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A STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL OF THAILAND: REAPPRAISAL AND
READJUSTMENT IN HER ALLIANCES (1969-1976)

The University of Oklahoma

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

A STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL OF THAILAND: REAPPRAISAL
AND READJUSTMENT IN HER ALLIANCES (1969-1976)

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
SMAIROB SUTHIWART-NARUEPUT

Norman, Oklahoma

1980

A STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL OF THAILAND: REAPPRAISAL
AND READJUSTMENT IN HER ALLIANCES (1969-1976)

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A STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL OF THAILAND: REAPPRAISAL
AND READJUSTMENT IN HER ALLIANCES (1969-1976)

INTRODUCTION

Every Asian Third World nation has been confronted with many new problems arising from the rapidly changing relationships between the major powers. This was especially true for Thailand during the time period under consideration in this study, 1969-1976. The Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 brought their relations to a new nadir and led to intensified competition in Southeast Asia and elsewhere between these powers. During the same period, the role of the United States in Asia was being drastically revised: both the gradual de-escalation in Vietnam and the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine seemed to indicate a significantly lowered American posture in the area. In perhaps the most far-reaching of all the changes, there emerged a rapprochement between the U.S. and China, dramatically altering a twenty-year hostile relationship. Along with this came an apparent warming--especially in the areas of strategic arms limitations and trade--in U.S.-Soviet relations as well. Predating the period under consideration but accelerating during it was the fact of

Japan's increasing role as an aspiring regional power. Moreover, the regional organizational thrust of some of the Asian states working together--i.e., the emergence of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)--gives this new polarity a fifth dimension and a distinctively Asian character.

Thailand is situated in the heart of the Southeast Asian mainland, and historically has been effected by the interests and rivalries of the great powers. However, Thailand was the only country in this area to retain its independence during the period of Western colonization. This capacity to remain independent is usually attributed by historians to the agility of the nation's leaders and diplomats.

In the contemporary period, Thailand has acutely felt the pressures of almost continuous conflict in the Indochina area. Considered to be a strong anti-Communist bulwark in Southeast Asia by American policy-makers, Thailand in turn sought security through alliance ties with the United States and other interested nations. However, by the late 1960's it was apparent that the American security effort in itself was insufficient, and that it would have to be replaced or supplemented by other means.

Since 1969, shifts in American policies have largely determined the tone of Thailand's search for security. Thailand called for greater co-operation within Southeast

Asia, and less reliance on non-Asian countries to enable countries in the region to fill the vacuum created by reduced U.S. involvement in the area. Thailand reiterated her willingness to hold talks with Peking to ensure peace and security in Asia, and sought more extensive relations with the Soviet Union and East European countries in the mid-seventies.

The purposes of this study are to examine the ways which Thailand has responded to external developments from 1969 to 1976, and to determine whether they conform to the historical pattern of Thai security policy. According to scholars,¹ the Siamese have been highly pragmatic people strongly influenced by events rather than by ideology, general theories or speculation. The Thais bend like the bamboo with the wind. When Thailand has been faced with more than one potentially hostile power, she has either played one against another, or selected the strongest one for her ally. For the time period under consideration, what potentially hostile power(s) did Thailand face? What country was (has been) the strongest one? How has

¹See Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 230; D. Insor, Thailand (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 125; Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 23; Astri Suhrki, "Smaller-nation Diplomacy: Thailand's Current Dilemmas," Asian Survey XI (May 1971): 429-430 and Charles E. Morrison, Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. 109.

"power" been defined by Thai leaders?

The main time period under consideration in this study is one which greatly complicates the task for the foreign policy analyst interested in causation. Is foreign policy basically a national response to external or systemic factors, or is it more a product of domestic and decision-making process factors? For Thailand during this period, both sets of factors were subject to basic changes.

Externally, as noted above, systemic changes were rapid and drastic ranging from those on Thailand's border to Indochina to Asia-wide to global, all with important significance for Thailand. Domestically, several types of government existed during the same period: Military Rule (1971-1973), Unelected Civilian Government (1973-1975), and Elected Civilian Governments (1975-1976). Out of this interplay of external and internal change came changes in Thai foreign policy. A basic purpose of this study is to shed some light on the relative impact of these various factors for Thailand during this period.

Existing scholarly analysis is most helpful in identifying and classifying the variables at the systemic, nation-state, and decision-making levels that shape foreign-policy.² However, no consensus exists among scholars as

²See Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics (Princeton: Foreign Policy Analysis Project, 1954); James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell ed.,

to how these variables rank in importance, for small states (and for Thailand in particular), except for the general point that systemic and key national decision-makers are key factors.³ Fortunately, it is these same factors that have been most amenable to analysis in this study. Lacking, due to practical considerations and inadequacy of materials, is any systematic and complete analysis of the foreign policy decision-making machinery and process within the Thai political system.

Sources of Information

Primary research material for the study of Thai foreign policy is relatively meager compared to that available for the study of more modern, open countries like the United States. The primary sources available yield descriptive understanding of the official policy viewpoints of the top leadership and at times of opposition viewpoints, but are inadequate for a deeper understanding of the policy process or for causative analysis.

The primary source for information about the policies

Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-92; John Spanier, Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics, 3rd. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston/Praeger, 1978).

³See Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," pp. 27-92; Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968) and Astri Suhrki, "Smaller-nation Diplomacy: Thailand Current Dilemmas," pp. 429-444.

of the official decision-makers in the Executive Branch was the Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand). Additional information was also obtained from Executive speeches, letters, and news reports as included in public documents, not all of which were available during the time period under discussion in this research. These documents were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs News, the ASEAN News Bulletin, and the Collected Statements of Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman.

Regarding the views of legislative leaders, Thailand was under parliamentary systems from 1969 to 1971, and during 1975-1976. Some members of Parliament were assigned to foreign affairs committees, but their views were not documented by the governments. The writer therefore obtained their views from newspapers and magazines.

Description of Chapters

Chapter 1 is a review of Thailand's previous policy toward alignment and of scholarly interpretations of that policy, especially during World War II and at the beginning of the 1960's during which Thailand needed United States' protection. Chapter 2 is devoted to the analysis of Thailand's policy of alignment with the United States from 1969 to 1973. The emerging balance of power in Southeast Asia is examined in Chapter 3 in an effort to determine a rational direction for Thai foreign policy alignment. Chapter 4 is an analysis of how ASEAN may best be used

by Thailand to promote Thai security. In Chapter 5, Thai alliance policies are evaluated and analyzed under the guidelines of scholarly interpretations of these policies, the rational direction dictated by the newly emerging balance of power, and the potential benefit of ASEAN for Thailand as characterized in Chapters 1, 3 and 4 respectively. The concluding chapter is an attempt to draw together all of the salient points, including a comparison of Thailand's alignment policies under its two basic types of government, military and civilian.

CHAPTER I

THAI POLICY OF ALLIANCE: THE BACKGROUND

The oldest recorded Thai state--the kingdom of Nanchao in South China--was completely destroyed in 1253 by Kublai Khan's Mongols after some 300 years of successful resistance to Chinese imperial assaults and several hundred additional years of vassalage to the Chinese empire. In response to the overwhelming thirteenth-century Mongol onslaught, the Thai engaged in a mass migration into Southeast Asia and created a new kingdom based upon the capture of the Khmer (ancient Cambodian) imperial garrison at Sukhotai in what is now north-central Thailand.

Sukhotai produced an outstanding leader in King Ramkamhang the Great who, by combining statesmanship with military skill, built his Kingdom into the most powerful state in the Indochina peninsula. King Ramkamhang was a brilliant diplomat who concluded an agreement of fraternity in 1287 with many powerful independent Thai leaders in the north. The agreement of fraternity enabled Sukotai to extend its borders far to the south and east without having to worry about the northern states. The Sukhotai kingdom began to disintegrate after the death of Ramkamhang.

The fall of the kingdom led to its conquest by a lesser Thai principality, Utong. Subsequently, the capital was moved to Ayudhya and a major modernization and expansion of the kingdom was undertaken by the new ruler, King Rama Tibodi I. The kingdom of Ayudhya, which eventually was known internationally as Siam, developed into a great civilization by the end of the fifteenth century.

The dominance of Ayudhya ended when General Taksin united the Siamese provinces under his rule and had himself proclaimed King. After moving his capital to Tonburi, across the Chao Pya from the present capital of Bangkok, Taksin invaded Cambodia in 1771 and forced the King to accept Siamese suzerainty, which continued for nearly a hundred years.

In 1781 King Taksin was deposed on grounds of mental incapacity and was executed. In his place the nobles chose General Chakri, the hero of the battle of Chiengmai, who ascended the throne in 1782. Chakri moved the capital to Bangkok and took the title of Rama I.

Relations with the West

During the eighteen-forties, the British and Americans tried to open up Siam to large western trade and to conclude comprehensive treaties, but Rama III steadfastly refused. When Rama IV, King Mongkut, ascended the throne in 1851, relations with the West were at a critical juncture. Britain had gained control of the Malay States up

to the area under Siamese influence. There was now a serious possibility that the British might use force to accomplish their objectives in Siam.

With the vast changes being wrought in Southeast Asia by the new power of the West, Mongkut became intensely interested in international relations. When he came to power in 1851, he was convinced that Siam would have to accommodate itself to the West or be subdued by it. D.G.E. Hall¹ paid him the supreme compliment, stating that Siam owed to Mongkut more than anyone else the fact that she preserved her independence when by the end of the nineteenth century all of the other states of Southeast Asia had come under European control.

The treaty of Friendship and Commerce of 1855 with Great Britain was a turning point in Siamese history, not only in her relations with Western countries but also in her internal life. The treaty necessitated profound changes in the internal administration of the country and in the implementation of justice. The major concessions limited Siam to an ad volorem duty of three per cent on goods imported by British merchants; permitted opium to be imported duty free, subject to some restrictions; limited export duties to an agreed schedule; gave British subjects the right to rent or own land near the capital; granted

¹As quoted in Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia. p. 13.

British subjects extraterritorial rights-that is, the right to trial under British rather than Siamese law for violation of criminal and civil codes; and, recognized the right of the British consul in Bangkok to handle cases involving British subjects. These latter two provisions became the most serious threat to Siamese independence during succeeding decades and were the source of much subsequent resentment of Western influence in Siam.

The year after the conclusion of the British treaty, Siam negotiated similar treaties with the United States and France. The American envoy, Mr. Townsend Harris, had been commissioned to go to Japan to negotiate a treaty with the emperor for trade and commerce. Harris stated in his diary that the Siamese wanted a commitment from the United States to act as arbiter on Siam's behalf in case it became involved in trouble with Great Britain.²

Although Monkut recognized clearly that Siam must accommodate itself to British power, he was not willing to trust the British. Thus he sought guarantees from other powers to help insure Siam's independence during this critical period. It was a policy based on a sober assessment of Siam's weakness in the face of pressure from a powerful nation.

When the French negotiated with Siam in 1856 for a treaty of trade and commerce, their envoy was also

²Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for South-east Asia, pp. 14-15.

approached with a plea for protection from the British. The French representative came away from the negotiation with the impression that the Siamese would have welcomed French assistance to counterbalance British influence.

If fear of British encroachment dominated Siamese foreign policy in the eighteen-fifties, the intervention of the French in Cambodia and Laos beginning in the eighteen-sixties became Siam's principal worry during the latter part of the century.

Difficulties and Adjustments

Siam faced difficulties in foreign affairs during this period. The British completed the annexation of Burma in 1886 and were steadily extending their influence in the Malay States. Despite their fear of the British, the Siamese were able to negotiate most differences in an amicable manner. The French, however, used any pretext to extend their control over all territories that had at any time been part of Cambodia or Laos. After France completed the subjugation of Vietnam in the eighteen-eighties, Siam began to worry about its own hold on the Laotian states and sent a strong army to Luang Prabang to put down a local uprising.

When in 1893 France laid claim to all Siamese territory east of the Mekong River, Britain did not reject this claim but only raised with the French the question of Siamese rights in the area. In desperation Siam pleaded

with Great Britain to intercede and to ask France to moderate its demands. Britain did indeed become alarmed as the Siamese situation appeared to be drifting toward war; it sent several warships to the Gulf of Siam to demonstrate its interest in the dispute. In 1896 Britain and France reached an agreement that gave France all territory east of the Mekong, in upper Burma, and in Laos; and both nations then agreed to guarantee the independence of Siam in the Chao Pya Valley.³ Without active British support, Siam's position was hopeless.

It has become something of a cliché to observe that Siamese independence survived because the British and the French needed a buffer between them and because no bilateral agreement was achieved on how to divide the Kingdom. There is partial truth in that interpretation, but it ignores some central points. In addition to the loss of significant parts of the Siamese territory and her sovereignty in this period of the nineteenth century, the Bangkok monarchy of King Mongkut proved to be both stable and perceptive in meeting the foreign threat.

"Bending with the wind," a characteristic of the Thai stressed by area scholars, is very evident in the history of Thailand. For example, in the period preceding World War I, although King Wachirawut (Rama VI), who had ascended the throne in 1910, was sympathetic to Britain

³Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, p. 20.

as a result of his long years of schooling in that country, the army officers tended to be sympathetic to Germany because many of them, including several royal princes, had received their military training there. Furthermore, the Siamese elite was opposed to both the British and the French because of their treatment of Siam during the eighteen-nineties. The Germans, on the other hand, had never infringed on Siamese sovereignty, had been good traders, and had assisted Siam with its internal development, notably in railroad construction. However, when it was clear in 1917 that the Allies would win, Siam declared war on Germany on the pretext of its unrestricted submarine warfare.

The international status of Siam after the war had improved enormously from what it had been a decade earlier, and the stage was now set for negotiations with the European powers to terminate the extra-territorial and "special privileges" provisions of those treaties concluded in the eighteen-fifties and sixties. Also, Siam gained the right both to be represented as an equal at the Paris Peace Conference and to participate as a charter member of the League of Nations.

Thai Diplomatic Alignment in World War II

By 1940, as Britain and France, Thailand's most powerful opponents became involved in the European war, Japan moved to exploit their weakened position in Southeast

Asia and thus became a new factor for Thailand's security. The problem for the Thai government was to preserve the nation's neutrality; and, failing this, the next task was to reach an accommodation with whatever power presented the greatest danger. Since Thailand became convinced that the Allies were in no position to help her, it moved very swiftly to cooperate with the Japanese. Japan's ultimatum of December 7, 1941, stated that it did not regard Thailand as an enemy nation but wished to cooperate with it. The Japanese offered the Thai government three alternatives: it could allow the Japanese to use its territory for moving troops and supplies into Burma and Malaya, in return for which Japan promised not to interfere in Thailand's internal administration; Thailand and Japan could form a defensive military alliance, under which Thailand would assist the Japanese war effort in return for a guarantee of assistance in case Thailand was attacked by a third party; or, Thailand could join Japan in the war against the Allies in return for which Japan would agree to the return to Thailand of all territories in the Malay Peninsula ceded to Britain in 1909.

On January 25, 1942, Thailand declared war on Great Britain and the United States. The reason given for this action was that the participation of British and American fliers in bombing attacks against civilian as well as military targets in Thailand constituted an act of aggression.

In December, 1943, after Thailand yielded to the Japanese, the Thai minister in Washington, Seni Pramot, took it upon himself to inform the State Department that he believed his country to be under Japanese coercion. He asked for assistance to form a "Free Thai" movement from among Thai students and officials then in the United States, in order to work for the liberation of his country. James V. Martin, Jr.⁴ states that the anti-Japanese, Pro-western policy of the Thai Minister in Washington was to affect profoundly the policy of the United States toward Thailand throughout the war and during the negotiations at its end. At the time the Free Thai movement was being organized in the United States, efforts were also being made within Thailand to organize an underground movement to assist the allies. The leader of this movement was Pridi Panom-yong, one of the organizers of the 1932 revolution. Pridi resigned his cabinet post when the Pibun government decided to capitulate to Japan in December 1941, and was then appointed Regent in the absence of the young King, who was in Switzerland completing his education.

The contribution of the Free Thai and the Thai underground to the Allied war effort was significant: it enabled British and American forces to penetrate Thailand, to obtain information on Japanese capabilities and troop

⁴James V. Martin, Jr., "Thai-American Relations in World War II," The Journal of Asian Studies XXII (August 1963): 460.

movements, and to rescue several hundred American and British fliers who had been forced down over Thai territory. More important, the Free Thai movement, with the support of the United States Office of Strategic Services, supplied well-trained guerrilla warfare officers to the underground. They in turn recruited a Thai force of some 50,000 men who were prepared to attack the Japanese whenever the Allied headquarters gave the command.

As it became increasingly clear that Japan would eventually be defeated by the Allied forces and that Thailand might then be treated as an enemy nation rather than as an enemy occupied nation, the problem for Prime Minister Pibun was how to extricate Thailand from this situation with a minimum of damage. On August 16, one day after the Japanese surrendered to General MacArthur, Pridi Panomyong issued a proclamation as Regent of Thailand. This document, approved unanimously on the same day by the National Assembly, declared that the will of the Thai people did not approve of the declaration of war and of acts adverse to the United Nations; and, that the Regent (acting for the King) proclaimed on behalf of the Thai people that the declaration of war on the United States of America and Great Britain was null and void and not binding on the Thai people as far as the United Nations were concerned. Subsequently, Pridi asked Seni Pramot in Washington to become Prime Minister. Seni seemed well

suited for the job during this critical period because of his British education and his leadership of the Free Thai movement. The United States accepted the Thai government's position that it had been coerced by Japan into joining in an aggressive alliance. A statement by Secretary of State Byrnes, issued on August 20, 1945, said that "the American Government has always believed that the declaration (of war) did not represent the will of the Thai people." The statement concluded by asserting that the United States "regarded Thailand not as an enemy but as a country to be liberated from the enemy," and that it looked "to the resumption by Thailand of its former place in the community of nations as a free, sovereign, and independent country."⁵ The British, however, were not willing to give unconditional support for Thai independence after the war.⁶ With this divergence in policy between the principal Allied nations, the Thai government relied principally on the United States to help it obtain better terms from Britain.

As was true regarding Thailand's success in maintaining its independence during the nineteenth century, the emergence of Thailand from World War II practically unscathed was the result of a combination of astute

⁵"American-Thai Relations: Statement by the Secretary of State," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XIII, August 19, 1945, p. 261.

⁶Martin, Jr., p. 466.

diplomacy, based on a realistic view of Thailand's relation to the great powers, and luck, in the form of the country's geographical position.

Thailand emerged from World War II with a new sense of realism about its international position. Fortunately for the Thais, United States postwar policy in Southeast Asia favored the emergence of free and independent nations rather than the restitution of colonial empires.

Pridi and His Idea of Regional Cooperation

Following the collapse of Japan, Thai foreign policy was largely determined by Pridi Panomyong, who had emerged from the war as a national hero because of his leadership of the Thai underground, which had been so active on behalf of the Allies. Pridi had very definite ideas about the role that Thailand should play in Southeast Asian affairs. While maintaining good official relations with the victorious Allies, particularly with the United States, Pridi also was ambitious for Thailand to become the leader of independent nations in this strategic area of Asia. He foresaw that nationalist forces in Burma, Indonesia and Indochina would one day force the weakened colonial powers to recognize the futility of trying to rule these areas in the prewar manner, and that it was only a matter of time until the powers were forced to grant them independence. Pridi believed that Thailand's long history of independence and political stability and its success in

dealing with European powers made it a natural leader among these emergent nations. It was an ambitious vision, but Pridi was an extraordinary person who seemed to have unlimited faith in his ability to lead Thailand and Southeast Asia in the new postwar era.

The dilemma in Pridi's policy became apparent in Indochina, where French efforts to work out an agreement with Viet-Minh forces failed in 1946, and guerrilla warfare ensued. Pridi sought to mediate this conflict while negotiating with France in May 1947 over Thailand's border with Indochina. Pridi proposed that the two countries sponsor a Southeast Asian Union, which would include Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam as free and independent states. If the plan succeeded, Pridi envisioned that other states in the area would join, and that a united Southeast Asia eventually could become an important factor in international affairs. In 1947, however, the French were more interested in crushing the Viet-Minh revolution than in recognizing its independence, and rejected the plan.

Pridi then followed more vigorously a policy of support for the nationalist movements in neighboring countries: while maintaining correct relations with France, his government gave increasing aid to the rebel forces in Indochina. After World War II, some 50,000 Vietnamese refugees had settled in the northeastern area of Thailand, and then the Thai government did little to prevent them

from infiltrating recruits and supplies into Indochina. After the Dutch launched military operations against the Indonesian nationalists in 1947, Pridi organized a South-east Asia League in Bangkok. It included a number of his followers as well as exiled leaders from neighboring countries who wanted to expel the colonial powers from their homelands. By the autumn of 1947 Pridi was moving toward an anticolonialist policy in an effort to align Thailand with the emerging states of Southeast Asia.

Pibun Administration and the United States

Pridi was ousted by an army coup d'état in November 1947 and went into exile. The Coup Group, which favored the return of Pibun to power, tried to justify its action by accusing Pridi of plotting a rebellion in which he planned to depose the King, establish a republic, and place himself at the head of the state.⁷ The coup leaders did not immediately place Pibun in control of the government because of his wartime record of collaboration with the Japanese. When Pibun formed his government in April 1948, he was sympathetic to the nationalist groups fighting for independence in his neighboring countries. But when the Chinese Communists captured control of the China mainland in 1949, he decided to join the West, especially the United States, in resisting the Communist threats. In

⁷Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, p. 95.

1950, Thailand signed agreements on Economic and Technical Cooperation and on Military Assistance with the United States. Thailand staunchly supported the United Nations action in Korea. It sent 4,000 officers and men, twenty nurses, one transport ship, three airplanes, two corvettes and 40,000 tons of rice to aid the Korean people.⁸

It openly condemned before the United Nations the Viet-Minh invasions of Laos and Cambodia. In 1954, it brought the matter to the attention of the Security Council. It also submitted a draft resolution calling on the Peace Observation Commission to send a sub-committee to Thailand to observe the situation and to make necessary recommendations and reports to the Council. Unfortunately, Thailand's request was rejected by the Soviet Union.⁹

From the early 1950's, Communist threats increasingly came closer to Thailand as North Vietnam became Communist. Later on, Laos was divided into Communist and Non-Communist portions. Communist insurgency began in Thailand and problems occurred among the overseas Chinese and the North Vietnamese refugees in the northeast. Realizing the need for a cooperative approach to the problem of national survival, in August 1954, Thailand suggested the establishment of a regional defense organization, but the idea was

⁸Thailand Official Year Book: 1968 (Bangkok: Government House Printing Office, 1968), pp. 115-116.

⁹Ibid., pp. 115-116.

rejected.¹⁰ A month later, Thailand entered into the American sponsored Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO).¹¹

Therefore, since 1950, Thailand has mainly based its own security upon the United States. It was convinced that an American military presence in Southeast Asia was most important in containing the revolutionary wars sponsored by Peking and Hanoi. It rejected the policy of neutralism and was determined to stop the expanding power of the Asian Communists. It believed that without the help of the United States and other non-Communist nations, Southeast Asia would be left alone to fight the Communists who would gradually take over South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma and finally Thailand.¹²

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Thailand's motivation for entering the American-sponsored SEATO was its desire to commit the United States to come to its aid in case of external aggression. It did not want to be left in a lonely and helpless position like the time it faced Japanese occupation in 1941.

During the first two years of SEATO (1954-56), the

¹⁰Werner Levi, The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 58.

¹¹Richard A. Butwell, Southeast Asia Today and Tomorrow: Problems of Political Development (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 78.

¹²Daniel Wit, Thailand, Another Vietnam? (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp. 9-11.

Pibun government gave complete support to the organization. From February 23-25, 1955, the first meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers was held in Bangkok. The day before the meeting, Pibun declared that Communist China had massed 20,000 "Free Thai" troops in Yunnan and that Thailand was in great danger of attack. At the meeting, the representatives of Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines urged that the SEATO Allies establish a joint mobile striking force and unified military command, and that American troops be stationed within the Treaty area. But John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, rejected the idea, stating that the use of mobile American air and naval power with local ground forces was enough. He believed that the safety of Southeast Asia also depended on related fronts in Japan, South Korea and Formosa. The army of twenty divisions in South Korea and the 300,000 men of the Nationalist Chinese, which the United States helped to maintain, could contribute to the defense of SEATO. Besides those, Dulles convinced them that the United States also maintained "a navy of 400 ships and 350,000 men; Army forces totaling five divisions and about 300,000 men; and an Air Force of 30 squadrons" in the Western Pacific.¹³ The point was made again by Dulles at the second meeting of the SEATO Council in Karachi

¹³"Convincing Man," Time 65 (March 7, 1955): 31-32.

during March 6-9, 1956.¹⁴

Though Pibun's government was rather preoccupied within the country, it was watchful of the conflicts in its neighboring countries and tried to bring SEATO into action. In July 1955, when the Pathet Lao forces clashed with the Laotian government forces, Thailand brought the situation to the attention SEATO. Thailand's action caused annoyance to the Laotian government which considered the matter a domestic affair that could be settled through the truce machinery of the Geneva accords. Britain, France, and India also believed that the International Control Commission in Laos was competent to deal with the matter. Thus Thailand's attempt failed to arouse SEATO into public action.¹⁵

Pibun's efforts in SEATO, however, benefitted him personally. He finally gained trust from the Great Powers who were critical about his collaboration with the Japanese during the war. During his state visit to the United States and Britain in the spring of 1955, he was welcomed with respect and honor.

At the same time, Prince Wan Waithayakon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, represented Thailand in the Asian-

¹⁴"Communique Issued by Asia Treaty Allies," The New York Times, March 9, 1956, p. 4.

¹⁵George Modelski, ed., SEATO: Six Studies (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia, 1962), p. 8.

African Conference held at Bandung from April 18-24. Prince Wan had the opportunity to discuss with the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, relations between their two countries. Adhering to the new policy of peaceful co-existence, Chou En-lai was friendly, reasonable, and conciliatory. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations between Thailand and China, the Chinese Premier invited a Thai delegation to visit China. He assured it that China would not resort to aggression or direct threats against Thailand. He rejected the idea that the autonomous region in Yunnan was a threat to Thailand. The region was established as only an autonomous minority area of China and not for the purposes of infiltration or subversion into Thailand. He assured the delegation that Pridi was in Peking as a political exile and not in Yunnan to organize the local Thai against Thailand. He also stated that China was ready to negotiate the question of citizenship for the Chinese minority in Thailand.¹⁶

The Bandung Conference had a great effect on SEATO as well as on Thailand's attitudes toward SEATO. Actually, the Conference was organized by the neutral Asian nations to oppose military alliances such as SEATO and to find an alternative to maintaining peace in Asia. SEATO was accused of dividing South and Southeast Asia into two blocs: one pro-Western and one neutralist. Thailand

¹⁶George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 13-15.

was criticized for siding so closely with the West, causing displeasure to its neutral Asian neighbors. Chou En-lai's friendliness at Bandung eased Thailand's fears of Communist China. But the prospects of a "rapprochement" between Communist China and the United States caused much concern to the Thai government. The government was annoyed that the United States did not consult with the SEATO Council before commencing discussions with Peking. Thailand now felt uncertain about being in SEATO. This was because its SEATO policy was based largely on an anti-Chinese attitude; and its security policy was partly dependent upon the United States. It expected the United States to be strongly opposed to the Communist Chinese regime. The change by both the Chinese and the United States would leave Thailand "out on a limb."¹⁷

The government now changed its policy toward the Chinese minority in Thailand. It lessened restrictions on the overseas Chinese and allowed merchants to trade with mainland China. The overseas Chinese had more contacts with Peking and could voice their pro-Peking policy. Many groups of Thai leftists visited Peking. Later on, the Thai government became more flexible in its decision to recognize the Peking government. In 1956, it declared that its decision to recognize Communist China would depend

¹⁷Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for South-east Asia, pp. 124-126.

upon the decision of the United Nations to admit China into the organization (although Thailand voted against admission during this period).¹⁸

The new trend in Pibun's policy coincided with his policy of democratic reforms. The reforms were launched because Pibun was quite impressed by the democratic institutions and practices which he observed during his world tour. Another reason for the reforms was his desire to strengthen his position in the government. By gaining wider popular support, he could reduce the power of two of his great competitors: Phao Sriyanon, the Police Chief, and Sarit Thanarat, Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

He started his reforms by organizing press conferences where news reporters could question him and members of his government. Press censorship was lifted and the Press Act was revised. Political parties were allowed to organize and Pibun promised that there would be free general elections in 1957. He encouraged freedom of speech and "Hyde Park" debating centers were set up.¹⁹

These reforms resulted in increased criticism in the press and, at the "Hyde Park" meetings, of SEATO and of the United States. Several political parties, including leftist parties, were soon formed. The leftist political

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 126-128.

¹⁹Darrell Berrigan, "Thailand: Pibun Tries Prachathipatai," The Reporter 14 (June 14, 1956): 30-33.

parties gained much support from the northeast region. Their party platform included neutralism, recognition of Communist China, opposition to SEATO, and anti-Americanism. The Thai press and many public speakers complained that the United States was providing more economic aid to non-SEATO members than to the members; that there were too many American economic and military advisors in Thailand; and, that the United States interfered in Thai internal affairs. They charged that Thailand's membership in SEATO was the cause of poor relations with China as well as for being branded as the "puppet" of the United States.

During 1956-1957, the government's support of SEATO seemed to decrease while there was an increase of strong domestic criticism of SEATO, the United States, and the Pibun government as well. However, the government remained basically loyal to SEATO.

By February 1956, when Pibun realized that his democratic system did not work out as well as he had hoped, he began to put limits to the new system. In February 1957, general elections were held. The result was not pleasing to Pibun's regime, which received very little public support. The government was charged with cheating in the elections and thus was faced with much opposition. A few days before the third meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers in Canberra, the new Pibun government claimed that it had received a report from the SEATO committee

Experts concerning a plot to overthrow the government. (This report is still unverified.) The report was, in a way, used to justify the government decree proclaiming a state of emergency. This action to suppress the opposition groups included the banning of public meetings, arrests of several editors who were critical of the regime, and the Army's seizure of strategic positions throughout Bangkok. At the third meeting, during March 11-13, 1957, the SEATO members, especially Thailand, placed greater stress on Communist subversion and ways to counter it. These developments encouraged the government to take stricter action against the opposition.²⁰

At the meeting, the Council also approved the appointment of a Secretary-General and a Deputy Secretary-General for SEATO. On July 1, 1957, Mr. Pote Sarasin, the Thai ambassador to the United States, was appointed the first Secretary-General. Pote's immediate duty was to administer the organization and coordinate and supervise the work of the specialized counter-subversion, cultural and economic agencies.²¹

Despite Thailand's growing annoyance with the United States and SEATO, the United States increased its aid to

²⁰Frank C. Darling, Thailand and the United States (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), pp. 158-160.

²¹"Thai Chief Defends Nations SEATO Role," The New York Times, September 23, 1957, p. 3.

Thailand. It reduced the financial obligations of the Asian members in SEATO and accepted more of the costs. It expanded nonmilitary activities and provided more scholarships for the purpose of cultivating knowledge of SEATO. It also agreed to support the establishment of a graduate engineering school in Bangkok.

These activities were undertaken to bolster the declining power of Pibun's anti-Communist government. But Pibun still faced the opposition parties which were trying desperately to overthrow him. Finally, on September 17, 1957, Sarit seized the government in a bloodless coup, causing Pibun to go into exile in Cambodia.

The Sarit Thanarat Administration (1958-1963)

The new government continued its pro-Western policy. On October 2, Sarit announced to the press that Thailand saw the usefulness of SEATO and would continue its membership in SEATO. Pote Sarasin resigned from his position as SEATO Secretary-General to become a temporary premier of Thailand for three months, while William Worth was assigned as acting Secretary-General of SEATO.²²

In December 1957, national elections were held and most of Sarit's candidates won in the elections. Having health problems, Sarit appointed his assistant Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Thanom Kittikachorn, as the

²²"Flight of the Thunderbird," Time 70 (September 30, 1957): 29.

new Premier. Thanom accepted the position although he admitted that he was not prepared for it. He asked the wise and respected Prince Wan and two other statesmen and scholars to serve as Vice-Premiers.²³ He announced that Thailand would follow an independent foreign policy in close cooperation with the West and the SEATO alliance.²⁴

The Thanom government faced unrest in Thailand. He had to cope with growing official corruption and with the press which was becoming more irresponsible and open to Communist infiltration. In October 1958, Sarit returned from the United States after a health treatment to stage a coup against the government which he had set up. He liquidated the National Assembly and unseated the Premier. He banned all political parties and suspended the constitution, although promising to draw up a new one. He banned several Communist-inspired publications and declared martial law. Sarit then set up a revolutionary regime to rule by arbitrary methods. He pledged to adhere to all of Thailand's international obligations, especially SEATO.²⁵ After that, there was no public criticism of SEATO. SEATO was no longer a public issue until the crisis in Laos arose in 1959, in which Thailand was directly

23. ²³"Trusted Hand," Time 71 (January 13, 1958):

²⁴Darling, Thailand and the United States, p. 184.

28. ²⁵"Coup de Repos," Time 72 (November 3, 1958):

involved.

The Crisis in Laos and SEATO's Inaction

The conflict in Laos was considered to be the highlight of Thailand's political role in SEATO. The continual fighting between the non-Communist Laotian government and the Communist Pathet Lao was the nature of the conflict in Laos. After World War II, when Ho Chi Minh began his moves to drive the French out of Indochina, Laos took part. In 1951, Ho sent the North Vietnamese army to assist the Laotian guerrillas known as the Pathet Lao, headed by Prince Souphanouvong. Since then, the North Vietnamese have continued their presence in Laos. During 1953-1954, they helped the Pathet Lao to establish strong bases in the northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly.²⁶ The Pathet Lao owed its successes to the North Vietnamese who had sponsored and supported them, providing them with guidance, training, material and weapons, and military manpower.²⁷

The conflict intensified into many crises during 1959-1962. In 1960, the two-sided civil war became a three-sided conflict when the rightist faction of Prince Boon Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan set up a revolutionary

²⁶Butwell, Southeast Asia Today and Tomorrow: Problems of Political Development, pp. 50-51.

²⁷Paul F. Langer, "Laos: Preparing for a Settlement in Vietnam," Asian Survey IX (January 1969): 69.

government in Suvannakhet and mounted a campaign to overthrow the Vientianne government. The struggle for power among the three factions was more complicated because of the foreign influence behind each faction. North Vietnam backed Prince Souphanouvong's Pathet Lao; the Soviet Union backed Prince Souvanna Phouma's neutral faction; and, the United States and Thailand supported the right-wing Prince Boon Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan.²⁸

At various stages of the crises in Laos, SEATO's assistance was called for. But political circumstances as well as disagreement among the SEATO members had prevented SEATO from taking any strong and effective action. This caused disappointment and frustration to the Thai government which had put high reliance on the assistance of SEATO and the United States.

Thailand had several reasons for being disturbed by the situation in Laos. Laos shared its northern border with Communist China, its eastern border with North Vietnam, and a 1,000 mile common border with Thailand. Laos thus could serve as an obvious route for Communist infiltration toward Thailand. Thailand was determined to keep Laos free from hostile powers and to maintain it as a buffer area between the Communist and non-Communist region. It was not in favor of having a neutral government in Laos. Such a government would be friendly to Peking, Moscow and

²⁸Butwell, Southeast Asia Today and Tomorrow: Problems of Political Development, p. 82.

Hanoi, all of which were considered hostile to Thailand.

Besides the security interest, the Thai government had "fraternal feelings" for the Lao People, which justified its special interest in Laos. These feelings were clearly expressed by Prime Minister Sarit in the following speech:

The relationship between the kingdoms of Thailand and Laos has special characteristics that distinguish it from the simple neighborliness which would follow from a long common border. For the people are one nation; they have the same language, religion, customs and physique so that there is nothing to distinguish which is Thai and which is Laos. Moreover, the people who have their homes near the border between the two countries have family ties and relatives who live on both banks of the Mekong, and they must come and go all the time. Because of this special situation, everything that happens in the kingdom of Laos cannot help but affect Thailand.²⁹

For these reasons, the Thai government advocated that SEATO take a forward policy in dealing with the crisis in Laos. But the other members had divergent views on how to solve the problem of subversion and aggression in Laos. The members' interpretation of Article IV of the Treaty was one source of disagreement. According to Article IV, paragraphs 2 and 3, SEATO could act only when there was unanimous agreement among the member-nations and only if the Laotian government consented to such action. These requirements were never fully met throughout the

²⁹Quoted in David A. Wilson, "Bangkok's Dim View to the East," Asian Survey I (June 1961): 13.

various crises in Laos.³⁰

A divergence of interests in Laos was another reason for disunity among the members. Although Great Britain had no material or strategic interest in Laos, it was interested in the Laotian crisis because of its responsibilities as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference of 1954. France had major interests in Laos in the economic, strategic and cultural fields. It still maintained its military base at Seno and supported Laos in the fields of health and culture.³¹

According to the Geneva Agreements of 1954, France was authorized to maintain its military advisers to train the Royal Laotian Army, while the United States was responsible for paying for the military equipment and supplies. The United States began to play an active role in Laos after the Geneva Conference. When conflicts between the different factions of Laos began, President Eisenhower declared that "we cannot let Laos fall to the Communists even if we have to fight."³² His administration and the following administrations had hopes of making Laos a "bulwark against Communism."

³⁰Donald E. Nuechterlein, "Thailand and SEATO: A Ten-year Appraisal," Asian Survey IV (December 1964): 1175.

³¹Sisouk Na Champassak, Storm Over Laos (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 105.

³²"If You Wonder What U.S. is Doing in Laos," U.S. News and World Report, January 5, 1970, p. 29.

By supplying more economic and military aid, the United States' influence in Laos increased. This distressed France which was losing its influence. The difference of interests between the United States and France led to different interpretations of the situation in Laos. The French sometimes believed that the Laotian government exaggerated about the Communist threat in order to get greater American aid. France and Great Britain thus preferred a neutral Laotian government to a pro-American government.

The first occasion on which the Sarit government brought the Laotian problem to the attention of SEATO was at the beginning of 1959. In January, the Viet-Minh forces entered southern Laos and occupied several villages. When they refused to leave, the Poui Sananikone government appealed to the United Nations to obtain the withdrawal of the Viet-Minh forces. On this occasion, the Thai government requested SEATO to look into the situation, but no action was taken by SEATO.

In July, the Pathet Lao forces attacked the province of Sam Neua. Later on in August, they were assisted by the Viet-Minh forces. The Laotian government then requested the United Nations to send an emergency force to assist Laos. The United States issued a warning to the communist powers that further support of the invading force would raise the question of the need for greatly increased free

world support for the Laotian government.³³

By this time, the Thai government realized that the Communists had ended their peaceful coexistence policy. It wanted SEATO to take military action in Laos. It sent a friendly military mission to observe the situation in Laos and commissioned army units for duty there. At Thailand's request, SEATO Council Representatives met three times in September. At the Bangkok meeting of SEATO military advisers on September 22, SEATO Secretary-General Pote Sarasin stated that SEATO would be ready to consider sending armed assistance to Laos if the Laotian government requested it. But the Laotian government did not make the request because it wanted to mark time pending the result of the United Nations' initiative, or a worsening of the situation.³⁴

At the United Nations, the SEATO members, especially Britain, France and the United States, were successful in obtaining a Security Council resolution calling for the appointment of a committee of inquiry to go to Laos to study the situation. In November, Dag Hammarskjold, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, visited Laos. After he consulted with Premier Poui Sananikone, the latter

³³"United States Supports Laos Against Communist Attack," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XLI, September 21, 1959, p. 414.

³⁴Norman J. Padelford, "SEATO and Peace in Southeast Asia," Current History 38 (February 1960): 98-99.

announced that Laos would remain neutral and would not allow the country to become a base for any foreign power bloc. This announcement also served as notice that Laos would not welcome SEATO's armed aid.³⁵

However, the crisis in 1959 ended in a satisfactory way. The action of the United Nations and SEATO brought peace to Laos again and the Viet-Minh quickly retreated.

The internal political situation in Laos was disturbed again when the army, which was dissatisfied with Sananikone's act to reshuffle his cabinet, staged a coup on December 30, and Sananikone was replaced by a government of Prince Somsanit. General Phoumi Nosavan, who staged the coup, became the Minister of Defense. The Sarit government was pleased with the new government, which was pro-Western and anti-Communist. General Phoumi received much support from Sarit, who was his cousin.

Peace and stability in Laos were upset again when a parachute battalion commander named Captain Kong Lae staged a coup in August 1960. Kong Lae wanted Laos to have a neutral government which would cooperate with the Pathet Lao. He believed that such a government could avoid a civil war and restore peace.³⁶

Somsanit's government was replaced with a neutralist

³⁵Padelford, p. 100.

³⁶See Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 144-148.

government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. General Phoumi Nosavan did not join the new government, but instead retreated to establish a military headquarters in Southern Laos from which he started a campaign to retake the capital. During that time, the pro-Communist elements in Laos began to broadcast anti-Western and pro-Communist propaganda.

Because of this crisis, Thailand became alarmed that the Pathet Lao was gaining control over the government. Thailand urged that SEATO support General Phoumi in his plan to oust the Vientianne government. The Philippines and Pakistan shared Thailand's view that SEATO should take action to prevent Laos from being taken over by the Communists.

But SEATO did not take action because of the opposition of Britain and France. These two countries did not want SEATO to intervene because:

1. There had not been any substantive evidence of overt armed attack in Laos.

2. They believed that a return of a pro-Western government would provoke a strong Soviet reaction which might lead to larger war in Southeast Asia.

3. SEATO should not intervene unless the Souvanna Phouma government requested it.

The situation in Laos was a dilemma for the SEATO members, especially the United States. In Washington, there were two conflicting ideas concerning the matter: 1), that the best long-term solution to the Laotian problems was the establishment of a non-Communist neutral

government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma; and 2), that the only way to prevent the Communist Pathet Lao from infiltrating the Laotian government was through the establishment of a strongly pro-Western and anti-Communist government headed by General Phoumi.³⁷

The United States decided to support both sides while seeking an agreement with Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi to cooperate with each other in keeping the Communists out of Laos. But the attempt failed because Kong Lae prevented any reconciliation between the two leaders. Later on, Phoumi established a revolutionary government with Prince Boon Oum as the President.

Because of SEATO's inaction, the Thai press started to question the role of SEATO in Laos. Secretary-General Pote Sarasin explained that the Laotian crisis was only a local conflict and SEATO would not interfere in the internal affairs of Laos. SEATO members also favored a neutral policy for Laos. But Thailand still believed that if SEATO remained inactive, the situation in Laos would deteriorate and would become more dangerous to Thailand. Sarit frequently expressed his concern about the situation in Laos. He declared:

If the situation in Laos or elsewhere develops to the point where it is obvious that it will inevitably become a danger to the nation, I shall have to fight in defense of it; and in fighting

³⁷Nuechterlein, "Thailand and SEATO: A Ten-year Appraisal," pp. 1176-1177.

against such Communist danger, I hope to receive the assistance and cooperation of friendly nations of the free world, because fighting against the Communists is a fight for the welfare of the whole free world. However, even if we have to fight alone without help from anyone, it is something that we have to do even if the country is plunged into danger and we die in the end.³⁸

Furthermore, Thailand refused to recognize the Vientiane government, but openly expressed a strong preference for the revolutionary government. Since the August coup, Thailand had closed its border with Laos in order to put blockade on Laotian foreign commerce. It continued to express displeasure with SEATO and with the United States, which kept on providing financial and political support to the Vientiane government.

The concern of Thailand, SEATO, and the United States about Laos was temporarily solved by General Phoumi's successful counter-coup against the Vientiane government in December 1960. A pro-Western government was established with Prince Boon Cum as the Prime Minister. Prince Souvanna Phouma escaped to Cambodia to set up a government in exile there, while Kong Lae's forces joined up with the Pathet Lao. The three-sided conflict became more complicated when the Soviet Union started to airlift arms to both the Pathet Lao and Kong Lae's neutralist forces, and continued to recognize the Souvanna Phouma government in exile.³⁹

³⁸Quoted in Darrell Berrigan, "Thailand is on the Spot," The Reporter 24 (January 19, 1961): 29.

³⁹Sisouk, Storm Over Laos, p. 169.

Only the United States

From the beginning of 1961, the Pathet Lao and Kong Lae's forces, assisted by the Soviet Union and North Vietnam, began an offensive in central and southern Laos. They were able to defeat Phoumi's forces there. Even though Phoumi's forces were well-equipped with American arms and material, they were inferior to the Communist forces.

At the SEATO Council meeting on January 4, the Council called for the pacific settlement of the Laotian problem and reaffirmed the members' determination to fulfill their obligations under SEATO. However, when the Laotian government proposed that SEATO send an observation team to study the extent of Communist intervention in Laos, France and Britain opposed the proposal.⁴⁰

In March, the military situation in Laos worsened. The Communists had almost defeated Phoumi's forces. Thailand was worried and appealed to SEATO to intervene to prevent the fall of the Boon Oum government. The United States was firm in this situation. On March 23, President Kennedy warned the Soviet Union that it would take action if the Communists did not stop their attacks. But SEATO was not as firm because of the differences of opinion among the members. Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan wanted military intervention. France disagreed because it wanted a return of Souvanna Phouma's government. Great

⁴⁰L. P. Singh, "Thai Foreign Policy: The Current Phase," Asian Survey 3 (November 1963): 536-537.

Britain would rather wait for the Soviet Union's reply to its ceasefire proposal, and favored armed intervention only as a last recourse. Thailand had come to the conclusion that only the United States could preserve the Boon Oum government in Laos. But the United States, wanting to preserve the unity of SEATO, settled for a mild warning to the Communists. After the Council meeting, at the end of March, SEATO declared only that it might take action unless the Pathet Lao agreed on a cease-fire.

Thailand agreed with the British proposal to seek the Soviet Union's cooperation in ending the war. But it was afraid that the negotiations would lead to a coalition government which would include Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao faction. Thailand would accept a neutral government only if it were not a pro-Communist one. It believed that Souvanna Phouma would be a weak Prime Minister who relied too much on Communist support.

During April, the Communists pushed closer to the Mekong River at Takhek and by April 20, they were only ten miles from the town. The Sarit government declared that Thailand's armed forces were ready to go into action if Takhek were attacked. If the attack were considered a direct threat to Thailand's security, the government would take military action no matter what other SEATO members were prepared to do. In this crisis, Thailand believed that it could only look to the United States for

military action in Laos.

At the time, the United States was involved in the crisis in Cuba; thus it was not ready to risk a large war in Laos. Also, it was uncertain whether it was suitable to use force in solving the problem. It preferred to negotiate with the Soviet Union in order to avoid a collision between the great powers.

The United States' decision was a hard fact for Thailand to accept. Thailand concluded that "if the United States would not be firm in resisting Communist pressure in Laos, what certainty was there that it would be firm when and if Thailand were faced with a similar threat of indirect aggression?"⁴¹

In May 1961, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Thailand to reassure it of the United States' determination to protect Thailand, and to offer more economic and military aid. But Johnson's visit could not entirely erase the "disillusionment" felt in Thailand. The Thai government reacted strongly to show its disappointment. It started to consider a change to a neutral foreign policy. It considered adopting a policy of "Thaism" or improving relations with the Soviet Union to counter-balance Communist China's influence. It even considered quitting SEATO.

On SEATO Day (September 8, 1961), Prime Minister

⁴¹Nuechterlein, "Thailand and SEATO: A Ten-year Appraisal," p. 1179.

Sarit charged that SEATO had become weak because of the lack of unanimity among the members. Thus he proposed that the organization be reformed. Because the interests of certain members were not similar to those of the majority, Sarit would like to replace the SEATO unanimity clause with majority rule. He also sought to give wider powers to the Secretary-General. Sarit declared that he would like SEATO to be refashioned,

in such a way as to inject into it a new sense of purposefulness and dedication to make it an organization composed of members who completely share the same thought and interests, the same hopes and aspirations, whose fundamental goal is to safeguard and maintain peace and welfare in Southeast Asia and who are ready to make common sacrifices to build up a bastion against impending danger.⁴²

The 1962 American Pledges

Thailand's confidence in the United States was restored by two events. The first one was a joint declaration of the Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman and Secretary of State Dean Rusk on March 6, 1962, which was an American guarantee of Thailand's security. The statement declared:

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State reviewed the close association of Thailand and the United States in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and agreed that such association is an effective deterrent to direct Communist aggression against Thailand. They agreed that the Treaty provides the basis for the signatories

⁴²"Sarit Criticizes SEATO," Bangkok Post, September 8, 1961, p. 1.

collectively to assist Thailand in case of Communist armed attack against that country.

The Secretary of State assured the Foreign Minister that in the event of such aggression, the United States intends to give full effect to its obligation under the Treaty to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this obligation of the United States does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual as well as collective.⁴³

The American pledge brought renewed confidence and good will between the two countries. The Thai government was full of praise for the United States and Prime Minister Sarit hailed the United States as a true friend.

Another event which helped restore Thailand's confidence in the United States was its action in the crisis in May 1962. The Pathet Lao assisted by the North Vietnamese forces captured the town of Nam Ta in northwestern Laos. General Phoumi's forces were routed Southward across the Mekong into Thai territory at Chiang Kham. This situation convinced the Thai government that the Communists had broken the cease-fire and were not likely to negotiate a political settlement. Thus Thailand called for United States assistance. In response, President Kennedy sent 5,000 marine, army, and air force personnel to be stationed at Udon Thani in northeastern Thailand, only forty miles from the Laotian capital. Shortly there-

⁴³"Secretary Rusk, Thai Foreign Minister Discuss Matters of Mutual Concern," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XLVI, March 26, 1962, pp. 498-499.

after, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand also dispatched military units to assist in the defense of Thailand.

The Pathet Lao offensive was stopped within a few weeks. The American determination to protect Thailand's borders had stopped the Communist occupation of the territory along the Mekong River, and had forced them to negotiate instead.

The Geneva Conference of 1962 ended with the setting-up of a coalition government in Laos. The government was headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma and it included the neutralist, rightist as well as Communist factions. Though Thailand was not pleased with the solution, it signed the Geneva Agreements of July 23, 1962. This was because it was finally convinced that Prince Souvanna Phouma was the only Laotian leader who could bring peace to Laos.⁴⁴

At the Geneva Conference, Laos presented its statement of neutrality which declared that it would not "recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition."⁴⁵ Since then, the United States and other SEATO allies have had a limited role in Laos.

On December 8, 1963, Sarit died after a short illness. Though Sarit was known as an absolute dictator, he was often praised as a leader with a strong sense of responsibility toward his country and people. He was able to

⁴⁴Nuechterlein, "Thailand and SEATO: A Ten-year Appraisal," p. 1180.

⁴⁵Selected Agreements and Treaties Affecting Southeast Asia (Bangkok: SEATO Headquarters, 1970), p. 62.

stabilize Thailand's disorganized government and declining economy, and suppressed official corruption. He took harsh measures against Communist infiltration. When Communist guerrillas increased their campaign of subversion in the poor northeast provinces of Thailand, Sarit launched a \$300 million program of economic, medical and educational development that undercut the Communist threat there. He created national unity through the enhancement of traditional values as represented by Buddhism and the monarchy.

In the "domino" view of Southeast Asia, Thailand, under the Sarit regime, always stood firm, surrounded by wavering neighbors in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Burma.⁴⁶ Sarit's determination to solve the Laotian problems motivated Thailand to take a strong political role in SEATO.

The Thanom Kittikachorn Administration (1963-1971)

Sarit was succeeded as Prime Minister by General Thanom Kittikachorn who was Sarit's senior Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. General Prapat Charusathian, a powerful figure, remained Minister of the Interior, Thanat Khoman, the able and outspoken Foreign Minister of Sarit's regime, retained his position. Prince Wan continued his position as Deputy Prime Minister. Another

⁴⁶"Death of Man," Time 82 (December 20, 1963): 18.

important man in the new government was Pote Sarasin, who had resigned his position as SEATO Secretary-General to become Minister of National Development. The Thanom government adopted the policies of the previous government in both domestic and foreign affairs. Thanom announced that his government would continue to be friends of the West and to combat Communism.⁴⁷

The new Premier assumed office at a time when Thailand was surrounded by political conflicts. In Vietnam, the Diem government was overthrown and the Viet Cong took the opportunity of the resulting confusion to launch more attacks in the Mekong Delta. In Laos, the civil war between the different factions threatened to occur again. Burma continued its fight with the dissident groups, and Cambodia moved into closer relations with Peking. Malaysia and the Philippines were quarreling with each other and with Indonesia over right to the North Borneo territories.⁴⁸

During the Thanom administration, the Communist threat to Thailand's security was intensified. After 1963, the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese increasingly infiltrated into northeastern Thailand, in order to create separatism among the eight million Thais of Lao ethnic origin. However, the extent to which it was in fact

⁴⁷Donald E. Nuechterlein, "Thailand After Sarit," Asian Survey 4 (May 1964): 846-847.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 842.

Communist inspired and/or Communist led and the numbers of participants involved have been subjects of a great deal of controversy and disagreement. In some of the areas with a large Lao population there were insurgents, often miscalled Communists, who were more accurately separatists--i.e., they sought to detach northeastern Thailand from Thai rule and either form a new state or join the Laotian nation.⁴⁹ In 1965, Peking established many subversive groups, such as a United Patriotic Front of Thailand and a Thai Independence Movement. It also supported the Malayan Chinese terrorists in the southern provinces of Thailand. At the end of 1965, Communist China's Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, announced that Thailand was the new target of Communist guerrilla warfare. This announcement was regarded by the Thai government as a declaration of war.⁵⁰

Hanoi and Peking also sponsored the Thailand Patriotic Front which aimed at the overthrow of the Thanom government and at cancelling all Thai-U.S. agreements on military, economic and technical aid. And for several years, Communist China had been building a highway from Yunnan Province, southwest across northern Laos and toward the Mekong River which is only twenty miles from the border

⁴⁹Robert F. Zimmerman, "Insurgency in Thailand," Problems of Communism 25 (May-June 1976): 18-20.

⁵⁰Daniel Wit, Thailand: Another Vietnam?, pp. 3-8.

of Thailand.⁵¹

As the Vietnam War increased in intensity, Thailand was more concerned about its own security. The North Vietnamese had long influenced the Communist insurgents in Thailand. During the 1920's, Ho Chi Minh was an active political organizer of Vietnamese communities in Thailand to support his revolutionary movement in French Indochina, these efforts becoming part of the beginnings of the Indochinese Communist Party which was formed in 1930. During 1931-33, the Indochinese party even moved its headquarters temporarily to Northeast Thailand to escape severe repression by the French colonial authorities in Indochina. Since 1951, the Thai-Lao insurgent leaders had been trained in North Vietnam for political activity in the northeast. The North Vietnamese government provided leadership and logistical support to the Thai insurgents; and, the Soviet Union and the Pathet Lao supplied them with small quantities of military aid. With about 70,000 Vietnamese in the northeast, North Vietnam might not find it difficult to create their insurgent organizations there.⁵²

Realizing the intention of North Vietnam to communize South Vietnam and later Thailand, the Thai government forcefully supported the enlarged war effort of the United

⁵¹Ibid., p. 6.

⁵²Melvin Gurtov, Southeast Asia Tomorrow: Problems and Prospects for United States Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 16-17.

States in the defense of South Vietnam. Two significant aspects of the Thai government's contribution to the Vietnam War were as follows:

1. In 1964, the Thai government, under the "contingency plan," granted to the United States the use of its six air bases⁵³ in northeastern Thailand and a large naval base at Sattahip. From these bases, American aircraft were able to bomb targets in Vietnam and Laos. By the end of 1967, 40,000 Americans were stationed in Thailand.

2. From 1966 on, Thailand provided combat troops to assist in the Vietnam War. The first Thai military force, called "The Queen's Cobra Regiment," was sent to Saigon in 1966. In October, the Thai government announced that it was willing to increase the size of its forces to 12,000 men if the United States would provide the training and equipment.⁵⁴

As in the case of the Laotian conflict, the Thai government wanted SEATO's military intervention in the Vietnam War. And similarly, SEATO could not take a direct formal role in Vietnam because of the lack of unanimity among its members. South Vietnam was the only Protocol state which had never renounced the protection of SEATO

⁵³The air bases are situated at Ubon, Udon, Nakhon Ratchasima, Nakhon Phanom, Utapao, and Takhli.

⁵⁴Frank C. Darling, "Thailand: Stability and Escalation," Asian Survey VIII (February 1968): 124-125.

contained in the Protocol to the Manila Pact.

At the tenth meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers in Manila in 1964, all aspects of the armed attack on Vietnam were seriously considered. The Council reaffirmed in its communique its belief that the defeat of the communist campaign was necessary not only for the security of South Vietnam, but also for that of Southeast Asia. Thus it was agreed that:

. . . . the members of SEATO should remain prepared if necessary, to take further concrete steps within their respective capabilities of fulfillment of their obligations under the Treaty.⁵⁵

France disassociated itself from the communique because it had a different position on Vietnam problems. It wanted the problems to be settled on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements. In solving them, it preferred a political solution in the form of neutralization of South Vietnam. But the other members considered that such a step would be only a device for turning South Vietnam over to the Communist.⁵⁶ At the next meetings of the SEATO Council, in London in 1965 and Canberra in 1966, France refused to take part in the meetings, but was represented by an observer.⁵⁷

⁵⁵Dean Rusk, "The Situation in the Western Pacific," SEATO Record 3 (October 1964): 20-21.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 21.

⁵⁷"The Position of France," SEATO Record 4 (June 1965): 20.

It was not until 1966 that the United States government declared that, "it is this fundamental SEATO obligation that has guided our actions in Vietnam."⁵⁸ The United States position in Vietnam was overwhelmingly supported by most of the SEATO members. Australia and New Zealand sent more combat troops to South Vietnam, and Thailand allowed the United States to use its territory for American airbases.

France and Pakistan were the two opponents of SEATO's position on Vietnam. France was absent from the SEATO ministerial meeting held in Washington, D.C., in April of 1967. It boycotted the meeting because it opposed Secretary Dean Rusk's statement which linked SEATO with the Vietnam war; and, it did not want to create the impression that it was in any way even remotely associated with the Vietnam War. It also considered that SEATO members' "initiatives" in the war violated the Organization's rule of unanimity.⁵⁹

Like France, Pakistan emphasized its support for a return to the 1954 Geneva Agreements as a basis for settlement in Vietnam. Since that meeting, Pakistan continued to attend the annual meetings in an observer status, while France stopped attending the meetings in

⁵⁸Quoted in Roger H. Hull and John C. Novogrod, Law and Vietnam (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968), p. 136.

⁵⁹Henry Tanner, "France Explains Boycott of SEATO," The New York Times, April 19, 1967, p. 5.

any capacity.

Thailand's representative at the meeting, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, expressed displeasure with the refusal of France and Pakistan to aid the Allied Military cause materially. He criticized the members which derived benefits from the alliance without accepting obligations and responsibilities. Australian representatives shared a similar view with Thanat.

In 1968, Thailand was disturbed by the United States policy toward withdrawal from the Vietnam War. In response to the U.S. withdrawal, Thanat called for greater cooperation in Southeast Asia. There should be less reliance on non-Asian countries to enable countries in the region to fill the vacuum that would be created by a U.S. withdrawal from the area. Thanat reiterated his willingness to hold talks with Peking to ensure peace and security in Asia. He also gave the "green light" to a proposed trade mission to the Soviet Union and east European countries, and for the establishment of an embassy in Yugoslavia.

Thanat's Soviet initiative might have been a straw in the wind. If in the seventies the U.S. would withdraw from its commitments from the area, the USSR might become available to aid Thailand in resisting what appeared to be a China-based threat. This type of thinking was reflected in a September 9, 1968 article in Siam Rath, which urged that:

(We should use) our heads to think where our national interest and our hope of survival lie, to what extent we can rely on our allies, how much we have to stand on our own two feet, and how free we are to dictate our foreign policy.⁶⁰

The next stage in the relations between Thailand and the major powers (other than the U.S.), or between Thailand and the ASEAN countries, will probably depend to a large extent on the actions of the U.S. in Asia.

Summary

In the nineteenth century, Thailand was the only Southeast Asian country to retain its independence, partly because of King Mongkut's ability to make the necessary accommodations with the European colonialist powers and partly because of Thailand's good fortune that the British and French preferred an independent buffer between their respective colonial empires to a long, common boundary. Again, Thai policy in World Wars I and II can be cited as proof of the correctness of the image of Thailand as a bamboo bending with the prevailing wind.

However, a new pattern--the appearance of different ways to respond to the external factors by different types of Thai governments--is evident after this period. After World War II, Civilian Prime Minister Pridi tried to establish regional cooperation between Southeast Asian states as free and independent states, although the French rejected

⁶⁰ See: Kenneth Young, "Thailand's Role in Southeast Asia," Current History 56 (February 1969): 97.

the plan. When Field Marshal Pibun came to power, he rejected this policy of neutralism and entered the American-sponsored SEATO.

The successive military governments of Pibun, Sarit and Thanom benefited from the competitive great power environment of the 1950s and 1960s to fashion and maintain an alliance with the United States. The Thai leaders hoped the alliance would check what they regarded as hostile influences on Laos and Cambodia so that these countries would remain as buffer states, of little threat to Thai security and susceptible to Thai access and influence. Even in its heyday, the American alliance did not fully meet all Thai expectations and hopes. During the Laotian crises, Thailand had to accept a coalition government in Laos which included elements hostile to the Thai government rather than a right-wing government closely linked to Thailand. In the Vietnam War, the Thai advocated stronger American military action against Hanoi. The alliance was for many years highly rewarding to successive Thai military governments. The change of American policy toward Southeast Asia in 1968, would similarly determined the tone of Thailand's foreign policy during the 1970's.

CHAPTER II

DECLINE OF AMERICAN PROFILE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia and the Nixon Doctrine

The disappointment with the intervention in Vietnam, the political crisis it had created within the United States, and the deterioration of relations with other nations which had resulted from the Vietnam war, led to a revision of the foreign policy principles as announced by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. In the course of a tour of Asian countries, which President Richard M. Nixon undertook between July 25 and August 1, 1969, the new look was stated and explained in presidential speeches and informal remarks.

In a press conference held on the island of Guam on July 25, 1969, the President said among other things:

If the U.S.A. just continued on the road of responding to requests for assistance, of assuming the primary responsibility for defending these countries when they had international or external problems, they were never going to take care of themselves.¹

In an exchange of formal greetings in Bangkok, on

¹Keessing's Contemporary Archives, (London, 1969), 23509.

July 28, President Nixon explained that the nations of Asia can and must increasingly shoulder the responsibility for achieving peace and progress. He went on:

The challenge to our wisdom is to support the Asian countries' efforts to defend and develop themselves, without attempting to take from them the responsibilities which should be theirs. For if domination by the aggressor can destroy the freedom of a nation, too much dependence on a protector can eventually erode its dignity.²

Gradually the general lines of a foreign policy doctrine emerged which was to be applied not only to Asia, where it was originally announced, but to all parts of the world where the United States had assumed responsibilities. Its central idea is to limit American intervention. Whereas the United States would keep its treaty commitments for the maintenance of international security, it would in the future refrain from militarily intervening in the case of internal disturbances. Assistance in such situations would be limited to material help if requested excluding the kind of support which would involve the commitment of American manpower. This new attitude became soon to be called the doctrine of Guam or the Nixon Doctrine.

The overarching principle of the Doctrine is that, in contrast with past American practice, interests will determine commitments. "We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because

²"Bangkok, Thailand: Exchange of Greetings, Phan Fah Bridge Pavilion, July 28," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LXI, August 25, 1969, p. 154.

we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."³ On Guam, Nixon laid down three policy principles:

- First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
- Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
- Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the man-power for its defense.⁴

The first point to note is that the Doctrine excluded any reconsideration of existing commitments, such as those arising from the Vietnam War, the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, the SEATO pact, or that portion of the 1962 Rusk-Thanat communique⁵ which appeared to promise U.S. involvement in Thailand to combat "subversion" as well as "aggression." Such commitments clearly do determine U.S. interests.

The Doctrine's relevance hence was narrowed to the

³U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace (Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 25, 1971), cited hereafter as Nixon Report 1971.

⁴Speech of November 13, 1969; text in William P. Rogers, United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, March 1971), p. 324.

⁵The Doctrine excluded any reconsideration of the SEATO pact but the Doctrine, of course, had an impact on its disintegration. See "Impact of Nixon Doctrine on SEATO's Disintegration in this chapter, and "The Demise of SEATO" in Chapter V infra.

question of future commitments. But a careful reading of the President's foreign policy reports does not afford a basis for confidence that the criteria governing U.S. interests in Asia changed much. The United States remained committed to "averting great power dominance over Asia;" U.S. interests were still said to be "important," "basic," "substantial," and "deep" in Asia's security.⁶ "Interests," in short, were assumed rather than defined, implying anew that military and or political commitments to protect those interests would be forthcoming. The spasmodic reactions to Asian crises that in past years have characterized U.S. policy and determined U.S. interests seem destined to continue under President Nixon.

The other side of the Nixon Doctrine, which the administration also stressed, was Asian self-help. In the president's phrase, "Asian hands must shape the Asian future." More specifically, pro-American Asian regimes were to be strengthened militarily so that in the suppression of the "insurgencies" they could shoulder a major part of the burden borne up to that time by the U.S. At the same time, the United States would stand by with its nuclear arsenal and tactical support, honoring its commitments and be vigilant against external aggression.

While the primary thrust of the doctrine was military,

⁶See the East Asia sections of the Nixon Report 1971 and the Nixon Report 1972 (U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 9, 1972).

the economic side was not ignored. Here the president stressed interregional cooperation-"Asian initiatives in an Asian framework"-abetted by "multinational" corporations and organizations. At the same time, however, it was acknowledged that in both military and economic matters, "Japan's partnership with us will be a key to the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia."⁷

President Nixon has long been an outspoken advocate of regional security cooperation "as a counterforce to the designs of China."⁸ Nixon conceived of an all-Asian multilateral appeal for U.S. assistance or intervention as the most desirable future way "to insure that a U.S. response will be forthcoming if needed. . . ."⁹ Although regional cooperation was increasing on the economic side, security cooperation had not markedly advanced. In the absence of further progress in regional security, the Administration's policy seemed to make Indonesia the focal point of a regional consensus favorable to U.S. policies.

The United States as a Pacific Power and Cost-Consciousness

The Nixon Doctrine was fundamentally a cost-conscious policy, aimed at maintaining a major U.S. role in Asia

⁷"Japan and the Nixon Doctrine," The New York Times, November 4, 1969, p. 4.

⁸Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs XLVI (October 1967): 124.

⁹Ibid., p. 114.

at less cost in both dollars and American lives. President Nixon believed that the United States had a destiny to be a Pacific power.¹⁰ Consequently, the U.S. couldnot withdraw from Asia without undoing all that long-term involvement, capped by the Vietnam War. The United States was obliged "to fashion the sinews of a Pacific community"-one in which military and economic strength are coordinated, China could be counterposed with "a concert of Asian strengths," Japan can play "an increasing role," and the United States would exercise discreet leadership.¹¹ One key benefit of a substantial withdrawal of manpower from Asia would be that this could permit reduction of the defense budget and provide a substantial check on the "dollar drain".

Impact of Nixon Doctrine on SEATO's Disintegration

By July 1969, when the Nixon Doctrine was made public at Guam, it had become apparent that an American reevaluation concerning United States Asian commitments had culminated in President Nixon's decision to shift primary responsibility for the defense of South Vietnam and other Southeast Asian nations from United States military forces to those indigenous forces of nations "which might be threatened by Communist aggression."

¹⁰Ibid., p. 112.

¹¹Ibid., p. 124.

While the President contended that Southeast Asian nations welcomed this shift,¹² SEATO's Secretary-General Vargas warned that any restraint on American involvement in Asian security affairs or American deference to an all-Asian security arrangement inevitably would constitute credibility problems for American bilateral defense arrangements in Asia. It would also force Southeast Asian nations to contemplate accommodation with Communist insurgency movements in their region.¹³ This analysis coincided with Robert Osgood's analysis on the nature of Asian alliance systems:

. . . there is little prospect of the emergence in the next decade or two of regional or subregional balances of power and systems of order--or disorder--based on indigenous alliances among the underdeveloped states. Regional organizations like ASEAN . . . may provide useful international political experience to new states and somewhat dampen intraregional tensions, but they cannot perform peace-keeping or collective security functions and they show little promise of acting as significant constraints against external aggression. . . .¹⁴

Despite the expressed reservations of those who feared that United States political retrenchment and military withdrawal would result in the United States relinquishing effective influence over Asian affairs and/or

¹²"Pursuit of Peace in Vietnam," November 3, 1969 address of President Nixon, reprinted in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LXI, November 24, 1969, p. 440.

¹³"Asia's Balance of Power," SEATO Record 8 (April 1969): 13.

¹⁴Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 107.

the means to deal with unwanted contingencies in that region, the American initiative toward a "winding down" of commitments in Southeast Asia accelerated from 1969 onward. A clear tendency inherent in that "winding down" process constantly emerged: that future United States policy toward SEATO and toward Southeast Asia as a whole would be basically reactive in nature, contingent upon the "changing conditions" now present in the area.¹⁵ Yet, other than a few vague references to "the end of the cold war" or to the retention of Asian treaties by the United States on a "nonbinding" basis, there seemed to have been little effort made by American policy officials to redefine specifically the SEATO commitment or the future American role in the organization within the context of the Nixon Doctrine or related United States policy statements. Without significant efforts for clarification by the Nixon Administration, members of Congress and other interested parties increasingly questioned the need for maintaining SEATO at all.

Uncertainty about SEATO's purpose pervaded other members of the alliance. With the election of Labor governments in both Australia and New Zealand in late 1972, Prime Ministers Whitlam and Kirk both expressed their reservations over SEATO's ability to maintain a "balance

¹⁵See February 15, 1973 News Conference of Secretary of State William Rogers in U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LXVIII, March 5, 1973, p. 254.

of power" in Southeast Asia. Only strong warnings by the U.S. State Department to Canberra and Wellington, coupled with Thai-Filipino unhappiness over further dissolution of SEATO after Pakistani, French, and British objections toward it became more manifest, prevented Australia and New Zealand from leaving the organization.¹⁶ Until SEATO's eventual demise in late 1975,¹⁷ both the Australian and New Zealand governments continued to regard the organization critically.¹⁸

The Nixon Doctrine in Action

The troop withdrawals, base reduction, China diplomacy, and self-help rhetoric notwithstanding, the Nixon Doctrine in action, especially on the Southeast Asia mainland, appears not to be a great departure from past U.S. policy.

The most careful unclassified study of the air war, the Cornell study,¹⁹ estimates that during 1971,

¹⁶Robert Trumbell, "Leaders Decide New Zealand and Australia Stay in SEATO," The New York Times, January 22, 1973, p. 7. Also see Keith Sinclair, "New Zealand's Metamorphosis," and Peter King, "Whither Whitlam?" International Journal 39 (Summer 1974): 412-440.

¹⁷See, "The Demise of SEATO" in Chapter V infra.

¹⁸Whitlam cancelled an Australian commitment to participate on October 1973 SEATO naval maneuvers by recalling the four warships slated to be present at the exercises. Wolfgang Pollak, "What Does SEATO Stand for Today," Aussen Politik 26 (March-April 1975): 254.

¹⁹Center for International Studies, Cornell University, The Air War in Indochina, November 1971, as summarized by the Indochina Resource Center (Washington, D.C.).

about 270,000 tons of bombs were dropped on South Vietnam (down from about 1 million tons in 1968), over 400,000 tons on Laos (more than double the 1968 level), and about 90,000 tons on Cambodia (Zero in 1968). The amount dropped on North Vietnam under "protective reaction" was drastically reduced from over 150,000 tons in 1968. The changed pattern of U.S. air attacks--less in North and South Vietnam, more in Laos and Cambodia--was also reflected in the deployment of U.S. air power. U.S. bases in South Vietnam were being closed or transferred to the Vietnamese, whose strength in aircraft and personnel was going up. U.S. air strength was moving almost entirely to Thailand and carriers in the South China Sea (B-52s would continue operating from Guam and Okinawa as well as Thailand).

The extensive bombing in Indochina was perfectly compatible with the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization. Bombing was less costly, financially and politically, than continued ground force involvement, which was then left to the Indochinese allies. Bombing could not "win" the war--a lesson learned from Johnson's ROLLING THUNDER Campaign--but it could punish the other side from continuing it (thus, "protective reaction"); it could also prevent the opponent from winning by keeping him off balance, disrupting new offensives and diminishing his ability to keep his forces well supplied. The fact that increasing numbers of persons in Indochina were killed or left homeless

because of the bombing,²⁰ and the high likelihood that the Vietnamese Communists and their allies in Laos and Cambodia would not (any more than before) be persuaded by bombing to accept U.S. peace terms, did not appear to enter into Nixon's calculations.

In Laos, the Nixon Administration's innovations in the bombing program included increased attacks in the Southeastern (Ho Chi Minh Trails) sector, heavy bombing in northern Laos using B-52s for the first time, the use of helicopter gunships in combat, and a shift of the tactical command of air operations to Air Force headquarters in Thailand.

The intense bombing in the Laotian panhandle, without precedent in modern warfare, was supplemented toward the end of 1970 by the use of helicopter gunships in direct support of Lao ground soldiers²¹ (although engaged in combat, the U.S. helicopter personnel were officially said not to be combat troops). So much concentrated air power evidently increased pressure on Washington from the Air Force and CIA to take prior approval of Laos air operations out of the hands of the American Embassy in Vientiane. During 1971 it was reported that USAF tactical headquarters in Udorn, Thailand, had

²⁰See George Mct. Kahin, "One-Third of a Nation Uprooted," New Republic, August 7-14, 1971, pp. 19-21.

²¹"U.S. Is Now Flying Copter Missions For Laos Troops," The New York Times, January 20, 1971, p. 1

assumed that responsibility--a major policy shift that promised increased bombing.

CIA and Thai involvement in Laos, which had its parallel in Special Forces and South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia, pointed up the weakness of Congressionally imposed financial restrictions on covert and proxy warfare under the Nixon Doctrine. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of January 1971 included an amendment--the so-called Fulbright amendment--that was specifically designed to prohibit U.S. funding of Thai or South Vietnamese intervention in Laos or Cambodia.²²

As for Thailand, the Thai government officials publicly and privately expressed concern that the Nixon Doctrine would mean sharp cutbacks in U.S. military assistance, upon which Thailand had relied since 1950. But, while the total value of U.S. military aid to Thailand had apparently declined since 1969, it remained substantial; and, Secretary Laird had reportedly assured Bangkok that it could continue to count on U.S. support for the next decade.²³ In fact, for Thailand the Nixon Doctrine seemed

²²The amendment states that no military funds shall be used to support "Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos" except as required to ensure U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam or to aid in the release of prisoners of war.

²³"U.S. Policy Made in Favour of Thailand," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XI (January-March 1971): 47.

only to mean a streamlining of U.S. assistance rather than a reassessment of the program or the commitment that underlied it.

Nevertheless, the form that the Nixon Doctrine and "self-reliance" had taken in Thailand, because it did not represent a significant change from previous Administrations, left ample room for skepticism. Since the bombing of Indochina was the key part of the Administration's Indochina policy, the U.S. presence in Thailand was likely to continue for a long time to come, as witness the 1972-73 restoration of U.S. force levels to 50,000 after having been reduced to 32,000 in 1971. This circumstance was bound not only to exacerbate political tensions in Thailand, generated by opponents of the military government as well as by leftist forces. It was also bound to inhibit Thailand's avowed interest in improving relations with China, whose leaders were very unlikely to respond to direct and third-country Thai overtures while U.S. Thai-based aircraft were bombing their Indochina allies and while Thai troops operated in Laos.

In 1972 the United States added A37B Skyraider jets to the Thai air force's counter-insurgency arsenal. Although the Thai situation was different from Vietnam, and although Thai officials and their U.S. advisors were determined that there should not be another Vietnam in Thailand, the U.S. assistance program ran the risk of

helping a military regime with substantial firepower at its disposal to repeat the "military solution" that had failed in Vietnam.

The Military Government under the 1968 Constitution
(1969-1971)

In 1968, the Thanom Government was not an elected one, and there was as yet no parliamentary means whereby it could be turned out of office. The constitution proclaimed in June, 1968, provided for the election of only one house of the national legislature, with the executive in no way technically responsible to the Parliament. The United Thai People's party, which made the strongest single party showing in the February, 1969, voting (the first national election in more than a decade) was not really a ruling party. It was a partially successful device designed primarily to legitimize the military regime. The Democratic party, which swept all the seats in the capital area in the February balloting, had started to seek changes in the constitution and had secured support from some other opposition and independent elements. The Democrats wanted to make the Cabinet responsible to the legislature.²⁴

Many observers of the Thai political scene predicted the replacement of the pro-liberalization Thanom Kittikachorn

²⁴"Prachatipat Rong Plien Ratamanoon" ("Democrats asked for changes in the Constitution"), Siam Rath, September 15, 1969, p. 1.

government by another coup, led by strongman General Prapat, in the event that the legislature got out of control and tried to unseat the government or threatened its budget. This was certainly the old Thai way of doing things. But 1969 was not 1947 or 1958, and Vietnam had provided a rather painful illustration of what happened when a regime lost the support of the people. This was one reason why Prime Minister Thanom pushed so hard for the 1968 constitution and the ensuing elections, despite the objection of General Prapat.²⁵

The main props of state authority in Thailand were likely to remain the country's popular monarch and royal family, and Buddhism, the nation's religious faith. To these traditional elements a consensual base might be added if Thailand could continue on her moderately liberalizing course. The army and civil service had been the backbone of Thai politics for more than a generation, and the time was probably ripe for the partnership's expansion to include more members of the new (and by no means wholly Chinese) business elite as well as the mass of the population through their elected representatives. Insurgents, especially those aided materially from abroad, could conquer popular as well as unpopular governments, but the feat was more difficult. Thailand might well be the place where communism

²⁵Ibid., p. 16.

was finally defeated in Southeast Asia.

Thai-American Relations

The lifting of martial law for the election campaign provided the opportunity for candidates and journalists to raise critical questions about the Thai-American alliance. Opposition party candidates in particular campaigned against the government's "total reliance on the United States" and the "unseemly conduct" of American troops in Thailand. Military aid was upsetting the social balance in Thailand because it went to a very few people. Field marshals, air marshals, and admirals placed themselves in position to accept directions from their American benefactor. Thus, when Washington proposed to build air fields, and to man them with Americans and subsequently to fly bombers from the fields for the Vietnamese war, the military could not resist. Thailand also accepted American troops without a time-limit, and permitted the United States to use these bases for bombing neighbors not hostile to Thailand.

Unlike the open welcome of the American soldiers in 1961 to prevent Communist insurgency from Laos, subsequent military operations were kept officially secret. When these operations became known, the permission for American use of Thai bases fell not to the military but to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The very size of the aid was corroding the integrity of the chains. Highly placed recipients, like the late Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat, opened accounts

at Swiss banks and bought luxurious mansions for their mistresses instead of passing funds along to the more integral parts of their chain of dependents.²⁶

In fact, the fundamental objective of Thai-American co-operation was to achieve peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia. To attain such an objective, Thailand did not need to lure the United States into committing itself in Southeast Asia. Although the U.S. moved toward a "low-profile" policy, as a world power with worldwide responsibility it has, and undoubtedly will always have, interests in ensuring peace and stability in Southeast Asia as in other parts of the world.

Like in the previous years, Thailand's foreign affairs in 1969 were dominated by Thai-US relations. In February, with Thailand already deeply committed to the U.S. cause in Vietnam and the Nixon administration yet to give a clearcut policy on the war, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman said the U.S. would be asked to withdraw military forces from Thai bases after the war. Thailand would rely on its own forces to combat communist guerilla activities, he said, and would ask outside help only in the event of largescale conflict.²⁷ It should be noted

²⁶Lucien M. Hanks, "American Aid Is Damaging Thai Society," Trans-action 5 (October 1968): 31.

²⁷"Prospects of a New Pax Asiana, Delivered by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman at the East-West Center, Hawaii," on March 9, 1969 printed in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) IX (January-March 1969): 14.

that the Thai attitude toward what is generally known as a communist "peoples war" or "war of national liberations", is that the local people are best equipped to deal with it rather than outsiders. The local people know the mentality of each other, the terrain, and other minor problems; and, communist guerrilla warfare or wars of national liberation, in order to be successful, had to depend almost entirely on support from the local people. Thailand, therefore, needed outside help only in the event of the need to cope with conventional warfare.

But in June, as President Nixon announced withdrawal of 25,000 U.S. troops from Vietnam following his Midway meeting with President Nguyen Van Thieu, Thanat appeared considerably more flexible, declaring America could seek permission to keep troops in Thailand after the Vietnam withdrawal.²⁸

Senator Fulbright's opposition to expanded military aid to Thailand on the grounds that such aid would lead to "another Vietnam" greatly annoyed the Bangkok government; nonetheless, Fulbright's was an opposition voice. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's August 21, 1969, statement that the Nixon administration did not feel bound by the 1965 contingency plan was a different matter. Laird was the President's top civilian defense adviser, not a congressional

²⁸"Foreign Minister on Government's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) IX (April-June 1969):
80.

critic. The Nixon administration appeared to be wavering on the subject of the President's public statement in Bangkok in July that "the United States will stand proudly" against those who "might threaten" Thailand "from abroad or within." During his mid-1969 trip to Southeast Asia, President Nixon had promised the Thai increased military assistance. But Thanat wondered whether the President would honor his promise in view of congressional fears that such help would lead the United States into "another Vietnam." On August 22, Thanat called for talks on the withdrawal of United States forces from Thailand.²⁹ The talks began on September 1.

Most pointedly Thanat suggested "an immediate evacuation so there is no opportunity for United States forces to be used to fight subversive activities launched by the Communists against Thailand."³⁰ The Americans and the Thai subsequently and quickly agreed that there would be no withdrawal of United States combat forces from Thailand that would in any way diminish the war effort in Vietnam.

Thanat's call for talks on the withdrawal of United States forces from Thailand was partly designed to remind

²⁹The New York Times dispatch in the Herald-Tribune (Paris), August 30-31, 1969.

³⁰"Talks on U.S. Troops Withdrawal from Thailand," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) IX (July-September 1969): 83.

the United States that the Thai--not colonized in the heyday of European colonialism--were masters in their own house and controlled their own foreign policy. In August, 1969, that control seemed to be diminishing. Secretary Laird seemed to be saying that the Nixon administration was not bound by the commitments of its predecessors, and could change the terms of the Thai-United States defense relationship unilaterally. The Thai were not so independent as they had thought they were, and the Thanom government and its articulate foreign minister, Thanat, were not pleased.³¹

According to Thanat, however, the communist side was deprived of a very important propaganda item (namely that Thailand had been unable to cope with its own defence and had had to rely on foreign forces) since the Thais had declared their willingness to see American forces withdrawn from Thailand. The declaration also served the interests of both the United States and Thailand. This was the reason why Thailand suggested to the United States Government that it enter into discussions to redeploy and to withdraw those forces in conformity with the requirements of the war in Vietnam, although Thailand had no desire of hastening the withdrawal of those forces. If and when such forces would become unnecessary, then such forces

³¹"American Ton Tahan" ("The U.S. Withdrawal"), Siam Rath, August 24, 1969, p. 3.

might be withdrawn.³²

President Nixon's September 17, 1969, announcement of a further withdrawal of 35,000 United States forces from Vietnam (making a total withdrawal of 60,000) was not communicated beforehand to the Thanom government. The Bangkok response was a sharp reminder that Thailand was a United States ally and that allies ordinarily consult with one another on such matters.³³ It was apparently felt in Bangkok that the very brevity of the bombing halt was suggestive of a certain indecisiveness in the United States approach to Vietnam and, inferentially, towards the rest of Southeast Asia.³⁴ Shortly thereafter, Thanat reacted positively by calling for U.S.-Southeast Asia co-operation for mutual benefits as appeared in his speech at the Economic Club of Detroit:

Southeast Asia has actually had much less substantial assistance from the United States in the field of economic development either on a bilateral basis or through international organizations or institutions such as the United Nations or the World Bank. A far greater amount of

³²Extemporaneous Remarks by Dr. Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, at An Informal Meeting with Visiting Members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, Bangkok, November 7, 1969 as printed in Collected Statements of Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, 6 (October 1969-November 1970, Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs), pp. 23-25.

³³"Kan Tang Pratet" ("Foreign Relations"), Siam Rath Weekly Review, September 20, 1969, p. 10.

³⁴Ibid., p. 7.

assistance might be available once military expenditure in connection with the Vietnam War could be drastically reduced or totally devoted to more constructive uses.

At this juncture, it is convenient to note that the old concept of aid or assistance with strings attached has become obsolete. With the march of time, it is no longer fashionable to talk about aid or even about trade-and-aid. A more acceptable concept has emerged which may perhaps with accuracy be termed "mutual co-operation."³⁵

Thanat also deliberated the term "co-operation for mutual benefits." There are benefits to be derived by all concerned, donor and recipient countries alike. There are benefits accruing to both sides. Those transactions are grant aid, credit assistance, technical assistance, investment and trade. Some mutuality of benefits is self-evident, but for some transactions the donor country may be expected to derive long-term benefit from the economic growth and resulting stability of the recipient country either directly or as a potential market.

Thailand and Its Idea of Regionalism

According to Thanat, when the U.S. enunciated what is known as the Nixon Doctrine, the Thai approved of it and intended to work with President Nixon for the successful implementation of that policy. While welcoming co-operation for mutual benefits with the U.S. as well as other well-

³⁵Speech by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, "Mutual U.S.-Southeast Asia Co-operation in the Post-Vietnam Period," Detroit, October 6, 1969; as printed in Collected Statements of Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, pp. 17-18.

wishing outside powers, the countries of Southeast Asia should first and foremost rely on themselves, on their own strength and resources to promote peace and stability as well as the economic progress and prosperity of their respective peoples. In their efforts of national reconstruction and economic development, the Southeast Asian nations looked to their close neighbours for meaningful and productive co-operation. In all such co-operative endeavours, Thailand had not been found lacking in determination or initiative to promote closer partnership among like-minded developing countries.³⁶

Other than a regional co-operation of the most comprehensive nature, which is called ASEAN, a wider but more loosely organized regional association is the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) which came into being after the historic Meeting of Ministers in Seoul, the Republic of Korea, in 1966. Like ASEAN, it is also concerned with economic co-operation for the peace, progress and prosperity of its member nations. However, ASPAC has a wider range of membership from the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, the Republic of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Malaysia down to Australia and New Zealand. Unlike ASEAN, whose members are of the same or a similar stage of economic development, ASPAC has a mixture of three advanced and other less developed

³⁶Ibid., pp. 19-20.

countries.

Apart from the above regional co-operative efforts, Thailand participates in various other regional activities such as the Mekong River Project, the South East Asian Ministers of Education Council (SEAMEC), the Colombo Plan, the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia, and the Asian Development Bank. However ASEAN is the only organization which will be considered in this study.

In early June 1971, Thanom paid an official three-day visit to Malaysia. He told Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak that Thailand could not accept Malaysia's proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia because of China's support for insurgency against Thailand.³⁷ However, this view was criticized by Democratic Party parliamentary member Pichai Rattakul who labelled it as "nonsense" while describing Malaysia's proposal as "sound and logical."³⁸ Also Thanom and the army commander, General Prapat Charusathein, did not welcome President Nixon's attempt to shift much of the burden for defending Asia to Asians. On the other hand, Thanat and others of

³⁷"Prime Minister Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn's Official Visit to Malaysia," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XI (April-June 1971): 87.

³⁸"Pichai Sanubsanun Kwam Pen Klang Kong Malaysia" ("Pichai Agrees with Malaysia's Proposal for Neutralization of Southeast Asia"), Ban Muang, June 9, 1971, p. 3.

the ruling group had long favored closer relations among the various Southeast Asian lands. Thailand, a founding member of ASEAN in 1967 as well as of the predecessor ASA in 1961 and SEATO in 1954, might be expected to seek to strengthen ties with such countries as Indonesia and the Philippines after the war in Vietnam in an effort to bring new stability to troubled Southeast Asia. Thanat did not favor the regional military pact proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Thai foreign minister told correspondents in Bangkok in September 1969 that any future security grouping for the area must be primarily political, economic and social in character, not military.³⁹

The Thai government continued to reshape its foreign relations to meet the new realities. In speeches throughout the year, Thai government spokesmen reiterated two common themes which had been expressed rather perfunctorily in previous years but which appeared to be taken increasingly seriously: "we must depend on ourselves," and "we must build Southeast Asian regional alliances."⁴⁰ Thai foreign policy in this year included a revival of nationalism which took the form of an overt but non-militant anti-Americanism.

³⁹"Foreign Minister on Government's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) IX (July-September 1969): 85.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 86.

Thailand and the Sino-Soviet Competition

Thanat has on more than one occasion said he would be willing to have "serious talks" with Chinese and other Asian Communist leaders on matters affecting the peace and security of the area. Beginning late in 1970, considerable discussion in the Thai government was reported about the desirability and feasibility of improving relations with China.⁴¹

In April, 1971, after President Nixon's end to the embargo on trade between the U.S. and China, Thanat said that Thailand would not automatically follow the U.S. in ending its own trade ban but would adopt a cautious attitude before coming to any decisions regarding China. As the U.S. move began to be discussed in earnest, Thanom made a statement to the press in mid-May claiming there would be no change in Thailand's foreign policy as long as he remained head of Thailand's government. Thanat also stressed that there would not be any foreign policy changes.

But because of Thanat's previous admission that he was seeking "a dialogue" with Peking, a great deal of confusion developed. This led to a battle of words between the Thai press and Thanat after the foreign minister was quoted as saying that several Thai newspapers had accepted bribes from an unspecified foreign embassy in

⁴¹ "Minister of Foreign Affairs on China Policy," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) IX (January-March 1969): 17.

Bangkok. It later led to the arrest of three Thai newspaper editors who were charged with defamation of Thanat. In response, all news involving Thanat was declared "black" by Thai newspapers. The controversy was not resolved until early September when Thanom appealed for a compromise and the court case against the three editors was dropped.

In early July, Thanom informed his cabinet ministers that he opposed any commercial or other contact with China until Peking halted its support for communist insurgency in Thailand. Deputy Prime Minister Prapat also made it known that he opposed any sort of ties with China because of the opportunities he claimed would be opened for subversion among the Chinese minority in Thailand.⁴²

By early August it was reported that the Thai government was developing a "two China" policy of its own by not opposing admission of China into the United Nations but also voting to retain Taiwan in the international body. But by the end of the month Deputy Foreign Minister Sa-nga Kittikachorn had told a press conference that Thailand would either vote for China's entry or abstain. This was followed by Prapat expressing his personal view that Thailand should support China's admission.

Then, on September 10, the NSC (National Security

⁴²"Mayobai Tangpratet Thai" ("Thai Foreign Policy Review"), Siam Rath, January 5, 1972, p. 8.

Council) decided Thailand would vote "yes" for Peking. But Thailand, the NSC said, would also vote to retain Taiwan in the UN. According to Thanat, the admission of China was advantageous to Thailand because it would present an opportunity to establish a dialogue with Peking--without the necessity of establishing formal diplomatic relations. But before leaving for the UN General Assembly session, Thanat, on September 15, told newsmen that Thailand would recognize China after its UN entry.⁴³

This potential for increased flexibility toward the Communist World was further illustration of Thailand's pragmatic approach to the shifting relations among the major powers in the Southeast Asia region. It was not necessarily a sign of neutralist sentiment or readiness to accommodate to China--phrases that have often been used by foreign observers who have tended to overlook the essentially nonideological, hardheaded Thai interpretation of events on the basis of Thailand's national interest. It should also be noted that past experience also indicated that the Thai government had sometimes held out the possibility of improved relations, especially with the Soviet Union, as a means of inviting a strong American commitment to Thailand.

Although the Soviet Union had been accused at various times of providing the Communist insurgents with

⁴³Ibid., p. 10.

arms--an accusation based on the capture of Soviet-made weapons--the strongly anti-Soviet stance of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the Soviet unwillingness to support the Thai Communists improved prospects for more formalized Thai-Soviet ties. A thirty-man Thai trade mission visited the Soviet Union and six other East European countries in May and June of 1969.⁴⁴ The mission returned with a number of contracts. During the first half of 1970, trade agreements were concluded with Bulgaria and Rumania, followed by more intensive discussions with Soviet officials that led to the trade agreement on December 25, 1970.⁴⁵ Thai-Soviet agreement was also reached on May 6, 1971 to permit Aeroflot, the Soviet national airline, to have stopover privileges in Bangkok.⁴⁶

Thailand's partial opening of the door to China as announced by Thanat, and the negotiations that led, late in 1970, to the start of such official trade relations with the Soviet Union, could thus cut two ways: they might evidence Thailand's traditional sensitivity to the growing power and nearness of China at a time when the

⁴⁴"Thai Trade Mission Returned from the Soviet Union," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) IX (April-June 1969): 79.

⁴⁵"Thai-Soviet Trade Agreement Signed," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XI (January-March 1971): 77.

⁴⁶"Thai-Soviet Agreement on the Permission for the Soviet Airline to have Stopover in Bangkok Signed," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XI (April-June 1971): 74.

Laos situation remained uncertain, Soviet responsibilities continued to be important in North Vietnam and Laos, and the American presence in Asia might be reduced; or, they might also be intended to influence the United States against any significant reductions in either the American aid programs to Thailand or the American security commitment.

The Return to Absolute Military Rule (1971-1973)

During the previous years, the Thai ruling elite made a significant move in coping with the vagaries of the early post-Vietnam era by placing the Administration of its domestic affairs on a more stable and efficient basis. To the dismay of many observers, the Bangkok authorities interpreted the reduction of American military and economic support as justification for a lesser need to emulate Western styles of democracy and a far greater need to manage internal affairs in a more traditional manner. Like political leaders in Cambodia, South Vietnam and South Korea, the Thai leaders made a concrete move in this direction by abolishing the modest institutions of representative government which they had established in part to placate Western critics of authoritarian military rule. On November 17, 1971, they sent a few tanks and several hundred troops to selected spots in Bangkok and calmly announced that the constitution had been terminated and that Parliament was dissolved. They

proclaimed martial law and abolished the Cabinet. An official announcement of the Revolutionary party stated that this action:

. . . has been necessitated by the deteriorating situation within and outside the country and, in particular, the increasingly grave threat to the security of the nation and to the throne. The seriousness of the situation could not be dealt with effectively in ways other than the seizure of power and the adoption of appropriate revolutionary measures.⁴⁷

As in the past, the Thai government announced that this change in the political system involved no alteration in the nation's foreign policy.

Shortly thereafter, other reasons for the "coup" were cited by top government leaders. They voiced increasing fears caused by the Communist insurgency in the north, student demonstrations at universities in Bangkok, parliamentary obstruction in the elected legislature, adverse economic conditions resulting in a serious trade imbalance, the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, and the uncertain political orientation of the 3,000,000 Chinese residing in the country. The Thai leaders likewise cited the rising crime rate and the unorthodox social styles of Thai young people seeking to imitate the youth culture of the West.

The Thai military elite took the unprecedented action of forming a National Executive Council (NEC)

⁴⁷Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release No. 45, November 18, 1971.

rather than appointing a new Cabinet to administer the policies of the government. The NEC consisted of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn who had served as Prime Minister since 1963 and assumed the role of Chairman of the new "revolutionary council." General Prapat Charusathien became the Deputy Chairman of the NEC and continued to control the ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. Air Marshal Dawee Chullasaph retained authority over communications, agriculture, and development, while General Krit Sivara accepted the position of Secretary General of the NEC. In effect, these four military leaders assumed total control of the Thai government. The only civilian on the NEC was Pote Sarasin, a former Prime Minister and a leading administrator of economic, trade, and industrial affairs. Thanat Khoman, the former Foreign Minister, was removed from this top-level policy-making body. In another unprecedented action, the NEC did not appoint successor to Thanat's important post at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

While many Thai and foreign critics lamented this action by the Thai ruling regime, the abolition of modest constitutional government in November, 1971, reaffirmed the reality of political power in the Kingdom. In spite of rapid economic modernization and close diplomatic relations with Western democracies, the base of Thai politics continued to be military power. The democratic

facade erected by the 1968 constitution made it appear that a wider base of representative government was possibly being established. Yet the end of military tolerance with this representative facade caused it to be promptly removed. No other organized political force in the country could oppose this action.

The return to absolute military rule likewise reasserted the fact that the primary rationale of the Thai government was the protection of what it considered to be the national interest. The failure of elected representative in the Parliament to comport themselves in accordance with the welfare of the entire nation, rather than their own local constituency, was one of the prime reasons cited by the military leaders for the dissolution of Parliament and the reimposition of martial law. In the opinion of the ruling military leadership the reduction of American aid and military spending had created an urgent requirement for a tighter budget and new sources of income, not the generous and reckless spending of government funds for "pork barrel" projects throughout the Kingdom as sought by elected representatives in both the pro-government and opposition political parties.

Insurgency

The Thai wanted a modest number of United States forces to remain in their country after the war ended in Vietnam--but not to fight local insurrectionists in the

northern and northeastern parts of the nation. Premier Thanom had stated specifically that the Thai would not ask the United States to commit forces to an "insurgent war."⁴⁸ But the Thai saw no reason to believe that the Communist Vietnamese would desist from aggressive behavior in the future any more than they had in the past.

When abolishing the trappings of constitutional government, the Thai military leaders articulated their fear of the Communist insurgency in the north. Actually, they had been increasingly concerned about the three insurgencies operating within their national boundaries.

The insurgency in the Southern provinces along the Thai-Malaysian border involved the least number of insurgents (estimated at about 1,500 men); yet, it was the most complex dissident area because it contained three separate insurgent groups. The Malayan Communist party used Thai border territory primarily as a sanctuary and staging base. These Chinese Communist insurgents directed their guerrilla warfare activities largely at the Malaysian government, not toward Thailand. They were a nuisance to the Thai government, but not a serious threat. More dangerous was a Thai-Muslim separatist movement which directed its violence at Thai military forces in an effort to obtain the secession of the four Malay-populated provinces and

⁴⁸"The Pact with Thailand: Picking Words Carefully, Diplomats Try to Calm," National Observer, August 25, 1969.

to join the Malaysian federation. This dissident organization exploited Malay racial and religious grievances and received considerable financial support from criminal elements in this prosperous region.⁴⁹

The insurgency in the depressed northeastern provinces has been active since the mid-1950's. The estimated 2,000 dissidents in this region received only intermittent material support (via Laos) from Communist China and North Vietnam, and they also possessed a variety of Chinese, Russian, and American weapons.

The insurgency in the north, cited by the Thai military leaders as a major reason for the November, 1971 coup, received widespread publicity due to increasing attacks by insurgent forces. The dissident group in this area consisted largely of Meo tribesmen led by Thai and Thai-Chinese Communists trained at special camps in North Vietnam by Chinese Communists.⁵⁰ Increasing insurgent activity was abetted by the migration of Meo tribespeople from areas of military operations in Burma and Laos to lowland sections in northern Thailand which had been occupied by landless Thai-Lao villagers moving from

⁴⁹For more detailed discussions of insurgence in Thailand see, for examples; Jeffrey Race, "Thailand 1973: 'We Certainly have been Ravage by Something'" Current History XIV (February 1974): 192-203; Zimmerman, "Insurgency in Thailand," pp. 18-39.

⁵⁰Frank C. Darling, "Thailand: De-escalation and Uncertainty," Asian Survey IX (February 1969): 116.

poverty-stricken regions in the northeast. The insurgency in this vulnerable region was the internal rebellion in Thailand most directly supported by Communist China. Approximately 50 percent of the insurgents had Chinese weapons.⁵¹

In March, 1972, the Thai government launched the largest military operation in the nation's history against the insurgents in this northern "tri-border" area. For several weeks, some 12,000 Thai army troops sought to destroy the insurgent forces estimated at a few hundred men. This operation yielded few concrete results. The guerrilla leaders had been warned in advance of the government dragnet and only a few prisoners were captured by Thai government forces. The withdrawal of army troops from this sensitive region shortly thereafter again left the area open to renewed insurgent activity. Yet the Thai military leaders and some American military advisers were pleased with the operation in spite of its meager results.⁵² It proved that Thai military forces could operate on a large scale and maintain sustained military action over a very difficult terrain. It marked the end of nearly total official indifference to remote insurgent bases. It indicated to the people of the northern lowlands

⁵¹ "Insurgency in Thailand," The New York Times, March 18, 1972, p. 8.

⁵² Ibid., p. 10.

that the central government was increasingly concerned with their security and welfare.

Thai-American Relations

In the realm of foreign policy, the Thai government showed its greatest uncertainty and fear since the beginning of the Nixon doctrine. Much confusion was generated in Bangkok by the rapid withdrawal of American military forces from South Vietnam and the American detente with the People's Republic of China. For a time the Thai leaders undertook several actions indicating their apprehension. Until resigning from the Cabinet, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman was engaging in indirect exploratory talks with Peking regarding the possibility of terminating Chinese support to the insurgents in Thailand in exchange for the removal of American air bases from Thai soil.⁵³

Thai views on U.S. withdrawal. At the end of 1972, the newly-appointed Deputy Foreign Minister, Chatchai Choonhavan, indicated that talks had begun with the Americans on the phasing down of their swollen presence in Thailand and that Thai preparations for such a withdrawal were already underway.⁵⁴

In mid-May 1972, Thanom said that Thailand would

⁵³Bangkok Post, Supplement, May 5, 1971.

⁵⁴"Mayobai Tangpratet Thai" ("Thai Foreign Policy Review"), Siam Rath, January 3, 1973, p. 29.

continue to make available military facilities to the U.S. so long as there were violations of ceasefire and peace agreements in Indochina.⁵⁵ Thanat, as a private citizen, on the other hand, wrote a trenchant article in the Thai-language Social Science Review on the "Problems of Foreign Troops in Thailand and Thai Foreign Policy," which basically called for the removal of the troops and the hastening of detente policies.⁵⁶ Thanat, perhaps, therefore deserves credit for being in the leading van.

However, only a few weeks before Chatchai's references to American withdrawal, the most powerful man in Thailand, Field Marshal Prapat Charusatien, had talked about the Americans being free to stay on their bases even until the end of the year. Thanat had argued that the U.S. would be departing anyway, so why not take the initiative?⁵⁷ (Thanat seemed to reaffirm his remarks before the visiting members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives in Bangkok at the end of 1969. He argued that if the Thais declared their willingness to see American

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 30.

⁵⁶Thanat Khoman, "Panha Tahan Tangdao Nai Pratet Thai Lae Nayobai Tangpratet Thai" ("Problems of Foreign Troops in Thailand and Thai Foreign Policy"), Sangkom Sat Paritat (Social Science Review) X (July-September 1972): 14-28.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 15.

forces withdrawn from Thailand, the communist side would be deprived of a very valuable propaganda item.)⁵⁸ Prapat's reported remarks suggested a disinclination to take this point. Chatchai stipulated that Thai "policy is the same as that of American Congressmen who want their troops recalled."⁵⁹

All of this implied that the Thai leaders were convinced at the time that President Nixon would be unable to stay the course in Indochina. The Thais wanted to be ahead of the game. Several days after the August 15 bombing halt in Cambodia, Thai and U.S. officials began discussing the question of phasing out the 40,000 U.S. forces in Thailand. Agreement on the first withdrawal was reached quickly: some 3,500 men and 100 planes left Thailand shortly afterwards, mainly from the Nam Phong air base in the northeast. The U.S. said it planned to cut down its troops to about 20,000 by the end of the year and to reduce the number of B-52s stationed in the country by 10 percent.⁶⁰

Thai-Chinese Relations

In April 1972, Chairman Thanom declared that Thailand would "wait and see" rather than rush into "contacts"

⁵⁸See note 32, p. 79, supra

⁵⁹"Nayobai Tangpratet Thai" ("Thai Foreign Policy Review"), Siam Rath, January 3, 1973, p. 30.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 32.

(not even "relations") with China.⁶¹ Radio Peking initially analyzed the 1971 coup as an effort "to strengthen fascist dictatorship" in Thailand, and the Chinese continued to denounce the "frantic reactionary policies" of the "Thanom-Prapat clique" which strengthened fascist rule at home and intensified the suppression of the people, while externally actively serving as a U.S. accomplice in invading Indochina.⁶² At this point the question of relations with China was put into "deep freeze." Also, Thailand had no foreign minister at the time, and foreign policy initiatives in any direction seemed out of the question.

However, in late March, Cabinet approved Peking's request to establish satellite communications between the two countries (Bangkok-Shanghai). At the same time, Deputy Prime Minister Prapat said Thailand would maintain correct and cordial relations with Taiwan, but would not automatically support it in problems that it may have with other countries or in general international affairs. In early April, Taiwan's Ambassador to Thailand handed a "protest memorandum" to Thanom over Thailand's reported plan to relegate the status of its embassy in Taipei.

⁶¹"Chairman of the National Executive Council on Thai Foreign Policy Toward China," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XII (April-June 1972): 84.

⁶²Quoted in Frances Starner, "Uneasy Future," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 6, 1972, p. 18.

He, in turn, was told not to interfere in Thailand's internal affairs.⁶³

In August, Prasit Kanchanawat, the former Minister of Commerce, accompanied a Thai table tennis team to China,⁶⁴ and seemed to have gained a reduction in Chinese radio attacks against Thai leaders. The year saw perceptible progress in Thai-China dialogue. In early November 1972, a Thai economic mission to the Canton Trade Fair visited Peking. It was told by the Chinese Vice-Premier, Li Hsiennien, that Thailand should not feel compelled to hurriedly establish diplomatic relations with China. The Chinese Vice-Premier also warned the Thai to think carefully on the U.S. bases question. He apparently preferred an American presence, rather than a vacuum towards which the Russians might thrust.⁶⁵ Thanat argued that the Russians had no capacity to do this, and that the Chinese should only feel that way about U.S. bases in Japan--where the Russian threat was a real one.⁶⁶ Thanat also saw historical

⁶³"Nayobai Tang Pratet Thai" ("Thai Foreign Policy Review"), Siam Rath, January 3, 1973, pp. 31-32.

⁶⁴"Thai Table Tennis Team in the People's Republic of China," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XII (July-September 1972): 45.

⁶⁵"Thai Economic Mission in the People's Republic of China," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XII (October-December 1972): 49.

⁶⁶Thanat Khoman, "Nayobai Tangpratet Thai" ("Thai Foreign Policy"), Sangkom Sat Paritat (Social Science Review) XI (January-March 1975): 9.

Thai-Vietnamese rivalry in Indochina as the "creation of Western historians and journalists." If they saw that the hated Americans had left, Hanoi would be more reasonable with Bangkok.⁶⁷

In late February 1973, China invited Thailand to send a second pingpong team to Peking in September. In late March, the former Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, urged Thailand to speed up the establishment of relations with Peking. Early in June, the Government ordered a Taiwan intelligence unit operating from Thailand's northern border into China to cease activities with the objective of improving relations with China. Numbering 1,400 men, the spy force had been formed from remnants of old KMT regulars and allowed by Thailand to stay on its northern border.⁶⁸

In late June, Thailand invited a Chinese pingpong team to Bangkok for the first time. The team was accompanied by Chen Jui-sheng, the Director of Southeast Asian Affairs of the Foreign Ministry of China. Chen met Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Chatchai and exchanged wide-ranging views. The subjects discussed and the results achieved were not officially announced, but it was generally assumed that priority was given to asserted

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 10.

⁶⁸"Nayobai Tangpratet Thai" ("Thai Foreign Policy Review"), Siam Rath, January 2, 1974, pp. 15-16.

Chinese support for hilltribe rebels in Thailand's North and to the opening of trade relations. Chatchai also asked China to persuade North Vietnam to stop supporting local insurgency in Thailand.⁶⁹ According to Chatchai, "substantial progress" was being made in unofficial talks. Thanom praised the success of pingpong diplomacy.

By the end of June, the Government had begun to scale down visits and exchanges of government officials with Taiwan, the first step towards relegating the status of its diplomatic mission in Taipei. At the same time, Thai sports authorities said Thailand would support China's entry to the 1974 Asian Games in Iran.

In mid-July, the Cabinet approved the proposal to amend Revolutionary Party Order No. 53, which had prohibited trade with China since the late 1950s. The lifting of the trade barrier was announced just before Thailand's badminton team left for Peking. The team carried a message from Thanom urging China to help restore permanent peace in the region. The team was also accompanied by two high-level officials of the Foreign Affairs Ministry as well as the Finance Ministry's adviser, Dr. Amnuay Virawan. Telephone and cable links between China and Thailand were established in mid-August. The first phone call was made from Bangkok to interview the pingpong team's

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 16.

leader.⁷⁰

Thailand and ASEAN

In early January 1972, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Thailand in an eight-day official visit. Thanom and Lee agreed that U.S. assistance to Southeast Asia, after an Indochina settlement, would be necessary to maintain the peace and security of the region. Close consultation between ASEAN countries on the future of the region's security was also urged.⁷¹ This joint agreement was opposed by former Thai foreign minister, Thanat Khoman, who, as a private citizen, began his active campaign against the maintenance of U.S. forces on Thai soil after the Vietnam peace settlement.⁷²

Thereafter Thanat was appointed as a "Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand" to participate in the annual meeting of foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations at Kuala Lumpur. At this conference, the former Thai Foreign Minister signed a "declaration" on behalf of the government stating that "the neutralization of Southeast Asia is a desirable objective" and that the region should be recognized "as a zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality, free from

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 20.

⁷¹"The Visit of the Prime Minister of Singapore to Thailand," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XII (January-March 1972): 15.

⁷²"Thanat Kan Tahan Nai ASEAN" ("Thanat Opposes

any form or manner of interference by outside Powers."⁷³

During 1972, the Thai government withdrew all of its troops from South Vietnam. It also took initial steps toward some replacement of American support by seeking closer trading ties with Japan and EEC.⁷⁴

Conclusion

The Thai government began the early probings of another period of "readjustment" in the friendly but mutable relations that it had maintained with the United States since the beginning of the cold war. Once again, the Thai leaders were responding to the intermittent need of shifting their policies in accordance with the changing actions of the major non-Communist world power concerned with global interests and responsibilities.

For Thailand the Nixon Doctrine seemed only to mean a streamlining of U.S. assistance rather than a reassessment of the program or the commitment that underlied it. The Thai were profoundly concerned about the probable extent of United States disengagement and withdrawal from

Military Part in ASEAN"), Ban Muang, January 6, 1972, p. 3.

⁷³"The Kuala Lumpur Declaration," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XII (January-March): 42. See discussions of the "Declaration" in Chapter IV and V infra.

⁷⁴"Thailand and EEC Signed an Agreement to Exempt Import Duties for Cotton Fabric Imported from Thailand into the EEC Countries," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XII (October-December 1972): 23.

Southeast Asia, and the unpredictability of United States policies. Thai felt that SEATO and collective military security were weakened and less secure. While they applauded the Nixon Doctrine's endorsement of Asian self-reliance--a principle long practiced by the Thai--they were worried that American congressional and public opinion would render meaningless the Nixon Doctrine's pledge to maintain United States commitments to its allies in mainland Asia. The United States withdrawal from Vietnam and the restrictions on military support for Cambodia and confirmed Thai fears that American disengagement presaged a dangerous "vacuum of power" in Asia. In the Thai view, either the Soviets or the Chinese would fill the vacuum unless "a regional counterpoise" or "political defense" could be organized in time.

Thanat was against the U.S. bases because he saw the Americans as being primarily interested in a face-saving retreat, unwilling to fight insurgencies where they had to be fought--on the ground. And it was a type of war that the local people were best equipped to deal with. In his view, not only was the transfer of U.S. forces from Vietnam to Thailand at variance with the Nixon Doctrine, but the U.S. build-up was also likely to be counter-productive. North Vietnamese hostility would be incurred, but the involvement of U.S. ground troops was not guaranteed if that hostility enhanced insurgency.

At worst, Thailand could become another Vietnam because of the U.S. presence--but for the Thais, not for the Americans.

Thanat regarded detente and the U.S. presence as an either-or situation, while the military leaders thought that, to some extent, they could have both. The military leaders certainly took a far less sanguine view both of history and of the ultimate intentions of the Vietnamese. Hanoi, unlike Peking, made the ending of the U.S. presence a precondition for dialogue.

After the 1971 coup, Thanat was dismissed but Thailand still took steps toward some replacement of American support by seeking closer trading ties with Japan, EEC, and signing a "declaration" of ASEAN stating that "the neutralization of Southeast Asia is a desirable objective."

The coup slowed, but did not reverse, the general movement in Thai foreign policy away from a one-sided dependency on the American alliance. The aim of the Thai government was not primarily to disengage from the alliance, but to dispense with some parts of it (military) in order to strengthen other parts, i.e., diplomatic, economic.

As to the insurgency, Thailand would deal with it largely on its own. It seemed likely that they would be able to establish good relations with China and ask China to persuade North Vietnam to stop supporting local insurgency in Thailand.

CHAPTER III

NEWLY EMERGING MAJOR POWERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER

Background: The Major Powers and Southeast Asia

The configuration of power in the 1970's in the world has been marked by the emergence of a multipolar structure with Washington, Moscow, Peking, Tokyo and Western Europe as its poles. Geographically speaking, the People's Republic of China and Japan are two major powers with which the countries in South East Asia collectively or individually, are most concerned. Historically, however, the United States too has been and still is a major Pacific power with interests in the economic, political and defense areas in the region.

In Zbigniew Brezinski's words, "What we have now, and are likely to have for some time, is a combination of a bipolar power world with a multiple state interplay. In effect, two overlapping triangles, one still essentially competitive in nature and one basically cooperative. The largely competitive triangle involves America-China-Russia;

the cooperative one America-Europe-Japan."¹ The United States agreed with China, for example, in the Nixon-Chou Shanghai communique of February 1972, that they oppose any attempt by a state to achieve predominance in Asia, and oppose collusion by either power with a third country against the other. In June 1968, three of the four Security Council members with nuclear weapons (the United States, USSR, and Britain) subscribed to a resolution that promises protection to any non-nuclear weapon state against attack or threat of attack by a nuclear weapon state, commonly presumed to mean China. And the United States probably played balance-of-power politics during the India-Pakistan conflict over Bangladesh in 1971 by opposing India and backing Pakistan, mainly because the Nixon Administration viewed any increase in Indian power as an extension of that of the Soviet Union.

In the Asian context, the current "balance of power" situation is essentially as follows: The United States is trying to balance the Soviet Union with China, and China with Japan. The Soviet Union tries to balance China with Japan. Japan is trying to balance China with the Soviet Union. China is trying to balance the Soviet Union with the United States.

¹Zbigniew Brezinski, "The Balance of Power Delusion," Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972): 15.

The United States

In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, the United States since 1969 has been gradually withdrawing its troops from Asia, or to be more exact from Indochina, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines.

As mentioned in Chapter II, Vietnam is the major case in which the Nixon Doctrine has been translated into reality. Vietnamization from the United States' viewpoint was successful, in the sense that the United States withdrew all its troops in accordance with the Paris peace agreement of January 1973. In Cambodia too, the United States, based upon a compromise between President Nixon and the United States Congress, halted all its bombing activities in support of the Khmer troops in its fighting against the invasion of the Khmer Rouge and Khmer insurgents as of August 15, 1973.²

However the Pacific has been still the center of American power. Increasingly, it will be the key to overall U.S. strategic plans and, hence, to whatever broad political-military equilibrium is achieved in the Pacific-Asian area. The US mid-Pacific bases will be the front-line defense both for the American continent and for all Pacific allies. The United States will increasingly deemphasize fixed bases in populous areas

²The compromise was reached in a situation where President Nixon was under pressure due to the Watergate affair.

within East Asia in favor of mobile bases in the form of ships and aircraft operating primarily out of the Central Pacific.

The Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines is the largest naval support base in the Pacific. The operating costs are \$86.3 million a year.³ U.S. Air Force installations in the Philippines are Clark Air Base and three other locations--John Hay Air Base, Wallace Air Station at Poro Point and Camp O' Donnell, north of Clark base. Before the Vietnam War, there were 13,800 U.S. troops in the Philippines and the peak figure since has been 27,000. There are currently about 16,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in the Philippines--9,500 Air Force, 5,000 Navy, 1,500 Marine Corps and a small number of Army personnel.⁴

Regarding patterns in U.S. military assistance to the nations of Southeast Asia, the war in Vietnam, which cost the American taxpayers around \$22 billion each year and American combat deaths amounting "to an average of 278 weekly during 1968"⁵ as troops levels rose steadily for five years (to a peak of 549,500 persons), and all

³See Korea and the Philippines: November 1972, A Staff Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate February 18, 1973, p. 40.

⁴Ibid., p. 40.

⁵See Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for-the 1970's: Gaining a Durable Peace, A Report to the Congress, May 3, 1973, p. 43.

the repercussions and domestic turbulence it created in the United States, resulted in a kind of neo-isolationist tendency on the part of the American public with regard to involvement abroad. This is reflected in the fact that foreign aid (except for aid to Israel) has become rather unpopular in the United States Congress ever since the Vietnam War. "The Vietnam War," said President Nixon in his May 1973 annual foreign policy report to Congress in which he reviewed U.S. involvement, "dominated our attention and was sapping our self-confidence." "At home we faced pressures that threatened to swing America from over-extension in the world to heedless withdrawal from it."⁶

In his testimony during hearings on his nomination for Secretary of State before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. Henry Kissinger stated that American foreign policy towards the Southeast Asian countries would be marked by "economic aid on a declining scale," aiming only at "carrying out the residual moral and other obligations."⁷ Having said that the United States is in a transitional period, Kissinger indicated that ". . . We have no national interest in a predominant American position in this area and we will not seek to achieve

⁶Ibid., p. 43.

⁷United States Senate, "Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Part I, September 7, 1973, Washington, D.C., p. 67.

it."⁸

U.S. Interests in the Indian Ocean

The 1974 military budget presented by the White House to the Congress included a request for \$29 million dollars to build the first permanent U.S. naval base in the Indian Ocean. In a confidential memo to the Congressional leaders, the State Department said:

In our judgment, an adequate U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean provides a clear signal to the Soviets of our resolve to insure a credible military capability there The opening of the Suez Canal will obviously increase the Soviet ability . . . to show force to influence events where major U.S. interests are at stake.⁹

America sought to build this naval base on the island of Diego Garcia, a part of the Chagos archipelago, located some 1,200 miles south of the tip of India in the Indian Ocean. The American government showed interest in this area in the sixties, when the British made it known that they intended to phase out their military presence in the Indian Ocean. In 1966 the United States and the United Kingdom signed a 50-year agreement whereby the British-owned island was leased to the United States, rent free, for joint defense purposes. The United States now has only a minor communications facility on the island.

⁸Ibid., p. 67.

⁹As quoted in Warren Unna, "Diego Garcia," The New Republic, March 9, 1974, p. 7.

But reports of an increasing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, and the possibility of the Russians securing a naval base on India's east coast, have spurred the demand for a matching presence on the part of America. During the "global alert" called by President Nixon in October 1973, with a view to challenging a potential Soviet military intervention in the Middle East conflict, a U.S. aircraft carrier task group was sent to the Indian Ocean. When the alert was over, it was revealed by the Defense Secretary that the U.S. Navy would not be called back and that it would continue to patrol the area from that time on. This has provided the navy with the opportunity to seek a permanent base in the Indian Ocean because maintaining ships in this area with logistic support coming from the Subic Bay in the Philippines is considered impractical.

It was expected that were Congress to approve the appropriation, and already there were indications that it would, Diego Garcia would be turned into a base that would have a harbor to receive nuclear submarines, and runways to permit all types of U.S. planes to land there. It would also have fuel and storage facilities for both ships and planes. In addition there would be living facilities, which would be able to accommodate an American force of 500 to 600 men.

Some Congressmen were of the opinion that Diego

Garcia was bound to become one of America's major naval bases abroad, and that the \$29 million appropriation was only an initial investment. This was exactly what the littoral states in the area feared. India has been highly vocal in demanding that both the Soviet Union and the United States keep out of the Indian Ocean. She has been joined by Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and Sri Lanka (Ceylon), whose representative introduced a resolution in the United Nations in 1971 that asked that the Indian Ocean be declared a "Zone of Peace." The superpowers have ignored all protests.

This leads one to conclude that the "New Balance of Power" as conceived by Nixon and Kissinger, on the one hand allows for extension of U.S. commitments beyond the level at which they stood at the time of the ceasefire in Vietnam, and that on the other hand accommodation and adjustment are instituted only when the interests of Russia or China come into direct collision with those of the United States. Interestingly enough, even though Japan has emerged as one of the major economic powers of the world, and her geographical location is a compelling reason for involvement in Southeast Asia affairs, she appears to be playing little or no role in the power plays of the United States, Russia, and China in this region.

The United States and Japan

The U.S. policy makers seldom fail to mention that an effective balance-of-power system today demands the participation of Japan. But Japan is not a nuclear power. Even as a close ally she was neither consulted nor informed about U.S. intentions to normalize relations with China in 1971. Ironically, Japan continues to refuse to build sufficient armed strength to shoulder the burden of her own defense or the defense of the Southeast Asian region.

The American bilateral security pact with Japan, which came into force in April 1952, still remains the bulwark of protection for Japan against any attack from outside. Under the provisions of this treaty American forces remain on Japanese soil. These armed forces can also be deployed in any manner seen fit by the United States to keep peace in East Asia and Southern Asia. There was speculation in the sixties that the Japanese people would call for major revisions in the treaty when it came up for review. In 1960 and then in 1970, the treaty was revised; but the revisions were minor. The major provisions of the treaty remain intact. It is, however, now stipulated that there will be prior consultation between the two governments before American forces stationed on Japanese soil are used for "peacekeeping" operations abroad. But otherwise the United States still remains Japan's shield against any potential aggressor.

Thus, militarily speaking, if there is such a thing as a balance of power in Southeast Asia, it is tripartite in its dimensions. The U.S. has nothing to gain by encouraging Japanese rearmament, conventional or nuclear, which could revive fears of Japanese domination. But the only chance of preventing it may be to provide Japan cooperation and support for the power she has-economic power.

U.S. and Indonesia

Indonesia, with nearly half the population of Southeast Asia and vast resources, made a remarkable political **turn**-about beginning in 1965 when its new leaders decided that Sukarno's pro-Peking and pro-Hanoi policy was a great threat to the national interests of Indonesia. They then brought their country back into the United Nations, settled the confrontation with Malaysia, and worked out an agreement with the Free World powers to build up Indonesia economically. This shift in Indonesia's policy was a significant change in the regional balance of power in Southeast Asia and constituted a major gain for the United States and the non-communist nations of Asia.

Continued existence of Mutual Defense Pacts bears testimony to the fact that U.S. does not consider detente with China and Russia by itself an adequate source of guarantee for the security interests of Southeast Asia states. Moreover, Washington probably would not discourage other Asian states from relying on America for security

purposes. In this regard it is noteworthy that the growing presence of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean and other border areas has prompted the United States to strive for closer ties with Indonesia, and to establish a naval base in the Indian Ocean.

In conclusion, the United States' interests in the Southeast Asian region revolve around the maintenance of stability in the broadest sense of the word in the region, and in the prevention of dominance of the region by a single major power. Considering her considerable economic, political and defense interests in the region, within the framework of her global strategy and interests, the United States will continue to be a major power in the Pacific area.

The Soviet Union

The basic interests of the Soviet Union in the Southeast Asian region must be viewed in terms of its global strategy and ideology. The Soviet Union is competing with and confronting Communist China. This open conflict is significant to note here, because it has become the overriding consideration in the global strategy of both the Soviet Union and Communist China, and this applies to their respective policies towards Southeast Asia.

Soviet Naval Activities in the Indian Ocean

The increasing activities of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, based on the Russian Far Eastern naval base

of Vladivostok and passing through the Malacca Straits, are of long-range concern to the Southeast Asian nations, especially if the Soviets are permitted to dominate the strategic Ocean. The area of the Indian Ocean is 28.4 million square miles, as great as Africa and Asia combined. The countries in Southeast Asia are strategically located between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, which together cover almost fifty percent of the surface of the globe. Once the Suez Canal is reopened, the size of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean will be immediately increased, since the large Soviet fleet in the Mediteranean Sea can easily enhance Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet naval threat to the Indian Ocean area is **severalfold**. The first possibility is direct naval action by the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean area for whatever purpose, but this is not likely to happen in any foreseeable circumstances. The second possibility is harassment below the threshold of direct action. Examples of this are blockade, interference, hijacking, small scale warfare, sabotage, and so on. The third possibility is the extension of Soviet political influence at the expense of Western influence. The fourth is internal subversion affecting the littoral states. The fifth involves the reopening of the Suez Canal, which would immediately increase the dimensions of the Soviet presence. In particular, the Soviet Union's present capability of disrupting oil and

raw material supplies to the Western World, Australasia, Japan, and the littoral states should not be taken lightly.

Communist China on Soviet Naval Activities

Communist China, which does not have a strong naval power to send to the Indian Ocean, has condemned Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean. In a lengthy article in the Peking Review entitled "Soviet Revisionist Social-Imperialism: Every Inch a Hegemonic Sea Power," the Chinese view is formulated as follows:

The new tsars are engaged in arms expansion and war preparations both on and under the seas, setting up nuclear weapons and various military installation and clamouring that Soviet nuclear submarine equipped with guided missiles are the mistress of the seas. They conduct military exercises on the seas, carry out espionage activities and sea-borne reconnaissances on a global scale, seek and demand bases overseas, and try to gain control over the waterways of other countries.¹⁰

Further the article said:

. . . On the question of maritime rights and the right of territorial seas, they push power politics. They bully the sovereign and medium-sized countries at will and ignore their sovereign rights by accusing countries which have set the limits of their territorial waters beyond 12 nautical miles of having "violated" the law of nations.¹¹

This view reflects the intense conflict between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which

¹⁰See Peking Review, No. 41, October 12, 1973, p. 14

¹¹Ibid., p. 14.

as stated earlier is the underlying factor in the current policies of these two major powers in the Southeast Asian and related regions, including in the Indian Ocean area.

The increased visibility of the Soviet navy and merchant fleet, particularly with the granting by Singapore in 1970 of berthing facilities for Soviet use, is at least in part intended to present a strategic and psychological (as well as economic) counter-weight to the United States and the West. Toward this end the USSR has also sought to raise its trade turnover with states in the region and has been playing an increasingly active role in the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.¹²

The Collective Security Idea

Not long after the Sino-Soviet border clashes, the form of proposal for an Asian collective security system was first put forth by Leonid Brezhnev on 7 June 1969, in his address to the Moscow International Meeting of Communist and workers' Parties. This idea has been reiterated frequently by various Soviet leaders and

¹²See, for example, Frances Starnes, "Selling Security Soviet-Style," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 April 1972, pp. 72-74. The Soviet have been far more interested in the UN-related ECAFE, where their vote is equal to any other, than in the Asian Development Bank (which they have not joined), where voting weight is based on financial contributions. See, M. Lavrichenko, "Colonialist Plans and the Asian Development Bank," International Affairs 2 (February 1972): 86-89.

commentators but has been elaborated upon only marginally.¹³ In August 1973, Brezhnev revived the idea during a speech at the presentation of an award to the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan, north of Sinkiang. His remarks coincided with developments in Peking, where Chinese leaders were preparing for the tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Brezhnev declared that an Asian collective security system would require time and effort, "but we are convinced that the nations of Asia will achieve it."¹⁴ The revival of the "Asian collective security" idea occurred following stepped up public promotion in the Soviet press for such an arrangement. Brezhnev labeled Peking's policy as "outright anti-Sovietism and subversive activity against the socialist states."¹⁵

Another mention of the "collective security" idea occurred during Mr. Brezhnev's visit to India on the eve of his departure from New Delhi to Moscow on November 29, 1973. Pointing out that "the greater part of our state lies in Asia," Brezhnev said that "the establishment of

¹³A useful analysis of the proposal and Asian reactions to it can be found in Alexander O. Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," Asian Survey 13 (December 1973): 1075-1091; and V. Kudryavtsev, "Problems of Collective Security in Asia," International Affairs 12 (December 1973): 94-98.

¹⁴See Pravda, August 15, 1973.

¹⁵Ibid.

relations of peace, security and cooperation in Asia, a continent populated by over half of mankind, would be a step of world-historic importance."¹⁶ He believed that it was an "opportune time" to deal with Asian security. "In a word, we are calling for an active, broad and constructive discussion," said Brezhnev. In his opinion, "The opportunity has arrived and the present situation in Asia has created adequate prerequisites. Asia can and must become a continent of peace."¹⁷

The concept itself remains vague. It is more of an idea rather than a concept. "Given lasting peace," said Brezhnev in New Delhi, "the Asian countries will be able for the first time, to concentrate on solving the economic and social problems they face."¹⁸ "That is why," he added, "it seems opportune to hold a thorough and comprehensive discussion of the idea of collective security in Asia, which would help trace a common approach, acceptable to all states concerned."¹⁹

Mr. Brezhnev seemed to be calling for an Asian conference on collective security with the above remarks,

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

but he did not specifically say so; and, no Asian government so far has been invited to such a conference.

Generally speaking, the "collective security" idea is interpreted in Asia as a Soviet effort to isolate Communist China, its main rival in Asia and in the communist world. "An Asian security agreement would divert attention from the very real, long-standing issue of border alignments between the Soviet Union and China," wrote the Japan Times. "It would tend to isolate China from the rest of Asia and diminish its influence as an ideological rival to Moscow."

So far no Southeast Asian state has shown itself anxious to support the Russians on the proposal. The armed forces' daily in Jarkarta, Angkatan Bersendjata (14 October 1969), summed up the perception of many in the region when it stated: "We in Indonesia believe that regional cooperation for prosperity is better than a defense system. We think that no Southeast Asian country is eager to join the Soviet defense system. The invitation is unwelcome." Although this collective security approach would seem to fit in well with the calls of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the neutralization of the region, to be guaranteed by the major powers, Moscow was unresponsive to and generally skeptical of the latter idea.

Despite Moscow's denials, Soviet actions imply that

the Asian collective security idea as well as Soviet efforts in the individual countries of the area are primarily directed against the Chinese. Moscow is certainly not interested in an ASEAN-sponsored neutralization that could well be either a smokescreen for continued U.S. control and influence (Soviet doubts about ASEAN have been specially related to supposed U.S. influence in the organization), or a vacuum from which the USSR is excluded but the CPR, because of its location and ambitions, is not. Moscow's vigorous attempts to establish a heightened presence in individual states and in the region as a whole are indeed intended to make it natural and necessary that the USSR be included in any future security system or agreement. The Soviets have approached this goal through state interests and policy rather than through ideological analysis, local Communist Parties, or guerrilla movements. Moreover, this Soviet goal has in action been defined in terms of opposition to China, Moscow's greatest perceived threat. All the states of the region are seeking to widen their foreign policy options. Yet not one of these states, not even those persuaded of the danger of Chinese subversion or aggression, is interested in becoming a battleground for Sino-Soviet competition. The headline of a dispatch from Rangoon could be applied equally well to all countries of the region: "Big-Power Duel Worries Burma: Rangoon Fears Involvement in Soviet-Chinese Rivalry."²⁰ Nevertheless,

²⁰ Tilman Durdin in The New York Times, February 9, 1972.

an increase in Sino-Soviet competition in Southeast Asia seems likely as the United States reduces its military presence and as the Soviet Union seeks to fill that vacuum and contain an increasingly assertive China.

The Soviet Union and Southern Asia

Although Moscow did have high hopes of establishing a bridgehead in Indochina through its support of the Hanoi government's conquest of South Vietnam, recent trends in that area cannot be entirely to Moscow's satisfaction. Hanoi, while intent on maintaining good relations with Moscow, has refused to echo Moscow's call for an anti-Chinese collective security pact, has gone out of its way to improve its relations with its ASEAN neighbors, and, most important of all, has demonstrated great interest in a rapprochement with the United States. Hanoi is evidently attaching first priority to rebuilding its war-ravaged economy, and it wants to attract American and Western capital to aid in this effort. Hanoi has also sought to defuse the territorial conflict it has with China over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Thus, the Vietnamese communists are seeking to maneuver between Peking, Washington, and Moscow rather than to tilt one-sidedly toward the Russians. The Laotian communists are likely to follow the same path. In Cambodia, the new communist government seems much closer to Peking than to any other foreign power.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, despite Moscow's recent

efforts to improve its diplomatic and economic position in order to contain China, the Soviets have not achieved major successes anywhere. The ASEAN countries are, to be sure, interested in cultivating Moscow in order to take out a low-cost insurance policy against Chinese hostility. But nowhere in the region does Moscow have substantial influence. Moreover, in Australia and New Zealand, the new conservative governments, alarmed at the rapid expansion of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, have both moved closer to Peking.

Until the stunning and unexpected defeat of Indira Gandhi in the Indian elections in March 1977, the biggest Soviet success story in the Far East had been in New Delhi. But the new Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, has already indicated that, although he does not intend to abolish the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty of 1971, he is determined to improve relations with the United States. Indian relations with China were already showing some improvement even before the defeat of Indira Gandhi, and this trend may now accelerate. Thus, Soviet fortunes in India have been dealt a sharp setback.

Elsewhere on the Indian subcontinent, Soviet relations with Pakistan have been strained ever since Moscow openly supported India against Pakistan in the Bangladesh war of 1971. And the new Bangladesh government that came to power in 1976 has moved away from its earlier

pro-Indian and pro-Soviet orientation to improve relations with Pakistan and China.

The People's Republic of China

Although ideology clearly influences Chinese communist leaders' perceptions of the world and of how to deal with, and although many economic and other interests shape particular Chinese policies, the primary factors determining Peking's most important decisions on overall foreign policy strategy are related above all to their military-security concerns, viewed in a broad geopolitical context. The major shifts in China's overall foreign policy can best be understood, therefore, in terms of changes in the Peking leaders' perception of external threats and in their strategic decisions on how best to cope with such threats.

In the late 1960, for example, the crucial factor influencing Chinese policy was the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations to the point of possible military conflict, a development that led Peking's leaders to conclude--apparently during 1968-1969--that the Russians now posed a greater and more immediate danger to China's security than the Americans did. The Chinese leaders' opening to the United States and their normalization of relations with Japan, as well as important adjustments they made in policies toward both Northeast and Southeast Asia, followed logically from that conclusion.

More than is generally recognized, moreover, military-security factors were the critical ones at key stages in the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict from the late 1950s on. Much of the writing on the Sino-Soviet conflict, especially in the 1960s, focused on the ideological differences between Peking and Moscow. There is no doubt that ideological-as well as cultural, economic, and many other-factors must be taken fully into account in any comprehensive analysis of how the Sino-Soviet dispute evolved over the years. On balance, however, the evidence we now have suggests that the most important Sino-Soviet differences were precipitated by conflict over military-security issues.

There were three crucial turning points in the Sino-Soviet conflict, each of which qualitatively changed relationships between the two countries. The first was during 1957-1959. These years witnessed a divergence of broad Soviet and Chinese strategies toward the United States. Moscow moved toward a coexistence policy (or what would now be called *détente*) vis-a-vis Washington, and Peking feared that this would seriously compromise important Chinese national interests-in the Taiwan area and elsewhere-which the Chinese leaders at that time believed to require a confrontation policy toward the United States. The crisis resulting from Peking's bombardment of the Chinese Nationalist-held island of Quemoy in 1958 made

clear to the Chinese communists the limits of the assistance the Russians were prepared to give them under the Sino-Soviet alliance; and, it also heightened Soviet anxieties that the Chinese could involve the USSR in military conflicts that Moscow wished to stay out of. In this same period, disputes over naval issues further highlighted Sino-Soviet differences on basic military-security questions. Finally, in 1959, soon after the disagreements over the offshore island crisis and naval issues, Moscow ended its aid to China's nuclear weapons development program--clearly a major blow to Peking. The net effect of these developments was to convince Chinese leaders that the Sino-Soviet alliance was of limited utility to them--and to create doubts about the alliance in Moscow as well. (Peking's 1960 ideological offensive against Moscow, it should be noted, followed rather preceded these developments).

The second major turning point was in 1962-1963, and again basic differences focused on nuclear issues. When the Russians moved toward agreement with the Americans on a limited nuclear test-ban treaty, the Chinese requested Moscow not to go through with it.²¹ The Russians, however,

²¹See for example, the August 15, 1963, "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 3," in Peking Review 6 (August 16, 1963): 15. This statement said that the Chinese had sent three memorandums to the Soviet government before the signing of the test-ban treaty and declared that Peking had "hoped the Soviet Government would not infringe on China's sovereign right and act for

chose to do so anyway, and the Chinese regarded this as an act of Soviet-American collusion aimed primarily at them. From Peking's perspective, the signing of the agreement was probably a "point of no return" symbolizing the end, for all practical purposes, of the Sino-Soviet pact as an operative military alliance. (Again, Peking's intensification of ideological debate with Moscow followed rather than preceded a major falling-out on concrete policy issues. In 1963-1964, the Chinese brought many previous policy disagreements touching upon concrete national interests into the open).

The third major turning point converted the long-developing rift between Peking and Moscow from a political conflict into a military confrontation. From the Chinese perspective, the combination of the Soviet military build-up around China from 1965 on, Moscow's intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 raised the possibility that Moscow might be considering a military attack on China.²² Moreover,

China in assuming an obligation to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons . . . We hoped that after such earnest counsel from us, the Soviet leaders would rein in before reaching the precipice and would not render matters irretrievable."

²²There is little doubt that the Russians took actions designed to exert pressure on China and eventually to pose the threat of possible attack, and that the Chinese were genuinely fearful of attack at that time. As early as September 1968, Peking charged Moscow with "military provocations over China's air space," asserting that

Peking's leaders probably felt that even if Moscow was not planning to attack, it was nevertheless pursuing a hostile policy of military-backed pressure on China (similar, in Chinese eyes, to American policy during the Dulles era). Their conclusion, clearly, was that China's priority immediate foreign policy objective should be to do everything possible to deter any Soviet attack and to try to build new counterweight to check the growth of Soviet influence-first of all in East Asia, but worldwide as well. The decisions to open relations with the United States (which was seen as a nation whose power had peaked and begun to wane) and to normalize relations with Japan (which was seen as a prime target of Soviet efforts to encircle China in both a political and a broad strategic sense)²³ were accompanied by significant shifts in Chinese policy toward both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.

these were "in support of atrocities of aggression against Czechoslovakia," See Peking Review, September 20, 1968, p. 41. Soviet nuclear and other threats during 1968 are discussed in The New York Times, September 18, 1968, and Harold C. Hinton, The Bear at the Gate (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute and Hoover Institution, 1971), pp. 29-30.

²³For a brief period during 1970-1971, Peking's propaganda strongly attacked Japanese "militarism," and Chinese leaders at that time may well have actually feared that a decline in the U.S. position in Asia might stimulate Tokyo to rearm on a large scale and move toward assuming a regional military role. Peking quickly dropped this line when openings to the United States and Japan were in the offing.

Peking's primary immediate preoccupation in both of these areas now was competition with Moscow for influence, rather than competition with Washington. The Chinese position regarding Japanese-American security ties changed fundamentally; instead of denouncing the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the Chinese now endorsed it.²⁴ With respect to Korea, Peking, in order to outdo Moscow, increased its political support of Pyongyang against Seoul and Washington, although it apparently continued at the same time to exercise a restraining hand on Kim II Sung to discourage him from military adventurism.²⁵ In Southeast

²⁴As early as the beginning of 1973, Chou En-lai reportedly told a visiting Japanese official: "in as much as Japan constitutes a nation, weapons of self-defense are essential to it." See the interview with Takeo Kimura, Japan's former Minister of Construction, upon his return from a visit to China, in Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), January 27, 1973. In late 1973, Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei reportedly declared that "it is quite natural for Japan to maintain the security treaty with the United States while it lacks sufficient self-defense capacity." See Kyodo News Service, December 17, 1973. By 1975, Chou En-lai was saying: "Japan and the United States should develop even more intimate ties." See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," The China Quarterly (London) 62 (June 1975): 373-374. Privately, Chinese leaders now assert that U.S.-Japan ties are more important than China-Japan ties.

²⁵When Kim visited Peking in April 1975, the Chinese declared that they viewed his regime as the "sole legal sovereign state" of Korea and strongly backed his demands for a withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. By this time, the Chinese were no longer telling diplomats of countries other than the United States, as they had earlier, that they were tolerant of U.S. forces in South Korea. However, the Chinese firmly stressed (when Kim was in Peking) the need for "peaceful" reunification, and their statements were notably less militant than Kim's.

Asia, Chinese fear of increased Soviet influence (and, to a lesser extent, of increased North Vietnamese influence as well)-especially in the Indochina area-led Peking to do all it could to outbid the Russians in a struggle for influence, but its efforts have had only mixed results. During 1975, although Cambodia adopted a definitely pro-Peking stance, new strains developed in relations between Peking and Hanoi (which tilted slightly toward Moscow), and Laos tried to balance its relations with both the major communist powers and Vietnam.²⁶ Elsewhere, in non-communist Southeast Asia, China deemphasized (without abandoning) the revolutionary component in its policies, instead stressing normalized state-to-state relations with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.²⁷ Beyond establishing diplomatic ties, it also made clear that under existing circumstances-i.e., the potential threat that it now sees the Soviet Union as posing in the area-it tacitly approves of continuing security relationships between noncommunist Southeast Asian nations and the

See the speeches and communique in Peking Review, April 25, and May 1975.

²⁶The strains in Sino-Vietnamese relations were doubtless exacerbated by Chinese seizure of the Paracel Islands, which North Vietnam also claimed.

²⁷Peking, while endorsing antisubversion statements, did not, however, stop its public encouragement of Southeast Asian communist parties or the radio broadcasts originating in China directed to them, and this continued to disturb noncommunist Southeast Asian governments.

United States.²⁸

The Chinese Major Concern of Southeast Asia

Asia, and especially Southeast Asia, has been the major area of violent and ceaseless conflicts since the end of World War II. For the past thirty years, the sound of firearms has abated in the region hardly a day. But even should violent fighting stop or sizably diminish, the area will remain a center of the highest diplomatic interest. It is an area rich in resources, easily accessible, and considerably fragmented. These "Balkans of Asia" are often seen as a natural power vacuum, and seem to attract interference and intervention on the part of major powers near and far.

Of all the major powers, it is China that may be in the best strategic position to play a lasting role in Southeast Asia. This is due first, to her geographic proximity; second, to her traditional consideration of Southeast Asia as a historical sphere of influence; and lastly, to her special assets in the region such as the overseas Chinese communities and the national communist parties. Therefore, when one considers the new balance of power in Southeast Asia, it is imperative to study China's perspective in relation to the area and in terms

²⁸See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," The China Quarterly 63 (September 1975): 597-600; Ibid. 63 (December 1975): 809-812.

of China's foreign policy capabilities.

For Southeast Asia, the preoccupation of China with her northern neighbor is in a way relieving, for China presumably will not have too much time or freedom of action for exerting pressures on the Southeast Asian nations. In other words, the Soviet Union, rather than Southeast Asia, is the top priority on China's list of concerns. Geographically speaking, the Soviet Union is too remote to be a direct threat to Southeast Asia's security in terms of overt military aggression, whereas China, due to its proximity, is a concern of all of the Southeast Asian countries, particularly due to the long history of "wars of national liberation" supported or encouraged by China. Moreover, the approximately fifteen million overseas Chinese throughout Southeast Asia have been a major concern of the Southeast Asian nations, due to their dominant role in the economics of practically all of the Southeast Asian countries.²⁹

The history of Communist activities in the Southeast Asian countries has been closely associated with the Chinese Communist movement, especially since the Sino-Soviet rift became widely known during the Khrushchev era. During the colonial era prior to World War II, however,

²⁹For an interesting and rather informative discussion on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, see Louis Kraas, "The Wealth and Power of the Overseas Chinese," Fortune Magazine, March 1971, pp. 78-82.

when communist China had not come into being, the local communist parties in Southeast Asia had close ties with the Soviet Union the world headquarters of the communist movement.

During the Vietnam war, the competition between the Soviet Union and China was skillfully exploited by the North Vietnamese in securing aid, economic as well as military, from both sides. In Indonesia, the communist movement has gone underground, and, according to government sources, its activities are only sporadic and not well-coordinated. Prior to the abortive 1965 coup, the leadership of the Indonesian Communist movement was divided between the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions, but with a predominantly pro-Chinese orientation.

In Malaysia, the communist movement has been pro-Chinese. Some forty percent of the Malaysian population are of Chinese ethnic affiliation. In Singapore, some 75 percent of the population are of Chinese origin, but the Singapore government under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has been trying to create a Singaporean identity, rather than a Chinese one. In Thailand, where 3 million out of the 40 million population are of Chinese origin, the underground Communist movement has close ties with the Chinese Communists. The communist guerrilla activities in the northeast and northern part of Thailand constitute a major security problem to Thailand, and the

proximity of Thailand to Communist China makes it a more serious problem, compared to communist activities in other Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. In the Philippines, the Communist movement in the northern part of the country is usually described as Maoist. The communist activity along the Serawak border is Peking-oriented and continues to pose a security problem for both Malaysia and Indonesia along the borders of both countries.

In brief, the local communist and overseas Chinese problems compel these countries in Southeast Asia to consider Communist China as a major concern, more so than the Soviet Union.

Japan

Japan's major interest in Southeast Asia, as is generally known, is trade. Japan's primary need from these countries is their raw materials to feed her gigantic industry. The finished products made out of these raw materials are then exported to the Southeast Asian countries. The nature of these relations reminds the Southeast Asian leaders of the colonial relations between the former Southeast Asian colonies and their Western colonial masters. Numerous criticisms have been voiced by Southeast Asian leaders on this subject.

In simplified form, the criticism basically contends that Japan is unfairly taking advantage of the

current overall economic conditions of Southeast Asia by taking away the raw materials of Southeast Asia to be manufactured in Japan and to sell them back to Southeast Asia, rather than investing in manufacturing industries in Southeast Asia, using the abundant raw materials and labor available there, thereby contributing to the industrial development of the countries of the region. This criticism is beginning to be heeded by the Japanese, but only to a limited extent. Seventy percent of Japan's imports still consist of industrial raw materials, and only thirty percent of manufactured goods (mainly from other developed countries).

For comparative purposes, Southeast Asian countries' trade with Japan and the other major powers are as follows. In 1970, Japan's trade with Southeast Asia totalled \$3,859 million, which is 10 percent of Japan's total trade and 25.5 percent of Southeast Asia's total trade. Southeast Asia's total trade with Communist China for the same year totalled only \$270 million, which is 6.4 percent of China's total trade and 1.8 percent of Southeast Asia's total trade.

Southeast Asia's trade with the Soviet Union for 1970 totalled \$141 million, which is 0.6 percent of the Soviet Union's total trade and 0.9 percent of Southeast Asia's total trade. For the same period, Southeast Asia's trade with the United States totalled \$2,570 million,

which is 3.1 percent of total United States trade and 17 percent of Southeast Asia's total trade.³⁰

These statistics clearly indicate the importance of Southeast Asia-Japan trade relations, Japan being the largest trading partner of the Southeast Asian countries, and Southeast Asia as a whole being the second largest trading partner of Japan, after the United States.³¹

Today Japan is the main trading partner of every Southeast Asian nation. Her total trade with this part of the world approaches the level of commerce with Western Europe and exceeds the trade with Northeastern Asia. In 1973, for the first time in a decade, Japanese exports to Southeast Asia exceeded sales to the United States. During recent years, trade with Japan has accounted for the following percentages of Southeast Asian countries' imports: Thailand, 32.2 percent; the Philippines, 31 percent; Indonesia, 20.9 percent; Singapore, 11.1 percent; Malaysia, 7.8 percent; and, the whole area, 22.8 percent.³²

³⁰Source: International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade, Annual 1966-1970.

³¹The White Paper on Foreign Trade, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tokyo, 1972, stated that for 1970, the regional distribution of Japan's exports which consisted of 30.7 percent to the U.S., 25.4 percent to Southeast Asia, . . . and Japan's sources of imports which consisted of 29.4 percent from the U.S., 16 percent from Southeast Asia, . . .

³²Richard L. Walker, Prospects in the Pacific

Japan remains the only great power lacking the military clout to complement or support her economic and financial capabilities. Presumably her national defense against hypothetical foes is assured by the controversial but still effective U.S.-Japanese mutual security pact, which was revised in 1960 and automatically extended in 1970. Toward mainland China, Eisaku Sato's successor as prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka moved to normalize Sino-Japanese relations, at the inevitable expense of the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan. Although territorial questions have prevented the consummation of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, Japan has been dealing effectively with the Russians, again in the economic sphere, particularly with respect to joint development of Siberian resources, a project of not inconsiderable interest to the United States.

Under the circumstances, Japan would like to think that, for all of their ideological differences and tensions, Russia, the United States, and particularly China (which is closest to Southeast Asia geographically and culturally), share the Japanese desire for balance in the area, from reasons of self-interest and survival, not altruism.

In January 1974, Premier Tanaka took what turned

(Washington, D.C.: Heldref Publications, 1972), pp. 82-83.

out to be a memorable trip to Manila, Bangkok, Singapore, and Jakarta. He was well received by the governments and establishments but denounced by some other elements. Students staged demonstrations in Manila and Bangkok (where they had organized a brief boycott of Japanese goods in late 1972), and a serious riot in Jakarta. In the latter case, however, the students were obviously venting their general frustrations on a variety of targets, including their own government and overseas Chinese merchants. Wholly owned Japanese firms were the objects of a great deal of hostility during the Tanaka visit, but this was much less true of enterprises owned jointly by Japanese and local firms. Tanaka and many of his thoughtful country-men were shaken by these expressions of resentment. There was a general feeling that Japan and Japanese businessmen must try to adopt a lower posture in Southeast Asia and conduct their activities in ways less offensive to local feeling, but of course not withdraw from the region. What would actually be done was not clear.

India

In addition to Japan and Communist China, India is the only other major power in Asia. If Asia's destiny is to be decided increasingly by Asians, as it must be, then these three nations especially will dominate its future.

Strategically, of course, this focus on the Asian

trio oversimplifies the multipolar complexities of the Asia-Pacific region. Certainly the United States and the USSR are major participants, and lesser subregional roles are played by many others. The Soviet Union, indeed, with over half of its territory east of the Urals, can even claim to be an "Asian" nation. Moreover Japan, for all her spectacular industrial achievement, has yet to translate her economic power once again into military strength. As for China and India they are still only on the threshold of their industrial revolutions, a century or so behind present-day Japan and other advanced industrial nations in income level at their recent rates of growth. Indeed, two-thirds of their people still live in farm villages not far above traditional levels of poverty.

Nevertheless, the size and resources of the two continental giants-together they comprise a third of the human race-as well as the human capacities manifest in their long cultural heritage, suggest that they will play a decisive role in Asia's future, from the Yellow Sea to the Persian Gulf. This is true of Japan, too, as long as she possesses the bulk of Asia's industrial capacity within her island chain. Several smaller nation-states of the region may continue to lead in providing some of the better things of life at an early stage of development-political freedom, education, economic welfare. But the power balance is likely to be dominated increasingly by

the three because of their strategic location, the weight of their resources, and their human potential. Among the three, India has been the only one not yet to **characterize** **formulate her role in Asian politics.**

The observer of a century ago could hardly anticipate that the Indians, of all peoples, with their traditions of caste, personal despotism, and Mogul militarism-- "the most rigidly hierarchical system in the world"--would be living today in a comparatively open political order, more democratic at least than most neighboring regimes, free of army rule, and with a development of private capitalism within a mixed economy such as the Chinese only found possible when they migrated overseas. As to foreign policy, some have gone as far as characterizing the Indian policy of nonalignment itself as an exercise in the balance-of-power politics.³³

The new policy of detente between the United States and China and between the United States and the Soviet union might perhaps have brought about a new equation in Southeast Asia in which India would not have figured. However, a whole chain of totally unrelated happenings on the Indian subcontinent during 1971 have introduced an additional dimension to the international politics of the region and have propelled India into what may be

³³See Ton That Thien, India and South East Asia 1947-1960, Librairie Droz, Geneva, 1963.

characterized as an emerging balance of power in South and Southeast Asia. The 14-day war with Pakistan in December, 1971, leading to a spectacular Indian victory and the end of the trauma and tragedy for the 75 million people of the new nation of Bangladesh, should be listed as a new factor limiting the U.S. military capabilities in the 1970s compelling her to accept a new balance of power in Asia side by side with such factors as the growing presence of Russian naval power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the parity between the Soviet Union and the United States in strategic nuclear weaponry, and the development of missiles in China.

India and the Indian Ocean Naval Rivalries

The United States sent an aircraft carrier and five destroyers to the Indian Ocean in October 1973, at the height of the Arab-Israeli conflict.³⁴ The USS-Hancock, which had been in the Philippine Sea, sailed through the Straits of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. This move was presumably intended to remind the Soviet Union of the American presence in the Indian Ocean and to put pressure on it not to involve itself in the Middle Eastern crisis.

In November 1973, the Soviet Union sent two warships through the Straits of Malacca to strengthen the Russian fleet in the Indian Ocean. For members of the ASEAN, the

³⁴See "U.S. Aircraft Carrier Sent to Indian Ocean," Bangkok Post, October 30, 1973, p. 4.

use of the Straits of Malacca by warships of both superpowers becomes a source of concern, particularly because the littoral states wish to assert their adherence to the twelve-mile limit and the principle of "innocent passage" in the Straits.

The Indian Government has advocated the maintenance of "a zone of peace"³⁵ in the Indian Ocean, in accordance with a 1971 United Nation Resolution. Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh of India said that he would "sound a note of warning that the responses to the UN resolution from most of the big naval countries like the United States, France, Britain and the Soviet Union were not encouraging. There was an attempt to complicate the issue with the freedom of the high seas etc."³⁶

Concerning the rivalries of big powers in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Foreign Minister stated: "our fear is that any large scale and loud presence of the navy of one big power is bound to result in the presence of the navies of other big naval powers."³⁷ "This type of rivalry," he said further, "may create problems for

³⁵See "Indian Ocean As Zone of Peace--Swaran Sing's Appeal," in India News, published by the Embassy of India, Washington, D.C., November 23, 1973.

³⁶See "Big Power Rivalry in Indian Ocean--Fears of Littoral States--Foreign Minister," India News, November 9, 1973.

³⁷Ibid.

littoral countries, the overwhelming majority of whom are desirous of keeping the Indian Ocean area as a region of tranquility."³⁸

A complex set of relationships exists among the powers having interests in the Indian Ocean. India and the Soviet Union are aligned in the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which was basically established for reasons of mutual concern about Communist China. The United States is aligned with some of the countries in Southeast Asia and on the best of terms with all of the ASEAN nations, but does not have a warm friendship with India; on the other hand she is engaged in rapprochement with both the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Indian cooperation would be helpful to the Soviet Union in structuring any anti-Chinese policy apart from the mere logistical advantages of access to the Southeast Asian region. Moscow has been trying to break the Washington-Peking-Tokyo triangle. If it does not succeed, India's importance to the Soviet Union in stabilizing the Washington-Peking-Tokyo balance of power in Asia would even be greater. It would appear, therefore, that despite India's reluctance to play a major role in Southeast Asia, she will be involved in the region, even if indirectly, as a balancer of power.

³⁸Ibid.

Conclusion: Weighing the Balance of Power
in Southeast Asia

Although it is generally known that the international arena has changed from bipolarity to the new multipolarity, it should be noted that only the two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) are likely to remain capable of sending forces and supplies to distant parts of the globe.³⁹ Both Japan and Western Europe are military dependents of the United States. Neither, despite huge economic power, behaves on the strategic-diplomatic chessboard as if it intended to play a world role under the American nuclear umbrella. China is still mainly an Asian regional power, more concerned with breaking out of encirclement than with active external involvement.

Basic distinctions, emphasized by Inis L. Claude, Jr.,⁴⁰ should be made between balance of power as a situation, a policy, and a system. In Southeast Asia, we are not seeing a balance of equals (that is, under a situation). Japan lacks the military capability but far exceeds China and the USSR in economic penetration. But we seem to witness that the United States, the Soviet, China and Japan try to promote their separate interests

³⁹See Stanley Hoffman, "Weighing the Balance of Power," Foreign Affairs 50 (July 1972): 618-626.

⁴⁰Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 13-25.

while preserving stability (that is, balance of power as a policy). However these major powers have not yet established or accepted specific rules, mechanics or procedures for collective action to preserve a balance against efforts by a major power or lesser powers to disrupt it (that is, a system). The continuation of intense fighting in Vietnam and Cambodia despite the Paris Accords showed no rules or procedures for enforcing a multilateral balance of power.

The basic Asian policies of the major powers, will be examined next in order to determine their relative power in Asia.

Although the Soviet Union has established diplomatic relations with all of the ASEAN countries, exchanging high-level diplomatic visits and modestly increasing trade volume with some, the results have on balance been meager and the USSR remains but a marginal factor in the foreign policy calculations of these countries. Because of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, improved relations with the Soviet Union are welcomed by ASEAN countries for balancing purposes against China. It is the passive weight rather than the active influence of the Soviet Union that is being sought.

While the USSR has become India's principal arms supplier and sided openly with it in its war against Pakistan, India can hardly be counted a genuine ally of the Soviet Union. Because of its larger political interests

in the nonaligned Third World and its unwillingness to cut itself off from other non-Communist sources of external assistance, India clearly prefers to maintain a certain distance from the Soviet Union and to avoid the appearance of general alignment with it. Thus, the Indian policy of nonalignment itself has been characterized as an exercise in the balance-of-power politics.

Shifts in Peking's foreign policy strategy have been fundamental in transforming the nature of the international balance in the region. China deemphasized the revolutionary component in its policies, by normalizing state-to-state relations with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The potential threat is the Soviet Union, so China tacitly approves of continuing security relationships between noncommunist Southeast Asian countries and the United States.

The United States can conduct a dialogue with both the Soviet and China, can seek to resolve outstanding issues through negotiations, and in a host of other ways represents a centrist as well as central force in the American-Soviet-Chinese triangle. And the U.S. currently stands in precisely the position that both of the other parties would ultimately like to achieve.

At the beginning of the 1970's, it seemed unlikely that Japan would play a major security role in Southeast Asia; but its ability to influence political decisions

through use of its vast economic resources have made Japan a key factor for all the Southeast Asia states. Japan's willingness to play a major economic role has made the next U.S. role there a multilateral one, rather than the near-unilateral position it had assumed during the 1960's. This sharing of the burden in Southeast Asia among friends is a key element in the Nixon Doctrine, and such sharing makes it more likely that the American people will be willing to support a continued, although reduced, U.S. role in Southeast Asia. Finally, the shift in Indonesia's policy in 1965 constituted a major gain for the United States in Asia.

While the United States, the Soviet, China and Japan play balance-of-power politics in Southeast Asia, it is the United States which is the most influential power over this region. As Hoffman puts it:

It is the United States which, in effect, protects the weakest of the Three (China) from a Soviet strike; it is the United States which tries to hold the balance between Russia and China; . . . it is the United States which tries to retain preponderance in the arena of interdependence.⁴¹

⁴¹Hoffman, p. 642.

CHAPTER IV

THE IMPORTANCE OF ASEAN

Background and Goals

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formally established in Bangkok on 8 August, 1967. It is a regional organization with five charter members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It is devoted to joint endeavours in the economic, social and cultural, and technical fields.

How It Relates to ASA

Since the ASEAN was directly connected with ASA, consideration of the latter is necessary. The first endeavour to achieve regional economic cooperation has been a very modest one. In July 1961, the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASA) was formed by the Bangkok Declaration, with the Federation of Malay States, the Philippines and Thailand as its founding members. The main purpose of the Association was real economic cooperation in Southeast Asia.¹

It was also clearly stipulated at the very outset

¹See ASA/DCC/1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, October 1961.

that the Association was in no way connected with any outside power or power bloc and was directed against no other country. It was essentially a free association of countries of Southeast Asia having as its objectives the promotion, through joint endeavour, of the well-being and the economic, social and cultural progress of the region.²

In the early part of 1966, before the end of the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, ASA was again reactivated in Bangkok where, after a lapse of nearly three years, the first ASA Standing Committee was held. Subsequently a Joint Working Party was convened to prepare the agenda for the Third ASA Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok in August 1966.³

Meanwhile, a new ASEAN had come into being encompassing also the three members of ASA. Thus, the Foreign Ministers of ASA held a Fourth Meeting in August 1967 to determine its future status and relations with the larger Association. They agreed in principle that in order to avoid duplication of activities and to ensure the optimum utilization of their financial and human resources, ASA programmes and projects could be adopted by ASEAN. In February 1968, the First Meeting of the Heads of Secretariat of ASEAN recommended the complete take-over of all ASA projects by ASEAN. This

²Ibid.

³See "ASA," Ministry of Foreign Affairs News, Bangkok, December 1966, pp. 6-7.

recommendation was adopted by the ASEAN Standing Committee, with the result that for all practical purposes ASA projects which were still pending or yet to be completed became ASEAN projects. The direct effect of this take-over seemed to represent a virtual merger of ASA with ASEAN. In any event, the ASA members of ASEAN did not think its useful to maintain two separate national secretariates, one for ASA and another for ASEAN. While operational projects of ASA, such as the ASA express train between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, continued to function with the possibility of merging into the ASEAN project by extending its line to Singapore and beyond, other ASA projects invariably were either changed to ASEAN or were being studied by the ASEAN Standing Committee at its various Ad Hoc Committees.⁴

Formation and Aims

The formation of the larger association for economic cooperation was made possible by the termination of the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the preceding resumption of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Malaysia. With the good offices of Thailand and some other countries within the region, an agreement was concluded in Bangkok between Indonesia and Malaysia bringing to an end to the confrontation in the

⁴See ASEAN/Doc/1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, August 1967.

first half of 1966. By August 1967, Indonesia and Singapore together with the three ASA countries were able to hold their consultations at the ministerial level in Bangkok and Bangsaen with the view to forming regional economic cooperation among their nations. Out of this meeting of the Ministers of the Five Southeast Asian Countries, ASEAN was born.⁵

The Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) gathered in Bangkok on August 8, 1967, and signed a declaration called the ASEAN Declaration, containing aims and purposes essentially similar to those of ASA. It states the following objectives:

1. To accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations;
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres;
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, the improvement

⁵Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Economic Cooperation ASA-ASEAN and ASPAC, Bangkok, January 1968.

of their transportation and communication facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;

6. To promote Southeast Asian studies;
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.⁶

The five ASEAN countries stated in the ASEAN Declaration that "mutual interests and common problems"⁷ among the Southeast Asian countries were among the considerations that prompted them to "strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and Cooperation."⁸

Furthermore, the preamble to the goals of ASEAN stated that "in the spirit of equality and partnership" the five Southeast Asian countries had established "a firm foundation for common action to promote regional cooperation in Southeast Asia" in order to "contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region."⁹

The declaration stresses that, "in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding, good neighborliness

⁶See text of ASEAN Declaration in ASEAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, May 1973, pp. 4-5.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

and meaningful cooperation among the countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture."¹⁰

Although security was not the formal goal of ASEAN, security in the broadest sense of the word appeared to be one of the major considerations for the Southeast Asian leaders as reflected in the Declaration, which states that:

. . . the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.

The leaders of Southeast Asia, realizing their stage of development, believe that the security of the region does not depend entirely upon its military strength or number of modern weapons available, but rather that "stability and security" are conditions sine qua non for the strengthening of the economic and social stability of the region;" and, that a strong economy would in turn contribute to the region's stability and security. For at this point, "external interference in any form or manifestation" would probably not be in the form of overt aggression or conventional warfare, but rather in the form

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid. Emphasis added.

of subversion and local insurgencies, as has been demonstrated in Indonesia and Malaysia along the Sarawak border, in Malaysia and Thailand along the Malaysia-Thai border, and in North and Northeast Thailand.

With regard to foreign bases, the ASEAN Declaration states in its preamble that "all foreign bases are temporary in nature,"¹² and that they "remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned."¹³ This statement obviously took into account the fact that, at the time of the establishment of ASEAN, Thailand and the Philippines had American bases which were indeed there at the "expressed concurrence" of the two countries.

Economic Cooperation Programs Carried Out by ASEAN

The most thorough study thus far of ASEAN economic cooperation has been done by a United Nations Study Team composed of some forty-one international experts¹⁴ led by Professor Gunal Kansu of Turkey. The team was established as a result of an offer made by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) to ASEAN to provide help in identifying opportunities for closer economic cooperation within ASEAN. The team

¹²See ASEAN Declaration. Emphasis added.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴The forty-one experts include Indonesian, an international staff member of the United Nations, one Filipino but no other Southeast Asian.

conducted a study on the spot in the ASEAN countries from March 1970 to April 1972 and produced some twenty-two reports and fourteen ASEAN Industrial Studies, as well as a final report summarizing the comprehensive studies and reports. The following is based on the Study Team's Report.¹⁵

Cooperation in the field of tourism among the ASEAN countries has a great potential. Already ASEAN has established a fourteen-day free visa to travel in any of the ASEAN countries for citizens of the five countries. The year 1971 saw the beginning of a "Visit ASEAN Year," whereby tourists were given an attractive travel rate to ASEAN as "one destination region." A five year plan (1974-1979) for a marketing plan in the field of tourism was established, commencing in Fiscal Year 1974-75, with a budget of \$300,000 for that year and an increase of 10 percent every year thereafter for the period of the four year marketing plan.

An ASEAN Hotel Management Executive Training Center was recommended by the Permanent Committee on Tourism for the executive level echelon of hotel and catering staff in 1972, and this was approved by the Ministerial conference in April 1973.

The Dutch Government has offered some 200,000

¹⁵Report of a United Nations Team, Economic Cooperation for ASEAN (London: Metcalfe Cooper & Hepburn Ltd. Printers, 1972).

guilders to ASEAN in October 1972 for the use of the ASEAN Permanent Committee on Tourism for sales promotion activities in Europe. This is an indication of the interest of foreign governments in ASEAN's tourism projects.

Various other activities are under way in the field of tourism cooperation among the ASEAN countries.

The Regional Transport Survey estimated that tourism is expected to show steady growth over the next twenty years from some \$180 million in receipts in 1969 to about \$1.2 billion in 1990.¹⁶

Besides tourism, other areas of ASEAN cooperation that have achieved tangible results include agreements on civil aviation that have been signed by the five ASEAN countries under the title of the Multilateral Agreement on Traffic Rights for Non-Scheduled Operation, which was signed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the Fourth Ministerial Meeting in March 1971 in order to increase the frequency of non-scheduled flights among the ASEAN countries, in addition to the scheduled ones. Also in the field of Communication/Air Traffic Services, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers signed in April 1972 an Agreement for the Facilitation of Search for Aircraft in Distress and Rescue of Survivors of Aircraft Accidents (SAR).

¹⁶Southeast Asia Regional Transport Survey, by Arthur D. Little Inc. and Associated Consultants, Book 1, Chapter II on "Economic Potential of the Region," Asian Development Bank, 1972, p. 23. Southeast Asian countries in the Transport Survey always include Laos, Khmer and Vietnam besides the five ASEAN countries.

In the field of telecommunication, the five capitals of the ASEAN countries now have a direct telephone link with each other, which certainly facilitates quick communication not only among the leaders of ASEAN but among the businessmen and citizens in the region as well. All of the ASEAN nations already have earth satellite stations, with regional as well as international circuits. Exchange of officials and information as well as scholarships in the field of telecommunication has been carried on among the ASEAN members. Cooperation in the field of satellite communication has also been in progress. Microwave systems in the region have been completed.

In the field of transportation, the Regional Transport Survey has produced numerous transport projects, either within an ASEAN country or linking two or more ASEAN nations, such as the establishment or expansion or upgrading of international airports, which are too numerous to mention here.¹⁷

There is no doubt that transportation and telecommunications constitute a basic and vital part of the whole economy of the region, and that is why the numerous transportation and telecommunication projects recommended by the Regional Transport Survey for the Southeast Asian region, looking ahead to twenty years from now, constitute

¹⁷On completed transportation and telecommunications projects, see ASEAN Annual Report 1972/73, pp. 56-61.

important recommendations that could have a vital and favorable impact on the economy of the region if successfully implemented.

In the field of mass media, the ASEAN Permanent Committee on Mass Media has carried out radio exchange programs among ASEAN members since January 1971 on a monthly basis. Film Festivals as means of promoting closer relations and better understanding have been held in three different ASEAN countries, namely the first ASEAN Film Festival in Manila in December 1971, the second in Bangkok in November 1972, and the third in Kuala Lumpur in the second half of 1973. The Film Festivals are rotated among the ASEAN countries annually. Exchange of film artists and joint film productions have been encouraged within ASEAN. Seminars relating to mass communication, literature, arts, physical education, sport coaching, and exhibitions of works of art have been encouraged among the ASEAN members. An ASEAN song contest was held and was won by Singapore in 1973. ASEAN thus has a song of its own to be sung at openings and closing of ASEAN conferences.

Other activities in the Mass Media section includes the effort to enlarge the role of the mass media in the ASEAN countries in the field of national and regional development. An ASEAN Journal has been published and the establishment of an ASEAN Mass Media Association has been

explored.

In the socio-cultural area, it should be mentioned that the Socio-Cultural Activities Permanent Committee of ASEAN was established in January 1972 located in Manila. The creation of this Permanent Committee thus separates the socio-cultural activities from the Mass Media and Other Activities Permanent Committee. This committee deals with such problems as population control, family planning, control of drug addiction and drug traffic, educational matters, student and youth activities, and joint operations against natural disasters.

The 1972/73 Annual Report contains a number of recommendations for the advancement of regional cooperation in the socio-cultural field, among others: the establishment of an ASEAN Museum, the ASEAN Field School in Archaeology, the ASEAN Seminar on Southeast Asian Literature, the Seminar Workshop in Environmental Problems, the ASEAN Institute for Archival Science, and the ASEAN Folklore Festival. The Permanent Committee on Socio-Cultural Activities is empowered to coordinate training and other activities in the various fields of theatre arts. ASEAN also makes use of facilities in the socio-cultural field that belong to international bodies such as UNESCO and ECAFE for an Asian Handicraft Development Center that is to be set up.

In the field of sports, games and tournaments, the Permanent Committee is preparing for an ASEAN Universiade

and an ASEAN University Students Sports Federation. A Youth Exchange Program has been planned to involve participants in community development projects, social welfare activities or cultural programs. The possibility for greater regional cooperation in community development has been explored. Other activities, such as seminars and exchange of information on the socio-cultural activities among the ASEAN countries, have been encouraged.¹⁸

In the field of science and technology, the Permanent Committee on Science and Technology located in Jakarta has developed various programs, including the exchange of information on scientific and technological matter among scholars in the ASEAN region, joint research and development on topics of common interest, establishment of regional Science Information Center, and other similar activities. For example, Thailand hosted the second meeting of the heads of the Scientific Documentation and Information Services of ASEAN countries in Bangkok in November 1972.¹⁹ Malaysia hosted the meeting of the ASEAN experts on Food Protein in Kuala Lumpur in November 1972. Indonesia hosted the meeting of experts on soybean processing and utilization in Bandung in September 1972. The Philippines hosted the meeting of experts on corrosion

¹⁸ASEAN Annual Report 1972/73, pp. 8-13.

¹⁹See ASEAN Annual Report 1972/73, pp. 7 and 58.

of metals in humid tropical weather in Manila in March 1973. Regional seminars and workshops will be held once a year on a rotating basis among the ASEAN countries. The Permanent Committee on Science & Technology has recommended the publication of an ASEAN News Bulletin. Exchange of visits among the Scientists of ASEAN are being encouraged.²⁰

In the field of shipping,²¹ The Permanent Committee on Shipping of ASEAN, in its meeting in Jakarta in September 1972, recommended that all members work closely in the fields of bulk shipping, search and rescue operations, and navigational safety. Exchange of information and data on the problems of shipping faced by each ASEAN country has been encouraged by more contacts among the national Shipowners associations. A Project Team of Comparative Study of ASEAN Shipping Technicians, Officials, Experts including the Federation of ASEAN Shipowners Association (FASA), and the Federation of ASEAN Shippers Council (FASC), has also been established.

In 1976, ASEAN shipping bodies discussed concrete solutions after years of futile denunciations against closed shipping conferences and annual average freight rate increases of 12 percent.

If ASEAN cooperation is successful, the alternative conference could probably offer up to 20 percent cheaper

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid., pp. 16-18.

freight rates than closed conferences, and it would give its member lines better sailing rights, tonnage allowance, and ports of call than closed conferences offer.²²

At this point the ASEAN countries are trying to create the infrastructural elements of cooperation in shipping, including studies of various proposals in matters concerning oil pollution affecting the shores of the ASEAN countries, the adoption of measures to minimize the adverse effects arising from the monopolistic practices of the multinational container consortia, and other essential elements for solid long-range cooperation in the important field of shipping.²³

In the field of agriculture, one can readily understand that all of the ASEAN countries, except Singapore, put emphasis on the development of agriculture, since around 70 percent of the active population is engaged in agriculture, 36 percent of gross domestic product is generated in agriculture, and 57 percent of private consumption is devoted to food.²⁴

The ASEAN countries have begun training programs and seminars on various aspects of agriculture and

²²Ho Kwon Ping, "ASEAN Charts a New Course," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 23, 1976.

²³See ASEAN Annual Report 1972/73, pp. 16-18.

²⁴See discussion in Report of a United Nations Team, Economic Co-operation for ASEAN, particularly Chapter 8 on Possibilities of Co-operation in Agriculture and Forestry, pp. 92-100.

fisheries, including training for fresh water seasonal fishing, the repair and anchorage of fishing boats of member countries, exchange of information on piracy and fishery law provisions, and seminars on prawn farming, land use, food production and poultry raising.

The Permanent Committee on Food and Agriculture, at its meeting in Kuala Lumpur in September 1972, announced that in 1973 the Philippines would host an agriculture exchange program, a fishery training project, and a workshop on protein, food and vegetables. Various other efforts at cooperation in the form of seminars and workshops on different aspects of agriculture have been developed among the ASEAN countries.

The United Nations Study Team recommended that the ASEAN countries cooperate in agricultural research, agricultural training, agricultural marketing, and in the **coordination** of agricultural policies. Cooperation between the Permanent Committee on Science and Technology and the Permanent Committee on Food and Agriculture, especially with respect to agricultural research and related matters, has begun and should be very useful in the agricultural development of the region.

In the area of forestry, the room for cooperation among the ASEAN countries is certainly quite vast, in particular with respect to joint action vis-a-vis third countries. Technical cooperation in forest management

and research into the solution of common problems in forestry have a promising future.

ASEAN Cooperation in International
and Regional Trade

The establishment of SCCAN (Special Coordination Committee of ASEAN), for the purpose of negotiating better terms of trade for ASEAN's products, is a distinct step forward in economic cooperation among ASEAN countries. Dialogue continues between the EEC and ASEAN. The ABC (ASEAN Brussels Committee) in Brussels, the headquarters of the EEC, which consists of the Ambassadors or Representatives of the ASEAN nations to the EEC and is chaired by the Malaysian Ambassador with the Thai Ambassador as its Vice Chairman, continues to keep in touch with the EEC headquarters.

The value of a common ASEAN stand in world forums related to commerce and industry, as in the negotiation with the EEC through SCCAN, has become obvious. The same approach has been applied to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The joint stand taken by the ASEAN countries in these cases has been very useful not only in dealing with substantive issues, but unconsciously in establishing the habit of a collective approach, thereby

strengthening the sense of regional cooperation.

Moreover, major changes that have taken place, not only in the geopolitical area but in the world trade system as well, have made it necessary for the ASEAN nations to continue to adopt a common stand. The basic factors that dominate international trade movements are undoubtedly related to the emergence of the multipolar structure that has replaced or is in the process of replacing the bipolar structure in international politics. Each of these multipolar centers represents an important trade power: the European Economic Community, the United States, the COMECON countries led by the Soviet Union, and last but not least, Japan. Communist China is likely to play a considerable role in the multipolar structure in the future.

In coping with these big powers, ASEAN has become an increasingly effective instrument. With regard to the EEC, for which SCANN has been established, the entry of Britain into the EEC has enlarged the role and importance of the EEC as one of the major trade forces in the world. The EEC is a main market for the products of the Southeast Asian region. The fact that a group of former French colonies in Africa called the Yoande Community is given preferential treatment by the EEC in the form of import duty facilities for its exports to the EEC countries has placed the Southeast Asian countries in a comparatively disadvantageous position since they too produce similar

type of raw materials and agricultural products, such as copra, rubber, tobacco, coffee, palm oil, etc. Furthermore, the European Economic Community enforces restrictive duties on processed agricultural commodities.

It should be remembered that the processing of agricultural commodities and raw materials and industrial growth are essential to Southeast Asia's development process. Although the EEC has not yet imposed quota restrictions on light industrial products from the ASEAN countries, as imposed by the United States on textiles from Japan, Hongkong, and several other countries, the danger does exist in the view of the Southeast Asia countries.

Agreements between ASEAN and the EEC as a result of their dialogue have been reached in several areas, although further deliberations are **required**. The essential matters on which agreement has been reached include the consequences of the EEC expansion to include Britain, the Generalized System of Preference (the idea being to expand the EEC preferences to include the processed agricultural commodities, the semi-finished and the finished products of the ASEAN countries), ocean shipping, and economic and technical aid (including assistance in developing a statistical center for ASEAN calculated to improve the system of gathering and registering trade data in the ASEAN countries, which currently ranges from poor to excellent).

However, since the exports of ASEAN countries are

of a similar nature (mainly agricultural products, minerals, timber, and oil), it is understandable why the international market becomes more important than the regional market since the consumers are mainly **outside the region**. Intra-ASEAN trade for instance has been slower as compared to ASEAN's international trade. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew pointed out this fact in his speech at the opening of the Fifth Ministerial Meeting on April 13, 1972 in Singapore, namely that "as a percentage, trade within ASEAN to total ASEAN trade with the world dropped from 18.3 percent in 1966 to 15.7 percent in 1970. In other words, ASEAN partners decreased their trade among themselves and increased their trade with the rest of the world from 81.7 percent to 84.3 percent."²⁵

In spite of the above constraints on intra-ASEAN trade, economic integration in the ASEAN region is expected to eliminate or relieve the external and internal constraints to the economic development of the ASEAN nations. Regional economic integration implies a broadening of the regional market and a reduction in the country's or the region's dependence on trade with the outside world.²⁶

²⁵See Regional Meeting of Economic Planners on Southeast Asian Economy in the 1970s "An Ecosystem Approach to Southeast Asian Economic Integration," Bangkok, September 1972, p. 84.

²⁶See H. Kitamura, "Economic Theory and the Economic Integration of Underdeveloped Region," in Latin American Economic Integration, pp. 50-56.

Because of the broadened market in the ASEAN region, consumer goods can be imported in greater quantity from other members of ASEAN instead of from the outside world. Through this inter-country substitution, the availability of the foreign exchange required for imports of essential development goods from outside ASEAN, i.e., the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and EEC, is increased. The increased capacity of the members of ASEAN to import capital goods could also make it possible for them to produce manufactured items more efficiently than before, initially for consumption within the ASEAN nations, and eventually for the world market. Thus, through economic integration, Thailand as a member of ASEAN could conceivably increase her export-based capacity to import capital goods and, in turn, speed up the rate of her industrialization and economic development.

ASEAN Defense: A New Strategy

The major threat to each of the ASEAN countries may not be an overt attack from any external power, but rather internal subversion and local insurgencies on the part of the communist movements that have existed there for a number of years. Thailand, compared to the other ASEAN countries, has the most serious communist insurgency and subversive activities problem because of its proximity to Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam as well as Communist China. However, although the ASEAN nations face a common problem,

namely a Peking-inspired communist insurgency or subversion or both, there is as yet no common approach to the threat. The following is a discussion of the problems and prospects of ASEAN defense cooperation.

ASEAN Cooperation in Counterinsurgency

In view of the common nature of the threat faced by the ASEAN countries, it would be logical to assume that cooperation in the counterinsurgency area would be beneficial to all ASEAN members. At present, cooperation between Malaysia and Indonesia in the border areas of Sarawak, and between Thailand and Malaysia in the border areas, has been in progress for a number of years. Thailand and Burma also have worked together for a number of years in coping with the Communist insurgents along the Thai-Burmese borders.

Some of the problems confronted by the Armed Forces of the ASEAN countries in counterinsurgency cooperation stem probably from their differences in military doctrine, military terminologies, methods of operation, experiences and background. But the differences do not constitute an absolute obstacle to cooperation in counterinsurgency.

The bilateral cooperation in the border areas between Malaysia and Indonesia in Sarawak and between Thailand and Malaysia have over the years proven to be very beneficial for all parties concerned. Indeed, there have been differences and difficulties encountered, but

on the whole the semiannual meetings of the General Border Committees and day-to-day joint military operations in the field have brought improvement through the sharing of experiences as well as knowledge.

In the case of Thai-Malaysian bilateral military cooperation in the border areas, until 1975 there were seventeen meetings held by the General Border Committee. Each meeting reviewed and drew lessons from previous experiences in border operations. The fourteenth meeting, for instance, noted the importance of "study papers prepared by the Regional Border Committee on the strategy and set-up of the communist terrorist organization and also various countermeasures against the terrorists"²⁷ Based upon the need for a more effective operation, the Thais and Malaysians agreed at the fourteenth meeting "to complete the area for coordinated naval patrols in the seas adjacent to the border along the Satul/Perlis coast in order to tighten preventive measures against sea-borne Communist infiltration and illegal landing of arms."²⁸ The fifteenth meeting decided that it was also desirable to uplift the living conditions of the people in the border areas, "by carrying out more development

²⁷See Joint Communique 14 General Border Committee Meeting on May 30, 1972 as printed in Foreign Affairs (Malaysia), June 1972, p. 57.

²⁸Ibid.

projects"²⁹ as a way of denying the communist insurgents an opportunity to exploit the poverty of that area. The sixteenth and seventeenth meetings adopted other measures based upon previous experiences.

The same applies to the Malaysian-Indonesian border military cooperation efforts. There have been three meetings of the General Border Committee on the level of Cabinet Ministers, but on a lower level there have been more meetings as the day-to-day joint operation progresses. The cooperation has developed from a purely unit operation in the border areas to allowing a five mile "hot pursuit" beyond the other's border, to involving the Navies and Air Forces of both countries in the joint operations against the communist insurgents, in addition to the agreement to conduct a joint patrol in the Malacca Straits.

Based upon the progress and experiences obtained in the bilateral military cooperation among the ASEAN members, the problems mentioned earlier appear not to be insurmountable. The possibility of the establishment of a center for counterinsurgency training is there if the ASEAN countries deem it essential. It can be envisioned that all the necessary theoretical and practical military and social-political knowledge, including the nature of "wars of national liberation" as carried out by the "People's

²⁹See Joint Communique 15 General Border Committee Meeting on November 28, 1972 as printed in Foreign Affairs (Malaysia), December 1972, p. 102.

Liberation Army" of the communists in Southeast Asia, including that in Indochina, would be made available. Some of the military aid funds available for the training of officers from the ASEAN countries abroad (in the United States, Australia, and other countries) could be utilized for the development of such a training center. Expenses, as in the case of other ASEAN projects, would undoubtedly be borne jointly by the ASEAN members.

Among the ASEAN countries, perhaps Indonesia has had the most extensive experience in coping with insurgents, communist and non-communist. From independence in August 1945 to 1965, Indonesia has had to cope with, first of all, the Dutch military aggression from 1945 to 1949 through guerrilla warfare; then the Communist (PKI) rebellion in Madiun in 1948, while Indonesia was preoccupied in its struggle for independence; the Darul Islam/Tentera Islam Indonesia (DI/TII--a right wing Moslem rebellion aiming at the establishment of a Moslem state by force); the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in 1958 in Sumatra; and, numerous other minor insurgencies. The last insurgency was the abortive Communist coup d'état in September 1965, which was perhaps the bloodiest and most serious of all. The Vietcong-style insurgency conducted by the Communists in Blitar, East Java, in 1968, by building underground paths and quarters, was easily wiped out by the Army. In addition to the prospect of ASEAN cooperation in the field of

counterinsurgency, there are other prospects for regional defense cooperation.

Intelligence Cooperation

It goes without saying that intelligence cooperation in the broadest sense of the word go hand in hand with the existing military cooperation, which is within the framework of regional cooperation. Exchange of general data and information, bilaterally and multilaterally, has been carried out; but intelligence cooperation can cover a wide range of activities including security, science, economic, political, etc. Very often sensitive bilateral or multilateral issues can be settled through intelligence cooperation, without any publicity. In fact, quite a few of the bilateral issues within ASEAN have been tempered, cooled off, subdued, or settled through or with the aid of intelligence cooperation. As is the function of intelligence, the people involved always stay in the background rather than in the forefront.

ASEAN Armed Forces Cooperation

The prospect of cooperation among the ASEAN Armed Forces as a whole in the long-run is encouraging. Exchange of visits of officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force between the ASEAN countries have been made numerous times, such as Thai officers visiting Indonesian military installations and training centers, and the other way around;

Indonesian officers visiting Singapore's military installations and training centers; Malaysian officers obtaining training in Indonesia; and, Singapore officers visiting Indonesia or Thai military institutions, etc.

The process of cooperation will depend much upon the degree of mutual confidence and trust. The exchange of visits, the joint exercises, in addition to the existing joint operations, will gradually lead to a broader cooperation among the ASEAN Armed Forces. The common perception of a threat to security and stability in the region on the part of the military leadership is essential to establish a solid foundation for long range military cooperation.

A special endeavor is required to harmonize the existing differences of system and doctrines among the ASEAN Armed Forces. A uniform military doctrine would be helpful if not essential for effectiveness in future joint operations and joint defense planning. This will take time, but it is not impossible, if the ASEAN leaders demonstrate their political will to achieve it. Judging from statements frequently made by ASEAN leaders regarding their concern for the "security and stability" of the Southeast Asian region, they appear eager to gradually strengthen their cooperative efforts in the defense area. In the author's interviews with military leaders in Thailand, this idea of regional defense cooperation is favored, but

not a military pact. The reason is that establishment of a pact might provoke other powers and thereby invite unnecessary reactions. It is therefore considered more advantageous for all the parties concerned to emphasize the importance of "defense cooperation," rather than a "military pact," through step-by-step efforts in the various areas such as intelligence cooperation, joint operations in the border areas, exchange of visits among the officers of the Armed Forces, joint naval patrols, and the sending of officers for training to each other's Staff and Command colleges. They do not want to establish a military pact in the form of a SEATO or similar pacts. To the extent that military alliances still have relevance and credibility in Southeast Asia, bilateral agreements are considered more reliable than multilateral alliances.

The Last Alternative

Thailand was clearly disappointed by SEATO's inaction in solving the Laotian crises in the early 1960's. As a defense organization it faded away for years. And as a result of the reduction in U.S. military and economic aid, it is only ASEAN that Thailand will accept at present to fill the political vacuum in Southeast Asia. However the United States is still the most powerful state in the region (as analyzed in Chapter III), so Thailand should look at the compatibility of interests between the United States and ASEAN simultaneously.

The United States and ASEAN

What are the interests of the United States in the ASEAN region? And what are the interests of the ASEAN nations in a United States' presence in the region?

Within the framework of her global interests and strategy, the United States has a considerable economic, political and defense interest in the ASEAN region. Although the United States has withdrawn her forces from Vietnam, and later from the Southeast Asian or East Asia-Pacific region in general in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, it is to her interest and in the interest of stability in Southeast Asia that the region not be dominated by any other major power. Taking into account her "balance of power" policy, which has been discussed in the Chapter III, and considering the domestic pressures or public mood in the United States in view of the Vietnam experience, it can be concluded that the United States does not have any interest in seeking a domination of the ASEAN region. On the other hand, domination of Southeast Asia by any other major power would lead to instability in the region and would upset the "balance of power" in the area in a way contrary to United States' interests.

The interest of the ASEAN nations coincidentally runs parallel with that of the United States in terms of the need for stability in the region. In other words,

the ASEAN nations, realizing the United States' withdrawal from the area, do not wish to be dominated by either China or Japan or the Soviet Union. The United States' presence, therefore, would tend to balance the other major powers in the region: hence the mutuality of interest.

The ASEAN nations, therefore, welcomed President Nixon's statement that, "while adjusting our role in defensive alliances, we are supporting a compensating increase in the ability of our Asian partners to defend themselves."³⁰ A vivid example through which the ASEAN nations are trying to develop their "ability to defend themselves" is the regional cooperation in ASEAN itself, in the economic, political and bilateral defense and other related areas, with impressive progress thus far.

It is then in the interest of the United States to see the emergence of a viable, effective and strong ASEAN, and to see ASEAN playing a more active role in regional as well as international affairs since that would contribute towards the maintenance of stability and security in the Southeast Asian region.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, then the United States Secretary of State designate, in an answer to a Senator's question on the long-term objective of American foreign policy in Asia, said that the United States' purpose has been

³⁰Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's--The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress, 1972, p. 85.

"to shore up the capacity of indigenous countries to protect themselves against the danger of overwhelming attack."³¹

He also predicted that there would be "very substantial reductions"³² of American forces "over a five to ten Year period"³³ in the area. The next five to ten years then can be regarded as a transition period, during which time the United States is expected "to shore up the capacity of indigenous countries," the ASEAN countries included. The "capacity of indigenous countries" must not be seen from the defense point of view alone--economic prosperity, internal political stability, and defense capability are all interwoven and jointly constitute the vital fabric of stability in the region.

In conclusion, the United States' interests in the ASEAN region revolve around the maintenance of stability in the broadest sense of the word in the region, and in the prevention of dominance of the region by a single major power. Thailand, as a member of ASEAN, should maintain and increase the strength of ASEAN in order to serve U.S. interests, and the U.S. should look at ASEAN as a whole region rather than just Thailand.

³¹"Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Part I, Washington, D.C., September 7, 1973, p. 113.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality," which the ASEAN countries adopted in 1971 as a statement of Southeast Asia's desired position vis a vis the major powers, has become a subject of controversy with problems as well as prospects. The ASEAN foreign ministers defined Neutrality as a state of being "free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers." The "outside Powers" can be understood here as particularly the major powers, since they are the ones that have vested interests in the Southeast Asian region.

How do the ASEAN nations hope to achieve this goal? One widespread view, which we shall call the realistic approach, is that the ASEAN nations must have the strength and overall capacity to enforce their neutrality collectively. This does not have to be done by force, since the ASEAN nations do not at this point have the ability to do so against any of the major powers. Indonesia favors the motto "regional resilience," which encompasses the collective ideological, political, economic, social, cultural and military strength of each of the ASEAN nations. Hence, the need for what the Kuala Lumpur Declaration urges, namely "concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation" in each of these fields.

How does one reconcile the realistic approach with the existence of foreign bases in the ASEAN region? Thailand

and the Philippines would probably be unwilling to exchange the existing foreign military bases for the aim of "neutrality," without a substitute guarantee against what they perceive as external threats to their national security. Current perceptions of national security and external threats vary among the ASEAN nations, due to geographical and geopolitical conditions, and internal as well as external considerations, although all of the ASEAN countries have subscribed to the long-term objective of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. Thanat Khoman, the former Foreign Minister of Thailand, for instance, calls for "neutralization with strength."³⁴ Mr. Thanat Khoman, who as Foreign Minister of Thailand was one of the founders of ASEAN and was the Special Envoy of the then National Executive Council of Thailand to the meeting that led to the signing of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, basically objected to the presence of American bases in Thailand. In terms of internal security, the American troops in these bases had no role to play; and, the use of these bases for the bombing of North Vietnam **appeared** to be no longer necessary as a result of the Paris peace agreement. Foreign bases merely create tension, he argued. He pointed to ASEAN as the only alternative for the ASEAN countries, because

³⁴See his article "Neutralization with Strength," The Nation, Bangkok, April 16, 1973.

"there is no other choice."³⁵ The Thai Government, however, believed that American bases were still needed, although it believed in the importance of ASEAN as well.

The ASEAN countries at the outset agreed that "foreign bases are temporary" in nature when they established ASEAN in August 1967, since this principle was embodied in the Bangkok Declaration. The word "temporary," however, was not defined as to duration. Presumably, the duration would be adjusted to the respective condition of the countries in which foreign bases existed. The bases would presumably be phased out gradually, as the ASEAN countries gained cohesion and collective strength or resilience, to implement the neutralization concept.

The main proponent of the realistic approach, Indonesia, has stressed the importance of "national resilience" of each of the ASEAN countries. This called for each ASEAN nation to "put its house in order" by strengthening its ideological, political, economic, social, cultural and military fabric.³⁶ Thus military strength has not been

³⁵Ibid. For an elaboration of Thanat Khoman's views on the subject of American bases in Thailand and other related views, see his paper "Thailand in the Midst of Changes," presented at the seminar of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, 1973.

³⁶See text of ASEAN Declaration in ASEAN Journal I (January-March 1973): 4-5.

singled out as the major factor contributing to internal stability. The conventional approach to the role of military power is not accepted in the Southeast Asian political, security, and socio-cultural setting, as the example of Vietnam shows--so the argument goes. The Vietnam experience, in which the communist insurgents, as they do in the other ASEAN countries, carry out what is known as "protracted warfare," cannot be adequately coped with by a conventional military approach. Indonesia has experienced this in coping with numerous domestic insurgencies, Communist and non-Communist, out of which came the conclusion that a conventional military approach in the Southeast Asian setting can never be successful. Rather, a counter-protracted warfare approach must be devised, and successfully so. It is this background that has led Indonesia to place strong emphasis on "national resilience" and "regional resilience." Resilience emphasizes elasticity and endurance, as distinct from a conventional interpretation of strength, or so the Indonesians argue. The realistic school of thought contends that if resilience is present there is no need for the neutrality of the region to be guaranteed by the major powers.

The second view, which we shall call for the sake of discussion the idealistic approach, tends to stress the importance of a guarantee by the major powers of Southeast Asian neutrality, although not disagreeing with the main

thrust of the realistic approach. This school holds that the major powers have intertwined yet independent interests in the ASEAN or East Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

The United States, for instance, does not have any interest in seeking domination of Southeast Asia, although she continues to be a major (and the strongest) power in the region. It is to her interest and the interest of the ASEAN nations to maintain stability and peace in Southeast Asia. What about "neutrality" for Southeast Asia? President Nixon had "dialogue with the ASEAN member states" on this subject, and he concluded that "much remains to be done before such an objective can be realized: the secure independence of sovereign Southeast Asian nations is its essential precondition."³⁷ Basically, however, if the ASEAN nations through regional cooperative efforts can fulfill this "essential precondition," which in fact corresponds with the objective of the "realistic approach," the United States may be willing to guarantee the "neutralization" of Southeast Asia, so the argument continues.

The Soviet Union, whose interests in the ASEAN region are the containment of Communist China and access to the important straits and markets of ASEAN, may find it to her interest to see an increasingly stable Southeast Asia and a strong ASEAN as a guarantee that the region

³⁷Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's--The Emerging Structure of Peace, p. 85.

will not be dominated by either China or the United States. In fact, if ASEAN could constitute a balance to Communist China in the region, Soviet interests would be well served. The Russians realize that the ASEAN nations distrust the motives of the Communist Chinese because of Chinese support for communist insurgents or "wars of national liberation" in the ASEAN region. Thus the possibility that the Soviet Union might be willing to guarantee the neutrality of Southeast Asia exists according to the idealistic approach.

Japan, a non-military major power, should be asked to participate in guaranteeing the neutrality of Southeast Asia, the argument says further. Japan's interdependence with Southeast Asia is obvious due to her interests in raw materials, access to the vital Straits of Malacca, and markets for her exports. It would be to Japan's interest to see a stable and relatively prosperous Southeast Asia that was not dominated by any of the major powers. A prosperous and stable ASEAN would be a better market for Japan and a more dependable partner in trade and industry, the idealistic approach contends. Therefore, if the other major powers are willing to guarantee the neutrality of Southeast Asia, it would also serve Japan's interests.

China's relationship to the region is somewhat different from that of the other three major powers, due to her involvement in support of local subversives, which is often alleged to be evidence of China's desire to

dominate the region. But it should be noted that China has normalized state-to-state relations and endorsed antirsubversion statements with Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia as discussed in Chapter III. As Tun Razak said, Malaysia viewed the question of diplomatic relations with China "within the context of our proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia."³⁸ If China really discontinues her support of "war of national liberation" and other subversive activities in the ASEAN region, and continues to restrain herself from manipulating the overseas Chinese, in exchange for the normalization of its relations with the ASEAN countries, stability and neutrality in the region may well be to China's own interest in view of her concern with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is China's main foe, and her global strategy is based upon that premise. Is it not a fact, the proponents of the idealistic school of thought ask, that since the beginning of its detente with the United States China has implied that she does not object to the presence of United States bases in Asia, to the U.S.-Japan defense arrangement, or to the buildup of Japan's military powers?

Moreover, the Idealistic school of thought argues further, the Shanghai Communique issued by Premier Chou En-lai and President Nixon, and the Tanaka-Chou En-lai

³⁸"Prime Minister Places Emphasis on Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs (Malaysia), June 1972, p. 127.

Joint Communiqué contain identical commitments that neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. Thus there is an interlocking commitments between China and the United States, and between China and Japan, three of the major powers in Asia, not to dominate the region, including the ASEAN region. The idealistic school argues that China may be willing to guarantee the neutrality of Southeast Asia because two other major powers have agreed not to "seek hegemony" in the area. However, no ASEAN country is overoptimistic about China's intentions.

The idealistic approach is adequately reflected in the words of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, when he said that "The very heart of the proposal is the recognition and accommodation of the legitimate interests of all parties in the region, both the external powers and the countries in the region itself." "There must be a harmonization of all these interests," he said, "the end product of which is an order every-one can live with."³⁹ Such is the main thrust of the arguments of the idealistic

³⁹See "Prime Minister's Visit to Soviet Union, September 29-October 5," speech by Tun Abdul Razak at the dinner given in his honor by the U.S.S.R Government in Moscow on October 2, 1972, in Foreign Affairs (Malaysia), September 1972, p. 30.

approach.

Having presented the views of the two schools of thought on the problems and prospects of neutralization of Southeast Asia, we can conclude that both have merit. Whether all of the major powers will eventually agree to guarantee the neutrality of Southeast Asia, and what form the guarantee will take, cannot at this point be determined. A harmonization of the main thrusts of the two schools of thought on neutralization of Southeast Asia, with emphasis on the national and regional resilience of the Southeast Asian countries, appears to be desirable in order that the ASEAN countries can play an effective role as a group aiming at stability and increasing self-confidence in the region.

Cooperative acts between ASEAN states reflect a common desire that foreign Powers be more responsive to the needs and interests of those whose destiny they largely determine. And politically, there is the expectation that ASEAN will afford bargaining power with foreign Powers that any ASEAN member as an individual government lacks.

CHAPTER V

THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR POLICY OF ALLIANCES

The Unelected Civilian Government

While Thanom and Prapat had re-established military hegemony with the 1971 coup, they were to learn two years later that they had not achieved popular support. Student agitation for democratic government in 1973 was the immediate cause of the downfall and exile of Thanom and Prapat. The student criticism of the military regime enjoyed popular backing from all social classes to an extent never before seen in Thai political history. In addition the king opposed the continuation of the regime as it was then composed.

That student power exceeded the modest expectations of its leaders and ended in the overthrow of the country's military dictatorship, surprised not only the forty million Thais but also Thailand's Asian neighbors and the major powers, especially the United States, the proprietor of an elaborate complex of military bases in this country. Although the six American bases, with a complement of thirty-eight thousand men, were a minor issue in the

uprising, there were indications that the new government might seek a faster reduction in their number and strength than the Americans were anticipating.¹

The Sanya Administration (1973-1975)

King Bhumipol chose Sanya Dhamasak as the Prime Minister of the new interim Government. Prime Minister Sanya, a former president of the Supreme Court, academic and, most significantly, the first civilian to hold the post since 1956, took up the quest for true democracy with admirable enthusiasm. An 18-member committee was formed to draft a new, permanent Constitution, and began its work with great fanfare. Thanom's rubber stamp National Legislative Assembly was dissolved and replaced in December by a new National Assembly which was elected by 2,343 citizens from all walks of life to elect 299 from among themselves.² The new assembly then would be charged with the task of considering the constitution draft, to be completed a month later by the Constitution Drafting Committee.

All of the principal policy adjustments called for by the former military regime-withdrawal of United States forces, dialogue with China, opening the door to trade and diplomatic relations with other socialist countries-

¹Robert Shaphen, Letter from Thailand, New Yorker, January 14, 1974, p. 67.

²Ibid., p. 68.

had been initiated under the former regime, mainly in response to changes in U.S. foreign policy. They were pursued unchanged under the Sanya Government.

The U.S. forces in Thailand. In 1974, the year got off to a bad start with the revelation that an American intelligence officer attached to the CIA Sakon Nakhon station had sent a bogus letter to the Prime Minister in the name of the communist party. The incoming American Ambassador, William Kintner, apologized for the incident; but the new freedom felt by Thai leaders was exemplified by the action of General Vitoon Yasawas, a former commander of Thai volunteers in Laos, who, in an unprecedented move, revealed publicly the name of Bangkok's CIA station chief.³ Early in the year Kintner made several statements which were much resented in Thai circles, but as the year wore on he gained generally high marks for his initiative, open mind, and apparently sincere support of Thailand's current experiment with democracy.

Until the first phase of limited reduction began, there were 45,000 U.S. servicemen and 600 planes located at seven bases--the second largest concentration of U.S. military personnel anywhere in the world outside the U.S. The gradual reduction of forces had begun in August 1973 (under the former regime) at the time of the Cambodian

³"Waking Up to the Spy Game," Bangkok Post, January 5, 1974, p. 1.

bombing halt and continued at a modest pace--partly to mollify Thai public opinion, which had become increasingly critical of the U.S. military presence, and partly as a cost-effective economy move by the U.S. Air Force.

In his first major policy statement in January, the new Foreign Minister, Charunphan Isaranghun, made it clear that the Government hoped for a change in emphasis by the U.S. from military to economic and technical cooperation. "Thailand's future relations with the U.S.," he stated, "will have to be modified and adapted to changing circumstances. During the past decade one characteristic of our relations with the U.S. has been an over-emphasis on military cooperation. This needs to be adjusted in order to achieve a more truly balanced relationship" ⁴

He was said to have conveyed this message to key U.S. officials; and, as a result, a programme of U.S. withdrawals for the year was announced in March 1974. Although this involved a one-third cut in U.S. strength and the virtual closure of two large bases (Ubon and Takhli), the remaining American military presence in Thailand-27,500 men and 350 aircraft--was still the largest concentration of U.S. air power anywhere in the world outside the U.S. ⁵

⁴"Minister of Foreign Affairs Told a Meeting of the Foreign Correspondents' Club about Thailand's Future Relations with the U.S.," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XIV (January-March 1974): 32.

⁵"Thai Pen Tan Tap America" ("Thailand is American

In July 1974, the Government formally asked the U.S. to stop flying reconnaissance missions over the Indian Ocean from U-Tapao Airbase, which apparently took U.S. officials by surprise. Foreign Minister Charunphan told U.S. Ambassador William Kintner that such flights contravened Thailand's support for the U.N. resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace; that they undermined the ASEAN declaration on peace and neutrality, which Thailand also supported; and, that they were not covered by the 1967 U.S.-Thai agreement on the use of U-Tapao. Kintner reportedly assured the Foreign Minister that the U.S. would not do anything to violate Thai wishes, and the flights were halted.

However, the Thais imposed no such restrictions on U.S. use of Thai bases to support its various activities in Indochina: although bombing missions over Cambodia were ended in August 1973, U.S. reconnaissance missions over Indochina from Thai bases continued; the training of Cambodia pilots and soldiers was still carried on at Udorn; and, supplies of vital commodities, including rice, sugar, oil (up to 3 million litres a month) and weapons, were channelled to the Lon Nol forces by barge (under contract to the Thai Maritime Navigation Company) and to isolated outposts by Thai-based U.S. transport aircraft.

Base"), Thai Rath, March 28, 1974, p. 1.

Thailand's reluctance to impose such restrictions was probably due to the conflict between the increasingly influential Thanat as foreign affairs adviser and Charunphan-Chatchai. Foreign Minister Charunphan had announced that Thailand would shift the emphasis in relations with the U.S. from military to economic cooperation. "In the matter of military cooperation," said Charunphan, "we will cut off what is not necessary, keeping only that which is important to us."⁶

The Foreign Ministry's policy announcement was followed by Thanat's own view, when, in a speech at the Foreign Correspondents Club, he charged that foreign policy remained the only area unchanged since the civilian Government succeeded the former military regime.⁷

The other factor affecting the Thai leaders' policy regarding American use of Thai bases was that the Nixon administration had come to power in Washington dedicated to ending the Vietnam intervention "with honor," although the situation in 1974 had changed very little from what it had been ten years earlier. This was that the war in Vietnam continued with no apparent end in sight. Even

⁶"Foreign Minister Made a Declaration on Thai Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XIV (January-March 1974): 33.

⁷"Thanat-Charunphan Katgan Raung Ton Tahan" ("Thanat-Charunphan Conflict on the U.S. Withdrawal"), Siam Rath, September 17, 1974, p. 1.

though the United States had withdrawn over half a million troops from Vietnam between 1969 and 1973, the Vietnamese continued to fight and to sustain large casualties. A major reason was that the South Vietnamese were not prepared to accept a communist-imposed government so long as they were assured of continued U.S. economic and military aid. While the Thieu government was not respected by many South Vietnamese, there appeared to be no real effort among the various political groups to replace it with a pro-communist coalition. So the war, including U.S. use of Thai bases to support it continued.

Thai-Soviet relations. The Soviet had long sought to establish closer trade and political relations with Thailand, but they were repeatedly rebuffed by the Thai military leadership because of that group's strong anti-communist sentiments. In January 1974, Soviet officials were pleasantly surprised by the encouraging tone of references to Thai-Soviet relations made by Foreign Minister Charunphan, and a vigorous attempt to improve these relations appeared to be underway on the Soviet side. A new ambassador was sent to Bangkok who was very active in promoting better relations after a 25-year period during which the Soviet Union was regarded with suspicion and hostility. The Mayor of Moscow paid a three-day visit to Bangkok in February, and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firynbin made a one-night stopover in the Thai capital in

March. However, certain "obstacles" still remained: anti-Soviet propaganda was still common, and Soviet hopes to stage a cultural exhibition in Bangkok were dashed by official Thai objections. Thailand did establish diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and East Germany in 1974, and Deputy Foreign Minister Chatchai was scheduled to make the first-ever Thai Government visit to Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and East Germany in November.

A crucial factor was that the Soviet Union, in some loose partnership with India, sought to contain the future influence of Peking by erecting a "cordon sanitaire" around China's periphery, forcing it to bend to Moscow's will through political and economic pressure rather than through military threats. Thailand (and other states in Southeast Asia) thus became a prime target of Soviet policy, after Moscow established its naval position in the Indian Ocean. Thailand and some states in Southeast Asia were already recipients of Moscow's offers of trade and aid. Although the Brezhnev proposal in 1969 for an Asian security pact, in which the USSR would replace the U.S. as the guarantor of small states' security, had not found much receptivity in the capitals of Southeast Asia, the appeal of Soviet help and mediation might be enhanced for some states in this region if China's policy should change to a hard ideological line, or if there should be a serious conflict between two states in the region.

Accommodation with China. The loosening of relations with the U.S. has been in line with an evolving policy to shift emphasis from the West to regional countries. Accordingly Thai leaders continued to seek closer relations with China, with Foreign Minister Charunphan stating as early as the end of 1973 that Thailand intended to pursue a one-China policy and that recognition of Peking was just a matter of time.⁸

In December 1973, Thailand's Deputy Foreign Minister, Chatchai Choonhawan, led Thailand's first official delegation to Peking since the Chinese revolution. It climaxed a series of sports exchanges and contacts in third countries, during which preparatory talks on normalizing relations had taken place. A contract was signed for the sale of 50,000 tons of Chinese diesel oil at a "friendship price." The Chinese indicated that there were no serious problems standing in the way of improved relations (including the U.S. military presence), but the Thais seem divided over the prospects of détente with some demanding an end to Chinese support for the Thai communists (including a powerful radio transmitter in southern China), and arguing that the Chinese minority in Thailand could become a dangerous fifth column if normal relations with China would be established.

⁸"Diplomatic Relation with China Soon," The Nation, December 30, 1973, p. 2.

Thai leaders have been cognizant of the broader political meaning of Peking's ties to the insurgents and hoped that many of their security problems would diminish if they could effect a rapprochement with the P.R.C. Thus, Thanat, an adviser to Prime Minister Sanya, stated:

We have seen examples in certain countries like Burma and Ceylon, that if you reach understanding with the sources of support for insurgency or for communist illegal activities, then the illegal activities stopped. The case of Burma is very convincing. At a certain moment the communist activities supported by China were quite apparent in Burma but after General Ne Win went to Peking (1972) those activities have ceased or have been reduced to a great extent.⁹

Thanat was among the very first to advocate a dialogue with Peking. However in April 1974, Thanat, as Chairman of the committee to consider whether or not to repeal the Revolutionary Decree No. 53 which prohibits trade with China, felt that its repeal should be made "with proper timing" and with "dignity" so that Thailand would not be at a disadvantage. He is also quoted as saying that he was against a state trading organization for trade with China. His new "cool" attitude provoked much curiosity. A critic at the time observed how now that Thanat was the government's adviser, his attitude changed once again. But it should be noted that before the Committee made the decision on this topic, many Assembly members voiced the suspicion that Thai officials

⁹"Interview with Thanat Khoman," Bangkok Post, May 5, 1974, p. 5.

visiting Peking could have made private deals with Chinese leaders using the repeal of Decree No. 53 as a concession. It was also noted that a well-known business-man, Lengler Baiyok, had, strangely, accompanied Thai officials to Peking.¹⁰

Attempts at open trading with Peking were blocked for eight months until December 1974 when Decree No. 53 was repealed. The further step of establishing diplomatic relations with Peking was then only a matter of time.

The Japanese trade. Relations were good with most western nations, but there were problems with Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Bangkok in January and was greeted by thousands of students protesting against "Japanese economic imperialism." (There were over 130 Japanese firms active in Thailand, and Japan had far more capital invested in Thailand than in any other country. Japan was Thailand's principal trading partner and with whom Thailand had a growing trade deficit). The students claimed that Japan exploited Thai cheap labour solely for Japanese interests and accused Japanese businessmen of unscrupulous practices. Tanaka reportedly promised to try and improve the trade balance with Thailand, but in a meeting with student leaders Tanaka was evasive and obviously

¹⁰ "Another Target for the Critics," Bangkok Post, April 22, 1974, p. 5.

not prepared to solve the problems.¹¹

Nevertheless, the basic pattern of relationship between the two countries has remained unchanged. The series of concessions that Japan made in Thailand at that time were not due to Japanese initiative but to Thai pressures or to business provisions which the Thai Government laid down. The proposed expansion of Thai exports to Japan to \$530 million in 1974, which was agreed upon in the Japan-Thai Trade Committee conference in Tokyo in June, was, according to official sources, not Japan's offer but a concession resulting from a strong Thai demand. Even this figure, which is substantially larger than 1973's \$353 million in Japanese imports from Thailand, was much smaller than Japanese exports to Thailand, which totalled \$719 million in 1973.¹²

Reports¹³ from Bangkok indicated that Japan's slice of the Thai economy remained unchanged or even increased because of increased industrialization of the country. Of the \$54 million in Japanese exports to Thailand in January, 1974, more than 80 per cent was accounted for in industrial materials such as metal products (\$17 million)

¹¹K. Das, "Thai Nationalism," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 14, 1974, p. 15.

¹²"Karn Ka Thai Kab Yee Poon" ("Thai-Japanese Trade"), Siam Rath Weekly Review, October 18, 1974, p. 26.

¹³Ibid., p. 27.

and machinery and equipment (\$22 million). It should be noted that Thailand was the largest purchaser of Japanese automobiles among the five ASEAN countries--more than \$6 million compared with Indonesia, (less than \$4 million), and the others, (less than \$3 million).

How, and if, this emergent trend gains momentum will depend primarily on whether Thailand needs Japan more than Japan needs Thailand. It could even be debated that the Japanese conciliatory move has been a calculated counter-offensive against rising economic nationalism in Thailand. However, for a country that imports a substantial amount of maize, sugar, and natural rubber,¹⁴ it seems unthinkable that Japan would risk Thai reprisals over disruption of the Japanese industrial programmes.

Aside from the question of trade, neither the Thai nor the Japanese themselves envisioned a further Japanese naval presence in Southeast Asia; therefore, Japan would remain an economic, but not a political or military, power in the area (as analyzed in Chapters III and IV).

India: keeping watch. The developments in Thailand until 1974 were expected to place Thai-Indian cooperation and understanding on a better footing than in the preceding two decades. India was keenly watching the results of the previous year's popular upsurge, the working of Thailand's

¹⁴Ibid., p. 26.

interim Constitution, and for the outcome of the forthcoming elections.

The Vietnam War and the presence of American bases and military personnel in Thailand had acted as a brake on improving ties between the two countries. The considerable reduction of American forces in Thailand and the closing of some of the bases there, it was felt in New Delhi, would be preliminary steps towards eliminating altogether the presence of foreign troops in an Asian country.

A team from the Commerce Ministry of India visited Bangkok earlier in 1974 to explore avenues for joint ventures there. Discussions with the Thai Government and industrial representatives disclosed that there was scope for joint ventures in several agricultural and industrial areas.¹⁵

In addition to trade with India, another factor which lay on the horizon in 1974 was the further role of India in southern Asia. Having concluded a Friendship Pact with the Soviet Union in 1971 and gone to war with Pakistan a few months later, India underscored its claim to great power status in 1974 by exploding several atomic devices. Even though New Delhi proclaimed its intention of developing nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes,

¹⁵"Karn Ka Thai Kab India" ("Thai-Indian Trades"), Siam Rath Weekly Review, October 18, 1974, p. 14.

few foreign observers doubted that India hoped to impress China and the other great powers with its new military capability. For Southeast Asians, the question was what else India might do to assert its interests in the Indian Ocean. So long as India confined its activities to the subcontinent and continued its reluctance of being a genuine ally of the Soviet Union (as analyzed in Chapter III), Thailand and the other ASEAN countries would take little notice of India's activities.

Thai-North Korean relations. In early 1975, a North Korean trade delegation visited Bangkok, the first such direct contact between the two countries. The North Koreans also invited the Thai Minister of Commerce to Pyongyang, but the invitation was not taken up during the year. Thai officials said they were in no great hurry to normalise relations with North Korea, and they seemed to believe that the North Koreans were anxious to establish relations as part of a diplomatic offensive against South Korea.¹⁶ Thus Thailand had little to gain from such a move, other than a supply of North Korean fertiliser.

North Vietnam and the U.S. forces in Thailand. Since 1972, the Thai authorities had been trying without much success to begin a dialogue with North Vietnam. North

¹⁶ "Perd Sakaraj Mai Thai Kab Kaoru Nua" ("Thai-North Korea: Open a New Course"), Siam Rath Weekly Review, January 16, 1975, p. 25.

Vietnamese officials said earlier in 1974 that they did not expect rapid developments in this direction and that they did not regard the Thai Government as different from its predecessor, calling it "new wine in old bottles." According to press reports published in Bangkok on October 20, a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman stated on the 19th that the Thai "have allowed the United States to maintain military forces and military bases in Thailand to oppose the people of Vietnam, Indochina and other countries of this region . . . With such a hostile policy towards Vietnam and Indochina it is unrealistic for the Thai administration to talk about improving relations between the two countries."¹⁷ It meant that the North Vietnamese set as their top priority the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand, and that they would only begin talks when that happened.

Further negotiations seemed likely to focus on the 40,000 Vietnamese residents in northeastern Thailand, all of whom the Thai authorities wanted to repatriate to Vietnam; Thailand's relations with South Vietnam; the situation in Laos and Cambodia; and (on the Thai side), North Vietnamese support for the Thai communist insurgents, especially in the northeast where large numbers of Vietnamese

¹⁷"Vietnam Mai Len Duary" ("Vietnam Doesn't Play With"), Thai Rath, October 20, 1974.

refugees live, which the Thais claimed consisted of arms and training in Hoa Binh.¹⁸

Involvement with Cambodian conflict. While claiming to adhere to a neutral position, Thailand was, in fact, deeply involved in the Cambodian conflict on the side of the U.S. backed Lon Nol Government. Although Thai officials said, "we hope we can begin anew with Sihanouk,"¹⁹ it seemed likely that traditional Thai-Cambodian rivalry, and the unhappy relations which existed between the two neighbors before the coup against Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970, would be revived in the event of a Cambodian settlement.

Crisis in Laos. In September 1974, the last Thai prisoners of war were released by the Pathet Lao in Laos--a reminder of Thailand's role in the Lao conflict, again on the side of a corrupt and non-representative U.S.-backed regime. Thai officials in Bangkok maintained that they were "quite happy" with the situation in Laos and found the official attitude of the new Lao Government towards Thailand "very reasonable." But the Lao authorities voiced resentment at what they regarded as acts of provocation and exploitation by the Thais: allegedly sending agents

¹⁸Harvey Stockwin, "Thai Foreign Policy," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 4, 1974, p. 22.

¹⁹"Kuen Dee Kab Sihanouk" ("Compromise with Sihanouk"), Siam Rath Weekly Review, August 17, 1974, p. 13.

into Laos, letting Thai-based U.S. planes fly reconnaissance missions over Laos, doing little to reduce the flow of smuggled goods across the Mekong River, and creating transportation difficulties for Laos, which relied on Thailand for access to the sea.²⁰ Although an invitation was made to the Laotian Foreign Minister and Pathet Lao leader, Phoumi Vongvichit, to visit Bangkok, at the time it appeared unlikely that he would feel able to accept it under existing conditions.

Malaysia's guarantee of non-interference and more cooperation. Apart from the mistrust and ill-feeling resulting from Thailand's involvement in the Indochina War, relations with its other immediate neighbours were less than happy. In June 1974, there was a dramatic cooling in relations with Malaysia after a Malaysian Cabinet minister said, "the request for autonomy with specific conditions in the administration of the four southern provinces of Thailand (where the population is predominantly Malay Muslim) . . . seemed credible and could be a wise move towards reconcilliation and peace."²¹ It aroused indignant protests in Bangkok where it was

²⁰ "Thai Kub Lao" ("Thai and Laos"), Siam Rath Weekly Review, September 29, 1974, pp. 18-20.

²¹ "Malaysia Kab See Changwad Pal Tai Kong Thai" ("Malaysia and the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand"), Siam Rath Weekly Review, July 18, 1974, p. 19.

labelled as an intolerable interference in Thailand's internal affairs. In the end, a letter from Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak reassured the Thai Government that there had been no change in Malaysia's policy of non-interference in Thai affairs.

Despite the difference, however, there was more cooperation between the two countries than was commonly realized. Thailand seems just as convinced about the wisdom of the ASEAN neutralization concept as Malaysia; and the return of the former Thai foreign minister, Thanat Khoman, in a prominent though advisory position in Bangkok, was seen in Kuala Lumpur as an indication that Thailand's increasing contacts with the region would continue.

There was still a considerable amount of trade between the two countries, with Malaysia buying significant quantities of Thai rice. There was also regular trade along the border, where under commonly agreed rules people born or living within 50 miles of it were permitted free access to the other side.

For Malaysians, particularly those on the border, Haadyai, in southern Thailand, was a welcomed weekend resort, just as Penang was for the Thais. Alone among the international airlines, Thai International has been allowed to land at Penang and Kuala Lumpur, while others (in West Malaysia) have been restricted to Kuala Lumpur.

Indonesia: the ASEAN prospects. Although more than

60 per cent of Indonesian trade is conducted with Asian nations, Thailand accounts for only a tiny fraction of the total. However, in the past Indonesia has relied heavily on Thai imports, particularly of rice and cement, to tide it over during periods of shortage. In 1972-73, when the Indonesian rice crop was severely affected by a long dry season, imports from Thailand shot up from the previous year's US\$7 million to \$35 million. Thailand also exported quantities of goods associated with Indonesia's construction boom--cement, plywood, asbestos sheeting--and small amounts of synthetic fibers and gunny sacks. Indonesian exports to Thailand, on the other hand, were insignificant, never exceeding \$1 million during the preceding five years.²²

There were indications, however, that this pattern would soon change. Indonesia intended to achieve self-sufficiency in most of the products that it was buying from Thailand. The Minister of Agriculture announced that Indonesia would be self-sufficient in rice by the end of its Second Five-Year Plan. And a massive cement plant building programme should make Indonesia an exporter by the end of 1976.²³

If economic relations between the two countries do not proceed along old lines, the most promising

²²"Kan Ka Gab Indonesia" ("Trade with Indonesia"), Siam Rath Weekly Review, July 25, 1974, pp. 30-35.

²³Ibid.

prospect for a new pattern seems to lie within the framework of ASEAN cooperation. With oil the key during the previous boycott, discussions between the two countries on the possibility of Indonesia shipping small quantities of crude to Thailand came to nothing, partly because Indonesia's oil had been already committed and partly because Thai refineries were not geared to processing Indonesia's low-sulphur product. Nevertheless, refined petroleum product were the largest item on the list of Indonesian exports to Thailand (followed by coffee, tea and spices). It was very small--only 11,000 barrels in the first five months of that year.²⁴ But Indonesian officials repeatedly said that they would like to use oil to cement relations with other ASEAN countries. While Indonesia might well give preference in supplying oil to its partners in ASEAN, however, it was doubtful if this would mean preferential prices.

Thailand and Indonesia have much in common. Both have an economically powerful, if relatively small, Overseas Chinese community (although in Thailand's case the Chinese have been better absorbed). Both have been the target of subversion. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, presiding over his "active, neutralist" policy, had watched with keen interest the establishment of diplomatic relations

²⁴Ibid.

between Kuala Lumpur and Peking, followed by the visit of Imelda Marcos to the Chinese capital.

Philippines: moving closer. SEATO was born in Manila in early 1950s, with its headquarters then in Bangkok. However, with SEATO close to disintegrating owing to indifference and the withdrawal of almost half of its original membership, it will be in the field of economic rather than military collaboration that the Thais and the Filipinos will be moving closer together. And it will be as members of ASEAN that the two countries will be expanding economic cooperation and trade and industrial ties.

Two-way trade between two countries has been growing steadily since the 1960s—from barely US\$1 million in the early part of that decade to nearly \$25 million in 1972. This was because of more than \$22 million in imports—mostly rice—during that year. The Philippines had experienced severe rice shortages due to heavy flood damage. The Filipino trade deficit then exceeded \$20 million since exports to Thailand were valued at a little more than \$2 million. In 1973, the Philippines continued to import Thai rice although the value of total imports dropped to \$10 million, reducing the trade deficit to \$6 million.²⁵

While the bulk of Thai exports to the Philippines

²⁵"Na Yo Bai Tangbrated Thai Kab Philippines" ("Thai and Philippines Foreign Relations"), Siam Rath Weekly Review, October 25, 1974, p. 10.

consists of food grains and other primary products, most Filipino sales to Thailand were manufacturers, with newsprint and other paper products heading the export list along with coconut oil, coffee extracts, and parts for motor vehicles. The Philippines' automobile manufacturing industry was exporting motor vehicles with more than 50 per cent of the parts fabricated locally.²⁶

Technical cooperation between the two countries in agriculture as well as industry was considered essential. Many Thai students have availed themselves of new technology at the University of Philippines' College of Agriculture at Los Banos, where the International Rice Research Institute is also located, and Thailand has been more than successful in applying the latest scientific knowledge to rice culture. Over the years, Thailand has helped to overcome the shortfall in Philippines production.

In 1974, Thais were the second largest group of foreign students enrolled in Filipino schools. For that school year, 1,148 Thai students were enrolled in schools in the Philippines—a number exceeded only by the Americans, who headed the list with 1,571.²⁷

Singapore: a buffer zone. When Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew paid his first official visit to

²⁶Ibid., p. 11.

²⁷Ibid., p. 13.

Bangkok in January 1973, he had made no bones about his desire to see Thailand acting as a buffer state. With the Indochina War still hanging in the balance and anxious about the American withdrawal from Vietnam, Lee was at pains in stressing to the Thai leadership the vital necessity of retaining an American military presence. "An American presence in Thailand," he counselled, "ensures the doctrine of economic and military aid in order to enable Thailand to maintain its independence."²⁸

Except for an indignant protest to Lee for interfering in Thai affairs—from former Thai foreign minister Thanat Khoman—the now defunct Thanom-Prapas clique found it easy to see eye-to-eye with the Singapore Premier. Even more reassuring for the visitor was former Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn's announcement during the visit itself that Thailand had agreed to a U.S. request that American aircraft and personnel be allowed to remain at their bases in Thailand even after the Vietnam "cease-fire."

Although there were some anxieties in Singapore over the sudden overthrow of the Thanom-Prapas regime the previous year and the subsequent widespread student demonstrations against U.S. bases, it was clear that once

²⁸"Singapore Klua America Ton Tan Tap" ("Singapore is Afraid of the U.S. Withdrawal"), Ban Muang, January 15, 1973, p. 2.

the dust had settled the Government of Prime Minister Sanya Dhamasak had no serious objections to the continued American presence in Thailand. In fact, in March 1974, Thai Foreign Minister Charunphan Isarangkun publicly stated that Thailand still regarded SEATO as indispensable to Thai security, while the Thai Army Commander, Kris Sivara, also said that the U.S. would not abandon Thailand at such crucial times. To be sure, there was a need to appease student opinion, and to that end there had been a gradual reduction of U.S. forces.

Cooperation between Thailand and Singapore was also stepped up after Lee's visit. Singapore was supplying three missile-equipped patrol boats to the Thai Navy, while several groups of Singapore commandos had been training at Thailand's special warfare facilities. With regard to setting up diplomatic ties with China, both countries, at that time, were glad to take a back seat.

The Elected Civilian Governments

(Feb. 21, 1975-Oct. 6, 1976)

On October 15, 1974, the formation of political parties was legalised after a three years' prohibition. The election, on January 26, 1975, was the cleanest and fairest ever conducted in Thailand.²⁹ The veteran Democrat

²⁹For a more detailed discussion of the 1975 election see Clark D. Neher, "Stability and Instability in Contemporary Thailand," Asian Survey XV (December 1975): 1097-1113.

Party, led by Seni Pramot, which formed the token opposition during the years of military rule, won more seats than any other party--72, including 23 of the 26 seats in Bangkok, its traditional stronghold.

After lengthy private discussions, Seni only managed to obtain the support of the Social Agrarian Party as a coalition partner. Together, the two parties commanded only 91 of the 269 votes in the House, and it seemed unlikely that this fragile alliance could survive for long. The members of the new Government-Thailand's first elected government in over 25 years--were officially appointed by royal proclamation on February 21, 1975. But at its very first hurdle in the legislature, the mandatory vote of confidence in the new Government's proposed policy statement on March 6, the Government was defeated by 152 votes to 111.

On March 13, Kukrit Pramot, Seni's younger brother, and the leader of the Social Action Party, was nominated Prime Minister by the House by 135 votes to 59. He was officially appointed Premier by royal proclamation on the next day. Finally, Kukrit was joined by other parties to make up a right-wing coalition. The new 26-member Cabinet officially took office on March 17 and presented its policy statement to the House on March 19, when it was approved by 140 votes to 124.

The Kukrit Administration (1975-1976)

The pattern of Thai foreign relations began to undergo far-reaching changes in the months following the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon. Diplomatic relations were established with Peking and Pyongyang; official delegations from North Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam, and from Cambodia visited Bangkok; and, the Thais entered into a "cautious but correct" relationship with the Soviet Union.

Relations with ASEAN. Within days of the fall of Phnom Penh in April 1975, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore hurried to Bangkok for two days of talks with Thai military and civilian leaders on the implications of the new situation in Cambodia.³⁰ It was to be the first of many top-level meetings between the remaining non-communist governments of the region as they attempted to breathe new life into ASEAN, which for Thailand had become an important diplomatic front useful for dealing with Indochina issues. All of the ASEAN countries were of the opinion that the development of ASEAN into a political force to be reckoned with would greatly enhance the prospects for political integrity and long-term security in the region. That this general approach was shared by Thailand's ASEAN partners can be seen from the Press Statement issued at the close

³⁰"Singapore Lae Kwam Yu Rod" ("Singapore and the Politics of Survival"), Siam Rath Weekly Review, April 25, 1975, p. 17.

of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in May 1975.³¹

Also during the meeting, Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai called for the so called "Five Regional Needs:"

1. The need to depend on one another;
2. The need to strengthen friendship among us and renew long dormant ties;
3. The need to live together in peace, in security and in harmony;
4. The need to be collectively self-reliant, and above all,
5. The need to have what is known in Buddhist teachings as 'Kantidharma,' or tolerance of one another's ways.³²

This concept of the "Five Regional Needs" was transtated into reality at the organization's first summit

³¹The Statement, among other things, "welcomed the end of war and the restoration of peace in Cambodia and South Vietnam. The ministers expressed the hope that these developments would open up prospects for real peace, progress and stability in the region of Southeast Asia. The ministers expressed their readiness to enter into a friendly and harmonious relationship with each nation in Indochina. They also reiterated their willingness to cooperate with these countries in the common task of national development for the benefit of their respective peoples as well as for the greater good of the region on the basis of a strict adherence by all countries to the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutual beneficial cooperation, noninterference, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and justice in the conduct of their relations with one another." Extracted from ASEAN's Press Statement, Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XV (April-June 1975): 53.

³²Address of Major-General Chatchai Choonhavan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand at the eight ministerial meeting of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur May 13, 1975, Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XV (April-June 1975): 4.

meeting held on the Indonesian island of Bali in February 1976. The Bali summit, where the five ASEAN heads of government signed the ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, institutionalized procedures for the peaceful settlement of intra-ASEAN disputes. At this meeting, for the first time, ASEAN was given an explicitly political character. The underlying philosophy was that if the members were at peace with one another there would be no provocation for outside interference in the region, which the members would strive to make into a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. The treaty established a five member ministerial "High Council" to take cognizance of disputes (if not settled through direct negotiations), and to recommend means of settlement, offer its good offices, or (on the agreement of the disputing parties) constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council, however, could not interfere unless the parties to the dispute agreed that the peaceful settlement procedures of the treaty were applicable, a provision the Malaysians insisted upon because they wanted no formal mediation in the Sabah dispute.³³

³³The same article of the treaty provides that lack of agreement "shall not" preclude the other High Contracting Party to the dispute from offering all possible assistance to settle the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such offers of assistance. This treaty is printed in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XVI (January-March 1976): 57-62.

Since this dispute was settled through informal mediation, the provisions of the treaty have not yet been utilized. Although ASEAN has not yet settled any of the inter-regional disputes that vex the region, such as the dormant Philippine claim to the said Sabah, the growing value which all members have attached to ASEAN harmony and goodwill has helped to dampen down the old disputes and may have kept new ones from arising. The conspicuous example of this was the question of Sabah, which was finally resolved when President Marcos announced during the Kuala Lumpur Summit in August 1977 that the Philippines was withdrawing its territorial claim to Sabah. It dispelled the cynicism and skepticism concerning ASEAN, which brought into doubt not only its viability but also the capacity of its member states to sacrifice aspects of national interest to promote regional amity, harmony, and cooperation.

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration, which called for the recognition of ASEAN countries as a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality," was reaffirmed at this Bali summit. Article 11 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, certified at Bali, obliged the ASEAN nations to

. . . strengthen their respective national resilience in their political, economic, socio-cultural, as well as security fields . . . free from external interference, as well as internal subversive activities in order to preserve their respective national identities.³⁴

³⁴ Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XVI (January-March 1976): 60.

However, the treaty does not call for the immediate removal of military base systems already in place, but for a vaguely defined "phased" process of dismantlement in accordance with conditions agreed by the ASEAN signatory and the base operator.³⁵ What the treaty has done is to accelerate the re-negotiation process regarding United States bases in the Philippines. At issue is the relationship between United States control of the base and Philippine sovereignty.

The United States considers the Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base an important part of its regional and global operations. As summarized by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown,

. . . U.S. bases in the Philippines are essential for support of U.S. military forces deployed in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans . . . (the base) functions are important components of a peacetime presence to deter aggression, maintain stability, and for support of operations. . . .³⁶

Therefore, no matter how the future United States-Philippine security relationship will be defined within the context of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the United States will not leave the Pacific Ocean; and the American bases in the Philippines are crucial for the

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶In testimony during U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1978, Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st sess., Part 2, February 22, 1977, pp. 130-131.

Pacific power of the United States.

The demise of SEATO. After a one-week visit to the Philippines and Singapore, Prime Minister Kukrit said that Thailand and the Philippines had agreed that SEATO should be dissolved step by step.³⁷ However, SEATO is gradual dissolution was related only to the organized activities under the Southeast Asian Treaty and the large headquarters staff in Bangkok. It did not involve a renunciation of actual treaty, the so-called Manila Pact. Thailand is the only signatory in the area, however, to which the Pact now has practical application insofar as a U.S. security commitment is concerned. Pakistan renounced the treaty several years ago; and, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, are tied to the United States by other defense arrangements.

Senator Mansfield made the following observation about the security relationship between the United States and Thailand upon the demise of SEATO:

The security relationship between the United States and Thailand is complicated by the existence of the 1962 Rusk-Thanat communique in which the obligations of the Manila Pact were held to be both joint and several. Under that interpretation, it would seem the multilateral SEATO treaty would also amount to a bilateral U.S.-Thai treaty. Thus, the treaty, potentially, has far more significance than the "scrap of paper," as it is often called today. An attack for example, by an enemy in Southeast Asia could conceivably lead on a Thai call on the

³⁷"Thailand and the Philippines Agree for SEATO Dissolution," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XV (July-September 1975): 91.

United States to come to its aid notwithstanding the disinclination of any other of the signatories to do so.

The fact is that the Manila Pact was born of an old and now altered view of China. It is of no current relevance to U.S. interests in Asia. Left in abeyance it is, perhaps, a source of potential mischief or embarrassment. We would be well-advised, therefore, to reexamine this agreement forth-with, with a view to its termination.³⁸

However, Kukrit said that SEATO's gradual dissolution would in no way affect the Thanat-Dean Rusk joint statement since that joint statement was not effective anyway at the present moment. It was not a treaty approved by Parliament. As a joint statement, it was thus effective only during the days when Colonel Thanat Khoman and Mr. Dean Rusk were in office. After their retirement, their joint statement became invalid, he said.³⁹

Establishing diplomatic relations with China. Upon taking office in March 1975, Kukrit announced that his government would seek to establish diplomatic relations with China. Shortly thereafter, the Prime Minister went to Peking and signed a communique establishing diplomatic relations for the first time since the Communists seized power on the mainland in 1949. As in the case of Japan

³⁸Mike Mansfield, Charting A New Course: Mike Mansfield and U.S. Asian policy (Four Reports by Mike Mansfield, Senator) 1st. ed. (Rutland, Vermont & Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., 1978), p. 64.

³⁹"Thailand and the Philippines Agree for SEATO Dissolution," p. 91.

and the Philippines, economic relations with Taiwan would continue. Efforts were begun to accelerate the acquisition of Thai citizenship for the more than three hundred thousand overseas Chinese who still had nationalist Chinese passports.

The government's rationale for this move was that its policy was now to make Southeast Asia an area of peace and neutrality, and that this could only be accomplished through the recognition of all the superpowers. And Thailand hoped that once relations were established, the Chinese support for insurgency would be reduced to a great extent. Peking, during this period, had ceased pushing for the removal of U.S. forces from Thailand and indicated that it considered the U.S. presence in Thailand as an "internal matter" for the Thai alone to resolve.⁴⁰

The Chinese have even warned the Thai about moving so quickly to drive the "wolf" (the U.S.) out the front door that they let the "tiger" (the Vietnamese and the Russians) in the back door. Peking believes that the Russians are using the Vietnamese for their own purposes in Southeast Asia. It is equally plausible, however, that even on its own, Hanoi is a strong potential competitor with Peking for political and psychological ascendancy in Southeast Asia.

⁴⁰"Kukrit in Peking," Bangkok Post, June 29, 1975, p. 2.

The Vietnamese. While the Chinese expressed moderate and conciliatory attitudes which culminated in normalization of relations during this Thai Administration, the North Vietnamese maintained a relatively more belligerent posture-in part, as stated earlier, because Thailand continued to host American air-force units which were used in the last heavy bombing conducted during the Vietnam War. And the North Vietnamese-led final victory over the Saigon forces, and their capture of substantial amounts of American military equipment, were viewed with alarm in Bangkok. Thus the Kukrit government, in March 1975, announced that it would seek the withdrawal of American forces within the year and when the subsequent communist victories in Indochina ended the fighting there. The new Thai government was clearly in a hurry to prove its goodwill towards the Indochinese governments. In mid-May, Thailand received missions from both the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in South Vietnam and from North Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese approached the Thais, through their Embassy in Vientiane, and proposed that a Vietnamese delegation visit Bangkok to discuss the disposition of the more than 130 aircraft and a number of ships brought to Thailand by fleeing members of the defeated South Vietnamese Air Force, as well as other matters of mutual concern.⁴¹ The PRG claimed ownership of all the aircraft

⁴¹"Vietnam Tuang Krueng Bin Chark Thai" ("Vietnam Asked Thailand for the Aircrafts"), Siam Rath Weekly Review,

and ships, and statements broadcast by Hanoi made it clear that the future course of Thai-Vietnamese relations would be affected by Bangkok's handling of this question. As it happened, the aircraft issue turned out to be a revealing test of the Thai Government's new diplomacy.

On May 16, 1975, a three-man PRG delegation, led by Ambassador-at-large Nguyen Minh Phuong, arrived in Bangkok and was given a list of South Vietnamese aircraft, vessels, and other property in the possession of the Thais-- a meeting which the Vietnamese later described as showing "the Thai Government's correct viewpoint of officially recognising the ownership by the South Vietnamese people and the right to recovery by the PRG of their properties" But at the same time, the Thais pointed out that the U.S. Government also claimed title to the property (given to the Nguyen Van Thieu government as part of the U.S. aid programme), and said that Thailand was "impounding" it until the rival claimants settled the dispute among themselves.⁴² In fact, the U.S. had secretly removed the aircraft it wanted by airlifting them on to the carrier "Mid-way" in the Gulf of Thailand and leaving behind the less valuable aircraft, which the Thai Government then

April 19, 1975, p. 30.

⁴²"South Vietnamese Delegation Ends Their Visit to Thailand." Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XV (April-June 1975): 75-76.

"impounded." A well-placed U.S. official said at the time that Thai military authorities had been informed of and had approved their removal in advance, but some observers interpreted this move as a deliberate American attempt to sabotage a Thai-Vietnamese rapprochement.⁴³ In any case, the Vietnamese were not pleased.

Two days after the PRG delegation left, a 13-man North Vietnamese delegation, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien, arrived to a warm airport welcome by Vietnamese residents in Bangkok.⁴⁴

The North Vietnamese said, on May 29, 1975, in a brief joint statement that the two sides had "agreed on many important matters of mutual interest . . . (but) a few outstanding questions . . . need further discussion."⁴⁵ Phan Hien himself said that although the talks had "not yet achieved complete results . . . they contributed to the normalisation of relations . . . and strengthened the solidarity and friendship between the Vietnamese and Thai people in the interests of peace, independence, and neutrality of the nations of this region."⁴⁶ Kukrit stated

⁴³"Saharat Kwang Thai-Vietnam" ("U.S. Obstruct Thai-Vietnamese Rapprochement"), Thai Rath, May 20, 1975, p. 1.

⁴⁴"Phan Hien Ma Thai" ("Phan Hien Arrived in Thailand"), Thai Rath, May 27, 1975, p. 1.

⁴⁵The Joint Statement is printed in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XV (April-June 1975): 58.

⁴⁶"Speech of Head of DRVN Delegation Upon Departure for Home," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XV (April-June 1975): 77.

that he had high hopes that Thailand would have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam as he himself would love to see Thailand having relations with every neighbour country. He said the North Vietnamese are Sotheast Asian people like Thailand and thus understanding could easily be reached.⁴⁷ So it seemed that diplomatic relations between the two countries might soon follow.

Apart from the disputed property, observers speculated that other possible outstanding problems were the repatriation of about 40,000 Vietnamese refugees who came to Thailand in the 1940s and 1950s (during the North Vietnamese delegation's visit, violent demonstrations were staged against the refugee community, almost certainly at the instigation of an extreme right-wing group in the Thai Government); the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Thailand, regarded by Hanoi as a direct threat to its security; and, compensation for damage caused by U.S. bombing in Vietnam from Thai bases.

However, as the months passed there was no return visit to Hanoi by the Thais. Deteriorating Thai-Laotian relations (with the Vietnamese supporting the Laotians), and Vietnamese suspicions that the American withdrawal might not be genuine, apparently delayed an early rapprochement

⁴⁷"Prime Minister's View on Thai-North Vietnamese Relations," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XV (April-Junes 1975): 76.

between Thailand and Vietnam. The Pathet Lao and Hanoi have waged a strident anti-Thai propaganda war for the past several months. Many observers believe that this campaign is merely preparation of a rationale for increased support to communist insurgents in North and Northeast Thailand, particularly in the Thai provinces along the Mekong River where the predominantly Thai-Lao population and large numbers of Vietnamese residents could provide the basis for an irredentist movement.

Former Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, long an advocate of phased U.S. withdrawal, suggested that the Kukrit government reconsider its demands that all U.S. forces be withdrawn by March 20, 1976. Thanat believes U.S. forces should serve as a bargaining chip and be retained until North Vietnamese forces leave Laos and cease supporting the Thai communist insurgents.⁴⁸

Laos. At the same time, Thailand's relations with neighboring Laos cooled dramatically after the Pathet Lao took over effective control of the coalition Government in May 1975. Many members of once-powerful right-wing Lao families fled to Thailand, where they were welcomed by old friends in the Thai military. Over 25,000 Meo hill tribesmen also crossed the Mekong river into Thailand following their former leader, General Vang Pao, into

⁴⁸"Thanat: Suspicious," Bangkok Post, October 22, 1975, p. 2.

exile. The Lao government was convinced that some of these exiles were planning to send spies and saboteurs into Laos, and demanded that the Thais return all Laotian refugees and expel the former right-wing leaders.

Border incidents began to occur along the Mekong river in which shots were exchanged between Lao border guards and Thai patrol boats, and Vientiane requested the closure of the three Thai consulates in Laos (which moved to the Thai side of the river). Vientiane radio strongly denounced Thai Government actions which, it claimed, showed a deliberate intention to trample underfoot the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Laos, and to brazenly and arrogantly challenge and provoke the kingsom of Laos.⁴⁹ Hanoi radio also reported these developments at length, and voiced "full support" for the Laotian stand.⁵⁰

Then, on August 5, 1975, relations almost reached a breaking point when two Thai assistant military attachés were arrested in Vientiane for alleged espionage. The outraged Thai Government demanded their immediate release claiming diplomatic immunity; and, when this was not forthcoming, Thailand expelled two Lao diplomats in

⁴⁹"Lao Chome Tee Thai" ("Laos Attacked Thai"), Thai Rath, July 25, 1975, p. 1.

⁵⁰Ibid.

retaliation and recalled its Ambassador from Vientiane.⁵¹ The crisis was defused 10 days later when Laos released the two men, but relations between Laos and Thailand remained cool, with Laos accusing the Thai Government of pursuing a "two-faced" policy.

Thai, Lao, Cambodian involvements and the Sino-Soviet rivalry. In striking contrast, there were no complaints and demands from the new Cambodian Government, although the Thais had been deeply involved with the U.S. military effort there right up to the fall of Phnom Penh. About 10,000 Cambodian refugees were living in camps along the Thai side of the Cambodian border, and were joined by a steady trickle of others every week. Phnom Penh radio indicated that the Cambodians were interested in forgetting the past and establishing good relations quickly; and, that the two neighbouring countries, Cambodia and Thailand, live peacefully within the limits of their own territory as neighbours forever.

In response to such hints, Kukrit and Chatchai voiced similar wishes; and, in broadcasts over the Thai Government radio station, the Voice of Free Asia, proposed that diplomatic relations be opened soon. Following a September meeting at the UN General Assembly in New York

⁵¹ "Two Laotian Diplomats Expelled," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XV (July-September): 94.

between Chatchai and Cambodian Vice-Premier for Foreign Affairs Ieng Sary, it was agreed that Ieng Sary would visit Bangkok at the end of October. He brought a high-ranking delegation which included Minister of Justice Norodom Phurissara, a cousin of Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and the Cambodian ambassadors to China and Senegal. In a Joint communique signed on October 31, 1975, the two governments agreed to establish diplomatic relations. They were to exchange ambassadors "at a date convenient to both countries depending on the conditions prevailing."⁵² Thailand thus became the first non-communist country to open ties with Cambodia. In view of the strikingly different attitude adopted towards Thailand by Laos and Cambodia, it was believed that the Sino-Soviet rivalry could be reinforcing these attitudes and bringing about a division of the region into two spheres of influence in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal.

This interpretation seemed to be strengthened by the warm reception given to Prime Minister Kukrit in Peking when diplomatic relations with China were finally established on July 1.⁵³ The Thais were left in no doubt

⁵²The Joint Communique is printed in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XV (October-December 1975): 37.

⁵³"Prime Minister M.R. Kukrit Pramot's Official Visit to the People's Republic of China," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XV (July-September 1975): 81.

during this visit that China was anxious to establish close and friendly relations with Thailand (despite the Chinese Communist Party's continued support for the Communist Party of Thailand's armed struggle in outlying provinces), in what appeared to be a move to forestall the growth of Soviet influence. Trade, sports and scientific exchanges, ministerial-level commercial delegations, and a steady stream of Thai visitors pointed to the speed with which Thailand eventually normalised its relations with China, culminating in the arrival of a Chinese advance party in Bangkok led by a chargé d'affaires in October to look for a suitable site for their embassy. Meanwhile Soviet diplomacy was intensifying efforts to win friends and influence people by pressing hard for Thai approval of its collective security scheme, the signing of a cultural agreement with Thailand, and for the appointment of a military attaché in Bangkok. The Thais responded politely and with interest, in contrast to the icy state of relations in former years, and began to extend reasonably equitable treatment to the Soviets.

The Thai must accept considerable risk in their efforts to balance off the Russians, Chinese, Vietnamese, Lao and Khmer communists. All of these states propagate and some possibly seek to impose, in one way or another, a political process that aims at the very heart of the Thai social-cultural-political system, including the Thai

monarchy. This threat became even more apparent with the abolition in December of the Lao Monarchy and the coalition government by the Pathet Lao. Many Thai leaders might see the new "People's Democratic Republic of Laos" as an uncomfortably close example of the fate awaiting Thailand if they don't manage their own "peaceful revolution" successfully. The success of the Thai effort to maintain their freedom and continue to balance off foreign nations also depends considerably on whether China will be able to seek "hegemony" in Southeast Asia, and how intensely Hanoi decides to push and support the increasingly active communist insurgents in Thailand, thereby forcing competition with the Chinese.

Controversies over the U.S. withdrawal. At this time, Thai relations with the U.S. were recovering from the blow delivered to Thai sovereignty during the Mayaguez Affair in May 1975. The U.S. Government, ignoring the Thai Government's wishes, used U-Tapao as the main staging base for its armed operation to rescue a freighter being detained by the Cambodians. The incident led to the largest-ever anti-American demonstration in Bangkok, in which an estimated 5,000 protesters marched on the U.S. embassy and besieged it for several days, hoisting a giant effigy of "Uncle Sam" onto the front gates and burning it. A new U.S. Ambassador, Charles Whitehouse (a veteran of Laos and South Vietnam), arrived in May

and proved considerably more diplomatic than his predecessor William Kintner.⁵⁴ Withdrawals of the 25,000 U.S. troops in Thailand continued smoothly, and there were scheduled to be no more American combat troops left in Thailand by the end of March 1976 (a question mark hovered over the possibility of non-combat military "advisers" remaining) as pledged by Kukrit upon his taking office in April 1975. The Kukrit Government went out of its way to reassure the U.S. that it wanted continued good relations in an apparent effort to achieve some balance in relations with the superpowers.

At the same time, the Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Anand Panyarachun, was of the opinion concerning the Mayaguez Affair that the United States should have made a request to the Thai Government for consideration before sending marines to U-Tapao.⁵⁵ He also mentioned concerning the U.S. withdrawal that since 1969 the Thai Government had repeatedly asked to negotiate with the United States on the question of gradual and orderly withdrawal. That the loss of Cambodia and Vietnam came so abruptly, only

⁵⁴"5000 Kon Lom Satan Tood America" ("5000 Persons Besieged U.S. Embassy"), Siam Rath Weekly Review, May 15, p. 15.

⁵⁵H. E. Anand Panyarachun's interview by Mr. Martin Agronsky at WETA Television Station, U.S., May 13, 1975. This interview is printed in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XV (April-June 1975): 8-15.

added urgency to the Thai long stated policy favoring withdrawal. He also pointed out that it was in the interest of the United States that the countries in Southeast Asia, in particular Thailand, take the responsibility for self-defense. He criticized U.S. policy in the past as exhibiting too much rhetoric. He also suggested that the future relationship between United States and other states in the area particularly in Southeast Asia that have the gap between a rhetoric and a policy or a capability to act on the promise must be merit. They should have a more honest relationship between each other.⁵⁶

Some U.S. officials had privately accused him of being anti-American. Anand was recalled and promoted later as Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under the new post, Anand continued supporting the incumbent prime minister and foreign minister in improving relations with all socialist countries and urging the complete withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Thai soil.

The U.S. wanted to retain a residual presence of about 3,000 men, mainly at U-Tapao air base on the Gulf of Thailand, a strategically useful staging and refuelling point between the Philippines and Diego Garcia and Australia and the Middle East (it was also used as a turn-around point by high-flying U.S. spy-planes from Japan). Washington

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 8-15.

also wanted men at certain radar, signal and communication sites scattered around the country and at Korat, where the U.S. maintained a munitions dump and where there was believed to be an underground command centre for use in the event of nuclear war.⁵⁷

More importantly, the U.S. wanted to keep personnel at Ramasun-a top-secret electronic espionage site run by the U.S. National Security Agency a few miles outside Udorn in northeast Thailand, which monitored low-frequency radio communications in Indochina-and at a seismic centre near Chiangmai in northern Thailand used to detect underground Chinese nuclear tests.⁵⁸

On February 4, 1976, U.S. Ambassador Charles Whitehouse was called to the Foreign Ministry and informed that any U.S. military personnel remaining after March 20 would only be allowed to do so on the basis of seven principles, including no interference in the internal affairs of Thailand's neighbours, complete Thai control and jurisdiction over all U.S. facilities, and the sharing of information gathered by these U.S. facilities.⁵⁹ When the U.S. failed to respond to these demands, the Thai

⁵⁷Bangkok Post, Supplement, January 17, 1976.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹"U.S. Military Withdrawal," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XVI (January-March 1976): 84.

Government took the unusual step of setting out its position in English and broadcasting it over Radio Thailand in an apparent attempt to press the U.S. to act. But Washington remained silent.

On the domestic front, left-and right-wing forces lined up for or against the Government's stand; and, as March 20 1976, approached, there were fears of a military coup or violent confrontation on the streets of the capital. Finally, the U.S. bluntly replied that it would not accept a Thai ultimatum, and set out counter-proposals that were unacceptable to the Thais. On the final day Premier Kukrit announced that all remaining U.S. military personnel must leave within four months, except for a maximum of 270 advisers under the 1950 U.S.-Thai Military Assistance Agreement. He said the advisers would be in Thailand on a temporary basis, and that their number would be gradually reduced. The Prime Minister further added that following the American pull-out the Thai armed forces would have to be built up to strengthen themselves since Thailand must stand on its own feet. He said the Cabinet would consider the matter later.⁶⁰

The Seni Administration, which succeeded the Kukrit Government in April 1976, also carried through with the policy favoring the withdrawal of U.S. residual forces from

⁶⁰Ibid.

Thailand by July 1976, putting the Americans on standby in the great power play in mainland Asia.

The Seni Administration (April-October 1976)

During early 1976, the Democrat Party, working with a group of small parties committed to social and economic reform, leaked to the press a policy programme containing fairly sweeping proposals, including government control of the rice trade and state intervention in other key sectors of the economy, legalisation of the outlawed Communist Party of Thailand, total withdrawal of U.S. military advisers, and a shift towards a more non-aligned foreign policy.

These ideas horrified Thai military leaders who, with their substantial land holdings, business interests, close ties with the U.S. and a need to maintain a communist suppression policy to justify their huge budget and sustain their political influence, were quick to react. On the evening of January 11, 1976, virtually the entire leadership of the armed forces called on Kukrit at his residence for what was described as a New Year's party. They are said to have made it clear the military could not tolerate a socialist-orientated government and that they would support him if he advised King Bhumibol to dissolve the Assembly and call new elections. Kukrit took this step the following day.

The election was set for April 4. The Democrat Party won a landslide victory with 114 seats, including all seats in Bangkok. The Democrat Party leader, Seni Pramot, took over as Prime Minister on April 20 at the head of a four-party coalition made up of the Democrat, Thai Nation, Social Justice and Social Nationalist parties, which between them controlled 206 of the 279 seats in the House. Pichai Rattakul, a deputy leader of the Democrat Party, was promoted as Foreign Minister. Anand was still Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Thai foreign policy under the Seni Administration as expressed by Pichai few days after he took the office was to be flexible, but firm, and based on the will of the people. He further stated that the top priority was to reach proper understanding with the countries of Indochina to realise the tremendous potential in economic collaboration between them. At the same time, Thailand would strengthen the firm ties they had with the countries of ASEAN. But he strongly objected to any possibility of ASEAN cooperation being extended to the field of security, even the exchange of military-related information and intelligence. Though he believed that the U.S. would continue to have an important role to play in the region of Southeast Asia, he was opposed to the presence of American bases in Thailand. He pointed out that his government would not be involved in great power rivalry.

Thailand, therefore, would permit U.S. aircraft bound for Diego Garcia to stop over for refuelling on a humanitarian basis only.⁶¹

Relations with Cambodia. The Mekong incident took place on the same day that Foreign Minister (under the Kukrit Administration) Chatchai was having cordial talks with the Cambodian Deputy Premier in charge of Foreign Affairs, Ieng Sary, at Poipet just over the Cambodian border. Thai-Cambodian relations had remained good, in stark contrast to those with Vientiane and Hanoi, since Ieng Sary's official visit to Bangkok in October 1975, when diplomatic relations were established. Before long, liaison offices were opened in the nearby border towns of Aranyaprathet and Poipet, where occasional official exchanges took place.⁶²

The Seni Government continued to maintain these friendly contacts; and, in July 1976, Foreign Minister Pichai Rattakul made a secret two-day visit to Sisomphon, about 50 kilometres inside Cambodia, for further talks with Ieng Sary. The meeting resulted in agreement in principle to open embassies, although no date for this was fixed; to demarcate an uncertain stretch of common

⁶¹Pichai Rattakul, "Thailand's Policy Objective," as interviewed by correspondent Norman Peagam in, Far Eastern Economic Review, July 23, 1976, pp. 12-14.

⁶²"Chatchai in Poipet," Bangkok Post, November 20, 1975, p. 1.

border; discussion about the fate of the 30,000 Cambodian refugees in Thailand; and, agreement to solve the problem of Thai fishermen who had strayed into Cambodian waters and been arrested.⁶³

Observers attributed the relative warmth in Thai-Cambodian relations to Phnom Penh's need to cultivate friendship with its western neighbour to avoid becoming overly dependent, politically or economically, on its powerful eastern neighbour, Vietnam, and partly to the continuing contest between the superpowers in the region. The Thais, for their part, were mainly interested in retrieving some of the lucrative border trade they enjoyed before the communist victories in Indochina, and in ensuring the security of their long frontiers.

Relations with Laos. Meanwhile, despite the recent border incidents and icy propaganda blasts, the Seni Government was moderately successful in reaching an amicable understanding with Laos, following a visit to Vientiane by Pichai in August 1976.⁶⁴ After several days of talks, the Thais agreed to open one or two-border points--they had unilaterally closed the border following the November shooting incident--and the Laotians agreed to

⁶³"Thai and Cambodian Governments Agree to Open Embassies," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XVI (July-September 1976): 55.

⁶⁴"Foreign Minister on Thai Lao Border," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XVI (July-September 1976): 59-60.

release all Thais imprisoned in Laos.⁶⁵ Both sides undertook to prevent further border clashes. This understanding would be one of the first casualties of the October military coup.

Relations with Vietnam. Leaving Vientiane, the Thai delegation flew to Hanoi⁶⁶ for three days of talks with their Vietnamese counterparts in what was to prove an even more controversial initiative domestically. Two communiques⁶⁷ emerged from the discussions, which were approved by the Thai Cabinet sitting in special session after receiving their texts by two-way radio from the delegation in Hanoi. The first communique simply announced the establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of the four principles already agreed to by the other ASEAN countries. The four principles are:

1. Respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.
2. Not to allow any foreign country to use one's territory as a base for direct or indirect aggression and intervention against the other and against other countries in the region.

⁶⁵"Prime Minister on Thai-Laos Border Opening," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XVI (July-September 1976): 59.

⁶⁶"Foreign Minister Visits Laos and Vietnam," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XVI (July-September 1976): 65.

⁶⁷The Two Joint Communiques are printed in Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XVI (July-September 1976): 41-44.

3. Establishment of friendly and good neighborly relations, economic co-operation and cultural exchanges on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Settlement of disputes among the countries in the region through negotiation in a spirit of equality, mutual understanding and respect.
4. Development of co-operation among the countries in the region for the building of prosperous countries in keeping with each country's specific conditions, for the benefit of genuine independence, peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia, thereby contributing to peace in the world.⁶⁸

The second noted the formal exchanges between the two sides: -Thai congratulations for Vietnam's reunification; Vietnamese appreciation of the Thai Government's "independent foreign policy," and, at Vietnamese insistence, an expression of hope for the continued improvement of Thai-Laotian relations. It also listed the problems touched on in the talks. These included:

The return of Vietnamese aircraft, vessels, and other military equipment taken to Thailand by fleeing refugees when Saigon fell. Further discussions were to be held on this issue.

The question of war reparations by the Thais--euphemistically expressed as "contributions for healing the wounds of war in Vietnam." The Thais "showed an understanding of the problem and expressed their willingness to participate in a concrete manner in such forms as

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 44.

humanitarian aid, assistance and economic cooperation," which was to be discussed further.

The question of the 40,000 Vietnamese refugees who had lived in Thailand since the mid-1950s. A joint commission was to be established to handle their problems, "including the modalities of repatriation."

The possibility of developing economic, commercial and cultural relations; specifically, overflight rights, a direct air link between Bangkok and Hanoi, the opening of postal relations and shipping links, and the exchange of cultural groups, parliamentary delegations and journalists. There was also discussion about the possibility of cooperation in the field of commodities such as rice and rubber, as well as tourism. However, the fate of all these agreements was thrown into serious doubt following the coup in Bangkok.⁶⁹

Thai-Malaysian border incident. Thailand has conducted a bilateral defence effort with Malaysia against communist insurgents in the Yala Province area (Betong District) since 1965. Both Thai and Malaysian border patrols were given permission to cross each other's borders if in hot pursuit of the MCP (Communist Party of Malaya) "12th Regiment" guerrillas which often used the Betong

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 41-43.

area as a sanctuary.⁷⁰ With other insurgency problems covering on Bangkok in the north and northeast, and with a Moslem separatist problem in the southern provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun, the government of Kukrit regarded the Communist presence in Betong as a low priority.

Malasian counterinsurgency operations in the area were also considered detrimental by Thailand because the Communist insurgents: (1), had developed a rapport with the local populace by providing reciprocal economic and social advantages (i.e., low crime rate, buying of local food-stuffs) to the Betong populace, an area where Bangkok's authority has not been extended;⁷¹ and (2), the two Communist factions of the MCP, the 12th Regiment describing itself as the Communist Party of Malaya ("Marxist-Leninist") and the 8th Regiment forming the Communist Party of Malaya ("Revolutionary Faction"), had consistently clashed with one another over "territorial rights" to Betong. This largely alleviated the neccessity of RTA (the Royal Thai Army) units to attempt establishment of military control over a rural area where the population would, at best, be neutral.⁷²

⁷⁰For an extensive background of the MCP's use of Southern Thailand as a sanctuary, see Asia Research Bulletin 5 (May 31, 1976): 204-206.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 204-205.

⁷²Ibid. Also see background information in "Improvement in Ties with Malaysia," Bangkok Post, November 12, 1976, p. 3.

In May 1976, a Malaysian military sweep across the southern Thai border in pursuit of MCP insurgents allegedly resulted in damage to Thai property and interference with Thai civilians.⁷³

Soon afterwards, anti-Malaysian demonstrations broke out in Betong, and senior Thai officials made public statements saying they intended to press for the withdrawal of Malaysian Police Field Force units (200-500 men) stationed in Betong and to end the right of hot pursuit across the border,⁷⁴ both of which existed under the 1965 Agreement on Border Cooperation. The Malaysians were extremely perplexed and worried by these statements, which was predictable. Prime Minister Seni shortly thereafter made a state visit to Malaysia and met the Malaysian Prime Minister to exchange views with him on matters of mutual benefit and interest including discussions on revision of the border agreement.⁷⁵

On March 4, 1977 (during the Thanin Government), a new Thai-Malaysian border agreement was signed and two joint operations, Big Star I and Big Star II, have been conducted in the Thai-Malaysian border area.⁷⁶ It is

⁷³Bangkok Post, Supplement, May 22, 1976.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵"Prime Minister in Malaysia," Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Thailand) XVI (July-September 1976): 53.

⁷⁶K. Das, "Operation People's War," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 22, 1977, pp. 10-12.

evident that regional defense cooperation between the two countries is on the ascent after a two-year interlude:

. . . Malaysian sources attributed the . . . lag . . . to long drawn-out discussions on revision of the border agreement initiated by the elected Thai government early last year. . . Thailand and Malaysia have agreed to extend the zone of joint naval patrols along the border to stamp out arms smuggling infiltration by Communist elements . . . , General Charoen (the leader of the Thai delegation) said that changes in Thailand would lead to better cooperation in the suppression of communist terrorists.⁷⁷

The End of the Civilian Government's Democracy

While Thailand's foreign relations progressed towards closer cooperation with socialist countries, the military leaders were increasingly irked by the manner in which civilians at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted many aspects of national security affairs. Actions of Seni's foreign minister, Pichai, intensified this attitude by contributing to an image of Thailand as fearful and weak. Examples of such actions were Pichai's establishment of diplomatic relations with the three communist governments in Indochina.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 3. Also see Norman Peagam, "Malaysians Seek Border Commitments," Far Eastern Economic Review, 94 (November 26, 1976): 17. Peagam reported that the basis for remaining differences was the extent that Malaysia was reluctant to "overextend" its own anti-MCP activities into areas of Southern Thailand where the Muslim separatist movement remains viable because of the risk of upsetting political sensibilities among the Malaysian Islamic Community. Also see Sea Chee-Miow, "The Muslim Issue and Implications for ASEAN," Pacific Community 5 (October 1974): 139-160.

Thai foreign policy was suddenly changed by the coup of October 1976 that brought the staunchy anti-communist Thanin Kraivixien to head the new government backed by the military. The coup leaders justified their action, among other things, on the claim that their student opponents included Vietnamese communist subversives who had participated in student demonstrations.

One of the harshist actions by the military junta was taken against Anand, the former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Less than three weeks after the coup, Anand was relieved of his post and suspended from the Civil Service, an action undoubtedly taken in retaliation for his key role in the diplomatic negotiation which removed American military forces from Thailand and established formal relations with the new communist governments in Indochina.

Thai military leaders' assessments were in accord with those of U.S. Embassy personnel in Bangkok:

. . . the capability of close monitoring of Communist troop movements in Indochina that Ramasun (the top secret U.S. electronic-espionage facility) provided . . . was particularly essential to the maintenance of the country's (Thailand's) security.⁷⁸

⁷⁸"Key Thailand Negotiator with U.S. Over Bases is Ousted from Cabinet," The New York Times, October 25, 1976, p. 8.

Analysis and Conclusion

All three of the Thai Administrations' foreign policies which have been characterized in this chapter were active in ASEAN. But the Sanya Government which took power at the end of 1973 did not make any startling innovations in foreign policy, no doubt because of its tenuous legitimacy as a caretaker regime. Pending the creation of a more securely based government, its position in the 1974 remained fluid. The attitude of the Thai government toward the withdrawal of U.S. forces, relations with Communist states, particularly China but also the Soviet Union, became more ambiguous and less rigidly hostile. In fact the overthrow of the military government in October 1973 hastened the rapprochement with China, but the interim Sanya Government proved unwilling to undertake the major foreign policy initiative of recognizing China.

Within five months after taking office, Kukrit visited not only Peking but all of the ASEAN countries. Thailand joined in support of the proposal to create in Southeast Asia a zone of "peace, freedom, and neutrality" which might be guaranteed by the great powers.

Kintner's Thai Foreign Policy Options

William Kintner suggested recently the following basic foreign policy orientations for Thailand that can

be considered in the context of contemporary regional and global developments:

1. Choose Active Neutrality. Withdraw from SEATO, end active military cooperation with the United States, but remain active in ASEAN and establish a "cooperative" relationship with the PRC. Establish at least correct, nonantagonistic relations with Hanoi. Accept a limited expansion of the Soviet political presence. Continue to accept Japanese economic assistance as well as limited U.S. aid but look more and more to multilateral organizations for needed support.
2. Adopt an Active Pro-Peking Foreign policy. While attempting to retain a non-communist political system, seek Peking's support in curbing any Vietnamese or Soviet interference in Thai foreign and domestic policy and in agreeing to the reduction or cessation of all outside material support for Thai insurgents. Cool relations with the United States to the extent that Peking thinks this desirable.
3. Acquiesce to all Vietnamese Terms for the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. Cut all ties to SEATO and cease military cooperation with the United States in any form. Follow Hanoi's lead in foreign policy whenever necessary. Definitely avoid opposing Vietnamese interests and activities in Southeast Asia. Lobby on Hanoi's behalf in ASEAN and perhaps in the UN. Accept on faith that the Vietnamese will cease support for the Thai insurgents.
4. Seek an "Adjusted" but Continued Close Relationship with the United States. Reduce if not eliminate the U.S. military presence but consider granting "re-entry rights." Seek correct relations, generally anti-Soviet in character, with Peking. Be prepared to establish relations with Vietnam but not on a capitulation basis. Make ASEAN a major focus of attention and work actively to make it a politically effective force in Southeast Asia-with or without Hanoi, but certainly not subservient to Hanoi.
5. Adopt a Pro-Soviet but not Actively Anti-Peking Posture. Keep Chinese and Vietnamese at arm's length and rely on the Soviets to encourage cessation of Vietnamese support to the Thai insurgency. Withdraw from SEATO and end close relations with the United States. Remain in ASEAN but assume generally inactive role except

- where Soviet interests are involved.
6. Assume a Low Profile and Adhere to a Burmese-Style Neutralism. Antagonize no one, especially the communists. Maintain only formal relations with major powers; accept only limited assistance, if any. Withdraw from the Manila Pact; become inactive in or withdraw from ASEAN.⁷⁹

Before commenting specifically on the above options for determining Thai foreign policy, some observations will be made regarding Thailand's security concerns and the idiosyncrasies of Thai leaders.

Neutrality

Mutual disengagement seems to be the dominant feature shaping relations between the countries of Southeast Asia and the major powers within and outside Asia at this time. But this trend is the result rather than the cause of the specific policies adopted by each government. All face the difficult task of making decisions under conditions of greater uncertainty than in the previous period. Cooperation and neutralization among ASEAN nations are increasingly evident.

Thanat wrote an article⁸⁰ at the beginning of 1973, arguing that "neutral nations are required by their neutrality to prohibit the establishment of foreign military bases on their soil. But shunning military alliances

⁷⁹William R. Kintner, "Thailand Faces the Future," Orbis 19 (Fall 1975): 1133-1134.

⁸⁰Thanat Khoman, "Neutralization with Strength," p. 4.

does not mean that the neutral nations should allow themselves to be caught militarily unprepared completely." He further stated that independence required not only military but economic muscle. "Economic strength may be an even more effective guarantee for the preservation of neutrality than military strength. Independence in the political and military field cannot truly exist for a country which is in a state of dependence on foreign aid and whose economy is more or less dominated by foreign interests."⁸¹ All of the countries in Southeast Asia are the case in point since the ultimate decisions will not be made by the region itself but by the great powers--by their willingness or refusal to permit regional insulation. As Richard W. Mansbach said, "In a sense it is the great powers, not Southeast Asia, that must be "neutralized."⁸²

The writer does agree with Mr. Mansbach, but it should be emphasized that all of the major powers' interests would be well served by the neutralization of Southeast Asia (as analyzed in Chapter IV). Whether the major powers will agree to guarantee the neutrality of Southeast Asia, and what form the guarantee will take, cannot at this point be determined. Whatever it will be, all ASEAN nations

⁸¹Ibid., p. 5.

⁸²Richard W. Mansbach, "Southeast Asia in the Global Political System," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies IX (March 1978): 118.

should be active in "neutralization" for the benefit of all members.

The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was the first of ASEAN's agreements to lay the foundation for the forging of a collective political decision. The members agreed to set up machinery for settling disputes on their own. Accordingly, there would be no provocation for outside interference in the region, which the members would strive to make into a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality. Also the cynicism and skepticism concerning ASEAN, regarding its viability and the capacity of its members to sacrifice national interests when necessary to promote regional harmony and cooperation, have been hopefully dispelled with President Marcos' announcement during the Kuala Lumpur Summit in August 1977 that the Philippines was withdrawing its territorial claim to Sabah.

The American Factor

Although the United States still is the dominant military as well as economic power in Asia (as analyzed in Chapter III), Southeast Asian doubts about American intention have now become firm conviction that a significant United States military presence in the region can no longer be expected--a belief that the American executive branch is now greatly restricted by an increasingly assertive U.S. Congress and by a seemingly indifferent American

domestic opinion toward Asian affairs. As Thanat comments:

" . . . Perhaps some day Congress will realize that its efforts to score a domestic and political victory over the Administration with respect to the Vietnamese war did not enhance America's international stature or credibility. If anything, the April capitulation of Phnom Penh and Saigon, by dealing a heavy blow to the U.S. position in the whole of Asia, raised doubts about how effectively it will play its future role as a great. . . ."83

For The Thai, America appears as an uncertain, unreliable power, lacking a sense of purpose to sustain alliances and other forms of cooperation with small nations. Thailand and other non-communist countries in Southeast Asia do not think that the United States would intervene decisively if local insurgencies or interventions from within the region were to threaten their political regimes or even their territorial integrity. Southeast Asian views concerning the credibility of the United States as a guarantor of the status quo have become quite sophisticated: it is assumed that American intervention is most likely to occur in the least likely contingencies, namely large-scale conflicts among some of the major powers, but is least likely to materialize in the most likely contingencies, such as insurgencies of local armed conflicts between neighboring countries.

⁸³Thanat Khoman, "The New Equation of World Power and Its Impact on Southeast Asia," Orbis 20 (Fall 1976): 614.

The Hanoi-Moscow Link

After South Vietnam's defeat, Kintner predicted that Vietnam would dominate Indochina and be the strongest state in Southeast Asia, citing the following factors:

1. The Vietnamese army (including former South Vietnamese soldiers, the best of whom will be absorbed into it), is the largest, most battle-tested and best equipped force in the area-in fact, one of the best in the world.
2. The Vietnamese navy and air force are also without peer in the region. The navy in particular will enable the Vietnamese to play a dominant role vis-a-vis other Southeast Asian states in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. Vietnam will be able to extend and protect her claim to fishing and oil resources in the South China Sea. Conflict with Thailand over some of these resources seems inevitable.
3. The Vietnamese military and political/psychological tactics and strategy of revolutionary warfare have been vindicated by their success throughout Indochina against the leader of the capitalist world.
4. Vietnam will have political stability and national discipline unmatched by any other Southeast Asian state.
5. Vietnam has a fairly strong resource base, and with the Mekong Delta under Hanoi's control she can even become a major rice exporting country-and thus a competitor to Thailand in this field. Moreover, the long war forced Vietnamese of both North and South to handle and maintain a vast array of technologically advanced equipment. As a result, a skilled labor force exists in Vietnam and may provide the impetus for an industrial take-off if capital is available and more rapid exploration of resources other than coal occurs. Overly rigid communist economic management, however, may spoil this prospect.
6. The Vietnamese can continue to draw upon substantial Soviet (and perhaps Chinese) assistance. They even enjoy considerable political and moral support throughout the Third World. The long-term consequences of North Vietnam's

victory have yet to be fully reckoned.⁸⁴

Moreover, there are Soviet technicians in Laos. They have improved the road system from Laos to Haiphong and Danang so that this landlocked country will no longer have to depend on Thailand for its only outlet to the sea. As Hanoi's master plan seems to call for the complete integration of Indochina under its authority, it is only logical that the Vietnamese should give priority to ending Laos' economic dependence on Thailand.

According to Thanat:

For now, it is all too apparent that the power equation in Southeast Asia is out of balance. The U.S.-China component is weakened to the point of atrophy . . . it is owing to the United States' lack of interest . . . The Hanoi-Moscow component, on the contrary, is ebullient over its recent military and political successes.⁸⁵

Hanoi's Objectives

At the first session of the National Assembly of Vietnam, on June 25, 1976, Le Duan, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, stated ambiguously in his report that Vietnam's foreign policy will "fully support the just struggle of the people in Southeast Asia for national independence, democracy and

⁸⁴Kintner, pp. 1128-1129.

⁸⁵Thanat Khoman, "The New Equation of World Power and Its Impact on Southeast Asia," p. 618.

social progress," which sounds like an endorsement of revolutionary movements in the region; but he added in the same paragraph that his government was "ready to establish and develop relations of friendship and cooperation with other countries in Southeast Asia." on the basis of the five principles of coexistence adopted by the 1955 Bandung Conference.

Perhaps to underline its continued support for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), a Hanoi radio broadcast at the beginning of August 1976 noted the success of the "patriotic armed forces" which had forced the "Thai ruling circles" to declare an emergency in 10 provinces. The radio concluded: "Not complacent with their past success, the Thai people remain vigilant and continue to struggle resolutely for their objectives . . . "86

Even only a few days before the establishment of diplomatic relations with Thailand in the beginning of August 1976, Hanoi was not willing to throw away another important card-the support for Thai insurgents. Unlike Malay or Filipino insurgents, who do not enjoy its specific verbal support, the CPT has long been backed by Hanoi.

⁸⁶Nayan Chanda, "Hanoi: Turning Words into Deeds," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 6, 1976, p. 25.

Insurgency

Insurgency threats in Thailand primarily exist in the northeast, north, and most of the southern parts of the country. Potentially, the most serious guerrilla problems are in the northeast areas . . . the Nakhon Phanom, Sakon Nakhon, and the Nong Kai provinces.

Northeast Thailand's insurgency threat has an ethnic orientation. The Communists can exploit the eight to twelve million Laotians and sixty thousand Vietnamese that live in an area of Thailand characterized by infertile soil, inadequate irrigation, and extreme remoteness from the Bangkok Government which, on the whole, has regarded them with indifference.

Thus, the ethnic population of Thailand's seventeen northern provinces have had a long tradition of resistance to the country's central authorities, and captured Pathet Lao operations plans which were publicized in Bangkok during 1975 designated thirteen of these provinces as target areas.⁸⁷ Other Western reports have cited over 1,000 Thai students that joined the ranks of the insurgents since the October 1976 military takeover of Thailand's government and a total civilian CPT infrastructure of

⁸⁷Major John B. Haseman, "Thailand and the Realities of Southeast Asia," Military Review 67 (May 1977): 85; and Nayan Chanda, "Southeast Asia is Never Quite Free of Insurgencies," The New York Times, March 27, 1977, p. 3.

over 80,000.⁸⁸

Soviet assisted North Vietnamese troops number over 40,000 in Laos and 20,000 in Cambodia, and they are presently developing with the CPT a sophisticated social-political organization to incorporate mass peasant participation.⁸⁹

As early as 1962, a Communist infrastructure was created by Vietnamese Communist agents working among the Vietnamese living in Thailand. Its activities have ranged from solicitation of funds and clandestine indoctrination to espionage and armed operations against government troops.⁹⁰ Laotian advisors have also been active inside Thailand for several years by supervising flows of personnel, advisors, munitions, and other supplies to Communist insurgents.⁹¹

Of most concern to Thailand is the nature of the interrelationship of Vietnamese and Laotian insurgency elements in Northeast Thailand--reflecting a fear " . . .

⁸⁸George MacArther, "About 1,000 Thai Students Joined Reds after Fall of Military Coup," Los Angeles Times, February 2, 1977, p. 5.

⁸⁹Robert F. Zimmerman, "Insurgency in Thailand," p. 18.

⁹⁰Justus M. Van Der Kroef, "Hanoi and ASEAN: A New Confrontation in Southeast Asia," Asia Quarterly 4 (1976): 260-261; and Russel H. Fifield, "Power Relations Among the Southeast Asian States," Asian Affairs 3 (January/February 1977): 155.

⁹¹Haseman, p. 85.

that the Pathet Lao are merely fronts for a more powerful SRV support system."⁹² Vietnamese and Chinese AK-293 and hand grenades, e.g., have been confiscated from captured insurgents in increased numbers.⁹³ In recent analyses, both former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, George S. Brown, concluded that Thailand's principal potential security threat to its stability comes from Vietnam's military power, expanded Laotian and Vietnamese support to Thai Communist insurgents, and Vietnam's "attitude towards its neighbors which remain unclear."⁹⁴

However, Thai officials have already reported that the Pathet Lao have negotiated for receipt of Soviet rockets and gunboats to be used against any Thai military patrols conducted along that part of the Mekong River which demarcates the Thai-Laotian Boundary.⁹⁵

Attitudes of Thai Foreign Policy Makers

During the Sanya Administration, Foreign Minister Charunpan expressed his willingness to talk with the

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Dana Adams, "Thailand's Rightists may be Inviting Stronger U.S. Role," Christian Science Monitor, March 16, 1977, p. 4.

⁹⁴General George S. Brown, "The Strategic Importance of Seven Vital International Areas," Commander's Digest, March 17, 1977, p. 18.

⁹⁵"Relations between Laos and Thailand Deteriorating," Asia Research Bulletin (MPS) 5 (August 31, 1975): 115.

Vietnamese "any time and anywhere," and informally let Hanoi know that the Thai government would ask the United States to withdraw its forces from Thailand in return for a North Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and Laos (reflecting the much greater Thai interest in the two buffer states than in South Vietnam, the major American interest).

There was a clear impasse, with both sides insisting that the other make the first move. This impasse was seemingly broken in March 1975 when the new Kukrit government announced that it would seek the withdrawal of American forces within the year and when the subsequent communist victories in Indochina ended the fighting there. The new Thai government was clearly in a hurry to prove its goodwill towards the Indochinese governments.

Meanwhile, Anand, Thai Ambassador to the United States and later Under-Secretary of State, was convinced that the long experience of preserving its territorial integrity should prove to be an asset for Thailand in its effort to defend itself. Whatever the insurgent problem that has existed in Thailand, he does not believe that the guerillas can bring down the government. The loss of Cambodia or Vietnam does not effect the internal stability of Thailand, but it is the external pressures generated which complicate the problem of trying to coexist peacefully with all its neighbours. The United States will not, in effect, be the guarantor of peace

or a sure obstacle to the spread of Communism in the area.

Anand did not do this to curry favour with Vietnam, but he based his argument firmly on his perception of the national interests. He insisted the United States withdraw its forces on the ground that the problems which exist in the area can not be solved exclusively by military means. Thailand had to pay greater attention to the economic and social conditions of its people although at the same time maintain friendly relations with the United States. The United States should change its policy accordingly.⁹⁶

The power and influence that accrued as a result of the U.S. venture in Vietnam have to be foregone. A greater degree of neutrality between the socialist countries and the U.S. are perceived as essential for better protection. So Thailand once again articulates a policy of being friendly to all, in the belief that all nations are unfriendly only some being more unfriendly than others.

Seni-Pichai's foreign policy would appear to be based on the calculation that while there are problems to worry about, there are still cards to play. In 1976 Vietnam has been reunified but Indochina has not. Cambodia

⁹⁶For excellent discussions of American strategies in containing communism in developing areas see, for examples, Laurence E. Grinter, "How They Lost: Doctrines, Strategies and Outcomes of the Vietnam War," Asian Survey 12 (December 1975): 1114-1132; and Donald E. Secrest, "Containing Communism with Communism," The Midwest Quarterly XIV (Autumn 1972): 11-25.

remains an effective buffer state: the Khmer Rouge have shown border hostility towards both Thais and Vietnamese. The break-up of the coalition government in Laos also ended the Lao role as a buffer between Thailand and the Pathet Lao/Vietnamese, a point driven home by the violent incidents along the Mekong. But Laos almost certainly continues to need economic cooperation with Thailand. Whether or not the priority of reconstruction makes Hanoi amenable to better relations with Thailand, it may make the Vietnamese reluctant to assume the full burden of supplying Laotian needs which remain more easily supplied from the better infrastructure existing in Thailand.

The Thais must worry as to how Pathet Lao relations will develop with the Thai-Lao in Thailand's poverty-stricken northeast. They can assume that the new Laotian rulers are as likely as the Khmer Rouge to want to do some balancing with their two larger neighbours. Meanwhile, China will also want to play its balancing role in this area. The Russians, too, are part of this power jigsaw puzzle.

The above regional geopolitical facts justify Pichai's trip across the Cambodian border to talk to Ieng Sary; hence the equal stress on the dialogue with the Vietnamese and the Laotians.

Thanat criticised the Kukrit and Seni administrations for having "gratuitously served on a platter to Vietnam

the much-demanded removal of the American military presence without getting anything in return . . . ⁹⁷

Pichai did not return empty-handed. Apart from the decision to establish full diplomatic relations and the granting of overflight rights to Thai airlines, he obtained for the first time, a Vietnamese commitment to the eventual repatriation of about 40,000 Vietnamese refugees in Thailand. But the Thanin Administration's (After October 6, 1976 coup) tirade against the Vietnamese community, and Hanoi's sharp reaction to what it calls "despicable, slanderous allegations," certainly devalues the agreement (between Pichai and the Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs) signed in August.

Pichai has made it clear that the client-state relationship with the U.S. has ended, but the hope for real partnership remains. In the longer view, present frictions may yield future advantage. The network of U.S. bases through eastern Thailand was essentially an irrelevance on the chequer board of power since (unlike Subic naval base) they were nullified by Congressional limitations on their use. Their sudden disappearance thus makes it possible for not only the Thais, but also for the U.S., to start afresh.

⁹⁷Thanat Khoman, "The New Equation in World Power and Its Impact on Southeast Asia," p. 620.

The Kukrit and Seni Administrations' policies on Thai and United States security interests have been further laconically summarized by Thanat:

. . . The Thai government's handling of the Mayaguez affair succeeded in further poisoning friendly relations between the U.S. and Thailand which had extended over a century. This, with new relations hardly consolidated, ancient relations have been shaken to their roots.⁹⁸

. . . Past Thai governments instead of sitting and talking about our problems together on a friendly basis, brought these relationships to the brink of destruction. We gave them ultimata, destroyed their emblems, gave deadlines for the U.S. troop withdrawal and gave Malaysia one week to pull out their police force from Betong border province between Thailand and Malaysia with Communist insurgency problems.⁹⁹

Senator Mansfield, on the other hand, said:

The withdrawal in July of the last regular U.S. military forces, leaving only a 250-man advisory unit, was a significant factor in creating favorable conditions for the establishment 2 weeks later of diplomatic relations between Thailand and Vietnam. American should not interpret the Thai demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces as an unfriendly gesture. It should be seen for what it was, an inevitable adjustment to the new realities which both countries face in Southeast Asia.¹⁰⁰

And William R. Kintner wrote:

. . . The rise in Thai anti-Americanism and official calls for withdrawal of all U.S. forces may induce the Thai to end the de facto alliance. Washington might prefer this denouement, for if the United

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 620.

⁹⁹Thanat Khoman, "We Must Improve Ties with U.S., Japan, KL," Bangkok Post, October 16, 1976, p. 3.

¹⁰⁰Mansfield, pp. 46-47.

States initiated the withdrawal it would be evident that the Thai have no further utility to the Americans. Suddenly Thailand seems to stand almost alone.¹⁰¹

The military junta's shock dismissal of Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary of State Anand Panyarachun and the flight into apparent exile of ousted foreign minister Pichai Rattakul (following his successful establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam) only added to the doubts and fears of foreign observers. Under Anand's dynamic and professional leadership, the Thai Foreign Ministry had earned a reputation as an effective and forward-looking government department which had successfully pulled off major achievements in the face of domestic opposition and complex international pressures.

Thailand became the first non-communist country to establish diplomatic relations with the new authorities in Cambodia; it finally established diplomatic relations with Hanoi, a move which might have signalled the start of a new era in regional peace and cooperation.

All of these moves had been carried out on the basis of maintaining equidistance from the major powers and achieving friendly and mutually-beneficial relations with all neighbouring countries. A relatively small group of skilled diplomats under Anand had managed to enlist the

¹⁰¹Kintner, p. 1128.

full support of the incumbent prime minister and foreign minister; and, basing their arguments firmly on the national interest, had overcome deep-seated opposition within the Cabinet and National Security Council.

Their views seemed to be clearly shaped by the realization that it was vital for Thailand to adjust to the new international realities following Sino-American detente and the U.S. defeat in Indochina in order to promote Thai interest and maintain the domestic status quo. Those opponents who sometimes labelled them communist could not have been farther from the truth.

A Proposed Objective

Selective Neutrality. The country wants to remain noncommunist but without participating in an international containment or "crusade" policy of any kind. This would seem to require the following: a continuing close relationship with the U.S.; active participation in ASEAN, working toward making ASEAN a viable political force; the expanding of relations with as many international and other regional trades as possible; no active military cooperation with any major powers, although maintaining bilateral cooperation with Malaysia in counterinsurgency efforts; maintaining at least nonantagonistic relations with all socialist countries, but avoiding a pro-specific country (Soviet, Vietnam or China); acceptance of aid

from any sources that would enhance rather than jeopardize neutrality, e.g., much greater reliance on multinational donors.¹⁰²

¹⁰²This proposed objective is closed to the Kintner's combination of proposed options (1) and (4) on page 250 above and Kintner calls this particular objective "the Active, Selective Neutralism." See Kintner, pp. 1134-1135.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

It is generally recognized by scholars that foreign policy is a product of the interplay between external and domestic factors, although as these factors are perceived and interpreted by the nation's decision-makers. It is not external and internal realities in themselves that determine actual policy, but how they are defined by the particular leaders. However, an essential requirement for "correct" or effective policies is some general correspondence between the realities that exist in the minds of the decision-makers and the real realities of their external and internal worlds.

For any nation--particularly small states--it is also accepted that the external world (the systemic variable) has more significance in a causal sense than internal variables (including the factor of perception). However in assessing and assigning the significance of the systemic variable, it is important for the scholar to make a distinction between prescriptive and descriptive analysis. Too often when discussing the systemic variable, observers imply that foreign policy is actually primarily a response

to external factors when what they really mean is that leaders should primarily respond in this way in order to have a successful foreign policy (meaning . . . to "protect the national interest").

A related danger is that scholars seem to automatically define the systemic variable in terms of its state system component, ignoring or minimizing other potentially important parts. The general thrust of this narrow definition is that the world of international politics is solely the fact that it is supposedly anarchical, a jungle, etc., requiring its members to focus on the requirements of balance of power politics, usually defined in terms of military power factors. This approach can lead to unwise and unrealistic prescription and policy in the contemporary world, which may be true in the case of Thailand.

Three general observations about Thai foreign policy can be made on the basis of the review in this study of the contemporary period: (1) that Thai policy has been a product of the interaction between the decision-making (the idiosyncratic factor) and systemic variables, but that the factor of perception has been most important in accounting for actual policy; (2), that the perception of systemic (and internal) factors has not been a national or cultural "Thai" perception or response, but instead that of a particular elite or stratum of Thai society

(this point calls into question the argument of area scholars that stresses the "pragmatic" or "bending in the wind" character of the Thai people); and (3), regarding prescription, that Thai leaders must base foreign (and domestic) policy on a correct reading of the realities of the contemporary world. They must reinterpret or redefine the "wind" that must be bent to: it is a wind of change and of social justice as much as one of military power and balance of power politics.

The first two points made above can be considered together since they are closely intertwined. Thai foreign policy did undergo change during the period under consideration. However, the analytical question is whether the new policies were primarily a product of systemic change in combination with a "Thai" way of dealing with the external world; or, whether they were a product of systemic changes as interpreted variously by particular Thai leaders. The latter was clearly the case as the Thai military and civilian governments favored basically dissimilar ways for Thailand to respond to external changes in conjunction with favored sets of domestic policies.

The military governments generally favored a mix of foreign and domestic policies that we usually associate with contemporary Thailand: alignment and then some form of modified continued alignment with the United States;

receptiveness to American foreign assistance (emphasizing military aid); opposition to non-alignment and to an effective strengthening of neutralist-type regional security organizations such as ASEAN; a toned down but basically hard line toward regional communist states; a linking of internal communist elements with external or "international communism," and a linking of any or all internal critics of military rule with internal and communist elements; and, an attitude identifying democracy and civilian rule as threatening to internal and external stability. Despite rapid and extensive external changes, the military governments favored policy changes that were in basic conformity with previous patterns in Thai policy.

Thai civilian leaders, in or out of power during this same time period, called for more fundamental if not drastic policy changes. They favored a policy of near genuine non-alignment coupled with effective regionalism (ASEAN) as a replacement for the American security tie: friendly but non-security relationships with the United States; a policy of non-provocation or detente toward the regional communist states, based on greater awareness of the security concerns of Vietnam and China; and, progressive domestic policies emphasizing movement toward economic and social justice to be achieved within the framework of an emergent democratic-open political system.

Regarding the prescriptive point made above as a

third major observation from this study, any nation (particularly the smaller ones) must correctly read and interpret recurrent and changing patterns in its regional and global environment. As for dealing with the superpowers and surviving their competitive relationships, it is now apparent as ever that a position of genuine non-alignment is generally the most practical for a small state, particularly in the Asian context. Joining with the U.S. (as in the case of Thailand) or with the Soviet Union (Vietnam or, currently, Afghanistan) only generates counterpressures from the other side calling forth the neutralist truism that "when the elephants play the grass gets trampled."

The final and related point is that domestic strength and stability manifested in popular support for a political system and government, is a prerequisite for avoiding great power intervention and great power rivalry over any nation or region, and that this can best be achieved by movement toward economic and social justice for the populace. This is the systemic or historical wind of change that Thai leaders must "bend" to--as has been acknowledged by Thai civilian governments, however short their period of rule.

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