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A NEO-KANTIAN APPROACH TO THE
ETHICS OF RHETORIC.**

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A NEO-KANTIAN APPROACH TO THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC

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DONALD G. DOUGLAS

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A NEO-KANTIAN APPROACH TO THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC

APPROVED BY

Wayne E. Broghrie
Harold Famer
J. E. Hargrave
Roger J. Hargrave
Charles L. Hargrave

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A NEO-KANTIAN APPROACH TO THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Justification

We live in a world fashioned by the spoken word and the method in which the word is employed in our world will determine in no small part the possibilities for our tomorrow. In the cold war of the twentieth century, the power of oratory is the strength of battle. That democracy lives by talk is not an idle maxim. Wherever men are free to think concerning their public well-being, freedom to speak their thoughts constitutes the natural outlet for will to action. Indeed, Henry N. Wieman seems to adhere to this belief when he says, "Language is democracy when language carries the full load of a people's most cherished meanings from each to all and back again from all to each."¹ The historian Arnold J. Toynbee

¹"Democracy and Language," Ethics, 52:221 (January, 1942), 216.

lends additional support when he writes that only when government was to a great and growing extent a government by discussion has civilization been able to reach its greatest height.² Thomas Mann, the great German novelist, has written that "'speech is civilization,' by which he apparently meant that discussion and persuasion are the only civilized way by which to settle differences."³

Yet the right to use language as an instrument affecting the thinking of mankind presupposes moral principles by which the results of rhetoric may be, indeed are, judged. The rhetoricians, Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, elaborate upon this problem when they state:

If man is a political animal, if he uses speech to achieve his ends in deliberative situations, he also needs a guiding ethic, a set of principles which will enable him to judge the right from the wrong and to govern his own conduct by appeal to moral standards.⁴

Similarly the philosopher Eliseo Vivas, in his book The Moral Life and the Ethical Life, states:

If . . . [man] loses his primary intrinsic interest in

²Civilization on Trial (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 49.

³Cited in Robert T. Oliver, The Psychology of Persuasive Speech (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), p. 3.

⁴Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948), p. 470.

moral problems and substitutes for it interest in how to elaborate his subject matter to meet extrinsic standards of rigor and clarity borrowed from logic and mathematics, his activity becomes a game in which . . . a dialectic of concepts has taken the place of examination of actual empirical facts.⁵

The presupposition of moral principles is of special concern because the problem of distinguishing right from wrong and conducting our appeals accordingly is always with us. The British philosopher Stephen E. Toulmin states that "scientific problems and scientific theories may from time to time intrigue or arrest all of us, but they are of immediate practical importance to only a few. Everyone, on the other hand, is faced with moral problems."⁶

Yet, in spite of the apparent importance of moral problems, relatively few decisions have been made concerning the criteria of right and wrong in human actions, including those actions employing the art of persuasion. B. J. Diggs, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, indicts man for his failure to concern himself sufficiently with the problem of ethics in rhetoric and points out the consequences of this failure when he states:

⁵(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 8.

⁶An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 1.

The unethical use of persuasion is one of man's most typical and most glaring faults. Misuse of "the persuasive arts" has been so common and at times so notorious, that some have regarded persuasion as inherently evil, something which by its nature "ought to be avoided," like a lie.⁷

Indeed, lack of development in rhetorical ethics is an unfortunate state of affairs compounded by confusion and disagreement. Treatment of the subject of ethics in rhetoric consists almost exclusively of writings which point the way toward the kind of theory that is needed rather than an attempt to embark upon a trail which could lead to a system of ethical principles themselves applicable to rhetorical functions.

As a result of the increasing awareness of the freedom of speech as the axis guiding the currents of social events comes an increasing need for knowledge of the principles necessary to steering an ethical course of action.

Thonssen and Baird seem to identify further the need which Professor Diggs expresses when they reason that

there is a need for the establishment of a more binding relationship between the instrumental and the ethical components of the speaking art. Overemphasis of technique in speaking; the disposition to regard rhetoric as an instrument of power, by which a speaker may improve himself, make more money, control people--

⁷"Persuasion and Ethics," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, L (December, 1964), 359.

these are the snares which beset a sound point of view in contemporary public speaking. . . . Society needs, and needs desperately, orators who, working with facts, are also poets and philosophers, men who can costume truth effectively.⁸

If politics and, in its turn, rhetoric are associated with the practical means of getting things done, the uniting of ethics and the practical arts is imperative. While there has been some disposition to resist the inclusion of a system of ethics in the scheme of rhetorical theory, the return of ethics as an active force to the field of practical rhetorical application is nevertheless of no little consequence. Specifically this study is projected on the assumption that rhetoric as practiced in the world of practical affairs serves a utilitarian function in the process of civilization building. If such is the case, then the elucidation of a socially desirable ethic establishing guidelines applicable to the reasoning practices involved in the art of rhetoric appears warranted.

The Problem for Investigation in This Study

The problem posed for investigation in this study grows out of the characteristics of and demands placed upon the language employed to make value judgments in rhetorical

⁸ Speech Criticism, p. 471.

discourse. Rhetoric involves a process of making decisions regarding the advocacy of certain policies or possible actions. Inherent in the making of such decisions is the weighing of alternative actions, each of which must be based upon reasons. These reasons may have relative merit, but ultimately one deems that action best which is based upon the best possible reasons. The best possible reasons in turn imply "higher values" and may be called good reasons.

Previous to modern times the idea that things of highest value must have a supernatural origin was generally taken for granted. In more recent times, however, this view has given way to the feeling that values may not be fixed and unchangeably determinate. Rhetoric, a practical art, has social consequences; and no matter what the desired objective of rhetorical employment, the end result can serve neither as justification nor condemnation of the means used to procure that end. One interesting development of the principle of means over end is found in Aldous Huxley's The Devils of Loudon, in which he not only condemns

the magic of words and a golden voice, [used to persuade] an audience of the rightness of a bad cause, [but also cautions that] we ought to feel the same dismay whenever we find the same irrelevant trick being used to persuade people of the rightness of a good cause. . . . The belief engendered may be desirable,

but the grounds for it are intrinsically wrong.⁹

The difficulty in understanding the problem of indeterminate values in rhetorical practices may be explained in part at least by the changing conditions existent in the knowledge of the origin and nature of values themselves. In his work on literary criticism William J. Handy explains that "the singular advance made by modern philosophy is one which currently is revolutionizing man's traditional view of what constitutes human knowledge."¹⁰ According to Susanne Langer this new advance of philosophy is the symbolizing of human experiences which logical abstractions are unable to represent. This new key to philosophy involves the study of symbols and meaning; and further than this it insists that there are differences in the symbolic formulations of scientific, artistic, and axiological meanings. In her Philosophy in a New Key Langer says:

And all at once, the edifice of human knowledge stands before us, not as a vast collection of sense reports, but as a structure of facts that are symbols and laws that are their meanings. A new philosophical theme has been set forth to a coming age; an epistemological theme. . . . The power of symbolism is its cue, as

⁹

(New York: Harper and Bros., 1952), p. 219.

¹⁰

Kant and the Southern New Critics (Austin, Texas: The University of Texas Press, 1963), p. 6.

the finality of sense data was the cue of a former epoch.¹¹

Langer demonstrates that the "new key" to philosophy is the recognition that logical formulations of human experience are but one kind of symbolism and that other kinds of symbolic formulations are possible which symbolize human experiences that cannot be represented adequately by abstractions of logic. Some of these "other kinds of symbolic formulations" are expressed by art, myth, or religious ritual; but in addition there are differing kinds of symbolic formulations that utilize linguistic symbols; and these are determined to be of varied kinds because of the different kinds of meanings they convey. When the materials of valuation are said to be different from those of art, myth, or ritual, it means that the kind of reality represented by axiology's special employment of language is different from that represented by the formulations of art, myth, and ritual. Yet the nature of understanding symbolic formulations conveying ethical valuations remains to be defined.

A second factor involved in the problem for consideration is the criteria for establishing an ethic of rhetoric.

¹¹(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), pp. 16-17.

Many writers treating the problem of knowledge (some from an earlier period as well as from more recent times) concur that, to be reliably valid, any knowledge must be grounded in the facts of the world around us. Leonardo da Vinci asserts that "all sciences are vain and full of errors which do not terminate in observation."¹² Roger Bacon testifies that "without experience, nothing can be known sufficiently."¹³

More recently Irving J. Lee, in his book, Language Habits in Human Affairs, comments on the importance of being extensionally oriented. People become extensionalized in their actions when they go to life's facts first and abide by the observations thereof in conducting life's affairs. For Lee extensional orientation is the rule of reason in the securing of knowledge to direct our actions.¹⁴

Such views as those of da Vinci, Bacon, and Lee, however profound they may be, point only to the relative character of the means and not the means itself. While we may realize from the foregoing the necessity for our reasoning in matters of ought and ought not, of right and wrong in human

¹²Cited in W. H. Werkmeister, A Philosophy of Science (New York: Harper and Bros., 1940), p. 15.

¹³Cited in ibid., pp. 11-12.

¹⁴(New York: Harper and Bros., 1941), pp. 123-24.

actions, to correspond with the facts of the world around us, the method of so doing remains an elusive problem.

One additional aspect of the problem proposed for investigation in this study must be considered before the problem itself can be stated in its entirety. Richard Weaver states, and Marie Hochmuth Nichols affirms, that "there is no honest rhetoric without a preceding dialectic," that is, without the determination of right from wrong and the ought from the ought not in matters of human affairs.¹⁵ Accordingly, whenever confronted by decisions of right and wrong, ought and ought not, in matters of rhetorical concern, we are required to weigh the considerations involved, i.e. the relevant facts so far as we are acquainted with them, and then make decisions according to those considerations. In so doing, we pass from factual reason (R) to ethical conclusions (E). At this moment the question to be considered is: in view of what I know (R), ought I to choose in this way (E)? Therefore the student of rhetorical ethics is naturally concerned with the problem of determining whether or not (R) is a good reason for (E).

¹⁵Cited in Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 70.

The problem for investigation in this study may now be stated in its entirety. Recognition of the "new key" in philosophy raises the problem of discerning the epistemological nature of symbolic formulations which have axiological determinations. The moral consciousness is recognized as being different in kind from rational consciousness. What is grasped by the moral consciousness is possible because of a special kind of cognition which is as significant a symbolic representation as are the logical judgments in the work of science. Further, the problem for investigation in this study recognizes the desirability for symbolic formulations of the moral consciousness to correspond to life's facts in the world around us, to achieve what Lee calls extensionalized behavior by realizing the significance of the "new key" in philosophy. If the orator's good reasons adhere to the divisions of symbolic formulations which distinguish between logical abstractions of science and moral or axiological cognition, what possible basis can there be for extensionalization in the discovering of good reasons? Indeed, in view of the apparent gulf between kinds of knowledge on the one hand and the desirability of being extensionalized on the other, can there be such a thing as "good reasons"? As the philosopher John Crowe Ransom put it, scientific and other "ways of

knowledge should illuminate each other; perhaps they are alternative knowledges, and a preference for one knowledge over the other might indicate an elemental or primary bias in temperament."¹⁶

The problem for investigation, therefore, is three-fold: (1) the problem of discerning the place of "good reasons" in rhetorical discourse; (2) the problem of discerning the epistemological character of "good reasons"; and (3) the problem of extensionalization in the symbolic formulation of "good reasons."

The Focus and Scope of This Study

This study proposes to investigate (1) the theoretical nature of the rhetorical-ethical relationship to discover the place of good reasons in the scheme of rhetoric; (2) the philosophy of Immanuel Kant as an explanation of the particular characteristics of the language of valuation, and extensionalization of symbolic formulations of axiological valuations; and (3) the relationship of Kant's philosophy of ethics to the art of rhetoric.

¹⁶The New Criticism (New York: New Directions Press, 1941), p. 294.

The Rhetorical-Ethical Relationship

Insight into the relationship between ethics and rhetoric can be gained in part by considering three concepts which are fundamental to both of these disciplines. The first of these concepts is probability. Jebb indicates that the earliest concept of probability as an element of rhetorical theory was advanced in the works of Corax. Evidently Corax' system of rhetoric was divided into three parts, the third of which was an attempt to demonstrate probability as an element of rhetorical invention. In developing the doctrine of probability, Corax advanced the principle that the "likelihood of truth must always be present in order to be convincing."¹⁷ Later Aristotle ascribed to Corax the following illustration of probability: if a physically weak man is accused of an assault, he is to ask, "Is it possible that I should have attacked him?" If a strong man is accused, he is to ask, "Is it probable that I should have committed an assault in a case where there was sure to be presumption against me?"¹⁸ Aristotle further upheld the principle of

¹⁷Bromley Smith, "Corax and Probability," The Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, VII (February, 1921), 29.

¹⁸Aristotle, "Rhetoric," trans. W. Rhys Roberts. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1402a. 18.

probability as an element of rhetoric by maintaining that the materials of enthymemes are probabilities when the conclusion is derived from such facts as either are or are "supposed to be usually true."¹⁹

The terms "likelihood of truth" and "supposed to be usually true" pertain to this discussion. Each of the terms points to the quality or state of presumption. Accordingly, two definitions of actions or prosecutions contingent upon presumption exist today. One is that probability is founded on the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind. The other definition is: probability means a reasonable ground for suspicion to warrant a cautious man in the belief of rightness and propriety. The basic distinction between the two definitions appears to rest upon a difference in types of evidence necessary to support presumption. In the first instance presumption is secured by facts and circumstances (examples), while in the second by a reasonable ground for suspicion. An analogous distinction might be that of Aristotle's delineation of scientific-demonstration and dialectic. The one supports conclusions based on demonstration of scientific fact and

¹⁹Ibid., 1402b. 16.

example (water freezes at thirty-two degrees Fahrenheit) while the other supports conclusions reached dialectically from premises representing something less than exact, scientific truth, i.e. a premise whose truth can only be asserted and not positively ascertained (a democratic form of government is more likely to promote world peace than a communistic form of government).

That probability serves at the core of rhetorical practices, as conceived by Corax and Aristotle and recognized by rhetorical scholars even today, determines the involvement of choice as a second concept fundamental to both rhetoric and ethics. To be probable demands that a thing more nearly represent rightness and propriety than a second thing. This may be called the "doctrine of possibilities"; for, unless there are two or more possibilities between which a choice must be made, there is no second thing against which the first thing may be measured. Choice, then, may be considered the natural consequence of determining probability; for, as Aristotle contends, the origin of action is choice and the origin of choice is desire molded by reason with a view to an end.²⁰ That a "reasonable mind" or a "cautious man" might

²⁰ Ethel M. Albert, Theodore C. Deinse, and Sheldon P. Peterfreund, Great Traditions in Ethics (New York: American Book Co., 1953), p. 55.

act independent of reason with a view to an end appears incomprehensible lest he lose his state of being reasonable or cautious, the qualities essential to the determination of probability. Hence the basis for action is the choice in favor of that proposition containing the preponderance of presumption among possibilities as would excite belief in a reasonable mind or give ground for suspicion to warrant a cautious man in the belief of rightness and propriety.

The third concept fundamentally involved in the disciplines of ethics and rhetoric is derived primarily from the conception of ethics which usually refers to some relationship between customs and habits. John Dewey and James H. Tufts in their book, Ethics, point out that the terms "ethics" and "ethical" as developed by the Greeks originally meant customs, usages, especially those belonging to some group as distinguished from another and later came to mean disposition or character.²¹ From Dewey and Tufts' discussion of the meaning of the term "ethics," the rhetorical-ethical relationship may be viewed as the essence of the speaker's disposition, habit, or custom of choice which relates his cause with probability. Recognizing this relationship, however, only enhances

²¹(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1929), p. 1.

the problem for the student of rhetoric and ethics, for he must now inform what "habits and customs of choice" are ethically desirable factors applicable to rhetorical practices in a world of practical affairs.

The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the Language of Valuation

The second problem investigated in this study involves Kant's contribution to rhetorical ethics and may be considered under the following three topics: (1) the critical circumstances of Kant's epistemology; (2) the components comprising Kant's ethics; and (3) the evaluative nature of choosing to act. This study does not propose to consider the whole of ethics nor to treat the ethical theories of any particular school of ethical philosophy. Rather, the questions considered in this study are questions which we cannot help encountering in every ethical situation; and, in this respect, the area of rhetorical practices is no exception. What is a good reason in ethics as to the orator's rhetorical acts is of more practical importance in this study than questions concerning the nature of right or the nature of wrong. No doubt these latter questions would sharpen the critical faculties of the philosopher toward his own pure discipline; but such an approach blunts the interest of other disciplines in

a broader, more practical social application: that is, for example, in the discipline of rhetoric and those areas where the instruments of rhetoric are most useful. As such, this study is related to the ethical aspects of a particular rhetorical situation much in the same way that conceptual analysis and scientific method are related to the practices of scientists. No true scientist would expect a book on scientific method to do the actual work of science itself. And, likewise, one must not expect to find in this study any conclusion about what rhetorical conduct is right or wrong. The purpose of any methodological or analytical study, regardless of whether that study is in the area of science or ethics, is indirect. It hopes to send others to their tasks with clearer heads and a better understanding of the roles they perform.

Although the ethical theories of many philosophers will be analyzed and expanded upon in this study for the purpose of establishing ethical guidelines for the practice of rhetoric, one system of ethics seems particularly relevant to the needs of social discourse. The philosopher Theodore Meyer Greene observes that, if properly understood, the philosophy of Immanuel Kant probably has more to offer the twentieth century than that of any other single man:

Kant, unlike the Ancients and Medievalists, is essentially modern in basic orientation. Indeed, he has probably done more to set the modern intellectual stage and to mold our contemporary ethos than any other philosopher. No competent philosopher today . . . can ignore him with impunity. Furthermore, Kant not only saw man's perennial problems through modern eyes; he also grappled resolutely and powerfully with the problems which more deeply concern us today. He asked the very questions which are uppermost in our minds. His answers . . . are the kind of answers we are looking for.²²

The advantages in following Kant's philosophy for developing a system of ethics applicable to rhetorical practices are probably best explained by the critical method he utilized in examining the epistemological basis for ethics. Kant's philosophy begins by recognizing differing kinds of consciousness: scientific or logical consciousness, ethical consciousness, aesthetic consciousness, and so on. What is grasped by the ethical consciousness, for example, is possible because of a separate kind of cognition which is not limited by the grasp of logical abstractions. Kant's own examination of logical cognition suggests the limits and the scope of the rational intellect. As Greene states in his introduction to Kant:

Kant was too suspicious of easy thinking ever to rest content with what other thinkers might regard either

²²Moral, Aesthetic and Religious Insight (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 11-12.

as satisfactory or as inevitable. The rationalistic belief in the power of reason to discover the deepest secrets of ultimate reality seemed to him to betray a blindness to the limits of human thought, lacking in philosophical insight and spiritual profundity as it was.²³

However our failure to grasp ethical reality with concepts provided by logical abstractions does not preclude our ability to grasp it in some other way. The ontology of ethics suggests the approach which any worthwhile analysis of its nature must take. In this connection Kant seems quite consistent with the "new philosophy" of Handy, Langer, and others. Yet, on the other hand, Kant sees in the ontology of ethics a dependency or interrelationship of cognition of ethical reality and logical abstractions of sensible reality; and in this respect Kant's philosophy seems very much in accord with the thinking of those who, like da Vinci, Bacon and Lee, believe that for knowledge to be reliable it must be extensionalized.

Kant's great problem, as he himself envisaged it, grew out of the contrasting schools of rationalism and empiricism so prominent during his time. As Greene states, "Kant's approach is characterized by two major assumptions . . . [both

²³Theodore Meyer Greene, "Introduction," Kant Selections, ed. Theodore Meyer Greene (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. LXX.

of which] are epistemological; both are concerned with the knowing process as such."²⁴ Kant recognized that reason is indeed essential for knowledge, but he also recognized as important sensation or primary sensory experience.²⁵ Both the empiricists and the rationalists were like men trying to hop on one leg, observes Greene, while Kant recognized that, actually, walking requires two legs, duly coordinated.²⁶ Accordingly, Kant is able to postulate his theory that knowledge is possible only when sensibility and understanding work in inseparable harness together. As Greene states, "These two faculties, working in conjunction, enable us bit by bit, both individually and collaboratively to reconstruct the structure and order of the phenomenal world."²⁷ Kant here "assumed that moral experience has its own generic uniqueness and its two distinctive poles, the subjective pole of the moral agent and the objective pole of the real."²⁸ In short, Kant's philosophy is that of practical reason, reason as a

²⁴Greene, Moral, Aesthetic and Religious Insight, p. 2.

²⁵Ibid., p. 18.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., p. 24.

²⁸Ibid., p. 43.

cause producing actions; or, as G. C. Field argues, Kant's philosophy assumes that practical reason is the capacity for finding means to ends in accordance with sensibility and understanding.²⁹

In accordance with the epistemology he expounded, Kant viewed ethics as composed of two elements, sensory impulse and rational consideration. Brought together in proper proportions, sensory impulse and rational consideration will initiate rational action. Rational consideration without impulse is incapable of producing action; and impulse without rational consideration produces irrational action, the kind of action experienced by the brutes. The actor receives an initial impulse to act, and the manner in which his rational consideration influences that impulse determines the consequence of that particular impulse. That is to say, an actor may alter, defer, or even deny an impulse, depending upon the influence of his own rationale.

On the subject of the goodness or badness of an act, Kant is quite specific. Whether choice is determined or free is unimportant to the fact that the rule of reason directing an act (the maxim) should be correct. Under no circumstances,

²⁹Moral Theory (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1921), p. 46.

he contends, does an act depend upon the realization of its objective as a measure of the choice from which that act arises. The effect of an act is determined not by its consequences but by the manner in which the maxim directs the impulse initiating the action. Thus, in the strictest Kantian sense, the evaluation of the goodness or rightness of choice depends not upon effects of choice in the events of human actions, but rather upon the maxims of choice from whence those actions arise.

The Relationship of Kant's Ethics to Rhetorical Practices

The third procedure followed in this study concerns the drawing of a relationship between Kant's practical reason (ethics) and practices of the art of rhetoric. The drawing of a relationship between ethics as an aspect of Kant's philosophy and the field of rhetorical theory is predicated upon the Kantian categories serving to deduce "good reasons" to be employed in rhetorical practices. A "good reason" determines the rightness and appropriateness of what ought to be the orator's objective.

The thesis of this study is that ethical guidelines applicable to the dialectical process of the rhetorical function may profitably be developed as a significant contribution

to rhetoric as it is practiced in the course of civilization building. And the contributions of Kant's philosophy to the ethics of rhetorical reasoning in accordance with the purpose here stated seems proper in light of the fundamental view Kant assumes in the moral philosophy he expounded. An effort will be made in this study to set forth Kant's ethical philosophy in support of the stated thesis.

Since this study consists of abstracting from Kant's philosophy a system of ethics suitable to the uses of rhetoric, this work is not restricted to Kant's organizational development. Wherever Kant's organizational pattern is appropriate to the need of this study, it is used. However, for the most part, the purpose of the study dictates the structure employed in the exposition.

Previous Studies

A search of Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities, the Index of The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Thonssen and Fatherson's Bibliography of Speech Education, Auer's "Doctoral Dissertations, Work in Progress," and Knower's "Index to Graduate Work in Speech and Drama" has revealed no previous studies treating the subject of ethics and rhetoric as conceived in this proposal.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE RHETORICAL-ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP

Introduction

In recent years, students of rhetoric have been turning increasingly to the studies of human nature and conduct for insight into the principles of the persuasive arts. The alliance of rhetoric and these studies reaches far back in history. In the days of the Athenians during the fifth century B. C., the art of rhetoric, says Everett Lee Hunt, constituted a way of life.¹ Rhetoric was the major instrument for influencing public opinion in Athenian society. Donald Lemon Clark reminds us that rhetoric as a formal study first grew up in Sicily about one hundred and fifty years before Aristotle. Rhetoric was originally conceived as an instrument for training speakers in matters of litigation in the

¹"Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James Albert Winans by Pupils and Colleagues, ed. A. M. Drummond (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), p. 2.

law courts; and "since Greek law required every free man to speak for himself in court, every free man needed the training--not merely a small class of professional advocates."² For Plato, however, the orator of Athens needed to be more than merely a rhetorician if he was to influence properly the events of his day. To be an adequate master of his subject, the rhetorician needed "true wisdom"; and the way to "true wisdom," according to Plato, was through philosophy. As Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Bard point out, "Aristotle, granting rhetoric dignified status, nevertheless joined Plato in calling rhetoric a counterpart of dialectic, and in articulating it with ethics."³ Most assuredly, Plato, too, was concerned with dialectic and ethics. Aristotle, though differing from Plato's positions on the relation of rhetoric to dialectic and ethics, nevertheless agreed with him that rhetoric should be related to these two philosophical studies.

The classical period, however, is not particularly unique in its view of rhetoric as allied with other disciplines in the study of human behavior. From the early days

²Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (Morningside Heights, N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 25.

³Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948), p. 180.

of our own republic, Daniel Webster observed that "when public bodies are to be addressed on momentous occasions, when great interests are at stake, and strong passions excited, nothing is valuable in speech farther than it is connected with high intellectual and moral attainments."⁴ During our present era, the poet Archibald MacLeish asserts that "the sickness of our day is the sickness of disordered and multifarious phenomena, undisciplined, unorganized and uncomposed. Our desperate need is to impose upon the world of chaotic phenomena, an order of understanding."⁵ Marie Hochmuth Nichols believes that "with respect to verbal phenomena, elusive and fleeting, rhetoricians are attempting to impose that order."⁶ Thonssen and Baird further attest that "rhetoric has long been the handmaid of politics. . . . Nowhere are the relations of men to their constituencies more fraught with social consequences than in the area of political representation."⁷ Rhetoric, as the intermediary between the will

⁴"True Eloquence," Modern Eloquence, ed. Thomas B. Reed (Philadelphia: John B. Morris and Co., 1903), XV, xi.

⁵Cited in Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), p. 32.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Thonssen and Baird, p. 466.

to action and the achievement of the result," continue Thonssen and Baird, "must accordingly be conceived as both a political and an ethical instrument."⁸

As a counterpart of politics and ethics, rhetoric is necessarily concerned with decisions influencing human actions and as such involves theoretical relationships within the framework proposed in the studies of human behavior and conduct. Since the days of the ancients, subjects of rhetorical consideration have been those subjects which, through the instrumentation of persuasion, seek order out of chaos fermented with alternative possibilities. In final analysis, rhetoric, as Richard M. Weaver views it, "deals with subjects at the point where they touch upon actuality or prudential conduct."⁹

The problem of immediate concern, then, is the relationship between rhetoric and that study of human behavior known as "ethics." While rhetoric is recognized as interrelated with ethics in the ordering of undisciplined, uncomposed phenomena, the theoretical nature of that relationship is not so generally recognized. Accordingly, this chapter will

⁸Ibid., p. 467.

⁹Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 5.

consider (1) the theoretical nature of rhetoric as it affects the actualization of concepts; (2) the theoretical nature of ethics as it dictates which concepts ought to be actualized; and (3) the interdependency of rhetoric and ethics which makes ethics an integral part of a system of rhetoric. An understanding of this interdependency is important for an appreciation of the role played by "good reasons" in the area of rhetorical practices.¹⁰

The Theoretical Nature of Rhetoric

While the alliance of rhetoric with other studies of human behavior has historical precedent, scholars nevertheless have often disagreed concerning the nature of rhetoric. Not infrequently the focus of disagreement has been concentrated on the dialectical-rhetorical aspects of the orator's practice. Richard Weaver points to the effects of a confused dialectical-rhetorical practice as partial explanation of the disagreement of their art. Says Weaver:

The failure to appreciate this distinction [between the dialectical and rhetorical processes] is responsible for many lame performances in our public controversies. The effects are, in outline, that the dialectician cannot understand why his demonstration

¹⁰See chapter one for an explanation of the need for "good reasons" in the area of rhetorical practices.

does not win converts; and the rhetorician cannot understand why his appeal is rejected as specious.¹¹

Following a similar line of reasoning, Robert Oliver points to a statement by Thomas Carlyle that seems to indicate a decisive difference between determining a fact in dialectic and persuading an audience concerning that fact in rhetoric.¹²

Rhetoric: an Art of Discovery

The confusion and disagreement surrounding dialectic and rhetoric are demonstrated in the increased consideration of rhetoric as a "science of persuasion" where orators attempt to influence their audiences through the various modes of persuasion without previously having investigated through dialectic pursuit (i.e. the practice of reasoning about matters of opinion) the facts to which their persuasive efforts are applied. In the opening chapter of the Rhetoric, Aristotle defines his subject as "the faculty of discovering in any given case the available means of persuasion."¹³ Obviously, Aristotle does not consider rhetoric to be simply

¹¹Ethics of Rhetoric, pp. 27-28.

¹²Robert T. Oliver, The Psychology of Persuasive Speech (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), p. 21.

¹³Trans. W. Rhys Roberts, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1355b. 26. (Later cited as Aristotle, Rhetoric.)

persuasion, but also the "discovery" of arguments suitable to the case at issue. Surprisingly, the word "discovery" itself, as used in the translation of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, has its origin in the Greek word, *εὑρεσις*, which also serves as the Greek word meaning an investigation and the Greek word meaning a choice. Interestingly, Baldwin translates Aristotle's definition of rhetoric using the word "investigating" rather than "discovering," pointing up the interchangeability of certain ideas in the original Greek concept of rhetoric.¹⁴

Since rhetoric is concerned with the discovery of the means of persuasion, the process of discovery itself becomes an essential ingredient in the theoretical nature of rhetoric. Closely allied with the process of discovery, however, is the function of choice as it serves to bring certain arguments to bear upon the proposition and to disregard others. Accordingly, the process of discovery may be considered a function of choice whereby the discoverer rather systematically comes to know the conditions pertinent to the subject of his investigation. The conclusions reached by the investigator-discoverer are contingent upon the data he selects (chooses)

¹⁴Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959), p. 7.

to present.

The Object of Rhetorical Discovery

Surely many may question what the rhetorician seeks to discover or choose. Edward Steele points out that for Aristotle the end of rhetoric is persuasion; the essence of persuasion is proof; the essence of proof is the enthymeme; and the essence of the enthymeme is the premise. The premise, Steele believes, is the popular conception of the good which influences the rational choice of means.¹⁵ In this scheme Steele has indeed made rhetoric a kind of offshoot of dialectic, on the one hand, and the actualization of dialectical findings in the ordering of undisciplined, uncomposed phenomena, on the other. Ralph T. Eubanks and Virgil L. Baker assert, "Since man can 'transcend' through consciousness an objective situation of which he is a part, he can have a hand in shaping his destiny by the 'exercise of choice based on value.'"¹⁶ The means of this transcendency, then, is persuasion, the essence of which is proof implemented through

¹⁵"Social Values in Public Address," Western Speech, XXI (Winter, 1958), 40.

¹⁶"Toward an Axiology of Rhetoric," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVIII (April, 1962), 157-58.

the instrumentation of the enthymeme. If such is the nature of rhetoric and if the enthymeme is the means between persuasion on the one hand and the premise as a conception of the good on the other, by which man may transcend an objective situation of which he is a part to influence the future, then surely the enthymematic premise is the object of the rhetorician's discovery or choice.

The Nature of the Enthymeme

Lloyd F. Bitzer modestly complains that in view of the importance Aristotle "has given the enthymeme, we might reasonably expect to find it carefully defined. However, although there are many hints as to its nature, the reader of Aristotle's Rhetoric will find no unambiguous statement defining the enthymeme."¹⁷ Bitzer continues by demonstrating that the mysteries of the enthymeme are as perplexing to scholars in rhetorical theory as to the ablest of Aristotelian scholars. Yet certain fundamental principles concerning the enthymeme may be deduced from what selected rhetorical scholars have said concerning its nature and function.

Aristotle contends the enthymeme is the most effective

¹⁷"Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLV (December, 1959), 399.

of the modes of persuasion;¹⁸ for, as Bitzer concludes, "enthymemes occur only when speaker and audience jointly produce them. Because they are jointly produced, enthymemes intimately unite speaker and audience and provide the strongest possible proofs."¹⁹ Yet what is the nature of this mysterious but important aspect of rhetoric?

Earl Wiley, in his study of the enthymeme as an idiom of persuasion, relates the story of the man who literally talked himself to death with three short words. He shouted, "Down with Stalin." This, according to Wiley, is an example of an enthymeme. It signalizes the kind of logic we live (or die) by in the give-and-take of controversy, when persuasion is the end sought and fact must share place not only with probabilities but with behavioral patterns of speaker and listener alike.²⁰ The man who literally talked himself to death failed so miserably in his attempt to unify behavioral patterns of speaker and audience that he was psychologically and politically severed from the body of popular opinion as a declared enemy of the state worthy of the

¹⁸Rhetoric, 1356a. 23.

¹⁹Bitzer, 408.

²⁰"The Enthymeme: Idiom of Persuasion," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLII (February, 1956), 19.

punishment of death. Patently the enthymeme, says Wiley,

is not the traditional syllogism of laboratory logic employed by scholars in tracking down abstract truth and concerned with demonstration. If it were the speaker might argue tightly:

Tyrants should be deposed;
Stalin is a tyrant;
Stalin should be deposed;

Such precision in reasoning we leave to the needs of demonstration. An enthymeme, on the other hand, is one man's judgment of the propriety of events in some conflict involving people; being contingent, it is not demonstration, and being controversial, it is framed in argument.²¹

Following a similar line of thought, James McBurney defines the enthymeme "as a syllogism, drawn from probable causes. . . . As a syllogism drawn from these materials . . . the enthymeme starts from probable premises and lacks formal validity."²² McBurney amplifies these characteristics of the enthymeme by saying:

Both dialectic and rhetoric are differentiated from scientific demonstration in the fact that they deal with probabilities and do not attempt apodictic proof in the sense that it appears in scientific demonstration.

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Perhaps no other passages in Aristotle bring out more forcibly the point that . . . the enthymeme . . . [is] formally deficient than these explanations

²¹Ibid.

²²"The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Monographs, III (1936), 58.

dealing with the refutation of enthymemes. This is an exceedingly important point that is almost universally overlooked. Many rhetorical arguments which are perfectly legitimate in reasoned discourse and which may establish high degrees of probability are formally deficient; i.e. they cannot be thrown into a formally valid syllogism. Many enthymemes which are wholly acceptable from the standpoint of cogent speech are formally deficient from the point of view of the apodictic syllogism.²³

A third aspect of the enthymeme important to an understanding of the nature of rhetoric is determined, in Aristotle's view, by the place of the enthymeme in the system of rhetorical proofs. First Aristotle divides rhetoric into the artistic and inartistic application of proofs. By inartistic proofs Aristotle means "such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset--witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on."²⁴ By artistic Aristotle means "such as we ourselves construct."²⁵ According to Aristotle inartistic proofs "are merely to be used," while artistic proofs have "to be invented."²⁶ Clearly, Aristotle is most concerned with artistic proofs for they admit of the orator's skill in making choices.

²³Ibid., 51.

²⁴Rhetoric, 1355b. 38-40.

²⁵Ibid., 1355b. 41.

²⁶Ibid., 1355b. 42.

Aristotle examines three kinds of artistic proofs: the ethical, which is a means of persuasion when the speech is so delivered as to produce an impression of the speaker's credibility; the emotional, which results from the audience's being worked into an emotional state by the speech; and lastly, the logical, which results from the speech itself when a truth or apparent truth has been proved by the persuasive means appropriate to a particular subject.²⁷ The instrument effecting these three modes of persuasion is the enthymeme.

The question now arises why, since the syllogism and the enthymeme are both instruments of artistic proofs, is the enthymeme, which lacks formal validity, more desirable for rhetorical proof than the syllogism? In partial answer to this question, Charles Mudd in his study of the enthymeme and the logical syllogism tells us that "logically, the syllogism is an ordered structure of simple beauty, but stylistically it leaves much to be desired. A speaker, then, does not often use the syllogism as a means of communicating argument."²⁸ A speaker, if using the syllogism frequently, would

²⁷ Ibid., 1356a. 1-4.

²⁸ "The Enthymeme and Logical Validity," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLV (December, 1959), 410.

be required to treat subject matter already familiar to the audience. Instead he alters the syllogistic form by leaving out whatever premises the audience can infer and including only that information necessary to make the argument clear. In the Rhetoric Aristotle contends that the speaker must not carry the chain of reasoning too far back or its length will render the argument obscure; and he must not put in every single link that leads to his conclusion or the statement of what is obvious will render it prolix.²⁹ The enthymeme, say McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, "is almost universally understood by rhetoricians and logicians alike as an elided or truncated syllogism; i.e. as a syllogism with one of its premises or the conclusion omitted. Such an omission, usually the major premise, is characteristic of rhetorical discourse."³⁰

The distinction between the syllogism and the enthymeme, then, and thus the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric, is in part the consequence of a difference in the "functions" of the syllogism and the enthymeme. The

²⁹1395b. 24-27.

³⁰James McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E. Mills, Argumentation and Debate (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), pp. 19-22.

sylllogism of dialectic, containing its ordered structure, says Aristotle, treats "criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiry."³¹ The enthymeme, on the other hand, treats rhetorical problems of which persuasion is the end sought. As Bitzer concludes:

Dialectic [sylllogisms] must ask for premises because criticism cannot begin until the parties involved agree on some proposition. Rhetorical [enthymemes] . . . must begin with premises held by the audience because persuasion cannot take place unless the audience views a conclusion as required by the premises it subscribes to.³²

The Premise as a Concept of the Good

In light of the dialectical-rhetorical distinction thus made, the importance of the premise should be obvious. Dialectic, being concerned with criticism, asks for premises upon which the parties involved may agree. Rhetoric, being concerned with persuasion, begins with premises held by the audience. Thus the syllogism is appropriate to the employment of the dialectical premise while the enthymeme, lacking in formal validity but accounting for the premises held by the audience, is appropriate to the employment of a rhetorical

³¹Topica, trans. W.A. Pickard, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 101b. 3-4.

³²Bitzer, 405.

proposition. The premise of the rhetorical enthymeme, in Steele's thinking, is the popular conception of the good which influences the rational choice of means. Steele points out that of particular significance to the premise "is the idea that human behavior is motivated by concepts of the desirable and not just by physiological needs or desires."³³ He contends that few actions indeed can be proved clearly to be made in the service of physiological needs and desires. Modern scholars of social behavior "find the idea of physiological need or instinct inadequate to explain anything as complex as a modern corporation farm or a banking system. The same can be said of all cultural institutions and folkways."³⁴

The question now becomes: What "concepts of the desirable" are held by the audience and how may the rhetorician discover them in performing his dialectical-rhetorical function of providing content for enthymemes. Concerned with this question, Aristotle proceeded to delineate the popular conception of the good and describe the various goods that could be utilized as enthymematic premises.³⁵ In 1925,

³³"Social Values in Public Address," 39.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵See Edward D. Steele, "Value Theory and Rhetoric;

however, William Utterback pointed to Aristotle's descriptions of the popular conception of the good as a series of conceptual systems containing a set of stock major premises which were appropriate to the relatively simple society of Athens but insufficient to measure the popular conception of the good relative to modern society.³⁶ We live in a world of changing values; and, as revealed in Irving J. Lee's doctoral dissertation, the failure to recognize this fact has led many to a mistaken reliance upon the value system of the Athenian society as described by Aristotle which is inconsistent with the motivational appeals available to the speaker's purpose in the twentieth century.³⁷ From such a delineation of the popular conception of the good as relative to the Athenian society, however, we may infer, as Steele does, that the persuader has only "two available ethical alternatives in his efforts to influence rational choices made by his audience."³⁸ As Steele states, "He must show that

Social Values, the Enthymeme, and Speech Criticism," Western Speech, XXXIV (Spring, 1962), 71.

³⁶Cited in ibid.

³⁷Cited in ibid., 72-73. See Irving J. Lee, "Some Conceptions of Emotional Appeal in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Monographs, VI (1939), 66-68.

³⁸Ibid., 73.

choosing his program is a reasonable deduction from premises held by the listener or he must seek to show that the listener's values are inadequate or unsuitable" and attempt to replace them with new concepts of the good derived from the speaker's own value-ethical system.³⁹

Methodologically, then, the speaker seeks to discover value premises to be employed enthymematically in his oratorical practices. These premises, according to Steele, are generalized concepts of the desirable held by the audience, a term denoting generalized feeling which is the source of motivation and serves as the basis for directing conduct.⁴⁰ Here the primary interest is in the evaluation of alternatives from the viewpoint of their implications for a system of action to be followed. In short, whether in the form of audience-held concepts of the good or concepts derived from the speaker's own value-ethical system which replaces those held by the audience, the generalized concepts of the good serve as the premises from which the speaker's propositions are deduced. Bitzer points out and Steele concurs that "the

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., 73-74. See "General Statement," Toward a General Theory of Action, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 29.

assumption is that the speaker will be effective in persuasion if the audience is willing to accept his reasoning as a deduction of premises to which it subscribes."⁴¹

Finally, now, a picture of the theoretical nature of rhetoric begins to take shape. Rhetoric traditionally considered is an art of utility; that is, rhetoric is the means by which man transcends through consciousness an objective situation of which he is a part to shape his future destiny. Such transcendency comes about through the resolution of probabilities. That the subjects of rhetoric are topics of probabilities has long been recognized. But underlying rhetoric's concern with the problematic is the fact that all rhetorical discourse is developed in relation to an audience. If the orator is to perform his function adequately he must, in accordance with Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, discover (choose) those means for accomplishing the adherence of thought of speaker and audience alike. In essence this is the end sought through persuasion, and in a major sense it accounts for the distinction between dialectic and rhetoric.

The aim of dialectic is criticism--often the aim is criticism of the respondent's own position. Since arguments

⁴¹ Steele, "Value Theory and Rhetoric . . .," 71.
See also Bitzer, 407.

are formed from premises supplied by the respondent, dialectical arguments have the virtue of being self-critical.⁴² But the interaction between speaker and audience necessitates a different form in rhetoric. The purpose of speaker-audience interaction is joint adherence to a unified concept of belief for action. "The speaker uses a form of interaction which has its counterpart in dialectic," says Bitzer, "but instead of using question and answer to achieve interaction, he uses the enthymeme, which accomplishes for rhetoric what the method of question and answer accomplishes for dialectic."⁴³ The important factor here, as Bitzer continues to point out, is that the speaker draws his premises from propositions which members of his audience would supply if he proceeded by question and answer.⁴⁴

The point to be emphasized is that the rhetorical enthymeme occurs only when speaker and audience join together to supply the necessary premises. In the strictest sense, the enthymeme cannot be considered a syllogism having one or more suppressed premises; for the "speaker does not lay down

⁴²Bitzer, 407.

⁴³Ibid., 408.

⁴⁴Ibid.

his premises but lets his audience supply them out of its stock of opinion and knowledge."⁴⁵ On occasion, however, the speaker's task is compounded because he must supply the knowledge to the audience or in some instances alter and modify the audience's already existing knowledge out of which it will draw the premises for the enthymeme the speaker uses. Premises, as a generalized conception of the good, are nevertheless the essence of the speaker's objective when he seeks to discover the available means of persuasion in any given case.

The Theoretical Nature of Ethics

Wayne A. R. Leys tells us in his book, Ethics for Policy Decisions, that "the study of standards for decision making is the part of philosophy that has been called ethics."⁴⁶ This area of systematic investigation has been known as the study of ethics for about twenty-five hundred years. Leys subsequently reminds us that the word "philosophy" itself, with which ethics is associated, originally meant "'the love of wisdom,' and philosophers have conceived their task as the discovery of very general principles of

⁴⁵Ibid., 407.

⁴⁶(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 4.

wisdom."⁴⁷ If such is indeed the task of the philosopher, then apparently that branch of the philosopher's study called ethics needs to concern itself with "discovery of very general principles of wisdom in the rather limited area of standards for decision making." This at least is the consideration for the immediate investigation.

The Theoretical Nature of Ethical Standards

The nature of ethical standards and, correspondingly, the "quality of being wise" are two essential aspects for consideration in a study concerning the nature of ethical theory. According to Charles Miltner the task of revealing the essence of ethics cannot be a historical study of how men acted in the past. The scope of ethics involves more than a consideration of how men do act; it involves how men "should act."⁴⁸ Patrick Romanell, in advocating a new naturalism, supports Miltner's distinction of the "ought" and the "is" in ethics by pointing out that

if we take the pragmatic test of truth in its first or empirical sense, we are faced with the difficulty that no moral hypothesis can be justified. How can an idea of life, which a moral hypothesis describes

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸The Elements of Ethics (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 4.

and prescribes, be justified by a mere empirical study of relevant facts. For it should be obvious that it is logically impossible to infer a conclusion containing an ought (expressed through the ideal itself) from premises that are, by definition, limited to what is.⁴⁹

Rickaby, in his work on moral philosophy, explains the scope of ethics this way: "The principal business of Ethics is to determine what moral obligation is, or to fix what logicians call the comprehension of the idea 'I ought.'"⁵⁰ With this scope of ethics in mind the concern for standards of wise decisions men ought to make is considered an important aspect of "standards for decision making."

Again, according to Miltner, "policies for decision making" in terms of the "ought" in ethical considerations have reference to a custom or practice, a more or less invariable mode of behavior observable in deliberate actions of rational beings.⁵¹ To this description may be added the idea that man is a rational and active being, a being capable of choosing deliberately to perform certain actions and to refrain from certain other actions. With Saint Thomas, Miltner believes ethics to be the practical science which influences

⁴⁹Toward a Critical Naturalism (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1958), p. 46.

⁵⁰Cited in Miltner, p. 4.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 3.

human acts and provides norms for their natural integrity and honesty.⁵² Bertrand Russell goes one step further and explains that ethics is commonly concerned not only with the questions of what men ought to do and not do, but also the basis of reason which determines what men ought to do and not do. "It [ethics] is conceived . . . as [reason] dealing with human conduct, and as deciding what is virtuous and what vicious among the kinds of conduct between which, in practice, people are called upon to choose."⁵³

Good and Bad--Right and Wrong

The answer to the question, "What do you mean by Good?" differs from the explanation which could be given to the question, "What do you mean when you say such and such is red?" for example. Good is not a quality like redness, perceivable by the senses; and, Russell points out, as a result, "there is less agreement as to the things that are good than as to the things that are red."⁵⁴ As a more recent exponent of the opinion first set forth by G. E. Moore,

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³"The Elements of Ethics," Readings in Ethical Theory, ed. Wilfred Sellars and John Hospers (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), p. 1.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 3.

Russell continues by contending that the failure to comprehend the distinction between things perceivable by the senses, like redness, and things not so perceivable, like goodness, has led many a person mistakenly to think that the notion of good could be analyzed into some other notion such as pleasure or happiness.

Somewhat related to the association of good with happiness is the problem of associating good with desire. This view holds that a thing is good when it is desired. Yet the view of good as an object of desire fails to account for the existence of bad desires. Moore and Russell each point out that when someone contends that good means "pleasant," or in the substantive sense, "pleasure," he is defining good in terms of some natural property that is desired by the individual. The fallacy of such reasoning may be seen by substituting the question, "Is pleasure good?" According to the logic of this view we can clearly see that we do not mean anything like it--we are not asking if pleasure is qualified by some unanalyzable and unique property. John Stuart Mill furnishes a classical example when he equates pleasure or happiness with "desirable ends" and then defines "desirable" as "desired." Actually Mill exemplifies his own fallacy by describing things as desired, such as virtue, money, or

health. He thus obliterates his own distinction by attempting to show that such things as money and health are parts of happiness. The disclosure of "desired" as an object of sense points to the impersonal nature of ethics, i.e. the viewpoint that a thing should be recognized on its own account, not on account of its consequences. As Russell states, "We cannot maintain that for me a thing ought to exist on its own account, while for you it ought not; that would merely mean that one of us is mistaken, since in fact everything either ought to exist or ought not."⁵⁵ Russell concludes, therefore, that we cannot "infer any results as to what is good or bad from a study of the things that exist."⁵⁶

The same reasoning, however, does not necessarily apply to rightness or wrongness as to goodness or badness. Such would be a confusion of the ought with the is and, as previously pointed out, the "ought" and not the "is" is the primary consideration of ethics. That consequences do exist and are of interest to the acts of man is a recognized fact of man's nature as an active being. Since practical judgments assert a causal relationship between actions and consequences,

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 4.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 8.

an empirical method providing right actions for certain consequences is implied. What, then, can be offered as an explanation of right actions with which ethics is appropriately concerned?

With respect to the question of rightness, Russell contends that since the objectively right act seems in some way dependent on consequences, we most naturally start with the supposition that the objectively right act is that which will have the best consequences.⁵⁷ The act having the most favorable consequences Russell labels the "most fortunate act." The most fortunate act is one producing the greatest number of things having positive value. And "things having positive value" are roughly described as certain states of consciousness which contain pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects. But, according to this view, the most fortunate act cannot always be considered the most objectively right act. This is so since the act that proves to be the most fortunate may on occasion appear to be less fortunate according to the evidence at our disposal at the time of commission. Hence the rightness of an act is a probability-type judgment of conduct. That is to

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 13.

say, the objectively right act is that act which will probably be most fortunate as judged by a wise man who takes account of all available data at his disposal. This act Russell calls the "wisest act."⁵⁸ Thus the most fortunate act involves the actual good, whereas the wisest act may or may not involve the actual good.

The description of this "wisest act" presents a special difficulty: What may be considered available data? Generally speaking, all available data have reference to things capable of being foreseen, not to things unpredictable. In respect to the consequences of an act, those conditions that are physically impossible for the agent to perform or impossible for the agent to consider must not be included. Thus the objectively right act with which ethics is concerned may be described as that act, of all that are possible, which will probably have the best consequences as described by all available data.

With this description of the objectively right act, however, one additional consideration of major importance to the essence of ethics remains: namely, subjective rightness. The comparison and contrast of subjective rightness with objective rightness is important for distinguishing conduct

⁵⁸ Ibid.

that is merely mistaken from conduct that is immoral or blameworthy. Russell states that "in the objective sense, a man ought to do what is objectively right. But in the subjective sense . . . he sometimes ought to do what is objectively wrong."⁵⁹ The act which ensues from the proper amount and kind of considered approval is, in some sense, subjectively right, although it may ultimately be determined objectively wrong. An act is said to be subjectively right when judged by the agent to be objectively right. Or put in another way, an agent's judgment as to what is objectively right may err, but so long as the agent follows what his consideration reveals to be probably objectively right, his act will be subjectively right in spite of the ultimate error of objective consideration. Consequently an act is considered moral "when the agent approves it, and immoral when he disapproves it, using moral to mean 'subjectively' right and immoral to mean 'subjectively' wrong."⁶⁰

The doctrine of "subjective right" and "subjective wrong," however, has certain drawbacks in need of modification. First, an agent may exist who convinces himself of the

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 14.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 15.

belief that what he wishes to do is right. Of course, the belief of self-deception is not a genuine belief; and hence an act may be immoral even if an agent judges it to be right.⁶¹ Secondly, an agent may commit an unreflective act, one where he has made no judgment but rather has acted from impulse. Many of these unreflective acts, such as those that spring from malice or cruelty, are blameworthy. Yet they have not proceeded from a previous judgment. In problems where inadequate reflection exists or where reflection is non-existent, the blame does not properly belong to the act, but rather to the agent's character or habit as revealed by the act. Russell therefore concludes that

A moral act should be defined as one which the agent would have judged to be right if he had considered the question candidly and with due care; if, that is to say, he had examined the data before him with a view to discovering what was right, and not with a view to proving such-and-such a course to be right.⁶²

Ethics properly concerns itself with the wisdom in man's habit or custom of responding to what he ought to do. It is not only concerned with the "oughts" and "ought nots" of man's behavior but also with the determination of the ought and ought not in directing man's behavior. The

⁶¹Ibid., p. 16.

⁶²Ibid.

involvement of wisdom in ethics implies reasoned behavior, and the reasoning employed for making judgments of "right and wrong" requires a special body of laws fitting the peculiar characteristics of the knowledge involved therein. The nature of this knowledge of "ought and ought not" and the laws of reason to procure such knowledge constitute the special concern of this study yet to be considered.

The Interdependency of Rhetoric and Ethics

The British philosopher Stephen Toulmin, in his work on philosophical ethics, tells us there are many philosophers for whom the search for ethical standards has a political aim. For this class of philosophers ethics has a "rhetorical force" useful in forwarding their particular policies.⁶³ In fact Toulmin goes so far as to describe Jeremy Bentham's philosophical ethics as having been required in order to counter-balance by rhetoric the existing prejudices.⁶⁴ In this sense rhetoric appears as an instrument for the propagation of ethical precepts, as indeed it may be. Yet the theoretical nature of rhetoric and ethics reveals an interdependency of

⁶³Stephen Edelston Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 195.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 199.

rhetoric and ethics more subtly and more intimately involved than is indicated by the view that rhetoric exists merely as an instrument of ethics.

Wayne C. Minnick, in his book, The Art of Persuasion, tells us there is general agreement that some means of persuasion are unethical. He lists them as follows:

1. It is unethical to falsify or fabricate.
2. It is unethical to distort so that a piece of evidence does not convey its true intent.
3. It is unethical to make conscious use of specious reasoning.
4. It is unethical to deceive the audience about the speaker's intent.⁶⁵

"A person who wishes to be ethical," says Minnick, "must avoid these practices" and with this most rhetoricians will agree.⁶⁶ What this view fails to consider, however, is the necessity for maintaining the appearance of properly considered ethical precepts as an integral part of rhetorical practices without which a theoretical rhetoric would be non-existent. That an abuse of the rhetorical faculty can work great mischief is not to be denied. But the failure to realize the necessary interdependency of the orator's cause with recognizable values as a basis for all persuasive

⁶⁵(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), pp. 283-84.

⁶⁶Ibid.

discourse has long been overlooked in specious and questionable rhetorical practices.

Thus neither the view that rhetoric is an instrument for propagating ethical precepts nor the view that selected ethical criteria apply to rhetorical practices fully explains the theoretical nature of the dependency of rhetoric and ethics.

The Nature of Proof in the Rhetorical-Ethical Relationship

The nature of the rhetorical-ethical interdependency may be explained by reconsidering the theoretical nature of rhetoric and the theoretical nature of ethics already discussed. As a beginning for this explanation, Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as "the discovery of the available means of persuasion" must be recounted. Rhetoric is an act of discovery and the object of rhetorical discovery is "the means of persuasion." Thus persuasion is the sought-after end of rhetoric; and, as Edward Steele tells us, the means to this end is "proof." Or, said chronologically, the act of the orator is to discover the proof essential for securing persuasion.

The immediate problem for consideration here, then, is to recount the nature of proof and of persuasion. Douglas

Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede in their book, Decision by Debate, define proof as "the process of securing belief in one statement by relating it to another statement already believed."⁶⁷ As already noted, Edward Steele describes the premise as the "concept of the good"; and thus, in relation to the Ehninger and Brockriede definition of proof, the object of rhetorical discovery is the process of securing belief in one concept of the good by relating it to another concept of the good already recognized. In this process of drawing relationships, persuasion is accomplished insofar as the audience is united with the speaker in accepting the speaker's premised good.

The point of juncture between rhetoric and ethics comes straight to the problem of probabilities. The process of proof just noted involves the process of speaking judgments covering the popular concept of the good that may be either praiseworthy or blameworthy. One commonly alludes to the character of these judgments by saying they are "probably" worthy of praise or worthy of blame.

Obviously, then, when considering the nature of the interdependency of rhetoric and ethics, there is need to mark

⁶⁷(New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1963), p. 99.

out clearly the kind of probability determination rhetoric and ethics are involved with.

The Nature of Probability in the Rhetorical-Ethical Relationship

Most important is the fact that the probability of the rhetorical-ethical relationship is a "logical determinant type probability" and not a "relative frequency determinant." The method for logically determining probabilities is most easily seen in C. D. Broad's interpretation of the inductive argument. Having argued that induction by simple enumeration involves a formal fallacy, Broad continues by stating that

the conclusion of inductive argument must therefore be modified and the most reasonable modification to make is to state them in terms of probability. . . . With suggested modification of our conclusion the logical difficulty vanishes. Suppose the conclusion becomes that it is highly probable that all S's are P. There is then no illicit process. We argue from a certain proposition about some S's to the probability of a proposition about all S's. This is perfectly legitimate.⁶⁸

Considering Broad's view of probability as a natural result of inductive logic, Max Black, in his book, Language and Philosophy, points out that

this view that categorical inductive conclusions are not legitimate and ought to be replaced by probability statements, is very popular today. (Indeed it is

⁶⁸"The Problem of Induction," Mind (1918), 391.

commonly taken as almost too obvious for discussion that inductive conclusions ought not be regarded as more than probable.)⁶⁹

According to Rudolf Carnap "inductive logic is here conceived as the theory of an explicatum for probability."⁷⁰ While inductive logic is not the same as probability, the method of making probability determinations is nevertheless meaningfully explained by the concept of inductive logic.

Some further explanations are needed, however, concerning the method of qualifying with probability the conclusions of logical induction. Suppose Mr. X. would like to know whether the prediction, "It will rain tomorrow," is true or false because it is relevant for a practical decision he has to make. To formulate sharply the distinctive feature of this probability is more troublesome than might appear because a probability-type conclusion can become entangled with different matter from some conclusions asserted categorically; it sometimes is to be taken hypothetically only. As Clarence Irving Lewis contends, "The distinction here is that between conclusions which are merely valid, being correctly drawn from

⁶⁹(Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949), p. 391.

⁷⁰Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 161.

the premises, and those which, the premises being factual, are also asserted as true."⁷¹ Because a probabilized conclusion is relative to its premises, and because the full statement of it must be of the form, "on data 'D,' 'P' has probability a/b," the maker of such a conclusion does not deem necessary the remarking of the difference between valid conclusions which are merely justified hypothetically and those which, the premises of them being factual, are categorical and asserted true.⁷² On this matter, Lewis points out that "if data 'D' hold, then on data 'D,' 'P' has probability a/b would be a neoplasm; the hypothesis here is superfluous, and on data 'D,' 'P' has probability a/b tells the whole story."⁷³ Yet Lewis further remarks that the distinction between the hypothetical and categorical as a qualifier of the data still holds. Lewis says, for example,

If one assert, "judging by the barometer, tomorrow will probably be fair," one does not mean merely "if the barometer is high, then tomorrow will probably be fair." The intention is to assert the premises as factual, and the conclusion, "on the barometer data, tomorrow will probably be fair," is meant as a categorical probability statement. One has still to retain reference to the ground of judgment because,

⁷¹Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1946), p. 268.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid.

for example, it could also be simultaneously true that judging from radio reports from the west, it will probably rain tomorrow, and there is no such thing as the probability of tomorrow's weather except relative to the data on which it is judged.⁷⁴

A probability theory of the logical inference type takes its point of departure from our concern in making probability determinations for predicting results of acts yet uncertain. The method of making such predictions is logical induction and the product of such a method is probability inference. At most, the assigned probability can only be taken as having predictive significance which is more or less well confirmed by the data of its premises collated by the correct procedure of induction. On this basis, we presume further behavior to have empirical determination on the same assurance as the data themselves.

Here, in terms of the "ethical ought" and the "popular conception of the good" in rhetorical premises, we are concerned only with probability determinations. The "ethical ought" and the "popular conception of the good" are kinds of probability statements; and, as Henry Kyburg states in his book, Probability and Logic of Rational Belief, as probability statements they "serve in discourse not only to express

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 268-69.

opinions (well grounded or otherwise) about future occurrences, but to guide our decisions and inform our actions in an uncertain world."⁷⁵ Rhetoric finds its province in establishing unanimity of audience and speaker in accepting the conceptualized good, while ethics finds its province in matters determining what the good ought to be. The underlying relationship between rhetoric and ethics is that a "concept of the good" as a rhetorical premise is impossible to attain apart from a consideration of the ought and ought not provided for in the province of ethics. While good and bad may be, as Russell believes, indefinable in the philosophical sense of their involvement, they are nevertheless expressible in the valuation of human conduct as a matter of right or wrong actions. The underlying assumption of value judgments concerning praiseworthy and blameworthy actions is that value accrues in direct relation to the probable "rightness" of the actions considered.

Summary

Rhetoric is an art of utility. It is conceived as the means for getting things done through influencing

⁷⁵(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), p. 2.

decisions that have to be made concerning the actions that men perform. To supply the material for expediting its functions, rhetoric seeks to discover the available means of persuasion where persuasion is considered the uniting of speaker and audience in the common acceptance of a given proposition. The object of this discovery is the enthymematic premise which is a "popular conception of the good." In this connection the enthymeme is based on probability and relies on the audience to supply missing premises.

Through its influencing of decisions regarding actions to be performed, rhetoric is intimately dependent upon ethics. The objective of both rhetoric and ethics is rightness of action and only through rhetoric directed by ethical precepts may the probably right action be achieved. Rhetoric seeks to persuade to the probably right actions and ethics seeks to determine which actions probably ought to be considered the right actions of persuasion.

CHAPTER III

A DEVELOPMENT OF THE "SYNTHESIS A PRIORI" FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT

Introduction

Because of rhetoric's concern for issues bearing ethical consequences and because ethical standards serve as measurements for the orator's actions, a question arises concerning the method for resolving rhetorical problems in an ethical manner. This question has particular interest for the "laws of ethics" that affect the realization of ought-type determinations in the rhetorical process. John Dewey, in his work, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, tells us that

laws . . . are means of prediction only as far as they operate as means of production of a given situation. . . . Laws . . . are instrumentalities in determining, through operations they prescribe and direct, the ordered sequence into which gross qualitative events are resolved.¹

Also speaking on the nature of laws, Bella K. Milmed

¹(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1938), pp. 454-56.

paraphrases a statement made by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, pointing out that

the epoch-making discovery of Galileo and other early experimenters was the discovery that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own, and . . . must itself show the way with principles of judgment based upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answer to questions of reason's own determining.²

The similarity of these two statements concerning the nature of laws, the first issued by the twentieth century philosopher John Dewey, and the second by Immanuel Kant in the year 1781, seems to lend credence to the view expressed by A. R. C. Duncan when, in considering moral laws, he wrote that the "philosopher in the twentieth century who pays any attention to what is being said and suggested in the field of . . . [moral philosophy] cannot avoid facing Kant's problem."³ "Indeed, according to the Critical interpretation, the argument of the . . . [moral law] does not begin to be intelligible until it is taken in relation to the Critical philosophy developed in the Critique of Pure Reason."⁴

²Kant and Current Philosophical Issues (New York: New York University Press, 1961), p. 10. A similar comparison of Dewey and Kant is made by Milmed which supports Duncan's conclusions cited here.

³Practical Reason and Morality (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957), p. x.

⁴Ibid., p. 40.

This problem which each philosopher must face in his quest for laws and principles (and particularly moral laws and principles) is indeed the problem that Kant so readily recognized. Frederick Copleston, in his work, A History of Philosophy, succinctly states the problem with which Kant dealt: "How, for example, can we reconcile with the scientific conception of the world as a law-governed system, in which each event has its determinate and determining course, the world of moral experience which implies freedom?"⁵ In his introduction to Kant's work Norman Kemp Smith states the problem of concern to Kant, and correspondingly the problem of concern to students of philosophy in general, in terms similar to those of Copleston: "The fundamental principles upon which all experience and knowledge ultimately rest are synthetic in nature: how is it possible that they should also be a priori?"⁶ Elsewhere, Smith analyzes the problem that Kant first dealt with by expounding the

self conflict of Reason in the form of a broad judicial statement of the grounds and claims of the two opposing authorities which divide the allegiance of the human spirit, namely, the intellectual and the moral science with its cognitive demands on the one

⁵(Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1961), VI, 186.

⁶Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Random House, 1958), p. xi.

hand, the consciousness of duty with its no less imperious prescriptions on the other.⁷

Kant's work, as Copleston and Smith so aptly point out, was born in the attempt to reconcile the two influential schools of philosophical thought currently at his time-- British empiricism as represented by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume; and continental rationalism as represented by Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff. In examining these two schools of thought, Kant reasoned that a metaphysics of science might be possible only if there exist knowable truths different from the synthetic truths of nature and knowable through sense experience such as advocated by the empiricists, or from the analytic truths that owe their validity to the meanings of their terms (that is, true by definition) as advocated by the rationalists.

The problem of the source and nature of knowledge is indeed a problem with which any student of philosophy and not least of all the student of moral philosophy must be concerned. To this end, the student of rhetorical ethics is no exception. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the juncture between rhetoric and ethics involves the nature of

⁷Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan and Co., 1923), p. 436.

rhetorical judgments which is that these judgments are either probably worthy of praise or probably worthy of blame. The ethical soundness of these judgments is dependent upon the laws for developing good reasons used for making such judgments. The understanding of these laws is dependent upon understanding the epistemology formulating the rational basis from which such reasons may be developed. For a consideration of the source and nature of these laws, we now turn to Immanuel Kant's first critique, the Critique of Pure Reason.

The Distinguishing of Pure and Empirical Knowledge

Obviously, the problem of Kant's concern does not pertain only to knowledge of ethical laws and maxims but concerns human knowledge in general. Kant begins his inquiry into the conditions of knowledge by saying that in the order of time no one has any knowledge whatever prior to experience, that is, prior to that knowledge which comes to us somehow through the medium of impressions of sense.

There can be no doubt [says Kant] that all knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw

material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience.⁸

On the occasion of sense impressions, then, our faculty of knowledge is called into activity with the result that somehow we come to have knowledge of sensible objects.

While granting that our knowledge originates in experience, Kant does not assume, however, that there is in knowledge no element which has an origin different from that of sense impressions. To the contrary, Kant remarks that "though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience."⁹ Here Kant is suggesting that sense impressions in and of themselves do not constitute knowledge, but rather that knowledge is obtained when the mind contributes something peculiar to itself.

A Priori Knowledge as Distinguished from A Posteriori Knowledge

We must therefore inquire whether there is in knowledge an element which is not derived from experience. Knowledge of this character Kant calls "a priori" as distinguished

⁸Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1953), p. 41. All subsequent references to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason will refer to this translation unless otherwise specified.

⁹Ibid.

from that derived from sense experience and called "a posteriori." For Kant "a priori" knowledge is that knowledge consisting of judgments independent of sensible experience.¹⁰ This a priori knowledge is further divided by Kant into (1) pure, and (2) mixed. "Pure a priori" knowledge exists when no sensible element whatever is involved in the object about which there is a judgment. "A triangle has three sides," for example, is a pure a priori judgment because a triangle is a determination of space; and, as Kant later shows, space is a pure form of perception. Conversely the judgment, "every change has a cause," is also a priori but it is not "pure" because there is no knowledge of change except in relation to sensible objects; and knowledge of sensible objects necessarily implies an element of sense perception.¹¹

In what follows, the Critique of Pure Reason has two questions for consideration: (1) Is there an a priori element

¹⁰Ibid., p. 42.

¹¹These two examples are given by Watson as exemplary of what Kant means by pure and mixed a priori knowledge. John Watson, The Philosophy of Kant Explained (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1908), p. 50. Watson describes the Kantian concept of experience as the apprehension of individual objects in space and time and their connection with one another. This concept will be elaborated upon under the consideration of space and time. Watson's interpretation of Kant's controversial definitions of experience will continue to be relied upon in this study.

in experience?--obviously, if such an element does exist in experience, it will be of the mixed a priori kind; and (2) Is there a priori knowledge that transcends experience? Apparently, if there is an a priori element in experience, that element, unlike the a posteriori element, must be such that it cannot be other than it is. As Kant says, experience teaches us (i.e. a posteriori knowledge) that a thing is so and so but not that it cannot be otherwise.

Thus we would say of a man who undermined the foundations of his house, that he might have known a priori that it would fall, that is, that he need not have waited for the experience of its falling. But still he could not know this completely a priori. For he had first to learn through experience that bodies are heavy, and therefore fall when their supports are withdrawn.¹²

While the man who undermines the foundations of his house does so expecting the house to fall because past experience is predictive of this eventual outcome, he yet does not know of the house's falling a priori--i.e. experience teaches us that such and such is the case in a particular instance but not that it cannot be otherwise without actually experiencing the happening thereof.

¹² Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 43.

A Priori Judgments Are Universal and Necessary

Thus if we mean, as Kant does, that a priori knowledge is not knowledge independent of this or that experience, then there should be no difficulty seeing that the a priori element of knowledge, unlike the a posteriori element, must be such that it cannot be other than it is. Hence every judgment that can only be thought "as necessary" is a priori. But further, because a priori judgments are necessary under all possible circumstances, they are, in the strictest sense, also universal. These two criteria imply each other, for whatever is necessary under all possible circumstances must be universal and whatever is universal under all circumstances must be necessary.

Hence the Critique of Pure Reason is an attempt to discover (1) if there is an element in experience that is universal and necessary and (2) if such an element transcends experience. Since an answer to the second question presupposes an answer to the first, it is set aside temporarily.

The Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgments

In examining the problem of a universal and necessary element existing in experience, Kant begins by pointing out

that every judgment exists in some form of relationship between subject and predicate.¹³ Watson remarks that the distinction of these forms is important because upon it depends the fundamental distinction between the content of analytic and synthetic judgments.¹⁴ This distinction must be carefully observed, however, so that analytic and synthetic judgments do not seem to correspond to a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Though all a posteriori knowledge is synthetic, all a priori knowledge does not necessarily follow from analytic judgments. On the contrary, the main problem for Kant, as previously pointed out, is to consider a priori knowledge which is yet synthetic.¹⁵

The Subject-Predicate Relationship of Judgments

The problem of synthetic and analytic judgments is a matter of the kind of relationship existent between the subject and predicate expressing the judgment. According to Watson's interpretation of Kant's verbose descriptions on this point, "an analytic judgment is one which expresses in the predicate what is already, though perhaps obscurely,

¹³Ibid., p. 48.

¹⁴Watson, p. 57.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 57-61.

implied in the subject; a synthetic judgment is one which adds something to what is already involved in the conception expressed by the subject."¹⁶ As Kant states:

I can apprehend the concept of body analytically through the characters of extension, impenetrability, figure, etc., all of which are thought in the concept. Now, however, looking back on the experience from which I have derived this concept of body, and finding weight to be invariably connected with the above characters, I attach it as a predicate to the concept; and in doing so I attach it synthetically, and am therefore extending my knowledge. The possibility of synthesis of the predicate "weight" with the concept of "body" thus rests upon experience.¹⁷

The Relationship of A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge to Analytic and Synthetic Judgments

To obtain the predicate in the analytic judgment, then, one is not required to go beyond the concept of the subject; and as a result, the predicate is formed independently of sensible experience and is, therefore, a priori. In the synthetic judgment, however, the predicate is not implied in the mere conception of the subject. No judgment can be synthetic unless it is an actual addition to knowledge in which the predicate is obtained through sense experience and thus goes beyond the conception of the subject.¹⁸

¹⁶Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁷Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 50.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 50-51.

Obviously, from Kant's point of view all analytic judgments are a priori and therefore are logically necessary and universal. This is true both of judgments whose content is derived from reason alone and those based upon sense experience. The first is known as analytic judgments of the pure type and the second as analytic judgments of the mixed type.¹⁹ Though we can no doubt obtain a priori analytic judgments both of the pure and the mixed type, as Kant contends, we cannot necessarily affirm anything except in regard to our own conceptions. As a result, the combination of the a priori with the synthetic seems an impossibility; at least this was the position held by the two schools of philosophical thought so prominent during Kant's time. And yet, unless we can show the legitimacy of judgments which are at once a priori and synthetic, we can have no knowledge of real existence whatsoever.

The Problem of A Priori Synthetic Judgments

An answer to the question concerning the relationship of a priori and synthetic judgments, Kant believes, will enable us to see how a pure science of nature is possible.²⁰

¹⁹Watson, p. 58.

²⁰Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 55.

The "sciences" to which Kant has reference are the mathematical sciences which determine the universal form of the sensible world, and the physical sciences which determine the principles underlying the system of connected objects of sense.²¹ Thus Kant seeks to discover how pure mathematics and pure physics are possible. If an answer to this search can be formulated, then Kant has cause to suspect that a system of reason is possible for resolving the problem of original concern, namely, the reconciliation of the scientific world as a law-governed system with the world of moral experience. For an explanation of the "synthetic a priori" possibility, Kant proceeds by analyzing the "transcendental Doctrine of Elements." The investigation of the "Doctrine of Elements" is divided into two parts: (1) "The Transcendental Aesthetic," which treats the a priori elements presupposed in perception; and (2) "The Transcendental Logic," which treats the a priori elements presupposed in thought.

The Transcendental Aesthetic

Philosophy, Kant tells us, explains "the principles of the rational cognition that concepts afford us of

²¹Ibid., pp. 52-54.

things."²² In the concluding remarks to the introduction of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states: "I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori."²³ Robert Paul Wolff, in considering these two statements, points out that "Transcendental Philosophy," therefore, "is a self-reflective, second level investigation whose purpose is to test and pass judgment upon the claims of reason in all its manifestations."²⁴ Wolff states:

All knowledge, or knowing, involves both an object and a subject. As the student of knowledge--the transcendental philosopher . . . cannot place these two elements on equal footing, but must instead make the subject primary and the object secondary. In other words, before he can investigate the nature of objects, he must determine the powers and limits of the subject. Thus, Transcendental or Critical Philosophy can be viewed as a systematic inventory of the possessions of the human mind, a catalog of the functions, capacities, modes of representation, passions, and actions of the self, all with an end to establish the validity or invalidity of their cognitive claims.²⁵

²²Immanuel Kant, Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), p. 8.

²³Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 59.

²⁴Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 35.

²⁵Ibid.

Assuming the role of philosophy to be "self-reflection," then, Kant proceeds in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" by treating perception as if it involved consciousness of an object, independent of any activity of thought. However, when he treats the "Transcendental Analytic," he considers the conditions in thought of experience and clearly indicates that there can be no knowledge of objects proper without the activity of thought. Therefore the point of view exhibited in the "Aesthetic" may be regarded in a certain sense as provisional to the total concept of knowledge.

The Isolation of Sense Perception--the Elements of Matter and Form

What Kant sets himself to do in the "Aesthetic" is, therefore, to point out that, assuming perception to be a form of knowledge in which individual sensible things are apprehended, we must maintain that perception contains two elements: (1) matter, coming from without; and (2) form, belonging to the very constitution of our perceptive faculties.²⁶

In the opening paragraphs of the "Aesthetic," Kant points out that the condition of perception is sensation when a modification of the subject is called forth through the

²⁶ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 65-66.

influence of an object.²⁷ A perception is a mode of consciousness that reflects itself directly to an object. The product of this reflection is sensibility which Kant defines as "the capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects,"²⁸ i.e. the receiving of certain ideas (ideas being any mode of theoretical consciousness).

Here, therefore, the term "object" is used in reference to the object in consciousness and not the thing in itself.²⁹ Hence the "object," as it exists apart from consciousness and in the world of the real, must be kept in contrast to the "object" as it exists in consciousness. The object in consciousness is the only object that can really be known; for, as Kant later shows, the object out of consciousness can exist only as an object of thought. This distinction between the conscious and the real objects is the distinction later drawn between the phenomenal object and real or noumenal existence. Such an object is a phenomenon inasmuch as it is not the thing in itself and is an object of

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., p. 65.

²⁹Watson, p. 75.

consciousness. Thus a phenomenon may be defined as any sensible object whatever of which we are conscious.³⁰ On the occasion of sensation, an object is produced in the form of a phenomenon comprised of two distinguishable elements: (1) matter (or content) which corresponds to sensation; and (2) form which is the ordering of the sensible manifold in relations of space and time.³¹

Kant's point is that sensations become an element in the perceived object (i.e. the phenomenon) when they are given form. Sensations are the matter to which form is given; and as sensations they are a "manifold," i.e. individual sensory stimulants given to us in sequences through time. But once sensations are given form through consciousness, as is required in order that a perceived object may result, they are no longer mere sensations but are ordered and formed and given the title "content of phenomenon." Hence the matter or content of the phenomenon corresponds to what previously was pure sensation.

The other element of the phenomenon, "the form," is likewise essential to a perceived object. As a result of

³⁰Ibid., pp. 75-76.

³¹Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 65-67.

form, the manifold sensations are ordered in certain relations. What Kant says, in effect, is that no perceived object (i.e. object internal to the self) can exist unless the sensible manifold is ordered into certain relations of space and time. The ordering of the sensible manifold, however, is not a distinguishing among parts of things or things in themselves, but rather a distinguishing among sensations that affect the self and are perceived as representative of things in themselves. And, as Watson points out, "since sensations are in themselves mere particulars without relations of any kind, we can only explain the perceived object by recognizing that the relations between sensations are due to another element, its form."³²

Kant, having distinguished between form and content, is now ready to make a major assumption concerning the origins of form. He assumes that in their own nature, sensations are mere particulars of experience; and from this he infers that the form applied to sensations must therefore come from some source other than the sensuous world. This form, in its pure sense, is the capacity for ordering sensations in certain relations; and this capacity, when actually exercised in

³²Watson, pp. 77-78.

relation to sensations, yields perceptions of sensible objects. As Kant says: "It will be found that there are two pure forms . . . serving as principles of a priori knowledge, namely, space and time."³³

The Exposition of the Concept of Space

Kant seeks to show in the exposition of space that space is not an empirical idea. When he says that "in external sense we are conscious of objects as outside of ourselves," he does not have reference to things in the world of the real or the extended world, but to objects as they exist within our consciousness, i.e. perceived objects or objects of apprehension. What exists "outside of ourselves" is what we perceive in space as being extended from ourselves. And what we perceive as inextended exists only in time. Or, in other words, what is perceived as extended and what is perceived as inextended is the distinction between objects we perceive as existing in space and objects we perceive as existing only in time. What, then, Kant asks, are space and time?

Are they [he inquires] real existences? Are they only determinations or relations of things, yet such as would

³³Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 67.

belong to things even if they were not intuited? Or are space and time such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind, apart from which they could not be ascribed to anything whatsoever?³⁴

In analyzing these questions Kant concludes that (1) space is non-empirical, (2) space is a necessary a priori, and (3) space is a pure intuition.

First, space is not an empirical concept, for in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me . . . and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only different but as in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed.³⁵

Space, therefore, cannot be empirically obtained from the relations of outer appearance. As a result, a perceived object cannot exist in space prior to its apprehension as so existing. But the object as it exists for the conscious subject (i.e. the conscious self) came into being in the perception. In other words, the sensations are in the act of perception ordered "spacially"; and, as Watson concludes, only in this way can sensations designate perceived objects. The external object as it is known comes into being with its presentation as spacial; and unless the spacial determination

³⁴Ibid., p. 68.

³⁵Ibid.

is presupposed, there can be no known external object whatsoever.³⁶

Second, space, Kant argues, is necessarily an a priori idea because, while we can think away any sensible object presented as in space, we cannot think away space itself.³⁷ The idea of space is thus necessary to any perception whatever. The necessity for space, however, does not prove that we are unable to think the absence of space, but only that the presentation of extended objects is impossible if we suppose the absence of space.

Third, since we can present to ourselves only one single space, space is a pure perception. Here Kant not only argues that space is an a priori idea, but he also specifies the kind of a priori idea it is. Space, he says, is a pure a priori idea because there is only a single space, not several spaces.³⁸ Space is itself a concrete, immediate idea of which the so-called spaces of individual experiences are only parts or determinations of one single space. There are no specifically different spaces; each particular space is

³⁶Watson, p. 83.

³⁷Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 68.

³⁸Ibid., p. 69.

space. Further, Kant contends, space is pure a priori because the "parts" of space do not precede the idea of space as constituents out of which it is made up, but are thought of as in the one all-embracing space.³⁹ The parts of space are not first given as parts and then put together so as to form a whole, but are rather a unity as an "infinite given magnitude," i.e. they "coexist ad infinitum."⁴⁰

Space, then, first because it is non-empirical, second because it is a priori, and third because it is a pure idea, cannot be said to have any independent reality. It exists only for beings who, as we, know under sensible conditions the perception of spacially located objects; for, if we suppose the removal of subjective conditions under which we have the perception of external things, space no longer has any meaning. Space is a determination given to sensible matter of our apprehension or added by the mind itself.

The Exposition of the Concept of Time

Kant's exposition of time is similar to that of space. Any differences are due primarily to the distinctive features of the former. Therefore the exposition of time may be

⁴⁰Ibid.

stated very briefly. Kant assumes that perception yields (1) knowledge of individual things as co-existent and (2) knowledge of the changes of things as successive. Watson points out that, on the basis of this assumption, Kant is now able to argue that knowledge is possible only under the presumption of time. For, unless the existence of time is presupposed, the consciousness of objects as existing units or events as following one from another is impossible to obtain.⁴¹ "Time is a necessary representation," Kant states, "that includes all intuitions. We cannot, in respect to appearances in general, remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as void of appearances. Time is, therefore, given a priori."⁴²

As in his consideration of space, Kant demonstrates certain a priori judgments based upon the "idea" of time and shows that these judgments are explicable only if we take a certain view of time. Kant assumes that a priori judgments are based upon the concept of time since obviously the judgments, "time has only one dimension," and "different times do not co-exist but follow one another," are a priori and

⁴¹Watson, p. 92.

⁴²Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 74-75.

based upon the idea of time.

What Kant now needs to prove is that the judgments we make under the perception of time are universal and necessary. On this subject, he relies heavily on his exposition of the concept of space. "Time has only one dimension," says Kant; and "different times are not simultaneous but successive (just as different spaces are not successive but simultaneous)." ⁴³ That is to say, "different times are but parts of one and the same time." ⁴⁴ Time is not discursive or what is called a general concept, but is a pure form provided for by the formulation of sensible intuitions.

Further, and still relying upon the exposition of space, Kant says we are conscious of the parts of time only in so far as we consider "the one single time." ⁴⁵ Time is only a perception which can yield consciousness of one individual whole. It is the method in which the mind orders its ideas, and the ordering of ideas is undoubtedly a real function. Without the capacity to order the sensible in time, we could have no experience. But time cannot be predicted as a determination of things in themselves just because it is

⁴³Ibid., p. 75.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid.

the subjective condition of experience. Thus, while we affirm the "empirical reality" of time, we must also maintain its "transcendental ideality," meaning that time is neither a real thing nor a property or relation of real things, but merely the manner in which objects are presented to us under the necessary conditions of experience. As such, time itself is a priori.

The assumptions involved in Kant's exposition of space and time are in fact the fundamental assumptions of his entire Critical philosophy. But Norman Kemp Smith, concerned only with the problem of immediate consideration, namely, isolation of the a priori elements in sensory content, points out that

the proof that space and time are subjective forms establishes the phenomenal character of everything which can be apprehended in and through them, and is meaningless except on the assumption that things in themselves exist. This assumption, Kant argues, is already involved in the very word "appearance," and unless it be granted, our thinking will revolve in a perpetual circle.⁴⁶

Perhaps one's difficulty in understanding Kant's reasoning lies in the expectation of any proof at all. Kant might have been simply explaining his position. How else can one convince someone of a principle so basic that there

⁴⁶Smith, p. 406.

is nothing more ultimate from which to argue? Subordinate principles can be proved by deducing them from more fundamental premises; but ultimately these premises must stand without proof. When one comes to first principles there is nothing to do but explain their meaning and rest the case there. Apparently this is the position in which Kant finds himself.⁴⁷

Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic: Space and Time

In the introduction to the "Aesthetic," Kant questions how a priori synthetic judgments may be possible. This problem has been partly answered in the discussion of the "Transcendental Aesthetic," in the consideration of space and time.

The problem was to explain the existence of a priori judgments in which the predicate is ascribed to the subject and not analytically contained in the conception of that subject. Or, to restate the problem, the question was to ascertain the X or middle term which provides for the legitimate

⁴⁷There is, to be sure, other evidence of an object's existence, such as the way others describe the object, the frequency of light waves it reflects, etc. But for Kant this other evidence is all indirect evidence based upon sensory perception. Thus, ultimately, perceiving an object's existence is the only evidence of the object's really existing.

connection of the predicate with the subject when the predicate involved a determination that transcends the subject. This X or middle term is revealed as the pure forms of perception, namely, space and time.

The judgments based upon the concepts of space and time have, by virtue of their very nature, a limited range, however. Based upon perception, they have no meaning except in relation to objects of our sensible experience. In other words, we must not suppose that we have justified the application of such judgments to all possible objects whatsoever, but only to all possible objects of experience. A consideration of the ultimate connection of a priori judgments to all perception whatsoever is left to the "Transcendental Logic."

Transcendental Analytic

When Kant passes from the "Transcendental Aesthetic" to the "Transcendental Logic," he modifies and supplements the conclusions reached in the former to meet the needs of the latter. He repeats that there are two stems of human knowledge: sensibility and understanding, by which he means sense impressions and reasoning. As Kant says: "Without sensibility no object would be given us, without understanding

no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."⁴⁸

In the introduction to the "Transcendental Analytic," which is the first major division of the "logic," Kant repeats the distinction between sensibility and understanding in a slightly modified form. Here he says there are two ultimate sources of knowledge. The first is sense perception which he has discussed in the "Aesthetic"; the second is thought or understanding which he proposes to discuss in the "Logic." Watson believes that Kant speaks of sensibility as if it of itself were sufficient to give us knowledge of individual objects and as if thought, starting from these given objects, proceeds by thinking them.⁴⁹ But, as Kant proceeds to point out in the "Logic," the "Aesthetic" has not given a full answer to the question: "How is the synthetic a priori possible?" A perception without the exercise of thought is inadequate for making judgments about individual objects. In the "Aesthetic," Kant describes space and time as "pure perceptions"; but in the actual practice of making judgments,

⁴⁸Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 61.

⁴⁹See Watson, p. 107, for an analysis of Kant's views on sensibility apart from thought.

they are shown only as "pure forms" of perception.⁵⁰ A pure form of perception is simply a capacity for ordering sensible impressions in certain fixed ways, and this capacity can yield us knowledge of objects only when it is actualized or determined.⁵¹ Pure forms of perception will not yield knowledge of objects without some unity or combination of the parts of the object to be perceived. Therefore the problem with which Kant must now contend is that objects can be made known only in their combined or synthesized form and perception cannot combine. Combination or synthesis is the work of reasoning;⁵² and in the case of perceptions, the work of reasoning operates in an unconscious or unreflective way. When it so operates, Kant calls it productive imagination; and, Watson remarks, productive imagination is really thought operating directly in relation to sensible content.

Thought, therefore, in the form of a direct action on sense, is presupposed even in perception. The result of its action, however, is only to produce a perceptual image. In the strict sense of the term there is

⁵⁰Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 67.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 96.

⁵²Kant here uses the word "understanding" rather than "reasoning"; but greater insight into what Kant had in mind may be gained if we remember that understanding in Kant's frame of reference is more nearly like our present day connotation of the word "reasoning."

as yet no knowledge of objects, i.e. no connected system of perceptions. Hence . . . a further action of thought is required in the explanation of experience.⁵³

In leading up to this problem, Kant seems to have in mind a new distinction between perception and thought. Sensibility, no matter how we view it, is concerned with the mind's perception of sense impressions. In other words, impressions of sense constitute the content that the mind receives as it is affected by sense stimuli received from objects external to the self. Thought, on the other hand, is the formulation applied to the content of sense impressions. When no sense impressions are given to the mind, thought in and of itself cannot constitute knowledge of the real and objective world. According to Watson's analysis of Kant, analytic judgments of thought, in which general or abstract conceptions are manipulated, have no objective meaning except in reference to the perception of individual objects.⁵⁴ Knowledge, setting aside for the meantime the ideas of reason alone (formal logic, for example), arises only from the united action of thought and perception. In the "Aesthetic," Kant isolated the sensibility in order to inquire into the a priori

⁵³Watson, p. 109.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 110.

forms of perception. Similarly, he must now isolate the understanding in order to inquire into its a priori forms if indeed such should exist.

The Logical Employment of Reasoning

Kant's "Transcendental Logic" is divided into two parts: (1) "Transcendental Analytic," and (2) "Transcendental Dialectic." The object of the "Analytic" is to show that pure a priori conceptions do exist in analytical type judgments and that there are pure a priori judgments based upon them (analytical type judgments) which determine the conditions under which all sensible experience is possible. Obviously, then, the nature of reasoning is of prime importance and consequently is the first subject Kant takes up under the "Analytic."

The character of a conception is such that it presupposes perceptions; and hence reasoning is always an indirect or mediating process of knowledge. It operates, not directly with objects, but only with conceptions which are relative to perceptions. The one function of thought is to inter-relate conceptions. The use which reasoning makes of conceptions is to judge by means of them; and we may properly say, therefore, that all reasoning is judgment.

This is indeed the point that Kant so laboriously makes. As he explains:

Since no representation . . . is in immediate relation to an object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately [directly], but to some other representation of it. . . . Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of any object. . . . In every judgment there is a concept which holds for many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately [directly] related to an object. . . . Accordingly, all judgments are functions of unity among our representations.⁵⁵

With the role of judgment delineated as the function of uniting various representations, Kant believes that all acts of reasoning may be reduced to judgments and reasoning itself may be represented in the mind's actions as a "faculty of judgment."⁵⁶ In this way Kant moves to what Robert Paul Wolff calls "the most important consequence of the 'analytic,' namely that judgment rather than conception is the fundamental activity of the mind."⁵⁷

Up to this point Kant has presented no clear explanation of the "concept" and "perception." As a result, Wolff comments: "It is a remarkable fact that after nearly two centuries of intensive criticism and study, commentators have

⁵⁵Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 105.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 105-06.

⁵⁷Wolff, p. 63.

not come to an agreement about the precise nature of Kant's argument in the 'Transcendental Analytic.'"58 The explanation most frequently given for the "Analytic" is the one Wolff attempts to clarify and is the explanation adopted here. "Concepts," explains Wolff, "'rest on functions,' and a function is 'the unity of the act of bringing various representations [perceptions] under one common representation.'"59 The difference between saying that a concept "rests on a function" and saying that "it is a function" is further explained by Wolff as follows: "Concepts turn out to be rules [or laws] for the performance of mental activities, and according to Kant these rules are built upon certain underlying simple 'functions.'"60 As an example, the concept (rule) of cause and effect is based upon the temporal relation of succession; the concept of reciprocity is based upon the temporal relation of contemporaneity, and so forth. A concept, therefore, is a rule or rules for the function of unifying several perceptions by abstracting from their differences and attending only to their common characteristics. Thus the

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

function upon which concepts rest is, in a strict sense, deductive judgments. Concepts relate to objects only mediately, or indirectly through judgments which combine "perceptions of a perception" of an object.⁶¹ Perceptions of an object are given by means of the senses; and they are, in turn, combined or synthesized by the functions of judgment which are directed by concepts. The fundamental activity of the mind, then, can thus be revealed if the functions of unity in judgments can be completely exhibited. This is the next task of Kant's concern.

The Table of Judgments and the Table of Categories

Hitherto Kant has generally spoken of the pure or a priori concepts of the understanding. But now he also calls them "categories."⁶² Wolff states that Kant here has in mind the works of Aristotle, from whom he takes the term "category."⁶³

The understanding possesses an a priori categorical structure which, because of what it is, necessarily

⁶¹ Ibid. The fact should be noted that Kant uses the term "judgment" as interchangeable with "reasoning."

⁶² Copleston, p. 250.

⁶³ Wolff, p. 61.

synthesizes perceptions in certain fundamental ways in accordance with certain basic categories. As Copleston explains, the categories are the a priori conditions for the possibility of objects being thought. And without being thought, the objects cannot really be said to be known.⁶⁴ For the sake of convenience Copleston gives the "Table of Judgments" and the "Table of Categories" side by side, showing which category corresponds, or is believed to correspond, with each judgment. The tables of Kant's judgments and categories, as given by Copleston, are as follows:⁶⁵

Judgments		Categories	
I	Quantity	I	Quantity
	A. Universal		A. Unity
	B. Particular		B. Plurality
	C. Singular		C. Totality
II	Quality	II	Quality
	A. Affirmative		A. Reality
	B. Negative		B. Negation
	C. Infinite		C. Limitation
III	Relation	III	Relation
	A. Categorical		A. Inherence and substance (Substance and accident)
	B. Hypothetical		B. Causality and dependence (Cause and effect)

⁶⁴Copleston, p. 250.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 250-51.

C. Disjunctive

C. Community (reciprocity
between agent and
patient)

IV Modality

IV Modality

A. Problematic

A. Possibility-impossibility

B. Assertoric

B. Existence-non-existence

C. Apodictic

C. Necessity-contingency

The categories of understanding, which are functions of unity, are devised to express the universal character of objects a priori. Inasmuch as the categories are the necessary functions of unity, they are inseparable from the very constitution of knowledge. Following this principle to its logical conclusion, Kant finds that an equal number of categories of understanding (knowledge) and functions of concepts in judgments must exist if indeed those functions of judgment are to constitute the essence of understanding. Without an equal number of categories we cannot judge at all.

In the deduction of the categories, Kant faces the difficulty of explaining or justifying the contention that they are universal and necessary principles of understanding. As Copleston explains, no such difficulty exists concerning the employment of the a priori forms of sensibility, because no objects can be given to us at all except through the subjection of sensory content to the forms of space and time.

Copleston states: "It would be foolish to ask how we are justified in applying the forms of sensibility to objects. For these forms are a necessary condition of there being objects at all."⁶⁶ This is not the case, however, with the categories of understanding. Kant explains that, unlike sense perceptions, in the understanding the objects are already present in the form of perceptions⁶⁷ and as such the categories may give a distorted representation of them. Kant proceeds to resolve this problem by means of the deduction of pure concepts of understanding.

Transcendental Deduction of the A Priori Concepts

What remains to be explained is the actual systematic connection by the mind of all objects of experience into a whole. Consciousness must, therefore, be itself a unity. As a result, Kant presents the disjunctive argument that either the object alone must make the representation possible in its connected form or the representation alone must make the object possible.⁶⁸ Kant's consideration of these two alternatives may be summarily set forth in the following manner.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 252.

⁶⁷Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 121.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 125.

The perception of an object involves the presence to consciousness of various elements viewed by the mind as a single whole or totality. This is called synopsis; but evidently, since no distinctive elements can ever be presented to the mind unless they have been distinguished and combined by the mind, synopsis must necessarily imply some form of synthesis. The explanation that objects of perception refer merely to sensibility is not adequate; for the sensibility is purely receptive, and as such it can yield only an unconnected manifold. With the receptivity must be combined the spontaneity of synthesis born out of the categories. But a category has absolutely nothing in common with perception. In the example given by Watson, the category of cause, viewed purely in itself, "is simply the conception of the relation between a condition and that which is conditioned or dependent upon it."⁶⁹ The question specifically asked, then, is: How can a sensible object legitimately be brought under a pure conception or category, seeing that they have nothing in common? What must be shown is how pure conceptions of understanding (reasoning) may be employed in the actual determination of objects of sense even though objects of sense

⁶⁹Watson, p. 170.

have nothing in common with these conceptions. As Wolff believes, Kant's development of the synthesis is the most important and central concept of the entire Critical Philosophy.⁷⁰

The "Schema"

In Kant's thinking a mediatory idea must operate between pure conceptions and possible objects, an idea homogeneous with the object of sense on the one side and with the categories of judgment on the other. In addition, this mediating idea (called an idea at this point of Kant's analysis because of the inconclusiveness of its present development) must be pure, because what has to be explained is how there can be a priori synthetic judgments in regard to objects of sense. Kant explains this important and central problem of the "Critical Philosophy" in the following terms:

Now among the manifold concepts which form the complicated web of human knowledge, there are some which are marked out for pure a priori employment, in complete independence of all experience; and their right to be so employed always demands a deduction [i.e. the deduction of the categories]. For since empirical proofs do not suffice to justify this kind of employment, we are faced by the problem how these concepts can relate to objects which they yet do not obtain

⁷⁰ Wolff, p. 67.

from any experience.⁷¹

Inasmuch as the mediating element is to connect pure conceptions, which are intellectual, with the object of perception, which is sensuous, it must therefore be at once intellectual and sensuous.

The categories, as have been shown previously, constitute the mode of producing synthetic unity in sensuous elements of which we are conscious as different. The question then arises concerning the manner in which pure conceptions of understanding introduce unity so as to enable us to make universal and necessary judgments. If there is a universal and necessary way of combining the elements of sense in relation to time, for example, then the manner in which the categories are related to objects of sense can be made known. This is so because the universal manner of determining the sensible in relation to time is (1) homogeneous with the category and thus universal and (2) rests upon an a priori rule.

Kant calls such a representation as that connecting the category with the object the transcendental schema. The schema, says Kant, "is in itself always a product of

⁷¹Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 120-21.

imagination";⁷² but as he goes on to show, it is a particular product of the imagination. Since the object which the schema produces is not individual but universal, or rather is not the production of an individual object, it is thus a certain "universal method" of producing an individual object. Kant explains this crucial point in the following manner:

Since . . . the synthesis of imagination aims at no special intuition, but only at unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema has to be distinguished from the image. If five points be set along side one another, thus,, I have an image of the number five. But if, on the other hand, I think only a number in general, whether it be five or a hundred, this thought is rather the representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this concept.⁷³

The schema of a number, then, for example, is the method by which the number five, or any other number for that matter, is produced. In other words, the schema is the idea of the successive combination of units into a whole in conformity with the conception. Obviously, there is a difference between the image and the schema; for, while the schema enables us to realize the conception, a certain difficulty arises in attempting to show that the image is adequate to

⁷²Ibid., p. 182.

⁷³Ibid.

the conception.

While the above description explains "what" the schema does in Kant's view of category-object relations, it does not explain "how" the schema establishes its relations of categories to objects. For an explanation of the "how," two previously discussed factors must be reconsidered, namely, "time" and "causality."

To repeat, schema is a transcendental product of the imagination, i.e. it is the means of bringing sense perceptions under the form established by the categories (which are a priori) by virtue of the imagination. A sense perception (i.e. a sensation) is not an extensive magnitude. That is to say, each sensation must be conceived as occupying only a single moment of time. The quantity of sensation is, therefore, not extensive quantity. Every sensation fills a given moment of time with more or less of itself.

The schema, then, in some way must imply the relation of the sensible to time. It does this through the category of "cause." Causality is the conception of the condition and conditioned: the logical dependency of one thing upon another. The schema here assumes the special form of ordered succession in time, so that cause and effect as known in our experience necessarily imply the regular or ordered succession

of phenomena in time. In other words, a cause is always an antecedent, an effect always a consequent; and the antecedent and consequent are so related that without the former the latter cannot be.

The schema, then, is a determination of the inner sense; it brings the sensible into relation with time, time being a form of the inner sense as considered under the "Aesthetic." This determination of the sensible relative to time is a necessary condition of knowledge, because apart from this process the categories have nothing to which they can be applied. And inasmuch as the application of the categories to the sensible is a condition in us, with schemata there would be no unity of apperception.⁷⁴ Hence Copleston concludes by restating that

time is the only feature which is common to all appearances whatsoever, including the states of the empirical self. . . . Time is the formal condition of the connection or conjunction of all representations. And a transcendental determination of time, which is a product of the imagination, has, as it were, a footing in both camps. It is homogeneous with the category of which it is the schema in that it is universal and rests on an a priori rule. It is homogeneous with appearances [objects] in that time is contained in every empirical representation

⁷⁴"Apperception" is a term used by Kant to express consciousness of self as distinguished from and related to objects. See Copleston, pp. 255-58.

of the manifold.⁷⁵

In Kant's own words:

Thus an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category.⁷⁶

One may question why Kant so completely ignores space as the second a priori element of the "Aesthetic." Norman Kemp Smith states:

No really satisfactory answer seems to present itself. It is true that time is the one universal form of all intuition, of outer as well as of inner experience. It is also true that, as Kant elsewhere shows, consciousness of time presupposes consciousness of space for its own possibility, and so to that extent may be regarded as including the latter form of consciousness within itself.⁷⁷

Admittedly, Kant gives no real explanation for disregarding the idea of space as a component of the schema. Yet, as Kemp Smith points out, the answer may not be totally lacking. Since the taking place of events in time necessarily implies their taking place in space, it seems unnecessary to expound upon the obvious. This is at least one approach to resolving the question of space that may otherwise go

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 258.

⁷⁶ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 181.

⁷⁷ Smith, p. 341.

unanswered.

Similarly, Kant does not discuss at much length the schemata as corresponding to the categories. "And what he does say is in some instances extremely difficult to understand," Copleston points out.⁷⁸ For most practical purposes, what Kant has to say concerning the correspondence of the schema to the categories may be summarily stated in the following manner. The schema of "quality" is the consciousness of an object generated by a successive synthesis in time, a synthesis which at once generates time itself. The schema of quality is the synthesis of sensation fulfilling a given moment of time. The schema of relation is the relation of different perceptions to one another at all times or in conformity with a rule for the determination of time. Lastly, the schema of modality is the relation of objects to time itself, whether that relation is the relation to time in general, to a specific time, or to all time.⁷⁹ The schemata are, therefore, the modes in which the categories may be determined in relation to the sensible elements of perception by reference to time. Because things take place in time and

⁷⁸Copleston, p. 258.

⁷⁹Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 182-87.

because causality relates events one to another, we imagine a unity or synthesis of intuition which brings sensible objects under a given form known as a category. In a summary type statement of Kant's total argument, Kemp Smith states that "the true Critical teaching is that the category and intuition, that is to say, form and content, mutually condition one another, and that the so-called schema is simply a name for the latter as apprehended in terms of the former."⁸⁰

Transcendental Dialectic

As Kant passes from the first part of the "Transcendental Logic," namely, the "Transcendental Analytic," to the second part, the "Transcendental Dialectic," he enters upon a new problem. Kant has set forth in the "Analytic" the conditions under which logic, or judgment, as he frequently calls it, may be related to sensuous content of objects. Through the "Analytic," we become aware of the fact that our knowledge of objects cannot be the same as the ultimate nature of things. Implied in this fact is a reality beyond our capabilities of understanding. The problem for the Dialectic, then, is to discover the limits of reasoning in determining ultimate reality. As a result of Kant's investigation, the

⁸⁰Smith, pp. 335-36.

conclusion is reached that pure reason cannot determine things as they absolutely are.

The examination of the limits of pure reason is titled by Kant, "Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion." The term "illusion" is here given as an all-important concept, for Kant's belief is that in attempting to determine ultimate reality from pure conceptions a kind of illusion arises that comes from confusing understanding with things in themselves.

In the concluding remarks of the "Analytic," Kant prepares the way for clarifying the limits of pure reason by introducing and distinguishing between the terms "Phenomena" and "Noumena." Wolff says that in the strictest sense "phenomenon" means for Kant the "object of sensibility," while "noumenon" means the "object of intelligence."⁸¹ Kant describes "noumenon" as a new element of knowledge he introduces to contrast with phenomenon in the following manner:

If by "noumenon" we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility.

⁸¹ Wolff, p. 314.

This would be "noumenon" in the positive sense of the term.⁸²

If by a "noumenon," Kant means an idea of an object that is not an object of sense, he is then setting up a conception of that which transcends phenomena. Perceptions involve sensibility, but nothing in perception precludes the existence in the object of something knowable only by intellection. The value of the concept of a "noumenon" is to prevent us from assuming that objects of experience are the objects in and of themselves.

To deal with the differentiation of "noumenon" and phenomenon, Kant proposes still another distinction in knowledgeable processes. In the first part of the "Transcendental Logic," he treated understanding as somewhat synonymous with what may be thought of as "reasoning" or the faculty for drawing knowledgeable conclusions under the direction of rules. Here in the "Dialectic," Kant distinguishes reason from understanding by entitling it the "faculty of principles."⁸³ He states that "understanding may be regarded as a faculty which secures the unity of appearances by means of rules, and reason as being the faculty which secures the

⁸²Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 268.

⁸³Ibid., p. 301.

unity of the rules of understanding under principles."⁸⁴

By virtue of the distinction thus made between understanding and reasoning, reasoning does not deal directly with objects of perception, but with judgments containing conceptions already derived from perceptions. The relation of reason to perception is thus indirect. As an example, Kant explains that the process of a syllogism consists of bringing a certain conception under the condition of a rule with which principles of reason directly operate.⁸⁵ In the distinction between reason and perception, pure reason is intellectual and is not directly related to perceptions of sense but rather presupposes the work of understanding. Reason in its pure logical use (transcendental use) searches for the unconditional, assuming that when a condition is given by the understanding, reason can pass to the conditional. If reason is capable of leading us to knowledge of reality in its completeness, then the knowledge of that reality must be possible because reason can pass from the conditioned as revealed in experience to the unconditional without having recourse to experience.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 303.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 304.

The illusion to which Kant has reference in the introduction to the "Dialectic" may now be explained. Without the distinction of understanding and reasoning and the processes to which they are applicable, one is apt to confuse the intellectual world with the sensuous world. In other words, "Transcendental Illusion" arises from the confusion of phenomena and things in themselves. The maintaining of this distinction, however, i.e. between reason and understanding, and "noumenon" and phenomenon, by no means allows us to determine reality by reason alone. On the contrary, while reason is capable of application beyond the sphere of sensible phenomena, the understanding does not enable the securing of any real extension beyond that supplied by sense perceptions. No knowledge is possible for use, except in so far as perceptual elements are given which, in turn, can be subsumed under the rules of the understanding. Where no such elements are given, the conception is merely a logical one.

Yet one should note that the categories do have a problematic extension beyond the sphere of experience.⁸⁶ The very fact that when viewed in themselves they are non-sensuous implies that the categories, in limiting their actual application to phenomenon, are at the same time setting up

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 457.

conditions of that which transcends phenomena, i.e. conditions in the conception of the noumenon. In the end, however, we can form no definite idea of any object non-sensuously. All that we gain directly from the conception of the noumenon is that we are prevented from declaring phenomena to be things in themselves, and thus we leave open a possible sphere beyond phenomena which can be filled by the exercise of reason. The categories help form the basis of the content for this reasoning.

The Synthesis A Priori and the
Rationality of Laws

The question of Kant's original concern was how the reconciliation of fixed laws of judgment with the constraining characteristics of nature can be possible when laws are invariable and nature flexible and changing. Kant himself asks:

But as regards the empirical rule of association, which we must postulate throughout when we assert that everything in the series of events is so subject to rule that nothing ever happens save in so far as something precedes it on which it universally follows--upon what I ask, does this rule, as a law of nature, rest? How is this association itself possible? The ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold, so far as it lies in the object, is named the affinity of the manifold. I therefore ask, how are we to make comprehensible to ourselves the thoroughgoing affinity of appearances, whereby they

stand and must stand under unchanging laws?⁸⁷

Kant's interpretation of laws, like knowledge in general, is founded in the analysis of the conceptual element of the knowing process. "Rational structure in things," Milmed reminds us, "is a product of our ways of understanding them, by virtue of which they are constituted as physical objects; but rational structures by themselves are empty and irrelevant to knowledge unless there is sensory subject matter that fits into them."⁸⁸ Kant's own contribution to the analysis of the character of laws states that

understanding is something more than a power of formulating rules through comparison of appearances; it is itself the lawgiver of nature. . . . Understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and so of its formal unity. . . . [And] certainly, empirical laws, as such, can never derive their origin from pure understanding. . . . All empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding, under which, and according to the norm of which, they first become possible.⁸⁹

Empirical laws, then, are regarded by Kant as the fundamental laws of science which are deductively derived from the very principles by which physical objects are constituted, i.e. from the principles of understanding. Laws

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 139.

⁸⁸Milmed, p. 51.

⁸⁹Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 148.

of nature, says Kant, are special "determinations of still higher laws, and the highest of these, under which the others all stand, issue a priori from the understanding itself."⁹⁰ Just as appearances do not exist in themselves but only relatively to the subject in which, so far as it has senses, they inhere, so the laws do not exist in the appearance but only relatively to this same being, so far as it has understanding.⁹¹ Consequently, empirical laws, Milmed concludes, "derive their existential subject matter from sense perception, but their structure . . . from logic."⁹²

But laws are special cases of applied logic; they exist only in accordance with logic's application to sensory material. Milmed explains that laws are not entities "which somehow exist independently of us waiting to be discovered, nor are they a by-product of our senses; we understand sensory material by means of them, and we develop them in so doing."⁹³ She believes we may come closer to the real nature of laws as Kant viewed them by thinking of them in terms of

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 147-48.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 172.

⁹² Milmed, p. 51.

⁹³ Ibid.

an applied logic or a "logic of physics."⁹⁴ Such an interpretation of logic is obviously consistent with Kant's distinction between sense content and thought as the irreducible elements of knowledge, i.e. between the material and formal components of knowledge where the formal components (categories) are the ruling principles of thought.

Certainly such an interpretation is consistent with what Kant himself explains in selected passages. "Categories are concepts which prescribe laws a priori to appearances and therefore to nature the sum of all appearances."⁹⁵ In the Prolegomena, Kant explains that the

"formal conditions of all judgments in general . . . offered in logic . . . constitute a logical system"; the categories "grounded thereupon" constitute a "transcendental system"; and the principles, by means of which all phenomena are subsumed under these concepts, constitute a physical system . . . which precedes all empirical knowledge of nature, and makes it possible.⁹⁶

The "logic of physics," then, is the system for conceptualizing the laws of knowledge generally. "Thus the understanding is something more than a power of formulating rules through comparison of appearances; it is itself the

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 85.

⁹⁵ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 172.

⁹⁶ Cited in Milmed, p. 55.

lawgiver of nature."⁹⁷

But what, then, are we to believe concerning the nature of laws? Are we to believe that laws are categorical applications of form to sensory content in accordance with some supreme and possibly unknown guiding principles? Surely not, for Kant never pretends that specific a priori laws may be known in each and every instance. Contrarywise, he explains that

if . . . wax, which was formerly hard, melts, I can know a priori that something must have preceded, . . . upon which the melting has followed according to the fixed law, although a priori, independently of experience, I could not determine, in any specific manner, either the cause from effect, or the effect from the cause.⁹⁸

Thus the laws which we know a priori are not the "many laws of nature which we can know only by means of experience; but conformity to law in the connection of appearances."⁹⁹ All this tells us, however, is that laws must be present in the application of logic to objects; but it does not tell us what these laws are, nor does it give any real clue to their nature except in so far as laws may be defined

⁹⁷Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 148.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 610.

⁹⁹Immanuel Kant, The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1951), p. 65.

by the categories of the understanding.¹⁰⁰ Still, nothing is seen to indicate that laws differ from other categories.

Kant now points out, however, that the determining of individual and specific laws must occur in the context of each happening under consideration as it may be perceived by means of the categories. In the sense that laws are thus determined on the basis of individual happenings, a distinct and decisive difference between categories and laws appears. The occurrence of an event goes unknown unless it be brought into being through the medium of the categories by which it becomes knowable. Laws, on the other hand, come into being by virtue of events being known. In this connection, Milmed refers to Kant's example illustrating that we sometimes find in perception

"that a certain appearance is constantly followed by another (though not conversely); . . . for instance, . . . if the sun shines long enough upon a body it grows warm." Here, in this very statement of the facts perceived, we are applying a "conditioned judgment," or "hypothetical judgment," the "form" of which is "first given a priori, by means of logic." This form is applied whenever we have one cognition given as antecedent and another given as consequent.¹⁰¹

Kant's above statement may be further explained in

¹⁰⁰ Milmed, p. 56.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 57.

the following manner. The transformation of a proposition which may be merely a subjective connection of perceptions into a proposition that explains and, as Kant would have us say, objectively legislates to nature, demands that such a "connection of perceptions" be both necessary and universally valid. But since we cannot, according to Kant, completely and objectively account for either the sun or the body warmed in terms of objects in and of themselves, we cannot make the necessary transformation of subjective statements of past perceptions into objective law about future events except in a hypothetical sense: that if the antecedent be true, the consequent likewise is true. "For experience can be nothing but objectively valid knowledge of appearances and of their succession, only so far as the earlier can be joined with the latter according to the rule of hypothetical judgments."¹⁰²

In essence, then, the answer to Kant's problem concerning laws and the way out of the apparent dilemma in which he finds himself is the logical inductive inference.

Several particular instances, which are one and all certain, are scrutinized in view of the rule, to see whether they follow from it. If it then appears that all particular instances which can be cited follow from the rule, we argue to its universality, and from this again to all particular instances, even to

¹⁰² Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. 59.

those which are not themselves given.¹⁰³

Because the process of reasoning in the securing of law is based upon ideas as problematic concepts, Kant gives to it the title of "the hypothetical employment of reason." Because it is hypothetical, its products in terms of the laws it helps establish are not, properly speaking, constitutive. That is to say that, as laws, they are "not of such a character that, judging in all strictness, we can regard . . . [them] as proving the truth of the universal rule."¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, laws established through the hypothetical employment of reason are regulative so far as may be possible, for their sole aim is "to bring unity into the body of our detailed knowledge, and thereby to approximate the rule of universality."¹⁰⁵

In short, laws are a special kind of category. Categories issue forth a priori from the understanding and are necessary to the apperception of natural objects. Just as physical objects are defined by the categories, so is "nature," as the sum of physical objects, defined by the categories.

¹⁰³Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 535.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

Happenings in the objective world are subject to the categories and thus cannot violate the laws of their application without becoming irrelevant in their existence.¹⁰⁶

But, while categories are necessary to perception of physical objects, categories themselves do not constitute laws. Laws are the rule of catholicizing numerous perceptions under a single principle. They are derived from logical inference and thus are a logical formulation which in turn becomes applicable to further happenings in order to bring universality into the nature of objective occurrences. Milmed states:

Laws are not, then, deducible from the actual structure of the understanding, as Kant has elsewhere asserted, although they may be deducible from other scientific laws. The form of scientific laws, however, the assumption (that of a universal system) in line with which science advances, is derived from the actual structure of reason, although only as its ideal limit. Thus the laws are not arbitrary; those laws are to be regarded as valid that most advance that structure in the direction of (unattainable) completeness, besides being empirically applicable.¹⁰⁷

As such, laws are logically speaking hypothetical as opposed to the categorical nature of knowledge concerning objects given. Consequently, laws cannot be constitutive. In contrast to the categories of the understanding, laws, because

¹⁰⁶Milmed, p. 56.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 70.

they introduce universality into the manifold of understanding, are regulative. Laws, being regulative, require that nature should direct itself and indeed depend upon our subjective ground of apperception in respect to its conformity to law.¹⁰⁸ Kant concludes that "if we do not . . . proceed in accordance with laws, . . . our guessing or enquiring into the existence of anything will only be idle pretense."¹⁰⁹ Laws, like knowledge in general, begin with experience but arise a priori from the understanding only to return to experience as a regulative factor of a manifold perception.

Summary

Duncan assures us that "any brief account of such a complex work as a [first] Critique is bound to be dogmatic and is open to the dangers of distortion."¹¹⁰ This is especially true when the purpose for considering the Critique is to abstract from it only those concepts and ideas that may have bearing upon an allied but otherwise unconsidered subject such as rhetoric. Remembering the limited intent for

¹⁰⁸ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 140.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 243-44.

¹¹⁰ Duncan, p. 40.

this analysis, however, will allow for alteration in perspective if such an analysis is desired for purposes other than the one here intended.

The immediate line of thought leading to the first Critique was Kant's realization of the problem of objective validity of intellectual presentations. Here Kant is chiefly concerned with an inquiry into speculative and cognitive employment of reason. Knowledge, according to Kant, is possible only when sensibility and understanding work together inseparably in the same harness. When such is the case, synthetic a priori truths are possible. Synthetic a priori truths are universally and necessarily true; but unlike analytic truths, their necessity cannot be derived from definitions of the subject term involved. Space and time are the a priori forms of sensibility; quantity, quality, relation, and modality are the a priori categories of our understanding. The categories of the understanding organize the contents of sense experience in terms of the rules they establish. What the categories order are the items of experience--tactile impressions, sounds, shapes, sizes, odors, etc. But Kant still recognized the problem of showing how a priori principles relate to empirical data. The answer to this problem is found in the mediatory power of time--time itself being one

of the necessary conditions of sense experience. Through the presupposition of substance and the relating of the concepts of causality and time, the synthesis of the categories to objects and hence the knowledge of things making up the natural world is made possible. According to the critical position here established, Kant is forced to make a distinction between the phenomenal world which can be known and the "noumenal" which can only be thought. Following this line of reasoning, the regulative factors of man's existence, i.e. the laws that direct his activities, are seen as products of reasoning and not of sensory perception. The actual nature of these laws, however, revealed in Kant's later works, will be the topic of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE "SYNTHESIS A PRIORI" AND PRACTICAL REASON-- A DEVELOPMENT OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

Introduction

Louis Infield, in his "Proem" to Kant's Lectures on Ethics, states that "philosophy is either theoretical or practical. . . . The theoretical form judges the object; the practical produces it."¹ Paul Schilpp, in his work on Kant's pre-critical ethics, points out that "from the beginning, Kant wanted to lay definite and lasting foundations for the philosophical disciplines."² In light of the theoretical and practical dichotomous nature of philosophy and Immanuel Kant's desire to include in his works the determinable basis for the differing philosophical disciplines, the student of Kantian

¹Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (New York: The Century Co., 1930), p. 1.

²Paul Arthur Schilpp, Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1938), p. 1.

philosophy should not be surprised that the broad sweep of Kant's mind includes considerations of practical concern as well as a theory of epistemology. Kant's pursuit of the conditions of knowledge as in the Critique of Pure Reason appears to be only preparatory to the discussion he undertakes in his works on ethics. The problem of the first Critique was forced upon Kant by the apparent irreconcilability of the rule of law in nature with the reason of man. For if man is, as other animals appear to be, a product of natural causation, then apparently he cannot be capable of personal deliberation and determination. If knowledge is limited to that which falls within the sensibility of experience, then the resolving of critical problems only partly encompassed by experience becomes impossible.

The results of Kant's first investigation show that we have no knowledge of the objects of what he terms "ideas." According to these findings, the supersensible in any form is beyond the reach of theoretical reason; yet we can think or believe in the supersensible. In fact, the very nature of knowledge is such that we cannot fail to see its essential limits. While the Critique of Pure Reason denies that we can have certain knowledge about the world of the noumena, it in no way excludes the possibility of the noumena's

existence. Knowledge is not a complete whole; but, since the mind cannot be satisfied by less than a complete whole, we are compelled to investigate further to see if man himself possesses a condition that can account for and direct the decision-making process of his activity apart from the super-sensible or noumenal world.

H. J. Paton believes that if it is the part of a philosopher to ask questions concerning the nature of man's being in the noumenal world,

it is still more the part of a philosopher to ask "What is philosophy?" According to Kant, what was wrong with philosophy before his time was this--that philosophers blundered along trying to solve philosophical problems without ever asking themselves what it was that they were doing and whether what they were doing was something that could be done. He may have been unduly hard on his predecessors--most philosophers are--but in any case this was what he thought. For him a sound philosopher must know clearly and reflectively what he is doing, and only so is philosophy likely to succeed. This is one reason why Kant's philosophy is called the Critical Philosophy.³

For the reason Paton cites, Kant's work in moral philosophy is in no small way related to and dependent upon the findings of his earlier work, the Critique of Pure Reason. In the first Critique Kant held expressly that no knowledge is prior to experience in time and that with experience all knowledge

³ The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 19.

begins. The principles of experience, however, point beyond experience itself. In his ethical treatises, particularly the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant approaches the problem of ordinary moral consciousness by examining our noumenal being to discover the essential ideas of morals. His object, therefore, is to set forth the nature of moral laws in their purity.

The Theoretical Nature of Morality

In the preface to the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant restates the findings of the first Critique by once again pointing to the conditions of all rationality. All knowledge is either formal or material: the former considers the forms of the understanding and is called logic, while the latter concerns determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject. Material philosophy is further divided into two areas: (1) that area concerned with the laws of nature and called physics; and (2) that area concerned with the laws of freedom and known as ethics. They are also called natural philosophy and moral philosophy respectively.⁴

⁴Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill

In such a division as this Kant is attempting to delineate clearly the boundaries of the specific field to be included in his ethical considerations. This is Kant's habit--to strive in each way possible to keep clearly before him the field of his inquiry. While, as Lewis White Beck so appropriately claims, Kant was inclined to explore blind alleys and get almost lost in tangents,⁵ he nevertheless adheres to a single line of argument: empirical judgments are always judgments of fact. Experience can tell us that such and such is the case, but it cannot tell us that it ought not be otherwise. This is the conclusion of Kant's earlier critical analysis and is the starting point for his inquiry of the metaphysics of morality.

That the direction of Kant's future work was to include and, in fact, concentrate upon the obligations we have for knowing right and wrong actions is purposely clear from what is said in the first Critique. To profess to solve all

Abbott (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), p. 1. This work may be variously titled The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals or Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals, depending upon the translator's preference of translation. Hereafter cited as Metaphysic of Morals.

⁵A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 3. Hereafter cited as Beck.

problems, says Kant,

would be impudent boasting, and would argue such extravagant self-conceit as at once to forfeit all confidence. Nevertheless there are sciences the very nature of which require that every question arising within their domain should be completely answerable in terms of what is known, inasmuch as the answer must issue from the same sources from which the question proceeds. In these sciences it is not permissible to plead unavoidable ignorance; the solution can be demanded. We must be able, in every possible case, in accordance with a rule, to know what is right and what is wrong, since this concerns our obligation, and we have no obligation to that which we cannot know. In the explanation of natural appearances, on the other hand, much must remain uncertain and many questions insoluble, because what we know of nature is by no means sufficient in all cases, to account for what has to be explained.⁶

Kant feels that whether the writing of a moral philosophy entirely devoid of everything empirical is of utmost necessity or not, the possibility for such a philosophy is evidenced in the common idea of duty and moral laws that most men have. Not only are moral laws distinguishable from all other knowledge containing anything empirical, but all moral philosophy whatsoever rests wholly on its pure parts.⁷ So long as we are without the clue and supreme canon of a pure

⁶ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1953), pp. 430-31.

⁷ Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1923), p. 4.

moral philosophy by which to estimate moral actions correctly, morals themselves are open to all sorts of corruption.

That which mingles these pure principles with the empirical does not deserve the name of philosophy (for what distinguishes philosophy from common rational knowledge is, that it treats in separate sciences what the latter only comprehends confusedly); much less does it deserve that of moral philosophy, since by this confusion it even spoils the purity of morals themselves, and counteracts its own end.⁸

Kant's philosophical morality, then, is concerned not only with the limited area of philosophy known as ethics and involving the laws of freedom, but also with the knowledge of what is right and what is wrong in its pure parts. Kant uses the method of analysis employed in the Critique of Pure Reason when, in his study of ethics, he attempts to isolate from the nature of man or the circumstances in the world in which he is placed the pure characteristics of morality. Though Kant is the first to recognize that moral laws require a judgment sharpened by experience⁹ and a practical application for obtaining their intended realization,¹⁰ he also

⁸Ibid., p. 5.

⁹Moral laws require such a judgment in order that they may distinguish cases to which they are applicable and gain for themselves effectual influence on conduct.

¹⁰Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, p. 5.

recognizes the need to locate the unconditioned condition for all conditions if moral laws are to have a binding and unifying effect in their application. The nature of moral laws requires that they be independent of contingent requirements if they are to have legitimacy for more than each individual respective act of experience. For Kant the function of connecting pure reason with its practical or ethical qualities is known as the activity of the will; and his purpose is to show that the will is not divorced from reason, controlled internally by psychological stimuli or externally by pleasure stimuli. In this capacity the will is a purely rational enterprise; it is pure reason which controls drives and determines external ends.

Rational Knowledge and Morality

"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it which can be called good without qualification except a Good Will."¹¹ This opening sentence of the first section of the Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals strikes the keynote of Kant's moral philosophy. His

¹¹Immanuel Kant, Critical Examination of Practical Reason. In Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), p. 9.

consideration of this theme is three-fold: (1) as in the first Critique, Kant begins with a careful and thorough analysis of man's moral experience; (2) he then explores by means of transcendental inference the freedom and responsibility of the moral agent; and (3) Kant examines at length the entire nature of the moral law.

While Kant's consideration of practical reason follows in accordance with the three-fold division here stipulated, the order of analysis according to its logical relations cannot be so divided. As the task of the first Critique was to reveal the a priori or categorical laws of cognitivity, the task of the second Critique is to discover the a priori or categorical laws of the rational good will. At the heart of the problem of the will's activity is, first, the problem of freedom; for without freedom of the will morality is an impossibility.

The importance of freedom in Kant's scheme of things may be seen by recognizing that if the will is free, then Kant believes the possibility exists for showing the capacity of pure reason to determine the will's total activity.¹² According to Kant's reasoning the only possibility for the

¹²Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 101.

objectivity of ethics is reason presupposing nothing else but itself; for rules or laws can be objective and universal only if they are not subject to contingent-subjective conditions. Ethics, as an outgrowth of Kant's epistemology, cannot be based on the happiness or pleasure principle because happiness and pleasure can only be identified empirically and thus have no universal objective necessity. So-called ethical rules or laws can gain the status of being ethical not according to their content, which is always gained from experience, but only according to their form, which is supplied by reason and is itself universal and necessary.

The Conditions of Freedom in Morality

While speculative reason strives to explain the noumenal world, the antinomies of the first Critique render the conditions necessary for noumenal existence merely problematic. Fundamental among the conditions necessary for noumenal existence is the freedom of the will. Reasonably, then, before Kant can properly declare the autonomous nature of the will, he must first determine the possibility of freedom for the will's existence. From the studies of such men as Lewis White Beck and Henry Sidgwick, there appears reason to suspect that throughout his work Kant has used two

different concepts of freedom interchangeably without realizing their indeterminateness. Beck warns that "discussions of freedom are so frequent in Kant's work that the full compass of the concept and its attendant problems cannot well be surveyed in a running commentary on passages taken seriatim."¹³ Actually, Beck contends, the different theories of freedom appear to be theories about different things and answer different questions.¹⁴

One theory of freedom appears to come from the Critique of Pure Reason and the other from the Foundations for the Metaphysic of Morals which was published four years after the first Critique and three years before the Critique of Practical Reason. Beck contends that from the Critique of Pure Reason "there is inherited the concept of freedom as spontaneity, the faculty of initiating a new causal series in time. From the Foundations there is taken the concept of freedom as autonomy, as lawgiving and hence as independent from any pregiven law."¹⁵ Sidgwick believes that in this latter sense freedom equals rationality so that man is free

¹³Beck, p. 176.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 176-77.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 177.

in proportion to his acting in accordance with reason.

Sidgwick's consideration of the Kantian view of freedom is more in the form of criticism than analysis. Sidgwick, like Beck, believes Kant uses two different concepts of freedom interchangeably. But, unlike Beck's analysis, Sidgwick's criticism produces an impossible-intolerable situation for the entire "critical philosophy of practical reason."¹⁶ The two "kinds of freedom" considered by Sidgwick are seemingly contradictory in part to the two types of freedom discovered and explained by Beck. Yet Sidgwick's view helps point up the nature of the subject considered.

Sidgwick's view is fixed on the differences between what he discovers in Kant as the "Rational or Moral Freedom" and the "Freedom of Caprice" as "the power of acting without a motive, or against the strongest motive when the competition is among merely natural or non-rational desires or aversions."¹⁷ But, as Sidgwick points out, man acting without a motive could certainly have no "power" (that is of and through himself) at all. "The power of choice between good and evil . . . lies in its complete avoidance of Capricious

¹⁶ Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 511.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 512.

Freedom or the power of acting without a motive in any particular volition," and this most assuredly is not Kantian.¹⁸

But, while rejecting the "Freedom of Caprice" theory as inappropriate for explaining Kant's concept of Freedom, Sidgwick also theorizes certain inadequacies in the "freedom-Rationality" theory which has generally maintained that man is free to choose between good and evil, demonstrated by his deliberate choice of evil as well as good. Sidgwick believes this theory is untenable since "if we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally, we cannot also say . . . that it is by his free choice that he acts irrationally when he does so act."¹⁹ With Sidgwick's criticism, then, appears an impossible situation in Kant's whole ethical viewpoint. Since the will cannot responsibly act without the underlying presumption of the "freedom of the will," and since the equation of "freedom with rationality" appears inadequate under limiting conditions, the whole concept of "the freedom of the will" appears under a shadow of great doubt.

Sidgwick's criticism of Kant's concept of freedom is representative of the many criticisms of Kant on this particular point. What Sidgwick's criticism does is to point up

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 511.

(1) the Kantian contention for a free-will and (2) the requirement of a rational determination of the will. What remains to be seen, however, is that Kant's freedom-rationality theory provides an additional factor that Sidgwick, like many opponents of the Kantian theory of ethics, unfortunately seems to overlook: a factor that makes possible a rationally determined free will. This additional factor is left for Beck to explain.

To repeat: "From the Critique of Pure Reason there is inherited the concept of freedom as spontaneity, the faculty of initiating a new causal series in time. From the Foundations there is taken the concept of freedom as autonomy, as lawgiving."²⁰ Beck points out that later Kant gives these two views the title of Willkur and Wille respectively.²¹ Beck distinguishes between Kant's Willkur and Wille in the following manner:

Will is the faculty of determining our causality through a conception of rules, . . . and, since for the derivation of an action from a rule or law reason is required, will is nothing but practical reason. It is the relationship between understanding

²⁰Beck, p. 177.

²¹Ibid. Beck explains that considerable difficulty exists in translating Willkur and Wille. As a result, Beck leaves these terms in German. This procedure will be followed here.

and the faculty of desire. . . . The faculty which makes a rule of reason the efficient cause of an action through which the object is to be made real is will; the will is never determined directly by the object or our conception of it, but always by a rule of reason. . . . That the will is, in this sense, free from direct sensuous necessitation is an empirical fact. This conception of will, as a faculty of desire guided by a rule of reason taken as a maxim, later becomes more specifically Willkur. . . . It has, therefore, an incentive (Triebfeder) for action in addition to law, while Wille has no Triebfeder.²²

If the Willkur is responsive to desire and natural impulses, then anything that tries reducing it to the obedience of pure practical reason destroys its freedom. The Willkur and freedom, then, are not synonymous terms necessarily. The Willkur is free only in a comparative sense, and this in no manner explains the existence of freedom. To this degree Sidgwick's criticism is fitting and appropriate. But yet one still must ask the origin of the law. While the Willkur may be appropriate for explaining the application of the maxims to natural impulses for the guiding of right actions, it in no way accounts for the origin of the law from which maxims are derived.

Here once again Kant has reached the point of "first principles." The problem is to determine a law that Willkur

²²Ibid., p. 178.

can obey without losing its freedom through the very act of obedience. Kant's major contribution here is that "law" is not a restriction on freedom but rather the very product of freedom itself. Beck explains that in this sense

there is a concept of will not as the direct determiner of action but as the lawgiver to the maxims which will determine action. In this sense, Kant says . . . that laws determine what ought to happen and maxims determine what does happen. . . . Reason is necessary to the formulation of a law, but a maxim determines behavior directly. In the formulation of a law, we have to do with the real use and not with the mere logical use of reason: by the "real use" is meant the establishment of an a priori synthetic proposition, and by the "logical use" is meant merely the inferring of action from a rule.

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If practical reason determines the will (Willkur), then we can say that the latter is free in the psychological or comparative sense . . . even though there may be a natural law connecting the conception of practical reason with the action and even if connecting this law is itself a naturally caused event in the inner life and even if law is a practical translation of a natural law.²³

The concept of will, then, not as the direct determiner of action, but as the giver of laws to maxims which determine action, is the function of Wille and not Willkur. "The law is a product of the freedom of Wille as pure practical reason. . . . Wille gives only a law . . . from its own nature. It does not mediate laws of nature to

²³Ibid., pp. 178-79.

Willkur."²⁴ The nature of Wille is that of autonomous law-giver. Since we have the right and even the need to use the concept of freedom, or since "the actor in a moral situation must act as if he were free and thereby shoulder all the responsibilities that he would have if it were theoretically proved that he is free,"²⁵ the Wille exists autonomously and not in accordance with anything else in the world or even out of it. The Wille is completely free; it gives the rational law that the Willkur would follow if it were completely and purely rational. Although the Willkur can fail to abide by the law of the Wille, i.e. it can give way to the importunities of sense stimuli, the Wille, on the other hand, as pure practical reason, cannot fail to be free. The moral law is an a priori statement of what the Willkur ought to do; and, as Beck says, "however depraved Willkur may be, it still hears the 'heavenly voice' of pure practical reason, so that even the most hardened criminal trembles before its tribunal."²⁶

A statement of caution must be observed here, however.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 179-80.

²⁵Ibid., p. 194.

²⁶Ibid., p. 203.

Kant does not claim to have proved the existence of freedom or even to have explained it. However, some philosophers, of whom Sidgwick is representative, have inaccurately accredited Kant with such an accomplishment and this accreditation has been responsible for their criticism of him. This error should not be repeated. Kant does assert that from a practical point of view we must assume freedom to be present in human actions and, as just demonstrated, this can be done without incurring any real contradiction between freedom and physical necessity of the same human actions. This and this alone constitutes the sole objective of Kant's consideration of the issue of freedom.

The Good Will

Having outlined the conditions necessary for the existence of morality, Kant can now bring into these conditions the elements of the human actions through which the moral attainments of man may be realized. Primary among these elements is the good will. Recognizing of course that the will may act under the nature of the autonomous law-giver, what then is the nature of the will that so acts as opposed to the will that acts contrary to the laws established autonomously?

In dealing with freedom, we do more than establish the

conditions necessary for morality; we also give explanation to the rational idea of the will. The faculty by which reality is given to the super-sensible is the will, or practical reason, "a faculty either to produce objects corresponding to ideas, or to determine ourselves to the effecting of such objects."²⁷ Obviously, then, Kant has reason for asserting in the first section of the Metaphysic of Morals that "nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will."²⁸ Kant suggests that this is so in the most unqualified sense of the term:

Intelligence, wit, judgment, and other talents of the mind, however they be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will.²⁹

From the above, one should not assume, however, that good will is the only good. On the contrary, many other

²⁷ Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 101.

²⁸ Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, p. 9.

²⁹ Ibid.

things are good, but they are not good under all circumstances. These other things--qualities of mental talents, temperament, and gifts of fortune--are good in many respects but may become bad under certain circumstances. Kant even refers to the good qualities here mentioned (qualities of temperament, for example) and points out how these gifts in certain circumstances are not only dangerous but actually more abominable than bad character alone would otherwise be.

David Ross contends that the high esteem Kant expresses for "goodness" is no passing phase of his thought.³⁰ In the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant states:

Before a humble plain man, in whom I perceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, my mind bows whether I choose it or not, and though I bear my head never so high, that he may not forget my superior rank. Why is this? Because his example exhibits to me a law that humbles my self-conceit when I compare it with my conduct: a law, the practicality of obedience to which I see proved by fact before my eyes. Now, I may even be conscious of a like degree of uprightness, and yet the respect remains. For since in man all good is defective, the law made visible by an example still humbles my pride, my standard being furnished by a man whose imperfections, whatever they may be, are not known to me as my own are, and who therefore appears to me in a more favorable light. Respect is a tribute which we cannot refuse to merit, whether we will or not; we may indeed outwardly withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly.³¹

³⁰ Kant's Ethical Theory, A Commentary on the Granlegunz zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 8.

³¹ Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 169-70.

For Kant the ordinary mind does not hesitate to set aside as irrelevant to morality all those inward or outward advantages which distinguish one man from another. A man is not inherently good because he is endowed by nature with superior intelligence or because he has acquired external advantages such as great wealth. There is, therefore, that common opinion that man is unworthy of the title "a good man" who has not a good will.

What, then, is a good will? Ross appropriately points out for us that neither "here nor elsewhere does Kant try to define 'good,' either as it occurs in the phrase 'a good will' or as it occurs in the phrase 'the only good thing in the world.'" ³² Kant nevertheless has his view about the nature of "the good will." The will is not good simply because its actions produce good consequences or because it obtains the sought-after end, but solely because the good is willed. Evidently, when Kant denies that the consequences of an act determine its moral character, he means consequences such as happiness to the individual or others. His view, therefore, is opposed to that taken by some other philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill. According to Kant an act is good

³²Ross, p. a.

if the will is good, that is, if the motive for acting in a given way is solely and entirely good.

Kant's position is that goodness may not be judged by the successes a man has in obtaining the end of action at which he aims. Although the aim or objective of an act may be good, its actual results may go unrealized and thus all acts that failed to secure their stated purpose would be deemed morally not good. This naturally would include all such acts as might have a worthy end and objective but exist in an impossible situation--for example, an unsuccessful attempt at saving a person's life. Kant believes that the good will, not to be judged by its end results, is a persistent and resolute endeavor to secure a good end and nothing short of such an endeavor can deserve being called good.

Even with such a persistent and resolute endeavor to secure a good end, certain qualifications to the nature of the will remain. Kant states:

I omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, since they even conflict with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform to duty, but to which men have no direct inclination. For in this case we can readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish view.³³

³³Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, p. 13.

We must therefore inquire as to the ground for the belief in a good will. Kant answers this inquiry (although he does not so title it at this point of his analysis) by pointing out that for an act to have moral worth it must issue from a sense of duty. Such a proposition requires an analysis of the concept "duty," a conception not wholly identical with a "good will" but compatible with a will that is good as manifested under the limitations of our external-sensuous nature. This duty excludes all acts that result from a motive stemming from natural inclination, even when inclinations are not opposed to duty. In this connection, one may speak of the maintaining of one's life as a duty. "But on this account," says Kant, "the often anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth. . . . They preserve their life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because duty requires."³⁴ Thus Kant believes that self-preservation, which is the outcome of natural inclination, has no moral value, for moral value lies only in that which springs from duty itself.

The second proposition supporting a belief in a good will is that the moral value of an action is determined

³⁴Ibid., p. 14.

entirely by a maxim or subjective principle independent of an object of desire. As Kant previously pointed out, an act may still have moral worth although it fails to attain its objective. Conversely, another act may attain its end objective and not be morally good.

The third proposition may be explained as the obligation to act from reverence for law. As Washington says: "For Kant, Ethics is the science of Law; of a law expressing itself concretely in the single word Duty."³⁵ Kant himself states: "The notion of duty stands in immediate relation to a law,"³⁶ and "is in itself already the notion of a constraint of the free elective will by the law."³⁷ The character of a law, then, includes the idea of determining the will independently of all desire and thus of all consequences in the way of happiness. Since the will must not in any way be moved

³⁵ William Morrow Washington, The Formal and Material Elements of Kant's Ethics (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1898), p. 19.

³⁶ Immanuel Kant, Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), p. 299.

³⁷ Immanuel Kant, Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), p. 282.

by desire, obviously the principle of the will must be absolutely universal, i.e. the law must determine the will before the object be presented. Duty, therefore, may be termed obligation to act from pure reverence of the law independent of sensuous desire. This is the only motive of a good will, a will which is good without limitation.

The Categorical Imperative: The Objective
Moral Law

The theory of moral duty as responsive obedience to law theoretically implies a formal determination of law to which duty must be obedient if it is to be judged morally good. Washington believes that "the moral law is a formal determining principle of action by pure practical reason."³⁸ While maxims determine the nature of our acts, the moral law points to those maxims having the force of universal law and to which we ought to be obedient. Nothing less is consistent with moral law.

The formula of the moral law is repeated by Kant in various forms depending upon the point under consideration. Paton, for example, finds five different formulations of the categorical imperative, while Kant himself, curiously enough,

³⁸Washington, p. 19.

tends to speak as if there were only three.³⁹ Its most frequently cited and most widely accepted form, however, is: "I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law."⁴⁰

The reasoning by which Kant reaches his first formula of morality is substantially as follows. Because man has rational capabilities, he is not necessarily subject to laws in a purely mechanical way. That is to say, man is not the object of natural causation; he is, through the Wille, a free agent, able to respond to natural instincts or refrain from acting from them. More specifically, man's nature presupposes the consciousness of a law which he may or may not obey. Because man finds in himself certain inescapable desires, the moral law presents itself as an imperative, the claims of which determine actions that nature refuses to acknowledge. Thus the pure consciousness of self is bound up with the willing of a universal law. Hence the formula: "Act as if the maxim from which you act were to become through your will a universal law of nature."

The analysis of the conception of a categorical

³⁹ Paton, p. 129.

⁴⁰ Kant, Metaphysic of Morality, p. 18.

imperative corresponds to what Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, calls the metaphysical deduction of the categories. We assume in the meantime that there is a categorical imperative, and we simply ask what must be its character. From our discussion so far we learn three things: (1) all moral conceptions proceed from the Wille a priori; (2) the setting of moral conceptions and laws before the mind in their purity is of supreme importance--the purity of moral conceptions and laws is not merely in the interest of a true theory of morality, but also is an aid to practical life--and (3) the principles of pure practical reason are derived from the very conception of a rational being and thus do not depend upon the peculiar character of man. Hence objectively necessary acts are subjectively accidental, i.e. though man through his reason recognizes he ought to do certain acts, he yet may act, not from reason, but from sensuous desire. The determination of man's will by objective laws presents itself to him as an obligation to obey them and not as the spontaneous expression of his will. Reason, therefore, commands obedience to its objective principle, and the formulation of its command is in the nature of an imperative. A perfectly good will agrees with the rational will of man in conforming to objective laws, but its distinctive character is that it is under no

obligation to conform to objective law. An imperative has no meaning for the divine will or any other holy will--such a will by its very definition is in harmony with the law of reason. Imperatives are limited, therefore, to beings with an imperfect will such as that of man, expressing as they do the relation of objective law to an imperfect will.

The Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives

In connection with the Kantian concept of an imperative, two problems arise: (1) the nature of the imperative involved in an act that finds its obligation in pure reason, and (2) the distinction between imperatives and laws which, according to Beck, is one of the most celebrated distinctions Kant makes.⁴¹

"Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically,"⁴² says Kant. Thus we have a double nature of the imperative. The hypothetical imperative arises in the pursuit of happiness or wealth. If we will the end of happiness (for example) we must also will the means by which happiness can be obtained. The hypothetical imperative is, in this sense, both problematic and assertoric; it is problematic

⁴¹Beck, p. 84.

⁴²Kant, Metaphysic of Morality, p. 31.

when it tells us what actions are good relative to a certain end, and assertoric when it tells us that certain and actual ends are good that result from a given action. The former of these two natures is called "rules of skill"; the latter, "counsels of prudence." Thus an imperative supplies the practical rule for a will that may not will the good either from ignorance or through the influence of maxims opposed to the objective principles of a practical reason, i.e. maxims which are based upon sensuous desire.

In contrast, the categorical imperative commands an act without limitation. It is an apodictic or absolutely necessary principle. The categorical imperative commands us to will an act for itself, and not merely as a means to an end. This imperative springs straight from reason and directly connects the act with the conception of the rational being as such. It has nothing to do with the special kind of act or with the consequences expected, but solely with the principles or motive of the agent.

The Character of an Imperative as a Law

A distinction remains to be made between an imperative and a law. In the Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals Kant contrasts imperatives and laws by comparing an imperative

to a practical rule by which an action is made necessary and contending that a law, on the other hand, is merely the objectively valid cognitive component in the determination of choice by a rational being.⁴³ The consciousness of law may be said to be a fact of reason because law cannot be reason resolved into anything higher than itself. The imperative, however, provides us with the necessary clue to the existence and nature of those farther reaches of reality which Kant prophetically entitled "noumenal." Theodore Meyer Green states:

It is this Law [the moral law as stated in the categorical imperative] which man apprehends in his most profound moral insights. It is that higher rationality which man's "moral reason" . . . discerns in moments of moral vision. It is what evokes man's highest spontaneous loyalty, and what impells him to formulate and obey the categorical imperative. . . . He is therefore free to obey it without any external compulsion, finite or divine.⁴⁴

The importance of the distinctive nature of the imperative is that it makes the imperative not just a law but a

⁴³Kant, Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, p. 278. Beck appropriately points out that this is a distinction Kant repeatedly ignores by using the terms "law" and "imperative" interchangeably. See Beck, p. 84.

⁴⁴Moral, Aesthetic and Religious Insight (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1957), p. 48.

special kind of law. The imperative is in the strictest sense of the word "the law of the noumenal world" comprised of the "objects of intelligence."⁴⁵ In such a nature as this, the moral law (called the imperative) is set off squarely against the natural laws of the phenomenal world (the world encompassing the "objects of sensibility"). An imperative exists simply for the sake of being obeyed when it is called forth out of volition. Regulative techniques from threats of external enforcement, police powers, for example, may cause an individual to abide in accord with natural laws, but no pressures whatsoever can require anyone to stand helplessly by in the presence of the imperative. In final analysis, the imperative is the a priori law of pure intelligence.

Justification of the Categorical Imperative

An analogy may be drawn between the problem of knowledge and the problem of morality. The question in the problem of knowledge was: How are a priori synthetic judgments of knowledge possible? Similarly, the problem of ethics is: How are a priori synthetic judgments of morality possible? When the nature of the imperatives is considered, no

⁴⁵Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 314.

difficulty arises in discovering how problematic imperatives are possible; for in this case the imperative merely tells us that if a particular end is sought, we must employ the means for the attainment of that end. This imperative of skill, as it is also called, is therefore an analytic judgment. The imperative implies that in the idea of willing a certain end objective is directly implied the willing of the acts necessary to the attainment of that end. Undoubtedly, certain synthetic judgments of knowledge are presupposed in willing the means to an end, but these judgments are not synthetic judgments of morality; for, as has been shown, these synthetic judgments of knowledge have nothing to do with the principle of the will.

The case of the assertoric imperative is quite the same. Each person desires his own happiness, but no one can give a universal description of what happiness is. It is certainly not the ever-present end of desire, for experience teaches that one can desire something which is undesirable. One may desire to take in the beauty of a blooming orchard until he suffers an allergic reaction.

One may argue further that since each person desires his own happiness, happiness is the desirable for that person; and therefore happiness is the desirable end for everyone.

The transition from "each" to "every," however, is on the level of the desirable and not the desired. If one accepts the inference from being desired to being desirable, the argument is cogent. But such an inference does not show that everyone's happiness is equally relevant to the obligation of a given individual. Even granting that happiness is universal, what is one man's happiness may be another man's unhappiness. Pleasant experiences are desired by their respective owners, but experiences are as individualistic as the persons who own them.

If each person could tell precisely wherein happiness consists, then, as such, happiness as a universal would be a recognizable fact and the imperative of prudence would obviously be analytic. We may therefore say, notwithstanding its differences from the problematic imperative, that like the problematic imperative, the imperative of prudence commands that he who wills the end should will the means. No deduction or justification of either of these imperatives is required. Both are obviously analytical in character.

The real difficulty appears in the justification of the categorical imperative as an a priori synthetic judgment. We cannot say that the end of the categorical imperative is presupposed and that the only question regards means. The

categorical imperative does not have an end objective as such, nor can the categorical imperative be based upon experience, for no number of instances ever establishes a universal and necessary proposition. Experience may tell us what has been done but never that what is yet to be done can only be done in accord with past experience. What must be shown, therefore, is that the categorical imperative can never be reduced to a hypothetical imperative. Kant puts it this way:

Here then we see philosophy brought to a critical position, since it has nothing to support it either in heaven or earth. Here it must show its purity as absolute dictator of its own laws, not the herald of those which are whispered to it by an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary nature. Although these may be better than nothing, yet they can never afford principles dictated by reason, which must have their source wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority, expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due respect for it.⁴⁶

Quite evidently, then, Kant considers the categorical imperative the only imperative with the dignity of practical law--that is a principle forever binding upon all men. Other imperatives presuppose a certain end which is not absolutely necessary and is therefore regarded as contingent. But how can a categorical imperative or an unconditional law of morality be justified?

⁴⁶Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 43-44.

Kant's inquiry into the justification of the categorical imperative resembles the metaphysical deduction of the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. The first Critique examined the nature of knowledge in general. Since morality for Kant is founded in rationality, the metaphysics of practical reason must then be consistent with what is believed to be the nature of knowledge elsewhere if indeed practical reason is to have any legitimate basis.

The conception of the categorical imperative implies that the subjective principles by which the will of the agent is to be determined must be connected to the objective principles of the law. Not only must the imperative, as an objective principle, be connected with the very conception of the will, but it must be so "altogether a priori."⁴⁷ In terms which the Critique of Pure Reason establishes, the motive of the act as corresponding to the categories must be joined to the content of the act as it corresponds to the content of sense in the phenomenal world.

If the consciousness of an agent who acts in violation of the principle of duty were examined, a conditional principle of the act that could not be willed as a universal

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 44.

law would be revealed. What is actually willed is that an exception to certain duties should be made and made as a favor under "special circumstances." Hence, if each act were considered under similar circumstances and the totality of actions followed to their logical conclusions, a contradiction between the will and the willed of the objectively necessary conclusion should be revealed. The will attempts to order conditions after a certain fashion, but the fashion after which the conditions are to be ordered constantly changes to meet the "special circumstances" of each and every situation as the situation changes in its own time sequences. Thus as many individual distinctive "wills" as elapses of time would result ad infinitum. Such a result would be wholly contrary to the very nature of man which is dependent upon consistency and order. In such a nature, Kant finds his reason for asserting that the law of morality must be derived a priori from the very idea of a rational will, without any reference to the peculiar constitution of human desire. A rational being is by its very nature an end which can never be regarded as a means to some other end. As such, no object of natural desire can have more than a conditional value, for its value depends entirely upon its being desired by this or that individual. In contrast, non-rational beings have only

the relative value of means and are therefore called things while rational beings are ends in themselves and ought never to be treated otherwise.⁴⁸

If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for every one because it is an end of itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. . . . Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.⁴⁹

The Maxim

Clearly, man is obliged to obey the law of duty. But, since this is a law which man imposes upon himself, in obeying it he is but realizing his own rational will which by its very nature lays down universal laws. As the principle of moral law is really self-imposed, it may very properly be called the principle of the autonomy of the will and be distinguished from all other principles which are rightly called

⁴⁸For Kant's discussion of the justification for the categorical imperative, see Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 39-47 and pp. 73-75.

⁴⁹Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, p. 47. Kant's imperative here stated is of course recognized as the categorical imperative, but of varied form from that stated earlier.

principles of heteronomy. Chief among these latter principles in the moral matrix, however, is the "maxim." Maxims are practical principles that are known subjectively or objectively. They are subjective when they are known by the subject as valid only for his own will, but objective when the condition is valid for the will of every rational being.

Beck tells us that the term maxim is "taken from logic, deriving from sententia maxima, the name of the first major premise in a polysyllogism."⁵⁰ In Kant's first Critique, he tells us what kind of logic he has in mind. General logic, he says, is not to be associated with the procedure of discovering content for knowledge. Rather, logical rules are to be "applied in the examination and appraising of the form of all knowledge before we proceed to determine whether their content contains positive truth in respect to their object."⁵¹ A maxim, then, taking its nature from logic, is a regulator of form and not creative of content. In this connection, Beck analyzes Kant's consideration of the maxim under the following three questions which require answering: (1) Are maxims the form of laws? (2) What is the supreme

⁵⁰Beck, p. 81.

⁵¹Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 98.

maxim of practical reason? (3) Can a law itself be a maxim?⁵²

Maxims in the Form of Laws

In the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant distinguishes sharply between a maxim and a law. A maxim, according to Kant, tells us how we do act; a law tells us how we ought to act. "A law is prescriptive whether it is a theoretical or a practical law."⁵³ A law cannot be based upon any actual features inductively discovered in the generality of mankind.⁵⁴ A maxim, on the other hand, depends upon conditions that reflect individual differences among rational beings.⁵⁵ Meanings that direct activities are maxims and thus maxims become a part of the "is." This "is" is the condition of will, recognizable in its very evident characteristics of actual experience.

Kant is pointing out a very clear and important distinction in morals. Beck states: "There is no possible inference from how men do, in fact, behave to how they ought

⁵²Beck, p. 82.

⁵³Ibid., p. 83.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 82.

⁵⁵Ibid.

to behave. No empirical generalization can do anything but surrender in the face of a well-authenticated exception."⁵⁶ But a pure practical reason which necessarily wills in accordance with law as such is not present in every man. Consequently, an action can only be willed through a maxim and not through a moral law such as that of the categorical imperative. According to Paton,

this serves to bring out Kant's view of spontaneity or freedom. On the one hand he insists . . . that the free and autonomous and moral will must be influenced by no needs, no desires, no pathological interests in determining its duty. On the other hand he does not forget that our sensuous motives must be "taken up" into our maxim, if they are to influence action; nor does he forget that if we are to have moral action, our maxims must in turn be taken up into our rational volition of law as such. Because of this it is possible for moral man to make, or to give, particular moral laws through their maxims.⁵⁷

A discussion of Kant's view of maxims and their relation to laws leads straight to the most important part of the second Critique. The purpose of the first Critique is to show how a priori categories of thought may be related to objects of sense. The purpose of the second Critique is to show how a priori categories of thought (moral laws) may be related to actions. Just as in the first Critique a third

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 83.

⁵⁷Paton, The Categorical Imperative, pp. 182-83.

element (schema) is needed in order to relate the categories of understanding to sense objects, so a third element is needed in the second Critique order to relate moral laws to man's actions. As Paton explains, this element must be something that will not leave out our sensuous motives on the one hand, but will consider the pure a priori concepts of law on the other.⁵⁸

Until now Kant has considered man as noumenon and man as phenomenon as having no possible interrelation. Surely the concluding remarks of the first Critique could scarcely leave any doubt as to the limits of objective knowledge. Thus far in Kant's ethical writings, the categorical imperative has been considered in its ideal nature, without deciding whether it is ever actualized in man. Such, however, is not Kant's conception of the nature of man. "Homo noumenon and homo phenomenon are two utterly irreducible elements of the one man. . . . They act indissolubly and together through the organic unity of the individual."⁵⁹ This comes about, not by an inquiry of fact, as might initially appear, but by some process of assumption a priori, lest the "critical method" should not be maintained.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Washington, p. 48.

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant begins his inquiry by examining the conditions of fact (experience) first. But throughout the Foundations for the Metaphysic of Morals, the Critique of Practical Reason, and his other works on ethics, Kant does not hesitate to assert that what man is, whether he is or is not a rational being, has little importance in deciding the essential elements of moral responsibility. He argues that since moral laws ought to hold good a priori for every rational being, they must all be derived from the general concepts of morality. Consequently we must not make the principles of the moral law dependent upon the particular interests of individual human nature. As a result, Kant, rather than following the procedure of the first Critique, begins his inquiry into the nature of morality with the establishment of a principle (i.e. the moral law as formulated in the categorical imperative) and then moves to a consideration of its application to human actions.

First in importance in the inquiry into the nature of moral principles is the conditions necessary for the existence of pure a priori principles of morality, namely, freedom. In Kant's consideration of freedom, the two concepts of freedom Willkur and Wille, play prominent roles as has been shown. The existence of the double components of freedom makes

possible the existence of pure a priori moral laws, on the one hand, and laws that yet may be morally considered but still account for phenomenal existence on the other. As later demonstrated, the pure a priori laws of morality, i.e. the categorical imperative, are developed under the freedom of the Wille, while the Willkur mediates laws of morality with nature. In other words, the law of morality is under the freedom of the Wille, while the meanings that generalize sense stimuli with their response are under the freedom of Willkur and called "maxims."

To explain this important factor of relating the sense perceptions to their responses in a slightly varied and less encumbered manner, two different but interrelated factors need to be considered. The first of these is impulse. Man possesses a dynamic moving force, a want, desire, need, or wish. We generally assume that this dynamic force is the prime mover of animals. Certainly, men feel pushed or pulled in this way or that by their wants, desires, needs, and passions.⁶⁰

But we are equally certain that man in full possession

⁶⁰ See Beck, p. 33 and forward for a more elaborated discussion and explanation of this particular facet of Kantian philosophy.

of his faculties is not always appropriately responsive to the demands of his impulses. Occasionally, action may be denied or deferred and a need may be left unfulfilled for an agonizingly long period of time. Happily, behavior in man, unlike the brutes, is not automatically triggered by impulse. Rather, impulsive demands are moderated, directed, redirected, and sometimes thwarted by our taking thought of the meaning of an impulse to act. Thus the second factor in Kant's ethical system is meaning which gives a conception of the kind of response appropriate for each impulse.

Meanings that direct impulses to responses are called "maxims" in Kantian terminology. These maxims are derived from a process of generalization. In the course of human activity, the impulse and response not only become associated together through trial and error in such a manner that this response is related to that impulse, but each impulse and each response also become generalized. Much of this generalization takes place below the level of consciousness. But in the more novel, complex, and problematic situations, a conscious effort must be made toward (1) identifying the dynamic impulse and (2) accumulating the needed knowledge to generalize that impulse with its proper class of responses. These two functions are respectively termed "conative" and

"cognitive." Thus, in any purely non-sub-conscious act, the conative and cognitive factors are always present.

But what man has and the planets lack, however, is a conception of the relation between things and events. Such a conception as comprises the "conative function" in the process of human activity may take many forms: the barely conscious conception identifying things of a particular aroma with the satisfaction of hunger, for example; or the conception of a natural law contending that poisonous things are injurious to the individual's well-being; or the conception of the moral precept that one should overcome temptations to lie.

Likewise, the conception comprising the cognitive function of securing maxims may also take various forms. It may take the form of a policy formulated in very specific rules to govern a specific habit, or it may be expressed in general terms to cover many different behaviors.

While the "conative function" is concerned with the conception identifying things with events (impulses with responses), the "cognitive function" is concerned with identifying the rule or law that generalizes each impulse with its appropriate response. In this connection the Wille states the conditions of the moral law in its pure a priori form and the Willkur states the maxim that actually generalizes the

impulse with its particular response. The Willkur is not required to state its maxim out of obedience to the moral law supplied by the Wille; but when it does identify its maxim in obedience to the moral law the ensuing act is said to be moral. Maxims exist under the law but cannot be said to be subsumed in the law. They are always a part in experience, the third thing existing in unity with the analytic and the synthetic. As such, maxims can neither be wholly analytic as are laws nor wholly synthetic as is the content of phenomenal existence.

Supreme Maxim of Practical Reason

Kant seems to indicate that all maxims are grounded in sensuous inclinations. Certainly, maxims have the function of treating inclinations by means of generalizing them with their particular response. Yet Kant has previously shown that a morally good action cannot have as its determining motive any mere sensuous inclinations to produce certain results. If this is so and if the maxim of an action is, as it were, a generalization of the action and its motive, it follows at once that the moral maxim cannot be based on sensuous inclinations but must follow directly from the moral law.

In order to distinguish between maxims that are based

upon sensuous inclinations and those that are not, Kant recalls the distinction made in the first Critique between a posteriori and a priori. Maxims based on experience or desire are a posteriori and those not so based are universal and necessary, making them analytical. As such, maxims not based on sensuous inclinations are a priori. Kant further distinguishes between those maxims by calling them material and formal.

Since a man who shows his good will acts for the sake of duty, he is acting on a formal maxim and not a material maxim. A good man, in Kant's concept of things, does not act merely for the purpose of producing certain results he happens to desire. This doctrine is already established under the arguments favoring the good will. Deductively speaking, for Kant the supreme maxim is in simple terms the maxim of the moral law. It is the formal maxim and not the material maxim. The supreme maxim is not, "this is the kind of thing I will do if so inclined to do it," but rather, "I will do my duty whatever it may be." Essentially this is the moral law and the supreme maxim. Because it is supreme in terms of moral value it coincides with the law of the morally good.

Laws and Maxims Differ in Time

Homo noumenon and homo phenomenon, as previously asserted, are not two separate entities having no possible interrelation, but rather two irreducible elements of the one man. A law might then also appear to be a maxim at certain times under the conditions of the one singularly unified person of a noumenal-phenomenal man. The noumenal-phenomenal man is, however, one and the same being with exception only to time. Washington so adroitly states this particular aspect of man's existence when he says that "noumenon is the man out of time, phenomenon is the man in time."⁶¹ Washington explains the matter in this way: Before an event occurs, reason may forecast it with a certain degree of accuracy, and decide on using its causality in some direction or another. Reason, therefore, acts "out of time," i.e. before time, and sets conditions that ought to govern "in time" happenings. Reason, says Washington, always asks, "What next?" and not "What am I doing now?"⁶²

Phenomenon, on the other hand, is concerned with the business of consciousness. Phenomenal being always asks,

⁶¹Washington, p. 48.

⁶²Ibid.

"What am I doing now?" In other words, phenomenal being is concerned with the "is" and not the "ought" of man's activity. Accordingly, maxims are always a part of the "is"--they are the actual regulative factors "in time." Every happening that occurs in the consciousness of man demands that a regulative factor be present for the actual determining of impulse responses. Each impulse has its own "generalization with its response" that is the maxim in action. The maxim reflects the differences of each individual's desires in the conative and not the cognitive components of their volitions.

While a maxim may be in accord with a law and correspondingly a law may use its causal influence to direct a maxim, a law itself is never in time with a maxim as such. The Willkur, as may be recalled, does not act in accord with the Wille from necessity, but rather is left to its own volition for generalizing each impulse and response. The law itself remains a law and hopefully the maxim of an action will assume its direction from the causal influence thereof; but of necessity such an occurrence can only remain in a hopeful state of affairs. The necessity of freedom dictates that this be the case.

The Summum Bonum

Accepting the view, then, that the maxim, functioning under obligation to the moral law, is the third element in Kant's principles of a moral act and the element connecting pure a priori concepts with sensory stimuli, what is the nature of the act with the greatest moral value? The summum bonum, or the highest good, has reference to two terms that must be distinguished from each other: the "supreme" and the "perfect," and unless the ambiguity contained therein is clarified, needless disputes may arise. According to Kant, "the former is that condition which is itself unconditioned, i.e. is not subordinate to any other (originarium); the second is that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the same kind (perfectissimum)."⁶³ The supreme good, therefore, is that which is absolutely unconditioned and presupposes nothing higher than itself. Consequently it is not subordinate to anything else; it is itself the complete good as a whole.

Now the condition of virtue, or worthiness of being virtuous, is the supreme condition of all that we can regard as good and consequently is the supreme good. In the "analytic," however, Kant shows that worthiness is a condition of

⁶³Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 206.

being happy, but from this it does not follow that happiness "is the whole and perfect good as the object of the desires of rational finite beings."⁶⁴ The objects of desire require happiness also; however, objects of desire are not complete goods as a whole, but parts of a larger whole. Virtue is thus the supreme good. Yet it is not the whole or complete good which finite beings seek to obtain and impartial reason declares to be a legitimate object of desire. The highest good of a possible world must therefore consist in the union or harmony of virtue and happiness in the same person, i.e. it must consist in happiness in exact proportion to morality. What has to be especially observed, however, is that virtue, or the supreme good, is the necessary condition of the complete good. Happiness is not a good in itself, but only a good under the condition that conduct is in conformity with the moral law.

Kant has reason for the existence of a two-part sum-mum bonum. The proper object of moral judgment is not the law but man as an end in himself. Man's activities are the means, and the laws thereof are intended only to serve the ends of man's being. The moral law performs three offices:

⁶⁴
Ibid.

(1) it is the formal determining principle of action by means of practical reason; (2) it is also a material and objective determining principle of the objects of action in so far as willing an object is to be decided in terms of good and bad; and (3) it is a subjective determining principle, a motive to action; it is a motive that deprives the will from taking account of every material inclination.⁶⁵ Thus the law is at once the objective moral motive and the subjective motive in respect for the law.

The basis of moral duty springs from this two-part nature of the moral law which is in itself an interpretation of the summum bonum in each of its parts. A man is a moral agent only if his acts meet two demands: (1) they must proceed from maxims that comply with the moral law and (2) they must be adopted for the guide to actions because the law demands them, not because of any extenuating results that may be incurred. Virtue is a good, but it is the highest good only when happiness of doing good in accord with the law becomes the motivational principle of action.

Summary

Morality, according to Kant, can claim objectivity and universality only by being founded upon pure reason

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 168.

itself. This view is based upon the development of the conclusions of the Critique of Pure Reason. The essence of the Critical philosophy is based upon the assumption of reason's capacity for discovering the necessary forms for characterizing all things. While reason attempts to complete man's knowledge by bringing his phenomenal and noumenal being into unity, it is frustrated in this speculative function by certain antinomies that defy resolution. Kant's ethical system is of major importance not only as the attempt to create a purely rational ethic, but also for demonstrating that rationality is not restricted to cognitive meanings. The will is not divorced from reason, controlled by drives, impulses, or stimuli, external or internal. Will in its fulfilled capacity is pure reason. Consequently, morality is dependent upon discovering the a priori or categorical laws of the rational will.

The categorical imperative, as the moral law, is the free directive of man's activities by means of maxims. Man has certain sensory stimuli, impulses, or drives for the initiation of action. The will connects this initiating force with a maxim that determines the disposition of the stimuli, impulse, or drive in terms of its satisfaction through actions thus prescribed. When the maxim so willed is in agreement with the moral law, the ensuing action is said to

be moral. And when the willing of the maxim is in agreement with the moral law out of simple obedience to the law, the ensuing act is said to have the highest moral value, i.e. summum bonum. Each maxim strives for this ideal and the progress toward this ideal deserves the name "virtue."

The task that remains now is to determine in what nature, if at all, the categorical imperative here discussed may be made applicable to the practices of rhetoric as they were discussed in earlier chapters.

CHAPTER V

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRACTICES OF RHETORIC

Introduction

Relating Kant's philosophy to the practices of rhetoric is indeed no simple task. Drawing such a relationship would be facilitated if we could speak of Kant's philosophical thought as including a theory of communication or as containing a natural basis for developing such a theory. However, the problem is compounded by Kant's noticeable lack of consideration for the literary arts in general and the art of rhetoric in particular. Except in a limited sense as a critic of literary practices, Kant seems to have been neither qualified nor willing to extend his philosophical thinking to the practices of rhetoric.

Theodore Meyer Greene points out that when Kant undertook to analyze man's creation of and response to the artistic means of expression "he was far less well equipped to deal with the relevant data than in the areas treated in the two

. . . [major] Critiques."¹ Kant never traveled more than fifty miles in any direction from his culturally bleak Königsberg home in East Prussia. One should not be surprised, then, that with this background Kant's ideas on literary and artistic discourse were markedly lean.

Yet Kant did not live during a deprived era of literary history. Late in the eighteenth century, mainly as an effect of Kant's philosophical publications, an unending stream of books on literary and aesthetic criticism sprang up in Germany. The greatest of philosophers were influenced by the writings of Kant and proceeded to popularize and modify the ideas propounded by that great speculative mind by adapting them to various systems of aesthetic and literary criticism. Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Schiller, Novallis, Tieck, and Jean Paul expounded their philosophies of art and literature while accrediting Kant with many of their principles and ideas.²

¹Moral, Aesthetic and Religious Insight (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957), p. 64.

²See Rene Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism: 1750-1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 227-31, for the development of Kantian ideas in literature and art by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century German School of Philosophy.

Kant apparently derived his understanding for the expression of art from omniverous reading and his life-long habit of inviting visitors to the city to dine with him and discuss their travels and experiences in a wide variety of cultural topics. Greene believes that from all this reading and talk Kant "did somehow acquire an appreciation of aesthetic taste in some of its universal aspects, as well as of the chief characteristics of the artistic styles which we [recognize] today."³ Not only was Kant acquainted with the various art styles, but he also displayed an uncanny ability to appreciate their essential merits and defects as stylistic trends.⁴ His resultant criticism seems more than indirectly relevant for the German aestheticians and poets. The direct relationship of Kantian philosophy specifically to rhetoric, however, remains to be explored. The task of the present chapter is to analyze the manner in which Kant's philosophy can be made applicable to ethical practices of rhetoric. This analysis is divided into three areas of consideration: (1) Kant's philosophy and the problem of linguistic symbolization; (2) the rhetorical objective in a Kantian-viewed

³Greene, p. 60.

⁴Ibid.

world; and (3) the categories of good reasons--instruments for use in rhetorical practices.

Kant's Philosophy and the Problem of
Linguistic Symbolization

The impact of the generative theme of the "new philosophy" is hardly recognized yet; but if we look at the actual trend of thought expressed by modern philosophy, we recognize that the knowing subject differs from the known object and that which is believed to be known is the product of interaction of the knowing subject with his known object. Here we may say with Kant that all knowledge begins with experience. Such an admission is the framework from which human action can spring forth, for in it is knowledge not only of the material circumstances of man's being but also the whole system of man's desires and their relative strengths. We can know man's experience only if we are able to reflect upon what our own nature contributes to experience and what is contributed by other sources. Material circumstances alone are not enough, for surely experience involves more than sensory stimuli resulting from the presence of material substances; it must likewise contain patterns of response to those stimuli.

In chapter one the paradox of an ethics of rhetoric was referred to by pointing up the differences of symbolic formulations representing differing kinds of human experience on the one hand (scientific, artistic, and axiological experiences, for example) and the necessity for any knowledge to be founded in the facts of life around us in order to be reliably valid on the other (being extensionalized). The beginning of modern philosophy with Descartes raised this apparently insoluble problem by positing the method of doubt culminating in the cogito ergo sum. Descartes' unprovable belief seems so expansive as to leave little or nothing to certainty save the cogito itself. According to this view, the existence of objects apart from the subject can only be asserted and never known with more than a degree of belief. But merely to assert the existence of an object of cognition is insufficient to explain the nature of such knowledge; for if our knowledge does not have an independent reality as its object, then it is unknowable; but if such independent reality does exist, then the knowledge of its existence and not just the assertion therefore is of major importance.

Kant, we may recall, found the necessary conditions for explaining the existence of a physical reality in the manifold sense perceptions schematized under the categories.

Oscar W. Miller succinctly describes the perceptions to which Kant refers as

empirical representations from the influence of moving energies of matter which affect the subject. These energies affect the subject because he is a physical being. The inner changes wrought in him by the activity of consciousness are perceptions. The moving energies of matter are, in the mind of the subject, the cause of his perception. . . . [These] objects of sense, metaphysically speaking, are appearances.⁵

These sense perceptions distinguishable in space and time are organized according to the rules of the categories of the understanding. For example, categorical judgments contain a referring expression known as the grammatical subject and a characterizing expression called the predicate. Many factual claims normally made are of this same basic form--substance and predicated property. For Kant the concept of substance is a kind of category of knowledge. Included in this category of substances are all such substantive words as "chair," "table," "tree," etc. Kant views the categories as ordering principles. What they order or synthesize are the phenomenalist items of experience--colors, tactile impressions, odors, sizes, sounds, and so forth.

The problem of the ordering principles of experience

⁵The Kantian Thing-in-Itself or The Creative Mind
(New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1956), p. 21.

which Kant so recognized concerns the a priori principles of empirical data. Kant, as we have seen, finds the resolution for this problem in the mediatory power of the categories of causality and time. By merging the category of substance with the categories of causality and time, universal and necessary (a priori) laws for things making up the natural world emerge.

Since the concepts of substance, causality, and time are not analytic (i.e. their denials are not self-contradictory); and since we know them to be necessarily true (and no empirical generalization is ever necessarily true), Kant believes they are, therefore, synthetic a priori. But, as Copleston points out, we must not here assume that Kant means to imply we are all explicitly aware of the application of a priori principles.⁶ Given our ordinary experience, however, these principles can be distinguished by a process of analysis of the formal and material elements in our theoretical knowledge of objects. Because of this conceptual nature of our knowledge of objects, Kant concludes that knowledge initiated by sense-experience is inadequate to explain the "object-in-itself." At best such knowledge has reference only to the

⁶Fredrick Copleston, S. J. A History of Philosophy, VI (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1961), p. 309.

object in consciousness. Kant here merely took for granted the existence of objects in our ordinary knowledge. But what we know of these objects in a process of extensionalized behavior is only that which we have as an object in consciousness.

With this in view the whole scope of metaphysics is cast onto a new plane which leads to the conclusion that without the consciousness of the subject the object could not be. Heidegger explains that "the 'Being' of things is now seen to be grounded in the possibility of experience. The search for 'Being' is now directed not toward a 'reality in itself' but toward the subjective roots of the transcendental horizons of consciousness."⁷ Yet, while this may explain the nature of our knowledge when we become extensionalized, nothing in sense perceptions nor Kant's explanations thereof prevents the possibility of gaining knowledge by intellection only. Contrarywise, the very nature of phenomenal being implies the existence of noumenal being in which case there is implied a nature knowable by an experience different from the experience of scientific knowledge. Having grasped the nature

⁷Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. x.

of extensionalized knowledge, the problem becomes one of analyzing the nature of ethical knowledge. The specific problem is one of examining Kant's philosophy further to determine if it can explain how ethical knowledge can differ from scientific knowledge (or, said differently, knowledge of objects) and still be extensionalized.

In chapter two ethics was characterized as being concerned with "ought type questions." On this basis, moral knowledge appears to be in direct contrast to extensionalized knowledge which is concerned with the nature of objects. As Copleston remarks in considering Kant's philosophy of ethics:

Now besides our knowledge of objects which are originally given in sense intuition there is also moral knowledge. We can be said to know, for example, that we ought to tell the truth. But such knowledge is not knowledge of what is, that is to say of how men actually behave but of what ought to be, that is to say, of how men ought to behave.⁸

Just because a thing happens to exist gives us no claim to the absolutes of its hidden nature. Throughout the ages men have sought to pluck out the golden thread of absolute reality, but unfortunately they have not been able to hold the thread long enough to discover the spool from which it unwinds.⁹ Consequently we live much of our lives dealing in

⁸Copleston, p. 308.

⁹As an explanation of Reality here suggested, see

probabilities where reason alone and not experience carries on those inquiries which, owing to their importance, we consider more excellent and in their purpose far more lofty than all the understanding acquired through sense perceptions.

As Kant's explanation of the phenomenal world depends upon the a priori laws of cognitive activity, so his views of the noumenal world--the world capable only of being thought--depend upon the a priori or categorical laws of a rational will. As we have seen in the first Critique, Kant held that no knowledge is prior to experience in time and that with experience all knowledge begins. The principles of experience, however, point beyond experience itself; but, when given our ordinary experience and scientific knowledge of things, we can analyze the formal and material elements in our knowledge to discover those principles according to which moral judgments are possible. These formal elements in our knowledge must, of course, be consistent with what we know of the world around us--the material elements in our knowledge; for if an inconsistency existed it would mean that either our scientific knowledge or moral knowledge was

Oscar W. Miller's account of "A Reconstruction of the Thing in Itself," The Kantian Thing-in-Itself or The Creative Mind, pp. 50-51.

inaccurate. Accordingly, if the qualifications for understanding knowledge of objects are universality and necessity, as Kant believes, then such qualifications should likewise be the qualifications for moral knowledge.

In his ethical treatises Kant attempts to delineate these specific boundaries of moral knowledge: universality and necessity. The particular distinctiveness of moral knowledge, according to Kant, is the good will which is the connecting of reason with its practical application in action. Kant begins his argument by dramatically proclaiming that a good will is without limitation. But what is meant by a good will? We have already noticed how G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell believe that "good" is an indefinable concept. Furthermore, does Kant mean to imply that a "good will" is absolutely good? The difficulty for Kant is this: if there is such a thing as knowledge of a good will it must be knowledge a priori in the sense that it does not depend on men's actual behavior. The statement, "men ought to tell the truth," is true independently of their actual conduct. Here two things are to be observed. First, in its formal function reason determines the object given in sense perception; and second, in its practical function reason is itself the source of objects; it is concerned with the production of choices which

bring objects out of time in accordance with the laws of the will which proceed from themselves. Copleston lends assistance in understanding this particular aspect of Kant's philosophy by explaining in plain language that formal reason "is directed towards knowledge, while practical reason is directed towards choice in accordance with moral law . . . to the implementation of choice in action."¹⁰ Kant, of course, is not here saying that we must find the whole cause for a moral act in the concept of practical reason. What he is saying is that the "law" of practical reason is located in the a priori element of the moral judgment.

What, then, does Kant's philosophy have to suggest when considering the problem of linguistic symbolization as it was discussed in chapter one? First, Kant's philosophy as described in the preceding chapters suggests that the knowledge involved in extensionalization is that which exists in the object of consciousness derived through the application of categories to sense stimuli; and second, our ethical knowledge which differs from our scientific knowledge is not divorced from internal impulses and drives or external stimuli but rather is different because it comes under the a priori

¹⁰Copleston, p. 310.

law of practical reason. When Kant points out that nothing can be called absolutely good except a good will, he simply means that morality can claim objectivity only by being founded upon reason alone and the a priori element in reason on matters of morality is the categorical imperative better known as the moral law. We must here point out that Kant, although he does not explain his reasons for so doing, does not define "good" in the concept of the "good will," but rather, like Moore and Russell, merely describes those conditions under which an act of the will is right, namely, when done out of obedience to the a priori moral law. According to this reasoning the good will is the only thing without limitation whose goodness is not the goodness of a means to something else and is rooted in the integrity required by reason itself determining the acts initiated in objects of consciousness.

The Rhetorical Objective in a Kantian-Viewed World

Having just examined the nature of linguistic symbolization, the task becomes one of discovering the objective to which such symbolization may be employed. According to Kant's philosophy, as we have here examined it and as it was

developed in chapters three and four, all knowledge is either formal or practical: the former considers the form of the understanding and of the reason itself with the universal laws of thought in general; the latter is concerned with the a priori law in the choice of action and includes the distinction of the objective of such actions. While we have seen the formal aspects of linguistic symbolization, the practical application remains to be investigated. Accordingly the immediate task is to examine the objective of that action considered as the practice of rhetoric.

For Kant each aesthetic criticism "is a mere subjective feeling, but it claims universal validity and can do so justly because we must assume a common sense of mankind as an ideal norm."¹¹ Therefore to know Kant's philosophy explaining acts such as those of rhetorical practices requires knowing not only the material circumstances of such acts but also the whole system of men's desires and their relative strengths. A Kantian theory of rhetoric demands the discovery of a behavioral theory suitable to the practices of rhetoric which will at once incorporate deterministic nature and moral freedom: a behavioral theory of persuasion suitable to chart a

¹¹Wellek, p. 230.

course, as it were, between authoritarianism and nihilistic relativism. Generally speaking, authoritarianism claims that good is an absolutely real and objective quality in man's existence and further that this good can be known with certainty. Obviously, even if a Kantian should admit to the first of these two claims--which is unlikely since even if an absolute real and objective good did exist it would be unknowable in the realm of the world of the external being and thus could only be thought--he certainly could not admit to the second. In contrast, the nihilistic relativists deny the objective reality in the authoritarian's good and accordingly reject the very possibility of moral insight, fallible or infallible. Neither of these two extremes is in accord with a world viewed from the point of Kant's philosophy, and anyone seeking an interpretation of rhetoric in terms of that philosophy must reject them. As previously noted, characteristics of sensory stimuli and rationality both play important roles in Kant's philosophy.

The Kantian man views himself as a rational being. His intellect is regarded as the governor of his emotional stimuli. As a rational being he counts himself as belonging to the intelligible world; and as considered solely of the intelligible world, all his reasons for propositions and

judgments would be in perfect conformity with the principle of the autonomy of a pure will. But the intelligible world also contains a grounding in the sensible world; and therefore a being must be recognized as containing such elements as are not altogether of the intelligible world. The orator treats his findings in the sensible world (examples, statistics, and the like) by supplying laws of reason for their adaptation to an audience. The orator may, by virtue of his freedom to act in accordance with the laws of reason, be conceived as cause acting a priori upon the audience's will to accept or reject his proposal. This is to say, the "springs of human action" are found in man's behavioral patterns whereby sensory stimuli are brought together with rational consideration, the unity of which acts as a cause in nature influencing the actions of the audience toward accepting or rejecting the orator's proposition or judgment. This is the function of practical reason; and practical reason, Lewis White Beck remarks, "is not concerned with the relation of knowledge to objects which may be given to us [through sensibility], but with the bringing into existence of objects which are not passively given us."¹² Practical

¹² A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 67.

reason is reasoning utilized causally against behavior for the sake of bringing into existence the satisfaction of some desire, the transcendency from things in time to things which are presently out of time. And, as Kant would say, unless this cause of practical reason is brought into more or less close combination with the moral law, the fate of discontentment will be its ultimate destiny.¹³

The source of this theory of rhetoric is found in the manner by which nature (natural phenomena) and the rules of the art are combined. And, according to later developments of German philosophy, Kant's idea is that artistic works and nature are strict analogies. Wellek aptly remarks that for Kant "the work of art is a parallel to an organism, not only in a metaphorical sense which compares the unity of a work of art to that of an organism, but because both art and organic nature must be conceived of under the terms of . . . [purposefulness]."14

The overcoming of the deep dualism basic to Kant's philosophy is pointed up in the union of art with its organic

¹³Immanuel Kant, Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911), p. 126.

¹⁴Wellek, pp. 230-31.

nature.¹⁵ Kant's world, as we have seen, is divided into two realms: (1) that accessible to our mind by the senses and the categories of our understanding and known as the phenomenal world; and (2) that of moral knowledge accessible only in action and known as the noumenal world. Kant sees in artistic expression a possibility of bridging the gulf between the necessary world of deterministic nature and the world of moral freedom; and among the "arts of expression," Kant classifies poetry and rhetoric as the "arts of speech" and places them first among all the arts.¹⁶ Of all the arts, says Kant, the art of speech, which owes its origin almost entirely to genius,

maintains the first rank. It expands the mind by setting the imagination at liberty; and by offering within the limits of a given concept amid the unbounded variety of possible forms accordant therewith, that which writes the presentment of this concept with a wealth of thought, to which no verbal expression is completely adequate; and so rising aesthetically to Ideas. It strengthens the mind by making it feel its faculty--free, spontaneous and independent of natural determination--of considering the judging nature as a phenomenon in accordance with aspects which it does not present in experience either for Sense or Understanding, and therefore of

¹⁵Ibid., p. 231.

¹⁶Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (London: Macmillan and Co., 1914), pp. 207 and 215.

using it on behalf of, and as a sort of schema for, the super-sensible.¹⁷

In this way the "art of speech" exists for the purpose of uniting the two realms in Kant's world into an autonomous whole. For Kant art accomplishes a union of the general and the particular, of sensuous intuition and thought, imagination and reason.¹⁸ There is little doubt that from the beginning Kant's view was taken from this pragmatic standpoint. Something had to exist consisting within the framework of the critical method that could reciprocate between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds and bridge the deep dualism involved therein. This something is found in man's artistic expression and first among the arts is the "art of speech."

The Categorical Imperative--An Instrument
for Use in Rhetorical Practices

Having seen the objective toward which the practices of rhetoric are directed in a system of rhetoric based on Kantian philosophy, we need now determine the rules for proper action provided for in Kant's philosophy. Since the

¹⁷Ibid., p. 215.

¹⁸Wellek, p. 231.

days of Aristotle many rhetoricians have believed that rhetoric is an instrument quite detached from the moral judgments of the orator's practices. However, others believe that rhetoric's sole purpose is to supply the methodology by which man may both express and activate principles they believe in, the substance of things for which they live, by influencing others in the direction of truth and justice.¹⁹ In the theoretical relationship of ethics and rhetoric, ethics has the function of discerning the concept of the good; and without this discernment as a command to future actions, rhetoric is without impetus.²⁰ Not only as measured by the standard of lasting attainment of rhetorical accomplishments, but from the very circumstances of the phenomenal-noumenal worlds, ethics cannot be divorced from the practices of rhetoric as viewed in terms of Kant's philosophy. Kant's whole epistemology depends upon the existence of the conditions necessary for moving from the phenomenal world and the "is" to the noumenal world and the "ought" and back again to the phenomenal so that not two wholly independent worlds but one

¹⁹Richard Murphy, "Preface to an Ethic of Rhetoric," The Rhetorical Idiom, ed. Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 141.

²⁰See Chapter II of this dissertation, "The Interdependency of Rhetoric and Ethics."

unified world of two parts emerges. This method, according to Kant, is found in man's artistic expression primarily in the "art of speech," guided in its activity by the precepts of moral reason.

Objections to General Rhetorical Practices

Yet Kant subsequently remarks that most of his respect for the place and importance given to the "art of speech" is primarily reserved for that art known as poetry. In the opening statements of the classification of the arts Kant defines poetry "as the art of conducting a free play of the imagination as if it were a serious business of the Understanding."²¹ Poetry holds "first rank" among the arts of speech because the poet merely promises an entertaining play upon ideas--there is no deception about the poet's designed intent. The poet promises little and announces his occupation as a mere play with ideas. Conversely, rhetoric is defined by Kant as "the art of carrying on a serious business of the Understanding as if it were a free play of the imagination."²² Later he points out that this "business of the understanding" is too often an "art of persuasion" designed

²¹Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 207.

²²Ibid.

"to win minds to the side of the orator before they have formed a judgment, and to deprive them of their freedom."²³ Consequently rhetoric, when so practiced by design, loses its place of respect as an enduring art form, for it functions against the vary nature of man's being and disregards the forms of its own existence. Too often, Kant feels, the orator fails

to supply what he did promise, which is indeed his announced business, viz. the purposive occupation of the understanding. . . . It cannot therefore be recommended either for the law courts or for the pulpit. For if we are dealing with civil law, with the rights of individual persons, or with lasting instruction and determination of people's minds to an accurate knowledge and a conscientious observance of their duty, it is unworthy of so important a business to allow a trace of any exuberance of wit and imagination to appear, and still less any trace of the art of talking people over and captivating them for the advantage of any chance person. For although this art may sometimes be directed to legitimate and praiseworthy designs, it becomes so objectionable, when, in this way maxims and dispositions are spoiled in a subjective point of view, though the action may objectively be lawful. It is not enough that we do what is right; we should practice it solely on the ground that it is right.²⁴

But Kant proceeds by recognizing that rhetoric "is not a work like that of a tradesman, the magnitude of which can be judged, exacted, or paid for, according to a definite

²³Ibid., p. 216.

²⁴Ibid., p. 208.

standard; and again, though the mind is occupied, still it feels itself contented and stimulated, without looking to any other purpose (independently of reward)."²⁵ What Kant seems to be saying is that rhetoric, unlike the products of a tradesman, has a capacity for making the mind at once contented and stimulated without possessing the qualities for properly determining contentment and stimulation. This is the moral problem that Kant envisions in rhetoric--a problem prevalent even in contemporary rhetorical practices.²⁶

Once the artist-orator has determined his desires, that will become a natural cause of his subsequent actions, specifically that cause which directs the orator to the objective he seeks when confronting an audience. Primary in the development of objectives are the artist-orator's concepts, the art form, the manner of presentation which the artist, working from his observations and judgments, purposefully designs in order to achieve his desired objective or will. By purposeful design Kant does not mean conscious

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Kant views the moral problem in rhetoric as fundamentally the same as for other art mediums. Therefore it is primarily from his discussion of the moral problem in art in general that an analysis of the moral problem in rhetoric is possible.

intention and aim, but harmony of parts, unity, totality, with every member having its proper place in the system. From this view of purpose, Kant is able to speak of art as analogous to an organism, an organic unity of the two-part world: the phenomenal and the noumenal. The concept of this ordered organism directs (or is, as it may be) the artist-orator's objective. Such concepts are of two kinds: natural concepts resulting in the legislation of knowledge, and concepts of moral legislation resulting in choices of actions. The essential determinative element is not natural concepts for

even impetuous movements of the mind--be they allied under the name of edification . . . or, as pertaining merely to culture, with ideas involving a social interest--no matter what tension of the imagination they may produce, can in no way lay claim to the honour of a sublime presentation, if they do not leave behind them a temper of a mind which, though it be only indirectly, has an influence upon the consciousness of the mind's strength and resoluteness in respect to that which carries with it pure intellectual finality (the supersensible).²⁷

Thus rhetorical practices in a Kantian view find their determinations of good or bad, right or wrong, in the temper of mind which they leave behind. Such determinations

²⁷ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, p. 216. The Meredith translation is used here because of its comparative clarity in relation to the Bernard translation of the same passage.

are found, not in sensible perceptions of the phenomenal world, but rather in the intellectual qualities of the noumenal world as they may be measured by moral precepts, i.e. the "ought" and not the "is" of the here and now. As Kant contends, presentations which omit concepts of moral legislation make

the spirits dull, the object gradually distasteful [i.e. the object of the artist-orator's purpose], and the mind, on account of its consciousness of a disposition that conflicts with purpose in the judgment of Reason, discontented with itself and peevish.

If the beautiful arts are not brought into more or less close combination with moral ideas, which alone bring with them a self-sufficing satisfaction, this latter fate must ultimately be theirs.²⁸

Implicit in Kant's characterization of general rhetorical practices is the need for a rational form of presentation--a form that brings together (i.e. legislates the development of) an organic unity comprising the two part world. When the orator determines his objective (i.e. his method for developing an organic unity) he is required to have "good reasons" (i.e. moral ideas) as to why he chooses a particular objective as opposed to other alternatives. The reasons here employed are considered the determinants of the moral value of the act proposed. The problem, therefore, that Kant's

²⁸Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 214.

philosophy must be prepared to resolve if indeed it has value for an ethics of rhetoric is the reasons determining right from wrong actions. As Minnick remarks, "Social pressures are such in our society that we, at least as far as public action is concerned, are encouraged to offer good reasons for our behavior. We are expected to be reasonable, and acts which can be justified by good reasons are praised, while capricious and whimsical action is condemned."²⁹ Recently Karl R. Wallace gave a fine accounting of a categorical system for the deduction of good reasons, and a good reason he defined as a statement offered in support of an ought-type proposition or a value judgment.³⁰ On this particular point, Wallace is quite Kantian, for in this very system of good reasons we find the "universalizable" method of man's behavioral patterns. The task, then, seems clear: (1) determining the manner of employing statements in support of ought-type propositions or value judgments for bridging the phenomenal and noumenal worlds--as is required of a system of rhetoric in terms of Kant's philosophy (such

²⁹Wayne C. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), p. 23.

³⁰"The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIX (October, 1963), 247.

statements will be referred to as "good reasons" in accordance with Wallace's definition)--and (2) determining the method for discovering statements in support of ought-type propositions or value judgments as provided for in Kant's philosophy.

Employing Good Reasons

The problems to be treated rhetorically are those derived from actual human affairs: sometimes characteristically political, other times vocational or recreational in nature. These wants, needs, desires, and passions are not some kind of "vague and amorphous restlessness," but are certain dynamic existences that must be identified in order to receive the benefit of the orator's efforts. The Kantian orator, then, begins his rhetorical practices by identifying (discovering-choosing) dynamic wants, needs, etc. which exist in his experience; for with experience all knowledge begins. Without this sensibility the will is incapable of stimulating or directing activity, as it lacks any content to regulate and motives to give it life. Without content of experience the Kantian orator's presentations are simply a vehicle for responding to reason alone without involvements with the extensionalized world. The responses to such

practices must be baseless and without firm cause. Sensibility must be the springs of the orator's practices, the facts by which he is motivated to perform certain actions; for without these sensible impressions the orator, like men in general, would be without the raw material from which propositions and judgments may be drawn.³¹ The function of identifying this content of experience Kant terms the "conative" element in action.

But the orator is more than a "knowing being," more than a being of the phenomenal world and the "is." He is also an active being, a being of the noumenal world and the "ought." With the knowledge of the "is" acquired conatively from phenomenal existence the orator possesses the raw material from whence spring the impulses of human action. The orator in a Kantian interpretation of rhetoric, however, must put his knowledge to work--he must employ knowledge in stating enthymematic premises which support judgments to regulate, influence, and direct the behavior of his noumenal self and audience. And he does this by practical reason

³¹See Kant's accounting of the importance of the sensibility in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and Co., 1953), p. 41. Also note Chapter III of this dissertation, especially the section titled "The Distinction of Pure and Empirical Knowledge."

which Kant understands as human intelligence concerned with ethical concepts, or the reason so far as it deals with human actions.

Man as a rational being is not an object of natural causation; by virtue of the Wille man must at least assume the characteristics of an agent who uses his reason in "practical situations that involve choice and decision. Practical reason is revealed in judgments that guide man's conduct, i.e. judgments are statements having to do with action, motives, feelings, emotions, attitudes and values."³² Practical reason is the act of subsuming the particular under the universal, the impulse under the moral law, the stimulus under its valuation and obligation. Theoretically at least, the proposition an orator chooses to support in a Kantian

³²Wallace, p. 242. Wallace is here summarizing his findings from several modern treatises on ethics. Chief among these are: Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory: The Problem of Normative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959); Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958); Paul Edwards, The Logic of Moral Discourse (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955); P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Baltimore: Penguin Press, 1954); and Stephen Edelston Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1960). Wallace's explanation of practical reason in rhetoric seems to be quite consistent with the way Kant would probably explain it. Thus Wallace's description of practical reason is valuable to a Kantian interpretation of rhetoric.

ethics of rhetoric is that proposition arising out of factual data (sensibility) being molded, modified, and justified by reason taking thought of alternative actions for resolving some want, need, desire, or passion. Lewis Beck remarks:

The taking thought of his action is one of the causes of his action; but until he himself has taken thought and thereby reached his own decision, the specific direction of the action that will issue from his taking thought cannot be known to him. To him, the act of taking thought is not so much a cause of a particular action, related to it by causal laws, as it is a search after a ground or good reason which will lead him to choose a specific act. The acting is a product of choice or decision which is reached just in his process of taking thought.³³

The "taking of thought" or "search for good reasons" in the process of choosing a specific act is called the cognitive element of action. The Kantian orator utilizes the medium of the public platform to resolve and satisfy some social want, need, desire, or passion by generalizing conative content with cognitive determinants. That is to say, the orator, after finding the relevant sensible experiential data, seeks to discover premises (generalized concepts of the good) which can be used for uniting the speaker and his audience concerning some ought-type proposition or value judgment. These premises, utilized in enthymemes, take the

³³ Beck, p. 30.

form of good reasons which are given in support of a proposition or judgment. And as good reasons, supports for a proposition or judgment are derived from thought and are analogous to maxims utilized in a Kantian system to channel human behavior into certain activities.

A "good reason," however, is a special kind of statement offered in support of an ought-type proposition or a value judgment. Some ought-type propositions and value judgments are legitimately good while others are not. Some propositions and judgments which are believed good are indeed proved to be so by subsequent events. These reasons are called legitimately good reasons. Yet, on still other occasions, reasons may be given to indicate a proposition or judgment is good and right when in reality the conclusion to such a proposition or judgment legitimately indicates otherwise.³⁴ Surely, then, a good reason must be more than just a statement offered in support of a proposition or judgment; for it would be a contradiction of terms to call propositions and judgments good when they are legitimately not good. Beck

³⁴Wallace, p. 247. See the distinction between subjective and objective good to distinguish explicitly between statements which are "legitimately good" and those which are merely believed to be good. See pages 48-55 of this dissertation.

reminds us that Kant ascribed to reason the task of going beyond the order of things, as given, to an ideal order of systematic connection of experience, a systematic connection that is never passively found in knowledge but must be striven for according to a certain regulative idea.³⁵ The regulative idea Beck refers to is the "categorical imperative:" "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."³⁶ Wallace tends to use "good reason" and "practical reason" as interchangeable terms; and this is entirely proper, for practical reason is "will acting according to a conception of the moral law"; and when the will does so act it is called the will of the greatest good or the summum bonum. Good reasons, then, are statements that guide impulses in the formulation and acceptance of ought-type propositions and value judgments in obedience to the moral law. Because they are derived from the moral law they are of the summum bonum and thus are known as legitimately good reasons. As good reasons they are generalized concepts of the good, where sensibility

³⁵Beck, p. 38.

³⁶Cited in H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 129.

is generalized with the moral law, and serve as enthymematic premises in the orator's attempts to persuade to future actions.

With this description of a "good reason," however, one additional consideration of major importance remains: subjective and objective good.³⁷ As pointed out in chapter two, good itself is in many ways an indefinable term, but this fact does not apply when good is associated with the rightness or wrongness of actions. In this latter sense, a good reason seems to be the cause directing the right action. Or, in other words, the reason guiding the impulse to the right action is the good reason where good is determinable by rightness. And, as we have just seen, the right act, or the act that "ought" to be performed, is the act ensuing straight from reason that accords with the moral law.

The doctrine of "good reasons," therefore, is a matter involving objective and subjective principles. Since the moral law is objective in nature, man ought to do what is objectively right. But in a real sense the determining of reasons to guide impulses, i.e. practical reason, is a subjective determination. Consequently a good reason is

³⁷See the exposition of Russell's discussion of subjective and objective good in Chapter II.

that reason which is subjectively determined to be objectively in accord with the conception of the moral law. Or, stated another way, the application of the categorical imperative as an objective law of morality is a subjective application; and thus a reason is subjectively good when judged by the agent to be objectively right, and subjectively bad when judged to be objectively wrong.

The Deduction of Good Reasons

If "good reasons" are the fundamental materials in a Kantian approach to the ethics of rhetoric, it should be possible to derive from Kant's ethical system a scheme of categories for deducing good reasons to be offered in support of ought-type propositions and judgments of value. Indeed this can be done by interpreting the main points of Kant's "Table of the Categories of Freedom Relative to the Notions of Good and Evil," offered in the Critique of Practical Reason.³⁸ Beck remarks: "[Kant] assumes that the important

³⁸See Immanuel Kant, "Critical Examination of Practical Reason" in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), p. 158. After giving his table of categories, Kant says, "I add nothing further here in explanation of the present table since it is intelligible enough of itself." Ibid. Lewis White Beck has offered an invaluable service by interpreting Kant's table of categories which Kant himself did not see

formal features of practical judgments [reasons] are identical with those of theoretical judgments, and thus he avails himself of the division of categories arising from the table of judgments in the first Critique."³⁹

What Kant does is to present a four-fold classification of the categories using the same classification of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality as set forth in the Critique of Pure Reason. The system for developing each of these classes of categories similarly follows a pattern first established in the earlier work.

The first class is "The Categories of Quantity." Here we are concerned with principles of right actions. Principles involve both maxims and laws. Maxims may refer either to maxims of an individual or to those shared generally by mankind. Laws differ from maxims by being universally valid and by requiring that the will under law coexist with

fit to explain. Beck's explanation of the categories will be relied upon extensively in the present analysis. These categories of necessity must be flexible and non-restrictive in nature and they must be derived in strict accordance with the moral law lest they disregard the nature of Kant's categorical imperative. Conversely, such a system of categories must be wholly independent of any particular desire and thus comprise practical reason alone lest they be incompatible with the very essence of Kant's critical method. Beck's description of the categories meets both of these demands.

³⁹Beck, p. 145.

the total system of ends.⁴⁰ The categories of quantity are as follows:

<u>Categories</u>	<u>Judgments</u>
1. Mere maxim of individual	Subjective good for the individual
2. Maxim of human beings generally	Objective good for the generality of men
3. Laws as maxims	Good for rational beings as such, both objective and subjective

By utilizing the instrumentation of the categories of quantity, one may find good reasons for supporting the proposition that "one ought to contribute to a certain charity." In this connection the orator has two functions to perform: he needs to (1) identify the dynamic impulse in the problem of his consideration and (2) identify the moral maxim (good reason) for generalizing that impulse with a particular set of responses. Thus, in support of the proposition that "one ought to contribute to a particular charity," the advocate might offer the reasons: (1) contributions to this charity will supply food and clothing to the needy (a factual reason) and (2) this act is morally right because man (under the moral law) is obligated to those programs

⁴⁰Ibid.

aiding the good for the generality of men (a moral reason). In this example the factual reason serves as a premise expressing a dynamic impulse to action (some want, need, desire, or passion) while the moral reason serves as a maxim deduced from the moral law of the categorical imperative and designed to generalize the dynamic impulse (factual reason) with the appropriate actions called for in the statement of the proposition.

In the example of the category of quantity here cited, the Kantian system establishes a three-part criterion for moral acts. First, the proposition is dependent upon the reasons (premises) given in support of it. As pointed out in chapter two these reasons serve as premises for the orator's enthymemes and may be supplied from the audience's stock of common knowledge or may be supplied or altered and modified through the orator's presentation. Without the establishment of these supporting premises or reasons, however, the argument loses its basis from which the inference or deduction of the proposition is drawn. Hostility cannot grievously threaten a neo-Kantian approach to the ethics of rhetoric for neglecting to give reasons in defense of ethical judgments. Reason is the very essence of the moral law as Kant devised it.

Second, the Kantian system maintains a consistency with recognized logical systems of valid reasoning processes. As we previously noted, the enthymeme of rhetorical practices is obliged to abide by the same rules for valid reasoning as is the drawing of inductive inferences and deductive conclusions. Accordingly, Kant's categories are especially appropriate, for in a very real sense the Kantian system finds its very essence in the generalizations formed by logical inferences or deductions. Without such generalizations, the method for moving from a sensory stimulus to its satisfaction is non-existent in the Kantian system. One should not wonder at the normal logical processes of a Kantian system, for they are the very foundation of the critical method set forth in Kant's first Critique.

Third, the generalizing of sense stimuli with responses possesses flexibility by considering all available actions with which a particular stimulus may be generalized. Acting under the mediatory powers of the Willkur, the will of the individual may demonstrate preferences for a variety of actions while yet reflecting the influence of the moral law set forth by the static and non-flexible component of rationality called the Wille. That flexibility is to be the standard of a neo-Kantian ethics of rhetoric is not to be

denied, for it is the basis of the freedom of the will.

These three factors, then: (1) a system of ethics based on reason; (2) recognized logical processes, and (3) flexibility, characterize the nature of Kant's philosophy of ethics and form the basis of each of the classes of categories which may be developed under the rule of the categorical imperative.

The second class is "The Categories of Quality." Practical reason with respect to quality rules either affirmative, negative, or infinite. If it rules affirmative, it does so by commission; if negative, it rules by omission; if infinite, it rules by granting permission to make some exception to a rule of the former kind. The categories of quality are as follows:

<u>Categories</u>	<u>Judgments</u>
1. Rules of commission	The good is that which is commanded
2. Rules of omission	The good is that which is to be achieved through the avoidance of certain actions
3. Rules of exceptions	The good is that which is appropriate in obedience to a general precept. ⁴¹

⁴¹"Rules of exception correspond to infinite judgments in theory, in that they exclude certain actions from the scope of one of the earlier rules." Ibid., p. 147.

By utilizing the instrumentation of the "categories of quality," the orator may discover good reasons to support the proposition, "We should oppose the expanding influence of Communist doctrine in America," because (1) historically Communism has impeded the promotion of individual enterprise (a factual reason); and (2) good may be achieved through the avoidance of actions injurious to individual self-reliance (a moral reason).

The third class is "The Categories of Relation." Practical reason states the relation of an act to the good and identifies the good of the act. But, furthermore, practical reason rules the relation in which actions of one person are to be judged in relation to the effects on the state of another. The categories of relation are as follows:

<u>Categories</u>	<u>Judgments</u>
1. The rule that all acts be judged as acts of a subject	The good of the character of the person: good sense, dignity, <u>etc.</u>
2. The rule that all acts be judged as having consequences for the state of the person. ⁴²	

⁴²This category presents considerable difficulty since "state" may have reference to moral condition, physical condition, or the state of well being and its opposites. See Beck, pp. 147-48.

- | | |
|---|---|
| a) the rules that an action may be judged as issuing from a person in a certain moral condition | Goods pertaining to action derived from specific goods of character, the courageous, the magnanimous, <u>etc.</u> |
| b) the rule of taking account of the welfare of those affected by an action | The good is that suitable for the welfare of the recipient of the act |
| c) the rule that acts be judged by their consequences for the welfare of the person | The good as the prudent |
| 3. The rule that in a moral community the acts of one person be decided upon and judged as they affect the state of another, and conversely | The good as justice or equality under a common law; the moral community |

By utilizing the instrumentation of the "categories of relation," the orator may discover good reasons to support the proposition that "Steel prices should not be increased at this time because (1) an increase in steel prices detrimentally depreciates the value of consumer income (a factual reason) and (2) the good is that suitable for the welfare of the recipient of the act (a moral reason).

The fourth and last class is "The Categories of Modality." The categories of modality tell us the weight of the value to be assigned to the copula "ought" in statements prescribing actions. The modality of the statements concerning duties of actions we are about tells us if they are

possible, really, or necessarily good.⁴³ The categories of modality are as follows:

<u>Categories</u>	<u>Judgments</u>
1. The rule that certain actions are to be judged as allowed and certain ones as forbidden with respect to the accomplishment of some arbitrary purpose	The permitted and forbidden act; the possible good act and acts which cannot possibly be good on the assumption of an arbitrary purpose. ⁴⁴
2. The rule that certain actions are required or forbidden by an actual law lying in reason as such	Dutiful actions and actions contrary to duty; the actual moral good and evil in abiding by or disobeying prevailing laws
3. The rule that certain actions are made necessary by virtue of the actual rule lying in reason as such	Perfect duty; an action directly commanded; the necessarily good
and the rule that, while a	Imperfect duty; an action

⁴³The class of the categories of modality differs from the other classes in that each of the categories of modality seems to have its own individual purpose rather than all three categories having a single unity of purpose. The first category seems to treat the "good" of judgments having differing degrees of possibility. The second category tends to treat propositions prescribing an actual end to be achieved. The third category, rather than being a synthesis of the first two categories, as was the method of development in each of the first three classes, is a logical division of the first two categories in the classification of modality. See Beck, pp. 149-51.

⁴⁴Kant elsewhere describes the permitted and forbidden as the maxim following from obedience to the law and the maxim following from desire for the pleasure expected. See Beck, Chapter VII, pp. 90-107.

certain maxim is necessary for rational beings, there is permissible latitude in the choice of actions under it

not fully determined by the actual rule taken abstractly, but falling within the scope of the rule as determined by sound judgment using the rule of exceptions; the contingently good action under a necessarily good maxim

Thus, by utilizing the instrumentation of the categories, the orator in a neo-Kantian approach to the ethics of rhetoric, by means of a deduction from the "categories of modality," might present the proposition that the federal government ought to guarantee an opportunity for higher education to qualified high school graduates because (1) such action will alleviate certain educational needs of high school graduates who cannot now go to college (a factual reason) and (2) this act is a morally right act because the federal government is obligated to those dutiful actions of abiding by prevailing laws which include those laws requiring the government to administer to people's needs which they cannot themselves satisfy (a moral reason).⁴⁵

⁴⁵Probably a more realistic example of the "categories of modality" would be as follows: The federal government ought to guarantee an opportunity for higher education to qualified high school graduates because (1) such action will alleviate certain needs of high school graduates who cannot now go to college (a factual reason); (2) the government is obligated by law to administer to people's needs

Once the orator locates the dynamic impulse in the problem of his own reason, he identifies the maxim (good reason) for terminating the impulse in a particular action. When audience and speaker unite in the deduction of a particular maxim, action results and with action the proposition or judgment which reason supports becomes a part of the "is"--being brought from out of time into time, it becomes a fact of history. The reason itself directly deduced from the categories generalizes or directs the impulse into the proper solution of the problem (the proposition) in accordance with the dictates of the moral law (the categorical imperative). When the orator's audience in a Kantian ethics of rhetoric does not accept the speaker's moral reasons, he must revert to a defense of the more basic principles of morality, the moral law itself, and justify his reasons as a deduction from the moral law. As in theoretical judgments where no representations can exist for consciousness apart from the categories, so no consciousness of morality can exist in practical judgments apart from the categories of the categorical

which they cannot themselves satisfy (a factual reason); and (3) the federal government ought to meet its obligations to dutiful actions in abiding by prevailing laws (a moral reason). The format of the preceding examples has dictated the form used when considering the "categories of modality" in the text of this paper.

imperative. The claim of an aesthetic judgment to a universal validity for every subject, as a judgment which is based upon some a priori principle, stands in need of a deduction of justification of its pretensions; and the pretensions of a good reason as a moral pronouncement find their justification in their deduction from the categorical imperative.

A rhetorical system based upon this Kantian approach to the ethics of rhetoric points up the responsibilities a practitioner of moral suasion assumes by virtue of being an advocate on the public platform. It describes for him the procedure involved in advocacy--a procedure based upon and consistent with an epistemology recognized as a major turning point in the history of philosophy. Not only does a Kantian approach to rhetorical ethics describe the procedure of advocacy, it also gives the practitioner the necessary instruments for executing this procedure in a moral manner. In short, the categorical structure provides the framework for the orator's upholding of moral responsibilities which are legitimately his. On this account, Kant's categorical imperative is an instrument of lasting value, giving assistance in each of its three offices: (1) it is the orator's formal determining principle of action by means of practical reason; it informs the subject of the law that his will

directs him to follow; (2) it is the material-objective determining principle in so far as in willing an object its good or evil being is decided; and (3) to these Kant adds the feeling of respect the law demands as a subjective determining principle--a motive to action. Little else can be said about the categories of the moral laws--they need only be employed to realize beneficial results.

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