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**LINGUISTIC AND NON-LINGUISTIC MEANINGS: AN INTERPRETATION
OF HUSSERL'S THEORY OF NOEMA**

The University of Oklahoma

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LINGUISTIC AND NON-LINGUISTIC MEANINGS: AN
INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL'S THEORY OF NOEMA

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degree of
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BY
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Norman, Oklahoma
1982

LINGUISTIC AND NON-LINGUISTIC MEANINGS: AN
INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL'S THEORY OF NOEMA

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LINGUISTIC AND NON-LINGUISTIC MEANINGS: AN
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INTRODUCTION

Among Edmund Husserl's most notable philosophical achievements is the development of a comprehensive theory of intentionality. According to Husserl all mental acts are directed toward something. Even if there is no actually existing object to which a mental act is directed, as when one thinks of unicorns, the act in question still has the phenomenological character of 'being directed'. Husserl also offers us a general theory of the content and structure of mental acts which makes such directedness possible. This theory, once fully developed, provides a general model for the role of mental representations in the philosophy of language and mind.

Correlated with each mental act, there is a noema in virtue of which that act is directed in the specific manner it happens to be. The primary task of this dissertation is to provide an account of how the noema makes such mental

directedness possible. Fundamental to this theory is the view that the noema is a meaning which directs the act whose noema it is towards some object.

Traditionally, the notion of meaning is understood to be bound up with language, so that it is a linguistic notion. Many philosophers have held the view that it is the meaning of a term which determines the referent or extension of that term. Husserl extends the notion of meaning from its linguistic context to the field of all mental acts.

Two influential treatments of the noema have been given by Aron Gurwitsch and Dagfinn Føllesdal. It has been claimed by Robert Solomon that the divergence of these two treatments originates in Gurwitsch's taking the noema of perceptual acts to be paradigmatic and Føllesdal's insistence that the noema is to be understood on the model of Frege's Sinn, an essentially linguistic notion. In the following work I argue for a comprehensive model of the noema which does justice to both linguistic and non-linguistic noemata.

In the first chapter, I sketch Husserl's relation to Franz Brentano, emphasizing Husserl's conception of the noema as his contribution to the problems resulting from Brentano's characterization of intentionality. I then offer an exposition of Husserl's account of the essential structure of the noema. According to the account of the noema given in Ideas I, the noema, or rather as we shall see, the noematic Sinn has two components: a determinable X and a set of predicate

senses.

The second chapter explicates Husserl's analysis of the meaning of linguistic acts given in the Logical Investigations. Drawing on the results established in that analysis we shall note a certain parallelism and symmetry between the noemata of linguistic and non-linguistic acts. Some philosophers, following Føllesdal's 'Fregean' reading of the noema, have claimed that the noematic Sinn of linguistic acts is the same as the noematic Sinn of non-linguistic acts. In spite of the similarities of linguistic and non-linguistic noemata, I shall provide textual evidence that the two types of noemata are not identical.

In the third chapter, I offer a detailed analysis of both types of noemata in which I carefully sort out the similarities and differences between linguistic and non-linguistic meaning. In Ideas I, Husserl claims that the meaning of non-linguistic acts may be expressed through language. When this happens the non-linguistic Sinn is raised to linguistic meaning, what Husserl calls Bedeutung. Chapter Three thus offers an account of the modifications of non-linguistic Sinn which then result in Bedeutung.

In the final chapter, I elaborate on a suggestion made in the third chapter, viz. that linguistic meaning is cast in a matter-form structure, and then show how this matter-form schema encompasses non-linguistic meaning as well. Finally, I examine Hilary Putnam's arguments designed

to show that intensions do not determine extension. I argue that the interpretation of Husserl's theory of meaning developed in the third chapter does not fall prey to Putnam's arguments. My position here rests on individuating psychological states differently than Putnam does. Once this move has been made we are free to retain a version of the thesis that intensions determine extensions although this version is weaker than the one Putnam directly attacks.

CHAPTER I

INTENTIONALITY AND NOEMA: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

This work is an attempt to examine the relation between Husserl's concepts of intentionality and meaning as well as to offer an interpretation of his theory of meaning. Husserl's analysis of intentionality, i.e., the directedness of mental acts, appeals to meaning as the element which makes such directedness possible. The conception of meaning as the correlate of a mental act which is responsible for the act's being directed, is recognized to be the typical contribution Husserl made to the problems resulting from Brentano's characterization of intentionality as the directedness toward an object.

Brentano held that intentionality was the mark of the mental. Every mental act, according to Brentano, was directed toward an object. This directedness, however, is common to both acts directed toward real extramental objects as well as acts directed toward imaginary or unreal objects. If the intentionality of acts is due to the object which the act is

directed toward, then those acts which are non-veridical, i.e., hallucinations and imaginings, and have no real object, would seem to be non-intentional. Brentano, however, insists that both veridical and non-veridical acts are intentional. He is usually interpreted as holding the view that the objects towards which such acts are directed enjoy an intentional inexistence.

If we apply this same sketch of intentionality to veridical acts, such as my seeing a real tree outside my window, we are forced into the counter-intuitive position of holding that towards which my perceptual act is directed is not the real tree outside my window, but rather an inexistent tree somehow contained in my mind. If on the other hand we start with cases of veridical perception and say that an act is intentional because there is a real object toward which it is directed then we will have troubles explaining hallucinations and thoughts of non-existent objects such as unicorns.

Husserl's contribution to this difficulty lies in his conception of the noema. According to Husserl, each act has as its correlate a noema in virtue of which that act is directed toward its object, if there is indeed an object towards which the act is directed. Acts without objects are nevertheless directed. If I think of a unicorn there is no such object towards which my act of thinking is directed, yet according to Husserl, my act is directed. Since acts without objects may be directed, the directedness or

intentionality of acts cannot be explicated as a relation between an act and an object. Acts are directed in virtue of their noemata, not in virtue of the objects they are seemingly directed toward. What then is this noema?

Husserl's answer is that the noema is the meaning correlate of the mental act. Let us give an example. If in a perceptual act I have the experience of "seeing the tree," there is correlated with that experience the "tree as seen." The tree is seen as being large or small, having certain properties, the tree is seen from a certain perspective. The tree may or may not actually instantiate the properties I take it to have. Nevertheless, the "tree as seen" instantiates certain properties. We may say that the tree, if real, is seen under a certain interpretation or description, it is this interpretation or description that is the noema of the mental act.

Rather than focus attention on the object towards which the act is directed, Husserl examines what the directedness consists in, or as Dagfinn Føllesdal puts it: "what features it is that make consciousness always be as if it is consciousness of something."¹

Husserl's analysis of intentionality begins with the affirmation that the intentionality of acts consists in its directedness and the denial that every act of consciousness has a (real) object. Rather acts are directed by their noemata. We must then ask "What is this noema?" and "How

does this noema direct the act toward its object?" A detailed answer to the first question is given in Chapter II, while the latter question will comprize most of this work.

Now we may say that the noema is the correlate of an intentional act, but not its referent, i.e., the object towards which the act is directed. For example, suppose that at t_1 I have a visual experience of seeing the tree outside my window. I see it from a certain perspective, with certain properties, etc. Let us further assume that it is a veridical perception. Now suppose that at t_2 I have the same visual experience of the tree outside my window, seen from the same perspective, etc. Now suppose that the visual perception at t_2 was hallucinatory. Both acts are said to have the same noema. Thus two separate acts may have as their correlate the same phenomenon, i.e., "the perceived as such." The "perceived as such" is independent of any real object towards which the act may be directed.

Husserl contends that the noema is a meaning, i.e., a generalization of the notion of linguistic meaning (for Husserl, the meaning of linguistic acts) to all acts. Thus all acts have a noema or meaning and through this meaning they are directed toward an object. This is clearly an extension of the notion that linguistic expressions have their meanings and through these meanings they refer to their objects.

A number of philosophers have attempted to explicate

the notion of noema by giving a Fregean reading of Husserl. The main thesis of this interpretation is that Husserl took from Frege the insight that the referent of a linguistic expression was a function of or determined by the sense or meaning (Sinn) of a linguistic expression.² It has also been argued that Husserl formulated a sense/reference distinction independently of Frege's influence.³ In the Logical Investigations, Husserl provides examples designed to show that two expressions may have different meanings but refer to the same object, e.g., "the victor at Jena" and "the vanquished at Waterloo." Other examples given are "the equilateral triangle" and "the equiangular triangle." Insofar as the two sets of descriptive expressions illuminate different aspects of their common referent Husserl takes it to be obvious that they have different meanings.

There are also expressions which Husserl claims to be meaningful but do not have a referent. "The golden mountain," is such an expression, as well as "Pegasus," the mythical winged horse. Both Husserl and Frege consider such expressions to be meaningful, but as there are no such objects bearing those names the expressions are meaningful but have no referents. And both Husserl and Frege held the view that expressions refer to their referents via the sense or meaning of those expressions. Unlike Frege, Husserl takes the meaning of those expressions to be not of the expressions themselves, considered as words, but to be the meanings of

mental acts employing the expressions, i.e., expressive acts. In Ideas I, Husserl extends this analysis of act-meaning-object to all mental acts. Just as the Sinn of an expressive act, e.g., the act expressed in "the victor at Jena," directs the act towards an object (if there is one and if not the act still remains directed), so does the Sinn of a non-expressive act direct that act. Thus non-expressive acts as well as expressive ones can be shown to be intentional without being dependent on a relation with some object (real or otherwise). It is then the Sinn of acts which Husserl calls the noema. Every act has a noema and through this noema the act is directed, i.e., intentional. Just as the meaning of a linguistic expression determines its referent so does the noema of a non-expressive act determine what object the act is directed toward. So, we have seen that according to Husserl, it is the noema which is responsible for the directedness of mental acts. Thus we have an answer to our question "What is the noema?" It is the intentional correlate of an act of consciousness and as such it is neither a real physical object nor a momentary act of consciousness but rather a meaning and, according to Husserl, an ideal entity correlated with that mental act. Of course, such an answer only calls out for more explanation.

The two Husserlian commentators who have both tried to explicate the concept of noema and who have had broad influence are Aron Gurwitsch and Dagfinn Føllesdal. Their

respective interpretations are widely seen to be in opposition and in competition for an accurate Husserlian account of the noema. The specific point of the controversy lies in their allegedly different accounts of the noema of perceptual acts. Briefly put, Gurwitsch takes the perceptual noema as a "Gesalt coherence," i.e., a percept whose aspects mutually imply one another. For Føllesdal, noemata are best characterized as intensional entities, and accordingly they are abstract. As a conceptual or intensional entity the perceptual noema is not perceived. Gurwitsch, on the other hand, takes the perceptual noema to be perceptually given. If, indeed, these are opposing views one needs to show that according to Gurwitsch the Sinn of the perceptual act is what is seen, i.e., that the Sinn is sensuously given.

Føllesdal takes the noema to be a meaning and as such the noema cannot be sensuously given. Føllesdal's view here seems to be that Husserl modeled his analysis of intentional reference or intentionality on Frege's notion of Sinn, the meaning of expressions.

My intention is neither to referee nor to take sides in what may be called the Gurwitsch-Føllesdal debate. Rather I shall offer an interpretation of the noema by examining the intentional structures of two different kinds of noemata, expressive and non-expressive. The distinction is overlooked in most discussions of this matter. Husserl's remarks on the matter are reasonably clear, he distinguishes between

Bedeutung and Sinn, i.e., the meanings of linguistic acts and non-linguistic acts respectively. We have seen that Husserl extends the notion of meaning from the domain of expressive acts to non-expressive acts to account for the latter's intentionality. I shall compare and contrast the intentional structures of both types of resulting noemata by showing how both kinds of meanings direct acts to their objects.

Husserl begins his explication of intentionality in the Ideas I by affirming that intentionality is the essential property of consciousness. "It belongs as a general feature to the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of something."⁴ Any act of consciousness, e.g., a perception, memory, or desire, is directed toward an object. It is further claimed that every object presented to consciousness necessarily appears against a background. Any conscious experience or act is conscious of not only its object but also a "coperceived objective 'background'." To take a simple example, suppose I am watching my cat sleeping on the sofa. My attention is directed towards the cat. My visual field includes many other objects, however. Paintings on the walls, books on the shelf, magazines cluttered in chairs are all present in my field of vision. However, my attention is not directed towards these but rather to the cat. My act of perception is directed toward the cat.

The distinction between act and object is already implicit in the notion of an intentional act. An intentional

act is one directed towards an object. In this characterization, intentionality is already explicated as a two-term relation. In sec. #35 of Ideas I, Husserl writes, "We shall not think of confusing the objects of which we are aware . . . with conscious experiences themselves which are a consciousness of them."⁵ Husserl continues to draw this distinction in sec. #88, where he speaks of the "proper components of the intentional experiences, and their intentional correlates, or the components of them."⁶ The components of the intentional acts, Husserl calls real (reale) and the correlates of the acts he calls "intentional."

A word of caution about the terminology being used here is in order. The term "act" is being used to denote a complete intentional experience such as seeing an apple or remembering a friend. It may be objected that such intentional experiences should be described as complexes of acts rather than as simple acts. Demarcating segments of consciousness into acts has an arbitrary air about it in any case. In spite of these difficulties which remain in the background here, I will use the term "act," following Husserl, to indicate any intentional experience which can be distinguished from others by ordinary and everyday criteria. For example, one has no trouble distinguishing seeing a sunset from imagining a ghost or hearing a bird.

The explication of intentionality into a relation between act and object demands an explication of the nature

of that relation. Husserl warns us that this relation is not to be construed as a relation between actually existing mental acts and actually existing objects.⁷ The reasons for this are familiar. I may think of centaurs and dragons without there being any such creatures. In hallucinations one may be directed toward 'objects' which do not exist. In propositional acts I may think that today is Sunday without it actually being Sunday. Brentano described intentionality as "relation-like" to indicate that the object of the act need not exist. The relation-like quality of the intentional act seems to be exactly the directedness of the act.

As a consequence of the distinction between act and object, Husserl warns us against identifying the "intentional object of a consciousness" with the "apprehended object."⁸ Here I take Husserl to be making the distinction between the object which is intended and the object as it is intended. Reasons for this distinction are also familiar. I may think about one and the same object in different ways. In thinking about the Morning Star and in thinking about the Evening Star I am thinking about the same heavenly body, i.e., the planet Venus. From different perspectives I may see one and the same coin, first as an Indian nickle and then as a Buffalo nickle.

In the Logical Investigations, Husserl contrasts what he calls the intentional quality of an act with the intentional matter of an act. The distinction is best made

by examples: All acts of judging have the character or quality of being judgemental. The act of judging that the Morning Star is Venus and the act of judging that the Buffalo nickle is the Indian nickle have the same quality but differ in matter. It is the act's matter which gives the act a reference to an object, "reference so wholly definite that it not merely fixes the object in a general way, but also the precise way in which it is meant."⁹

Obviously, the matter may remain the same in various acts while the quality changes. I may desire Indian nickles, I may see them, remember them, or even despise them. We should notice here that while the matter of acts may change, those acts may still be directed toward one and the same referent. If I am thinking of the victor in the battle of Jena now and then later think of the defeated in the battle of Waterloo, I shall have been intentionally related to one and the same object, viz., the historical person Napoleon. In the former case the matter of the act is "the victor in the battle of Waterloo," while in the latter the matter is "the defeated in the battle of Waterloo."

To sum this up, the matter of various acts may change while the object referred to does not. Thus the same object may be intended in different ways. The object as intended is not the same as the object which is intended. In all cases it is the act's matter which allows the act to be directed toward a particular object.

Before moving on to a general discussion of the concept of noema it will be useful to clear up some possible misunderstanding of one particular form of consciousness and then to extend the insight gained to other forms of consciousness. Husserl writes in sec. #43 of Ideas I, that it is a "fundamental error to suppose that perception (and every other type of intention of things, each after its own manner) fails to come into contact with the thing itself."¹⁰ Husserl takes the above erroneous supposition to be in part a result of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, "according to which the specific qualities of sense should be 'merely subjective' and only the geometrico-physical qualities 'objective'."¹¹ He takes it to be the case that secondary qualities have traditionally been seen as "signs" of certain primary qualities. Given this interpretation, the "thing-in-itself" or "true being" becomes "entirely and fundamentally something that is defined otherwise than as that which is given in perception as corporeal reality."¹²

Against this view, Husserl points out that although what is bodily given in perception is "mere appearances" it is by no means an empty illusion. The phenomenal properties are given as the properties of this thing present in perception. Thus he writes:

The sensory content of that which is given in perception itself continues indeed to be reckoned as other than the true thing as it is in itself, but the substratum, the bearer (the empty X) of the perceived determinations still continues to count as that which is determined through exact method in the form of physical predicates.¹³

On the strength of this type of argument Husserl writes in sec. #52 of Ideas I: "in physical method the perceived thing itself is always and in principle precisely the thing which the physicist studies and scientifically determines."¹⁴

The tendency to think that the "true being" of perceived objects lies in something that is entirely and fundamentally different from what is given in perception arises from the mistaken view that secondary qualities are signs for primary qualities. Signs point beyond themselves, to something different from themselves. "But," Husserl writes, "the physical thing is nothing foreign to that which appears in a sensory body, but something that manifests itself in it. . . ."¹⁵ Thus it is ordinary everyday objects which are the subject of primary and secondary qualities. There is no Lockean substance, a something I know not what, but rather such ordinary objects as the pen on my desk which is both blue and weighs twelve grams.

In Ideas I, Husserl continues the explication of the intentional act, begun in Logical Investigations. It is in Ideas I that we begin to get a fully developed theory of intentionality. This conception of intentionality as a two term relation (act and object) had already been undermined in Logical Investigations with the introduction of the concept of intentional matter. The implicit distinction between the act, the object as intended, and the object which is intended, clears the way for a three term analysis of

intentionality. Husserl distinguishes an act from its object and both of these from the meaning of the act which he calls the noema. In this way, one arrives at the thesis that consciousness is directed towards its object through its noema.

The noema rather than being the object which is intended, is the object as intended. In acts of perception, the noema is the object as perceived in memory it is the object as remembered, in judgement the object as judged. I may think of my mother as the "woman who bore me" or as "the woman who bore my sister." In each case, the noema, i.e., the object as intended, is a particular aspect or conception of that object, my mother, which I intended at the time. The act of consciousness, the noesis, which is directed toward an object, is a particular event taking place in time. As a particular mental occurrence, a noesis comes into and passes out of existence as the act is performed and terminated. The same noema, on the other hand, i.e., "the woman who bore me" may be returned to through various acts across time. Thus I may intend my mother under the descriptive characterization "the woman who bore me." In sec. #90 of Ideas I, Husserl tells us that an intentional experience is so organized that a "sense" can be extracted from it. He articulates this in the following manner:

The tree plain and simple, the thing in nature is as different as it can be from the perceived tree as such, which as perceptual meaning belongs to the perception,

and that inseparably. The tree plain and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning--the meaning of this perception, something that belongs necessarily to its essence--cannot burn away; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.¹⁶

It was noted earlier that in Logical Investigations Husserl distinguished between the intentional matter and the intentional quality of an act. In Ideas I, what was called the intentional matter in Logical Investigations becomes the noematic nucleus. If an act of thinking about a particular object, i.e., my cat lying on the sofa, changes into an act of remembering or imagining that same state of affairs, my cat lying on the sofa, the matter or noematic nucleus remains the same while thethetic quality of the act changes. The full noema is then the noematic nucleus together with the quality of the act in which the object is intended. The noematic nucleus is called the Sinn or meaning or sometimes the content of the act. In explicating this use of the term "content," Husserl writes:

Under content we understand the 'meaning' of which we say that in it or through it consciousness refers to an objective as its 'own'. . . . Every noema has a 'content' namely, its 'meaning', and is related through it to 'its' object.¹⁷

We have seen that Husserl distinguishes within each intentional experience two kinds of components. One is the act which is a real (relle) event occurring in time, and the other is the correlate of the act, the noema which is said to be unreal or ideal. According to Husserl, each act, or its parts, consists of two separate components, the noetic

and the hyletic phases. In an intentional experience of a physical object, such determining characteristics such as color, touch, sound are given as belonging to that object. These characteristics are given as determinative of that object in so far as the corresponding sensory contents have been animated, i.e., interpreted as "objective properties of the object intended." An intentional act is then composed of a meaning-bestowing noetic phase giving form and meaning to the hyletic data. This notion of hyletic data, as unformed material entering into the intentional act via the meaning-bestowing activity, has been widely criticized by Husserl's commentators. It is neither my intention to develop those criticisms nor to defend Husserl against them. It is only my purpose here to note in brief outlines the place of the hyle in Husserl's analysis of the intentional act.

Husserl writes in sec. #88 of Ideas I that it is in the essential nature of each intentional experience to harbour in itself a "meaning." The meaning is a product of the sense bestowing activity of the noesis. He then tells us that the noesis is structured into a number of constituent phases:

Such noetic phases include, for instance, the directing of the glance of the pure Ego upon the object "intended" by it in virtue of its gift of meaning, upon that which "it has in its mind as something meant"; further, the apprehension of this object, the steady grasp of it whilst the glance has shifted to other objects which have entered within the circle of "conjecture"; likewise the effects of bringing out, relating, apprehending synoptically, and taking up the various attitudes of belief, presumption, valuation, and so forth.¹⁸

Here I take Husserl to have listed three noetic phases. First there is the directing of the glance of the Ego upon an object, secondly there is the apprehension of that object, thirdly there is also the doxic modality of belief or presumption or valuation of the apprehended object. Let us consider an example to make this clear. I may direct my attention to an object on my desk (phase 1). I see it "as a coffee cup" (phase 2). Several variations are possible within this second phase, for instance I may redirect my glance to other objects while retaining an apprehension of the coffee cup. I may then notice that the coffee cup is lying next to a pencil, or that the coffee cup is made of the same kind of material that the saucers and bowls in my cupboard are. The third noetic phase is then the attitude toward such objectivities. I may believe or doubt that the cup is made of an certain material. I may value the fact that the cup is a certain color or I may find it displeasing.

Corresponding to each of these noetic phases there is a correlative noematic phase: i.e., a meaning-structure constituting the object as intended. Each intentional act, i.e., the noetic animation of hyletic data has as its correlate, "the object as intended." The noema is then an achievement of the noesis animating the hyletic data. According to the Husserlian thesis of noetic-noematic correlation there is "No noetic phase without a noematic phase that belongs specifically to it."¹⁹ With this in mind we can

delineate the basic structure of the noema into the three component phases of the noesis mentioned above.

- 1) The directing of the glance of the Ego toward an object.
- 2) The apprehension of the object.
- 3) The "taking up" of one of the various attitudes of belief, presumption, valuation and so forth.

Each noema, as a correlate of a sense-giving noetic act, is the object as it is intended, and as such has a sense, "Sinn." If I perceive an object "as a tree," "as an oak tree," or "as an apple tree," the object intended "as such" thereby has a sense or meaning. We have seen that it is Husserl's thesis that corresponding to each noetic phase there is a noematic phase. Within each noema there are two basic components, what Husserl calls a thetic component and a noematic nucleus. The thetic component is the quality of the act while the noematic nucleus is the correlate of the first two phases mentioned.

Accordingly, the same noematic nucleus may appear in acts of perception, memory, or even desire. In such cases I may perceive a certain tree under certain aspects, or remember that same tree under those same aspects, or desire that same tree under those same aspects. In sec. #91 of Ideas I, Husserl writes:

We observe from this that within the complete noema (as we had in fact previously declared) we must separate out as essentially different certain strata which group

themselves about a central "nucleus," the sheer "objective meaning," that which in our examples was something that could be everywhere described in purely identical objective terms, because in the specifically different though parallel experiences there could be an identical element.²⁰

The noematic nucleus is distinguished from the full noema by considering the identical element in acts of differing quality. The concept of the noematic nucleus introduced in Ideas I is the same concept as the intentional matter of the Logical Investigations. The nucleus of the noema of an act of perception is the same as the nucleus of the noema of an act of memory only if the object is seen precisely as it is remembered. One way of bringing this out is to note that the noematic nucleus is the object intended under a certain description. The noematic nucleus is the same in different noemata if the object is intended as having the same properties, relations, categorial forms, etc.

Husserl sometimes speaks of the noematic nucleus as "content" of the noema. "Every noema has a 'content', namely its 'meaning', and is related through it to 'its' object."²¹ This is an important statement inasmuch as Husserl clearly says that the noema is related to its object through the noematic content which he identified with its meaning. And later he writes:

. . . there belongs to its noema an 'objectivity'--in inverted commas--with a certain noematic constitution unfolded in a definitely limited description, which, as the description of the 'meant objective just as it is meant,' avoids all subjective expressions. Formal-ontological expressions are then utilized, such as

'object', 'constitution', 'positive content'; material ontological expressions such as 'thing', 'figure', 'cause'; determinations of content such as 'rough', 'hard', 'colored' . . . it would fall again within the limits of the description in question to say: 'in front', its colour, shape, and so forth are of such and such a well-defined kind, 'behind' it has 'a' colour, but one that is 'not more' closely defined, and generally in this and that respect it remains 'undetermined' whether it is thus or so.²²

We have seen that, according to Husserl, each act of consciousness has as its intentional correlate, a noema, i.e., the intended as such. In the case of perception the object seen is always seen under a certain description. It is seen as "large" or "small," "shaped in a certain way," "having this or that color," etc. Perceptual objects are usually seen as belonging to a certain kind, cats, dogs, trees, etc., although this is not always the case. It is of course Husserl's thesis that through phenomenological reflection the invariant structures of noemata may be brought out. We have seen that each noema has athetic character, or a complex of such characters, and a central nucleus which is the sense directing the act to the intended object.

Within the nucleus, itself, there are further invariant structures. Each object "as seen," "as heard," "as imagined," "as remembered," is intended under a certain description, i.e., as having a certain set of properties. Through a noematic description, "we acquire a definite system of predicates either formal or material, determined in positive form of left 'indeterminate' (intended 'emptily'), and these predicates in their modified conceptual sense

determine the 'content' of the object-nucleus of the noema in question."²³

These predicates, Husserl speaks of here, correspond to the properties that the object in question is intended as having. Properly speaking, of course, the noema does not contain predicates, but rather each noema has a specificable content, which may be expressed or described through linguistic predicates such as, "brown," "rough," "hard," "heavy," etc. In sec. #131 Husserl writes:

"But these predicates are predicates of 'something', and this 'something' belongs together with the predicates, and clearly inseparably, to the nucleus in question: it is the central point of unification which we referred to above." It is the nodal point of connexion for the predicates, and later: 'their' bearer but in no wise their unity in the sense in which any system or connexion of predicates might be called a unity." There detaches itself as the central noematic phase: the 'object' the 'objective unity; the 'self same', the determinable subject of its possible predicates'--the pure X in abstraction from all predicates--and it disconnects itself from these predicates, or more accurately from the predicate-noemata.²⁴

According to these passages, each noematic Sinn is intentionally directed to an object via two components in the Sinn, an "X" and a "determining content." In ordinary cases of perception we might see an object from many different sides and yet we may recognize it to be the same object even though the determining content, i.e., the aggregate of predicate senses changes from one act to the next. In each noema, as a part of the sense of the noematic content, there is an element or a meaning structure which functions as the "bearer" of the aggregate of predicate senses,

i.e., of the determining content. The X, as Husserl tells us, is the "bearer" of noematic senses. The complete noematic Sinn, i.e., the noematic nucleus, correlates to an object bearing precisely those properties which constitute the determining content of the noema within the noematic Sinn. There is also a distinction between the object "simpliciter," "in abstraction from its properties," and the object as "bearing" those properties. So we may say the X has to do with which object is intended while the content prescribes how the object is determined or propertied.

We have seen that Husserl characterizes the X as the bearer of predicates, the central point of unification, the object simpliciter in abstraction from its properties, and as the determinable subject of its possible predicates. The noematic Sinn is then the X with its determining predicate senses. These two components are supposed to explicate the way in which various noemata, i.e., noemata with differing contents, may be directed toward the same object. It is the X which allows for various acts to intend the same object with differing contents. If I view a coffee cup from various sides or perspectives, in each case I see the coffee cup under a different description (with each various perspective). Even though with each perspective there is a new noematic content, there is also something common to every act performed, in so far as they have the sense of being directed to the same object. Each noema (in their series of acts) has

the same determinable X, and it is in virtue of this common element that they are all perceptions of the same object.

The attentive reader of sec. #131 of Ideas I will realize that the most glaring defect of Husserl's analysis of the determinable X is his failure to make clear the role of the X in identifying or individuating an object. We have seen that the noema of any act of consciousness is directed towards an object. The noematic Sinn or nucleus is the sense of the object as it is intended. This sense in turn has two major components, the aggregate of predicate senses corresponding to the properties the object is intended as having, and the X which is the bearer of those predicate senses.

If indeed the X is a meaning component of the noema which is consciously grasped as self identical in various noemata, then it seems that the X is the element which does the work of individuating its object. Husserl, however, does not tell us how the X individuates its objects. One thing is clear however, as the X corresponds to the object "in abstraction from its properties," and the object may remain the same even if intended through differing noematic contents, the various predicate senses corresponding to properties of the intended object, seem prima facie to have little to do with individuating an object. As we shall see the above statement shall turn out to be too strong, the noematic content does have a central role in individuating

objects.

In sec. #128, Husserl raises the problem of how the noema is said to be related or directed toward its object.

If then we ask how the "meaning" of consciousness transmits itself to the "object," its own object, and in manifold of very varied noematic content can yet remain "the same," and how we perceived this in the meaning itself, new structures present themselves of which the exceptional importance is at once obvious. For moving forward in this direction and, on the other hand, reflecting on the parallel noeses, we eventually strike the question what the "claim" of consciousness to be really "related to" an objective, to have an objective "reference," properly comes to, . . .²⁵

Husserl is here asking a very fundamental question, "How is the meaning of an act, i.e., its noema, directed toward its object?" He is seeking an explication of the phenomenon or the 'sense' of objective reference within an intentional act. Simply to say that a noematic Sinn has two component structures, one, an X which corresponds to an object independently of its properties, and two, a set of predicate senses characterizing (one aspect of) that object, does not by itself explain the phenomenon of reference. At most, Husserl has given us an invariant feature of "Sinn" or the meaning of acts within which an account must be found.

A detailed explication of how noematic Sinn is directed toward an object is not to be found explicitly in Husserl. In Chapter III I shall attempt to provide an answer to this question, a Husserlian answer, by considering a broader spectrum of Husserl's writings than has been considered so far. Before this can be attempted, however, two

things need to be done.

First, we need a closer look at what Husserl means by the noematic X. Secondly, we need to give a general account of Husserl's notion of meaning and in particular his generalization of the notion of meaning, i.e., of linguistic meaning, or of the meaning of expressive acts, to all acts.

As we have seen, Husserl's position is that each component structure of the noema is the correlate of a sense giving noetic phase. The predicate senses, "brown," "smooth," etc., are the results or products of the 'animating' activities of interpreting the appropriate hyletic data. But what is the noetic phase corresponding to the determinable X?

In sec. #84 and 92, Husserl speaks metaphorically of a glancing ray of the Ego directed towards the object of consciousness. In sec. #129 he refers to this "directed glance of the Ego" and writes:

And let us accurately note how this Ego with its rays is now "directed upon" the objective as apprehending what it is, on as presuming or wishing, and so forth, how its glance penetrates the noematic nucleus; we will then be observant that the phase concerning the relation (more specifically the "direction") of consciousness to its objective points toward a most inward phase of the noema. It is not the nucleus itself just indicated, but something which, so to speak, constitutes the necessary midpoint of the nucleus and functions as the "bearer" of the noematic peculiarities which specially belong to it, of the noematically modified properties, namely, of the "meant as such."²⁶

Husserl is here distinguishing between the object which is intended and that object intended via a more or less determinate sense. In sec. #131 of Ideas I he writes

that this determinable X cannot be lacking in any noema. There can be, "No 'meaning' apart from this empty 'something', nor again with 'determining content!'" He then goes on to say that "different meanings refer to the same object, just in so far as they can be organized into unities of meaning, in which the determinable X's of the united meanings coincide with one another"27

If it is Husserl's view, then, that various noemata refer to the same object if their noematic X's coincide, how then are we to interpret the X? In the previous paragraph we saw Husserl refer to the X as an empty something. If the determinable X is indeed empty, it would seem to be a purely formal structure and as such the X's in any and every noema would carry the same sense. But if this were so, then the X's of any and every noema would seem to coincide. This clearly cannot be the case. It would seem then that we must interpret the noematic X in such a manner that we may be able to preserve or capture the sense of the X being empty but at the same time attribute to it a role or a function which allows for X's to coincide in a manner that captures the sense of the phenomenon of various acts and noemata being directed to the same object. This explication shall be the thrust of Chapter III.

NOTES

¹Dagfinn Føllesdal, "Husserl's Theory of Perception," Ajatus 36, Yearbook of the Philosophical Society of Finland, 1976, p. 96.

²See Hubert Dreyfus, "The Perceptual Noema: Gurwitsch's Crucial Contribution," in Life-World and Consciousness, ed. L. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 136.

Robert C. Solomon, "Husserl's Concept of the Noema," in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. Elliston and McCormick (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 168.

Ronald McIntyre and David Smith, "Intentionality via Intensions," Journal of Philosophy 68, 18 (September 16, 1971), p. 541.

³J. N. Mohanty, "Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship," Research in Phenomenology, V, 1975, p. 52.

⁴Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 108.

⁵Ibid., p. 106.

⁶Ibid., p. 237.

⁷Ibid., p. 108.

⁸Ibid., p. 109.

⁹Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. II, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 589.

¹⁰Husserl, Ideas, p. 122

¹¹Ibid., p. 115.

¹²Ibid., p. 116.

¹³Ibid., p. 116-117.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 145.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 145.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 230.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 333.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 237-238.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 250.

²⁰Ibid., p. 245.

²¹Ibid., p. 333.

²²Ibid., p. 336.

²³Ibid., p. 336-337.

²⁴Ibid., p. 337.

²⁵Ibid., p. 332.

²⁶Ibid., p. 335.

²⁷Ibid., p. 339.

CHAPTER II

LINGUISTIC AND NON-LINGUISTIC MEANINGS:

THE PROBLEM

We have seen in the previous chapter that Husserl identifies the noematic correlate of an intentional act, more specially the noematic nucleus, with the meaning of that act, hence the notion of "noematic Sinn." In sec. #124 of Ideas I, he says that the noema is a generalization of the notion of meaning. Husserl's move here is not only curious but to many highly artificial. One may, for example, ask "What sense does it make to speak of the meaning of a perceptual act?" The notion of meaning is traditionally and quite normally understood to be entirely bound up with speech, language, and expression. Conceived of in this manner, it is essentially a linguistic notion.

In light of this consideration, the following questions are pertinent. First we may ask what is Husserl's motivation and justification to so extend the notion of meaning to all acts? Secondly, if the meaning of an act,

i.e., a noema, is the same sort of thing as linguistic meaning, does this not render intentionality itself a linguistic notion? To the first question we may say that in using the notion of meaning as the vehicle of intentional reference Husserl develops a comprehensive theory of intentionality in which a certain parallelism and symmetry between linguistic and non-linguistic acts is worked out. To the second question we may say that intentionality is not a linguistic notion because, as we shall see, linguistic meaning is only a special case of intentionality. The purpose of this chapter is to show how Husserl's general theory of intentionality encompasses both linguistic and non-linguistic acts as well as to carefully note Husserl's explicit statements regarding the differences between the two.

Husserl begins his analysis of meaning in the first Logical Investigation by distinguishing between "sign" and "expression." Some signs are said to express a meaning, these Husserl names "expressions," others do not express a meaning and these he names "indicators." His examples of indicators are such things as a flag being a sign of a nation, fossil bones are signs for the existence of prehistoric animals, and a brand is the sign of a slave.¹ Such signs express no meaning and are signs only when they actually serve a thinking being as an indication of something else.

Husserl takes expressions to be co-extensive with "each instance or part of speech."² Expressions are

meaningful because they express a communicable sense which can be shared by speaker and hearer. Husserl quickly dismisses the view that there are two sides to every expression --the physical side, i.e., written or sounded, and the mental side which by being "associatively linked with the expression, makes it be the expression of something."³ He does not deny though that there are mental experiences, i.e., acts, essentially involved with expression and meaning, but only that the meaning of an expression is the mental act itself.

He also does not deny that mental experiences are made known by expressions. In communicative discourse, the paradigm of which is the dialogue between a speaker and his hearer, expressions serve as indicators of the mental states of the speaker. They serve the hearer as signs of the thoughts (beliefs, hopes, desires, etc.) of the speaker.

Husserl further tells us that expressions function not only in communicative discourse but in solitary mental life as well, in what may be called speaking to oneself. However, the meaning of an expression remains the same in silent thought and in communication. In communication, expressions function as signs for making known the speaker's mental experience. In soliloquy or silent speech expressions do not serve the function of indicating mental experience, for these experiences are directly present to the thinker. Husserl's point here is that expressions are essentially meaningful and only accidentally do they serve as indicators.

If we consider expressions as such, i.e., regardless of whether they occur in dialogue or in soliloquy, we find two things that seem to be left over: "the expressions themselves and what they express as their meaning or sense."⁴ Husserl writes: "the expression is more than a merely sounded word. It means something, and in so far as it means something, it relates to what is objective."⁵

The word, as an expression, means something, and through this meaning relates to something objective. The "something objective" here is the referent of an expression. When the referent of an expression is perceptually present the relation to the intended object is said to be realized or fulfilled. Husserl makes it clear however, that this fulfillment need not occur. The fulfillment is essential neither to the meaningfulness of an expression, nor to the understanding of the meaning. Expressions are meaningful signs only in virtue of the meaning conferring acts or the meaning intentions. It is the meaning conferring acts which, Husserl tells us, "infuse" the sign with sense. Hence, meaning for him is not the meaning of words or sentences as such, but the meaning of expressive acts. It is not the case that the act itself is what is expressed by a meaningful word, but rather the word expresses the sense of the act associatively linked with a term or word. This distinction between the act and the meaning or sense of the act is necessary for the following reason. I may use the same word on

many different occasions and thereby express the same sense time and time again. Although the acts expressing the sense are different, each being a distinctively individuated occurrence, the sense expressed in such acts is the same from time to time. In this sense the expressive acts, like all acts, are real, while the sense expressed by the act is ideal.

Husserl attempts to make this distinction clear by appealing to mathematical examples. If we inquire into the meaning of the expression 'quadratic remainder',

we are naturally not referring to the sound pattern uttered here and now, the vanishing noise that can never recur indentially: we mean the expression in specie. 'Quadratic remainder' is the same expression by whomsoever uttered. The same holds of talk about the expression's meaning, which naturally does not refer to some meaning-conferring experience.⁶

To take another example mentioned by Husserl, if one sincerely says that, "The three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect at a point," it is obvious, Husserl claims, that the speaker judges this to be so. When a hearer listens to a speaker make such a statement, the hearer takes the speaker to be judging or rather to have judged that this is so. The sense or meaning of the statement is not the judgment itself (i.e., the act of judging). The meaning of the statement is the same, Husserl maintains, each time it is stated, regardless of who states it, when it is stated, or the circumstances under which it is stated.

When I assert "The three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect at a point," I make known or announce my act of

judging, but the act itself is not the meaning of the statement. My act of judging is a temporal occurrence which arises and passes away. The content of the assertion, viz. that the three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect at a point, neither arises nor passes away. According to Husserl "it is an identity in the strict sense, one and the same geometric truth."⁷

These examples along with the preceeding exposition should make two things clear. Meaning is conceived of primarily as the meaning of an intentional act, more specifically an expressive act, originally framed with the intent to communicate. It is the correlate of an expressive act. Furthermore, meaning is an ideal unity. "Ideal" here simply means that one and the same meaning may be expressed or intended in many different acts. Meanings then are not temporally individuated as the acts intending those meanings are. These two thesis, viz. that meanings are the correlates of intentional acts and that meanings are ideal parallel Husserl's phenomenological description of non-expressive noemata.

In the analyses of perceptual noemata we get the following description. The phenomenon of viewing a tree, for example, is analysed into two components, the seeing of the tree, and the tree as seen. The seeing of the tree, i.e., the temporally individuated intentional act, has as its necessary correlate the "tree as seen." "The tree as

seen," considered as the correlate of the act, cannot be temporally individuated. The reason for the latter is that many acts may have identically the same noemata. Any perceptual act will present the tree from a certain perspective. Successive perceptual acts from the same perspective will present the tree as the same (also by different persons). Here we have the situation of identical noemata throughout a multiplicity of acts.

This situation clearly shows that the noema is distinct from the act which may be correlated to it. The noema is not a real part of the act and does not exist within consciousness as the act does. The "perceived tree as such" may be identically the same in different acts. This is what Husserl called the noematic nucleus, and it is this to which he generalized the notion of meaning and called the noematic Sinn.

Thus both the meanings of the linguistic expressions (i.e., the meanings of expressive acts) and the Sinn of non-expressive noemata are ideal in the sense that they resist temporal individuation. In the case of linguistic expressions, the sameness or identity of meaning of different uses of the same term or sentence is thought to be required by communicative discourse in particular. For such a situation to be possible, meanings must be in principle communicable and in fact shared by speaker and hearer alike.

Such a view requires then that meaning in some sense

be independent of the private experience of the speaker and hearer. If one were to characterize Husserl's theory of meaning as Platonic it would be these features that one would have in mind. This is, however, only one aspect of his theory of meaning. On the other hand Husserl conceives of meanings as being somehow internally related to the mental life of persons thinking or understanding them.⁸

Husserl's thesis may be best expressed by noting that meanings are the intentional contents of intentional acts. At any rate Husserl finds the meaning of linguistic expressions to be the content or ideal correlate of expressive acts, acts which were "originally framed to fulfill a communicative function."⁹

We can see from this characterization the parallelism between non-expressive noemata and the meanings of linguistic expressions. Both are correlates of intentional acts, as such they retain an identity throughout a multiplicity and in this regard they are ideal. Husserl also uses the term "content" to describe the meanings of expressive acts and the meanings of pre-linguistic acts. In the first Logical Investigation this concept of "content" is left unanalyzed. The only insight into the structure or nature of the ideal meanings is given indirectly by pointing out that expressions refer to certain objects. Husserl writes:

The necessity of distinguishing between meaning (content) and object becomes clear when a comparison of examples shows us that several expressions may have the

same meaning but different objects, and again that they may have different meanings but the same object.¹⁰

Two questions which we may profitably ask here are,

1) What supports Husserl's thesis that meanings are ideal and intersubjectivity available? and 2) what is this "content" which the meaning is like?, in other words, what constitutes a criteria^{on} of identity for these meanings? Husserl's answer to the first, I believe, is implicit in his starting point. Through language we may and do communicate and share thoughts, and this requires that the same words have the same meanings. Husserl thinks this is a necessary condition for discourse. Secondly, using expressions in solitary thought Husserl writes, "we live in the understanding of a word, it expresses something and the same thing, . . ."¹¹ Since we understand the same thing by the use as well as the hearing of a word, this 'same thing' which is the object of our understanding is the identical meaning.

In both cases of meaning Husserl has spoken of "intentional content" which has been explicated as the correlate of intentional acts. If we are to inquire into what this content is like we need to recall the basic characterization of the thesis of intentionality: each act of consciousness is directed toward an object. As we have seen, both expressive and non-expressive acts are said to be directed towards their objects in virtue of their meanings. If we wish to know what the meanings of expressions are like we need to inquire into ways in which expressions refer. Consider the

two names "the victor at Jena" and "the vanquished at Waterloo." Husserl considers it obvious that the two names differ in meaning but yet refer to the same object. He offers no explicit argument that the two names in question have different meanings. His contention that the two names are plainly different in meaning seems to rest on the assumption that one understands something different by the "victor at Jena" and "the vanquished at Waterloo." In explicating this notion Husserl writes:

an expression only refers to an object correlate because it means something, it can be rightly said to signify or name the object through its meaning. An act of meaning is the determinate manner in which we refer to our object of the moment, though this mode of significant reference and the meaning itself can change while the objective reference remains fixed.¹²

Non-expressive acts are also directed toward their object in virtue of their content, i.e., their noematic Sinn. This much we have seen in the preceeding chapter. In Ideas I, Husserl writes that different noematic Sinne may be directed toward one and the same object. In perception I may see the same object from different perspectives, in memory I may remember the same object in different ways. Thus both expressive acts and non-expressive acts intend their objects in a certain manner or under a certain description.

It is the descriptive character of the meaning of expressive acts and the sense of non-expressive acts which is behind Føllesdal's Fregean reading of Husserl's theory of meaning mentioned in the first chapter. Recall Frege's

analysis of sense and reference, and that an identity statement such as "The Morning Star is the Evening Star," is informative (as opposed to non-informative identity statements such as "The Morning Star is the Morning Star") because the meaning of the two terms in the relation of identity differ in their mode of presentation. The notion of one and the same object being thought of or seen (intended) via different modes of presentation is applicable not only to linguistic acts but to all acts as well.

The preceeding pages have focused on two interrelated aspects of expressive and non-expressive acts. 1) They are both correlated to a sense or meaning, and 2) their senses or meanings are ideal in the sense that a multiplicity of acts may intend the same sense or meaning. To this we should add 3) that in both cases, senses or meanings are in some way descriptive of their intended objects. (To specify in what way (3) is true and in what way it is not true will take up much of the third chapter.) In fact we might conclude from this that Husserl conceived of intentionality as a relationlike structure between a person and an object under a certain description. He writes "All differences in mode of objective reference are descriptive differences in intentional experiences."¹³ To conclude, however, that the meanings of acts, both expressive and non-expressive acts, involve (at least) a descriptive characterization capable of individuating the object intended by an act would be too

hasty. The following chapter offers an alternative to this view.

Ronald McIntyre and David Smith have argued, following Føllesdal, that the Husserlian noema is just the Fregean Sinn applied to all acts (even though the Fregean Sinn was the sense of expressions and not of acts). Developing this line of thought they argue, as Føllesdal might not, that the noematic Sinn is the sense of a definite description. They claim that "noemata are intensional in exactly the sense that the meanings of words are intensional."¹⁴ According to this view, words denote their referents via their senses, which are synonymous with some description individuating their referents. It is then their position that the Husserlian notion of noema is an extension of Frege's notion of linguistic meaning and that the latter is to be understood as the sense of a definite description.

According to this interpretation, Husserl saw in Frege's analysis of the role of meaning in linguistic reference the key to the 'directedness' of intentionality generally. Thus they state that Husserl's theory of intentionality is, strictly speaking, "a generalization of Frege's theory of reference. For Husserl recognized speech acts as a species of intentional acts and, even more interesting, linguistic reference as a species of intentionality. The directedness of all these acts, he believed, must be explained in terms of meaning."¹⁵

Calling upon distinctions, which we have already made in the first chapter, Smith and McIntyre argue for this position in the following manner. Since we know that acts with different thetic characters may have the same noematic Sinn (e.g., remembering a tree exactly as it was perceived) and since Husserl takes linguistic acts to be a species of intentional acts in general they conclude that "A linguistic act, even though it differs in thetic character, may nonetheless be directed by the same noematic Sinn that directs a non-linguistic act."¹⁶ (This premise, we shall see, is plainly false.)

A linguistic act and a non-linguistic act may be said to be directed toward their objects by the same sense (i.e., intensional entity), if they are both "directed to the same object characterized according to the same aspects."¹⁷ According to Smith and McIntyre it seems that the only difference between linguistic and non-linguistic acts is that the Sinne of the former are expressed in publicly observable behavior. And since it is undeniably a Husserlian contention that every non-linguistic, e.g., perceptual act, may be expressed through language, Smith and McIntyre think that it is possible "precisely because the Sinn of the linguistic act and the Sinn of the perceptual act are the same."¹⁸

Their position is then, "the noema of an act is the sense of an appropriate sentence describing the act."¹⁹ A perceptual act might be described in the following way: "I

see the tree in the garden." The direct object phrase here "the tree in the garden" (provided that it is appropriately expanded to insure unique reference) whose sense is a definite description of some sort, is the same sense of my conscious act of seeing the tree, i.e., the noematic Sinn.

While this interpretation is illuminating in many respects, it simply is not Husserl's view. Husserl's conception of the relation between perceptual meaning and linguistic meaning is decidedly more complex.

To discuss the relation of expressive to non-expressive meaning, Husserl distinguishes between "Bedeutung" and "Sinn." "Bedeutung" shall designate meaning at the conceptual level, i.e., the meaning of expressive acts, and Sinn shall be used in a wider sense to cover also the sense of non-linguistic acts. Husserl first makes the distinction in the following manner. Suppose that a person sees a physical object. He knows what the object is and clearly sees it. The object is seen characterized by certain aspects, i.e., the perceptual meaning. Husserl argues that one can make this meaning more explicit by discriminating certain features of the object and relating those features to each other. He says that this process of looking something over is made without any 'call on expression of verbal meaning'.²⁰ If, however, one thinks or states "this is white," "a new stratum is there with the rest, and unites with the 'meant as such' in its pure perceptive form."²¹ At this point

Smith and McIntyre quote the following passage from the Ideas I #24,

Whatever is "meant as such," every meaning [Meinung] in the noematic Sinn (and indeed as noematic nucleus) of any act whatsoever can be expressed conceptually (durch 'Bedeutungen').²²

The task here is to spell out in what way expression raises the noematic Sinn (of non-expressive act) to this level of the general, i.e., what does the giving the noematic Sinn conceptual form properly come to? Smith and McIntyre are committed to the following answer: The noematic Sinn of a perceptual act and the meaning of a linguistic statement expressing that act are identical, the perceptual noema and the expressive noema have the same Sinn but differ only in thetic qualities, i.e., ways of intending.

Smith and McIntyre here take expression to be the intentional quality of a noema. On this reading, expression is just another way of intending the noematic Sinn, just as one may perceive, imagine, or remember the same Sinn, or believe, doubt or presume the same Sinn, one may also express that same Sinn. This puts expression on the same level as the thetic qualities of perception, doubt, belief, etc. Such a reading collapses the important distinction between expressive and pre-expressive Sinn. This, however, is a position which Husserl seems explicitly to deny.

Moreover, the expressing stratum, from the side of its thetic character, is completely one in essence with that which finds expression, and in the covering process absorbs its essence so completely that what we call the

expressive presenting just presenting; and expressive belief, presumption, doubt, in themselves and as a whole, belief, presumption, doubt; similarly we call expressive wish or will just wish or will.²³

What Husserl is indicating here is that an expressive noema such as "I believe the Eiffel Tower is in Paris" has the intentional quality of belief, and the corresponding expressive noema "I doubt that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris" has the intentional quality of doubt.

The really decisive passages against the Smith and McIntyre view comes at the end of sec. #124 and in #126. In the last paragraph of #124, Husserl writes:

. . . expression is not of the nature of an overlaid varnish or covering garment; it is a mental (geistige) formation, which exercises new intentional influences (Funktionen) on the intentional substratum and experiences from the latter correlative intentional influences. . . . Of special importance is the understanding of different kinds of "generality" which there emerge: on the one hand, that which belongs to every expression, even to the dependent "is," "not," "and," "if," and so forth; on the other hand, the generality of "general names" like "man" contrasted with proper names like "Bruno."²⁴

It would seem then that to understand Husserl's thesis concerning the relation between the expression and what is expressed we need to understand what Husserl means when he says "expression . . . exercises new intentional influences on the intentional substratum." In this regard he writes

"Expression" is a remarkable form, which permits of being adapted to every "meaning" (to the noematic nucleus), and raises it to the realm of the "Logos," of the conceptual, and therewith of the "general."²⁵

In the following chapter, we shall give an account of how

expression raises the pre-expressive Sinn to the conceptual level. Husserl claims not only that expression exerts new intentional influences on the Sinn which is expressed, but also that the expressed meaning does not fully capture the complete Sinn of non-expressive acts.

It lies in the meaning of the generality which belongs to the essential nature of the expressing function that it would not ever be possible for all the specifications of the expressed to be reflected in the expression. The stratum of the meaning function is not, and in principle is not, a sort of duplication of the lower stratum. Many directions of variability in the latter do not appear at all in the meaning whose function it is to express. . . .²⁶

We may conclude from these passages that the expressive Sinn, i.e., the Bedeutung is not the same as the pre-expressive Sinn although there is some common element between the two.

To spell out the differences and similarities between Bedeutung and Sinn shall be the focus of the following chapter.

NOTES

¹Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. I, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 270.

²Ibid., p. 275.

³Ibid., p. 276.

⁴Ibid., p. 280.

⁵Ibid., p. 280.

⁶Ibid., p. 284.

⁷Ibid., p. 285.

⁸J. N. Mohanty, "Husserl's Theory of Meaning," in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. Elliston and McCormick (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 27.

⁹Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. I, p. 276.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 287.

¹¹Ibid., p. 279.

¹²Ibid., p. 289.

¹³Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. II, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 587.

¹⁴Ronald McIntyre and David Smith, "Intentionality via Intentions," Journal of Philosophy 68, 18 (September 16, 1971), p. 543.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 542.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 547.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 547.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 547.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 547.

²⁰Husserl, Ideas, p. 320.

²¹Ibid., p. 320.

²²Ibid., p. 320.

²³Ibid., p. 321-322.

²⁴Ibid., p. 322.

²⁵Ibid., p. 320.

²⁶Ibid., p. 325.

CHAPTER III

LINGUISTIC AND NON-LINGUISTIC MEANINGS: AN INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL'S DISTINCTION

Our task now is to clarify the relation between Sinn and Bedeutung, i.e., pre-expressive and expressive noemata. The method employed here shall be both exposition and interpretation. Husserl's own account is sketchy and is not presented in any one place as a detailed study. Husserl does, however, provide enough material from which to develop a detailed and coherent account of the relation between linguistic meaning and pre-linguistic meaning based on a theory of intentionality. In section I, I shall examine that feature of language Husserl calls the "generality of words." It is this feature of linguistic meaning that raises the pre-expressive Sinn to the conceptual level, thus resulting in Bedeutung. This notion of the generality of words shall be interpreted as a meaning function, which when supplied with an appropriate context, picks out a particular referent. This shall be worked out from Husserl's remarks on indexical

expressions as well as proper and common names. In section II, I shall examine the structure of pre-expressive Sinn and in section III I shall offer a comparison of Bedeutung and Sinn. This will involve noting the parallelism and symmetry between the two types of meaning as well as giving an account of what Husserl's claim that the pre-expressive Sinn can be raised to the linguistic level comes to.

I

According to Husserl, the Sinn of non-expressive acts may be expressed through language. When this happens the Sinn is said to be raised to the general conceptual level which involves a modification of that Sinn by (1) omitting some aspects of its sense while (2) "exerting new intentional influences" on that sense resulting in the Bedeutung or conceptual meaning of linguistic expressions. It is the specification of these two changes which will concern us here.

In sec. #124 of Ideas I, Husserl writes:

Of special importance is the understanding of different kinds of "generality" which there emerge: on the one hand, that which belongs to every expression and phase of expression, even to the dependent "is," "not," "and," "if" and so forth; on the other hand, the generality of "general names" like "man" contrasted with proper names like "Bruno."¹

To properly understand this notion of the generality of the expressive function we shall look at some revealing passages in the first and sixth Logical Investigations in which the issue is dealt with explicitly (in the Ideas I the matter is only briefly dealt with). In speaking of this

generality, Husserl writes:

"I would like" expresses the wish in a general form; the form of command, the command; "might very well be" the presumption, or the likely as such, and so forth. Every closer determination in the unity of the expression is itself again expressed in general form.²

I take this passage to indicate that an expression such as "I would like this apple" is such that it may express the desire of any number of speakers for one of any number of apples.

In sec. #26 of the first Logical Investigation, Husserl distinguishes between essentially subjective occasional expressions and objective expressions. It is in these essentially occasional expressions that we may most clearly see the generality of the expressive function. Occasional expressions, unlike objective expressions, may have different referents when used in different contexts. They nevertheless retain a single general function on all occasions and in all contexts in which they are used. It is this feature which constitutes their generality. As we shall see, however, objective expressions have a generality of their own. Husserl writes:

We shall call an expression objective if it pins down (or can pin down) its meaning merely by its manifest auditory pattern, and can be understood without necessarily directing one's attention to the person uttering it, or to the circumstances of the utterance. . .

On the other hand, we call an expression essentially subjective and occasional or, more briefly essentially occasional, if it belongs to a conceptually unified group of possible meanings, in whose case it is essential to orient actual meaning to the occasion, the speaker and the situation.³

Examples of objective expressions favorite to Husserl are those that are taken from scientific discourse. "The Pythagorean Theorem" is a good example as is a classifying statement such as "Bears are mammals." Existential statements such as "There are triangles" are included here as well. The terms in these expressions, viz., "bears," "mammals," and "triangles" denote their referents independently of the actual circumstances of use. Such terms as "I," "here," "there," "this," "now," "you," "he," "it," etc., refer to different objects depending on the different circumstances of their use. The essentially occasional expressions are often called "indexicals" or "ego-centric particulars."

Husserl begins his analysis of such expressions by considering the word "I" and notes that any expression including a personal pronoun lacks an objective sense. "The word 'I' names a different person from case to case, and does so by way of an ever altering meaning." It would seem that Husserl is committed to the view that the word "I" has no unitary meaning and that the meaning changes from occasion to occasion. To show that this is not so, he considers the case of reading the word without knowing who wrote it. In such a situation, Husserl argues, the word is clearly not meaningless, for we know that it is "a word with which whoever is speaker designates himself."⁴

Husserl tells us that the conceptual meaning of the

word "I" is "whatever speaker is now designating himself." This conceptual meaning is not, however, synonymous with the meaning of an actual use of the word "I". The sentence "I am pleased" when uttered by a speaker does not have the same meaning as the sentence "Whatever speaker is now designating himself is pleased." The difference between these two is the following. The word "I" uttered by a speaker has and can only have one referent, i.e., the person uttering the word "I." The phrase, "whatever speaker is now designating himself" has as its referent any number of speakers who are presently referring to themselves. When I utter the phrase "whatever speaker is now designating himself," I am not thereby referring to myself. The word "I," however, uniquely refers to the utterer of the word. It is the "universal semantic function of the word 'I'," ⁵ to designate the utterer of that word. This is what Husserl calls the indicating meaning of the word, i.e., the idea of self reference in the case of "I." In an actual use of the word "I" there is a particular pointing to the speaker uttering the word as well as the general idea of self reference. Both these aspects belong to the meaning of the word used on a particular occasion and together they make up its full or actual meaning. Husserl calls the former element of meaning, i.e., the idea of self reference "the word's general function." ⁶ The latter element of meaning, i.e., the meaning indicated, picks out the individual being

referred to and this changes from utterance to utterance among different speakers.

When a competent English speaker encounters an essentially occasional expression such as the word "I," he at once understands the general semantic function of the word, but to understand the meaning indicated, and thus be able to pick out the referent, one must know the circumstances of the utterance (or writing). The same analysis applies to demonstratives as well. The general semantic function of the word "this" consists in expressing a reference to something in the speaker's immediate surroundings. The word "here" has the function of referring to the immediate surroundings of the speaker.

In his essay, "Outlines of a Theory of 'Essentially Occasional Expressions'," ⁷ Aron Gurwitsch alters Husserl's terminology in the following manner. Husserl used the terms "anzeigende Bedeutung" and "angezeigte Bedeutung" which are translated by Findlay as "indicating meaning" and "indicated meaning" respectively. Gurwitsch's own translation of these is "signifying meaning" and "signified meaning"; however he prefers to make the distinction with the phrases "meaning function" and "specific meaning." In what follows I shall employ Gurwitsch's terminology. With this new terminology the distinction can be clarified in the following way. It is the function, i.e., the meaning function of the word "I" to designate the speaker of that word, the function of the

word "before" to designate a moment of time prior to the utterance of that word, and it is the function of the word "yesterday" to designate the day prior to the utterance. The particular meaning functions of such terms prescribe what sorts of objects they may have as their referents. "I" can only refer to a speaker, "now" only to a time, "tomorrow" only to a future day, "here" only to a place. The meaning function does not then individuate a referent, but only picks out a certain range of possible referents (i.e., speakers, times, and places) which is in need of further specification to uniquely denote one member of the selected range. These indexical expressions secure reference by delimiting some context or range of variables and pointing to some item in that context. "I" delimits its range of possible referents to speakers uttering the word. "I" and each use of the word uniquely refers to the speaker uttering the word. "Now" delimits the context to times and refers to the moment of the utterance of the word "now." "Here" delimits the context of possible referents to places and uniquely refers to the spatial environment of the speaker who says "here."

The specific meaning is then secured by orienting the semantic rule or meaning function of the indexical in question to the actual circumstances of the utterance, the occasion, the speaker, the situation. According to Husserl, there are two layers of meaning involved in the use of

indexical expressions. One is the general semantic function which prescribes a rule for going from context to referent. The other is the sense as determined by the specific contextual situation or occasion.

With regard to the word "I," there is a special problem, which if properly handled will provide some insight into these matters. Husserl writes in the first Logical Investigation:

In solitary speech the meaning of "I" is essentially realized in the immediate idea of one's own personality, which is also the meaning of the word in communicated speech. Each man has his own I-presentation (and with it his own individual notion of I) and this is why the word's meaning differs from person to person.⁸

From this passage one might conclude that according to Husserl, the specific meaning of the word "I" as used in communicative discourse is dependent upon the speaker's notion of himself at the time. In itself, this interpretation would not be unsatisfactory. It is tempting, however, to carry this interpretation one step further in a way that would lead to grave difficulties. Consider Frege's discussion on this topic:

Now everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else. So, when Dr. Lauben thinks that he has been wounded, he will probably take as a basis this primitive way in which he is presented to himself. And only Dr. Lauben can grasp thoughts determined in this way. But now he may want to communicate with others. He cannot communicate a thought which he alone can grasp. Therefore, if he now says, "I have been wounded," he must use the "I" in a sense which can be grasped by others, perhaps in the sense of 'he who is speaking to you at this moment', by doing which he makes the associated conditions of his serve for the expression of his thought.⁹

If one takes the Husserlian passage as suggesting that since the meaning of "I" is one's own I-presentation and that since one's own I-presentation is such that it is private and incommunicable, then one is seemingly forced to conclude that for Husserl the specific meaning of an use of the word "I" is incommunicable. A better reading of the situation would be the following. Even if we grant the Fregean premise that "everyone is presented to himself in a particular and private way" there is no need to identify that presentation with Husserl's construal of "I-presentation" in the sentence, "Each man has his own I-presentation (and with it his individual notion of I) and this is why the word's meaning differs from person to person." Suppose Dr. Gustav Lauben utters the following:

- 1) "Dr. Gustav Lauben is wounded"
- 2) "The only doctor left in the village (referring to himself) is wounded."
- 3) "I am wounded."

Corresponding to each of the subject terms there is a presentation involved. In 1) Dr. Lauben thinks of himself as the bearer of the name "Gustav Lauben." In 2) he thinks of himself as "The only doctor left in the village." In 3) he thinks of himself as "I." The presentation of 1), that of being the bearer of a certain name is certainly not private but intersubjectively available and certainly communicable. The descriptive presentation of 2) is also neither private

nor incommunicable.

Given Husserl's analysis of the meaning of "I" there is no reason to construe the specific meaning of a use of "I" with the speaker's private conception of himself, if indeed he has any. The meaning function of the word is that it designates any speaker who utters it. This again is certainly not incommunicable, and when Dr. Lauben says "I am wounded" he refers to himself as "this speaker presently referring to himself." This last construal does not, of course, capture the full and specific meaning of Dr. Lauben's use of the word "I." The specific meaning is the general function oriented to a specific occasion. The specific occasion, of course, has nothing to do with any private conception the speaker might have of himself, but only with which speaker is speaking. The "I-presentation" then is not one's own private notion of oneself but rather the intending of oneself under the rubric of "the speaker presently designating himself."

So while we may conclude that for Husserl the specific meaning of "I" changes from speaker to speaker, this change has nothing to do with any speakers private knowledge or presentation of himself. I do not pretend to speak here for Husserl, for he may have held this unfortunate view. I only wish to show that given Husserl's semantical analysis of indexicals, he certainly need not and should not hold the thesis that the meaning of "I" is in any way incommunicable.

We are now in a position to inquire into the "generality" of words which guided our excursion into the domain of essentially occasional expressions. The generality of these indexical terms is especially clear. Insofar as these expressions have a meaning function, i.e., a semantic rule delimiting the range of possible referents, they are of a purely general and conceptual nature. The general meaning function of an indexical expression does not actually refer to any particular object, although such indexicals are used to uniquely refer. It is often said that indexicals denote their referents without any conceptual mediation. On Husserl's view this is simply false. "I" characterizes its referent as a speaker, "here" characterizes its referent as a place, "now" a time, etc., and all thus involve conceptual elements.

In sec. #7 of the sixth Investigation, Husserl gives an explicit statement of the generality of words and he makes it clear that his remarks are to be applied to all expressions.

The 'generality of the word' means, therefore, that the unified sense of one and the same word covers (or in the case of a nonsense word, purports to cover) an ideally delimited manifold of possible intuitions, each of which could serve as the basis for an act of cognitive naming endowed with the same sense.¹⁰

How does this passage bear out our interpretation of indexicals? We have seen that the meaning of these occasional expressions have two aspects. The first is the meaning function which has been explicated here as a semantic rule

delimiting the range of possible referents. Husserl tells us that the general function of the word "here" is "to name the spatial environment of the speaker."¹¹ This corresponds to Husserl's remarks saying that the generality of the word is the unified sense which covers an ideally delimiting manifold of possible intuitions. These possible intuitions are those possible intuitions of the spatial environment of a speaker. We might express this by saying that in the case of indexical expressions the semantic rule delimiting the range of possible referents does so by supplying a function to go from a context to a particular item in that context. Without an appropriate context the meaning function does not individuate any referent, i.e., in the case at hand a particular place. The second aspect of meaning, the specific meaning, results when a particular context is added to the meaning function. If "here" designates the spatial environment of the speaker who utters the word "here," the speaker and his location at the time of utterance must be identified before the referent of "here" is picked out. Thus the appropriate context relevant for a full specification of the meaning of "here" is the speaker of that word and his environment at the time of utterance.

At this point, however, occasional expressions fail to fit Husserl's full specification of the generality of words. In the quoted passage above, he tells us that each possible intuition covered by the sense of the word can

serve as the basis for "an act of recognitive naming endowed with the same sense." According to Husserl's treatment of indexicals, to recognize a place as "here" requires the knowledge of the full or actual sense of "here" as specified on a certain occasion. This same sense cannot then serve as a basis of recognition of the phrases referred to by "here" on other occasions. The general meaning function remains the same but as it is completed or specified in different ways the full or actual sense of the occasional expression is different from occasion to occasion. On the basis of this, we can see that the specific sense of one use of "here" cannot thereby designate the place referred to by another use of the word "here."

For this reason it seems best to identify the general conceptual element in linguistic meaning with the general meaning function as explicated above, and not with the criteria by which recognition of the referent of the word is established. In the cases of non-occasional expressions we shall see that the general meaning function also does not provide for criteria of recognition although it does provide a fixed formula by which one can establish such criteria in a way that occasional expressions do not.

On this interpretation, in order for a language user to actually pick out or recognize the referent of an indexical expression he needs to know or understand the entire meaning of an indexical, i.e., both the rule and the context

to which it is supplied. It is equally possible, however, for speakers and hearers to meaningfully use and understand indexicals without being able to pick out or recognize the referents of the terms in question. For instance, if I hear someone say, "This is a wonderful thing" (without knowing what the speaker is referring to) I still understand the meaning of that sentence and each of its composite terms. I understand the meaning of the word "this," but I cannot pick out or recognize what its referent is. I may also meaningfully use the indexical without knowing what its referent is. I may reply to the original speaker, "This must please you then." When I meaningfully use an indexical without being privy to the appropriate context to pick out its referent, I nevertheless refer to a particular object but only emptily and symbolically. The semantic function is all that comes into play in such cases.

Husserl's notion of the generality of words has here been interpreted in light of this notion of the meaning function belonging to indexical expressions. The meaning function, in turn, has been explicated as a function from a context to a particular item in that context. We have also seen that Husserl makes clear that this generality of words applies to all linguistic expressions. Therefore in the following pages I shall extend this interpretation to names as well. This interpretation would then construe all linguistic expressions as having two layers of meaning, one

being a general conceptual element and the other as being a determinate specification based on that general meaning.

In sec. #5 of the sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl compares his treatment of occasional expressions with proper names. A proper name, like occasional expressions, "names an object 'directly'."¹² A proper name does not refer to an object attributively, i.e., "as the bearer of these or those properties."¹³ Husserl writes that "The meaning of a proper name lies accordingly in a direct reference-to-this-object, a reference that perception only fulfills . . ."¹⁴ Here we begin to see the similarity between the semantic analysis of indexicals and proper names. In both cases there is a reference which is only specified or made determinate by orienting a general meaning function to an actual situation.

This can be shown by an analysis of the empty or symbolic use and understanding of proper names analogous to the treatment just given of indexicals. This analysis is based on the distinction between purely linguistic reference to an object and the ability to match the object with the name, i.e., picking out or recognizing the referent.

If I hear someone say, "Bill is a fine fellow," I understand the meaning of the sentence and its composite terms, even though I do not know who Bill is, i.e., I cannot pick him out as "being named 'Bill'." I likewise can refer to Bill if I say, "I would like to meet Bill." Again, the

referring intention to Bill, i.e., the understanding of or meaningful use of the term "Bill," is possible without being able to match word and object. The meaning intention is empty.

In the corresponding case of indexicals this general feature of meaning was explicated as a semantic rule which delimits the range of possible referents by providing a function which goes from a context to a particular item in that context. Husserl makes this same point when he tells us that proper names may be "significant in a derivative fashion."¹⁵ When a proper name has been applied to an object, even if we are not privy to that original application, we can "by employing the concept of 'being called' . . . give proper names to objects . . . even though such objects are not directly given or known to us . . ."¹⁶ Husserl goes on to write:

The capital of Spain, e.g. is called (i.e. has the proper name) 'Madrid': A person unaquainted with the town Madrid itself, thereby achieves both knowledge of its name and the power to name it correctly, and yet not thereby the individual meaning of the word 'Madrid'. Instead of the direct reference, which only an actual seeing of the city could arouse, he must make do with an indirect pointing to this reference operating characteristic ideal of properties and the conception of 'being called' such and such.¹⁷

This element of "being called" is present in the meaningful use of proper names in cases in which the speaker can match word and object as well as those in which he cannot. If I know a person or thing by name, I know this person or thing "as something called so and so. I know Hans as Hans, Berlin

as Berlin."¹⁸

On the basis of this similarity of proper names and indexicals I would like to suggest that proper names qua proper names share a general semantic function just as indexicals do. The rule may be stated in this way: [If "P" is a proper name, then "P" designates whatever is called "P" or has been named "P" by X or in X where "X" stands for the linguistic community in which "P" is at home.] The appropriate context to be supplied in this case would involve assigning a value to "X." To some the rule may seem trivial or circular, one might charge: Of course "P" designates whatever is called "P." This would involve interpreting the rule as saying: "P" refers to the referent of "P"; an even more striking way of putting this: "P" refers to P. In demonstrating that the rule is not trivial, I shall argue that the appeal to a particular linguistic community in which the name has a standard usage involves the specification of their referring habits which presuppose a standard of correct and incorrect usage. A complete explanation of this matter is not possible until we have developed Husserl's notion of 'semantic essence'.

Before developing the notion of 'semantic essence' we should first see how this formulation of the general semantic function has the virtue of allowing us to understand some key aspects of Husserl's theory of meaning, viz., the contrast between empty and fulfilled intentions and the

contrast between the objectivity of meanings and the constitution of those meanings in the intentional life of individuals. In sec. #8 of the sixth Logical Investigation, Husserl describes the situation in which an expression first functions "in a merely symbolic fashion, and then is accompanied by a 'more or less' corresponding intuition."¹⁹ If I am involved in an conversation about a man called "Jones," I may think of Jones, refer to him by mentioning his name without knowing the slightest thing about him. My intention, although directed to Jones is empty or purely symbolic. This empty intention may become fulfilled (more or less) in a variety of ways. As I begin to hear about Jones' deeds and exploits, the empty intention begins to become progressively fulfilled.

I may find out that Jones is the man who saved the Smith family from drowning and that he is the president of a local charitable institution. I may come to know enough about Jones that I can tell when Jones is being talked about even though his name is not mentioned. One might call this "linguistic recognition." On the other hand, Jones may be pointed out to me and I may learn to visually recognize him as "Jones." In both cases the meaning intention directed to Jones has been fulfilled.

The same example may also illustrate both the objectivity of meanings and the constitution of those meanings in the conscious life of an individual language user. According

to Husserl, meanings are objective and passed down from generation to generation. In the case of the proper name, "Pythagorean Theorem," one may emptily intend it by asking "What is the Pythagorean Theorem?" The full meaning becomes constituted for an individual when it becomes fulfilled, i.e., when the individual learns what the Pythagorean Theorem is.

The objectivity of meanings and the possibility of emptily referring to an object by a name are two sides of the same semantic feature. The semantic rule for proper names enumerated above, i.e., If "P" is a proper name, then "P" designates whatever is called "P" or has been named "P" by the linguistic community in which "P" is at home, assures its objectivity by fixing the correspondence between the symbol "P" and its referent. It is in virtue of this fixed correspondence that one may emptily and symbolically refer to the thing named "P."

The next task here will be to extend this scheme of linguistic meaning to common names and definite descriptions. It will be best, however, to take a closer look at the scheme itself before doing so. The scheme represents linguistic meaning as having two aspects:

- 1) A function which specifies a rule moving from a context to a particular item in that context.
- 2) The particular context needed to specify the general function into a specific meaning which

determines its referent.

The first aspect that we have identified with the "general conceptual" element peculiar to Husserl's Bedeutung. We have seen that this general semantic element is by itself empty. It provides a formula for determining its referent only when supplied with a material content or a particular context. The contexts noted have been such ordinary matters as time and space for indexicals as "here" and "now." With regard to proper names the context was the referring habits of the linguistic community in which a name is at home.

Viewed in this way one can see that this notion of linguistic meaning is cast in a matter-form structure. If the present interpretation is correct, the matter-form schema articulated here is an essential feature of linguistic meaning. On this interpretation, there is an element of meaning that may be absent in the intentional structure of expressive acts. It is the criterion necessary to pick out or recognize an object as denoted by the name in question. If I say to my neighbor, "Who is Jones?", I certainly refer to Jones. I meaningfully use the name because I understand the meaning function, the general conceptual element. It would also be true to say that I do not fully understand the name, i.e., know who Jones is, because I do not know the actual practices of my linguistic community in so far as "Jones" is concerned. To know the actual linguistic practices in this case would be to know the details of the

particular context in which the meaning function operates. The result of this would be the ability to recognize Jones as "Jones."

To extend this analysis to class or general names is not difficult. Class names have a generality apart from what we are calling the general conceptual element in linguistic meaning. Class names are general in the sense that they refer to a range of objects, they denote all the members of a particular class. Husserl makes it quite clear that the general conceptual feature of expressive meanings is not to be identified with the generality of class names. In sec. #7 of the sixth Logical Investigations, Husserl writes: "What we have said applies to all expressions, and not merely to such as have generality of meaning in the manner of a class-concept."²⁰

If my remarks concerning the general semantic function hold good for proper names, they should hold good for common names as well. Consider the following example: I may know that "molybdenum" is a name but not whether it is a proper name designating an individual or class name designating the set of molybdenii, or a mass term designating the stuff called "molybdenum." In any case, the referent is the thing, set of things, or kind of things called "molybdenum" by a particular linguistic community. If someone tells me that molybdenum is very valuable and that he plans to invest heavily in it, I may desire some molybdenum for myself

without knowing anything about molybdenum other than it is valuable. I may also wonder what kind of stuff it is. The fact that one can wonder what properties molybdenum has seems to make it clear that molybdenum can be intended without molybdenum instantiating any set of properties intended by the act directed toward molybdenum. In the cases of my desiring some molybdenum or wondering what kinds of properties molybdenum has, I am intending the stuff molybdenum solely in virtue of that stuff being called "molybdenum." It is the referring habits of the linguistic community which provide the context which secures reference. If I wonder what kind of stuff molybdenum is, I am intending molybdenum only within the context of the referring habits of my linguistic community.

Given this, it seems that the semantic rule given for proper names can be extended to cover class names as well.

If "P" is a name (proper or general) then "P" designates whatever is called "P" or what has been named "P."

Again this rule preserves the identity and objectivity of meaning independently of one's ability to recognize or identify the referent of the expression. In sec. #9 of the sixth Logical Investigations, Husserl writes:

If we compare expressions used in recognizing objects with those used outside such recognition, it is plain that both have the very same meaning. Whether I understand the word 'tree' as a mere symbol, or use it in connection with my intuition of a tree, it is plain that I mean something by the word, and mean the same thing on both occasions.²¹

To complete the discussion we need to return to Husserl's notion of the "generality of words" along with his remarks concerning the ability to recognize an object as that which is called "such and such." This will in turn allow us to develop Husserl's notion of semantic essence. Allow me to once again quote the passage referred to earlier from sec. #7 of the sixth Investigation.

The "generality of the word" means, therefore, that the unified sense of one and the same word covers (or in the case of a nonsense word, purports to cover) an ideally delimited manifold of possible intuitions, each of which could serve as a basis for an act of recognitive naming endowed with the same sense.²²

We saw earlier that the latter part of this statement does not fit occasional expressions. The reason for this failure is that any intuition of the referent of an occasional expression cannot serve as the basis for recognizing other referents named by the same occasional expression.

The general semantic function for proper names has been explicated as the following: If "P" is a proper name, then "P" designates whatever is called "P" by X or in X, where X stands for the linguistic community in which "P" is at home. The general meaning function of a proper name does not give us any explicit criteria to recognize or pick out the referent of the proper name, but it does provide a formula by which one can follow to establish criteria by which to recognize or pick out its referent.

We have already seen that one may think about the man called "Jones" or refer to him by name without knowing

any specifying or identifying traits about him. This ability to emptily and symbolically refer to Jones as the man named "Jones" does not count as fully knowing who Jones is. The principles establishing criteria for knowing who someone is may be quite problematic in any case. Here we count only the ability to match name and person as "knowing who Jones is." At any rate, Husserl's principle for the generality of words comes to the following in the case of proper names: Although to each proper name there corresponds no single definite perceptual appearance of the person so named, i.e., the bearer of the proper name can make his appearance in many different manners; any one of these appearances can serve as a basis for reidentifying that person as "Jones." As Husserl writes: "Each appearance from such an intuitive manifold will justify a precisely synonymous use of the proper name."²³ And later: "In this way the naming word has a recognitive relation to a boundless multitude of intuitions, whose identical object it both knows and thereby names." To come to know who Jones is, is partly a matter of empirical investigation into the referring habits of the linguistic community that calls Jones "Jones." It is a matter of finding out which individual is the one called "Jones" and the ability to perceptually reidentify Jones from one occasion to another. It is with this in mind that Husserl writes:

It is plain that the recognitive character of certain acts, which gives them their significant relation to objects of intuition, does not pertain to words as

noises, but to words in their meaningful, their semantic (bedeutungsmässigen) essence.²⁴

According to this, then, the semantic essence of a word is the full or actual meaning, i.e., the general semantic rule specified by the criteria necessary for recognizing the object as named by the word. We can see, then, that proper names differ from indexicals in that indexicals have no unitary semantic essence as do proper names. The criteria by which to recognize the referent of a proper name does not change from occasion to occasion as the criteria by which to recognize the referent of an indexical does. In both cases the respective general semantic functions of proper names and indexicals appeal to empirical considerations of situation and context. In the case of proper names these contextual factors do not change from occasion to occasion as the contextual factors of indexicals do.

The semantic essence of a term must then be something like the proper set of recognitive criteria by which the referent of the term is properly identified as the term's referent. This involves raising the criteria by which to reidentify an object to the linguistic or conceptual level. Thus the semantic essence of a term is its general meaning function oriented by a set of criteria by which to pick out or recognize the referent of the term. This is what we have called, following Husserl, its full or actual meaning.

In order for a term to have a semantic essence, i.e., to be a genuinely meaningful expression, the term must be

used to name something. This further presupposes that there must be some way to identify and reidentify that thing, i.e., a set of recognitive criteria associated with that thing which is named. This recognition or possibility thereof is, of course, non-linguistic. We may certainly recognize, identify, and reidentify objects without attaching names to them. By attaching names to such objects we may intend them in their absence, talk about them, etc.

In the early sections of the sixth Investigation, Husserl brings out the details of this matter by giving us first a static and then a dynamic analysis of empty and fulfilling intentions. What Husserl calls a dynamic identity synthesis occurs when an empty intention "functions in a merely symbolic fashion, and then is accompanied by a 'more or less' corresponding intuition."²⁵ The first stage of this dynamic situation occurs when one hears or uses a word emptily as when one asks, "What is molybdenum"? The fulfilling stage comes when molybdenum is intuitively presented to someone. The paradigm of such intuitive presentation, for Husserl, is the direct perceptual contact with an object.

There is one slight difficulty with this formulation that needs to be settled. In sec. #8 of the sixth Investigation, Husserl writes:

We experience how the same objective item which was 'merely thought of' in symbol is now presented in intuition, and that it is intuited as being precisely the determinate so and so that it was at first merely thought or meant to be. We are merely expressing the

same fact if we say that the intentional essence of the act of intuition gets more or less perfectly fitted into the semantic essence of the act of expression.²⁶

The possibility remains open, however, that such an empty intention is fulfilled not in perceptual intuition but by simply being told (or have read) what molybdenum is, how it is identified, what its important properties are, etc. For such linguistic fulfillment to take place, however, it is necessary that some speakers have identified the stuff called "molybdenum" and have some criteria of recognition which allows them to successfully pick out molybdenum.

Having such recognitive criteria in hand one may introduce the word "molybdenum" into the linguistic community via the general semantic rule: "Molybdenum is that which is called 'Molybdenum'." Such a term becomes "significant in derivative fashion"²⁷ when introduced under the rubric of "being called such and such." What is of importance here is that the person or persons who originally introduced the term to the linguistic community must have first perceptually identified molybdenum and then given the stuff a name.

We must also point out that the original recognitive criteria may not stand the test of time. Such criteria frequently becomes more fine grained. The criteria by which to recognize gold, for example, are certainly more fine grained since the rise of chemical theory. We have said that the semantic essence of a name must be the proper set of recognitive criteria associated with the name. It is also clear

that with primitive criteria often. With the introduction of the semantic essence of a name is tantamount to the same change with the primitive criteria?", then the assumption is plausible that the reason since the advent of a name is incompatible with meaning.

In criteria to count as terms had to reject any particular with the name. Such adoption of such a view is sense or different : notion of semantic expression. For this reason it is primitive criteria used 28. This is in fact what recognizes primitive criteria of certain term is in question refer to the appropriate sophisticated indicated fine detail determine whether a concept the semantic essence of a problem,

that with the advancement of science such recognitive criteria often become(s) increasingly more accurate. With the introduction of new recognitive criteria does the semantic essence of a name then change? If this question is tantamount to the question, "Does the meaning of a name change with the introduction of more reliable recognitive criteria?", then the answer must be 'no'. For surely it is implausible that the meaning of the word "gold" has changed since the advent of modern chemical theory. It would also be incompatible with Husserl's thesis of the ideality of meaning.

In looking for a set of recognitive criteria to count as the semantic essence of a name we have had to reject any particular set which an individual associates with the name. Such a notion must be rejected, for the adoption of such a view would give us a different semantic essence for different individuals using the term. We need a notion of semantic essence that is fixed and community wide. For this reason it is tempting to fall back upon the recognitive criteria used by experts in the appropriate area.²⁸ This is in fact what most rational speakers do. When the recognitive criteria for identifying the referent of a certain term is in question, competent speakers appeal to or defer to the appropriate experts. If we, however, rely on the sophisticated fine grained test available to scientists to determine whether a certain metal is gold or molybdenum as the semantic essence of gold or molybdenum, we run into similar problems,

for these tests may change from one generation to the next. Again the semantic essence of a term proves elusive.

The above considerations seem to suggest that it is a mistake to look for a single set of such recognitive criteria as the semantic essence of a term. The semantic essence of a term perhaps is best viewed as an ideal which is progressively approached by more and more fine grained ways of recognizing the referent of the term in question. In order for this interpretation to be made viable one needs to show that the intentional essence of an act of intuition (i.e., the intentional essence that the semantic essence gets fitted into) likewise has this character of allowing for subsequent greater determinations. This notion has some immediate intuitive support for often we become better and better at reidentifying objects or kinds of objects as we become more and more familiar with them.

Returning to the case of "molybdenum," the semantic essence of "molybdenum" must then be the general semantic rule ("Molybdenum" refers to whatever is called "molybdenum" by the linguistic community in which "molybdenum" is at home) specified by the criteria necessary for recognizing molybdenum. This recognitive criteria must be found by empirical investigation into the referring habits of the appropriate community. This formulation is, however, not without problems.

The criteria by which molybdenum is recognized may

(and probably does) vary from one member of the linguistic community to the next. The miner may recognize molybdenum by different signs than the engineer. The chemist or metallurgist may have different criteria than either of the former. People having little contact with molybdenum perhaps cannot distinguish molybdenum from aluminum. All this seems to indicate that there is no fixed semantic essence here.

We have already seen that linguistic reference is not dependent upon any concept of the referent associated with the name by the utterer of that name. The general semantic rule of a name assures its reference as an objective public affair. Because of this a person can meaningfully use a name and thus refer to whatever is the bearer of the name without any associated criteria for recognizing or saying anything about that bearer. Being able to emptily refer in this manner, however, does not count as 'knowing the meaning of the word'. Such empty linguistic reference is reference without understanding. Although I may refer to molybdenum and meaningfully use the word "molybdenum" when I ask, "What is molybdenum?", I have no understanding of the word "molybdenum," i.e., I do not know the meaning of "molybdenum." More often than not, however, words are used with some associated criteria by which to recognize, identify, or pick out their referents. Within the linguistic community the set of criteria associated with the term may vary widely from a

very meager understanding to a more or less complete understanding.

Corresponding to the use of a term there are those levels of understanding which may accompany that use. (1) One may use a word and be said not to know its meaning, i.e., not understand the word, as when one asks "What is molybdenum"? (2) One may use a word and emptily understand it. An example would be a case in which one knows that molybdenum is a kind of metal but nothing further to help identify it. (3) One may use the word with a more or less complete understanding. As we shall see, a complete understanding has the character of an ideal, a goal possibly never reached. The criteria by which an understanding is counted as complete varies from term to term and is relative to the total knowledge of the appropriate linguistic community.

To find the semantic essence of a term we need to look more closely into the referring habits of the linguistic community in question to see how various disputes between the proper recognitive criteria get resolved. Typically such disputes are resolved by appealing to dictionaries, encyclopedias, etc. Often a speaker will give up his conception of what counts as proper recognitive criteria if other competent speakers correct him. It appears then that the semantic essence of a term is just those recognitive criteria which ultimately govern the correct application of that term to the thing(s) to which it refers. The semantic essence of a

term "P," i.e., the proper way of recognizing P as that which is called "P" need not be fully known to any one individual, but must be present to at least some members of the linguistic community.

Thus it seems that the cognitive criteria by which the semantic essence of a term becomes specified depends upon a non-linguistic feature of intentionality, i.e., the ability to reidentify an object as 'the same' object previously identified. To spell this out we need to return to Husserl's analysis of pre-expressive acts (perceptual acts again being our paradigm) and pre-expressive noematic Sinn. Doing this will allow us to show exactly the similarities and differences between expressive and non-expressive meaning.

Before offering such a comparison, let us first consider descriptive phrases used as names. This will allow us to see more clearly the role of the referring habits of the linguistic community in establishing the referent of a name. Consider such phrases as "the victor of Jena" or "the vanquished at Waterloo." These phrases are, of course, taken to be descriptive of Napoleon. The phrases, "victor at Jena" and "vanquished at Waterloo," become names, for Husserl, when supplied with a definite or indefinite article, i.e., "the victor at Jena," "the vanquished at Waterloo." With this addition the phrases are now suitable for use in the subject position of a predicative sentence. The names "the victor at Jena" and "Napoleon" are not synonymous but co-extensive,

i.e., they have the same referent. On this interpretation, however, the two names have the same referent not because the person Napoleon uniquely instantiates the definite description "victor at Jena," but because Napoleon is the person commonly referred to by the phrase "the victor at Jena." Suppose now that one makes the statement, "The victor at Jena was a short man." Such a statement comes out true only if the referent of the name "the victor at Jena" was in fact short.

Suppose now, contrary to known history, that Napoleon was not present at the Battle of Jena, and in fact he had nothing to do with the battle. Further suppose that the actual winning general of that battle stood six feet and four inches. It would then seem to be false that "the victor of Jena was a short man." Given our semantic rule for names, however, in spite of the actual facts of history, the sentence in question comes out true. That person commonly referred to by "the victor at Jena," viz. Napoleon, was a short man. The nominalized phrase, "the victor at Jena," refers to Napoleon in virtue of the practices of the linguistic community. Even though the definite description does not truly apply to Napoleon, Napoleon may be referred to by the description in virtue of the conventionally established referring habits.

In our counter-factual case, suppose that some clever historian discovered that Napoleon had nothing to do with the Battle of Jena and that the winning general was actually a man who stood six feet four inches tall. If this historian

made the statement, "The victor at Jena was not a short man," the statement would certainly be true. So we have the paradoxical situation in which two seemingly contradictory sentences, "The victor at Jena was a short man," and "The victor at Jena was not a short man," are both true.

To dispel this seeming contradiction we need to look more deeply into the notion of 'the referring habits of the linguistic community'. In the former sentence, "The victor at Jena was a short man," the nominalized phrase, "The victor at Jena," refers to Napoleon in virtue of the established and prevailing linguistic practices. This is of course based on the historical assumption that Napoleon is the victor at Jena. In the latter case, i.e., the sentence "The victor at Jena was not a short man," the subject term does not refer to Napoleon but to someone else who is believed to fit the description "the victor at Jena." Does this then not violate our rule for names, "If 'P' is a name then 'P' refers to whatever is called 'P' by the appropriate linguistic community"?

In the former case, the referring habits of the linguistic community are established on the assumption the victor of Jena is Napoleon. The latter case is in fact a denial of that historical assumption. It may, in fact, be seen as a plea to change the referring habits of the linguistic community. In any case we may say that within the general linguistic community there are a group of speakers (perhaps only

one) which does not share the historical assumption that the victor of Jena is Napoleon.

In light of these remarks, we may say that the two seemingly contradicting statements, "The victor at Jena was a short man," and "The victor at Jena was not a short man," are not in fact contradictory because the phrase "the victor of Jena" does not refer to the same individual in the two different sentences.

This, however, is not the end of the matter. In his article, "Reference and Definite Description," Keith Donnellan has distinguished the attributive from the referential uses of definite descriptions occurring in the subject position of sentences. According to Donnellan, a definite description is used attributively when the speaker intends to refer to whatever or whoever fits the description, and a definite description is used referentially when the speaker intends to pick out a definite individual which may or may not actually fit the description. The referential use refers (on our account) by the rule given for names, i.e., whoever or whatever is called so and so, while the attributive use refers to whomever or whatever uniquely fits the description.

The referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions may occur in the same sentence, e.g., if one says that "The victor of Jena was a short man," one may intend to refer to "Whoever is commonly referred to by 'The victor at Jena'" and state that that man is short, or one

may intend to refer to whomever uniquely satisfies the description, whoever he may be, and state that he is short. Our interpretation of Husserl's theory of meaning accounts for the referential use. Such phrases as "the victor at Jena" are for Husserl names. If our interpretation is correct, i.e., if for Husserl if "P" is a name then "P" refers to whatever is called "P" by the appropriate linguistic community, then the attributive use of definite descriptions cannot be names (for Husserl). Husserl, however, clearly thinks that such phrases are names. His analysis then does not adequately cover the attributive use of such phrases.

II

We have seen (Chapter II) that Husserl has extended the notion of meaning beyond its ordinary linguistic sphere to non-linguistic acts as well. Linguistic or expressive meaning he calls Bedeutung and non-expressive pre-linguistic meaning he calls Sinn. Husserl's insight here is that it is the pre-linguistic Sinne of non-expressive acts that are given conceptual form when expressed in language.

We have also seen that, for Husserl, Bedeutung has a general conceptual element not shared by non-expressive Sinn. In the preceeding section an account was given of this notion of a general conceptual layer or element of meaning. Each expression was interpreted as having a meaning function which, when supplied with an appropriate context, picks out a particular referent.

This general meaning function which refers only emptily and symbolically is the "new intentional influence" Husserl speaks of in Ideas I, which raises the Sinn of non-expressive acts to the realm of the Logos, i.e., the conceptual and general. We have also seen that, for Husserl, there are elements in the Sinn of non-expressive acts which drop out in the corresponding Bedeutung or expressed sense. For Husserl then at least part of the non-expressive noematic Sinn is preserved when that Sinn is given an expressive form. In that expressive form there is also the general meaning function which gives it its new status as Bedeutung. In this Bedeutung, however, there are absent some aspects of the non-expressive Sinn. So far we have given an account of the new element of meaning superimposed on the non-expressive Sinn; it is now time to deepen our analysis of non-expressive Sinn to see what structures of the non-expressive Sinn are preserved in expression and what structures are not.

We have already seen that the noematic Sinn or noematic nucleus, is construed to be the determinate manner in which the act is directed toward its object. Husserl gives us, in Ideas I, the essential structure of (the form of) noemata. To engage in a bit of repetition let me recall that structure. Noemata are the ideal correlates of intentional acts, expressive and non-expressive. In each noema, whether it be the "perceived as such" in perception, the

"desired as such" in desire, or the "expressed as such" in expression, the meaning context, whether Sinn or Bedeutung, directs the act toward its object.

In the case of the perceptual noema, Husserl writes in sec. #88 of Ideas I: "Perception, for instance, has its noema, and at the base of this its perceptual meaning, that is, the perceived as such."²⁹ Husserl illuminates this by describing the experience of a blossoming apple tree. "The tree as seen" is the noematic correlate of the act of seeing the tree. In describing the "perceived as such" we describe the object as given in perception. Thus the noematic correlate of the act of perception includes the perceptual sense of the various properties of the object present in perception. In sec. #130, Husserl tells us that in carrying out a noematic description of an object "we acquire a definite system of predicates either formal or material, determined in positive form or left 'indeterminate' (intendedly 'empty') and these predicates in their modified conceptual sense determine the 'content' of the object-nucleus of the noema in question."³⁰

A noematic description is then not a description of the object we are aware of, rather it pertains "to the way in which we are aware of it."³¹ Thus if I see an apple tree "as blooming," "as having rough bark," "as twelve feet tall," these determining characteristics are not to be predicated of the objectively existing tree, but they are rather

predicate senses of the "perceived as such," the perceptual noema. Clearly in cases of ordinary visual perception, the perceived objects are given with enough determinate properties to allow a quite extensive description of that object. One may even say that when I see a pencil lying on my desk as a long and yellow No. 2 pencil with a sharp point and a good eraser, I see the pencil under a certain description. It is perhaps more accurate in Husserlian terms to say that the "perceived as such" is the descriptive sense of that perception while the articulation of that sense would give a resulting description.

Husserl tells us that the predicate meanings in the noematic Sinn are always experienced as "predicates of something."³² In each noema, then, the meaning content is not exhausted by the predicate senses descriptive of the properties of the object. In addition to these there is a meaning component which is the "bearer" of these properties. A noematic Sinn, consisting of the predicate senses and the determinable X, is the sense of an intentional act as directed toward a particular object under a particular description. The determinable X does not have a descriptive sense, but rather the sense of "determinable subject of its possible predicates," "in abstraction from all predicates."³³

Having distinguished between the determinable X and its descriptive predicate senses, a further distinction between two different types of these predicate senses is now

in order. These may be divided into determinate and indeterminate senses. The determinate senses in a noema of visual perception are the senses corresponding to the properties the intended object is seen as having. Thus if I see a tree as having "brown bark," "green leaves," and "pink flowers," these determinate senses are part of the descriptive content of the noematic Sinn. The tree seen as a material object is taken as having many properties not included in a single perspective. The particular texture and color of the backside of the tree are left open, such predicate senses are indeterminate. It may also happen that the object I am viewing is so far away that I cannot tell if it is a person or a shadow cast on a building. If I move closer to it or it moves closer to me, I may be able to see that it is a person, but I may not be able to tell if it is a man or a woman, or tell if he/she has blue or brown eyes.

In the previous chapter, we have commented on the misguided interpretation which identifies Fregean Sinn (conceived of as a sense of an identifying description) with Husserl's noematic Sinn. Much of the plausibility of this line rests on the joint assumptions that in every noema there is a sufficient complex of determinate predicate senses to insure uniqueness of reference and that the perceptual noema is the proper paradigm for all noemata. In the case of perception it is quite plausible to think that the descriptive sense of the object "as seen" individuates the

intended object. In many cases this may be true. There is, however, no reason to construe all noemata on this model. In the case of perceptual noemata, the distinctive features are usually the determinate senses of the seen object. I see the tree "as blooming," "as having rough bark," "as twelve feet tall." Not only would the descriptive sense (appropriately expanded) individuate the object, but the sense of the corresponding linguistic expression would as well. (This is the Smith and McIntyre position as outlined in "Intentionality via Intensions.") The prominent feature in perceptual acts is the determinate descriptive predicates senses given: We have seen, however, that the meaning structure of the noema consists of a determinable X and predicate senses which are both determinate and indeterminate. The 'Fregean' analysis of perceptual noemata (in fact of noemata in general) is blind to all but the determinate senses.

To show that this is clearly not the case for all noemata is not difficult. Even within the class of perceptual noemata the Fregean interpretation is strained. In the case of seeing an object from so far away that one cannot tell whether it is a person or a shadow, the noema, is characterized by a high degree of indeterminacy. What determinate senses there are is clearly not sufficient to provide the sense of individuating description. Consider a noema of recollection, the "remembered as such," corresponding to an

act of remembering. I may remember a man reading a paper at a meeting without remembering any individuating characteristics of the man. I may not even remember much about the paper nor which meeting it was. Consider now an expressive noema, the "expressed as such." Someone may tell me that molybdenum is very valuable and that he plans to invest heavily in it. I may also linguistically refer to or expressively intend the stuff molybdenum by saying "Tell me more about molybdenum." I may also silently wonder what kind of stuff this molybdenum is. The fact that one can wonder what kinds of properties molybdenum has seems to clearly indicate that molybdenum can be referred to or intended without molybdenum instantiating the set of properties intended by the act directed toward molybdenum.

These last examples were designed to show that an act can be intentionally directed toward some particular object or kind of object without the sense of the corresponding noema individuating that object via a definite description of that object. In thinking about molybdenum and wondering if it is really valuable I am intending molybdenum, as Husserl says, "in abstraction from its predicates."³⁴ In such a case I intend molybdenum independently of any description. These considerations seem sufficient to show that the Husserlian conception of noematic Sinn is not the same as the Fregean conception of linguistic Sinn (construed as an identifying description).

Nevertheless, it is Husserl's view that the noematic Sinn directs the act (whose Sinn it is) towards its object. If the object is not intended via the descriptive content of the noema, there must be a non-descriptive element of sense which plays a role in directing an act to its object. Much of what Husserl says about the determinable X of the noematic Sinn seems to fit this need for a non-descriptive component of the Sinn. These considerations suggest that the X has the sense or rather is the sense expressed by an indexical expression.

Textual support for this is available in the Ideas I where the distinction between the determinable X and the determinate and indeterminate predicate senses is made. In perceptual noemata, the perceived object is always perceived within the context of a visual field. In sec. #35 of Ideas I, Husserl writes:

In perception properly so called, as an explicit awareness, I am turned toward the object, . . . I apprehend it as being this here and now. The apprehension is a singling out, every perceived object having a background in experience.³⁵

In sec. #40, he writes:

The thing as strictly experienced gives the mere 'this', an empty X . . .³⁶

In cases where an object is seen from such a distance that the viewer cannot tell what the object is, the object is to a great degree seen "in abstraction from its properties." The thing seen is seen as "this here and now," as occupying a specific spot in the visual field. Such a

determination does not belong to the thing itself as one of its properties, but to the thing seen within the context of the visual field relative to the position of the perceiver, and this context may change from occasion to occasion. The sense of the "perceived as such" seems to have its occasional element.

III

Now that general sketch of the structure of expressive and non-expressive sense has been given, a comparison of the two should yield a more precise statement of the similarities and differences between the two. In Ideas I, Husserl has given us a description of the essential structure of all noematic Sinn. Focusing on pre-expressive Sinn, in particular the perceptual noema, Husserl analyses the structure of the noematic Sinn into the determinable X and its determinate and indeterminate predicate senses. In order to show that the interpretation of Bedeutung offered here is viable, it must be demonstrated that such an interpretation is compatible with this general exposition of the noema.

To do this I shall show that the account of Bedeutung, offered in the preceeding pages can be reasonably cast into the language of the noematic X and its predicate senses. Some of the groundwork for this has already been done. In the cases of empty symbolic intentions we have seen that the phenomenon of linguistic reference can easily be construed as intending an object in abstraction from its properties.

This seems to be made especially clear by the ordinary case of an uninformed speaker wondering what kinds of properties molybdenum has. In perceptual acts the close analogue here is the experience in which one sees an object but can distinguish no specific features of that object. In both cases the determining features of objects intended may be progressively filled out. To linguistically refer to molybdenum without knowing any characteristic properties of molybdenum is then to intend molybdenum as an empty X, undetermined but determinable through further experience. Here, of course, to intend molybdenum is to refer to molybdenum solely under the rubric of "that which is called molybdenum."

In the preceeding pages it has been argued that expressive meaning or Bedeutung results from the raising of the pre-expressive Sinn to the general conceptual level. This is accomplished by the exertion of "new intentional influences" on the Sinn which is expressed. This new intentional influence is of course the general semantic rule explicated earlier. We have seen that this semantic rule provides a function from a particular context to an item in that context. This function must be supplied with a particular context in order to determine a referent.

The supplying of this context can mean two different things here. In the case of names we have seen that the semantic essence of a name is the general semantic rule or meaning function plus the appropriate criteria by which to

recognize the referent of the name. On the other hand, the formulation of the meaning function itself contains a reference to the referring habits of the linguistic community in which the name is embedded: P is that which is called "P," is referred to as "P" by the linguistic community in which "P" is at home. The supplying of the context in the former case allows for a speaker to be said to know the meaning of the term in question, to be linguistically competent with regard to that term, and to be able to recognize the referent. Notice that to fulfill this desideratum it is not enough for a speaker to only be able to identify and reidentify the referent of a name via some unknown (or relatively unknown) criteria. The speaker must know the typical criteria by which the referent is individuated. This is ordinarily an idealized set of beliefs about what the referent is like or what kinds of properties it typically manifests.

In the latter case, referring terms in a natural language are never without their context, i.e., the referring habits of the linguistic community. This is entailed by our explication of the general meaning function developed earlier. The meaning function there was seen to secure a fixed correspondence of word and object. The rule prescribes that P is whatever is called "P" . . . If such a rule does indeed assure a fixed correspondence of word and object, then this would account for the objectivity of meanings as well as the possibility of empty referring to an object by using its

name. In order for such a rule to do this job there must be a principle of determining the identity of the referent; otherwise there would be no way to distinguish falsely applying a name to an object from correctly applying a name. Without such a principle the referent would not be fixed, this would destroy both the objectivity of meaning and the possibility of empty referring to an object.

We have also seen that the understanding of a term may fall somewhere on a continuum between not understanding the term at all and a more or less complete understanding. We have seen that a speaker may successfully refer to the bearer of a name by using that name even if the speaker knows nothing about the bearer except that it is called "P." Linguistic competence with regard to a term is not an all or nothing affair but a matter of gradual approximation to an ideal limit of understanding.

In the case of the speaker who knows nothing about molybdenum, he can only think of molybdenum and refer to molybdenum "in abstraction from its properties." As such all the properties of molybdenum are indeterminate. The speaker who knows only that molybdenum is a metal certainly cannot pick out or recognize molybdenum, but he knows the kind of properties molybdenum might have, i.e., properties that are consistent with its being metallic. The indeterminate properties are not wholly indeterminate but prescribed according to the various ways that metal can be

determined. A speaker with a more or less complete understanding of "molybdenum" typically knows that molybdenum is a white metal, resembling iron, and is typically used for forming steel-like alloys when combined with carbon. The understanding of such a term can never be truly complete, if completeness is taken to mean knowing every property of molybdenum. What is important here is that what determinate properties are known prescribe in general fashion the unknown but indeterminate properties. For instance, the speaker who knows only that molybdenum is a metal, typically will know that molybdenum will conduct electricity, but will not know how efficient a conductor it is.

These remarks are important because they demonstrate the symmetry of Bedeutung and Sinn. As we have seen, pre-expressive Sinn is a structured whole exhibiting a determinable X and its determinable properties. Another way of putting this is to say that every particular perception is a one sided view of the object perceived. Perceptual objects appear from a certain perspective and under a certain aspect. Because of this one sidedness any particular perception is incomplete insofar as other perspectives will yield a further determination of the object.

In the case of a continual viewing of an object we are free to change our perspective. We may walk around this object and the different perspectives of the object blend into one another. In spite of the different

properties exhibited in the different perspectives, the object remains "the same." Husserl describes this situation by the following:

. . . sundry act-noemata have everywhere here a variety of nuclei, yet so that, despite this fact, they close up together in an identical unity, a unity in which the "something," the determinable which lies concealed in every nucleus, is consciously grasped as self-identical.³⁷

Husserl employs this same sort of analysis for non-continuous perceptions, i.e., perceptions separated in time. Such perceptions "can likewise close together in a 'harmonious' unity." When this happens the object of the perception "which at one time may be determined thus or thus and at another otherwise determined, is now consciously grasped as the same Something, or as in common accord the same 'object'."³⁸

This conditions for this 'harmonious unity' and as such for the identification of the object of one perceptual act with the object of another perceptual act are contained in the noematic structure of the X and its determinate and indeterminate predicate senses. As we have seen any particular perception of an object presents that object from a certain perspective, some of its properties are directly given, e.g., the color of the side seen, the shape of the side seen, the texture of the side seen, and so on. The object is also taken as having many properties not given in the original perception. The particular texture, color, and shape of the other sides of the object are left open,

i.e., they are indeterminate.

We have also seen that the indeterminate senses are not wholly open but prescribed or predelineated in accordance with its directly given determinate properties. For instance, if the object I am viewing is a tree, I normally expect the color and texture of the sides unseen to be similar to the side seen. If, for instance, the object of my perception is a book, or what I take to be a book, I expect to find pages filled with print between its covers. If I actually do look between its covers and find pages filled with print, some of the indeterminate senses of the previous perception becomes determinate; there my expectations have become fulfilled. When such expectations are fulfilled, the latter (fulfilling) perception is in agreement with or conforms with the former perception. In this way indeterminacies are brought to determination. This "agreement" with other perceptions is precisely what Husserl means by "harmonious unity."

Thus two or more perceptual noemata come to be taken as directed toward the same object when they complement each other in the manner of mutual consistency and coherence. In this way the one-sidedness of any single perception is overcome when the multiple appearances of an object confirm, continue, and compliment each other. It is by this process of mutual confirmation and fulfillment that a harmonious unity is established and thus the consciousness of the

identity of the perceived object is established.

In Experience and Judgement, Husserl speaks of the internal horizon of the experience of a particular thing.

He writes:

Every experience has its own horizon; every experience has its core of actual and determinate cognition, its own content of immediate determinations which give themselves; but beyond this core of determinate quiddity, of the truly given as "itself here," it has its own horizon. This implies that every experience refers to the possibility . . . of obtaining, little by little as experience continues, new determinations of the same thing . . . And this horizon in its indeterminateness is co-present from the beginning as a realm (Spielraum) of possibilities, as the prescription of the path to a more precise determination, in which only experience itself decides in favor of the determinate possibility it realizes as opposed to others.³⁹

This notion of the internal horizon, the possibility of progressive determination of the object of experience, is but a consequence of the essential structure of the noema, i.e., the structure of the determinable X with determinate and indeterminate predicate senses. The incompleteness of any single perception results in anticipatory references to further perceptions which may progressively reveal more exact and greater determinations, the uncovering of more properties always remains open to further continuation.

Accordingly, this possibility of a continual and progressive determination of the object of perception entails that an infinity of determinations of the same object is possible. There are then an infinite number of possible perceptions, i.e., perceptual noema, of the same object. Therefore a complete and adequate perceptual apprehension of a

perceivable thing is an impossibility. In sec. #143 of Ideas I Husserl tells us that "within the finite limits of appearance," we can have only inadequately appearing objects. Although the adequate presentation of a perceptual object is an a priori impossibility, the idea of a progressively infinite process of greater determinations yield an "Idea in the Kantian sense."⁴⁰ This is simply to say that the determinable X can always receive more exact determinations. The idea of complete and adequate givenness is a regulative idea, an unreachd goal towards which greater advance may always be made.

In the case of perceptual noemata, what is given may be called a perceptual slice of the object seen. The object is seen from one side rather than another. Perception is thus essentially perspectival. The analysis of the determinate and indeterminate senses in the perceptual noema is just the spelling out of the perspectival nature of perception. By analyzing perception in this way, Husserl is emphasizing the informational character of perception. For instance, if the perceived thing is seen as a 'physical object', it will be expected to enter into causal relations, follow the laws of physics, endure through time, etc. If the perceived thing is seen as a "living being" (plant or animal), it will be expected to display certain properties and behave in a manner incompatible with inanimate objects. If not for this informational character, perception would

hardly be the reliable guide to the world that it is. The informational character of perceptual noemata lies not only in the characteristics determinately given of the object of perception but in empty intentions pointing to further possibilities of fulfillment, i.e., further possible determinations of the object coherent and 'harmonious' with what is determinately given.

Now that we have specified the intentional structure of expressive and pre-expressive meanings we are now in a position to make good the guiding theme of this chapter: to state in explicit form the similarities and differences between Sinn and Bedeutung by noting what "new intentional influences" added to pre-linguistic Sinn when it is given an expressive form and to note what intentional elements of pre-expressive Sinn are dropped when given expressive form.

The most obvious point of difference is that in perception objects are intended in their presence while this need not be the case for objects intended through language. In perception the intended object has the character of being given as "bodily present." Perception always had the character coming into contact with the thing itself, while language involves the possibility of intending an object in its absence. This possibility is not unique to Bedeutung. Objects may be intended in their absence through memory, desire, expectation, etc. What makes language unique is that through language objects are intended symbolically. This

difference between Sinn and Bedeutung is reflected in the different ways each exhibit an empty and fulfilled intentional structure. In perception the intended object is given with an acquainting sense, it is seen as "this here now," the object is explicitly individuated in the perceptual noema. We have seen that within the structure of the perceptual noema there are determinate and indeterminate senses. The determinate senses may be thought of as filled relative to the emptiness of the indeterminate senses. According to the nature of the determinate senses arise unfulfilled intentions which point toward further possibilities of fulfillment, i.e., further determinations of the 'inner horizon'. This situation is also described by Husserl as the presented-appresented structure of all perceptual experience, "the strictly seen front of a physical thing always and necessarily appresents a rear aspect and prescribes for it a more or less determinate content."⁴¹

In the case of linguistic intention or Bedeutung the empty and fulfilled structure does not have the character of this presented-appresented structure. The reason for this is clear. In linguistic intention nothing is presented. The distinction between empty and fulfilled intention in Bedeutung is the distinction between the general semantic function, described earlier, as the possibility of empty referring to P on the basis of "that which is called 'P'," and the object intuitively given as "P."

To claim that the empty/filled distinction in Bedeutung is simply the distinction between an intentional reference to an object via the meaning function of a term denoting that object and the intentional reference to an object via a perceptual act needs some clarification. We have already seen that empty symbolic intentions may become progressively fulfilled through hearing other speakers describe the referent in question. In fact, much of our understanding of physical object terms comes from the shared beliefs of our linguistic community. The beliefs we come to have, by hearsay, about the referents of physical objects terms count as fulfilling original empty symbolic intentions. These beliefs are, however, empty relative to the fulfillment they receive when we actually have occasion to verify them through direct intuition of the object(s) in question.

Any discussion of the relation between Sinn and Bedeutung must take as its point of departure Husserl's thesis that any Sinn is in principle expressible through language. This is explicitly stated in Ideas I, sec. #124:

Whatever is "meant as such," every meaning (Meinung) in the noematic sense . . . of any act whatsoever can be expressed conceptually (durch 'Bedeutung') . . . "Expression" is a remarkable form, which permits of being adapted to every "meaning" . . . and raises it to the realm of the "Logos," of the conceptual, and therewith of the "general."⁴²

Husserl's thesis is then that linguistic meanings express non-linguistic meanings. Using names as our paradigm of referring expressions we have argued that Husserl's notion

of the general meaning function is the "new intentional influence" added to the pre-linguistic Sinn which raises that Sinn to Bedeutung or linguistic meaning. As we have seen the general meaning function of names involves an appeal to the linguistic community in which that name is at home. Linguistic meaning is thus a social affair.

We have also noted that Husserl tells us that some aspects of pre-linguistic Sinn are not preserved in the linguistic expression of such Sinn. Because of the generality of the expressing function "it would not ever be possible for all the specifications of the expressed to be reflected in the expression."⁴³ There are then some elements of pre-linguistic Sinn not expressible by the naming function. These are the intuitionl elements of such noemata. By intuitionl elements I mean such things as the degree of clarity with which an object is perceived, the determinate properties the object is seen as having, and any particular aspect or property of an object on which one's attention may be focused.

The degree of clarity with which an object is perceived may be called the degree of its intentional fullness. It is important not to confuse this with the fulfilling sense which is always relative to an empty intention. One may have an obscure perceptual presentation of an object which exhibits such and such properties or a clear presentation of that object and its properties. According to

Husserl, "there is nothing to hinder the determining content whereby the obscurely grasped object is indicated from being absolutely identical with that of the clearly grasped object. The descriptions would coincide."⁴⁴

The specific predicate senses which belong to the noema of an obscurely grasped object may be the same as in a noema of the same object clearly grasped with the same determinations. Specific predicate senses are not then part of the intentional fullness of a noema. The specific predicate senses are, however, part of the intuitional elements of the perceptual noema, they are directly given as determinations of the thing seen. They are part of the "perceived as such."

We have seen that according to Husserl when an object is given a name, the name refers to its object directly; a name does not refer to its object attributively, 'as the bearer of these or those properties'. Still it is Husserl's thesis that some aspects of pre-expressive Sinn are preserved when that Sinn is given expressive form in Bedeutung. This much is clear from sec. #124 of Ideas I. The specific predicate senses of the perceptual noema are not then part of what is preserved of that Sinn when raised to Bedeutung.

With these differences of Sinn and Bedeutung already spelled out it is time to turn to the question of what similarities they have. The relevant question may be posed as the following. What is the common meaning element in the

perceptual noema directed toward an object P, and in the Bedeutung of a linguistic expression, i.e., a name, denoting P? We have seen that in the case of two different perceptual noemata, they can be said to be directed toward the same object if their determinate and indeterminate predicate senses complement each other in a manner that gives rise to a 'harmonious unity'. Such a notion of "harmonious unity" involves specific predicate senses of noema₁ being compatible with specific predicate senses of noema₂.

We have also seen that a name names its object without attributing to it any specific or determinate attributes. Furthermore, in considering the common meaning element of Bedeutung and Sinn we are considering the criterion for the fulfillment of an empty linguistic noema by a perceptual noema. Since the Bedeutung of an empty linguistic noema contains no predicate senses, the identity of a meaning element in an empty linguistic noema and its fulfilling perceptual noema cannot be construed as one of "harmonious unity" in the manner of noemata with mutually fulfilling and cohering senses, i.e., in the manner of establishing the identity of objects of different perceptual noemata.

What then is the common meaning element of perceptual noemata and linguistic noemata? Husserl considers this question in Logical Investigations VI, Chapter III, sec.

#26.

If one finally asks how one and the same content (in the sense of 'same matter') can at times be 'taken up'

in the manner of an intuitive, and at times in the manner of a signitive representative, in what the differing nature of these interpretative forms consists, I can give them no further answer. We are facing a difference that cannot be phenomenologically reduced.⁴⁵

Husserl's admission here that he is unable to specify the common meaning element in intuitive and linguistic contents is not surprising. The analyses presented in the Logical Investigations do not provide a framework in which to adequately deal with this problem. The analyses in Ideas I, however, provide us with the necessary material to give an answer to this problem. Specifically, it is the introduction of the empty but determinable X as the bearer of determinate and indeterminate predicate senses which provides the necessary framework to specify the common meaning element needed.

In the case of the perceptual noema, we have already argued the element of Sinn responsible for directing the act to its object is not the descriptive predicate senses but the empty X construed as an indexical element. The object to which the predicate senses are seen as describing is picked out as "this object here and now in my visual field." Thus the object is picked out or individuated "in abstraction from its properties." We have also seen that names may refer to their referents "in abstraction from their properties." When an object is given a name, i.e., referred to linguistically, the pre-expressive Sinn is raised to the general conceptual level. This "raising to the conceptual

level" is accomplished by a new intentional influence which we have explicated as the general meaning function of names. The transition from Sinn to Bedeutung is effected when the X of the perceptual Sinn, with the sense of "this thing here and now," is given the new form of "that which is called such and such."

While this claim has an initial plausibility, in order for it to be established we need to show how the two X's coincide. The coincidence of the two X's is established not by the congruence of mutually cohering determinations but by a direct pointing to an object in the manner of "this object is that which is called so and so," where the X of the perceptual noema is expressed by the terms "this object" and the X of the linguistic noema is expressed by the terms "that which is called so and so." Such a coincidence of X's is arbitrarily established, there is no internal connection between the two. This is not surprising as it is commonplace that a name only contingently denotes one object rather than another. Once the coincidence of these two X's has become established, the criteria by which to reidentify the object becomes incorporated into the semantic essence of the term naming that object.

NOTES

¹Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 322.

²Ibid., p. 325.

³Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. I, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 314-315.

⁴Ibid., p. 315.

⁵Ibid., p. 315-316.

⁶Ibid., p. 316.

⁷Aron Gurwitsch, "Outlines of a Theory of Essentially Occasional Expressions," in Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations, ed. J. N. Mohanty (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 118.

⁸Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. I, p. 316.

⁹Gottlob Frege, "Thoughts," in Logical Investigations, ed. P. T. Geach, trans. P. T. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 12-13.

¹⁰Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. II, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), p. 691-692.

¹¹Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. I, p. 317.

¹²Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. II, p. 684.

¹³Ibid., p. 684.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 684.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 685.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 685.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 685.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 685.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 694.

²⁰Ibid., p. 692.

²¹Ibid., p. 698.

²²Ibid., p. 691-692.

²³Ibid., p. 693.

²⁴Ibid., p. 693.

²⁵Ibid., p. 692.

²⁶Ibid., p. 694.

²⁷Ibid., p. 685.

²⁸See Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of Meaning," in Language, Mind, and Knowledge, ed. Keith Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975) for the development of a similar line. Putnam's notion of the linguistic division of labor provides some added support for the correctness of this view.

²⁹Husserl, Ideas, p. 238..

³⁰Ibid., p. 336-337.

³¹Ibid., p. 336.

³²Ibid., p. 337.

³³Ibid., p. 337.

³⁴Ibid., p. 337.

³⁵Ibid., p. 105.

³⁶Ibid., p. 116.

³⁷Ibid., p. 338.

³⁸Ibid., p. 338.

³⁹Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment, trans. James Spencer Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 32.

⁴⁰Husserl, Ideas, p. 366.

⁴¹Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 109.

⁴²Husserl, Ideas, p. 320.

⁴³Ibid., p. 325.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 340.

⁴⁵Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. II, p. 742.

CHAPTER IV

FORMAL AND MATERIAL STRUCTURES OF THE
NOEMA, PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES, AND
THE TWIN EARTH PROBLEM

In the previous chapter I offered the suggestion that linguistic meaning is cast in a matter-form schema. I should now like to articulate this suggestion and broaden it to cover the notion of pre-linguistic meaning as well. This analysis comprises the first part of this chapter. The second part is a discussion of the relation of Husserl's theory of meaning to some contemporary studies by analytic philosophers, primarily Hilary Putnam. Specifically, I hope to show that Putnam's celebrated Twin Earth examples have no force against the Husserlian conception of the doctrine that meaning determines reference.

I

As we have seen, the perceptual noema has the essential formal structure consisting of the determinable X with its determinate and indeterminate predicate senses. We have

also seen that the determinable X corresponds to the immediate acquaintance of the perceptual object. An object of perception is given as "this thing here and now." The determinate predicate senses correspond to the properties the thing is seen as having while the indeterminate senses are those unseen but possible determinations of the object compatible with the determinate senses. The determinate predicate senses are, of course, filled in any particular perception. Although the indeterminate senses are empty, they are prescribed in a general fashion. The specific determinate and indeterminate senses represent the material content of the perceptual noema.

Perception is informational because the determinate predicate senses attaching to the determinable X prescribe the different possible states of affairs which are compatible with those determinate predicate senses.¹ It is in this way that the informational character of perception is bound up with action. If a perceived object is seen as a pencil, it will be expected to be able to enter into the appropriate causal relations to be used to write a letter. So, if for example, I desire to write a letter, I will pick up the pencil and expect it to function accordingly. Or, suppose I am hiking in the Rockies and I see a large print in the mud which I recognize to be a grizzly bear print. To recognize such a print as that of a grizzly bear is to make the judgment that the most probable state of affairs responsible for

such a print is that ~~of~~ a grizzly bear recently passed this way. Consequences for the theory of action seem obvious here. ←

Of course there are other states of affairs compatible with the print in the mud other than a grizzly walking by. Someone may have made the print to scare off hikers. Whether I take the print to be indicative of bears or of mischievous mountain men partly depends on my background beliefs. Perceptions, of course, may be more informative to one person than to another. This again depends on background beliefs. To the mountain men, with a complex set of beliefs about bears, the print may also be a sign for certain kinds of vegetation in the area, a certain kind of terrain nearby, etc.

We have seen that it is the determinately given properties of the perceptual object, i.e., the determinate predicate senses of the noema, that delimit what possible states of affairs are compatible with the object "as seen." As the indeterminate predicate senses are brought to determination, the different possible states of affairs compatible with the whole complex of now determinate senses are further reduced. For example, if I see an object in the distance and can make out no determinate properties of that object the possible states of affairs compatible with my perception are quite large. If I come to see the object as a tree then such states of affairs compatible with my perception are now

considerably reduced. For instance, now I expect the perceived object to be capable of growth, to have leaves, bark, etc.

With this in mind, the matter-form structure of the perceptual noema can be interpreted in two ways. First, there is the purely formal structure, i.e., the determinable X with its determinate and indeterminate predicate senses. The material content of the noema becomes specified with the determinate predicate senses and these imply a broader range of indeterminate predicate senses. So now we have a picture of a formal structure common to all perceptual noemata with differing material contents distinguishing one noema from another. We may also extend this hylomorphic schema in a way which is at least reminiscent of Aristotle. If we reinterpret matter and form as potentiality and actuality we can see the complex relation between the two.

If, for instance, I see an object and know not what it is, as we have seen in the previous chapter, I see it "in abstraction from its properties," as "an object simpliciter," an empty X. I take the perceived object to be actual but as I don't know what it is, it could possibly be anything.² In such a case, there are no determinate predicate senses but only indeterminate ones. As these indeterminate predicate senses become filled, i.e., brought to determination, I may recognize the object as a tree. Upon recognizing the object as a tree, I now have more definite expectations concerning

what properties the tree possesses. These expectations are the possible properties of an actual tree. With further inspection of the tree (and thereby certain possible predicate senses become actualized) I may recognize it as a deciduous tree; upon still closer inspection I may recognize the tree to be an elm.

To each subsequent act of recognition there corresponds a new noema. These acts and their corresponding noemata may be loosely represented in the following manner.

- 1) I see [this thing is (something I know not what)]
- 2) I see [this thing is a tree]
- 3) I see [this tree is an elm]

Act₁ recognizes something as actual, and it could potentially be anything. Act₂ recognizes this actual something as a tree, and it could possibly be any kind of tree. Act₃ recognizes this actual tree as an elm, and it could possibly have any determinate properties that elms can have. Each subsequent recognition is the actualization of the previous possibilities delimited by the actual character of the "perceived as such."

Suppose someone, an archaeologist perhaps, spots a bit of clay protruding from the ground; it could perhaps be the tip of a buried pot, or perhaps part of a burial urn, or perhaps a statue. In this case the clay is the actuality seen and as such it lends itself to certain possibilities,

i.e., certain material determinations. On the other hand, it is equally conceivable that the archaeologist could have first spotted a statue. This statue, according to the initial lights of the archaeologist, could possibly be made of clay, possibly of cement, or possibly of marble. Further viewing will actualize one of these possibilities.

This shows that the matter-form structure in question is an epistemological structure, not a metaphysical structure such as Aristotle's. On the Aristotelian theory the relation of the clay to the statue is always one of matter to form, potentiality to actuality. The Aristotelian matter-form structure is a structure of Being, the Husserlian matter-form structure is a structure of knowing.

In this epistemological structure, potentiality is in some way tied to or a derivative from actuality, predicate senses (determinate or indeterminate) are tied to an X. When, through different perspectives, an unidentified object is recognized to be a tree, the noematic content is no longer (1) ["this thing" in need of determination] but (2) ["this tree" in need of further determination]. Thus in #2 what is given as actual and in need of determination (i.e., determinable) is not a purely empty X but a "tree" that can be determined through future experience. Each subsequent act of recognition is founded on the former one, and thereby their X's come to coincide, as Husserl would say.

This structure of actuality and potentiality is

another way of explicating the internal horizon of an object of experience discussed in the previous chapter. There the internal horizon was characterized as the possibility of progressive determination of the intended object. This was shown to be a consequence of the essential structure of the noema, i.e., the structure of the determinable X with determinate and indeterminate predicate senses. Some comments are now in order concerning the external horizon of perceptual experience.

There are two structures of the external horizon which concern us here. We may call these structures the spatial and temporal horizons. Any perceptual object is seen within a spatial field. Such a spatial horizon recedes indefinitely in all directions. In sec. #53 of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl writes,

. . . my animate bodily organism . . . has the central "Here" as its mode of givenness; every other body . . . has the mode of "There." This orientation "There," can be freely changed by virtue of my kinesthesias.³

Thus an object of perception is always presented as "over there," i.e., occupying a certain spot in my perceptual field. The temporal horizon, which Husserl says is "infinite in both directions,"⁴ stretches out from the "now" component present in each noema. The perceptual object is thus presented as "here and now."

As I have argued in the preceeding chapter, the determinable X of the perceptual noema is an indexical element. It captures the sense of the 'this-here-now' component of

perceptual experience. We saw earlier that the X component in the noema presents its object in abstraction from its properties. The X picks out its object by locating it in a certain spot in the spatial and temporal environment. It does not present any individuating characteristics of the object other than its spatial and temporal position relative to the perceiver.

This external horizon manifests a matter-form structure of its own. The spatial horizon is characterized by the modes of "near" and "far" stretching out from the central "here." This is a purely formal structure. This formal structure is given a material content by persisting beliefs concerning where "here" is. Parallel remarks hold for the temporal horizon. The temporal modes of "earlier" and "later" stretch out from the immediately present "now." This temporal framework is given a material content by beliefs concerning when "now" is. Once I know that it is now, September 1982, I have oriented ^mby relative "now" to an ob- < jective context with a certain material as opposed to formal content.

Indexicals

Following Husserl's analysis of indexical expressions, we have isolated two aspects of the meaning involved in the use of such terms. One is the meaning function which prescribes a rule for going from context to referent, the other is the sense as determined by orienting the meaning

function to a specific contextual situation or occasion. The former is the purely formal element devoid of any particular material content. The latter is the material content which completes the empty formal aspect of the term's meaning and thus individuating a referent. As the material element or context changes from occasion to occasion, the referent of that expression changes.

It is the meaning function of the word "I" to designate the utterer of that word. This rule or meaning function is both [~]formal and conceptual structure of the expression. ≡ It is formal in that it is a constant character or form of the meaning, i.e., a rule. It is conceptual in that it delimits its possible referents to and characterizes them as "a speaker." Parallel remarks hold for temporal expressions such as "now," "before," and "after," as well as spatial expressions as "here," "there," "near," and "far."

Names

The formal and material aspects of the meaning of names may be explicated in a parallel manner to indexicals. In the previous chapter we developed a semantic rule stating the meaning function of names

If "P" is a name in (Language) L, then "P" designates in L whatever the community of L-users have called "P" or what has been named "P" in L.

This is, of course, the purely formal element in the meaning of names and as we have seen in the previous chapter this rule must be supplied with a context to pick out a referent.

The rule itself is empty in the sense that it provides no criteria to pick out the referent of the name. The rule does, however, appeal to a particular linguistic community in which the name has a standard usage and this involves a specification of the referring habits of that community with respect to the name in question. The referring habits of a particular linguistic community with respect to "P" (and this presupposes a standard of correct usage) is the material element of meaning needed to complete the empty and formal aspect described by the semantic function.

In the previous chapter the notion of "semantic essence" was introduced and explicated as the full or actual meaning of a term, i.e., the general semantic rule specified by the criteria necessary for correctly applying the term to its referent(s). As we have formulated the general semantic function, the criteria necessary to match word and object is a matter of the referring habits of the linguistic community in which the word in question is native. The general semantic function is then a rule about a term in its native linguistic community. The semantic essence of a term is then accordingly defined relative to a particular linguistic community. Accordingly, for any linguistic community L , if there is a term "X" which is native to that community L , then "X" designates that stuff, thing, or kind of thing which has been named "X" in L .

In the preceeding chapter we saw that pre-expressive

meaning and expressive meaning cannot be naively identified. It is true that expressive meaning is founded on pre-expressive meaning in the sense that pre-expressive meaning may be given a conceptual form and expressed through language. According to the view established in Chapter III, the key feature that conceptualizes the pre-expressive meaning and constitutes a Bedeutung or expressive meaning is what we have called the general meaning function, i.e., the formal rule which appeals to the linguistic community in which the name is at home. Expressive or linguistic meaning is thus a social affair. If we identify this linguistic meaning with conceptual meaning then it seems we must recognize concepts to be strictly associated with rule-governed cognitive activity. This would permit us to say that the concept of "tree" is the meaning of "tree." This concept then must be construed as something intersubjective and essentially social. What we must not do is to think of the concept of "tree" as this or that particular individual's idea of what trees are like. If a person thinks that the word "tree" only applies to conifers, we should not say that that person has a poor concept of "tree"; rather we should say that he has a poor understanding of the concept of "tree." Although we often speak of this or that person having his or her own concepts of such things, the mistake here is to identify one's understanding of a term with the concept expressed by that term.

II

We have seen earlier (Chapter II) that the tendency to interpret the noema as a generalization of Frege's notion of Sinn has led some philosophers to consider the noema as a meaning synonymous with a definite description. The two assumptions generating this view are: (1) that Husserl took over Frege's notion of Sinn and generalized it to all acts, linguistic as well as non-linguistic, and (2) that the Fregean Sinne of names are synonymous with, i.e., have the same meaning as definite descriptions uniquely individuating the object(s) that it names.

As for the second assumption, it is not my purpose to argue for either its truth or falsity but only to note that it has become commonplace to take Fregean Sinn to be equivalent to definite descriptions. For example, Saul Kripke writes:

A proper name, properly used, was a definite description abbreviated or disguised. Frege specifically said that such a description gave the sense of the name.⁵

It is the wedding of these two assumptions that is the impetus of the Smith and McIntyre interpretation discussed in Chapter II. Given this "Fregean" interpretation it can easily be shown that the Husserlian theory of meaning (so conceived) is vulnerable to a variety of criticisms recently formulated by philosophers of language such as Donnellan, Kripke, and Putnam. Ronald McIntyre has admirably shown that the Husserlian theory (so conceived) falls prey to such criticisms.⁶

Kripke's work has been widely interpreted, rightly I think, to show that the classical theory of the relation of names to their referent(s) simply fails. The classical or Fregean view, in a nutshell is this: The meaning associated with a name determines the thing or set of things to which the name refers, i.e., sense or meaning determines reference, and, as we have seen, the sense of such a name is synonymous with a definite description describing some object or set of objects and it is that object or set of objects to which the name refers. Kripke rightly points out⁷ that (1) names are often used to refer to a unique individual even though there is no definite description associated with the name, and (2) a definite description associated with a name picks different individuals out in different possible states of affairs, whereas a name designates the same individual in all worlds in which that individual exists.

Neither of these criticisms has any force against the interpretation offered in the previous chapter. On my interpretation of Husserl, the meaning of a name, proper or common, is not to be identified with a description, definite or indefinite. There is, of course, a descriptive component in such meanings. The descriptive component is the filling of the empty meaning function of a name. According to the interpretation presented earlier, the meaning of a name has two components: the determinable X and a descriptive content. The X, explicated as a function within a certain

linguistic community, picks out the referent and the descriptive content characterizes the referent. It is the job of the former, not the latter, to secure reference.

Now that we have distinguished Husserl's view from the theory of definite descriptions commonly attributed to Frege, I should like to examine Hilary Putnam's arguments designed to refute the theory that sense determines reference. Although Husserl is fully committed to the view that sense determines reference, I shall try to make it clear that his view, as explicated earlier, does not fall prey to Putnam's arguments.

In a series of papers,⁸ Putnam gives us a sketch of what he calls the traditional theory of meaning, i.e., the view that sense determines reference, and some clever arguments designed to show that such a theory fails. "On the traditional view," Putnam writes,

the meaning of, say, "lemon," is given by specifying a conjunction of properties. For each of these properties, the statement "lemons have the property P" is an analytic truth; and if $P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n$ are all of the properties in the conjunction, then 'anything with all the properties $P_1, \dots, P_n$ is a lemon' is likewise an analytic truth.⁹

Putnam also states that philosophers holding the traditional view have never doubted that:

understanding a word (knowing its intension) was just a matter of being in a certain psychological state (somewhat in the way in which knowing how to factor numbers in one's head is just a matter of being in a certain very complex psychological state.¹⁰

Thus, the traditional view, according to Putnam,

holds that knowing the meaning, sense, or intension of a term is being in the psychological state which associates with that term a conjunction of properties which "must always provide a necessary and sufficient condition for falling into the extension of the term."¹¹ The traditional view is also committed to the view that "two terms cannot differ in extension and have the same intension."¹² Thus "the meaning of a term determines its extension (in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of extension)."¹³ Knowing the meaning of a term is then, according to the traditional theory, just being in a certain psychological state associating an intension(s) with a term. Thus Putnam argues that the traditional theory is committed to the view that "two speakers cannot be in the same psychological state in all respects and understand the term A differently; the psychological state of the speaker determines the intension (and hence . . . the extension) of A."¹⁴

In response to this conception of the traditional theory, Putnam provides us with a series of counterexamples, as well as a recipe for generating an indefinite number of such counter-examples, designed to show that two speakers can be in the same psychological state "even though the extension of the term A in the idiolect of one is different from the extension of the term A in the idiolect of the other."¹⁵ Putnam asks us to suppose that somewhere there is a planet that at first glance is identical to Earth. We

call it "Twin Earth." Some of the inhabitants on Twin Earth seem to speak English, while others presumably speak the other natural languages found on Earth or at least what would be the homophonic counterparts of the other natural languages spoken on Earth. The English speakers on Twin Earth call the liquid that fills their rivers and lakes "water," just as Earthian speakers do. The liquid called "water" on Twin Earth is indistinguishable from the liquid called "water" on Earth in its superficial or phenomenal properties but differs from it in its underlying molecular structure. Thus our identity statement "Water is H_2O " is true only of "Earth Water" or that liquid called "water" on Earth. That liquid called "water" on Twin Earth is not H_2O , Putnam imagines, but rather XYZ ("XYZ being an abbreviation of a long and complicated chemical formula). Given that XYZ is not H_2O , we conclude that the extension of "water" on Earth is different from the extension of "water" on Twin Earth.

To develop the alleged counter-example let us follow Putnam and focus on the years prior to 1750, i.e., prior to the development of chemistry and therefore prior to the development of the empirically established identities, 'Water is H_2O ' (on Earth) and 'water is XYZ' (on Twin Earth). We let $Oscar_1$ be a typical Earthian English speaker, and $Oscar_2$ his counterpart on Twin Earth. We suppose that $Oscar_1$ and $Oscar_2$ are exact duplicates in appearance, thoughts, and

beliefs, interior monologue, etc., and further that there is no belief that Oscar₁ had about water that Oscar₂ did not have about "water."¹⁶ (For the moment I shall use the sign "water" for both the Earthian term "water" as the Twin Earthian term "water." Later it will be necessary to use the notation "Water_E" to stand for Earth water and "Water_{TE}" to stand for Twin Earth water. The sign "water" is taken here to be something that occurs both in English and Twin English.) Oscar₁ would then assent to everything that Oscar₂ would with respect to "water," i.e., they both believe that "water" is that liquid which fills the rivers and lakes, is necessary to sustain life, is clear, odorless, tasteless, boils and freezes at certain temperatures, etc. It seems then that their respective concepts (understood in the individual sense mentioned earlier) of the liquid each of them called "water" are identical. From this Putnam draws the conclusion that Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ are in the same psychological state although the extension of the term is H₂O in Oscar₁'s idiolect and XYZ in Oscar₂'s idiolect.

Putnam is thus committed to the view that with respect to the natural kind term expressed by the sign "water," Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ have acquired the same concept, and with respect to the use or understanding of the sign "water" they are in the same psychological state. In what follows I shall argue that Putnam's Twin Earth examples do not show that Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ are in the same psychological state

with respect to the term in question. The impetus for this interpretation lies in much of what Putnam himself says.

Let us first examine how Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ might acquire the term "water." If a speaker gives a meaning explanation of a term to another speaker one way to do so is by ostensive definition, i.e., pointing out the extension or a sample of the term's extension. Putnam describes this situation in the following manner:

Suppose I point to a glass of water and say "this liquid is called water" (or "this is called water," if the marker "liquid" is clear from the context). My "ostensive definition" of water has the following empirical presupposition: that the body of liquid I am pointing to bears a certain sameness relation (say, X is the same liquid as Y, or X is the same L as Y) to most of the stuff I and other speakers in my linguistic community have on other occasions called "water."¹⁷

We may ask "Why is this empirical presupposition necessary?" It may happen that I am mistaken about what is in the glass, i.e., it may be gin and not water. In such a case the presupposition would be false. Without the empirical presupposition, there would be no standard of correct usage. Suppose I point to a horse and say "this is water," what I say is obviously false. It is false because in my linguistic community the term "water" is never correctly applied to horses. This empirical presupposition is the presupposition of standard usage.

For English speakers on Earth, the term "water" is correctly applied to all and only H₂O molecules because the stuff that English speakers on Earth call "water" is in fact

H₂O. This is the force of the empirical presupposition. For the speakers of the homophonic counterpart of English on Twin Earth the term "water" is correctly applied only to XYZ, not H₂O.

Suppose now that after being privy to such an ostensive definition, Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ develop certain beliefs each ascribable in their respective languages by an identical string of words. Oscar₁ believes that water is wet and Oscar₂ believes that water is wet. Oscar₁ has the attitude of belief toward the proposition expressed by "water is wet" (in English) and Oscar₂ has the attitude of belief toward the proposition expressed by "water is wet" (in Twin English). Do they believe the same proposition? If so, then the content of their respective attitudes is the same; if not, then the content of their attitudes differs. The term "water" as used on Earth has a different extension than the term "water" as used on Twin Earth. Let us denote the Earthian term "water" as "water_E" and the Twin Earthian term "water" as "water_{TE}." So we may say that Oscar₁ believes that "water_E is wet," while Oscar₂ believes that "water_{TE} is wet." The question then is whether Oscar₂ believes "Water_E is wet."

I think not. Consider the following scenario. Oscar₂ surely believes that "water_{TE} is the liquid in the rivers and lakes of his home planet." This belief is true. Can we say that he believes that "water_E is the liquid in the rivers and lakes of his home planet?" If he does

believe this, then his belief is false. Ergo, the belief that "water_E is the liquid in the river," and "water_{TE} is the liquid in the river" are not the same beliefs. This follows, given the premise that if belief A is true and belief B is false, then A and B cannot be the same belief.

The thesis that Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ have two different beliefs can be made in two ways. First, one may say that their respective intentional acts are directed toward two different kinds of stuff. Oscar₁ believes of the stuff that fills the rivers and lakes on Earth that it is wet, while Oscar₂ believes of the stuff that fills the rivers and lakes on Twin Earth that it is wet. Such beliefs are typically called de re. I take it to be obvious that their de re beliefs are different. But this in itself surely does not show that Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ are in different psychological states. The de re belief is not specified in terms of mental representations, psychological states or in any intentional discourse at all. Rather the de re belief is specified by the object of which the belief is about. What is needed for our purposes is to show that Oscar₁'s and Oscar₂'s de dicto beliefs are different. A de dicto belief, or a de dicto reading of a propositional attitude, shall be construed here as one in which the substitution of coreferring terms does not preserve the truth of the sentence or proposition ascribing the belief.

Under a de re specification of Oscar₁'s beliefs, he

believes both that

- 1) Water is wet. and
- 2) H_2O is wet.

These are two ways to specify the same belief and both are true specifications even if Oscar₁ or his linguistic community knows nothing of chemistry or the molecular structure of water. Under a de dicto specification of Oscar₁'s beliefs, we are entitled to say that he believes that

- 3) Water_E is wet. but not
- 4) H_2O is wet.

Similarly we may say that Oscar₂ believes that

- 5) Water_{TE} is wet. but not that
- 6) XYZ is wet.

The question is whether Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ share the same de dicto belief, i.e., is the belief that "Water_E is wet" the same de dicto belief as the belief that "Water_{TE} is wet?"

To show that Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ have different de dicto beliefs let us return to Putnam's remarks about what he calls the "empirical presupposition" necessary for ostensive definitions. To teach someone the meaning of the term "water," I point to a glass of water and say "This (liquid) is water." When I give such an ostensive definition, it may happen that I am mistaken about what is in the glass I am pointing to. If I find out that it is not water but gin in the glass, Putnam remarks, "I do not intend my ostensive definition to be accepted."¹⁸ This is the force of the

empirical presupposition. The ostensive definition is to be accepted only if the liquid I point to is the same kind of liquid that members of my linguistic community have for the most part called "water." If this account is correct, my ostensive definition includes or implies a reference to other members of my linguistic community and their established referring habits. In saying that my ostensive definition includes a reference to my linguistic community I mean that pointing to a glass of liquid and saying "this is water" is only to be counted as an ostensive definition if the stuff in the glass is the same kind of stuff as the local stuff that I and members of my linguistic community ordinarily call "water."

We have seen that Putnam maintains that philosophers ascribing to the traditional view are committed to the thesis that knowing the meaning of a word is a matter of being in a certain psychological state. With respect to Oscar₁ and Oscar₂, are they in the same psychological state with respect to the term "water" after learning its meaning by ostensive definition? Oscar₁'s psychological state would presumably include something like the following "Water: that stuff which is the same kind of stuff called 'water' by my linguistic community." Oscar₂'s psychological state would then be: "Water: that same kind of stuff called 'water' by my linguistic community." Are these the same psychological states? I think not. The implicit reference to one's own

linguistic community preclude Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ from being in the same psychological state.

If Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ took "water" to mean any clear liquid, then it might be that they would be in the same psychological state. But this would be a misunderstanding of the ostensive definition. The empirical presupposition which we have taken to be a necessary part of the ostensive definition would play no part. The psychological states of Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ (corresponding to the ostensive definition) each involve references to the stuff present to each of them and to their own respective linguistic communities along with the referring habits of those communities. Not only are the samples pointed to different, but the linguistic communities are different.

It is not, however, the fact that Oscar₁'s sample of liquid is H₂O and Oscar₂'s sample of liquid is XYZ that makes their psychological states different. If the stuff called "water" on both planets were H₂O, Oscar₁ and Oscar₂'s psychological state would still be different. Oscar₁'s psychological state involves a reference to a different linguistic community than does Oscar₂'s psychological state. Their respective psychological states are therefore different. On this view, understanding the word "water" is knowing that water is whatever bears a sameness relation to the stuff pointed to, i.e., that local stuff ordinarily called "water" by my linguistic community. Articulating the view in this

way incorporates the indexicality and the social aspect of the term's meaning into the psychological state of the speaker and hearer. This departs from the letter of Putnam's analysis, if not the spirit. Part of what I am arguing that both the indexicality and the social aspect of such a term's meaning is indexed to (or relative to) a particular linguistic community.

One way to bring this out is the following. Notice that the ostensive definition does not directly give one a means of identifying other stuff as "water." It does not give a specification of what it is to be water; it only gives a sample of the extension of "water," not what it is about the sample that makes it water. Thus a hearer who has been introduced to the term "water" via ostensive definition will not fully know the meaning of the term in question, but he will know how to acquire the standard criteria by which to reidentify water and become a fully competent speaker with regard to the term "water." He will simply check the referring habits of his fellow speaker and follow those himself. He may do this by asking other speakers about "water," or he may seek out a dictionary, or he may simply watch the usage of other speakers. Perhaps most importantly, if he misuses the term other speakers will correct his usage and thereby sharpen his criteria by which to reidentify water. Thus Putnam's empirical presupposition that the body of stuff being pointed to bears a certain similarity to most of the

stuff speakers in this linguistic community have called "water" becomes for the hearer a rule to be followed to acquire greater understanding of the term in question. In this way, the empirical presupposition accounts for both the indexicality and the social dimension of the terms meaning.

More directly, I am arguing that the empirical presupposition, or something like it, is a part of the understanding of a term and thus a part of the psychological state of the speaker and hearer of that term. When Putnam initially sketches the idea that understanding a term is being in a certain psychological state, he explains that as "somewhat in the way in which knowing how to factor numbers is just a matter of being in a very complex psychological state."¹⁹ I take the "knowing how to" locution here to be important. If, after being privy to an ostensive definition, the hearer did not implicitly recognize the empirical presupposition, the hearer would not regard the referring habits of other speakers to be a guide for his own. As we saw before, if such a person took "water" to mean any clear liquid, then he would simply misunderstand the term "water," i.e., he would be in the wrong psychological state corresponding to the term "water."

If all of this is correct, we may describe Oscar₁ and Oscar₂'s de dicto beliefs in the following ways: (1) Oscar₁'s belief that "water is wet," i.e., "water_E is wet"

is to be analyzed as the belief that "what is called 'water' by my linguistic community, i.e., what is called 'water' around here is wet." (2) Oscar₂'s belief that "water is wet," i.e., "water_{TE} is wet" is similarly analyzed as the belief that "what is called 'water' by my linguistic community, i.e., what is called 'water' around here is wet." As far as the formal structure of these beliefs are concerned, they are identical. When the contexts necessary to complete the sense of the indexicals "my" and "here" are supplied, the formal structure of the two de dicto beliefs remain the same but they differ in their material content, thereby individuating them as different beliefs.

As this conception of de dicto belief includes an indexical element, one may charge that this analysis smuggles in a de re element into the de dicto belief and thereby fails to show that the two de dicto beliefs are different. Part of this I am willing to concede. What I think the above shows is that the notion of a purely de dicto belief is in trouble. One reason for this is the following. Suppose we count Oscar₁'s and Oscar₂'s de dicto beliefs as the same. We have already recognized a sense in which they are the same, viz., they have the same formal structure. Although the formal structure of their beliefs may be the same, the truth conditions are different. Oscar₁'s belief is true in virtue of the wetness of H₂O, and Oscar₂'s belief is true in virtue of the wetness of XYZ. Thus if we identify the content of

Oscar₁'s de dicto belief with its formal structure we must distinguish between the content of a belief and its truth conditions. This may be all right for certain purposes, but it would require us to hold that the truth conditions for the belief "water is wet" have nothing to do with the meaning of "water."

This interpretation of de dicto belief has been considered and rejected by Jerry Fodor, in "Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem." To view the de dicto propositional attitude of Oscar₂ as the de dicto belief that "what is called 'water' in my linguistic community is wet" is according to Fodor both implausible and too metalinguistic sounding. Fodor writes,

Whatever belief "water₂²⁰ is wet" is used to express is surely one that animals, prelinguistic children and (nb) people who have never heard of the word "water₂" can share; and none of this would be so if one accepted the present proposal about what "water₂ is wet" is used to say. To put the point generally: the belief that "water₂ is wet" expresses must turn out, on any acceptable analysis, to be identical with the belief that water₂ is wet (whatever belief that turns out to be . . .). But surely, it must be possible to have the belief that water₂ is wet without having any metalinguistic beliefs at all. The belief that water₂ is wet is a belief about water₂, not a belief about language.²¹

Fodor is claiming that the proposed analysis of Oscar₂'s de dicto belief cannot be correct because the metalinguistic nature of the analysis would preclude animals and prelinguistic children from sharing that belief. Fodor takes it to be obvious that dogs and children do or can share Oscar's de dicto belief. I think, however, we must deny this

last supposition. Fodor's own characterization of a de dicto specification of propositional attitudes is "one in which substitution of co-referring expressions does not in general, preserve truth unless the expressions are synonymous."²² Now we can hardly apply this test to non-language users. The notion of "de dicto," as specified here, seems to be essentially a linguistic notion. The point is that we cannot give a de dicto specification of the beliefs of pre-linguistic children and animals.

If a dog can be said to have an attitude toward a proposition, it seems we must interpret that proposition as de re. If a dog has the belief that water is wet, then it must be a belief about some water, that it is wet. Presumably, for the dog, his belief can be equally characterized by saying that he believes that H_2O is wet (or that XYZ is wet in the case of the Twin Earth dog). Fodor claims that such de re specifications of belief [propositional attitudes] are too weak to explain or predict behavior. Suppose we were to claim then that the dog's belief that the stuff in his bowl was water explained his drinking behavior, but that his belief characterized as the stuff in his bowl is H_2O did not explain that behavior. The latter ascription of belief would fail to explain the dog's behavior only to those people who did not know that water is H_2O . It is no good to say that the dog would not have attempted to drink the stuff if he believed that the stuff in the glass was H_2O (or XYZ in

the Twin Earth case). This shows that if we interpret non-linguistic creatures as capable of de dicto belief we must then interpret such belief in a way which does not require these de dicto beliefs to take as their objects propositions or sentences. I shall offer a suggestion in section III of this chapter which would allow us to interpret some non-linguistic beliefs as de dicto.

There are some immediate consequences of the view I am arguing for that seem counter intuitive. If this view is correct, then Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ have different de dicto beliefs expressed by the same homophonic string "water is wet." I take it to be uncontroversial that they have different de re beliefs, for the res that their respective beliefs are of is different, one being H₂O, the other XYZ. I have also claimed, however, that even if the stuff called "water" on Twin Earth were H₂O, Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ would still have different de dicto beliefs. Or if you do not like belief talk here, that they are in different psychological states. To show this I shall change examples and modify the Twin Earth story a bit. Suppose that Earth and Twin Earth make contact and that Earthian travelers visit Twin Earth. At first glance the Earthian visitors think that identical names refer to identical substances on both planets. After some initial investigation it is found that the liquid filling the rivers and lakes on Twin Earth is XYZ, not H₂O. Further, it is discovered that the stuff

called "aluminum" on Twin Earth is the same kind of stuff called "molybdenum" on Earth and vice versa and other such discrepancies may be suspected. Now, also suppose that Oscar₁, the Earthian Oscar, has come to Twin Earth and meets his counterpart, Oscar₂. We can, of course, no longer suppose them to be identical in the previous way, i.e., they no longer have the same thoughts. But nothing in this proviso affects their respective de dicto beliefs expressed by the string "water is wet," or any other such homophonically identical string.

With the discovery of some identical strings as "water," and "aluminum," and "molybdenum" designating superficially similar referents with different underlying structures a translation manual would have to be worked out to see the extent of such discrepancies. Suppose, now, that Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ are involved in the joint task of compiling such a translation manual. Perhaps the Oscars have made the discovery that the terms "aluminum" and "molybdenum" are switched on Earth and Twin Earth. They could have compared Earth and Twin Earth periodic tables and noticed the differing positions of "aluminum" and "molybdenum." Let us now imagine the Oscars compiling names and referents of tree species. With regard to the names "elm" and "beech" each of the Oscars knows only that elms and beeches are common deciduous trees. As Putnam would have it, their concepts are the same and on his own assumptions they are in the same

psychological state when they believe "Elms are common deciduous trees." The Oscars need to establish the respective referents of each of the terms " elm_E " and " elm_{TE} ," compare those referents, and see if they are the same. Oscar₁ will presumably look up "elm" in botanical texts compiled on Earth and Oscar₂ will do the same in botanical texts compiled on Twin Earth. In other words, Oscar₁ will appeal to the referring habits of his linguistic community, i.e., " elm_E " will designate what is called "elm" by Earthian English speakers and " elm_{TE} " will designate what is called "elm" by Twin Earthian English speakers. The moral here is that Oscar₁ will behave differently than Oscar₂, i.e., Oscar₁ will seek Earthian experts to establish the referent of " elm_E " and Oscar₂ will seek Twin Earthian experts to establish the referent of " elm_{TE} ." If we take their de dicto beliefs concerning "elm" to be the same we should expect their behavior to be the same.

There is a sense, of course, in which their behavior is the same, i.e., they each go about checking the referring habits of their own linguistic communities. Their behavior is the same in the sense in which their beliefs are the same, i.e., they have the same formal structure. The important point, however, is that Oscar₁ will rely on different individuals or different experts than Oscar₂ will. This can be made sharper by modifying the example again. Suppose Oscar₁ is back on Earth sitting at his desk pondering the

referent of "elm." Fortunately for him, there is a convention of botanists across the hall, all of which are experts on common deciduous trees. Oscar₁ may approach any of these scientists with his questions about "elm." It makes no difference which one. Now suppose that the botanical convention across the hall is an interplanetary meeting composed of Earth and Twin Earth scientists. And now assuming that Oscar₁ knows the make-up of this meeting and knows of some discrepancies in Earthian and Twin Earthian usage, who will he approach about the referent of "elm_E"? To me it seems uncontroversial that he will approach the Earthian scientists and avoid the Twin Earthian scientists.

If we suppose, as Putnam does, that the psychological states of Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ to be the same with respect to the term "elm," then would we not also expect their respective behavior associated with such a term to be the same? I think we should, on the grounds that a difference in psychological states explain differences in behavior.

If all this is correct, then we have it that Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ have different de dicto beliefs expressed by the strings "Elms are common deciduous trees," even if the referent of the term "elm" is the same in each of their respective languages.

In the preceeding pages I have tried to show that Putnam's Twin Earth examples do not show that two speakers can be in the same psychological state "even though the

extension of the term A in the idiolect of one is different from the extension of the term A in the idiolect of the other."²³ I have done this by interpreting the notion of psychological state differently than Putnam does. Putnam takes the psychological state associated with a term to be defined by the conjunction of properties the user or hearer of the term takes to be true of the referent.²⁴ At least this is the notion of psychological state that Putnam has in mind when he claims that two speakers may be in the same psychological state and yet the extensions of their (homophonically identical) terms differ. It is my position that this construal of psychological state is not adequate to support Putnam's conclusions. In fact, my interpretation of psychological states is based upon Putnam's own claims. My interpretation of psychological states makes room for what Putnam calls the empirical presupposition. To be fair to Putnam we must notice what he is arguing against, viz., the traditional theory of meaning. If those philosophers ascribing to the traditional theory of meaning understood psychological states and thus the meanings of terms as Putnam claims, then too bad for them; Putnam clearly shows that such a view cannot be right. At the same time, however, Putnam offers us a different way of understanding psychological states that does not fall victim to his examples. It is also my claim that this reconstructed Putnamian view falls in line with Husserl's views on meaning

and reference given in the previous chapter (more of that later). For the moment let me clearly distinguish my account of psychological states from what Putnam says.

Putnam's strategy to refute the traditional theory of meaning is the following. First he notes the two assumptions of that theory: (1) That knowing the meaning of a term is being in a certain psychological state, and (2) That the meaning of a term (the intension) determines its extension. These two assumptions are perfectly compatible with the reconstructed Putnamian view I have offered. It is a third assumption which Putnam claims that the traditional theory of meaning is committed to which differs from the reconstructed view. This assumption is not explicitly mentioned in "The Meaning of Meaning" but is laid out nicely in "Is Semantics Possible."²⁵ This assumption (3) is that the intension(s) of a term is just the conjunction of properties that the user/hearer of that term associates with or takes to be true of the referent of the term. This is, of course, the assumption on which definite description theories are based, viz., that the referent of a term is whatever satisfies the description associated with the term. I take it that Putnam's Twin Earth examples refute any theory which holds the third assumption.

If we drop the third assumption, however, the Twin Earth examples fail to refute theories committed to the first two. We may still hold that the intension(s) of a

term determine its extension without holding that such intension(s) are just a conjunction of properties or a definite description. In fact, this is just the moral I think we should draw from Putnam's "elm" and "beech" example. To paraphrase Putnam's argument: Suppose I cannot tell an elm from a beech tree, i.e., I associate the same properties with "elm" that I do with "beech," yet the extension of "elm" in my idiolect is just the set of elms and the extension of "beech" in my idiolect is just the set of beeches. My concept of an elm tree is exactly the same as my concept of a beech tree. At this point Putnam remarks, "This shows that the identification of meaning 'in the sense of intension' with concept cannot be correct." Putnam here is construing "concept" as a conjunction of properties or a certain kind of description. In this Putnam is correct. What I am arguing is that the descriptive concept we associate with a term does not adequately characterize the psychological state of knowing the meaning of a term. This move is certainly open to Putnam, although he does not make it.

It is for this reason that I made such heavy use of Putnam's notion of "empirical presupposition." It is my suggestion that we must include the empirical presupposition (or some better analysis of that feature of language) into the understanding of a term and thus into the specification of the psychological state which just is the state of

understanding the term. Independently of this, there is ample reason to believe that the role of the empirical presupposition in Putnam's work is greater than commonly acknowledged. Putnam introduces it as a necessary feature of ostensive definitions and then seems to drop it. If a person comes to acquire a term, whether by ostensive definition or by a description, he cannot be said to have (minimally) acquired the term unless he at least implicitly acknowledges the empirical presupposition. We have seen that if a speaker, after being privy to an ostensive definition took "water" to be any clear liquid, he would misunderstand the term "water." As a minimal condition for understanding the term he must know that "water" is that same kind of stuff called "water" by his linguistic community. This is also a minimal condition for understanding a term introduced via description. On Putnam's view, and the modified one proposed here, a term like "water" has "an unnoticed indexical component: 'water' is stuff that bears a certain similarity relation to the water around here."²⁶ Any speaker who does not recognize this indexical feature cannot be said to have acquired the term. Notice that even if one recognizes this indexical feature, one still must fall back upon the knowledge of other speakers to learn what is commonly taken to be the proper criteria by which to recognize or pick out water. Thus the empirical presupposition construed as "'water': that stuff which bears a certain

sameness relation to most of the stuff I and other members of my linguistic community have on other occasions called 'water'," incorporates both the indexicality and social aspect of a term's meaning.

If all this is correct, then the offending assumption of the traditional theory is not that intensions determine extension but that the intension(s) of a term is a conjunction of properties, i.e., a definite description. Once we remove this assumption, we are free to interpret the notion of intension(s) in a new way. All along intensions were thought to be something that was grasped when a speaker understood the meaning of a term. We have also seen the minimal condition for understanding a term involves an implicit recognition (grasping) of the indexical element captured by the empirical presupposition. If this is right, then we can specify the intension of the term "water" (in L) as the function "water is that stuff commonly called 'water' by the linguistic community (of L-users) in which the term 'water' is native." Proceeding along this line is but a spelling out of the earlier claim that the feature of language Putnam alludes to by his notion of "empirical presupposition" is a part of the meaning of a referring term. If we identify this function with the intension of a term we do not identify meaning and intension but make intension a part of the term's meaning. It is a purely empty or formal part of the term's meaning in that it provides no descriptive

content and it appeals to a certain context (linguistic community) to determine the referent. Once the context is established, i.e., the referring habits of the community in which the term is native, the referent is thereby fixed. The descriptive component of the term's meaning, i.e., the stereotype, is tied to the function. Stereotypes are conventional ideas about the stuff picked out by the function together with the appropriate context.

According to the view presented here, Putnam's Twin Earth examples do not refute the doctrine that intensions determine extension. That the Twin Earth examples do refute such a doctrine is plausible only on the assumption that the intension(s) of a term are a conjunction of properties providing a definite description picking out the referent of the term.

The critical move in my interpretation of Putnam's work was to insist on including the "empirical presupposition" in any analysis of the understanding of a referring term and hence to include the "empirical presupposition" in the term's meaning. As we have seen, any speaker who did not implicitly recognize the empirical presupposition in question would not regard the referring habits of other speakers to be a guide for his own. Without the implicit recognition of the empirical presupposition there would be no such phenomenon as the linguistic division of labor and thus there would be no social aspect of a term's meaning.

On this interpretation of the Twin Earth examples, the empirical presupposition plays the same role that the general meaning function of a term plays in our interpretation of Husserl's theory of meaning. Recall the general meaning function explicated earlier in the Husserl analysis.

If "P" is a name in (Language) L, then "P" designates in L whatever the community of L-users have called "P" or what has been named "P" in L.

Putnam's sketch of the empirical presupposition with regard to the term "water" can be formulated as: Water is the same kind of stuff that I and other members of my linguistic community commonly call "water." This empirical presupposition can be recast without any loss of content into the general meaning function formulated above. We simply replace the variable "P" with the term "water":

If "water" is a name in (Language) L, then "water" designates in L whatever the community of L-users have called "water" or what has been named "water" in L.

What is important here, for Husserlian scholarship, is that according to this interpretation Husserl is committed to the doctrine that

- 1) intension(s) determine extension, but not that
- 2) intensions are a conjunction of properties or a definite description associated with a term.

And again, as we have seen, Putnam's Twin Earth examples refute only theories committed to both (1) and (2). Therefore, Putnam's Twin Earth examples do not show that Husserl's theory is mistaken or even implausible. Indeed, as I have

reinterpreted the Twin Earth examples they offer support for the Husserlian theory. The first moral to be drawn here is that Husserl's theory of meaning cannot be dismissed so quickly as simply another version of the descriptivist theory of meaning.

Here we might ask, given the construal of 'intention(s)' offered here, in what sense can intension be said to determine extension? The intension of the word "water" has been specified as:

that stuff commonly called "water" by the linguistic community in which the term "water" is native.

Construed in this way the intension(s) of a term does not by itself uniquely determine a particular referent or extension. The intension is a function which must be supplied with a particular context in order to do its work of referring. This is, of course, a weaker version of the thesis that "intention(s) determine extension" than the traditional view, sketched by Putnam. According to the strong version of that thesis, the referent of a term is uniquely picked out by the concept (construed as a conjunction of properties) associated with the term in the mind of the individual using the term.

According to the Husserlian view defended here, it is intension(s) plus a context which determines reference. In the case of indexical expressions such as "I," the intension of the term remains the same with each speaker using the term while the referent changes. The same is true of

spatial and temporal indexicals. The terms "here" and "now" always have the same intensions yet they have different referents when used on different occasions, i.e., in different contexts. One cannot go directly from intension to extension; the path of reference is mediated by the context of utterance.

The same general considerations are true of proper and common names as well. The difference is in the nature of the context. Indexicals change contexts on each occasion of their use, while names presuppose a standard and fixed context which does not change from occasion to occasion.

III

The other moral to be noted concerns how we individuate psychological states involving linguistic content. What Putnam's Twin Earth examples show, I think, is that one cannot take seriously the social dimension of linguistic meaning and still conceive of psychological states (which involve linguistic content) as being individualistic.

Using the basic elements in Putnam's thought experiment, I have argued for a different way of individuating psychological states than Putnam does. A fundamental assumption of the Twin Earth Problem is that there is a direct correspondence between psychological states and the meanings of the terms that play a role in those psychological states. What I have done is to try to make explicit the indexical element in the psychological state that results

from the indexical element in the semantic properties of a term involved in that psychological state. Following this line, we found that Oscar₁'s and Oscar₂'s de dicto beliefs, each of the form, 'Water is wet' were, in fact, two different de dicto beliefs. In order to show this, I argued that Oscar₁ and Oscar₂ each have an indexical element in their respective beliefs which serves to individuate those beliefs. Further, I suggested that this shows that the notion of a purely de dicto belief is in trouble, for the specification of such a belief involves an indexical or de re element.

Once under the methodological constraint of Husserl's phenomenology, viz., the epoche, we purposefully bracket or suspend judgement on the extra-mental existence of our intentional objects. In order to make the de re/de dicto distinction within the epoche, we must appeal only to the content of the belief and not to any external res which may be the object of that belief. To individuate beliefs on the contents of beliefs by appealing to any actually existent res to which the act of belief may be directed is to take a point of view which leaves the Husserlian program behind. The same point holds for the program known as methodological solipsism, although there are major differences between the two enterprises.²⁷

Operating within the epoche, we may still distinguish between intentional acts which seem to be directed

toward a definite individual and acts which seem to be directed to no particular individual but rather to whatever satisfies a certain description. At one extreme is perceptual acts which, as we have seen, contain a determinable X which plays the role of 'this-here-now'. If I see an object in the woods and know not what it is, I am directly or non-conceptually directed to that object. If the object does not actually exist, the structure or content of my perceptual act is still as de re as one could hope for.

On the other hand, there are intentional acts which seem not to be directed to or about any particular individual. If I believe the winner of next year's Boston Marathon will be over twenty years old without having any preconceptions about who will win that race, my act of belief is then directed toward no definite individual. Since this latter sort of intention is expressive and the former de re intention is pre-expressive, it might be thought that the Sinn-Bedeutung distinction is precisely what is needed to help clarify the de re/de dicto distinction. Although there may be something to this suggestion, it cannot help us here for the following reason. Suppose I am in the wilderness without my canteen and I become thirsty, I would then desire some water. Certainly my desire is directed toward water, but there is no particular bit of water which I desire. If I do discover some clean water, then I will desire that particular bit of water. This shows that the de re/de dicto

distinction is not dependent upon the distinction between expressive and pre-expressive acts. In this last example of definite and indefinite desires we still have the distinction between intending a particular object and intending whatever object fits a certain description or satisfies some condition. Both acts of desire are pre-linguistic. This shows that whatever is behind the distinction cuts across both Sinn and Bedeutung, and is likely to be some fundamental feature of intentionality.

With this in mind, I would like to suggest that Husserl's distinction between the noematic X and its predicate senses is just that feature of intentionality that gives rise to the de re/de dicto distinction. Suppose I am looking at a blossoming cherry tree and am admiring how delicate and beautiful it is. If we were to describe the noema of that admiring glance we would find that the intended object is individuated via the indexical nature of the noematic X as it functions in perceptual acts. The perceptual noema has the content: ["this X" which is a delicate and beautiful blossoming cherry tree]. If, after viewing such a tree, I desire to see another just like it, I may tramp through the woods in search of another delicate and beautiful blossoming cherry tree. The noema correlated to the act of searching has the content: ["any X" which is a delicate and beautiful blossoming cherry tree].

These examples show that we can make the de re/de

dicto distinction at the pre-linguistic level. Thus we are free to interpret de dicto acts in a way that does not require them to take as their objects a proposition or a sentence. So a likely analysis of de re and de dicto acts might go like this. Perceptual acts, taken here to be de re par excellence, individuate their objects via the X component, "this object here and now." Linguistic acts may, of course, be de re as well. Consider my belief that Abraham Lincoln was the sixteenth president of the United States. Such a belief requires the mediation of the proper name "Abraham Lincoln." We have seen in Chapter III that such names individuate their referents via the X component present in the sense of that name, i.e., the function which picks out the name, Abraham Lincoln, in virtue of his being named or called "Abraham Lincoln." The X component may or may not be qualified by a set of determinate predicate senses giving us a more or less adequate description of the object. If such a determinate descriptive sense is given, as in I see ["this thing" which is a delicate and beautiful blossoming cherry tree] then there are both indexical and descriptive aspects to the act in question. In the linguistic case, someone might (unfortunately) believe that Abraham Lincoln was the first female Secretary of State. In both cases, however, it is the indexical component which determines the intended object, not the descriptive component.

In Chapter III we saw that there may be perceptual acts which have no determinate predicate senses. Even in these cases, there is still an indeterminate descriptive sense. If I see an object in the woods and know not what it is, I still expect it to have a certain size, shape, weight, color, etc. On the other hand, de dicto acts intend their objects not just under a certain description, as do some de re acts, but rather through a certain description, i.e., it is the descriptive component of an act which directs that act.

In these de dicto acts there remains an X-component which we have characterized as "any X which is" In cases of de re perception, one may see a particular object with only indeterminate predicate senses. In such a case these predicate senses may become determined through greater perceptual access to the object. The predicate senses may be indeterminate but they are determinable. In the de dicto cases, the predicate senses, i.e., the descriptive character, is determined but the object to which the act is related is indeterminate. This indefinite object may become determined, i.e., it is determinable.

Consider my belief that the next Boston Marathon winner will be over twenty. To say that this de dicto act has an indeterminate but determinable object does not mean that there must be some object, in the actual world, which satisfies the descriptive prescription of that act. The

Boston Marathon may never have another winner. On the other hand, if I desire to see the world's tallest mountain (not knowing that it is Everest) then there is a particular object towards which my act is directed although I don't know which object. In both cases the object is determinable.

The contents of de dicto acts have an indeterminate X and a determinate descriptive sense. The contents of de re acts have a determinate X and may have an indeterminate descriptive sense. This suggests that de re acts are directed through their X component and de dicto acts are directed through their descriptive component. Along these lines then, the de re/de dicto distinction may be analyzed via the two kinds of noematic components. Whether such an analysis of the de re/de dicto distinction proves to be fruitful is a matter for further research. I offer the suggestion as a possible way to make some sense of the distinction in a broadly Husserlian framework.

IV

By distinguishing Husserl's view of meaning from the theory of definite descriptions commonly attributed to Frege, I have tried to show that Putnam's Twin Earth examples have no force against the Husserlian thesis that sense determines reference. Thus, the Husserlian theory of meaning does not stand or fall with the adequacy or inadequacy of the Fregean descriptivist theory. In the first chapter we mentioned that the two conceptions of the noema

offered by Føllesdal and Gurwitsch are widely seen to be competing and incompatible. It is, of course, the Fregean reading of the noema offered by Føllesdal that seems to put Husserl in the descriptivist's camp. But what of the Gurwitsch view of the noema? Does it avoid the descriptivist reading or is Gurwitsch's view also committed to the descriptivist reading as well?

Robert Solomon has claimed that the Gurwitsch interpretation takes perceptual acts as paradigmatic while the Føllesdal interpretation takes the meaning of linguistic acts to be paradigmatic.²⁸ Solomon locates the specific point of difference between these interpretations by taking Gurwitsch to hold that the perceptual noema is perceived through the senses and by taking Føllesdal to hold the view that noemata are abstract entities, i.e., intensional entities and as such not perceived through the senses. It is my view that this issue is a major one only if it can be shown that Gurwitsch takes the Sinn of the perceptual noema to be sensuously given. While I am not at all sure that this is Gurwitsch's position, he does say some things which suggest it. Rather than focus on the alleged differences of these two interpretations I would like to briefly suggest that the similarities that these two views share are more important than their differences.

Gurwitsch has denied that there is an X component in the noema.²⁹ His analysis claims that the noema is a gestalt

of mutually coherring predicate senses. If this is true, then all intentional directedness would be through the descriptive component of the noema. Indeed, for Gurwitsch, the descriptive component makes up the noema in its entirety. We have also seen that Føllesdal's Fregean reading of the noema interprets the noema just as a definite description. On both of these readings then, an intentional act is directed toward its object in virtue of the act's noema which is just a purely descriptive Sinn. In this regard, the Gurwitsch and the Føllesdal views share the same general interpretation of the structure of noematic Sinn. Both views entail a descriptivist view of intentional directedness and both share the difficulties with that view.

In the preceeding pages I have tried to develop a model of the noema sufficient to handle both linguistic and pre-linguistic acts as well as to point to the reactions between the two. The interpretation I have offered of the general structure of intentional directedness avoids the difficulties of the descriptivist reading. It has been argued here, that there are two components to every noematic Sinn, i.e., the X and its predicate senses. There is thus a non-descriptive and a descriptive component to each noema. We have seen that although some acts are directed via their descriptive component, many acts are directed via the noematic X, a non-descriptive component.

NOTES

¹Jaakko Hintikka, The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities (Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel Publishing Company, 1975), p. 201.

²There are, of course, certain restraints on what the object could be. It could not be Mt. Everest (if the woods I am in is in Georgia) nor could it be the Indian Ocean. It can only be any object which can be found in the woods I am in. This shows the continued restraints on my expectations involved.

³Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 116.

⁴Edmund Husserl, Ideas: An Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 92.

⁵Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 27.

⁶Ronald McIntyre, "Intending and Referring," in Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science, ed. Hubert Dreyfus (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1982), pp. 222-226.

⁷Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp. 81-83.

⁸Hilary Putnam, "Is Semantics Possible?", reprinted in Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, ed. Stephen P. Schwartz (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 102-118.

Hilary Putnam, "Meaning and Reference," reprinted in Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, ed. Stephen P.

Schwartz (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 119-132.

Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of Meaning," in Language, Mind, and Knowledge, ed. Keith Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), pp. 131-193.

⁹Putnam, "Is Semantics Possible?", p. 103.

¹⁰Putnam, "Meaning and Reference," p. 119.

¹¹Ibid., p. 120.

¹²Ibid., p. 119.

¹³Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁴Putnam, "The Meaning of Meaning," p. 139.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 139.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 141.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 141.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 142.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 135.

²⁰Fodor uses the expression 'water₂' where I use 'water_{TE}'.

²¹Jerry Fodor, "Cognitive Science and the Twin Earth Problem," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23, 2 (April, 1982), p. 106.

²²Ibid., p.

²³Putnam, "The Meaning of Meaning," p. 139.

²⁴Putnam, "Is Semantics Possible?", p. 103.

²⁵Ibid., p. 103.

²⁶Putnam, "The Meaning of Meaning," p. 152.

²⁷Daniel Dennett, "Beyond Belief," in Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality, ed. Andrew Woodfield (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 39.

²⁸Robert Solomon, "Husserl's Concept of the Noema,"

in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. Elliston and McCormick (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 169.

²⁹Aron Gurwitsch, "Perceptual Coherence as the Foundation of the Judgement of Predication," in Phenomenology and the Theory of Science, ed. Lester Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 250-252.

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