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THE RELIGIOUS RESTRUCTURING OF THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION:
EXPLORING STALLED SUPPORT FOR EDUCATION SPENDING, 1973-2018

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THE RELIGIOUS RESTRUCTURING OF THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION:
EXPLORING STALLED SUPPORT FOR EDUCATION SPENDING, 1973-2018

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ABSTRACT

Recent research on Americans' attitudes toward public education focuses on controversial legislation surrounding curriculum, increasing teacher compensation, and changing priorities of political parties. However, the processes by which religion also shapes attitudes toward education remain largely unexplored. Given Robert Wuthnow's (1988) religious restructuring thesis, which posits religion's relationship to politics evolved substantially since World War II, sociologists of religion have explored the changing relationship between religion and attitudes toward political institutions. We build upon this body of research, using data from the General Social Survey to explore both religious tradition and religious practice and their associations with attitudes toward education spending from 1973 to 2018. Results show that prior to 1990, attitudes toward education spending have converged across religious traditions. After 1990, this convergence plateaus and remains stable through 2018. Conversely, after 1990, we also capture a divergence across religious practice, with those who report high religious service attendance and report strong religious affiliation showing declining rates of support for educational spending. In a time of heightened political polarization, our findings contribute to our understanding of the changing ways in which religion matters for politics.

Key words: education, religious practice, religious belonging, politics, government spending

INTRODUCTION

The United States has one of the most well-funded public education systems in the world, spending \$800 billion in the 2019-2020 school year (Cornman et al. 2022:2). Per-pupil expenditures, on average, have risen over the past decade (NCES 2022). Although education spending has increased nationally, Americans across the political spectrum express concerns related to education funding and content. In the spring of 2018, teachers in several states went on strike (Blanc 2019), organizing around their concerns related to low school funding and low teacher pay. Despite these strikes, low wages (Allegretto and Mishel 2020) and low funding (Leachman and Figueroa 2019) persist, which in turn contributes to a teacher shortage in some districts (Nguyen, Lam, and Bruno 2022). At the same time, parents and politicians raised concerns related to the content of school curriculum, including heated debates over critical race theory (Pollock et al. 2022) and “Don’t Say Gay” bills (Barbeauld 2014; Branigin 2022). Conservative politicians increasingly advocate for school choice and voucher systems that divest from mainstream public schooling (Berends 2015). Education is yet another site of growing political polarization (Dar and Lee 2014).

While many social and political mechanisms shape individual attitudes toward educational spending, the processes by which religion may shape these remain largely unexplored. Soon after Donald Trump nominated Betsey DeVos for U.S. Secretary of Education, an interview circulated in which she described her work in education reform as a way to “advance God’s kingdom” (Stewart 2016:31). Religious language behind political views is a long-standing facet of American public life. Robert Wuthnow (1988) argued that American religion has restructured such that conservative religion is increasingly aligned with conservative politics. Given the enduring connections between religion and politics, exploring how religion

shapes support for education uncovers how religion is complex (Wilde and Glassman 2016) and shapes attitudes toward other institutions. Prior research on religion and education consists of historical accounts of evangelicalism (Miller 2014; Noll 2022; Williams 2010), qualitative work studying evangelicals in government institutions (Lindsay 2007), sociological research on the role religion plays in shaping government (Hout and Fischer 2002; Wuthnow 1988), and longitudinal analyses on educational attainment and religious belief (Schwadel 2016; Uecker, Regnerus, and Vaaler 2007). However, little research explores how religion shapes attitudes toward education spending, and how these patterns have changed over time. While Americans might be unfamiliar with the exact dollar amounts spent on education at the local, state, and national levels, their support (or lack thereof) of spending increases reflect a support for education in general, and support for government investment of tax dollars in that institution.

Using data from the General Social Survey from 1973 to 2018, I find that support for increased education spending has plateaued since 1990. Figure 1 shows the percentage of Americans each year who believe there is *too little* government spending on education.

[Figure 1 about here]

Since 1973, the percentage of Americans who believe there is too little spending on education has increased steadily, from 50% to 75%. However, after 1990, this trend stalled, though with a slight uptick in 2018. Beyond political party, by exploring the complex associations between religion and attitudes toward education spending, I find that over time, religious tradition has waned in importance in predicting support for education spending, while religious practice has become a driver of declining support, a trend obscured by the general plateau in attitudes toward education spending among all Americans.

In this paper, I first explore prior research on the intertwining of religion and the politics of education. I explore the history of religious involvement in politics in the late 20th century United states to understand the complex social and political environment that surrounds the plateau in support for education spending highlighted in Figure 1. I then perform a series of analyses that unpack the role of religion in the stall of support for educational spending, focusing on religious belonging, religious practice, and various other measures of religious belief. After conducting analyses, I find that it is not religious tradition, but rather religious practice, that continues to shape attitudes toward education spending beyond the general plateau we observe in the early 1990s (See Figure 1). Results show that prior to 1990, attitudes toward education spending converged across religious traditions. After 1990, this convergence plateaus and remains stable through 2018. Conversely, after 1990, I find a divergence across religious practice, with those who report high religious service attendance and report strong religious affiliation showing declining rates of support for educational spending. These findings offer novel contributions in our understanding of the shifting ways in which religion matters for politics and our knowledge of enduring politicization of education, and offers a unique methodological contribution in its unique treatment of time. These have important implications for understanding Americans' shifting support for education.

BACKGROUND

Religion and Politics

In the United States, adherents of conservative religious traditions often support conservative political causes (Gross, Medvetz, and Russell 2011; Steensland and Wright 2014). Wuthnow (1988) explained the growing influence of religion on American politics as a result of a religious restructuring, a complex process that occurred in the decades after World War II in

which conservative religion aligned itself with conservative political ideology. Though recent research suggests Wuthnow's thesis holds only for white-majority religions (O'Brien and Abdelhadi 2020), his main argument persists: in the decades since the 1950s, conservative politics became associated with conservative religion. In particular, white evangelicals have gained considerable cultural and political power, supporting conservative political leadership (Steensland and Wright 2014). Evangelicals made their home among political and cultural elites, becoming one of the most politically powerful religious groups in the United States today (Lindsay 2007).

In the past half-century, more Americans joined evangelical elites in popular movements of conservative religious and political activism. The Christian right, a political faction of Christians who supported conservative policies, emerged from a movement of politically-minded evangelicals that sought to make their faith known "in the public square" (Miller 2014:5). Evangelicals aimed to make their moral concerns policy through the Republican party, resulting in a strong presence of evangelicals within the GOP (Williams 2010:2). After the election of Donald Trump in 2016, popular support for Christian nationalism, an ideology that seeks to shape American civic life with a particular type of Christian identity and culture, grew in an attempt to preserve authority in America through political means (Baker, Perry, and Whitehead 2020; Hummel 2016; Whitehead and Perry 2020). Conservative religion's enduring influence on politics is crucial to understanding the American political landscape.

Religious Americans who are more progressive found themselves changing in response to the rise of evangelical politics. Hout and Fischer (2002) find the growth of the religious right led to a significant rise in those who claim no religious affiliation, and that this act of non-affiliation serves as a symbolic statement against these conservative religious/political traditions.

Furthermore, during the presidency of Donald Trump, an increasing number of Americans self-identified as evangelical despite little to no religious service attendance (Burge 2021; Smith 2021). Holding certain religious beliefs or affiliating with a particular tradition, however, do not perfectly predict political ideology. Understanding that religion is “complex” and operates in tandem with other social structures complicates the relationship between religion and politics (Wilde and Glassman 2016). Recent research in Christian nationalism finds that many Americans are embracing an authoritarian form of Christianity, seeking to preserve moral and political authority (Perry, Davis, and Grubbs 2022; Whitehead and Perry 2020). In an era of growing political polarization, highlighting the central role of religion in its relationship to politics, power, and other social institutions is crucial to understanding social behavior and attitudes (Perry 2022). In particular, some argue that the recent growth of Christian nationalism is part of a longer pattern of using a religious identity to describe a particular political and social identity (Stroope et al. 2021).

Religion and Education

As with politics in general, conservative religious activists often seek to influence the institution of (public) education. Conservative Protestants often view education and religion at odds with one another, partly because of the perceived incompatibility between science and religious belief (Ecklund and Park 2009; Evans 2011). Education, and especially higher education, could lead to a decline in (conservative) religious belief and potential disaffiliation from religion altogether. Research from twenty to thirty years ago show that higher levels of education are associated with declines in religious belief (Herbert 2003; Johnson 1997), and those with a college degree report more secular beliefs than their peers who did not attend

college (Funk and Willits 1987). This added evidence to the belief in the “well-established fact that education, even Christian education, secularizes” (Hunter 1983:132).

However, more recent research questions the assumption that higher education necessarily leads to declines in religious belief and practice. Uecker and colleagues (2007) find that while most young adults decline in religious service attendance during the transition to adulthood, those who do not attend college report higher rates of religious decline compared to their college-educated counterparts, including declining religious service attendance, declining of personal importance of religion, and disaffiliation from religion. Schwadel (2011) finds that higher education often leads to switching of religious traditions or changing of strict beliefs, but is not associated with a disaffiliation with religion altogether. Further longitudinal analysis suggests while there may be some decline in religiosity among college graduates, highly religious students maintain high levels of religious attendance after graduation, in part because of their tendency to self-select into nonelite colleges that may not challenge beliefs (Schwadel 2016). Schleifer and Joyce (2023) find that completing a college education has a stronger effect on reducing personal religiosity for women than for men. In a broad review of research on higher education and religion, Maryl & Ouer write “the old assumption that religion and higher education are necessarily at odds must be discarded” (2009:263). Nonetheless, despite mixed evidence suggesting education is itself a source of religious decline, some religious groups still see education as a threat to faith.

Conservative religious traditions, particularly fundamentalists, Pentecostals, and evangelicals, sometimes consider higher education an environment hostile to their religious faith (Horwitz 2021; Sebbi and Schaefer 2008; Beyerlein 2004; Sherkat and Darnell 1999). Though some in these groups view education with suspicion, educational attainment is still relatively

high among conservative religious groups. Beyerlein (2004:512) found that evangelicals had much higher probabilities of being college graduates compared to other religious groups, second only to Jewish individuals.

In addition to higher education, these patterns also occur in primary schooling. Religious groups may choose to opt out of the traditional education system to maintain ideological and moral purity among their students, or to focus on religious instruction not found in public schooling. One alternative is private schooling, which intentionally focuses on religious instruction and preserving religious identity (Cohen-Zada 2006). Though private schools exist for most religious groups, private schooling in the United States is primarily associated with Catholicism (McDonald 2001). A more affordable option for moral education is homeschooling. The modern homeschooling movement originated in the 1960s, when Supreme Court decisions removed required prayer and Scripture reading in schools, leading to concerns about the moral education of students (Jeynes 2012).

Behind suspicions of education as hostile to faith and a contributor to religious decline lies a deeper trend of anti-intellectualism. Compared to other Christian groups, there is not a strong intellectual tradition among American evangelicals (Noll 2022). Rather than viewing education as threatening to faith, evangelical anti-intellectualism refers to a general hostility toward the educational enterprise itself. Despite their extensive contributions to theological and biblical studies (Noll 2022:7), evangelicals have largely not contributed to intellectual pursuits in other academic fields. Anti-intellectualism is also distinguished by a populist stance against the “intellectual establishment,” not necessarily opposed to learning itself but opposed to elites within educational institutions (Barker, Detamble, and Marietta 2022). The enduring nature of

anti-intellectualism among evangelicals could also contribute to lower support for government spending on education.

Political & Cultural Shifts around 1990

As highlighted in Figure 1, there is stable growth among all Americans in the view that we should be spending more on education from 1973 to 1990. Post-1990, this attitude generally plateaus. Political and cultural changes since 1990 provide a series of mechanisms that may account for these shifting attitudes toward education spending in general, and here I will focus specifically on the role of religion in shaping these processes. The rise of the Christian right marked a significant social movement of political conservatism in America, with enduring impacts on public policy. The election and administration of Ronald Reagan exemplifies a key moment of evangelical political power that achieved reduced government oversight and spending, and subsequent presidential administrations garnered less support from evangelicals. Finally, rhetoric surrounding “Culture War” that emerged in the 1990s shifted political priorities with religious fervor.

The Christian right coalesced in the 1970s as evangelicals (and to a lesser extent, some Catholics) sought to directly influence the political realm. Drawing from a long history of political activism among conservative religious groups, in the late 1970s evangelical activists began to dominate the Republican party (Williams 2010). Garnering popular support from evangelicals, and even some support from conservative mainline Protestants and Catholics, the Christian right became a powerful voting block within the GOP, taking vocal stances against abortion (Evans 2002) and the teaching of evolution (Guhin 2016) while advocating for “traditional” family values (Dowland 2009) and prayer in school (Laats 2012).

The campaigning of the Christian right played an important role in the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 (Lindsay 2007; Miller 2014; Williams 2010). Reagan appointed several evangelicals in his cabinet, including antiabortion activist C. Everett Koop as surgeon general (Miller 2014:65). Concerning education, Reagan promised to restore prayer in public schools (AP 1982) and promised to abolish the Department of Education altogether (Kuehl 2012), though he reneged on the latter due to a lack of congressional support for such a drastic action (Verstegen 1990; LA Times 1985). Reagan implemented the largest tax cut in U.S. history, which included reduced education spending. By the end of his administration in 1988, education's share of the national budget dropped from 12% to 6% (Clabaugh 2004), a reduction of \$453 million between 1981-1988 (Verstegen 1990:366) when adjusted for inflation. At the federal level, education became a lower priority, allowing state and local governments to take greater control over education.

In the years following Reagan's administration, evangelical political rhetoric centered around the concept of "culture war." In 1991, sociologist James Davison Hunter published *Culture War: The Struggle to Define America*, arguing that American public life had become polarized between two groups, the progressives and the orthodox (Hunter 1991). These two factions waged this culture war over key social issues, including abortion, gay rights, and education. Politicians were quick to embrace Hunter's thesis and at the 1992 Republican National Convention, politician Pat Buchanan delivered his "Culture War" speech where he argued "there is a religious war going on...for the soul of America" (Buchanan 1992:714). Though researchers question the extent of the culture war (Baldassarri and Park 2020; Jacoby 2014), the rhetoric surrounding a culture war persists as Americans find themselves increasingly polarized along cultural dimensions (Iyengar et al. 2019; Perry 2022).

The Present Study

In the past half-century, conservative religion and right-wing politics have aligned in ways to preserve cultural power. Despite the general rise of educational attainment among all Americans, conservative religious groups often hold some suspicion towards education – in particular *public* education – as a potential threat to faith. Reagan’s shrinking of federal spending and oversight in American public education has enduring consequences for perceptions of education as an institution, and rhetoric surrounding “Culture War” transforms political debates into a symbolic battleground for the future of America. With these historical changes in mind, several questions remain. One, given that Americans’ support for increased education spending plateaued since 1990 (see Figure 1), what role does religion (specifically religious belonging and practice) play shaping these trends? Two, given the shifting nature of American religion and politics, how have these patterns changed over time? I will explore change over time on Americans’ support for education spending since the 1970s and how these patterns differ by both religious belonging and practice. This will uncover patterns of religious change obscured by the general plateau in American’s attitudes toward education spending, and show the changing ways in which religion matters for politics. Furthermore, these findings add to our understanding of the continuing politicization of support for public education. Finally, by using a piecewise treatment of time, I find important shifts in how support for education spending has changed over time.

METHODS

Data

Data for this study come from the cross-sectional General Social Survey (GSS), a nationally representative survey of the social characteristics and attitudes of the non-

institutionalized adult population in the United States. The GSS collects responses regularly with face-to-face interviews from 1972 through 2018.¹ Since 1973, the GSS collected information on respondents' attitudes towards several areas of government spending, including the public education system. The GSS asks questions on government spending attitudes for all respondents from 1973 through 1987. In 1998, the GSS introduced a split-design ballot, assigning many survey items, including the government spending battery, to two of three ballots, resulting in roughly two-thirds of the total respondents each survey year responding to a particular question.² After accounting for missing data using listwise deletion, my analytical sample includes 49,780 individuals from 1973 to 2018.

Key Dependent Variable

The primary outcome variable is the respondent's attitude towards government spending on education. The GSS asks respondents a series of questions about their views on government spending on several issues, including public health, transportation, and the environment. The GSS provides respondents the prompt: "We face a lot of issues in this nation, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively" followed by a series of statements including "When it comes to *improving the nation's education system*, do you think we're spending 'too much money on it' (coded 1), 'too little money' (coded 2), or 'about the right amount' (coded 3)?" Following previous research on similarly worded measures of confidence (Gauchat 2012), I collapse these responses into a binary indicator variable for those who believe too little money is spent on improving the nation's education system (coded 1) and collapse the remaining categories of "too

¹ In 2021, GSS surveyors administered a web-based survey instead of interviews. Due to the substantial methodological shift in this wave and low response rate, especially among the highly religious (Schnabel, Bock, and Hout 2022), I omit 2021 from my analysis.

² See Appendix Q in the GSS Codebook for more information on this rotating sample design (<https://gss.norc.umd.edu/get-documentation>).

much” or “just right” response into a single reference group (coded 0).³ Overall, 63% of respondents across all survey waves believe that “too little” is being spent on education, but this proportion has changed over time, from 48% in 1973 to 76% by 2018.

In 1984, the GSS implemented a survey experiment that test how the wording of attitudes toward government spending may shape responses. An alternate version for the question for education reads: “We face a lot of issues in this nation, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. When it comes to education, do you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount?” To retain cases, I collapse this variable version in the exact same manner as the original, creating an indicator for those who believe the government is spending too little on education. I combine both versions of this question, creating a single indicator variable for those who believe too little is being spent on education. In both versions of the question, the GSS reminds respondents that none of the issues listed “can be solved easily or inexpensively.” Respondents who then select “too little” are supporting increased education spending, consistent with prior interpretation of these survey responses (Oldendick and Hendren 2018; Rasinski, Timberlake, and Lock 2000).

While the change in question wording can impact respondents’ answers, prior research indicates these differing responses largely disappear among once demographic factors are taken into account (Rasinski 1989).⁴ To control for the possible effects of wording changes on respondents’ answers, I create an indicator variable for those who received the first form of this

³ To test the reliability of this measure, I conducted additional regression analyses treating this outcome as ordinal (Appendix Table A1, p. 44) and multinomial (Appendix Table A2, p. 46). Results do not differ substantially, so I retain the indicator variable for too little spending on education to align my analyses with the literature and to maintain theoretical parsimony.

⁴ Exceptions are for three questions: urban issues (“assistance to big cities” vs. “solving the problems of big cities”), aid to black Americans (“assistance to blacks” vs. “improving conditions of blacks”), and social security (“social security” vs. “protecting social security”). Here, differing responses to these wording changes persist even after controlling for other personal factors.

question (Form X: “improving the nation’s education system), with the alternate form as the reference category (Form Y: “education”).⁵

Key Independent Variables

To explore how patterns for support of increased spending on education vary by religion, I use the variety of measures on religious practice and identity provided by the GSS. To capture embeddedness within religious traditions, I examine respondents’ religious service attendance (McCarthy, Olson, and Garand 2019; Perry and Schleifer 2019; Stroope 2012; Frejka and Westoff 2008). High religious service attendance often impacts behavior and political beliefs more directly than religious affiliation alone (Perry and Schleifer 2019; Hastings 2016; Wright 2014). The GSS asks respondents how often they attend religious services, with a scale ranging from “never” to “several times a week.” I create an indicator for respondents who indicate they attend weekly or several times a week, with those who attend at lower frequencies as the reference category.⁶

For religious tradition, I use a modified form of “RELTRAD”, a common classification scheme for studying religious tradition in the GSS (Steensland et al. 2000; Steensland, Woodberry, and Park 2018; Woodberry et al. 2012). I disaggregate respondents originally classified as Black Protestants into evangelical and mainline Protestants to avoid collinearity issues with race controls (Uecker and Ellison 2012; Wilcox and Wolfinger 2007), and I place Jewish respondents with respondents who identify with other religious traditions because of their small sample size (Schleifer and Chaves 2017). Using evangelical Protestants as the reference

⁵ I also conduct a series of regressions on each education spending question separately. The pattern of results is consistent between the measures, so I retain the combined question for main analyses. See Appendix Table A3 (p. 50).

⁶ I conducted additional analyses using both continuous and categorical measures for attendance (Table A4, p. 52 and Table A5, p. 54 in appendix). Since results are consistent between measures, I use the binary measure of attendance for analysis.

group, I create a series of indicators for mainline Protestants, Catholics, those of other faiths, and the religiously unaffiliated.

The effect of time is crucial to my analysis. Data show a plateau in support increased educational spending beginning in 1990 (see Figure 1). In 1973, 50.45% of Americans supported increased spending on education. For each successive wave of the GSS, the percentage of Americans who support increased education spending grows steadily, reaching 74.90% by 1990. However, the once-rapid increase in support plateaus. By 2018, 77.98% of Americans, reflecting slight increase from 1990. Considering this stall, I will model these data with a piecewise function of time, rather than a linear or quadratic fit.⁷ I disaggregate the variable for GSS year into two separate variables. One variable for the survey years from 1973 to 1990, and a second variable captures the trend for survey years from 1991 to 2018.

For supplementary analyses, I explore additional measures of high religiosity. These include binary measures that indicate high levels of (conservative) religious belief and practice. These include reporting belief in God with no doubts, viewing the Bible as the literal word of God, considering self a very religious person, considering self strongly affiliated with a religious tradition, reporting praying at least once daily, and support for required Bible reading and prayer in schools. While these are not all available for the full time series, these measures can explore other dimensions of religious belief and practice that contribute to understanding how religion might play a role in the stalled support for education spending after 1990.

Control Variables

The GSS also allows me to control for a wide variety of factors that may shape attitudes towards education spending. I include two controls related to political views. First, I include a

⁷Analyses comparing piecewise, linear, and quadratic treatments of time are in appendix (Table A6, p. 57).

control for political party affiliation. The GSS asks respondents “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?” Respondents select a response, ranging from “Strong Democrat,” “Not very strong Democrat,” “Independent, close to Democrat,” “Strong Republican,” “Not very strong Republican,” “Independent, close to Republican,” and “Independent or Other Party.” I create a series of indicators for those who align with Democrats (including strong Democrats, not very strong Democrats, and Independents who are close to Democrats) and those who align with Republicans (including strong Republicans, not very strong Republicans, and Independents who are close to Republicans). For each group, I use those who select “Independent” or “Other Party” as a reference category.⁸ Second, I also control for broader attitudes toward government spending. To isolate support for spending on education from other government spending attitude measures, I construct a variable to include opinions on other areas of government spending. Building on Rasinski et. al (2000), I first dichotomize the ten additional areas of government spending in the same manner of education. These include the space program, the environment, the nation’s health, reducing crime, drug addiction, urban issues, assistance to black Americans, national defense, and foreign aid.⁹ I then find the row means for all ten other measures, retaining the mean if the respondents answered at least seven of the ten questions.¹⁰ This creates a continuous control for views on other government spending that ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating highest support for increased government spending across all domains, and 0 indicating no support for increased government spending in any domain.

⁸ I also tested political ideology (liberal, moderate, and conservative). Results are not substantively different (see Table A7, p. 59 in appendix), but I control for political party in my main analyses to retain cases lost with political ideology.

⁹ There are several other national spending questions asked in the GSS, including spending on social security and parks and recreation. However, these ten (with education as the eleventh) have been asked consistently since the 1973 GSS and are useful for the time span of this analysis.

¹⁰ Over 90% of respondents answered at least 7 of the 10 government spending questions (in addition to education).

I also control for a host of demographic and family factors. I control for education by highest degree attained, creating a series of indicators for “high school,” “some college,” “college degree,” and “graduate degree” with respondents who have less than a high school education as a reference. I also include a control for race by creating indicators for “Black” and “Other Race” individuals, with “White” as the reference group. I control for gender differences by creating an indicator for women respondents, with male respondents as the reference group.¹¹ I control for regional differences by creating a series of indicators based on U.S. Census categories of Midwest, Northeast, and West, with South as the reference group. I create a series of controls for family structure. I control for respondent’s number of children with a series of indicators for 1, 2, 3, and 4 or more children, with no children as the reference category. I also control for marital status by creating an indicator for respondents who are currently married (coded 1), with all those respondents who are currently not married as the reference group (coded 0). Finally, I control for income with equivalized family income, a continuous measure of income that considers total household income and household size.¹² I present descriptive statistics for the analytical sample in Table 1.

[Table 1 About Here]

¹¹ These measures for race and gender are limited and do not reflect the full scope of racial identity and gender expression. Furthermore, the respondent does not self-report these identities; the surveyor ascribes them. Despite these limitations, the GSS asks these measures consistently since the inception of the GSS, and therefore I use them to conduct analyses spanning several decades.

¹² Equivalized family income = $\ln(\text{household income} / \sqrt{\text{total household size}})$. Here, I use total household income in inflation-adjusted dollars (Mann and Schleifer 2020).

Analytical Strategy

Since my outcome measure is dichotomous, I conduct binary logistic regression with a series of interactions disaggregating attitudes toward national spending on education. I include a piecewise specification for time. This model takes the following form:

$$\ln\left(\frac{pr(y = 1)}{1 - pr(y = 1)}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Wkly. Attd.) + \beta_2(Reli. Trad.) + \beta_3(Yrs_1) + \beta_4(Yrs_2) + \beta_5(Int.) + \beta_6(Conts.)$$

where y is the indicator for supporting increased spending on education. Religious Tradition is the indicator for the respondent's faith tradition, captured by β_2 . Weekly Attendance is the indicator variable for those respondents who report attending religious services weekly or more than weekly, captured by β_1 . Years₁ and Years₂ are the splined variables for year in the piecewise specification for time. Years₁ corresponds to survey years 1973-1990, captured by β_3 , and Years₂ corresponds to survey years 1991-2018, captured by β_4 . Interactions refers to a vector of interactions between weekly attendance, religious tradition, and the piecewise specification of time, and is captured by the β_5 coefficient. Following Long and Mustillo (2021) I will interpret interaction effects by comparing predicted probabilities. β_6 is the coefficient that represents a vector of all control variables included in the model. β_0 is the model intercept. To account for missing data, I use listwise deletion to remove observations from analysis that have missing data on the variables in the regression.

RESULTS

Table 2 presents the results of logistic regressions on support for increased spending on education, exploring the changes over time in the associations between religious tradition, attendance, and support for education spending. Model 1 describes the general pattern for all key variables. Across all waves of the GSS, those who attend religious services at least weekly or more have 0.072 lower logged odds of supporting increased educational spending, or 1.28%

lower predicted probability of support than those who attend religious services at lower rates. Reported high religious service attendance predicts a slight decrease in support for increased government spending on education.

Slight differences occur when examining religious tradition and associated support for education spending across all waves of the GSS. Results show that compared to Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants have slightly lower logged odds of supporting an increase in education spending, but this difference is insignificant. Put more concretely, the model predicts that 69.11% of Evangelicals and 68.70% of Mainline Protestants support increased spending on education, net of other variables. The model predicts that Catholics have 0.090 lower logged odds of supporting increased education spending, significantly lower than Evangelicals' predicted probability of support by 1.62%. In contrast, those of other faiths have 0.174 higher logged odds and the religiously unaffiliated have 0.108 higher logged odds of supporting increased education spending compared to Evangelicals. In other words, those of other faiths and the religiously unaffiliated have 3.02% and 1.88%, respectively, greater predicted support for increased spending relative to Evangelicals.

Finally, the two trend variables also show a changing support for education spending over time. For each survey year from 1973 to 1990, the log-odds of supporting such spending increase significantly by 0.049. The predicted probability of supporting increased spending grows from 56.40% to 72.26% between 1973 and 1990. However, after 1990, the log-odds of supporting greater education spending do not increase at all, showing that support for increased education spending has stalled.

[Table 2 About Here]

In Model 2, I interact religious service attendance and time, and in Model 3, I interact religious tradition and time. Interpreting the interaction effects of logistic regression requires careful attention. Due to unobserved heterogeneity within the coefficients themselves, direct comparisons should not be made of interaction terms (Allison 1999). Following Long & Mustillo (2021), I compare predicted probabilities between groups to explore interaction effects.

Since high religious service attendance impacts behavior and political beliefs more directly than religious affiliation alone (Perry and Schleifer 2019; Hastings 2016; Wright 2014), I interact those who attend religious services weekly with time to explore changes in predicted support for education spending over time by frequency of religious service attendance in Model 2. To visualize these results, I plot predicted probabilities for those who attend religious services weekly compared to those who do not in Figure 2. In 1973, the model predicts 52.92% of weekly attenders support greater government spending on education, significantly lower¹³ than those who report religious service attendance at lower frequencies, of which the model predicts 56.37% support increased spending. By 1990, both groups converge. 68.84% of weekly and 69.00% of nonweekly religious services attenders support increased spending on education. However, between 1990 and 2018, weekly attenders decline again. While those who attend religious services infrequently plateau in their support, remaining at 70.35% by 2018, weekly attenders significantly drop over 4% in their predicted support of educational spending, lowering to 65.98% by 2018, significantly lower than those who attend religious services at higher rates. Those who report high religious service attendance are declining in support for government spending on education.

¹³ To determine if predictions are significantly different, I employ a linear difference test using delta-method standard errors that compares the magnitude of difference between predicted probabilities and determines if the difference is statistically significant. All differences reported are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) unless otherwise noted.

[Figure 2 about here]

In Model 3, I interact religious tradition and time to explore changes in support for education spending between religious traditions over time. To highlight the minimal differences between religious traditions on support for education spending, I plot the predicted probabilities for each religious group in Figure 3. First, I compare Mainline Protestants and Evangelicals. In 1973, the model predicts 58.72% of Evangelicals support increased spending on education, compared to only 53.69% of Mainline Protestants, a significant difference of 5.02%. Given historical concerns of Evangelicals about education, this is surprising. However, by 1990, that difference is no longer significant, with 68.96% of Evangelicals and 68.74% of Mainliners supporting an increase in education. After 1990, both groups plateau in their support, and do not significantly change through 2018. Both Evangelicals and Mainline Protestants are consistent in their support for increased spending on education after 1990, hovering at around 69% from 1990 through 2018.

[Figure 3 About Here]

Catholics, however, pose a different story. In 1973, Model 3 predicts that 51.69% of Catholics support increased education spending, compared to 58.72% of Evangelicals, who are 7.02% higher, a significant difference. However, by 1990, both Evangelicals and Catholics converge in their predicted support, with about 68.96% Evangelicals and 67.96% Catholics supporting an increase in education spending. Interestingly, between 1990 and 2018, Evangelicals plateau in their support for education spending while Catholics decline slightly. By 2018, Catholics are 3.43% lower than Evangelicals, a significantly lower amount. While Evangelicals and Catholics converged in 1990 in their support, Catholics have declined slightly

in their support for education spending relative to Evangelicals, perhaps due to the historic prevalence of Catholic private schooling in the United States (Cohen-Zada and Sander 2008).

Those of other faiths and the religiously unaffiliated follow similar patterns. In 1973, those other faiths are slightly higher than Evangelicals in their predicted support of education spending through 1990. By 2018, those of other faiths have declined slightly, only about 2% higher than Evangelicals, but not significantly different than them. The religiously unaffiliated follow similar trends. In 1973, Evangelicals were only about 3% higher than the religiously unaffiliated, but the difference in predicted support is insignificant. By 1990, however, the religiously unaffiliated are 2.38% higher than Evangelicals to support increased education spending. In 2018, the religiously unaffiliated outpace Evangelicals in predicted support, but the difference is again not significant. To emphasize distinctions between each religious group, I graph each religious tradition against Evangelicals (Figure 3). While Evangelicals once outpaced Mainliners in terms of predicted support for education spending, the two groups are now identical in terms of support. Catholics, too, once fell behind Evangelicals in education support. By 1990, Catholics had converged with Evangelicals, but have declined slightly by 2018 relative to Evangelicals. Virtually all religious traditions increase between 1973 and 1990, and remain relatively stable between 1990 and 2018. These findings are striking when compared to the results from Model 2. From 1973 to 1990, religious tradition was the key predictor of differences in education support, while attendance was less important. However, after 1990, religious traditions converged in their support for education spending, and weekly attendance becomes a key indicator for declining support in education spending.

Additional Analyses: Other Religious Measures after 1990

Since predicted support for increased education spending declines for weekly religious service attendees after 1990, I theorize that other measures of religious expression after 1990 might also capture a similar decline in support for education spending. To that end, I analyze reported belief in God with no doubt, belief in the Bible as literal, considering self very religious, considering self strongly affiliated with a religious tradition, praying at least daily, and supporting required prayer in school, indicators for high religiosity. Table 3 presents the predicted probabilities at 1990 and 2018 for high versus low levels of each dimension of religiosity. I first compute the difference in predicted probabilities between the high and low religious groups at 1990 and 2018 to explore the religious gap in support for education spending at the two time points. A negative sign for these differences (termed first-order differences) captures the highly religious having a lower predicted probability than the less religious, while a positive difference captures a greater predicted probability for the less religious than the highly religious. I then subtract these differences from 2018 and 1990 (second-order difference) to explore how the gap in support for education spending has changed over time. Positive second-order differences indicate the religious gap in support for education spending has decreased over time (convergence), and negative second-order differences indicate the religious gap in support for education spending has increased over time (divergence).

[Table 3 About Here]

Since religious traditions converged and plateaued in their support for education spending after 1990, while reported weekly religious service attenders declined in their support for education spending after 1990, exploring other dimensions of religious belief and practice might uncover other ways in which religion shapes attitudes toward education spending. Results show

that at both 1990 and 2018, the only measure of high religious belief that is significantly different from the lower level of religious belief at each time point is for those who view the Bible as the literal word of God compared to those who do not. At 1990, those who view the Bible as literal word of God have 2.7% lower predicted support for education spending compared to other views of the Bible. At 2018, those who view the Bible as literal word of God have 3.8% lower predicted support for education spending. I take the second-order difference, subtracting the gap at 1990 from the gap at 2018. The second-order difference in predicted probabilities for this group is -0.8%, indicating that the predicted support for education spending between Biblical literalists and others has increased slightly (but significantly) over time. Conservative views of the bible are an enduring predictor of conservative political views, at least in terms of educational spending.

The other significant finding is among those who consider themselves strongly affiliated to their religious tradition. In 1990, the differences between strong and not strong affiliation on predicted support for education spending are insignificant. However, by 2018, the difference on predicted support between the strongly affiliated against others is significant, 3.2% lower for the strongly affiliated. The second-order difference indicates that the gap grew significantly by 3.9 percentage points between 1990 and 2018. Considering oneself strongly affiliated with a religious tradition is associated with declining support for education spending since 1990. In addition to declines among those who attend religious services weekly in their predicted support for education spending since 1990, those who report themselves as strongly affiliated with their religious tradition are also significantly lower in their support for education spending by 2018. Reported strength of affiliation is an additional element of religious practice that shapes attitudes

toward education spending. To visualize these differences in predicted support for education spending among various measures of religion, I graph results from Table 3 in Figure 4.

[Figure 4 About Here]

CONCLUSION

Recent research on Americans' attitudes toward public education focuses on controversial legislation surrounding curriculum, increasing teacher compensation, and changing priorities of political parties. However, the processes by which religion also shapes attitudes toward education remain largely unexplored. Recognizing that support for education spending has largely plateaued among all Americans since 1990, I explore how various dimensions of religious affiliation and practice shape attitudes toward education spending and how these have changed over time. Results show that between 1973 and 1990, religious traditions have converged in their predicted support for education spending. After 1990, there is little change in support for education spending among religious traditions. However, by exploring reported religious service attendance, I find that those who report attending religious services weekly or more declined in their support for education spending since 1990.

This study offers several contributions to the study of religion and politics. First, the findings lend additional support for Wuthnow's (1988) thesis of the religious restructuring of America. Denominational differences in political views, though once significant, have diminished. Other research shows that among political views within American religious traditions, within-group heterogeneity has increased (Gay and Ellison 1993) and between-group differences have become less pronounced (Hoffmann and Miller 1997), particularly in relation to politics. My results show the differences between religious traditions are becoming less significant, and I find greater differences on reported religious practice. In other words, religion

is complex (Wilde and Glassman 2016). Religion operates in tandem with other social structures, and to explore both religious and political change, we must understand the shifting ways in which religion matters for politics.

Two, another contribution is in our understanding of the politicization of education. The once strong and increasing support for education in the 1970s now wavers after 1990. Support for spending on education reflects a trust in education, and that has begun to decline. In a time where substantial debate over school curriculum, funding, and choice dominates legislative chambers, this study finds that support for education has stalled among all Americans and is declining among more religious Americans. Advocates for education reform must reckon with this plateau and decline.

Third, this study makes a methodological contribution. By using a piecewise specification for time, rather than treating time as linear, I find a stall in support for education spending that would be otherwise obscured. Between 1973 and 1990, support for education spending increases steadily. However, after 1990, support for education spending plateaus. Had I treated time linearly, the changing slopes of support for spending would be concealed. Studies exploring trends over time should explore the changing ways that historical period might impact political and social attitudes.

There are some limitations to this analysis. One is in our understanding of the reasons for the plateau. Though the process of religious restructuring (Wuthnow 1988) impacts the association between religious groups and politics, it could be that Americans have generally hit a ceiling effect in terms of support of government spending. Nonetheless, by controlling for both political party affiliation and for other views on government spending, I minimized the effect of people who oppose any form of government spending. I examined historical trends in ten other

domains of government spending over time (see Figure 5) and find that while education and healthcare spending reach the highest levels of predicted support, education spending maintains its high support for the longest. Future research should examine the possibility of a ceiling effect for Americans' attitudes towards government spending.

[Figure 5 about here]

Secondly, this measure for increased spending on education does not perfectly capture trust in the system of education itself. The GSS does ask a panel of questions about confidence in the people running institutions like education, but this measure is quite limited, as the responses are “hardly any,” “only some,” and “a great deal” of confidence. Additionally, the question asks specifically about leaders of institutions, not the institution itself. Prior research shows confidence in all institutions is declining, not just education (Twenge, Campbell, and Carter 2014). Despite this, by exploring support for increased spending, we do successfully capture a important dimension in the politics of education. Increased spending on an institution reflects support for investment in that institution, and while most Americans have plateaued in their support, some are declining.

Broadly, I explored how Americans have changed their attitudes toward increasing government spending on education since the 1970s. Broadly, Americans increased in their support for education spending between 1973 and 1990, but this support has stalled since 1990. By exploring how religion shapes these attitudes, I find that the way religion impacts support for education spending has changed over time. Prior to 1990, attitudes toward education spending have converged across religious traditions. After 1990, this convergence plateaus and remains stable through 2018. However, I find a divergence across religious practice after 1990, with those who report high religious service attendance and report strong religious affiliation showing

declining rates of support for educational spending. Religious practice, not tradition, is a key indicator for declining support after 1990. This religious restructuring of the politics of education shows the ways that religion matters for politics have changed. Advocates for education reform should reckon with how religion shapes attitudes towards education.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean or %
Supports Increased Government Spending on Education	69.01%
Weekly or more religious service attendance	27.47%
Religious Tradition	
<i>Evangelical Protestant</i>	30.40%
<i>Mainline Protestant</i>	24.30%
<i>Catholic</i>	25.21%
<i>Other Faiths</i>	7.30%
<i>Religiously Unaffiliated</i>	12.79%
Views on Other Government Spending^a	.41
Question Form	
<i>Form X "Improving the Nation's Education System"</i>	60.94%
<i>Form Y "Education"</i>	39.06%
Political Party	
<i>Independent or other party</i>	15.33%
<i>Republican or Republican-leaning</i>	34.80%
<i>Democrat or Democrat-leaning</i>	49.88%
Degree Earned	
<i>Less than High School</i>	19.09%
<i>High School Diploma</i>	51.71%
<i>Associate or Junior College</i>	5.95%
<i>Bachelor's Degree</i>	15.47%
<i>Graduate Degree</i>	07.78%
Race	
<i>White</i>	80.61%
<i>Black</i>	13.99%
<i>Other</i>	05.40%
Women	54.76%
Age	45.29
Region	
<i>South</i>	35.39%
<i>Northeast</i>	18.69%
<i>Midwest</i>	26.07%
<i>West</i>	19.85%
Lives in a SMSA	31.00%
Currently Married	53.34%
Number of Children	
<i>0</i>	27.40%
<i>1</i>	16.06%
<i>2</i>	25.12%
<i>3</i>	15.58%
<i>4 or more</i>	15.83%
Equivalized Family Income^b	9.95
Observations	49,780

Source: GSS 1973-2018

^aThis value ranges from 0 to 1. It is calculated from the average response to 10 different areas of government spending. Values closer to 0 indicate low support of government spending, and values closer to 1 indicate high support of government spending.

^bEquivalized family income = $\ln(\text{Household income}/\sqrt{\text{Household size}})$

Table 2. Logistic Regressions Predicting Support for Increased Educational Spending, 1973-2018

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Main Effects						
Weekly or more religious service attendance	-.072**	(.02)	-.095	(.07)	-.073**	(.02)
Religious Tradition (reference: Evangelical)						
Mainline	-.023	(.03)	-.020	(.03)	-.233**	(.08)
Catholic	-.090**	(.03)	-.093**	(.03)	-.297***	(.08)
Other Faiths	.174***	(.05)	.172***	(.05)	.171	(.14)
Religiously Unaffiliated	.108**	(.04)	.100*	(.04)	-.180	(.12)
Survey year, up to 1990	.049***	(.00)	.047***	(.00)	.038***	(.00)
Survey year, 1990 or later	.000	(.00)	.003	(.00)	.001	(.00)
1990+ Indicator	.150***	(.04)	.152***	(.04)	.156***	(.04)
Interaction Effects						
Weekly Attendance $\times$ Survey Year Spline						
Every week or more $\times$ up to 1990			.006	(.01)		
Every week or more $\times$ 1990 or later			-.008**	(.00)		
Religious Tradition $\times$ Survey Year Spline						
Mainline $\times$ up to 1990					.016*	(.01)
Mainline $\times$ 1990 or later					-.001	(.00)
Catholic $\times$ up to 1990					.017**	(.01)
Catholic $\times$ 1990 or later					-.005	(.00)
Other Faiths $\times$ up to 1990					.002	(.01)
Other Faiths $\times$ 1990 or later					-.003	(.01)
Religiously Unaffiliated $\times$ up to 1990					.017	(.01)
Religiously Unaffiliated $\times$ 1990 or later					.003	(.00)
Controls						
Views on Other Government Spending	3.840***	(.06)	3.842***	(.06)	3.839***	(.06)
Form X (reference: Form Y)	-.222***	(.02)	-.222***	(.02)	-.222***	(.02)
Political Party (ref: Independent, Other Party)						
Republican or Republican-leaning	-.140***	(.03)	-.139***	(.03)	-.140***	(.03)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	.252***	(.03)	.252***	(.03)	.250***	(.03)

Table 2 *Continued.*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Controls (cont.)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Degree Earned (<i>reference: Less than High School</i>)						
High School Diploma	.259***	(.03)	.259***	(.03)	.264***	(.03)
Associate or Junior College	.390***	(.05)	.390***	(.05)	.393***	(.05)
Bachelor's Degree	.479***	(.04)	.479***	(.04)	.482***	(.04)
Graduate Degree	.463***	(.05)	.464***	(.05)	.464***	(.05)
Race (<i>reference: White</i>)						
Black	.071	(.04)	.072	(.04)	.069	(.04)
Other	-.322***	(.05)	-.323***	(.05)	-.319***	(.05)
Women	.190***	(.02)	.189***	(.02)	.190***	(.02)
Age	-.016***	(.00)	-.016***	(.00)	-.016***	(.00)
Region (<i>reference: South</i>)						
Northeast	-.181***	(.03)	-.182***	(.03)	-.179***	(.03)
Midwest	-.117***	(.03)	-.119***	(.03)	-.115***	(.03)
West	-.006	(.03)	-.007	(.03)	-.006	(.03)
Lives in SMSA	.068**	(.02)	.068**	(.02)	.068**	(.02)
Currently Married	-.052*	(.02)	-.052*	(.02)	-.053*	(.02)
Number of Children (<i>reference: 0</i>)						
1 child	.093**	(.04)	.093**	(.04)	.092**	(.04)
2 children	.196***	(.03)	.196***	(.03)	.196***	(.03)
3 children	.129***	(.04)	.128***	(.04)	.129***	(.04)
4 or more children	.148***	(.04)	.149***	(.04)	.149***	(.04)
Equivalized Family Income	.149***	(.01)	.149***	(.01)	.149***	(.01)
Constant	-2.505***	(.14)	-2.497***	(.14)	-2.362***	(.14)
Observations	49,780		49,780		49,780	
AIC	52983.102		52979.811		52981.394	
BIC	53256.378		53270.718		53325.194	

Source: GSS 1973-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3. Point-Estimates & Difference Table in Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Increased Spending on Education by Various Measures of Religiosity, 1990-2018


	Predicted Probability ¹⁴		First-Order	Second-Order
	<i>Estimate</i>	<i>SE</i>	Differences ¹⁵	Difference ¹⁶
<i>Belief in God</i> (N = 18,862)				
<i>Belief in God, no doubts</i> × 1990	0.727	(0.008)	-0.026	
<i>Other beliefs</i> × 1990	0.753	(0.011)		0.012*
<i>Belief in God, no doubts</i> × 2018	0.740	(0.006)	-0.013	
<i>Other beliefs</i> × 2018	0.753	(0.008)		
<i>Bible as Literal</i> (N = 24,741)				
<i>Bible as literal</i> × 1990	0.724	(0.010)	-0.027*	
<i>Other beliefs</i> × 1990	0.752	(0.006)		-0.008*
<i>Bible as literal</i> × 2018	0.722	(0.009)	-0.035***	
<i>Other beliefs</i> × 2018	0.757	(0.006)		
<i>Considers self very religious</i> (N = 14,582)				
<i>Considers self very religious</i> × 1990	0.721	(0.020)	-0.043	
<i>Does not</i> × 1990	0.764	(0.009)		0.035*
<i>Considers self very religious</i> × 2018	0.736	(0.013)	-0.008	
<i>Does not</i> × 2018	0.744	(0.006)		
<i>Strong affiliation</i> (N = 30,333)				
<i>Strong affiliation</i> × 1990	0.747	(0.007)	0.007	
<i>Not strong affiliation</i> × 1990	0.740	(0.006)		-0.039*
<i>Strong affiliation</i> × 2018	0.725	(0.008)	-0.032**	
<i>Not strong affiliation</i> × 2018	0.758	(0.006)		
<i>Prays daily</i> (N = 21,885)				
<i>Prays at least daily</i> × 1990	0.742	(0.008)	0.003	
<i>Lower prayer frequency</i> × 1990	0.739	(0.009)		-0.018*
<i>Prays at least daily</i> × 2018	0.740	(0.006)	-0.015	
<i>Lower prayer frequency</i> × 2018	0.755	(0.008)		
<i>Supports required prayer & Bible reading in schools</i>				
(N = 18,320)				
<i>Supports school prayer</i> × 1990	0.745	(0.007)	-0.000	
<i>Does not</i> × 1990	0.746	(0.009)		-0.014*
<i>Supports school prayer</i> × 2018	0.744	(0.008)	-0.014	
<i>Does not</i> × 2018	0.758	(0.009)		

Source: GSS 1990-2018

*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

¹⁴The predicted probabilities of various measures of high and low levels of religiosity from beginning (1990) and end (2018) of the time series. Full regressions are available in Appendix, Tables A8a (p. 62) and A8b (p. 64).¹⁵ These indicate first order differences- that is, the predicted probabilities for high religiosity measure minus the predicted probabilities for the low religiosity measure at each time point. A negative sign captured highly religious having a lower predicted probability than the less religious, while a positive difference captures a greater predicted probability for the less religious.¹⁶ These indicate second-order differences: the religious gap from 2018 minus the religious gap from 1990. Positive 2nd order differences indicate the religious gap has *decreased* over time (convergence), and negative 2nd order differences indicate the religious gap has increased over time (divergence).

Figure 1: Plateau of Support for Increased Spending on Education (Total Sample)



Source: GSS 1973-2018
N=49,780

Figure 2: Predicted Support for Increased Spending on Education by Frequency of Religious Service Attendance






Figure 3: Predicted Support for Increased Spending on Education by Religious Tradition (compared to Evangelicals)



GSS 1973-2018
Total N=49,780


Figure 4. Probability Estimates from Table 3

Predicted Probabilities of Support for Increased Education Spending by Various Measures of Religiosity, 1990-2018



GSS 1990-2018

Figure 5. Other Government Spending Measures



TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Table A1. Three Models of Ordered Logistic Regressions Predicting Support for Increased Educational Spending

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Main Effects						
Weekly or more religious service attendance	.081***	(.02)	.056	(.06)	.081***	(.02)
Religious Tradition (<i>reference: Evangelical</i>)						
Mainline	.007	(.03)	.004	(.03)	.237**	(.07)
Catholic	.070*	(.03)	.074*	(.03)	.310***	(.08)
Other Faiths	-.171***	(.05)	-.168***	(.05)	-.118	(.14)
Religiously Unaffiliated	-.095*	(.04)	-.086*	(.04)	.284*	(.12)
Survey year, up to 1990	-.047***	(.00)	-.047***	(.00)	-.034***	(.00)
Survey year, 1990 or later	.001	(.00)	-.001	(.00)	-.000	(.00)
1990+ Indicator	-.132**	(.04)	-.134**	(.04)	-.140***	(.04)
Interaction Effects						
Weekly Attendance × Survey Year Spline						
Every week or more × up to 1990			-.002	(.00)		
Every week or more × 1990 or later			.008**	(.00)		
Religious Tradition × Survey Year Spline						
Mainline × up to 1990					-.019**	(.01)
Mainline × 1990 or later					.004	(.00)
Catholic × up to 1990					-.020***	(.01)
Catholic × 1990 or later					.005	(.00)
Other Faiths × up to 1990					-.006	(.01)
Other Faiths × 1990 or later					.004	(.01)
Religiously Unaffiliated × up to 1990					-.023**	(.01)
Religiously Unaffiliated × 1990 or later					-.003	(.00)
Controls						
Views on Other Government Spending	-3.773***	(.06)	-3.775***	(.06)	-3.774***	(.06)
Form X (<i>reference: Form Y</i>)	.214***	(.02)	.214***	(.02)	.215***	(.02)
Political Party (<i>ref: Independent, Other Party</i>)						
Republican or Republican-leaning	.141***	(.03)	.140***	(.03)	.140***	(.03)

Table A1 *Continued.*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	-.287***	(.03)	-.287***	(.03)	-.286***	(.03)
Degree Earned (<i>reference: Less than High School</i>)						
High School Diploma	-.214***	(.03)	-.213***	(.03)	-.219***	(.03)
Associate or Junior College	-.343***	(.05)	-.343***	(.05)	-.346***	(.05)
Bachelor's Degree	-.405***	(.04)	-.405***	(.04)	-.409***	(.04)
Graduate Degree	-.403***	(.05)	-.404***	(.05)	-.403***	(.05)
Race (<i>reference: White</i>)						
Black	-.102**	(.04)	-.103**	(.04)	-.100**	(.04)
Other	.270***	(.05)	.270***	(.05)	.268***	(.05)
Women	-.218***	(.02)	-.216***	(.02)	-.217***	(.02)
Age	.017***	(.00)	.017***	(.00)	.017***	(.00)
Region (<i>reference: South</i>)						
Northeast	.188***	(.03)	.188***	(.03)	.184***	(.03)
Midwest	.112***	(.03)	.113***	(.03)	.109***	(.03)
West	.034	(.03)	.034	(.03)	.033	(.03)
Lives in SMSA	-.055*	(.02)	-.056*	(.02)	-.056*	(.02)
Currently Married	.069**	(.02)	.069**	(.02)	.071**	(.02)
Number of Children (<i>reference: 0</i>)						
1 child	-.104**	(.03)	-.104**	(.03)	-.104**	(.03)
2 children	-.211***	(.03)	-.211***	(.03)	-.211***	(.03)
3 children	-.142***	(.04)	-.142***	(.04)	-.143***	(.04)
4 or more children	-.158***	(.04)	-.159***	(.04)	-.158***	(.04)
Equivalized Family Income	-.136***	(.01)	-.136***	(.01)	-.136***	(.01)
/						
cut1	-2.262***	(.13)	-2.268***	(.13)	-2.098***	(.14)
cut2	-.052	(.13)	-.058	(.13)	.113	(.14)
Observations	49,780		49,780		49,780	
AIC	67908.326		67903.421		67898.790	
BIC	68190.418		68203.144		68251.404	

Source: GSS 1973-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A2. Three Models of Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting Support for Increased Educational Spending
Base: About Right Spending

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Outcome: “Too little” spending on education						
Main Effects						
Weekly or more religious service attendance	-.047	(.03)	-.111	(.07)	-.050	(.03)
Religious Tradition (<i>reference: Evangelical</i>)						
Mainline	-.041	(.03)	-.040	(.03)	-.194*	(.08)
Catholic	-.111***	(.03)	-.113***	(.03)	-.248**	(.08)
Other Faiths	.178***	(.05)	.176***	(.05)	.179	(.15)
Religiously Unaffiliated	.132**	(.04)	.126**	(.04)	-.084	(.13)
Survey year, up to 1990	.042***	(.00)	.039***	(.00)	.035***	(.01)
Survey year, 1990 or later	.004*	(.00)	.007**	(.00)	.004	(.00)
1990+ Indicator	.172***	(.04)	.175***	(.04)	.177***	(.04)
Interaction Effects						
Weekly Attendance × Survey Year Spline						
Every week or more × up to 1990			.009	(.01)		
Every week or more × 1990 or later			-.008*	(.00)		
Religious Tradition × Survey Year Spline						
Mainline × up to 1990					.009	(.01)
Mainline × 1990 or later					-.004	(.00)
Catholic × up to 1990					.011	(.01)
Catholic × 1990 or later					-.004	(.00)
Other Faiths × up to 1990					.000	(.01)
Other Faiths × 1990 or later					-.000	(.01)
Religiously Unaffiliated × up to 1990					.011	(.01)
Religiously Unaffiliated × 1990 or later					.004	(.01)
Controls						
Views on Other Government Spending	3.546***	(.06)	3.548***	(.06)	3.544***	(.06)
Form X (<i>reference: Form Y</i>)	-.236***	(.03)	-.236***	(.03)	-.236***	(.03)
Political Party (<i>reference: Independent, Other Party</i>)						
Republican or Republican-leaning	-.121***	(.04)	-.120***	(.04)	-.120***	(.04)

Table A2 *Continued.*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	.180***	(.03)	.180***	(.03)	.178***	(.03)
Degree Earned (<i>reference: Less than High School</i>)						
High School Diploma	.262***	(.03)	.262***	(.03)	.265***	(.03)
Associate or Junior College	.403***	(.06)	.403***	(.06)	.406***	(.06)
Bachelor's Degree	.525***	(.04)	.525***	(.04)	.528***	(.04)
Graduate Degree	.491***	(.05)	.492***	(.05)	.492***	(.05)
Race (<i>reference: White</i>)						
Black	.035	(.04)	.035	(.04)	.033	(.04)
Other	-.380***	(.05)	-.380***	(.05)	-.374***	(.05)
Women	.136***	(.02)	.136***	(.02)	.136***	(.02)
Age	-.013***	(.00)	-.013***	(.00)	-.013***	(.00)
Region (<i>reference: South</i>)						
Northeast	-.166***	(.03)	-.167***	(.03)	-.165***	(.03)
Midwest	-.116***	(.03)	-.117***	(.03)	-.114***	(.03)
West	.035	(.03)	.034	(.03)	.035	(.03)
Lives in SMSA	.084**	(.03)	.084**	(.03)	.084**	(.03)
Currently Married	-.029	(.03)	-.029	(.03)	-.030	(.03)
Number of Children (<i>reference: 0</i>)						
1 child	.078*	(.04)	.078*	(.04)	.078*	(.04)
2 children	.158***	(.03)	.158***	(.03)	.158***	(.03)
3 children	.092*	(.04)	.092*	(.04)	.093*	(.04)
4 or more children	.118**	(.04)	.118**	(.04)	.119**	(.04)
Equivalized Family Income	.153***	(.01)	.153***	(.01)	.153***	(.01)
Constant	-2.293***	(.14)	-2.272***	(.14)	-2.189***	(.15)
Base outcome: "About right" spending on education						
Outcome: "Too much" spending on education						
Main Effects						
Weekly or more religious service attendance	.149**	(.05)	-.087	(.11)	.139**	(.05)
Religious Tradition (<i>reference: Evangelical</i>)						
Mainline	-.095	(.06)	-.096	(.06)	.232	(.14)

Table A2 *Continued.*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Catholic	-.115	(.06)	-.110	(.06)	.307*	(.15)
Other Faiths	.028	(.10)	.026	(.10)	.070	(.27)
Religiously Unaffiliated	.149	(.08)	.155	(.08)	.569**	(.22)
Survey year, up to 1990	-.046***	(.01)	-.053***	(.01)	-.021*	(.01)
Survey year, 1990 or later	.021***	(.00)	.023***	(.00)	.012*	(.01)
1990+ Indicator	.207*	(.09)	.208*	(.09)	.188*	(.09)
Interaction Effects						
Weekly Attendance $\times$ Survey Year Spline						
Every week or more $\times$ up to 1990			.021*	(.01)		
Every week or more $\times$ 1990 or later			-.006	(.01)		
Religious Tradition $\times$ Survey Year Spline						
Mainline $\times$ up to 1990					-.036**	(.01)
Mainline $\times$ 1990 or later					.022**	(.01)
Catholic $\times$ up to 1990					-.036**	(.01)
Catholic $\times$ 1990 or later					.010	(.01)
Other Faiths $\times$ up to 1990					-.010	(.02)
Other Faiths $\times$ 1990 or later					.011	(.01)
Religiously Unaffiliated $\times$ up to 1990					-.031	(.02)
Religiously Unaffiliated $\times$ 1990 or later					.006	(.01)
Controls						
Views on Other Government Spending	-1.687***	(.12)	-1.687***	(.12)	-1.694***	(.12)
Form X (reference: Form Y)	-.070	(.05)	-.070	(.05)	-.068	(.05)
Political Party (reference: Independent, Other Party)						
Republican or Republican-leaning	.063	(.06)	.061	(.06)	.063	(.06)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	-.443***	(.06)	-.444***	(.06)	-.446***	(.06)
Degree Earned (reference: Less than High School)						
High School Diploma	-.008	(.06)	-.007	(.06)	-.014	(.06)
Associate or Junior College	.065	(.11)	.065	(.11)	.064	(.11)
Bachelor's Degree	.201**	(.08)	.201**	(.08)	.197*	(.08)
Graduate Degree	.103	(.10)	.102	(.10)	.101	(.10)

Table A2 Continued.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Race (<i>reference: White</i>)						
Black	-.403***	(.10)	-.404***	(.10)	-.395***	(.10)
Other	-.369***	(.11)	-.369***	(.11)	-.359***	(.11)
Women	-.303***	(.04)	-.303***	(.04)	-.301***	(.04)
Age	.020***	(.00)	.020***	(.00)	.020***	(.00)
Region (<i>reference: South</i>)						
Northeast	.088	(.06)	.087	(.06)	.081	(.06)
Midwest	.003	(.05)	.002	(.05)	-.003	(.05)
West	.209***	(.06)	.207***	(.06)	.204***	(.06)
Lives in SMSA	.090	(.05)	.090	(.05)	.086	(.05)
Currently Married	.139**	(.05)	.138**	(.05)	.138**	(.05)
Number of Children (<i>reference: 0</i>)						
1 child	-.091	(.07)	-.091	(.07)	-.088	(.07)
2 children	-.228***	(.06)	-.229***	(.06)	-.227***	(.06)
3 children	-.217**	(.07)	-.220**	(.07)	-.215**	(.07)
4 or more children	-.177*	(.07)	-.180**	(.07)	-.178*	(.07)
Equivalized Family Income	.039	(.03)	.039	(.03)	.037	(.03)
Constant	-1.631***	(.27)	-1.553***	(.27)	-1.868***	(.28)
Observations	49,780		49,780		49,780	
AIC	67262.718		67259.846		67257.380	
BIC	67809.271		67841.660		67944.979	

Source: GSS 1973-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3. Four Models of Logistic Regressions Predicting Support for Increased Educational Spending Comparing Forms X and Y

	Model 1 (Uninteracted)				Model 2 (Attend $\times$ Time)			
	Form X		Form Y		Form X		Form Y	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Main Effects								
Weekly or more religious service attendance	-.047	(.03)	-.119**	(.04)	-.102	(.07)	-.633	(.47)
Religious Tradition (ref: Evangelical)								
Mainline	-.006	(.04)	-.059	(.05)	-.004	(.04)	-.056	(.05)
Catholic	-.101**	(.04)	-.070	(.05)	-.102**	(.04)	-.072	(.05)
Other Faiths	.239***	(.06)	.072	(.08)	.237***	(.06)	.069	(.08)
Religiously Unaffiliated	.120*	(.05)	.083	(.07)	.115*	(.05)	.075	(.07)
Survey Year, up to 1990	.049***	(.00)	.015	(.02)	.046***	(.00)	.003	(.03)
Survey Year, 1990	-.001	(.00)	.002	(.00)	.001	(.00)	.005	(.00)
1990+ Indicator	.159**	(.06)	.246*	(.10)	.162**	(.06)	.250*	(.10)
Interaction Effects								
Attendance $\times$ Survey Year Spline								
Every week or more $\times$ up to 1990					.009	(.01)	.036	(.03)
Every week or more $\times$ 1990 or later					-.008	(.00)	-.010*	(.01)
Controls								
Views on Other Gov't Spending	3.497***	(.08)	4.516***	(.11)	3.498***	(.08)	4.518***	(.11)
Political Party (ref: Ind., Other Party)								
Republican or Republican-leaning	-.167***	(.04)	-.102	(.05)	-.166***	(.04)	-.101	(.05)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	.215***	(.04)	.309***	(.05)	.215***	(.04)	.309***	(.05)
Degree Earned (ref: < H.S.)								
High School Diploma	.217***	(.04)	.368***	(.05)	.217***	(.04)	.367***	(.05)
Associate or Junior College	.446***	(.07)	.335***	(.09)	.447***	(.07)	.336***	(.09)
Bachelor's Degree	.447***	(.05)	.566***	(.07)	.447***	(.05)	.565***	(.07)
Graduate Degree	.436***	(.06)	.549***	(.08)	.437***	(.06)	.549***	(.08)
Race (reference: White)								
Black	.076	(.05)	.053	(.07)	.077	(.05)	.054	(.07)
Other	-.324***	(.07)	-.321***	(.07)	-.325***	(.07)	-.321***	(.07)
Women	.177***	(.03)	.210***	(.04)	.177***	(.03)	.209***	(.04)

Table A3 Continued.

	Model 1 (Uninteracted)				Model 2 (Attend $\times$ Time)			
	Form X		Form Y		Form X		Form Y	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Age	-.014***	(.00)	-.019***	(.00)	-.014***	(.00)	-.019***	(.00)
Region (<i>reference: South</i>)								
Northeast	-.172***	(.04)	-.206***	(.05)	-.173***	(.04)	-.208***	(.05)
Midwest	-.151***	(.03)	-.052	(.05)	-.152***	(.03)	-.054	(.05)
West	-.052	(.04)	.076	(.05)	-.053	(.04)	.075	(.05)
Lives in SMSA	.126***	(.03)	-.042	(.04)	.127***	(.03)	-.042	(.04)
Currently Married	-.058	(.03)	-.039	(.04)	-.057	(.03)	-.039	(.04)
Number of Children (<i>reference: 0</i>)								
1 child	.123**	(.04)	.021	(.06)	.123**	(.04)	.019	(.06)
2 children	.164***	(.04)	.247***	(.06)	.164***	(.04)	.247***	(.06)
3 children	.118**	(.05)	.150*	(.06)	.117**	(.05)	.149*	(.06)
4 or more children	.144**	(.05)	.160*	(.06)	.144**	(.05)	.160*	(.06)
Equivalized Family Income	.138***	(.02)	.165***	(.02)	.138***	(.02)	.165***	(.02)
Constant	-2.508***	(.17)	-2.371***	(.41)	-2.491***	(.17)	-2.197***	(.45)
Observations	30,336		19,444		30,336		19,444	
AIC	34242.527		18676.045		34242.476		18675.967	
BIC	34492.130		18912.304		34508.719		18927.976	

Source: GSS 1973-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A4. Logistic Regressions on Support for Increased Educational Spending Comparing Various Measures of Attendance, Uninteracted Model

	Binary		Continuous		Categorical	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Main Effects						
Religious Service Attendance Measures						
Binary: Every week or more	-.072**	(.02)				
Continuous: 0-8 (0: Never; 8: Several Times a Week)			-.012**	(.00)		
Categorical (Reference: Never)						
Less than once a year					-.011	(.05)
About once or twice a year					.029	(.04)
Several times a year					.044	(.04)
About once a month					.012	(.05)
2-3 times a month					-.036	(.05)
Nearly every week					-.010	(.06)
Every week					-.048	(.04)
Several times a week					-.108*	(.05)
Religious Tradition (reference: Evangelical)						
Mainline	-.023	(.03)	-.020	(.03)	-.026	(.03)
Catholic	-.090**	(.03)	-.091**	(.03)	-.097**	(.03)
Other Faiths	.174***	(.05)	.171***	(.05)	.171***	(.05)
Religiously Unaffiliated	.108**	(.04)	.090*	(.04)	.108*	(.04)
Survey year, up to 1990	.049***	(.00)	.049***	(.00)	.049***	(.00)
Survey year, 1990 or later	.000	(.00)	.000	(.00)	.000	(.00)
1990+ Indicator	.150***	(.04)	.151***	(.04)	.151***	(.04)
Controls						
Views on Other Government Spending						
Form X (reference: Form Y)	-.222***	(.02)	-.222***	(.02)	-.222***	(.02)
Political Party (ref: Independent, Other Party)						
Republican or Republican-leaning	-.140***	(.03)	-.139***	(.03)	-.141***	(.03)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	.252***	(.03)	.253***	(.03)	.251***	(.03)
Degree Earned (reference: Less than High School)						
High School Diploma	.259***	(.03)	.260***	(.03)	.259***	(.03)

Table A4 *Continued.*

	Binary		Continuous		Categorical	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Associate or Junior College	.390***	(.05)	.392***	(.05)	.390***	(.05)
Bachelor's Degree	.479***	(.04)	.481***	(.04)	.479***	(.04)
Graduate Degree	.463***	(.05)	.465***	(.05)	.463***	(.05)
Race (<i>reference: White</i>)						
Black	.071	(.04)	.078*	(.04)	.074	(.04)
Other	-.322***	(.05)	-.320***	(.05)	-.321***	(.05)
Women	.190***	(.02)	.191***	(.02)	.192***	(.02)
Age	-.016***	(.00)	-.016***	(.00)	-.016***	(.00)
Region (<i>reference: South</i>)						
Northeast	-.181***	(.03)	-.183***	(.03)	-.184***	(.03)
Midwest	-.117***	(.03)	-.118***	(.03)	-.119***	(.03)
West	-.006	(.03)	-.009	(.03)	-.007	(.03)
Lives in SMSA	.068**	(.02)	.068**	(.02)	.068**	(.02)
Currently Married	-.052*	(.02)	-.052*	(.02)	-.051*	(.02)
Number of Children (<i>reference: 0</i>)						
1 child	.093**	(.04)	.093**	(.04)	.093**	(.04)
2 children	.196***	(.03)	.198***	(.03)	.197***	(.03)
3 children	.129***	(.04)	.130***	(.04)	.130***	(.04)
4 or more children	.148***	(.04)	.149***	(.04)	.150***	(.04)
Equalized Family Income	.149***	(.01)	.149***	(.01)	.148***	(.01)
Constant	-2.505***	(.14)	-2.479***	(.14)	-2.503***	(.14)
Observations	49,780		49,780		49,780	
AIC	52983.102		52984.332		52991.493	
BIC	53256.378		53257.609		53326.477	

Source: GSS 1973-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A5 *Continued.*

	Binary		Continuous		Categorical	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Less than once a year $\times$ up to 1990					.005	(.01)
Less than once a year $\times$ 1990 or later					-.002	(.01)
About once or twice a year $\times$ up to 1990					.000	(.01)
About once or twice a year $\times$ 1990 or later					-.005	(.01)
Several times a year $\times$ up to 1990					-.002	(.01)
Several times a year $\times$ 1990 or later					-.000	(.01)
About once a month $\times$ up to 1990					.005	(.01)
About once a month $\times$ 1990 or later					-.006	(.01)
2-3 times a month $\times$ up to 1990					.012	(.01)
2-3 times a month $\times$ 1990 or later					-.012*	(.01)
Nearly every week $\times$ up to 1990					-.005	(.01)
Nearly every week $\times$ 1990 or later					-.003	(.01)
Every week $\times$ up to 1990					.013	(.01)
Every week $\times$ 1990 or later					-.013**	(.00)
Several times a week $\times$ up to 1990					-.005	(.01)
Several times a week $\times$ 1990 or later					-.008	(.01)
Controls						
Views on Other Government Spending	3.842***	(.06)	3.840***	(.06)	3.841***	(.06)
Form X (<i>reference: Form Y</i>)	-.222***	(.02)	-.222***	(.02)	-.222***	(.02)
Political Party (<i>reference: Independent, Other Party</i>)						
Republican or Republican-leaning	-.139***	(.03)	-.137***	(.03)	-.139***	(.03)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	.252***	(.03)	.253***	(.03)	.250***	(.03)
Degree Earned (<i>reference: Less than High School</i>)						
High School Diploma	.259***	(.03)	.258***	(.03)	.258***	(.03)
Associate or Junior College	.390***	(.05)	.391***	(.05)	.388***	(.05)
Bachelor's Degree	.479***	(.04)	.480***	(.04)	.479***	(.04)
Graduate Degree	.464***	(.05)	.465***	(.05)	.463***	(.05)
Race (<i>reference: White</i>)						
Black	.072	(.04)	.079*	(.04)	.076	(.04)
Other	-.323***	(.05)	-.319***	(.05)	-.320***	(.05)

Table A5 *continued.*

	Binary		Continuous		Categorical	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Women	.189***	(.02)	.190***	(.02)	.192***	(.02)
Age	-.016***	(.00)	-.016***	(.00)	-.016***	(.00)
Region (<i>reference: South</i>)						
Northeast	-.182***	(.03)	-.184***	(.03)	-.185***	(.03)
Midwest	-.119***	(.03)	-.120***	(.03)	-.121***	(.03)
West	-.007	(.03)	-.008	(.03)	-.008	(.03)
Lives in SMSA	.068**	(.02)	.068**	(.02)	.069**	(.02)
Currently Married	-.052*	(.02)	-.052*	(.02)	-.051*	(.02)
Number of Children (<i>reference: 0</i>)						
1 child	.093**	(.04)	.093**	(.04)	.092**	(.04)
2 children	.196***	(.03)	.199***	(.03)	.197***	(.03)
3 children	.128***	(.04)	.130***	(.04)	.130***	(.04)
4 or more children	.149***	(.04)	.150***	(.04)	.150***	(.04)
Equalized Family Income	.149***	(.01)	.150***	(.01)	.148***	(.01)
Constant	-2.497***	(.14)	-2.477***	(.14)	-2.503***	(.16)
Observations	49,780		49,780		49,780	
AIC	52979.811		52979.093		53005.142	
BIC	53270.718		53270.000		53481.172	

Source: GSS 1973-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A6. Logistic Regressions on Support for Increased Educational Spending Comparing Various Measures of Time, Model 1

	Piecewise		Linear		Quadratic	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Main Effects						
Weekly or more religious service attendance	-.072**	(.02)	-.072**	(.02)	-.071**	(.02)
Religious Tradition (reference: Evangelical)						
Mainline	-.023	(.03)	-.043	(.03)	-.023	(.03)
Catholic	-.090**	(.03)	-.101**	(.03)	-.092**	(.03)
Other Faiths	.174***	(.05)	.174***	(.05)	.176***	(.05)
Religiously Unaffiliated	.108**	(.04)	.077	(.04)	.107**	(.04)
Time Measures						
Piecewise						
Survey Year, up to 1990	.049***	(.00)				
Survey Year, 1990	.000	(.00)				
Linear Year						
			.010***	(.00)	3.956***	(.30)
Quadratic Year $\times$ Year						
					-.001***	(.00)
1990+ Indicator						
	.150***	(.04)	.336***	(.04)	.088*	(.04)
Controls						
Views on Other Government Spending						
Form X (reference: Form Y)	3.840***	(.06)	3.842***	(.06)	3.855***	(.06)
Political Party (ref: Ind., Other Party)						
Republican or Republican-leaning	-.222***	(.02)	-.308***	(.02)	-.230***	(.02)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	-.140***	(.03)	-.118***	(.03)	-.134***	(.03)
	.252***	(.03)	.257***	(.03)	.256***	(.03)
Degree Earned (ref: Less than High School)						
High School Diploma	.259***	(.03)	.271***	(.03)	.260***	(.03)
Associate or Junior College	.390***	(.05)	.411***	(.05)	.386***	(.05)
Bachelor's Degree	.479***	(.04)	.490***	(.04)	.479***	(.04)
Graduate Degree	.463***	(.05)	.468***	(.05)	.462***	(.05)
Race (reference: White)						
Black	.071	(.04)	.079*	(.04)	.070	(.04)
Other	-.322***	(.05)	-.324***	(.05)	-.325***	(.05)
Women						
	.190***	(.02)	.193***	(.02)	.190***	(.02)

Table A6 Continued.

	Piecewise		Linear		Quadratic	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Age	-.016***	(.00)	-.016***	(.00)	-.016***	(.00)
Region (reference: South)						
Northeast	-.181***	(.03)	-.181***	(.03)	-.180***	(.03)
Midwest	-.117***	(.03)	-.115***	(.03)	-.117***	(.03)
West	-.006	(.03)	-.001	(.03)	-.006	(.03)
Lives in SMSA	.068**	(.02)	.057*	(.02)	.066**	(.02)
Currently Married	-.052*	(.02)	-.069**	(.02)	-.052*	(.02)
Number of Children (reference: 0)						
1 child	.093**	(.04)	.091**	(.04)	.091**	(.04)
2 children	.196***	(.03)	.194***	(.03)	.195***	(.03)
3 children	.129***	(.04)	.124***	(.04)	.127***	(.04)
4 or more children	.148***	(.04)	.141***	(.04)	.147***	(.04)
Equivalized Family Income	.149***	(.01)	.150***	(.01)	.148***	(.01)
Constant	-2.505***	(.14)	-22.269***	(3.05)	-	(299.13)
					3966.334***	
Observations	49,780		49,780		49,780	
AIC	52983.102		53148.319		52976.575	
BIC	53256.378		53412.780		53249.852	

Source: GSS 1973-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A7. Logistic Regressions Predicting Support for Increased Educational Spending Comparing PartyID and PolViews

	Party ID		Political Views	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Main Effects				
Weekly or more religious service attendance	-.072**	(.02)	-.049	(.03)
Religious Tradition (<i>reference: Evangelical</i>)				
Mainline	-.023	(.03)	-.040	(.03)
Catholic	-.090**	(.03)	-.074*	(.03)
Other Faiths	.174***	(.05)	.163**	(.05)
Religiously Unaffiliated	.108**	(.04)	.104*	(.04)
Survey year, up to 1990	.049***	(.00)	.047***	(.00)
Survey year, 1990 or later	.000	(.00)	.000	(.00)
1990+ Indicator	.150***	(.04)	.143**	(.04)
Controls				
Views on Other Government Spending	3.840***	(.06)	3.864***	(.07)
Form X (<i>reference: Form Y</i>)	-.222***	(.02)	-.226***	(.03)
Political Belief Measures				
Party ID (<i>ref: Independent, Other Party</i>)				
Republican or Republican-leaning	-.140***	(.03)		
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	.252***	(.03)		
Political Views (<i>ref: Moderate</i>)				
Conservative			-.240***	(.03)
Liberal			.130***	(.03)
Degree Earned (<i>reference: Less than High School</i>)				
High School Diploma	.259***	(.03)	.274***	(.03)
Associate or Junior College	.390***	(.05)	.386***	(.06)
Bachelor's Degree	.479***	(.04)	.475***	(.04)
Graduate Degree	.463***	(.05)	.473***	(.05)
Race (<i>reference: White</i>)				
Black	.071	(.04)	.150***	(.04)
Other	-.322***	(.05)	-.292***	(.05)
Women	.190***	(.02)	.202***	(.02)

Table A7 Continued.

	Party ID		Political Views	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Age	-.016***	(.00)	-.015***	(.00)
Region (<i>reference: South</i>)				
Northeast	-.181***	(.03)	-.207***	(.03)
Midwest	-.117***	(.03)	-.127***	(.03)
West	-.006	(.03)	-.010	(.03)
Lives in SMSA	.068**	(.02)	.062*	(.03)
Currently Married	-.052*	(.02)	-.051	(.03)
Number of Children (<i>reference: 0</i>)				
1 child	.093**	(.04)	.087*	(.04)
2 children	.196***	(.03)	.192***	(.03)
3 children	.129***	(.04)	.115**	(.04)
4 or more children	.148***	(.04)	.120**	(.04)
Equivalized Family Income	.149***	(.01)	.147***	(.01)
Constant	-2.505***	(.14)	-2.407***	(.15)
Observations	49,780		44,276	
AIC	52983.102		47038.586	
BIC	53256.378		47308.231	

Source: GSS 1973-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8a. Logistic Regressions Predicting Support for Increased Spending on Education by Other Religiosity Measures (Belief in God, Bible Views, and Considering Self Very Religious), 1990-2018

	Believes in God with No Doubt		Bible as Literal Word of God		Considers Self Very Religious	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Main Effects: Religiosity Indicators						
No doubt in belief in God	-5.452	(8.81)				
Bible as literal word of God			3.284	(7.91)		
Consider self very religious					-22.435	(19.70)
Year	.000	(.00)	.001	(.00)	-.006	(.00)
Interaction Effects: Religiosity Indicator × Year						
No doubt in belief in God × Year	.003	(.00)				
Bible as literal word of God × Year			-.002	(.00)		
Consider self very religious × Year					.011	(.01)
Controls						
Religious Tradition (reference: Evangelical)						
Mainline	.004	(.05)	-.018	(.05)	-.008	(.06)
Catholic	-.137**	(.05)	-.135**	(.05)	-.172**	(.06)
Other Faiths	.121	(.08)	.086	(.07)	.064	(.09)
Religiously Unaff.	.085	(.07)	.053	(.06)	.079	(.07)
Views on Other Government Spending	4.139***	(.10)	4.131***	(.09)	4.170***	(.12)
Form X (reference: Form Y)	-.206***	(.04)	-.253***	(.03)	-.230***	(.04)
Political Party (reference: Ind., Other Party)						
Republican or Republican-leaning	-.231***	(.05)	-.188***	(.05)	-.316***	(.06)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	.306***	(.05)	.309***	(.05)	.245***	(.06)
Degree Earned (reference: Less than High School)						
High School	.457***	(.06)	.385***	(.05)	.523***	(.06)
Associate/Junior Co	.418***	(.09)	.350***	(.07)	.419***	(.10)
Bachelor's Degree	.639***	(.07)	.589***	(.06)	.719***	(.08)
Graduate Degree	.515***	(.08)	.482***	(.07)	.570***	(.09)
Race (ref: White)						
Black	-.061	(.07)	.004	(.06)	-.095	(.07)
Other	-.388***	(.07)	-.344***	(.06)	-.401***	(.07)
Women	.207***	(.04)	.199***	(.03)	.175***	(.04)

Table A8a *continued*.

	Believes in God with No Doubt		Bible as Literal Word of God		Considers Self Very Religious	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Age	-.019***	(.00)	-.018***	(.00)	-.019***	(.00)
Region (<i>reference: South</i>)						
Northeast	-.205***	(.06)	-.202***	(.05)	-.176**	(.06)
Midwest	-.077	(.05)	-.082	(.04)	-.035	(.06)
West	.097	(.05)	.066	(.05)	.152*	(.06)
Lives in SMSA	.030	(.04)	.057	(.04)	.031	(.05)
Currently Married	-.069	(.04)	-.058	(.04)	-.094*	(.05)
Number of Children (<i>reference: 0</i>)						
1 child	.103	(.06)	.059	(.05)	.096	(.07)
2 children	.275***	(.06)	.231***	(.05)	.290***	(.06)
3 children	.188**	(.06)	.157**	(.05)	.212**	(.07)
4 or more children	.144*	(.07)	.071	(.06)	.098	(.08)
Equivalized Family Income	.186***	(.02)	.164***	(.02)	.186***	(.02)
Constant	-2.303	(7.11)	-4.102	(4.75)	11.007	(8.70)
Observations	18,862		24,741		14,582	
AIC	18490.538		24264.895		14079.306	
BIC	18725.886		24508.382		14306.932	

Source: GSS 1990-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8b. Logistic Regressions Predicting Support for Increased Spending on Education by Other Religiosity Measures (Reported Strong Affiliation, Reported Prayer, and Support for Prayer in Schools), 1990-2018

	Reports Strong Affiliation		Reports Praying at least Daily		Supports Required Prayer in School	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Main Effects: Religiosity Indicators						
Strong affiliation	17.314*	(7.05)				
Prays at least once a day			8.017	(8.37)		
Supports prayer in schools					6.087	(8.68)
Year	.004	(.00)	.004	(.00)	.003	(.00)
Interaction Effects: Religiosity Indicator × Year						
Strong affiliation × Year	-.009*	(.00)				
Prays at least once a day × Year			-.004	(.00)		
Supports prayer in schools × Year					-.003	(.00)
Controls						
Religious Tradition (reference: Evangelical)						
Mainline	.058	(.04)	.019	(.05)	.026	(.05)
Catholic	-.083*	(.04)	-.072	(.05)	-.059	(.05)
Other Faiths	.180**	(.06)	.138	(.08)	.122	(.08)
Religiously Unaff.	.105*	(.05)	.106	(.06)	.130*	(.07)
Views on Other Government Spending	4.060***	(.08)	4.134***	(.10)	4.089***	(.11)
Form X (reference: Form Y)	-.231***	(.03)	-.233***	(.03)	-.284***	(.04)
Political Party (reference: Ind., Other Party)						
Republican or Republican-leaning	-.156***	(.04)	-.193***	(.05)	-.136*	(.06)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	.314***	(.04)	.313***	(.05)	.320***	(.05)
Degree Earned (reference: Less than High School)						
High School	.365***	(.04)	.444***	(.05)	.361***	(.06)
Associate/Junior Co	.358***	(.07)	.408***	(.08)	.324***	(.09)
Bachelor's Degree	.553***	(.06)	.653***	(.07)	.550***	(.07)
Graduate Degree	.502***	(.07)	.549***	(.08)	.415***	(.09)
Race (ref: White)						
Black	-.013	(.05)	-.022	(.06)	-.005	(.07)
Other	-.365***	(.06)	-.380***	(.06)	-.342***	(.07)
Women	.195***	(.03)	.190***	(.04)	.172***	(.04)

Table A8b *continued*.

	Reports Strong Affiliation		Reports Praying at least Daily		Supports Required Prayer in School	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Age	-.018***	(.00)	-.019***	(.00)	-.018***	(.00)
Region (<i>reference: South</i>)						
Northeast	-.192***	(.04)	-.199***	(.05)	-.169**	(.06)
Midwest	-.095*	(.04)	-.057	(.04)	-.094	(.05)
West	.072	(.04)	.092	(.05)	.049	(.05)
Lives in SMSA	.042	(.03)	.059	(.04)	.076	(.04)
Currently Married	-.051	(.03)	-.076*	(.04)	-.061	(.04)
Number of Children (<i>reference: 0</i>)						
1 child	.106*	(.05)	.052	(.06)	.065	(.06)
2 children	.228***	(.04)	.231***	(.05)	.201***	(.06)
3 children	.153**	(.05)	.149*	(.06)	.161*	(.06)
4 or more children	.135**	(.05)	.078	(.06)	.090	(.07)
Equivalized Family Income	.174***	(.02)	.181***	(.02)	.194***	(.02)
Constant	-9.848*	(4.46)	-8.967	(6.46)	-7.648	(6.83)
Observations	30,333		21,885		18,320	
AIC	29966.425		21450.524		17992.886	
BIC	30216.024		21690.330		18227.358	

Source: GSS 1990-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A9. Logistic Regressions Predicting Support for Increased Educational Spending, Race $\times$ Attendance

	Race $\times$ Attend		Race $\times$ Attend $\times$ Time	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Main Effects				
Weekly or more religious service attendance	-.087**	(.03)	-.107	(.07)
Race (reference: White)				
Black	.038	(.04)	.527***	(.12)
Other Race	-.335***	(.06)	-.161	(.42)
Survey Year Spline				
Survey year, up to 1990	.049***	(.00)	.050***	(.00)
Survey year, 1990 or later	.000	(.00)	.003	(.00)
1990+ Indicator	.149***	(.04)	.151***	(.04)
Interaction Effects				
Attendance $\times$ Race				
Every week or more $\times$ Black	.111	(.08)	.156	(.23)
Every week or more $\times$ Other Race	.046	(.11)	.178	(.71)
Attendance $\times$ Year				
Every week or more $\times$ up to 1990			.006	(.01)
Every week or more $\times$ 1990 or later			-.009**	(.00)
Race $\times$ Year				
Black $\times$ up to 1990			-.035***	(.01)
Black $\times$ 1990 or later			.001	(.01)
Other Race $\times$ up to 1990			-.009	(.03)
Other Race $\times$ 1990 or later			-.002	(.01)
Attendance $\times$ Race $\times$ Year				
Every week or more $\times$ Black $\times$ up to 1990			-.006	(.02)
Every week or more $\times$ Black $\times$ 1990 or later			.007	(.01)
Every week or more $\times$ Other Race $\times$ up to 1990			-.004	(.04)
Every week or more $\times$ Other Race $\times$ 1990 or later			-.002	(.01)
Controls				
Religious Tradition (reference: Evangelical)				
Mainline	-.024	(.03)	-.016	(.03)
Catholic	-.090**	(.03)	-.090**	(.03)
Other Faiths	.173***	(.05)	.175***	(.05)
Religiously Unaffiliated	.107**	(.04)	.101*	(.04)
Views on Other Government Spending	3.840***	(.06)	3.837***	(.06)

Table A9 Continued.

	Race x Attend		Race x Attend x Time	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Form X (reference: Form Y)	-.222***	(.02)	-.222***	(.02)
Political Party (reference: Independent, Other Party)				
Republican or Republican-leaning	-.139***	(.03)	-.141***	(.03)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	.252***	(.03)	.253***	(.03)
Degree Earned (reference: Less than High School)				
High School Diploma	.260***	(.03)	.265***	(.03)
Associate or Junior College	.390***	(.05)	.394***	(.05)
Bachelor's Degree	.479***	(.04)	.481***	(.04)
Graduate Degree	.464***	(.05)	.467***	(.05)
Women	.190***	(.02)	.190***	(.02)
Age	-.016***	(.00)	-.016***	(.00)
Region (reference: South)				
Northeast	-.181***	(.03)	-.183***	(.03)
Midwest	-.117***	(.03)	-.120***	(.03)
West	-.006	(.03)	-.010	(.03)
Lives in SMSA	.068**	(.02)	.065**	(.02)
Currently Married	-.053*	(.02)	-.055*	(.02)
Number of Children (reference: 0)				
1 child	.093**	(.04)	.095**	(.04)
2 children	.196***	(.03)	.199***	(.03)
3 children	.129***	(.04)	.135***	(.04)
4 or more children	.149***	(.04)	.152***	(.04)
Equivalized Family Income	.149***	(.01)	.148***	(.01)
Constant	-2.497***	(.14)	-2.533***	(.14)
Observations	49,780		49,780	
AIC	52984.805		52967.271	
BIC	53275.712		53346.332	

Source: GSS 1973-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$


Figure A1. Predicted Support for Increased Education Spending, Race $\times$ Attendance $\times$ Time

Table A10. Logistic Regressions Predicting Support for Increased Educational Spending, Religious Tradition $\times$ Race

	Religious Tradition $\times$ Race		Religious Tradition $\times$ Race $\times$ Time	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Main Effects				
Religious Tradition (<i>reference: Evangelical</i>)				
Mainline Protestants	-.026	(.03)	-.162	(.09)
Catholics	-.065	(.03)	-.237**	(.09)
Other Faiths	.181***	(.05)	.198	(.15)
Religiously Unaffiliated	.116**	(.04)	-.058	(.13)
Race (<i>reference: White</i>)				
Black	.091	(.05)	.488***	(.14)
Other	-.266*	(.12)	.568	(.84)
Survey Year Spline				
Survey year, up to 1990	.049***	(.00)	.043***	(.01)
Survey year, 1990 or later	.000	(.00)	.002	(.00)
1990+ Indicator	.151***	(.04)	.159***	(.04)
Interaction Effects				
Religious Tradition $\times$ Race				
<i>Mainline $\times$ Black</i>	.045	(.10)	.011	(.28)
<i>Mainline $\times$ Other Race</i>	.310	(.20)	-.199	(1.22)
<i>Catholic $\times$ Black</i>	-.034	(.13)	.515	(.40)
<i>Catholic $\times$ Other Race</i>	-.225	(.14)	-.810	(.99)
<i>Other Faiths $\times$ Black</i>	-.062	(.17)	.632	(.62)
<i>Other Faiths $\times$ Other Race</i>	-.012	(.18)	-.735	(1.23)
<i>Religiously Unaffiliated $\times$ Black</i>	-.189	(.12)	-.607	(.45)
<i>Religiously Unaffiliated $\times$ Other Race</i>	.118	(.17)	-2.021	(1.28)
Religious Tradition $\times$ Year				
<i>Mainline $\times$ up to 1990</i>			.011	(.01)
<i>Mainline $\times$ 1990 or later</i>			-.002	(.00)
<i>Catholic $\times$ up to 1990</i>			.015*	(.01)
<i>Catholic $\times$ 1990 or later</i>			-.005	(.00)
<i>Other Faiths $\times$ up to 1990</i>			.003	(.01)

Table A10 continued.

	Religious Tradition × Race		Religious Tradition × Race × Time	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
<i>Other Faiths × 1990 or later</i>			-.008	(.01)
<i>Religiously Unaffiliated × up to 1990</i>			.009	(.01)
<i>Religiously Unaffiliated × 1990 or later</i>			.003	(.01)
Race × Year				
<i>Black × up to 1990</i>			-.031**	(.01)
<i>Black × 1990 or later</i>			.005	(.01)
<i>Other Race × up to 1990</i>			-.024	(.05)
<i>Other Race × 1990 or later</i>			-.038**	(.01)
Religious Tradition × Race × Year				
<i>Mainline × Black × up to 1990</i>			.009	(.02)
<i>Mainline × Black × 1990 or later</i>			-.011	(.01)
<i>Mainline × Other Race × up to 1990</i>			.016	(.08)
<i>Mainline × Other Race × 1990 or later</i>			.024	(.02)
<i>Catholic × Black × up to 1990</i>			-.044	(.03)
<i>Catholic × Black × 1990 or later</i>			.010	(.02)
<i>Catholic × Other Race × up to 1990</i>			.004	(.06)
<i>Catholic × Other Race × 1990 or later</i>			.044**	(.02)
<i>Other Faiths × Black × up to 1990</i>			-.053	(.04)
<i>Other Faiths × Black × 1990 or later</i>			.018	(.02)
<i>Other Faiths × Other Race × up to 1990</i>			.008	(.08)
<i>Other Faiths × Other Race × 1990 or later</i>			.008	(.08)
<i>Religiously Unaffiliated × Black × up to 1990</i>			.046	(.03)
<i>Religiously Unaffiliated × Black × 1990 or later</i>			-.022	(.02)
<i>Religiously Unaffiliated × Other Race × up to 1990</i>			.092	(.08)
<i>Religiously Unaffiliated × Other Race × 1990 or later</i>			.043*	(.02)
Controls				
Weekly or more religious service attendance	-.075**	(.02)	-.072**	(.02)
Views on Other Government Spending	3.839***	(.06)	3.840***	(.06)
Form X (reference: Form Y)	-.223***	(.02)	-.223***	(.02)

Table A10 *continued*.

	Religious Tradition × Race		Religious Tradition × Race × Time	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Political Party (<i>reference: Independent, Other Party</i>)				
Republican or Republican-leaning	-.140***	(.03)	-.143***	(.03)
Democrat or Democrat-leaning	.249***	(.03)	.249***	(.03)
Degree Earned (<i>reference: Less than High School</i>)				
High School Diploma	.258***	(.03)	.265***	(.03)
Associate or Junior College	.385***	(.05)	.390***	(.05)
Bachelor's Degree	.475***	(.04)	.480***	(.04)
Graduate Degree	.455***	(.05)	.459***	(.05)
Women	.190***	(.02)	.190***	(.02)
Age	-.016***	(.00)	-.016***	(.00)
Region (<i>reference: South</i>)				
Northeast	-.187***	(.03)	-.183***	(.03)
Midwest	-.119***	(.03)	-.117***	(.03)
West	-.007	(.03)	-.006	(.03)
Lives in SMSA	.069**	(.02)	.069**	(.02)
Currently Married	-.052*	(.02)	-.056*	(.02)
Number of Children (<i>reference: 0</i>)				
1 child	.093**	(.04)	.097**	(.04)
2 children	.198***	(.03)	.201***	(.03)
3 children	.130***	(.04)	.136***	(.04)
4 or more children	.149***	(.04)	.153***	(.04)
Equivalized Family Income	.148***	(.01)	.148***	(.01)
Constant	-2.495***	(.14)	-2.438***	(.15)
Observations	49,780		49,780	
AIC	52982.413		52976.972	
BIC	53326.213		53567.602	

Source: GSS 1973-2018

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure A2: Predicted Support for Increased Education Spending, Religious Tradition $\times$ Race $\times$ Time