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EDUCATION FOR A TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY: A
COMPARISON OF JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU'S
CONCEPT OF GENERAL WILL TO JOHN DEWEY'S
CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1974
Education, general

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

EDUCATION FOR A TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY: A COMPARISON
OF JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU'S CONCEPT OF GENERAL WILL
TO JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY






FRED D. KIERSTEAD, JR.

Norman, Oklahoma

1974

EDUCATION FOR A TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY: A COMPARISON
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TO JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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PREFACE

This study is based on the conviction that American society lacks the motivation, intellect, and participation necessary for democratic determination of core values, purpose and educational priorities in a transitional era. A crisis-culture has resulted, causing technological assimilation, sociological alienation, and political impotency. Value-free discoveries in the sciences, cultural inequities, and undemocratic practices in the economic, political and psychological areas of human endeavor have also contributed to the crisis. The "educational imperialism" exercised in the schools completes the social dilemma in America described as a cultural lag.¹

It is the author's contention that part of the crisis in the culture is attributable to pre-industrial concepts of democracy, education and individual participation practiced in a post-industrial era. This author demonstrates that Rousseauian democratic concepts are still being used in America to find traditional causes, universal truths,

¹Martin Carvay, Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1974), *passim*. The author uses this term to describe the use of education as a cultural domination.

and general will of sentiment. It is suggested that Deweyan democratic notions are more in accordance with the needs of a transitory culture.

The comparison of general will to collective intelligence is utilized to demonstrate the basic difference between the democracy of Jean Jacques Rousseau and the democracy of John Dewey. Although Dewey's writings are more popular in America and have more acclaim, social implimentation of his philosophy is lacking. American post-industrial society has an inefficient communications means and a structural authority system that subverts individual participation and worth.

This writer defends the postulates of social reconstructionism. Much of John Dewey's philosophy is useful in the development of a social order that is responsive to changing needs. Reinterpretation of core values for every new generation, re-examination of all the consequences of actions, and reliance on collective intelligence for consensus are especially noteworthy. Priorities for the education of a creative, well-informed, changable world community of social activists are needed. This paper examines the present priorities and finds them inadequate.

The reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and social ideals and methods thus go hand in hand. If there is especial need of educational reconstruction at the present time, if this need makes urgent a reconsideration of the basic ideas of traditional philosophic systems, it is because of the thoroughgoing change in social life accompanying the advance of science, the industrial revolution, and the development of democracy. Such practical changes cannot take place without

demanding an educational re-formation to meet them, and without leading men to ask what ideals and ideas are implicit in these social changes, and what revisions they require of the ideas and ideals which are inherited from older and unlike cultures.¹

¹John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916), pp. 385-6.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The American Crisis

Modern American society, like any other society, has the task of trying to define philosophical terms and agree on values, goals and other social determinations. In a democracy, John Dewey, William H. Kilpatrick, Boyd Bode and other pragmatists feel that each new generation has to define and resolve the meaning of terms such as freedom, democracy, liberty and government control for its own purposes and well-being. There has, however, been little examination of these terms and values by the society as a whole. Education is in part to blame for this neglect, not only failing to find the definition and meaning of these terms for each new generation, but also for failing to determine the significance and strength of their contribution to the society.

Core Values. The crux of any society's survival is agreement on at least some basic assumptions and terms; John Dewey calls them core values.¹ Core values in this context

¹Scott Greer, The Logic of Social Inquiry (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1969) p. 22. See also John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Free Press, 1916) passim.

are the values held in common by the society for specific purposes and goals. The method of determination varies with the alternatives offered by each community. In primitive societies the number of core values held in common is large because of the unifying characteristics of basic needs, such as food, clothing and shelter. Reliance upon mutual cooperation and defense necessitates accomodation of these values. In a democracy, however, core values are few, because of the larger franchise and the freedom of choice supposedly afforded the populace.¹ Social agreement concerning the determination of values is, at best, a difficult task in a democracy when compared to other less tolerant forms of social living that decide values for their people without public consent. There are, however, some values which must be held in common for any society or the society would wane as a unifying entity. In a democracy, determination of these core values is especially complicated, and agreement is much more difficult; but this does not preclude any attempt to find these values.

In recent years there has been considerable examination of American core values, with alarming conclusions. It has been found that the meaning of words and what is supposedly known by all in even the smallest "democratic" organization is very often not agreed upon by many.² Not only does America

¹Ibid.

²Ernest Bayles, Democratic Educational Theory (New York: Harper Bros., 1960), p. 34. See also the writings of Gunnar Myrdal.

have a small set of core values, but the number is diminishing because of many factors affecting the society, to include technology, wars and social inequality. One of the roles of educators and philosophers is to determine the core values agreed upon and relate them to the populace. This has meant merely a definition of terms rather than any interpretation or examination of their meaning. Consequently, there are sacred and traditional doctrines that are above scrutiny and are accepted without question. Habits of conduct have restricted interpretations, thereby widening the division between reality and tradition. Instead of providing the incentive necessary for reexamination of goals, education has stifled new interpretations of meanings. Education has meant socialization rather than the examination of testing of alternatives.

America faces a crisis-culture.¹ The crisis in this context is the inability of a society to cope with the problems and advances in technology and rapid change due to an adherence to tradition. It is a cultural lag caused by outdated concepts unsuitable to impending needs.²

The Cultural Lag. It is the object of philosophers to determine the problems facing man in his society, and to provide some insight for their resolution. Dewey claims

¹For a further clarification of crisis-culture, see the writings of Theodore Brameld, Harry Girvetz and Robert Theobald.

²William Ogburn, Social Change (New York: Delta Books, 1966), p. 215.

philosophers in this century have done little more than find causes and describe effects.¹ An added problem is the unprecedented technological change that has detached the culture taught in the schools from experiences in the community.² American culture "teaches" cooperation and respect in the Judeao-Christian tradition, but the experience of life induces competition and unethical practices in business in order to succeed.

Scientific discoveries have changed the order of things so quickly that immoral practices and competition have become the "ethics" of life as well as in business. Part of the explanation for these practices is the speed of technological change. Technology determines the criteria for success, and human problems out of technological problems. The gap between the material and non-material cultures produces a cultural lag.³ Consequently, Americans understand the material aspect of life and the luxuries afforded them, but they do not relate the implications of this thinking to the non-material culture.⁴

Charles Peirce points out that American traditions tend to be tenacious. A respect for previous authority and

¹John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1920), passim.

²Oscar Handlin, John Dewey's Challenge to Education (New York: Harper Bros., 1959), passim.

³Ogburn, pp. 210-213.

⁴Ogburn, pp. 200-213.

a belief in a priori ideas make the transition from older values to newer and more applicable values difficult.¹

Advances in communications have made a smaller world, but it is now a world of problems without responsive methods of problem-solving. With all the media of communication, people of the world still cannot communicate well enough to promote peaceful coexistence. Wars, for example, the Vietnam conflict, challenged not only American foreign policy, but also the domestic establishment. Believing in unlimited resources and inevitable progress is no longer acceptable or realistic. Technology, once considered a panacea, has created a vacuum in the non-material culture while choosing between alternatives in the material culture. Americans have settled for "peace with honor" in the last few wars instead of absolute victory or unconditional surrender of its enemies. The uncompromising mentality of an earlier era has been replaced by a more compromising alternative, but only after much criticism and loss of human life. The Vietnam conflict might have taught Americans a lesson of impotence: they have very little control of governmental practices.

Historial Perspective: Earlier Attempts to Evaluate the Worth of the Individual

Early Revisionist Historians

Conflicts over power, authority and social control have persisted throughout America's history. Interest groups

¹Thomas Knight, Charles Peirce (New York: Washington Square Press, 1953), passim.

sprang up in the nineteenth century because people found them to be the only way to have their interests heard and acted upon. But in the interest of being heard, individuals have given up their individuality, and have lost meaning of their own experiences. Not only have the meanings of terms remained unchanged since this country's inception, but there are many who also claim the "traditional" meanings now adhered to never existed in the first place.

Revisionist historians like Charles Beard have questioned interpretations of previous American historians and have concluded that the "democratic tradition" believed and taught in this country quite different from what contemporary historians now believe to be the concepts of the founding fathers. Such revisionists as Beard have reexamined the facts and events of the period and have come up with many alternative explanations. These historians now believe the originators of the Constitution might have feared the masses. Representation was awarded to the landholders and aristocracy who were loyal rather than every living male over twenty-one years of age.¹ The fact that the Loyalists and neutralists held limited citizenship and were ostracized by the rest of the citizenry after the revolution gives some evidence in favor of this argument. Many of the ostracized fled to Canada or back to Europe in fear of reprisal. "Democracy" in

¹Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Macmillan Co., 1913), I.II.

colonial America flourished in name only; the decisions of the state were not democratically determined, nor were they democratically implemented.

Vernon L. Parrington sensed that the propertied class triumphed in this "revolution" more than the small worker or farmer. These higher class citizens blocked the "will of the people" and controlled American interests until a wider franchise was implemented much later.¹ The American creed of equality and democracy meant something actually much different from what is considered to be the creed today.² John Stuart Mill pointed out that such terms as "self government" and "the power of the people over themselves" did not express the true state of the case in America. The will of the people meant the "will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people."³ The most active part of the people were the landed aristocracy. The issue of participation and representation is still a matter of contention in American governmental and educational circles, even though many authors have attempted to expose these inconsistencies.

Historians such as Merle Curti, Henry Commager, Richard Hofstadter and Lawrence Cremin later favored a

¹V.L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1927), I., V.

²Gunnar Myrdal, The American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) pp. 7-8.

³John S. Mill, "The Tyranny of the Majority," Philosophy for a New Generation, edited by A.K. Bierman and J.A. Gould, (New York: Macmillan Co. 1970) pp. 341-345.

"liberal humanitarianism" for the twentieth century in order to combat power struggles and undemocratic principles. Realizing that historical records were merely interpretations of what had happened, they hoped to interpret history as an unbiased view of the events of that time. Progress was possible, but no longer was it an inevitability without some method of corresponding value determination. Success to these men had humanitarian consequences as well as technological and economic significance. This form of social meliorism tried unbiasedly to compare the consequences of the past in order to profit from earlier human indiscretions. But this attempt to find causal relationships and impartial conclusions failed in its effort to convert an uninformed public. To the contrary, finding causal factors actually contributed significantly to the search for universals of will instead of tested conclusions.

Despite efforts by historians, philosophers, liberals and educators, a "Bergsonian" intellect in favor of the material culture remained as the measure of success for the individual in his social posture. The non-materials culture continued as an incalculable determinant. Knowledge divided against itself had created socio-economic and cultural inequities in the richest country in the world.¹ Urban slums, poverty and anti-intellectual pursuits became the rule, with

¹John Dewey, Individualism: Old and New, (New York: Minter & Balch, 1930). p. 23.

few exceptions. Man as a social being exploited others under the guise of survival of the fittest. Superimposed on the democratic ideals of American society was an economic and scientific oligarchy, couched in materialism and social pre-determination.

Liberalism in America As a Movement to
Reinstate Individual Worth

There are always liberal and conservative elements in any society, just as there are reactionaries and radicals. The time factor and rate of change determine the effect of each. What American writers now call "classical" liberalism had its beginnings in the writings of such men as Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Locke and Thomas Jefferson. These men were most noted for their efforts to replace religious sovereignty with social authority. In an effort to explain, control and determine social problems; these authors provided the intellect to initiate a more liberal concept of individual worth and participation in a society.

Liberalism was a "revolutionizer" in an America built on theocracies, the Anglican tradition, and European dependence. Harry Girvetz credited two main factors causing liberalism in America to flourish and become a definitive movement: (1) the impact of new discoveries in the physical sciences, which allowed for growth in technology; and (2) the aspirations of a new neo-capitalist class from this technology that demanded more participation in the legislative

process.¹ In an attempt to elevate the common man in the decision-making process, liberal authors advocated everything from laissez faire governmental control to positive control by government.

Under the general category of liberalism, the beliefs, aspirations, and political implications of two types of liberalism are used interchangeably today, further confusing the meaning behind the term. Therefore, it is necessary to make the distinction between the two types of liberalism before continuing.

Classical Liberalism.

Because of the influence of American and European writers and the colonial experience with British control, liberals in America regarded government as a necessary evil. Herbert Spencer became a popular figure during the nineteenth century because he believed strongly in laissez faire government. His conviction that man was social only out of necessity corresponded closely with Rousseau's concept of man needing a social contract with his government. Man, in order to protect himself from government controls beyond his will, gave up certain inherent liberties in exchange for protection and services rendered by the state. Both Rousseau and Spencer were trying to find a society that left man as free as before he had to enter social control. The individual had

¹Harry Girvetz, The Evolution of Liberalism (New York: Collier Books, 1963), p. 23.

certain "inherent," "God-given" and "inalienable" rights granted to him by nature, which no state could take by force without being tyrannical. These "negative liberties," as they were called by contemporary liberals, could be repossessed in the form of a revolution if the state did not live up to its contract.¹

These social sentiments implied that man was a separate entity from his society and that such dualisms as man and nature, man and society, mind and body, and the will of the people versus the general will were to be studied in order to determine proper orders and causal relationships of man of man to his social setting.² This belief in dualisms was one of the most important differences between classical and contemporary liberalism. Further clarification of this difference is discussed later in the chapter.

Rousseau as a Classical Liberal.

Rousseau believed man to be born innately good and in harmony with himself in nature, but society and man-made institutions were unnatural and had to be guarded against and controlled by the sovereignty of the people.

¹Rousseau in the Social Contract went as far as to say a revolution was justified in order to bring about the needed conformity to the general will. This aspect of his writings was, by both the Americans and French radicals, used to justify revolution against unrepresentative governments.

²Robert MacIver, Social Causation (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1942), pp. 74-76. MacIver feels it is almost impossible to isolate variables that affect social causation. Hence one should not study causal factors, but consequences of action.

Society as it was lived in the eighteenth century destroyed all that was natural in man. In order to return to equality, Rousseau believed "man cannot create new forces, but only unite and direct those that exist,"¹ namely natural sentiments of will. Man became lazy, destructive, greedy and devious because he was not directed by nature, but by a system of institutionalized control.

There were four main assumptions viewed by the classical liberals as part of man's human nature in society:

(1) egoism; (2) intellectualism; (3) quietism; and (4) atomism.²

Egoism. Thomas Hobbes, John Stuart Mill and Rousseau believed man in society to be hedonistic, selfish, and egoistic. Mill and Rousseau considered "the greatest good for the greatest number" to be only expedient measures to prevent man from utter depravity. Both men viewed majority will just another aspect of tyranny.³ There was a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion over individual independence, This protected man against political despotism.⁴ Just how man was to be individualized and kept from egoism at the same time is far from clear. Rousseau

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, ed. and trans. by Masters, p. 360.

²Girvetz, pp. 28 - 47.

³J.S. Mill, "The Tyranny of the Majority," p. 328.

⁴Ibid.

claimed the general will would allow man to be free, but he must respect the general will, because it gave "the good" to all.

Intellectualism: Education as the Panacea. The Classical liberals considered man to be a rational animal. Through intellectual pursuits he could overcome laziness, quests for hedonistic pleasures, economic misery and most other inequalities of life.¹ Through education man was to overcome his self-centered appraisal and narrow insights. Education was viewed as almost a miracle panacea for man's social ineptitudes and was to bring man out of the depravity into which he had fallen. Contemporary liberals have a faith in education, but they also feel the need for additional government controls to correct usury and political exploitation. But faith in education still has not been a wholly convincing cure for social inequalities, even with government aid.

Quietism is a term Girvetz uses to describe man's state as an organism as stated by the classical liberals.² Man, according to these liberals, was in a state of rest until acted upon by external forces. This assumption reinforced the Rousseauian proposition that man would not work in a society

¹Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 5.

²The whole concept of man being a part of an organism denotes class distinction and superiority of one individual over the other. Some parts of the organism are more important than the others. See John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 60.

unless it was absolutely necessary. Institutionalization had made man lazy, exploitive and chained to unnatural loyalties. The Protestant work ethic in America became a means of social control, producing a social stigma on inactivity and welfare programs in general. In order to keep him out of trouble, man had to be given work in order to have a feeling of worth and accomplishment. The quest for money and material gain, however, became the opiate for feelings of helplessness and dissent that developed in the political sphere.¹ Instead of being an active participant, man became something to be conditioned and appeared through material gain.

Atomism. The atomistic concept of man mentioned by Girvetz recognized man as a part of society, but classical liberalists believed he had an existence apart from society as an individual. Man affected humanity around him, but it did not necessarily affect him individually. As a consequence, man became part of society, but he also was alienated and susceptible to exploitation by unscrupulous managers moralizing survival of the fittest and the greatest good for the greatest number.

Contemporary Liberalism

Myths such as a belief in "rugged individualism," the "self-made man," laissez faire economics, and majority rule emerged from the resultant industrial revolution as a deceptive symbol of freedom and democratic principles of the

¹Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), passim.

classical liberal tradition. Although the settlers of the American West cooperated with one another in order to survive all the hardships suffered, early historians romanticized the pioneer spirit as a union of man with Nature.¹ When "robber barons" and industrial complexes such as the oil industry, railroads, and public utilities assumed control of virtually all large industrial concerns, and when control of national local government became an extension of industrial power, a new group of liberals began to question the validity and conceptualization of individualistic potentiality and laissez-faire government. The anachronous belief that government withdrawal would allow for self-regulation in the Darwinian sense was examined for feasibility and substantiation. Classical liberalism was examined by a new group, calling it "a flaccid substitute for democracy."² Closing one's eyes to hardship, poverty and abuse was not an acceptable answer to the contemporary liberals. It was determined that the classical liberals' conception of democracy was being used to exploit individual worth and participation.

The community, the early medium for man's expression had waned and was replaced by powerful interest groups, unions and political factionalism. The large corporation was the "conscience-carrier" of society because the community no longer

¹See Frederick Jackson Turner's Frontier Thesis and the critical analysis by Carl Becker.

²Robert MacIver, Democracy and the Economic Challenge (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), pp. 26-27.

created a referent of responsibility or a way to test alternatives.¹ The classical liberalists' attempt to exalt the individual above the state had little hope for success in a nation already molded by industrial demands.

John Dewey as a Contemporary Liberal. From 1860 to 1920 the contemporary liberals made their case for reexamination of classical liberalism. Rousseau's concepts of negative government and education were perceived by the contemporary liberals as being as authoritarian as any Fascist government or English public school. These principles lacked individual participation and interaction except in the most elementary positive or negative sense.² Charles S. Peirce, James Baldwin, Edward Ross, G. Stanley Hall, Josiah Royce and John Dewey were some of the main authors who criticized and cited the limits of classical individualistic concepts: they advocated a social conscience rather than merely an individualistic conscience.³ As a result the new liberals embraced more government involvement because it gave "positive freedoms" rather than "negative liberties."⁴ Instead of "giving up" certain liberties in order to profit from

¹A.A. Berle, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1960), pp. 181-182.

²Thomas Hopkins, Interaction: The Democratic Process (Boston: D.C. Heath & Co., 1941), p. 4.

³R.J. Wilson, In Quest of Community (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), p. 27.

⁴Clarence Karier, et al, Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), p. 68.

larger governmental services, the contemporary liberals took a positive attitude toward government intervention. Governmental control was needed to restore the individual as a participating member of society. Through cooperation and participation by all individuals, they believed man could exceed his individual efforts for change and have a more representative government.

The community was to be reinstated as the social forum of action for the individual. Rather than leaving the decision-making process entirely up to majority will, the contemporary liberals felt that the community would provide the necessary medium for exchange of ideas. Instead of relying on causal factors and infallible general will, truth was again to become fallible and capable of change. Rules for evaluating evidence were no longer fixed by universals. Science, the scientific method and testing were to eliminate nonviable alternatives in favor of tested accomplishments. Instead of trying to find the causal factors behind the occurrence of certain events, the meaning of these events to humanity were to become more important.¹

Contemporary liberals felt that the problems of the time were not answered; they were either eliminated by the passage of time, or they just ceased to be urgent.² Earlier philosophers concentrated on the tremendous increase

¹Knight, Charles Peirce, pp. 12-65.

²John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy (New York: Holt & Co., 1910), p. 19.

of concrete conditions under which men had lived, but left the consequences of these conditions to be settled in a haphazard manner. This led to what Dewey termed "irrational habits, institutions, and a class and sectarian distribution of power between the stronger and the weaker." ¹ In an effort to eliminate struggles for power in favor of practical consequences for all, the contemporary liberals advocated the use of the scientific method of intelligence to determine authority and freedoms rationally.

The Experimental Method. Although the authors cited above varied in basic philosophy, each believed the individual to be conditioned, and not determined, by his culture. They felt that man could not exactly perceive the environment in which he was living, but he could come much closer to solving problems if he realized his relationship to the society and the mutual interdependence he experienced.² Man actually lived in an "ersatz reality" because he lived in a realm of what others (namely political leaders and industrial magnates) told him.³ Contemporary liberals further sensed that man not act as an individual in society without

¹John Dewey, Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), p. 9.

²M. McLuhan and Q. Fiori, War and Peace in the Global Village (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), p. 17.

³R.S. Morison, "The Need for a New Type of Excellence," Excellence and Leadership in a Democracy, edited by S. Granbard and G. Holton, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 195.

affecting those around him and himself.¹ Achieving the good life by anyone was not due to individual efforts, but to the combined efforts of all who were struggling to achieve the same ends. Only through pooled efforts and collective analysis could democratic ideals be realized and implemented.

What was probably most important in the movement was a belief in man's ability to make things better by experimentation.

The Liberalist Division

The difference between classical liberalism and contemporary liberalism has caused more serious disagreement between members of American society than any agreement. The fact that there is still a cultural lag and lack of participation by all adds to the credibility of this belief. Not only do Americans have conflicting opinions about the role of the individual, they have few ways of resolving this conflict in society. Classical liberalism has become a more conservative element in America's political structure, and contemporary liberalism a liberal element. Some authors believe that the liberal movement as a whole died with President Kennedy, and that Americans have embraced conservatism as a reaction to the rapid change affecting them. Paul Sexson, for example, believes that Americans have always been rather conservative, and have traditionally followed the conservative trend with or without any test of consequences affecting

¹Hopkins, p. 4.

their decisions.¹ Whatever one believes, there is disparity, disagreement, and an overall lack of consensus as to the meaning of democracy, representative government and the role played by the individual in society. This disagreement in itself would not be in opposition to the democratic process if Americans were honest and tolerant of each man's convictions. But instead, deceit, trickery, and manipulation pervade American politics, and political power has become the goal of the party system, government and man in general. Man has not only been alienated, he has been assimilated into the whole, thereby compounding the feeling of helplessness in an overwhelming political process.

The Prevailing Rousseauian Democracy. Americans have the problem of adapting the changed political machinery of power politics and technological imperialism to the still-prevalent concepts of Rousseauian democracy. Although contemporary liberalist doctrines are expounded in America, the Rousseauian democratic ideal remains as a more prevalent model. Edward H. Carr states three propositions of American democracy supposedly agreed upon by the populace: (1) the individual conscience is the ultimate source of decisions; (2) there exists between individuals a harmony of interests (core values); and (3) rational decision are made when action is taken on the part of society through discussion

¹Paul Sexson and Stephen Miles, The Challenge of Conservatism (New York: Exposition Press, 1964), p. 16.

(collective intelligence).¹ All of these contemporary liberalist propositions have been challenged. Carr thinks the American public comes much closer to a "general will" of pre-supposed authority and that there is no individual conscience.² America has a "mass democracy" instead of a democratic, well-informed, participating group of individuals in the Deweyan sense.³ This issue is manifested in loyalty oaths, committees on un-American activities, closed shops, party discipline and the "silent majority."⁴ Recent American involvement in Southeast Asia brought this issue to the forefront. Senator Richard Schweiker described this entanglement as the "result of a remote and unresponsive government." He further states:

If we systematically eliminate the participation of private citizens in our government process, we will build a private cocoon for ourselves which will ultimately smother American political freedoms as we know them. I reject the contention that our representative government demand too much participation from individual citizens. We must demand more participation. I propose to you today that we join in a system of broadbased participatory politics that meet the challenges of the 70's.⁵

Dewey felt that trying to discriminate between individual rights and social responsibility deterred attempts to

¹Blackington and Patterson, School, Society, and the Professional Educator (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), p. 267. reprinted from E.H. Carr, The New Society, (London: Macmillan Co., 1951).

²Ibid., p. 266.

³Ibid., p. 268.

⁴Ibid., p. 269.

⁵Richard Schweiker, Commencement Address, Widener College Press, 1959, p. 19.

find the real problems at hand. "If we eliminate the social factor from the child, we are left only with an abstraction; if we eliminate the individual factor from society, we are left only with an inert lifeless mass."¹ Dewey further argued that American belief in mass society had "reached the point of reverence for mediocrity; for submergence of individuality in mass ideas and creeds."² Not only has the contemporary liberalist movement failed in America, but liberalism in general has suffered at the hands of conservative reaction to unparalleled change.

The Decline of Liberalism. The decline of liberalism in general has been a popular topic of discussion in contemporary literature. One reason for the decline, according to Paul Sexson, is a lack of combined effort. The liberal tends to avoid substantive issues and provides only a minority opinion for argument. The power of liberalism, according to Sexson, is only in dissent, and it lacks the fortitude to carry hard issues to a conclusion.³ "Liberals have proven to be participants in domestic affairs, but inept in foreign affairs."⁴

¹Martin Dworkin, Dewey on Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 1959), p. 19.

²John Dewey, Characters and Events (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929), p. 474.

³Sexson and Miles, p. 16.

⁴ibid.

Other conservatives such as Clarence Karier assume that such liberals as Dewey sought to preserve the system with his pragmatic approach to education and government. Karier felt that pragmatists really did not deal with moral issues of the day; instead they dealt with the problem of how to survive in a capitalist system.¹ Vocational education, according to Karier, was Dewey's way of fitting people into the system rather than helping them determine their own problems.² In times of crisis, the liberals turned more to the right and became as reactionary as any conservative to any change. Americans have the "roots of crisis" because the liberals fail to answer or even analyze the problems at hand. Contemporary liberals eliminate the dualisms by "blurring the opposites."³

Those defending contemporary liberalism take the opposite view. They feel that never before has the American voter had more decisions to make in democratic history. The tremendous increase of media technology and the knowledge explosion have made Americans more informed than was thought possible fifty years ago. The Supreme Court has made recent disputes a public matter, thereby expanding the franchise

¹Karier, et al, pp. 16-21.

²ibid., p. 21.

³Ibid., p. 106

⁴John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927), p. 48.

of those affected by their decisions.¹ To the contemporary liberal, Rousseauian appeals to emotion commonly expressed by politicians and advertisers, have nullified the practice of "cooperative experimental intelligence."² The fault lies not with the movement, but with individuals who claim to be liberal and practice the opposite.

Liberalism as a movement is in danger "unless it attacks the fear of the unknown."³ Dewey went beyond Carr's argument and placed the blame on the classical liberals for the growth of illiberalism. He stated: "We have been so taught to respect the beliefs of our neighbors that few will respect the beliefs of our neighbors when they depart from the accepted norms."⁴ The culmination of illiberalism in America occurred perhaps with the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as was suggested by Charles Forcey.⁵ Regardless of the accusations placed on the liberalist movement, and by whom, this country is experiencing a period of frustration concerning the power and worth of the individual in social action. Conformity to tradition and conservative reaction to unprecedented change

¹John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927), p. 48.

²Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1935), p. 47.

³Ibid, p. 452.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Charles Forcey, The Crossroads of Liberalism (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961), p. X.

are as much to blame as the factionalism in the political arena.

Rule of the Majority as Conformity.

Conformity to the crowd is a part of the American quest for approval. Americans as a people are what David Reisman calls "other-directed."¹ As a result, they confuse the right to dissent with being radical or reactionary against American ideals. Public opinion, therefore, becomes synonymous with conformity. Dewey was quick to point out that the rule of the majority could turn into a dictatorship of the majority.² Juan Ortega observed that never had anyone ruled for any long period basing his rule on any other thing than public opinion.³ He further commented, however, that public opinion could be swayed to conformity out of fear and indoctrination.

What has determined good leadership in America and any other country has been the ability of the leaders to anticipate or manipulate public comment. As a representative government, Americans elect officials to represent them in the legislative process. How well they represent their constituents is usually determined by the election process. But as a result, there is relatively little control of these

¹David Reisman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 8-36.

²Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 18.

³J. Ortega Y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1932), p. 126.

representatives except during re-election years. But all of the blame cannot be placed on the politicians. Even when legislators solicit responses from their constituents, there is a marked lack of any rejoinder. This denotes not only a lack of committed responsibility, but also a lack of communication.

Kimball and McClellan still consider democracy to be the best form of representation, even though "the range of choices has increased to the point where no one can be said to choose rationally on any significant portion of his lifestyle."¹ These authors believe the elected officials, however, know more about the issues anyway because they have staffs researching the material. Walter Lippmann contends that people do not have the time to be full-time citizens, and as a consequence, the government assumes the responsibility. Out of "necessity" the vote of the people becomes a positive or negative sanction. The people reign, but they do not govern.² Dewey disagrees with Lippmann, maintaining that the people lose their bargaining power with governing officials just because they cease to practice their privileges of discussion and dissent. He has, however a basic faith in human nature few of the classical liberals or conservatives seem to favor. Although Dewey's "common man" was capable of making decisions and participating in government he was not given

¹Kimball and McClellan, p. 138.

²Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), pp. 14, 20, 60, 72-73.

this mandate. Dewey felt thumb control by few would continue if the public was incapable of widescale discussion.

On some occasions the public has made its opinions known, but there are so many other situations when discussions concerning alternative plans to action are not analyzed. Dewey thought that a return to a local community atmosphere would return public deliberation. In order to have a "Great Community," Dewey determined that all had to have the opportunity to participate. Only through communication could the issues of the day be solved through cooperation.

To contemporary liberals, the answer to representative government was not in power politics of the majority, as was contended by Max Weber, but by testing alternatives and all the possible courses of action by all the people.¹ Power politics had already alienated so many from the decision-making process that a lack of knowledge of the citizens about political issues made the public impotent as a directing force. The rule of the majority was more of a mandate for the legislators to legislate until a situation arose that could not be tolerated by the whole society (such as the Vietnam situation). The "silent majority" in recent years is beginning to be heard for the first time, but the contemporary liberal would ask: Should this happen only when things become unbearable?

¹Richard Bendix, Max Weber (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960), p. 447.

The Escape from Freedom. Erich Fromm surmises that during this transitional period in America, man has "escaped from freedom," and his conformity and tendency to follow the crowd has assimilated him into a social will and mass democracy. As a consequence, the power blocs in government have eliminated the choice of discussing alternatives.¹ The percentage of voters attending the polls during election times testifies to the fact that Americans see little point in voting any more on important issues.² Fromm's thesis is that Americans have actually given up their rights and privileges as citizens in order to escape the responsibility of commitment.

General Welfare. Legislation in the name of general welfare can be considered as much a travesty of individual consent as any other reason heretofore mentioned.³ The government has passed many acts of legislation, to include federal aid to education and social welfare programs, but they have been less effective in promoting welfare in general. The vast administrative network formed to control general welfare programs further assimilates, and at the same time, alienates,

¹Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1951), p. 78.

²Recent 1972 polls indicate 62 million eligible Americans did not vote in the last presidential election, even though it was one of the largest turnouts ever. Fronlash statistics, November 15, 1973.

³Don Adams and Gearald Reagan, Schooling and Social Change (New York: David McKay & Co., 1972), p. 222.

the individual into oblivion. What makes the situation almost comical is the lack of knowledge each governmental department has of the others' doings.¹ Instead of trying to alleviate the problem of nonentity, the oppressed try to become the oppressors.² Power struggles have become more important than the issues, and in the name of efficiency, mankind has become a debilitating link in the system.

Failure of Nerve. Americans have what Gilbert Murray first termed a "new failure of nerve," much like the Greeks suffered during Roman occupation.³ Americans no longer think they can solve everything with science or even the scientific method. To the contrary, they have recently attacked the scientific method, pragmatic approaches to educational goals, reconstructionist attempts to change the system within the schools, and the use of tested alternatives, in order to justify untested hypotheses and irrational judgement lately contended.⁴ Because scientific advancements have alienated them from the non-material culture, Americans have reverted to mysticism and tradition. Previous conjecture that man is rational animal has been proven to be wrong many times in

¹Ben Bagdikian, "The Press and the Crisis of Identity," Mass Media in a Free Society, ed. by W. Agee (Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1969), pp. 8-9.

²Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970).

³Sidney Hook, The Quest for Being (New York: Delta Books, 1963), p. 80.

⁴Ibid., pp. 80-83.

history.¹ Rather, one might disagree with Plato and agree with Hegel; man has accomplished more from passion than from anything else. But can passion and irrational thought prevail as the method of social determination?

Value-Free Scientific Advancements. Despite the lack of intelligent decision-making practices and the "failure of nerve" during this century, science has triumphed as the problem-solver extraordinaire in the material culture. But it has left the non-material culture with few corresponding answers to its problems. The result is a "value-free conception of science" that provides no responsibility for its actions.² Science alone cannot solve social problems without having corresponding values to control its implications to the society. Scientists have placed that value in an individualist mode, and have not responded to social needs. Senator Levin of North Carolina, considered a conservative in politics, has warned Congress and the American people that individual rights might be endangered by "blinding faith in science."³ The result has been a reaction to science; not an attempt to find the new values needed to combat alienation.

Americans have become specialized into small divisions of labor that would have baffled Adam Smith, but in the

¹Lloyd Williams, "Some Speculations on Man and Civilization," Oklahoma Phi Delta Kappa Lecture, 1972.

²Abraham Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 24.

³Ervin, Phi Delta Kappan, vol. LV, no. 1, September, 1973, p. 85.

process they have become "spectators in discussion."¹ Reliance on computer sciences has made even the predictions and alternatives of possible courses of action free of any corresponding responsibility to all the public. Recent predictions by polls and computers are astonishingly accurate in light of supposedly unlimited possibilities. But the possibilities have been limited by the demands of the technology and adherence to tradition.

Americans have fallen prey to historicism and tradition, resting on laurels that were found in a haphazard manner. The scientific method, despite the efforts of the progressives and other liberalist attempts to change the schools to meet future needs, has been attacked and defeated by more conservative essentialist and perennialist doctrines advocating factual information. The growing popularity of existential thought has indicated the displeasure of some people with the culture at present. In an effort to glean out of this society what is needed for one's own happiness, existential philosophers are experiencing recent celebrated praise for their writings. It is suggested that behaviorist doctrines are also receiving more notoriety because they too have reduced education to simplistic terms. Concentrating on the "what" rather than the "why" of things, they have eliminated the study of causal factors behind man's nature. No longer does man need to really think about consequences or even

¹Blackington and Patterson, p. 22.

causes, he is trained to respond to the proper conditions as desired by the ruling body. Just how these conditions are determined is a matter of conjecture unanswered by many educators. Because of the speed of change and valuefree concepts in science, Americans have reverted to traditional methods, arrived at through the "knowing" representatives in government and industry.

Victims of Culture. Knowledge is increasing at an alarming rate, doubling every ten years.¹ Americans have consequently become what Harvey Laudin calls "victims of culture," because they have not been given the opportunity to think for themselves. In order to eliminate "prolonged infantilism" caused by a lack of faith in the public, Laudin advocates a return of public deliberation.² He contends that in order to accomplish this, the schools must not only transmit the culture, but also show the method of problem-solving.³ This is in full agreement with Deweyan and reconstructionistic doctrines.

Laudin feels Americans in the schools are taught to be proud of what they do not know.⁴ Argument in favor of educational problem-solving is not new. It is a revival of

¹Harvey Laudin, Victims of Culture (Columbus: C.E. Merrill Pub. Co., 1973), p. 17.

²Ibid., p.128

³Ibid., p.62.

⁴Ibid. See also John Lilly, The Center of the Cyclone (New York: Julian Press, 1972), p. XII.

pragmatic and reconstructionistic doctrines; but often educators are willing to grasp at any new straws in order to accomplish their proposed aims. These philosophies, consequently, suffered at the hands of more conservative viewpoints and lost popularity because of their improper usage. Placing reconstructionism in the same category as other less popular progressive ideals has nullified its potentiality as a viable educational philosophy. The emphasis placed on the schools as the medium of social change has been virtually unheeded, as witnessed by undemocratic principles practiced in the schools. Although most educators would agree that democratic principles should be taught in the schools, few teach or practice these principles in the classroom. Instead, America's children learn democracy as a subject, and are not accorded the opportunity to practice it.

Adams and Reagan allege that there are two new major trends in the structure of American education: (1) planning, efficiency and accountability; and (2) the rise of equality of opportunity.¹ The reasoning behind the accountability and efficiency trends stems from what the authors term intense dissatisfaction with present educational practices. Based on the assumption that there is a given amount of material and certain facts to be taught, educators are judged according to their ability to relate this knowledge. Equal opportunity has become a major trend in

¹Adams and Reagan, pp. 269-297.

education, not because it is necessarily the need of the public, but because it receives pressure from government legislation. Despite guarantees from the Constitution, it has taken hundreds of years to even try to enforce these ideals.

A third and more radical suggestion has been to "deschool" the society to prevent brainwashing, conformity and compliance with governmental and technological dictates.¹ This approach to the education dilemma, however, has been met with opposition by almost all but the most radical educator, mainly because of the attack on and the elimination of the school as an institution. Most prefer to work within the system rather than having everyone fend for himself in his educational endeavors. But it is interesting to note this alternative is even suggested.

Purpose of the Study

Because of the transitional nature of American society and the corresponding lack of communication, America faces a crisis-culture. No longer can Americans stay in isolation and hope the problems of their time go away. Nothing is accomplished without diligent effort on the part of all. Americans will have to solve not only their own problems, but also assist in other world problems in order to survive in peaceful coexistence.

¹See the writings of Everett Reimer and Ivan Illich.

In early days, educational endeavors were constituted in memorization of the three R's. Education was not especially needed to help a person survive; he learned about life in the living. Later, however, schools helped maintain hierarchical structures. Knowledge was "colonized" to preserve the capitalist system.¹ Schools promoted job preparation. In the present post-industrial society, this purpose has not changed. It is this author's contention that it should. Any social problem has educational implications for both the present and the future, and learning the method of problem-solving and promoting the method of collective intelligence are important and necessary preparations for successful cooperative living.

The purpose of this study is to compare the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey to determine the influence of each to the concept of democracy in American educational and social practices. Both Rousseau and Dewey lived in transitional times, and each had suggestions for improvement of the corresponding social evils, but the approach taken by each varies considerably in the political and educational domains. This study examines the role of politics, and of the electorate, the meaning of democracy and the corresponding role of education in American society. The comparison of Rousseau to Dewey is chosen because the writings of each have been accepted in America as possible modes of

¹Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay Co., 1974), p. 364.

of democratic operation under which a governmental body should progress. The ensuing disparity in America as to the role of government and education is partially attributable to the difference between general will and collective intelligence. Although these terms are considered political concepts, they have educational implications. The conclusion of the study is speculative but speculation is inevitable when dealing with the future. It is suggested that America is using Rousseauian concepts of democracy (developed in a pre-industrial era) in a post-industrial society that needs reinterpretation, re-evaluation and consensual validation of the meaning of terminology.

It must be noted that both of these authors have been misquoted, misconstrued, misinterpreted and taken out of context on many occasions. This study is designed to clarify the meaning of these authors with respect to their political and educational philosophies. Both authors expressed apprehension about being misunderstood by their age, and their apprehensions were well founded.

An analysis is given to how each man answers the following questions: What type of government is most conducive to the most desirable educational system? What is the relationship of the individual to his society in terms of participation? What is the difference between general will and collective intelligence with respect to educational purpose? What inconsistencies of terms, concepts or philosophies does American society have in its educational

goals attributable to disparities between interpretations of Rousseau and Dewey? What concepts do Dewey and Rousseau agree upon that will serve as a basis of agreement for future educational endeavors?

Delimitations.

Certain delimitations are needed to narrow the scope of the study to a workable size. Emphasis is placed on the educational implications of each man's concept of democracy, the role of the participating individual in society, and the difference between general will and collective intelligence with respect to educational outcomes. No effort will be made to evaluate them as philosophers per se, but understanding important philosophical concepts in terms of general will and collective intelligence as paramount to the study. The next two chapters deal with the meaning each author held for general will and collective intelligence, while the fourth chapter compares them. The last chapter of this study is dedicated to possible future educational implications. As a reconstructionist, this author has taken a "defensible partiality" and stated his educational priorities for the future.

Related Literature

Several competent works are utilized to provide the background needed for the study. Rousseau's Emilé, Social Contract, Considerations on the Government of Poland, Discourses and the treatise on Corsican government, translated by Rhys, Vaughn and Boyd, respectively, are the basic

volumes utilized to interpret general will and the meaning of terms such as democracy, freedom and the role of the individual in society. Other works, such as C.E. Vaughn's The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau in two volumes, Lester Crocker's Rousseau's Social Contract, Roger Master's The Political Philosophy of Rousseau, Judith Shklar's Men and Citizens, and Alfred Cobban's Rousseau and the Modern State are most helpful works determining the integration of Rousseau's social and political philosophy with his educational philosophy.

John Dewey's The Public and Its Problems, Creative Intelligence, Problems of Men, Freedom and Culture, Individualism: Old and New, Liberalism and Social Action, Human Nature and Conduct, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and A Common Faith are especially useful works for finding the meaning of collective intelligence and the role of the individual in society. Other works such as Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, The Way Out of Educational Confusion, Democracy and Education, and numerous articles are used to determine the basis of Deweyan educational philosophy. Unpublished dissertations by Podeschi and Schultz have been useful for an analysis of Dewey's education for the community. Joann Boydston's Guide to the Works of John Dewey and John Powell's Philosophy of Education: A Selected Bibliography have helped in the search for critics of Dewey. Works by Joseph Ratner and Martin Dworkin are also worth mentioning as general texts.

Volumes by Harry Girvetz, Isaiah Berlin, Frank Blackington and Robert Patterson, A.A. Berle, Charles Forcey and Dewey himself in Liberalism and Social Action are helpful for making the distinction between classical and contemporary liberalism in America.

Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man, Edward H. Carr's The New Society, Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies, David Reisman's The Lonely Crowd, Charles Reich's The Greening of America, Solon Kimball and James McClellan's Education and the New America, Paulo Freire's Pedogogy of the Oppressed and several works by Robert MacIver William Stanley, Abraham Maslow and Robert Theobald provide the background the the discussion of technological oppression and the concept of mass democracy. Several other contemporary authors such as George Leonard, John Holt, Paul Goodman, Ivan Illich, Colin Greer and Marshall McLuhan are included as references for specifying the inconsistencies practiced in American educational practices. Works by Robert Theobald, Theodore Brameld and John Dewey furnish the material necessary for this author's appraisal of educational priorities for a transitional, post-industrial society.

Definition of Terms.

General Will - A will that pre-exists the collective vote of the people. It is what mankind should will for the good of all. It is the sovereign legislator in governmental matters. It is determined by the Legislators and eventually the people when they are indoctrinated to follow natural inclinations rather than individual desires.

Will of the People - The vote of the majority for a specific time frame. It is usually couched in self-interest, emotion and lack of reason. It becomes the general will only if it abides with an already-proposed plan of action for the good of all.

Collective Intelligence - Social self-realization through communication. It is a logic of method, or an integration of intellect--a pooling of experiences in order to allow for validation of everyone's experience. This method of intelligence must be used in order to provide the information needed to arrive at tested conclusions that have the needed consequences. Theodore Brameld calls it "consensual validation."

Crisis-Culture - The inability of a society to cope with problems, advances in technology, or rapid change due to adherence to tradition. Emotional or biased use of authority without finding all the consequences and alternatives.

Community - It is as much a "process of deliberation as substance or geographical area." Conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all.

Classical Liberalism - An appeal to nature as the model for mankind to follow. Man has inalienable rights that cannot be violated without his consent. Man has an existence apart from society and makes a "contract" with his government for certain services rendered by the state. Man is basically lazy, hedonistic and selfish and has to be protected from exploitation.

Contemporary Liberalism - It is the degree to which man should have collective control over individual behavior. Man is conditioned and not determined by society. Man must be collectively involved in the democratic process and must participate in order to validate his experiences.

Core Values - Values held in common by a society for specific purposes and goals.

Post-industrial Society - It is a society based on cybernation, extensive communications, and industrial complexes that make the present society no longer operational. Preparation for fitting into the work force is no longer a priority of education.

CHAPTER II

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU'S CONCEPT OF THE GENERAL WILL, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY

And those times passed away, when men saw the Great Truth, which is this: That all men are one and that there is no will save the will of all men together... We are one in all and all in one. There are no men but only the great WE, one, divisible and forever.

--Ayn Rand, Anthem

The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God: and however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact.

--Alexander Hamilton
Federal Convention, June 18, 1787.

The General Will

Discovering the meaning of "general will" and determining all its implications to a social organization is a difficult and far more complicated task than was first believed by this writer. It is the foundation of Rousseau's political, moral and educational philosophies. In order to understand fully contemporary problems in American cultural history, a true meaning of general will in social context, as defined by Rousseau, is needed. Understanding its intent for mankind furnishes estimable insight for present perplexities extant in American civilization.

It is discerned by this author that few really know the meaning of general will and the full philosophical implications it implies, even though much of the meaning of the term "democracy" in America is based on Rousseauian interpretation. Students of Rousseau have used the term to exert their own private wills and justify revolution; they have used general will as a mandate for untested assumptions and as authority for elimination of opposition that would have shocked Rousseau himself.¹ It is therefore, necessary to define general will as Rousseau proposed it. Just how the concept has been adulterated, applied to fit only tangential situations, and misconstrued in America is the object of later chapters.

General Will Defined

There is no simple definition of general will. It is an abstract concept and is subject to change according to the interpretation of the people involved. The best avenue of approach, therefore, is to first determine what is known about the meaning and how it is applied in Rousseau's state.

Rousseau tried to tie his moral psychology and political theory together by making every ethical act of the general will a political act as well.² The general will was

¹Annie Osborn, Rousseau and Burke (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1940), p. 15.

²Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens (Cambridge: University Press, 1969), p. 184.

the "living body of constitutional law." ¹ The general will was "living" because Rousseau conceptualized the authority of the state as resting with the people. In order to be general "a will need not always be unanimous, but every vote must be counted. Any exclusion is a breach of generality." ² The general will, then, is Rousseau's definition of the authority of the people. State power to control comes from this authority. Everyone must be included in the determination of the general will because the general will must draw its mandate from the whole. However, as one continues to examine Rousseau's meaning, certain inconsistencies become apparent.

The general will is inalienable and implies a collective consciousness. ³ Rousseau believed "the nearer opinion reaches unanimity, the greater dominance of the general will." ⁴ Although Rousseau admits that there need not be any unanimity, he also admits that the general will needs some sort of mandate from the people. His escape mechanism from the trap of contradiction is his belief in the "Legislators" as those knowledgeable of the general will. This contention is in close accord with Plato's role of the

¹Osborn, p. 16.

²J. Rousseau, Social Contract, trans, by R. Rhys, The Social Contract and Discourses by Jean Jacques Rousseau (New York: E.P. Dutton Co., 1913) II, p. 1.

³See later comparison between general will and will of the people later in chapter.

⁴Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Rhys, II, p. 92.

philosopher-king. What has to be present as opposed to mere majority are common objectives for the common good. Without these, the general will is not being followed. Osborn summarizes: "Whether unanimous or not, so long as the citizens were conscious of their solidarity as a group and voted for the one objective common to them all, the majority vote would register the general will." ¹

According to Rousseau, it is not often, however, that the public needs to vote on issues that arise. He views the general will as an "abstract entity, preexisting the collective vote."² It is a law of reason that has stood the test of time.³ Rousseau states: "It must be thought that it (general will) is only the excellence of ancient wills which could have conserved them for so long."⁴ The general will, then, is a universal that improves with the passage of time; it is what is universally good for the people, regardless of what they think is good for them at a particular time. Here again, Rousseau has demonstrated that the public is not always well-informed and that "Legislators" may have to show the people the proper political path to follow.

¹Osborn, p. 168.

²C.E. Vaughn, ed., The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau (Cambridge: University Press, 1915). Vol. I, p. 70.

³Ibid., pp. 16-17.

⁴Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Masters, p. 383.

The term "general" in general will must have two connotations: (1) general in object or interest (universal); and (2) general held (common to the great majority at any time).¹ It is the "will of the moral person known as the state."² The people are the state and become a superpersonality (in relation to just a collection of personalities); they are a single being acting in concert with a common interest.³

In order to clarify further the meaning of general will, Rousseau makes a distinction between the general will and the "will of the people."

The General Will versus the Will of the People

Rousseau makes an important distinction between the will in general (la volonte generale) and the will of individual (la volonte de tous). One of the problems people face in Rousseau's society is the true determination of the general will, and too often in the name of the general will, only the sum of the most powerful wills governs as law (will of the people). Rousseau claims that the general will is not a sum of the individual wills taken separately, but rather, it implies a collective consciousness much like

¹Osborn, p. 169.

²Ibid.,

³Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1966), Volume I, p. 50.

a "public spirit."¹ This is not to say that the general will excludes each individual will. ". . . On the contrary, it (general will) must take up all into itself. It may remold them (all individual wills), it may transform them; the more completely it does so the better. But at least it must include them all; it must draw its mandate from them all."²

The Method of Coercion, The Interest Factor and the Time Frame

The key to understanding the difference between general will and will of the people is in: (1). the method of coercion; (2). the time frame used; and (3). the interest factor. A person may be molded and transformed by the rest of the public, but it has to be by the whole community in conformity to the general will. Coercion by the majority does not necessarily mean the general will is being followed; it may be only a controlling faction. Rousseau believed that the general will was not determined by the amount of voices that can, at any moment, be heard (this is again will of the people). Rather, it was determined by the one interest that united the citizens, i.e., education.³ Interest in this context is not perfectly clear. However, Rousseau best describes interest of the people as the replacement of

¹Rousseau, Emile, trans. by C.E. Vaughn, The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Vol. 11, p. 28.

²Ibid., p. 64.

³Osborn, p. 169.

inequalities of nature with that of civil equality.¹ He further defines interest as that which is for the good of all. The method of coercion and the interest factor are two aspects of the general will that needed definition. The time frame, however, is the most important factor to consider.

Possibly the greatest difference between general will and will of the people is the time frame used. The meaning of "will" in general will is defined as holding steadfast to some principle, purpose or plan in the face of temptation or distraction. "Its sphere of operation is defined by the purpose at hand; it is a reinforcement of purpose, not a source of alternative purposes."² Rousseau agrees with Plato--the will is the warrior of the soul. "Its function is to make sure that the purposes and principles decided on by reason are carried out."³ Any decisions, therefore, made by the public in any time frame is not a general will, unless it abides by an already-proposed plan of action affecting the people in general. The general will has universal meaning, transcending time and situations that tend to deviate the populace from its presupposed goals. The will of the people has no such lasting effect, and is usually only a majority decision for one particular moment in time.

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, trans by Shklar, p. 39.

²R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1966), p. 33.

³Ibid.

Rousseau chided men of his age for making decisions that had no lasting affect and were couched in self-interest, emotion, and lack of reason, and designating those decisions as tenents of the general will. Such decisions were what were earlier termed wills of the people. According to Rousseau, what was needed for a general will was not only the sum of individual wills, but also the cancellation of extreme opinionation. He stated:

Remove from these same wills (will of the people) the more and less which destroy each other and the general will remains as the sum of the differences.¹

It is more important to note Rousseau's overall plan. In order to eliminate control by vested interests and mandatory decisions made by non-elected officials, he tried to negate the authority of other wills besides the general will. The general will was closest to the will of nature, and therefore had to be for the good of all.

Nature and Society

Return to Nature

The belief that Rousseau intended that people should literally return to nature to escape from society is a travesty of his meaning. In a state of nature, Rousseau's natural man schemed and fought for his own advantage just as much as any other animal. He was restless and a creature of appetite, but at least he was not corrupted by social

¹Rousseau, Contrat Social II, iii, p. III.

institutions.¹ Rousseau felt that a literal return to nature would merely return man to the life of an animal.² What Rousseau really wanted was a return to dependence on "things" rather than people. In this way, man followed the natural order in the course of nature instead of individual wills. Rousseau was criticized by Burke and others for giving an expression to a desire to return to the simple life of "natural" man, away from the burdens of civilized life. What Rousseau in fact criticized was a society that corrupted man into utter depravity. It was no so much a love for nature Rousseau expressed, but a hate for the institutions that made man lower than the animals.

Contrary to the beliefs of many authors, Rousseau does see natural inequalities in man and he feels society enhances this disparity through voluntary associations and limited education. Robert Ardrey agrees that equality of individuals is a natural impossibility. This, he contends, is the first law of vertebrates. What Ardrey (and earlier Rousseau) contends revolves about what he calls the second law of vertebrates--equality of opportunity. Ardrey states:

The just society. . . is one in which sufficient order protects members, whatever their diverse endowments, and sufficient disorder provides every individual with with full opportunity to develop his genetic endowment whatever it may be.³

¹Robert MacIver, On Community, Society and Power (Chicago: Univ. Press, 1970), p. 83.

²Shklar, p. 10.

³Robert Ardrey, The Social Contract (New York: Delta Books, 1970), p. 3.

Rousseau believes men are beasts in society because of the lack of freedom in the class system, material inequalities, and control of interests by the few.¹ According to Rousseau, what is needed is sufficient control by government to give man a notion of the right and wrong ways of doing things.² A man should be able to develop his own character, but the rules imposed on him should be the rules of the society, not his own. During Rousseau's time, the "built-in" notion of right and wrong was not determined by the whole at all--sovereignty was in the hands of the monarch and the church. Rousseau once quipped the Emperor Caligula reasoned that either kings were gods or men were beasts.³ By this analysis, Rousseau wanted to point out the tremendous disparity between the powers of those who rule and those who serve.

Unnatural Society

Rousseau believed that no man had natural authority over his fellow man. Society was not a natural thing at all; it could only be a product of reason.⁴ Natural law was to be replaced with a law of reason that stood the test of time

¹Shklar, p. 28. In Rousseau's model for Corsica, he advocated no accumulation of material wealth because it produced inequalities.

²R.S. Peters, p. 238.

³Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Rhys, p. 41.

⁴Emile Durkheim, Montesquieu and Rousseau (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 25.

(general will).¹ He stated:

Once we enter society, our self is doomed to suffer from conflicts between our instincts and our socially acquired urges. . . We need a faculty to protect us from inner threats of our own happiness That is why the will, when in command, makes us feel whole, and gives us a feeling of self-possession.²

Rousseau felt that what made society corrupt was the lack of will in the order of things. Rousseau further stated: "The will has ceased to be ruler of actions. It is far more the force that orders men's inner life and defends it against compulsion."³

Rousseau blames the governmental system itself for being the "force" that determines man's life, rather than will. Thoreau later agreed, stating:

The government itself, which is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it.⁴

Rousseau would also tend to agree with W.I. Thomas, who argued:

No political system can work because no political system can escape the structural contradictions inherent in the necessity of achieving values in a system which subverts the values themselves.⁵

¹Vaughn, Vol I, pp. 16-17.

²Rousseau, Social Contract trans. by Shklar, pp. 72-73.

³Ibid.

⁴H.D. Thoreau, The Variorum Civil Disobedience (New York: Twayne Pub. Co., 1967), p. 31

⁵W.I. Thomas, At the Edge of History (New York: Harper Books, 1972), pp. 120-121.

Political systems not only tend to subdivide the population into interest groups, but in order to accomplish their intentions, they act undemocratically.¹

Rousseau would not agree with David Truman, who states:

We do not need to account for a totally inclusive interest, because one does not exist.²

To Rousseau, there are universals in nature that affect all, and are for the good of all. But as was noted earlier, he entertains the notion that man must leave nature and intellectually conform to natural law. "In order to leave the state of nature, . . . men cannot create new forces, but only direct those (intellectually) that exist. . . making them act in concert."³ Hence:

The only datum which is a certain and solid basis for principles of political right is the will, because it is the conscious and perceptible manifestation of man's sentiment of his own existence, the only sentiment which necessarily existed in the state of nature and is still shared by all human beings.⁴

It is therefore deduced that Rousseau only wanted to return to nature to extract the will of mankind before he was corrupted by society in which he now lives--it was not a literal return to nature.

¹Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), passim. See also Intermediate Groups, this chapter.

²David Truman, The Government Process (New York: A. Knopf Co., 1951), p. 51

³Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Masters, p. 324.

⁴Ibid.

Intermediate Groups

In order to combat social evils of the time, Rousseau advocated: (1) the elimination of class distinction in education; (2) an end to the control of the government process by the privileged; and (3) the reduction of other socially acquired powers that produced inequalities. His main contention concerning inequality in society (which still plagues us today) was concentrated in the growth of intermediate groups. These organizations, not necessarily the people themselves, determined what was good for society in general, and consequently did not follow naturally--good or generally--held inclinations.

Rousseau argued that it was the organization of the larger civilizations that actually took rights away from the citizens. It was "the superior force of one group over the others."¹ Rousseau further stated:

When one of these associations is so large that it wins out over all the others, you no longer have as a result a sum of differences, but a single difference; then there is no longer a general will, and the view that wins out is only a private view.²

Intermediate groups, to Rousseau, were the principal cause of not only the negation of general will, but also the manipulation of opinions to suit the needs of only a selective few. As a matter of record, Rousseau advocated no communication between members of interest groups because

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Masters, p. 436.

²Ibid., p. 312.

communication was apt to generalize differences more strongly and separate men from the general will. He stated:

If, when people, sufficiently informed, deliberate, and the citizens have had no communication amongst themselves, from the great number of small differences, the general will will always result; and the deliberations will always be right. But when there are factions and partial associations at the expense of the great association, the will of each association becomes general in relation to each of its members, and private in relation to the State.¹

Original Sin

Rousseau did not believe man to be inherently and naturally bad. The fact that man had pity in his soul was proof to him that man born to nature was born good.² Man was not "shapen (sic) in iniquity" and "conceived in sin."³ Rather, his natural inclinations were good; society changed his natural inclinations from cooperation and compassion to competition and power over others. Because he defied the divine right of kings to rule over others, and religious doctrines advocating original sin, Rousseau witnessed the burning and banning of his works throughout Europe. But, he could do nothing else but believe in man's natural goodness if he was to break the clutches of religious and monarchical will.

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Vaughn, Vol. 1, p. 71.

²Masters, pp. 150-156.

³Psalms, 51:5

Condemnation of Society

Besides being unnatural, Rousseau condemned society for two other noted reasons: (1) competition; and (2) dependence on individuals instead of things.¹ Man became corrupt in society because society rested on power and exploitation rather than law and cooperation. Society was unnatural because man tended to put himself before the general welfare, which to Rousseau was an unnatural act in itself.² In order for man to participate in government and make him as free as he was in nature, a pact between man and government was needed--a social contract.

The Social Contract

Rousseau's social contract was his answer to the Hobbesian question: How can we have an association that enlists all and still let the individual remain as free as before? He saw a need for social control, but not at the expense of individual integrity. When relating his thoughts to a friend about the French government in 1740, Rousseau stated: "The cost of the objectives of society is too high for the individual."³

As a means of social control in society, Rousseau advocated contracting individual rights to the State for prescribed services. He believed that man could still be

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Crocker, p. 7.

²Ibid., p. 8.

³Letter by Rousseau, 1704, trans. by Shklar, p. 75.

free in a society that is just, even though it might be preempting some inalienable rights. His social contract involved ". . .the unity of men so that each wills what all will and . . . obey only himself and remain as free as before."¹

Freedom

Freedom in Rousseau's society was having the ability to possess and express a private will contrary to the general will he obeyed as a citizen.² John Locke would have agreed that man needed an intellect, but not necessarily to know the general will. Locke stated:

Every man carries about him a touchstone. . .to distinguish substantial gold from superficial glitterings, truth from appearances, and indeed the use and benefit of this touchstone, which is natural reason, is spoiled and lost only by assuming prejudices, overwhelming presumption, and narrowing our minds.³

Locke believed that the will was not a separate entity from any mental learning, and that man could learn to use his powers of reasoning. Rousseau tended to agree with Locke, but not completely. Man possessed a separate will, but he became intelligent when he was able to see that the general will was universally good. This did not mean that man should

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Masters, p. 314.

²Ibid., p. 323.

³John Locke, "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding," Philosophy for the Study of Education (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), p. 207.

be given total freedom. Rousseau would have agreed with Thoreau; those who believe in complete freedom run the risk of causing harm. There must be the stipulation that freedom will promote people's interests as a whole and not harm individuals. To remove all freedom from man's will would also remove all morality from his actions, and consequently morality from the general will.¹ The general will was, then, the "application of human freedom to political institutions."² This freedom was assured in the social contract between man and his state. In essence, free man was "one who desires what he is able to perform and does what he desires."³

In retrospect, freedom was the ability to have individual wills that count as part of the general will. Man became virtuous, right and intelligent when he conformed to the general will, however, and not his own inclinations.⁴ Man was, in a sense forced to be free, because the general will compelled individuals to act as a whole, and it thereby gave freedom from dictatorial control to all. Man was literally free in a society that was just.⁵ Freedom, therefore was not freedom from control; it was freedom within the "justness" of the general will.

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Masters, p. 315.

²Rhys, ed., p. XXXVI.

³Boyd, ed., The Emile of Jean Jacques Rousseau (New York: Teachers College Press, 1962), p. 48.

⁴Osborn, p. 163.

⁵Shklar, p. 17.

Man's freedom came with intelligence; the "chains" man possessed were "ignorance and brutishness."¹ When man had the intelligence to know the general will, he would conform, because it was the best means of obtaining justice and equality for all. Rousseau would have agreed with Bishop Sheen's position:

Liberty is not the right to do as you please,
but the right to do as you ought.²

Rousseau's social contract seems to many authors to be scarcely a contract at all, but a document of surrender of the individual to the group. The social contract did subordinate individual wills, but it did not subordinate the individual, according to Rousseau. In unity there was freedom, justice, equal representation, promotion of common interests, and obedience to law, all for the common good. Rousseau felt it a small price to pay for the services rendered by the State. In later chapters a discussion of what has happened to the state as a controlling force in America is discussed.

The "Good" and "Just" Society

Rousseau's "good" and "just" society is realized when every man surrenders himself to the collective will. There is no "good" in a society unless the people conform

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Vaughn, Vol. I, p. 39.

²Fulton Sheen, television appearance. MacIver, ed., On Community, Society And Power, p. 160.

to that will.¹ Man must accept the will of the whole as his will, its interests as his interests. Rousseau states:

For the whole, like a true organism, cannot will anything that is not for the good of all.²

This concept is what may be called Rousseau's theory of individual commitment. His contention was that if you give to all, in effect, you give to none. This theory would only be true, however, if the general will was truly the measure of authority. This would not be true if the less than the whole decided the will.

Thoreau agreed with Rousseau's political analysis of commitment of the individual in theory, but he noted certain inconsistencies in social practice. It was his observation that governmental practices shunned total commitment. He stated:

He who gives himself entirely to his fellow-man appears to them useless and selfish; but he who gives himself partially to them is pronounced a benefactor and philanthropist.³

Rousseau would argue, however, that this was the fault of the social structure of the society. Once the society was "forced to be free" by conforming to the general will, all would want to give themselves for the betterment of the society as a whole. Thoreau's problem occurs only when men under the will of a few.

¹Rhys, Ed., p. XL.

²Rousseau, *Social Contract*, ed. by MacIver, On Community, Society and Power, p. 83.

³Thoreau, p. 34.

Rousseau realized that individuals had to be changed before total commitment became the "right" course of action. Whether good or bad, Rousseau believed man to be socially made. There could be no literal return to nature. Man, therefore, had to be "trained" to be "docile" in order to ensure the superiority of the general will.¹ Society in this context was the ability in other citizens to accept the general will as the best authority. Both Rousseau and Plato suggested "manipulation" to be the most efficient method to make people think they were promoting both their own and the general welfare. Plato's philosopher-kings manipulated the populace because they had a closer insight into reality. Rousseau's citizens were to be regimented and trained from earliest childhood to place community above self, and most importantly, to do this "not intellectually, but reflexively."² Following the reflexive laws of nature was in agreement with the general will.

Rousseau's natural man was not actually to think about the general good, because this tended to promote the factionalism and voluntary associations heretofore mentioned. Man was to reflexively think of the good. Deliberation and judgment often confused the issues because they involved individual wills and vested interests that did not have the best interests of the whole community. Rousseau stated:

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, ed. by Crocker, p. 10.

²Ibid., p. 6.

Men always love what is good or what they find good; it is in judging what is good that they go wrong. This judgement, therefore, is what must be regulated. He who judges of morality, judges of honour; and he who judges of honour finds his law in opinion.¹

Before Rousseau, Montesquieu and Pufendorf believed the common good to be the "reunion of private wills of the subject."² They would have agreed that "One only wants one's own good, but one does not always see it."³ It was here that Rousseau saw the need for a "Legislator" to regulate the true judgement for the common good.

Sovereignty, Government and the "Legislator"

Sovereignty in the Government

Rousseau believed that sovereignty should rest with the people as a whole. The sovereign will was the general will, and had its interests in the people as a whole. Any representative sovereignty was impossible because the term was contradictory; the will was inalienable in relation to other forms of deliniation.⁴ As a consequence, Rousseau appointed the government as only a law enforcer. Every society had to have a government to carry out the specifics of the general will, but the government acted only as a trustee

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, III, vii, p. 111.

²Masters, p. 324.

³Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Masters, p. 326.

⁴Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Rhys, p. XXXV.

of the sovereign people and was merely the organization of power to enforce the needs of the group. The government made no decisions. It only enforced the general will.

For specific instances, such as court cases, there was no general will per se, because of the small number of jury members, but the government represented the general will as closely as possible by enforcing the laws. Sovereignty of the people was legitimized and enforced by an unlimited right of revolution.¹ If a government did not conform to the general will, the people could either vote the representatives out of office, or revolt.

The "Legislator"

Rousseau believed the general will to be the will of one man, provided he was the "Legislator" and had the good of the whole in mind.² Rousseau wanted the "supremacy of the common" in man (not in the common man) to rule.³ The common in man was what Rousseau claimed to be the natural inclinations of man before he was corrupted by society. Though the people had the right of sovereignty, Rousseau felt them

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, trans by Masters, p. 322. This aspect of Rousseau's social contract was one of the most utilized by his "scholars." They used revolution to change to individual wills, but not in conformity to the general will.

²Alfred Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1934), pp. 130-131.

³MacIver, On Community, Society and Power, p. 84.

incompetent to control the details of government. The Legislators and Magistrates were needed to interpret the abstract general will and apply it to specifics.¹ "The general will was right, but the judgement that guides it is not always enlightened."²

Lester Crocker agreed that Rousseau felt a need for an administrator, at least at first, because the Legislator could inform the people of the general will in the early stages of government.³ This "Lawgiver" or "Magistrate" was a "miracle," telling the people what they wanted and needed.⁴ Therefore, he could overrule the will of the people if it was not in the general interest. Rousseau stated:

We must reason with the wise, but never with the public. The common herd has long been compared to a flock of sheep.⁵

The "wise" were the Legislators; men who, by use of reason, were able to place personal interests behind them. As long as there was harmony between public opinion and the laws (manifestations of the general will), these Legislators would ensure that existing legislation would receive the consent of the governed.⁶

¹Vaughn, Vol. I, p. 33.

²Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Vaughn, Vol II, p. 371.

³Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Crocker, p. 8.

⁴Vaughn, Vol. I, p. 33.

⁵Personal letter by Rousseau, trans. by Crocker, p. 8.

⁶Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Masters, p. 383.

There were three wills with which the Magistrate (or Legislator) had to contend: (1) the individual will; (2) the corporate will; and (3) the general will.¹ Of the three the individual will was the strongest, because it included personal biases. The state or corporate will was weaker, but it too did not reflect the general interest and was to be guarded against (will of the people). The general will was the weakest of all, but it was the will that was to be instituted. The Magistrates and Legislators were judged according to their ability to reflect the general will and interpret the laws, and any breach of their trust justified their removal.

The Law

Roger Masters states that Rousseau saw the role of the Legislators to be in the interpretation of the laws, and their enforcement. The laws were the written manifestation of the general will. Rousseau stated:

Obedience to law is the only ground for respectable authority; usurpation of sovereignty by the government threatens that voluntary popular consent which is necessary for lasting success and justice.²

Rousseau best expressed the role of the Legislator as a guide in this manner: "Pleasure calls us, laws coerce us, but it is opinion that rules."³

¹Rousseau, Social Contract, ed. by Rhys, p. 54.

²Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Masters, p. 383.

³Personal letter by Rousseau, trans. by Shklar, p. 75.

The Most Conducive Form of Government

Rousseau credited the city-state as being the most suitable state government for his overall plan. As long as sovereignty was preserved for the people, however, it did not matter much to Rousseau what type of geographic unit or governmental form was used, as long as it did not produce factionalism.¹ Rousseau favored the tenants of democracy over the forms of government because he felt the need for elected officials (Legislators) to carry out the everyday administration dictated by the laws. Representative government was not acceptable, however, unless the representatives were "enlightened" to the general will.²

Rousseau saw a need for an ordered environment, encompassed by a broad frame of reference and organized into communal activities. This ordered environment could be produced in a democracy without loss of freedom, using elected official to manage properly the public mind in concert with the general will. Rousseau placed emphasis not on democracy, but on the sovereignty of the general will. He would have agreed with the statement:

Freedom and democracy are only worth while if they are the means for achieving the kind of life that man ought to live.³

¹Vaughn, Vol. I, p. 33

²This is a decided weakness in Rousseau's plan. He supposed that there would be those who would place their own interests behind them in favor of the general will.

³A.K. Ottaway, p.16.

Democracy seemed to Rousseau to be the most advantageous government to utilize his concept of the social contract. Some authors feel he might have distracted democracy because of its lack of complete organization and its tendency towards dictatorship of the majority. But democracy at least bequeathed to the world the principle that government was the servant of the governed, which was the main point Rousseau wanted to stress.¹ Rousseau considered democracy as the final organization of the common interest, and it, therefore was most conducive to his political, moral and educational philosophies. Because flux was the most common experience mankind shared in government (besides the general will), democracy was the best form of legislative enactment to deal with specifics. It provided the most freedom of action for the individual and still did not compromise interests in general.

Rousseau's Role for Education in Society

Jean Jacques Rousseau's educational philosophy is possibly one of the most misinterpreted, misunderstood, misquoted and generally misconceived educational doctrines. Yet, his educational writings are used to represent a classical conflict still in existence today--the education of man in the State. As with most other authors who are well-known and well read, Many of his ideas concerning the education of youth are extracted to suit certain needs, i.e., unfoldment

¹Ardrey, p. 95.

of the child, education for national sentiment, and the natural development of inquiry. Much of the meaning in these concepts to Rousseau, however, is taken out of context by other authors.

The conclusion of this chapter deals with some of the inconsistencies present in American education that are attributable to superficial examinations of Rousseau's complete works. There are, however, aspects of Rousseauian educational philosophy that are utilized in America, and significant attention is placed on these doctrines as well.

Educational Documents of Rousseau

The Emilé is considered by many authors to be Rousseau's true model for the education of youth. In this most popular work, Rousseau sought to protect the child from social evils by allowing the child complete freedom until the age of fifteen. Many have taken this to mean that there was no national system of education planned by Rousseau. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In an effort to demonstrate the full meaning of Rousseau's educational plan, other documents are utilized by this writer later in this portion of the chapter. Since the Emilé is the basis of Rousseau's early education of children, however, this author devotes some attention to its overall meaning.

Education by class was one of the inequalities Rousseau attempted to eliminate in the Emilé.¹ In order to

¹Durkheim, p. 121.

combat social evils such as class distinction, religious dogmatism, and individual alienation, Rousseau favored an educational environment that promoted natural inclinations. His concept of "natural unfoldment" of the child without outside influences early in life was viewed by later educators to be a "negative" sanction of formal education. In an effort to eliminate institutionalization, Rousseau advocated: (1) limited formal education until the age of fifteen; (2) no religious training; (3) no outside influences from the society; (4) limited use of texts or other prepared reading materials; and (5) elimination of other forms of control exercised in the learning process.¹ The importance of formal education early in life was de-emphasized by Rousseau, not because the concept of education was bad, but because the education of his time negated the natural goodness and the inquiring nature of the child. Rousseau stressed "losing" time (in formal education) rather than gaining it because it was more important for the child to develop "natural" inclinations instead of social norms that stifled creativity.²

Rousseau's ultimate goal, however, was not to produce a noble savage. On the contrary, he viewed man as a social being, needing goals, norms and social training in the art of associative living. But this training was to be accomplished only after the child developed a "social

¹Rousseau, Emilé (New York: D.C. Heath & Co., 1833), passim.

²Ibid, p. 14.

feeling."¹ What Rousseau wanted to eliminate were the social inconsistencies, the competitive spirit, and a class structure taught in the schools of his time. Rousseau once quipped: "Men would rather have their children know their lessons and lie than to remain ignorant and speak the truth."² Only until a child developed a sense of belonging and recognized his role as a part of the whole community, did Rousseau feel it was necessary to educate a child to the general will.

Robert Archer felt Rousseau to be inconsistent in this aspect of his philosophy of education. He thought Rousseau was naive in his assumptions that a child would eventually develop a social feeling. Archer claimed that man only acquired social feeling through social action, and that Rousseau did not provide for social action in the early education of children.³ Despite the fact that Archer did not account for social interaction among the children themselves, neither did he understand Rousseau's purpose. Rousseau did not want to dispel socialization; he wanted to dispel socialization that went against nature.

Other educational documents, such as Considerations on the Government of Poland, Encyclopedié, the treatise on Corsican government, and numerous personal letters and credence that Rousseau was interested in the socialization

¹R.L. Archer, Rousseau on Education (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912), p. 11.

²Rousseau, Emilé, p. 84.

³Archer, p. 11.

process for "State" education. The governmental plan for Poland was, in essence, a utopian conceptualization of how the people of Poland should prepare for the ideal State. Education in this utopia was an important aspect of the overall plan. Rousseau assumed that education was a "common interest," and for that reason he considered education to be a state function. The family became a secondary source of cultural development. His reasoning was The State abides; the family passes. ¹

The role of education in the plan for a utopian government was simple. Rousseau stated:

It is for education to give souls the national form and so direct their opinions and tastes, that they will be patriots out of inclination, out of passion, out of necessity.²

Education as Training

Rousseau believed that people could not be educated intellectually to the general will--they could only be trained.³ As was earlier stated, the general will was not a source of alternative purposes; it was a reinforcement of purpose, and therefore, could be taught. There were no new forces to create in a society, just the ones that already

¹Rousseau, "Political Economy," Encyclopedié, ed. by W. Boyd, The Minor Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau (Teachers College Press, 1962), p. 41.

²Rousseau, Encyclopedié, edited by Boyd, p. 39.

³Peters, p. 33. This author cites both Plato and Rousseau in this context.

existed. Man, therefore, merely directed them into conformity to the general will. Education became a training mission for the citizenry. Conformity to the general will brought freedom, harmony with nature, and a feeling of community in place of competition, self-indulgence and alienation.¹

Rousseau likened his State to the city-state of ancient Greece.² He believed that everyone must be in close communion with everyone else in the community in order to provide the necessary atmosphere needed for general consensus. Training young citizens was the most important aspect of a successful State. Rousseau stated: "Train up good citizens and you have everything."³ The laws of the land were to be obeyed, because they were founded on the general will. Realizing that laws had to be popular in order to be successful, Rousseau saw the need of education to be "manipulation." He stated:

It is not so much coercion as education which is the means of ensuring obedience to the laws.⁴

Education placed the State above the self "reflexively instead of intellectually."⁵ Men should be able to question

¹Rousseau, Discourses, II, trans. by Crocker, p. 8.

²Rousseau, Considerations on the Government of Poland, ed. by C.E. Vaughn, Vol. II, p. 434.

³Rousseau, Encyclopedie, edited by Boyd, p. 39.

⁴Rousseau, Social Contract, edited by Masters, p. 384.

⁵Rousseau, Social Contract, ed. by Crocker, p. 6.

the government, but only for the purpose of measuring competency and conformity to the general will.

Education for Consent

Boyd Bode claimed that Rousseau took refuge in the concept of "consent of the governed" because the common man was not yet a philosopher, and science had not yet furnished him with helpful hints for survival.¹ Adrian DuPuis agrees with this contention.² Rousseau had little faith in the common man because he was not enlightened enough to discriminate between individual will and the general will. Rousseau did not have faith in science either because although modeled upon nature, science was itself unnatural and subject to error; external phenomena were knowable only by means of fallible conceptions by man.³ The only datum that was a certain and solid base for principles of political right was the will.⁴ Rousseau therefore, believed education to be preparation for conformity to the general will. Man consented to the general will because it was a natural sentiment and was in harmony with natural law.

¹Boyd Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads (New York: Newson & Co., 1938), pp. 36-40.

²Adrian DuPuis, Philosophy of Education in Historical Perspective (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1957), passim.

³Rousseau, Social Contract, edited by Masters, p. 324.

⁴Ibid.

Human Engineering

Rousseau's education is not, in effect, education for absolute freedom, as is contended by many authors. In reality it is an early form of behavioral engineering.¹ B.F. Skinner condemned Rousseau for trusting the citizen-teacher to control the students' environment, but agreed that in essence, Rousseau desired certain behaviors from the people, limited by the laws prescribed by the general will.² Individuals were allowed to have their own private wills, but they lived by and obeyed the general will.

Both Rousseau and Skinner claimed that man could actually be "forced" to be free, but these freedoms would not be absolute.³ Rather, the freedoms afforded the people were freedoms within prescribed behavioral limits that were in the best interest of the public in general. In this manner, both authors hoped individual worth would be enhanced, and human dignity would be placed above individual dignity, through the State.

Rousseau's Concept of the Educator

Rousseau's "educator" was every citizen in the State. Everyone had the responsibility of educating the populace in

¹Crocker, p. 167, and B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp. 35-46.

²Skinner, p. 39.

³Rousseau, Social Contract, trans. by Masters, p. 314, and Skinner, pp. 40-41.

conformity to the general will. Rousseau stated:

Above all, do not allow teaching to be made a profession. No public man. . . should have any permanent position but that of a citizen.¹

Training the citizenry to conform reflexively to the general will was, in reality, one of Rousseau's principles of good citizenship. Rousseau suggested that this "teaching" could be done in many ways. The most important method was, however, setting a good example.

Because people always willed the good, but sometimes did not know all the circumstances involved, the "Legislators" were the best examples to follow. Their leadership provided the necessary "truth" needed to conform to the general will. All other citizens were prepared to consent to government administration, as long as it was in the general interest.

The "subjects" taught by the citizens were general in nature:

1. a moral and political analysis of what man should be, rather than what he was.
2. recognition of the common interests of the culture. (what each receives does not divide the product of the collectivity or lessen the benefits available to all the rest).
3. reliance on the general will as the common good.
4. obedience to the law.²

Rousseau rationalized that if all men were taught the principles of obedience to law, and these laws conformed to the

¹Rousseau, Considerations on the Government of Poland, ed. by Boyd, p. 98.

²Masters, p. 15. MacIver, On Community, Society and Power, p. 87.

general will, all else would be in harmony with nature. Again, good citizenship was in the living, and living in harmony with natural laws was the "right."

Methodology

Rousseau's methodology was by no means structured. Formal "schooling" for children beyond the age of twenty was not a significant part of his educational plan. Rousseau relied on field trips, conferences, expeditions, tutorial programs and experience-centered learning in general.¹ The "teacher" was to be feared, but loved.² Children were prepared for citizenship in much the same manner as the Greeks prepared their youth for participation in the city-state. The most important aspect of his educational methodology was to allow the child develop his own natural sentiments and retain natural harmony.

¹Rousseau, "Project for the Education of M. De Saint Marie," ed. by Boyd, p. 27.

²Ibid., p. 28.

CHAPTER III

JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPTS OF COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, DEMOCRACY EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY

Individualism is a stage of transition between two types of social organization.

--W.I. Thomas, The Unadjusted Girl

Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward force which make it a living thing.

--John Stuart Mill, On Liberty

But what more oft in nations grown corrupt,
And by their vices brought to servitude,
Than to love bondage more than liberty--
Bondage with ease than strenuous liberty.

--John Milton, "Samson Agonistes"

John Dewey's Concept of Collective Intelligence

Intelligence Defined

John Dewey defines intelligence as "holding an end in view and selecting, organizing out of this end, conditions that are means."¹ It is further an "adjustment and application of individual tendencies" and the "discrimination of multiple and present 'goods' and the many means of obtaining it."² Intelligence to Dewey is, therefore, the experimental

¹John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 43.

²Ibid., pp. 59, 68.

way of living. Man must use the scientific method in a much wider application than merely scientific fields in order to find a proper source of authority for society. He must intelligently use all experiences and test all consequences before coming to a decision. Authority in Dewey's analysis rests with the public. It is not an absolute, nor is it above scrutiny. In order to have true authority, all must have at least a say in the decision-making process and all must have the opportunity to contribute their experiences.¹

The Failure of Philosophy

Dewey felt philosophers of his time failed society because they searched for causal factors. Rather than to find rationales for man's actions, Dewey recommended that philosophers should concentrate their energies in the study of alternatives and meanings of actions to the society. What Americans called history was largely a "non-human" study of facts, rather than an intellectual history of man conditioned by intelligence.² Dewey believed that philosophy could no longer be a "rationalization of traditions and accented beliefs."³ Philosophy's purpose was to clarify men's ideas as to the moral and social strifes of the time. It was not to look to the past as the sole means of solving problems,

¹Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 31-35.

²Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 35.

³Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 5.

but, rather it was to analyze human consequences of action.

The Memory. Relying on past experiences and causes obviously depends on the memory. Dewey feels, however, that the memory "is vicarious experience in which there is all the emotional values of actual experience without its strains, vicissitudes and troubles."¹ The memory is primitive in this respect, "full of fancy and imagination of how good the good old days were," without taking into account the consequences to the society as a whole.² As a result, man does not solve questions of the society; either the problems cease to be urgent through the passage of time, or Americans get over them in a haphazard, unintelligent manner.²

Reconstruction of Philosophy. Dewey's instrumentalism was a "revolt against the habits of mind which dispose of anything whatever. . .by tucking it away."³ The individual had lost his bargaining power in deference to habit, tradition, and universal will. Dewey called for a reconstruction of philosophy in order not to find the summum bonum or final goal, but to discriminate between the alternatives, and find intermediate goals.⁴ Dewey stated:

¹Ibid., p. 2.

²Ibid.

³Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 19.

⁴Ibid., p. IV.

⁵Ibid., p. 67.

Because we live in world of process, the future, although continuous with the past is not its bare repetition.¹

Dewey felt that formal theory in philosophy failed for three reasons: (1) people relied on others for their thinking; (2) passion was used in place of reason; and (3) people reasoned without knowing all the circumstances and consequences of action.² By using the scientific method of inquiry (recognizing the problem, analyzing it, determining all the alternatives, reaching a conclusion, and testing the conclusion), philosophers could again provide the society with the conditions necessary for effective problem-solving. "Knowledge was to be defined in terms of inquiry, not vice-versa, both in particular and universally."³

Collective Intelligence

Dewey believed in social self-realization based on democratic tenents. His last step in the scientific method of inquiry was what he called "experimental corroboration."⁴ This term did not necessarily mean a dictatorship of the majority, nor did it imply complete autonomy of the individual. It was rather a consensus of the whole public in order to reach a viable solution.

¹John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938), p. 40.

²John Dewey, How We Think (New York: D.C. Heath & Co., 1910), p. 23. Dewey extracts certain ideas from Locke in this context.

³Ibid., p. 21.

⁴Ibid., p. 77.

Classical liberalists believed that intelligence was an individual possession, and was not social.¹ Rousseau, for example, claimed that intelligence was based on universals of time-tested will. Dewey defined intelligence as not only acquisition of knowledge by individuals, but also "cooperative experimentation."² Dewey stated:

The notion that intelligence is a personal endowment of personal attainment is the great conceit of the intellectual class.³

Dewey's intelligence referred to an expansion of the understanding and judgement of meaning for both the public and the individual; a collective intelligence based on consensus.⁴

Democracy as the Method of Intelligence. Dewey believed that the democratic process was synonymous with the method of intelligence. He stated:

The method of democracy--in as far as it is that of organized intelligence--is to bring conflicts into the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised, discussed and judged.⁵

Since all must be participants in the social order, intelligence becomes a collective effort. Passive receptivity is replaced with a constant "intellectual integration."⁶

¹Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 45.

²Ibid., p. 47.

³Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 211.

⁴Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 47.

⁵Ibid., p. 79.

⁶John Dewey, The Way Out of Educational Confusion (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1931), pp. 33-34.

Not only must everyone have the opportunity to participate in Dewey's society, but there must be a . . . "mutual conference and mutual consultation, arriving at social control by pooling, by putting together all of these individual expressions of ideas and wants."¹ Democracy and collective intelligence are interdependent. Thus, democracy becomes a method of finding intelligence, and intelligence becomes a democratically pooled source of experience.

Collective Intelligence as Experience. Dewey conceived collective intelligence as not only the pooling of knowledge alternatives, and solutions to be tested, but also the integration of experience. Understanding implied more than just knowledge; it implied "cognition of the conditions and consequences that only comes from experience."² Experience was not only individual, it was associative and possessed collective properties.³ Knowledge itself became "a function of association and communication."⁴ The only intelligent method by which human beings could succeed was "through mutual respect, mutual toleration, give and take, the pooling of experience."⁵

¹John Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 36.

²ibid., p. 49.

³John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept of Psychology," Psychological Review, III, 1896, p. 359.

⁴Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 158.

⁵Dewey, The Way Out of Educational Confusion, p. 49.

Collective Intelligence as Method. Consequently, Dewey's collective intelligence implied a method of problem-solving as well as the "pooling of knowledge and experiences." The solution to problems in Dewey's society was not to bring individuals under the control of a predetermined will (general will). Rather it was a readjustment of social relationships to find new logic of method. Dewey believed man possessed a tremendous intellect, but until it was pooled for public scrutiny, it remained dormant.¹ Intelligence was social consciousness for action. Dewey stated:

The fact that they (earlier judgements) have fulfilled the demands imposed upon them in previous inquiries is not a logical proof that, in the form in which they emerged, they are organs and instrumentalities which will satisfy the demands of new problematic situations.²

In order to have good judgement in social, political, and economic affairs, every possibility had to be explored and evaluated. Then, and only then, was there a creation of a true democratic "public" and a collective intelligence, using the collaborative scientific method.

Extending Intelligence to the Moral Domain. The crisis-culture in America was not only attributed to cultural lag or technical difficulties in the material culture, Like Ogburn, Dewey saw the crisis in the moral and intellectual realm

¹Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 221.

²Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 141.

as well.¹ The difficulties Dewey noted in his society were attributed to the failure to extend the method of organized intelligence to "the entire field of human relations, moral, social and political."²

Because morality was earlier assumed to be based upon traditional rules of conduct, it became a habit to society "to avoid pain and get pleasure."³ Habits, were to Dewey, a sense of "will" determined by causal affects rather than consequences.⁴ He states:

Will is a cause of consequences; it is causation in its personal aspect, the aspect of immediate preceeding action.⁵

Dewey believed that a man could only "know" good from habits if his habits were already good.⁶ There was no guarantee, however, that these habits were for the good of all unless they were testable by all. Dewey's moral education was, therefore, learning how to motivate oneself and participate in the social conscience.⁷

¹W.O. Stanley, Education and Social Integration (Columbia: Teachers College Press, 1953), p. 116.

²Ibid., p. 115.

³B. Smith, W. Stanley, et al, Readings in the Social Aspects of Education (Danville: Interstate Printers & Pub., 1951), p. XV.

⁴Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, 1922), p. 44.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 32.

⁷John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909), pp. 16-20.

Dewey contended that rules and mores in America were not intelligently determined at all and came closer to an unchanging, untested general will of conduct based on early Judeao-Christian and Rousseauian tenents. Dewey went as far as to say Americans were slaves to their morality instead of active participants in the problem-solving process. He conceived moral issues to be "settled within conscious or human sentiment apart from consistent study of facts and application of specific knowledge."¹ Morality was, to Dewey, a domain that had also to be observed and tested, or any intelligent act would ultimately be limited by these morals. He stated:

The approach to human problems in terms of moral blame and moral approbation, of wickedness and righteousness, is probably the greatest single obstacle now existing to development of competent methods in the field of social subject-matter (inquiry).²

Holding things sacred to Dewey only tended to obscure the true circumstances and limited the possibilities for advancement.

Forces that Control Society

Dewey cited three main forces that controlled society; (1) habit; (2) coercive and non-violent force; and (3) action directed by intelligence.³ The most common of these forces was habit; the least common was intelligent action. Habit became the mainspring of human action or what William G. Sumner

¹Ibid., p. 11.

²Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 495.

³Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 79.

originally, and later Charles S. Peirce called the "flywheel" of society.¹ Society became an "engine," started by inertia of custom and precedent, and fed by traditions. Dewey called for a substitution of this use of customary symbols and propaganda with the use of intelligence exemplified in scientific procedure.² The typical American had an intellect, but only in the Bergsonian sense "mind attuned to the conditions of action upon matter, upon the world. Our emotional life is quick, excitable, indiscriminating, lacking in individuality. . .and generally controlled by precedent."³ In order to match corresponding innovations in scientific discoveries, Dewey wanted to eliminate antequated morals as a measure of these concepts. Another force, action directed by intelligence, was the force Dewey thought would be capable of this change.

Coercive and non-violent force was a third effect Dewey wanted to guard against. Along with a morality based on sentiment, and a failure of philosophy to define the problems of society, he attacked vested interests as one of the contributors of social failure in intellect. The coercive and nature of interest groups tended to negate individual experience in favor of generalized traditions based on social stratification. Dewey stated:

¹Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, pp. 72-73.

²Ibid.

³Dewey, Individualism: Old and New, p. 23.

Our life has no background of sanctified categories upon which we may fall back; we rely upon precedent as authority only to our own undoing--for with us there is such a continuously novel situation that final reliance upon precedent entails some class interest guiding us by the nose whither it will.¹

Reliance on past precedent and control by vested interests had the same meaning to Dewey. Although Americans changed in class structure, they were still controlled by upper class interests that tended to preserve the status quo. In order to combat these interests, reliance on complete investigative powers by the public as a whole was needed.

Dewey's Faith in Human Nature and the Common Man

John Dewey's faith in the common man to make rational decisions and contribute to the society is a major point of departure from the writings of causal theorists. Rousseau, for example, wanted the common in man to dominate. He had little faith in the common man to participate actively in society. Dewey had a "common faith" in mankind to rule not only over nature, himself and groups, but he also believed man could still be "rational, generous and democratic" in the process.² He had "faith in the continued disclosing of truth through directed cooperative human endeavor."³

¹John Dewey, W.A. Kilpatrick, et al, Creative Intelligence (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1917), p. 68.

²Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 26.

³Ibid.

One of the main differences noted earlier in this study between the classical liberals and the contemporary liberals was a faith in mankind. In order to change the society, the classical liberals relied on changing man's human nature from laziness and depravity to goodness through the use of the state. Contemporary liberals conceived man to be relatively plastic, and they relied on changing the institutions to allow man the participation necessary for needed consequences. Dewey argues in favor of this proposition by stating:

Of human organisms it is especially true that activities carried on for satisfying needs so change the environment that new needs arise which demand still further change in the activities of the organism by which they are satisfied and so on in a potentially endless chain.¹

In order to become a problem-solver, Dewey believed the common man had to find a new morality based on the study of human nature, rather than a disregard for it.² American morality became essentially negative, mainly because the Puritans stressed what Dewey termed a "negative ethic." American traditions likewise revolved around denial rather than positive application. These negative rules assume man's human nature as inherently depraved and unchanging in society, and for that reason, restraint should be enforced by the society, and for that reason, restraint should be enforced by the society. Instead of believing man's ability to change

¹Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 28.

²Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 12.

his human nature with a corresponding change in the institutions, Americans have relied on traditions of control to restrain inherent evils. Thus Americans have been "forced into subjection from without," rather than trying intelligently to manage a study of human nature itself from within.¹

Dewey attacks Rousseau as one of the prime authors of control of the society through sentiment. This sentiment is manifested in Rousseau's concept of the general will.

Dewey stated:

While the executive type (Legislators) keeps its eyes on actual conditions so as the manipulate them, this school (Rousseau's) abrogates objective intelligence in behalf of sentiment.²

Dewey believed that human nature does change, and that morality should not be based on habits that have no immediate application. Rousseau wanted to produce a man as an individual within a state, but he had little faith in human nature within social institutions. He relied on the production of the citizen in the state, subject to the general will.³ Rousseau's education was a "civic function" of nationalization, and the state was substituted for humanity.⁴

The notion of "organism" by Rousseau was used to give sanction to class distinction and external moral laws rather

¹Ibid., p. 4.

²Ibid., p. 7.

³Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 94.

⁴Ibid., p. 93.

than human growth potential.¹ Some parts of the organism of the state were considered more important than others, thereby justifying the use of legislators and magistrates to control the masses. Dewey's "organism" known as society "is the cooperative consensus of multitudes of cells, each living in exchange with other."² The "good" was not found in general universals of will, but in the tested application of collective intelligence. All parts of Dewey's organism possessed the same importance. Dewey believed any habits based on sentiment were "artificial." He stated:

Sheer repetition is in the case of the human organism, a product of conditions that are uniform because they have been made so mechanically--as in much school and factory work. Such habits are limited in their manifestation to the rather artificial conditions in which they operate. They certainly do not provide the model upon which a theory of habit formation and operation should be framed.³

Dewey's organism "does not live in an environment; it lives by means of an environment." ⁴

Dewey viewed most suggestions for change as attempts to alter "inertia of custom" rather than changing human nature.⁵ He felt that "an artificially induced uniformity of thought and sentiment was a symptom of an inner

¹Ibid., p. 60.

²Dewey, Individualism: Old and New, p. 86.

³Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 33.

⁴Ibid., p. 25

⁵Dewey, Problems of Men, pp. 127-135.

void."¹ The inner void was a lack of understanding of man's human nature. Theodore Brameld suggests that one of the five "buttresses" needed for a philosophy of life was an adequate theory of human nature.² Without a belief in man's ability to know himself and change with the circumstances, Dewey felt there could be no social meliorism. Man would continue to be controlled by habit and irrational force rather than by collective intelligence. Dewey stressed the study of human nature because he believed man could change it to suit his needs. This required, however, a faith in the abilities of the common man--a faith Rousseau and classical liberalists did not have.

Democracy as a Way of Life

Democracy Defined

Democracy in Dewey's analysis "really means diversification."³ It is an educational principle, a way of life, and a political, economic and social theory.⁵ Both Dewey and Margaret Mackie agree that democracy and literacy grow together. As Mackie stated:

¹Dewey, Individualism: Old and New, p. 87.

²Theodore Brameld, Education for the Emerging Age (New York: Harper Bros., 1960), p. 83.

³John Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1931), p. 560.

⁴Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 34.

Without education about issues, democracy and literacy are meaningless.¹

But merely education concerning the issues is not enough. Not only must people know what forces direct them, they must also know their worth in participation and direction for improvement of the situations that arise. The term "democracy" must have changeable meaning to the society as a whole, and all must know their capabilities and limitations in it.

Redefinition of Democracy for Every Generation. Dewey saw the need for a redefinition of the term democracy for every generation. He stated:

Every generation has to accomplish democracy over again for itself; its very nature, its essence is something that cannot be handed on from one person to one generation to another, but it has to be worked out in terms of needs, problems and conditions of the social life.²

Because collective intelligence was method, and because problems and consequences changed with the times, and lastly because the values held in common by a society changed with the times, terms such as democracy, liberty, freedom and equality must be constantly reinterpreted for meaning.

Democracy was widely defined by Dewey to be the necessity of every human being in the formation of values

¹Margaret Mackie, Education in the Inquiring Society (Victoria: Australian Council for Educational Research, 1966), p. 106.

²Dewey, Problems of Men, pp. 39-40.

that regulate the living of men together: "for creating general social welfare and development of human beings as individuals."¹ Dewey claimed each new generation knew its own evils, or at least knew there were evils. For that reason, all were to seek their own remedies, and were not to rely on tradition.²

American society has not been, in Dewey's interpretation, any more effective in its attempts to solve contemporary problems than any other form of associated living. What plagued Americans was the inability of the society to agree upon the meaning of democracy to new generations. Democracy has meant only a form of governmental practice, and not a way of life. Dewey conceived democracy to be "primarily a mode of associated living. . .of conjoint communicated experience."³

The "Way of Life." Because democracy is considered a mode of associated living, it is more simply defined by pragmatists as a "way of life."⁴ Dewey believed the best plan for people to communicate, decide on meanings of terms, and promote collective intelligence was to extend the political process of democracy to all social sciences. It was essential

¹Ibid., p. 58.

²Dewey, et al, Creative Intelligence, p. 66.

³Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 87.

⁴See writings of Bodé, Childs, Brameld, and Kilpatrick for further explanation.

that all have the ability to validate their experiences in order to arrive at an agreement concerning values in common, or what Dewey termed core values.¹ He believed democracy to be the best form of government because it allowed for a wider quality of experience for a greater number, without forsaking individual preference.² The constant "problem" of democracy was to "construct a new individuality consonant with the objective conditions under which we live."³

Faith in Human Nature as a Condition of Democracy.

Dewey conceived the concept of democracy to be an "absurdity" if there was no corresponding faith in the common man or in human nature, or even if intelligence was considered a cosmic force.⁴ The "duty" of democracy was not to prescribe beliefs, but to aid in the collection, discussion and interpretation of facts and circumstances.⁵ Democracy was not a "way of life" or "democratic" if individuality was subverted for majority will. The foundation of Deweyan democracy was "faith in human nature and human intelligence, and the power of pooled and cooperative experience."⁶

¹Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 84.

²Dewey, Experience and Education, passim.

³Dewey, Individualism: Old and New, p. 32.

⁴Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 59.

⁵Boyd Bode, Democracy as a Way of Life (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1937), p. 107.

⁶John Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," Stanley, et al, eds, Social Foundations of Education (New York: Dryden Press, 1956), p. 297.

Individualism as Democratic Growth

Both Dewey and Rousseau recognized the need for cultural interdependence in a democratic setting, but Dewey believed this required the individual to do more than merely consent to majority will. Man was to assume what Theodore Brameld termed "defensible partiality" to his position on all issues.¹ In order to be included as an individual, man must draw from his own experiences and demonstrate his preferences without external pressure from without. He must participate in the American legislative process as a symptom of alienation. It "tends to produce a lack of interest" and a "corresponding lack of effective responsibility" on the part of the public as a whole.²

Democracy's Role in Growth

Democracy's role in man's existence was to feed, sustain and direct growth. Growth was not only individual intellectual growth, but also social development of the individual as a participating member in the community of intellect. Democracy extended to "all the areas and ways of living, in which the powers of individuals shall not be merely released from mechanical external constraint. . ."³ In a democratic

¹Theodore Brameld, Ends and Means in Education: A Midcentury Appraisal (New York: Harper Bros., 1950) passim.

²Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administration," Social Foundations of Education, p. 298.

³Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 31.

posture, the individual was allowed to "grow" to intellectual maturity and select individual partialities to be included in the collective intellect. Growth was a cumulative and cooperative movement to action for specific occurrences; it was not the collection of facts that conditioned past responses. The condition for growth provided not only the setting for maturity, but also the encouragement by the community for a person to grow to his full potential. Growth was not to be something done to a person--they did it themselves.¹

Man's Individual Contributions. Dewey believed that problems of men were no longer individual problems; they evolved out of "social conditions."² Every overt act by an individual had social consequences. Dewey used the example of Supreme Court decisions to justify this contention. Decisions that had specific consequences to few have widened the number of those affected through the courts. The important aspect of the Supreme Court decisions was the inclusion of individual grievances as a representation of other members of the society who felt the same way about certain wrongdoings in the state.

Dewey agreed with the classic Greek contention that man was a social being and assumed a social role. He did not,

¹Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 35-46.

²Dewey, Individualism: Old and New, pp. 92-93.

however, agree with early Greek beliefs that a man with a different hypothesis and experience could only be a "distractive skepticism," or that subjectivism served to invalidate knowledge.¹ Dewey knew men chose values, but they usually chose them within the limits of socially determined values. Inquiry is a mode of activity that is socially conditioned and has cultural consequences.² Emile Durkheim agreed with Dewey. He felt collective consciousness could not exist without individual conscience.³ Man must include both his social and individual experiences in his growth pattern. Dewey stated:

If we eliminate the social factor from the child, we are left only with an abstraction; if we eliminate the individual factor from society, we are left only with an inert and lifeless mass.⁴

The Conditions for Growth. Dewey assumed two conditions before man could grow in a social setting: (1) each person had to have his feelings heard; and (2) each person counts only as one equally with others "so that the final social will comes about as the cooperative expression of the ideas of many people."⁵ In order to grow, man must contribute

¹George Mead, "Scientific Method and Individual Thinkers," Creative Intelligence, p. 192.

²Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 19.

³Emile Durkheim, "Society and Individual Conscience," Talcott Parsons, et al, eds., Theories of Society (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 722.

⁴John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," M. Dworkin, ed, Dewey on Education (New York: Teachers Col. Press, 1959), p. 22.

⁵Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 36.

his experiences, no matter how slight. More importantly, man received enlightenment from exchange of ideas and experiences.¹

C.I. Lewis agreed with Dewey concerning the contribution of individuals in American society. He felt that much of the alienation individuals felt could be attributed to what he called "mass democracy."² Americans have become mass (with only a positive or negative vote) because they lost the ability to include their experiences. In a treatise written about individual thinking, he stated:

The only brains society has to think with are individual ones. But to impose social authority of the traditional and accepted on the individual would be stopping the clock. It is the individual freedom of thought, and the respect for the individual in his own initiative and self-criticism, that human society has become human instead of an ant colony.³

The Role of the Democratic State

John Dewey treated the formulation of the state much the same as he did other aspects of his philosophy. Given that he believed in democracy as a way of life, and given that collective intelligence was the only method of obtaining true consensus of the public on specific matters, the state and the community were to provide the democratic medium for their fulfillment.

¹Ibid.

²J. Goheen and J. Mothershead, eds, Collected Papers of C.I. Lewis (Stanford: University Press, 1970), p. 213.

³Ibid, p. 36.

Formulation of the State

Definitions of the State. There have been many definitions of the state throughout man's civilized existence, to include everything from an arbiter of conflicts to organized oppression. Many writers in the sociological and anthropological fields contended that man organized himself out of instinct or convenience. It was a "natural" thing to organize or organization was accomplished to streamline the basic needs of the society. Even though Dewey believed democratic principles to be the best, he did not feel studies concerning how men got together were the most important factors.¹ It was more important to consider why men got together and for what purposes.

Dewey first attacked the contention that man had an "instinct to collect," believing this to be mere speculation on the part of social scientists.² His scientific approach to this analysis prevented him from accepting this opinion. Trying to find the causes of man's collection was a waste of time and energy to Dewey. Rather, he stressed finding the consequences of this collection. Dewey took his point of departure in the analysis of why man collected from the objective fact "that human acts have consequences on others,"

¹See Rejection of Causal Factor Theory, This Chapter.

²Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 10-12.

and that man has tried to control acts to get desired outcomes.¹ Any other assumption was considered speculative to him.

Rejection of the Causal Factor Theory. How a state became a state was, as previously noted, a tremendously wasted drain on the intellect. Not only was it a waste of talent, but Dewey contended that it obscured what was really needed--the determination of consequences. Efforts to "find the state" in terms of "authorship" explained theories as "instincts, fiats of will and universal of reason," thereby giving sanctity to absolutes instead of the method of intelligence.² Dewey's state was not a "primary" form of association, beyond any form of criticism. It was a "secondary form of association, having a specific work to do and specific organs of operation."³ Dewey felt those who separated the state and government were suffering from illusion. He gave no credence to the idea that the state should be considered noble and dignified to the point of complete individual submission. The state was susceptible to graft and ineptitude just as much as the people who comprised it. Only through constant watchfulness and criticism of public officials by citizens can a state be maintained in integrity and usefulness.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 12

²Ibid., p. 25

³Ibid., p. 71.

⁴Ibid., p. 69

The State as the Public Mind

Because man is not born capable of fending for himself, he has to associate and depend on others to exist. Early in life man learns what the beliefs, goals and rules of his community are, just as he learns that he is an individual within this community. Dewey states:

What he (man) believes, hopes for and aims at is the outcome of association and intercourse.¹

This creates a social being, having individual partiality, but also public responsibility. Dewey defines the public as "those indirectly and seriously affected for good or evil."² Since there are a growing number of public consequences, and all acts by individuals have consequences on others, an informed public becomes a most important aspect of the state. Therefore, Dewey contends that the state should be made up of the collective intellect, capable of dealing with public consequences.

Two Kinds of Consequences. Dewey cited two kinds of consequences to consider when determining state control; private consequences that affect the person directly, and public consequences that affect more than just the person concerned.³ The state should only be concerned with controlling those consequences that affect others. Any violation of

¹Ibid., p. 25.

²Ibid., p. 35.

³Ibid., p. 12.

individual rights is a violation of privacy and individuality itself. The state should in now way influence private decisions which would promote conformity and subversion of individual integrity.

Representative Government. Dewey observed that the obvious external mark of a state was in the existence of public officials. Through these officials Dewey felt the public could be represented, but they should not direct the public. The state was not a sanctity of these officials, but rather "a public articulated and operating through representative officer. . ." ¹ "There is no state without a government, but also there is none without the public." ² Dewey conceived the public mind to be the state, and therefore included the public as the true means of social control. ³ Alternatives and consequences of action must be returned to public deliberation, and not the representatives. Dewey stated:

By its very nature, a state is ever something to be scrutinized, investigated, searched for. Almost as soon as its form is established, it needs to be remade. . . . The state must always be rediscovered. ⁴

The Ideal State. Dewey rejected any attempts to find an ideal state as a model for future generations. The ever

¹Ibid., p. 67.

²Ibid.

³Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 33.

⁴Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 31-34.

changing circumstances, consequences, and number of those affected necessitated the need for flexibility in government. Because Dewey was a meliorist, the state had to be "experimentally determined" as a reflection of the public mind.¹ Insuring that the public officials adhered to public deliberation, Dewey thought that public elections should be held frequently. He built no utopias in his governmental system, but rather strived constantly to form a representative government that worked on democratic principles.

Internal and External Authority. Dewey determined that politics were to be in the form of hypotheses and not rigid programs. Too often authority meant limitation and conformity to a predisposed plan of action, thereby, limiting social input and intellectual cooperation. In an attempt to differentiate between conformity and collective intelligence, Dewey defined external authority as any universal or unresolved method of deliberation based on tradition, and defined internal authority as any decision based on public deliberation to powerful forces triumphant of external authority held by public officials. American reliance upon precedent has led to alienation and conformity rather than "warranted assertion," which logically eliminates ambiguity.² Imitation has become what Dewey terms the "chief" of social control.³ The result has

¹Ibid., p. 74.

²Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 9.

³Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 33.

been a "deification of power" and "assent to the doctrine of take-who-take-can."¹ Dewey believed that ultimately all decisions in America came from someone in particular, rather than the public.

Individuals might lose their identity in a mob, but it doesn't mean that some mysterious collective agency is making decisions--but some few persons taking advantage of the mob, and the only alternative afforded was not action by the public, but routine, impulsive and other unreflected acts also performed by individuals.²

Dewey did not want all authority eliminated. To the contrary, he stated:

When external authority is rejected, it doesn't mean that all authority should be rejected, but rather that there is a need to search for a more effective source of authority.³

The only true democratic authority was internal authority based on collective intelligence.

The Great Community

John Dewey depended on the formulation of a "Great Community" to restore internal authority and public deliberation known to him as collective intelligence. Knowing that terms such as democracy and liberty meant little and were hopeless extractions unless they were in social context, he chose to return to communal deliberation. America

¹Dewey, et al, Creative Intelligence, p. 68.

²Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 18.

³Oscar Handlin, ed., John Dewey's Challenge to Education (New York: Harper Bros., 1959), p. 49.

was a "Great Society," but it in no way was a "Great Community."¹ "Mechanical forces and vast impersonal organizations were determining the frame of things."² Only through communal action, in its true meaning, could social and humane ideals return as the foundation of authority.

The Meaning of Community

One of the most difficult and variable terms described by Dewey was community. After careful deliberation, most authors agree that he used this term very loosely, and meant as much process as substance.³ Dewey's closest appraisal of community is described as:

Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is good shared by all, there is in so far a community.⁴

In Dewey's analysis, there is little doubt that the community was needed not only to collect and intelligently investigate alternatives, but also to assume the additional role of disseminating ideas. After careful deliberation by the community, the final decision must be known by all

¹Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p.98.

²ibid., p. 97.

³Fred Schultz, The Concept of Community in the Philosophy of John Dewey, Unpublished dissertation, University of Indiana, 1969, passim.

⁴Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 149.

members, and this could only be accomplished with a communications network capable of the task.

Common, Community and Communication.

Dewey recognized more than just a "verbal tie" between the words common, community, and communication.¹ Men live in a community, not out of instinct, but because of what they hold in common, and they communicate to get that way. All forms of communication were educative, and communication became the essential ingredient to collective intelligence, and consequently the felling of community. The only way Dewey's society would become the "Great Community" was through communication.²

Divided Knowledge. As was previously noted, knowledge was considered by Dewey as a function of association and communication.³ Dewey did not deem it important that the whole community was able to collect data or be knowledgeable about everything (although that would have been the ideal situation). What was more important was knowing the consequences of experience and how to test alternatives. Because of the lack of communication, the divided knowledge of American society had created slums, poverty and exploitation by the few. To Dewey, class difference was a communication

¹Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 4.

²Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 142.

³Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 148.

problem. The community was needed to collect and combine knowledge and invoke full participation of its members.

The Return to Local Community. Rousseau and Plato believed the community to be no larger than the number of persons capable of personal acquaintance with one another. Dewey agreed that there needed to be a means of knowing others feelings about specific circumstances, but he felt communications would enlarge the community to a much greater size than mere city-states.¹ Dewey stated:

The local is the ultimate universal, and as near an absolute as exists. . . Unless local communal life can be restored, the public cannot adequately resolve its most urgent problem: to find and identify itself.²

A feeling of local community was needed, but Dewey believed all men could have a feeling of local community if all means of communication were used to promote public deliberation.

Dewey's "Great Community" was a world community, much in the same mold as McLuhan's global village; however, Dewey stresses the "feeling" of community as the most important aspect. One reaches a feeling of community through communication. The verbal tie between community, common and communication is fully understood when Dewey states:

Communication of the results of social inquiry is the same thing as formation of public opinion.³

¹Ibid., p. 15.

²Ibid., pp. 215-216.

³Ibid., p. 177.

The Great Community was conceivable, but it still would not possess all the qualities of the local community unless all could communicate their ideas and experiences. Only through "systematic and continuous inquiry" into all the conditions could a "true public" be created, and only through extensive communication could Americans end their identity crisis.¹

The Components of the Great Community. There were essentially two main components of the Great Community; (1) freedom of social inquiry and distribution of its consequences, and (2) freedom of expression and systematic communication.² For the sake of political unity, however, man has been unable to identify himself with his own community. The creation of political unity has "promoted social and intellectual uniformity, a standardization favorable to mediocrity."³ Dewey attributes the identity crisis in America with deficiencies in communication, a lack of "community" identity, and the need for a common value system. If these two components of the Great Community were provided, Dewey believed Americans would again be in the position of active participation instead of voting only on issues brought up to them.

¹Ibid., p. 218.

²Ibid., p. 160.

³Ibid., p. 115.

Education and Educators

Education Defined

Dewey stated that education was growth leading to more growth. This aspect of his educational treatise is one of the most popular. The idea of intellectual growth is central to his definition of education, but one would be oversimplifying meaning if he were to stop all inquiry at that point. As was noted earlier, Dewey viewed the scientific method of intelligence as paramount to solving problems, and that all must participate in order to have meaning for all. Democracy as a way of life and the feeling of community provided the medium necessary for meaningful communication and a common purpose, but Dewey's education "embraces the whole complex of human dynamics, through which every culture seeks both to maintain and innovate its structures, operations and purposes."¹ Education was life, not the preparation for life. Man learned in cooperation with others and continued his education throughout life.

Reflective Thinking

Education, to Dewey, was also the unity of theory and practice.² He believed more in practice (scientific method of inquiry) because formal theory was far behind scientific

¹Brameld, Education for the Emerging Age, p. 15.
See also Dewey, Democracy and Education, Chapters 1 and 2.

²Dewey, Experience and Education, pp. 2-14.

progress when determining practical consequences.¹ Education was to stress the logic of "careful, alert and thorough habits of thinking."² It is "autonomous and precludes resting logic upon metaphysical or epistemological assumptions and pre-suppositions."³ Thinking in this context was reflective thinking--putting things in order and sequence to come to a conclusion or find consequences.⁴ Reflective thinking required the collection of intelligence to find all the possibilities to impending problems and the use of the scientific method to determine consequences.

Dewey believed that "no one is ever forced by just collection of facts to accept a particular theory of their meaning."⁵ He states:

One 'fact' would be just as good as another--that is, good for nothing in control of inquiry and formation and in settlement of a problem.⁶

Because thinking has been interpreted as collecting facts and universals, rather than determining consequences of alternatives, the distinction between facts which conditioned human activity and facts which were conditioned by human

¹Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. XL.

²Dewey, How We Think, p. 58.

³Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 21.

⁴Ibid., pp. 1-5.

⁵Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 3.

⁶Ibid., p. 499.

activity needed to be emphasized.¹ Dewey relied on science in this differentiation because it "gave the ability to interpret and control the experience already had."² Dewey had faith in man to be the conditioner of activities and not a collector of facts. The social sciences were to be studied not for the "facts," but for determining the rational consequences to change an "uncontrolled general bias into a set of explicit and specific viewpoints."³

Education as Reconstruction of Experience and Direction

The Reconstruction. Another interpretation of education by Dewey was the reconstruction of experience which adds to its meaning and increases the ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.⁴ Reconstruction of experience implies using all interpretations, and trying to find all the resultant consequences of such action for future reference. The past should not be reconstructed as an end in itself, but as a guide for present and future alternatives.

The Direction. Education, therefore, accomplished more than imparting information. "Minding," consciousness, interests,

¹Ibid., p. 7.

²Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," Dworkin, ed., Dewey on Education, p. 26.

³Gunnar Myrdal, Value in Social Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1958), p. 54.

⁴Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, Ch. 1.

patterns of action and self-awareness were not "givens" in original nature. Dewey believed they were shaped and molded by education. It was therefore the task of education to direct humanity. Dewey stated:

. . .the question of education is the question of taking hold of his (man's)activities, and of giving them direction.¹

In the concept of education as direction, "focusing and ordering were the two components."² One is spacial and the other temporal. All direction is to Dewey re-direction and is a continuous process of trial and error.³ Man had to have the ability to vary his conceptions of things and redirect emphasis with the changing conditions. Through directed experiences, man could change his logic from "casual and sporadic suggestion to alert and cautious inquiry" in concert with others.⁴

Interest in Education

Like Rousseau, Dewey was not naive to think all would participate in the problem-solving method of intelligence without having some form of interest as an incentive. The conditions for man's interest were direct relations of

¹Dewey, School and Society (Chicago: University Press, 1900), p. 37.

²Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 25.

³Ibid.

⁴Dewey, How We Think, p. 62.

need, experiences and relevance.¹ The freeing of inquiry would not have an effect on the public unless it is made interesting enough so all will read, communicate and understand.² As was earlier stated, freedom did not make one intelligent, nor did it guarantee participation. The only guidelines Dewey suggested were to promote involvement, expand the core values, and instill a feeling of worth and participation through democratic, communal cooperation.

Dewey suggested that the schools be the first place to try to instill participation and interest. He suggested that the schools should be a miniature community, where democratic practices were to be applied. The society should allow the experiences of the child to function within the socialization process. This would not only provide the medium for learning communications skills, but would make the learning process relevant, and provide the skills necessary for determining common values. Living the process of democracy in the schools instead of learning about democracy would, in Dewey's opinion, promote participation throughout one's life. As was noted earlier, democracy itself becomes an educative principle, not in preparation for life, but in the living of life itself. Therefore, "all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness

¹John Dewey, Interest and Effort in Education (New York: Houghton Mifflin, & Co., 1913), p. 23.

²Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 182-183.

of the race," and interest becomes not only an individual commitment, but also a social involvement.¹

Experience and Education

John Dewey lived in an era of alienation and detachment for the individual in political, social, and intellectual realms. Rapid change brought about by industrial and scientific innovations separated the culture of the schools from the experience in life.² The terms experimentalism, instrumentalism, scientific humanism, evolutionary materialism, pragmatism and reconstructionism were all used by various authors, and some by Dewey himself, to describe his educational philosophy. Each author believed on expression to be a most important aspect of Deweyan education--experience.

The Invalidation of Experience. Dewey believed the schools would provide the atmosphere where "individualism and socialism were at one."³ But the schools of his time did not promote individualism. Instead, "Americanization" of individuals in the schools tended to demand conformity and mediocrity. Colin Greer concludes that schools in America are not only "culture-bound" but they also "project and impose deadening conventions."⁴ Therefore, experiences were

¹Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed," Dworkin, ed., p. 19.

²Dewey, Experience and Education, Chapter 1.

³Dewey, The School and Society, p. 3.

⁴Colin Greer, The Great School Legend (New York: Viking Press, 1972), p. 5.

invalidated unless they fell within educational expectations. Dewey was convinced that man could not find the social evils of his time because of these limited perspectives afforded the populace in the schools.¹ Dewey's "purpose of schools," therefore, was to validate individual experience in order to provide the society with a true collective intelligence.

The Good. What was "good" to Dewey was the method that worked under the present circumstances, and provided the consequences desired. A true test of the feasibility of an idea was in the "doing." Experience of various members of the society provided the method of determining the "good," but in order to be good, all had to be benefitted. The most important aspects of Dewey's goodness were flexibility and the method of determination. What was good for one generation was not necessarily good for another. Experiences were only a guide in the determination of the "good," and were the chart for re-direction. The "good" could only be found with intelligent discrimination of all experiences, and a test of their consequences.²

Evaluation. Dewey reasoned that one of the largest problems of American society was the education scientists received. They evaluated scientific discoveries in terms

¹Ibid., p. 22.

²Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, p. 68.

of technological progress, but it made them "indifferent to the social consequences of what they were doing."¹ They did not rely on the experiences of others to determine the consequences of their discoveries, nor did they solicit any opinions. Correct evaluation, as seen by C.I. Lewis, was the most essential of all learning.² In order to evaluate anything correctly, all ideas must be tested and validated. Because scientists evaluated only in terms of technological progress, the repercussions of their indiscretions are now being felt.

Blind faith in technological advancements has given Americans the false impression that progress was inevitable. Dewey contended that progress was not a steady and continuous thing, but rather a series of fluctuations.³ In fact, there were regressions as well as progress, particularly in the field of evaluation. Both Dewey and Lewis called for a community of experience to approach agreement on issues, and thereby validate evaluations through experimentation.⁴

Educators as the Directors of Experience

Educators in Dewey's plan are the guides, the encouragement, and the directing force to lead to collective intelligence. If man is to assume that he counts as a

¹Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 56.

²Goheen and Mothershead, p. 183.

³Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 30.

⁴C.I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York: Dover Pub., 1929), *passim*.

particular in society, he must be guided and directed in his endeavors to validate his experience in collaboration with others. Education, then, becomes more than merely a useful tool; it is absolutely necessary for a democratic way of life.¹ It is more important to know "where the shoe pinches" than to know how the shoe pinches.²

Dewey determined that one of the tragic weaknesses in the schools was that they endeavored to prepare future members of the social order in a medium in which the conditions of the social spirit are eminently wanting.³ The schools were not a real reflection of society and did not provide the guidance necessary for problem-solving and communication. They tried to train the students en masse without giving them the chance to associate, integrate and experiment with their own experiences.⁴ David Tyack concurs, stating that educational in America is "indoctrination."⁵ Dewey believed that "we have reached the point of reverance for mediocrity, for submergence of individuality in mass ideals and creeds."⁶ Granted, the school was the "essential

¹Arthur W. Combs, The Professional Education of Teachers (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1965), p. V. See also B. Chandler, D. Powell and W. Hazard, Education and the New Teacher (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1971), p. 52.

²Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 35.

³Dewey, School and Society, p. 12.

⁴Ibid., pp. 33-34.

⁵David Tyack, Turning Points in American Educational History (Waltham, Mass: Blaisdell Pub., Co., 1967), Ch. 7.

⁶John Dewey, Characters and Events (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929), Vol. II, p. 479.

distributing agency" for whatever values and purposes any society cherishes, but Dewey felt there was too much emphasis on tradition and building the American dream, instead of guidance for future problems. Dewey's meaning of "discipline" in the schools was not conformity, but the "realization of interests." He states:

The only valuable discipline to be found in school is the same as that which arises apart from school--from situations which demand effort at work which is felt to be worthwhile.¹

Dewey's role for the teacher is to "select influences that are to affect the child."² This selection, however, is not to find the causes of things or their origins, but to aid in the determination of the consequences. The educator is charged with what Bruce Raup called, "keeping the method of intelligence elevated above the method of force."³ The active component of the teaching method was to guide the students by "proposing and actively advancing new bases for consensus in American belief and conduct."⁴ These bases by definition had to be "new" because each new generation had to interpret the meaning of concepts for themselves.

¹John Dewey, Educational Essays (London: Blackie & Sons, Ltd., 1930), p. 75.

²Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 37.

³Bruce Raup, Education and Organized Interests in America (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1936), p. 228.

⁴Ibid., p. 229.

Educational Planning for Direction

Educational planning is an essential aspect of the role of an educator if he assumes the role of a director of experience. Harry Broudy stated:

There is no choice in education whether to plan or not to plan. The question is who will do the planning and to what end?¹

Because there is a need for reinterpretation of goals and term by every generation, and because meaning changes with each new circumstance, the plan of the teacher should reflect a process for continued growth when the child leaves school. Dewey contended that the school should become a "miniature community, an embryonic society," so that the democratic way of life is practiced in the schools as the means of achieving specified goals for specific circumstances later in life.²

The term "democratic control," therefore, becomes a most important part of educational planning. Dewey stated:

Is there any meaning in the phrase 'democratic control' of social affairs, save as men have been educated into an intellectual familiarity with the weak places, the dark places, the unsettled difficulties of our society before they are overwhelmed by them practically?³

The planning in Dewey's educational system was concerned with the "pragmatic" aspects of "distinguishing between

¹Harry Broudy, Paradox and Promise (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 176.

²Dewey, School and Society, p. 15.

³Dewey, Characters and Events, Vol II, p. 478.

matters of mere opinion and argument and those of fact and ascertainment of fact."¹ Plans made by educators included the use of the method of problem-solving to distinguish between biases and viable alternatives.

Dewey continually asked the question "What is the value of the accepted and generally current classification of subjects?"² The curriculum should be geared for what Dewey called, "indirect sociology--a study of society which lays bare its process of becoming and its modes of organization."³ In essence, subjects and plans for education must encourage man to know what William James termed "the motives that inspire us; not only the instinctive sympathies, but also formal reasoning."⁴ Schools were to promote thorough habits of reflective thinking, with flexible ends in view, and to modify the social order when necessary.⁵

Educational Purpose

The purpose of education is one of the questions every society must ask. It is a perennial question which has to be answered by every society if it is to deal with new and old problems. Dewey had no specific answers to problems of his

¹Ibid., p. 461.

²Dewey, The Way Out of Educational Confusion, p. 4.

³Dewey, School and Society, p. 155.

⁴John Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1931), p. 21.

⁵Dewey, Moral Principles in Education, p. V.

time other than to question everything for consequences and validity. Doubt and questioning are not in themselves an occasion for pessimism, but Americans have viewed this technique as a negative outlook to be avoided. Fear of instability and factionalism has made this country a people ruled by tradition instead of a government ruled by the people. In an effort to retain stability, Americans have placed government and traditions above scrutiny. Dewey chided Americans for holding things above reproach, because it added to the confusion and lead to "futility in action."¹ The purpose of education has correspondingly been to promote conformity and adherence to accepted traditions.

Educational purpose in America has meant finding some one goal instead of finding specific goals for each circumstance. Man has valued in terms of what C.I, Lewis called "descriptivism" and the "relativity disease."² Americans have assumed wrongly that all values are relative and therefore have to be only described. Dewey believed that those scientists that chose to keep out of the social aspect of scientific investigation were accomplishing "intellectual busywork".³ He states:

. . .in order to base conclusions upon the facts and only the facts all evaluative procedures must be strictly ruled out.⁴

¹Dewey, The Way Out of Educational Confusion, p. 2.

²Goheen & Mothershead, ed., p. 184.

³Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 499.

⁴Ibid., p. 495.

F.S.C. Northrop agrees, stating:

The only way to get pure facts, independent of all concepts and theory, is merely to look at them and forthwith to remain perpetually dumb, never uttering a word or describing what one sees.¹

But Dewey saw the need for evaluative judgement in social theory, not to find ends, but to find "ends-in-view."²

Purpose does change, and man has to plunge into the confusion to find it.³ Contemporary critics like John Holt believe that "true education doesn't necessarily quiet things down-- it stirs them up."⁴

Finding educational purpose in a democracy to Dewey was not something easily agreed upon. As Harold Laski stated:

A community that cannot agree is already a community capable of advancement.⁵

Dewey would add that all had to have the opportunity to disagree and have these feelings communicated to the community before it could be called a community. Educational purpose as defined by Dewey, should be shared, communicated, intellectual deliberation of openly derived intentions of the public for that specific time period.

¹F.S.C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949), p. 317.

²Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 499.

³Dewey, The Way Out of Educational Confusion., p. 3.

⁴John Holt, Freedom and Beyond (New York: E.F. Dutton & Co., 1972), p. 235.

⁵Harold Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917), p. 24.

Education for Freedom

Much of what has previously been discussed requires an amount of differentiation by the public and the individual. In order to differentiate properly and make value judgements, the individual must be given freedom to think. The most important freedom Dewey felt man should possess was freedom of intelligence.¹ Without it, terms such as democracy, collective intelligence, and internal authority are meaningless. Boyd Bode agrees with Dewey, stating;

Freedom doesn't make you intelligent--intelligence makes you free.²

But intellectual freedom also requires individuals to be willing to submit to the scrutiny of others and have mutual respect for other opinions.³ Democracy does not guarantee a large base of common values, nor does it ensure a degree of rationality in the collective decisions of the state.⁴ But it does grant individual preference, the right to have minority opinion, and the right to oppose the majority and become a legal interest.

Education in a democracy is therefore freedom of choice. As long as individuals are given the opportunity to interpret meaning in light of their own experiences,

¹Dewey, Experience and Education, pp. 24-46.

²Bode, Democracy as a Way of Life, p. 105.

³Paul Nash, Authority and Freedom in Education (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 76-80.

⁴Myrdal, Value in Social Theory, p. 24.

individual preference will continue to be a contribution to collective intelligence.

America's Developing Pattern

The historical perspective of America's misconceptions about the meaning of democracy and the role of education has been set in the preceeding chapters. Emphasis is placed on Dewey and Rousseau because these authors represent the two main factions present in America's liberal tradition. The lack of agreement as to the meaning of democracy, the variations in opinion concerning the role of the individual in society, and the subsequent crisis in value orientation have made Americans less than an informed, deliberating public.

In order to demonstrate further the present dilemma, the following chapters compare the meaning of general will to collective intelligence, with emphasis placed on the reconstruction of educational objectives. The ideas expressed in the concluding chapter should not be assumed to reflect the views of the authors cited, but are an expression by this author as possible alternatives to lead Americans from their educational confusion.

CHAPTER IV

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENERAL WILL AND COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE: SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Passion has helped us; but can do so no more. It will in future be our enemy. Reason, cold calculating, unpassioned reason, must furnish all the materials for our future support and defense. Let those materials be moulded into general intelligence, sound morality and, in particular, a reverence for the Constitution and laws.

--Abraham Lincoln, "The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions," January 27, 1838.

The cry for law and order is really a cry for oppression and little thinking. Does the only political power come from the barrel of a gun?

--Chairman Mao Tse Tsung

The appeal is no longer to the reason of the citizen, but to his gullibility.

--Edward H. Carr
The New Society

A people first of all preoccupied. . .with achieving the richest living standards in the history of any nation are not likely to be concerned, except in secondary ways, with the clarity of either their means or ends.

--Theodore Brameld
Education for the Emerging Age.

General Will and Collective Intelligence: A Reference Guide

The following chart is a comparison of the concepts discussed by Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey in reference to general will and collective intelligence. In order to answer

the questions stated in the purpose of this study, a comparison of the contents of the preceeding chapters is needed as a frame of reference. Wherever possible, direct quotes are used to explain the terms as well as answer the questions. The statements are taken from comments by the authors in the chapters.

Concept or Question

Jean Jacques Rousseau

John Dewey

Intelligence

The sense of right and wrong that comes only from society; the universal will that leads to knowledge of man's role in Nature, knowledge of the general will.

Holding an end in view; and selecting, organizing out of this end conditions that are means; discrimination of multiple "good" and finding the many means of obtaining it; not a personal endowment, but an integration of experiences.

The Good

The general will; what the "Legislators" see will benefit all; the natural will of man's nature before he was corrupted by society; the will of the whole, based on human sentiment.

Whatever has stood the test of the scientific method of investigation and provided the needed consequences; it has to be redefined by every society for each circumstance; whatever is decided by the whole community as good.

General Will

The living body of constitutional law, a universal good that preexists the collective vote; it must draw its mandate from all; general in object and generally held; only a reinforcement of purpose and not a source of alternative purposes; a universal that has stood the test of time; the rules of law that must

Crowd psychology; conformity to legislators; symptom of an inner void; inertia of custom; no faith in man's human capabilities or capacity to think reflectively; trying to find the causal affects and habits of custom rather than the circumstances and the consequences.

Concept or Question

Jean Jacques Rousseau

John Dewey

General Will (continued)	be adhered to by the public through indoctrination and manipulation; the one interest that unites the citizens.	
Will of the People	Will of the people for a specific time frame, couched in self-interest, emotion, and lack of reason; only the sum of individual wills; it can become a general will, but only if it abides with an already-proposed plan of action affecting the people in general.	This comes closest to collective intelligence for a specific circumstance, but "will" is still concerned with causal factors rather than trying to discern consequences; trying to find out "why" rather than "how to."
Collective Intelligence	Social conformity to general will; control of all individuals to adhere to the universal good; collective consciousness of the general will without the need for manipulation or indoctrination.	Not to bring people into conformity, but to find a new logic of method; the problem-solving method; intellectual integration and pooling of experiences and knowledge; validation of all experiences and counting all members as equal participators in the determination of values, goals, consequences and goods.
Sovereignty	It ultimately rests with the people as a whole; when government does not conform to the general will, the people have the right to ultimately revolt; there is no such thing as representative sovereignty.	Rests with the people as the public mind; collective intelligence will determine the rules of conduct and interpretation of the laws; sovereignty of the people signifies active participation by the public.

Concept or Question

Jean Jacques Rousseau

John Dewey

Liberty

The right to do what you ought to do: liberty is assured when all conform to the general will.

No such thing as liberty in general; man has liberty only in relation to others; a social action allowing individuals privileges the government provides.

Common Man

Man is born innately good, but society corrupts him; man should follow natural inclinations; man is not many times capable of making good judgement because he does not know all the circumstances; a restless animal and a creature of habit; empty like a beast until the state gives him a sense of right and intelligence; virtue in man was conformity to the general will; he wanted the common in man to dominate.

Man is born neither good nor bad; he is a creature of habit; man learns through experience and association with others; he must know the forces that direct him; he must assume a defensible partiality to his feelings and assume responsibility for his actions; Dewey had faith in the common man to grow to his full potential in a democracy based on collective intelligence.

Crisis-Culture

Man was in chains intellectually; vested interests determined the frame of things; society destroys all good and natural things in man; institutions corrupt the society; there was no general will of conduct, only individual wills capable of changing with the power structure.

The crisis of technological progress and the inability of society to cope with rapid change is due to the failure to extend the method of organized intelligence to the entire field of human relations--moral, social and political. Finding causal factors, holding to traditions and habit, and

Concept or Question

John Jacques Rousseau

John Dewey

Crisis-Culture
(continued)

trying to find universals of will has invalidated experience of the public, and nullified intellectual cooperation as a means of achieving immediate goals.

Democracy

The best form of government favors equality of all citizens and participation of all; promotes the general will; government that serves the people; provides for the election of officials; minimizes inequality of opportunity; provides a feeling of community; the best means of achieving the kind of life men ought to live; best organizer of the common interest; provides the most freedom for the individual, while seeking the common good.

It has to be redefined for every generation; necessary for every human being to participate in the formulation of values that regulate the living of people together; a mode of associated living, conjoint communicated experience; a way of life; to feed, sustain and promote growth of the individual's potentiality; pooled cooperative experiences; the best form of government known to validate experiences and promote growth; provides a feeling of community.

The State

Utopia-building; trustee of the general will; man forms a social contract with the state; the family dies, the state abides; the primary organization in society; a corporate body with a life of its own apart from that of the individual that comprises it.

There is no such thing as a utopia; the state function must change with the circumstances; medium for democratic fulfillment; concerned only with those consequences that affect others; there is no state without government, and no government without the public; a secondary organization in society.

Concept or Question

Jean Jacques Rousseau

John Dewey

Role of Education

To train good citizens; negative education until the child has social feelings; manipulate man to conform to the general will; training and not education; a civic function; reflexively train mankind to place the state above all else; all citizens are educators; produce a behavior within prescribed limits set by the general will; learn by doing; to give souls the national sentiment.

Aid in the process of growth validate individual experiences; the whole complex of human dynamics through which every culture seeks both to maintain and innovate its structures, operations and goals; unity of theory and practice; to promote reflective thinking and collective responsibility; reconstruction of experiences for collective intelligence; direction leading to re-direction; to make good problem-solvers; to promote the scientific method of investigation to all areas of human endeavor.

Social Contract

In unity there is freedom, promotion of common interest justice, equal representation, and obedience to law, all for the common good; an association that enlists all and still lets the individual remain as free as before.

Surrender of the individual to the group; contracts between parties are always subject to generalized norms that have evolved over time; it stresses giving up liberties instead of promoting positive freedoms in the individual.

Every ethical act is one of politics and vice versa; the nearer opinion reaches unanimity, the greater the dominance of the general will

Each must test alternatives to reach a conclusion that has best consequences for all; each participating individual must make his evaluation from

Concept or Question

Jean Jacques Rousseau

John Dewey

Evaluation
(Continued)

correct evaluation is conformity to the general will, which is the excellence of ancient wills that have stood the test of time; the public does not evaluate correctly because they do not know all the consequences; the "Legislator" defends against compulsion and mere will of the people.

his own experiences and work in cooperation with others to find all the consequences to the society. The use of the scientific method of collective intelligence; good judgment comes from taking more and more into account until it includes all consequences and experiences which concern every human being.

Freedom

The ability to possess and express a private will; promote people's interest and not harm the whole; to remove all freedom from man's will would also remove all morality from his actions; the general will gives freedom to all; freedom comes with intelligence of the general will.

The most important freedom is freedom of intelligence; the amount of differentiation a person has in the planning of his society; internal authority of public deliberation; the right to have defensible partiality and legally oppose majority decisions; the right to interpret meaning in light of one's own experience.

Community

Community can be no larger than a city-state atmosphere; all must know everyone else; unites the common interest to form the general will; national sentiment for preservation; the smaller the membership, the closer the will and sentiment.

Restoration of internal authority; there is a tie between the words common, communication, and community; each is dependant on the others; as much "process" as substance; conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all; the medium of collective intelligence; the feeling of belonging in local autonomy.

Concept or Question

Jean Jacques Rousseau

John Dewey

What is the relationship of the individual to his society in terms of participation?

To vote as a member of society and determine the will of the people; man is doomed to suffer from conflicts between instincts and socially acquired urges; the "public spirit" that is united by a common interest; the individual conforms to the general will so all will benefit; individuals educate others to be obedient to law.

It is the human aspect of society; the individual is a problem-solver using his own experiences and relating them as part of collective intelligence; a participator in the process of intelligence; the part that comprises the "whole" of experience. The only brains society has to think with are individual ones; a voter who is equal with all other voters to determine choice of alternatives.

What type of government is most conducive to the most desirable educational system?

Democracy is the best form of government because it favors equality of all citizens; government is the servant of the people and should organize the common interest. A democracy provides man the most freedom for individuals while seeking common good. Education is therefore, a civic function, training citizens to conform to the general will.

Democracy allows for participation by all in the decision-making process, and should be practiced in the schools. A democratic government allows for individual growth in a social setting, validates everyone's experiences and promotes individual and collective responsibility.

The difference between general will and collective intelligence with respect to educational purpose.

The general will implies universals of custom that have stood the test of time, It is not a source of alternatives, but merely prescribed the purpose to be obtained. Therefore education implies training and indoctrination; it is socialization based on the

Collective intelligence implies a method of problem-solving, using one's own experience to arrive at a consensus. The purpose of education is to not only find historical meaning, but to direct and re-direct purposes to desired consequences.

<u>Concept or Question</u>	<u>Jean Jacques Rousseau</u>	<u>John Dewey</u>
Differences continued	study of causal factors and historical trends.	
Inconsistencies in American educational goals attributable to Rousseau and Dewey.	Classical liberalism has adhered to many of the tenets of Rousseau, to include <u>laissez faire</u> government, <u>training children</u> to be good citizens in conformity to tradition, nationalizing the public, finding causal factors of issues, and producing behavior within prescribed limits set up by the general will of sentiment. All of these have produced cultural lag, an uninformed and alienated public, Americanization, and control by vested interests of industry.	Contemporary liberalism has advocated many of Dewey's tenets, to include positive control by government, participation by all in the decision-making process, promotion of collective responsibility, and faith in common man as a participant in society. Instead, America faces a crisis-culture with a Bergsonian intellect, basing values on productivity, the work ethic, and dictatorship of the majority. Instead of continuing throughout life, education has meant job preparation and adherence to specific modes of operation determined in a pre-industrial era.
Should values be objective or subjective?	Rousseau was objective in his value orientation. His aim was dignity of the whole, which was manifested in the State. The general will was universal sentiment that could produce a utopia if found. Values in general, therefore, must be found and taught as	Dewey was subjective in his value orientation, mainly because he believed in a reinterpretation of values for each generation. His educational process was to promote the dignity of the individual as a participant in the problem-solving method. Values,

Concept or Question

Jean Jacques Rousseau

John Dewey

Values

Continued

part of the socialization
process.

truth, consequences all change
with the circumstances.

What concepts to
Dewey and Rousseau
agree upon that will
serve as a basis of
agreement for future
educational en-
deavors?

Both authors believe in a "good" for all and they have the notion of the "good" being something that works in the common interest. however, they do not agree in methodology (see The Good above). They also agree that democracy provides the individual the freedom needed to develop in individual characters, and that representatives should be elected by a vote of the people. Vested interests have long been the determining factor in government. Rousseau would eliminate this control by allowing the individual to follow his natural inclinations, while Dewey would improve communication among members of the society to reach a consensus and direct the representatives. The most important area of agreement is the author's concept of community. They view community as the medium of expression for the common man, and as the only way man can restore proper authority. Again, they do not agree in methodology (see Community above).

American Democracy as the General Will

Romantic Naturalism as Classical Liberalism: The Problem Defined

One of the problems facing American democracy is the lack of it in our country.¹ In an effort to subvert government control, attempts by combined cartels to dominate economic enterprises and machine politics, and alienation in general, America experienced the maturity of a democratic liberalist movement in the nineteenth century. This liberalist movement incorporated many tenets of earlier popular writers, but one author was to excel in popularity--Jean Jacques Rousseau.

Better known as Romantic Naturalism Rousseau's philosophy was absorbed into the classical liberalist movement as one of the pillars of social reform. The fact that very little of his entire philosophy was neither understood nor utilized has caused tremendous repercussions to this age. Americans did what they needed from a variety of diverse opinions, thereby causing a grave inconsistency in meaning and valuation of supposedly universally-accepted concepts. This is not hard to conceptualize. In 1839, de Tocqueville stated that he had seen no other country less concerned with philosophy than America.² Part of the explanation he attributed

¹Robert MacIver, Democracy and the Economic Challenge (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1952), p. 76.

²Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Oxford: World Classics, 1916), p. 295.

to America's insatiable drive for growth expansion. It was as if Americans had not time to pause and ponder about what they were doing. There was, therefore, little need for consistency of philosophy throughout the country, and sectionalism remained as the major disjunctive force in America until the rise of industrial and national sentiment.

The sectionalism and lack of consensus, however, has carried over to this time period. The diminishing number of common values needed to a democratic base has seriously weakened the needed integrative force. The American democratic "tradition" has been further weakened by what William Stanley terms a deep cleavage and conflict in basic ideals, attitudes and goals, and by a pervading confusion that has obscured the meaning of democratic principles and norms.¹ Sectionalism has continued to be a limiting factor in the determination of common goals, ideals and aspirations of American society to the point of dangerous confusion. Democratic ideals are still expressed, but have little meaning in a society that has transformed from a pre-industrial to a post-industrial era in only a few decades.

Another aspect of the aforementioned weakness in unity is attributable to early liberals espousing democratic ideals expressed by Rousseau without revision. By extracting ideas from the concept of the social contract and believing in a general will of conduct, Americans have only confused

¹Stanley, Education and Social Integration, p. 166.

the role of the individual in society to mean conformity to majority decisions and to follow traditions expressed by the founding fathers.

Classical Liberals and Contemporary Liberals.

In response to classical liberalist doctrines that tended only to further alienate the public in the decision-making process, contemporary liberals tried to demonstrate the disparity between "mass mind" and a group acting in concert. There is a subtle difference in their meanings.

C.P. Snow warned that the mass mind can be as intolerable as any Fascist organization. He stated:

We must not forget that as a state and a people, we must fear and defend ourselves against the passionate and vehement voices and peers, that insist upon patterns of conformity. The 'mass mind' can be a deadly enemy to the democratic state. . . . It is one of our tasks to stop the trampling feet of those who want to destroy what they cannot understand.¹

As was noted in Chapter I, contemporary liberals stressed freedom of intelligence for positive action on the part of the individual. Collective intelligence meant validation of individual experiences, not to find causal factors or universal general will, but to discover all the alternatives and consequences of problems yet to be faced. The contemporary liberals, however had little effect on American political or educational policy, and Americans are living

¹C.P. Snow, "History is Merciless to Failure," The Professor and the Public, G. Smith, ed., (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1972), p. 22.

by Rousseauian democracy in an age that needs the interpretation of values and goals.

This chapter deals with some of the perplexities already mentioned in American society: the confusion about the meaning of democracy; general welfare; the effects of technology; the purpose of education; and the lack of communal responsibility.

The Relationship of American Democracy to Rousseauian General Will

American society, as with all other societies, is basically irrational as a whole.¹ Democracy in America has thrived because it has, in actuality, limited those who think for the society in general. In the name of democracy, representative government has ruled as the expression of the public deliberation. Edward H. Carr feels American democracy is really a dictatorship of an elite. He states:

The spectacle of an efficient elite maintaining its authority and asserting its will over the mass by the rational calculated use of irrational methods of persuasion is the most disturbing nightmare of mass democracy.²

Carr further maintains that leadership in America is judged on irrational criteria such as voice characteristics, dress, and the ability to sidestep difficult political questions.¹

¹Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. IX.

²Edward H. Carr, The New Society, School, Society and the Professional Educators, p. 277.

³Ibid., p. 272. Max Weber was one of the originators of a strong government. Thus, people looked to other criteria for leadership.

He cites numerous examples of Rousseauian general will in America previously mentioned, to include committees on un-American activities, loyalty oaths, closed shops, party discipline, and the "silent majority."¹ Carr notes one of the prime examples of the lack of public involvement to be the difference between the interests of the leadership in an organization and those of the rank-and-file. In an effort to retain their power, the leaders describe problems in other terms to the rank-and-file members, while they maneuver among themselves for overall control.² As a consequence, the membership is alienated from the decision-making process.

Herbert Marcuse contends that the public is not alienated in the sense most Americans believe, but rather, they are assimilated and swallowed up by technological progress. He states:

The union of growing productivity and growing destruction; the brinkmanship of annihilation, the surrender of thought, hope and fear to the decisions of the powers that be; the preservation of misery in the face of unprecedented wealth constitute the most impartial indictment.³

Because technology has so rapidly changed the conditions of survival, survival has meant conformity to technological needs. Working for the system has superceded any individual expression of human need.

¹Ibid., p. 269.

²Ibid., p. 277.

³Marcuse, p. XIII.

Marshall McLuhan and Q. Fiori believe that "man-made environments are always unperceived by men during the period of their innovation."¹ They are visible only after they are superceded. This conceptualization seems to have merit in light of historical lessons unlearned. Man's hindsight might be very perceptive, but Americans have not cultivated the ability to foresee future possibilities or even present consequences, As a consequence, education has not been concerned with an educational milieu based on situational/problematic studies, and continues to refer to the past for traditional solutions.

Historicism. In an effort to combat uncertainty, Americans have reverted to what Karl Popper calls "tribalism and a closed society based on mysticism."² Historicism, in Popper's words, is the art of finding universals of history and making long-term prophesies from past experiences. Finding causal factors of past events is in close proximity to Rousseauian tenents of universal general will that have stood the test of time. Popper classifies Rousseau as an enemy of the open society because he subverts individual expression in favor of historicism and will.

Not only are universals improbable to Popper, but the causes behind events are never the same as before. As a

¹Marshall McLuhan and Q. Fiori, War and Peace in the Global Village (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), p. 17.

²Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1945), Vol. I, p. 1.

consequence, democracy has become totalitarian. In order to survive times of crisis, Popper claims a democratic government will react in much the same manner as any Fascist organization.¹ Popper maintains that "The future depends on ourselves, and we do not depend on any historical necessity. . . . Historical prophesies and the great man theory are entirely beyond the scope of scientific method."²

Americanism. Conformity, instead of democracy, has become a way of life in America. David Riesman concludes that the typical American seeks constant approval through conformity rather than individuality.³ Thomas Molnar agrees, stating:

It is undemocratic to excel--Americans don't need brains, they need good citizens.⁴

Americans have not only rejected other cultures in the name of "Americanism," but they have also rejected those people associated with the culture as well.⁵ Those who do not conform to "American" ideals are overtly and covertly eliminated from the democratic process.

Contemporary Critics of Socialization

Whatever the reasons, gullibility, stupidity in the

¹Ibid., p. 2.

²Ibid.

³David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 22.

⁴Thomas Molnar, The Future of Education (New York: Fleet Pub., Co., 1961), p. 55.

⁵Laudin, p. 25, and Greer, pp. 80-105.

masses, apathy on the part of the public, and education for job preparation have pervaded American life in this century. American society has ridiculed those who drop out of school, just because they might not be able to wait to try their own ideas and validate their own experiences. "Stupidity" in children is, to Paul Goodman, a defense against the system. Arthur Jersild feels those who conform to society are those using defenses against society.¹ They would rather conform than face the anxiety of being a non-conformist in a society that has little toleration for such behavior.

Technology Rather than Terror. Herbert Marcuse, Robert Theobald and many others cite technological productivity as the most destructive force in the free development of human needs. In the name of efficiency and the rise of the standard of living, American technology has "conquered" all contrifugal social forces.² The ability to contain social change has been a singular achievement of advanced industrial society. Marcuse states:

The general acceptance of the National Purpose, bipartisan policy, the decline of pluralism, the collusion of business and labor within the strong state testify to the integration of opposites.³

¹Arthur Jersild, When Teachers Face Themselves (Columbia; Teachers College Press, 1955), Chapter II.

²Marcuse, p. X.

³Ibid., p. XII.

The productive apparatus itself tends to become totalitarian because it not only "determines a priori the product of the apparatus as well as the operations of serving it."¹ In a sense, the will of technology becomes the general will. The rationale given is the suppression of individuality for social mechanization. Rights and liberties so valuable to earlier stages of production and industry have been replaced by more efficient and productive measures--achievements cancel premises.² Satisfaction of needs has become the main concern of the time, and it does not matter if systems are authoritarian or not.

Marcuse further maintains that technology has paid lip service to the idea that through centralization and elimination of competition, all would benefit and society could move beyond the need for vital things. It would also produce an individual autonomy by releasing people from toil to what they want to do.³ What appears is quite the opposite-- "industry calls for times, skills, numbers of workers and is totalitarian."⁴ Charles Reich substantiates this argument, and concludes that America is experiencing a "Consciousness II," which includes a company loyalty and a corporate image above

¹Ibid., p XV.

²Ibid., p. 1.

³Ibid., p. 2.

⁴Ibid., p. 3.

individuality.¹ A will of industrial needs has become the most important aspect of life; whether they be real or manufactured needs is of little importance. What has emerged is a way of life based on accumulation of wealth.

Americans are not so much alienated as they were caught up in technological progress. According to Marcuse:

society takes care of the needs of liberation by satisfying the needs that make servitude palatable, and perhaps unnoticeable, and it accomplishes this fact in the process of production itself²

Men live their denial less conspicuously because they are not denied the "necessities"--things that would make them look for and desire freedom.³ In essence, "The Pleasure Principle absorbs the Reality Principle."⁴ As a result, a "one-dimensional thought is systematically promoted by makers of politics and purveyors of mass information."⁵

Marcuse explains the lack of participation on the part of Americans in political and social crises by stating:

The established system, in spite of everything, delivers the goods.⁶

This society turns everything into "progress and exploitation, of drudgery and satisfaction, of freedom and

¹Charles Reich, The Greening of America (New York: Random House, 1970), *passim*.

²Marcuse, p. 24.

³Ibid., pp. 26-27.

⁴Ibid., p. 72.

⁵Ibid., pp. 13-14.

⁶Ibid., p. 79.

oppression."¹ A happy consciousness becomes another dimension of technological rationality. There is "atrophy of the mental organs for grasping these contradictions and alternatives."² The "truths" of the alienated are assimilated into the culture as merely "factions of truth."³ Conscience is absolved by the general necessity of things. In Rousseauian fashion, the whole cannot be wrong. In general necessity, there can be no guilt. Any individual disturbance is dealt with in hospitals. Crime and guilt become private affairs.⁴ The elements of autonomy, discovery, demonstration and critique recede before designation, assertion and imitation.⁵

Marcuse and Theobald conclude that America has a mentality of productivity, linear in scope, following the tenents of Rousseauian general will. Samuel Clemens once wrote: "If there is no work in heaven, I do not care to go." This mentality has pervaded the American concept of worth and value in the society. Accumulation of goods has stifled any individual attempts to analyze the problems of society. Solon Kimball reiterates:

The American solution to the problem of human misery arising from want has been to create an

¹Ibid., p. 78.

²Ibid., p. 79.

³Ibid., p. 72.

⁴Ibid., p. 80. See also the writings of Michael Szasz and Robert Laing.

⁵Ibid., p. 85.

industrial economy capable of producing a superabundance of goods.¹

These "goods" in many cases are no longer necessities for survival, but merely opiates to public deliberation and critical examination of values and tradition. The real needs of the society are invalidated in favor of productivity and accumulation of gadgetry.

Marcuse's solution to this problem is to "liberate the imagination" by again analyzing all alternatives. Reich agrees, and suggests education should stress control of technology rather than trying to work with it.² Karl Popper suggests that there is a need for a "social technology whose results can be tested by social engineering."³ In their interpretation, truth is used with a small letter "t" rather than a Rousseauian capital "T." Truth is relative, and man should strive to interpret continually its meaning to society. Because man does not know all the circumstances and all the consequences, truth should and must change to meet specific needs. Robert MacIver states:

We can only make guesses of social causation. What is important is that we find the linkage of difference to difference and demarcate.⁴

¹Solon Kimball and James McClellan, Education and the New America (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 43.

²Reich, *passim*.

³Popper, p. 210.

⁴MacIver, Social Causation, p. 377.

Technology as Unneutral. Just as education cannot be neutral, neither can technology. Americans have used the "scientific conquest of nature for the scientific conquest of man."¹ The more available knowledge becomes, and increases, the more it has occupied itself with a task that is no longer humanly pertinent.² Relying on causal factors, tradition, classical liberalist doctrines of survival of the fittest and laissez faire practices in industry, Americans have lost control of any decision-making process as advocated by Dewey. In the name of general welfare, individuality has been subverted for socialization and technological efficiency.

The Meaning of General Welfare in America. Because of rapid technological progress and the knowledge explosion, the term "general welfare" has been a misleading concept. Aubrey Haan states that certain qualifications have to be added in order to provide for the general welfare in America: (1) there is really no welfare that can be called general, except as it pays attention to the welfare of each individual making up society; (2) the term general welfare carries with it the implications that though there may be many compromises in setting up the arrangement of society, there is basically a fair share for all.³ Both Haan and Dewey agreed

¹Marcuse, p. XIV.

²Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 7.

³Aubrey Haan, Education for the Open Society (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1962), p. 14.

that everyone might not know all the circumstances and alternatives to social problems, but Dewey believed what was more important was knowing how to analyze a problem.

Harry Gervitz and Walter Lippmann felt not every citizen is capable of contributing and that some had to be dependent on others to accomplish anything. Dewey took issue with this concept, and attributed this line of thinking with the present problem in individual participation and worth.¹

Only through a process of give and take and the validation of individual experience can a general welfare be realized.

Maslow stated:

It is quite clear that no social reforms, no beautiful constitutions or beautiful programs or laws will be of any consequence unless people are healthy enough, strong enough, good enough to understand them and to want to put them into practice in the right way.²

Contemporary American Public Opinion. Abraham Lincoln once stated that no man was wise enough to govern without consent. As was noted earlier, Juan Ortega and Paulo Freire stated much the same thesis. But information distortion, a feeling of helplessness, alienation, assimilation into the technological system, and pressure to conform have transformed public opinion into what Paul Goodman calls a "Fascism to the center."³ In 1984 fashion, society has become

¹Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, passim.

²Maslow, p. 19.

³Paul Goodman, Compulsary Mis-Education (New York: Horizon Press, 1964), p. 13.

automated and intolerant at new ways of looking at problems. The new democracy has meant regimentation. National needs have become more important than individual development.¹

Clarence Karier warns:

As conflict in American culture increases and the idea of revolution is no longer dismissed as some absurd anarchist dream, but increasingly entertained by men of more moderate persuasion, more and more voices can be heard echoing a common warning--the new left must temper its attacks or face the wrath of a fascist nightmare.²

Hans Toch believes that in order for a person to join a social movement, two things must be present: (1) the person must feel something can be done about the problem; and (2) he must want to do something himself.³ These two aspects of public opinion in America are more times than not conspicuously absent. Discrimination in the form of denial of equal access to public deliberation and demands for traditional and conformist attitudes make the public mind more of a general will of conduct than any kind of a deliberating, responsible clientele.

Social Organization as Another Deterrent to Public Opinion. Herbert Marcuse, John Dewey, and Charles H. Cooley felt that one of the real dangers in America was the way in

¹Ibid., p. 20.

²Clarence Karier, Liberalism and the Quest for Orderly Change, History of Education Quarterly, Vol. XII, nr. 1, 1972, p. 57.

³Hans Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1965), p. 11.

which society was organized. Marcuse contended that the organization of American society prevented individuality, and that people were trained to fit into the technological complex as cogs in the industrial machine.¹ Cooley stated that the unity of public opinion is dependent upon organization rather than any kind of agreement.² People of like interest and mutual agreement tended to organize themselves into groups. This in itself would not be bad, but as both Rousseau and Dewey noted, this tended to produce supremacy of interest groups, and leadership in these groups was based on the ability to manipulate others to one's will. Power became the end itself, rather than a consensus. Organizational structures became heirarchical and gravitated toward denial of cooperative efforts instead of systematically including them.

Suddenly, certain ideas against the majority became "un-American."³ Only certain groups have been successful in making their feelings known.⁴ Not only is this undemocratic, but it is against the American ideals of human dignity and worth of the individual.

The Power of Public Opinion. The power of public opinion in America is a strong force, but it seldom used

¹Marcuse, p. IX.

²Charles H. Cooley, Social Organization (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), p. 11.

³James P. Shaver, Americanism as an Educational Objective, The Educational Forum, November, 1968, p. 63.

⁴Ibid., p. 66.

outside group participation. Recent presidential referral to the "silent majority" attests to the mentality of political leaders concerning public power. Instead of trying to find real public opinion, political leaders revert to "selling" ideas to the public, or trying to appeal to more basic considerations such as personal appearance, good speech techniques or charisma. The power of politics is dependent on those who can sway the most votes by any means necessary in order to declare a mandate from the public.

Individualism in Contemporary America

The democratic way of life has encouraged great dreams and aspirations on the part of its members. Unfortunately, they have only been dreams. Freedom in a democracy implies not just opportunity, but options as well. One of the problems in American democracy is the lack of both opportunity and options. Paulo Freire once stated:

Freedom is acquired by consent, not by gift.¹

His meaning is clear when relating this statement to the atmosphere prevalent in South America.²

Dewey agreed that many of the liberalist doctrines concerning freedom of the individual and democratic determination of values were actually illiberal. There exists

¹Freire, p. 31

²Roy E. Horton, "American Freedom and the Values of Youth," Anti-Democratic Attitudes in American Schools (Boston: Northwest University Press, 1963), p. 57.

"onesided and egoistic individualism in American life that has left its imprint on our practices."¹ Gunnar Myrdal pointed out the inconsistencies in American theory and practice by using the example of the treatment of the American Negro. But what has been more of an issue in recent years is the regulation of public opinion. Dewey states:

The regulations and laws of the states are therefore misconceived when they are viewed as commands, . . . If will is the origin of the state, then state-action expresses itself in the injunctions and prohibitions imposed by its will on the will of its subjects.²

Dewey believed that eventually people would question this will, unless Americans believed in a general will, with absolute reason. Since Dewey had little faith in absolutes, he could not conceive a general will as the basis of democratic action. What has transpired in American politics, however, is a will based on traditional and untested assumptions. Sidney Hook declared this as an example of "philosophical imperialism," and that Americans have declared only one method of establishing truth.³ As a consequence, other methods have gradually been invalidated.

Alienation in American Organizational Structure

Western democracies have suffered from what Edgar Faure terms the "law of entropy." The right to vote, once

¹Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 34.

²Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 53.

³Hook, The Quest for Being, p. 173.

fought and died for, is no longer an effective instrument to stimulate enough interest in the public.¹ Manipulation of the individual has been the concern of the powers-that-be, and planning has been a function of a separate group from the society as a whole. Although Americans are generally repulsed by the term "collectivism," Thomas Buford contends that this is what in fact exists in American organizational structure. He states:

Collectivism, explicit in totalitarianism, and implicit in economic planning, tends to make man an object to be manipulated and to separate men from one another; the ruler from the ruled, the owner from the laborer; the planner from the recipient.²

The history of America could be categorized by what Erich Kahler terms as a history of the alienation of man, or what Robert Merton termed a "flight into faith."³ Men like Marx, Weber, C. Wright Mills, and Emile Durkheim have written classics about alienation, and the subject still dominates both contemporary literature and the history of sociological thought. Melvin Seeman attempts to clarify uses of the term alienation into five main concepts:

1. Powerlessness--the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot

¹Edgar Faure, The Heart of the Battle (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1972), p. 207.

²Thomas Buford, ed., Toward a Philosophy of Education (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969), p. 13.

³Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," Buford, ed., Toward a Philosophy of Education, p. 62.

determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or the reinforcement he seeks.

2. Meaninglessness--the rise of what Karl Mannheim termed "functional rationality" and the decline of "substantial rationality." With the growth of efficiency (functional), there is a subsequent decline of the capacity to act intelligently on the basis on one's own insights. The individual's choice among alternatives has declined and a 'low confidence limit' in the individual increases. Man is intellectually alienated.

3. Normlessness--C. Wright Mills and Melvin Seeman reflect the view that the individual who remains free may continue to learn more and more about modern society, but he finds the center of political initiative less and less accessible--He can't control what he can't foresee. Merton's definition of anomie applies here. People place faith in mysticism.

4. Isolation--a person assigns low regard for values, goals or beliefs that are high in society.

5. Self-Estrangement--the individual becomes estranged from himself and others as he tries to secretly make an instrument of others. C.W. Mills and Riesman are most noted for this concept.¹

All of these types of alienation are present in the contemporary American organizational structure. As was noted earlier, Herbert Marcuse adds to the disorientation by contending that Americans are not only alienated, but they are assimilated into the culture by means of technological necessity as well.

The Social Ethic. William H. Whyte contends that America, although it holds the "American dream" of the Protestant Ethic, in actuality lives by a "Social Ethic."²

¹Ibid., pp. 63-74. See also Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1940), p. 59. C.W. Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 157. David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, passim.

²William H. Whyte, The Organizational Man, Buford, ed, Toward a Philosophy of Education, pp. 75,76.

The social ethic is a contemporary body of thought which makes morally legitimate the pressures of society against the individual.¹ Whyte lists three major propositions of the social ethic:

1. the group is the source of creativity
2. "belongingness" is the ultimate need of the individual;
3. belief in the application of science to achieve this "belongingness."²

Because of these beliefs, man has determined he is meaningless unless he is in a unit of some kind. These assumptions in themselves would not be bad, but man presently interprets these propositions in a narrow, immediate sense. Whyte states:

One can believe man has a social obligation and that the individual must ultimately contribute to the community without believing that group harmony is the test of it.³

As a result, group harmony is not an objective; "belonging" is the objective. Man has to belong to a group even to be recognized.

Dewey measured the effectiveness of a government by the "degree in which it relieves individuals from the waste of negative struggles and needless conflict, and confers upon him positive assurance and reinforcement in what he undertakes."⁴

¹Ibid., p. 76.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 77

⁴Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 53.

This is what Dewey termed "positive" service of government. But present governmental practices promote what Kenneth Boulding terms "dialectical" conflicts instead of "nondialectical" evolution.¹ The organizational structure promotes conflict and victory of one group over the others. The social organization in America is either a "threat system," which uses defiance, avoidance, or deterrance, or it is an "exchange system," which promotes a give-and-take atmosphere.² Boulding suggests an "integrative system," which could validate everyone's experiences and help in the determination of a Deweyan collective intelligence.³ Whyte suggests that Americans do not need to know how to work with an organization as much as they need to know how to resist it without destroying it.⁴ Since the growth of knowledge is nondialectical, and since economic growth is dialectical, the "winner" in the organizational structure has been the development of economic efficiency over collective intelligence.⁵ Boulding concludes that a "developmental philosophy" based on testing rather than conflict could be advanced by this society if the organizational pattern were to reflect an integrative structure.⁶

¹Kenneth Boulding, A Primer on Social Dynamics (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. IV.

²Ibid., pp. 21-28.

³Ibid., p. 28.

⁴Whyte, p. 80.

⁵Boulding, pp. 58-67.

⁶Ibid., p. 73.

Synergy. Buckminster Fuller and later Robert Theobald suggested that systematic thinking could replace individual, linear thought if inner, outer and situational communication were developed in America.¹ They point out that Americans have been successful with the analysis of secondary goals and consequences.² Theobald advocates synergy in thinking, where there is advantage for all rather than advantages for some and disadvantages for others.³ His method of obtaining this integration of knowledge is the use of a more extensive communications system worldwide, and the elimination of information distortion. Before one could change this information distortion, however, an analysis of the role of communications in America is needed.

Communications as a Manipulator

In recent years, Americans have begun to recognize the power of communications as a medium for propaganda, knowledge, and information. Dewey recognized the worth of communication, and in order to have a democracy of informed and deliberating individuals with a common purpose, he relied on an extensive communications system. In order to promote the feeling of local community, he advocated communications among all participators. Literature concerning communications

¹Robert Theobald, Habit and Habitat (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 183-184.

²Robert Theobald, An Alternative Future for America II, pp. 17-19.

³Ibid., p. 47.

in America, however, espouses other aspects of the media that produces the opposite effect.

Rousseau, in an effort to eliminate the power of vested interests, favored no communication among members of a society, so that their natural inclinations would prevail. He did not, however, foresee the impact of mass communications on the public and how conformity could be induced by the use of technological advancements that "bombard" the unsuspecting individual.

Herbert Marcuse senses that the American media produces a "hypnotic character" because of the continued use of repeated syntax.¹ This repetition of words "fixes meaning and stereotypes institutions, attitudes, aspirations."² Words and abbreviations are no longer nouns--they are concepts that have concreteness about them. Marcuse states that words do not lend themselves to "discourse" at all.³ As a consequence, he feels man has lost the critical ability to analyze slogans, traditions and common verbalisms used by the media. Education has also become disruptive, and merely explains the terms and jargon used by the various "disciplines" as having no other interpretation.

An American impotency has emerged from this situation, making words merely instruments of dialogue, rather than

¹Marcuse, p. 95.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 101.

having two dimensions--reflection and action.¹ Carl Rowan maintains that Americans have no appreciation of the potency of words and the power of ideas, mainly because they have become fixed in meaning and impact.² Marshall McLuhan believes the multimedia have demolished any kind of consciousness.³ Lies become credibility gaps and truth becomes trust.⁴ "Tranquilizers and anesthetics, private and corporate, become the largest business in the world, just as the world is attempting to maximize every form of alert."⁵

Newspapers, magazines, television and radio have become "industries" instead of information distributors. They have lost the real purpose of their inception--public service. These industries have become "too costly to be jeopardized by irresponsible individualism."⁶ Mass communications has not meant communication to all. It is, rather, selective, and bombards only certain segments of the population.⁷ Selling ideas and products has become a profitable business, with as little consciousness on the part of the public as possible.

¹Freire, p. 75.

²Carl T. Rowan, The Mass Media in an Era of Explosive Change, Agee, ed., Mass Media in a Free Society (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1969), p. 44.

³Marshall McLuhan and W. Watson, From Cliche to Archtype (New York: Viking Press, 1970), p. 34.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 13.

⁶Theodore Patterson et al, The Mass Media and Modern Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965). p. 3.

⁷Ibid., p. 7.

The media has only helped to induce a "silent majority" by selectively limiting means of communicating as an individual. Politicians have taken this silence as a mandate for their actions, with no attempts really to improve the communication or even test their assumptions.

America has the current problem of making a traditional static society dynamic, capable of change and meeting unforeseen circumstances. Modern communications have changed the culture, but to whose liking? Knowledge and control of its dissemination have become the power instead of a means of obtaining a common purpose for the good of all.

Educational media has become a part of mass media. Its purpose is stated by Wilbur Schramm to be "to speed and ease the long, slow social transformation required for economic development and in particular to speed and smooth the task of mobilizing human resources behind the national effort."¹ Although Schramm is depicting the role of communications and educational media in underdeveloped countries, this continues to be the role after economic development has been accomplished. His argument in favor of this attitude is based on certain assumptions: (1) knowledge is better than ignorance; (2) food is better than hunger; (3) health is better than disease, and (4) participation is better than isolation.² Since change is

¹Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development (Stanford: University Press, 1964), p. 27.

²Ibid., p. 35.

inevitable, Schramm blames the people in charge of communication, not communication itself, for its manipulative character. One can place the blame on human error with relative ease. But what makes Schramm's thesis less than convincing are the assumptions he makes. He views production and efficiency in technology as the opiate for any problems that might be encountered. As Theobald states:

The generally accepted goals of our society appear to be technological wizardry, economic efficiency, and the development of the individual in the good society, . . . but in that order.¹

The needs of the state in terms of production and efficiency come first. The will of our technology continues to be a general will of action for its preservation, and communications its instrument.

Reexamination of the Local Community

Back to Normalcy

Radicalism on American campuses and in urban ghettos has waned since the late sixties. Efforts by American youth and minority groups reaped a wealth of literature and political sloganism in favor of law and order. As a consequence, many of America's youth have reverted to introspection rather than violence. The recent rise in popularity of existential philosophies and Eastern religious doctrines among America's youth attests to the lack of adequate concern for their opinions.

¹Theobald, An Alternative Future for America II, p. 1.

The word "new" has been in the vocabulary of Americans ever since this country's world involvement. New Nationalism, New Deal, New Frontier, and New Federalism were terms used by politicians in the past "New Liberalism," however, has been a term conspicuously absent.¹ Rather than voicing their opinions, "Americans have revolted against war, women's liberation, hell-raising, and liberals and reformers in general."² The 1972 election campaign is an example of the victory of a "Back to Normalcy" attitude by Americans hoping for a return to "privatism."³ Alienation in the decision-making process, and the desire to go back to a much simpler way of life have contributed to political and social indifference on the part of the public.

The minute divisions of labor and extreme social mobility have an added affect on the public. Americans have become many-sided in their opinions, and rather than trying to be consistent and show partiality toward their own experiences, Americans assume different roles for different situations.⁴ Survival has meant adaptability to the inconsistencies present in the society. Men would rather conform to expectations or leave the public domain completely, rather than to try collectively to take a stand on their partiality and defend

¹Forcey, p. XIII.

²William Van Til, "Back to Normalcy," Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. LIV, nr. 8, April, 1973, p. 522.

³Ibid.

⁴Raup, The Improvement of Practical Intelligence pp. 6-11.

contentions. Rather than recognize difficult problems, Americans have chosen to overlook them. They would rather say, "We don't have a race problem--we don't have any Negroes." ¹ Problems, consequently, cease to be urgent or are eliminated by the passage of time. ²

The Return to the Community

Both Rousseau and Dewey espoused the need for a feeling of local community in order to reach what Rousseau termed general will and what Dewey termed collective intelligence. Local community in both Rousseau's and Dewey's era failed as a social unit. The difference in their time periods is possibly in the difference between technological power and religious power. Rousseau viewed the religious hierarchy as one of the largest forces determining the needs in his period, while Dewey sensed the technological framework as the conscience-carrier for his age.

Delbert Miller lists five reasons why the local community has failed in America as a social solid force:

- (1) the lack of social solidarity and respect for neighbors,
- (2) the lost identity as a physically bounded area; (3) the loss of effective leaders on the local level; (4) the weakness in local institutions of government; and (5) the power of the local communities concentrated in groups outside the

¹Rowan, p. 45.

²Dewey, see Chapter II.

government structure.¹ In order to restore the local community as the most important part of political power, and thereby give the citizen renewed capabilities in the social determination of needs and values, both Rousseau and Dewey felt the need for control of government. Rousseau's control was negative, based on the absolute freedom of the individual, and manifested in a social contract system. Dewey's control was positive and was based on scientific investigation by all to reach tested conclusions. What has resulted in America is a government controlled by technological needs, with a power structure sympathetic only to certain numbers of influential citizens.

The philosophic aim of both Rousseau and Dewey was to get each individual out of an isolated class system and into a whole humanity. Both Rousseau and Dewey believed life to be a social experience and that only through human association could man rise above the animals. Institutions were to be judged according to their ability to serve the public. But Rousseau and Dewey do not agree on the method of communal determination of the "good." Rousseau's community is thriving in America if one believes in following tradition, causal factors, and universals that have stood the test of time.

¹Delbert Miller, "Democracy and Decision: Making a Community Power Structure," W.B. D'Antonio and H. Ehrlich, eds., Power and Democracy in America (Notre Dame: University Press, 1961), p. 22.

Dewey's community is dying unless one can "rediscover a new method of public deliberation."¹

Dewey's community members are creators as well as members to be counted in public deliberation. A person's creativity in America, however, is viewed as dissent and radicalism from the "traditional" norms. The method of collective intelligence has no way of expressing itself or reaching what Edward Lindeman called "compromise on the basis of tentative progress."² Americans have relied on others for their thinking, and communication has assumed the role of selling programs and products. The most difficult part of the process of collective intelligence is communicating to all and using honest and vigorous persuasion.³ Since "money-theism"⁴ has replaced religious institutions as the manipulator of social determination, man is born into competition rather than cooperation.⁴ Linear thinking in terms of individual outcome or corporate will invalidates the common experience that unite rather than separate common purposes.

Reexamination of Dewey's Local Community. In a time when urban alienation, apathy in politics, and submergence of individualism to technological progress have subverted

¹Stanley, Education and Social Integration, p. 35.

²Edward Lindeman, The Community (New York: Association Press, 1921), p. 123.

³Gordon McCloskey, ed., Education and Public Understanding (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 30.

⁴Ashley Montagu, Education and Human Relations (New York: Grove Press, 1958), p. 21.

democratic ideals, Dewey's insistence on communal feeling might be the answer to a perennial question: "How can man be affected by a decision or policy by society and still in some way have a part in shaping it?" Dewey stated:

The things which are socially most fundamental, that is, which have to do with experiences in which the widest group shares, are the essentials. The things which represent the needs of specialized groups and technical pursuits are secondary.¹

In order to have a society, William Stanley claims it "is at bottom an affair of moral community. . . Hence the welfare of a people and ultimately its existence depend upon acceptance by a vast majority of its members of a common system of basic values and beliefs."² Dewey advised: "Majority rules when consensus can't be obtained."³ Trying to find consensus has not been the issue in America. There is a need for a return of the human element in decision-making. A return to community feeling through communication could replace "dry language of scientific discourse" with a "warm and persuasive language of human discussion."⁴ "In order to have a large number of values in common and the ability to change them with the circumstances, a community atmosphere must be present to provide the medium for human discussion."⁵

¹Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 225.

²Stanley, Education and Social Integration, p. 138.

³Ibid., p. 200.

⁴Ibid., p. 247.

⁵Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 84.

Community, as was noted earlier, is a term used by Dewey in a broad sense. It is not necessarily a geographical limitation, but it is a political, social and psychological concept. Edward Lindeman suggests that the community must have geographical confines, political laws agreed upon, a social intercourse system, and a like-mindedness or homogeneity of mind.¹ Human community no longer means geographical area, but people must still have common ends and share certain kinds of concerns. This does not mean one must have these ends in view or must agree with the community in order to exist in it. The common orientation should not be pre-determined; people should reach a common orientation through communication, or what Brameld calls "social consensus."²

Robert MacIver defines community as "a sense of common patterns of feeling, acting and thinking; a sense of unity typically growing out of a consensus of a common world of experience."³ Community, although defined in many ways, has changed in meaning in a world changed by technology. The possibility of a world community is well within the realm of feasibility because of the improved communication means and transportation. But the political structure, control of communications means, and "fact-finding" missions in education

¹Lindeman, p. 10.

²Theodore Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy (New York: World Books, Co., 1950), p. 531.

³Stanley, Education and Social Integration, p. 35.

have eliminated this goal as a needed aspect of world survival.

The Transitional Aspect of Community. Dewey broadly categorized community because of the changing nature of its meaning to each generation. The most important aspect is the ability to communicate and exchange ideas. Communication comes from social needs, not from any predetermined will of collective thought.¹ When one studies a community, it is a study of transitional processes.² What has caused a decay in community responsibility and power is the denial by its members that there exists an "invisible government" of privileged leaders that "defend individual rights" on the one hand, and control the decision-making power on the other.³ At best, the capacity of people to think, feel and act as a unit in a transformation is reduced.⁴ A person finds less and less consensus to the problem areas increase in a changing communal pattern. Robert Theobald feels that any reliance on such organizations as the nuclear family without other close relationships "is a tragic distortion of the meaning of community."⁵

¹Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 79.

²Maurice Stein, The Eclipse of Community (Princeton: University Press, 1960), p. 99.

³Ibid., pp. 290-292.

⁴O. Smith, et al, Social Foundations of Education, p. 46.

⁵Theobald, An Alternative Future for America II, p. 44.

So often community planning is left up to the experts without critical revision. Louise Mumford, when referring to city planning, states:

It is naive to think that geographers, sociologists or engineers can by themselves formulate the social needs and purposes that underlie a good regional plan: the work of the philosopher, the educator, the artist, the common man is no less essential; and unless they are actively brought into the process of planning, as both critics and creators, the values. ... will be merely those that have been carried over from past situations. . .without critical revision.¹

Michael B. Katz once warned that any reform proposals from the top tend to have unexamined assumptions and values that strengthen the already existing power structure. Thorstein Veblen stated that the educational power structure was the means of maintaining upper class values in an age that needed to change values.

The question then arises: What is the institution in a community responsible for promoting communication for consensus, participation, and critical minds? Dewey would contend that this is the purpose of the schools.

Education for the Community. As was noted earlier, Rousseau and Dewey had different plans for the education of community members. Rousseau educated for "good citizenship," which meant conformity to the general will. Dewey's educational plan was to make good citizens also, but to promote collective intelligence and social responsibility in a

¹Louis Mumford, Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1938), p. 377.

constantly-changing situational setting. The school was to be a miniature community, and democracy was to be practiced as a part of the educational learning process. Children would learn the scientific method of investigation through their own experiences with others to form a collective intelligence. Education becomes the main purpose of life instead of preparation for life in conformity.

The Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association in 1960 developed a guide for democratic education. It espoused such goals as liberation of intelligence, using democratic methods in the classroom, administration and student activities, equipping students with the materials for knowledge needed for democratic efficiency, and guaranteeing the right to share in determining the purposes and policies of education.¹ This author contends, however, that educational implementation of these goals needs improvement, but can be realized if the meaning of democracy is changed to suit changing interpretations. The next chapter deals with the problem of changing goals in a society based on Rousseauian tradition, manipulation, and educational indoctrination.

¹Learning the Ways of Democracy: A Case Book of Civic Education. Educational Policies Commission (N.E.A., Washington, D.C., 1970.

CHAPTER V

THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION: EXTRAPOLATION OR INNOVATION?

Indeed the good law of today may become the straight jacket of tomorrow, for times change and institutions must change with them or human liberty is lost.

--D. Dewitt Baldwin

We are all of us, no matter how hard we work, no matter how curious we are, condemned to grow relatively more ignorant every day we live, to know less and less of the sum of what is known.

--Paul Goodman,
Compulsary Mis-Education

Man has to un-think many assumed proposals in society before any progress can be obtained. We as Americans suffer from "old-think."

--Charles Weingartner,
"Ruminations"

In these times specialists have become committed and have convictions about their field, and have not considered on what base these convictions are justified--they are practitioners and not theorists.

--Talcott Parsons,
"The Role of the Social
Sciences."

Current Educational Practices: An Appraisal

Recent Critics of Education

Recent critics of education, such as Paul Goodman, Ivan Illich, John Holt, Neil Postman, George Leonard, Abraham Maslow, and Robert Theobald have expressed their distaste

for educational practices in American society. The one common trait of them all is that they are critical of education, but likeness in other parts of their criticism toward education is remote. Each suggests alternatives to present educational practices, and the over riding complaint seems to center around dehumanization of the learning process. Each has notable comments to consider.

Paul Goodman has commented on the "universal trap" of democratization, which he considers to be a regimentation to "national needs."¹ In his opinion, education is not a matter of individual preference of industry. He believed that too many employers in America required college and high school degrees, not because they signified a better education, but because these graduates were traditionally "no-trouble" people.² A degree of some kind was a document to prove that an individual conformed to the "mechanical systems" that dictated the requirements of the labor force.³

John Holt in numerous volumes has tried to demonstrate that most learning really occurs from a continuum of experience outside the schools. Since most classrooms are not experience-centered and follow a traditional pattern of "fact-finding," there is a "theft of knowledge" by teachers

¹Goodman, p. 20.

²Ibid., p. 21.

³Ibid., p. 26.

in general.¹ Educators have made education a scarce commodity to be doled out only to those who persevere. Following specific directions, using fear tactics, and conforming to teacher expectations become or are the expected modes of operation of the schools.

George Leonard, in an effort to prepare American educators for future possibilities not yet foreseen, has constructed a possible alternative to "schools" for the year 2001. Learning centers, "think tanks" and communications centers are provided for young and old alike in the community. Education for future possibilities becomes the "main purpose in life," instead of present practices of preparation for life in the industrial complex.² Education for leisure time and "apprenticeships for living" are necessary parts of the future curriculum for survival and not just for divergent interest. "Schools" are geared for cooperation and integration of knowledge rather than competition and separation of "disciplines." The purpose of this "community communications center" (school) is not to provide the "right" answers, but to provide the communications network needed for intelligent and coordinated action.³

¹John Holt, What Do I Do on Monday? (New York: Delta Books, 1970), passim.

²George Leonard, Education and Ecstasy (New York: Delta Books, 1968), p. 16.

³Ibid., p. 129.

Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner have written several works intended to demonstrate the inadequacies of the schools. Their main contention is that the schools should provide the relevance and knowledge needed to continue learning throughout life. This is accomplished by helping a person learn how to learn, which is a difficult but not impossible task. However, after he knows how to learn from his own experiences and ask the right questions for value determination, he is prepared to face any other problems he encounters in life.¹

Charles Reich's analysis of America's "Consciousness II" attributes much of the alienation and lack of individual control and participation in America to technological manipulation. Consciousness II, which is our present state, induces a corporate image and company loyalty that negates individual evaluation. The only way Reich believes Americans can elevate themselves to "Consciousness III"--satisfaction of one's own life--is through control of technology.²

Ivan Illich, regarded as a "radical" critic, proposes complete elimination of the institution of "school." Indicating that school is not equated with education, he recommends the end to the "consumption syndrome" by providing

¹Postman and Weingartner have written several works concerning relevance in American education, to include The Soft Revolution, Teaching as a Subversive Activity and The School Book.

²Reich, passim.

alternatives such as skill exchanges and resource centers. His voucher system is an attempt to provide the instructors without having a formal system of education.¹ Like Rousseau, Illich abhors the institution of school, but his method of elimination is not a departure from the control technology already has over the present schools. His education is still either skill development of job preparation rather than the development of creative, deliberating individuals. His assumption that all will be working and needing jobs in a society leaning toward cybernation and shorter work hours seems less than feasible.

American education has been more successful when viewed as a job-finding function, or if it has existed to prepare individuals to fit in a preexisting, static, structure of economic, political and social institutionalization. Compared to the non-material culture which has experienced a cultural lag, the material culture has advanced with relative ease. If the institutions of our society were in fact based on traditions and universal laws of conduct and procedure, it would seem the goals of education would be correspondingly static and uncomplicated. Ideas, goals, concepts, needs, and meanings have changed, however, and the changes have met with opposition from a society steeped in Rousseauian concepts of universals. The result has been a

¹Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 56-59.

cultural lag that has not produced the needed reinterpretation of goals, values and concepts. Schools have asked questions that have only one "right" answer, instead of asking questions that need to be answered for wanted consequences. It is time schools asked questions to which Americans do not have the answers in order to find meaning and purpose in a changing society.

Education as Extrapolation

Intellectual Impotency: Technological Terrorism. Two other critics, Robert Theobald and Abraham Maslow, contend that the most critical problem in education is its socially value-free descriptive conception of scientific and technological progress. Marshall McLuhan quotes J.O. Nef as saying that most wars resulted from intellectual mistakes, and not power struggles for land and peoples.¹ Scientific intellect has not been able to foresee or predict the implications of technological innovation on its own or other countries. Scientists have limited their value orientation to only personal levels. Marshall McLuhan suggests that every new technological invention necessitates a new "war" because of the impact of this thinking on the society.² Northrup contends that Americans need a normative as well as an empirical approach to educational problems, because without both, man

¹McLuhan, Understanding Media, p. 95.

²McLuhan and Fiore, p. 98.

cannot understand or solve world problems.¹ He believes that "no normative social theory ever achieves completely in de facto society. . . a complete concordance." Scientists must not only find empirical facts (what is) they also must consider normative goals (what should be).² Man has not been able to cooperate successfully with others outside his social immediacy because of "national" or technological interests within his country. Every new weapon developed in this century, whether offensive or defensive purposes, has been used by various peoples to force their will on others. Education has become "information technology being used by one community to reshape another."³

Even if modern scientists did consult others for the consequences of their discoveries, there is still the problem of political control of these innovations. "Whitehead's Dilemma," as noted by Buckminster Fuller, still prevails in America. The "bright ones" (scientists) are being cultivated by the "second grade" (executives) smart ones who take over executive chores and are responsible for integrating the knowledge gained by these scientists.⁴ But, as a consequence, the not-so-bright ones control the use of this knowledge without the consensus needed for responsible implementation.

¹Northrop, pp. 312-313.

²Ibid., p. 332.

³Ibid., p. 149.

⁴Fuller, p. 56.

Hence, anything considered "un-American" is dealt with in terms of "technological terrorism."¹ Education in America has not assumed responsibility for intellectual mistakes, nor has it promoted collective intelligence to combat this value-free implementation of technological innovation. Consensual validation is needed to control the impact and influence of technology.

The Prevailing Myth: Extrapolation

An even larger problem exists in a socially value-free conception of science. There is a traditional belief that the future will merely be an extrapolation of the past. This is a most dangerous conception. Abraham Maslow states:

People talk today about the future as extrapolations of what goes on today, as if we were helpless to do anything about our future. This comes from value-free descriptive conceptions of science.²

Both Dewey and Theobald claim that the future will necessarily not be an extension of the present because of the need for a reinterpretation of values, goals, and concepts used by this society.³ Man is not helpless in this regard and can change to meet impending needs, but only if the society is willing to investigate scientifically and test alternatives to present beliefs and practices.

¹Marcuse, Chapter 1.

²Maslow, p. 24.

³Theobald, Habit and Habitat, pp. 126-139. Dewey, Democracy and Education, passim.

Extrapolation is based on the assumption that there are basic goals, values and aims that will not change. Extrapolists contend that the future will be an improvement of what already exists, until a utopian type life is achieved. Basing a value system on the availability of goods, the continuous rise of productivity, and an increase in income in a post-industrial era that is already feeling the scarcity of jobs, fossil fuels, precious metals and natural resources in general, is a thoughtless distortion of reality.

Reasons why Americans choose to view the future as an extrapolation of the past are not difficult to discern. America's energies are channeled into production and efficiency. The possibility that work would not be a part of life, or that use of leisure time would be a major concern of the future is not in the realm of American thinking. Yet, all indications point in that direction. A belief in free enterprise, success based on competition in the system, and education for job preparation will be replaced with cooperation, education for leisure time and control of industry.

Education for Cultural Silence. No educational system is neutral, and the American system has produced a "cultural silence" similar to the educational practices in South America.¹ Thomas Molnar believes that the will and intellectual force

¹Freire, pp. 11-15. Freire believes education in South America is used to keep the public in conformity with the wishes of the men in power. Thus, it produces a "cultural silence."

of any civilized society have always been concentrated in and formulated by a minority.¹ Educational goals in America has successfully mirrored the needs of technology rather than the consensus of the majority. It has prepared people for their "quiet, unspectacular, and captive role of an ideally average man."² To justify this role as inevitable, Walter Lippman states:

No human mind has ever understood the whole scheme of a society. At best, the mind can only know its own version of the scheme.³

Consequently, Americans have relied too heavily on their representatives and other elected officials. Extrapolation of present conditions has precluded and invalidated other modes of thought in favor of behavioral responses already determined by the group in power. But Stanley and Dewey take issue with this contention. Stanley states:

It has never been proven that man cannot change the course of events with conscious social purpose, even when it involves the whole world.⁴

But Stanley's and Dewey's faith in the common man is not shared by others in society. Dewey rebelled against a reliance on universals and a hierarchy of legislators who claimed they knew more about the circumstances. But Rousseau's

¹Molnar, p. 35.

²Ibid., p. 43.

³Walter Lippman, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950), p. 31

⁴Stanley, Education and Social Integration. p. 21.

belief in the supremacy of the "Legislators" still prevails as the accepted authority.

Innovation in Education: A Reconstructionist Viewpoint

Too often political leaders, experts in various fields, and executives in technological systems have produced distortions of reality and promoted information distortion in order to accomplish needed changes. The invalidation of individual experiences has caused an oversimplification of complex problems in American culture. Scientists and inventors have been successful in major areas of social change, but tangential consequences have progressively alienated more and more knowledgeable people who also consider normative aspects. Leadership has meant "the manipulation of the ideal average and the social devices that safely condition the average man through life."¹ There are no simple answers to complex questions arising in society. But in the name of technological efficiency and convenience, Americans have lost bargaining power in the social determination of values and goals. In an effort to simplify meanings and consequences of past actions, Americans have relied upon finding causes of the events, rather than finding the alternatives needed to correct the problems.

World Involvement

Socrates once stated that he was "of the world." In order to express a fuller and wiser imagination and

¹Molnar, p. 44.

experience, he chose to consider himself an earthling rather than a citizen of a specific geographical area. Nationalized education tended to distort truths and realities for the "good of the state." For that reason, Socrates did not espouse a national system of education.

Rousseau based his educational purpose on the contention that the state was supreme and that education was to preserve the state through manipulation of the general will. In an effort to preserve the state, Americans have reverted to totalitarianism and undemocratic procedures to make the world "safe for democracy." But now questions must be asked of every society: Can one trust traditions in a society to help in future decisions? Can Americans afford to be isolationist in a world affected by the actions of everyone in it?

The Social Aspect of the Scientific Method

Education can no longer be an apprenticeship.¹ Rules for weighing evidence do change, as do truths. The society that survives is one that does not need static order and can face the unknown and improvise.² The educational practices in America do not reflect this need. Greer points out that all one has to do is examine and cite all the rhetoric of intentions expressed by school "idealogues" and see the

¹Boyd Bode, Fundamentals of Education (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1927), pp. 10-19.

²Maslow, p. 59.

difference between theory and practice in the schools.¹ Reconstructionists such as Theodore Brameld feel that educational practices in America provide no forum for interchange of ideas so necessary for "defensible partiality" and "social consensus."² Stanley maintains that the American democratic system does not embody a way of life, it does not provide for a system of changing values, nor does it instill a faith in any philosophy.³ All of these aspects are needed to develop a truly democratic organization based on individual responsibility.

John Dewey's philosophy of education has been the topic of discussion in more than a few dissertations, books and articles. But in spite of Dewey and other theorists, there is a demonstrated lack of democratic principles actually practiced in American society. Despite his efforts, Dewey's insights concerning social responsibility and education as life have been unheeded as viable alternatives to the recurring problem of industrial alienation and political sterilization.

A social aspect of the scientific method of investigation is needed. Karl Mannheim and John Dewey agree that scientific thought does not proceed in a vacuum. It is affected by social/situational circumstances of the time. But social responsibility for actions taken has been seriously

¹Greer, p. 7.

²Brameld, Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 531.

³Stanley, Education and Social Integration, p. 21.

lacking. Northrop warns:

Education must fit men to understand and solve the inescapable problems of our time. Any consideration of the character of education, therefore,¹ must begin with an analysis of these problems.

Stanley believes purpose, choice and intelligence should again be significant categories of human action, rather than tangential outcomes of historicism.² The purpose of education should be to "gain clarity of the salient conflicts and confusions of the time" and "cultivate common purposes, loyalties and beliefs."³ A social aspect of the scientific method of investigation can be a reality, but only if collective intelligence is used as the base. Without collective intelligence, democracy is a meaningless abstraction. In order to promote the democratic skills of intelligent thought, communications for the transfer of collective intelligence and authority based on sapiential knowledge rather than structural hierarchies are needed. Education geared toward personal commitment, practical judgement, self-realization, and cooperation is necessary for the development of a well-informed, participating society, capable of change.

"School" has not "liberated the capacity" of students, not has it treated the individual as the end.⁴ The Educational

¹Northrop, p. 311.

²Ibid., p. 89.

³Ibid., p. 225.

⁴Bode, Fundamentals of Education, pp. 20, 62.

Policies Commission of the N.E.A. in its Central Purpose Statement advocated democratic educational objectives such as "liberation of intelligence," but to the contrary, actual educational goals still include such goals as good citizenship, job preparation, conformity to universal standards, memorization of terms, concepts of facts, and knowledge of values in a society based on tradition.¹ The present goal of schools is not to produce individuals capable of understanding and coping with change (other than welcoming all technological innovations as "progress"), nor do schools help a person discover himself or "reduce the sense of uncertainty about changes in society."² Instead, schools still transmit a culture that has not been able to deal with impending problems.

Bruce Raup lists three possible traits needed for the creation of a character adequate for practical judgement:

1. Sensitivity to important distinctions made in the course of analysis, notably in the phases and moods of judging;
2. Mastery of symbolic mediums in a way appropriate to the practical judgemental functions they serve;
3. Commitment to the ideal criterion of validity--an uncoerced community of persuasion.³

Raup's basic tenent for educating the youth of America is

¹Educational Policies Commission of the N.E.A., Learning the Ways of Democracy: A Case Book of Civic Education (Washington: N.E.A., 1960), pp. 35-39. See also Laudin, p. 40-45. See also Greer, pp. 5-19.

²Laudin, p. 41.

³Raup, The Improvement of Practical Intelligence p. 255.

to produce judges that have mastered objectivity, integration, and creativity to reach a collective decision through persuasion and testing.¹ This author believes these traits are needed if any collective intelligence is going to be realized.

Priorities in Education

It has been the contention of this study that the goals, values and meanings of terms such as democracy, freedom and truth have fixed connotations in a transitional society. Education, politics and the role of the individual in society have reflected a Rousseauian character, emphasizing the study of causal factors as an extrapolation of the future. Relying on a general will in the technological society for authority, instead of examining all the consequences and alternatives Americans are witnessing rather than determining, their own fate. In a reactionary manner, Americans have met change with unchanging and untested assumptions. In the process, they have sacrificed individual participation for security and industrial productivity. Americans have not been educated to be critical and creative judges, but rather they have been trained to be socialized creatures, crushed by predictable habit and fixed values that do not respond to needs. The "American school legend" still persists as a measure of greatness.²

¹Ibid., pp. 255-265.

²Greer, p. 3.

The comparison of John Dewey's concept of collective intelligence to Jean Jacques Rousseau's concept of the general will is used in this study to differentiate between major trends in American education and politics. Parallels were drawn between the views of Rousseau and classical liberalism, and the views of Dewey and contemporary liberalism. Although modern American liberalism is not the only political faction, it does constitute a large portion of the elected bureaucracy and citizenry. American democratic traditions owe allegiance to both of these liberal creeds. Even though these democratic ideals are expressed, there is incongruity in actual practice. Americans exercise procedures in closer proximity to Rousseau's democratic ideals than to Dewey's model.

This study demonstrates that Americans value, educate for, and live by general will of sentiment, while experiencing unprecedented technological and post-industrial change. They are experiencing a "cultural lag," a "new failure of nerve," are "victims of culture," and have a "value-free concept of science" because of the adherence to Rousseauian concepts developed in a pre-industrial era. Americans suffer from "old-think" because the educational system promotes it. Men cannot critically examine the conflicts in society because the educational system rewards the "right" answer and the "right" way of doing things, according to traditional standards.

Schools, no less than any other institutions in America, is a reflection of its society. Partiality on the part of the

individual often means having to conform to an interest group that is capable of being heard in political circles. But the party system is not sympathetic to all opinions; only those opinions that constitute power. Values are taught, but can they be taught when they should change with each new circumstance? Can terms like freedom, democracy and authority be taught in schools as "subjects" without practice in their use? Do terms mean the same today as Rousseau interpreted them to mean centuries ago? Is communication with others on an extensive scale now considered a necessary principle of social responsibility? It is the contention of this author that these questions must be answered negatively before progress in American education is to be realized.

American educational practices reflect a decided lack of confidence in the common man. They limit the alternatives offered and dictate the standards to be met. Instead of being responsible for his own education, man is given limited choices in the schools according to the needs of technology. Americans choose training fields as they choose any other utility, thus, and American education signifies training and conformity--not thinking.

In order to restore the human aspect in education, this author feels the concepts of Abraham Maslow are useful. His concepts include:

1. promotion of growth choice as opposed to fear choice now present in the schools;
2. development of individual honesty, courage and responsibility;

3. use of intelligence to determine possibilities and consequences rather than depending on tradition or reactionary methods;

4. dropping defenses and opening feelings and partiality;

5. working for peak experiences of joy rather than material or competitive gain.¹

These concepts produce a self-actualized, creative and partial member of society so badly needed in America. Maslow calls himself a "Taoist," or one who posses a humanistic conception of psychology.² This author agrees with his contention that an educator is one who "helps a person become the best that he is able to become."³

Americans are facing what H.G. Wells termed a race between education and catastrophe. Credibility gaps, degrees of truth and information distortion prevail because of external authority premised on technological needs and competitive practices. All victories in succeeding centuries won by Protestantism, rationalism, science and industrialization were gained at a terrible cost--the sacrifice of individual responsibility and participation. The community died as the medium of cultural exchange because of industry, specialization, urbanization, and directed communications.⁴ People now defend corporate images rather than community images,

¹Maslow, pp. 45-49.

²Abraham Maslow, "What is a Taoist Teacher," in Louise Rubin, Facts and Feelings in the Classroom (New York: Viking Press, 1973), pp. 149-140.

³Ibid., p. 153.

⁴Stanley, Education and Social Integration, pp. 5-135.

and the industries are the conscience-carriers of the society.

Educational Priorities Defined

Man can no longer think in terms of natural rights and state contracts, nor can he base his theories on complete freedom of the individual. The theoretical base must be collective intelligence or what Theodore Brameld terms "consensual validation." As Charles Beity and Michael Washburn state:

Children are conditioned to respect the values that 'made America great' and are, in turn, conditioned to respect as well that same power that propels the consumer culture toward greater consumption and more conspicuous waste. it is useless to perpetuate 'skills' for survival in a society so potentially doomed. Because it may not be practicable or possible to predict what specific characteristics human kind will need to possess, it may be best for basic education to develop general skills, sensitivity, and moral depth to handle situations not yet imaginable.¹

The following is a list of priorities that are needed for effective change for society to meet inevitable change. They are not placed in any order of importance, and are strictly the views of the author. They are not meant to be principles, but rather guidelines.

Reconstructionist Design for a Transitional Society

A World Democracy:

1. Man must have a world, and not a national perspective of the problem/possibilities continuum.

¹Charles Beity and Michael Washburn, Creating the Future (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 166.

2. Communications must be integrative, allowing for validation of individual and cooperative experiences worldwide.
3. A feeling of local community, enhanced by intense communications networks, respect for individual differences, equality of opportunity and individual worth must replace mechanical systems, bureaucratic complexes and irrational reasoning used for value and goal determination.
4. A world population, capable and willing to change with the circumstances and consequences must replace a nationalist mentality, couched in tribalism, historicism and general habits of conduct.

Educational Goals:

1. Education must be student oriented, problem/possibilities centered and individualized to produce world problem solvers.
2. Education must be dedicated to the validation of individual experiences through the use of the scientific method of collective intelligence.
3. Alternatives in and to the educational process must be provided.
4. Truth again must become fallible and capable of change.
5. Self-awareness and worth of the individual must have meaning to the society.
6. A student's responsibility for his own education must be delegated to himself.
7. Profitable use of leisure time must be a part of the process of education.

The Cultural Design:

1. Determination of core-values and meaning of terms must include everyone's appraisal.
2. Government control must be positive and controlled by internal authority decided by the scientific method of collective intelligence.
3. Trust, cooperation, honesty and responsibility must replace competition, internalization, alienation and assimilation.
4. Social organization must promote consensus rather than factionalism.
5. Democracy must be lived as well as learned, and practiced in all social, economic, political and psychological aspects of life.
6. Authority must be sapiential and agreed upon by collective intelligence (consensual validation).

Conclusion

The history of Americans has been a history of struggle for individual recognition in politics, education and the social structure. Alienation, assimilation, manipulation, and exploitation describe the experiences of man today in society much better than do the democratic ideals of cooperation, consensus, individual partiality and social objectivity. Several possible reasons for these experiences are cited in this study. Reactionary faith in antiquated traditions, untested assumptions, laissez faire industrial practices that negate social needs in favor of individuals, and universal truths have decidedly limited social inquiry.

Americans have the difficult task of applying the continuing Rousseauian concept of static democracy to an ever-changing political system, technological practices and social stratification that demand reinterpretations of the values, goals and possibilities.

This author believes that many of the ideas expressed by John Dewey have application to this observed dilemma. The concept of collective intelligence as the method of scientific investigation for inclusive consensus is a viable alternative to present experiences. The feeling of local community can be restored as the medium of individual expression if the vast communications network already in existence is used to eliminate information distortion, degrees of truth, and directed bombardment for advertising purposes. With

a direct, two-way access to worldwide communications, mankind could validate individual experiences, show defensible partiality, and reach consensus through persuasion and scientific tests for desired consequences. The world community or "global village" is well within the realm of possibility in a post-industrial era, but only if the world sees the need.

This author defends and supports the theory of social reconstructionism. Many of Dewey's insights are the intellectual foundation of this philosophy and still have application for present problems of core-value determination, economic exploitation, technological control, knowledge explosion and political alienation. In a post-industrial society that promotes cybernation and extends the amount of leisure time, Dewey's thoughts concerning a community of action, cognizant of the alternatives, provide the framework needed for the return of internal authority and collective intelligence.

This chapter is speculative and possibly asks more questions than it has answered. In accordance with the tenets of reconstructionism, however, this author has assumed a defensible partiality and has defined his priorities for the society. Education can no longer depend on extrapolation of the future, traditional frames of reference, or even predisposed plans of action. In order to solve future world problems, education must produce a world of problem-solvers, responsible for their actions, tolerant of criticism, and capable of change.

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