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THE FORMULATION OF ARMY RESERVE FORCES POLICY: ITS SETTING AMIDST PRESSURE GROUP ACTIVITY

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CHARLES DALE STORY

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THE FORMULATION OF ARMY RESERVE FORCES POLICY: ITS SETTING

AMIDST PRESSURE GROUP ACTIVITY

APPROVED BY

Joseph C. Pray

Corty M. Carey

Virgil G. Wilhite

Rufus G. Hall Jr

J. Hack

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

PREFACE

This dissertation is a study of a portion of the panorama of mid-twentieth century military manpower policy. Although there has not been much study of any of the aspects of military policy, manpower research has been especially meager. Partially because of the shortage of information, the nation has yet to make any solid decisions on manpower policy. For lack of a policy, we continue selective service. Unknowingly, we allow our administrators to bring us to the brink of universal military training. We still have only a vague idea of the desirability of a big Reserve program.

This study is an exploration into the policy-making structure of the Army Reserve Forces with particular emphasis on the role of the pressure groups. After setting the stage of postwar Reserve activities, it describes the locale of pressure group efforts--in the administrative hierarchy, in Congress and in three special boards. Special attention is paid to the National Guard Association, composed of approximately 35,000 National Guard officers, and the Reserve Officers Association, composed of about 65,000 Reserve officers of the various military services. The Regular Army, as a pressure group, is also considered. An inquiry is made into the nature of these interest groups, their goals, and the extent to which they have influenced Army Reserve Forces policy,

particularly in five agencies of the Department of the Army.

Reserve Forces policy has been made in a milieu dominated by intrinsic, technical factors such as the suitability of Reserve Forces in atomic warfare, the difficulties in keeping ready to fight, recruiting troubles, problems of federalism, the deficient numbers of enlisted men, the over-supply of high-ranking officers, and the general functional problems growing out of the cold war. No attempt is made to analyze any of these basic problems, except as vehicles to show the influence of interest groups.

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Dale Story

Norman, Oklahoma
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THE FORMULATION OF ARMY RESERVE FORCES POLICY: ITS SETTING AMIDST PRESSURE GROUP ACTIVITY

CHAPTER I

THE ARMY RESERVE FORCES IN THE POSTWAR ERA

The Reserve Forces of the Army of the United States, which includes the National Guard, continue to have a controversial role. This is for a variety of reasons. There is a widespread conviction that "weekend warriors" can never be trained to the degree necessary to win a modern war where almost every job requires considerable technical ability. Numerous military authorities support this view. Air Brigadier General Dale O. Smith's provocative volume, United States Military Doctrine,[1] stresses professionalism as one of the fundamental necessities of mid-twentieth century defense. Samuel P. Huntington has put military professionalism at the crux of the civil-military relationship.[2] In a similar vein, the celebrated military analyst for the New York Times, Hanson Baldwin, has said that "any legislation which strengthens the reserves at the expense of the regulars is not worth the price."[3]

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[1]Dale O. Smith, United States Military Doctrine (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1955).

[2]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 7.

[3]New York Times, June 9, 1945, p. 6.

Walter Millis, editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune has severely criticized reliance on reserve forces:

> While the British were disbanding their reserve divisions, the United States was adopting the National Reserve Act of 1955, which contemplated (among other things) a force of no less than thirty-seven National Guard and Reserve divisions--none, however, to be maintained at full strength or with full equipment, and the whole force requiring anywhere from three months to a year before it could be made combat ready.[4]

Several other authorities including Dr. Vannevar Bush, wartime chief of research and development, and presidential candidate Adlai E. Stevenson have expressed a doubt of the value of bulky reserves in an atomic-powered army.

Such observers emphasize the likelihood that nuclear weapons will dominate any future hostilities. They speak of the failure to build bigger bombs and bigger airplanes to carry them as tantamount to national suicide. They see victory as stemming almost entirely from the scientific laboratory. They discount the possibility of outlawing the strategic atomic bomb, and they claim the maintenance of a large ground army is not justified.

To the extent that a clear-cut policy was announced, this was the view of the Eisenhower administration. From 1953 to 1955, it came to be called the "new look" in military affairs. The policy emphasized atomic weapons--tactical as well as strategic--whereby United States power would be strengthened while manpower levels held steady. It recognized the futility of competing with Russia for manpower superiority.

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[4]Walter Millis, Arms and Men, A Study of American Military History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), p. 354.

The opposing view calls for readiness to fight "limited wars" in which, for some reason, nuclear weapons are not used or at least are used only in tactical situations. The Korean War, where 33,629 men died in a local war without the use of nuclear weapons, is cited as historical proof that "limited wars" can occur. Deterrence, the believers in this concept say, must involve more than deterrence against atomic bombs. It is not a case of total atomic war or total peace--there are gray areas. The United States must be ready with tremendous numbers of ground troops in case a "limited war" comes. The Reserve, it is claimed, can fulfill this need.

The dangers of a "no middle ground" policy between total atomic war and total peace were pointed out by Henry A. Kissinger, who in 1957 achieved recognition as an authority on military-diplomatic cold war strategy after publication of his influential book, Nuclear Warfare and Foreign Policy. Here, and on other occasions, he asked for a "military and diplomatic framework which would cause war, if it does come, to take less absolute forms which might spare humanity at least the worst horrors of nuclear conflict."[5]

As of 1958, the technical military questions are as yet unanswered. Little is known, for instance, of the need for massive numbers of infantry troops where only tactical nuclear weapons are used. It may be that even those most anxious about small local wars will find such wars fought as artillery duels--using atomic cannon--without even the need for infantry to hold ground taken by the cannon. With such

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[5]Henry A. Kissinger, "Controls, Inspections and Limited War," Reporter, 16 (June 13, 1957), 14.

questions unresolved by either military or political decision-makers, the tendency has been to steer a middle course. Many people, still seeking answers, compromised by supporting the "new look" while simultaneously speaking well of a large ground force composed mostly of Reserves.

Even the 1957 chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, generally considered the architect of the "new look," hesitates to fully de-emphasize the Reserves. On January 30, 1957, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, he spoke of the existence of a large Reserve as a "possible deterrent to an impending war."[6] In answer to a question by Representative George H. Mahon, Democrat of Texas, on whether Reserve Forces are still needed, Radford said, "New-type warfare, in which atomic weapons might be used, downgrade the importance of the inactive and standby Reserves, but makes the ready Reserve more valuable . . . an even more important role for the Reserves would be the use to restore order in the event of a surprise attack."

A more comprehensive statement of the role of the Army Reserve Forces in current plans has been made by Army Chief of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor. Speaking before the 1957 National Convention of the Reserve Officers Association at Santa Barbara, California, he asked that the United States be ready for any eventuality--any type of war. Such a view gives the Reserves a formidable place in our defense. "The enemy must see clearly," General Taylor said, "that if he engages in any aggression, he will be met quickly and decisively by Army men on the

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[6]Army Times (Reserve Edition), May 4, 1957, p. 1.

ground, standing between him and the objective of his aggression." He described the over-all system of American defense as follows:

> In the first line of national defense will be our Army forces abroad. . . . If these forces become engaged, we must come to their aid promptly and effectively. This need for a ready reinforcement in the United States requires us to maintain a group of active Army divisions at home which we call the Strategic Army Force. . . . At units, that because of their requirement for readiness there is no job for the reserves in the important strategic force. I take an opposite view--I believe we can and should use some reserves in this force.[7]

This concept of immediate use of the Reserve is relatively new. Although the National Guard boasts of three centuries of service to the states and nation, and although the Army Reserve organization has existed since 1916, neither organization has had much practical importance in war plans, so far as immediate use is concerned. For most of our national history up to World War I, the Guard has been used primarily for state functions, and national mobilization was usually accompanied by legal and practical complications. Even in the World War II mobilization, the Guard's effectiveness was riddled by the discharge, on the eve of war, of many husbands and fathers.

The Army Reserve never amounted to much more than a list of officers who wanted, in case of war, to retain their officer status. The first mention of an Army Reserve occurred in 1908 when Congress provided for the appointment of doctors of medicine as Reserve officers in the Army Medical Corps. The Reserve, as an organization, was created in the National Defense Act of 1916. It was for the principal purpose of shepherding together the graduates of the new Reserve Officer Training Corps

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[7]"Objective: Readiness," Army Reservist, 3 (Sept., 1957), 4.

and the Civilian Military Training Camps. These two programs continued to produce officers who received almost no more training after graduation and who were definitely not ready for immediate use in battle.

The Army Reserve and National Guard have always been small in size. In 1921, with nearly all World War I officers eligible, the Army Reserve amounted to only 66,000.[8] In 1929, it reached a peak pre-World War II strength of 110,000, and this included the Air Corps Reserve, then a part of the Army. The National Guard in 1939 numbered 175,000.

Planning for a post-World War II Army civilian component program began in 1944. General of the Army George C. Marshall, wartime Chief of Staff, issued War Department Circular 347 on August 25, 1944, which was to be "the basis for all plans for a postwar peace establishment." He described the goal as follows:

> The type of military institution through which the national manpower can be developed is based upon the conception of a professional peace establishment (no larger than necessary to meet normal peacetime requirements) to be reenforced in time of emergency by organized units drawn from a citizen reserve, effectively organized for this purpose in time of peace; with full opportunity for competent citizen soldiers to acquire practical experience through temporary active service and to rise by successive steps to any rank for which they can definitely qualify; and with specific facilities for such practical experience, qualification, and advancement definitely organized as essential and predominating characteristics of the peace establishment.

General Marshall's Circular 347 (1944) was the basis of more specific policies[9] issued late in 1945. These were compiled in the traditional staff methods and presented to Marshall, who in turn got them

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[8]Col. Arthur Roth, "Development of the Army Reserve Forces," Military Affairs, XVII (Spring, 1953), 3.

[9]Approved War Department Policies of October 13, 1945 Affecting the National Guard and Organized Reserve.

approved by Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson.[10] However, according to Section 5 of the National Defense Act of 1920,[11] all policies affecting the National Guard must be submitted for recommendations to the general staff committee on National Guard policy, composed of an equal number of National Guard officers and Army staff members. The 1945 policies were formulated through this process.

These policies were prepared at a time when military appropriations were generous. Also, at the time, there was an assumption that a universal military training bill would be passed, thus removing all worries of an adequate source of manpower. Consequently, the planning eventually proved to be highly unrealistic. The troop basis for the National Guard was set at 475,000 men of whom 278,000 were to be organized into 27 divisions at either 75 per cent or 40 per cent strength. The Organized Reserve Corps was to have 579,000 men of whom 96,000 were to be organized into 25 divisions. These were to be maintained at 200 per cent officer strength and ten per cent enlisted strength.[12]

The unrealistic and unattainable requirements of the 1945 policies eventually became apparent. Clarifying policies were published December 13, 1946, and a complete revision of the troop basis occurred in 1949. Under the new doctrine, the National Guard was to be the primary mobilization day force for the Reserve Forces. The Organized Reserve Corps was to organize only those combat units which the Regular

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[10]File 326.6 Organized Reserve Corps (1945), Departmental Records Branch, contains staff papers on this subject.

[11]Department of the Army, Act of June 4, 1920 (41 Stat. 759).

[12]New York Times, May 1, 1949, p. 41.

Army or the National Guard could not organize, equip and train. Needless to say, such a plan remained controversial as long as it lasted. As early as September, 1946, Brigadier General E. A. Evans, the executive director of the Reserve Officers Association, had traveled over the West declaring that "the War Department was not being absolutely on-the-level with Reserve officers."[13]

The program hit other snags. Although the law seemingly required World War II veterans to be transferred to the Reserve Forces, this was not accomplished. Section 3 (c) of the Selective Service Act of 1940 required each draftee upon his release from the service to be:

> . . . transferred to a reserve component of the land or naval forces of the United States until he attains the age of forty-five or until the expiration of a period of ten years after such transfer. . . .

The Army chose to disregard this requirement and consequently was severely criticized by Reserve enthusiasts. Colonel William H. Neblett, former president of the Reserve Officers Association, declared among other things that the Army's disregard of the provision was "illegal."[14]

Even if Colonel Neblett's wishes had been followed, the Army Reserve would have amounted to little more than a bulky, overflowing pool of veterans, many of whom wanted no more contact with military activities.

At the end of the war, as before, the Organized Reserve Corps had no organization, traditions, leaders or facilities. It is true that mandatory transfer to the Reserves might have encouraged more men to

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[13]Letter from Brig. Gen. Frank Merrill (6th Army) to Brig. Gen. E. S. Bres (Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs), Sept. 18, 1946, Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

[14]William H. Neblett, Pentagon Politics (New York: Pageant Press, 1953), p. 22.

participate in Reserve Forces training, but it would have helped only slightly. There was a general deep-seated antagonism for things of a military nature; too many Reservists had been mistreated. Memories were too fresh of inequities in their original appointments, mal-assignments, deprivation of "civilian" liberties and inadequate leadership. The few who did seek appointment in the Army Reserve Forces were frequently ridiculed by their former military associates.

Colonel Neblett's plan would have made it possible, however, to maintain contact with the thousands of former officers and men who, at some later date, might have been persuaded to attend training as a citizen-soldier. As it happened, thousands of veterans were lost to the Reserves.

In the first stages of the Russian-American cold war, the Army became alarmed that almost no information was available concerning the officers and men who had accepted Reserve commissions at the close of the war. Questionnaires were sent out by registered mail to determine which persons remained "available to the Organized Reserve Corps program."[15] This nationwide survey revealed that about seventy per cent of the officers currently on the Organized Reserve Corps rolls (but not National Guard) desired to remain there. The remainder desired discharge. At the time, Brigadier General Wendell Westover, Executive for Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, said in a memorandum to Lieutenant General Willard S. Paul, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration,

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[15]File 326.2 Organized Reserve Corps (1948), Department Records Branch, Department of the Army.

that the number who desired discharge was "lower than anticipated."[16] The Organized Reserve Corps had dropped, indeed, to a low ebb.

It is impossible to pin-point the cause of the troubles. The Regular Army has been accused of sabotaging the Reserve program. However, its force commitments around the world, even with the best of intentions, might have made the construction of a big Reserve program almost beyond its reach, considering the resources and facilities available. At least, very little was done.

The Navy, on the other hand, started off the postwar period with a well developed Reserve plan. Money was requested from Congress for the erection of armories; equipment was supplied by the Navy department, and units were established throughout the United States. Even before the beginning of World War II, the Navy department had achieved the passage of a law providing for drill pay for each participant in the naval program.

The Navy's enthusiasm did not spread to the Army. There was no drill pay, no retirement program, no accident or death benefits for training mishaps. There were no government-owned armories in existence for the Organized Reserve Corps, and none were being built. The National Guard had only those buildings financed exclusively by the state governments. Equipment in both components was inadequate, although millions of pieces of World War II production were being junked or sold as surplus.

The situation brought many complaints from enthusiastic reser-

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[16] Ibid., June 11, 1948.

vists. The president of the Ohio Reserve Officers Association declared publicly, as early as 1946, that the program was getting off to a bad start in the Pentagon.[17] Brigadier General Donald B. Adams, 1946-47 national president of the Reserve Officers Association, complained strongly at a commanders' conference in the Pentagon on January 22, 1947, about the disgruntled and discouraged attitudes of Reservists. Almost simultaneously, Hanson Baldwin attacked the Pentagon's "unrealistic" Reserve policies.[18] He spoke of the Oklahoma National Guard as the one exception which has "led the Army in the postwar reorganization of the Guard, due in considerable measure to the leadership of Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain, a native Oklahoman."

By 1948, the Pentagon staff agencies, especially the Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, were being showered with complaints. The 1948 files for the office reveal many bitter letters from high-ranking reservists, and usually these reservists were not bashful about writing to their congressman about the situation. The office spent considerable time answering the polite inquiries and embarrassing questions sent over from Capitol Hill. In other Pentagon offices, there seemed to be little concern about the dilapidated Reserve.

The Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs was relatively incapable of doing much about the complaints or fostering improvements. The office was low in the Pentagon hierarchy and restricted

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[17]File 322 Org. (1946), Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

[18]New York Times, March 17, 1947, p. 8.

to the performance of staff functions under the leadership of several Regular Army assistant chiefs of staff and deputy chiefs of staff--all of whom were more interested in preparing against Communist aggression overseas.

When questioned on the lack of progress among the Reserve components, the Army denied any lack of enthusiasm for a strong program; the problem was simply the lack of resources. With declining appropriations, the Army declared that every available dollar was needed to maintain occupation troops abroad in addition to a minimum Regular Army "mobilization day" force at home. Regular officers could not be spared to serve as instructors in Reserve units, and there was no money for constructing armories or recruiting reservists.

Many compromises were suggested. At one point, there was a willingness to accept, as better than nothing at all, a system whereby Reserve officers would organize, with almost no surveillance by Army authorities, into informal discussion groups.[19] In big cities, such groups would be segregated according to branch of service. In less populated areas, there would be only one big composite group. These organizations would supposedly "be able to train themselves" and would "require only the use of a meeting place and the official sanction of the local reserve headquarters." The idea was never implemented.

The discouraging situation was further complicated by disagree-

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[19]Memorandum to the Director of Organization and Training from the Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, signed by Colonel Charles A. Miller, Sept. 25, 1946, Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

ment between the Organized Reserve Corps and the National Guard. In the approved policies of 1945 and 1946 the priority position of the Guard over the Organized Reserve Corps was emphasized, and it was a constant source of bitterness. The Guard had been allotted more combat divisions, where the greater part of the positions of high military rank are found. In addition, personnel priorities were given to the National Guard; the law provided for draft exemptions for its men, while Organized Reserve Corps men continued to be vulnerable to the draft.

The tended also to be some envy on the part of Organized Reserve Corps men for the Guard's traditional place of prestige and power. The Organized Reserve was a postwar organization while the National Guard boasted of three centuries of service to state and nation. At almost any minute, the Guard and its friends could manufacture tremendous pressure on Congress--usually enough to defeat any unfavorable legislation. While it hesitated to engage the Pentagon in a power struggle, the Guard had little fear of defeat in any bout with the youthful Organized Reserve.

Other complications, of great importance in explaining the postwar troubles of the civilian components, stemmed from the "military federalism" contained in the militia clause of the United States Constitution. The founding fathers had sought a "well-regulated militia"[20] in each of the states. They gave to Congress the power to provide for organizing, arming, and training the militia, but reserved to the states, respectively, the appointment of all officers and the actual training

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[20]U. S. Constitution, Art. 4, sec. 8, clause 16.

of the troops.[21] Under rules which were developed during the last century, the Guard could be called into national service by the President of the United States. Naturally, the frictions resulting from the system were tremendous. As will be later shown, it has appeared, on occasion, that the National Guard and Regular Army have been more interested in fighting each other than in preparing to fight a common enemy.

The historical evolution of the antagonism was affected greatly by the increased willingness of the national government, after 1900, to subsidize National Guard operations. Since that time, the use of financial subsidies has helped to bend the Guard to the national will. Still, however, the National Guard has continued to be administered entirely by state personnel largely for the performance of state functions. Particular criticism erupted sporadically over the use of National Guard troops by state authorities in activities distasteful to the nation as a whole. The most prominent examples concern their use to curtail labor strikes and to prevent integration of Negroes into Southern white schools.[22]

The handicaps arising from the dual status of the National Guard, as well as other roadblocks to an effective Reserve program, caused the Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, to appoint a board in November, 1947 to study the entire Reserve Forces program. It was named the Committee on Civilian Components, but came to be popularly called the "Gray

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[21]National Guard Association, Our Nation's National Guard (Washington: National Guard Association, 1954), p. 23.

[22]B. M. Rich and P. H. Burch, Jr., "The Changing Role of the National Guard," American Political Science Review, 50 (Sept., 1956), 702.

board," after its chairman, Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of the Army and tobacco millionaire. The board's duties, which included the determination of recommendations on all branches of the service, were carried out at sixty-five meetings in which eighty-nine witnesses were heard. The recommendations, issued June 30, 1948, were sufficiently drastic to produce news headlines for several days. The board suggested ending the dual status of the National Guard. It condemned the bickering, recriminations, factionalism and stalemate resulting from state control of the Guard.[23] The Organized Reserve Corps and the National Guard should be merged to form the Army Reserve Forces,[24] the board said. The states should be expected to organize home guard units for local emergency purposes, as they did while the Guard was in national service during World War II, under the militia clause of the United States Constitution.

Active opposition to the Gray board report came from governors, the National Guard Association, and state military chiefs. The National Guard Association took the starring role in the controversy. It declared the denial of the Guard's dual status was a violation of the spirit of the Constitution and was, militarily speaking, an unwise recommendation. "The Association eloquently reaffirmed the tradition of the citizen soldier, completely overlooking the fact that a national militia was no less composed of citizens than a state militia."[25]

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[23]Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 312.

[24]Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 9.

[25]Louis Smith, op. cit., p. 312.

A large percentage of the Gray board's recommendations were eventually put into action, but the federalization of the National Guard was rapidly abandoned. It was a Presidential election year--not a propitious time to infuriate strong National Guard interests.

The ever-growing chaos in world affairs and the increasing dissatisfaction of the Reserve Officers Association and the National Guard Association produced a tense state in Reserve affairs in 1948 and 1949. In a well calculated move, the Pentagon installed the first reservist to occupy the post into the office of the Executive of Reserve and ROTC Affairs. His persistent nudging for a stronger Reserve program started early in his tenure and matured into strong demands before the end of 1948. On September 18, 1948, in a memorandum to the General Staff Committee on Reserve and National Guard Policy, he asked that the Army take notice of his April 15, 1948 recommendations. "More than fifty per cent of the officer personnel of the Organized Reserve Corps has been lost to the program,"[26] he told the committee's chairman. "There must be an overhaul of the Approved Policies of 1945 and 1946. The penalties accruing from the over-long adherence to these policies are now clearly defined." He asked for the rescission of all priorities giving preferential treatment to the National Guard over that portion of the Organized Reserve Corps which is necessary for the mobilization base. "The conclusion is inescapable," Wendell Westover, the Executive for Reserve and ROTC

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[26]Memorandum from the Executive, Reserve and ROTC Affairs, to the Chairman, General Staff Committee on Organized Reserve and National Guard Policy, dated Sept. 16, 1948. Files 326 (16 Sept. 48), Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

Affairs, said, "that the prolonged period of relative stagnation of the Reserve component while the National Guard has ridden a gravy train of priorities must end without delay."[27]

The immediate effect of Westover's efforts was the publication on October 29, 1948, of the Revised Clarification of Department of the Army Policies Pertaining to the National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps, but his other goals were not accomplished. Nevertheless, his demands spurred on some general attempts to improve the riddled Reserves. Among other bits of progress, the Republican 80th Congress in its last days investigated the situation without much effect except to spotlight the problem in the public mind. The passage of the Selective Service Act of 1948, however, was of major importance. It gave Reserve obligations to draftees being released from active service.[28]

Of still more consequence was an order issued by President Harry S. Truman on October 15, 1948, to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal

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[27]Ibid., p. 2.

[28]The Selective Service Act of 1948, enacted June 24, 1948, provided that men from 19 to 26 years old, who were inducted for twenty-one months should serve in a Reserve component for five years, but they were not required to render active duty service or attend drills or classes. By enlisting for three years in an organized unit, a man could cut down his five year obligation, or he could discharge it by remaining an extra year on active duty. The Reserve obligation was similar for those who volunteered in the Regular Army for twenty-one months. Eighteen year olds could enlist for one year up to a maximum of 160,000 men, but their Reserve obligation was six years during which time they could be recalled for one month each year for active duty training. These men were required to fill any vacancies which occurred in an organized Reserve unit, and in such a case their obligation was cut to four years. Failure to accept appointment in an Organized Reserve vacancy resulted in liability for recall to active duty for twelve months. Since enlistment in an organized unit of a Reserve component meant deferment from active duty, the law had the effect of increasing the voluntary enlistments, or at least this was the intended effect of the legislation.

requiring a report within sixty days on the condition of the Reserves. Hanson Baldwin referred to the presidential command as "possibly an aberration of Major General Harry Vaughan,"[29] the President's military aide and a staunch reservist. There was other speculation at the time on the origin of the order. It was more likely a subtle and deft stroke by the Reserve Officers Association lobby, and, considering the impending presidential election, it probably was intended by the administration to pick up the political support of thousands of Reserve officers.

The executive order was couched in urgent tones, so much so that it was reportedly reworded at the last minute to avoid alarming the population.[30] It said:

> 1. The Secretary of Defense and the head of each department in the National Military Establishment, shall proceed without delay utilizing every practicable resource of the regular components of the armed forces, to organize all Reserve component units, and to train such additional individuals now or hereafter members of the Active Reserve, as may be required for the national security; and to establish vigorous and progressive programs of the Reserve components, including the National Guard.
>
> 2. The Secretary of Defense shall within sixty days after the date of this order submit to the President a report showing action which has been taken by the National Military Establishment in respect hereof, and any proposed legislation or other measures deemed necessary or appropriate in the interest of the maximum effectiveness of the reserve components of the Armed Forces.
>
> 3. Every citizen is urged to do his utmost in aiding the development of effective Reserve components of our Armed Forces, and every person who is a member of a Reserve component of the Armed Forces or who is qualified to become one is urged to take an active part in building up the strong and highly trained Reserve forces which are so vital to the defense of the United

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[29] New York Times, Oct. 18, 1948, p. 9.

[30] Time Magazine, 52 (Nov. 1, 1948), 24.

States.[31]

(signed) Harry S. Truman

Accompanying the Order was a letter to Forrestal suggesting:

> . . . (1) the assignment of an active, capable, high-ranking officer to head the Reserve program in each department. (2) the assignment of an adequate number of young vigorous officers as instructors and administrative officers in programs of Reserve training. (3) increased attention on the part of all General Staff divisions to planning and directing Reserve activities and reviewing accomplishments thereunder. (4) the development and institution of training programs . . . and (5) the provision of more adequate training facilities. . . .

Secretary Forrestal's reply, dated December 14, 1948, was compiled from reports rendered by the various departments within the National Military Establishment after the interchange of comments among the secretaries.[32] John H. Ohley, Special Assistant to Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royal, prepared most of the Army report, which followed a basic outline laid down by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray. The report told what had been done, what can be done by the Army, and what decisions must be made in Forrestal's office.

Simultaneously feverish actions began in the Department of the Army. As directed by the President, the executive order itself was given wide distribution among Reservists scattered throughout the nation. Approval was given to the field by teletype on October 20th to initiate procedures to organize substantially all of the Organized Reserve Corps units of the current eighteen division Army plan, which had lain unimple-

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[31] Executive Order 10007, Oct. 15, 1948.

[32] File 326 (5 Nov 48), Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

mented so long in Pentagon files. A survey of facilities suitable as locations for 1949 summer camps was begun "with a view of expansion." A program of mobilization assignments for reservists not in organized units was put into action in accordance with plans announced July 2, 1948.[33] Major Charles W. Ryder was appointed Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff (Army) for Civilian Components, and weekly meetings were scheduled in Army officialdom to coordinate planning for the Reserve Forces.

The General Staff Committee on Reserve and National Guard Policy was convened from November 8th to the 13th, 1948, to consider the President's order. As might be expected of an advisory board composed mostly of members of the civilian components, it recommended drastic actions to accomplish the President's objectives. They asked for the appointment of a special troop basis board to reconsider the 1946 policies on the composition of the mobilization day force. Even more spectacular was their recommendation to place an officer in charge of the Reserves on the level of the deputy chiefs of staff within the Army organization, together with other organizational changes. The assignment of "2,500 additional young and vigorous instructors and assistants" to the Reserve program was also recommended.

Almost all of these recommendations were received with a "we will do the best we can" attitude in Regular Army circles, but several were "deferred pending further study."

One General Staff committee recommendation that was carried

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[33]Department of the Army Circular 199 (1948).

through to completion was a reappraisal of the 1946 troop basis. By 1949, discontent over the favoritism shown to the National Guard had brought the appointment of a special study board in the Department of the Army. It was a distinguished group of Americans, headed by former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, and included the presidents of the Reserve Officers Association and the National Guard Association. When the report of the board was rendered, the committee had again given the Organized Reserve Corps a place in the third line of defense--after the Regular Army and the National Guard. As a result, Brigadier General Westover "bitterly opposed" the recommendations espoused by the group.[34] Colonel Clarence E. Barnes, president of the Reserve Officers Association, signed the report but simultaneously wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Army which was a virtual disclaimer of his earlier approval. Colonel Barnes termed the report "a limited and restricted approach not meeting the requirements of national security." Instead, he recited his approval of the efforts of General Westover.

There were rumors at the time that the Byrnes report would never be implemented. They proved to be true, for after the Korean War, the Organized Reserve Corps was allowed plans for expansion.

All the while, the Reserve Forces were climbing in actual strength, getting better organized and improving generally, but the process was slow and tedious. Worst of all, the program seemed to be without adept leadership. Pentagon responsibility was vague and nebulous, and there was no leadership at all to coordinate the Army Reserve activi-

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[34]New York Times, June 12, 1949, p. 19.

ties with those of the other services. The Navy, Air Force and Marines were all constructing armories, recruiting personnel, opening district offices--each without knowledge of the other's activities. The situation stimulated the creation by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson of the Civilian Components Policy Board on May 20, 1949. Its purpose was to develop over-all policies and coordinate and maintain surveillance over the plans, policies and programs of the civilian components. It was to have a civilian chairman, a military executive and eighteen members, only six of whom were to be on active duty with the regular services. The others were to be non-active duty Reservists. It was to have a staff of approximately eight officers and several clerks.

Due largely to the wide scope of authority originally allotted to the board, the military services complained, and a delay until October 3, 1949, occurred before the board's first meeting.[35] Trouble was also experienced in finding a suitable civilian chairman. Finally, William T. Faricy, president of the Association of American Railroads, accepted the part-time, uncompensated job, and began the effort to work out a set of priorities to remedy the numerous ills of the Reserve.

Also in 1949, the military services commenced an expanded armory-building program, from which the Army Reserve Forces were to derive great benefit. Previously, the Organized Reserve Corps had no armories, except those leased from private owners. The National Guard armories, built mostly before the war, were becoming inadequate. Furthermore, the post-World War II troop basis was so large, few states could afford an

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[35]New York Times, Sept. 21, 1949, p. 20.

adequate building program. The states, realizing the size of the Guard was already well beyond their own needs, refused to take responsibility for the construction of armories. Until 1949, efforts to work out a system of financial cooperation between the national government and the state governments were unsuccessful. Consequently, armory construction was negligible.

In early 1949 a plan was formulated in the Department of Defense whereby the national government would pay the complete cost of all Organized Reserve Corps armories and seventy-five per cent of the costs of National Guard armories. The armed services committees began hearings on the plan in March, 1949.[36] The Secretary of Defense had called it a "priority measure" but in May, 1949, withdrew this classification from the bill. It was subsequently dropped from the legislative program. When Congress opened in 1950, the defense secretary again restated the "critical importance"[37] of the armory program, and the bill was enacted into law.[38] It authorized the appropriation of $500,000,000 for armory construction for all the services, with the division of funds among the services to be accomplished by the Secretary of Defense.

Several other attempts were made in the years previous to the Korean conflict to enhance the Reserve Forces. In late December, 1949, Secretary of Defense Johnson decreed that all Regular Army, Navy, and

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[36] S. 960, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

[37] U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Facilities Act of 1950, S. Rept. 1785, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, accompany S. 960, p. 3.

[38] P. L. 783, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

Air Force officers would be expected to serve at least two years during their career with the Reserve Forces if they expected to attain high military rank. The new policy, made on recommendation of the new Civilian Components Policy Board, recognized the distaste which many regular officers held for civilian component duty. The jobs required tremendous psychological adjustment. Officers accustomed to "commanding" sometimes found it difficult to find the persuasion necessary to manage a Reserve unit well. If he were too demanding, some irate Reserve colonel would likely complain about the young officer to higher military authorities or even to a congressman. Such episodes might be the single entry on an officer's personnel records which would prevent promotion to high military command. Johnson's new policy was intended to reverse this trend.

At this point in its development, the Reserve Forces were shocked by the outbreak of the Korean Conflict. It broke out in June, 1950 when the United States possessed a standing army of only 591,487 officers and men.[39] Under existing law there seemed to be no legal authority whereby the President could mobilize the Army Reserve Forces (in the absence of a declaration of war or national emergency)[40] except the Dick Act of 1903 which allowed the National Guard to be mobilized in cases of invasion or rebellion. The Congress quickly placed a clause in the Selective Service Extension Act of 1950[41] allowing the recall of re-

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[39]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, National Reserve Plan, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, on H. R. 5426, Appendix, p. 337.

[40]Ibid., p. 337.

[41]P. L. 599, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

servists for not to exceed twenty-one months. In 1952, the period was increased to twenty-four months.[42]

In the one and one-half years after July 1, 1950, there were 334,000 members of the Organized Reserve Corps back in uniform, and by 1952 eight National Guard divisions had been recalled to active national service. Two of the divisions eventually sailed to Europe, two went to Asia, and four remained in the United States.

There were great inequities involved in the recall procedures. Delays in reporting for duty were permitted many members, but others found themselves fighting in the Korean hills almost immediately. The process of closing businesses and leaving school was in many cases a great sacrifice. Even those reservists not called immediately were hurt by the denial of employment and loans. Numerous members of the Volunteer Reserve, who were not assigned to units and were not receiving pay, were among the first to be called. Previous Army policy had envisioned the recall of organized units first, to be followed by the individuals in the Volunteer Reserve. As it happened in the case of the Korean partial mobilization, the great need was for individual replacements. To avoid breaking up the organized units, a policy which might have endangered national security, the Volunteer Reserves were mobilized, although many of them had received no training since World War II.

The inequities appear even greater when it is remembered that draft deferred persons, mostly students and fathers, although they had

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[42]P. L. 51, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

never served in the military service, continued to be deferred while World War II veterans were returned to combat.

The Department of Defense, engulfed in criticism, announced in late October, 1950 that insofar as conditions would permit, "a reservist called to active duty would be allowed thirty days from the time he was called until the date he would report for active duty."[43] In addition, the three military departments were told to determine their manpower requirements six months in advance of recall, and that due notice would be sent to the reservists concerned.[44]

There was considerable agitation to have a firm recall policy written into law, and during congressional hearings on the matter in 1951, spokesmen for the Department of Defense promised to have a new comprehensive Reserve bill in the hands of Congress within six months. Actually work had been underway in the Reserve establishment on such a bill for well over a year, but had been cast aside in the wake of much bigger problems associated with the war in Korea.[45] After the promise was made, the responsibility for making the final preparations for the legislation was handed to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, formerly called the Civilian Components Policy Board. After much deliberation, the board recommended to the Secretary of Defense a number of general policies affecting the Reserve. The policies were approved by Secretary

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[43]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, on H. R. 4860, p. 7.

[44]Ibid., p. 7.

[45]Ibid., p. 475.

George C. Marshall and published April 6, 1951.[46] They were the basis of the proposed Armed Forces Reserve Act sent to the Congress by Secretary Marshall on July 18, 1951.

House and Senate consideration of the bill was in the light of two important, recent occurrences--the Korean recall debacle and the failure of universal military training legislation in the Congress. It was largely because of these two factors that the bill, as originally submitted, was almost entirely rewritten by the Brooks subcommittee of the House Armed Services committee.[47] The bill faced many other difficulties, but the greatest occurred on May 28, 1952, when the National Guard Association unexpectedly denounced the bill during Senate hearings. The association feared the bill would endanger the Guard's dual state-national status. Despite the obstacle, it became law late in the 1952 session. The National Guard Association could not overcome the great public discontent over recall policies.

The law divided the Reserves into ready, standby and retired categories, and by limiting the recall powers of the President, it abolished the system which was the source of so much criticism during the Korean mobilization. Standby Reserves could be ordered to active duty only after a declaration of war or emergency by Congress. Ready Reserves could be called by the President in the number authorized by

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[46]U. S. Department of Defense, Policies Relating to the Reserve Forces, Approved 6 April 1951 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951).

[47]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, on H. R. 4860, p. 168.

Congress. It was an attempt to assure that the persons who had done the most in earlier wars would not have to carry the major burdens in the future.

Only after 1952 did the Reserve program feel the full brunt of the ramifications of the Korean recall system. Officer strength dropped, and enlisted strength would have shown a similar decrease except for the requirements of the Selective Service Act of 1948 which forced men into the Reserve upon their release from the service. Therefore, instead of falling, enlisted strength rose by 50,000 during the 1952 fiscal year. Unfortunately, however, the increase was not of much value to national security because the men refused to take an active interest in Reserve training. The number of active training units and the assigned strength of these units showed an alarming decrease.[48] At the end of June 1953 there were five hundred fewer Reserve units than one year earlier. The assigned strength of the organized units had dropped more than 18,000.

Thus, the most crucial task faced by the Army was that of inducing reservists who had statutory Reserve obligations to join units. The law permitted the mandatory assignment of reservists to organized units, but it was questionable whether, as a practical matter, actual participation in unit training could be enforced under existing statutes.[49] Mandatory participation was not tried, but instead considerable effort was made by the Army to induce men into training through use of the in-

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[48]U. S. Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1-June 30, 1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 104.

[49]Ibid., p. 105.

centives already provided in various pieces of legislation. Inactive duty training pay and generous retirement credits were offered, but all such efforts failed to produce satisfactory results.

In 1953, as the Korean Conflict was being terminated, the new Eisenhower administration applied its efforts to the reconstruction of the Reserve. All veteran reservists who were on active duty involuntarily were returned to civilian life, except a few trained in critical specialties.[50] Implementation of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 was begun. Categories of Ready and Standby Reservists were established in all the military departments. Indefinite term commissions replaced the five-year appointments still existing in the Army and Air Force, except for a few officers still on active duty.

At the end of June, 1953, the statutory Reserve obligations of veterans had pushed the Reserve to over two million men in strength. The program was bulky and unmanageable. Recent legislation[51] made it possible for these veterans to reduce their eight-year military obligation by participating in part-time training in units near their homes, but the number who utilized this opportunity continued to be disappointingly small.[52]

The impending expiration of the selective service law and the need for reappraisal of the Reserve situation in the light of the results

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[50] Ibid., p. 25.

[51] Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 75).

[52] U. S. Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1-June 30, 1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 25.

of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 caused the Eisenhower administration to begin major studies of all manpower problems. On December 1, 1953, the National Security Training Commission issued its Twentieth Century Minutemen Report which proposed an improved long-range Reserve program. Slightly over one month later the director of the Office of Defense Mobilization published a report of the relative availability of civilian and military manpower. Out of these studies came the administration's recommendations for the National Reserve Plan.[53] When introduced in Congress in early 1955, it was destined to be rewritten five times before it was finally enacted into law on August 9, 1955.

The 1955 act amends both the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 and the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. Its provisions fall into two categories, those remedying certain inadequacies in the structure and operations of the Reserve and those providing a new voluntary enlistment system whereby young men could avoid the draft by taking six months' active duty training followed by seven and one-half years of Reserve training.

In the first category, the act raised the statutory limit on the size of the Ready Reserve from 1,500,000 men to 2,900,000 men. Previously the limit had been ignored because other laws required the transfer to the Reserve of all veterans who were being released from the service. The act also made major changes in the recall system in periods of emergency. The President was authorized to call up to one million men of the Ready Reserve without the specific number being approved by Congress.

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[53]H. R. 2967, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1953.

Any call exceeding one million continued to require congressional approval. Standby reservists continued to be uncallable without congressional approval, and furthermore could not be called until the selective service system decided whether each reservist was needed in the Army or in his civilian job.

A continuous screening process was established by the act for the purpose of transferring men from the Ready to the Standby Reserve. It was intended that the Ready Reserve be truly ready to serve; all men who had critical jobs in industry, who were overage, or who were for other reasons not qualified to serve immediately would be transferred to the Standby Reserve.

Reserve training requirements were stiffened considerably by the new act. Persons who acquired a Reserve obligation after August 9, 1955, were required to take an active part in Reserve training. Men who failed to perform this requirement satisfactorily could be ordered to active duty for a period of forty-five days, and any one who refused such an order to active duty was subject to court-martial proceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

The most far-reaching portion of the 1955 act was the introduction of the six months' training program whereby Reserve enlistees would be given Army[54] basic training and various types of advanced training on Army posts throughout the country. Afterwards they would be returned home, in a draft-free status, where they would participate in a minimum

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[54]The other services announced in advance that they would not make use of the six months' provisions.

of forty-eight paid drill periods yearly for seven and one-half years.[55] Because the other branches of the military service felt that the six months' program interfered with their long-range regular recruiting program and because many Americans would oppose the program if it became a form of universal military training, the law provided for a strict quota system for entry into the program. A maximum of 250,000 new entries annually was set by the law, but it was anticipated that budget limitations would be an even greater limiting factor, as they were in later years.

As enacted by Congress, the act's six-month enlistment privileges were intended to be available only to young men between the ages of seventeen and eighteen and one-half. The program was implemented in August, 1955, with this limitation, but enlistments came slowly. Men in this age group did not fear the draft. Selective service did not reach men so young. Few of these men foresaw that, by the time the draft drew near, they would be too old to join for only six months' active duty. Consequently, as of December 1, 1955, only 5,500 men had joined the program.[56] On the verge of being declared a failure, the program was opened on April 1, 1957, to persons up to twenty-six years of age.[57] Enlistments increased rapidly. In June, 1957, the weekly enlistment rate reached over four thousand.[58]

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[55]By administrative regulations, the period was reduced to three years effective April 1, 1957.

[56]National Security Training Commission, Final Report to Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 13.

[57]Ibid., p. 1.

[58]Ibid., p. 13.

The expanded program brought much criticism from the other services which had to compete with it in recruiting men for tours of three, four, and five years. Other temporary criticism came from congressmen who felt that the Department of Defense had violated the spirit of the 1955 law by opening the program to older men. These criticisms, as well as the lack of sufficient funds, forced the Army temporarily to suspend enlistments in the program on May 14, 1957. When reopened, new entries were severely limited by a regulation which required a vacancy before any new six-months' trainees could be accepted. Late in 1957 additional enlistments were permitted.

Thus, ten years after the first major agitation for an improved Reserve Forces program, there was still much to be accomplished. The improvements that had occurred were not based on a clear understanding of the role of the Reserve in modern warfare. There was considerable coordination needed among the Reserve programs of the various services. There was still great indecision over the use of compulsory recruitment methods, and the National Guard and Army Reserve disagreed greatly over several key policies.

On the other hand, the Reserve program had been greatly stabilized by the activities of the postwar era. There were more systematic procedures. The question of the proper role of the Reserve in the Armed Forces was, at least, being debated. The Reserve Forces were rapidly becoming institutionalized, with their own procedures, organization, and interests.

CHAPTER II

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION FOR POLICY-MAKING

The organizational structure of any administrative organization is highly influential in the decisions which flow from it. This is true for a variety of reasons. Organizations develop institutional qualities that lead policy in certain directions. They are the frames of reference--indeed, the boundary lines of interest--for the bureaucracy and the public generally. In addition, administrative organizations constitute the machinery by which knowledge, efficiency, procedures and personalities are intermeshed to grind out decisions in a methodical fashion.

The administrative organization of the Reserve Forces is important for the above reasons, and also because it is the scaffolding from which the Regular Army, the National Guard Association and the Reserve Officers Association have frequently transmitted their desires into policy.

A birdseye view of the Reserve organization reveals a sprawling, disjointed establishment, without its own compact hierarchy. It falls into two major portions--the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army. The Defense Department machinery is new, small and fairly well organized.

Department of Defense

With the creation of the National Military Establishment by the National Security Act of 1947, there came to be an increased amount of Army Reserve Forces policy made at levels higher than the Army Staff. The dedication to a new, unified military policy required the Army to relinquish some control over its Reserve program to the Secretary of Defense.

Earlier, small portions of policy may have been made by the secretive State-Army-Navy Coordinating Committee, or by the Bureau of the Budget, as well as by the President himself, but the amount was undoubtedly insignificant. After 1947, there was increased pressure for new Reserve legislation, and more attention was demanded from the President and his immediate staff. Yet there are no indications in published reports that the agencies above the Department of Defense exerted any great influence on Reserve policy. Problems tended to be resolved before they reached such high levels. This could possibly be in error, however. Little is known of the work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. Because of the high degree of secrecy surrounding them, there is no information as to the degree these agencies influenced policy. Nevertheless, it is widely assumed that almost all Reserve policy was made in the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army.

The evolution toward an effective Department of Defense was a slow and painful process. The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act converted the National Military Establishment into an executive de-

Chart No. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION FOR RESERVE POLICY-MAKING



NINE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

(Research and Development, International Security Affairs, Supply and Logistics, Comptroller, etc.)

[1]Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel and Reserves.

[2]Reserve Forces Policy Board.

partment and increased the Secretary's coordinating powers. In February, 1953, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson appointed a committee headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller to make recommendations for overhauling the Department of Defense. From the committee's report came President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6, which took effect on June 30, 1953, and provided that the major functions of the Department be divided among nine assistant secretaries.

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 had required the Secretary of Defense to designate an assistant secretary as having principal responsibility for the Reserves.[1] Chosen for this purpose was the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Personnel,[2] one of three assistant secretaries in existence when the reorganization plan became effective. On September 2, 1955, Secretary Wilson added the Reserve function to the title of the office to make it the "Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve)."[3]

In recent years, repeated proposals have been offered for the appointment of an additional assistant secretary to be exclusively responsible for Reserve affairs. Representative L. Mendel Rivers, of South Carolina, introduced bills into several post-Korean War sessions of the House of Representatives to accomplish this,[4] and in the Senate, Burnet R. Maybank, of South Carolina, offered similar proposals.[5]

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[1]P. L. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, sec. 256 (a).

[2]U. S. Department of Defense Directive 5120.9, Dec. 31, 1952.

[3]U. S. Department of Defense Directive 5120.7, Sept. 2, 1955.

[4]H. R. 2302, 83d Cong.; H. R. 2427, 84th Cong.; H. R. 913, 85th Cong.

[5]S. 2926, 83d Cong.

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, Mrs. Anna Rosenberg made the same recommendation in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in 1951.[6]

President Eisenhower's defense department, as of 1957, had not looked favorably on such legislation, and it had never reached the floor of either house. The department claimed that one of its "principal administrative objectives" was the "achievement of maximum integration of the Reserve and Regular components." The Secretary, therefore, wanted the Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Personnel and Reserve to have full manpower controls over all components. Personnel policy relating to both active and Reserve Forces, the Department said, must "emanate from the same source."[7] The argument was sufficient to defeat any further moves in this direction.

The Department of Defense mushroomed into a mammoth organization, without concomitant reductions in the size of the lower departments.[8] This is true in practically all areas including the Reserve program. At first the Department of Defense was envisioned as a small policy-coordinating agency only. Instead, there came to be several boards, committees and other agencies that cut squarely across the operating authority of the individual services. It occurred slowly, and practically every such move was accompanied by vehement complaints from the subordinate services.

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[6]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 4860, p. 201.

[7]Letter from Richard A. Buddeke to Hon. Carl Vinson, mimeographed, February 26, 1957, Report on H. R. 2427, 85th Congress for the Department of Defense.

[8]New York Times, July 28, 1949, p. 40.

This was the case with the Civilian Components Policy Board, created by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in 1949. The department needed a small advisory group to represent the viewpoints of all the services. When the activating directive was issued, the services claimed it was a surprise and that the new board had been given operating authority. The board would be sufficiently powerful, it was said, to destroy the responsibility of the several departmental secretaries. After several compromises--all reducing the board to a non-operating position--the members were appointed. In 1950, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall reconstituted the board, renaming it the Reserve Forces Policy Board.

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 made the Reserve Forces Policy Board statutory and declared it to be the "principal policy advisor"[9] to the Secretary of Defense on Reserve matters. The wisdom of writing the board into law was much debated at the time. The Reserve Officers Association, champion of the idea, finally won its point. Later, clear-cut recommendations against such provisions were made by the Rockefeller Committee,[10] possibly with the Reserve Forces Policy Board in mind.

The board, according to law,[11] must have four civilians--a civil-

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[9]P. L. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

[10]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization. 83d Cong., 1st Sess., April 11, 1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 11.

[11]P. L. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

ian chairman and the assistant secretary responsible for Reserve matters in each of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments. Additional members include one regular officer from each of the departments, two representatives each from the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and one officer of general or flag rank who serves as military adviser and executive officer of the board. When the Coast Guard is operating as a unit of the Navy, it has a non-voting representative on the board.

Seldom does the board meet more often than once every six weeks. The agenda for such meetings is laid out, with the approval of the chairman, by the board's staff which takes care of all other routine administrative responsibilities.

The board operates as an adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M, P & R). In its formative days, this location was not considered suitable by several persons connected with the board, but after a few months the demand for a loftier status was forgotten. It came to be, by 1957, one of approximately seven special advisory boards surrounding this particular assistant secretary's office.

By 1957, with the assistant secretary's office getting more firmly established the Reserve program constituted only a minor portion of its responsibilities. In addition to all personnel and manpower policy, the office controlled matters of personnel security, soldier voting, certain aspects of civil defense, Armed Forces information and education programs and several special projects.

There were two offices of major importance under the assistant secretary--one for personnel policy, the other for manpower problems. Reserve matters fell in the domain of the Office of Personnel Policy which was divided into civilian, military and Reserve policy divisions.

The Reserve Affairs Policy Division was created in November, 1955, by Assistant Secretary Carter L. Burgess.[12] It was first headed by Colonel James A. Norell, who was succeeded by Colonel Joseph L. Chabot. In 1957 Colonel Chabot had two assistant directors and two secretarial clerks in the Office. The parent Office of Personnel Policy was, at the time, even smaller with only four persons in all.

The functions of the Reserve Affairs Policy Division cover policy-making on all matters affecting reservists as individuals, including procurement, placement, career management, promotion, separation, retirement and retainment standards. It has responsibility for all policy involved in the implementation of Reserve legislation, publicity requirements for the Reserve program and liaison on Reserve matters with the White House staff, Office of Defense Mobilization, National Security Training Commission and various private interest groups.

The inter-working of the Department of Defense agencies with the Reserve agencies of the Department of the Army is a complicated, and usually highly informal matter. Pressures arise irregularly throughout the organization, as well as from higher and lower echelons, which cause policy changes to be initiated at any number of points in the hierarchy.

Generally speaking, the Department of Defense makes its power

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[12]Army Reservist, 1 (Nov., 1955), 15.

felt most vividly as new legislation is being transmitted from one of the departments through the Department of Defense to Congress, or when budget estimates are being prepared. An excellent example of this was the inter-departmental coordination for the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. The act sprang from the Navy Department's Roper Board, which prepared a bill to revitalize the Naval Reserve. When the bill went forward to the Department of Defense, Secretary James Forrestal "thought it ought to apply across the board" to all the departments,[13] even though the Army and Air Force seemed to be unenthusiastic. This was in December, 1948. Nothing happened until the Civilian Components Policy Board was created and its authority clarified between June and October, 1949. The job of redrawing the bill to fit all the departments was handed to the new board as its first important function. The following time-table of events reveals well the inter-working of the conglomeration of Reserve agencies within the military structure:

October 17, 1949	Ad hoc committee of the Civilian Components Policy Board undertook rewriting the bill.
December 1, 1949	Ad hoc committee submitted certain policy questions for decision of the parent Board.
January 10, 1950	Tentative draft sent to the Services for comment.
January 19, 1950	Revised draft submitted to CCPB by ad hoc committee for decision on differences among the services.
March 1, 1950	Further revised draft sent to CCPB for approval.
March 21, 1950	CCPB formally submitted draft to military departments and the Secretary of Defense.
May 5, 1950	CCPB requested Secretary of Defense to resolve controversies among military departments.
May 12, 1950	Further comments from military departments submitted to Secretary of Defense.

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[13]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, on H. R. 4860, p. 119.

July 5, 1950	Secretary of Defense's staff completed study of the controversies and isolated twenty-two areas of disagreement.
July 21, 1950	Secretary of Defense made decision resolving differences on bill.
August 1, 1950	Navy directed to prepare revised draft in accordance with the Secretary's decisions.
January 30, 1951	Navy submitted draft to Secretary of Defense for comment.
February 15, 1951	Secretary received comments on the draft from the military departments.
March 1, 1951	Revised draft prepared by Department of Defense legal staff; held pending approval of Reserve policies.
April 6, 1951	Reserve policies approved.
April 27, 1951	Further comments from military departments received.
April 16, 1951	Bill redrafted to conform to policies; submitted to military departments for comment.
April 27, 1951	Comments from departments received; additional coordination in Department of Defense began.
June 26, 1951	Final draft submitted to the Bureau of the Budget.
July 16, 1951	Bureau of the Budget's comments received.
July 18, 1951	Bill submitted to Congress.[14]

The above process is typical for all subjects as important and complicated as the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. For less intricate matters, the process is naturally more simple. Generally, materials prepared by the staff of the appropriate division of the Department of Defense are forwarded to the appropriate assistant secretary of the subordinate departments. The assistant secretary's staff prepares comments from the viewpoint of the best interests of the particular department. If the matter is important enough, the appropriate secretaries or their staffs might meet with Department of Defense personnel to settle disagreements. The most common device, as of 1957, was an ad hoc committee of staff members,[15] ranging from the most formal type of organization to

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[14] Ibid., p. 1123.

[15] Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 122.

informal meetings arranged by telephone. If all such efforts fail to bring agreement, the matter is submitted to the Secretary of Defense for decision--accompanied by a full set of staff papers showing concurrences and non-concurrences, as well as comments by the controller's office.

The orders of the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Administrative Secretary, are formulated as directives to the secretaries of the subordinate departments. They are for guidance only; they are not actual operating orders. Each department must issue regulations and orders to the extent necessary to put the guidance into operation. Frequently the resulting regulations must be submitted to the Department of Defense for approval prior to promulgation.

Department of the Army

Within the Department of the Army there are five staff agencies working closely with Reserve policy: The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components; the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, the National Guard Bureau, and the General Staff Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy.

All five of these agencies are located in the Pentagon. By 1957, at least three of these had reached the status of "institutions" which are not likely to be changed appreciably, except by a major upheaval. These are the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces; the General Staff Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy and the National Guard Bureau. Each of these has a statutory base. The other two agencies, the Assistant Chief

of Staff for Reserve Components and the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, do not have a statutory base.

The most powerful figure in the Army Reserve program tends to be the Assistant Secretary of the Army (M, P & RF). This was particularly true in 1957 with former president of the New Mexico Military Institute Hugh M. Milton II as incumbent. Milton came up through the military hierarchy, a most unusual source for Army civil authorities. He was a Kentuckian by birth, a mechanical engineer and a World War I veteran. After World War II, from which he emerged as a brigadier general, he served on the General Staff Committee on Army Reserve Policy. In 1957, he returned to active duty as Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, later to be called Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, where he was promoted to major general. In 1954, he became an Assistant Secretary of the Army on the recommendation of James P. Mitchell, the outgoing assistant secretary who was becoming Secretary of Labor.[16] Milton's personality and knowledge of Reserve affairs boosted the office in the public eye.

The Assistant Secretary's Office was "institutionalized" by acts of Congress in 1952[17] and 1954[18]. The Armed Forces Reserve Acto of 1952 required the Secretary of the Army to designate an assistant secretary to have principal responsibility for supervision of the Reserve compon-

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[16]Reserve Officer, 30 (Jan., 1954), 16.

[17]P. L. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952)

[18]P. L. 562, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (Act to Provide Two Additional Secretaries for the Army, Navy and Air Force), 1954.



Chart No. 2

RESERVE POLICY AGENCIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

ents under the jurisdiction of that particular department.[19] The Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Personnel was so designated, and later his title was lengthened by administrative ruling to include "Reserve Forces."

The 1954 Act stemmed from a variety of earlier occurrences. When President Eisenhower submitted his Reorganization Plan No. 6 in 1953 to increase the number of assistant secretaries in the Department of Defense, he said further studies "should be initiated" by the secretaries of the three departments "with a view toward making these secretaries truly responsible administrators. . . . "[20] This touched off the appointment of the Davies Committee on Army Organization in late 1953, headed by Paul L. Davies, president of the Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation of San Jose, California. The committee heard 129 witnesses in a series of meetings held on 28 days over a period of three months. The report of the group was the partial basis for the 1954 act which increased to four the number of assistant secretaries in each of the three military departments. Although the act designated the responsibilities for only the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management, the intentions of Congress were clear. The 1952 provision was to be retained so that each department would have an Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Personnel and the Reserve Forces.[21]

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[19]P. L. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, sec. 256 (a).

[20]U. S. Department of the Army, Organization of the Army, Report of the Advisory Committee on Army Organization, 18 Dec. 1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 1.

[21]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Act to Provide Two Additional Assistant Secretaries in the Army, Navy and Air Force, Senate Report 1643 on S. 3466, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., June 15, 1954 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 2.

Before the increase to four assistant secretaries, the duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary (M,P & RF) were ill defined. They covered a multitude of functions ranging from membership on the Armed Forces Explosives Safety Board to management of the United States Soldiers' home. After the increase, the diversity was reduced, but the office continued to carry the heaviest load of all the immediate assistants to the Secretary of the Army, with perhaps the exceptions of the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary (M,P & RF) has continued to grow until, in 1957, it had a civilian deputy, a military executive officer (colonel), a civilian special assistant, and six military branch chiefs (all lieutenant colonels). One of these branch chiefs worked exclusively on Reserve Forces problems.

The second highest "institutions" within the Reserve establishment are the General Staff Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy.[22] The two committees ordinarily meet in joint session in Washington about six times yearly; however, they may meet separately or more often. Meetings usually last from two days to a full week.

The National Guard committee, the oldest of all existing Army Reserve agencies, is composed of seven members of the National Guard and seven Regular Army members of the Army Staff. Except for one resident member, all Guard representatives are part-time personnel called to active duty only for the duration of the meeting. Each Guard member is ap-

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[22]Commonly called the "Section V" Committee because of its origin in Section V of the National Defense Act of 1920.

pointed by the Secretary of the Army to represent a particular Army area, except the resident member who is appointed at-large. The law requires that these appointees have the approval of their respective governors. Nominations are sent, by the governors, to the chief, National Guard Bureau who prepares recommendations for the Secretary of the Army listing three nominees for each vacancy in order of his preference.[23]

The seven Army staff members on the National Guard Committee are Regular Army officers and represent the Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operation, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components, Comptroller of the Army, and the Commanding General, Continental Army Command. They are given indefinite terms and are not eligible to serve as chairman. The same officers serve as the Regular Army representatives on the Army Reserve committee.

There are seven Army reservists on the Army Reserve committee, in addition to the seven Regular Army representatives. They are appointed by the Secretary of the Army, one from each Army Area, upon the recommendation of the commanding general of the Army Area concerned. One resident member is appointed at-large.

The term of office for both the National Guard and Army Reserve members, except resident members, is three years but one year extensions

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[23]Letter from Major General Edgar C. Erickson, Chief, National Guard Bureau, 11 October 1957, to the author. Membership was raised from five to seven by Department of Army Memorandum 135-1, dated 28 Jan. 1957, superseding the edition of 24 Oct. 1955.

are possible for not to exceed two years.[24] Resident members have four-year terms. The senior officer of each committee serves as chairman. When the committees meet in joint session, again the senior officer presides, regardless of his component.

Practically all the National Guard and Army Reserve members of the committees, except for resident members, are general officers. Usually they are commanders of Reserve Forces infantry divisions. The resident members, who are full-time active duty personnel, are usually colonels. The Regular Army representatives are usually colonels or brigadier generals.

The resident members are appointed by the Secretary of the Army upon the recommendation of the respective committee chairman. They administer the papers and facilities of the committees, gather information and prepare the agenda for meetings. Between meetings, they may be required to represent their respective committees in various Department of Army activities.

Both the National Guard and Army Reserve committees are strictly advisory in nature. Under Section 3033, they are required to consider all proposed policies affecting the Reserve Forces and make recommendations thereon to the Secretary of the Army though the Chief of Staff.[25]

As might be expected, the committees were not established through the initiative of the Army staff. The committee's chief functions involve a review of the civilian component policies of the Army staff.

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[24]U. S. Department of the Army, Memorandum 135-1, 28 Jan. 1957.

[25]U. S. Code, Title 10, sec. 3033 (1956).

Consequently, the committees, which look over the shoulder of the Regular Army, are not particularly desired by the Pentagon. They were forced on the Regular Army, by the National Guard lobby, in the National Defense Act of 1920.[26]

This is not to say that open antagonism exists between the Regular Army and the general staff committees. On the contrary, a great deal of deference is shown the civilian component members. Considerable work goes into the preparation of the oral presentations by members of the Army staff before the committees. Such presentations are usually rehearsed before high-ranking general staff officers before being given to the committees. And there is practically no hostility between the reservists and Army staff members as individuals. They are sometimes personal friends. The members of the general staff committees frequently receive their appointments through the support of friends in the Pentagon, chiefly in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components.

The relationship between the two organizations is a vague, official coldness--a nebulous resentment. The Regular Army members know and dislike the fact that pressure groups, such as the general staff committees represent, are allowed to participate in official policy-making, but they must endure it because of the National Defense Act of 1920. They know that, because the committees serve as "official leaks" of information,[27] the National Guard and Reserve Officers Association are

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[26]Arthur A. Ekirch, The Civilian and the Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 202.

[27]This is the view of certain Army officials who prefer to be unidentified.

prepared at almost any moment to do battle with the Pentagon in the newspapers and before Congress on any new policy unfavorable to the civilian components. This is despite the fact that committee meetings are ostensibly ultrasecret.

The third "institution" in the civilian component hierarchy is the National Guard Bureau, which occupies an extremely interesting position as a staff agency for the Department of the Army. By virtue of its primary responsibility--the state National Guard units--the bureau is thrown into the caldron of American federalism.[28]

On occasion it seems halfway between the states and the national government. Through it comes information for the Army's leaders on the needs and complaints of the National Guard units maintained out in the states by state authorities. Its liaison activities with the states, which are among the bureau's most important functions, keep the personnel of the bureau better informed on the condition of the various Guard units than any other Army agency. Because of the bureau's close relations with the states, its personnel frequently become highly sympathetic with the state viewpoint.

A majority of the bureau's officers are Regular Army personnel, assigned to duty there just as they might be placed on duty with an infantry regiment. The remainder are National Guard officers called to active service specifically for duty with the bureau. The voluntary recall of National Guard officers for this purpose is permitted by law.

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[28]William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957).

In 1950, Congress decided that up to forty per cent of the bureau's officers could be national guardsmen.[29] This is an important reason why the bureau has strong sympathies for state interests.

There are other reasons for the bureau's loyalty to the state guard units. By law, the chief of the National Guard Bureau must be recommended by the governor of his state, must be above the rank of lieutenant colonel and must have been for ten years previous a member of the National Guard. These prerequisites have generally been sufficient to assure the accession of a loyal Guardsman to the office. Certainly, these legal prerequisites were meant to restrict the office to a true believer in National Guard doctrines. Never in the history of the bureau has it failed to provide a chief with strong inclinations for "getting along with state interests." Usually, the chief is a former state adjutant general. For instance, Major General Raymond Flemming served as the adjutant general of Louisiana for twenty years before becoming chief of the National Guard Bureau.

Whether the bureau's chief should be a Regular Army officer, who would be loyal to national Army interests, or a state-oriented Guardsman has been a matter of controversy for many years.[30] In 1916 when the National Guard Bureau was created, the chief was a Regular Army officer. The law which created the bureau abolished the old five-man militia board. This was actually no great change, so far as the loyalties of the bureau were concerned, because the militia board had also been dominated

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[29]P. L. 458, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

[30]Ibid., p. 83.

by Regular Army interests.[31] The important change requiring the chief to be a guardsman came later in the 1920 amendments to the National Defense Act. The bureau became neither fish nor fowl. It became half-state, half-national.

Thus, under the 1920 act, the National Guard Bureau was freed from considerable national control by the requirement that the chief be a National Guard officer.[32] However, it must be remembered that, as a whole, the National Guard came under greater national control by virtue of the 1920 act. The National Guard was recognized as a Reserve component of the Army under the act, and the President was given greater authority to call National Guard troops into national service during periods of emergency. Congress laid down standards for organizing, arming, and disciplining the state forces. By such familiar devices as fixing standards, inspections, advice, grants-in-aid, formulation of rules and regulations, supply of equipment and training, and the granting or withholding of recognition of units and their commanding personnel, Congress provided conditions which have enormously contributed to federal ascendancy over state forces.[33]

There were provisions in the 1920 act giving five positions on the General Staff to guardsmen, which most regulars claimed would sub-

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[31]Frederick Wiener, "The Militia Clause of the Constitution," Harvard Law Review, 14 (Dec., 1940), 181.

[32]John Dickinson, The Building of an Army (New York: Century Co., 1922).

[33]Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 312.

vert the ability to hold the Army responsible. Guardsmen, of course, lauded the idea. The approval of these provisions by one well known regular, Brigadier General John M. Palmer, was particularly discouraging to the regulars. Palmer, formerly on General Pershing's wartime overseas staff and an expert on manpower policy, as well as an official adviser to Congress, had led the congressional committees to this decision. It had been an easy decision for the congressmen to make, considering the increasing political power of the National Guard lobby. Long after its passage, General Palmer lauded the provisions of the act:

> The principle that professional officers and citizen officers would serve together on the General Staff is probably the most highly constructive feature of that law. Under our military system, professionals and non-professionals must serve side by side in war and should therefore learn to understand and to respect each other in time of peace. The lack of mutual understanding and respect was always the source of suspicion and friction in the past. Perhaps the greatest contrast between the crude War Department of 1917 and the more enlightened War Department of 1941 lies in the fact that today the professional welcomes and values the cooperation of his non-professional brother.[34]

There were many officers who disagreed with Palmer, then and later. But as time passed, practically all personnel came to accept the assignment of approximately five national guardsmen on the Army staff, in addition to the personnel of the National Guard Bureau, as a suitable compromise between two strong forces. By 1940 almost all agitation against the system had died, although professional Army men continued to believe it was only the best solution to a bad situation.

After 1940 when all Guard units were mobilized, the National

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[34]John McCauley Palmer, America in Arms (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 119.

Guard Bureau's duties declined. Its chief wartime functions were the management of Guard records and the formulation of postwar Guard policy. It also handled the Army's liaison activities with the various Home Guard and State Guard units which were authorized by an act of October 21, 1940,[35] and which were eventually established in forty-four states and Hawaii. In March, 1942, the National Guard Bureau was assigned as a section of the office of the Army adjutant general, and was made one of the administrative services of the Services of Supply in April, 1942. When the war ended, the bureau was shifted back to its old status as a special staff division in May, 1945.[36]

The path of the chief of the National Guard Bureau has continued to be rough, largely because of the bureau's dual status. Until Major General Edgar C. Edgar C. Erickson broke the precedent in 1957, not a single chief had ever been reappointed to a second four-year term.[37] The previous Army reluctance to reappoint the chief was probably not accidental. There was wide speculation that the Department of the Army wished to prevent any bureau chief from consolidating his position within the Pentagon. Also, the chief was frequently considered an outsider, and at times he was thought of as a spy for National Guard interests. To say the least, the chief was seldom a member of the intimate family of high ranking staff officers who keep the Department of the Army functioning as a headquarters. These factors contributed to the "no reap-

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[35] 54 Stat. 1206.

[36] U. S. National Archives, Federal Records of World War II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 138.

[37] Army Times (Reserve Edition), Aug. 10, 1957, p. 2.

pointment" pattern.

When asked about his success as National Guard Bureau chief, Major General Erickson denied that his reappointment stemmed from any additional realism on his part concerning his role in the Pentagon hierarchy. He said:

> . . . any success that I have enjoyed during the past four years is attributed to the hard work and farsightedness of my staff in implementing approved policies of the Departments of the Army and the Air Force, and also the enthusiastic manner in which National Guard officials of the several States and unit commanders so willingly accepted and implemented necessary changes as they occurred.[38]

This statement probably does not consider all aspects of the situation. Other observers said that General Erickson fitted well into the Army staff system. He saw the National Guard bureau as a part of the Army machine. He did not consider it an independent entity outside the administrative hierarchy. He saw the desirability of cooperation with those who were responsible for the well-being of the entire Army; he won their respect as a player on the Army team. Therefore he was reappointed because of his great value as a stabilizing factor at headquarters.[39]

The exact position of the National Guard Bureau is difficult to analyze. Officially, it is a staff agency which reports directly to the Chief of Staff. The chief of the bureau must on formal, official occasions espouse the Department of Army viewpoint, although he is a Guard officer and although he frequently does not believe in the view. This

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[38]Letter from Major General Edgar C. Erickson, Oct. 11, 1957, to the author.

[39]This is the view of at least one Pentagon official who desires to remain anonymous.

is especially true when he is reporting the Army's budget requests to Congress for the appropriation of National Guard funds. On less formal occasions, he usually espouses the National Guard viewpoint.

This schizoid position places him in a position of considerable importance as a mediator in the occasional Army-National Guard disagreements. Few practitioners of the military arts, either in the National Guard or Regular Army, recognize this role as legitimate; some deny that the chief acts as a mediator at all. Others with a more detached and objective turn of mind, see the value of the bureau's mediating qualities.

The most obvious example of the bureau's harmonizing activities was in the 1957 "six-months' training controversy" whereby the Department of the Army, realizing the weekly drills of the Guard seldom went beyond basic training, ordered all new enlistees in the National Guard, except those who were veterans, to take six months' active duty training. The National Guard lobby raised a tremendous clamor and besieged congressmen with protests. The department stood its ground, pointing to lack of readiness for combat on the part of the Guard. The question was resolved in the offices of the armed services committees, but the National Guard Bureau played an important part in the settlement. It stood halfway between the opponents and served as a mediator and agent of compromise.

Major General Erickson, chief of the bureau at the time, chose not to describe the role of the bureau in the controversy so summarily. He said:

> The National Guard Bureau did not serve as a mediator in the so-called six-months' controversy. Members of the National

> Guard Bureau did appear before various Department of Defense and Congressional committees for the purpose of furnishing certain statistical information which was used in arriving at an amicable agreement.[40]

Major General James F. Cantwell, Chief of Staff of the State of New Jersey in 1957, has termed it more bluntly: "Practically [speaking], the National Guard Bureau attempts to harmonize the views of the National Guard and Department of the Army whenever possible through coordination between them."[41]

The other two Reserve agencies in Department of the Army, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components and the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, are without a statutory base. Theoretically, they are separate entities, but as a practical matter, their functions are so intertwined that it has been impossible for each to operate independently.

Analysts have frequently attempted to explain the relationship by saying the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff is a planning and policy-making agency while the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs is an operating agency. This differentiation is the official view. Army Regulations[42] make the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components responsible for "(1) development and supervision of the Reserve Components Control Program, (2) initiation of, participation in, and monitoring of other policies and plans which affect the Reserve

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[40] Ibid.

[41] Letter from Major General James F. Cantwell, July 23, 1957, to the author.

[42] U. S. Army, Regulation 10-5, 22 May 1957, par. 31 (1), (2).

Components." Under the same regulation,[43] the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs is charged with implementation of these policies. The actual functioning of the two agencies, however, makes the regulation somewhat of a myth--both agencies help plan the Reserve program, and both agencies are involved in implementation of the plans.

The same regulation, in addition, gives the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components "direct supervision and control over the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs."[44] As of 1957, this clause is not completely in effect. There exists no actual supervisor. It is true that the Assistant Chief of Staff would win any showdown fights between the offices, but so far as the daily work of the two organizations is concerned, there is no strict demarcation that justifies the terms "supervisor" and "supervised." The heads of both offices are ordinarily major generals. The "supervising" office has considerably less tradition in the Pentagon hierarchy than the "supervised." And more importantly, the men who have served as Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Reserve Components have had much less experience in Reserve matters than the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs. All the chiefs, starting with Brigadier General Wendell Westover in 1947 have been reservists called to active duty specifically to head the office. Consequently, the superior position and status of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components has been frequently offset by the superior knowledge of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs.

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[43] Ibid., par. 31 (c).

[44] Ibid., par. 37.

One significant argument is often put forth to discredit the above approach and to show the Assistant Chief of Staff has an overpowering role over lower echelons in the Reserve hierarchy. It is said his functions involve coordination of the work of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs. This, too, is unrealistic. Theoretically, he supervises the program of both Reserve components, but it is only in theory. The National Guard Bureau is carefully protected by the National Guard Association from extensive encroachment by Pentagon regulars. Its powers are based on law and the solicitude of dozens of congressmen. Unfavorable moves, by higher Army officials, will be immediately challenged by the National Guard lobby. The resulting tensions make all such efforts particularly distasteful to Army authorities, and they are avoided. Thus, whatever regulations say, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components lacks coordinating authority of any great moment. Any coordination beyond that desired by the National Guard Bureau is done in the shadow of the National Guard Association.

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components, as of 1957 a relative newcomer to the Reserve family, was activated November 1, 1956.[45] This occurred after approximately five years of agitation by the Reserve Officers Association. This move toward greater status for the Reserve is perhaps the most delicate aspect of the Regular Army-Reserve relationship.

The activation order simply announced that centralized control

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[45]U. S. Department of the Army, General Order Number 45, 16 Oct., 1950.

of the Reserve components within the Army had been recognized as necessary. The Reserves would be brought up one echelon closer to the Chief of Staff, and the existing deputy chiefs and assistant chiefs would lose a portion of their previous control.

Before the new office was established, the management of the Reserves had been scattered throughout the general staff. For instance, Reserve personnel matters were handled by a comparatively small division within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. "This meant that Reserve matters were somewhat buried within a large office and had to go through three or four echelons before they got to the Chief of Staff."[46] Other Reserve matters were occupying other nooks and crannies in the Pentagon. Meanwhile, the Army based its justification of the system on the need for continued integration of Reserve-Regular Army policy-making. This approach, Reserve lobbyists maintained, was nothing but a respectable way of saying that the Regular Army would continue to keep a tight grip on Reserve expansion. Later, when the assistant chief's office was created, the chain was partially broken. It was a compromise temporarily suitable to reservists whereby Reserve matters would be given a spokesman on the general staff.

The reorganization gave to a single officer a single responsibility. The numerous diverse aspects of the Reserve program were to be coordinated by one office.

This move toward centralized control stemmed, at least partially,

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[46]Letter from Brigadier General James H. Banville, Oct. 9, 1957, to the author.

from the report of the 1953 Davies Committee on Army Organization, which had not been complimentary to the Army's management of the Reserve program. It said:

> The necessity of maintaining, during a period of cold war, an Armed Force ready for combat places large importance upon the effectiveness of the Army Reserve. This Reserve does not now match the country's needs.
>
> Moreover, the Army has been unable, with its existing organization and program, to build up the unit strength and improve the morale and effectiveness of its Reservists. There is in the Committee's opinion, an urgent need for improvement of the Reserve program. There is also need for the revision of existing organizational structure. . . .[47]

The Board recommended the abolition of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Civilian Components which had been established in 1949. Simultaneously, the board asked for the appointment of "a senior officer with special responsibility for developing a new and vitalized (Reserve) program." The new Reserve structure, the board said, should report directly to the Chief of Staff. The 1956 creation of the assistant chief of staff's office was in accord with the board's recommendations.

The new office was built around the old Office of the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Civilian Components. Major General Philip DeWitt Ginder, the special assistant, became the first Assistant Chief for Reserve Components. He favored the reorganization and worked to develop the new concept until he left the Pentagon to become deputy commanding general of the First Army at the end of 1957.[48]

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[47]U. S. Department of the Army, Report of the (Davies) Advisory Committee on Army Organization, Dec. 13, 1953 (Washington: mimeographed, 1953), p. 37.

[48]Letter from Major General Philip D. Ginder, Oct. 14, 1957, to the author.

The domain and authority of the new assistant chief were from the beginning the crucial questions. It was decided that he should have authority, without reference to the deputy chiefs of staff, to resolve all difficulties unique to the Army Reserve Forces, subject to the approval of the chief of staff and higher Army authorities. His decisions were subject to review by the deputy chiefs of staff if they had a bearing on the active Army. Obviously, the great mass of Reserve matters are applicable, in one way or another, to the active Army. Thus, the Reserve still lack any appreciable degree of independence from Regular Army attitudes.

Perhaps the most potent of the roles to be played by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components was his authority as director of one of the five control programs of the Army. Beginning in the early 1950's, the Army sought a new, clarified approach to its major objectives, which so often had been cluttered with secondary considerations. Sixteen major goals or programs were isolated. They were seen as a basis for planning and as a basis for further clarification by increased emphasis on performance budgeting. In 1956, these programs were reduced to five: troops, installations, materiel, research and development and Reserve components. By Army Regulation 10-5, dated 22 May 1957, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components became director of the Reserve Components Control Program, with its concomitant influence over budget preparation, expenditures and establishment of goals. It is his responsibility to provide long range guidance on the Army Reserve Forces matters, including size of forces, installation-support requirements and

similar matters for five-year periods at a time.

As of 1957, the office contained, in addition to Major General Ginder, eleven division and branch chiefs, a deputy with the rank of brigadier general, an executive officer with the rank of colonel and an assistant executive officer who was a lieutenant colonel.

It must not be supposed that all Reserve policy matters were really moved under one roof through the creation of General Ginder's office. All the various technical offices of the Army staff still play tremendously important roles in the Reserve program. For instance, the Office of the Provost Marshal General is extremely active in the preparation of policy for military police units in the Reserve Forces. The actual regulations governing such units are usually formulated by either the Assistant Chief for Reserve Components, Deputy Chief for Military Operations, or the Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Forces at Continental Army Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia, but they are sent to the subject-matter specialists, such as the Provost Marshal General, for comment. On occasion, such staff sections as the Provost Marshal General's office might initiate Reserve policy which would be coordinated throughout the Department of the Army by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components or by one of the deputy chiefs of staff before it was promulgated.

The troop basis (the number and type of Army units) for the technical services, such as military police units of the Reserve program is compiled by the technical service concerned. However, it is based on the over-all troop requirements and deployment schedule as established

by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. In other words, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations determines, with the approval of higher authorities, the number of combat troops needed by the Army, both in the active Army and the Reserves. The technical services determine the type and amount of support needed for these fighting troops. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components determines whether the strength allocated to the Army Reserve Forces will be National Guard or Army Reserve troops.[49]

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components currently serves as a newly selected foster parent to the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs. Until 1954, the "chief" was known as the "executive" for Army Reserve and ROTC affairs. The old term, it was felt, according to official press releases, "suggested a purely administrative type function and therefore the Department of the Army made the change in order to conform with existing designations of other staff sections. . . . "[50]

The office was first conceived by General of the Armies John J. Pershing, chief of staff, in September, 1922. In a memorandum to his deputy, Pershing asked for recommendations on a new agency to handle Reserve matters. It was first organized as the "Reserve Section" of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence) in June, 1923, with Major C. F. Thompson as the first chief. Subsequently it was

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[49]Letter from Colonel J. M. Ernst, Executive Officer, Office of the Provost Marshal General, 3 Oct. 1957, to the author.

[50]Army Reservist, 1 (Jan., 1955), 11.

moved to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War in March, 1926, as the Office of the Executive for Reserve Affairs. In 1927, it was returned to function under the chief of staff, and on August 21, 1940, it was made responsible for ROTC matters, in addition to its Reserve functions. The name was changed officially to include the ROTC function in June, 1941. The following year, with World War II getting underway, the office was placed under the jurisdiction of the Adjutant General of the Army, where it had only advisory functions. On June 27, 1942, the office was established as an independent service under the Chief of Administrative Services, Services of Supply. Then, on November 12, 1943, it was again moved so as to be in the jurisdiction of the Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces. When the war was over, the office was again established as a special staff section of the War Department.[51]

Currently, the mission of the office remains the same as when reestablished in 1945, that is, to promote the development of the Army Reserve and ROTC, to assist and advise the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Army, to prepare budget estimates and justify them before the Bureau of the Budget and Congress, to maintain liaison with Reserve units, private associations and educational institutions, and to coordinate Reserve public information activities.

Since World War II, the Office of the chief has been occupied by reservists exclusively.[52] Several chiefs were appointed while serving

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[51] Ibid., p. 11.

[52] Brigadier General Edward W. Smith (1945-47); Brigadier General Wendell Westover (1947-49); Major General James B. Cress (1949-51); Major General Hugh M. Milton II (1951-53); Major General Philip F. Lindeman (1953-57); Major General Ralph A. Palladino (1957-).

on the General Staff Committee on Army Reserve Policy. Although there is no long established precedence or law which requires subsequent appointments to be made from the same source, the practice may become a tradition. Most observers agree that it would be a good one. It seems necessary for public relations reasons, as well as by provisions of law,[53] to have five reservists on duty with the Army staff at all times. There is no office more suitable for reservists. Consequently, the chiefs will probably continue to come from Reserve ranks. If this is true, their selection from among the membership of the general staff committee is entirely likely. It gives Pentagon leaders a chance to observe the officer for a couple years or more--an important aspect since Army leaders have no desire to appoint a chief who will not adjust himself to the Regular Army team and to the Regular Army viewpoint.

The 1953 Davies Committee on Army Organization recommended that the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs be split into Army Reserve and ROTC Sections. It further asked for a "strengthening of the leadership of the Reserve in each area."[54] The first of these suggestions was refused by the Secretary of the Army and, so far as the second is concerned, no appreciable change in the office can be detected.

It must be remembered that the entire Department of the Army Reserve framework is a staff section and, theoretically at least, has no operating responsibilities. Operations are the responsibility of the

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[53]U. S. Code, Title 10, sec. 3033 (e) (1956).

[54]U. S. Department of the Army, Report of the (Davies) Advisory Committee on Army Organization, Dec. 13, 1953 (Washington: mimeographed, 1953), p. 37.

Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff acting through a vast organization of zone of interior armies, often called "continental" armies to differentiate them from the overseas commands. The continental armies report to the Commanding General, Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, who is the highest operating authority for Reserve functions, as well as for other Army functions, under the Chief of Staff. Authority for management of the Army Reserve (but not for the National Guard) is delegated by each of the continental army commanders to a variety of corps areas and military districts, commanded by major generals, brigadiers, and colonels. In some parts of the country, Army Reserve activities are handled by the commanding generals of the corps areas, which cover three, four or more states. Each state constitutes a military district, with headquarters usually in the state capitol. Where corps areas do not exist, the chief of the military district reports directly to the continental army headquarters in which he is located.

As of 1957, additional corps areas were being created to cover the entire United States. Each corps area was to be commanded by an active Army major general. The Army planned that the new corps areas would take over several functions formerly performed by military districts.[55] It was claimed that the change would permit reductions in personnel and facilities, but this was doubted in many quarters. The plan was frequently challenged by reservists who claimed it was an effort

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[55]U. S. Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve for Reserve Components, Fact Sheet on DA Plan for Consolidation of Military Districts, undated, mimeographed.

to create more positions calling for major generals, but this seems illogical considering that several military districts were already commanded by major generals. The Army status system would prevent major generals from commanding both echelons--either the chiefs of military districts will be demoted or the corps commanders will be promoted to lieutenant generals.

The military districts in turn delegate authority to smaller areas called unit adviser's offices. The size of such areas depend upon population and other factors. Usually they are ten or twelve counties.

The unit advisers, usually field grade officers, manage the Reserve units within their immediate locality and also assign sergeants to sub-stations at other cities within their areas. It is the intention of the Army to give every Reserve unit close supervision through this system of advisers.

Management of National Guard functions is, of course, the responsibility of state authorities. Each governor has an adjutant general as his chief staff officer, and he ordinarily has an over-all commanding general of all Guard units. The Army's varied interests in the Guard units are handled by the Continental Army Command and the continental armies through a set of senior Army advisers and unit advisers, similar to the Army Reserve organization.

Below army area headquarters, the echelons have almost no responsibilities other than the Reserve program. Above the corps areas, there are many other functions. Thus at army areas and above, Reserve matters are immeshed into the total Army picture.

Previous to 1956, small staff sections handled Reserve matters at the Continental Army Command and at the various army headquarters, and consequently the Reserve frequently came out a poor second in the race for attention. In 1956, a deputy commanding general for Reserve Forces was allocated to Continental Army Command and to each of the continental armies. At Continental Army Command, the new job was allocated the rank of lieutenant general, which is currently the highest ranking position found in the Reserve hierarchy. At Army headquarters, the officer holds the rank of major general, and he has a Reserve Forces staff section as an aide. It is usually composed of an administrative division and an ROTC division, as well as Army Reserve and National Guard divisions.

The previously described administrative structure has a profound influence on Reserve policies. First, the diffusion of policy-making is great. Power and responsibility are scattered throughout the Department of Defense and Department of the Army. Relations between the five major Reserve agencies of the Department of the Army are particularly confusing, which suggests the need for administrative reorganization.

The new unification of the Armed Forces in the Department of Defense has required Army Reserve Forces policies to be, at least partially, agreeable to the other services. The necessity of equity among the services has affected Army policies, usually to advantage. There has been a significant effort to build Army standards to be as high as those of the Naval Reserve.

The Department of Defense, as yet still in its formative stages,

has been somewhat unable to coordinate well since it lacks long established powers, procedures, and attitudes. Although the Reserve Forces Policy Board will be treated in detail later, it might be noted here, that the Department of Defense coordination has been the responsibility of a board. This board was handicapped by a slow, controversial beginning, as well as the usual disadvantages accruing from the use of boards within an administrative organization.

Another important aspect of the Reserve structure has been its relation to the guilds interested in Reserve policy--the Regular Army, National Guard and Army Reserve interests. There has been considerable competition among these interests to get and maintain a preponderant influence over the Reserve agencies. This competition will be considered in detail later.

The institutional characteristics of the various agencies have been important. Some agencies have a statutory basis, and for this and other reasons, have a solidified position on the Army staff. The National Guard Bureau, lodged between the nation and the states is in a particularly fortified position.

CHAPTER III

CONGRESS AND RESERVE FORCES POLICY

"It was the intention of the constitutional fathers to give the Congress substantially, although not exclusive, control over the military establishment."[1] In this role, the Congress is an important factor in keeping the civilian components efficient and within democratic control. Congress attempts to establish long-term Reserve policies, or at least, to point out the ultimate ends toward which the Reserves should aim their efforts. It has established the basic organizational outline for the agencies responsible for the realization of Reserve objectives. "It sets the overall standards for the operation of these agencies, investigates their actions, and criticizes their performance."[2]

The fundamental powers of Congress to make military policy stems from Article 1, Section 8, of the United States Constitution. Of the eighteen powers of Congress specified there, six are concerned directly with the military forces, and five of these six deal with the land forces, including the Army Reserve and National Guard. Congress, says the Constitution, shall have power:

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[1]Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 152.

[2]Ibid., p. 154.

> . . . to declare war . . . to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that end shall be for a longer term than two years . . . to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces . . . to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasions . . . to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . .

To the extent to which the Congress has been able to exercise, in a practical way, these powers, it has depended upon its committee structure, chiefly the Armed Services committee of each house.

These committees have had an eventful past. Almost any student remembers the Civil War's Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Later, during World War I, Senator George E. Chamberlain of Oregon, chairman of the Senate military affairs committee, was the leading critic of the War Department's policies. Although he belonged to the same political party as the President, Chamberlain sought to make his committee another "Committee on the Conduct of the War." Until 1921, when the famous Budget and Accounting Act was passed, the House military affairs committee dominated military appropriations, although the appropriations committees had been functioning since 1865.[3]

In World War II, the military affairs committees, were, of course, important although they were displaced from the limelight by Senator Harry Truman's war investigating committee. Further important functions

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[3]Edward L. Katzenbach and John A. Ballard, Congress and Defense: Defense Appropriations; Investigations; and Relations with the Pentagon (Cambridge: Harvard Defense Studies, Serial No. 48, Reading Assignment No. 11, mimeographed, 1955), p. 13.

were denied the committees by the appointment, in 1944, of a select house committee on post-war military policy, which looked into the important matters of universal military training and unification of the Armed Forces.

In the early post-war years, the chairman of the House military affairs committee, the energetic, temperamental Andrew Jackson May, of Kentucky, was disgraced by his conviction for fraud against the government.[4]

In 1947, under the Legislative Reorganization Act of that year, the military affairs committees and the naval affairs committees of each house were combined to form the two present armed services committees. Thus the color of unification came to the committees for the first time. There was no redivision of the committees into Army, Navy, Air Force subcommittees, as occurred when similar unification came to the house appropriations committee, two years later.

The approximately 37 members of the House armed services committee have divided themselves into either three or four standing subcommittees and from three to twenty-one special subcommittees. On occasion there has been a special policy subcommittee composed of the eight members with the longest tenure who, if members of the majority party, were also subcommittee chairmen.

The standing subcommittees were numbered rather than names and were assigned no specific province of responsibility. They simply considered whatever bills the chairman of the full committee chose to assign

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[4]Louis Smith, op. cit., p. 251.

to them. The policy subcommittee served as an executive board to coordinate the work of the other subcommittees.

At the beginning of the 80th Congress in 1947, a subcommittee on "personnel" handled Reserve Components matters with Mr. Dewey Short of Missouri, as chairman. Mr. Short, a Republican, was continued as chairman in the Democratic 81st Congress. Although he was one of twenty-one special subcommittee chairmen that session, Short was the only Republican. His appointment represents the only occasion that a minority member has ever served as an armed services subcommittee chairman.[5]

In the 82nd Congress, beginning in 1951, a sixteen-man special Reserve subcommittee headed by Representative Overton Brooks, Democrat of Louisiana, was appointed. This was the beginning of a long career for Mr. Brooks as the chief House spokesman in Reserve affairs. At the time, Mr. Brooks was the second ranking Democrat of the House armed services committee, having been elected to the 75th Congress of 1937 and all succeeding congresses. He was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. During World War I, he served with the 6th Field Artillery Battalion in France. After graduation from law school, he was appointed to be United States commissioner, and from that job he was elected to Congress from a district centering around Shreveport, Louisiana. In later years he was to be called "Mr. Reserve" of Congress for his devotion to the civilian components.

In the Republican 83d Congress, 1953-54, there were three stand-

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[5]Letter from Robert W. Smart, Chief Counsel, House Committee on Armed Services, Nov. 18, 1957, to the author.

ing subcommittees and six special subcommittees. Reserve affairs, previously handled by a special subcommittee, were removed to the domain of Subcommittee No. 3. This was the first time the subcommittees had been assigned definite jurisdictions. Subcommittees 1, 2, and 3 were given responsibility for materiel, personnel, and reserve problems, respectively. In assigning Reserve affairs to Subcommittee No. 3, Chairman Dewey Short said:

> This is a vital and important committee. You will notice that the members we put on there are men with a great deal of military experience, and fellows who have had a long and earnest interest in building up an effective and efficient fighting Reserve Force . . .[6]

The rise to power of the Republicans also brought an end to the policy subcommittee which might on occasion have reduced the responsibility of Subcommittee No. 3 for Reserve affairs. At the organizational meeting of the full committee on February 4, 1953, there was also an effort made to end the life of the special investigations subcommittee, but it failed.

The chairman of Subcommittee No. 3 for Reserve affairs was Representative Leroy Johnson, Republican of California, who came to Congress in 1953. He was also a major general in the Army Reserve and commanding general of the 96th Reserve Infantry Division. Brooks was the ranking minority member. The subcommittee conducted eight weeks of study and hearings on the Reserve Officer Personnel Act which established the first statutory system of Reserve promotions.

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[6]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Report of Activities of the House Committee on Armed Services, 83d Cong., Sept., 1954 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 3.

By virtue of a Democratic majority elected to the 84th Congress, Representative Carl Vinson, of Georgia, regained the chairmanship of the full committee in 1955. The structure of the committee remained almost the same. There were three standing subcommittees, of which Subcommittee No. 1 was delegated responsibility for Reserve legislation. Mr. Brooks became subcommittee chairman. From its work came the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, a three-year extension of the National Defense Facilities Act of 1950 and an act to provide rehabilitation pay for reservists who are forced off active duty because of reductions-in-force.

In the 85th Congress, Subcommittee No. 1 continued to have jurisdiction of Reserve matters and Brooks continued as chairman.

Although Reserve affairs have been delegated to the subcommittee level, it must not be assumed that the full committee chairman is without power or influence over such matters. Throughout the life of the subcommittee, the chairman and the ranking minority member of the full committee have held ex officio membership on the subcommittee, and have greatly influenced Reserve affairs. Carl Vinson, often called "the admiral" because of his earlier enthusiasm as a naval advocate, never willingly relinquished any power to the Reserve subcommittee. In fact, he has been widely known as an autocrat.[7]

Although the authority of the committee chairman is great whenever he chooses to exercise it, there is also considerable autonomy vested in the subcommittees, including the Reserve subcommittee.

On the other side of the Capitol building, the Senate has steered

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[7]Katzenbach and Ballard, op. cit., p. 19.

clear of Reserve subcommittees, and subcommittees of all types have been less used. There seems to be a greater friendliness for the functional approach on the Senate side, so that, for instance a materiel problem within the Reserves would be considered by a subcommittee responsible for materiel problems of the entire Armed Forces. In addition, the twenty-man Senate committee, smaller than the House committee, has less need for subcommittees. Also important is the desire of all members of the Senate committee to consider Reserve matters instead of delegating them to a small portion of the committee. Each member wants to be influential on all matters before the committee.

Even the staff of the Senate Armed Services committee is not conspicuous for division of labor. In 1957, one professional staff member handled real estate matters exclusively, and the other two staff members shared the remainder of the work. Neither handled Reserve matters exclusively, except that the real estate man took charge of all armory construction interests of the committee.[8] On the other hand, the House armed services committee assigned one of its four professional staff members to handle all Reserve matters.

There is much controversy over which of the two Houses of Congress sees the Reserve picture with greater perspicacity. The highly-specialized House subcommittee holds many more Departmental briefings and hearing than the Senate committee, and therefore can possibly seek out more details. This is especially true because each House member

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[8]Interview with T. Edward Braswell, Jr., Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee, Sept. 16, 1957.

serves on only one committee while Senators serve on two or three. However, it is said that the Senate, not so concerned about details, can see the defense picture with greater perspective.

Of great importance to the work of the congressional committees is the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison of the Department of the Army. The office is the official channel of communications from the Army to Congress, and it is the channel most often used for minor or routine inquiries from Congress to the Army. But, of course, congressmen and their staffs may directly contact any Army agency which they choose.

Until World War I the Army had no agency responsible for legislative matters. In 1918, the war plans division of the general staff was assigned to be responsible for War Department contacts with Congress. When the position of deputy chief of staff was created in 1921, one of its specified duties was the handling of legislative matters. The first holder of that office established a legislative branch as a "clearing house" for legislative proposals. In 1931, this branch became the budget and legislative planning branch.

Upon reorganization of the War Department in 1942, a Legislative and Liaison Division was formed as a staff agency. After World War II, it was placed under supervision of the Chief of Information. Redesignation as the Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison, came in 1950 when it was transferred to function directly under the Chief of Staff of the Army. In February, 1955, the organization was moved from the Army staff to the Office of the Secretary of the Army.

Under the present organization the legislative division of the office coordinates the flow of legislative proposals to the Department of Defense, Bureau of the Budget, and to Congress. The liaison division answers the myriad complaints and questions from individual members of Congress. These two agencies have been important aides to Congress in military legislation.

From the end of World War II until 1950, the contact of congressional committees with the Reserve Forces came almost entirely from legislative consideration of bills sent through the legislative liaison division. From 1950 until the end of the Korean conflict, the contact grew out of the thousands of complaints received by congressmen concerning the mobilization of reservists. Congress took upon itself the responsibility to investigate both the recall procedures and the promotion of reservists on active duty. After 1952 congressional initiative eased off somewhat but never to its earlier level. Representative Brooks' Reserve Components subcommittee conducted numerous hearings, not only on the 1952 and 1955 Reserve acts, but on the Reserve program in general.

The motivation for the 1947-50 legislation, including provisions for drill pay, retirement, and disability benefits, arose from three basic sources. First, the Navy had possessed most of these privileges since 1938. The resulting comparison with Army Reserve austerity supplied Reserve lobbyists and their congressional friends with convincing arguments for extension of these benefits. The Navy program served as a tremendous lever for additional Army Reserve legislation. Secondly, the Army itself was interested in the improvement of the Reserves,

although it seldom gave the problem top priority. Last, and perhaps of most importance, was the general criticism of the public and Congress for the inadequacy of the Reserves.

Senator Margaret Chase Smith, Republican of Maine, provided particularly caustic comment, and introduced resolutions calling for an investigation of the Air Force and Army Reserve. Representative John W. Byrnes, Republican of Wisconsin, declared on the floor of Congress on May 6, 1948, that the Reserve program was "poorly conceived and poorly executed." Senator Harlan J. Bushfield openly charged the Army with "neglecting the Army Reserve and National Guard."[9] On March 19, 1949, Senator Smith asked the Secretary of Defense for a comparative report on the Reserve programs of the three services, and on May 9, 1949, bitterly reported on the floor of the Senate the failure of the secretary to provide such a report.

To such criticisms, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall denied that "the fault lies entirely with the Army or any other specific agency since many factors are involved."[10] Generally speaking, Democrat Royall astutely chose to share the blame with the Republican Congress. He said the large Reserve troop basis was predicated upon the passage of universal military training legislation, still unenacted. He grumbled at the previous lack of inactive duty training pay which the War Department had only recently requested and received from Congress. He also decried the

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[9]U. S. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., May 6, 1948, p. A 2769.

[10]Letter from Royall to Rep. John W. Byrnes, April 15, 1948, File 326.6 ORC, 1948, Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

lack of appropriations.

In January of 1947, Mrs. Smith, then a member of the House of Representatives, had introduced an inactive duty training pay bill for the Army and Air Force Reserves.[11] Nothing happened to the legislation until Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson sent over a departmental bill to accomplish the same goal.

The bill passed the Senate without debate in the first session of the 80th Congress and came up for House debate in March, 1948.[12] The discussion, very general in nature, brought out a major complaint against the bill. The National Guard was already receiving drill pay in the same amount Army reservists were destined to receive. In competing with the Army Reserve for recruits, the National Guard, whose responsibilities included state as well as national functions, would suffer. Young men would prefer to join the Army Reserve, which had only national functions, unless the National Guard received extra pay to offset the extra functions. Representative Errett P. Scrivner, of Kansas, argued vigorously, but offered no specific amendment. The bill became law in the same form as recommended by the House committee.[13]

Almost as far reaching, and a great deal more complicated, was the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948 which permitted reservists with twenty years of satisfactory military service to draw retirement pay after reaching sixty years of age.

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[11]H. R. 1059, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

[12]U. S. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., March 9, 1948, p. 2418.

[13]P. L. 460, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.

In order to have a year of service credited as a satisfactory year, a reservist must have earned at least fifty "retirement points" by attending drill sessions, teaching classes or completing Army correspondence courses. During summer camp and other types of active duty, reservists receive one retirement point for each day of active service. The sum of all retirements points earned in a lifetime career determines the rate of retirement pay. The rate is geared to the active Army pay scale, so that whenever the regulars get a pay raise, the reservists also benefit.[14] This system gave reservists some assurance that their retirement pay would not suffer from inflation since each Regular Army pay raise would constitute an adjustment.

The retirement bill was originally introduced under National Military Establishment sponsorship in 1947,[15] but made no headway. In 1948 the bill had no difficulty winning congressional committee approval. Floor debate was lengthy but noncontroversial. The bill became law[16] under the joint sponsorship of the Defense Establishment, the Reserve Officers Association and the National Guard Association.

Complications immediately arose, however, over the administration of the act. The effective date was not specific. During consideration of the bill, the House Committee on Armed Services had recommended the addition of a new section permitting the departmental secretary to set

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[14]This was thought in many informed quarters to be an astute system whereby thousands of reservists would support Regular Army pay raises.

[15]H. R. 2744, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

[16]P. L. 810, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.

the effective date, but in no case could it be later than the first day of the seventh month following the enactment of the bill. The amendment was subsequently accepted by the House and Senate and became a part of the law. Later the comptroller general ruled that in order for reservists to earn a satisfactory retirement year, they must begin to earn retirement points as of the enactment date. This was impossible because the National Military Establishment had not issued appropriate regulations and, in fact, was not required to do so by the act until January 1, 1949.[17] An amendment was needed to clarify the effective date of the law.

The following year, a bill was introduced into the 81st Congress making the effective date July 1, 1949.[18] As the bill was moving painlessly through the House, Representative Overton Brooks offered an amendment upon the request of Major General Milton A. Reckord, Adjutant General of Maryland and Legislative Chairman of the National Guard Association. The amendment would have extended retirement privileges to personnel who had served in the National Guard and state militia forces prior to June 3, 1916. Before this date, the system of national recognition of state forces was not in existence, but nevertheless the bill, together with the amendment, passed the House on July 18, 1948, and the Senate on July 26, 1948. It was vetoed by President Eisenhower, who

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[17]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Amending Reserve Retirement Provisions of the P. L. 810, 80th Congress, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, H. Rept. 1021 to accompany H. R. 5508, p. 2.

[18]H. R. 5508, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949)

would not permit the retirement privilege to be extended to "non-federally recognized service." Another bill without the obnoxious amendment was quickly pushed through the House and Senate.[19] The last of the statute's complications had been finally cleared up.

Another major boost was given to the Reserve program by the passage, in 1949, of a disability and death benefits bill. The effort was begun in 1947 when Representative Margaret Chase Smith, of Maine, and Senator William F. Knowland, of California, introduced bills to this effect in their respective Houses. It was Senator Smith's bill which finally became law--without the support of the Department of Defense.[20] Spokesmen for the department said the bill should await "a single legislative program dealing with all aspects of compensation of the armed services."[21] Because of pressure from the civilian components, the request for delay was denied. It was passed first by the Senate in April, then by the House in June, 1949. Under the law, reservists won financial protection from injuries and death which occurred on short tours of active duty. Protection during longer periods of active duty was already provided by law.

Also in 1949 there came the first congressional steps toward an armory construction program. By early 1948 the Army staff was forced, by rising pressure, to take definite planning action. After the publica-

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[19]H. R. 5929, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. which became P. L. 297, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

[20]S. 213, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. which became P. L. 108, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

[21]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Disability Benefits for Reserves, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, on S. 213, p. 4.

tion of the 1948 Gray board report, which inquired into the over-all conditions of all Reserve components, and after President Truman had focused attention on the Reserve problem through his Executive Order 10008, the Army considered it essential that Reserve facilities legislation be introduced under departmental auspices in the next Congress. This was accomplished. Chairman Chan Gurney of the Senate armed services committee introduced the bill in early 1949.[22]

On May 17, 1949, Harold R. Bull, Acting Director of Organization and Training of the Army, was called before members of the Senate Armed Services committee to explain the armory problem. It was decided that the bill should be returned to the Department of Defense for revision in accordance with various principles of inter-service cooperation laid down by the Gray board.[23]

In the same month the Secretary of Defense restated the legislative items which he considered deserved high priority, and although the facilities bill had earlier possessed this status, it was no longer included. The Senate committee therefore gave the bill no further consideration in 1949.

In the second session of the 81st Congress, the bill regained its priority. On April 20, 1950, the Bureau of the Budget released a statement that the bill "should not be further delayed." On May 5, 1950, the Secretary of the Army notified the committee that he considered the

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[22]S. 1646, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

[23]File D15-1-23, Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

bill of critical importance.[24]

The outbreak of the Korean War caused some delay in congressional consideration of the armory bill, but once taken up, it went through Congress without difficulty. It was passed by the House on August 15, 1950, after an amendment by Representative Brooks which removed any mention of a specific amount to be appropriated. The Senate version, which passed on August 21st, created twenty-two disagreements, only five of which were technical in nature. It was finally decided by a conference committee to authorize appropriation of $250,000,000 for the next five years. The conference also accepted the House language calling upon the Secretary of Defense to consult the respective armed service committees about the construction of specific armory buildings.

In 1955 the program was extended for three years and given authorization for an additional $250,000,000. When this authorization expired in 1957, the Department of Defense asked for $150,000,000 more for a two-year period. Instead, Congress decided to authorize funds for only one-year periods thereafter. Furthermore, a one-year limit was attached to the appropriations themselves. Beginning with the budget for 1959, the Department of Defense must ask for authority and money for specific projects on a line-item basis. Projects not placed under contract by the deadline date, must be resubmitted the following year for congressional approval.

The public furor over the inequitable recall of World War II

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[24]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Facilities Act of 1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1949, S. Rept. 1785, to accompany S. 960, p. 4.

veterans into the Korean hostilities generated the great congressional interest in the Reserves. On American entry into the war, Congress enacted legislation permitting the involuntary recall of reservists for periods not exceeding twenty-one months.[25] In the same law, Congress also permitted the President to extend all enlistments for a period of twelve months. In both cases, the authority was to terminate July 9, 1951, but the entry of the Chinese communists into the war required that both powers be extended until July 1, 1953.[26] Simultaneously, the period during which reservists could be involuntarily retained on active duty was lengthened from twenty-one to twenty-four months.

The public clamor over recall procedures centered around the induction of inactive reservists who had neither participated in training nor received pay. Generally speaking, these inactive reservists were forced back to active duty before those who had drawn pay as participants in organized units. Even World War II veterans were recalled while draft-deferred students remained in school.

The policy of the Department of Defense to call inactive individuals of the Army Reserve prior to members of organized units was defended by Brigadier General E. A. Evans, executive director of the National Reserve Officers' Association. The great need, he told the House Committee on Armed Services, was for individual replacements. To have taken the replacements from the organized units would have destroyed these units, leaving this country extremely vulnerable in case of all-out

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[25]P. L. 599, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

[26]P. L. 51, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

war. It was a "proper" decision, Evans said.[27]

It was several months before Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall could calm the storm by a promise that reservists would thereafter receive considerable advance notice before recall.

Demands for quick releases of the reservists continued to bombard Congress, and during the hearings on the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 the House armed services committee succumbed to a demand for a twelve-months' limit on involuntary service by those who were recalled out of the inactive Reserve. All would be released as soon after June 25, 1951, as they completed twelve months' service, according to an amendment presented by the committee and accepted by the House of Representatives. The Senate version of the bill contained no such provision, and it was the responsibility of a conference committee to work out a compromise. The final version enacted into law required the release of all World War II veterans after seventeen months' service.[28]

The clamor still did not end completely. In August of the same year, during debate over the defense appropriation bill for fiscal year 1952, Representative James Van Zandt, of Pennsylvania, proposed a rider prohibiting the use of any part of the appropriation to pay salaries after November 30, 1951, of inactive reservists who were World War II veterans. It would have forced the Army to discharge all veteran re-

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[27]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pursuant to H. R. 4860, p. 6.

[28]P. L. 51, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

servists. The proposal aroused tremendous controversy. Its opponents declared the period of recall had been settled and should not be reopened. The powerful chairman of the House armed services committee, Carl Vinson, took the floor in an effort to defeat the amendment, but to no avail. The amendment was accepted by a vote of 110 to 94,[29] but in later Senate action, the amendment was discarded and never reappeared.

The Reserve troubles of the Korean conflict found their partial solution in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952.[30] Actually the Department of Defense had been working on a proposed bill, a compilation of over-all Reserve policies, since 1949 when Secretary James Forrestal decided that Naval Reserve legislation should be extended to all the services. The Civilian Components Policy Board drafted an "omnibus" bill in 1950, but it failed to receive a hearing. Representatives Carl Vinson and Overton Brooks continued to prod the Department of Defense for additional Reserve proposals.[31] During legislative hearings on selective service matters in the latter part of 1950, defense officials promised to submit a Reserve bill within six months. In early January, 1951, the chairman of the House armed services committee sent a note to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel asking for the bill on or before March 1, 1951. Mrs. Anna Rosenberg, the assistant secretary, put the department in high gear, and a bill was introduced

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[29]U. S. Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 9, 1951, p. 9752.

[30]P. L. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952.

[31]New York Times, July 2, 1951, p. 13.

into the 1951 session.[32]

The House committee made approximately 150 amendments to the bill, and on the advice of the Reserve Officers Association, the bill was ultimately superseded by H. R. 4860 which in turn was superseded by H. R. 5277, and finally by H. R. 5426.[33]

The Reserve Officers Association made a penetrating study of the bill and was very influential in its final form. The National Guard Association, on the other hand, said, at the beginning at least, that it was "well satisfied with the existing laws and policies."[34] The revised bill passed the House on October 15, 1951, without much interest from the Guard, but this attitude was not to continue.

By the time the representatives of the National Guard Association testified on the bill before the Senate subcommittee, on May 26 of the following year, they had proposed 97 amendments to the bill, 96 of which had been accepted by the Department of Defense. Major General Ellard A. Walsh, the organization's chief lobbyist, told the group that the bill was a "non-reality" without universal military training. He declared that:

> . . . no action should be taken on the bill at this time and thus afford an opportunity for further study to determine what can be done in this connection with the subject matter of the proposed Act. As the National Guard sees it, this proposed measure, if enacted, would establish a Reserve system whereby

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[32]H. R. 4667, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced June 29, 1951.

[33]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, on H. R. 5426, p. 105.

[34]Ibid., p. 105.

> the whole burden for national defense would fall upon the veterans of the country who have already been placed in jeopardy as the result of war or emergency and who would again be placed in jeopardy if another emergency, comparable to the Korean emergency should arise.[35]

Major General Milton A. Reckord, chairman of the Guard's legislative committee, testified that the provisions of the bill would "almost completely federalize the National Guard."[36] This same charge had previously been leveled against practically all legislation which the National Guard Association disliked, and to many observers it was a far-fetched conclusion to draw concerning the bill. On the following day, Earl D. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army, countered the Reckord statement:

> "I can state unequivocally and officially on behalf of the Department of the Army that there is absolutely no intent and no desire whatever on the part of those responsible for the administration of the Army, to change the traditional dual status of the National Guard, either by law or regulation.[37]

Assistant Secretary Anna Rosenberg also appeared before the Committee to deny the charges. She said, "The Department has been in almost continual contact with the senior representatives of the National Guard Association, and this is the first intimation that we have had that the National Guard Association is dissatisfied."[38] She claimed the Guard had actually pointed to some of its own amendments as attempts to federalize the Guard.

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[35] Ibid., p. 108.

[36] Ibid., p. 115.

[37] Ibid., p. 264.

[38] Ibid., p. 245.

Regardless of the denials, the National Guard Association's drive against the bill pushed ahead. Letters began to pour into congressmen's offices from the various state adjutants general and their friends. Many, which were printed in the hearings, utilized the same terminology, hinting of a common origin. Among other charges, the letters said that, (1) with universal military training impossible, the bill was unrealistic; (2) it does nothing for enlisted personnel or the National Guard; (3) it created a Reserve composed of veterans; (4) it was an entering wedge for the federalization of the National Guard; (5) it weakened the National Guard Bureau; (6) it would hurt National Guard recruiting, and (7) it would create a system of Ready and Standby Reserves which was "utterly unrealistic."[39]

By the time the Senate acted on the bill in 1952, universal military training had truly been killed. Consequently, a radically altered bill was passed.

During floor debate, Senator James E. Murray, Democrat of Montana, failed to win acceptance of an amendment providing for the appointment of osteopaths as Reserve officers. Two other amendments were accepted, however. The Senate spoke out in favor of motherhood by accepting a proposal by Senator Robert C. Hendrickson, Republican of New Jersey, to remove the ban against mothers in the Women's Army Corps-Reserve. Another amendment by Senator Styles Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire, allowed service as Military and Naval Academy cadets to be counted toward Reserve longevity pay.

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[39] Ibid., p. 306.

The National Guard lost in its big effort to kill the bill, but won most of its minor skirmishes. The conference committee sided with the Senate version to retain the Inactive National Guard,[40] a paper organization of those guardsmen who cannot participate in meetings. Also, upon National Guard Association complaint, a policy statement for the integration of the Reserves into the Regular Army management system contained in the House bill was rejected. Another provision contained in the House bill which repealed the dual oaths for national guardsmen was rescinded. The final law carried requirements for enlistment oaths to both the state and national governments. This requirement, the National Guard Association said, made it unnecessary for each state to pass a special oath law.[41]

The conference committee also decided to retain the ban on mothers in the Reserve portion of the Women's Army Corps. In addition, the provision for three categories of reservists--ready, standby and retired--although not favored by the Senate, was retained in the final version. The maximum size of the Ready Reserve was raised by the conference committee from one million to one and one-half million men.

Thus, the discontent over Korean recall procedures had been the springboard to extensive changes in the Reserve system.

The next major congressional effort on behalf of the Reserves began in 1953 and culminated in 1955. It was the Reserve Officer Per-

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[40]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Conference Rept. 2445, to accompany H. R. 5426, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 34.

[41]Ibid., p. 35.

sonnel Act of 1954,[42] which gave the Army Reserve its first statutory promotion law. It went into effect in 1955.

Earlier, there was considerable dissatisfaction among all Reserve components over the lack of long range promotion policy. It was claimed that the promotion system discriminated against civilian soldiers in favor of the regulars. There was sufficient pressure behind this claim that Congress almost inserted a hurriedly-formulated promotion provision in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. At Department of Defense insistance, a substitute provision[43] was accepted and the Department of Defense agreed to submit to Congress a new promotion plan. For the formulation of the bill, an interim committee, representing all the services, was created in the department.[44]

The treatment of the departmental bill is an extremely interesting example of congressional leadership in the Reserve area. Throughout its slow trudge to enactment, the bill was opposed by the professional military forces of the nation. The fight over the language in the bill was a clear-cut battle between the Reserve Officers Association and the Regular Army.

The clash began in May, 1953, in the chambers of the House Armed Services Committee. Republican Dewey Short was chairman. As customary when Reserve legislation is under consideration, the Pentagon

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[42]P. L. 773, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954.

[43]Section 216 (a).

[44]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, pursuant to H. R. 1222, p. 1579.

sent an active-duty reservist forth to do battle.[45] Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Parker of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, stated the Army's opposition to the bill. The Army believed, he said, that it would be impossible "to draft a bill acceptable to all parties which would be substantially uniform for all reserve components."[46]

The hearings brought forth much statistical evidence intended to prove and disprove that the regulars had discriminated against reservists. Much antagonism was shown for the terminal leave promotions handed to reservists as they left the service after World War II. The reservists complained bitterly of the number of citizen soldiers serving on active duty in ranks below that which they possessed in the Army Reserve while numerous regulars were serving in higher "temporary" grades than their "permanent" or Regular Army grades.

Perhaps the most heated argument stemmed from the fact that reservists called to active duty went in without any credit toward promotion regardless of their experience in the Reserves. The promotion bill, as presented by the Department of Defense would have continued this system. The Reserve lobbyists insisted on change. They demanded that reservists be given credit for their Reserve and civilian experience. The regulars insisted that military science was so unique and complicated that only actual active duty time should constitute credit for active-duty promotions.

The bill that emerged from the House committee was highly suit-

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[45] Ibid., p. 1560.

[46] Ibid., p. 1562.

able to Reserve interests. It had been changed extensively to meet the Reserve Officers Association's desires. It passed the House without a single word of opposition being spoken.[47] But despite the association's pleas, the Senate Committee on Armed Services decided to delay additional hearings until 1954 in order to give the defense establishment time to make other proposals.

Senate hearings opened April 22, 1954, and still no word had been received from the defense department. Dr. John A. Hannah, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, appeared before the committee and asked for additional time. He told of important plans developed by the new Eisenhower administration to revitalize the Reserve. The promotion bill, he said, should wait the new over-all program. At the same time, Hannah spoke of several provisions of the promotion bill as "intolerable."[48]

The Senate committee agreed to a postponement of further hearings, and did not again consider the bill until after the department sent over several proposed amendments on July 8th. On July 20, 1954, the committee heard Reserve planners recommend that the Secretaries of the three services be allowed more discretion than contemplated in the bill. Brigadier General-Senator Strom Thurmond, of South Carolina, national president of the Reserve Officers Association, and Major General Maas, a Marine Corps reservist and for over fifteen years a congress-

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[47]U. S. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., July 31, 1953, p. 10672.

[48]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, on H. R. 6573, p. 8.

man from Minnesota, argued for the bill.

On July 27, 1954, President Eisenhower addressed a letter to the committee chairman, Leverett Saltonstall, Republican from Massachusetts, asking that the promotion legislation be "withheld until the entire system can be tightly evaluated. . . . "[49] Nevertheless, the committee did not yield. The report, issued two days later, printed the letter, but made no recommendation for delay in passage. It did ask that the effective date of the bill be postponed almost a year--to May 3, 1955.[50] During action on the Senate floor, the date was again put off until July 1, 1955, under an amendment offered by Senator Margaret Chase Smith. The delay was intended to give the Department of Defense additional time to prepare for the implementation of the Act, which in the case of the Air Force was a particularly complicated and time-consuming process.

During the following session of the Congress, in June, 1955, the congressional committees considered several minor amendments to the bill.[51] The defense department, Reserve Officers Association and National Guard were all deeply interested in a variety of extenuating circumstances which the new law would create. All worked together to clear up the difficulties. The amendments were passed without controversy.

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[49]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, S. Rept. 2010, to accompany H. R. 6573, p. 2.

[50]Ibid., p. 1.

[51]S. 1718, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, which became P. L. 115, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.

The fruit of five or more years of planning emerged in the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. Since 1948, Congress had been seeking a source of Reserve manpower which would not divert needed enlistments from the active service or rob the civilian economy of necessary manpower. It sought a method for constantly replenishing the Reserve with fresh, young citizen soldiers without extreme reliance upon combat veterans of previous hostilities. An attempted solution, inadequate at best, was written into the 1948 and 1951 draft acts. Under these laws both enlistees and draftees leaving the service were required to serve several years in the Reserve Corps or National Guard.

The 1951 law[52] also ordered the National Security Training Commission to recommend a universal military training program. The commission submitted a plan in 1952 which would have required all able-bodied eighteen-year-olds to put in six-months' active duty followed by seven and one-half years in the Reserve.[53] The House, however, diluted the bill by amendments until it was practically meaningless, and then on a 236-162 roll-call vote, recommitted the bill, thereby killing it. For the remainder of the Truman administration and during the first year under Eisenhower, the problem lay dormant. In late 1953, the Eisenhower administration began a series of studies in the Department of Defense, National Security Training Commission, and the Office of Defense Mobilization. A National Reserve Plan was formulated and presented by Eisen-

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[52]P. L. 51, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

[53]U. S. National Security Training Commission, Universal Military Training, Foundation of Enduring National Strength, First Report to the Congress, Oct., 1951 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952).

hower in a special message to Congress on July 13, 1955. The administration wanted three million ready reservists and two million standby reservists by 1959.

The administration bill[54] provided for six months' active duty training for youths between 17 and 19 years, followed by nine and one-half years' training in Ready Reserve units. If an insufficient number volunteered, Selective Service would be used to maintain the quotas. All men finishing two-year enlistments in the Army would be transferred to the Army Reserve, or perhaps the National Guard, for six years' Reserve duty. All men in these programs would be required to participate in regular drill sessions at local armories; otherwise they would be vulnerable to recall or discharge under "other than honorable" conditions.

The House Armed Services Subcommittee No. 1 began hearings on February 8, 1955. In his testimony, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson emphasized the need for immediate readiness on the part of all Reserves. On the following day, General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, said four or five years of National Reserve Plan operation would reduce the post-mobilization time for Reserves from ten to five months. Officials of the Air Force and Navy expressed fear that the plan's short six-month training program would endanger their service's long-term voluntary enlistment program.

By late February the most prominent public question surrounding

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[54]H. R. 2967, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.

the plan was the compulsory six-month draft of young men. On February 19, several top military chiefs issued a press release calling the compulsory provisions essential. Representatives of farm and labor organizations appeared before the subcommittee on February 28th and declared the plan was an effort to foist on the country a form of universal military training. This was denied by Assistant Secretary of Defense Carter L. Burgess who said the proposed program was "not an absolute parallel with UMT."

In closed sessions, the subcommittee authored a new bill,[55] which stripped away the main compulsory features of the old bill. It denied authority to grant "other than honorable" discharges, and the draft provisions were eliminated. During consideration by the full House armed Services committee, a proposal by Representative Arthur Winstead, Democrat of Missippi, to eliminate also the provision that reservists who failed to keep up prescribed training could be recalled for a maximum of forty-five days of active service, was rejected by a vote of 2-32. Winstead and Charles P. Nelson, Republican of Maine, were the only two members who favored throwing out this last bit of compulsion. On April 27, 1955, the committee, by a 31-5 vote, issued a favorable report on the bill.[56]

Probably the most controversial provision in the committee bill

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[55]H. R. 5297, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.

[56]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, National Reserve Plan, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, H. Rept. 457 to accompany H. R. 5297.

was the authority of the Army to assign men, who had finished their six months' training, to National Guard units. This was a delicate provision. Many men would have intensely disliked being involuntarily transferred to certain Guard units--particularly those which were racially segregated or those which had reputations for "anti-labor union" activities. In addition, the committee bill quieted the Air Force and Navy fears by setting a 250,000 limit on the number of men who could be annually trained in the new program. It required the National Security Training Commission to keep a watchful eye on the welfare problems of the teen-age trainees. One new element of compulsion was added to the bill. Men who failed to carry out Reserve duties satisfactorily could be drafted for two years.

On May 18th, during floor consideration of the plan, a proposal by Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Democrat of New York, to prohibit enlistments in or transfers to racially segregated National Guard units threw the House into deep trouble. Powell's amendment was agreed to by a 126-87 standing vote. On the following day, the House rejected an attempt by Chairman Carl Vinson to remove the anti-segregation amendment. The Vinson effort was voted down by a 116-143 standing vote and a 143-167 teller vote. Nevertheless, the segregation issue jeopardized enactment of the entire bill. On another resolution by Representative Vinson, on the same day, the Committee of the whole House rose from its deliberations without acting either to pass or reject the bill. It was indefinitely postponed.

Although the President continued to press for action on the Re-

serve bill, nothing of importance happened until June 21, 1955, when Chairman Carl Vinson attempted to persuade his full armed services committee to approve a watered-down version of the Reserve bill.[57] The committee, instead, voted 16-14, to send the bill to Mr. Brooks' subcommittee. On the following day, Subcommittee No. 1 approved for the full Committee an amended version of the Vinson bill. The new bill eliminated all references to transfers to the National Guard, softened the penalties against obligated reservists who failed to participate in meetings and lowered the total Reserve obligation from eight to six years.

On the House floor an amendment designed to eliminate segretation in National Guard units was rejected on a 105-156 standing vote. Also rejected was a proposal by Representative Powell to deny the customary draft immunity to those men who enlisted in segregated National Guard units. Another amendment giving the National Security Training Commission operational control of the six-months' program was refused. The over-all bill finally passed the House July 1, 1955.

The Senate Committee reported out the bill on July 13th with several amendments, all of which were intended to strengthen and enforce the provisions of the bill. The Senate accepted all committee amendments and passed the bill on July 14, 1955, by a vote of 80-1. The lone vote against passage was cast by Senator William Langer, Republican of North Dakota. An amendment by Senator William E. Jenner, Republican of Indiana, was rejected; it would have prohibited the assignment of military personnel in any foreign country which had criminal jurisdiction

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[57]H. R. 6900, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.

over such personnel.

The final bill, as it came out of the conference committee, retained the major provisions of the plan, but made a variety of minor changes. An annual limit in the six-months' program was set at 250,000 men although the Senate had not wanted to set a maximum. The bill discarded the Senate plan to pay cash bonuses for participation in Ready Reserve training. It altered slightly the Senate provision which authorized the six-months' training graduates to be drafted if they failed to attend drill sessions, but it retained the House plan for a forty-five day recall to active duty for such persons.

President Eisenhower signed the bill on August 9, 1955. At the same time he expressed disappointment that it did not permit young men to be drafted into the Reserve components.[58]

When President Eisenhower signed the bill, he also mentioned the "unwarranted disparity" under the bill between the $78 per month offered to the national guardsmen and the $50 per month provided for the Army reservists who undergo the identical six-months' training. This deficiency was corrected on April 23, 1956, when the Congress approved an equalization measure introduced by Representative Overton Brooks. All trainees were given $78 per month.[59]

Other than by direct enactment of legislation, the Congress has influenced Reserve policy in several other ways. The first important,

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[58]New York Times, Aug. 10, 1955, p. 101.

[59]P. L. 490, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956.

official step toward adequate surveillance of the Reserve Forces came in 1949 with the establishment of the House Reserve components subcommittee. It was created by a resolution of the House armed services committee on April 5, 1949, "to inquire into the adequacy of the organization and training of the civilian components of the Armed Forces." Representative Dewey Short was chairman and a committee staff member, Bryce Harlow, later to be administrative assistant to President Eisenhower, was detailed to work with the Special Subcommittee. Because of the prevalent congressional attitude that the Reserve Forces were poorly managed, it was intended that the subcommittee make a special investigation of the matter. The heavy pressure of other legislative work kept the subcommittee from meeting early in the session. In the meantime, the Department of Defense took steps to sooth the anxiety over Reserve matters.

The Civilian Components Policy Board was established within the Department of Defense on June 14, 1949. A chairman for the new board was found just fourteen days before the subcommittee hearings began on August 17, 1949. The department's representative at the hearings, Colonel Louis H. Renfrow, assured Chairman Short that the Board meant business and asked the subcommittee to delay any reports until the Board had a chance to function.[60]

The creation of the Civilian Components Policy Board impressed Mr. Short, and he acceded to Colonel Renfrow's request. "It looks to

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[60]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Matters Affecting the Civilian Components of the Armed Forces, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4401.

me," he said, "as if there is an excellent opportunity for the military itself to take the required action to put the civilian components on an absolutely sound footing."[61] Although the subcommittee heard several other witnesses, nothing of importance was accomplished.

Of greater importance as a surveillance technique were the periodic reviews of the Reserve program conducted by the subcommittee in 1955 and 1956. The Brooks group made a serious effort to keep a watchful eye on the implementation of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. Beginning approximately one-half year after the enactment of the law, hearings were conducted about every five months. After each set of hearings, an interim report was usually prepared for the information of Congress and the public.

The first such report revealed the subcommittee's great interest in the enlistment rate in the new six-months' program and the problem of providing adequate armory facilities for Reserve units. The subcommittee commended the Air National Guard for "its excellent progress."[62] It also said "the Subcommittee does not wish to leave the impression that it is entirely pleased with the operation of the Act,"[63] but did not wish to prejudge the program. The report complained that "it is disconcerting for the Congress to appropriate funds for needed Reserve facilities con-

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[61] Ibid., p. 4393.

[62] U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, First Interim Report by Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on Armed Services, on the Implementation of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955, Publication No. 45, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., Jan., 1956 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 5303.

[63] Ibid., p. 5306.

struction only to learn they are held up in the Bureau of the Budget and not apportioned to the military service for use."[64] The report ended with some compliments on the current recruiting publicity program for the Reserves. Other hearings occurred in the late spring and fall of 1956, and February of 1957, and again in July of 1957. A variety of complaints and suggestions came out of the hearings.

A significant aspect of congressional policy-making for the Reserves has been the absence of party partisanship. Not a single policy has served as an election issue, and generally speaking, no prominent legislator has attempted to make political profit out of the Reserve program, except as a minor aspect of the over-all question of military spending.

On the one bill concerning the Reserves Forces which received a record vote, there was no evidence of party division. On the final conference report on the Reserve Forces Act of 1952, 169 Democrats favored the bill in the House and 38 opposed it. The Republicans voted 146 to 40 in favor of the bill.[65]

Possibly some of the de-emphasis on party feeling stemmed from the overpowering influence of the two strong pressure groups interested in Reserve Forces policy. Certainly, the Reserve Officers Association and the National Guard Association exercised more influence over the members of Congress than did either political party.

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[64] Ibid., p. 5306.

[65] U. S. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., July 25, 1955, p. 11410.

Lack of strong party feeling in the armed services committee of the House is evident in the cooperation between the chairman and the ranking minority members. In 1949, Republican Dewey Short was appointed chairman of the Reserve components subcommittee, although Democrats controlled the Congress. It is likely that this grew out of earlier courtesies extended by Short to the ranking Democrat, Carl Vinson, when the Republicans controlled Congress in 1947 and 1948. Vinson had been allowed to decide the appointment of all Democrats to the various subcommittees in 1947. This came to be a customary power of the ranking minority member.

Local and sectional interest in the Reserves has not been so impotent as party interest. The pork barrel and patronage have been important barriers to good military policy as a whole, and to a much lesser extent in Reserve policy.

Everyone is familiar with the furor caused by the deactivation of any Army post. Local business interests are especially active in seeking to retain every possible source of government funds coming into their area. In the case of the Reserve Forces, similar outcries resulted from the few, scattered relocations of National Guard units. No such thing has happened in the extremely frequent deactivations and relocations of Army Reserve units.

The public has been, in many instances, unconscious of the cash brought into a community from Army Reserve sources. Also, units have been switched, renamed and deactivated so rapidly by Army Reserve authorities, the general public had little time to get accustomed or emo-

tionally attached to a specific unit. This is not likely to continue. In asking community leaders to cooperate with the local Reserve program, the Army has pointed out the generous cash offerings available to the area through a big Reserve program. With this information, there is strong likelihood that future mention of deactivations will bring a local outburst of agitation from special interests in the towns and cities.

The Army Reserve has also largely avoided the agitation of local interests concerning the geographical locations of military airports. This has been a never-ending headache for Air Force Reserve authorities. Since the Army needs only meager air facilities, it is usually exempt from the protests aroused by establishment of airports near residential areas.

The small towns, especially, have been interested in procuring Army Reserve and National Guard armories. So far, however, pressure for political decisions in choosing the location have not been great. This is mostly because funds were not scarce. Any community that could support an Army Reserve unit could get an armory. The residents of the area did not need to create political pressure in order to secure a project, except when there was doubt of the ability of the area to meet the criteria laid down by the Bureau of the Budget and Department of Defense.

Congress has nevertheless insisted, from the beginning of the construction program, that full plans for each project be submitted to the armed services committees for review. Behind the scenes, congressmen were no doubt influential in selecting exact locations, deciding which

cities within their district would get priority in Army construction, and getting funds for specific projects released by the Bureau of the Budget. Very little discussion of such local matters have occurred in official hearings, however.[66]

There is some evidence of regional feeling on Reserve policy. The record vote taken on the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 shows a varying degree of interest in the new six-months' program according to geographical area. There was only one opposing vote in the House from all the eleven western states from Colorado to the Pacific Coast. This was the greatest support given by any part of the country. On the other hand, 42 per cent of the Representatives from the six states surrounding the Great Lakes (Pa., Ohio, Mich., Wisc., Ill., Ind.) in addition to West Virginia opposed the bill. This was the area of heaviest opposition.

The determination of the role of Congress in the Reserve build-up of the 1940's and 1950's is extremely difficult. It requires the analysis of congressional activities in the enactment of some ten major pieces of Reserve legislation and several other minor acts. At first glance, it is obvious, that Congress has not been the originator of spe-

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[66]An exception to this general statement occurred during House Appropriations subcommittee hearings in 1955. Representative Daniel J. Flood was very much interested in a Reserve Armory being constructed in his home town, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Since Wilkes-Barre was only a "hop, skip and jump from four coal mines," the armory ought to be heated with a coal burner, he thought. The Reserve authorities agreed, considering the fact that Flood was a member of the Army subcommittee of the House appropriations committee. But as soon as Flood was defeated for re-election, plans for the coal burner went out the window. Instead, an oil burner was installed. When Flood was reelected to Congress, he declared the switch to have been an "atrocity." His tirade required four pages of small print in the report of the hearings.

cific Reserve policies. Insofar as policy details are concerned, the congressional committees and Congress, itself, have been little more than a review board. Except where there is great public interest, as in the Korean recall procedures, individual congressmen have shown little interest in the details of policy. Extremely few seek to interfere with the managerial authority of the department. In other words, Congress has had an extremely small place in the formulation of the multitudinous details which constitute the body of the Reserve program.

There is strong evidence, too, that Congress has refrained from interfering with technical military matters relating to the Reserves. There has been almost no discussion among congressmen, for instance, concerning the troop basis--whether reservists will be organized as artillerymen or infantrymen--or any other matter requiring professional military knowledge. In these areas, Congress usually accepts the recommendations of experienced military leaders. Except where there is controversy among soldiers, Congress is not likely to debate technical military problems. For this reason the military services, including the Reserve Forces, usually present every new policy in military terms and have it announced by a uniformed soldier.

To what extent has Congress accomplished its goals for the Reserve? The goals, usually vague, involved little more than a general build-up in the size and efficiency of the Reserve Forces. As of 1957, few experienced reservists would say that the program is sufficiently effective. Certainly, it is not so large a program as Congress has generally desired.

While it is necessary to recognize the occasional decisive acts of Congress, it is evident that the Army formulated most of the Reserve's policies. It was also the Army, or at least the Department of Defense, that drew the total defense picture and pointed out the place of the Reserves in that picture. Although Congress constantly desired information which would provide perspective, such information was rarely forthcoming. Even if it were available, there is some doubt of the ability of the Congress, with its committee structure, to make good use of the information.

Nevertheless, Congress ultimately played the more decisive role in the over-all build-up of the Reserve Forces. Generally speaking, Congress wanted more Reserve strength and the managerial authorities wanted less. Through years of harassment, the Reserves prospered only to a limited extent. Almost every inch of the way was won in a battle against administrative apathy. There was constant agitation by congressmen for administrative action. It was Congress that provoked the Army into action on behalf of the Reserve. Although Congressional success was not a full victory, the Reserve program is, nevertheless, an excellent example of legislative leadership.

CHAPTER IV

APPROPRIATIONS AND RESERVE FORCES POLICY

"Since the days of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 there has been no question but that the sine qua non of democratic government has been legislative control of the purse."[1] These words by two leaders of the Harvard Defense Studies are declared by their authors to be "beyond the pale of the arguable." However, on occasion Congress seems to be willing to appropriate any amount asked by military authorities; consequently this statement is perhaps less certain than the authors believe. Nevertheless, the power to appropriate is an important aspect of American democracy. It is a fundamental factor in the formulation of Army Reserve Forces policy.

The Constitution makes Congress the custodian of the public purse, but the function has been largely delegated to the appropriations committees of each House. As the years have passed, subcommittees have assumed more and more of the responsibilities until now, just as Arthur W. Macmahon has said, "Subcommittees are the realities of the appropria-

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[1]Edward L. Katzenbach and John A. Ballard, Congress and Defense: Defense Appropriations; Investigations; and Relations with the Pentagon (Cambridge: Harvard Defense Studies, Serial No. 48, Reading Assignment No. 11, mimeographed, 1955), II-1.

tion process."[2]

There have usually been about ten subcommittees within each of the two appropriations committees. Until 1949, there was a subcommittee to study Army and Air Force estimates in addition to the Navy subcommittee in each House. There was little coordination between them.[3] In 1949, the two were combined in each House to form a defense appropriations subcommittee. The 1950 Appropriations bill was the first since the budget system was established in 1921 to unify the Armed Forces' appropriations.

As it turned out, however, the unification in its pure form was short-lived in the House. The subcommittee divided itself into three subgroups of from three to five persons each to study particular parts of the defense budget. One group studied Army estimates; another studied Navy estimates, and a third took the Air Force estimates. In the Senate, no such division was considered necessary, and all the members, usually around fifteen, studied the entire defense budget.

The members of the subcommittees have not been without considerable experience in military affairs. Elias Huzar reports that almost half of the members of the two subcommittees from 1933 to 1949 had some experience in the military forces.[4] That experience was mostly in the Army, but a few had served in the Navy or Marine Corps. However, such

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[2]Arthur W. Macmahon, "Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse I," Political Science Quarterly, 58 (June, 1943), 176.

[3]Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), p. 27.

[4]Ibid., p. 30.

experience is seldom a good foundation for decisions on appropriation bills; the purview of military duties is usually too limited. The appropriations experience of the members was probably more valuable in this function.

In 1954, six of the nine members of the House subcommittee were lawyers. Six had seen military service at one time or another, and one of these had been a Reserve colonel in World War II. The average age was 54.[5] At that time the subcommittee membership "had more experience with military appropriations than any of the civilians at the secretarial level who testified before them, with the single exception of the Department of Defense Comptroller, Wilfred J. McNeil."[6] They also had more experience with military finance than all but a few of the generals, admirals, and other servicemen who testified before them. In practically all instances their education and experience were much broader than that of the military witnesses.

The 1957 Army subgroup, composed of four Representatives designated to study Army appropriations, was similarly well prepared. Robert L. F. Sikes, Democrat of Florida, was a 51 year old graduate of the University of Florida and held a commission as a colonel in the Army Reserve. Another member, Gerald R. Ford, Jr., of Michigan, was a Yale Law School graduate with 47 months' experience in the World War II Navy. Edward T. Miller of Maryland was an infantry officer in World War I and a colonel of infantry in World War II. Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania had both a

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[5]Katzenbach and Ballard, op. cit., p. 3.

[6]Ibid., p. 3.

master's degree and a law degree.[7]

This information on the background of the subcommittee members seems inconsistent with the beliefs of so many observers who enjoy that great American pastime of criticizing legislators. So far as the Army subcommittee is concerned, the derogatory approach seems inaccurate. At least, it ought to be suspect. The Army subcommittee works hard. Numerous comments by the members during hearings and on the floor of the House show their sincere concern with the tremendous responsibilities of recommending the Army portion of defense expenditures. Their questions frequently revealed a great desire for information that would lead to a solution of the major policy problems, only to find the generals and colonels had no such information.

The congressional hearings on defense appropriations, including those for the Reserve Forces, are colorful. In 1954, the House appropriations subcommittee on military affairs heard testimony from 96 generals and admirals, 180 colonels and captains, together with miscellaneous civilians and lower-ranking military officers.[8] Relatively few witnesses, of course, were heard by the full committee. All nine members listened to the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The remainder appeared before the provincial subgroup with its aides, one clerk and one stenographer.

House subcommittee hearings usually begin in January and last until early May. The Senate subcommittee studies the bill from about

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[7] U. S. Congressional Directory, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 134.

[8] Katzenbach and Ballard, op. cit., p. 2.

mid-May to mid-June. In 1956, similar to other years, the three subgroups of the House subcommittee remained in combined session for about one month, hearing broad policy statements by military leaders with particular emphasis on the roles of the various services, missiles, and strategic jet bombers.

It appears that there is a powerful motivation at work leading these congressmen to make a conscientious effort. Undoubtedly, they sense the tremendous importance of their work in the cold war with Russia. In addition, mistakes in this area by earlier congresses have frequently returned to haunt them. Often times, the country was unprepared when military might was badly needed. Later the vengeance of the voters has been painfully felt by congressmen who earlier were niggardly with military appropriations. It is with care that any member of Congress now speaks against the appropriation of military funds.

There is always a certain amount of trivia and nonsensical proposals displayed in the Reserve Forces budget hearings. For instance, in 1956 the members of the Senate subcommittee showed concern over the inability of rural residents to participate in the branch of service of their choice. Some small towns would have only enough men to support one reserve unit, but not enough for every branch of service. The senators suggested a solution--let the men join any branch of service, then train together in one unit. Practically everyone well versed in Reserve

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[9]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1956, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 64.

affairs would oppose such an effort; it lacks appreciation for the specialized training demanded of units of the various services. The senators, perhaps with sincerity, did not understand why the Department of Defense hesitated.

This is certainly no worse than the attempt by Brigadier General Philip F. Lindeman, Chief of Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, on the same day, to sidetrack responsibility for failures.[10] Senators John Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, and Margaret Chase Smith, Republican of Maine, said they had heard complaints from reservists about inept training programs. Lindeman insisted the problem was the fault of the reservists themselves. It was the unit commander's job to achieve good instruction, he claimed. Senator Stennis finally agreed that maybe this is true, but pointed out that the Army had ultimate responsibility for getting good commanders who could achieve good instruction.

Another topic of discussion, the use by governors of National Guard planes, recurred frequently. Congressmen saw no reason for the United States Government to help pay for the Governors' air travel, but Department of the Army officials hesitated to forbid the use of these planes by the commanders-in-chief of the National Guard units. In 1953, the report of the house committee[11] went so far as to recommend a $1,238,000 reduction in the National Guard appropriation for "operation and maintenance of aircraft," allegedly to reduce this use of Army planes.

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[10] Ibid., p. 643.

[11] U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1954, House Rept. 680 to accompany H. R. 5969, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, p. 25.

Typical also of the details in which the committees frequently get immersed was the persistent effort to extend the franking privilege to state adjutants general; other examples include the occasional consideration which the committees give individual cases, as in 1951, when Senator McCarran coerced the commanding general of the Sixth Army to delay the transfer overseas of the son of a prominent West Coast businessman.[12]

The incidence of trivia and misleading witnesses can be easily overmephasized. The preponderance of testimony in the hearings has been sincere and helpful. The few exceptions that are found seem to be fairly evenly divided between professional witnesses and congressmen, so far as the Army Reserve Forces hearings are concerned. It would be most dangerous to conclude that congressional hearings fail to provide perspective of over-all Reserve policy because of the ineptness of congressmen.

The hearings reveal many attempts to get the generals to talk about something except trivia. So often, the military and civilian authorities before the committee refuse to give candid discussions of major policy problems. They do not care to have their problems aired--in or out of official hearings; they consider it bad public relations. Consequently, their prepared statements are usually dry rehashes of certain basic facts relating to the progress of the program. On most occasions,

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[12]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 1952, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. on H. R. 5054, 1951, p. 1659.

if a legislator wants candid information, he must get it from less official sources.

The difficulty in extracting frank statements from witnesses has been of great concern to those committees of Congress which deal with military affairs, probably more than other committees. Statements about this difficulty are frequently uttered in the hearings. Generals are asked, "Is this your personal recommendation to this committee or is this the bureau's official view which you are reporting?"; or frequently they are asked, "What is your personal opinion?" Seldom do the congressmen secure satisfactory answers.

Since the removal of Admiral Louis Denfield in President Truman's administration and the pressured exodus of General Matthew Ridgeway under President Eisenhower, both allegedly for their remarks in conflict with administration policy, the committees have been particularly interested in the matter. They seek to defend witnesses from rebuke by their departmental superiors for statements during hearings.

Despite the tendency of the generals to refrain from broad policy discussions of Reserve policy, many high-level policy matters get a hearing before the committees. Usually it is the members of the committee who provoke such discussions. They have been especially diligent in considering the over-all power of the President to recall reservists, although this is perhaps not a legitimate topic for an appropriations subcommittee. They have been particularly anxious about Regular Army encroachment on National Guard prerogatives and about the dilatory attitude of the Regular Army toward the Reserve Forces, in general. From the early years of the 1950's to the present date of 1957, the committees

have shown close surveillance of the over-all plan to turn various National Guard units into anti-aircraft battalions, in later years to be supplied with nike missiles, for protection of our big cities. Tremendous concern for the joint use of armories by all components is revealed by the hearings. To a lesser extent, the committees have shown their broad perspective by attempting to force military authorities to a decision on the major Reserve question of the era--to what extent can the country rely on the Reserves rather than the Regular Army.

One other aspect of appropriations subcommittee hearings deserves consideration. A high percentage of "executive" or secret hearings is characteristic of the subcommittee, as it is with a few other committees dealing with the national security. These range from five to forty per cent of the testimony before the Department of Defense subcommittee.[13] Similar percentages apply to the hearings on the Reserve budget. As practiced on other types of defense hearings, the decision as to whether Reserve hearings will be open or secret is left almost entirely to the discretion of the departmental authorities presenting the testimony.

There are several important differences between the House and Senate Subcommittees. First, the Senate subcommittee does not start with the raw budget as does the House subcommittee. The proposed defense expenditures are considerably refined and much more information is available after the House hearings. The Senate subcommittee can afford to be less concerned about details. It can sit as a high review and appeal board. It can and does concentrate on the changes made by the

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[13]Katzenbach and Ballard, op. cit., p. 11.

House subcommittee and by the full House of Representatives.

Because of its role as an appeal board, the Senate subcommittee is usually capable of taking a broader view of its area of surveillance. There are other reasons for this fact. The official purview of the subcommittee is the over-all defense budget. The eight- or nine-man House defense appropriations subcommittee, also responsible for the over-all defense budget, tends to accept the view of its three- or four-man subgroups, one for each of the services, which on occasion is distinctly provincial.

Also, House members serve ordinarily on only one subcommittee of the appropriations committee while Senators serve not only on more than one committee but also on more than one subcommittee of the appropriations committee. It is frequent for a Senate subcommittee member to be thrown into formal official contact with other aspects of defense, such as through service on the joint atomic energy committee. In addition, the Senate subcommittees are usually reinforced by at least three ex officio members from the Senate armed services committee. Many political scientists thus believe the Senate is able to see American defense with more perspective.

Senate hearings are shorter in duration, mostly because time-consuming de novo hearings are deemed unnecessary. So many times, also, the Senate subcommittee limits itself to the matters which the Department of Defense and the President deem worthy of added attention.

The Senate subcommittee usually works under a great deal of executive pressure. By the time the subcommittee begins to function, the

desires and fears of the Department of Defense are well refined, and the light of publicity is turned on the hearings. The President may even make a speech or issue a press release concerning matters before the subcommittee. If not the President, the Secretary of Defense, or his generals, will have comments to make and pressure to wield concerning the decisions to be made by the subcommittee. The administration's pressure is nearly always toward an increase in appropriations, and more often than not the subcommittee increases rather than reduces House figures. "However, the Senate is somewhat sensitive to the allegation frequently voiced on the House side that it (the Senate) often undoes the work of the House and does not really believe in economy."[14] For this reason, and others, the Senate frequently makes cuts of its own.

The appropriations committees do not make all the spending decisions. As is widely known, there must be an authorization for appropriations which is processed, in the case of the Reserve Forces, through the armed services committees.

Basic legislation creating the Army Reserve and National Guard, as national forces, were passed in the early years of this century and constitute the major authorizations for appropriations. Several laws of more recent origin are immensely important, however, as authorizing legislation. The Inactive Duty Training Pay Act of 1947[15] provides

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[14]Ernest S. Griffith, Congress--Its Contemporary Role (New York: New York University Press, 1951), p. 79.

[15]P. L. 460, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

authority for large annual drill pay expenditures. The Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948[16] permits expenditures for retirement salary of reservists. There are several acts authorizing disability benefits for reservists.

Perhaps the most interesting of all such laws are those providing for the armory construction program, starting with the National Defense Facilities Act of 1950. The armed services committees had an important role in the determination of the amount of money to be expended on the program. The original bill, introduced into the 81st Congress, authorized the appropriation of $400,000,000 over a period of eight years. On the House floor, the exact amounts were stricken from the bill, but they were replaced in the Senate version so that $135,000,000 would be authorized over a period of three years. As the law was finally passed, it provided for $250,000,000 for five years.[17]

When the first act expired it was extended by another law[18] which again, when introduced provided for "such amounts as may be appropriated from time to time."[19] The armed services committee of the House again took action to set a maximum. A committee amendment was adopted in the House limiting appropriations to $500,000,000 for the next eight

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[16]P. L. 810, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.

[17]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, National Defense Facilities Act of 1950, Conference Rept. 3026 to accompany H. R. 8994, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 1.

[18]P. L. 302, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.

[19]Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., April 27, 1955, p. 5160.

years--meaning the 1950 Act would be extended to allow $250,000,000 from 1955 to 1957. The decisive role of the armed services committees is thus seen in the appropriating process.

The Reserve budget studied by the congressional committees has come to be, ostensibly, fairly simple in structure. The effort toward performance budgeting in the Department of the Army has brought important changes in all Army appropriations, especially since 1949 when the Eberstadt Committee said, "The budgetary and appropriation structures of the Army and Navy are antiquated." The scattered Reserve Forces appropriations have, as of 1957, been gathered together into four items: Reserve personnel, National Guard, military construction for Reserve components, as well as certain funds which appear under the general "operations and maintenance of the Army" item. The last is a grouping of several projects from three of which the Reserves draw support for their summer camps and other operations closely connected with active army expenditures.

Except for the four budget items above, which are required by law, there seems to have been no congressional influence on the structure of the Reserve budget. The appropriations committees always seek more detail--perhaps by force of habit--but otherwise, they take the budget structure as it is handed to them by defense officials. The appropriations are enacted in the same terms as requested. It is likely, however, that further reduction in the number of Reserve items might very well stir congressional complaints.

The Reserve budget is the responsibility of the Office of the

Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components. This office has the responsibility under the Army Program System which provides for the compilation of five-year plans for each of the Army's five major objectives. The Reserve Forces, which constitutes one of these objectives, has its force level, installation requirements, and materiel requirements established by Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components before budget planning begins. These are decisions of the most basic character and are approved by the Chief of Staff and higher civilian authorities. They constitute "budget guidance."

Using the budget guidance, each subordinate command prepares its budget. In the case of the Army Reserve Forces, the Field Army Headquarters is the focal point for bringing together National Guard and Army Reserve budget estimates, which are then forwarded through the commanding general, Continental Army Command to the appropriate staff section in the Pentagon. The National Guard Bureau directs the preparation of over-all National Guard estimates, and the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs directs similar preparations for the Army Reserve. In each case, the figures must be submitted for review to the General Staff Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components coordinates these functions and prepares the final draft for consideration by the budget advisory committee, composed of the chief of staff, comptroller, heads of the general staff sections, and a few other top officials. With the approval of the Budget Advisory Committee and the Secretary of the Army, the budget begins the long tedious process through the Depart-

ment of Defense, and the Bureau of the Budget. Then it is ready for study by the congressional appropriations committees.

"The Committees on Appropriations, like Congress as a whole, have been favorably disposed toward the civilian components of the Army," says Elias Huzar.[20] This student of military appropriations cites numerous evidences of the historical validity of his pronouncement. He tells of the enthusiasm of the appropriations committees for the 1935 Thomason Act which set up a ten-year program for training one thousand Reserve officers annually, from which fifty would be chosen for integration into the Regular Army.[21] He tells of the solicitude about appropriations for the Citizens' Military Training Camps, meager but important Reserve officer training program between the two World Wars, and about the interest in the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice. He tells, most of all, of the loving care lavished on the National Board by the committees.

The more recent work of the subcommittees--since the period studied by Huzar--is an important, but not particularly exciting story, so far as the Reserve Forces are concerned. Except for rare, brief flurries, the hearings and the recommendations have stirred little public interest except among a few politically-minded reservists.

During World War II, the Congress appropriated annually the insignificant sum of $100 to handle the minute expenses of the war-adjourned Reserve program. It was neither controversial nor of any importance

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[20]Huzar, op. cit., p. 270.

[21]Huzar, op. cit., p. 247.

Chart No. 3

APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD, ARMY RESERVE PERSONNEL AND ARMY CONSTRUCTION, 1947-1958[a]

Year	National Guard	Army Reserve	Armory Construction
1947	61,775,000	26,000,000	
1948	134,000,000	67,828,000	
1949	290,000,000	125,000,000	
1950	216,000,000	115,000,000	
1951	210,000,000	114,525,000	
1951[b]	17,648,000	6,506,000	
1952	202,982,000	104,810,000	24,000,000
1953	115,300,000	73,000,000	20,000,000
1954	210,035,000	85,500,000	9,094,000
1955	218,530,000	90,000,000	15,000,000
1956	308,239,000	130,289,000	31,611,000
1957	320,000,000	215,000,000	55,000,000
1958	333,800,000	207,000,000	55,000,000

[a]These figures do not include miscellaneous funds from the appropriation item "Operations and Maintenance of the Army" which are used to support certain Army Reserve Forces activities.

[b]Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951.

except as a sort of reservation of a position in the budget structure.

Beginning in 1946, the first post-war budget for the Reserve system was enacted.[22] It, too, was largely noncontroversial; it gave $110,000,000 for the recuperation of the National Guard and $56,000,000 for the Organized Reserve Corps, but in the following session of Congress, President Truman asked in a message to Congress[23] for permission to divert sixty million dollars from the National Guard and thirty million from the Organized Reserve Corps for active Army salaries. On May 1, 1947, Congress agreed[24] to the recommendations of the House appropriations committee[25] and allowed the Organized Reserve Corps reduction and all but $4,875,000 of the request for National Guard funds to be transferred. Later in the year, it became apparent that the balance of the funds would not be sufficient to carry out National Guard responsibilities. After considerable clamoring by national guardsmen, eager to rebuild their forces, over four million dollars was taken from the Air Force for National Guard use. The final National Guard budget was thus $61,775,000 and the Organized Reserve Corps got $26,000,000.

For fiscal year 1948, the budget estimates came to fifty-six million dollars for the Organized Reserve Corps and $110,000,000 for the

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[22]P. L. 515, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 1946.

[23]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Supplemental Estimate for Appropriations for 1957 for the War Department, House Document No. 92, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 2.

[24]P. L. 46, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

[25]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Appropriation Bill, 1947, House Rept. 200 to accompany H. R. 2849, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 10.

National Guard. These figures were approved by the House subcommittee[26] except for a ten per cent reduction in civilian employees of the Reserve program amounting to slightly more than one million dollars. The full House approved these amounts but the Senate subcommittee asked for considerable increases. In testimony before the Senate subcommittee, the National Guard Association requested an $88,815,949 increase for the National Guard and the Reserve Officers Association asked for a $100,000,000 increase for the Organized Reserves. The Senate subcommittee settled for a total of $136,535,176 plus a $25,000,000 contract authorization for the National Guard and $80,681,900 for the Organized Reserve Corps.[27] The conference committee decided to break even on the Organized Reserve Corps appropriation and $67,828,000 was appropriated.[28] The National Guard prospered much more; it got $134,000,000 in addition to a contract authorization of $15,000,000.

The 1948 session of Congress brought the biggest upsurge in Reserve enthusiasm since the war. The long-desired, newly-passed Inactive Duty Training Pay Act[29] permitted the Army Reserve to be paid, as the Navy and National Guard had long been paid, for attendance at weekly

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[26]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Military Establishment Appropriation Bill, 1948, House Rept. 495 to accompany H. R. 3678, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 15.

[27]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Military Establishment Appropriation Bill, 1948, Senate Rept. 465 to accompany H. R. 3678, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 25.

[28]P. L. 267, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

[29]P. L. 460, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.

drill sessions. The act brought a tremendous increase in appropriations for the fiscal year 1949. For the National Guard, the War Department requested $240,000,000 which the House subcommittee readily approved. The Organized Reserve Corps request for $125,000,000 was reduced to $100,000,000 which reduction the subcommittee attempted to explain:

> The committee was not impressed with the presentation of the needs for the funds requested or with the manner in which this program is apparently being conducted. Too many men are encouraged to enlist in the Reserves and then hear nothing further from such enlistment. The committee was informed that a total of 518,069 officers and 644,590 enlisted men had joined the Reserve ranks and are willing to devote their time and energy toward developing a balanced national defense force, but of these numbers only a small number of units have been given assignments; . . .
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> The committee is in deep sympathy with the purposes of the Organized Reserves and sincerely trusts that during the coming fiscal year and with the expenditure of the funds here recommended are made available it will be possible for this organization to provide some organized activity. . . . [30]

The House accepted the recommendation but the Senate subcommittee pushed both funds higher. The highest figure heretofore mentioned for the Guard, $298,113,759 was recommended.[31] The Organized Reserved Corps' loss in the House subcommittee was restored so that its recommended appropriation would be $125,000,000. These figures were accepted completely by the full Senate and almost completely by the conference committee. The final appropriation gave the Organized Reserve Corps its full $125,000,000 as originally requested, and the National Guard got fifty million more than originally requested--a total of $290,000,000.[32]

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[30]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Appropriation Bill, 1949, House Rept. 2135 to accompany H. R. 6771, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, p. 15.

[31]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Military Functions Appropriation Bill, 1949, Senate Rept. 1763 to accompany H. R. 6771, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, p. 7.

[32]P. L. 766, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948.

When the inactive-duty training pay program for the Organized Reserve Corps commenced on October 1, 1948, there were no experience figures available upon which to base estimates as to how many individuals would participate. It was thought the pay would be a much greater incentive than it actually was and that the appropriation would be insufficient. As a result, priorities of units and individuals for pay were established and requirements were made stringent. But on December 31, 1948, only nine per cent of the appropriation had been expended. When the fiscal year ended, it was discovered there were more than enough funds[33] because the severe restrictions had served to limit expenditures.

For the next fiscal year, 1950, the appropriating process was unexciting, so far as the Reserve Forces were concerned. With little discussion the appropriations went through the House and Senate exactly as requested in the President's budget. The National Guard got $216,000,000 and the Organized Reserve got $115,000,000.[34] As it turned out, however, these figures proved to be so inadquate that cutbacks were necessary. Additional costs resulted from a military pay raise given in the Career Compensation Act of 1949, and persons in drill status increased over 150,000 in the first four months of the fiscal year, requiring the program to be contracted greatly in the last part of the year.[35]

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[33]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Army Appropriations for 1950, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, on H. R. 4146, p. 54.

[34]P. L. 434, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

[35]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, General Appropriation Bill, 1950, House Rept. 1797 to accompany H. R. 4146, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1949, p. 291.

For 1951, interest in the Reserve budget was higher, although it was only a minute portion of the experimental omnibus appropriation bill of that year which supplied funds for the entire governmental establishment. In the case of the National Guard, the administration requested $210,700,000, but the House appropriations subcommittee raised the figure to $212,400,000. The Guard's recruiting program last fall, the subcommittee said, was a big success--quotas were oversubscribed--the National Guard was to be commended. The additional funds, according to the subcommittee's report[36] were for "service contracts and utilities," but no further explanations were offered. The bill, as passed by the House of Representatives, accepted the subcommittee recommendations completely, but only after a bold effort by Representative Robert L. F. Sikes, of Florida, to get the National Guard portion increased[37] by an additional five million dollars. On the floor, Sikes quoted National Guard Bureau chief Kenneth Cramer's pleas for more money: " . . . this budget was prepared under the assumption that attendance at armory drill would be 75 per cent by enlisted men and 85 per cent by officers." Attendance, Cramer said, was increasing and insufficient funds might result in the necessity to suspend drills. The ensuing debate brought out comments not often heard against the National Guard. Representative Charles A. Plumley, of Vermont, declared, "the trouble with him [Cramer] is he talks too much." Plumley suggested that the Bureau Chief use some

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[36]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, General Appropriation Bill, 1951, House Rept. 1797 to accompany H, R. 7786, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 291.

[37]Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., May 9, 1950, p. 6740.

of the money for drills that he uses to fly National Guard planes around for governors. These comments, of course, provoked a defense for the National Guard. Afterwards the subcommittee chairman, George H. Mahon, of Texas, rose to oppose his fellow subcommitteeman's motion. He assured the House the Guard could ask for a supplemental appropriation next spring if funds proved inadequate, and the amendment was defeated 27 to 32.

The Senate subcommittee reduced the figure again to $210,500,000, which was lower than the original budget request. The full Senate, nevertheless, allowed the small National Guard decrease on July 25, 1950,[38] and on August 25, 1950, approved a conference committee report which accepted the Senate figure.[39]

The Army Reserve budget underwent similar experiences. The President requested $110,000,000 but the House committee raised the figure to $115,000,000. The increase was on the request of Army officials, however. Previous to the printing of the President's budget, the Bureau of the Budget had refused permission to request the full $115,000,000. Afterwards, with attendance at Reserve drills increasing, the bureau relented, and the House subcommittee approved the request with a strong statement for additional build-up of the program.

> The committee again this year, as it did last year, desires to emphasize the necessity for a well-planned, well-thought-out Reserve program. The continual shifting of programs has ser-

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[38] Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 11312.

[39] U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, General Appropriation Bill, 1951, Conference Rept. 2991 to accompany H. R. 7786, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 62.

> iously handicapped the development of an effective Reserve Corps and has had a very detrimental effect on the morale of the reservists. . . . It is hoped the proposed new program will be one which the reservists can rely upon and really put their efforts into without fear of a new change next week or next month.[40]

The figures approved by the House subcommittee were approved by the full House. Major General James B. Cress, Executive for ROTC and Reserve Affairs, appeared before the Senate subcommittee to encourage the continuation of the five million dollar increase. He was partially successful. The subcommittee approved almost all of the increase, and the recommendation was accepted by the full Senate. The conference committee voted complete acceptance of the Senate version, thus giving the Organized Reserve Corps $114,525,000 for fiscal year 1951.

In late 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the President made a request for supplementary military appropriations including $17,648,000 for the National Guard and $6,506,000 for the Organized Reserve Corps.[41] Little discussion was aroused and these two particular provisions were approved by the Congress in the amounts requested.

For 1952, the House subcommittee made only minor reductions in both National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps requests. In both cases, the reductions were based on delays in the actual procurement of civilian employees. The full House accepted the figures and they were likewise accepted by the Senate subcommittee and the full Senate. The National

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[40]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, General Appropriation Bill, 1951, House Rept. 1797 to accompany H. R. 7786, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 291.

[41]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Supplemental Estimates of Appropriations for the Armed Forces, House Document 657, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 3.

Guard got $202,982,000 and the Organized Reserve Corps got $104,810,000 for the year. The armory construction program, for both Reserve and National Guard, got $24,000,000.[42]

For the fiscal year 1953, when the Korean War was being fought less aggressively, the over-all military budget was cut considerably. The administration requested for the Reserve Forces:

Military Construction, Army Reserve Forces	$ 24,000,000
Reserve personnel	115,486,000
Army National Guard	220,000,000

The House subcommittee left only $20,000,000 for armory construction, $73,000,000 for the Organized Reserve Corps and $115,300,000 for the National Guard--figures which eventually became law with the Senate subcommittee and full Senate approval. They were evidently satisfactory to the administration; no requests for restoration of any of the amounts were heard.

For the fiscal year 1954, the Eisenhower administration's original budget estimate called for $15,000,000 for armory construction, $103,909,000 for the Organized Reserve Corps, and $211,273,000 for the National Guard. These figures constituted increases in all three areas over 1953 appropriations. On the other hand, the House subcommittee made reductions in all three, but Reserve construction was the only area cut below the previous year.[43] Again the House subcommittee figures went

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[42]P. L. 179, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

[43]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1954, House Rept. 680 to accompany H. R. 5969, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, p. 25.

through to become law without debate in the House or Senate. Reserve construction was given $9,094,000; Reserve personnel received $85,500,000 and the Army National Guard got $210,035,000.[44]

For 1955, the executive budget called for $15,000,000 for Reserve construction, $90,000,000 for the Army Reserve, and $218,530,000 for the National Guard. These figures were approved by the House subcommittee, the full House, the Senate subcommittee and the full Senate. The Senate subcommittee added language giving the executive officers authority to transfer $36,000,000 to Reserve construction and $25,000,000 to the National Guard from the "Procurement and Production, Army" account.[45]

The $15,000,000 for construction was recommended by the Senate subcommittee to remain available until expended and exempt one million dollars of it from the provisions of Section 4 (d) or the National Defense Facilities Act of 1955 which requires the states to contribute 25 per cent of National Guard building funds. The subcommittee also proposed that all National Guard funds expended for anti-aircraft units be without regard to Section 67 of the National Defense Act which requires all National Guard funds to be apportioned among the states on the basis of personnel strength. All the subcommittee's Reserve recommendations were enacted by the full Senate.

The conference committee agreed to accept all the provisions

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[44]P. L. 179, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953.

[45]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1955, Senate Rept. 1582 to accompany H. R. 8873, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, p. 5.

attached to the appropriation as passed by the Senate except for the authorization to transfer $36,000,000 to Reserve construction from Army procurement and production appropriations. This was reported back to the Houses as still in disagreement. The matter was settled outside the official framework of the Congress. Representative Richard B. Wigglesworth presented the solution to the House and won its acceptance--the $36,000,000 authorization was to be trimmed to $18,000,000. The figure was also accepted by the Senate.[46]

For the fiscal year 1956, the first increases in the Reserve budget estimates came from the executive branch. The President's amended requests boosted the Army Reserve estimate by more than eleven million dollars to $130,289,000. The National Guard estimate was raised almost fourteen million to become $308,239,000. The armory construction program remained at $31,611,000. The increases were based on the potential revitalization of the Reserve program by the passage of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 which created the six-months training program. With almost no discussion, the Reserve Forces appropriation slipped through exactly as requested by the President.

For 1957 the administration's estimates were even higher. Forty million dollars was requested for Reserve construction, $215,000,000 for Reserve personnel and $306,000,000 for the National Guard. The House subcommittee reduced only the Reserve personnel budget. The eight million

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[46]U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1955, Conference Rept. 1917 to accompany H. R. 8873, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, p. 3.

dollar decrease, the subcommittee said,[47] was a recognition of the "reduced six-months training input." The new program had not won popularity as anticipated. The subcommittee decided the full request was not needed "in view of experience to date." The House accepted the subcommittee's recommendation.

The Senate subcommittee received no request for restoration of Reserve personnel and consequently reiterated the House's Reserve personnel appropriation. The subcommittee boosted the construction figure to sixty million dollars and the National Guard to $321,492,000. The recommendation for the National Guard would permit that component to reach a new peak of 425,000 men.[48]

The two Houses, through conference committee action, agreed on slight reductions in the Senate figures. The armory construction program got $55,000,000; the National Guard got $320,162,000, and the Reserve got its previously decided $215,000,000.

For 1958 the budget carried provisions for only Army Reserve personnel and National Guard. The armory construction program awaited renewal of its legislative authorization, and appropriations had to await a supplemental bill later in the session. For Reserve personnel, $207,000,000 was requested, of which $197,000,000 was recommended by the House subcommittee. This constituted an eighteen million dollar reduc-

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[47]U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1957, House Rept. 2104 to accompany H. R. 10986, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956, p. 25.

[48]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1957, Senate Rept. 2260 to accompany H. R. 10986, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956, p. 3.

tion from the previous year's spending. It would cause considerable cutback of the six-month training program which by this time was bulging at the seams. The result was a low roar of dissatisfaction. Already the Army had temporarily suspended entry into the popular program, and public interest in the re-opening date was increasing.

In the midst of dissatisfaction, Representative Overton Brooks, chairman of the Reserves subcommittee of the House armed services committee, called a one-day hearing to examine the potential effect of the budgetary limitation. Representative Robert Sikes, who headed the subcommittee that made the cut, was invited, and Assistant Secretary of the Army Hugh Milton testified. Milton was quite willing to have the National Guard budget increased, but was vague on the plight of the Army Reserve. Time and again, he was asked to reveal the terrible calamity which would overtake the Reserves should the budget not be raised. "Sikes did everything but promise an appropriation increase . . . if only Milton would give some indication for the record of an urgent need for such an increase. No indication came."[49] Milton was eager to evade any request for the restoration of funds. This attitude was no doubt in accordance with instructions from superiors in or above the Pentagon.

The House approved the $197,000,000 recommendation of its committee and the bill went to the Senate subcommittee. Again Pentagon officials refuse to ask for an increase, but the subcommittee nevertheless recommended a twenty million dollar increase. In addition, the Army was to be allowed to keep approximately ten million dollars left unspent from

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[49]Army Times (Reserve Edition), June 1, 1957, p. 10.

the previous fiscal year. The specific purpose of the increase, the subcommittee said, was to permit entry of an additional 20,000 young men into the six-month program. The full Senate accepted the recommendation.

On a basis of a conference committee report, the two Houses finally accepted a compromise figure--$207,000,000--the amount originally requested in the President's budget.

The circumstances were more favorable to the National Guard. The $320 million budget request was approved by the House subcommittee and by the House itself. The Senate subcommittee tacked on an additional forty million dollars. This was at the request of the Army. Actually Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles of the Department of Defense had said, "the job could be done with a $13.8 million increase." Nevertheless, the Senate voted the full forty million for the Guard. It was trimmed back to $13.8 million by the conference committee, leaving a total of $333,800,000 for expenditure.

Armory construction funds were appropriated in the supplemental appropriation bill for fiscal year 1958.[50] The administration request for $55,000,000 was trimmed to $46,000,000 by the House subcommittee. The larger amount was later restored by the Senate subcommittee and enacted into law just as the session was coming to a close.

Elias Huzar's statement that Congress has looked favorably on the Reserve components, so far as appropriations are concerned, is verified for the post-World War II years. In five of the fourteen acts making appropriations to the Army Reserve from 1946 to 1958, at least one portion

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[50]P. L. 170, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.

of the act has exceeded the President's budget requests. The Army Reserve enjoyed an eleven million dollar increase over presidential estimate in 1948, but that was the only year this generous disregard of the President's budget occurred for the Reserve. In three other acts, the Reserve request was reduced, but on the other eight occasions, Congress appropriated the same amount as requested by the executive branch.

The National Guard fared even better. The appropriation acts of 1948, 1949, 1957, and 1958 exceeded the budget estimates by $24,000,000, $50,000,000, $14,100,000, and $13,800,000, respectively. Cuts below the estimates were made for the four years between 1951 and 1954, but except for 1951 all such reductions were minor in scope. In the remaining acts, the amount appropriated was the same as requested by the President.

In one of the six acts making appropriations for armory construction, the final amount exceeded budget estimates by $15,000,000. On two occasions, the amount was the same as requested and in the other two acts, the appropriations were below the estimates.

For proper perspective, it must also be noted that the appropriations committees were generous to military functions in general. In ten of the fifteen years between 1934 to 1949, the Army was given more money than was requested by the President. Congress appropriated less than the President's budget estimates for the Army in only five years.[51]

The treatment of the various items in the Reserve Forces budget by the two Houses of Congress is interesting to compare.

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[51]James L. McCamy, review of The Purse and the Sword, by Elias Huzar, American Political Science Review, 45 (June, 1951), 564.

The House of Representative's treatment of the Reserve personnel budget was generous, but not so much for other items. Cut of thirteen bills containing Reserve personnel appropriations from 1948 to 1958, the House lowered the President's estimates seven times, never increased them, and approved without change six times. The Senate raised the House figure four times, lowered it once, and allowed it to remain the same eight times.

The House lowered the President's estimates for the National Guard three times, raised them once and let them remain the same nine times. The Senate lowered House figures once, raised them five times, and let them remain the same seven times.

In the six bills carrying funds for Reserve construction, the House lowered the President's estimates three times and allowed them to remain the same three times. The Senate never attempted to lower House figures, voted to raise them twice and allowed them to remain the same four times.

The Reserve personnel appropriation went to conference four times, for 1948, 1949, 1951, and 1958. In 1951, the Senate was seeking a slight reduction of the appropriation, but on all other occasions it sought increased figures. It won its point completely in every year except 1948. Then the two Houses compromised evenly on the Organized Reserve Corps budget. In other words, the Senate won out when it wanted a reduced Reserve budget and also in two out of the three cases when it desired a higher Reserve budget.

In the six conferences mediating disagreements over the National

Guard--in 1948, 1949, 1951, 1955, 1957, and 1958--the Senate sought an increased National Guard budget five times. In 1951, it sought to lower the figures, which it achieved. On the five other occasions, it won its way completely one time, was generally successful three times, and partially lost its fight once to the House version.

Construction appropriations went to conference three times, 1955, 1957, and 1958. In every case, the Senate was seeking to raise the appropriations. In 1955 and 1957, the Senate broke even with the House in conference and won its way entirely in 1958.

Certainly the Senate conferees have been more successful in the conferences concerned with Reserve Forces appropriations. It appears at first glance, from the number of Senate increases, that the Senate has been a greater friend to the Reserve Forces than the House of Representatives. This, of course, arises from the nature of the Senate as an appropriations appeal board and does not constitute a good basis for the conclusion. Some foundation for the statement can be found, however, in the appropriation acts for 1948, 1949, 1957, and 1958, where the Senate made great increases in the Reserve Forces appropriations while the House was hesitant.

To Elias Huzar's statement about congressional generosity for the Reserve Forces, another generality can be validly added--the appropriations committees have been critical of the Army Reserve (but not National Guard) program. It has been constructive, sympathetic criticism.

As previously reported in this study, the committees have looked with suspicion on any hesitation by the Regular Army to build the Reserves.

The most vociferous criticism has been directed toward regulars as saboteurs of the civilian components. This is not to say that congressmen have not shown great admiration for West Pointers, but they have more frequently visualized the graduates of the Military Academy as members of a caste system who have no appreciation of the "new blood" provided by Reserves which might revitalize the decadent peacetime Army during periods of emergency.

As early as 1934, the House appropriations committee was criticizing the management of the Organized Reserve Corps for the large number of over-age-in-grade officers contained on the Reserve rolls. The following year, the same committee took the Army to task for the slow production of new Reserve officers through the college Reserve Officers Training Corps.[52] The criticism has continued year by year. In the 1958 hearings, the House subcommittee's members had arrived at the point of condemning the Pentagon for failing to spend all the money appropriated for the Army Reserve.

This favorable disposition toward the Reserves and the frequent criticism of the officers responsible for the Reserve Forces has been a fundamental factor in the postwar growth of the program. It was the willingness to recommend healthy appropriations and the severe criticism of bureaucratic lethargy by congressional committees which weighted the scales in favor of an expanded Reserve.

It must, of course, be understood that these influences stemmed basically from the power of the Reserve Forces lobby, from the general

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[52]Huzar, op. cit., p. 271.

interest of the American people, and from other sources. Nevertheless, Congress and its appropriations committees must be given much credit, or discredit for the great post-World War II expansion of the Army Reserve and National Guard.

The most obvious and most far-reaching aspect of the appropriations process, so far as the Reserve Forces are concerned, is the tremendous solicitude which the appropriations committees show to the National Guard. It stems, of course, from the influence of the National Guard Association and the grass root qualities of the Guard units themselves.

The solicitude has not been a recent development. It pre-dates World War II, but only since World War II have the propensities for economy been of such character that the National Guard had little to worry about. Before World War II with military spending deemed unnecessary, it was difficult for any military function to get sufficient funds, even the National Guard. Then "the committees were apologetic about their inability to do a better job by the National Guard,"[53] but frequently the committees reduced other portions of the military budget and diverted the savings to the National Guard program.

Since World War II, with high military spending being more palatable, the National Guard has appeared on occasion to many people to be writing its own ticket. Certainly the committees showed great deference to National Guard opinions. It has even become customary for the committees to print the National Guard lobby's views in its official reports so that the colleagues of the members will be informed of the path which

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[53]Huzar, op. cit., p. 273.

the National Guard Association is taking.

The deference shown to the Guard has, by no means, been limited to financial affairs. The committees display rapt attention of all aspects of the Guard's livelihood. As Representative Sikes said in the House appropriations subcommittee hearings for 1952, "The National Guard is something we in Congress have always been interested in."[54] The members inquire into the success of the Guard's nike anti-aircraft program, training conditions, and numerous other matters. On occasion, they have even considered the dangers involved in "favorite politicians" assuming high positions in the National Guard organization.[55]

Another characteristic of the National Guard's special position with the appropriations committees is revealed in the aid offered by the committees to subvert the President's budget. Seldom, of course, does the National Guard Bureau chief openly request funds over and above those allowed in the budget, but there have been a number of subtle methods used whereby this can be accomplished without affronting higher executive authorities. The appropriations committees have, more than once, helped such efforts. They inquire into the amounts originally requested by the National Guard Bureau in estimates submitted to the bureau of the budget. They asked the National Guard Bureau's personnel for their "personal opinions" and provide other opportunities for the bureau spokesman to make an argument for additional funds. Usually, the bureau chief is

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[54] Ibid., p. 943.

[55] U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Army Appropriations for 1957, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 10986, 1956, p. 1323.

more than happy to use the invitation to get more money, but he hesitates to antagonize his departmental superiors. By indirection, he tells the committee his hopes for money. Such Guard statements as "it will be an austere but adequate year" is meaningful to the congressional friends of the lobby.[56] Occasionally, the bureau chief is bolder and says, "We actually need at least ---- millions more but I am not permitted to submit an official appropriations request for it."

Other agencies indulge in this strategy, but the National Guard Bureau employs it, perhaps, most frequently.[57] On several occasions, the bureau would probably not attempt to go beyond the President's budget except for National Guard Association pressure, which acts directly and with greater persistency on the bureau than it does on Congress. The bureau feels that it can risk offending the Bureau of the Budget but it seldom dares to challenge the National Guard Association. Requests for additional funds are thus backed by a common front. The bureau, using these indirect methods, can get increases whether higher executive authorities approve or not.

The Reserve budget has never been a matter of political-party partisanship in either the appropriations committees or in floor debate. The committees have been proud of this record.[58] Frequent references to this fairly unusual outlook are made during committee hearings and on the floor. Representative Engel, a Republican from Michigan, said in

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[56]Interview with Frances J. Hewitt, Staff, U. S. Senate Appropriations Committee, Sept. 18, 1957.

[57]Huzar, op. cit., p. 126.

[58]Huzar, op. cit., p. 32.

1949, "There never has been a time during the 13 years I have been on this Subcommittee when there was any politics in the Subcommittee. Time and time again we divided, yes, we disagreed but never along political lines."[59] The nonpartisan character of subcommittee actions has continued.[60] The over-all size of the military budget has been the subject of considerable party controversy but it has never reached the Reserve Forces.

Of a similar vein is the lack of direct competition for funds between the National Guard and Army Reserve. The tremendous competition between the two--so easily seen in other matters such as recruiting--has not spread to the appropriations field. The appropriation for each component is decided independently. An increase for one component does not necessarily mean a decrease for the other. On the contrary, the two appropriations have tended to rise and decrease simultaneously. There has been no atmosphere of competition in the legislative branch as there has been in the executive branch.[61]

The appropriating power, as a method of providing surveillance over the Reserve Forces, is somewhat unique. It is generally concluded by most political scientists that democratic government depends on legislative control of the purse. A look at military appropriations for

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[59] Congressional Record, April 14, 1949, p. A 2401.

[60] Interview with T. Edward Barswell, Staff, Senate Appropriations Committee, Sept. 16, 1957.

[61] William H. Riker in his Soldiers of the States (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), p. 93, seems to believe there is considerable competition. He sees the larger National Guard appropriations as proof that the National Guard lobby is more effective than the Army Reserve lobby in this competition.

specific years will make any student wonder if the conclusion is legitimate. In periods of military emergency, the legislative branch is extremely lacking in vigilance. Millions of dollars are expended according to executive inclinations. But the purse strings have always been tightened later. Congress has seldom forgotten, for any lengthy period, to protect its great power over spending.

The degree of congressional oversight through the appropriation power over Reserve agencies has been far from consistent. Generally speaking, it has been lax since World War II. The Reserve Forces received all the funds Congress thought they could use. The appropriations were in lump sums with almost no limitations attached. The riders that were attached were usually meant to exempt the Reserve Forces from the ordinary legal requirements. For instance, Congress frequently suspended the requirement for a 25 per cent state contribution on National Guard buildings of a non-armory nature; construction funds were allowed to "remain available until expended" in later years;[62] and permission was given on two occasions to transfer additional funds from the Regular Army to Reserve Forces accounts.

Indeed, the surveillance functions ordinarily performed by Congress have been more often performed by the Bureau of the Budget. The bureau has withheld funds and laid down broad criteria for the Reserve Forces.

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[62]Although the U. S. Constitution says Army appropriations may be made for no longer than two years, this applies only to "raising and supporting Armies." The construction of armory buildings is deemed exempt from this limitation.

Although the practice of impounding Reserve funds began in 1947 under President Truman, the greatest use of the power has been under President Eisenhower. Reserve personnel funds, as appropriated by Congress, were only partially spent during several Eisenhower years. The greatest non-use of funds, however, was because of the inability of the Army to meet the criteria for the construction of armories as laid down by the Bureau of the Budget.

One restriction was on the cost of the armory per participating reservist. Initially, the limit was $800 per man for the authorized strength of the Reserve unit and $1,300 per man for the "on-board strength" (the number actually participating in training). Later, the bureau relaxed the requirement to permit a twenty per cent variance in the requirement for individual armories, providing the over-all construction program averaged out to the above figures.

Similar requirements have been enforced throughout the construction program. Before a unit could get a new armory, its actual strength must have been equal to fifty per cent of its authorized strength. In no case could an armory be built to serve less than an eighty-man unit or no more than a total of five units.[63]

The congressional appropriations subcommittees have been extremely resentful that the Bureau of the Budget could make additional rules without consulting Congress. Representative John J. Riley declared, in the hearings for fiscal year 1958, that he didn't like the bureau "changing

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[63]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Army Appropriations for 1958, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 1253.

rules" after Congress passed them.

Representative Daniel Flood, at the same hearing, said,

> I am concerned about the principle of the thing. . . . More and more are we in the Congress and particularly in the Appropriations Committee and even more particularly in that part of the Appropriations Committee which is the Defense Subcommittee concerned about this exercise of these rights and privileges by the Bureau of the Budget. We are becoming conscious daily that the Bureau of the Budget is doing indirectly what it has never been able to get a law to do directly as the spokesman for the executive, exercising a line item veto on an act of Congress.[64]

Others, resentful that the armory construction program was being delayed, spoke of the Bureau of the Budget as "arbitrary" and decried the necessity for the "imprimatur" of "this new octopus" on every government project.

Thus, appropriations have been important in Reserve Forces policy-making, but congressional generosity has, to some extent, moved the critical area of decision-making on appropriations matters to the executive branch. The crucial factors are the amounts requested by military leaders and the willingness of these military leaders to expend the full amounts as appropriated. It is important to note, however, that congressmen have been instrumental in getting the budget estimates to be higher. Their encouragement of bigger Reserve estimates has been easily seen, especially after the Reserve Forces were caught tremendously unprepared for the Korean War. Congress has also, as already reported, harassed the executive branch to spend all funds appropriated for the Reserve Forces.

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[64]Ibid., p. 44.

CHAPTER V

REGULAR ARMY PRESSURES

It is fairly clear that Army chieftains have not been enthusiastic to build a big Reserve. Their lackadaisical approach to new legislation from 1945 to 1957 is sufficient to verify this conclusion. Yet, there is a long history of argument among the components which further verifies the fact.

Since early in the nineteenth century there has been sporadic debate on military manpower policy. The Regular Army has traditionally reiterated the theories and practice of John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War from 1817 to 1825, and Major General Emory Upton, military theorist of the post Civil-War period. These two leaders were the foremost contributors to the United States Army's "lasting shape,"[1] the expansible standing army. They favored the maintenance in peacetime of a skeleton standing army to be filled in with civilians in time of war. The plan involved no dependence on trained citizen reserves.

One of the chief opponents of the expansible standing army has been the late Brigadier General John McCauley Palmer, who espoused George

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[1]Frederick M. Stern, The Citizen Army (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), p. 139.

Washington's well-regulated citizen militia as the prime foundation of our defense. In addition, Reserve Force interests have championed this view.

Although the argument frequently bubbled and boiled, it was usually nothing more than a heated academic discussion. At all times, the Regular Army deemed the Reserve Forces highly inefficient, but until World War II, there was little antagonism. The blending of the Reserve Forces into the Second World War brought open disharmony. The National Guardsmen, in particular, complained about discrimination in promotions, job assignments, and other treatment. The regulars, on the other hand, claimed the guardsmen, and especially their generals, were incompetent.

One incident, in itself unimportant, was typical of World War II antagonism. While mobilized guardsmen were returning from field maneuvers in Tennessee to their station in Arkansas, some of them yelled obscene remarks at a group of women on a Memphis golf course. Crusty Lieutenant General Ben Lear ordered a long, forced march for punishment. The resulting publicity, including vehement orations on the floors of Congress, provided an excellent vehicle for the National Guard to air its anti-regular Army views. Later, the Guard division's commanding general, Major General Ralph T. Truman (whose cousin, Harry, was a member of the United States Senate), was relieved of his command.[2] Many people wondered if the Regular Army made a practice of removing National Guard generals.

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[2]Roland Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 159.

After the Reserve Forces were mobilized in 1940, the Regular Army was extremely harsh in its evaluation of the Reserve Forces' readiness for combat. Although Americans were awakened to the actual conditions of our defenses, it nevertheless hurt the sensitive ears of guardsmen and reservists. In May, 1940, Lieutenant General Hubert J. Brees, the referee of the Louisiana training maneuvers, caught public attention by a thorough-going critique of the Reserve Forces' actions in the maneuvers. He was publicly critical of the commanding general's leadership. So widespread was the publicity that General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, made a statement that he hoped it would not happen again.[3]

There were numerous charges throughout World War II that the Regular Army was discriminating against citizen soldiers in the matter of promotions. During Senate inquiries in both 1941 and 1944, the charge was denied. General Marshall explained to a Special Senate Investigating Committee in 1941 the complications of the promotion system. Promotions in the Regular Establishment, he said, had been limited by the pay increases involved in the promotions--the government simply could not afford many promotions. National Guard promotions were regulated primarily by the requirement of a position vacancy prior to advancement. Army Reserve promotions depended upon the number of years of service. Marshall said he hoped soon to have a common system of promotion for all components, but for the time being he was more worried about discrimina-

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[3]Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, Historical Division, Department of the Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 205.

tions against the Regular Army. It was widely thought, he said, that the Army Reserve and National Guard already had their mobilization grades while the regular officers entered the emergency with grades appropriate to a small peacetime force.

The senatorial investigation of 1944 considered the halting of permanent promotions in the Regular Army for the duration of the war. In the hearings, Senator Harley M. Kilgore, Democrat of West Virginia, insisted that the National Guard and Army Reserve were being "kicked in the teeth" in the promotion system.[4] Information was brought out that 94.5 per cent of all promotions to general officer rank had gone to regulars, 2.4 per cent to national guardsmen, and 1.8 per cent to organized reservists. The Regular Army position was defended by Major General M. G. White, a National Guard officer on duty with the general staff. He denied the charge of discrimination by comparing the number of promotions to all grades for each component with the total membership of the component. White said that Regular Army officers constituted 4 per cent of the entire officer corps and got 5.4 per cent of all promotions; the National Guard received exactly its share of promotions, and the Army Reserve received far more than its share.[5]

There was also serious disagreement over the competence of top National Guard and Army Reserve leaders. Of the twenty-one National

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[4]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings, Promotions in the Regular Army, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 1944, p. 1.

[5]Ibid., p. 11.

Guard major generals inducted into the service in 1940, eight had been separated by March, 1944.[6] Reserve Forces personnel concluded, generally speaking, that their colleagues were ousted to make room for more regulars at the top. The truth of the allegation is doubtful. Large numbers of Reserve Forces colonels and generals were over-age-in-grade. Whether any were more incompetent than regular officers will probably never be known. Regardless, it seems to have been highly desirable that some be replaced. This the Army attempted to do, early in World War II. A law was requested and enacted[7] giving the War Department authority to appoint a special board to reclassify Regular Army personnel, and by administrative order, the same board also took jurisdiction over civilian component personnel. General Malin Craig, former Chief of Staff, was recalled to active duty to head the board which began the process of reassigning and dismissing unsatisfactory officers.

There was considerable protest that General Craig's group, and its subsidiary reclassification system, was only a stylish way of ousting National Guard officers. To protect the War Department from further charges, still another advisory board was established, composed of former officers of the Reserve components. Its purpose was to guide the Secretary of War in special cases involving the reclassification of senior National Guard and Army Reserve officers with unsatisfactory records.[8]

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[6]Ibid., p. 13. William H. Riker says in his The Soldiers of the States (Public Affairs Press, 1957), p. 114, that all National Guard major generals except two were replaced by regulars as commanders of National Guard divisions during 1941 and 1942.

[7]P. L. 190, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1941.

[8]Watson, op. cit., p. 244.

The antagonism has persisted since World War II, but bitterness did not openly erupt during the Korean War. There were some charges of National Guard ineptness, particularly at Camp Pickett, Virginia. In general, however, the regulars were grateful for the speedy aid rendered by the Reserve Forces, and antagonism was not in evidence. This is partly because only a few National Guard divisions were mobilized. It was widely assumed the Army chose only the better-prepared Guard organizations for mobilization. Thus, it was the excellence--not the inadequacy of the units--that won public attention.

It has frequently been said that the Regular Army has opposed a large Reserve program in the hope that universal military training will eventually be adopted. Colonel William H. Neblett, 1949 President of the Reserve Officers Association, agrees in his book Pentagon Politics, with this view.[9] But he believes it important to make clear that the Regular Army wants a "German" style of universal military training which is little more than permanent "peacetime conscription" to maintain a large standing army.[10] This, he says, is true despite War Department Circular 347, August 25, 1944, wherein General Marshall announced plans for a small postwar military establishment which would be reinforced in times of emergency by organized units drawn from a civilian army reserve. The circular, according to Colonel Neblett, was for publicity purposes only. It was for the purpose of off-setting the effect of recent anti-Army publicity.[11] Regardless, Neblett says, Marshall's

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[9]William H. Neblett, Pentagon Politics (New York: Pageant Press, 1953), pp. 112-116.

[10]Ibid., p. 97.

[11]Ibid., p. 115.

circular was later discarded by well-concealed deception in Circular 119, April 24, 1946, issued by General Dwight D. Eisenhower.[12]

Others agree on the UMT question, as revealed by the following testimony by the executive director of the Reserve Officers Association, Brigadier General E. A. Evans, before the House Committee on Armed Services, April 22, 1948:

> Representative Philip J. Philbin: In other words as you interpret the attitude, they [the Army] felt that they need not build up either the Organized Reserves or the National Guard because they are going to get universal military training or the draft.
> General Evans: I have heard that statement made.
> Representative Dewey Short: My contention, General, is that if the Army had done its duty and supported the Guard and Reserves, having made a sincere, earnest and determined effort to build them up, we would not have this UMT legislation here.
> General Evans: I agree with you completely.[13]

During the same year, when Congress was fretting at taking a stand on universal military training, a group of seventy-four war veterans in the House of Representatives cooperated in pushing for a build-up of the Reserves as a substitute for compulsory service. The group, led by Republican Representative Edward A. Mitchell, of Indiana, assumed that a Reserve build-up was the opposite of universal military training--that the Regular Army desired UMT without the assignment of UMT graduates to Reserve units.[14]

There has been a widespread feeling among Congressmen that this

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[12] Ibid., p. 114.

[13] U. S. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7975, quoted from Hearings, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, April 22, 1948.

[14] New York Times, Feb. 26, 1948, p. 12.

was the policy of the regulars. In 1954 Representative Philip J. Philbin reiterated this belief:

> Congress has repeatedly given all branches of the service funds to build up large Reserves and to strengthen the National Guard, but in a surprising number of instances these funds have not been substantially used, indicating that there was no real wholehearted effort to build up the Reserves. The reason for this is plain. There were some in the military who were so intent upon putting UMT across that they were not interested in building up the Reserve.[15]

Many other members of Congress have been quick to charge the Regular Army with intentionally holding back the Reserve Forces.

Senator Margaret Chase Smith has said "the War Department literally abandoned any planning or thinking during World War II about future Reserve plans and progress and after the war for many years made only half-hearted efforts on a Reserve program."[16]

Representative Harry R. Sheppard, Democrat of California, after severely questioning Major General Harold R. Bull, the Army's Director of Organization and Training, said that "I cannot find any legitimate excuse other than the fact that a lot of officers are not interested in the Reserve program. . . Somebody on top is not producing. There is no excuse."[17]

Representative Robert L. F. Sikes, Democrat of Florida, said

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[15]U. S. Congressional Record, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., Aug. 9, 1954, p. 13761.

[16]U. S. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., April 12, 1956, p. 6189.

[17]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Army Appropriations for 1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 51.

> It is great concern to this [Appropriations] Committee that no really workable Reserve program has been brought forward in all the years since World War II. The Committee has seriously wondered on many occasions whether there is any real interest in and appreciation for the Reserves among many of the professional soldiers who dominate the thinking in the Pentagon. . . . Reserves are pushed around in little ways--denied promotions, denied even the right to participate in study courses after the age of 45. Heretofore they have been denied the right of weekend drills. Our committee assumed that a quirk in the law was at fault but found that there had simply been no implementation of regulations to permit weekend training of Reserves.[18]

Representative Olin E. Teague, Democrat of Texas, said:

> Problems concerning the Reserves have always been shunted to the bottom of the file of things to do on the desks of our military leaders. Too few of our military men who have been charged with our Reserve affairs have actually cared whether or not we build a Reserve. Some have actually tried to keep us from doing it. Too many of our civilian Secretaries charged with the Reserve responsibility have either devoted their time to other matters or have been ineffective spokesmen for reservists. I believe that it can be proven that the Regular Services have over and over attempted to prevent our having a strong Reserve. It makes little difference what kind of a law we pass here in Congress, unless the people handling this program want it to work, it will not work.[19]

While considering whether the Regular Army would sincerely attempt to implement the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, Representative Leroy Johnson, Republican of California, said he believed the Pentagon was so "afraid and ashamed" of what had "been done to massacre the Reserve system" that "they will use every possible means to make the thing work successfull."[20] Others have said jokingly that the Regular Army has

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[18] U. S. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., May 17, 1955, p. 6496.

[19] U. S. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., May 17, 1955, p. 6502.

[20] Ibid., p. 6499.

attempted to keep reservists so utterly disgusted and confused that they will already be fighting mad whenever war comes.

The criticism of Senator Margaret Chase Smith has been the most persistent of all. She said, on the floor of the Senate, May 9, 1949, that:

> . . . my experience on these (Reserve) matters has been an unbroken series of opposition on the part of the War Department and its successors . . . This opposition is particularly puzzling because most of my measures propose only that the Air Force and Army Reserves be given that which the Naval Reserve has enjoyed for a long time.[21]

In a rousing oration to the national convention of the Reserve Officers Association in Boston on June 24, 1955, she said her inactive duty training pay bill was opposed by the Pentagon. She told of more opposition to her Reserve retirement bill and how her death and disability coverage bill had been given a "kind of pocket veto"--the Pentagon failed to make any comments on the bill. Senator Smith said she unsuccessfully attempted to get the adoption of an Army Reserve medal and commendation ribbon by executive action; after she tried legislation, the Pentagon decided to create the decorations by executive order. On December 2, 1955, in a letter to the chairmen of the armed services committees, she deplored a "mounting bitterness between the Pentagon and reservists" and urged the establishment of a Senate watchdog committee over Reserve affairs.

Perhaps the most vehement words have come from Representative Thomas B. Curtis, Republican of Missouri, who charged in a March 19, 1955,

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[21]U. S. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., May 9, 1949, p. 5858.

speech to the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Life Underwriters that:

> . . . the nation's highest military leaders are sabotaging congressional efforts to develop a workable Reserve program, in favor of a large standing army. The Military Establishment is determined that no Reserve will work . . . These leaders do not want the National Guard to be attractive.

Representative E. Keith Thomson, Republican of Wyoming, in a similar vein, has said the Regular Army is keeping the Reserve program "dangerously weak," and he made references to a "West Point Protective Association" as a "playhouse for promotion."[22]

The Regular Army leaders' lack of enthusiasm stems from a combination of three motives. First, as patriotic Americans and military specialists, they feel it would be unwise for the United States to depend upon a non-professional force in this age of specialization. Second, by neglect, perhaps because of the necessity for solving more pressing problems elsewhere, they have allowed the Reserve Forces to languish. Third, they believe the rise of the Reserve involves a concurrent decline in the Regular Army; because the Reserve challenges their interests, they show no enthusiasm for its growth.

The most poignant reason given for the Regular Army's hesitancy is the possibility that Reserve Forces' can never be adequately trained for modern warfare. A greater degree of specialization is required in the Army today than ever before. It is doubtful whether the weekly two-hour drill period will keep the citizen soldier in readiness.

The Army says, "The appearance of nuclear arms on the battlefield

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[22]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, A National Reserve Plan, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 10.

has wrought a revolution in tactics--a revolution that calls for more men--more highly trained than ever before."[23] More men are needed because greater dispersion of troops is necessary in nuclear warfare. More men are needed "because we must have the mobility and capacity to rapidly exploit the effect of those weapons . . . to move in . . . clean up . . . move on."[24] But this plea for more men has, in practical effect, included reservists only where Reserve Forces pressure groups and Congress have forced it on the Army. The professional military leaders believe the new weapons require active-duty soldiers.

There is considerable evidence, historically speaking, for doubting the ability of citizen soldiers in a war where a premium rests on rapid mobilization. Reserve Forces personnel, called in 1940 to "be fit to fight by February," required almost as much training as raw recruits. This would probably have been true in the Korean War except for the abilities learned by the Reserve Forces in World War II. It might have been true anyway. Since most of the National Guard stayed home, it cannot be determined how fast the entire Guard could have been mobilized.

Of course, all regulars do not hold the same dubious view of the Reserve Forces. It is interesting to note the position, on this issue, of a noted military leader, Lieutenant General Raymond S. McClain, a civilian banker from Oklahoma City and the only citizen soldier to com-

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[23]U. S. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, The Right to Live: A Presentation in the National Interest, undated (issued in Oct., 1957), p. 13.

[24]Ibid., p. 13.

mand a unit as large as a corps in World War II. He said, in 1954, after his integration into the Regular Army, "Let no one tell you that the so-called civilian soldier is no good, and that our wars have to be fought by regulars."[25] This view is probably not widely held among regulars, however.

There seems to be adequate reason for the Regular Army to believe that the Reserve Forces are truly a challenge to its vested interests. On several occasions and in a variety of official pronouncements, the administration has said that a major purpose of building the Reserves is to reduce the size of the Regular Army. In 1949 Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall told Congress, in his requests for Reserve appropriations, that he "hoped" to reduce the Regular Army by building up the Reserves.[26] Congressmen have inquired how soon after a build-up in the Reserves would it be possible to cut the Regular forces.[27] In 1954, the Senate Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness, speaking through its chairman, Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts, reprimanded the Eisenhower administration for "neglecting" the Reserves and said, "If we reduce the size of the Regular Military Establishment, we must have a Reserve Force which will be able to take up the slack caused by the reduction." A year earlier, the same subcommittee had said

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[26]New York Times, March 24, 1949, p. 21.

[27]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, National Security Training Corps Act, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, on S. 2441, p. 468.

[28]New York Times, Jan. 30, 1954, p. 8.

that "If we were to reduce the Regular Military Establishment, it would be essential to have a continuous rotating Reserve which was revitalized in its operation and being."[29] Even General Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged this policy in 1953. Defending Army Reserve appropriation estimates for fiscal year 1954, he said, "If we are to reduce the standing army, we can do that only if we maintain a strong and vigorous National Guard and Reserve program."[30] Also the American Legion has recognized the possibility of replacing certain parts of the Regular Army with citizen soldiers. At its Atlantic City convention in September, 1957, the organization adopted a resolution urging the replacement "of every unit, man and machine cut from the active services in the last year with a unit, man, or machine in the Ready Reserve."[31]

Also of importance is the vague, nebulous feeling on the part of many regulars that, if it were not for the Reserve Forces, the Regular Army would receive bigger appropriations. This is of extremely doubtful validity.

These army convictions on the necessity of protecting its own position have, consciously or unconsciously, been the primary motives for the regulars' resistance to the Reserves. The greatest evidence of hesitancy came to the dramatic forefront during the tour of Brigadier

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[29]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness, Investigation of the Preparedness Program, Senate Document No. 152, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, p. 6.

[30]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriation Act for 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1953, p. 121.

[31]Army Times (Reserve Edition), Sept. 28, 1957, p. 6.

General Wendell Westover as Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs. His service was between 1947 and 1949, a period of rampant Reserve agitation. In two years, he succeeded in irritating the Pentagon regulars to the point of open hostility.

At that time, and for several years thereafter, the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs was the highest official concerned solely with Reserve matters within the Army establishment. Yet, he had extremely little authority for finalizing Reserve plans. A set of assistant and deputy chiefs of staff determined most Reserve policy. Each assistant or deputy chief had responsibility, in his particular functional area, for initiating and processing Army plans until a decision was forthcoming from the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of the Army. Among these, the executive was a relatively minor figure.

As plans for improving the Reserve continued to be lost in the shuffle, Westover grew suspicious of the Regular Army's motives. Gradually, relations between Westover's office and the top general staff officers grew cold. Files of the internal papers which flowed between the offices reveal that administrative efficiency was undoubtedly impaired by the misunderstandings. Westover complained frequently of the failure of other Pentagon offices to consult his office on matters pertaining to the Reserve. Such complaints ordinarily took the form of gentle reminders that his own staff ought to be consulted on a specific matter or a courteous note claiming that planning on a given topic "impinges on the responsibilities of this office," and therefore ought to be coordinated.[32]

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[32]File 326.6 (1948) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

On September 30, 1948, General Westover wrote directly to the Secretary of the Army asking to be heard on the question of ROTC pay. He called the secretary's attention to the fact that staff papers prepared by other Pentagon agencies had "omitted mention of certain non-concurrences and their justifications recorded by this division."[33] Later in a memorandum, to the higher-ups, he said:

> While coordination has been improved somewhat, it is yet far from being acceptable and it is believed that this is perhaps due to volume of work constantly flowing through the subordinate branches who, in their hurry to finish a paper on scheduled time, either forget to secure our coordination or are unaware that their problem impinges on the responsibilities of this office.[34]

It appears that General Westover made no effort to appease his superiors. Letters written by him, on file in the Departmental Records Branch, Alexandria, Virginia, reveal his antagonistic attitude and biting comments concerning Pentagon staff matters. One typical example is his comments on a proposed letter to all reservists "in order for all Reserve officers to have a better understanding of the ORC program." The letter was a public relations move, with the intention of spreading the blame for current criticism of the Reserve over a wider area, including the Congress. The letter said:

> During the past year and a half, there has been considerable criticism of the progress of the ORC program. The criticism, generally speaking, has not been constructive in nature; in many cases it has been highly inaccurate as to facts and in some

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[33]Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover to the Secretary of the Army, 30 Sept., 1948, File 326.6 (1948) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

[34]File 326.6 (1948) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

> instances has reached the stage of constituting a disservice to the country by undermining the confidence of the people in the Department of the Army and certainly affecting the teamwork which should exist between the Regular Establishment and the Reserve components. It is time the situation be fully clarified. The following information is therefore offered. . . .

On May 25, 1948, this draft letter was submitted to Westover for comments. He needled his superiors, in his reply, by asking them to straighten out the difficulties rather than talk about them. He said the "inaccuracies of fact referred to in the letter can be blamed only upon lack of dissemination of the facts." He said the letter would not "engender the desired understanding and cooperation" and struck out bitterly against Pentagon acquiescence in National Guard demands concerning the formulation of the troop basis. He denied the truth of the "implication" in the letter that adequate funds had been requested by the Department of the Army for the Reserve. He pointed out several areas where the Army could show its good faith on Reserve matters if it cared to do so.[35]

The President's Executive Order 10007, in effect, called a halt to the lack of cooperation among the Pentagon agencies. The order called for a report on the progress of the Reserves on January 1, 1949. It caused the Office of the Director of Organization and Training, previously resistant on Reserve matters, to become more cooperative. A member of the office's staff told an aide to Westover that:

> This may prove embarrassing, and General Bull (the Director) is much worried about it. The Office of the Secretary of De-

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[35]Letter from Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover to the Director of Organization and Training, Department of the Army, 21 May 1948, File 326.6 (1948), Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

> fense is bound to call for a report around December 15, 1948, which is only five weeks away, and it is necessary that progress be reported.[36]

Despite the lessening of tension, General Westover had left the Pentagon before the end of 1949, two years short of finishing his four-year term.

Westover's troubles pointed out the overpowering influence of organization and administrative procedures on Reserve policy in the late 1940's. The high staff divisions, immediate to the chief of staff, insisted on keeping control over Reserve activities. Actually they had little insight into, and were slow to initiate policy for, the Reserve components. With the "operational" aspects of staff action in the hands of the assistant and deputy chiefs, Westover's office could do little more than make suggestions, which it frequently did.

Memoranda were constantly going upward from the executive's office, such as the one of April 30, 1947:

> It has been called to the attention of this division that there is no uniform system of maintaining records of the activities of members of the Organized Reserve Corps while on inactive status. Some records are being maintained, but the type and extent appears to be entirely up to the individual instructor . . . it is recommended that the Adjutant General be directed to develop a suitable form of record to be maintained in the field, on each Reservist.

Even if the executive had the authority or the initiative to do more than make suggestions, it would have been impossible because of the lack of information available in his office. A monopoly on information existed

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[36]Memorandum for the Record, by Lt. Col. G. R. Tyler, Assistant Executive Officer, Office, Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, 5 Nov. 1948, File 326.6 (1949) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

within the general staff sections, which were the great coordinators of the four functional areas of Army activity: personnel, intelligence, plans, and logistics. The executive's office, on a special staff level, was without the massive amounts of data necessary to perform adequately. As time passed during the Westover incumbency, his office refrained from making comments on certain staff papers because of the lack of information.[37]

Typical, also, of the Reserve troubles of the Westover era was the preparation of the Reserve budget. The office of the executive had insufficient information with which to prepare the budget, and it was not required to do so by the regulations. The general staff divisions had both the information and the responsibility. Yet, the Reserve aspects of the Army budget continued to be mishandled, and on occasions, the representatives of the general staff divisions blamed the executive's office for "poorly supported" budgets.[38]

There appeared to the Reserve lobbyists to be one absolute method of ending the bickering among the staff sections. There should be a general staff officer responsible solely for Reserve activities. Such

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[37]For instance, see Memorandum from Colonel George R. Butler, Deputy Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, to the General Staff Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy, 10 Jan. 1949, File 326.6 (1949) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

[38]In discussions on the 1950 budget among high level Army leaders, Dec. 22, 1948, there was an unfriendly flurry between representatives of the Logistics Division and the executive's office as to which office had responsibility for the Reserve budget. Lt. Col. Hawkins of the Control Office of the Logistics Division claimed his division had "little concern" for the Reserve and that, furthermore, this part of the budget was the "least satisfactory" in all the Army. Col. George R. Butler, Deputy to Westover, in a sharp rejoinder, claimed the general staff sections were responsible for the inadequacies. File 326.16 (1948) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

a staff officer, under the authority of the chief of staff, would have power to finalize Reserve policies. He would perhaps be a lieutenant general, probably from the Regular Army, capable of maintaining the status of the Reserve in discussions with the older, embedded staff sections. It was assumed such an officer would become emotionally involved with the progress of the Reserve Forces.

The drive toward the appointment of a high staff officer to control Reserve matters, grew out of roots in the Reserve Officers Association. It sprang from the agitation of 1947 and 1948. Before General Westover left office, he said, in an official memorandum to the General Staff Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy, that any such officer "should be afforded authority to direct and control, in the name of the chief of staff, the operational functions of the general and special staff" which relate to Reserve matters.[39] At the same time, he condemned a suggestion that the Reserve and ROTC sections of his own office be separated into two different Pentagon agencies.

In 1948 the Reserve Officers Association procured from President Truman the famous Executive Order 10007 which suggested the appointment of a high ranking staff officer to direct the Reserves.[40] As a result Major General Charles W. Ryder was made a special assistant to the chief

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[39]Memorandum to the Director of Organization and Training, November 23, 1947, File 326.6 (1947) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

[40]At least, the executive director of the Reserve Officers Association claimed the association was the "instigators" of the executive order. U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 12.

of staff. In a memorandum of December 21, 1948, Army Chief of Staff Omar N. Bradley, dismissed the matter with the following memorandum to Ryder:

> 1. Your assignment as my special assistant for civilian component affairs has been made necessary by the President's Executive Order No. 10007 and the President's accompanying letter to the Secretary of Defense, dated 15 October.
> 2. Your assignment gives you direct access to me at all times. It will not, however, alter present channels for doing business either in the Headquarters, Department of the Army, or in the Army.
> 3. It is my desire that you become an expert in civilian component affairs by:
> a. familiarizing yourself with present and planned army policies . . .
> 4. By your superior knowledge of civilian component affairs, I expect you to be able to offer advice to all concerned with a view towards:
> a. implementing and expediting current plans.
> b. assisting in, and following through on, the development of future plans.
> 5. Whenever you feel that problems affecting the civilian components are not being solved properly, I want you to report to me.[41]

Although the office of the special assistant lacked authority and could not be held responsible for any failures in the Reserve, it was an important step toward representation for the Reserve Forces on the general staff.

Also, early in 1949, a Civilian Components Coordinating Committee began to operate within the Department of the Army, under the monitorship of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. There was representation on the committee from all the general staff sections

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[41]Memorandum from General Omar N. Bradley, Army Chief of Staff, to Major General Charles W. Ryder, 21 Dec. 1948, File 326.6 (23 Nov. 1947), Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

as well as from the Office of the Special Assistant, Comptroller, National Guard Bureau, Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, Chief of Information and the headquarters of Army Field Forces. It was an important element in keeping harmony within the Army staff. After the committee had functioned over two years, Major General Lawrence C. Jaynes, who was Ryder's replacement as the special assistant and formerly commanding general of the New York-New Jersey Military District, said:

> This committee meets weekly and has proven very effective with respect to a common understanding and able teamwork. The committee puts out many fires, but its main activity is in anticipating and preventing fires.[42]

The appointment of the special assistant or the coordinating committee made no difference in the over-all handling of Reserve matters in the Pentagon. Reserve matters continued to be processed by the same general staff sections in much the same fashion as earlier.

Furthermore, the Army staff resisted any change in the system. The Regular Army sought to prevent any further increase in the prestige and status of the Reserves. To allow any autonomy would permit encroachment upon their own prestige. Regulars argued, instead, that integration of Reserve and Regular Army administration was essential to effective management. They said that an autonomous Reserve would lay the way open for a lack of coordination.

The regulars relied heavily in their argument on the 1948 report of the Gray board which said:

> All organizational, administrative, training and supply functions of the Reserve Forces should be handled by the staff

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[42]Reserve Officer, 27 (Jan., 1951), 10.

> sections which handle the same functions in the regular services and no special organizational structure should be set up.[43]

The resistance continued even after the passage of a provision in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 which said:

> The Secretary concerned shall designate a general or flag officer for each Armed Force under his jurisdiction to be directly responsible for Reserve affairs to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations. . . .[44]

This provision, however, made sure that the Army did not abolish the position of the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Civilian Components, although that officer continued with practically no staff or responsibilities.

The Reserve Officers Association, meanwhile, continued to press for more rank for Reserve leaders. Writing in the organization's journal, Colonel C. M. Boyer, executive director, demanded the appointment of an assistant secretary of the Army and a deputy chief of staff to handle Reserve matters as their major function. He said:

> At the present time, the Reserve program flows through the staffs of the various services. We realize that each of these staffs is confronted with problems of such global and immediate importance that consideration of Reserve problems must be related to a subordinate status.

To end the confusion he wanted a deputy chief to take control of all operational and administrative functions previously handled by the various general staff sections. His requests were not arbitrary. He

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[43]U. S. Department of Defense, Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 20.

[44]U. S. Code, Title 10, sec. 264 (1956).

recognized that many of the aspects of policy-making, common to both the active and Reserve Army, should be retained under the jurisdiction of the various general staff sections. Boyer also asked that the field armies be reorganized to have a deputy commander in charge of each of the Reserve components. In the same issue of the Reserve Officer Magazine, Colonel John W. Mayo, a national executive committeeman of the organization, charged that the Pentagon's various assistant and deputy chiefs of staff had "stifled" the implementation of ideas put forth by the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs.[45]

In 1956, Senator Margaret Chase Smith introduced a Senate bill providing for the rank of lieutenant general for the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for the Reserve components. It never reached the floor, however.[46]

The drive for a Reserve chief, comparable to the deputy chiefs for administration, operations, and logistics was never publicly opposed by Army leaders. Public relations-wise, it would have been a most unpopular move to oppose increased prestige for the Reserves. The Regular Army approach was one of passive resistance. Yet, there was never a chance that the Reserve chief would be promoted to lieutenant general or given a higher status so long as the Regular Army general staff officers continued with the lesser rank of major general and held the title of assistant chief of staff.

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[45]Col. C. M. Boyer, "It's Time for a Change," Reserve Officer, 29 (June, 1953), 10.

[46]S. 3336, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956.

An up-grading of the general staff officers, beginning in the late 1940's, paved the way for proportionate advancement for the Reserve chief. During the war, there were four assistant chiefs of staff, all major generals, operating under the chief of staff. By 1951 the duties of these officers had been handed over to a new set of deputy chiefs of staff with the rank of lieutenant general. From 1951 to 1954, the Army staff was overloaded with a set of deputy chiefs, all lieutenant generals, and also a full set of assistant chiefs, all except one of whom were major generals. In 1954 an ad hoc committee of the Army staff made recommendations which eventually ended most of the duplication. The outcome was the delineation of five major functional areas, each headed by a deputy chief with the rank of lieutenant general.

The status-conscious Regular Army staff then acquiesced in a similar up-grading of the Reserve chief. The switch of the regulars from assistant to deputy chiefs made acceptable the creation of an Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components in 1956. The promotion of the general staff officers to lieutenant generals assured the continued leadership over the proposed Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components with the rank of major general.

Thus, the Army produced the gift so long requested by the Reserve Officers Association, but the gift involved far less freedom from Regular Army domination than the association desired. The same Regular Army supervision still existed at the next higher echelon.

The new office, however, gave some new powers to the Reserve hierarchy. For the first time, the Reserve chief could forward plans

and policies which pertained exclusively to Reserve matters directly to the vice chief of staff, without referral to the various deputy chiefs. Any policy which, in any way, touched on active army interests, continued to be coordinated with the appropriate deputy chief.

The leading figure in the decision to raise the status of the Reserve chief was General Williston B. Palmer, at that time the vice chief of staff. Earlier, in 1954, he had served on the ad hoc committee which reorganized the Army staff and later he was deputy commander of all American troops in Europe. Approximately a year after the decision was made, General Palmer recalled the purposes and benefits which he had anticipated from the decision:

> There were two staff divisions, "Reserve and ROTC Affairs" and the National Guard Bureau, each of which administered a separate element of the annual Army Appropriation. It had become progressively more evident that, if we were ever going to relate our reserve components to JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) approved programs for all forces, both active and reserve, necessary for the Army to make a single picture of its reserve component availabilities and capabilities; it could not be done effectively with two separate reserve programs, which historically were more closely related to the aspirations of the respective reserve components than to the strategic necessities of the United States.
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> The creation of an Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components amounted to removing the Special Assistant (for Civilian Components) from his ivory tower and giving him the necessary staff to take on a real, comprehensive, and continuing job of supervising a unified Reserve Components Program. The necessary staff was provided, without any over-all increase in spaces, by collecting from other general staff divisions the people they were using to keep track of the two Reserve Components separately; these people who had been scattered here and there, were now gathered into a coherent group working under an officer who had been given specific responsibilities.[47]

Although, in 1957, when General Palmer was writing, his optimism

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[47]Letter from General Williston B. Palmer, Oct. 25, 1957, to the author.

for administrative efficiency within the Reserve framework had not come true, there was evidence that the new assistant chief's office would eventually become an efficient coordinator of the two Reserve components.

The office can never, however, get an equal voice with active army staff sections so long as it continues on an assistant chief level and active army matters are handled on a deputy chief level. The active army will continue to veto all Reserve proposals which are not in complete accord with Regular Army interests. The veto will occur deep in one of the deputy chief's staff sections, and there is little chance that the light of public attention will ever reach it. Therefore, the Reserve Officers Association will likely continue to have the same goal--to get Reserve matters on a sufficiently high level within the Pentagon that such matters will receive equal attention with active army interests.

Most regulars who are well informed on Pentagon politics hedge on the question of giving Reserve matters to a special deputy chief of staff. For instance, General Palmer commented thusly:

> What is "a Deputy Chief of Staff level"? For that matter, what is "a level" of any sort? On the General Staff organization chart, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components is actually shown in a box that is placed above the Deputies, but it was merely a matter of convenience in spacing a chart on a sheet of paper. Is the rank of the titular chief the criterion--lieutenant general or major general? Or is immediacy of access to the Chief of Staff the criterion? Or is it the variety, personal authority, and global extent of the responsibilities assigned? . . . No one mentioned the "Deputy Chief of Staff level" because that expression is gobbledegook which actually conveys no definable meaning.[48]

This is decidedly not the view of the Reserve Officers Association.

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[48] Ibid.

Whether there is a formal, intentional Regular Army pressure group pulling the strings to assure continued domination of the Reserve cannot be answered by a study of the Reserve question alone. The entire Regular Army framework, as an institution, must be given much more study. So far it has received no sustained attention, except in the case of the Army's effort to prevent the establishment of an independent Air Force.[49]

The job facing American political scientists and sociologists, so far as the Regular Army institution is concerned, is not easy. Regular armies the world over associate their interests with national security and national honor. Just which of their pleas is truly in behalf of the national interest is extremely difficult to determine, especially by the non-military political scientist or sociologist. Such questions have been traditionally left to the legislator.

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[49]The effort occurred throughout the 1920's and again in the late 1940's. No adequate study exists on the episode of the late 1940's. A combination of books makes information adequately available on the situation in the 1920's. These include: Harry Howe Ransom, "The Air Corps Act of 1926--A Study of the Legislative Process" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Princeton University, 1954). Ransom presents most clearly the techniques used by the Army to scuttle encroachments on its vested interests. He says the military establishments are "peculiarly prone to resistance to change," and he calls Congress, in this instance, a "broker" with final powers of arbitration whenever it cares to use them. In General William Mitchell's Winged Defense (New York: B. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925), which is one of the best primary sources, the author says that the Army and Navy saw in air power "the curtailment of their ancient prerogatives, privileges and authority" (p. viii). He said "changes in military systems come about only through the pressure of public opinion or disaster in war" (p. xviii). Mitchell allots to Congress the special duty to keep the military alert. Other sources include: Roger Burlingame, General Billy Mitchell (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1952); Ruth Mitchell, My Brother Bill (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1953) and R. Earl McClendon, The Question of Autonomy for the United States Air Arm, 1907-1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: The Air University, 1950).

On practically all public questions, including the Reserve question, the viewpoint of the regulars has not been clearly set forth, and the consensus is not known in any definite way. If it were available, its diversity would probably be surprising to those who see the Army as an isolated, indoctrinated group. It is true that the hierarchical structure of the Army establishment usually produces a highly conformist pattern of thought on the part of most of its members, but random observation of opinion will not verify this to be true on the Reserve question.

Opinion differs for a variety of reasons. The biggest divergence probably stems from the thousands of officers integrated into the Regular Army after World War II. Many were active duty reservists for several years before moving over to a career status, and a few continue to espouse their previous anti-Regular Army prejudices.

In addition, because of a lack of information throughout the services, the regulars have not been articulate. They have had little experience with Reserve affairs. Until the 1950's, and to a small extent thereafter, regulars avoided service with the civilian components. As an advisor or instructor with the Army Reserve or National Guard, there was little chance to show one's military prowess, and the opportunities for mistakes were plentiful. Consequently, a strong preference existed for other assignments, and the officers tended to remain uninformed on Reserve matters.

Since there are no public opinion polls on Regular Army opinion, and there is no formal Regular Army lobby organization available for

study, it is necessary to look to the actions and statements of Regular Army leaders for indications of interest group activity. Whether the actions of high-ranking officers are valid indications of over-all opinion is unknown; it must be recognized to be, at best, an assumption. There is a chance that further sociological study will reveal numerous cliques and interests within the Regular Army--so that the actions of top Army leaders do not portray the interests of the entire Regular Army. Perhaps it is true, as thousands of wartime soldiers insisted, that a powerful "WPPA," a West Point Protective Association, exists as a pressure group within a pressure group. Usually, however, the West Point interest is considered identical to, or at least the dominant force in, the ranks of the Regular Army.

At least the leaders of the Regular Army have opposed the building of a large Reserve Force. As officers, they see the accumulation of Reserve troops under the leadership of Reserve officers, as a challenge to their role in both peace and war. They consider the Reserve Forces, and particularly the National Guard, as amateurs unworthy of the people's trust, even as foot-soldiers. The requirements of atomic warfare, the regulars feel, makes dependence on the Reserves even more risky.

However, for at least two reasons, the propensities of the Regular Army to deny the Reserves an important role and high status should not be considered resolute. First, the Regular Army has a much bigger status problem on its hands in the well known inter-service rivalries stemming from the 1947 unification. The Reserve question is comparatively trivial; it might be lost by default.

In addition, as time passes, the regulars themselves might see

more clearly the interest they have in a large citizen Army. The Reserve function provides many jobs for regulars. Frequently, these jobs are high-ranking--a thing which almost every soldier seeks. After serving with the Reserves, a regular officer has a vested interest in his knowledge of the Reserves, and he is likely to protect his interest.

It is already well known that the regulars do not show the same ill will toward the Army Reserve as they do toward the National Guard. If there must be a Reserve organization, the Regular Army prefers a national force, over which it will have control, rather than a state force.

Thus revealed is the quandary with which the Regular Army struggles. As the number of regulars assigned to Reserve duty increases, there is a chance the Regular Army will embrace the Reserves as its own offspring and no longer treat them as foster children thrust upon it by the Congress and the other pressure groups.

CHAPTER VI

THE RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

The Reserve Officers Association represents, in 1957, approximately 65,000 officers of the Army Reserve and the Reserve branches of the other services. It was organized in 1922 by the merger of a small group of Reserve officers of Washington, D. C., with a similar group in New York City. The groups, led by Brigadier General Henry A. Reilly and Brigadier General John Ross Delafield, had the tacit support of General of the Army John J. Pershing.[1] The first operations of the organization were conducted from Reilly's office, but later in 1922, a small office was opened at 1653 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest, in Washington near Blair House. The first national convention of the association was in 1923 in Detroit. Delafield was elected the first national president. At the end of Delafield's term, with membership at about 14,000, Brigadier General Roy Hoffman, a well known citizen soldier of Oklahoma, was elected president.

Through the years until the beginning of World War II, the association worked for bigger military appropriations, an expanded ROTC program, and a more substantial Citizens' Military Training Corps.

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[1]Reserve Officer, 27 (Feb., 1950), 12.

In 1940 the Reserve Officers Association had 35,000 members out of about 120,000 Americans who held Reserve commissions throughout the nation. There were 729 chapters.

In January, 1942, following the Pearl Harbor attack, organizational activities ceased for the duration of the war. The membership lists were frozen, and the organization's assets were turned over to a board of trustees who were to serve as caretakers until the active members returned from war.

In May, 1945, the organization came to life again. The wartime board of trustees relinquished control to a new executive director, Brigadier General E. A. "Art" Evans, who was until that time on active duty in the Pentagon. Two years later, the membership of the association reached 140,000.

After the Air Force was separated from the Army in 1947, the association revised its constitution so as to recognize the new independent status of the air arm. An Air Force section was created within the organization. The new constitution was adopted at the national convention in Denver, June 16-19, 1948. Two years later, June 30, 1950, Congress granted the association a charter based on the new constitution.[2]

The constitution provides for the election of a president, a vice president for each of the three services, a national executive committeeman for each of the three services, three junior vice presidents, a judge advocate, a chaplain, a surgeon, and a historian. These officers are chosen at the annual convention for one year terms. So that none of

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[2]P. L. 595, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

the services can dominate the organization, the presidency is rotated among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Thus, an Army president is followed by a Navy man who is followed by an Air Force man.

The charter, as provided by Congress, requires a financial audit to be submitted to the Congress by January 15th of each year.

There are six committees of the association which handle policy matters in the interim period between conventions. These are the committees on the Reserve program, budget and finance, legislation, publications, constitution and by-laws, and public relations.

So far as actual managerial authority is concerned, the president is not powerful; however, he carries considerable national influence. When Captain Robert Granville Burke left the presidency in July, 1953, he said that during his term of office, he traveled in excess of 98,000 miles on Reserve Officer Association business. Over one-third of this travel had been furnished by the armed forces without cost. He spoke in seven foreign countries and eighteen states.[3]

The real governing authority of the association is vested in the fourteen-man national executive committee, composed of all the top officers of the association. This committee has the authority to appoint the paid professional employees of the Washington office, including the executive director, who is the association's chief lobbyist. The committee holds periodic meetings in which policy is made for the guidance of the full-time employees. In addition, the committee appoints the national treasurer and the national public relations officer, who are not

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[3]Reserve Officer, 29 (Aug., 1953), 18.

paid employees.

The fundamental policies of the association are, as in most other organizations, made in a series of chapter, state, and national conventions. In the 1950's the organization had well over one thousand chapters, all of which could submit resolutions to their respective state conventions, which in turn could submit them to the national convention. The resolutions passed by the national conventions each year are binding upon all chapters.

In the national conventions of 1949, 1950, and 1951, there were a total of 162 resolutions passed. Several were duplicates of resolutions passed in earlier years and when these are eliminated, the remainder adds up to 91 in all. In that particular period, the association sought cash allowances for uniforms, earmarking of Reserve funds, appointment of an assistant secretary for Reserve affairs in each of the services, the ending of the requirement of sixty per cent attendance of enlisted men at drill sessions before officers could be paid, the appointment of a deputy chief of staff for Reserve matters, a new promotion law, the merger of the Reserve Officers Association with the Air Reserve Association, and many others.[4]

The main purpose of the Reserve Officers Association has been, of course, to influence in its own behalf the law and administrative regulations which govern the Reserve Forces of the various services. The objectives, as announced by the association, are usually stated more delicately--to aid in the development and execution of a strong defense

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[4]Reserve Officer, 27 (Dec., 1951), 4.

policy with special interest in the Army Reserve. The organization has, generally, sought to build the Army Reserve in size and status. As officers, the members have a sincere, but one-sided view of what constitutes strengthening of the Reserve. The association has no enlisted members, and consequently there has been no great effort toward such things as higher pay scales for enlisted men.

When the association was being incorporated by Congress in 1950, the exact wording of its objectives was a matter of debate. According to the proposals of the association, it would "assist in" the development of military policy. The incorporation bill was referred to the Senate judiciary committee which in turn requested comments from the Department of the Army. Gordon Gray, at that time Secretary of the Army, strongly objected to the words "assist in." In a letter from Gray to Chairman Pat McCarran of the Senate judiciary committee, it was recommended that the words be replaced by "promote" in order to "make it abundantly clear that the organization has no right to assist in the development and execution of Reserve policy."[5]

Since World War II, the Reserve Officers Association has maintained its national headquarters in an old stone mansion just beyond Rock Creek Park outside of the Washington business district at 2517 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest. From this point, the national officers and the national executive director stay in touch with Reserve affairs, contact administrative officials, testify before congressional committees and,

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[5]Letter from Gordon Gray, Secretary of the Army to Senator Pat McCarran, Feb. 1, 1950, Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

in general, superintend the interests of the Reserve officers of the nation.

It was at first planned to have in the national headquarters three assistant directors, one each for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, in addition to an officer manager, legislative assistant, editorial and public relations chief, and a field service assistant. These plans did not mature on schedule, and for the first six or seven years after World War II, the three assistant directors had also to fulfill the other functions.[6] By 1957, the association has a paid professional staff consisting of the executive director, deputy executive director, the three assistant directors for Army, Navy, and Air Force business, a supervisor of membership campaigns, two legislative consultants, an administrative assistant to the executive director, an editor of the association's magazine, and several clerical and field liaison personnel.

The executive directors of the association have been registered with Congress as lobbyists and, at the time, reported that their salary to be $1,250 per month. The longest tenure of any of the executive directors since World War II was that of Brigadier General E. A. Evans, who served for seven years. He left in 1952 to become the $25,000 per year city manager of Miami, Florida. He was replaced by his assistant, Charles M. Boyer, a colonel formerly assigned to the Reserve branch of the Army G3 office. Although he was a skillful Washington representative, his tour was not completely successful so far as harmony within

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[6]E. A. Evans, "Report of the Executive Director," Reserve Officer, 28 (Aug., 1952), 6.

the national headquarters was concerned. He was reprimanded in the report of the national president at the 1953 national convention. President (Capt.) Robert Granville Burke of the Navy Reserve told the assembled delegates that he wanted the

> . . . chain of command between the national president and the executive director to be reaffirmed by this convention as the same as written into the constitution. There is one and only one top official in the organization and that should be the person elected national president. Unfortunately--and this has not to do with personalities; this is a fault as I see it in our set-up--we have two heads going, in many imstances, their separate ways. There is a chain of command prescribed in our constitution, that fixing of responsibility should be followed and understood by all.[7]

The national president commented at the same time about a current effort to render the executive director less responsible to the national association's officers by permitting the removal of the executive director only with the approval of the national convention. The national council of the association, composed of representatives of the state departments as well as national officers, in a meeting in February, 1953, had passed a resolution to this effect, abrogating that provision of the constitution which allowed the national committee to remove and appoint the executive director.

The dissension had grown out of the threatened secession of a group of old line Naval officers who desired to maintain the autonomy of the Naval Reserve officers within the Reserve Officers Association.[8] Boyer, an ardent Army man, was brusque and impatient during the episode,

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[7]Reserve Officer, 29 (Aug., 1953), 5.

[8]Interview with Colonel Clarence E. Barnes, former president, Reserve Officers Association, Nov. 20, 1957.

as were the Naval officers. Eventually they resolved the disagreements among themselves, but continued to be antagonistic to Boyer's strong hand.

Boyer was replaced by Brigadier General Harold R. Duffie, who also left the directorship under a cloud on June 30, 1957. Although Duffie's resignation was for "pressing personal reasons," a high-ranking member of the Army section of the association told newspaper reporters that a thorough cleanout of the top members of the staff was in order because it was felt that paid employees had been taking "too personal interest" in the campaign of individuals for the national presidency of the association. He also said there was friction among the Washington staff. Duffie served only one year as the executive director.

After the 1957 convention, at Santa Barbara, California, the executive committee appointed Colonel John T. Carlton to be the new executive director. Carlton was a former Washington, D. C., newsman, administrative assistant to Senators George Smathers, of Florida, and Walter F. George, of Georgia, and investigator for the Senate foreign relations committee.

The association was fortunate in having three skilled lobbyists on its staff after World War II. The most prominent was Major General Melvin Maas, who before and during World War II served in Congress from Minnesota for a total of sixteen years. He served two years in the United States Marine Corps in the Pacific area during World War II, and in 1946 was an advisor to the naval affairs committees. The politically wise Maas was a popular figure after the war in military Reserve circles,

and was a particularly adept spokesman for the association. He was on the staff as a legislative consultant.

From June, 1954, till June, 1955, the association had as its national president the famous presidential candidate of the states' rights party, Senator Strom Thurmond, of South Carolina. At the same time, the association had on its paid staff Colonel Justice M. Chambers as assistant executive director. Chambers was a World War II Congressional Medal of Honor winner and former staff advisor to the Senate armed services committee. Because of this experience he was very valuable to the association.

The major area of action for the Reserve Officers Association is, of course, in Congress. The professional staff stays in constant contact with the armed services committees and has developed considerable influence within these committees.[9] Largely because of this influence, there has been a steady increase in the amount of Reserve interests that have been written into law. At the organization's insistence, Congress has given statutory status to many administrative details.

On the question of the proper amount of administrative details to be written into law, the association has been in direct controversy with the Army. In 1951 Brigadier General E. A. Evans said:

> If we were to state what we believe to be the principal differences between the thinking of the ROA and the Pentagon in connection with H. R. 4860, it would be that we wished to see a maximum written into law; while the Pentagon apparently wishes to have a minimum, therefore leaving a large portion of our problems to be settled administratively. We have gone through many hectic years since World War II on such a basis, and we feel very

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[9] Ibid.

strongly that the solution to the Reserve problems is in having a maximum covered by law.[10]

Perhaps the association's greatest victory, so far as the denial of administrative discretion is concerned, was the Reserve Officers Personnel Act of 1954. Starting early in the 1950's, the association urged Congress to write a promotion schedule into law. Reserve officers were extremely dissatisfied with the administrative regulations governing promotions, which were unstable and discriminated between regulars and reservists. Members of the Reserve recognized no reason why reservists should not be promoted alongside regulars who had the same time in grade.

The first major success came in the House version of the Armed Forces Reserve bill of 1951. At the insistence of association lobbyists, the House armed services committee added a provision to the bill requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit new promotion legislation by February 1, 1952. This requirement was discarded from the final draft of the act which passed in 1952. A substitute provision required the various services to promulgate equitable promotion regulations. The Army did this in sufficiently good form that later its regulations were largely written into the statutes. Mostly because the Air Force continued to administratively discriminate against reservists, the House began hearings on a new bill in 1953.

Throughout the struggle, it was a vigorous battle between the Pentagon and the Reserve Officers Association. The importance of the promotion law to reservists was stated by Executive Director Charles M.

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[10]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 442.

"Count" Boyer before the Senate armed services committee in 1954: "In no other area of Reserve affairs has there been more dissatisfaction with existing policies and procedures than in this delicate area of promotions. . . "[11] It was very important to the Department of the Army, too, that the Reserve Officers Association be prevented from foisting upon the service a law which discriminated against regulars.

As previously described, the bill did not go into effect until three years after its introduction. The House passed the bill in 1953, and the Senate passed it in 1954 to be effective on July 1, 1955. Before it could go into effect on schedule, the defense department asked for several amendments. The law finally went into effect in an amended form on schedule--with much Reserve Association jubilation.

The association's efforts to control the organization and procedures within the Army Reserve hierarchy has been felt in two specific areas. The first effort, made by Brigadier General E. A. Evans while he was executive director of the association, was toward the decentralization of operational activities. In 1951, he told a House committee investigating the Reserve program:

> Much of the trouble which has arisen in connection with the Reserve program of all the services has been the attempt on the part of large staffs located in the Pentagon to operate and administer directly the Reserve programs. . . . We feel that the large Pentagon staffs should be for the purpose of creating policy and over-all plans and that the operation of Reserve programs can most effectively be performed if you take their operating staffs away from Washington and put them out where they can think and act.[12]

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[11]U. S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Hearings, Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, p. 28.

[12]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 21.

Evans lauded the decentralized operations of the Naval Air Reserve training program which is administered outside the Pentagon. He said:

> The Army today could effectively create such a system by giving to General Mark Clark, the commanding general of the Army Field Forces, full responsibility for the administration, organization, control, training and all other things that might be necessary in order to create an effective Army Reserve. But there shouldn't be any strings on his mission. He should be given complete responsibility. If this were done, you would find a marked change in the Army Reserve effectiveness.[13]

Soon afterward, the Army adopted this idea, not only for the Reserve Forces but for all Army operations within the continental limits of the United States. The move, perhaps, stemmed from Reserve pressure.

The second major effort of the association to control Reserve organization and procedures was the drive for higher rank and higher status for the Reserve chief in the Pentagon. As described earlier, the effort has been mildly successful. As of 1957, the association continues to work for the promotion of the Reserve chief to deputy chief of staff level. Starting with the national convention of 1949, the association passed resolutions asking for the appointment of a deputy chief.[14]

Another important interest of the Reserve Officers Association has been the 23 per cent of its membership which were, in July, 1957, on active duty in the Armed Forces. This group had the status of a separate section within the association. A separate active duty committee, composed of eight members--a chairman, a vice chairman and an alternate vice

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[13] Ibid., p. 21.

[14] Reserve Officer, 33 (Jan., 1957), 15.

chairman from each of the three services, and a secretary--looked after the interests of the members in extended active service. Actually, this was only a coordinating group. Three subcommittees performed the basic function of maintaining surveillance over the three services. The full committee reviewed the actions of the subcommittees and sent recommendations to the executive director for action.

Until about 1955, the interests of active duty personnel held a secondary position in the association's program. In 1957, the active duty committee estimated that only ten per cent of the Reserve officers on active duty were members of the association.[15] A recruiting effort was begun to enlist these officers. With the improved facilities for handling active duty interests, as exemplified by the formation of the committee, it appears that the organization will gain influence in the active duty area. At some later date, it might even compete favorably in power with Regular Army interests, which are without a formal organization but which nevertheless now rule over all active duty matters.

A major victory was won for the active duty members in the passage of the Reserve Officer Personnel Act. Previously, Reserve officers going on active duty carried with them into service no credit for their Reserve service toward promotion. The association fought hard for a new provision giving equal seniority for Reserve and active duty service. This point, one of great contention between the regulars and reservists, was settled by the arbitration of the armed services committees. When the law was finally enacted, it carried a compromise whereby reserve time

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[15] Reserve Officer, 33 (Aug., 1957), 7.

would be credited toward promotion, providing the reservist had been sufficiently active in Reserve work--if he had attended drill sessions or finished correspondence courses. Considering the vehemence with which the Regular Army fought this provision, the compromise was a major success for the Reserve Officers Association.

The older officers constitute an element within the association which has contributed greatly to the size and power of the organization. Since World War II, there have been many officers in this category. Vast numbers were promoted to be majors and lieutenant colonels and many became colonels. Being in this position of high rank, they desired even more than other Reserve officers, to receive additional promotions, to win credit toward retirement, and to get high and influential assignments within the Reserve combat units.

Army planners have been worried by the demands of these older officers, partially because they know of the unfortunate condition of the Reserve when war broke out in 1940. At that time there were thousands of officers on the Reserve rolls who were too old for combat. Many were not suitable for desk jobs. Efforts to clean out the deteriorated ranks released a torrent of dissatisfaction.

To prevent the Army Reserve from falling into a similar predicament after World War II, the Pentagon sought strict enforcement of age-in-grade limitations. For all types of units, the age ceiling was set at 55 years for lieutenant colonels, and 58 years for colonels. These rules kept older officers out of pay status in combat units and even prevented their enrollment in Army Reserve schools.

All such regulations were promulgated with sincere intentions to

keep the Reserve vigorous and ready for combat. Each new restriction, nevertheless, brought forth additional clamor which was especially resented by the Pentagon. Army planners believed such pressures were in obvious violation of the best interests of the nation. Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., has given his view of the matter:

> The training of officers of the civilian components is one of the most delicate and difficult problems that confront the Army because both the Reserves and the National Guard are political, as well as military organizations, especially the National Guard. When the Army tries conscientiously to eliminate those who are inefficient, it is subjected to all sorts of pressures to prevent action which is known to be in the interests of the nation, and it is often unjustly accused of prejudice.[16]

Because of such views as this, the older officers have been unable to win much ground in their battle.

The Reserve Officers Association has cooperated with a variety of other interest groups in the building of a large Reserve. These include the United States Chamber of Commerce which has generally favored increasing the size of the Reserve, probably in order to avoid the taxation necessary to maintain a large standing army. Other organizations favorably disposed toward the Reserve include the American Legion, Military Order of World Wars, American Veterans of World War II, Disabled American Veterans, Jewish War Veterans, Marine Reserve Officers Association, Veterans of Foreign Wars, American Veterans Auxiliary and the National Security Committee.

During consideration of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, these patriotic organizations joined together to urge passage of the bill.

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[16]Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr. (Ret.), "No Safety in Numbers," Atlantic, 181 (June, 1948), 30.

They organized themselves into a loose confederation called the National Security Committee and wrote to President Eisenhower that they would "vigorously direct efforts" to secure passage of the bill, which they did.[17]

The American Legion has been particularly cooperative with the Reserve Officers Association. During consideration of the 1952 Reserve bill, Granville S. Ridley, chairman of the Legion's National Security Training Committee, told the Senate armed services committee that: "The American Legion has never set itself up as being top expert in the Reserve problems. We have sought to leave that detail to the National Guard and Organized Reserve."[18] He asked for favorable consideration of the bill on behalf of the American Legion's national convention which, at Miami, Florida, had approved the bill. Ridley said, "We are dissatisfied with the manner in which Reserve activities have been conducted in the past." He asked that more Reserve matters be "spelled out in the law, leaving a minimum to administrative control." The words are surely the same as the Reserve Officer Association might utter.

The association has constantly sought for itself a more secure foothold on Reserve policy-making. It has looked longingly at the National Guard Association's penetration of the National Guard Bureau and yearned for a similar bureau of its own in the Department of the Army.

The association has looked particularly for methods whereby it

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[17]Interview with Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President, Sept. 18, 1957.

[18]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 3.

can dominate the General Staff Committee on Army Reserve Policy. This committee was originally established as an after-thought to the General Staff Committee on National Guard policy which, according to congressional intentions at the time of its creation, gave to the National Guard a spokesman in the higher reaches of the Army staff. The Reserve Officers Association has never quite been able to duplicate the Guard's success. It has never been able to dominate the Reserve counterpart of the National Guard committee.

In fact, the Army Reserve policy committee is, on occasion, dubbed a rubber stamp for the Army staff. Although this is not altogether true, so long as the Department of the Army keeps its current control over committee appointments, the committee is likely to remain outside of Reserve Officers Association control. The members of the National Guard committee must be nominated, according to law, by the governors, and by custom they must also receive a recommendation from the chief of the National Guard Bureau. Because the governors and the National Guard Bureau are easily within its influence, the National Guard Association is able to exercise great control over the National Guard committee. The Reserve Officers Association has no such legal requirement or custom.

The association has attempted to gain control of the committee through legislation requiring committee members to be nominated by the association and to be confirmed by the United States Senate. A resolution to this effect was passed at the association's national convention

in 1950, and in 1951 the organization's journal[19] announced partial success in that the Department of the Army was beginning to consult the association before appointments were made among the Reserve members of the committee. The resolution, however, has received no serious consideration by either the Department of the Army or Congress.[20]

Although the Reserve Officers Association has not developed its political powers to the same extent as the National Guard, it is nevertheless powerful. Its representatives before Congress have been skilled in the lobbying arts. So often it is recalled among reservists that, at parties given by Brigadier General Evans, practically all the members of Congress who were influential in military affairs could be found. Other executive directors, although without General Evans' long lobbying experience, were also well known among congressmen.

According to Colonel Clarence E. Barnes, former president of the association,[21] the organization's lobbyists have not been extremists for the Reserve cause. They have acknowledged the need for a balanced military program, including National Guard as well as Regular troops. In fact, on occasion the unified Reserve Officers Association, in order to function as an organization of Army, Navy and Air Force men, have been forced to show more perspective than the three semi-separate active military services which constantly tend to be provincial. If this were

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[19]LTCR Henry G. Doyle, "The Bulletin Board," Reserve Officer, 27 (Dec., 1951), 4.

[20]Interview with T. Edward Braswell, Staff, Senate Appropriations Committee, Sept. 16, 1957.

[21]Interview, Nov. 20, 1957.

not true, the association would have disintegrated from dissension many years ago.

This sober and sincere interest in the national security has brought the Reserve lobby respect and prestige among congressmen, Colonel Barnes says. It explains, to some extent, the effectiveness of the lobby although there is little grass roots political power within the organization.

It must, of course, be understood that the problem of national security is broad, and there remains plenty of room for the association to recommend only improvements from which its members will benefit. It is indeed noticeable that the association has not, with any vigor, pointed out the lack of combat readiness on the part of its members. It has not demanded the ouster of Reserve officers from a pay status who, because of their critical civilian employment, would not be able to go off to war. It has not encouraged the enforcement of strict age-in-grade requirements or fostered frequent physical examinations of its members who might be called to active duty.

Also, it must be noted that the association has not unanimously indulged in generosity and compromise. General Westover, a long term association enthusiast and office holder, had disagreements with Pentagon brass which bordered, at times, on feuds. Colonel William H. Neblett, national president in 1947-48, became widely known for his anti-Regular Army views, which contributed to the refusal of the regulars to cooperate. Colonel H. N. Willoughby, former president of the Indiana department, mustered considerable antagonism among national guardsmen for his plan

to merge the Army Reserve and National Guard into a single federal force. Nevertheless, these incidents have not been frequent, and the Reserve Officers Association is usually considered one of the more responsible and stable lobby organizations in Washington.

The association has prevailed in its controversies which have reached congressional attention. Except for the refusal of Congress to force the Department of Defense to create a deputy chief of staff to handle Reserve affairs, the association has not lost a single major issue before Congress. In this one exception, Congress feared to demand any specific administrative arrangement and compromised by telling the Army secretary to "designate a general . . . officer to be directly responsible for Reserve affairs to the Chief of Staff."[22]

Obviously, this settlement does not suggest any impotence on the part of the association. The legal provision that was adopted was as close to the association's demands as Congress could give without hopelessly hamstringing administrative flexibility.

The reasons for the association's success, as previously considered, did not grow from any tight political network such as that possessed by the National Guard Association. The Reserve Association has to depend largely on the good sense of its arguments and the favorable disposition of the Congress for the Reserve as opposed to an expensive active army.

The Reserve Officers Association has shown its impotence, however, in the administrative area. It has budged the administrators of

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[22]U. S. Code, Title 10, sec. 264.

the over-all Army a little--but very little. The cause of this failure lies in the fact that the administrators, generally respected by congressmen as subject-matter experts, have substantial power to delay congressional action. Usually the administrators have the power to delay, sometimes indefinitely, any or all legislation as complicated as that involving Reserve matters. This has been true, even in the post-1952 period with its Democratic Congress and Republican president. There are several examples of delay sponsored by the bureaucracy. The arrival of the 1952 Reserve bill in the congressional hopper occurred only after pleas from the association caused Representative Vinson to send a deadline to Assistant Secretary Rosenberg. The armory bill was in the administrative mill from 1947 until 1949 and was not implemented until long after the Korean War because the Army and Defense Departments and the Bureau of the Budget could not or did not establish final building specifications. Construction finally began after the association persuaded Congress to harass the administration. Similarly, the promotion law was prepared by congressional ultimatum, stemming almost entirely from the association.

Thus, the Reserve Officers Association has prospered but only so far as it has been able to drive the problems out into the congressional arena.

CHAPTER VII

THE NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION

> "Civilian in peace, soldier in war. For three centuries I have been the custodian of security and honor. I am the Guard."

With this slogan, together with "There will always be a Guard," the National Guard Association has marched in wedge formation to an extremely strong position in the making of Reserve policy. The association--an unincorporated, non-profit organization--began in 1878. A group of Civil War officers, who according to Guard claims were from both the North and the South, met at Richmond, Virginia.[1] They had one goal, to put strength into that constitutional clause calling for joint participation between the state and nation in the maintenance of a militia. They wanted the national government to supply money and instructors sufficient to revitalize the state militias.[2] They hoped to end the long history of uncertainty within the militia system.

Out of the Richmond meeting, grew an "Association of Officers." They met again in New York City, in 1879, and again the same year in St. Louis, Missouri, where the organization evolved into the National

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[1] Army Times (Reserve Edition), Sept. 21, 1957, p. 17.

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, "Civilian Control and the Constitution," American Political Science Review, 50 (Sept., 1956), 684.

Guard Association. The association grew slowly, but today it is undoubtedly the most powerful pressure group within the Reserve area.

In October, 1944, the association began a post-war awakening. It opened its first permanent headquarters--two rooms and a bath--in a former apartment hotel, the Stoneleigh Court Building, in Washington, D. C. Assets were extremely meager,[3] but from that point on, the growth of the association was rapid.

In 1948, only 42 per cent of Guard officers belonged to the association.[4] The leaders of the lobby insisted that the various state adjutant generals require every National Guard officer to become a member of the association. As the Guard units were being reorganized from the shambles of World War II demobilization, almost all applicants for Guard commissions were "offered the opportunity" to fill out a membership application blank prior to the time they appeared before the official examining board. This coercion was sufficient to build a National Guard Association which, by 1953, included 99 per cent of all Guard officers.

Since October, 1947, the association has been publishing its monthly National Guardsman, which is the official voice of the asscciation. As of 1957, it has a circulation of about 85,000 copies.

The president and other officers are elected at an annual conference of the association in which each state is entitled to one vote

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[3]Interview with Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, Sept. 21, 1957.

[4]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 174.

for the adjutant general or commanding general and one additional vote for every five hundred men comprising its Army and Air National Guard. From 1943 to 1957, the association became almost another name for Major General Ellard A. Walsh, who served as its national president throughout this period, in addition to another term between 1928 and 1929. During this fifteen years' service to the organization, he moulded the association largely to his own liking. In 1957, Walsh decided to relinquish the top post, and at the organization's 79th general conference in Louisville, Kentucky, Major General William H. Harrison, Jr., Massachusetts adjutant general, was selected as his successor.

The first president of the association was General George W. Wingate of New York. At other times the presidency has been occupied by a long list of politically potent National Guard officers including Major General Charles Dick, of Ohio, Mayor General Edward Martin, of Pennsylvania, and Colonel Bennett C. Clark, of Missouri--all members of the Congress.

The association has held a convention in some prominent American city every year since 1896, and perhaps even earlier. Records have been lost on all except six conventions between 1879 and 1896.

By 1955, the association had fulfilled plans made at the 1946 convention in Buffalo, New York, to have an eighteen-man staff. Nine persons were assigned to headquarters duties and nine others managed the association's monthly journal.

The top officers of the association, the president, vice president, secretary, treasurer and chaplain are elected by the annual convention. An executive committee is also chosen by the convention to

make interim decisions. Ordinarily, two three-day sessions of the executive committee are held each year. The committee is composed of all elected officers and two other officers from each field army area and field air force area, each with three-year terms.

In addition, the convention has a number of specialized committees which function throughout the year, including committees on legislation, finance, membership, publications, public relations, air affairs, constitution and by-laws, and others. The executive committee creates, as it sees fit, several special committees to meet specific problems.

Alongside the National Guard Association there exists the Adjutant Generals' Association, composed of all the adjutant generals of the various state Guard units. The men who make up the Adjutant Generals' Association, generally speaking, control both organizations. The same interests, as a comparison of the rosters of officers will show, are at the helm in both organizations.

The National Guard Association has reached a status, in 1957, of great power. It occupies an ambiguous position on the borderline between a private association and a public agency.[5] Actually it is nothing more than another Washington lobby, but it considers itself the official spokesman for a government organization, namely the National Guard of the United States. The Guard officials of the various states, seeing the association's handiwork, are glad to view it in the same light, and Congress has frequently accorded the association a semi-official status. For instance, in 1951, the House armed services committee took action to

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[5] Ibid., p. 174.

permit the association to sit in on secret testimony by defense officials. It would have done so, except for the complaints of the Department of Defense.[6]

Although the National Guard Association has usually had fewer members and less money than the Reserve Officers Association, it has constantly won more of the rewards for good lobbying. Its successes, which will be obvious later in this essay, have been tremendous. The victories won by the Guard Association have come almost entirely from its influence with the Congress.

By virtue of the dual status clause in the Constitution, Congress has control of the training and discipline of National Guard troops, and because Congress furnishes almost all the money required by the Guard, it can coerce the Guard in almost any other area. At any time, the Congress could federalize the Guard under the same powers through which it controls the Regular Army. It is therefore completely logical for the National Guard Association to show its greatest attention to congressmen. This has been done, and Congress has rewarded them well. "Congress," in the words of President Walsh, "has ever been our refuge and our strength."[7]

A number of guardsmen and congressmen have commented upon their close relationship. Major General James F. Cantwell, chief of staff of the New York National Guard has said:

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[6]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 679.

[7]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 175.

> Because the National Guard Association represents the fifty-one states and territories and is able through its membership to bring considerable pressure to bear on Congress, it has consistently enjoyed a high respect from Congress. The leadership of the Association has been of such caliber, too, that the Association has been able to influence Congress. The strength ties both in the state representation and in the fact that the potential vote represented by the 500,000 and their families.[8]

A few congressmen, fully as candid, have spoken about the situation in critical tones. Representative Charles A. Plumley, Republican of Vermont, has said:

> The gentleman [General Walsh] is correct in that he [in his political action] contacts the Governor; the Governor contacts the adjutant general, and the adjutant general contacts every member of the National Guard. Then they write you and me and the pressure is brought to bear that should not be brought to bear.[9]

Representative Sterling Cole, Republican of New York, was even more caustic. During testimony by General Walsh on the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, he said:

> I have, during those five years, acquired the impression--and I don't speak personally critical of you two gentlemen at all, but the fact is you two gentlemen have been the ones that have appeared during those five years. I have acquired the impression, which is the National Guard Association and the Adjutant Generals Association are somewhat difficult to satisfy. I will put it mildly, and I wonder what the reason for it is. Is it because of this hybrid nature of the Guard, of being both federal and state, and neither federal nor state; is that true; is it because of the fine spirit that has been developed through the existence of the National Guard over a long period of our national history; is it because of the zeal of its representatives who have appeared before us for the last five years, or is there any explanation for it?
>
> General Walsh: Yes, sir.
>
> Representative Cole: But at any rate, I do have the impression, that the Guard Association is pretty cantankerous.
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> General Walsh: I think it is quite the reverse. If you will

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[8]Letter from Maj. Gen. James F. Cantwell, July 23, 1957.

[9]U. S. Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 6740.

> go back to my testimony, I said the National Guard is pretty well satisfied with existing laws and policy. Well, if we are satisfied with existing laws and policy, then wherein do you find us difficult to satisfy.
>
> Representative Cole: Well, only that whenever a personal problem comes up it never meets satisfaction of the National Guard Association initially. Eventually, it usually does, but that is only because the Committee and the Congress acquiesces in the criticisms that are advanced by the Association.[10]

The statements by these two congressmen portray, in an elementary way, the functions and character of the National Guard Association. The association has two themes, states' rights and the minute-man tradition, which tend to stir many Americans, although both are widely considered these days as historical shibboleths. The success of the two themes show the sentimental feeling for the Guard which exists throughout America. Any tampering with the Guard brings a quick reaction.

High placed guardsmen do not always leave political maneuvering to the National Guard Association. In military circles, Guard officers have an undeniable reputation as "politicians." This can be verified by listening to various division commanders of the Guard talk about running for governor. However, more reliable proof of the Guard's reputation comes from a study in 1942 which surveyed the opinions of privates in National Guard and Regular Army divisions.[11] In the Guard divisions, 52 per cent of the privates who were national guardsmen said that promotions were made through "bootlicking or politics," as compared to 26 per cent who said promotions were won through ability. The percentages were

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[10]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1950, p. 496.

[11]Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 269.

almost exactly reversed in the replies of Regular Army privates in two Regular Army divisions.

Further verification comes from Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times, who pointed to four general officers currently commanding Guard divisions in the northeastern United States in 1947 as political appointees. He stated his alarm that they all lacked combat experience.[12] In 1957, two prominent Pennsylvania politicians, a former lieutenant governor and the incumbent United States senator, held National Guard commissions as major generals. None of these appointments are illegal. Under an opinion of the United States Attorney General, the political activities of guardsmen are exempt from laws limiting the political activity of national employees or state employees whose salaries come from national funds.[13]

As previously described, Guard political activities bear fruit in the big Guard appropriations. Frequently Congress appropriates more for the National Guard than is requested by the administrative officials. In 1948, the Republican 80th Congress raised such appropriations almost one hundred million dollars, although the administration was controlled by the Democrats.

As with other pressure groups, the association has not been content with control over legislation. It seeks also to control the day to day regulations coming from the administrative hierarchy. With the

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[12]New York Times, March 30, 1947, p. 33.

[13]U. S. Department of Justice, Opinions of the Attorney General, vol. 40, no. 19 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940).

help of Congress, it has made great inroads toward the domination of the administrative machinery. Its greatest conquest, so far, has been its domination of the National Guard Bureau of the Department of the Army.

The association has achieved legislation requiring the chief of the bureau to have ten years' Guard experience and have a recommendation from his governor.[14] This requirement effectively limits the leadership of the bureau to members of the lobby itself. Aside from the fact that the association's national headquarters by skillful use of publicity holds a virtual veto over any unfavorable appointment, this legal limitation tends to expand the veto power to the state adjutants general. It is unlikely that any governor would sign such a recommendation without the approval of his military staff office, the adjutant general.

From the standpoint of long-term benefits derived, the capture of the War Department's administrative structure for making Guard policy has been the association's most glorious conquest. The fact that the Army's chain of command has been adversely affected has not seemed to worry the Guard leaders. In 1944, General Walsh said:

> There can be no question either but throughout the years many of our difficulties with the War Department are due to the shibboleth of the "chain of command." Entirely too much stress has been placed on the fact that the Chief, National Guard Bureau is in the chain of command with the result that in our opinion he has been hampered in dealing openly and frankly with the States.[15]

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[14]U. S. Code, Title 10, sec. 3015 (1956).

[15]National Guard Association, Official Proceedings of the 66th Annual Convention (Baltimore, Md., 1944), p. 64.

The first organization for handling National Guard policy was established in 1908 in the form of the National Militia Board. It was composed of five active militia officers appointed by the Secretary of War and convened only upon summons by that officer. Evidently the system was not satisfactory to the association. A resolution was passed at the 1909 convention of the association in Los Angeles asking for a change,[16] which came in 1916. A militia bureau under a Regular Army officer replaced the militia board. The President was also authorized under the same Act to assign to duty in the bureau one colonel and one lieutenant colonel of the National Guard.

The militia bureau, in harmony with Regular Army interests, was far from satisfactory to the National Guard Association, and efforts for amendment were successful in 1920. In that year, the National Defense Act required that the chief of the bureau be a National Guard officer and prescribed the system of appointment. This had been the association's goal, and it has been the most far-reaching change accomplished thus far toward enhancing the association's grip on Guard policy. General Walsh has said, concerning the action, the following:

> The establishment of the Militia Bureau of the War Department . . . with a National Guard Officer as Chief thereof as provided in Section 81 . . . was the culmination of years of effort on the part of the National Guard to establish its own bureau with a National Guard Officer as its Chief. Its efforts to establish such a bureau naturally met with considerable opposition and the then Regular Army Officer in charge of the Militia Division of the War Department was to characterize the efforts of the National Guard in this connection as "pernicious meddling."[17]

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[16] Ibid., p. 60.

[17] Ibid., p. 61.

The system of appointing bureau chiefs came under brief reconsideration in the House armed services committee in 1951. Representative L. Gary Clemente, Democrat of New York, showed some concern that gubernatorial nomination of the chief might put some inexperienced man into the chief's position. Walsh said the fear was groundless and went on to describe in detail the system:

> . . . before the vacancy occurs the Secretary of the Army advises the Governors of the States of the prospective vacancy and requests them to submit nominations in conformity with the provisions contained in existing law. Each Governor may submit as many names of qualified people as he desires, or may not submit any name. When the lists come back to the Department of the Army, the procedure has been to convene a board of six general officers who screen that list and submit recommendations . . . usually three to the Secretary of the Army. From there, they go to the Secretary of the Army and then they go to the President who makes the final selection. Then he sends the nomination to the Senate and if confirmed, of course, the chief is duly appointed and sworn in.[18]

The fact that the Congress has specifically provided by law for this special staff officer, the bureau chief, is itself unique. But it has gone further. In other areas, the law has left Army officials relatively free to reorganize the various Army staff sections as desired. Such freedom is limited in the case of the National Guard Bureau. The chief may be removed only for cause, and he may succeed himself although other members of the Army staff may stay at Army headquarters for no longer than four years except by "a special finding that the extension is necessary in the public interests"[19] by the Secretary of the Army.

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[18]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 1035.

[19]U. S. Code, Title 10, sec. 3031 (1956).

In 1957, the National Guard Association sought to write into law a detailed plan for the organization of the bureau. The purpose was to make the bureau less vulnerable to professional army control. Such a measure has long been a goal of the guard association. Speaking of such legislation in 1951, General Walsh said:

> . . . there was a bad situation over there . . . with the advent of General Flemming as the chief, there has, as I say, been a vast improvement. . . . But the whole trouble over there will never be resolved until Congress defines the duties and the functions of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief thereof by law. For the past 28 years they have been defined by regulation, and regulations, of course, are subject to change and to whim and caprice.[20]

The 1951 bill[21] was introduced by Representative Overton Brooks. It would have made the bureau the only channel of communications with the states on National Guard matters, prescribed the various branches in each of the two divisions of the bureau, made the chief responsible for the "administration and promulgation of policies pertaining to the National Guard," as well as for the preparation of budget estimates and for new National Guard legislation. It would have allowed the chief to report to the Secretary of the Army directly through the Army chief of staff, without consultation with deputy or assistant chiefs.

The association has also fought to retain, for the state adjutants general, the authority to decide the types and functions of the Guard units. The founding fathers did not make it altogether clear, but they probably intended the national government to be able to pattern and

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[20]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 100.

[21]H. R. 6297, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.

mold the various state militias together into a well constructed whole, according to the best military doctrine of the times. It is doubtful if they would have approved of current legislation:

> No unit of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may be relocated or redrawn under this chapter until the Governor or the State or territory, or Puerto Rico, or the Commanding General of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, as the case may be, has been consulted.[22]

Consultation with the governor, of course, gives the association time to muster its forces to prevent change.

Another limitation that has been attached to the Army's control over the Guard is the requirement that Guard appropriations be apportioned among the states "in direct ratio to the respective actual strengths in enlisted members of the active National Guard."[23]

The domination of the National Guard Bureau by the association was a major success, but there was still no law which required the Army to make use of the bureau in policy-making for the National Guard. There was no legal provision which would prevent the Army from relying upon some other staff agency for Guard policy. This vulnerability motivated the National Guard Association to attempt to write into the National Defense Act of 1916 requirements that such policy be made by special committees of Regular Army and National Guard personnel. The 1916 attempt failed, but success came in the National Defense Act of 1920. That act said:

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[22]U. S. Code, Title 10, sec. 2238 (1956).

[23]U. S. Code, Title 32, sec. 107 (1956).

> All policy and regulations affecting . . . the National Guard . . . shall be prepared by committees of the appropriate branches or divisions of the War Department General Staff to which shall be added an equal number of officers from the National Guard of the United States, whose names are borne on lists of officers suitable for such duties submitted by the governors of their respective States, Territories and for the District of Columbia by the Commanding General of the District of Columbia National Guard.[24]

The provision went on to require at least five National Guard officers to be on duty with the Army staff at all times. It was mandatory that the chief of staff send all policies and regulations prepared by the committee to the Secretary of the Army, and to advise him thereon.

It is this organization, currently in operation in 1957, as the General Staff Committee on National Guard Policy, which has helped to keep Guard policy within the grasp of the National Guard Association. There is still no method whereby the association can force the committee's program into Army regulations, but at least the committee has a direct channel to the Secretary of the Army. In addition, the committee enables the association to secure all the information available to the Army staff on Guard affairs.

Initially, the committee functioned as the association desired, and it appears that both the Army and the National Guard profited from its deliberations. Gradually, however, from about 1929 the National Guard Association sensed a change. It complained that their representatives no longer functioned as true members of a joint Guard-Regular Army committee. Although the Guard representatives were assigned to specific sections of the general staff as contemplated by law, the Guard Associa-

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[24]41 Stat. 764.

tion continued to complain:

> In being so assigned there was a tendency to segregate them and seldom was there the intercourse between the members which permitted a free exchange of views as had been the custom and which was contemplated by law. More and more matters pertaining to the civilian components and particularly the National Guard were ticketed as "secret" and instead of dealing openly and freely with the National Guard Bureau and the National Guard, dealings tended to become surreptitious--if at all. The practice of labeling such matters "secret" where the components are concerned is not only indefensible but a practice which has always and is now working to their great disadvantage.[25]

The association continued to complain, especially after the promulgation of a policy which the association claims the National Guard committee was not consulted about, limiting the initial assignment of guardsmen on the Army staff to six-months' duration. An additional six-months' duty could be given upon approval of the general staff section chief, who was a Regular Army officer.[26] The National Guard Association protested vigorously against the six-months' limit which was obviously a discrimination against the Guard since Regular Army staff officers held four-year terms. The association felt that:

> Such a policy was promulgated for the sole purpose of insuring that no National Guard officer would become thoroughly familiar with General Staff procedures or with any matter of import or have a real voice in determining matters of policy affecting the National Guard.[27]

The War Department blandly replied that it was trying to train as many National Guard officers as possible in general staff procedures. Eventually, however, the association won its point, and the term of office

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[25]National Guard Association, Official Proceedings of the 66th Annual Convention (Baltimore, Md., 1944), p. 71.

[26]Ibid., p. 72.

[27]Ibid., p. 72.

was established as three years, with possible one year extensions for not to exceed two years. Through the years, also, the association has won for its representatives on the general staff the right to contact and coordinate freely with the National Guard Bureau. This was a privilege which, according to the association, the Regular Army frequently sought to impair.

In addition to its efforts to keep the chief of the bureau within its grasp, the National Guard Association has also sought to maintain the support of as many officers within the bureau as possible. When the bureau was founded in 1920, it was administered almost entirely by Regular Army officers. An act of September 22, 1922, permitted the assignment of four National Guard officers to the bureau. Then in 1949 the association secured introduction of a bill in the 81st Congress,[28] asking that fifty per cent of the bureau's officers be guardsmen. General Walsh gave two reasons for his request:

> . . . to overcome the existing shortage of officers of the Regular Establishment, and the other to insure that there would always be a substantial number of National Guard officers on duty in the National Guard Bureau so that the National Guard point of view would at all times be evident.[29]

Defense Secretary Louis Johnson said there was no objection to a fifty per cent figure, but Department of the Army officials requested that only forty per cent be permitted.[30] The association was agreeable

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[28]S. 1197, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

[29]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Amendments to Section 81, National Defense Act, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950, p. 5068.

[30]Ibid., p. 5068.

to a forty per cent figure which would have allowed assignment of some 44 National Guard officers to the bureau at that time. Their assignment was, of course, not mandatory upon the Army.

Earlier, the law permitted only four Guard officers in the bureau, but various war powers given the President during World War II were used as the basis for assignment of several more to the Bureau.

The bill went into law[31] with little discussion. The scanty House and Senate hearings were spent largely in discussing whether the Air National Guard was included in the language of the bill.[32]

As of 1957, there are no specified spaces in the bureau to be filled with Guard officers while other positions belong to the Regular Army.[33] The chief of the bureau says assignments depend more on "professional qualifications and job requirements."[34]

Since the reestablishment of the National Guard after World War II, the National Guard Bureau has included an information office within its structure. This office is staffed by an Army officer, an Air Force officer and six civilians,[35] all of whom have had training and experience in the field of advertising or public relations. They are assisted by a professional advertising agency, selected after valid bids. This part

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[31]P. L. 458, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 1950.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Letter from Maj. Gen. Edgar C. Erickson, Chief, National Guard Bureau, Oct. 11, 1957, to the author.

[34]Ibid.

[35]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Department of Army Appropriations for 1957, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 1285.

of the bureau produces publicity of all types--news releases, television film clips, radio spot announcements, posters, bill boards, pamphlets, and other advertising. It was established for recruiting purposes but has the secondary function of issuing propaganda for the National Guard in general. This propaganda capability will be of considerable value in preserving respect for the minute-man tradition and for states' rights, the hard rock foundation upon which the Guard has built its success.

Much of the guard association's power is based on the ability to produce and disseminate propaganda. The organization has both an effective propaganda theme, the minute-man tradition and states' rights, and the tools of dissemination. Every Pentagon action not in accordance with National Guard views is seen as an attempt to end the traditional dual status of the National Guard. The tools of dissemination are the Guard organizations in each of the states, usually led by the state adjutant general, who is a major general on the staff of the governor. He usually has the ear of the governor, and frequently he can exercise great political pressure through the office of the governor.

The ability of the state adjutants general to pass information, propaganda, and indoctrination down to the troops is important. They have, at least as much, and probably more, influence over the votes of their subordinates, the guardsmen, than any other top administrators. In addition, the adjutants general are important elements of the vast provincial interests in this country. By personality, they are politicians, and they stay attuned to local interests which, almost by definition, want the National Guard to be within the control of state govern-

ments.

Local interests, up to and including the governors, appreciate the Guard immensely. Usually state officials, including the governor, lack sufficient legal power to perform many of the functions prescribed by the state constitutions and expected of state officials by the people. In cases of necessity, the state officials can rely upon the National Guard. It is only natural that they would appreciate this fact and work hard to protect it from national encroachment.

The contention of these state officials who fight so hard for the National Guard--that a state force is needed--is usually accepted, even by those who normally stress the handicaps of dual status.

But the National Guard Association goes much farther. It uses these favorable inclinations in the people to get a great deal more than was probably intended by the founding fathers. It wants the national government to pay the Guard's salaries, furnish all equipment including that used by the Guard in the fulfillment of its state mission, and pay more and more of the cost of armories.

The controversy over the dual status of the National Guard has been, more than usual, at boiling point since 1940. Three particular incidents are interesting, not only as proof of the guard association's power but also to demonstrate the Guard's successful use of the dual-status arguments. These are the quick death administered by the Guard Association to the 1948 report of the Committee on Civilian Components, the furor of a similar vein in the first years of the Eisenhower administration, and the six-months' controversy of 1957.

Because of the elusiveness of ready solutions to the over-all

Reserve problem in 1947, Secretary of Defense Forrestal appointed Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray to head a six-man inter-service board to make a thorough study of the situation. An assistant secretary and a high ranking line officer from each of the services, who constituted the membership, concluded that the National Guard ought to be merged with the Army Reserve to form a single, nationally-controlled Reserve.[36] It produced, as might be expected, a tremendous outburst from the Guard. Letters besieged the Department of Defense, the President, and Congress. In the week after the issuance of the report, Major General Walsh publicly threatened a fight in Congress and said, as he had many times earlier, that state control of the Guard "is practically the last bastion in the fortress of states' rights."[37] Secretary Forrestal, almost simultaneously, pointed out to reporters that the report was not "a pattern for legislative action . . . and does not at this stage, constitute military establishment policy."

A letter in the files of the Departmental Records Branch of the Army reveals President Truman's view of the furor. He said, in a note to Forrestal:

> It is a most interesting document and one that deserves a lot of study but, at this time, it is filled with political dynamite, and during a presidential campaign can defeat its own purpose. Sometime or other I'd like to have a good long session with you and the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force and the Navy. I have some very strong ideas on Reserve Forces and also have some suggestions to make in connection with the report referred to.[38]

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[36]Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security (Government Printing Office, 1948).

[37]Time Magazine, 52 (Aug. 23, 1948), 19.

[38]Letter from President Harry S. Truman to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Aug. 12, 1948, Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

Soon thereafter, a resolution against the Gray board report was passed by the executive committee of the conference of governors meeting in Chicago. It said that the report was "un-American, unconstitutional and contrary to the basic philosophy of our American form of government."[39] Attacks such as this, together with the other National Guard Association agitation, were sufficient to kill the report.

In 1953, Assistant Secretary of Defense John A. Hanna brought a similar storm of protest by suggesting that the Guard be used, in the case of atomic attack, for civil defense purposes. Pentagon plans, it was rumored,[40] wanted the Guard, since it could not be made into a national force, to take on the functions of a home guard. Nothing enrages the Guard's high ranking officers so much as this threat to diminish their role in the event of hostilities. They fought back hard. Speaking to the state convention of the Massachusetts National Guard Association at Boston, General Walsh used words which recalled the history of nearby Lexington: "If they want war, let it begin here," he told fifteen hundred cheering Guard officers. Without explanation, the Department of Defense abandoned any further action on the plan.

Another clash of much greater import occurred from January to March, 1957. On January 14, the Army ordered, under the authority of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 that all new enlistees in the Army Reserve and National Guard be required to take six months' active duty training,

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[39]U. S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 310.

[40]Time Magazine, 63 (March 1, 1954), 18.

after which they would be returned to their homes for weekly participation in army drill sessions. The requirement grew out of an awareness of the fact that, with only raw recruits going into the Reserve units, the armory drill training seldom got beyond elementary basic training. Not only would six months' active duty put the training program on a more stable basis, but it would also meet legal requirements that all soldiers have four months' training before being sent overseas.

Almost in mass, the National Guard rose up to fight this training requirement. It was felt the new rule would cause a tremendous reduction in Guard enlistments which would eventually diminish the Guard's importance. Early in February, the Brooks Subcommittee of the House armed services committee began hearings on the controversy which lasted until February 21st.[41] The chief of the National Guard Bureau said publicly that he opposed the Pentagon plan,[42] and Alabama Governor James E. Folsom appeared to ask the subcommittee members to support the Guard "against the clique of brass and bureaucrats seeking complete control of all military forces of our country."[43] Both Army and National Guard Association officials appeared with long technical arguments. The Guard Association claimed the six months' requirement would produce a better trained National Guard private than the average Army second lieutenant; therefore such a long program was not necessary. They wanted the length

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[41]U. S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on Armed Services, Review of the Reserve Program, Committee Publication No. 22, Feb. 4-21, 1957, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.

[42]New York Times, Feb. 8, 1947, p. 8.

[43]New York Times, Feb. 9, 1947, p. 8.

of the training reduced and the commencement of such training to be postponed. Backed by ten uniformed National Guard generals, Walsh added that the new program was another attempt to federalize the Guard.[44]

A compromise favorable to National Guard interests was arranged in late February between the antagonists, with Representative Overton Brooks serving as mediator. Later, Brooks told a New York Times reporter that he had arranged the compromise by holding "a series of conferences with spokesmen for each side, gently prodding first one and then the other to give a little ground."[45] When the smoke cleared, the Guard had won an eleven weeks' training period which was to be available to enlistees until October 15, 1957, at which time it would increase to six months. In addition, the Army promised to maintain the total strength of the Guard at a minimum of 400,000 men.

The clamor over the situation motivated Hanson Baldwin to write:

> The National Guard has unlimbered its biggest guns in Washington to retain its preferred position in the nation's defense structure. . . . The Guard, because of its dual state and federal status has always occupied a privileged position in the U. S. defense structure. Two masters--the states and Washington--have helped the Guard to retain its independence. But this dualism has complicated our military problem, hampered combat efficiency and interfered with the direct exercise of command. It has also subjected the Army Department to great political pressures, exercised indirectly through state capitols and directly through the National Guard Association . . . In a military sense the arguments for doing this (ending the dual status) are all on the Regular Army side.

The dual status of the Guard has also been the basis of considerable antagonism between the Army Reserve and the Guard. Because of

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[44]New York Times, Feb. 9, 1947, p. 8.

[45]New York Times, Feb. 27, 1957, p. 14.

fear that a strong Reserve would eventually discredit the National Guard, the National Guard Association has opposed any advance in the Army Reserve program. Just after the war, the association sought to prevent the founding of Army Reserve combat divisions. Previously, only the National Guard had active divisional organizations in operation, and therefore almost all the high rank within the Reserve Forces was to be found in Guard units. If the Army Reserve were authorized to organize active line units, it would for the first time constitute direct competition for the Guard.

The controversy came to a head in the meetings of the Byrnes committee, in 1949, which had the responsibility of planning the postwar structure of the two forces. Major General Ellard A. Walsh, a member of the committee, fought hard to prevent any recognition of equality between the two Reserve components. His pressure came to bear not only upon Congress but also upon the Regular Army.

Generally, the Regular Army has felt that, if a Reserve Force were mandatory, it would be better to have a wholly national force. For years the professional soldiers had winced at the Guard's use of their profession as a hobby. They had heard rumors of political commissions in the Guard and of the Guard's alleged avoidance of its responsibilities by hiding behind the skirts of states' rights. If there had to be a civilian component program, the regulars preferred the Army Reserve.

The Regular Army view, however, had little chance of survival when the great winds of the National Guard began to blow. To avoid an open battle over the troop basis decision, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royal convened the Byrnes board. The subtleties of this particular situation

will probably never be understood. The chairman was James F. Byrnes, a Southern states' righter who had been elbowed out of his position as President Truman's Secretary of State. The reasons of the Byrnes appointment remain mysterious. It might have been anticipated that the committee's recommendations would be in favor of the National Guard, only to be overruled by Byrnes' new antagonist, President Truman; this is largely what happened. The Regular Army staff allowed the Byrnes committee report to become ostensible public policy. The Army Reserve was to be shunted off on a mission of providing support troops. In actuality, the Byrnes report was never fully implemented. In later years, the troop basis was revised many times. The Army Reserve won authority to organize combat divisions along side the National Guard. The Byrnes episode reveals well the struggle for power and status between the Army Reserve and the National Guard.

The dual status of the Guard is, thus, the crux of the power of the National Guard Association, and in addition the ramifications of the dual status permeates the entire Reserve program. It is the key factor which must be reckoned with whenever any long range plans for the Reserve components are under consideration.

Since the dual status of the Guard is a problem in federalism of fundamental importance, it was surprising that the 1955 report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations did not study--indeed, did not mention--this arm of our national defense. Meyer Kestnbaum, the commission's chairman, has said:

> The dominant interest of the National Government in the field of defense is the main reason why the Commission did not make the

intensive study which would have been necessary and only upon which a firm recommendation or recommendations could be based.[46]

To a certain extent, this view that the National Guard is already or will sooner or later move entirely into the national domain is widely held. Already the national government, by controlling purse strings, controls many Guard policies; state authority is frequently a ceremonial carry-over from older times.

If there should come an end to dual status--either by an outright switch to the Army clause of the Constitution or by a gradual infiltration of national authority--the National Guard Association would lose tremendous power. Some observers see this trend already in action. William H. Riker says, "Administratively as well, the National Guard is today much weaker than it was in 1916 or, for that matter, in 1948."[47] Such a conclusion is not easily proved. It is true that the National Guard lost in some of its endeavors in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, and several administrative rulings have gone against the Guard. But it is much too early to bury the National Guard as a state force, or to ignore its lobby, the National Guard Association.

It must be admitted, however, that all logic points to the eventual decline of the Guard as a state force. The disadvantages of dual status to military efficiency are apparent. The Guard is not even completely satisfactory as a state police force anymore. Its weapons are now too big and destructive to be suitable for handling mobs. The ex-

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[46]Letter from Meyer Kestnbaum, August 14, 1957, to the author.

[47]William H. Riker, The Soldiers of the States (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), p. 100.

pense of the Guard is great even for states, although the national government pays most of the expenses.

In addition, the Guard has evoked the ill will of the Regular Army, and to a lesser extent, the Reserve Officers Association. Both these interests can be expected to quietly urge the nationalization of the Guard. It must be understood, however, that the efforts of these two interests to subdue the Guard will be somewhat clandestine. Heretofore, the hostility of the regulars for the National Guard is a matter of record, but they must be cautious in proposing nationalization. Such proposals inevitably get their civilian superiors into political trouble. Likewise, the members of the Reserve Officers Association have considerable dislike for the National Guard, but the organization avoids any open breaks with the Guard Association. It is felt that the two organizations should, if possible, present a common front. With this objective, the Reserve Officers Association has passed resolutions opposing the Gray board's recommendations to nationalize the Guard. Such resolutions are not as significant, however, as the profound feeling against the Guard which exists among many Army reservists. Whenever there is a chance of success, the Reserve Officers Association can be expected to favor the nationalization of the Guard. In the meantime, in unofficial ways, the association will quietly foster nationalization.

The state officers who fight for continuance of the dual status, together with all others who want to preserve the Guard as a state force, will probably be unable to maintain the present favorable position of the National Guard. Certainly, if the next few years showed the Guard to be inadequate for modern warfare, nationalization would undoubtedly come.

Perhaps, in the long run, the most significant factor in the Guard's future, other than dual status and its ability in modern warfare, is the possible decline of the Guard in prestige. Lately, the National Guard Association's activities have been seen by the public to be obviously in behalf of the National Guard. Efforts to get its men draft exempt have hurt the reputation of the National Guard as a patriotic organization. Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, in 1957, called guardsmen "draft-dodgers," which constituted a tremendous blow. The Guard's resistance to a civil defense role has focused some public attention on its unwillingness to help in a vital area of national defense.

These factors will probably encourage nationalization. At the present time, however, the National Guard interests continue in a strong position, and there seems to be no immediate nationalization in sight.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD

In June, 1948, Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal created an interdepartmental board to write a prescription for the sickly Reserve program. The following recommendation of this board, the Gray Board, became the basis of the Reserve Forces Policy Board:

> For the purpose of considering, recommending, and reporting to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force on Reserve Force policy matters provision should be made in each service for a policy committee at least half the members of which shall be officers of the Reserve Forces. From the membership of these three service committees, there should be established a joint interservice committee to consider, recommend and report to the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Force policy and procedures of joint or common interest to the Reserve Forces of all the services.[1]

Under the Naval Reserve Act of 1938 and Section V of the National Defense Act of 1920, the departmental committees already existed. About one year later, after Secretary Forrestal had left office, the new secretary, Louis Johnson, began implementation of the recommendation for a joint inter-service committee. He established the Civilian Components Policy Board in June, 1949, which was later renamed the Reserve Forces Policy Board.

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[1]U. S. Department of Defense, Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 22.

At the time, the new Department of Defense was establishing its program of uniformity and coordination over the three subordinate services. The Civilian Components Policy Board was given the objective of bringing uniformity to the Reserve components of all the services. In his semi-annual report of December 31, 1949, the Secretary of Defense said:

> The Board will initiate and coordinate plans which, when approved, will be made operative by the Secretaries of the three departments. It will see that all policies, plans and programs of the civilian components as promulgated by the Secretary of Defense will concur with strategic plans, roles, and missions agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that all plans represent a joint enterprise of the civilian components and the regular military establishment, working together in a composite policy group.[2]

On matters of major policy the board was directed to make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, and on other policy matters it was empowered to exercise full delegated authority within its field. A charter embodying this authority was approved June 14, 1949, and amended August 19, 1949, to include the additional authority granted to the Secretary of Defense by the amendments to the National Security Act in 1949. On all matters which are determined by the chairman to involve major policy, the board had only authority to make recommendations to the secretary.[3]

The board's membership included a civilian chairman, the assistant

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[2]U. S. Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1949 to December 31, 1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 36.

[3]William T. Faricy, "The Civilian Components Policy Board," Reserve Officer, 27 (Dec., 1949), 4.

secretary who had responsibility for Reserve affairs in each of the military departments, one active officer from each of the departments, as well as two Reserve officers each from the Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, National Guard, and Air National Guard. In addition, a non-voting Reserve officer of general or flag officer rank served as full-time executive officer for the board. The Coast Guard Reserve was represented by a Reserve officer without a vote, although in peacetime, the Coast Guard is an integral unit in the Treasury Department.

The board held its first meeting October 4-6, 1949. In the years thereafter, it met about every eight weeks for one, two, or three day sessions. During the first year the meetings were held monthly, but the number lessened as administrative procedures became stabilized. For example, from February 16, 1953, until December 9, 1955, the board met seventeen times.[4] The board also developed a small secretariat ranging from four to eight military officers paid by their respective services and from four to seven civil service women. The head of the board's staff is the full-time military executive officer. During the first seven years of the board's existence, it has had only two such executives. The first, Brigadier General Luke W. Finlay, was borrowed for a few months from his position as an attorney for the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. A 1928 graduate of the military academy, Finlay

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[4]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, Replies from the Executive Departments and Field Agencies to Inquiry Regarding the Use of Industry Advisory Committees, January 1, 1953 to January 1, 1956, Part IV, Department of Defense, November 1, 1956, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1278.

had resigned from the service, reentering during World War II. He served the board in the rank of colonel. After nine months he returned to his civilian post and was replaced by Rear Admiral Irving M. McQuiston. McQuiston was a reservist who had been recalled to active duty in 1932 to set up and administer a long range Naval Air Reserve training program. He had remained in the active service thereafter, and had been appointed to be the Regular Navy's representative on the board when it was first set up in September, 1949.

The board's beginnings were not impressive. The announcement of its creation came on May 20, 1949, with little prior planning or coordination with the three subordinate departments. Neither the directive which established the board nor the membership had been cleared with the departmental secretaries. When the directive became available, the three services considered the board's powers and responsibilities to be much too broad.[5] The board would have power not only to establish the general Reserve policies but also could interfere with the operational details which were considered by the services to be properly within the prerogatives of each of the services. The regulars felt they were held responsible by law for the military proficiency of the civilian components, but this responsibility might be subverted at any time by interference from the board. The regular services disliked, also, being outnumbered, two to one, on the board by reservists. Thus, the reservists controlled the policy, but the regulars were held responsible for the success of the policy.

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[5]New York Times, June 12, 1949, p. 19.

By the time the Secretary of Defense had issued his next semi-annual report, the operational authority of the Civilian Components Policy Board had been curtailed. He said in the report,

> The Civilian Component Policy Board is founded on the concept that it should function as a staff agency only, establish overall policies for the civilian components of the three military departments and coordinating the separate plans, policies, and programs of the departments whenever such coordination is indicated. The Board has been rigid in a strict and constant adherence to this concept. Responsibility for the operations of the individual programs remains in the hands of the secretaries of the three military departments, a responsibility which they and their subordinates are discharging with effective results.[6]

Another point of discussion was the role of the chairman, who is required by law to be a civilian because of the fundamental policy of civil supremacy over the military establishment.[7] As part of this concept, the chairman has the deciding vote in case of a tie. It is assumed the civilian chairman will not be influenced by strong prejudices toward any of the services; this, however, is not always true, since any civilian sufficiently well informed to be a good chairman will usually have served with one of the armed forces and will probably have developed strong affiliations.

Nevertheless, Lieutenant General Milton G. Baker, former civilian chairman of the board and superintendent of Valley Forge Military Academy, has recommended that the use of civilians as chairmen be continued.[8]

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[6]U. S. Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, December 1, 1950--June 30, 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 22.

[7]Letter from Lt. Gen. Milton G. Baker, Nov. 5, 1957, to the author.

[8]Ibid.

On September 12, 1949, the chairman was authorized to act between meetings on all matters other than those of major policy in order that official action need not wait for the calling of an emergency meeting. On October 14, 1949, this interim authority was transferred to an executive committee composed of the four civilian members of the board as voting members and the military executive as a non voting member. The chairman continued to act alone between meetings on matters which did not require consideration by the executive committee.[9]

The first chairman was William T. Faricy, president of the Association of American Railroads. He was succeeded by another railroad man, Edwin H. Burgess (Baltimore and Ohio) on May 4, 1950, and was in turn replaced by Charles H. Buford. When Buford resigned in early 1953, he won approval for Dr. Arthur S. Adams, president of the American Council on Education as his replacement. Other chairmen have been Milton G. Baker and John Slezak, former Assistant Secretary of the Army.

Most matters considered by the board at its regular meetings have been prepared by the board's own secretariat, by some staff section of the Department of Defense, or by one of three subordinate departments. Officially, the agenda has been prepared by the chairman with the help of the military executive and his staff. This was with the understanding, as Chairman Edwin H. Burgess told the House armed services subcommittee in 1951, "Any interested party can present a matter to the Board." Actually, board members have had little to do with the matters to be dis-

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[9]U. S. Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1949--December 31, 1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 38.

cussed in the meetings--except by interjection on the spur of the moment during meetings. Although representatives of the pressure groups frequently testify before the board, they are responsible for bringing up little new material.

In January, 1952, a heated controversy arose concerning participants in board meetings. The secretarial members--the assistant or undersecretaries of the departments--lacking time to attend the meetings, usually sent substitutes. During the previous year, the substitutes had generally been the top civilian assistants to the assistant secretaries and included such men as Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., former dean of the University of Kentucky Law School and, at that time, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The dispute was born out of an attempt by Under Secretary Francis P. Whitehair to establish Captain E. B. Taylor, of the Regular Navy, as his alternate. Whitehair had queried Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, an assistant to the Secretary of Defense, by telephone as to the legality of the appointment. Coolidge said the appointment seemed satisfactory except that the alternate should be a reservist. The board directive anticipated that a majority of the membership would be reservists, and if Under Secretary Whitehair appointed a regular officer, the directive would be violated. Nevertheless, Captain Taylor appeared at the next meeting of the board, and there was "apparently a heated discussion on the matter at the meeting."[10] The controversy was later resolved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, Anna

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[10]This was a handwritten note on a staff paper concerning the matter, contained in File OASD (M&P) 334 RFPB (1952), Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

Rosenberg, who agreed with a recommendation by Chairman Charles H. Buford that

> Approving, as an alternate for the Undersecretary of the Navy, a regular naval officer would not only upset the contemplated balance but establish a precedent that could lead to full military representation.
>
> I recommend that the Navy be requested to nominate a civilian alternate for the Undersecretary whose status would eliminate the question of legality and propriety in accordance with the attached proposed reply.[11]

Whitehair later appointed a civilian as his alternate.

Assistant Secretary Anna Rosenberg did not ever feel favorable toward the use of alternates. She asked on November 10, 1951, in a memorandum to the military executive of the board for an attendance chart of the assistant secretaries at the board meetings. At the meeting on the 7th, 8th, and 9th of November, 1951, every assistant secretary was absent, except Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl D. Johnson attended for two hours, while his alternate was also in attendance. In January, 1952, Mrs. Rosenberg, in a mimeographed request to the various secretaries, ordered their attendance at the board meetings. After a short time, however, the appointment of alternates continued, and it was not long until the assistant secretaries revived the previous practice of sending alternates.

The formulation of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 was the most valuable and far-reaching contribution of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Starting in 1949, the Reserve lobby had applied pressure to the

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[11]Memorandum from Charles H. Buford to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&P), January 16, 1952, File OASD (M&P) 334 RFPB (1952), Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

Department of Defense to produce recommendations which would improve the Reserve. The board constituted a ready-made, active, and expert administrative body to prepare the recommendations. Early in 1951, the Reserve Forces Policy Board developed a set of basic principles on behalf of the Secretary of Defense which were offered as the basis of a new and effective Reserve program. They included (1) the assumption that all citizens should share the responsibilities and burdens of national security, (2) that the members of the Reserve and Regular Services are entitled to equal treatment under equal circumstances and, to this end, all true disparities between regulars and reservists should be eliminated, (3) that reservists should be recruited, promoted and eliminated according to a system designed to produce competent and vigorous forces, (4) a concentration upon realism in training, (5) that the Reserve Forces must be provided with a continuous flow of pre-trained personnel, if they are to perform the missions which the national security requires of them.[12] These policies became the basis of a bill presented to the House in 1951 which later was enacted as the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952.

The continuous pressure of the Reserve Officer Association from 1949 to 1952 to write the Reserve Forces Policy Board into statutes brought forth the greatest discussion thus far of the over-all organization and functions of the board. The idea of statutory status was very much opposed by the National Guard Association. Major General Ellard A.

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[12]Rear Adm. I. M. McQuiston, "History of the Reserves Since the Second World War," Military Affairs, XVII (Spring, 1953), 25.

Walsh complained that statutory status for the board might cause the general staff committees to "be virtually eliminated or superseded in time."[13] With one of these general staff committees practically controlled by the association, the National Guard would certainly not want to trade it for a board on which the Guard was outvoted, four to fifteen, as it was on the Reserve Forces Policy Board.

Brigadier General Evans of the Reserve Officers Association, appearing before congressional committees, discussed the possibility of including general staff committee members among the members of the new statutory Reserve Forces Policy Board, but hesitated to approve the outright abandonment of the general staff committees at that time.

Representative Sterling Cole of New York of the House Armed Services committee was most interested of all congressional committee members in abolishing the Reserve boards and creating one Reserve Forces Policy Board. He said:

> I am inherently opposed to creating more and more boards and more secretaries and more people in the government to stumble over each other, and if a job can be done effectively without it, I think we ought to try to see that that is done . . . Now I am wondering if it isn't possible to unit these three existing boards, . . . and constitute them as a watchdog board to see that the principles of whatever law passes with respect to Reserve affairs is carried out by the various departments, whether by a secretary assigned especially for that job or by somebody else. . . . [14]

General Walsh, of course, would not stand for the elimination of the general staff committees, and the idea of combining the various boards was abandoned.

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[13]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 481.

[14]Ibid., p. 467.

However, it appeared that General Walsh could not keep the board from being given a statutory basis; therefore, he suggested an amendment which would appeal greatly to the line departments. The amendment which would appeal greatly to the line departments. The amendment provided that the board "shall not engage in the administration or operation of any policies, procedures, or programs." He presented the amendment, "to protect the Defense and military departments from invasion."[15] Representative Cole immediately announced his opposition to the amendment, but asked the opinions of various services represented at the hearing. Mr. John Adams, legal counsel for the Department of Defense said,

> . . . it is doing a great deal of that now and . . . I think (the amendment) would seriously restrict . . . and would hamper considerably the effective implementation of the Reserve programs which the subcommittee seems to desire to place by statute as responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense.[16]

The Departments of the Army and Air Force favored the Walsh amendment, but Mr. Clayton L. Burwell, speaking for the Navy, opposed the amendment. He said, "I think the Secretary of Defense has to have some latitude or the whole system may tend to disintegrate."[17] The respected Melvin Maas commented that the whole Department of Defense was for policy-making--not operations--therefore he had no great opposition to the amendment but thought it was useless. As discussion proceeded, it appeared that no member of the subcommittee was sufficiently interested in the amend-

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[15] Ibid., p. 955.

[16] Ibid., p. 955.

[17] Ibid., p. 957.

ment to move its acceptance, so Representative Cole moved that the amendment be not accepted. Thus, the subcommittee, rejected Walsh's idea.

Because a statutory status for the board would abolish considerable administrative discretion, the Department of Defense strongly opposed any move in that direction. Knowing this opposition, the House armed services committee was curious about opinions on the subject by board members. Chairman Edwin H. Burgess, testifying before the subcommittee,[18] said the board had originally approved a new statutory status, and further questioning by the subcommittee members revealed that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had overruled this part of the board's recommendations. Burgess said he, personally, had favored the provision and recommended that the board be written into law without any changes in the current organization. He declared, "I think the board is admirably set up for the purpose that it is designed to perform."[19]

Later, testimony by Admiral McQuiston that the board wanted itself continued but not put in a statutory status was inconsistent with the earlier testimony by Chairman Burgess, and the subcommittee was confused. But the matter was soon forgotten. The subcommittee members, however, especially Representative Cole, continued to question the admiral about occasions in which the Office of the Secretary of Defense had overruled the board in its recommendations to Congress.

During this time while Congress was considering the board recom-

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[18] Ibid., p. 356.

[19] Ibid., p. 356.

mendations on the material to be contained in the Armed Forces Reserve bill of 1952, a feeling persisted among some congressmen and board members that board recommendations were disapproved by the secretary without the proper referral back to the board or to Congress. Because of congressional allegation to this effect, including that of Representative Clyde Doyle, Democrat of California, the Assistant Secretary of Defense asked the military executive of the Reserve Forces Policy Board to make a study of the occasions when board recommendations had met such disapproval. In his reply of December 18, 1952, Rear Admiral I. M. McQuiston mentioned three such instances.[20]

The Reserve Forces Policy Board became a statutory agency on the first of January, 1953, by virtue of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. On January 19, 1953, and October 9, 1953, the Department of Defense issued new charters for the organization, the last of which is still in effect in 1957. The membership and organization of the board continued as before, and the board, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&P) was designated as the principal policy advisor on Reserve affairs to the Secretary of Defense. The charter also carried a provision, as required by law, assuring that no changes were intended in the general staff committees. The Reserve members of the board were given three year terms and the civilian and regular military service members continued to serve for indefinite terms, depending upon their

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[20]Investigation revealed that these disapprovals occurred through actions of Major General E. B. Lynch, in the absence of Assistant Secretary Rosenberg. When General Lynch was asked about his actions, his reply revealed that Reserve affairs were not handled harmoniously in the Defense establishment organization.

tenure in office.

The duties of the board continued to be entirely advisory in nature. The chairman was empowered to appoint, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the military executive of the board. All members of the board's staff were made responsible to the chairman. Yet, the chairman was continued in a part-time status.[21]

After the passage of the 1952 act, the board dedicated itself to the abolition of several discriminations between regulars and reservists of the services and in improving the Reserve Forces, in general.

An episode of some practical importance was caused by the directive of October 9, 1953. Reserve officers on the board were required to be in an active status and to continue in an active status throughout their terms of office. At the time, two members of the board, Major General Melvin Maas and Commodore J. B. Lynch were retired personnel of the Army and Navy, respectively. The Reserve Officers Association leadership was outraged by the possibility that their legislative consultant, General Maas, would be ousted from the board. The association's magazine reminded the Pentagon that Congress, itself, had rejected such proposals earlier, and it threatened: "Watch for a legislative inquiry when Congress assembles in January."[22] An open clash on the subject was avoided by a memorandum, dated November 27, 1953, from Assistant Secretary of Defense John Hannah which suspended until January 1, 1955, the active

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[21]U. S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 5120.2, Oct. 9, 1953.

[22]Reserve Officer, 29 (Nov., 1953), 3.

duty provisions of the new directive.[23]

As time passed, most of the issues and controversies suitable for board action rapidly declined. The great majority of Reserve decisions could be more appropriately handled by the ordinary administrative hierarchy of the three services, with the board considering only those questions which required greater deliberation and coordination. By 1954, when the new Eisenhower administration was working on a revision of the 1952 act, the Reserve Forces Policy Board was already beginning to be sidetracked. Timothy W. Stanley, a former student in the Harvard Defense Studies Program and at the time an assistant to the Secretary of Defense, has described the role of the board in the formulation of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955:

> When the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 was being prepared in the Department of Defense, the major responsibility fell to ad hoc task forces working directly under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M,P&R). The Reserve Forces Policy Board was opposed to certain aspects of the plan as drafted by the task forces, and its role was less significant than its title might indicate.[24]

Because of the secrecy policies of the Department of Defense during the tenures of Charles E. Wilson and Dwight D. Eisenhower, little is known about the role of the board in the formulation of Reserve policy. The information which has leaked to newspaper reporters in recent years shows the board considering the routine policy questions. It was

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[23]File OASD (M&P) 334 RFPB (1953), Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

[24]Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 124. This observation arises from Stanley's and R. G. Stevens' "The Formulation of the National Reserve Plan within the Department of Defense," an unpublished, classified (Confidential) staff study, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1955.

reported that, at the meeting during the week of September 14, 1957, the board considered such items as (1) a renewed effort to obtain conscription legislation whereby youths could be drafted directly from civilian life into the Reserve components, (2) a study of the impact on the Navy and Air Force of the Army's six-months' training program, (3) proposals to cut back the summer camp training of non-unit Army reservists, and (4) a discussion of the financial cutbacks in the Reserve program which began in 1957.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board has certainly not performed as an independent, watchdog committee for the public and for Congress, as contemplated by several legislators. Representative James E. Van Zandt, Republican of Pennsylvania, had said, when a statutory status for the board was being considered by the armed services committees, that he would like to see the board composed of members "who are permitted to take a definite position, probably in conflict with the position of the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and still retain his position on the Board."[25] Later, he told the Senate armed services committee that the board should be required:

> . . . to report direct to Congress if, in their opinion, the will of Congress is being ignored. Therefore, Congress as the representative of the American people, retains its control over Reserve affairs.[26]

By no means has the board been an agent of Congress. The Department of

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[25]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Reserve Components, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 922.

[26]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 1952, p. 162.

Defense maintains a jealous guard over the loyalties of the board. There is an even occasional insistence that the board, and especially its secretariat, show complete loyalty to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M,P&RF) rather than directly to the Secretary of Defense, as stated in law. An incident of this type occured in July and August, 1953, when Chairman Charles H. Buford submitted a final report of his tour of duty to the assistant secretary. It was customary not to release such documents to the press until the Secretary of Defense had personally seen them, but in this instance, Admiral McQuiston asked permission for immediate release. A lieutenant colonel was assigned the duty of examining the report for public relations reasons prior to release. He reported there was nothing objectionable in the report except paragraphs No. 10 and 11, which dealt with the loyalty of the board to the Secretary of Defense and ultimately to Congress, as required by law. His memorandum on the subject read:

> Someone on the Board or the staff appears to believe that the Board is responsible to the Secretary of Defense and ultimately to Congress . . . I suggest that Dr. Hannah (the Assistant Secretary) contact Dr. Adams (Mr. Buford's replacement as Chairman of the Board) with a view of determining who on the RFPB staff is forcing this issue on the responsibility of the Board direct to the Secretary and to the Congress. If somebody in his office does not want to play ball, Dr. Hannah may wish to take steps to get rid of him.[27]

Even the semi-annual report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, which is printed as a part of the semi-annual report of the Secretary of Defense, is carefully censored by Defense officials. For example, the

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[27]Memorandum from the Assistant to the Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Aug. 3, 1953, File OASD (M&P) 334 RFPB (1953) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

board's report for the period ending December 31, 1954, was stopped by a brigadier general who complained:

> It is noted that in the proposed report the RFPB has expressed Board opinion on a matter upon which final DOD (Department of Defense) position has not been established. This is considered to be outside the purview of the report and could prove to be embarrassing to the OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) since such material will become a chapter in the Sec/Def report required by the National Security Act of 1947. It is felt that the RFPB report should be objective and not serve as a vehicle to announce their feelings to Congress. Such feelings in way of advice should be properly submitted to Sec/Def via ASD (M&P) in accordance with the Board's mission.[28]

The fact that the loyalties of the board were misunderstood from the beginning was a tremendous handicap. Most congressmen, when they voted for a statutory status for the board, were under the impression they were furnishing the Reserve interests with a spokesman within the Department of Defense. It was for this reason that they wrote into law the membership of the board which was to be dominated by reservists. Yet there is no evidence that the appointees to the board have shown any great degree of independence. Little change in this respect appears likely for the future. Reservists appointed to the board must be active in the Reserve Forces, according to administrative fiat, and by public pressure must hold high rank in the Reserve. They profit by not rocking the Defense boat, and except for Major General Melvin Maas, who was in a retired status while serving on the board, there has been no exceptions. Thus, while the Department of Defense has the benefit of the views of some long experienced reservists, it has denied itself the uncoerced,

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[28]Memorandum from Brig. Gen. John H. Ives, USAF, Director of Military Personnel Policy Division, OSD, to Admiral Womble, Feb. 10, 1954, File OASD (M&P) 334 RFPB (1954) Departmental Records Branch, Department of the Army.

independent, fresh approach to the Reserve questions. The concept of the board as a focal point where conflicts among the various services can be resolved has not developed. Lieutenant General Milton G. Baker has said, "Actual clashes between the departments on Reserve matters are very rare."[29] As natural to all administrative hierarchies, the personnel handling the day-to-day problems prefer to resolve differences among themselves. It is a rare instance when such personnel will be willing to refer a question for arbitration to a board of outsiders. It is even more unlikely that the administrative hierarchy composed of regulars will be willing to turn over any touchy problem to a board of reservists of the several services. It is much more likely that controversies will be resolved by ad hoc committees and by use of other administrative remedies.

In the case of controversies which are referred to the board, Lieutenant General Milton G. Baker has described how they are handled:

> Upon questions of major policy, as determined by the Chairman, an affirmative vote of ten members is required. On all other questions, the affirmative vote of a majority of the Board is required to carry the question.[30]

It appears that much of the board's troubles derives from the lack of a clear role, despite the fact that it has acted efficiently in areas where any board could have performed well. It has provided a forum wherein interest groups could espouse their views within the Department of Defense and thereby keep the administrators informed. It has provided a board of experts to study Reserve plans for criticism at

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[29]Letter from Lieutenant General Milton G. Baker, Nov. 5, 1957, to the author.

[30]Ibid.

a minimum of expense to the government. It has also made available an arena for the settlement of interdepartmental disagreements. Yet, none of these functions have been sufficient to keep the board's status as the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense in Reserve affairs, as provided by statutes. It is likely that the board's importance will continue to dwindle as the administrative framework of the Department of Defense becomes more institutionalized.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

The Reserve situation must be seen in the context of over-all manpower policy. Unfortunately, as in World War II, the manpower problem continues to be an enigma in our defense policy. In order to solve our Reserve problems, it is imperative that some basic decisions be made on several key manpower questions--on the manpower needs of the civilian economy in wartime, on whether military or domestic leaders will make the manpower allocations if and when war comes, on the use of involuntary recruitment in these years of semi-peace, and on several other fundamental issues.

The United States has never fully applied its resources in peacetime to the solution of manpower problems, and the current troubles with Russia might not be sufficient to inaugurate advance planning now. Yet, the great need remains. This dissertation discusses a very small area where planning is necessary. It inquires into the pressures involved in making policy for the Army Reserve Forces, where manpower problems loom large. By use of examples from our experience of the last ten years, it considers the influences of the National Guard Association, the Reserve Officers Association, and the Regular Army interests.

It is, of course, important to note that there are other deter-

minants of Reserve policy. These are the far-reaching functional issues which surround the Reserves. The most significant of these have concerned the over-all benefits to be derived from a vigorous Reserve program in light of the specialization seemingly required in modern armies. Almost as important has been the role of federalism, which has been used effectively by the National Guard Association to win special privileges. Troubles in manpower recruitment, especially those stemming from the antagonism of many veterans for almost everything of a military nature, have been of fundamental importance. Other technical matters that have influenced policy include civil defense, unit versus individual training, armory construction, inter-service coordination, and conflicts between the civilian mobilization responsibilities of reservists as opposed to their military mobilization duties. These pages are intentionally devoid of a general discussion of these technical issues.

In the final analysis, it has been the interaction of the three prominent pressure groups making use of the various technical arguments that have shaped the policies of the Army Reserve Forces.

The National Guard Association's power is due to a combination of factors. First, the National Guard lies in the marrow of practically every American community. Its members and its friends have votes of which every congressman is acutely aware. The leaders of the Guard are frequently influential men in the community who have contact with members of Congress. From this grass-roots situation, springs the power of the National Guard Association.

Secondly, the guard association's power arises out of the backing provided by state officials who feel strongly the need for a state force

such as the National Guard. The governors and other state officials are alert to prevent any estrangement of the National Guard and the state governments. The concern of these officials stems from their high regard for the usefulness of their own guard units, from their emotional and intellectual attachment to the cause of states' rights and from the desire of their constituents to maintain the minute-man tradition and states' rights.

It is important to recognize, then, that the crux of National Guard power is the dual status clause of the United States Constitution. However, this constitutional provision is only one of two alternatives which is available to the nation as a foundation for any Reserve organization. Those constitutional powers possessed by Congress to raise and support armies remain available at any time. Whenever they desire, the people can make the Guard into a national force. This is the great vulnerability of National Guard power.

The handicaps to the efficiency of the National Guard as a fighting force which arise from the dual status, are not well known to the American public. Consequently, the National Guard Association has not greatly feared the abolition of dual control. Furthermore, it will be difficult for the people, who are traditionally uninterested in military matters, to get adequate information on the subject. The association attacks with vehemence any mention that a dual status prevents the fielding of an efficient army. Yet, there is considerable evidence that the National Guard lacks the leadership, as a state force, necessary to produce a first class army. As the people decide the answer to this fundamental question, they will be deciding the ultimate fate of the National

Guard Association and its interests.

The Regular Army is, perhaps, fully as influential as the National Guard Association, but it works in a much different fashion. Its leverage is exercised deep in the bureaucracy. In fact, it is the double personality of the Regular Army, as an interest group and as the bureaucracy, from which its power arises.

Its influence has been handicapped by its inability to throw charges--either reckless or responsible charges--into the headlines as its opponents frequently do. The complaints concerning Regular Army discrimination against the Reserve Forces during World War II are good examples. There was a particularly deep-seated disagreement over who was to get the promotions, but the bureaucracy was never able to make use of propaganda during the furor to the same extent as Reserve Forces lobbyists.

The Regular Army as an interest group has sought a large standing Army. As a part of this goal, it has wanted universal military training, and the strong Reserve usually considered concomitant to universal military training has not been pushed by the regulars. Frequently, it has been thought, by congressmen in particular, that the Regular Army actually opposed large Reserve Forces. The actions of the regulars tend, without actual proof, to verify this. At least, they have not been enthusiastic for the Reserve program.

Further verification of interest group activity on the part of the Regular Army is seen in the hassle over the level at which Reserve policy will be made in the Pentagon. Only after ten years of feuding over the matter did the regular establishment consent to the creation of

an office which would raise the Reserve Forces' position in the bureaucracy. This occurred five years after Congress expressed, by statute, a desire that the Reserve be given a more prominent voice. It occurred only after the regulars had assured retention of their relative position on the Army staff. Matters formerly handled by assistant chiefs of staff were moved to a new, higher level of officers called deputy chiefs of staff. Then and only then did the Reserve Forces get their own assistant chief of staff.

Most of the evidence bearing upon the Regular Army's treatment of the Reserve problem fails to prove conclusively any determined, intentional effort to halt the progress of the Reserves. It reveals, however, fairly strong indications that a guild feeling exists which works to the detriment of the Reserve Forces. Undoubtedly much of this feeling arises from well substantiated, professional doubt among regulars that the "summer soldiers" of the Reserve can ever be made into an adequately trained Army.

Much of the feeling also stems from an inherent uneasiness that a greatly expanded Reserve program would curtail the interests of the Regular Army guild. There is already evidence that, given the opportunity, Congress will rely, for reasons of financial economy, on the Reserve Forces rather than on a professional Army. Regulars feel further insecurity from the numerous campaign speeches and propaganda which claim that citizen soldiers singlehandedly won World War II. In addition, the regulars have a vivid impression, which might be mistaken, that Congress and the people consider them to be an undemocratic, indoctrinated caste. They sense a widespread favoritism for the Reserves based on the concept

that the Reserves will keep the Army democratic--that the Reserves will heighten popular control over the military. All these factors intensify the guild feelings and make the Regular Army fear its displacement by reservists.

The Reserve Officers Association is the least powerful of the three important pressure groups. It lacks the powerful support of state officials which the National Guard Association possesses, and it is without the strategic position in the bureaucracy which the Regular Army has.

In addition, the Reserve Officers Association has never had the strong, stable leadership found in either of the other two interest groups. The presidents of the association do not move their homes to Washington as Major General Walsh did as president of the National Guard Association. The head of the Washington office of the Reserve Officers Association has been a professional lobbyist. There has been a high turnover in the office.

However, the association has been influential with Congress. It was especially effective in getting changes in recall procedures after the Korean War and in getting a more equitable promotion system in 1954.

Generally speaking, congressmen have been favorably disposed toward the Army Reserve. They deem a large, trained Reserve to be a necessary supplement to the Regular Army. Many believe the Reserve proved its effectiveness in World War II and in the Korean War. In addition, numerous congressmen are now, or have been, members of the Reserve. They are familiar with the program and are, therefore, inclined to support it. Another important reason for congressional support arises from

the attitudes and voting power of thousands of reservists and former reservists, not organized into pressure groups, who passively favor a larger Reserve. Their favorable attitudes seem to influence congressional decisions.

The Reserve Officers Association can, thus, present its proposals in a fairly fertile atmosphere. This is of considerable importance since the association's political power--its vote getting power--is not great. The successes of the association can be attributed largely to the favorable climate in which it works. It has had to depend on whatever logic and intelligence it could muster in its arguments, together with the favorable disposition of congressmen.

Because the association has been only mildly successful in influencing the administrators of the Reserve program, the congressional tendency to leave many decisions to the discretion of the executive branch has been a serious handicap to the association. Consequently, the association has constantly sought to have more and more Reserve policies written into law--well beyond administrative tampering.

The Role of Congress

In addition to reasons already mentioned, Congress supports the Reserve Forces for the sake of political expediency. This situation grows out of the fact that the United States is spending around $38 billion annually on defense--a figure widely considered to be a maximum which the people can stand. Still, there is evidence that the United States is losing the armament race. Cost statistics reveal to a fairly precise degree, that economies will accrue from dependence on Reserves rather than

on an expensive professional force. The Reserves, thus, make possible a strong defense without additional taxation. It is an inviting offer which few legislators, for political reasons, can ignore.

To accomplish a more effective Reserve, Congress has constantly urged the executive branch to build the program. The legislative branch does not seem to have the technical ability or the inclination to write, for itself, the detailed policies which would improve the program. Nevertheless, the leadership provided by Congress, through its badgering and harassment of the Army, has been a significant reason for the progress of the Reserve Forces.

Not many years ago, this would have been considered the least that Congress might do in the making of policy. Today, such activities are usually called "congressional leadership." Although since the days of John Stuart Mill, legislative bodies have been occasionally declared to be incapable of initiating policy, it is only recently that we have become resigned to the doctrine that Congress can do little more than review policy made by the executive branch.[1]

Congress demanded in the early 1950's that departmental experts prepare, for its consideration, legislative proposals to build the Reserves. By such action, Congress admitted that its role was that of a reviewing agency--that it was incapable of initiating policy.

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[1]This view of Congress is not accepted by Lawrence Chamberlain in his The President, Congress and Legislation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946). Chamberlain studied ninety pieces of legislation, including several in the field of national defense, and concluded that Congress was playing a lively role in the initiation of government policy. The view of Congress contained in this dissertation is not at odds with Chamberlain. Although Congress has not initiated Reserve policy, it has by methods described herein, played a preponderent role in the development of the Reserves.

However, during consideration of the same departmentally-prepared measures, several new ideas and proposals were put forth by congressional leaders. On at least two occasions, congressional committees made major revisions in legislation sent over from the Department of Defense--on the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and the National Reserve Plan which became the Reserve Forces Act of 1955.

One congressional innovation, added to the Eisenhower administration's National Reserve Plan, would have desegregated southern National Guard units. Although stricken from the final version of the bill, Congress deliberated on this specific policy. No such thing can be said for the Department of Defense. The consideration given the problem by Congress shows more willingness to meet this thorny problem than was shown by the Department of Defense in ignoring the situation.

These activities, including the constant pressure on the executive branch to improve the program, constitute congressional leadership. Although Congress has not had the ability to write Reserve policy itself, it is the agency most responsible for the policies which built the Reserve Forces to their present level. Congress continues, by generous appropriations and other methods, to be the program's most important safeguard against administrative cutbacks.

The Reserve program is somewhat unique in that it has not been the subject of close congressional surveillance. The appropriating power has not been used to superintend the program; appropriations have been much too generous to constitute controls. So far as other surveillance methods are concerned, there has been suggestions of special committees to oversee the Reserves, such as the watchdog committee recommended by

Senator Margaret Chase Smith, but such committees were never meant to harass or restrict the Reserves. They were generally meant to protect the Reserve Forces from the Regular Army, or to furnish impetus which seemed to be lacking.

It is interesting to note, also, the complete absence of political partisanship in congressional handling of Reserve affairs. There has been no outright disagreements along party lines since World War II. In addition, the chairmen and minority leaders of the House armed services committee have been especially congenial. The chairman allows the minority leader, by custom, to make assignments of minority members to the subcommittees. And on one occasion the minority leader served as a subcommittee chairman.

Whether Congress has acted wisely in sponsoring a vigorous Reserve program is, at present, very much undecided. In its enthusiasm for the Reserves, the Congress has acted largely on short range motivations--to pacify interest groups or for reasons of financial economy. Like the bureaucracy, Congress has made no fundamental, profound decisions based on the over-all proved merit of the Reserve Forces.

It is likewise apparent that neither Congress nor the Department of Defense have made much progress in allocating equitably the burdens of national defense among the various individuals of the country. The inequity of recalling World War II veterans to fight in the Korean War became obvious in 1950 with tremendous impact. Since the Korean War, the matter has lain dormant, potentially explosive in case it should again come to grip public attention. The equity of the various types of active and Reserve duty has not interested the major pressure groups to

the extent that a solution has become mandatory.

The Interaction of the Interest Groups

The National Guard and the Regular Army interests constitute the two main forces which dominate Reserve Forces policy. It is significant that these two interests frequently neutralize each other--tending to pull policy down a middle course. There have been occasions when the conflict has prevented the determination of any firm policy, or more often, the conflict has forced a compromise. The compromises have been obvious in legislation. They have also been an important factor in policy-making at administrative levels. For instance, the 1957 decision requiring six months' training for all National Guard enlistees was clearly the result of compromise between these diametrically opposed interests. Even President Eisenhower indirectly acknowledged the near equality of the two groups by speaking nicely of the Guard while simultaneously agreeing with the regulars by saying the National Guard was "never going to be the kind of force we need until we get these recruits having at least six months of good hard basic training."

It must be recognized that the near equal power of these groups does not always result in precisely equal compromise. Each compromise depends, of course, on the problem under discussion. In explaining, for instance, the rapid death suffered by the Gray board report at the hands of the National Guard Association, it is evident the radical qualities of the report put the Regular Army in a position for total defeat. As expected, the Guard Association was completely successful.

To some extent, the mutual neutralization of the two powers has

enhanced the position of the Reserve Officers Association, and has been indirectly the reason for the moderate development of the Army Reserve during the last decade. Actually neither the Regular Army nor the National Guard Association has desired to build the Army Reserve. Alone, the Reserve Officers Association had little chance of accomplishing this build up. The progress which has occurred has had its origin in the acquiescence of the Regular Army. The regulars understood that, because of National Guard power, there would always be some type of citizen force. If so, they preferred a nationally-controlled Army Reserve over a state-controlled National Guard. This preference was the basis of acquiescence by Regular Army interests in the drive of the Reserve Officers Association toward an increase in the size of the Army Reserve.

The Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954 is an example of the benefits derived by the Reserve Officer Association from the acquiescence of one of the more powerful groups. It came about through a combination of Army Reserve and National Guard interests, although the Regular Army vehemently opposed the law. The Reserve Officers Association wanted the law, and the National Guard Association gave its tacit approval.

The Armed Forces Act of 1952 grew out of a combination of National Guard opposition, Reserve Officer Association approval and Regular Army acquiescence with its civilian superiors in the Pentagon who felt public pressure for the act. In the final analysis, it was the great public agitation, aside from pressure group agitation, which brought passage of the bill. The vehemence with which so many Americans viewed the Korean recall system was the dominating factor.

The Reserve Forces Act of 1955, which brought out the most ambitious plans for the Reserve yet announced, had a nebulous source. There were no diametrically opposed forces. The National Guard Association would probably have opposed the bill if there were any mention of the Guard in the bill. Major General Walsh made it clear to the congressional committees that the National Guard did not want to be covered by the legislation. Since it was not covered, the National Guard Association made little effort to influence the disposition of the bill. On the other hand, the Reserve Officers Association supported the bill enthusiastically. Final passage was largely the result of strong administration backing, however. The bill would have failed without the strong support of the Department of Defense.

It seems, from a study of the past ten years, that the Reserve Officer Association is likely to be successful in lobbying Congress whenever the National Guard or the Regular Army will acquiesce in the Reserve viewpoint. If the matter under consideration is strongly opposed by one of these big interests, that one interest can usually secure a veto of the matter in Congress. The cancellation of an anti-segretation clause in the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 by National Guard interests is an example of this power.

Certainly a combination of the two major interest groups can veto an Army Reserve proposal. This is seen in the long effort of the Army Reserve to get a high-ranking Reserve coordinator into the Pentagon hierarchy. Both the Regular Army and the National Guard opposed the move, but despite great enthusiasm by the Reserve Officers Association, the idea has not fully materialized.

The three important pressure groups involved in Reserve Forces policy-making have much in common, and it would be a mistake to assume they are in total, constant competition. It might be noted, among other things, that all three groups are composed of officers, except that the Regular Army might, on occasion, be considered as including enlisted interests. Generally speaking, enlisted men have no ability to apply, in an organized way, any pressure on policy-making. Thus, the three groups safeguard officer interests almost exclusively.

All three groups are of the nature of guilds. The guild feelings are based on the same military skills, but the groups are significantly, although artificially, different. The distant future will probably bring some realignment of the groups so that the basic differentiation will be between active duty and non-active duty personnel. For the time being, the groups are different largely by legal definition. They, nevertheless, compete for preferred positions in national defense, higher rank, and greater status. The fundamental issues, such as the state of combat readiness, military techniques, and similar technical matters, have not been the areas of great debate. The controversies stem from the areas where guild interest is prevalent.

A typical example is the competition between the National Guard and Army Reserve for authority to organize combat units of the Reserve Forces. It is in the combat units, rather than in support units, where high rank is found. To capture this high rank, and to have a higher standing among the defense forces, the two components have competed vigorously.

Another example is the resistance shown by the National Guard to

accept a civil defense mission. This is a suitable objective for a state force, according to Regular Army views, especially since there will probably be great agitation to retain the Guard units at home in case of atomic attack on civilian communities. The Guard declares the move is only an attempt to relegate state forces to a secondary position in national defense. As of 1957, the controversy has not come to a head, and considering the political power of the National Guard, a decision is likely to be long delayed.

The Administrative Hierarchy

An already confusing Reserve policy-making mechanism was further complicated in 1947 by the creation of the Department of Defense. Along with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel, Manpower, and Reserves, there was created the Reserve Forces Policy Board to coordinate the Reserve policies of all the military departments. At first, the board seemed to serve efficiently as a body of experts representating the various departments to write Reserve policy. As the administrative hierarchy of the Department of Defense has developed, the board seems to have declined in usefulness.

The new unified defense department served to relay pressure from the other departments toward a revitalization of the Army Reserve program. The Navy, in particular, according to popular opinion, had a better program, and this was the basis of considerable agitation to improve the Army system.

As might be expected, the three prominent interest groups have sought to control the day-to-day regulations which flow from the defense

establishment. The Regular Army, of course, has a tremendous advantage over the other two interests in this effort because the administrative hierarchy is but another name for the Regular Army. Obviously, the struggle is an effort by the National Guard Association and Reserve Officers Association to entice the hierarchy away from its Army managers.

The National Guard bureau has, since about 1920, been the prime example of National Guard Association success in the struggle. Through legal requirements that the chief of the bureau have ten years' experience as a guardsman and be recommended by the governor of his home state, the National Guard interests have been able to influence greatly the occupant of the office. In addition, the guard association has accomplished legislation allowing forty per cent of the employees of the bureau to be guardsmen who have been called to active duty specifically for service in the bureau. This has been an important reason for the domination of the entire bureau by the association.

The Reserve Officers Association, as yet, has not enjoyed similar success, although it is influential. Already, it is the habit of the Army to recall a prominent reservist to serve as chief of Army Reserve and ROTC affairs. So far these men have not been vociferous spokesmen for Reserve interests, except Brigadier General Wendell Westover, who made a frontal assault on Regular Army interests opposed to the Reserve. He was definitely more loyal to Reserve interests than to the dictates of his superiors in the Pentagon. There have been other less dramatic evidences of Reserve Officer Association influence.

It is not the major objective of this thesis to recommend administrative techniques which will provide these agencies in the Pentagon

with adequate armor to withstand the interest groups. Nevertheless, it is evident that administrative reorganization of the Reserve Forces staff within the Army is in order. In fact, it is essential if further encroachment is to be avoided.

Policy is currently made in scattered offices which are not always cooperative. The National Guard Bureau has been, on occasion, openly hostile to its ostensible superior, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components. The Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs has been naturally jealous of the same agency which has become the top Reserve office in the Army.

If policy is to be made in a responsible manner, free from the irresponsible pressures from interest groups, there must be a consolidation of these agencies into a common front. It is important that the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components, and the secretariat of the General Staff Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy be joined into a single staff agency which can be held responsible for what happens or fails to happen in the field of Reserve policy.

There should, perhaps, be four divisions in the new staff section: National Guard Affairs, Army Reserve Affairs, ROTC Affairs, and the secretariat of the general staff committees. The latter would be responsible for the presentation of information at meetings of the committees, the preparations of the committee's reports, and for general administration of the committee's responsibilities.

The objective is to move these agencies into a position so they

can be held responsible for carrying out the goals of the Secretary of the Army and his superiors. Currently, the National Guard bureau acts independently to the extent that it is protected by the National Guard Association. It is essential that the unique system of appointment for the chief of the bureau be ended. He must not be required to have been for ten years a member of the National Guard. There must be no shackles on the Chief of Staff in choosing his Guard advisor--at least no more than govern the appointment of other members of the Army staff. Then the Chief of Staff can be held responsible, by the Secretary of the Army, for National Guard policy.

It is also essential that the Army adopt procedures to assure that the Reserve staff is adequately informed on Reserve matters. Heretofore, there have been miscellaneous colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors come and go on the Reserve staff. They are at that point in their Army career where a tour of staff duty is in order. Because of a record of excellent prior service or because they have friends already in the Pentagon, they are assigned at Department of Army level. Without ever having heard of the particular office before, they are given a position on the Reserve staff. They begin, in a most sincere way, to learn something about the Reserve Forces. Except for a few, they have no long range interest in the Reserve. Usually, before they have been able to master the intricacies of Reserve policy, they are transferred to field duty or some other job.

Therefore, it seems to be necessary to develop a corps of specialists, dedicated to an effective Reserve, if the Army staff is to show enough mental superiority to withstand the interest-group onslaught.

The day must end when the lobbyists know more about the Reserve situation than do members of the staff.

Already the Army has administrative techniques for the selection of officers qualified for various types of duty with the civilian community. These personnel classification procedures must go further. A career field in Reserve management might be established whereby Army personnel would stay in Reserve work for a major portion of their careers and thereby develop a high degree of proficiency.

It seems worthwhile for the general staff policy committees to be retained as legitimate forums for the discussion of policy with the interest groups. No major changes are necessary. They are already strictly advisory in nature and constitute no interference with administrative responsibility.

From the standpoint of administrative efficiency, it would be better if the committee's members were more efficient as advisors, more alert as liaison with the field, and more accurate as voices of the various interest groups. At the present time, the committee seem to be absorbed in Army politics--too anxious not to make anyone angry. It would be better if there were free and frank recognition that the Army Reserve members, National Guard members, and Regular Army members were outright spokesmen for their own interests. Presently, this is the role of the National Guard members, but the others are much less candid. Too many Reserve members are, as Senator Margaret Chase Smith calls some reservists, "too regular-minded." They tread lightly so as to retain the little influence they have in getting friends promoted and the like. They tend to be too pliant, and therefore all aspects of many problems

do not get an adequate hearing. Consequently, the value of the committees is less than it should be.

The Control of Regular Army Interests

The foregoing suggestions constitute the traditional remedies to illegitimate interference by pressure groups in the making of public policy. They will probably be sufficient to restrict the National Guard Association and the Reserve Officers Association. They cannot possibly be adequate to protect policy-makers from Regular Army pressures. This is true because the Regular Army <u>is</u> the Army staff which makes policy for the Reserves.

The only possible solution lies in the strict maintenance of civil supremacy. It is mandatory that civilian authorities in the Pentagon be able to keep all policy in accordance with the desires of Congress and the people. To perform in this manner, they must be alert to the nature, goals, and political tactics of the Regular Army.

Civil supremacy has in the past been altogether inadequate. This is partially shown by the ability of the Army to partially ignore the Army Reserve despite the fact that Congress, and probably the people, have wanted a big, effective Reserve.

In areas where the Regular Army puts its own interests ahead of policies announced by Congress, as seemingly occurred in the case of the Reserves, we must establish civil authorities in sufficiently strong positions to correct the situation. So far, civil supremacy has been largely a matter of a professional military organization outweighing non-expert civilians. The high turnover keeps civilian secretaries in a

johnny-come-lately status, and they are appallingly dependent on the Army staff.

The problem could probably be resolved in the next few decades by the establishment of a corps of civilian specialists who were in a position to dominate the Department of Defense. A nucleus of such a corps already exists in the Pentagon. An example is seen in Mr. Gordon Gray who, beginning in the 1940's served as Assistant and Under Secretary of the Army, Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director of Defense Mobilization. Such personnel should be free of military discipline and military folkways. Whether or not they could be kept free of emotional involvement with the military "institution" and its interests is, of course, the fundamental question so far as the corps' effectiveness is concerned.

Whatever solutions are proposed, they must not involve the ruination of the military institution itself. There must be no dimunition of the esprit de corps of the Army or the other services. Its discipline, traditions, rank structure, and the like must be preserved until shown to be of no value in military operations. At the present time, there is no reason to believe that these factors are not important factors in the effectiveness of a field army. In establishing effective civil supremacy, there must be no hampering of the qualities which contribute to military effectiveness.

However, it might be advantageous to institutionalize, as a group, the managers of the Reserve program within the Regular Army--to give them a semi-separate hierarchy. They might even be given some of the trappings of independence, but no actual autonomy. This would be for

the purpose of dividing the Regular Army in order that it can be kept conquered. If a segment of the Regular Army were "civilian minded" by virtue of its long association with the civilian components and other civilian activities, there might be a better opportunity for containment of its interests.

Postscript

The decisions on the Reserve program that are pending, in 1957, are momentous, indeed. The most vital current question concerns our dependence on Reserves rather than upon an active, professional Army. A number of similar decisions are long overdue. It is imperative that we decide what to do with the Reserve Forces. Generally speaking, we must either build a large Reserve machine constantly ready for battle, or quit deluding ourselves about the ability of any amateur army to win modern wars.

When the decisions are made, the pressure groups which have been considered here will have a strong voice in their formulation. If the goals and methods of these groups are widely understood at the time we will probably be able to prevent any undue influence which would hurt the nation. The danger comes from the current lack of public awareness.

The dangers are particularly great in that the power of these groups is possibly currently preventing the formulation of important policies. If not already in existence, a deadlock among these groups is conceivable. At least, there seems to be no current progress toward far-reaching decisions on the role of the Reserves. It is possible that we are moving steadily toward war while our three main interest groups battle among themselves for status, prestige and power.

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