's decision to essentially bolster his presidential image as opposed to a direct confrontation of the charges contributed to the ultimate failure of his apologia.

If Nixon had analyzed his previous apologia efforts he might not have made this decision. Clearly, the situation and specificity of the charges surrounding the "Checkers" speech demanded a direct confrontation without which Nixon faced the strong possibility of being removed from the Republican ticket.[6] In the Vietnam and Cambodia addresses, however, there were implied versus specific charges that demanded rhetorical consideration. Moreover, Nixon's popularity might have been affected, but he was not really in danger of losing his office through impeachment. Although not always completely effective with his audience, Nixon's bolstering strategies

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[5]Jackson Harrell, B. L. Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, "Failure of Apology in American Politics: Nixon on Watergate," Speech Monographs, 42 (November 1975), 245.

[6]Barnet Baskerville, "The Nixon Affair," in "The Election of 1952: A Symposium," ed. Frederick W. Haberman, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 38 (December 1952), 406.

in these war speeches were feasible rhetorical devices. In his 1973 Watergate address, Nixon seemingly failed to recognize the specificity and incriminating nature of the charges at hand. Additionally, Nixon seemingly failed to realize that the Watergate scandal, like the "Checkers" case, could be an either/or situation, that is, either confront the charges directly or lose your office. If one truly seeks to retain an office in such a rhetorical situation, the strategic alternatives are severely limited. Thus, Nixon's strategic choices imply that either he was unaware of the necessity of a definite rhetorical confrontation through denial or simply unable to support such denials because the available facts could contradict them.

In light of this second set of circumstances, apologia appeared nearly doomed to failure. Specifically, the self-defense rhetor attempts to extricate himself from wrongdoing by illuminating the situation. If such an illumination is unavoidably self-incriminating, the rhetor will find himself "hoisted on his own petard." I can view only two possible exceptions to this rule. First, the rhetor may obscure the facts convincingly and thereby diminish the charges. Second, the charges may not have been severe enough to warrant

public condemnation. In the case of Richard Nixon, both of these exceptions also failed.

Significant Tactics

The notion of rhetorical tactic will be viewed as a specific means of implementing the general strategies of denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence. Of the four examined discourses, the only definite use of denial was apparent in the 1952 "Checkers" speech. In this address, Nixon accomplished his strategic task of denial by first differentiating the charges against him and then denying them rather directly. Hence, denial strategies and subsequent tactics are thus limited to one address and obviously not a recurring phenomenon.

In terms of specific tactics underlying Nixon's bolstering strategies, several observations can be made. The important tactic here was that of identification and definite trends emerge in Nixon's apologia. In the "Checkers" speech Nixon's essential identification was with American values. He associated himself with patriotism, humility, courage, and anti-communism. Nixon's crucial identification tactics in the Vietnam address linked him with those critical of Johnson's Vietnam politics, but more importantly, with his own office

of the presidency. Furthermore, similar presidential association tactics were pursued in both the Cambodia and Watergate discourses. In fact, this association tactic amounted to his fundamental Watergate defense, that is, the urgency of presidential responsibilities caused him to delegate authority to those who evidently abused it. From this analysis, one can conclude that when Nixon was in office and under fire, he often sought refuge in the mere legitimacy of his office.

The key tactics within his strategy of differentiation are also revealing. The significant tactics here are that of distinguishing oneself from the opposition and particularizing certain facts. In the "Checkers" speech Nixon distinguishes himself both from charges of impropriety and especially from his opposing Democratic party leaders. In the Vietnam address Nixon contrasted his peace-seeking efforts with the ineffective measures of the previous administration, the uncooperative North Vietnamese, and the trouble-making "vocal minority." Similar tactics were used in the Cambodia address as Nixon pinpointed North Vietnam as the belligerent foe, South Vietnam as a friend in need, and the public's often counter-productive response to his selfless efforts for peace. Finally, Nixon's Watergate tactics function to separate him from actual wrongdoing,

to differentiate his acceptance of responsibility from cowardly blame-placing, and to particularize the aftermath of this scandal.

It is interesting to note that in the first three addresses Nixon separates himself from wrongdoing by contrasting the propriety of his actions with the actions of others. Although not always effective, this "rhetoric of contrast" was one of Nixon's more convincing tactics. Given the circumstances surrounding the Watergate speech, Nixon evidently did not view this tactic of contrast as a viable differentiation alternative. As previously noted, his only use of this device in this speech amounted to a rather brief allusion to the realities of campaigning. It would appear that Nixon did not believe that the apparent campaign abuses of Watergate lent themselves to the tactic of contrast. This kind of tactic would have amounted to a more complete examination of campaign abuses, particularly by Nixon's democratic counterparts. Perhaps a thorough and open development of this tactic was seen as simply too negative to really pursue.

Last, the specific tactics underlying Nixon's transcendental strategies will be noted. The tactics here are those which rhetorically join Nixon with certain abstract concepts.

In his "Checkers" speech Nixon used appeals to American values, such as political integrity, the victimized underdog, and peaceful prosperity. In both the Vietnam and Cambodia speeches Nixon employed fairly common patriotic appeals for peace, freedom,and Americanism. The Watergate address alluded to the importance of political integrity and the necessity of strong but honest leadership in America. These rhetorical tactics consistently join Nixon with the American values of peace, freedom, and political integrity. Thus, Nixon's rhetorical tactics that constitute transcendental strategies appeal to basic American values. As previously noted, this is a fairly common rhetorical practice and Nixon's most telling tactics are more apparent when viewed through his bolstering and differentiation efforts.

In sum, the following recurring tactics are evident in the examined self-defense discourses: (1) Nixon attempted to bolster his image essentially through identifying himself with his presidential position; (2) Nixon often differentiated himself from wrongdoing by contrasting the propriety of his actions with the actions of others; and (3) Nixon frequently transcended the situation at hand by alluding to basic American values. Since this second recurring tactic was a seemingly

unavailable option for Nixon in his Watergate self-defense, this could have weakened his attempts for persuasion.

Nixon's Influence on Contemporary Apologia

The self-defense rhetoric of Richard Nixon has had a significant influence on the genre of modern apologia. I contend that Nixon's impact on contemporary apologia has (1) maximized the need for apologetic-like statements in politics while (2) prompting a change in the traditional form of apologia. As Gold (1978) has pointed out, the aftermath of Watergate and Nixon's mishandling of it have increased politicians' need to "defend their character."[7] However, the traditional form of the apology appears to have undergone some changes since Nixon left office in 1974.

The 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns serve as examples of the heightened importance of apologia in the political arena. With Nixon's political ruination from the Watergate scandal still fresh in their mind, the electorate in 1976 was subjected to a number of presidential candidates insistent upon proving their honest and integrity. In fact,

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[7]Ellen Reid Gold, "Political Apologia: The Ritual of Self-Defense," Communication Monographs, 45 (November 1978), 306.

the most successful Democratic and Republican candidates--Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford--seemed to make "personal integrity" the foundation of their campaign. Perhaps Carter ultimately won the election with his repeated campaign promise: "I'll never lie to you." Consequently, Gold concluded that the circumstances were such in the 1976 presidential election that "the need to defend one's character [was] more imperative--and difficult--than ever."[8]

Even more recently--in the 1980 presidential campaign--self-defense strategies were of definite import. The strong morality of Jimmy Carter was alluded to throughout the early campaign thus transcending other charges of presidential ineptness. Additionally, the Chappaquiddick incident haunted Edward Kennedy's candidacy as he attempted to deny continued allegations. Finally, John Connally sought to disassociate himself from the "Milk Fund" scandal with strong denials of wrongdoing and emphasizing his swift acquittal in that bribery trial. Not surprisingly, Ronald Reagan emerged victorious as the "oldest and wisest" and the "anti-Washington" candidate.

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[8]Gold, "Political Apologia," p. 306.

Although Richard Nixon's inability to apologize his way out of the Watergate scandal and his subsequent political demise may have increased the need for politicians to "defend their character," the actual mode of the classic apologia has taken on numerous forms. More specifically, Nixon's frequent use of the mass media (televised) apology seems to have spawned nontraditional and indirect forms of apologia. While political figures feel the need to uphold their integrity, there appears to be a growing effort by politicians to avoid the mass media and highly personalized apologetic style which characterized Nixon's apologia.

Upon taking office in the summer of 1974, Gerald Ford exemplified such an avoidance in his handling of the Presidential pardon of Nixon. Although he delivered his actual pardon speech to the nation via television, he did not attempt to use this channel when confronted with considerably negative reactions from Americans. He chose instead to appear before a Congressional subcommittee in an attempt to justify his decision. Ford consciously seemed to distinguish his apologia style from that of Nixon who constantly went before Americans on television.[9]

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[9]See Gold, "Political Apologia," pp. 309-310.

Another interesting variation in post 1974 apologia is the emergence of surrogate apologists. In contrast to Nixon's face-to-face televised encounters with his audience, in recent years a number of surrogate spokesmen/women often deliver apologetic-like statements. For example, in the early 1980 presidential campaign Jimmy Carter relied heavily on a number of surrogates, such as brother Billy, wife Rosalynn, mother Lillian, Vice-President Mondale, and campaign chairman Robert Strauss. As Carter initially vowed not to hit the campaign trail until the safe release of the American hostages in Iran, his surrogates were called upon to defend his "morality, motives, and reputation."

Other candidates in the 1980 presidential campaign also relied on surrogate apologists. When the Chappaquiddick incident troubled Edward Kennedy's candidacy, his campaign chairman, Stephen Smith, would frequently defend Kennedy's integrity.[10] Similarly, Reagan spokesman, Representative Jack Kemp, often upheld the wisdom and reputation of Ronald Reagan.[11]

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[10]See, for example, "Kennedy Timetable Plans Pushed Ahead," Daily Oklahoman, 31 October 1979, p. 5.

[11]See, for example, "Aide Describes Reagan as 'Oldest but Wisest,'" Daily Oklahoman, 15 November 1979, p. 10.

Overall, Richard Nixon appears to have had a dual influence on the contemporary practice of apologia. First, Nixon's political downfall seems to have increased the need for politicians to take part in substantive self-defense. Second, political figures appear hesitant to use Nixon's particular style of apologia and many opt for different approaches in defending their character.

Utility of Critical System

Ware and Linkugel's (1973) critical system has provided an effective analytic method which can be applied to Nixon's self-defense rhetoric. As previously noted, this method is specifically tailored for the genre of apologia, and it is the only detailed system of analysis adapted to contemporary self-defense rhetoric. Thus, Ware and Linkugel have formulated strategic standards which can be applied to the genre in question. Additionally, four subgenres are isolated to further categorize apologetic discourses.

An important asset of this critical method is that it allows the critic to make strategic comparisons across time and diverse apologetic situations (see Figure 3). For example, the critic can easily conclude that Nixon frequently identified himself with past presidents as a key bolstering strategy in

crucial self-defense addresses. The critics can also deduce that Nixon thrived on a "rhetoric of contrast," that is, clearly distinguishing himself from his opposition as a recurring differentiation strategy. This analytic system thus provides the critic with a fairly objective means of evaluating the rhetor's strategic choices in self-defense discourses.

Finally, this system can lend a scientific attractiveness to the rather subjective art of rhetorical criticism as the critic can easily quantify the use of specific strategies. Hence, the critic fulfills his/her traditional role by advancing well-reasoned observations based not only on value judgments but also on quantifiable frequency counts of isolated strategies. Dealing with numbers alone, the critic can conclude that Nixon used differentiation in each of the analyzed addresses more than any other strategy. Conversely, Nixon made only one clear denial--apparent in his "Checkers" speech.

However, the Ware and Linkugel system does have some shortcomings. First, this method can become somewhat prescriptive in its focus on isolated strategies--denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence. The problem here is that these strategies constitute the foundation of the critic's method of analysis. Strategies which do not fit into the above categories are overlooked by the critic. Consequently, some

of the apologist's important emotional and logical appeals might not be accounted for in this system.

A second weakness of this method of analysis is the lack of sufficient explanation particularly in terms of distinguishing bolstering and transcendental strategies. While I have tried to fill in Ware and Linkugel's explanative gaps (see Figure 1), more detail is needed from the original authors. Unfortunately, it sometimes becomes difficult to distinguish "positive identifications" (bolstering) from "attempts to go beyond the situation at hand" (transcendence). Further explanation is thus needed to maintain discrete strategic categorization.

A final flaw is apparent in the lack of clarification of the four "subgenres" of apologia. Ware and Linkugel state that speakers usually assume one of four major rhetorical postures or subgenres when speaking in defense of their character: (1) absolution, (2) vindication, (3) explanation, or (4) justification (see Figure 2). However, the authors do not demonstrate how they arrive at these four postures other than to state that "these four subgenres represent those postures which Western culture, customs, and institutions seem to dictate as being most acceptable in dismissing charges against a

rhetor's character."[12] A sufficiently detailed explanation of the origins of these subgenres would allow the critic to advance more generalizable findings on the possible types of discourses found within the genre of apologia.

As a result of applying Ware and Linkugel's critical system to selected self-defense discourses, several future investigations can be suggested. Although four of Richard Nixon's apologetic discourses were analyzed in this study, the self-defense rhetoric of other apologists certainly could be examined with the use of this analytic tool. For example, a thorough application of Ware and Linkugel's system to Edward Kennedy's 1969 "Chappaquiddick" address could yield insightful analysis. Moreover, entire political campaigns, such as the 1980 presidential election could be analyzed in terms of candidates' use of selected self-defense strategies.

Ware and Linkugel's critical system could be effectively applied to a relatively new area of political communication research known as political advertising. Thus, a content

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[12]B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (October 1973), 282.

analysis of apologetic strategies--denial, bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence--apparent in television political advertisements could produce insightful findings. With the huge amounts of money and time devoted to political advertising, such an analysis would be of interest to communicologists as well as advertising specialists.

Finally, I have suggested in this study that the political downfall of Richard Nixon actually increased politicians' need to "defend their character." I have also suggested that these defenses have often strayed from Nixon's apologia style to more nontraditional methods of character defenses. An entire study devoted to tracing post-Nixon (1974) apologia could be worthwhile. Such a study would actually begin where my study has ended and thus more conclusively explore the present state of the art of apologia.

Summary

In the examined discourses, the predominant subgenre of apologia assumed by Nixon was that of explanation. The fundamental purpose of such apologia is to eliminate condemnation by providing a clearer understanding of the situation. Explanative apologia is mainly the result of bolstering and differentiation strategies. The most noteworthy shortcoming

of Nixon's strategic efforts was apparent in his crucial Watergate address. The circumstances of this scandal demanded a more direct response to the charges at hand. However, Nixon circumvented the charges of impropriety by attempting to bolster his presidential image instead of a direct confrontation and a definite denial of wrongdoing. The recurring rhetorical tactics of the examined addresses were presidential association, the use of contrast--particularly from one's opposition, and appeals to basic American values. It was speculated that the failure of Nixon's Watergate apologia could have been attributed to his inordinate reliance on presidential omnipotence and the fact that this address was lacking in Nixon's fundamental tactic of contrast.

Rhetoricians have noted that the long and controversial political career of Richard Nixon resulted in an unprecedented use of the apologia forum.[13] I have further theorized that Nixon has had an identifiable influence on contemporary apologia. Dating as far back as the ancient Greek civilization, however, there have been numerous examples of rhetors thrust into this

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[13]Harrell, Ware, and Linkugel, "Failure of Apology," p. 245.

critical rhetorical situation. Some of the most interesting rhetoric of history was produced by those rhetors who stood before the bar of public opinion and spoke in defense of themselves.[14] Indeed, thoughtful analysis of self-defense rhetoric is a fascinating and worthwhile endeavor, particularly to students of persuasive communication. The critical system used in this study--Ware and Linkugel (1973)--proved to be a fruitful method for examining this genre of apologia. Moreover, I suggest that subsequent researchers of apologia consider this analytic system to make their critical moment a revealing one.

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[14]See, for example: Socrates' "Apology"; Isocrates' "On the Antidoses"; Demosthenes' "On the Crown"; Sir Thomas More's "Remarks at His trial"; Martin Luther's "Speech at the Diet of Worms"; Susan B. Anthony's "Is It a Crime for a United States Citizen to Vote?"; Douglas MacArthur's "Address to Congress"; Harry S. Truman's "Television Address on Harry Dexter White"; Adlai Stevenson's "The Hiss Case"; and Edward Kennedy's "Chappaquiddick Address."

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APPENDIX A

LETTER FROM KENNETH KHACHIGIAN

August 10, 1978

Mr. Robert A. Vartabedian
407 Pinecrest
Wichita, Kansas 67208

Dear Mr. Vartabedian:

In response to your request for information for your Master's thesis, I have drafted up some answers which you might find helpful. They follow:

* * * * *

Q: Does President Nixon have any particular theory on what he believes to be the key ingredients of an effective political speech? (Any elaboration on this question through specific examples from his long political career -- or of other political figures -- would be appreciated.)

A: While each speech is different, there are a number of common ingredients that President Nixon believes are essential to a good speech.

(1) Preparation - This is the most important element of them all. President Nixon sets aside several days of uninterrupted time to prepare for a major speech. Only preparation permits a speaker to develop a coherent, logical and persuasive presentation. Writing, re-writing, organization and total familiarity with the material are essential to get his message across in the most effective manner -- to know what the central theme is and to deliver it well.

As you noted in reading RN, virtually every important speech President Nixon delivered included intense preparation: the March, 1954 speech in response to Adlai Stevenson; the 1960 and 1968 Acceptance Speeches; the Lakeside Speech at Bohemian Grove in 1967; the November 3, 1969 "Silent Majority" speech are examples.

(2) Addressing the Audience - Each speech must address the audience that is listening. A speech to a small group of, say, visiting Boy Scouts that will be heard only by those in the room requires different delivery and presentation than a speech on television to be heard and watched around the world. Speeches to political conventions are good examples of the problem that is raised in deciding which audience to address. The audience in the hall is excited, partisan, and anxious for rhetorical flourish. In a large hall that audience might number 15,000 people. But on television and radio, the audience might

be 70 to 80 million people, and after replays on news broadcasts, the audience that hears the speech may jump to over 100 million in America alone. It is the wise political speaker who determines that he must address the convention in such a way as to ensure that his message reaches the entire voting public. Thus, eye contact with the television audience is at least as important as eye contact with those in the hall. President Nixon's Acceptance speech of 1968 -- which you should watch if possible -- is really a classic in this genre. Both the partisan crowd and the broader audience were reached very effectively.

(3) Brevity - Lincoln's Second Inaugural and his Gettysburg Address are superb examples of how eloquence and a message can be maintained in very short speeches. President Nixon tried whenever possible to keep his speeches short. There are occasions, of course, when complex issues or the need for elaborate explanation, make absolute brevity shortsighted, if not impossible. Nevertheless, as a general rule, a point worth making is worth making briefly.

(4) Anecdotes, Quotations and Stories - These should only be used when they help make a point better than the speaker can make in his own words and when they drive home a point very effectively through illustration. Too many public speakers are inclined to toss in quotations which sound eloquent, but in fact may not be apt. President Nixon feels strongly that quotations should never be just thrown in a speech haphazardly. They should be introduced with a little background -- to capture if possible the drama and import of the original speaker's presentation.

You will note in a review of President Nixon's speeches that he uses quotations only selectively. The Lincoln quote used in the Fund speech of 1952 was particularly apt. It made a point better than it could have been made otherwise. More often than not, the President preferred a story, sometimes out of his own experience, to reach his audience. One of the best examples of this is in his speech to the Russian people in May, 1972. He referred to a diary he had read at Leningrad's Piskaryev Cemetery -- the poignant story of the death of a 12-year-old girl and all the members of her family. No words could have better made his point about the grim consequences of war; and there was no better way to capture his Russian audience than this reference to the heroic stand of the Russians during the Nazi siege at Leningrad in World War II.

(5) Newsworthiness - The age of mass communications has transformed the art of rhetoric. Today, an essential ingredient of a speech is for it to include something that will command attention. Newsmen call the central

point of their stories the "lead." Thus, the modern speaker must think out what the "lead" of his speech will be; what the central point is; and what will be deemed most newsworthy. Like it or not, aphorisms and homilies compete with substance in modern communications. It is helpful to come up with a unique way of saying something, a perceptive thought, and a fresh presentation that is forceful in wording or memorable in impact and delivery. Two examples that come to mind are the call to the "Silent Majority" in 1969 and this line from President Nixon's Second Inaugural: "Government must learn to take less from the people so that people can do more for themselves."

(6) The Peroration - A good peroration is one of the most difficult elements for any speaker. It takes great skill to bring all points of the address together thematically and to leave the audience on a high note. It folds together logic, eloquence and a flair for the dramatic. Care must be taken not to overdo the peroration; a bad peroration can ruin an otherwise effective speech.

Q: Did President Nixon consider his obvious skill in public speaking (in both substance and delivery) a significant factor contributing to his political career? (Again, any elaboration on this question through specific examples from his long political career would be appreciated.)

A: Yes. In his first political campaign, it was the debates with his better-known opponent that were so important to President Nixon's victory. His presentation was sharp, concise, and reflected substantial preparation. His opponent's presentation was methodical, plodding, technical and much more boring. The difference between the challenger's abilities and the experienced five-term incumbent's less effective presentation was telling. It appeared that Mr. Nixon knew Congressman Voorhis's record better than Voorhis himself.

There are several other examples where President Nixon's skill as a public speaker was a significant factor in his success -- the Senate campaign against Helen Douglas; the Fund Speech; the speech in 1952 before the New York State Republican dinner which caused Governor Dewey to predict the presidency some day for then Senator Nixon; the Lakeside Speech at Bohemian Grove which, because of the important audience and the substance of the speech, played a key role in President Nixon's comeback in 1968.

Nevertheless, public speaking is not, in the end, a substitute for competence. The most eloquent man in the world could not survive in politics if he is an incompetent administrator or an ineffective leader. The quality of one's work is always much more important than the glibness of his speech.

* * * * *

Best of luck to you as you move ahead for your PhD.

Cordially,



Kenneth L. Khachigian

APPENDIX B

MY SIDE OF THE STORY: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

MY SIDE OF THE STORY: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS*

Analysis

1. There is a clear differentiation of Nixon from the Truman Administration.

2. A transcendental strategy is demonstrated as Nixon alludes to the actual office of the Vice Presidency and its inherent greatness.

3. The charge against Nixon is differentiated.

4. Nixon differentiates the legal and especially moral wrongness of the charge into three categories.

5. Denials are offered for each of the categories of possible impropriety.

6. Within these denials, Nixon makes an important differentiation between personal use of the fund and using it for political expenses.

Speech

MY Fellow Americans: I come before you tonight as a candidate for the Vice Presidency and as a man whose honesty and integrity have been questioned.

The usual political thing to do when charges are made against you is to either ignore them or to deny them without giving details.

I believe we've had enough of that in the United States, particularly with the present Administration in Washington, D. C. To me the office of the Vice Presidency of the United States is a great office, and I feel that the people have got to have confidence in the integrity of the men who run for that office and who might obtain it.

I have a theory, too, that the best and only answer to a smear or to an honest misunderstanding of the facts is to tell the truth. And that's why I'm here tonight. I want to tell you my side of the case.

I am sure that you have read the charge and you've heard that I, Senator Nixon, took $18,000 from a group of my supporters.

Was It Wrong?

Now, was that wrong? And let me say that it was wrong —I'm saying, incidentally, that it was wrong and not just illegal. Because it isn't a question of whether it was legal or illegal, that isn't enough. The question is, was it morally wrong?

I say that it was morally wrong if any of that $18,000 went to Senator Nixon for my personal use. I say that it was morally wrong if it was secretly given and secretly handled. And I say that it was morally wrong if any of the contributors got special favors for the contributions that they made.

And now to answer those questions let me say this:

Not one cent of the $18,000 or any other money of that type ever went to me for my personal use. Every penny of it was used to pay for political expenses that I did not think should be charged to the taxpayers of the United States.

It was not a secret fund. As a matter of fact, when I was on "Meet the Press," some of you may have seen it last Sunday—Peter Edson came up to me after the program and he said, "Dick, what about this fund we hear about?" And I said, Well, there's no secret about it. Go out and see Dana Smith, who was the administrator of the fund. And I gave him his address, and I said that you will find that the purpose of the fund simply was to defray political expenses that I did not feel should be charged to the Government.

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*Richard M. Nixon, "My Side of the Story," Vital Speeches of the Day, 19 (October 15, 1952), 11-15.

Analysis

Speech

And third, let me point out, and I want to make this particularly clear, that no contributor to this fund, no contributor to any of my campaign, has ever received any consideration that he would not have received as an ordinary constituent.

I just don't believe in that and I can say that never, while I have been in the Senate of the United States, as far as the people that contributed to this fund are concerned, have I made a telephone call for them to an agency, or have I gone down to an agency in their behalf. And the record will show that, the records which are in the hands of the Administration.

WHAT FOR AND WHY?

But then some of you will say and rightly, "Well, what did you use the fund for, Senator? Why did you have to have it?"

Let me tell you in just a word how a Senate office operates. First of all, a Senator gets $15,000 a year in salary. He gets enough money to pay for one trip a year, a round trip that is, for himself and his family between his home and Washington, D. C.

And then he gets an allowance to handle the people that work in his office, to handle his mail. And the allowance for my State of California is enough to hire thirteen people.

7. Bolstering is evident as Nixon attempts to identify himself as working with the Veterans Administration.

And let me say, incidentally, that that allowance is not paid to the Senator—it's paid directly to the individuals that the Senator puts on his payroll, that all of these people and all of these allowances are for strictly official business. Business, for example, when a constituent writes in and wants you to go down to the Veterans Administration and get some information about his GI policy. Items of that type for example.

8. Nixon differentiates between proper and improper Senatorial use of taxpayer's money.

But there are other expenses which are not covered by the Government. And I think I can best discuss those expenses by asking you some questions. Do you think that when I or any other Senator makes a political speech, has it printed, should charge the printing of that speech and the mailing of that speech to the taxpayers?

Do you think, for example, when I or any other Senator makes a trip to his home state to make a purely political speech that the cost of that trip should be charged to the taxpayers?

Do you think when a Senator makes political broadcasts or political television broadcasts, radio or television, that the expense of those broadcasts should be charged to the taxpayers?

Well, I know what your answer is. The same answer that audiences give me whenever I discuss this particular prob-

Analysis

Speech

lem. The answer is, "no." The taxpayers shouldn't be required to finance items which are not official business but which are primarily political business.

But then the question arises, you say, "Well, how do you pay for these and how can you do it legally?"

And there are several ways that it can be done, incidentally, and that it is done legally in the United States Senate and in the Congress.

The first way is to be a rich man. I don't happen to be a rich man so I couldn't use that.

Another way that is used is to put your wife on the payroll. Let me say, incidentally, my opponent, my opposite number for the Vice Presidency on the Democratic ticket, does have his wife on the payroll. And has had her on his payroll for the ten years—the past ten years.

Now just let me say this. That's his business and I'm not critical of him for doing that. You will have to pass judgment on that particular point. But I have never done that for this reason. I have found that there are so many deserving stenographers and secretaries in Washington that needed the work that I just didn't feel it was right to put my wife on the payroll.

9. A bolstering strategy is apparent as Nixon attempts to identify himself with the not so well-to-do but honest Americans.

10. There is a differentiation of Nixon from his Democratic counterpart, John Sparkman, who has put his wife on the payroll for the past ten years.

My wife's sitting over here. She's a wonderful stenographer. She used to teach stenography and she used to teach shorthand in high school. That was when I met her. And I can tell you folks that she's worked many hours at night and many hours on Saturdays and Sundays in my office and she's done a fine job. And I'm proud to say tonight that in the six years I've been in the House and the Senate of the United States, Pat Nixon has never been on the Government payroll.

There are other ways that these finances can be taken care of. Some who are lawyers, and I happen to be a lawyer, continue to practice law. But I haven't been able to do that. I'm so far away from California that I've been so busy with my Senatorial work that I have not engaged in any legal practice.

And also as far as law practice is concerned, it seemed to me that the relationship between an attorney and the client was so personal that you couldn't possibly represent a man as an attorney and then have an unbiased view when he presented his case to you in the event that he had one before the Government.

And so I felt that the best way to handle these necessary political expenses of getting my message to the American people and the speeches I made, the speeches that I had printed, for the most part, concerned this one message—of exposing this Administration, the communism in it, the corruption in it—the only way that I could do that was to accept the aid which people in my home state of California who contributed to my campaign and who continued to make these contributions after I was elected were glad to make.

11. A differentiation is made between deceiving taxpayers into paying for primarily political business and what he has done--using willing contributors' money.

No Special Favors

And let me say I am proud of the fact that not one of them has ever asked me for a special favor. I'm proud of the fact that not one of them has ever asked me to vote on a bill other than as my own conscience would dictate. And I am proud of the fact that the taxpayers by subterfuge or otherwise have never paid one dime for expenses which I thought were political and shouldn't be charged to the taxpayers.

Let me say, incidentally, that some of you may say, "Well, that's all right, Senator; that's your explanation, but have you got any proof?"

And I'd like to tell you this evening that just about an

hour ago we received an independent audit of this entire fund.

I suggested to Gov. Sherman Adams, who is the chief of staff of the Dwight Eisenhower campaign, that an independent audit and legal report be obtained. And I have that audit here in my hand.

It's an audit made by the Price, Waterhouse & Co. firm, and the legal opinion by Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, lawyers in Los Angeles, the biggest law firm and incidentally one of the best ones in Los Angeles.

I'm proud to be able to report to you tonight that this audit and this legal opinion is being forwarded to General Eisenhower. And I'd like to read to you the opinion that was prepared by Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and based on all the pertinent laws and statutes, together with the audit report prepared by the certified public accountants.

"It is our conclusion that Senator Nixon did not obtain any financial gain from the collection and disbursement of the fund by Dana Smith; that Senator Nixon did not violate any Federal or state law by reason of the operation of the fund, and that neither the portion of the fund paid by Dana Smith directly to third persons nor the portion paid to Senator Nixon to reimburse him for designated office expenses constituted income to the Senator which was either reportable or taxable as income under applicable tax laws. (signed) Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher by Alma H. Conway."

12. There is a differentiation between Nixon's own opinion of the propriety of his use of the fund and the legal opinion of his independent audit.

Now that, my friends, is not Nixon speaking, but that's an independent audit which was requested because I want the American people to know all the facts and I'm not afraid of having independent people go in and check the facts, and that is exactly what they did.

But then I realize that there are still some who may say, and rightly so, and let me say that I recognize that some will continue to smear regardless of what the truth may be, but that there has been understandably some honest misunderstanding on this matter, and there's some that will say:

"Well, maybe you were able, Senator, to fake this thing. How can we believe what you say? After all, is there a possibility that maybe you got some sums in cash? Is there a possibility that you may have feathered your own nest?"

Financial History

And so now what I am going to do—and incidentally this is unprecedented in the history of American politics—I am going at this time to give to this television and radio audience a complete financial history; everything I've earned; everything I've spent; everything I owe. And I want you to know the facts. I'll have to start early.

I was born in 1913. Our family was one of modest circumstances and most of my early life was spent in a store out in East Whittier. It was a grocery store—one of those family enterprises. The only reason we were able to make it go was because my mother and dad had five boys and we all worked in the store.

I worked my way through college and to a great extent through law school. And then, in 1940, probably the best thing that ever happened to me happened, I married Pat—sitting over here. We had a rather difficult time after we were married, like so many of the young couples who may be listening to us. I practiced law; she continued to teach School. I went into the service.

13. In the midst of his financial history, Nixon uses a bolstering strategy as he identifies himself with the rather heroic World War II American soldier.

Let me say that my service record was not a particularly unusual one. I went to the South Pacific. I guess I'm entitled to a couple of battle stars. I got a couple of letters of commendation but I was just there when the bombs were falling and then I returned. I returned to the United States and in 1946 I ran for the Congress.

14. A bolstering strategy is apparent as Nixon identifies himself as a patriotic American with "every cent" of his money in Government bonds.

When we came out of the war, Pat and I—Pat during the war had worked as a stenographer and in a bank and as an economist for a Government agency—and when we came out the total of our savings from both my law practice, her teaching and all the time that I was in the war—the total for that entire period was just a little less than $10,000. Every cent of that, incidentally, was in Government bonds.

Well, that's where we start when I go into politics. Now what have I earned since I went into politics? Well, here it is—I jotted it down, let me read the notes. First of all I've had my salary as a Congressman and as a Senator. Second, I have received a total in this past six years of $1,600 from estates which were in my law firm at the time that I severed my connection with it.

And, incidentally, as I said before, I have not engaged in any legal practice and have not accepted any fees from business that came into the firm after I went into politics. I have made an average of aproximately $1,500 a year from non-political speaking engagements and lectures. And then, fortunately, we've inherited a little money. Pat sold her interest in her father's estate for $3,000 and I inherited $1,500 from my grandfather.

We live rather modestly. For four years we lived in an apartment in Park Fairfax, in Alexandria, Va. The rent was $80 a month. And we saved for the time that we could buy a house.

Now, that was what we took in. What did we do with this money? What do we have today to show for it? This will surprise you, because it is so little, I suppose, as standards generally go, of people in public life. First of all, we've got a house in Washington which cost $41,000 and on which we owe $20,000.

We have a house in Whittier, Calif., which cost $13,000 and on which we owe $10,000. My folks are living there at the present time.

I have just $4,000 in life insurance, plus my G. I. policy which I've never been able to convert and which will run out in two years. I have no life insurance whatever on Pat. I have no life insurance on our two youngsters, Patricia and Julie. I own a 1950 Oldsmobile car. We have our furniture. We have no stocks and bonds of any type. We have no interest of any kind, direct or indirect, in any business.

What Do We Owe?

Now, that's what we have. What do we owe? Well, in addition to the mortgage, the $20,000 mortgage on the house in Washington, the $10,000 one on the house in Whittier, I owe $4,500 to the Riggs Bank in Washington, D. C. with interest 4½ per cent.

I owe $3,500 to my parents and the interest on that loan which I pay regularly, because it's the part of the savings they made through the years they were working so hard, I pay regularly 4 per cent interest. And then I have a $500 loan which I have on my life insurance.

Well, that's about it. That's what we have and that's what we owe. It isn't very much but Pat and I have the satisfaction that every dime that we've got is honestly ours. I should say this—that Pat doesn't have a mink coat. But she does have a respectable Republican cloth coat. And I always tell her that she'd look good in anything.

One other thing I probably should tell you because if I don't they'll probably be saying this about me too, we did get something—a gift—after the election. A man down in Texas heard Pat on the radio mention the fact that our two youngsters would like to have a dog. And, believe it or not, the day before we left on this campaign trip we got a message from Union Station in Baltimore saying they had a

15. Nixon further bolsters his image as he identifies himself as a courageous individual who is willing to confront difficult tasks in spite of personal hardships.

16. A strategic differentiation is made between Nixon and the very wealthy Adlai Stevenson.

17. A bolstering strategy is demonstrated as Nixon identifies his beliefs with a statement made by Abraham Lincoln.

18. An implied differentiation is made between Nixon's conduct and that of his opponents Stevenson and Sparkman.

19. There is a differentiation between what Nixon has done--a complete financial history--and what Stevenson and Sparkman should do--considering the allegations.

package for us. We went down to get it. You know what it was.

It was a little cocker spaniel dog in a crate that he sent all the way from Texas. Black and white spotted. And our little girl—Trisha, the 6-year-old—named it Checkers. And you know, the kids love the dog and I just want say this right now, that regardless of what they say about it, we're gonna keep it.

It isn't easy to come before a nation-wide audience and air your life as I've done. But I want to say some things before I conclude that I think most of you will agree on. Mr. Mitchell, the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, made the statement that if a man couldn't afford to be in the United States Senate he shouldn't run for the Senate.

And I just want to make my position clear. I don't agree with Mr. Mitchell when he says that only a rich man should serve his Government in the United States Senate or in the Congress.

I don't believe that represents the thinking of the Democratic party, and I know that it doesn't represent the thinking of the Republican Party.

I believe that it's fine that a man like Governor Stevenson who inherited a fortune from his father can run for President. But I also feel that it's essential in this country of ours that a man of modest means can also run for President. Because, you know, remember Abraham Lincoln, you remember what he said: 'God must have loved the common people—he made so many of them.'

Courses of Conduct

And now I'm going to suggest some courses of conduct.

First of all, you have read in the papers about other funds now. Mr. Stevenson, apparently, had a couple. One of them in which a group of business people paid and helped to supplement the salaries of state employees. Here is where the money went directly into their pockets.

And I think that what Mr. Stevenson should do should be to come before the American people as I have, give the names of the people that have contributed to that fund; give the names of the people who put this money into their pockets at the same time that they were receiving money from their state government, and see what favors, if any, they gave out for that.

I don't condemn Mr. Stevenson for what he did. But until the facts are in there there is a doubt that will be raised.

And as far as Mr. Sparkman is concerned, I would suggest the same thing. He's had his wife on the payroll. I don't condemn him for that. But I think that he should come before the American people and indicate what outside sources of income he has had.

I would suggest that under the circumstances both Mr. Sparkman and Mr. Stevenson should come before the American people as I have and make a complete financial statement as to their financial history. And if they don't it will be an admission that they have something to hide. And I think that you will agree with me.

Because, folks, remember, a man that's to be President of the United States, a man that's to be Vice President of the United States must have the confidence of all the people. And that's why I'm doing what I'm doing, and that's why I suggest that Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Sparkman since they are under attack should do what I am doing.

Now, let me say this: I know that this is not the last of the smears. In spite of my explanation tonight other smears

20. A bolstering strategy is illustrated as Nixon reinforces his role in the Alger Hiss case.
21. A transcendental strategy is implied as Nixon joins those columnists and commentators who attacked him then, with those who attack him now.
22. Nixon uses a bolstering strategy as he identifies his fighting spirit and love for this troubled country with the only man who can save America, his running mate, Eisenhower.
23. A differentiation is made between the Presidential actions that Eisenhower would take and those which Stevenson would pursue.
24. There is a differentiation, in particular, of Eisenhower's and Stevenson's stand on Communism.

will be made; others have been made in the past. And the purpose of the smears, I know, is this—to silence me, to make me let up.

Well, they just don't know who they're dealing with. I'm going to tell you this: I remember in the dark days of the Hiss case some of the same columnists, some of the same radio commentators who are attacking me now and misrepresenting my position were violently opposing me at the time I was after Alger Hiss.

To Continue Fight

But I continued the fight because I knew I was right. And I can say to this great television and radio audience that I have no apologies to the American people for my part in putting Alger Hiss where he is today.

And as far as this is concerned, I intend to continue the fight.

Why do I feel so deeply? Why do I feel that in spite of the smears, the misunderstandings, the necessities for a man to come up here and bare his soul as I have? Why is it necessary for me to continue this fight?

And I want to tell you why. Because, you see, I love my country. And I think my country is in danger. And I think that the only man that can save America at this time is the man that's running for President on my ticket—Dwight Eisenhower.

You say, "Why do I think it's in danger?" and I say look at the record. Seven years of the Truman-Acheson Administration and what's happened? Six hundred million people lost to the Communists, and a war in Korea in which we have lost 117,000 American casualties.

And I say to all of you that a policy that results in a loss of 600,000,000 to the Communists and a war which costs us 117,000 American casualties isn't good enough for America.

And I say that those in the State Department that made the mistakes which caused that war and which resulted in those losses should be kicked out of the State Department just as fast as we can get 'em out of there.

And let me say that I know Mr. Stevenson won't do that. Because he defends the Truman policy and I know that Dwight Eisenhower will do that, and that he will give America the leadership that it needs.

Take the problem of corruption. You've read about the mess in Washington. Mr. Stevenson can't clean it up because he was picked by the man, Truman, under whose Administration the mess was made. You wouldn't trust a man who made the mess to clean it up—that's Truman. And by the same token you can't trust the man who was picked by the man that made the mess to clean it up—and that's Stevenson.

And so I say, Eisenhower, who owes nothing to Truman, nothing to the big city bosses, he is the man that can clean up the mess in Washington.

Take Communism. I say that as far as that subject is concerned, the danger is great to America. In the Hiss case they got the secrets which enabled them to break the American secret State Department code. They got secrets in the atomic bomb case which enabled 'em to get the secret of the atomic bomb, five years before they would have gotten it by their own devices.

And I say that any man who called the Alger Hiss case a "red herring" isn't fit to be President of the United States. I say that a man who like Mr. Stevenson has pooh-poohed and ridiculed the Communist threat in the United States—he said that they are phantoms among ourselves; he's accused

us that have attempted to expose the Communists of looking for Communists in the Bureau of Fisheries and Wildlife—I say that a man who says that isn't qualified to be President of the United States.

And I say that the only man who can lead us in this fight to rid the Government of both those who are Communists and those who have corrupted this Government is Eisenhower, because Eisenhower, you can be sure, recognizes the problem and he knows how to deal with it.

Now let me say that, finally, this evening I want to read to you just briefly excerpts from a letter which I received, a letter which, after all this is over, no one can take away from me. It reads as follows:

"Dear Senator Nixon,

"Since I'm only 19 years of age I can't vote in this Presidential election but believe me if I could you and General Eisenhower would certainly get my vote. My husband is in the Fleet Marines in Korea. He's a corpsman on the front lines and we have a two-month-old son he's never seen. And I feel confident that with great Americans like you and General Eisenhower in the White House, lonely Americans like myself will be united with their loved ones now in Korea.

"I only pray to God that you won't be too late. Enclosed is a small check to help you in your campaign. Living on $85 a month it is all I can afford at present. But let me know what else I can do."

Folks, it's a check for $10, and it's one that I will never cash.

And just let me say this. We hear a lot about prosperity these days but I say, why can't we have prosperity built on peace rather than prosperity built on war? Why can't we have prosperity and an honest government in Washington, D. C., at the same time. Believe me, we can. And Eisenhower is the man that can lead this crusade to bring us that kind of prosperity.

25. A transcendental strategy is used to equate the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket with peaceful prosperity and honest government.

26. There is an implied differentiation between the Democrat's prosperity of war and Nixon's pledge of peaceful prosperity.

And, now, finally, I know that you wonder whether or not I am going to stay on the Republican ticket or resign.

Let me say this: I don't believe that I ought to quit because I'm not a quitter. And, incidentally, Pat's not a quitter. After all, her name was Patricia Ryan and she was born on St. Patrick's Day, and you know the Irish never quit.

27. A bolstering strategy is apparent as Nixon identifies himself and his wife with people who refuse to quit, in particular, the Irish.

But the decision, my friends, is not mine. I would do nothing that would harm the possibilities of Dwight Eisenhower to become President of the United States. And for that reason I am submitting to the Republican National Committee tonight through this television broadcast the decision which it is theirs to make.

Let them decide whether my position on the ticket will help or hurt. And I am going to ask you to help them decide. Wire and write the Republican National Committee whether you think I should stay on or whether I should get off. And whatever their decision is, I will abide by it.

But just let me say this last word. Regardless of what happens I'm going to continue this fight. I'm going to campaign up and down America until we drive the crooks and the Communists and those that defend them out of Washington. And remember, folks, Eisenhower is a great man. Believe me. He's a great man. And a vote for Eisenhower is a vote for what's good for America.

28. A transcendental strategy is evident as Nixon equates a vote for Eisenhower with a vote for what's good for America.

APPENDIX C

A VIETNAM PLAN: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

A VIETNAM PLAN: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS*

Analysis

1. A familiar Nixon strategy is demonstrated here as he differentiates between the easy course of action and what he believes to be his greater obligation

2. A transcendental strategy is apparent as Nixon relates U.S. involvement in Vietnam to the future of peace and freedom for the world.

3. A differentiation is made between the importance of being re-elected and Nixon's greater obligation to the future of the world.

4. Nixon differentiates that the essential question is not who is for peace or who is to blame, but how can peace be won.

Speech

GOOD EVENING, my fellow Americans. Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

How has this Administration changed the policy of the previous Administration?

What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and the battlefront in Vietnam?

What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

What are the prospects for peace?

Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on Jan. 20th: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. Five hundred forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.

The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.

In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office.

I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him—and come out as the peacemaker.

Some put it to me quite bluntly: this was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war.

But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.

Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war. The great question is: How can we win America's peace?

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*Richard M. Nixon, "A Vietnam Plan," Vital Speeches of the Day, 36 (November 15, 1969), 66-70.

Analysis

Speech

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover.

5. Bolstering is evident as Nixon identifies himself with those who have been critical of the way the war was conducted--particularly by the Johnson Administration.

Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

6. A transcendental strategy is illustrated as Nixon relates withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam to a disaster for the cause of peace.

But the question facing us today is—now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.

We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.

7. An additional transcendental device is apparent as Nixon relates a U.S. defeat in Vietnam to a collapse of confidence in American leadership throughout the world.

With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.

For the United States this first defeat in our nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world.

8. A bolstering strategy is demonstrated as Nixon identifies his conclusions on the Vietnam situation with those reached by previous Presidents.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said we want to see a stable Government there, carrying on the struggle to maintain its national independence.

We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So we're going to stay there.

9. A transcendental strategy is used as Nixon relates U.S. defeat in Vietnam with betraying one's friends, promoting reckless conquests, sparking violence, and ultimately more deaths from more war.

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office. For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude.

A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war.

Analysis

10. A differentiation is made between points which are negotiable and those which are not--the freedom of the South Vietnamese.
11. There is also a differentiation between the cooperativeness of the U.S. and the uncooperativeness of North Vietnam.
12. Nixon differentiates between public and private forums as a means of negotiating peace.

Speech

For these reasons I rejected the recommendation I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war on many fronts. I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.

In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail. We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed to cease fire under international supervision. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force.

And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the election.

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we're willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.

At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum.

That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.

I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement.

Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kiesinger; Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started.

In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.

None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks.

I spoke directly in this office, where I'm now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.

I did this outside the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end.

Analysis

Speech

"Dear Mr. President:

"I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace.

"I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war.

"You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam.

"Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their face towards peace rather than toward conflict and war."

I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on Aug. 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press.

In addition to the public meetings that I've referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions.

And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.

13. There is a differentiation of the question regarding who is at fault for the failure of negotiations.

But the effect of all the public, private and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on Jan. 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.

Well, now, who's at fault? It's become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace.

And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate—to negotiate seriously.

I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth—the bad news as well as the good news—where the lives of our young men are involved.

Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

14. A transcendental strategy is used as Nixon explains that his plan for peace--the Nixon Doctrine--will both end this war and prevent future Vietnams.

It is in line with the major shift in U. S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25.

Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine—a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people—we're an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the armament and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Analysis

Speech

Before any American troops were commited to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen.

He said: "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, United States policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them."

Well in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles of guidelines for future American policy toward Asia.

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsbiiity of providing the manpower for its defense.

15. A transcendental strategy is evident as Nixon relates his military policy with the defense of freedom.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business—not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous Administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

16. Nixon differentiates between the approach that was taken toward the Vietnam War by the Johnson Administration and his administration.

The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams's orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies.

Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 per cent.

And now we have begun to see the results of this long-overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.

17. As Nixon recites the improved statistics concerning the fighting in Vietnam, there is an implied differentiation between his administration and the previous one.

After five years of Americans going into Vietnam we are finally bringing American men home. By Dec. 15 over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, including 20 per cent of all of our combat forces.

The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result, they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

Two other significant developments have occurred since this Administration took office. Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack over the last three months, is less than 20 per cent of what it was over the same period last year.

And, most important, United States casualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three years.

Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all United States combat ground forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable.

This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

Analysis

Speech

I have not, and do not, intend to announce the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision which I'm sure you will understand. As I've indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts. One of these is the progress which can be, or might be, made in the Paris talks.

An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces.

And I'm glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal.

As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June.

Now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time, rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly. However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.

At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam, they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam.

I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.

If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage.

18. A differentiating strategy is apparent as Nixon assesses his warning to Hanoi as a legitimate statement of policy and not a threat.

If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy which as commander in chief of our armed forces I am making and meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really have only two choices open to us if we want to end this war.

I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.

Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement, if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization, if necessary. A plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

19. Nixon differentiates his Vietnamization plan as not the easy way, but the right way.

I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace, not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and the world.

20. A transcendental strategy is demonstrated as Nixon views his plan as providing peace for the entire world.

Analysis	Speech
21. In projecting the consequences of an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops, Nixon's strategy is that of transcendence.	In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America. Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.
22. Another transcendental strategy is illustrated as Nixon relates the Vietnam situation with other crises that Americans have confronted.	We have faced other crises in our history and we have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what has to be done when we knew our course was right.
23. There is a differentiation between Nixon and other Americans who have reached different conclusions on the Vietnam situation.	I recognize that some of my fellow Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved. Honest and patriotic citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen.
	In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading, "Lost in Vietnam, bring the boys home."
	Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view.
	But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.
24. A transcendental strategy is used as Nixon equates the cause of the "vocal minority" with opposing the historical principles of our nation.	For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation has been under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all the people.
	If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society.
25. The reasons for peace are differentiated.	And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned about this war.
26. Nixon bolsters his image as he identifies his administration with fewer war casualties.	I respect your idealism. I share your concern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam.
	It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.
27. A transcendental strategy is employed as Nixon seeks to avoid future Vietnams.	I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam. I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam some place in the world.
28. As Nixon discusses his quest for peace, he differentiates the efforts of the youth.	And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.
29. There is an apparent transcendental strategy as Nixon implies that whether or not his Vietnam plan for peace succeeds, what the critics say is irrelevant.	I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed. If it does not succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. Or if it does succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won't matter.
	I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days, but I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion.
30. Another transcendental strategy is evident as Nixon contends that U.S. is still the hope of the free world.	Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world.
	Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free-world leadership.

Analysis	Speech
	Let historians not record that, when America was the most powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.
31. There is an interesting use of differentiation here as Nixon implies a contrast between the great silent majority and the vocal minority.	So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace.
	I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed. For the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate in Paris.
32. The notion of possible defeat is differentiated.	Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand—North Vietnam cannot defeat or humilitate the United States. Only Americans can do that.
33. There is an attempt at bolstering as Nixon equates his goal of peace with the goal of Woodrow Wilson as well as other American Presidents.	Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: "This is the war to end wars." His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard reality of great power politics. And Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.
	Tonight, I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars, but I do say this:
	I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated—the goal of a just and lasting peace.
34. A bolstering strategy is also used as Nixon alludes to his Presidential responsibility and thus identifies himself with his powerful office.	As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path for that goal and then leading the nation along it.
	I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command, in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.
	Thank you.

APPENDIX D

CAMBODIA: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

CAMBODIA: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS*

Analysis

Speech

GOOD EVENING my fellow Americans. Ten days ago in my report to the nation on Vietnam I announced a decision to withdraw an additional 150,000 Americans from Vietnam over the next year. I said then that I was making that decision despite our concern over increased enemy activity in Laos, in Cambodia and in South Vietnam.

And at that time I warned that if I concluded that increased enemy activity in any of these areas endangered the lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam, I would not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

Despite that warning, North Vietnam has increased its military aggression in all these areas, and particularly in Cambodia.

After full consultation with the National Security Council, Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams and my other advisors, I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last 10 days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam now and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be there after withdrawal of another 150,000.

To protect our men who are in Vietnam, and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization program, I have concluded that the time has come for action.

Tonight, I shall describe the actions of the enemy, the actions I have ordered to deal with that situation, and the reasons for my decision.

Cambodia—a small country of seven million people—has been a neutral nation since the Geneva Agreement of 1954, an agreement, incidentally, which was signed by the government of North Vietnam.

1. America's respect for the neutrality of Cambodia is differentiated from North Vietnam's lack of respect.

American policy since then has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people. We have maintained a skeleton diplomatic mission of fewer than 15 in Cambodia's capital, and that only since last August.

For the previous four years, from 1965 to 1969 we did not have any diplomatic mission whatever in Cambodia, and for the past five years we have provided no military assistance whatever and no economic assistance to Cambodia.

North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutrality. For the past five years, as indicated on this map, as you see here, North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam. Some of these extend up to 20 miles into Cambodia.

The sanctuaries are in red, and as you note they are on both sides of the border.

They are used for hit-and-run attacks on American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. These Communist-occupied territories contain major base camps, training sites, logistics facilities, weapons and ammunition factories, airstrips and prisoner of war compounds.

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*Richard M. Nixon, "Cambodia," Vital Speeches of the Day, 36 (May 15, 1970), 450-52.

Analysis

Speech

And for five years neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation.

Even after the Vietnamese Communists began to expand these sanctuaries four weeks ago, we counseled patience to our South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our own commanders.

In contrast to our policy the enemy in the past two weeks has stepped up his guerrilla actions and he is concentrating his main force in these sanctuaries that you see in this map, where they are building up the large massive attacks on our forces and those of South Vietnam.

North Vietnam in the last two weeks has stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty or the neutrality of Cambodia. Thousands of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries. They are encircling the capital of Pnompenh. Coming from these sanctuaries as you see here, they had moved into Cambodia and are encircling the capital.

Cambodia, as a result of this, has sent out a call to the United States, to a number of other nations, for assistance. Because if this enemy effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on South Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier: a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat without fear of retaliation.

2. The available options are differentiated: (1) do nothing, (2) provide only massive military assistance, or (3) provide both military assistance and American soldiers.

North Vietnamese men and supplies could then be poured into that country, jeopardizing not only the lives of our men but the people of South Vietnam as well.

Now confronted with this situation we had three options:

First, we can do nothing. Now, the ultimate result of that course of action is clear. Unless we indulge in wishful thinking, the lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam after our next withdrawal of 150,000 would be gravely threatened.

Let us go to the map again.

Here is South Vietnam. Here is North Vietnam. North Vietnam already occupies this part of Laos. If North Vietnam also occupied this whole band in Cambodia or the entire country, it would mean that South Vietnam was completely outflanked and the forces of Americans in this area as well as the South Vietnamese would be in an untenable military position.

Our second choice is to provide massive military assistance to Cambodia itself and, unfortunately, while we deeply sympathize with the plight of seven million Cambodians whose country has been invaded, massive amounts of military assistance could not be rapidly and effectively utilized by this small Cambodian Army against the immediate trap.

With other nations we shall do our best to provide the small arms and other equipment which the Cambodian Army of 40,000 needs and can use for its defense.

But the aid we will provide will be limited for the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality and not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the other.

Our third choice is to go to the heart of the trouble.

And that means cleaning out major North Vietnamese- and Vietcong-occupied territories, these sanctuaries which serve as bases for attacks on both Cambodia and American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.

Some of these, incidentally are as close to Saigon as Baltimore is to Washington. This one, for example, is called the Parrots' Beak—it's only 33 miles from Saigon.

Now faced with these three options, this is the decision I have made. In co-operation with the armed forces of South Vietnam, attacks are being launched this week to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border. A major responsibility for the ground operation is being assumed by South Vietnamese forces.

Analysis	Speech
	For example, the attacks in several areas, including the parrot's beak, that I referred to a moment ago, are exclusively South Vietnamese ground operations, under South Vietnamese command, with the United States providing air and logistical support.
	There is one area however, immediately above the parrot's beak where I have concluded that a combined American and South Vietnamese operation is necessary.
	And now, let me give you the reasons for my decision.
	A majority of the American people, a majority of you listening to me are for the withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam. The action I have taken tonight is indispensable for the continuing success of that withdrawal program.
	A majority of the American people want to end this war rather than to have it drag on interminably.
	The action I have taken tonight will serve that purpose.
	A majority of the American people want to keep the casualties of our brave men in Vietnam at an absolute minimum.
	Tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong for five years in blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality.
3. Nixon differentiates his military decision as not being an invasion of Cambodia.	This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces.
	Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw.
4. The purpose of Nixon's decision is differentiated; not to expand the war into Cambodia but to end the war in Vietnam.	These actions are in no way directed to security interests of any nation. Any government that chooses to use these actions as a pretext for harming relations with the United States will be doing so on its own responsibility and on its own initiative and we will draw the appropriate conclusions.
	The action I take tonight is essential if we are to accomplish that goal.
5. Also inherent in this statement is a transcendental strategy as Nixon relates his decision to winning a just peace.	We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam, and winning the just peace we all desire.
	We have made and will continue to make every possible effort to end this war through negotiation at the conference table rather than through more fighting in the battlefield.
	Let's look again at the record.
6. Bolstering is evident as Nixon identifies his administration with slowing down the war.	We stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have cut air operations by over 20 per cent. We've announced the withdrawal of over 250,000 of our men. We've offered to withdraw all of our men if they will withdraw theirs. We've offered to negotiate all issues with only one condition: and that is that the future of South Vietnam be determined, not by North Vietnam, and not by the United States, but by the people of South Vietnam themselves.
7. Negotiable and non-negotiable issues are differentiated.	
8. The answer of the North Vietnamese is differentiated.	
	The answer of the enemy has been intransigeance at the conference table, belligerence at Hanoi, massive military aggression in Laos and Cambodia and stepped-up attacks in South Vietnam designed to increase American casualties.
	This attitude has become intolerable.
	We will not react to this threat to American lives merely by plaintive diplomatic protests.
	If we did, credibility of the United States would be destroyed in every area of the world where only the power of the United States deters aggression.
9. There is an apparent transcendental strategy as Nixon relates a lack of U.S. military response to our loss of credibility throughout the world.	
10. Another transcendental strategy is used as Nixon relates North Vietnam's escalation of the war to action necessary to defend U.S. men.	Tonight, I again warn the North Vietnamese that if they continue to escalate the fighting when the United States is withdrawing its forces, I shall meet my responsibility as commander and chief of our armed forces to take the action I consider necessary to defend the security of our American men.
11. Nixon bolsters his image as "commander and chief"	

Analysis	Speech
12. It is differentiated that the U.S. will be patient and conciliatory but not humiliated or defeated as it works for peace.	The action I have announced tonight puts the leaders of North Vietnam on notice that we will be patient in working for peace. We will be conciliatory at the conference table, but we will not be humiliated. We will not be defeated. We will not allow American men by the thousands to be killed by an enemy from privileged sanctuary. The time came long ago to end this war through peaceful negotiations. We stand ready for those negotiations. We've made major efforts many of which must remain secret. I say tonight all the offers and approaches made previously remain on the conference table whenever Hanoi is ready to negotiate seriously.
13. A transcendental strategy is illustrated as Nixon labels the times: "an age of anarchy."	But if the enemy response to our most conciliatory offers for peaceful negotiation continues to be to increase its attacks and humiliate and defeat us, we shall react accordingly. My fellow Americans, we live in an age of anarchy, both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all the great institutions which have been created by free civilizations in the last 500 years. Even here in the United States, great universities are being systematically destroyed.
14. A transcendental device is also employed as Nixon equates a lack of U.S. action with a threat to free nations throughout the world.	Small nations all over the world find themselves under attack from within and from without. If when the chips are down the world's most powerful nation—the United States of America—acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.
15. A differentiation strategy is used as Nixon distinguishes that which is being tested.	It is not our power but our will and character that is being tested tonight. The question all Americans must ask and answer tonight is this: Does the richest and strongest nation in the history of the world have the character to meet a direct challenge by a group which rejects every effort to win a just peace, ignores our warning, tramples on solemn agreements, violates the neutrality of an unarmed people and uses our prisoners as hostages?
16. There is a transcendental strategy as Nixon equates U.S. failure to meet this challenge with a widespread loss of respect.	If we fail to meet this challenge all other nations will be on notice that despite its overwhelming power the United States when a real crisis comes will be found wanting.
17. Bolstering is used as Nixon identifies himself as a President who keeps his promises.	During my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to bring Americans home from Vietnam. They are coming home. I promised to end this war. I shall keep that promise. I promised to win a just peace. I shall keep that promise.
18. Nixon again bolsters his image as he identifies his decision with other great decisions made by former Presidents.	We shall avoid a wider war, but we are also determined to put an end to this war. In this room, Woodrow Wilson made the great decision which led to victory in World War I. Franklin Roosevelt made the decisions which led to our victory in World War II. Dwight D. Eisenhower made decisions which ended the war in Korea and avoided war in the Middle East. John F. Kennedy in his finest hour made the great decision which removed Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba and the western hemisphere.
19. However, Nixon differentiates the magnitude of their decisions from his decision.	I have noted that there's been a great deal of discussion with regard to this decision I have made. And I should point out that I do not contend that it is in the same magnitude as these decisions that I have just mentioned.
20. There is an additional differentiation of the fundamental difference between his decision and their decisions.	But between those decisions and this decision, there is a difference that is very fundamental. In those decisions the American people were not assailed by counsels of doubt and defeat from some of the most widely known opinion leaders of the nation. I have noted, for example, that a Republican Senator has said that this action I have taken means that my party has lost all chance of winning the November elections, and others are saying today that this move against enemy sanctuaries will make me a one-term President.

Analysis	Speech
21. The easy political path is differentiated from the right one.	No one is more aware than I am of the political consequences of the action I've taken. It is tempting to take the easy political path, to blame this war on previous Administrations, and to bring all of our men home immediately—regardless of the consequences, even though that would mean defeat for the United States; to desert 18 million South Vietnamese people who have put their trust in us; to expose them to the same slaughter and savagery which the leaders of North Vietnam inflicted on hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese who chose freedom when the Communists took over North Vietnam in 1954. To get peace at any price now, even though I know that a peace of humiliation for the United States would lead to a bigger war or surrender later. I have rejected all political considerations in making this decision. Whether my party gains in November is nothing compared to the lives of 400,000 brave Americans fighting for our country and for the cause of peace and freedom in Vietnam. Whether I may be a one-term President is insignificant compared to whether by our failure to act in this crisis the United States proves itself to be unworthy to lead the forces of freedom in this critical period in world history. I would rather be a one-term President and do what I believe was right than to be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second-rate power and to see this nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history.
22. A transcendental strategy is illustrated as Nixon states that the ramifications of his decision go beyond any differences of opinion that may exist about U.S involvement in the Vietnam War.	I realize in this war there are honest, deep differences in this country about whether we should have become involved, that there are differences to how the war should have been conducted. But the decision I announce tonight transcends those differences, for the lives of American men are involved. The opportunity for a 150,000 Americans to come home in the next 12 months is involved. The future of 18-million people in South Vietnam and 7-million people in Cambodia is involved, the possibility of winning a just peace in Vietnam and in the Pacific is at stake.
23. Nixon differentiates between the customary way to conclude a speech from the White House and his concluding statement.	It is customary to conclude a speech from the White House by asking support for the President of the United States. Tonight, I depart from that precedent. What I ask is far more important. I ask for your support for our brave men fighting tonight halfway around the world, not for territory, not for glory but so that their younger brothers and their sons and your sons can have a chance to grow up in a world of peace and freedom, and justice. Thank you, and good night.
24. Also implicit in this final paragraph is a transcendental strategy as Nixon relates the efforts of the American soldier in Vietnam to the future of peace and freedom for the world.	

APPENDIX E

THE WATERGATE AFFAIR: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

THE WATERGATE AFFAIR: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS*

Analysis

Speech

GOOD EVENING. I want to talk to you tonight from my heart on a subject of deep concern to every American. In recent months members of my Administration and officials of the Committee for the Re-election of the President — including some of my closest friends and most trusted aides — have been charged with involvement in what has come to be known as the Watergate affair.

These include charges of illegal activity during and preceding the 1972 Presidential election and charges that responsible officials participated in efforts to cover up that illegal activity.

The inevitable result of these charges has been to raise serious questions about the integrity of the White House itself. Tonight I wish to address those questions.

Last June 17 while I was in Florida trying to get a few days' rest after my visit to Moscow, I first learned from news reports of the Watergate break-in. I was appalled at this senseless, illegal action, and I was shocked to learn that employes of the re-election committee were apparently among those guilty. I immediately ordered an investigation by appropriate Government authorities.

On Sept. 15, as you will recall, indictments were brought against seven defendants in the case.

As the investigation went forward, I repeatedly asked those conducting the investigation whether there was any reason to believe that members of my Administration were in any way involved. I received repeated assurances that there were not. Because of these continuing reassurances, because I believed the reports I was getting, because I had faith in the persons from whom I was getting them, I discounted the stories in the press that appeared to implicate members of my Administration or other officials of the campaign committee.

1. The initial reports Nixon received about the Watergate scandal are differentiated from those he received later.

Until March of this year, I remained convinced that the denials were true and that the charges of involvement by members of the White House staff were false.

The comments I made during this period, the comments made by my press secretary in my behalf, were based on the information provided to us at the time we made those comments.

However, new information then came to me which persuaded me that there was a real possibility that some of these charges were true and suggesting further that there had been an effort to conceal the facts both from the public — from you — and from me.

As a result, on March 21 I personally assumed the responsibility for coordinating intensive new inquiries into the matter and I personally ordered those conducting the investigations to get all the facts and to report them directly to me right here in this office.

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*Richard M. Nixon, "The Watergate Affair," Vital Speeches of the Day, 39 (May 15, 1973), 450-52.

Analysis	Speech
	I again ordered that all persons in the Government or at the re-election committee should cooperate fully with the F.B.I., the prosecutors and the grand jury.
	I also ordered that anyone who refused to cooperate in telling the truth would be asked to resign from Government service.
	And with ground rules adopted that would preserve the basic constitutional separation of powers between the Congress and the Presidency, I directed that members of the White House staff should appear and testify voluntarily under oath before the Senate committee which was investigating Watergate.
	I was determined that we should get to the bottom of the matter, and that the truth should be fully brought out no matter who was involved.
2. There is an apparent transcendental strategy as Nixon suggests that the situation at hand goes beyond personal considerations.	At the same time, I was determined not to take precipitive action and to avoid if at all possible any action that would appear to reflect on innocent people.
	I wanted to be fair, but I knew that in the final analysis the integrity of this office — public faith in the integrity of this office — would have to take priority over all personal considerations. Today, in one of the most difficult decisions of my Presidency, I accepted the resignations of two of my closest associates in the White House, Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, two of the finest public servants it has been my privilege to know. I want to stress that in accepting these resignations I mean to leave no implication whatever of personal wrongdoing on their part, and I leave no implication tonight of implication on the part of others who have been charged in this matter. But in matters as sensitive as guarding the integrity of our democratic process, it is essential not only that rigorous legal and ethical standards be observed, but also that the public, you, have total confidence that they are both being observed and enforced by those in authority, and particularly by the President of the United States. They agreed with me that this move was necessary in order to restore that confidence, because Attorney General Kleindienst, though a distinguished public servant, my personal friend for 20 years, with no personal involvement whatever in this matter, has been a close personal and professional associate of some of those who are involved in this case, he and I both felt that it was also necessary to name a new Attorney General.
3. A differentiation strategy is evident as Nixon accepts the resignations of Haldeman and Ehrlichman while still attempting to separate them from actual wrongdoing.	
4. The same differentiation strategy is used in accepting Kleindienst's resignation.	The counsel to the President, John Dean, has also resigned.
	As the new Attorney General, I have today named Elliott Richardson, a man of unimpeachable integrity and rigorously high principle. I have directed him to do everything necessary to insure that the Department of Justice has the confidence and the trust of every law-abiding person in this country. I have given him absolute authority to make all decisions bearing upon the prosecution of the Watergate case and related matters. I have instructed him that if he should consider it appropriate he has the authority to name a special supervising prosecutor for matters arising out of the case.
5. Bolstering is employed as Nixon identifies himself with the office of the Presidency.	Whatever may appear to have been the case before, whatever improper activities may yet be discovered in connection with this whole sordid affair, I want the American people, I want you, to know beyond the shadow of a doubt that during my term as President justice will be pursued fairly, fully and impartially, no matter who is involved.
	This office is a sacred trust, and I am determined to be worthy of that trust!

Analysis	Speech
6. The 1972 campaign is differentiated from Nixon's past campaigns. 7. Also inherent in this passage is a bolstering attempt as Nixon clearly identifies himself with the office he holds.	Looking back at the history of this case, two questions arise: How could it have happened — who is to blame? Political commentators have correctly observed that during my 27 years in politics, I've always previously insisted on running my own campaigns for office. In both domestic and foreign policy, 1972 was a year of crucially important decisions, of intense negotiations, of vital new directions, particularly in working toward the goal which has been my overriding concern throughout my political career — the goal of bringing peace to America, peace to the world. And that is why I decided as the 1972 campaign approached that the Presidency should come first and politics second. To the maximum extent possible, therefore, I sought to delegate campaign operations, to remove the day-to-day campaign decisions from the President's office and from the White House. I also, as you recall, severely limited the number of my own campaign appearances.
8. In terms of blame-placing for Watergate, Nixon differentiates the easy and cowardly thing to do from the right thing to do.	Who then is to blame for what happened in this case? For specific criminal actions by specific individuals those who committed those actions must of course bear the liability and pay the penalty. For the fact that alleged improper actions took place within the White House or within my campaign organization, the easiest course would be for me to blame those to whom I delegated the responsibility to run the campaign. But that would be a cowardly thing to do. I will not place the blame on subordinates, on people whose zeal exceeded their judgment and who may have done wrong in a cause they deeply believed to be right. In any organization the man at the top must bear the responsibility. That responsibility, therefore, belongs here in this office. I accept it.
9. A transcendental strategy is used as Nixon seeks to insure clean politics even after his term of office. 10. There is a differentiation of the ramifications of Watergate as demonstrating good rather than bad things about the American system. 11. Possible reactions to Watergate are differentiated. 12. Nixon demonstrates a transcendental strategy as he attempts to go beyond Watergate to his more important duties.	And I pledge to you tonight from this office that I will do everything in my power to insure that the guilty are brought to justice and that such abuses are purged from our political processes in the years to come long after I have left this office. Some people, quite properly appalled at the abuses that occurred, will say that Watergate demonstrates the bankruptcy of the American political system. I believe precisely the opposite is true. Watergate represented a series of illegal acts and bad judgments by a number of individuals. It was the system that has brought the facts to light and that will bring those guilty to justice. A system that in this case has included a determined grand jury, honest prosecutors, a courageous judge — John Sirica, and a vigorous free press. It is essential that we place our faith in that system, and especially in the Judicial System. It is essential that we let the judicial process go forward, respecting those safeguards that are established to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty. It is essential that in reacting to the excesses of others, we not fall into excesses ourselves. It is also essential that we not be so distracted by events such as this that we neglect the vital work before us, before this nation, before America at a time of critical importance to America and the world.
13. Once again Nixon attempts to bolster his image as he identifies himself with his office.	Since March, when I first learned that the Watergate affair might in fact be far more serious than I had been led to believe, it has claimed far too much of my time and my attention. Whatever may now transpire in the case, whatever the actions of the grand jury, whatever the outcome of any eventual trials, I must now turn my full intention — and I shall do so — once again to the larger duties of this office. I owe it to this great office that I hold, and I owe it to you, to my country.

I know that, as Attorney General, Elliot Richardson will be both fair and he will be fearless in pursuing this case wherever it leads. I am confident that with him in charge justice will be done.

14. A transcendental strategy is illustrated as Nixon attempts to go beyond Watergate to his more pressing duties.

There is vital work to be done toward our goal of a lasting structure of peace in the world — work that cannot wait, work that I must do.

Tomorrow, for example, Chancellor Brandt of West Germany will visit the White House for talks that are a vital element of the Year of Europe, as 1973 has been called.

We are already preparing for the next Soviet-American summit meeting later this year.

This is also a year in which we are seeking to negotiate a mutual and balanced reduction of armed forces in Europe which will reduce our defense budget and allow us to have funds for other purposes at home so desperately needed.

It is the year when the United States and Soviet negotiators will seek to work out the second and even more important round of our talks on limiting nuclear arms, and of reducing the danger of a nuclear war that would destroy civilization as we know it.

It is a year in which we confront the difficult tasks of maintaining peace in Southeast Asia and in the potentially explosive Middle East.

There's also vital work to be done right here in America to insure prosperity — and that means a good job for everyone who wants to work; to control inflation that I know worries every housewife, everyone who tries to balance the family budget in America. To set in motion new and better ways of insuring progress toward a better life for all Americans.

15. Bolstering is quite apparent as Nixon frequently identifies himself with his office.

When I think of this office, of what it means, I think of all the things that I want to accomplish for this nation, of all the things I want to accomplish for you.

On Christmas Eve, during my terrible personal ordeal of the renewed bombing of North Vietnam which, after 12 years of war, finally helped to bring America peace with honor, I sat down just before midnight. I wrote out some of my goals for my second term as President. Let me read them to you.

To make this country be more than ever a land of opportunity — of equal opportunity, full opportunity — for every American; to provide jobs for all who can work and generous help for those who cannot; to establish a climate of decency and civility in which each person respects the feelings and the dignity in the God-given rights of his neighbor; to make this a land in which each person can dare to dream, can live his dreams not in fear but in hope, proud of his community, proud of his country, proud of what America has meant to himself, and to the world.

These are great goals. I believe we can, we must work for them, we can achieve them.

16. America's important goals are differentiated.

But we cannot achieve these goals unless we dedicate ourselves to another goal. We must maintain the integrity of the White House.

And that integrity must be real, not transparent.

There can be no whitewash at the White House.

17. Differentiation is employed as Nixon delineates the needed reform in our political process.

We must reform our political process, ridding it not only of the violations of the law but also of the ugly mob violence and other inexcusable campaign tactics that have been too often practiced and too readily accepted in the past including those that may have been a response by one-sided to the excesses or expected excesses of the other side.

Two wrongs do not make a right.

I've been in public life for more than a quarter of a century. Like any other calling, politics has good people and bad people and let me tell you the great majority in politics, in the Congress, in the Federal Government, in the state government are good people.

Analysis	Speech
18. A transcendental effort is evident as Nixon charges that both parties have been guilty of campaign abuses.	I know that it can be very easy under the intensive pressures of a campaign for even well-intentioned people to fall into shady tactics, to rationalize this on the grounds that what is at stake is of such importance to the nation that the end justifies the means. And both of our great parties have been guilty of such tactics. In recent years, however, the campaign excesses that have occurred on all sides have provided a sobering demonstration of how far this false doctrine can take us.
19. Nixon uses a transcendental strategy as he attempts to make his goal, the goal of America.	The lesson is clear. America in its political campaigns must not again fall into the trap of letting the end, however great that end is, justify the means. I urge the leaders of both political parties, I urge citizens — all of you everywhere — to join in working toward a new set of standards, new rules and procedures to insure that future elections will be as nearly free of such abuses as they possibly can be made. This is my goal. I ask you to join in making it America's goal.
20. Bolstering is demonstrated as Nixon again identifies himself with his office.	When I was inaugurated for a second term this past January 20, I gave each member of my Cabinet and each member of my senior White House staff a special four-year calendar with each day marked to show the number of days remaining to the Administration. In the inscription on each calendar I wrote these words: "The Presidential term which begins today consists of 1,461 days, no more, no less. Each can be a day of strengthening and renewal for America. Each can add depth and dimension to the American experience. "If we strive together, if we make the most of the challenge and the opportunity that these days offer us, they can stand out as great days for America and great moments in the history of the world." I looked at my own calendar this morning up at Camp David as I was working on this speech. It showed exactly 1,361 days remaining in my term.
21. Finally, Nixon uses a transcendental strategy as he equates the leadership of America with the only hope for the free world.	I want these to be the best days in America's history because I love America. I deeply believe that America is the hope of the world, and I know that in the quality and wisdom of the leadership America gives lies the only hope for millions of people all over the world that they can live their lives in peace and freedom. We must be worthy of that hope in every sense of the word. Tonight, I ask for your prayers to help me in everything that I do throughout the days of my Presidency to be worthy of their hopes and of yours. God bless America. And God bless each and every one of you.