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RESOLVING ONTOLOGIES OF ANTISEMITISM, ORIENTALISM, AND THE QUESTION OF ZIONIST COLONIALISM

A THESIS APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

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Table of Contents

Abstract v
Introduction 1
PART I: The Twin Births of Antisemitism and Orientalism 19
The Advent of Modern Antisemitism 19
A Working Redefinition of Antisemitism 24
The Advent of Modern Orientalism 26
Reformulating Edward Said: A Working Redefinition of Orientalism 30
The Early Jesuits as a Precedent for Jewish Anticolonialism 33
The Early Jesuit Order as a Converso Refuge 34
The Early Jesuit Order and the Pureza de Sangre Discourse 36
Early Converso Jesuit Anticolonialism 38
PART II: A Colonial History of German Jewry 50
The Colonization of German Jewry 51
German Jewish Communities as Colonies 51
German Jewish Anticolonialism 54
Moses Mendelssohn and the Capitulation of the Haskalah 54
Saul Ascher and the Capitulation of the Wissenschaft Des Judentums 64
German Jewry and the Matter of Orientalism 70
Postcolonial Studies Scholarship on German Jews 71
Muslim Spain as Role Model and Anticolonial Critique 75
German Jews and Ostjuden: A Question of Orientalism 77
German Jewish Emancipation and the Ostjuden Refugee Crisis 82
Zionism as an Anticolonial Nationalist Turn 88
The Dreyfus Affair: Herzl's Loss of Faith in Emancipation 89
Herzl Rejects Capitulation: Jewishness as Anticolonialism 91
Conclusion: Islam, Capitulation, and Continuity 95
Herzl and Islam 95
Zionist Capitulation and the End of Ottoman Power 100
References 104

Abstract

This study addresses the persistent charge of orientalism leveled against Zionism and explores the relationship between orientalism and antisemitism, which Edward W. Said describes in his 1978 book *Orientalism* as that of an ironic "secret sharer." This study traces that sharing back into the early modern period and posits that antisemitism and orientalism both came into being within the context of the *Reconquista* and emergent Western Colonialism and Imperialism. This is followed by an examination of German Jewish history as a colonial history, and identifies the Zionism which arose out of that history as distinctively non-orientalist in nature.

Introduction

Edward Said's 1978 book *Orientalism* posits a thesis on the underlying culture informing Western Colonialism and Imperialism. At its core, Said argues, orientalism is a paradigm of representing the people of "the Orient" as fundamentally backward and needing the guidance of the West—and that this essential element animates and justifies Western Colonialism and Imperialism.[1] While ostensibly applying to the full scope of Western Colonialism and Imperialism more broadly, Said's *Orientalism* primarily focuses on arguing against essentialist Western representations of Islam and Arabs.

Said, a Palestinian-American who lived in the United States, formulated his identification of orientalism as a phenomenon to be a means of supporting the Palestinian side of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.[2] Specifically, it was an attempt to replicate the same sort of support within the West for the Palestinian national cause which Israel and Zionism then enjoyed.[3] To this end, Zionism and the State of Israel are framed as iterations of orientalism and Western Colonialism, a framing which Said continued to elaborate on through the course of his life.[4]

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[1] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 25th Anniversary Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1994 [1978]), 2-3.
[2] Ibid., 26-27.
[3] Ibid.
[4] See, for example Edward W. Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims," *Social Text* 1 (1979): 7-58.

This is reflected in the substantial impact Edward Said's *Orientalism* has made since its first publication. In academic terms, his book was a seminal work of the academic discipline that has come to be known as Postcolonial Studies. Against critics, Edward Said complained that they responded to *Orientalism* as though it were an "opportunity for them to defend Zionism, support Israel, and launch attacks on Palestinian nationalism."[5] While this is certainly true, Said should hardly have been surprised by this; *Orientalism* is at least as much an anti-Zionist work as it is a theory on Western Colonialism and Imperialism. This is well reflected within the Postcolonial Studies field, which integrated Said's characterization of Israel and Zionism as iterations of Western Colonialism and Imperialism into its core worldview.

Said's complaint is also bizarre when viewed in the context of one of his own observations within *Orientalism*:

> I have found myself writing the history of a strange, secret sharer of Western antisemitism. That antisemitism and, as I have discussed it in its Islamic branch, Orientalism resemble each other very closely is a historical, cultural, and political truth that needs only to be mentioned to an Arab Palestinian for its irony to be perfectly understood.[6]

[5] Edward W. Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," in *Literature, Politics, and Theory: Papers from the Essex Conference, 1976-84*, Francis Baker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iverson, and Diana Loxley (eds.) (New York: Methuen, 1986), 221.
[6] Said, *Orientalism*, 27-28.

Said does not linger on this comparison, as it is made primarily for dramatic effect. Yet, his complaint against Zionist critiques of *Orientalism* indicates that Said may not have perfectly understood the irony himself.

Given that Jews in Israel, and worldwide, see Zionism and the State of Israel as a grand repudiation of antisemitism—especially that which motivated Nazi Germany to perpetrate the Holocaust—it is already obvious why Said's attempt to undermine the legitimacy of Israel by inverting its narrative would cause apoplectic reactions. This is clearly illustrated in the fact that critiques of *Orientalism* and Postcolonial Studies have operated with the general goal of reversing that inversion.

To take some recent examples, Irfan Khawaja critiques *Orientalism*'s thesis as incoherent because it remains committed to essentialism *about* orientalism while simultaneously arguing against the essentialism *of* orientalism—that it is senseless to argue that orientalism is an essential element of the West while also arguing against the possibility of making essentialist claims about Islam.[7] Efraim Karsh contends Islamic Imperialism through the Ottoman period had a much greater impact on the Middle East than the short history of Western Imperialism in the region.[8] David Cook and Andrew G.

[7] Irfan Khawaja, "Essentialism, Consistency, and Islam: A Critique of Edward Said's *Orientalism*," in *Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-Israel Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 17, 30n4.
[8] Efraim Karsh, "The Missing Piece: Islamic Imperialism," in *Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-Israel Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

Bostom contend that Islamic Imperialism was equivalent to Western Colonialism and Imperialism, thus the Palestinian presence in the area is no less colonial than Israel's.[9] Gideon Shimoni argues that the orientalist paradigm does not accurately describe or explain the Arab-Israeli Conflict as it actually exists, and that Zionism itself actually fits within that paradigm as a colonized victim.[10] As noted, what typifies this kind of opposition to the Said/Postcolonial Studies view is reversing its inversion of the Zionist narrative.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict has, no less surprisingly, drawn the attention of antisemitism scholarship. Scholars in this field have had particular trouble parsing the line between antisemitism and anti-Zionism. Such scholarship proliferated first in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, and then with heightened frequency after the Second Intifada and 9/11, approaching what has been variously identified as anti-Zionism, global antisemitism, or, most often, "new antisemitism."[11] This literature exhibits an undercurrent of confusion in its

[9] David Cook, "The Muslim Man's Burden: Muslim Intellectuals Confront their Imperialist Past," in *Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-Israel Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Andrew G. Bostom, "Negating the Legacy of Jihad in Palestine," in *Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-Israel Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2008).
[10] Gideon Shimoni, "Postcolonial Theory and the History of Zionism," in *Postcolonial Theory and the Arab-Israel Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2008).
[11] Jonathan Judaken, "Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism: The Frankfurt School's Anti-Antisemitism," in *Antisemitism and Philosemitism in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries: Representing Jews, Jewishness, and Modern Culture*, Phyllis Lassner and Lara Trubowitz (eds.) (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2008), 27, 33. The tendency of scholars to insist on emergent new antisemitisms extends back to the 1930s, with scholars like Max Horkheimer.

multiplicity, and a franticness with the continuation and escalation of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

Following the Yom Kippur War, Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein identified, in 1974, a "new antisemitism" pervasive on the Far-Right and especially on the Radical Left of the political spectrum.[12] On the Left, this new antisemitism is animated by anti-imperialism and a sense that the Jews and Israel are an obstacle to the goals of revolutionary liberalism.[13] Since the end of the "post-World War II honeymoon," a double standard developed toward Israel that indicated the intention of the Radical Left to liquidate the State of Israel as an entity.[14] Bernard Lewis, in 1986, postulated a "new antisemitism" exhibiting the radicalizing effect of the Arab-Israeli Conflict upon Muslim nationalism and Western influence upon Muslim antisemitism.[15] Lewis warned that if some resolution was not reached in the Arab-Israeli Conflict soon, Muslim antisemitism was likely to become genocidal.[16]

More recently, in 2013, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen identifies all antisemitism, to include the "new antisemitism," as an ideology originating within Christianity that is Manichean and eliminationist in nature because it

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[12] Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein. *The New Anti-Semitism* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), 6-7.
[13] Ibid., 9, 11.
[14] Ibid., 14-15, 125.
[15] Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (New York: Norton, 1986), 196, 236.
[16] Ibid., 257-259.

seeks the ending of the Jews in some manner or another, up to and including extermination.[17] The "new antisemitism" is without any fixed location because of its inherent globalism, and its rise corresponds with America's hegemonic decline because it is the only country willing or even inclined to combat it.[18] Further, Goldhagen identifies Muslim antisemitism as an indispensable part of the "new antisemitism," through which it achieves its greatest and most intractable virulence in the form of Hamas's genocidal designs on the Jews of Israel.[19] The Nazification of Israel, what Goldhagen terms "the Nazified fantasy," is also central to the "new antisemitism."[20] Further, rather than emerging all at once, this "new antisemitism" separated from previous religious and racial antisemitisms, gradually becoming chiefly political since the end of the Second World War and into the onset of globalization.[21]

There is a general consensus, then, that what typifies these "new" antisemitisms is the centrality of the Arab-Israeli Conflict within them. The question of whether anti-Zionism and antisemitism are the same phenomenon has caused some ontological confusion. There have been attempts to parse this

[17] Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *The Devil That Never Dies: The Rise and Threat of Global Antisemitism* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2013), 37, 85, 88, 94, 252.
[18] Ibid., 163, 193, 195.
[19] Ibid., 227.
[20] Ibid., 313.
[21] Ibid., 79, 145, 151, 153, 163, 360.

confusion, such as the 2007 edited volume *Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism in Historical Perspective: Convergence and Divergence*, edited by Jeffrey Herf.

Within this volume, Derek J. Penslar argues that the pre-World War II Arab attitudes toward the Jews were far less militant in that they acknowledged the peoplehood of the Jews and their competing claim for the land of Israel.[22] The period of the war saw a Westernization of the Arab perspective, especially amongst fundamentalists influenced by Nazi antisemitism, but that despite this, most Muslim anti-Zionism, excepting the fundamentalists, is not antisemitic.[23]

Pierre Birnbaum looks at the transition from pro-Zionism to anti-Zionism by French antisemites on the radical right before and after the formation of Israel; initially, pro-Zionism arose from a desire to remove the Jewish contamination from France.[24] The subsequent shift to anti-Zionism was animated by older antisemitic tropes, which considered the Israelis to be a powerbase of global Jewish domination, and a general disdain for the United States, Israel's chief supporter.[25] Overall, the consensus of *Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism in Historical Perspective: Convergence and Divergence* is that there is no absolute connection between antisemitism and anti-Zionism, but they

[22] Derek J. Penslar, "Anti-Semites on Zionism: From Indifference to Obsession," in *Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism in Historical Perspective: Convergence and Divergence*, Jeffrey Herf (ed.) (London: Routledge, 2007), 13.
[23] Ibid., 14-17.
[24] Pierre Birnbaum, "The French Radical Right: From Anti-Semitic Zionism to Anti-Semitic Anti-Zionism," in *Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism in Historical Perspective: Convergence and Divergence*, Jeffrey Herf (ed.) (London: Routledge, 2007), 145.
[25] Ibid., 151.

can and do often overlap. While a laudable attempt, this appears to highlight the ontological confusion, rather than make much headway in dispelling it.

Indeed, the problem of parsing anti-Zionism has even led to an apparent inability to consistently identify antisemitism. For example, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's refusal to entertain the notion that Christian Zionism can be anything other than philosemitism, despite the centrality of Christianity within his own ontology for antisemitism—certainly support for Israel based on an eschatological hope that ends in the ultimate destruction of Jews is no less eliminationist than the global antisemitism Goldhagen postulates.[26] Also, Steven K. Baum, founder of the *Society for the Study of Antisemitism*, asserted in 2012 that "[w]hile all antisemites are anti-Israeli, the obverse does not follow."[27] Two things appear to be at play here: categorization in antisemitism scholarship, and a dearth of attention to philosemitism within that scholarship.

Antisemitism scholarship maintains a categorical separation between Christian antisemitism and racial antisemitism.[28] This corresponds to the coining of the term in 1879 by Wilhelm Marr to differentiate his ostensibly novel rejection of the Jews on the basis of race rather than Christianity.[29] Antisemitism

[26] Goldhagen, *The Devil That Never Dies: The Rise and Threat of Global Antisemitism*, 246.
[27] Steven K. Baum and Shimon Samuels, *Antisemitism Explained* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2012), 187.
[28]Jerome A. Chanes, *Antisemitism: A Reference Handbook* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 5-6.
[29] Ibid., 2.

scholarship also tends to exclude philosemitism from its overall analysis.[30] These two elements have led to broader ontological issues, which work dealing with anti-Zionism reflects. These issues have negatively impacted the ontology of antisemitism so severely that encyclopedias on the subject consider any attempt to even define antisemitism as being, at best, arbitrary.[31] This warrants attention.

One of the primary components of Christian antisemitism's doctrine of *deicide* (the charge that all Jews are culpable for the murder of God in the person of Christ) is that it is an *inherited* guilt.[32] This is held to be in distinction from racial antisemitism because that guilt is washed away at the baptismal font. However, this distinction does not hold up to scrutiny. For example, laws based upon the *pureza de sangre* (purity of blood) discourse of early modern Spain illustrate at least some racial aspect within Christian antisemitism. Jerome Friedman illustrates in a study on the subject:

> This understanding of Jewishness was explained by Fray Prudencio de Sandoval, Charles V's biographer, who wrote in 1604, "Who can deny that in the descendants of the Jews there persists and endures the evil inclination of their ancient ingratitude and lack of understanding, just as in Negros [there persists] the inseparability of their blackness…it is not enough for the Jew to be three parts aristocrat or Old Christian for one family-line [i.e., one Jewish ancestor] alone defiles and corrupts him." Consequently, "it is not necessary to be of a Jewish father and mother . . .

[30] Jonathan Karp, *Philosemitism in History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1-2.
[31] Richard Levy, *Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio, 2005), XXIX.
[32] Robert Michael, *Holy Hatred: Christianity, Antisemitism, and the Holocaust* (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 10, 17-19.

> half is enough and even if not that much, a quarter is sufficient or even an eighth."[33]

This clearly illustrates that there was some sort of racial theory attached to Jewishness at least as early as 1604.[34] This racial theory extended to arguments that prominent Jewish figures in Christianity, such as Jesus and Paul, were somehow biologically different from other Jews.[35] If this categorical problem of ontology requires additional attention, as it clearly does, what of philosemitism?

The pool of scholarship on philosemitism remains small, and revolves around the ontological problem of identifying the phenomenon's existence in history. Alan Levenson's approach to this problem generated a core definition of philosemitism as "*any* pro-Jewish or pro-Judaic utterance or act," regardless of whether or not the actor in question would identify as a philosemite (and even if said actor would identify as an antisemite, for that matter), which other scholars

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[33] Jerome Friedman, "Jewish Conversion, the Spanish Pure Blood Laws and Reformation: A Revisionist View of Racial and Religious Antisemitism," *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 18 no. 1 (1987): 3-30, 16-17; See also Hyam Maccoby, *Antisemitism and Modernity: Innovation and Continuity* (London: Routledge, 2006); While the codification of racial laws dealing with "purity of blood" were termed *limpieza de sangre*, this reflected legal terminology—beginning in medieval Spain and carrying forward into the Spanish and Portuguese empires where the *limpieiza* terminology reflected a pseudoscientific designation of blood content by ratio. For the purposes of approaching the cultural discourse that generated such laws, this thesis utilizes the term *pureza de sangre*.

[34] Ibid. Friedman goes so far as to assert that the "pure blood laws" were *entirely* about a theory of heredity and race, and that religious matters were actually of no real concern. This goes too far. Rather, it is important to understand that these two concerns were in actuality *inseparable* elements of Spanishness.

[35] Ibid., 18; This theme has remained a consistent part of modern antisemitism, including within Germany. See, for example Susannah Heschel, *The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

on the phenomenon have accepted provisionally.[36] Jonathan Judaken expands this to see philosemitism as a belief system that views Jews and Jewishness in typologically positive terms.[37] Judaken's expansion is a reasonable one. However, its application threatens to render philosemitism almost phenomenologically non-existent. While Judaken's formulation obviously and immediately excludes "philosemites" such as Goldhagen's Christian Zionists, it also seriously challenges the basic ontology of antisemitism.

This is best exemplified by looking at a case widely considered emblematic of philosemitism: the Dreyfusards. These Frenchmen who publicly defended the falsely accused and imprisoned French Jewish officer Alfred Dreyfus are remembered as the philosemitic heroes of the great antisemitic spasm that marred the liberalism of France and split France in twain: into the France of *Liberté, égalité, fraternité*; and the France of the anti-Dreyfusards.[38]

However, recent scholarship on the Dreyfus Affair has called the "two Frances" dichotomy into question.[39] Ruth Harris observes that some of the most prominent Dreyfusards began the Affair as ardent antisemites, and remained so throughout it.[40] They were unconcerned with benefitting the Jew *qua Jew*, and

[36] Alan T. Levenson, *Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism: Defenses of Jews and Judaism in Germany, 1871-1932* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004 [2013]), xii; Judaken, "Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism," 27.
[37] Judaken, "Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism," 40.
[38] Ruth Harris, *Dreyfus* (London: Allen Lane, 2008).
[39] Ibid., 7.
[40] Ibid.

acted instead to support and protect the Revolution from the Right.[41] As a particular example, Émile Zola remains the most famous "philosemite" for publicly charging the French government with antisemitism in his open letter, "*J'accuse ...!*"; yet, he wrote against antisemitism on the logic that the Jews would have finally and rightfully disappeared from the world had their "Jewishness" not been reinforced through maltreatment.[42] Georges Benjamin Clemenceau expressed the value of the liberal cause over a physical Dreyfus when he quipped, "I am indifferent about Dreyfus, let them cut him to pieces and eat him."[43] Fernand Labori came to resent what he felt was the Jewish Dreyfusards' regard only for Jewish interests.[44]

A number of Dreyfusards became actively hostile toward the man after his ultimate pardon, and derided him for his Jewish "tribalism," because he did not want to move forward with subsequent legal battles over his innocence in the name of liberty.[45] Georges Picquart, the lieutenant colonel and former instructor of Dreyfus who became instrumental in the latter's ultimate pardon by discovering the real traitor, remarked, "I *knew* one day I would be attacked by the Jews and notably by the Dreyfuses."[46] All of this seems to indicate that

[41] Ibid., 382-383.
[42] Levenson, *Between Philosemitism and Antisemitism,* 96.
[43] Harris, *Dreyfus,* 337.
[44] Ibid., 351.
[45] Ibid., 353.
[46] Ibid., 356.

Dreyfusard "philosemitism" was based on antisemitic premises, as it saw the dissolution of Jewishness as a social good. Such philosemitism was clearly conditional on Alfred Dreyfus's utility as a weapon in his supporter's contest with the Right.

The Dreyfusards illustrate that any "philosemitism" that is pro-Jew for any reason, or in any way, other than *qua Jew*, is in fact actually antisemitic. This is because such "philosemitism" seeks to unmake Jewishness or the Jews *existentially* for some "greater" purpose. This thoroughly, yet necessarily, qualifies Levenson's core definition in a way that also makes use of Judaken's more phenomenological perspective: philosemitism is any act or utterance that is genuinely pro-Jew *qua Jew*. This makes the landscape of philosemitism barren indeed. It is immediately clear that this pro-Jew *qua Jew* problem exerts a very strong influence on antisemitism scholarship's attempts to parse anti-Zionism. As ideologies that have been viewed as historically philosemitic, such as European liberalism, have increasingly aligned themselves against Israel in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, it has been impossible for antisemitism scholars to overlook the anti-Zionism of European liberals in the same way that the antisemitism of liberals like the Dreyfusards has been overlooked. This has led antisemitism scholarship to an assessment of an emergent need for a

"sophisticated" and complex definition of antisemitism.[47] Leaving aside, for a moment, Edward Said's partisanship in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, does his estimation of the "secret sharer" relationship have anything to offer in dealing with ontological problems in antisemitism scholarship? If so, it will requiring establishing common ground.

Even at first glance, the restrictive definition of philosemitism, allowing as it does for both Wilhelm Marr and Émile Zola to be identified as antisemites, hints at common ground in an immediately visible parallel between these two figures and Said's formulation of orientalism's blend of hostility and paternalism. While this is interesting, it is insufficient to establish a true common ground between antisemitism and orientalism. Gideon Shimoni's critique of the Postcolonial Studies outlook offers an opportunity to establish that common ground. If the postcolonial paradigm can be applied to Zionism, then it should be possible to demonstrate that the history of European Jewry is a colonial history.

There is a growing amount of scholarship dealing with European Jews, and especially German Jews, as a colonized population. One of these scholars, Jonathan M. Hess, even goes so far as to identify antisemitism and orientalism

[47] Kenneth L. Marcus, "The Definition of Antisemitism," in *Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of Modernity*, Charles Asher Small (ed.) (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 91.

as "mutually determining discourses."[48] While promising, this path presents potential problems. Such studies as Hess's are themselves conducted within the Postcolonial Studies framework, and thus suffer from some particularly Saidian temporal problems. These scholars limit themselves to the eighteenth century as a cut-off point for the beginnings of the colonization of German Jewry. This is a reflection of Said, who, while acknowledging a Christian basis for orientalism, places the same general temporal limit on his own framework.[49] Be that as it may, these limits are far too narrow for mapping out the history of German Jewry's colonization. Certainly, any discourse in German society on the emancipation—or decolonization—of the Jewish population would have to come *after* their colonization, rather than in tandem with it.

Notably, this temporal problem is similar to the one seen in antisemitism scholarship in its ontological problem with separating Christian and racial antisemitism—to the extent that they are nearly contemporaneous. This common temporal issue brings a common ground between both into view.

Taking Jonathan M. Hess's assessment that antisemitism and orientalism are "mutually determining discourses" as a guideline, it stands to reason that each should have a common modern origin. However, as we have seen,

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[48] Jonathan M. Hess, "Johann David Michaelis and the Colonial Imaginary: Orientalism and the Emergence of Racial Antisemitism in Eighteenth-Century Germany," *Jewish Social Studies, New Series* 6, no. 2 (2000): 56-101, 93.
[49] Said, *Orientalism*, 333. Even twenty-five years after its initial publication, Said was placing the advent of modern Orientalism at so late a date as 1798.

antisemitism scholarship and Postcolonial Studies set these origins apart from each other—though the temporal distance is relatively small. In addressing this problem, it is reasonable to track backward in time in search of a point of nexus for this modern divergence.

In the case of orientalism, this presents potential difficulties, as different iterations of Western Colonialism and Imperialism begin at different times. Indeed, this is the root of Postcolonial Studies' temporal confusion—Edward Said places orientalism chiefly in the context of the Western incursion into the Muslim and Arab world, yet this time frame represents a very late phase of the overall enterprise of Western Colonialism and Imperialism. This problem is best addressed, then, by following the unbroken continuity of European Jewish experience across the modern period. In doing so, we are looking for a location in modern history where both antisemitism and orientalism were physically co-incident, a place and time that allows us to get to the heart of Jonathan M. Hess's mutual determinism. Does such a nexus exist? Indeed, it does.

Rather than existing as ironic "secret sharers," antisemitism and orientalism are, in fact, twins of a common birth—that of Western Colonialism and Imperialism itself, during the early modern period. Exploring this birth, during the transitional period between the completion of the *Reconquista* and the expansion of the Spanish and Portuguese empires, offers resolution to the ontological problems within scholarship dealing with both phenomena, and

resolves the dispute over identification of Zionism with orientalism and Western Colonialism—it is neither.

Part One of this study deals with the *Reconquista*, the nascent empires that grew out of its completion, and their role in the twin births of both modern antisemitism and orientalism, and derives working redefinitions of each. This section continues on to identify the historical precedent of Jewish anticolonialism amongst *conversos* of the early Jesuit order, including their attempt to save themselves and the natives of Colonial Latin America from the worst ravages of Spanish colonization.

Part Two of this study approaches the history of German Jewry as a colonial history, from its appropriate origin point during the Age of Mercantilism. The emancipation discourse is identified as a fundamentally antisemitic discourse of colonization, elaborating upon the contours of German Jewish anticolonialism through its major *Haskalah* and *Wissenschaft des Judentums* phases, before addressing the question of German Jewish orientalism directly, and illustrating that scholarly identifications of orientalism among German Jewish anticolonialists arose from a general failure to recognize both their positive (and non-orientalist) assessment of Muslim Spain, and that these anticolonials were forced to accept the basic antisemitic premises within German society to even engage in the emancipation discourse. This, rather than orientalism, animated German Jewish relations with the *Ostjuden*. This section

then moves on to the development of Zionism as a nationalist turn in German Jewish anticolonialism, demonstrating its lack of orientalism in continuity with the broader history of German Jewish anticolonialism.

Finally, a concluding discussion is offered on Theodor Herzl's approach to Islam, and the continuity of Zionist anticolonialism into the Mandatory Period and Statehood. This includes an illustration of how the Zionist view of history in the context of the Holocaust has resulted in the misidentification of German Jewish self-hatred in a manner similar to how the Palestinian view of history in the context of the *Nakba* has resulted in the misidentification of Zionism as a manifestation of orientalism and Western Colonialism and Imperialism.

PART I: The Twin Births of Antisemitism and Orientalism

The *Reconquista* must be understood as the opening act of Western Colonialism and Imperialism if the nexus of antisemitism and orientalism is to be successfully identified. The *Reconquista* was the centuries-long retaking, by Christendom, of the Iberian Peninsula from the various Islamic powers that had taken possession of the territory in the eighth century. It was during the final century of the *Reconquista*, culminating in the final surrender of the Emirate of Granada in 1492, and the century after, that the internal colonization of Spain and Portugal would come to relative completion and turn outward to grow into what became known as the Portuguese and Spanish empires. This period saw the concurrent development of what have come to be known as modern antisemitism and orientalism, as well as Western Colonialism and Imperialism.

The Advent of Modern Antisemitism

The issue of *pureza de sangre*, briefly discussed in the Introduction for its thorough blurring of the line between Christian and racial antisemitism, began as a discourse at the end of the fourteenth century. In 1391, a wave of *pogroms* (anti-Jewish riots) motivated by the Christian idea of Jewish culpability for *deicide* (the Crucifixion), precipitated a mass of conversions to Catholicism

amongst Jews trying to escape the violence.[50] This *deicide* concept within Christian antisemitism is the key component of the process of racializing the Jews of Iberia and Europe as a whole, forming the core of the *pureza de sangre* cultural discourse. Within Catholic doctrine, the guilt from the sin of *deicide* passed through the blood to each new generation of Jews. While this was common throughout all of Christendom, there are particular elements of the history of the Jews of Iberia which caused the racialized aspect of modern antisemitism to manifest so readily.

By the time of the 1391 *pogroms* and the subsequent droves of *conversos* it created, Iberian Jews had already been particularly racialized in Iberia for centuries. This manifested in two particular ways during the pre-modern period. The first stretches all the way back to the Visigothic period, when Iberian Jewry attempted, without success, to invoke the Catholic doctrine of *deicide* in the defense of their own community. Their logic was that because Iberian Jews had already been established on the peninsula well in advance of the birth of Christ, the ancestors of Iberian Jewry were not responsible for the Crucifixion—therefore, the inherited sin of *deicide* was absent from their blood.[51] The second

[50] Robert Aleksander Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews: Jesuits of Jewish Ancestry and Purity-of-Blood Laws in the Early Society of Jesus* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 2; See also David Nirenburg, "Enmity and Assimilation: Jews, Christians, and Converts in Medieval Spain," *Common Knowledge* 9 no. 1 (2003): 137-155.
[51] Salo Wittmayer Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, Vol. III, 2nd Ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), 34.

aspect of Iberian Jewish racialization in the eyes of the Christian population was inextricably tied to the Islamic conquest of the peninsula and the subsequent *Reconquista*. During the Muslim invasion, Jews allied themselves with the Islamic conquerors, believing that life under Muslim rule would be an improvement over Visigothic oppression.[52] Within the Iberian Christian mind, this made Iberian Jewry blood-traitors and a fifth column during the *Reconquista*…in addition to the inherited taint of *deicide* guilt.[53] This exceptionally strong sense of inherited Jewish infidelity in the eyes of Iberian Christians interfered with the more traditional Catholic doctrine that conversion washed away Jewishness at the baptismal font.

The enormous growth of the *converso* population, unparalleled in Europe, created an affluent segment of the population with strong financial and political ties to royalty—whose incessant military campaigns against the Islamic enemy had dire need of such a resource.[54] Resentment amongst Old Christians (of Gentile background) in Toledo toward the high position of New Christians (of Jewish, and later Muslim, background), had grown to a fever pitch by 1349. Old Christians, convinced of the intractable perfidy inherent to the Jewish heritage of New Christians, exploded into an anti-*converso pogrom*.[55] In the

[52] Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews*, 3.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid., 2.
[55] Ibid., 3.

wake of these riots, the city council, citing the inborn impossibility for *conversos* to manifest genuine Christian fidelity, passed laws banning *conversos* and their descendants from holding public offices or testifying in Christian courts of law.[56]

These laws sparked intense debate across Iberia about the nature of *converso* piety and whether or not conversion did indeed wash away Jewishness. Arguments ranged from full support of the *converso* population as an unequivocally legitimate part of the Christian whole, to those upholding the view of Toledo—asserting that the taint of Jewishness in the blood persisted for generations, racially predisposing *conversos* toward false piety and Jewish customs.[57] As this debate raged, Aragon and Castile joined through the marriage of its monarchs, and modern Spain was born. Very quickly, through the course of this *pureza de sangre* discourse, positive Spanishness within Spain began to become defined in terms of contra-Jewishness, with Jewishness representing everything negative in society.[58] It was in this context of the discourse that the Spanish Inquisition came into being as an attempt at compromise. At its inception in 1480, the Inquisition took up a middle ground on the matter of

[56] Ibid., 4; For more on this as an example of early racial antisemitism, and its continuity with later German developments, see Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, "Assimilation and Racial Anti-Semitism: The Iberian and the German Models," *Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture* 26 (1982): 3-58.
[57] Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews*, 23.
[58] Gretchen Starr-LeBeau, *In the Shadow of the Virgin*: *Inquisitors, Frias, and* Conversos *in Guadalupe, Spain* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 112.

pureza de sangre, viewing *converso* impiety as a racially inherited propensity, but not as an absolute.[59] The Inquisition was thus tasked with seeking out and expunging this propensity where made manifest in the heretical retention of Jewish practices and customs (*Judaizing*) among *conversos*, which was taken to be a dire threat to the security, and even the identity, of Catholic Spain.[60]

Twelve years later, the completion of the *Reconquista* had driven the last bastion of Islamic power out of the Iberian Peninsula in 1492. Catholic Spain would no longer suffer the presence of Jews within its realm, and thus they were delivered an ultimatum to accept baptism or face expulsion.[61] This watershed replicated 1391 on a peninsular scale. Though the Jews were now gone, the threat to Catholic Spain was even greater—*conversos* spread throughout the land, freshly converted *en masse* with little to no sense of Catholic orthodoxy, the threat of *Judaizing* to the security and identity of Catholic Spain was now endemic.[62] The Spanish Inquisition responded in kind, ceasing to be a middle ground on the matter of the *pureza de sangre*.[63] By 1547, Juan Martínez Silíceo, the Inquisitor General of Spain and Archbishop of Toledo, had gained the upper hand with his argument that even the descendants of formerly Jewish converts

[59] Ibid., 113.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Henry Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition: an Historical Revision*, 3rd Ed. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997), 64.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.

"still hold on their lips the milk of their ancestors' recent perversity." [64] On this basis, the *Limpieza de Sangre* Statutes were promulgated as the law of Spanish Catholic lands—with the approval of King Philip II and of the Pope in Rome.[65]

A Working Redefinition of Antisemitism

We see then, already fully articulated in 1547, the racially based modern antisemitism which would only be given a distinctive designation in Germany more than three centuries later. Indeed, the contours of the *pureza de sangre* discourse are identical to those of the emancipation discourse in Germany. Returning to the idea covered during the discussion of philosemitism within the Introduction, the "Jew *qua Jew*" paradigm is ultimately a position on Jewishness. Notably, in the same way that the Dreyfusards would centuries later be prepared to accept any *assimilated* Jew who was expunged of Jewishness, the Spanish Inquisition was prepared to accept any *converted* Jew who was likewise expunged of Jewishness.

The central matter, then, is Jewishness—however it is defined. The central concern of the *pureza de sangre* discourse was how to resolve the negativity of Jewishness within Spanish society—a theme we will also see within the emancipation debate in Germany. These discourses are fundamentally

[64] Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews*, 1.
[65] Ibid., 29; As footnoted above, the term *limpieza* reflects legal codification of the *pureza de sangre* cultural discourse.

antisemitic, because they were debates about the capacity of Jews to be divested of enough of their Jewishness to even be a part of society at all—working from the assumption that Jewishness itself was negative. With this in mind, a core working definition derives:

Antisemitism is:

1. The attribution of an inherent negativity to Jewishness;

and

2. The sentiment that this negativity must be resolved.

Within the context of this redefinition of antisemitism, any act or utterance that inheres *both* of the above two elements is antisemitic. Such a redefinition is highly versatile by virtue both of its simplicity and its specificity.

In addition to being capable of identifying otherwise disparate antisemites such as Marr and Zola, this redefinition allows a more certain means of parsing anti-Zionism. For example: both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas see the existence of a Jewish state as inherently negative. However, only Hamas seeks to *resolve* that negativity by dissolving that state by any and all means. The Palestinian Authority, by contrast, has opted instead to pursue the erection of an adjacent Palestinian state. Put simply, antisemitic anti-Zionism would be any act or utterance that is anti-Israel *qua Jewish state*.

Having now articulated a straightforward and truly robust redefinition of antisemitism, attention can turn to the advent of orientalism.

The Advent of Modern Orientalism

The taking of the Emirate of Granada saw the same forced conversion among Muslims that had also occurred among Jews. These Muslim converts, known as *moriscos,* faced problems similar to those of the *conversos*. Even after the close of the *Reconquista,* Spain remained engaged—along with Latin Christendom at large—in military contests with Islamic, and especially Ottoman, powers. This persistent threat had a particular effect on the construction of Spanish identity throughout the sixteenth century. In much the same manner that contra-Jewishness had come to define Spanishness *within* Spain—contra-Islam came to define Spanishness *outside* of Spain.[66] This paradigm intensified after Spanish fears of the external Islamic threat led to widespread panic over an imagined *morisco* uprising in 1580.[67] Spain became so thoroughly committed to placing the Islamic literally *outside* of Spanishness that it ultimately decided that it would rather expel its converted Muslim (*morisco*) population at the beginning of the seventeenth century, at substantial economic loss, than retain anything that appeared Islamic within its heartland.[68] *Conversos*

[66] Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, "The Improbable Empire," in *Spain: A History*, Raymond Carr (ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 123.
[67] Michel Boeglin, "Between Rumor and Resistance: The Andalucian Morisco 'Uprising' of 1580," in *The Conversos and Moriscos in Late Medieval Spain and Beyond*. *Volume 1: Departures and Change*, Kevin Ingram (ed.) (Boston: Brill, 2009), 224.
[68] See Barbara Fuchs, "Maurophilia and the Morisco Subject," in *The Conversos and Moriscos in Late Medieval Spain and Beyond*. *Volume 1: Departures and Change*, Kevin Ingram (ed.) (Boston: Brill, 2009), 284-285.

did not face similar mass expulsion; rather, Spain remained committed to purging *conversos* of their Jewishness and completing their forced colonization.

Because of the pervasive Spanish sense that *moriscos* remained inherently threatening, there was little real interest in assimilating the *morisco* population, or facilitating their integration into Spanish Catholic society—with the notable exception of *converso* Jesuits, which is discussed below. The core of this was a racial conflation similar to that directed at the *conversos*. To Spanish society, *moriscos* carried within them the blood not only of Spain's external Islamic enemy, but the same blood as the Muslims who invaded Iberia in the first place. No amount of Catholic orthodoxy could expunge the sin of that invasion. In this way, Spanish attitudes toward the *moriscos* were very similar to the *pureza de sangre* discourse of racialized Jewishness, including its focus on the Muslim conquest of Iberia. Notably, *moriscos* attempted to marshal a defense of themselves very similar to the one that Jews attempted to use previously.

Near the end of the sixteenth century, *moriscos* claimed to have made a startling discovery proving a pre-Islamic Arab presence in Iberia. More than that, the *Lead Books of Sacramonte* purported to show that it was in fact Arabs who brought Christianity to Iberia in the first place.[69] *Moriscos* argued that the

[69] Mercedes García-Arenal and Fernando Rodríguez Mediano, "Jerónimo Román de la Higuera and the Lead Books of Sacramonte," in *The Conversos and Moriscos in Late Medieval Spain and Beyond*. *Volume 1: Departures and Change*, Kevin Ingram (ed.) (Boston: Brill, 2009), 245.

implications of this discovery were two-fold: first, the Arab heritage of *moriscos* was pre-Islamic and thus untainted by the sin of the Islamic invasion; second, as the progenitors of Christianity in Iberia, a Catholic of Arab descent was unquestionably Spanish in nature.[70] Such argumentation did the *moriscos* no more good in the sixteenth century than it did the Jews centuries before. Within a handful of years, *morisco* populations were being expelled from Spain *en masse*, decades before the Vatican had even ruled the *Lead Books of Sacramonte* to be forgeries.[71]

Certainly, we can see in early modern Spain elements of Edward Said's orientalism, at least in terms of its direction particularly at Arabs and Islam—as well as in the conflation of the two. Within the broader context of the advent of Western Colonialism and Imperialism during this period, we can see the origin of orientalism in its fuller scope.

The successful completion of the *Reconquista* did much to cement Spain's reputation, and that of Portugal, within Christendom's larger ongoing confrontation with Islamic power during the fifteenth and sixteenth century—during which the capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453 had sent Latin Christendom into a panic.[72] The overseas expansion of both Spanish and Portuguese territory, and power, were explicitly framed as counterpoints to

[70] Ibid., 265.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Fernandez-Armesto, "The Improbable Empire," 143.

negate what was increasingly seen as the global threat of Islamic power—to, in effect, neutralize the threat of Islam by Christianizing the world out from under it.[73]

Indeed, the Papal Bull *Romanus Pontifex* defined the colonial and imperial enterprises as an effort "[…] to invade, search out, capture, vanquish, and subdue all Saracens [Muslims] and pagans whatsoever, and other enemies of Christ wheresoever placed […]."[74] Notably, these pagans were specifically to be those "[…] who are entirely free from infection by the sect of the most impious Mahomet […]" in order to prevent Islam from gaining these peoples and territories for itself.[75] Within *Romanus Pontifex*, it is apparent that Latin Christendom was already conceiving of itself collectively as "Westerners" arrayed against the power of an Islamic East by 1455.[76] By the latter half of the sixteenth century, both the colonial expansion of Spain into pagan lands and its key role in a number of major naval victories over Ottoman forces gained Spain the reputation as an exemplar of the emergent West.[77]

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[73] John M. Hobson and J.C. Sharman, "The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change," *European Journal of International Relations* 11 no. 1 (2005): 63-98, 84-85.
[74] Quoted from Frances Gardiner Davenport (ed.), *European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies to 1648* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917), 21.
[75] Ibid., 22
[76] Ibid., 21.
[77] Henry Kamen, "Vicissitudes of a World Power, 1500-1700," in *Spain: A History*, Raymond Carr (ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 155.

Reformulating Edward Said: A Working Redefinition of Orientalism

While all of these elements fall within the purview of Edward Said's definition of modern orientalism in more or less broad strokes, there are particular differences that need to be dealt with, leading to a working redefinition of orientalism itself. First, and perhaps most relevant, these elements of Said's modern orientalism can be seen operating in a fully articulated form some three centuries before the time frame Said placed its origins in the late eighteenth century.[78] Further, the elements that Said identifies as central to modern orientalism, such as "race, color, origin, temperament, character, and types," were already present by the mid-fifteenth century—as we saw in our discussion of the status of both *conversos* and *moriscos* in Spain.[79] That Latin Christendom was already defining itself as a West in terms of an opposed East at the onset of Western Colonialism and Imperialism ultimately destroys Said's ontology of modern orientalism.

Edward Said contends that orientalism developed at the height of Western Colonial and Imperial power as a discourse justifying the power relationship of the West over the rest.[80] However, we can see the constituent elements of that discourse fully articulated and active in a historical moment where not only was the power of the West far from dominant, it was not yet

[78] Said, *Orientalism*, 3.
[79] Said., 120.
[80] Ibid., 4.

clear whether or not this emergent West would even *survive* its contest with the Islamic East. Indeed, the logic of Pope Nicolas V in issuing *Romanus Pontifex*, and later Papal Bulls issued by subsequent popes, was based on an assessment that Latin Christendom would likely lose its contest with Islam without colonial expansion into pagan lands.[81] Moreover, it is clear that modern orientalism as a discourse arose as a part of that contest, rather than *post facto* from a place of Western hegemony.

Said's temporal fallacy is tied to his formulation of modern orientalism as a thoroughly secular phenomenon, though this identification also crumbles in the face of modern orientalism's emphatically Latin Christian origin. Said insists that Christianity by itself was too conceptually narrow to allow for the advent of modern orientalism in the absence of the "secularizing elements in eighteenth-century Europe."[82] In his estimation, such secularizing elements were required to produce modern orientalism because they overwhelmed the basic categorization within Christianity of "Christians and everyone else."[83]

Yet, such a simple categorization is utterly absent from the Latin Christendom which inaugurated Western Colonialism and Imperialism in the fifteenth century. If we include Jews, the first victims of this colonial enterprise during the course of the *Reconquista*, with the categories identified in the

[81] Hobson and Sharman, "The Enduring Place of Hierarchy," 85.
[82] Ibid., 20.
[83] Ibid.

Romanus Pontifex, we find that there are in fact *four* categories: 1) Christians, 2) Jews, 3) Muslims, and 4) pagans. It is within the interplay of these categories that orientalism (and antisemitism) are located. Let us take Spanish colonialism as our example of this interplay: 1) Catholic Spanishness is defined as 2) contra-Jewishness; Spain itself is defined as 3) contra-Islam, through combat and 4) its expansion into and conversion of pagan lands. Those elements identified by Said as modern orientalism correspond to categories three and four. From this, a definition derives:

> Orientalism is:
>
> 1. The attribution of an inherent existential threat from the Islamic that must be neutralized;
>
> and
>
> 2. The sentiment that this threat can only be neutralized by supplanting its power through global hegemony.

Notably absent from this redefinition is the primacy that Edward Said attributes to the ascribed "backwardness" of colonized people as a justification for Western Colonialism and Imperialism. While this quickly developed as a common feature of orientalist discourse across time, it did not gain the same level of immutability found within antisemitism toward the Jews or in orientalism toward Muslims. Because of this, it is not integral enough to be definitional.

Indeed, because Latin Christendom had virtually no contemporary experience in interacting with pagan populations prior to the advent of Western Colonialism and Imperialism, its conception of pagan populations was very much in flux at the outset. This becomes evident when looking at *converso* Jesuit activity in Colonial Latin America. First, we must look at the early Jesuit order as a site of refuge and anticolonial criticism for *conversos* in Spain.

The Early Jesuits as a Precedent for Jewish Anticolonialism

It may not be immediately sensible to turn to a Catholic religious order and apostates from Judaism as a site of Jewish anticolonialism, especially in a Spain from which Jews had already been expelled some four decades prior. However, it must be borne in mind that conversions were made by Jews as a means to fully enter Spanish society, and that such *conversos* remained subject to legal exclusions and the terrors of the Spanish Inquisition on account of their perceived Jewishness—in racial terms. As a class of people within Spanish society, these *conversos* remained a subject population long after the initial colonizing projects of the *Reconquista* and forced conversion had come to completion. Moreover, the particular contours of Jewish anticolonialism of the emancipatory variety are on full display amongst the *converso* Jesuits, as made clear below.

The Early Jesuit Order as a Converso Refuge

The Society of Jesus was founded in 1540 by Ignatius of Loyola, at the height of the *pureza de sangre* discourse.[84] Loyola himself may have been a *converso* from his mother's side, though later Jesuit purges of records detailing *conversos* in the early order have left this unclear.[85] Whatever the case, as a young man, Ignatius found his spiritual calling in a *converso* milieu through the more spiritually inclined *alumbrado* movement, contributing to "a large web of Loyola's *converso* connections" and an enduring affinity for *conversos*.[86] Such connections brought the Spanish Inquisition to bear upon Ignatius repeatedly before he founded the Society of Jesus, though he was never pronounced guilty of *Judaizing*.[87]

At least a third of the six founding members of the Society of Jesus were *conversos*.[88] Diego Laínez and Nicolás Bobadil were for certain, and Simão Rodrigues and Alfonso Salmeron may have been *conversos* as well.[89] Of the founding group, only Peter Faber, from France, was not Spanish. As such, the group was very aware of the growing threat the *pureza de sangre* discourse

[84] John W. O'Malley, *The First Jesuits* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 23.
[85] Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews*, 50; See also Kevin Ingram, *Secret Lives, Public Lies: The* Conversos *and Socio-religious Non-conformism in the Spanish Golden Age*, Ph.D. Dissertation (San Diego: University of California, 2006), 87-88.
[86] Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews*, 52. The *alumbrado* movement emphasized spirituality over ritual, and found great appeal amongst *conversos*.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid., 178.
[89] Ibid., 55.

posed to *conversos* in Spanish society. Indeed, Ignatius was not the only founding member with personal experience of the Spanish Inquisition. Several members of Diego Laínez's family were tried and sentenced for *Judaizing* by the Spanish Inquisition.[90]

Ignatius sought to make his order a refuge for *conversos*, and his commitment to their entry into the Jesuit order was unwavering. As the *pureza de sangre* discourse intensified, Ignatius began funneling *conversos* wishing to join the Society out of hot spots in Spain to safety.[91] Iberian c*onversos* flowed into this new refuge. While it is impossible to know the exact number of *conversos* within the early Society of Jesus, again due to subsequent Jesuit document purges, Maryks identified at least eighty-seven *conversos* who entered the Society before such entry was banned.[92] Indeed, entire generations of some *converso* families fled to the Society. For example, while José de Acosta is best remembered among them, a total of five sons of the de Acosta family became Jesuits.[93]

[90] Ibid., 57.
[91] O'Malley, *The First Jesuits*, 188.
[92] Marc Rastoin, S.J., "From Windfall to Fall: *Conversos* in the Society of Jesus," in *Friends on the Way: Jesuits Encounter Contemporary Judaism*, Michel Thomas, S.J. (ed.) (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 19-27. The appendix at the end of this chapter contains a chart detailing, to the extent known, backgrounds of these *conversos*.
[93] Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews*, 54.

The Early Jesuit Order and the Pureza de Sangre Discourse

Though the Society of Jesus was a sanctuary for *conversos* from its inception, stirrings of an anti-*converso* faction manifested quickly as the Society became widely known as a *converso* refuge and drew the attention of the Spanish Inquisition.[94] As this attention grew more intense, the superior provincial of the Jesuits in Spain, Antonio de Araoz, who would later lead the anti-*converso* faction, suggested to Ignatius that *pureza de sangre* restrictions should be placed on entry, at least where the Spanish Inquisition was in force.[95] As this was antithetical to Ignatius's very purpose, he refused.

Later, Grand Inquisitor Juan Martínez Silíceo threatened to have the Society ejected from Spain if Ignatius continued to admit *conversos*.[96] Ignatius was flippant in response, directing one of the most powerful men in Spain to "apply himself to understanding his own affairs."[97] Enraged, Silíceo was prepared to burn Jesuits operating in Spain *en masse* in response, alleging all were of *converso* background.[98] Ultimately, a compromise was made—*conversos* were funneled to other places, such as Rome, where they could join the Society out of the reach of Spain's obsession with *pureza de sangre*.[99]

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[94] Thomas M. Cohen, "Jesuits and New Christians: The Contested Legacy of St. Ignatius," *Studies in the Spirituality of Jesuits* 42.3 (2010): 1-46, 5.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid., 6.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews*, 83-84.
[99] Ibid.

After the death of Ignatius in 1556, Araoz lead a small but growing anti-*converso* movement within the Society of Jesus.[100] This faction was not immediately successful. This was due in no small part to the fact that the second Superior General, Diego Laínez, was a known *converso*. The third Superior General, Francisco de Borja, while not a *converso*, shared Ignatius's pro-*converso* spirit.[101] With the election of the fourth Superior General in 1573, however, the anti-*converso* faction was powerful enough to block the election of *converso* Juan Alfonso de Polanca.[102] The anti-*converso* faction succeeded in pushing through Everard Mercurian as Superior General.[103] This marked a decline in the status of *conversos* within the Society, culminating in the adoption of *pureza de sangre* restrictions in 1593, barring *converso* entry into the Society. Mercurian set about to "cleanse the house," depriving *conversos* of governmental posts in Europe.[104] Many of these *conversos* were reassigned to work in Colonial Latin America, far from the European centers of Jesuit power—especially in Peru.[105] From this point on, the status of the Jesuit order as a refuge for *conversos* was at an end.

[100] Cohen, "Jesuits and New Christians: The Contested Legacy of St. Ignatius," 6.
[101] Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews*, 100.
[102] Ibid., 117-118.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid., 119.

The early Society of Jesus, in which *conversos* were so prominent, functioned as a site of Jewish anticolonialism. Notably, the absence of actual Jews in Spain was irrelevant to its antisemitism—the ascribed Jewishness of the *conversos* was more than sufficient. These *conversos* were forced to defend themselves against a charge of lingering and inherent Jewishness. *Conversos* came to understand that a full emancipation into Spanish society was contingent upon society at large perceiving them as sufficiently Catholic as to no longer be seen as Jewish.[106] Moreover, they went on to attempt to convey this understanding to other groups and peoples who found themselves colonized under the Spanish and Portuguese imperial yokes.

Early Converso Jesuit Anticolonialism

The Society of Jesus came relatively late to the possessions of the Spanish and Portuguese empires, created as it was after these colonial enterprises had begun.[107] During his lifetime, Ignatius's attitude on the matter of non-European converts was as unequivocal as his attitude toward *conversos*.

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[106] For more recent work on this in both a *converso* and *morisco* context, see Kevin Ingram (ed.), *The Conversos and Moriscos in Late Medieval Spain and Beyond*. *Volume 1: Departures and Change* (Boston: Brill, 2009); Kevin Ingram (ed.), *The Conversos and Moriscos in Late Medieval Spain and Beyond*. *Volume 2: The Morisco Issue* (Boston: Brill, 2012); Kevin Ingram and Juan Ignacio Pulido Serrano (eds.), *The Conversos and Moriscos in Late Medieval Spain and Beyond*. *Volume 3: Displaced Persons* (Boston: Brill, 2016); See also Benzion Netanyahu, *The Marranos of Spain: From the late 14th to the early 16th century, According to Contemporary Hebrew Sources*, Revised and Expanded 3rd Edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Benzion Netanyahu, *The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth Century Spain* (New York: Random House, 1995).

[107] Cohen, "Jesuits and New Christians: The Contested Legacy of St. Ignatius," 37.

There was doubt expressed by Francis Xavier, in racialized terms, about the capacity for the native subjects of Portuguese India to be genuine converts or suitable for entry into the Jesuit order.[108] Ignatius was unreceptive to such arguments, and ordered that Indian initiates were "not to be received less willingly than the old Christians..."[109]

This directive made clear that Ignatius disdained racial targeting of all people within the Spanish and Portuguese realms. Notably, Ignatius did recommend a probationary period for new converts to allow them to accumulate a high degree of Catholic orthodoxy.[110] This probationary period reflects both the *converso* experience and Jesuit attempts to aid Spanish *moriscos*. One of the hallmarks of the Spanish Inquisition was harsh enforcement of orthodoxy against erstwhile Jewish and Muslim populations too recently converted to have possibly assimilated to the strictures of their new religion. The Catholic Church in Spain, and the other religious orders, left *moriscos* to their own devices and at the mercy of the Spanish Inquisition. The Jesuit order alone intervened, sending *converso* members to *morisco* populations to try and help them into orthodoxy as an escape from the ever more racially oriented onslaught of the Spanish Inquisition. This attempt by *converso* Jesuits was an attempt to help the *moriscos* self-colonize, that is, to make themselves sufficiently Catholic, and thus sufficiently Spanish, to

[108] Ibid., 38.
[109] Ibid., 39.
[110] Ibid.

be accepted as Spanish in society—this attempt was ultimately without success.[111] This experience heavily informed *converso* Jesuit activity in Colonial Latin America.

Before turning to early Jesuit *converso* anticolonialism in Colonial Latin America, it is worth noting that anticolonial *conversos* activity had already been present there before the arrival of *converso* Jesuits. The best known exemplar of such activity was that of Bartolomé de las Casas. Las Casas, of *converso* background on his father's side, entered the Dominican order roughly two decades before the founding of the Jesuit order.[112] Bartolomé de las Casas' defense of the indigenous population of Colonial Latin America shows the same continuity with the *pureza de sangre* discourse later seen from *converso* Jesuits. This is clear from his disputation with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda over indigenous rights in 1550. Las Casas makes a special point of the assertion that the natives are not by nature unsuitable for Christianity, and that substantial moderation of the Spanish Inquisition is appropriate for natives newly converted to the faith—that it should be corrective rather that direly punitive.[113] Las Casas also argued

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[111] Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews*, 86 n176. Spain began expelling *morisco* populations *en masse* in 1609.

[112]Manuel Giménez Fernández, "Fray Bartolomé de las Casas: A Biographical Sketch," in *Bartolomé de las Casas in History: Toward an Understanding of the Man and His Work*, Juan Friede and Benjamin Keene (eds.) (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971), 67-68.

[113]Ángel Losada, "The Controversy between Sepúlveda and Las Casas in the Junta of Valladolid," in *Bartolomé de las Casas in History: Toward an Understanding of the Man and His Work*, Juan Friede and Benjamin Keene (eds.) (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971), 288-294.

against the racial conflation of indigenous peoples and Jews, specifically in the capacity that natives did not possess an inherent incapacity for genuine conversion.[114]

In turning to early Jesuit *converso* activity in Colonial Latin America, it is important to reiterate that the Postcolonial Studies framework has taken the Jesuit order as a discrete unit and monolithic agent of empire, leaving the *converso* experience of many early Jesuits out of scholarly analysis. Factoring this experience back into such analysis offers a different, and often opposite, perspective. One such example is the activities of the *converso* Jesuit José de Anchieta in colonial Brazil. Scholars Paulo Edson Alves Filho and John Milton insist that José de Anchieta's massive production of religious texts translated into the native Tupi language was merely a tool to facilitate colonial domination.[115] The authors refer generally to Anchieta's adaptations of native religious and cultural elements in ways that made them more compatible with Catholicism as a cynical method of reinforcing colonial domination.[116]

Anne B. McGinness discusses the contradiction between Anchieta's support of both imperial subjugation and cultural accommodation toward the native population of Brazil. She characterizes this contradiction merely as Jesuit

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[114] Ibid.
[115] Paulo Edson Alves Filho and John Milton, "Inculturation and acculturation in the translation of religious texts: The translations of Jesuit priest José de Anchieta into Tupi in 16th century Brazil," *Target* 17.2 (2005): 275–296.
[116] Ibid., 291-292.

expediency in the mission to save heathen souls.[117] While the latter-day position of the Jesuit order *did* adopt a hardened racial stance against the natives, this was not until after the *pureza de sangre* restrictions had driven *conversos* from the order. Analyses such as those above do not account for the fact that for the first half-century of the order, *converso* Jesuits were both active in Colonial Latin America and themselves increasingly victims of the same forces that were being brought to bear on the native populations.

Converso Jesuits were keenly aware that the *only* possible emancipation within a society under Spanish or Portuguese power was through Catholicism. More than that, *conversos* such as José de Anchieta were aware through their own experiences that any possibility for such emancipation depended on two key things: 1) a deracialization of the natives in the eyes of colonial power—especially away from a conflation with Jewishness that would have threatened *converso* and natives alike; and 2) a perception of sufficient Catholic orthodoxy among the native population in the eyes of colonial power. It was the distinct lack of success on both of these counts that allowed the *pureza de sangre* discourse to become codified and destroy the position of *conversos* in society—and was, by the time of Anchieta's work in Brazil, seriously threatening their status in the order as well.

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[117] Anne B. McGinness, "Between Subjection and Accommodation: The Development of José de Anchieta's Missionary Project in Colonial Brazil," *Journal of Jesuit Studies* 1.2 (2014): 227-244.

In this context, the writings of José de Anchieta become clearly anticolonial, in an emancipatory capacity, as an attempt to resolve and bring the *pureza de sangre* discourse over the Tupi to an end. Anchieta's adaptation of native concepts and terminologies through his translations of religious material into Tupi was intended to facilitate the appearance of Catholic orthodoxy as quickly as possible, as had been attempted with *moriscos*, to get the natives clear of the dangers that *conversos* had come to dread themselves. In the same fashion, McGinness misidentifies Anchieta's work as supporting subjugation. *Conversos* were well aware that subjugation and coercion into Christianity was unavoidable, having experienced it themselves within living memory. Anchieta's work conveyed well-informed warnings about the futility of resistance and of a dire need to conform to Catholic orthodoxy with all possible haste.[118] José de Anchieta's work was as much about saving native lives as it was saving native souls. This thread of emancipatory anticolonialism is even more pronounced in the work of José de Acosta and other *converso* Jesuits in Peru.

Like his *converso* contemporaries in Brazil, José de Acosta has been framed by the Postcolonial Studies outlook as merely an appendage of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in a manner which has caused analytical

[118] Ibid., 243.

confusion. Gregory J. Shepherd's studies of de Acosta's *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias* and *De Procuranda Indorum Salute* stand as particular examples. On the one hand, Shepherd claims that de Acosta is a tool of colonialism.[119] Elsewhere, de Acosta is put forward as its opponent.[120] Shepherd tends to essentialize de Acosta and his work, approaching them from a macroscopic, if not ahistorical, temporal frame.[121] In doing so, Shepherd shoves disparate elements, such as Spanishness and Jesuit uniformity, together in attempts to designate cohesive objects.[122] Shepherd's very brief biographical sketch of de Acosta fails to account for, or even mention, his *converso* background or the *pureza de sangre* discourse within the Society in which de Acosta was embroiled.[123] Shepherd is unable to offer any contextualization for de Acosta's "objectives to create and promote a 'Christianizeable' standing for Amerindians."[124]

A reading of *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias* makes it abundantly clear that the context Shepherd lacks is de Acosta's *converso* background and his involvement in the *pureza de sangre* discourse, which is reflected strongly in

[119] Gregory J. Shepherd, *An Exposition of José de Acosta's* Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias, *1590: the Emergence of an Anthropological Vision of Colonial Latin America* (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), 4-6.
[120] Gregory J. Shepherd, *José de Acosta's* De Procuranda Indorum Salute*: A Call for Evangelical Reforms in Colonial Peru* (New York: Peter Lang, 2014).
[121] Shepherd, *An Exposition of José de Acosta's* Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias, 23.
[122] Ibid., 24.
[123] Ibid., 24-28.
[124] Ibid., 34-35, 75.

the contours of de Acosta's argumentation in *Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias*. He does the work of unequivocally disassociating the natives from any ancestral connection to the Jews by elaborating on their lack of any common traits.[125] De Acosta takes this further, calling out the general absurdity of the idea that the natives descended from the Lost Tribes of Israel, which enjoyed great popularity at this time: "…I do not see how the apocryphal Euphrates of Esdras could have provided a better opportunity for men to cross to the New World than Plato's enchanted and fabled Atlantis."[126]

De Acosta explicitly writes his history against the notion that there are racial traits rendering natives unsuitable for Catholicism, to "…refute the false opinion that is commonly held about them, that they are brutes and bestial folk and lack in understanding or with so little that it scarcely merits the name."[127] He derides such opinions as a "common and harmful delusion," of "the most ignorant and presumptuous of men."[128] De Acosta insists that the native peoples of Colonial Latin America possess a capacity for Catholicism and learning on par with or superior to any Spaniard, and castigates the Spanish for their outrages against the natives at great length.[129] He then carries on to demonstrate

[125] José de Acosta, *Natural and Moral History of the Indies*, Jane E. Mangan (ed.), Walter D. Mignolo (intro.), Frances M. López-Morillas (trans.) (London: Duke University Press, 2002), 71.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid., 329.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid., 329-331.

natural native merit by elaborating on their extensive history of cultural accomplishments for another twenty-seven chapters.[130]

Another work, *De Procuranda Indorum Salute*, reflects de Acosta's involvement with the *pureza de sangre* discourse in his defense of allowing *mestizos* (those of mixed Spanish and native descent) into the Jesuit order. In making his defense, he attacks the verbiage of Grand Inquisitor Silíceo, whose argumentation (discussed above) relied heavily on the concept of custom as a function of race.[131] De Acosta employs a modified version of Silíceo's metaphor of mother's milk to invert the latter's argument, asserting instead that custom is not racial—rather, it is learned as a function of culture from "having suckled Indian milk *and* being raised among Indians."[132] This shift away from Silíceo's contention that custom is transmitted literally *through* mother's milk to de Acosta's assertion that custom is a function of environment has been overlooked by scholars working with a Postcolonial Studies framework and unfamiliar with de Acosta's *converso* background and his efforts against the racial element central to the *pureza de sangre* discourse. One ironic example is Sabine Hyland,

[130] Ibid., 329-377.
[131] Maryks, *The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews*, 1.
[132] Sabine Hyland, *Conversion, Custom, and "Culture": Jesuit Racial Policy in Sixteenth Century Peru*, Ph.D. Dissertation (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University, 1994), xx. Emphasis mine.

who, through this oversight, places blame for the racism of Colonial Peru specifically on the shoulders of José de Acosta.[133]

Such oversight is even more apparent when taken in the context of *converso* Jesuit activity in Colonial Peru at large. The number of these *converso* Jesuits was exceptionally high as a result of Mercurian's exile of them from Europe in 1573. More relevant even than this is that these were the same *converso* Jesuits who had previously been deployed in the ultimately futile attempt to save *moriscos* from the Spanish Inquisition.[134] Through this experience, these Jesuits were uniquely aware of the existential threat posed to native Peruvians by Spanish racism—especially in light of the fact that native protections from the Spanish Inquisition were starting to weaken.[135] De Acosta worked with this group of *converso* Jesuits in combating, as much as possible, emergent racism against native Peruvians within colonial society. This included their approach to education, which steadfastly maintained racially mixed classrooms even as it began to draw increasing ire from the viceroyalty's authorities.[136] These effort enjoyed only limited success and came to an abrupt

[133] Ibid., 7. While Hyland is aware of the *pureza de sangre* discourse, she insists that it is not a racial discourse. De Acosta's *converso* background is absent from her analysis.
[134] Ibid., 86 n176.
[135] On this see Pablo Joseph de Arriaga, *The Extirpation of Idolatry in Peru*, L. Clark Keating (trans. & ed.) (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1968).
[136] On this see Luis Martin, *The Intellectual Conquest of Peru: The Jesuit College of San Pablo, 1568-1767* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986).

end, as *conversos* were themselves ejected from the Jesuit order and replaced by far more racist men.

We see Homi K. Bhabha's paradigms of mimicry at work here. Bhabha, in *The Location of Culture*, describes colonial mimicry as a desire by the colonizer to produce a "reformed" colonial subject.[137] This desire is integral to Western Colonialism and Imperialism—to claim and convert populations as part of the overall contest with Islamic power. Bhabha notes that, despite this desire, the creation of a colonial subject so similar yet different from the colonizer causes ambivalence from the colonizer which disrupts society—this can clearly be seen in the case of the *conversos*—as they grew more indistinguishable from majority Catholic society, the *pureza de sangre* discourse and the Spanish Inquisition became increasingly Manichean and murderous in outlook.[138]

While Bhabha's concept of mimicry only considered the colonizer's intent, it is vital to understand that there is such a thing as *anticolonial mimicry* as well. Anticolonial mimicry is characterized by the colonized population attempting to accommodate the colonizer's desire for a "reformed" colonial subject as a means to gain emancipation and decolonization into society. We see this anticolonial mimicry in action first in the *converso* surges of Jews attempting to gain emancipation (and retain residency) in Spain, and later in the

[137] Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 86.
[138] Ibid.

instances of *converso* Jesuit attempts to intercede and aid both *moriscos* and natives in becoming unobtrusive enough to gain entry into society.

This anticolonial mimicry, self-colonization as a means toward the end of emancipation into majority society, has remained a hallmark of European Jewish anticolonialism—including the German Jewish variant discussed below. In addition to anticolonial mimicry, the attempt to deracialize Jewishness within the cultural discourse of society has also remained key. A discussion of the colonial history of German Jews quickly reveals that what we saw in Spain as the *pureza de sangre* discourse is replicated in German culture as the discourse on Jewish emancipation.

PART II: A Colonial History of German Jewry

The colonization of German Jewry has its origins in Latin Christian Europe's policies toward Jews. Church policy toward the Jews was imbued with a tension between the impulse to forcibly convert Jews into Catholic society and the impulse to shackle them as an enslaved minority in "perpetual servitude" for their collective guilt of *deicide*.[139] The general characterization of Jews as tainted within Christianity led to their being forced into vocations that were considered unclean and, especially, un-Christian—such as moneylending, merchant activities, and other occupations deemed offensive to Christian sensibilities.[140] This developed into a situation where Jews in German lands and the rest of Latin Europe were allowed residence by authorities based on their economic utility to the community, and were legally allowed to remain only so long as this utility continued.[141] The situation of the Jews in German lands deteriorated into the early modern period, especially as the Jewish ethnic difference became ever more visible as Christianity homogenized Europe.[142]

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[139] Mark R. Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 36-40.
[140] Ibid., 78, 109-111.
[141] Kenneth R. Stow, *Alienated Minority: The Jews of Medieval Latin Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 101.
[142] Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross*, 111.

The Colonization of German Jewry

During the cataclysm of the sixteenth century, which included a resurgence of the Black Death as well as the disintegration of Christendom brought on by the Protestant Reformation and resultant religious warfare, European Jewry was subjected to intense violence at the hands of Christians.[143] This hostile environment drove Jews to flee Central Europe into Polish and Slavic areas.[144] Between the end of the sixteenth century and the onset of the Thirty Years' War in 1618, rulers within the German states began to import Jews back into their realms in order to exploit the vast financial network developed by Jews during centuries of occupational marginalization—allowing German states to gain a source of independent wealth.[145]

German Jewish Communities as Colonies

During the Thirty Years' War, rulers increasingly exploited their imported Jews as a means to finance their military campaigns. By the mid-seventeenth century, the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War exhausted Protestant-Catholic violence and financially ruined the German states of the fragmented Holy Roman Empire.[146] With the rise of mercantilism and of

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[143] Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Jews in the Modern World* (New York: Vintage, 2005), 4.
[144] Ibid.
[145] Jonathan I. Israel, *European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550-1750*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1989), 45.
[146] Sachar, *History of Jews in the Modern World*, 4.

absolutist states following the Peace of Westphalia, the politics of power in Europe became one of economic warfare. In response to this, German rulers formalized the status of Jewish populations into their realms by designating them as royal chattel—these populations were ghettoized and held for ransom against their ability to produce endless amounts of liquid wealth.[147] This was framed as royal protection. German Jewish communities would be subject to expulsion into the midst of an increasingly hostile Christian population if they failed to meet the constant financial demands of their royal owners.[148]

In reformulating the status of Jewish communities into ghettoized colonies, the older medieval structure of Jewish communities in German lands was modified to treat these communities as a corporate unit under royal ownership.[149] While the particulars of this arrangement were as numerous as the various potentates themselves, more generally, they resembled a blending of administrative units found in the British Empire, namely crown colonies and the Princely States under the British Raj. The German ruler owned the community as a possession, which was internally administered and taxed by a (mostly) autonomous Jewish authority structure—which, depending on the community in question, may have included a *Landrabbiner* and/or a Court Jew interfacing with

[147] Ibid., 5.
[148] Ibid.
[149] "Landrabbiner," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd Ed., Vol. 12, Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (eds.) (Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 474.

royal authority and acting as a representative, or *shtadlan,* interceding on behalf of the colonized Jewish community.[150]

This typified the experience of German Jewry during the Age of Mercantilism into the latter half of the eighteenth century, where entire Jewish communities were ejected for failure to come up with demanded funds.[151] As mercantilism began to decline, the growing Enlightenment changed the economics and politics of German lands. During this transition, German Jewish anticolonialism manifested during the struggle for emancipation. It is appropriate to view this process as one of attempted decolonization, not only because the ghettos exhibited the hallmarks of colonialism—a captive, subject population exploited for its resources and labor—but because the ghettos were actually referred to as colonies within the emancipation discourse.[152] This in itself highlights the inappropriateness of the Postcolonial Studies framework's tendency to view the German Jewish experience as "proto-colonial." By the time of the emancipation discourse, German Jews had already been thoroughly colonized for more than a century.

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[150] Hermann Kellenbenz, "Court Jews," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd Ed., Vol. 5, Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (eds.) (Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 246-248; "Shtadlan," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd Ed., Vol. 18, Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (eds.) (Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 521-522.
[151] Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770-1870* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 17.
[152] Israel, *European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism,* 3; David Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780-1840* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 100.

German Jewish Anticolonialism

German Jewish anticolonialism proceeded in roughly two phases, each of them responding to changes within the culture of their German colonizers—invoking the ideals therein in the effort to bring about the decolonization of German Jewry. The first phase reformulated the German Enlightenment as a means to secure Jewish emancipation, while the second reflected the German shift to Romanticism. Notably, both of these phases were characterized with an initial rejection of German antisemitic premises, followed by capitulation and anticolonial mimicry—with debate over the question of to what extent Jewishness needed to be mitigated to facilitate the emancipation of Jews fully into German society.

Moses Mendelssohn and the Capitulation of the Haskalah

Moses Mendelssohn was one of the founding figures of the *Haskalah*, or "Jewish Enlightenment." The *Haskalah* began as an intellectual and social movement amongst German Jews seeking to revitalize Jewish life within its communities, combining elements of the German Enlightenment with a nostalgic view of the cultural vitality of Jews in Muslim Spain.[153] Mendelssohn and other early figures of the *Haskalah*, known as *maskilim*, operated on a logic

[153] Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 61-62.

that the German Enlightenment's rationalism had created an emergent secular space within German culture which could allow for an integration of German Jews into German society without abandoning their Jewish identity.[154]

Mendelssohn occupied a central place in the advent of the debate over the emancipation of German Jewry, which began in Prussia in 1781. His German friend, the historian and political writer Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, was asked by Mendelssohn to produce an argument in favor of Jewish emancipation. The result was a pamphlet titled *Concerning the Amelioration of the Civil Status of the Jews*. Therein, Dohm argues that Jews should be granted equal rights under the law.[155] However, Dohm also contends that the colonized state of German Jews has caused in them a degenerate Jewishness that must first be expunged in order for them to be decolonized and emancipated into German society.[156] Further, German Jews should be compelled to do this by the government:

> This would have to be done either in Jewish schools, or if teachers and funds are for the time being lacking, the Jews should be permitted to send their children to the Christian schools (except for the hours reserved for religious instruction). As some Jews perhaps would be kept from making use of this permission by prejudice, they should even be required

[154] Ibid.
[155] Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, "Concerning the Amelioration of the Civil Status of the Jews (1781)," in *The Jew in the Modern World*, 2nd Ed., Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 32. Notably, Mendelssohn asked Dohm to write his pamphlet for the benefit of German Jews and French Jews alike, arising from a situation in Alsace, where the Jewish community was in dispute
[156] Ibid.

> to send their children to certain classes in accordance with their future vocations.[157]

Already in the opening document of the German Jewish emancipation discourse, its antisemitic premise of coding Jewishness as negative is clear. Moreover, in the opponents of emancipation, those same elements that we identified within the *pureza de sangre* discourse as the core of antisemitism manifest themselves immediately.

The famous biblical scholar Johann David Michaelis opposed emancipation in his *Arguments against Dohm*. Michaelis contends that in addition to the risk Jewish emancipation posed as disruptive to German civil society, it is in fact *impossible* to emancipate Jews into German society.[158] This is due to an innately disloyal nature tied inextricably to their Jewishness:

> But it will be impossible to consider the Jew as an equal of our citizens, and it is therefore impossible to grant him the same freedoms. For he will never be a full citizen with respect for and pride in his country […] and he will never be fully reliable in an hour of danger […] The Jews will always see the state as a temporary home, which they will leave in the hour of their greatest happiness to return to Palestine.[159]

Michaelis elaborates that this innate disloyalty is why the Egyptians enslaved the biblical Hebrews, and adds that the racial inferiority of Jews also makes

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[157] Ibid., 34.
[158] Johann David Michaelis, "Arguments against Dohm (1782)," in *The Jew in the Modern World*, 2nd Ed., Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 42-43.
[159] Ibid., 43.

them physically incapable of that basic component of citizenship: military service.[160]

Before discussing Mendelssohn's reaction to this exchange, it is important to understand Michaelis' opposition to emancipation also as an explicit argument against decolonization. Michaelis believed that, in addition to being a "southern race" incapable of emancipation, Jews would be more useful if they were redeployed as a colonial possession:

> Such a people can perhaps become useful to us in agriculture and manufacturing, if one manages them in the proper manner. They would become even more useful if we had sugar islands which from time to time could depopulate the European fatherland, sugar islands which, with the wealth they produce, nevertheless have an unhealthy climate.[161]

This proposed creation of "sugar islands" was after the style of those possessed by other European empires, which imported African slaves to the West Indies in order to produce as much sugar crop as possible.[162] This underscores the colonized status of German Jews in two ways.

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[160] Ibid., 43-44.
[161] Hess, "Johann David Michaelis and the Colonial Imaginary," 58;
[162] For comparison, see Richard S. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713* (Williamsburg, VA: University of North Carolina Press, 1972); Notably, Michaelis was integral to removing Jewishness from scripture in the academic field in a way not dissimilar to how Christian figures such as Jesus were rendered non-Jewish. Alongside this, Michaelis' biblical scholarship was instrumental in making scripture and biblical studies a utility of the state. See Michael C. Legaspi, *The Death of Scripture and the Rise of Biblical Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Michaelis was also an Orientalist in the academic disciplinary sense, his specialization being Semitic language. Despite his own prominence, academic Orientalists overall were far less impactful on German politics and society. See Suzanne L. Marchand, *German Orientalism and the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

First and foremost, Michaelis' consideration of relocating Jews to sugar islands rather than bothering with the Atlantic Slave Trade highlights the chattel status of the German Jewry. Second, it was the specific colonial problems German States were facing with the economic changes brought about by the shift away from mercantilism that allowed the emancipation discourse to arise in the first place. In much the same way that African American slaves could not be emancipated for as long as the plantation system of the Southern United States remained in place, the advent of the discourse on German Jewish emancipation had as much to do with the end of the economic system that made Jews valuable as a colonial possession as it did the ostensible secular space in culture generated by the German Enlightenment. It is important to understand that Michaelis' suggestion is not an intellectual exercise in "proto-colonialism" or any such "colonial imaginary," it is his solution to the problem of a colonial cash-crop whose mercantile soil had turned barren.

Returning to Moses Mendelssohn, he was deeply dissatisfied with both sides of the nascent emancipation debate. In his *Response to Dohm,* Mendelssohn utterly rejects the idea that Jews must be made ready for emancipation through government programs targeting degenerate Jewishness in order to be useful to society—Jews are already useful to society, and thus

deserve emancipation as a matter of natural rights.[163] Mendelssohn also rejects Michaelis' racialized conception of the intractable difference between Jews and Germans in his *Remarks Concerning Michaelis' Response to Dohm*.[164] Mendelssohn further criticizes the considerable liberal failure inherent to the *Christian* colonial impulse, while also intimating a Jewish moral superiority common to anticolonial criticism, and rebuts Michaelis' racist description of Jewish physical deformity with sarcasm:

> Christians have neglected the doctrines of their founders and have become conquerors, oppressors and slave-traders, and in this way, Jews too could be made fit for military service. But it is obvious that they will have to be the proper height, as Herr Michaelis wisely reminds us, unless they are merely to be used against hostile pygmies and fellow Jews.[165]

This strong rebuke of the moral failings of German Christians, and by extension the colonial enterprise of the Christian West at large, was central to Mendelssohn's appeal to the secular space that he and other early *maskilim* believed Enlightenment rationalism could and would produce.

This particularly informed his insistence that any major changes made within German Jewish culture needed to begin following emancipation, rather than as a condition of emancipation.[166] However, the hoped for secular space did

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[163] Moses Mendelssohn, "Response to Dohm (1782)," in *The Jew in the Modern World,* 2nd Ed., Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 45.
[164] Moses Mendelssohn, "Remarks Concerning Michaelis' Response (1783)," in *The Jew in the Modern World,* 2nd Ed., Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 49.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 69.

not and would not manifest. Mendelssohn's own life interacting with German society illustrated this particularly.

For example, Mendelssohn was beset by the Protestant deacon Johann Caspar Lavater, a famous practitioner of the pseudoscience physiognomy, which supposedly could divine the nature and fate of a person by examining the shape of one's head. Lavater was certain that the slope of Mendelssohn's forehead marked him as a latent convert to Christianity.[167] Lavater also believed that the conversion of Mendelssohn, the "German Socrates," would help bring about the mass conversion of Jewry and the Second Coming of Christ.[168] He issued a public challenge to Mendelssohn, to either refute Christianity or convert, which embarrassed and angered Mendelssohn, who insisted that personal religion is irrelevant in civil society.[169]

Lavater was representative of liberals who favored emancipation, but suggested conversion to Christianity as a necessary requirement to expunge the Jews of their backward Jewishness; Mendelssohn responded with exasperation:

> Rulers of the earth! If it be permitted to an insignificant fellow inhabitant thereof to lift up his voice to you: do not trust the counselors who wish to mislead you by smooth worlds to so harmful an undertaking. They are either blind themselves, and do not see the enemy of mankind lurking in the ambush, or they seek to blind you. Our noblest treasure, the liberty to think, will be forfeited if you listen to them. For the sake of your felicity

[167] Ibid., 46.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Ibid.

> and ours, *a union of faiths is not tolerance*; it is diametrically opposed to true tolerance![170]

Mendelssohn was not without his German supporters. The writer and statesman Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was chagrined at the shocking failure of liberalism apparent within German society's response to Mendelssohn.[171] German satirist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg also defended Mendelssohn against Lavater in a satire he published, titled *Timorous: The Defense of Two Israelites Who, Overwhelmed by Lavater's Proofs and the Taste of Pork Sausages, Converted to the One True Faith*.[172]

Moses Mendelssohn's stalwart rejection of the "regeneration" of Jews out of their Jewishness as a precondition for emancipation was both an explicit anticolonial demand and a strange counterpoint to his own legal status. Moses Mendelssohn's protected legal status as an individual was predicated on his designation by Frederick the Great as an "exceptional" non-Jewish Jew.[173] Mendelssohn's personal efforts to illustrate the natural worthiness of German Jews as a group to German society resulted in the irony of that society recognizing him idiosyncratically as aberrantly non-aberrant. Mendelssohn was not even able to successfully gain legal protection for his own wife and children,

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[170] Moses Mendelssohn, "The Right to Be Different (1783)," in *The Jew in the Modern World,* 2nd Ed., Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 69.
[171] Amos Elon, *The Pity of it All: A Portrait of the German-Jewish Epoch, 1743-1933*, (New York: Picador, 2002), 45.
[172] Ibid., 49.
[173] Ibid., 45.

only for himself.[174] Mendelssohn's hoped for secular space, where Jews might be emancipated into German society spontaneously on the merits of natural law, had not come into being by time of his death in 1786, or after. The capitulation of the *Haskalah* and subsequent mimicry began in short order.

Of Mendelssohn's six children, all but two converted to Christianity in an effort to gain entry into German society, and by 1799, David Friedländer, who succeeded Mendelssohn as the representative of Prussian Jewry, became desperate enough to maintain the Jewish community to suggest that Jews undergo nominal conversion to Lutheranism as a means of entering German society.[175] This "dry-baptism" envisioned a sort of unitary church-synagogue in Berlin, notably an exact inversion of Mendelssohn's contention that "a union of faiths is not tolerance"; the capitulation, now complete, was rejected by Germans as made in bad faith.[176] From this point on, the efforts of the *maskilim* turned toward the regeneration of Jewishness as a means of emancipation that Mendelssohn had so opposed.[177] The *Haskalah* was thus a reactionary and radical program of Enlightenment, seeking to intensively reform Jewishness in a

[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid., 73.
[176] Ibid., 74-75.
[177] Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 101.

manner the German colonizer might find acceptable and deserving of emancipation.[178]

A genuinely secular space failed to manifest itself within majority German society even as legal emancipation was accomplished. This was very clear in the case of the Jews in Prussia, who were declared emancipated by King Frederick William III in 1812. Despite his declaration that the Jews "…shall enjoy equal civil rights and liberties with Christians," Jews remained barred from any positions of leadership in the Prussian government or military.[179] Notably, prior to the unification of Germany in 1871, Prussia's emancipation of its Jews was the most thorough.[180] In other German states, Jews faced further restrictions, especially in southern German states like Bavaria, where Jews were denied various rights such as free trade, movement, and residence.[181]

This hobbled legal emancipation induced a wave of conversions to Christianity by Jews desperate for a more complete entry into majority society.[182] Heinrich Heine was among these converts—the famous poet and journalist hoped that a baptismal certificate would function as an "entrance

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[178] Carsten Schapkow, *Role Model and Countermodel: The Golden Age of Iberian Jewry and German Jewish Culture during the Era of Emancipation*, Corey Twitchell (trans.) (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2016), 37.
[179] Frederick William III, "Emancipation in Prussia (March 11, 1812)," in *The Jew in the Modern World,* 2nd Ed., Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 141, 142n1.
[180] Ibid., 142n1.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Elon, *Pity of it All*, 82.

ticket into European society."[183] Such hopes were overwrought, as the decline of Enlightenment rationalism and a wave of riots would illustrate the true dearth of a secular space in German society, as well as inspire the second phase in German Jewish anticolonialism.

Saul Ascher and the Capitulation of the Wissenschaft Des Judentums

During the nineteenth century, Romanticism began to displace the Enlightenment's dominant place in the culture of German society. Romanticism's sentimental focus and nostalgia for the medieval period as a basis for developing an emergent sense of national Germanness introduced a new peril to German Jewry. Not unlike *Reconquista*-era Spain, German society began to increasingly define Germanness in terms of contra-Jewishness, with Jewishness representing everything negative in German society.

This was not simply a *prima facie* similarity. German nationalist writers such as the historian Friedrich Rühs explicitly referenced the Spanish past as precedent for the Jewish contamination of German culture.[184] For his part, Rühs believed that the baptismal font was enough to wash away Jewishness and bring erstwhile Jews into German society as Christians.[185] Other German nationalist writers were not so gracious. The philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte contended

[183] Ibid., 83.
[184] Schapkow, *Role Model and Countermodel*, 107.
[185] Ibid.

that Jews could only be useful to German society if they were decapitated and had their heads replaced with German heads empty of "Jewish ideas"; otherwise, they should all be deported to Palestine.[186]

German Jewish journalist and publisher Saul Ascher was scathing in his criticism of such nationalist writers, and roundly rejected the increasingly popular formulation of Jewishness as contra-Germanness.[187] In his 1815 response to Rühs, Fichte, and other nationalists, *Germanomania: Sketches of a Portrait of the Times*, Ascher asserted that the Jews *as Jews* have been a boon to European society, and that to destroy that Jewish element through conversion or expulsion would hobble German society, which already lagged behind the rest of Europe.[188] Notably, Ascher also contended that the very idea of an isolated "German" culture is deluded, suggesting instead a process of hybridity very similar to the one Homi K. Bhabha describes between colonizers and colonized.[189] The uncompromising position on the value of Jewishness as it was, and the explicit anticolonial demand of Ascher, would not withstand the intensification of German nationalism, even among Ascher's own family. Not unlike the case of Moses Mendelssohn before him, Saul Ascher's family would choose conversion and assimilation away from their Jewish identity as means of

[186] Elon, *Pity of it All*, 99.
[187] Schapkow, *Role Model and Countermodel*, 110-111.
[188] Ibid.
[189] Ibid.

entry into German society, ultimately entering into the German aristocracy.[190] Within four years of Ascher's *Germanomania*, widespread violence would induce a group of Jewish intellectuals to capitulate to the nationalist turn of German Romanticism, and engage in a fresh form of anticolonial mimicry.

In August of 1819, the city of Würzburg in Bavaria rioted against Jewish civil rights while screaming "Hep! Hep! Death to all Jews!"[191] Before ending in October, anti-Jewish rioting spread and terrorized cities throughout the central and southwestern German states.[192] The "Hep! Hep! Riots" were a clear indication that German Jewish anticolonial appeals to Enlightenment rationalism were insufficient, in the face of intensifying German Romantic nationalism, as a path toward emancipation into German society. The *maskilim* had no ready response to these developments—up to this point the *Haskalah* as an intellectual movement had not had cause to engage with popular sentiment so directly, and its anticolonial argumentation was based primary upon German Jewish utility to the state.[193] Moving forward, emphasize would shift progressively toward utility to German national culture.

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[190] See Debora Hertz, "The Red Countess Helene von Rocawitza: From the Edict of Emancipation in 1812 to Suicide in 1912," in *Das Emanzipationsekikt von 1812 in Preußen, Europäischjüdische Studien, Beitrag 15*, Irene Diekmann (ed.) (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013). The Red Countess was the great-granddaughter of Saul Ascher.
[191] Elon, *Pity of it All*, 101.
[192] Ibid., 102.
[193] Ibid.

Within weeks of the riots, a new movement began to emerge out of the *Haskalah* known as the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, responding to prevailing German Romanticism—these intellectuals adopted Saul Ascher's valuation of Jewishness, but capitulated away from his stalwart position to approach German Jewish integration as a matter of making Jewishness appear German enough to no longer be perceived as a threat by German nationalists.[194] A large part of German Romanticism's development of a sense of German national identity involved academic "sciences" such as philology, philosophy, and history.[195] The *Wissenschaft des Judentums* (Science of Judaism) was intended to introduce these elements into Jewish intellectual culture.[196] Leopold Zunz, the founder of the movement, saw this as essential to the success of German Jewish emancipation:

> The neglect of Jewish science is intricately bound up with the Jews' civic degradation. Through greater intellectual culture and more fundamental knowledge of their own affairs, the Jews would have gained not only a higher level of recognition, thus of rights; but many legislative blunders, many prejudices against Jewish antiquity, many judgements of recent efforts are a direct result of the neglected state in which, in the last seventy years in Germany, Jewish literature and culture found themselves.[197]

The *Wissenschaft des Judentums*' turn toward "scientific" self-study and self-reform moved away from earlier anticolonial appeals to liberalism which

[194] Sorkin, *Transformation of German Jewry*, 134.
[195] Ibid.
[196] Ibid.
[197] Ibid.

typified the *Haskalah*, exemplifying again Homi K. Bhabha's paradigm of mimicry, but in an anticolonial mode, by attempting to self-colonize Jewishness in such a way that would allow German majority society to accept Jews as sufficiently "German" to gain entry into society:

> Its purpose was to bring ordinary Jews into the orbit of German *kultur* and at the same time reinforce Jewish identity…*Wissenschaft*, then, was to reconcile Jews and Germans.[198]

This mimicry was a program of radical Romanticism in a manner very much like the *Haskalah* had been a program of radical Enlightenment—both were intensive and reactionary responses to hostility on the part of their German colonizer.

Anticolonial mimicry extended to changes in Jewish religious practices. Abraham Geiger, founder of Reform Judaism, altered Jewish religious services in such a way that brought them very close to that of Protestantism. Geiger's move to bring Judaism closer to German Christianity, while still retaining Judaism's identity as a religion, constituted anticolonial resistance to the diametric opposition of Jew and German within majority society.[199]

Like the *Haskalah* it arose from, the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* was unsuccessful in gaining German Jewry full entry into German society. Even

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[198] Elon, *Pity of it All*, 112.
[199] Susannah Heschel, "Revolt of the Colonized: Abraham Geiger's Wissenschaft des Judentums as a Challenge to Christian Hegemony in the Academy," *New German Critique* 77 (1999): 61-85, 67.

following the ultimate consolidation of the German "inner-empire" with the unification of the German Reich in 1871, and the legal emancipation of all German Jews, entry into society remained unsuccessful.[200] The more German Jewry endeavored to bring itself into line with German national mores and culture, the more German society disdained them—again falling within Homi K. Bhabha's paradigm of colonizer ambivalence.[201] By 1879, the general conception of Germanness defined in terms of contra-Jewishness was such a central aspect of German national identity that the German publicist Wilhelm Marr formulated it into its own discrete term, "antisemitism," and founded the League of Antisemites.

It must be remembered that antisemitism had already been operative in Germany and Europe at large for centuries, as the earlier discussion of early modern Spain clearly illustrates. All he did was provide an innovation of terminology. Notably, even Marr was known to exhibit tendencies that would be identified as philosemitic as it is currently misidentified in some scholarship—he was as willing to accept individual Jews who had entirely shed their Jewishness as the Dreyfusards would be a few decades later.[202]

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[200] Elon, *Pity of it All*, 210.
[201] Ibid., 215.
[202] See Moshe Zimmerman, *Wilhelm Marr: The Patriarch of Antisemitism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Even Marr came to express horror about the increasingly radical direction taken by champions of the term he coined, and insisted that he himself was both an antisemite *and* a philosemite, (116-156).

The intensification of German antisemitism, and the failure of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* to ameliorate it, as well as the deterioration of the situation of European Jewry at large, began to stir a nationalistic anticolonial response among German Jews leading into the twentieth century. Before turning to the development of Zionism out of this response, it is necessary to give attention to German Jewish perception of the Islamic world, and its relationship with the *Ostjuden*.

German Jewry and the Matter of Orientalism

The relationship between German Jewish anticolonialism and the "Orient" has left itself open to criticism from both the Postcolonial Studies framework and from other scholars seeking to facilitate a final resolution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict.[203] This has taken the form of ascribing orientalism to German Jews, especially in their highly ambivalent responses to and interactions with the *Ostjuden*.

[203] This generally takes the form of conceding a relationship between Zionism and Western Colonialism and Imperialism. See, for example Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, *Orientalism and the Jews* (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University Press, 2004). This edited volume conflates orientalism and antisemitism as identical phenomena, and largely dispenses with antisemitism as a term, in an attempt to create common ground in the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

Postcolonial Studies Scholarship on German Jews

Postcolonial Studies scholarship on German Jews follows after Suzanne Zantop's 1997 monograph *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Pre-colonial Germany, 1770-1870.* Therein, Zantop attributes to Germans an envy of the possessions of the major Western colonial powers—leading to a "colonial fantasy" in which the German nation engaged in a "rehearsal" for its subsequent late nineteenth century territorial expansion.[204] Within this imagined rehearsal, the German nation defined its relations with outsiders of its would-be subject populations as an extension of the already extant relationship between Germans and "internal others," such as the Jews, thus colonizing these groups internally in preparation for the German nation's forthcoming colonial enterprise.[205] Notably, for being a work on the internal colonization of German lands, Zantop's work includes scant mention of Germany Jewry, and only then in reference to all "internal others" as a conglomeration.[206] Despite this, her book informed subsequent Postcolonial Studies scholarship on German Jewry.

Susannah Heschel expands on Zantop's idea of "rehearsal" in a 1999 article dealing with Abraham Geiger and the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* as a

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[204] Susanne Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Pre-colonial Germany, 1770-1870* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), 7.
[205] Ibid., 15, 82.
[206] Zantop's also suffers from a tendency to overlook the highly ambivalent interface between Jews and German society. For example, she discusses Heinrich Heine as a figure critical of the German colonial fantasy, yet makes no mention of Heine's Jewish background and its centrality to his ambivalence toward modern Germany.

site of colonial revolt, framing debates surrounding Jewish emancipation in Germany as a "proto-colonial enterprise."[207] Heschel utilizes Homi K. Bhabha's framework of complex interrelation between the colonized and the colonizer to view Abraham Geiger's use of a Protestant theological framework as a subversion of German "proto-colonialism" to create new space for German Jews as cultural insiders.[208]

Jonathan M. Hess's 2000 article, noted in the Introduction, focuses on Johann David Michaelis and expands upon Edward Said's concept of orientalism by pairing it with modern antisemitism as "mutually determining discourses," particularly Michaelis' view that the Jews were of a "southern race" which could not possibly be integrated into the German populace.[209]

While Heschel and Hess view German Jews as courageous anticolonialists, Leo W. Riegert, Jr. complicates this Saidian binary in his 2009 article by exploring German Jews as both subjects and agents of empire.[210] Riegert is rightly critical of the tendency to depict German Jewish figures primarily as heroic figures railing against colonial oppression.[211] Instead of subscribing to a narrow view of colonized German Jews as "countering

[207]Heschel, "Revolt of the Colonized," 62.
[208] Ibid., 64.
[209] Hess, "Johann David Michaelis and the Colonial Imaginary," 56-101, 93.
[210] Leo W. Riegert Jr., "Subjects and Agents of Empire: German Jews in Post-Colonial Perspective," *The German Quarterly* 82, no. 3 (2009): 336-355, 337.
[211] Ibid., 338.

modernity's homogenizing claims," Riegert takes a cue from Homi K. Bhabha by suggesting an "interstitial approach to the contradictory ways in which Jews contributed to German colonialist and Orientalist fantasies" around the turn of the twentieth century.[212] In this sense, the German Jewish capacity both as subjects and agents of empire is seen especially in regards to their highly ambivalent attitudes toward the *Ostjuden*, or Eastern European Jews.[213] Riegert also borrows from Homi K. Bhabha's concept of mimicry discourse between the colonizer and the colonized, which disrupts colonial stability by accentuating the otherness of the colonized and inspiring mockery by the colonizer. Riegert expands this idea to note how an internally colonized population like German Jewry can simultaneously direct mockery through mimicry discourse in both directions, toward the German colonizer and the *Ostjuden* outsider, through German Jewry's own insider/outsider status.[214] Riegert highlights this doubling of the mimicry discourse into dual mockery as illustrating the extreme identity instability of colonized German Jews.[215]

While there is much borrowing from Edward Said in this scholarship on German Jewry as a colonized people, there are also illuminating criticisms. For example, Susannah Heschel is highly critical of Said's overall dismissal of the

[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid., 343.
[214] Ibid., 347-349.
[215] Ibid., 349.

historical importance of German orientalism.[216] Similarly, Jonathan M. Hess confronts Said's characterization of German orientalism as essentially intellectual in nature and, thus, not overly politically relevant, and is very critical of Said's vague treatment of the connection between antisemitism and orientalism.[217]

Certainly, German Jewish responses to *Ostjuden* can appear to be very similar to orientalism, and, to a limited extent, they are. However, the attribution of orientalism by scholars such as Riegert often does not take into account German Jewish engagement with the antisemitic discourse in German society actively arrayed against it, or, if it does, frames this discourse as orientalism as well. Moreover, this view also tends to look backward from the Arab-Israeli Conflict as a referent. A more historically contextualized look at the apparent relationship between German Jews and orientalism illustrates that what was actually occurring was an extension of the German Jewish anticolonial response to German society's antisemitic discourse. Before turning to the relationship between German Jews and the *Ostjuden*, it is important to discuss the place of the Islamic world within German Jewish anticolonialism.

[216] Heschel, "Revolt of the Colonized," 62.
[217] Hess, "Johann David Michaelis and the Colonial Imaginary," 93.

Muslim Spain as Role Model and Anticolonial Critique

Recall that early *maskilim*, such as Moses Mendelssohn, believed that the German Enlightenment had generated a secular space within German culture into which German Jews might be decolonized and emancipated. When this was not immediately forthcoming, enlarging that secular space sufficiently so that both Christians and Jews could live inside it became the great goal of the *Haskalah* as the surest way to facilitate emancipation. Because appeals to liberalism proved insufficient to convince German society that German Jews were worthy of emancipation, another option was needed. Other anticolonial movements in history, such as that of British India, invoked the nobility of the colonized's cultural past as proof of worth.[218] German Jewish anticolonialism sought to do likewise. However, the *maskilim* had little precedent to draw from in the history of German Jews, or from Jews of Latin Christian European environs overall, for the kind of secular space they were attempting to enlarge within German society to facilitate their decolonization.[219] For this reason, *maskilim* turned to the historical experience of the Jews of Muslim Spain.[220]

The Jews of Muslim Spain were a protected minority under Islamic political and religious law in a way that prevented the same kind of colonization

[218] See, for example Mahatma Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj; or, Indian Home Rule* (Ahmedabad, India: Navajvan Publishing House, 1939).
[219] Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross*, xx.
[220] Schapkow, *Role Model and Countermodel*, xiv.

and chattelization Jews experienced in Germany.[221] This difference allowed a secular space in the culture of Muslim Spain to exist in which Jews were able to participate and thrive.[222] *Maskilim*, therefore, looked toward prominent Jewish figures from the history of Muslim Spain as role models for how they might make the most of the diminutive secular space German society had available.[223]

The use of Muslim Spain as a role model persisted throughout the *Haskalah*, and was an integral element of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* as well. German Jews perceived the period of Islamic rule in Spain as the cause of the flowering of Jewish culture during that period, specifically because of the secular space that existed within Muslim Spanish culture. The resulting "efflorescence" of Jewish scholarship and art resulted in an enhanced hybrid culture that created a Golden Age.[224]

The relationship between Jewish inclusion in majority society and that society's cultural well-being was considered by German Jews to be existential. So much so, in fact, that the expulsion of Jews at the conclusion of the *Reconquista* reduced nascent Christian Spain to a state of fanatical barbarism and backwardness which spilled over into the world at large.[225] This particular

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[221] Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross*, 52. And, for that matter, Muslim Spain did not include the same colonial impulse that would animate the Spanish Christians who later drove them from the peninsula.
[222] W. Montgomery Watt and Pierre Cachia, *A History of Islamic Spain*, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Aldine Transaction, 2008), 64.
[223] Schapkow, *Role Model and Countermodel*, 56.
[224] Ibid., 162, 171.
[225] Ibid., 217.

vein of anticolonial criticism is visible as early as Moses Mendelssohn's castigation of Christianity over the Western Colonial and Imperial enterprises, and notably calls all of European society to task over it.

Importantly, this basic formulation of the laudable nature of Islamic rule in Spain, and the sense of tragedy at its end, dramatically undercuts any simple attribution of orientalism to German Jews. Far from considering Islam an inherent threat, this perspective was in fact an inversion of the orientalist perspective. Indeed, that was the point. In the face of a German culture that came to increasingly valorize Medieval Latin Christendom, Muslim Spain served as a pointed anticolonial critique: medieval Muslim Spain had been more vital, more liberal, and more advanced than modern Germany. As German Jewish anticolonialism contained within its basic premise a repudiation of orientalism, from its point of origin no less, this casts immediate doubt on the attribution of orientalism to the German Jewish response to the *Ostjuden*.

German Jews and Ostjuden: A Question of Orientalism

Given that the viewpoint of German Jewish anticolonial intellectuals fails to meet the basic criteria of orientalism, an alternative explanation for their ambivalent perspective toward the *Ostjuden* is necessary. Importantly, this perspective was based primarily around two elements. The first was the relationship between the *Ostjuden* and Muslim Spain within the German Jewish

anticolonial paradigm, while the second was a reflection of the running antisemitic discourse within German culture.

As noted above, part of the paradigm of Muslim Spain within the German Jewish anticolonial imagination was the sense that the expulsion of Jews from Christian Spain destroyed its culture. Within this paradigm, the expulsion was seen to have led to the decay of Spanish Jewish culture as well, especially where Spanish Jews relocated to Europe. The general idea here is that the Spanish expulsion was so traumatic that it largely stopped the development of Spanish Jewish culture in its tracks, becoming one that looked back upon the days of Muslim Spain with nostalgia and regret. This ossification was felt to have spread to *both* the Jews of German lands and Eastern Europe. In drawing on that past as noble and restorative, German Jewish anticolonialism, first through the *Haskalah* and, later, the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, sought to reverse that ossification and reproduce its enhanced hybrid culture in a German context.

Important here is that the differences between German Jews and Eastern European Jews were taken to be geographic rather than categorical, at least not in the same sense implied by orientalism. Indeed, both shared in an older common Germanic Jewish (Ashkenazic) culture. Much of this geographical difference was tied to the relative situation of Jews in each region *at the hands of Christian majority society*.

The situation of the *Ostjuden* well into the modern period had been different from that of German Jews. Most significantly, the *Ostjuden* had enjoyed a more or less unbroken history of legal protection that dated back to before the full Christianization of Eastern Europe.[226] This prevented the same manner of chattelized colonization experienced by German Jews. This also meant that the *Ostjuden* were not ghettoized in the same manner that German Jews had been; they lived in communities throughout Eastern Europe and plied a full array of trades.[227] This changed dramatically during the seventeenth century, when Eastern Europe became the site of increasing territorial disputes between European empires such as Austria and Russia. Violence and oppression against the *Ostjuden*, beginning in earnest during the seventeenth century, remained far greater than that suffered by German Jews.[228]

As they lived spread throughout the region, the *Ostjuden* were particularly vulnerable to surges of antisemitic violence, which disrupted their livelihoods and left them increasingly as destitute refugees. If the *Ostjuden* were more "backward," it was a result of these factors, rather than anything inherently "Oriental" about them. These tumultuous times generated cultural impulses in

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[226] See François Guesnet, "Agreements between neighbours. The 'ugody' as a source on Jewish-Christian relations in early modern Poland," *Jewish History* 24 no. 3 (2010): 257-270.
[227] Solomon Maimon, *An Autobiography*, Michael Shapiro (intro.), J. Clark Murray (trans.) (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001 [1786, 1880]), 130.
[228] Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross*, 4, 179; See also Israel Bartal, *The Jews of Eastern Europe, 1772-1881*, Chaya Naor (trans.) (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 3-5, 7, 18, 25, 123.

the opposite direction as those experienced among German Jews. The great cultural response of the *Ostjuden* was toward mysticism and messianism, itself not at all uncommon for peoples under harsh imperial or colonial dominion—it is during this time that the spiritual revivalism of *Hasidism* took root.[229] Again, it must be stressed that there was not a typological difference at play here. This is clear from the fact that throughout this period, German Jews and *Ostjuden* travelled heavily between regions for educational pursuits, depending on whether the education sought favored the spiritualism of the *Hasidim* or the rationalism of the *Haskalah*.

These developments in Eastern Europe which endangered the *Ostjuden* were well understood by the *maskilim* in German lands. Moses Mendelssohn was sympathetic, and offered entry into the *Haskalah* for *Ostjuden* as a sort of pipeline out of Eastern Europe similar to the one the early Jesuit order offered to *conversos* as a way out of Spain.[230] Indeed, one of the most brilliant figures of the era, Solomon Maimon, was among the *Ostjuden* who entered into the circle of *maskilim* in just this fashion.[231] For his own part, Maimon is of particular note.

Born Shlomo Ben Joshua in Polish Lithuania, Maimon was an autodidact and Talmudic prodigy who left his home in a search for learning which brought

[229] Ibid., 45.
[230] Elon, *Pity of it All*, 55-57; Maimon, *An Autobiography*, xvi, xxvii.
[231] Ibid.

him to Berlin.[232] Shlomo Ben Joshua became "Solomon Maimon" as a self-reference of his own symbolic return to the intellectual flowering of Muslim Spain, personified by Maimonides, whose work Maimon helped to adapt to serve the needs of the *maskilim's* anticolonial endeavor.[233] For his part, Maimon's perspective of his fellow *Ostjuden* was similar to German Jewish *maskilim*, he felt that the *Haskalah* was better equipped to cope with the changes the *Ostjuden* were facing, and, in effect, Maimon's own autobiography continued to inform German Jewish anticolonialism regarding the *Ostjuden* through its *Wissenschaft* phase.[234]

It is clear that a charge of orientalism on the part of German Jews against the *Ostjuden* lacks the kind of basic typological categorization that orientalism requires (leaving aside that the *Ostjuden* were not an Islamic group, which could serve as a summary disqualifier). Be that as it may, while figures such as Mendelssohn were sympathetic to the *Ostjuden,* and were content to invite them into the *Haskalah*, German Jews overall remained more ambivalent, and sometimes even hostile, toward the *Ostjuden*. This begs the question of why.

[232] Ibid.
[233] Schapkow, *Role Model and Countermodel*, 60.
[234] Ibid., 167.

German Jewish Emancipation and the Ostjuden Refugee Crisis

As the situation of the *Ostjuden* continued to deteriorate, greater and greater numbers began to arrive in Germany as refugees—around fifty-thousand arrived during the 1870s alone.[235] However, this was nothing compared to what came next. Beginning in 1881, a wave of *pogroms* caused a flood of *Ostjuden* to flee their homes in spectacular numbers. No less than two and one-half million *Ostjuden* had poured out of Eastern Europe by 1914, with tens of thousands arriving in Germany annually.[236]

This caused an unexpected crisis for German Jews. In the midst of their increasingly beleaguered attempt to diffuse the growing hostility of the antisemitic emancipation discourse within German culture, masses of impoverished *Ostjuden* suddenly began to arrive and draw the attention of German majority society. German opponents of German Jewish emancipation seized on this immediately, and the government reacted with intense negativity to the sudden presence of Jews who appeared to personify the oldest of antisemitic stereotypes. This imperiled German Jews and *Ostjuden* alike. It is vital to understand German Jewish responses to the *Ostjuden* within this context.

Further, it is important to reiterate that cultural and intellectual exchanges had been going on between German Jews and the *Ostjuden*, in both

[235] Jack Wertheimer, *Unwelcome Strangers: East European Jews in Imperial Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 11.
[236] Ibid., 11-12.

directions, for some time. Indeed, there was so much exchange both in culture and bloodlines that it is more accurate to consider German Jews and *Ostjuden* as a hybrid culture, which of course it was—Ashkenazic culture—comprising both elements together, rather than Riegert's attribution of an orientalist and colonial German Jewish outlook.[237] However, this is not to say that there were not intensely negative responses to the *Ostjuden* on the part of German Jews, especially intellectuals of the *Haskalah* and *Wissenschaft des Judentums*. There very much were. Often, German Jewish writers resorted to the very antisemitic tropes German Jews themselves were consistently unable to escape from.[238] This was an effort to distance themselves from association with these tropes. In order to avoid a simplistic attribution of German Jewish orientalism against *Ostjuden* victims, it is vital to understand that some of the harshest responses to the *Ostjuden* refugee crisis were from *Ostjuden* themselves.

A particular example of this is seen from the *Wissenschaft* historian Heinrich Graetz. Graetz was born in Poland, and the trajectory of his life was not unlike that of Solomon Maimon before him. Early in life, Graetz received a religious education in Wolstyn while also teaching himself both French and Latin.[239] Following a period of study under the innovator of modern German

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[237] Ibid.
[238] Schapkow, *Role Model and Countermodel*, 164-166.
[239] See Schmuel Ettinger and Marcus Pyka, "Graetz, Heinrich," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd Ed., Vol. 8, Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (eds.) (Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 26-29.

Orthodox Judaism in Oldenburg, Samson Raphael Hirsch, Graetz ultimately made his way into Berlin and the *Wissenschaft* circle as a historian.[240] Though a Polish Jew himself, Graetz' assessment of the *Ostjuden*, and Polish Jews in particular, was intensely negative. He went so far as to transpose antisemitic tropes almost wholesale onto the *Ostjuden*:

> People joked about the "Polacks," but nevertheless became subordinate to them. […] Through their influence, scientific knowledge and the study of the Bible declined still more than previously. In the century of Descartes and Spinoza […] Jewish-Polish emigrants, baited by Chmielnicki's bands, brought a new middle age over European Judaism[.][241]

Notably, Graetz transposes antisemitic tropes onto the *Ostjuden* of the past, making them responsible for the Jewishness that German majority society so disdains, rather than contemporary German Jews or even the fellow *Ostjuden* toward whom Graetz was so ambivalent. Two elements here are essential. First we see, again, the anticolonial trope of attempting to divert the colonizers' racialized perception *temporally* away from its target. In the same way that early

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[240] The various iterations of modern Orthodox Judaism functioned as an alternate form of anticolonial mimicry to the one focused upon in this thesis. Within the modern Orthodoxy variant, full social emancipation of the Jews into society was not the goal. Rather, legal emancipation of the Jews served as an avenue for Jews to solidify Jewish identity through distinctive retention of religious ritual and custom, in contrast to Geiger and the Reform position of moving Judaism closer to Protestantism in form. The key difference here is that while Geiger and other *Wissenschaft* figures sought to pass beyond the threshold of colonizer ambivalence into full social emancipation, S.R. Hirsch and other modern Orthodox figures sought to remain just beyond that threshold. See Simha Katz and Yehoyada Amir, "Hirsch, Samson (ben) Raphael," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 2nd Ed., Vol. 9, Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (eds.) (Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 129-132.

[241] Heinrich Graetz, *History of the Jews Vol 5: From the Chmielnicki Persecution of the Jews in Poland (1648 C.E.) to the Present Time (1870)* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1895), 17.

modern *moriscos* were not responsible for the Islamic invasion of Spain, nineteenth century Jews were not responsible for the presence of the Jewishness that Germans so hated. Second, this highlights the tendency of German Jews and even other *Ostjuden* such as Graetz to see the refugee crisis as conjuring a sort of specter from the past which threatened to endanger their efforts to accomplish a full social emancipation of Jews within society, and from which they needed to distance themselves.[242]

Similarly to the way that it had been dangerous for both *converso* Jesuits and natives in Colonial Latin America to be racially conflated with Jewishness in Spanish society, so too was it dangerous for both German Jews and *Ostjuden* within German society. While responses to the *Ostjuden* could be callous and cruel, they were not orientalist. German Jews did not look at the *Ostjuden* and see an "other," they saw themselves. This is immediately clear from the fact that *Ostjuden* such as Heinrich Graetz were prominent members of the *Wissenschaft* milieu—it encompassed the broader hybrid Ashkenazic culture. Moreover, a simple attribution of orientalism to German Jews fails to account for the harsh invective with which German Jews often dealt with each other.

The mimicry aspect of German Jewish anticolonialism is essential to understanding this dynamic in its broader scope. Considerations of what could

[242] See Ismar Schorsch's introduction to his translation of Heinrich Graetz, *The Structure of Jewish History and Other Essays*, Ismar Schorsch (trans., ed.) (New York: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1975), 1-62.

jeopardize emancipation were not limited to fears about the impact of the *Ostjuden* refugee crisis. Recall that the fundamentally antisemitic basis of the emancipation discourse meant, especially in the *Wissenschaft* phase, that convincing Germans that Jews could dispense with sufficient Jewishness was key to any successful social emancipation. Jews had to become *Germans*. Not unlike any intellectual movement, or anticolonial movement for that matter, there was not a universal consensus of how to go about this process. Disagreements became heated, even nasty. It is within these debates amongst German Jews about how best to engage with German society in the emancipation discourse that accusations of "Jewish self-hatred" began to be cast between different camps within German Jewish intellectual circles.[243]

Succinctly, "Jewish self-hatred" is characterized by the internalization of antisemitic tropes on the part of Jews. The irony of such accusations is readily apparent. Given that the emancipation discourse was fundamentally antisemitic in nature, the very capitulation and engagement with that discourse by German Jewish anticolonialists *required* a level of internalization in order for its praxis of anticolonial mimicry to function. In a particular way, accusations of "Jewish self-hatred" functioned as a reflection of the emancipation discourse. For

[243] See Richard M. Alperin, "Jewish Self-Hatred: The Internalization of Prejudice," *Clinical Social Work Journal* 44 no. 3 (2016): 221-230. Such accusations flew across the broad intellectual cross-section of German Jewry, from debates over religion, history, attire, and so on; See also Paul Reitter, *On the Origins of Jewish Self-Hatred* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

example, as a Polish Jew himself, Heinrich Graetz' expressed disdain for *Ostjuden*, the Jews of the land of his own birth, might qualify him for the label of "Jewish self-hatred." Yet, such attribution would be ridiculous. Rather, accusations of "Jewish self-hatred" served as a language of strongest terms through which Jewish disagreed about the proper level of anticolonial mimicry. In the case of Graetz and other *Wissenschaft* intellectuals, we now have a better context for the ambivalent response to *Ostjuden* refugees. It was a perception of the risk to Jewish emancipation, caused by the *Ostjuden* refugees' apparent utter lack of anticolonial mimicry that animated this ambivalence—not orientalism.

Zionism represented a shift within German Jewish anticolonial mimicry away from self-colonization into German nationalism and toward an explicitly Jewish nationalism. This new phase, drawing heavily from previous phases, nevertheless reflected a growing sense that emancipation was an untenable option for decolonizing German Jews.[244] This began slowly over the latter half of the nineteenth century. Notably, this shift was not only a German Jewish phenomenon, and, in fact, spanned the hybrid culture of German Jews and *Ostjuden*, represented by figures as diverse as the assimilated Spinozist Moses Hess from Bonn and the Orthodox Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer from Lesno.[245]

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[244] Jehuda Reinharz, "Ideology and Structure in German Zionism, 1882-1933," *Jewish Social Studies* 42 no. 2. (1980): 119-146, 127.
[245] Arthur Hertzberg (ed.), *The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader*, 2nd Ed., (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1997), 108, 116.

Both figures, later identified as Proto-Zionists, arrived at a common conclusion from opposite secular and religious camps: emancipation was a failure and Jews must help themselves by forming a nation in Palestine.

Zionism as an Anticolonial Nationalist Turn

As some German Jewish anticolonialists began to gain an understanding of the futility of the emancipatory paradigm of decolonization, their Jewish consciousness began also to extend beyond a consideration of German Jews in Germany. These figures had, of course, been aware of Jews elsewhere—as has clearly been demonstrated in the case of the *Ostjuden*. However, in the case of French Jews, for example, German Jewish anticolonialists looked toward France in an aspirational manner—France was seen to be as exemplar of the modern possibilities of emancipation not unlike the way the Jews of the Muslim Spanish past were seen as role models for German Jews. This offers some understanding as to why it was an outburst of French antisemitism, rather than the situation of Germany, that so impacted Theodor Herzl—the father of German Jewish Political Zionism.[246]

[246] Elon, *Pity of it All*, 285; See also Jacques Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl: From Assimilation to Zionism* (Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 1993).

The Dreyfus Affair: Herzl's Loss of Faith in Emancipation

Theodor Herzl, born to a secular family and raised in the German Jewish intellectual milieu of Budapest, was a newspaper correspondent in Paris when the Dreyfus Affair began in 1894. During the course of the Affair, the French Government falsely accused Jewish officer Alfred Dreyfus of espionage, convicted him of treason, and confined him to Devil's Island. In 1896, Georges Picquart discovered that another officer, Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy, had framed Dreyfus to cover his own acts of espionage.

The military attempted to suppress the matter; Esterhazy was acquitted and quickly fled the country. When supporters of Dreyfus accused the military of conspiracy and antisemitism against Dreyfus, French nationalists responded with antisemitic riots in cities across France.[247] Like the riots that in 1819 had spurred the formation of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, the French riots resonated with shouts of "Death to Jews!"[248] As witness to such rioting in a French culture where emancipation was thought to be more successful than in German culture, Herzl was deeply troubled by the antisemitism that the Affair showed to exist immediately under the surface of ostensibly liberal French culture.[249] Herzl did not remain in France throughout the course of the Affair.

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[247] Ruth Harris, *Dreyfus: Politics, Emotion, and the Scandal of the Century* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010), 120.
[248] Elon, *Pity of it All*, 285.
[249] Ibid.; See also Kornberg, *Theodor Herzl*, 190-200.

He was not present to witness the disdain toward Jews exhibited even by Dreyfus's French defenders, and, having died in 1904, Herzl did not live to see the Dreyfusards turn on Dreyfus with antisemitic vitriol after the Affair's conclusion. For Herzl, the very fact of the Affair and the rioting of 1895 were enough to shake his faith in emancipation.

Herzl began to embrace the idea of Jewish nationalism as an alternative to emancipation; by 1896, this transition was complete with the publication of the pamphlet *Der Judenstaat*.[250] Herzl had come to see the process of emancipation itself as a cause of antisemitism—increasingly ardent attempts by Jews to embrace Gentile ways could only produce ever greater antisemitic responses.[251] Notably, this is the very definition of Homi K. Bhabha's paradigm of colonial mimicry.[252] For Herzl, only the establishment of a Jewish national home could end this feedback loop—he believed that Jewish nationalism could actually resolve and bring an end to antisemitism.[253]

Unlike other anticolonial nationalisms, Jews did not occupy a homeland from which to eject its colonizers. To this end, Theodor Herzl developed a novel approach to the opposing sides of the antisemitic emancipation discourse, by

[250] Hertzberg, *Zionist Idea*, 203.
[251] Theodor Herzl, *Der Judenstaat: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question*, Sylvie D. Avigdor (trans.), Filiquarian Affordable and High Quality Paperback Ed. (Lexington, Kentucky: Filiquarian, 2011 [1896]), 52.
[252] Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 85.
[253] Herzl, *Der Judenstaat*, 92.

simultaneously acceding to both through a program of self-expulsion *and* self-colonization.[254]

Herzl Rejects Capitulation: Jewishness as Anticolonialism

It is useful to view the formulation of Herzl's Zionism as a rejection of the capitulations of the *maskilim* and *Wissenschaft* scholars who came before him. It was also an ultimate rejection of the emancipation discourse created by such capitulation: Jewishness did and would always cause antisemitism so long as Jews lacked their own national home; emancipation and assimilation, no matter how total, would change this. In doing so, Herzl managed to invert previous German Jewish anticolonial critiques on the benefits of Jewishness to European culture (via the example of Muslim Spain), to make Jewishness *itself* an anticolonial critique of Europe.

This manifested itself in classic anticolonial nationalist form, wherein the colonizer is depicted as morally bankrupt, and only the moral superiority of the colonized people was capable of truly realizing the colonizer's expressed ideals.[255] In the formulation of anticolonial nationalism, the cultural core of the colonized population itself becomes the ultimate anticolonial critique, and one that empowers the colonized people to break away as its own nation. The idea of

[254] Ibid., 86.
[255] See Marchand, *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire*, xxvi. Marchand notes that this was especially true in the concept of a colonized people's spirit.

Jewishness as anticolonial critique is especially evident in Herzl's utopian novel *Altneuland* (Old-New Land).

Within this novel, Herzl's vision of a Jewish polity in Palestine is replete with criticisms of the failure of European liberalism, such as the absence of universal suffrage, which remained the norm in Europe.[256] In addition to these criticisms, there is a strong assertion that the moral superiority of Jewish anticolonialism is uniquely equipped to bring the stagnated progress of European liberalism to its completion:

> And you know, man, who could show the way? You! You Jews! Just because you're so badly off. You've nothing to lose. You could make the experimental land for humanity. […] On that ancient soil, Old-New-Land![257]

Notably, Herzl viewed this national redemption of Jews out from under the antisemitic European yoke as akin to the breaking of a levy. In the wake of such an advent, Herzl imagined that the troubled progress that had plagued Europe since the Enlightenment would finally come flooding forth to its conclusion—to the extent that it would reach as far as the United States and lead directly to the end of racism against African Americans as well.[258]

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[256] Theodor Herzl, *Altneuland*, Filiquarian Classics 1st Ed., (Lexington, Kentucky: Filiquarian, 2007 [1902]), 78-79, 89-91.
[257] Ibid., 60-61.
[258] Ibid., 193. The idea that Jews could serve as a vanguard of global liberalism was, of course, not unique to Herzl's Zionism. Jewish self-perceptions of being on the cutting edge of modernity and liberalism were no less important in the United States, up to the present day.

Herzl broke with earlier German Jewish anticolonialists in a number of ways. First and foremost was a rejection of occupying the same space as their colonizers. Second, Herzl's Zionism turned to—and to an extent invented—the "nationalist" heroes of the Jewish past. The Zionist "nationalist" hero was a tragic one, willing to risk and lose, and even die, for the cause of the Jewish people. Examples include those who chose death at Masada rather than surrender to the Romans, who Herzl idolized alongside the failed seventeenth century messiah Shabbatai Zvi as tragic national heroes.[259]

Herzl also turned away from Continental Europe and toward the United States of America as a model for the Jewish immigrant nation he envisioned. Notably, it is not for its republican form of government that Herzl looks to America, but rather as a model of industry and ingenuity possible for an immigrant nation. American cultural strength is juxtaposed against European weakness, and America is invoked as a role model repeatedly.[260] This illustrates a clear break in the aspirational gaze of German Jewish anticolonialism, which even for Herzl had still been focused upon France prior to the Dreyfus Affair.

While Zionism as a political movement began in a German Jewish anticolonial context, through the person of Herzl, Zionism quickly became a more pan-Ashkenazic phenomenon. With the First Zionist Congress, in Basel,

[259] Herzl, *Altneuland*, 124-125.
[260] Ibid., 36, 95, 150, 187.

Switzerland in 1897, Zionism was already officially an international phenomenon. Indeed, it was not long before the movement's intellectual and political leaders were largely *Ostjuden* in background.[261] With this being the case, the question of orientalism again comes to the fore.

The majority representation of *Ostjuden* within Zionism largely obviates the question of Zionist orientalism, at least as an extension of alleged German Jewish orientalism—and further illustrates the broader hybrid Ashkenazic culture over Riegert's characterization of German Jews as agents of empire against the *Ostjuden*. Indeed, disenchanted *maskilim* and *Wissenschaft* intellectuals of Eastern European origin quickly became the dominant shapers of Zionism both politically and culturally. Yet, the charge of orientalism, and by extension Western Colonialism and Imperialism, against Zionism persists—despite its anticolonial origins and existential repudiation of both.

[261] Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism: From the French Revolution to the Establishment of the State of Israel*, 2nd Ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 2003 [1976]), 136.

Conclusion: Islam, Capitulation, and Continuity

Having laid out the twin births of antisemitism and orientalism, and traced a continuity of Jewish anticolonialism since those twin births, especially among German Jews, which clearly demonstrates the non-orientalist background of Zionism, it is useful to conclude with a discussion of continuities. Before looking at some of the particular continuities that have persisted into the period of Israeli statehood, an exploration of Herzl's conception of Zionism's relationship with Islam is germane.

Herzl and Islam

While the Zionist anticolonial turn meant giving up Muslim Spain as a role model for the possibilities of emancipation into German society and Europe at large, this did not result in a rejection of Muslim Spain as a role model entirely.[262] The idea of Jews as a mediator for advancing culture remained, though this was modified to a more national perspective, with Zionism facilitating the realization of the model in a way that emancipation could not—as noted above. For a brief time, however, Zionism existed as an attempt for a literal recreation of the Jewish-Muslim hybridity of Muslim Spain within an Ottoman context.

[262] Schapkow, *Role Model and Countermodel*, 26.

Early in the Zionist movement, Herzl considered the idea of gaining a sort of rental charter from the Ottoman sultan for a Zionist community in Palestine, structured along the lines of the older German Jewish semi-autonomous communities prior to the age of emancipation.[263] There was even an unsuccessful attempt to bring this into reality; Herzl held meetings and negotiations on the matter with Sultan Abdülhamid II until 1902.[264] This phase of Herzl's activity is usually considered little more than a footnote in the history of Zionism—especially because the British Empire took possession of Palestine after the First World War fulfilled the originating impulse of Western Colonialism and Imperialism, bringing more than six centuries of Ottoman power to an end. Be that as it may, Herzl's original assessment and intentions for Zionism under Ottoman auspices demonstrate a starkly non-orientalist perspective.

It is obvious enough that Herzl did not view Islam as an inherent threat, which alone obviates any foundational orientalism within the movement. There is, however, more than this. In the same manner that Herzl had transformed Jewishness itself into anticolonialism, Herzl reformulated the ideal of Muslim Spain into a vision of a hybrid anticolonial culture that could counterbalance Western Colonialism and Imperialism. He even presented the idea of an

[263] Herzl, *Der Judenstaat*, 56.
[264] Laqueur, *History of Zionism*, 100.

Ottoman Zionist charter to Abdülhamid II in these terms—as a means to reverse the ever growing threat presented by the West.[265]

This was not merely telling the sultan what Herzl thought he wanted to hear. It must be remembered that German Jewish anticolonialism had been vocally critical of Western Colonialism and Imperialism since Moses Mendelssohn, and this disdain only intensified through the *Wissenschaft* phase as the situation of German Jews continued to deteriorate.[266] Herzl inherited and carried forward these sentiments in his reformulation of the Muslim Spanish role model.

This is most clear in his utopian novel *Altneuland*. Often, his novel is decried as thoroughly orientalist, especially in the field of Postcolonial Studies.[267] However, such assessments do not account for Zionism as an anticolonial movement, nor for Herzl's particular conception of a Muslim-Jewish hybrid culture in anticolonial terms. Within *Altneuland*, very similar to

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[265] Ibid., 114-119.

[266] See John M. Efron, "Orientalism and the Jewish Historical Gaze," in *Orientalism and the Jews*, Ivan David Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar (eds.) (Waltham, Mass: Brandeis University Press, 2005).

[267] See, for example Edward Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims"; Muhhamad Ali Khalidi, "Utopian Zionism or Zionist Proselytism? A Reading of Herzl's Altneuland," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30 no. 4 (2001): 55–67; The general consensus is that Altneuland functions as a foundational document for Zionist orientalism and its manifestation as an iteration of Western Colonialism and Imperialism, especially settler colonialism. Recent dissertations reflect what could be called the "state of the field." See Awad Issa Mansour, *Orientalism, Total War and the Production of Settler Colonial Existence: The United States, Australia, Apartheid South Africa and the Zionist Case*, Ph.D. Dissertation (Exeter: University of Exeter, 2011); See also Nora Scholtes, "*Bulwark against Asia": Zionist Exclusivism and Palestinian Responses*, Ph.D. Dissertation (Canterbury: University of Kent, 2015).

the model of Muslim Spain envisioned first by German Jewish *maskilim*, the cultural, intellectual, and economic flowering of the Jews under Ottoman auspices flows outward to quickly return Ottoman society to the elevated state it enjoyed before Western Colonialism and Imperialism began to encroach upon it.[268]

In Herzl's assessment, this revitalized hybrid culture would be more than a match for the combined power of Christian Europe, to the extent that he presumed that any attempted attack on such a revitalized Ottoman Empire would quickly unravel into a repeat of the confused warring amongst Christian crusaders during the medieval period.[269] This idea of Muslims and Jews as a joint force to curtail the apparent barbarity within the failure of Western liberalism is a key element of *Altneuland*. This imagined revitalized hybrid culture benefited Jews, Arabs, and Turks alike.[270] The most significant point here is that whatever degradation there was among Turks and Arabs in the realms of culture and economics was the result of a persistent and growing Western Colonial and Imperial encroachment, rather than any inherent racial or Islamic "backwardness."

Indeed, the "old-new" land referred to in the title is intended as much to be a restoration of Jews to their national homeland in Palestine as it is to be a

[268] Herzl, *Altneuland*, especially 135-195.
[269] Ibid., 152-153.
[270] Ibid.

restoration of the hybrid Muslim-Jewish culture that reached a pinnacle higher than had been reached by either culture separately. This is clear in the framing of the characters—a combined group of Spanish Jews, Eastern European Jews, Turks, and Arabs have created a society so advanced that the German and German Jewish author surrogates can only look upon it all in dumbfounded amazement. Herzl's conception of a Muslim Spain reborn under anticolonial auspices was indeed utopian, even naïve and fanciful. It was not, however, orientalist.

It is clear enough from the above discussion on Herzl's approach to the Ottoman Empire as a whole that there was no essential orientalism toward Palestinian Arabs within Zionism itself.[271] The inconsistent relationship between Zionists and Palestinian Arabs during the late Ottoman period and early Mandatory Palestine offers strong support for this notion in a peculiar way: most Zionists didn't think of the Palestinian Arabs as a real threat to their movement at all until 1929.[272] And even then, such considerations were not in the terms of "inherent threat" that define orientalism as a phenomenon. This has remained

[271] Derek J. Penslar moderates depictions of Herzl as an exemplar of orientalist colonialism somewhat, noting that Herzl's perspective of Palestinian Arabs was varied, and not essentially colonial, but rather more benignly orientalist. Be that as it may, this is an extension of Penslar's earlier compromise on the matter of Zionist colonialism, as part of a more general attempt to facilitate an end to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. See, in order of publication Derek J. Penslar "Zionism, Colonialism, and Postcolonialism," *The Journal of Israeli History* 20 no 2-3 (2001): 84-98; Derek J. Penslar, "Herzl and the Palestinian Arabs: Myth and Counter-Myth," *The Journal of Israeli History* 24 no. 1 (2005): 65–77; Kalmar and Penslar (eds.), *Orientalism and the Jews* (2005).

[272] Laqueur, *History of Zionism*, 209.

true even through the course of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, as Israel remains quite willing to maintain its peace treaties with former enemies in the conflict.

Before the Arab-Israeli Conflict began to crystalize as a contest between the national movements of Jews and Palestinian Arabs, and even after, Zionism was far more concerned with its own affairs than it was with those of Palestinian Arabs.[273] It is important to bear in mind that this self-attention was in itself an adaptation, on the part of Zionists, of the older model of anticolonial mimicry that had previously tried to remake German Jews into "Germans of the Mosaic faith"—as a means of ultimate decolonization into German society. In the Zionist case, this took the form of rebirth, into a "new Jew" with his or her own capacity to live a national life.[274] Prior to the time of the British Mandate, many Zionists besides Herzl were open and even enthusiastic about the prospect of pursing this rebirth on a path of Muslim-Jewish cultural hybridity.[275]

Zionist Capitulation and the End of Ottoman Power

The end of this possibility had much to do with Zionists and Palestinian Arabs both finding themselves unexpectedly under Western Imperial auspices. This moment was the end of the Zionism of Herzl's most hopeful imaginings, because it meant that Muslim Spain's glory as a hybrid society was now fully

[273] Ibid., 270.
[274] Ibid.
[275] Ibid.

consigned to the past. There is great irony in this, as Zionists found themselves suddenly recolonized by the West they were attempting to be free of.

From this point on, the direction of Zionism had no choice but to change, because the old discourse had returned—the *Yishuv* (Zionist community of Palestine) had to convince a Western colonizer that it was sufficiently Western to gain emancipation into the society of nations. At length, Herzl's initial rejection of capitulation could not stand. An even greater irony, this change put Zionists in a position of advantage they did not previously have against their nascent Palestinian Arab nationalist rivals. Jews had half a millennia of experience in how to deal with the power structures and sensibilities of Western colonizers which the Palestinian Arabs, or any other colonized group, utterly lacked. Despite that greater experience, Israel has continued to remain largely a pariah in the international community.

In this particular way, Zionism must be viewed as a failure—at least in the anticolonial framework that Theodor Herzl first devised. Herzl believed that the establishment of a Jewish national home or state would normalize the situation of world Jewry, bringing an end to antisemitism and making the Jews a nation like any other.[276] This has not happened. Indeed, the emancipation discourse that so occupied German Jewish anticolonialists has essentially re-

[276] Herzl, *Der Judenstaat*, 52.

manifested itself on an international scale. The international order has remained one of essentially unchallenged Western hegemony since the destruction of the Ottoman Empire—which, as we've seen, was the entire animus of the history of the Western Colonialism and Imperialism that created the current international order in the first place.[277]

Why wouldn't that order, fundamentally informed by the same cultural premises that formed Western Colonialism and Imperialism, cast a dubious eye at a Jewish state? Notably, in the disparate attempts by antisemitism scholarship to parse anti-Zionism, the elements that formed the contours of the old emancipation debate engaged by the *Wissenschaft* scholars and *maskilim* before them are clearly visible—in each instance where the Jewishness of Israel is addressed as an inherent negative that must be resolved in order for the state to truly be a part of the international community. In this sense, attributions to Zionism such as orientalism, Western Colonialism and Imperialism, even Nazism, follow a certain logical continuity. The "postcolonial" world order, with its Western-derived culture, defines itself as a community of states contra-orientalism, contra-Western Colonialism and Imperialism, and contra-Nazism. To transpose those things onto a Jewish state makes sense in that context, and fits the historical pattern.

[277] We should not be confused by the "Eastern bloc," "Western bloc" language which pervaded during the Cold War. The Soviet bloc, a colonizing empire in its own right, was merely the "east" of the West.

Thus, Zionism finds itself within a neo-emancipation discourse, mired in an arrested process of anticolonial mimicry. In the eyes of an increasingly global West, the more Israel attempts to resemble a state inhering contemporary Western-derived values, the more orientalist it is perceived, the more colonial and imperial, the more Naziesque. Indeed, this highlights the true failure of Zionist anticolonialism as Herzl originally imagined it, as a hybrid Jewish and Muslim culture within the Islamic sphere, beyond the reach of a dominant Western discourse. Such a sphere no longer exists. The persistence of the Arab-Israeli Conflict has only compounded this problem, as figures such as Edward Said and others have succeeded in guiding that dominant discourse toward an inherent association between Israel as a Jewish state and traits the West deems inherently negative.

This thesis has thoroughly illustrated that Zionism is anticolonial and non-orientalist at its core, and thus beyond the scope of Western Colonialism and Imperialism. That Said and Postcolonial studies look at the same history of the emancipation discourse as proof of the opposite, while deeply ironic, makes its own sense beyond a polemical context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The process of German Jewish emancipation was, after all, a discourse about the terms of German Jewish colonization—premised upon the antisemitism that is orientalism's twin.

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