

INFORMATION TO USERS

This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed the photographer has followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases we have filmed the best available copy.

University
Microfilms
International

300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106
18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND

7921260

RINKER, CRAIG WAYNE
THE ART OF CENSURE: CLASSICAL "PSOGOS"
RHETORIC.

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA, PH.D., 1979

CDPR. 1979 RINKER, CRAIG WAYNE

University
Microfilms
International 300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106

© 1979

CRAIG WAYNE RINKER

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE

THE ART OF CENSURE: CLASSICAL ψ 0 ρ 0 Σ RHETORIC

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
CRAIG WAYNE RINKER
Norman, Oklahoma

1979

THE ART OF CENSURE: CLASSICAL Ψ ΟΓΟΣ RHETORIC

APPROVED

Paul A. Bonifield

Roger M. Behr

h. Beach Hill

Clayton K. Lora

William Carmack

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

THE ART OF CENSURE: CLASSICAL PSOGOS RHETORIC

BY: CRAIG WAYNE RINKER

MAJOR PROFESSOR: PAUL A. BAREFIELD, Ph.D.

This study investigated the development of invective into the rhetorical theories of 4th century B.C. Greece. The work showed that invective was a vital aspect of Greek public activity rooted in their poetical, legal, and oratorical traditions. The study isolated technical meanings of various terms for invective from individual rhetors and focused on sophists who stood out as teachers of the art. The study concentrated on the art in the Rhetoric to Alexander and Aristotle's Rhetoric.

Invective functioned culturally as the presentation of ignominy or the casting off of evil with vile words. Invective's power for social criticism, foreshadowed in Homer, was used forcefully by Archilochus and other iambographers. While invective's apotropaic function transferred into ancient comedy, Aristotle classed the iambographers as psogos speakers. The sages' maxims on a proper use of blame indicated a typing of blame into categories. Laws on loidoria, aporrata, and the political dokimasia demonstrated the tension between the protection of citizens from slander and the protection of the city-state from undesirables. Plato restricted psogos to educators for training ideal citizens. The earliest sophists taught the art. Evenus of Paros invented parapsogoi and developed commonplaces of blame. Thrasyarchus became famous for employing diabole and defending against it. Gorgias developed censures to new stylistic heights. Isocrates outshone the rest in theoretic treatment and the moral value he attached to censures on great themes.

Anaximenes' Rhetoric to Alexander interchanged psektikon and kakologikon as the species label and included ridicule, and abuse within its parameters. Epitimao (Isocrates' label for moral censure) primarily meant an irritated jury's uproar against the speaker. Anaximenes clearly placed diabole within the species of accusation and defense, mentioning it only indirectly for kakologikon prooemia. He considered blame an independent, but interrelated, species of rhetoric not normally employed in contest situations. Psektikon proposed to achieve moral condemnation using blameworthy things, developed by amplification, and aimed against persons,

actions, emotions, and possessions. Anaximenes showed no unique concern for artistry in this species.

Aristotle uniquely treated the sub-genre in his process of proofs and bound psogos particularly to artistic ethos. Since psogos was classed under epideictic, the following terms were defined: (1) theoros was a judge in the wide sense, (2) dynamis was both the faculty of the speaker to demonstrate the case and the magnitude of vice displayed, (3) epideixis meant the demonstration of the subject of the speech. Aristotle gave example censures on practical themes and did not support epideictic as mere display of skill. Censure was distinguished from other genres by its present time frame, non-contest occasion, ethos material, ethical goal, and enthymemic amplification. Psogos excluded diabole, loidoria, hybris, and katageloion. Aristotle did not relate indignation to censure.

Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge Dr. George L. Kustas, who, while serving as visiting professor of Classical Rhetoric at the University of California, Berkeley, critiqued my prospectus. And, I wish to express appreciation to Dr. William R. Carmack, Dr. Paul A. Barefield, Dr. A. J. Heisserer, and Dr. J. Clayton Feaver of the University of Oklahoma for enlightening me to the vicissitudes of classical rhetoric and ancient Greece. And I wish particularly to express my deep appreciation of my dissertation chairman, Dr. Paul Barefield, now chairman of the Department of Speech at the University of Southwestern Louisiana, for his persistence, perseverance, and continued willingness to serve in this capacity until the completion of this dissertation.

I also wish to acknowledge here my parents, Berl and Maxene Rinker, who aided me financially during the years of my doctoral program. Finally, I wish to acknowledge my loving wife, Kathy, who had to give her husband up for this project, for her patience, perseverance, and sacrifice.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. SETTING FOR THE THEORETIC TREATMENT OF BLAME.....	16
The Poetic/Dramatic Tradition.....	19
Invective in the Homeric Poems..	20
The Iambic Poets.....	23
Old and Middle Comedy.....	32
The Philosophical/Legal Tradition..	38
Pre-Socratic Philosophers.....	39
Laws Concerning Invective.....	45
Plato on Blame.....	55
The Rhetorical forerunners to the Rhetoric of Blame.....	66
Evenus of Paros.....	68
Thrasymachus of Chalcedon.....	71
Gorgias of Leontini.....	78
Isocrates.....	83
III. <u>INVECTIVE IN THE RHETORIC</u> <u>TO ALEXANDER</u>	102
The Place of Blame in the Treatise.....	107
Definition of Blame Oratory.....	118
Materials and Objects of Blame.....	120
Methods of Blame.....	124
Arrangement of Blame and its Style.....	127
Blame in Relation to Accusation and Attack.....	131
Διαβολή in Accusation.....	135

Κακολογία in Accusation.....	144
Censure as Epideictic Oratory.....	150
Censure and Ethical Considerations...	155
Summary.....	156
IV. <u>BLAME ORATORY IN ARISTOTLE'S</u> <u>RHETORIC</u>	161
Setting for the Oratory of Blame.....	168
Explication of Blame Oratory.....	191
Methods of Blame Oratory.....	201
Style and Arrangement of Blame.....	208
Other Pertinent Considerations.....	217
Injustice as Blame and as	
Accusation.....	217
The Presentation of	222
The Relation of Blame and Anger...	224
V. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION.....	236
The Climate of Rhetorical Invective..	237
Aristotle and Anaximenes Compared....	242
Blame Oratory and the Epideictic	
Genre.....	251
Conclusion and Questions.....	256
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	259

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Focus of the Study

Classical epideictic oratory has traditionally been labeled as "mere display" or "praise rhetoric" and has been relegated to all those occasions where nothing important needs to be addressed, in the manner of the modern after-dinner speech. Yet there is evidence that the ancients employed one of the sub-divisions of the genre, censure, both extensively and with the purpose of making a decisive impact. This study, then, seeks to expound and clarify the role and usage of invective and censure in ancient Greece.

The essay develops the following theses: First, the study produces a history of the development of invective into rhetorical theory in the 4th century B.C. The work shows that invective was a vital aspect of Greek public activity rooted in the poetical, legal, and oratorical tradition. Second, the study establishes the technical meanings

of various terms for invective from the society at large, and especially from the usage of the individual rhetors of the period. Third, the study exhibits the sophists who were noted for developing certain aspects of the art of censure, paying particular attention to the Rhetoric to Alexander. Fourth, the study emphasizes Aristotle's treatment of censure as a substantive sub-division of his epideictic genre.

This investigation is justified by a number of factors. First, there is manifold evidence of the presence of terms of invective, abuse, and denigration in the classical speeches and extant *τέχνη*. As Robert Bonner noted, "The Greek language was well supplied with a vocabulary of vituperation, and the literature, from Homer on, shows that there was no hesitation in employing it with the full sanction of public opinion."¹ At the same time there is a seeming lack of differentiation of those terms by modern scholars. John Hollar noted that, "usually the terms 'invective' and 'satire' denote one and the same aspect in an analysis of Roman satire."² He added that "the literary

¹Robert J. Bonner, Aspects of Athenian Democracy (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967), p. 124.

²John Arthur Hollar, "The Traditions of Satire and Invective in Catullus" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, 1972), p. 8.

traditions link iamb with invective."³

Second, the study is justified because scholars have not given the subject proper treatment from the rhetorical perspective. Most of the research touching on censure and invective has come from those who pursued the history and development of comedy and satire into the Roman period, or studied comedy and drama from the perspective of Greek poetry and drama.⁴ They have readily noticed the presence of blame in Greek literature, but have not related it to the rhetorical theory of the period.⁵ On the other hand, rhetorical scholars researching the theory and practice of the epideictic genre (and in the process disagreeing about its meaning) have left blame oratory unattended

³Ibid., p. 9.

⁴For example: Ibid., pp. 1-24. C. A. Van Rooy, Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), esp. pp. 90-116. Gilbert Highet, The Anatomy of Satire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), esp. pp. 151-155. Mary A. Grant and George Converse Fiske, The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable. The Greek Rhetoricians and Cicero, University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, No. 21 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1924), pp. 7-53. Lawrence Giangrande, The Use of Spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman Literature (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), pp. 15-101.

⁵Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 2, write: "That there was a place for invective in Greek oratory, is clear from the very names given to the divisions of the speech."

to focus only on the rhetoric of praise.⁶ Therefore the standard dictionaries and encyclopedias of classical literature contain articles on epideictic and its first sub-

⁶Vinzenz Buchheit, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1960), p. 127, in particular feels that ψόγις has little place in Aristotle's Rhetoric: "This somewhat colorless and easily misunderstood label [epideictic] did not reign long after Aristotle chose it. Shortly thereafter, encomium rightfully replaced it, since growing out of practice, it was the part of the genre which was also fundamentally the practical part. The speech of Blame was, yes, only theoretical as a complement. Perhaps Aristotle had already considered something similar [to what was just conjectured]; but he would have appeared illogical and unsystematic. For in both of the other genres, the designations did not come from one of the halves (as exhortation - dissuasion, accusation - defense). Thus [Aristotle] had to find a neutral label, which in our case was not simple." (Underlining and translation from the German and Greek is mine.) Notice also the following: James Richard Chase, "The Classical Conception of Epideictic," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 47 (1961), 293-300, and James Richard Chase, "Classical Conception of Epideictic" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1961), pp. 1-276, do not use an investigation of ψόγις to solve the questions on the concept of Aristotle's third division. Oskar Kraus, Neue Studien zur aristotelischen Rhetorik insbesondere über das Γένος Ἐπιδεικτικόν (Halle: Verlag von Max Niemeyer, 1907), in his underrated expansion of the argument with Paul Wendland's review of his first publication on the subject, does not consider censure directly. Theodore Chalon Burgess, Epideictic Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902), views epideictic through Menander and Dionysius, who had no separate theory of invective. F. J. Schwaab, "Über die Bedeutung des Γένος Ἐπιδεικτικόν in der aristotelischen Rhetorik" (unpublished dissertation, Würzburg, 1923), available here only via its review by Englebert Drerup in Philologische Wochenschrift, 43 (1923), 745-748, discusses the genre from the perspective of the word epideictic and concerns itself with a response to Kraus. A discussion of ψόγις is not evident.

species, encomium, but lack any separate treatment of censure.⁷

A third factor justifying this study is the disagreement among scholars on Aristotle's division of epideictic. Many have assumed that Aristotle considered the epideictic branch of rhetoric as essentially the display of the skill of the orator.⁸ Some have severely castigated him for this, as Chaim Perelman, for example, wrote,

Unfortunately, Aristotle himself encouraged this confusion between the producing of a work and the exercise of an action by his own grossly mistaken conception of epideictic discourse. Whereas he saw without ambiguity that the deliberative and the

⁷For example, The Oxford Classical Dictionary (2nd ed., 1970) treats slander and libel in the Roman period, but not the Greek. Der Kleine Pauly Lexikon der Antike, ed. by Konrat Ziegler, Walter Sontheimer, and Hans Gärtner, 5 Vols. (Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller, (1964-1975) treats encomium and epideictic, but not psogos. Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. by Georg Wissowa (Stuttgart, J. B. Metzler, 1897-1972) does not contain listings for blame oratory. Heinrich Lausberg, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft, 2 Vols., (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1960) a work George Kennedy, [Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972]], p. xiv] considered the replacement of Volkmann's 1885 work, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischen Übersicht, contains no treatment of psogos rhetoric beyond listing it within the definition of epideictic, I, 55, 133.

⁸The following individuals are cited in the dissertation: Volkmann, Wendland, Hobbes, Welldon, Cope, Freese, Roberts, and Chase.

forensic genres aimed at influencing the decision of the men deliberating in political assemblies and of those who have to pass a legal sentence, he thought that in the epideictic genre the listeners only played the part of spectators and that their decision was concerned merely with the speaker's skill (Rhetoric 1358b1-7). ...There is no more absurd idea [than this], and moralists, from Epictetus to La Bruyère, have never ceased to deride it.⁹

Another scholar, Forbes Hill, put the thinking of the many into a terse sentence when he wrote, "His [Aristotle's] threefold classification seems to be taken, without modification, from the sophists."¹⁰ Other scholars, however, have advanced the position that Aristotle's treatment of epideictic was not anomalous to his treatment of the other two genres.¹¹ Vinzenz Buchheit has stated, for example, that nothing could be more false than that Aristotle's conception of epideictic was not one whit better than the

⁹Chaim Perelman, "The New Rhetoric," in The Prospect of Rhetoric, Report of the National Developmental Project sponsored by the Speech Communication Association (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 115 (Underlining mine).

¹⁰Forbes I. Hill, "The Rhetoric of Aristotle," in A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, ed. by James J. Murphy (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 29.

¹¹For example, Kraus, Schwaab, Drerup, Hinks, and Buchheit are cited in this dissertation.

sophists.¹² This disagreement over the concept of epideictic, then, justifies a fresh look at the disputed genre from a new direction, blame oratory.

A fourth justification for this study is that no one to this writer's knowledge has catalogued the particular rhetorical distinctions the ancient theorists formed between such terms as ψόγος , κακολογία , ἐπιτίμησις , and διαβολή . Parsing out those distinctions therefore adds to the knowledge of the history of Rhetoric as well as suggesting questions for further study.

Finally, the work is also justified by the promise that explaining the theoretic structure of blaming behavior at the well spring of rhetorical theory may indicate where to focus on current blaming practices. The study may also make possible rethinking of current blaming practices within society. The study may aid in the formulation of a current rhetoric for blaming activities within the context of the freedom of speech.

Limitations of the Study

The dissertation limits itself in the following manner. First, the work ends at the beginning of the Hellenistic period. The study focuses on the Rhetoric to

¹²Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 120.

Alexander and the Rhetoric of Aristotle. The precursors to rhetorical treatments of blame from Homer through Isocrates are also included in the paper either by way of a review of the literature, or by first hand investigation.

Secondly, the investigation is limited to those aspects of Greek culture and literature which had bearing on the theoretic treatment of blame in rhetoric. Studies of actual extant speeches, or portions, or fragments of speeches of blame, abuse, or attack, are primarily used in the manner of examples.

Thirdly, the work is limited to authoritative¹³ researchers, particularly from the last one hundred fifty years, who have studied, analysed, commented on, transmitted, and, or translated the works under consideration.

The work does not propose to be primarily a philological study and therefore while questions of the

¹³Authoritative means those who have researched and written on the subjects under scrutiny and are acknowledged by others as authoritative by written statement, or by acceptance of their contributions into scholarly journals or publications, or by scholastic accreditation such as degrees conferred, or posts on faculties. Let it be noted here that one of the works cited in this dissertation received a castigating review. Barbara P. Wallach, American Journal of Philology, 96 (1975), pp. 211-214, reviewed Giangrande, The Use of Spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman Literature, and found it both inadequate and heavily dependent on the work of others without proper citation. This dissertation notes an error of Giangrande also.

authenticity or integrity of specific passages in the ancient texts are noted and the opinions of the text-critical scholars are presented, the writer does not assume a different posture than the most widely accepted reading. The Loeb Classical Library editions of the Greek texts were normally and routinely employed.

Thus, the dissertation has limited itself to a bibliographical form of research.¹⁴

As noted earlier in the chapter the Greeks had an abundant supply of words to describe verbal actions of denigration and defamation of each other. In practice, most of these words held no firm technical distinctions and were used in a loose interchangeable fashion which may

¹⁴The following works were consulted to generate the bibliography: Dix Années de Bibliographie Classique, ed. by Jules Marouzeau (1914-1924); L'Année Philologique, ed. by George Kennedy (Paris: Societe d' Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1927-1978); The International Guide to Classical Studies (Darien, Conn.: American Bibliographic Service, 1961-1971); Dissertation Abstracts International (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1960-1978); Ronald Matlon and Irene R. Matlon, eds., Table of Contents and Index to Journals in Speech Communication (New York: Speech Communication Assn., 1971); Ned A. Shearer, ed., Bibliographic Annual in Speech Communication (New York: Speech Communication Assn., 1971-1975). Keith Erickson, Aristotle's Rhetoric: Five Centuries of Philological Research (Clinton, N. J.: Scarecrow Press, 1975); Subject Guide to Books in Print, (New York: R. R. Bowker, 1975-1979). The bibliographies of those who were cited by the bibliographies were also perused, and the recent yearly and quarterly indexes of the Speech Communication Journals and the Classical Journals were also examined.

have been dictated in many instances more by the beauty of sound or style than by denotational differences. One of the tasks of this study is to establish the technical meanings of the terms as they were used for blaming behavior by the rhetorical theorists, and to draw out the dissemblances which the rhetorical theorists framed among them. *ψόγος* oratory is the main concern of this paper but the following terms are also of central interest. They are defined here in their general meaning, with footnotes to the places in the dissertation where they are treated.¹⁵ The verb form and noun form are listed:¹⁶

1. *ψέγω, ψόγος* : to blame, to censure; a blamable fault.¹⁷

2. *ἐπιτιμάω, ἐπιτίμησις* : to place value upon, to censure, a criticism.¹⁸

¹⁵Within the dissertation the verb, noun, or adjective is listed in parenthesis in the form of 1st person present, or in its nominative form, unless it stands in a quotation.

¹⁶The definitions given here are from Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, editors, A Greek-English Lexicon, rev. by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958). The Greek-English Lexicon, Supplement, ed. by E. A. Barber, P. Maas, M. Scheller, and M. L. West (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), was also consulted.

¹⁷See pages 18f, 27f, 30-32, 36, 56-59, 69-71, 77, 82, 118-124, 224-229, 240.

¹⁸See pages 19, 39, 85-88, 90, 91, 142, 144f, 241.

3. Μέρφομαι, μέμφις : to blame, censure, find fault, a blame.¹⁹
 4. Κακολογέω, κακολογία : to speak ill, revile, slanderous.²⁰
 5. Διαβάλλω, διαβολή : to throw over, set at variance, traduce, slander, a false accusation.²¹
 6. Κατηγορέω, κατηγορία : to speak against someone before judges, accuse, accusation.²²
 7. Κακηγορέω, κακηγορία : to speak ill of, abuse, slander.²³
 8. Λοιδορέω, λοιδορία : to abuse, revile, rail, reproach.²⁴
-

¹⁹See pages 19, 82, 85, 86.

²⁰See pages 18, 108, 119f, 144f, 147-150, 157, 226-227,

²¹See pages 19, 46n, 72-78, 135-144, 214n, 222-224.

²²This word was commonly understood in its technical meaning of accusations in court. Cf. George M. Calhoun, The Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1927), p. 66. See the following pages in this dissertation: 19, 65, 67, 74, 83, 85 86-88, 90, 92, 187, 217-221.

²³See pages 19, 46n, 51n, 60, 131-135, 142, 147, 198.

²⁴See pages 18, 19, 35, 36n, 43, 46, 49, 61, 65, 86, 120, 139, 149, 198, 215, 240-241.

9. Ὑβρίζω, ὕβρις : to outrage, insult, maltreat, an outrage.²⁵
10. Ὀνειδίζω, ὄνειδος : to reproach, upbraid, a reproach, disgrace.²⁶
11. Ἀισχρολόγω, αἰσχρός : to speak shamefully, foul language, abuse.²⁷
12. Ἀσχύνω, αἰσχύνη : to make ugly, dishonor, be ashamed, a disgrace, dishonor.²⁸
13. Ἀτιμώω, ἀτιμία : to dishonor, a dishonor, the loss of civil rights.²⁹
14. Καταγελῶ, κατάγελως : to ridicule, deride, laugh down, a mockery, derision.³⁰
-

²⁵See pages 51, 53n, 71, 225-227, 251.

²⁶See pages 19, 44, 51, 65, 71, 194, 196f.

²⁷See pages 32n, 35, 57, 89, 121, 149, 192ff, 225.

²⁸See pages 19, 21, 41, 51-54, 57, 120, 149, 194.

²⁹See pages 121, 192-194, 225.

³⁰See pages 60, 61, 120, 226f.

15. Βλασφηημέω, βλασφηημία : to drop evil or profane words, to speak slander, a defamation.³¹

16 Ἐκτεδίδωμι, ἐκτίδωσις : to show forth, display, an exhibition.³²

Organization of the Study

The data of this investigation are presented in the following order. The presence of blame in Greek society is first established in Chapter II by reviewing the literature on the poetic, dramatic tradition in Ancient Greece. The roots of invective in the religious festivals and ancient poems are noted and particular emphasis is placed on Archilochus and other iambic poets as the forerunners to the rhetoric of blame. Then the philosophical and legal traditions are perused for the presence of invective in ancient wise sayings, and the treatment of acts of invective in law. Thales, Periander, Chilon, Cleobus, Solon, Xenophanes, and Democritus are treated in the section for their sayings which related to blame. The laws which have

³¹See pages 30, 58, 59n, 61.

³²See pages 19, 62, 65, 93-97, 150-155, 174-191, 253.

a bearing on invective are treated next, through a review of the literature. Plato's philosophical views on verbal abuse are also presented in this section.

In the next section of Chapter II the sophistic forerunners to the theoretic treatment of blame oratory are examined. Four sophists stand out in the history of invective. (1) Evenus of Paros developed the art of indirect censure and invented stock phrases to aid the memory. (2) Thrasyarchus showed himself to be a master of courtroom calumny. (3) Gorgias appears as the father of epideictic oratory in the sense that later theorists developed their analyses of praise and blame from his form. And, (4) Isocrates set himself apart from the others in his high moral goals, defined in the Greek sense, and in his stress of the practical importance of speeches of blame (and praise).

Chapter III discusses the rhetoric of blame presented in the Rhetoric to Alexander. First, the place of blame within the framework of the treatise is given, followed by a definition of blame oratory itself. Next, the materials and objects of blame are treated and the methodology of blame is presented. Next, the author's conception of the distinctions between blame and attack (δυσκολία) are given, along with his conceptual division between blame oratory and accusation oratory. Finally, the

treatise is shown to have no overriding or related system of ethics.

Chapter IV on the Rhetoric of Aristotle is treated in the same manner as the previous unit, with the changes in the order of presentation which are dictated by Aristotle's unique handling of the three genres. Blame oratory is established in its place as a sub-species of epideictic oratory, presented within a framework of rhetorical proofs. Blame oratory is defined, and its materials and objects presented, followed by the methods of blame. Then, the next section deals with the relation between forensic and epideictic injustice, Aristotle's presentation of forensic attack (δίκη), and the relation of blame and anger.

Chapter V synthesizes the results of the investigation. The general background and atmosphere of invective is reviewed along with a recapitulation of the rhetorical forerunners. Then there follows a comparison of the presentations of Anaximenes and Aristotle, contrasting their emphases and comparing their logical, ethical and psychological perspectives, and distinguishing their methods of blame. The next section is devoted to Aristotle's and Anaximenes' understanding of epideictic, with suggestions about the change of perspective which occurred after them. The unit ends with a conclusion and questions for further study.

CHAPTER II

THE SETTING FOR THE THEORETIC TREATMENT OF BLAME

Introduction

This chapter seeks to clarify the place of ψόγος oratory in ancient rhetoric by presenting a general account of blame and abuse in ancient Greek literature. This clarification is accomplished by reviewing the literature on Greek culture and literature, and selecting statements on invective from the three perspectives of the poetic/dramatic tradition, the philosophical/legal tradition, and the oratorical/rhetorical tradition, which have bearing on the topic.

The poetic/dramatic tradition portion of this chapter will show that invective found its power in Greek society from two general sources, the desire for immortality and the casting off of evil with vile words. That is, the Greeks eschewed ignominy and shame because they desired immortality through the remembrance of their great speeches

and deeds, and they routinely employed vile abuse in their religious festivals for apotropaic purposes. The unit will establish that Aristotle considered the invectives of Archilochus and other iambic poets as examples of ψόγος, not comedy, and that the ancients did not consider the invective in the Old and Middle comedies to be ψόγος. This first section will also show that the poetic/dramatic tradition acted as one of the major roots of the rhetoric of blame present in the 4th century B.C.

The philosophical/legal tradition portion of this chapter will establish the following facts. First, the sayings of the sages and the early laws against invective indicate a general typing of invective into categories which show a movement away from 'flyting' toward social purpose for censure. Second, the emergence of democracy encouraged laws to protect citizens from slander, while at the same time, guarding the city-state from the political participation of undesirables. The laws of the period demonstrate a tension between abusive language and accurate censure. Plato shows through his philosophical position the function ψόγος should have in the ideal state by restricting its use to educators who would employ it for training ideal citizens.

The section of this chapter on the rhetorical fore-runners to Anaximenes and Aristotle will confirm that the Greeks did not lack teachers to train them to employ

invective and abuse persuasively. Evenus of Paros, Thrasymachus, Georgias, and Isocrates are given particular treatment because they each contributed to some aspect of the rhetoric of censure. Evenus developed indirect censure and composed commonplaces of vituperation for ready use. Thrasymachus showed himself an expert in courtroom calumny, teaching students of forensic oratory how to employ and defend against character denigration and malicious accusation. Gorgias developed stylistic beauty in censures, along with his doctrine of appropriate length. Isocrates stood above the rest of the sophists in the high moral value he attached to censures on great themes.

In general, this chapter will establish that when Anaximenes and Aristotle wrote down their lectures on rhetoric they had more than one hundred years of rhetorical tradition and oratorical practice in the art of invective to form the background for their formulations. The chapter shows, further, the following general classification of terms for invective in the 4th century B.C.: (1) *ψόγος* appears as proper censure, an upheld right of the people to expose the bad so that it could be removed from society. (2) *γέλαιον* or *καταγέλαιον* holds less positive value for society, but serves to release emotions in playful or serious ridicule. (3) *λοιδορία* means to abuse another unfairly. It seemed to serve no good purpose so was restricted by law.

(4) Κατηγορία and διαβολή were legal terms of accusation for plaintiffs and prosecutors at court. Some types of accusation were covered by law. (5) Ἀνόρητα were bad actions or qualities of people either prosecutable by law or by scrutiny in the public assembly. If the allegations were true, the defendant faced (6) ἄτιμία, legal disgrace. If false, the defendant had been slandered (7) κακηγορία, λοιδορία or had become a victim of (8) ὄνειδος, odious words. (9) Ἐπίδειξις was used in the period in a non-technical sense to mean any kind of showing forth of something, that is, a verbal demonstration of something. Some writers used (10) μέφορος and (11) ἐπειμῶ as synonyms of ψέγω.

The Poetic/Dramatic Tradition

Introduction

Ancient Greek society was a conservative culture by today's standards and while there were obvious, noticable changes in the government, habits, and outlook of the Greeks it is still possible to generalize about their outlook and practices from the 7th through the 4th century B.C. This is particularly true of their concept of the power of the spoken and written word, which, while it changed modes from poetry to prose in this period, still held ever increasing effect in the minds of the Greeks. In fact, Homer and the

iambic poets probably influenced Greek thinking on religion and morals more towards the end of the period, then when they first wrote.

This section, then, reviews the indications of blame in Homer, the iambic poets, and the Old and Middle comedies to see what role these played in the development of the rhetoric of blame. The section ends with a conclusion that the poetic/dramatic tradition in Greek society was one of the major roots of the rhetoric of blame.

Indications in the Homeric Poems

Honor (τιμή) was a fundamental goal for Homer and the aristocracy of his day, for they believed that through it a person could achieve immortality. They considered that denying a person the honor due him, "was the greatest of human tragedies."¹ This natural desire for immortality could be satisfied if others would rehearse in words a person's great deeds and speeches. This immortal honor could be secured either by great words or great deeds, but, as Kennedy pointed out, only speech had the power of preserving the memory of a person for his descendents.² The sources of

¹ Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Vol. 1, Archaic Greece: The Mind of Athens, trans. by Gilbert Highet (2nd ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 9.

² George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 39.

honor or dishonor (ἄτιμία) were, then, verbal praise or blame (ἐπαίνος and ψόγος).³ This power of the spoken praise or blame is already embedded in the poems of Homer, and extended upon Greek culture through him.⁴

Obviously if speech could confer immortality, then speeches of censure also had great significance. Speeches of blame could defeat a person and bring him to shame and dishonor. The heroes presented by Homer could use their words as well as their swords to heap contempt on their antagonists and so defeat them. In a classic presentation of ancient invective, Brédif cited the example of Achilles' reaction to Agamemnon's depriving him of a captive.⁵ The goddess Minerva advised Achilles to keep his sword in its scabbard, but, to "insult him with abusive language to your heart's content."⁶ Achilles proceeded to vilify Agamemnon

³Jaeger, Paideia, I, 9.

⁴For other allusions to this see: Vinzenz Buchheit, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1960), p. 12, and Josef Martin, Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1974), p. 177.

⁵Leon Brédif, "Invective in Greek Eloquence," in Demosthenes, trans. by M. J. MacMahon (Chicago: S. C. Griggs, 1881) p. 293.

⁶Ibid., citing the Illiad 1.231 - 2.212.

by labeling him a drunkard, an uncouth coward, and a pitiful ruler.⁷

The intention of such invective was to humiliate, to degrade a person, and to bring him into disrepute. As mockery and derision, invective could bring forth the laughter of ridicule from those who heard it. According to Giangrande, Homer used invective to attack, "ugliness, deformity, and the unexpected, e.g., gluttons, drunks, antagonists and repressors."⁸ Examples of such invective are found in the mocking of Thesites, the ridicule of the hunch-backed Hepaestus, the derision of bald headed Odysseus, and the insulting of the beggar Irus.⁹

Thus, the Homeric poems both present and establish the ideal of immortality through the power of words and the recital of great deeds. The poems also contain speeches which seek to establish the ignominy of a person and bring him to shame. The rehearsal of base actions and the use of invective in Homer to dishonor and scorn a person indicates

⁷Ibid.

⁸Lawrence Giangrande, The Use of Spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman Literature (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), p. 38.

⁹Ibid., citing Illiad 2.217, 18.371, Odyssey 18: 350-555, and 18: 1-3.

a model or pattern by which later vituperative speeches were composed and accepted as appropriate.

The Iambic Poets

The iambic poets constitute the next link in the tradition of blaming behavior in Greek society.¹⁰ Although the etymology of the term ἰαμβος itself is obscure,¹¹ Archilochus of Paros (fl. c. 650 B.C.) apparently applied it as a name for his own form of satiric verse. By labeling

¹⁰For a basic treatment of the iambographers see: G. A. Gerhard, "Iambographen," Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. by Georg Wissowa and Wilhelm Kroll (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1916), 17, 652-680. Wilhelm Schmid and Otto Stählin, "Die Iambographie," in Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, in Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft ed. by Iwan von Müller, rev. by Walter Otto (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1929), 7, I, 1, 386-403. Albin Lesky, A History of Greek Literature, trans. by James Willis and Cornelis de Heer (2nd ed.; London, Methuen and Co., 1966), pp. 109-117. For texts with English translation see: J. M. Edmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus with the Anacreontea, 2 vols. (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1954).

¹¹Cecil Maurice Bowra, "Iambic Poetry, Greek," Oxford Classical Dictionary, (2nd ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 537. Also cited by John Arthur Hollar, "The Traditions of Satire and Invective in Catullus" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, 1972), p. 13, with the fragment from E. Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca. Fasc. 3, Iamborum Scripturae, revised by R. Beulter (Leipzig, 1964), frag. 20, printed out. Mary A. Grant and George Converse Fiske, The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable. The Greek Rhetoricians and Cicero. University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, No. 21 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1924), p. 40, attributed this to fragment 22.

his verses in this way, Archilochus took up the tradition which commonly occurred in the festivals of the phallic cults. There the participants (φαλλοφόροι) tossed coarse, often violently obscene invective at individual members of the audience.¹² Archilochus turned this type of invective into, "a great artistic form without blunting its cutting edge..."¹³ "As a result of Archilochus' use of iambics to flay his enemies," wrote Hollar, "subsequent generations both before and after Aristotle recalled the power and effect of his invective verses."¹⁴

Two samples from the fragments¹⁵ of Archilochus' poetry express his invective. Archilochus had been prevented from marrying one Neobule by her father, Lycambes.

¹²cf. Lesky, A History, pp. 110, 233, 234.

¹³Ibid., p. 110.

¹⁴Hollar, "Traditions of Satire," p. 13.

¹⁵See also Nancy Felson Robin, "Some Functions of the Enclosed Invective in Archilochus' Erotic Fragment," Classical Journal, 74, 2 (1979), 136-141, for a discussion of the embedded invective in a recently discovered fragment. The fragment is printed in John Van Sickle, "Archilochus: A New Fragment of an Epode," Classical Journal, 71 (1975), 1-15.

He responded by composing iambic metered verses which castigated the father and his daughter(s). The poems made them the laughing stock of the town, and tradition has it that they hung themselves.¹⁶ One of Archilochus' most violent pieces of invective was directed at a former friend.¹⁷ Here, Archilochus turned from a traditional type of poem composed to give one courage who is about to embark for the sea, to an iambic which "described with furious delight how his enemy is shipwrecked; pinched with cold, covered with weed...captured...[and] made to earn the bitter bread of servitude."¹⁸

Iambics were not only written against individuals, as the fragment of Semonides of Samos, Iambos on Women, showed.¹⁹ Yet, even in the individual polemics and

¹⁶A scholiast on a passage in Horace's Epodes 6.13, has it that Lycambes committed suicide. (Elegy and Iambus, II, 84, 85), while Eustathius, commenting On the Odyssey, says that the daughters of Lycambes hung themselves (Elegy and Iambus, II, 86, 87). The story was also told of Hipponax, cf. Lesky, A History, p. 113.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 15. See also, Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 41.

¹⁸Lesky, A History, p. 113.

¹⁹Stobaeus, "ψόγος Ἰωνάκῳ ... Σημωνίδου," in Elegy and Iambus, pp. 216-225.

denigration, there appeared to be a social sub-text.²⁰ Jaeger pointed to the paranetic function of Archilochus' writings,²¹ and Hollar noted that because of Archilochus, the iamb became the medium of social criticism.²² The character of important individuals and the values of society were attacked, since, as Giangrande noted, unimportant people were not worth attacking.²³

The important items to note among the names of the iambic poets who carried this tradition into the period of the Attic orators, are that they attacked personal living enemies,²⁴ that they displayed a spirit of anger against felt wrongs,²⁵ and that they used the type of verse which

²⁰Cf. I. V. Stál, "ИМБЕКТИВА КАК ИСТОЧНИК ИСТОРИИ ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ МЫСЛИ", Vestnik Drevnex Istori: Revue d'Histoire Ancienne, 2, (84), 148. Translated for me by Kathryn McCormack, graduate student, Department of Languages, University of California, Berkeley, Spring, 1976.

²¹Jaeger, Paideia, I, 121.

²²Hollar, "Traditions of Satire", p. 16.

²³Giangrande, Spoudaiogeloion, p. 17.

²⁴Hollar, "Traditions of Satire", p. 16.

²⁵Ibid. Giangrande, Spoudaiogeloion, p. 73, states: "It has been, further, commonly held that the characteristic emotion of these 'wasps' or 'dogs', as they were called, was one of anger."

was closest to conversational speech.²⁶ One suspects that if they had written pamphlets in the age of prose speeches their verses would definitely have been classed with the category of blame;²⁷ certainly so by Anaximenes.

It also seems clear that Aristotle definitely considered Archilochus a forerunner to speeches of blame. Three signals suggest this, which, taken together with the fact that *ψόγος* is a technical rhetorical term, confirm Archilochus' place, along with other writers of bitter invective such as Hipponax and Semonides, as precursors to rhetoric rather than to drama.

The first signal is that Archilochus and other famous writers of invective poems were actually absent from Aristotle's account in the Poetics. In fact, Aristotle's account of the development of comedy and tragedy excluded Archilochus, because Aristotle was looking for indicators

²⁶Aristotle, Poetics, 1449a, 1459a, trans. by W. Hamilton Fyfe (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1973), pp. 19, 91 (Hereafter labeled as Fyfe).

²⁷Cf. C. A. Van Rooy, Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), p. 92, demonstrates that the Latin idea of satire (*spoudaiogeloion* for the Greeks) cannot be applied to the Archaic period since these pieces dealt "unduly" with "the rebuke of vice."

of the comic spirit (γέλοισιν).²⁸ He found it in the Margites, which he attributed to Homer, who he said, "was the first to mark out the main lines of comedy, since he made his drama not out of personal satire (οὐ ψόγον!), but out of the laughable as such (οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ γέλοισιν)." ²⁹ Before the Margites, according to Aristotle, poets did not use the laughable as such (τὸ γέλοισιν), but instead wrote poems of blame (ψόγους), just as others wrote hymns and encomia (ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκομίας).³⁰ Homer introduced the iambic meter in Margites, said Aristotle, because it was the meter used by people to lampoon (ἰαμβίζεν) each other.³¹ Archilochus' iambics could not be considered here because

²⁸Cf. Gerald F. Else, Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 148, 149. The following citation shows how Else views Archilochus' absence from the Poetics: "The comic sequence, on the other hand, not only is not clear but reveals, upon examination, a mildly scandalous anomaly: there is no place in it for Archilochus....Archilochus will no longer be the Homer of iambic poetry, but a backslider, a denier of the light, and therefore unimportant... Thus the strange case of Archilochus demonstrates vividly how arbitrary and abstract Aristotle's pattern is. Archilochus' very existence the whole tenor of his work, was an implicit threat to the history of comedy as Aristotle saw it..." The position advanced by this dissertation reduces the felt 'scandal' and shows Aristotle not to be so 'arbitrary and abstract'.

²⁹Poetics, 1448b, Fyfe, p. 17.

³⁰Ibid., 1448b, Fyfe, p. 15.

³¹Ibid., 1448b, Fyfe, p. 17.

they were serious, personal, and did not contain the seeds of comedy Aristotle sought.

The second signal appears when Aristotle referred to iambs in the sections on the development of comedy and tragedy in the Poetics. The term iambs does not appear as a synonym for blame. The first reference makes this clear. Iambic is a meter of speech, but blame is not, as is seen, "for these the iambic metre was fittingly introduced and that is why it is still called iambic, "because it was the metre in which they lampooned each other."³² This is clearly a noetic definition, which Fyfe translated correctly as "lampoon," since it has an acquired meaning.³³ The third reference: "Crates was the first to give up the lampooning form (ἰαμβικῆς ἵδεα), and to generalize his dialogue and plots,"³⁴ also uses the common sense definition,

³²Ibid., 1448b, Fyfe, p. 15, 17.

³³Ibid., 1448b, p. 16, Fyfe notes, "Since the iambic came to be the metre of invective, the verb ἰαμῶν, acquired the meaning to lampoon. There is probably implied a derivation from ἰαμῶν, 'to assail'."

³⁴Ibid., 1449b, Fyfe, p. 21. But see Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy with an Adaptation of the Poetics and a Translation of the 'Tractatus Coislinianus' (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), p. 21. Cooper argued against the opinion that Aristophanes was classed by Aristotle as an iambic writer, to which this writer agrees, but he believed that Aristotle was thinking of Archilochus when he mentions iambic writing in the Poetics.

but here Aristotle stressed the change from the personal character of subject of iambic poems to a more generalized plot.³⁵ So then, in none of these places did Aristotle use iambic (ἰαμβοῖς) as an exchange word for blame (ψόγος).

The last signal comes from the references Aristotle did make to Archilochus, that "educator of the Greeks".³⁶

The one reference in the Politics (7. 132a 1) does not lend much light to where Aristotle positioned Archilochus.³⁷

However, someone might suppose, as Hollar has, that Aristotle attempted to repress Archilochus' influence from the following quote in the Rhetoric (1398b11, 12):

"Similarly, in order to prove that men of talent are everywhere honoured, Alcidamas said: 'The Parians honoured Archilochus, in spite of his evil-speaking: (βλάσφημον)'."³⁸

³⁵See also, Ibid., 145b, Fyfe, pp. 35, 37, "and they the modern comics do not, like the writers of iambics, write about individuals." (My translation).

³⁶Jaeger, Paidia, I. 122.

³⁷Aristotle, Politics, 7. 1328a1, "When we think we are slighted, our anger rises more against friends and acquaintance (sic) than against strangers. And so Archilochus is quite right when he thus addresses his soul in blame (ἐγκαλῶν) of his friends..." cited by and translated by Edmond, Elegy and Iambus, II, 133.

³⁸Cited by Hollar, "Traditions of Satire," p. 12, to support his conjecture that Aristotle was attempting to downplay the influence of Archilochus on Greek culture.

Since Aristotle used this quotation of Alcidamas within the context of illustrating the topic of induction, nothing can be deduced from it concerning Aristotle's opinion of Archilochus. The third reference, however, sheds more light. In Book 3 (Rhetoric, 1418b, 23-29) Aristotle stated:

In regard to moral character ($\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$), since sometimes, in speaking of ourselves, we render ourselves liable to envy, to the charge of prolixity, or contradiction, or, when speaking of another, we may be accused of abuse ($\lambda\omicron\iota\delta\omicron\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$) or boorishness ($\alpha\gamma\rho\alpha\upsilon\kappa\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$), we must make another speak in our place, as Isocrates does... Archilochus used the same device in censure [literally 'when he blames', ($\psi\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota$)]; for in his iambics he introduces the father speaking as follows of his daughter...³⁹

Here Aristotle clearly used Archilochus as an example of effective blaming behavior. Again, the term 'iambics' was employed to denote the type of poetry Archilochus wrote. It was not synonymous with satire, because there was no spirit of humor ($\gamma\epsilon\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$) in it.

Therefore, when the signals are placed together:

- (1) That Archilochus was not mentioned in the Poetics, though his iambics were well known to Aristotle. (2) That Aristotle

³⁹Aristotle, "Art" of Rhetoric, trans. by J. H. Freese (Loeb Library; London: Methuen 1925), pp. 460, 461 (Hereafter labeled Freese).

used Archilochus as an example of blaming behavior in the Rhetoric. (3) That for Aristotle blaming behavior (ψόγος) was not synonymous with iambic metered writing, the conclusion seems firm, that for Aristotle, the serious invectives of the iambic poets were the precursors to the rhetoric of blame, not the poetry of comedy.⁴⁰

Old and Middle Comedy

The comedies of the Old and Middle period need not be examined, except in so far as they also constituted a link

⁴⁰Note that Jaeger, Paideia, I, 121, writes: "It is not for nothing that Archilochus was famous as the first and greatest representative of ψόγος in poetry..." This conclusion clears up some of the difficulty scholars have had with Aristotle's account of the development of comedy. Hollar, for example, claims rightfully that Archilochus had no place in the development of Aristotle's theory of comedy, but he wrongfully conjectures, certainly, that Aristotle was attempting, "to deffuse the powerful iamb and to negate its influence on the development of satire and comedy, especially as it was employed by Archilochus and his successors." See Hollar, "Traditions of Satire," p. 12. Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 45, make a good point that, "Aristotle's charge against iambic poetry and the Old Comedy was probably threefold; its personal abuse violated his principle that poetry should be general and not specific; the abuse caused pain, and pain is no element in the truly ridiculous; the indecency of language (ἀλσχρολογία) was an offence against decorum." They could have made the stronger case that Aristotle's dislike of the abusive elements of Old Comedy was that it was not comedy at all, in the sense he defined it. Van Rooy presents a very mature scholarly article on this subject in Studies in Classical Satire, pp. 90-116, and seems aware, without stressing the point made above, that Aristotle distinguished between ψόγος, ἁμβάζειν, and γελοῖον. See especially pp. 92, 94. Van Rooy, of course, is looking for elements of Greek satire under the Latin definition.

along with the early iambic poets in the tradition of invective in society.⁴¹ The iambics and the Old Comedy (circa 500-400 B.C.)⁴² both seem to have had their origins in the revel of the spring festivals to Dionysus mentioned earlier.⁴³ When Aristotle traced the history of comedy, he was of course, looking for the ingredients of the comedy of his day, e.g. actors, chorus, plot and laughter. Yet, the interest here is the abusive language which took place in the festivals and in Old Comedy and Middle Comedy, and how this effected an oratory and a rhetoric of blame.

⁴¹Lesky, A History, p. 304, writes, "The iambos probably had no independent development during this period (5th century B.C.), as appears from the vigour with which comedy trod in its footsteps. We have, however, some remains of the iambi of the comic writer Hermippus..."

⁴²For a basic overview of Old Comedy, Middle Comedy, and its origins see: Kenneth James Dover, "Comedy (Greek), Origins of," Oxford Classical Dictionary, (2nd ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 269-270. Kenneth James Dover, "Comedy (Greek), Old," Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd edition, pp. 270-271, and William Geoffrey Arnott, "Comedy (Greek), Middle," Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd edition, pp. 270-271.

⁴³But see Dover, "Origins," p. 269: "Archilochus in the Seventh Century and Hipponax at the end of the sixth composed many poems which contain unrestrained vilification and the grossest sexual humour. These elements in Attic Comedy thus have a distinguished literary ancestry, and it is not necessary to account for them by reference to Dionysiac ritual of any kind."

During the spring growth festivals, it was common practice, even in parts of Greece in Aristotle's day, to hold processions led by *φαλλοφόροι* who would direct raillery and abuse towards individuals of the audience. Along with them, clowns and jesters would drive around in wagons and keep up "a lively fire of abuse against the bystanders."⁴⁴ The purpose of this was originally religious and apotropaic,⁴⁵ and the specific feature was gross obscenity.

Old Comedy seemingly picked up from this accepted practice and used derision, ridicule, and obscenity for comic rather than religious effect. The Old Comedies served the purpose of being able to laugh off the feeling of impotence in society. Dover wrote, "The essential spirit of Old Comedy is the ordinary man's protest - using his inalienable weapons, humour, and fantasy - against all who are in some way stronger and better than he: gods, politicians, generals, artists, and intellectuals."⁴⁶

The comedies were, in effect, burlesques which ridiculed and parodied living contemporary leaders, as well as

⁴⁴Lesky, A History, p. 233. .

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 110.

⁴⁶Dover, "Old Comedy," p. 270.

the gods and the ancient myths.⁴⁷ Since the plots and the scenes were fantastic, and the costumes grotesque, some of the insults were blunted. Aristotle labeled these features as shameful or foul words (αἰσχρολογία),⁴⁸ or he called them mocking or jesting (σκῶμμα),⁴⁹ or he may have characterized them as abuse (λοιδορία).⁵⁰

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸See Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 40. They cite, of course, Aristotle's Ethics, 1128a. See also, then, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by H. Rackham (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1975), 1128a23-25, pp. 246-247, (Hereafter labeled Rackham): "The difference may be seen by comparing the old and the modern comedies; the earlier dramatists found their fun in obscenity (αἰσχρολογία), the moderns prefer innuendo (ὑπόνοια), which marks a great advance in decorum."

⁴⁹See Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy, p. 261 and Aristotle, Ethics, 1128a, 30-34, Rackham, pp. 247, 249. "...for raillery (σκῶμμα) is a sort of vilification (λοιδορία), and some forms of vilification are forbidden by law; perhaps some forms of raillery ought to be prohibited also."

⁵⁰Aristotle's Ethics, 1128a, 30-34, Rackham, pp. 247, 249. But see Giangrande, Spoudaiogeloion, p. 18, who writes: "Aristotle made this distinction in Poetics 5.1448 b25, where he condemned as inferior to laughter (to geloion) the aischrologia (obscenity of language) and loidoria (personal abuse) of Old Comedy." Unfortunately, the passage Giangrande cites does not contain the word λοιδορία. In fact, the word does not even occur in the Poetics. The only evidence we have that Aristotle would have condemned the λοιδορία of the Old Comedy, is an indirect identification of iambs with λοιδορία, Poetics 5.1448b, 36, 37. Cooper, Aristotelian Theory of Comedy, p. 259, gives us the direct reference to λοιδορία in comments from the Tractatus: "Comedy differs from abuse (λοιδορία), since abuse openly censures the bad qualities attaching to men, whereas comedy employs

Although the attacks and insults on political leaders were certainly violent and abusive to modern ears, they seemed not to have been taken too seriously by the ancients.⁵¹ There were apparently, however, some legal attempts to limit or forbid attacks on named persons, but these had little effect.⁵² Giangrande cited the Pseudo-Zenophon Polity of the Athenians, 18 to show the limits of ridicule:

The people do not permit the popular government to be lampooned and vilified, because they do not care to hear themselves vilified. But if anybody desires to lampoon an individual, they give him full leave, well knowing that the object of comic ridicule does not, as a general thing, belong to the people or the masses. He is rather a man of wealth or of noble birth or of great influence. Very few persons who are poor and of the common classes are made the butt of

'emphasis'." This passage seems to mirror Aristotle's statement in the Ethics, 1128a, 30, 31, where he is discussing the doctrine of propriety in pastime conversations, but that entire section of the Ethics has nothing to do with ψόγος. The careful distinction of terms is important to this thesis, particularly since some writers on Aristotle's theory of Comedy have not been careful in distinguishing λαισσορία from ψόγος. See also, for example, Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, pp. 26, 26, 40.

⁵¹Lesky, A History, p. 420. See a more complete discussion of the laws regarding verbal abuse below.

⁵²Ibid. See the section on the legal tradition below.

comedy, and not even those few unless they are meddlesome or seek to have some advantage over the populace.⁵³

Generally, then, Old Comedy, though it could be violently abusive,⁵⁴ did not have the effect of arousing hatred and disgust of the persons vilified, but rather had the effect of arousing raucous laughter from the crowd. So then, as an art form, the more sophisticated and developed comedy became in the middle period, the less it related to the concept of $\psi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ under investigation here. A further investigation of elements of rhetorical blame within the comedies and tragedies of the Old and Middle periods by examination of the individual plays is desirable, but beyond the scope of this study.

⁵³Giangrande, Spoudaiogeloion, p. 17. Also: Robert J. Bonner, Aspects of Athenian Democracy (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967), pp. 123, 124.

⁵⁴Lesky, A History, p. 420, writes: "The attacks of Cratinus must have been exceedingly obscene. One is surprised to read that Aristophanes fell far behind him in this respect." The question here, of course, is whether these obscenities could be classed as $\psi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, rhetorical blame, or whether they had a different purpose. Isocrates distinguished invective with the intent to injure and blame with the intent to aid. Plato would allow only the jesting which had no serious purpose. See those sections below.

Conclusion

This investigation of the indications of blame from the perspective of the poetic/dramatic tradition showed clearly that both praising and blaming behaviors were deeply rooted in the culture of Greek society. From the ancient ideal of honor which lead to immortality, to the vigorous attacks on individuals and the mores of society by the iambic poets, to the festive ridicule of people in the spring festivals, and the vilification of living individuals in the Old and Middle Comedies, the power of speech and the potential power of blame were clearly evident. One can say without doubt that one of the major roots of the rhetoric of blame, which Aristotle classed under epideictic, and Anaximenes treated as a separate species of oratory, came through the poetic/dramatic traditions of the Greeks.

The Philosophical/Legal Tradition

Introduction

The philosophical and legal traditions also provided foundations for the direction of the rhetorical theories of vituperation which this paper studies. This section, then, will examine the various extant maxims and fragments of the pre-socratic philosophers which relate to invective, and will view the legal tradition for laws which were enacted regarding the freedom of speech. The section also considers

Plato's views on rhetorical blaming activity, and then concludes with some summary remarks.

Pre-socratic Philosophers

Within the sixth century, which Bury recorded as "the most critical period in the mental development of the Greeks"⁵⁵ the Greeks preserved and later elevated the sayings of several political or philosophical leaders whom they called the 'seven sages'. Although most of the extant fragments of these men are merely maximatic, those which bear on blame are worth noting for the spirit and temper of the times they displayed. Some of the sayings also bore upon laws which were enacted to define and limit the freedom of speech. Of the seven, namely, Solon, Periander, Pittachus, Thales, Chilon, Bias, and Cleobus, five had utterances pertaining to the topic.

Thales of Miletus (fl. 580's) was quoted as saying the following when asked how one could live uprightly: "If we do not ourselves do the things we blame (ἐπιτιμοῦμεν) others

⁵⁵J. B. Bury, History of Greece, revised by Russell Meiggs (3rd ed.; London: MacMillan, 1967), p. 321.

for doing."⁵⁶ The saying underscores the moral value which the Greeks attached to their blaming behaviors, but it also displays the seeds of the notion that righteous indignation is a virtue which adds dignity to one's verbal assaults.⁵⁷ Of course, the saying obviously displays the surface meaning that one's ethical standards should be as high as what one expects of others.

A contemporary of Thales, Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, is quoted as saying: "Do not bring out unsayable words (ἀρόρητων)."⁵⁸ Unsayable words were unsubstantiated

⁵⁶Translation quoted from Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 14. Their source is Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1906-1910), pp. 6, 8, which they printed out on p. 62n14. The term ἐκτιμάω was Isocrates' technical rhetorical term for blame. See under Isocrates below.

⁵⁷For a discussion of the concept of righteous anger from the perspective of the Roman period see William S. Anderson, "Juvenal and Quintilian," Yale Classical Studies 17 (1961), 1-93, esp. 30-34, and William S. Anderson, "Anger in Juvenal and Seneca," University of California Publications in Classical Philology, XIX, 3 (1964), 1-69. Another article, Robert Renehan, "Aristotle's Definition of Anger," Philologus, 107 (1963), 61-74 is an exegetical study of Aristotle's physiological definition of anger in De Anima, 403b.

⁵⁸Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. by Walther Kranz (6th ed.; Berlin: Weidmannsche, 1951), I, 65.

charges against another person, especially a public official, which would bring him into disgrace and dishonor (ἀτιμία) if believed.⁵⁹ They included accusing a person of killing another man, or killing his father, or throwing away his shield in battle. The Athenians enacted laws against these unsayable words, which will be discussed in greater detail below. However, it should be stated in connection with Periander's saying that whether a law existed in Athens or Corinth when Periander would have made this remark is uncertain.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, his statement reflects the growing awareness among the Greeks of the propriety or impropriety of certain invective utterances. Standards were being

⁵⁹See Thalheim, 'Ἀπόρρητα', Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. by Georg Wissowa (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1894), I, 176. The same information is given in abbreviated form by Walter Sontheimer in Der Kleine Pauly Lexikon der Antike, ed. by Konrat Ziegler and Walther Sontheimer (Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller, 1967), III, 457. According to Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, eds., A Greek-English Lexicon, (7th ed.; New York: American Book Co., 1897), p. 196, the term meant words which were "abominable", "unfit to be spoken". Their use was synonymous with foul abuse.

⁶⁰Max Radin, "Freedom of Speech in Ancient Athens," American Journal of Philology, 48 (1927), 223, n31. Radin believed that Solon's law against λοιδορία fell into this category. But he also believed that the specific law naming ἀπορρητα appeared in Athens sometime in 415 B.C., see 229.

formed which would theoretically at least exclude certain types of unsubstantiated defamation by law.

Periander is also noted for saying, "Praise those who are living and bless those who are dead."⁶¹ The statement sounds similar to Solon's law against reviling the dead,⁶² Chilon of Sparta's statement, "Do not speak evil of the dead,"⁶³ and the iambic poet, Archilochus' similar dictum.⁶⁴ Since this was such a common maxim, it is evident that the Greeks customarily abused both the living and especially the dead.⁶⁵ The pronouncement of the philosophers

⁶¹Diels, Fragmente, 6th ed., I, 65.

⁶²Cited by Radin, "Freedom of Speech," 221, from Plutarch (Solon, XXI). "ἐπαινέται δὲ τοῦ Σολῶνος καὶ ὁ κωλύων νόμος τοῦ τεθνηκότος κακῶς ἔχοντος... ἡρώτα δὲ κακῶς λέγειν ἔκωλοσε πρὸς ἱερῶς καὶ δικαστηρίους καὶ ἀρχαίους καὶ θεωρίας οὔσης ἀγώνων.

⁶³Cited by Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 14, from Diogenes Laertius I, 3, 2, and printed in a note, p. 63.

⁶⁴Cited by Jaeger, Paideia, I, 120. "It is not noble to abuse the dead."

⁶⁵Ibid., I, 446n. "[Archilochus'] criticism of the ignoble abuse of the dead by his fellowmen must have been famous among Greeks in all parts of the country, as shown by a grave inscription of a physician just 50 years later: he was praised because he was not maligned, even after he died."

and poets were, again, indicative of the growing sense of a 'proper' use of abuse and invective.

The sayings of the seven sages indicate the desire to curb and control the license of the tongue of the Greeks. Cleobus said, "Keep a discreet tongue."⁶⁶ Periander said, "Abuse (λοιδοροῦ) with the idea of soon becoming friendly."⁶⁷ And Chilon of Sparta said, "Keep guard over your tongue, especially at banquets."⁶⁸ (The reviling of the banqueteers, as well as their revelry, was proverbial.) These wise dictums of the sages were meant to curb abusive language which served no purpose except to degrade adversaries, or make adversaries out of former friends.

The extant fragments of two other pre-socratic philosophers, Xenophanes and Democritus, also include sayings which, while they do not deal directly with oratorical

⁶⁶Cited by Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 13, and printed in note, p. 62 from Diels, Fragmente, 2nd ed., p. 520.

⁶⁷Diels, Fragmente, 6th ed., I, 65, 66. "λοιδοροῦ ὡς τὰ πρὸ φίλος ἐσόμενος". Also cited by Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 14. Another fragment of Periander which uses the term κατηγορία was not cited above. It reads, "φύσεως κατηγορία" Diels, Fragmente, 6th ed., p. 65. Clearly something is missing. The editor, Kranz, notes, p. 65, n16, that it is truly a garbled sentence.

⁶⁸Cited by Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 14, and printed out, p. 63n, from Diels, Fragmente, 2nd ed.

utterances, are worth noting here to show the common subjects of blame and reproach. Xenophanes of Colophon remarked, "Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to all of the gods as much blame ($\psi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$) and reproach ($\acute{o}\nu\epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$) as is leveled against mankind; stealing, adultery, and deceiving one another."⁶⁹ Democritus of Abdera said, "ill gotten wealth more conspicuously prevails over the reproach ($\acute{o}\nu\epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$) it gains."⁷⁰ The subjects of blame in these quotes are stealing, adultery, deception, and ill gotten wealth.

In summary, the sayings of the pre-socratic philosophers invite the following deductions. First, they show a growing awareness among the Greeks of the ethical side of censure. The movement is away from 'flyting' as a method of simple verbal victory over another, toward censure as a means of social admonition. Second, although not yet completely set down in law, certain defamatory ejaculations

⁶⁹Diels, Fragmente, 6th ed., I, 132.

⁷⁰Diels, Fragmente, 6th ed., I, 189. Note: Democritus also said, "It is very easy to praise and not hard to blame ($\psi\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon$), but each is a sign of bad character." Ibid., I, 185. Democritus' meaning is unclear. Possibly he meant that both the flatterer and the sycophant were of bad character. See J. O. Lofberg, "The Sycophant-Parasite," Classical Philology, XV (1920), 61-72, for a discussion of the contempt Athenians held for flatterers and sycophants.

were considered reproachable in and of themselves. Certain types of verbal attacks began to be off limits. Third, the several maxims of the philosophers about blaming activity show that invective was a commonly accepted practice of the era. Finally, the statements of the philosophers reveal that no one had as yet set down a theoretic formulation of blaming behavior.

Laws Concerning Invective

The earliest laws of Athens were sacral and were not generally written down. In fact, many of the specifics of Draco's laws and even Solon's reforms are unknown, or in doubt.⁷¹ According to Fritz and Kapp, "everything seems to indicate that not until about the beginning of the fifth century, especially after the Persians Wars (sic), were systematic records made and carefully preserved, first of the most important, then also of the less important political regulations and decisions."⁷² Yet, secondary sources do present indications that from around 600 B.C. certain laws were in force in Athens regarding verbal abuse.⁷³

⁷¹For an overview of the laws of Draco and Solon see: Bury, History of Greece, pp. 179-189.

⁷²Kurt Von Fritz and Ernst Kapp, trans., Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts (Hafner Library; New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1950), p. 15.

⁷³For a basic discussion of the laws see Herbert

According to Plutarch, the slander laws began with Solon, who enacted a law by which no one could speak evil of those who were dead.⁷⁴ In the same decree Solon restricted evil speaking of living people by geography and season. One could not defame another in the presence of one of the temples, the law courts, or in the presence of the political assemblies. Defamation was also forbidden during the celebration of the festivals. The penalty was a fine of 3

Meyer, "κακηγορίας δίκη," Paulys Real-Encyclopädie, ed. by Georg Wissowa (Stuttgart, 1894), I, 1525, 1526. Also see Thalheim, "Λοδορία," in the same work, IX, 1081, 1082. Also see Erich Berneker "Λοδορία," Kleine Pauly Lexikon der Antike, II, 715. Please note Gordon Willis Williams, "Libel and Slander," Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 606. The article does not include the Greek period, but contains this sentence: "The study of Greek literature brought the rhetorical invective to the attention of the Romans - Thrasymachus, for example, was a great expert in such psogoi (Pl. Phdr. 267d)." This note shows the interchangeability of blaming terms in modern scholar's minds, since the Phaedrus uses the term δαβολή (accusations, calumnies), not ψόγος here. This thesis shows however, that 4th century B.C. writers on rhetoric did not use such terms interchangeably.

⁷⁴See footnote 66 for Plutarch's text. Bonner, Aspects Democracy, p. 70, states, "a general libel law is found in the legislation of Zaleucus." Bury, History of Greece, p. 145, calls Zaleucus, one of those "misty figures" who made laws for the Western Locrians sometime in the 7th century.

drachmae to the plaintiff and 2 drachmae to the public treasury.⁷⁵ Obviously, religious thinking directed the formulation of this law. However, what specifically constituted evil speaking was not spelled out. Further, the text Plutarch gives does not employ the term $\psi\acute{o\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, so, evidently the law was directed towards abuse and slander, not censure and blame, which would have been a true restriction on the freedom of speech.

Solon ordered that his laws not be changed for 100 years,⁷⁶ but the available scanty evidence seems to indicate that almost 150 years elapsed before the slander laws were expanded. Max Radin has shown through scholarly deduction approximately when, and to what extent, other laws were added.⁷⁷ Radin reached his conclusions by examining the scholia and remarks about the laws on slander and comparing them with the comedies of Aristophanes. Radin concluded

⁷⁵Bonner, Aspects of Democracy, p. 70. Radin, "Freedom of Speech," 221 says that the law did not give reparation to the injured party, but to the prosecutor. This is not an accurate statement, for each citizen in ancient Athens was to plead his own case.

⁷⁶Fritz and Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution of Athens, p. 74.

⁷⁷Radin, "Freedom of Speech," 215-230.

that the Solonic law against evil speaking was never removed from the laws, but that it fell into almost total disuse because the 5 drachma fine became a pittance through inflation and devaluation.⁷⁸ Next, he noted a decree of Morchides, effective for 3 years, which restricted the old comedies from abusing political personages. This law was enacted in 440 B.C.⁷⁹ Then he examined the law against the 'unsayable' (ἀπόρητα), which specified particular accusations which could not be mentioned unless they were verifiable, on pain of a 500 drachma penalty. These 'unsayables' included throwing away one's shield in battle, being a man-slayer, or killing or beating one's parents.⁸⁰ Radin postulated that this law went into effect in 414 B.C. and that it was a law of Syracosius, who is already known to have restricted the writers of the comedies from certain abusive

⁷⁸Ibid., 221, 223.

⁷⁹Ibid., 220.

⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 223, 224. See the discussion on Periander above, and the references to this law in footnote 66. There is no evidence that this law was directed only against the writers of comedies.

attacks.⁸¹ Radin added, finally, that possibly the list of 'unsayables' received additions from time to time, so that abusing another for having worked in the market place, for example, was later included in the list.⁸²

An incidental fact mentioned by Aristotle adds to Radin's argument that the slander laws were developed in the period of 440 to 414 B.C. In the Constitution of Athens, Aristotle noted that Cleon, the head of the Assembly in 427 B.C., inaugurated a newer, poorer era for public speaking,⁸³ for, "He was the first who shouted on the public platform, who used abusive language (λοιδόρησεν) and who spoke with his cloak girt up about him, while all the others used to

⁸¹Ibid., pp. 224-230. Radin argues on the basis of Aristophanes' attacks against Cleonymus that the law was not enacted yet in 420 B.C., but must have been in force in 414, because that is the year Aristophanes resorts to innuendo in the Birds. Cf. Bonner, Aspects of Democracy, p. 71.

⁸²Ibid., p. 229. Radin says the addition of the marketplace 'unsayable' occurred after 384 B.C., while Bonner, Aspects of Democracy, p. 71 says it occurred in 403 B.C., the same year it was decreed that court cases must be decided only on the basis of written laws, unwritten ones being disallowed. See also, George M. Calhoun, The Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1927), p. 132.

⁸³Note: The speeches of the politicians of the 5th century are known chiefly through the pens of the historians, but a close study of their purposed style and blaming activities is beyond the scope of this paper.

speak in proper manner and dress."⁸⁴ Aristotle seems to be saying that Cleon began the era of greater license of tongue (*παρρησία*) for public speakers.⁸⁵ Possibly this change in the oratorical climate prompted such a reaction as the slander law Radin discussed. At any rate, the deliberative and forensic speeches of the period showed an increase and a stylization of denigration and abuse.⁸⁶ Bury said of Cleon, "To those who regretted the dignity of Pericles, the speech[es] of Cleon...may have seemed violent and coarse; but Cleon himself could hardly have outdone the coarseness and the violence of the personalities which Demosthenes heaped on Aeschines in a subsequent generation."⁸⁷

The slander laws also reflected another aspect of Athenian culture which is important for the understanding of

⁸⁴Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, H. Rackham, trans. (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1966), pp. 83, 84. Fritz and Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution, pp. 98, 99. The translation cited here is from Fritz and Kapp.

⁸⁵Cf. Radin's statement that the Greeks prized their freedom of speech, which they generally took to mean freedom to attack others. Radin, "Freedom of Speech," 215.

⁸⁶See the section on the Attic orators below.

⁸⁷Bury, History of Greece, p. 416.

the political power of a speech of blame. It is not enough to say that accusations and virilent abuse of others seemed almost a mark of manliness and oratorical excellence to the Greeks. The heaping of blame upon another could have serious, lasting effects. If the reproachable terms (*δυνεδίσμος*) were proved true in court, the result was ignomy and political disenfranchisement (*ἀτιμία*).⁸⁸ Whereas suits for defamation of character could be private (*δικαία δίκη*) and the accuser and the accused could face each other, the suits could also be addressed as public wrongs (under the *δοκιμασία* or *ὑβρεως γραφή*), particularly when the accused was holding an office.⁸⁹ The private suits would net a fine, but the public suits, when awarded to the accuser, netted the guilty person the loss of his voice in the assembly, the loss of the right to bring criminal actions to court, or to serve as a witness in a court case, and even, in some cases, the loss of his property.⁹⁰ Like ostracism, the verdict of disgrace

⁸⁸ Herbert Meyer, "*κακηγορία δίκη*," Paulys Real-Encyclopädie, I, 1525.

⁸⁹ Bonner, Aspects of Democracy, pp. 71, 97. Free citizens were eligible to hold office if they were citizens from 3 generations, possessed a family tomb, showed proper respect for parents, adhered to certain religious groups, and had duly performed their military duties.

⁹⁰ Paul Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence, Vol. 2, The Jurisprudence of the Greek City (London: Oxford University Press, 1922), 174.

(ἀτιμία) was one of the means the democracy used to exclude from its process undesirables and unworthies.⁹¹

The slander laws, of course, were not the ones invoked if the abused person was actually suspected of being an unworthy. The laws provided for a 'scrutiny' (δοκιμασία) to be given to all who would take office, which could be called again while they were in office.⁹² An orator (any free citizen who customarily spoke in the assembly) could be declared in disgrace (ἀτιμία) if he was found to have committed any of the following classes of actions: (1) offense against his parents, (2) military offenses, (3) prostitution of his body, or (4) squandering his patrimony.⁹³

⁹¹Cf. Brédif, "To attack another's private life was not only a right, but a duty." Brédif, "Invective in Greek Eloquence," p. 302.

⁹²Bonner, Aspects of Democracy, p. 81. See Fritz and Kapp, Constitution of Athens, paragraphs 45, 2, and 55, pp. 119, 130, 131, 192, 193. Edmond Martin Burke, "Character Denigration in the Attic Orators with Particular Reference to Demosthenes and Aechines" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tufts University, 1972)," p. 26 states that the scrutiny which could be called during the term of office was called a ἐπιχειρησιν. The official was also examined for his conduct of office, called an εὐθύνη, but that does not relate to the investigation here. Cf. Robert J. Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 97 (also cited by Burke).

⁹³Bonner, Aspects of Democracy, p. 82.

There are two extant cases of suits involving litigation under the 'scrutiny' laws.⁹⁴

With all the evidence of accusations and abuse, one wonders why more cases were not tried, either for slander, or for unworthiness. Bonner suggested that in the case of slander, the suits that would result would not really be worth pursuing since the plaintiff would be considered "mean and litigious".⁹⁵ Instead, Bonner stated, "The victim of abusive language was expected to reply in kind, and usually he was both able and willing to do so."⁹⁶ In the instance of suits for unworthiness, conviction was difficult to obtain, particularly on the score of prostitution, since any "witness" would also be incriminating himself.⁹⁷ And, of

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 82-84. They are: Aeschines verses Timarchus, and Lysistheus verses Theomnestus.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 74.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Vinogradoff, Outlines of Jurisprudence, II. 174, 175. He describes another law against public insult (ἔβρω, ὁρμή), which could also be invoked for verbal offenses. Again, the penalty for this crime was disgrace. The law, however, was directed towards many kinds of violations of personal rights, including adultery, beating another's slave, and violations of the rich against the poor. This is the law which Demosthenes accused Meidias of breaking when he verbally and physically assaulted Demosthenes, who was functioning as a Choragos. The law does not need further explication in this paper.

course, winning or losing the case depended primarily on one's oratorical ability, since hard evidence (the inartistic proofs) were used only in the preliminary hearing and no cross examination of witnesses was allowed. All of the evidence of the case was written down and put into the hands of the clerk when court convened.⁹⁸

Summary

The survey of the laws which concerned invective and blame showed that the Greeks prized freedom of speech, which they usually took to mean the freedom to attack others. Originally, as in the case of the origins of raillery in the old comedies, verbal abuse had religious tones, and was restricted for religious reasons. But the flowering of the democracy presented a new reason for encouraging blaming behavior and restricting verbal abuse. The principle underlying the laws on slander and unworthiness was that bad people, defined as those who were murderers, cowards, spend-thrifts, and prostitutes, would give bad advice and would deceive the people in the assembly or in the courts. Of

⁹⁸For an overview of the court process in Aristotle's day see, Leonard Whibley, A Companion to Greek Studies (4th ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), pp. 484-490. See also H. T. Wade-Gery, "The Judicial Treaty with Phaselis and the History of the Athenian Courts," in Essays in Greek History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), pp. 180-200.

course, the city-state could not be protected from such men if verbal abuse (*λαβωρία*) was so commonplace as to be heaped upon every opponent in every situation. Therefore laws were enacted to restrict false and unsubstantiated accusations against the character of others. The unworthiness laws showed that blaming activity (*ψόγος*) was not discouraged, since identifying undesirables was considered a good for the operation of the city-state. The laws of the period showed, then, a tension between verbal abuse (*λαβωρία*) and accurate censure (*ψόγος*).

Plato on Blame

Plato is included in the philosophical setting for the rhetorical treatment of vituperation for two reasons: first, he placed the rhetorical practices of his day into sharp relief in presenting his picture of the ideal city-state in his various works.⁹⁹ Second, he deeply influenced

⁹⁹The standard overviews of Plato's view of rhetoric are: Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," in Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. by Raymond F. Howes (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 19-70; Edwin Black, "Plato's view of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 44 (1958), 361-374. Wilhelm Kroll, "Rhetorik (Platon)," Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. by Georg Wissowa, Supplement, VII, ed. by Wilhelm Kroll and Karl Mittelhaus, (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1940), 1054-1057; and, George Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece, esp. pp. 15-16, 62-63, 74-49, 158-164. Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, pp. 84-108, is the authority for Plato's conception of epideictic, while Theodore Chalon Burgess,

Aristotle's thinking in Aristotle's early period.¹⁰⁰

Plato did not present a theory of rhetoric per se, except as a criticism of the teachers of rhetoric,¹⁰¹ in order to draw students away from them and to enlist them in his school of philosophy.

In the same way, Plato was not active in the political or legal arena, but he certainly presented a theory of politics and law. A review of his literature, therefore, displays the function which he felt the oratory of blame should have in the ideal society, and from this literature comes his opinion of the true purpose of blame, the true subject of blame, and the proper persons to engage in blaming (Plato does not present a method for the rhetoric of blame). After his opinions have been enumerated here, a summary of his place in the history of vituperation is presented.

For Plato, the purpose of both blame and praise was

Epidictic Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902), esp. pp. 172, 175, 434, displays Menander's concept of epideictic sections in Plato's works.

¹⁰⁰Cf. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 83.

¹⁰¹Plato, Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias, trans. by W. R. M. Lamb (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1967), pp. 249, 250 (Hereafter labeled, Lamb). See William H. Race, "Shame in Plato's Gorgias," Classical Journal, 74, 3 (1979), 197-202 for an insightful study of Plato's attack on the sophistic redefinition of αἰσχος from the emotional and intellectual recoil from what is ugly and evil to mere political embarrassment.

to serve the education (παιδεία) of the ideal citizen.¹⁰² The verbal display of what is shameful (αἰσχρὸς), or without honor (ἀτιμία) along, of course, with what is praiseworthy (εὐδαίμων) would make people more tractable and more eager to do the good.¹⁰³ The purpose of blame, then, was to build character (ἦθος) in the citizen so that he became a good man (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός).

The subjects of praise and blame came from life in the city-state,¹⁰⁴ and the good (ἀρετή) was defined through service to the city-state.¹⁰⁵ As Buchheit observed, the 'good man' was praiseworthy, because he himself had knowledge of what is good.¹⁰⁶ The essential characteristics of this good, however, were not completely spelled out,¹⁰⁷ yet, clearly, they were a peripatetic good, as Buchheit succinctly stated.¹⁰⁸ In the Laws Plato stated it this way: everything

¹⁰²Jaeger, Paideia, II, In Search of the Divine Center, 84 ff.

¹⁰³Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 90.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 86.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., "Der ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ist lobenswert weil er sich als ἀγαθός erweisen hat."

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

that is τιμῶς is also ἐπαίνετος and vice versa.¹⁰⁹

According to Plato's way of thinking, then, only those who knew what was truly blameworthy had a right to blame. All other censurers must be restricted, or monitored by the educators. In the Laws Plato set down the limits for blaming in the ideal state.¹¹⁰ Paideia was learned through the hymns, then, which were laws for conduct. The first rule for hymns was euphamy (εὐφημία). All hymns would be 'auspicious'.¹¹¹ Further, the poets who compose the verses would never "go beyond the limits of what the State holds to be legal and right, fair and good."¹¹² The poets would necessarily submit all works for review by the legislators of music and the supervisor of education.¹¹³ The proper

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 85, citing the Laws, V.

¹¹⁰Jaeger, Paideia, II, 237, 238. The 'laws' of Plato were really rules for education. The ideal state did not need detailed legal codes, only proper education, and that education was 'musical'.

¹¹¹Plato, Laws, 800E trans. by R. G. Bury (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1952) II, 44, 45 (Hereafter labeled Bury). Notice that the opposite of εὐφημία is βλασφημία.

¹¹²Ibid., 801C, Bury II, 47.

¹¹³Ibid.

objects for songs (ᾠμῆς) and speeches of praise (ἐγκόμιον) were the gods, the powers, and the heroes.¹¹⁴ Citizens might become the subject of praise, after they died, if they "have wrought with body or soul noble works and toilsome, and have been obedient to the laws".¹¹⁵ Since no statement of attaching blame to those who had died is apparent, one can assume that Plato would probably not have allowed it.¹¹⁶

While Plato did not specifically mention blame (ψόγος) as either appropriate or inappropriate in his ideal state's laws, it can not be assumed that he would not, therefore, have tolerated it. Plato exhibited the type of abuse he would not allow in Book XI of the Laws. There he detailed that the wrathful kind of speaking ill of one another and saying blasphemies was "unseemly and totally out of place

¹¹⁴Ibid., 801D, Bury II, 49.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 801D, E, Bury, II, 47.

¹¹⁶This conjecture is based on the close similarity in wording of Plato's restriction of jesting (ἔλαστον) from the holy places, public sacrifices and games, in the marketplace, or in the courts or public assembly, with Solon's restriction from defaming the dead in these same places. See Plato, Laws, 935B, Bury, II. 460, 461.

in a well-regulated State".¹¹⁷ Concerning this type of verbal abuse (κακηγορίας) he stated, "there shall be this one law to cover all cases: - No one shall abuse anyone (μηδένα κακηγορείτω μηδέεις)."¹¹⁸ Ridiculing (γελοῖον) was also not allowed, not even in the comedies, unless previous permission had been given, and the minister of education could see that the jesting was without serious intent or passion.¹¹⁹

On the basis of the Laws, then, one can not say that Plato disapproved completely of every sort of blaming behavior. On the contrary, Grant and Fiske, looking at the same section of the Laws, even asserted that Plato admitted here that deserved ridicule was legitimate.¹²⁰ Plato's central concern with the speaking of rhetorical abuse was the

¹¹⁷Ibid., 934E, Bury, II, 461.

¹¹⁸Ibid. Also cited by Radin, "Freedom of Speech," 216, and Bonner, Aspects of Democracy, p. 70.

¹¹⁹Plato, Laws, 935C-936B, Bury, II, 462-465.

¹²⁰Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 22, also assert this on the basis of Plato's remark in the Republic, 452D, "That the man is foolish who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any object other than vice and folly."

same as his concern with the teachers of rhetoric, which was, that they taught or spoke without true knowledge of the good.¹²¹ Therefore neither the orators, nor the masses should be allowed to praise or blame (ἔπαινος or ψόγος) since they did not speak from knowledge for the goal of the betterment of others.¹²² Even more so should the people be restricted from verbal attacks (λοιδορία), blasphemies (βλασφημοῦντες), and ridicule (γελοῖον) since these utterances were the result of the passions and not the mind.¹²³

In other respects, also, Plato used the terminology of the rhetoric of his day in the normal way. Both in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, two works which discussed oratory, Plato mentioned praise and blame¹²⁴ and presented examples

¹²¹Kroll, "Rhetorik (Platon)," Paulys Real-Encyclopädie, VII, 1055. Kroll cited the Phaedrus, 272dff, 259e. See also the Phaedrus, 260.

¹²²Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 91. Buchheit cited the Republic, 173-174. See also Plato, Gorgias 503-505, Lamb, pp. 453-463.

¹²³Plato, Laws, 934E-936B, Lamb, pp. 460-465. See also Plato, Phaedrus, trans. by Harold North Fowler (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1967), 253D-254, pp. 495-499 and 277B, D, pp. 570-573 (Hereafter labeled Fowler).

¹²⁴For example, Phaedrus, 233A, B, 234E, 257E, 240B, 241E, 243C, D, 265C, D, 267A, 274E, Fowler, pp. 431, 437, 507, 453, 457, 563, and see Gorgias, 448E, Lamb, p. 265.

of speeches which praised or blamed.¹²⁵ He normally called those speeches "discourses" (λόγος) or "displays" (ἐπίδειξις).¹²⁶ He used the term epideictic in the general meaning of showing forth something. A display (ἐπίδειξις) meant primarily the showing forth of the subject of the speech, but in a secondary sense, especially in the case of Gorgias, it also meant a display of the orator's skill at persuasive speech.¹²⁷ A display (ἐπίδειξις) was a type of speech which gave value to the subject of the speech, and thereby persuaded.¹²⁸ One should not assume that Plato placed encomiums and scolds into a tight category called epideictic, however, since he used the term in such a general fashion.

As a final note, while Plato showed himself to be the enemy of the rhetoricians of his day, and the speeches

¹²⁵For example, Phaedrus, 236A, 241E, and 260B, Fowler, pp. 439, 457, 515.

¹²⁶For example, Gorgias, 447, 467C, Lamb, pp. 259, 327. See D. A. G. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," Classical Quarterly, 30 (1936), 170-176. Hinks defined the word as "lecture" and noted on p. 170, "[ἐπίδειξις] comes to mean a verbal demonstration or exposition, and the word and its cognates are regularly applied by Plato to the lectures of the Sophists, whether to those general discourses intended to impress the public and attract pupils, or to the instructional lectures themselves."

¹²⁷Ibid. See also, Phaedrus, 260B, Fowler, p. 515.

¹²⁸Ibid.

of praise or blame which they produced, he has been called the greatest epideictic writer. Burgess commented that Plato's style was "epideictic in the best and highest sense,"¹²⁹ since he treated his philosophical topics epideictically.¹³⁰ Hermogenes of Tarsus (2nd century A.D.) praised Plato as the model for panegyric writing in prose.¹³¹ Menander of Laodicia (3rd century A.D.) catalogued what he thought to be several epideictic sections in Plato.¹³² And, more importantly here, the modern authority on classical epideictic, Buchheit, said that Plato used the style of a speech of praise in the Menexenus to produce a scold (ψόγος).¹³³

Summary

Plato responded to the blaming behavior of the rhetors of his day from his philosophical perspective. His

¹²⁹Burgess, Epideictic Literature, p. 246.

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 247.

¹³¹Ibid., p. 172.

¹³²Ibid., p. 175.

¹³³Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 94. See Chapter I footnote 4, where it was noted that Buchheit did not believe that ψόγος was deserving of its own category.

philosophy of the soul and the knowledge of the good excluded the value judgments which the rhetors made in their speeches as mere appearance of good. His philosophy of the ideal city-state and the education of the citizen forced him to exclude the ridicule and abuse which the commoners heaped upon each other in private, and on the stage. Plato did not extend his own theory of rhetoric beyond the germinal axioms in the Phaedrus, yet his anchoring of rhetoric to psychology, ethics, and politics was carried to fulfillment by Aristotle in the next generation.

Conclusion

The forerunners to the theories of invective in Aristotle and Anaximenes advanced from the maximatic statements of the seven wise sages and Solon's single law concerning evil speaking in the 6th century B.C. towards an expansion of blaming activity among the people with the coming of the democracy, and the additions of laws restricting verbal abuse in the 5th century, to the first philosophical look at speeches of blame and praise by Plato in the early 4th century.

The review of the philosophers and laws of the period displays the development of a sense of propriety for words or speeches of blame. The laws show an attempt to distinguish levels and types of abuse and blame so that undesirables could

be expelled from the democracy, but the worthies would not be slandered or falsely accused. The writings of the period show the following general grouping of terms which designated blame and abuse. (1) To censure the qualities or actions of another (ψόγος) was an upheld right of the people. Its purpose was to expose the bad so that it could be removed from society. (2) To ridicule another (γελοῖον or καταγελοῖον) had less positive value for society, but it served to release emotions which might or might not have an underlying serious intent. (3) To abuse another (λοιδορία) meant to make an unfair or unsubstantiated attack upon another's actions or qualities. It seemed to the philosophers and lawgivers to have no good purpose, and was restricted by law. (4) To accuse another (κατηγορία or διαβολή) became legal terms in this period for plaintiffs and prosecutors at court. Some types of verbal attacks were covered by the laws. "Unsayables" (ἀπόρητα) were the bad qualities or actions of people which were prosecutable by law. If the allegations were false the defendant had been slandered (λοιδορία), or become the victim of odious words (ὄνειδος). The oratical climate of the 4th century, of course, always made the applications of these terms disputable. As a final note, the term epideictic (ἐπίδειξις) was used in this period in a non-technical sense to mean any kind of showing forth of something, that is, a verbal demonstration of something.

The Rhetorical Forerunners to the Rhetoric of Blame

Introduction

This third section of this chapter on the predecessors to Anaximenes' and Aristotle's rhetorics identifies the theoretical statements about blame which were arising in the 5th and 4th century B.C. in Greece. Of course, the evidence for this focus is scarce because the handbooks of the period (none have survived) were generally notes from the instructor to his students, and were generally incomplete from the perspectives of the rhetorics of Aristotle and Anaximenes.¹³⁴ Furthermore, they dealt mainly with court oratory,¹³⁵ and then, mostly only with the parts of the speech.¹³⁶ Yet, the reference available to moderns do allude to at least three factors of interest to this study. First, the citations indicate that an art (τέχνη) of blame was developing concurrently with the rest of the art of rhetoric. Second, the references suggest that the prescriptions for praise or blame were some of the first and most developed of the tactics for persuasion which went into the handbooks. Third, the quotations display more evidence

¹³⁴ Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 58.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 57, citing Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1354b26.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 56, citing Aristotle, Rhetoric, 13546b 17ff.

that the rhetoric of blame was linked by the ancients back to the iambic poets, as was suggested earlier.¹³⁷

This section discusses three rhetors who were known to have played a role in the development of the art of blame. They are Evenus of Paros, Georgias of Leontini, and Isocrates. Thrasy-machus of Chalcelon is also considered in this section, since he was the expert of his day in court room accusations (*διδασκαλία*), which is a related, but quite independent concept under the rhetorical genre of forensic oratory, accusation (*κατηγορία*). A discussion or investigation of the extant speeches of the Attic orators has been omitted from this section, except for purposes of example, since that study is beyond the parameters of the paper.¹³⁸

¹³⁷See pp. 27-32 above.

¹³⁸The standard works on the invective in the oratory of the period are: Brédif, "Invective in Greek Eloquence," pp. 290-337. This classic presentation lacks historical perspective and the precision of the terminology of invective called for by this thesis. Ivo Bruns, Das literarische Portrait der Griechen (Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1896), pp. 427-585. Bruns notes the development of invective (in the general sense of *διδασκαλία καὶ λοιδορία*), along with other emphases, from the speeches of Lysias through Demosthenes. Burke, "Character Denigration in the Attic Orators," pp. 1-285. This work examines only the forensic speeches of the Attic orators, but Burke made several discoveries which are of interest to this paper, so an outline of his work is presented here. Burke did not make any of the ancient distinctions between accusation (*κατηγορία*), attack (*διδασκαλία*), abuse (*λοιδορία*), and blame (*ψόγος*). Instead, he devised his own definition of terms to apply to the speeches. They were: (1) disparagement, which are attacks mildly perjorative in connotation, (2) abuse; which are more violent and personal

Evenus of Paros

Through Socrates' conversation with Phaedrus moderns have been introduced to the earliest known theorist on the oratory of blame, the mid-5th century B.C. sophist and iambic poet, Evenus of Paros.¹³⁹ Kennedy rendered a translation of

attacks, where the opponent's attitudes and actions are defined in such a way as to transcend the legal force of the indictment, and (3) invective; which Burke defined as more violent abuse aimed at the person of the antagonist himself, and which appear in vocative, or appositional form. With these conceptual tools, Burke examined the orators in historical order and came to the following conclusions which in general fashion support the thesis of the depth and vitality of invective and blame in the period. First, he discovered that character denigration was an essential weapon in forensic oratory used to establish the propriety of one's own character and the impropriety of the opponent's. Second, he showed that character denigration was a stylistic rhetorical device of the period, which appeared at almost the same place in all the orations, but he noted that it was more impersonally applied by the logographers. (In his section on Demosthenes and Aeschines, however, he advanced that Demosthenes invoked denigration primarily for political reasons, whereas Aeschines was unique in the fire of his venom and in not following either political or rhetorical considerations, but operating from passion alone.) Third, he showed that character denigration was evident in every oration he examined. Fourth, he established a growing intensity of character denigration from the period of Lysias to the period of Demosthenes. Burke also developed lists of the terms of denigration from the speeches and placed them in appendices at the end of some of the chapters. If Burke had applied the ancient rhetorical distinctions to find the elements of attack, abuse, and blame, and if he had examined some epideictic and/or deliberative speeches, his thesis would have been more beneficial to this paper.

¹³⁹Plato, Phaedrus, 267A, Fowler, pp. 536, 537.

Plato's passage, thus:

...And we're forgetting the distinguished Evenus of Paros who first discovered insinuation and indirect praise, and they say he also spoke indirect censure, learning stock phrases for this purpose in verse so that he could remember them better. He was a shrewd one!¹⁴⁰

This simple observation by Plato suggests several factors about praise and blame in the mid-5th century. First, since Evenus is normally classed as an elegiac or iambic poet,¹⁴¹ he becomes another link between the poetic censures (ψόγος) of the 7th century Archilochus¹⁴² and the prose speeches of blame extant in the 4th century.¹⁴³ Second, the passage suggests that Evenus was distinguished as a speaker and writer on the techniques of oratory, especially in the area

¹⁴⁰Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 55, citing Plato, Phaedrus, 267A, which reads: "Τὸν δὲ καλλίστον πάριον Ἑλληναῖς μέσον οὐκ ἔχομεν, ὃς ὑποδηλώσιν τε πρῶτος εὖρε καὶ παρεπαίνους οἷδ' αὐτὸν καὶ παραψόγους φάσιν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγων μνήμης χάριν. σόφος γὰρ ἄνθρωπος."

¹⁴¹Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, I, 33. All the ancient citations available to moderns are gnomic elegies, iambics, and epics. Sections of three poems are preserved.

¹⁴²See the section on the iambic poets above, where it is argued that Aristotle classed the iambic poets' invectives as predecessors to the rhetoric of blame.

¹⁴³See the section on Isocrates below.

of indirect praises (*παρεπαίνους*) and indirect blames (*παραψόγους*). In another place Plato cites Evenus as the sophist par excellence who could charge and get 20 minae for his services.¹⁴⁴ The passage reveals in the third place that other unnamed sophists must have also given prescriptions on praising and blaming, since Evenus is singled out particularly for indirect praise and blame. Finally, the passage shows that techniques of praising and blaming were being developed from the beginning of the prose period of oratory, right along with the teaching of the parts of an oration, the art of calumny and defense, and the like.¹⁴⁵

The other ancient references to Evenus would also indicate that he may have discussed the subjects related to censure in oratory. Aristotle, for instance, quoted Evenus in the section of the Metaphysics where he was discussing pain.¹⁴⁶ The Pseudo-Aristotelian, Virtues and Vices, cited

¹⁴⁴Edmunds, Elegy and Iambus, I, 467, citing Plato, Defense of Socrates. Plato asked to whom Callias would wish to give his sons for education in arete, whereupon Callias quickly responded, "Evenus of Paros, and his fee is 20 minae."

¹⁴⁵Plato, Phaedrus, 266D-267D, Fowler, pp. 266-268.

¹⁴⁶Edmunds, Elegy and Iambus, I, 475, citing Metaphysics, 1015a28.

Evenus in the discussion of haughty insult (ὕβρις) "whereby men make pleasure for themselves by bringing dishonour (ὄνειδος) upon others, or in the words of Euenus (sic) [Hubris]: which doeth wrong albeit she profit nothing."¹⁴⁷ And finally Stobaeus cites Evenus on the subject of anger (ὀργή).¹⁴⁸ The citations are there, but whether they came from a techne on rhetoric, by the hand of Evenus (which included a section on blame) can not be known for certain.¹⁴⁹

Thrasymachus of Chalcedon

In the same section of the Phaedrus cited for Evenus, Plato also alerted moderns to a particular forte of Thrasy-machus, when he had Socrates say,

For tearful speeches, to arouse
pity for old age and poverty, I
think the precepts of the mighty
Chalcedonian hold the palm, and
he is also a genius, as he said,
at rousing large companies to wrath,
and soothing them again by his

¹⁴⁷Ibid., citing Aristotle, Virtues and Vices, 1251a.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., p. 473, citing Stobaeus, Anthology, 51.17.

¹⁴⁹The fact that Evenus is mentioned among the list of writers of handbooks by Plato, and that he was quoted on the subject of oratory by Athenaeus, Doctors at Dinner, 9.367E, Edmunds, Elegy and Iambus, I, 471, suggests he may have written a techne.

charms when they are angry, and most powerful in devising and abolishing calumnies (δισβολάς) on any grounds whatsoever.¹⁵⁰

Unfortunately, more than one modern scholar has in effect glossed the calumnies (δισβολάς) of Thrasymachus here with the censures (ψόγοι) of Evenus and others just mentioned, and lumped together into one category two rhetorically independent concepts.¹⁵¹ An explication of the calumnies of Thrasymachus is in order, then, to clear the confusion and illuminate the differences between the two concepts.

Scholars generally agree that Thrasymachus did write a rhetorical handbook¹⁵² which concentrated on forensic rhetoric in contrast to the teachings of Gorgias and Isocrates, who concentrated on epideictic speaking.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰Plato, Phaedrus, 267C, D, Fowler, p. 539.

¹⁵¹For Example, R. G. M. Nisbet, ed., M. Tulli Ciceronis in L. Calpurnium Pisonem Oratio (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 193, and Williams, "Slander," Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 606. See footnote 73 above. Both these scholars may be excused this infelicity since they are reporting 3rd hand introductory material for their own expertise in the Roman period. The problem, as was stated in the introduction, is that none have until now made a serious study of the terms of invective in the Greek period from the perspective of rhetorical theory.

¹⁵²Kroll, "Rhetorik (Andere Sophisten)," Paulys Real Encyclopädie, VII, 1046.

¹⁵³Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 69.

though Trasymachus may have also included a section on that.¹⁵⁴ Moderns know that Thrasyarchus contributed to rhetorical theory the terse compact prose period, "fittest for real contests"¹⁵⁵ as well as certain emphases on emotional appeals (ἐλεος).¹⁵⁶ If he included a section on attack (δισβολή) it is necessary to reconstruct what he would have included under the topic.

Fortunately this is not difficult to do here since one scholar, Walter Voegelin, has produced an exhaustive and authoritative work on the calumnies of Thrasyarchus' era by examining the speeches of his contemporary, Lysias,¹⁵⁷ Voegelin defined the word δισβολή by characterizing its meaning from the contexts of several writers of the period.¹⁵⁸ To summarize his discussion, δισβολή was a rhetorical term normally used for perjorative attacks against an opponent

¹⁵⁴R. C. Jebb, The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaias (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), II, 133, 424.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., II, 423.

¹⁵⁶Kroll, "Rhetorik," VII, 1046 and Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 69.

¹⁵⁷Walter Voegelin, Die Diabole bei Lysias: Das Verhältnis von Bürger und Staat in der Rechtsprechung der attischen Demokratie (Basel: Benno Schwabe, 1943), pp. 1-168.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 23-30.

during a court trial.¹⁵⁹ The term was distinguished from court-room accusation (κατηγορία) in that it was "outside" the actual subject matter of the suit at hand.¹⁶⁰ Διαβολή then, was additional supplementary material used to arouse the emotions of the jury against the opponent. Of course, each party in the suit would normally characterize his "hostile information" about his opponent as accusation (κατηγορία), while he would experience all of his opponent's charges, of course, as calumny (διαβολή).¹⁶¹ Isocrates closely identified the two terms,¹⁶² but Aristotle made a clear separation of them on the basis of proofs.¹⁶³ Aristotle would class διαβολή as an appeal to an artistic proof, emotion (πάθος), whereas κατηγορία would be an appeal

¹⁵⁹See also "διαβαλλεῖν", Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, 7th ed. abridged (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 185, where it is noted that Demosthenes used the term in the most neutral sense, "to give hostile information (without insinuation of falsehood)."

¹⁶⁰Voegelin, Die Diabole, p. 24.

¹⁶¹Ibid.

¹⁶²Ibid.

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 23. Voeglin asserted this on the basis of Aristotle's remarks about the previous handbooks discussing only the matters outside the subject, such as methods for arousing prejudice, anger, etc. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1354a.

to an inartistic proof, written law.¹⁶⁴ Of course both the accusations at hand and the supplemental attacks were designed to bring guilt and disgrace upon the opponent, and to render him odious in the minds of the jury. Of the two terms, however, διαβολή was more perjorative and more feared.¹⁶⁵

Voegelin's work displayed the stock classifications of attack that Thrasymachus would have put into his handbook. Voegelin divided the διαβολή of Lysias into eight classes. They were: (1) to say that the opponent rejected his due service to the polis in some way, from deserting in battle, to exhibiting lack of discipline,¹⁶⁶ (2) to observe that the opponent used money improperly, such as shirking state liturgies, embezzling, or just being too loose or too tight with money,¹⁶⁷ (3) to accuse the opponent of either not pursuing justice because he did not file suits against offenders,¹⁶⁸ or (4) to accuse him of being a sycophant, filing case after case, (5) to attack the parentage or nobility of the

¹⁶⁴Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1356a3, 1354a7, J. H. Freese, trans. (Loeb Library; London: William Heineman, 1975), pp. 17, 5 (Hereafter labeled Freese).

¹⁶⁵Voegelin, Die Diabole, p. 25.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 33-44.

¹⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 45-73.

¹⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 74-83.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 84-110.

opponent,¹⁷⁰ (6) to accuse the opponent of being falsely enrolled in one of the demes,¹⁷¹ (7) to characterize the opponent as an enemy of democracy,¹⁷² and, (8) to charge the opponent with some religious fault.¹⁷³

The manner of refutation of calumnies may also be suggested from the speeches of Lysias which Voegelin perused.¹⁷⁴ For one, the defendant could claim that no (written) law had actually be violated by his actions.¹⁷⁵ Next, he might put the opponent's attack into a different perspective, showing that what he was accused of was actually lawful, just, or beneficial,¹⁷⁶ or at least common to all people, including the judges.¹⁷⁷ Then, he certainly would assert that his opponent was only maligning him.¹⁷⁸ Finally,

¹⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 117-146.

¹⁷¹Ibid., pp. 117-141.

¹⁷²Ibid., pp. 142-152.

¹⁷³Ibid., pp. 153-167.

¹⁷⁴Both Anaximenes and Aristotle gave full accounts of presenting and refuting attacks (δικαλογία) in court. See those sections in the following chapters.

¹⁷⁵For example Ibid., pp. 34, 36, etc.

¹⁷⁶For example Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁷⁷For example Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁷⁸For example Ibid., p. 34.

the defendant would certainly use counter attacks (διαβολάς) of his own.¹⁷⁹

Thrasymachus of Chalcedon was one of the first to develop this art of forensic attack, through which the jury would be aroused against the opponent, and feel pity and mercy for the speaker.¹⁸⁰ Thrasymachus would have enjoined his readers to use διαβολή particularly in the prooemium and in the epilogue,¹⁸¹ and would have suggested that the speaker display the emotions he was seeking to arouse.¹⁸² He probably would not, however, have classed the censures (ψόγος) or indirect censures (παράψόγος) of the period within this section of his handbook.¹⁸³ Rhetorically speaking, censure

¹⁷⁹For example Ibid., pp. 67, 87, etc.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 26, 27.

¹⁸¹Ibid., p. 27. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1415a36-44, Freese, pp. 432, 433, where he suggested that the defendant should accuse the opponent in the prooemium to create prejudice, while the plaintiff should work up accusation in the epilogue. See also, Ad Alexandrum, 1443b, 28ff, 1444b, 28ff.

¹⁸²Voegelin, Die Diabole, p. 27.

¹⁸³See Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1416a-b. Aristotle includes the use of praise and blame as one of the tools suitable for the attacker when he praises a little thing in the other, in order to blame something which is a great defect in the opponent. It is suggested here that Anaximenes also presents censure as a tool in forensic defense at Ad Alexandrum, 1441b15-28. See the section on Ad Alexandrum in chapter III.

censure was not directly used to help secure a favorable verdict in court. Its direct task was to attach moral value to a person, an action, a speech, or an event.

Gorgias of Leontini

The Ancients considered Gorgias to be the father of epideictic oratory,¹⁸⁴ but it is clear that Gorgias did not develop a theory of epideictic oratory as such.¹⁸⁵ Buchheit examined the references to Gorgias as the father or master of epideictic, and as a writer of a techne and concluded that

¹⁸⁴Cf. Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, pp. 27-29 and Martin, Antike Rhetorik, pp. 177-178.

¹⁸⁵Let it be noted here with the discussion of Gorgias as the father of speeches of praise and blame, that one Stephanos of Byzantium, a 6th century A.D. grammarian and writer of a book named Ethnica (Moderns have only fragments of an epitomy of this work done by a Hermolaus for Justinian II), labeled Protagoras as a teacher of blame and praise. The fragment reads (Diels, Fragmente II, 260): "Ἀβδήρα : πρωταγόρας. ὃν Εὐδοξὸς λήτορες τὸν ἥσσῳ καὶ κρείσσῳ λόγον πεποιηκέναι καὶ τοὺς μαθητὰς διδάσκειν τὸν αὐτὸν ψεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν.

This, roughly translated, reads: "Abdera (the geographical location Stephanos is discussing): Protagoras (A reference to an ancient writer from there); the famous one who knew how to make the weaker argument the stronger and who was able to teach his students to blame (ψεῖν) and praise." In spite of this citation Protagoras is not included as a forerunner to the rhetoric of blame. The evidence, coming as it does almost 1000 years after Protagoras lived, is just not sufficient to pursue here. The first section of the sentence certainly comes from Protagoras, via his Ἀντιλόχεια (See Fredrick Copleston, Greece and Rome, I, 1 of A History of Philosophy, 8 vols. Image Books; New York: Doubleday, 1962, 111.), but there is no extant evidence for the other part of the sentence, either from the fragments of Protagoras, or from the allusions to him by the others who wrote about him. Moderns couple this statement to the reference to Protagoras in Aristophanes,

they said nothing about the art itself.¹⁸⁶ Kennedy suspected that the few ancient references to a techne by Gorgias really refer to his verbal discussions with his pupils,¹⁸⁷ or his method of presenting his students with specimen speeches and collections of commonplaces, which they could use to learn the art by memorization and imitation.¹⁸⁸ Cicero was aware of a set of commonplaces by Gorgias labeled Laudes et Vituperationes, but he could not locate it.¹⁸⁹ All but one of Aristotle's citations of Gorgias deal with his style rather than a theoretical position.¹⁹⁰ So then, it is clear that

Clouds, 112ff, but no reference to $\psi\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ or to the teaching of $\psi\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ appears there (See Diels, Fragmente, 6th ed. II, 270). At this point, it seems that Stephanos just conflated Cicero's account of lists of commonplaces which both Protagoras and Gorgias produced, without distinguishing that the contents of the commonplaces were different (See Cicero, Brutus, 46ff). A thorough search for other clues, or for the reasons Stephanos attributed the teaching of $\psi\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ to Protagoras, is beyond the scope of this paper.

¹⁸⁶Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 28.

¹⁸⁷Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 62.

¹⁸⁸Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁸⁹Martin, Antike Rhetorik, p. 196, citing Cicero, Brutus, 46ff.

¹⁹⁰Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1404a, 1406b, 1414b, 1415b, 1416a, and 1419b, Freese, pp. 349, 365, 367, 429, 437, and 467. In the final reference, Aristotle indicates that it was Gorgias' dictum "to confound the opponent's earnest with jest and their jest with earnest."

Gorgias did not generally follow prescribed rules for his epideictic speeches, and he did not generate a theory about it. He should be viewed, says Buchheit, not as a theorist, but as a "master of the λόγος." ¹⁹¹

The type of oratory in which Gorgias excelled does display the central stuff of the oratory of blame and praise that Anaximenes and Aristotle incorporated into their theories. For one, Gorgias practiced the art of amplification and disparagement. In fact, according to Cicero, "Gorgias held that it was the peculiar function of oratory to magnify a thing by praise, or again, by disparagement to belittle it." ¹⁹² Gorgias also related the length of the speech to this art of amplification, and his technique of μακρολογία and συντομία (length and brevity), says Kennedy, "enabled him to spin out a speech to any length appropriate for persuasion at the moment." ¹⁹³ He performed this tactic in part by carrying

¹⁹¹Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 32. But see Richard Leo Enos, "The Epistemology of Gorgias' Rhetoric," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 42 (1976), 35-51. Enos argues that Gorgias was a true philosopher of rhetoric.

¹⁹²Verne R. Kennedy, "Auxesis: A Concept of Rhetorical Amplification," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 38 (1971), 63.

¹⁹³Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 63.

each section of the subject to its logical conclusion, and in part by inserting commonplaces.¹⁹⁴ Again, his doctrine of the kairos, appropriate words for the critical moment,¹⁹⁵ was also one of the underpinnings of the theory of the art of blame, and can be linked to the doctrine of τὸ πρέπον in Aristotle.¹⁹⁶ Finally, Gorgias developed the device of answering serious attacks with jest and answering jest with seriousness.¹⁹⁷

Buchheit drew the following conclusions about the substance of Gorgias' concept of speeches of praise and blame from a study of the Helena. There, the praiseworthy, those things which must be praised, seem to be; men, women, speeches, works, cities, and deeds.¹⁹⁸ Buchheit did not find an objective standard of these praiseworthy things, however, and considered Gorgias' criteria to be completely subjective.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

¹⁹⁵Kroll, "Rhetorik (Gorgias)", VII, 1045.

¹⁹⁶Ibid. and Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 67.

¹⁹⁷Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1419b, Freese, p. 467. Cf. Burgess, Epideictic Literature, 102n.

¹⁹⁸Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 35.

¹⁹⁹Ibid., p. 36.

Kroll remarked that Gorgias claimed that he made his pupils better by his teaching, but that his perspective sounded amoral.²⁰⁰

While Gorgias was a master at his art, then, it does not seem that he advanced the theory of blame to any degree. Of course, this does not mean that he did not consider blame to be a valid category of oratory.²⁰¹ In fact, the title of his commonplaces shows that Gorgias composed *ψόγος*, just as he composed encomiums. Further, Aristotle's citation to Gorgias' obscure style lends weight to this assertion. Even though moderns do not know from where Aristotle secured this following quotation from Gorgias, it appears to come from a speech of censure, when he said, "You have sown shame and reaped misfortune."²⁰²

²⁰⁰Kroll, "Rhetorik (Gorgias)," VII, 1046.

²⁰¹The extant fragments do not show that Gorgias used the term *ψέγω* to any extent, but he does employ the synonym *μέμφομαι* in the extant speeches. This word appears more often among the writings of the historians (Liddell & Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 8th ed. (1958), p. 1101), and it is interesting to notice that Gorgias was one of the founders of the Sicilian school of history (Burgess, Epideictic Literature, p. 199).

²⁰²Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1406b14, Freese, p. 365. In the same section Gorgias censures a bird for defecating upon his head.

In summary, then, Gorgias should be seen as one who elevated the art of blame into a florid ostentatious style, just as he did with all the types of speeches he performed or lectured upon.²⁰³ Gorgias stands out, then, as a forerunner to the theories of blame, not because he developed theoretic treatments of the art, but because his performances were the practical stuff from which the τέχναι were produced.²⁰⁴ He also served as one of the teachers to one who did develop a theory of blame, Isocrates, to whom the attention of this section now turns.

Isocrates

Isocrates (436 - 338 B.C.) stands as one of the principle forerunners to the theories of blame though he is not really a forerunner, since he headed a school of oratory, and presented a developed 'philosophical' treatment of rhetoric.²⁰⁵ Unfortunately, however, moderns do not have his

²⁰³From the fragments, Gorgias, like Thrasymachus and the others, seems primarily interested in the forensic aspects of oratory. The terms κατηγορία and δαβολή occur often. See Walther Kranz, ed., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, by Hermann Diels, Index (6th ed.; Berlin: Weidmannsche, 1952), III, 126, 231.

²⁰⁴Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 21.

²⁰⁵Cf. Ibid., p. 39. Also, Kroll, "Rhetorik (Isokrates)," VII, 1128.

techne, if he wrote one, so what he specifically taught about the art of blame has to be inferred from his extant treatises.²⁰⁶ An examination of his works will amplify his importance in the progress from the oratory of blame to the rhetoric of blame, since he provided moderns with both examples and prescriptions. As a theorist Isocrates presented the definition of the oratory of blame and distinguished accusations, abuse, and calumny. He also tied blame to morality and provided moderns with at least one example of a speech of censure, Against the Sophists. Isocrates himself set for his own goal the attainment of immortality through honor (τιμή) as a speaker of words.²⁰⁷

In order to begin with Isocrates' definition of the oratory of blame, one must isolate the terms he used. First, then, it is noteworthy that all of the occurrences of the noun ψόγος by Isocrates appear in the epistle To Demonicus.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 38, 40. He states that at the beginning of this century most scholars believed that Isocrates wrote a techne, but now many, including Buchheit, are under the impression he did not.

²⁰⁷Cf. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 203, and Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 41. Buchheit said, "Isocrates himself strove for τιμή through his speeches."

²⁰⁸Siegmundus Preuss, Index Isocrateus (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1971), p. 207.

Isocrates used the verb form, ψέγω, at eleven places.²⁰⁹ On the other hand, he employed a synonym, ἐπιτιμάω, forty-nine times in the extant collection.²¹⁰ So then, the meaning of speeches of blame for Isocrates are to be found primarily in the passages where he used ἐπιτιμάω. He employed ψόγος particularly in relating censure to ethics so that will be discussed here also.

Moderns are able to draw Isocrates' understanding of blame and its related topics from a statement in the Areopagiticus²¹¹ which reads:

But perhaps some of you may wonder what my purpose is in trying to persuade you to exchange the policy which has achieved so many fine things for another, and why it is that after having just now eulogized (ἐγκωμιάσκα) democracy in such high terms, I veer about capriciously and criticize (ἐπιτιμάω) and condemn (κατηγορῶ) the present order. Well, I reproach (μέμφομαι)

²⁰⁹Ibid., p. 205. Two of the occurrences are in his letters.

²¹⁰Ibid., p. 83. Isocrates probably used this word because of its connotation of "placing value upon something".

²¹¹Jebb, Attic Orators, II, 206, dates the treatise to the latter half of 355 B.C. The speech was cast in deliberative form and was a contrast between the Athenian democracy of the 5th century and that of the 4th century (p. 202).

men in private life when they succeed in a few things and fail in many, and regard them as falling short of what they ought to be; and more than that, when men are sprung from noble ancestors and yet are only a little better than those who are distinguished for depravity, and much worse than their fathers, I rebuke (λαιδόρω) them and would counsel them to cease from being what they are. And I am of the same mind also regarding public affairs.²¹²

With characteristic artistic deliberateness Isocrates changed the words for each type of censure so that one may conclude the following: (1) criticism (ἐπιτίμησις) is the contrast of encomium (ἐγκώμιος) and therefore is the rhetorical term for blame; (2) it is furthermore used for censure in the public sphere, along with accusations (κατηγορία), whereas (3) finding fault (μέμψις)²¹³ is used of men in private life, and is (4) compared with rebuke (λαιδόρεω) which is reserved for greater failures in the private sphere.

²¹²Isocrates, Areopagiticus, 71, in Isocrates, trans. by George Norlin (Loeb Library; London: William Heineman, 1968), II, 149, 151 (Hereafter labeled, Norlin).

²¹³Cf. Gorgias' use of this word footnote 201 above.

The purpose which speeches of blame held for Isocrates were elaborated in the following quotations from On the Peace²¹⁴ and Panegyricus:²¹⁵

But those who admonish (νουνθετοῦντας) and those who denounce (καταγοροῦντας) cannot avoid using similar words, although their purposes are as opposite as they can be. You ought not, therefore, to have the same feeling towards all who revile you to your harm (ἐνὶ βλάβῃ λαοδοροῦντας) an inimical to the state, you ought to commend those who admonish you for your good and to esteem them as the best of your fellow citizens, and him, most of all, even among them, who is able to point out most vividly the evils of your practices and the disasters which result from them.²¹⁶

and:

It is not, however, possible to turn men from their errors, or to inspire in them the desire for a different course of action without first roundly

²¹⁴Jebb, Attic Orators, II, 183, places this speech in the first half of 355 B.C. Like Areopagiticus, it is cast in the form of a deliberative speech.

²¹⁵Ibid., II, 150, dates this speech at autumn of 380 B.C. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," p. 170, says this speech gave a new category to oratory, panegyrics. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 189 sees it as a combination of a funeral oration and a festival speech. For him it was Isocrates' greatest speech.

²¹⁶Isocrates, On the Peace, 72, Norlin, II, 51.

condemning (ἔρρωμένους ἐπιτίμησιν)
 their present conduct; and a distinction must be made between accusation (κατηγορεῖν) when one denounces with the intent to injure and admonition (νοουθετεῖν) when one uses like words with intent to benefit; for the same words are not to be interpreted in the same way unless they are spoken in the same spirit.²²¹

From these quotes one can say that the purpose of censure was to roundly condemn present evil conduct and the resulting disasters with the intent to inspire new actions which would benefit the hearers. This purpose was contrasted with accusation (κατηγορία) the purpose of which was to prosecute and cause injury. The best censure, then, was the one which could "point out most vividly the evils of your practices and the disasters which result from them." This was the noble task of the orator which should afford him honor, as Isocrates' wrote To Nicocles,²¹⁸ "Regard as your most faithful friends, not those who praise (ἐπαινοῦντας) everything you say and do, but those who criticize (ἐπιτιμοῦντας) your mistakes."²¹⁹

²¹⁷Isocrates, Panegyricus, 130. Norlin, I, p. 201.

²¹⁸Jebb, Attic Orators, II.

²¹⁹Isocrates, To Nicocles, 28, Norlin, I, 57.

As Kennedy noted, Isocrates set himself apart from other sophists with his high moral purpose.²²⁰ This moral purpose to present the good (ἀγαθόν), the beautiful (or virtuous) (καλόν), and the magnificent (μέγα)²²¹ also through the oratory of blame was reflected in Isocrates' hortatory epistles, especially in To Demonicus.²²² There Isocrates spoke of ψόγος three times and shame twice. Three of the quotes were parental type dicta, such as, "Whatever is shameful (αἰσχρόν) to do you must not consider it honorable (καλόν) to mention,"²²³ but two quotations presented the subject matter of the rhetoric of blame, honor and disgrace. Isocrates wrote, "But virtue (ἀρετή), when it grows up with us in our hearts without alloy, is the one possession which abides with us in old age; ...it considers sloth a

²²⁰Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 182.

²²¹Cf. Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 79. He says Isocrates gave no systematic understanding of the terms.

²²²Jebb, Attic Orators, II, 85, assigns this letter to about 372 B.C.

²²³Isocrates, To Demonicus, 15, Norlin, I, 13. See also, 7, 16, and 33, Norlin, I, 7, 13, 25.

censure (ψόγον), and toil a praise (ἔπαινον)," ²²⁴ and,
 "Be more careful in guarding against censure (ψόγον) than
 against danger; for the wicked may well dread the end of life,
 but a good man should dread ignomy (ἄδοξίαν) during life." ²²⁵

In the same letter, Isocrates distinguished
 from accusations and censure. The διαβολαί were malicious
 accusations or malicious misrepresentations. He wrote:

Guard yourself against accusations
 (διαβολή), even if they are false;
 for the multitudes are ignorant of
 the truth and look only to reputations.
 In all things resolve to act as though
 the whole world would see what you do;
 for even if you conceal your deeds for
 the moment, later you will be found
 out. But most of all will you have
 the respect of men, if you are seen
 to avoid doing things which you would
 blame (ἐπιτιμᾶς) others for doing. ²²⁶

Taken together with the other quotations above one can sur-
 mise that accusations (κατηγορία) held the normal forensic
 meaning, and attacks (διαβολή) also could be true or false,

²²⁴ Ibid., 7, Norlin, I, 9.

²²⁵ Ibid., 43, Norlin, I, 31.

²²⁶ Ibid., 17, Norlin, I, 13.

but normally had malicious intent, while blame (ἐπιτιμῆσις) held a possible salutary purpose.

The objects of blame are also evident from Isocrates' use of the term, ἐπιτιμῶν. They include government policies and governments, but they also include persons, actions, and speeches.²²⁷ The greater the theme of the censure, the more noble the speech, and more honorable the speaker.²²⁸ The time frame for censure is present,²²⁹ and the purpose of censure is admonition.

By applying this explication of Isocrates' conception of censure to his extant treatises one is able to find sections of censure and, in fact, one whole speech fragment of censure, the treatise Against the Sophists.²³⁰ Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to perform a complete rhetorical analysis on individual speeches, it seems clear, on the surface to be sure, that Against the Sophists is a

²²⁷Besides the quotations here, see Antidosis, 62, Norlin, I, 221, Areopagiticus, 76, 77, Norlin, I, 153, To Nicocles, 28, Norlin, I, 57.

²²⁸Cf. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 179, quoting from Antidosis, 274f.

²²⁹Cf. To Nicocles, 28, Norlin, I, 61.

²³⁰Isocrates, Against the Sophists, Norlin, II, 160-177.

speech which fits the category of blame. The subject matter is the teaching of virtue (ἀρετή), the method is blame, the censured ones are living rivals, the goal is to move the hearers from one value orientation to another for their good, the time is present. The oratory of accusation (κατηγορία) and attacks (δυσκολία) are excluded, and it is for certain that the treatise is not symboleutic exhortation. Clearly this treatise, as well as the opening sections of Helen²³¹ and Busiris²³² are examples of the oratory of censure.²³³

The question of whether Isocrates placed the oratory of censure under a genre called epideictic has to be answered

²³¹Cf. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 177. See also, Isocrates, Helen, LaRue Van Hook, trans. (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1968), III, 54-98 (Hereafter labeled Van Hook).

²³²Cf. Jebb, Attic Orators, II, 128. See also, Busiris, Van Hook, III, 100-133.

²³³Jebb, Attic Orators, II, 81-83, discussed the problem of classifying Isocrates' works and commented that the commonly used system is weak at best. This system was devised by Jerome Wolf in 1570 "For the sake of convenience". While Wolf placed Against the Sophists into the epideictic category, Jebb changed this and arranged the non-forensic speeches by subject matter so that the treatise fell under "essays on education" (pp. 82, 83). This seems unnecessary. It reveals first of all, the modern prejudice that epideictic can only mean display oratory, or encomium, when the Greeks of the 4th century B.C. used the genre to include censure. Next, it is not the ancient method of classifying speeches, and to divide the works, some by forensic genre, and some by subject matter is inconsistent. Worst, it tends to perpetuate the blind spot for censure, even though Jebb himself certainly sees this treatise as a censure (pp. 127-134).

in the negative. There are no indications from his use of ἐπίδειξις that he was thinking of it as a technical term for speeches of praise and blame.²³⁴ Nevertheless it is worth noting how he used the term, since as a rhetorician, he presented the first clear employment of ἐπίδειξις as the display of one's oratorical ability alone. The following four examples make his use of the term clear. (1) In the epistle To the Children of Jason, Isocrates wrote, "And pray do not entertain any such notion as that I have written this letter, not on account of your friendship, but for the purpose of making a rhetorical display (ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσασθαι)".²³⁵ (2) A few sentences later he continued, "Besides, if I were intent upon producing a composition for display (ἐπίδειγμα) instead of having your interest at heart, I should not have chosen of all available subjects, that one which is difficult to treat passibly well, but I should have found other themes, much

²³⁴But see Kroll, "Rhetorik (Epideiktik)," VII, 1128, 1129. Kroll named Isocrates as the creator of praise speeches [Lobreden] to individuals and said that one can determine the first rules of the art from Isocrates, which Anexamenes and Aristotle codified. But Kroll also claims that it is possible to go back to Isocrates for the formation of ἐπίδειξις as a special genre. If he means by that, that Isocrates himself was cogently forming epideictic as a special genre, this writer must disagree. Buchheit also finds neither name nor concept of a genos epideiktikon in Isocrates, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 77.

²³⁵Isocrates, To the Children of Jason, Van Hook, III, 437.

nobler and more logical."²³⁶ At the beginning of Panegyricus, Isocrates wrote, "No, the man who does not aim merely to make an oratorical display (μόνον ἐπίδειξιν ποιούμενον), but desires to accomplish something as well, must..."²³⁷ And, in the most obvious instance of the use of epideictic as "display of skill", Isocrates wrote, "and those who devote themselves to music and letters and to the various contests, some by exhibiting their strength and others (displaying [the same verb form functions for both phrases]) their artistic skill (τέχνας ἐπιδειξάμενοι)..."²³⁸ This use of ἐπίδειξις by Isocrates has helped guide the modern classification of the genre, then, as "the demonstration of any production of the technical skill... without practical aim."²³⁹

²³⁶Ibid.

²³⁷Isocrates, Panegyricus, 17, Norlin, I, 129.

²³⁸Isocrates, Evagoras, 4, Van Hook, III, 7.

²³⁹Abbreviated from Wilhelm Schmid, "ἐπίδειξις," Paulys Real-Encyclopädie. (1907), 11, 53, which reads, "ἐπίδειξις ist Vorführung von Erzeugnissen irgend einer Kunstfertigkeit entweder zur Prüfung der Brauchbarkeit vor dem Abnehmer oder vor grosserem Publikum ohne praktischen Zweck, bloss um des δόναμις ἐπιδείξεως willen."

But Isocrates did not always use ἐπίδειξις as the display of one's oratorical ability.²⁴⁰ He also employed the term in the sense of demonstrating the goal of the speech, as in Evagoras, 65, "In truth how could one reveal (ἐπιδείξαι) the courage, the wisdom, or the virtues generally of Evagoras more clearly than by pointing to such deeds and perilous enterprises."²⁴¹ Again, in Helen he wrote, "The most ridiculous thing of all, in my opinion, is that, by these arguments they seek to convince us that they possess knowledge of the science of government, when they might be demonstrating (ἐπιδείξιν ποιέσθαι) it by actual work in the professed subject."²⁴²

In Panegyricus Isocrates used the term once in contrast to the plainness of style (ἁσφάλως) of the speeches of the courts.²⁴³ Here one gets the sense of ἐπίδειξις as meaning "fullness of style", or "ornateness", or "polish".

²⁴⁰Whenever Isocrates used epideictic as display of skill he normally used the phrase "to make a display" (ποιέω ἐπίδειξιν). Cf. Panegyricus, 17, Norlin, I, 129; Busiris, 44, Van Hook, III, 127; Antidosis, 55, Norlin, II, 217; Antidosis, 147, Norlin, II, 269; To Philip, 17, Norlin I, 257; To Philip, 93, Norlin, I, 302. An exception to this phrase is To Philip, 25, Norlin, I, 261, where the verb "to make" is missing, but the meaning is clearly the same.

²⁴¹Isocrates, Evagoras, 65, Van Hook, III, 41.

²⁴²Isocrates, Helen, 9, Van Hook, III, 65.

²⁴³Isocrates, Panegyricus, 11, Norlin, I, 135.

Now, it should also be noted that Isocrates never categorized his own works as merely a display of skill. He always claimed both rhetorical excellence and serious purpose for what he wrote.²⁴⁴ Isocrates regularly contrasted his work with the displays of the majority of the sophists, and in one instance, showed moderns the extent to which the oratory of blame was practiced in his day. The passage from Antidosis, reads:

For they see most of the sophists, excepting those who have embraced your life and ways, showing off their oratory [lit.] in the public assemblies or in private gatherings, contesting against each other, making extravagant professions, disputing, reviling each other, omitting nothing in the language of abuse, but in effect damaging their own cause and giving license to their auditors, now to ridicule what they say, sometimes to praise them, most often to despise them, and again to think of them whatever they like.²⁴⁵

The passage clearly shows that Aristotle and Anaximenes had many examples of the oratory of blame from which to draw up

²⁴⁴Cf. Kraus, ΓΕΝΟΣ ΕΠΙΔΕΙΚΤΙΚΟΝ pp. 94, 95. He argues for the practical side of Isocrates' use of the term, but seems to overstress the point, by sort of excluding the use as a display of skill alone.

²⁴⁵Isocrates, Antidosis, 147, Norlin, II, 269 (Underlining mine).

their theoretic statements. And the passage also shows that it was Isocrates' habit to disclaim the displays of the other sophists, while advancing the practical value of his own speeches.²⁴⁶

Although there is no extant *τέχνη* by the hand of Isocrates to tell moderns how he taught the arrangement of a speech of blame, the indications from the treatises make it clear that he had developed the art to new heights. Isocrates stood out among the sophists for binding the oratory of blame to moral purpose, for advancing epideictic speeches which claimed practical purpose, and for embodying in his own value system the homeric Greek ideal for immortality through great speeches, eshewing shame to cultivate honor. He was, in fact, the epideictic orator par excellence.

²⁴⁶See also, Buchheit, *Genos Epideiktikon*, pp. 129-123. Buchheit asserted that all the scholars have wrecked themselves on Aristotle's conception of epideictic because they did not see that he drew his new genre from Isocrates' works, and Isocrates' works were not mere displays. Isocrates, said Buchheit (p. 123) did not identify the speeches of praise with the term *ἐπιδεικτικὸς*. Buchheit presented Isocrates' position in the following three sentences: "1. Epideixis und epideiktikos bezeichnen das stilische Können des Redners. 2. Isokrates erkennt bestimmten Reden Epideixis zu, lehnt aber eine Rede ab, die nur auf eine Epideixis und nicht auf einen ernsthaften Zweck (*πράξις*, *διὰ πρᾶξιν*) gerichtet ist. 3. Isokrates begrenzt die Epideixis nicht auf Lobreden; denn Lobrede und Epideixis sind für ihm nicht identisch" (p. 122).

Summary

The preceeding section examined the developing art and rhetoric of blame among the sophists of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C., concentrating upon Evenus of Paros, Thrasy-machus, Gorgias and Isocrates. Although the evidence available to moderns was in many respects thin, it was possible to show that the techniques of praising and blaming developed concurrently with the other aspects of the oratorical art. One of the earliest sophists, the elegiac and iambic poet, Evenus, invented indirect praise and blame, and developed stock commonplaces of blame to use when the situation availed itself. Thrasy-machus wrote a handbook which probably included a fairly complete section on developing and defending against calumnies in court or at the assemblies. Gorgias gave his students and admirers specimen praises and vituperations, and gave the art his unique stamp of the ability to amplify and disparage any topic. Finally, Isocrates related praise and blame to morality and to subjects of great import, and exemplified himself both as a practitioner and as a theorist of the art. On the basis of these rhetorical indicators then, it is undeniably certain, that while the rhetoric of blame was only one aspect of the art of oratory, it was a living and vital aspect which could be separated in theory from forensic calumny or assembly harrangue, so that the rhetorics of Anaximenes and Aristotle

were able to draw from over one hundred years of oratorical practice and rhetorical prescriptions to formulate their rhetorical positions.

Conclusion

This chapter set out to establish the background and level of invective within ancient Greek culture during the period up to the writing of the rhetorics of Anaximenes and Aristotle by reviewing the literature on poetry and comedy, philosophy and law, and oratory and rhetoric. In this review the chapter was able to ascertain several noteworthy items which place the sections on ἐπίδαμνος in Aristotle and Anaximenes into their context, as the following paragraphs reiterate.

First, the concept of verbal praise and blame evolved from two deeply rooted concepts in Greek culture. The first and more primitive idea was the religious use of words to dispel evil through the use of vile abusive language. This employment of invective displayed itself in the revels and in the comedies, and provided the people with a sense of relief. The second concept of praise and blame evolved from the goal of permanence through the rehearsal of great speeches and great deeds. The central concepts within this ideal were honor and disgrace. This use of praise and blame effected the writing of poetry, then

prose, and expressed itself in eulogies, hymns, invectives, etc., by which the people could remember their past and emulate the noble while eschewing the disgraceful.

As the culture progressed a 'proper' use of invective developed too. Laws were enacted to safeguard the honor of the dead. The sayings of the sages concerning verbal abuse were remembered and elevated. Laws were enacted to protect the living from unsubstantiated shame. At the same time people were encouraged to attack one another's errors and misdeeds verbally and publically so that people of low character could be changed or expelled for the good of the city-state. It was found that blame was used by the Greeks for education of the good, for the vindication of wrong, and for the expulsion of evil, all for the good of the individual and for the good of the city-state.

In the third section, furthermore, it was shown that the Greeks did not want for those who could teach them how to distinguish and employ artfully the types of verbal attack which would effect persuasion. Evenus, Thrasymachus, Gorgias, and Isocrates all excelled in some aspect of the practice and teaching of the art of blame, accusation, or calumny. The last section demonstrated, then, that by the time Anaximenes and Aristotle wrote their treatises the art of verbal attack had developed into a complete theoretical

treatment which was taught and practiced, and which could elaborate on the type of abuse, the class, the object, the goal, the method, the style, and the arrangement needed in each specific case to achieve persuasion.

CHAPTER III

INVECTIVE IN THE RHETORIC TO ALEXANDER

Introduction

The Rhetoric to Alexander is probably the earliest extant theoretic treatment of the oratory of blame and therefore is of central importance to this paper. The treatise came down to moderns with a cover letter which ascribed the work to Aristotle and claimed to be based on the τέχνη of Corax and To Theodectes.¹ Moderns unanimously agree that Aristotle did not write the treatise, however, and also agree that the work is an example of sophistic teaching. Furthermore, moderns date the writing of the work either prior to the extant copy of Aristotle's

¹Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum, 1421b1-3, Trans. by Henry Rackham (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1965), p. 275 (Hereafter labeled Rackham). This work serves as the Greek text for this chapter. It is based on Bekker's 1831 manuscript and updated through Grenfell and Hunt's papyri discovery of 1906. The most recent critical edition, an update of Spengel and Hammer titled, Anaximenis Ars Rhetorica, quae vulgo fertur Aristotelis, Ad Alexandrum, ed. by Manfred Fuhrmann (Leipzig: B. G. Tuebner, 1966) was

Rhetoric, or approximately contemporary with it.² The work displays no dependence on Aristotle's philosophical thinking, but actually develops the very techne style which he castigates in his work.³ In fact, the Rhetoric to Alexander presents a highly developed picture of the Greek rhetorical climate of invective and blame which was exhibited in the previous chapter.

Neither the dating, the theoretical source, nor the naming of a specific author are necessarily central to the explication of the doctrine of blame within the treatise, and those questions are not pursued here to any degree.

not available to this writer except through reviews, which in general rated the effort highly, especially in regard to the full critical apparatus. On the other hand, several articles and reviews have displayed some problems with Fuhrmann's reconstruction of the text. Buchheit, Kennedy, Reeve, and Zwierlein cited a number of problems or serious flaws, although none of those listed dealt with the passages under consideration here. See M. D. Reeve, "Notes on Anaximenes' Τέχνη Ῥητορικὴ," Classical Quarterly, 20 (1970), 237-241. Otto Zwierlein, "Zum Text der Anaximenes' - Rhetorik," Rheinischen Museum, 112 (1969), 223. Vinzenz Buchheit, Gnomon, 41 (1969), 728-737. George Kennedy, American Journal of Philology, 90 (1969), 371-373.

²From internal evidence the terminus a quo is 341 B.C. Scholars who accept the authorship of Anaximenes generally date the work between 340 and 330 B.C. Buchheit rejects Anaximenes, but still dates the work at 330 B.C. Others, such as the translator for the Loeb Library edition, think it is a product of about 300 B.C. All the investigators agree, nevertheless, that the work represents the earlier theoretical position of the sophists.

³Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum, Rackham, p. 258.

Nevertheless, the author's understanding of the place of blame within his scheme of rhetoric does need to be parsed out, since the opening sentence of the work, which names three genera and seven species, may also be considered to be an emendation to the text. So, at the outset of this chapter the question of the integrity of the text is examined and a position for a seven species scheme under a two genera umbrella will be assumed.

The rest of the chapter is in eight parts, examining each aspect of Anaximenes' rhetoric of blame. First, the oratory of blame is defined as the disparagement of esteemed qualities and the amplification of disreputable purposes, actions, and speeches, and the attribution of ignoble qualities that do not exist. This section notes that Anaximenes labeled the species as ψόγος in one part of the treatise, but changed the name to κακολογία in the latter sections of the work. This interchangeability demonstrates both his fuzziness of scheme and his lack of ethical concern.

The next section, the materials and objects of blame, displays that Anaximenes presented two separate lists of materials of blame in two separate sections of the treatise, with no correlation. The first list comes from speeches in the assembly, the second from a discussion of virtue. Further, this section shows that Anaximenes did not limit the object of the speech to individuals, but included

governments, classes of people, animals, individual actions, emotions, speeches, or possessions. He presented no particular time frame for blame oratory.

The section on the methods of blame lists Anaximenes' commonplaces of amplification, the technique he cited as most powerful for blame speeches, and also shows his instructions to use conjectures, maxims, ridicule, irony and the like. The next section on arrangement and style demonstrates that Anaximenes borrowed from the exhortation species for his injunctions on the blame prooemium, that he presented a novel geneological arrangement for the narration, and that he enjoined a standard recapitulation for the epilogue. He encouraged a style of considerable fullness for the blame speech.

In order to clarify Anaximenes' treatment of blame further, the next section of this chapter is devoted to accusation. While not restricted to the courts, accusation dealt with the recital of prosecutable errors and offenses of an opponent. The section shows that Anaximenes fully intended his students to use every means at their disposal to achieve victory with the maximum verdict. The section also exhibits that censure and hostile attack were included in those means by Anaximenes.

This chapter then focuses on these two means, treating hostile attack first. Anaximenes presented his

discussion in two sections of the treatise, elaborating on how to deal with both prejudice and open attack. He also enjoined the orator to use hostile attack and gave instructions in technique. The section expounds the use of rhetorical anticipation and the shifting of guilt. The sections show that a wide range of attitudes and actions, from lack of attention to vile abuse of the opponent and his friends, were included in Anaximenes' concept of *διαβολή* .

The next section, titled *Κακολογία* in Accusation' constitutes a new treatment of Anaximenes' use of blame in accusation. This writer draws out two separate accounts from the treatise which elaborate parts of Anaximenes' understanding of blame oratory. The first account concerns the reaction of the orator to the tumult of the crowd during a forensic type address. The term censure (*ἐπιτιμᾶω*) entitles this portion of the treatise to be considered blame, even though Anaximenes used it only in the sense of general indignation. The second account is taken from the section of the treatise which is normally thought to be special remarks on the arrangement of blame oratory. This writer, however, advances three reasons to re-classify the paragraph under accusation oratory, primarily because it discusses that species. The noteworthy items in this section are Anaximenes' injunctions to use ridicule and vile abuse.

The next unit of the chapter demonstrates how Anaximenes employed the term ἐπίδειξις . The section establishes that he normally and routinely used the verb form in the sense of proving or demonstrating the subject of the speech. The unit also shows that whereas Anaximenes encouraged virtuosity in all species of oratory, that he in no way singled out blame oratory as a special domain for that display of skill. Instead, the section shows that at the theoretic level blame oratory was to be distinguished from the other species particularly by a lack of contest.

The final three sections present the lack of ethical concern evident in the treatise, a summary of the distinguishing attributes of blame and accusation in outline form, and a recapitulation of the chapter.

The Place of Blame in the Rhetorical Scheme of the Treatise

Blame is one of the seven sub-divisions (εἶδη)⁴ of public oratory which may appear by itself,⁵ or appear in

⁴Ad Alexandrum, 1421a10, 11, Rackham, p. 275, Rackham noted, "The Greek word is a technical term of natural history in which it denotes the smaller groups into which each genre of kind is divided."

⁵D. A. G. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," Classical Quarterly, 30 (1936), 171. Hinks stressed this: "The arrangement of the book, and the separate treatment given to the pair [encomium, blame], show that Anaximenes has distinct and self-contained speeches in mind...[for example]... a set ψόγιος of wine."

relation to one or more of the other sub-divisions; exhortation (προτροπᾶς), dissuasion (ἀποτροπᾶς), encomium (ἐγκωμαστικόν), accusation (κατηγορικόν), defense (ἀπολογητικόν), or investigation (ἐξεταστικόν).⁶ In other words, there may be speeches composed entirely for blame (ψόγος or κακολόγος), or there may be speeches of the other species which employ it. The author writes, "They [all the species of oratory] are to be employed separately when suitable, and jointly, with a combination of their qualities (δυνάμεις) - for though they have considerable differences, yet in their practical application they overlap."⁷

The clear fact that blame oratory could stand alone as an independent category of rhetoric supports the evidence developed in Chapter II of this paper and lessons the importance of determining the integrity of the text on the number and names of the genera in the opening sentence of the treatise. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to review the issue in order to gain a more precise view of the place of blame within the treatise.⁸ Therefore the following

⁶Ad Alexandrum, 1421a10, 11, Rackham, p. 275.

⁷Ibid., 1427b32-35, Rackham, p. 317.

⁸James Richard Chase, "The Classical Conception of Epideictic" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1961) pp. 5-17, considered the transmission of the text, the authorship and the dating of this work in detail without attempting to establish authorship himself.

paragraphs investigate some aspects of the issue and come to the conclusion that the system presented in the treatise is of two genera.

His interest was to determine the epideictic elements in the Rhetoric to Alexander, or "to experience a functional conception of epideictic" (p. 13). His purpose was to "report in convenient, synoptic form what these theories were rather than to furnish fresh interpretations of them" (p. 4). A review of his main points are given here. First, regarding authorship, Chase cited Quintilian's statement which caused Victorius (1579) to choose Anaximenes as the author of the work (pp. 5, 6). He then asserted that Spalding, Spengel, Hammer, Grenfell and Hunt, Volkmann, and Wendland all worked to further the hypothesis (p. 6), while Navarre, Havet, and Zeller opposed Anaximenes and the change in the text (pp. 7, 8). He concluded this discussion with Cope, who, seemingly unhappily sided for Anaximenes (p. 9). Chase next considered the date of the work and sided with the majority of scholars [citing Rhys Roberts] that the work reflected rhetorical theory prior to the Rhetoric of Aristotle, circa 340 B.C. (pp. 9, 10). The school of theory Chase decided upon was Isocratean, in line with Cope and Havet (pp. 10, 11). Chase next discussed the kinds of discourse evident in the treatise (pp. 11-16) working from the scholarship of Volkmann and Havet, who both argued that pre-Aristotlian rhetoric was bi-partite, but with a definition of this division which was unique, being based on the statements of Syrian (2nd century A. D.), to wit: prior to Aristotle the Greeks divided rhetoric into two species, (1) πραγματικόν (speeches by citizens of Athens), subdivided into forensic and symboluetic, and (2) speeches of non-citizens, called ἐπιδεικτικόν, in "ostentatione positum." Going beyond Syrian, Volkmann (1895) stated that the encomiums also were later classed under the πραγματικόν, and that this last species was what Aristotle called epideictic. This division of the genera seems novel for classical scholars who use the materials of the 4th century B.C. rhetors for their sources, and cited as authoritative only by those Chase named. Such a division reflects the thinking of the 2nd Sophistic period and certainly ignores the role of the oratory of blame. It leaves a definition of epideictic which only means ostentatious display, or Prunkrede. Chase concluded his discussion by opting for the bi-partite rhetoric which was pre-Aristotlian in orientation.

The manuscripts which have come down to moderns⁹ name three genera in the opening sentence and three species in one other place in the text.¹⁰ The critical sentences in the received texts read:

τρία γένη τῶν πολιτικῶν εἰσι λόγων, τὸ μὲν
δημηγορικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιδεικτικόν, τὸ δὲ δι-
καινικόν. εἶδη δὲ τούτων ἑπτὰ...¹¹

νῦν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ὑπολοίπων, ἃ τῶν τριῶν
εἰδῶν ἔστι καὶ παρὰ πάντος τοὺς λόγους
χρήσιμα γίνεται, διδάσκειν ἐπιχειροῦμεν.¹²

⁹Cf. Rackham's discussion in Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum, pp. 261, 262, and Wilhelm Kroll, "Rhetorik (Anaximenes)", Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. by Georg Wissowa (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzeler, 1940), Supplement, VII, 1052.

¹⁰Cf. the discussion in Vinzenz Buchheit, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles (Munich: Max Hüber, 1960), pp. 189-197.

¹¹"Public discourses are of three kinds; those pertaining to the assembly, and those epideictic, and those pertaining to the courts. And of these there are seven species..." Ad Alexandrum, 1421b8ff. The text is also printed out in Josef Martin, Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode (Munich: Beck, 1974), p. 197.

¹²Ad Alexandrum, 1432a 8, 9, Rackham, p. 349: "Now we will endeavor to explain the remaining expedients which belong to the three species of oratory and can be used in speeches of all sorts."

The rest of the treatise does not define epideictic as a genre again, and the sections on encomiums and censures are not openly tied to any one of the three genera. In fact, the author, with the exception of one place¹³ does not clearly use symboleutic (δημηγορικόν) or 'forensic' (δικανικόν) in the conceptual manner one would expect of the generic scheme.¹⁴

Since the cover letter was obviously spurious, the possibility that the text itself was also amended to look Aristotelian was also apparent. Buchheit reported that Petrus Victorius was the first (published 1579) to ascribe the work to a specific rhetorician, a contemporary of Aristotle and tutor to Alexander, Anaximenes.¹⁵

¹³Ibid., 1441b 30-33, Rackham, p. 413, where the forensic genre is linked in the received text to the subdivisions of accusation and investigation. Spengel suggested that there was some corruption in the text.

¹⁴For example, the writer stated, 1421b12-17, that exhortation and dissuasion were the forms most employed in private company conversation (ιδίας ὁμιλίας) [a 3rd or 4th genre?] and common deliberations (κοινᾷς δημηγορίαις), thus displaying the non-technical sense in which he used δημηγορίαις. Further, he never related encomium and censure to the epideictic genre and, further, when he discussed accusation and defense he did not use δικανικόν in the technical sense of the first sentence of the treatise. Certainly the writer did not intend to subdivide each of the seven species into one of the genera, but to designate the two general types of public speaking, and then to develop each of the seven species. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," p. 170 shows that the writer thought of "speeches in private company" (ιδία ὁμολόγια) as a 3rd genre.

¹⁵Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 190.

Victorius suggested him on the basis of a citation about his rhetorical scheme by Quintilian.¹⁶ When Spengel took up the thesis of Victorius, he (published in 1849) added the evidence of a quotation in Syrian's commentary on Hermagenes that Aristotle named two genera, δικάνικόν and δημηγορικόν, which appear in seven species.¹⁷ This citation so convinced him that Syrian was speaking of the Ad Alexandrum that he amended the received text by deleting the word epideictic and changing the three genera to two.¹⁸ At the other critical sentence he changed the number three species to read seven.¹⁹

¹⁶Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, III, iv, 9 reads: "Anaximenes iudicialem et cortionalem generales partes esse voluit; septem autem species hortandi, dehortandi, laudandi, vituperandi, accusandi, defendendi, exquirendi (quod ἐξεταστικόν dicit): quarum duae primae deliberatiui, duae sequentes demonstratiui, tres ultimae iudiciales generis sunt partes." (Anaximenes called judicial and councilier to be the general parts; and of them seven species: exhortation, dissuasion, praise, blame, accusation, defense, inquiry (that he called ἐξεταστικόν); the first two [species] were deliberative, the second two demonstrative, [and] the last three are parts of the judicial genre) (Translation mine).

¹⁷Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 192, citing Syrian, II, 11, 17-12, 2: "And Aristotle said there to be two genera of public speaking: δικάνικόν and also δημηγορικόν, and these appear in seven [species] ..." Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ δύο γένη φησὶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτικῶν λόγων, δικάνικόν τε καὶ δημηγορικόν, εἶδη δὲ ἑπτὰ, προτεπτικόν, ἀποτρεπτικόν, ἐγκωμιαστικόν, ψεκτικόν, κατηγορικόν, ἀπολόγητικόν, ἐξεταστικόν." (Translation mine).

¹⁸Ibid., p. 193.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 194, 195.

Many scholars have accepted this attribution of the techne to Anaximenes with the changes in the received text,²⁰ with the recent notable exception of Vinzenz Buchheit.²¹ He has advanced four major arguments against the authorship and the changes in the text,²² two of which touch directly on the place of ψόγος in the treatise under consideration here. Therefore those two arguments will receive some attention.

²⁰A sampling of classical scholars for Anaximenes are: Victorius, Spengel, Hammer, Volkmann, Burgess, Wendland, Hinks, Kroll, Chase, Barwick, Kennedy, and Martin. Some scholars see Isocratean influence, or believe a student of Isocrates wrote the treatise. For example, Cope, Kroll, Susemihl, Havet, Zeller, and Mathieu. Other possibilities have been advanced by Brzoska, Navarre, Forster, and Rackham. See Kennedy's discussion in George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 114-117.

²¹Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, pp. 189-207.

²²Ibid., pp. 189-204. George Kennedy reviewed the work in the American Journal of Philology, 82 (1962), 326-329, listing the arguments and responding to them: "As I understand him, Buchheit objects (1) that the order of the genera is not the same in Quintilian and in the Ad Alexandrum (this is trivial since Quintilian was probably quoting from memory and maybe through an intermediate source); (2) that Syrianos' ἐξεταστικόν is in the province of the hearer not the speaker, thus inconsistent with the Ad Alexandrum, and thus not quoted from it (but Syrianos' interpretation may easily be arrived at from the account in chapter five of the Ad Alexandrum, cf. especially 1427b15 and 22ff); (3) that a three-fold division is implied, at least, by the rest of the work (if so, it is somewhat incidental. The fact remains that the real basis of the discussion is the unusual system of the seven species); and (4) that the classifications πολιτικά and δικανικά of the introductory epistle, which everybody admits is a later addition to the treatise, are not the same as the δημηγορικόν and δικανικόν of the first

In Buchheit's third argument he pointed out that the breakdown of the presentation of the seven species actually fell naturally into three units of two with 'inquiry' alone at the end.²³ He contended that the encomium species and the censure species should have appeared separately before or behind the species of inquiry, if they too were not meant to be tied to one of the genera. He argued furthermore, that the author would have written two species instead of three in the sentence, 1432a8, 9 (cited above), since a classical scholar knows that *εἶδω*s and *γένος* are really interchangeable terms.²⁴

chapter of the work proper (but the classification is two-fold rather than three, at least epideictic is not regarded as a separate class). Buchheit may be right that Anaximenes is not proved to be the author of the Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum. Not scientifically proved that is. But probability is all that can be expected in rhetorical matters (p. 328)." See also, Karl Barwick, "Die Rhetorik ad Alexandrum und Anaximenes, Alkidamus, Isokrates, Aristoteles und die Theodekteia," Philologus, 110 (1966), 214-218, for a more complete refutation of Buchheit's arguments. Barwick ended his rejoinder on a stronger chord than Kennedy, stating that he would hope that Buchheit would be the last to make the fruitless attempt to snatch away from Anaximenes the Rhetoric to Alexander (218).

²³Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, pp. 194, 195. Also against Buchheit's assertion that the author placed the species together with deliberateness so that they would fall under epideictic is the author's own statement at 1421b16 that he would enumerate the seven species in serial fashion (*ἀπαριθμησάμεθα*), Ad Alexandrum, Rackham, p. 275.

²⁴Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, pp. 194, 195. For a discussion of *εἶδω*s and *γένος* in Aristotle's Rhetoric

Against these contentions, however, consider the following alternative possibilities for the same phenomena supporting the position that the seven species do independently form the conceptual framework of the treatise.²⁵

First, the fact that the encomium and censure species are considered together is certainly for stronger reasons than that they may be subsumed under epideictic oratory (where Aristotle placed them). The Greek love for antithesis alone is sufficient reason to link the polar activities of the species, just as the other polar species are linked. That being the case, then, it would not effect Buchheit's contention even if the species appeared in different order than the author chose. The occasion of the speech is another reason for the author to link censure and praise. The author indicated, 1440b13, that as a rule the speeches of praise and blame were for lectures (or proofs, or displays)²⁶ rather than for deciding public policy at the

see Manfred Fuhrmann, Das Systematische Lehrbuch: ein Beiträge zur Geschichte der Wissenschaften in der Antike (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960), I, 141n, 143.

²⁵The following, for example, argued strongly that the author organized his work around the seven species, not the three genera: Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," pp. 170-177; Chase, "Classical conception of Epideictic," pp. 19, 22; Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, pp. 114, 115; and Martin, Antike Rhetorik, p. 197.

²⁶Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," p. 170 points out that ~~ἐκδιδάσκω~~ normally meant 'lecture'. The concept will be discussed in detail below.

assembly, or a case of law at court. So there is no compelling reason to assume from the order of the presentation of the species that the author was conceptualizing an epideictic genre as he wrote on the two species.

The second part of Buchheit's third argument can also be interpreted differently, and even adds proof, contrary to his assertion, that the author was not thinking clearly of distinguishing his seven species by the overriding genera. The change of genre (γένος) to species (εἶδος) at 1432a8, 9 more certainly demonstrates fluidity of thought than it shows a high degree of mental structuring. Moderns will probably never know conclusively whether the author actually wrote (1) "three species" meaning "three genera", or (2) "three genera" referring back to the first sentence of the work, or (3) "seven species" thinking about the subjects of the techne. Without such certainty, or even probability, the sentence cannot be used to support any position, but must be interpreted from whatever position has already been assumed.

In the fourth argument Buchheit advanced that neither encomiums nor censures can fit under the bi-partite scheme of Anaximenes as Spengel tried to do.²⁷ According to Buchheit

²⁷Buchheit, Genos Epidiektikon, pp. 195-197.

the loss of the epideictic genre leaves a wide gap between the other two genera, in which blame and encomium do not fit. For moderns, as well as for the ancients after Aristotle, this case seems well taken. We almost automatically supply the term epideictic to encomiums and censures, and normally mean by that term, "ostentatious display".²⁸ Hinks, for example, admitted this problem when he said,

It is obvious that such a classification [the seven species] cannot be fitted to the less extensive field of mere δημηγορία and δικαιολογία ; and Anaximenes confesses as much when he says on page 80.8 (1440b14), speaking of encomium and invective that ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ ταὐτὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιστῶν οὐκ ἀγώνος ἀλλ' ἐπιδείξεως ἕνεκα λέγομεν.²⁹

But this unhappiness with a two genera classification should not be directed at Spengel, or the others who opted for Anaximenes as the author, but in reality at those who used that system. In other words, Buchheit must direct his criticism primarily at the Anaximenes whom Quintilian cited, or the Aristotle whom Syrian quoted, since they were the ones who pressed seven species into two genera, whether or

²⁸For example see the citation in the introduction and the sections on the meaning of epideictic in this chapter and the next.

²⁹Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," p. 171.

not Anaximenes is the actual author of the treatise under discussion here. So then, even though the division is unsatisfactory to moderns, it does not mean that it was not the one used by rhetors in the period of this techne, or in this techne itself.

Taking the two objections of Buchheit together, then, with the response put forth here, one can see that his contentions do not establish anything conclusively wrong about the assumption of Anaximenes as the author of a two genera, seven species treatise, which was slightly amended to appear Aristotelian. The most important fact to be stressed here, in any case, is that the work was organized around seven independent, self-standing species of oratory, which included the oratory of blame, whether or not there is a concurrent thought of two genera, or three (or four if one includes ἡδὲ ὁμολόγια in the list).

Definition of Blame Oratory

The definition of the oratory of blame was presented along with the oratory of encomium (ἐγκωμιαστικόν), which, parsed out reads: "The vituperative species (ψεκτικόν) consists, to put it briefly, in the disparagement (ταπείνωσις) of esteemed qualities (ἐνδοξῶν), and the amplification (αὐξήσις) of disreputable (ἄδοξα) purposes, actions, and speeches, and the attribution of [ignoble]

qualities that do not exist."³⁰ The fact that Anaximenes' definition was not anchored to ethical concerns was accented by the change of the name of this species after chapter 34 (1440b5).³¹ From 1440b5 on **ψεκτικόν** did not occur at all as the designation of the species,³² and a new term, **κακο-λογικόν**, which did not occur before this chapter was used.

³⁰Ad Alexandrum, 1425b36-40, Rackham, p. 305. It reads: "The encomiastic species of oratory consists, to put it briefly, in the amplification of creditable purposes and actions and speeches and the attribution of qualities that do not exist, while the vituperative species is the opposite, the minimization of creditable qualities and the amplification of discreditable ones."

³¹See Grube, "The Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum and its Language," in A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), pp. 156-163. Grube abided by an early date for the treatise, but lists "doubtful", "new" and "late" expressions occurring there. Among them were **κακολογικόν**, as the opposite of **ἐγκωμιαστικόν** which is not found elsewhere (p. 161). Grube also listed **κατηγο-ρικός** which he incorrectly said Aristotle used for "affirmation", but in this treatise was "accusation" (p. 161). He considered **τάρε(ν)σεις** as a new technical term, the opposite of **αὐξήσεις**, "apparently used only here in this sense" (p. 162). Finally, he thought that **ψεκτικός** was a "late word" (p. 163). It is beyond the scope of this paper to pursue the ramifications of the change of terminology in the treatise. Surely the author is pulling material from another source in chapter 35, but other possibilities exist. Here it is taken to mean that the author had no clear conception of an overriding ethical system and therefore thought the terms were synonymous. Others have noticed the unusual use of terms in the treatise, but no one to this writer's knowledge has focused on what the changes mean for the species of censure itself.

³²The phrase "those being blamed" (**τοὺς ψευδόμενους**) does appear once at 1440b12.

Since *κακολογικόν* denoted evil speaking or revilement,³³ and since Anaximenes included ridicule (*καταγελοῖον*), verbal abuse (*λοιδορία*), and disgrace (*ἀτίμια*) within its context³⁴ it seems clear that not only was he drawing from different sources, but also that he himself thought that the two terms were conceptually close enough to be interchangeable.³⁵ It seems that this interchangeability came from his lack of ethical-political concern and will be discussed further in the section on the relation of blame to ethics below. Anaximenes did not exchange terms for the encomiastic species.³⁶

The Materials and Objects of Blame

In the next sentences of the text Anaximenes proceeded to outline the disreputable purposes, actions, and speeches which the orator uses for his materials. They

³³Cf. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, 8th ed. (1958).

³⁴See Ad Alexandrum, 1441b15-28, Rackham, p. 413.

³⁵Anaximenes used *ψεκτικόν* for the oratory of blame at 1425b38, 1426a19, 1426b17, 20, 1428a4, and the opening of the treatise, 1421a10. He used the verb form at 1426a8, 9 and 24. He employs *κακολογικόν* for the oratory of blame at 1440b5, 1441a14, 1441b28, 1442a9, 1444b28. The word does not occur at the beginning of the treatise. Anaximenes used the verb form at 1441a12, 1441b15, 18, 24, and 1-42a13.

³⁶The term *ἐγκομιαστικόν* occurs throughout the treatise, specifically at 1421a10, 1425b36, 1426a19, 1426b17, 20, 1428a4, 1440b5, 12, 1441a11, 24, 1441b28, 1442b28. He

were presented already, he said, in the section which covered the oratories of exhortation and dissuasion, 1421b35ff. They were the praiseworthy things (ἐπιδυνετὰ). In this case, of course, they were the base things, which were (1) the unjust (ἀδίκεια), (2) the illegal (ἀνόμια), (3) the inexpedient (ἀσυνμφέρον), (4) the disgraceful (ἀίσχρα), (5) the odious (ἀηδής), and (6) the impractical (ἀδυνατὸν πράττειν).³⁷

Anaximenes defined these praiseworthy things after listing them, and a simple transposition of concepts obtains the following definitions for the oratory of blame:³⁸

(1) Injustice is to ignore or break unwritten customs of all or a greater part of humankind. For example, it is to be dishonorable to one's parents, to do evil to one's friends, or to fail to repay kindnesses of others.

(2) The illegal is to do whatever is against written law.

used the phrase "the one we are encomiaizing" (ἐγκωμιαζόμενος) once. He used the form of the verb "to praise" at 1426a24, 1440b23, 28, 1441a2, 9, 13, 25, 30, 1441b12, 1442a9, 10. He employed the form of the verb "to eulogize" at 1427a4, 1440b27, 31, 1441b4.

³⁷See the list at 1440a1f, which adds (7) laborious (ἐργώδη), and unnecessary (οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα).

³⁸Ad Alexandrum, 1421b37-1422a22, Rackham, pp. 277, 279.

(3) The inexpedient is the wasting of existing goods, the failure to achieve goods, the acceptance of existing evils, and the failure to prevent future evils. Inexpedient things for the individual are: (A) for the body; weakness, ugliness, and disease, (B) for the mind; cowardice, stupidity, and unrighteousness, (C) for externals; lack of friends, poverty, and lack of property. Inexpedient things for the state are: civil discord, military weakness, lack of land, poor revenue, and lack of allies.

(4) Disgraceful things are those which accrue shame and ignomy to the agents.

(5) Odious things are those that cause disgust.

(6) Impractical things are those not able to be done.

(7) Laborious things are those that cost great amounts of time, labor and expense.

(8) Unnecessary things are those that are inconsequential, and are done without need or compulsion.³⁹

When Anaximenes presented the arrangement of a speech of blame in chapter 35, however, he offered a slightly

³⁹Notice that (7) Laborious and (8) Unnecessary were listed at 1440alf. See footnote 37 above.

different set of materials. Now the orator was to display the aspects of virtue (ἀρετή) instead of praiseworthy things (ἐπαιντός)⁴⁰. Virtue was divided into two parts: (1) those qualities which were inherent in virtue, which were (a) wisdom (σοφία), (b) righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), (c) manliness (ἀνδρείαν), and (d) the practice of esteemed qualities (ἐκτετηδεύματα ἔνδοξα); and (2) qualities outside of virtue (ἔξω τῆς ἀρετῆς), which were (a) noble birth (εὐγενείαν), (b) strength (ῥώμην), (c) beauty (κάλλος) and (d) wealth (πλοῦτον).⁴¹ Of course, in the species of blame the opposite of all these qualities were presented, and the orator will concentrate on the inherent defects.⁴² Although praiseworthy things and virtue were not exclusive categories, Anaximenes made no attempt to interrelate them.⁴³

Anaximenes did not limit the objects of blame to individual persons. Speeches of blame could be directed

⁴⁰Ad Alexandrum, 1440b17ff, Rackham, p. 405. As in footnote 31 above, it seems clear that Anaximenes is drawing from a different source for this section.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., Notice also that in the presentation of the praiseworthy things at 1421b35ff, Anaximenes links the 'just' with what is praiseworthy without the rhetorical distinctions of occasion, place, or subject matter. The virtues he lists here are contained in the first list, especially by numbers 1, 3 and 4 of the enumeration above.

against classes of people,⁴⁴ against animals,⁴⁵ against governments,⁴⁶ or they may also be attacks against actions,⁴⁷ emotions,⁴⁸ speeches,⁴⁹ or possessions.⁵⁰

Anaximenes did not put the species into a time scheme, so one does not know whether it dealt specifically with either the past, present, or future.

The Methods of Blame

Anaximenes stated that amplification (αὐξήσις) and disparagement (ταπεινός) were the methods by which the orator developed his speech of blame.⁵¹ Buchheit noted that amplification was the heartbeat of sophistic oratory,⁵² and he pointed out that the rhetorical theorists, such as the author of the Ad Alexandrum, only codified in schematic

⁴⁴Ibid., 1440b25, Rackham, p. 405.

⁴⁵Ibid., 1440b27, Rackham, p. 405.

⁴⁶Cf. the "inexpedient things for the state." above.

⁴⁷Ibid., 1440b27, Rackham, p. 407 and 1441b15, p. 413.

⁴⁸Ibid., 1440b27, Rackham, p. 407.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid., 1440b28, Rackham, p. 407. Cf. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," p. 171.

⁵¹Ibid., 1425b38, Rackham, p. 305. See footnote 31 above.

⁵²Buchheit, Genos Epidiektikon, p. 213.

fashion the practices of their culture.⁵³ Buchheit's conclusions are evidenced by Anaximenes' presentation, since he showed little interest in developing the basic principles of amplification,⁵⁴ and was content to list eight methods or commonplaces of amplification and disparagement.⁵⁵ Without noticeable reflection he observed that one must first establish the case before amplifying it, for it is necessary to show that the blame belongs to the person, action, or speech to be disparaged.⁵⁶ This was to be done by revealing that

⁵³Ibid., pp. 15-26. Buchheit studied examples of poetry and prose of the Greeks to Isocrates and made three conclusions of note for this study: (1) he found no hard and fast art of auxesis before Isocrates (p. 24), (2) he saw that the rhetorical practice of amplification was not as stylized as moderns might think (p. 24), and (3) he stated that there is no need to look behind Isocrates and Aristotle for forerunners to the theory of amplification (p. 25).

⁵⁴Verne R. Kennedy, "Auxesis: A Concept of Rhetorical Amplification," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 38 (1971), pp. 60-72. Kennedy found three basic underlying principles in amplification. They were: (1) identification of the properties of one thing with another, (2) comparison of less to greater, and (3) vividness, the use of mental imagery to produce proximity between hearer and the object being amplified. See also Richard Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1885), pp. 266-271, and S. Deligiorgis, "The Auxetic Mode in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice." Flaton, 23 (1971), 311-318.

⁵⁵Ad Alexandrum, 1426a3-9, 21, 22, Rackham, pp. 305, 307.

⁵⁶Ibid., 1426a3-9, Rackham, p. 305. As in the section on the definition of blame the section is transposed from praise to blame.

the blameworthy things were directly accomplished by the agent, or produced through his efforts, or resulted incidentally by this action, or formed a necessary condition from his actions.

The list of topics of amplification appeared in this manner, as Verne Kennedy concisely condensed it:

- (1) [by] demonstration of the...bad results produced by a person's actions.
- (2) [by] introduction of past judgments concerning the topic.
- (3) [by] the process of direct comparison with the least subject in the same category.
- (4) [by] placing attention on contraries where opinion is well formed.
- (5) [by] discussion of the intention behind an action.
- (6) [by] developing continually raising parallels with the topic for amplification as the last item.
- (7) [by] arranging the material to give greater weight to the subject for amplification.
- (8) [by] following the procedures opposite of those above when the speaker desires to obtain minimization.⁵⁷

Anaximenes reported that amplification was the method used in all species of oratory, but it had the most

⁵⁷V. Kennedy, "Auxesis," p. 66. Chase, "Classical Conception of Epideictic," pp. 26, 28 also presents a list. The source is Ad Alexandrum, 1426a22-1426b21, Rackham, pp. 307-309.

power (*δύναμις*) in encomium and blame.⁵⁸ Of course censures were not limited to amplification and minimization for their method. In the section on the arrangement of the speech the author enjoined the orator to employ at the appropriate places conjecture,⁵⁹ maxims,⁶⁰ enthymemes,⁶¹ comparison,⁶² irony,⁶³ ridicule⁶⁴ and recapitulation.⁶⁵

The Arrangement of a Speech of Blame and its Style

Anaximenes ostensibly gave the arrangement of a speech of blame in chapter 35.⁶⁶ A speech of censure was divided into three parts: the prooemium (*προοίμιον*), the narration (labeled here, the *μετὰ τὸ προοίμιον*), and the

⁵⁸Ad Alexandrum, 1426b18-21. Amplification appeared in accusation, 1427a, and in exhortation, 1425a28f, and in the topic of anticipation, 1439b2-12.

⁵⁹Ibid., 1441a33.

⁶⁰Ibid., 1441a21.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid., 1441a31.

⁶³Ibid., 1441b24.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid., 1440b5 - 1441b28, Rackham, pp. 403-413.

epilogue (ἐπιλογία). The prooemium⁶⁷ of censure was arranged just as in exhortation. The orator would make his statement of the case and refute the prejudices (διαβολή) of the audience, "...in order to inform them of what the speech is about and to enable them to follow the line of argument, and to exhort them to attend, and to make them well-disposed..."⁶⁸ Just as in the speeches before the assembly, the orator would stress the novelty and importance of the subject, and promise to prove that the subject demanded vituperation.⁶⁹

The narration of the speech was accomplished in the following manner. If the subject is human or animal, the author should proceed with a genealogy, "as that is the fundamental ground of reputation (ἐνδοξία) or discredit (ἀδοξία) for humans and animals."⁷⁰ If the speaker was blaming an emotion (πάθος), a deed (πράγμα), a speech (λόγος), or a possession (κτῆμα), he would commence with the defects inherent in those subjects.⁷¹ Nothing more was

⁶⁷Ibid., 1440b6-14, Rackham, p. 405. Chase, "Classical Conception of Epideictic," pp. 29-32 also presents a list of the arrangement of an epideictic speech.

⁶⁸Ibid., 1436a35f, Rackham, p. 377.

⁶⁹Ibid., 1440b8-13, Rackham, p. 405.

⁷⁰Ibid., 1440b25f, Rackham, p. 405.

⁷¹Ibid., 1440b28, Rackham, p. 407.

said about how the arrangement of the second set was accomplished, and Anaximenes proceeded by laying out a geneology for the first set.

To vituperate a person, the orator developed his bad ancestry and worked up to his present despicableness in three stages. First, his geneology was presented, skipping any men of merit, to accent his ignoble ancestry. His inferior family tree was to be decorated by the base deeds of its members.⁷² Then, in the second stage, the impious conduct of his youth and those of his friends were to be declared.⁷³ At the third level, which was the main focus of the speech, the orator was to bring out the disgraceful and reproachable character of the man at present.⁷⁴

The method of this narration may be viewed as an expansion from the amplification and disparagement presented in Anaximenes' earlier chapter. As was noted above, the author enjoined the orator to use amplification, but here he also suggested some of the rhetorical proofs such as maxims and enthymemes and the like. It is important to note that Anaximenes urged the orator to develop the geneology by going

⁷²Ibid., 1440b30-1441a13, Rackham, pp. 407, 409.

⁷³Ibid., 1441a15-1441b3, Rackham, pp. 409, 411.

⁷⁴Ibid., 1441b-9, Rackham, p. 411.

"through all the species of virtue....,"⁷⁵ instead of enjoining him to find his materials from the praiseworthy things (ἐπαινετά). The species of virtue were, of course, in the case of vituperation: injustice, stupidity, unrighteousness, cowardice, and the practice of ignoble things.⁷⁶

At the end of the speech, the epilogue, the orator should recapitulate with a summary all that he has said, and then conclude the speech with a maxim or enthymeme.⁷⁷ Nothing else was said about the epilogue, or about recapitulation⁷⁸ at this point in the text. Later on, however, in the section on the arrangement of a speech of defense, in the epilogue section, Anaximenes wrote, "After this comes recapitulation...[which] is useful on all occasions, so... should be employed at every part of a speech and with every kind of speech...as in eulogies and vituperations..."⁷⁹

⁷⁵Ibid., 1441b9f, Rackham, p. 411. "Virtue" is supplied to the English by Rackham, but the context makes it clearly understood.

⁷⁶See the materials of blame above.

⁷⁷Ad Alexandrum, 1441b9-11, Rackham, p. 411.

⁷⁸Anaximenes devoted a paragraph to recapitulation at 1443b29-1434a16.

⁷⁹Ad Alexandrum, 1444b27ff, Rackham, p. 433. Here the author was urging the speaker to add to the recapitulation some things which would further dispose the judges to his case, but he said more about the extensive use of recapitulation than at other places in his handbook.

One sentence of the handbook was devoted to the style of $\psi\acute{o}\sigma$ oratory. Anaximenes enjoined the orator to "speak about each topic with considerable fullness."⁸⁰ The presentation of style in sections 1435a32-1436a27, however, did not aid the reader in discerning what Anaximenes meant exactly.⁸¹ Chase stated, "What our author means by 'considerable fullness' ($\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota\alpha$) is nowhere explained. We assume that it was related to what later came to be called the high or elevated style."⁸²

Blame in Relation to Accusation and Attack

Unlike the species of censure, moderns have had no difficulty conceptualizing the oratory of accusation in the same manner as Anaximenes' presentation of it.⁸³ Obviously accusation was an independent, self-standing species of oratory, just as the ancients knew it was. There were abundant opportunities to compose such speeches for the court

⁸⁰Ibid., 1441b11-13, Rackham, p. 411.

⁸¹Anaximenes discussed style under length of speech, 1434a33-40, 1434b11-15, 19, and under diction, 1434b33-1435a31, as well as the sections on clarity, antithesis, and parallelism, listed above.

⁸²Chase, "Classical Conception of Epideictic," pp. 32, 33.

⁸³Ad Alexandrum, 1426b23-1427a23, Rackham, pp. 311-313.

room, and many of them are extant. A consideration of the species here is still worthwhile, however, because it casts more light on the differences between accusation, attack, and censure, and shows how attack and censure could be used within the species of accusation (just as it was possible within Anaximenes' scheme to use accusation within a speech of blame). The following paragraphs, then, present the definition of the oratory of accusation with the place of attack and blame outlined within them. Next, the methods of attack (διαβολή) are expounded. Then the use of blame (κακολογία) within a speech of accusation is given. The section closes with a summary statement of the relationship of the concepts to the oratory of blame.

Anaximenes said, basically, that a speech of accusation is "the recital of errors (ἁμαρτημάτων) and offenses (ἀδικημάτων) of which a man is accused or suspected."⁸⁴ This recital took the following form. If the case at hand was covered by a law which imposed the penalty, the task of the orator was to present and prove the errors and offenses by means of the proofs. Anaximenes divided the proofs into: (1) those drawn from the words, actions, and persons themselves, which were to be handled by arguments from probability,

⁸⁴Ibid., 1426b26ff, Rackham, p. 311.

examples, tokens, enthymemes, maxims, signs, and refutations,⁸⁵ and (2) those drawn from supplementary sources to the words, actions, and persons themselves, which were the opinions of the orator, evidence of witnesses, evidence taken by torture, and oaths.⁸⁶ This was all the basic stuff of the oratory of accusation as Anaximenes defined it.

But it is obvious that the goal of the oratory of accusation was not just the proper recital of the opponent's errors and offenses, but also the achievement of a verdict by the jury against the opponent, and, on top of this, the achievement of the maximum possible penalty against the opponent. This becomes readily apparent when Anaximenes cautioned the orator to carefully distinguish between accusations where the penalty was fixed by law, and accusations where the jury decided the penalty.⁸⁷ In the first instance the orator should restrict himself to proving that the action was committed so that the verdict would be achieved.⁸⁸ In the second instance (understood), the orator should bring all his

⁸⁵Ibid., 1428a17ff. Rackham, p. 319.

⁸⁶Ibid., 1428a22ff, Rackham, p. 321.

⁸⁷Ibid., 142641ff, Rackham, p. 311.

⁸⁸This is more true of the handbooks than of the practice. In practice the orator would probably use everything at his disposal in every court situation. .

rhetorical wares to bear on dissipating compassion for the opponent⁸⁹ and arousing anger, hatred, and jealousy against him by the jury.⁹⁰ It was in this latter connection that the methods of attack (διαβολή) and censure (κακολογία) became important. The rhetorical concept of anticipation was vital here also, since the accuser must anticipate and deal with the attacks of his opponent in his speech of defense.

It must be remembered, as was developed in Chapter II, that the Greeks had a wider range of prosecutable offenses than moderns.⁹¹ Such things as whether a person properly honored his parents and if he properly handled his money could become an issue in the assembly, or in the courts. These could also be used against a person to aid in determining the outcome of other cases.⁹² So then, a proper understanding of Anaximenes' oratory of accusation includes the thought that this species had for its subject matter all errors and offenses, wickedness and injustice, which might influence the

⁸⁹Ad Alexandrum, 1426b41ff, 1427a18, Rackham, pp. 311, 313.

⁹⁰Ibid., 1443b16ff, Rackham, pp. 425, 527.

⁹¹See the section on slander laws in Chapter II above.

⁹²See the section on διαβολή under Thrasymachus above.

outcome of the case at court.⁹³

Having this in mind, then, censures and attacks could be used to aid the accuser in his goal. Anaximenes devoted several sections of his treatise to the employment of these tactics. A basic way to distinguish them from accusation is to be aware that they stand outside the matter of the case at issue itself,⁹⁴ but their use might effect the outcome of the case. So, the purpose of accusation is to achieve a verdict of legal condemnation,⁹⁵ and the purpose of attack and censure within the speech of accusation is to create an attitude of moral condemnation in the minds of the jury.

Διαβολή in Accusation

Anaximenes presented a highly developed tactic of attack to be employed by the accuser (as well as in other

⁹³Anaximenes defined this species broadly enough so that it was not restricted to court. Accusations could take place at the assemblies, or any public occasion, but one of the key thoughts is that the accusations are of a prosecutable nature.

⁹⁴Anaximenes did not make this distinction himself. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1354a4, Freese, p. 5.

⁹⁵Anaximenes never said this in so many words. Instead, he said that the accuser must prove the case, or, in many places, that the accuser uses the various methods to make the jury well-disposed towards him, and ill-disposed toward the opponent.

species or oratory). He gave an account of the concept in two senses, private thoughts and spoken attacks. These appeared in three forms. The first was a presentation of διαβολή as the hostile attitudes of the hearers against the speaker, the subject of the speech, or the speech itself.⁹⁶ In the second form διαβολή appeared as the actual verbal attacks against the speaker during the trial in the speeches of his opponents.⁹⁷ In the third form διαβολή was the method the speaker used against his opponent's case in some way.⁹⁸ Anaximenes discussed the defenses against attack more than he enjoined attack, but both perspectives were presented in the treatise.

The main discussion of attack appeared in the section of the arrangement of a speech of exhortation or dissuasion for the prooemium.⁹⁹ A second discussion occurred in the similar section on accusation and defense.¹⁰⁰ In these sections the orator was encouraged to use the prooemium to

⁹⁶Ad Alexandrum, 1436b39ff, Rackham, pp. 379, 381.

⁹⁷Ibid., 1444a17ff, Rackham, pp. 429, 431.

⁹⁸Ibid., 1437a22-24, Rackham, p. 383, and 144513-27, pp. 435-437.

⁹⁹Ibid., 1436b39-1438a1, Rackham, pp. 379-387.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 1442a21-1442b28, Rackham, pp. 417-421.

dispell any hostile attitudes he might be aware of. To do this he had to know where these attitudes (διαβολάς) resided. Anaximenes identified three places: (1) the speaker, (2) the subject of the speech, or (3) the speech itself.¹⁰¹

If the hostile attitudes fell upon the speaker they must attach themselves either to past attacks (διαβολάς) or to something in the present.¹⁰² The past attacks may be countered in the accuser's prooemium by addressing the attacks with whatever arguments were available. These included objections to the trial if it had occurred already, or acceptance of the penalty of the verdict as sufficient punishment to dispel current διαβολή, and the declaration that what the speaker was proposing was correct and proper of itself. If the trial was pending the orator would plead that the hearers did not pre-convict him. If no trial was pending for the διαβολή, then he would claim that as sufficient proof that the enemies charges were false. In every case the orator would also accuse (κατηγορεῖν) his enemies of misrepresentation (διαβολή).¹⁰³

¹⁰¹Ibid., 1436b39ff, Rackham, pp. 379, 381.

¹⁰²For the sake of order the two sections are compiled. Anaximenes did the same, as in the section on accusations and defenses, he referred back to διαβολή in exhortation and dissuasion. See 1441b35f and 1442a23. This paragraph on past διαβολή is taken from 1437a1-30, Rackham, pp. 381, 383.

¹⁰³Ibid., 1437a22-24, Rackham, p. 383. The critical

If the διαβολή fell upon present charges, called private prejudices (ἰδίας διαβολάς), Anaximenes suggested responses in each particular category. (1) If the speaker was too young he must plead lack of friends and the magnitude of the charges.¹⁰⁴ (2) If the orator was speaking on behalf of another he should claim that it was due to close friendship to the plaintiff, or hatred of the defendant, or presence at the events in dispute, or public interest, or the plaintiff's isolated position and the wrong which had been done.¹⁰⁵ (3) If the plaintiff's personality was not compatible with the charges he was bringing, then the orator would adjure the jury not to pre-judge the case.¹⁰⁶ (4) If the plaintiff had a history of bad conduct, the orator would turn the abuse

phrase reads, "ἀεὶ δὲ κατηγορεῖν χρὴ διαβολάς, καὶ λέγειν ὡς δεινὸν καὶ κοινὸν καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν αἵτιων." (And it is always necessary for you to accuse (them) of diabole, and to say how dreadful it is, and how it is a common problem, and responsible for many evils) (My translation).

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 1442b12f. Anaximenes also included how to respond to charges in symboleutic oratory, but those are omitted wherever they can be distinguished from the oratory or accusation.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 1442b10ff, Rackham, p. 419.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 1442b18ff, Rackham, p. 419.

(λοιδόρειαν) against the opponents, counter attacking by calling them slanderers, unjust, cheaters, contentious, and bad tempered. The orator would claim that this was the only way to get justice.¹⁰⁷

If the διαβολή is against the subject of the speech, as when an unpopular goal was advanced, the orator would anticipate this and claim the facts of the case, putting the fault on necessity, fortune, and circumstances.¹⁰⁸ When the διαβολή was directed at the speech itself, for being too long, too dull, or using the same worn out arguments, the orator would plead so many facts to relate, and that the old arguments were still valid, and that the case would be proved in the course of the speech.¹⁰⁹

Anaximenes presented διαβολή in the second sense as a defense against the attacks of the accusers leveled at the character of the speaker during the trial.¹¹⁰ Even though the setting was the speaker's response,¹¹¹ it was actually a

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 1442b22ff, Rackham, p. 419.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 1437b23f, Rackham, p. 385.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 1437b28ff, Rackham, p. 385.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 1444a17ff, Rackham, p. 429.

¹¹¹Ibid., and 1444a27, Rackham, p. 431. The setting is the rebuttal of the anticipations of the opponents, but the response is set in the mouth of the accuser.

tactic of the accuser, and is considered so here. The tactic was to malign the opponent, particularly if the facts of the case did not appear sufficient,¹¹² by accusing him of reading his speech, or being a practiced or professional rhetor, or that he is working only for pay. Anaximenes suggested a selection of appropriate responses to these διαβολάς which are outlined thus:¹¹³ (1) If the attack was that the orator is reading his speech, the response was: (a) reading is not illegal, and (b) the opponent has committed such offenses that he believes that the speaker must compile a written draft and review it. (2) If the charge was that the speaker was a practiced or professional rhetor, the response was: (a) to admit this and prove that the opponent is a worse person for not studying rhetoric, or (b) claim that everybody will help his friends with the best abilities he has. (3) If the indictment was that the speaker was only working for a reward, the response was: (a) to admit this in a tone of irony and show that the opponent is doing the same, and (b) distinguish rewards of money, honor, and friendship, and claim the reward of doing a favor, while accusing the opponent of getting big money for his work.

¹¹²Ibid., 1444c18ff, Rackham, p. 429.

¹¹³Ibid., 1444a17-1444b8, Rackham, pp. 429, 431.

Anaximenes used *διαβολή* in the third sense when he urged the speaker to always accuse his opponent of *διαβολή*.¹¹⁴ He also devoted a section of the epilogue of the accuser's speech to the employment of *διαβολή* in order to arouse hatred, anger, or jealousy against the opponents. The section is reproduced here:

We shall discredit (*Διαβαλοῦμεν*) our adversaries and make them objects of jealousy...by showing that our hearers themselves or those they care for have been or are being or are going to be wrongfully ill-treated by them or their friends; for such statements will inspire the audience with hatred and anger towards them. If this is not possible, we shall adduce considerations that will result in our inspiring our hearers with jealousy against our opponents; because jealousy is near to hatred. Speaking generally, they will encounter jealousy if we show that they are prospering undeservedly, and that they are ill-disposed towards our hearers - we must recount that they have received or are receiving or are going to receive many benefits unjustly, or that they have never before been or are not now meeting with some evil, or will not do so unless the judges punish them now.¹¹⁵

So then, Anaximenes showed no qualms in the use or the claim of *διαβολή* by his students. Whatever might make for victory

¹¹⁴Ibid., 1437a22-24, Rackham, p. 383. See footnote 101 above.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 1445a13-26, Rackham, pp. 435, 437.

in the species of accusation more than justified its use.

Now, as the main method in censure was amplification, the main method for attacking (κατηγορία) was anticipation. Anaximenes devoted two chapters to anticipation, and presented a definition of this rhetorical device in both. The definition at chapter 18 reads, "Anticipation (προκαταλήψις) is the device by which we shall remove ill-feeling that we encounter by anticipating the criticisms (ἐπιτιμᾶτακα) of our audience and the arguments of those who are going to speak on the other side."¹¹⁶ The definition at chapter 33 reads,¹¹⁷ "Anticipation (προκαταλήψις) is the method by which you anticipate the objections (ἀντιλόγειν) that can be advanced against your arguments and sweep them aside [lit. tear them to pieces]."¹¹⁸ Chapter 18 dealt mainly with the censure of the hearers, and will be considered below, while chapter 33 dealt more directly with destroying the opponent's

¹¹⁶Ibid., 1432b11ff, Rackham, p. 349.

¹¹⁷It seems again, as in the case of the species of censure, that Anaximenes is drawing from two different sources. It appears that the other source of the treatise begins at chapter 29.

¹¹⁸Ad Alexandrum, 1439b2ff, Rackham, p. 397.

arguments before he can advance them. The method of anticipation in the second case was like the method of censure, amplification.¹¹⁹

Anaximenes laid down two general rules for all cases which come before the courts, to dispel the attacks of the opponents. The first one is, "whatever arguments you think your adversaries will use to make an impression on the judges, anticipate them and make the impression yourself."¹²⁰ The second rule is always to shift the blame onto the opponents, or, if that is impossible, onto something or someone else.¹²¹

To recapitulate what has been brought forward regarding *διαβολή* then, note that Anaximenes used the term in basically two senses. The first was the unspoken hostile attitudes of the jury, called *ἰδίας διαβολάς*, and the second was the open verbal attacks against the character of the opponent. The difference between *διαβολή* and accusation was

¹¹⁹Ibid., 1439b5f, Rackham, p. 397. "You must minimize (*μικρὸν ποιεῖν*) the other party's arguments and amplify your own in the manner which you have heard already in the passage dealing with amplifications."

¹²⁰Ibid., 1442b4ff, Rackham, p. 419.

¹²¹Ibid., 1442b6ff, Rackham, p. 419.

that accusation dealt with the subject in dispute, while the attacks were auxiliary arguments used to dissipate compassion for the opponent, and to arouse anger, hatred, or jealousy against him. The attacks were to appear primarily in the prooemium and in the epilogue.¹²² The primary way to dispel attacks against oneself and to achieve attacks against the opponent was through anticipation. The orator anticipated the hostile attitudes of the audience and the hostile attacks of the adversary by meeting them before they arose. The orator achieved *διαβολή* against his opponent primarily by accusing him of it, and by heaping *διαβολή* upon him in the epilogue.

Κακολογία in Accusation

The presence of the tactics of censure in the species of accusation was not as evident as the presence of *διαβολή*. Nevertheless, this writer found two sections which specifically addressed the use of censure in accusation. Just as in the case of attack, Anaximenes used the concept in two senses, (1) how to dispel the censures (*ἐπιτιμῆς*) of the crowd during the trial, and (2) how to employ censure (*κακολογία*) in a forensic speech of accusation. The two sections seemed to be

¹²²Chapter II on Thrasyarchus, footnote 183.

drawn from two different sources, since the terms Anaximenes used for censure were different and the meaning of the terms themselves did not exactly hold the moral sense of purpose of blame (*ψόγος*) developed in Chapter II.¹²³

The first section may be captioned 'How to Anticipate Censures in Court' since a central issue was how the orator could deal with the uproar or tumult (*θορύβος*) of the jury.¹²⁴ The orator not only had to deal with his opponent's attacks, but he also had to be able to counter the uproar of the judges against him, if they did not like him, or what he was saying, or how he was saying it. Brédif asserted that what normally upset the jurors and caused them to call down the speaker was not obvious falsehoods or bold attacks against the opponent, but "They hissed a mistake in pronunciation (and) they rose up against a solecism. ...their moral sense emanated from their aesthetic sense."¹²⁵ Therefore the censure (*ἐαριμύεις*) of chapter 18 was a general indignation of the

¹²³Cf. Chapter II above, pp. ,

¹²⁴Ad Alexandrum 1432b11-1433a29. Anaximenes classed the uproar (*θορύβος*) as censure (*ἐαριμύεις*) at three places in this section.

¹²⁵Leon Brédif, "Invective in Greek Eloquence," in Demosthenes, trans. by M. J. MacMahon (Chicago: S. C. Griggs, 1881), p. 364.

jury which expressed itself in booing or jeering the speaker when he was believed to have failed in some respect.

Anaximenes divided the orator's responses into those made if the interruptions occurred at the beginning of the speech and those which occurred during the speech. If the orator encountered uproars at the beginning he should adjure the jury to uphold his right to speak on the bases of the law, fair play, and their power over the final decision.¹²⁶ If the tumult began during the speech, and the jeerers were few, the orator should censure the noise makers (ἐπιτιμᾶν τοὺς Θορυβοῦντας) telling them that justice requires them to listen. But if the uproar came from the majority the orator should censure (ἐπαγγέλλον) himself, for to blame (ἐπιτιμᾶν) them will make them angry, but to censure one's self would bring forgiveness.¹²⁷ The orator would also plead with the jury to hear him out. In general Anaximenes enjoined the orator to meet interruptions with maxims or enthymemes which showed how the tumulters were running counter to justice, law, public interest, or morality.¹²⁸

¹²⁶Ad Alexandrum, 1432a35-1433a13, Rackham, pp. 351, 353.

¹²⁷Ibid., 1433a18-22, Rackham, p. 353.

¹²⁸Ibid., 1433a25-29, Rackham, p. 355.

The second section concerned the orator's employment of censure (*κακολογία*) to aid in defeating his opponent, and it appeared in the section on the arrangement of a speech of censure, chapter 35.¹²⁹ Anaximenes did not mark off the section adequately, and Chase listed it without comment as "Special Suggestions for Vituperation".¹³⁰ Yet, for the following reasons this writer considers it here, under accusation, rather than at the section on arrangement of blame above. First, Anaximenes did not talk about arrangement in the paragraph, even though the section fell within that unit of the treatise.¹³¹ Second, he talked about the

¹²⁹Ibid., 1441b14-22, Rackham, pp. 411, 413.

¹³⁰Chase, "Classical Conception of Epideictic," p. 33.

¹³¹Ad Alexandrum, 1441b29, 30, Rackham, p. 413. The paragraph seems to be independent of the genealogy narration, where Anaximenes specifically mentions vituperation (1441a12, 13, p. 409). But on the other hand, it can be assumed that Anaximenes is just continuing the previous paragraph on praising the man's career. Yet that section does complete the entire speech with dicta for the epilogue, while Anaximenes does start the next section with the words, "As to these species of oratory this will teach us the mode of employing them. We still have left the oratory of accusation..." (Rackham, p. 413).

censures by calling them accusations,¹³² an unusual use if he was not actually talking about accusations.¹³³ Third, the use of these vituperations seemed to indicate that they could be used in a contest situation¹³⁴ which Anaximenes said was not, as a rule, the character of a speech of censure.¹³⁵ So, although no one of these reasons is sufficient cause to read the paragraph as censure within the species of accusation, taken together they seem to argue that the paragraph can actually serve as an account of how to use censure (κακολογία) within the species of accusation.

With this assumption then, Anaximenes said that when applying censure within accusation one should:

¹³²Ibid., 1441b14, 15, Rackham, pp. 409, 411. Anaximenes opens the section with the sentence which reads, literally, "In the same manner we will compose accusations upon the wretched deeds of those being reviled." And towards the end of the paragraph he cautions the orator to stick to regular accusations (κατηγόρια) in the public assemblies (1441b27, p. 413). Of course, it has usually been assumed that he is just calling vituperations, accusations in this paragraph.

¹³³Anaximenes gave no decisive clues which would tie the paragraph to any one species. He spoke of accusations twice, but does not allude specifically to the courts. He did not name the assembly either, but used the phrases for private groups; or 'common crowds', which could fit any of the occasions of the species.

¹³⁴Ad Alexandrum, 1441b17, 18, 27, Rackham, p. 413.

¹³⁵Ibid., 1440b13, 14, Rackham, p. 405.

- (1) Recount the opponent's career to mirror his character and manners, without scoffing at his appearance or possessions, since that is not as persuasive.
- (2) Be careful to avoid using the shameful names (ἀισχροῦς ὀνόμασι) for his shameful deeds (ἀισχροῦς πράξεις), so that he can not claim diabole, but put the facts in such a way that the audience will apply the words.
- (3) Use irony [Defined as saying something while pretending not to say it, or calling things by the opposite of the real names].
- (4) Use ridicule (καταγελοῦν) for that on which he prides himself.
- (5) Disgrace (ατιμάζειν) him in private company, but abuse (λοιδορεῖν) him before the public assemblies with the regular accusations.¹³⁶

This discussion of the operation of blame and attack within the species of accusation clarified that censure and attack were distinct types of auxiliary arguments used in addition to the recital of errors and offenses to move the judges toward the legal verdict of condemnation. Censure oratory has been clearly distinguished from attack in that the two did not operate in the same rhetorical spheres. Attack dealt with prosecutable offenses, extraneous and additional to the accusations at hand, while censure dealt with moral blame extraneous and additional to the accusations at hand. A speech of censure would turn into a speech of accusation if it contained attack for the most part.

¹³⁶Ibid., 1441b15-29, Rackham, p. 413.

Censure as Epideictic Oratory

Having seen how διαβολή and κακολογία operate within the context of accusation, then, it remains to view how Anaximenes contrasted the species of censure itself with the species of accusation. The critical way Anaximenes viewed the difference reads: "For as a rule in speeches of this class (encomium and censure) we are not speaking to contest a case, but for display."¹³⁷ This meant in the simplest sense, that whereas a basic ingredient of accusation was a contest (ἀγών) where an opponent was present who would also speak against the issue and a verdict would be awarded to one or the other, in censure oratory there was, as a rule, no contest of this sort, so no opponent was present to speak against the issue, and no verdict was to be awarded to one or the other. In other words one can say that accusation oratory dealt with prosecutable subject matter which used accusations, whereas censure oratory dealt with non-prosecutable subject matter which used censures. To say it another way, accusation oratory had as its goal the attribution of a verdict upon a subject, and censure had as its goal the attribution of value upon a subject.

This seems to be the clearest way to understand the difference between accusation and censure in the way

¹³⁷Ibid., 1440b13, 14, Rackham, p. 405.

Anaximenes made the distinction. Unfortunately, however, the term ἐπιδείξεις, which he used here as a contrast word to ἀγών, has caused a great amount of difficulty for the rhetors and scholars from the Roman period to the present.¹³⁸ In order then, to set the stage for the comprehension of the term, it seems to this writer, that it is better at this point to refrain from thinking about the practices of the sophists, or presenting what Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian, or others thought ἐπιδείξεις meant, and first concentrate on the use of the word in this treatise.

A perusal of the term ἐπιδείξεις and its cognates makes it abundantly clear that Anaximenes always employed the term as proof. Here are three examples:

- (1) If [your speech before the assembly] is unconvincing, you must promise that you will prove (ἐπιδείξεω) the truth of your statements in the course of your speech.¹³⁹
- (2) Even I myself am not unaware that there is prejudice (δυσβολή) against me, but I will prove (ἐπιδείξω) that the charges are false.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ See the section on epideictic in Chapter IV, and in Chapter V.

¹³⁹ Ad Alexandrum, 1437b32, 33, Rackham, p. 387.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 1437a3, 4, Rackham, p. 381.

- (3) When the jury assesses he must amplify the offenses and the errors of his opponents, and if possible prove (ἐπιδείξας) that the defendant committed the offense.¹⁴¹

There are many instances of this use¹⁴² but this is sufficient to show how Anaximenes used the term. Kraus studied ἐπίδειξις and several of its cognates ἐπιδεκνύναι, δεκνύναι, ἀπόδειξις, ἀποδεκνύναι in this treatise and came to exactly the same conclusion.¹⁴³ It is incontrovertably true then that ἐπίδειξις normally meant proof or demonstration of something in a non-reflexive sense within this treatise.

The question, then, is what is the object of this proof in the statement, "For as a rule in speeches of this class we are not speaking to contest a case, but for display"?¹⁴⁴ Chase, for example, leapt to the criticism of the common

¹⁴¹Ibid., 1427a2, Rackham, p. 311.

¹⁴²Cf. Ibid., 1426b16, 1427a2, 1428b19, 1437b33, 1444a38, 1440a20, 1441a3, 1429a3, 5, 1427a26, 1445a3, etc.

¹⁴³Oskar Kraus, Neue Studien zur aristotelischen Rhetorik insbesondere über das ΓΕΝΟΣ ΕΠΙΔΕΙΚΤΙΚΟΝ (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1907), pp. 60-62, 73-75, 79.

¹⁴⁴Ad Alexandrum, 1440b13, 14, Rackham, p. 405.

sophistic practice and responded "The only acceptable interpretation of this statement is that the speaker 'displays' not the virtuous acts of the subject of his oration, but his own oratorical abilities."¹⁴⁵ The statement is an error, however, because there is no foundation within the treatise to support the assertion. Anaximenes nowhere stressed the virtuosity of the speaker when he discussed the oratory of censure. What Anaximenes did say, towards the end of the treatise referred to all the species: "These rules will supply us with the largest number of resources of the most scientific character for speaking artistically (ἐν τέχνῳ) in private and public contests (τοῖς ἰδίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κοινὰς ἀγῶσι) and in social intercourse (τοὺς ἄλλους ὁμιλίας)." ¹⁴⁶

Anaximenes was no more concerned with rhetorical artistry in censure than in any of the other species. He obviously wanted the orator to show skill in all the species, on all occasions. Therefore the assertion that ἐπιδείξις is uniquely a display of the orator's skill stands unsupported by the term itself and the context of the entire treatise.

¹⁴⁵Chase, "Classical Conception of Epideictic," p. 28.

¹⁴⁶Ad Alexandrum, 1445b27-30, Rackham, p. 411.

Therefore the commonly held opinion that Anaximenes distinguished censure (and praise) from accusation or exhortation or the other species for the reason that it uniquely displayed the skill or the orator finds no support from the treatise, or the sophistic τέχνη from which he draws.¹⁴⁷ Instead, the distinguishing marks were that in censure (or praise) the orator proved or demonstrated his subject. He attributed disreputable qualities to things. He proved what was blame worthy or bad (κακά), as was outlined above. So, then, this proof, or demonstration differed from the other species because it was not, as a rule, subject to refutation by a present opponent, and the hearers deposited no votes. Because of this the speech itself had to carry the day, and convince the hearers. This is why it was called a proof and not a contest. Of course the mere fact that no vote was taken, and no victory declared does not theoretically remove this species of oratory from effecting belief about practical life.¹⁴⁸ The hearers were

¹⁴⁷ Obviously the scholars who contend that epideictic merely means a display of rhetorical skill, draw from the practices of the sophists which were criticized by Plato and Isocrates. It can be suspected that, just as in the case of Isocrates (see chapter II above), most of the sophists practicing in the period under discussion here claimed for their work practical value.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Chapter II on Gorgias and footnotes 130, 131 for examples of persuasive demonstrations in the Gorgias and Phaedrus. Also see Isocrates' opinion of his work in chapter II above.

either persuaded into a new value judgement by the speech, or they were not. The fact that this species of oratory lent itself in practice to a display of the virtuosity of the speaker, then, was not constitutive to its meaning from the standpoint of the Rhetoric to Alexander.¹ It was incidental.

Censure and Ethical Considerations

The preceeding discussion of blame, attack, and accusation has made it clearly evident that Anaximenes anchored his treatise to no ethical system. The goal of the orator was, in every case, to demonstrate his point so that persuasion was achieved in the hearers. The power of the speech itself (ὁ λόγος) was the all-embracing norm. If the use of commonly held opinions of badness and blameworthy things would achieve persuasion, then the orator would advance them. If they would not, then the orator refrained from advancing them. The life of virtue itself was only one tool among the wares of the orator to gain his hearers' good will and to achieve compassion and persuasion.¹⁴⁹

This lack of ethical system was also highlighted by the interchangeability of the terms of blame by Anaximenes. The sophistic doctrine of censure which he presented

¹⁴⁹Cf. Ibid., 1445b30-34, 38-44, Rackham, p. 441.

exhibited fuzzy thinking among the terms ψόγος, ἐπιτίμησις, and κακολογία. Ψόγος seemed to mean censure proper, but it did not occur as the term for that species in one of the major sections devoted to that art.¹⁵⁰ Ἐπιτιμᾶω was used as criticism in some places¹⁵¹ but it was mainly equated with booing and jeering by the judges.¹⁵² Κακολογία meant evil speaking more than censure, and under its umbrella Anaximenes encouraged both censure proper leading to disgrace (ἀτιμία) and ridicule and abuse.¹⁵³ The moral distinctions of Isocrates were not really in evidence in the presentation of this species.¹⁵⁴ So, it remained for Aristotle to relate the species to ethical considerations, and that will be seen in the next chapter.

Summary

From the presentation of the various aspects of blame oratory and accusation oratory which has just transpired, it is possible to present in an outline form the

¹⁵⁰See page 119, above.

¹⁵¹See page 144, above and footnote 127.

¹⁵²See page 146, above.

¹⁵³See page 148, above.

¹⁵⁴See page 88f, above.

distinctive characteristics of both species side by side.

This comparison places the two species into clear relief:

<u>Accusation Oratory</u>	<u>Blame Oratory</u>
1. Is an independent species.	1. Is an independent species.
2. Interrelates with other species.	2. Interrelates with other species.
3. Used in contests as a rule.	3. Not used in contests as a rule.
4. Has an opponent to counterclaim.	4. Has no opponent to counterclaim.
5. Allows a verdict to resolve the issue.	5. Allows the speech itself will resolve the issue.
6. Is spoken in the presence of judges as a rule.	6. Is spoken in private company or common assemblies.
7. Its materials are prosecutable errors and offenses.	7. Its materials are the blameworthy things and badness.
8. Its method is the use of the rhetorical proofs.	8. Its method is the use of amplification and disparagement.
9. Its objects are persons.	9. Its objects are persons, actions, emotions, possessions, animals, speeches, governments.
10. Its goal is a verdict of legal condemnation.	10. Its goal is an attitude of moral condemnation.

Recapitulation

This chapter examined the Rhetoric to Alexander for the species of oratory labeled blame (ψόγος) and proceeded along the following lines. First, the main thrust of the treatise was shown to revolve around the discussion of seven

species of oratory, each independently conceived and considered. A two genera umbrella of public assemblies and forensic speaking was chosen.

The definition of the oratory of blame was examined and found to include "the amplification of disreputable purposes, actions, and speeches, and the attribution of ignoble qualities that do not exist." The materials for blame were, in the first section, the blameworthy things, which were the unjust, the illegal, the inexpedient, the disgraceful, the odious, the impractical, the laborious, and the unnecessary. In the second major section devoted to censure, the materials were the aspects of badness, which were stupidity, unrighteousness, cowardice, and the practice of reproachable things. Anaximenes did not attempt to interrelate the materials. The objects of blame were people, animals, governments, actions, emotions, possessions and speeches.

In the section of methods of censure, Anaximenes presented eight ways to amplify or disparage the object of the speech, once the speaker establishes that blame adheres to the object of the speech. Then, in the three part arrangement of the speech of censure he presented a somewhat different tactic of defaming the object of the speech through a genealogy with some of the rhetorical proofs included in the introduction and epilogue. The style of the speech of censure was to be one of "considerable fullness."

Next, accusation oratory and one of its subtopics, attack, was examined and distinguished from the oratory of censure. Accusation concerned itself essentially with people's prosecutable errors and offenses. The setting of accusation was a contested issue where others beside the speakers would decide the issue and apply a verdict. The methods of accusation oratory were the rhetorical proofs. The goal of accusation was to achieve a favorable verdict.

Anaximenes discussed attack both in the sense of hostile attitudes and hostile words. Anaximenes presented sections on how to dispel hostile attitudes and squelch hostile words, but he also devoted space to developing attack against opponents so that they would fall under the odium of the judges. A critical distinction between attack and accusation lay in the issue at hand. Attacks were auxiliary arguments directed particularly at expanding the attitude of judges to 'justly' condemn the opponent and apply the maximum penalty to him. The main method of attack was rhetorical anticipation.

Censure was also found to be used in the employ of accusation. Anaximenes also used censure here in two senses: (1) as the booing of the judges against the speaker, and (2) as the means to denigrate the opponent. The change of

terminology for censure showed that Anaximenes drew from different sources for the different discussions. In both discussions Anaximenes gave ways to overcome criticism, or establish criticism.

The distinction which Anaximenes drew between contest oratory and epideictic oratory was the next item of examination. It was shown that the word ἐπίδειξις normally meant proof or demonstration, and that the word was used in a non-reflexive sense. Furthermore it was established that Anaximenes had no unique or overriding concern for a display of virtuosity in epideictic oratory. It was shown instead that Anaximenes sought artistry in all the species of rhetoric. It was shown that the word ἐπεδειξέως was used by Anaximenes to designate the species which had to establish its own case according to its particular subject matter without a verdict or a vote by the hearers.

The discussion of blame oratory as it related to accusation oratory was then summarized in a ten point contrast.

The final section showed that Anaximenes did not tie the oratory of blame to an ethical system. The ethical system was relative to the hearers and used as a tool to aid in the achievement of persuasion. The norm was the power of the speech itself.

CHAPTER IV

BLAME ORATORY IN ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC

Introduction

The Rhetoric of Aristotle is unique among the classical treatises on the subject. While Aristotle surely developed his systematic treatise from observation of the practices of the orators¹ after reviewing the rhetorical handbooks of others², he did not present the subject in the same manner as other rhetoricians. Anaximenes had written his handbook so that the readers would train themselves to repeat his rules and examples along the lines of the progymnasmata, so that they would have plenty of

¹Aristotle's frequent examples from the speeches of the period attest to this. Cf. also, Donal J. Stanton and Goodwin F. Berquist, Jr., "Aristotle's Rhetoric: Empiricism or Conjecture?," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 41 (1975), 69-81.

²Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1354a12-15, trans. by W. Rhys Roberts in Aristotle (Modern Library; New York: Random House, 1954), pp. 19, 20 (Hereafter labeled Rhys Roberts). Cf. the comments on Synagoge technon by Keith V. Erickson, "The Lost Rhetorics of Aristotle," Communication Monographs, 43 (1976), 229-237.

material for persuasion in both writing and speaking.³ But Aristotle presented the subject from the philosophical perspective of a logician,⁴ and he wrote about rhetoric in relation to his understanding of the soul,⁵ ethics, and

³Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum, 1436a25ff, trans. by Henry Rackham (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1965), p. 375 (Hereafter labeled Rackham). Cf. also 1445b27ff, Rackham, p. 441.

⁴Theresa M. Crem, "The Definition of Rhetoric According to Aristotle," in Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric, ed. by Keith V. Erickson (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1974), p. 52 (Reprinted from Laval Theologique et Philosophique, 7 (1956), 233-250). There has been some disagreement about Aristotle's purpose. Was it to present a philosophy, or to present a practical guide to persuasion? James Richard Chase, "Classical Conception of Epideictic" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1961), pp. 37-67 presents an excellent survey of scholarly opinion, citing Jebb, Crem, M. L. Clarke, Rhys Roberts, Cope, Zeller, Navarre, Solmsen, Ross, Hinks, Thonssen, and Bonner. Stanton and Goodwin, "Aristotle," 69-81, also treat the issue, citing Hunt, Kennedy, Jaeger, Clarke, Roberts and others, so it is unnecessary to repeat their thoughts here. It seems to this writer that the issue is not really 'what ought to be' versus 'what is', as Chase conceived the argument (see footnote 15 below), for that would have fit Aristotle more during his platonic period. Instead, Aristotle's purpose was to present in a systematic fashion, from his philosophical perspective, the underlying rationale for what is. Therefore the work is both philosophical and practical, and presents an ambivalence of both the proper way to persuade through proofs which are actually outside the issue (see the section on δεδόξα below). Cf. Whitney J. Oates, Aristotle and the Problem of Value (Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 333-351 (Reprinted in Erickson, Aristotle: The Classical Heritage, pp. 102-160..

⁵Cf. William E. Utterback, "Aristotle's Contribution to the Psychology of Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, 11 (1925), p. 223, and Lester W. Thonssen, "A Functional Analysis of Aristotle's Rhetoric", Quarterly Journal of Speech, 16 (1930), 297-310.

politics.⁶ Therefore, while other handbooks on rhetoric promised to produce persuasion if followed, Aristotle attempted to provide his students with the theoretic means of persuasion in any given instance.⁷

The treatise which moderns have is actually the set or sets of lecture notes which Aristotle used for his courses at the Lyceum.⁸ For this reason they are abbreviated, choppy in spots, even inconsistent in some respects, and fragmentary in some places.⁹ Modern scholars have established within the treatise about four strata of thought, the progression of which is assumed to be a moving away from the more speculative position of Plato towards a more empirical position.¹⁰ For the purpose of this

⁶Aristotle, "Art of Rhetoric", 1356a30ff, 1359b10-13, trans. by John Henry Freese (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1975), pp. 18n, 19, 41 (Hereafter labeled Freese).

⁷Ibid., 1355b12f and 1355b28ff, Freese, pp. 12n, 13, 15.

⁸This is generally accepted. Cf. Ibid., Freese, p. xxxi.

⁹See footnote 182 below and cf. Lane Cooper, "Burnett on Aristotle," in Aristotelian Papers (Ithica, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1939), pp. 188, 189, who stresses that Aristotle probably revised his lecture notes somewhat every time he presented the course, and surely incorporated some of the fruits of 'classroom' discussions over the years.

¹⁰For an overview with a bibliography see George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 83-87, 103-114. See also, Keith Erickson, "Aristotle's Lost Rhetorics," cited above.

investigation, however, it is not necessary to explicate those arguments to any degree.¹¹ The critical text used for reference in this unit is the edition edited by W. D. Ross.¹² Other editions and translations, of course, are freely cited.

¹¹The important point is that all three books are the work of Aristotle, and that is the assumption of this paper. But see for example, Felix Grayeff, "The Problem of the Genesis of Aristotle's Text," Phronesis 1 (1956), 105-122. Grayeff writes about the entire corpus and asserts that there are so many additions, critical remarks, and radical variances, "so heterogeneous in purpose and standpoint, that perhaps we must conclude that many peripatetic lecturers contributed to almost every part of what is known as Aristotle's works." (pp. 109, 110). Grayeff cites examples from several of the works (but not the Rhetoric) and asserts, moreover, "...that, broadly speaking, there may not be a single chapter in the Corpus which, as it stands now, is purely Aristotelian in origin" (p. 119). Grayeff is essentially speaking about the manuscripts (Erickson, "Lost Rhetorics of Aristotle," p. 230n7 inadvertently footnotes Grayeff as discussing the Gryllus), but his wide swaths at the corpus seem unworkable. The contributions which Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," American Journal of Philology, 62 (1941), 35-50, 170-190, attributes to Aristotle seem a much better guide (see esp. 37n).

¹²Aristotelis, Ars Rhetorica, ed. by W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, Press, 1959). The most recent critical recension of the Rhetoric is Aristotelis "Ars Rhetorica", ed. by Rudolfus Kassel (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976). This work developed from Kassel's studies of the manuscript traditions published as, Rudolfus Kassel, Der Text aristotelischen Rhetorik: Prologemena zu einer kritischen Ausgabe (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971). Friedrich Solmsen, Classical Philology, 74 (1979), pp. 68-72, gives the work his highest accolades. Solmsen did note, however, that "few or none" of Kassel's changes in the spelling, wording, or phrasing in the "text effect a serious change in orientation in Aristotle's thought" (p. 70). For a brief overview of the manuscript tradition see, Aristotle, "Art" of Rhetoric, Freese, pp. xxx-xxxi.

A major basic assumption governing the investigation for this chapter is that Aristotle was logical and consistent within his own system, both with his methodology and with his presentation of his thought. This does not mean that inconsistencies within the Rhetoric are ignored, or glossed.¹³ It means, instead, that where two interpretations are possible, one which coincides with the general perspective of the rhetorical outlook, and one which collides with that outlook, the preference goes to the first, and the burden of proof rests with the latter. Since epideictic oratory, in which the discussion of $\psi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ is embedded, has commonly been interpreted in an anomalous fashion from the rest of Aristotle's scheme of rhetoric, it is viewed in the first major section with critical attention.

This first section shows that it is unnecessary to interpret Aristotle's third division in an anomalous fashion by noting that the entire treatise was framed around Aristotle's proofs and then pointing out that each of the three genera emphasized one particular artistic proof, and that, in particular, epideictic oratory stressed the $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ proof. The study notes that whereas the only evidence that Aristotle taught the display of skill in blame oratory comes

¹³For example, see the section on amplification below.

from the traditional interpretation of three terms in one paragraph of the Rhetoric, there is ample evidence from the rest of the treatise that Aristotle tied blame oratory to the proof of moral character. In fact, this section stresses that Aristotle repudiated the sophistic position of teaching persuasion by technique alone.

The chapter next examines the three central terms, $\Theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$, $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$, and $\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\iota\varsigma$ by showing their traditional interpretations and then demonstrating through the work of Kraus, Schwaab, Hinks and Buchheit that the traditional interpretations are inadequate. The first section concludes with an adequate and accurate translation, showing that $\Theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ is a judge in the wide sense, $\delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$ is the power or force of the speaker to demonstrate his point, including the force of the argument itself, and $\epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\iota\chi\iota\varsigma$ is an active demonstration of the magnitude of vice.

The second major division explicates blame oratory. The section explains that Aristotle considered $\psi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ oratory to be a substantive sub-division of epideictic. The two lists of the materials for blame are enumerated from the Rhetoric, and ranked by the Ethics. The third division of the chapter clarifies Aristotle's concept of amplification as a source of reasoning and as a line of reasoning, as well as listing other $\tau\acute{o}\tau\omicron\iota$ appropriate for blame. The next

section on style and arrangement explains the reading function of epideictic by conjecturing that Aristotle used the term because the examples he had before him were written and refined. The reading functions meant for Aristotle that the speeches had a high degree of the virtues of style and therefore were suitable for reading. The section also shows that the examples Aristotle cited in his discussion of the arrangement of epideictic speeches also argue that he defined epideictic by its function of praising and blaming, not by its display of the orator's skill. The section enumerates Aristotle's injunctions for epideictic prooemia, narrations, and epilogues.

The next division of the chapter adds important information to Aristotle's concept of $\psi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ rhetoric. Here the injustice appropriate to blame is defined and separated from the injustice of forensic rhetoric. The section shows that Aristotle's theory excluded blame from the courts as a proper mode of argument. The unit expounds Aristotle's handling of $\delta\iota\alpha\beta\omicron\lambda\acute{\eta}$ as a sophistic device in the forensic genre, convincingly but unfairly employed to persuade the hearer. The section lists eleven methods of $\delta\iota\alpha\beta\omicron\lambda\acute{\eta}$ and stresses that $\delta\iota\alpha\beta\omicron\lambda\acute{\eta}$ and $\psi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ were conceptually distinct. The last part of the section brings out that Aristotle

separated ridicule, abusive language and insult from blame oratory. It also notes that Aristotle did not conceptually link indignation to blame oratory.

The chapter concludes that Aristotle classified the invective and blame of his day by his schemes of rhetorical proofs. The weight of the evidence in the chapter shows with considerable force that Aristotle considered blame oratory a substantial, practical, and vital aspect of the rhetoric of his day.

The Setting for the Oratory of Blame

Unlike Anaximenes, who presented invective as a self-standing independent species of oratory, Aristotle presented his discussion of blame within and under a three genera system of rhetoric, which in turn was elaborated with a system of rhetorical proofs, and the whole art itself was positioned among Aristotle's explication of other arts and sciences.¹⁴ Proceeding with the assumption of a logical and consistent system, then, one must first have an accurate conception of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric and of the rhetorical process before analyzing and interpreting the

¹⁴Cf. Takatura Ando, Aristotle's Theory of Practical Cognition (2nd ed.; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 175-216, for a reasoned discussion of Aristotle's scheme of arts and sciences, and his division between practice and production.

ψόγος oratory facet. Unless one proceeds with caution, the abbreviated nature of Aristotle's notes too easily invite a definition of epideictic¹⁵ which, as Buchheit put it, makes Aristotle's conception not one whit better than all the sophists.¹⁶ Therefore the following paragraphs set down Aristotle's general perspective.

¹⁵Chase, "Classical Conception of Epideictic," seems to have faltered right at this point. Although he carefully elaborates the philosophical nature of Aristotle's work, he had already pre-conceived that ἐπίδειξις meant merely a display of the performance of the orator (see p. 44). For this he is forced to argue what is already well known, that the display of the skill of the orator appeared in all types of oratory in Aristotle's day (pp. 45-57). After discounting the position of Hinks (pp. 57, 69-70), because he accepted "the dubious premise that Aristotle's intention in writing the *Rhetoric* was to reflect and classify what was taking place about him (p. 58)," and discounting Drerup (and through him, Kraus, who was not available to Chase) because their position "destroys the entire significance" of the distinction between the θεωρῶς and κερῶς (pp. 69, 70), he concludes that Aristotle worked as a "creative philosopher" to "restrict" display oratory to "an unrealistically limited group of rhetorical functions" (p. 59, *passim*), "because of his distaste for display (p. 66)." Chase writes, "Apparently disturbed by the nature of Athenian discourse, he sought to purge it of what appeared to him sophistry (pp. 67, 68)." The logical absurdity here is that Chase assigned the sophistic practice to Aristotle's meaning of ἐπίδειξις, in order to prove that Aristotle rejected such practice. This false premise sets an otherwise insightful study in a fog of trying to reason out of the difficulties inherent in the premise. But see, James Richard Chase, "The Classical Conception of Epideictic," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 47 (1961), 293-300. Here Chase's arguments, while essentially the same, seem toned down. Aristotle's presentation appears here more as praise and blame, and less as display of skill, while Chase still contends that both functions are meant.

¹⁶Vinzenz Buchheit, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles* (Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1960), p. 120.

As was mentioned above, Aristotle developed a definition of rhetoric which made it a faculty, a systematic rational procedure.¹⁷ Rhetoric was the "mirror image"¹⁸ of dialectic, the two arts in Aristotle's scheme with general application.¹⁹ Rhetoric was not, then, the art (τέχνη) of persuasion, but the "faculty" (δύναμις) of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever.²⁰ The term Aristotle chose for discovering (θεωρεῖν) meant "to consider carefully".²¹ So his purpose in teaching this art to students was both philosophical and practical, for he expected the learners to use rhetoric to discern the means and then use those means in practice to persuade.²²

¹⁷Lawrence J. Flynn, S. J., "Aristotle; Art and Faculty of Rhetoric," Southern Speech Journal, 21 (1957), 245, citing Edward Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric with Analysis Notes and Appendices (New York, 1867), pp. 16, 17.

¹⁸Forbes I. Hill, "The Rhetoric of Aristotle," in A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, ed. by James J. Murphy (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 22.

¹⁹Rhetoric, 1355b9ff, Freese, p. 13.

²⁰Ibid., 1355b29f, Freese, p. 15.

²¹E.g., Flynn, "Art and Faculty," p. 247.

²²Cf. Ibid., 251.

Since rhetoric dealt only with matters that can be otherwise, "the things about which we deliberate",²³ it used for proofs (*πράξεις*), not induction and syllogism, but example and enthymeme.²⁴ It is important to note here what Forbes Hill saw clearly,²⁵ that the entire treatise of Aristotle was framed around his presentation of proofs.²⁶ Proofs (Aristotle used the term in several senses in the Rhetoric, basically as the matter which persuades, and also the form which persuades,²⁷) are in two classes, inartistic, and artistic. The artistic class appeared in three species (*εἶδη*): (1) ethical, dealing with the character of the speaker, (2) emotional, dealing with the emotion aroused in

²³Rhetoric, 1357a3f, Freese, p. 23.

²⁴Ibid., 1356b7f, Freese, p. 19: "Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes and nothing else..."

²⁵Hill, "The Rhetoric," p. 21.

²⁶Ibid. He outlined the book in the following manner: I. Introduction (I₁₋₃), II. Material Premises (II₄₋₁₉), III. Forms of Arguments (II₂₀₋₂₆), IV. Language for Presenting Proofs-Style (III₁₋₁₂), IV. Arrangement of Proofs (III₁₃₋₁₉).

²⁷Joseph T. Leinhard, S. J., "A Note on the Meaning of ΠΙΣΤΙΣ in Aristotle's Rhetoric," in Erickson, Classical Heritage, p. 174 (Reprinted from American Journal of Philology, 87 (1966), 446-454).

in the hearers, and (3) logical, dealing with the argument of the speech itself.²⁸ Although enthymeme and example have sometimes been restricted to the logical proof,²⁹ Aristotle did not make that restriction.³⁰ The difference between examples and enthymemes as logical proofs, and examples and enthymemes as ethical or emotional proofs was that in the later case the orator was using the speech as a vehicle.³¹ He was still using examples or enthymemes to enhance his credibility, or to rouse the audience to compassion or anger, just as much as he was using examples or enthymemes to prove the facts at issue.

An important question for this investigation is where do the three genera of rhetoric fall within this system? One can assume that Aristotle was classifying speeches in terms of their functions of advising, dissuading,

²⁸Rhetoric, 1355b45ff, Freese, p. 17.

²⁹Cf. Hill, "The Rhetoric," p. 20.

³⁰Cf. Lienhard, "Meaning of $\mu\epsilon\tau\eta\sigma\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$," p. 173. See also, William W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions," in Erickson, Classical Heritage, pp. 205-234 (Reprinted from Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 52 (1970), 40-70). And see, James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory", Speech Monographs 3 (1936), 62-65.

³¹Lienhard, "Meaning of $\mu\epsilon\tau\eta\sigma\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$," p. 173. He states, "The implication is that ethos (taken technically) is conveyed to the audience in logos as a vehicle, rather than as a separate proof."

blaming, defending, etc. And, further, that Aristotle was dividing the kinds of rhetoric by the three kinds of hearers, the three goals in view, and the three times in view (past, present, future).³² These are all proper ways in which Aristotle schematized the "fields of existing oratory".³³ But a relationship between the three kinds of artistic proofs and the three kinds of rhetoric, which has not received much attention, also appears. Following the assumption of consistency of Aristotle's scheme, a solid relationship between the three kinds of artistic proofs and the three kinds of rhetoric would clarify further what the orator was attempting to prove in the epideictic branch.

Although the connection is not unrealistically tight (the three species of artistic proofs obviously operate in all three genera) Aristotle did indicate that in practice each kind of genre had a particular proof which was most effective. In the first chapter of the book³⁴ he stated that the logical proofs worked best for the hearers in the

³²Cf. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 87.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 118 separates chapter one of the Rhetoric as earlier than chapters two and three, but this writer has followed the natural progression of thought to tie the three kinds of proofs to the three kinds of genera and hearers.

assembly, since their self-interest was at stake, but that it did not work as well in the courts, where the hearers were more easily persuaded by appeals to their emotions.³⁵ In both the first two chapters Aristotle chided other writers of rhetorical handbooks because they dwelled on pathos proofs in forensic oratory, and ignored the logical and ethical proofs (along with ignoring symboleutic and epideictic oratory).³⁶ Now if in practice logical appeals had the most effect in symboleutic oratory, and if pathetic appeals worked best in forensic oratory, then it follows that appeals to ethos were most closely connected to epideictic oratory.

This is certainly confirmed by Aristotle. In explicating the epideictic branch in Book I, 9 Aristotle stated that he was also "incidentally bring[ing] to light the means of making us appear of such and such a character; ...for it is by the same means that we shall be able to inspire confidence in ourselves or others in regard to virtue."³⁷ The $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ appeal was particularly critical in

³⁵Rhetoric, 1354b26-1355a3, Freese, pp. 9, 11.

³⁶Ibid., 1355a22f, 1356a19f, Freese, pp. 11, 17.

³⁷Ibid., 1366a25-27, Freese, p. 91.

blame oratory, for it was a common proverb that one who blames another should not be guilty of the same things.³⁸

So then, the material presented here shows that in Aristotle's overriding scheme the artistic proofs governed his general approach to the topic. It was also shown that Aristotle linked a species of artistic proof with each of the kinds of rhetoric, and that he closely linked the ethical proof with epideictic. Since Aristotle considered *πίστις* as either the material which persuades or the form which persuades, according to the context, there is nothing in Aristotle's general scheme which would lead one to believe that he would have considered the epideictic branch of rhetoric to be merely a display of the skill of the orator. If anything was to be displayed by the epideictic orator, according to the general scheme, it would be his moral character (*ἡθός*), so that he could more easily persuade by the logical and emotional proofs, which he also employed.³⁹

³⁸*Ibid.*, 1384b3-5, Freese, p. 217. See Chapter II above on Thales.

³⁹Let it be suggested here that the linking of the proofs with the kinds of genera could give a different sense to *Rhetoric*, 1358a36-1358b8. On the basis of what Aristotle says about the three elements of the speech, the three kinds of hearers would be those who are persuaded by the logical, emotional, and ethical appeals (the sense of 1358a37f). These three kinds of hearers give the meaning to the division of rhetoric into three kinds. The next step, then, was to divide the three kinds of hearers into two classes, either critics of the present situation, or judges of past or future issues.

Translators and commentators, however, have not given a treatment of epideictic in line with the scheme of the rest of the Rhetoric because of the three terms, θεωρός, δύναμις and ἐπίδειξις, which appear in Book I, 3. The critical sentences, then, and examples of common translations are presented here.

ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι
ἢ κριτὴν, κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ
τῶν μελλόντων. ἔστιν δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν
μελλόντων κρίνων ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ
περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων [οἶον] ὁ δικαστής,
ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός, ὥστ'
ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τρία γένη τῶν λόγων
τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικα-
νικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν.⁴⁰

Hobbes translated the underlined sections, "The hearer must of necessity be either an unconcerned hearer, or a judge... the other respecting the abilities of the orator, as the unconcerned hearer."⁴¹ He noted in this translation,

This interpretation takes the stress away from defining the three genres by the class of hearer, and puts it back on Aristotle's larger focus of linking the genera to elements of the speech which persuade.

⁴⁰Rhetoric, 1358b2-8, Ross, p. 13 (Underlining mine).

⁴¹Thomas Hobbes, Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1851), p. 24 (Underlining mine).

however, "Both hearers are interested; but the $\Theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{o}s$ is a speculative, the $\kappa\rho\iota\tau\acute{\iota}s$ a practical auditor."⁴² His title for epideictic was demonstrative.⁴³

Welldon translated the same sections as, "Audiences are necessarily either critics or judges ... while one who judges merely the ability displayed in a speech is the critic."⁴⁴ And, he noted, "The difference is that the "critic" regards a speech merely as an intellectual effort, the "judge" as an argument in which he is personally interested."⁴⁵ He suggested, further, " $\text{As } \epsilon\pi\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\kappa\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ is a set rhetorical display, so epideictic oratory is the oratory of display."⁴⁶

Cope commented on the term $\Theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{o}s$ with the words, "Audiences are of two kinds, either mere 'spectators' like the $\Theta\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\tau\alpha\iota$ in a theatre, at the games, or in any exhibition where amusement is the object, or at all events where there is no interest in the practical character or tendency; or

⁴²Ibid., p. 24n (Underlining mine).

⁴³Ibid., p. 24 (Underlining mine).

⁴⁴J. E. C. Welldon, The Rhetoric of Aristotle Translated with Analysis and Critical Notes (London: MacMillan, 1886), p. 22 (Underlining mine).

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 22n2 (Underlining mine).

⁴⁶Ibid. (Underlining mine).

else 'judges' where a real interest is at stake ..."⁴⁷ For ἐκδεικτικὴς he cited Quintilian's definition that epideictic is properly "ostentatio".⁴⁸

Freese continued the tradition when he translated the underlined section, "Now the hearer must necessarily be either a mere spectator or a judge".⁴⁹ What the spectator viewed was "the ability of the speaker".⁵⁰ Freese noted, "All three kinds of hearers are regarded as judges (the mere spectator as a 'critic'), although strictly speaking κριτικὴς should be limited to the law courts."⁵¹

Cooper expanded the tradition when he called the hearer of epideictic speeches "a mere observer (critic)" who "decides about the force and of the speech". [He defined

⁴⁷Edward Merith Cope, The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary, rev. and ed. by John Edwin Sandys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1877), I, 53 (Underlining mine). See also, E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric with Analysis Notes and Appendices (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1970), p. 121, where he wrote, "The third branch is inferior to the two preceding in extent, importance and interest ... so called because speeches of this sort are composed for 'show' ... to amuse an audience."

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 53.

⁴⁹Rhetoric, Freese, p. 33 (Underlining mine).

⁵⁰Ibid. (Underlining mine).

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 32n, 33.

the δύναντες, the faculty, as force] ⁵² Cooper concluded that Aristotle was speaking of "panegyrical or declamatory speeches in the nature of an exhibition or display, eulogies - in general, speeches of praise or blame."⁵³

The concluding example, Rhys Roberts, defined the section in the following fashion. (Μεωρός was a "mere on-looker, present at a show, where he decides no grave political or legal issue and plays no higher role than that of a speech taster or oratorical connoisseur."⁵⁴ He translated ἐπίδειξις as "the ceremonial oratory of display"⁵⁵ and a δύναντες as "skill".⁵⁶

There has been gathering opposition to these interpretations, however, from those who felt they are both inadequate and unfair to Aristotle's systematic position and practical intention. Oskar Kraus blazed the trail for a better comprehension of Aristotle's third genre in a study

⁵² Lane Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle (New York: Meredith, 1932), p. 16 (Underlining mine).

⁵³ Ibid., p. 17

⁵⁴ Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. by W. Rhys Roberts (Modern Library; New York: Random House, 1954), p. 32n.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 32.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

produced in 1905,⁵⁷ and expanded in 1907.⁵⁸ He took each of the critical terms, researched them, and came to the following conclusions.

Concerning the term $\Theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$, Kraus advanced citations from the Rhetoric, the Ethics, and the Politics (the central constellation of arts which Aristotle linked together) to display how the $\Theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ was also a judge in the citations above, though he was not one who cast a verdict. The following citation shows his argument.

Aristotle explicitly teaches at II, 18, 1391b12: 'for he who it is necessary to persuade; this one is, so as to say, in a word, a 'judge,' and in the same place, line 16: 'and similarly also in epideictic speeches, for the speech is put together for the [$\Theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$] just as [if] to a judge [$\kappa\rho\iota\tau\eta\rho$]'!!⁵⁹

Kraus followed this understanding of $\Theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$, showing that it had a narrower and wider sense, just as $\kappa\rho\iota\tau\eta\rho$ did.⁶⁰ He

⁵⁷Oskar Kraus, Die Lehre von Lob, Lohn, Tadel und Strafe bei Aristoteles (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1905).

⁵⁸Oskar Kraus, Neue Studien zur aristotelischen Rhetorik insbesondere über das $\Theta\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ $\epsilon\pi\iota\delta\epsilon\iota\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu$ (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1907).

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 31 (The translation from the German and the Greek is mine. For the full citation see Rhetoric, 1391b, Freese, p. 263).

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 32.

stated,

The *Θεωρός* is no *κριτής* in the narrow sense as a dicastic judge, and also not a *κριτής* in the, yes, somewhat wider sense as an *ἐκκλησιαστής*, but truly in the widest sense, in which each hearer is a critic (*κριτὴν*) of what he hears.⁶¹

He traced the source of this understanding to the following citation from the Nicomachean Ethics: "And each judges correctly what he knows, and of these things he is a good critic (*ἀγαθὸς κριτής*)... Hence the young are not fit to be hearers of politics."⁶² On the bases of these quotes Kraus concluded that the *Θεωρός* of Rhetoric I, 3 was a judge of the *δυνάμει* of the vice or virtue displayed in the speech.⁶³

Kraus then took up the term *δύναμις*, commonly translated as "the ability of the speaker".⁶⁴ He stated that his thesis was simple: "the epideictic speaker is either a praise or a blame speaker, who brings out the greatness of virtue or vice".⁶⁵ His citations from the Rhetoric read:

⁶¹Ibid. (Translation mine).

⁶²Ibid. (Translation from the German and Greek is mine.), Kraus misdirects the reader for the citation from the Ethics. He lists it as NE I, 1094a28, but it is NE I, 1094b28.

⁶³Ibid., p. 33.

⁶⁴Cf. Rhetoric, Freese, p. 33.

⁶⁵Kraus, ΓΕΝΟΣ ΕΠΙΔΕΙΚΤΙΚΟΝ, pp. 36.

"Praise is the language that sets forth the greatness of virtue; hence it is necessary to show forth (ἐπιδεικνύουσα) that a man's actions are virtuous".⁶⁶ And, "We will next speak of virtue and vice, of the noble and disgraceful, since they constitute the aim of one who praises and of one who blames."⁶⁷

Kraus referred to the Nicomachean Ethics to elaborate the nuances of δύναμις in relation to virtue (ἀρετή). He stated that for Aristotle virtue itself was a δύναμις , a predictable power, a force, or energy.⁶⁸ It was a possession or a habit (ἔξις) in the area of the practical or possible.⁶⁹ With this information Kraus advanced that the power (δύναμις) which the orator displayed was not his own power or ability, but the faculty or magnitude of the virtue or vice, honor or disgrace.⁷⁰

Turning to the meaning of ἐπίδειξις , Kraus devoted the main part of his effort to establishing this term as

⁶⁶Ibid., citing Rhetoric, 1367b27 (The translation here is from Freese, p. 101).

⁶⁷Ibid., citing Rhetoric, 1366a36 (The translation here is from Freese, p. 91).

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 41. His citations from NE II, 1103a31 as proof of his position appear on p. 44.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 42.

⁷⁰Ibid.

coming from the active verb ἐπιδείκνυμι rather than from the reflexive ἐπιδείξασθαι.⁷¹ Kraus asserted that epideictic got its name from the showing forth (ἐπιδεικνύναι) that a man's actions were virtuous.⁷² To accomplish this in all the occurrences Kraus had to deal with Rhetoric 1391b27⁷³ where some of the manuscripts had the middle voice, and some the active. Of course, he chose the active verb on the analogy of Rhetoric 1358b6, and citations from Isocrates Panegyricus.⁷⁴ Kraus bolstered his interpretation with numerous citations from the Rhetoric, as well as quotations from various other authors.⁷⁵

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 36-40, 53-87.

⁷²Ibid., p. 36, Citing Rhetoric, 1367b27, Kraus states, "Von dieser hier ausdrücklich mit ἐπιδεικνύναι bezeichneten Aufgabe des Redners hat das γένος ἐπιδεικτικόν seinen namen; das Lob weist auf die Handlungen als tugendhafte, der Tadel als lasterhafte hin; und darum heisst die ganze Gattung die darlegende, hinweisende, darstellende; in diesem Sinne, wenn man so will, 'schaustellerische'."

⁷³The contested reading occurs at 1391b25 in Ars Rhetorica, ed. by Ross, p. 108. Ross retained the reading of Bekker, probably on the critical rule that the more difficult reading is to be preferred, since the manuscript evidence is divided.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 56, citing Panegyricus, 4, Helen, 15, Busiris, 9. See Chapter II on Isocrates' use of epideictic.

⁷⁵Ibid., citing Rhetoric, 1356b29, 1356a35, 1356b15 and Plato, Euthydemus, 274A, 274D. Kraus also developed a history of the word epideictic, pp. 58-87.

Schwaab⁷⁶ confirmed and expanded Kraus' thesis in 1923, accepting his work on the active ἐπιδεκνύναι, but doubting some of his assertions about the concept of δύναμις.⁷⁷ Schwaab seemed more cognizant of the levels of composition within the Rhetoric, so he distinguished Aristotle's discussion of epideictic in the third Book and linked it to Isocrates' works.⁷⁸

Hinks took the middle course in regard to Kraus' interpretations. He first credited Kraus for stressing and maintaining the serious purpose of epideictic speaking, but he heartily disagreed with the thought that the θεωρός was in a real sense a judge, since, he said, that rendition obliterated the distinction Aristotle was actually making.⁷⁹ Contrary to Kraus, Hinks thought the θεωρός-κρείτης distinction expressed the "peculiar character" of epideictic, "the absence of any δῶν".⁸⁰ Hinks preferred instead to retain

⁷⁶Franz Joseph Schwaab, "Über die Bedeutung des γένος ἐπιδεκτικόν in der aristotelischen Rhetorik" (dissertation, Würzburg, 1923), 46 S. Available here only through E. Drerup's review in Philologische Wochenschrift, 32 (1923), 746-748.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 747.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 748.

⁷⁹D. A. G. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum, "Classical Quarterly, 30 (1936), 276.

⁸⁰Ibid., 275.

the anomolous division of two genres for the κρείς and one for the θειός, and let it be a "grand descent" and an "adventitious corruption" of Aristotle's philosophical perspective into a recitation of the current rhetoric of the day.⁸¹

When Buchheit addressed the issue he also confirmed the thrust of Kraus' thesis after first stating that Kraus did not have sufficient philological means to do the job, and therefore issued a lop-sided report.⁸² Buchheit agreed, however, that Kraus and Schwaab had seen that Aristotle had secured the material for his third genre from Isocrates' practices so that "Praxeis und Epideixis stehen einander gegenüber."⁸³ Buchheit bound the understanding of epideictic to Aristotle's Ethics, and stressed that ignorance of Aristotle's ethical-political system caused the distortion of his meaning after his death.⁸⁴ Buchheit emphatically rejected the view that Aristotle and Anaximenes were on the same theoretical plane in regard to epideictic.⁸⁵

⁸¹Ibid., 274, 275.

⁸²Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 120.

⁸³Ibid., p. 121.

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 127f, 147, 158, passim.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 125.

Buchheit agreed with Kraus that the *Θεωρός* was a critic in the wide sense but he allowed that Aristotle did not say in the section just what the *Θεωρός* actually reviewed, which was unfortunate, since he did tell the reader what the two *κρῖται* judged.⁸⁶ Because of this Buchheit stressed that both the reviewing of the skill of the speaker and the reviewing of the content of his speech (virtue and vice, A, 9) must be allowed to stand in an ambiguous fashion.⁸⁷

In considering *δύναμις*, Buchheit first discounted the common notion that Aristotle's position could be understood by a dichotomy between *ἐκτέλεσις* and *ἄγων*.⁸⁸ Buchheit confirmed that Aristotle was aware of that kind of distinction,⁸⁹ but that it did not govern what he considered the essence of the *δύναμις* to be displayed. With astuteness Buchheit established that the contrast is more correctly between *ὑψηλότης* and *ἄγων*, on the basis of the following quotes:

(1) Γ17, 1417b31ff: In epideictic speeches, amplification is employed, as a rule, to prove that things are honorable or useful;

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸This was the distinction of Anaximenes. See Ad Alexandrum, 1440b13, 14, and the discussion in Chapter III above.

⁸⁹Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 126.

for the facts must be taken on trust...⁹⁰

(2) A9, 1368a27: ...amplification is most suitable for epideictic speakers, for we take the deeds as facts so that we must invest these with greatness and beauty.⁹¹

(3) B18, 1392a4-7: Now of the common-places amplification is most appropriate to epideictic rhetoric, as has been stated; the past to forensic, since things past are subject to judgment; and the possible and future to deliberative.⁹²

(4) A9, 1367b27-28: Since praise is founded on actions, and acting according to moral purpose is characteristic of the worthy man, we must endeavor to show (δεικνύειν) that a man is acting in that manner.⁹³

So the epideictic orator did not prove his point in a contest situation (ἀγών) by means of propositions (προτάσεις), but he proved his point by amplification (αὔξησις) of the good or bad (καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα) with his δύναμις.⁹⁴

In this light, almost echoing Kraus' sixty year old contention, Buchheit defined the concept of ἐπίδειξις by binding it to the showing forth of praise, the proof of the καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα that the speaker produced by his δύναμις.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 125, The translation here is from Freese, p. 453.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 126 (Translation is mine).

⁹²Ibid., The translation is from Freese, p. 265.

⁹³Ibid., The translation is from Freese, p. 101.

⁹⁴Ibid.

This section reviewed the systematic approach which Aristotle brought to his presentation of rhetoric and found that while there were several indications that the epideictic genre should be viewed and defined from the perspective of the rest of the work (e.g., Aristotle's concentration on the proofs, and his dislike for the sophistic approach to rhetoric) there were three terms which could allow an anomalous description of epideictic. The terms were the word epideictic itself, the description of the hearer of an epideictic speech as a *θεωρός*, and the expression of the genre in the sense of power or ability.

A sample of translators and commentators showed a predominant preference to define those terms in the sophistic sense, but a series of studies were also produced to show with some force that such translations were inaccurate. On the basis of this review this paper assumes the position of Kraus and Buchheit, and makes the following assertions.

(1) The term *θεωρός* should be translated in its sense as 'reviewer' or 'critic'. Aristotle used the term in the sense of 'contemplation'. While the distinction which Aristotle made between *θεωρός* and *κρίτης* should stand, it is a mistranslation to make the *θεωρός* a mere spectator, who listens to the speech for amusement. Such thinking is alien to Aristotle. (2) The term *δύναμις* must remain interpreted

in an ambiguous fashion, allowing for both the faculty of the persuasive orator to demonstrate his point, and for the faculty of the subject of the speech itself. Again, to restrict δύναμις to the skill of the orator finds no support from Aristotle.⁹⁵ Instead, to tie δύναμις to the orator is to tie it to his moral character, ἡθός. (3) The term ἐπίδειξις needs to be translated in the active sense, as demonstration oratory, where the orator proves the value of the present situation. The idea that epideictic oratory is mere display is contrary to Aristotle's explication, and probably even the sophists of the period would not own such a definition, even though they practiced it in fact.⁹⁶

Therefore the translation of the passage under question should be translated as follows:

Now the hearer must be a critic or a judge, and a judge either of things past or things to come; for instance a member of the assembly is a judge of things to come; the juror of things past; the critic of the power or quality

⁹⁵See *Rhetoric*, 1404a1-14, Freese, pp. 347, 349, where Aristotle speaks of the mere display of the speaker's performance with contempt. He called it φαντασία, "mere outward show for the pleasing the hearer."

⁹⁶See the section on ἐπίδειξις in Anaximenes, Chapter III, above, and see Isocrates' use of the word in Chapter II above. The sophists who specialized in display oratory for the amusement of the crowds probably began their speeches with a disclaimer, stating the salience of their topic, and denying that they were speaking for the praise of the crowd alone.

(of the present). Therefore there are necessarily three kinds of rhetorical speeches, symboleutic, dicastic, and epideictic.⁹⁷

This reading of the text gives several felicitous results. It fits the context of Aristotle's discussion of rhetoric. It solves the dilemma of having to suppose either that Aristotle's understanding of epideictic was indistinguishable from the sophistic practice, or that Aristotle developed his three genres without reference to practice, or that this system was basically empirically elaborated, and therefore unsystematic. And it fits with Aristotle's practice of defining things according to the end in view (τέλος), instead of thinking that he was defining this one genre by occasion alone.

So then the necessary items for the foundation of properly understanding Aristotle's presentation of the rhetoric of ψόγιος include the following: (1) to keep in view that the text of the Rhetoric is composed of lecture

⁹⁷Ars Rhetorica, 1358b2-8, Ross, p. 13 (Translation is mine). Unfortunately the term 'demonstrative' has been used in the past in the sense of display of skill, so the choice of 'demonstration oratory' for epideictic could cause confusion. To term it 'proof' oratory would be even worse. Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (New York: MacMillan, 1924), p. 15, expressed the inability to translate the term into English properly, and so he chose the term panegyric, which he defined as commemorating the significance of a present occasion, p. 8. It seems that the wisest approach is just to transliterate the term into English, and let its meaning be determined by the context.

notes, which in various ways are abbreviated and sometimes inconsistent, and which show some levels of development, (2) to see that the structure of the three genera system stands within a philosophical-rhetorical process of proofs, (3) to know that rhetoric by Aristotle's definition showed inexactness of science, which worked out in the production of the Rhetoric in an ambivalence between the philosophical and the practical, and (4) to realize that $\psi\acute{o}\varsigma$ oratory was a highly practiced art in Aristotle's day, as chapter II above brought out. With these foundations in hand, the paper now proceeds to an explication of blame oratory.

Explication of Blame Oratory

Because Aristotle focused on the functions of oratory he presented the sections on blame in intimate connection with praise oratory,⁹⁸ although in practice and theory the two could be separated, as Anaximenes had done. Therefore portions of the presentation here are the polar functions of the oratory of praise. Consequently, according to Aristotle's definition of epideictic, blame oratory would have for its own aim the showing forth of the magnitude of

⁹⁸It does not follow, as Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 127, thought, that there is no need to discuss blame oratory. Aristotle gives blame oratory much more attention than it might appear on the surface, as this unit shows.

vice (κακία) and disgrace (αἰσχύρῳ).⁹⁹ Further, the rhetoric of blame would deal primarily with the present, "for it is the existing conditions of things that all those who praise or blame have in view."¹⁰⁰ The goal (τέλος) of this sub-division of epideictic therefore, was the establishment of the disgraceful.¹⁰¹

The orator can find the materials for blaming, said Aristotle, by looking at the contraries of the virtues, his main topic of discussion.¹⁰² A vice (κακία) was an action which was voluntarily done which was worthy of blame (ψόγος).¹⁰³ The vices, in Book I, 9. were: (1) injustice (ἀδικία), (2) cowardice (δολία), (3) profligacy (ἀκολασία), (4) avarice (ἀνελευθερία), (5) smallness of spirit (μικροψυχία), and (6) meanness (μικροπρεσία).¹⁰⁴ Aristotle had listed eight virtues, but presented no contraries to the intellectual two, prudence and wisdom.¹⁰⁵ Of the six listed

⁹⁹Cf. Ars Rhetorica, 1367b28, Ross, p. 41.

¹⁰⁰Rhetoric, 1358b17ff, Freese, p. 35.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 1358b27f, Freese, p. 35.

¹⁰²Ibid., 1368a37, Ross, p. 43.

¹⁰³Cf. Ibid., 1366a35, 36, Freese, p. 91.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵He did not speak of contraries of the intellectual virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics either.

one can assume that injustice and cowardice were considered the most disgraceful, because they were particularly injurious to others in peace or in war.¹⁰⁶

Aristotle expanded the list of vices in his discussion of the disgraceful things which bring about shame (αἰσχος) and presented them in a somewhat different order. His list was presented as all those "misdeeds (κακῶν) as seem to be disgraceful (αἰσχροί), either for ourselves or for those we care for".¹⁰⁷ They were all due to vice (κακία)¹⁰⁸ and were listed and exemplified in the following fashion:¹⁰⁹

1. Δειλία - cowardice, exemplified by throwing away one's shield or taking flight.
2. Ἀδικία - injustice, exemplified by withholding a deposit.
3. Ἀκολασία - profligacy, exemplified by illicit relations with any person at forbidden places or times.
4. Ἀνευθερία - avarice, making a profit out of the petty or disgraceful, or out of the weak.
5. Κολακεία - flattery, excessive and fained praise.

¹⁰⁶Cf. Rhetoric, 1366b7f, Freese, p. 91

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 13836b20, 21, Freese, p. 211.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹The list is derived from Rhetoric, 138b13-1384a20, Freese, pp. 211-215.

6. Μαλακία - softness, effeminacy, not submitting to work which others less fitted will do.
7. Μικροψυχία and ταπεινότης - smallness of spirit and vileness: to accept a favor and to turn and reproach the person.
8. Ἀλαζονεία - boastfulness, making all kinds of professions and taking credit for what others have done.

Aristotle concluded the list with the words, "and similarly also from all the others of these [vices] of bad characters (ἡθους κακῶν); the deeds (ἔργα) and the signs (σημεία) and the like (ὅμοια); for they are disgraceful (αἰσχρά) and shameful (αἰσχυντικά)." ¹¹⁰

The other disgraceful things mentioned in the chapter, which bring dishonor (ἀτιμία) and reproach (ὄνειδος) were the prostitution of one's person, performing disgraceful actions such as unnatural lust, and not sharing in the good and honorable things that one's peers and kinfolk do. ¹¹¹ Aristotle did not attempt to provide a complete list, analyzing vice too finely in the Rhetoric, since that would have been beyond the rhetorical sphere. ¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Ars Rhetorica, 1384a6-8, Ross, pp. 86, 87.

¹¹¹ Rhetoric, 1384a8-20, Freese, pp. 213, 215.

¹¹² Cf. Ibid., 1359b2-12, Freese, p. 41.

It is possible however, to turn to his Nicomachean Ethics for a fuller treatment of the vices. There he treated vice as an excess or deficiency of virtue, laying out the vices which were traditional in Greek society.¹¹³ Aristotle gave the definition of vice in the following quote:

Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean in relation to us ... and it is a mean state between two vices, one of excess (*υπερβολή*) and one of defect (*ελλειψις*).¹¹⁴

In terms of this division of vices then, the following items are of particular interest to the Rhetoric, since Aristotle assigned degrees of blameworthiness to some of the vices listed in the works.¹¹⁵ Vices which were not

¹¹³See Chapter II above.

¹¹⁴Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b36 - 1107a2, translated by Henry Rackham (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1975), p. 95 (Hereafter labeled Rackham). Aristotle stated that people tend to call the vices they were more inclined to do as contrary to the virtue, rather than a defect or excess of it. He stated for example that cowardice, a vice of deficiency, normally considered the contrary to courage; so too, profligacy, a vice of excess, thought of as the contrary to self-control (NE 1108a8-19).

¹¹⁵There is no attempt here to synthesize the two presentations. The concern is to achieve an understanding of the degrees of value placed upon the vices mentioned in the Rhetoric.

particularly blameworthy were: (1) Μικρόψυχος, small-souled. This vice, a defect of magnanimity, was concerned particularly with dishonor but was not especially evil (κάκος) since the agent did not harm as much as err.¹¹⁶

(2) Μικροπρέπεια, meanness. This defect of magnificence was similarly not a serious discredit (όνειδος) since the agent was not "injurious to others, nor ... excessively unseemly".¹¹⁷

(3) Ἀνελευθερία, avarice (or tightfistedness). This defect of liberality was considered much less an offense than profligacy, which appeared to be a combination of vices.¹¹⁸

(4) Ἀλαφονεία, boastfulness. This pretense to more merit than deserved was not considered a very blameworthy defect of character if the person boasted for no apparent ulterior motive.¹¹⁹ Again, if the person boasted to gain glory and honor, that was not especially blameworthy (οὐ λίαν ψεκτός). But if the person boasted to gain wealth, that was worse.¹²⁰

(5) Κολακεία, flattery. Aristotle stated that this excess

¹¹⁶Ethics, 1125a18, 19, Rackham, p. 225.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 1223a33, Rackham, p. 213.

¹¹⁸Ibid., 1119b33f, Rackham, p. 189.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 1127b12, Rackham, p. 243.

¹²⁰Ibid., 1127b13f, Rackham, p. 243.

of friendliness for one's own advantage was a reproach (ὄνειδος), but he did not go into more detail about its blameworthiness.¹²¹

The following vices, however, were more blamable than the five just mentioned. Aristotle stated that it was the common opinion that (1) μαλακία , effeminacy, was blameworthy and foul.¹²² He also stressed that (2) ἀκολασία , profligacy, the excess of self-control, was clearly blameworthy.¹²³ Further, profligacy was more reprehensible because it is voluntarily pursued.¹²⁴ (3) Δειλία , cowardice, which was the expression of excessive fear and lack of confidence,¹²⁵ was shown from the Rhetoric to be a particularly bad vice, for it was injurious to others in war.¹²⁶ (4) Ἀδικία , injustice, was considered in several senses in the Ethics; as legal injustice, general unrighteousness, inequity, and unfairness. When used in the universal sense, injustice included all the

¹²¹Ibid., 1173b36, Rackham, p. 589.

¹²²Ibid., 1145b10f, Rackham, p. 377.

¹²³Ibid., 1119b32f, Rackham, p. 189.

¹²⁴Ibid., 1119a25f, Rackham, p. 183.

¹²⁵Ibid., 1107b5f, 1109a3, 1115b34f, Rackham, pp. 99, 109, 161.

¹²⁶Rhetoric, 1366b7f, Freese, p. 91.

vices. Therefore injustice was the major term for blamable qualities in persons or actions. Aristotle stated that injustice could refer to the worst man, who practiced vice towards his friends as well as in regard to himself.¹²⁷

In the process of defining injustice Aristotle mentioned particular injustices which echoed the censurable vices in the tradition of Greek society.¹²⁸ Some were declared illegal, and some considered vicious. The citation reads:

When a man displays the other vices - for instance, throws away his shield, from Cowardice, or uses abusive language (κακηγορία), from Bad Temper, or refuses to assist a friend with money, from Meanness - though he acts unjustly, he is not taking more than his share of anything; whereas when a man takes more than his share, it is frequently not due to any of these vices ... yet nevertheless the action does display some vice, since we blame it (ψέγομεν αὐτό); in fact it displays the vice of Injustice.¹²⁹

In the Rhetoric Aristotle gave the orator the means to find the materials for the vices to be blamed by directing

¹²⁷Ethics, 1130a6ff, Rackham, p. 261. See the discussion of injustice in Ethics, V., Rackham, pp. 253-323..

¹²⁸See Chapter II above.

¹²⁹Ethics, 1130a17-23, Rackham, pp. 261, 263 (Underlining mine).

him to their (1) works (ἔργα), their (2) signs (σημεῖα), and their (3) similarities (ὁμοιότητες). The works were the actions which follow from vice, which the orator could use to show vice.¹³⁰ The signs were the necessary indicators which produced vice and the orator could claim that they showed vice.¹³¹ The similarities were the "qualities which closely resemble the real qualities", and the orator would treat them as if they were the qualities themselves.¹³² Aristotle exemplified how the orator did this when he said that the orator should describe a cautious man as cold and designing.¹³³

Aristotle also directed the orator to treat the actions of the person as if they were purposed by him, even if they were really only accidental or strokes of bad luck.¹³⁴ He stated that all the vices appeared even more disgraceful if the fault laid with the person engaging in them.¹³⁵ In the same section Aristotle pointed out that by changing the phrasing the orator could turn his speech of censure into a

¹³⁰Rhetoric, 1366b33, 34, Freese, p. 93.

¹³¹Ibid.

¹³²Ibid., 1367a33ff, Rackham, p. 97.

¹³³Ibid.

¹³⁴Ibid., 1367b22-27, Rackham, p. 101.

¹³⁵Ibid., 1384a13, Rackham, p. 213.

dissuasive speech on how not to act.¹³⁶

This section, then, showed that blame oratory dealt with the showing forth (ἐνδείκνυσθαι) of the magnitude of vice and disgrace. The materials of blame were the universally or commonly held opinions of what constituted moral badness of character. Aristotle listed six general vices in Book I, 3 and then presented another list of eight vices in Book II, 6 as he discussed the kinds of actions which arouse shame and bring about disgrace. The lists included injustice, cowardice, avarice, profligacy, smallness of spirit, meanness, flattery, effeminacy, vileness, and boastfulness. In a separate section Aristotle also included prostitution of one's body and unnatural lust. A review of the Nicomachean Ethics showed that Aristotle allowed a hierarchy of vice, ranking smallness of spirit, meanness, avarice, boastfulness and flattery as lesser evils than effeminacy, cowardice and injustice.

Aristotle encouraged the orator to look for the materials of his speech among the vices, but also to include with the works of vice, the signs and the likenesses of vice. Whatever was similar to vice was to be expounded as if it were the vice itself. Aristotle stressed that the orator

¹³⁶Ibid., 1367b37-13684, Rackham, p. 101.

should show that the works and signs all came from moral purpose from a responsible agent, even if they were really accidental or just unfortunate circumstance. Finally, Aristotle noted that by changing the phrasing of the speech of blame, one would be presenting a symboleutic speech.

Methods of Blame Oratory

As stated earlier, Aristotle developed the rhetorical process of persuasion to occur through inartistic and artistic proofs, which were applicable in all three genres of rhetoric. As was also stated, the artistic proofs were the appeals for conviction through the reasoning of the speech itself, through the perceived moral character of the speaker, and through the arousal of the appropriate emotions in the hearer. The methods of applying the artistic proofs, example and enthymeme, were also universal to all three kinds of rhetoric.¹³⁷ However, just as the ethical proofs were more closely connected to epideictic oratory, as was shown, so also certain topics of enthymemes were most appropriate

¹³⁷Cf. Rhetoric, 1356b7-10, Freese, p. 19, "Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes and nothing else." See also, McBurney, "Place of the Enthymeme," 52 (reprinted in Erickson, The Classical Heritage, pp. 117-140.)

to epideictic oratory, and its sub-species, blame. For Aristotle, amplification¹³⁸ was most suitable for praise and blame oratory, although not restricted to it, nor its only topic. He stated: "Generally speaking, of the topics common to all rhetorical arguments, amplification (ἀνέκδοσις) is most suitable for epideictic speakers."¹³⁹

Aristotle seemed to present amplification both as a topic of an enthymeme, and as an enthymeme, so it is necessary to make his meaning clear. The basic statements are listed as follows:

(1) Generally speaking of the topics common (κοινὰ ἐν ᾗ) to all rhetorical arguments, amplification is most suitable for epideictic speakers.¹⁴⁰

(2) Further, the topic of magnitude (μέγεθος) is common to all kinds of rhetoric, for all men employ extenuation or amplification (μεῖωσις καὶ ἀνέκδοσις) whether ... praising or blaming ...¹⁴¹

¹³⁸For a general overview of ancient amplification see: Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, pp. 20-26. S. Deligiorgis, "The Auxetic Mode in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice," Platon, 23 (1971), 311-318. Verne R. Kennedy, "Auxesis: A Concept of Rhetorical Amplification," Southern Speech Communication Journal 38 (1971), pp. 60-72. See also the section on methods of blame in Chapter III above.

¹³⁹Rhetoric, 1368a30ff, Freese, p. 105.

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Ibid., 1391b39, 40, Freese, p. 265.

(3) Now of the commonplaces (κοινῶν) amplification is most appropriate to epideictic rhetoric, as has been stated.¹⁴²

(4) Amplification and depreciation (αὐξεῖν καὶ μεινοῦν) are not elements (στοιχεῖον) of enthymeme, for I regard element or topic (τόπον) as identical, since element or topic (στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπος) is a head under which several enthymemes are included, but they are enthymemes which serve to show that a thing is great or small, just as others serve to show that it is good or bad, ... or anything else. All these are the materials of syllogisms and enthymemes; so that if none of these is a topic of enthymeme, neither is amplification or depreciation.¹⁴³

The terms to be sorted out here are topics (τόποι), commonplaces (κοινὰ εἰδῶς), and enthymemes (ἐνθυμημαίους).

Two scholars in particular have researched the meanings of these Aristotelian terms, and their works gave the accurate meanings. The first, McBurney, demonstrated the relationship between the topics and enthymemes.¹⁴⁴ According

¹⁴²Ibid., 1392a4f, Freese, p. 265.

¹⁴³Ibid., 1403a18-25, Freese, pp. 341, 343.

¹⁴⁴McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme," 59-62.

to McBurney, Aristotle distinguished between three kinds of topics: (1) the εἶδη, which provide the premises for enthymemes in rhetoric, (2) the κοινὰ τόποι, which are general principles of propositional probability, applicable to all fields of knowledge, and (3) the τόποι ἐνθυμημάτων, which are the formal methods of reasoning for enthymemes.¹⁴⁵ The topics, then, do duty according to terminology or context, both as material or source for the mode of reasoning, and as the formal structure of the mode of reasoning, the enthymeme. McBurney summarized his study thus:

...we may say that whereas the speaker goes to the special or general topics for his premises, he may call upon these "lines of argument" for his mode of reasoning. The premises and the line of argument selected will together constitute an enthymeme.¹⁴⁶

The other scholar, Grimaldi, said essentially the same thing¹⁴⁷ when he stated, "The κοινὰ τόποι are logical modes of

¹⁴⁵Ibid., 60.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., 62.

¹⁴⁷William M. A. Grimaldi, "The Aristotelian Topics," in Erickson, Classical Heritage, pp. 176-193 (Reprinted from Traditio, 14 (1958), 1-16).

inference which generally obtain the matter for their inference from the ἐξῆς ."¹⁴⁸ Grimaldi showed special interest in Aristotle's identification of element (στοιχεῖα) and topic (τόπος) and showed that he was referring to the common topics as the larger category which contains many enthymemes.¹⁴⁹

On the basis of these renderings, then, none of the four passages cited above actually conflict. Amplification was a form of rhetorical syllogism, an enthymeme. As a source of reasoning it was one of the ἐξῆς common to all rhetorical arguments and therefore one may go to it to find the material for reasoning. As a τόπος it was a mode of inference and as an enthymeme it was the form of inference. The enthymeme, amplification, then, dealt with "greatness and smallness (μέγεθος καὶ μικρότης), the greater and the less, and of things great and small generally."¹⁵⁰

Aristotle pointed out that amplification was proper reasoning only when the facts were already established or taken for granted.¹⁵¹ The enthymeme of amplification was a

¹⁴⁸Ibid., 184.

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

¹⁵⁰Rhetoric, 139a9f, Freese, p. 273.

¹⁵¹Ibid., 1368a32f, 1396a, Freese, pp. 105, 291-293.

false mode of reasoning when the fact is not established.¹⁵² When this occurred the mode of reasoning was only an apparent enthymeme. This was why Aristotle stated that amplification was most appropriate for blame oratory (and epideictic speeches), since the actions spoken about were not normally in dispute.¹⁵³

Amplification of course, was not the only mode of developing a speech of blame. In presenting the topics Aristotle included examples of blame oratory and these are noted here. In the process of presentation the various examples will show the vitality of blame oratory in Athenian public speech. When Aristotle stated that the premise of an enthymeme must be established or generally accepted he cited an example of blame:

Similarly, they base their censure (ψέγουσιν) upon actions ..., examining whether those censured have really, or seem to have committed them; for example, that the Athenians subjugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the Aeginetans and Potidaeans who had fought with distinction on their side against the barbarians, and all such acts, and whatever other similar offences

¹⁵²Ibid., 1401b4f, Freese, p. 328.

¹⁵³Ibid., 1368a32f, Freese, p. 105.

(ἀμείρημα) may have been committed
by them.¹⁵⁴

Again in the same section Aristotle cited a speech of blame
of an ancient hero:

...for when advising Achilles,
praising or censuring (ψέγοντα)
...we must grasp all that really
belongs, or appears to belong to
him, in order that we may praise
or censure in accordance with this,
if there is anything noble or dis-
graceful (ἀσχηρόν).¹⁵⁵

Aristotle presented an example of the use of disgrace from
the topic of relative terms (πρὸς ἄλληλα):

...Diomedon the tax gatherer said
about the taxes "If selling is not
disgraceful for you, neither is
buying disgraceful for us."¹⁵⁶

Aristotle also enjoined the orator to use the topic of con-
sequence in praising and blaming,¹⁵⁷ and he cited several
examples of praise oratory among the topics, which would, of

¹⁵⁴Ibid., 1396a19-26, Freese, p. 291.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., 1396a30-35, Freese, p. 293.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., 1397a25-27, Freese, p. 299.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., 1399a14f, Freese, p. 311.

course, fit equally well for blame.¹⁵⁸

So then it is plain that Aristotle wished for the blame orator to use examples and enthymemes as the method of developing his speech. The most suitable enthymeme was amplification, but the orator would want to develop his arguments from the other topics as well.

Style and Arrangement of Blame

In Book III, which dealt with the proofs appropriate for style and arrangement, Aristotle gave no distinctive treatment of blame oratory. All the sections dealt with general principles applicable to all of rhetoric, or they were divided down only to the generic level of epideictic, symboleutic, or forensic oratory. Only one section specifically treated defense oratory and that section is discussed below in the section on *δυσκολία*. Therefore the specific injunctions for blame oratory are all drawn from the treatment of the epideictic genre.

After handling the virtues of style; purity, clarity, appropriateness, and dignity, Aristotle isolated three levels of polish for the three kinds of rhetoric. In these levels of refinement, the symboleutic genre was the least, appearing

¹⁵⁸Ibid., 1399a30ff, 1401a15ff, Freese, pp. 313, 325.

like a rough sketch (σκαρφαλόα).¹⁵⁹ The forensic genre attained the next level of refinement,¹⁶⁰ especially when the speech was presented before a single judge.¹⁶¹ The most refined style occurred in epideictic oratory, "for its function is reading".¹⁶²

The presence of the reading function of epideictic naturally raised the question, as Buchheit put it, "Wie kommt er aber im dritten Buch zur nachdrücklichen Betonung der schriftlichen Form?"¹⁶³ The issue of the reading function was expressed by Freese in a footnote, "This does not seem to agree with the general view. Funeral orations of the nature of panegyrics, for instance, were certainly meant to be spoken."¹⁶⁴ Since the reading function did not appear in

¹⁵⁹Ibid., 1414a8ff, Freese, p. 423. The orator needed a loud voice and dramatic body action to carry his point to a large crowd.

¹⁶⁰Ibid. The root word ἀκριβής meant "exact, precise, done to a nicety". Cf. Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 8th ed. (1958).

¹⁶¹Ibid., 1414a10ff, Freese, p. 423.

¹⁶²Ibid.

¹⁶³Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 173. "How did Aristotle come to stress the emphasis of the written form in the third book?"

¹⁶⁴Rhetoric, Freese, p. 423.

the first two books of the Rhetoric an explanation needs to be given.¹⁶⁵

Buchheit explained the presence of the reading function by saying that Aristotle was attempting to tie the two styles of written and spoken oratory into his three genera system.¹⁶⁶ In other words, Aristotle did not have a natural place for the spoken and written style within his system so he 'forced' the practical occurrence in at this point.¹⁶⁷

Buchheit's suggestion stands as a possible option, but another explanation seems better because it can be formed

¹⁶⁵Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 113n, said flatly, "Aristotle is not interested here in the old dispute over the written and unwritten word nor in the technique of extempore speech," Chase, "Conception of Epideictic," does not consider the question. Instead he uses the reading function as one of two pillars to uphold his view that epideictic meant a display of skill (pp. 70-72). The other pillar was applying the term for ornamentation to Aristotle's discussion of the virtues of style and assuming that Aristotle, though he made no reference to epideictic in that section, "must have been thinking of those elements of ostentation that were frequently employed in Athens" (p. 72).

¹⁶⁶Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 174.

¹⁶⁷Ibid.

from the context of Book III itself.¹⁶⁸ When Aristotle discussed the prooemium of the epideictic speech he directed the orator to write it in the same manner as a prologue in poetry.¹⁶⁹ He then cited two examples from Isocrates and one from Gorgias¹⁷⁰ which, in all probability, he had in written form for reference. In other words, Aristotle, concentrating on the virtues of style, noticed the polished nature of epideictic speeches (citing censures, by the way, as will be seen below) which were not produced under the pressure of a contested issue and therefore could attain the purest style. Freese alluded to this in his footnote on the issue, for he felt that the emphasis of the sentence about epideictic's readability rested on the word function (ἔργον). The function of the epideictic speech consists "in its being agreeable to read."¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 173 dismisses the idea that Aristotle was focusing on the thought that it was the nature of epideictic speeches to be written, because so many were produced and remembered orally, but he does not suggest the proposal of the paragraph above.

¹⁶⁹Rhetoric, 1414b24-25, Freese, p. 427.

¹⁷⁰Ibid., 1414b27-35, Freese, pp. 427-429.

¹⁷¹Ibid., Freese, p. 423n.

When Aristotle turned to the arrangement of speeches he devoted some attention to the prooemium of an epideictic speech and incidentally gave information on the types of speeches he classed as epideictic. In summary fashion, then, Aristotle stated the following about the prooemium: (1) The speaker should at once speak upon whatever he wished; give the keynote, and then attach the main subject.¹⁷² Wandering from the main point in the prooemium, however, was not too bad, since it was better than being monotonous.¹⁷³ (2) The prooemium, of course, presented praise or blame, but the speaker might also frame the address in the form of symboleutic advice or forensic appeal if the subject was paradoxical, difficult, or commonly known.¹⁷⁴ (3) The hearer should be made to believe that he shared in the praise in some way (or did not share in the blame).¹⁷⁵

The examples Aristotle cited show that he obviously classed speeches by their function and not by their occasion.

¹⁷²Ibid., 1414b24-26, Freese, p. 427.

¹⁷³Ibid., 1414b28-30, Freese, p. 429.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., 1414b35-1415a3, Freese, p. 429.

¹⁷⁵Ibid., 1415b28ff, Freese, p. 437.

Isocrates' Helen, Gorgias' Olympiacus, Isocrates' Panegyricus,¹⁷⁶ Socrates' Funeral Oration, and Gorgias' Eleans all appeared as examples of epideictic prooemia.¹⁷⁷ Of these, furthermore, Isocrates' Panegyricus was used as an example of ψόγος in the prooemium, and his ψόγος of eristics was alluded to in Helen.¹⁷⁸ But in another place Aristotle uses Isocrates' Panegyricus to illustrate symboleutic oratory.¹⁷⁹ So it is clear that Aristotle classed the speeches by what the speaker was doing, be it praising or blaming, advising or dissuading.¹⁸⁰ Aristotle also showed by precept and example that he conceived of the functions of praise and blame in the present to be close to advice for the

¹⁷⁶Cf. Rhetoric, Rhys Roberts, p. 201n.

¹⁷⁷Rhetoric, 1414b27-35, 1415b31, 1416a1-3, Freese, pp. 427, 429, 437.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., 1414b27, 33, Freese, pp. 427, 429.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., 1418a31f, Freese, p. 457. Furthermore, Aristotle is stressing in the citation that even in the symboleutic function Isocrates makes courtroom type accusations.

¹⁸⁰Let it be noted that there were no tight classifications of speech, so Aristotle was placing them into his categories (especially the new epideictic category) according to his own system.

future.¹⁸¹ This fact alone stands as another indictment against an interpretation of epideictic rhetoric as mere display of the virtuosity of the speaker.

After the section on prooemia, Aristotle next considered the narrative of an epideictic speech. Moderns do not know everything Aristotle wrote, however, since there is an obvious lacuna after Rhetoric, 1416b29.¹⁸² The following summation of the narration, then, comes from the deficient extant paragraphs:¹⁸³ (1) The narrative should not be

¹⁸¹Ibid., 1367b37-1368a10, Freese, pp. 101, 103. When one says that Aristotle placed epideictic close to symboleutic it does not mean he joined the two. He kept his categories conceptually clean, as the following citation shows: "In political oratory there is very little opening for narration; nobody can 'narrate' what has not yet happened. If there is narration at all, it will be of past events, the recollection of which is to help the hearers to make better plans for the future. Or it may be employed to attack some one's character [διαβάλλοντες - forensic function] or eulogize him [ἐπαινοῦντας - epideictic function] - only then you will not be doing what the political speaker, as such, has to do," Rhetoric, 1417b12-16, Rhys Roberts, p. 210 (Underlining mine). Translators have missed the point that διαβολή refers to forensic oratory. Eg. Rhetoric, Freese, p. 451, where the word is translated simply as 'blame'.

¹⁸²Cf. Ars Rhetorica, 1416b29, Ross, p. 182, apparatus.

¹⁸³Rhetoric, 1416b16-29, 1417b31-34, 1418a33-1418b3, Freese, pp. 443, 445, 453, 457.

consecutive, but disjointed, since the orator needs to present inartistic proofs, the actions of the subject of the speech, and ascribe quality to them. Only the most famous (infamous) actions need to be recounted.¹⁸⁴ (2) The orator should vary the narration with episodes about others.¹⁸⁵ (3) Ethical proofs are more important in the narration than exactness of argument.¹⁸⁶ (4) The general rule is to use amplification in this section of the speech.¹⁸⁷

In regard to the epilogue, there was no distinctive advice for a speech of blame. Aristotle had said earlier that there were really only two parts to an address: stating the case, and proving it.¹⁸⁸ He did, however, present some

¹⁸⁴Ibid., 1416b16-29, Freese, pp. 443, 445.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., 1418a33-1418b3, Freese, p. 457.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., 1418b2, 3, Freese, p. 457.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., 1417b31-34, Freese, p. 453, 457. The discussion on the narration of a forensic speech contains a section on maintaining one's quality of $\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ in the contest situation of counter-arguments, accusations, and attacks. Aristotle enjoined the orator to put the charges in the words of someone else in the same manner as Archilochus did in his censures ($\psi\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\omicron$). This keeps the orator from being charged with abuse ($\lambda\omicron\upsilon\delta\omicron\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$) or rudeness ($\acute{\alpha}\gamma\rho\omicron\upsilon\kappa\acute{\iota}\alpha$).

¹⁸⁸Ibid., 1414a31, 32, Freese, p. 425.

general statements about epilogues, which were applicable to all kinds of rhetoric, although the dicta were actually framed for a forensic address. The four parts of the epilogue are: "(1) to dispose the hearer favourably towards oneself and unfavourably towards the adversary; (2) to amplify and depreciate; (3) to excite the emotions of the hearer; (4) to recapitulate."¹⁸⁹

In this section on style and arrangement of the speech of blame it was shown that Aristotle presented no distinctive stress on any peculiarities for $\phi\acute{o}\rho\omicron\varsigma$ oratory alone, but offered his advice on the subject in terms of the epideictic species. Of the style of the three genera, epideictic would show the most refinement, which meant that it would display the highest form of the virtues of style; clarity, dignity, appropriateness, and purity. Thus, its function of style consisted in its readability.

On the other hand, in terms of arrangement, epideictic speeches would have the freest latitude in relation to the other genres. The speaker might begin the speech with anything he wished, attach the keynote, and then go into the subject of the speech. The epideictic speaker should use variety in the prooemium, so he might frame it in the form of

¹⁸⁹Ibid., 1419b10-13, Freese, p. 467.

advice or accusation, even though its function was praise or blame. He should present a disjointed narrative and not dull the attention of the hearer with a long recitation of deeds already well known. Instead, he should select the most important and by means of amplification, elaborate them. Within this narration episodes about others should be included. The most important proof in the narration was the ethical appeal, and that should be concentrated on more than the logical proofs. The dicta for the epilogue applied in general to all species, and included actually a recapitulation of the three proofs: (1) to develop the hearer's confidence in the speaker, (2) to excite the hearer's emotions and (3) to recapitulate the arguments of the speech.

Other Pertinent Considerations

This section of the chapter considers the other statements Aristotle made about aspects of blame oratory and also considers aspects of the Rhetoric which may be thought to deal with blame oratory. There are three sub-sections: (1) injustice as blame and as accusation, (2) Aristotle's presentation of διαβολή and (3) the relation of blame to anger and indignation. The section concludes with a summary.

Injustice as Blame and as Accusation

Aristotle described injustice as one of the cardinal vices to be expounded upon in ψόγος oratory, but, of course

he also listed it as the main material for the accuser in forensic rhetoric. So it is necessary to know how Aristotle defined the term and what distinctions he made between its use in epideictic, and its use in forensic rhetoric. The various ways Aristotle used the term were alluded to above in the discussion of the vices from the perspective of Nicomachean Ethics, but it is not essential to refer back to the Ethics since Aristotle outlined the rhetorical distinctions in the Rhetoric. The citation reads:

We have said that there are two kinds of just and unjust actions, for some are written, but others are unwritten, and have spoken of those concerning which the laws are explicit; of those that are unwritten there are two kinds. One kind arises from an excess of virtue or vice, which is followed by praise or blame, honour or dishonour, and rewards; for instance, to be grateful to a benefactor, to render good for good, to help one's friends, and the like; the other kind contains what is omitted in the special written law.¹⁹⁰

On the basis of this citation then, Aristotle stated that the injustices with which the blame orator was concerned are those actions which no law has been written against, but which mankind in general considered to be blameworthy and dishonorable,

¹⁹⁰Ibid., 1374b18-26, Freese, p. 145 (Underlining mine).

such as being ungrateful to one's benefactors, rendering evil for good, and not helping one's friends.

In other sections of the Rhetoric Aristotle offered examples of censurable injustices which elucidate his meaning further. In the section on epideictic procemiums he stated, "Isocrates ... blames them because they rewarded bodily excellences, but instituted no prize for men of wisdom."¹⁹¹ When discussing enthymemes he wrote, "...the Athenians subjugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the Aeginetans and Potidaeans who had fought with distinction on their side against the barbarians..."¹⁹² There were no laws against either of the examples, but the actions, nevertheless, were considered unjust and blameworthy, and their recitation in words exposed the base and the shameful. As the proverb Aristotle cited states, "A country pays a heavy reckoning by being condemned (ψόγῳ) by the judgement of mankind."¹⁹³

Now while the injustices which were blamable but not illegal could be conceptually distinguished from those which were prosecutable by law, some of the blameworthy actions would eventually, or had already fallen under the realm of

¹⁹¹Ibid., 1414b33-35, Freese, p. 429.

¹⁹²Ibid., 1396a19-24, Freese, p. 291.

¹⁹³Ibid., 1411b19f, Rhys Roberts, p. 201.

written law, as was shown earlier in Chapter II.¹⁹⁴

Aristotle stated that some blamable actions were of such a nature that legislators would seek laws and penalties for them.¹⁹⁵ Therefore blamable actions and prosecutable actions held a slightly different meaning when considered from the perspective of forensic oratory. In that situation the illegal actions and accusations of illegal actions were the subjects of the dispute, while blamable actions were all the injustices which the opponent was also guilty of, but not being charged with, which would show him to be of base character.¹⁹⁶

Aristotle stated clearly that blame oratory had no proper place in accusation or defense.¹⁹⁷ The orator should only use the appropriate inartistic and artistic proofs to

¹⁹⁴For instance, disrespect of parents was not strictly punishable by law, but a man could be disenfranchized politically if convicted in a 'scrutiny' by the assembly.

¹⁹⁵Rhetoric, 1375a4f, Freese, p. 149.

¹⁹⁶Cf. Ibid., 1368b12-24, Freese, p. 107. Aristotle shows what the motives are which lead men to break the law, and they are the vices which he lists under epideictic as the material for blame, Book I, 9.

¹⁹⁷Ibid., 1415b7f, 1416b7, Freese, pp. 433, 443. Freese translated the second citation, "Such methods are most artful and unfair..."

accuse an opponent, or defend himself. To use blame in court was to use a fallacious argument, since whatever else the man had done or left undone was actually outside the issue.¹⁹⁸ But, having said that in a number of places in a number of ways, "owing to the corruption of the hearer",¹⁹⁹ Aristotle informed his students about effective ways to employ censure in forensic contests. From the perspective of the accuser, the following could be employed in the prooemium:

(1) Praise something trivial in the opponent at great length so as to condemn (ψέξαι) something important concisely.²⁰⁰

(2) Advance several praiseworthy things in the opponent, then censure (ψέξαι) the one thing that has an important bearing on the case.²⁰¹ For the epilogue, Aristotle gave the praising of oneself and the censuring of the opponent as a standard device.²⁰²

¹⁹⁸Ibid., 1404a6ff, Freese, p. 347. "For justice should consist in fighting the case with the facts alone, so that everything else that is beside demonstration is superfluous; nevertheless, as we have just said, it is of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer."

¹⁹⁹Ibid.

²⁰⁰Ibid., 1416b4f, Freese, p. 443.

²⁰¹Ibid., 1416f, Freese, p. 443.

²⁰²Ibid., 1419b15, Freese, p. 467.

Aristotle's Presentation of Διὰβολή'

Aristotle used the term διὰβολή' both in the sense of slanderous or factual hostile information, and in the sense of slanderous or factual hostile attitudes.²⁰³ He did not classify διὰβολή' as a function of blame but instead listed blame as one of the methods of διὰβολή'.²⁰⁴ He restricted the discussion of its employment to a portion of his treatment of the prooemium in forensic speeches.²⁰⁵ His presentation of the topic appeared quite traditional and sophistic. In fact, the only real distinction between his presentation and that of Anaximenes' in Chapter III, is that Aristotle disclaimed the fairness of διὰβολή' use.²⁰⁶

Aristotle listed eleven ways to employ or deal with them. They were:²⁰⁷

1. Make use of the arguments [of the case] to clear one's self.
2. Contest the disputed issue by denying the fact, or the fact's harmfulness, importance, or disgrace.

²⁰³Ibid., 1416a5f, Freese, p. 437.

²⁰⁴Ibid., 1416b4f, Freese, p. 443.

²⁰⁵Ibid., 1416a5f-1416b15, Freese, pp. 437-443.

²⁰⁶Ibid., 1416b7, Freese, p. 443.

²⁰⁷Ibid., 1416a5f-1416b15, Freese, pp. 437-443.

3. Admit the *δισβολή* but attribute it to error, misfortune, or necessity.
4. Show that the opponent uses this accusation often, on many people, some of whom have been acquitted.
5. Show that the opponent or others are involved in the same or similar charges.
6. Counter-attack the opponent.
7. Appeal to a verdict already given.
8. Accuse the act of *δισβολή* itself, because it alters judgment and does not rely on the facts of the case.
9. Use the topic of tokens (Identification by connection with something base).
10. Use praise and blame together to highlight blame.
11. Choose the worst motive for any action of the opponent, the best motive for any action of the self.

Earlier in the Rhetoric Aristotle had related that *δισβολή* was one of the causes of hatred.²⁰⁸ In another place he gave an example of *δισβολή* under the topic of explaining the reason for false opinion. He wrote, "For example, a woman embraced her son in a manner that suggested she had illicit relations with him, but when the reason was explained, the slander (*δισβολή*) was crushed."²⁰⁹ In none of the places where

²⁰⁸Ibid., 1382a2, Freese, p. 199.

²⁰⁹Ibid., 1400a3f, Freese, p. 319.

Aristotle discussed this device did he conceptually join it with, or even class it along side $\psi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$. Therefore it is abundantly evident that forensic invective bore no relation to the oratory of censure in the theoretic treatment of Aristotle.

The Relation of Blame and Anger

Aristotle discussed anger and indignation in the section of the Rhetoric devoted to ethical proofs.²¹⁰ Even though he made no direct connection between anger²¹¹ or indignation and the presentation of censure,²¹² the exposition

²¹⁰Ibid., 1378a30-1380a4, 1380b15-22, 138a1-19, 1386b8-1387b21, Freese, pp. 173-185, 191-193, 199-201, 231-239. But see, Friedrich Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings," Classical Philology, 33 (1938), 390-404. Solmsen stressed that Book II, 2-11 is concerned with $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$. Both $\eta\acute{o}\varsigma$ and $\pi\acute{\iota}\theta\eta$, of course, are being discussed. Certify, Rhetoric, 1377b24ff, Freese, p. 169.

²¹¹For an exegetical study of Aristotle's physiological definition of anger see, Robert Renehan, "Aristotle's Definition of Anger," Philologus, 107 (1963), pp. 61-74.

²¹²See Chapter II above in the section on iambic poets. For a discussion of the concept of righteous anger from the perspective of the Roman period see William S. Anderson, "Juvenal and Quintilian," Yale Classical Studies, 17 (1961), 1-93, esp. 30-34, and William S. Anderson, "Anger in Juvenal and Seneca," University of California Publications in Classical Philology, 19 (1964), 1-69.

of these emotions showed their relationship to censure oratory and clarified the distinction Aristotle made between censure ($\psi\acute{o}\delta\omicron\varsigma$) and insult ($\acute{\upsilon}\beta\rho\upsilon$).

Anger was presented under three topics: the nature of anger as an emotion, the objects of anger, and the occasions of anger.²¹³ The emotion itself was defined as, "a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight ($\acute{o}\lambda\iota\gamma\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$), affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such slight is undeserved."²¹⁴ Anger was directed against an individual, while hatred was directed against a class,²¹⁵ which means one would hate a thief and be angry at one who steals.

The objects of anger of interest for blame oratory were the slights of insult ($\acute{\upsilon}\beta\rho\upsilon$) as "causing injury or annoyance whereby the sufferer is disgraced ($\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\chi\upsilon\nu\eta$)."²¹⁶

²¹³Rhetoric, 1378a22f, Freese, p. 173. Aristotle defines anger more fully in Nicomachean Ethics, 1125b26-1126a10. Cf. the translation in Introduction to Aristotle, ed. by Richard McKeon (Modern Library; New York: Random House, 1947), pp. 389-391 (Hereafter labeled McKeon).

²¹⁴Ibid., 1378a30f, Freese, p. 173.

²¹⁵Ibid., 138a5f, Freese, p. 201

²¹⁶Ibid., 1378b23ff, Freese, pp. 175, 177.

In fact, dishonor was the characteristic of insult.²¹⁷ The verbal aspects of insult were the ridiculing (καταγελῶσαι), mocking (χλευάζουσαι), scoffing (σκώπτουσαι), and evil speaking (κακῶς λέγουσαι) upon whatever the insulted person considered of great import.²¹⁸ The central thought was that these verbal activities were unjust criticism, causing unjust disgrace.

Among the list of the occasions of anger, the five classes of people before whom one was slighted seemed to fit the occasion of verbal insult. Aristotle stated that a person was more angry if he was insulted in the presence of (1) his rivals, (2) those he admired, (3) those he would like to have admire him, (4) those he respected, (5) and those who respected him.²¹⁹

Indignation (νεμεσῶν) was related to anger, but it was anger which was directed against the unjust in a more general sense,²²⁰ since its anger was directed at the unjust and undeserved benefits of others.²²¹ Indignation was the

²¹⁷Ibid., 1378b29, 30, Freese, p. 177.

²¹⁸Ibid., 1379a30ff, Freese, p. 181.

²¹⁹Ibid., 1379b23-26, Freese, p. 183.

²²⁰Ibid., 1386b20f, Freese, p. 231.

²²¹Ibid., 1386b26, Freese, p. 231.

hate of the unjust and therefore showed good character.²²² The term was presented straight forwardly as a virtue²²³ unlike anger, which could be a virtue or a vice, according to whether a person was angry for the right reason, against the right person, at the right time.²²⁴

Strangely, Aristotle did not connect either the expression of indignation in the speaker, or the arousal of indignation in the hearer to ψόγος oratory. Instead, the general presentation of this emotion was framed in the context of forensic rhetoric.²²⁵ Obviously the concepts of ridicule, mockery, evil speaking, and the like would not fall into Aristotle's ψόγος category because they were unjust criticisms.²²⁶ On the other hand, the expression of indignation showed high moral character, and it would most appropriately be used in ψόγος oratory. Possibly, at this stage,

²²²Ibid., 1386b24f, Freese, p. 231.

²²³Ibid., 1387b8, 9, Freese, p. 237, "Men are prone to indignation...if they happen to be virtuous and worthy, for they both judge correctly and hate what is unjust."

²²⁴See Nicomachean Ethics, 1125b32ff, McKeon, p. 389.

²²⁵See Rhetoric, 1387b18-21, Freese, p. 237.

²²⁶Ibid., 1380b17, Freese, p. 191, Aristotle stated that people remain mild if they think they are wrong and deserve what they suffer, "for anger is not aroused against what is just." Compare this with Anaximenes' presentation of κακολογία in Chapter III above.

Aristotle did not see the complete ramifications that his epideictic genre should appropriately include indignation as a characteristic of the censure orator. Possibly he had defined indignation too finely, reserving it for undeserved benefits, while applying pity for undeserved misfortunes.²²⁷

This section on the consideration of injustice, *δικαιοσύνη*, and indignation demonstrated from another angle the clearness with which Aristotle handled his rhetorical categories. In the first sub-section Aristotle distinguished forensic and epideictic injustice by dividing the vice into different senses. Forensic injustices were written or unwritten prosecutable offenses, while epideictic injustices were unwritten principles of moral and civic behavior, such as fairness, beneficence, dignity, and their opposites. Next, from the perspective of forensic oratory, the injustices brought out, which were outside the case at hand, were labeled *δικοβολή*. Aristotle used this term in the sense of either true or slanderous hostile information, verbalized or not, which would tend to devalue a person. Censure was one of eleven methods which the orator could employ in *δικοβολή*, and it was kept conceptually separate from that term. Aristotle also restricted verbal insult and its components, mockery, ridicule,

²²⁷Ibid., 1386b25f, Freese, p. 231.

evil speech, and scoffing, from the epideictic genre, because he considered them unjust. On the other hand, he did not connect indignation with censure oratory for some reason.

Conclusion

The chapter began by establishing that Aristotle framed his discussion of rhetoric and the rhetorical process within a system of rhetorical proofs which were labeled inartistic and artistic, with the artistic being divided into three kinds (ἐΐδη); ethical proofs, emotional proofs, and logical proofs. This division governed the lectures, so that the kinds of discourse; epideictic, symboleutic, and forensic, were developed in the context of that system. It was shown that epideictic discourse coincided closest to the ethical proofs and it was postulated that Aristotle had the kinds of proofs in mind when he spoke of the three kinds of hearers at Rhetoric I, 3.

Next, the traditional translations and interpretations of the meaning of ἐπίδειξις, θεωρός, and δύναμις were presented. It was shown that ἐπίδειξις was commonly translated 'display' oratory, that θεωρός was normally translated as 'mere spectator', and that δύναμις was usually thought of as 'ability of the speaker'. The studies of Kraus, Schwaab, Hinks, and Buchheit were then outlined to show how the common

translations were inadequate or unfair to Aristotle's meaning. The main issues advanced by those scholars were that (1) epideictic was used by Aristotle in an active, rather than a reflexive sense, (2) that Aristotle himself contextually defined *θεωρός* as a critic, or judge in the wide sense, and (3) that the *δύναμις* which the orator displayed was not essentially his own power of persuasion, but the faculty or magnitude of virtue or vice, honor or disgrace. The interpretations of these scholars were adopted by this essay because of the force of the evidence they presented, and for the additional reasons that their interpretations solved the apparent dilemma of having to suppose that Aristotle's understanding of epideictic was indistinguishable from sophistic practice, or that he developed his system in an anomalous fashion, or that he wrote as a creative philosopher without reference to the practices of his day.

In the next section blame oratory, which Aristotle always presented in conjunction with praise oratory, was defined as "the showing forth of the magnitude of vice and disgrace." Aristotle initially outlined the materials for the blame orator as (1) injustice, (2) cowardice, (3) profligacy, (4) avarice, (5) smallness of spirit, and (6) meanness. When Aristotle offered his understanding of the emotion of shame he added the vices of flattery, effeminacy,

vileness, and boastfulness. Furthermore, he mentioned prostitution of the self and unnatural lust. Aristotle did not attempt in any case to provide a complete or exact list of vices, since he considered that beyond the rhetorical scope. Therefore, further indications of a ranking of vices was presented from the Nicomachean Ethics. There it was seen that one type of boastfulness, effeminacy, cowardice, and injustice were the most blameworthy vices. Aristotle directed the orator to develop the materials of blame from their works, their signs, and their tokens.

The next section of the chapter developed Aristotle's method of employing the materials of censure oratory. Aristotle stated, "Speaking generally, of the topics common to all rhetorical arguments, amplification is most suitable for epideictic speakers."²²⁸ The section showed that Aristotle considered amplification to be a form of rhetorical syllogism. As a source of reasoning it was one of the ἐνδοξοι common to all rhetorical arguments, as a topic it was a mode of inference, and as an enthymeme it was the form of inference. Amplification dealt with greatness and smallness. The proper use of amplification depended upon the acceptance of the actions under consideration, which made it most appropriate for blame oratory, since the facts were not

²²⁸Ibid., 1368a30ff, Freese, p. 105.

normally in dispute. Aristotle also encouraged the orator to employ the other topics which were applicable to all genres of rhetoric. These included the possible and impossible, examples, and maxims, with specific examples of blame oratory under the topic of relative terms and consequence.

The section on style and arrangement of blame oratory noted that Aristotle did not specifically treat blame oratory as a separate unit. Instead he spoke in more general terms about the virtues of style appropriate for all rhetoric. When he discussed the arrangement of speeches, however, he did distinguish levels of refinement for all three genres. The epideictic genre showed the most refinement, as its function was reading. The apparent change of emphasis from speaking to reading was then considered and it was postulated that Aristotle was examining style with written speeches in his possession, and that in referring to them he was prompted to stress readability in style.

Aristotle presented three major thoughts on the prooemium of an epideictic speech. They were: (1) The speaker should speak about whatever he wishes, give the key-note, and then attach the main subject. Wandering from the subject is more permissible in epideictic than in the other genres. (2) The speaker may frame the prooemium in

the manner of any of the three kinds of rhetoric. (3) The hearer should be able to see from the prooemium that he does not share in the blame.

The examples Aristotle used to clarify his presentation also showed how he classed speeches within his system. They showed that the speeches were classed by function so that epideictic speeches could also be labeled symboleutic in part, or vice versa. It was also stressed, however, that Aristotle kept his conceptual forms pure.

A portion of Aristotle's presentation of the narration of an epideictic speech did not come down to moderns. The three points made in the extant section were:

- (1) The narration should be disjointed, not consecutive.
- (2) The narration should include variations where others are blamed.
- (3) The ethical proofs are more important in the narration than exactness of argument.

Aristotle gave no distinctive treatment to epideictic speeches in regard to the epilogue.

The next section of the chapter presented the other pertinent considerations of blame oratory. These were:

- (1) Aristotle's definition of injustice in forensic rhetoric, and injustice in epideictic rhetoric,
- (2) Aristotle's treatment of $\delta\iota\alpha\beta\omicron\lambda\eta'$ in forensic oratory, and how blame could be used in court, and
- (3) the relationship between anger and indignation, and censure.

The important points were the following. First it was shown that Aristotle considered epideictic injustice as a vice of unwritten principles of moral and civic righteousness; the opposite of fairness, beneficence, and dignity. Epideictic vice emphasized what was immoral more than what was illegal. Next the section presented that Aristotle forcefully stated that blame had no proper place in forensic oratory, yet he still discussed how blame could be used as one of eleven methods of διαβολή. Διαβολή itself was either true or slanderous hostile attitudes or attacks against the character of the opponent in the forensic genre. normally meant the bringing in of other prosecutable charges outside of the case at hand. This section also noted that Aristotle did not unite the emotion of indignation with censure, as later rhetors would do. Anger, too, was excluded from blame, by definition, since it was aroused by unjust actions. Aristotle included insult under the emotion of anger and thereby showed that he excluded from blame oratory such common practices as mockery, scoffing, ridicule, and evil speaking. The consideration displayed again that Aristotle conceived of blame oratory as a proper use of denigration.

In general terms then, this study of Aristotle's Rhetoric has shown that in spite of the prevalent practice

of invective in all forms of oratory in his day, Aristotle was guided to analyse and systematize it into a conceptual system based on rhetorical proofs. His system, however, did not keep him from showing how the various blaming activities functioned in the different genres. Aristotle conceptually separated censure, accusation, insult, hostile information, and the other terms in this constellation by way of the goal of the speech, the occasion of the speech, and the nature of the invective. He defined the terms in relation to his psychological and ethical philosophy.

This investigation also confirmed to a greater degree that Aristotle did not view his epideictic genre with the eyes of a practicing sophist. This study added four arguments to those brought forward by other scholars. They are: (1) Aristotle's linking of epideictic with the ἥθος proof is much more central to his system than his mention that epideictic rhetoric uses a refined, precise style. (2) The speeches of censure which Aristotle used for examples of various topics show practical goals. (3) Aristotle clearly defined the genres by their function and goal, not by their occasion. (4) The chapter as a unit brought out Aristotle's distinctions among the concepts of ψόγος, διαβολή, ὕβρις, λοιδορία and the like, which, in the past have been lumped together and generally ignored by those who thought that epideictic rhetoric had no practical value.

CHAPTER V

SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION

This study produced a history of the development of invective into the rhetorical theory in the 4th century B.C. The work showed that invective was a vital aspect of Greek public activity, rooted in their poetical, legal, and oratorical tradition. The study isolated the technical meanings of various terms for invective from the usage of the individual rhetors, as well as focusing on the sophists who stood out as teachers of the art. The study concentrated on explicating the art of censure in the Rhetoric to Alexander and Aristotle's Rhetoric.

The work showed that the abundant presence of terms of invective, abuse, and denigration had its counterpart in the development of an art of employing these terms in the service of persuasion. The study also showed that the terms of invective were differentiated by the rhetors by purpose and occasion. Finally, the study also clarified from the perspective of the art of censure, the Greek concept of epideictic rhetoric.

This chapter reviews the findings of the previous units and summarizes the most important aspects. The presentations of Anaximenes and Aristotle are compared to highlight the wide divergence of their presentations on the same subject. This chapter contrasts their treatment of epideictic and indicates ways epideictic rhetoric changed in meaning in the Roman period. Finally, the unit ends with a conclusion and suggestions for further study.

The Climate of Rhetorical Invective

Working by a review of the literature the first sub-unit of Chapter II demonstrated that the use of invective in Archaic Greek literature was fairly undifferentiated into types, but had its source in the ideal of immortality through the rehearsal of great deeds and speeches. The reversal of this, of course, was the heaping of abuse upon adversaries, rivals and inferiors in order to bring them into shame and dishonor. Indications of this use of invective were present in the homeric poems and in the poems of the iambic poets. It was also seen that because of the ideal of immortality the abuse of the dead was quite common.

Invective in the Old and Middle comedies, however, had a different source and served a somewhat different purpose. The invective in the Old Comedies seemed to come from the religious festivals of the period, where virilant

abuse was heaped upon others for the purpose of dispelling evil by words of vile abuse. This sense of ridicule seemed also to monitor the presence of the obscenities against living people in the comedies so that their employment did not raise the wrath of the people as much as it raised raucous laughter.

The presence of invective from both sources set the cultural stage for its employment in both senses by the orators of the emerging democracy.

In the process of reviewing the literature for this division of the study, the investigation uncovered the fact that Aristotle classed Archilochus and other iambic poets as representatives of early $\psi\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ rhetoric, not as forerunners of comedy, a modern misclassification commonly forced upon him.

The study of philosophy and law revealed the beginnings of the differentiation of invective into classes and types. Five of the Seven Sages uttered statements on invective and abuse which the Greeks preserved as important maxims. Thales' statement that one should not blame others for the same things one does become so proverbial that Aristotle alluded to it twice in the Rhetoric as a maxim which operated in the ethical proof.¹ Periander was supposed

¹Aristotle, "Art" of Rhetoric, 1384b3ff, 1384b3ff, trans. by John Henry Freese (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1975), pp. 217, 303.

to have cautioned people against speaking the 'unsayables' and that caution later became a law imposing a fine on those who charged others with such things as cowardice and patricide. Abusing the dead was also forbidden by several of the Sages, and Solon made it a law of the city-state. Of course, the several dicta about foul language displayed how common the practice was in the period. The sayings also revealed a growing sense of awareness of a 'proper' use of censure and evidenced that the Greeks were moving away from 'flyting' as a means of overcoming an opponent verbally, towards censure as social admonition. There was, however, no real evidence for any degree of rational typing of invective.

The emergence of the democracy made the abuse of others a political tool since the Greeks would not theoretically entrust decisions of the state to unworthy persons. Popular leaders such as Cleon found they could rouse the people through the use of verbal abuse. In the very same period the slander laws were expanded to protect reputations and also to safeguard the city-state against unworthies. The 'unsayables' were written down so that one would have recourse to law if he was branded as a coward, a murderer, or disrespectful of his parents, or even if he was accused of having worked in the market place. On the other side, the political process provided for a 'scrutiny' to prevent or

expel people from the assembly who had failed in their military obligations, wasted their personal resources, showed disrespect of their parents, or sold their bodies for gain. The laws restricted slanderous abuse (λοιδορία), but did not seemingly restrict censure (ψόγος).

The last part of the section on the philosophical and legal background of rhetorical invective examined Plato's philosophical reaction to practical and rhetorical invective and showed that he excluded all abusive language (κακηγορία) (as well as orators) from his Ideal state. The study found, however, that even Plato did allow some forms of censure and harmless jesting approved by the educators of the state.

The search for the rhetorical precursors of Anaximenes and Aristotle revealed that the evidence was somewhat thin, but still sufficient to confirm that the abundant presence of invective in the extant speeches of the period had its counterpart in developing rhetorical theory. In fact, the earliest teachers of the art of persuasion were especially remembered for their teachings on censure and calumny. Evenus of Paros, one of the earliest sophists, developed the art of insinuation and taught censure through stock commonplaces to be memorized for ready use. Thrasymachus gave ancients everything they needed in the art of denigrating their opponents in court, or in defending against the calumnies thrown at them. Gorgias developed

praises and blames to a new dimension and taught his methods to his students, one of whom was Isocrates. The rhetorical forerunners showed, then, that they differentiated between court room calumny, harrangue in the public assemblies, and blame oratory for the general audience.

The investigation found that Isocrates played an essential role as a forerunner to the theories of Anaximenes and Aristotle. As a theorist Isocrates distinguished and classified invective into appropriate categories. An outline of his classifications include the following. Ἐπιτιμία was Isocrates' species term for censure. He may have chosen it instead of ψέγω because of its particular moral value connotation. He ranked it as the counterpart of encomium. Isocrates distinguished censure from abuse, λοιδορία, and he considered abuse to be below the dignity of the orator who would speak on great themes. Isocrates tied censure to high moral purpose and contrasted it with accusation, κατηγορία, since the former had salutary purpose while the latter had injurious purpose. He considered the employment of censure to be the duty of the great orator. He embodied within himself the homeric ideal of immortality through great speeches. Isocrates also classed διαβολή as malicious misrepresentation which should have no place in censure.

While Isocrates did not classify his speeches into genres, as a practitioner he provided his students with

epideictic speeches of praise and blame for their learning. He used the term epideictic in a non-technical sense to mean in some cases the mere display of the skill of the orator, and in some instances as the display of the subject of the speech. Isocrates always claimed for himself practical, important goals for his epideictic speeches. The study suggested that moderns have some extant fragments of Isocrates' censures in Against the Sophists, Helen, and Busiris.

By this study of the various forerunners, this study provided the background for the explication of the rhetoric of blame in Anaximenes and Aristotle. In general terms it exhibited that the art of accusation, attack and blame developed distinctively and concurrently with its practice. The investigation also displayed conclusively that the rhetoric of blame was a substantive, vital aspect of public speaking, both in practice and in theory.

Aristotle and Anaximenes Compared

This study accepted the attribution of the Rhetoric to Alexander to Anaximenes and dated it, therefore, as a few years earlier than the Rhetoric. Both authors, then, were obviously theorizing about the same oratorical practices. Their different presentations were due to their differing assumptions, perspectives, methods, and goals. The following discussion shows how these differences effected their

presentations.

Anaximenes set down his rules and examples so that if the hearer would practice and memorize them he would affect persuasion by his speech, but Aristotle would have considered such an approach like teaching the art of shoe making by giving the pupil sets of sample shoes. Aristotle therefore set as his goal the presentation of the principles behind the samples which would enable the orator to find the means of persuasion in any given case. So then, Anaximenes presented his discussion of blame rhetoric in the manner of the progymnasmata, while Aristotle gave his discussion of blame within a rhetorical system of proofs.

The Place of Blame

The investigation showed that Anaximenes presented the rhetoric of invective as an independent, self-standing category under an umbrella of two genres, the speeches of the courts (δικανυκόν) and the speeches of the assemblies (δημογορικόν). The following reasons were presented for this position: (1) Modern scholars agree that the work was framed around seven species of oratory, (2) Quintilian cited Anaximenes as the author of a two genre, seven species system of rhetoric, and (3) Syrian attributed to a rhetoric by Aristotle a two genera, seven species system, obviously referring to the Rhetoric to Alexander.

Aristotle, on the other hand, offered his study of blame rhetoric as a sub-species of epideictic rhetoric, intimately connected with praise rhetoric. This investigation demonstrated that Aristotle's use of epideictic was not to be divorced from his overall systematic scheme of rhetorical proofs by bringing forward the following proofs. First, the three terms which have stood in the way of an analogous understanding of all the genres were all shown from the context of the Rhetoric itself to be amenable to the rest of his presentation. *Ἡγεμώνας* was defined as a judge of a persuasive appeal in the wider sense of critic. *Δύναμις* was linked to the faculty of the ethical proof of the orator. The term epideictic itself was seen in the non-reflexive sense as the showing forth of something. Secondly, these definitions were supported by Aristotle's use of examples of *ψόγος* oratory which had practical goals, by demonstrating that Aristotle defined his species by their function and not just their occasion, and by showing how Aristotle conceptually distinguished between the terms of *ψόγος*, *διαβολή*, *ὑβρις*, *λοιδορία*, and the like.

Definition of Blame

The study demonstrated that Anaximenes defined his rhetoric of invective as the disparagement of esteemed qualities and the amplification of disreputable qualities,

purposes, actions, speeches, and the attribution of qualities that do not exist. Aristotle, however, did not even include amplification in his definition of the species. For him amplification was a form of rhetorical syllogism, an enthymeme applicable to all kinds of rhetoric. He considered that amplification was most suitable as the means of proof in $\psi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ oratory, but certainly not definitive of the species. Instead Aristotle defined rhetorical censure as the showing forth of the quality of vice and disgrace. The goal of censure was the establishment or proof of the vice and disgrace in the present.

Materials of Censure

The distinction between the two authors continued in their presentation of the materials of blame. Anaximenes gave two separate sets of materials, pulling the first without transposition from his species of exhortation and dissuasion, and generating the second set from his conception of virtue. Anaximenes did not correlate the two sets and their listing shows that for him invective had a broad latitude of subject matter. Aristotle would not have considered some of the vices Anaximenes listed as actual materials for $\psi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, e.g.: (1) the illegal, (2) the inexpedient, (3) the odious (4) the impractical, (5) the laborious, (6) the unnecessary, (7) the stupid, (8) the physical defects.

Aristotle developed his list of materials for the blame orator from his psychological-ethical perspective. He carefully discriminated between the censurable and the illegal kinds of injustice and spent sections of his Rhetoric explaining how the vices and their attendant emotional states occurred. He, furthermore, set the discussion of vices and the disgraceful within the context of the ethical proof. Anaximenes did not develop an ethical proof at all, beyond a few exhortations to secure the good will of the hearers.

Method of Blame

Aristotle and Anaximenes displayed a striking contrast in their presentation of the methods of blame. Anaximenes employed the term $\tau\alpha\pi\epsilon\lambda\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ in an unusual use, according to Grube, as the counter-term to amplification. Aristotle used the same term to denote low style.² The term amplification itself was not understood in the same way by the two teachers. Anaximenes presented eight topics of amplification which he wanted the student to memorize for ready use. Aristotle, however, defined amplification as a rhetorical syllogism and placed it within the structure of his presentation of lines of argument. The study exhibited

²Cf. G. M. A. Grube, "The Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum and its language," in A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 162.

that Aristotle saw amplification as one of the source materials for rhetorical reasoning, and as one of the forms that reasoning took.

The greatest disparity between the two men's conception of amplification was how they compared it to other parts of rhetoric. Aristotle compared amplification to other forms of propositional reasoning, while Anaximenes contrasted amplification with the ἀγών, the contest situation. If amplification was a method, then obviously Anaximenes' classification was illogical, yet his contrast was the one which the ancients accepted.³

Both authors presented the amplification method of the ψόγις orator as the developing of facts which were already established or accepted. Both men urged the orator to stress the responsibility of the agent but only Aristotle discussed the logical means to do this, referring the orator to the signs, works, and similarities of vice. Both suggested that the orator also employ other rhetorical methods within the speech. Aristotle included the topics of consequence and relative terms, as well as the lines of argument common to all genres of rhetoric, while Anaximenes encouraged the orator to use consideration, maxims, as well as irony and ridicule; concepts Aristotle excluded from censure.

³Cf. Cicero, Orator, xi, 37, trans. by H. M. Hubbell (Loeb Library; Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 333.

Anaximenes specifically suggested a variety of subjects for the blame orator's consideration. Aristotle did not discuss that, but his discussions and examples show that ψόγος included not only individuals but animals, governments, and groups. In the Roman period, however, censure would theoretically be restricted to individuals.⁴

Style and Arrangement of Blame

The strong contrast between the authors continued in their presentation of the style and arrangement of blame rhetoric. Aristotle discussed the style of epideictic by comparing the levels of refinement among the three species. Epideictic oratory showed the highest refinement in that its virtue of style made it agreeable to read. Anaximenes, on the other hand, stated that speeches of praise and blame should be delivered with considerable fullness, by which he probably meant in the style of Gorgias.

Aristotle treated the arrangement of an epideictic speech in two parts, the prooemium and the narration. Anaximenes presented three parts, the prooemium, the meta-prooemium, and the epilogue. (Aristotle discussed the epilogue for all genres.) Anaximenes showed a lack of ingenuity by directing the orator to frame his invective

⁴Cf. Cicero, De Inventione, I, V, 7, trans. by H. M. Hubbell (Loeb Library; Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 15.

prooemium just like in speeches of exhortation. The orator was to state his case, refute διαβολή, exhort the listeners to attend, and make them well disposed. Aristotle actually discussed epideictic prooemia, directing the orator to begin with whatever he liked, attach the key-note, and then proceed into the subject. Aristotle also encouraged a variety of forms for the opening.

The authors presented different narrations. Anaximenes, after merely mentioning that the orator will blame the inherent defects if the subject of the speech is a deed, an emotion, a speech, or a possession, spent his whole lecture on developing the speech by a three-stage genealogy. The three stages were: (1) the bad ancestry of the person, (2) his evil youth and that of his friends, and (3) his despicable present. Aristotle, however, did not mention genealogy, but encouraged the orator to present a disjunctive, episodic narration for variety, hitting only the most memorable highlights. Aristotle stressed ethical proofs over logical argument and stressed the use of amplification. Neither author gave special attention to the epilogue, although Anaximenes did stress recapitulation. Aristotle gave no special injunctions for epideictic orators at all.

Διαβολή

Both presented topics on διαβολή. Aristotle eschewed its use, while Anaximenes seems to have encouraged its employment. Aristotle restricted his presentation to the arrangement of a forensic speech, while Anaximenes discussed διαβολή in accusation, exhortation, and discussion. Of the two, Anaximenes' conception of διαβολή was much more amoebic. Within its meaning he considered the booing and jeering of the crowd against the speaker, the complaints about the speaker reading his speech, as well as the malicious verbal accusations against the speaker's character and life. Aristotle's presentation restricted the term's meaning to spoken or unspoken hostile information against the speaker. In treating διαβολή, however, Aristotle's eleven method list seemed quite sophistic, and analogous to Anaximenes, in spite of the fact Aristotle repeated how unfair its use was. Anaximenes accented while Aristotle downplayed it.

Censure in other genres

Both authors included statements about using censure in forensic oratory. Aristotle mentioned the use of censure as one of the eleven methods of διαβολή, while the study exhibited that Anaximenes devoted an entire paragraph to evil-speaking in the courts. Particularly in this section

Anaximenes displayed just how much more inclusive he was than Aristotle in his concept of invective. Here, along with labeling the species itself as evil-speaking, κακολογικόν, Anaximenes actually encouraged the use of irony, ridicule and vile abuse (λοιδορία) of the opponent. Aristotle, on the other hand, clearly excluded those activities from censure, as the study discovered, since they aroused anger and had no moral purpose. For Aristotle's ridicule, scoffing, mockery, and the like were evidences of haughty insult (ὕβρις), which he classed as itself a vice. The difference between the two rhetors was shown to be their differing ethical positions. Aristotle had developed an ethical system, while Anaximenes had not.

Neither author connected indignation or anger with censure, as later rhetors would do. Anaximenes did not discuss the concept at all. Aristotle classed it as a virtue, but did not make any connections to censure oratory.

Blame Oratory and the Epideictic Genre

Epideictic in Aristotle and Anaximenes

This study demonstrated how Anaximenes and Aristotle related ψόγος rhetoric to epideictic. Aristotle, of course, used epideictic as his genre label for proving the quality of the present. Anaximenes, on the other hand, identified his discussion of ψόγος with epideictic when he contrasted

rhetorical situations. Anaximenes set other speeches in a contest event, but he placed praise and blame in a non-contest event, display.

This study exhibited that Anaximenes intended for epideictic to mean the display or proof of the orator's subject in a non-contest situation. The essay showed from Anaximenes' own writing that he regularly and normally employed the word in a non-reflexive sense meaning 'proof'. At the same time Anaximenes encouraged his students to exhibit their skill and virtuosity in every species of oratory. Therefore Anaximenes actually theoretically linked the two aspects of the common sophistic practice, which were, to claim a practical goal and to exhibit great rhetorical skill for the amazement and amusement of the crowd.

The essay clearly and conclusively showed that Aristotle was not interested in presenting the mere skill of the orator. He intended to present to his students the ways in which one could discover the available means of persuasion in any given case. Aristotle also used epideictic in the non-reflexive sense, and he meant for it to connote the persuasion in the hearer of the quality of virtue or vice in the present. He did not encourage artistry: he encouraged proofs. The epideictic orator's job in that sense was analogous to the exhorter or accuser in the symboleutic or forensic genres,

and he addressed his hearer as if he were a judge. The distinguishing marks of the epideictic genre, aside from its time frame and materials were its suitability to the method of amplification and its stress on ethos proofs. From Aristotle's standpoint, then, someone like Gorgias was not persuasive because he was eloquent (as Anaximenes might have thought), but because he had high ethical appeal.

Later Meaning of Epideictic

With this study in mind even a cursory glance at the rhetorical treatises of the Roman period shows immediately that the mixture of Aristotle's and Anaximenes' works produced a predominance of Anaximenes' mode of thought. Aristotle's titles for the three genres were accepted in the Roman period, as Solmsen noted,⁵ but Aristotle's meanings were not employed. The Ad Herennium, for example, exhibited almost a complete loss of any of the meaning Aristotle had for praise and blame. Instead of praise and blame being the functions of epideictic, they were now its subjects.⁶ Aristotle's system of rhetorical proofs was completely absent

⁵Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," American Journal of Philology, 62 (1941), 43.

⁶Ad C. Herennium, Trans. by Harry Caplan (Loeb Library; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 173, 175.

and Anaximenes' genealogical approach appeared instead.⁷ Epideictic oratory no longer considered the great themes of virtue and vice in the city-state, but was now directed specifically to the individual, and his internal and external circumstances.⁸ In De Oratore, Cicero claimed for epideictic the province of "pleasure and entertainment."⁹ The most important aspect of epideictic rhetoric, said Cicero, was style.¹⁰

In addition to these emphases, censure was dropped from being one of the sub-species of epideictic. The Stoics removed it all together¹¹ and Quintilian placed it in the background, stating that the kind of oratory concerned with praise and blame "derives its name from the better of its two functions and is called laudatory."¹² As was stated above, epideictic was removed from practical oratory and relegated, on the supposed authority of Aristotle, to solely

⁷Ibid., p.

⁸Ibid., p. 175.

⁹Cicero; De Oratore, II, xxxiv, 341, trans. by Henry Rackham (Loeb Library; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 457.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 459.

¹¹E.g. Ad C. Herennium, Caplan, p. 172n.

¹²Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, III, iv, 12, trans. by H. E. Butler (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1933), p. 395 (Underlining mine.)

pleasing the audience.¹³ By these indications, then, the meaning of censure oratory underwent a distinct change from the 4th century B.C. to the 1st century A.D.

Further, this dissertation did not directly uncover commonplaces of personalities, except possibly in the general sense of Thrasyarchus' calumnies. Yet such topics and lists of invectives were available in the Roman and Byzantine periods.¹⁴ Possibly the loss of great moral and communal themes from the realm of censure had something to do with the development of topics and lists of personalities. A further study is needed to show where and when such lists developed.

The study of how and why these changes occurred in the Hellenistic and Roman period must stand as a topic for future study. This study, however, will serve as the

¹³Ibid., III, vii, 1, p. 465.

¹⁴For commonplaces of invective in the early Roman period see. Norman Williams Merrill, "Cicero and Early Roman Invective," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cincinnati, 1975). See also J. R. Dunkle, "The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1967), 98, 151-171. For the Byzantine period note George L. Kustas, "The Function and Evolution of Byzantine Rhetoric," Viator, I (1970, 55-78). He states, "...its opposite, *ψόγος* ...helped supply the long vocabulary of Byzantine invective before which one can only stand back in amazement" (p. 58).

theoretic basis for the rhetorical treatment of blame in the later periods.

Conclusion and Questions

This dissertation serves as a preliminary study of the rhetoric of censure in the Classical period of Greece. The study uncovered several new insights into classical rhetoric and conclusively demonstrated that the social, political, and individual employment of invective in the period, had its meaningful classification into an art by the rhetoricians. $\Psi\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ rhetoric has been one area of classical theory which has not received the attention it deserves. Since this has been one of the first essays to focus on invective in Classical Greece without resorting to or fusing it with ideas of the rhetoric in other periods (such as Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzantine), it was able to understand what the Greeks themselves were doing with invective, and what they thought they were doing. This study, of course, raises many questions for future investigation. Using the classifications of invective which this essay uncovered, a series of studies needs to be done on the speeches of the Attic orators, on the speeches embedded in the Greek histories, and on the speeches in the Greek plays of the period to ascertain how the practices of the period related to the theory. The entire presentation of praise and blame and

epideictic speaking in the Hellenistic and Roman period needs to be reinvestigated to discover the why and the wherefore of the changes in the use of the terms that was noted earlier.

The expression of censure and invective generally operates in a relational fashion to the political freedom of a people. A study should be done which specifically relates the extent of invective and censure present in the classical societies with the amount of political freedom which they enjoyed.

This study raised philological questions. With so many terms of invective and abuse in classical Greek it is probable that this study may have missed some nuances not only of the terms under investigation here, but others which were not directly considered. Why certain terms such as ψόγος, κακηγορία and ἐπιτιμάω were readily employed by the rhetors but terms like μέφομαι and διαφημέω were not, needs further investigation.

This study did not ask ethical questions of the use of invective in ancient society. The virilent use and rhetorical treatment of the subject certainly had objective impact on the society. A study of this impact is needed.

One of the justifications of this study was that it might bring the promise of a new look at current blaming behavior in our culture. The Greek idea that the censure of

the indignant man showed moral virtue and that it was proper for a person of low moral character to be publically exposed and debased may clash with the Christian opinion that true moral rebuke (ἐπιτιμᾶω) properly belongs to the deity alone.¹⁵ Since both the Greek and the Christian opinion operate in modern society, a study of their functions is needed to formulate a rhetoric of censure for the present day. One recent study titled "Defamation by Slander," outlined verbal invective from the perspective of English law.¹⁶ A similar study from the perspective of the Greek and Christian heritage would be worthwhile.

Let this study, then, serve as a springboard for other fruitful investigations.

¹⁵Cf. Ethelbert Stauffer, "ἐπιτιμᾶω" in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. by Gerhard Kittel, trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromily (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Co., 1964), II, 625.

¹⁶George P. Rice, "Defamation by Slander," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 39 (1954), 75-78.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Texts, Commentaries, Indices

Anaximenis Ars Rhetorica quae vulgo fertur Aristotelis Ad Alexandrum. ed. by Manfred Fuhrmann. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1966.

Aristotelis "Ars Rhetorica." Edited by Rudolf Kassel. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1976.

Aristotelis. Ars Rhetorica. Edited by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959.

Aristotle. "Art" of Rhetoric. Trans. by J. H. Freese. Loeb Library. London: Methuan, 1925.

Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts. Trans. by Kurt Von Fritz and Ernst Kapp. Hafner Library. New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1950.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Introduction to Aristotle. Edited by Richard McKeon. Modern Library. New York: Random House, 1947.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by Henry Rackham. Loeb Library. London: William Heinemann, 1975.

Aristotle. Poetics. Trans. by W. Hamilton Fyfe. Loeb Library. London: William Heinemann, 1973.

Aristotle. Rhetoric. Translated by W. Rhys Roberts. Aristotle. Modern Library. New York: Random House, 1954.

Barber, E. A., Maas, P., Scheller, M., and West, M. L., eds. Liddell and Scott. A Greek-English Lexicon. Supplement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

Bonitz, H. Index Aristotelicus. 2nd ed. Graz: Akademische Druck und Verlagsanstalt, 1955.

- Cicero . Ad C. Herennium. Trans. by Harry Caplan. Loeb Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.
- Cicero. De Inventione, De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica. Trans. by Henry M. Hubbell. Loeb Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949.
- Cicero. De Oratore. Vol. I. Books I, II. Trans. by E. W. Sutton. Loeb Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942.
- Cicero. Orator. Trans. by H. M. Hubbell. Brutus and Orator. Loeb Library. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1942.
- Cooper, Lane. The Rhetoric of Aristotle. New York: Meredith, 1932.
- Cope, Edward Merith. An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric with Analysis Notes and Appendices. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1970.
- Cope, Edward Merith. The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary. Rev. and ed. by John Edwin Sandys. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1877.
- Diels, Hermann. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 3 Vols. 6th ed. ed. by Walther Kranz. Berlin: Weidmannsche, 1951.
- Edmonds, J. M. Greek Elegy and Iambus with the Anacreontea. 2 vols. Loeb Library. London: William Heinemann, 1954.
- Else, Gerald F. Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Erickson, Keith. Aristotle's Rhetoric: Five Centuries of Philological Research. Clinton, N. J.: Scarecrow Press, 1975.
- Ernesti, Christ. Theoph. Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhetoricae. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1962.

Hobbes, Thomas. Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric.
London: Henry G. Bohn, 1851.

Isocrates. Trans. by George Norlin and LaRue Van
Hook. 3 vols. Loeb Library. London:
William Heinemann, 1968.

Liddell and Scott. An Intermediate Greek-English
Lexicon. 7th ed. abridge. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1964.

Liddell, Henry George and Scott, Robert, eds.
A Greek-English Lexicon. 8th ed. Revised by
Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958.

Plato. Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. Translated by
W. R. M. Lamb. Loeb Classical Library.
London: William Heinemann, 1967.

Plato. Laws. Trans. by R. G. Bury. Loeb
Classical Library. London: William
Heinemann, 1952.

Plato. Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus.
Trans. by Harold North Fowler. Loeb Library.
London: William Heinemann, 1967.

Preuss, Siegmundus. Index Isocrateus. Hilde-
sheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1971.

Quintilian. Institutio Oratoria. Trans. by H. E.
Butler, 4 vols. Loeb Library. London:
William Heinemann, 1933.

Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum. Trans. by Henry Rackham.
Loeb Library. London: William Heinemann,
1955.

Welldon, J. E. C. The Rhetoric of Aristotle
Translated with Analysis and Critical Notes.
London: MacMillan, 1886.

Related Works

Ando, Takatura. Aristotle's Theory of Practical
Cognition. 2nd ed. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1965.

- Baldwin, Charles Sears. Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic. New York: MacMillan, 1924.
- Bonner, Robert Johnson. Aspects of Athenian Democracy. New York: Russell and Russell, 1967.
- Bonner, Robert Johnson. Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927.
- Bruns, Ivo. Das Literarische Portrait der Griechen. Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1896.
- Buchheit, Vinzenz. Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles. Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1960.
- Burgess, Theodore Chalon. Epideictic Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1902.
- Burke, Edmond Martin. "Character Denigration in the Attic Orators with Particular Reference to Demosthenes and Aeschines" Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Tufts University, 1972.
- Bury, J. B. History of Greece. 3rd ed. Revised by Russell Meiggs. London: MacMillan, 1967.
- Calhoun, George M. The Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1927.
- Cooper, Lane. An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy with an Adaptation of the Poetics and a Translation of the 'Tractatus Coislinianus'. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922.
- Copleston, Frederick. Greece and Rome. Vol 1, part 1. A History of Philosophy. 8 vols. Image books. New York: Doubleday and Col, 1962.
- Fuhrmann, Manfred. Das Systematische Lehrbuch: ein Beiträge zur Geschichte der Wissenschaften in der Antike. 2 vols. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960.

Giangrande, Lawrence. The Use of Spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman Literature. The Hague: Mouton, 1972.

Grant, Mary A., and Fiske, Converse. The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable. The Greek Rhetoricians and Cicero. University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, No. 21. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1924.

Hight, Gilbert. The Anatomy of Satire. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

Hollar, John Arthur. "The Traditions of Satire and Invective in Catullus." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, 1972.

Jaeger, Werner. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. 2nd ed. vol. I. Archaic Greece. The Mind of Athens. Trans. by Gilbert Hight. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Jaeger, Werner. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture. 2nd. ed. vol. II. In Search of the Divine Center, Trans. by Gilbert Hight. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Jebb, Richard C. The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaias. 2 vols. New York: Russell and Russell, 1962.

Kennedy, George. The Art of Persuasion in Greece. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Kennedy, George. Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.

Kraus, Oskar. Die Lehre von Lob, Lohn, Tadel und Strafe bei Aristoteles. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1905.

Kraus, Oskar. Neue Studien zur Aristotelischen Rhetorik insbesondere über das ΓΕΝΟΣ ΕΠΙ-ΔΕΙΚΤΙΚΟΝ. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1907.

- Lausberg, Heinrich. Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Gründlegung der Literaturwissenschaft. 2 volumes. Munich: Max Hueber Verlag, 1960.
- Lesky, Albin. A History of Greek Literature. 2nd ed. Trans. by James Willis and Cornelis de Heer. London: Methuen and Co., 1966.
- Martin, Josef. Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1974.
- Merrill, Normand Williams. "Cicero and Early Roman Invective." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Cincinnati, 1975.
- Nisbet, R. G. M., ed. M. Tulli Ciceronis in L. Calpurnium Pisonem Oratio. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961.
- Oates, Whitney J. Aristotle and the Problem of Value. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Rooy, C. A. Van. Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965.
- Vinogradoff, Paul. Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence. Vol II, The Jurisprudence of Greek City. 3 Vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1922.
- Voegelin, Walter. Die Diabole Bei Lysias: Das Verhältnis von Bürger und Staat in der Rechtsprechung der attischen Demokratie. Basel: Benno Schwabe, 1943.
- Volkman, Richard. Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischen Übersicht. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1885.
- Whibley, Leonard. A Companion to Greek Studies. 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931.

Articles

- Anderson, William S. "Anger in Juvenal and Seneca." University of California

Publications in Classical Philology, 19 (1964), 1-69.

Anderson, William S. "Juvenal and Quintilian." Yale Classical Studies, 17 (1961), 1-93.

Arnott, William Geoffrey. "Comedy (Greek), Middle." Oxford Classical Dictionary. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Barwick, Karl. "Die 'Rhetorik ad Alexandrum' und Anaximenes, Alkidamus, Isokrates, Aristoteles und die Theodekteia." Philologus, 110 (1966), 214-245.

Berneker, Erich. "Ἀουδσία." Kleine Pauly Lexikon der Antike. Ed. by Konrat Ziegler, Walther Sontheimer, and Hans Gärtner. 5 vols. Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller, 1964-1975.

Black, Edwin. "Plato's View of Rhetoric." Quarterly Journal of Speech, 44 (1958), 361-374.

Bowra, Cecil Maurice. "Iambic Poetry, Greek." Oxford Classical Dictionary. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

Brédif, Leon. "Invective in Greek Eloquence." Demosthenes. Trans. by M. J. MacMahon. Chicago: S. C. Griggs, 1881.

Buchheit, Vinzenz. Review of Anaximenes Ars Rhetorica quae vulgo fertur Aristotelis, Ad Alexandrum. Edited by Manfred Fuhmann. Gnomon, 41 (1969), 728-737.

Chase, James Richard. "The Classical Conception of Epideictic." Quarterly Journal of Speech, 47 (1961), 293-300.

Cooper, Lane. "Burnett on Aristotle." Aristotleian Papers. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1939.

Crem, Theresa M. "The Definition of Rhetoric According to Aristotle." Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric. Edited by Keith V. Erickson. Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1974.

- Deligorious, S. "The Auxetic Mode in Ancient Rhetorical Theory." Platon, 23 (1971), 311-318.
- Dover, Kenneth James. "Comedy (Greek), Old." Oxford Classical Dictionary. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.
- Dover, Kenneth James. "Comedy (Greek), Origins of." Oxford Classical Dictionary. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.
- Drerup, Englebert. Review of "Über die bedeutung des Γένος Ἐπισευκτικόν in der aristotelischen Rhetorik," by F. J. Schwaab. Unpublished dissertation. Würzburg, Ger., 1923. Philologische Wochenschrift, 43 (1923), 745-748.
- Dunkle, J. R. "The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1967. Vol. 98, pp. 151-171.
- Enos, Richard Leo. "The Epistemology of Gorgias' Rhetoric." Southern Speech Communication Journal. 42 (1976), 35-51.
- Erickson, Keith V. "The Lost Rhetorics of Aristotle." Communication Monographs, 43 (1976).
- Flynn, Lawrence J., S. J. "Aristotle: Art and Faculty of Rhetoric." Southern Speech Journal, 21 (1957), 243-254.
- Fortenbaugh, William W. "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions." Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric. Edited by Keith V. Erickson. Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1974.
- Fuhrmann, Manfred. "Untersuchungen zur Textgeschiehte der pseudo-aristotelischen Alexander-Rhetorik." Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. 15, (1964) 7, 547-752.
- Gerhard, G. A. "Iambographen." Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. ed. by Georg Wissowa. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1916.

- Grayeff, Felix. "The Problem of the Genesis of Aristotle's Text." Phronesis I (1956), 105-122.
- Grimaldi, William M. A. "The Aristotelian Topics." Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric. Edited by Keith V. Erickson. Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1974.
- Grube, G. M. A. "The Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum and its Language." A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961.
- Hill, Forbes I. "The Rhetoric of Aristotle." A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric. Edited by James J. Murphy. New York: Random House, 1972.
- Hinks, D. A. G. "Tria Genera Causarum." Classical Quarterly, 30 (1936), 170-176.
- Hunt, Everet Lee. "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians." Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians. Edited by Raymond F. Howes. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961.
- Kennedy, George. Review of Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles, by Vinzenz Buchheit. American Journal of Philology, 82 (1962), 326-329.
- Kennedy, George. Review of Anaximenis Ars Rhetorica, quae vulgo fertur Aristotelis, Ad Alexandrum. Edited by Manfred Fuhrmann. American Journal of Philology, 90 (1969), 371-373.
- Kennedy, Verne R. "Auxesis: A Concept of Rhetorical Amplification." Southern Speech Communication Journal, 38 (1971), 60-72.
- Kroll, Wilhelm. "Rhetorik." Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Edited by Georg Wissowa. Supplement, Vol. VII. Edited by Wilhelm Kroll and Karl Mittelhaus. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1940.

- Kustas, George. "The Function and Evolution of Byzantine Rhetoric." Viator, 1 (1970), 55-78.
- Lienhard, Joseph T., S. J. "A Note on the Meaning of in Aristotle's Rhetoric." Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric. Edited by Keith V. Erickson. Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1974.
- Lofberg, J. O. "The Sycophant-Parasite." Classical Philology, 15 (1920), 61-72.
- McBurney, James H. "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory." Speech Monographs, 3 (1936), 49-74.
- Meyer, Herbert. "κακηγορίας δίκη ." Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. ed. by Georg Wissowa. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1894.
- Perelman, Chaim. "The New Rhetoric." The Prospect of Rhetoric. Report of the National Developmental Project sponsored by the Speech Communication Association. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971.
- Race, William H. "Shame in Plato's Gorgias." Classical Journal, 74 (1979), 197-202.
- Radin, Max. "Freedom of Speech in Ancient Athens." American Journal of Philology, 48 (1927), 215-230.
- Rayment, Charles S. Review of Anaximenis Ars Rhetorica quae vulgo fertur Aristotelis, Ad Alexandrum. Edited by Manfred Fuhrmann. Classical World, 62 (1969), 223.
- Reeve, M. D. "Notes on Anaximenes' Τέχνη Ῥητορική ." Classical Quarterly, 20 (1970), 237-241.
- Renahan, Robert. "Aristotle's Definition of Anger." Philologus, 107 (1963), 61-74.
- Rice, George P. "Defamation by Slander." Quarterly Journal of Speech, 39 (1953), 75-78.

- Robin, Nancy Felson, "Some Functions of the Enclosed Invective in Archilochus' Erotic Fragment." Classical Journal, 74 (1979), 136-141.
- Schmid, Wilhelm, and Stahlin, Otto. "Die Iambographie." Geschichte der griechischen Literatur. Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft. Edited by Iwan von Müller. Revised by Walter Otto. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1929, 7, I, 1, 386-403.
- Schmid, Wilhelm. "Ἀπόρρητα." Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Edited by Georg Wissowa. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler,, 1907.
- Sickle, John Van. "Archilochus: A New Fragment of an Epode." Classical Journal, 71 (1975), 1-15.
- Solmsen, Friedrich. Review of Aristotelis "Ars Rhetorica", Edited by Rudolfus Kasse. Classical Philology, 74 (1979), 68-72.
- Solmsen, Friedrich. "The Aristotelian tradition in Ancient Rhetoric." American Journal of Philology, 62 (1941), 35-50, 170-190.
- Sontheimer, Walter. "Ἀπόρρητα ." Der Kleine Pauly Lexikon der Antike. Edited by Konrat Ziegler, Walther Sontheimer, and Hans Gärtner. 5 volumes. Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller, 1964-1975. Vol. 3 (1967) 457.
- Stal, I. V. "ИНВЕКТИВА КАК ИСТОЧНИК ИСТОРИИ ОБЩЕСТВЕННО-ПОЭТИЧЕСКОЙ МЫСЛИ," Vesnik Drevnex Istori: Revue d'Histoire Ancienne. 2, (84) (1963), 141-152.
- Stanton, Donal J., and Goodwin, F. Berquist, Jr. "Aristotle's Rhetoric: Empiricism or Conjecture?" Southern Speech Communication Journal, 41 (1975), 69-81.
- Stauffer, Ethelbert. "Ἐντυμῶν." Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Edited by Gerhard Kittel. Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromily. Grand Rapids: William B. Eardmans Co., 1964, II, 623-627.

Thalheim. "Ἀποσπῆς." Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. ed. by Georg Wissowa. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1894.

Thalheim. "Ἀποσπῆς." Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Edited by Georg Wissowa. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1894.

Thonssen, Lester W. "A Functional Analysis of Aristotle's Rhetoric." Quarterly Journal of Speech, 16 (1930), 297-310.

Utterbeck, William. "Aristotle's Contribution to the Psychology of Argument." Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, 11 (1925).

Wade-Gery, H. T. "The Judicial Treaty with Phaselis and the History of the Athenian Courts." Essays in Greek History Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958.

Wallach, Barbara P. Review of The Use of Spoudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman Literature, by Lawrence Giangrande. American Journal of Philology, 96 (1975), pp. 211-214.

Williams, Gordon Willis. "Libel and Slander." Oxford Classical Dictionary. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

Zwierlein, Otto. "Zum Text der Anaximenes-Rhetorik." Rheinischen Museum, 112 (1969), 72-81.