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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF INDIA WITH BHUTAN, SIKKIM
AND NEPAL BETWEEN 1947-1967: AN ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF BIG
POWER-SMALL POWER RELATIONS

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THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF INDIA WITH BHUTAN, SIKKIM
AND NEPAL BETWEEN 1947-1967: AN ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF BIG
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PREFACE

The following International Relations study is an effort to provide a new classification tool for the examination of big power-small power relationships. The purpose of the study is to provide definitive categories which may be used in the examination of relationships between nations of varying political power. The relationships of India with Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal were selected for these reasons.

Three different types of relationships each of a distinct and unique nature are evident. Indian-Sikkimese relations provide a situation in which the large power (India) controls the defenses, foreign relations and internal affairs of the small power. Indian-Bhutanese relations demonstrates a situation in which the larger power controls the foreign relations of the smaller power, but management over internal affairs and defenses remains in the hands of the smaller nation. Indian-Nepalese relations is characterized by a situation in which defenses, control over foreign and internal affairs, remain in the hands of the smaller power, yet

there exists strong historical and cultural ties between the two nations.

My second reason for selecting the nations involved, is the fact that in all three relationships the big power, namely India, remains constant. Hence, the policy making environment of the big power in all three cases remains the same. By the policy making environment is meant such internal factors as public opinion, interest groups, legislative blocs, political parties, the executive establishment, press, policy making processes, etc. The same would be true for external pressures which might effect the policy making environment. The relative geographical isolation of the small powers under consideration and resultant limited foreign relations contacts (especially in the case of Bhutan and Sikkim) also makes them excellent specimens for study.

In the third place, the special relationships existing between India and the three Himalayan Kingdoms are unique, and as yet no specialized attempt to study these relationships has been attempted. Hence this work seeks to add to the body of knowledge of Indian foreign policy. It is sui generis in that it attempts to provide a definitive category scheme designed in the first instance to explicate the special relationships which India has with the Himalayan States of Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal. This writing also endeavors to make a

contribution to the field of international relations in that the definitive categories arrived at are intended to provide a means of defining the relationships of nations of divergent political power throughout the international scene.

I hope that this dissertation will provide an interesting and enlightening insight into the foreign relations of India with the Himalayan Kingdoms under study, and that the new classification scheme will purvey another tool in the never ending search for knowledge about the relations between nations.

I am most grateful to the Embassy of India, and in particular to Secretary G. V. Shukla of that embassy for his generous cooperation in supplying requested data for this work. Without that cooperation this dissertation could not have been written.

Special mention must also be given to assistance rendered from:

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


TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	iii
MAP	vi
 Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Snyder, Paige Decision Making Process	1
The Realist Theory	2
Systems Theories	3
The Dahl Classification Scheme	7
A New Classification Plan	8
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION	20
A. Nepal	20
Geography	20
Demography	21
Political History	23
Contemporary Political Scene	25
B. Bhutan	28
Geography	28
Demography	30
Political History	31
Contemporary Political Scene	33
C. Sikkim	35
Geography	35
Demography	36
Political History	38
Contemporary Political Scene	40
III. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES INVOLVING COMMUNIST CHINA, INDIA AND THE HIMALAYAN KINGDOMS	44
A. The 1950 Invasion of Tibet	45
B. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute	49
C. Disputes Involving the Himalayan Kingdoms	54
Nepal	56
Bhutan	71
Sikkim	86

Chapter	Page
IV. BASIC TENETS OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE HIMALAYAN STATES	99
A. Indian Foreign Policy (1947-1962)	99
B. Indian Foreign Policy (1963-1967)	110
C. Indian Himalayan Defense Strategy	116
D. Basic Similarities in the Foreign Policies of Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal	122
V. INDIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH NEPAL	134
Indian Aid Programs	134
Foreign Investments	153
Indian-Nepalese Trade Relations	155
Politico-Legal Relations	164
Defenses	178
VI. INDIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH BHUTAN	184
Indian Aid Programs	184
Foreign Investments	194
Indian-Bhutanese Trade Relations	195
Politico-Legal Relations	196
Defenses	208
VII. INDIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH SIKKIM	214
Indian Aid and Investment Programs	214
Indian-Sikkimese Trade Relations	225
Politico-Legal Relations	227
Defenses	237
VIII. INDIAN CULTURAL SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMI- LARITIES WITH BHUTAN, SIKKIM AND NEPAL	242
I. Ethnic and Social Characteristics	242
A. Indian Ethnic and Racial Characteristics	242
B. Nepalese Ethnic and Racial Characteristics	244
C. Bhutanese Ethnic and Racial Characteristics	244
D. Sikkimese Ethnic and Racial Characteristics	245
II. Religious Considerations	245
A. Indian Religious Characteristics	245
B. Nepalese Religious Charac- teristics	246
C. Bhutanese Religious Charac- teristics	247
D. Sikkimese Religious Charac- teristics	247

Chapter	Page
III. Linguistic Considerations	243
A. Indian Linguistic Characteristics	248
B. Nepali Linguistic Characteristics	250
C. Bhutanese Linguistic Characteristics	250
D. Sikkimese Linguistic Characteristics	251
IV. Traditional Economic and Historical Comparisons	252
A. Nepalese Traditional Economic and Historical Ties . .	252
B. Traditional Bhutanese Economic and Historical Ties . .	253
C. Traditional Sikkimese Economic and Historical Ties . .	255
IX. CONCLUSION	258
APPENDIXES	271
BIBLIOGRAPHY	314

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. The Character and Degree of Big Power Control over the Defenses, External Relations and Internal Relations of the Small Power	9
2. Elemental Components of the Internal Relations, External Relations and Defenses of Any Given Nation	14
3. Definitive Categories Designed for Use in the Study of Big-Power-Small Power Relationships	15
4. Major Foreign Aid Contributors to Nepal 1964-1967	150
5. The Nepal Budget, 1964-1965	151
6. Major Foreign Industrial Investments in Nepal During 1963-1964	154
7. Direction of Nepal's Foreign Trade	157
8. Indian Expenditures Allocated to Bhutan During the 1961-1966 Five Year Plan	186
9. Expenditures Allocated to Sikkim During the 1954-1961 Seven Year Plan	216
10. Expenditures Allocated to Sikkim During the 1961-1966 Five Year Plan	217
11. Major Religions of India, 1967	246
12. Major Languages of India, 1963	249
13. Cultural Similarities Between India and the Kingdoms of Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal . . .	255
14. India's Relations with Nepal	259

Table	Page
15. India's Relations with Bhutan	260
16. India's Relations with Sikkim	261
17. The Character and Degree of Indian Control over the Defenses, External Relations and Internal Relations of Nepal	263
18. The Character and Degree of Indian Control over the Defenses, External Relations, and Internal Relations of Bhutan	264
19. The Character and Degree of Indian Control over the Defenses, External Relations and Internal Relations of Sikkim	265
20. Definitive Categories Designed for Use in the Study of Big Power-Small Power Rela- tionships	266


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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Several approaches could be taken in a study of the four nations involved.

The Snyder, Paige Decision Making Process utilizes a generalized conceptual scheme whereby researchers may look at international relations policy decisions according to the following model:



The nature and disposition of the decision making body, organizational structure, internal and external communications network are all examined in detail, in an effort to determine the manner in which a nation arrives at a given policy decision. Decision Making consists in the translating of attitudes, information, perceptions, situations, and above all values into a particular choice of action. Snyder and Paige emphasize the importance of motivation (the willingness of the decisional unit to act), information (types, adequacy, relevance, quantity, etc.), and the organization of the group as important factors for consideration in attempting to discern a nation's policy decision on any given matter.¹

The realist theory of international politics makes power and interest the fundamental means of analysis and the basis of explanation. Hans Morgenthau, a leading proponent of the realist theory, refers to nations being motivated by their national interests in terms of power. To him, international relations become the struggle for power. By power, Morgenthau means man's control over the minds and actions of other men. He recognizes that many kinds of activities may transpire between two nations such as legal, economic, humanitarian and cultural

¹Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 3, December, 1958, pp. 342-378.

intercourses. But truly in the Morgenthau scheme, the struggle for power occupies the center of the stage. This is so because to Morgenthau, the laws of politics are rooted in human nature (which is similar to a kind of Nietzschean concept). To Morgenthau, power comprises anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man, from pure brute physical violence to the most subtle of psychological ties. According to his scheme a nation may pursue only three basic choices. These are:

1. Status quo (a political policy which seeks to keep power).
2. Imperialism (a political policy which seeks to increase power).
3. Prestige (a political policy which seeks to demonstrate power).²

Systems theories of international relations create a focus on transactions and relationships occurring in the flow of events between two or more nations. To Bachrach and Baratz, power is relational and becomes only one kind of relationship in international transactions. To them, power exists as only one of a set of seven behavioral categories. These include:

1. Relationship of power. For this to exist, three prerequisites are required.

²Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 25-94.

- a. A conflict of interests must exist between the parties involved.
- b. One of the parties of the conflict must be made to comply with the other nation's demands.
- c. One nation must be able to invoke threats of sanctions on the other.

2. Relationship of Influence. This is similar to the power relationship, except no threat of sanctions exists.

3. Relationship of Authority. In this relationship, the compliant nation yields to the desire of the influencing nation, because the former recognizes that the command is in its own best interests.

4. Relationship of force. In this relationship, the influencing nation secures the compliance of another by the actual application of sanctions, coercion and force.

5. Manipulative Relationship. The influencing nations achieve compliance through measures of which the affected party remains unaware.

6. Probing Relationship. These consist of preliminary encounters to seek opportunities, and provide fresh information about one nation on the part of another.

7. Maintenance Relationships. These comprise all transactions that keep situations in a non-decision state meant to preserve the status quo and create the

effect of perpetuation and reinforcement.

Hence, to Bachrach and Baratz, power turns out to be merely one kind of transactional relationship, and not a pervasive force running through the universe of all international diplomacy and statecraft.³ David Singer has suggested a model with particular reference to power and influence relationships. He attempts to answer the problems as to why nations seek to influence each other on the international scene. To Singer, nations exhibit an interdependence in their relations with one another, but that the scarcest commodity on the international scene is security. Lack of security produces anxiety, hence nations seek to influence each other in order to obtain security. Singer alleges that a nation's decision makers must consider three basic criteria:

1. The perceived present behavior of what another government is presently doing.
2. The preferred future behavior for that government.
3. The predicted future behavior of what the other government is likely to be.

These three factors provide the setting within which the influencing nation is to act in the manner of persuasion or dissuasion on the target nation. Persuasion or dissuasion by reinforcing or modifying the behavior of

³Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Review, Vol. 57, September, 1963, pp. 632-642.

the other nation by punishments, rewards, threats or promises, according to the following model:

	Persuasion Situations: A prefers X				Dissuasion Situations: A prefers O			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Preferred Future Behavior	X	X	X	X	O	O	O	O
Predicted Future Behavior	X	X	O	O	O	O	X	X
Perceived Present Behavior	X	O	X	O	O	X	O	X
Reinforce or Modify?	R	M	R	M	R	M	R	M
Punish?	No	p*	No	Yes	No	p*	No	Yes
Reward?	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Threaten?	P	Yes	Yes	Yes	P	Yes	Yes	Yes
Promise?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes ⁴

*P is probably.

The four aforementioned methods are all useful in the study of international relations. They are all similar in that they seek to shed light upon the relationships between nations via some model or scheme. They are all dissimilar in that they focus upon different aspects of national relationships. The method developed in this project attempts to establish new categories by focusing upon control of various elements essential to the internal and external sovereignty of a nation state.

⁴David J. Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Forman Model," American Political Science Review, Vol. 57, June, 1963, pp. 420-430.

By doing so it is designed to shed new light and provide a new focus for the investigation of Big Power, Small Power relations.

Robert A. Dahl has devised a model utilizing the Aristotelian classification by which political systems are classified by the nature and end for which the state exists and the various kinds of authority to which men and their associations are subject. Dahl expands Aristotle's scheme in establishing a model providing for comparing nations based on 16 different categories defined in terms of his concept of power rule and authority:

Dahl's Classification

		Legitimate Systems		Tyrannies	
power over decisions of govern- ment exer- cised by:		Sub-system Autonomy		Sub-system Autonomy	
		Low (unitary)	High (pluralistic)	Low (unitary)	High (pluralistic)
	One				
	Few				
	Many				
	Mixed				

The Dahl scheme is especially useful as an index of measurement for comparative government studies. It is helpful to the political scientist endeavoring to generate hypotheses about political systems.⁵

Because an important aspect of this study seeks to measure the nature and degree of Big Power control over the internal relations, external relations, and defenses of the Small Powers involved; the Dahl scheme, as a comparative government tool, is useful in providing an analytical framework and inducing influence for the development of a new investigative construct.

It is my hope in this study to design a model based on delimiting classifications which will aid the political scientist to categorize big power-small power relationships into specific groupings. The tentative categories, which seem feasible and essential for use, are control over defenses, internal relations, and external relations. Consideration must be given to a crucial factor: whether or not big power control is with or against the will of the government of the small power nation. A model of the proposed scheme is shown on the following page:

⁵Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 25-38.

TABLE 1

THE CHARACTER AND DEGREE OF BIG POWER CONTROL OVER THE
DEFENSES, EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND INTERNAL
RELATIONS OF THE SMALL POWER

	Big Power Control with Small Power Permission			Big Power Control without Small Power Permission			Autonomous Control	
	Absolute Control	Partial Control		Absolute Control	Partial Control		Absolute	Partial
Defenses								
External Relations								
Internal Relations								

In order to determine the degree and nature of control by a big power over the internal relations, external relations and defenses of a small power, it is first necessary to ascertain what in actuality constitutes the essential elements of these three categories.

Internal Sovereignty: Robert A. Dahl has asserted that any group which exercises power, rule and authority over a given geographical area is in effect the sovereign authority of that area.⁶ David Easton has put it in terms of which group makes an authoritarian allocation of values.⁷ Almond and Coleman became more definitive in listing three elements for determining the same, namely rule making, rule enforcement and rule adjudication.⁸ It does seem reasonable that with reference to big power-small power relationships a determination of which of two powers actually exercises control over these functions in a de facto sense, and to what degree that control is exercised, is of considerable importance in determining the amount of big power control over a small power's internal relations. However, it also seems inconclusive,

⁶Ibid., pp. 4-13.

⁷David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York), 1953, p. 130.

⁸Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 52-58.

since it would seem that other factors though not of a prime consideration nevertheless also affect to a degree, the internal sovereignty of any political system. Two such elements are the internal transportation and communication network of the small power. It would seem specious at best to say that a small power exercised sovereignty over its internal affairs merely because its governmental machinery exercised de facto rule making, rule adjudication and rule enforcement functions, if all the communication and transportation media of that country were controlled by another larger power. The larger power could at any given moment stifle the smaller power by simply terminating these facilities. Two other elements of less importance but of some consequence are the amount of foreign aid and investments which the big power extends to the small power; and the degree of dependence of the small power upon these economic reinforcements.

The threat of curtailing or terminating needed foreign aid, which may not be available from any other source could act as a potent influencing factor upon the decision makers of an economically backward nation. A small power whose economic life depended upon businesses with main offices located within the territory of a big power would again be vulnerable to economic pressures. The government of the big power by passing laws, increasing

taxes, etc., affecting its companies would also affect the economic life of the smaller nation, where branch offices were located. This is not to say that the communication-transportation-economic factors under consideration constitute sovereignty, but rather that control over them can give the regulating authority enormous leverage as a persuading influence over governmental decision makers who do exercise sovereignty. It may perhaps also be significant to note whether or not the small power possesses its own currency or uses the currency of the larger power as a medium of exchange. Currency appreciation and depreciation, control over the amount of coinage, etc. could all have an impact on the economy of the smaller country.

External Relations: Knowledge of which power negotiates with other countries on behalf of the smaller nation is, of course, of prime facie importance. The degree of foreign trade between the big power and small power could be an influencing factor.

Defenses: Knowledge of which country's armed forces defend the borders of the small power nation and to whom the armed forces of the smaller power owe their allegiance is essential for a proper understanding of the relations of the two nations.

Tentative elements which will be used to determine the degree of big power control over the internal

relations, external relations and defenses of the smaller power are as follows:

TABLE 2

ELEMENTAL COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNAL RELATIONS,
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND DEFENSES
OF ANY GIVEN NATION

I. Internal Relations

A. Main categories

1. Control over rule making functions of the small power.
2. Control over the rule adjudication functions of the small power.
3. Control over the rule enforcing functions of the small power.

B. Influencing categories

1. Amount and exclusiveness of foreign aid, and foreign investment programs.
2. Amount of control over the communication and transportation networks of the small power.
3. Whether or not the small power coins its own currency or uses the currency of the larger power.

II. External Relations

A. Main categories

1. Control over the political, economic and financial relations of the small power.

B. Influencing category

1. The amount and exclusiveness of foreign trade.

III. Defenses

- A. 1. Control over the defense and territorial integrity of the small power.
2. Control over the allegiance of the armed forces of the small power.

TABLE 3

**DEFINITIVE CATEGORIES DESIGNED TO DESCRIBE
BIG POWER-SMALL POWER RELATIONSHIPS**

Function of the Small-Power Controlled	Method of Big Power Control	
	Voluntary Treaty	Involuntary Treaty or Imposition
1. Defenses, external relations, internal relations, all controlled.	Superintendency	Subjugation
2. Defenses, external relations, controlled; internal relations, autonomous.	Protectorate	Satellite
3. External relations, controlled; Defenses, internal relations, autonomous.	Tutelage	Restraintment
4. Defenses, external relations, internal relations, all autonomous.	Autonomous	Autonomous

The terms in Table 3 were selected to indicate varying degrees of Big Power control over the internal relations, external relations, and defenses of the Small Power involved. The definitive categories were, where possible, selected to be compatible with those used in standard International Relations texts.

Fenwick's book, International Law, and the "Plano-Alton" book, The International Relations Dictionary, were helpful.

When necessary, new terms were introduced to represent relationships in which no adequate descriptive terminology currently exists.

The terms used in Table 3 are not designed to denote legalistic relationships, but are meant rather to specifically indicate the absence or presence of Big Power political control over the external relations, internal relations and defenses of the Small power involved.

For the purposes of this paper, by internal sovereignty is meant control over the rule making, rule adjudication, and rule enforcement functions of a given national state. By external sovereignty is meant control over the political, economic and financial relations of a given national state. By Defense Control is meant control over the defenses, territorial integrity of a given national state, with due consideration of to whom the allegiance of the armed forces of that state are given.

The seven broad definitive categories may be distinguished as to partial or total control by the large power to form 14 more specific classifications:

1. Partial Superintendency
2. Total Superintendency
3. Partial Subjugation
4. Total Subjugation
5. Partial Protectorate
6. Total Protectorate
7. Partial Tutelage
8. Total Tutelage
9. Partial Satellite
10. Total Satellite
11. Partial Restraintment
12. Total Restraintment
13. Partial Autonomy
14. Total Autonomy

A relationship of Total Autonomy is one in which the Small Power exercises unqualified control over its internal relations (rule making, rule adjudication and rule enforcing functions), external relations (political, economic and financial) and defenses.

A relationship of Partial Autonomy is also one in which the Small Power exercises control over its internal relations, external relations, and defenses. However, in this relationship, Small Power control is qualified by Big Power domination of certain influencing categories (foreign aid and investments, foreign trade, currency, and the communication and transportation networks), to such an extent that it constitutes a consistent, persuasive and comprehensive influence over the policy decisions of the Small Power regarding its defenses, internal relations and external relations.

Finally, the 14 sub-categories may be further defined by the development of a second classification scheme. By cultural categories such as religious, linguistic, ethnic, and racial similarities or dissimilarities as well as traditional economic and historical ties trichotomized into three broad classifications we may form 52 definitive categories. The three broad cultural categories would be as follows:

1. Cultural Synergism--65-100% of the citizens of the small power exhibit culturally similar

characteristics to 65-100% of the large power.

2. Cultural Amorphism--40-60% of the citizens of the small power exhibit culturally similar characteristics to 65-100% of the citizens of the large power.

3. Cultural Divergency--0-35% of the citizens of the small power exhibit culturally similar characteristics to 65-100% of the citizens of the large power.

To cite an example of how the 52 definitive categories could be used, the following example is used:

Country A, a Large Power, controls completely the foreign relations of Country B, a small power by voluntary treaty on the part of both countries. However, Country B possesses full autonomy over its own defenses and external relations. 80% of the citizens of Country B exhibit culturally similar characteristics to 75% of the citizens of Country A. Utilizing the developed categorization system, the relationship of Country A to Country B would be classified a Culturally Synergistic Total Satellite.

Each of the chapters which follow are designed to provide a systematic development of the classification scheme ascribed to in this introduction. Chapter II provides background information about the countries under study. Chapter III is designed to furnish an understanding of the genesis of the current relations of India with the

three Himalayan kingdoms, and the role of Communist China in accounting for these relations. Chapter IV describes the basic tenets of Indian foreign policy, the foreign policy similarities of the three Himalayan kingdoms and concludes by narrowing the scope of exploration to India's Himalayan defense strategy. The chapter thus provides a platform upon which to build the more specialized relationships which follow. Chapters V through VII deal with a particularized study of the political, economic and defense relationships of India with Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal, and is designed to develop the first phase of a definitive category scheme based on the internal, external and defense relations of India with each of the Himalayan States. Chapter VIII is an exploration of the cultural similarities and dissimilarities between India and each of the three Small Powers under study in order to develop the second phase of the categorization plan. The categories of phase two are based on ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic considerations; with attention also given to the traditional economic and historical ties of India with the Small Powers under study. Chapter IX concludes the work by converging the two classification systems into one definitive categorization for each of the three relationships under study, and describes the general implications of the study for the field of international relations.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

NEPAL

Geography

Nepal is a landlocked country depending for access to the sea on Indian ports far removed from its borders. It occupies an area of 54,345 square miles and supports a population of about 10 million people.¹ The country extends for approximately 500 miles from east to west. Within the 100 miles between its southern and northern borders, its topography ranges from a low plain to the world's highest mountain range, the Himalayas.

With the exception of the Katmandu Valley, the eastern section of the Terai is better developed economically than the other regions of Nepal and contains about 30 percent of the country's population. Grain is cultivated on 60 to 90 percent of the arable land. Rice, corn, wheat, millet, potatoes, and oilseeds are among the most important food crops; jute is the most important industrial

¹"Background Notes--Nepal," U.S. Department of State Publication 7904, October, 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 1.

crop; and there are also large forest reserves in this area.

The Katmandu Valley, though geographically part of the hill country, is of such importance that it warrants separate consideration. Only some 230 square miles in extent, the valley is the political and cultural heart of the nation. Drained by the Baghmatti River, its rich soils are intensively cultivated to produce a wide variety of grains, vegetables, and fruits. With irrigation as many as three crops a year can be grown. About 450,000 people live in the valley, 110,000 of whom are concentrated in Nepal's capital city, Katmandu.²

Demography

The Nepalese people are descendants of three major migrations from India, Tibet, and central Asia. The intermarriage of these various groups has resulted in a uniquely Nepalese group in addition to various groups which exhibit the characteristics of the diverse strains which make up the population.

Many diverse tribal and caste groups in Nepal maintain their social cohesion. Many western authors have used the term "Gurkha" to refer to members of so-called "military tribes" of Nepal from which British

²All of the above data was taken from "The Sub-continent of Asia," U.S. Dept. of State Publication 7410 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, Nov. 1962), pp. 53-55.

recruited soldiers for their "Gurkha battalions." Correct usage of the term restricts it to designate a number of western Nepalese tribes which conquered and brought national unity to Nepal under the leadership of the Gurkha dynasty which has ruled the country since the latter part of the 18th century.

In the past, Sanskrit and Pali served the educated class of Nepal in handing down cultural and religious tradition. Today in addition to Nepali, which is the national language, Newari, Marthili, and Bhojpuri are widely used. Hindi or Hindustani is also extensively used in the Terai areas bordering India. The isolation of the country has made the progress of education extremely slow, and only five percent of the people can read and write.

Hinduism is the official religion practiced by the majority, and, under the Gurkha dynasty until the 1950 revolution, it was the state religion. However, Buddhist influences are strong, and throughout the country there is an intermingling of the two religious traditions. Some time in the sixth or seventh century Hinduism began to grow in strength as a result of migrations and conquests from India, bringing with it the worship of Hindu gods, Brahmanism, and the caste system. Despite the conquest of Nepal by Hindu kings, Buddhism continued to flourish, the two religions exerting an influence upon one another.³

³Ibid., pp. 55-56.

Political History

Nepal was founded in the latter half of the 18th century when Prithvi Narayan Shah, the ruler of the small principality of Gurkha, forged a unified country from a number of mountain states. The country was frequently called the Gurkha Kingdom, and when recruitment of Nepalese soldiers for the British Indian Army began in the early 1800's the British called them "Gurkhas." The name remained and became world famous due to the bravery of Nepalese fighters in the First and Second World Wars. Today Nepal permits both India and Britain to recruit Nepalese nationals for their armies.

After 1800 the heirs of Prithvi Narayan Shah proved unable to maintain firm political control over Nepal, and a period of internal turmoil ensued. Stability was restored in the 1840's when the Rana family gained power, entrenched itself through hereditary Prime Ministers, and reduced the monarch to a figurehead.

A tightly centralized autocracy, the Rana administration pursued a conscious policy of isolating Nepal from external influences. This policy helped Nepal maintain its national independence during the colonial era, but at the same time kept it in an economically underdeveloped state.

Democratic currents set in motion by the independence movement in neighboring India had their impact

on Nepal, and opposition to Rana rule grew in the 1930's and 1940's. In 1950 and 1951, shortly after India became independent, a popular revolution toppled the Ranas, restored King Tribhuvan to power, and paved the way for a non-Rana to become Prime Minister. The decade of the 1950's saw a period of quasi-constitutional rule during which the monarch assisted by leaders of fledgling political parties governed the country. At times Prime Ministers from these parties were in office and represented a wide spectrum of views. During other periods the throne ruled directly. King Tribhuvan was succeeded after his death in 1955 by his son, King Mahendra, who is the present ruler.

Throughout the decade efforts were made to frame a constitution for the country that would establish a representative form of government, presumably patterned on a modified British model. In early 1959 such a constitution was issued by the King, and shortly afterward the first democratic elections were held for a national assembly.

The Nepali Congress Party, a moderate socialist group, gained a substantial victory and its leader, B. P. Koirala, was called upon to form a government and serve as Prime Minister.

In December 1960 King Mahendra dismissed the Koirala government, suspended the constitution, and

resumed direct rule. The King charged the Nepali Contress government with corruption, misuse of power, and an inability to maintain law and order throughout the country. King Mahendra declared that Nepal was not yet ready for Western parliamentary institutions and needed a democratic political system closer to Nepalese traditions. To meet this need the King initiated a partyless system of "panchayat," or village council democracy.⁴ The move may have been the only solution feasible to quell growing rural disturbances between liberal minded peasants demanding greater land reforms, and conservative land owners who were recalcitrant to change.⁵

Contemporary Political Scene

The new constitution promulgated by King Mahendra in February 1959 had provided for a constitutional monarchy with a bi-cameral Parliament and a Cabinet responsible to the Lower House.

During the parliamentary period the major political parties were represented in the lower house of 109 members as follows:

⁴"Background Notes--Nepal," U.S. Department of State Publication 7904, October, 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, pp. 1, 3.

⁵"The Subcontinent of Asia," Department of State Publication 7410, November 1962, p. 59.

The Nepali Congress Party	74 seats
The Gorkha Parishad Party	19 seats
United Democratic Party	5 seats
Communist Party	4 seats
Independents	<u>7 seats</u>
TOTAL	109 seats

With the banning of political parties and activities in December 1960, these parties became inactive publicly.⁶

All the political parties had promised land reform, development of unexploited resources, hydro-electric power, industry, improvement of health, education and communications. In foreign affairs, all professed a neutral policy of nonalignment with power blocs, friendly relations with other countries, and promotion of international peace. The Nepali Congress formerly led by B. P. Koirala laid great emphasis on achieving national socialism by democratic evolutionary means (a kind of Nepalese Fabianism). The party gave high priority to redistribution of land and improvement of agriculture, village development, cottage industries and improvements in health, education and communication. The United Democratic Party led by former Prime Minister K. I. Singh was

⁶"The Subcontinent of South Asia," pp. 59-60.

more radical, proposing to liquidate the landed aristocracy. Singh had been critical of Communist China and opposed the communists in the election campaigns. The Communist Party itself was always weak, being confined to the Katmandu Valley and the young labor movements in the Terai. The right wing Gurkha Parishad Party was supported mostly by Ranas and aristocrats.⁷

Currently, the King exercises broad powers over Nepal's "panchayat" system of government. The panchayat system draws its theoretical inspiration from the traditional local government institution found in parts of Nepal--the village panchayat. Under a constitution promulgated in 1962 four tiers of government were established: village or town panchayats; district (country) panchayats; zonal (provincial) panchayats; and, at the apex, a national panchayat which is the national legislature. Members of the village or town panchayats are elected indirectly by the panchayats immediately beneath them in the hierarchical order.

The Council of Ministers is the executive arm of the Government and gives policy advice to the King. The Ministers are appointed by the King from the membership of the National Panchayat.

⁷Pradyumna P. Karan, Nepal, A Physical and Cultural Geography (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960), p. 11.

Elections were held in 1963 and the new national legislature (the National Panchayat) held its opening session in April 1963. One-half of the seats in the National Panchayat became vacant in 1967 under the provision for staggered 6-year terms of office for Panchayat members. Elections were held in April 1967 to fill these seats.

In the past few years the Government has initiated a number of significant social reforms, including a program of land reform and a modernization of the legal code removing legal sanction for caste discrimination. However, Nepal still faces challenging political and social tasks in order to develop stable governmental institutions that can meet the needs of a modern society. The Government also faces the problem of reforming social institutions and customs so that the society itself can keep abreast of political and economic changes under way.⁸

BHUTAN

Geography

Bhutan, whose capital is Thimbu, is in the eastern part of the Himalayan chain. The rectangularly shaped country occupies an area of 18,000 square miles and is

⁸ All of the above data was taken from "Background Notes--Nepal," U.S. Department of State Publication 7904, October, 1967, p. 3.

approximately 200 miles long from east to west, and 100 miles wide from north to south. It is situated north of West Bengal and Assam, and west of the North East Frontier Agency of India. Its northern boundary runs along Eastern Tibet, and its western boundary partly along the Chumbi Valley in Tibet and partly along Sikkim.

In the west the Tula la range, mountain range separates Bhutan from Sikkim. In the northeast, the mountains of Towang separate Bhutan from the Towang area in the North East Frontier Agency. The Black Mountain Range runs through the center of Bhutan between the Punakha and Tongsa Valleys, influencing the development of two different regions, each possessing different languages, characteristics and customs.

There are five main rivers in Bhutan which include the Toorsa, Raidak, Sankosh, Tongsa and Manas. The Toorsa rises in Tibet and all the others rise in the high mountains of Northern Bhutan. All five rivers flow into Indian Territory, eventually joining the Brahmaputra River of that country. The Manas and its tributary, the Kuru River, drain the whole of Eastern Bhutan.

The country is known to have considerable mineral wealth as yet largely unmined. Preliminary surveys carried out by the Indian Government indicate that Bhutan has substantial deposits of dolomite, limestone, copper, graphite, gypsum, coal, pyrites and gold. The nation also has

considerable forest wealth and hydroelectric potential.⁹

Demography

The ethnic composition of the population is complex. It includes the Bhote majority, a large number of Nepalese, a few Indians of various castes, and at least two tribal groups: the Lepcha, an indigenous people; and the Santal, whose ancestors migrated from the northern part of India's Bihar State.

Because much of the northern area is uninhabitable, the population is distributed mainly along the country's southern border and in the high valleys to the north, particularly those near the western end of the east-west lateral route.

At least two-thirds of the population speaks one or another of a variety of Tibetan dialects, among which there is a high degree of mutual intelligibility. The written language is identical with Tibetan. The only minority languages of much importance are Nepali, spoken by the Nepalese settlers, and Bengali and Hindi, spoken near the Indian border. To what extent the native speakers of any of these tongues are able to use any of the Tibetan dialects in their limited contacts with the Bhote is not known. A number of educated Bhote have a good knowledge

⁹All of the above data was taken from G. V. Shukla, "Bhutan," Information Service of India (Washington: Embassy of India, February, 1969), pp. 1-2.

of Hindi or English, both of which are taught in the schools.¹⁰

Political History

Bhutan's early history is shrouded in obscurity, but as far as is known, the country's past resembles that of rural medieval Europe. The consolidation of Bhutan began 300 years ago when Shepton La-Pha, a traveling lama from Tibet, became king; and acquired the title of Dharma Raja. His successor Doopgein Shepton, strengthened his power by appointing penlops (Governors of territories) and jungpens (governors of forts). Shepton La-Pha exercised both temporal and spiritual power. His successor, however, appointed a minister, the Deb Raja, to exercise temporal power. The Deb Raja soon became the predominant power and reduced the Dharma Raja to a position of revered spiritual leader.

By the 18th and 19th centuries, however, the local penlops had grown increasingly powerful, and the Deb Raja was frequently a mere figure-head of the most powerful penlop, usually the Paro or Tongsa penlop. In 1885 the Deb Raja requested and received Chinese aid in crushing these two powerful penlops. To neutralize the Chinese

¹⁰All of the above demographic data was taken from U.S. Army, Area Handbook for Nepal (With Sikkim and Bhutan), Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-53 (Washington: Government Printing Office, May 1964), pp. 412-413.

threat, Ugyen Wangchuk, head of the Tongsa penlop, encouraged a British presence in the area. In 1906 the Dharma Raja died, and the following year the Deb Raja stepped down, thus facilitating Ugyen's consolidation of power. He became Bhutan's first hereditary king. In 1910 King Ugyen signed the Punakha Treaty between Bhutan and Britain. This treaty provided that Bhutan's foreign relations were to be guided by the advice of the British, though Bhutan retained full control over its internal affairs. The present King, Jigme Dorji Wangchuk, is the third in King Ugyen's line.¹¹

A treaty signed with India in 1949 placed Bhutan's foreign affairs under Indian control. The invasion of Tibet in 1950 by Communist China raised the question of that country's intention toward Bhutan and the other Himalayan states. The threat to Bhutan seemed particularly serious as early as 1954, when the Peiping authorities distributed maps showing extensive areas in northeastern and northwestern Bhutan within Communist China. As late as 1964, the communists had refrained from entering Bhutanese territory, and Bhutanese authorities had consistently rejected Peiping's offers for aid and its proposals to enter unilateral negotiations regarding the demarcation of Bhutan's northern boundary.

¹¹"Background Notes--Bhutan," U.S. Department of State Publication 8334, December 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967).

Contemporary Political Scene

Traditionally a loose theocracy and since 1907 an autocracy, Bhutan is slowly adopting a rudimentary system of representative government. The King of Bhutan governs his country through a National Assembly, personal councillors, a Central Secretariat and administrative officers located throughout the country.

The eight Royal Councillors include the Chief Secretary, the Deputy Chief Secretary, the Thimbu Thrimpon, the Punakha Trimpon, one representative of the Lamas, one representative of the public, and The Agent to the Government of Bhutan. The Secretariat is headed by a Chief Secretary who oversees the work of the subordinate administrative officers.

The Tsongdu (National Assembly) has a membership of 126, 90 of whom are elected, and the remainder appointed by the King. The system of election to the Assembly is that each village or group of small villages elect, on the basis of one vote for each family, a person for nomination as the Headman who is formally appointed as Headman by the Maharaya for a 5 year term. Headmen so appointed, in turn, elect the representative to the assembly. The Tsongdu constituencies which elect the Headmen are made up of representatives from local villages elected for three year terms. The nominated members of the assembly consist of important government officials, influential

lamas, and the priest of Punakha. The Chief Secretary acts as the Speaker of the Assembly which meets semi-annually.

There are no political parties in the country. However, the lack of popular mass representation has led to the creation of the Bhutan National Congress Party. A shadow political party that exists only outside Bhutan, the Congress represents the Nepalese settlers of southern Bhutan who have only 13.8 percent of the Tsongdu seats although they compose an estimated 25 percent of the population. The party operates from bases in Assam and Siliguri in West Bengal. The principal demands of the National Congress set forth by its leader D. B. Gurung include abolition of discrimination against the Nepalese, repeal of a 1959 law prohibiting further immigration into Bhutan, liberalization of the Maharaja's rule, and an increase of elected representatives in the government. However, the majority of Bhutanese citizens are largely apathetic toward political issues. Living standards are better than those of neighboring countries, there are no overcrowded and impoverished settlements, and almost all families possess their own lands.¹² The fact remains that Bhutan is essentially an absolute monarchy.

¹²"Bhutan," Embassy of India, p. 5; "Background Notes--Bhutan," Department of State Bulletin 8334, p. 3.

SIKKIMGeography

Sikkim lies in the North-East Himalayas, bordered by Nepal in the west, Tibet in the north, India in the south, and Bhutan in the east. The country is situated on the shortest route between the Tibetan plateau and the Indian plains.¹³ The almost rectangularly shaped country occupies an area of 2,745 square miles and is 70 miles long and 40 miles wide. In the north it stretches up to the great Himalayan range, which is the watershed between Tibet and Sikkim. In the east, the Dongya Range stands between Sikkim and the chumbi valley of Tibet. This range has a number of passes, the most famous of which are Nathu la and Jelep la, just over 14,000 feet. In the south there is no natural feature between Sikkim and India, except in the center of the boundary where it runs along the Tista and Rangit Rivers.

Cardamon, which is one of the most important Sikkimese exports, is grown in this sector, and Singhik and rice are grown in the lower Tista and Rangpo valleys. The southwestern quarter of Sikkim is the most fertile, due to the Rangit River and its tributaries.¹⁴ Sikkimese

¹³Doig Desmond, "Sikkim," National Geographic Magazine, Vol. 123, no. 3, March 1963, p. 407.

¹⁴G. V. Shukla, "Sikkim," Information Service of India (Washington: Embassy of India, February 1969), pp. 2-3.

oranges, rice, pulse, wheat, barley, apples, potatoes, paddy and buckwheat are grown here. Domestic animals include cattle, buffalo, yak, sheep, goats, pigs, mules and poultry. Sikkim also has deposits of copper, coal, graphite, gypsum and iron.¹⁵

Demography

Persons of Nepalese origin make up an estimated 65 to 80 percent of the population. The remainder is comprised largely of Bhote, some Lepcha and a few strongly Indian-influenced groups on the southern frontier, such as the Tharu (Mechi subgroup), Dhimal and Rajbansi. None of these ethnic groups is found exclusively within the borders of Sikkim.

As in Nepal these varied ethnic communities fall into two large groupings on the basis of cultural orientation: those influenced by Tibetan culture and those influenced by Indian culture. The Indian oriented group, by far the larger, is made up almost exclusively of persons of recent Nepalese extraction whose ancestors entered Sikkim within the past century.

Nepali is spoken with varying degrees of fluency by nearly everyone. It is the common medium of communication not only among the Nepalese but also between them and the Bhote and Lepcha, each of which has a native tongue

¹⁵Desmond, "Sikkim," National Geographic Magazine, p. 407.

of its own. The use of English, however, is being encouraged by the current Maharaja.

Considerable discord has existed between the Hindu settlers of Nepal and the country's Bhote and Lepcha groups. The Nepalese tend to feel that the government does not adequately represent their interests as the largest element in the population and resent the discrimination practiced against them. Nepalese settlers traditionally have not been allowed to become village headmen and for some time have been forbidden by law to settle north of the Dikchu River, above Gangtok. They can apply for citizenship only after 15 years' residence, and their citizenship can be revoked at any time by the Maharaja for disloyalty to or dissatisfaction with the monarch.¹⁶

Only about one-third of the people are adherents of Tibetan or Lamaist Buddhism, the state religion. The remainder are Hindus who undoubtedly have retained the beliefs and practices that characterize the popular religion of their caste or ethnic group in Nepal, including their own form of shamanism.

The present Maharaja, Palden Thondup Namgyal, is a strong supporter of the Buddhist faith, deeply interested in preserving its cultural and moral influence on the life

¹⁶ Foreign Affairs Studies Division, Special Operations Research Office, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan and Sikkim)," pp. 370-371.

of the country. In October 1958 he founded the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology at Gangtok, with the aim of promoting research and knowledge of Buddhism, particularly in its Tibetan form. He is also president of the Mahabodhi Society--an Indian organization devoted to the propagation of Buddhism.¹⁷

Political History

The Lepcha migrants from the Assam hills, are thought to be the earliest inhabitants of Sikkim. Definite control by the Tibetans was acquired during the first half of the 17th century when several lamas fled from the Chinese in Tibet. They made Buddhist lamaism the state religion of Sikkim and established government under a Tibetan King, Pencho Namgyal in 1641.¹⁸ The boundaries of the country fixed at the time of Namgyal's coronation, extended beyond their present outlines on the east across the Chumbi Valley to the Ha Valley of Bhutan, on the south to the plains of India just below Darjeeling and Kalimpong, and on the west across the Ilam province of Nepal. During the eighteenth century, Sikkim was attacked first from the east, later from the west, and lost much of its territory. The Bhutanese invaders struck during the reign of the third

¹⁷Ibid., p. 372.

¹⁸Foreign Affairs Studies Division, Special Operations Research Office, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Sikkim and Bhutan)," p. 369.

Maharaja Chakdor Namgyal, who ascended to the throne in 1700. Having occupied the country and forced the Maharaja to flee to Lhasa, they were eventually expelled with Tibetan help, but the terms of the settlement allowed the Bhutanese to retain the Kalimpong area. The Bhutanese attacked again in 1780, but this time were turned back.

Greater territorial losses were suffered by Sikkim as a result of the Gorkha invasion of the late 18th century, when the Nepalese conquerors seized the entire western and southern portions of Sikkim, up to the banks of the Tista River.¹⁹ Sikkim remained a Tibetan dependency until the end of the 18th century when British expansion in India changed the situation. Under a British Nepalese Treaty (1816) Nepal was obliged to return the Terai or submontane portion of Sikkim to the Sikkimese. In 1817, the Treaty of Titalia signed between Britain and Nepal, established the current boundary between Sikkim and Nepal. To safeguard its interests the Government of British India in 1861 imposed the Treaty of Tumlong under which Sikkim was forced to recognize British authority and responsibility in its internal and foreign affairs. An annual subsidy of 3,000 Indian Rupees was also paid the Maharaja by the terms of the treaty. In 1890, the British in a convention with the Chinese acquired conclusive

¹⁹G. V. Shukla, "Sikkim," Information Service of India, p. 2.

acknowledgement of Britain's protectorship of Sikkim and the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim was formally delimited. A British political officer was appointed to "assist the Maharaja."²⁰ In 1947, after independence, India "inherited" the responsibilities of the British in Sikkim, and in 1950, India entered into a new treaty with the Kingdom. The treaty makes India responsible for Sikkim's external affairs, defense and strategic communication. Just as in the British period, India by treaty, has a representative permanently resident in Gangtok, the capital.²¹

Contemporary Political Scene

An Indian-appointed dewan (quasi-prime minister) shares power with Maharaja Palden Thondup. The Maharaja is assisted by an executive council and by a state council whose 20 members are partly elected and partly appointed by the Maharaja. The subjects which the members of the state council are permitted to discuss are restricted, and the Maharaja retains a veto over all their decisions.²²

Sikkim has five political parties. These include:

- a. Sikkim State Congress

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," issued in Gangtok on December 5, 1950, Texts of Documents, 1947-1964, Lok Sabha Secretariat, p. 170.

²² Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. , p. 508.

- b. Sikkim National Party
- c. Sikkim National Congress
- d. Sikkim Raja Praja Sammelan
- e. Sikkim Scheduled Caste League.²³

The popular opposition to the vaguely defined legislative, judicial and administrative powers accorded by the Maharaja to large landholders created the basis for Sikkim's first widespread political movement. A coalition of three political groups on December 3, 1947 formed the Sikkim State Congress Party, an offshoot of the Indian National Congress. The group composed largely of young Nepalese pressed for three major reforms: a) abolition of the landlord system, b) formation of a democratic government with the Maharaja as constitutional monarch, and c) admission of Sikkim to the Republic of India, but with retention of internal autonomy.

The Sikkim National Party, financed largely by the Maharaja, represents the Bhote and Lepcha communities and favors retention of the Maharaja's powers as sovereign head of state. The Sikkim Raja Praja Sammelan Party is composed almost entirely of Nepalese who favor dethronement of the Maharaja and tightening ties with India as a means of acquiring increased recognition in government.²⁴

²³G. V. Shukla, "Sikkim," Information Service of India, p. 4.

²⁴Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan and Sikkim)," pp. 385-386.

The Sikkim National Congress was formed by dissidents from former Sikkim National Party and Sikkim State Congress members. This group expresses somewhat radical political aims and demands a broad based elected government.²⁵

In 1958, the strength of the State Council was raised from 17 to 20 seats which were distributed as follows:

Bhutias and Lepchas	6 seats
Nepalese	6 seats
Nominees of the Maharaja	6 seats
Monasteries	1 seat
General seat	1 seat

In November 1962, the Sikkim People's Consultative Committee was created by the Maharaja with a view to organizing the people's participation in strengthening the security of Sikkim. The Consultative Committee consists of 14 members of the Sikkim National Party, 5 from the Sikkim State Congress, 12 from the Sikkim National Congress, 1 from the Scheduled Caste League, 1 from the Sikkim Rajya Praja Sammelan, 2 members from the Christian Community, 3 Indians and one official representative. The committee meets monthly under the chairmanship of the Principal Administrative Officer.²⁶

²⁵Karan, The Himalayan Kingdom, p. 75.

²⁶G. V. Shukla, "Sikkim," Information Service of India, p. 4.

The Indian dewan is nominated by India and has now become an essential part of the kingdom's administrative machinery. As prime minister he is the chief adviser to the Maharaja. There is also an Indian financial adviser, chief engineer, and an Indian director of the state distillery--an important source of revenue.²⁷

The Executive Council, State Council and People's Consultative Committee, are advising bodies only, with final judgment power in all cases retained by the Maharaja.

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide background information about each of the Himalayan kingdoms including geography, demography, political history, and the contemporary political scene. Chapter III is designed to furnish an understanding of the genesis of the current relations of India with those countries and the role of Communist China in helping to promote these relationships.

²⁷G. V. Shukla, "Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, Political Office, Gangtok, Sikkim, July 5, 1968, pp. 14-15.

CHAPTER III

TERRITORIAL DISPUTES INVOLVING COMMUNIST CHINA, INDIA AND THE HIMALAYAN KINGDOMS

Chinese claims and designs on portions of the Himalayan region and India itself have had a profound impact upon the relations of India with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal. The treaties and foreign relations which India has established with each of these nations has been to a large degree a response to Chinese aggressions and designs in the himalayan area and portions of Indian territory. China has been instrumental in instigating the very relationships upon which the classification scheme depends. Some elucidation of Chinese activities and ambitions in the area is thus essential.

China has exercised preponderance over many parts of Asia in the past two thousand years. Invariably, Chinese rulers became expansionists whenever China had a strong central government. The Chinese viewed China as the center of world civilization and felt a sense of mission to civilize the "barbarian" peoples surrounding China. The concept of sovereign equality among nations

was entirely alien to traditional Chinese leaders until the end of the Manchu dynasty. Many small Asian nations were at one time or another tributary states of the Chinese Empire.¹ Like Tibet, Nepal was at one time a contributory state of China, and Sikkim and Bhutan were tributaries of Tibet. In his dispatch to the Secretary of the government of Bengal dated April 8, 1861, Ashley Eden, the British Envoy and Special Commissioner to Sikkim, wrote: "Nepal is tributary to China, Tibet is tributary to China, and Sikkim and Bhutan are tributary to Tibet."²

The 1950 Invasion of Tibet

Tibet and Nepal were both successfully invaded during the Manchu dynasty. Tibet was invaded in 1720 by Chinese imperial armies and compelled to allow the stationing of Manchu garrisons within the country.

Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was thus established. When the Manchu Empire became corrupt and began faltering, it was unable to give Tibet effective protection against the 1855 Gurkha invasion. China's tributary states of Burma, Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan were made dependents of Great Britain. Tibet was invaded by a British expeditionary force in 1904, but under the Anglo-Russian convention

¹George P. Jan, Government of Communist China (San Francisco: Chandler, 1966), p. 561.

²P. C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1962), p. 154.

of August 31, 1907, the two powers recognized China's influence and stipulated that neither Russia nor Great Britain would send representatives to Lhasa.³ In October 1913, a conference was held in Simla at which the Chinese Republic, Tibet and Great Britain were represented. The convention provided for a division of Tibet for administrative purposes into two sections, Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. Inner Tibet was to be administered by China while Outer Tibet was to be autonomous. China repudiated the action of its commissioners and never signed this agreement. It was signed, however, by British and Tibetan representatives on July 3, 1914.⁴

Britain transferred to India its relations with Tibet in 1947 and a British mission in Lhasa and two trading agencies were taken over by Indian representatives. Chinese Communist troops invaded Tibet in October 1950. India condemned the Chinese invasion and asserted its determination to protect the border states of Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal.⁵

An agreement signed between the two nations in May 1951 recognized the Dalai Lama as spiritual and

³Tsepan W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet a Political History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 205, 223.

⁴Ibid., pp. 246-259.

⁵"The Defense of India's Northern Borders," India Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 1, January-March 1966, p. 36.

temporal ruler but made Tibet virtually a Chinese province. In March 1959, autonomous government in Tibet was suppressed by Communist China, and the Dalai Lama fled to India.⁶ The Tibetan rebellion and Chinese suppression stirred Indian public opinion. There had always been historical and sentimental ties between India and Tibet. The Indian outcry infuriated Peking and the chain of events thereafter was one of accusation and counter-accusation.⁷ The Chinese government and press remained silent about the development in Tibet until March 28, when it was announced that the Tibetan Local government had been dissolved by the Central Government in Peking. It stated that a rebellion had broken out in Lhasa on March 10, 1959, which had been inspired by imperialists and reactionaries. Two points in the Chinese statement affected India. In the first place it was alleged that the Tibetan rebellion was being directed from Indian soil. Secondly a reference to Tibetan developments in the Indian Parliament was characterized as interference in the internal affairs of China.⁸ The suggestion that the Tibetan rebellion had been conducted from the territory of India was

⁶George Ginsburgs, Communist China and Tibet (The Hague: Martinus Nyhoff Press, 1964), p. 117.

⁷Vidya Prakash Dutt, China and the World (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 195.

⁸S.C.S., "Indian Reactions to the Crisis in Tibet," World Today, Vol. 15, No. 6, June, 1959, p. 239.

promptly disavowed by Prime Minister Nehru. On March 30, 1959, the Prime Minister said that Parliament certainly had the right to discuss any topic it considered proper, though it might be difficult for people trained in a different tradition to understand the way of parliamentary democracy. On April 3, the Lok Sabha was informed that in response to his own request, the Dalai Lama had been granted political asylum in India.⁹

All the major political parties of India with the exception of the Communist Party condemned the Chinese action in Tibet. The Government had been quite restrained in its references to developments in Tibet, and this restraint was generally reciprocated by the Indian press and public. The Chinese government and press, however, maintained that the Dalai Lama was under duress in India, and also levelled charges that India had "expansionist aims" with regard to Tibet.¹⁰

In a statement to Parliament on August 25, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru declared that India would go to the defense of Bhutan and Sikkim if they were attacked by any foreign power. The Prime Minister stated: "We know that it is our responsibility to defend them in case of any

⁹Ibid., p. 240.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 244-245.

attack."¹¹ Marshal Chen Yi, foreign minister of Communist China, speaking at a North Vietnamese National Day reception at which the Indian Ambassador and Premier Chou En-Lai were present on September 3, 1959, replied to the Indian statement. The Foreign Minister stated: "In international affairs, we (China) always stand for settlement of disputes between nations through peaceful negotiations."¹²

In the same speech the Foreign Minister accused India of imperialistic aims toward Tibet and the Himalayan Kingdoms.

The Sino-Indian Border Disputes

After the occupation of Tibet, there followed the problem of the demarcation of the Sino-Indian frontier.¹³ The Chinese border with India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim extends along the formidable mountain barrier of the Himalayas, inaccessible to motorized traffic and crossed only by a few caravan routes.¹⁴

Hardly had excitement over Tibet subsided than a much more serious situation affecting India's northern

¹¹"Nehru Asserts India Has Duty to Defend Bhutan and Sikkim," New York Times, Vol. CVIII, No. 37,104, August 26, 1959, pp. 1, 6.

¹²"Red China Denies Any Encroaching," New York Times, Vol. CVIII, No. 37,112, September 3, 1959, p. 6.

¹³Guy Wint, Communist China's Crusade (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 93.

¹⁴Chiao-Min Hshieh, China Ageless Land and Countless People (New York: Van Nostrand), p. 5.

frontier developed. For some years, Indian opinion had been disturbed by Chinese maps depicting parts of Indian territory as belonging to Communist China, a subject on which correspondence had taken place between the two Governments. In the northeast, the border, according to India, followed what was known as the McMahon Line, which was fixed at a meeting in Simla in 1914 between representations of the Governments of India, China, and Tibet under the Chairmanship of Sir Henry McMahon. The agreement, however, was later repudiated by China, who refused to ratify it on the ground that it was an unfair arrangement imposed on a weak China. Accordingly, the concordance was signed only by the British and Tibetan representatives.¹⁵ In the northwest, the border of Ladakh, a barren and mountainous part of Kashmir, was examined in 1847 by a joint commission of British, Indian, Chinese and Tibetan officials, but the Chinese merely said it was too well known to require definition and the Indian Government recognized it as "that fixed from ancient times."

If the invasion and suppression of Tibet by China disenchanted the Government of India, and placed a great strain on Sino-Indian relations, the massive Chinese invasion of October 20, 1962 severed all effective rapport between the two nations. Although the Indian Government

¹⁵Alastan Lamb, The McMahon Line (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), pp. 507-566.

like the British before independence was prepared to recognize Chinese overlordship over Tibet, that government had been greatly concerned about Chinese expansion along the Himalayan border immediately after the Chinese invasion of Tibet.

On October 20, 1962, China launched a full scale attack on two fronts in Ladakh and in the NEFA, and quickly seized much of the border territory it had earlier claimed, especially in the northwestern Sector. The Government of India sent an urgent request to the United States and Britain for military aid. Both responded quickly.

On November 21, 1962, the Chinese Government issued a statement to foreign correspondents announcing a cease-fire from November 22, 1962 and that beginning on December 1, 1962, Chinese "frontier guards" would withdraw to positions 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) behind the lines of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959. China also announced that she would take unilateral action even if there were no response from the Government of India.¹⁶ She called upon India to negotiate. But India had refused to accept Peiping's terms unless the Chinese forces pulled back to the line of September 8, 1962, which China had seized in late 1959

¹⁶S. H. Ahmend, "Chronology of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute," International Studies, Vol. V, Nos. 1-2, July-October 1963, p. 220.

and India had subsequently regained some of the territory previously lost in Ladakh. Mr. Nehru made a statement in the Parliament making India's position clear:

- (1) . . . that cease-fire and withdrawal declaration by China was unilateral one, but India would do nothing to impede the implementation of the cease fire declaration;
- (2) that negotiations with China would be possible only on the basis of undoing the further aggression committed by the Government of China on Indian territory since 8 September 1962;
- (3) that India does not agree to the so-called line of actual control immediately prior to 8 September 1962, and that on 7 November 1959, as defined by the Chinese Government, there is a difference of about 2,500 square miles of Indian territory which China has occupied as a result of the aggression during the last three months. . . .¹⁷

In December 1962, six nonaligned nations, Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Central Arab Republic, and Ghana met at Colombo to seek ways of resolving the dispute between India and China. They developed proposals for a renewal of negotiations which the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, took to New Delhi and Peiping. The essential features of the Colombo proposals were:

1. With regard to the Northwestern Sector, the Conference appealed for the withdrawal of both Indian and Chinese troops to positions 12.5 miles behind the lines of actual control which existed on November 7, 1959.

2. The administration of the demilitarized zone would be bilaterally controlled by the two governments by

¹⁷Ibid., p. 220.

setting up civilizn posts. As for the Northeastern Sector, the conference proposed that the line of actual control in the areas recognized by both governments could serve as a cease-fire line to their respective positions.¹⁸ In addition, the Conference noted that two spots, Chedong or the Thagla ridge area and the Longju area, would require settlement of differences of opinion about the line of actual control. With regard to the Middle Sector, the Colombo Conference asked that the status quo in this area should be maintained, as there had been no hostilities there. India accepted the proposals after clarifying them sufficiently to meet its minimum demands. despite vigorous non-communist political opposition in Parliament, which described the proposals as an offense to India's honor and dignity. Peiping's response was so conditional as to amount to a rejection. Apart from the Colombo proposals, Nehru suggested that India was prepared to refer these frontier disputes to the International Court of Justice at the Hague or to arbitration.

Despite the early withdrawal, China was now a confirmed enemy in India's eyes. India's defense budget

¹⁸ Upon Indian inquiry, the clarification given by the delegations of Ceylon, the UAR and Ghana indicated that the Indian forces would be free to move up to the McMahon line--a feature which would presumably be repugnant to the persistent Chinese move to repudiate the existing McMahon Line altogether.

more than doubled to 1.8 billion dollars within two years, as New Delhi attempted to develop a military machine capable of facing China and Pakistan at the same time. India's policy against acceptance of military arms was altered as New Delhi attempted to secure a continued flow of western and Soviet arms.¹⁹ An uneasy truce has persisted which has lasted until the end of our 20 year period of concern.

Disputes Involving the Himalayan Kingdoms

Imperial China claimed suzerainty over Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim in extension of similar claims over Tibet. Bhutan and Sikkim were described as southern gateways to the celestial empire. The Chinese emperors granted seals of offices and patents of investiture to the rulers of Bhutan and Sikkim. However, they never tried to annex these states even when their hold over Tibet was relatively firm.²⁰ In 1939, Mao Tse-tung has said:

"In defeating China in war, the imperialist states have taken away many Chinese dependent states. . . . England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong. . . ."21

To Mao, this was the first dismemberment of the

¹⁹Barnds, "India in Transition: Friends and Neighbors," p. 554.

²⁰Jain, Panchsheela and After, p. 158.

²¹George N. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi (London: Taber and Taber, 1963), p. 149.

Chinese empire.²² In 1954, Chinese officers in Tibet proclaimed that they would before long "liberate Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh, and the NEFA, which were wrongfully being held by the 'Indian imperialists.'" Vital border areas were similarly saturated with propaganda and people were told in 1959 that if Tibet was the palm of China's hand, Bhutan, the NEFA, Sikkim, Nepal and Ladakh were its fingers.²³ Presumably now that the palm was restored to China, the fingers must go with it. A Peking radio broadcast on September 3, 1949 commenting on the dependency status of Bhutan with respect to India stated: "Suzerainty stands for the dark vassal state system, the protective system and is another name for foreign oppression and enslavement."²⁴ On September 16, 1959, Peking announced:

"Under the standing influence of British imperialism, the bourgeoisie of India, of whom Nehru is the representative, have learned the ways of the imperialists, and are harboring intentions against Tibet and Sikkim as well as Bhutan."²⁵

Significantly the Chinese Communists have consistently refused to discuss with India the issue of their frontiers with Bhutan and Sikkim. They have taken recourse to the pretext that China regarded these as

²²Dutt, China and the World, p. 30.

²³Chakravarti, India's China Policy, p. 99.

²⁴Jain, Panchsheela and After, p. 18.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 7-8

frontiers of peace and friendship, though China does not appear to want to accept India's power to negotiate on behalf of Bhutan and Sikkim. Peking also has said that it respects the "proper relationship" between India and these countries. Apparently Peking reserves the right to decide what constitutes a "proper" relationship and will refuse to accept any relationship between these countries and India which it does not deem proper.²⁶

Nepal

Chinese travelers began writing about Nepal in the seventh century, and in 643 A.D. a Chinese mission visited Nepal for the first time.²⁷ Between 640 and 703 A.D. Nepal was regarded as a vassal state of the vast Tibetan Empire, and as late as 1730, the small principalities of Nepal paid tribute to the Manchu Emperors. The Gurkha Kings who conquered the Katmandu valley in 1769 ceased to pay tribute and in 1788 subjugated Tibetan territory near Nepal's borders. In 1791, Nepalese forces marched on Tibet causing the Emperor of China to send his army to repel the invasion. The terms of a treaty of 1792 which Nepal signed with China required her to send tribute to Peking every five years:

²⁶Dutt, China and the World, p. 227.

²⁷Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, p. 131.

It was stipulated that Nepal's tribute status was to be like that of various other dependencies of China such as Annam, Korea, Siam and Burma, and an inscribed stone was set up in Lhasa to commemorate the conquest.²⁸

In 1854, the Gurkhas again attacked Tibet, this time successfully, and in the peace negotiations of 1856, Tibet agreed to pay an annual tribute to China.²⁹ Article 1 of the treaty states: "The Tibetan Government agrees to pay the sum of ten thousand Rupees annually in cash to the Gurkha Government."³⁰ This treaty also gave Nepal certain privileges in Tibet and regulated the rights of Nepalese and Tibetan merchants traveling between the two countries.³¹ The Tibetan tribute was paid regularly until 1953.

On September 20, 1950, Nepal and the People's Republic of China had signed an agreement to maintain friendly relations. The agreement primarily concerned trade and intercourse between Nepal and the "Tibet region of China." However, Article III stated: "All treaties and documents which existed in the past between Nepal and

²⁸Ibid., p. 131. (See Appendix A for full text of the Treaty.)

²⁹Pradyumna P. Karan, Nepal: A Cultural and Physical Geography (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960), p. 13.

³⁰"Peace Treaty between Tibet and Nepal (1856)." Texts of treaties, agreements and certain exchange of notes relating to the Sino-Indian Boundary: Indian Society of International Law (New Delhi, 1962), p. 10. (See Appendix B for full text of the Treaty.)

³¹Ibid., pp. 10-12.

the Tibet region of China are hereby abrogated."³²

On August 1, 1955, Nepal and the People's Republic signed an agreement providing for the establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of Panch Shila.³³

Apparently realizing the strategic values of Nepal, China has sought her friendship by peace missions, cultural delegations and in aid programs. Nepalese leaders have seemingly sought to take advantage of Nepal's position between India and China to balance her relations with the two more powerful Asian countries.³⁴ On September 20, 1956, a new treaty aimed at "establishing friendly relations between the Chinese People's Republic and the Kingdom of Nepal and regulating trade between Nepal and the Tibetan part of China" was signed at Katmandu. Under this treaty Nepal lost certain privileges in Tibet and recognized Tibet as "an integral part of China."

Article 5, par. 2, states:

The Government of Nepal will be pleased to withdraw completely within six months after the exchange of notes its military escords in Lhasa and other places in the Tibet Region of China.³⁵

³²"China - Nepal Boundary," International Boundary Study No. 50. The Geographer U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 30, 1965, p. 4.

³³(Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence), Jain, Panchsheela and After, p. 154.

³⁴Karan, Nepal: A Physical and Cultural Geography, p. 13.

³⁵"Sino-Nepal Treaty 1956," Texts of treaties, agreements and certain exchanges of notes relating to the Sino-Indian boundary, Indian Society of International Law (New Delhi, 1962), p. 48.

Article 5, par. 3, asserts:

Nepalese nationals in the Tibet region of China . . . shall be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Government of the country of residence observe the laws . . . pay taxes to that Government. . . .³⁶

Nepal, however, was given permission to trade at four points on Tibetan territory on condition that she give China similar rights on Nepalese territory.

Paragraph 2 states:

The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries may trade at the following places:

1. The Chinese Government agrees to specify (1) Lhasa, (2) Shigatse, (3) Gyantse and (4) Yatung as markets for trade;
2. The Government of Nepal agrees that when with the development of Chinese trade in Nepal, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in Nepal, the Government of Nepal will specify an equal number of markets for trade in Nepal.³⁷

The treaty was supplemented by an agreement on economic assistance signed on September 25, 1956, in Peking in which China was to give Nepal 60 million Indian rupees worth of aid, one-third to be paid in cash installments and the remainder in the form of machinery and other goods. In January 1957, Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai declared during an official visit that China was prepared to give further economic aid to Nepal. He disclosed that the first cash installment of ten million rupees had been paid under the previous year's agreement. Nepal received

³⁶Ibid., p. 48 (for full text of the treaty see Appendix C).

³⁷Ibid., p. 64.

a further payment of ten million rupees shortly thereafter.³⁸ In addition to regular economic aid, the Chinese have made token gifts from time to time; for example, in 1957 Chou on a state visit to Katmandu, donated 4,000 dollars for a Buddhist shrine, and the Nepalese Premier received a lump sum during his official exchange visit to Peking."³⁹

Despite the official "friendship," the position of Nepalese citizens in Tibet steadily worsened. In March 1959, the Nepalese press reported that as a result of the Tibetan uprising many of the approximately 25,000 Nepalese in Tibet were returning home. In August 1959, Nepalese traders in Tibet were disenchanted when the Chinese authorities declared the Tibetan currency to be invalid and refused to listen to official and unofficial protests against this measure.⁴⁰ In addition to this, a disagreement regarding the status of the 500 mile un-demarcated line between the two countries began to cause difficulties.

In 1958, the century old dispute had erupted in

³⁸A. Kashin, "Nepal--Chinese Stepping Stone to India," Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., Vol. XII, No. 7, July, 1965, p. 23.

³⁹Karan, Nepal: A Physical and Cultural Geography, p. 13.

⁴⁰Kashin, "Nepal--Chinese Stepping Stone to India," p. 23.

regions of Lamogabar, Kodari and Khojanat. In its second issue for 1958, the Peking English language journal "Evergreen" published a map showing the whole of Mount Everest as being in Chinese territory. In 1959, Chinese Communists began infiltrating into Nepal.⁴¹

On August 30, 1959, the Reuters press agency reported that Chinese agents were distributing portraits of Mao Tse tung and Chou En-Lai in the northern part of the country, particularly among that part of the population ethnically related to the Tibetans. Reuters also disclosed that Chinese agents in the Solu Khumbu region, not far from Mount Everest, were getting local inhabitants to sign a petition to the effect that they considered themselves to be Tibetans. On August 12, 1959, the Katmandu newspaper "Motherland" reported that the Nepalese government had protested against such activities and on September 4th the Nepalese Prime Minister, Mr. B. P. Koirala, announced in parliament that the government was watching developments on the Tibetan frontier "very closely." Koirala stated that a strengthening of Nepalese frontier posts was in effect. On December 6, 1959, the Katmandu newspaper "Iwatandra Samachar" announced that Chinese detachments had entered the western part of the country⁴² and hoisted

⁴¹Ibid., p. 23; Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms: Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal, p. 86.

⁴²Kashin, "Nepal--Chinese Stepping Stone to India," p. 24.

two Chinese flags. For the apparent purpose of settling the boundary dispute and increasing China's participation in Nepalese economic development, the Chinese government invited Koirala to Peking in March 1960. Koirala arrived in Peking on March 11, 1960 for an eleven day visit.⁴³

On March 21, 1960, it was announced that Koirala had invited Chou En-Lai to Nepal to sign a treaty of peace and friendship which had been proposed by the Chinese. On the same day, the two statesmen signed a border treaty whose main points were as follows:

1. In areas where the boundary line between the two countries was shown to be identical in the maps of both, the frontier was to follow that line. A special commission was provided for, composed of an equal number of persons from both sides to resolve all points of dispute.

2. In cases where the maps did not agree but "the situation as regards actual control by one or the other side leaves no room for doubt," the course of the frontier was to be based on geographical factors such as waterways, valleys and mountains.

3. In cases where the maps did not agree and the situation as regards "actual control" was disputed, joint Chinese-Nepalese groups of investigators were to make an

⁴³Dutt, China and the World, p. 179.

on the spot examination of the situation and adjust the frontier in accordance with the principles of "equality, mutual advantage, friendship and trust."⁴⁴ Chou En-Lai and Koirala also signed a new economic agreement. By the terms of the agreement China would give to Nepal within three years of its signing "a free grant" of economic assistance of 100 million Indian rupees without any conditions of privileges attached. This was in addition to the 40 million rupees worth of machinery and other goods promised under the 1956 economic aid agreement, and not yet used by the Nepalese Government. The amount, it was stipulated, would be spent on the acquisition of equipment, machinery, materials, techniques and other commodities from China. China also agreed to dispatch the necessary number of technicians and experts to help in the construction of items specified under the agreement. A protocol signed in Katmandu on September 5, 1961 mentioned a cement plant, a paper mill, and a leather and shoe factory as among the items to be constructed with Chinese assistance.⁴⁵ In 1960, there were numerous incidents on the Nepalese-Chinese frontier. In the Mustant region, a Chinese armed detachment opened fire on a group of

⁴⁴"Nepal-China Border Treaty, March 21, 1960," International Boundary Study No. 50. U.S. Department of Research, Department of State, May 30, 1965, pp. 6-7 (for text of actual treaty see Appendix D).

⁴⁵Dutt, China and the World, p. 180.

Nepalese sent to make investigation of the border situation and arrested them. On July 2, 1960, Chou En-Lai apologized to the Nepalese government for the incident, explaining that the Chinese had taken the Nepalese for Tibetan bandits, but had handed them over to the Nepalese frontier authorities as soon as they had realized their error.⁴⁶ On April 26, 1960, Chou En-Lai visited Katmandu to discuss the border dispute. A great deal of confusion had existed on the number of places in dispute and their location. Almost every discussion on the boundary listed three points of dispute, but the places were rarely the same. The Joint Commission held four sessions:

- a. First, from August 12, to October 26, 1960 in Katmandu.
- b. Second, January 1, to February 15, 1961, in Peking.
- c. Third, July 31, to August 24, 1961, in Katmandu.
- d. Fourth, October 1 to October 5, 1961, in Peking.

The Commission and its subsidiary Joint Survey Teams produced a detailed delimitation based upon common agreement for the entire frontier. The position of Mt. Everest was regarded as special and was left to the heads of government for decision.⁴⁷ King Mahendra arrived in

⁴⁶Kashin, "Nepal-Chinese Stepping Stone to India," p. 25.

⁴⁷"China Nepal Boundary," International Boundary Study No. 50, p. 4.

Peking on September 29, 1961 from an 18 day state visit. In a speech at a banquet he gave in honor of the King, Liu Shao-chi praised the King's role at a recent Belgrade conference of nonaligned nations saying: "In the face of foreign aggression and pressures, the heroic Nepalese people remained firm and unyielding and always maintained their independence and dignity, this deserves great admiration."⁴⁸

He also expressed China's pleasure that with regard to Tibet "Nepal firmly adhered to a correct stand for noninterference in China's internal affairs."

On October 5, 1961, Liu Shao and King Mahendra signed a frontier agreement. The agreement allowed each party the right of access to the summit of Mount Everest and meant in effect that one half of the mountain was recognized to be Chinese and the other half Nepalese.

1. The complete delimitation of the boundary created by Joint Commission became article I.

2. Article II defined the boundary in all streams as the median line and provided for the continuation of that line in the event of a change of river course.

3. Article III directed the Joint Commission to draft a demarcation protocol to be incorporated into the

⁴⁸Dutt, China and the World, p. 182.

treaty.⁴⁹ King Mahendra expressed his satisfaction that:

"The entire boundary line between the two countries has been formally delimited on the basis of the traditional, customary boundary in accordance with the principles of equality, mutual benefit, friendship and mutual accommodation. . . ."50

A joint communique issued on October 15, 1961, by Mahendra and Liu Shao-chi, "agreed that national peace was the urgent demand of the people throughout the world and for this it was necessary to oppose wars of aggression."⁵¹

The King supported China's rights in the U.N. and the Chinese reaffirmed that they fully respected the independent policy of peace and nonalignment pursued by his Majesty's government of Nepal and solemnly declared that all nations must treat each other as equals and that "China would never adopt an attitude of great national chauvinism toward Nepal."⁵²

On October 15, 1961, the foreign ministers of the two countries concluded an agreement under which China was to build a macadam road from the Tibetan frontier to Katmandu at a cost of 3,500,000 pounds sterling during

⁴⁹"Boundary Treaty between the People's Republic of China and Kingdom of Nepal, October 5, 1961," International Boundary Study No. 50, p. 4. (For treaty text see Appendix E.)

⁵⁰Dutt, China and the World, p. 183.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 184.

⁵²Ibid., p. 185.

the period July 1962 to June 1966 and to extend the road to the Tibetan capital of Lhasa. The details were reported by Hsinhua on October 28, 1961. In actual fact, as Reuters disclosed on October 29 the latter section had long been completed.⁵³

On October 5, 1962, at the first anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Nepalese boundary treaty Chen Yi, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, gave a firm pledge to Nepal on behalf of the Chinese Government: "The Nepalese people can rest assured that should any foreign power dare to attack Nepal, the Chinese Government and people . . . will stand by Nepal."⁵⁴

During the Sino-Indian border crisis in 1962, Nepal adopted an official posture of neutrality toward the border dispute, and limited its public statements to expressions of hope that the two countries could settle their differences peacefully.⁵⁵

On January 23, 1963, the final demarcation work of the joint commission created by the 1961 Sino-Nepal Boundary Treaty was embodied in the Protocol. Part one

⁵⁴Kashin, "Nepal--Chinese Stepping Stone to India," p. 25.

⁵⁵"Sino-Nepalese Boundary Treaty," Peking Review, Vol. V, No. 41, October 12, 1962, p. 6.

⁵⁶"Background Notes--Nepal," U.S. Department of State Publication 7904, October 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 1.

concerned general arrangements; part two contained the final detailed delimitation; part three, the details of the erection of the demarcation pillars; part four maintenance of the pillars; and part five, a concluding section. The protocol has not been made public, as is apparently often typical with technical demarcation documents.⁵⁶ In 1963, almost 20,000 Tibetans were scattered along Nepal's northern border;

Almost half of the former rebels, who fought against the Chinese during the 1956-59 revolt . . . should they become a nuisance to China in their marauding raids on convoys in West Tibet as they have been doing. . . . or should the situation in Nepal not develop to Peking's liking, then the presence of these larger armed attacking force on Nepal's northern border could give Peking the excuse it wanted to take direct action to absorb the country.⁵⁷

In April 1965, China expressed willingness to provide additional economic aid for Nepal's next five year plan. According to a joint communique issued at the end of a five day visit by the Chinese Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi and Nepal's Foreign Minister K. N. Bosta, "The two countries had agreed to utilize the unallocated balance of Chinese aid for the development of transport to Nepal."⁵⁸

Chinese experts were to assist in the effort.

⁵⁶"China-Nepal Boundary," International Boundary Study No. 50, p. 5.

⁵⁷Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, p. 154.

⁵⁸"China Offers Nepal New Economic Help," New York Times, Vol. CXIV, No. 39,152, April 4, 1965, p. 9.

In 1965, Nepal and China began to use the finished part of the Katmandu-Kodari Highway for the direct exchange of mail between the two countries. The exchange has been taking place at the village of Kodari on the Nepal-Tibet border. An account of alleged subversive activities being carried out in Nepal by the Chinese under the guise of activities permitted by the Peace and Friendship Treaty and the Economic Aid Agreement was given at a press conference in Taipei on June 26, 1964 by Huang Jung-Sheng. This individual was a refugee from Communist China who had graduated from the Chungking Transport Academy, and worked on the construction of the road from Tibet to Katmandu between April 1962 and April 1964. He said:

. . . the bridges along the Kodari-Katmandu road are secretly being built to accommodate heavy vehicles such as 60 metric tons rather than 8 metric tons specified by the Nepalese government. They are large enough to accommodate heavy trucks and tanks. Technical personnel working on this road have been obliged to spy for the Chinese military attache in Katmandu.⁵⁹

The London Daily Telegraph had written on June 16, 1964: ". . . the four hundred road technicians, to judge from their unwillingness to face the camera, are probably military engineers."⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Singh, "India and the Future of Asia," p. 199, Free China Weekly, Taipei, June 28, 1964; Kashin, "Nepal--Chinese Stepping Stone to India," p. 25.

⁶⁰ Kashin, "Nepal--Chinese Stepping Stone to India," p. 26; Daily Telegraph London, June 16, 1964; Singh, India and the Future of Asia, p. 200.

The Times of India unofficially reported on July 28, 1964 that the presence of Chinese workers in Nepal was being used to smuggle small arms into the country. Relations between the People's Republic of China and Nepal remained overtly friendly and cooperative through December 1967. On June 26, 1966, Nepalese Crown Prince Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva visited China at the invitation of the Peking Government. Referring to "the deep friendship" between the Chinese and Nepalese peoples, Vice Premier Chen Yi said: ". . . Today, the relations between our two countries, based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, have become still closer and more friendly than before."⁶¹

The Nepalese crown prince praised the People's Republic of China for the significant progress it had achieved in economic and other spheres under the leadership of the Chinese people's great leader Mao Tse tung. "He refuted the 'two Chinas' doctrine, dismissing it as ridiculous."⁶²

Also in 1966 China completed a survey for another road to be built by the Chinese joining Katmandu with the Nepalese town of Pokra. The highway linking Katmandu with Lhasa remained under construction. Through December 1967, Nepal continued its apparent policy of seeking to

⁶¹"Nepalese Crown Prince Visiting China," Peking Review, Vol. 9, No. 28, July 9, 1966, p. 43.

⁶²Ibid., p. 43.

maintain a balance between India and China, seemingly attempting to develop and maintain a policy of close and friendly relations with both.⁶³ In May 1967 the highway between Kodari and Katmandu had been completed. King Mahendra cut the ribbon for the highway at an impressive ceremony on May 26, 1967 marking its completion.⁶⁴ China has also agreed to construct a hydro-electric project yielding 10,000 kilowatts on the Sun Kosi River in eastern Nepal. Despite the official cooperation and friendship between the two nations, a dissatisfaction of at least certain segments of the Nepalese populace with the Chinese regime was evidenced in Katmandu on July 2, 1967 when Nepalese students pulled down a Chinese flag and burned pictures of Mao Tse tung that were on display at a Chinese stall in a local trade exhibit.⁶⁵

Bhutan

No formal diplomatic relations exist between Bhutan and the People's Republic of China. By the 1949 Treaty of Friendship between the Government of India, Bhutan has agreed to be guided by the "advice" of India

⁶³"Background Notes Nepal," p. 3.

⁶⁴"China Nepal Friendship Highway Completed," Peking Review, Vol. 10, No. 23, June 2, 1967, p. 46.

⁶⁵"Demonstrations in Nepal," New York Times, Vol. CXVI, No. 39,972, July 3, 1967, p. 2.

in foreign affairs matters.⁶⁶ Hence all formal diplomatic messages between the People's Republic and Bhutan go through the India Foreign Office. Article 2 of the treaty permits India to control Bhutan's foreign relations and much of its defenses.⁶⁷

Between the seventh and tenth centuries the territory known as Bhutan was completely overrun by Tibetans. In 1720 a Chinese imperial army invaded Tibet and established suzerainty over both Tibet and Bhutan. After the defeat of the Dzungarian Mongols, one of the Tibetan ministers appointed by the Chinese had extended his conquest into Bhutan, and claimed suzerainty over it for China. Overlordship was officially accepted by the Chinese emperor in 1728. The Government of Bhutan thenceforth was required to pay an annual tribute to China through Tibet as an intermediary.⁶⁸

On November 11, 1865 Bhutan had signed a treaty with Britain, ceding to that nation the althara passes in the foothills, as well as those in Assam, Bengal and eastern Bhutan. Bhutan also agreed to British mediation in disputes between Bhutan and the tribal chiefs of

⁶⁶"Text of Indian-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship," Issued in Darjeeling on August 8, 1949, Texts of Documents, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1965, p. 4.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 5.

⁶⁸Patterson, Peking versus Delhi, pp. 200-207.

Cooch-Behar, and Sikkim. The treaty negotiations proceeded without the participation of the Chinese or Tibetan governments, thereby weakening their claim to suzerainty.⁶⁹ The definitive end of that suzerainty came in January 1910 when King Ugyen of Bhutan signed the Punakha Treaty with Britain. This treaty provided that Bhutan's foreign relations were to be guided by the advice of the British.⁷⁰ The Tibetan-Bhutanese boundary is undefined. Here, the customary boundary follows the crest of the Great Himalayan Range which is also the watershed in this section, but China does not recognize this traditional watershed boundary as valid. The Chinese claim about 300 square miles of northeastern Bhutan and a substantial area to the north of Punakha, the old Bhutanese capital. The Chinese claim is based mainly on ethnic similarity with Tibet. In the Bhutan Himalayas, people have settled up to the water parting of the rivers and, since ancient times, the watershed range has served to separate the sphere of influence of the Bhutanese principality from the northern Tibetan tribes. The watershed range (the crest of the Great Himalaya) has thus evolved in Bhutan as the frontier with Tibet through settlement, custom,

⁶⁹Singh, India and the Future of Asia, pp. 201-202.

⁷⁰"Background Notes--Bhutan," p. 1.

and tradition.⁷¹ Discussing the Himalayan boundaries, the preface to the report of the Pamir Boundary Commission of 1895 states that:

. . . geographically, politically and ethnographically watersheds . . . are the only true and stable boundaries in these regions. . . . the possession up to the headwaters of each system by one people constitutes the only frontier that has survived the lapse of time.⁷²

Soon after the communists came to power, they published various maps of the Himalayan frontier region on which the southern boundary included large areas such as the Tashi Gang Dzong district in northeastern Bhutan and a sizable strip of territory in northwestern Bhutan as being within Chinese territory. The New York Times reported in May 1954 that "maps recently have been published in Peiping showing parts of Nepal, Bhutan and Assam on the northern borders of India as belonging to Communist China."⁷³

In October 1954 when Prime Minister Nehru questioned the Chinese leader Chao En-Lai regarding the maps, Chao replied that they were only reproductions of old "pre

⁷¹Pradyumna P. Karan, "Sikkim and Bhutan: A Geographical Appraisal," The Journal of Geography, Vol. LX, No. 2, February, 1961, pp. 58-65.

⁷²Report on the Proceedings of the Pamir Boundary Commission," Government of Calcutta, India, 1897.

⁷³"Maps published in Peiping show Parts of Nepal, Bhutan and Assam as belonging to China," New York Times, Vol. CIII, No. 35,170, May 10, 1954, p. 15.

liberation maps" and that his government had not had time to revise them.⁷⁴

In May 1955, thirty-two Indian labor leaders affiliated with the Indian National Trade Union Congress visited China for the Annual May Day celebration. They reported seeing a map hung on an office wall in Shanghai showing as a part of China, the kingdoms of Bhutan and Nepal.⁷⁵ Maps published in 1958 and 1960 by Peking continued to show large tracts of Bhutanese territory as part of Tibet.⁷⁶

In July 1958, these were published in the "China Pictorial" and also in the Soviet "New Times."⁷⁷

On August 21, 1958, the government of India addressed a note "drawing the attention of the Government of the People's Republic of China again to this matter." The note asserted:

It appears that the entire Tashi gang area of Eastern Bhutan and a considerable portion of territory in northwest Bhutan have also been included as Chinese territory.⁷⁸

In a memorandum given by the foreign office of

⁷⁴Indian White Paper I (1954-1959), p. 49.

⁷⁵A. M. Rosenthal, "Indian Labor Men Rebuff Red China," New York Times, Vol. CIV, No. 35,547, May 22, 1955, p. 10.

⁷⁶Background Notes--Bhutan," p. 3.

⁷⁷Chakravarti, India's China Policy, p. 67.

⁷⁸Indian White Paper L (1954-1959), p. 46.

China to the counsellor of India dated November 3, 1958, Peking replied:

The Chinese Government has not yet undertaken a survey of China's boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned, and that it will not make changes in the boundary on its own.⁷⁹

In a letter from Prime Minister Nehru to the Prime Minister of China dated March 22, 1959, the Prime Minister again warned that the continuing publication of Chinese maps "showing considerable parts of India and Bhutanese territory as if they were in China," was not in accordance with long established usage as well as treaties and "is a matter of great concern to us." The Prime Minister warned that it would be most unfortunate if the frontier question were to adversely effect the "friendly relations" existing between India and the People's Republic.⁸⁰ In early August 1959, China occupied eight villages within the Tibet region of China over which Bhutan had been exercising administrative control for more than 300 years. The villages had been previously immune to Tibetan law and taxes. In an August 19, 1959 note given to the Foreign Office of China by the Government of India, at the request of the Government of Bhutan, India protested the seizure. The note also decried that the local Chinese authorities had "seized

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 47.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 57.

all arms, ammunitions and ponies belonging to the Bhutan officers who were in charge of these enclaves at the village of Tarchen."⁸¹

The Indian Government urged that the Peking leaders return the articles and animals and to "ensure respect in the future by the local authorities for Bhutan's jurisdiction over the villages."⁸²

In an August 20, 1959 note given to the Foreign Office of China by the Government of India on behalf of the Government of Bhutan, India charged alleged maltreatment of Bhutanese courriers crossing through Tibetan territory. The note asserted:

The Government of India who are responsible for the external relations of Bhutan protest against the arrest and ill-treatment of Bhutan's courriers and against restrictions being placed without notice on Bhutan nationals. In particular we protest against Bhutan courriers being prevented from approaching the Indian trade agency.⁸³

The Indian note alleged that the system of Bhutan courriers crossing through Tibetan territory had been prevalent traditionally for a long time and no regulations were prescribed requiring permission or possession of any special kind of papers. Asked in August 1959 about recent Chinese assertions that Bhutan is a part

⁸¹Ibid., p. 96.

⁸²Ibid., p. 96.

⁸³Ibid., p. 97.

of Tibet, Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Dorji said, "If they (the Chinese) try to take over Bhutan, we will stand and fight,"⁸⁴

On August 31, 1959, 400 armed Chinese Communists invaded several square miles of Bhutanese territory. Following the "invasion" Prime Minister Nehru charged Communist China with penetration of Indian territory. The Indian leader told Parliament that Chinese troops had penetrated Indian border regions at two points opposite Tibet in recent weeks and that an Indian checkpoint was in Chinese hands. Mr. Nehru also made it clear that he had no intention of going to war with Communist China "over bits of jungle in northeastern India." Asked by members of the Indian Parliament what the government proposed to do about the Communist intrusion, Mr. Nehru replied: "Send more reminders. We hope this will be settled by discussions and conferences, and we do not propose to go to war."⁸⁵

This was in contrast with his statement of August 28, 1959 that "India had no alternative but to defend our borders," and that "any aggression against Bhutan and Sikkim will be considered an aggression against India."⁸⁶

⁸⁴"Bhutanese Criticizes China," New York Times, Vol. CVIII, No. 37,102, August 24, 1959, p. 4.

⁸⁵"Thrust in Bhutan by Reds Reported," New York Times, Vol. CVIII, No. 37,110, September 1, 1959, p. 1.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 10.

India was obviously retreating from its earlier statement.

In a letter from the Prime Minister of China to the Prime Minister of India, dated September 8, 1959, China added another dimension to the discussion:

The boundary between China and Bhutan . . . does not fall within the scope of our present discussions; . . . China has always respected the 'proper'⁸⁷ relationship between them (Bhutan and Sikkim) and India.⁸⁸

India replied in disagreement:

The rectification of errors of Chinese maps regarding the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India.⁸⁹

In a note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China to the Embassy of India in China dated December 26, 1959, China stated that with regard to Bhutan China had every intention of living in friendship with that nation and had no intentions of aggression against that country. The Chinese note went on to say:

. . . concerning the boundary between China and Bhutan, there is only a certain discrepancy between the delimitation of the maps of the two sides in the sector south of the so-called McMahon line.⁹⁰

For centuries there had been trade between Tibet

⁸⁷The quotations are the writer's.

⁸⁸White Paper 11 (September-November 1959),
p. 29.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 41.

⁹⁰Indian White Paper 111 (Nov. 1959-March 1960),
p. 77.

and Bhutan. An average of 20,000 tons of rice were sold to Tibet annually.⁹¹ In addition to rice, Bhutan's chief exports to Tibet consisted of fine fabrics, vegetable dyes, and brass utensils.⁹²

Bhutanese merchants brought back salt, soda, wool, and Chinese silver dollars from Tibet in exchange. During the late 1950's the Chinese had forced the Bhutanese to accept paper currency which was worthless in Bhutan. A constant harassment of Bhutanese traders also ensured. As a result of the border dispute and other abuses, in 1959, Bhutan stopped all trade with Tibet. Bhutan withdrew its trade representatives from Lhasa in 1960. Now only a trickle of refugees pass between the two countries.⁹³ The Bhutanese economy suffered initially because of the stoppage of trade with Tibet. Premier Dorji announced in 1960 that the price of rice had dropped "practically in half" to ten to fifteen rupees (\$2-\$3) a mound (82 lbs.). The rice price had risen from 150 to 180 rupees in Tibet.⁹⁴ India now provides an export market for Bhutanese rice and other Bhutanese exports.⁹⁵ In 1960, Peking published still

⁹¹"Bhutan Bars Tibet Trade," New York Times, Vol. CIX, No. 37,386, June 3, 1960, p. 4; Karan, Bhutan, p. 81.

⁹²Karan, Bhutan, p. 81

⁹³Ibid., p. 11; New York Times, June 3, 1960, p. 4.

⁹⁴New York Times, June 3, 1960, p. 4.

⁹⁵Karan, Bhutan, p. 81.

another map showing Bhutan within Communist China. Meanwhile during a major propaganda effort mounted in Lhasa, senior Chinese army officers and civilian officials threatened to "liberate" Bhutan and other Himalayan frontier states "wrongfully held by imperialist India," and suggested that military actions might be taken to occupy these areas. Bhutan had set up armed guards at check posts on the Chinese border and declared that "if there is any violation of the border area we will certainly fight."⁹⁶

Bhutan is more vulnerable to infiltration than Nepal, and Sikkim. Fourteen passes leading into Bhutan from Tibet make the kingdom more accessible to the Chinese than to the Indians.⁹⁷

A road from Lhasa to the Bhutanese border north of Thunkar was completed in 1965. Also, there are in Tibet incarnates of the Shabdungs, once powerful Dharma Rajas. The reverence in which they are held by the Bhutanese could be exploited by the Chinese.⁹⁸ The Maharaja of Bhutan and his acting Prime Minister Jigme Dorji visited Delhi in February 1961. While in Calcutta

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

⁹⁷ "Remote Bhutan Is Vital to India as a Passage to Frontier Areas," New York Times, Vol. CXII, No. 38,256, October 26, 1962, p. 7.

⁹⁸ Karan, Bhutan, p. 21.

they announced at a press conference that China had been in touch with them, offering aid for development projects as well as recognition of her sovereignty and diplomatic recognition abroad. In September 1962, new Soviet atlases issued at the time showed India's international border to be south of Sikkim and Bhutan, instead of north of these principalities as India claimed.⁹⁹ During official talks at Peking, Delhi and Rangoon, Chinese officials persistently refused to discuss the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan.¹⁰⁰ Mr. Nehru again rejected the Chinese minister's suggestion that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan did not fall within the scope of discussion. The prime minister said, ". . . The government of India was the only competent authority to take up matters concerning Bhutan's external relations."¹⁰¹

In 1962, Dorji was again approached with a Communist Chinese proposal. This one recommended a "confederation of Himalayan states" composed of Sikkim, Nepal, the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Nagaland. China also suggested exchanging some territory with Tibet, and merging the area with Sikkim to make a viable economic unit. Bhutan was not included in the Chinese proposal. Perhaps this is so because China looks upon a

⁹⁹Patterson, Peking versus Delhi, p. 219.

¹⁰⁰Chakravarti, India's China Policy, p. 158.

¹⁰¹Jain, Panscheela and After, p. 174.

large portion of Eastern Bhutan as being part of Chinese territory. The Maharaja rejected these overtures.¹⁰²

In November 1962, a month after the Chinese Communist military action had begun against India, the Peking authorities published a series of five maps which without explanation included within Bhutan, those areas previously indicated to be within Communist China.¹⁰³

Requests by Prime Minister Dorji for Bhutanese participation in negotiations with Peking relating to Bhutan were rejected by India. This clearly demonstrates the preponderant control which India exercises over the foreign relations of Bhutan. Peking occasionally still makes indirect and unofficial approaches to Bhutanese leaders, perhaps to perpetuate controversial discussions regarding Bhutan's lack of autonomy in foreign relations.

During the summer of 1966, Bhutan expressed concern at a number of border intrusions by Chinese troops and Tibetan graziers. The "intrusions" occurred in the high mountain pasture area near Sinchel La, which lies south of the traditional boundary in southern Chumbi. On April 13, 1966, a patrol of the Bhutanese army allegedly observed a Chinese patrol of 13 men about three miles

¹⁰²"U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Sikkim and Bhutan)," Department of the Army pamphlet No. 550-35 (Washington: Government Printing Office, July 1964), p. 409.

¹⁰³Peking Review, November 30, 1962, pp. 3-15.

southwest of Sinchel La, and on July 28, 1966, a party of five Tibetans with approximately 300 yaks were reportedly encamped about two miles south of Sinchel La. On September 8, 1966, Tibetan graziers were again reported in the Sinchel area. In addition, Chinese troops were cited setting up two heaps of loose stones, possibly to set up a territorial chain south of the traditional border. On September 13, 1966 a Bhutanese patrol found that Tibetan graziers were continuing to use the pastures, despite repeated warnings, and that a party of Chinese troops had dug fresh trenches in the Sinchel area.¹⁰⁴ Repeated unsuccessful attempts were purportedly made by local officials to secure withdrawal of the Tibetan graziers and Chinese troops.

India made a formal complaint to the Chinese Government on behalf of Bhutan.¹⁰⁵ The Chinese are reportedly continuing to build strategic roads along the border and are continually improving their air capability, particularly with the installation of new facilities in the Lhasa area. They have also put new radar equipment into use at several points along the Tibetan-Bhutanese border.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Sikkim and Bhutan)," p. 409.

¹⁰⁵Karan, Bhutan, p. 11.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 84.

Tibetan refugees are a potential source of friction between Bhutan and China. When the refugees began arriving in 1950, the Bhutanese Government, to preclude misunderstandings and disputes with the Peking regime, adopted a policy of refusing them the privilege of permanent asylum. The refugees were, however, allowed the right of transit on the way to India. In early 1961, India declined to accept more refugees, leaving about 4,000 awaiting permits to enter India still in Bhutan.¹⁰⁷

It can be readily discerned that Chinese designs upon the Himalayan region have had an enormous motivating influence upon Indian foreign policy in the area. Imperial China exercised suzerainty over the region for centuries and has continuously sought to reimpose its influence by means of infiltration and subversion as well as economic, military, and propagandistic tactics. The 1950 Chinese invasion of Tibet, the Sino-Indian border dispute, and the October 1962 Chinese invasion of Ladakh and the NEFA were stimuli of an enormous magnitude, and could not help but influence Indian policy toward the Himalayan States. Also, the influence of Britain in the area cannot be discounted. From 1858 the administration of India was formally transferred to the British crown and this control lasted until India became a sovereign democratic republic in April 1949.

¹⁰⁷Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Sikkim and Bhutan)," p. 409.

The example of British policy and British treaties with each of the Himalayan states, has provided a formidable mold from which Indian foreign policy toward Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim has been shaped.

Sikkim

Sikkimese history like that of Bhutan is closely identified with Tibet, and because of that, with China. Definite control of Sikkim by the Tibetans was acquired during the first half of the 17th century when several lamas fled from the Chinese in Tibet. They made Buddhist lamaism the state religion of Sikkim, and in 1642 established a government under a Tibetan king, from whom the succeeding line of Maharajas claimed descent. In the 18th and 19th centuries strife between Sikkim and Tibet, invasions of Sikkim by Nepal and Bhutan, and disputes within Sikkim's ruling family, led the British to intervene in 1826, and again in 1850. Britain had seized the Terai area and some outer hills. The trouble resulting from this matter was settled by a treaty which Britain had forced on Sikkim in 1861. This treaty established British suzerainty over Sikkim, but this was not accepted by the Tibetans who continued to engage in official activities in Sikkim. In 1888, a British military expedition drove the Tibetan army out of Sikkim and pursued it into the Chumbi valley in Tibet. The Chinese suzerains of Tibet ordered their resident in Lhasa to

make peace, but disagreement regarding suzerainty over Sikkim delayed a treaty until 1890, when Sikkim's borders were finally defined, and China recognized British control over Sikkim's internal administration and foreign relations. A convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet was signed at Calcutta on March 17, 1890 by the representatives of the Chinese and British Indian Governments.¹⁰⁸ Articles one and two of the treaty specifically defined the boundary of Sikkim and Tibet and defined Britain's control:

The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gysmochi on the Bhutan frontier and follows the abovementioned waterparting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.

2. It is admitted that the British government, whose protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognized, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that state and except through and with the permission of the British Government, neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have official relations, of any kind, formal or informal, with any other country.¹⁰⁹

In a book entitled A Brief History of Modern China, by Liu Pei Hua, a Communist Chinese author, Sikkim is listed as a "Chinese Territory" taken by imperialists "in the old democratic revolution period."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Singh, India and the Future of Asia, pp. 203-204.

¹⁰⁹ "Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet (1890)," Indian Society of International Law, New Delhi, 1962, pp. 13-15.

¹¹⁰ Singh, India and the Future of Asia, p. 206.

In 1959 Chinese officers in Tibet proclaimed that they would before long "liberate" Sikkim being wrongfully held by "Indian imperialists."¹¹¹ When the Tibetan Dalai Lama fled Tibet and Civil War broke out in that country, five thousand Tibetans entered Sikkim.¹¹² In 1961, several hundred Tibetan refugees were settled in Western Sikkim.¹¹³ Repeated proposals by Chinese authorities to form a federation of Himalayan states evoked little interest even among Sikkimese opposition leaders.¹¹⁴ On March 22, 1959, the Indian Prime Minister addressed a communication to Chou En-Lai. The note asserted:

"The boundary of Sikkim, a protectorate of India, with Tibet region of China, was defined in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and jointly demarcated on the ground in 1895."¹¹⁵

Chou replied in a letter to the Prime Minister of India dated September 8, 1959. The letter said:

"In your excellency's letter, you also referred to the boundary between China and Sikkim. . . . this question does not fall within our present discussions."¹¹⁶

¹¹¹Indian White Paper 11, p. 43.

¹¹²Harrison E. Salisbury, Orbit of China (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 102.

¹¹³Karan, The Himalayan Kingdom, p. 78.

¹¹⁴Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Sikkim and Bhutan)," p. 387.

¹¹⁵Indian White Paper (1954-1959), p. 55.

¹¹⁶Indian White Paper 11 (September-November, 1959), p. 30.

Chou assured the Indian government that China was willing to live together in friendship with Sikkim and has always respected the "proper relations" between Sikkim and India.¹¹⁷ In a letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China dated September 26, 1959, Prime Minister Nehru asked the Chinese to clarify what they meant by the statement that "the boundary of Sikkim did not fall within the scope of discussions." The letter repeated assertions made in an earlier March 22, 1959 letter that the Chinese Government recognized as far back as 1890 that the Government of India "has direct and exclusive control over the internal and foreign relations of that state. . . . there is thus no dispute regarding the boundary of Sikkim with that of Tibet."¹¹⁸

In a note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China to the Embassy of India in China, dated December 26, 1959, the Chinese Government stated: "The boundary between China and Sikkim has long been formally delimited and there is neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any disputes in practice."¹¹⁹

The Government of India in a February 12, 1960

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 30.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 41.

¹¹⁹"Boundary Question," Peking Foreign Languages Press, November, 1962, p. 88; Indian White Paper III (November 1959-March 1960), p. 77.

The Chinese Consuls in Sikkim were also expelled, and Sikkim's trade with Tibet terminated. Sikkim had previously depended upon Tibetan trade for a steady supply of animals, wool, hides, and meat.¹²³

Sino-Indian Confrontation over Sikkim

On October 27, 1962, the Chinese Mainland Press charged that the Indian ruling circles headed by Nehru were preserving the legacy of the British colonial rulers with regard to Sikkim. The report stated:

India is the only country in Asia that has a protectorate. The Indian ruling circles have used every means to interfere in the internal and external affairs around India, to control their economy and trade, and demand their absolute obedience.¹²⁴

In the mid-1960's Pulitzer Prize winner Harrison E. Salisbury, managing editor for the New York Times newspaper, visited the kingdom of Sikkim. He reported upon returning that:

They (the Indians) did not bother to conceal their wish that Sikkim be incorporated into India. They looked with hostility and suspicion on the Chogyal's (Maharaja's) determination to maintain Sikkim's independence, and to increase, if possible, her area of sovereignty. Sikkim, they said, was too small, too poor, too backward to handle its own affairs. It was hinted, a possible security risk as well. After all, there are well-known links of the Sikkim ruling house to Tibet.¹²⁵

¹²³Harrison E. Salisbury, Orbit of China (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 102.

¹²⁴Chou En-Lai, "The Sino Indian Boundary Question," pp. 97-98.

¹²⁵Salisbury, Orbit of China, p. 102.

By 1963 most of the refugees from Tibet had been interrogated and passed into India,¹²⁶ and Sikkimese sentiments toward Communist China appeared to become more cordial. At a news conference at the Overseas Press Club in New York in September 1964, the Maharaja of Sikkim voiced confidence in the relations between Sikkim and Communist China. The Maharaja also related that this country was attempting to export silver, woodwork, tents, and clothing.¹²⁷ However, the mood was soon to change for on September 28, 1964, the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China sent a note to the Indian Embassy in China protesting alleged intrusions by Indian troops crossing the China-Sikkim border. The note asserted that Indian troops had time and time again intruded into China's territory across passes on the China-Sikkim boundary and listed the following specific examples:

- " . . . as early as September 1962 Indian troops intruded into the Chinese side of Natu La pass and up to now have unlawfully entrenched themselves there and refused to withdraw. . . .
- 2. Up to August 1964, Indian troops crossed Tungchula pass and intruded into China's territory. They have built 18 aggressive military structures on the Chinese side of the pass on the boundary line.
- 3. Indian troops intruded into China's territory on August 12, 1964, at Tagi Pass and on August 14, 1964, four Indian soldiers crossed the Peilunga Pass

¹²⁶"U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 388.

¹²⁷"Sikkim Ruling Couple Voice Confidence in Red China," New York Times, Vol. CXIII, No. 38,953, September 17, 1964, p. 2.

(West of Tagi Pass) and intruded into China's territory for reconnaissance."¹²⁸

In addition to charging the Indian government with border intrusions Peking accused Delhi of "groundlessly slandering China as "concentrating troops," building bases along the China-Sikkim border, and penetrating deep into Sikkim. Peking urged India to put an immediate stop to its "aggressive activities" and withdraw its troops which "are unlawfully entrenched on Chinese territory."¹²⁹ A Chinese threat to Sikkim occurred on September 17, 1965. On that date, a Chinese ultimatum demanded that India demolish structures allegedly built by that nation on the Tibetan side of the Sikkimese border. India replied that if any structures were found on the Tibetan side of the Sikkimese border, there would be no objection to their being demolished. The Indian note offered:

joint inspection of those points of the Sikkim-Tibetan Indian frontier where Indian personnel are alleged to have set up military structures in Tibetan territory. The Government of India on its part is prepared to arrange such an inspection as early as possible.¹³⁰

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a note

¹²⁸"China Strongly Protests Against Indian Troops' Intrusion into Chinese Territory," Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 41, October 9, 1964, p. 18.

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 18.

¹³⁰Singh, India and the Future of Asia, p. 195.

of May 4, 1966, to the Indian Embassy charged that India had not only stationed large numbers of troops in Sikkim, but had constantly crossed the delimited China-Sikkim boundary to intrude into Chinese territory and provoke conflict. The Chinese government accused India of imposing a protectorship on the people of Sikkim, and "inheriting the mantle of aggression from British imperialism." The note went on to say:

"Frankly speaking, such unequal relationship in which a big country bullies a small one and encroaches upon its sovereignty, has long been spurned by the people of the world. . . . Talking about military pressure on Sikkim, it is not China that applies it, but precisely India, who is tightening her military control over Sikkim on the pretext of defense."¹³¹

On September 12, 1967, the Chinese began an artillery barrage at Natu La pass in Sikkim in an attack that lasted intermittently until October.¹³² China charged in a broadcast monitored in Tokyo that India "attacked Chinese forces to get more U.S. aid."¹³³

The first clash started when the Chinese fired upon Indian troops as they were erecting a barbed wire barricade on the border. On October 1, 1967, Indian

¹³¹"India Slanders Cannot Cover Up Its Intrusions into Chinese Territory," Peking Review, Vol. 9, No. 21, May 20, 1966, p. 43.

¹³²Joseph Lelyneid, "India Asks China for Sikkim Truce," New York Times, September 13, 1967, p. 14.

¹³³Bernard D. Nossiter, "Shots Traded Again on Sikkim Frontier," Washington Post, September 14, 1967, p. 26.

and Chinese troops again exchanged fire, at Cho Pass, a narrow pass on the border about three and a half miles northwest of Natu La Pass. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said at a public meeting in Bombay that she hoped the flare up would not expand, but if it did, "we must keep ourselves ready to face it."

The Prime Minister stated: "We will not do anything to worsen the situation. . . . the clashes are not of our seeking."¹³⁴

Just what was behind these border "flare ups" was not known, but the New Delhi government and defense officials agreed that they were local actions. The Chinese shooting began the day the Maharaja of Sikkim and his American born wife returned from a visit to India. It may have been a warning to Sikkim that too close a friendship between its government and India would not be tolerated. Another theory is that Peking wanted India to keep up its heavy defense expenditures by staging a shooting incident at the border. The hostilities came at a time when Indian Deputy Prime Minister Mararji Desai was in Washington, and it was said that the Americans had suggested India reduce its defense budget since the country could ill afford high military expenditures during its current economic recession. Any thought of a

¹³⁴"New Fight Flares at a Sikkim Pass," New York Times, October 8, 1967, p. 4.

cutback appeared ended when the Chinese opened their barrage. After the border incidents an undisclosed number of Indian troops moved into Sikkim. The Christian Science Monitor reported in January 1968: "Uniforms (Indian) are everywhere in the city, with soldiers buying souvenirs for the folks back home in Rajasthan, Bombay, or New Delhi."¹³⁵

Chinese Designs on the Himalayan States

From 1958 to 1961 the Chinese had asserted emphatically and frequently over the Peking and Lhasa radio systems that Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and the North East Frontier Agency were "fingers of the hands of China." If Ladakh is the little finger by China's reasoning, both in position and relative importance, then Nepal is the fourth finger. This might seem surprising in view of Nepal's relatively large (ten million) population, international importance and present position of influence in the Himalayas. However, China is having some success with its present policies, and can afford to wait for Nepal to fall further under Chinese influence by methods which Hans Morgenthau would call economic and cultural imperialism and which Bachrach and Baratz would call relationships of influence and manipulation. In

¹³⁵Everest Weatherall, "Peking Jab at Sikkim Border Still Mystifies Indian Soldiers," Christian Science Monitor, January 6, 1968, p. 13.

1956, a treaty was signed between China and Nepal permitting an exchange of diplomatic representatives and an offer of Rs six crores in Chinese aid to Nepal. Since then, China's economic aid has been extended to Rs 23 crores. She has built a vitally strategic road from Lhasa to Katmandu, and a network of roads in an area to the north and east. The Nepal communist party now underground, has only about 10,000 members,¹³⁶ but it is quite cohesive and well organized.

Sikkim, the middle finger, was formerly described by Sir Charles Bell, a British officer, as a "dagger pointed at the heart of India." Modern military strategists in the Indian army agree with this statement. The Chinese could launch a major assault down the Teesta Valley into Bengal and Bihar and the port of Calcutta 400 miles away. The proximity of the Chinese army located in the Tibetan passes, 50 miles from Gangtok, has created great tension in the area. Since the Sino-Indian border clash in 1962, China has protested several times about the movement of Indian troops on Sikkim's northern border.

Bhutan is the first finger of the Chinese hand. By occupying Bhutan, China would not only be able to dominate the NEFA but the whole of Assam and invoke a blockade on India's trade of tea, oil, and jute from the area.

¹³⁶ George Patterson, "The Five Fingers of China," The Indian Review, Vol. 64, No. 2, February, 1965, p. 58.

Chinese agents operate in Bhutan, disguised as Tibetan refugees, attempting to create unrest among the citizenry against the Maharaja and his regime. The Chinese view the NEFA, the thumb, as a political problem and an important supply route from China to Assam.¹³⁷ It is against this awesome background, then, that the foreign relations of India with the Himalayan kingdoms must be viewed.

Chapter III has dealt with Communist Chinese aggressions and designs on the Himalayan frontier and parts of India itself as a great influencing factor upon the relationships of India, with Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal. The Indian reaction to Chinese advances as well as the particularized relations which ensue are explored in detail in Chapters V through VII. Chapter IV provides a platform upon which to build the specialized relations of India with the three Himalayan kingdoms by exploring the basic tenets of Indian foreign policy, and the foreign policy similarities of the three kingdoms. Chapter IV also focuses upon the importance of Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal to the Indian Himalayan defense strategy.

¹³⁷Ibid., p. 58.

CHAPTER IV

BASIC TENETS OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE HIMALAYAN STATES

Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1962

The foreign policies of the British Indian Government were based on preventing outside attack and keeping open the line of communications with Great Britain. The Afghan campaigns, the British expedition to Tibet, and the efforts to maintain British influence in Persia were designed to make India secure against penetration from Russia. The creation of buffer states along the northern borders, along with a foothold on the border areas in the northeast, was part of a defensive belt against Russia and China. In the eastern Mediterranean, the Suez, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, British policy was aimed primarily at keeping the trade routes open.

However, many Indians felt that certain aspects of the British foreign policies were not in their best interests. The Indian National Congress, founded in 1885 to build a nationalist movement and later to act as spokesman for the people, disapproved from the very beginning the annexation by the British of Upper Burma and in

1897 deplored "frequent (British) military expeditions beyond the present limits of the British Indian Empire." In a similar vein, the Congress in 1904 protested against the British expedition to Tibet and other ventures into Afghanistan and Persia, fearful that they might "involve India in foreign entanglements." Beginning in 1921, the foreign policies of the Congress became much more vocal, when it formally proclaimed that "the present government of India in no way represents Indian opinion."

In 1920 Gandhi had written:

Common lot no less than territorial homogeneity and cultural affinity is bringing the Asiatic races wonderfully together, and they now seem determined to take their fullest share in world politics.¹

In subsequent resolutions the party encouraged and supported the struggle of dependent peoples for freedom and independence from the grip of foreign imperialism and continued to condemn the racial segregation in South Africa. The horizons of the Congress were further broadened by the establishment in 1928 of a Foreign Department under Jawaharlal Nehru, who has had an enormous impact in the formulation of the principles of Indian foreign policy. Even while the Indian National Congress was struggling against the British it was formulating a stand in foreign affairs under Nehru's leadership, that bore a

¹Patwant Singh, India and the Future of Asia (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1966), p. 116; Young India, April 14, 1920.

great resemblance to India's future foreign policy. Nehru's aim seems to have been to avoid being drawn into any groups or configurations of power, and this was associated in his mind from a very early date with the methods of anachronistic empires, which he labeled policies of the balance of power, or simply power politics. India was to refuse to tie her policy to the interests of any great power so that she was free to cultivate friendly and cooperative relations with all powers. At the same time, Nehru believed that the system of national independent states, without any empires, and extended to the rest of the world, was not viable in itself, so that peaceful and friendly cooperation under some sort of world association or federation was inescapable.²

When in 1939, India was declared a belligerent country by Great Britain the Congress refused cooperation "in a war which is conducted on imperialist lines and which is meant to consolidate imperialism in India and elsewhere." This refusal culminated in the famous "Quit India" resolution of August 1942, passed by the Congress against British colonial administration. As a result, the Congress was outlawed, and most of its leaders imprisoned until the war was nearly over. The

²A. R. Rana, "The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Nonalignment," The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, February, 1969, pp. 302-303.

numerous resolutions of the Congress failed to influence the policies of Great Britain to any appreciable extent. However, after independence on August 15, 1947, the Indian National Congress, led by Nehru, became the ruling political party of India.

As early as 1946, Nehru as Minister for External Affairs in the interim Government had spelled out the objectives of the future foreign policy of India:

"In the sphere of foreign affairs, India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from the power politics of groups aligned with or against the other. . . . India will uphold the principle of freedom for the dependent peoples and will oppose racial discrimination wherever it may appear. . . . Towards the United Nations, India's attitude is that of whole-hearted cooperation and unreserved adherence, in both spirit and letter, to the Charter governing it. To that end, India will participate fully in its various activities. . . ." ³

In 1948, the Congress declared that the foreign policy of India must be based on the principles which had guided the Party in past years. The main objective of foreign policy as pronounced by Nehru on various occasions was the preservation of world peace:

In foreign affairs we had no interest other than to cultivate friendly cooperation with all countries and to help keep world peace as the sine qua non of everything else. ⁴

³ Singh, India and the Future of Asia, p. 119; The Indian Annual Register 1946 (Calcutta: Annual Register Office, 1947), II, pp. 252-253.

⁴ Jawaharalal Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 3, April, 1963, pp. 453, 465.

Nehru explained that this attitude had been shaped by India's own struggle for freedom, as well as by "the accumulated experience of centuries and above all by Mahatma Gandhi's teachings."⁵ Beyond the pursuit of peace, although in many instances strictly subordinate to it, the major objectives of Indian foreign policy were declared by Nehru in his Columbia University address in the United States on October 17, 1949. In explaining India's foreign policy as an attempt "to combine idealism with national interest" Nehru listed the following foreign policy objectives:

1. The liberation of subject peoples.
2. The maintenance of freedom, both national and individual.
3. The elimination of racial discrimination.
4. The elimination of want, disease, and ignorance affecting the greater part of the world's population.⁶

The foreign policy of India, like that of any other country, has in part been conditioned by certain basic factors, such as geographic, strategic, and historical considerations, as well as domestic pressures and influences, and basic characteristics of national life. Other factors affecting the course of a country's foreign

⁵Ibid., p. 456.

⁶Ross N. Berkes, The Diplomacy of India (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 1, 140.

policies are the policies and attitudes of other states and the general course of international developments. In geographic and strategic terms, India occupies a vital part of the earth's surface. Since relations with Pakistan are unsettled, there is a strategic problem within the natural frontiers of the Indian subcontinent. India is directly concerned with the security of the Indian Ocean area, but has no immediate problem in this respect, so long as the defense of the region depends essentially upon British and American sea power, with such collateral support as the Indian Navy can provide. With Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim within its strategic frontiers, India has the largest border which any non-communist state shares with a communist state, and the greatest of the Communist powers is not far to the northwest. In countless ways, India's long historical experience has shaped its policies as an independent state. Its leaders have been made particularly sensitive to foreign domination in a cultural and psychological sense as well as a political one, and they are especially concerned with remaining aloof from great power politics in order to concentrate on serious internal problems. India has struggled to act externally as well as internally, in keeping with its traditions and beliefs. The policy of nonalignment may not be explained solely in terms of current weaknesses and opportunities as related to the existing international

situation. The careful student of Indian society and history is likely to conclude that the policy has even deeper roots in the Indian past and that it is linked with the great traditions of Indian philosophy and experience, such as the Buddhist teaching of the middle way, the ancient faith in Ahimsa--meaning nonviolence in more than a physical sense--and other Gandhian teachings based on Indian values.⁷ Gandhi's emphasis on truth and purity of means from which he evolved his creed of nonviolence was but another aspect of his deep humanism, for it insisted that men in their fight for rights, whether as individuals or as groups, should never violate their basic obligation to respect life. Gandhi had said:

"I do not want the freedom of India if it means the extinction of England or the disappearance of Englishmen. . . as man has not been given the power to create, he has not the power to destroy the smallest creature that lives."⁸

The deep humanism and preoccupation with peace which Gandhi felt and which greatly influenced his thoughts on foreign policy are inherent in the Hindu philosophy of India.

From the Aryans stemmed the Hindu religious philosophy, the oldest of the world's surviving religions.

⁷George M. Kahin, Major Governments of Asia (New York: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 389-390.

⁸Indira Rothermund, "The Individual and Society in Gandhi's Political Thought," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, February, 1969, p. 381.

Some mention should be made of Hinduism as to its effect on the political climate of India since the Republic is the home of more than 95% of the world's adherents of Hinduism.⁹ Traditional Hinduism has led to a deep-rooted tendency toward mysticism and monistic philosophy. It also has helped to foster a stratified system of social classes, generally called castes which have been given religious sanction; and a propensity to assimilate rather than to exclude. The whole scheme of life of the Hindus is governed by their religious rules. These rules effect health, clothing, food, and occupations. In traditional Indian society members of separate castes were forbidden to marry or even eat together and occupations were categorized according to caste.

In the sixth century B.C., Gautama, the Buddha, born in the foothills of the Himalayas, branched off from Hinduism in his search for means of escape from the wheel of life and the endless succession of birth and rebirth. Three centuries later the Maurya Emperor Asoka became a convert to Buddhism, making it the state religion of his great empire. Until the mid-sixth century A.D., Buddhism flourished in India and flowered in works of art and literature. Then, though it continued to become strong in other parts of Asia, in

⁹Statesman's Yearbook 1968-1969, p. 1068.

India it declined steadily and was largely absorbed by Hinduism.¹⁰ The influence of Hinduism upon Gandhi's political thought with particular reference to the Hindu belief that all living things are the same in essence, and a part of the Universal essence known as Brahma is evidenced by his statement that,

Willing submission to social restraint for the sake of the well being of the whole society, enriches both the individual and society of which he is a member. . . . if one man gains spiritually, the whole world gains with him, and if one man fails, the whole world fails to that extent.¹¹

The influence of Gandhi and Hinduism on Nehru's foreign policy is also evident in the latter's sympathy that "some sort of world association or federation is inescapable,"¹² as well as his development of the principles of Panch Shila.

The guiding rules in the formulation and execution of Indian foreign policy in an ideal sense are particularized by Panch Shila (Five Principles). They are:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. Mutual nonaggression.

¹⁰"The Subcontinent of South Asia," Dept. of State Publication 7410 (Washington: Government Printing Office, November, 1962), pp. 36-37.

¹¹Rothermund, "The Individual and Society in Gandhi's Political Thought," pp. 315-316.

¹²A. R. Rana, "The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Nonalignment," p. 303.

3. Mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

4. Equality and mutual benefit.

5. Peaceful coexistence.¹³

The Panch Shila was first enunciated in the preamble to the Sino-Indian agreement of Tibet of 1954 and was reaffirmed later in the year in a joint statement by the two Prime Ministers, Nehru and Chou En-Lai. The Indian government had since adopted these principles as its idealistic creed in foreign relations. As will be pointed out later India's foreign policy toward Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal has been based on far more pragmatic considerations such as national interest and national security.

The "five principles" are based on the traditional belief that truth is not confined to one person or one people or even to one country, because truth is viewed to possess too many aspects for anyone to presume that he knows all.

Most Indian leaders have felt strongly that the most pressing problem in the world is not that of communism versus democracy but peace versus war. They did not commonly accept the idea that the struggle between the

¹³"Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China 1954-1959," Indian White Paper I (New Delhi, 1959), p. 105.

West and the Communist powers is between the forces of good and evil. In their view, the East-West conflict tends to discount the value of peace because of the growing tendency on the part of the great powers to stress the primacy of military strength rather than the importance of creating a climate for peaceful discussion. Consequently, the leaders have disagreed with the theory of "peace through security," as manifested in the military pacts subscribed to by the Western as well as Communist bloc nations, because in their view, contending parties will go on increasing their respective strength, causing further fears and tensions.

Also, India's national self-interest has required peace since it is economically backward and militarily weak. Its leaders have felt that the urgently needed rapid economic development could be undertaken only in a climate of peace and this required that India be surrounded by friendly neighbors. India's determined efforts to cultivate friendly and peaceful relations with its powerful Communist neighbors, the Soviet Union and China, were based partly on this pragmatic appraisal of both external and internal factors.

India's national interests also required that it maintain a complete freedom of maneuver, uncompromised by adherence to any pacts or blocs. It has believed therefore that nonalignment was the most expedient means

of assuring continued economic and technical aid from both the Western and Communist-bloc nations.¹⁴

India's hatred of imperialism has its roots in the nation's long domination under the British. British ideas and political examples had an enormous impact upon Indian foreign policy, for as will be shown later, the current treaties which India has with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal were all patterned after treaties which Britain had made with these Himalayan kingdoms prior to Indian independence.

Indian Foreign Policy 1963-1967

Since October 1962, the principle of peaceful coexistence has become subject to vigorous attack in India. Nehru himself came to the conclusion that:

"We will now already have to give considerable more attention to strengthening our armed forces and to the production within the country, to the extent possible, of all weapons and equipment needed by them. . . . in the world today it is not enough to be devoted to peace, or to mind one's own affairs, but it is also necessary to have adequate armed strength . . . and above all, to conserve and consolidate national unity."¹⁵

After the Sino-Indian War of 1962, advice and assistance were sought in developing India's armed forces. Arrangements were made with the United States, Great Britain and

¹⁴Michael Brecher, Nehru's Mantle (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 6-20.

¹⁵Nehru, "Changing India," Foreign Affairs, April, 1963, pp. 462-463.

the Soviet Union, among others, for help in an Indian arms buildup. To many, clear evidence of the declining favor of the Congress Party as demonstrated in the election of May 1963 was a result in part of Nehru's foreign policy.¹⁶ In that election three important Congress Party candidates were defeated in Lok Sabha elections. Though detailed studies of these elections have revealed that factors other than government policy had been more important, the opposition parties, the press, and the Congress Party itself tended to perceive these defeats as a protest against its foreign and domestic policy.¹⁷

Since Prime Minister Nehru's death in 1964, India has been reorganizing its foreign policy, a *modus operandi* that did not succeed in reaching its major goals. Nehru's attempt to establish cordial relations with Communist China, even at the expense of Tibetan aspirations for independence, appeared to terminate with the border war of 1962. The Sino-Soviet split complicated the Indo-Chinese discord by dividing the Communist party of India into Moscow and Peking factions, thereby adding internal political cleavage to the circumstances of external confrontation.

¹⁶For an excellent analysis of the factors responsible for these defeats see the Economist Weekly, XVII (May 22, May 29, and June 19, 1965), pp. 845-858, 893-902, 987-1000.

¹⁷Stanley A. Kochenek, "Post Nehru India: The Emergence of the New Leadership," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No. 5, May 1966, p. 292.

As of 1964, India's relationships with other immediate neighbors such as Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal and Burma were inconstant. The war with Pakistan in 1965 revealed the depth of the bitterness that existed between the two countries over Kashmir and other matters.¹⁸

Nehru's successors, Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri and Mrs. Indira Gandhi, have not abandoned his policies, although they have altered the emphasis. They have continued to advance the search for peace, while at the same time strengthening and modernizing the Indian defense establishment. Nonalignment is still the cornerstone of India's diplomacy and the United States and the U.S.S.R. compete with aid, as the circle of bilateral agreements widens to include more support from West and East Germany, Japan, East Europe and others. At the United Nations and in world forums generally, India maintains a search for the nonviolent solution of major world disorders.

President Savepalli Radhakrishnan, addressing Parliament on March 18, 1967, underlined the continuity of India's policy:

"The foreign policy of India has stood the test of time. The concept of peaceful co-existence, which India has done so much to sponsor, is now accepted by the leaders of the two groups. With both the United States and the Soviet Union, we have the

¹⁸Richard L. Park, "India Foreign Policy, 1964-1968," Current History, April 1968, p. 46.

friendliest of relations. Our policy of non-alignment stands vindicated. Government will do everything possible to strengthen non-alignment and pursue the positive aspects of this policy with rigor and determination."

Radhakrishnan added: "It will be Government's special endeavour to strengthen India's relations with our neighbours."¹⁹

The conflict with India's most immediate neighbor, Pakistan, is as heated as it was in 1964. One should take note of the restraint shown by India in her relations with Pakistan, and the extent of the public and private effort made to appreciate the Pakistani viewpoint, even on Kashmir. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri gave a great deal of attention to the settlement of long-standing disagreements with Ceylon, and Mrs. Gandhi has continued the dialogue. The Agreement on the Status and Future of Persons of India Origin in Ceylon, signed on October 30, 1964, did much to set a new tone for Indo-Ceylonese relations. The understandable desire for independence in Nepal has led that government to seek a judicious middle ground between India and China, but Indian influence--and, to a degree, popularity--remains dominant. Burma and other areas of Southeast Asia also have been approached for improved ties of commerce and friendship.

What has changed since 1964 is an improvement in the craftsmanship of India's diplomacy, the planned

¹⁹Ibid., p. 46.

diversification of cultural and economic interests in Asia and Africa, the rebuilding of closer relationships with the U.A.R. and Yugoslavia, and a tightening of ties with the U.S.S.R. India's association with the United States is cooperative, but cordiality is only occasionally present. The Vietnam war and its ramifications tend to place in jeopardy other aspects of Indo-American cooperation, at least within official circles. India's foreign policy is changing; but not abruptly, nor are the old principles and approaches being discarded.²⁰

India's parliamentary democracy passed a crucial test following the death of Prime Minister Nehru in late May 1964. Until his death Mr. Nehru had been India's preeminent political leader and only Prime Minister. Because of the unique position he occupied in Indian public life and because of his great personal contribution to the growth of Indian democracy, there had been some concern within India itself over the impact which the loss of Mr. Nehru's leadership might have on the country's political life. However, within a few days of Mr. Nehru's death, a new Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was elected unanimously by the ruling Congress Party, and the transfer of power was accomplished in an orderly and constitutional manner.

Mr. Shastri led the Government for 19 months until

²⁰Ibid., p. 48.

his death at Tashkent in Soviet Asia in January 1966. He had just signed an agreement with President Ayub Khan of Pakistan designed to establish a more durable peace in the subcontinent in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. Once again India's political leadership effected a smooth transition, electing Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the widowed daughter of Prime Minister Nehru, to succeed Mr. Shastri. Mrs. Gandhi subsequently was reelected to the Prime Ministership following the fourth general election in 1967.

These elections ushered in a new phase in Indian political development. The Congress Party, for 50 years the supreme forum for meaningful politics in India, no longer holds the monopoly of power it had enjoyed throughout the postindependence period. It has lost its preponderant position in Parliament, where its victories in the first three general elections had consistently given it control of about three-fourths of the seats in the key lower house; and it has suffered even more severe setbacks in the voting for State legislatures, a number of which are now controlled by non-Congress governments.

Most of these non-Congress governments are coalitions of various small political parties, often dissimilar in policy and ideology. Several of them have proven unstable, and by the end of 1967 three had lost their legislative majorities and were dismissed. Nevertheless,

it remains clear that the era when the Indian political structure was characterized as a "one plus" party system is over, and that the country is moving into a new phase of development which will pose both challenges and opportunities to its institutions.²¹

Indian Himalayan Defense Strategy

It is useful to narrow the discussion from the more general considerations of earlier chapters to the restricted focus of India's Himalayan defense strategy, in order to provide a smooth transition to the more particularized relationships that follow upon which the definitive categorization scheme will be constructed.

The Chinese invasion of Indian territory in October, 1962, brought into sharp focus the important strategic position of the three Himalayan Kingdoms. In that attack, and in later probing moves in Sikkim in 1965 and 1967, China has demonstrated an apparent intention of gaining dominance over the approaches to northern India and establishing herself as the preponderant political power in the area. The communist leadership has stated unequivocally that Tibet is like the palm of China's hand; and, with the palm firmly under control, the fingers, namely Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and the NEFA must

²¹ "Background Notes--India," U.S. Department of State, Publication 7847, December, 1967, p. 3.

also be brought under control. New Delhi fears that Communist Chinese control over the passes leading from Tibet would cause Bhutan and Nepal to lose confidence in India's determination and ability to protect them, and would make China the dominant foreign power in the area. "With control over the Himalayan region, Communist China would be like a boulder poised to roll downhill into Indians (sic) heartland, an ancient Indian fear."²²

China has looked upon the three Himalayan kingdoms as an extension of Tibet: as areas of former Chinese influence wrested away initially by the imperialistic British, and more recently imperialized by their vicar, the Indian government.²³ Militarily the topography favors China, who can advance down from the Tibetan plateau. India has been improving strategic communications in the region; and the Chinese have been building roads, and air fields, and have a more comprehensive logistical structure. In 1960, the Chinese were estimated to be maintaining in Tibet six divisions organized into two armies. In the Ladakh area they held the high ground and their supply routes across the Tibetan plateau were relatively

²²A. M. Rosenthal, "British Will Fly Weapons to India in Next Few Days," New York Times, Vol. CXII, No. 38,263, October 28, 1962, p. 6.

²³"Bhutan and Sikkim," Canadian Geographical Journal, Vol. LXV, No. 6, December 1962, pp. 200-207.

close to their front lines.²⁴ The situation has presented India with a major security problem.²⁵ As a result of the 1962 conflict, India lost key positions along the Himalayans and Chinese armies had held the mountain gateways to the Assam plains.²⁶ As a result of the cease-fire agreement, China has pulled back from all but two of the passes leading into Assam.

The location of Bhutan and Sikkim between the Tibetan plateau and the Assam-Bongal plains of India gives the two kingdoms considerable strategic importance. Along with the rest of the Himalayas, India regards these nations as a front-line defense in the border conflict with China.²⁷ Speaking before the Indian parliament, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru has asserted:

"From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier, of course, they are no longer as impassible as they used to be but are still fairly effective. . . . We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated . . . , to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security."²⁸

The Chumbi Valley was once the seat of Sikkim's rulers, but was taken over by Tibet in the 18th century.

²⁴Hanson W. Baldwin, "Mountain War in India," New York Times, Vol. CXII, No. 38,262, October 27, 1962, p. 2.

²⁵Kahin, Major Governments of Asia, p. 389.

²⁶Ibid., p. 390.

²⁷"Bhutan and Sikkim," Canadian Geographic Journal, pp. 200-202.

²⁸Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 135.

Five strategic passes lead from the Chumbi Valley into Sikkim. These include:

- a. The Cho-La
- b. The Yok La
- c. The Natu La
- d. The Dongchui La
- e. The Jelep-La.²⁹

From Sikkim two vital highways lead into India, The Nathula Gangtok-Siliguri and Jelep Rhenoch. If China were able to wrest control of the passes and highways they could pour down the Indian plains and cut off Siliguri, isolating completely the eastern areas of India comprising parts of Bengal, Assam, the NEFA, Nagaland and the Kingdoms of Bhutan and Sikkim.³⁰

Fourteen passes through the Himalayas leading from Tibet into Bhutan also concern India as potential invasion routes for the Chinese Communist forces. However, with elevations ranging from approximately 15,000-20,000 feet, the passes are negotiable only by pack animals or porters. The passes include:

- a. Senchel La³¹
- b. Tremo La

²⁹Scene of Chinese probe attacks in 1965 and 1967.

³⁰Singh, India and the Future of Asia, pp. 202-203.

³¹Scene of a number of probind intrusions by Chinese troops in 1966.

- c. Thunkar Pass (the Pass leads to Lhasa over a Tibetan motorable road completed by Communist China in 1965)
- d. Shingbe Pass
- e. Tashi-Gang Dzong

In addition to these, the two most critical passes on the east-west axis route are within 25 miles either side of Tonga Dzong, the most important community in central Bhutan. On the east is Rudong Pass, elevation 12,000 feet, on the west is Pele Pass, elevation 11,055 feet.³²

Nehru had reaffirmed in 1963: "The Himalayan barrier has proved to be vulnerable. If it is breached the way to the Indian plains and the ocean beyond would be exposed."³³

India has taken measures to strengthen the Himalayan frontier. In Bhutan, in accordance with the recommendation of a team of Indian military experts, Bhutan has been reorganizing its military power. Several Bhutanese have received military training at the Indian military academy, and have returned to Bhutan to direct the reorganization program of the army at Thimbu. However, although India maintains groups of military

³²Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (with Sikkim and Bhutan)," pp. 397-398.

³³Nehru, Foreign Affairs, April, 1963, p. 458.

advisers at Thimbu and Ha, there are no Indian military formations in Bhutan.³⁴ Indian troops in Sikkim were increased to 25,000-30,000 men in 1962 to guard the passes from Tibet. Particular attention is given to Natu-La and Jelep-La passes, about 25 miles northeast of Gangtok. India is also completing the construction of roads, particularly into the northern valleys.³⁵

Geographically, Nepal also occupies a key position in the Himalayan defense perimeter. India has recognized this and has made it clear that it will not allow any encroachments on Nepalese territory. India has also provided Nepal with substantial economic assistance, which currently totals more than 14 million dollars annually.³⁶

India has sought to maintain its prestige and influence with the leaders of the Nepalese Government and tends to be highly sensitive about Nepal's relations with other countries, particularly those with Communist China and Pakistan.³⁷ Indeed along the whole of the Himalayan border, it is not as much coexistence as containment that the Indians are following.³⁸

³⁴Karan, Bhutan, p. 21.

³⁵Karan, The Himalayan Kingdom, p. 77.

³⁶"Background Notes--Nepal," Department of State Publication 7904 (Washington: Government Printing Office, October, 1967), p. 5.

³⁷National Geographic Magazine, Vol. 123, 1963, pp. 409-410.

³⁸Gordon Shepherd, "Where India Meets Red China in the Himalayas," The Reporter, Vol. 19, No. 3, Sept. 4, 1968, p. 29.

Basic Similarities in the Foreign Policies of
Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal

Basic similarities in the world-view of the ruling classes in Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan are reflected in the policies pursued by the three states. These similarities are caused by the fact that all three are comparatively small and weak countries surrounded by more powerful and expansion minded neighbors. Certain geopolitical factors have operated to their advantage. Lines of communication into and within their territories have been limited, and the mountainous terrain has provided them with a natural defense against invasion. This comparative inaccessibility fostered the evolution of ethnic and cultural features that caused these societies to develop a culture fairly distinct from their neighbors to the north and south. For all of these reasons, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan have been relatively successful in safeguarding some degree of independence throughout much of their history.

For these reasons a consistent theme in the foreign policy pursued by these states has been the great dependence placed upon efforts to isolate themselves from outside influences, particularly in periods when developments to the north or south appeared to pose a threat to their independence. Complete isolation has not been possible for the simple reason that trade routes and lines of communication between India, Central Asia and China traverse

the three states. Nevertheless, at various times in their history the authorities in these states often were prepared to forfeit some of the economic advantages inherent in their control and strategic position in favor of political isolation. Thus, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Chinese control in Tibet and British expansion in India threatened the political integrity of the border states, their governments placed rigid controls on international trade as one means of limiting external pressure. This policy was implemented with relative success throughout the British period in India. The single exception was Sikkim, which was less favorably situated to resist British pressure--a fact which partly explains the difference between Sikkim's present position and that of Bhutan and Nepal.

An "isolationist" policy was no longer quite so attractive after 1947 and even less so after 1951. Nevertheless, this general approach to the world still exerts great appeal to the authorities and public in these states. It is reflected, for example, in their attitude toward the development of systems of communications. Some elements in Nepal are strongly opposed to north-south roads that connect the country with the outside world; their preference is for east-west highways that help unify the country without increasing access to the country from either India or China. Similar motivations underly the opposition of

the Bhutanese authorities to road construction programs within their territory. It was only the recent events in Tibet that finally convinced the Bhutan government of the absolute necessity of direct communications with India. Government factions in Bhutan still react negatively to suggestions for the improvement of communications with the outside world.

A second facet of the Himalayan border state's traditional foreign policy has been the utilization of what might be termed a "balance of power" principle. When feasible (i.e., when powerful governments controlled northern India and Tibet) and when necessary (i.e., when any of these powers threatened the political integrity of the Himalayan states), a policy based on this principle has been pursued. "Balance of Power" has been a fundamental political concept in this area for many centuries and it appears to be deeply ingrained in the thoughts of the political elite. The automatic and immediate response to any outside threat has always been to seek other external sources of support that might conceivably be useful as a counterbalance. The history of this area is characterized by instances in which the rulers excelled in the art of playing neighbor against neighbor. Preferences for this strategy still are apparent in the policies pursued by Nepal and Bhutan.

"Isolationism" and "balance of power," then, were the twin pillars of the foreign policies of the border states. Under certain circumstances both policies would be applied jointly. For example, from 1770-1850 Kathmandu's foreign policy pursued as its dual objective the maximum isolation of Nepal from both the British in India and Chinese in Tibet while, at the same time, balancing these two powers against each other to Nepal's advantage. It is quite possible that Nepal would have been absorbed into the British Indian Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century except for British fears of a Chinese reaction to such an absorption.

At other times, however, one or the other of these two basic policies could not be easily implemented. After 1850, for instance, Peking's influence at Lhasa declined, due to China's defeat in the "Opium War" and internal upheavals such as the T'ai ping rebellion. Since China could no longer be counted on to balance British imperial ambitions, Nepal and Bhutan were forced to seek an accommodation with the British that left them autonomous, but under strong British influence in foreign affairs. In these circumstances both Nepal and Bhutan placed an even greater emphasis on an "isolationist" policy aimed at preventing Indian advances. Sikkim, under much greater pressure from the British after 1860 than either of its immediate neighbors desperately sought support from Tibet

and China, but with no great success. The result was, ultimately, Sikkim's virtual absorption into the British Indian political system.

Independence for India (1947) and the Chinese aggression against Tibet (1950-51) forced the Himalayan border states to readjust their foreign policies to the new circumstances. An "isolationist" policy was no longer considered feasible, due to the influence which Indian nationalist and democratic ideals had made upon the value systems of the educated class, and the reemergence of China as an interested participant in Himalayan politics. The Rana regime, apprehensive over the pervasiveness of Indian influence in Nepal and its possible consequences on the regime's autocratic rule, turned again to the "balance of power" principle, a policy continued by successor governments after the 1950-51 revolution. In the immediate post 1947 period, relations with China were viewed as too ineffectual and insecure to warrant much consideration. Kathmandu therefore sought diplomatic relations with non-Asian powers, at first with the Western countries and the United Nations, and later with the communist bloc as well. However, as Chinese power expanded in Tibet, and Peking began to exhibit a definite interest in establishing relations on terms moderately favorable to Nepal, the possibility of a reversion to the "balance of power" principle arose once again. Nepal appeared to

be attempting to use China as counterweight against growing Indian cultural and economic influence.

In 1956 Nepal and China agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives, and a new phase in Nepali foreign policy came into view. The balancing of Chinese and Indian power (in a Morgenthau sense) has become the basic feature of Nepali foreign policy. This general tendency was somewhat modified from June 1959 to December 1960, when a democratically elected government was in power. However, the old "balance of power" principle appears to have reemerged as the central theme of the policy of the successor government dominated by King Mahendra. The King was the dominant political figure in Nepal in 1956 when relations with China were first established.³⁹

By the end of 1963, Nepal had established relations with more than 30 countries, including at least six Communist states. The official representatives from most of these countries were concerned largely with trade and economic development programs. Meanwhile, strict adherence to the policy of modified neutralism had been seriously threatened by two major Chinese Communist operations: the invasion of Tibet in 1950, and aggression against the Indian frontier in 1962. Throughout this period, Nepal, maintaining

³⁹Leo E. Rose, "Sino Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan Border States," Orbis, Vol. V, No. 2, Summer, 1961, pp. 204-208.

a strictly neutralist attitude in the Peiping-New Delhi clashes, has strengthened its ties with India while not weakening those with Communist China. The success achieved in the field of foreign relations is evidenced by the offer and acceptance of aid from countries such as India, Communist China, the Soviet Union, the United States, Israel and Pakistan--countries with widely divergent interests and viewpoints.⁴⁰

Because of the nature of their treaty relations with India, Sikkim and Bhutan are not as well positioned to use the "balance of power" principles as is Nepal. Such a policy would be inconceivable for Sikkim under existing conditions, though this is not as true for Bhutan. The Bhutan government has expressed an interest in exploring the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with governments other than India, obviously with the intention of modifying Bhutan's dependence upon India in external affairs. While not likely at this time, it does represent a tendency for the future.⁴¹

The foreign relations of Sikkim are conducted solely by India under provisions of the Indo-Sikkim Treaty

⁴⁰Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (with Sikkim and Bhutan)," Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-35, pp. 187-188.

⁴¹Rose, "Sino Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan Border State," Orbis, p. 208.

signed on December 5, 1950, Sikkim's only existent treaty with any foreign country. Close ties with Tibet prevailing prior to the Chinese Communist invasion of that country in 1950 have since deteriorated. These ties (based on traditions, customs and religious beliefs, including the spiritual leadership of the Dalai Lama, and fostered largely by trade and royal family marriages with Tibetans) were practically severed by the Chinese Communists' suppression of Tibet. This forced the Sikkimese, situated south of the Himalayan barriers, to look to India for protection and guidance. India regarding the northern boundary of Sikkim as an important portion of the line of defense against Chinese aggression, responded with economic and military aid. Although sympathetic to the royal family, India has endeavored to maintain the uneasy balance between Sikkim's opposing domestic political groups, without incurring enmities that could be exploited by Chinese Communist forces seeking to "liberate" the country.

Sikkimese authorities attempt to maintain a neutral attitude toward the Chinese Communists and exercise care to avoid actions or disputes which might be used as a pretext for retaliatory tactics. The problem of dealing with Tibetan refugees is particularly sensitive in this respect. The initial influx of refugees, including the flight of the Dalai Lama in 1959 after the unsuccessful Tibetan revolt against the Chinese Communists, alerted

the Sikkimese to their repressive policies. Hence, Peking's proposals for a federation of Himalayan states evoked little interest, even among the Sikkimese opposition leaders.

In 1961, India agreed to bear the brunt of the refugee burden by accepting some 7,000, leaving only a few hundred to settle in Sikkim.

By 1963, most of the refugees from Tibet had been interrogated and passed on to India. If any Communists are detected among the refugees they are sent back to Tibet.

The generally harmonious relations with Nepal and Bhutan are under Indian supervision. The bulk of the Nepalese migrations occurred during the period of the British protectorate and apparently have not become an issue between the authorities of the two states. Bhutanese incursions into Sikkim have ceased and the common boundary is not in dispute.⁴²

Bhutanese Foreign Relations

The foreign relations of Bhutan have been conducted by a foreign power since the signing of the Punakha Treaty with the British in 1910. Under this treaty, the Bhutanese Government accepted British guidance in foreign affairs, and the British agreed to exercise no interference

⁴²Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (with Sikkim and Bhutan)," Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-35, pp. 387-388.

in Bhutan's internal affairs. After the British left India the pact was supplanted on August 8, 1949, by the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship, a slightly more comprehensive version of the Punakha Treaty, with India replacing Great Britain in the text.

Close ties are maintained between the two countries by frequent exchanges of visits by officials engaged in the numerous Indian-supporter projects initiated in furtherance of the country's economic development program.

Bhutanese authorities like those in Sikkim attempt to maintain a neutral attitude toward the Chinese Communists. This policy of neutrality is frequently put to a test by Peiping's offer of financial help and its proposals for unilateral negotiations for defining the uncertain boundary with Tibet.

India in turn became increasingly sensitive regarding any direct contact between Bhutanese and Chinese Communist officials. Requests by Prime Minister Jigme Dorji to participation in negotiations with Peiping relating to Bhutan were rejected by India. Nevertheless, Peiping occasionally makes indirect and unofficial approaches to Bhutanese leaders, apparently to perpetuate controversial discussions regarding Bhutan's boundary, and its lack of autonomy in foreign relations.

Tibetan refugees are a potential source of friction with Communist China. When they began arriving in

1950 the Bhutanese Government, to preclude misunderstandings and disputes with the Peiping regime, adopted a policy of refusing them the privilege of permanent asylum, but conceded their right of transit on the way to India. After the revolt of 1959 in Tibet, about 3,000 Tibetans entered Bhutan. In early 1961, India declined to accept more refugees, leaving some 4,000 within Bhutan, theoretically awaiting permits to enter India.⁴³

Chapter IV has discussed the basic tenets of Indian foreign policy, narrowed the focus of study to India's Himalayan defense strategy, and concluded by a consideration of the foreign policy similarities of the three Himalayan kingdoms under study. India's historical and cultural experience including the teachings of Hinduism have had a profound impact upon Indian foreign policy makers. The teachings of Gandhi and Nehru have reflected and propagated earlier teachings. From these fountainheads have sprung the traditional Indian emphasis on neutralism, world peace and nonalignment as expressed in the five principles of Panch Shila.

The Sino-Indian War of October 1963, provided a great stimulus for modification of traditional Indian foreign policy. There ensued a much greater emphasis on military preparedness, and the desire to strengthen the

⁴³Ibid., pp. 407-411.

frontier area between India and China. The strategic importance of the three Himalayan kingdoms in the context immediately becomes obvious.

Shielded partially by relative geographical isolation, and located between two more powerful neighbors, the three kingdoms of Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal have sought the traditional foreign policy objectives of isolationism, and attempting to balance the power of stronger nations against each other. With this information as a backdrop, Chapters V through VII will provide a specialized analytical examination of the political, economic and defense relationships of India with Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal. The purpose of this is to develop the first phase of a definitive category scheme based on the internal relations, external relations, and defense relations of India with the countries involved.

CHAPTER V

INDIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH NEPAL

Indian Aid Programs¹

The Indian aid program to Nepal has been both extensive and comprehensive. The Hindustan Times reported on November 7, 1963 that India was working on 105 development projects in Nepal, under 24 major programs of Indian aid.²

By June 1967, India had spent about Rs 50 crores (500 million dollars) (Nepali currency) in the kingdom and had pledged another 40 crores for development in the next five years.³ One object of the Indian aid program has been to supplement the efforts of Nepal to develop its

¹The following weights and measures will be useful for the present chapter, and those that follow:

Rs = rupees.

Rupee = the monetary unit of India = app. \$0.21.

1 lakh = 100,000.

1 crore = 10 million.

Mound = a greatly varying weight of India. In Madras a Mound is equal to about 25 lbs.

²"India Working on 105 Plans in Nepal," Hindustan Times, Vol. XIIX, No. 5, November 7, 1963, p. 12.

³"India Is Largest Single Aid-Giver to Nepal," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 24, June 17, 1967, p. 9.

economy and to raise the living standard of its people. A second goal has been to strengthen India's position in the Himalayan region by reinforcing traditional ties of similar culture and heritage between India and Nepal. To compete with aid from other countries such as the U.S., China, Russia, West Germany and others, India has doubled the amount of its foreign aid to Nepal. The 1964-1965 Indian aid figure was 62,736 Nepalese Rupees, and the 1966-1967 figure was 113,194 Rupees.⁴ Communist China, India's main competitor in the area, has also more than doubled its foreign aid to Nepal during the same period. The total Chinese commitment for 1967 was Rs 35 crores (Nepali currency) of aid, 80 percent of which remained to be spent.⁵ Regardless of the motives, Indian aid has been benefiting important sectors of the economy of Nepal.

One of Nepal's most critical problems has been a lack of adequate means of transportation. Hence, with the onset of massive Indian aid, the task of constructing a large number of roads throughout the country was begun. The tribhuvan Rajpath, the first National Highway of Nepal, was completed in December, 1956, with Indian assistance. The 79 mile road, which was constructed by Indian

⁴A. T. Chandramohan, "Surplus at Last," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, July 28, 1966, p. 141.

⁵Hindustan Times, June 17, 1967, p. 9.

army engineers, cost the Indian Government Rs 27.5 million,⁶ and connects Katmandu with the Indian border. The highway was formally handed over to the Nepal Government on June 30, 1957. Speaking at the presentation ceremony at Thankot, Mr. Bhagwan Sokay, Indian Ambassador, said the road "had supplemented the age-old cultural links between the two countries." King Mahendra expressed his "deep sense of thankfulness."⁷ A tripartite agreement of January 1958, between Nepal, India, and the United States, provided for the construction of extensive roads at a total cost of about Rs 800 lakhs (Nepalese currency). India has also provided a large number of technical personnel for the Regional Transportation Organization Engineering Division. Work was started on various roads under this program and up to March 1963, about 300 miles of roads were constructed in different areas of Nepal. By an agreement signed on April 25, 1962, India had undertaken the construction of a road linking Katmandu with Dakshinkali in East central Nepal at an estimated cost of Rs 17.6 lakhs.⁸

⁶"Tribhuvan Rajpath Handed to Nepal," Hindustan Times, Vol. VIII, no. 27, July 4, 1957, p. 1.

⁷Ibid., p. 1.

⁸"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Ministry of Finance, Government of India, Calcutta, August, 1963, p. 10.

On August 25, 1964, India and Nepal signed a further agreement committing India to build for Nepal a 128 mile highway between Sunauli, a border town in the plains, and Pokhara Valley in midwestern Nepal, at an estimated cost of over Rs 9 crores. The agreement of the Government of India to extend assistance for the construction of the road was first officially mentioned as part of an India-Nepal joint communique issued in New Delhi on August 30, 1963. The road was expected to be completed by December 1968.⁹ India has also agreed to build the major portions of Nepal's most ambitious highway project to date--a 640 mile east-west highway to connect its eastern and southern borders through the southern foothills.¹⁰ The total cost of the road was estimated by Rs 22 crores. The agreement envisages that the eastern portion connecting Jhapa to Janakpur will be completed by India in March 1971. As for the middle sector the Russians have been building an 85 mile stretch from Dhalkebar to Adhaver, while the U.S. is building a 52 mile stretch from Hetaura to Narayangarh.¹¹ India will

⁹"Text of Fifth India-Nepal Joint Communique," Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-1964, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, India, p. 349.

¹⁰"Text of Seventh India-Nepal Joint Communique," Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-1964, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, p. 54.

¹¹A. T. Chandramohan, "Indian Aid," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 49, No. 7, August 12, 1965, p. 287.

take up the construction of a 110 mile stretch from Butwal to Nepalgunj in the western sector after March 1971 and will look also the construction of the remaining portion of the highway westward.¹² The east-west road, it is stated, will not only help the Nepal government in linking remote parts of the country, but will also help in promoting expanded trade between Nepal and India. The Chinese who have been stepping up their economic aid to Nepal were to have built this road but had agreed at Nepal's request to withdraw from the project. The road passes through the Southern Nepal Terai region near Indian territory, and India was prepared to pay for the construction of the major portion of the highway and step up her aid to Nepal.¹³

In addition to the construction of roads, India has assisted Nepal in the construction of airfields. India is building seven or eight airports in various parts of Nepal.¹⁴ Work on airstrips at Simra, Jankpur, Bhairawa, Biratnagar and Pokhara have been completed.¹⁵ India has

¹²"India to Build Nepal Highway," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVII, No. 51, December 29, 1966, p. 9 "X-mas-Presents," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 55, No. 2, January 19, 1967, p. 79.

¹³S. M. Ali, "Nepal at the Crossroads," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 121, No. 4, April 22, 1965, p. 159.

¹⁴Hindustan Times, July 1, 1965, p. 6.

¹⁵Ibid., August 12, 1965, p. 288.

also agreed to improve the runways and other facilities at Nepalganj, Tumlingtar, and Rajbiraj airports.¹⁶

Under the Canal and Drinking Water Supply Board Program, entirely financed by India, 15 out of 16 irrigation projects sponsored by the mission have been completed. These programs are providing irrigation facilities for 140 thousand acres of cultivated land. India has also built 24 water supply schemes covering every large town in the kingdom at a cost of Rs 145 lakhs.¹⁷ The network of irrigation projects was undertaken by India as part fulfillment of her obligations to Nepal under the Colombo Plan.¹⁸

Under a village rural development program sponsored by India, Nepalese village development blocs, and three intensive valley development schemes at Pokhara, Lalitpur, and Palung were provided assistance. India, under agreements signed in 1959 and 1961, has committed aid of Rs 400 lakhs, and Rs 112 lakhs respectively for the program which sought to subsidize projects meant to benefit rural areas. These programs included 320 schools and libraries, 710 drinking water schemes, 280 culverts

¹⁶"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian Ministry of Finance, p. 13.

¹⁷Hindustan Times, June 17, 1967, p. 9.

¹⁸"Nepal's Irrigation Projects," Hindustan Times, Vol. VI, No. 7, Sept. 15, 1955.

and bridges, 110 village roads, 37 panchayat ghars, 11 school grounds, 15, new ponds, 6 parks and other miscellaneous works.¹⁹

Nepal has several streams and rivers running across the country and consequently the country's hydro-electric power potential is very great. India has taken up the construction of Nepal's biggest power project to date--the Trisuli Hydel Project. The project is located at Trisuli Bazar, 28 miles from Katmandu.²⁰ Designed to produce 12,000 kw of power, in the first stage, and 21,000 ultimately, the project when completed will provide light and power to stimulate industrial development in the Katmandu Valley. The project undertaken by the Central Water and Power Commission of the Government of India will cost an estimated Rs 600 lakhs, which is being provided entirely by that Government as a gift to Nepal.

In March 1963, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri, Minister for Home Affairs of the Government of India, visited the project at the invitation of King Mahendra, during a state visit. He was pleased to find that work on the construction of the barrage and power-house was progressing well

¹⁹"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian Ministry of Finance, p. 20.

²⁰"Indian Aid for Nepal Project," Hindustan Times, Vol. VIII, No. 20, May 16, 1957, p. 12.

and stated that the pace of construction "would be speeded up."²¹

The Phewatal Hydel Project in Pokhara has also been undertaken with Indian aid. The project envisages the generation of 100 kw of electric power for the Pokhara Valley at an estimated cost of Rs 20.6 lakhs.²² In addition to these two, several new agreements were mentioned in a joint communique issued in February 1965 by the Governments of India and Nepal. The talks resulted in an agreement by India to provide aid for further progress on the Karwali hydel project.²³

To provide benefits of modern technology and common service facilities to skilled artisans of the Patan area of Nepal, India has entered into an agreement with that country to give aid to the extent of Rs 28.8 lakhs for establishing an Industrial Estate at Patan itself. The project is designed to provide facilities such as power and workshops, for the economic and efficient running of small scale industries under one roof where common services will be provided on a cooperative basis.

²¹"Text of Fourth India-Nepal Joint Communique," Issued Simultaneously in Katmandu and New Delhi on March 5, 1963, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, p. 348.

²²"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian Ministry of Finance, p. 29.

²³"India Will Provide Aid to Nepal Hydel Project," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 7, February 18, 1965, p. 8.

The agreement also provides for facilities for the purchase of stores, equipment and machinery as well as financial and technical guidance to businessmen.²⁴ In addition India and Nepal signed a joint communique in February 1964 committing India to extend a Rs 1 crore loan for the industrial development of Nepal. The loan was to be repayable in 15 equal annual installments with interest at 3%. It was meant to facilitate the purchase of capital goods from India and for equity investments in industrial projects such as paper, jute, cement, textiles, and other industries for which machinery is available in India.²⁵

In the field of schemes designed to benefit local communities, Nepal has formulated a number of projects for the provision of medical, education and drinking water facilities. In this sphere too, India's contribution has been significant. Aid has been rendered for running the Paropkar Shri Panch Indra Rajy a Lakshmi Devi Maternity Home at Katmandu, and providing up to date equipment for a Child Welfare Center.²⁶ Nepal has received

²⁴"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian Ministry of Finance, p. 29.

²⁵"India Will Give One-Crore Project Loan to Nepal," Hindustan Times, February 27, 1964, p. 1.

²⁶"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian Ministry of Finance, p. 31.

a gift of a 500 bed hospital from India. The hospital with all its auxiliary components such as X-ray units, ambulances, etc., cost about Rs 400,000 and was established in the Katmandu Valley.²⁷ Indian aid for drinking water supply schemes has been facilitated by the building of canals by the Canal and Drinking Water Supply Development Board of Nepal. Twenty plans have already been initiated including the installation of hand pumps, and water pipe systems. India has assumed financial responsibility for a Katmandu water supply project at a cost of Rs 126.4 lakhs, which will provide an additional 32,000 gallons of drinking water per day to the capital.²⁸

India has been active in helping Nepal to instruct a growing number of technical and other trained personnel. In March 1962, nearly 1,500 Nepalese were in training institutions in India.²⁹ The entire cost of training such personnel as physicians, engineers, agronomists, etc., has been assumed by the Indian Government and India has also helped to set up three training institutions within Nepal itself. These include an Engineering school, operative since 1959, a Forestry Institute at Hithaura

²⁷"Modernization of Nepal," Hindustan Times, Vol. VI, No. 35, September 1, 1955, p. 10.

²⁸Ibid., p. 33.

²⁹"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian Ministry of Finance, p. 35.

for the purpose of training forest rangers and a Rural Institute in the outskirts of Patan, to train persons who are involved in implementation of the Village Development Program. Personnel trained at the Institute include Block Development Officers, Social Education Organizers, Village Development Workers, artisans and others.³⁰ India has helped to construct, develop and provide teachers for Nepal's first university--Tribhuvan University begun in 1959.³¹ Thirty professors and lecturers have been provided and a sum of Rs 32 lakhs has been made available for expansion and library needs at Tribhuvan and Trichanda College in Katmandu. Rs 3.2 lakhs have also been provided for the improvement of the Tribhuvan Adarsha Vidyalaya, which is being developed as a model public school.³²

There are many other areas in which Indian aid programs have assisted Nepal. A survey was undertaken in 1956-1957 for upgrading the Raxaul-Amlekhganj rail line and extending the line to Hithaura. In 1958 India, the U.S. and Nepal had signed an agreement and subsequently constructed 58 wireless stations for Nepal. Two have been located at Katmandu, and the rest throughout

³⁰Ibid., pp. 35-36.

³¹"Nepal's First University: India's Aid," Hindustan Times, Vol. XI, No. 42, October 20, 1960, p. 1.

³²"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian Ministry of Finance, p. 39.

the country.³³ A topographical survey of Nepal to prepare detailed maps of the country conducted at the request of King Mahendra has also been completed. In addition, India has been making geological surveys in Nepal, with a particular emphasis on the investigation of ground water resources in the Katmandu Valley. Further surveys for the exploration of mineral resources, such as the Godavari marble deposit, the Arkhaule Kulikhani copper deposits, and the copper and cobalt deposits of Samar Bhamar have also been conducted by India. To facilitate the surveys, a chemical laboratory has been set up at Katmandu. India has also provided aid in an attempt to develop the orange growing valley of Pokara into a modern winter resort³⁴ and has assumed a major share of responsibility for a National Archives Project. An agreement provides for the cataloging and microfilming of documents and manuscripts, as well as designing and constructing of the archives building itself. Under another program, archeological excavations have been carried out at Lumbini, and pre-historic explorations in the Katmandu Valley.

³³Nepal to Have Tele-Links in Two Months," Hindustan Times, Vol. XV, No. 16, April 16, 1964, p. 3.

³⁴"Indian Aid to Develop Nepal Tourist Spots," Hindustan Times, Vol. XI, No. 35, September 1, 1960, p. 4.

On April 12, 1965, the Indian post office located in the Indian Embassy Compound at Katmandu closed. Until that time, India had handled the postal services of the nation. In 1959, Nepal started its own postal services to the outside world after becoming a member of the Universal Postal Union. The Indian Embassy continued to run parallel services. The closing of the Indian service marks the end of Nepal's dependence on India, for an essential service.³⁵ The services of senior Indian officers in fields such as forests, posts and telegraphs, law, parliamentary affairs, education and accounts have been made available on Nepal's request, and have also been helpful in the reorganization of Nepal's Governmental Departments.³⁶

In addition to the commitment of funds for aid programs, Nepal is obtaining great advantage from a canal project known as the Kosi-Gandak, financed entirely by India. From the Kosi portion, a western canal will provide irrigation for over 33,000 acres of land in the Saptari district. A hydro-electric power station is under construction on the East Kosi main canal which will generate an estimated 18,000 kw of electric power, half of which

³⁵A. T. Chandramohan, "Deplored Demise," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 48, no. 12, June 12, 1965, pp. 542-543.

³⁶"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian Ministry of Finance, p. 46.

will be made available to Nepal. The Kosi project will also provide protection from floods in an area of about 500 square miles in the Morang District, which was devastated by a flood in 1954.³⁷ A similar project on the river Gandak was expected to provide irrigation facilities and hydro-electric power to large underdeveloped areas in Nepal and India.³⁸ The Gandak Project will provide irrigation for 1.43 lakh acres in Nepal, and water supply for an additional two lakh acres in the Rapti Doon area. A power house located in the same region will be constructed entirely for Nepal's benefit and become Nepalese property.³⁹ In a joint communique issued at the end of a three day visit of Prime Minister Shastri of India to Nepal stated in May 1965:

"These two projects (the Kosi and Gandak) are symbolic of the joint efforts to the two countries to provide in cooperation with each other a better and fuller life to their people."⁴⁰

India has spent a great deal in money, material, and manpower in its Nepalese aid missions. Mr. Shriman

³⁷A. T. Chandramohan, "Kosi Landmark," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 48, no. 9, May 27, 1968, p. 393.

³⁸"Text of India-Nepal Joint Communique," issued in Katmandu on June 14, 1959, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, p. 341.

³⁹"Cooperation for Progress in Nepal," Indian Ministry of Finance, p. 49.

⁴⁰"India Assures Aid for Nepal's Development," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 18, p. 4.

Narayan, India's ambassador to Nepal, said in Patna on December 30, 1965, that India had spent about Rs 32 crores for development projects in Nepal during the last ten years.⁴¹

However, it would be wrong to imagine that India is the sole source of Nepalese aid or that other countries do not participate substantially. The East-West highway, already mentioned, is a case in point. In 1960, King Mahendra took direct control of the government of Nepal and has since become known for the skill with which he has made his country a profitable focal point of the economic cold war. Russia, Communist China, the U.S., India, the United Kingdom, West Germany and Israel have foreign delegations in Katmandu and vie for "the privilege" of providing the kingdom with roads, hospitals, schools, factories, technical training, etc.⁴² The Russians agreed on April 8, 1964 to construct a 120 kilometre section of the Katmandu-Kodari Road, and an agricultural implements plant at Birganj on the Indian border. A survey for a cement plant is also going on. Three other Soviet projects, the Panuati hydro-electric project, a cigarette factory at Jankpur and a sugar mill at Birganj, have been completed.

⁴¹"India Spends 32 crores on Nepal Projects," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 52, December 30, 1965, p. 9.

⁴²Andrew Nathan; "Nepal on Your Map," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 13, June 25, 1964.

The Communist Chinese are also involved in Nepalese aid as exemplified by the construction of the major portions of the Katmandu-Kodari road mentioned earlier. Moreover, the Chinese are constructing a brick factory in Katmandu, a tannery and shoe factory in that same city and two warehouses, one in Katmandu and the other in Birganj.⁴³ At the end of a five day state visit to Katmandu in March 1967, West German President Leubke agreed to provide a long term loan to the Nepalese government of D M 5 million. West Germany has also showed interest in giving Nepal agricultural aid by offering technical advice on raising farm yields in certain regions and supplying fertilizers in bulk.⁴⁴ The United States has provided approximately 110 million dollars worth of economic assistance since its aid program commenced in Nepal in 1951. U.S. aid, which now runs about 10 million dollars annually, helps to provide for basic economic and social needs such as rural development, education, health, communications, forest development, small industry, military assistance and others.⁴⁵ The following is a table of the major foreign aid contributors to Nepal for a four year period:

⁴³A. T. Chandramohan, "Sino Soviet Aid," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 6, May 7, 1964, p. 288.

⁴⁴"German Aid," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 55, No. 13, March 30, 1967, p. 603.

⁴⁵"Background Notes--Nepal," Dept. of State Publication 7904 (Washington: Government Printing Office, October, 1967, p. 4.

TABLE 4

MAJOR FOREIGN AID CONTRIBUTORS TO NEPAL 1964-1967

Contributing Countries	Amount of aid in Nepalese Rupees (Million)		
	1963-64	1965-66	1966-67
India	62,736	88,876	113,194
United States	65,530	60,037	48,168
Communist China	12,144	16,137	30,220
U.S.S.R.	463	11,430	18,500
Others	174	737	6,850
N =	141,047	177,237	216,927

Source: Adapted from data obtained from the "Far Eastern Economic Review," July 28, 1966, p. 141.

The foreign aid has enabled Nepal to maintain a balanced economy as exemplified by the 1964-1965 budget as shown on the following page.

TABLE 5

THE NEPAL BUDGET 1964-5

Nepalese Rupees Million		
Expenditure		
Regular		123.1
Development		<u>217.2</u>
Total		340.3
Income		
Current revenue		163.9
New taxes		15.0
Foreign aid		
US	94.4	
India	19.3*	
China	12.7	
USSR	1.1	
Switzerland	0.6	
Ford Foundation	<u>0.1</u>	
Total		128.3
Cash balance from 1963-4		12.5
Foreign loan		15.5
Internal loans		<u>5.0</u>
Total		340.3

Foreign Exchange Budget		
	Rev. Est. 1963-4	Est. 1964-5
Income		
Invisible export	27.1	26.5
Visible export	4.1	6.0
Foreign Embassies	2.0	2.5
Foreign aid	7.1	5.5
Miscellaneous	<u>12.7</u>	<u>6.5</u>
Total	53.0	47.0
Expenditure		
Embassies	5.4	6.6
Development	16.2	38.2
Reverse fund	9.7	10.0
Invisible import	0.9	1.0
Debt redemption fund	0.2	1.0
Miscellaneous	<u>4.9</u>	<u>4.8</u>
Total	37.3	61.9
Balance	+15.8	-14.9

*Excluding another Rs 79.5 million Indian aid projects not directly undertaken by Nepalese Government.

Source: His Majesty's Government, Katmandu.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ A. T. Chandramohan, "Balanced Budget, Far Eastern Review, Vol. LX, No. 24, July 19, 1958, p. 8.

The nature of the Indian goal in Nepal--to protect Indian security through the development of a government capable of performing needed services and of carrying out needed reforms--has shown clearly in Indian policy during the last decade. In spite of pressing needs at home, Indian experts have been dispatched to Nepal to train an army and a civil service, to build schools and roads where almost none existed before. Since 1950, India has spent millions of dollars in that country for development purposes. Undoubtedly, Indian aid in Nepal, involving calculations of high strategy, economic planning, and military aid programs, are designed to bring maximum returns for the expenditures. This aid is intended to build a shield to keep Chinese power contained north of the Great Himalaya.⁴⁷ The Indo-Nepal agreement on the utilization of Gandak waters for irrigation and power development is a source of conflict. Although Nepal's sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction remain supreme, some Nepalese view the river agreement with suspicion and feel it compromises the nation's sovereignty. Although Indian aid is designed to enhance the stability and security of the kingdom, Nepalese often complain of wastage and lack of concrete results.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, pp. 124-125.

⁴⁸Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 35, February 22, 1962, p. 397.

Foreign Investments

In addition to foreign aid, the Government of Nepal began in 1958 a policy of inviting foreign capital for investment in any peaceful industry in the kingdom under a new industrial policy. The new policy has welcomed foreign capital in industries other than those of arms and ammunitions.⁴⁹ By the 1963-1964 period foreign industrial investments in Nepal were as given in Table 6 on the following page.

Thus, in the area of foreign investments as well as foreign aid, India certainly does not have a monopoly in the kingdom of Nepal. As though catalyzed by the competition of other nations for foreign aid programs in Nepal, India has increased its activities in this area. In a joint communique issued in October 1967 by the Governments of India and Nepal the Deputy Prime Minister of India assured the Deputy Prime Minister of Nepal of India's increasing assistance both material and technical in the economic development of Nepal. He also agreed to arrange an early technical appraisal of the Karnali hydro-electric project for the purpose of determining India's interest in it. Mr. Kirti Nidhi Rista, the Nepalese representative, thanked the government of India "for its generous help

⁴⁹"Inviting Foreign Capital," Hindustan Times, Vol. LX, No. 24, July 19, 1958, p. 8.

TABLE 6

MAJOR FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS IN
NEPAL DURING 1963-4

Name	Investment (NRS '000)	Source	Comments
Janakpur Cigarette Factory	20,000	Russian Aid	2,000 million sticks per year
Birgunj Sugar Fac- tory	30,000	Russian Aid	Crush capacity 1,000 tons per day
Maharajjung Leather Factory	7,000	Chinese Aid	
Indo Nepal Cotton Textile	31,500	Birla Bros	Private Indian firm
Golchha Woolen Works (P) Ltd.	n.a.	Golchha Co.	Private Indian firm
Golchha (P) Ltd.	1,900	Golchha Co.	Producing cata- chu for betel
Sahu Jain Ltd.	2,200	Sahu Jain	Private Indian firm; sugar crushing, ca- pacity of 1,000 tons per day
Nepal Commercial Corporation (P) Ltd.	800	Private Indian firm	Tapes and dyes
K.A. Dikshir Products Ltd.	n.a.	Private Indian firm	Camphor, resins, tur- pentine
Mr. J.V. Coapman	n.a.	Private American	Hunting camp ⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Andrew Nathan, "Nepal on Your Map," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 13, June 25, 1964, p. 669.

and assistance."⁵¹ In addition, an eight member delegation of the Nepal Chamber of Commerce touring India, told businessmen and industrialists in Madras on January 13, 1966 that there was wide scope for India to establish industries in Nepal. The group had said that the Nepal Government had assured foreign investors of a tax holiday for ten years.⁵²

Indian-Nepalese Trade Relations

The flow of trade and commerce between India and Nepal is as ancient as the history of the two countries. The geographical contiguity of Nepal and India makes them interdependent and complementary to each other in many ways. This is particularly true in the context of their economic geography and trade. Exports from Nepal to India include:

- a. jute and jute manufactures
- b. rice
- c. ghee
- d. mustard and rape seed
- e. wood and timber
- f. medicinal herbs

⁵¹"India to Step Up Economic Assistance to Nepal," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 24, November 4, 1967, p. 4.

⁵²"Nepal Offers Incentives to Indian Investors," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVII, No. 3, January 20, 1966, p. 2.

g. oil seeds.

Imports from India to Nepal include:

a. textiles

b. salt

c. tobacco

d. mineral oils

e. iron and steel

f. cement

g. drugs and medicines

h. sugar, tea

i. motor vehicles and machinery

j. cigarettes

k. vegetables and vegetable oils

l. soaps.⁵³

Nepal's trade with India has steadily increased over the last few years. During the 1964-1965 period Indian exports to Nepal were valued at Rs 1,662 lakhs and imports amounted to Rs 721 lakhs, resulting in a surplus of Rs 941 lakhs for India.⁵⁴ A comparison of Nepal's foreign trade with India for the period 1959-1968 is as follows:

⁵³ Shri Manubhai Shah, "Trade Between India and Nepal," The Indian Review, Vol. 64, no. 4, April, 1965, p. 180.

⁵⁴ "Nepal Needs Indian Consumer Goods," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVII, No. 4, January 27, 1966, p. 2.

TABLE 7

DIRECTION OF NEPAL'S FOREIGN TRADE

	Imports			Exports		
	1958- 1959	1959- 1960	1960- 1961	1958- 1959	1959- 1960	1960- 1961
India	97.69%	13.88%	92.0%	98.95%	99.02%	99.3%
TiPee	0.60	0.98	N.A.*	1.05	0.98	N.A.*
Other Countries	1.71	5.14	8.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

N.A. = not available

Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 35, March 16, 1962, p. 619; Dan Galenpaul, Information Please Almanac, 1969, p. 216.

Between 1958 and 1962, the volume of Indo Nepalese trade had more than doubled.⁵⁵ We can thus readily imagine the enormous economic influence which India might exert upon Nepal when we consider the significance of the fact that more than 90 per cent of Nepal's total foreign trade is with India.

It becomes even more significant when we realize that Nepal is a landlocked country and depends upon Indian ports exclusively for access to the sea. Originally India's trade relations with Nepal were regulated under a

⁵⁵Hindustan Times, February 27, 1964, p. 1.

Treaty of Trade and Transit signed by both Governments in October 1950. The agreement stipulated that the:

"Government of Nepal agrees to levy at rates not lower than those leviable in India custom duties on imports from and exports to, countries outside India. The Government of Nepal also agrees to levy on goods produced or manufactured in Nepal, which are exported to India, export duties at rates sufficient to prevent their sale in India at prices more favorable than those of goods produced or manufactured in India which are subject to central excise duty."⁵⁶

The Government of India had presumably been influenced by the consideration of preventing the smuggling of goods into India from Nepal and of protecting the country's industries. The restriction on export goods to India was rather harsh.⁵⁷ In January 1957, the Nepalese government had suggested to India two important changes to the treaty. One of the amendments desired by Nepal was to enable her to market her goods within India and overseas at the price her economy permitted. The other change Katmandu desired was that Nepalese foreign exchange, controlled by India would come directly under the control of Nepal.⁵⁸ On May 27, 1959, Prime Minister Koirala of Nepal informed the Government of India of Nepal's desire to revise the 1950 treaty which was to expire in June,

⁵⁶Jirilal Jain, India Meets China in Nepal (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1959), pp. 93-94.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 94.

⁵⁸Hindustan Times, January 31, 1957, p. 8.

1960.⁵⁹ A new Treaty of Trade and Transit was signed between the two governments on October 31, 1960. In its preamble the treaty mentions the:

"desire of the two governments to strengthen economic cooperation between India and Nepal and gives expression to their conviction in the benefits likely to accrue from the development of their economics toward a common market."⁶⁰

This implies that both Nepal and India, placed as they are in one geographic economic area, should endeavor to meet the requirements of each other, and both should assist in each other's economic advancement and development. The 1960 treaty considerably modified the 1950 agreement, but the fact remains that most of Nepal's economic ties with the outside world still run through New Delhi.⁶¹ Nepal has sought measures to broaden its trade with countries other than India, and reduce its dependence upon that country for imports. In 1961 a State trading corporation, the National Trading Ltd. was established to encourage trade with other countries other than India and provide better organization in Nepal's foreign trade. It handles about 50% of all non-Indian trade.⁶²

⁵⁹Hindustan Times, June 4, 1959, p. 12.

⁶⁰Shah, "Trade Between India and Nepal," p. 181.

⁶¹Leo E. Rose, "Sino-Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan Border States," Orbis, Vol. V, No. 2, Summer, 1961, p. 201.

⁶²"Basic Data on the Economy of Nepal," U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce Report, OBR 68-86 (Washington: Government Printing Office, Sept. 1968), p. 8.

Pakistan and Nepal agreed to accord to each other, most favored nation treatment in a trade agreement concluded between the two countries in October, 1962. According to the details of the agreement, this treatment extends to all matters relating to customs duties on the export and import of goods and to facilities governing customs operations. India agreed to Nepal's request for transit facilities across her territory for Nepal's trade with Pakistan, at an Indo-Nepalese official level conference in October, 1963. Two ports, Radhikapur on the East Pakistan-India border, and Wagha on the West Pakistan-India border, had been fixed through which transit would take place across the Indian territory.⁶³ At ministerial level talks held in Katmandu, the Nepalese Minister of Commerce and Trade, Mr. Vedanond Jha, explained the need for Nepal to diversify and increase the volume of trade with new countries. The Indian Minister of International Trade, Mr. Manubhai Shah, stated that India appreciated Nepal's desire to diversify her trade and assured Nepal of India's cooperation in this regard, in accordance with the Nepal-India treaty of 1960.⁶⁴ However, Shah admitted in the Lok Sabha in December 1964, that there was a difference of view between India and Nepal on the question of service

⁶³Mookerjee, "Indo-Nepalese Relations," Calcutta Review, July 1965, p. 48.

⁶⁴Hindustan Times, February 27, 1964, pp. 1, 12.

charges to be levied for supervision and handling of transit traffic at Radhikapur. The Indian delegation which had negotiated the matter with Nepalese authorities had suggested a service charge of Rs 1.50 per ton and 50 paise per parcel. The Nepalese delegation had desired that no service charges should be levied at all. Mr. Shah explained that while it was true that India did not collect any charge for providing services and facilities for Nepal's transit trade through Calcutta port, small charges were collected for "certain special types of services."⁶⁵

Nepal was obviously distressed at the restrictive behavior of the Indian Government with regard to transit facilities through Indian territory and the use of Indian ports. The Nepalese Commerce and Industry Minister, Vedanand Jha, said in an informal conference with newsmen:

"India's refusal of transit facilities to starting trade with Pakistan via Radhikapur did really touch the sentiments of the Nepalese people. We really feel distressed. . . . We never imagined that India could ever go beyond the treaty of 1960 and demand from Nepal such a charge when even Pakistan was not charging from her for Indo-Afghan trade through Pakistan . . . the Indian delegation put forward one demand after another."⁶⁶

Despite these restrictions, Nepal has continued to expand its trade with other countries.

⁶⁵"India Not Hampering Pak-Nepal Trade"; Shah, Hindustan Times, Vol. XV, no. 51, December 17, 1964, p. 9.

⁶⁶"Nepal Presses for Transit Facilities," Hindustan Times, Vol. XV, no. 52, December 24, 1964, p. 9.

On September 9, 1965, Nepal signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, by which transactions were to be made in Nepalese rupees.⁶⁷

In October, 1965, Nepal signed an agreement with Yugoslavia for trade on a barter basis.⁶⁸ By December 1967, Nepal had trade agreements with seven different countries including India, Communist China, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia and Poland. However, Indo-Nepalese trade also continued to expand rapidly so that over 90% of Nepal's total trade continued to be with India.⁶⁹ An intergovernmental joint committee (Border Committee) was established in January 1967, by Nepal and India to resolve trade difficulties between the two countries:

"to make further endeavors severally and jointly to make available to each other commodities and products which one country needs from the other and to avoid to the maximum extent possible diversion of commercial traffic or deflection of trade."⁷⁰

To provide further facilities for transit traffic

⁶⁷A. T. Chandramohan, "Doors to the World," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 49, no. 11, September 9, 1965, p. 493.

⁶⁸A. T. Chandramohan, "Another Outlet," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 50, no. 2, October 14, 1965, p. 51.

⁶⁹"Basic Data on the Economy of Nepal," U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce OBR 68-86, September 1968, p. 8.

⁷⁰"Joint Commission for Industrialization of Nepal," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 1, January 5, 1967, p. 9.

across India and to remove the difficulties which had been experienced by Nepalese importers and exporters, it was agreed upon by the two countries that all cargo arriving at the port of Calcutta would be moved in the first instance to a transit shed, where it would be expeditiously cleared by the customs authorities in Calcutta. It has also been agreed that Indian laws will not apply to the transit trade of Nepal. Indian railway authorities attempt to move Nepali import and export cargoes expeditiously.

India has agreed to provide a separate and self contained space for handling Nepalese cargo at an Indian port in West Bengal in principle. The matter will be discussed further between the two governments in a study to be made of the arrangements which are in force for the movement of cargoes from the ports of Rotterdam, Trieste and Hamburg to land locked states.⁷¹

Nepal has little foreign trade with nations other than India because of three factors: an unstable currency which necessitates payment in Indian currency; the small size of Nepal's demand for goods manufactured outside India; and its dependence on Indian railways and ports for shipments from abroad. Some trade was formerly carried on with Tibet, but the volume has dwindled since the Chinese occupation of the plateau. In view of the predominantly

⁷¹Ibid., p. 9.

agricultural character of Nepal's economy, imports from India are naturally concentrated on basic industrial products which are not made in the kingdom. The principal articles of export from Nepal into India are agricultural products such as rice, mustard, and oil seeds. Traditionally, whatever is imported into India flows freely into Nepal. This aspect of trade has been emphasized in the Indo-Nepal Treaty of Trade and Transit which came into force in November, 1960. It is probable that most of Nepal's trade will remain confined to India in the foreseeable future. The market for Indian goods can be affected only if this Himalayan kingdom starts importing in much greater quantities from other countries. This possibility is dampened by the fact that Nepal has little or no foreign exchange reserves. However, under the Indo-Nepal trade agreement of 1960, Nepal has the freedom to pursue its own trade with foreign countries and is seeking to expand its activities in this area.⁷²

Politico-Legal Relations

A comprehensive detailed study of the politico-legal relationship of India with any one of the three Himalayan kingdoms could serve as the basis of a doctoral dissertation in itself. This is not the purpose of this work, which is designed instead to develop definitive

⁷²Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, pp. 110-111.

categories for the purpose of providing another international relation tool for the study of big power-small power relationships. Hence only those elements relevant to that purpose will be explored.

If China's main interest in Nepal is the expansion of its influence over territory where it previously exercised suzerainty (a policy which Hans Morgenthau would call imperialism), India's interest is economic and cultural as well as strategic. Her geographical contiguity with Nepal as well as her economic-cultural connections make essential the development and maintenance of close contact with the Himalayan Kingdom. This is so not just as an adjunct to India's economy, but also as a strategic necessity in containing Communist Chinese expansionist designs with regard to the three Himalayan Kingdoms, and parts of Indian territory itself. (A policy which Morgenthau would name that of desiring to preserve the status quo via containment.) This position in turn involves the maintenance of political strength in order to prevent interference with or discrimination against her economic and political interests in Nepal. Nepal is not a bonafied buffer between India and China for two reasons. Firstly, Tibet is not a natural part of China. Secondly, even if China's claims over Tibet are accepted as they have been by both Nepal and India, this does not detract from the fact that the main Himalayan ranges lie

to the north of Nepal and it is the Himalayas that form the only natural strategic defense line between China and South Asia. Also, Nepal does not possess any natural boundary with India.⁷³

The significance of this is that India must maintain close economic and cultural relationships with Nepal, and prevent, at all costs, Chinese influence in Nepal, less it bring that influence to bear south of the Himalayan barrier, and directly threaten India's northern border.

Indo-Nepalese relations rest upon a Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed with the Ranas on July 31, 1950. Several clauses in the treaty are almost identical with those of a Treaty signed between Britain and Nepal at Katmandu on December 21, 1923.⁷⁴

When Chandra Shumshere was Prime Minister, the Anglo-Nepalese Treaty was signed under which the British government recognized the sovereignty of Nepal.⁷⁵ Article I of the treaty reads:

"Article 1: There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the governments of Great Britain and Nepal, and the two Governments agree mutually to

⁷³Girilal Jain, India Meets China in Nepal (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1959), p. 86.

⁷⁴Levi, "Nepal in World Politics," Pacific Affairs, September, 1957, p. 236.

⁷⁵Jain, India Meets China in Nepal, p. 92.

acknowledge and respect each other's independence, both internal and external."⁷⁶

Nepal was never reduced to the status of a British protectorate (in a legal sense) as were Bhutan and Sikkim, In referring to the Treaty, the London Times stated:

The Treaty . . . is another mark of the fuller recognition of the unrestricted independence of the kingdom of the Gurkhas which followed the war. It was then signalized by change of the style of the British representative from that of resident to that of British Envoy at the Court of Nepal, Katmandu."⁷⁷

The 1923 treaty served as a model for the 1950 agreement. Article one of the latter treaty states:

"Article 1: There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other."⁷⁸

Despite the seemingly comprehensive terminology in the treaty there is one limitation on Nepal's freedom of action in external affairs. Article 2 states:

"The two governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments."⁷⁹

⁷⁶For full text of the "Treaty between Great Britain and Nepal, 1923" see Appendix F.

⁷⁷"Treaty with Nepal," The London Times, No. 43,532, December 24, 1923, p. 9.

⁷⁸For the full text of "India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship," Issued in Katmandu on July 31, 1950, see Appendix G.

⁷⁹"Text of India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship," Issued in Katmandu on July 31, 1950, Texts of Documents Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, p. 56.

The Treaty also permits Nepal to import arms through India (Article 5), which is the kingdom's only access to the rest of the world.

During the revolt against the Rana regime in 1950-1951, India advised both sides in the conflict and played a leading role in negotiating the terms of peace. The Rana representatives finally accepted India's proposed reorganization of Nepal's political structure and agreed to restore King Tribhuvan to the throne and to recognize him as the King of Nepal. The King approved the proposals immediately. The Nepali Congress Party leaders, after considerable persuasion by the Indian Government and some further negotiations with the Rana regime, finally acceded to the compromise plan. Since 1951, India's policy has apparently been to assist Nepal in establishing a stable popular government that will develop a sound political administration and social system, capable of withstanding internal and external subversive forces. This policy seems to be acceptable to the Nepalese ruling powers, despite repeated accusations by political opposition groups that it involves undue Indian interference with both internal and external affairs.⁸⁰ The New York Times

⁸⁰Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan and Sikkim)," Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-35 (Washington: Government Printing Office, May 1964), p. 193.

reported on January 9, 1952 that according to reliable sources, a serious internal situation was building up in Nepal, with the pro-Chinese Communist Party and anti-Indian elements separately opposing the Government. The article went on to say:

"India is deeply concerned that the strategic border state shall remain stable within the Indian sphere of influence as a buffer against Communist China."⁸¹

The anti-Indian movement gained support among Nepalese living in the Katmandu Valley as the civil servants living there had created the impression that the Indian advisers had taken over the Nepalese administration. The Indian advisers had attended cabinet meetings which was regarded by dissidents as proof enough that the independence of Nepal had been compromised. In addition, the Nepali business community had resented the presence of Indian business men. The provisions of the Indo-Nepalese Trade Agreement of October 1950 already mentioned, added fuel to the fire. The anti-Indian feeling in the Katmandu Valley continued to grow in 1953 and 1954. India suffered from the failure of the Nepalese leaders to give the country a stable administration and to improve the lot of the people.⁸² The Indian authorities

⁸¹"Nepal-India Moves Counter Red Plot," New York Times, Vol. CI, No. 34,318, January 9, 1952, p. 3.

⁸²Jain, India Meets China In Nepal, pp. 94-97

have functioned as intermediaries between various political groups sometimes exerting a moderating influence on the parties involved, particularly when their activities seemed to endanger governmental stability. Almost all of India's efforts in this respect have brought accusations of "interference," "domination" and a "threat to Nepal's sovereignty."⁸³ Anti-Indian sentiment has been aroused on occasions, and in several instances has been manifested by demonstrations. The position of Nepal with regard to the India-China dispute in 1959 was not in accord with the sentiments of the Indian Government. Nepalese Prime Minister B. P. Koirala said on September 4, 1959 that Nepal should not "take sides or get involved in any way" in the dispute.⁸⁴ When King Mahendra struck at the elected government in December 1960, he also in a way struck at India's defense interests. Establishment of closer relations with China and Pakistan and the reduction of the role of India in Nepal no doubt is a policy which has gained the King's support from Nepalese nationalists.⁸⁵

Relations between India and Nepal began to be

⁸³"Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-35," May 1964, p. 194.

⁸⁴"Nepal Not to Get Involved," Hindustan Times, Vol. X, No. 37, September 10, 1959, p. 1.

⁸⁵K. Krishna Moorthly, "Worsening Nepal-India Row," Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 Vol. XXXVIII, No. 5, p. 200.

strained in 1969, after the flight of political exiles to India. According to the Nepalese government, the politicians in exile in India, who according to Nepal, were using India as a safe haven, were responsible for the striking increase in rebel activity in the kingdom. As the tempo of the activities increased, Nepalese officials became more resentful toward India for allegedly giving asylum to the exiles and providing them with bases and material support for their operations against Nepal.⁸⁶

King Mahendra himself has denounced these Nepalese leaders for directing guerilla violence "from the sanctuary of a foreign power." In January 1962, when an attempt was made to bomb his car, the king repeated the charge, saying "Some people from foreign soil are making improper efforts to disturb the peace in the country."⁸⁷

The increase in strained relations was marked by an anti-Indian demonstration on January 26, 1962 in front of the Indian Embassy at Katmandu. On April 17, 1962, Nepal's Ministry of National Guidance issued a sixty page pamphlet charging that rebels operating from Indian bases were conducting raids into Nepalese territory. The King

⁸⁶"Dept. of the Army Pamphlet," 550-35. May 1964, p. 194; Dept. of State Publication 7904, October, 1967, p. 4.

⁸⁷Times of India (Delhi), January 24, 1962; "India's Dilemma in Nepal," The Economist (London), February 17, 1962, p. 624.

after threatening to take the question of India's encouragement of the raids to the United Nations sent his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rishikesh Shah, to New Delhi early in September 1962 for talks with Prime Minister Nehru, Minister of Defense Krishna Memon and other cabinet ministers. The Nepali Monarch also appealed to the Indian Government to stop giving support to the armed opposition movement.⁸⁸ On October 1, 1962 Bihar's Deputy Police Minister declared that Indian outposts on the Nepal border had been reinforced and other precautionary measures taken after an "unprovoked firing" by Nepalese policemen in Raxaul. He told the Bihar State Legislative Assembly that the incident had caused panic and widespread resentment among the people on the border. The Bihar Government asked the Indian Central Government to make a strong protest to the Nepalese Government. In a note to the Nepalese Government on October 4, 1962, the Indian External Affairs Ministry called for a joint Indo-Nepalese inquiry into the incident.⁸⁹ After the talks following the investigation and protests, the tempo of anti-government operations in Nepal subsided. This was due in part to Indian pressure on the emigree Nepalese political leaders to desist from actions against the

⁸⁸Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 124.

⁸⁹Far Eastern Economic Review, November 1, 1962, p. 285.

Nepalese Government that threatened to demoralize Nepal's internal security forces. More important, however, was a decision of the emigree leaders themselves to cease their militant activities because of a mounting Chinese Communist threat to the Himalayan region in general.⁹⁰

Another irritant to Indian-Nepalese relations was the passage by Nepal of the 1967 Land Tenancy law. The law restricted the ownership of land and other property to Nepalese citizens. Mr. Dinish Singh, Minister of State for External affairs, said in a speech before the Rajya Sabha in November 1967:

"Under the treaty of peace and friendship signed by the two countries in 1950, they agreed to give each other's nationals "equal treatment" with their own nationals . . . therefore any provision made to discriminate against Indian citizens by equating them with other foreigners would appear to be in violation of this agreement."⁹¹

Nepal agreed to hold discussions regarding the situation.

These then are the elements which act as a centrifugal force, serving to disrupt Indo-Nepalese relations. However, the elements of Indo-Nepalese cultural affinities, economic interdependence, and geographical contiguity catalyzed by a mutual suspicion of Communist designs in the Himalayan area, have acted as a stronger centripetal

⁹⁰"Department of the Army Pamphlet 500-35," May 1964, p. 194.

⁹¹"Nepal Government to be Approached," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, No. 48, December 8, 1967, p. 3.

force serving to solidify relations between the two. Nepalese authorities, on the whole, have a high regard for Indian advice. Government leaders when confronted with serious problems frequently visit New Delhi to seek counsel from the Indian Government. As pointed out earlier, Nepal depends upon India ports for contact with the outside world.⁹² Throughout the 1947-1967 period friendly messages, statements and joint communiques have been issued by both governments with regard to their "special relationship." Nepalese Prime Minister Rana said on July 31, 1950 upon the signing of the India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship:

"I am confident that the treaty will help in strengthening and making yet closer the present happy relations between our two countries which have lived in perfect peace, amity and understanding throughout the centuries."⁹³

In 1954 Mr. Mahendra Mikram Shah, Nepalese ambassador to India, told a meeting of the International Centre, a socio-cultural organization of Kanpur:

"We appreciate the generous friendship of the government of India who in spite of their vaster and more complex problems and shortage of technical men had always shown their willingness to meet ungrudgingly the needs and demands of Nepal."⁹⁴

⁹²"The Subcontinent of Asia," Department of State Publication 7410, November 1962, p. 62.

⁹³"Foreign Policy of India," Texts of Documents 1947-1964, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1964, p. 58.

⁹⁴"Nepal's Foreign Policy," Hindustan Times, Vol. V, No. 52, December 30, 1954, p. 9.

In his inauguration of the India-Nepal Friendship Association at New Delhi in November 1955, King Mahendra said:

"India and Nepal are two independent and sovereign nations, of the same great family. Racially, spiritually and culturally we are closer than we are to other countries . . ."95

The two countries expressed solidarity on matters of international peace, anti-colonialism, respect for each other's territorial sovereignty, and intention to consult together on appropriate measures of mutual assistance in the texts of joint communiques issued between June 1959 and November 1963.⁹⁶ Statements of friendship were issued by leaders of both countries during the same period. Perhaps a statement by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, President of the Republic of India on August 27, 1963, is a good example of many such utterances:

"Our friendship is based on cultural links, on geographical proximity, on historical tradition, on a great heritage to which we are both heirs. It is my ambition that our policy towards each other must be one, if nothing more, of friendship and well being of our people."⁹⁷

To the disquiet of the Indian Government, China has been trying to agitate anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal. Chinese designs toward the Himalayan kingdom are

⁹⁵"Close Indo-Nepal Relations," Hindustan Times, Vol. 6, No. 46, November 17, 1955, p. 1.

⁹⁶"Foreign Policy of India," Texts of Documents 1947-1964, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1964, pp. 341-354.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 350.

being pursued by a triple line of action. These consist of a political line of Communist indoctrination and infiltration, a military line aiming at securing control over strategic boundaries, and a diplomatic line which aims at discrediting and isolating India.⁹⁸ Between 1964 and 1967 Indo-Nepalese relations remained generally friendly and cooperative. King Mahendra said in Banaras on December 1965 that the relations between Nepal and India which went back to ancient times, would be further strengthened by the efforts of the people and the governments of the two countries.⁹⁹

A joint communique was issued by both countries on December 20, 1965 at the conclusion of King Mahendra's three week tour of India. The two countries agreed that the policies of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence had promoted the concept of equality among all sovereign states, big and small. The communique noted the continuing growth of co-operation and partnership "in diverse fields of activity to the mutual benefit of both countries."¹⁰⁰ In April 1966, Mr. Surya Bahadur Thapa,

⁹⁸Satyabrata Rai Chowdhuri, "Nepal--A Study," Modern Review, Vol. CXVII, No. 4, April 1965, p. 294.

⁹⁹"Nepal King Confident of Stronger Ties with India," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 49, December 9, 1965, p. 4.

¹⁰⁰"Nepal Supports Our Stand on Self-Determination," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 52, December 30, 1965, p. 1.

Chairman of Nepal's Council of Ministers, commended India's efforts to "build good neighborly relations" with Pakistan on the basis of the Tashkent declaration. The chairman declared:

"there are no serious problems between India and Nepal and that there was a complete understanding and identity of views between them on important issues."¹⁰¹

Indian President Radhakrishnan declared on November 5, 1966 that India and Nepal would stand together whatever may be the cost or consequences. In addressing a meeting of the Indo-Nepal Friendship Association in Katmandu the President said:

"We may have our differences here and there, but deep down, there is this calm, connection, a kind of intermingling of cultures of our two countries."¹⁰²

At the conclusion of talks between India's Deputy Prime Minister Moraji Desai and Nepalese Deputy Prime Minister Kirti Nidhi Bista at Katmandu in late 1967 a joint communique was issued by India and Nepal. The Communique said:

"The two Deputy Prime Ministers reiterated their firm support and unflinching dedication to the principles of peaceful coexistence, non alignment, international cooperation and peace."¹⁰³

¹⁰¹"Nepal Assured of All Possible Aid," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVII, No. 16, April 21, 1966, p. 6.

¹⁰²"President Underlines Indo Nepal p. 2 Affinity," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVII, No. 26, December 12, 1966.

¹⁰³"India to Step Up Economic Assistance to Nepal," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, No. 24, November 4, 1967, p. 4.

The note stressed the need to eliminate the threat of war and said the two leaders were pledged to the settlement of conflicts through peaceful means, relaxation of international tensions "based on the principles of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, justice, equality, and peaceful co-existence."¹⁰⁴ Though China was not mentioned by name, the principles of foreign policy to which Nepal and India had declared their adherence made it clear that they were united in opposing the path of violence chosen by Peking. They also expressed the hope that in times to come the bonds of friendship between Nepal and India would go "from strength to strength."¹⁰⁵

Defenses

Nepal is signatory to no formal military alliances and has sought to avoid any appearance of political alignment which might complicate the relations with either Communist China or India. It is interesting to note as mentioned in earlier chapters that both India and China have announced that if Nepal were attacked they would come to her aid.¹⁰⁶ Nepal has a 20,000 man standing

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁰⁶"Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-35," May 1964, pp. 343-344.

army.¹⁰⁷ In addition, there are 10,000 Gurkhas serving in the British army and 21,000 in the Indian army which could be called home in the event of a national emergency.¹⁰⁸ Sufficient manpower is available to maintain an army of some 100,000 men in addition to those already serving in Gurkha units. The annual expenditure from state funds by the Ministry of Defense has almost doubled between the fiscal year 1956-57 and the fiscal year 1961-62. The Ministry of Defense spends more than any other government agency. Nineteen military check posts on the boundary with Tibet are manned solely by Nepalese forces. The main pass across the 500 miles Nepal Tibet border is the Kodari Pass (6,500 feet).¹⁰⁹

The army had proved loyal to the government and been called upon to protect the integrity of the Crown. In December 1960, when the King took direct control of the government, army units patrolled the streets of Katmandu and a number of political leaders, including cabinet members, reportedly were taken into custody and detained by the military pending disposition of their cases. The King has been the supreme commander of the

¹⁰⁷Statesman's Yearbook, 1968-1969, p. 1268.

¹⁰⁸Pradyumna P. Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms (New York: Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 117.

¹⁰⁹"The Defense of India's Northern Borders," India Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 1, January-March, 1966, p. 36.

Royal Nepalese Army since the overthrow of the Rana regime in 1951, and reserves for himself the portfolio of the Minister of Defense. In July 1958, an Indian military mission to Nepal which was in that country at the request of the Nepal Government to train and modernize the Nepalese Army, ceased to function. In asking the mission to return home, King Mahendra "thanked it for its satisfactory completion of the job."¹¹⁰ An Indian Military supply and liaison group continues to function in Katmandu. In 1964, Nepal had decided to accept limited arms aid from Britain and the United States to modernize the Royal Nepal army. King Mahendra was emphatic in stressing on the occasion that there would be no change in Nepal's policy of non-alignment.¹¹¹

In every sense of the word, Nepal is a viable sovereign state. Briefly summarizing the subcategories developed in our original scheme as applied to the situation in Nepal's relations with India:

I. INTERNAL RELATIONS:

A. Rule Making Authority--Under the control of the Royal Nepalese Government; no Indian control.

B. Rule Adjudication Authority--Under the control

¹¹⁰"Indian Military Mission in Nepal," Hindustan Times, Vol. IX, No. 30, July 24, 1958, p. 11.

¹¹¹A. T. Chandramohan, "Dovecote Calm," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 69, No. 4, April 23, 1964, p. 191.

of the Royal Nepalese Government; no Indian control.

C. Rule Application Authority--Under the control of the Royal Nepalese Government; no Indian control.

D. Economic Aid and Investments.

In the 1966-67 period India was furnishing 113,194 million Nepalese Rupees of foreign aid for about 52% of Nepal's total foreign aid of 216,927 million Nepalese rupees. While Indian aid is substantial, Nepal is becoming less and less dependent upon India for assistance. Traditional contributors such as Communist China and the Soviet Union have increased their aid to a great extent. U.S. aid remains high and new donors such as West Germany are advancing increasingly large amounts of aid. With regard to foreign investments in Nepal, India participates in less than 50% of these, with the Soviet Union the largest investor and the United States and Communist China also participating substantially. Hence, foreign economic aid and investments from India in no way infringes upon the internal sovereignty of Nepal.

E. Internal Communication and Transportation.

Although Communist China and India have helped in the construction of Nepal's internal transportation and communication systems, neither exercises any form of control over these vital facilities. Until April 12, 1965, India had handled the postal services of the nation, but this is no longer true.

F. Currency--The monetary unit is the Nepalese rupee, printed and distributed by the Nepalese government.

G. Conclusion--Nepal has formal control over its internal relations, though India has enormous indirect influence through its domination of foreign trade and large share of economic aid.

II. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

A. Diplomatic Representation--Nepal is a member of the U.N. and has diplomatic relations with most countries of the world.¹¹² India has no right by treaty, nor has it sought by imposition of its will to speak on behalf of the Government of Nepal. Nepal's sole responsibility to India in the area of foreign relations is stated in Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship which obligates the two governments "to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighboring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments."

B. Foreign Trade--Over 90% of Nepal's total trade is with India. In addition, Nepal being a landlocked country depends upon Indian ports for access to the sea. These facts give India an enormous capacity to apply pressure to the Kingdom in the form of economic sanctions. India has not chosen to do so, because of the

¹¹²Dick Wilson, "Himalayan Honour," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 117, No. 12, March 25, 1965, p. 555.

generally harmonious relationship between the two countries; except for one occasion. A service charge of Rs 1.50 per ton and 50 paise per parcel have been levied on transit traffic at the port of Radhikapur through which flow imports and exports between India and Pakistan. However, trade between Nepal and other countries has been expanding rapidly in the last few years. Competition with Communist China for Nepalese trade would act as an inhibitor against India's invoking economic sanctions even if she should desire to do so. As Nepalese trade with other countries continues to expand, India's leverage to apply economic sanctions will decrease. Hence, although India does possess this capacity for influencing Nepalese foreign relations, it does not in any measure control these relations.

Conclusion--(a) Nepal has formal control over its external relations. (b) India has an enormous capacity to apply economic sanctions by its control over Nepalese access to the sea, and the large volume of trade which is negotiated between the two nations.

III. DEFENSES

Under the control of the Royal Nepalese Government; no Indian control.

CHAPTER VI

INDIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH BHUTAN

The solitude which Bhutan enjoyed prior to this century has been eroded away by the emergence of India as an independent nation, and by recent Chinese Communist aggressive moves. Until recently Bhutan had followed a policy of isolationism. However, in 1959 Prime Minister Jigme Dorji, King Wangchuk, and other leaders of Bhutan, became convinced that progress could not be achieved without international intercourse, and they began negotiations with the Indian Planning Commission for drafting a Five Year Development Plan. This had occurred after an earlier visit by India Prime Minister Nehru to Bhutan in September, 1958.

Indian Aid Programs

Economic development of Bhutan was the main topic of the two day discussions held between Prime Minister Nehru and King Mahendra which were concluded in Paro on September 26, 1958. Mr. Nehru had emphasized the need for development of road communications between India and

Bhutan, and within Bhutan itself. He expressed India's readiness to give technical aid and other kinds of assistance required by the Kingdom.¹ Subsequently as a result of a later visit by Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Dorji to New Delhi in September 1959, India agreed to render Bhutan both technical and financial assistance for the construction of five all-weather roads.²

Bhutan's first five year plan was financed solely by India, and implemented from 1961-1966. The total Indian expenditure was Rs 105 million, in addition to Rs 300 million spent by the Indian Border Roads Organization for road construction.

Indian expenditures allocated for economic development during Bhutan's 1961-1966 Plan were as shown in the table on the following page.

A second five year plan beginning in 1966 and scheduled to terminate in 1971 at an expenditure of Rs 200 million is also being totally financed by India.³

More than 800 kms of roads have been constructed

¹"India Willing to Assist in Bhutan's Development," Hindustan Times, Vol. IX, No. 39, September 25, 1958, p. 12.

²"Mr. Jigme Dorji on Indo-Bhutanese Relations," Asian Recorder, Vol. 3, September 19-25, 1959, p. 2903.

³Pradyumna P. Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and Cultural Geography (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 81.

TABLE 8

INDIAN EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO BHUTAN DURING
THE 1961-1966 FIVE YEAR PLAN

Project	Expenditure in Rs million
Roads	62.00
Education	10.00
Transport	7.50
Health	3.20
Forest Conservation	3.20
Agriculture	2.00
Power	1.60
Animal Husbandry	1.50
Industries	1.10
Miscellaneous	9.10
Total	Rs 101.20 million

Source: Adapted from information obtained from the Information Service of India, Political Office, Gangtok, Sikkim, July 5, 1968, p. 5.

since planning began. A 208 kilometer road linking Phuntsholing on the Indo-Bhutan border in North Bengal to Paro and Thimbu in the interior has opened up Western Bhutan to motor vehicles for the first time.⁴ In addition to the Phuntsholing-Paro highway, three other north-south roads from the Indian border to central Bhutan have been constructed under the first Five Year Plan period. These are the Samdrup-Jongkar-Tashigang road; the Hatisar-Tongsa road; and the Sarbhang-Chirang-Wangdu Phodrang road. These roads have opened up large areas of central

⁴"Bhutan on Threshold of Great Changes," Hindustan Times, Vol. XI, No. 23, June 9, 1960, p. 2.

and eastern Bhutan to motorized vehicles. A 300 mile (400 km) east-west road connecting all the major inner Himalayan valleys is under construction. It will link Paro and Tashigang when completed.⁵ India, aware of the military vulnerability of Bhutan if Chinese Communist aggression should occur, is giving financial and technical assistance for the construction of another 400 miles of new roads under a second Five Year Plan. In addition to the roads, small airplane landing strips have been constructed at Paro and Thimbu to provide links with India. Helicopters are used to provide fast travel between Hashimara and Paro-Thimbu.⁶

In the field of communications fifteen wireless units have been supplied by the Government of India, some of them for flood warning systems.⁷ In 1965, India lent the services of a postal adviser to help modernize Bhutan's postal system.⁸ There are now 25 post offices in Bhutan, and eight more are to be opened in 1970. Telegraph

⁵"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, Political Office, Gangtok, Sikkim, July 5, 1968, p. 6.

⁶Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and Cultural Geography, p. 79.

⁷K. Krishna Moorthy, "Bhutan the Economic Scene," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 31, February 23, 1961, p. 333.

⁸Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and Cultural Geography, p. 81.

facilities are also being constructed. Sites have already been built at Phuntsholing, Paro, and Thimbu. The Border Roads Organization of the Government of India has provided telephone links between some principal towns in western and eastern Bhutan.⁹

In the field of education, before the Five Year Plan, there were only 36 lower primary schools and 23 upper primary schools in the entire country. The total enrolment was about 2,500 children. By the end of 1967, there were 108 schools, with a total student population of over 15,000 students, one teacher's training institute, and one technical training school. In addition 500 Bhutanese students were receiving training in India.¹⁰ At the technical training school students were being trained in the use of the wireless, in mechanics, and other training subjects.¹¹ The schools teach Bhutanese, Hindi and English.¹²

In September 1961, India and Bhutan signed a pact to harness the Jaldhaka River for hydroelectric power. A diversion wier has been constructed on the border of

⁹"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, p. 7.

¹⁰"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, p. 7.

¹¹Daniel Wolfstone and M. P. Gopalan, "The Road to Bhutan," Far Eastern Review, Vol. 42, No. 3, p. 86.

¹²Far Eastern Economic Review, February 23, 1961, p. 333.

Bhutan and India from which water is brought to a power house. The plant generates 18,000 kilowatts of power of which Bhutan receives without charge, 250 kilowatts daily. In addition to bringing benefit to the northern areas of West Bengal with its tea plantations, the plant is supplying power to southwestern Bhutan, which has no supplies of coal and oil.¹³ The Indian Central Water Power Commission has sent technical personnel to help the Bhutanese Government establish a Hydel Directorate Commission. Under this Commission's direction, the construction of a 400 kw project to serve the needs of Paro is nearing completion.¹⁴ Indian engineers have been surveying likely sites on Bhutan's rivers for the location of other hydroelectric projects. A number of small stations at Wangdu, Phodrang, Tongsa, Byakar Dzong, Tashigang, Ha Dzong, Sarbhang, and Samdrup Jongkhar have been recommended.¹⁵

With the beginning of the first Five Year Plan, a department of Health was established within the Government of Bhutan, for the first time. Prior to the onset of the Plan in 1961, there were only 11 dispensaries and

¹³Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and Cultural Geography, p. 47.

¹⁴"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, p. 8.

¹⁵Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and Cultural Geography, p. 47.

5 hospitals throughout the entire country. Only two of the hospitals had physicians. Since 1961, the facilities of these institutions have now been expanded, and all have qualified physicians. Three new hospitals have been constructed, and a fourth is underway. In addition, 40 new dispensaries have been established. There has ensued an extensive campaign for the eradication of malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy, goiter and venereal disease.¹⁶ Water supply schemes for major Bhutanese towns have been completed, and a number of pharmacists and nurses have been trained in Bhutan and India.

A Bhutanese Government Department of Agriculture was also established with the first Five Year Plan. The Department has established a large number of model agricultural farms, seed multiplication farms, and agricultural research stations. Bhutan, a land of small farms, has predominantly an agricultural economy. A concerted effort is being made by the new Agricultural Department to increase the area under fruit and vegetable cultivation. A Department of Animal Husbandry has also been established after the inception of planning. Its achievements have been to initiate six livestock farms, a sheep breeding farm, a mithun breeding center in eastern Bhutan,

¹⁶"Satisfactory Progress in Bhutan," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 23, June 15, 1965, p. 2.

furnished to Bhutan.²⁰ High level talks were held between officials of India and Bhutan in February 1967 at Thimbu covering the entire range of Bhutan's second Five Year Plan. At the talks Prime Minister Shastri of India assured the Bhutanese King: ". . . the government of India will gladly provide the necessary financial and technical assistance for the implementation of Bhutan's development schemes."²¹

In 1962, Bhutan became a member of the Colombo Plan under Indian sponsorship. The Colombo Plan is an arrangement for discussing national economic development plans, providing technical assistance, and financing particular developmental projects for south and southeast Asia, established at Colombo, Ceylon in June 1951. The scheme followed discussions by the governments of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain, Later the United States, Japan and a number of countries in southeast Asia joined the organization. The basic work is done at one annual meeting. However, a continuing body, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, deals with technical assistance. Financing of development projects is arranged bilaterally between

²⁰"Aerial Survey of Bhutan," Hindustan Times, Vol. VIII, No. 1, New Delhi, January 3, 1957, p. 10.

²¹"P.M. Assures Financial Aid to Bhutan," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 3, January 21, 1965, p. 3.

individual governments or the International Bank.²²

Six students have now received training in India under the Colombo Plan in veterinary science. In addition, an agricultural expert from Japan has joined the Bhutanese Department of Agriculture in 1964.²³ Several member countries of the Colombo Plan have offered scholarships for Bhutanese students, but only those offered by India have been utilized.²⁴ At a Bangkok meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee in November 1963, a three-member Bhutanese delegation presented the immediate requirements of the kingdom, calling attention to a shortage of transport, labor, and technical personnel as the main hurdles in the progress of its five year development plan.²⁵ The Australian government has supplied 40 three-ton trucks and the United Kingdom has given four Land Rover Ambulances. A Colombo Plan survey for extensive sheep breeding, particularly in North-central and northeastern Bhutan, has indicated that the prospects

²²Statesman's Year Book 1968-1969, pp. 45-46.

²³Foreign Affairs Studies Division, Special Operations Research Office, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Sikkim and Bhutan)" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 395.

²⁴Far Eastern Economic Review, April 9, 1964, p. 85.

²⁵Karan, Bhutan, pp. 75, 81.

are good.²⁶ By a treaty signed with India in August 9, 1949, Bhutan has agreed to be guided by India in its foreign relations. Besides a subsidy of Rs 500,000 provided for under the Treaty, India has been providing all Bhutan's foreign aid. Contributions by other nations (under the Colombo Plan) have thus far been insignificant.²⁷ Bhutanese leaders have felt that they have the right to approach foreign countries directly for economic aid, despite their treaty obligations to be guided by India's advice in foreign affairs. India, however, has feared that direct foreign contacts would draw Bhutan into power politics and might seriously harm its progress toward social and economic stability.²⁸

Foreign Investments

Because of the backwardness of the country and lack of trained personnel, foreign investments in Bhutan have been insignificant. Modern industry is itself almost nonexistent in Bhutan. In 1961, The Bhutanese Government had negotiated with a Swedish Company for technical assistance in developing a paper industry but

²⁶Ibid., p. 82.

²⁷Moorthly, Far Eastern Economic Review, February 16, 1961, p. 295; Karan, Bhutan, p. 19.

²⁸Paul Grimes, "Remote Bhutan Awakening to 20th Century," New York Times, Vol. CLX, No. 37,396, June 13, 1960, p. 8.

these negotiations have recently been abandoned. Except for a fruit preserving plant, which processes oranges and pineapples, and a distillery owned by an Indian entrepreneur, handicraft industry accounts for most of the goods produced. In 1963-1964, a team of Japanese also considered the possibility of a rayon pulp and paper plant for which raw materials would be obtained from the Conifer forests in the upper reaches of the Wang Chu. Foreign assistance is being sought for the plant and also for matchwood and plywood industries.²⁹

Indo-Bhutanese Trade Relations

With the sealing of the Tibetan border in 1959, Bhutan's trade has been limited to India (95%), and the members of the Colombo Plan (5%).³⁰ Under the 1949 treaty there is free trade between India and Bhutan, and India provides facilities for the carriage, by land and water, of Bhutanese produce. India has further given Bhutan the right to use the Indian forest roads along the border area, and Bhutan is free to import, through India, whatever arms, ammunition, and machinery are needed for the defense and welfare of the kingdom. Bhutan's total annual trade is valued at Rs 1,000,000 and all of Bhutan's

²⁹Karan, Bhutan, p. 47.

³⁰Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year, 1963, p. 207.

foreign exchange needs for development purposes are met by the Reserve Bank of India.³¹

Exports from Bhutan to India include:

1. Timber
2. fruit
3. metals
4. handicrafts
5. rice
6. food grains
7. potatoes
8. forest products
9. handloom cotton cloth.

Exports from India to Bhutan include:

1. Cotton textiles
2. light machinery and equipment.

Politico-Legal Relations

The strategic position of Bhutan from the standpoint of India's political geography cannot be overstressed. Bhutan is the pivot for the defense of India's northeastern frontier. An unfriendly or Chinese dominated Bhutan would flank India's position in upper Assam, and strategically place the Chinese south of the Himalayas.³²

³¹Pradyumna P. Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms (New York: Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 43.

³²A. R. Field, "Bhutan Kham and the Upper Assam Line," Vol. III, No. 2, Summer, 1959, p. 182.

India's relations with Bhutan have as their foundation the India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, signed by both countries and issued in Darjeeling on August 8, 1949. The treaty was basically patterned after a British treaty with the Maharaja of Bhutan revising certain articles of an earlier treaty, the Sinchula treaty, of November 11, 1865. The Sinchula Treaty had followed a period of hostility between Britain and Bhutan between 1837 and 1864 in which the Bhutanese continually raided British troops occupying the Durrang Duars in Assam.³³ The sturdy Bhotias using the hills as natural fortifications defeated an English garrison in 1865, with heavy losses to the British. This, combined with developments inside India, and the experience of the Great Rebellion of 1857, probably prevented the British from further expansion, and helped Bhutan to remain independent.³⁴ The date of the Treaty Revision Agreement was January 8, 1910.³⁵ The Sinchula Treaty had ceded the Duars to the British Government, freed British prisoners, and established free trade between Bhutan and British India.³⁶ It also

³³Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 36.

³⁴Hem Chandra Halder, "India's Neighbor: Bhutan," Modern Review, Vol. 107, April, 1960, p. 310.

³⁵For full texts of the 1865 Sinchula Treaty and the January 1910 revision Treaty see Appendixes H and I.

³⁶"India," The London Times, No. 25,353, November 27, 1865, p. 12.

guaranteed an annual allowance of Rs 50,000 (Indian Rupees) "provided the Bhotias abstained from fresh breaches of peace." The major significance of the 1910 Amendment Treaty was that it amended Articles IV and VIII of the earlier Sinchula Treaty. Article IV increased the annual allowance to the Government of Bhutan from Rs 50,000 to Rs 100,000. Article VIII required the Bhutan Government to agree to the arbitration by the British Government of all disputes between Bhutan and the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Bihar and "to abide by the decision of the British Government."³⁷ Article VIII of the amended Treaty guaranteed Bhutan control over its internal relations and the Bhutanese Government agreed to be guided by the advice of Britain with regard to its external relations:

"Article VIII: The British Government undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations."³⁸

Under the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949, India has also formally guaranteed to Bhutan that it will not interfere in the internal administration of the country. Bhutan has also agreed to be guided by the advice of India in

³⁷"The Sinchula Treaty of 1865," Principal Treaties and Documents Relating to Bhutan (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 93.

³⁸"Treaty with the Maharaja of Bhutan Revising Certain Articles of the Sinchula Treaty of 1865," dtd. 8th January 1910 Bhutan (University of Kentucky Press, 1967), p. 96.

regard to its external relations.³⁹ These provisions were specifically mentioned in Article II of the agreement, which is an exact duplicate of Article VIII of the 1910 Revision of the 1865 Sinchula Treaty, which Bhutan had signed with Britain. In the case of the 1949 Treaty, India replaces Britain in the wording which states:

"The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the Internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations."⁴⁰

Other major provisions of the treaty include the following:

- a. It should continue in force in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent (Article X).
- b. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the government of India and the Government of Bhutan (Article I).
- c. The Government of India agrees to make an annual payment of Rs 500,000 to the Bhutan Government (Article III).
- d. There shall be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan, and the Government of India agrees to grant every facility for the carriage by land and water throughout India of Bhutan produce, including the right to use such forest roads as may be specified from time to time (Article V).
- e. The Government of India agrees that the Government of Bhutan shall be free to import with the assistance and approval of the Government of

³⁹Robert Trumbull, "India, Bhutan Sign Perpetual Pact," New York Times, Vol. XCVIII, No. 33,435, August 9, 1949, p. 3.

⁴⁰"Text of India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship," issued in Darjeeling on August 8, 1949, Texts of Documents, Lok Sabha Secretariat, p. 4.

India, from or through India into Bhutan whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores as are desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan (Article VI).

Other clauses of the treaty relate to reciprocal judicial (Article VII) and extradition facilities (Article VIII).⁴¹

Relations between Bhutan and India have been outwardly friendly. Speaking at a State banquet in January 1954, Prime Minister Nehru stated that India would help Bhutan materially, with "affection and understanding."⁴² India has also reaffirmed Bhutanese independence and its non-imperialistic aims with reference to the Kingdom. Nehru speaking at a public meeting at Paro, Bhutan, on September 23, 1958, said that India's only desire for the border state was that it should remain independent and choose its own direction of progress. Mr. Nehru asserted:

"Some may think that, since India is a great and powerful country and Bhutan a small one, the former might wish to exercise pressure on Bhutan. . . . It is essential that I make clear to you that our only wish is that you (Bhutan) shall remain an independent country, choosing your own way of life and taking the path of progress according to your will. . . ."⁴³

In a press conference held in New Delhi on

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 4-7. For full text of the 1949 India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship, See Appendix J.

⁴²"Friendship with Bhutan," Hindustan Times, Vol. V, No. 3, January 21, 1954, p. 2.

⁴³"Foreign Policy of India," Texts of Documents, 1947-64, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1964, p. 8.

September 15, 1959, Prime Minister Digma Dorji of Bhutan mentioned the need for a furthering of cultural and other contacts between India and Bhutan. He disclosed that in November 1959 a delegation of about a hundred men and women would undertake a tour of India.⁴⁴

In a written statement of August 1964, Bhutanese Acting Prime Minister Lhendup Dorji said that Bhutan's policy of friendship and "extreme cordiality" towards India remains unchanged.⁴⁵ Upon the assassination of Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Dorji on April 1964, the Government of India, at Bhutan's request, had deployed a few expert crime investigators from Calcutta and New Delhi to assist Bhutanese officials in their investigation. The Indian Government charged that "a well laid out plot of Chinese conspirators" was involved in the assassination.⁴⁶ Upon his return from Gangtok on December 30, 1969, Indian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Dinesh Singh reported that King Mahendra was quite happy with existing arrangements in Indian-Bhutanese relations. His report said:

⁴⁴Mr. Digma Dorji on Indo-Bhutan Relations," Asian Recorder, Vol. 5, September 19-25, 1959, p. 2903.

⁴⁵"Accent on Friendship in Indo-Bhutanese Ties," Hindustan Times, Vol. XV, No. 34, August 20, 1964, p. 6.

⁴⁶"Chinese Hand in Bhutan P.M.'s Assassination," Hindustan Times, Vol. XV, No. 17, p. 6.

"The King was appreciative of the special relationship and the collaboration his Government was receiving from the Government of India."⁴⁷

The vagueness of Article II of the 1949 Treaty relative to India's "guidance" in Bhutan's foreign relations has been the subject of heated discussions in the Bhutanese National Advisory Assembly and is interpreted by some Bhutanese leaders to mean that India may offer advice but Bhutan is not obliged to accept it.⁴⁸ In speaking about Indo-Bhutanese relations on May 8, 1956, Prime Minister Jigme Dorji stated:

"Bhutan considered herself independent and wanted to stay independent."⁴⁹

There is scope for various interpretations of what the Indian "guidance" in Bhutan's foreign affairs really means. Mr. Dorji said again at a news conference in New Delhi on September 15, 1959, that his government stood by the Treaty of 1949 with India under which Bhutan had agreed to be guided by India in its external relations, but this did not mean that the Government of India was to conduct Bhutan's foreign policy. He was of the

⁴⁷"Mr. Dinish Singh Visits Bhutan," Asian Recorder, Vol. XIII, January 22, 1967, p. 7505.

⁴⁸Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal with Bhutan and Sikkim," p. 146.

⁴⁹A. M. Rosenthal, "Change Is Coming Bhutanese says," New York Times, Vol. CV, No. 35,901, May 10, 1956, p. 12.

opinion that while Bhutan could directly contact foreign countries and establish diplomatic relations with them, it had to consult India before embarking on any such negotiations, including those concerning economic and military aid. He was not aware that the Bhutanese Government wished to make any foreign contact "at this moment or in the immediate future." The Bhutanese Government was, however, studying a report submitted to it by its constitutional advisor, Mr. D. K. Sen.⁵⁰ Mr. Nehru wrote to the Maharaja advising against such a move alleging that Bhutan could not afford the costs--presumably financial-involved. The Maharaja accepted this advice with the caveat that "Bhutan must decide for itself in such matters."⁵¹

The Bhutanese Tsongdu (National Assembly) continued to maintain that the Bhutanese Government had a right, in theory at least, to establish direct relations with countries other than India even while conducting its foreign relations with India's guidance. Sen's recommendation had been known to include establishing

⁵⁰"Mr. Jigme Dorji on Indo-Bhutanese Relations," Asian Recorder, September 19-25, 1959, p. 2903.

⁵¹Rose, "Sino-Indian Rivalry and the Himalayan Border States," Orbis, Summer, 1961, pp. 199-200; Moorthly, "Bhutan: Thoughts of Sovereignty," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 23, 1961, p. 297.

foreign relations with the U.S., Russia and Britain.⁵²

New Delhi has interpreted the 1949 treaty to mean that all of Bhutan's external relations must be negotiated through India.⁵³ India has feared that direct foreign contacts would draw Bhutan into international power politics and might seriously hamper the nation's progress toward social and economic stability. The issue has gained in importance because of Chinese probes to Bhutan for direct negotiations.⁵⁴ Some time ago, two western powers were approached by Bhutanese agents for direct diplomatic relations, and New Delhi politely told the two countries that such a move would be considered an unfriendly act.⁵⁵ Mr. Jigme Dorji had approached British officials in 1959 about the possibility of obtaining teachers and was rebuffed.⁵⁶ Dorji has wanted to be included in the negotiations between Mr. Chou En-Lai and Mr. Nehru regarding the border dispute but Nehru had turned down this request also. The Chinese have nevertheless continued to make unofficial approaches to Bhutan.

⁵²"Bhutan for More Say in Foreign Policy," Hindustan Times, Vol. XI, No. 23, June 9, 1960, p. 12.

⁵³Paul Grimes, "Premier and Indian Lead Bhutan's Struggle to Modernize," New York Times, Vol. CIX, No. 37,398, June 15, 1960, p. 12.

⁵⁴New York Times, June 13, 1960, p. 1.

⁵⁵Far Eastern Economic Review, February 16, 1961, p. 297.

⁵⁶New York Times, June 15, 1960, p. 12.

In 1961, the Bhutanese Prime Minister alleged, "The Chinese urge that Bhutan, in enlightened self-interest, may now by pass India and start direct negotiations."⁵⁷

The Maharaja of Bhutan, arriving in India for talks with Mr. Nehru, declared that Bhutan had no desire to enter into direct negotiations with China. But he added: "We do not want to be either friends or enemies of China."⁵⁸ The Maharaja had also added that Bhutan had the right to establish direct diplomatic relations with any country as Bhutan is "a sovereign independent state."⁵⁹ In a seeming reversal of policy Acting Prime Minister Lhendup Dorji of Bhutan said in Calcutta on August 11, 1964:

"There is no question of Bhutan having any direct diplomatic relations with foreign countries. . . . Bhutan respects, honors and will stand by the 1949 Treaty of Friendship between India and Bhutan."⁶⁰

Bhutanese authorities have attempted to maintain a neutral attitude toward the Chinese Communists.⁶¹

⁵⁷Far Eastern Economic Review, February 16, 1961, p. 297.

⁵⁸"Bhutan and India Can Safeguard Border," Hindustan Times, Vol. XI, No. 25, June 23, 1960, p. 3.

⁵⁹Far Eastern Economic Review, February 16, 1961, p. 297.

⁶⁰Hindustan Times, August 20, 1964, p. 6.

⁶¹Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 475.

Indian Socialist Leader Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia said at a press conference in New Delhi on November 2, 1964 that they (Bhutan and Sikkim) did not feel grateful to India as they should have been for the aid which it had given them from time to time:

"The trouble with these countries, he added, was that the people who mattered politically in the Government as well as others had been trying to be non-aligned between India and China. This is I believe one of the most dangerous twists to the doctrine of non-alignment."⁶²

On September 13, 1966, Chinese troops had begun encamping on Bhutanese territory in the Doklan Pasture area. The intrusion was believed to be politically motivated. The Peking intentions may have been to put pressure on Bhutan for direct dealings in solving their border dispute.⁶³

In addition radio Moscow said in July 1967 that China had moved a military division specializing in sabotage activities into Tibetan mountain areas bordering Bhutan.⁶⁴ Indian Defense Minister Swaran Singh returning home after a visit to the area in late July 1967, said the local people had felt that Chinese arms

⁶²"Peking Pressure on Sikkim, Bhutan Increasing: Lohia," Hindustan Times, Vol. XV, No. 46, November 12, 1964, p. 6.

⁶³"Chinese Occupy Bhutan Area," Hindustan Times Vol. XVII, No. 40, October 13, 1966, p. 1.

⁶⁴"Maoism Active on Bhutan Border," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, No. 29, July 22, 1967, p. 1.

were being smuggled into the area.⁶⁵

Under Indian sponsorship, Bhutan became a member of the Colombo plan in 1962. India is also backing Bhutan's application for membership in the Universal Postal Union.⁶⁶ Bhutan's king has a trade commissioner at Calcutta, and the political officer in Sikkim represents the Government of India in Bhutan.⁶⁷ King Mahendra has been anxious for his country to join the United Nations, with India's consent and backing.⁶⁸ However, under the threat of Communist Chinese demands and activities in the Himalayan region, India has kept a rather firm control over Bhutanese foreign relations under the provisions of Article 2 of the 1949 Treaty of Friendship between Bhutan and India. No foreigner can enter Bhutan without a permit from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. In theory, any visitor who has obtained the permission of the Bhutanese authorities should get the permit automatically, but this has not always proven to be the case. No Bhutanese, not even the King, can go

⁶⁵"Chinese Army Buildup on Bhutan Border," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, No. 29, July 22, 1967, p. 9.

⁶⁶Department of State Publication 8334, December, 1967, p. 3.

⁶⁷The Statesmen's Year Book 1968-1969, p. 833.

⁶⁸Karan, Bhutan: A Physical and Cultural Geography, p. 19; The Statesman's Weekly (Calcutta), April 23, 1966; The London Times, April 28, 1968, p. 13; The New York Times, October 23, 1967, p. 4.

abroad without applying to the Indian reserve bank for foreign exchange. This would appear to give the Indian Government virtually complete control over Bhutan's foreign contacts,⁶⁹ and be a direct illustration of India's influence in domestic affairs. The Indian Government has said it will support Bhutan's application for U.N. membership "when the Bhutanese are ready."⁷⁰ Some Bhutanese regard this as undue procrastination. Namgyal Wangchuk, Governor of Paro, said in October 1967: "We are ready now. The question is, when will the Indians be ready?"⁷¹

Defenses

The defense of Bhutan is the joint responsibility of the Indian military establishment and the Government of Bhutan. Although there is no defense agreement between India and Bhutan, India has declared that an attack on Bhutan would be considered as aggression against India.⁷² Justification also exists under article 2 of the 1949

⁶⁹Joseph Lelyveld, "Kingdom of Bhutan Opening Window on the World," New York Times, Vol. CXVII, No. 40,084, October 23, 1967, p. 4; Washington Star, August 23, 1966, p. 5.

⁷⁰Lelyveld, New York Times, October 23, 1967, p. 4.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 4.

⁷²"India Would Rush to Bhutan's Defense if It Is Attacked," Weekly India News Information Service of India, Vol. 25, No. 28, Washington, D.C., October 28, 1966, p. 6; New York Times, September 1, 1959, p. 1.

treaty between India and Bhutan in which the Government of Bhutan agrees to be "guided by the advise of the Government of India in regard to its external relations." Bhutan also conducts her own defense, under Indian military training and supervision, deploying 20,000⁷³ military troops--a number which would be doubtless insufficient in case of a major Chinese aggression. The Bhutanese Army uses Indian equipment exclusively and is in fact paid by New Delhi.⁷⁴ The Kingdom has, however, forbidden the stationing of Indian combat troops in her country, apparently because it feels that no provocation should be given to the Chinese.⁷⁵ The ability of Nepal to prevent the stationing of Indian troops within its borders demonstrates Nepalese internal sovereignty with regard to this point. Additional justification for the participation of India in Bhutan's defense system originates from agreements of high level meetings, and statements of the Bhutanese Government formally endorsing Indian defense assistance. Bhutanese Prime Minister Digmé Dorji welcomed at a press conference in New Delhi on September 15, 1959 an assurance by Prime Minister Nehru that India would defend Bhutan in

⁷³Statesman's Year Book 1968-1969, p. 833.

⁷⁴Karan, Bhutan: A Cultural and Physical Geography, p. 84.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 84; New York Times, October 23, 1967, p. 4.

case of external aggression.⁷⁶ The Bhutanese Prime Minister also indicated the readiness of Bhutan's own militia to defend its borders in an interview in Calcutta on November 20, 1959. He declared that the people and Government of Bhutan "were as keen and anxious as any other independent country to safeguard their territorial integrity."⁷⁷

At a high level meeting held in February 1961, presided over by Prime Minister Nehru and attended by the Maharaja of Bhutan and India's Defense Ministers and service chiefs, the group formulated new programs for the discharge of India's responsibilities for the defense of Bhutan. The strength of the Indian defense forces available to answer a distress call from Bhutan were substantially increased. Also an intensive study of facilities for Indian air force operations over Bhutan was instigated. At an invitation from the Bhutanese Government, senior Indian military officers visited Bhutan's lands in 1961 and made an elaborate survey of Bhutan's defense requirements. Following their advice, the Bhutanese Government started a large scale recruitment of militia from the population, ingrained with the tradition of voluntary service for border patrolling in the North.⁷⁸ On his way back

⁷⁶Hindustan Times, September 24, 1959, p. 4.

⁷⁷Hindustan Times, November 26, 1959, p. 1.

⁷⁸Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 55.

to New Delhi after a visit to Bhutan, Indian Minister of External affairs Mr. Dinesh Singh said at Calcutta in December 1966:

"The Bhutan King has assured me that Bhutan would work more closely with India. He was aware of the danger from China and would co-operate with India so that the two countries, when necessary, might jointly defend the valley."⁷⁹

Summary

Briefly summarizing the sub-categories developed in our original scheme as applied to Bhutan's relations with India:

I. INTERNAL RELATIONS:

- a. Rule Making Authority--Under the control of the Bhutanese Government; no Indian control.
- b. Rule Adjudication Authority--Under the control of the Bhutanese Government; no Indian control.
- c. Rule Application Authority--Under the control of the Bhutanese Government; no Indian control.
- d. Economic Aid and Investments.

India has been providing virtually all Bhutan's foreign aid. Contributions by other nations under the Colombo Plan have been insignificant. Foreign investments in Bhutan, including Indian, remain as yet inconsequential, due to the backwardness of the country and to the lack of trained personnel among the Bhutanese people.

⁷⁹"Bhutan Alive to Danger from China," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, January 5, 1967, p. 1.

e. Internal Communications and Transportation.

Although India has been instrumental in helping Bhutan to develop a more sophisticated communication and transportation system, she does not exercise any control over these vital facilities.

f. Currency.

The traditional monetary unit has been the Indian rupee. However, The New York Times reported that in 1968, Bhutan began printing its own money in opening its first bank at Phunchholing.⁸⁰

Conclusion.

Bhutan has absolute control over its internal relations though dependence upon Indian economic aid gives India a strong leverage point of influence.

II. EXTERNAL RELATIONS:

a. Diplomatic Representation.

India has absolute control over the external relations of Bhutan under the provisions of article 2 of the 1949 Treaty of Friendship. Bhutanese officials have challenged the vagueness of the article's provision with reference to "guidance," but have for the most part acquiesced to the Indian interpretation thus far.

b. Foreign Trade.

In excess of 95% of Bhutan's foreign trade is with India. Article 2 of the 1949 Treaty of Friendship

⁸⁰New York Times, October 23, 1967, p. 4.

has been interpreted by India as giving her stewardship powers with regard to the kingdom's external trade relations.

Conclusion.

India has absolute control over the external relations of Bhutan.

III. DEFENSES:

The defense of Bhutan is the joint responsibility of the Governments of Bhutan and India. Although no formal defense agreement exists, Article 2 of the 1949 Treaty of Friendship has been interpreted by India as giving her responsibilities in the defense of Bhutan. The Bhutanese army is trained, financed, and supervised by the Indian Government. Unilateral declarations by the Indian government to come to the defense of Bhutan if it were attacked by a foreign power, and statements and conferences by Bhutanese officials publicly approving India's defense efforts on her behalf, all make India the senior partner in the Indo-Bhutanese defense of the Kingdom. However, Bhutan does have a 20,000 man militia at its disposal, and the kingdom has forbidden the stationing of Indian combat troops on its soil. The defense of the strategic northern passes leading into Tibet is the responsibility of the Bhutanese army.

Conclusion

The defense of Bhutan is both the responsibility of the Indian and Bhutanese Governments, with the Indian Government assuming the greater share of the burden.

CHAPTER VII

INDIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH SIKKIM

Sikkim is situated in the most strategic and exposed position in the frontier region between India and China. Not only is Sikkim the major channel of communication between India and Tibet, it is also the connecting link between the predominantly Hindu culture of the Central Himalayan Region, and the Buddhist and Animist communities of the Eastern Himalayan Region.¹ The Chinese threat has been responsible for a greatly stepped up program of road construction and economic development in Sikkim, as well as Bhutan.²

Indian Aid and Investment Programs

In 1952, Sikkimese Maharaja Sir Tashi Namgyal, the Chogyal (ruler) of Sikkim and Indian Prime Minister Nehru

¹Leo E. Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLII, No. 1, Spring, 1969, p. 32.

²Karan, "Sikkim and Bhutan: A Geographical Appraisal," Journal of Geography, February, 1961, p. 58.

met and formulated Sikkim's Seven Year Plan. Since then Sikkim has prospered economically as the result of the implementation of two economic plans. The first one began in 1954 and lasted until 1961. On March 15, 1955, the Maharaja of Sikkim recommended the Seven Year Plan to his people with the following words:

"I would now earnestly call upon my people to set themselves, with purpose and determination to the fulfilment of this great adventure. I am confident that with the implementation of the Plan, we shall have advanced far towards achieving the welfare and happiness of the people."³

The second plan began in 1961 and terminated in 1966. At the end of the second plan the Kingdom had showed an annual per capita income of Rs 700, approximately double that of India, its benefactor. The two plans have been financed from funds provided by India as outright grants.⁴ India spent a sum of Rs 32.369 million on the Seven Year Plan (1954-1961). An examination of the Plan is provided by Table 9 on the following page.

The emphasis on road construction evident in the first plan doubtless reflects India's concern for being able to transport its troops to Sikkim to meet any military threat from the Communist Chinese. Also it is

³Chandra Das Rai, "Sikkim 3-Seven Year Plan," United Asia, Vol. 12, no. 4, 1960, pp. 360-361.

⁴"Sikkim Parties Share Hostility to China," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 22, June 1, 1967, p. 9.

TABLE 9

EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO SIKKIM DURING THE
1954-1961 SEVEN YEAR PLAN

Project	Expenditure in Rs Million
Agricultural and Rural Development	1.300
Horticulture	1.121
Minor Irrigation Works	0.155
Animal Husbandry	0.292
Dairying and Milk Supply	0.552
Forest	2.258
Co-operation	0.542
Power Project	2.983
Cottage Industries	0.387
Other Industries	1.440
Roads and Buildings	13.901
Communications	0.001
Road Transport	1.670
Education	2.322
Medical and Public Health	2.273
Buildings	1.026
Cultural Organizations	0.146
Total	Rs 32.369 Million

Source: Adapted from information obtained from the Information Service of India, Political Office, Gangtok, Sikkim, July 5, 1968, p. 16.

understandable that without good roads and bridges none of the other schemes under the plan could be developed.

Medical aid would remain static, the farmers' markets would be restricted, education would be departmentalized, etc.⁵

In the second Plan (1961-1966) India doubled its

⁵"Sikkim 3-Seven Year Plan," United Asia, Vol. 12, no. 4, 1960, p. 361.

aid to Sikkim, with the major emphasis again on road construction. An examination of the Plan demonstrates the area of road construction to be of greatest concern to New Delhi:

TABLE 10
EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO SIKKIM DURING THE
1961-1966 FIVE YEAR PLAN

Project	Expenditure in Rs Million
Agricultural Production	2.892
Minor Irrigation	0.145
Animal Husbandry	1.179
Dairying	0.209
Forests	5.379
Soil Conservation	0.456
Fisheries	0.026
Co-operation	0.315
Power	5.305
Cottage Industries	0.935
Other Industries	0.241
Roads	26.084
Road Transport	4.400
Tourism	0.524
Education	7.682
Health	4.267
Housing	0.632
Publicity	0.140
Press	0.440
Cultural Activities	0.139
Marketing Centers	0.174
Secretariat Building	0.525
Community Center	0.306
Planning Development	1.242
Total	Rs 63.637

Source: Ibid., Chart one, p. 17.

It is an important consideration to take note of the fact that both the Seven Year plan and the Five Year plan were completely financed by the Government of India.⁶ The greatest emphasis of both plans has been on communication and transportation development. Before 1954, there were only 50 kilometers of motorable road between Gangtok and Rangpo, on the West Bengal-Sikkim border; and only 342 kilometers of motorable roads throughout the entire country. By 1962, several jeep tracks in lower Sikkim and about 153 kilometers of the North Sikkim Highway connecting Gangtok with Lachen and Lachung in North Sikkim had been constructed. Former pathways inaccessible to motor vehicles have been developed into roads capable of supporting mechanized traffic. These include a road between Rishi on the West Bengal border, and Jalepla on the Tibet border; a road from Gangtok to Natu La on the Sikkim-Tibet border; and other roads in eastern Sikkim.⁷ On June 29, 1965 a Rs 500,000 suspension bridge linking Kalimpong, a sub-division in West-Bengal, and Western Sikkim at Malli was completed. The 292 foot long bridge transversed the Teesta River and linked the Sikkim-Namgyal

⁶"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, Political Office, Gangtok, Sikkim, July 5, 1968, p. 17.

⁷Ibid., p. 18.

highway with the Siliguri-Gangtok highway.⁸ The bridge was subsequently "washed away by heavy landslides" but plans have been drafted to build it again. In addition, 19 "long bridges"⁹ were constructed in outlying areas. As a result of the road construction programs, almost all parts of Sikkim are within easy reach of Gangtok and the Sikkim Nationalized Transport operated services on all important routes. Sikkim has neither airfields nor railways, but Gangtok is connected to the Indian Air terminal and railhead of Silguru by a motorable road via Rangpo.¹⁰ Under the 1950 Indo-Sikkimese Treaty, communications are managed by the Government of India. Under the Indian Development assistance programs, Sikkim has increased the number of Post and Telegraph offices from two to nine.

Before the onset of the two development plans, 88 schools with a total enrollment of 2,500 students existed in Sikkim. "With the termination of the Second Plan, there were 191 primary schools, 5 secondary schools, 1 public school, 1 technical training school and one monastic school."¹¹

⁸"Bridge with Sikkim Inaugurated," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 27, July 8, 1965, p. 4.

⁹"Sikkim's March to Progress," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVII, No. 13, March 31, 1966, p. 3.

¹⁰Statesman Year-Book 1968-1969, p. 424.

¹¹"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, Political Office, p. 19.

The Government of India has donated about Rs 1 million since 1958 to the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, at Gangtok, where Mahayana Buddhistic Studies are carried on. Two hundred fifty Sikkimese students have been trained in India on scholarships made available by the Government of India.¹²

There are plans for a college to be established in Gangtok in 1971, and four Adult Education Centers have recently been established. The total student enrollment in July, 1968 was 15,000.¹³

About one-third of Sikkim's 2,828 square miles of territory are forested, and lumber is considered one of the Kingdom's greatest assets. The Sikkimese Forest Department has been engaged in soil conservation and afforestation programs. Sikkim sells timber to India for its railway development projects. The Forest Department has also embarked upon a tea plantation program which is providing for hundreds of Tibetan refugees. Contour surveys are also being carried out for a proposed tea garden and reclamation area to be located at Kewzing.¹⁴

Sikkim has considerable hydro-electric potential.

¹²Ibid., p. 22.

¹³Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁴"Sikkim's March to Progress," Hindustan Times, March 31, 1966, p. 3.

In 1961 the Rangni Hydel Project was completed and is now generating 2100 kilowatts of electricity for the Gangtok area.¹⁵ The project was expanded during the Five Year Plan, and is now the principal source of power supply to Singtam, and Rangpo. In addition, it will soon be supplying hydro-electric power to adjoining areas in West Bengal.¹⁶

A Micro-hydel project in Manul in North Sikkim is also under construction, and plans have been completed for three more hydel projects at Rothak Geyzing and Lagyap.¹⁷

Before the commencement of planning, there were only two hospitals in Sikkim. At the conclusion of the Five Year Plan, there were 5 government hospitals, 24 government dispensaries and 4 sub-dispensaries. Medical complexes consisting of a maternity ward, an isolation ward, and a T.B. ward have been completed in almost every district. Government programs for the eradication of such diseases as malaria, tuberculosis, venereal disease, Kola Azar, and intestinal worms have had remarkable success. One hundred fifty-four village water supply schemes have also been instituted with Indian help. Indian army doctors

¹⁵Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 72.

¹⁶"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, Political Office, p. 19.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 19; Hindustan Times, March 31, 1966, p. 3.

have been quite active in all of these programs.¹⁸

Agriculture has traditionally been the chief support of Sikkim's economy. Ninety-five percent of the population of Sikkim depend upon agricultural products for their livelihood. In order to assist in the development of this vital area, a Department of Agriculture was created in 1955.¹⁹ Under Indian grants the Department has given Rs 400,000 in loans to needy farmers and opened 100 acre farms at Geyzing, and Ribdi to provide quality seeds. A crash program to step up food production and provide seeds, fertilizers and technical expertise to farmers has also been introduced.²⁰ Government demonstration centers have been set up at Tadung, Lachen and Gangtok.²¹ A Department of Animal Husbandry recently established, has taken steps to improve the quality and yield of wool, improve cattle and sheep breeds, and provide veterinary hospitals and dispensaries for all district headquarters.²²

Since 1960, the Sikkim Mining Corporation, a joint

¹⁸"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, Political Office, pp. 19-20; Hindustan Times, March 31, 1966, p. 3.

¹⁹Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 70.

²⁰Hindustan Times, March 31, 1966, p. 3.

²¹"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, Political Office, p. 20.

²²Hindustan Times, March 31, 1966, p. 3.

undertaking of the Governments of India and Sikkim has been instrumental in sponsoring systematic mineral development. Copper, lead and zinc are mined in appreciable quantities. In addition the five year plan has provided for an industrial survey of the Kingdom to determine possibilities for setting up industries based on forest products.²³ A Rs 13 crore paper pulp project with Indian collaboration is currently under consideration.²⁴

Twenty-four co-operative societies and four fair price shops are now functioning in Sikkim. A sum of Rs 840,000 was given in 1965 to Sikkim by India to start four small scale industries. These include a wire nail factory at Rangpo, a gas plant at Rhensek, an orchard sanctuary at Gangtok, and an extension of the nursery at Rhenock.²⁵

A third plan (1966-1971) is currently in effect. Under the Plan, India is contributing outright grants totaling Rs 90 million to Sikkim, with the accent on further industrialization. Allotments have also been made

²³Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 71.

²⁴"Indian Aid for Sikkim Paper Pulp Project," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVII, no. 13, March 31, 1966, p. 3.

²⁵Hindustan Times, March 31, 1966, p. 3.

for improving agriculture.²⁶

Virtually the entire development budget is met by India through direct grants in aid, loans or subsidies. Article IV of the Text of the Indian-Sikkim Peace Treaty issued in Gangtok, on December 5, 1950 forbids Sikkimese acceptance of foreign aid from countries other than India. The Article asserts:

(1) the external relations of Sikkim whether political economic or financial, shall be conducted and regulated solely by the Government of India and the Government of Sikkim shall have no dealings with any foreign power.²⁷

Sikkim is interested in such multi-national aid programs as the Colombo Plan or in private foreign capital investment. However, the Indian Finance Minister, Moraji Desai made it quite clear during his visit to Gangtok in March 1968 that the government of India is not disposed to approve foreign collaboration in the development of industries in Sikkim.²⁸ Indeed most of the local commercial and credit structure is dominated by Indian merchants and bankers domiciled in Sikkim. Even the recently

²⁶"Sikkim Parties Share Hostility to China," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 22, June 1, 1967, p. 9. Leo E. Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship," Pacific Affairs, Spring, 1969, p. 35.

²⁷"Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," Issued in Gangtok on Dec. 5, 1950, Texts of Documents 1947-64, Lok Sabha, New Delhi, 1964, p. 170.

²⁸Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship," Pacific Affairs, Spring, 1969, p. 44.

established Sikkim State Bank is closely connected with the Indian State of Marwari banking firm. In addition, Sikkim's industrial development program has been intrusted to a corporation in which 92.5 percent of the share capital is held by the Kamani Engineering Group of Bombay.²⁹

Indo-Sikkimese Trade Relations

The restrictions on Sikkim's external relations with other countries under Article IV of the Indian-Sikkim Peace Treaty of 1950 also applies to Sikkimese trade, which is consequently limited to India alone. Imports from Sikkim to India include:

1. Cardamom
2. Oranges and apples
3. Potatoes

Imports from India to Sikkim include:

1. Essential textiles
2. Foodstuffs
3. Other consumer goods.³⁰

Under the 1950 treaty and supplementary arrangements, Sikkim has almost been constituted as an integral part of the Indian economy. The procedures under which

²⁹Ibid., p. 36.

³⁰"Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, Political Office, p. 15.

Sikkim obtains its foreign-exchange requirements from India are not specifically mentioned in the treaty, but rather stem from the pattern of economic relations implicit in the treaty provisions, and from the fact that the Indian rupee is the only legal currency in the state. Article 5 of the 1950 treaty states: The government of Sikkim agrees:

not to levy any import duty, transit duty, or other import on goods brought into, or in transit through Sikkim, and the Government of India agrees not to levy any import or other duty on goods of Sikkimese origin brought into India from Sikkim.³¹

The treaty thus bars Sikkim from imposing excise duties on imports that it has gained from Indian economic assistance. The Sikkimese Maharaja has spoken of the "very great disadvantage to us," and suggested that this is an appropriate subject for negotiations.³² Sikkim has been even more dissatisfied by the system by which India has collected and retained excise duties on goods imported into Sikkim. The Sikkim Executive Council claimed in 1967 that:

It is true that the financial aid amounting to Rs 12 crores or so given to Sikkim during the past 14 years

³¹"Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," issued in Gangtok on December 5, 1950, Texts of Documents, 1947-1964, Lok Sabha, p. 170.

³²Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship," Pacific Affairs, Spring, 1969, p. 43.

of the plan period by the Government of India has considerably increased the revenue of Sikkim. But the granting of aid which has generated the increase has been more than offset by Indian excise duty levied on all the goods imported to Sikkim from India, which has not been transferred to Sikkim so far. And this excise duty paid by Sikkim amounts to nearly a crore of rupees per annum.³³

If these figures are correct, Sikkim has obtained approximately Rs 120 million in aid from India since 1953, but has paid nearly Rs 140 million in excise duty during the same period. The implication is that Sikkim would have been better off if it had not received any economic aid from India but had itself imposed excise duties on Indian imports.³⁴ Sikkimese officials have resented the Indian Foreign Ministry's restrictions on Sikkim's exports and other contacts with the outside world.³⁵ The Maharaja is particularly unhappy that the State cannot trade and earn hard currency from cardamom.³⁶

Politico-Legal Relations

India's relations with Sikkim have as their foundation the India-Sikkim Peace Treaty signed by both countries, and issued in Gangtok on December 5, 1950. The Treaty was

³³Ibid., p. 44.

³⁴Ibid., p. 44; Peter Braestrup, "Sikkimese Want Pact with India That Gives Them More Self-Rule," New York Times, Vol. CXVI, no. 39,971, July 2, 1967, p. 3.

³⁵New York Times, July 2, 1967, p. 3.

³⁶Hindustan Times, June 1, 1967, p. 9.

patterned after a March 17, 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet. The Convention signed at Calcutta, delimited the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, and, according to article 3, both Governments agree to respect the boundary as defined in Article I and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the frontier. In accordance with Article 4, regulations regarding trade communication and pasturage were appended to the Convention.

Article 2 of the treaty had the effect of making Sikkim a protectorate of the British Government. It provided:

(2) It is admitted that the British Government, whose protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognized had direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State, and except through and with the permission of the British Government, neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal, or informal, with any other country.³⁷

British suzerainty was thought by the British to have been established by an earlier treaty which Britain imposed upon Sikkim in 1861. This view however, was repudiated by the Tibetans who proceeded to engage in official

³⁷"Convention Between Great Britain and China Relating to Sikkim and Tibet (1890)," Tests of Treaties, Agreements and certain exchange of notes relating to the Sino-Indian Boundary. Indian Society of International Law, New Delhi, 1962, p. 14. For full text of Treaty see Appendix K.

activities in Sikkim. In 1888, a British military expedition drove the Tibetan army out of Sikkim and pursued it into the Chumbi Valley in Tibet. The Chinese suzerains of Tibet then ordered their resident in Lhasa to make peace and the 1890 Calcutta Treaty was signed.³⁸ The London Times in commenting on the signing of the Treaty said: "It is understood that the main effect of the treaty is to confirm the British claims to treat Sikkim as a feudatory State."³⁹

A controversy arose almost immediately after Indian independence over whether India automatically inherited the paramount rights the British had enjoyed in the border states. India argued that as the successor government, it enjoyed all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of the British. The Sikkim Court disagreed and argued that independent India was "a new juristic person" which could not "claim to be subrogated to the rights and obligations of the British Government."⁴⁰ Paramountcy had lapsed, the Sikkimese insisted, with the British withdrawal

³⁸Koran, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 59.

³⁹"Sikkim," The London Times, No. 32,967, March 24, 1890, p. 5.

⁴⁰Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationship," p. 33; Gyalmo Hope Namgyal, "The Sikkimese Theory of Landholding and the Darjeeling Grant," Bulletin of Tibetology, Vol. III, no. 2, July 21, 1966, pp. 47-60.

from India. The political climate in Sikkim during the negotiations with India in 1950 was seriously disadvantageous to the Sikkim government. Internal disorders in the state had reached alarming proportions between 1947-1949, and the very survival of the ruling dynasty had seemed to require outside support. With the exception of a small (300) man State Police, the only military force in Sikkim at the time was an Indian army detachment that had been sent to Gangtok during the disturbances in May, 1949. The Chinese occupation of Tibet, with all that this implied for both India and Sikkim occurred between the signing of the Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1949, and the signing of the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty. This latter Treaty in particular reflected New Delhi's heightened concern with frontier security.⁴¹ Article 2 and 11, deal with Sikkim's relationship with India regarding Sikkim's internal affairs.

Article 2 states:

Sikkim shall continue to be a Protectorate of India and, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, shall enjoy autonomy in regard to its internal affairs.⁴²

Article XI states:

⁴¹Ibid., p. 34.

⁴²"Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," Issued in Gangtok on December 5, 1960. For full text of the Treaty see Appendix L.

The Government of India shall have the right to appoint a Representative to reside in Sikkim; and the Government of Sikkim shall provide him and his staff with all reasonable facilities in regard to their residential and office accommodation and generally in regard to their carrying out their duties in Sikkim.⁴³

In theory, the Maharaja of Sikkim controls the State's internal affairs. However, he is aided by an Indian appointed civil servant who assists as the Principal State administrative officer. The Indian officer called a dewan is permanent chairman of the State Council. His duties are rather similar to those of a prime minister, and he has now become an essential part of the Kingdom's administrative machinery. The Dewan is appointed by the Government of India with the approval of the Maharaja.⁴⁴ There is also an Indian financial adviser, an Indian Chief engineer, an Indian director of the state distillery and Indians at the head of other important departments of Government.⁴⁵ Hence, India and Sikkim share in the executive-legislative functioning of the Sikkimese government. Article 6 of the treaty grants India further control over the internal physiology of the Kingdom; in particular,

⁴³Ibid., p. 172.

⁴⁴"Parliamentary Government Sought for Sikkim," Hindustan Times, Vol. XI, No. 35, September 1, 1960, p. 3.

⁴⁵Statesman's Yearbook 1968-1969, p. 424; Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, pp. 74-75; "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 383.

control over Sikkim's transportation and communications systems. The Article states:

(1) The Government of India shall have the exclusive right of constructing, maintaining and regulating the use of railways, aerodromes and landing grounds and air navigation facilities, posts, telegraphs, telephones and wireless installations in Sikkim. . . .

(3) The Government of India shall have the right to construct and maintain in Sikkim roads for strategic purposes and for the purpose of improving communications with India and other adjoining countries.⁴⁶

Although the Kingdom exercises judicial power over its subjects, Article 12 of the 1950 treaty gives India supremacy in judicial disputes regarding interpretation of the Treaty itself. Since many of the articles deal with matters concerning Sikkim's internal affairs, the Article indirectly gives India juridic control over these affairs. Article 12 reads:

If any dispute arises in the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty which cannot be resolved by mutual consultation, the dispute shall be referred to the Chief Justice of India whose decision thereon shall be final.⁴⁷

Article 4, which grants India domination over the political, economic and financial external relations of Sikkim has already been discussed. As a result of Article 4, Sikkim has not, nor may it have external relations with any country other than India. In addition,

⁴⁶"Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," Lok Sabha Secretariat, p. 170.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 173.

the unit of exchange in Sikkim is the Indian rupee.⁴⁸

Despite Indian influences, the Maharaja exercises strong authoritarian control over his Sikkimese subjects and areas of the Sikkimese government not covered by the 1950 treaty. In 1960, a delegation from the Sikkim National Congress Party presented a memorandum to Prime Minister Nehru of India seeking a promise that India would not interfere when the Party "launched civil disturbances" in an effort to attain a more democratic rule. The group was particularly interested in securing a constitution, since Sikkim has none, and a parliamentary form of Government. The delegation also asked for the abolition of the post of Dewan, and the formation of a Constituent-Assembly to create the desired constitution. India failed to act, and the Party's attempt for reforms were aborted.⁴⁹

India has been most adamant about limiting Sikkim's relations with all other nations through the Indian Government, particularly in the case of Communist China. In December 1963, China sent a condolence message to the new Maharaja of Sikkim, Thondup Namgyal, upon the death of his

⁴⁸Paul Grimes, "2 Sikkimese Ask Closer Indian Tie," New York Times, Vol. CIX, no. 37,132, September 23, 1959, p. 12.

⁴⁹"Sikkimese Prod India," New York Times, Vol. CIX, No. 37,471, August 27, 1960, p. 5; Hindustan Times, September 1, 1960, p. 3.

father. India upon learning of the incident issued a protest to the People's Republic, that "this was a breach of protocol."⁵⁰ In April, 1965, Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, sent the Maharaja of Sikkim a telegram of congratulations on the occasion of his coronation. In a note sent to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi, on April 9, 1965, the Government of India said that the Chinese action "is totally unacceptable." The note went on to say that the Chinese Government was well aware that the external relations of Sikkim were the responsibility of the Government of India, and any communications either formal or informal from the Government of China to the Government of Sikkim or its Chogyal (Maharaja) should be channeled through the Indian Government.⁵¹

Publicly and superficially the relations between India and Sikkim have been warm and friendly. In Gangtok on April 6, 1965, the Sikkimese Maharaja extolled the friendship of the two countries:

"India is a great and peaceloving country and we feel secure in her protection. The bonds of friendship between our two countries are strong and indissoluble. I take this opportunity to affirm that it will be our

⁵⁰"India Protests to Peking over Message to Sikkim," New York Times, December 23, 1963, p. 3.

⁵¹"Protest at Message to Sikkim," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 18, May 6, 1965, p. 6.

purpose and endeavor to further strengthen these bonds in the fullest measure.⁵²

After the Maharaja concluded his speech, Mrs. Lakshmi Memon, India's Minister of State of External Affairs, asserted:

"We are certain that your benevolent guidance will lead the people of Sikkim to great prosperity and well-being and will preserve and promote cultural and spiritual values."⁵³

Underlying the cordiality and camaraderie of such statements there has existed great tension between the two nations, as Sikkim has sought to attain greater internal and external autonomy. In a joint statement, issued in June, 1967, three members of the Executive Council of Sikkim had stressed the need for a "thorough change" in the provisions of the Indo-Sikkimese treaty. The statement contended that any right which had become the responsibility of India under the treaty had been intrusted to her by Sikkim. It was therefore, an obligation on the Government of India to "gracefully sponsor our membership of various international organizations." The statement said that since Sikkim had signed the Treaty with India, it was within her rights as a sovereign nation to demand its revision. The note concluded:

⁵²"Sikkim Maharaja Affirms Friendship with India," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVI, No. 15, April 15, 1965, p. 4.

⁵³Ibid., p. 4.

"Every country has the inherent right to exist and maintain its separate identity and to review and revise its Treaty obligations in the wake of changing circumstances."⁵⁴

On May 19, 1967, the Maharaja of Sikkim told newsmen in Gangtok that the Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1950 had to be "reviewed" in view of the changed situation since the Treaty was signed. This was the first time that the Maharaja had spoken publicly of the need to review the Treaty, although he had indicated earlier about the matter to members of the Sikkimese Court. Asked how soon he would seek review of the treaty the Maharaja said:

"We await the convenience of the Government of India. We have chosen to throw our lot with India. We share the ideology that you (India) follow. This does not, however, mean merger with India."⁵⁵

He also spoke of economic independence as being "more important than political independence in the present day world."⁵⁶ Mr. Vincent Coehli, a local representative for the Government of Sikkim said in July, 1967 that he had a great distrust of "New Delhi's colonialism." He spoke with great disfavor of the Indian Foreign Ministry's restrictions on Sikkim's exports and other contacts with the outside world. To gain a visa to enter Sikkim a

⁵⁴"Call for Revision of Indo-Sikkimese Pact," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 35, June 24, 1967, p. 12.

⁵⁵"Sikkim Ruler on Need to Review Treaty with India," Asian Recorder, Vol. XII, no. 25, June 24-28, 1967, pp. 7755-7756.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 7756.

foreigner must apply several days in advance to the Indian Foreign Ministry, which may or may not grant him permission.⁵⁷ India appears to face a great dilemma with regard to Sikkim. Sikkimese authorities have attempted to maintain a neutral attitude toward the Chinese Communists and have exercised care to avoid actions or disputes which might be used as a pretext for retaliatory tactics by the Chinese Government.⁵⁸ The Maharaja of Sikkim had said as late as May 19, 1967: "Sikkim was a small country and she did not seek a quarrel with the north (China)."⁵⁹

Meanwhile, the Chinese continue to remain in strength along the northern borders.⁶⁰

Defenses

The defense of Sikkim is the responsibility of the Indian Army. The 1950 Treaty grants India the right to station troops anywhere in the country, take any measures regarded as necessary to defend it, control all imports of arms, build strategic roads and track down fugitives

⁵⁷Braestrap, "Sikkimese Want Pact with India That Gives Them More Self Rule," New York Times, July 2, 1967, p. 3.

⁵⁸Foreign Affairs Studies Division, The American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (with Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 387.

⁵⁹Asian Recorder, June 18-24, 1967, p. 7756.

⁶⁰"Heavy Casualties Inflicted on Chinese at Nathu-La," Hindustan Times, Vol. XVIII, no. 47, November 24, 1967, p. 9.

within the country. Article 3 of the treaty states in part:

(1) The Government of India will be responsible for the defense and territorial integrity of Sikkim. It shall have the right to take such measures as it considers necessary for the defense of Sikkim or the security of India whether preparatory or otherwise, and whether within or outside Sikkim. In particular, the Government of India shall have the right to station troops anywhere within Sikkim.⁶¹

In December 1960, the Sikkimese Maharaja expressed a desire for an increased participation in its own defense.⁶² The Army then consisting of only 60 men was used primarily to guard the Maharaja's palace. India agreed to establish and equip a separate militia force of 280 men to be trained and commanded by Indian officers to help man the border outposts.⁶³

The size of the Sikkimese army was later raised to 560 men, a strength at which it remained up to October 1968. The Sikkim guard is not under the direct command of the Indian army, however, nor is it currently used as a border defense force. In times of emergency, such as during the border firings in September 1967, the Guard is available for defense purposes, and presumably would

⁶¹"Text of the India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," Issued in Gangtok on Dec. 5, 1950, Tok Sabha, p. 169.

⁶²"Sikkim Wants Its Own Military Force," Hindustan Times, Vol. XI, No. 49, December 8, 1960, p. 1.

⁶³"U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan and Sikkim)," p. 388.

then come under the authority of the Indian army commander in the area.⁶⁴ The New York Times reported the Indian troop strength in Sikkim in July 1967 at 40,000 men.⁶⁵

Briefly summarizing the sub-categories developed in our original scheme as applied to Sikkim's relations with India:

I. INTERNAL RELATIONS:

a. Rule Making Authority--Under the control of the Maharaja, who is aided by the Indian dewan (or prime minister), nominated by India.

b. Rule Application Authority--Under the control of the Maharaja and the elected State Council, assisted by the Indian dewan and other Indian department heads.

c. Rule Adjudication Authority--Under Sikkimese control except for those matters dealing with Article 12 of the 1950 Treaty, in which case the Chief Justice of India has the final say, e.g., transportation, communication, defenses, etc.

d. Economic Aid and Investments--India is the sole provider of Sikkim's foreign aid, and its sole economic investor. This has been required under Article IV of the 1950 India-Sikkim Peace Treaty.

⁶⁴Rose, "India and Sikkim: Redefining the Relationships," Pacific Affairs, Spring, 1969, pp. 41-42.

⁶⁵New York Times, July 2, 1967, p. 3.

e. Internal Communication and Transportation--

India has ultimate control over the communication and transportations network of Sikkim under Article VI of the 1950 India-Sikkim Peace Treaty.

f. Currency--The medium of exchange in Sikkim is the Indian rupee.

Conclusion: Sikkim and India share control over the internal relations of Sikkim. India's control over economic aid and investments, internal transportation and communications, and the use of the Indian rupee as a medium of exchange, all give the Indian Government enormous influencing leverage. A Dewan and other Indian officers constitute an indispensable part of the Government's administrative machinery. However, the Maharaja must approve the Dewan's appointment, and the former exercises strong authoritarian control over his Sikkimese subjects and governmental areas not covered by the 1950 Treaty.

II. EXTERNAL RELATIONS:

a. Diplomatic Representation--Article IV of the 1950 India-Sikkim Peace Treaty places the external relations of Sikkim under the regulatory power of the Government of India.

b. Foreign Trade--Article IV places a similar restriction on Sikkim's foreign trade.

Conclusion: The external relations of Sikkim are under the control of the Government of India.

III. DEFENSES:

Article III of the 1950 India-Sikkim Peace Treaty places the defense of Sikkim under the protection of the Government of India. A small 560 man self-defense force exists in Sikkim, but it is trained by Indian officers and is inconsequential to Sikkim's defense.

Chapters V through VII have dealt with a particularized study of the political, economic and defense relationships of India with Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal and developed the first phase of a definitive category scheme based on the internal, external and defense relations of India with each of the Himalayan states. Chapter VIII will explore the cultural similarities and dissimilarities between India and each of the three countries under study in order to develop the second phase of the categorization plan.

CHAPTER VIII

INDIAN CULTURAL SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES WITH BHUTAN, SIKKIM, AND NEPAL

I. ETHNIC AND SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

a. Indian Ethnic and Racial Characteristics.

The ethnic history of India is extremely complex, and racially distinct divisions between peoples generally cannot be clearly drawn. However, Negroid, Australoid, Mongoloid, and Caucasoid stocks are discernible. The first three are represented mainly by groups of tribal peoples in the southern hills, the Plateau, Assam, the Himalayas, and the Andaman Islands. The main Caucasoid element is Mediterranean, including the dark complexion Dravidians of the south, and other groups dominant in much of the north; and Indo-Aryan, a taller, fairer skinned group dominant in the northwest. Historical groupings result mainly in differences of language and religion. The small, dark Dravidians, ancestors of the Tamils of South India, were among the earliest known inhabitants. Ruins of a civilization in the Indus Valley has revealed that 5,000 years ago the inhabitants there

were using metals and had domesticated animals, cities, bathrooms, and drainage systems. About 1500 B.C. the taller, light skinned Aryans began pushing through the passes of the Northwest frontier and gradually spread across all northern India, pressing the indigenous people southward but absorbing certain features of their culture in the process.¹

¹ The statistics quoted in this chapter are the result of comparing data from the following sources:

- a. "Background Notes--Bhutan," U.S. Department of State Publication 8334, December, 1967, p. 1.
- b. "Background Notes--Nepal," U.S. Department of State Publication 7904, October, 1967, p. 1.
- c. "Background Notes-India," U.S. Department of State Publication 7847, December, 1967, p. 1.
- d. "Bhutan and Sikkim," Information Service of India, Political Office, Gangtok, Sikkim, July 5, 1968,
- e. Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 3, pp. 566-567; Vol. 16, pp. 220-224; Vol. 20, p. 508.
- f. Golenpaul, Dan. Information Please Almanac (New York: Golenpaul Assc.), November, 1968.
- g. Karan, Bhutan, pp. 72-75.
- h. Karan, Nepal, p. 66.
- i. Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, pp. 41, 62-64.
- j. "The Subcontinent of Asia," U.S. Department of State Publication 7410, p. 55.
- k. Smith, C.R. "Overseas Business Reports," OBR 6886, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce (Washington: Government Printing Office, September 1968), p. 2.
- l. The Statesman's Yearbook, 1968-1969, pp. 833, 424, 1268.
- m. "U.S. Army Area Handbook for India," U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-21, July, 1964,
- n. Foreign Affairs Studies Division, the American University, "U.S. Army Area Handbook for Nepal (With Bhutan and Sikkim)," pp. 395, 164, 274.
- o. Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations, Vol. 4 "Asia and Australia," 1967, pp. 82, 25, 196, 236.

b. Nepalese Ethnic and Racial Characteristics.

The people of Nepal are descendents of three major migrations from India, Tibet, and Central Asia. Major groups include the Tharus, Bhutias, Sunware, Limbus, Newars, Gurung, Magai and Rois. The aboriginal stock are Mongolians, who managed to migrate to Nepal via Tibet, Sikkim, Assam, and northern Bengal; and Indo-Aryans, who migrated from the Indian plains and from the sub-Himalayan hill region. Ethnically and culturally the Nepalese in the Terai and central hills have close links with India, but the inhabitants of Northern Nepal, which borders on Tibet, are mostly Buddhist.

Because of the polyglot nature of the racial and ethnic groups of both India and Nepal, they must be considered on the basis of this categorization to be racially and ethnically amorphous.

c. Bhutanese Ethnic and Racial Characteristics.

The major ethnic groups of Bhutan are the Bhutiyas (Bhotias). These people are of Tibetan origin, speak a Tibetan dialect and practice the same form of Buddhism prevalent in Tibet. The Bhutias comprise about 65% of the inhabitants of Bhutan, and the majority of them live in the northern part of the country. The largest minority ethnic group is the Nepali faction which comprises 20-25% of the population. Other minority elements are the indigenous Lepcha; and Santals, who migrated from India's

Bihar state. These two comprise 10-15% of the nation's citizens. Because of the preponderant presence of the Bhutias (65%), Bhutan must be considered racially and ethnically divergent to the majority of the Indian population.

d. Sikkimese Ethnic and Racial Characteristics.

The majority of the indigenous people of Sikkim are generally of Tibetan stock. Although 75% of the inhabitants of the tiny kingdom are Nepalese, the vast majority of Nepalese immigrants are from the northwestern part of Nepal and possess Mongolian features. The largest minority element are the Bhutias and Lepchas, which together comprise 21% of the population. These groups are both of Tibetan stock, the latter racially akin to some of the hill tribes of Assam and the Tamangs, Limbus and Rois from Nepal. The Lepchas are believed to have been the original inhabitants of Sikkim. There are also many Tibetan refugees living in Sikkim. Because of the preponderance of the Mongolian-Tibetan group, the majority of the people of Sikkim must be considered racially and ethnically divergent to the majority of the Indian population.

II. RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS

a. Indian Religious Characteristics.

The preponderant religion of India is Hinduism, the elemental characteristics of which were discussed

earlier. A breakdown of the major religions of India is as follows:

TABLE 11
MAJOR RELIGIONS OF INDIA, 1967

Religion	Number of Believers (in millions)	Percent of Believers
Hindu	428	84%
Moslem	56	10.9%
Christian	12	2.3%
Sikh	9	1.7%
Others*	5	1.1%
Total	510	100%

*Jain, Buddhist, Zoroasterin, Jewish, etc.

Source: Adapted from "Background Notes--India,"
Department of State Bulletin 7847, p. 1.

b. Nepalese Religious Characteristics.

Nepal is officially a Hindu kingdom with about 75% of the population professing that faith; however, Hinduism has been both influenced by and is an influence upon a large Buddhist minority. There is an intermingling of the two religions throughout the country as Buddhists venerate Hindu Gods and use the same temples. The result is that a unique variation of the two religions has been created. The inhabitants of northern Nepal bordering

Tibet are mostly Buddhist. Because no sharp line can be drawn between Hindu and Buddhist groups in Nepal, the two faiths are becoming more or less fused. The Hinduism practiced in India is decidedly different from that practiced in Nepal, yet there are many similarities. The majority of the people of Nepal must thus be considered religiously amorphous to the majority of the Indian population.

c. Bhutanese Religious Characteristics.

The majority of the citizens of Bhutan (75%) practice Mahayanan Buddhism of the Druk Kargyu sect such as that practiced in Tibet. The majority of the remaining twenty-five percent practice either Brahmanical Hinduism or a form of religion characterized by a fusion of Hinduism and Tibetan Buddhism. These two beliefs are practiced predominantly by the Nepali minority group which makes up 25% of the population of Bhutan. Because 75% of the citizens of Bhutan practice Mahayan Buddhism (the State religion), the majority of the people of Bhutan must be considered religiously divergent to the majority of the Indian population.

d. Sikkimese Religious Characteristics.

The preponderance of the Bhutia and Lepcha elements as well as some Nepalese practice Tibetan Buddhism, the religion of 28% of the population, and the official state religion. The majority of the population, however,

(60%), practices the same form of Hinduism found in Nepal. That is, a unique variation created by the fusion of Buddhism and Hinduism. The Hinduism practiced in Sikkim is thus decidedly different from that version practiced in India, yet there are many similarities. The majority of the people of Sikkim must thus be considered religiously amorphic to the majority of the Indian population.

III. LINGUISTIC CONSIDERATIONS

a. Indian Linguistic Characteristics

In India, cultural regions are coterminous with linguistic regions. Within each region, the language, food habits, dress and attitudes are generally similar. As a result of government policy, the 14 major linguistic divisions in India correspond generally to the administrative division into states. Within each of the major regions, are several subregions of dialectical variation and patches of extreme linguistic heterogeneity and mutual unintelligibility. Table 11 demonstrates the language distribution in detail.

To simplify a most complex matter, almost 75% of the population speak one of the four Indo-European languages of Hindi, Hindustani, Urdu or Punjabi. It is difficult to determine the extent of the use of Hindi, the national language of the Union. According to the 1961 census 42% of the population speak Hindi, Urdu, Hindustani or Punjabi as a mother tongue. These were grouped together as a

TABLE 12
MAJOR LANGUAGES OF INDIA, 1963

Language	Region	Number of speakers (in thousands)
<u>Indo-European Family</u>		
Hindi		
Hindustani		
Urdu		
Punjabi	Northern States	149,944
Assamese	Assam	4,988
Bengali	West Bengal	25,122
Gujarati	Gujarat	16,311
Kashmiri	Kashmir	n.a.
Marathi	Maharashtra	26,547
Oriya	Orissa	13,154
<u>Dravidian Family</u>		
Kannada (Kanarese)	Mysore (Karnatak)	14,472
Malayalam	Kerala	13,380
Tamil	Madras	26,547
Telegu	Andhra Pradesh	33,000

Source: Adapted from India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, India 1963, p. 19.

single language in 1961. The Constitution of 1950 states that Hindi in the Devanagari script shall be the official language of the Union.

b. Nepali Linguistic Characteristics

In the past Sanskrit and Pali served the educated class of Nepal in handing down cultural and religious traditions. Today, in addition to Nepali, which is the national language, and spoken by about two-thirds of the people, Newari, Marthili, and Bhojpuri are widely used. Hindi and Hindustani are also used extensively in the Terai areas bordering India. Nepali is a language which has certain features in common with Hindi, being derived from Sanskrit, and written in the Devanagari script. However, it also presents a mixed character, having borrowed words from the Tibeto-Burman languages. Hence, the preponderant portion of Nepal's citizens speak a language different from Hindi, the most common language spoken in India, yet possessing certain characteristics in common with that language (the official Indian language and the one spoken by the largest number of Indians). The majority of the people of Nepal must thus be considered linguistically amorphic to the majority of the Indian population.

c. Bhutanese Linguistic Characteristics

The most widely spoken dialects in Bhutan are forms of Tibetan, blended with words and idioms from

languages of the neighboring countries. The most common include:

1. Dzongkha (the official language) spoken primarily in western and northern Bhutan.
2. Bumthangkha, spoken primarily in central Bhutan.
3. Sarchaphkka, spoken in Eastern Bhutan.
4. Nepali, spoken in southern Bhutan.

Bengali, Assamese and Hindi are minority languages.

Nearly 2/3 of Bhutan's citizens speak dialects akin to the language of the Khampas of eastern Tibet. Hence the preponderant portion of Bhutan's citizens speak a language linguistically divergent to the majority of the Indian population.

d. Sikkimese Linguistic Characteristics

The official language of Sikkim is English, though comparatively few Sikkimese speak it. Sikkimese and Gurkhali are spoken by a majority of the people. Lepcha is spoken by a minority faction. Gurkhali is a form of Nepali, exhibiting stronger Tibetan influence than the latter. Because Gurkhali is spoken by a majority of the Sikkimese people, and has certain features in common with Hindi (being derived from Sanskrit, and written in the Devanagari script), Sikkim must be considered linguistically amorphic with reference to India.

IV. TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC AND HISTORICAL COMPARISONS

a. Nepalese Traditional, Economic and Historical Ties

The history of Nepal is in many ways inseparable from India. During the Mauryan era of Indian history (250 BC), Buddhist culture flourished in Nepal, and Ashoka, the Indian king, built four stupas at Patan in the Katmandu Valley, and erected a pillar to mark the birthplace of Buddha in the Terai. The first recorded use of the name Nepal occurs in the fourth century A.D. when the country was under the Gupta dynasty of India. Although the Nepalese have been nominally autonomous for most of their history, they have been either directly or indirectly under some measure of foreign domination. Bana in his work, "Charita Harsha" records that the Indian ruler Sri Harsha invaded the country in 607 A.D. After the successful invasion Harsha supposedly returned to India, leaving the conquered state in the hands of a governor, who was driven out by Amsuvarman, one of the great rulers of early Nepal (620 A.D.). The new King instigated the first Sanskrit grammar in the country. About the first quarter of the seventh century, Bod (Tibet) embarked with an army of 100,000 under the leadership of King Srong Dtsan and conquered Nepal, which then became a vassal state to China until the 8th century. During this period Nepal pursued a somewhat independent course in domestic affairs, although

within the Tibetan sphere of influence. Around the thirteenth century, the Hindus, fleeing from the Moslem penetration of their own country, began to take refuge in the hills of western Nepal, where they set up a small number of kingdoms. It was the little western kingdom of Gurkha, formed by some refugees of Rajput origin, which in the eighteenth century consolidated the territory, and founded the modern state of Nepal.² Geographical proximity and cultural affinities have kept India's influence dominant vis-a-vis China. In 1960-61, India was the leading importer (99%) and exporter (92%) of Nepalese trade.³

b. Traditional Bhutanese Economic and Historical Ties

It is generally assumed that the ancestors of the dominant ethnic group, the Bhote, descended from Tibet. Tibetan invaders in the ninth century conquered Bhutan, then a Hindu state, ruled by a Maharaja. Small groups of farmers, herdsmen and Buddhist priests followed the Tibetan warriors across the Himalayan ranges; the main influx coming in a southeastward direction through the Chumbi Valley into Bhutan, over several high passes. Inter-marriage between the Tibetan conquerors and descendants

²Pradyumna P. Karan, Nepal: A Physical and Cultural Geography (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960), pp. 4-6.

³Dan Golenpaul, Information Please Almanac (New York: Golenpaul Assc. November, 1968), p. 216.

of the original Bhutanese inhabitants was common, and many of the latter, originally Hindus or animists, were converted to Lamaistic Buddhism. In the early seventeenth century, Bhutan became a distinct political entity when Shabdung, an influential Tibetan, established his authority as king, and acquired the title of Dharma Raja of the church-state.

The early Dharma Rajas exercised both temporal and spiritual authority through penlops (governors of territories) and jungpens (governors of Dzongs).⁴ In 1865, under a treaty signed at Sinchula Pass near the Indian border, Bhutan assented to the formal cession of the Duars to British India for an annual subsidy.⁵ After the withdrawal of the British from India in 1947, a new treaty signed between Bhutan and India in 1949, replaced the earlier agreement with the British.⁶ As explored earlier, traditional Bhutanese trade has been with Tibet. However, this trade has completely stopped since 1959 as a result of the border dispute. At present the Himalayan kingdom is almost totally dependent upon India for its economic development and prosperity.

⁴Fortresses built in the architectural style of the potala (palace) of the Delai Lama, at Lhasa.

⁵Karan, Nepal: A Physical and Cultural Geography, p. 9.

⁶Karan, The Himalayan Kingdoms, p. 52.

c. Traditional Sikkimese Economic and Historical Ties

The Lepchas are thought to be the earliest inhabitants of Sikkim, though their numbers began to diminish after the Tibetans started to colonize Sikkim at the end of the 16th century. Definite control by the Tibetans was acquired during the first half of the 17th century. Lamaist Buddhism was introduced, and government established under a Tibetan king from whom the succeeding line of Maharajas claim descent. Tibetan suzerainty over Sikkim ended in 1890 when Tibet and China recognized British control over Sikkim's internal administration and foreign relations. In June 1949, Sikkim again agreed to be a protectorate, this time of India. Traditional trade was with Tibet although India now controls all of Sikkim's trade.

Listing the cultural categorizations developed along linguistic, religious and racial-ethnic classifications:

TABLE 13
CULTURAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN INDIA AND THE
KINGDOMS OF BHUTAN, SIKKIM AND NEPAL

	India		
	Racial/Ethnic	Religion	Language
Nepal	amorphic	amorphic	amorphic
Bhutan	divergent	divergent	divergent
Sikkim	divergent	amorphic	amorphic

The classification of Nepal and Bhutan becomes rather obvious.

In the case of Nepal, its relationship to India based on the definitive classifications established is one of Cultural Amorphism. That is to say, 40-60% of the citizens of Nepal exhibit culturally similar characteristics to 65-100% of the citizens of India; based on racial, ethnic, religious and linguistic similarities and dissimilarities.

With regard to Bhutan its relationship to India based on the same cultural categories is one of Cultural Divergency. That is to say, only 0-35% of the citizens of Bhutan exhibit culturally similar characteristics to 65-100% of the citizens of India.

With regard to Sikkim the results indicate a more complex situation. Racially the majority of the people possess Mongoloid features. Although 75% of the inhabitants are Nepalese, 60% of the population practices the same form of Hinduism practiced in Nepal (a fusion of Hinduism and Buddhism); and a majority of the people speak Gurkhali (a language with features of both Hindi and Tibetan).

The sole factor of cultural divergency is the fact that the majority of Nepalese immigrants have strong Mongoloid features (although they cannot be strictly called Mongolian). This fact cannot by itself tip the balance of

cultural characteristics in favor of cultural divergency especially in view of the fact that Sikkim has been an Indian "Protectorate" since 1949 with Sikkim's defenses, communications and external relations under Indian management. In a country of only 180,000⁷ people, the cultural impact of 25-30,000 Indian troops stationed there since 1962 to guard the vital passes from Tibet, also cannot be overlooked.

With regard to India, the relationship of Sikkim based on comprehensive cultural similarity factors must be considered to be one of Cultural Amorphism.

Chapter VIII has explored the cultural similarities and dissimilarities between India and each of the Himalayan States and developed the second phase of the categorization plan based on ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic considerations with attention given to the traditional economic and historical ties of each nation involved. Chapter IX will conclude this work by converging the two classification systems into one definitive categorization for each of the three relationships under study, and describe the general implications of the study for the field of international relations.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

An examination of the foreign relations of India with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal has provided an excellent milieu for testing the categorization scheme conceived in the introductory chapter of this writing. The nature of the relationship of India with each of the Himalayan Kingdoms is of a sufficient variance to permit the demonstration of three definitive classifications and thus indicate the usefulness of the method as a tool in the study of big power-small power relationships. A summarizing of the elemental components explored in Chapter IV designed to determine the locus of sovereignty in the internal relations, external relations, and defenses of the national samples under study, is provided by the following tables:

TABLE 14
INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH NEPAL

1. Internal Relations:

- a. Rule Making Authority--Total Nepalese Control.
- b. Rule Adjudication Authority--Total Nepalese Control.
- c. Rule Application Authority--Total Nepalese Control.
- d. Economic Aid and Investments--Indian aid and investments are substantial.
- e. Internal Transportation and Communications--Total Nepalese control.
- f. Currency: The Nepalese rupee.

Illation: Nepal has absolute control over its internal relations.

2. External Relations;

- a. Diplomatic Representation--Formal Nepalese Control.
- b. Foreign Trade--90% with India.

Illation: Nepal has formal control over its external relations though India is in a strong influencing position.

3. Defenses: Total Nepalese Control.

TABLE 15

INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH BHUTAN

1. Internal Relations:

- a. Rule Making Authority--Total Bhutanese Control.
- b. Rule Adjudication Authority--Total Bhutanese Control.
- c. Rule Application Authority--Total Bhutanese Control.
- d. Economic Aid and Investments--Indian Aid predominant, foreign investments inconsequential.
- e. Internal Transportation and Communications--Total Bhutanese Control.
- f. Currency: Bhutan is just recently adopting its own currency.

Illation: Bhutan has absolute control over its internal relations, though India has suasive potential by its dominance over the kingdom's foreign aid.

2. External Relations:

- a. Diplomatic Representation--India has absolute control over the external relations of Bhutan under Article 2 of the 1949 Indo-Bhutanese Treaty of Friendship.
- b. Foreign Trade--India dominates Bhutanese foreign trade (95% of all its total trade is with India).

Illation: India has absolute control over the external relations of Bhutan.

3. Defenses:

The Defense of Bhutan is the joint responsibility of the Governments of Bhutan and India. Although no formal defense agreement exists, Article 2 of the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, Indian military training and financing of the Bhutanese army, unilateral declarations by the Indian Government, and statements and conferences by Bhutanese officials acknowledging India's efforts, all make India the senior defense partner.

Illation: The defense of Bhutan is the joint responsibility of the Governments of Bhutan and India.

TABLE 16

INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH SIKKIM

1. Internal Relations:

- a. Rule Making Authority--Is shared between the Maharaja and his staff with an Indian dewan and other Indian administrators.
- b. Rule Application Authority--Is shared between the Maharaja and his staff with an Indian dewan and other Indian administrators.
- c. Rule Adjudication Authority--Under the kingdom's control, with the exception of those matters dealing with the 1950 Indo-Sikkimese Treaty, at which time the Chief Justice of India decides.
- d. Economic Aid and Investments--India is the sole provider of Sikkim's foreign aid and investor as required by Article IV of the 1950 Treaty.
- e. Internal Communication and Transportation--Under the control of the Indian Government as outlined in Article VI of the 1950 Treaty.
- f. Currency--The Indian rupee.

Illation: Control over the internal relations of Sikkim is shared between the Royal Sikkimese Government and the Government of India.

2. External Relations:

- a. Diplomatic Representation--Under the control of the Government of India by the provisions of Article IV of the 1950 Treaty.
- b. Foreign Trade--Under the Control of the Government of India, by the provisions of Article IV of the 1950 Treaty.

Illation: India has absolute control over the external relations of Sikkim.

3. Defenses:

Under the control of the Government of India by the provisions of Article III of the 1950 Treaty.

The data of the first three tables may be collapsed into three trichotomous tables designed to summarize indicate which nation has the dominant influence over the internal relations, external relations and defenses of the three small-powers under consideration. In addition each table has been constructed to show whether or not any existing big-power control is exercised by voluntary treaty or involuntary imposition, as well as the relative degree of big-power control.

TABLE 17

THE CHARACTER AND DEGREE OF INDIAN CONTROL OVER THE DEFENSES,
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND INTERNAL RELATIONS OF NEPAL

	Indian Control With Nepalese Agreement			Indian Control Without Nepalese Agreement			Nepalese Autonomous Control	
	Absolute control	Partial control		Absolute control	Partial control		Absolute control	Partial control
Defenses							*	
External Relations								*
Internal Relations							*	

TABLE 18

THE CHARACTER AND DEGREE OF INDIAN CONTROL OVER THE DEFENSES,
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND INTERNAL RELATIONS OF BHUTAN

	Indian Control With Bhutanese Agreement			Indian Control Without Bhutanese Agreement			Bhutanese Autonomous Control	
	Absolute control	Partial control		Absolute control	Partial control		Absolute control	Partial control
Defenses		*						
External Relations	*							
Internal Relations							*	

TABLE 19

THE CHARACTER AND DEGREE OF INDIAN CONTROL OVER THE DEFENSES,
EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND INTERNAL RELATIONS OF SIKKIM

	Indian Control With Sikkimese Agreement			Indian Control Without Sikkimese Agreement			Sikkimese Autonomous Control	
	Absolute control	Partial control		Absolute control	Partial control		Absolute control	Partial control
Defenses	*							
External Relations	*							
Internal Relations		*						

TABLE 20

**DEFINITIVE CATEGORIES DESIGNED FOR USE IN THE
STUDY OF BIG POWER-SMALL POWER RELATIONSHIPS**

Function of the Small Power Controlled	Method of Big Power Control	
	Voluntary Treaty	Involuntary Treaty or Imposition
1. Defenses, external relations, internal relations, all controlled	Superintendency	Subjugation
2. Defenses, external relations, controlled; Internal relations autonomous.	Protectorate	Tutelage
3. External relations controlled; Defenses, internal relations, autonomous	Satellite	Restraintment
4. Defenses, external relations, internal relations, all autonomous.	Autonomous	Autonomous

By comparing the results of Tables 16, 17, and 18 with the definitive categorization scheme developed in Table 19, it is possible to classify in exact terms the relationship of India with the three Himalayan Kingdoms.

1. Nepal--whose defenses, external relations and internal relations are controlled by Nepal is categorized as a Total Autonomy in its relations with India.
2. Bhutan--whose internal relations are controlled by Bhutan; whose external relations are controlled by India; and whose defenses are partially controlled by India, by voluntary treaty with India the senior partner, is categorized as a Partial Protectorate in its relations with India.
3. Sikkim--whose defenses and external relations are totally controlled by India; and whose internal relations are partially controlled by India, by voluntary treaty, is categorized as a Partial Superintendency.

It is possible to further expand the development of the classification scheme by including a cultural basis of comparison between India and the three Himalayan kingdoms. By comparing the degree of similarity or dissimilarity of such elemental factors as religion, language, ethnic and racial groups; as well as traditional economic and historical ties, three cultural categories are possible.

1. Cultural Synergism--65% of the citizens of the small power exhibit culturally similar characteristics to

- 65-100% of the citizens of large power.
2. Cultural Amorphism--40-60% of the citizens of the small power exhibit culturally similar characteristics to 65-100% of the citizens of the large power.
 3. Cultural Divergency--0-35% of the citizens of the small power exhibit culturally similar characteristics to 65-100% of the citizens of the large power. On the basis of the cultural classification scheme:
1. Nepal is categorized as a Cultural Amorphism when its culture is compared to the culture of India.
 2. Bhutan is categorized as a Cultural Divergency when its culture is compared to the culture of India.
 3. Sikkim is categorized as a Cultural Amorphism when its culture is compared to the culture of India.

In summation, the relationship of India with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal may be indicated by the following definitive classification:

1. Indian-Nepalese Relations (1947-1967):
A Culturally Amorphic Total Autonomy
2. Indian-Bhutanese Relations (1947-1967):
A Culturally Divergent Partial Protectorate
3. Indian-Sikkimese Relations (1947-1967):
A Culturally Amorphic Partial Superintendency

The categorizations developed for Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal in their relations with India for the specific

time period indicated are but 3 of 52 possible classification groupings which this scheme provides. It is recognized that the relationship between nations is constantly changing. Hence, in using this method it is essential that the date of formulation accompany the determined categorization. For instance what may be at one time classified a superintendency may actually evolve into a Total or Partial Subjugation at a later date. This is indeed what may happen to the tiny kingdom of Sikkim should its struggle for greater autonomy in internal and external affairs be thwarted or even suppressed by the Government of India.

The definitive categories developed by this work may be utilized to interpret the relationships of nations of divergent political power wherever they exist on the international scene. The categorizations furnish a frame of reference for the political scientist which indicates an immediate awareness of several elemental considerations in the study of Big Power-Small Power relationships. These considerations include the degree of cultural similarity and the extent of control by the Big Power over the internal relations, external relations, and defenses of the Small Power under study. An adequate frame of reference for the study of nations of divergent political power has not been afforded by conventional classification models and schemes currently used in the field of

international relations. Consequently terms used to describe this kind of relationship have been vague, indistinct and lacking in clarity.

It is my hope that this classification plan may provide a new implement for the study of Big Power-Small Power relations for the field of international relations.

APPENDIX A

TIBETO-NEPALESE TREATY OF 1792

1. That China should henceforth be considered as father to both Nepal and Tibet, who should regard each other as brothers;
2. That after due investigation by the Chinese Government, the full value of the articles plundered at Lhasa would be paid to the Nepalese sufferers by the Tibetan authorities;
3. That all Nepalese subjects, with the exception of armed soldiers, would be permitted to travel, to establish factories and to carry on trade within the jurisdiction of Tibet and China;
4. That if either of the two brotherly States should commence an unprovoked dispute with the intention of possessing the territories of the other, the representatives of the two Governments would report all particulars to the court of Peking which would finally decide the dispute;
5. That if Nepal be ever invaded by a foreign power, China would not fail to help her;
6. That the two brotherly States would send to China some produce of their country every five years in token of their filial love;
7. That the Chinese Government would in return send to Nepal a friendly present, and would make every necessary arrangement for the comfort of the mission to and from Peking.

(From the Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur by General Pudma Jang Bahadur Rana, Allahabad, 1909.)

APPENDIX B

PEACE TREATY BETWEEN TIBET AND NEPAL, 1856

We undersigned Bharadars and Lamas representing the Gorkha Government and the Tibetan Government have mutually settled a treaty of the following 10 articles, and with the Supreme Being as witness we have affixed our seals unto it of our own free will and choice.¹ The Emperor of China shall continue to be regarded with respect² as heretofore. So long as two Governments continue to abide by terms set forth herein, they shall live in amity like two brothers. May the Supreme Being not allow that side to prosper that may make war upon the other; and may the side be exempt from all sin in making war upon the other side which violates the terms contained in this agreement (Treaty).

Here follow the names and seals of the signatories .

Article 1: Tibet shall pay a sum of Rs. ten thousand annually to the Gorkha Government.³

Article 2: Gorkha and Tibet have both been regarding the Emperor of China with respect.⁴ Tibet being merely a country of monasteries and Lamas and place of recitation of prayers and practice of religious austerities, should the troops of any other Raja invade Tibet in future, Gorkha shall afford such assistance and protection as it can.

¹The Tibetan text omits "of our own free will and choice."

²The translation of the Treaty by Aitchison says instead: "we further agree that the Emperor of China shall be obeyed by both States as before."

³The Tibetan text inserts the words "in cash." Aitchison adds the words as "tribute" and Sir Charles Bell "as a present."

⁴Aitchison translates the relevant word as "borne allegiance."

Article 3: Tibet shall not levy any taxes (on routes), duties (on merchandise) and rates (of any other kind) leviable by Tibet on the merchandise and subjects of the country of Gorkha.

Article 4: Tibet shall return to the Gorkha Government all Sikh soldiers held as prisoners and also all officers, soldiers, women and guns of Gorkha that were captured and taken during the war; and the Gorkha Government shall return to Tibet all the soldiers of Tibet captured in war, as also the arms, the yaks, whatever may be belonging to the Rayats of Kirong, Kuti, Jhunga, Taklakhar, Chhewar-Gumbha and on the completion of the Treaty all the Gorkha Troops that are in Taklakhar and Chhowar-Gumbha, Kirong, Jhunga, Kuti, Dhyaklang up to Bhairab Langur shall be withdrawn and places evacuated.

Article 5: Henceforth not a Naiya (Headman), but a Bharadar shall be posted by the Gorkha Government at Lhasa.

Article 6: The Gorkha Government shall establish its own trade factory at Lhasa which will be allowed to trade freely in all kinds of merchandise from gems and ornaments to articles of clothing and food.

Article 7: The Gorkha Bharadar at Lhasa shall not try and determine suits and cases among subjects and merchants of Tibet; and Tibet will not try and determine suits and cases among Gorkha subjects, merchants, the Kashmeries of Nepal, residing within the jurisdiction of Lhasa. In the event of dispute between the subjects and merchants of Gorkha and those of Tibet, the Bharadar of both Gorkha and Tibet shall sit together and jointly adjudicate the cases. All incomes (fines, etc.) from such adjudications realised from the subjects and merchants of Tibet shall be taken by Tibet and those realised from the Gorkha subjects and merchants and Kashmeries shall be taken by Gorkha.

Article 8: A Gorkha subject who goes to the country of Tibet after committing murder of any person of Gorkha shall be surrendered by Tibet to Gorkha; and a Tibetan who goes to the country of Gorkha after committing murder of any person of Tibet shall be surrendered by Gorkha to Tibet.

Article 9: If the property of Gorkha subjects and merchants be plundered by any person of Tibet, the Bharadars of Tibet shall compel the restoration of such property to the Gorkha subjects and merchants; should the property not be forthcoming from the plunderer, Tibet shall compel him to enter into arrangement for restitution (of such property). If the property of Tibetan subjects and merchants be plundered by any person of Gorkha, Gorkha shall compel the restoration of such property to Tibetan subjects and merchants; should

the property be not forthcoming from the plunderer, Gorkha shall compel him to enter into agreement for the restitution (of such property).

Article 10: After the completion of the Treaty neither side shall act vindictively against the person or property of the subjects of Tibet who may have joined the Gorkha Durbar during the war, or of the subjects of Gorkha who may have joined the Tibetan Durbar.

This the third day of light fortnight of Chaitra in the year Samvat 1912 (March 24, 1856).

(Translation from Nepalese text by Perceval Landon, in his Nepal).

APPENDIX C

SINO-NEPAL TREATY (1956)

This Treaty was signed between China and Nepal in 1956. As a result of this Treaty, the extra-territorial privileges granted by Tibet and enjoyed by Nepal (by virtue of 1856 Treaty of Peace between Tibet and Nepal) were renounced. The Treaty proves that the People's Republic of China has accepted the legal position that treaties concluded by Tibet without the mediation of China had continued validity until abrogated and replaced by other agreements in regard to the same subject, after the assumption of governmental authority by China over Tibet. It also proves that Tibet had the power, without the intermediary of China, to conclude treaties with foreign States at that time.

The Government of the Kingdom of Nepal and the People's Republic of China, being desirous of further developing the friendly relations between the two countries as good neighbours on the basis of the longstanding friendship between the two peoples.

Reaffirm the Five Principles (Panch Sheela) of

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Non-Aggression;
3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs by any reason of economic, political or ideological character;
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and
5. Peaceful co-existence,

should be the fundamental principles guiding the relations between the two countries.

The two parties have resolved to conclude the present Agreement in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and have for this purpose appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries:--

The Government of the Kingdom of Nepal, His Excellency Shri Chuda Prasad Sharma, Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Government of the People's Republic of China, His Excellency Pan Tzu-li, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China to the Kingdom of Nepal, who having examined each other's credentials and finding them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties declare that peace and friendship shall be maintained between the Kingdom of Nepal and the People's Republic of China.

Article 2. The High Contracting Parties hereby reaffirm their decision to mutually exchange diplomatic representatives on ambassadorial level.

Article 3. All Treaties and documents which existed in the past between Nepal and China including those between Nepal and the Tibetan region of China are hereby abrogated.

Article 4. In order to maintain and develop the traditional contacts between Nepal and the peoples of the Tibetan region of China, the High Contracting Parties agree that the nationals of both Parties may trade, travel and make pilgrimage in these places in each other's territory as agreed upon by both Parties, and the two Parties agree to safeguard the proper interests of the nationals of the other party in its territory in accordance with the laws of the country of residence, and for this purpose the High Contracting Parties agree to do as follows:

Paragraph 1

The High Contracting Parties mutually agree to establish Trade Agencies.

1. The Chinese Government agrees that the Government of Nepal may establish Trade Agencies at Shigatse, Kyerong and Nyalam.
2. The Government of Nepal agrees that the Chinese Government may establish an equal number of Trade

Agencies in Nepal, the specific location of which will be discussed and determined at a later date by both Parties.

3. The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The Trade Agents of both Parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their functions, and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives, and their children who are dependent on them for livelihood freedom from search.

The Trade Agencies of both Parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mailbag and communication in code.

Paragraph 2

The High Contracting Parties agree that traders of both countries may trade at the following places:

1. The Chinese Government agrees to specify (1) Lhasa, (2) Shigatse, (3) Gyantse and (4) Yatung as markets for trade;
2. The Government of Nepal agrees that when with the development of Chinese trade in Nepal, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in Nepal, the Government of Nepal will specify an equal number of markets for trade in Nepal;
3. Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in border trade between Nepal and the Tibet Region of China may continue trade at the traditional markets for such trade.

Paragraph 3

The High Contracting Parties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of either country to the other country may continue according to religious custom. Personal baggages and articles used for pilgrimage carried by the pilgrims of either Party shall be exempt from taxation by other Party.

Paragraph 4

For travelling across the border between Nepal and Tibet Region of China, the High Contracting Parties agree that the nationals of both countries shall use the customary routes.

Paragraph 5

For travelling across the borders by nationals of the two countries, the High Contracting Parties agree to adopt the following provisions:--

1. Diplomatic personnel and officials of the two countries and nationals of the two countries except those provided by sub-paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 who travel across the border between Nepal and the Tibet Region of China, shall hold passports issued by their respective countries and visaed by the other Party. Nationals of the two countries who enter Nepal or Tibet Region of China through a third country shall also hold passports issued by their respective countries and visaed by the other Party.
2. The Traders of the two countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between Nepal and the Tibet Region of China, their wives and children dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants, not covered by sub-paragraphs 3 of this paragraph, who enter into Nepal or Tibet Region of China as the case may be for the purpose of trade shall hold passports issued by their respective countries and visaed by the other party, or certificates issued by their respective Governments or organs authorised by their respective Governments.
3. Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade, to visit friends or relatives or for seasonal change of residence, may do so as they have customarily done heretofore and need not hold passports, visas or other documents of certification.
4. Pilgrims of either Party who cross the border between Nepal and the Tibetan region of China for

the purpose of pilgrimage need not hold passports, visas or other documents of certification, but shall register at the border checkpoints or the first authorised Government office of the other Party, and obtain permits for pilgrimage therefrom.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing sub-paragraphs in this paragraph, either Government may refuse entry to any particular person.
6. Nationals of either country who enter the territory of the other Party in accordance with the foregoing sub-paragraphs of this paragraph may stay within the territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the other Party.

Article 5. This Agreement shall be ratified. It shall come into force after mutual notice of ratifications, and remain in force for eight (8) years. Extension of the present Agreement may be negotiated by the two Parties if either Party requests for it six (6) months prior to the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other Party.

Done in Kathmandu on the 20th day of September, 1956, in duplicate in the Nepalese, Chinese and English languages, all texts being equally authentic.

The Government of Nepal and the Government of the People's Republic of China have also agreed to regulate the following related matters by an exchange of notes:

1. The two Parties mutually agree to establish Consulates-General:
The Chinese Government agrees that the Government of Nepal may establish Consulate-General at Lhasa of the Tibet Region of China.

The Government of Nepal agrees that the Chinese Government may open Consulate-General at Kathmandu of Nepal, the date for the establishment of which will be discussed and determined at a later date.

2. The Government of Nepal will be pleased to withdraw completely within six (6) months after the exchange of notes its military escorts now in Lhasa and other places in the Tibet Region of China, together with all their arms and ammunition. The Chinese Government will render facilities and assistance in such withdrawal.

3. Nepalese nationals in the Tibet Region of China and Chinese Nationals in Nepal shall be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Government of the country of residence, observe the laws and regulations of the country of residence, pay taxes to that Government and respect the local customs.

All civil or criminal cases or disputes in which nationals of one Party in the territory of the other may be involved, shall be dealt by the Government of the country of residence.

4. The Government of either Party will protect and safeguard the person, property and legitimate interests of the other Party in its territory.
5. (a) The Governments of the two Parties agree that the nationals of either Party in the territory of the other Party, under the condition that they pay rents according to market prices and sign contract for lease with the house owners on a mutually voluntary basis, may continue to rent the houses.
- (b) Nationals of either Party who have already rented houses in the territory of the other Party, under the condition that they pay rent according to the market prices and contracts for lease are or have been concluded with the house owners on a mutually voluntary basis, may continue to rent the houses.
6. Both Parties agree to adopt necessary measures to promote and expand the trade relations between the two countries, and to levy customs duty on the import and export commodities of the two Parties in accordance with the favoured tax-rates of each Government.
7. The range of business engaged in by the traders of either Party in the territory of the other shall comply with the relevant laws and regulations of the country of residence.
8. The Nepalese primary school in Lhasa in the Tibet Region of China shall be changed into a primary school for children of Nepalese nationals and shall complete registration in accordance with the relevant regulations of the Chinese government.

9. The two Parties agree to establish direct wireless telegraphic service between Lhasa and Kathmandu, the specific arrangements of which will be discussed and decided upon at a later date by the Governments of both Parties.
10. The Government of either Party will assist the Consulate-General and the Trade Agencies of the other in its territory in renting houses.
11. The Trade Agents of both Parties may, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the country of residence, have access to their nationals involved in civil or criminal cases.
12. The Trade Agents and traders of both countries may hire employees in the locality.
13. Traders and pilgrims of both countries shall have the facility of hiring means of transportation at normal and reasonable rates.
14. The two Parties agree that any persons residing in the Tibet Region of China born of parents holding respectively the nationality of the People's Republic of China and the nationality of the Kingdom of Nepal and of 18 years of age or above, may, according to their own will, choose the nationality of the People's Republic of China for themselves and their children who are under the age of eighteen (18) by completing relevant procedures of the Chinese Government. After the completion of the above-mentioned procedures, they and their children under the age of eighteen shall be considered to have lost automatically the nationality of Nepal.

"Sino-Nepal Treaty (1956)," Texts of Treaties, Agreements, and Certain Exchange of Notes Relating to the Sino-Indian Boundary, Indian Society of International Law (New Delhi, 1962), pp. 44-49.

APPENDIX D

A full text of the Nepal-China Border Treaty, March 21, 1960, is not available to the Office of the Geographer. However, the following has been excerpted from Padma Behadur Khatri: "Nepal - China Sima Sandhi" (Nepal-China Border Treaty), Gorkhapatra, Volume 63, Issue No. 313, Falgun 24, 2018 (March 7, 1962, pp. 2-3).

"It has been decided to conclude an agreement with a view to establishing a definite boundary line and formally delineating the boundary between the two countries, to set up a Joint Committee composed of an equal number of delegates from the two sides and to entrust it with powers to discuss and solve the concrete problems concerning the Nepal - China border, under the rules mentioned in Article 3 of the present Agreement, to install boundary pillars and, lastly, to prepare a draft of the Nepal - China Boundary Treaty. The said Joint Committee shall hold its meetings in the capitals or other places of Nepal and China.

"While studying the boundary lines as shown in the exchanged maps and also the information made available by each side, concerning the actual jurisdiction of the respective countries, the contrasting Parties agree, that barring some differences over some particular area, their understanding of the traditional customary boundary line is basically the same. In order to determine concretely the boundary between the two countries, the Contracting Parties agree to act as follows in three different cases.

- (1) Areas where the boundary line between the two countries as shown in the maps of both the parties is identical.

The boundary line in such areas shall be determined according to that shown as identical in the maps of both sides. The Joint Committee shall send out Joint Survey

teams composed of an equal number of persons from each side to conduct survey and erect boundary pillars there.

When the boundary line is determined according to the provisions of the above Article, the areas to the South shall conclusively belong to Nepal, and those to the North to China, and subsequent to that neither party shall lay claim to any area on the other side.

- (2) Areas where the boundary line between the two countries as shown in the maps of both parties is not identical, although the actual jurisdiction is undisputed.

The Joint Committee shall send out Joint Survey Teams composed of an equal number of persons from each side to conduct surveys on the spot and install boundary pillars to determine the boundary line according to the physical features (watersheds, valleys, passes, etc.) and the actual jurisdiction of the respective party.

- (3) Areas where the boundary line as shown in the maps is not identical and each side has its own understanding of such jurisdiction.

In such areas the Joint Committee shall send out Joint Survey teams composed of an equal number of persons from each side in order to find out the actual jurisdiction, make adjustments according to the principles of equality, mutual benefit, friendship and mutual accommodation, demarcate the boundary and to install boundary pillars."

APPENDIX E

"Boundary Treaty Between the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Nepal" October 5, 1961:

The Chairman of the People's Republic of China and His Majesty the King of Nepal,

Being of the agreed opinion that a formal settlement of the question of the boundary between China and Nepal is of fundamental interest to the peoples of the two countries,

Noting with satisfaction that the friendly relations of long standing between the two countries have undergone further development since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and that the two parties have, in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and in a spirit of fairness, reasonableness, mutual understanding, and mutual accommodation, smoothly achieved an over-all settlement of the boundary question between the two countries through friendly consultations,

Firmly believing that the formal delimitation of the entire boundary between the two countries and its consolidation as a boundary of peace and friendship not only constitute a milestone in the further development of the friendly relations between China and Nepal, but also are a contribution toward strengthening peace in Asia and the world,

Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the present treaty on the basis of the agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and His Majesty's Government of Nepal on the question of the boundary between the two countries of 21 March 1960 and have agreed upon the following:

Article I.

The contracting parties, basing themselves on the traditional customary boundary line and having jointly conducted

necessary on-the-spot investigations and surveys and made certain adjustments in accordance with the principles of equality, mutual benefit, friendship, and mutual accommodation, hereby agree on the following alignment of the entire boundary line from west to east, Chinese territory being north of the line and Nepalese territory south thereof:

1--The Chinese-Nepalese boundary line starts from the point where the watershed between the Kali River and the Tinkar River meets the watershed between the tributaries of the Mapchu (Karnali) River on the one hand and the Tinkar River on the other hand, thence it runs southeastward along the watershed between the tributaries of the Mapchu (Karnali) River on the one hand and the Tinkar River and the Seti River on the other hand, passing through the Niumachisa (Lipudhura) Snowy Mountain ridge and Tinkarlipu (Kipudhura) Pass to Pehlin (Urai) Pass.

2--From Pehlin (Urai) Pass the boundary line runs along the mountain ridge southeastward for about 500 meters, then northeastward to height 5,655 meters, thence continues to run along the mountain ridge northwestward to Tojang (Tharodhunga Tappa), then northeastward passing through height 5,590.6 meters to Chimala Pass, thence it runs generally northwestward, passing through Chimala to Lungmochiehkua (Numoche Tappa); thence, the boundary line runs generally eastward, passing through Paimowetunkua (Kitko Tappa) and then runs along the Chokart'ing (Kitko) Mountain spur down to the Chilungpa (Yadangre) stream, then it follows the Chilungpa (Yadangre) stream northward to its junction with the Mapchu (Karnali) River, then to Yusa (Hilsa). At Yusa (Hilsa) the boundary line departs from the Mapchu (Karnali) River and runs northeastward along the mountain spur up to Chialosa (Takule), then along the mountain ridge, passing through Kumalatse (Kumalapche), Kangpaochekua (Ghanbochheko), and Mainipaimikua (Manepamango) to Kangkuona (Kangarje), then northward passing through Kangchupeng (Kandumbu) (at?) height 6,550 meters to Nalakankar.

3--From Nalakankar the boundary line runs generally northeastward along the watershed between the tributaries flowing into Manssarovar Lake and the tributaries of the Humla Karnali River passing through Nalakankar Pass to Latsela (Lapche) Pass; thence it runs generally southeastward along the watershed between the tributaries flowing into Manasarovar Lake and the tributaries of the Machuan River on the one hand and the tributaries of the Humla Karnali River, the Mugu Karnali River and

the Panjang Khola on the other hand, passing through Changla Mountain, Namja Pass, Khung (Thau) Pass, and Marem Pass to Pindu Pass, then it continues to run southeastward along the watershed between the tributaries of the Machuan River on the one hand and the tributaries of the Barbung River and the Kali Gaudaki River on the other hand gradually turning northeastward to height 6,214.1 meters.

4--From height 6,214.1 meters, the boundary line runs northeastward along the mountain spur, passing through height 5,025 meters and crossing the Angarchubo (Angarchhu) stream to height 5,029 meters; thence it runs generally eastward along the Tuchu (Thukchu) Mountain spur, passing through height 4,730 meters and Bungla (Panglham) to the foot of Tingli Bhodho spur at its northwestern end, then turns northeastward and runs along the southern bank of the Roumachushiu (Rhamarchhushu) seasonal stream to the foot of Tingli Bhodho spur at its northeastern end; thence turns southeastward, crosses the junction of two seasonal streams flowing northward, and runs to the junction of three seasonal streams flowing northward, and then up the eastern stream of the above three seasonal streams to height 4,697.9 meters, then turns southwestward crossing a seasonal stream to height passing through Pengpengla (Phumphula) and then along Chukomaburi (Chhukomapoj) Mountain ridge, passing through height 4,676.6 meters and height 4,754.9 meters to height 4,798.6 meters, thence along the mountain ridge northeastward passing through Hsiabala, then generally eastward passing through height 5,044.1 meters to Chaklo.

5--From Chaklo the boundary line runs generally southward along the watershed between the tributaries of the Yalu Tsangpo River and the tributaries of the Kali Gandaki River, passing through height 6,724 meters to Lugula Pass, thence it runs generally eastward along Lugula Snowy Mountain and the watershed between the tributaries of the Yalu Tsangpo River and the tributaries of the Marshiyangdi River to Gya (Gyala) Pass.

6--From Gya (Gyala) Pass the boundary line runs along the mountain ridge eastward to height 5,782 meters, then southeastward to Lajing Pass, then it runs along the Lajing Mountain ridge, passing through height 5,442 meters and Lachong (Lajung) Pass to height 5,236 meters, then turns southwestward to Sangmudo Snowy Mountain; thence gradually southeastward and continues to run along the Lajing Mountain ridge, passing through height 6,139 meters to height 5,494 meters, and then in a

straight line crosses the Dougar (Tom) River to height 5,724 meters; thence the boundary line runs generally northeastward along the Snowy Mountain ridge, passing through height 6,010 meters, height 5,360 meters, and height 5,672 meters to Thaple Pass.

7--From Thaple Pass the boundary line runs generally northeastward along the Snowy Mountain ridge, passing through Tsariyangkang Snowy Mountain to Khojan; thence it continues to run generally southward along the Snowy Mountain ridge, passing through Mailatsaching Pass, Pashuo Snowy Mountain and Lango Snowy Mountain to Yangrenkangri (Yangra) Snowy Mountain.

8--From Yangrenkangri (Yangra) Snowy Mountain the boundary line runs along the mountain ridge southward to Tsalasungkuo and then generally eastward and then northeastward along a dry stream bed and passes through Kirapo (Kerabas) to reach the Sangching (Sanjou) River, then follows that river southeastward, passes through its junction with the Changchish (Bhrangre) River and continues to follow the Sangching (Sanjan) River to a point where a small mountain spur south of Genjugma (Pangschung) Pasture ground and north of Chhaharey (pasture?) ground meets with the Sangching (Sanjen) River; then it runs along the (above all?) mountain spur eastward and then southeastward to height 4,565.4 meters, then runs eastward to the Black Top; thence it runs along a mountain spur to the junction of the Bhurlung River and the Tanghsiaka (Khesadhang) stream, then runs eastward along the Bhurlung River to its junction with the Kyerong River; thence follows the Kyerong River southward and then eastward to its junction with the Tungling Tsangpo (Lende) River; then runs northeastward up the Tungling Tsangpo (Lende) River, passing through Tasua bridge to the junction of the Tungling Tsangpo (Lende) River and the Guobashiachu (Jambu) stream; thence turns eastward up the Guobashiachu (Jambu) stream, passing through the junction of the Chusumdo Tsangpo River and the Phuriphu Tsangpo River, both tributaries of the upper Guobashiachu (Jambu) stream, to reach the boundary marker-point at Chusumdo.

9--From the boundary marker-point at Chusumdo the boundary line runs generally southeastward along the ridge of Tsogakangri (Seto Pokhari) Snowy Mountain, Langtang Snowy Mountain, Dorley Mountain, and Gulinchin (Phurbo Chyachu) Mountain to Chakesumu (Kharaney) Mountain; thence runs down to reach the Changnibachu (Kharaney) River, and then follows that river southward to its junction with the Bhochu (Bhota Kosi) River; then follows the Bhochu (Thota Kosi)

River southward, pushing through Dalaima (Bhaise) bridge to the junction of the Bhochu (Bhota Kosi) River and the Junchu (Jum) River; thence eastward up the Junchu (Jum) River to its source at Tsaje Mountain (Jum Khola Ko Sir Ko Tuppa); thence the boundary line runs generally northward along the mountain ridge to Chomo Pamari (height: 6,208.8 meters).

10--From Chomo Pamari (height 6,208.8 meters) the boundary line runs generally northward along the mountain ridge to height 5,914.8 meters, then generally northeastward along Shondemo Kangri (Sudemo) Snowy Mountain passing through height 5,148 meters, and then crosses two tributaries of the Shondemo Chu (Shongdemo) Stream, passing through Shondemo (Sudemo) which lies between the above two tributaries to Gyanbyan; then it runs along Gyanbyan Mountain spur downward, crosses the Pinbhu Tsangpo River (the western Tributary of the Lapche River--Ed.) and then along the mountain spur up to height 5,370.5 meters at Sebobori (Korlang Pari Ko Tippa); thence the boundary line turns southeastward along the mountain spur downward, crosses the Lapche Khung Tsangpo River (the eastern tributary of the Lapche River--Ed.), then it runs along Biden Kangri (Piding) Snowy Mountain to height 5,397.2 meters; thence the boundary line turns westward along the mountain ridge to height 5,444.2 meters at Kabobori (Raling), then generally southward along Rasumkungpo (Rishinggumbo) Mountain ridge to Niehlu (Niule) bridge.

11--From Niehlu (Niule) bridge the boundary line runs generally eastward to Chejenma (Guari Smankar), and then eastward along the mountain ridge and then northward along the watershed between the Rongshar River and the Rongbuk River on the one hand and the tributaries of the Dudh Kosi River on the other hand to Nagpa Pass, and then runs generally southeastward along the mountain ridge, passing through Cho Oyu Mountain, Pumoli Mountain (Gniire Langur), mount Chomo-lungma (Sagarmatha) and Lhotse, to Makalu Mountain; then runs southeastward and then eastward along the mountain ridge to Popti Pass.

12--From Popti Pass the boundary line runs along the mountain ridge eastward passing through Tsagala (Kepu Dada) to Kherala (Khade Dada), and then generally northeastward passing through Lanapo (Lhanakpu) and Chebum (Chhipung) to the source of the Sunchunchu (Shumjung) River; then it follows the Sunchunchu (Shumjung) River to its junction with the tract leading from Kimathangka to Chentang; then it runs along the track to the bridge on the Karma Tsangpo (Kama) River;

thence it runs generally southeastward along the Karma Tsangpo (Kama) River passing through its junction with the Pengchu (Arun) River, and then along the Pengchu (Arun) River to its junction with the Nadang River, then continues to follow the Pengchu (Arun) River westward to its junction with the Tsokangchingpo (Chhokang) River, thence the boundary line departs from the Pengchu (Arun) River and runs generally eastward along a mountain spur passing through Angde and Dalai (Tale) Pass to Dalaila (Tale), and then runs along the mountain ridge passing through Jungkan (Dukan), Kaijungkan (Khachunkha), Renlangbu (Relinbu) and Sulala to reach Rag La (Rakhala) Pass.

13--From Rag La (Rakhala) Pass the boundary line runs generally eastward along the watershed between the tributaries of the Nadang River and the tributaries of the Yaru River on the one hand and the tributaries of the Ramur River on the other hand, passing through Ombolap (Ombak) Pass, the Putala (Tiptala) Pass, Yangmakhangla (Kangla) Pass and Chabukla to the terminal point where the watershed between the Khar River and the Chabuk River meets the watershed between the Khar River and the Lhonak River.

The entire boundary line between the two countries as described in the present article is shown on the 1:500,000-scale maps of the entire boundary attached to the present treaty; the location of the temporary boundary markers erected by both sides and the detailed alignment of certain sections of the boundary are shown on the 1:500,000-scale maps of those sections attached to the present treaty.

Article II.

The contracting parties have agreed that wherever the boundary follows a river, the midstream line shall be the boundary. In case a boundary river changes its course, the original line of the boundary shall remain unchanged in the absence of other agreements between the two parties.

Article III.

After the signing of the present treaty the Chinese-Nepalese Joint Boundary Committee, constituted in pursuance of the agreement of 21 March 1960 between the two parties on the question of the boundary between the two countries, shall set up permanent boundary markers as necessary on the boundary line between the

two countries, and then draft a protocol setting forth in detail the alignment of the entire boundary line and the location of the permanent boundary markers, with detailed maps attached thereto showing the boundary line and the location of the permanent boundary markers. The above-mentioned protocol, upon being signed by the governments of the two countries, shall become an annex to the present treaty and the detailed maps shall replace the maps now attached to the present treaty.

Upon the signing of the above-mentioned protocol, the tasks of the Chinese-Nepalese Joint Boundary Committee shall be terminated, and the agreement of 21 March 1960 between the two parties on the question of the boundary between the two countries shall cease to be in force.

Article IV.

The contracting parties have agreed that any dispute concerning the boundary which may arise after the formal delimitation of the boundary between the two countries shall be settled by the two parties through friendly consultations.

Article V.

The present treaty shall come into force on the day of the signing of the treaty.

Done in duplicate in Peking on 5 October 1961 in the Chinese, Nepalese, and English languages: all three texts being equally authentic.

Chairman of the People's Republic of China, His Majesty the King of Nepal (Signed) Liu Chao-chi, Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva.

"Boundary Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Nepal," October 5, 1961, International Boundary Study No. 30, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 30, 1965, pp. 8-12.

APPENDIX F

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND NEPAL, 1923

Whereas peace and friendship have now existed between the British Government and the Government of Nepal since the Treaty of Segowlie on the second day of December One Thousand and eight Hundred and fifteen; and whereas since that date the Government of Nepal has ever displayed its true friendship for the British Government and the British Government has consistently shown its goodwill towards the Government of Nepal; and whereas the Governments of both the countries are desirous of still further strengthening and cementing the good relations between them for more than a century; the two High Contracting Parties having resolved to conclude a new Treaty of Friendship have agreed upon the following articles:

Article 1: There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Governments of Great Britain and Nepal, and the two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect each other's independence, both internal and external.

Article 2: All previous Treaties, Agreements and Engagements since and including the Treaty of Segowlie of 1815, which have been concluded between the two Governments, are hereby confirmed, except so far as they may be altered by the present Treaty.

Article 3: As the preservation of peace and friendly relations between the neighbouring States whose territories adjoin their common frontiers is to the mutual interests of both the High Contracting Parties, they hereby agree to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with those states likely to rupture such friendly relations and each to exert its good offices as far as may be possible to remove such friction and misunderstanding.

Article 4: Each of the High Contracting Parties will use all such measures as it may deem practicable to prevent its territories being used for purpose inimical to the security of the other.

Article 8: The Treaty signed on part of the British Government by Lieutenant-Colonel W. F. T. O'Connor, C.I.E., C.V.O., British Envoy at the court of Nepal, and on the part of the Nepal Government by General His Highness Maharaja Sir Chandra Shumshere Jung Bahadur Rana, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.V.O., D.C.L., Thong-Lin-Pinma-Kokang-Wang-Syan, Prime Minister and Marshal of Nepal, shall be ratified and ratifications shall be exchanged at Kathmandu as soon as practicable.

Signed and Sealed at Kathmandu, this the Twenty-First day of December in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-three Anno Domini corresponding with the Sixth Samvat Era One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty.

"Treaty Between Great Britain and Nepal, 1923,"
Texts of Treaties, Agreements and Certain Exchanges of
Notes Relating to the Sino-Indian Boundary, Indian
Society of International Law, pp. 162-163.

APPENDIX G

TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL, 1950

The Government of India and the Government of Nepal recognising the ancient ties which have happily existed between the countries for centuries;

Desiring still further to strengthen and develop these ties and to perpetuate peace between the two countries;

Have resolved therefore to enter into a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with each other, and have, for this purpose, appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following persons, namely,

The Government of India:

His Excellency Shri Chandreshwar Prasad Narain Singh,
Ambassador of India in Nepal.

The Government of Nepal:

Mohan Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana, Maharaja, Prime Minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Nepal.

Who having examined each other's credentials and found them good and in due form have agreed as follows:

Article 1: There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other.

Article 2: The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.

Article 3: In order to establish and maintain the relations referred to in Article 1: The two Governments

agree to continue diplomatic relations with each other by means of representatives with such staff as is necessary for the due performance of their functions.

The representatives and such of their staff as may be agreed upon shall enjoy such diplomatic privileges and immunities as are customarily granted by international law on reciprocal basis, provided that in no case shall these be less than those granted to persons of a similar status of any other State having diplomatic relations with either Government.

Article 4: The two Governments agree to appoint Consul-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and such Consular agents, who shall reside in towns, ports and other places in each other's territory as may be agreed to. Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and other Consular agents shall be provided with exequaturs or other valid authorisation of their appointment. Such exequatur of authorisation is liable to be withdrawn by the country which issued it, if considered necessary. The reasons for the withdrawal shall be indicated wherever possible.

The persons mentioned above shall enjoy on a reciprocal basis all the rights, privileges, exemptions, and immunities that are accorded to persons of corresponding status of any other State.

Article 5: The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal. The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two Governments acting in consultation.

Article 6: Each Government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic development of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating to such development.

Article 7: The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in the trade and commerce and other privileges of a similar nature.

Article 8: So far as matters dealt with herein are concerned, this Treaty cancels all previous Treaties, agreements and engagements entered into on behalf of India by the British Government and the Government of Nepal.

Article 9: This Treaty shall come into force from the date of signature by both Governments.

Article 10: This Treaty shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by giving one year's notice.

Done in duplicate at Kathmandu this 31st day of July 1950.

(Sd.) Chandreshshwar Prasad Narain Singh,
For the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

(Sd.) Mohan Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana,
For the GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL.

"Text of India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship," Issued in Kathmandu on July 31, 1950. Texts of Documents, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1965, pp. 56-58.

APPENDIX H

THE SINCHULA TREATY OF 1865

Treaty between His Excellency the Right Honorable Sir John Lawrence, G.C.B., K.S.I., Viceroy and Governor-General of Her Britannic Majesty's possessions in the East Indies, and Their Highnesses the Dhurm and Dab Rajahs of Bhootan concluded on the one part by Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Bruce, C.B., by virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by the Viceroy and Governor-General, and on the other part by Samdojey Deb Jimpey and Themseyrensey Donai according to full powers conferred on them by the Dhurm and Deb Rajahs--1865.

Article I.

There shall henceforth be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government and the Government of Bhootan.

Article II.

Whereas in consequence of repeated aggressions of the Bhootan Government and of the refusal of the Government to afford satisfaction for those aggressions, and of their insulting treatment of the officers sent by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council for the purpose of procuring an amicable adjustment of differences existing between the two States, the British Government has been compelled to seize by an armed force the whole of the Doars and certain Hill Posts protecting the passes into Bhootan, and whereas the Bhootan Government has now expressed its regret for past misconduct and a desire for the establishment of friendly relations with the British Government, it is hereby agreed that the whole of the tract known as the Eighteen Doars, bordering on the Districts of Rungpoor, Cooch Behar, and Assam, together with the Talook of Ambaree Fallacottah and the Hill territory on the left bank of the Teesta up to such points as may be laid down by the British Commissioner

appointed for the purpose is ceded by the Bhootan Government to the British Government for ever.

Article III.

The Bhootan Government hereby agree to surrender all British subjects, as well as subjects of the Chiefs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar who are now detained in Bhootan against their will, and to place no impediment in the way of the return of all or any of such persons into British territory.

Article IV.

In consideration of the cession by the Bhootan Government of the territories specified in Article II. of this Treaty, and of the said Government having expressed its regret for past misconduct, and having hereby engaged for the future to restrain all evil disposed persons from committing crimes within British territory or the territories of the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar and to give prompt and full redress for all such crimes which may be committed in defiance of their commands, the British Government agree to make an annual allowance to the Government of Bhootan of a sum not exceeding fifty thousand rupees (Rupees 50,000) to be paid to officers not below the rank of Jungpen, who shall be deputed by the Government of Bhootan to receive the same. And it is further hereby agreed that the payments shall be made as specified below:--

On the fulfilment by the Bhootan Government of the conditions of this Treaty twenty-five thousand rupees (Rupees 25,000).

On the 10th January following the 1st payment, thirty-five thousand rupees (Rupees 35,000).

On the 10th January following forty-five thousand rupees (Rupees 45,000).

On every succeeding 10th January fifth thousand rupees (Rupees 50,000).

Article V.

The British Government will hold itself at liberty at any time to suspend the payment of this compensation money either in whole or in part in the event of misconduct on the part of the Bhootan Government or its failure to check the aggression of its subjects or to comply with the provisions of this treaty.

Article VI.

The British Government hereby agree on demand being duly made in writing by the Bhootan Government to surrender under the provisions of Act VII. of 1854 of which a copy shall be furnished to the Bhootan Government, all Bhootanese subjects accused of any of the following crimes who may take refuge in British dominions. The crimes are murder, attempting to murder, rape, kidnapping, great personal violence, maiming, dacoity, thuggee, robbery, burglary, knowingly receiving property obtained by dacoity, robbery or burglary, cattle stealing, breaking and entering a dwelling house and stealing therein, arson, setting fire to a village, house, or town, forgery or uttering forged documents, counterfeiting current coin, knowingly uttering base or counterfeit coins, perjury, subordination of perjury, embezzlement by public officers or other persons, and being an accessory to any of the above offences.

Article VII.

The Bhootan Government hereby agree on requisition being duly made by, or by the authority of, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to surrender any British subjects accused of any of the crimes specified in the above Article who may take refuge in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Bhootan Government, and also any Bhootanese subjects who after committing any of the above crimes in British territory shall flee into Bhootan, on such evidence of their guilt being produced as shall satisfy the Local Court of the district in which the offence may have been committed.

Article VIII.

The Bhootan Government hereby agree to refer to the arbitration of the British Government all disputes with, or causes of complaint against the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, and to abide by the decision of the British Government, and the British Government hereby engage to enquire into and settle all such disputes and complaints in such manner as justice may require, and to insist on the observance of the decision by the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar.

Article IX.

There shall be free trade and commerce between the two Governments. No duties shall be levied on Bhootanese goods imported into British territories, nor shall the

Article VI.

The British Government hereby agree on demand being duly made in writing by the Bhootan Government to surrender under the provisions of Act VII. of 1854 of which a copy shall be furnished to the Bhootan Government, all Bhootanese subjects accused of any of the following crimes who may take refuge in British dominions. The crimes are murder, attempting to murder, rape, kidnapping, great personal violence, maiming, dacoity, thuggee, robbery, burglary, knowingly receiving property obtained by dacoity, robbery or burglary, cattle stealing, breaking and entering a dwelling house and stealing therein, arson, setting fire to a village, house, or town, forgery or uttering forged documents, counterfeiting current coin, knowingly uttering base or counterfeit coins, perjury, subordination of perjury, embezzlement by public officers or other persons, and being an accessory to any of the above offences.

Article VII.

The Bhootan Government hereby agree on requisition being duly made by, or by the authority of, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal to surrender any British subjects accused of any of the crimes specified in the above Article who may take refuge in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Bhootan Government, and also any Bhootanese subjects who after committing any of the above crimes in British territory shall flee into Bhootan, on such evidence of their guilt being produced as shall satisfy the Local Court of the district in which the offence may have been committed.

Article VIII.

The Bhootan Government hereby agree to refer to the arbitration of the British Government all disputes with, or causes of complaint against the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, and to abide by the decision of the British Government, and the British Government hereby engage to enquire into and settle all such disputes and complaints in such manner as justice may require, and to insist on the observance of the decision by the Rajahs of Sikkim and Cooch Behar.

Article IX.

There shall be free trade and commerce between the two Governments. No duties shall be levied on Bhootanese goods imported into British territories, nor shall the

Bhootan Government levy any duties on British goods imported into, or transported through the Bhootan territories. Bhootanese subjects residing in British territories shall have equal justice with British subjects and British subjects residing in Bhootan shall have equal justice with the subjects of the Bhootan Government.

Article X.

The present Treaty of ten Articles having been concluded at Sinchula on the 11th day of November 1865, corresponding with the Bhoota year Shim Lung 24th day of the 9th month, and signed and sealed by Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Bruce, C.B., and Samdojey Deb Jimpey and Themseyrensey Donai, the ratifications of the same by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council and by Their Highnesses the Dhurm and Deb Rajahs shall be mutually delivered within thirty days from this date.

(Sd.) H. Bruce, Lieut.-Col.,
Chief Civil and Poltl, Officer.
(Sd.) In Dabe Nagri.
(Sd.) In Bhoota language.

This Treaty was ratified on the 29th November 1865 in Calcutta by me.

25th January 1866. (Sd.) John Lawrence,
Governor-General

25th January 1866. (Sd.) W. Muir,
Secy. to the Govt. of India

"The Sinchula Treaty of 1865," Texts of Treaties, Agreements and Certain Exchanges of Notes Relating to the Sino-Indian Boundary, Indian Society of International Law, New Delhi, 1962, pp. 93-94.

APPENDIX I

TREATY WITH THE MAHARAJA OF BHUTAN REVISING CERTAIN ARTICLES OF THE SINCHULA TREATY OF 1865

Dated the 8th January 1910

Treaty between His Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Gilbert John Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound, P.C., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., G.C.M.G., Earl of Minto, Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, and His Highness Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, K.C.I.E., Maharaja of Bhutan,--1910.

Whereas it is desirable to amend Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty concluded at Sinchula on the 11th day of November 1865, corresponding with the Bhootea year Shing Lang, 24th day of the 9th month, between the British Government and the Government of Bhutan, the undermentioned amendments are agreed to on the one part by Mr. C. A. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, in virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by the Right Honourable Sir Gilbert John Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound, P.C., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E., G.C.M.G., Earl of Minto, Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, and on the other part by His Highness Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, K.C.I.E., Maharaja of Bhutan.

The following addition has been made to Article IV of the Sinchula Treaty of 1865.

"The British Government has increased the annual allowance to the Government of Bhutan from fifty thousand rupees (Rs. 50,000) to one hundred thousand rupees (Rs. 100,000) with effect from the 10th January 1910."

Article VIII of the Sinchula Treaty of 1865 has been revised and the revised Article runs as follows:

"The British Government undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations. In the event of disputes with or causes of complaint against the Maharajas of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, such matters will be referred for arbitration

to the British Government which will settle them in such manner as justice may require, and insist upon the observance of its decisions by the Maharajas named."

Done in quadruplicate at Punakha, Bhutan, this eighth day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and ten, corresponding with the Bhutia date, the 27th day of the 11 month of the Earth-Bird (Sa-Ja) year.

C. A. Bell
Political Officer
in Sikkim

Seal of Dharma Raja
Seal of His Highness the
Maharaja of Bhutan
Seal of Tatsang Lamas
Seal of Tongsa Penlop
Seal of Paro Penlop
Seal of Zhung Dronyer
Seal of Thimbu Jungpen
Seal of Punaka Jungpen
Seal of Wangdu Phondrang
Jungpen
Seal of Taka Penlop
Seal of Deb Zimpon

(Sd.) Minto
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This Treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor General of India in Council at Fort William, on the twenty-fourth day of March A.D., one thousand nine-hundred and ten.

(Sd.) S.H. Butler
Secretary to the Govt. of India
Foreign Dept.

APPENDIX J

INDIA-BHUTAN

TEXT OF INDIA-BHUTAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP

Issued in Darjeeling on August 8, 1949

The Government of India on the one part, and His Highness the Druk Gyalpo's Government on the other part, equally animated by the desire to regulate in a friendly manner and upon a solid and durable basis the state of affairs caused by the termination of the British Government's authority in India, and to promote and foster the relations of friendship and neighbourliness so necessary for the well-being of their peoples, have resolved to conclude the following treaty, and have, for this purpose named their representatives, that is to say Sri Harishwar Dayal representing the Government of India, who has full powers to agree to the said treaty on behalf of the Government of India, and Dob Zimpon Sonam, Tobgye Dorji, Yang-Lop Sonam, Chho-Zim Thondup, Rin-Zin Tandin and Ha Drung Jigmie Palden Dorji, representing the Government of His Highness the Druk Gyalpo, Maharaja of Bhutan, who have full powers to agree to the same on behalf of the Government of Bhutan.

Article I

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan.

Article II

The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.

Article III

In place of the compensation granted to the Government of Bhutan under Article 4 of the Treaty of Sinchula and enhanced by the treaty of the eighth day of January 1910 and the temporary subsidy of Rupees one lakh per annum granted in 1942, the Government of India agrees to make an annual payment of Rupees five lakhs to the Government of Bhutan. And it is further hereby agreed that the said annual payment shall be made on the tenth day of January every year, the first payment being made on the tenth day of January 1950. This payment shall continue so long as this treaty remains in force and its terms are duly observed.

Article IV

Further to mark the friendship existing and continuing between the said Governments, the Government of India shall, within one year from the date of signature of this treaty, return to the Government of Bhutan about thirty-two square miles of territory in the area known as Dewangiri. The Government of India shall appoint a competent officer or officers to mark out the area so returned to the Government of Bhutan.

Article V

There shall as heretofore, be free trade and commerce between the territories of the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan; and the Government of India agrees to grant the Government of Bhutan every facility for the carriage, by land and water, or its produce throughout the territory of the Government of India, including the right to use such forest roads as may be specified by mutual agreement from time to time.

Article VI

The Government of India agrees that the Government of Bhutan shall be free to import with the assistance and approval of the Government of India, from or through India into Bhutan, whatever arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores may be required or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan, and that this arrangement shall hold good for all time as long as the Government of India is satisfied that the intentions of the Government of Bhutan are friendly and that there is no danger to India from such importations. The Government of Bhutan, on the other hand, agrees that there

shall be no export of such arms, ammunition, etc., across the frontier of Bhutan either by the Government of Bhutan or by private individuals.

Article VII

The Government of India and the Government of Bhutan agree that Bhutanese subjects residing in Indian territories shall have equal justice with Indian subjects, and that Indian subjects residing in Bhutan shall have equal justice with the subjects of the Government of Bhutan.

Article VIII

(1) The Government of India shall, on demand being duly made in writing by the Government of Bhutan, take proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Extradition Act, 1903 (of which a copy shall be furnished to the Government of Bhutan), for the surrender of all Bhutanese subjects accused of any of the crimes specified in the first schedule of the said ACT who may take refuge in Indian territory.

(2) The Government of Bhutan shall, on requisition being duly made by the Government of India, or by any officer authorised by the Government of India in this behalf, surrender any Indian subjects, or subjects of a foreign power, whose extradition may be required in pursuance of any agreement or arrangements made by the Government of India with the said power, accused of any of the crimes specified in the first schedule of Act XV of 1903, who may take refuge in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Government of Bhutan, and also any Bhutanese subjects who, after committing any of the crimes referred to in Indian territory, shall flee to Bhutan, on such evidence of their guilt being produced as shall satisfy the local court of the district in which the offence may have been committed.

Article IX

Any differences and disputes arising in the application or interpretation of this treaty shall in the first instance be settled by negotiation. If within three months of the start of negotiations no settlement is arrived at, then the matter shall be referred to the Arbitration of three arbitrators, who shall be nationals of either India or Bhutan, chosen in the following manner:--

- (1) One person nominated by the Government of India;
- (2) One person nominated by the Government of Bhutan;
- (3) A Judge of the Federal Court, or of a High Court in India, to be chosen by the Government of Bhutan, who shall be Chairman.

The judgment of this Tribunal shall be final and executed without delay by either party.

Article X

This Treaty shall continue in force in perpetuity unless terminated or modified by mutual consent.

DONE in duplicate at Darjeeling this eighth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and fortynine, corresponding with the Bhutanese date the fifteenth day of the sixth month of the Earth-Bull year.

HARISHWAR DAYAL
Political Officer in Sikkim

DEB ZIMPON SONAM
TOBGYE DORJI
YANG-LOP SONAM
CHHO-ZIM THONDUP
RIN-ZIM TANDIM
HA DRUNG GIGMIE
PALDEN DORJI

"Text of Indian-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship,"
Issued in Darjeeling on August 8, 1949, Texts of Documents, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1965, pp. 4-6.

APPENDIX K

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RELATING TO SIKKIM AND TIBET (1890)

Whereas Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exists between their respective Empires; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the said relations, and it is desirable to clearly define and permanently settle certain matters connected with the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have, for this purpose, named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, His Excellency the Most Hon'ble Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice, G.M.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.M.I.E., Marquess of Lansdowns, Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, His Excellency Sheng Tai, Imperial Associate Resident in Tibet, Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor.

Who having met and communicated to each other their full powers, and finding these to be in proper form, having agreed upon the following Convention in eight Articles:--

- (1) The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier and follows the abovementioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.

- (2) It is admitted that the British Government, whose protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognised, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of the State, and except through and with the permission of the British Government, neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal, or informal, with any other country.
- (3) The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article (1), and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the frontier.
- (4) The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers.
- (5) The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of the frontier is reserved for further examination and future adjustment.
- (6) The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement the method in which official communications between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.
- (7) Two Joint Commissioners shall, within six months from the ratification of this Convention, be appointed, one by the British Government in India, the other by the Chinese Resident in Tibet. The said Commissioners shall meet and discuss the questions which by the last three preceding Articles have been reserved.
- (8) The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible after the date of the signature thereof.

In witness whereof the respective negotiators have signed the same affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta this seventeenth day of March in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety, corresponding with the Chinese date the twenty-seventh day of the second moon of the sixteenth year of Kuang Hsu.

LANSDOWNE

Chinese Seal and Signature

APPENDIX L

THE TEXT OF THE INDIA-SIKKIM PEACE TREATY ISSUED IN GANGTOK ON DECEMBER 5, 1950

The President of India and His Highness the Maharaja of Sikkim, being desirous of further strengthening the good relations already existing between India and Sikkim, have resolved to enter into a new Treaty with each other, and the President of India has, for the purpose, appointed as his plenipotentiary Shri Harishwar Dayal, Political Officer in Sikkim, and His Highness the Maharaja having examined Shri Harishwar Dayal's credentials and found them good and in due form, the two have agreed as follows:--

Article I

All previous treaties between the British Government and Sikkim which are at present in force as between India and Sikkim are hereby formally cancelled.

Article II

Sikkim shall continue to be a Protectorate of India and, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, shall enjoy autonomy in regard to its internal affairs.

Article III

(1) The Government of India will be responsible for the defence and territorial integrity of Sikkim. It shall have the right to take such measures as it considers necessary for the defence of Sikkim or the security of India, whether preparatory or otherwise, and whether within or outside Sikkim. In particular, the Government of India shall have the right to station troops anywhere within Sikkim.

(2) The measures referred to in paragraph (1) will as far as possible be taken by the Government in consultation with the Government of Sikkim.

(3) The Government of Sikkim shall not import any arms, ammunition, military stores or other warlike material of any description for any purpose whatsoever without the previous consent of the Government of India.

Article IV

(1) The external relations of Sikkim, whether political, economic or financial, shall be conducted and regulated solely by the Government of India; and the Government of Sikkim shall have no dealings with any foreign power.

(2) Subjects of Sikkim travelling to foreign countries shall be treated as Indian protected persons for the purpose of passports, and shall receive from Indian representatives abroad the same protection and facilities as Indian nationals.

Article V

The Government of Sikkim agrees not to levy any import duty, transit duty or other impost on goods brought into, or in transit through, Sikkim; and the Government of India agrees not to levy any import or other duty on goods of Sikkimese origin brought into India from Sikkim.

Article VI

(1) The Government of India shall have the exclusive right of constructing, maintaining and regulating the use of railways, aerodromes and landing grounds and air navigation facilities, posts, telegraphs, telephones and wireless installations in Sikkim; and the Government of Sikkim shall render the Government of India every assistance in their construction, maintenance and protection.

(2) The Government of Sikkim may, however, construct, maintain, and regulate the use of, railways and aerodromes and landing grounds and air navigation facilities to such extent as may be agreed to by the Government of India.

(3) The Government of India shall have the right to construct and maintain in Sikkim roads the strategic purposes and for the purpose of improving communications with India and other adjoining countries and the Government of Sikkim shall render the Government of India every assistance in the construction, maintenance and protection of such roads.

Article VII

(1) Subjects of Sikkim shall have the right of entry into, and free movement within, India, and Indian nationals shall have the right of entry into, and free movement within, Sikkim.

(2) Subject to such regulations as the Government of Sikkim may prescribe in consultation with the Government of India, Indian nationals shall have:--

- (a) the right to carry on trade and commerce in Sikkim; and
- (b) when established in any trade in Sikkim, the right to acquire, hold and dispose of any property, movable or immovable, for the purpose of their trade or residence in Sikkim.

(3) Subjects of Sikkim shall have the same right--

- (a) to carry on trade and commerce in India, and to employment there-in; and
- (b) of acquiring, holding and disposing of property, movable and immovable, as Indian nationals.

Article VIII

(1) Indian nationals within Sikkim shall be subject to the laws of Sikkim and subjects of Sikkim within India shall be subject to the laws of India.

(2) Whenever any criminal proceedings are initiated in Sikkim against any Indian national or any person in the service of the Government of India or any foreigner, the Government of Sikkim shall furnish the Representative of the Government of India in Sikkim (hereinafter referred to as the Indian Representative) with particulars of charges against such person.

If in the case of any person in the service of the Government of India or any foreigner it is so demanded

by the Indian Representative, such person shall be handed over to him for trial before such court as may be established for the purpose by the Government of India either in Sikkim or outside.

Article IX

(1) The Government of Sikkim agrees to seize and deliver up any fugitive offender from outside Sikkim who has taken refuge therein on demand being made by the Indian Representative. Should any delay occur in complying with such demand, the Indian police may follow the person whose surrender has been demanded into any part of Sikkim, and shall, on showing a warrant signed by the Indian Representative, receive every assistance and protection in the prosecution of their object from the Sikkim officers.

(2) The Government of India similarly agrees, on demand being made by the Government of Sikkim, to take extradition proceedings against, and surrender, any fugitive offender from Sikkim who has taken refuge in the territory of India.

(3) In this Article, "fugitive offender" means a person who is accused of having committed an extradition offence and defined in the First Schedule to the Indian Extradition Act, 1903, or any other offence which may hereafter be agreed upon between the Government of India and the Government of Sikkim as being an extradition offence.

Article X

The Government of India, having in mind the friendly relations already existing between India and Sikkim and now further strengthened by this Treaty, and being desirous of assisting in the development and good administration of Sikkim, agrees to pay the Government of Sikkim a sum of rupees three lakhs every year so long as the terms of this Treaty are duly observed by the Government of Sikkim.

The first payment under this Article will be made before the end of the year 1950, and subsequent payments will be made in the month of August every year.

Article XI

The Government of India shall have the right to appoint a Representative to reside in Sikkim; and the Government of Sikkim shall provide him and his staff with all reasonable facilities in regard to their residential and office accommodation and generally in regard to their carrying out their duties in Sikkim.

Article XII

If any dispute arises in the interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty which cannot be resolved by mutual consultation, the dispute shall be referred to the Chief Justice of India whose decision thereon shall be final.

Article XIII

This Treaty shall come into force without ratification from the date of signature by both the parties.

"Text of India-Sikkim Peace Treaty," Issued in Gangtok on December 5, 1950, Texts of Documents, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1965, pp. 169-173.

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