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C. Tyler Godines Camarillo

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Form Factors:

Chicano Movement Form and the Factors that Influenced it in Los Angeles and San Antonio

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BY THE COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF

Dr. Ann-Marie Szymanski, Chair

Dr. Tyler Johnson

Dr. Alisa Fryar

Dr. Justin Reedy

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As it stands now, this project is the result of many years of work. Had you told me in 2002, right after I barely completed my high school degree, that twenty years later, I would earn a doctoral degree at a flagship university, I would have laughed. But here I am. I am proud of what I have accomplished in this work, but none of it would have been possible without the help and sacrifice of numerous individuals.

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Preface:

The temporal focus of this dissertation is the 1970s, but we must set the stage before we address the central questions of this project. In 1968 a seismic change occurred in the movement for Latino rights in the United States. Latino students in multiple public schools in East Los Angeles left their classrooms in protest to the poor and discriminatory conditions at predominantly Mexican American schools in the area. Shortly after Latino students organized similar protests in other cities, like the westside of San Antonio, Texas. These students represented a fundamental change in Latino activism in the U.S. Unlike those who came before; they focused on promoting Latino culture, history, and more aggressive methods of protest to achieve their goals. They were Chicanos!

The conditions of which these students were protesting were atrocious. Classrooms lacked necessities like proper lighting, windows, and up to date books. Students had to bring their own toilet paper. White teachers punished them for speaking in Spanish and forced them to conform to white cultural standards. Furthermore, their futures were never taken seriously. There was not proper academic or career counseling available for Chicano students. There was also severe gender discrimination too. The futures of Chicana students were narrowed to that of only a housewife and mother. The punishment for stepping outside of the bounds of what their more often than not white teachers considered acceptable was usually severe, like corporal punishment. The period of the 1960s enabled them to break from the convention of their parents and challenge these systems of oppression.

The 1960s was an era marked by social upheaval. The counter-culture revolution, second-wave feminism, and the Black civil rights movement all were at a peak of power and mobilization during this period. The Chicano students were a part of this period of contentious politics. Unlike the League of United Latin American Citizens and the American GI Forum their identity was front and center and they did not want to ask politely for what they wanted. However, after a turbulent two years, the movement seemingly lost its contentious momentum in both LA and SA. It is true that the more contentious aspects of the Chicano Movement, like the Brown Berets, did not last into the new decade, but the story of the movement is much more complex than one that faded into obscurity.

This section lays the foundation for what is to come. There was a marked difference in how the Chicano movement operated from the late 1960s to the 1970s and the change happened at a different pace between the two case cities. By the mid-1970s in San Antonio, groups like Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) and Southwest Voter Research Education Project (SVREP) had formed and were successfully active in the city. A similar group did not form until the latter part of the decade. What happened? Why did the form of the movement change and at different rates in LA and SA? This project enables me to contribute to social movement scholarship in two ways. First, the project enables me to explain the evolution of the Chicano Movement, which is under researched in political science. Second, I am able to test which theory of social movement form best explains this variation and why.

Finally, there is a personal aspect to this project for me. Having grown up in San Antonio, Latino politics were always a major factor in the way I understood government and politics. I was able to see firsthand the difficulties this group faced in achieving its goals. Much

like McAdam has stressed in the study of movements, you must expand the research beyond only one event or year. Growing up in SA made me intuitively aware that collective action is never ending. The politics of the 1960s and many other movements have taken the lions share of attention, but the Chicano Movement in the 1970s is deserving of scholarly attention and has much to teach us.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

Why did the Chicano Movement (CM) vary in form between the cities of Los Angeles, CA, and San Antonio, TX, during the 1970s? That is the central question that I seek to answer in this dissertation. Answering this question will help contribute significantly to the literature on Latino politics and social movements in political science. Scholars in the discipline have recently published many substantial and groundbreaking contributions to these two research areas.[1] Hence, one goal of this project is to add substantively to the impressive work in Latino Politics and social movement theory in political science so that others can build on this study in the future. Another goal is to analyze the development of Latino movements in the United States.

Much of the political science work on the CM has focused on questions about the actors' outcomes in the movement. For example, studies have explored whether the Southwest Voter Research Education Project (SVREP) was successful in its mission to register and get Latino voters to the polling booth and the impact of student members on freedom of speech law in public schools (Pantoja and Woods 1999; Schumaker 2019). These works are essential and contribute to the analysis used to complete this project; however, I seek to take a step back and look at the movement more broadly to answer why there were variations in movement form in the Chicano Movement.

[1]See Ann-Marie Szymanski's "Pathways to Prohibition: Radicals, Moderates, and Social Movement Outcomes" where she illustrates the power of local strategies and movement success; Chris Zepeda-Millán's "Latino Mass Mobilization: Immigration, Racialization, and Activism" where he finds that the way in which the debate around immigration was racialized activated Latino's to mobilize; and Megan Ming Francis's "Civil Rights and the Making of the Modern American State" where she illustrates how nonstate actors, like the NAACP, impact constitutional/institutional development in the United States.

The Cases

The cities at the heart of this project are Los Angeles, California, and San Antonio, Texas. The Chicano Movement was geographically broad, with actors fighting for institutional and social discrimination in Denver, Chicago, Albuquerque, and Seattle. Still, I must narrow this project's scope to the two cities mentioned above. Los Angeles and San Antonio are the best fit for this study as "hubs" for the CM; they have two crucial descriptive features. First, the two cities had the highest Hispanic populations. Secondly, the two cities featured different social movement forms within Chicano movement populations, with Los Angeles having the more radical actors and San Antonio. There were other significant similarities. Both cities were in states with governors who had presidential aspirations. California governor Ronald W. Reagan achieved his goal in the 1980s. Finally, national politics impacted both cities. The Vietnam War, the War on Poverty, and the Civil Rights Movement spurred collective action by Chicanos in the 1960s and 1970s.

San Antonio

It is plausible that each theory of form, RMT, time and place, organizational efficacy, and perceptions of success significantly impacted movement strategies. However, before we begin the analysis at the center of this project, we need to discuss the city's backstory pre-1965. I think two aspects of development are essential to understanding the Chicano Movement in San Antonio.[2] At face value, it makes sense that San Antonio was more conservative in its form

[2] There are many factors pre 1965 that impacted the CCRM in the city, but I cannot cover them all as documenting a complete history is not the goal of political science. I leave the completionist goal of filling in that canvas to the historians.

movement-wise.[3] The city was subject to the same mobilization forces that impacted much of Texas during the mid to late 1950s. In his award-winning book, David Montejano describes, much like in California, how the grower strike in south Texas fueled Chicano mobilization in the 1960s throughout the state even though the strikers were unsuccessful (Rodolfo Rosales 2000). This similarity is significant as it illustrates another important state-level factor that both California and Texas share, even if the outcome differed. The following paragraphs describe the city's economic, cultural, and time and place factors.

San Antonio is an important and fascinating case that can help us better understand the Chicano Movement and social movement form in general. The city had the second-highest Latino population in the country, second only to Los Angeles, CA. It is also racially segregated, like many major cities throughout the United States, and conditions in Black and Latino sections of the city were unlivable. It is important to note that the Latino population within the municipality faced internal barriers to action within the community. It was split between the demands of the new middle class and working-poor Latinos (Rodolfo Rosales 2000). The Anglo ruling business and political elite were quick to work with the newly Latino middle class in the city by ensuring that there was what Rosales the "illusion of inclusion" with a handpicked member of this group on the city council.

The Good Government League (GGL) controlled the San Antonio City Council during this period. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, the city was Mills' *The Power Elite* come to life in local politics form. Montejano found that "the at-large elections for nine city council seats

[3] Descriptors like conservative and moderate when discussing movement form are relative. When movements try to "break the status quo they are inherently radical. However, there is variation.

favored the GLL, which had the resources to recruit and finance full electoral slates. From 1955 to 1975, seventy-seven of eighty races for the city council were won by members of the GLL" (Montejano 2010). The GLL was created to reform government, make it more efficient, and make the city a modern and bustling Sunbelt city. The group achieved this goal through repression and negligence of Latinos on the city's west side.

Mayor Walter W. McAllister Sr. was the de facto leader of the GLL. Through this group, he transformed the city by funneling resources into the majority Anglo north side and developing projects like the northwest medical center, Hemisphere Park, and the University of Texas at San Antonio. Even though the city council took on such costly projects, they could keep taxes low through extreme neglect of Black and Latino residents. The city is still divided, with Latinos living on the West and South sides. These areas were economically depressed. In the 1960s, the west side of San Antonio had the country's highest tuberculosis rates (Rodolfo Rosales 2000). Due to the lack of proper infrastructure, every time it rained, the area flooded. The public schools in the area, such as Lanier High School, were dilapidated and unable to prepare students for their future careers or college adequately. All these factors created a situation that was ripe for contentious action.

As stated earlier, any push back to the status quo is radical. However, there is almost always variation in the degrees and style in the delivery of movement demands. In San Antonio, an apparent dichotomy in the Chicano Movement form emerged and developed over time. There were school "blowouts," and the Brown Berets had a significant presence in the city. On the other end of the spectrum, it was also home to many well-known nonprofits and Latino interest groups. Even young radical Willie Velazquez, one of the founding members of the

Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO), created, with the help of federal funds, the Southwest Voter Education Research Project (SVREP). Before we can understand that factor(s) drove this variation, we need a clear picture of what happened during this period.

Los Angeles

Los Angeles, CA, is perhaps the center of the Chicano Movement during this era. The city had the highest population of Latinos by percentage outside of Mexico City at this time. It was racially segregated like San Antonio and other cities throughout the United States. There were small enclaves throughout the city with a more than twenty-five percent Asian American population, for example, near Jefferson Park, Gardena, and of course, “China Town.” South Central Los Angeles was predominantly Black, with over fifty percent of African American residents. East Los Angeles was the majority Latino area of the city. This area of Los Angeles included neighborhoods like Lincoln Heights, Pico Rivera, and the infamous Boyle Heights, which in a *Los Angeles Times* historical profile described as a "melting pot" where you would see stores with signs advertising products for Jewish and Latino residents in the same window (Sahagun 1983). Today this neighborhood is about 95 percent Latino.

The Asian, Black, and Latinos in the city suffered from similar social and economic discrimination throughout the U.S. during this era. However, it is essential to note that there were vast differences in employment and income rates amongst these groups. The Black population in Los Angeles suffered hasher unemployment rates than the Asian and Latino communities. In Pulido's analysis of activism in Los Angeles, she notes that "overall poverty rates between South and East Los Angeles ere relatively comparable, 26.8 percent and 23.6 percent

respectively, their figures obscure important spatial difference." [4] The predominantly Black Watts neighborhood saw 41.5 percent of its residents living below the poverty line in 1965, while most areas in East Los Angeles were half that rate (Pulido 2006). Black activists from that period theorize that the differences in economic outcomes are a possible reason Latinos were slow to protest in the city.

Cesar Chavez positively impacted the CM in Los Angeles and led Delano Grape Strike from 1965 to 1970. Unlike the Texas counterpart, this strike was successful and showed Latinos that their collective action could bring about change to the status quo. It would be unfair to state that activism in the area was purely from the more radical toolbox of strikes and walkouts. There were formal groups created like The United Mexican American Students (UMAS) and The August Twenty-Ninth Movement (ATM) founded in the city (Acuña 1988). However, the Young Chicanos for Community Action (YCCA) later became the Brown Berets (Chávez 2002). The nationalist group Movimiento Estudiantil Chicanx de Aztlán (MEChA) had a presence there as well.

Theories of Form

Resource Mobilization Theory

McCarthy and Zald first described Resource-Mobilization Theory (RMT) in 1977. The influence of Olson's work is highly evident in the theory described by McCarthy and Zald. It is an economical, rational choice, and top-down or elite-driven. The language of economics permeates their description of the field. While they have one of the more concise definitions of

[4] Pulido, *Black, Brown, Yellow, and Left- Radical Activism in Los Angeles*.

social movements, they hierarchically describe the field. Descriptive terms like "social movement sector," "social movement industry," and "social movement organization" are used to label the different aspects of the social movement landscape (McCarthy and Zald 1977). The individuals involved in the movement and their actions are also given business-type terms. Now we get to the innovations and contributions of this theory.

RMT has a rational choice foundation. This addition of rational choice theory was a departure from more traditional thinking contentious politics that were more socio-psychological (McAdam 1985). In the past, classical social movement studies proposed that societal strain, whether that negative stimulus is discrimination or income inequality, would become so great that it would create a psychological state of mind that induced repressed individuals to protest (Kornhauser 1959; McAdam 1985). Societal strain can, without a doubt, cause people to engage in protest politics, but the classic theory was lacking. Mainly, there is never a point in time in which groups are all equal. There is always some sort of societal strain. It is challenging to predict when there will be a sufficient amount of stress to cause a movement to form (McAdam 1985). The shift in focus to the resources available to social movements allowed scholars to test why some flourished empirically and some failed.

McCarthy and Zald draw on rational choice when they propose that social movement tactics and success are determined by the number of resources they receive. In this instance, resources are mainly time and money (1977). These resources come from two places, the base of support and societal infrastructure (1977). A proposed example of how varying levels of available resources determine S.M. tactics is the claim that those organizations with more capital will be more formal and hierarchical in structures with clear leaders and workers (1977).

More money also means a more significant number of groups that develop in the "social movement sector" and vice versa (1977). RMT treats participation in social movements as conditioned by what Olson proposed in his work. To get individuals off the sidelines, the benefit of participating must outweigh the cost of spending your time and money. The two main foci of RCT are where criticism of this theory by other social movement scholars has developed over time.

RMT is inherently an elite-driven approach to understanding social movements. More resources mean more groups and more members. The all-important goal of "broadening the scope of conflict" is achieved (Schattschneider 1960). This focus means there is a great emphasis on the well-to-do elite and gatekeepers. Two things are essential to point out based on this assumption. First, elites often want to contain threats to the status quo as it has been helpful to them, so they may be less inclined to support groups that would disrupt the status quo (McAdam 1985). Second, even the most disadvantaged groups have the power to collaborate (McAdam 1982). The African Americans who engaged in protest politics in the Jim Crow South were individually weak economically and politically but could cooperate (McAdam 1982). The industrial workers and unemployed in the Great Depression 1930s collaborated despite being often in a state of economic destitution (Piven and Cloward 1977). That being stated leads us to the second flaw in the theory.

There is an assumption of rationality and irrationality based on how much time and money a group has concerning participation. If the cost is more than the benefit, one shouldn't act. However, many repressed groups lack some resources, be it money or time, due to institutionalized and social repression. We have seen many times throughout history that these

groups have banded together to overcome their oppressors, leading many critics of this theory to question its overall usefulness in understanding movement form, mobilization, and success. Piven and Cloward can best summarize this critique in their theory assessment. They state, "like many malintegration analysts before them, resource mobilization analysts have also reduced lower-stratum protest politics to irrational and apolitical eruptions " (Piven and Cloward 1995). McAdam echoes these elite criticisms as well.

All theories, especially in the social science sphere, have critics. RMT is no exception to this norm. Many scholars of contentious politics have criticized RMT. McCarthy and Zald have provided frequent "state of the theory" updates in which they give an overview of the recent literature and have addressed the shortcomings of their original theory. There has also been an offshoot of RMT in the "mobilizing structures" literature (Amenta et al. 2010). I will summarize these three factors and discuss why these factors mean we still need to take RMT seriously despite some apparent limitations when considering social movement form.

Recent RMT research has built upon the original foundation while also changing it. Social movement scholars have recently researched how changes in the availability of resources in the movement industry impact repertoire and found that more generalist organizations tend to outlive more specialist groups (S. A. Soule and King 2008). Others have combined RMT with other factors to better understand the distribution of resources in movement organizations. A study on how right-to-work laws or hostile environments to labor unions impact how these organizations disburse their resources indicated that union spending in right-to-work states was low for both organization size and campaigns as these firms most likely want to avoid failure (A. W. Martin 2008).

Time and Place

Before discussing political opportunity and social movements, we must first delve into time and place. In short, where we come from matters, as it dictates our current position and future location. In his groundbreaking work Social Movements, 1768 – 2004, Charles Tilly masterfully describes how the repertoires deployed by social movements are limited by where and when they occur. It is worth noting that Tilly had been developing this theory of repertoires of contention and movement claim-making since the 1970s. The work mentioned above is the culmination or magnum opus of a decades-long career. All scholarly roads to and from regarding the relationship between time and place and social movement form emanate from Tilly.

In Tilly's theory of repertoires of collective action, when groups move off the sidelines to create change, they are not starting from scratch. They have an inherited claim-making toolbox bound by time and place. Three main factors: economics, institutions, and social formalities, set the boundaries of this toolbox. The homeless in San Francisco could riot, environmentalists could destroy construction equipment, and leftists could burn an effigy of President Donald Trump in a public space. Still, these types of protests are rare due to the constraints mentioned above on movement repertoires. The significant limitations evolve slowly, and so do the repertoires available to movement activists. Later studies of social movement form further articulated and provided greater nuance of how repertories have evolved.

McAdam takes this theory of formation and form further and theorizes that movements must be studied not as singular one-off events but as part of broader social changes or "movement families" (McAdam 1995). This is another term for cycles of protest. He is building

off literature from Tarrow by defining two discrete categories in the "movement families" umbrella. First are the "initiator movements" that "signal or otherwise set in motion an identifiable protest cycle (McAdam 1995)." The Civil Rights movement in the south set off the protest cycle of the 1960s that the New Left and Anti-War Movement would follow (McAdam 1995). The two movements mentioned above are "spinoff movements" that "draw their impetus and inspiration from the original initiator movement (McAdam 1995)." This categorization is not to say that all movements after the initiators are simple copycats of said group. McAdam goes on to explain that “spinoff movements” are “creative adapters and interpreters of the cultural “lessons” of the early risers (McAdam 1995).” These movements can not just follow the plan of those who came before, as institutions are usually preoccupied with the initiator movement.

The Chicano Movement struggled with the federal government's treatment of the group as similar to the "civil rights mold for Blacks in the south" during the late 1960s and 1970s (Kaplowitz 2003). In the early 1900s, more conservative Latino advocacy groups, like LULAC, argued that “Mexican Americans should be treated like any other white American” (Kaplowitz 2003). As such, they shouldn't be subject to Jim Crow laws. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Great Society legislation changed that framing calculus for Latinos (Craig Allan Kaplowitz 2003). During the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, LULAC adopted a new argument that Mexican Americans were a racial minority, distinct from African Americans, and had their own policy needs (Craig Allan Kaplowitz 2003). This shift towards embracing identity and demand for a targeted policy may have

pushed Latinos to be “creative adapters” and vary in organizational efficacy, in the words of McAdam.

It would be incorrect to argue that the CM did not learn or use any part of the Civil Rights Movement’s repertoires or innovate as a movement based on its history. LULAC changed its advocacy approach based on the political opportunity before it. The southwest differs from the southeast in various ways. The CM had to contend with Texas's different economic and political realities than those faced by Black activists in states like Alabama. In the wake of the Great Depression, the Roosevelt Administration sought to nationalize worker standards. Still, his New Deal policies were tied to southern conservative Democrats who were nowhere close to supporting unionization or equality for Black and Mexican Americans. The new national standards were limited in scope, and these laws gave power to the states, which varied in implementation.

By the 1970s, Texas had continued to grow economically; by that point, it was fifth in garment production in the U.S. (Amberg 2006). However, as a state, it still lagged in terms of pay and worker treatment. The social and institutional conditions fostered a low quality of life for workers, especially Mexican Americans. Texas has a “weak” government, and the state gives much of the power over the economy to employers (Amberg 2006). During this time, they could nefariously capitalize on racial divisions within the state and the “ambiguous immigration status” of many Mexican Americans to exploit them by fostering poor working conditions and paying unfair wages to increase profits. Amberg also argues that adherence to traditional family structures prevented Mexican Americans from organizing to protect their rights (2006). In this article, Amberg builds on Orren and Skowronek's argument, which holds that groups confront

a range of opportunities because “the shaping of such opportunities typically occurs in a disjointed way because the institutions often do not operate in synchrony” (2006). California is an interesting comparison case as Mexican Americans did have some successes in labor relations. It is also interesting as the most famous strike in the state, the Delano Grape Strike, was preceded by a successful strike by Filipino American agricultural workers in the state. Mexican Americans in California may have been learning the lessons of their Filipino American counterparts rather than those of Black Civil Rights activists in the southeast.

Political Opportunity Model

The Political Opportunity Model (POM) is an alternative to the classical model and RMT. POM consists of three main elements, the growth of political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength, and specific shared cognitions; these cognitions are often achieved via framing processes in groups (McAdam 1982). There are some apparent similarities between other models of understanding social movement growth. Organizational strength overlaps with RMT, and specific shared cognitions are similar to the classical model (McAdam 1982). However, those similarities are limited as McAdam describes a far more complex model that is less elite-driven and can better explain the rise and decline of social movements in an empirical manner.

The POM is inherently political. It's even in the name. The first of the three elements to describe is the "growth of political opportunities." Political opportunities can be a range of events. Typical examples are prolonged war, economic downturns, electoral outcomes, and passage, and possible passage of legislation. Corresponding examples include the antiwar protest during the Vietnam and Iraq and Afghanistan War Eras, the Occupy Wallstreet

movement formed during the Great Recession, and the strengthening of the Anti-Abortion movement after the Republican Party gained at the state level post-2010.

We can also see how the variability of political opportunities across states impacts undocumented immigrants' protest tactics. In the absence of action by the federal government, states and cities have taken measures to address the increase of undocumented immigrants (Burciaga and Lisa M. Martinez 2017). These governments have variations in their openness to undocumented immigrants ranging from actively accepting and passively accepting to exclusive (Burciaga and Lisa M. Martinez 2017). In Los Angeles, CA, where the local government is actively welcoming immigrants, undocumented college student activists were freer to organize on and off college campuses. These activists pushed the state of California to adopt laws that allowed other undocumented persons to obtain a state identification card and expanded healthcare for the same people (Burciaga and Martinez 2017). Denver, CO, a city with a rich Chicano Civil Rights Movement history, passively accepted immigrants in the same period. Burciaga and Martinez described a political climate trending more liberal but saw significant pushback from conservative immigration groups like the Colorado Minute Men (2017). This divided political climate narrowed political opportunities for the supporters of immigration rights to oppose restrictive immigration laws instead of pushing for legislation that expanded access for immigrants like in California.

On the other end of the spectrum are locations like Atlanta, GA. The Georgia state legislature and the Board of Regents were actively hostile to immigrants during this period. In 2010, the Georgia Board of Regents passed a policy prohibiting undocumented immigrants from attending the state's top five colleges (Burciaga-and Martinez 2017). In the same year, the

state passed a law similar to Arizona's controversial SB1070 that required law enforcement to "ask for papers" and criminalized the use by undocumented immigrants of public services like attending college or seeking emergency medical care (Burciaga and Martinez 2017). These acts by the government of Georgia severely hindered participation in two ways. First, college students and young people were the two locations' driving forces. Mobilization was far more difficult without those institutions acting as a collective action home base. Second, the stricter immigration policies enacted by the state raised the cost of collective action considerably.

Perceptions of Success

The final theory is that of perceptions of success. This theory is essential to investigate concerning the Chicano Movement because of the two broad strategic paths movements can take to initiate change, contentious or formal action. Perhaps the best way forward is based on what those who participate in the cause see as the method most likely to succeed in achieving their goals. There are solid arguments for each path in the social movement scholarship. It has been shown that working within the status quo often fails to create desired change.

Conversely, working outside the accepted institutional and societal norms and rules is unacceptable, even by those sympathetic to the cause. What is a group to do in a situation that is, at best, a catch-22? This internal debate may be the most potent force in shaping form.

Piven and Fox argue that a marginalized group should employ a strategy of sustained radical action instead of formalizing it, stating that “during times of disturbance, elites only offer symbolic gestures and respond not to the groups but the underlying force of insurgency” (1977). In this model, there is a direct argument against the pluralist theory described by Dahl.

Instead of an open system in which anyone can participate and enact broad change, the system is designed only to diminish the power of those scarce resources. Because of this closed design, nontraditional politics is the only tool for those oppressed to succeed (1977). This argument is straightforward and makes intuitive sense. Why would those who benefit from the status quo want to give up their power and status? Why waste resources to take part in a nonresponsive system?

Conversely, Gamson argues that groups that formalize in a structure are “battle-ready” to face off against privileged groups and more likely to succeed (1977). Gamson’s theory of the benefits of formalization has two factors at work. First, he discusses “the centralization of power” within a group that helps a group prevent “factionalism” (1977). A group with more centralized power can better address internal divisions and develop a sustained organization. The modern Occupy Movement that arose in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008 was averse to such a strategy and was a proudly "leaderless" movement (Gautney 2011). The Occupy Movement was active early on during its lifespan. Still, without direction from leadership and no desire for leadership by those in the “inner group,” it splintered into many of the various leftwing groups we are familiar with today (Gitlin 2012; Levitin 2015). Formal design is the second factor ensuring groups are “battle-ready” (Gamson 1977). In short, a bureaucracy helps a group act quickly to oppose well-funded opposition elites and their strategies. The Occupy Movement, again, had no desire to formalize. In the wake of the group's in-fighting and splintering, the formal “outer-groups” that were battle-ready and shared interests with the movement, like “trade unions, professional groups, and liberal representatives,” were the ones able to have some success in the policy area (Gitlin 2012). There is apparent disagreement in

the literature on the question of whether a group should have a formal structure or not. However, there is also the question of what tactics a group should employ on the ground. Should they work within the legal system or use extra-legal tactics?

Groups have often attempted to take a less radical path to achieve their goals. In the pre-Civil Rights era of Virginia, the Virginia Voters League (VVL) conducted voter education programs and poll-tax payment drives from 1941 to the mid-1950s (K. S. Johnson 2017). They saw early success, but the group ultimately failed due to institutional barriers, business and political elites push back, and skepticism by younger black activists (Johnson 2017). Working directly with an executive and developing an independent platform to assist in advocacy for policy and societal change may not produce the desired results. While a President may be sympathetic to a group and share its goals, they may diverge on achieving outcomes and fear alienating voters from their support (Miroff 1981). Many of these same obstacles may be present for state governors and city mayors. This variation in professionalism means that insurgency group members may not perceive a moderate approach as a potentially successful endeavor.

Importance of the Underground Press

During the Civil Rights Movement, Free Speech Movements, Anti-War and all-encompassing New Left movements in the 1960s U.S., there was a proliferation of social movement publications or "underground press." Two changes in society are directly related to the rise of these publications. The mimeograph, an early iteration of modern copying machines, reduced publishing costs for everyday people. The counter-culture movement born out of the widely conformist post-war 1950s America began to push back against institutional and social

problems (McMillian 2011). This new low-cost form factor was the perfect outlet for young new radicals on a social justice outreach mission. Many of the underground newspapers from this time "came and went" as quickly as they burst onto the scene; however, some landmark publications from this era were relatively long-lasting and undoubtedly influential.

Some of the most well-known underground publications from this era are the *Weather Underground,* which was associated with the leftist student group, Students for a Democratic Society, and the *Los Angeles Free Press* or "Freep." Other publications, like *The Rag* in Austin, TX, followed shortly after these papers. Advocates that created these publications to counter the status quo orientated and reinforcing messaging from traditional news outlets like the *New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times* directly address the three types of claims outlined by Tilly, "program, identity, and standing (Tilly 2019)." McMillian states that most traditional news outlets, including the *Los Angeles Times,* were surprised by the Watts Riot as these newsrooms downplayed and ignored the economic and social plight of Black, Brown, and Asians in the city (McMillian 2011). Without these publications, many movements would not have been successful, as the mainstream press often works directly against them in many ways. Traditional news sources favor the status quo in their reporting and often portrayed movement claims as illegitimate. This undermining of repressed groups is not surprising as the newsrooms of this time lacked all types of diversity and were institutions full of all straight white men (Mellinger 2013b). There has been an improvement in diversity in the news media; this fact holds in many cases regarding diversity in the press.

Mellinger drives home two important facts about reporting in newspapers during this era that should influence how we study social movements and the data used. First, major news

media outlets tried for what was essentially faux neutrality in their reporting of race during the civil rights era. Criticism in reporting the racist repressive institutions and conditions for those subjected to it took a side and overt advocacy by news outlets. Second, while criticism of the status quo in reporting was avoided, support for these repressive institutions and policies was not especially opposed by southern newsrooms (Mellinger 2013b). In short, the newspapers' reporting turned a blind eye and refused to engage in the harsh reality many faced during this time.

These practices kept people of color, who would have provided much-needed insight into the repressed' s lived experiences, out of these organizations because they and their publications were seen as advocacy and not real news. We can see this awareness of perceived illegitimacy by those who published underground magazines and newspapers in the publications' names. The titles were sometimes self-deprecating, for example, *The Rag.* There was also an awareness that these publications were the only way their stories would be heard. Underground papers had names that conveyed coverage of geographic concerns, like *Inside Eastside and The Westsider*. Some expressed the importance to specific groups, like *The Chicano Times* and *The Black Panther.* The issues outlined above with major newspapers and the availability of, albeit not complete, underground press publications present us with a significant data choice.

Civil rights movements for historically repressed groups, like Black and Chicanos, faced a dual delegitimization from the traditional press. In the essential independent works that studied how the press covers social movements in general by Gitlin and McLeod, the status quo bias that nearly all social movements confront and continue to face is clearly shown. For

example, news reports went to local law enforcement instead of movement leadership when interviewing people on the ground. This issue is what McLeod calls the "Social Movement Paradigm" (McLeod 2007). The demonization of social movements often occurs in traditional news sources, as detailed by Todd Gitlin regarding leftist groups in the 1960s (Gitlin 2003). Gitlin highlights that press often focused on the more unique figures of movements and the violence.

If the press focuses on extremes and violence associated with all protest movements, why does/did it matter more for the Chicano Movement? This reporting around Chicano and other civil rights movements is that whites in America view POC as economic and social threats, and status quo protecting reporting heightens this issue. Our understanding of this negative phenomenon comes from Racial Threat Theory. V.O. Key bore this theory in the "Old South" politics. In short, Racial Threat is the idea that whites become more racially hostile; the more significant the Black population is near them. Anglos perceive a sizable Black population as threatening their economic, political, and social dominance. This political behavioral theory put forward by Key has been confirmed across multiple studies; for example, whites are more likely to change their party identification to Republican, the higher the Black population in nearby precincts (Giles and Hertz 1994). We also see that when the population of nearby Black neighbors declines, whites are less likely to participate electorally (Enos 2016). If white *Los Angeles Times* readers see Chicanos protesting in the streets demanding power, we can expect a punitive response.

Recent studies in Latino politics in America confirm that Latina/os face similar social and political hurdles outline in Racial Threat Theory as their Black comrades. Not only does the

media report in a status quo reinforcing fashion, but it also reports in a manner that portrays issues often negatively associated with Latinos, like crime and immigration, that drives "white backlash" towards them (Zepeda-Millán 2017; Abrajano and Hajnal 2017).

The Chicano Press

The Chicano press did much of the movement's deliberative and rhetorical heavy lifting. It served multiple purposes in the movement. First, editors and contributors argued that the southwest U.S. was rightfully their land and a place for them to be a full Chicano. This land was called Aztlán, the Aztec peoples' ancestral land, and in this case, included the land annexed by the U.S. after the Mexican American War. The discrimination, isolation, and violence by Anglo and the state were further delegitimized as they had no rightful claim to the land. The more radical in the movement called for this land to be a new nation for Chicanos. Second, the writers in these papers sought to do away with the "hyphenated" identity of the "Mexican-American." This dual identity was meant to suppress Mexican culture, whereas the new Chicano identity was a way to express pride in one's culture and heritage. This goal was challenging as there was much disagreement within the movement about what it meant to be. Often, their definition was different from other contributors in the same issue. Finally, the Chicano Press had to get the word out as the movement was often underreported or reported in a demining or negative fashion.

The two movement papers analyzed in this dissertation are *El Popo* and *The Chicano Times.* These movement periodicals provide insight into the issues that the Chicano movement considered most essential and how they frame their ideas. In the following paragraphs, I describe the history of these two papers. I discuss how long these papers were

published, who created them, what was reported, and how individuals acquired them. There are some elements that I am unable to answer due to a lack of information, such as how many people were reading these movement publications. Still, the previous scholarship provides a solid base for using them to answer the central questions in this project.

El Popo was published by students in the Chicano Studies program at San Fernando Valley State College, which is now California State University Northridge. The paper was meant to serve multiple purposes. It was meant to be consumed by the various groups within the Chicano movement, and it was to be read outside of the university in the surrounding area (Licón 2018). The early editorial team for the paper chose the name after the Mexican volcano Popocatepetl. They felt it was strong symbolically of the movement as it was a young volcano that, although dormmate could erupt at any moment, "like a volcano, the movement should be beheld with respect (*El Popo* 1970a). The creators had the goal of being the go-to paper for understanding the issues Chicanos faced on campus and the surrounding area as the "Anglo-controlled media" did not adequately or truthfully report on events, the movement, or matters of concern for Chicanos.

The early lead editor of *El Popo* was the young Frank del Olmo. After his time with the paper and at San Fernando Valley State College, he went on to be an award-winning journalist for the *Los Angeles Times* (Luther 2004). The paper was editorial sound and not conspiratorial. It was critical of Anglo elites, but reasonably so for a good reason. The topics covered in each issue were current events on campus, the surrounding area, and California. Also, included articles covered what was happening in the movement in the LA area and across the country. There were articles submitted by readers that discussed the movement

and its ideas in a philosophical nature. There was also a lot of Chicano artwork that represented various aspects of the Chicano movement. This Chicano paper provides an in-depth look into the movement at the time and how it evolved.

The Chicano Times was published in San Antonio from June 1970 to August 1977. It was published semi-monthly and in both Spanish and English. In 1972 it "absorbed" the Dallas, Texas-based publication "*Chicano,"* and in 1977, it merged with another San Antonio publication called *The Westsider*. The editorial team outlined the goals of the paper in the first edition. First, they wanted to create a space for the differing opinions among Mexican Americans in San Antonio to be accurately reported and foster debate. The editorial team blamed the growing divide among the Mexican American population in the city due to the inaccurate reporting of the group and a lack of a representative publication. Next, the editors sought to present the Mexican American version of events in the city because "the Mexican-American has long had to depend on the editorial power of individuals who are not familiar with the Mexican-American way of life and are subject to misinterpretation (*The Chicano Times Newspaper* 1970)." The editors did achieve these goals

The *Chicano Times* included stories about the goings on and issues of concern in the city of San Antonio, the state of Texas, and from around the United States. Most editions mainly did focus on matters of local concern. The paper also included letters to the editor where individuals wrote to express their opinions on previous stories, goings on in the city, and issues within the Chicano movement. There were also posts for local events, like dances and fundraisers. In early editions, the reader-submitted poetry about the Chicano movement and identity. There were also political cartoons that usually expressed support for the

movement and criticized the elites that stood in the way of progress. The paper was also an outlet for Mexican American-run businesses to advertise and support the report. Overall, the editors achieved their goals stated in the first issue. It was a medium for discussing the best path forward for Chicanos in the city. It reported on significant events through the lens of Mexican-American identity that provided readers with a fuller truth.

Both papers could be acquired as you would any other newspaper at the time. An individual could buy a single issue of *El Popo* for ten cents per issue or purchase a subscription that would be sent to their home for three dollars a year. The *Chicano Times* could be bought at twenty-five cents an issue, or a subscription sent to their home could be purchased for six dollars a year. There are no circulation numbers or data on how many editions of each paper were sent to areas outside of its target readership. This issue will be addressed in future iterations of this project via interviews. However, the comprehensiveness of these papers in the range of information provided makes them a quality source for data on resources, political opportunities, and perceptions of the Chicano movement during this period.

I want to know the disagreements among members of the Chicano Movement that concerned how to achieve these goals, how various alternatives were discussed, and what impact those debates had on the form of the movement.

The Data and Methods

The data used in this study comes from underground magazines/newspapers from Los Angeles and San Antonio, ranging from 1967 to 1978. The publications are collected from various archives, but the Chicano Studies Serials Collection produced by the Ethnic Studies

Library at the University of California at Berkeley and the Underground Newspaper Collection created by the Micro Photo Division – Bell & Howell Co. and the Underground Press Syndicate are the two primary sources. There are six different publications from San Antonio for a total of 53 issues between the publications. The date range for these publications in the city is 1967 to 1977. All the magazines are written in either English or a mix between English and Spanish. Like the Chicano Times and Inferno, some had two editions in both languages, but I am only analyzing the English or bilingual editions in this study. To my knowledge, very few, if any, of the all-Spanish language editions were archived. Many underground publications pre-1950 in the southwest were published only in Spanish, but those are not included in this study.

More underground publications in Los Angeles and the data set reflect this fact in the geographic ratio. There are 17 different publications from this city in the dataset. Those range from the years, like those from San Antonio, 1967 to 1977. There are 87 individual editions across the publications I have collected. The editions are in either English in their entirety or with some articles or sections in Spanish. None of the publications are entirely in the Spanish language. Some publications were regularly archived, for example, *El Popo,* with 26 editions scanned to microfilm in the archive. For others, like *Adelante,* only a single edition was archived. This lack of completeness may have been due to the publication only lasting for a single printing, or it was never collected to be archived. Many of these publications were produced with few resources. Even monthly publications sometimes skipped a month or two and often went defunct with little notice to their readership. A chart of the included publications with is in the appendix.

This study will investigate if resources, political opportunity, or perceptions of success significantly impacted Chicano Movement between the two cities by analyzing underground newspapers and other archival material. Did radical groups believe that hierarchy was problematic? Did moderate groups view organizations to be effective? (Perception of organizational efficacy) Were they aware of the resources available to them? To test which independent variables significantly impacted perceptions of organizational effectiveness, I will conduct a directed content analysis. This type of content analysis is the optimal method for this type of analysis as there are existing research and theories on the topic of form, and most importantly, "The goal of a directed approach to content analysis is to validate or extend a theoretical framework or theory (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) conceptually". As opposed to a grounded theory approach to analysis, I will have a base of coding categories that I will further discuss below, derived from the theories of RSM, political opportunity, and perceptions of success.

I use the paired comparison analysis to test the theories in this chapter. This approach is novel in that this type of analysis is primarily conducted in comparative politics studies and the cases analyzed in those studies are generally entire nations. At the same time, this is an American politics and local level study and will work well for this analysis. This study is a most similar case analysis. The researcher chose these two cases methodically. Los Angeles and San Antonio were similar in fundamental ways during the 1970s. Yes, there was a significant population difference between the two cities. In 1970, Los Angeles had a population of 2,816,061, and San Antonio had a total population of 654,153 (Gibson and Jung 2005). There

is a significant population difference between the two cities, but the two cases work well for this study.

The two cities in this study are fundamentally similar in that they are our independent variables and make them most similar cases. Both cities were part of Mexico and were seized by the United States after the conclusion of the Mexican-American War with the Treaty of Guadalupe of Hidalgo in 1848. Mexican Americans in the southwest of the U.S. and these cities shared culture and history. That shared culture and history was essential to the Chicano movement. The movement in both cities started close in time and was youth student-led (Acuña 1988; Montejano 2010). The U.S. Census did not include a question to count Mexican Americans until 1970. Still, the count is highly unreliable due to how the question was constructed, and the census did not refine how it categorized Latinos until the 1980s (Cohn 2010). However, do know that both cities had large Latino populations in subsequent Censuses. And importantly, Latino activism in both cities has been subject to numerous studies, and this scholarship provides a robust research foundation for this study. This scholarship also provides insight into how these populations were similar. Chicanos in both cities suffered from political repression, poverty, and geographic segregation (Rodolfo Rosales 2000; Acuña 1988; Montejano 2010). Los Angeles and San Antonio make good cases for this study because of these many similarities.

Variables

In this dissertation, I will research and provide a comprehensive explanation of why the Chicano Civil Rights Movement in the U.S. evolved from nonconventional to conventional forms of political action. Social movement form, or repertoire, depending on the scholar, is, in sum,

the type of confrontational political tactics the members utilize to disrupt the status quo order. These forms can include, for example, the “creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering” (Tilly 2005).

Independent Variables

Resources

Resources have been defined broadly in numerous RMT studies. In this dissertation, I focus on the resource of social capital. I build off the work of Putnam and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady to understand where the social capital is to mobilize Chicano movement activists in the two cities. This resource is essential to investigate because the institutions and networks from which it comes may not only impact if the group was able to organize but how. This study contributes significantly to the study of resources and form as it attempts to explain how resources impact both factors.

Social movement scholar Chris Zepeda-Millán narrows this concept to three “preexisting community resources” in his work. These three include "individual agency," "economic resources," and "social resources" (Zepeda-Millán 2017). This concept is similar to the Civil Volunteerism Model (CVM) (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The similarity is beneficial as Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's simplification of the concept is a useful shorthand. In sum, they answer why individuals don't participate as “because they can't; because they don't want to; or because nobody asked” (1995). These factors have been shown to matter for social movements

organizationally. They have been operationalized in previous scholarly work, so there is a clear path forward for others to study the phenomenon qualitatively.

In the CVM, the primary resources required for participation are time and money. During the 2006 nationwide protest against the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, otherwise known as the "Sensenbrenner bill," the resources for organizing Latinos came not from elites but also members of the community (Zepeda-Millán 2017). There were no “faces of the movement” and little support from major corporations. Individuals and local Latino-owned businesses would educate others in their community about the issue and how they could participate and donate supplies, like food and water so that people could participate (Zepeda-Millán 2017). We know direct contact is the best way to mobilize electorally (Green and Gerber 2008). In this case, contact by activists helped create more activists. I can use this past work as a guide in my content analysis. In these Chicano Movement underground newspapers, I will search to use existing community resources from individuals and independent local businesses.

Above, I briefly discuss one path of organizational efficacy. That information will provide insight into a much flatter or DIY form of mobilization—very “grassroots,” so to speak. However, we know that formal interest groups represented Hispanics and their interests and still do to this day. However, I do have access to data for the nonprofit organization SVREP. In this archive, two materials will help better understand the group's available resources from year to year. First, there were volunteer lists for various voter registration drives. Second, grant proposals that explain what donations will be used and included in the archive are year-to-year financial reports that provide totals of both funds pledged and received from businesses and nonprofits,

like the Gulf Oil Corporation and the Ford Foundation (SVREP 2018). A significant increase in one or both resources over time may explain the cause of the shift from nonconventional form to conventional.

Political Opportunity

To understand if organizational efficacy perceptions were significantly affected by political opportunities or the lack thereof, I will compare moderate and radical groups in California and Texas. As we can surmise from the examples of how state politics can impact how groups approach achieving their goals, we can expect variations in the political landscape to affect how advocates react and mobilize. How do we operationalize this model to illustrate the interaction between state politics and organizational efficacy? This question is essential as POS's main criticism is that the term "political opportunity" has come to mean whatever the researcher wants it to be and thus losing its explanatory power (Goodwin and Jasper, n.d.). Scholars have suggested focusing on two aspects of political opportunity to clarify and unmuddle this concept that has gone a bit wayward. This study is a local politics project. To better understand if political opportunities significantly influenced movement form in Los Angeles and San Antonio, I look to multiple factors that were prevalent at the time. First, were the city councils and school boards open to Chicano activists and their demands. Second, how did local law enforcement treat Chicano activists? Where elite groups willing to work with them on major issues in the cities? Lastly, how did the local press report on the Chicano movement during this period? These various elements that make up the political opportunity model will provide insight into the openness or closedness of the political landscape of the cities and if it significantly impacted movement form.

Much attention to group formation and success is focused at the federal level. However, much of the politics that matters happen at the state level. In San Antonio, TX, the conservative group, the Good Government League (GGL), was able to suppress Chicano Movement activists' efforts in the city in two ways. First, they supported candidates for city government who aligned with their beliefs. This action effectively blocked any effort to elect someone who supported the Chicano Movement cause for over a decade. In a 1975 election result report in the local newspaper, *The Express-News*, the GGL expressed grave concerns about becoming defunct (Handy 1975). Second, the GGL capitalized on the city's rift between the middle class and poor Latinos (Rodolfo Rosales 2000). Those Latinos who moved into the middle class, but were still closed off from the broader political landscape in the city, faced the choice of supporting the further left Chicano activists. The latter wanted to tackle deep-seated oppression, try for less radical change, and leave those stuck in the forgotten barrios behind (Rosales 2000). However, this organization had a dramatic decline in the 1970s which may have opened the door for Chicanos in the city to push the city council for change. The absence of the long running political machine may have had a positive impact on the political opportunities for the movement.

Who is in office and if they’re responsive matters for activists and their strategies can impact form. This element is key because there was no such group like the GGL in Los Angeles. To understand how political opportunities mattered we have to look beyond just the openness of city council to institutions and politics holistically. In 1970, there was a deadly event that occurred in which the Los Angeles Police Department killed multiple Chicano protesters. This critical event along with other factors may have impacted the strategic choices of Chicanos in the city.

Perceptions of Success

Underground newspapers will help better understand how Chicano activists viewed each of the two possible paths to change. In the content analysis of sections, like the letters to the editor and reports of movement activity I will look for themes of trust or the lack thereof in institutions and political elites. However, the focus shifts from the institutions and political elites directly to how activists perceive them and their opportunities in them. Regardless of whether those perceptions were correct, their opinion may have been a critical driver in determining the movement form. In short, was a highly organized approach better, or, should activists ride the momentum and keep the pressure on the system through contentious action? A better understanding of how Chicano activists perceived their relationship between institutions and elites will help them understand the importance of organizational efficacy for the movement.

To best understand how Chicanos perceived success I look to methods they promoted in their publications. I utilize the work by Bernstein and analyze these documents for two different elements, *where* they focused their efforts and *how* they focused their efforts (Bernstein 2003). Activists are informed of what is happening on the ground and are strategic. They perceive what is happening around them and focus their efforts. I analyze the archival data in this study and see where the Chicanos in the cities focused their efforts, either on mobilization, policy, or cultural goals. Then I investigate if they focused on those goals in either formal or contentious methods. The local institutions and politics were different between LA and SA. We should expect to see variations in perceptions.

Chapter 2 – Resources and Chicano Movement Form

Introduction

The day after Christmas in 1977, a story in the *Los Angeles Times* described a growing concern for a movement that had run out of steam and a cause for renewed hope for Chicano activists in Los Angeles. This stark dichotomy in the assessment of the movement was due to a lull in mobilization and a change in strategy by Latino activists in the city. As reported, Chicano organizations had become "dormant" and "dysfunctional" in the early 1970s. However, an activist Catholic Bishop laid out his vision for a new path forward through, in his view, a needed change in movement strategy. He had attended a Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS), an Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) group, meeting in San Antonio, TX. He came away with a vision of what could be for Chicano activists in LA if they could emulate what he had observed. He stated, "the faces I saw were not those of zealots, but average people-the elderly, some middle-aged, and some young." He wanted this type of group in Los Angeles (1977). Thus, this vision became the United Neighborhoods Organization (UNO), a local civic group focused on community solutions to community issues.

What I find striking about this story is that in Los Angeles, the birthplace of the Chicano movement, where young Chicanos led a successful fight for civil rights for Latino people beginning in 1968, the activists had become highly fragmented and inactive. The abundance of social fuel for activism had been depleted. However, twelve hundred miles away in San Antonio, Chicano activists had changed the form of the movement to a more formal participation style and kept the movement going throughout the decade. Why was there a difference in both form and mobilization between the cities? This question is the central focus of the chapter.

The critical elements to the analysis in this chapter are movement resources and the institutions from which those come. In this case, the resource is social capital, defined as the bonds of trust and reciprocity that enable communities to act together and address issues within their group. Next are the institutions that foster the creation and distribution of resources. In this case, the institutions were the newly launched Chicano Studies programs at public higher education institutions in Los Angeles and the lack thereof in San Antonio. Meanwhile, there was a robust historical mobilization network in San Antonio and the inverse in Los Angeles. Based on a comprehensive historical analysis of Chicano movement newspapers, traditional newspapers, and oral histories, I argue that the variation in resource creation and distribution of those in the two cities created differentiation in movement form.

First, there were vastly different higher education opportunities between the cities. There were far more opportunities within the city of LA for Chicanos who had begun the fight for civil rights in their local high school to continue that fight in college compared to San Antonio. At these institutions of higher learning, there were newly created Ethnic Studies programs designed to teach Chicano culture and histories and foster community ties–or, in political science terms, social capital. This dual-purpose design had both positive and negative impacts on movement mobilization. Second, the civic histories of the two cities and surrounding regions vary. Both cities had numerous Latino community organizations, also called sociedades mutualistas, but those were more numerous and more enduring in San Antonio. The city's civic history also led to the creation of major civil rights organizations before the Chicano movement, like the G.I. Forum and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC). As such, the

Chicano activists in the city had a successful form of emulation in the city. In the following pages, I elaborate on how resources and institutions impact movement form.

The chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss the "lay of the land" for the Chicano movement in both cities leading into the 1970s. Second, I will discuss the previous literature on social capital and how it impacts participation. Third, I will elaborate on networks of collective action in relation to social capital and how social networks varied between the two cities in the study. Fourth, I will describe how college access varied between the two cities and the Chicano Studies programs in Los Angeles. Fifth, I will discuss the theory developed from the previously discussed literature, the data used in this research project, and the methods used for this study. Sixth, I will discuss the findings from the analysis. In the final sections of this article, I will discuss the implications of the results and describe where we go from here in this work.

This study makes multiple contributions to the study of social movements in political science. First, it addresses a gap in the literature regarding Latino activism pre-1980s. Second, the findings have implications for activists at the local level as to how they should consider their relationships with local institutions. Third, this research contributes to the broader discussion and debates around the intersection of social capital, resource mobilization, and social movement form. Finally, this research brings together essential research from multiple disciplines and illustrates the importance of multidisciplinary research in political science.

The Chicano Movement Up to 1970

The Beginning of the Chicano Movement

The 1960s was a well-documented socially and politically turbulent era in the U.S. when many historically oppressed and disenfranchised groups engaged in contentious politics. Black activists, who, without a doubt, were the first movers of the civil rights era, mobilized via new and more combative forms, at least compared to the NAACP. Organizations like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) mobilized to fight against the violent repression of Jim Crow. Similarly, activists of contentious organizations, like Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), took to the streets to protest U.S. foreign engagement in Vietnam, which began in the previous decade during the Eisenhower administration. This war disproportionately impacted young people due to the conscription policies. In the latter part of the decade, Chicano activists inspired by Black activists and student-led organizations also mobilized to push for social change that had eluded them as a people since the end of the Mexican American War. Chicana/o activism in both cities shared similarities that are worth noting.

In March of 1968, Chicano students who lived in the barrios of East LA mobilized and took action to push for education reform. This action marked a new era for civil rights for the Latino community. These students, with the help of an activist educator and the Young Citizens for Community Action (YCCA), planned and executed a series of school walkouts, also known as "blowouts," which took place from March 1 thru the 8th (Bruns 2018). The condition and quality of public schools in East LA were horrendous. Student dropout rates were extraordinarily high. At Garfield High School, the student dropout rate was 57 percent (Sahagun 2020). Over the week of the blowouts in East LA, over 20,000 students participated in the protests (Estrada 2011)

San Antonio in the 1950s and 1960s was a poor and racially segregated city. As David Montejano explains in his book *Quixote's Soldiers,* it was the poorest large city in the U.S. during this time (Montejano 2010). However, like in most cities, not all people suffered from this poverty equally. The city's west side is where most of the Latino population resided. The living conditions drew national attention after CBS aired the scathing report "Hunger in America." In this program, the San Antonio westside was discussed first, and images of bleak living conditions and interviewees told their stories of discrimination and struggles in the deeply segregated city (CBS 1968). The schools in the area were no better. Due to years of neglect, the buildings were dilapidated. Students reported that the windows in many of their classrooms had been broken out, and they often had to stop class when birds flew in and disrupted lectures (Barrera 2017). Many classrooms did not have working lights, and due to lack of funding, students would have to bring their toilet paper as restroom facilities in the buildings were not stocked with supplies (Barrera 2017). Instruction was poor as well. There were no bilingual courses, Mexican history courses, or college preparatory classes (Barrera 2017). Like Latino students in L.A., their culture, identities, and language were suppressed (Barrera 2017).

Once news of the blowouts in Los Angeles reached San Antonio, Latino students in that city acted as well. One month later, students in two westside high schools, Lanier and Edgewood, engaged in their own "blowouts." These school walkouts were not as large as the Los Angeles protests but shared similarities. The list of demands was similar to that of the East L.A. activists. Students wanted bans on speaking Spanish in school and more access to college preparation classes (Barrera 2017). The movement in both cities was similar, but there was a divergence once the new decade began.

Social Capital and Where It Comes From

Social capital involves the bonds of trust and reciprocity that bind a community together and enable people to work together and achieve their goals. It is, without a doubt, a resource. Portes describes how social capital is a resource and from where it comes (Portes 1998). He compares and contrasts it to capital resources. Capital or money are resources that help individuals to achieve their goals and get things done. Social capital is a resource but exists between individuals and impacts groups as it "inheres in the structure of their relationships" (Portes 1998). The more trust and reciprocity in a community, the more likely its members can overcome barriers to collective action. Putnam and Skocpol elaborate on the concept of social capital and how networks can facilitate and distribute it.

"Old" and "New" Networks of Civic Engagement

Local civic histories matter. Scholars like Robert Putnam and Theda Skocpol have had robust academic careers studying social capital and its sources. The local organization is the center of the production of social capital for the two scholars. In his historical analysis of Italian political development, Putnam illustrates how groups overcame collective action problems and created mutual aid organizations to improve the lives of the communities they served and the government. Civic networks positively affect group mobilization by decreasing the potential cost of acting as a collective by lowering startup costs by creating durable networks. They also foster cooperation by creating "norms of reciprocity," enabling effective communication, and creating a future success template (Putnam 1993). In short, these types of organizations overcome the three barriers: no one asked, cannot participate, and do not want to participate (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Putnam's work in *Bowling Alone* did not focus on the

impact of race and participation. We must go to other scholars and sociology to better understand that aspect of the phenomenon.

Skocpol researched how Black fraternal organizations and their federated structure, which were second only to churches in civic engagement, taught civic engagement skills, provided mutual aid to the communities they served, and fought for civil rights in a hostile social and policy environment (Skocpol, Liazos, and Ganz 2018). These organizations brought together Black people across gender, age, class, and profession as well. These groups were so successful in their goals that white elites took steps to use the state's power and ban them, but the SCOTUS upheld the right of Blacks to maintain these groups. McAdam and Paulsen go further in their study of civic networks. Their findings highlight the impact of networks on participation by linking organizational membership and commitment to their cause and identity (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). "Instead, it is a strong subjective identification with a particular identity, reinforced by organizational or individual ties, that is likely to encourage participation (659)." Latino activists also used similar organizations in the southwest to assist their communities that were harmfully impacted by systematic racism.

Latinos have historically established civic organizations serving their communities in the southwest U.S., called Sociedades mutualistas or mutual aid groups. Like the Black fraternal organizations discussed above, these groups were like the aforementioned civic organizations studied by Putnam, such as the Elks. They were places where members could learn civic organization skills, secure mutual aid, celebrate culture, and fight for civil rights. These groups also provided assistance and a link to Latino immigrants as well. The city of San Antonio had the most sociedades mutualistas in the country at the height of the membership for these types

of organizations (Pycior 2014). Los Angeles had the second most (Pycior 2014). The lasting impact of these organizations can still be seen today in how Latinos in both cities organize. Pycior argues that the lasting effect of mutual aid groups in the southwest can be seen in groups like OneLA, a member of the Industrial Area Foundation. At the same time, her landmark historical study illustrates the similarities of such groups in the present day. I believe we can go further and use historical documents and oral histories to understand how civic histories impacted Chicano movement form in Los Angeles and San Antonio.

Sociedades Mutualistas in LA & SA

In political science, this emphasis on mutual aid organizations and their importance is not a new phenomenon. The civic engagement and social capital literature by scholarly heavyweights like Skocpol, Putnam, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady are built on the theoretical foundation that social clubs and community organizations are crucial to a healthy democracy (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). We have all read about the importance and decline of bowling leagues and the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks. Comparatively, outside of one book, there has been less research into the importance of similar mutual aid groups historically marginalized populations in the U.S. Los Angeles and San Antonio were hubs of mutual aid collective action in the early 1900s. San Antonio had more active sociedades mutualistas than Los Angeles (Pycior 2014). The most widely reported group in Spanish-language newspapers were 13 mutualistas with 5301 mentions and spanned 49 years of reporting. In Los Angeles, there were 18 groups with 759 observations over ten years of reporting in Spanish-language newspapers. Below is a description of mutual aid groups and what those organizations were doing to help their communities in the two cities.

What Were These Groups Doing?

These groups were highly prominent and influential for the first 60 years of the twentieth century. However, by the 1960s, due to multiple developments, the federal government took a much more active role in social issues. These groups were also reasonably conservative, which did not necessarily align with how young activists wanted to approach change in the 1960s (Gómez-Quiñones 1990). By the mid-1960s, membership in these groups fell dramatically. However, these organizations were a training ground for the Latino activists of the Chicano movement.

Los Angeles Mutualistas

Cruz Azul Mexicana was one of the most active and renowned mutualistas in Los Angeles. This group was part of the Blue Cross and provided medical and resource aid to immigrants in the area. In a high-profile event, the organization assisted Mexican immigrants sent to Mexico via a ship (*The Los Angeles Times* 1921). Cruz Azul Mexicana was also the most active group based on reporting. Outside of financial assistance, they also held dances and benefits to collect charitable funds. *Club Independencia* was a nonpartisan group that helped provide financial aid to Mexicans in the Los Angeles area and held cultural events. The group did have larger ambitions of helping Mexican workers who were "worthy" in the L.A. area. In 1921, there were plans to open a trade school for Mexican workers named "Centro de Instruccion." There is no reporting or records that the trade school was ever created. The Mexican consulate even created some groups to help maintain ties to the country of Mexico.

San Antonio Mutualistas

Cruz Azul Mexicana was a multistate organization. As such, there was a chapter in San Antonio too. This chapter also operated under the leadership of the Mexican consulate and assisted Mexicans in San Antonio and south Texas (Acosta n.d.). This group helped poor Mexican families in the area and established libraries (Acosta n.d.). This group was active in the area until the 1930s, and much of their work was discussed in the long-running Spanish and English language newspaper *La Prensa.* The group *Sociedad de la Union* was the most active mutualista in the city of San Antonio (Pycior n.d.). Reporting of the group's activity in *La Prensa* continued well into the late 1950s, but there was very little in the city's primary English language newspaper, *San Antonio Express-News*. The group offered traditional community assistance with funeral benefits, lost wage assistance, and help to cover the cost of illnesses (Pycior n.d.). The group also held regular bingo nights, fundraised with tamaladas, and rented out its building on the west side of San Antonio on W. Commerce Street for fiestas (*Prensa* 1957). These groups built the foundation by which Latino activists could transition from marching in the streets to marching into offices to get the job done.

The Legacy of Sociedades Mutualistas

LULAC was and is still the most prominent Latino civil rights organization in the United States. The organization was founded in Corpus Christi, Texas, in 1929 when groups like the Order Sons of America from south Texas and the remnant offshoots of the San Antonio-based Sons of America agreed to unite and create a statewide organization to better the lives of Hispanic Americans (Craig A. Kaplowitz 2005). Middle-class Mexican Americans from urban areas who were also conservative in their views and approach to politics comprised the membership of LULAC. They did want better education for their children, desegregation, and

economic opportunity, but they nevertheless differed from their successors, the Chicano activists, in their understanding of the Mexican-American identity.

LULAC, especially up to the 1970s, walked a fine line between activism and working from within the system. That system consisted of both social and governmental institutions. Socially, organizational leadership was conscious of possibly drawing negative attention from white America. They aimed to portray themselves as worthy of inclusion because they were not the "other" but white patriotic Americans (Craig A. Kaplowitz 2005). They declared English as the organization's official language and encouraged assimilation into the idea of American life civically and politically (Craig A. Kaplowitz 2005). Early in its history, the group excluded immigrants from membership (Craig A. Kaplowitz 2005). These groups lost favor with younger Chicano advocates as they were seen as too conservative in form.

In Los Angeles, groups like Community Service Organization (CSO) existed. This group began to increase Latino electoral power in the Los Angeles area through voter registration drives. Still, it shifted its focus to nonpartisan community service activities like healthcare, welfare, and lobbying (Gómez-Quiñones 1990). This shift to less overt political organizing led high-profile members, like Cesar Chavez, to leave the group and drew the ire of local advocates who wanted more action (Gómez-Quiñones 1990). The critical characteristic of these groups is that they were institutionally focused in nature. Leadership wanted to work within the system and possessed clear ideas. Many more politically focused groups that emerged in the wake of the Chicano movement failed to work within the system or possess clear ideas. The winning form that enhanced Chicano political power were organizations with clear foci and structures

at the local level. This forum developed in part, and is hampered by, this chapter argues, the civic networks in the two cities.

Data & Methods

To answer the central questions in this chapter, I analyze Chicano Movement and traditional newspapers published in Los Angeles and California from 1970 to 1978. Other scholars, such as Mora and Okamoto's groundbreaking article, have used this type of data to compare how Asian Americans and Hispanics discussed panethnicity. Their analysis illustrated that ethnic/movement newspapers could provide a rich insight into movements and related issues, themes, and engagement (Mora and Okamoto 2020). To maintain a manageable scope for this project, I narrowed the number of publications analyzed to two from each city. I also gathered information from the two largest traditional newspapers from each city, *The Los Angeles Times* and *The Express-News,* for reporting verification of data collected from the four Chicano publications.

The four underground publications that systematically compared each city's institutional makeup impacted how activists viewed it. They participated in civic organizations covered by *El Popo* and *La Voz de Eastmont,* published in Los Angeles and *The Chicano Times,* and *Voz del Consejo,* published in San Antonio. *El Popo* was a paper published by Chicano activists at the California State University, Northridge and *La Voz de Eastmont* was a general community paper published by the Eastmont Community Center. *The Chicano Times* was a community publication that reported on city-wide issues and happenings in San Antonio's predominantly Latino west and south sides. The *Voz del Consejo* was a newsletter for the education-focused

group Texans for the Educational Advancement of Mexican Americans. Their local chapters contributed their news to the newsletter.

Articles from 62 total issues were coded for this chapter. The articles were coded to reflect whether an organization was mentioned in the content and related to an institution of higher education. The codes also account for any organization cooperation, overlap, and policy issues. The descriptive information, like group name, member data, locations, and dates, was used to gather local newspapers to verify and elaborate on data collected in the Chicano publications. This supplemental data was essential as there are issue gaps in the archives. I also analyze oral histories from the *Tejano Voices* collection at the University of Texas at Arlington Center from Mexican American Studies and *Civil Rights in Black & Brown Oral History Project* at Texas Christian University.

Findings

Civic Organization and San Antonio

To be clear, the prominent four private universities fostered social capital and collective action in the Chicano movement. The Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) was founded by the young Chicano activists known as "Los Cinco" at the private university Saint Mary's. The La Raza Party sprang out of this group the following year. William "Willie" Velázquez, the activist who created the nonpartisan Latino voter registration organization the Southwest Voter Education Research Project (SVREP) in the city, was a founding member. This group was very active and used more aggressive tactics than older organizations like LULAC and the American G.I. Forum. The group held its first demonstration in front of the city's most

well-known landmark, the Alamo, on July 4, 1967 (D. Johnson 2020). This group and its contribution to the Chicano movement cannot be understated. Still, in the city, the institutional center of gravity that drove social capital and, in turn, the action was different than that of Los Angeles. This difference, in part, is because the city lacked a broadly accessible institution of higher education.

As we can see from the documents left behind from the era, the institutions that drove social capital throughout the decade in the Chicano movement in San Antonio were public schools and the surrounding neighborhoods. Chicano students in Los Angeles and San Antonio participated in Chicano student walkouts or "Chicano Blowouts" in 1968 (Montejano 2010). These walkouts were successful, and it was evident even among the older Chicano elites. In the summer of 1968, at a steering committee meeting for the westside located high school, Lainer, members of the committee, and adults who were in attendance expressed their support for the students (Wright 1968). Adela Navarro, who did not go as far as to express support for protesting, did say, "I'm not educated in Spanish because the stupid educators told me not to speak my native tongue...you fight for what is right...we were denied that right" (Wright 1968). Activists in both cities were on paths of change.

The local movements in the two cities diverged because San Antonio had fewer local public higher education institutions. A network of civic organizations, like Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS), Consejo el Barrio, and The Westside Coalition, formed in the city and sought to improve historical Latino school districts like the San Antonio Independent School District (SAISD) and Harlandale Independent School District (HISD). These groups focused on improving the quality of education in their communities by carrying on

where students left off in the late 1960s by advocating for implementing bilingual classes, teaching Chicano culture and history in schools, and improving school buildings.

This type of participation occurred through more traditional means. Civic organizations were, at one time, the heart and soul of involvement in the community. These organizations were crucial to community life and mobilization in the Black and Latino communities pre-and-post-Civil Rights era in the U.S. (Skocpol 2013; Skocpol, Liazos, and Ganz 2006; Orozco 2010). San Antonio, in particular, served as the fertile ground for Chicano movement civic organizations. The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) and The Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP) were both founded in the city and took the lead in the fight for gains in civil rights for Latinos in the southwest and nationally (Orozco 2010). Lesser-known civic organizations in the city also were highly active as well.

The main group analyzed in this project is the Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS). The COPS organization was different from other groups in the city. The core principle in its creation was that it did not take government funding, instead of relying on member and charitable collections (D. Johnson 2020). COPS was far more combative toward elected and elite officials as it took its cues from its leaders' understanding of Saul Alinsky's tactics for political engagement (D. Johnson 2020). The group focused on improving education and infrastructure and establishing more job training opportunities in the city (D. Johnson 2020). The networking opportunities in the city shaped the group's operations. Without a robust higher education sector to create opportunities for mobilization, civic organizations and these groups still focused on larger Chicano movement goals, as did the Chicano college students.

College Access in LA and SA

Since the 1960s, the college student has been broadly seen as the prototypical activist. Early social movement studies sought to explain this increase in activism on college campuses across the country as the product of hyper-partisan ideologies and overly permissive parents who were also leftist (Block, Haan, and Smith 1969). However, as research into contentious politics continued, we better understand how the college campus fostered activism. In the 1960s and 1970s, there was an expansion in family incomes and a unifying issue of anti-Vietnam war sentiment in the U.S. (Altbach and Cohen 1990; Van Dyke 2003). However, these factors are not true across all groups, and nor do they fully explain what McAdams calls "high-risk" participation in contentious politics.

The city of Los Angeles is home to three large public universities. California State University, Northridge was known as San Fernando Valley State College until 1971 (*The Los Angeles Times* 1998*)*. California State University, Los Angeles was established in 1941 and officially became part of the California State System in 1964 ("History of Cal State LA" 2013). The University of California, Los Angeles has existed in many forms and names since 1868 (Dundjerski 2011). Most notable is East Los Angeles College, which was established in 1945. This community college was a gateway to higher education for many Latinos in L.A. and was a primary mobilization institution for the Chicano movement. Many East Los Angeles College students participated in the school "blowouts" in 1968 when the Mexican American Student Organization began (Bernal 1998). The United Mexican-American Students (UMAS) also established chapters at UCLA and California State University, Los Angeles (Bernal 1998).

The college campus is conducive to mobilizing its student body because social networks are crucial to mobilization (Siegel 2009). Even historically-discriminated groups can often

participate in contentious politics to bring attention to and pressure university administration to act. However, success can be challenging even with the built-in mobilization structure. In short, it lowers the cost of mobilization through its fostering of social networks by, in a sense, centralizing student life. Many college campuses have student unions where people can gather, and universities encourage student clubs. Students are often in multiple groups and can recruit their friends to various causes that foster political participation by other individuals (Van Dyke 2003; Scholz, Berardo, and Kile 2008). We can see this mobilization among discriminated groups, like the LGBTQ+ community and Dreamers (Taylor et al., n.d.; Hope, Keels, and Durkee 2016). However, not all communities have access to universities and still come together to address governmental and social issues that impact them.

During this era of contentious politics, the higher education system in San Antonio was much different from that of Los Angeles. The city's prominent institutions consisted of the big four private Catholic universities, St. Mary's University, Our Lady of the Lake University, Trinity University, and the University of the Incarnate Word. The only public post-secondary institution was San Antonio Community College, located downtown and which could boast of notable alumni like Congressman Henry B. González. Today there is the University of Texas at San Antonio. Still, it was not established until June 6, 1969, and did not hold its' first classes until the summer of 1973, and these were graduate classes ("History of UTSA" 2021). The first fall with undergraduates happened later that year. The university did not admit undergraduates until 1975 ("History of UTSA" 2021). It is important to note that the campus was ultimately built on the primarily undeveloped northwest side of the city, away from its Latino and Black population centers. The downtown campus was completed in 1997.

Chicano Studies Programs in Higher Ed

Chicano studies programs were one of the critical victories of Chicano activists. These programs began as introductory courses and quickly expanded to whole departments across colleges in California. The goals of the programs were multifaceted. In Soldatenko's research on Chicano Studies, he identified two critical goals in their creation, first, "explain the Mexican American condition" (Soldatenko 2012). Tied directly to this first goal was the gathering and analyzing new data to shed light on the issues they sought to address (Soldatenko 2012). The second goal was to "utilize this new information to transform their communities" (Soldatenko 2012). Critics of these programs viewed this connection to the community negatively as it was seen as outside of an academic goal (*Los Angeles Times* 1970). It may have also been an issue as it was seen as training a new generation of Chicano activists, a plan opposed by high-profile elected officials, like Governor Ronald W. Reagan, who pushed colleges to punish and limit the actions of student protestors. Despite this elite opposition, many Chicano Studies programs were created at California colleges, like at San Fernando Valley State College, with programs that sought to develop ties to Mexican-American communities in Los Angeles.

Mexican-American Studies programs were at the University of Texas Austin in central and south Texas. That program was formed in 1971. In San Antonio, while universities like St. Mary's University had an essential role in connecting Chicano activists, the programs were far less numerous. Trinity University began offering a Mexican-American Politics course as part of its Urban Studies program in 1971 (*San Antonio Express-News* 1971). There was a student walk-out in the same year at Our Lady of the Lake University (OLL) due to the delay in creating a Mexican-American Studies program at the school (Bunting 1971). The newspaper record and

Chicano newspapers in the area lacked any follow-up on the university administration's fulfillment of this promised program. Based on news records, these programs did not flourish in San Antonio as they did in Los Angeles and the surrounding area.

Discussion

Linking to the Past via Political Socialization

This chapter draws on multiple research foundations, Chicano Studies, history, and sociology to explain the Chicano movement form, but its discipline core or foundation lies in political science. That political science core involves the study of political socialization. Political socialization research in political science has shown that parents and where you grow up impact the likelihood of voting, vote choice, and if a person runs for office (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 2015). Political socialization perpetuates both positively and negatively concerning participation. Parents and even grandparents significantly impact the likelihood that their children and grandchildren participate politically. This passage of familial resources has been termed "political reproduction" (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 2015). The bulk of the research focuses on the perpetuation of political inequality. Still, the study of social movements, especially the Chicano movement, presents a unique opportunity to understand how repressed groups denied resources can still have positive “political reproduction” in the face of significant social and institutional repression.

Many keystrokes dedicated to explaining participation in social movements are devoted to who shows up to flashier activities. This attention is arguably warranted because it is of great interest to those taking part in the riskiest political action. One who participates in a

demonstration can face negative legal and social consequences, be physically injured, and, at worst, be killed for their participation. As social scientists, there is great value in understanding why individuals decided to participate in a protest rather than writing a strongly worded letter to their elected representative. We know a lot about who does participate. There is the old Marxist theory that when people are aware of their place in the social class stratification, they will rise and take action. There are more empirically modern explanations, like living geographically near where protests occur (Wallace, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa 2014). Here in this chapter, we focus on familial and community-based social ties in Los Angeles and San Antonio. Much of the work on who participates in activism focuses on age, income, and network ties. In their study of network factors that impacted participation in high-risk protests by Black activists during the Freedom Summer, McAdam and Paulsen found that parental recruitment was second only to the influence of other activists in determining who participated (McAdam 1986). Parents had a significant role in participation during the Civil Rights movement.

Effect of Higher Education

As outlined earlier, the pathways to higher education between the two cities were different. Los Angeles had multiple public university options, and San Antonio had private 4-year college options and two community colleges. This variation impacted the Chicano movement form between the two cities. Based on the historical analysis in this chapter, the most involved Chicano activists in early 1970s Los Angeles continued to be students. The students went to colleges like California State Northridge and organized with high school students. Ultimately, this continuation of student life meant that L.A. Chicano activists could

remain in a similar form and more insular. The historical analysis below illustrates that student activism became stagnant and dysfunctional, as reported in the Christmas 1977 article in the *Los Angeles Times*. Chicano activists in San Antonio did not have the option to continue this form. Congruent with this variation in access to higher education is the founding of Chicano Studies/Mexican-American Studies. These programs were more robust in colleges in California and the Los Angeles area than in Texas and San Antonio.

Chicano activists in Los Angeles did have a great deal of success. Still, the student-centric form created a situation that disconnected it from the broader Latina/o community in the city. Much of their work supported the critical need to improve education for the community with more Chicano teachers and counselors and to include Mexican American studies in the curriculum (Acuña 1988). However, by 1972, the cracks began to show in the activists' efforts to reach the community they wanted to serve. In the Chicano activist student newspaper, *El Popo*, a member meeting was held to discuss what was working and not during the beginning of the decade. Some highlights were discussed in the multiple-page editorial, like a local voter registration drive, but the attendees identified evident failings. In a community relations workshop led by now legendary Chicano movement leaders Raul Ruiz and Ben Saiz, it was stated that neither the Chicano Studies Program at CSUN nor MECHA activists had a strong relationship with the communities they wished to serve (El Popo 1972). They identified a few motivated members who volunteered in the community but had no coordinated response (El Popo 1972).

The La Raza Council on Higher Education gave *El Popo* an even more scathing assessment of the community ties of Chicano Studies and MECHA activists in Los Angeles.

Traditional news media reported similar issues with Chicano student activism as well. For many young Chicano activists, Chicano Studies programs are not only a policy win but a hub for action. However, by 1975, higher education administrators expressed skepticism if the programs could continue to serve students. Professors and activists were interviewed for a report by the *Los Angeles Times* about the state of ethnic studies programs in California. Most expressed skepticism and disappointment about these hard-fought-for programs five years later (Bennett 1975). Those interviewed stated that these programs were hastily created to appease activists at the time and were never meant to be successful (Soldatenko 2012). Negative factors included a lack of faculty hiring, administrative neglect, and fewer enthusiastic students who were hindering program success less than a decade into their creation (Bennett 1975). The inherent difficulty of getting students to work together for an extended period and institutional administrative barriers created a time of fragmented activism in Los Angeles in the early 1970s. Due to the nature of higher education and the network history in San Antonio, they were guided to a much more traditional civic group form earlier than Chicano activists in Los Angeles.

As outlined earlier, the higher education landscape differed between the two cities. Los Angeles had multiple public institutional pathways for Chicano students to move on to after secondary school and keep those student connections with MEChA members at all levels. San Antonio Chicano activists had fewer higher education options, which means those who did go to college either left the city or went to college at one of the private universities. This local feature does not say that Chicano activists who went to private universities in the city did not organize. The Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO), which directly led to the

founding of the La Raza Unida Party, was founded in 1967 by legendary activists José Ángel Gutiérrez, Willie Velásquez, Mario Compean, Ignacio Pérez, and Juan Patlán at Saint Mary's University (Cardenas 1969). This organization expanded statewide and nationwide with chapters on college campuses, like the University of Texas. Willie Velásquez also created the Southwest Voter Research and Education Project (SVREP) in San Antonio in 1974. The group worked with political scientists and volunteers to register and mobilize Latinos in the city and across the southwest. MAYO also led voter drives as well. It is already well noted that these groups were formed directly to the moderation of groups like LULAC and the G.I. Forum. Despite his community work, the *Express-News* once reported that Velásquez gained notoriety for protesting a commencement speech by Congressman Henry B. González. By the mid-1970s, MAYO and La Raza Unida were declining in political power. What is clear from Chicano movement publications, the local media, and others is that the city's activists had to rely on community activism to get things done.

Historical Networks

By 1974, Chicano activists in S.A. were experiencing an evolution in movement form. This change occurred earlier than in L.A. As stated, the San Antonio leaders had worked to develop activism through formal groups. Leaders proclaimed this to be a positive development in a *San Antonio Express-News* op-ed; José Ángel Gutiérrez, considered by many to be the most radical activist in the state, later became a radical professor, outlined where the movement was less than a decade later after the school blowouts. The article discussed how the movement in the city evolved, stating, "Our approach is different now; instead of yelling in the streets, our people are yelling in the offices of city officials where it’s more effective. Our revolution is not

dead. It's the best thing that can be done now, but the system is still rotten" (Delgado 1974). In the historical analysis across movement publications, traditional newspapers, and oral histories conducted for this chapter, we show that, in part, activists were drawing from their history toolbox and applying it to their form.

In keeping with the emphasis on letting activists answer our questions in their own words, oral histories provide much insight into how the past provided the tools for Chicano activists to draw from regarding movement form. Jaime Martinez was a committed activist and union leader in San Antonio in the 1960s and 1970s. He led a strike in the city in 1964 and marched in anti-war rallies in 1968 (J. Martinez 1997). He continued to organize union workers in the 1970s and held leadership positions in organizations like LULAC in the 2000s (J. Martinez 1997). During an interview in the fall of 1997, he recounted how his grandfather took him to meetings for the sociedades mutualista, *Mutualista Mexicana* when he was young and joined the group officially as an adult, which, in part, led him always to be involved (J. Martinez 1997). More specifically, Rosa Rosales, who became the three-term leader of LULAC from 2006 thru 2008 and a long-time civic activist in the city, discussed how her father founded two mutualistas, *La Union Fraternal* and *en la Calle McCleary* (Rosa Rosales 1997). Her mother was active in both mutualistas and was president of *en la calle McCleary* (Rosa Rosales 1997). The linkages to the past were there in the city.

Glenn Guillermo, an El Paso, TX activist who moved to S.A., spearheaded efforts to improve health care in the city and south Texas by creating non-profit organizations focused on providing health services for disadvantaged Latinos in SA and the surrounding area. However, providing these services was not accessible due to the high administrative costs.

Many groups failed to keep up with it over time by acting through formal organizations and lost their state and local government funding (Glenn 2015). However, he stated that while many groups went defunct due to failing to meet these requirements, others were successful.

No local Chicano organization related to a public university or college is mentioned in either of the two movement publications from San Antonio. The only times a university is mentioned are in member profiles that provide background information, such as career accomplishments and education. However, organizations like COPS are reported in the city in the local and the Chicano press. Much of the reporting about COPS is related to two main issues, education and the San Antonio School District (SASD) and infrastructure issues like stormwater drainage on the San Antonio westside. Extensive reporting of a budget battle in 1975 and 1976 highlights the group's power and work with San Antonio community members.

In the August 1975 SASD meeting, COPS members attacked board members even though it had just passed a then-record budget because they felt the money was not allocated fairly. Members led by Father Pugh requested the board complete a study to investigate if enough money could still be allocated to education programs while using funds to construct new administrative buildings for the school district (Davidson 1975a). Members of the group walked out after their request was denied. The fight continued. In October, district officials moved forward with their plans to complete the new administrative building. However, the COPS organization still opposed the current projects as proposed. A representative from the group quoted in a report said they were not against new administrative buildings but wanted to address dilapidated schools in the district (Davidson 1975b). The issue continued to evolve; the following year, the organization got more money for schools but continued to pressure the

board (Davidson 1976). Jose Siller of COPS was quoted in the *Express-News*, stating to the board, “we have the voters, but you board members will have to give them something” (Davidson 1976).

Conclusion

The historical analysis of various data sources provides a clear picture of multiple factors that impacted movement form in Los Angeles and San Antonio. Activists had to draw from the "movement toolbox" available at the time. Chicano activists in Los Angeles successfully pushed higher education institutions in the city to create programs that were designed to promote their culture and history and had the goal of serving the broader community. However, due to multiple factors, these programs and the student-led movement could not create sustainable ties with the community they wished to serve. Chicano activists in San Antonio did not have easy access to higher education institutions. Instead, they drew on the city's and south Texas's organizational histories to create a movement that had stronger ties to the community earlier than those activists in Los Angeles.

Chapter 3 – Perceptions of Success and Chicano Movement Form

Introduction

How did Chicano activists' perceptions of success impact movement form in Los Angeles and San Antonio? That is the question I seek to answer in this chapter. Of the three theories applied and tested in this dissertation, perceptions of success are perhaps the least studied in the social movement literature. As stated in chapter one, many previous studies focus on success rather than form. However, in the recent social movement literature, attempts to understand perceptions of success have been expanded upon in unique ways. I seek to add to that growing body of scholarly work substantively. When these scholars have sought to understand the strategic choices of social movement organizations (SMO), they have looked at their goals and how perceptions impacted their choices. This new literature will assist in furthering our understanding of the strategic decisions of Chicano activists in LA and SA and why there were significant variations in perceptions and form. As in previous chapters, I analyze Chicano movement publications, major newspapers, and oral history data to understand better what form these actors considered the most effective in spurring change. My findings indicate that perceptions of success were most significant in impacting the Chicano movement form during the 1970s.

Literature Review

To answer the central question of this chapter, I draw from various literature, specifically Bernstein's work on the impact of movement success on form, as she has a broader concept of movement success than Gamson (Bernstein 2003). With a more general idea of success than Gamson, I can better understand why Chicano activists "did what they did" in their respective

cities and analyze their behavior more nuancedly. Then, I discuss how perceptions matter, even if those perceptions are incorrect.

Traditional Understanding of Movement Success

Gamson defines success as acceptance by the challenging group's antagonist and the advantages gained for the group (Gamson 1975). For example, acceptance is if pro-lumber groups accept an environmental protection group as the legitimate spokesgroup and negotiate with them regarding-forestry protection policy issues. Clear advantages are often defined as a policy gain. In the example mentioned earlier, it will be considered successful if the environmental protection group gained protection for a specific forest. If not, the group failed. This concept is still in use in social movement studies as it provides a clear dichotomous variable to measure what a movement accomplishes. The Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) was more likely to secure acceptance from Republican-controlled state legislatures and achieve its policy goals through such legislatures during the late 1800s (Chamberlain and Yanus 2021). This line of scholarly study is concerned with outcomes. What is missing from this earlier work addressed in recent literature is that perceptions of success are more than just acceptance by their adversary and gains via policy outcomes. This is not to say that policy outcomes do not matter. However, to fully understand the differences in form between Chicano activists in LA and SA, we will need to investigate their goals and the methods they perceived to be the best methods to achieve them beyond policy outcomes. This study shifts the focus beforehand and looks at what methods Chicano activists perceived best to gain that influence.

Rational Actors in Movements

One key aspect to understanding why activists do what they do is that they are strategic in their actions. Activists must consider success before they get off the sidelines and engage in contentious politics. This strategic action is related to the rational choice model of participation. Participants in collective action do a cost-benefit analysis before they decide to engage (Downs 1957). This theory is based on the idea that individuals are rational utility maximizers. But, further building on this theory has considered that people are, to put it simply, messy (Riker 1995; Ostrom 1998). People consider trust, relationships and reciprocity when deciding whether to act collectively or not (Ostrom 1998). These findings have echoes of Putnam in what they add to our political science understanding of collective action. The social movement literature incorporates many aspects of these findings too.

Social movement research has shown that activists consider cost and benefit in their actions (Wiltfang and McAdam 1991; DiGrazia 2014). These individual calculations are illustrated in situations where a member of an SMO perceives the group as failing to achieve its goal(s); they will seek out a group that they identify as successful (Zald and McCarthy 1987). I expand on this argument by building off of a classic study that proposed a model of participation. The model by Oberschall incorporates aspects of rational choice but moves beyond the pure economic foundation by including a "social dimension" or "assurance" (Oberschall 1994). I expand on his avenues for future research by focusing on his model's "production functions" element. Oberschall asked, "for a variety of protest goals, tactics, and number of participants, what estimates of success changes do they make (1994)." I argue that by examining activists' perceptions of what should produce success, namely what goals and

tactics they promote in their publications, we can understand why there is variation in form within a movement.

Multitudes of Success

How activists perceive success and the best manner to achieve it matters because it impacts strategic choice or, more specifically, form. We discussed the traditional goal definition by Gamson early, but Staggenborg expands on that work by outlining three-movement goal evaluative categories, cultural, mobilization, and policy goals (Staggenborg 1995; Bernstein 2003). This categorical broadening of how we define a movement's goals is helpful as it enables us to investigate better how SMOs interact with their entire environment and make strategic choices (Bernstein 2003). For example, if we only consider policy change success, a group focused on social acceptance may be categorized as failing. Also, goal type directly impacts movement form; as Bernstein argues, their choices are filtered through assessing the relative importance of and the likelihood of achieving political, mobilization, and cultural goals (2003)." This goal broadening is not stating that Gamson is incorrect. However, to understand activist strategic choices, we need to see the broader goal ~~possibility~~ possibilities and how their perception of success impacts their choices.

Movement Goal Type

Cultural goals are those changes related to "norms and behaviors" (Bernstein 2003). These shifts in societal culture are reflected by "the creation of new master protest frames, collective identities, and tactics, as well as changes in institutional cultures and practices (Bernstein 2003)." Examples of these changes include how groups can frame their cause to broaden their reach for new members by linking the individual to the collective (Bonilla and

Tillery 2020; Chan and Jasso 2021). Movement success concerning societal culture can be broad societal acceptance instead of policy change. The movement for marriage equality was unsuccessful for many years in gaining public policy success. However, through public discourse, it gained acceptance in society, ultimately leading to the ability to challenge the status quo (Woodly 2015). This research will focus on what formal or contentious tactics activists in both cities perceived as the best method to achieve their goals.

Mobilization goals are straightforward in definition. They involve SMOs trying to overcome the ever-present collective action problem and get people off the sidelines to participate. Schattschneider correctly stated that politics is like a street fight, and ~~those~~ successful groups can get people off the sidelines and into the fight (Schattschneider 2013). This movement goal impacts the present and future of movements because even if the window for change is closed, continued mobilization can lead to a desired change in the future (Inclán 2018). The goal of "in the now" mobilization success for policy change at an undetermined point in the future is illustrated in the LGBTQ+ and feminist movement literature (Bernstein 2003; Staggenborg 1995). When the possibility of policy change is low, movements will often focus on increasing the number of members to continue their work (Bernstein 2003). This goal is a reasonable expectation in both cities as the pathway to policy change had been elusive for Chicanos in both cities.

Policy change is the gold standard of goals for social movements. Across various movements, we can see policy demands, variation in tactics, and the celebration of legislative success, from lowering taxes, marriage equality, and living wages, which illustrates the power of movements and the mobilization impact of goal achievement (Piven and Cloward 1977; I.

W. Martin 2015; Vries-Jordan 2018). Policy change can decrease participation by those on the losing side and increase mobilization for those on the winning side (Bernstein 2003). However, this argument goes against recent findings regarding policy change and mobilization (Nowlin 2016). What is analyzed in this chapter is activist perceptions and how those impacted form. The political opportunity chapter further explores the effect of policy and government institutions.

Theory and Hypothesis

These possible movement goals outlined above may explain the strategies used by the Chicano movement in Los Angeles and San Antonio. At a descriptive level, the Chicano movement had three primary goals. We know that the young Chicano activists of the era advocated cultural pride and acceptance instead of the assimilation strategies promoted by early Mexican American civil rights organizations like LULAC. The movement also had clear mobilization goals in both cities with targeted movement publications to convey what was happening on the ground and get out the vote efforts by the Southwest Voter Research Education Project (SVREP). Chicano activists had policy goals centered around education, poverty reduction, and civil rights. However, these activists were separated by thousands of miles in the 1970s. While they did have state and national aspirations, they still had to respond to the political challenges in the local setting.

We also know from the previous chapter that the Chicano movement in Los Angeles was much more contentious in its form than activists in San Antonio. They did not shift to more formal methods of achieving their goals until the mid-70s. Perceptions of success may better explain these differences than resource mobilizations theory. If this theory does explain the

variation of form between the two cities, what should we expect to find in the historical analysis? Simply put, if activists are promoting one method of activism over another consistently over time, we can glean that they perceive specific methods as the pathway to success over others. For example, if they consistently promote disruptive marches over waiting for a turn to speak at a school board meeting and vice versa, they perceive that method as the best to achieve success.

Data and Methods

The publications *The Chicano Times* and *El Popo* provide excellent insight into the development of the Chicano movement form in the 1970s in both cities. The articles in the papers illustrate what goals activists had in both cities and what they perceived as the best form to achieve success. The previous chapter states that the movement papers are best viewed as artifacts and do not provide a comprehensive view of the past. Oral histories collected from Chicano activists fill in the historical gaps, provide context, and verify the events described in the movement publications.

Findings

Perceptions of Success in San Antonio

Reporting of group success was without a doubt favorable in the *Chicano Times*. In fact, after completing the coding of articles, there was only one instance of reported group failure regarding transit workers' strike within the city. Forty-nine articles discussed group goals and success across the outlined three possible categories. Of these identified articles, three described contentious methods like strikes and protests. The other approach involved formal actions, such as attending a school board meeting or holding a diabetes testing clinic. These

descriptive statistics regarding tactics are not surprising, as we learned in the previous chapter that Chicano activists in the city took a more formal approach after they abandoned the contentious methods very early in the decade. The type of goals often promoted also reflect the strategic decisions made by activists in San Antonio.

The most promoted goal during this era was that of policy. Twenty of the 55 articles, or 42 percent of all the articles coded, were either about or the attempt of policy change. These goals were related to anti-discrimination policy, social worker regulatory changes, and school bond issues in the city. The most common groups mentioned were COPS, local LULAC chapters, MALDEF, and SVREP. The second most common goal was mobilization. Many of these reported goals and successes were groups like LULAC and SVREP sponsoring events to raise money for causes and organizations or to register Latino voters in San Antonio. Finally, these groups also had cultural goals as well. These stories reported groups that promoted Chicano film and art in the city. Groups like the Mexican-American Cultural Center worked with the Texas Commission on the Arts and Humanities. Other groups worked with local institutions like the McNay Art Museum and the Institute of Texan Cultures to promote and preserve Latino art. Perceptions of success in San Antonio were centered on formal action in policy change and mobilization. Activists in Los Angeles had a different perception of success.

Table 3.1 - San Antonio Goal Type

Mobilization	Policy	Culture
17	23	12
31%	42%	22%

Perceptions of Success in Los Angeles

Chicanos conveyed stark differences in their perceptions of success in Los Angeles compared to their San Antonio counterparts. In the analyzed publications, the most commonly promoted goal was that of mobilization. Of the forty-three articles identified and coded, seventy-four percent expressed a mobilization goal. Seventeen percent were written to convey a policy goal. Sixteen percent of the articles described a policy goal, and two percent reported a cultural goal. Another key difference was the variation in form style as well. Chicano activists in the city often tried to achieve their mobilization goals by encouraging others to participate in marches, boycotts, and attending meetings. They also did try to achieve policy goals at the university and city levels during this time frame. Even though there were fewer direct calls to action in achieving cultural goals, it is essential to note that many contributors deliberated on what it means to be a Chicana/o in both social and political spaces. There was also a significant difference in what form Chicano activists considered successful. Chicano activists in LA were far more focused on mobilization to create political and social change than their SA counterparts. They also differentiated in their perception of the best manner to achieve their goals.

The perceptions of success regarding movement form were between contentious and formal action. Thirty-seven percent of the articles promoted formal action and success, while thirty-five percent conveyed contentious action as successful. The critical difference between the perceptions of the two types of form is how activists perceived failure when they employed these two forms. Because the activist reporters of *El Popo* were likelier than those of the *Chicano Times* to report movement failure, we have a better insight into their views of success. More reports of movement failure were partially related to formal action (58 percent) rather than contentious form (42 percent). Overall, twelve of the forty-three articles reported movement failure. While these are not a substantial number of the total articles coded, these provide significant qualitative insight into the variation of activists' perceptions of success in Los Angeles *and* San Antonio.

Table 3.2 Los Angles Form Success and Failure Reporting

Contentious Success	Contentious Failure	Formal Success	Formal Failure
15	5	16	7
35%	12%	37%	16%

Table 3.3 Los Angeles Goal Type

Mobilization	Policy	Culture
32	7	3
74%	16%	7%

Discussion

The Perceived Path to Success via Failure

When Chicano activists in Los Angeles perceived the failure of the two types of forms, their analysis reenforced the perception that a contentious movement form was the pathway to success. If a march or boycott failed, it was not due to the form itself, but in their evaluation, because of unresponsive institutions, Chicano apathy, or a lack of resources. They perceived contentious politics as the best form, and Chicanos needed only to come together, work hard, and keep up the pressure on institutions and society to achieve their goals. Conversely, when formal methods failed, they perceived institutions as untrustworthy, and activists had become too reliant on discriminatory systems. They needed to return to the successful form in the late 1960s. This perception persisted even with continual self-evaluations of the difficulty of such type of collective action.

In analyzing the articles in *El Popo*, activists often conveyed mobilization goals. Formal mobilization goals in LA ranged from community efforts to broader movement goals. For example, in May of 1970, Chicanos Obregon Park led an effort to collect resources so that the school swim team could train at the East Los Angeles College pool and better compete with well-funded Anglo teams in the area (*El Popo* 1972). Broader formal mobilization goals included efforts to increase membership in La Raza Unida throughout the 1970s. The mobilization effort of combative tactics included disruptive actions like on-the-ground protests. In May of 1970, Chicano activists protested across the street from the academy awards to raise awareness of Latinos' portrayal in movies (*El Popo* 1970b). A high-profile series of protests occurred outside of Basil's Cathedral, where Chicanos demanded the Catholic church be more

involved with the movement and accessible (*El Popo* 1971). In 1976, MECHA students planned to protest cutbacks to Chicano Studies programs in the area. It is unclear if these protests occurred, as none were reported in the local news. These protests were covered in more detail than the formal mobilization, often taking up multiple pages and including pictures. It was clear they saw this strategy to be the most effective. What is also striking from the analysis is that when organizing efforts failed, they didn't see that issue as a need to change tactics.

When fewer Chicano activists participated in marches and rallies, there wasn't a discussion of whether this method of action was the best way to achieve the movement's goals. As written in the previous chapter, mobilization for contentious politics faltered early in the 1970s and worsened throughout the decade. In 1973, the MECHA Labor Committee held a boycott of Safeway stores because they sold lettuce harvested by scab workers but were displeased that Chicano students did not participate in the boycott and "failed to see the significance." They wrote that they needed Chicano students to get off the sidelines and provide manpower for the cause, "stop using excuses," participate, and "we'll get somewhere" (*El Popo* 1973b). They perceived the form as successful but needed more participation to be so. Chicano activist apathy was considered the leading cause of failure.

This perception partially reflected the belief that too many Chicanos were heavily dependent on discriminatory and Anglo-controlled institutions and programs. Chicanos were accused of relying on payments from the Equal Opportunities Program (EOP) to live a somewhat comfortable life instead of participating in protesting against continued discrimination. In a scathing editorial, three cartoon representations of Chicano activists are shown discussing whether they will participate in a MECHA demonstration. They replied they

were not and instead were going to cash their EOP check. Many relied on programs the Chicano Support Services, which mainly were run by Anglo students who were not committed to the cause (*El Popo* 1973a). Again, these critiques did not discuss the form of contentious politics failing but rather a need to double down by Chicanos.

The generational divide was also among the points of tension among activists in the CCM. In a 1975 protest of a federal immigration reform bill, referred to as the "Rodino Bill," named after its main sponsor, New Jersey Congressman Peter W. Rodino, older and younger Chicano activists clashed and hindered the demonstration from gaining traction (*El Popo* 1975). Most of the attention was on the feud rather than what they were protesting. The reporting in *El Popo* stated that there were enough protestors there, but older Chicanos felt they were being pushed to the back and not being respected (*El Popo* 1975). Again, a contentious form is perceived as successful, but in this case, CCM activists were too busy with in-fighting rather than fighting for their cause. The form is seen as successful if they would have gotten out of their way. Activists in LA perceived the path to success as a contentious form, if they could make it work.

The high-cost activism that LA Chicanos were engaged in was challenging to maintain and is illustrated by oral histories provided by activists in this period. Joe Razo, the co-editor, writer, and photographer for the Chicano movement publication, *La Raza,* described the toll it took on him and other members of the movement. During that period, he and his family struggled financially and emotionally due to his involvement (Razo 2013). He also stated that many activists he knew struggled to balance family and financial responsibilities (Razo 2013). He recalled in his interview that many Chicano families were “broken up through divorce and

spousal abuses and all that kind of stuff, and you keep saying, wow, maybe it was worth it for me in the long run, but for many people in the movement, it took a heavy toll, heavy toll on them (Razo 2013)."

San Antonio – Clear-Eyed and Formal

Form in San Antonio was, without a doubt, formal. They mobilized not to protest, picket, or boycott but to use the traditional pathways of participatory democracy. They perceived a conventional form could be successful if it could be sustained over time and proven effective, like attending city council and school board meetings (Polletta 2012). They seemed to realize that formal strategy at the local level could help a movement sustain its momentum (Szymanski 2003). They trained community members to educate others on voting how, why, and when. This strategy was done through organizations discussed in the previous chapter, like COPS and SVREP. They were also about evenly split in where they directed their attention between policy and mobilization. In short, Chicano activists in SA perceived formal methods of collective action as more successful than contentious methods of engagement.

Only one instance of failure was reported across the three possible goals. In a minor defeat, the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUERMW) could not stop the local transit board from providing charter buses to scab workers during a high-profile strike against the Friedrich Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Company in the city (Bailey 1977). This setback was minor as the IUERMW pushed the company to make concessions and signed a new labor agreement with the overwhelming support of its members (Clift 1977). The rest of the reports on collective action were wholly focused on success.

The vast majority of what was perceived as success was the product of formal action by activists in the city. Mobilization goals among Chicanos in SA ranged from the more mundane, like the Westside Six Parish Coalition holding a raffle during Fiesta week, to the standard GOTV efforts by SVREP. There were also events, like the Chicana Conference in the summer of 1976, which held politics and legal workshops for future Chicana leaders in the city. Traditional groups, like the westside Lions Club, often had diabetes testing clinics as a medical outreach to the medically underserved Chicano community. One can also suspect that this action was also a recruitment effort. Perceptions of success went beyond mobilization and into the policy sphere too.



C.P.S. to Review Connection Costs

SAN ANTONIO--Communities Organized for Public Service were claiming another victory after the City Public Service Board voted to review the utility's policies with regards to connection charges for new subdivisions.

COPS spokesmen had repeatedly charged that the CPS was subsidizing developers through it's electric and gas supply main extension line policies.

lectricity from the existing unit to the new subdivision, the CPS must run wiring from the single unit to the nearest substation or point where there is enough generating power. All of this additional wiring is free to the developer.

3) If the building of a new substation is required, this is also built free to the developer. A substation costs approximately $300,000 to build.

Figure 3.1: "C.P.S. to Review Connection Costs," *Chicano Times*, 07/30/1976

Chicano activists perceived policy success to impact the daily lives of those in the city. For instance, in the late summer of 1976, COPS pushed City Public Service to lower the energy costs of SA residences. Some may consider this type of mobilization mundane, but the policy victories by groups like COPS had community impact. For example, the group had 200 members attend a City Public Service board meeting and pressured it to review its utility

connection costs that had been passed off to residents to subsidize developers (*The Chicano Times Newspaper* 1976). This group also influenced the city council's decisions about bond issues and other budgeting matters during the 1970s too. By 1977, they were able to get the city council to agree to place a major bond issue on the ballot in 1978(*San Antonio Express-News* 1977). The activist legal group MALDEF, with the cooperation of the local chapter of the National Organization of Women and Mexican American Businesses Professional Women Association, sued the city council for gender discrimination.



Council OKs bond issue vote

Communities Organized for Public Service sought and received from City Council Thursday an informal commitment to hold a bond issue election next Jan. 14.

COPS members filled council's chamber and adjoining rooms Thursday afternoon. COPS spokesmen urged 75 per cent of a bond issue in the range of $90 million to $100 million be spent on COPS-requested drainage projects.

Those details would have to be worked out later, Mayor Lila Cockrell told the group, adding she has supported a bond issue election for two years.

Mayor Cockrell said council is expecting a report in September from the City Planning Commission which would outline all needed physical improvements in coming years.

In effect, council agreed Thursday to soon formally call a Jan. 14 bond election and set in motion the procedure for putting together a bond package.

Mayor Cockrell said council will have to wait for staff studies showing what amount of bonds the city can afford to issue, with or without raising taxes.

COPS members presented a list of projects, such as drainage, street improvements, libraries and parks, to be part of the bond issue.

The COPS list totals $84 million with $66 million going for drainage projects, COPS' main concern and request.

Figure 3.2: "Council Oks bond issue vote," *San Antonio Express-News*, 08/19/1977

Importantly, they perceived success across all three goals as best achieved through formal action through formal groups, not loosely connected individuals through contentious action. Organizations like COPS, SVREP, and MALDEF are often mentioned. Activist members of these groups attended community gatherings and city council and school board meetings. In an interview with Jose Angel Gutierrez, he stated that San Antonio's movement changed in the 1970s. Chicano activists were no longer in the streets but in the city offices where the real change was happening (Delgado 1974). Rolando Ríos stated that he went back to graduate

school in the 70s to improve his math and writing skills to help the movement and worked with SVREP and MALDEF (Ríos 1996). MarÍa Berriozabal, who was active in the movement in SA, did attend protests in the late 1960s stated that she attended but was skeptical if contentious action was an effective method of achieving positive change for the Latino community in the city (Berriozabal 1996). San Antonio Chicano activists were far more likely to focus on formal action than those in Los Angeles. They perceived success differently.

Conclusion

Perceptions of success significantly impacted movement form between the two cities. Chicanos in the city went from protesting in the streets to pushing the local government for policy change. As stated in chapter two, there was less of a gap in activism in San Antonio. While the resource of social-capital did impact form between the two cities, this theory does a better job of explaining the differences in form. Chicano activists in Los Angeles were not opposed to formal methods of activism, but they perceived contentious action as the best path forward. They also placed a greater emphasis on mobilizing other Chicanos and refused to outright change methods when they could not do so. San Antonio Chicanos celebrated policy success and getting people to the school board and city council meetings, while in Los Angeles, they were hyper-focused on getting people to join the cause.

Chapter 4 – Political Opportunities and the Chicano Movement

Introduction

In this chapter, I seek to provide insight into how and if political opportunities in Los Angeles and San Antonio impacted Chicano movement forms. To do so, I will apply concepts from the political opportunity scholarship, mainly those of McAdam and Tilly. The critical political opportunities I focus on in this chapter are increased access to political systems, division within the elites, the availability of elite allies, and diminishing state repression (Meyer 2004; McAdam 1996). To test whether these opportunities varied and if they impacted movement form, I conduct a systematic historical analysis of movement publications and the local newspapers of record in the two cities. As this study focuses on local politics, I define each element of the political opportunity model as the city institutions and groups that the Chicano movement in each city interacted with at that time. As such, in this study, I seek to answer if the city council and local school boards in each city increased or decreased access for Chicano activists, whether political elites disagree with the methods and goals of these activists, and whether individual and group political elites willing to work with them to achieve their goals, and how the local law enforcement treat Chicanos in LA and SA. Based on the findings from this study, I can illustrate that there were fewer political opportunities in Los Angeles compared to San Antonio. However, the political opportunity model does not adequately explain the difference in the Chicano movement form between the two cities.

The chapter proceeds as follows; the first section covers the relevant literature and discusses how it applies to this study. The following section discusses the study's theory and hypothesis, followed by a brief description of the data and methods. The fourth section

describes the findings that San Antonio had more open political systems than Los Angeles, and these opportunities impacted form. The final sections discuss the results and ends with a concluding chapter summary.

Literature Review

Political opportunity is a complex collective action theory. The debate among social movement scholars focuses on whether the theory is too broad and fragmented in its application. However, I argue that the evolution of the theory through rigorous debate and testing has made it applicable to this study. It is possible that both positive and negative changes in political opportunities in LA and SA significantly impacted the form of the local Chicano movement. In the following paragraphs, I will describe the theory, social movement scholars' concerns, how those scholars have addressed those concerns, and how it has evolved. I will then discuss how this theory may explain the observed variations in the form of the Chicano movement.

Eisinger's 1973 article on the variation of protest events across cities in the U.S. is the modern genesis of the political opportunity model (POM) (Eisinger 1973; Meyer 2004). In this study, outside factors or "political opportunities" explain the presence or lack of protests in American cities in the 1960s (Eisinger 1973). He argues, albeit somewhat begrudgingly in the end, that "The data support the conclusion that the incidence of protest is mildly related to the nature of a city's political opportunity structure, which I have conceived as a function of the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system" (Eisinger 1973). From that lukewarm endorsement of the study's findings and this initial conceptualization of "political opportunity," numerous other social movement

scholars have advanced this theory in multiple ways and operationalized "openness" and "closedness" of political opportunity at both the local and national levels differently. As such, the debate about the usefulness of understanding movements via the theory questions whether it is too broad and muddled to derive any true understanding of contentious politics (Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). The outside political factors used for independent variables in the political opportunity models fall into two categories, structural and signal opportunities (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Structural opportunities have to do with government, rules, and policy. In short, increased representation in government lowers protest activity, and decreased representation increases protest activity (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Fatke and Freitag 2013; Platt 2008). In 1954, for example, Virginia political elites fought back against Black voter registration and electoral gains, effectively closing this avenue of participation, thus leading to increased protests (K. S. Johnson 2017). The formal pathway to participation was closed, and Black citizens in the state took the path to protest. It is important to note that increased institutional access can also increase protest activity (S. Soule et al. 2006). This outcome is due to activists perceiving access as a means to achieving their goals. Other structural factors can include citizenship status, in which undocumented people are less likely to participate (L. M. Martinez 2005). Signal opportunities can have similar impacts on protest participation.

These types of opportunities are not institutional rules or policy and can be, for example, the demographics of a governing body, changes in society, or media attention (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Platt 2008). Social movement scholarship provides us with ample examples of the impact of signal opportunities. Higher levels of descriptive representation in Congress have been found to have positive effects on the constituent and representative relationship, and

Black, Latino, and female legislators are more likely to work to address issues for people like them (Bowen and Clark 2014; Lowande, Ritchie, and Lauterbach 2019; Wilson 2010). However, increased diversity in Congress has not been shown to positively impact these groups' legislative outcomes due to unequal institutional barriers (Peay 2021). Meanwhile, the positive impact of an increase in racial diversity in Congress has been shown to decrease protest events because of the perception of increased representative access to the institution (Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003). A decrease in electoral and policy success and being in the electoral minority can have the inverse effect of increasing the likelihood of protest events (Anderson and Mendes 2006; Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003).

The media also has a clear impact on protest participation. In the 2006 immigration protests, how the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, or as it was more commonly referred to, the "Sensenbrenner Bill," activated Mexican-Americans in the U.S. to protest against the anti-immigration legislation across the country (Zepeda-Millán 2017). The media can also spur mobilization in place of traditional collective action organizations (Walgrave and Manssens 2006). Institutional and signal opportunities can produce action, and studies of that activity fall into two broad categories, movement formation and movement success.

There is an opportunity to study political opportunity and social movement form. It is reasonable to suggest that if institutions and signal opportunities can spur and suppress activism, then those exogenous factors can also influence the strategies of those actors. There is already some evidence of political opportunities impacting movement form. Institutions that were open and receptive to changes in rape policies were more willing to work with moderates,

and many feminist groups were ready to change their approach to pursuing these policies (Gornick and Meyer 1998). Signal opportunities have shown some impact on movement form as well.

Data and Methods

In this chapter, I will conduct an in-depth historical analysis of archival documents from Chicano movement publications, local newspapers, and oral histories from both cities. These documents will enable this study to test whether political opportunities significantly influenced Chicano movement form in the two cities. Each of the three document types provides a broader insight into political opportunities in LA and SA. Each data type has strengths and weaknesses that have been addressed in other chapters. However, as stated before, each data type helps address these weaknesses and allows this study to provide insight into whether political opportunities explain movement form and variances in LA and SA.

In this historical analysis, I analyze the data to see if Chicano activists report interaction with local government, elected and bureaucratic officials, law enforcement, political parties, and other local organizations. If they report interaction with them, it is necessary to determine whether it is conveyed as positive and open or negative and closed. In other words, do they report that these two cities' pollical systems are accessible and supportive or inaccessible and actively working against their efforts? In the *Los Angeles Times* and the *San Antonio Express-News*, I am investigating if the news reporting of the Chicano movement is positive or negative and how oppositional individuals, groups, and organizations are covered during this period. Finally, the Chicano activist oral histories allow for a retrospective analysis of political opportunities.

Results

The results of the historical analysis show that there were fewer political opportunities for formal collective action in Los Angeles than in San Antonio. The city council in LA remained closed as a path to achieving their goals. In San Antonio, the city council's openness increased as the decade progressed. This openness didn't mean that groups like COPS had it "easy" to achieve their goals, but they had the opportunity to push the council for policy change. Los Angeles activists did not have this open path for change. This openness in San Antonio was primarily due to the fracturing and ultimate demise of the once politically powerful Good Government League (GGL) by the middle of the decade. There was no comparable group in LA, but the city council remained closed as an opportunity for much of the decade due to its institutional design.

This lack of representation on the LA council is not new knowledge. Still, this study does show that not only was the council unsupportive to Chicano activists in LA, but due to the fact the council did not expand, Chicanos were left with white conservative Democrats, John S. Gibson Jr, and Arthur K. Snyder, to represent them. Gibson was best known for supporting the forced removal of Mexican-American homeowners from the Chavez Ravine to build Dodger Stadium (Burleigh 1975). Gibson focused on balanced budgets and bringing shopping malls to his ward (Burleigh 1971). However, he voted to expand the city council to 17 members (Baker 1970). Snyder drew the ire of Chicano activists with his support for urban renewal programs in his district that did nothing to help Chicano citizens (del Olmo 1972). Chicano activists did have some success in improving educational opportunities.

In San Antonio, COPS had the opportunity to and was able to partner with environmental groups and other organizations to grow its influence in the city. As discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation, there wasn't a comparable group in LA, the United Neighborhoods Organization (UNO), until 1976. Finally, the Los Angeles police department was far more repressive against Chicano activists in the early 1970s than the San Antonio police department. This lack of evidence of ongoing confrontations between Chicanos and San Antonio law enforcement may be attributed to the change in form in San Antonio and the lack of contentious mobilization in Los Angeles.

The Los Angeles city council was closed in the 1970s to Chicano activists. The first aspect of how political systems were closed in this decade for Chicano civil rights advocates was their failure to secure representation on the city council. Community activists attempted to expand the city council but failed (Santillan 1983). They also unsuccessfully fought against a Mexican-American vote-packing effort when the city council district lines were reapportioned in 1971 (Santillan 1983). Under the plan put into place and upheld by the Court of Appeals, council district 15 was packed, with 67 percent of its population being Mexican American (Santillan 1983). The next closest district was district 4, with Mexican Americans making up 30 percent of the overall population (Santillan 1983). The uphill battle for Mexican American electoral power in Los Angeles is best exemplified by the fact that by 1979, only one Mexican American, Edward R. Roybal, had served on the city council (Santillan 1983). This lack of electoral opportunity and descriptive representation on the city council ensured that Chicanos were up against a closed political system regarding the issues of infrastructure, education, and others which meant that

formal efforts were not always the best path forward for them. These attempts at formal participation and their lack of success are discussed in detail below.

It is also important to note that the *Los Angeles Times* and *The Express-News* incorporated a status quo bias in their reporting but did not actively attempt to undermine the movement in either city. The *Los Angeles Times* was particularly negative in reporting the Chicano movement. As discussed in previous chapters, there is often a status quo bias against social movements in traditional newspaper reporting, especially for the Chicano movement (McLeod 2007; Mellinger 2013a; Ontiveros 2010). What was lacking in the *Los Angeles Times* was its reporting on how activists interacted with the local government. The paper under-reported the movement rather than attacking it. The *LA Times* also hired Frank del Olmo as a staff writer after the LA police killed Ruben Salazar at the Chicano Moratorium protest in 1970. The presence of del Olmo ensured there was a fair and supportive journalist who understood the movement. The reporting in San Antonio was somewhat different, as it focused on both criticism of the status quo political machines along with criticism of the movement. This attempt, even if it was unintentional, at balance is essential. The criticism of political elites illustrates a divide in the city's political power, which is an opening for activists. The lack of that divide in LA further shows the differences between the political elites in the two cities.

Discussion

San Antonio Opportunities

The critical political opportunity in San Antonio was the five-year decline and dissolution of the Good Government League. This group of city elites controlled city council politics for

almost twenty years. In 1971, each of the nine GGL candidates won their city council election. That was the final election the GGL achieved that unanimous electoral success. The challenges to the group's political power were evident in 1973. There were three independent city council candidates in the 1973 election, and Wanda Ford was considered the most potent challenger (McCrory 1973). She was an aquifer conservationist who received a fair amount of coverage in the *Express-News*. This affiliation is essential because COPS aligned themselves with aquifer protection groups, among others. However, she did not win against the GGL candidate.[5] Five of the GGL candidates had to go to a runoff election. Two of the independent candidates were able to defeat their GGL opponents. The 1975 council election went far worse for the group and ended its 20 years run of power in San Antonio politics. Only Henry G. Cisneros won his election outright, and the rest of the GGL eight-candidate slate went to a runoff (Staff 1973). Only two GGL candidates won their runoff elections. Lila Cockrell won her runoff and was the first female mayor of the city (Diehl 1975b). There were numerous political takes in the local media about what caused the group to fail. Still, regardless of its cause, this failure had a significant impact on groups like the Communities Organized for Public Service, which was able to take advantage of the subsequent political opportunities.

COPS put continual pressure on the San Antonio City Council after the demise of the GGL. The group was successful on several local issues. The *San Antonio Express-News* reported that in the group's first year of existence, it was successful on a whole range of issues: "during the next 12 months, drainage bond issues were passed, lots were cleared, sidewalks were built

[5] Unfortunately, the Bexar County elections archive only has data as far back as 1994. I was unable to find any vote totals for San Antonio City council elections during the 1970s.

– and then COPS turned to matters of concern to the whole community, including a challenge of the City Water Board's proposed 30 percent rate hike" (Stinson 1975). The string of success continued for the group. The following year, they effectively pressured the council to increase city regulation of a junkyard (*San Antonio Express-News* 1976). The organization did not go at it alone to influence the city council. One of the group's significant allies was the Aquifer Protection Association. After a two-year-long battle with city builders and the Greater San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, the city council passed an 18-month ban on building in the Edwards Aquifer recharge zone (Wood 1977). COPS took advantage of a more open city government and achieved its goals. Unfortunately, Chicano activists in Los Angeles did not have the same opportunity.



FORECAST
Partly cloudy, warm. High, low 90s. Low, low 70s.
Thursday's temperatures in Column 2
Details, Page 6C

San Antonio Express

6 a.m. SPORTS FINAL
15¢

FRIDAY, JUNE 10, 1977

EXCLUSIVE WIRE SERVICES: ASSOCIATED PRESS, NEW YORK TIMES SERVICE, WASHINGTON POST SERVICE, LOS ANGELES TIMES SERVICE, NEWSDAY SERVICE, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN SERVICE, LONDON TIMES SERVICE

COUNCIL BANS ALL AQUIFER BUILDING

FRANK LEACH
. . .will lose jobs

By JIM WOOD

City Council clamped an 18-month ban on development over the Edwards aquifer Thursday in spite of warnings the action will have grave consequences.

In voting a complete building ban by a 6-4 margin with one member abstaining, the council majority rejected advice of its Planning Commission, City Mgr. Tom Huebner and his staff advisors.

City Atty. Jim Parker said lawsuits up to be half a billion dollars may be filed. Finance Dir. Carl White said the lawsuits, in turn, "would seriously jeopardize our ability to sell bonds. It could take us out of the bond market completely."

Just how effective the ban will be in halting development in the northern areas that overlay the aquifer, the city's water supply source, was left open to question.

In spite of warnings of lawsuits and job losses, City Council approved the 18-month ban

The ordinances implementing the ban take effect in 30 days.

Councilman Glen Hartman, who opposed them, said the city cannot stop all development processes because of its limited jurisdiction. At best it can cause delays, he said, and termed the action "irresponsible and ineffective."

Councilman Bernardo Eureste, a vocal proponent, said if nothing else the action expresses the city's symbolic intent to protect its drinking water supply.

Hundreds of people, many of them members of Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS), packed council chambers, hallways and all other rooms on the first floor of City Hall.

They broke into sustained cheering and applause when the moratorium ordinances passed.

Voting for the ban were council members Joe Webb, Helen Dutmer, Frank D. Wing, Eureste, Joe Alderete Jr. and Rudy Ortiz.

Against a total ban were Mayor Lila Cockrell, Hartman, John Steen and Phil Pyndus.

Mayor Pro Tem Henry Cisneros abstained. He said he favors a moratorium but wants to reach it through processes he said would be more legally binding.

2-year fight

Council action capped a meeting that went on for nearly five hours with spokesmen for COPS and the Aquifer Protection Assn., which have waged a two-year battle to get the moratorium.

Dodds to quit over ban

By DAVID HENDRICKS

Claiming City Council represented anarchy, City Planning Com. William Dodds said Thursday he was resigning from the commission.

"My mind is made up," Dodds said following City Council's vote to impose a building ban over the Edwards aquifer recharge zone, which the commission had recommended against.

"When the council takes an action against the advice of its established advisors, in this case, the Planning Commission, the city manager and the city attorney, I do not want to be a part of this government," Dodds said.

"This is not government, but anarchy."

He said he would be resigning even though the commission was in the

See RESIGNS, Page 9A

Carter car rebate loses

Figure 4.1: Wood, Jim, "Council Bans All Aquifer Building," *San Antonio Express News,* 06/10/1977

Council is Closed Talk to the Board

There were no formal political machine politics groups like the GGL that held power in Los Angeles city elections during the 1970s. The failure to expand the city council in LA to enable increased Chicano representation in the Los Angeles city government was an early and severe defeat for the movement, and the closed nature of the institution remained robust. In the analysis of *El Popo* and the *Los Angeles Times*, the city council was not an institution the movement interacted with as COPS did in San Antonio. During the period of study in this dissertation, Chicano activists in Los Angeles were up against a city council that was unrepresentative and unresponsive. Chicanos in the city attempted to get the council to expand from 15 to 17 districts, with one of the new districts being majority Mexican Americans, to increase their political representation in the city (Boyarsky 1970). The mayor supported expanding the size of the council to dilute the power of members who did not support him but said, "you can't base elections on ethnic considerations" (Boyarsky 1970). By 1980, the city council had still not expanded Chicano representation. The institution also supported the extreme actions of law enforcement against Chicano citizens. In 1972, the council voted to provide legal defense in a criminal case involving two LA police officers who killed two Chicanos in what the department described as a "mistake killing" (Baker 1971). Numerous Chicanos attended the council meeting to protest the act. When writing about this meeting, the *Los Angeles Times* characterized the protestors negatively by describing them as "militants" (Baker 1971). On other issues, the council was highly dismissive of Chicanos and their demands.

Council members like Arthur K. Synder were characterized as unconcerned with the demands of Chicanos in news reports. Snyder's 1972 urban renewal plan drew the ire of

Chicanos in neighborhoods like Lincoln Heights due to fears that they would be displaced (del Olmo 1972). This fear was not unfounded, as the memories of the forced removal of Mexican-American homeowners from the Chavez Ravine to build the Dodger Stadium were still fresh in their minds. Chicanos in his district had difficulties unseating councilmen Snyder for multiple reasons. He did his best to make small but highly visible gestures to build Mexican-American support. For example, he made sure a majority Latino school got a new coat of paint and funneled federal money into his district to build pools and libraries (Boyarsky 1979). His district also had many immigrants from Mexico who were challenging to mobilize (Boyarsky 1979). It wasn't until 1978, with the creation of the United Neighborhood Organization (UNO) group, that Chicanos began to engage with the city council on issues like worker training programs in LA (Harris 1978). The city council was not an open institution during this period, but there was some success in educational improvements.

In the years following the genesis of the Chicano movement, Mexican American parents' were able to increase attendance at school board meetings. Schools changed their policies to have an open-door policy for parents to come to express their concerns and to come to the school to observe classes without a permit (Vasquez 1971). By the mid-1970s, their hard-fought efforts began to pay off with improvements like bilingual education programs, ethnic study programs at the secondary level, and advisory committee meetings conducted in Spanish (del Olmo 1976). However, Chicanos in the city perceived these gains as under threat from a busing program designed by the Los Angeles school district to desegregate the school (del Olmo 1976). This plan consumed the political energy of Chicanos for the rest of the decade, with many of the original demands not showing up in the *Los Angeles Times* in any meaningful way.

The education reporting about Chicanos focused on the opposition to the plan due to fears of Chicano student isolation at their new schools (del Olmo 1977). While there was a path to success in education, their gains were limited, and that path was in the second half of the decade.

Police Violence in LA

The Los Angeles Police Department was brutal in its repression of Chicano protestors in the early 1970s (Escobar 1993). The highest-profile case of the use of deadly force by LA law enforcement occurred during what was at the time the largest Mexican American protest in the city (Escobar 1993). Escobar describes in detail the Chicano Moratorium that took place on August 29, 1970. It was a mass protest in which Chicanos from across the country participated to protest the deaths of Chicanos in the Vietnam War and to demand civil rights (1993). The Los Angeles Police declared the protest a violation of the law and broke up the mass gathering with force (Escobar 1993). It is unclear in the reporting what law they had broken. Three Chicanos were killed, and many more were injured (Escobar 1993). This deadly event is well known and has been covered journalistically and academically. But, it is essential to discuss in this study because it is an example of an overt *increase* in state repression in the city. Raul Ruiz was a photographer, reporter, and editor for the most well know Chicano movement publication, *La Raza.* He was at the protest and captured the most well know photos of the event and deadly police violence. This extreme use of violence by the LA police may have been a contributing factor to the waning contentious mobilization in the city before there was a rise in formal action by groups like UNO.



Figure 4.2: Photo of police violence at the Chicano Moratorium from *La Raza* Vol. 3 Special Issue (Raul Ruiz)

San Antonio police did not generate a similar mass deadly incident as in the LA case, but there were many incidents of reported police brutality. In 1970, two members of the San Antonio police department were sued for damages for killing the unarmed Ralph Lopez Sr. 1970 (Denman 1970). Both officers won their cases (Staff 1972). Detective William "Duke" Harlow, one of these officers, openly supported and campaigned for the pro-segregation presidential candidate George Wallace in 1975 (*San Antonio Express-News* 1975). Early in the decade, members of the Brown Berets also picketed outside the city hall and main police department location in a protest against police brutality (Bailey 1971).

Similarly, in the early 1970s, the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) did file numerous police brutality lawsuits against the SA Police Department. Still, in later years there was no reporting of such actions (Cook 1971). In the *Chicano Times,* there is only one instance of reporting about police brutality, in which a young man was reported to have been

assaulted by jail guards in San Antonio (*The Chicano Times* 1976). There was also one reference to one resolution passed at a Raza Unida convention that states: "Be it resolved that the RUP considers the Police and Fireman's Civil Service Commission ineffectual in disciplining problem policemen" (The Chicano Times 1976c). In numerous editions of the *Chicano Times*, there is a section entitled "Police Beat," with short summaries of crimes in which the police were involved. For example, a report described an incident in which a man was shot in his driveway after returning home from a night at the club (*The Chicano Times* 1976a). There was no doubt tension due to the actions of SA law enforcement, but the lack of a high-profile deadly incident in the city like the deadly actions in LA suggests police tolerance of the continued formal collective efforts of Chicano activists. The lack of reports in the *San Antonio Express-News* and the *Chicano Times* after 1976 indicates a *decrease* in repression by the state which signals an expanded political opportunity.

Newspaper Coverage in LA & SA

The reporting in the major newspapers in both cities provides a good indication of the levels of elite support for the Chicano movement. *The Los Angeles Times* hired Frank del Olmo, the editor of *El Popo,* during his time at San Fernando Valley State College. His inclusion ensured there was a Chicano who was active in the movement from the beginning, who understood its goals and helped shape them. For example, in a 1974 article, he discussed the Cinco de Mayo holiday and reflected on the beginnings of the Chicano movement (del Olmo 1974b).



the issue. Why can't there be better schools in the barrios? Is the achievement of a "better education" paid by rejection of ones community and culture?

This type of solution, to a prevalent feeling of bias in the white academic structure is not adequate. At worst, it presents more opportunities to the Chicano students to be programmed into and the parents, who overwhelmed with frustration will feel inadequate.

Bussing is another medium for breaking down the Chicano culture, his community relations and himself. The Chicano community should have a decision in the matter and demand, not bussing, but better local schools. This will help us in building up and idifying our barrios.

EDITOR . . . . . Frank del Olmo

BARRIO EDITOR . . . . . Manuel

CAMPUS EDITOR . . . . . Rosa Martinez

EDITORIAL GROUP . . . . . Mario Alvarado, Yvonne Aguirre, Cecilia Espinosa, Jose P. Galvan, Roberto Guerra, Felix Martinez, Edward D. Nunez, Teresa Orozco, Delia Perez, Gloria Perez, Leonor A. Ramirez, Maria Teran, Jose Luis Vargas, Miguel Valenzuela, Ben Saiz.

PHOTOGRAPHERS . . . . . Francisco Benavides, Ismael Campuzano, Oscar Castillo, Henry Romero, "El Hawk," Tomas Trimble, Armando Vasquez.

ARTISTS . . . . . Rebecca J. De Santos, Joe Bravo, David Falcon, Sergio Hernandez, Marta Ramirez, George Stoneman.

ADVISOR . . . . . Raul Ruiz

Figure 4.3: Staff List *El Popo* Vol. 1 No. 2 April 7, 1970

He also reported on the city council 14th district and its often-embattled, due to his actions, councilmen Arthur K. Snyder. Olmo frequently reported on the councilman's political blunders and was sure to highlight the campaign donations he received from big businesses (del Olmo 1974a).



Cinco de Mayo: A Springtime Holiday With a Serious Side

BY FRANK DEL OLMO

My family and I won't be sitting heme this Sunday. For us, that is too important a day on the calendar, and we plan to be out celebrating.

Contrary to popular belief among Anglos, Cinco de Mayo is not Mexico's Fourth of July. Perhaps the mistake will become less frequent as California continues to rediscover its Mexican heritage. Indeed, the culture and history of Mexico, rooted here long before Anglos came, have already gained increasing recognition from public and private institutions in the American Southwest—at least in part because of militant Chicano activism over the past few years.

My memories of Cinco de Mayo date back to my boyhood in Pacoima, where, as I recall, the Valley Latin Knight Club's dance—and the crowning of its Cinco de Mayo queen were the only commemorations. But the celebrations as we know them today got started among third-generation Chicanos in the late 1960s, particularly among those on college and high school campuses.

They were first marked by stridently nationalistic commemorations that featured militant speeches more often than cultural presentations. The tough speeches were well accepted in that period, and gringo-be-damned was a common theme.

Most Chicanos now see that early militancy for the chauvinism it was, yet I think it served a purpose. Among other things, the general acknowledgement of Cinco de Mayo—and, by association of the Mexican-American community as a whole—probably would not have come about without such attention-getting tactics.

Significantly, most of this year's Chicano commemorations that I know about will be culturally oriented—the arts and music of Mexico have taken on greater importance than political statements.

Activist considerations, of course, still carry weight. But now they are viewed from a different perspective—the street-marching style may have faded, but *la Causa* is not dead. The Chicanos who first sparked the activism of the '60s are going through a stage of reassessment; their ideas about the future of the movement vary from mild reformism (getting Mexican-Americans into middle-class jobs or elected to public office), to a leftist orientation (Chicanos as a nationalist, working-class revolutionary vanguard).

But whatever the case, Mexican-Americans are taking pride in their ethnic heritage. They have also learned that there is nothing wrong—nothing un-American—in expressing that pride publicly.

The Cinco de Mayo celebrations scheduled for Sunday are rooted in that realization. Rather than a day of political speeches, May 5 has become a spring holiday for enjoying and treasuring our Mexican heritage.

Frank del Olmo is a staff writer for The Times.

For years the holiday was all but ignored outside the Chicano community. Now it is becoming institutionalized through public commemorations in schools and other institutions. It is even increasingly commercialized — a sure (though not entirely encouraging) sign that the holiday has taken hold on the public imagination. Around now, many amusement parks and shopping centers stage their annual "Viva Mexico" weekend—right down to the obligatory mariachi bands.

Yet, as long as our heritage receives legitimate and realistic appreciation from the Anglo community at large, I suppose we shouldn't mind these vaguely tokenistic celebrations. I just hope they don't divert public attention from the serious problems still facing urban and rural Mexican-Americans.

It's a long way from the Valley Latin Knights dance to today's Cinco de Mayo celebrations. The ones I look forward to most eagerly are those small community fiestas in parks, churches and playgrounds in practically every Chicano barrio between San Diego and Sacramento, Venice and Blythe. It's at affairs like these that we wear our pride most joyously.

Oh yes—for the record, Mexico's Independence Day is Sept. 16. This Sunday's events celebrate the victory of Mexican President Benito Juarez over the French Foreign Legion at Puebla in 1862. Cinco de Mayo, therefore, symbolizes the Mexicans' spirit in fighting domination by outsiders. Even though we Chicanos may celebrate it this year with greater cultural than political emphasis, we will not forget its true significance: Our forebears' refusal to be stepped on.

Figure 4.4: Del Olmo, Frank, "Cinco de Mayo: A Springtime Holiday with a Serious Side," *The Los Angeles Times,* 03/03/74

The *San Antonio Express-News* did not have as high a profile of a reporter covering the movement, but how it reported Chicano activism was important. There was support in the

reporting of the GGL before it went defunct, but even by 1971, there was a willingness to report that their opposition argued that the group was not representative of Chicanos. By 1975, it was clear in its reporting that the GGL had failed to take the Chicano vote on the westside seriously (Diehl 1975a). Furthermore, the reporting of COPS was positive. In an article about the group's success, one reporter characterized the group not as outsiders but as insiders: "it struck me that the ragtag group has become respected...accepted. Give the organization another year, and it'll probably be part of the Establishment" (Stinson 1975). The paper was even willing to give the group's leadership multiple pages to describe their projects and vision for the city (White 1975). This positive reporting may have positively impacted Chicano and general public perceptions of the group.

Conclusion

Political opportunities did impact Chicano Movement form in Los Angeles and San Antonio. Institutions in LA were closed to activists in the city. The city council was not descriptively substantively representative. Council members like Arthur K. Snyder were not concerned about significant actions that would have improved Chicano residents. The Los Angeles Police Department took deadly action against Chicano activists in 1970, sending a clear repressive message to the group. There were a few bright spots of political opportunity for the movement. *The Los Angeles Times* did hire the Chicano activist Frank del Olmo after the murder of his mentor, Ruben Salazar. His reporting took the concerns and needs of Chicanos in the city seriously and portrayed them as legitimate. The movement did have partial success in achieving its goal of improving education. Still, its energy was consumed in the second half of the decade by opposing a busing plan meant to desegregate schools in the city.

Institutions and organizations were more open in San Antonio. This openness significantly impacted form of the movement in the city. They had access to the city council in the city, and organizations outside the movement were willing to work with COPS. Instead of more contentious action, the open political opportunities enable the movement to assume a formal structure and engage in formal processes. The *Express-News* framed them as combative but successful and as an establishment group. The San Antonio police were accused of police brutality but failed to participate in a high-profile deadly event like that in LA. Police brutality was never an issue at the top of the agenda for community activists in the city.

The political opportunity model does explain movement form in these cases, but not as well as perceptions of the best means to secure success. The openness or closed political structures ultimately does shape perceptions of what strategies are best to deploy. The conveyance of closed institutions and state repression in Los Angeles negatively impacted formal participation. This demobilization is best exemplified in District 15. Synder was not a good representative, but Chicanos in the city could not unseat him due to a lack of participation. Combined with the fact that there were no Latinos on the council and the institution did not attempt to address their needs, why would they come off the sidelines?

Finally, as noted in the second chapter, Chicanos in Los Angeles eventually established the United Neighborhoods Organization (UNO). A LA Catholic archdiocese priest attended a COPS meeting in San Antonio and created the organization in the city. The success of COPS positively impacted the perceptions of activists in LA. Activists are smart and deliberate actors who take in the world around them and make strategic choices based on this information. Political opportunities and resources are a part of this information that drives perceptions.

Ultimately, we must look to how activists respond to both political opportunities and the source of their resources to understand why movements take particular forms.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

Review

This study set out to understand better why the Chicano movement took the form it did in the 1970s, specifically in Los Angeles, CA, and San Antonio, TX. The study also set out to contribute to the study of social movements by testing which theory of social movement form best explains variation in social movement tactics within the same movement during the same period. The Chicano movement provided an excellent case study as it was underreported during its peak and understudied in political science.

This study sought to contribute to our understanding of the Chicano Movement and the study of social movements by answering the following questions. First, did resources significantly impact Chicano Movement strategies in both cities? Second, did perceptions of a form's potential for success substantially impact the choice of form? Third, did political opportunities impact form? Finally, which social movement theory best explains why the Chicano Movement took the forms it did in Los Angeles and San Antonio? This chapter summarizes the answers to these questions from the previous chapters, discusses the limitations of this study, and describes the future directions of the study of the Chicano Movement in the field of political science.

Chicano Movement Form

Chapter two set out to test if the resources available to Chicano Movement activists significantly impacted the form it took in the two cities. I built off the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) scholarship of McCarthy & Zald and Edwards & McCarthy (1977, 2004). RMT, in its beginnings, was developed to understand success, but later works also utilized the theory to

understand movement form. While academically divisive, resource type has a broad definition, and this study focused on the social-organizational resources available to Chicano activists. In short, it analyzed the movement's networking and social capital resources. The study argues that these social-organization resources were crucial for understanding the form of the movement in the two cities as the institutions that created and fostered networking and social capital in the Chicano community between the two cities were different. In Los Angeles, the young Chicanos who started this movement during their time in high school were able to attend public colleges. These public colleges, through their successful activism, were newly created Chicano Studies programs meant to teach and form direct community ties from where they came. This access to Chicano Studies programs meant that the networking and social capital created in these institutions were insular, and the form the movement took in Los Angeles was more contentious. That form was not sustainable due to the limitations created by the institutions to which they were tied. Chicano activists in San Antonio did not have those same public college opportunities in the 1970s. As such, they had to rely on the existing networks and organizations in the city and, by doing so, built a broader generational coalition of Chicano activists that preferred to take a less contentious form. Resources did matter and impacted the dependent variable of form in this study.

Chapter three set out to test if and how the perceptions of Chicano activists impacted the movement's form. This study utilizes the scholarship of Bernstein, who argues that the interaction between social movements and their environment affects their strategic choices (2003). In sum, SMOs are rational actors who assess their chances of success and adjust their methods accordingly. The study in this chapter found that perceptions of success mattered and

explained the variation of form between the two cities. The Chicano movement in Los Angeles was much more likely to perceive the goal of mobilization as important and contentious mobilization as the best way to achieve success. This perception of success via contentious mobilization was often to the detriment of the movement as it could not effectively achieve continuous mobilization in the city. Conversely, Chicano activists in San Antonio were more likely to focus on policy goals and accomplish those goals through formal action, like attending city council meetings. Mobilization goals in San Antonio also focused on formal mobilization, not activities like picketing. Groups like Communities Organized for Public Services (COPS) and Southwest Voter Research Education Project (SVREP) were highly successful groups focused on formal action in San Antonio. It was not until the latter part of the decade in Los Angeles that a similar group appeared and focused on traditional methods of collective action to achieve its goals. Perceptions of success were significant and best explained why the Chicano Movement took the form it did in both cities. This finding will be further synthesized in the next section.

Chapter four, the final empirical chapter in this study, sought to answer whether political opportunities in LA and SA impacted the Chicano Movement form. The chapter utilizes the political opportunity scholarship of McAdam (1996). This chapter tests whether specific aspects of the political system in both cities were "open" or "closed" to Chicano activists and how those opportunities or lack thereof impacted their strategic choices. Specific opportunities included access to city councils and school boards, if political elites agreed with their methods, if they were willing to work with them, and how local law enforcement interacted with the movement. This study's findings indicated that political opportunities varied in both cities and impacted the strategic choices of the Chicano Movement. The Los Angeles City Council was closed to Chicano

activists during the 1970s. They were unable to succeed in expanding the council membership in 1970. Chicanos in the city were left with two council representatives who did not focus on the needs of Mexican-Americans in the city. The mayor even stated that race shouldn't be a factor when making representative choices. However, the movement did have some success in improving public education at the secondary and post-secondary levels. But, these gains were minimal and sometimes short-lived. Police brutality in LA had a significant impact on form. The deadly actions by LA law enforcement officers during the Chicano Moratorium were perhaps the most unambiguous indication of a closed political system in the city for Chicanos.

The political system in San Antonio was more open than in Los Angeles. Groups like COPS were able to access the city council and make policy gains. This openness was partly due to the dissolution of the Good Government League (GGL), which had maintained a stranglehold on the council for nearly 20 years. The group also partnered with the Aquifer Protection League, the League of Women Voters, and the San Antonio Teachers' Council. COPS also continually pushed the San Antonio School District to address critical issues with district schools. While the relationship between COPS and SASD was combative, the group did have access. In 1978, after years of pressure, COPS was highly supportive of many of the SASD budget provisions. Finally, police brutality was not a significant focus in San Antonio. There were accusations of police violence toward Mexican-Americans, but it was not a high priority for groups like COPS to address. The group even called for a more significant law enforcement presence at Harlandale High School. The open political opportunities in San Antonio impacted the strategic decisions made in San Antonio by Chicano activists because they helped channel their activism toward the pursuit of particular goals.

The Theory with the Most Explanatory Power

The final question answered in this study is which theory of social movement form best explains why Chicano activists made the strategic choices they did in Los Angeles and San Antonio. Perceptions matter the most. That is not to state that resources and political opportunities had no impact. However, activists must consciously recognize that they have opportunities and available resources before deciding how to mobilize best to achieve their goals. Ultimately, each factor was inseparably intertwined with how Chicanos perceived the best method to achieve success. The institutions of social capital creation were different in each city. In Los Angeles, social capital came from public universities. In San Antonio, it came from organizations like COPS. This variation impacted the generational makeup of the Chicano movement in the two cities; each had perceived success differently. The Chicano youth was born out of a rejection of the old assimilationist guard and sought to be more aggressive from the beginning of the movement. The movement transitioned into a multigenerational undertaking in San Antonio and perceived engaging with the city government as a viable option to achieve their goals. They were seen as combative at times. For example, they occasionally walked out of school board meetings to express their displeasure with the board members, but they still took an insider track.

The variation in the levels of political openness between the two cities directly impacted their perceptions of the pathway to success. The failure to expand the city council and the deadly actions by the Los Angeles police at the beginning of the decade signaled to Chicano activists that the local institutions were not open to them. At best, they were going to be ignored. At worst, law enforcement may take their lives. In San Antonio, the Good Government League

dissolved, the openness of other organizations to work with COPS, and the somewhat favorable reporting in the *Express-News* conveyed that these institutions were open as an avenue for success. The activists in the city perceived formal action as a means to success because of the political opportunities. This finding is in line with Szymanski's research into the two eras of the prohibition movement (2003). The more radical Women's Temperance Movement perceived state and national prohibition as the best manner to achieve success. In contrast, Anti-Saloon League perceived a gradual and local approach as the best way to achieve success (2003). The Anti-Saloon League was the most successful. Activists take stock of the environment in which they operate and make strategic choices, which is why perceptions matter.

Limits of Study

There were two main limitations to this study. First, the data used to test these theories of social movement form is a mixture of primary sources and existing studies, like history studies. Due to the availability of resources, time, and the Covid-19 pandemic, the researcher could not interview Chicano activists for this study. Oral histories were analyzed, but those are limited as to the insight they can provide as the interviewers did not always ask the interviewees questions that pertained to the subject matter of this study. Archives, like the Communities Organized for Public Service, were closed to the public due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the documents have not been digitized for public use as of 2022. In the future, the researcher will need to interview Chicano activists from this period to ask about how they directly perceived success at the time, what resources were available to them, and their relationship with local government. The researcher will also need to travel to additional archives once those are open to the public.

The second limitation of this study is the limited number of cases. As written, there are only two cities included in the study. This limitation is due to resource and time constraints. Adding a third case will assist in finding out if the findings of this study hold in another city and thus are generalizable. Denver, Colorado, is the best city to include in the expansion of this study. The Chicano Movement was active in this city and was home to the well-known movement leader Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales (Acuña 1988). Numerous Chicano Movement publications in Denver were operating in the 1970s, including *La Luz* and *Metamorphosis*. Those movement publications can be obtained and analyzed, as included in this study. The *Denver Post* archive has daily publications from the 1970s available via the Denver Public Library. The availability of these primary sources makes Denver an optimal case to add. The addition of this case will ensure the validity of the results and provide insight into the generalizability of this study. There are limitations to this study, but they can be addressed thoughtfully and systematically.

Future Directions

The most important future direction in the study of Chicano and Mexican-American movements is to include more cases and see if the findings in this study hold in different eras. This study focused exclusively on the Chicano Movement at the local level. Since the 1970s, politics has been nationalized in the United States, significantly impacting how politics is conducted. For example, what were once low-engagement school board elections and dreary meetings have become nationalized battlegrounds that have included threats of violence during the Covid-19 pandemic. How does this nationalization impact perceptions of success

versus what is happening on the ground in the community for Mexican-American activists who are still trying to improve education in their neighborhood schools?

Technological advancements have made communication and coordination of movements more accessible than ever. Social media enable social movements to organize even in repressive and violent political regimes (Tudoroiu 2014). Applying the theories of social movement form to modern Mexican American SMOs will enable us to see if the finding in this study is not only geographically generalizable but also over time. Why might technological changes matter for movement form? First, where movements build and receive social capital is no longer tied to a specific institution or area. Activists have the opportunity to reach a broader audience than ever before. Movements may be better able to go and recruit across generations and other groups now. The barriers that limited Chicano activists in Los Angeles are no longer there as a limiting factor; as such, form may be more fluid and flexible. The type of group cooperation between COPS and other groups in San Antonio may be even easier to achieve now too.

Elected officials and even local governments communicate with the electorate via social media. This ease of access, at least the presentation of access, may encourage SMOs to take a more formal inside track to achieve their goals. However, missteps in communications by elected officials and government can go viral, and activists may consider these avenues closed based on these official communications.

Most importantly, police brutality is a significant issue in the current political environment. The Black Lives Matter movement has increased public awareness of the deadly action by law enforcement toward people of color. The question of how this increased

awareness impacts the strategic decisions of modern Mexican American activists has not been the focus of political science studies. This lack of focus is significant as Latinos are disproportionately victims of police brutality (Foster-Frau 2021). This study and others have illustrated the inability of Chicanos to work in tandem with Black activists and organizations during the 1970s. Future studies should also focus on answering how police violence impacts political opportunity perceptions and the ability of Latinos to work with other racial groups to address this critical issue.

The Latino population is the fastest-growing ethnic group in the U.S. and can potentially be a significant political force in U.S. politics. The backlash to the actions taken by the Trump Administration highlights this collective action potential with increased Latino and Latino immigrant participation (Zepeda-Millán and Wallace 2018; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020). The continued collective action of this group warrants serious study in the field of political science. I also argue that because social movements are an integral part of the political process, they deserve the same scholarly attention as participatory actions like voting. The right to collaborate, voice your concern, publish movement materials, and petition the government is all enshrined in the 1st Amendment. Latinos have shown that they are more than willing to exercise these rights. If we do not give Latino collective action the scholarly attention it deserves, we will not be able to understand political phenomena in American politics truly.

Appendix A: List of Chicano Movement Publications by City

Los Angeles	Year(s)	Issues	San Antonio	Year(s)	Issues
El Popo	1971 - 1975	18	The Chicano Times	1973 – 1978	23
La Voz de Eastmont	1973	1	La Voz de Consejo	1972	2

Appendix B: List of Chicano Studies Programs for Los Angeles and San Antonio

Los Angeles	Ethnic Studies
San Fernando Valley State College (California State University – Northridge)	Yes
California State University, Los Angeles	Yes
The University of California, Los Angeles	Yes
East Los Angeles College	Yes

San Antonio	Ethnic Studies
San Antonio Community College	Mixed
University of Texas at San Antonio (1976)	No

Appendix C: List of Oral Histories and Archives

Tejano Voices - University of Texas at Arlington Center from Mexican American Studies, interviews conducted by Gutiérrez, José Angel.

Civil Rights in Black & Brown Oral History Project - Texas Christian University History Department, Director Krochmal, Max

Southwest Voter Registration Education Project Records, MS 452 - University of Texas at San Antonio Libraries Special Collections

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