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A DISSERTATION

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BY

SUZANNE JOLICOEUR KATSIKAS

Norman, Oklahoma

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INTERVENTION/PENETRATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

APPROVED BY

Rufus G Hall

Paul M. Page Jr

Stephen Sloan

V. Stanley Vardys

Oliver Benson

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, intervention has been investigated within a legalistic framework, or as a minor offshoot of power theories, or with a normative, moral, or policy-oriented thrust. To note the predominance of moral, legal, and strategic emphases in the literature concerning intervention is not to imply that these investigations have been misguided, for any individual needs only a modicum of humanity to be aware of the moral issues and legal questions involved when one international actor intervenes in the affairs of another.

This study, however, will investigate the systemic sources of interventionary and penetrative behavior. This study begins with the basic assumptions that potent sources of intervention are to be found within the systemic structure of the international system and within the systemic structure of the "intervened" national actor. Furthermore, it seems that only an approach using systems analysis, specifically across-systems theory, with its flexibility in analyzing all levels of interactions and relationships, offers a simple method of organizing and understanding the underlying factors which encourage intervention and penetration.

Several national and international scholars use a systems framework to generate explanations, and even though system theorists employ a variety of versions and applications, the basic idea of a systems framework is to design "a simplified model of a complex entity that may be defined by its systemic characteristics."[1] This chapter should not be construed as an overview of systems theory literature. By reviewing the models of a few systems theorists, this chapter will simply illustrate the scope and the variety of definitional emphasis, versions, and applications of systems framework.

The political systems approach is most fully articulated in the influential works of David Easton, which draw heavily on the communication science of cybernetics and on general systems theory. In his book, The Political System, published in 1953, Easton surveyed the condition of political science as a discipline and contended that the prime reason for the poor state of the discipline was the absence of a theoretical orientation which would provide meaning, coherence, and direction to on-going research. He professed that a conceptual framework was needed in order to give relevancy and orientation to political research and argued for the use of the systems concept, which is "an analytical tool designed to identify those integrally related aspects of concrete social reality that can be called political."[2]

Easton seeks to define the kinds of functions characteristic of any political system and to examine "the basic pro-

cesses through which a political system, regardless of its genetic or specific type, is able to persist as a system of behavior in a world either of stability or change."[3] Easton holds that "there are certain basic activities and processes characteristic of all political systems even though the structural forms through which they manifest themselves may and do vary considerably in each place and each age."[4] The requisite function of any political system, and the criteria by which a political system is distinguished from other kinds of systems is the "authoritative allocation of values for a society."[5] According to Easton, systems theory is based on the

> notion of political life as a boundary-maintaining set
> of interactions imbedded in and surrounded by other
> social systems to the influence of which it is constantly
> exposed. As such, it is helpful to interpret political
> phenomena as constituting an open system, one that must
> cope with the problems generated by its exposure to
> influences from these environmental systems. If a
> system of this kind is to persist through time, it must
> be able to take measures that regulate its future
> behavior. Regulation may call for simple adaptation
> to a changing setting in the light of fixed goals.
> But it may also include efforts to modify old goals
> or transform them entirely. Simple adaptation may not
> be enough. To persist it may be necessary for a system
> to have the capacity to transform its own internal
> structure and processes.[6]

A political system, which is an aspect of the whole social system, is the aggregation of interrelated human activities having to do with the formulation and effectuation of community policies for "the authoritative allocation of values for a society." Those interactions which are not predominantly oriented toward "the authoritative allocation of values for a society" constitute the environment, to which the political

system is open and responsive.

Easton, whose paradigm is identified with what is termed "input-output analysis,"[7] directs his attention to the capacity of political systems to respond to their environment since systems are open to varying degrees of influences from the environment as well as from within the system itself. Influences from the environment are conceptualized as inputs, summary variables of demands and supports. Demands, which are mainly concerned with matters relating to the allocation of resources, materials, or positions, are able to penetrate the boundaries of the system despite the "gatekeeping" functions of such filtering institutions as parties and interest groups. These gatekeeping institutions, which aggregate and articulate the diffuse and undifferentiated demands, regulate the volume and variety of demands in order to keep the flow of demands manageable for the decision-making institutions of the political system. The whole process of demand regulation reflects an elitist orientation since the system will respond to the politically relevant members:[8] "all members will not have equal access and the decision-makers will respond to those members with political capital--money, prestige, organization, status."[9]

Supports may be either for the society (the set of political institutions comprising the current regime) or for the output of the political system. (The outputs of the system consist of the decisions which authoritatively allocate the

values of the society.) The first type of support is much more stable than the last type. Although every system depends on specific support which is generated by "the satisfaction a member feels when he perceives his demands as having been met, a system may seek to instill in its members a high level of diffuse support in order that regardless of what happens the members will continue to be bound by its strong ties of loyalty and affection."[10]

Outputs which represent the system's response to demands, are the policies or decisions allocating system benefits. Outputs generate the process of feedback, information concerning the state of the system and its environment, which is communicated back to the authorities. "The capacity of a system to persist in the face of stress is a function of the presence and nature of the information and other influences that return to its actors and decision-makers."[11] However, "even if the authorities do obtain accurate information, lack of will to use it, lack of resources to put it to use, inadequate wisdom and skills in doing so may all contribute as much to an inability to meet a decline in support as the absence of such information feedback itself."[12]

Easton's predominant concern is with the maintenance of the system or with the question of how the system maintains the existing pattern of interaction in the face of stress or external/environmental disturbances. His basic proposition is that three variables--demands, supports, and outputs--

tend to maintain a balance or an equilibrium despite changing magnitudes of each of the variables. This primary concern with system maintenance underlies an implicit static, conservative, or status quo bias in Eastonian analysis. Easton attempts to overcome this status quo bias by not equating system maintenance with the total absence of change and by introducing the concept of system persistence which is different from rigid maintenance of the status quo.[13]

System persistence means that a system may change up to a point and still persist; a system will react to varying degrees of stress by changing or adapting its capacities to handle such stress. "System analysis directs our attention toward the processes that all types of political systems share and that make it possible for them to cope, however successfully, with stresses that threaten to destroy the capacity of a society to sustain any political system at all."[14] However, Easton does not explain whether such system change creates a radical alteration within a persisting system or if it creates an entirely new political system. Easton does not discuss quantitative volume or qualitative intensity of stress, nor does he specify a range of permissible change within which a system adapts and persists beyond which a system breaks down or "non-persists." This issue which is essentially the problem of system transformation is crucial in the application of the system concept to any real system. In a system there are variables and relations between the variables and

when the variables change, the relationships change. It would

be absurd to say that a system continued as long as the vari-

ables remained the same, since the important characteristic

of a system is the pattern of relationships not the actual

individual variables. Change in actual variables might not

be viewed as a critical factor in determining whether the

system has been transformed, however, major changes in the

number of variables might alter the pattern of relationships

considerably.[15] Although Easton never adequately deals with

systemic change and systemic persistence, system theory does

direct its attention to system transformation and this concern

has special relevance for many international students who must

take into account the powerful transformational influences

operating at the international level.[16]

Easton posits that his model is suitable for the global

system, he states:

> ...an international system is just another system at a
> different level of organization...it is amenable to
> investigation through the same conceptual apparatus that
> is being developed in this volume with respect to what
> we normally call domestic political systems....This
> interpretation of the international political system
> as just another kind of political system cognate with
> any national system creates no theoretical hardships,
> at least with the systems conceptualization developed
> here...we can identify in the international system all
> of the basic variables that we have already discussed
> for political systems in general.[17]

The systems approach at the international level is of con-

siderable value, however, one must question the suitability

of Easton's particular model.[18] As noted earlier, Easton

defines the essential variables of a political system as "the

(authoritative) allocation of values for a society and the relative frequency of compliance with them."[19] In the global system do "authorities" exist, and if so who are the "authorities?" According to Easton, authorities in this case are much "less centralized than in most modern systems, less continuous in their operation and more contingent on events, as in the case of primitive systems. Nevertheless, historically the great powers and, more recently, various kinds of international organizations, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, have been successful, intermittently, in resolving differences that were not privately negotiated and in having them accepted as authoritative."[20] However, the problem is the excessive instability of the "authorities" or the uncertainty of who can or will act as the authority in relation to a particular demand.[21] According to Easton's conceptualization the authorities do not always have to be the same and precisely identifiable, but if the source of authoritative allocation cannot be identified or is very unstable, the information concerning demands and supports cannot flow in a sufficiently constant and persistent pattern, and the systemic processes break down.[22] Moreover, the systemic processes cannot be sustained by the actions of the politically powerful: "Whatever the politically powerful members in fact decided to do, their decisions and actions would not have the compelling quality of authoritative allocations; if their own demands are not processed through the

authorities, they 'would not be converted into recognized systemic outputs.'"[23] Actions on the part of the politically powerful could be considered a systemic process of some kind, but not of the type conceptualized by Easton. The point being made is not that there has always/or never been an authoritative allocation in the global system, "merely that on the continuum between these two extremes the global system is very much closer to the latter than perhaps Easton implies."[24]

Another critical systemic element is the input of support which gives a system legitimacy, this is minimal or lacking at the global level.[25] Although Easton's major concern is to determine how political systems persist in the face of stress, he contends that the absence of a sense of legitimacy at the global level "need not constitute a danger or threat of stress for the system."[26] There seems to be little logic in the contention that there is no danger to the system, since a system may exist with no sense of legitimacy. The global system's ability to persist in the face of stress is reduced tremendously by the lack of a sense of legitimacy.[27]

The difficulty in identifying the "authorities," the threat to the processing of demands, and the question of support and legitimacy, lead one to question the usefulness of Easton's model as an aid to understanding the global system, which is essentially anarchical--one in which values are not authoritatively allocated through the processes identified by Easton.[28]

Another problem in applying Easton's framework to the
international system is that Easton gives more attention to
the processes of the system than to those of its environment.
Even though Easton attempts to delineate the nature of political
systems and the boundaries between them and their environments
and notes that political processes of a society are responsive
to developments which unfold in the environment beyond its
boundary, he does not offer any systematic ways in which these
developments abroad could be interdependent and thereby gene-
rate environmental processes which could in turn condition
societal processes. Easton's approach which distinguishes
between intra- and extra-societal environments of a political
system, the latter consisting of such entities as other
political systems, social systems, and international organi-
zations, such as NATO, the United Nations, international
social structure, international economic system, merely
categorizes the two environments.[29] Nowhere are the phenomena
embraced by his categories posited as interdependent or con-
ceived as self-sustaining processes which could lead to
predictable forms of behavior. To know that the external
environment consists of other political, economic, and social
systems, to assert that the external environment is a source
of inputs into a system is not to explain how that society
may respond to them nor to suggest the existence of interde-
pendencies.[30] In short, as Rosenau notes, "categorization...
is not conceptualization, and thus Easton offers no help to
the researcher interested in horizontal forms of analysis"[31]

of international politics.

Easton's interest in the functions of the political systems is shared by Herbert Spiro,[32] whose formulations constitute another version of input-output analysis. Spiro's paradigm revolves around the processing of issues, which involves a four-phase policy-flow process: the formulation of issues (identification or recognition of the problem), the deliberation of issues (the consideration of alternatives), the resolution of issues (selection of one of various alternatives which had been considered), and solution of the problem which created the issue (application of the decision). Other elements in his paradigm include a two-dimension classification scheme of all political issues. The first of these dimensions refers to time--an issue may be viewed as either "fundamental" or "circumstantial." A fundamental ᵔ ᵔe is considered basic to the system, whereas a circumstantial issue is concerned only with present circumstances or a particular situation. The second dimension of political issues relates to their content--issues are perceived as being either procedural (concerned with the method by which issues are processed), or substantive (concerned with the content of the decisions). Spiro also classifies issues according to problems--constitutional problems, economic problems, power problems, and cultural problems--which arise out of the system's goals.[33]

All political systems are more or less deliberately directed toward four basic goals: stability, flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness. This fourfold classification

of system goals corresponds to a fourfold categorization of
political style--legalism, pragmatism, ideologism, violence.
In different political systems or in any one political system
at different times, more or less emphasis is given to one or
more of the basic goals, to one or more phases of the policy
process, and/or to one or more types of issues and problems.
These emphasis differences can be described or explained in
terms of political style.[34] For example, a political system
which is preoccupied exclusively with the basic goal of
stability and emphasizes the formulation and deliberation
of constitutional issues to the neglect of the other goals,
issue-processing phases, and problems (economic, power,
cultural) is said to be legalistic. A political system whose
style is violent emphasizes the goal of efficiency (or the
desire to solve problems immediately) and often resorts to
armed conflict to resolve issues. Where political style is
violent, power problems are likely to occupy the center stage.
Pragmatism results from excessive concern with the basic goal
of flexibility (or the desire to keep the future permanently
open, to be permanently in a position to avail oneself of
novelty). Where political style is pragmatic, economic prob-
lems are likely to predominate. A political system whose
political style is ideological is excessively concerned with
the goal of effectiveness. In this system, the main preoccu-
pation is to create values and to enforce "if necessary, the
population's permanent commitment to values that can offer

answers to all questions and solutions to all problems, in a manner both comprehensive and consistent."[35] Where political style is ideological, cultural problems are likely to predominate.[36]

Spiro recognizes that actual political systems do not exhibit "undiluted" or "pure" political styles, they contain a combination or variety of styles: for example, both pragmatism and violence in Stalinist Russia and both pragmatism and legalism in the United States. However, differences between political systems with respect to stability and successful processing of issues can be explained by the fact that actual political systems do emphasize certain political styles and deemphasize others, occasionally to the detriment of the flow of policy.[37] He holds that a successful system must process its real issues and this depends on the achievement of a dynamic equilibrium among the four system goals. If one goal is stressed to the preclusion of others a pathological political style will develop and interfere with the processing of issues.[38]

Spiro's paradigm which fails to specify precise empirical indicators for its key concepts is fraught with methodological difficulties. He does not indicate how he would operationalize his concepts of political style, he does not offer criteria to measure the degree of legalism, pragmatism, violence, or ideologism in a given system, and he does not specify a threshold level beyond which a political system would fail due to its pathological political style. Moreover, Spiro's basic

proposition is that a system must process its real issues or fail, yet he does not define "real" issues, he does not assign weights to various issues (all issues are not.of equal importance), and he does not indicate what percentage of issues must be processed.[39] Spiro's explanations are imprecise and incomplete, nevertheless he does attempt to explain systematically the difference between actual political systems and why some are more likely to succeed (or fail) than others.[40]

Like Easton's framework, Spiro's paradigm is applicable to many levels of analysis. For example, at the international level Spiro compares the style of world politics in the period before World War I to the era of the Cold War--in the former the goal of flexibility was stressed, whereas in the latter the goal of stability (motivated by the fear of nuclear violence). During the Cold War era international politics frequently oscillated from the legalism of a John Foster Dulles in the 1956 Suez Crisis to the pragmatism of a Lyndon Johnson in the 1965 Dominican Republic Crisis.[41]

Spiro defines a political system as a community that is processing its issues. He holds that a "political system can exist whenever people are concerned about common problems and are engaged in cooperation and conflict in efforts to solve these problems."[42] In the light of the previous statement Spiro asserts that "today for the first time in history a global community exists or at any rate is coming into existence in the consciousness of human beings..."[43] "No quali-

tative or 'essential' difference in political process can be found between lower political systems and the all encompassing global system to warrant the study of two different levels of politics..."[44] Spiro's definition of a global or political community rejects the focus on power, or "the legitimate physical compulsion" (Almond), or on the state. Like Easton, Spiro applies his framework to the international level, however, by the definitional nature of the political system, Spiro sidesteps Easton's problem--mainly that at the global level no person or institution has a monopoly of the instruments of coercion, therefore, there is no global authority which can make allocations of values which are generally accepted as being binding. Spiro believes that the political system is dominant; he rejects the "prevailing narrow view of the political system as a subsystem of the society." The political system is, according to Spiro, "more important, more comprehensive, and 'greater' than the social system."[45]

By focusing upon the state as the political system, Spiro believes the analysis of international politics is distorted because it leads to the qualitative distinction between national and international politics.[46] He gives limited praise to Morton Kaplan who avoids this type of distortion by rejecting the focus on power and by denying that the political system "is the coercive subsystem in the social system."[47] Kaplan, who "focuses upon a political system whose geographic scope is defined by the purpose of a particular analysis,"[48] sees the

main difference between national political systems and the
international system as in the fact that the former are "system
dominant" and the latter is "subsystem dominant." Politics,
according to Kaplan, "is the contest to fill decision-making
roles, to choose alternate political objects, or to change the
essential rules of the political system."[49] Even though Kaplan's
view of politics is more acceptable than Morganthau's, Easton's,
or Almond's, Spiro still considers it unsatisfactory "partly
because of its definitional nature, partly because it does
not entirely overcome the danger of compartmentalization: 'a
political system exists when its constitution and laws are
communicated successfully _within_ a social system.'"[50] Thus,
rejecting the more "conventional" view of the political system
and proceeding upon the assumption that the political system
should not be considered an operating component of the social
system, Spiro builds his "global system" which is based on the
thesis of "the universality of basic political processes, no
matter when or where they are taking place."[51]

> Whether or not a political system exists depends not
> upon acceptance as legitimate or authoritative of the
> same goals by all, or by some proportion of, the
> participants; nor upon the capacity of any of the
> participants to compel others; nor upon the stability
> over a prolonged period of time of the essential rules
> governing the process. It depends, rather upon the
> participants' awareness of their participation in the
> political process. The point here is that the participants
> through their consciousness impose upon their interaction
> the characteristics of a system. This means that a set
> of interactions of only brief duration not only can be
> analyzed as a political system, but may actually
> be a political system.[52]

Easton and Spiro are primarily concerned with the functions of the political system, whereas international analysts Morton Kaplan, Charles McClelland, and Richard Rosecrance, view nation-states or national actors as the predominant or significant units and seek to explain interactions between national actors by phenomena such as their previous interaction and the structure of the system.

Morton Kaplan defines a system as "a set of variables so related in contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize the internal relationships of the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables."[53] He contends that the international system is subsystem dominant, for a system can only be considered dominant over its subsystems when "the essential rules of the...system act as parametric 'givens' for any single subsystem. A subsystem becomes dominant to the extent that the essential rules of the system cannot be treated as parametric 'givens.'"[54] Charles McClelland, who views system theory as furnishing a framework for understanding, identifying, measuring, and examining interaction within a system and its subsystems, states:

> The strategy, first of all, of conceiving of many kinds of phenomena in terms of working relations among their parts, and then labeling them systems according to a definition of what part of the problem is most relevant, is the key to the approach. Then, the procedures of bypassing many complexities in order to investigate relationships between input and output, or systematically moving to different levels of analysis by recognizing the link of subsystems to systems, of being alert to "boundary phenomena" and the ranges of normal operations of sub-

> systems and systems, and of taking into account both "parameters" and "perturbations" in the environments of systems are other major parts of the general systems apparatus.[55]

He conceives of the international system as an expanded version of the notion of two actors-in-interaction. The international system, which is complex, one that has much variety in the process of changing from one state to another, and multi-dimensional, encompasses all interactions in full scope--"all of the exchanges, transactions, contacts, flows of information, and actions of every kind."[56] McClelland who contends that the international system cannot be viewed "from the lofty vantage point where the whole system is envisaged,"[57] believes in focusing attention upon one level of analysis at a time. McClelland concentrates on interaction between the national actors, specifically prior transactions between national units and any significant variation in the flow of action within the system.

McClelland's essay "The Acute International Crisis"[58] explicates the event/interaction model which describes the state of the international system in terms of its pattern, structure, and performance. Using interaction analysis, McClelland examines cases of crisis, whose sequences of action-reaction can be traced (since the time span and focus of inquiry are narrowed), and posits that present international interactions can be explained by previous international/event sequences and systemic configurations.[59] A basic assumption underlying his framework is that events in crises form a chain of interaction

sequences and that these international processes occur regularly with specific international situations such as crises. Thus, his objective is to identify, compare, describe, and possibly predict patterns of interactions which accompany various crisis situations. "Interaction analysis focuses on the outputs of national systems. The national systems themselves are black boxed."[60] McClelland believes that this approach avoids the problems or complexities of the decision-making approach which requires access to monumental amounts of "hard-to-come-by" information concerning the internal workings of government.

Common to McClelland's, Rosecrance's, and Kaplan's conceptual frameworks of the international system is their concern about stability and change. This concern is illustrated by Kaplan's interest in transformation rules, by McClelland's emphasis on the ability of an "open and adaptive" system to change in order to cope with disturbances, and by Rosecrance's principal preoccupation with the capacity of a system to contain disturbances, in part through his regulator mechanism.[61]

Richard Rosecrance,[62] who bases his system analysis on nine historical models which existed in succession from 1740-1960--(1) 18th Century, 1740-1789; (2) Revolutionary Imperium, 1789-1814; (3) Concert of Europe, 1814-1822; (4) Truncated Concert, 1822-1848; (5) Shattered Concert, 1848-1871; (6) Bismarckian Concert, 1871-1890; (7) Imperialist Nationalism, 1890-1918; (8) Totalitarian Militarism, 1918-1945; (9) Post War, 1945-1960--constructs an analytic framework which is

equally applicable to all of them. Rosecrance, whose primary preoccupation is with the capacity of a system to deal with disturbance, holds that a system is comprised of disturbance inputs, a regulator which reacts to the disturbance inputs, the environmental restraints which influence the possible outcomes, and the outcomes themselves. The disturbance input usually refers to one or more national actors who are behaving in a potentially disruptive fashion, from such forces as ideologies, domestic insecurity, conflicts in national interest, disparities in national actors' capabilities. The regulator, the formal or informal mechanisms such as the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, the balance of power, or the United Nations, reacts to the disturbance input and attempts to maintain the system. The environmental restraints limit the range of possible outcomes--for example, in certain historical systems the environment permitted conflicts among European national actors to be assuaged by compensations in other parts of the system, such as competition for colonies, compensation through empire building, etc. Outcomes, which are limited by environmental constraints, refers to the regulator's action or actions. The equilibrium or stability of the system is related to the strength of the regulator versus the strength of the disturbance. If the outcomes are generally acceptable to all participants, then the system is considered to be equilibrial.[63]

Rosecrance puts a tremendous emphasis on national elites and questions whether the elite is satisfied with its role

domestically, threatened by international events, secure in
its position, etc. He examines the sources of inputs and
the factors that influence the behavior of systems. He
develops four determinants: ideologies or attitudinal di-
rection of elites, degree of elite control, resources avail-
able to the controlling elites, and capacity of the system
to mitigate disturbances.[64] After examination of his histor-
ical system in relationship to his four determinants, Rosecrance
found that at least four of his nine systems were unstable
and five were stable. In the stable historical systems the
amount of disturbance was at a minimum, the regulator was
able to cope with the input disturbance since the elite in-
volved were secure and satisfied with the status quo and
were willing to solve their problems short of war. Moreover,
the environmental constraints were adequate to ease the dis-
turbance by either assuaging the disturbed actor without
affecting the national interests or without causing major
losses to other actors, or by transferring territorial am-
bition to colonial areas. On the other hand, in the unstable
systems the degree of actor disturbance was greater than the
regulator's ability to cope with it. The variety of means at
the disposal of the regulator was minimal, the environmental
restraints failed to play a role in constraining the distur-
bances. The elites were dissatisfied with the status quo,
both within their own respective national units and in the
international system, the elites felt insecure, and they

attempted to improve their own position by mobilizing resources
and by appealing to nationalism and ideology. In the unstable
systems national actors would undertake to improve their position
at a cost of disrupting the entire system.[65]

Rosecrance's major conclusion is that there is a corre-
lation between international instability and the domestic
insecurity of elites.[66] He states,

> if the impact of domestic factors has been somewhat
> neglected, the present study strives to remedy the
> defect: if any single thesis emerges from the follow-
> ing pages it is that international constellations
> and patterns of conflict are very often determined
> as the inadvertent by-product of domestic change.[67]

Morton Kaplan constructs six actual and hypothetical
models of the international system and specifies rules and
patterns of interaction within each model. He writes,

> The conception that underlies System and Process is
> fairly simple. If the number, type, and behavior of
> nations differ over time, and if their military capa-
> bilities, their economic assets, and their information
> also vary over time, then there is some likely inter-
> connection between these elements such that different
> structural and behavioral systems can be discerned
> to operate at different periods of history. This con-
> ception may turn out to be incorrect, but it does not
> seem an unreasonable basis for an investigation of the
> subject matter. To conduct such an investigation
> requires systematic hypotheses concerning the nature
> of the connections of the variables. Only after these
> are made can past history be examined in a way that
> illuminates the hypotheses. Otherwise the investigator
> has no criteria on the basis of which he can pick and
> choose from among the infinite reservoir of facts
> available to him. These initial hypotheses indicate
> the areas of facts which have the greatest importance
> for this type of investigation; presumably if the hypo-
> theses are wrong, this will become reasonably evident
> in the course of attempting to use them.[68]

Within each of his six models--balance-of-power system, loose bipolar system, tight bipolar system, universal international system, hierarchical international system, unit-veto system-- Kaplan has developed five sets of variables: the essential rules, transformation rules, the actor classificatory variables which set forth the structural characteristics of actors, the capability variables which refer to the resources and the national actor's ability to use resources to attain goals, and the information variables which refer to the levels of communication within the system. The first two sets of variables, which will be discussed at greater length, concern the nature of the international system, whereas the last three sets of variables cover the types of things that are investigated at lower levels of analysis.

The essential rules describe the behavior necessary to maintain equilibrium in the system; the rules stipulate the conditions under which national actors comprising that system should negotiate, fight, mobilize resources, stop fighting, become members of alliances, contest changes and accommodate other changes. For example, the "balance-of-power" international system is characterized by the operation of the following essential rules: (1) increase capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight; (2) fight rather than fail to increase capabilities; (3) stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential actor; (4) oppose any coalition or single actor that tends to assume a position of predominance within the

system; (5) constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizational principles; and (6) permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners, or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification. Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.[69] Another example is the loose bipolar system: (1) blocs subscribing to directive hierarchical or mixed hierarchical integrating principles eliminate the rival bloc, negotiate rather than fight, fight minor wars rather than major wars, and fight major wars rather than fail to eliminate the rival bloc; (2) bloc actors increase their capabilities in relation to those of the opposing bloc; (3) bloc actors subscribing to nonhierarchical or nondirective hierarchical organizational principles negotiate rather than fight to increase capabilities, but refrain from initiating major wars for this purpose; (4) bloc actors engage in a major war rather than permit the rival bloc to gain preponderant strength; (5) bloc members subordinate the objectives of universal actor to the objectives of their bloc; (6) universal actors reduce the incompatibility between blocs and mobilize nonbloc member national actors against cases of major deviation, such as resorting to force, by a bloc actor.[70]

Even though a single actor could change the system state by breaking one or more of the essential rules, the rules themselves are not dependent upon the behavior of any one

national actor, they are derived from the overall patterns of interaction among the actors comprising the system. Thus, from the perspective of a single national actor, the essential rules are a part of its environment and _if_ the prevailing system is to persist, the national actor, irrespective of previously-acquired policy and value orientations of the decision-makers and irrespective of situations with which the decision makers must deal, must conform its actions to the systemic requirements.[71] Kaplan does emphasize the environmental contexts, however, the scope of his model is limited. His formulation of environmental interdependencies "is essentially addressed to the issue-area bounded by questions of military and national security which, while extremely important, are far from a predominant majority of the external problems with which societies must contend. There are many areas of foreign policy behavior for which the essential rules of Kaplan's model are irrelevant."[72]

The second set of variables embraces transformation rules, which specify the ways in which a system changes as inputs other than those necessary for equilibrium enter the system. A system which transforms itself in response to a major disturbance input is considered changed when a different systems model is needed to account for its behavior. Kaplan states,

> We will adopt the following constriction: when the
> system changes in such a way that a different theory is
> needed to account for its behavior, we will say that the
> system has changed. Thus the change from "balance of
> power" system to bipolar system will be called a system
> change.[73]

Kaplan's formulation acknowledges that the international system is not permanent and that its interdependencies can undergo transformation, but it does not deal with the processes whereby the system is transformed from one state to another. Therefore, even in Kaplan's terms, "during periods of transformation decision-makers will presumably have difficulty adjusting their behavior to the systemic requirements."[74] Kaplan claims that by specifying rules for system change, a step level function, to have built into his models a means of understanding how international systems are transformed.[75]

Kaplan's six systems, which in no way exhausts the possibilities for useful model building for analytical purposes in international politics, represents "positions along a spectrum of schemes of international political organization."[76] Moreover, depending upon the structural characteristics of actors, Kaplan distinguishes between directive and non-directive systems--"the non-directive international system functions according to political rules generally operative in democracies. The directive hierarchical system is authoritarian in character."[77]--which in turn may be system dominant or subsystem dominant. The assumption underlying the distinction between directive and non-directive systems is that historical commitments and value orientations of the two types of systems will cause different interpretations of how adherence to the essential rules of a particular system should be achieved.[78]

The balance of power system has a minimum of five essential

national actors and no universal actor. It is distinguished
by an international social system but lacks a political sub-
system. The loose bipolar system consists of two major blocs,
a leading national actor within each bloc, non-bloc national
actors, and universal actors such as the United Nations. The
way in which the loose bipolar system operates reflects the
internal organization of bloc actors: if the blocs are non-
hierarchically organized, it resembles to a degree the balance
of power system; if both blocs are hierarchically organized,
their membership becomes rigid and only non-bloc members can
shift in alignments. The tight bipolar system tends to be
transformed into the loose bipolar system if both bloc
actors are not hierarchically organized. The integrating
mechanisms are weak in the tight bipolar system. By extending
the functions of the universal actor of the loose bipolar
system, the universal-international system could develop.
This system has a political subsystem which can allocate
rewards to both national actors and individuals; nevertheless,
national actors still make the important decisions and take
independent action. The universal international system does
possess integrating mechanisms which perform political,
economic, and administrative functions. The universal inter-
national system possess resources and facilities which are
superior to those of any national actor system; the universal
international system is able to coordinate and integrate value
structures of the national actors. If the universal inter-

national system is unable to integrate the domestic values of
the different national actors within a common system, it will
be unstable. The hierarchical system, which may be directive
or non-directive, evolves from a universal international
system. This system operates directly upon individuals, and
national actors are not independent political actors, rather
they are merely territorial subdivisions of the international
system. Interest groups become the primary actors, and
"functional cross-cutting makes it most difficult to organize
successfully against the international system or to withdraw
from it."[79] Moreover, channels of communication facilitate
central control, and make it almost impossible for local
regions to revolt or secede. This system is characterized
by great stability, in fact, once a hierarchical system is
established it becomes almost impossible to displace it.[80]
If Kaplan's six systems were ranged along a scale of integrative
activity, the hierarchical system would be considered the most
integrated and the unit veto system the least integrated.
The unit veto system is a Hobbesian system in which "the
interests of all were opposed--were, in fact, at war--but
in which each actor responded to the negative golden rule
of natural law by not doing to others what he would not have
them do to him."[81] This system could only exist if all actors
had weapons capable of destroying any other actor. National
actors equipped with nuclear forces would tend to be self-
sufficient and to reject any outside pressure. Universal

actors would have no role to play, alliances would recede in
importance, and major nuclear actors would tend to have
isolationist policies. This system would be stable as long
as national actors were prepared to retaliate in case of
attack, and their willingness to do so would serve as a
credible deterrent to attack by another national actor.[82]

In each of the above models, Kaplan directs attention
to the following: (1) the organizational focus of decisions
which includes the nature of actors' goals and the capabil-
ities available to attain them; (2) the allocation of rewards
which includes the degree to which they are allocated by the
system or the subsystem; (3) the alignment preferences of
actors; (4) the direction and scope of political activity;
(5) the flexibility or adaptability of actors in their
behavior.[83]

In the words of System and Process in International
Politics, "systems models are merely tools for investigating
reality."[84] Kaplan's models which are less complex than the
real international system are designed "to facilitate com-
parison with the real world, to contribute to a meaningful
ordering of data, and to build theory at the macro-level."[85]

Although Kaplan has made tremendous analytical contri-
butions by constructing models of the international system
which stress universal rules and requirements which are
binding on all national actors, the major part of his analysis
has consisted of alternative sets of system-wide rules. In

their concern for the international system, Kaplan and other international analysts generally have tended to underplay the critical role which domestic politics of the member states play in determining the rules and operation of the system.

In recent years, a predominant interest of James Rosenau's has been to modify the outlook on conceptual boundaries between national and international systems. Rosenau in his book, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy,[86] contends that the traditional division between international and domestic politics obscures the linkages between them, linkages which make the independent study of each not very satisfying or fruitful. He observes that most theorists who specialize in international systems acknowledge that such systems are largely subsystem dominant, however, their models of global international systems do not allow for differential subsystem impacts. Inversely, most theorists of national systems models ignore the impact and operation of external variables and treat the national system as a self-contained unit. With the increasing obscuration of the boundaries between national political systems and the international environments, Rosenau believes that theorists must break down the rigid distinction between national and international politics and make adjustments in their conceptual frameworks.

The linkage concept, which describes a relatively new approach within the political science discipline, implies that under certain circumstances an overlap or linkage exists

between the two traditionally distinct subfields of comparative and international politics. Rosenau defines linkage "as any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another."[87] The across-systems theorist[88] ignores long-standing conceptual boundaries[89] and focuses on different levels of aggregation; the theorist aspires to explanations in which actions and interactions at one level are at least partially accounted for by behavior and attributes at another level. The across-systems theorist is not willing to presume that variables or the dynamics operative at the system level that interests her (or him) can be adequately explained by holding the other levels constant. Thus, the dependent variables comprising the person's theory all concern phenomena at the same systemic level, but the independent variables will be taken from lesser or greater levels of aggregation as well as from the same level.

The decision as to which direction an across-systems theorist should move depends in the final analysis in the kind of phenomena that interest the theorist and the questions they lead the theorist to ask. In this across-systems study the concepts of intervention and (to a lesser extent) penetration in developing political systems are the focuses of interaction between national and international political processes. The dependent variables, intervention and penetration, which comprise this study all concern phenomena at the same systemic level, however, the independent variables, the struc-

ture of the international system and the instability of developing nations in the system, are drawn from a greater level of aggregation as well as from the same level.

Rosenau in "Pre-theory of Foreign Policy"[90] recognizes that foreign policy or international policy is an interplay and combination of both external and internal variables. He has clustered what he believes are the relevant external and internal variables of foreign behavior of nations into five categories: the individual variables--the personal characteristics of the decision-maker(s); role variables--the impact of the office on the officeholder; governmental variables-- the structure of government upon officials; societal variables-- the demands made upon officials by groups and individuals in the society; and systemic variables--the impact of the state of the world on a government's attempt to deal with it (systemic referring to the international system). Rosenau asserts that all pre-theories of foreign policy are translatable into these five dimensions. In other words, all foreign policy analysts explain (or their explanations can be re-cast in terms of these five sets) the external behavior of national actors in terms of these five sets of variables.

Rosenau not only notes the intermixing of external and internal variables, but attempts to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other. He specifically assesses the relative potencies of the five sets of variables in terms of which set of variables contributes most to external

behavior; the relative potencies of the five sets of variables is determined by the nature of the country. He distinguishes between large and small, developed and underdeveloped economies, and open and closed political systems.[91] Rosenau's various rankings of the five sets of variables, which at this stage are not based on precise specifications, are neither a single-cause explanation of foreign policy, nor a choice of employing only one of the sets of variables; it is a relative assessment of which set of variables contribute most to external behavior, which ranks next in influence, etc. Thus, Rosenau's pre-theory assumes international policy is shaped by individual, role, governmental, societal, and systemic factors and his ranking is one of determining how to treat each set of variables relative to the others.

Rosenau contends that systemic variables are more important for small underdeveloped countries than large ones since small ones are more dependent on their environment and lack the resources to change it very much. Thus, in a small underdeveloped country like Laos or Cambodia, which lacks capabilities, the systemic variables are more potent and ranked higher than in large developed countries like the United States, where systemic variables are ranked low, since it has the resources to influence and change the environment, and role variables are ranked high.

Building upon the assumption that Rosenau's categories of clustered variables can be applied to a study of intervention in and penetration of developing political systems,

one must first decide the relative potency of individual,
role, governmental, societal, and systemic variables. Both
individual and systemic[92] variables rank high as sources of
intervention and penetration. This analysis recognizes the
potency of individual variables--different leaders respond
differently to the same developments in the international
system--but it will focus and stress the potency of systemic
variables. Two systemic variables, the basic structure of
the international system and the stability/instability of
the nations in the system, will be especially potent as
sources of intervention and penetration for those leaders
who are predisposed to undertake such behavior or policy.

The basic structure of the international system refers
to the degree to which "the capability for affecting the con-
duct of international life is concentrated or dispersed within
the system."[93] According to Kaplan, even though "the causes
of internal war are themselves internal in the sense that their
origin is likely to be found in the social and political struc-
ture of the nation involved,"[94] the international system by its
nature encourages or discourages intervention. For example,
in the balance of power model, intervention in the domestic
affairs of another state is discouraged since "if the inter-
vention--for instance in favor of the rebels--were to succeed,
there might be a permanent alliance between them or a tutelage
of one over the other. Since this arrangement would injure
all other states in the system and tend to create active
opposition, the intervention would be unwise or unsuccessful."[95]

If it were unsuccessful, the intervened actor could become a permanent enemy of the intervening actor. As Kaplan notes, "these reasons are not absolutely compelling, but they are strong enough to make likely general observance of the rule of non-intervention in a balance-of-power type of system."[96] On the other hand, the constraints present in the balance-of-power system would not be operative in the loose bipolar system. Even though fear of confrontation and escalation would inhibit intervention to some extent or be a factor in decisions concerning interventions, the consequence feared "is not so direct and massive in its weight that it would prove overriding. Moreover, most interventions would be indirect and covert."[97] Intervention is a feature of the loose bipolar system, and there is "the continued probability of the incitement of internal wars and of bloc aid to internal wars that have begun for indigenous reasons."[98]

The greater the dispersion of capabilities, like in a polypolar structure, the less likelihood that the system can be radically altered by a single development; hence, global actors are less likely to engage in interventionary behavior. Whereas in a bipolar structure, where capabilities are concentrated or tightly structured, a shift in allegiance or loyalty of a national actor will seem more threatening to a global actor and interventionary behavior is more likely to occur. Thus, this study will examine first the structure of the international system. However, since the international system has been undergoing extensive change, a new mode for

conceptualizing the distribution of power in the current international system will be presented; this paradigm will be referred to as the triangular polyarchic international system. (The loose bipolar system is in the process of being transformed into this triangular polyarchic system.)

The second independent variable in this study is the instability of national actors in the system. The more precarious the authority structures in developing national actors, the greater the chance that global actors will attempt to preserve or alter them through intervention or penetration. (The third chapter will define instability and examine the developing nations of Laos, Burma, and Cambodia in the international system.)

Rosenau, in his article "Internal War as an International Event,"[99] examines the characteristics of internal wars in the loose bipolar international system, and posits that internal wars can be differentiated as follows:

> PERSONNEL wars are those which are perceived as being fought over the occupancy of existing roles in the existing structure of political authority, with no aspiration on the part of the insurgents to alter either the other substructures of the society or its major domestic and foreign policies. Latin American "coups d'etat" in which one junta replaces another are examples of personnel wars.
> AUTHORITY wars are those which are perceived as being fought over the arrangement (as well as the occupancy) of the roles in the structure of political authority, but with no aspiration on the part of the insurgents to alter either the other substructures of the society or its major domestic and foreign policies. Struggles to achieve independence from colonial regimes, or those based on efforts to replace dictatorships with democracies, would ordinarily be classified as authority wars.

> STRUCTURAL wars are those which are perceived as
> being not only contests over personnel and the struc-
> ture of political authority, but also as struggles over
> other substructures of the society (such as the system
> of ownership, the educational system, etc.) or its major
> domestic and foreign policies. A war involving a
> Communist faction exemplifies a structural war, as
> does an agrarian revolt and possibly the present
> situation in the Union of South Africa. It is diffi-
> cult to imagine structural wars which are not also
> personnel and authority wars, and thus is the most
> comprehensive type.[100]

Rosenau hypothesizes that a direct relationship exists between

the scope of the internal war and its external repercussions:

the wider the scope of a conflict, the greater the reper-

cussions. (See Figure I) According to Rosenau, structural

wars can be both functional and dysfunctional for the inter-

national system. Bloc confrontation renders the international

system more rigid and more unstable; also such situations

always contain "a serious danger of escalation," since members

of both blocs maintain extensive commitments--Laos, Vietnam--

in the bipolar system.[101] On the other hand, Rosenau contends

that structural wars and intervention by major national actors

can actually enhance international stability since structural

wars provide a means for the two blocs to compete through an

intermediary, the war-torn society. However, as Rosenau notes,

"the war-torn society certainly pays a high price for this

low-cost technique of maintaining the global system, as the

South Koreans, Laotians, and Vietnamese well know."[102] The

instability of the social and political structures in developing

nations provides ample opportunity for intervention by global

actors who have the desire or the incentive (which as noted

is related to the international structure).

Figure I

R e p e r c u s s i o n s	World-wide Military intervention Severance of relations Regional Economic aid Diplomatic support Local and adjacent

Personnel wars   Authority wars   Structural wars

scope

Source: James Rosenau, "Internal War as an International Event," in International Aspects of Civil Strife, ed. by J. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 65.

C.R. Mitchell in his article "Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties,"[103] contends that an implicit assumption in some of the theoretical work on civil strife and external parties is that "a situation of violent civil strife between two domestic parties must 'inevitably' entail a third external party becoming involved in the conflict on the side of one or the other of the domestic parties."[104] For example, George Modelski[105] speaks of the "inevitability" of internal parties being forced to make an appeal for external assistance, since any domestic group engaged in an internal war is fighting to overpower the opposing group, and, therefore, must ask some foreign actor for aid if this is the only way to achieve this goal. Modelski states "...the demand for

outside aid is the basic mechanism for 'internationalization'
of internal war; it inheres in the fundamental condition of
the struggle for power found in internal war...the demand
for foreign involvement is implicit in the logic of the
situation..."[106] Mitchell is skeptical of the idea that some
logic in internal conflict situations impel domestic parties
to appeal for aid, since there are many examples where civil
strife existed but no demands for external aid were made and
no significant foreign involvement took place. Mitchell
posits that Modelski and some others who have written about
civil strife and internal war have "confined themselves to
studying the tip of a rather vast iceberg properly labelled
'social conflict.'" He suggests that when "enquiring whether
outside involvement is likely, questions should be asked
about the nature and intensity of internal conflict."[107]
Mitchell posits that key elements in determining whether to
appeal for external involvement appears to be associated with
"the level of social integration and political legitimacy
achieved by the political system, and the relative importance
attached by the parties in conflict to achieving their goals."[108]
Mitchell notes that the degree of internal cohesion or unity
and of shared values and sense of group integration within
any state are likely to be important factors deciding whether
conflicts reach levels of violence. However, since a high
level of internal conflict is not enough in itself to bring
about intervention, attention must also be directed "to those

factors outside the situation of domestic strife itself which help to decide whether external involvement takes place."[109] According to Mitchell, if a situation of high level civil strife exists within a state, at least one necessary condition for external intervention has been fulfilled. External involvement can then occur in two circumstances, "(1) when a direct appeal has been made to an external party; (2) when no such appeal has been made."[110] Hence, in the latter circumstance, neither group in internal war may wish or ask for external intervention or aid but bloc actors may intervene sans invitation.

After examining the two independent variables--the international structure and the instability of developing national actors in the system--intervention and penetration of developing actors will be defined, examined, and illustrated in chapter four. Intervention is the study of the unconventional in international politics. It cannot be defined so broadly as to equate intervention with any action directed toward another national actor. The definition must distinguish interventionary behavior from penetrative behavior, and then differentiate these phenomena from other aspects of international politics.

In this study, two prime characteristics of intervention are the basis for operationalizing the concept: its convention-breaking character and its authority-oriented nature.[111] The behavior of an international actor is interventionary when-

ever the form of behavior constitutes a sharp break with then-existing patterns. However, this unconventional behavior must be directed at changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the intervened nation. The convention-breaking behavior must be directed at preserving or altering the authority structure in order to be defined as interventionary. Thus, this definition distinguishes interventionary behavior from other types of convention-breaking foreign policy actions such as the Marshall Plan or Cuban missile crisis, which did represent sharp breaks with past policies but were not directed at the authority structures--they were directed at the policies or capabilities of other national actors.[112]

In the international system persistent patterns of behavior have a way of establishing their own legitimacy, ir-respective of their original illegitimacy. Thus, intervention is a temporary phenomena since the unconventional becomes conventional the longer it persists. Intervention is more readily recognized and more easily operationalized and measured than other types of behavior because it has a beginning--when conventional modes of behavior are abandoned, and end--when conventional modes of conduct are restored or when the un-conventional mode of behavior becomes conventional through persistent use.[113] This definition does not equate such phenomena as imperialism, colonialism, or neo-colonialism with intervention, since intervention is defined as coming to an end when the presence of the intervening actor in the target nation becomes conventional. The above-mentioned

phenomena would come under the concept of penetration.

The behavior of the intervening actor can no longer be considered interventionary if the unconventional mode of behavior becomes conventional or accepted and established through persistent use, even though the presence of the intervening actor in the intervened society remains undiminished. This phenomena associated with the prolonged and routinized process whereby one national actor is continually involved in the domestic affairs of another comes under the concept of penetration.[114] Thus, penetrative behavior replaces interventionary behavior when the presence of the intervening actor becomes conventional or routinized. The satellite arrangements between the Soviet Union and the actors of Eastern Europe since World War II illustrates this point. Penetration is not always permanent; it ceases if the penetrating actor withdraws--i.e., withdrawal of Soviet technicians from mainland China in 1960--or it reverts to intervention if the penetrating actor drastically alters its accepted mode of behavior with respect to the authority structure--i.e., the use of Russian troops in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. (With the removal of troops the interventionary behavior was once again replaced by penetrative behavior.) However, one major problem is that it is not always clear when unconventional mode of conduct has persisted long enough to have established a new convention. Thus, in some cases one cannot determine precisely when interventionary behavior becomes penetrative behavior since viewing behavior as inter-

ventionary may dissipate slowly—i.e., acceptance of United States bombing in Vietnam (February 1965), or acceptance of 500,000 American troops fighting in Vietnam, would dissipate slowly.[115]

The penetrative process transforms a national political system into a penetrated political system. A penetrated political system permits legitimacy to become attached to the direct participation of the non-member in the allocation of its values. However, penetrated political systems like national and international ones, are not static. In chapter five, the concluding chapter, this study will examine the penetrated polity in terms of the Third World and the international system.

NOTES

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[6]Ibid., p. 25.

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[8]Ibid.

[9]Easton, <u>A Framework for Political Analysis</u>, p. 122.

[10]Ibid., p. 125.

[11]Ibid., pp. 25, 26.

[12]Ibid., p. 130.

[13]Ibid., pp. 82-84; also, Young, <u>Systems of Political Science</u>, pp. 37-48.

[14]Easton, <u>A Framework for Political Analysis</u>, p. 79.

[15]M.B. Nicholson and P.A. Reynolds, "General Systems, The International System, and the Eastonian Analysis," <u>Political Studies</u> 15-1: 41-42.

[16]Ibid., 7.

[17]David Easton, <u>A System of Political Life</u> (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 173, 486, 487.

[18]Nicholson and Reynolds, "General Systems, The International System, and the Eastonian Analysis," 23-24.

[19]Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 50.

[20]Easton, A System of Political Life, pp. 284-5, 484-8.

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[22]Ibid.

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[27]Nicholson and Reynolds, "General Systems, The International System, and the Eastonian Analysis," 25.

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[32]Herbert J. Spiro, World Politics: The Global System (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1966).

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[34]Ibid., pp. 59-73.

[35]Ibid., p. 57.

[36]Ibid., chapter 4.

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[75]Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, p. 126.

[76]Ibid., p. 129.

[77]Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, p. 48.

[78]Rosenau, "The External Environment as a Variable in Foreign Policy Analysis," p. 156.

[79]Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, pp. 49-50.

[80]Ibid., chapters 2 and 3; also Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, pp. 125-30.

[81]Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, pp. 49-50.

[82]Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, pp. 128-9.

[83]Ibid., p. 129.

[84]Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, p. 2.

[85]Ibid.

[86]James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1971), chapter 4.

[87]James Rosenau, Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 45.

[88]Jonathan Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics (New York: D. McKay Company, 1973), pp. 1-11, 25-56.

[89]J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," World Politics 14 (October 1961): 77-92.

[90]Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, chapter 2.

[91]Ibid., p. 113.

[92]Morton Kaplan, "Intervention in Internal Wars: Some Systemic Sources," in International Aspects of Civil Strife, ed. by James Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), chapter 4.

[93]Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, p. 300.

[94]Kaplan, "Intervention in Internal Wars: Some Systemic Sources," p. 92.

[95]Kaplan, Macropolitics, p. 216.

[96]Ibid., p. 218.

[97]Ibid., p. 221.

[98]Kaplan, "Intervention in Internal Wars: Some Systemic Sources," p. 120.

[99]James Rosenau, "Internal War as an International Event," in International Aspects of Civil Strife, ed. by J. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), chapter 3.

[100]Ibid., pp. 63-4.

[101]Peter Paret and John Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962), pp. 65-6.

[102]Rosenau, "Internal War as an International Event," p. 94.

[103]C.R. Mitchell, "Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties," International Studies Quarterly 14-2 (June 1970): 166-94.

[104]Ibid., 71.

[105]George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War," in International Aspects of Civil Strife, ed. by J. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), chapter 2.

[106]Ibid., p. 20.

[107]Mitchell, "Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties," pp. 175-6.

[108]Ibid., p. 176.

[109]Ibid., p. 181.

[110]Ibid., p. 182.

[111]Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, chapter 10.

[112]Ibid.

[113]Ibid.

[114]Rosenau, Linkage Politics, p. 45.

[115]Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, chapter 10.

Chapter II

THE TRIANGULAR-POLYARCHIC INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The basic structure of the international system may be
characterized in terms of the degree to which the capabilities
for affecting the conduct of international life is dispersed or
concentrated within the system. Since World War II, world
politics have been characterized as a bipolar system, dominated
by the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.
However, in the past decade, a number of fundamental changes
have occurred, causing the gradual erosion of bipolarity.
The following developments--the splintering of the two basic
blocs and the breaking down of the alliances, the emergence
of Red China as a superpower, and the appearance of several
"middle power" actors--have created a significant movement
"in toto" toward the development of a triangular polyarchic
international system.[1]

By the 1960's, it became clear that major shifts were
occurring in the global bipolarity because of the internal
changes in the two blocs and in the alliances. The splintering
in the two basic blocs is reflected in the current polycentralism
of the Soviet sphere,[2] which suggests that the international
communist movement can no longer be regarded as monolithic
(the idea that all Communist power and authority emanate
from the Kremlin); the Sino-Soviet schism; and in the decen-

tralization among American allies. The alliances may endure
in some form for quite a few years, but it is extremely im-
probable that the alliances and the political relations within
them can ever take the form that they did during the 1950's.
Discordant personalities and political styles contributed to
and accelerated the disintegration of the alliance unity.
However, due to more fundamental differences between bloc
members and bloc leaders, the changes in leadership (DeGaulle,
Johnson, Khrushchev) could not restore Soviet and American
hegemony over their respective alliances.[3]

France and China, each having been extremely dependent
on its respective bloc leader for economic reconstruction and
national security, could have been considered penetrated
polities in the 1950's.[4] However, by the 1960's, France and
China became the most deviating or non-conforming members of
their respective alliances. Leaders in both France and China
became concerned with the asymmetrical nature of their alliances
and began to redefine international alignments in a manner
somewhat different from their bloc leaders and this led to
deviation from alliance norms.

Various crises precipitated by the bloc leaders in the
1950's and 1960's (i.e., Berlin crisis of 1961-1962, the Cuban
Missile crisis, the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war) brought
alliance members to the brink of war, and caused France and
China to perceive an imbalance of risks or costs over benefits
derived from their respective alliances. The potential risks
of alliance membership were not balanced off by the benefits,

because of the lack of bloc leadership support for the alliance members' vital interests. For example, the Soviet Union did not support China's quest to regain offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits, China's nuclear weapon program, or China's frontier campaign against India in 1962. Similarly, the United States did not support France in the Indochina and Algerian wars, the 1956 Suez Crisis, or France's nuclear weapon program. The lack of support by both superpowers precipitated a loss of confidence within both superpower alliances and destroyed or weakened earlier allegiances. Also, the tightness of dependencies dissipated as the cold war diminished, and as a community of interest between Moscow and Washington developed-- i.e., Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (which France and China refused to sign); SALT (which DeGaulle had repeatedly warned against as diminishing the degree of protection afforded to Europe by the United States); and economic trade.[5] (See Figure I)

The decentralization among American allies and the development of polycentralism within the Soviet bloc reflect the disintegration of unity within the two alliances. A few indications of the decentralization among American allies were: France's withdrawal from the military sector of NATO; DeGaulle's call for an end to the European sector of the cold war and the creation of a Europe from "the Atlantic to the Urals;"[6] and the preoccupation with national sovereignty, which is illustrated by West Germany's Ostpolilik.[7] Ostpolilik is aimed at creating a climate of detente in order to estab-lish a "new order" in Europe under the auspices of peaceful

Figure I

US/USSR Trade, 1970-1973

(millions of dollars)

Source: <u>Newsweek</u> (December 2, 1974), p. 50.

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coexistence or cooperation with the Soviet Union. Werner

Kaltefleiter in his article "Europe and the Nixon Doctrine"

contends that "Ostpolilik is in part the German answer to the

alliance's inability to define common objectives and to the

accelerating tendency among the most important member countries

to pursue strictly national interests."[8] It represents the

Federal Republic's drift away from its alliance orientation,

which was due, in part, to lack of leadership in NATO and the

rejection by the United States of partnership within NATO in

nuclear questions. (Domestic political issues also played a

role, as did a general decrease in the perception of threat

from the East.)[9]

The continued polycentric character of the Soviet bloc

(reduced Soviet control and increased demands for independence

by the bloc members) despite Soviet intervention and suppression

of revolts in Eastern Europe is indicated by the independent

foreign policies undertaken by Yugoslavia, which has pulled
out of the Warsaw Pact entirely; Albania, which has aligned
itself with Communist China; and Rumania, whose independence
can be illustrated by the 1972 invitation to Prime Minister
Golda Meir of Israel to visit Bucharest.[10] Another indication
of the fissures in the Soviet bloc is the bitter public debate
between Moscow and Peking, which is reflected in Lin Piao's
thesis of a "confrontation between the cities of the world
and the countryside of the world,"[11] predicated upon a change
in international alignments and a new role for China and
the Soviet Union. Moreover, data indicate an extensive and
severe rupture between the Soviet Union and China. Perhaps
more clearly than any other indicator, foreign trade data
(See Figure II) reveal how extensively Chinese relations
with the Soviet Union have changed in recent years. During
the first decade of the Peoples' Republic's existence, or as
late as 1960, there appeared little reason to believe that
China's economy was not becoming increasingly dependent on
the Soviet Union. Since then Chinese trade relations with
the Soviet Union have changed drastically and one might con-
clude that the Sino-Soviet rift has severely disrupted trade
relations.[12] In the past few years, China's trade patterns
have changed; today, some of China's most active trade partners
include Japan, Australia, Great Britain, West Germany, Canada,
and France.[13]

Morganthau and Liska[14] perceive the lack of alliance co-
hesion in both the Communist and Western alliances to be similar

Figure II

USSR-PRC Trade: 1950-1967

X = years
Y = millions of U.S. dollars

A=% Chinese exports to USSR
B=% Chinese imports from USSR
D=% Soviet imports from China
C=% Soviet exports to China

SOURCE: Sino-Soviet Interaction, 1950-1967: Project Triad. Data collected under direction of Franz Mogdis and Karen Tidwell. Data tape was made available by Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (1971).

in character, whereas Holsti, Sullivan, Kissinger, and Diner-
stein[15] contend that the schisms within the Communist system
are far more serious. It is not within the scope of this
study to assess the competing explanation of nonconforming
alliance policies or to identify all the "events" which
"caused" alliance disintegration, such as the Sino-Soviet
conflict, or the differences between Washington and Paris.
This analysis merely notes these developments since they did
contribute to the decline of the bipolar system.

The Sino-Soviet split is a prime factor and can be con-
sidered the most important single cause of the change from
a bipolar system[16] to a triangular polyarchic situation.
The Sino-Soviet dispute created a situation that convinced
Peking that its national security was threatened in such a
way that it should pursue more flexible policies toward much
of the rest of the world. The Sino-Soviet dispute convinced
the United States that it was both possible and desirable to
deal with Moscow and Peking separately rather than as parts
of a single bloc. Thus, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger
began to reassess U.S. policies on the premise that a new
international structure was emerging and thereby reevaluated
United State-China policy[17] in a context which perceived of
China as a major actor.

The Sino-Soviet dispute has created genuine concern in
Moscow about a potential "Chinese threat"[18] to the Russians
whose historical memories include the Mongol "hordes," the
sparce Siberian population and the dense Chinese population,

an emotional anti-Chinese feeling, and an uneasiness about the
"irrational" behavior of the Chinese leaders. From the Soviet
perspective the Chinese threat, which in some ways is comparable
to the American views which prevailed in the 1950's and early
1960's, was assessed as dangerous enough to the Soviet Union's
security and interests (even though the Soviet Union has over-
whelming military superiority) to cause Moscow to carry out
a huge military buildup on the Russian-Chinese borders.[19]
Moscow's buildup on the Chinese borders and the articulation
of the Brezhnev Doctrine caused China increased concern and
forced China to develop new relationships in order to counter-
balance and to constrain Moscow.[20]

Perceptions and misperceptions play a major role in
international politics. Policy measures are often the result
of selective attention to and interpretations of international
phenomena.[21] The Sino-American relations during the 1950's
offers a clear example of policies rooted in misperceptions,
which exacerbated existing conflicts. China today is not a
superpower, nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet
Union perceive and treat her as a major actor in the inter-
national system.

The decline in bipolarity is related to the emergence
(or indicated emergence) of a new great power actor, China,
and several new (or resurgent) "middle power" actors in the
international system, which are now displaying a significant
degree of independence and dynamism in their international
activities. The most obvious examples are Japan, Germany,

France, and possibly the development of certain regional actors[22]--i.e., integrated Western Europe, Organization of Petroleum Countries (OPEC)--as effective actors in international politics.

The breakdown in the bipolar hierarchical patterns of influence and the development of fragmentation along regional lines is and will be a characteristic of the transitional period and the mature triangular polyarchic system. A consequence of regional fragmentation of bargaining is the growth of regional intergovernmental organizations, multipurpose organizations, and specialized economic and social organizations which create conditions for bargaining among actors within a specialized area.[23] Even though actors are involved with actors in other regions, bargaining interactions are occurring more frequently and across a larger number of issues within specific geographical regions (Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, the Council of Europe, etc.). Moreover, there is a tendency for actors of the same subsystem to interact more frequently and to vote together in the United Nations.[24]

The case of the potential development of Europe is closely linked with progress in the different processes of political and economic integration. The European Economic Community (Common Market) which originally consisted of the "inner six" countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany) expanded in 1972 to include Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.[25] In the area of

economics, trade within the Common Market has become increasingly larger than trade between the six members and the outside world.[26] Since 1958, when the Market was established, trade among the "inner six" has increased twelvefold.[27] The socio-economic integration is high; the people of the six Western European states freely cross national borders. As Haas notes, policy influencer integration ("the extent to which policy influencers in two or more states cooperate with each other and/or identify intergovernmental institutions as targets for mutual activities"[28]) is extensive among Common Market states. He states that a set of "inner six" partisan, interest, bureaucratic, and mass influencers now exist:

> The character of decision-making (for the inner-six organizations) stimulate interest groups to make themselves heard; it spurs political parties in Strasbourg and Luxembourg to work out common positions; it creates enormous pressure on high national civil servants to get to know and establish rapport with their opposite numbers.[29]

Compared to the Western European subsystem, the Southeast Asian regional subsystem has not progressed very far. Until the mid-1960's, the Southeast Asia actors permitted their traditional rivalries and desires for direct external assistance to override their shared interests in limiting the role of outsiders in their affairs.[30] During the past decade, Southeast Asian actors have notably increased consultations and interchanges apparently realizing that they must assume greater responsibility for coping with their own domestic and foreign policy problems. They realize that they must broaden their international relationships rather than depend

upon one outside power for support. The habit and practice
of consultation resulting in policy reconciliation is developing
in the Southeast Asian subsystem. This is contributing to
an increasingly complex network of multinational organizations
and cross-cutting associational links, i.e., Asian Development
Bank (ADB), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The desire for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia is seen
in the formation of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA)
by Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaya in 1961. This regional
organization merged with ASEAN in 1967; ASEAN has brought
together the leaders of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indo-
nesia, and the Philippines for regular consultation. By ob-
taining resources through multilateral institutions, such as
the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) or
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the dependence of a Southeast
Asian actor on any one outside actor is minimized, and the
recipients are insulated from undue direct influence by a
single donor actor. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to view
these developments as a movement toward regional integration,
but they do represent fragile steps toward institutionalizing
mutual consultations and orderly examination of differences
among Southeast Asian actors. For example, under the auspices
of ECAFE, there have been numerous meetings of specialists
on investment finance and marketing, which have made Southeast
Asian actors aware of their neighbors' problems. The hope
of these organizations is to reconcile differences and to
collaborate or to concert a common policy toward a major

development within the region.[31]

Although there is a possibility that some regional units
may coalesce to replace some of the present traditional states
as effective actors, developments in the Southeast Asia sub-
system have not yet proceeded very far. Nevertheless, one can
observe a number of attempts to make at least the first steps
toward regional coordination in international politics. In
the present system, there is no uniform trend of any type.
Regional actors may coordinate their activities on some sub-
stantive issues and not others. A survey of the present
international system would show movement toward regional
coordination in some regional subsystems coexisting with
movement in the opposite direction in other subsystems. Also,
issue area fragmentation which leads two actors to cooperate
on some issues and disagree on others is a characteristic
of the triangular polyarchic system.

The trend toward declining bipolarity is related to the
increase in the number of extrabloc actors. The nonaligned
and noncommitted actors have acquired a great deal of influ-
ence by their structural position between the two major blocs.
Because of superpower competition for the allegiance of the
uncommitted actors, the uncommitted actors have been able to
escape the domination of either bloc. As Young notes, "in
the realm of positive actions, many nonaligned states have
demonstrated an ability to manipulate their structural position
with sufficient skill to guarantee themselves a freedom of
action that goes well beyond that which would be supported by

their ability to control the more tangible elements of power."[32]
Moreover, with the admission of the uncommitted actors of
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (former colonial states) to
the United Nations, the United Nations has been transformed
from a tool by which the superpowers could police the world
into an instrument by which mini-powers can put pressure on
the superpowers.[33]

Leaders of some of the uncommitted nations of the Third
World view the cold war as a parochial power conflict, and
believe the question of communism versus anti-communism as
peripheral and irrelevant. These uncommitted leaders have
redefined the problems of world politics. They consider the
real struggle to be between the economically "have and have
nots" rather than between communist and anti-communist;
between the economically developed societies and economically
primitive ones rather than between the Russians and the
Americans; between the North and South, rather than between
the East and West.[34]

At the United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment[35] in June 1972, the conflict between the North
and the South (developed and developing actors) was much
more salient than the conflict between the East and the West.
With the increasing depolarization of the international system
and with the lack of cohesiveness within the East and West
blocs, peoples of the Third World bloc of nations were not
content to be only recognized as neutrals, since they saw
themselves as an aggregate of nations with their own interests

and concerns. The emergence of the Third World with their own

issues was evident at the Stockholm Conference in 1972. The

Third World delegates used their superior voting strength to

insure that their viewpoint was represented in most official

pronouncements, which mainly called for action rather than

initiating it, or stated a policy in principle rather than

practice.* The North-South split was reflected in the Third

World proposals--proposals blaming developed actors for the

pollution of the environment; insisting on their right of

sovereign control over their natural resources; and suggesting

that the natural resources in the oceans be used to finance

their economic development.[36] (This last proposal to be

considered at the Law of the Sea Conference.)

The major nations of the North are entering "the post-

industrial era," whereas the nations of the South are generally

struggling to enter "the industrial era;" the different time

perspective engenders different viewpoints among the leader-

ship of these nations regardless of their ideology. This

conflict of interest was dramatized in the meetings of the

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),

where the delegates of the developing South urged the dele-

gates of the industrialized North to permit the developing

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*An exception to this statement was the establishment of
a global monitoring system called Earthwatch, which will keep
track of and measure the pollution of the environment.

nations to ship increased quantities of manufactured products
to them and to establish mechanisms for the transfer of large
amounts of capital and other resources from the developed
nations to the developing ones. The delegates of the North
answered these demands with a resounding "No." With the re-
ceding cold war and with the new power configuration, the con-
frontation between the industrialized North and the developing
South becomes increasingly important in the international
system.[37]

The triangular polyarchic structure[38] involves a greater
dispersion of capabilities than a bipolar system, thus, the
triangular polyarchic system is more complex, fragmented,
and diplomatically flexible than the bipolar system. The
following overview gives the essential characteristics of
the triangular polyarchic international system.

1. The triangular polyarchic system stresses the impor-
tance of systemwide and regional variables and emphasizes the
complex pattern of their interaction. While global actors
and issues are important in each subsystem, the autonomy of
various subsystems and national actors is greater than in the
bipolar system. Regional subsystems can be viewed as comple-
mentary to the global nature of the overall national system.
Global actors' existence and interests underlie the inter-
connection between subsystem and the overall international
system.

2. With the fragmentation of the international system
and with partial disengagement from the world by major actors

(US/USSR), previous bloc actors, non-essential actors, regional actors, and the universal (or international) actor increase their independence and flexibility. In the bipolar system, interest articulation is performed by bloc leaders, by actors aligned with neither bloc, and by the international actor. In the triangular polyarchic system, interest articulation is less stratified since there are a greater number of autonomous centers of power; thus, there is more functional diffusion in frequency and locus of performance of interest articulation. In the bipolar system, aggregation is performed by the bloc leaders to insure bloc solidarity and strength; however, in the triangular polyarchic system, the two blocs have become less hierarchical in structure, and national actors are dis-associating themselves from the blocs' aggregated goals. The growth in regionalism in the triangular system reflects in part aspirations for regularized aggregation of goals by regional actors.

3. Ideological conflict is muted or diminished in the triangular polyarchic system.

4. In the triangular polyarchic system, the three essential actors monopolize or have a preponderance of nuclear weapons. System equilibrium is related to three essential actors whose capabilities are relatively equal; equal capa-bilities restrain essential actors' aggressions. Each essen-tial actor competes to increase its capabilities, but nego-tiates to limit capabilities in order to avoid nuclear war.

However, each essential actor will fight a major conventional war, rather than permit other essential actors to attain a position of preponderant strength.

5. There are three global or essential actors. (If the number of essential actors increases, the system is transformed into a polypolar system.) All essential actors are acceptable role partners. Essential actors temporarily align depending upon issue area, regional subsystem, etc. No essential actor can be eliminated by other essential actors. Two of the three essential actors cannot permanently align; this would cause system transformation.

6. A "limited adversary" relationship exists among the three essential actors. Essential actors are competitive but competition is not conflictual. There are both areas of conflict and cooperation between each of the essential actors. Essential actors subordinate their common rivalry to their common interest whenever possible. Essential actors must remain aware of common interests even while they prosecute a variety of conflicting interests in various regional subsystems; thus, essential actors are constrained to modify their conflict in any given subsystem by the fact that they have important common interests in other subsystems which they do not wish to jeopardize. Essential actors cooperate within limits to prevent occurrences which might escalate and lead to direct nuclear confrontations.

7. Essential actors have an important but diminished role with previous "bloc actors."

8. Since essential actors reject the zero sum aspects of bipolarity, no attempt is made by essential actors to acquire a worldwide network of allies; thus, changes by non-essential actors may occur without drastic action being taken by essential actors.

9. Essential actors or the universal actor act as regulators for conflict among non-essential actors. The role of the universal actor is to lower tensions among the various national actors, and to play a major role at the request of the essential actors.

10. Essential actors, even when cooperating, cannot always dominate non-essential actors.

11. The relationship between essential actors, and between essential actors and non-essential actors, is determined by the specific issue, the regional subsystem, and the set of circumstances in the whole international system.

12. The more precarious the authority structures of a non-essential actor, the greater the possibility that convention-breaking attempts to preserve or alter them will be launched by foreign actors.

13. The structure of the triangular polyarchic system lessens interventionary behavior by essential actors. But, since the international system has a preponderance of unstable subsystems (Third World), and non-essential actors have a greater degree of freedom, interventionary behavior and penetrative behavior will be a recurrent feature of the triangular polyarchic system. There will be a tendency toward

less superpower intervention, but more nonsuperpower, non-supportive, and nondominant interventions in the Third World.

The thirteenth point was examined empirically by testing the general hypothesis that with the increasing tendencies of nonsupportive, nondominant interventions over time, there should be a decreasing trend in US-USSR dominant interventionary behavior.* The conclusions found from investigating this hypothesis were as follows: (1) in the future there is a possibility of decreasing superpower intervention; (2) if the intervention is of a nonsupportive nature (nonsupportive intervention is defined as an intervention without a commitment to the existing political situation or political actors, i.e., peace-keeping force), it is less likely that the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. will be involved; conversely, if it is a supportive action (supporting either the government or rebellious group) then the US-USSR might possibly be involved in the intervention even though the overall trend tends to indicate less superpower intervention over time; (3) there is a probable tendency that the US-USSR will be less likely to intervene in less-dominant situations (a dominant type of intervention or less-dominant type of intervention is determined by the type of group used by the intervener: i.e., dominant type of intervention = intervener crosses national border; less-dominant

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*See Technical Annex.

type of intervention = intervener uses mercenary forces, or supports rebel groups, or U.N. organizational forces); (4) the data tends to indicate that US-USSR interventions have a positive relationship to Europe, Asia, and North America; (5) the tendency toward intervention in Africa, the Middle East, and the South Pacific should be negative in the case of US-USSR involvement.

The data findings tend to support the systemic explanation (the structure of the international system and the stability/ instability of national actors in the system) of intervention/ penetration. The data have a tendency to support the observation that in the bipolar period (compared to the triangular polyarchic) superpower intervention could have been characterized as a greater amount, supportive (supportive of government or rebel group, rather than nonsupportive of both, i.e., third party intervening to stabilize situation), dominant (which is determined by type of group--mainly troops crossing borders, and having troops already in the intervened country), whereas in the triangular polyarchic system there is and will be more of a tendency toward less superpower intervention but more nonsuperpower interventions, nonsupportive and non-dominant interventions.

The bipolar system with its emphasis on the importance of a single dominant axis of conflict, its tendency to view regional and national actors and to conceptualize issues (i.e., civil wars, coup d'etats) in relationship to the underlying bipolar axis of the system tends to explain why superpowers

would intervene in local conflicts, and support the government or rebel group rather than be nonsupportive of both. Moreover, when the superpowers intervened they had the power and desire (because of the perceived dire consequences) to dominate the situation (i.e., Hungary, Vietnam); thus, superpower intervention tended to be by "nation crossing border" or troops (i.e., alliance troops) already within the intervened country, rather than by the "less dominating" (or controlling) method which weaker interveners must use--rebel group supported by/ or residing in another country, mercenaries, or international organization.

The triangular polyarchic system rejects both the zero-sum view and a worldwide network of allies, and presumes that the interest of two essential actors can be advanced simultaneously, i.e., Sino-American detente, Soviet-American detente. Moreover, superpowers must remain aware of common interest even while they prosecute a variety of conflicting interests in various regional subsystems.[39] Thus, it seems reasonable (as the data tend to indicate) that with the trend toward Sino-American and Soviet-American detente, that superpowers in order not to jeopardize their mutual interests would agree to more nonsupportive, less-dominating third party interventions to stabilize situations, i.e., Congo, Middle East.[40] Moreover, since this new power situation is more diffuse and fluid, and since local conflicts are perceived as less threatening to the overall balance than in the bipolar system,[41] it seems reasonable that superpower intervention

would decrease and if they do desire to aid an ally they will do so with a "lower profile," or with "less-dominating" methods, or indirectly penetrate the polity with foreign aid, trade, etc.[42] The Nixon Doctrine toward Asia which continues the policy of repression of Asian communism, hopes to avoid involvement by "Asianization"--the substitution of indigenous forces equipped through enlarged United States military assistance (Military Assistance Program 1972) for American troops.[43]

Data indicate US/USSR interventions have been mainly in Europe, Asia, and North America (Caribbean). The respective superpowers have intervened in their geographic "spheres of influence," Eastern Europe and the Caribbean; 70.1 percent of the Union of the Soviet Socialists Republic interventions (from 1948-1967) have been in Eastern Europe, and 48.4 percent of the United States interventions (from 1948-1967) have been in the Caribbean. (See Figure III) These areas seemed mainly off-limits to other actors' interventions.[44] Thus, military intervention in the Caribbean bears fewer costs (which is always a critical determinant of public tolerance or oppo-sition) and fewer risks for the United States than any other area.[45] The new structure reduces the compulsions of the superpower leaders to consider major direct (dominant type) military intervention, however, there are reasons (i.e., Czechoslovakia, 1968,[46] Dominican Republic, 1965, Chile, 1973[47]) to believe that the prevalence of intervention within each superpower's "sphere of influence" or respective bloc,[48]

Figure III

US/USSR/PRC Interventionary Behavior

Y = number of interventions / X = intervened area

SOURCE: The World Handbook Data as collected under the direction of Taylor and Hudson (John Sullivan, "Interventionary Data"); as made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research; also see C. Taylor and M. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

will continue during the transitional period and only decline in the mature triangular polyarchic system.[49]

In Western Europe the United States tends to rely on economic expansion, and penetration by means of capital and technology, whereas the Soviet Union tends to rely more on a physical presence, above all the military (deployment of soldiers, technicians, bases and other permanent installations);[50] therefore, as the alliances show advancing signs of disarray; as national actors on both sides display signs of independence in their foreign policy; as national leaders' perceptions of serious external threats (an important source of coordination

within alliances and coalitions) totally fades away; and, as the trend toward the resurgence of national particularisms and individual goals among bloc members continues to grow, the Soviet Union by military intervention may attempt to halt this loosening of the intrabloc cohesion and solidarity and force its bloc members to stop pursuing objectives at variance with the goals prescribed for them by their formal bloc commitment. This contention is based on two major factors: (1) the previously noted Soviet intervention patterns--70.1 percent being in Eastern Europe; and (2) the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty and the right of Soviet intervention within the Communist bloc, articulated in September 1968[51] and the resulting invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Brezhnev Doctrine may represent Soviet behavior during this transformation period, since during transformation periods, decision-makers have difficulty adjusting their behavior to the new systemic requirements.[52]

Asia has been another area of essential actors' interventions (U.S. = 30.4 percent, U.S.S.R. = 19.1 percent, China = 89 percent[53]--as noted in the "Technical Annex" all figures are slightly distorted since Vietnam and Korean figures are not included), however, the data tend to indicate a possibility for decreasing intervention. Two major features of the triangular polyarchic system, the rejection of the zero-sum game (as previously noted) and the triangular structure which resulted from the Sino-Soviet dispute, should reduce the possibilities for essential actors' interventions in this area.

The Sino-Soviet dispute is a dominating determinant in the three essential actors' decision-making (concerning intervention in local disputes). In the bipolar system and part of the transformation period, the presence of China and the desire to offset her potential influence were important factors in America's decision-makers proclivity to intervene in unstable situations in Asia.[54] With the continued development and U.S. leaders' recognition of the Sino-Soviet dispute (which was a major determinant in the creation of the Sino-American detente*[55]) and the triangular international balance, the compulsive American fear of the Chinese presence becomes subsumed to the new detente relationship, which is now an increasingly important element in U.S. decision-making. The United States has begun to take a somewhat more relaxed view of the consequences of many local conflicts, and tries to avoid direct military participation in most local Asian conflicts, i.e. Nixon Doctrine.[56]

The Dispute and resulting Sino-American detente have contradictory effects on Soviet interventionary behavior. The Soviet incentive to intervene in unstable situations in the Third World, especially Asia, to offset the potential influence of China is increased. However, the Soviet Union is restrained from taking this type of action by the following

---

*The detente was slowed down by U.S. invasion of Laos and Cambodia in 1970-1971.

factors: Moscow is uncertain about American and Chinese
reactions to any overt military intervention; Moscow does
not wish to become entangled with the United States through
the process of competitive intervention in the affairs of
minor actors;[57] and, Moscow is not willing to endanger the
detente with the United States. Thus, Moscow has responded
to the conflict with China by competing with the Chinese in
many and varied situations in the Third World. For example,
Soviet interest in containing suspected Chinese ambitions
in Southeast Asia is suggested in Moscow's proposal in 1969
for a collective security pact for Asia. The Soviet navy
has made its presence felt in Southeast Asian waters and
Moscow has been economically and diplomatically active in
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and militarily
active in North Vietnam. Moscow's backing of India in the
Sino-Indian War of 1962 and its general interest in India's
security capability is part of Moscow's anti-Chinese policy.[58]
The importance of South and Southeast Asia to the Soviet
Union is not of the same order as it is to China, whose
leaders have regarded Southeast Asia in general as their
sphere of influence, thus, Soviet Southeast and South Asia
policy must be seen as a response to perceived danger from
China.[59] At the same time, the dispute imposes constraints
on interventionary behavior of China, whose leaders are both
apprehensive about a hostile Soviet Union at their rear, and
the possibility of "collusion" between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Thus, the Sino-Soviet dispute and the

blurring of ideological lines have tended to defuse the automatic hostility characteristic of the cold war relationships between the United States and Soviet Union and the United States and China.[60]

From the data and other facts, it seems reasonable to expect a decreasing tendency of essential actor intervention in Asia; and a continued negative tendency of superpower intervention in Africa which has been left to the United Nations (i.e., Congo) and previous colonial powers.[61]

The Middle East, which both the United States and the Soviet Union have penetrated but in which both have avoided intervention, continues to be a major factor of instability and of potential friction in superpower relationship.[62] Nevertheless, both have a common interest in preventing superpower intervention and confrontation as a result of some local Middle East crisis. It is a major area of intervention by non-superpower actors[63] and to control crises may prove difficult for the simple reason that neither the United States nor Soviet Union is in control as far as events inside the area are concerned.[64] The balance of power in the Middle East can be upset by internal developments in one or more countries in this region or by regional interest.[65]

The triangular polyarchic system is more flexible than the bipolar system, but does constrain any essential actor's tendency toward adventurism. Essential actors will be more cautious in intervening in local conflicts because the outcome of a local conflict is perceived as less consequential than

before, and, there is greater unpredictability and flexibility about how the other essential actors would react.[66]

The Soviet Union, the United States, and China will all compete in the Third World subsystem and all have, at least, a limited low-key involvement. However, in this system neither Moscow, Peking, nor Washington will develop genuine intimacy and if any of these actors suspects or perceives of a threat to its interests by pursuing a moderate policy, which permits the limited interests of each actor to be pursued at a minimum cost to each, or if one of the major actors is tempted by the vulnerability of the Third World to embark on a more competitive aggressive policy or on a truly hegemonic venture, then intervention and penetration by major actors will increase in the Third World.[67]

Thus, from a long-term perspective it seems probable that the prevalence of superpower intervention will be reduced with the establishment of the triangular polyarchic system since it creates a complex pattern of mutual constraints that inhibit and limit big power intervention in local internal structural wars and encourages major actors to pursue their interests increasingly through political, diplomatic and economic competition and maneuvering, and through penetrative behavior. The new power configurations means continued major actor involvement in world politics. For example, the United States continues to be involved (penetration rather than intervention) in the Indochina area--not for national security reasons but partly from previous systemic requirements and

commitments and because of the new power configurations in that area resulting from the detentes: China favors a "balkanized" Indochina and in order to obtain it China needs United States support; the Soviet Union is for a unified Vietnam which would penetrate Laos and Cambodia, thus encompassing China and undermining the United States' influence.[68]

The new power configuration reduces big power interventions, however, interventions and threats to the stability of the system will come from middle power actors (i.e., Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, Egypt, Syria, and Israel in the Middle East[69]) which have greater independence in this system. For example, in the Southeast Asian subsystem the stability of the region could be endangered by the North Vietnamese's[70] or Thai's nationalism which might cause one of these actors to pursue militant pre-colonial policies and actions toward its neighbor Cambodia which in pre-colonial centuries was a vassal to Thailand or Vietnam or both. Thus, intervention by small and middle actors increases with their autonomy. The Middle East and Southeast Asia continue to be an unsettled conflict area (and an area of potential conflict) in which the interests of both major and minor actors are involved.

Even though the data have a tendency to indicate a declining trend in US/USSR interventions, data also clearly indicate that frequencies in intervention over the last twenty years have increased. (See Figure IV) Intervention (and penetration) is and will be a recurrent and dominant

Figure IV

Interventions: 1948-1967

1948 = 25	1953 = 2	1958 = 94
1949 = 6	1954 = 14	1959 = 24
1950 = 8	1955 = 23	1960 = 43
1951 = 2	1956 = 52	1961 = 95
1952 = 1	1957 = 43	1962 = 60

1963 = 81
1964 = 192
1965 = 126
1966 = 73
1967 = 109

Source: C. Taylor and M. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 74.

feature in the triangular polyarchic system since (a) the non-essential actors have a greater degree of independence, flexibility, and freedom of action due to the fragmentation of the international system and the partial superpower "disengagement" from the world; and (b) because the present international system has a preponderance of unstable subsystems (Third World) and the more precarious the authority structures of a non-essential actor, the greater the possibility that convention-breaking attempts to preserve or alter them will be launched by foreign actors.[71] The Third World contains a large number of new states lacking in internal viability and their politics are characterized by boundary problems, internal civil strife, and the dangers of interventions in internal upheavals. As Pearson notes:

> In terms of geographic location, Middle Eastern and Asian states were the most frequent intervention targets (excluding alleged interventions) from 1948-1967. The ten most frequent targets in order were Jordan, Israel, Congo K., South Vietnam, Malaysia, the UAR, Syria, Cambodia, Cyprus, and the South Arabian Sheikdoms; in all 58 countries were targets of interventions from 1948-67, and 47 of these were in Asia, the Middle East or Africa; of 34 intervening countries, 27 of these were in these regions. The relatively frequent Middle Eastern, African, and Asian interventions were often characterized by territorial and social disputes...[72]

The following small and middle-size powers were more prone to intervene than would be expected by their size, power, population, or resources alone: South Vietnam, New Zealand, Greece, Syria, Jordan, Somalia, North Vietnam, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.[73] Among the ex-colonial Europeans, France (93 interventions) and Britain (60 interventions) were the most

prone to intervene and their interventions were mainly in ex-
colonies.[74] Among the three big powers, the United States
(184 interventions excluding Vietnam), was much more prone to
intervene militarily and overtly than the Soviet Union (51
interventions) or China (19 interventions).[75]

The facts and data support this researcher's theory that
in the triangular polyarchic system superpower intervention
will have a tendency to decline but intervention in general
has a tendency to increase in the Third World.

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Hypothesis: With the increasing tendencies of non-supportive, non-dominant interventions over time, there might be a decreasing trend in US/USSR dominant interventionary behaviors, even in the areas of Europe, North America and Asia.

Stepwise multiple regression has been used to analyze the data and to test this hypothesis. Stepwise multiple regression is a statistical technique for analyzing a relationship between a dependent variable (y) and a set of independent variables $(x_1, x_2, ..., x_m)$ and for selecting the independent variables in order of their importance. The criterion of importance is based on the reduction of sums of squares, and the independent variable most important in this reduction in a given step is entered in the regression. This step procedure continues until all of the independent variables that explain the reduction of sum of squares at the one percent level are included. The independent variables are called predictors and the dependent variable is called the criterion. This analysis was performed using the Regression subprogram of the <u>Statistical Package for the Social Sciences</u>[1] on the IBM 370 at the University of Texas at Arlington's branch of the North Texas Regional Computer Center.[2]

The sample comprised 1073 "intervention" events in 136 countries[3] over a twenty-year period (1948-1967). The sample

was drawn from the <u>World Handbook</u> data collection.[4] "Intervention" in this analysis has been defined as "any attempt to engage in military activity within the borders of another country with intent of influencing the authority structure of that country."[5] Also notable is the lack of data relating to the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts. In the case of the Vietnam conflict the only data involved are those interventions which occurred in periphery nations such as Laos which might have some relation to the more major conflict.

In this analysis the dependent variable "Intervention by the US and/or the USSR," was measured on the following scale:

> 0 = the intervention involved neither the US nor USSR
>
> 1 = the intervention involved the US
>
> 2 = the intervention involved the USSR
>
> 3 = the intervention involved both the US and the USSR

The independent or predictor variables were initially ten in number, but one was discarded in the course of the step process as of insufficient importance. The nine predictors remaining included six regional variables (Africa, Middle East, Europe, North America, Asia and South Pacific; South America was the variable dropped as explaining little of the variance, and Central America had been omitted by the researcher because its explanatory role duplicated that of Asia). (See Table A) Each of the six regional variables was scored as

Table A

Countries within Geographic Regions

North America	Europe con.	Africa con.	Mainland
United States	Finland	Libya	Central
Puerto Rico	Sweden	Sudan	America
Canada	Norway		Barbados
Cuba	Denmark	Middle East	Mexico
Haiti	Iceland	Iran	Guatemala
Dom. Republic		Turkey	Honduras
Jamaica	Africa	Iraq	El Salvador
Trinidad &	The Gambia	U. Arab Rep.	Nicaragua
Tobago	Mali	Syria	Costa Rica
	Senegal	Lebanon	Panama
South America	Dahomey	Jordan	Colombia
Venezuela	Mauritania	Israel	
Guyana	Niger	Saudi Arabia	
Ecuador	Ivory Coast	Yemen	
Peru	Guinea	Southern Yemen	
Brazil	Upper Volta	Kuwait	
Bolivia	Liberia		
Paraguay	Sierra Leone	Asia	
Chile	Ghana	Afghanistan	
Argentina	Togo	China	
Uruguay	Cameroon	Mongolia	
	Nigeria	Taiwan	
Europe	Gabon	Hong Kong	
United Kingdom	Cen. Af. Rep.	North Korea	
Ireland	Chad	South Korea	
Netherlands	Congo (B.)	Japan	
Belgium	Congo (K.)	India	
Luxembourg	Uganda	Pakistan	
France	Kenya	Burma	
Switzerland	Tanzania	Ceylon	
Spain	Burundi	Maldive Is.	
Portugal	Rwanda	Nepal	
W. Germany	Somalia	Thailand	
E. Germany	Ethiopia	Cambodia	
Poland	Angola	Laos	
Austria	Mozambique	North Vietnam	
Hungary	Zambia	South Vietnam	
Czechoslovakia	Rhodesia		
Italy	Malawi	South Pacific	
Malta	S. Africa	Malaysia	
Albania	Lesotho	Singapore	
Yugoslavia	Botswana	Philippines	
Greece	Malagasy Rep.	Indonesia	
Cyprus	Mauritius	Australia	
Bulgaria	Morocco	Papua	
Rumania	Algeria	New Guinea	
Soviet Union	Tunisia	New Zealand	

follows for each intervention:

        0 = the intervention did not occur in this region

        1 = the intervention occurred in this region

The other three predictors, with score values were:

Year of intervention (scored as a time series):

        48 = the intervention occurred in 1948...

        67 = the intervention occurred in 1967

Type of intervention:

        1 = intervention in which a nation crosses a
            national border

        2 = intervener has troops already established
            in the country (i.e., colonial or alliance
            troops)

        3 = rebel forces "supported by and/or residing
            in another nation"

        4 = mercenary forces

        5 = international organization forces

Support decision of intervenor (or intention of inter-venor supporting action):

        0 = non-supportive intervention (Intervention
            without a commitment to the existing political
            situation or political actors within the nation,
            i.e., peace keeping force or conquering nation)

        1 = supporting the government in power

        2 = support of a rebellious group

In the discussion of the stepwise multiple regression analysis, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at times will be referred to as the superpowers or superpower intervenors; thus the criterion variable may be thought of as scaled on a non-superpower-superpower continuum.

The mean for the criterion variable was .2656 which tends to indicate that most of the intervention occurred with neither of the superpowers involved. (See Table B) The predictor variable "Year of Intervention" was scaled as a time series with a mean of 61.69 or 1961 and 8.28 months with a standard deviation of 4.35 (years).

The "Type of Intervention" predictor variable was perceived by the researcher as a dominance scale (or a power scale) with smaller values indicating coercive power to dominate the intervened nation and larger values indicating insufficient strength to directly intervene or coercively dominate within the intervened nation. The mean for "Type of Intervention" is 2.14 with a standard deviation of 1.36.

Table B

	US/USSR INTERVENTION	
Intervention		
839 cases	78.2%	Neither superpower involved
183 cases	17.1%	US intervening
51 cases	4.8%	USSR intervening
0 cases	0.0%	Both intervening
1073 cases	100.0%	TOTAL

The predictor variable "Support Decision of the Intervener" could be characterized as the intention of the intervener the direction of the intervener support-action. The mean for the "Support Decision of Intervener" variable is 1.276 with a

deviation of .7297, which tends to indicate that most of

the interveners chose to support either the government or

rebellious groups. (See Table C)

Table C

SUPPORT DECISION OF INTERVENER

Intervention Cases

178	16.6%	Non-supportive interventions
420	39.1%	Supporting the government in power
475	44.3%	Support of a rebellious group
1073	100.0%	TOTAL

Through multiple regression analysis (stepwise regression

used) the plane of prediction or plane of best fit was developed.

(See Figure I) This plane had a Y (US-USSR intervention) inter-

cept of 1.25 and a slope (a ratio of US-USSR intervention/other

independent variables) of .58276. The confidence interval of

the slope was found at the .01 level meaning that the sample

slope will be found at the .01 level of the population (only

one out of 100 will a case be found outside of the confidence

range). Even though the correlations of the independent variables

with the dependent variables (See Table D) are not large but

not small either, this analysis proved to be significant well

beyond the .01 level (F = 60.74074 DF 9(1063) because of the

large number of degrees of freedom.

Figure I: The Prediction of Intervention by Standardized Multiple Regression

US-USSR
Intervention

X Variables
X_1 = Africa
X_2 = Mid. East
X_3 = Support
X_4 = Type grp./inter.
X_5 = Europe
X_6 = Nor. Am.
X_7 = Asia
X_8 = Yr. inter.
X_9 = So. Pacific

Neither

Regression formula Y (intervention) = $-0.9085 X_1 -0.08698 X_2 -0.14605 X_3 -0.21333 X_4$
$+0.26519 X_5 +0.29401 X_6 +0.15564 X_7 -0.09624 X_8$
$-0.03999 X_9 +1.25045$

		Anal. of Var.	DF	Sums of Sq.	Mean Sq.	F
Multiple R	0.58276					
R Square	0.33961	Regression	9	105.72213	11.74690	60.7407
Standard Error	0.43977	Residual	1063	205.57889	0.19340	

Table D

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

Independent Variable	US-USSR Intervention
North America	0.25922
South America	-0.05461
Europe	0.28877
Africa	-0.34661
Middle East	-0.12386
Asia	0.18466
South Pacific	-0.04237
Year/Intervention	-0.20174
Type/Intervention*	-0.31584
Support	-0.18714

*dominance variable

Thirty-four percent of the variance or the change in superpower vs. non-superpower intervention was explained by the nine variables. The standard error of estimate was .43977. The standard error is the standard deviation of the differences between predicted and actual values of Y, and this is a measure of the average distance from the line of the residuals. The sum of squares for the regression line was 105.72 with a mean square of 11.7469. The sum of squares for the residuals was 205.578 with a mean square of .19342. The discussion of the coefficients of the independent variables will be in terms of Beta coefficients or standardized scores. (See Table E) All of the independent variables except for the variable South Pacific were significant at the .01 level, South Pacific

was significant at the .05 level. Because the standard error
of estimate is smaller in all cases one can assume confidence
that the sign for B is correct.

Table E

VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION

Variable	B	Beta	STD er. B	F
Africa	-0.09877	-0.09085	0.06270	2.482
Mid. East	-0.13153	-0.08698	0.06820	3.720
Support dec.	-0.10786	-0.14605	0.02062	27.353
Type Inter.	-0.08445	-0.21333	0.01156	53.351
Europe	0.48281	0.26519	0.06980	47.850
Nor. Am.	0.51591	0.29401	0.07221	51.052
Asia	0.24521	0.15564	0.06715	13.333
Yr. Inter.	-0.01192	-0.09624	0.00356	11.210
So. Pac.	-0.15925	-0.03999	0.11370	1.962
(constant)	1.25045			

The standard error in South Pacific being close to B in
size would tend to indicate that it can not be interpreted with
the same confidence.

There was a change in the coefficient in Africa and the
Middle East during the stepwise process. These changes seemed
to occur when variables were entered which explained or accounted
for variance in Africa and the Middle East that was not accounted
for in the dependent or criterion variable (US-USSR intervention
variable). As variables are entered into the equation they add
to the unique variance in the criterion variable (intervention).

The major findings of the multiple regression:

1. The analysis tends to indicate that as years increase there

will probably be a decrease in superpower (US-USSR) intervention as shown by the negative Beta coefficient of years of intervention (-0.09624).

2. If the intervention is of a non-supportive nature, it is less likely that the US or USSR will be involved. Conversely, if it is a supportive action then the US-USSR might possibly be involved in the intervention even though the overall trend tends to indicate less intervention by the US-USSR over time. These trends are indicated by the negative Beta coefficient (-0.14605).

3. The analysis indicates a probable tendency of the US-USSR being less likely to intervene in less dominant situations. The dominance or lack of dominance will be indicated by the type of group. The negative Beta coefficient, -.21333, indicates this trend. The data tend to indicate an increase in less dominant interventions which might tend to indicate a lesser role for the US-USSR as interventionary actors.

4. The data tend to indicate that the US-USSR interventions have a positive relationship to Europe, Asia, and North America as shown by the Beta coefficients, 0.26519, 0.15564, and 0.29401.

5. The tendency of intervention in Africa, the Middle East, and the South Pacific should be negative in the case of US-USSR involvement as indicated by the negative Beta coefficients, -0.09085, -0.08698, and -0.03999.

The correlations developed in this analysis are significantly different from zero at the .01 level, thus the hypothesis was proven not false.

NOTES--TECHNICAL ANNEX: Chapter II

[1]Norman Nie, Dale H. Bent, C.H. Hull, SPSS, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1970).

[2]Nancy B. Saunders served as technical assistant-programmer.

[3]Includes international organization (i.e., U.N.) interventions.   See Yale Handbook codebook, IUCPR.

[4](The Yale World Handbook Data as collected under the direction of Taylor and Hudson--John Sullivan, "Interventionary Data.") As made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research; also citing published version Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 124-127, and Table 3.6 "External Interventions."

[5]John D. Sullivan defined intervention as "any attempt to engage in military activity within the borders of another country with the intent of influencing the authority structure of that country." This data refers to the initial intervention but not to the continuance of that event. See World Handbook Codebook, Part IV, p. 2.

Chapter III

THE INSTABILITY OF NATIONAL ACTORS IN DEVELOPING AREAS

The triangular polyarchic international structure serves
to dampen the incentive of superpower interventions, however,
the instability of the social and political structures in
the Third World provide ample opportunity for intervention
and penetration. Although political instability is a concept
which can be explicated in more than one way, this analysis
is only concerned with one condition of instability--low
level of integration. This analysis, which uses Laos as
its major case study, assumes that the processes of integration
have important effects on the stability or instability of
developing political systems. Integration is an important
concomitant of political stability or instability. Generally,
a high level of integration modifies conflict and inhibits
instability.[1] The basic assumption is that there is a strong
negative or inverse relationship between integration of a
system and political instability. Integration generally
refers to the process of bringing together culturally and
socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and
the establishment of a national identity.[2] The term "inte-
gration" is used to cover an extraordinary large range of
political phenomena. In order to resolve the ambiguous

definition, this analysis focuses on and identifies separable
dimensions of integration which are related to, but not identi-
cal with instability/stability. This analysis operationally
defines and identifies three dimensions of integration--terri-
torial, national, and political.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRATION

Territorial integration refers to the establishment by
the central government of its authority over its territory.
No government claiming international recognition willingly
admits that it cannot exercise authority in areas under its
recognized jurisdiction, for to do so is to invite the strong
to penetrate into the territory of the weak.[3] Nevertheless,
political systems that are territorially unintegrated invite
penetration by outside powers. For example, Laos with its
rugged terrain, its internal political divisions based on
regions, its diversified and small population (migrating
groups have frequently pushed into Laos meeting little resis-
tance because of low population density), its regionalism,
its tribal and village isolation, and its strategic location,
is ideally suited for penetration by its neighbors or guerrilla
warfare.[4]

Sovereignty is characterized by an exclusive control
over territory; however, many developing nations face problems
in efforts to establish central authority over the entire
territory. Some colonial powers made no effort to establish
"de facto" control over border areas since both sides of a

border were often under the same colonial government--(Laos-
Vietnam) as in French Indochina, or French West Africa--or
because a weak independent power bordered the colony--India-
Tibet, Burma-China, Laos-China--or because recalcitrant tribes
resisted or ignored efforts to be incorporated into a larger
nation-state. In most instances, the new governments have
been left to fill the gap between "de jure" and "de facto"
control. Some of the new governments have wisely not attempted
to exercise control over subordinate authorities since their
ability to do so is often very limited. However, no modern
government can accept for long a situation in which its laws
are not observed in portions of its territory.[5] For most new
states the establishment of a territory precedes the estab-
lishment of subjective loyalties (the nation). Territorial
integration is related to the problem of "state-building."
Almond refers to the problem of state-building as the problem
of penetration and integration. According to Almond, "state-
building occurs when the political elite creates new struc-
tures and organizations designed to 'penetrate' the society
in order to regulate behavior in it and draw a larger volume
of resources from it."[6]

In Asia, the authority of the state is often questioned
or meaningless, making state disintegration a general possi-
bility.[7] There is no precolonial basis for secular legitimacy,
and there is no traditional concept of the state as a territory
with demarcated boundaries.[8] Thus, colonial rule and legacy
has created many problems for the new nations of the Third World.

Two of the main problems these developing nations must
solve are their national boundaries and their minorities. If
one looks at a map, one realizes what nonsense the imperial
era has made of the boundaries of countries now launched as
sovereign nation-states. Lines were drawn arbitrarily by
competing imperialists; territories were added by imperial
adventurers, and boundaries were inherited by unthinking usage.
There was no regard for ethnic groups, and national borders
are left crossing obvious ethnic boundaries. Thus, even though
these territories are now labelled nation-states, their past
lives on and their political, racial, dynastic and social
rivalries survive into the present.[9] The Kingdom of Laos and
the Union of Burma serve as illustrative examples.

Burma, whose present-day political boundaries are largely
the product of British colonial efforts and British attempts
to define a zone of influence as against those of China and
France, faces major state-building problems. One of the present
problems of Burma is that minorities not only form a very large
portion of the population, but they are strategically placed
on all borders. The mountainous regions which presently
make up the international boundaries with Bangladesh, India,
China, Thailand and Laos are occupied by such non-Burmese
(in speech and other cultural aspects) groups as the Chin,
Kachin, Wa, Shan, Karen, and Mon. Some of these groups like
the Shan rivaled the Burmans in political influence and cultural
developments. The British who recognized this put such terri-
tories as the Shan States and Kayah (or Red Karens) under a

special administrative jurisdiction which was not directly related to Burma proper. The area which has become the Union of Burma was treated as a section of Britain's Indian empire and largely administered by members of the Indian Civil Service. When the British agreed to Burma's independence, problems developed as to the type of government and the "fate" of various "minority" groups over which the Burmans never had exercised firm political control. Dissatisfaction with the "solutions" to these problems as well as post-independence government policies resulted in many long and violent attempts among such groups as the Shan and Karen to assert their political and cultural independence.[10]

Boundary and minority problems are especially evident in the Kingdom of Laos which is an artificial creation, the off-spring of a French colonial administrative unit. The concept of a Laotian nation-state exists more in the Western press and in Laos' international legal status than in the minds and actions of most of its people, whose activities and primary loyalties tend to be limited to tribal, familial, and regional units that fall short of the nation-state. The fact that this ex-colonial state has been given the status of nation-state, even though it is really only a geographic expression, poses many state-building problems. These problems can best be understood by looking at the background to the emergence of Laos as an independent state.

The parent kingdom of present-day Laos can be traced back to the Kingdom of Lan Xang (Land of the Million Elephants) in

1353. Its rule did not correspond to the present boundaries of the country, but from that time may be dated a tradition which has bearing on the present day. For five hundred years after Lan Xang emerged, the territory was under attack from three stronger powers: Burma, Thailand and Vietnam. The kingdom that emerged in 1353 survived in a tenuous way until 1570 when Burmese strength brought it under a vague suzerainty. By 1637, independent again and under the ruling authority of King Soulingavongsa, it remained unified until his death in 1694. At this time, it split into three kingdoms or prince-doms: Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champassak.[11] Continual dynastic struggles among the princedoms coupled with foreign interference characterized this area from 1694 until 1899.[12]

During the early part of the eighteenth century, the whole territory came under Thailand's domination mainly because of the internal conflict among rival monarchs of Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champassak. An attempt to break loose from Thailand's domination led to war in 1826, but it failed, and as a result Vientiane was sacked and much of the population moved across the Mekong River into what is now northeastern Thailand, where their descendants remain in as great a number as they do in present-day Laos itself. Besides Vientiane's being sacked, the royal house of Vientiane was extinguished, and Thailand established direct control over the Kingdom of Vientiane. Under the French, the city of Vientiane in the province of Vientiane also became the administrative seat of

the government, as it has continued since Laotian independence.[13]
It was in this area that the wealthy non-royal elite evolved.

For almost two centuries, until the French came, no
unified state existed. In 1887, the Kingdom of Luang Prabang
became a French protectorate; the French ruled indirectly
through the royal house. In 1888, the French forced Thailand
to give them what is northeastern Laos. The next phase of
French expansion resulted in the relinquishment by the Thais
of all territory east of the Mekong River. After a series of
Franco-Siamese treaties between 1893 and 1907, the frontiers
of Laos became what they are today.[14]

From this confused tracing of Laos' history, several
relevant factors emerge. Laos has never been a country: "it
was a patchwork of kingdoms overlaid by a short period of
French influence."[15] Laos has not been, nor is it now an
entity in any nation-state sense. It found itself independent
in 1954 with more Lao across the Mekong River in Thailand than
there were in Laos itself. The Mekong and other boundaries,
created by the French, really have very little meaning. With-
in Laos, especially in the north, there are tribal minority
populations. On the border between Laos and China, between Laos
and North Vietnam, and between Laos and Thailand, there is no
ethnic distinction; the minority tribes in the north and the
Lao in the east straddle both sides. There is little control
over the constant movement of these peoples. Geographic features
rather than tribal boundaries have been used to define Laos'
borders. The Chinese-Laotian border follows the watershed of

the Nam Ou, a small river. The borders shared with China and Burma are permeable and unpopulated. The borders between Laos and Thailand follow the mainstream of the Mekong; the ethnic Lao on both sides of the river are more oriented to their ethnic community than to their respective nation-state. Laos' border with South and North Vietnam is decided by the watershed of the Annamite Chain; the people living in the northern Laotian-Vietnamese frontier zones are tribesmen who do not think of the international boundary as a real dividing line between kinsmen living on either side. (The French who controlled both sides of the border had only "de jure" control of this area.) The Laotian government's influence has been extremely weak and at points nonexistent along this border.[16]

The frontier zones are so mountainous and so generally covered by thick jungles, that boundaries are poorly defined and hardly patrolled. Since the land is too rugged for easy communication, communication facilities in the frontier areas and borderlands are nonexistent or inadequate. In terms of transportation, Laos has one of the poorest road density ratings in the world.* A good part of upland Laos and frontier zones can only be reached by narrow trails which are unsuited to vehicular traffic. The topography and poor internal communication and transportation system encourage tribal (as well as village and regional) isolation and put

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*Transportation and communication will be discussed in more detail in the section on national integration.

obstacles in the way of any attempt to integrate these areas administratively and govern them from a single center.[17] Because the Laotian political process does not adequately encompass the hill tribes or integrate the isolated villages, and because of the general weakness of the central government, the Laotian border provinces can anticipate possible penetration by its neighbors--Burma, China, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. These border regions not only provide excellent conditions for infiltration and exfiltration, but also for small groups of guerrillas to hide out and to survive.[18]

Another threat to Laos' state-building is regionalism, which is a type of sub-territorial solidarity. The precolonial political systems in this area were much smaller in scale, and a number of traditional monarchies were absorbed within the new Laotian boundaries (as well as numerous societies).[19] One can discern residual regional loyalties revolving around the traditional Laotian principalities of Champassak, Vientiane, and Luang Prabang. Another factor which emerges from the tracing of Laos' history is that a certain rivalry has always existed between its kingdoms or princedoms. As a result, internal dynastic and regional quarrels have broken up temporarily established centralized control; but what is more important, regional rulers have attempted to further their ambitions by seeking political association with neighboring states, threatening the existence of an independent state. Laos has always been plagued by neighbors stronger than itself.

Thus, throughout history, the conditions for survival of an independent state have been the presence of a ruler powerful enough to attract the allegiance of regions inward toward himself and the existence of a balance of power among its neighbors.[20] (The history of Lan Xang is not without parallels to the current problems and situation in Laos.)

Laos is presently divided into military regions based on the historical regional princedoms. Each region is ruled by a coalition of traditional ruling families and right-wing generals (supported by the U.S.). These regions operate autonomously and have proven incapable of significant cooperation. The central government has little influence within these regions, where the word of the traditional ruling families and the allied military commander is law.[21] Neither the National Assembly whose membership is made up of men mostly from the traditional ruling regional families and which Laotians regard as a powerless debating club, nor the king wield noticeable influence outside of Luang Prabang.[22] A United States official reported to the Senate that "many people in his area (150 miles from Luang Prabang) do not know who the king is, they do not know what he looks like."[23] (A theme--geographic remoteness from political centers--is reflected in the above example and in the following pages.)

Regional loyalties, rivalries (and foreign support of these rivalries), and semi-autonomy threaten territorial integration and continue to be a factor in the confused kaleidoscope of Laotian politics. The conflict between the Laotian elite

symbolizes regional opposition to the central government. The
Lao elite have tended to disrupt national unity rather than
encourage it.[24] Laos remains a country where regionalism
rather than centralized authority largely determines the
pattern of political, social, and economic life.[25]

The threats to state-building in Laos have not only
come from regionalism, tribal-village and frontier isolation,
but also from "internal withdrawl" from the political system
by the Pathet Lao.* Internal withdrawal refers to the prac-
tice where remote areas satisfied with a near-subsistence
level of economic activity simply stop obeying central authority,
without overtly seceding.[26] The Pathet Lao represent one form
of internal withdrawal. Laos is territorially divided into
two areas, one controlled by the Royal Laotian government
and the other by the Pathet Lao. (The exceptions are some
pockets of enemy resistance in each area.) Ever since Laotian
independence an autonomous Pathet Lao state has existed. More-
over, the two political zones tend to coincide with ethnic
zones--Laos of the plains which are the domain of the ethnic
Lao is controlled by the Royal Laotian Government (RLG), and
Laos of the (uplands) hills and mountain jungles which are
distinguished by a heavy concentration of diverse non-Lao
ethnic groups is where the Pathet Lao prevail.[27]

States like Laos, Burma, Indonesia, with weak administrative
capacities and traditions tend to encounter local withdrawal.

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*In 1965, the Pathet Lao changed its name to the Lao
People's Liberation Army.

Moreover, central government's efforts at coercion are often rendered difficult by the terrain. Lucian Pye contends that countries like Burma and Indonesia are able to tolerate the loss of administrative control of large regions for protracted periods, as long as the center is not threatened.[28]

The specter of separatism such as the Katanga effort to separate from the Congo, is not as great in Asia as in Africa. As Fred R. von der Mehden notes, "the existence of prominent ideological cleavages in the Asian context, often cutting across the cultural divisions, tend to blur the edges of separatist movement."[29] In Burma, for instance, there have been a structured series of rebellions (since independence) in which religion, ethnicity, and Communism interact and overlap in a complex way. The groups which have participated in violent rejection of the authority of the Burmese government can be divided into three categories. The first category is the ethnic groups. Ethnic groups which have included the Karens in the southeast, the Shans in the northeast, the Kachins of the north, and the Arakanese and Mons of the south (these latter two have not caused large-scale depredations), have gone into rebellion, but usually not in a highly coordinated action. The various rebel groups have not been able to agree to cooperate and coordinate their military and political actions. Once numbering at over 25,000 the Communists which include two mutually antagonistic subgroups--the Red Flag Communist ("Trotskyists") and White Flag Communist ("regulars")--are

mainly guerrilla bands which roam rural areas of Burma and carry out hit-and-run attacks. The third group of insurgents, the paramilitary units such as the Burma Rifles, participated in anti-government military action in order to bring down the government or militarily force it to "reform." These groups never did fully cooperate with other rebels in the field. These various groups have different grievances and goals and have not been able to unify to fight the Government. Thus, none of these groups have been able to escalate into large units since 1950; however, the Government has been unsuccessful in eliminating the rebels. Burma remains like other areas of Southeast Asia, a scene of political turbulence and violence.[30]

Another factor in Asia which inhibits separatism is the "Marxist-Leninist ideological commitment of some Asian groups who might otherwise be tempted by separation."[31] For example, in Laos the Pathet Lao have not been tempted by separatism because of their commitment to a unified liberated Laos--the Marxist-Leninist imperative which is eventual control of all Laos, not legalization and consolidation of the separate zone as an independent state.[32] Thus, up to this point, liberationist or autonomist[33] aspirations have had to be achieved in Laos and Burma by the simple expedient of internal withdrawal from the political system; in both of these countries, internal withdrawal is a manifestation of the low level of territorial integration.

NATIONAL INTEGRATION

National integration is closely related to territorial integration, since sovereign control over a territory may be accompanied by a feeling of nationality. National integration refers specifically to the process of creating a national culture, a subjective loyalty on the part of the population within that territory which overshadows, or eliminates, or subordinates parochial loyalties.[34] National integration is related to Almond's concept of "nation-building" in developing political systems. Nation-building, which emphasizes the cultural aspects of political development, is the process whereby "people transfer their commitment and loyalty from smaller tribes, villages, and petty principalities to the larger central political system."[35] The ultimate sanctions for the failure of nation-building are internal violence or disintegration of the nation-state.[36] The ethnic diversity of many Southeast Asian nations, for instance Laos or Burma, makes nation-building there a complex process.

The Laotian population, which is estimated to be between two and a half and three million (no precise population figures exist), comprises a variety of ethnic groups, whose diversity and in many cases isolation makes the realization of true national and cultural unity extremely difficult. The multi-cultural society exhibits great ethnic and linguistic diversity, but it is possible to distinguish four main groups: the Lao (the predominant group who constitute a little less than half

of the population), the Tai, the Meo, and the Kha. Each retains
its own language and culture.[37]

The Lao occupy the Mekong plains and the alluvial fingers
ascending the tributaries which are the only fertile lowlands
in Laos. These people form a roughly continuous settlement
which is the most unified of any area inhabited by ethnic
groups. The Lao make up about forty-nine percent of the popu-
lation and live mainly in the provinces of Champassak, Khammouane,
and Vientiane. The Lao speak Laotian-Thai which is a dialect
belonging to the central and southwestern branches of the wide-
spread Thai family; it is a Sino-Tibetan language. The Lao
are related to their neighboring Thai speakers, the Siamese;
many Lao live across the Mekong River in Thailand and the
artificial political border is no barrier to constant movement.
This is because the Lao were originally part of a widespread
ethnic group that came south from what is now China; the Lao
share especially with the Siamese and to a lesser extent other
Thai peoples--language, social and political organization,
agricultural methods, artifacts.

Even though the Lao people have the same language, it
is written by these people in several different forms; the
Lao, in different parts of Laos, use different written styles
according to their preference. There is no standardization
of spelling. This local variation among the Lao also exists
in custom and behavior. The majority of Lao are peasants.
On the whole these people are sedentary wet-rice cultivators;

however, the small elite and the royalty of Laos are also Lao.[38]

The Tai Tribes who differ from the Lao but share their cultural origins speak a Lolo dialect of the Tibet-Burman family of the Sino-Tibetan stock. The Tai Tribes are made up of different ethnic subgroups. The main subgroups are: Tai Dam, Tai Deng, Tai Neua, Tai Phong and Phou Tai. These tribes live chiefly in the mountain valleys of northern Laos. Their widely scattered settlements are too isolated to allow any extensive sense of political or racial unity; thus, political organization in these tribes rarely extends beyond the immediate village area and its local trading and social relationships. The Tai Tribes are primarily wet-rice growers, although millet, sweet potatoes, corn, and beans are often cultivated. The mountain slopes are used for dry rice and wheat. These Tai Tribes are self-sufficient in their basic food and clothing requirements, but they have always traded with the lowland Lao for certain items.[39]

Even though the Lao and the Tai have similar basic languages and cultures (Sino-Tibetan family), the Lao regard these tribes as their inferiors; whereas, the Tai Tribes think that they are superior to the Lao. The Tai have a general suspicion and dislike for the Lao; this inhibits assimilation. Communication is possible between the Lao and the Tai, for the Tai dialects, of the same general structure as the Lao, are for the most part mutually intelligible.

Another closely related group is the Meo and the Man
Tribes. Linguistically, they are close to the Tai and the
Lao, but they exhibit strong evidence of influence from the
Chinese culture. This may be the result of their proximity
to the Chinese border. The outstanding peculiarity of these
people is that they practice "slash-and-burn agriculture" to
a more intensive degree than the other tribal people in Laos.
They habitually exhaust the soil to the degree that natural
vegetation cannot return.

The Meo are proud people and disdainful of the Lao
lowlander. The Meo, even though they live in scattered small
villages on the mountaintops, seem to have achieved some degree
of political unity. They are the only tribal group which has
an elected deputy in the National Assembly. This is rather
amazing since they only represent one-tenth of the population.[40]

The above groups have a certain linguistic unity and to
a lesser degree similar cultural origins. This can be con-
trasted with the so-called Kha Tribes who make up about a
fourth of the population in Laos. The Kha Tribes are believed
to be speakers of various Mon-Khmer languages which are
unrelated, historically, to the Sino-Tibetan stock. These
groups have in the course of time become to a small degree
acculturated to the Lao culture; this has been the result of
these tribes being conquered and enslaved by the Lao in
ancient times. Kha is the Laotian word for "slave;" even
though it is greatly resented, it is still applied by the Lao
to the people of these sixty different Kha Tribes.

These sixty different Kha Tribes have little sense of
ethnic or political unity. The Kha people are often distin-
guished by darker skin color. These tribes live on mountain-
tops above the Lao and subsist by cultivating rice, maize,
tobacco, cotton, and other crops, largely by means of the
"slash-and-burn method." The various languages spoken by
the Kha are very different in structure from the Lao's language.
Some Kha speakers know a little Lao or Tai language. However,
acculturation and assimilation of the Kha Tribes is going to
remain a problem for the Laotian Government, for there is a
long history of deep-seated antagonism and resentment between
the Kha and the Lao. At the moment there are no effective
plans for dealing with these groups which make up one-fourth
of the population.[41]

There are other tribal groups in Laos but they are
unclassifiable. No one group is significant in number or
political importance. Together they constitute about ten
percent of the population. The only other group in Laos
which has not yet been discussed is the foreign minorities.
In Laos, since independence, there are about six thousand
Europeans, nine thousand Vietnamese, thirty thousand Chinese,
and about one thousand Pakistanis and Indians. Most of these
groups are concentrated in the urban centers while most
natives inhabit the rural areas.

The Vietnamese are craftsmen and merchants; they were
also used by the French to fill administrative, teaching,
skilled labor, and clerical posts. The Chinese besides being

in the urban areas, are found throughout the rice-growing areas as millers, moneylenders and traders. The foreign minorities in Laos are a small but important group, for they have filled (and continue to fill) key engineering and administrative posts. Since independence, which caused the withdrawal of much of the foreign personnel, a vacuum was created which has been difficult to fill.

Each of Laos' ethnic groups do, to a great degree, preserve a distinct sub-society and geographic region. Generally speaking, the Lao Loum prefer the lowlands, the Tai the mountain valleys, the Kha the mid-mountain level, and the Meo the mountain tops. (Wartime dislocation has modified this stratification slightly.[42]) They each have their own language, culture, and religion; each tends to view the other as foreign. There is little acculturation because before the present century many of these people were enemies among whom armed clashes were very frequent. Thus, to this day they continue to resist intensive contact and intermarriage. The only political and cultural unity the Kingdom possesses is provided by the Lao who form the largest group. Their common language and traditions give the Kingdom a loose economic and political system. However, Laos, like Burma and other Southeast Asian countries, remains an extremely diverse and highly hetero- geneous society, which in reality cannot even be regarded as a single society.

The social and political structure in Laos is based to a large extent on these racial groups. The diverse tribal

people of the highlands are at the bottom of the scale; the
Lao peasant villagers who barely outnumber the tribes are next
on the scale. Above this, is perched the very small Lao
elite which includes about twenty families which have deep
regional roots and have deeply rooted antipathies toward
each other. An unimaginably wide gap (which will be covered
in the section on political integration) separates the widely
traveled, multilingual elite who are highly educated in both
Eastern and Western traditions, from the mass of primitive
rice cultivators.

In Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia, the ethnic diversity
is less important than in Laos, since the Thai, Vietnamese,
and Khmer form overwhelming majorities compared to the rela-
tively few members of the ethnic minority. However, in these
countries, the small minorities have been ignored. In South
Vietnam and Cambodia the minority problem has been officially
denied existence. For instance, Cambodia has a single domi-
nating culture; the Khmer make up ninety percent of the
population, and the Vietnamese and Chinese constitute most
of the remainder. However, according to Prince Sihanouk in
1965, "Cambodia is not their homeland (speaking about the
Vietnamese and Chinese populations in Cambodia) we do not
have minorities, only foreigners."[43] The Vietnamese in
Cambodia, who have maintained themselves as a community apart
from the Cambodians since there is a long history of enmity
between the two peoples, are believed to be sympathetic with the

views of the North Vietnamese government and are considered

behind-the-scenes supporters of the small Cambodian Communist

Party, the Pracheachon, which had little backing until the

fall of Sihanouk.[44] This can be contrasted with South Vietnam

where divisive sentiments derive from religion and strong

sectional feeling. In South Vietnam about eighty-five percent

of the population are culturally and linguistically Vietnamese,

but the existence of several sects within the Vietnamese

Buddhist religion, and the existence of minority religions

have been a significant source of social cleavage. Moreover,

a certain type of sect, i.e. Hao Hoa, is identified with a

given region.[45] Thus internal cleavages in its major religion

and minority religions are of great significance in Vietnam.

As Badgley notes, "Strong religious identification among minor-

ities--Catholic and Mahayana Buddhist Chinese and Vietnamese,

Theravada Buddhist Khmer, Cao Dai and Hao Hoa sects, and

animist hill tribes--accentuate the differences among Viet-

namese."[46] Even though tribal groups in Vietnam constitute

less than a tenth of the population, they occupy over half

of the territory and further divide the country.[47] The multi-

farious identities of the population makes the process of

acculturation and governing very difficult. In Thailand,

problems of nation-building are caused by the distrust of

subcultures in different areas of the country, particularly

the northeast where some of the hill tribes are situated.

Nevertheless, compared to its neighbors, Laos and Burma,

Thailand is a relatively unified and integrated state.[48]
Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam are more culturally
homogeneous than Laos, but even in these countries there
are some barriers to national integration.

Other Southeast Asian countries, such as Burma and
Indonesia share with Laos a similar set of ethnic and cultural
problems. In each of these countries, one religion and one
ethnic-language community (respectively, the Burmans-Theravada
Buddhist, Javanese-Muslim, Lao-Theravada Buddhist) dominate
the nationalization process and most institutions at the national
level, and important minorities are excluded.[49]

In Laos a small minority of Lao dominate the government
and administration. The non-Lao have been barred from all
but token opportunities for educational and social advance-
ment. The Lao do not govern oppressively, but this may simply
be because they have not extended their administration very
far or very effectively. The Lao elite who have had a nearly
"nonexistent" assimilation policy for the other ethnic groups
simply have acted upon the assumption that the minorities
would become Lao in dress, language, religion, etc. In Laos,
as well as in Burma, the army, which could be used as an
assimilation and integration tool, is controlled by men from
the dominant ethnic community. In Burma, officers from ethnic
minorities usually are placed in technical or specialized
duty away from command positions (and decisions) that are
filled and controlled by the Burmese. The military has not

assimilated minorities in Laos and Burma, rather, it has
tended to reinforce the interests of the dominant ethnic
community.[50] Thus, in Laos as well as in other Southeast
Asian countries, there are important minority communities
which find themselves cut off from influence in politics,
the military, the education system, and the economic process.
The existence of these unsocialized minorities has impeded
national integration and has led to serious political friction
and even to military conflict. In Burma both military and
civilian governments of the dominant Burmese have problems
ruling such minority groups as the Karens, Kachins, and
Shans. In Vietnam the "montagnards," or hill tribes, have
always resented central government control.[51] In Laos a
clear indication of the ethnic (as well as political) nature
of the struggle between the Royal Laotian Government and
the Pathet Lao is the composition of the contending armies—
the former is made up of the ethnic Lao, the latter the hill
tribes.[52]

The Pathet Lao have consistently and successfully
appealed to ethnic groups and have emphasized the minorities'
grievances against the Lao. The Pathet Lao have been actively
promoting education in their "liberated areas" and have paid
special attention to the schooling of the minorities. They
have permitted tribal languages and schools in their areas
and have sent members of tribes to school in North Vietnam,
the Soviet Union, and China.[53] In contrast, the Royal Laotian
Government does not recognize tribal languages and has for-

bidden publication of such languages.[54] The Pathet Lao rely heavily on ethnic minority cadres, and have their main bases in regions inhabited by minorities; the Pathet Lao have stressed "minority policies" and have devoted considerable effort to harmonizing relations between ethnic groups.[55]

Most vital to the nation-building process is a national language and educational system; the usefulness of education in the nationalizing process is obvious. However, in countries where most of the population is illiterate it is not an easy undertaking. The problem of language also presents obstacles. A multitude of languages, with no common language to serve as a means of communication inhibits nation-building. As indicated in the brief survey of the peoples of Laos, ethnic-linguistic differences remain a barrier to communication and unity. In Laos there is widespread illiteracy and no common language. The literacy rate is estimated at fifteen percent and it is the elite and the foreign minorities who make up much of this percentage. This has reinforced separatism and diversity and continuing tribal isolation. There are no common tools which can be used to spread ideals and integrate the "society."

Literacy is a measure of the degree to which a population has already been educated; whereas educational expenditures and enrollment ratios can serve as measures of "how much total effort a country is devoting to primary and secondary education."[56] Of the previous French colonies, (See Table A)

Table A

Education Table

Country	Literacy	Enrol. Ratio*	Ed. $ Per Capita
Mean	54%	47	24.55
North Vietnam	65	NA	6.79
South Vietnam	45	47	4.96
Cambodia	41	42	5.07
Laos	15	27	2.50
Burma	65	30	1.58
Thailand	70	38	2.81

*School enrollment ratio relates the school enrollment at the first and second levels of education to the estimated population aged five to nineteen years, inclusive.

Source: C. Taylor and M. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 30-32, 203, 232-234; 225-27.

where the task of making education available to the youth has

not been an easy one in view of the lack of ground work laid

by the French, North Vietnam has the highest literacy rate,

65 percent, and the highest educational expenditure per

capita, $6.79; South Vietnam with 45 percent has a higher

literacy rate and enrollment ratio, 47, than Cambodia whose

literacy rate is 41 percent and enrollment ratio 42; however,

Cambodia has a higher educational expenditure per capita,

$5.07 than South Vietnam, $4.96; Laos has an extremely low

literacy rate, 15 percent, and comparatively low enrollment
ratio, 27, and educational expenditures per capita, $2.50.[57]
Burma, which inherited an educational system from the British
which produced a limited number of liberal arts educated
leaders and a mass of people who could read and write English,[58]
has a comparatively high literacy rate, 65 percent, but a low
enrollment ratio, 30, and per capita expenditure, $1.58. Burma's
and Laos' low rankings tend to indicate that their present
educational policies, and Laos' past policies, are inadequate
in terms of being supportive of national integration. Thailand
has a high literacy rate, 70 percent, a relatively lower
enrollment ratio, 38, and per capita expenditure, $2.81. Since
Thailand has always been independent, her educational system
has evolved steadily, which seems to be reflected in her lower
expenditure rate but higher literacy rate; therefore, she does
not have the acute problem of the previous French colonies--
developing an educational system where one was nearly non-
existent--or the previous British colony--developing a Burmese
administration and staff to replace the British and reorienting
the system to the new Burmese state, i.e., using Burmese rather
than English as the language of instruction.[59]

By comparing the defense expenditures to the educational
expenditures, these quantitative measures provide evidence of
policy priorities within each country. (It also tends to
indicate the degree of instability in these countries; however,
this, with other indicators, will be covered in the section on

political integration.) Except for Thailand, all the countries expend considerably more money on defense than education. (See Table B) Laos, for instance, spends five times as much on defense as education. Before Laos can begin to have an effective education system, there are many practical problems which must be contended with: the ethnic and language variation, the inadequacy of funds for expansion of education, the scarcity and the extremely limited opportunities for higher education.

If Lucien Pye's assumption--that the basic functions of representative government are critical in the nation-building process[60]--is valid, then education is one of the most important problems which faces the new states. If a nation is to have economic modernization which requires skill at all levels, and, democratic institutions* which require a large body of educated people who can articulate and aggregate their interests and from whom leaders can be chosen, the benefits of education must penetrate the whole society. Education is a necessary tool in the creation of a new social ideal or national culture; the essence of nation-building "is the search for a new sense of collective identity for an entire people--a sense of identity which will be built around a command of all the potentialities inherent in the universal and cosmopolitan culture of the modern world, and a full expression of self respect for all that is

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*Economic modernization does not require democratic institutions or government.

Table B

Defense/Education Comparison Table

Country	Defense Expen. as % of GNP	Educat. Expen. as % of GNP
Mean	3.7	3.5
North Vietnam	19.7	6.8
Laos	15.6	2.9
South Vietnam	13.6	3.3
Cambodia	6.4	3.7
Burma	6.3	2.2
Thailand	2.2	2.2

Source: This data was obtained from the World Handbook Data as collected under the direction of Taylor and Hudson; as made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Date, 1965. C. Taylor and M. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

distinctive in one's heritage."[61] It is the blending of the universal and parochial cultures.

Regionalism, racialism, tribal and village isolation are also perpetuated by the character of the economy. Ninety-five percent of the Laotian population is engaged in some type of subsistence agriculture. The people for the most part live in villages along the main roads and the river banks. The typical Laotian village is composed of about fifty houses and two hundred and fifty people. The Lao in the lowlands are predominantly wet-rice cultivators; each family farms an area

just large enough to supply the family needs. The farmer
plants, cultivates, and harvests his crops by methods his
ancestors have followed for centuries. Not enough rice is
grown locally to feed the urban population. The Lao who is
the practitioner of a subsistence agriculture is completely
complacent and sees no advantage in employment for hire. Even
under the French administrators, Vietnamese had to be imported;
hence, the Laotian labor force under the French remained
almost entirely agricultural and lacked even semi-skilled
labor.[62] As a result of these characteristics, there has been
a lack of integration and interdependence among the different
elements of the population. For with industrialization and
the division of labor, village isolation, racial barriers,
and tradition often break down and acculturation and assimila-
tion become easier.

Educational statistics offer a key to present and future
manpower resources, which affect industrialization and urbani-
zation, and this in turn reduces village isolation and the
elite-mass gap. Educational enrollment as a percentage of
the whole population is an indicator of the proportion of
educated manpower a country has. According to Peasley[63] and
Badgley,[64] "sustained economic growth is associated with the
following enrollments as a percentage of total population:
primary 10 percent, secondary 2 percent, and higher education
above 0.3 percent."[65] The exact ratio, according to Peasley,
is not as important as the balance among these three, if the

developed states are to be used as a criterion for a desirable educational model. (See Table C) The percentage of total population enrolled at each level in Thailand was 14, 0.99, and 0.16; in Burma the ratios were 8.4, 1.1, 0.08; Cambodia—9.8, 0.82, and university insignificant; Laos—6.1, 0.2, 0.01; South Vietnam—9.2, 1.7, 0.11; North Vietnam—12.8, 0.28, 0.09. North Vietnam's and South Vietnam's low educational enrollments tend to be misleading in terms of manpower potential available for productive purposes, since these countries have experienced rapid social and political mobilization because of the war. The impact of the war quickens urbanization and industrialization as significant numbers of wartime-travelled* village youths seek urban opportunities. Thus, in these two countries, the urban-rural gap and village isolation will be reduced by the urbanization trend, which is "a behavior pattern common to modern postwar situations."[66] The educational ratios of Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, and Laos are comparable; their low percentages illustrate the long distance all of these states will have to go before their manpower base will be adequate for sustained economic growth which leads to urbanization. Unlike North and South Vietnam, the armies of these states tend to be too small and weak to have significant impact on mass attitudes.[67] Although their primary enrollments are increasing, all these countries have

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*Those youths who have broken the village umbilicus by serving and travelling with the army.

Table C

Manpower: Enrollments as a Percent of the
Total Population

Country	Primary	Secondary	Higher Education
Ideal ratio	10.0	2.0	.3
Thailand	14.0	.99	.16
Burma	8.4	1.1	.08
Cambodia	9.8	.82	insignificant
Laos	6.1	.2	.01
South Vietnam	9.2	1.7	.11
North Vietnam	12.8	.28	.09

Source: John Badgley, _Asian Development_ (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 79-85.

very weak secondary systems and higher education lags. Laos in particular is extremely weak, however, none of these countries are well off in terms of skilled manpower resources.

Transportation and communications increase mobility, hasten the break down of localism, and advance the nationalization of the society, the political system, and the economy. Village self-sufficiency and village-tribal isolation is encouraged by lack of transportation and communication. Cambodia, Burma, and Laos have embryonic transportation systems. Laos, for instance, has to depend upon river transport for much of its traffic; the principal and most important artery

of transportation is the Mekong River. However, its rapids, waterfalls, and often narrow channels make navigation difficult. Laos is laid on a north-south axis, however, the rudimentary road system built by the French runs from east to west, i.e., Vietnam to Laos. Few roads cut across it and those which do are nonpassable during the rainy season.[68] In the absence of an adequate system of highways and no railroad, great reliance has been placed on air transportation. Domestic as well as international air transportation facilities of the country have been greatly expanded since the war. Laos has three all-weather international airports located at Vientiane, Seno, and Pakee; it also has a dozen other fields for national traffic. This has not really solved the problem of village isolation. Efforts have been made mainly to improve international transportation, rather than unify and integrate the villages and tribes by a transportation network.[69]

In few countries are public information and communication more primitive than in Laos. The effectiveness of the printed word is severely limited by the illiteracy and language variation. All formal information media are controlled by the government or persons closely associated with high governmental circles. At the present, however, word-of-mouth communication is by far the most important source of news for the majority of Laotians. This is done by boatmen and ballad singers who travel from village to village. This keeps the Laotians near the rivers or towns fairly well informed on local matters; but,

the tribal groups which make up forty percent of the population
see far fewer travelers high in the mountains, and as a result
they are ignorant of affairs other than their own.[70] On the
whole, the government has never consciously attempted to use
these traditional newscarriers; thus, political and govern-
mental problems have not been popularized and disseminated to
the masses of the people. There are a few printed newspapers
which are mostly privately owned; these are circulated only in
the area in which they are printed. Laos has one radio station
which broadcasts six hours a day. It has one thousand tele-
phones which are out of order most of the time.[71] Transpor-
tation and communication, which are vital if a country expects
to be integrated and have national social cohesion, are lacking
in Laos.

Laos is a good example of a nation in which poor communi-
cations have been partially responsible for a serious lack of
national identity. As Fred von der Mehden notes, "without
railroads or good radio transmission, with one of the poorest
road density ratings in the world, and with the fifth lowest
newspaper circulation per capita, national unity is not great."[72]
However, Laos' poorly-developed transportation and communication
systems are not unique in Southeast Asia; Burma, Cambodia, and
to a lesser extent Thailand also have deficient systems. Like
Laos, Thailand utilizes extensive water transport to supplement
the road and rail link; Thailand, whose transportation network
is far superior to Laos', still has poor transportation links

and communication lines in frontier hill regions to the north
and northwest where the hill tribe minorities live, in the
peninsula, and the Korat plain area. Nevertheless, the trans-
portation and communication system is much better developed
in Thailand, than in Laos, Burma, or Cambodia. Thailand has
one km of road per 0.6 square miles, whereas Laos has 1.1 km
per 100 square km, Burma has 2.5, and Cambodia has 3.7 km of
road per 100 square km. Laos has no railroads, Burma has
0.45 km of railroad per 100 square km, and Cambodia has 0.23
per 100 square km. Comparatively speaking, Laos is the worst
off in terms of roads and railroads; Cambodia and Burma are
in a slightly better position with Cambodia having more roads
per square km and Burma having a better railroad system.[73]
(South Vietnam and North Vietnam, whose railroad and road
systems were disrupted by bombing or war in general, have had
to use water transport and air transport as a substitute. The
high costs of rail and road construction means that they
probably will not recover quickly or advance rapidly. In
terms of communications, North Vietnam relies extensively on
speaker systems in the villages and hamlets, as well as radios
in urban areas. Because of the war, telephone communication
is primitive and television does not exist. In South Vietnam,
radio communication has developed rapidly due to American aid.)

In communications, Thailand is the most developed with
thirteen newspapers per thousand people, Burma has ten, Cam-
bodia has seven, and Laos five.[74] Except for Thailand, which

has about one million television sets, none of these countries
have television. Burma, Laos, and Cambodia have less than
fifteen radios per thousand people. Except for Thailand,
these figures indicate primitive transportation and communica-
tion systems in Burma, Laos and Cambodia. The implication
of this generally primitive condition of communication and
transportation is obvious; these countries will not be able
to integrate territorially, nationally, or politically until
an infrastructure is built.[75] Moreover, as Daniel Lerner
emphasizes in his classical study, political as well as
economic modernization is dependent upon the development
of psychic mobility and empathy in individuals; this was once
gained by physical mobility but now it is multiplied by
mediated experience through the mass media.[76]

Nation-builders, seeking to secure the loyalty of the
citizen for the state alone, face serious competition. The
state has emerged apart from the local community structure
and village people. Religion serves as a basis of social and
individual identification in Laos, Burma, and Cambodia.[77] To
the exclusion of the state, Buddhism, the village community
structure, and the local Lao culture interact and reinforce
each other. This interaction between Lao-Buddhism and the
indigenous culture is illustrated in the following overview
of Lao-Buddhism and values.

Buddhism is the predominant faith in Laos. Buddhism,
which plays a very important role and goes a long way in

explaining and understanding these people and their values,
is the single greatest influence on the Lao people. Buddhism
is one of the few features in the Lao culture which peasants
and elite have in common.

Buddhism is based upon three main concepts: (1) the
doctrine of Buddha, a guide to right action and belief;
(2) the retribution of actions, or the responsibility of a
man for the sum of his actions in prior incarnations and to
date in his present incarnation; (3) the religious community,
the ascetic order within which a man can improve the sum of
his actions. There is no promise of heaven or a life after
death--Buddha did not preach the existence of a soul--but
there is salvation in the form of a release from the cycle
of births and deaths. The essence of Buddhism is contained
in the Four Noble Truths: (1) suffering exists; (2) suffering
has a cause--the craving for existence; (3) suffering can be
ended by extinguishing this craving; (4) there is an eight-
fold path by which a permanent state of peace can be obtained.[78]

Buddhism stresses the fact of suffering. Life is suffer-
ing. Existence is pain; the struggle to maintain individuality
is painful. The reason one suffers is because of the transi-
ency, the impermanence of human existence. There is sorrow
because all things pass away. One's dreams, hopes, desires--
all will be forgotten as if they never had been. This is a
universal principle common to all things. "'Whatever is
subject to origination is subject also to destruction.'"[79]

According to this view, desire causes suffering, since what one desires is impermanent, changing, and perishing. These desires are caused by ignorance. One is ignorant concerning his true nature and the nature of the universe in which he lives. However, he may be freed from his ignorance by following the Middle Path which was taught by Buddha.

This is not a doctrine of despair, for everyone can be saved finally. Through the wisdom which comes from reflection on the transitoriness of life, and by following the Path taught by the Buddha, everyone can attain Enlightenment. One may also cancel out suffering in this life or future lives by the acquisition of merit. Man is in this way treated individualistically and shown that he can progress or regress through his own merit.

Tolerance has been an outstanding characteristic of Buddhism from earliest times. Buddhists are generally noted for their liberal attitude toward other religions, whether polytheistic, monotheistic, or atheistic. Buddhists admit the truth of any moral and philosophical system, whether primitive or developed, provided only that it is capable of leading men at least part way toward their final goal. Thus, Buddhism is not prescriptive, authoritarian, prohibitive, or exclusive in its attitude toward its followers or other religions.

According to Buddhism, faith becomes superstition when it is not examined by reason. "Gautama was described as one

who reasoned according to the truth rather than on the basis
of the authority of the Vedas or tradition. Theravada and
Mahayana Buddhism have accepted two standards for the truth
of a statement: it must be in accord with the scriptures
and must be proved true reasoning."[80] No Buddhist is expected
to believe anything which does not meet these two tests. The
acceptance of rational analysis of the nature of human existence
has been a continuing characteristic of Buddhism. In Buddhism,
faith is an introductory means to the attainment of truth, not
an acceptance of definite dogmas.[81]

The central theme of Buddhism is that, by following the
right Path, one can free oneself from the bondage of existence
and come to the realization of the Supreme Truth. All Budd-
hists agree that Enlightenment is realization of the Supreme
Truth. All Buddhists agree that Enlightenment is their goal
and that it is attained by following the right Path. One who
has attained Enlightenment is far from having dissolved into
non-being; it is not he who is extinct, but the life of illusion,
passions, and desires. This ideal state is called Nirvana,
"extinction of afflictions." Nirvana is a lasting state of
happiness and peace, to be reached here on earth by "the ex-
tinction of the fires of passions." It is the highest happi-
ness, the bliss that does not pass away.[82]

The Doctrine of the Buddha is not a system of philosophy
in the Western sense but is rather a Path. A Buddha is simply
one who has trodden this Path and can report to others on what

he has found. All Buddhists aim to teach the way to realize
an ideal life. In Buddhism, the entire stress lies on the
mode of living, on the saintliness of life, on the removal
of attachment to the world. Buddhism simply offers a way for
those who will follow. Buddhism contains the ideal to which
the Lao offers reverence. The people generally respect the
Buddhist moral code and attempt to follow its more basic rules.
The importance of merit-making and the acquisition of merit
in preparation for one's future existence remains a dominant
theme in the lives of the Laotian Buddhists.[83]

The ten immoral actions according to Buddhist doctrine
are: killing any living thing, stealing, unchastity, lying,
slandering, harsh language, frivolous talk, covetousness,
ill will, false views. These actions are to be avoided by
following the Middle Path. A "middle way" between the extremes
of conduct is characterized ideally by gentleness, acceptance
of nature, avoidance of conflict, and respect for all life,
but within these bounds there is freedom of choice and by
implication, the right to have this choice respected by others.
In the Lao value system, compassion, serenity, and moderation
are held in high esteem.

According to Theravada Buddhist doctrine, every adult
male should become a bonze. This means at least three months
of monastic life. The bonze subjects himself to trials of
voluntary ugliness, asceticism, and chastity. He attempts
to learn perfect detachment and "will unconsciously be influ-

enced by the fact that he is most highly regarded by society when he exists in a state of material poverty."[84] The experience in the monastery creates an apathy, an indifference to others, disinterest, and nonchalance. This monastic experience is "at the same time a great 'savoir-vivre' and a block to all real effort."[85] In his youth, every Laotian male has spent a period in a monastery learning to apply the precepts of Buddhism. Buddhist doctrinal practices have come to have a great influence on the affairs of the people, their pattern of life, customs, values, and attitudes. It is the major socialization agent for the average Laotian male.

Giving alms to the bonzes and supporting pagoda projects are still a basic part of the life of the common believer and an effective way to gain merit. Nearly every sizeable village in Laos supports one pagoda, which is the focus of the religious and social life of the villagers. There were an estimated 1,868 pagodas in Laos at the last count in the 1960's. As Meeker states, "The Lao people continue to be completely, if sometimes casually, religious, with the pagoda as much a part of their daily lives as were the cathedrals of medieval Europe to the people who lived around them."[86] "Indeed the 'vat' (Buddhist monastery) is both the symbol and the center of the rural collectivity."[87]

The worth of surplus goods to the Lao lies in the potential it gives him for satisfying his two foremost concerns--religious merit and pleasure. The Laotian is willing to work hard--but

only as hard as necessary. Growing a larger crop merely to increase one's wealth is not within the Lao scheme of values. Prestige or merit is not gained by mere acquisition or hoarding. The man who acquires a surplus and saves it would lose rather than gain prestige.[88]

The Laotian people are quite different from the Vietnamese; the Laotians are not nearly as energetic or enterprising. In Laos no peasant is exploited by rapacious landlords; each man owns his ground. And if he wants more, he only has to wrest another acre or two from the forest, and include them within his primitive irrigation system. However, some serious need like an increased family, will prompt a Laotian to take such a step. The Vietnamese call him lazy, but he thinks his is a pleasant way of life. He is devoid of ambition: wealth means nothing to him; he is content with so little though much more is available for the taking. "The attitude of the Laotians is one of tranquility and repose. Not laziness."[89] However, as a result of this, the French had to bring in Vietnamese and Chinese to do all their skilled work. These limited aspirations, inherent in their values, help to per- petuate a self-sufficient village economy, inhibiting nation- building.

King Savang Vatthana was quoted as saying: "In Laos no one ever suffers from a nervous breakdown, if anyone did, it would be foreigners in the country who are administering eco- nomic aid."[90] The Lao are gentle, peaceful, innocent, and

charming. They are festive and fun loving; they are dreamy non-aggressive people.

There is a congruence of religion, personal, and social values in Lao society. The Buddhist doctrine emphasizes the gentle virtues of self-restraint, modesty, generosity, and serenity, and by extension the subsidiary values of careful good manners, hospitality, and respect for others. Another highly regarded value in interpersonal relations may be described as serenity, equanimity, or imperturbability. It is characterized by moderation of speech, lack of argumentativeness, and the concealment of any displeasing emotion. Another aspect of the distaste for open conflict in interpersonal relations is a readiness to compromise, which is entirely consonant with the Buddhist concept of a middle way.[91]

Unlike certain institutionalized religious systems, Buddhism--at least as it has developed in Laos--has not involved itself directly with any kind of nationalistic movement.[92] For the average Laotian villager, concepts such as democracy, communism, or even nationalism are meaningless. Even to the Lao elite the traditional Laotian values, such as family loyalty, proper Laotian behavior, or the importance of compromising conflicting interests, frequently override ideological or policy considerations in determining the course of Laotian politics. Buddhist sensibilities against taking human life are more meaningful to the average Laotian soldier than fighting for political objectives. As Stevenson notes:

> There is a basic peacefulness of the people. Armed
> forces have always been external creations, financed
> first by French and later by Americans. Most United
> States officials with experience in Laos have commented
> on the reluctance of the Lao to fight or to be diverted
> from their simple personal pleasures. The mediocre
> combat record of Laotian forces (other than Meo) bears
> witness to their lack of enthusiasm for war.[93]

If one contrasts the value systems of the Lao and the
Westerner, one begins to realize that until Laotian values
are modified, Western concepts will have little place in the
Lao way of life. The Laotians prize quiescence, stability,
traditionalism; whereas the Westerner admires rugged individ-
ualism, initiative, change, and what he calls progress. His
character structure is generally competitive and acquisitive.[94]
Because the "Westerner" lives in a society obsessed by economic
growth and banishment of poverty, he thinks that a country like
Laos must want to do the same. But as one can see by the
different value systems, the driving motives and goals are
not the same. There is an incongruity between the Laotian
set of values and the twentieth-century Western concepts.
Thus, a major problem of the nation-building process in Laos,
as in all developing societies, is to develop a new identity
and ideology which blends or merges the parochial and the
cosmopolitan (or universal).[95]

Western concepts such as progress, political responsi-
bility, and nationalism or nation-state mean little in the
rural world of Laos which "knows above all the autonomous
cell, that is the village living around the vat."[96] Badgley
contends that "the blending of this Western institution, the

state, into indigenous cultures (of Asia) may never transpire, and if it does it will certainly function differently from its Western counterpart."[97] Up to this point, in Laos and other Asian countries, nation-building has not yet succeeded: village, tribal and regional loyalty continues to persist. Southeast Asian cultures are magnificently endowed with institutions; however, as noted, few of the strong institutions in which villagers believe are related to the state. Most are provincial or local in character, such as tribal practices, religion, religious leadership, cultivation practices, and a host of other local institutions. Seriously missing are institutionalized methods of organizing politics, law enforcement, education, taxation, and equitable justice under the aegis of the state.[98] This is partially due to the fact that only weak connections (or a low level of political integration) existed between village folk, or most Asians, and the colonial regimes. The political "architecture Europeans and Americans created was poorly designed to serve the cause of statehood. Once independent, the governments in fact, were nearly as alien to villagers as were colonial regimes."[99]

All Southeast Asian societies are attempting to discover or create their own ideological identity. The appeals of nationalism which were focused against the colonials or foreigners during the fights for national independence have lost their basic unity. In fact the processes of social change have challenged the very legitimacy of most of the governments

of Southeast Asia. In their attempt to transform the traditional system into a modern society, in varying degrees, the elites (leaders, thinkers, writers) of Southeast Asian countries have been looking for the meaning of their particular societies and for the essence of their national cultures.[100] This searching is reflected in large measure in the lack of consensus in these countries. There is a lack of consensus on the basic ideological question which is how these changing countries can preserve their traditional sense of identity while coping with the modern world. There is also the problem of a lack of value congruence, or the developing of value integration which is part of the process of political integration.

POLITICAL INTEGRATION

Political integration has two dimensions: it encompasses both value integration among the elite (elites and their followers) and elite-mass integration. Value integration among the elite (elites and followers) means that there are acceptable procedures for the resolution of conflict. It includes the legitimacy of the constitutional framework, or acceptance of common values related to the authority structure; it refers to the minimum value consensus necessary to maintain social order.[101] In the culturally pluralistic and ideologically disunified new nations, one of the major problems has been one of finding acceptable procedures and institutions for

the management of conflict. Elite-mass integration refers to
the degree to which the elite and masses are linked together.
In developing nations, it is common to speak of an elite-
mass gap, which implies that some basic cultural, attitudinal,
political, and communication gaps exist between the "elite"
or "governors" who are secular-minded, French or English
speaking, Western educated, and most likely Western oriented,
and, the "governed" or "mass" who remain oriented toward
traditional values, and who are basically religious and are
vernacular speaking. The elite-mass gap is the problem where
elites are so cut off from the mass they govern that they can
neither mobilize the masses nor be influenced by them. The
elite-mass gap also indicates that communications are inade-
quate, "that is, that the elite is oriented toward persuading
the mass to change their orientation, but the feedback of
political demands is not heard or, if heard, not responded
to."[102] In elite-mass relations, attention must be given to
the development of "infrastructures," i.e. political parties,
newspapers, universities, and the like which can provide a
two-way channel between the government and the populace.
Existing differences in values and goals among the elite,
and between the governing elite and the governed mass does
not constitute political disintegration, if those who are
governed accept the right of the governing elite to govern.
Thus, a degree of political integration exists, not when
differences among the elite and/or differences between

"governors" and "governed" disappear, but when a pattern of consent is established.[103]

Many Southeast Asian countries are having major problems building politically-integrated systems. In many of these developing countries the elites out of power feel that the goals involved with national independence have not been achieved; the regimes or elites out of power have adopted "revolution" as the prominent ideological and political symbol for the nation. "The revolution" as a political symbol is seen in Laos, Burma, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand.[104] These "out of power" elites or groups are attempting to overthrow the system. (In Cambodia, the symbol of revolution was not particularly salient in political life or rhetoric until after the fall of Sihanouk.) The majority of these countries are under attack by communist revolutionaries, but "there is very often a coincidence of Marxism or ethnic or regional grievances in the rhetoric of the revolution."[105] For instance, the Pathet Lao mixes communism with resentment of Mekong Lao domination of hill tribes. (For example, Malayan Communist statements and documents have long had a strong tinge of Chinese chauvinism.)

In Laos, there is no consensus among the elite on basic goals, and sharp conflicts exist among the elite and their different ideologies. Partially because of the lack of value integration, the Kingdom of Laos has been in turmoil and the Laotian elite have been incapable of establishing a stable system of government. Due to the conscious and at times

unconscious acts of the ruling group, and their inability to cope with problems of ethnic and ideological disunity, political disintegration is a real possibility. Unlike some countries of Southeast Asia, which developed obstacles to political integration after independence and after "the failure of the revolution" in achieving its goals,[106] the problems affecting political integration in Laos developed during the colonial period and have continued to plague Laos to the present. Even before independence, disunity among the Laotian elite existed; it stemmed from a lack of unanimity on the question of independence from France and the question of present and future relations with the French, Vietnamese, and the Thai. In Laos, the appeals of nationalism were not focused against the "foreigner" during the drive for independence as it was in many countries; thus, neither the Laotian elite nor the nation ever had a semblance of ideological or political unity. Moreover, the elites' pattern of behavior, their ideology and relationship to foreign actors, were established before independence and have continued into the present.

Among the Lao elite there are many who see a unified and politically integrated system as something to be highly desired; but the historical pattern of this heterogeneous elite, who were sometimes in alliance, more often in rivalry, was perpetuated in the colonial and post-war period and has continued to dominate the post-independence political scene. Regional rivalry, dependence on protection from outside and

a consequent insecurity have fostered frustrations which are reflected in the factionalism of the Lao elite.

There are three main dynastic divisions in the present-day royal elite. The senior branch of the royal family of Luang Prabang, which has provided the ruling line, is represented by the King and Crown Prince. The cadet branch of the royal family of Luang Prabang include the late Prince Phetsarath, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and Prince Souphanouvong. The senior branch and the cadet branch of the royal house of Luang Prabang are descendants of the elder and younger sons, respectively, of King Anourouth of Luang Prabang who ruled from 1791 until 1815. The princes of the Kingdom of Champassak, the most well known being Prince Boun Oum, like those of Luang Prabang, trace their descent from King Soulingavongsa of Lan Xang.[107]

Thus, there are three main dynastic divisions in Laos, which are comprised of the descendants of the senior branch of the royal house of Luang Prabang who reside in Luang Prabang; the descendants of the cadet branch of the royal house of Luang Prabang who gravitated to the administrative capitol at Vientiane; and the descendants of the royal house of Champassak who reside in southern Laos. In 1946, under French coercive influence, Prince Boun Oum renounced his rights over the Kingdom of Champassak, so that the territorial unification of Laos could be accomplished; consequently, the King of Luang Prabang became the King of Laos. However, this

nominal unification did not wipe away deep-seated antagonism and rivalry between the Kingdoms of Luang Prabang and Champassak; separatist sentiment and regional loyalty continue to exist.

During the Second World War and after, foreign actors were or became aligned with rival internal dynastic groups. In the royal capitol of Luang Prabang, the King and Crown Prince were pro-French; whereas in the administrative capitol of Vientiane the cadet branch, which had few Francophile figures, developed a policy of independence from France. The cadet branch created the "Free Laos" movement; however, the cadet branch soon became divided within itself. In order to understand these different divisions and alignments which continue into the present day, it is necessary to look briefly at the post-war history of Laos.

During the Second World War, under the instigation of the Japanese, Prince Phetsarath proclaimed the independence of Laos from France. In 1945, the Prince announced that independence from France, proclaimed earlier, was not to be compromised. Under Prince Phetsarath a committee of Lao Issara (Free Laos) was formed. It included members of his family—Prince Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong—non-royal elite, and a few Vietnamese who had held official positions in Laos.

Many in this group believed that independence could be attained through French good will. However, when France sought a return to pre-war status, the French alienated the

Free Laos Movement. After the French entered Luang Prabang,
the King, who had always been pro-French, decided to declare
his loyalty to France and to accept the resumption of the
French protectorate. The Free Laos Movement which included
the majority of the most capable elite was forced to take
refuge in Thailand; a government in exile under Prince
Phetsarath was set up in Bangkok in March 1946.[108]

The Free Lao movement did not remain united during its
four-year period of exile. Prince Phetsarath, at its head,
was obviously ambitious for the crown and remained resolutely
anti-French. Prince Souvanna Phouma led a group who desired
complete independence but were inclined to work with the French
to achieve it; this group shared a fear of the Vietnamese,
but also distrusted the Thai, and, therefore was unwilling
to break with the French. Prince Boun Oum and other members
of the southern regional elite, who have been traditionally
linked to Thailand, favored reliance on Thai protection and
aid, or like Souvanna Phouma's group, worked cautiously with
the French for independence.[109] Prince Souphanouvong, who had
little faith in French sincerity and offers, favored armed
resistance in concert with the Viet Minh; he shared the Viet
Minh's view that the war for independence involved all of
Indochina. Prince Souphanouvong, who represented the extreme
nationalist wing of the movement, held at this time the position
of foreign minister in the Bangkok organization and was
commander of the Free Lao forces. In July 1946, he visited

Ho Chi Minh and established closer ties with the Viet Minh.
This began to arouse the doubts of his colleagues who were
traditionally "pro-Thai" and suspicious of Vietnamese motives
toward Laos.[110] Souphanouvong had few illusions about Viet-
namese ambitions, however, he believed that a strong Lao
Issara under his own or similar leadership could control
the Vietnamese influence accompanying proffered aid.[111]
Prince Souphanouvong devoted his attention during this period
to the organization of resistance among the hill tribes in
northern Laos. The Kha and Meo Tribes were the two most
prominent tribes that took part in the resistance. The mili-
tant resistance relied for its indigenous support mainly on
the hill peoples, rather than on the Lao lowlander. In May
1949, Prince Souphanouvong was removed from his post of
foreign minister in the exile government and of commander
of the resistance force, because it was believed by his
colleagues that he was leading the resistance movement too
fast and too far to the Left.[112]

After the reoccupation of Vientiane and Luang Prabang,
the French made conciliatory moves which led to the Franco-
Lao Agreement of 1947; it confirmed a unified Laos under the
sovereignty of Luang Prabang and established a constitutional
monarchy. A new convention in 1949 confirmed the autonomy
of Laos within the French Union and gave the country greater
liberty in the conduct of foreign relations. This left the
exile government with so little in the way of issues that it

dissolved itself in late 1949. Most of the leaders, with the notable exception of Prince Phetsarath and Prince Souphanouvong, who were repelled by the limited nature of the French concessions and the avidity with which the Lao-Issara accepted them, returned to Laos to re-enter governmental affairs.[113] Prince Souphanouvong moved to Vietnam and then, in 1950, set up a resistance group in northern Laos. These militant nationalists, who later adopted the name of Pathet Lao (which was changed in 1965 to the Lao Liberation Army), could not have survived as a meaningful political and military force without Viet Minh aid.[114]

The Lao Government, which included the exiles, saw advantages in a continuing association with France. They wanted political and economic independence, but were not so emotionally concerned about national independence as were the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese. In fact, they wished to rely on a further period of French aid for defense and for the cushioning effect that economic links with France would have through the French Union. The moderates of the Lao Issara who chose, like some Vietnamese and Cambodians, collaboration with the French, "reproduced a very traditional pattern of seeking effective patronage not only to safeguard the Kingdom but perhaps more important to protect their privileges as an elite group."[115] These elite feared that increasing independence from France would result in ultimate domination by the strongest of the Associated States--Vietnam. Thus, traditional fear and

suspicion of her neighbors, internal dynastic divisions, and
a realization of the weakness and insecurity of Laos resulted
in the weak nationalist movement for independence. Moreover,
among the Lao Issara moderates, a lack of ideology and social
concern permitted the easy transformation of a moderate political
nationalism keyed to the achievement of Laotian independence
"into an increasingly conservative political, economic,
military, and psychological dependence. The Laotian came
to see clientship as necessary to the preservation of their
elite model of government from increasingly effective attack
and counterorganization by the Pathet Lao."[116]

The main drive for independence came from the people of
Vietnam; Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh was the militant spearhead
of the nationalist revolt in Indochina. It was the nationalist
revolt in Vietnam, not in Laos, which finally led to the Geneva
Conference in 1954.[117] Thus, Laos found itself independent,
but barely viable politically. There was no social change;
the people remained indifferent. Rivalries between the
survivors of the old kingdoms continued. As a result there
was bound to be competition among rival groups and conflict
between the interests of powerful neighbors who supported
these different rival groups. This pattern of divisive elite
backed by foreign actors, can be contrasted with the Burman
elite, who have different ideologies concerning internal
politics, but who have consistently and strictly (since inde-
pendence in 1948) adhered to a policy of nonalignment. This

has continued to be a dominant feature up to the present.[118]

Cambodia, from 1954 until the fall of Norodom Sihanouk, main-
tained a policy of neutralism toward the communist and non-
communist. Under the guidance of Prince Sihanouk, neutralism
was the Cambodian method of dealing with its pro-American
neighbors, Thailand and South Vietnam; it was also used to
deal with Communist China, which is viewed as the long-run
influence in the region. Sihanouk's neutralism, which at
times tended to be anti-Western, sought to provoke the United
States into making its allies and associates, Thailand and
Vietnam, more accommodating to Cambodian wishes.[119] However,
since the overthrow of Sihanouk, as in Laos, the elite of
Cambodia have looked to foreign actors for backing. Sihanouk
has gone into exile in Communist China (forced out of a policy
of nonalignment, perhaps, even if he regains power) and the
American-backed regime of Lon Nol is relying on Thai troops
(which Lon Nol claims are necessary because his officers
might still be loyal to Sihanouk)[120] to contain a rising
insurgency.

Another major problem facing Asian states has generally
been the establishment of the state itself as a legitimate
institution. A common problem among developing nations with
traditional societies is the great gap between the elites and
the rural masses. In Laos, for instance, the wealthy French-
educated elite constitute five to ten percent of the popu-
lation, and the mass of the people who are subsistence agricul-

turalists constitute ninety to ninety-five percent of the popu-
lation. This gap is reinforced by poor communication and
transportation systems, lack of education in rural areas, lack
of government concern and rural policies, and lack of economic
development.

Lack of education, illiteracy, racial diversity, tribal
isolation, and political elitism have left the vast majority
of Laotians with no awareness of the central government. In
actuality, about twenty families control the political scene
in Laos; most of the people are not even represented in the
National Assembly. Most of the fifty-eight seats are held
by the urban dwellers and the Lao elite. The Lao peasants
very rarely hold a seat. To the Laotian villager, questions
of parliamentary representation and administration are the
concern of a few number of more or less westernized urban
dwellers who "are the beneficiaries of foreign economic and
military aid, and the successors to the class of nobles and
madarins."[121] As a result, the activities and policies of
the country reflect the attitudes of the elite who have no
contact with the majority of the population. The fact that the
central government has never been particularly close to the
people outside of the cities is reflected in the opinion
surveys. The surveys indicated that most Lao, if they know
anything at all about government, tend to view it in a passive
sense, as something that may be affecting their lives, but
in which they themselves are not personally involved. Indicative

of the level of political awareness was the fact that by one
opinion survey some three-quarters of the villagers interviewed
failed to respond at all to a question asking them to give the
names of two men whom they would consider the most important
leaders in Laos today. The number of "don't know's" to this
question was somewhat lower in the provincial capitols, but
still came to over fifty percent.[122] Another survey revealed
that fewer than half the people questioned knew the name of
their own country, and only ten percent knew the name of the
prime minister. It also indicated that the farther one
travels from the major towns the less important are the political
struggles in the capitol.[123]

Generally speaking, political parties throughout most
of Southeast Asia, and specifically in Laos, have failed to
overcome the basic problems of bringing together the world of
the ruling elite and the world of the peasant-masses. Even
in countries (not in Laos) where parties have attempted to
reach out into the villages, they have tended to upset old
relationships and have been unable to provide the basis of
new relationships.[124] They have been unable to perform the
type of functions that political parties are called to perform
in the West. Political parties have been highly unstable,
since the parties have been highly personalized organizations
reflecting personalities of the leading figures.[125]

In Laos, for instance, political parties with the exception
of the Neo Lao Hak Sat--NLHS--which is the political arm of

the Pathet Lao, are little more than transient groupings of

politicians who are united by neither ideology nor platforms.

Expediency prompts a political aspirant to adopt one party

label over another; political alignments within the elite are

neither permanent nor rigid.[126] As Stevenson notes:

> Parties which have formed, reformed, merged, disinte-
> grated, and otherwise transmogrified over the years,
> have tended to be the organization of strong leaders
> rather than special interest and ideological commitment.[127]

Political parties, especially in the Royal Government area are

little known popularly outside the city limits of Vientiane.

They have absolutely no grassroots organizations and their

leaders are "concerned more often than not with promoting

their individual interest."[128] The level of politicization

is relatively higher in the Pathet Lao zone because of the

grassroots organizations and the influence of NLHS cadres who

work in nearly every sector of organized life. Although the

Pathet Lao and the NLHS have campaigned mainly among the

rural people, it must be noted that they have acquired large

followings in the towns as well. For example, in the 1958

election, most of Souphanouvong's 37,389 votes were obtained

in the capitol of Vientiane and the immediate surrounding

area. It is in this area that the disparity in the standard

of living between the elite and the mass is most clearly seen

and keenly felt.[129] The NLHS has aided greatly in the political

education of the people by introducing a dissenting voice against

the government. By focusing attention upon the deprivations

of the peasantry and tribal people, the Pathet Lao and the

NLHS have begun to make the people realize that they do not have to be resigned to their lot and they have the right to certain services from the central government. Moreover, the Pathet Lao and the NLHS "have forced the governing elite to pay at least lip service to reforms."[130]

Since political parties lack deep roots within Southeast Asian societies, parties change their positions according to the whims of their leaders; this just increases instabilities for all. Pye contends that "above all, however, the parties have failed in Southeast Asia for the basic reason that they have been unable to serve effectively either as representational parties, because of the lack of interest groups, or as ideological organizations, because of the lack of coherent feelings of national identity."[131]

The attitudes of the governing elite in many Southeast Asian countries toward political opposition does not encourage party competition or participation. It is not uncommon for the governing elite to accuse the opposition of being disloyal to the nation or a threat to national security simply because it criticizes the government. In Cambodia, for instance, candidates of the left-wing Pracheachon party were arrested for "conspiring with agents of foreign powers;" they were executed one month before the election.[132] Similar methods to harass the opposition have been used in South Vietnam, where anti-government candidates have often been pressured and "advised not to run" and have been warned that if elected

they "would be accused of violating election laws."[133] Some

elites in developing nations deny the validity of party com-

petition, based on their ideological interpretations. For

instance, in Burma a socialist leader stated:

> By definition, a socialist framework means a social
> setting in which all forces antagonistic to socialism
> are nonexistent. How can therefore be (sic) a com-
> petition of political parties in a socialist frame-
> work? ...Competitive socialism is indeed a contradiction
> in terms.[134]

Both subtle and unsubtle means have been used to dis-

courage opposition and participation. For example, in the

first two national elections in Burma and Cambodia, which

were one-party dominant states, the fragmentation of the

opposition parties indirectly helped the majority party.

These states had a type of single-member district, under which

the electoral method did not result in strict proportional

representation. In the parliamentary system of Cambodia,

the opposition polled twenty percent of the votes but

received no seats; in Burma, the AFPFL polled only 47.7

percent of the national vote but obtained over sixty percent

of the seats and the party that polled the third largest

votes received no seats.[135] Less subtle means have also

been used in developing countries; abuses of the election

machinery are related to the absence of a tradition of a

politically-neutral civil service in handling elections, and

to the governing elite who use their patronage and power to

get votes.[136]

In Laos, the electoral system and laws have been so rigged
that the government party is given a powerful advantage; at
times, the opposition party has been denied a place on the
ballot. Because of the following reasons--candidates have
not offered the voters a choice of platforms, the NLHS was
either excluded from or boycotted the elections, NLHS candidates
were put in jail at the time of the election for "national
security" reasons, elections were rigged to ensure the defeat
of leftist candidates, and the government passed biased elec-
tion laws--elections have been worthless or little more than
rituals.[137] One exception was the 1958 supplementary election
in which the NLHS participated. The NLHS won nine out of the
thirteen seats which it contested (there were twenty-one seats
being contested in all); its success was due to the popular
support of its programs, its good organization, and the poor
organization of the other parties. However, because of the
NLHS success, the government passed the 1960 election law,
whose purpose was to ensure victory of pro-government candidates
by reducing competition among the candidates and especially
by limiting NLHS participation in the election. By the 1960
law, to be a National Assembly candidate, one has to "have
completed the equivalent of junior high school, or be a civil
servant with at least fifteen years of service or be a business-
man who has paid his taxes regularly for five years."[138] More-
over, a candidate has a filing deposit of $250.00 which is
forfeited if he does not obtain twenty percent of the vote in

his district. These stringent restrictions were aimed at
limiting NLHS participation, however, these restrictions have
had another effect, mainly to widen even further the gap
between constituents and their representatives. These require-
ments were so severe "that virtually all but the elite and
the moneyed were excluded from candidacy."[139] Partially
because of the lack of broadly-based political organization
and the lack of meaningful general elections, the individual's
participation in Laotian national life and his influence over
the affairs of central government are minimal or nonexistent,
despite the existence of an elected national assembly. General
elections which are held every five years, or with a vote of
no confidence, do not provide the electorate with a channel
through which mass-based partisan competition can take place.
In actuality, political activities are mainly controlled and
influenced by such noninstitutional factors as family connec-
tions, regional considerations, and personal popularity among
the elite.[140]

Some developing countries have found it impossible to
nurture a pragmatic, contractual form of politics; thus, such
countries as Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand must now rely on
the impact of leading personalities or such authoritative
organizations as the army, which often preclude competition
and popular participation. In Cambodia, dominance by Prince
Sihanouk (until his fall) prevented internal violence through
either coup or competitive elections; however, it did cause

the political process to atrophy. Today, Cambodia is racked
with violence and controlled by the military.[141] In Burma,
the government has reflected the personality of either Prime
Minister U Nu or General Ne Win and his Revolutionary Council.
In Burma, the disintegration of its dominant part, AFPFL, led
to the development of the authoritarian Revolutionary Council.
The AFPFL in Burma, like many one-party systems in the developing
area, was able to last a long time by emphasizing the "revolu-
tionary" heritage of the coalition, the need for unity, and
the disloyalty of any opposition. Competition of sorts could
be found within this one-party system. The AFPFL was divided
internally by personal conflicts and numerous factions. Since
the leaders of the party were also leaders of affiliated organi-
zations, competition was generated among the organizations
over the amount of influence they might have on government
policy. However, since the organizations did not represent
powerful interests within the society, conflict tended to
become highly personalized. In 1958, the AFPFL split into
two; this ended the nationalist coalition party control and
created two parties of equal strength. The conflict after the
split nearly caused a civil war, and this situation resulted
in the Burmese Army, under General Ne Win, taking control in
1958. In 1960, elections (which were the fairest in Burmese
history) were permitted; however, U Nu, who won, was unable
to provide effective leadership. The army, which has always
had a concern for the course of the nation's political develop-

ment, believed that civilian rule was creating a threat to national unity.[142] The military believed the U Nu government was unable to cope with the problems of ethnic and ideological disunity. Thus, for the second time, the Burmese Army under General Ne Win assumed control of the government in 1962. A Revolutionary Council which ended representative government was created. The inability of the government of U Nu to cope with internal insurgency was viewed by the Revolutionary Council as the first cause of the coup in 1962. According to the military, their desire was not to become another Laos or Vietnam.[143] No major civilian group or individual is able to heavily influence the military Revolutionary Council in its attempts to establish a socialist and integrated society.[144] The Revolutionary Council has a monopoly of power, but power alone cannot solve the serious problem of winning and holding popular support. The Burmese army, which is controlled by the dominant Burman ethnic group, has never been popular with the masses; it represents a class which has no social roots with the masses, which reinforces the elite-mass gap.[145] The Burmese government has not yet reduced the problem of loyalty to the central government nor has a central organization or political leader begun to bridge the barriers of trust between it and the diverse cultural communities.

In developing areas, the elite-mass gap is reinforced by the government's inability, ineffectiveness, or incompetence to penetrate the rural areas. This is illustrated in Laos by

the structural inability of the Royal Laotian government to meet rural needs. Even though Laotian villages suffer from the classic Third World problems[146]--poor diet, low life expectency, high infant mortality, and illiteracy--the Royal Laotian government uses most of its capital on luxury housing, imports, and amusements; it gives little money to rural or productive purposes.[147]

In theory, any Laotian above the age of eighteen may be appointed to public office; however, in actuality, education and experience requirements tend to limit the opportunities mainly to the French-educated Lao elite. A survey in 1971 showed that almost all high-ranking positions in civil service were filled by this elite.[148] Civil servants at the district level are the main government officials with whom the villagers have any contact. The civil servants are reported to be "feared because of their alleged authoritarian attitude"[149] and distrusted because of irregularities and maladministration in the civil service.[150] Moreover, both high and low-ranking officials in the Department of Rural Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture avoid visiting villages as much as possible. Generally speaking, it is the "more incompetent and less well-connected officials who are forced to go to outlying areas."[151] The attitude of the government is reflected in the following Laotian official's statement:

> You know, our Laotian villagers are happy, peaceful people. They know how to cooperate together, in fact they have their own kind of communism. The best thing for our government to do is to leave them alone. Oh,

> we can build a few schools, a few roads. But the best
> thing is to leave them be, allow them to grow their
> rice and till their fields.[152]

In an attempt to change village attitudes of indifference and

resentment toward the Royal Laotian government, the American

Civilian Administration has given aid directly to a few refugee

villages. The direct channeling of United States aid to the

villages has failed to change village attitudes, but it has

highlighted the incompetence of the Royal Laotian government.

Moreover, villagers have explained "that Americans should not

try to pass anything through Royal Laotian government officials

to the villages for it is sure to be stolen."[153] The Royal

Laotian government is weak, divided, disorganized, urban

centered, corrupt, and unpopular. Because of its fear of

becoming more unpopular, the weak central government refuses

to tax the villagers.[154] (Civilian and military leaders pay

literally no taxes on their large incomes.) Because of the

government's corruption, weakness, and unpopularity, the

government has become dependent and penetrated by foreign

governments (i.e., U.S.) who provide sixty percent of the

Laotian budgetary funds.[155] Insurgency has thrived on the

structural and political weaknesses of the government, which

demands large input of American aid. The Pathet Lao has

exploited to its advantage the issues of Western interference,

misuse of American aid, and corruption in government. The

rural people expect very little from the Laotian government;

they assume that officials are corrupt; and consequently, the

populace is not willing to serve the state.[156]

In Southeast Asian countries, such as Laos and Burma, there is substantial dissidence from peoples, who do not believe their interests are being served by the government. There are important tribal communities in these countries who find themselves cut off or excluded from influence in politics, the universities, the military, and in the economic process. In the multi-ethnic country of Laos, there is no political process that encompasses the hill tribes so as to earn their loyalty. The tribal people are disgruntled because they do not share in any of the benefits of economic development. They lack access to most government services. In particular, educational facilities which would help assimilate them in the Lao culture and would increase their social mobility have, to a large extent, been denied them. They are denied participation in government to the extent which their size would normally dictate.[157] The tremendous differences in background of the multi-ethnic population, the lack of a common language and culture, and economic inequalities inherent in the dissimilarities in habitats are not conducive to facile assimilation. Moreover, the Lao who feel superior to the tribesmen and who provide the governing class have had little interest in assimilating the non-Lao. The Lao policy toward the tribes has been one of informal discrimination. In the northern tribal areas, the government's policy has been one of non-involvement; the authority of the central government

has been virtually nonexistent.[158] For example, the Khas

have only a rudimentary administration; the main unit of

government is largely autonomous villages under traditional

headmen. In Xieng Khouang province, the Meos, who constitute

nearly a quarter of the population, enjoy virtual local autonomy

under several clan organizations.[159] Unlike other Southeast

Asian countries who have similar tribal problems, there are

no departments, ministry, or division of the Laotian govern-

ment specifically assigned to or responsible for the administra-

tion of the hill tribes. The Laotian elite's explanation for

this tribal administrative gap is the fact that the Laotian

constitution gives citizenship to all permanent residents,

regardless of race; they are guaranteed the same type of

administration and the same rights and privileges. In reality,

however, the provisions of the constitution do not apply to

tribal people; the system discriminates against the tribal

minorities. The court system offers an illustrative example

of how the constitutional system operates: French and Lao

are the official languages of the Laotian law courts; tribal

languages are barred, although, on occasion, tribal interpreters

are admitted.[160]

Even though tribesmen are considered to be citizens by

the Laotian constitution, most of these tribal people have

no special representation in the government. The government

has not tried to organize minority interests, and it seems

that they do not wish minorities, as such, to become organized.

This reflects the traditional disdain of Lao-lowlanders toward hill tribal people which has most likely been a more important factor affecting the government-tribal relations in Laos than any strategic or ideological consideration on the part of the Laotian government. In contrast, the Pathet Lao movement with its war of liberation has successfully recruited and organized many hill tribal peoples. In 1971, about two-thirds of the country's territory was under the Pathet Lao control;[161] in these areas, such as the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, the local administration is based upon people's committees whose membership reflect the tribal majorities in those areas.[162] The Pathet Lao promise equality and a termination to oppression from colonialist and neo-colonialist. Rather than autonomous regions for tribal groups as found in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, i.e. Meo districts of Thua-Chua and Mu Cang Chai in the Tay Bac Autonomous Zone, the Pathet Lao has emphasized a popular united front of all peoples.[163] A general survey not only of the Pathet Lao and its membership but of all Communist parties and their memberships in Southeast Asia, shows the strong role deprived racial groups play in Communist parties and the strong predisposition of depressed minorities to participate in anti-government party activities.[164]

The low level of political integration or the relationship between the rulers and the ruled is reflected in data on demonstrations, riots, armed attacks, and deaths from domestic

violence; they are also indicators of different types of participation within the political system. A protest demonstration is defined as a "non-violent gathering of people organized for the announced purpose of protesting against a regime, government, or one or more of its leaders; or against its ideology, policy, intended policy or lack of policy; or against its previous action or intended action."[165] Since this variable is intended to encompass peaceful protest outside the formal structures of government, this category excludes election meetings, rallies, and boycotts which are associated with a particular formal process. From 1948 to 1967, data indicate a very low occurrence of peaceful demonstrations in most of the mainland Southeast Asian countries: Laos had no peaceful demonstrations recorded, Cambodia 2, Thailand 3, Burma 13; this can be contrasted with South Vietnam which had 199. This data tend to indicate either a low level of politicization on the part of the masses, or that the government's coercive forces are used so that demonstrations may not occur. The comparatively higher rate of peaceful demonstrations in South Vietnam might indicate a greater politicization because of the war. The rejection of the political system and the use of more violent methods of protest is indicated in all of these countries by the progressively higher incidence of riots and armed attacks. A riot is defined as "a violent demonstration or disturbance involving a large number of people."[166] Violence infers "the use of physical

force, which is usually evinced by the destruction of property, the wounding or killing of people by the authorities or the use of riot control equipment, and by the rioters' use of various weapons."[167] Cambodia (still under Sihanouk)--5 riots, and Thailand--8, had a low incidence of riots; Burma had 50 riots and South Vietnam had 96; Laos had the highest incidence with 199. In terms of armed attacks, which refers to "an act of violent political conflict carried out by an organized group with the object of weakening or destroying the power exercised by another organized group,"[168] Cambodia and Thailand again had the lowest incidents--Cambodia had 49, Thailand 76; Laos, which had more riots than Burma and South Vietnam, had fewer armed attacks--Laos 610, Burma 1,200, South Vietnam 4,300. Closely related to armed attacks are deaths from domestic political violence (this indicator is not an event variable but a body count); these deaths have occurred mainly in conjunction with armed attacks, but also in relationship to riots. Cambodia had 135 deaths, Thailand 235, Laos 3,000, Burma 4,200, and South Vietnam 177,000.[169] (See Table D)

Military budgetary and military manpower allocations can also serve as indicators of instability. If the money and manpower are not being directed externally, a high level of military expenditure and participation tend to indicate substantial internal tension or repression.[170] (If it is the latter, a large army may turn against its creator. Thus

Table D

Indicators of Instability

Country	Demon.	Riots	Arm. Att.	Deaths/ Dom. Vio.
Laos	0	191	610	3,011
South Vietnam	199	96	4,300	177,000
Cambodia	2	5	49	135
Burma	13	50	1,200	4,200
Thailand	3	8	76	235

Source: C. Taylor and M. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 66-8.

large armies "may indicate both actual domestic instability and a potential instability on the part of the suppressors."[171]) Small countries which rank extremely high in terms of military expenditures often hold their high ranking because of substantial foreign assistance which reflects penetration. In terms of high level of military manpower and expenditures, South Vietnam, which ranked highest in terms of armed attacks and death from domestic violence, ranks fourth out of 119 countries in terms of manpower and third in terms of expenditures; Laos ranks 6,2; North Vietnam 10,1; Cambodia 49,18; Thailand 56,75 (however, this does not reflect U.S. military presence there). Burma ranks relatively high in expenditures, nineteenth, but lower in manpower, 58. The high levels of military expenditures

by South Vietnam, Laos, and Burma as well as their high levels
of domestic deaths (South Vietnam ranks second out of 120
countries, Burma 23, and Laos 29) and armed attacks (South
Vietnam ranks third out of 133 countries, Burma ranks ninth,
and Laos fifteenth) tend to indicate a low level of integration
and stability. Thailand's rankings (75 in military expendi-
tures, 58 in deaths from domestic violence, and 65 in armed
attacks) and Cambodia's rankings (eighteenth in military
expenditures, 68 in deaths from domestic violence, 73 in armed
attacks) tend to indicate that these two countries are more
stable than South Vietnam, Laos, and Burma, but they also
reflect elements of instability, especially Cambodia with
its high level of military expenditures.[172]   (See Table E)

Another manifestation of low level of political inte-
gration and stability are coup d'etats or "irregular executive
change events" which are characterized by "actual or threatened
violence or by abnormal procedures."[173] From 1954 to 1967,
South Vietnam which ranks first out of 136 countries (52
countries out of the 136 had "irregular executive change"),
experienced ten irregular changes; Laos ranks fifth with
five irregular changes; Thailand ranks fifteenth with three
changes; Burma twenty-fourth with two changes. Cambodia had
no coup d'etats from 1954 to 1967, however, in 1970 Prince
Sihanouk's government was overthrown. These coup d'etats
tend not only to reflect a low level of political integration
but tend to reinforce it by alienating certain groups from the

Table E

Military Indicators of Instability

Country	Military Manpower		Military Expenditures	
	Total in 000	Rank (119)	% of GNP	Rank (121)
South Vietnam	565	4	13.6	3
Laos	55	6	15.6	2
North Vietnam	350	10	19.7	1
Cambodia	49	49	6.4	18
Thailand	132	56	2.2	75
Burma	110	58	6.3	19

Source: C. Taylor and M. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 19-21.

political system. For instance, U Nu, the prime minister of Burma before the 1962 coup d'etat, declared in 1969 his intention to overthrow the leadership of Ne Win by peaceful or violent means. He is supported by armed insurgents; his group is known as the National United Front.[174] Another example is Cambodia where with the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk, some alienated groups coalesced under the sponsorship of Sihanouk, and civil war began.

The past and present failures of culturally heterogeneous states, such as Laos, Burma, and Cambodia to deal with and reconcile antagonisms have led these states to suffer from both communal and ideological insurgencies. Cambodia has to

deal with the Khmer Serai movement which operates out of Thailand and Vietnam, as well as Sihanouk-sponsored insurgencies encouraged by Vietnamese and Chinese Communist groups. Burma has to cope with the White and Red Flag Communist parties which have several thousand insurgent members; a Kachin Independence Army which came into being after the 1962 coup; the Karen National Defense Organization, a loose confederation of Shan and Burmese dissidents; and the United National Front, a coalition of some minority groups and political dissidents under the leadership of U Nu. Laos has to deal with a strong Communist Pathet Lao group backed by the North Vietnamese, the general hostility of the hill tribes, and right-wing factions within the military and aristocracy, which profit from Thai and American support.[175]

As this chapter has indicated, low degrees of territorial, national, and political integration have led to instability, insurgencies, and war. The war in Laos is simultaneously a civil war, an ideological war, a war in which different tribes and minorities have aligned themselves with one side or another for local advantage, and a war in which foreign actors have, for their own objectives and goals, exploited ethnic and political differences. In some multi-ethnic nations war against a common external enemy or against foreign intervention may weld the peoples together; however, as chapter four will show, "foreign intervention does not 'help' to unify a Laotian nation but sides with particular ethnic groups, classes,

factions, and individuals in a complex and unpredictable country."[176]

NOTES

[1]D. Morrison and H. Stevenson, "Integration and Instability: Patterns of African Political Development," <u>American Political Science Review</u> 66 (September 1972): 902-27; James C. Davies, "Political Stability and Instability: Some Causes and Manifestations," <u>Journal of Conflict Resolution</u> 13 (March 1969): 1-17; Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration," <u>Canadian Journal of Political Science</u> 12 (March 1971): 1-14; Philip Jacob and James Toscano (eds.), <u>The Integration of Political Communities</u> (New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964).

[2]Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in <u>The Developing Nations</u>, ed. by Frank Tachau (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1972), p. 63.

[3]Ibid., pp. 66-8.

[4]Richard S.D. Hawkins, "Contours, Cultures, and Conflict," in <u>Laos: War and Revolution</u>, ed. by Nina Adams and Alfred McCoy (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 4.

[5]Weiner, p. 67.

[6]Gabriel Almond and G.B. Powell, Jr., <u>Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach</u> (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), p. 35.

[7]John Badgley, <u>Asian Development: Problems and Prognosis</u> (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 144.

[8]Ibid., p. 123.

[9]Richard Harris, <u>Independence and After</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 17.

[10]Peter Kunstadter, "Burma," in <u>Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations</u>, ed. by Peter Kunstadter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 76-8.

[11]Russel Fifield, <u>The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958</u> (New York: Harper's Press, 1959), pp. 370-87.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Harris, pp. 1; 13-20.

[14]Ibid.

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[15]Saul Rose (ed.), Politics in Southeast Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), p. 165.

[16]Hawkins, pp. 4-5; R. Langer and J. Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 10-15.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

[19]C.W. Anderson, Fred von der Mehden and C. Young, Issues of Political Development (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 24-5.

[20]Rose, p. 165.

[21]Fred Branfman, "Presidential War in Laos, 1964-1970," in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. by Adams and McCoy, pp. 223-5.

[22]Ibid., p. 226.

[23]"United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Kingdom of Laos." Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Part 2, October 20, 21, 22, 28, 1969, p. 580.

[24]Charles A. Stevenson, American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 14.

[25]Langer and Zasloff, pp. 20-21.

[26]Anderson etal, p. 74.

[27]Langer and Zasloff, p. 11; Stevenson, p. 10.

[28]Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 165-6.

[29]Anderson etal, p. 70.

[30]Ibid., pp. 98-108.

[31]Ibid., p. 70.

[32]"A Quarter Century of Grim and Victorious Struggle," Neo Lao Hak Sat Publication, pp. 20-33; also see Anderson etal, p. 70.

[33]A serious weakness of the Karen autonomous movement was the partial dispersion of the Karen Community. An important

portion of the group were cohabitants of the lowland plains with the ethnic Burmans. Thus the Karen leaders have vacilated between efforts to reconstitute Burma on a basis more favorable to Karens and the creation of an independent state. Anderson etal, p. 72.

[34]Weiner, pp. 63-6; Almond, p. 36.

[35]Ibid., p. 36.

[36]Anderson etal, p. 10; Stevenson, p. 12.

[37]Lebar and Suddar (eds.), Laos (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1960), p. 35.

[38]Ibid., pp. 38-48; 93-114.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Langer and Zasloff, p. 13.

[43]Kunstadter, p. 24.

[44]Roger Smith, "Cambodia," in Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, ed. by George Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), pp. 637-8.

[45]Anderson etal, p. 24.

[46]Badgley, p. 61.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Badgley, pp. 91-2; 109; Peter Kunstadter, "Thailand," in Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, ed. by Peter Kunstadter, pp. 369-73.

[49]Badgley, pp. 98-9.

[50]Ibid., pp. 100-1.

[51]Lucian W. Pye, Southeast Asia's Political Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 35-6.

[52]Stevenson, p. 13; Joel Halpern and P. Kunstadter, "Laos," in Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, ed. by Peter Kunstadter, p. 243.

[53]Ibid.

[54]Stevenson, pp. 13-14.

[55]Marek Thee, Notes Of a Witness: Laos and the Second Indochinese War (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 7.

[56]Charles L. Taylor and Michael Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 203.

[57]Ibid., pp. 203, 232-4, 225-7, 30-32.

[58]Josef Silverstein, "Burma," in Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, ed. by George Kahin, pp. 159-61.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1966), p. 80.

[61]Ibid., p. 79.

[62]Lebar and Suddar, pp. 158-64.

[63]Alexander Peasley, "The Optimum Educational Mix for Economic Growth" (Washington: Brookings, 1966).

[64]Badgley, p. 79.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid., pp. 80-87.

[67]Ibid.

[68]Langer and Zasloff, pp. 13, 15; Badgley, p. 87.

[69]Lebar and Suddar, pp. 214-18.

[70]Ibid., pp. 135-47.

[71]Fifield, pp. 376-83.

[72]Fred R. von der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 39.

[73]Badgley, pp. 83-6.

[74]Taylor and Hudson,p. 246.

[75]Badgley, pp. 83-89.

[76]Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Societies: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), pp. 43-75.

[77]Pye, Southeast Asia's Political Systems, pp. 27-36; Anderson etal, p. 20.

[78]Kenneth W. Morgan (ed.), The Path of the Buddha (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956).

[79]Ibid., p. 376.

[80]Ibid., p. 372.

[81]Ibid., pp. 71-2.

[82]Ibid., pp. 150-3.

[83]Lebar and Suddar, pp. 94-6.

[84]Georges Condominas, "The Lao," in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. by Adams and McCoy, p. 20.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Oden Meeker, The Little World of Laos (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1959), p.204.

[87]Hawkins, p. 7.

[88]Lebar and Suddar, p. 101.

[89]Meeker, p. 205.

[90]Ibid., p. 78.

[91]Lebar and Suddar, pp. 96-101.

[92]Joel M. Halpern, Government, Politics, and Social Structure in Laos, Monograph Series No. 4, Southeast Asia Studies (Yale University, 1964), p. 59.

[93]Stevenson, p. 14.

[94]Ibid., p. 31.

[95]Pye, Aspects of Political Development, p. 80.

[96]Condominas, p. 25.

[97]Badgley, p. 121.

[98]Ibid., p. 119.

[99]Ibid., p. 121.

[100]Pye, Southeast Asia's Political Systems, pp. 40-45; Aspects of Political Development, pp. 79-81.

[101]Weiner, pp. 69-70; Morrison and Stevenson, p. 905.

[102]Weiner, p. 70.

[103]Ibid.

[104]Anderson etal, pp. 160-3; 145-50.

[105]Ibid., p. 162.

[106]Ibid., pp. 140-5, 160-3.

[107]Meeker, chapter 10.

[108]Rose, p. 167.

[109]Nina S. Adams, "Patrons, Clients, and Revolutionaries: The Lao Search for Independence, 1945-1954," in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. by Adams and McCoy, pp. 110-12.

[110]Meeker, pp. 106-112; Rose, p. 167.

[111]Adams, p. 110.

[112]Rose, pp. 169-70; Lebar and Suddar, pp. 20-21.

[113]Ibid., pp. 20-23.

[114]Meeker, p. 106.

[115]Adams, p. 118.

[116]Ibid., p. 119.

[117]Harris, pp. 21-2.

[118]Pye, Southeast Asia's Political Systems, p. 43.

[119]Ibid.

[120]Ralph Blumenthal, New York Times, June 16, 1970.

[121]Condominas, p. 25.

[122]Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc. Information and Attitudes in Laos (Washington: 1959, 1962).

[123]Ibid.

[124]Pye, Southeast Asia's Political Systems, pp. 56-7.

[125]Ibid.

[126]Roger Smith, "Laos," in Governments and Politics in Southeast Asia, ed. by George Kahin, pp. 579-81.

[127]Stevenson, p. 14.

[128]D. Whitaker etal, Area Handbook for Laos (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 166.

[129]Smith, "Laos," p. 584.

[130]Ibid.

[131]Pye, Southeast Asia's Political Systems, p. 57.

[132]von der Mehden, p. 66.

[133]Nguyen Tuyet Mai, "Electioneering: Vietnamese Style," Asian Survey 2 (November 1962): 11-18.

[134]The Nation (Rangoon), May 30, 1962.

[135]Silverstein, pp. 130-31; von der Mehden, p. 66.

[136]Ibid., pp. 65-7.

[137]Smith, "Laos," pp. 579-83; Whitaker etal, pp. 160-1, 177.

[138]Smith, "Laos," p. 583.

[139]Ibid., p. 582.

[140]Whitaker etal, p. 172.

[141]Badgley, p. 114.

[142]Pye, Southeast Asia's Political Systems, pp. 48-50, 57-60.

[143]Anderson etal, p. 173; Burma Weekly Bulletin 10 (March 15, 1962): 395.

[144]Anderson etal, p. 160.

[145]Silverstein, pp. 140-44.

[146]Laos, 1,900 calories per capita and ranks a low 99.5; Burma, 2,170, rank 78.5; and Thailand 2,120, rank 83 out of 139 countries; problem of illness--physicians per one hundred million population; Laos 15, Cambodia 42, Burma 85, Thailand 132; see Taylor and Hudson, pp. 253, 256, 259.

[147]Branfman, p. 227.

[148]Whitaker etal, pp. 159-60.

[149]Ibid., p. 160.

[150]Ibid.

[151]Branfman, p. 227.

[152]Ibid., p. 228.

[153]G.M.T. Osborn, "Government and the Hill Tribes of Laos," in Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, ed. by Peter Kunstadter, p. 260.

[154]Branfman, p. 226.

[155]Ibid.

[156]Badgley, p. 114.

[157]Ibid., p. 119; Smith, "Laos," pp. 569-79.

[158]James T. Ward, "U.S. Aid to Hill Tribe Refugees in Laos," in Southeast Asian Tribes, Minorities, and Nations, ed. by Peter Kunstadter, p. 302.

[159]Smith, "Laos," p. 579.

[160]Osborn, p. 266.

[161]Whitaker etal, p. 158. It has been indicated that the Pathet Lao have firm control of "border areas adjoining North Vietnam and the South Vietnam and throughout the provinces of Phong Saly, Sam Neua, in most of Houa Khong and in much of Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang provinces. In the southern panhandle, a border area contiguous to part of South Vietnam was being administered by the NLHS as a separate new province called Taven Ock, carved out of the hilly eastern half of Sarvane and part of Attopeu provinces."

[162]Smith, "Laos," p. 579.

[163]Bernard Fall, "The Pathet Lao: A 'Liberation Party,'" in The Communist Revolution in Asia, ed. by Robert A. Scalapino (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 150-1.

[164]Anderson _etal_, p. 93.

[165]_The World Handbook Data_ tape as collected under the direction of Taylor and Hudson, as made available by the IUCPR. Also see Taylor and Hudson, p. 66.

[166]Ibid.

[167]Ibid.

[168]Ibid.

[169]Ibid.

[170]Ibid.; also see Taylor and Hudson, pp. 19-20.

[171]Ibid.

[172]Ibid.

[173]Taylor and Hudson, p. 83.

[174]J. Henderson, J. Heimann, K. Martindale _etal_, _Area Handbook for Burma_ (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 164.

[175]Badgley, pp. 98-9.

[176]Guy Morechand, "The Many Languages and Cultures of Laos," in _Laos: War and Revolution_, ed. by Adams and McCoy, p. 29.

Chapter IV

INTERVENTION/PENETRATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Two systemic variables, the structure of the international system and the stability/instability of the nations in the system, are especially potent as sources of intervention and penetration (for those leaders who are predisposed to undertake such behavior or policy). The instability of national actors in the Third World has provided ample opportunity for intervention and penetration by major actors. Southeast Asia, particularly Indochina, has been the focus of major power interventionary behavior. This chapter will illustrate the salience of these two variables on interventionary behavior. Specifically, superpower interventionary and non-interventionary behavior will be examined in the Southeast Asia subsystem--focusing particularly on Laos, the major case study, Cambodia, and Burma--from 1954 to 1974, thus, encompassing in this study an examination of interventionary behavior in both the bipolar and triangular polyarchic international systems.

The basic structure of the international system, which refers to the degree to which "the capabilities for affecting the conduct of international life ·is concentrated or dispersed within the system,"[1] by its nature encourages or discourages

intervention.* In a bipolar system, where capabilities are concentrated or tightly structured, a shift in allegiance or loyalty of a national actor will seem more threatening to a global actor and interventionary behavior is more likely to occur.[2] (This is illustrated by the "domino theory" and U.S. policy in Southeast Asia in the 1950's and 1960's.) Although fear of confrontation and escalation would inhibit intervention to some extent or be a factor in decisions concerning interventions, the feared consequence according to Morton Kaplan, "is not so direct and massive in its weight that it would prove overriding. Moreover, most interventions would be indirect and covert."[3]

The greater the dispersion of capabilities, as in the triangular polyarchic system, the less likelihood that the system can be radically altered by a single development; hence, global actors are less likely to engage in interventionary behavior. The triangular polyarchic system rejects the zero-sum aspects of bipolarity and presumes that the interest of two essential actors can be advanced simultaneously, i.e., Sino-American detente, Soviet-American detente. Moreover, superpowers must remain aware of common interests even while they prosecute a variety of conflicting interests in various regional subsystems[4] (i.e., Soviet policy to Laos in 1962 and its policy to Cambodia in 1970). Additionally,

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*For a more detailed explanation see Chapters I and II.

since this power configuration is more diffuse and fluid and since local conflicts are perceived as less threatening to the overall balance than in a bipolar system,[5] it seems reasonable that superpower intervention would decrease (as it did in Laos) and if they do desire to aid an ally they will do so with a "lower profile," by either supporting third party intervention, i.e., U.N. intervention or by indirectly penetrating the polity with foreign aid, trade, etc.[6]

The Soviet Union and The Peoples' Republic of China in the 1950's, and the United States until the late 1960's, viewed the international power structure in terms of a bipolar system. As will be illustrated in the Laotian case study, the Sino-Soviet dispute, which was exacerbated by the Indochinese situation, caused both the Soviet Union and Red China to become aware in 1960 of the new international power configuration. The United States did not totally perceive of the new power configuration until the early 1970's, i.e., Sino-American detente. Thus, until each of these actors perceived of the new power configuration, their policies were based on the bipolar concept of the international system.

The bipolar system with its emphasis on the importance of a single dominant axis of conflict, its tendency to view regional and national actors and to conceptualize issues (i.e., civil wars, coup d'etats) in relationship to the underlying bipolar axis of the system tends to explain why superpowers would intervene in local conflicts, i.e., Indochina.

This conceptualization is reflected in the U.S. containment
policy and the domino theory. With this conceptualization,
America's leaders defined the problem of Indochina in its
global context; the domino theory justified intervention in
Southeast Asia. This theory, whether more or less articulated,
appeared in the relevant National Security Council papers
dealing with the Indochina situation and underlay all major
decisions taken relevant to the area.[7]

Although no major emphasis was given to Indochina in
1949, National Security Council papers did link the future of
Southeast Asia, particularly Indochina, with the rest of the
world:

> In any event...it is now clear (with the "loss" of
> Nationalist China) that Southeast Asia is the target
> of a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin.
> In seeking to gain control of Southeast Asia, the
> Kremlin is motivated in part by a desire to acquire
> Southeast Asia's resources and communication lines,
> and deny them to us. But the political gains which
> would accrue to the USSR from communist capture of
> Southeast Asia are equally significant. The extension
> of communist authority in China represents a grievous
> political defeat for us: if Southeast Asia also is
> swept by communism we shall have suffered a major
> political rout the repercussions of which will be felt
> throughout the rest of the world, especially in the
> Middle East and a then critically exposed Australia.[8]

In 1950, the question was raised where the containment line
was to be drawn. The domino theory as applied to Southeast
Asia reinforced the decision of where to draw the line of
containment. Both ideas--containment line and the domino
theory--were embodied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a 1950
memorandum to the Secretary of Defense evaluating "the strategic

importance, from the military point of view, of Southeast
Asia:"[9]

> c. Southeast Asia is a vital segment in the line of
> containment of Communism stretching from Japan southward
> and around to the Indian Peninsula....The security of
> the three major non-Communist base areas in their quar-
> ter of the world - Japan, India, and Australia - depends
> in a large measure on the denial of Southeast Asia to
> the Communists. If Southeast Asia is lost, these three
> base areas will tend to be isolated from one another;
> d. The fall of Indochina would undoubtedly lead to the
> fall of other mainland states of Southeast Asia;
> e. The fall of Southeast Asia would result in the
> virtually complete denial to the United States of the
> Pacific Littoral of Asia.... f. ...Soviet control
> of all major components of Asia's war potential might
> become a decisive factor affecting the balance of power
> between the United States and the USSR....[10]

This concept was the basis of our decisions not only in
the 1950's, but also in the 1960's. In March 1964, a
McNamara-Taylor report stated that the U.S. objective in
South Vietnam "is an independent non-communist South Vietnam."[11]
The importance of this objective was underscored in a classic
statement of the domino theory:

> Unless we can achieve this objective in South Viet-
> nam almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under
> Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia),
> accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective
> U.S. and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall under
> the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist
> but likely then to become so (Indonesia taking over
> Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with our
> help, but would be under grave pressure. Even the
> Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to India
> to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and
> Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would
> be greatly increased....[12]

The articulation of the domino theory to Southeast Asia
and the perception of a powerful threat to American world
interest, as well as the fall of China, the withdrawal of the

British (from Burma, Pakistan, etc.) and the defeat of the French in Indochina, combined to induce Washington to take action. However, since all Southeast Asian states were unstable (i.e., Burma, Laos), the United States had to select the key "domino" or country in which to take a stand against communism. The Pentagon Papers indicate that from the early 1950's, Indochina was considered the key area, and within that area, as viewed by President Eisenhower in 1959, Laos was of prime strategic importance:

> It is important to United States security interests that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.
> The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard.[13]

> ...President Eisenhower said with considerable emotion that Laos was the key to the entire area of Southeast Asia. He said that if we permitted Laos to fall, then we would have to write off all the area. He stated that we must not permit a Communist take-over.[14]

The Pentagon Papers indicate that Burma lacked the strategic importance of Laos; if Burma "went communist," Thailand would still be defensible; additionally, it would also create a "stiffer" Indian attitude toward communism; and, lastly, Burma was considered a British responsibility (however, Indochina was not considered a French responsibility):

> With respect to Burma, Thailand, and Malaya, internal subversive moves will probably remain the chief threats to the established governments. Chinese Communists would probably move against these countries only if first

successful in Indo-China...

...In the event of Chinese Communist moves against
Indo-China or Burma....It is unlikely that U.S. forces
would be employed in Burma. This is considered to be
an area of British responsibility.[15]

...The extension of communist power via Burma would
augment the communist threat to India and Pakistan and
strengthen the groups within those countries which
favor accommodation. However, such an event would
probably result in a stiffer attitude toward communism
on the part of the Indian government.[16]

11. Thailand has no common border with China and no
strong internal communist element. It adjoins areas
of Indochina...the border areas are remote and difficult.
Hence, communist seizure of Thailand is improbable
except as a result of the prior loss of either Burma or
Indochina.
12. Communist control of either Indochina or Burma
would expose Thailand to infiltration and severe
political pressures as well as to the threat of direct
attack....However substantial aid, together with assurance
of support by the United States and the UN might be
sufficient to preserve a non-communist government in
Thailand in spite of any form of pressure short of an
overt attack.
13. Thailand would be difficult to defend against an
overt attack from the east by way of the traditional
invasion route through Cambodia. Thailand is more
defensible against attack from Burma owing to the
mountainous terrain and poor communications of the
Thai-Burmese border...
14. If the collapse of Thailand followed the loss of
Indochina, the psychological and political consequences
would be less immediate, owing to the difficult terrain
of the Thai-Burmese border country.[17]

Thus, Burma was not involved in the cold war for two major

reasons: it was not perceived as a "key domino;" additionally,

its nationalistic elite agreed to develop a foreign policy of

nonalignment.

In contrast to the Laotian elite, the Burmese elite have

practiced a foreign policy which has helped to keep Burma

outside the politics of the cold war. Burma has been able

to do this only by isolating itself from the cold war contest between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Peoples' Republic of China. Two factors are significant in the Burmese government's calculations on relations with foreign actors: first, Burma has one of the longest frontiers with Red China; second, some of the non-Burman ethnic groups are eager to obtain foreign aid in support of their anti-government activities. Burmese foreign policy has been devised to minimize the non-Burman capacity to obtain foreign support particularly with respect to China, and to alleviate any apprehension in Peking that Burmese territory might be used against China.[18]

Burma has adopted nonalignment as the fundamental principle of its foreign policy. Burma interprets nonalignment on the Swiss Model and seeks to isolate the country from either global or regional disputes as far as possible.[19] One high Burmese official once aptly summarized Burmese foreign policy to a foreign visitor: "We wish Burma could be towed, like an island, into the sea and left alone."[20] On achieving independence, Burma opted against membership in the Commonwealth, thus losing a degree of security provided at that time by British military support and assistance. Moreover, in line with its nonalignment policy, Burma renounced military assistance from either the Western or Eastern bloc.[21]

In contrast to Laotian "neutralism," Burmese policy has been the exact reverse. The Burmese elite have isolated

Burma to the fullest extent possible from foreign economic
and political forces. In order to protect its neutrality
and sovereignty, many restrictive stipulations have been
placed on the acceptance of foreign aid. As one observer
noted:

> Disillusioned with foreign aid that Burma felt
> was being exploited by the donor as an instrument of
> persuasion, the government in Rangoon continued in the
> 1970's to decline any assistance unless it could pay
> for it or unless there was the firm assurance that
> political strings were not attached.[22]

(Burma, as a result of this policy, has not advanced econ-
omically as quickly as Thailand, South Korea, and Malaysia,
which have alliances with industrially-advanced powers.[23])

In 1953, the United States' economic aid program was
discontinued at the request of the Burmese government. Econ-
omic cooperation was resumed in 1956; however, aid from the
U.S. and other Western nations remain at insignificant levels.
The first Burmese-Soviet trade agreement, which set the
pattern for all subsequent accords, was signed in 1955.
Again, in order to avoid creating unwanted obligations or
to invite outside interference, all Soviet assistance is
paid for.[24] A 1967 dispute with the Peoples' Republic of
China terminated Burma's profitable "aid-trade" arrangement
with China; this agreement had provided for the sale of
Burmese rice to Communist China and for Chinese goods and
services to be sent to Burma on an interest-free credit basis
"without any conditions and privileges attached."[25] In
1970, after restoration of cordial relations, the "trade-aid"

arrangement between China and Burma was reestablished.

Thus, Burmese neutrality is a choice that has resulted in

slower economic development and has required considerable

expenditures for a self-sufficient defense.

Since independence, Burma has faced severe security

problems, primarily but not exclusively internal. Since

its inception, Burma has had to deal with insurgencies.*

In order to cope with its endemic internal rebellions, the

embattled Burmese government placed heavy emphasis on building

up its army. However, as Leo Rose notes:

> This virtually exclusive preoccupation with internal
> rebellions has influenced the character of the Burmese
> military, which has long been primarily involved in
> "counterinsurgency" operations. As a result, the army
> has developed only limited capacity to meet direct
> external aggression.[26]**

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*See Chapter III for a detailed explanation.

**On several occasions since Burma's independence, the
Chinese have sent patrols across the border into defenseless
areas; however, under diplomatic pressure from Rangoon, they
were removed. This was an acute problem in the 1950's when
Nationalist Chinese irregulars were mounting guerrilla attacks
from Burma into the Peoples' Republic of China. The irregulars
posed a serious problem to Burma's effort to maintain internal
and external peace. The Burmese became apprehensive that
these activities would provide a pretext for Communist Chinese
invasion, thus threatening Burmese sovereignty and, perhaps,
involving the nation in the "cold war." Burmese concern was
increased by occasional reports of Communist Chinese incursions
into the Shan state. Consequently, the Burmese military
security forces intensified their operations against the
irregulars but with limited results. Peking offered to aid
in ejecting the irregulars, however, Burma refused and turned
to the United Nations for assistance. Under U.N. auspices,
approximately 10,000 irregulars were evacuated and repatriated
to Taiwan in 1954 and 1961. In 1961, Burma and Peking signed a
mutual nonaggression pact and jointly stated that "the two
countries where necessary act in coordination and cooperation
to solve" the problem of "remnant Kuomintang troops in Burma."[27]

The nonalignment and isolation policies which the Burmese elite have adopted, are intended to alleviate Chinese apprehensions concerning Burma; to avoid direct involvement in the cold war; and, thus, to minimize any direct external threats.

The Burmese government has been challenged not only by tribal insurgencies, but also by the White Flag and Red Flag Communist parties. Unlike the Pathet Lao, the Burmese Communist cadres have never been able to bridge the gap between Marxist-Leninism and the native culture of any considerable segment of the population. Thus, as John Badgley notes, "The Party was damned because it did not make the linkage" between theory and the native culture and, therefore, has had to rely "instead on an external 'fountain' of legitimacy."[28] The Communists have also failed in Burma because they have suffered from disciplinary problems and ideological confusion. Compared to the broad-based communist movements in Laos and South Vietnam, the Burmese Communist movement is weak and insignificant. The Chinese Communist investment in Burma's Communist party has been "a low-risk, low cost affair."[29] However, as Badgley notes,

> Fortunately for Burma, it has kept itself out of the politics of The Cold War. Yet one cannot study the Communist movement and feel secure about the future. China has demonstrated a long and unusual interest in Burma, and manipulated the major Communist Party there to a greater degree than in any other country. Because Burmese politics do not inspire confidence in the ability of any Rangoon regime to control dissident groups, the potential for substantial warfare persists.

Although the Cold War has become less intense, it has been replaced by a Sino-Soviet hostility that inspires another type of intervention as in Bangladesh.[30]

Unlike the Laotian elite and ethnic Lao population, the Burmese elite and ethnic Burman population are deeply nationalistic and, therefore, suspicious and distrustful of any politician or group which is influenced by a foreign actor. As Badgley observes,

> Deeply felt ethnic Burman nationalism remains the dominant political mood of Burma today. Any variety of international communism or unusual loyalty to a foreign political system is sufficient cause to create suspicion, official distrust, and even confinement.[31]

Thus, by not being viewed as a key "domino" and by developing a policy of "hermit diplomacy,"[32] Burma did not become drawn into the great powers' cold war contest.

In contrast to Burma, Laos was perceived to be a key "domino;" additionally, unlike the Burmese elite, the Lao elites' factionalism based on regional rivalries and ideologies, their tepid nationalism, and their historical "clientship" relations with foreign actors, set the stage for their acceptance of anti-communist promises and foreign intervention. According to Nina Adams, the necessary personal and political compromises had been accomplished and rationalized by 1949:

> A lack of ideology and social concern allowed the easy transformation of a moderate political nationalism keyed to the achievement of Laotian independence into an increasingly conservative political, economic, military, and psychological dependence. The Laotians came to see clientship as necessary to the preservation of their elite model of government from increasingly effective attack and counterorganization by the Pathet Lao.[33]

As will be illustrated in the Laotian case study, the
imperatives of the bipolar international system, the non-
ideological factionalism among the Lao elite, and the lack
of political, national, and territorial integration which
helped to provide the Pathet Lao with a strong power base,
converged, thus, creating a war in Laos, which, as Guy
Morechand notes, was

> at the same time a civil war, an ideological war, a
> war in which different minorities have aligned them-
> selves with one side or another for local advantage,
> and above all a war in which foreign powers have, for
> their own ends, exploited ethnic differences, setting
> ethnic groups, or factions of ethnic groups, at each
> others' throats. Foreign intervention does not "help"
> unify a Laotian nation, but sides with particular ethnic
> groups, classes, factions, and individuals in a complex
> and unpredictable country.[34]

CASE STUDY: LAOS--1954-1974

United States diplomatic policy toward Laos can be
viewed as having four phases: 1954-1960, 1960-1962, 1963-
1973, and 1973-74. During the first phase, 1954 until approx-
imately 1960, the chief characteristic marking all of United
States policy was an overt anticommunism; this policy pre-
cluded acceptance of a neutral Laotian government. The
second phase, 1960-1962, was a transitional period; during
this period the United States policy changed from opposition
to nominal support of a neutral government. This shift in
policy was not the result of any real commitment to a truly
neutral Laos, but the recognition that only a neutral govern-
ment, supported at least nominally by both Communist and non-

Communist nations, could maintain a stable government. The
third phase of U.S. policy, 1963-1973, has been dominated
by U.S. interests and concerns in Vietnam. These phases
are valid and useful in comprehending American diplomacy
toward Laos, but there are certain elements of American
involvement which were common to these three phases: "namely
the covert and deceptive nature of U.S. involvement"[35] and
the recurring American subversion of the Geneva Agreements
of 1954 and 1962. This covert U.S. policy had been motivated
by an underlying anticommunist attitude and a desire to pre-
vent Communist hegemony in the Laotian territory.[36] The
fourth phase, 1973 to the present, has been the United States
disengagement from Laos, and its apparent acceptance of a
neutral coalition government.

1954-1960

After the Geneva Conference in 1954, Laos achieved
true independence (outside the umbrella of the French Union).
The Geneva settlement marked the end of the French*-Indo-
chinese fighting phase and the end of the "old imperialism."
However, it by no means established an adequate basis for
permanent peace. The distinctive feature of this settlement
was a vagueness and a general lack of precise provisions for
the political settlement of the conflict. The only detailed

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*U.S. military aid to the French in Laos during the
period of French control, 1950-1954, has been estimated at
$30 million.[37]

document was the document concerning the cessation of hos-
tilities. The Geneva agreements stipulated a general cease-
fire, the withdrawal of French Union forces (except for 1,500
French officers and men to train the Laotian army) and Viet
Minh, and the regroupment of Pathet Lao forces in Sam Neua
and Phong Saly provinces pending a political settlement.
The Geneva agreements prohibited introduction of foreign
military personnel and military advisors; Laos was to be
a neutral area.[38] Laos emerged in a good position from Geneva;
it was to be a neutral, independent and undivided state.
However, the realization of a neutral, nonaligned, and
united Laos was made impossible by a series of events both in
and outside Laos.

The major task of the newly established neutral govern-
ment of Souvanna Phouma was to reach a political settlement
with the Pathet Lao (which would create a coalition govern-
ment and would integrate the two armies). However, barely
three months after Geneva, October 20, 1954, Prince Souvanna
Phouma resigned. Souvanna Phouma's resignation has been
attributed to the political upheaval which followed the
assassination of Kou Voravong, Minister of Defense and a
leading advocate of the Geneva Accords. The imputed political
purpose of the assassination was to remove the cabinet mem-
ber most heavily in favor of reconciliation with the Pathet
Lao. The Sananikone family is considered the culprits and
is blamed for the killing.[39] However, years later in 1961,

Souvanna Phouma ascribed his fall in 1954 to foreign inter-
ference. He said:

> Immediately after the conclusion of the Geneva
> Agreements the Government over which I presided entered
> into negotiations with the Pathet Lao in order to re-
> integrate the combatants of this patriotic movement into
> the national community, but foreign interference into
> our internal problems compelled me to resign.[40]

Stevenson notes that "whether foreigners intrigued to

engineer Souvanna's ouster and the naming of Katay, who opposed

a coalition government or integration of the army remains to

be proved."[41] Stevenson believes that the United States

played no major role in these events since the C.I.A. was

just beginning to set up shop and operate in Laos at this

time. He contends that "the French or Thais seem more likely

sources of trouble."[42]

After the resignation of Souvanna Phouma, a new govern-

ment was formed under Katay Don Sasorith,* who favored closer

relations with Thailand and who opposed a coalition govern-

ment with the Pathet Lao. Katay, prime minister from November

1954 to February 1956, was a strong supporter of the South-

east Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) which came into

existence on September 6, 1954, seven weeks after the con-

clusions of the Geneva Accords, placed Laos within its

"protective orbit."[43] With the permission of Katay Don

Sasorith, the small United States Operation Mission (USOM) in

charge of administering the aid program was established in

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*A member of the Southern Laos family which has traditionally
preferred close links with Thailand.

Vientiane on January 1, 1955. The size of the mission rapidly
increased from a dozen men to over one hundred by December,
1957.[44]

The objective of the aid program to Laos was to bolster
the army and government rather than to promote economic develop-
ment or self-sufficiency in defense. Laos was "the only
country in the world where the United States supports the
military budget 100%."[45] The aid program was designed "to
keep Laos this side of the Bamboo Curtain." From 1955 to
1958, the United States' aid to Laos totaled approximately
$167 million.[46] However, despite the magnitude of the U.S.
aid program very little of it reached the average Laotian
peasant because of the corrupt administration of the pro-
gram.[47]

During 1955, the USOM civilian economist had to evaluate
requests for military equipment. Not having the technical
expertise in this area, the Pentagon won approval to estab-
lish a Program Evaluation Office (PEO) in January 1956. In
order to avoid contravention of the Geneva Agreement, these
military men wore civilian clothes; however, despite the
subterfuge, the PEO was in actuality a Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG). As Stevenson notes, "the PEO official
functions grew from disbursing and budget evaluation to end-
use inspection, to weapons training, and finally, in July
1959, to tactical training and field operations."[48] Thus,
the obstacle, the Geneva Agreement's prohibition of the

establishment of a military mission in Laos, was overcome

when the United States established a military mission but gave

it a different label--PEO--and attached it to the USOM. The

PEO violated the Geneva Agreement since it clearly served as

the functional equivalent of a military advisory group. The

PEO contrivance was so obvious that the State Department in

1957 included Laos on a list of "countries where MAAG personnel

are stationed."[49]

Katay did little to resolve the internal conflicts in

Laos. Negotiations with the Pathet Lao concerning the

administration of the two provinces under their control,

foundered and were broken off in April 1955. Talks with the

Pathet Lao resumed once in the summer and once in the fall

only to be broken off. General elections were held in

December 1955, without the participation of the Pathet Lao.

After the December elections, Katay could not obtain the

two-thirds Assembly majority support then needed to form a

new government; Souvanna Phouma, however, obtained this

support and formed a new government in March 1956 (which

lasted until July 1958), on a pledge of reconciliation with

the Pathet Lao.[50] He pledged: "No effort shall be spared

so that negotiation with the adverse party be crowned by the

loyal reconciliation longed for by all."[51] The Royal Laotian

Government and the Pathet Lao resumed negotiations; they

reached a final agreement in November 1957. The Vientiane

Agreements provided for the integration of 1,500 men from the

Pathet Lao units into the Royal Laotian Army and the discharge of the forces remaining. It also provided for the integration of the administration of the two Pathet Lao-controlled provinces after the creation of the Government of National Union, which would include two Pathet Lao representatives as Ministers in a new coalition cabinet. Also supplementary elections would be held in 1958.[52]

During this period, the United States government was developing economic and military aid programs, and was increasing its involvement in Laotian affairs. The aid programs were viewed in 1955 as necessary for victories by anti-communist elements in Laos; this aid was primarily for military purposes without concern for political support in the villages. There was no program whose objective was to create electoral support among the peasantry for the anti-communist factions. Thus, while Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao slowly moved toward reconciliation, there is little evidence that American influence altered the direction or pace of this movement before 1957.[53]

The major characteristic marking all American policy in Laos throughout the 1950's was anti-communism. In a Congressional hearing the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter S. Robertson, bluntly stated U.S. objectives:

> Our policy objectives in relation to Laos have been and are to assist the Lao:
> 1. In keeping the Communist from taking over Laos;
> 2. In strengthening their association with the Free World; and

3. In developing and maintaining a stable and inde-
    pendent government willing and able to resist
    Communist aggression or subversion.[54]

Robertson also indicated the strategic importance of Laos:

> ...when you look at the map you will see that Laos
> is a finger thrust right down into the heart of South-
> east Asia. And Southeast Asia is one of the prime
> objectives of the international Communists in Asia
> because it is rich in raw materials and has excess
> food. We are not in Laos to be a fairy godfather to
> Laos, we are in there for one sole reason, and that is
> to try to keep this little country from being taken
> over by the Communists....It is part of the effort we
> are making for the collective security of the free
> world. Every time you lose a country, every time
> you give up to them, they become correspondingly
> stronger and the free world becomes weaker.
> This isn't happening only in this little country
> of Laos, it is happening all over the world, every-
> where. We are engaged in a struggle for the survival
> of what we call a free civilization.[55]

A basic feature of American policy during the Eisenhower

administration was opposition to a coalition government in

Laos. Memories of the 1948 coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia

left American officials with a fear of coalitions with the

Communists and a belief that coalitions were dangerous and

unworkable. Walter Robertson expressed this belief in 1959:

> We very much feared when they took the Communists
> into the Government that the same thing would happen to
> Laos as happened to Czechoslovakia. We very much
> feared the Communist coalition would bring the Communists
> dangerously into the country.[56]

The United States believed that the Pathet Lao should not

and need not participate in the government of Laos in any

way.

Souvanna's visit during the negotiations to Peking and

Hanoi which was an effort to prove his neutrality and desire

to achieve reconciliation, and the negotiated agreement itself

was perceived by the United States as evidence of a Laotian

veering away from "pro-Western neutrality."[57] The setbacks

for the United States in its battle against a "communist

take-over" were recounted in the following Operations Coor-

dinating Board (OCB) Report on Southeast Asia:

> The formation in Nov., 1957 of a coalition cabinet
> with Communist Pathet Lao participation, additional
> communist gains of places in the army and civil service,
> and permission for the Pathet to operate as a legal
> political party throughout the country, were generally
> considered setbacks for United States objectives.[58]

Moreover, with elections scheduled for May 1958, American

officials' concern and worry prompted action. A congressional

report set forth the situation:

> In the fall of 1957, with an awareness of the forth-
> coming elections, Ambassador Parsons contemplated the
> cumulative results of U.S. aid program to date. He
> was concerned with the possibility that its short-
> comings might become an election issue for the Communists.
>   He was apparently impressed by the aid program's
> obvious neglect of the needs of the typical Lao, the
> villager or farmer. In an effort to remedy this short-
> coming, the Ambassador conceived Operation Booster Shot.[59]

In 1957, the United States realized that its corrupt and

abused aid program had not had a significant impact on Laotian

politics or economy. Not having the needed leverage with its

present aid program, the United States designed "Operation

Booster Shot," which was an emergency attempt to extend the

impact of the U.S. aid program into rural Laos before the

upcoming elections. As Walter Robertson explained to a

congressional committee:

> This was a crash program. Such a program, we felt, would do much to counter the anticipated vigorous Communist campaign in the villages and the growing criticism that American aid benefits the few in the cities and fails to reach the rural population.[60]

The operation, which cost over $3 million, involved more than ninety work projects. Included in this were repair of schools, temples, and roads, irrigation projects, and air-dropping 1,300 tons of food, medical and other supplies. American overzealousness weakened the effect of Operation Booster Shot. Americans took over and dominated the program. As Stevenson notes:

> Instead of letting the Laotian politician take credit for the village aid projects and special air lifts of commodities, many U.S. officials flaunted the American role in the effort and, consequently, added to the credibility of Pathet Lao charges that the established politicians were U.S. lackeys.[61]

Operation Booster Shot failed; the aid did not produce an electoral victory for the anti-communist. In the 1958 elections, nine out of thirteen Pathet Lao candidates won seats in the National Assembly. Moreover, when the National Assembly convened Souphanouvong was elected Chairman. A Laotian official offered one explanation for the Pathet Lao victory: "Black market deals in American aid dollars reached such proportions that the Pathet Lao needed no propaganda to turn the rural people against the townspeople."[62]

The impact of Operation Booster Shot was to weaken the anti-communist groups. American enthusiasm for concrete results in this program and later aid programs, as well as American contempt for Laotian reluctance and lethargy,

caused many U.S. aid officials to bypass the bureaucratic red tape and the legitimizing procedures which delayed their projects.[63] For example, in Operation Booster Shot the initial plans stated that civil action programs were to be implemented through the Royal Laotian Army, but American officials found the RLG too incompetent and slow moving. An ironic but important result of this overzealousness in the implementation of aid programs "has been to weaken local governments at a time when the major reason for extending development projects to the village level was to strengthen those political structures as an alternative to the Pathet Lao."[64] U.S. penetration of Laos weakened political integration and the Laotian Administration; it strengthened the Laotian Government's dependency on the United States (officials for implementation of programs). A U.S. intelligence estimate in December 1958 concluded that the Neo Lao Hak Sat, the political arm of the Pathet Lao, was making "strong gains in almost every sector of Laotian society."[65]

In 1957, the United States decided to increase its direct, but covert, intervention in Laotian domestic political affairs. By 1957 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) staff in Laos "had been expanded and its intelligence network fairly well established."[66] The CIA shared the anti-communism of other U.S. officials, i.e., State Department and Pentagon officials, and perceived its task as that of creating a viable non-French anti-communist political system. In order

to accomplish its objective, the CIA operations attempted to

manipulate various Laotian political factions in order to

keep pro-Americans on top. CIA, and later Pentagon and State

Department, manipulation and penetration of various Laotian

political groups were made possible by the nonideological

factionalism among the ruling elites.[67] As this chapter will

illustrate, factionalism also existed among U.S. policy makers:

the CIA, the State Department, and the Pentagon; each group

cultivated a Laotian clientele, each group perceived develop-

ment in Laos according to its own major objectives, tasks,

and concerns; each group used policies which preserved its

own primary interests. Moreover, once the CIA, the Pentagon,

and State Department officials promoted and backed their

respective Laotian faction or client, "to support another

faction would be to discredit their own judgement and activi-

ties."[68] Thus, a major consequence was the bitter-end support

of their respective Laotian clients. As U.S. officials pene-

trated different Laotian political groups, the close working

relationships with their clients led Americans to accept and

adopt some of their clients' perspectives and to defend their

clients' interests in U.S. policy debates. Thus, different

competing American officials might have penetrated, supported,

and promoted their own Laotian clients, but a "consequence

of these close relations was the increased susceptibility of

the Americans to manipulation by the Lao."[69]

In 1957, the major CIA rivalry was not with other American

officials but with the French "Deuxieme" bureau and the network

of Frenchmen who were high officials in the Royal Government

bureaucracy. The CIA vigorously opposed any Lao official

whom it considered under French influence or control; it also

rallied against any Lao who was not a staunch anti-communist.[70]

The CIA considered Souvanna Phouma hopelessly pro-French as

well as dangerously naive about the Pathet Lao which Souvanna

denied were under foreign Communist control. This evaluation

was reinforced when Souvanna Phouma took two Pathet Lao assembly-

men into his Cabinet in 1957. This coalition government and

the 1958 elections confirmed the CIA belief that new political

groups had to be created and established to replace the old,

insufficiently anti-communist ones. The State Department

became alarmed over these events, perceiving its whole anti-

communist policy to be in jeopardy. State Department officials

looked for a way to reverse this "creeping communism" either

by defeating the Pathet Lao in the upcoming elections through

Operation Booster Shot or by withholding U.S. aid to weaken

the government. The Pentagon played a minor role in the 1957

policy debate because its Laotian operations were still small

and of low priority. The Pentagon also viewed this policy

debate as one which would not affect the Laotian Army, its

primary concern.[71]

United States officials quickly registered their dis-

pleasure with the May 1958 election results, which gave the

Pathet Lao added authority in the coalition government, in two

ways. First, the CIA helped to organize a group of young right wing conservatives, the Committee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI), in opposition to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. The CIA saw this group as a new elite force and was impressed by their anti-communism. Some saw the CDNI as "no more than a U.S. front organization."[72] At the very least, the CDNI were heavily influenced and controlled by the CIA. Secondly, on June 30, the United States suspended aid to Laos. As Roger Hilsman later wrote: "...by merely withholding the monthly payments to the troops, the United States could create the conditions for toppling any Lao government whose policies it opposed."[73] The aid suspension and CIA opposition through the CDNI were too much to overcome; on July 23, Souvanna Phouma lost a vote of confidence in the National Assembly and resigned. One observer charged that the United States paid $100,000 for each National Assembly vote against Souvanna.[74] A U.S. source admits that CIA agents were "counting their votes and stage-managing the whole affair."[75] The United States intervened in the domestic politics of Laos in 1957-1958; it was clearly and deeply implicated in the fall of Souvanna Phouma, as it would be again in 1960.

With CDNI support, Phoui Sananikone succeeded in forming a government by a narrow margin on August 18, 1958. He excluded the two Pathet Lao ministers who had held cabinet positions in the Government of National Union; the coalition government was broken. He created his own brand of neutrality,

one which "does not imply a neutrality on the ideological

plane: we are anti-communists."[76] He stated that his major

objective was "the struggle without fail against the implan-

tation of the Communist ideology in Laos."[77] Phoui created

closer relations with Thailand, upgraded the diplomatic

mission in Saigon to embassy level, and established official

relations with Nationalist China. In October the U.S. resumed

aid to Laos; in January 1959, the United States increased its

aid by nearly 40 percent. The American role in Laos increased

with its foreign aid. The new and accelerated aid program

differed from earlier programs in its increased reliance on

the Royal Army for administration and implementation of the

programs. The new programs were for village and agricultural

improvement, health information, improvement of the supply

system for the army, and the training of the Laotian Army.

In February, Phoui with State Department support, renounced

the section of the Geneva Accords which placed limits on the

amount of foreign military aid Laos could receive. The Pentagon

for the first time began to take an active interest in Laos.

Through an agreement with the French who were reducing their

training forces, the Pentagon was moving toward complete con-

trol in the training of the Laotian Army. The new head of

the PEO, who was assigned in February, was an active general,

who was officially put on civilian status. These actions

caused Soviet protests that the U.S. was inciting the Laotian

government to violate the Geneva Accords.[78] Souvanna Phouma

subsequently claimed that Phoui's diplomatic actions, and the permission he gave to the American government to send military instructors and advisors for the army, were a "fundamental error" by which Laos, under U.S. pressure, turned from a policy of neutrality.[79]

Although the Phoui Cabinet was united in its anti-communism, it was divided by factional distrust and suspicion. Moreover the United States did not try to bolster Phoui within his Cabinet, because the CIA and the Pentagon supported other politicians, mainly the CDNI and a young vigorous anti-communist Colonel Phoumi Nosavan, who, with CIA and military support, became Secretary of State for Defense. The increased military aid program brought the Laotian Army under close American supervision and control. As the Laotian Army grew stronger under its expanded role in the U.S. aid program, Phoui Sananikone grew weaker, and the CDNI, which included many young army officers and which made up half of his cabinet, grew restless.[80] Fearing an army coup, perhaps backed by the CIA which preferred Phoumi Nosavan to Phoui Sananikone, Phoui, with possible backing from the State Department's American Mission, seized upon the occurrence of a Laotian-Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) border incident in a remote northern area to charge North Vietnam with starting a campaign against Laos "by acts of intimidation of all sorts, including the violation and occupation of its territory."[81] The validity of these charges are questionable; the incident served merely

as a pretext for political maneuvering. Phoui used the
incident to request emergency powers for one year; his
request was granted. Hugh Toye suggests that Phoui, in
maneuvering for emergency powers, may have been emulating
Marshall Sarit of Thailand, who had used the Communist
threat to assume full power less than three months earlier.[82]

As the government became more conservative, and, as the
power of the army and its anti-communism increased, purges
were initiated and continued for months against Pathet Lao
officials and sympathizers. Two Pathet Lao battalions were
encamped at Xieng-Ngeum and the Plaine des Jarres, and were
preparing to be integrated into the Royal Laotian Army, as
previously agreed upon by Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao.
The Pathet Lao battalions, fearing deception by the increasingly
anti-communist Phoui government, refused at the last minute
to comply with the integration agreement. The following day,
Prince Souphanouvong and other Pathet Lao leaders were arrested
in Vientiane, and the Pathet Lao battalions were encircled by
the Royal Army. Phoui issued an ultimatum to the two battalions:
either be integrated in the Royal Army or be disbanded. The
battalion at Xieng-Ngeum capitulated; however, the battalion
on the Plaine des Jarres, with their families, chickens, pigs,
and other household possessions, melted through the Royal Army's
cordon and headed toward the North Vietnam border.[83] An
OCB Report on Southeast Asia stated: "The Lao Army displayed
a disappointing lack of capacity to control a small scale

internal security problem when it permitted the battalion to
escape."[84] The Pathet Lao subsequently suggested a recon-

ciliation, however, the Phoui government rejected the idea;

the Phoui government declared that the Pathet Lao were

deserters and had committed an act of open rebellion, leaving

only a military solution available. The American government

voiced support of the Royal Government's position and actions.

As Stevenson notes:

> The stage was set for the first serious military crisis
> in Laos since France's Indochina war, a crisis made
> possible by the American policy of building a strong
> army which imposed an intransigent anti-communist
> policy on a weak and divided political system. John
> Foster Dulles' "dike" against Communism had been built
> and was waiting for the flood.[85]

In the summer of 1959, the Pathet Lao began attacks on

the Royal Government's positions in the North. Although the

United States publically claimed that the 1959 fighting was

an attempt by "Communist-led forces...to impose their will

over the Kingdom (of Laos) and its small army," the only

political demands the Pathet Lao made were for a "restoration

of the coalition government of 1957-1958."[86] Thus, the onus

of the blame for the resumption of guerrilla attacks and

hostilities rests with the Phoui Sananikone government and

indirectly with the U.S.[87]

On September 18, 1959, a Special National Intelligence

Estimate (SNIE) attributed the renewed guerrilla war to "a

reaction to a stronger anti-Communist posture by the Laotian

government and to recent U.S. initiatives in support of Laos."[88]

SNIE analyzed the situation as follows:

> 7. We believe that the initiation of Communist guerrilla warfare in Laos in mid-July was primarily a reaction to a series of actions by the Royal Lao Government which threatened drastically to weaken the Communist position in Laos. For a period of about one year after the November 1957 political agreements between the Laotian Government ant the Pathet Lao, the Communist controlled party in Laos - the Neo Lao Hak Sat - attempted to move by legal political competition toward its objective of gaining control of Laos. The Laotian Government had taken counteraction which checked this effort. Moreover, the U.S. had stepped up its activities to strengthen the Laotian Government, notably through the decision to send military training teams, and clearly was increasing its presence in Laos. The Communist advance in Laos was losing impetus. To the Communist world, the future probably appeared to be one of increasing political repression, declining assets, and a strengthened anti-Communist position in the country.[89]

During the summer of 1959, the Pathet Lao attacks against Royal Army posts in Northeastern Laos were not serious in a military sense; however, these attacks did create a feeling of insecurity and instability within Vientiane, and they did reveal the basic inability of the Lao Army to stand, fight and win. In spite of $200 million in American aid, mere rumors of advancing North Vietnamese troops were enough to cause the Royal Laotian troops to flee in terror. These rumors, which initially were the result of its own propaganda, had the same affect on the Royal Laotian government officials who asked Washington for assistance to meet the threat. The tension and particularly the rhetoric of crisis heightened. Distortions by the Lao government and irresponsible American

journalism*--U.S. newspapers treated the attacks as a major crisis--stimulated a high level policy review in Washington.[90] In July, the United States signed a new agreement which expanded the PEO group and called for U.S. military advisors to begin training Lao combat troops. In August, the CIA did increase its logistical support to the Lao Army by chartering transport planes belonging to Air America. However, direct overt military intervention was avoided. Neither President Eisenhower nor the new, less assertive and less influential Secretary of State Herter, who was not particularly interested in Asia, wanted intervention.[91] Dissatisfaction with the United States response to its request for assistance prompted the Royal Laotian Government to again charge North Vietnam with aggression; however, this time they appealed to the United Nations for assistance. Neither the U.N. team of observers nor the secret U.S. government SNIE of September 18, 1959, found any conclusive evidence of participation or aggression by the North Vietnamese.[92]

After failing to obtain international support in his battle against the Communists, Phoui considered reorganizing

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*Not an atypical example is given by Bernard Fall who was in Laos at the time. The New York Times on August 24, 1959, titled a story--"Laos Insurgents Take Army Post Close to Capitol." As Fall notes the headlines should have said "Rain Cuts Laos Vegetable Supply," because there had been no attack. The whole story resulted from a washed-out bridge which had stopped traffic to Vientiane and thus prevented the daily vegetable supply from coming through. The report of a Pathet Lao attack was speculation which resulted from the cut-off traffic.

his cabinet. The CDNI members who were advised by the CIA,[93] resisted this reorganization which would have shifted CDNI Foreign Minister Khamphon Panya to another cabinet post. The CDNI contended that Phoui intended to weaken the government's anti-communist orientation. In December, the army General Phoumi Nosavan and other CDNI members demanded Phoui's resignation and sent troops to surround his house. The Army coup was successful; on December 30, Phoui resigned.

Phoumi Nosavan was sponsored by and the protege of the CIA. For several months the CIA had been building up and strengthening Phoumi Nosavan; by supporting Phoumi, the CIA believed they could preclude another coalition and build an effective anti-communist government. Moreover, Phoumi was not only strongly pro-American and staunchly anti-communist, he also had a close relationship with his cousin, Marshall Sarit of Thailand. For these reasons, both the Pentagon and the CIA backed him against the Phoui Sananikone government and wanted him to become the head of the Laotian government. By 1959, the CIA had a strong hand in formulating and implementing American policy in Laos, however, at times the State Department opposed it.[94]

The State Department, which reportedly was unaware of the Pentagon and CIA support of the coup,[95] unenthusiastically supported the Phoui Sananikone government; the State Department did not want to choose between anti-communists. It opposed Phoumi Nosavan because he lacked political skill; he

had a militarist image, and he antagonized both America's allies--Phoumi was an anathema to the British, French, and Australians--and Laotians, who disliked him for his inability to keep his word and for being un-Laotian which is not following the traditional Lao policy of compromise. A compromise was reached, and the King appointed a caretaker government headed by Kou Abhay until the elections scheduled for April.[96] In the meantime, however, Phoumi holding the cabinet positions of Minister of Defense and Veteran Affairs, dominated the government. During this period, the U.S. had trouble controlling its "strong man." As the Pentagon Papers note:

> Our problem in the last few months has not been "to strengthen the determination of the RLG to resist subversion" or "to prevent Lao neutrality from veering toward pro-communism." Without minimizing the importance of these objectives, our immediate operational problem has been to persuade the Lao leadership from taking too drastic actions which might provoke a reaction on the part of the North Vietnamese and which might alienate free-world sympathy for Laos - as for instance, outlawing and eliminating by force the NLHX or taking a hard anti-communist position in international affairs.[97]

The election in 1960 was rigged; the election rules* were rigged against the Pathet Lao, and Prince Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao's top vote-getter in the 1958 elections, was under arrest and not permitted to run. No attempt was made to hide the fraudulent nature of the election. Frank Robertson of the Christian Science Monitor noted:

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*See Chapter III for complete details of the 1960 election law.

> Last April's elections, rigged so blatantly that the
> most backward villager could perceive the deception,
> played right into the hands of the Pathet Lao....The
> Pathet Lao in recent months have increased public support
> enormously.[98]

Another American reported: "If free elections were held

today, every qualified observer including the American

Embassy concedes this hermit Kingdom would go Communist in

a landslide."[99]   However, with the election carefully managed,

pro-American conservative candidates won, and the Pathet Lao

were soundly defeated.   The King appointed Tiao Somsanith

as the new Prime Minister; he was a front-man for Phoumi

Nosavan, the "incipient strong man" of the country.   Laos

was relatively peaceful after the elections and an NSC

memorandum in July cited among United States objectives in

Laos that of "helping maintain the confidence of the Royal

Lao Government in its anti-communist, pro-Free World

'neutralism.'"[100]

From 1954 to 1960, the United States spent $300 million,

which went primarily to support an army.   However, the PEO

director in Laos admitted, "we have yet to give this country

a fighting Army."[101]   In 1960, the army was evaluated as

being poorly trained and its dependence on motorized trans-

port made it ill-adapted for guerrilla warfare (Laos has few

roads).   Buddhist sensibilities against taking a human life

are more meaningful to the average Laotian soldier than fighting

for political objectives.   Other Laotian values such as care-

ful good manners, respect for others, concealment of any

displeasing emotion, and serenity do not contribute to the
creation of an efficient army. Keyes Beech noted: "By
Western standards discipline is appalling....Officers are
careful not to hurt enlisted men's feelings....Laotian army
troops are very much averse to fighting."[102]

A French advisor reported that four of the twelve
battalion commanders he was training were overtly sympathetic
to the Pathet Lao. In 1959-1960, the army proved to be in-
effective in battle being unable to defeat the Pathet Lao,
and inept at simple security measures--letting the Pathet Lao
leaders who had been in jail for a year escape from prison on
May 24, 1960. As Stevenson notes:

> The survival of the army depended on the continuation
> of American aid, which has assisted the rise to power
> of strongly anti-Communist and pro-American officers.
> This chain of dependency guaranteed that the Laotian
> government would avoid a coalition with the Pathet Lao,
> would align itself closely to the United States,
> Thailand, and South Vietnam, and would oppose pro-
> Communist elements both politically and militarily.[103]

In 1960, the International Cooperation Association summarized
to the House Foreign Affairs Committee the results of its
aid program to Laos: "That Laos has remained free is attri-
butable largely to U.S. aid."[104] This statement reflects the
continued prevalence of a cold war perspective on Laos. The
importance of Laos continued to be its context in the cold
war as an area threatened by international communism.

To what extent is the Pathet Lao a mere pawn of the
policy objectives of other Communist powers--if the Pathet
Lao is indeed a pawn. To what degree, if any, has the Pathet

Lao lost control over its operations? As Bernard Fall notes,
to supervise and direct <u>anything</u> in Laos by remote control
is, as the U.S. can testify, extremely difficult. In sheer
physical terms alone, it is easier, logistically, for the
United States to supply the Laotian pro-American right wing
forces from nearby Thai airstrips and railroads than it is
for "the Communist to supply even the 'Plaine des Jarres' across
the whole North Vietnamese upland jungle with its washed-out
roads (when they exist at all) and the monsoon climate which
is notoriously inhospitable to airlifts."[105] Thus, out of
sheer necessity a great deal must often be left to local
initiative.

Until 1960 the Soviet Union had no diplomatic relations
or influence in Laos.[106] The Chinese also stayed aloof from
Laotian affairs, in accord with Chou En-lai's Bandung Conference
pledge of noninterference. At the Geneva (1954) and Bandung
(1955) conferences, China had supported Laotian neutralism.[107]
China consistently backed the neutral forces from 1953 to
1962 and took relatively little direct action in Laos. In
January 1960, Peking seemed reluctant to involve itself in
the Laotian crisis. In January 1960, however, in reaction
to Phoumi's seizure of control, Peking charged the United
States with having installed a facist government. After the
1960 rigged elections in Laos, Peking criticized the Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese for putting any faith on elections
under rightist auspices.[108] Nevertheless, when the new

Laotian government of Tiao Somsanith pledged to respect the

Geneva Accords, Peking declared its intention to keep good

relations with the new government.[109]

North Vietnam was the only Communist government with

more than nominal interest or involvement in Laos at this

time. The North Vietnamese role during this period was low-

keyed. Although the United States publicly stated and acted

as if it believed that only the American threat of nuclear

retaliation and the Royal Army kept the Chinese and North

Vietnamese from marching to the MeKong,[110] American policy

makers had little evidence of foreign Communist troops in

Laos before the border clashes in disputed territory at the

end of 1958, and even then it is questionable.[111] The

Pentagon Papers reveal little direct involvement in Laos by

outside Communist actors during this period. In July 1955,

a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) came to the conclusion

that North Vietnam would infiltrate Vietnamese soldiers

into Laos only if the Royal Laotian Government took military

action which seriously threatened the Pathet Lao position in

the two Northern provinces.[112] The paper stated that some

North Vietnamese cadres remained in Laos after 1954, both as

advisors and administrators. Some of these Vietnamese were

withdrawn in early 1957, and during 1958 and early 1959,

North Vietnamese activities were "evidently attenuated."[113]

The study contends that the Vietnamese did increase their aid

and military involvement only when the Royal Government

attempted to "disestablish" the two remaining Pathet Lao battalions in May 1959. Reports, such as the OCB report, during the 1959 crisis confirm the lack of hard evidence on which to blame outside Communists for aggression. The August 12 OCB report stated that it was reasonable to assume North Vietnamese involvement, but "there is no conclusive evidence as to the exact composition and objectives of the attacking forces."[114] Both Bernard Fall and Denis Warner, journalists and frequent visitors to the Laotian front in 1959, refuted the American official public claim that the 1959 (and 1961-1962) Pathet Lao offensives were carried out largely by North Vietnamese combat troops.[115] (Warner later commented a "Laotian army commander accepted as fact what the most junior Western staff officer would have rejected as fiction."[116])

During the period 1954-1960, the most valuable and important service provided by the North Vietnamese "was sanctuary in case of trouble, although they also at times provided training and leadership for some operations."[117] Many of the Pathet Lao cadres, which were situated throughout the country to win the support of the people, were trained in North Vietnam, and to a lesser extent China and the Soviet Union. Bernard Fall estimated the number of Pathet Lao cadres involved at only two hundred; however, even such a small number could have extensive influence and impact among the isolated ethnocentric Laotian communities where

leadership material is scarce and poorly trained. Because of
this, neither was direct outside assistance and aid very
great in absolute terms, nor was it necessary during this
period; the North Vietnamese limited their activities to
encouragement, training, and providing some military supplies.[119]
However, as Stevenson notes, "a soldier could not carry much
through the mountains and jungle. Any political organizer
would ultimately need to win the support of the people with
whom he was working."[120] By 1960, the Pathet Lao had extended
their control throughout the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong
Saly and beyond. Bernard Fall quoted a "friendly Asian
military observer" who had an opportunity to visit these
remote areas in the Spring of 1960: "The Pathet Lao in
hundreds of villages has almost reached the stage of political
organization that enabled the Viet Minh to defeat the French
in Vietnam."[121]

U.S. involvement in Indochina during this period was
rooted in an ideological misconception of post-war Asian
realities. The Chinese revolution was perceived as a creation
of the Soviet Union, and the national liberation movements
in Vietnam and Laos, as projects of Moscow and Peking. As
Marek Thee noted, "John Foster Dulles approached the conflict
as an exercise in brinkmanship, playing with the idea of
'rolling back' the Chinese revolution through the Indochinese
gates."[122] U.S. policy makers throughout the entire period
of involvement never gave credence to the fact that Laotians

as well as Vietnamese acting independently and on purely
nationalistic grounds, made the decision to resist U.S.
interference. Neither China nor the Soviet Union was fully
consulted.

1960-1962

The reality of a Communist threat changed greatly after
1960; the Communist threat became much more real. According
to Bernard Fall, the Laotian crisis began to resemble the
Spanish Civil War; Western (mainly U.S.) and Communist powers,
respectively, continued or began to use various Laotian factions
as proxies for their own confrontation on Laotian soil.[123]
Moreover, in all of the almost two decades of the second
Indochina war, the 1960-1962 period was "the only time
during which Laos was for the United States much more than
a mere side show to the conflict in Vietnam."[124]

Captain Kong-Le, a nationalist and neutralist army
commander of the best unit in the Royal Lao Army, the Second
Lao Paratroop Battalion, precipitated the 1960 crisis, by
executing a coup d'etat on August 9, and occupying all of
Vientiane. Kong-Le explained the aims of his coup: to bring
an end to the Laotian civil war; to rid Laos of foreign troops;
and to stop and suppress those who "were making their harvest
off the backs of the people." He explained his motives for
overthrowing the government:

> What leads us to carry out this revolution is our
> desire to stop the bloody civil war; eliminate grasping
> public servants (and) military commanders...whose property

amounts to much more than their monthly salaries can afford; and chase away foreign armed forces as soon as possible....It is the Americans who have bought government officials and army commanders and caused war and dissension in our country....We must help each other, drive these sellers of the fatherland out of the country as soon as possible. Only than can our country live in peace.[125]

Kong-Le called on Souvanna Phouma to head and organize a new, truly neutral government. Souvanna Phouma organized a new cabinet and headed the new legitimate recognized government.

The following events illustrate American intervention/penetration of Laos and the crosscurrents in American policy toward Laos. The United States, which continued to have doubts about Souvanna's orientation to the Pathet Lao, pressured Souvanna to form a coalition government which included Phoumi but excluded the Pathet Lao. Convinced of Souvanna's neutrality, Winthrop Brown, the new U.S. Ambassador to Laos, supported Souvanna's newly-created neutralist government; J. Graham Parsons, new Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, temporarily tended to support Brown's actions and recommendations. However, Secretary of State Herter was indecisive; he was suspicious of Souvanna, but he suspected that Phoumi's army might bungle a coup d'etat overthrowing Souvanna's government. The CIA, the Pentagon, and its military advisors of PEO, favored Phoumi Nosavan. The Pentagon and CIA officials in Laos wanted to provide Phoumi with full American support and give him free rein.[126] Washington instructed Brown to find a pro-Western substitute

for Souvanna. While Brown delayed implementing his instruc-
tions and argued for Souvanna, the Pentagon and CIA "turned
once again to their protege--Phoumi Nosavan."[127] Throughout
September, the CIA and the Pentagon advisors continued to
aid Phoumi forces. CIA officials used their own private air
corps--Air America--to give Phoumi's troops a military supply
system.[128]

Despite his agreement with Souvanna Phouma, Phoumi flew
to his Savannakhet headquarters (in Southern Laos) in September
1960 and formed a countercoup committee against Souvanna's
government in which he was a nominal member. He announced
the establishment of a new revolutionary group nominally
headed by Prince Boun Oum, head of one of the three major
political dynasties in Laos and a venerated prince from the
South. This Southern faction has always had close relations
with Thailand. A week later, with America's tacit support,
Thailand closed supply routes to Vientiane and instituted a
blockade. The CIA and the Pentagon channeled all supplies,
including those intended for Vientiane, through Savannakhet.
Moreover, two hundred Laotian paratroops, who had been train-
ing in Thailand under America's sponsorship, were turned over
to Phoumi, even though Washington had made a promise to
Souvanna to the contrary. This military assistance to Phoumi
strengthened him against the established government rather
than the Pathet Lao.[129]

Souvanna Phouma pleaded with American officials for
supplies and for assistance in overcoming the Thai blockade,
however, no help was forthcoming. Thus, Souvanna looked to
the left--both domestically and internationally. Domestically,
he began talks with Pathet Lao representatives aimed at
bringing them back into the national community. Internationally,
he turned to the Soviet Union for aid. He announced the
establishment of a Soviet embassy and diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union. Souvanna sought help from the Soviet
Union, thus "proving," according to Washington officials, his
pro-Communist tendencies. In reaction to Souvanna's actions,
the United States suspended the Royal Government's monthly
payments.[130] However, Ambassador Brown interceded and
offered Souvanna a compromise. Aid would be resumed if
Souvanna would officially permit the United States to continue
providing General Phoumi with military assistance. In return,
Phoumi pledged to send his forces against the Pathet Lao.
Souvanna Phouma agreed, only to be overthrown by Phoumi two
months later. It became obvious that "the United States
was backing two horses in a race only one could win."[131]
The State Department was backing the recognized legitimate
government of Souvanna Phouma; both Brown and Parsons wished
to resume aid to Souvanna to prevent his dependence on the
Soviet Union. Anti-communism was all that mattered to the
Pentagon and CIA. The Pentagon viewed Souvanna as an
"accommodator" who had no moral principles, and objected to

State Department officials support for a "collaborationist
government" including the Pathet Lao.[132] They had great con-
fidence in Boun Oum and Phoumi and in their determination
to resist communism. In late October, a U.S. delegation,
including Parsons, was sent to Laos to confer with Souvanna;
Parsons demanded that Souvanna abandon his policy of neutrality.
Since Souvanna had already been denied most of the help which
the United States could have given, he refused to succomb
(to U.S. demands). Shortly thereafter, the United States
decided that the legally-constituted government of Souvanna
Phouma "must go."[133] Souvanna was fighting for political
survival and had no where to turn but to the Pathet Lao with
which he concluded an agreement on a coalition government.
On November 16, 1960, Souvanna announced his government's
decision to establish "good neighbor relations" with China
and to send good will missions to Peking and Hanoi. He also
began negotiations with the USSR for aid. According to
Stevenson, Souvanna's "willingness to establish a neutralist
rather than communist government is shown by both his political
dealings in November and by the fact that he delayed requesting
Soviet assistance until American opposition to his government
was unmistakably clear."   In a sense, the CIA and Pentagon
assessment of Souvanna's pro-communist tendencies proved to be
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Calling him pro-communist, the
Pentagon denied him aid. "In desperation, he turned to the
Soviet Union for aid, thus 'proving' the original assessment."[134]

Ambassador Brown attempted to avoid an open civil war. He protested when Phoumi began his abortively-started march against Vientiane on November 23. Brown contended that Phoumi had broken his pledge not to use his equipment against the neutralist government. The United States suspended military aid to Phoumi, because it feared that the Soviet Union was going to take the issue to the United Nations. Since American aid to Phoumi provided proof of U.S. complicity in the attack on Souvanna's government, the State Department wished to have a defense against this charge. The Pentagon was deeply angered by this decision, and encouraged Phoumi to continue his attacks on Kong-Le's forces and to ignore Washington's pressures to work with Souvanna or cease his offensive. Moreover, the CIA provided Phoumi with the funds he requested.[135] Thus, in December "with plans drawn by his American advisors," Phoumi and his Pentagon-CIA backed forces marched on Vientiane.[136]

With Phoumi moving North, on December 3 the Soviet Union began airlifting supplies to Kong-Le's forces, however, it was too little too late. After a bloody battle, Kong-Le's forces which were greatly outnumbered withdrew to the North and formed a tenuous political alliance with the Pathet Lao; Souvanna fled to Cambodia; this left Phoumi's forces in control of Vientiane and Luang Prabang. On December 13, the King nominated Boun Oum to form a new government. Thus, the Phoumi forces became the Royal Government troops and Kong-

Le's troops became the pro-Communist rebels. The United States quickly recognized the Boun Oum government and stated that "the responsibility for the present fratricidal war in Laos...rests squarely and solely upon the Soviet Government and its partners."[137] Exiled in Cambodia, Souvanna Phouma stated: "What I shall never forgive the United States for is the fact that it betrayed me, that it double-crossed me and my government."[138]

The Soviet Union, which had tended to ignore Southeast Asia before the growing Sino-Soviet rift, now felt compelled to try to preserve good relations with Communist parties in the area--especially North Vietnam.[139] The Soviet government could not stand idly by, in view of direct American support of one group of counter-revolutionaries. Thus, the Soviet Union airlifted supplies to the Pathet Lao and the Kong-Le forces. Between December 15 and January 2, 1961, aircraft of the Soviet Union and North Vietnamese flew 184 sorties to the Pathet Lao and Kong-Le. Kong-Le's capture of the Plaine des Jarres from Phoumi's forces on December 31 permitted regular supplies to be flown into the Plaine via the Soviet airlift. In Washington, the Soviet airlift made all Laos questions more psychologically important. The United States viewed increased activity in Laos as a threat to the newly-established government.

In an attempt to explain away a series of defeats and the rout of their troops on December 31, the Boun Oum/Phoumi

government claimed an alleged invasion of Laos by seven North Vietnamese battalions.[140] As Haney notes, "the charge later proved to be a complete fabrication."[141] The Kong-Le/Pathet Lao forces were numerically inferior, but proved more than a match for the Phoumi forces. Referring to this situation, the Pentagon Papers note, "it turned out that the neutralist/ communist forces were far more effective than those favored by the U.S., and so it became clear that only by putting an American army into Laos could the pro-Western faction be kept in power."[142]

President Eisenhower was disturbed at Phoumi's deteriorating military position, however, and he refused to take overt counteraction until he had indisputable evidence of foreign Communist intervention. Because of Phoumi's defeats, the Soviet airlifts, and the suspicions of large-scale inter-vention by North Vietnam, U.S. policy makers viewed the situa-tion as urgent. Since the use of American troops was a live option, this crisis was much greater than earlier ones invol-ving Laos.[143]

On January 19, 1961, the President conferred with President-elect Kennedy and briefed him on the Laotian situation:

> President Eisenhower said...Laos was the key to the entire area of Southeast Asia. He said that if we permitted Laos to fall, then we would have to write off all the area. He stated that we must not permit a Communist take-over...
>   As he concluded these remarks, President Eisenhower stated it was imperative that Laos be defended. He said that the United States should accept this task with our allies, if we could persuade them, and alone if we could not. He added that "our unilateral intervention would be our last desperate hope" in the event we were unable

to prevail upon the other (SEATO) signatories to join us.

At one time it was hoped that perhaps some type of arrangement could be made with Kong-Le. This had proved fruitless, however, and President Eisenhower said "he was a lost soul and wholly irretrievable."

...This phase of the discussion was concluded by President Eisenhower in commenting philosophically upon the fact that the morale existing in the democratic forces in Laos appeared to be disappointing. He wondered aloud why, in interventions of this kind, we always seem to find that the morale of the Communist forces was better than that of the democratic forces. His explanation was that the Communist philosophy appeared to produce a sense of dedication on the part of its adherents, while there was not the same sense of dedication on the part of those supporting the free forces.[144]

Soon after Kennedy assumed power, the President in January, 1961 provided Phoumi with six AT-6 airplanes; it also sent 400 special forces personnel to form White Star Mobile Training Teams, which lived in the jungles and organized guerrilla activities. The Meo tribes along the Laotian-North Vietnamese border were the first to be organized into an effective anti-communist force. As the Pentagon Papers reveal, "the 'White Star Teams' used in Laos...had the purpose and effect of establishing U.S. control over foreign forces."[145] Also, the CIA and Pentagon continued to supply the Royal Laotian Army. Kennedy's decision to send Special Forces personnel (White Star Mobile Training Teams) escalated the conflict. This decision was "an early application of the counterinsurgency theories propounded by Roger Hilsman and others who hold that by using Mao Tse Tung's techniques either side in a civil war should be able to win. As in Vietnam in 1961, the impending embarrassment of a weak ally's defeat pro-

voked in Washington a drive to enlarge the struggle and foresake the possibility of a political solution."[146] Nevertheless the Phoumi forces continued to fight and perform abysmally. The Pathet Lao/Kong-Le forces consolidated their military position on the Plaine des Jarres. In early March when the Kong-Le/Pathet Lao forces attacked the Sala Phou Khoun junction on the road from Vientiane to Luang Prabang, the Phoumi forces, despite American advisors, panicked and fled. To American policy makers, the crisis appeared to be reaching explosive proportions.

Having created a task force in January to review American policy in Laos, Kennedy delayed action on Laos and temporized. Various proposals for intervention were discussed, considered, and rejected. Agreement among the policy makers could only be found for increased military aid (discussed above) and a show of force. Without ordering any troops to Laos, Kennedy put the Task Force 116 (U.S. Marines) on Okinawa on alert for possible intervention and ordered helicopters and supplies to Thai bases near Laos. Two aircraft carriers and their auxiliary ships were dispatched to the Indochinese coastal waters. Kennedy's decision to send Special Forces personnel (White Star Mobile Training Teams) escalated the conflict.[147]

By March, however, Kennedy appears to have decided to pursue a diplomatic rather than a military solution. On television that day, Kennedy declared:

> I want to make it clear to the American people and to
> all of the world that all we want in Laos is peace and
> not war, a truly neutral government and not a cold war
> pawn, a settlement concluded at the conference table and
> not on the battlefield.[148]

However, the Pentagon Papers reveal that a May 1 meeting on

Laos seems to have been the final time (at least for this

crisis) at which overt intervention was considered. Kennedy

"deferred any decision on putting troops in Laos,"[149] however,

instead approved "a cable alerting CINCPAC to be ready to move

a 5,000-men task force to Udorn, Thailand and to Touraine, South

Vietnam....The alert was intended as a threat to intervene in

Laos, if the Communists failed to go through with the cease-

fire which was to precede the Geneva Conference."[150]

The United States' decision to retreat from overt mili-

tary involvement in Laos and to seek a political settlement

was based on the following factors:

1. The Phoumi forces, the only alternative to negotiated
   settlement or U.S. military intervention had repeat-
   edly demonstrated their abysmal fighting capabilities;
2. The Pentagon opposed limited scale intervention in
   an Asian land-war and particularly after the Bay of
   Pigs fiasco were reluctant to approve intervention
   which was restricted "in terms of either territory
   or the weapons to be used;
3. The United States at the time simply did not have
   the strategic reserves necessary to mount a massive
   intervention (and U.S. intervention in Laos would
   present some difficult logistic problems);
4. U.S. Congressional leaders "had no stomach for
   further military adventures;"
5. Major allies of the United States resisted inter-
   vention; and
6. There was no conclusive evidence of North Vietnamese
   troop involvement, which could have served as a
   pretext for a major U.S. intervention.[151]

As Dommen notes, "the 'decision' to accept a coalition in Laos

was virtually thrust upon the Kennedy Administration."[152]

Dommen's evaluation is supported by American intelligence

estimates at the time of the Geneva Agreement. According to

Stevenson, American intelligence officers perceived and con-

sidered the risk of Communist compliance fairly small:

> They concluded that the North Vietnamese were determined
> to preserve their corridor into South Vietnam--Ho Chi
> Minh Trails--but would not overtly expand or improve
> their infiltration routes. Within Laos, U.S. experts
> thought that the Pathet Lao would try to maintain their
> de facto control, otherwise restricting their actions
> to political maneuvering.[153]

Nevertheless, Washington policy makers opted for the Geneva

Conference and signed the subsequent agreement.

Roving Ambassador Averell Harriman, who perceived the need

for a negotiated settlement earlier than most Americans, re-

ported to the President on March 29, 1961 that the best option

would be to give at least conditional support to Souvanna

Phouma, and the best negotiated settlement for Laos was

neutralization by international agreement, guaranteed by both

the West and the Soviet Union.[154] The American diplomatic plan

included a cease-fire and a termination of the airlift before

a conference could take place. The United Kingdom called for

a new Geneva Conference on Laos, and on April 24, 1961, the

Soviet Union joined Britain in calling for a Laotian cease-

fire and a reconvention of the Geneva Conference.

Kennedy had "rejected" overt military intervention,

however, he demonstrated surprising willingness to permit

extensive covert operations in Indochina. The Pentagon Papers

showed that at a National Security Council meeting on

April 29, 1961, Kennedy approved plans for covert operations

to infiltrate intelligence and even assault or commando teams

into Laos regardless of the cease-fire.[155] A July report by

Brigadier General E.G. Landale, a counterinsurgency expert,

revealed other covert operations in Laos:

> About 9,000 Meo tribesmen have been equipped for
> guerrilla operations which they are now conducting with
> considerable effectiveness in Communist-dominated
> territory in Laos....Command control of the Meo operation
> is exercised by the Chief CIA Vientiane with the advice
> of Chief MAAG Laos. The same CIA paramilitary and U.S.
> military teamwork is in existence for advisory activities
> (9 CIA operations officers, 9 LIAG/Army Special Forces
> personnel in addition to the 99 Thai PARY (Police Aerial
> Resupply Unit))....There is also a local veteran's
> organization and a grass-roots political organization
> in Laos, both of which are subject to CIA direction and
> control and are capable of carrying out propaganda,
> sabotage, and harrassment operations.[156]

Despite the concurrent negotiations at the Geneva Convention,

which began May 16 and were to last more than a year, during

which time parallel negotiations among the three Laotian

factions proceeded sporadically, the United States continued

to increase covert operations in Laos. On August 29, 1961,

according to the Pentagon Papers, President Kennedy approved:

> An immediate increase in mobile training teams in Laos
> to include advisers down to the level of the company,
> to a total U.S. strength in this area of 500; together
> with an attempt to get Thai agreement to supply an equal
> number of Thais for the same purpose.[157]

The President also approved on April 29, 1961: "An immediate

increase of 2,000 in number of Meos being supported to bring

the total to a level of 11,000."[158] This continuing covert

military support and the intransigence of the Laotian rightist
faction led by Prince Boun Oum/Phoumi Nosavan encouraged by the
Pentagon and CIA, and Thailand were the major stumbling blocks
in the path of a negotiated settlement.[159]

Phoumi Nosavan was the biggest obstacle to a negotiated
settlement. As one Washington official stated, "Our major
problem was to get Phoumi and his people to accept the facts
of life that a military solution was impossible and that a
negotiated settlement was the only possible solution."[160]
Nevertheless, in June 1961, Pentagon officers encouraged by his
anticommunism, agreed to support an increase of his army to
60,000. This increased aid reinforced his resistance to a
coalition government. In December, Phoumi launched a series
of "probing actions" deep into Pathet Lao territory. According
to Hugh Toye, British military attache to Laos, these probes in
central and northern Laos, were in "areas where his opponents
could be expected to be sensitive and where probes would provoke
military reactions which could then be used as excuses for
delay on the political front."[161] By January 1962, Phoumi's
drive collapsed. His tactics were designed, however, not to
gain territory but to tear apart the fragile cease-fire and
disrupt the Geneva discussions. In these maneuvers, he was
supported by the CIA.[162] In the meantime, Boun Oum rejected
the division of portfolios in a proposed coalition government
and refused to confer with Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong
in order to work out a compromise. Thus, with the rightists'

intransigence becoming more apparent, Harriman, the U.S.
negotiator at Geneva, convinced his superiors that more effec-
tive pressure or drastic action was necessary to bring the Phoumi/
Boun Oum faction into line. Fearing that the suspension of
military aid would benefit the Kong-Le/Pathet Lao forces, in
January 1962, the U.S. withheld economic aid. Laotian economic
dependence on U.S. aid forced Boun Oum back to Geneva to
resume negotiations.

Phoumi Nosavan was more intransigent. In reaction to
Phoumi's probing actions and air attacks from Nam Tha, the
Pathet Lao in January 1962 clearly broke the cease-fire and
moved close enough to Nam Tha to mortar the airfield. Dis-
regarding American advice, Phoumi responded by increasing
his troops at Nam Tha to 5,000 by the end of January. Fighting
between the Phoumi/Pathet Lao forces continued through spring.
Once again, Averell Harriman suggested the use of sanctions
against Phoumi; the February U.S. aid payment was not made.
Moreover, Harriman obtained the removal of the CIA Station
Chief, Jack Hazey, of whom Harriman had suspected (and was
later proven correct) of counteracting the aid suspension by
supplying CIA funds to Phoumi's forces. Besides backing Phoumi
in his venture, the CIA had counselled Phoumi against agreeing
to a coalition government.[163] In March, Harriman met with
Phoumi and bluntly told him that "the Phoumist forces were
finished in Laos if they did not agree to a coalition."[164]
But the Nam Tha crisis had already reached the threshold stage.

In February, fearing that the fall of Nam Tha would provide the Chinese an easy land corridor into his country, Marshall Sarit of Thailand moved Thai troops to the northern Lao-Thai border. Thailand, thus, became a stumbling block to an agreement. However, Harriman who met with Sarit explained American policy to Laos in blunt and unambiguous terms. Sarit agreed not to give Phoumi his military support, and later urged Phoumi to accept the coalition.

Pathet Lao attacks on Nam Tha intensified and in early May Phoumi charged that the Pathet Lao were backed by North Vietnamese and Chinese troops. Believing their own propaganda, Phoumist forces abandoned Nam Tha. Haney describes the Nam Tha crisis and denouement:

> Accounts differ as to whether there actually was a battle
> of Nam Tha. Apparently there was not, "only the
> possibility of one." Whatever the case, Phoumi's troops
> fled in panic toward the Mekong River town of Ben Houei
> Sai and crossed into Thailand. Once again Phoumi cried
> "wolf!" and this time not just "North Vietnamese!" but
> "Chinese Wolf!" Amid the panic and confusion rumor had
> it that an attack on Ben Houei Sai was imminent. So
> Phoumi troops fled across the Mekong into Thailand.
> An American patrol, displaying more courage, probed
> back toward Nam Tha. They encountered only scattered
> Pathet Lao patrols, no Vietnamese or Chinese. One
> American officer displaying a sense of humor, undoubtedly
> necessary for his work as military adviser to Phoumi's
> troops reported to his superiors: "The morale of my
> battalion is substantially better than in our last
> engagement. The last time they dropped their weapons
> and ran. This time they took their weapons with them."[165]

After the Nam Tha fiasco, President Kennedy deployed 3,000 U.S. troops to Thailand, however no U.S. overt intervention in Laos was forthcoming. However, the Pentagon Papers reveal a continued focus on and support of covert operations.

A June 19, 1962 report recommended the increased use of third-country personnel, paying particular attention to

> The whole range of this concept from the current limited use of Thai and Filipino technicians in Laos to the creation of simply equipped regional forces for use in remote jungle, hill, and desert country. Such forces would be composed of foreign volunteers supported and controlled by the U.S.[166]

Nevertheless, despite continuing covert operations, after the Nam Tha defeat progress toward a neutral Laos and a coalition government came quickly. The princes agreed on the composition of the cabinet, and on July 23 the Geneva Conference approved the neutralization declaration and gave official sanction to the new Government of National Union. As David Wise notes,

> After a decade of humiliating reverses and the expenditures of close to half a billion dollars, the United States policy had come full circle: during the 1950's Souvanna Phouma and his plans for a neutral Laos had been opposed with all the power of the Invisible Government (CIA); now the United States was ready to settle for even less than it could have had five years earlier at a fraction of the cost.[167]

Washington suspected the Communists, especially China and North Vietnam, of harboring aggressive designs in Laos, and proceeded to use these suspicions to justify much of their own intervention in Laos. The Pentagon Papers' dominant concern is with "Communist expansion" perceived as part of an international great power contest. Although at points a distinction is made between the interests of Hanoi, Moscow, and Peking, the final judgment leans to coordinated communist bloc strategy.[168] For example, referring to the increasing insurgency in South Vietnam at the end of the fifties, the Pentagon Papers

state: "Whatever differences in strategy may have existed among Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi, it appears that at each critical juncture Hanoi obtained concurrence in Moscow with an aggressive course of action."[169]

The Kennedy Administration inherited the Indochinese commitment at a "critical juncture in Soviet-Chinese relations: The faltering of the seemingly monolithic structure of the socialist camp."[170] Neither the United States nor the Laotian and Vietnamese Communist leaders perceived that the Indochinese conflict would intensify Sino-Soviet discord; moreover, the rift would effect both Peking's and Moscow's strategy and actions in Indochina. The Kennedy Administration misread the nature of the struggle. As Marek Thee, a Polish delegate to the ICC, observes in Notes of A Witness, the Sino-Soviet rift and the Indochinese Left were totally underrated. The contest was viewed mostly as a key battle in the global confrontation with expanding Communism.

> Thus Washington paid more attention to Moscow and Peking than to Hanoi and the Neo Lao Hak Sat (Pathet Lao). In 1961-62 the Soviet Union, because it maintained the airbridge to Laos, was actually seen as the chief adversary, and U.S. strategy paid great attention to Moscow moves. Signs of Soviet reluctance to continue Laotian involvement thus encouraged the U.S. to aim for victory.[171]

In the 1950's and until the Sino-Soviet split, a Euro-centered vision of international relations which gave preference to Europe over Asia, to the preservation of the post-World War II status quo over revolutionary change dominated Soviet attitudes and outlook.[172] Over the years, the Soviet Union

vacillated in its support of Asian revolutionaries, and Khrushchev himself never demonstrated much interest in Southeast Asia. As Marek Thee notes, "Contrary to tendencies in Peking, Khrushchev strongly opposed a militant line in Indochina, and he adhered to this policy until the moment of his removal from office."[173]

The Soviet Union became involved in Laos in 1960 for three major reasons. First, the Soviet "sought to control a crisis through which its Asian allies might draw it into a larger conflict."[174] Thus, its first objective was to keep the war from growing out of proportion or getting out of hand. The second reason the Soviet Union became involved was because of its recent competitive relations with China. In view of the sharpening political and ideological controversy between the two nations, and due to the clash at the conference of the Communist parties in Moscow earlier that year, the Soviet Union felt obliged to act. Soviet involvement was to provide evidence of active help to liberation movements. Thirdly, while checking its own allies, a Soviet political-military position in Laos could provide the Soviet Union with a good bargaining card in negotiations with the United States over Berlin, etc. Involvement in Laos was perceived as enhancing the Soviet's international and diplomatic position.[175] Until Phoumi Nosavan's countercoup, the Soviet Union made some gains at the expense of the United States without much risk to themselves. However, once Phoumi/Boun Oum ascended to power, the

Soviet's newly-achieved position was threatened and the credibility of their professed support to "wars of national liberation" was questioned. Thus, the Soviet airlift and arms buildup to the Pathet Lao/Kong-Le forces in early 1961 were "to preserve their gains and to prove their credibility."[176] Between December 1960 and early 1962, the Soviet Union airlifted a little more than 3,000 tons of supplies to the Pathet Lao and Kong-Le forces. The Pentagon Papers reveal that this aid greatly worried American policy makers,[177] however, as Stevenson points out, it was "an amount which the 17,800 men of a typical U.S. Army infantry division would consume in less than four days."[178]

The Soviet Union did not wish to confront the United States in Laos and "was quite willing to put Laos on the shelf and get on with more important issues like Berlin and disarmament."[179] The Soviet Union wanted a negotiated political settlement for Laos. The Soviet Union responded encouragingly to the British note of March 23 which suggested a reconvening of the Geneva Conference; it expressed a willingness to appeal with the British for a cease-fire. Khrushchev told Ambassador Thompson, "If we keep our heads and do nothing provocative, we can find a way out of our problem in Laos."[180]

The expansion of U.S. involvement in Indochina in 1960 exacerbated and deepened the rift between Moscow and Peking. As Thee notes:

> While China's attitudes toughened, the Soviet Union showed a tendency toward appeasement. Peking saw danger moving nearer to its borders and was not ready to surrender; Moscow took the resolution and tenacity of the U.S. mili-

tary very seriously, and offered concessions. Although China was careful to steer clear of an open military clash with the United States, it thought that the greatest support must be given to Vietnamese and Laotians holding foreground positions on its borders. Peking's reaction to military pressures was not resignation but preparedness for protracted struggle. The Soviet Union, however, considered the risks too great. Moscow wanted to avoid confrontation with the United States, especially in faraway Indochina. Its main policy was "peaceful co-existence" and the objective seemed worth any price paid by the Indochinese...

Although the international set up following U.S. escalation in Laos compelled the Soviet Union to extend aid to Hanoi, this did not allow Moscow to dominate decisions in North Vietnam...[181]

The Soviet Union faced the problem of bringing their Communist allies into line. The Pathet Lao, with their continual and mounting victories over the Phoumist forces, were not willing to cease, and might have launched their offensive attacks in March and April without Moscow's know-ledge.[182] The North Vietnamese were also against a cease-fire at this time. The North Vietnamese thought in terms of maintaining the status quo; they did not want either a coalition government or larger military operations. This approach supported Hanoi's prime concern, to maintain communication lines with South Vietnam. Hanoi's approach suited the Pathet Lao for a different reason—the postponement of a coalition government could well serve to strengthen and expand their political and military gains achieved during the past year. From 1960, the Chinese, who believed that the Russians wanted "peace at any price" denounced all Soviet (and American) pro-posals for accommodation with the capitalist. "The Chinese were resolved not to make concessions, and to follow an inde-

pendent line in Indochina without heeding Soviet policy demands."[183] Nevertheless, the chances for convening the Geneva Conference were good, since Communist China, too, "seemed interested in a political solution that would eliminate any possibility that U.S. ground forces would one day enter Laos and appear on China's southern borders."[184] The Soviet leaders' only leverage was their logistical support, however, the Russians were no more willing to cease helping their clients, the Pathet Lao/Kong-Le forces than were the Americans.[185] With Soviet support and influence, Souvanna Phouma, who proceeded to visit Hanoi, Peking, and the Pathet Lao/Kong-Le forces, must be credited with bringing the Communists to Geneva.[186] The Soviet Union's, the Pathet Lao's, and Hanoi's approaches were reflected in a 1962 conversation Soviet Ambassador A.N. Abramov had with Marek Thee. Thee notes:

> Abramov dwelled in some detail on Khrushchev's conversation with Souphanouvong after the Zurich meeting, and he recalled that Khrushchev's main concern had been to tighten the alliance between the Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma, with the aim of forming a coalition government. ...he (Khrushchev) insisted on the overriding need for a peaceful solution to the Laotian problem.
> ...Moscow had a clear awareness of its differences with the Pathet Lao and Hanoi, and Abramov was disturbed that this divergent trend persisted. From his conversation with Khrushchev, Abramov said, Souphanouvong seemed to have chosen those points which suited a hard line, while reflecting the guiding principles of the line suggested; this was a reflection of essentially different approaches to the Laotian problem. While the Soviet Union was convinced that, of the burning international problems, the question of Laos was best suited to an exemplary peaceful solution, the local perspective inside Indochina seemed different. Hanoi, Abramov concluded, was particularly worried about developments in South Vietnam and rather inclined to ignore the international context.[187]

Since China shares over 200 miles of border with Laos,
Laos and America's penetration of it (South Vietnam and
Thailand) presented a vital national security rather than
ideological issue. Due to these considerations, China followed
a cautious foreign policy and did not become actively involved
in the conflict. Marek Thee gives a concrete example of the
Chinese orientation and their concern not to become involved
and not to escalate the Laotian conflict.

> In one of his angry reactions to Nosavan's war moves,
> Souvanna Phouma, without even consulting the Neo Lao Hak
> Sat, had requested Chinese jet pilots to defend Laotian
> airspace; he hoped to receive the planes from the Soviet
> Union and asked China for pilots. Liu Chun explained
> to me in great detail that the Chinese Peoples' Republic
> had refused because it did not want to be accused of
> intervention, and did not want to create a pretext for
> an escalation of the conflict. Transactions involving
> military personnel must be considered with great prudence,
> Liu Chun emphasized.[188]

Peking established diplomatic and economic relations with
Laos. On October 7, 1961, a Chinese Consul was established
in Phong Saly, and on November 5, a Chinese economic-cultural
delegation went to Laos.

In a note to the British and Russians, Peking stated
"its 'sacred duty' was to uphold the Geneva Accords, as well
as to 'take measures to safeguard its own security.'"[189]
On December 28, 1960, the Chinese called for the ICC to re-
convene and to deal with Souvanna Phouma not Boun Oum. Since
an imposed Laotian Communist government would increase the
chances of U.S. intervention, Peking favored a neutral buffer
state.[190] In March 1961, in the Peking Review, the Chinese

government observed that "though the military situation in
Laos (was) becoming increasingly unfavorable to the Laotian
(Rightist) rebel group"[191] the Laotian war was "in danger of
being extended," and "the patriotic troops and civilians of
Laos still face a difficult and complex struggle in defeating
the enemy's military intervention and political intrigues."[192]
Thus, Peking, being aware of no Soviet backing or "hard line"
approach, agreed to negotiation on Laos. Peking favored
negotiations and did not wish to upset the negotiations which
would create a neutral coalition government; this was reflected
in the Chinese Red Army "Military Papers" (prepared for top-
level internal use only), which stated that "The Laotian
revolutionary strength is greater now (1961) than before and
there is strong desire to have a government that wants peace-
ful neutrality. If we support this government we are actually
supporting the revolutionary strength."[193]

During the 1960-1962 period, China was content to see
the Soviet Union confront the United States. China (especially
with no Soviet support) did not want a bigger war on her borders
(another Korean War); however, Peking deeply mistrusted the
United States' peace pronouncement because of U.S. military
presence in Indochina. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet rift and the
American-Soviet dialogue made Peking suspicious of the Soviet
leaders' intentions. As Thee notes:

> Khrushchev's statements and behavior led the Chinese to
> wonder if Moscow did not feel that as a superpower it
> had more in common with the United States than with
> China. It seemed that Moscow had opted for the status

> quo and had concluded that more interests united the
> Soviet Union and the United States than divided them.
> "We need nothing from the United States, and you require
> nothing that we have," was Khrushchev's toast at the
> White House dinner. Was this an allusion to China's
> territorial claims on the Soviet Union?...[194]

With the fear of Soviet-American "collusion," a hostile or

at least untrustworthy (the Sino-Soviet rift had not yet

fully crystallized) Soviet Union on one border, and the

perceived aggressive America on another border, Peking pro-

ceeded prudently during this period.[195]

Neither Moscow nor Peking were capable of controlling

to their liking the pace of events in Indochina; neither were

able to dictate strategy to the Left (Kong-Le/Pathet Lao) in

Laos. As Thee notes, "the Indochinese Left always fought

vigorously to keep its independence. Beneath their state-

ments of revolutionary brotherhood and ideological relation-

ship with Moscow or Peking, there always ran a strong

consciousness of the real national content of the struggle."[196]

Similar philosophic orientations and common interests in

the Indochinese struggle have forged strong alliances between

the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. During the 1960-1962

period (as well as other periods when a rightist pro-American

government controlled the Laotian government), the Pathet Lao

and North Vietnamese perceived the Vientiane government as an

agency of foreign interests. According to their view, the

civil war in Laos could not be isolated; "it was a protracted

war on the entire Indochinese peninsula."[197] Hanoi became

involved because the same foreign interests were aligned

against its own national aspirations.[198] In addition, North

Vietnam has a direct interest in Laos since Laos abuts on 700

miles of highly vulnerable North Vietnamese border area and

offers the best avenue of approach to South Vietnam. (Both

factors are vital in the current South Vietnamese civil war.)

Thus, North Vietnam's national interest and security is involved

in its support for the Pathet Lao. In a divided and at times

(1960-1962) unfriendly Laos, the Pathet Lao and its territory

serves as a strong military buffer.

North Vietnam has two fundamental objectives or reasons

for its involvement in Laos. Its primary concern is to main-

tain communication lines with South Vietnam by operating the

Ho Chi Minh Trail, the infiltration system to the South. Its

second concern is to maintain a buffer zone along its borders,

particularly in Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces, by supporting

the Pathet Lao.

In order to have access to the South, according to Langer

and Zasloff,* the North Vietnamese operate the Ho Chi Minh

Trail as if it were a strategic rear area of South Vietnam.

Using both Vietnamese and Lao laborers, North Vietnamese engineer

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*Langer and Zasloff, who did a Rand study, exhibit a myopic
focus on North Vietnam intervention and completely ignore that
of the United States. They also tend to accept as fact ques-
tionable charges of "North Vietnamese invasion;" their work
lacks objectivity and impartiality and must be read critically.

units maintain and repair existing roads and bridges and build
new ones for intermittent motor vehicle, bicycle, animal, and
human transportation. Until 1964, the activity along the trail
was light.[199] A U.S. Department of State publication, Aggression
from The North: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Con-
quer South Vietnam, indicates that regular activity was light;
infiltration over these routes began in late 1959 but until
1964 most of the personnel infiltrating through Laos into
South Vietnam were native Southerners who had gone north after
the 1954 Geneva Agreement.[200] According to the U.S. Government,
80 percent of all the North Vietnamese soldiers, which the U.S.
believes to be in Laos, are located or stationed in southern
Laos, which demonstrates the priority given to the Ho Chi Minh
Trail by the North Vietnamese.[201] The North Vietnamese are
willing to fight to protect their investment in this vital
artery to South Vietnam, however, during the 1960-1962 period,
the Phoumist forces offered no challenges. (The Ho Chi Minh
Trail which is intimately linked to the prosecution of the war
in South Vietnam, had no military value in the Laotian civil
war.)

The second principal concern of the North Vietnamese--to
maintain a buffer zone--involved the supporting and strengthening
of the Pathet Lao which controlled the provinces adjacent to
the DRV. Moreover, the North Vietnamese wanted (and have) to
prevent the regions of Sam Neua and Phong Saly from becoming
sites for hostile activities. It became concerned when CIA

covert teams mobilized some of the Meo tribesmen for counter-
insurgency activity on both sides of the frontier in the struggle
against the DRV. Thus during the period 1960-1962, the North
Vietnamese provided the Pathet Lao with military supplies and
support, economic and technical help, and political support.
In Khang Khay, Hanoi maintained a military committee whose
main function was to channel supplies and aid to the forces of
the government (before Souvanna's fall) and the Pathet Lao.
Vietnamese staff officers aided in military planning. Hanoi
kept in close contact through the Vietnamese Doan 959 (Group
959), which was the key instrument through which North Vietnam
furnished advice to the Lao leadership; Doan 959 is located
near Hanoi. Strategic planning was a joint enterprize; the
North Vietnamese provided advisory personnel in some of the
main battles in the northern provinces. The main purpose of
the Vietnamese advisory effort is to improve the effectiveness
of Lao operations. According to Thee, both the battles at
Tha Thom and Ban Padong, the Meo stronghold, (both in a pro-
vince adjacent to North Vietnam) had been won by Vietnamese
support; the Vietnamese were mainly in charge of artillery.[202]
This supports Toye who suggests that, on occasion, in addition
to advisors, the DRV aided the Pathet Lao with mortar detach-
ments. There is no evidence of North Vietnamese troops in other
major battles (i.e., Nam Tha)[203] during this period, however,
this does not mean that there was no North Vietnamese involve-
ment at all. As noted above, the DRV supplied advisors and

material to the Pathet Lao, but not regular troops. Moreover, about one thousand Vietnamese drivers were in Laotian service, while about twenty thousand were employed in cleaning and repairing roads. According to Thee, from February to May 1961, "with the intensification of the fighting caused by increased U.S. intervention, the Vietnamese had lost in Laos some seven hundred dead and wounded soldiers and auxiliary personnel."[204]*

Additionally, the Soviet aid program, which was mounted on an emergency basis, was channelled through the DRV, and the North Vietnamese had a key role in its distribution. However, a September 1961 memorandum (Soviet) expressed dissatisfaction with Hanoi's handling of Soviet aid to Laos. The Soviet Union charged that Souvanna Phouma and the neutralist forces had received inadequate supplies, resulting in a weakening of the alliance between Souvanna Phouma and the Neo Lao Hak Sat which the Soviet Union emphasized was needed for the future coalition government; the Soviet leaders, who perceived this

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*As late as 1974, the exact relationship between the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese military high command is not yet totally known. As noted, many observers (i.e., Fall) perceived it as a joint military command, however, Langer and Zasloff in their Rand study tend to assume that the North Vietnamese make all basic decisions about military activities in Laos. There is as yet little evidence to support this point of view. Langer and Zasloff's contention appears to be based almost entirely on the revelations of one North Vietnamese officer, Captain Mai Dai Hap, who defected to the RLG in December 1966. Neither Hap's rank nor his advisory role to the Pathet Lao suggest that his testimony or know-ledge affords much solid evidence of the relationship between high commands.

move as another indication of Hanoi's opposition to a coalition government, "urged a reversal of the current trends, pleading for long-range commitments of cooperation with Souvanna Phouma."[205] Additionally, many of the supplies slated for Laos had not been shipped by Hanoi. One of the examples mentioned to Thee by Soviet Ambassador Abramov was "that out of 23,000 tons of gasoline delivered to Hanoi for Laos, only 990 tons so far had reached Laos, even though the gasoline shortage was severe."[206] Following the Soviet memorandum, and a consultative Communist conference in Hanoi, the North Vietnamese agreed to stop delay in delivery and alterations in assignments. The Soviet Union agreed that all aid would continue to go through Hanoi, but quotas were established for the government of Souvanna Phouma and the Neo Lao Hak Sat-- the former would receive three-fifths and the latter two-fifths of all the official supplies. However, agreement between Hanoi and Moscow on the flow of aid did not erase mutual mistrust.[207]

During the 1960-1962 period, the Vietnamese and Laotians, acting independently at times and on purely nationalistic grounds, resisted U.S. interference. Neither the Soviet Union nor China were fully consulted, since the Soviet Union objected to a military entanglement and China appeared reluctant to repeat the Korean experience. Being concerned above all with their own national problems, the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese were "dismayed both by the abrupt cessation of Soviet

military aid in 1962 and by the subsequent cleavage between Moscow and Peking."[208]

According to Langer and Zasloff's Rand study, a number of factors explain the Pathet Lao reliance and dependency on the North Vietnamese:

> During the two decades (1950-1970) that they have depended on North Vietnam for advice and assistance, the Lao Communist...found themselves sharing many of the interests of their Vietnamese allies. Both parties opposed French colonial rule....They faced a common enemy: first France, and then the United States. They also held a similar view of the world and of the desirable solutions to its problems....The great scarcity of human and material resources in the Communist zone has encouraged the Lao to turn for assistance to the North Vietnamese. The NLHS zone is handicapped by a small and dispersed population, a dearth of trained military and civilian personnel, and lack of organizational experience in civilian and military affairs. It has poor communications, and few production facilities that would allow the Lao to maintain their political and military struggle out of indigenous resources. Since their enemy has been able to draw on the support of a rich outside power, the United States, it is not unnatural for them to look to North Vietnam....From their own perspective, the Lao Communist have not compromised their legitimacy as a nationalist movement by their dependency on Hanoi.[209]

The Pathet Lao dependence on the North Vietnamese increased during these years of coup and countercoup; however, it was a limited dependency since the terrain itself inhibits communication and transportation and additionally, the North Vietnamese lacked the capabilities to fill Pathet Lao deficiencies and shortages. (This provided the Pathet Lao unconsciously perhaps with time to develop some of their own manpower.) These points are acknowledged in a Soviet statement made to Thee by Tchivilev:

> (The Russians) felt that a political solution was
> necessary to give the Pathet Lao time to digest their
> victories. Events had surpassed Pathet Lao capabilities.
> Used to guerrilla war and jungle conditions, to the
> countryside and village activity, they found it difficult
> to cope with new circumstances, they lacked political
> cadres and military experts to deal with administration,
> political, and military problems. Of course, Tchivilev
> added, the Vietnamese were helpful in this situation
> (but it was time to move from military to political
> solution).[210]

The concept of the Pathet Lao as a legitimate and independent

force is supported by the following statement made by Bernard

Fall in 1965:

> That the Pathet Lao could be considered as such a threat--
> not as a puppet of North Vietnam--is perhaps best evi-
> denced by the fact that, since the late 1950's, Thai
> police and intelligence keep picking up evidence of a
> Pathet Lao political subversive network among the Lao-
> speaking people of Northwest Thailand....The reported
> creation in Hanoi of a joint operation staff for Laos
> and Vietnam with Chinese, North Vietnamese, and Pathet
> Lao "military and political officers," is, if true,
> another indication that the Pathet Lao is more than a
> mere adjunct of the Vietnamese Communist Party.[211]

During this period of chaos and crisis (1960-1962 period),

the Laotian Left supported by North Vietnamese and Soviet aid

had made significant territorial gains. Neither the Pathet

Lao nor the North Vietnamese were anxious for a negotiated

settlement at this time. Nevertheless, due to the pressure

exerted by the Soviet Union, Souvanna Phouma's diplomatic trip

to Hanoi and the Pathet Lao territory, and perhaps fear of massive

U.S. intervention, the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao

agreed to the Geneva Conference and the subsequent establishment

of a neutral coalition government.

1963-1973

The 1962 Geneva Agreement, which established a tripartite coalition government that gave the Pathet Lao equal representation with the right-wing Phoumist forces, provided only a short and imperfect peace to the small Kingdom of Laos. The facade of cooperation, which concealed or obscured profound antagonisms and perhaps irreconciable disagreements, lasted from July 1962 until April 1963. If the Laotians had been left completely to themselves, the different factions might have been able to learn to live peacefully together--or regionally separated. However, foreign actors encouraged by Laotian factionalism, continued to interfere in Laos. According to Stevenson:

> None of the Laotian factions wanted to give up any weapons, territory, or control first. Each side was jealously protective of its position. The Americans likewise were reluctant to reduce or halt support of their clients until their interests had been safeguarded. The same was true for the North Vietnamese. As a result, each party perceived the actions of its antagonists as proof of a rejection of the understandings reached at Geneva. Cautious adherence to the accords reinforced mutual suspicions. In less than a year the agreements had collapsed.[212]

Although different scholars and observers have blamed various participants for the breakdown of the agreements,[213] the blame was ample, to be shared by all.[214]

The United States withdrew its military advisors, totaling 666 men, by the October 7 withdrawal date. The relief and resupply missions, particularly to the CIA-organized Meo tribesmen, were the key contribution to the breakdown of the Geneva agreements. The Pathet Lao vehemently objected and protested

the continual supplying of ammunition and aid to the Meo tribes-
men, many of whom lived in enclaves behind the cease-fire line
in Pathet Lao controlled territory. The Pathet Lao contended
that the CIA's "Air America" supply flights to the Meo were a
violation of the agreements since such flights could be legally
approved only by consensus of all three factions in the tri-
partite government. Additionally, some U.S. personnel, who
had begun to organize, train, and advise the Meo, remained
after the Geneva Accords as civilian coordinators of relief
supplies and covertly as guerrilla organizers. During this
transitional period, the Meo were by no means quiescent.[215]

As Roger Hilsman noted:

> The Meo were undoubtedly troublesome to the Communist
> Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese cadre. And it should
> also be said that there were occasions of tension in
> 1962 and 1963 when it was useful to have the Meo blow
> up a bridge or occupy a mountaintop in the deadly game
> of "signaling" that the United States had to play to deter
> the Communists from adventuring with the Geneva Accords.[216]

Thus, the Pathet Lao protests and chagrin over the continuing

supply of the Meo forces was valid and understandable.

Additionally, the AID program served as a cover for CIA

activities when the Requirements Office was established in

October 1962. The Requirements Office differed from the

former PEO or MAAG only by the fact that its personnel were

technically civilians and were not involved in field operations

advice. Despite the ostensible withdrawal of all "foreign

military personnel" as provided by the Geneva Accords, CIA

and Green Beret operations continued; there was no major pause

in activity because of Geneva.[217] Stevenson notes that "Americans were reportedly put into guerrilla bases with warnings to avoid capture, lest the United States be caught violating the accords. The code name for this effort was Operation Hardnose."[218] To supplement its covert activities, the United States hired third-country nationals,* particularly the Thais who could operate less visibly and often without a language barrier.

Writing later about this transitional period after Geneva, Roger Hilsman, a member of the Kennedy Administration, involved in U.S. policy making in Laos, stated that: "Harriman, especially, felt strongly that the United States could comply with both the letter and the spirit of the agreements in every detail, that its record should be absolutely clear."[219] Another Washington official, who was intimately associated with policy toward Laos at this time, said "we were Simon pure until 1964."[220] Evidence indicates that Americans were subverting Laotian neutrality and the Geneva agreements.

While the United States clearly can be held accountable for the failure of the 1962 Agreements, the North Vietnamese were not guiltless. The North Vietnamese violated the agreements by withdrawing only about half of their forces in Laos. DRV involvement was mainly in Southern Laos, where they were opening up the fledgling Ho Chi Minh Trail. North Vietnamese

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*This will be examined in more detail with the CIA Clandestine Army.

involvement in the breakdown of the Geneva Accords is obscure and unclear.[221] Stevenson notes that "although about 6,000 troops remained in Laos, these forces apparently did not engage in significant military operations until 1964."[222] There is no evidence indicating that North Vietnamese political advisors encouraged the Pathet Lao to stimulate dissension among the neutralists.[223] During this period, the Communist Chinese provided only verbal support and guidance to the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. In August 1962, G. Porter reports that,

> Communist Chinese sources let it be known that they had advised the North Vietnamese against withdrawing completely from Laos as long as the United States supplied Meo maquis in Pathet Lao territory.[224]

The Soviet Union extricated itself from Laos after the Geneva Agreement. The Russians continued their airlift, but gradually dismantled it and turned supply and aid operations over to the North Vietnamese, who improved their communication (mainly roads) links with Laos.[225] By reducing its support and aid, the Soviet Union lost influence and leverage over the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. In a meeting between Harriman and Khrushchev, Stevenson reports "the Soviet leader indicated that he no longer could restrain the pro-Communist forces in Laos, and would not try to do so."[226] The reasons for the Soviet loss of interest and subsequent disengagement in Laos are unclear. One explanation is that the Soviet leaders were preoccupied with more important affairs--the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Sino-Indian border war, and the

widening Sino-Soviet rift. Perhaps the continuing struggle against the Americans in Laos seemed insignificant by comparison.[227] Summing up the Soviet state of affairs in relation to the Asian allies on the eve of his departure, August 26, 1962, Soviet Ambassador Abramov gave Thee an explanation, which totally ignored increasing U.S. activities in the area:

> The Soviet Union, he told me, had dismantled the air-bridge to Laos and withdrawn its crews. The ten planes which constituted the air-bridge had already been turned over to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Vietnamese had enough pilots to handle the planes, and the Soviet Union was aiding Hanoi in training additional crews. The real aim was to leave responsibility for further development to the Asian parties; U.S. activities were completely omitted from this reasoning.[228]

Aid became a crucial problem for the neutralist forces; after the termination of the Soviet airlift to the Plaine des Jarres, the neutralist forces of Kong-Le were left with no independent supply source. With decreasing Soviet aid and increasing dependence on North Vietnamese aid (as were the Pathet Lao), Kong-Le's neutralist army, which was Souvanna Phouma's only power base, was threatened by internal dissension. By the end of March 1963, fighting broke out between the Pathet Lao and Kong-Le's troops. The reasons are obscure--perhaps resulting from disagreements over the allocation of supplies from North Vietnam.[229] Nevertheless, the neutralist forces split--one group of neutralist forces led by Colonel Deuan Sunnalath sided with the Pathet Lao. In April, the United States began supplying Kong-Le's neutralist forces. Renewed

fighting erupted between the neutralist forces; both military and political factors contributed to the renewal of fighting.

Souvanna Phouma/Kong-Le's reliance on the United States and the subsequent American supply flights to Kong-Le were viewed with alarm by the leftist forces. These fears were founded on previous suspicion and hostility which Souvanna Phouma incurred by tolerating continued U.S. supply operations to the Meo. Moreover, in February 1963, neutralist Ketsana Vongsavong was assassinated on the Plaine, and on April 1, the left-leaning neutralist Foreign Minister in Souvanna's Cabinet, Quinim Pholsena, was assassinated in Vientiane. Many left-leaning neutralist/Pathet Lao members feared for their safety.

In mid-April 1964, Souvanna Phouma, Souphanouvong, and Phoumi Nosavan met on the Plaine des Jarres for another tripartite conference. This terminated in a sharp dispute on plans for neutralization and demilitarization of Luang Prabang, and subsequently turned out to be the last such meeting. Souvanna Phouma returned to Vientiane and on the following day, April 19, 1964, two rightist generals, Kouprasith Abhay and Siho Lamphouthacoul, executed a coup d'etat and arrested Souvanna Phouma. With U.S. aid still dominating the Laotian economy, Washington officials threatened to terminate it if Souvanna was not released and reinstated as the leader of the coalition government; however, they insisted on enlargement and reorgani-zation of the Cabinet. Although Souvanna emerged as the undis-

puted leader of the non-communist faction, in actuality, he
was not so clearly in command; the coup leaders retained
effective control over important policy.[230] Walt Haney notes,
"while the form of the new government resembled the old
coalition, the substance was clearly not the same."[231] On
May 2, 1964, Souvanna announced the merger of the rightist
and neutralist factions. "The partnership was lopsided at
best. With the rightist in effective control Souvanna 'became
daily more of a figurehead'in a situation over which he had
little control."[232]

The Pentagon Papers reveal that by 1964, Souvanna had
tergiversated and cast his lot with the Americans. On May
21, Souvanna Phouma gave the United States permission to conduct
reconnaissance flights over Pathet Lao-controlled territory.
Armed escort planes were soon added to the reconnaissance
missions which we codenamed YANKEE TEAM. On June 6, 1964,
a squadron of U.S. jets attacked Pathet Lao positions on the
Plaine des Jarres in retaliation to a U.S. plane being shot
down by the Pathet Lao. A cable from Dean Rusk, Secretary
of State, on August 9, 1964, reported "Meeting today approved
in principle early initiation air and limited ground operations
in Laos..."[233] In December 1964, Ambassador Sullivan, the new
U.S. Ambassador to Laos, cabled Washington that Souvanna Phouma
"fully supports the U.S. pressures program (attacks on North
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao positions) and is prepared to coop-
erate in full."[234] Also, Souvanna Phouma pressed Washington

to increase its military aid. All U.S. operations in Laos for the next six years would be officially explained and described as reconnaissance flights,[235] both to protect Souvanna's "neutral" government and to keep from destroying the facade of American adherence to the Geneva Agreement.

By early May, the Pathet Lao perceived the recent political events (the merging of neutralist/rightist forces, and the increased American military activity) as evidence of a swing to the right and of American penetration. The Government of National Union had been reduced to a coalition between Souvanna and the right-wing. To this day, according to Stevenson, "Pathet Lao documents trace the collapse of the government to April 1964."[236] With the death of the coalition, fighting was renewed by mid-May. The Pathet Lao began their offensive which drove Kong-Le's neutralists from the Plaine des Jarres.

According to Porter, one of the ironies of the Geneva Agreement and the abortive experiment in Laotian neutrality was "Moscow's tacit acquiescence to the subversion of the tripartite coalition government by the United States."[237] He claims that the fiction of Souvanna's "neutrality" government could be preserved because of the complicity of the Soviet Union. After 1964, Moscow continued to recognize Souvanna and by extension the right-wing government as legitimate. As Souvanna himself frankly explained to the National Assembly in September 1965, "If we destroyed the structure of the coalition government...we would no longer have the support of

the Socialist countries, especially the USSR."[238]

The U.S. strategy of subverting Laotian neutrality, by engineering an alignment between the neutralist and right-wing factions which would give United States personnel freedom of action in Laos to accomplish its objectives,* began with the adoption of the Geneva Agreement. Explaining what prompted Washington policy makers to accept and support a neutralist coalition government, Roger Hilsman quotes Harriman as saying, "If Souvanna's government of national union breaks up, we must be sure the break comes between the Communist and the neutralist, rather than having them teamed up as they were before."[239] Unlike his predecessors in the Far Eastern Bureau who believed Souvanna was pro-communist, Harriman believed that Souvanna actually favored alignment with the West against the Pathet Lao;[240] and that Souvanna could be persuaded to cooperate with the right-wing against the left, "if he received a guarantee of American support for him as head of government--something he had always been denied in the past."[241] The disintegration of Souvanna's neutral power base and the April coup d'etat by the right-wing provided American policy makers with the opportunity to persuade Souvanna to move to the right. Seemingly, with little re-luctance,[242] Souvanna was pressured by circumstances which persuaded him to modify his political position and to align

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*These objectives will be explained below. U.S. strategy might have been less calculating than it appears.

his withering neutralist faction with the right. Perhaps
an indicator of American influence is that "nothing much
changed in Laotian politics after the events surrounding
the April 1964 coup."[243] There were coup scares in July,
August and December of 1964, but government troops and
American support and influence forestalled any attempt to
seize power.

After the April coup d'etat, the Americans tied their
policy to Souvanna Phouma for many reasons: he was the only
prominent Laotian leader who had not alienated one of the
major factions; he was supported by and held in high esteem
by the Russians, French, British and some key Americans;[244]
he was considered the only alternative to Communism. According
to State Department officials and the head of AID, who testi-
fied in front of a congressional committee: "If the civil
war broke out again, it is certainly conceivable, perhaps it
would be likely, that the Communist would just extend their
domination over the whole country."[245] However, the primary
reason was to retain the symbol of neutralism, Prince Souvanna
Phouma "as a figurehead in a government dominated by military
clients of the United States."[246] As Stevenson notes,

> The Americans supported Souvanna as the best compromise.
> So long as the Royal Laotian Government was neutralist
> on paper and anti-Communist in practice--by not inter-
> fering with the U.S. war effort against the North Viet-
> namese--the Americans were content.[247]

The third phase of U.S. involvement in Laos was dominated
by considerations for American interests in Vietnam. As Dean

Rusk, Secretary of State, noted, "After 1963 Laos was only the wart on the hog of Vietnam."[248] The United States incessantly carried out covert military operations against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese in Laos. The United States used bases in Northern Laos to aid in the bombing of North Vietnam, to gather intelligence and to perform acts of sabotage in North Vietnam.[249] Thus, after 1963 "Laos, itself, was little more than a sideshow in the growing conflict in Vietnam."[250]

The other major American goal in Laos, which had changed little since 1954, was to retain as much Laotian territory as possible within the American sphere of influence. Thus, after 1963 a general attitude of anticommunism and a desire to prevent Communist hegemony in territory adjacent to Thailand continued to motivate Washington policy makers.

Although U.S. strategy focused primarily on the interdiction of Communist supply lines through Southern Laos into Vietnam--Ho Chi Minh Trails--, it also included devastatingly heavy U.S. bombing attacks in Northern Laos, particularly in 1968-1969. This strategic policy also entailed a steady buildup of CIA-directed irregular forces, first in Northern Laos but later gradually expanding throughout the country. According to Branfman,

> The single most notable development of the Laotian war has been the American refusal to supplement its ground combat advisers with purely American combat units. No nation has ever made such an extensive--and expensive--attempt to control foreign territory without sending in large numbers of its own foot soldiers.[251]

The pattern of warfare developed by the U.S. in Laos was intended to realize the two American objectives. The U.S. secret Laotian war was really four wars, administratively distinct and only partially coordinated.[252] Two of the wars--codenamed Operation BARREL ROLL and Operation STEEL TIGER--[253] were air wars, the other two--FAR (Forces Armee Royale) and the CIA Armee Clandestine--mainly ground wars. The wars' major operational elements did not derive from prior long-range strategic projections but rather were the results of day by day tactical decisions. The escalation of the air wars illustrates this point. Initially, in 1964, the few sorties flown were mainly directed against the Ho Chi Minh Trails and enemy troop concentrations. However, as more planes became available, bombing strikes increased to include the outskirts of inhabited areas, then proceeded to random air strikes, and finally culminated in saturation bombing. Most other elements in the American "wars" underwent a similar developmental process.[254]

The two "wars" fought by American war planes were Operation BARREL ROLL in Northern Laos and Operation STEEL TIGER in Southern Laos. The fundamental justification of the bombing program in Northern Laos was to halt infiltration from the North into South Vietnam. BARREL ROLL, which involved armed reconnaissance missions by U.S. jet fighters against Viet Cong infiltration routes and facilities in Laos, went into affect on December 14, 1964, and slowly increased in tempo.[255] According to a Pentagon official:

> It seems clear to us that there should be a gradual,
> orchestrated acceleration of tempo measured in terms of
> frequency, size, number...of activities such as BARREL ROLL.
> An upward trend...will convey signals which, in combination,
> should present to the DRV leaders a vision of inevitable
> destruction if they do not change their ways. The exact
> rate of acceleration is a matter of judgment but we con-
> sider, roughly speaking, that each successive week should
> include some new act on our part to increase pressure on
> Hanoi.[256]

The program of twice weekly missions by four aircraft gradually

escalated. At a meeting of the National Security Council on

December 12, U.S. policy makers agreed that there would be no

public statements about armed reconnaissance operations in

Laos "unless a plane were lost."[257] If a plane were to be

downed the U.S. government would "continue to insist that we

were merely escorting reconnaissance flights as requested by

the Laotian government."[258]

Some of the air operations over the North were closely

coordinated with the Clandestine Army's ground war in the

North. The CIA personnel, which advised the Clandestine Army,

helped to decide on targeting for the air war in the North.

Ambassador Sullivan was nominally in charge of all military

operations in Laos; thus the new ambassador became known as

"General Sullivan," or "the Field Marshall."[259] However, within

Laos, there were mainly supply, rescue, and reconnaissance

aircraft under the immediate command of Americans; thus, air

support consequently had to come from the Air Force based at

Udorn, Thailand, and this in turn involved another bureaucracy

which caused additional coordination problems. Working with

the Lao, the CIA, the U.S. Air Force, and particularly, the

U.S. Embassy personnel developed the targets for the northern

air war. According to Stevenson,

> At first, air operations were few in number and often
> at the initial request of Laotian officials. The United
> States says that in 1964 there were only twenty strikes
> in Northern Laos. In 1965 the figure was 4,568, which
> would average to only about fifteen a day. The following
> year the strikes totaled 7,316. Figures since then are
> classified, but the trend line is known.[260]

Bombing was the main component of the second war in Laos,

the air war in Southern Laos. In January 1965, the U.S. Army

Chief of Staff, Harold Johnson, recommended that Operation

BARRELL ROLL be "reoriented to allow air strikes on infiltration

routes in the Lao Panhandle to be conducted as a separate

program from those directed against the Pathet Lao and North

Vietnamese units"[261] in Northern Laos. This recommendation

resulted in the creation and implementation of the program

STEEL TIGER, which involved U.S. airstrikes against the infil-

tration routes in Southern Laos.[262] Since much of this region

was written off as enemy territory, the embassy imposed few

restrictions and pilots were permitted to bomb anything east

of a certain line determined by the ambassador.[263] Following

the 1968 bombing halt over North Vietnam, activity shifted

from North Vietnam to Laos which subsequently led to increased

bombings over Laos. As Senator Symington noted,

> We made a big thing in the Johnson Administration about
> stopping the North Vietnamese air strikes. But at the
> same time we were increasing in secret the air strikes
> against Laos. In fact, as the general just said, which
> I knew, orders were that if you do not need the planes
> against Vietnam, use said planes against Laos.[264]

As a U.S. official put it, "we just couldn't let the planes rust."[265] By 1972, approximately 70 percent of all U.S. air strikes in Indochina were being flown against Laotian targets; and 80 percent of these sorties "were said to be in the region of trails including the bulk of B-52 flights."[266] Thus, as Stevenson notes, the war in Southern Laos escalated: "The number of (B-52) sorties grew overtime, from a daily average of fifty-five in 1965 to one hundred in 1967 and one hundred fifty in 1968. After the suspension of regular bombing of North Vietnam in November 1968, the strikes in Laos doubled."[267] Despite these increases, "the embassy retained and exercised targeting approval authority."[268] However, with the vastly increased air strikes and with the departure of Ambassador Sullivan in 1969, the limitations on U.S. air strikes designed to avoid the bombing of civilian targets were substantially relaxed.[269]

The two air wars were the single most expensive item in the American war budget for Laos. The estimated annual cost of U.S. bombing over Laos in 1971 was between $1.4 and $2 billion. (In addition to the daily operational costs of the actual air raids, the air "wars" in Laos have required a sizeable investment of overhead capital for personnel (50,000 at least), bases and planes.[270])

The third and "less secret" war was fought by the Laotian "Forces Armee Royale" (FAR); U.S. military attaches worked with FAR. Although American advisors supplied full logistic,

training and combat advisory support, FAR has been without a
doubt, the least efficient aspect of the Laotian conflict,
at least, from the American perspective. FAR increased
modestly from 48,000 in 1964 to about 60,000 in 1972. The
FAR units are equally distributed among the five Laotian
military regions. The conflicts in which FAR was engaged
were generally limited to the areas surrounding the principal
towns. Although the U.S. military advisors attached to FAR
would have liked to stimulate the Lao soldiers to undertake
more frequent operations, they were hampered by FAR's incom-
petence.[271] The United States which trained the Lao soldier
in Thailand, the Philipines, or the United States, found that
"once trained, the soldiers were subject to their Lao comman-
ders' lethargy."[272] The Americans attempted to encourage greater
activity by withholding rice if operations were not initiated
against communists; when the Lao complied, one observer reports,
"it was recognition of the truth: 'no boom-boom, no rice.'"[273]
Haney notes that "the five regional military commanders of
FAR have often been likened to warlords and seemed always
more intent on making money than on making war against the
Communist."[274]

From 1954 to 1962, a primary U.S. objective was to im-
prove and build-up an ethnic Lao army. After 1962 (and aware
of its abysmal record) and recognizing the legendary weakness
of the Lao army, the United States made two basic changes
in its ground policy. It supported the introduction

of regular Thai units, and it created a separate army called
the Armee Clandestine (AC) (also called the CIA Army, the
Special Guerrilla Units--SGUS). The fourth war was conducted
by the Armee Clandestine, under Vang Pao's command. The bulk
of the ground fighting in recent years has been by the secret
army of irregulars, not the FAR. Having been given the major
responsibility for offensive ground operations in Laos, the AC,
which is an outgrowth of the CIA-directed Meo Army of the early
1960's, sustained heavy losses of the Meo. Thus, by the late
1960's, the ethnic composition of the AC had changed; it is
now a polyglot mixture unrivaled anywhere in Asia. The indig-
enous troops are mostly Meo from the Northwest and other
montagnard tribes from the rest of Laos. Ethnic Thai and Lao
from Thailand are reported to make up at least 25 percent of
the total AC. In addition, there are sizeable numbers of
Burmese, Cambodians, Nationalist Chinese, and other mercenaries--
all paid by the CIA. There are today approximately 35,000
to 40,000 AC troops throughout Laos, but the bulk are concen-
trated in the Northeast.[275]

The Armee Clandestine is part of a larger American-con-
trolled supranational army extending throughout Southeast Asia.
Tammy Arbuckle, a knowledgeable observer on this phenomenon,
has written of the "American-directed Secret Army" which
operates all through Southeast Asia. Making up its units
are Cambodians, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Laotians, as well as
Thais and various hill tribes, such as the Meo who have been

active on the Plain of Jars. Its operations extend into North-
east Burma, China's Yunnam Province, North Vietnam, South
Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand. Laos, bordering on all the
Southeast Asian nations, is ideal for these U.S. operations.
And the Secret Army concept fits neatly into the Guam Doctrine.
Americans take care of the leadership, training, planning, and
logistics. The Asians do the bulk of the fighting.[276] This
army is oblivious to and respects no frontiers; it recognizes
no government, and is responsible only to its American employers,
particularly the CIA.

In many countries, the CIA is largely confined to and
responsible for intelligence gathering, however, in Laos, it
not only gathered the information but then recommended and
implemented policy based on it. The AC is completely con-
trolled by the CIA; the CIA and U.S. army advisors design and
develop strategy and operations, determine and direct air
support, and often lead AC troops into battle. Thus, although
the United States has not introduced ground troops into Laos;
it has introduced another type of army.[277]

The AC employs guerrilla tactic and its troops do a
creditable job in commando offensive operations. However,
as one American official noted, "they are better at attacking
than defending."[278] In the mid-sixties, the United States
supported the introduction of regular units of the Thai Army*
into Laos. The hope was that perhaps the Thai units could

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*The regular Thai Army units should not be confused with
the individual Thais who are part of the AC.

contribute something to the ground fighting. However, Branfman
reports that the Thai are generally regarded by the Lao military
as rather fainthearted soldiers, "who fight well only when
generously supplied in set-piece situations. Laotian generals
state quite openly that they consider Thai troops absolutely
useless in fighting guerrilla war."[278] Thus, due to the nature
of the AC, and the incompetence of the regular Thai Army and
the Laotian Army (FAR), none of these ground forces offer (or
are expected to) serious resistance to a determined communist
ground offensive. This was illustrated in March 1970, when
despite saturation bombing by B-52s, the Communist forces
regained control of the Plaine des Jarres, which was being
defended by AC/Thai/FAR troops. By 1972, two-thirds of Laos
was under Pathet Lao control.[279]

There is considerable ambiguity concerning the cost of
the ground war in Laos. However, according to Senator
Fulbright in 1969, U.S. military support costs of the Armee
Clandestine has averaged approximately $150 million a year.[280]
In addition, the cost of support of FAR and the Thai Army
units operating in Laos has averaged approximately $300 million.
According to the Moose-Lowenstein report in 1971 and Walt
Haney, military assistance to Laos (not including Thai regu-
lars and facilities based in Thailand but used in Laos) was
valued at $162.2 million and the CIA budget at roughly (since
it is estimated from other figures) $70 million.[281] The esti-
mated annual cost of U.S. bombing in Laos in 1971 was $1.4

billion to $2 billion. U.S. economic aid to Laos totaled
$52 million; the United States "spent roughly twenty-eight
times more to bomb Laos than on economic aid."[282]

By the end of 1968, Americans were in charge of most of
the activities that went on in Laos. American officials had
supplanted not only the military but also the Laotian civil
authorities in many functions and were responsive only to
U.S. government's needs and wishes. Because of the failings
of the Royal Lao government in every field--economic, political,
and military--America, to achieve its objectives in Laos, found
it necessary to intervene directly and assume control over the
functions normally carried out by a sovereign government--
welfare, economic management, domestic development (as well
as the military).

Counterinsurgency warfare is political as well as mili-
tary in nature; thus, the development of an administrative
structure which provides for the needs of the people is as much
a military organ as it is a political one. One of the most
critical weaknesses of the Royal Laotian Government has been
its political and structural inability to meet rural needs.*
Since 85-90 percent of the population lived in the country-
side and the war was being fought there, an effective and
honest civil administration, which could gain the loyalty of
the peasant and which could influence the outcome of the war,

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*See Chapter III.

needed to be created. This was vital since the Vientiane bureaucracy was not only inefficient and corrupt, it was also fundamentally out of touch with developments in the rest of Laos.[283] In 1962, an American administrative structure was developed which paralleled that of the RLG in every important aspect. On paper, the Americans were to advise and work with the Laotians, however, in practice "the Americans ran the show."[284] The American effort was headed by the U.S. ambassador; several U.S. officials and observers agreed with one official's conclusion that "the U.S. Embassy was the strongest part of the RLG's administrative structure in Laos."[285] American penetration of Laos is illustrated by an example given in Senate hearings on Laos in 1969. In October 1969, a RLG official queried USAID Director Mann:

> You know, sir, it is customary among us to refer to the USAID Director as the second prime minister of Laos. He has his own budget, his own cabinet, his own technical departments, his own bureaucracy. Do you really think that this is helping our government to develop.[286]

From 1962 to 1971, the USAID budget totaled $452 million or about $50 million annually.[287] This money established such departments as agriculture, irrigation, education, rural development; it built schools, roads and dams; provided fertilizer and a dry season rice program. Americans designed and financed radio programs to win over the Lao population; it provided and maintained minimal government services. However, in actuality, the American aid programs did little to strengthen the Royal Government and probably failed to change village atti-

tudes of resentment toward the RLG. In fact, the programs

may have increased village discontentment since the direct

channeling of aid to the villages emphasized American presence

and highlighted the incompetence of the RLG. The Laotians

learned that to get things done, they had to go to the Americans.

Moreover, as one USAID official testified, the aid programs

raised villagers' expectations (and frustrations) so that

> villagers' reaction to the ineptness of their officials
> is one of unrest. There is increasing awareness on the
> part of the villager that he has the right to determine
> his own future and certain benefits are entitled him
> under a central government system. This awareness, the
> freedom to express his views, and an increasingly better
> financial position have created social and political
> problems which the traditional central government author-
> ities find difficult to solve without upsetting the
> balance of large-family power, army strength, and the
> favored few.[288]

Since the objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Laos have been

"to support and maintain the present Lao government,"[289] which

gave the U.S. freedom of action in Laos, wealth and power has

remained concentrated in the hands of the tiny and corrupt

elite; thus, the U.S. aid program had "to work through and

around the elitism and corruption, but could not change it."

Under these conditions the USAID effort "was hardly conducive

to winning the political support which was the RLG's only

guarantee of a political future."[290] The USAID could neither

rally the Lao people to the RLG nor mobilize them against the

Pathet Lao. Insurgency thrives on the structural and political

weaknesses of an existing government. Since the RLG continued

to be weak, divided, disorganized, urban-centered and corrupt,

and since the Pathet Lao continued to win territory, greater emphasis was put on military counterinsurgency operations and escalation of the air "wars."

The concept behind the escalating U.S. air war has been as obscure and contradictory as its results. The aim of disrupting the socio-economic fabric of life in the Pathet Lao territory and demoralizing the civilians has been accomplished; the air "wars" have been, on the whole, counterproductive. Having ceded control of the air to the enemy for the past 25 years, and having learned to avoid bombing casualties, few Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese soldiers are killed.[291] Moreover, bombing has mobilized the apathetic peasant and provided the Pathet Lao with more volunteers. The attitude of the peasant was "better to die fighting than die hiding from bombs."[292] By 1970, Branfman, as well as other U.S. officials, held: "The Pathet Lao were the only soldiers in Laos who felt they knew what they were fighting for. Higher morale resulted in increased combat efficiency."[293]

The U.S. air war and increased assistance to AC and FAR ground forces since 1962 have strengthened the Pathet Lao most by increasing the North Vietnamese stake in the Laotian war. American actions, including the providing of air support for "monsoon" (rainy season) offensives and the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trails forced an increase in the number of North Vietnamese soldiers committed to Laos. T.D. Allman (whose New York Times reports helped to persuade the Senate to hold

hearings on Laos in 1969) wrote of the U.S. decision to intensify the bombings and to support ground advances into Northern Laos during the monsoon, that

> ...observers say the most significant development in the recent history of the Laotian war came in November 1968, when the full might of the U.S. air arsenal-- previously concentrated on North Vietnam--was turned on Laos and the trails...the five-fold escalation of the U.S. bombing in Laos, the observers say, convinced the North Vietnamese that they had to meet force with counter force.[294]

The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao did respond in force. After a year and half of escalation and counter-escalation by each side, the war was extended farther South and West than ever before. By January 1972, most observers agreed that"the Pathet Lao with North Vietnamese support could take any or all the country at almost any time."[295]

The North Vietnamese have focused on controlling and operating the Ho Chi Minh Trail and securing Northeastern Laos; U.S. government sources recently acknowledged that "about 80 percent of all North Vietnamese (in Laos) are in Southern Laos."[296] The North Vietnamese have avoided taking towns controlled by the RLG forces* or making massive forays into the Mekong. There are, at the maximum, five to ten thousand North Vietnamese troops in Laos,[297] mostly in the Northeast and areas

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*Despite its many failures, American reliance on air power guaranteed the achievement of one major aim: "bombing will, if nothing else, prevent the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese seizure of any major Laotian towns."

contiguous to the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Although in the 1970's
only about 5,000 North Vietnamese were actually engaged in
combat throughout Laos (since 60 percent of DRV troops are
used to maintain the Trail and other "North Vietnamese troops,"
mainly older men, women and girls, engage in porterage), this
still represents a significant increase over the number pre-
sent in May 1964, when the U.S. air war began.[298] Their
number in Laos has increased with the growth of American, Thai,
and other foreign military elements on the Royal Laotian
Government side. There is little doubt that the North Viet-
namese have played a significant role in strengthening
Communist ground power.[299]

   According to Langer and Zasloff, an important contribution
of the DRV in the strengthening of the Pathet Lao movement has
been to provide training to some of the Pathet Lao in North
Vietnam and to provide advisors in Laos. The North Vietnamese
also provide some Pathet Lao cadres with six weeks of political
and military training in Hanoi. Since 1962, the North Viet-
namese have created other programs, such as in the field of
medicine. Medical training programs are taught by a Lao teaching
staff in Laos, but the materials and methods are prepared by
the North Vietnamese.[300] Based on testimony of one North
Vietnamese defector, Captain Mai Dai Hap (who as an advisor
to the Pathet Lao would have some first-hand knowledge of
some training programs), Langer and Zasloff reports,

> There are a great many Vietnamese support activities...
> some derive from the presence of Vietnamese troop units
> and include the maintenance of roads by Vietnamese engi-
> neers, transportation assistance by Vietnamese mili-
> tary vehicles. A variety of technical assistance, both
> civilian and military is provided by Vietnamese specialists.[301]

It seems plausible that North Vietnam would increase or extend

its technical assistance and support activities during this

period of increased U.S. intervention. Also, it conforms

with an earlier quoted statement made by Soviet Ambassador

Tchivilev to Marek Thee in 1961 (when the Russians were per-

suading the Pathet Lao to agree to a political settlement):

> ...(the Pathet Lao) they found it difficult to cope with
> the new circumstances. They lacked political cadres and
> military experts to deal with administrative, political,
> and military problems. Of course, Tchivilev added, the
> Vietnamese were helpful in this situation...[302]

Thus, a logical outgrowth of the escalation of the war would

be increased Vietnamese training and technical assistance to

the Pathet Lao.

After 1962, there has been a progressive tying-in of the

Pathet Lao-held regions with neighboring areas of China and

North Vietnam. Both North Vietnam and China began significant

road-building programs. North Vietnam has built and maintained

Road 7 going into North Vietnam. The Chinese, who have nearly

completed a road linking the important Yunnan garrison town

of Sze-Mao with the northern Laotian provincial capitol of

Phong Saly, have sent men to build roads through northern Laos.

By 1973, an estimated 30,000 Chinese were in Laos (they were

reported there through early 1975), perhaps one-fourth were

troops to protect the road crews. When completed, these roads

will give Northern and Eastern Laos better land communication
with its two Communist neighbors.[303]

In totality, Red China's role in Laos has been limited.
Except for its moral support and its economic and cultural
mission, China's involvement in the Pathet Lao zone has been
minimal, due in part to the predominant role of the North Viet-
namese and its fear of another Korea-type war. In the northern
corner of Laos, a number of Chinese workers and troops have
been deployed for road building, but they present no threat,
however, to Vientiane.[304]

In this period, the Soviet Union continued to maintain
the diplomatic position that recognized the legitimacy of both
sides. Besides its indirect assistance to the Pathet Lao,
which was funneled through the North Vietnamese,* the Soviet
Union continued to support the government of Souvanna Phouma and
remain disengaged, despite the escalation. The Soviet Union
has had the least at stake, directly; its major concern has
been to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States
in Indochina and to disengage itself militarily from the area.

North Vietnam, like the United States, has used Laotian
territory in pursuance of its own ends. Most notably, this
has been so in Southern Laos where North Vietnam "has even
subordinated the interests of its allies in Laos, the Pathet
Lao, to its own ends."[305] Some observers, such as Noam Chomsky

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*According to Marek Thee, the Soviet Union refused to
increase Soviet military aid to Vietnam (for Laos) above the
normal supplies (see Thee, p. 22).

in At War With Asia, argue that North Vietnamese involvement
in Laos has come largely after and in response to U.S. inter-
vention in Laos (and South Vietnam).[306] The evidence currently
"available from the Pentagon Papers certainly does nothing to
detract from such a thesis."[307] It is also relevant to note,
again, that American government sources acknowledge that most
North Vietnamese forces are engaged mainly in activities
related to the Ho Chi Minh Trail.[308] Thus, as Haney notes,
"it would be impossible to judge this aspect of North Vietnamese
involvement in Laos without also judging the whole history of
the Vietnam conflict and U.S. intervention in it."[309] This
is clearly beyond the scope of this study. Thus, while
avoiding normative justification and while formulating no moral
judgment concerning North Vietnamese intervention, the facts
indicate that North Vietnam, like the United States, has ig-
nored Article 2, withdrawal of troops, and has incessantly
violated Article 4 of the 1962 Geneva Agreements, which pro-
scribes the introduction into Laos of foreign military and
paramilitary personnel.[310] (Although the DRV did not play
the crucial role the United States did in the overthrow of
Souvanna's government in 1960, or in the elections of 1958--
Operation Booster Shot.) North Vietnam, like the United
States, does have a record of deception concerning its involve-
ment in Laos. However, as Haney points out, "in terms of sheer
destruction of Laotian lives and homes and countryside, the U.S.
involvement in Laos has been far more disastrous than anything

the DRV has done."[311] He supports this statement by citing

figures from the Cornell Air War Study,

> ...from 1965 through 1971, the United States dropped more
> than 1.6 <u>million tons</u> of bombs over Laos. In a country
> of 91,000 square miles, this amounts to more than seven-
> teen tons for every square mile of the Kingdom. On a
> per capita basis this amounts to roughly six-tenths of
> a ton of bombs for every man, woman, and child in the coun-
> try....The bombing has resulted in the destruction of
> all urban centers under Pathet Lao control and, in at
> least some areas, the destruction of virtually every
> village. Such vast destruction wrought so casually on
> one of the least-developed countries of the world surely
> cannot be justified on the basis of any comparable
> destruction wrought by Communist action in Laos.[312]

The Cambodian Incursion

From 1954 until his downfall in March 1970, Prince Sihanouk

was a practitioner of a policy of neutrality. He perceived

his purpose as maintaining the territorial integrity and

independence of his small and weak kingdom of Cambodia. From

1965-1970, however, because of the pressures of the war in

Vietnam, Sihanouk acquiesced to logistical operations of the

armies of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of

South Vietnam on Cambodian territory. In December 1967,

Sihanouk offered to cooperate discretely with the United States

against the Vietnamese Communist, backing up his offer by

closing his eyes to secret American bombings of Vietcong and

North Vietnamese sanctuaries inside his borders. After his

downfall in 1970, Sihanouk stated that he tried to open dis-

cussions with the United States, but his overtures were twice

rejected by Henry Kissinger.[313]

In July 1973, the Pentagon acknowledged that during 1969-1970, acting under President Nixon's personal authority, U.S. military units (Special Forces and CIA operatives) engaged in almost daily ground incursions, codename "Salem House," as part of a wide range of top secret intelligence operations ranging over much of Southeast Asia. They were coordinated with secret B-52 and tactical U.S. air strikes against targets in Cambodia. These secret operations went on for fourteen months before Sihanouk's downfall. Both the secret bombings and ground incursions in 1969 were in flagrant contradiction to President Nixon's statement on April 30, 1970, that prior to the invasion U.S. policy had been "to respect scrupulously the neutrality of the Cambodian people."[314] In addition to the Cambodian incursions, according to information obtained in interviews with former CIA agents and military specialists, who had served with the National Security Agency, which covertly synchronized all these operations, Tad Szulc, diplomatic correspondent for the New York Times, reported other secret U.S. operations in Southeast Asia:

> Training of Khmer Serei units at two CIA camps in Greece...
> William E. Colby, the new CIA director, acknowledged that...
> at one point in 1969, the Khmer Serei were supposed to
> be used by the U.S. in a coup against Prince Norodom
> Sihanouk's regime, something the administration also
> disclaimed.
> Cross-border commando raids into China from Laotian
> territory in 1969, involving Special Forces and CIA
> advisers.
> ...Covert actions in Burma at the confluence of
> Thai and Chinese borders. The CIA station in Bangkok
> was in charge of these activities.[315]

The pressures within Cambodian politics in 1970, which arose principally from anti-Communist factions (particularly in the army which General Lon Nol commanded) were such that Sihanouk tried by both direct demand to the North Vietnamese and by appeal to the Soviet Union and Red China, to have the scale of the Vietnamese Communist operations reduced, if not eliminated. These pressures, which might have been exacerbated by the CIA, were a sufficient basis for ousting Sihanouk on March 18, 1970.[316] In Peking, on March 23, 1970, Sihanouk announced that he would organize a new National United Front and The Peoples' Armed Forces of National Liberation* against the new Lon Nol regime.[317]

From the beginning, the Khmer Rouge has been an ill-defined, tenuous alliance among Cambodian dissidents. For years, the Cambodian Communist Party failed to attract more than a few hundred members. However, with the ousting of Sihanouk, thousands of his supporters joined the Khmer Rouge. In addition, 7,000 Cambodians who had trained in North Vietnam joined the insurgents. Although this composite has coalesced, evidence tends to indicate that Sihanouk and his allies neither trust nor like each other. It is unclear, what roles Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan, alleged leader of the Khmer Rouge, would play in a Khmer Rouge coalition government. Would Norodum Sihanouk be head of state? Sihanouk plainly states in the

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*The provisional rebel government under Sihanouk is called GRUNK (Gouvernment Royal de l'Union National Khmer). The Khmer Rouge coalition itself is known as FUNK (Front Uni National Khmer).

closing of his recent book, My War with the CIA, that the "progressive" wing of the Khmer Rouge movement, involving younger Marxist leaders, has grown greatly in strength. He appears to perceive his role as that of a useful and effective figurehead and, insofar as that is possible, a mediator between communist and non-communist.[318]

Although the Khmer Rouge have accepted weapons from both China and North Vietnam, the rebels have retained their independence. Traditional rivalries have made the Khmer Rouge suspicious of Hanoi. Newsweek's Phnom Penh bureau claims that,

> Reports leaking out of Khmer Rouge territory indicate that fighting is common between rebel troops and North Vietnamese units stationed in Cambodia to protect supply routes to South Vietnam. Hanoi refuses to supply the Khmer Rouge with sophisticated modern weapons such as anti-aircraft missiles.[319]

The old traditional conflict and rivalry between Khmer and Vietnamese peoples was apparent in an interview Alain Bouc had with Sihanouk in August 1970. In that interview, Sihanouk said that he was assured by Peking and Hanoi that they had absolutely no interest in "satellizing" Cambodia.[320]

During the week of March 18, 1970, the Vietnamese Communists held formal meetings with General Lon Nol on the Cambodian sanctuary issue. When the meetings abruptly terminated on March 23, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese announced their support for Sihanouk's government-in-exile. Subsequently, the Lon Nol government terminated the trade payment arrangements

which had enabled the Vietnamese to purchase and transport supplies to their forces inside South Vietnam. With that supply line broken, their logistical position became much more difficult.[321]

In the meantime, the Chinese ambassador who had remained in Phnom Penh to negotiate with Lon Nol, proposed that the Peoples' Republic of China would recognize Lon Nol's new government if he would leave the Vietnamese sanctuaries alone. In May, however, with the American incursion into Cambodia, China broke diplomatic ties with Lon Nol and granted formal recognition to Sihanouk's regime. Red China then signed an agreement with North Vietnam, increased its aid to Hanoi, and gave Sihanouk's government a long-term interest free loan and free military aid.[322] King Chen reports that "the United States forces in Indochina discovered that 60 percent of the captured weapons and 80 percent of the captured ammunition in Cambodia were from China."[323]

Perhaps the most conspicuous indication of Sino-Soviet differences with respect to Indochina, which were present but less obvious in Laos, is the fact that Peking recognizes, supports, and aids the Sihanouk regime, whereas, Moscow recognizes the Lon Nol government of Phnom Penh. The USSR, which has not only retained its embassy but has also expanded its personnel, is in disfavor with the Khmer Rouge. In July 1971, a Dispatch News Service International reporter stated that,

> According to Phnom Penh Deputy Finance Minister Mau
> Say, Moscow secretly ships trucks to the Lon Nol regime.
> Eighty-five Soviet professors have quietly returned to
> their teaching posts at the Phnom Penh Institute of
> Technology, and Cambodian students are given scholarships
> to study in Moscow.[324]

Sihanouk attributes Moscow's nonsupport and nonrecognition

of his government to the Soviet disapproval of his residence

in exile which is in Peking and to the Sino-Soviet rift.

Moreover, he views the Russian conflict with Red China as

being motivated by racism--"a fear of the 'yellow peril.'"[325]

The Soviet rift with China and the Soviet priority for improved

relations with the United States proscribed recognition and

support for Sihanouk's regime. In 1970, the Soviet Union

suggested a new Geneva Conference to deal with the Cambodian

crisis. As Hsiao notes,

> ...The Vietcong, Hanoi, Sihanouk, and China rejected
> a Soviet peace balloon for a new Geneva conference....
> Moscow's real concern, of course, was not the crisis
> itself but the growing Chinese influence which evolved
> during the crisis....Pravda delivered a sharp attack
> on China, criticizing the Mao Tse Tung policy of seeking
> domination in Asia.[326]

Thus, destablizing situations in Southeast Asia, such as the

Cambodian and Laotian crises, tend to work against Soviet

interests.[327] The American incursion into Cambodia in 1970

and the later Vietnamese operations in Laos in 1971 served

to point up the restraint of Soviet policy, the exacerbation of

its rift with Peking, and the enhancement of Chinese influence.

American military officers were pleased that anti-communist

generals had come to power. A New York Times reporter was

told by American military officers, "I don't see how we can

miss....This is the sort of thing we've been waiting for."[328]

Subsequently in April at Lon Nol's request, the United States

airlifted weapons to Cambodia. During this month, the United

States air war was expanded to include Cambodia.[329] The New York

Times reported on December 5, 1971, that according to an official

study of the U.S. Government Account Office, "more than two

million Cambodians have been driven from their homes...since

the spring of 1970....Bombing is a very significant cause of

refugee and civilian casualties."[330] The same report disclosed

that 26 percent of Cambodian territory had come under saturation

bombing.

In the Spring of 1970, the American military recommended

"the decisive action by which widening the war (Vietnam) would

shorten it."[331] On April 30, President Nixon announced the

joint U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia; he also

stated that the troops would leave Cambodia in eight weeks.

In his article, "Beyond the Pentagon Papers: The Pathology

of Power," Fredric Branfman claims that,

> The American invasion of Cambodia which began April 30,
> 1970 and lasted two months, was a relatively minor inci-
> dent. Far more important was the full-scale air war
> initiated by the United States one month before the
> invasion began, and which has continued until this day
> (August 14, 1973).[332]*

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*At this writing, a "civilian contractor" with strong ties
to the CIA has been, according to Tad Szulc, "set up in business
by the Pentagon to fly an arms and fuel airlift from U.S. air
base in Thailand to Cambodia in violation of the spirit, if not
the letter, of the law banning American military operations in
Indochina. It is a transparent deception, but it has worked."[333]
Thus, these "civilian contractors" fly military equipment to
Cambodia abroad borrowed C-130 air force transports to get
around the prohibition in the Foreign Assistance Act of "mili-
tary or para-military operations by the U.S. in Vietnam or
Laos or Cambodia."[334]

As in Laos, the American government has carried out parallel escalation on the ground. The Lon Nol Army, comprised of many Thai officers, has been expanded from some 40,000 at the time of the coup to well over 150,000 today; the polygot secret Secret Army, "part of the CIA's 100,000-man force stretching throughout Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, has been pressed into action in Cambodia."[335]

The Cambodian conflict is essentially a civil war in which the American-supported Lon Nol government, despite almost $2 billion in American aid in five years, has proved too ineffectual and corrupt to win.[336] The Cambodian government, which has already spent the $275 million in American military aid for the current fiscal year, is requesting an additional $222 million in supplemental aid. However, the American aid and the ground and aerial escalations of the past five years have been no more successful in Cambodia than they were in Laos. The Lon Nol regime controls little more than Phnom Penh.

The Laotian Incursion

After the Cambodian invasion, the North Vietnamese increased their forces to improve their supply line through Laos and into Cambodia. Both militarily and politically, the situation in Laos had deteriorated further. Politically, in the Summer of 1970 as well as in 1971, Souvanna Phouma was threatened by a right-wing coup from generals who no longer perceived any need to preserve the facade of neutrality.

However, as Stevenson notes, "one factor, helping to save him was strong American support for him and firm opposition to any coup."[337]

Militarily, the situation was also disintegrating. The increased North Vietnamese activity caused U.S. military men to press for the invasion of the Laotian sanctuaries. The military logic was clear. Having been cut off from supplies through Cambodia, the North Vietnamese had expanded their logistical network in Laos and appeared to be building strength for an offensive against South Vietnam. A military attack by ground combat troops at the fifty-mile-wide Ho Chi Minh Trail network, could forestall the possible offensive and perhaps permanently damage the North Vietnamese. Thus, eight months after the Cambodian incursion, which at the time was said "to have bought eight months for the processes of Vietnamization and U.S. troop withdrawal,"[338] another invasion was launched. Since the Cooper Amendment prohibits funds for U.S. ground combat operations in Laos and Thailand,[339] the decision was for 22,000 South Vietnamese to invade Laos; thus, "the legal prohibition on the use of American ground combat troops was ostensibly honored."[340] The invasion was a failure; after only six weeks, with some South Vietnamese desperately clinging to the skids of U.S. helicopters, the last soldiers were brought out of Laos.

The many foreign actors involved in Laos from 1963 to 1973, as well as in Cambodia, were not concerned with the damage

and havoc they caused to the indigenous population. The North Vietnamese were determined to preserve and protect their access to the South by the use of the Ho Chi Minh and Sihanouk Trails. When pushed westward by the Cambodian and Laotian invasions, they extended and strengthened their holds in new areas. By providing troops to Souvanna Phouma's and Lon Nol's government, the Thais continued to avoid conflict on their own ground. The Americans refused to stop the bombings and the escalation of the war; they were willing to expand the war into Laos and Cambodia, claiming that it protected the lives of men being withdrawn from Vietnam.

In June 1971, after the Laotian invasion, Senator J.W. Fulbright called the Senate into secret session in order to inform them of the extent of U.S. involvement in Laos. Subsequently, after a special staff report for the Symington Subcommittee revealed for the first time the extent and cost of American activities in Laos, Congress voted to limit expenditures except for U.S. bombing to $375 million for 1972-1973.[341] Then, in 1973, a Congressional resolution ordered a halt to U.S. bombing in Cambodia and Laos at midnight August 14, 1973.[342]

1973-1974

From 1954 to 1972, Washington policy makers perceived that the United States was confronting China and the Soviet Union in an effort "to contain." China and the Soviet Union, whose rift had intensified since 1961, were espousing different

policies and were competing for influence over their Indo-chinese allies, the Third World, and for leadership among the Communist states. As this case study and the Pentagon Papers reveal, Washington policy makers were slow in discerning the Sino-Soviet rift. As Marek Thee observes,

> ...the study (Pentagon Papers) reflects a mistaken per-ception of the roles played by the Soviet Union and China. Throughout the study's dominant concern is with "Communist expansion" perceived as part of an international great power contest. Even in cases where a distinction is made between the interests of Hanoi, Moscow and Peking, the final judgment leans to coordinated Communist bloc strategy. ...the Pentagon analyst notes: "What-ever differences in strategy may have existed among Moscow, Peking and Hanoi, it appears that at each critical juncture Hanoi obtained concurrence in Moscow with an aggressive course of action."[343]

However, with his move to create a detente with China, President Nixon ended the 22 year "containment policy" toward China. In a news conference on February 22, 1973, Dr. Kissinger made it clear that "the substance of the detente was the two parties' movement 'from hostility toward normalization.'"[344] Additionally, after years of negotiation and war, President Nixon agreed to a negotiated peace; the Vietnam war officially ended on January 27, 1973. These two events had a major impact on the Laotian situation.

At a news conference on January 25, 1973, Dr. Kissinger discussed the complexities of the situations in Laos and Cambodia in light of the recent Vietnam cease-fire (Paris agreement). He contended that divisions among Cambodians (Khmer Rouge coalition) who opposed the Phnom Penh government

had complicated Cambodian cease-fire efforts,* while the situation in Laos was "simplified by the fact that leftist opposition to the Vientiane government is vested in the Pathet Lao."[345] A cease-fire agreement was expected in fifteen days.

The International Guarantee Conference, provided for in Article 19 of the Paris agreement, was scheduled to open on February 26. As the Paris conference approached, Washington policy makers were reluctant to enter it while continuing to bomb heavily in Laos, "a strategy that probably would be the subject of accusatory speeches by the Communists."[346] Thus, the United States strongly urged the Laotian government and the Pathet Lao to reach a cease-fire agreement. Additionally, according to an Indochinese correspondent, "The Hanoi government may not have wanted to walk into the international conference with the Laotian war hanging around their necks. The Americans seem to have felt the same way."[347] Thus, on February 21, the Laotian negotiators, Phagna Phoumi Vongvichit for the Pathet Lao and Phagna Pheng Phongsavan for the Vientiane government, signed a cease-fire agreement.

Under the 1973 agreement, the Laotian cease-fire "in place" began in both zones on February 22, 1973. The agreement stated that "All armed forces of foreign countries must completely and permanently cease all military movements in Laos"[348] and "The armed forces of all sides must completely

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*No Cambodian cease-fire agreement developed from the subsequent Paris conference.

cease all military movement encroaching upon one another both on the ground and in the air."[349] Despite occasional U.S. bombings and infractions of the cease-fire by all actors, the cease-fire held together during the negotiations of a peace accord. (Technically, this accord is a protocol putting into effect the cease-fire agreement of February 22.)

During this period of protracted negotiations, the United States Congress acted to diminish the U.S. role in Laos and Cambodia. A Congressional order to halt U.S. bombing in Laos and Cambodia on August 15, and to end "all combat activities in Cambodia and Laos at midnight August 14, 1973" was approved.[350] The United States could continue its military aid to Laos and Cambodia. Thus, with the disengagement of U.S. forces from Vietnam, with the recognition (i.e., Sino-American detente) of the new international power configuration, and with the Congressional ban on American military activities in Laos, the possibility of a Laotian peace was greatly improved. Since foreign actors (with Laotian factions collaborating) have twice subverted previous coalitions, perhaps, if the Laotians are left alone, peace may come to Laos. As New York Times reporter, J.M. Markham, notes,

> "Live-and-let-live attitude" of opposing sides in the
> Laotian conflict help to explain why Laos is the first
> of the Indochinese countries to apparently reach
> agreement on a military and political settlement....
> Laotians will be content to muddle through in their own
> easy going fashion if left alone by outside parties...[351]

On September 14, 1973, approximately six weeks after
Congress prohibited U.S. military activities in Laos, repre-
sentatives of the Laotian government and the Pathet Lao agreed
on the basic structure of a coalition government and signed a
formal agreement to bring about the third coalition in Laos'
history.[352] After several more months of "hard bargaining and
some arm twisting by Americans and Russians to achieve the
present arrangement,"[353] the Vientiane government and the Pathet
Lao agreed upon a coalition administration and a list of cabinet
members was presented to the King. The final protocol was
signed on April 5, 1974, and the tiny landlocked Kingdom began
its third attempt in two decades at a coalition government.
As J.M. Markham observed:

> The protocol signed by the Laotian government and the
> Pathet Lao representative is the perfect recipe for
> national reconciliation--or for government paralysis....
> The success or failure in instituting a coalition
> government depends on the attitudes of those who try,
> or fail to try, to make it work.[354]

The political side of the agreement included: a coalition
government headed by a premier and aided by two deputy premiers;
the sharing of ministries between the two factions; formation
of a political consultative council; and new national elections
for the National Assembly. Souvanna Phouma was designated
as prime minister. Apparently, his lack of a domestic power
base was viewed as a crucial element in the coalition, because
he threatens no one and can appeal to both sides to search for
the common ground in any dispute.[355] The national coalition
cabinet is comprised of five Pathet Lao members and five

"Vientiane government"* representatives, and "two intellectuals
who advocate peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy,
who will be agreed upon by both sides."[356] The function of
the government is "to implement all agreements reached and
the political program agreed upon by both sides."[357] The
National Political Coalition Council, which is headed by
Souphanouvong, reflects the same membership as the coalition
government. The functions of the Council are to help the
government organize the elections for the National Assembly
and to make policy recommendations. According to the agreement,
the Council is to be equal in authority to the Cabinet. More-
over, according to reports, Souvanna Phouma considers Souphanouvong
his natural successor.[358]

The military side of the settlement includes: the neutrali-
zation of the two capitols and the division of the country into
two zones; and, the withdrawal of all foreign troops by June
4, 1974. The two sides agreed (for the first time) to neutralize
the royal capitol of Luang Prabang and the administrative
capitol of Vientiane, which were to be secured by the stationing
of the Pathet Lao military and police units equivalent in
size to the Royal Army garrison. By permitting Pathet Lao
troops to be stationed in the two capitols, the agreement
assuaged the Pathet Lao anxieties concerning their members'
safety in the capitols. The agreement, which reflected the
realities of the battlefield, provides for Pathet Lao control

*Term used in the agreement to refer to the merged neutral
and right-wing faction which previously controlled the RLG.

of about 80 percent of the territory and about one-third of the people (many refugees left the area because of the saturation bombing; also it is the less populated area). Thus, the agreement was a formalization of the status quo, with the Vientiane government controlling part of Western Laos and two-thirds of the population and with the Pathet Lao controlling most of the territory, including the northern and eastern areas which border China and North Vietnam. In Kenneth Landon's view, this is the most significant point in the agreement:

> Thus, the two sides made it clear that the more things seemed to change, the more they remained the same and that Laos would continue to be divided along geographic, political, and ethnic lines running roughly from north to south in a fashion which gave most of the terrain to the Communist and most of the people to the government side.359

In the past the Pathet Lao has been better organized than the opposition, and its policies have been more effective. When ever the Pathet Lao were permitted to compete freely and openly, as in the 1958 elections, in which many of their candidates won seats in the National Assembly, they were successful. Thus, it is not surprising that this agreement, which granted the militarily superior Pathet Lao most of its demands, has been beneficial to them since its implementation. According to a New York Times correspondent,

> The Pathet Lao has taken the lead over the Government's disorganized rightist and neutralist competitors in the two months since the formation of a new coalition government. It has virtually taken military control of the royal capitol of Luang Prabang and, in Vientiane, it has its people at ministerial or subministerial levels in most of the important Government agencies....The

> Pathet Lao's most resounding forum has been the National Political Council, based in Luang Prabang and headed by Prince Souphanouvong, titular leader of the Laotian revolutionary movement....Premier Souvanna Phouma, always a neutralist, now plays role of umpire in the Cabinet. His accomplishments are seen as keeping Laos under one government, "nationalizing" the Pathet Lao by bringing them out of the jungle, and preparing Souphanouvong, his half-brother, to become his natural successor.[360]

In the Fall of 1974, J.M. Markham wrote a series of articles on the current conditions in Laos. He noted that,

> ...unlike South Vietnam, the Laotian cease-fire has held and the regime appears capable of holding together. Laos has a population of perhaps 3 million, most of whom live in the countryside and are little politicized.... Good relations exist between the Pathet Lao members of the mixed police forces and the residents of Vientiane and Luang Prabang....The rightist hold on the population is tenuous although they theoretically control two-thirds of the Laotian population...

Despite the continuing Laotian factionalism which was reflected in their dependency on different foreign actors and which is now reflected in stormy cabinet meetings, and despite the charges and countercharges of cease-fire violations by the different Laotian factions, the tenuous cease-fire and coalition government have remained in tact.[361]

According to the April 5 protocol, all foreign military troops had to be withdrawn by June 4, 1974. In addition, the agreement called on the American CIA to dissolve its paramilitary forces in Laos and to end the "secret war." It stipulated that the U.S. would have to dismantle its CIA contingent in Laos and the bases at which Laotian forces were being trained and equipped. The accord also cuts the number of U.S. personnel in Laos from 1,200 to about 600. The 1973 agreement contained

the intriguing statement: "The parties concerned in Laos, the United States, Thailand, and other foreign countries must strictly respect and implement this agreement."[362] Unaccountably,* the agreement made no mention of North Vietnam and did not overtly refer to North Vietnamese troops in Laos.

Since the June 4 deadline, Defense Minister Sisouk Na Champassak has claimed that North Vietnamese soldiers are still in Laos; "They have withdrawn into the Laotian scenery but not back to North Vietnam....The number of North Vietnamese is unknown because some units have pulled back from visible positions."[363] According to U.S. official reports, North Vietnam has reduced its troop level in Laos and has shifted most of the remaining military men to administrative and logistic duties. With the breakdown of the Vietnamese cease-fire and with the intensifying Cambodian civil war, the North Vietnamese have and, in all probability, will continue to use Laotian territory for supply routes and base areas for operations in South Vietnam. Although it is a violation of the cease-fire, both the non-Communist Laotian faction and the U.S. government seem to be tolerating continued North Vietnamese presence in Laos. The Laotian government, aware that North Vietnamese troops will not leave as long as there is fighting in Laos, is therefore, disregarding the presence of the troops in the interest of national unity. The official North Vietnamese position is that there are no North Vietnamese troops in Laos, however,

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*Perhaps it is indicative of the dominating influence of the Pathet Lao in drawing up the agreement.

there are large numbers of engineers, civilian laborers, and others helping the Pathet Lao make improvements in its zone, particularly along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.[364]

On May 23, 1974, U.S. officials and Thai spokesmen announced that all American advisors and Thai mercenaries were withdrawn on May 22. However, Minister Petrasy has charged that a number of Thai and U.S. paramilitary personnel "had simply been 'camouflaged' and not withdrawn."[365] Moreover, according to several New York Times reports in late 1974 and early 1975, U.S. planes were "still flying reconnaissance missions over Laos in violation of the pact."[366] American officials refused to comment. Although U.S. officials have a record of deception, it appears at this writing, that the United States is disengaging itself from Laos or at least, has reduced its role significantly. (In 1974-1975, only $55 million was given Laos in U.S. military aid.) In view of the past record no final judgment can be made concerning the role of the CIA and Thai "irregulars." The United States has given Laos $100 million (economic and military) in foreign aid for the fiscal year 1975. However, according to Senator Kennedy, by giving all aid to one faction--all economic aid goes to refugees and villages within the areas controlled by the non-Communist faction, and all military aid goes exclusively to the Royal Laotian military units--the United States might be perpetuating political division in Laos, despite the formation of the new coalition government. However, the

coalition government is also receiving $30 million from France, Great Britain, Australia, and Japan. They also have obtained an undisclosed amount from the USSR and North Vietnam. Thus, American aid policy should not create a "hardship" in the Pathet Lao zone.[368]

Although there have been violations of the 1973 agreement by foreign actors, it appears that, perhaps, the era has passed, when there was a certain absurdity in speaking of foreign and domestic policy of this tiny country, ravaged and divided by invasion, foreign-supported rebellions, and civil war. This statement is not pure speculation, it is based upon the realities of the international system and the policies of Red China and the Soviet Union in Laos in the 1960's, the Sino-American detente, and the U.S. policies in Laos and Vietnam in the 1970's.

The new power configuration no longer necessitates a U.S. reaction "to contain communism." The new international power structure has become more diffuse and fluid. Many local conflicts now will appear less threatening to the overall balance than they did when the balance was perceived to be both bipolar and fragile. Significantly, this affects the way the major powers, especially the United States and Red China, view many local conflicts on Red China's periphery.[369] This was reflected in an interview after the January 1973 Vietnam cease-fire agreement with Ambassador William Sullivan (the U.S. "field marshall" in Laos during the secret war). When asked about China's role in achieving the cease-fire agreement,

he responded by saying that "China wanted a Balkanized Indochina with two Vietnams and independent states of Laos and Cambodia. A united Vietnam with Laos and Cambodia under its control would form one of the strongest states in Asia and might establish a role in Asian affairs inimical to that of China."[370] According to Ambassador Sullivan, a powerful united Indochina would not be to China's liking or advantage.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union would prefer a more united Indochina under North Vietnam's control; this preference is based upon the larger pattern of Soviet design to encompass China. The Soviet Union, concerned over Chinese influence in Southeast Asia--such as in the Cambodian Civil War--has made new efforts to increase its influence in the area by offering economic assistance to some countries in the area, such as Burma and Indonesia, and by increasing its support to Hanoi in 1972.[371] Thus (with the sharpening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, which has been reflected in their different responses to the Cambodian and Laotian crises and which America perceived only recently), the Soviet objective in the Southeast Asia area is to undermine China's influence and thwart its ambition.

As illustrated in this case study, Peking's apprehensions about a hostile Soviet Union at its rear impose new limits on its policies elsewhere and Moscow's concern about China and their mutual uncertainty about American reaction to any military action either might take in Asia, operate to reinforce other constraints against military intervention in the area.

With the development of the Sino-American detente and
the Soviet-American detente, ideological lines have become
blurred. This tends to defuse the automatic hostility char-
acteristic of the cold war, which was reflected in U.S. policy
to Laos until 1973; it allows for greater flexibility and com-
promise. Thus, the Laotian agreement establishing a coalition
government, which was an anathema to the U.S. in 1954 as well
as in 1962 and necessitated its subversion of it, is more
acceptable to both the United States and China in 1972. As
Landon notes, the 1973 agreement is satisfactory to both the
United States and China:

> The agreement consolidated Laos into a pattern familiar
> since 1954, a pattern that seems satisfactory to
> China. The agreement should be viewed in light of the
> substantial presence of China in Northern Laos along
> the highway constructed by Chinese engineers and
> patrolled by Chinese troops. The highway ends at the
> River U, a small stream that has a matching highway
> started from its eastern side leading through Dien
> Bien Phu to Hanoi. The Chinese highway is a political
> symbol of China's interest in the nature of the Laos
> settlement. It would seem that a divided Laos suits
> China. It also suits the United States, since Laos
> would return to its traditional role of buffer between
> Thai and Vietnamese, a convenience to both and a
> threat to none.[372]

The realities of the new power configuration, which
were perceived by the Soviet Union in the 1960's and which
resulted in its disengagement from Laos and its non-recognition
policy of Sihanouk's regime, is presently resulting in an
American disengagement from Laos and Cambodia. According to
Landon, who previously perceived the Laotian conflict in the
cold war context and who now views it in light of the new

international structure, the question the United States must
now answer is what role it wishes to play in Indochina, if the
cease-fire breaks down:

> The question is whether the United States should make
> itself responsible for keeping the peace in a parochial
> situation in which its national interest is not involved,
> since the Paris agreements ended the Indochina war as a
> proxy war in which the United States confronted the
> Soviet Union and China. The nature of the situation
> has changed.[373]

In the future, instead of bipolar confrontations as the
United States viewed the Laotian situation in the 1950's and
1960's, more and more situations will be characterized by
"complicated and shifting patterns of competition, or cooperation,
or parallel action."[374] It seems probable that, as a result
of these factors, the new triangular polyarchic international
balance may create a complex pattern of mutual constraints
as it has in Laos, that could operate to inhibit and limit
big power intervention in local conflicts and to encourage
the pursuit of goals through political and diplomatic maneuvers,
and economic competition. The Soviet and Chinese policies
during the 1960's and U.S. policy in Laos during the 1970's
tend to support this conclusion.

Even though intervention in Laos in the future appears
less probable than in the past, indications of or the trend
of any possible interventions might be drawn from an analysis
of interventions in Laos from 1954-1967. The following con-
clusions were drawn from an analysis of the pattern of inter-
ventions over this period:

(1) The analysis tends to indicate that superpower inter-
vention has or has had a tendency to be in support of the
government, while non-superpower intervention has or has had
a tendency to be in support of rebellious groups.

(2) There appears to be an inverse relationship between
time and superpower intervention. This tends to indicate that
later interventions and possible future interventions would
tend to be by a non-superpower intervener. Conversely, this
analysis indicates that superpower intervention would possibly
continue its decreasing trend.

(3) The tendency of superpower intervention has been a
nation crossing border type. Due to the smallness of deviation
in the type of interventions by both superpowers and non-
superpowers in Laos, the non-superpower would also have this
tendency. Because of the inverse relationship of superpower-
non-superpower intervention with the type of intervention, non-
superpower interveners might have a tendency to establish troops
in Laos or might support rebellious groups within the boun-
daries of the non-superpower intervener so that rebel group
or groups could intervene within Laos.*

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*See Technical Annex for a more complete statistical analysis.

NOTES

[1] James Rosenau, <u>The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy</u>
(New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 113.

[2] Morton Kaplan, <u>Macropolitics</u> (Chicago: Aldine Publishing,
1969), p. 216.

[3] Ibid., p. 221.

[4] Oran Young, "Political Discontinuities in the Inter-
national System," <u>World Politics</u> XX (1968): 380.

[5] A. Doak Barnett, <u>A New U.S. Policy Toward China</u>
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 34-51.

[6] Ibid.

[7] <u>The Senator Gravel Edition--The Pentagon Papers</u> (Boston:
Beacon Press, 4 vols., 1971), Vol. I, p. 187. Hereinafter
this edition of the <u>Pentagon Papers</u> will be referred to as
simply Gravel, volume number, and page number(s).

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[9] Gravel, I, 187.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Gravel, III, 3.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Gravel, I, 194.

[14] Gravel, II, 636.

[15] Gravel, I, 374.

[16] Gravel, I, 376.

[17] Ibid.

[18] W. Wilcox, L. Rose, G. Boyd (eds.), <u>Asia and the Inter-
national System</u> (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc.),
pp. 235-43.

[19]John Badgley, _Asian Development_ (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 164-5.

[20]Wilcox _etal_, p. 268.

[21]Harvey Kebschull, _Politics In Transitional Societies_ (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1973), p. 238.

[22]J. Henderson _etal_, _Area Handbook for Burma_ (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 187.

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[24]Henderson _etal_, pp. 198-200.

[25]Ibid., p. 194.

[26]Wilcox _etal_, p. 242.

[27]Henderson _etal_, p. 192.

[28]John W. Lewis (ed.), _Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia_ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 18.

[29]Ibid., p. 165.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), _The Communist Revolution in Asia_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), p. 325.

[32]Wilcox _etal_, p. 268.

[33]N. Adams and A. McCoy (eds.), _Laos: War and Revolution_ (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), p. 118.

[34]Guy Morechand, "The Many Languages and Cultures of Laos," in _Laos: War and Revolution_, ed. by Adams and McCoy, p. 29,

[35]Walt Haney, "The Pentagon Papers and the United States Involvement in Laos," in N. Chomsky and Howard Zin (eds.), _The Pentagon Papers: Critical Essays_ - The Senator Gravel Edition, Volume V (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 279.

[36]Ibid., pp. 248-282.

[37]Gravel, I, 270-282.

[38]U.S. House Committee on Government Operations, _U.S. Aid Operations in Laos_: Seventh Report by the Committee, House Rept. 546, 86th Congress, 1st session, 1959, p. 7. Hereinafter called Porter Hardy Report.

[39]Charles A. Stevenson, The End of No Where: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 31; also see William G. Burchett, The Second Indochina War (New York: International Publishers, 1970), pp. 115-118.

[40]Stevenson, p. 31; Government Royal du Laos, Ministire de L'information, Pour in Laos Pacifique, Independent, et Neutre, pp. 15-16.

[41]Stevenson, p. 31.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Adams and McCoy, p. 129.

[44]Stevenson, p. 29.

[45]Porter Hardy Report, p. 8.

[46]Ibid., p. 7.

[47]Haney, p. 252.

[48]Stevenson, p. 39.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Len E. Ackland, "No Place for Neutralism: The Eisenhower Administration and Laos," in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. by Adams and McCoy, p. 146.

[51]Stevenson, p. 40.

[52]Ackland, p. 146-47.

[53]Haney, pp. 251-253; Stevenson, pp. 38-40.

[54]Porter Hardy Report, p. 180.

[55]Ibid., pp. 184-85.

[56]U.S. House Committee on Government Operations: United States Aid Operations in Laos, Hearings before a Subcommittee on the Committee on Government Operations, 86th Congress, 1st session, 1959, p. 191. Hereinafter called Porter Hardy Hearings.

[57]Haney, p. 253.

[58]United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967. Study prepared by the Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971, 12 vols.), 10: 1092. Hereinafter this edition of the Pentagon Papers will be referred to as simply USGED.

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[60]Ibid., p. 225.

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[62]Haney, p. 254; also see Bernard Fall, Anatomy of a Crisis (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), p. 85.

[63]Stevenson, pp. 47-49.

[64]Ibid., p. 265.

[65]USGED, 10: 1172.

[66]Stevenson, p. 43.

[67]Ibid., p. 247.

[68]Ibid., p. 263.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Burchett, p. 124.

[71]Ackland, pp. 149-150; Stevenson, pp. 246-247.

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[73]Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Dell, 1964), pp. 111-12.

[74]William Burchett, The Furtive War: The U.S. in Vietnam and Laos (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 172.

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[76]A.M. Halpern and H.B. Fredman, "Communist Strategy in Laos." Memorandum prepared by Rand Company, June 14, 1960; also see Fall, p. 94.

[77]Ibid.

[78]Stevenson, pp. 66-8; Ackland, pp. 149-51.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Ibid.

[81]Hilsman, p. 120.

[82] Hugh Toye, <u>Laos: Buffer State or Battleground</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 121.

[83] Ibid., pp. 123-24; Fall, p. 120-21.

[84] USGED, 10: 1239.

[85] Stevenson, p. 71.

[86] Fall, p. 121.

[87] Haney, p. 256; also see, P. Langer and J. Zasloff, <u>North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao</u> (Rand Corporation, 1970), pp. 66-7.

[88] USGED, 10: 1242.

[89] USGED, 10: 1244.

[90] Fall, pp. 137-40; Ackland, pp. 150-52.

[91] Stevenson, pp. 80-1.

[92] USGED, 10: 1246; also see Fall, pp. 154-5.

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[97] USGED, 10: 1250.

[98] <u>Christian Science Monitor</u>, October 11, 1960.

[99] Quoted in Stevenson, p. 89.

[100] USGED, 10: 1293.

[101] Quoted in Fall, p. 117.

[102] <u>Washington Post</u>, January 17, 1961.

[103] Stevenson, p. 88.

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[105]Bernard Fall, "The Pathet Lao: A Liberation Party," in The Communist Revolution in Asia, ed. by R.A. Scalapino, p. 205.

[106]Stevenson, p. 10.

[107]George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 60.

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[110]Stevenson, p. 10; see also Langer and Zasloff, p. 61.

[111]Arthur Dommen, Conflict in Laos (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 115.

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[113]USGED, 8: 60-61.

[114]USGED, 10: 1238-39.

[115]Fall in Scalapino, p. 201; Toye, p. 128.

[116]Denis Warner, The Last Confucian (London: Penguin, 1964), p. 257.

[117]Stevenson, p. 73.

[118]Fall in Scalapino, p. 198.

[119]Ibid.; also see Stevenson, pp. 73-89.

[120]Stevenson, p. 73.

[121]Fall in Scalapino, p. 198.

[122]Marek Thee, Notes of A Witness: Laos and the Second Indochinese War (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 122, 339.

[123]Fall in Scalapino.

[124]Gravel, II, 18; also Haney, p. 259.

[125]Haney, p. 259.

[126]Stevenson, pp. 97-104; Minsky and Stonefield, pp. 152-55.

[127]Haney, p. 259.

[128]Ed. Friedman and Mark Selden (eds.), America's Asia (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 282.

[129]Stevenson, pp. 96-109; Mirsky and Stonefield, pp. 152-54.

[130]Ibid.; Haney, p. 259.

[131]Stevenson, p. 112.

[132]Ibid.

[133]Haney, p. 259; Toye, p. 125.

[134]Stevenson, pp. 115-18.

[135]Ibid., pp. 116-18.

[136]Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: J.F.K. in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 328.

[137]Dommen, p. 173.

[138]New York Times, January 20, 1961.

[139]Dommen, pp. 179-81.

[140]USGED, 10: 1238-39; Fall, pp. 123-132; Stevenson, pp. 118-20.

[141]Haney, p. 260.

[142]Gravel, II, 22.

[143]Stevenson, p. 121.

[144]Gravel, II, 636-37.

[145]Gravel, II, 464.

[146]Mirsky and Stonefield, p. 159.

[147]Stevenson, pp. 124-32; Dommen, p. 187; Haney, p. 260.

[148]Gravel, II, 800.

[149]Gravel, II, 41-42.

[150]Ibid.

[151]Haney, pp. 261-62.

[152]Fall, pp. 212-13; Dommen, p. 205.

[153]Stevenson, p. 179.

[154]Schlesinger, p. 313.

[155]Gravel, II, 641, 643.

[156]Gravel, II, 646-7.

[157]USGED, 11: 247-48.

[158]Ibid.

[159]Haney, p. 263.

[160]Quoted in Stevenson, p. 160.

[161]Toye, p. 179.

[162]Hilsman, p. 137; Stevenson, p. 170.

[163]Stevenson, pp. 168-70.

[164]Dommen, p. 216.

[165]Haney, p. 264.

[166]Gravel, II, 683.

[167]David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Government (London: Mayflower, 1968), p. 149.

[168]Thee, pp. 351-54.

[169]USGED, IV: 51.

[170]Thee, p. 383.

[171]Ibid., p. 324-5.

[172]Ibid., p. 23.

[173]Ibid., p. 22.

[174]Ibid., p. 23.

[175]Ibid., p. 23-27.

[176]Stevenson, p. 140-1.

[177]USGED, 11: 318.

[178]Stevenson, p. 276.

[179]Ibid., p. 141.

[180]Ibid., p. 149.

[181]Thee, pp. 191-92.

[182]Stevenson, p. 149.

[183]Thee, p. 200.

[184]Zasloff, p. 73.

[185]Stevenson, p. 149.

[186]Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics XX (April 1968): 476.

[187]Thee, p. 124.

[188]Ibid., p. 245.

[189]Friedman and Selden, p. 293.

[190]Brian Crozier, "Peking and the Laotian Crisis," China Quarterly (July-September 1962): 118; Mirsky and Stonefield, p. 177.

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[192]Ibid.

[193]J. Chester Cheng (ed.), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1966), p. 367.

[194]Thee, p. 27.

[195]Ibid.

[196]Ibid., p. 28.

[197]Ibid. , p. 29.

[198]Ibid., pp. 128, 144, 175.

[199]Langer and Zasloff, pp. 152-165; 175-178.

[200]Department of State Publication 7839 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965); also see Langer and Zasloff, pp. 171-73.

[201]U.S. Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreement and Commitments Abroad, Laos: April 1971, a staff report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 6. Hereinafter called Moose-Lowenstein Report.

[202]Thee, pp. 128-29; Langer and Zasloff, pp. 106-13, 156, 176.

[203]Toye, p. 163; Stevenson, p. 174.

[204]Thee, p. 129.

[205]Ibid., p. 193.

[206]Ibid.

[207]Ibid.

[208]Ibid., p. 339.

[209]Langer and Zasloff, pp. 175-76.

[210]Thee, p. 123.

[211]Scalapino, p. 208.

[212]Stevenson, p. 181.

[213]D.G. Porter, in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. by Adams and McCoy, lays the blame entirely on the U.S. and the Laotian rightist. Dommen tends to place the blame on the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese. Langer and Zasloff focus on North Vietnamese intervention and completely ignore that of U.S. Stevenson tends to give a balanced account.

[214]Haney, p. 265.

[215]D. Gareth Porter, "After Geneva: Subverting Laotian Neutrality," in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. by Adams and McCoy, p. 182; U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Committments Abroad, Hearings, October 20, 21, 22, and 28, 1969, p. 473. Hereinafter referred to as the Symington Hearings. Stevenson, p. 185; Haney, p. 266.

[216]Hilsman, p. 115.

[217]Porter, pp. 186-87.

[218]Stevenson, pp. 186-7.

[219]Hilsman, p. 152.

[220]Quoted in Stevenson, p. 182.

[221]Dommen, pp. 258-59; Haney, p. 266.

[222]Stevenson, p. 187.

[223]Ibid.

[224]Porter, p. 186.

[225]Thee, pp. 327-28.

[226]Stevenson, p. 191.

[227]Ibid.

[228]Thee, p. 327.

[229]Haney, p. 266.

[230]Haney, p. 267; Stevenson, pp. 188-195; Porter, pp. 186-95.

[231]Haney, p. 267.

[232]Ibid.

[233]Gravel, III, 524, 523.

[234]Gravel, III, 253.

[235]Gravel, III, 518-19; 552-53.

[236]Stevenson, p. 199.

[237]Porter, p. 209.

[238]Quoted in Porter, p. 209.

[239]Hilsman, p. 153.

[240]Schlesinger, p. 517; also see Thee, p. 312.

[241]Porter, p. 180.

[242]Stevenson, pp. 274-75.

[243]Ibid., p. 218.

[244]Porter, p. 209; Thee, p. 312; Stevenson, p. 196-97.

[245]Stevenson, p. 196.

[246]Porter, p. 197; also see Dommen, p. 258.

[247]Stevenson, p. 218.

[248]Ibid., p. 180.

[249]Gravel, II, 653.

[250]Haney, p. 265.

[251]Fred Branfman, "Presidential War in Laos, 1964-1970," in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. by Adams and McCoy, p. 217.

[252]Stevenson, p. 210.

[253]Gravel, III, 95, 116, 352-55, 338.

[254]Branfman, p. 217.

[255]Gravel, III, 95, 116, 352-55.

[256]Gravel, III, 316.

[257]Gravel, III, 253-54.

[258]Ibid.

[259]Haney, p. 272.

[260]Stevenson, p. 216.

[261]Gravel, III, 338, 341.

[262]Ibid.

[263]Stevenson, p. 213.

[264]Symington Hearings, p. 713.

[265]Haney, 275.

[266]T.D. Allman, "Waiting for a Miracle," Far Eastern Economic Review 67, No. 11 (March 12, 1970): 6; also see Haney, p. 275.

[267]Stevenson, p. 216.

[268]Moose-Lowenstein Report, pp. 34-35.

[269]Haney, p. 275.

[270]Haney, p. 277; Branfman, p. 234.

[271]Haney, p. 273; Moose-Lowenstein Report, p. 14; Branfman, pp. 234-35.

[272]Stevenson, p. 211.

[273]Branfman, p. 250.

[274]Haney, p. 273.

[275]Branfman, p. 243-50; Stevenson, p. 212; New York Times, October 26, 1969.

[276]Tammy Arbuckle, "Thais Are Only Part of the U.S.'s Secret Army," Washington Star, March 25, 1970.

[277]Branfman, pp. 235-45; Stevenson, pp. 184, 187, 212-13.

[278]Branfman, p. 247.

[279]D. Whitaker etal, Area Handbook on Laos (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 268; Branfman, p. 250.

[280]Michael Malloy, "Allies in the Clouds," Far Eastern Economic Review (November 20, 1969); also see Branfman, p. 248.

[281]Moose-Lowenstein Report, p. 3; Haney, p. 277.

[282]Haney, p. 277.

[283]Stevenson, p. 221; Branfman, p. 255-64.

[284]Stevenson, p. 220.

[285]Ibid.

[286]Branfman, p. 261.

[287]Moose-Lowenstein Report, p. 4.

[288]Branfman, p. 260-61.

[289]Ibid.

[290]Ibid.

[291]Ibid., p. 240.

[292]Ibid., p. 241.

[293]Ibid.

[294]Allman, Vol. 67, No. 11, 6.

[295]Stevenson, p. 236; Branfman, pp. 240-41.

[296]Moose-Lowenstein Report, p. 6.

[297]Branfman, pp. 278-80; Stevenson, pp. 187, 189.

[298]Ibid.

[299]Haney, p. 280; Branfman, p. 219.

[300]Langer and Zasloff, p. 116-128.

[301]Ibid., p. 123.

[302]Thee, p. 123.

[303]Moose-Lowenstein Report, pp. 18, 21; New York Times, November 10, 1974.

[304]King C. Chen, "The Chinese Role in the Indochinese Crisis," in The Role of External Powers in the Indochina Crisis, ed. by Gene T. Hsiao (New York: Andronicus Publishing Company, 1973), p. 67.

[305]Haney, p. 280.

[306]Noam Chomsky, At War With Asia (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 213-234.

[307]Haney, p. 292.

[308]Moose-Lowenstein Report, p. 6.

[309]Haney, p. 292.

[310]Thee, p. 421.

[311]Haney, p. 280.

[312]Ibid., pp. 280-81.

[313]"Losing Cambodia," The New Republic, February 1, 1975, p. 7.

[314]New York Times, May 1, 1970.

[315]Tad Szulc, "Mums the Word," The New Republic, August 28, 1973, pp. 19-21.

[316]Ibid.; M. Caldwell and L. Tan, Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), p. 268. Also see Norodom Sihanouk and W. Burchett, My War with the CIA (New York: Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973), chapter 18, pp. 249-61.

[317]New York Times, March 24, 1970.

[318]Sihanouk and Burchett, pp. 249-61.

[319]Newsweek, March 10, 1975, p. 26.

[320]Alain Bouc, "An Interview with Norodum Sihanouk," Le Monde (Weekly, August 26, 1970), p. 8.

[321]Chen, pp. 72-76.

[322]Ibid.; New York Times, June 7, 1970, p. 3.

[323]Chen, p. 74.

[324]Caldwell and Tan, p. 336.

[325]Alessandro Casella, "In Peking, Monseigneur Talks About 'His' Communists, the Future of Cambodia, Nixon, and the Death of Kings," New York Times Magazine, January 23, 1972, p. 9.

[326]Chen, pp. 71-72.

[327]Wilcox etal, p. 365.

[328]New York Times, March 18, 1970.

[329]New York Times, April 16, 1970.

[330]New York Times, December 5, 1971.

[331]Stevenson, p. 233.

[332]Fredric Branfman, "Beyond the Pentagon Papers: The Pathology of Power," in N. Chomsky and Howard Zinn (eds.), p. 305.

[333]Ibid., p. 306.

[334]Tad Szulc, "Trail of Deception: Our Mercenary Air Force in Cambodia," The New Republic, March 15, 1975, pp. 10-11.

[335]Ibid.

[336]Time Magazine, March 10, 1975, pp. 47-48.

[337]Stevenson, p. 233.

[338]Ibid., p. 234.

[339]Congressional Record, December 15, 1969, p. S16761.

[340]Stevenson, p. 235.

[341]Ibid., p. 238.

[342]New York Times, August 15, 1973.

[343]Thee, p. 352.

[344]Kenneth P. Landon, "The Impact of the Sino-American Detente on the Indochina Conflict," in Sino-American Detente and Its Policy Implications, ed. by Gene T. Hsiao (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1974), p. 217.

[345]New York Times, January 25, 1973.

[346]Landon, p. 219.

[347]"One Sided Peace," Economist 248:65 (February 24, 1973): 29.

[348]New York Times, February 22, 1973.

[349]Ibid.

[350]New York Times, August 4, 1973, p. 1.

[351]New York Times, August 4, 1973, p. 1, 22.

[352]New York Times, September 14, 1973.

[353]New York Times, April 5, 1974.

[354]New York Times, September 15, 1973, p. 38.

[355]New York Times, September 15, 1973, p. 6.

[356]Landon, pp. 218-19; New York Times, April 5, 1974.

[357]Economist 251 (April 13, 1974): 37.

[358]New York Times, April 5, 1974.

[359]Landon, p. 219.

[360]New York Times, June 4, 1974, p. 2; New York Times, June 10, 1974, p. 2.

[361]New York Times, July 10, 1974.

[362]Landon, p. 217.

[363]New York Times, June 5, 1974.

[364]New York Times, November 10, 1974.

[365]New York Times, June 5, 1974.

[366]New York Times, November 10, 1974; December 9, 1974; January 5, 1975.

[367]New York Times, June 24, 1974.

[368]New York Times, May 12, 1974, p. 7.

[369]Barnett, pp. 38-45.

[370]New York Times, January 27, 1974.

[371]John R. Thomas, "The Soviet Union," in The Role of External Powers in the Indochina Crisis, ed. by Gene Hsiao, p. 89.

[372]Landon, pp. 219-20.

[373]Ibid., p. 223.

[374]Barnett, p. 42.

In Laos, if intervention occurs, trends tend to indicate that
the intervention would probably have a tendency to be by non-
superpower interveners crossing the border. Secondly, al-
though less likely, if superpower intervention possibly occurs,
it would tend to be by crossing Laos' border and would tend
to support the government.

Stepwise multiple regression was used to analyze the

data and to test this hypothesis. This analysis was performed

using the Regression subprogram of the Statistical Package for

the Social Sciences[1] on the IBM 370 at the University of Texas

at Arlington's branch of the North Texas Regional Computer

Center.[2] The sample comprised 70 "intervention" events in

Laos from the years 1954-1967. The sample was drawn from the

World Handbook data collection.[3] Intervention in this analysis

has been defined as "any attempt to engage in military activity

within the borders of another country with intent of influ-

encing the authority structure of that country."[4]

    In this analysis the dependent or criterion variable,

"Intervention by the US and/or USSR," was measured by the

following scale:

> 0 = the intervention involved neither the US nor
>   USSR
>
> 1 = the intervention involved the US
>
> 2 = the intervention involved the USSR
>
> 3 = the intervention involved both the US and the
>   USSR

The independent or predictor variables with score value were:

Support decision of the intervener:

0 = non-supportive intervention

1 = supporting the government

2 = support of rebellious group

Year of intervention (scored as a time series):

1 = the intervention occurred in 1954

14 = the intervention occurred in 1967

Type of intervention:

1 = intervention in which nation crosses a national border

2 = intervener has troops already established in the country (i.e., colonial or alliance troops)

3 = rebel forces "supported by and/or residing in another nation"

4 = mercenary forces

5 = international organization forces

The mean for the criterion variable was .5000 which tends to indicate that most likely the interveners in Laos were the United States or non-superpowers. The mean of the "Support Decision" predictor variable was 1.5571 which tends to indicate that a decision was probably made by the intervener to support either the government or rebel group. The standard deviation was 0.5003 which tends to support this indication. The "Year of Intervention" predictor variable had a mean of 10.2857 for 1963 with a standard deviation of 3.0557. The third independent or predictor variable, "Type of Intervention," had a

mean of 1.1143 with a standard deviation of 0.4676 which

indicates that the predominate type of intervention has been

by nation-crossing borders.

Through multiple regression analysis (stepwise regression

was used) the plane of prediction or the plane of best fit

was developed. (See Figure I) This plane had a Y (US-USSR

intervention) intercept of 1.34204. (Because all of the B

coefficients were negative their total was added to the

constant. (2.23340 + (-.89136))) The slope was .60010. The

confidence interval of the slope was found at the .01 level.

In this analysis standardized regression will be used where

the intercept will be zero and the coefficients will be

measured in Beta weights or Beta coefficients. Even though

the correlations of the independent variables were only viable

in one case ("Support Decision of Intervener"), "Year of

Intervention" was included in the analysis because the data

on interventions occur over time. "Type of Intervention"

was included to determine the nature of the interventions.

(See Table A) This analysis proved to be significant beyond

the .01 level (F (12.38117) DF (3/66)). Thirty-six percent

of the variance was explained by the predictor variables.

The standard error of estimate was .49722. The sum of squares

for the regression line was 9.18293 with a mean square of

3.06098. The sum of squares for the residuals was 16.31707

with a mean square of .24723. "Support Decision of Intervener"

and "Year of Intervention" were significant at the .01 level.

"Type of Intervention" was not found to be significant but

Figure I

Y | Standardized Multiple Regression
of Intervention in Laos (1954-1967)

Y = US/USSR Intervention

X_1 = Suppt. decision
of Intervener
X_2 = Yr. of Intervention
X_3 = Type of Intervention

Neither

$$Y = -0.57520 \ X_1 - .23603 \ X_2 - .11189 \ X_3 + 2.23340$$

Multiple R = .60010   R Square = .36011   Standard = .49722
Error

Ana. of Var.	DF	Sum of Sq.	Mean Sq.	F
Regression	3.	9.18293	3.06098	12.38117
Residuals	66.	16.31707	0.24723	

Table A

CORRELATION WITH US/USSR INTERVENTION

Support Decision	-.54798
Year of Intervention	-.09362
Type of Intervention	-.20394

---

was maintained in the regression for theoretical reasons and because it did not significantly reduce the F ratio of the regression (to an insignificant level). Because the standard error of estimate was small in all cases one can assume confidence that the sign of B and Beta are correct.[5] The analysis indicated an inverse relationship between the criterion variable and the predictor variables.

MAJOR FINDINGS OF THIS ANALYSIS

1. The analysis tends to indicate that superpower intervention has and has had a tendency to be in support of the government, while nonsuperpower intervention has a tendency to be in support of rebellious groups as shown by the Beta coefficient of "Support Decision of Intervener" (-.57520).

2. There appears to be an inverse relationship between time and superpower intervention as shown by the Beta coefficient "Year of Intervention" (-.23603). This tends to indicate that later interventions and possibly future interventions would tend to be by a non-superpower intervener. Conversely, this analysis indicates that superpower intervention would possibly continue its decreasing trend of intervention.

3. The tendency of superpower intervention has been of a nation-crossing-border type. Due to the smallness of deviation in the type of interventions by both superpowers and nonsuperpowers in Laos, the nonsuperpower would also have this tendency. Because of the inverse relationship of superpower-nonsuperpower intervention with the type of intervention, nonsuperpower interventions might have had a tendency to establish troops in Laos or support rebel groups within the boundaries of the nonsuperpower intervener so that the rebel group could intervene within Laos. This independent variable, "Type of Intervention," did not prove to be significant due to the lack of difference in behavior (score) of both groups (superpower and non-superpowers interveners) as substantiated by the mean (1.1143) and the small standard deviation, 0.4676. The first standard deviation is primarily concentrated within the range of nation crosses border (1.5819). The second standard deviation would include troops already established within the country (Laos). The third deviation would slightly include rebel forces (at this point most of variance is accounted for—about 95 percent+). Due to the fact that the Beta coefficient is negative for "Type of Intervention" (-.11189), the research developed an inverse scale of behavior which included possible behaviors of the nonsuperpower intervener.

NOTES--TECHNICAL ANNEX: Chapter IV

[1]Norman Nie, Dale H. Bent, C.H. Hull, SPSS, <u>Statistical</u>
<u>Package for the Social Sciences</u> (New York: McGraw-Hill Co.,
1970).

[2]Nancy B. Saunders served as technical assistant,
programmer.

[3](The Yale World Handbook Data as collected under the
direction of Taylor and Hudson--John Sullivan, "Interventionary
Data.") As made available by the Inter-University Consortium
for Political Research; also citing published version--
Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, <u>World Handbook</u>
<u>of Political and Social Indicators</u> (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1972), pp. 124-27, and Table 3.6, "External
Interventions."

[4]John D. Sullivan defined intervention as "any attempt
to engage in military activity within the borders of
another country with the intent of influencing the authority
structure of that country." This data refers to the initial
intervention but not to the continuance of that event. See
World Handbook Codebook, Part IV, p. 2.

[5]Ronald J. Wonnacott and Thomas H. Wonnacott, <u>Econometrics</u>
(New York: Wiley and Son, 1970).

Chapter V

CONCLUSION

This study has focused, examined, and stressed two
systemic variables--the basic structure of the international
system and the stability/instability of the national actors
that comprise the system--as being especially potent as
sources of intervention. By the basic structure of the
international system is meant "the degree to which the capa-
bility for affecting the conduct of international life is
dispersed or concentrated within the system."[1] As elucidated,
the triangular polyarchic system involves a greater dispersion
of capabilities than a bipolar structure. The more dispersed
the structure of the international system, the less the
possibility that it can be rapidly or radically altered by
a single development. Hence, as illustrated by Soviet behavior
and policies to the Cambodian situation in the 1970's and to
the Laotian situation in the 1960's, decision makers are "less
likely to succumb to the temptation to engage in convention-
breaking behavior toward an unfolding situation in the inter-
national system."[2] Moreover, decision makers must remain
aware of common interests even while they prosecute a variety
of conflicting interests in various regional subsystems;
essential actors are forced to modify their conflicts in a

given subsystem by the fact that they have important common

interests in other various regional subsystems which they

do not wish to jeopardize. Contrarily, interventionary behavior

appears more likely to occur in a more tightly structured

system such as in the bipolar. As exemplified in the Laotian

case study, the rationale for whatever actions taken by the

U.S. in Laos was based on its context in the cold war as an

area directly threatened by international communism. Thus,

in a tight system, a potential shift in the allegiances and

ties of a national actor will appear more threatening to other

national actors than would be the case in a more loosely

structured international system.[3]

During the periods of system transformation, i.e., bipolar

to triangular polyarchic system, decision makers may have

difficulty adjusting their behavior to the new systemic require-

ments. Thus, contradictory behavior of decision makers may be

a symptom of difficulty adjusting their behavior to the new

systemic requirements.[4] Contradictory behavior may be the

result of previous historical commitment and experiences

(i.e., bipolar system) determining the basis of some present

choices and behavior styles. An illustration of contradictory

behavior is Secretary of State Kissinger: having perceived

the new international situation, he became the major architect

of the Sino-American/Soviet American detentes; however, in

referring to our commitment to Cambodia and South Vietnam,

he uses the rationale of the domino theory in advocating a

greater commitment by the U.S.

The choices and activities of decision-makers can be guided by the cultural norms and historical precedents of the past international system (i.e., bipolar) that governed the behavior of their predecessors, or the choices can be guided by the changing demands that emanate from the present international system (triangular polyarchic). During a transformation period, decision makers' foreign policy choices might be guided by both, or solely by the former. As Laos illustrated, U.S. decision makers in the 1960's did not perceive the new power configuration and were guided by the "old systemic rules." As Thee notes,

> U.S. involvement in Indochina was rooted in an ideological misreading of postwar Asian realities. The Chinese revolution was seen as a creation of the Soviet Union, and the national liberation movements in Vietnam and Laos as projects of Moscow and Peking...
> The stubbornness of the Kennedy administration in pursuing the Indochina struggle stemmed from misconceptions about the nature of the struggle. The Indochinese Left was totally underrated and the contest was seen mostly as a key battle in the global confrontation with expanding communism...
> The Indochina conflict revealed the depth of U.S.-Soviet-Chinese rivalries...[5]

Moreover, this lack of (U.S. decision makers') perception was reinforced by the fact that the new policy makers (the Kennedy administration) at least initially tended to accept the definition and analysis of the Laotian situation given by the holdovers from the old administration. As Stevenson observes,

> The definition of the situation given by the holdovers from the Eisenhower Administration was that of a Communist threat to capture all of Laos. They pointed

to the large Soviet airlift and to the success of Kong-Le's troops, in contrast to Phoumi Nosavan's retreats. The men new to office did not try to change that definition; they accepted the analysis of the people from whom they had to learn about their jobs. If Laos had received greater public attention during the autumn of 1960, if it had been an issue in the election campaign, the new-comers might have formed their own opinions about the situation. As things were, they were slow to see the wisdom and the possibility of a neutral, non-Communist Laos.[6]

Two major features of the triangular polyarchic system, the rejection of the zero-sum game and the triangular structure which resulted from the Sino-Soviet dispute, should reduce the possibilities for essential actors' intervention in Asia. In the bipolar system and part of the transformation period, the presence of China and the desire to offset her potential in-fluence were important factors in America's proclivity to intervene in unstable situations in Southeast Asia.[7] With the continued development and U.S. recognition of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the triangular international balance, American decision makers' compulsive fear of the Chinese pre-sence has become subsumed to the new detente relationship, which is now an increasingly important element in U.S. decision making (i.e., U.S. disengagement from Vietnam and Laos).

The dispute and resulting Sino-American detente have contradictory effects on Soviet interventionary behavior. The Soviet incentive to intervene in unstable situations in the Third World, especially Asia, to offset the potential influence of China is increased. However, as the case studies of Laos and Cambodia exemplified, the Soviet Union is restrained

from taking this type of action by the following factors:
Soviet leaders are uncertain about American and Chinese re-
actions to any overt military intervention; Moscow does not
wish to become entangled with the United States through the
process of competitive intervention in the affairs of minor
actors;[8] and, Moscow is not willing to endanger the detente
with the United States. Thus, Moscow has responded to the
conflict with China by competing (i.e., mainly by economic
and military foreign aid, trade, and diplomatic maneuvers)
with the Chinese in many and varied situations in the Third
World.

As elucidated in the case study, the Sino-Soviet dispute
and the resulting triangular structure impose constraints on
interventionary behavior of China, which is both apprehensive
about a hostile Soviet Union at her rear, and the possibility
of "collusion" between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Thus, the dispute and the triangular structure have blurred
ideological lines and have tended to defuse the automatic
hostility characteristic of the cold war relationships between
the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States
and China.[9]

Thus, it seems probable that the prevalence of superpower
intervention will be reduced with the establishment and
recognition of the triangular polyarchic international struc-
ture since it creates a complex pattern of mutual constraints
that inhibit and limit big power intervention in local conflicts.

This encourages major actors to pursue their interests through political, diplomatic, and economic competition and maneuvering, and through penetrative behavior.

The second type of systemic variable in this study of interventionary/penetrative behavior is the stability/instability of national actors in the system. The more precarious the authority structures of national actors, the greater the possibility that "convention breaking attempts to preserve or alter them will be launched."[10] As Rosenau observes,

> ...top officials everywhere are likely to be particularly sensitive to the stability of foreign governments. The less the stability the greater their readiness to break with tradition and undertake unconventional efforts to avert the dangers of--or seize advantage in--the unstable situation.[11]

Thus, the less viable an actor is (i.e., Cambodia and Laos), the more susceptible it will be to intervention by outside actors. Oran Young observes that "a determinant of the opportunities for intervention in international politics is the relative internal viability of the actors in an international system."[12] He contends that during periods of extended civil strife, "the ability of an actor to resist external incursions tends to decline."[13] Moreover, various local factions are apt to "find it expedient, at least in proximate terms, to encourage intervention."[14]

C.R. Mitchell is skeptical of the idea that some logic in internal conflict situations impel domestic parties to appeal for aid, since there are many examples where civil strife existed but no demands for external aid were made and no

significant foreign involvement took place. He suggests that "when enquiring whether outside involvement is likely, questions should be asked about the nature and intensity of the conflict." Mitchell posits that key elements in determining whether to appeal for external involvement appear to be associated with the "level of social integration and political legitimacy achieved by the political system, and the relative importance attached by the parties in conflict to achieving their goals."[16] Additionally, there appears to be some relationship between the nature and intensity of the domestic violence, and the perceived costs involved in calling in an outside actor. As Mitchell notes, "the more intense the conflict, and the more likely the costs of an ally's involvement will be perceived as lower, and the advantages higher."[17] These observations tend to be supported by the Laotian and Burmese case studies and seem to be plausible. As elucidated in this study, both Burma and Laos lack integration and have had to deal with insurgents. The Burmese elite, which have not had to cope with a Pathet Lao organization, apparently have placed a higher value on the maintenance of the existing political and social system (rather than the gains of defeating the insurgents with external aid). Moreover, since the Burmese military has been able (barely) to cope with the disunified and anomic insurgents, the Burmese elite perceive the cost of an ally's involvement too high and the advantages too low. Additionally, the Burmese elite did not obtain or retain their power through

external actors' support or intervention. In contrast, the
Laotian elite which viewed foreign intervention and penetration
"as necessary to the preservation of their elite model of
government from increasingly effective attacks and counter-
organization by the Pathet Lao,"[18] have perceived the costs of
an ally's involvement to be lower, and the advantages higher.
The Laotian elite has always been racked with factionalism;
thus, the Laotian faction in power has had to deal with political
challenges from the Pathet Lao and with other political elite
faction power moves. Consequently, an elite faction (i.e.,
Phoumi Nosavan, Phoui Sananikone, or Souvanna Phouma) could
only maintain power with the aid of a foreign actor. Thus,
the faction, which was in power, obtained its "political
support" or "legitimacy" from neither the populace, other
elite faction, nor the military, rather from a foreign actor,
namely the United States. As Stevenson notes,

> Washington officials were sensitive to anti-communism.
> Because of their own concerns, Americans tended to
> view the struggle against Communist influence as the
> major issue in Lao politics while in fact the deeper
> reality was and is the nonideological factionalism
> among the ruling elites.[19]

Thus, as the case studies illustrate, the degree of internal
cohesion, and of (elite as well as mass) shared values, as
well as, the degree of territorial, national, and political
integration within any political system seem to be important
factors deciding whether domestic conflicts reach levels of
violence. As Mitchell observes,

> Internal unity and lack of violent conflict appear to
> be functions of the level of legitimisation and support
> enjoyed by the political system, of the integration of
> various social and ethnic groups within that system
> and a low level of aggregate or group frustration.
> These in turn, depend upon structural factors that
> differ from situation to situation and system to
> system.[20]

However, since a high level of internal conflict is not enough

in itself to bring about intervention, attention must also

be directed to the international system, or as Mitchell

states, "to those factors outside the situation of domestic

strife itself which decides whether external involvement takes

place."[21]

According to Mitchell, if a situation of high level

civil strife exists within a political system, "at least one

necessary condition for external involvement has been fulfilled."[22]

Intervention can then occur in two circumstances, according

to Mitchell:

    1.   When a direct appeal has been made to an external party;

    2.   When no such appeal has been made.

In Burma, there were no connecting links between the disunified

domestic insurgents or the "appealers" and the external party

or the (potential) "intervener" to whom the appeals were made.

Contrarily, in Laos, the cold war imperatives and the anti-

communist philosophy of American and Laotian elites provided

the necessary linkage between the "appealers" and the "inter-

veners." As Stevenson notes,

> Whenever the United States did intervene to try to in-
> fluence the course of events in Laos, it tended to
> side with those most willing to use the rhetoric of anti-
> communism rather than those most likely to strengthen
> and make viable the fragile bonds of the Laotian
> political system.[23]

On the other hand, the linkage between the Pathet Lao and

the North Vietnamese stemmed from an identical enemy, the

U.S., adjacent territories (Pathet Lao zone abuts North

Vietnam), and similar philosophies.

In certain societies, in which government has either

never developed or has completely broken down, "anarchical

decentralization" exists.[24] The Laotian system, politically,

territorially, and nationally unintegrated, could serve as an

example. As the case study exemplified, Laos, lacking a viable

central authority, allowed American operatives and their

clientelle factions tremendous freedom of action. The lack

of a viable centralized Laotian authority and the absence of

clear cut decisions in Washington gave the U.S. officials in

the field "a hunting license to fight for their own preferred

policies"[25] and to support their own preferred faction. Policy

was inadequately controlled by the highest officials in

Washington; "control of American operatives and their clients

was never easy;"[26] the CIA, Pentagon, and State officials in

Laos consistently fought any restrictions on their freedom

of action in support of their clients. Additionally, the

Americans in the field encountered no resistance from the

factional Lao power structure. Thus, as one American official

in Vientiane stated in 1960, "this is the end of nowhere. We

can do anything we want here because Washington doesn't seem to know it exists."[27]

Moreover, this anarchical decentralization (resulting from a lack of political, territorial, and national integration), the nonideological Laotian factionalism, and a general shortage of capabilities permitted Laos to be transformed from a national political system to a penetrated political system.

THE LAOTIAN PENETRATED POLITICAL SYSTEM

By the late 1950's, Laos' national political system was extensively penetrated by external actors and therefore it was no longer the only source of legitimacy or the unequivocal employer of coercive techniques. This contends that external actors permeated Laos' political system until late 1973, and that its functioning embraced actors (i.e., U.S.), who were not formally members of the system. Such a system is referred to as a penetrated political system and its essential characteristics, according to Rosenau, are defined as follows:

> A penetrated political system is one in which non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals. The political processes of a penetrated system are conceived to be structurally different from both those of an international and those of a national system. In the former, nonmembers indirectly and nonauthoritatively influence the allocation of a society's values and the mobilization of support for its goals through autonomous rather than joint action. In the latter non-members of a society do not direct action toward it and thus do not contribute in any way to the allocation of its values or the attainment of its goals.[28]

Another characteristic of a penetrated system is that national

societies always serve as the site for penetrated systems.

Additionally, penetrated polities are characterized by a

shortage of capabilities; a desire by the penetrated polity

to compensate for, or the external actor to take advantage

of this shortage, explains the participation of the non-member

in its political process. The shortage may stem from lack of social

cohesion (as in Laos); it could involve military weaknesses

(as in Laos or Vietnam); or it may be of an economic kind

(as in the case of a recipient, Laos, receiving foreign aid).[29]

As the Laotian case study indicates, the U.S. role in

Laos clearly involved thorough participation in the allocation

of Laotian values and in efforts to mobilize popular support

for the selected values (i.e., U.S. economic and military

aid programs--Laos is, "the only country in the world where

the U.S. supports the military 100%;"[30] the U.S. controlled

and coordinated the "four wars in Laos;" and U.S. economic

aid comprised 60 percent of the Laotian budget).[31] The

United States not only exerted influence upon the Laotian

political system but actually participated in the processes

through which the system allocated values, coordinated goal

directed efforts (i.e., Operation Booster Shot; the Americans

directly administered the aid programs to the Laotian popu-

lace; and significantly, the U.S. aid mission was called the

"parallel government," and the USAID director was referred

to as the "second prime minister.") and legitimately employed

coercion (i.e., suspension of aid to recalcitrant factions
to bring them into line--specifically, suspension of aid to the
Phoumi Nosavan faction in order to stop the military fighting
during the Geneva negotiation). Moreover, the United States
engaged in bargaining within the system, "taking positions
on behalf of one or another of its components."[32] (For example,
CIA support and backing of Phoumi Nosavan in 1960's; backing
right-wing coup d'etat and the consequent creation of a figure-
head government. As Roger Hilsman stated, "by merely with-
holding monthly payment to the troops, the U.S. could create
the conditions for toppling any Lao government whose policies
it opposed.")[33] Most important, according to Rosenau, "the
participation of non-members of the society in value-allocative
and goal attainment processes is accepted by both its official-
dom and its citizenry,"[34] therefore, the decisions "to which
non-members contribute are no less authoritative and legitimate
than are those in which they do not participate."[35]

During the 1950's and 1960's in Laos, penetration was
thoroughgoing; the United States was centrally involved in
efforts to mobilize support for certain political factions
and values as well as for military operations. Thus, Laos
was a "multi-issue" penetrated polity. As Rosenau explains,

> ...so as to differentiate degrees of penetration as
> well as the structural differences to which they give
> rise, it seems appropriate to distinguish between
> multi-issue and single-issue penetrated systems, the
> distinction being based on whether nonmembers participate
> in the allocation of a variety of values or of only a
> selected set of values.[36]

Penetrated systems like national and international systems are not static. They come into existence, develop, or disappear "as capabilities, attitudes, or circumstances change."[37] During the 1950's until the Sino-Soviet rift, the Peoples' Republic of China was a penetrated system, however, during the 1960's it became a national one. Laos was transformed into a penetrated system during the 1950's and 1960's; however, with the Sino-American detente, the recognition of the triangular polyarchic international structure, resulting in American disengagement from Laos (and Vietnam), Laos, ruled by a coalition government, emerged as a devasted but a national political system in 1974.

NOTES

[1] James Rosenau, _The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy_ (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 300.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Morton Kaplan, "Intervention in Internal War: Some Systemic Sources," in _International Aspects of Civil Strife_, ed. by James Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 92-121.

[4] J. Rosenau _etal_ (eds.), _The Analysis of International Politics_ (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 155.

[5] Marek Thee, _Notes of a Witness_ (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 337, 324.

[6] Charles Stevenson, _The End of No Where_ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 131.

[7] Oran Young, "Interventions and International Systems," _Journal of International Affairs_ 22: 180-181.

[8] Ibid., 181.

[9] A. Doak Barnett, _A New U.S. Policy Toward China_ (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1971), pp. 35-45.

[10] Rosenau, _The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy_, p. 301.

[11] Ibid., p. 302.

[12] Young, 181.

[13] Ibid., 181-2.

[14] Ibid.

[15] C.R. Mitchell, "Civil Strife and The Involvement of External Parties," _International Studies Quarterly_ 14:2 (June 1970): 176.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., 177.

[18]Nina Adams, "Patrons, Clients, and Revolutionaries," in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. by Adams and McCoy (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 119.

[19]Stevenson, p. 259.

[20]Mitchell, p. 180.

[21]Ibid., p. 181.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Stevenson, p. 240.

[24]Peter A.R. Calvert, "Revolution: The Politics of Violence," Political Studies 15:1 (1967): 5.

[25]Stevenson, p. 261.

[26]Ibid., p. 250.

[27]Ibid., p. 240.

[28]Rosenau, The Analysis of International Politics, pp. 127-8.

[29]Ibid., pp. 127-9.

[30]House Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Aid Operations in Laos; Seventh Report by the Committee, House Rept. 546, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, p. 8.

[31]Fredric Branfman, "Presidential War," in Laos: War and Revolution, ed. by McCoy and Adams, pp. 257-64.

[32]Rosenau, The Analysis of International Politics, p. 126.

[33]Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 112-21.

[34]Rosenau, The Analysis of International Politics, p. 126.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Ibid., p. 132.

[37]Ibid.

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