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INTEGRATION, INTERVENTION, AND IDENTITY:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN NATO AND THE EU

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
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
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

This thesis seeks to answer if the European Union (EU) is complementary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with regard specifically to military interventions. In order to achieve this, this thesis focuses on comparing the benefits and drawbacks between nationally based and operationally based military interventions. While a supranational organization, NATO remains mostly an alliance and forum between member states. Military interventions conducted by NATO retain most of the attributes of a directly initiated military intervention. In contrast, the EU is more institutionally involved. As such, the EU has unique supranational attributes that potentially complement NATO and its military interventions. The potential benefits of the supranational EU may only be harvested if NATO and the EU are complementary on a functional level as well. It is necessary, then, to inspect the relationship between the EU and NATO. By virtue of the Berlin Plus agreement, the EU has largely been encapsulated by NATO. While this encapsulation within NATO has led to more of a specialized role of the EU, it serves to increase the complementarity between the organizations much more than other developments that could have occurred. Given the EU's unique attributes, its progressively improving successes in military interventions, and its unique entwinement and specialized role within NATO, the EU may not just be complementing NATO but revitalizing the organization.

NATO has largely become more ambiguous with its purpose. This has led to a less consistent policy of when military interventions are justified. Because of this the EU has developed security capabilities that potentially duplicate and compete with NATO. Therefore, it is important to understand the dynamics between NATO and the

Integration, Intervention, and Identity: An Examination of the Dynamics between NATO and the EU

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This thesis seeks to answer if the European Union (EU) is complimentary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with regard specifically to military interventions. In order to achieve this, this thesis focuses on comparing the benefits and drawbacks between nationally based and supranationally based military interventions. While a supranational organization, NATO remains mostly an alliance and forum between member states. Military interventions conducted by NATO retain most of the attributes of a directly national military intervention. In contrast, the EU is more institutionally interwoven. As such, the EU has unique supranational attributes that potentially compliment NATO and its military interventions. The potential benefits of the supranational EU may only be harnessed if NATO and the EU are complementary on a functional level as well. It is necessary, then, to inspect the relationship between the EU and NATO. By virtue of the Berlin Plus agreement, the EU has largely been encompassed by NATO. While this encapsulation within NATO has led to more of a specialized role of the EU, it serves to increase the complementarity between the organizations much more than other developments that could have occurred. Given the EU's unique attributes, its progressively improving successes in military interventions, and its unique entwinement and specialized role within NATO, the EU may not just be complementing NATO but revitalizing the organization.

NATO has largely become more ambiguous with its purpose. This has led to a less consistent policy of when military interventions are justified. Because of this the EU has developed security capabilities that potentially duplicate and compete with NATO. Therefore, it is important to understand the dynamics between NATO and the

EU, as well as the special role the EU may play within the NATO framework. This introductory chapter will focus on the identity of NATO as well as the ambiguity in the organization and the rift within NATO between European allies and (primarily) the United States. A focus on EU history will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 4. Since the EU has largely been encompassed within the NATO framework through the Berlin Plus agreement, an inspection of NATO's background and its identity are a useful starting point for this thesis.

As the United States entered the Great War in 1917 and the Soviet Union dropped out of the war, a new ideological conception of the Entente powers was born under the American presidential administration of Woodrow Wilson.¹ This new conception changed what had been largely viewed as a war between pragmatic European states to one that banded democratic nations together ideologically by pitting them against anti-democratic nation states. In this regard, the Entente powers crafted the perception of the war to be viewed by domestic audiences as a righteous justification for their long perseverance in the lengthy and bloody war against the Anti-democratic Central Powers.² This concept proved not just to be an effective use of propaganda; it became a basis of national identity. In the United States, the Wilsonian tradition persists as a justifiable basis for American military intervention in regions abroad. This Wilsonian basis for foreign military intervention is only trumped by one other justification for intervention, national security. American intervention in Iraq beginning in 2003 illustrates both of these points in that weapons of mass destruction

¹ Woodrow Wilson, "U.S. Declaration of War with Germany," *Firstworldwar.com*, April 2, 1917, <http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/usawardeclaration.htm>.

² Gary Sheffield, "The Origins of World War One," *BBC*, March 8, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/origins_01.shtml#four.

appealed to a sense of national security, and the branding of the mission, "Operation Iraqi Freedom," appealed to the Wilsonian tradition.³

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed on the basis of security and sought to maintain an ideological solidarity and identity by only permitting non-communist countries to join, with a distinct preference for democracies. There are a few notable exceptions to the majority of democracies that are part of NATO. Portugal under the Salazar dictatorship was among the NATO founding members due to the strategic importance of NATO having access to the Portuguese Azores and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, the oldest alliance in the world.⁴ Other countries in NATO went through spells of less than democratic governments including Greece (under the colonels from 1967-1974) and Turkey (which endured several military coups since its acceptance into NATO). Furthermore, the communist threat of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact made NATO less scrutinizing in terms of admittance to the organization on grounds of ideology. Michael Ignatieff states, "Who you believe yourself to be is mostly defined in terms of who you are not."⁵ As with the individual, this is also applicable to NATO.

The basis of NATO may be rooted in the promotion of democracy and national defense; however, with the end to the Cold War and the dissolution of NATO's nemesis organization, the Warsaw Pact, the identity of NATO comes into question. NATO can no longer use its image of the opposition alliance to communism as a strong basis for

³ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed The World*, (New York: Taylor & Francis Books, 2002), 162-165.

⁴ "Military Facilities in the Azores: Agreement between Portugal and the United States," *Lillian Goldman Law Library*, September 6, 1951, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/port001.asp; and

"History of the Relations between Portugal and England," *The Anglo-Portuguese Society*, 2007, <http://www.angloportuguesesociety.org.uk/alliance-history>.

⁵ Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997), 174.

the organization's identity. Is NATO, then, a relic of the Cold War era, or has it been able to develop a revised identity and adapt to contemporary circumstances?

Since the end of the Cold War, the operations of NATO have changed to fit contemporary circumstances, namely in more proactively taking military actions and interventions in response to crisis situations that do not pose a direct threat to NATO members. This transition is far from complete, yet it is important to understand the reasons for and challenges with NATO's reassessments of purpose as well as the threats that are most relevant in contemporary times. Initially, NATO was simply a defensive military alliance of western democracies that stood in solidarity against the expanding reach of the communist Soviet Union and NATO's nemesis organization, the Warsaw Pact. Aside from making an attack on one NATO member state an attack on all NATO member states (as per Article 5 of the Washington Agreement), NATO served an important function by providing a forum for member states to discuss how to deal with the Soviet Union in a world with two superpowers. Most indicative of this function was the Harmel Report of 1967, which by the promotion of smaller member states, led to a strategy that accepted detente while maintaining the military strength of the NATO alliance.⁶ In addition to NATO's function as a forum between member states, it was prepared to deal with total war situations as catastrophic as a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union. However, such an event never occurred. No military operations under the banner of NATO were ever conducted before the fall of the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁷

⁶ Lawrence S. Kaplan, "History: The 40th Anniversary of the Harmel Report," *NATO Review*, Spring, 2007, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue1/english/history.html>.

⁷ "NATO's Operations: 1949 - Present," *NATO*, 2009, <http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/21/NATO%20Operations,%201949-Present.pdf>.

A newfound, extreme, and misplaced optimism followed in the wake of the Soviet Union's dissolution. The extent of this optimism is illustrated by Francis Fukuyama's article ostentatiously titled *The End of History*.⁸ This optimism found itself woven into the outlook of American foreign policy in the First Gulf War. In his 1991 State of the Union Address, President George H.W. Bush proclaimed a "new world order" to the American people, in which the world was now unified in its goals of peace, liberty, security, and rule of law. The President went on to say that the "leadership of the United Nations, once only a hoped for ideal, is now confirming its founders' vision."⁹ The manner of thought at the time seemed to be that Saddam Hussein would be taught a lesson that would set a precedent that demonstrated how the global community could work together, quickly come to consensus, and if necessary, enforce the new global political regime that demanded global stability and promoted democracy, liberal markets, and rule of law. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was to be the first and last test to this new post-Cold War international consensus that would be resolved with a victory in the First Gulf War. However, this certainly was not the last test of the "New World Order," as the post-Cold War Era would provide a new set of challenges and problems.

During the highly optimistic times of 1990, NATO conferred to reevaluate their role in this "new world order." This reevaluation was warranted and the need for changes to the strategy of the organization to fit the Post-Cold War Era was recognized in the aptly named "Alliance's New Strategic Concept" which stated: "The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the

⁸ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *Quadrant (Sydney)* 33, no. 8 (1989): 15-25.

⁹ George H. W. Bush, "State of the Union Address: Envisioning One Thousand Points of Light," Jan. 29, 1991, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0900156.html>.

Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain."¹⁰ The New Strategic Concept outlined that the traditional threats from Eastern Europe had greatly diminished, yet the Soviet Union's dissolution left many regions in an unstable environment. The key change in NATO was the shift away from a defensive strategy to a more proactive approach. Military intervention in unstable areas would be seen as necessary for protecting the "security and territorial integrity of members of the alliance."¹¹ While the concern here was for European NATO members and their close proximity to unstable east European countries, the New Strategic Concept also hinted at justified NATO intervention in the Middle East should it become unstable, as some states in that region had missiles capable of reaching some NATO member states.¹² Overall, the changes focused more on potential, less-traditional threats to NATO members and promote a broader interpretation of NATO security duties.

The first operations of NATO in the early 1990's deployed aircraft and air defense for Turkey during the Gulf War, performed interdiction duty, and enforced a no-fly zone over the Balkans. All of these enforcement operations were in accordance with the UN Charter. NATO's New Strategic Concept correctly evaluated the ethnic tensions and potential for crisis situations in Eastern Europe. In 1994, NATO conducted its first military operations. This began by NATO shooting down aircraft that were not in accordance with the no-fly zone over Bosnia¹³. Also interesting in the Bosnian case is that NATO acted before it was given the approval of the United Nations

¹⁰ "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," *NATO*, Nov. 7, 1991, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Section 9.

¹² *Ibid.*, Section 11.

¹³ "NATO's Operations: 1949 - Present," *NATO*.

to do so. While NATO had largely acted as the "teeth" of the UN in the past, NATO demonstrated that it was not shackled by the UN.

In 1999 NATO's Strategic Concept was reevaluated. The primary change was the recognition of other groups, such as the European Union, that were a growing influence in international security and how they could work within the NATO framework. Also iterated explicitly was that NATO would intervene in crisis situations that were not related to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (which basically stated that an attack on one member would be an attack on all NATO members).¹⁴ While NATO did not change its consistent mission of promoting the security of its member states, it continued to widen the areas in which it would be able to act.

After the attacks on September 11, 2001, Article 5 was invoked for the first time.¹⁵ This prompted an internationally justified and NATO backed American invasion of Afghanistan. Concurrent to this was an American declaration of War on Terror and the realization that the enemy was not represented directly by a nation state. U.S. security policy changed after September 11 and Condoleezza Rice highlighted this difference at her speech at Trinity University in 2010, when she mentioned that prior to September 11 the foremost security concern that was most talked about was about Chinese missiles. After September 11, she said she realized that the primary genuine security concerns were not generated from large powerful nation states but from smaller failed nation states. These talking points focused on the importance of spreading democracy for the purpose of American national security. Further into Secretary Rice's

¹⁴ "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," *NATO*, April 24, 1999, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.

¹⁵ "NATO and the Scourge of Terrorism," *NATO*, Feb. 18, 2005, <http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm>.

speech, she emphasized democracy as a universal human right. The ideological American Wilsonian tradition of spreading democracy to other countries had been fused with a feeling that American national security depended on it.¹⁶ There is a firm basis for this argument as well grounded in the Democratic Peace Theory. In the book, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, it is illustrated why democratic nations have almost never been at war with one another using this logic:

(a) Democracies rarely fight each other (an empirical statement) because (b) they have other means of resolving conflicts between them and therefore do not need to fight each other (a prudential statement), and (c) they perceive that democracies should not fight each other (a normative statement about principles of right behavior), which reinforces the empirical statement.¹⁷

The term "democracy" may seem a bit ambiguous in this context; however, even a more rigorous set of standards for democracy does not disprove but reinforces the validity of the Democratic Peace Theory. John T. Fishel listed these parameters for democracy as: (1) Leaders being chosen in free, fair, competitive, and frequent elections; (2) the existence of a sufficient freedom of expression, especially in freedoms to organize political campaigns and express feelings toward policy; and (3) an independent and impartial mechanism for a dispute settlement system (though this does not mean judicial review is necessary).¹⁸

Given the large influence of the United States within NATO, the "democratic peace theory," in which democracies are much less likely to go to war with one another, became not only a part of American national security but influenced the NATO mission

¹⁶ Mead, *Special Providence*, 162-165.

¹⁷ Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 4.

¹⁸ John T. Fishel, interview by Mac Higbee, Hester Hall at the University of Oklahoma, June 27, 2012.

as well.¹⁹ While the intervention in Afghanistan was sponsored by the United Nations and supported by NATO, it served as a precursor of the American nation building effort, which was later attempted in Iraq after the Second Gulf War began in 2003. Yet, the Second Gulf War did not receive the support of influential NATO members, France and Germany.²⁰ Therein lays NATO's central tension, the definition of its limits. NATO expanded its roles to do essentially anything to prevent instability or harm of any sort to come to its member states. It is in this regard that NATO can act preventatively in the cases of crisis situations (as it did in the Balkans, which is examined in chapter 4).

NATO is greatly influenced by the democratic peace theory and the Wilsonian tradition. Since both of these influences are grounded in the prevention of war, it may seem ironic that they help to justify small wars and military interventions. The reasoning is that such small conflicts are necessary to prevent inevitable and larger scale conflicts with non-democratic countries (or potentially with anti-democratic groups that have free range to operate within those countries). These types of conflicts are seen as potentially more costly or catastrophic than the option of military intervention. Again, it is difficult to determine where to draw the line when a low intensity conflict or small war is achieving its goal and when the cost to benefit ratio is not favorable. It is natural to question if the given conflict is truly promoting a foundation for enduring peace or if the conflict is the very war of the future that those guided by the Wilsonian tradition

¹⁹ Michael E. Brown, Sean L. Jones, and Steven E. Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996), 199.

²⁰ "Joint Declaration by Russia, Germany and France on Iraq," *France Diplomatie*, Feb. 10, 2003, <https://pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/editorial/actual/acl2/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20030211.gb.html>

were initially seeking to avoid.²¹ This makes NATO's responsibilities in participating in military operations that would install democracies more ambiguous.

The ambiguity of NATO's purpose and the lack of setting consistent parameters for when military intervention is required are new problems that have arisen with NATO's more initiative engagement of the world after the Cold War. The ambiguity of the responsibilities of NATO is a source of discord between NATO member states. NATO has gone beyond its days of simply being a defensive alliance to one where the NATO framework has been expanded greatly, even to being an organization that provides natural disaster relief. While many of these new initiatives may be a step forward, the legal obligations do not bind member countries to work together in all of these endeavors. NATO remains largely a framework for discussion between member states with the original mutual defense aspect being the one of the few obligations between member states. Instead there is a mutual collective security interest in promoting stable democracies. However, even without a definitive guideline deeming when military intervention is proper, the mutual collective security interests of each member country demand that NATO reacts to opportunities to promote democracy. Consider if a NATO member such as the United States unilaterally initiated an unpopular military intervention to topple a regime and promote democracy in a country, is it then under the primary directive of NATO to resolve the aftermath of the war and promote democracy in the area to stifle further security concerns about the region for its member states?

The definitive extent of NATO responsibility has become increasingly ambiguous and has caused a divide within the alliance. European NATO members have

²¹ Mead, *Special Providence*, 162-165.

contributed in the *post-bellum* operations in more specialized functions to aid in the stabilization of Iraq and other regions. This dynamic demonstrates the split often seen in NATO where the United States provides the initial military force to occupy the country and the European allies offer more of a policing action after the initial American use of traditional military force. This dynamic, in which different NATO member countries conduct different tasks, is cause for concern about how the burden of international security should be distributed, as well as under whose terms a military intervention is instigated. The Berlin Plus agreement (later described in some detail) allows for the EU to work within the framework of NATO to prevent a overlapping and potentially contesting security organization to develop, yet it also promotes this specialization of tasks. While a neo-functionalist could look at the EU and its security policy as taking on new challenges as a result of better integration, no such tangible bonds have brought NATO member states closer to one another. Rather, all that has bonded these nations has been momentary and fleeting sentiment, whether that was the idealism immediately after the Cold War or the September 11 terrorist attacks. As NATO takes on a new role in reacting to and proactively engaging in emerging crisis situations, it must be careful to define its boundaries should it wish to maintain a solidarity that would truly enhance NATO members' security and global stability.

The emerging foreign policy and military practices under the EU initially created a security network that overlapped NATO's duties; however, this dynamic has been transforming to fit EU defense within the NATO framework while further driving the specialization of tasks between NATO member countries. The EU has developed a common foreign policy and has improved its ability to deploy multi-national EU troops under short notice for crisis situations. It is arguable that this common foreign policy

and improved military coordination is not just congruent with NATO directives, but that it essentially serves the same role that NATO has filled since the end of the Cold War. "To be sure, NATO and the EU are largely competing models of security provisions with differing cultures, functions, instruments, and underlying institutional logics."²² The argument is that there is an incredible amount of overlap between the organizations, and therefore, to have more than one of them exist is superfluous and a waste of resources. The counterargument is that there must be a degree of duplication and autonomy in order for the EU to carry more of the burden of international security. In reference to this argument, Luke Coffey of the Heritage Foundation writes, "Every euro or pound wasted on EU defense is one less that could be invested in NATO."²³ The reasoning that EU defense is a waste of time is largely characterized by the incongruence in which countries are members of one organization and not the other. Specifically, the EU has six neutral member countries, it excludes non-EU members (Norway and Turkey) that are part of NATO from any decision making, and the controversy over Cypress often halts EU-NATO cooperation.²⁴ Another speculative argument is that the EU is slowly edging NATO out of Europe as NATO preeminence wanes and EU influence grows.²⁵ Overall, it is the ambiguity within NATO that prompts an EU response of developing its own security capacities that duplicate NATO's to a degree.

²² Sebastian Mayer, "Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU Transform Provision of External Security," *Contemporary Security Policy* 32, no. 2 (2011): 309.

²³ Luke Coffey, "Five Principles that Should Guide U.S. Policy Toward NATO," *The Heritage Foundation*, March 8, 2012, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/5-principles-that-should-guide-us-policy-toward-nato>.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Robert Bateman III, "The Death of NATO," *Proceedings Magazine*, 136(12):1,294, (2010), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-12/death-nato>; and Anand Menon, "European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 53:3, (2011), 76.

While the EU has developed some assets that duplicate functions of NATO, this has not gone to the extent of making the EU adversarial NATO. The Berlin Plus agreement is an effective counter to such arguments that the EU is in direct competition with NATO. The Berlin Plus agreement has allowed the EU to use the preexisting framework of NATO for new missions and has enveloped the EU's defense functions within the NATO apparatus, creating a sort of functional hierarchy. Primarily this has reduced the amount of overlap between the organizations, provided better coordination with in-field support, and promoted information sharing and transparency between the organizations.²⁶ Understanding the Berlin Plus agreement in just this capacity changes the context in which these arguments should be evaluated. Firstly, while it is technically true that money could be being diverted from NATO into the EU defense, it is possible to view EU defense as an arm of NATO given that it has largely been incorporated into the NATO framework. Secondly, while the EU has the potential to relieve NATO of some of the security burden in Europe, the notion of the EU edging NATO out of Europe provides a misconception that EU defense is a competitive security network that has not been entwined with NATO. Berlin Plus recognizes the similar goals of both NATO and the EU and allows the EU to use NATO resources primarily to reduce overlapping resources and to incorporate EU defense into the preeminent NATO security framework. Because of this, the Berlin Plus agreement could also be used by both arguments to say that NATO and the EU military and foreign policy are too similar and this cross-coordination effort reaffirms that. Berlin Plus also demonstrates that the EU is recognized by NATO as an asset in achieving NATO goals, thus bestowing an increasing amount of responsibility to the EU for issues that NATO would potentially take an active role in.

²⁶ "NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership," *NATO*, Nov. 15, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm.

This thesis seeks not only to clarify the dynamics of the relationship between NATO and the EU since the end of the Cold War. It will describe the strengths and weaknesses each organization has for dealing with crisis situations that demand military intervention. Articles in the media have used a comparative approach in favoring either NATO or the EU over the other for this interventionist role.²⁷ These arguments will be examined, as they highlight important issues. However, the structure of this thesis, conducted in a comparative manner, is to better clarify the differences between these organizations, which make a case for the complementarity of the EU to NATO. It is not to label one of these organizations "better" than the other in the generalized manner that some of these articles do. Overall, this thesis will demonstrate the important roles and challenges that both NATO and the EU have in reacting to international crises. In particular, the focus will be on the concerns of these organizations' interoperability highlighting issues including sharing security burdens, EU specialization versus duplication, and the variance in the conception of EU autonomy. The goal of this thesis is not to make specific policy recommendations based on these assessments but is to provide an understanding of contemporary NATO and EU policy concerning military intervention in the hopes of being a starting point for future discussion on how the complementarity of the EU to NATO can enhance global security.

²⁷ Bateman III, "The Death of NATO," *Proceedings Magazine*; Menon, "European Defence Policy," *Survival*; and Ian Traynor, "US Defense Chief Blasts Europe over NATO," *The Guardian*, June 10, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/10/nato-dismal-future-pentagon-chief>

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

This literature review chapter seeks to clarify the sources primarily used in each chapter and why those sources were chosen. Additionally, this chapter highlights these sources in a style similar to an abbreviated outline of this thesis. This chapter will also demonstrate how this variety of sources works in tandem to answer the primary questions of each chapter. Chapter three begins the comparison between the primarily nationally led (NATO) and supranational led (EU) military interventions by examining the current difficulties inherent of nationally led military interventions. Chapter four expounds on how the limitations of nationally led military interventions can be alleviated in part by the unique complementary features of the supranational EU. Chapter five accepts these premises that the EU has something uniquely useful to offer NATO. It explores the dynamic between the EU and NATO to determine if it is truly complementary in practice.

Chapter 3 focuses on the disadvantages of a military intervention conducted at the national level. The chapter begins with the reasons for the historically unpredictable American national response to crisis situations. A root of the sporadic decisions for military interventions is a domestic audience's influence on national politics. Moreover, this influence of domestic politics affects commitment and overall success of the mission. Another focus of this chapter is on the types of legitimacy necessary for a successful military intervention, aside from just the national domestic realm. Another point emphasized is that these different realms, where legitimacy can be garnered, are not mutually exclusive of one another. Fishel and Manwaring's book, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*, provides particular insight into the American military intervention in Somalia and is useful in all of the aforementioned focuses of this chapter. The Somali example is further supplemented with articles ranging from sources like *Time Magazine*

to the *Journal of Conflict Studies*. Also particularly helpful in this chapter are the presidential speeches of George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. These mainly show the rhetoric by which the United States seeks to identify itself and in so doing define NATO. These speeches also demonstrate the politically weighed importance of the domestic audience over the international. Furthermore, they demonstrate an American commitment to NATO and want to expand the organization.

Chapter 3 also delves into the potential of supra-national organizations, like the EU, to garner transnational legitimacy for military intervention. Mark Leonard's *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century* is ostentatiously titled but provides a legitimate case for the nuanced strengths found in the EU, with particular regard to international legitimacy. This is compared with the difficulties associated with trans-national legitimacy when the nation state not acting in conjunction with a supra-national organization. John Kiesling's *Diplomacy Lessons: Realism for an Unloved Superpower* as well as Andrew Bacevich's *The Limits of Power* both reinforce and demonstrate the extreme difficulties regarding cultivating trans-national legitimacy, as they assess difficult American military interventions.

Chapter 4 posits the unique advantages the EU brings, by virtue of being supranational, to NATO and military interventions. Thus, this chapter overall reinforces the notion of complementarity over competition between NATO and the EU. The assessment begins by looking at relevant contemporary EU security history and developments. John McCormick's *The European Union: Politics and Policies* provides a basic understanding of the recurring issues in the development of an ESDI (European Security and Defense Identity), most basically noting the Atlanticist and Europeanist divide. This divide is brought to reality primarily through the quotes of Tony Blair on

the British Atlanticist position in *The Rise of European Security Cooperation*. The book, *Defending Europe*, further expounds on the Atlanticist and Europeanist divide, though it is not used here as McCormick already provides the fundamentals of this concept. *Defending Europe* contains more subtlety and specifics, which are delved into much more fully in Chapter 5. Michael Ignatieff's *The Warrior's Honor* is a useful reference in comparing and contrasting the bases of identity. In this chapter, the book particularly highlights the inverse relationship of international and domestic legitimacies with regard to how they are gained. The *Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation* website provides a useful reference in creating a timeline that allows for the appropriate assessment of developments in the ESDI (notably the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon) with regard to EU military operations and failures to respond to crisis situations. De León's working paper on "New logics of Integration in European Security and Defence Policy" as well as Bastian and Wallace's article, "Not Such a Soft Power" in *Survival* are drawn on in the positive assessment of Operation Artemis in the DR Congo. In *NATO Review: Historic Change in the Balkans*, Javier Solana provides concise useful facts about troop deployment and rules of engagement for the EU in its operations in the Balkans.

Chapter 5 concerns the contention and strains between the EU and NATO and how the organizations interact in actuality, allowing for the assessment of if the potential complementarity of the EU to NATO may be realized. The strains within NATO are not limited to the EU's differences with the United States alone. The NATO and EU issues concerning members excluded from one organization or the other, such as Turkey (with its territorial issues with Greece over Cypress), is examined using

Gasparini's article, "Turkey and European Security," in *Istituto Affari Internazionali*. Also included in this chapter are a variety of sources critical of the EU's specialization and distancing from NATO. This includes Robert Bateman III's "The Death of NATO" in the U.S. Naval Institutes, *Proceedings Magazine*, which views EU autonomy initiatives as deleterious to NATO. Anand Menon's "European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya" in *Survival* (from the Institute for Strategic Studies) highlights EU inefficiency in the recent Libyan Civil War. Traynor's "US Defense Chief Blasts Europe over NATO" in *The Guardian* further exemplifies growing American discontent for the EU's lack of burden sharing. The article, "Berlin Minus," in *The Economist* goes on to illustrate the lack of communication between NATO and the EU. After reading these articles, it may not seem that the EU is complementary to NATO; however, a look at alternative outcomes to the relationship between the organizations helps to maintain perspective. Bastian and Wallace's *Defending Europe* grants a more in depth inspection of the Atlanticist and Europeanist issues. In spite of the aforementioned articles, *Defending Europe* is capable of highlighting the potential outcomes (mostly from British and French negotiations) that would have left the EU much more distant from and contentious to NATO. In as nuanced a way as looking at the potential impact of small changes in the verbiage of internal EU agreements, this book helps reveal the underlying tensions within the EU, as well as between the EU and United States. The final assessment of the inter-functionality between the EU and NATO is assessed by the potential alternatives. Despite the problems with the specialization of the EU within NATO, the outcome is concluded as being one that most utilizes the potential complementarity of the EU to NATO.

Overall these sources give insight into the identity of the EU and NATO, the interactions and integration between the two, and aid in the evaluation EU's complementary role in NATO. A primary challenge of this thesis is clarifying some of the more nuanced differences between the EU and NATO in the realm of military intervention while maintaining that clarity at the broader theme of the relationship of the EU and NATO. To overcome this challenge, there is quite a variety of different types of literature chosen for this thesis, ranging from presidential speeches to basic timelines, detailed nuances in treaties, and opinionated and controversial books and articles. The clarification of the relationship between the EU and NATO is a broad goal, and the varying scopes of each of these sources greatly benefit the depth and clarity of this thesis. Furthermore, the variance in levels of scope of these sources helps pinpoint the gap this thesis seeks to fill in identifying the supranational attributes of the EU that are complementary to NATO, as well as assessing if the dynamic between the EU and NATO allows for the full potential of this complementarity to be reached.

CHAPTER 3

The United States in NATO: Contingencies of American Military Intervention

Supranational organizations such as NATO and the EU provide the potential to reduce the inconsistency and capricious levels of commitment in foreign military interventions. However, NATO and the EU are two very different organizations, especially with regard to the greatly varying levels of institutionalization that bind their members together. Chapter 4 will discuss how the EU currently has a better potential to act as a concerted supra-national entity given the member states' extensive (and expanding) entwinements with one another. NATO, on the other hand, does not include the same multitude of agreements that forces more compliance between its member states.²⁸ As such, the nation states in NATO have a larger degree of autonomy, and their overall actions in a military intervention (in particular with its initiation and termination) are more subject to domestic national pressures than international pressures.

Despite the increased autonomy members countries have in NATO compared to the EU, the chapter will discuss the benefits NATO and even the United Nations bring to military interventions as supranational organizations. This chapter seeks to demonstrate how strong domestic pressures on a NATO member state can be, primarily to show how sporadic a nation's interventionist behavior may be due to this *vox populi* influence. This chapter will evaluate which rhetoric is successful in assuaging the public and is resultant of successful military intervention. The examples of

²⁸ This is not to say that NATO has not continually been developing agreements that bring its member states into greater harmony. In particular, the logistical coordination between member states in military interventions has greatly improved, as described in more detail later in the chapter.

interventions in this chapter are all from United States' interventionist history. The United States is the preeminent member of NATO and is not a member of the EU. As such, this chapter will also reveal the American influence on NATO and how the organization is primed to respond to situations potentially eligible for military intervention. Using the United States' history of interventions allows for a greater contrast with the EU in subsequent chapters. Despite the similarities in the responses by different nations' publics to the same types of rhetoric, it is more valid to assess a single nation's public response.

It should also be recognized that there is a large difference of public opinion between American citizens and citizens from countries in the EU on when military force is acceptable to use. A 2011 German Marshall Fund (GMF) survey that assessed twelve EU countries and the United States showed that 33% of the collective EU countries group believed that war was sometimes necessary to attain justice. This number was not even half of the American percentage, which was 75%. The difference in these publics' opinions demonstrates the variance of sentiments and potential domestic influences between the EU and the United States.²⁹ It also emphasizes the specialization of tasks between NATO member states (with the primary difference between EU member states and the United States) in dealing with crisis situations and its inevitability if the EU is not allowed to act more autonomously and duplicate NATO resources.

²⁹ Patryk Pawlak and Clara O'Donnell, "Are Europeans a Better Transatlantic Security Partner than Meets the Eye?" *European Union: Institute for Security Studies*, 2012, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/are-europeans-a-better-transatlantic-security-partner-than-meets-the-eye/>.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States needed to bolster its reasoning for military interventions to something beyond anti-communism. Yet, American foreign policy continued to use the same Wilsonian rhetoric that was promoted throughout the Cold War. This rhetoric of spreading democracy and freedom across the world originally competed with communist ideologies; however, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union such rhetoric has not changed in the post-Cold War Era. The struggle to reaffirm the interventional purpose of the United States and its foreign policy has become manifest through American presidents' varying foreign policy initiatives with regard to military intervention in this era since the end of the Cold War.

The popular notion that democracy was the only viable model of government reinforced and perpetuated the unchanged American rhetoric. For instance, according to President George W. Bush, history "has a visible direction, set by liberty and the Author of Liberty."³⁰ Also propagated is the additional ideological mantra that in order to secure liberty in America, liberty must be secured everywhere.³¹ Such rhetoric is combined with national security interests and used to promote new policies, such as preventative war. I will first examine this and other Presidents' policies and rhetoric for dealing with the problems of foreign and domestic legitimization of military intervention. This first section utilizes past cases of military interventions to demonstrate the overall consistency yet nuanced changes in rhetoric justifying American military intervention. Overall, these examples will demonstrate the sporadic

³⁰ Andrew Bacevich, *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism*, (New York, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008), 74.

³¹ Ibid, 75.

nature of how nationally based military interventions begin and end. This spontaneity is linked not just to the influence of a volatile domestic citizenry on national politicians but vice-versa as well. While this chapter will primarily demonstrate some of the weaknesses inherent of nationally based military interventions, it will also touch briefly on potential supranational remedies to these weaknesses, which will be expounded on in Chapter 4.

Nuanced developments in American rhetoric that justify military intervention, as well as the failures of the conflicts and wars of the past two decades in which the United States has been involved, can demonstrate the inconsistency in military interventions at both the domestic public level and national level. To start, President George H. W. Bush speaks of a New World Order in which the United States is the champion of freedom and enduring peace. The president also makes it clear in his speech on March 6, 1991 that the national interests of the United States are directly linked to affairs beyond the country's borders when he references the First Gulf War. He further bolsters this stance by referencing the weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein wants to produce.³²

All presidents since George H.W. Bush have continued to define America as the champion of freedom, assuring the American people that military intervention is a vital American national interest. This rhetoric is certainly required for the domestic legitimacy and success of any long term military intervention. The case of U.S. intervention in Somalia is a prime example of the importance of domestic legitimacy for military intervention. Humanitarianism provided the impetus for the initial intervention

³² George H. W. Bush, "New World Order: President Bush's Speech to Congress," (March 6, 1991), <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm>.

in Somalia. The initial mission, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), was to supply security for the humanitarian relief programs designed to help the starving denizens in the failed state of Somalia. UNOSOM I did not go smoothly. Despite the UN's attempts to maintain the ceasefire, it was largely ignored. The United States offered to intervene with military support from 23 other nations in what was called the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). While the mission of UNITAF to protect the relief efforts initially went well, the intervention would take a new direction in May of 1993 when the UN was given full control of the operation. UNITAF was redefined as UNOSOM II, which was fundamentally different, shifting the goals of protection for the humanitarian aid programs to one that envisioned shaping Somalia into a stable democratic state.³³ The intervening countries signed up for this redefined mission as well; however, the new directive resituated the interveners from being unbiased or indifferent to Somali "politics" (the warring between factions for political primacy) to a stance that placed the interveners in a more adversarial role toward Aideed, a prominent clan leader hoping to seize control of the country. Again, the mission transformed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 837, which ordered the capture of Aideed. This new directive was not acceptable to major force contributors, such as Italy, who refused to go after Aideed. Regardless, the direction of UNSCR 837 led to an inevitable clash between Aideed and UN forces that left American casualties in its wake. This ultimately resulted in the United States withdrawing from Somalia without completing the mission of UNOSOM II or UNSCR 837.³⁴

³³ John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 204-205.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 212.

The televised dire situation in Somalia initially garnered the American public's sympathy, which culminated in military intervention, yet sympathy ultimately proved to be a double-edged sword. The images of a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets provoked American citizens to question if the intervention in Somalia was worth the cost. President Clinton, who had just been elected, inherited his predecessor's military intervention in Somalia and was not quick to alleviate the American public's concern about the worthiness of the cause. Building pressure for withdrawal from Somalia quickly raged out of control. CNN acted as a catalyst in this reaction by replaying the gruesome images of the American forces that had been killed. President Clinton folded to the domestic political pressure on the American government to withdraw from Somalia entirely.³⁵

Stalin once stated, "The death of a single Russian soldier is a tragedy. A million deaths is a statistic."³⁶ The same principle applied to the military intervention in Somalia. The small number of American casualties compared to the large loss of Somali lives largely did not factor quantifiably into the American public's actual feelings of sympathy.³⁷ According to John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring in *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*, "The community authorizing the operation needs to see its objectives as both worthwhile and capable of being accomplished..."³⁸ It should be noted that President Clinton did miss the opportunity to assuage the public's concerns about the mission in Somalia. Had this been done and the mission reaffirmed by the

³⁵ "Somalia on the Edge," *Time*, Nov. 29, 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1689207,00.html>.

³⁶ Karen Jenni and George Loewenstein, "Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect," *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 14, No. 3 (May 1, 1997): 235.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 235.

³⁸ Fishel and Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*, 209.

public, the likely result would have been the quashing of Aideed and his forces followed by a potential victory in the UNOSOM II mission. Despite the potential President Clinton had to influence the public, the point still stands that the public exerts significant political pressure that determines how foreign policy (particularly regarding military intervention) is formed. In this case, the lack of defining the military intervention in terms of vital national interest for American citizens in part led to a withdrawal of forces after just forty-three American military casualties.³⁹

The mistake of not spinning military intervention as necessary for American national security to the American public was not made again for military interventions and wars thereafter. President Clinton legitimized the intervention in Bosnia when in 1995 when he stated, "Generations of Americans have understood that Europe's freedom and Europe's stability is vital to our own national security."⁴⁰ George W. Bush used the lessons of his predecessors with regard to the Second Gulf War. The war was framed as an American national security priority through the assertion that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. It was further legitimized with humanitarian rhetoric (Consider the operation's name, "Iraqi Freedom.") which was also imbued with the overtones of protecting democracy worldwide.⁴¹

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³⁹ Kenneth D. Bush, "When Two Anarchies Meet: International Intervention in Somalia," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 17, No. 1 (1997), <http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewArticle/11732/12485>.

⁴⁰ William J. Clinton, "Transcript of President Clinton's Speech on Bosnia," *CNN: U.S. News*, November 27, 1995, http://www.cnn.com/US/9511/bosnia_speech/speech.html

⁴¹ George W. Bush, "President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom," March 22, 2003, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html>

While Clinton heralded NATO intervention in Bosnia as a success story, it certainly had its setbacks.⁴² Most notable was the lengthy period of time it took for the Europeans to take action, which dramatically raised both the death toll as well as the total cost of the intervention.⁴³ If the United States could act unilaterally to intervene much more quickly, would that not trump the supposed importance of acting as part of NATO or the United Nations? The United Nations and NATO provide a true legitimizing factor for intervention, which provides political cover for the United States with the international community. More importantly, these supranational entities have the potential to legitimize a foreign presence to the people that find themselves in the middle of an occupational intervention.⁴⁴

President Clinton's speech is not primarily focused on an international audience but on legitimizing America's "indispensible" role in international affairs to the American public. This is to dispel the isolationist notions and to promote an American interventionist identity. Clinton states directly, "We have to resist those who believe that now that the Cold War is over the United States can completely return to focusing on problems within our borders and basically ignore those beyond our borders."⁴⁵ This rhetoric has not changed much from the New World Order promoted by George H. W. Bush, in which protecting freedom and human rights are paramount.⁴⁶ While each of these presidents has preached rhetoric that has likely sounded provocative to the rest of

⁴² William J. Clinton, "Transcript of the Remarks by President W. J. Clinton to the People of Detroit," *United States Information Agency*, October 22, 1996, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961022a.htm>

⁴³ Mark Leonard, *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century*, (Public Affairs: New York, New York, 2005), 64.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁴⁵ William J. Clinton, "Transcript of the Remarks," October 22, 1996.

⁴⁶ George H. W. Bush, "New World Order: President Bush's Speech to Congress," (March 6, 1991), <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm>.

the world or like arrogant self-righteous justification, it should be recognized that domestic politics largely influence the decision for conducting an American foreign intervention and that pride is a useful tool in garnering domestic support for military intervention.⁴⁷ It should also be noted that it potentially damages international legitimacy when it takes words that antagonize the international community to gain domestic support for military intervention.

With the United States often taking the brunt of international security situations or even circumventing NATO altogether for military intervention, does NATO still retain a purpose after the fall of the Soviet Union? Some argue that NATO is unnecessary and should be disbanded now that the Cold War is over, yet Clinton argues for its expansion.⁴⁸ NATO could legitimize intervention to American citizens by entwining the national security concerns of other NATO member countries with the United States. Furthermore, by having its hands tied with this obligation, the current American administration can effectively avoid blame and domestic politics to a larger degree. NATO can provide alternative *international* political cover when the United States cannot act through the UN, and it can still potentially *domestically* legitimate a military intervention with regard to NATO allies' national security concerns. Essentially, the closer there is to a global consensus for military intervention, the more consistent the reasons for interventions will be. Therefore, inconsistency of and volatility within military interventions arises when interventions are led from outside the parameters of supranational organizations. This creates more of a contingency for the intervention on domestic politics and national leaders. Because of this, the history

⁴⁷ Andrew Bacevich, *The Limits of Power*, 75.

⁴⁸ Bateman III, "The Death of NATO," *Proceedings Magazine*; and Clinton, "Transcript of the Remarks," October 22, 1996.

of military interventions of the United States has been erratic, with responses ranging from neglect to over-commitment.

In contrast to a lack of commitment in military intervention, domestic politics and the character of the president can also create a problem of over-commitment. Using the Vietnam War as an example, Lyndon Banes Johnson won the 1964 election in a landslide running under the platform of not escalating the Vietnam War. He reassured the public by stating, "We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do the job that Asian boys should do."⁴⁹ Yet, the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, in which a North Vietnamese boat attacked an American ship on two occasions (with differing vessels and with the first attack being actual and the second false), gave President Johnson the approval of the American congress to escalate involvement in the war. If members of the congress are truly representative of their constituency, this demonstrates how effective a *casus belli*, such as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, can be in quickly gaining support for military intervention or military escalation. Perhaps knowing that there would not be support for a long, drawn-out conflict, President Johnson hoped a drastic (yet incremental) increase of troops to Vietnam could hasten an end the conflict. Primarily the over-commitment problem is two-fold. There is an initial malleability of domestic opinion by a presidential administration and the national politics on the presidential level also largely shape the intervention often favoring political goals over national goals in the intervention. In some cases this likely may be more about reelection. In the case of President Johnson one could speculate that his decision to increase troop levels had to do with pride and

⁴⁹ Kent Germany, "American President: Lyndon Johnson (1908-1973)," *Miller Center at the University of Virginia*, 2012, <http://millercenter.org/president/lbjohnson/essays/biography/5>.

not going down in history as the president who lost the Vietnam War. This is the essence of the over-commitment problem. Some might indicate that Iraq or Afghanistan are products of a similar over-commitment issue. Regardless if there is validity to that assessment, the fear of an over-commitment situation similar to that in Vietnam likely fosters an unwillingness to act and a neglect of some other international situations almost entirely.

Intervention from NATO and even the United Nations (as in the case of Somalia) is still shaped largely by domestic politics in the United States. The fickle nature of mass public opinion affects commitment. In Somalia, the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu left 18 Americans killed and 78 wounded.⁵⁰ This, coupled with CNN broadcasting American soldiers' bodies repeatedly on television and a lack of a presidential response, dictated complete withdrawal from Somalia.⁵¹ This is not an American phenomenon either. In Rwanda, the deaths of ten Belgian U.N. peacekeepers dictated the complete withdrawal of Belgian troops from the region.⁵² In the United States as well as in EU countries, domestic political pressures from the public effect the state's actions in military intervention. This exemplifies the strain between the NATO and EU, in which the United States wants more military contributions from the EU, while EU member nations may find it difficult to reach these expectations given their citizens' significantly less favoring dispositions toward any military intervention.

⁵⁰ The American casualties of the overall military intervention were a total of 43 with 29 being hostile and 14 being non-hostile.

⁵¹ "Worldwide U.S. Active Duty Military Deaths: Selected Military Operations," *DoD Personnel and Military Casualty Statistics*, <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/table13.htm>

⁵² United Nations Security Council, "Statement by the President of the Security Council," April 7, 1994. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB119/Rw7.pdf>

Overall, it is difficult to achieve a consistent basis for when military intervention will be instigated on the national level. NATO and the United Nations can provide political cover and help legitimize military intervention to an international audience, but the volatile domestic politics of the United States (as well as other interventionist countries) and national leaders' priorities of motives are the systemic cause of inconsistent interventionist behavior. The lack of effective bureaucratic mechanisms (with "teeth") in NATO and the UN currently cannot bind countries to commit to interventions even in the direst of circumstances (such as the 1994 Rwandan Genocide). These organizations also cannot effectively check nation states bent on military intervention despite significant international opposition (such as the Second Iraq War). Commitment for intervention from the American people has been motivated significantly by two things – pride and fear. The pride is seen in triumphant proclamations, such as Clinton describing America as an “indispensible nation” and Bush asserting that America is a force of good that has a moral responsibility to spread democracy.⁵³ Fear is seen in proclaiming that the safety of the nation is at stake. National security, the American directive to promote democracy, a clear interventionist mission objective, and political cover under NATO or the United Nations are all essential ingredients for fostering a domestic and international environment supportive of military intervention. Regardless, nationally led interventions outside the auspices of a supranational organization retain a contingency on domestic politics and national leaders' priorities of motives. Therefore, this does not allow for the creation of a consistent or reliable *national* interventionist policy, as nationally based policies will

⁵³ William J. Clinton, “Transcript of the Remarks,” October 22, 1996; and George H. W. Bush, “New World Order,” March 6, 1991.

suffer from the bi-polar extremes of neglect and over-commitment regarding when and how military interventions are conducted. In other words, while countries still maintain the last word on when and where they will use force, supranational organizations such as the EU in particular have the potential to reduce the inconsistency and varied levels of commitment in military interventions. To this effect, Sebastian Mayer for *Contemporary Security Policy* writes, "Multinationalization, the pooling of assets, and role specialization enhance the legitimacy of the alliance vis-à-vis the international community and domestic audiences, and they demonstrate a high degree of solidarity."⁵⁴

While multinational military units have been part of NATO since the 1950's, the depth of this element has only increased. All NATO Corps are now multinational and integration can even be seen at operational headquarters. NATO's integrated force planning mechanism had initially been considered for abolishment in the early 1990's, but it was instead revitalized and revamped for coordination in contemporary military missions. In 1999 NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative attempted to further internationalize security responsibilities. The results were modest, but the initiative created mechanisms that resulted in better coordination between nations. More importantly and following the Defense Capabilities Initiative, "the binding character of commitments was increased by introducing more densely institutionalized schemes -- a clear indicator of further internalization."⁵⁵ Donald Rumsfeld aptly stated in 2002, "If NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile ... then it will not have much to

⁵⁴ Sebastian Mayer, "Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU Transform Provision of External Security," *Contemporary Security Policy* 32, no. 2 (2011): 318.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 320.

offer the world in the 21st century."⁵⁶ In 2006 a combat-ready NATO Response Force had developed. While this was not NATO's own army by any means, the NATO Response Force was more, in effect, a group of mechanisms that would place a significant amount of political pressure on NATO members to deploy forces in a rapid, multinational, and integrative way if a crisis situation arose that needed an immediate response.⁵⁷

NATO and the EU have both developed bureaucratic mechanisms that place multinational pressure on member states. These developing mechanisms have the potential to provide a political cover to national politicians from the aforementioned influences of a country's citizenry. The cover being that it is out of the control of national politicians altogether. The cost of withdrawing from commitments to NATO, the EU, or both would be detrimental, and a citizenry would not expect the politician to even consider this. The citizenry would not hold their countries preexisting obligatory agreement to a supranational organization against the national leader specifically. This would essentially tie the hands of national politicians due to the obligations their countries had within either NATO or the EU. Furthermore, these supranational organizations promote a sense of legitimacy through solidarity; however, this solidarity might involve a bit of "entrapment" in that some nations will have to participate in military ventures that they do not have direct national interests in.⁵⁸

The integrative bureaucratic measures that NATO has developed may not be as apparent as they are in the EU, given that the United States as a global superpower is

⁵⁶ "NATO Warms to Rapid Reaction Force," *BBC News*, September 25, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2277578.stm>.

⁵⁷ Mayer, "Embedded Politics," *Contemporary Security Policy*, 312.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 319.

able to largely avoid becoming ensnared in a NATO framework that would infringe on the nation's sole discretion to use of force (seen by some as the basis of sovereignty). However, discarding U.S. military interventions and a few unilateral interventions on part of France and Great Britain in former colonies, all other military actions by Europeans have been conducted multinationally and have usually been under either flag of NATO or the EU.⁵⁹ While not devoid of the inconsistency stemming from nation states being the primary actors, these interventions, conducted under the auspices of supranational organizations, have the potential to serve as a baseline for when military intervention is justified.

The EU is much more closely knit institutionally than NATO, giving a greater solidarity between EU member states in military interventions. Considering the significant anti-bellicose public mentality in most EU countries compared to the United States, the mechanisms that make the EU more closely knit are even more necessary to circumvent the challenges national politics brings to multinational military intervention. Additionally, these anti-war sentiments create a different manner in which EU member states have chosen to deal with international crisis situations. This difference in the general mindset as well the political geography accentuates the reason for the EU's more specialized role within NATO. The following chapter describes some of the significant differences between the EU and United States regarding military intervention, while drawing on history to aid in fostering an understanding of the EU's unique approaches to international crises. The chapter also analyzes these approaches in a comparative manner with American foreign policy concerning military interventions. Overall the chapter will show that the EU, by virtue of being

⁵⁹ Ibid., 321.

supranational yet more heavily institutionalized, has more to offer NATO than just the raw manpower of its member states.

CHAPTER 4

An Assessment of the Development of the European Union's Defense Policy

The United States' defense budget in 2000 was nearly double that of the EU-15's *combined* defense budgets.⁶⁰ If the United States so vastly surpasses the EU (as well as each of the countries in the rest of the world) in military spending, what expectations can there be for the EU, and can the EU offer anything more than more manpower in military interventions? This chapter seeks to answer these questions, in particular by showing the benefits that a supra-national organization, the EU, brings to the table regarding military interventions. The benefits discussed mainly relate to legitimacy advantages and a potentially more consistent and reliable policy of military intervention.

There are great similarities in the post-Cold War designs of American and European preemptive strategies, but the primary impediment for the preemptive model of the United States has been the issue of legitimacy. John Brady Kiesling, a career U.S. State Department diplomat, stated that, “There is *no* such source of American transnational legitimacy...”⁶¹ Regardless of nationality this statement retains the message that a national government does not have an easily accepted legitimacy over another nation of people. By operating as a network of states, whose primary goal is to restore stability to tumultuous regions, the European Union is able to claim a transnational legitimacy to intervene and conduct preventative engagement. The benefits of supranational military intervention will be weighed against manners of nation based military intervention. As this is explored, the EU's comparative advantage to NATO will come to light, as well as how the EU can use this to compliment NATO.

⁶⁰ Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*, (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 4.

⁶¹ John Kiesling, *Diplomacy Lessons: Realism for an Unloved Superpower*, (Potomac Books: Washington, D.C., 2006), 44.

This will come through an examination of EU integration history focusing on the catalysts for integration, external influences, and intentions behind proposals to define this relationship between NATO and the EU.

When considering the areas where the European Union is least integrated, EU defense policy springs to mind. The divergence in the levels of integration in the EU is aptly caricatured by Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eysken in his description of the EU as "an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm."⁶² Yet however slowly, the EU has continually made integrative efforts toward a common defense policy and a better coordination of military forces, despite the potential for infringement on what is typically considered part of national sovereignty. Furthermore, it has kept up with the pace of similar NATO initiatives in creating a rapidly deployable military force. Yet, if one were to ask any individual what he or she thinks about the EU's military involvement in interventions in other countries, they would likely respond with a confused expression asking, "Do you mean NATO?" Since EU nations often act through or in close association with NATO, it is necessary to ask: Is the EU's foreign policy regarding military intervention really altogether different from that of the United States and the mission of NATO? The EU and American policies concerning military intervention are very similar as both are primarily for the promotion of democracies, rule of law, and economic liberalism. The difference between the two lies primarily in the manner in which these goals are sought to be achieved. Mark Leonard in *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century* argues that the EU, with the allure of its markets and potential EU membership, is able to influence nations to adopt or improve their internal

⁶² John McCormick, *The European Union: Politics and Policies*, 4th Edition, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2008), 339.

democracy, rule of law, and economic liberalness. This is contrasted with the United States, which supposedly uses more bellicose means of achieving these ends. Using the "carrot and stick" metaphor, the United States is in most cases the "stick" and the EU the "carrot" in this caricature. While there is some validity in this perception, the *modi operandi* of the United States and the EU are not this one dimensional. However, Leonard may have a point in at least indicating the areas that are strengths and weaknesses of the United States and EU. In reference to the EU's effectualness, "the carrot without the stick is a less effective instrument than the carrot with the stick."⁶³ In this regard of military force, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is lagging behind what it likely needs to become more effectual.⁶⁴ While the EU will likely continue to bolster its own military capabilities to a degree, the "carrot and stick" caricature also demonstrates the potential specialization and complementarity between NATO and the EU, even if the burden sharing remains a strong tension.

The United States has the military might and is more likely to have the blessing of its citizenry to instigate an initial military intervention in another country. It is the aforementioned Wilsonian tradition that makes for an acceptable justification to the American people to go to war in defense of democracy. The citizenry determines the acceptable *casus belli*. The promotion of democracy infused with the connotation that the war is ultimately also in interest of national defense is largely acceptable in the United States. The United States is also able to quickly respond to crisis situations. However, both internationally and internally the United States may face more

⁶³ Howorth and Keeler, *Defending Europe*, 16.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 15-16.

legitimacy issues with intervention than that of an intervention directed through a supranational organization.

In the European Union military action is taken to restore order. In fact, EU missions have largely been peacekeeping missions that replaced NATO instigated military interventions. While ultimately framed in a manner of national security issues and where there are certainly selfish national interests involved, the rhetoric justifying military intervention could be perceived as significantly less self-righteous than American justifications for intervention. It is in this regard that what both the EU and the United States view as the ideal outcomes (democracy, rule of law, and economic liberalism) are viewed with more skepticism when the United States attempts to implement them, as these values are directly linked with American national interests.

The EU differs in this.

[EU] member-states have struggled to agree on their final destination and taken refuge behind processes which reflect European values. Ironically, they have chosen to project their values to a European level in order to defend their interest at a national one. This creates a strange situation where nations have interests and no values and the EU has values but no interests.⁶⁵

It is because of the supranational status of the European Union that its foreign policy and the perceptions of the EU differ from the United States. Also, a primary way the EU has been able to maintain a less than controversial stance in their military interventions is the nature of the missions themselves. These missions are smaller and more focused on peacekeeping than peacemaking. By virtue of this, the EU shields its member countries from being perceived as imperialistic, an identity most European states shy away from given their unsavory colonial history. This makes the EU register much lower and provoke much less outcry. For instance, the economy of EU roughly

⁶⁵ Leonard, *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century*, 18-19.

equals that of the United States, yet the sentiments of anti-Globalization are almost exclusively aimed at the United States. Consider the brands most gripe about -- Nike, Starbucks, McDonalds, etc. It is a challenge to come up with a company that is from the European Union that evokes similar disdain. Additionally, the EU has much more invested in the United States than Japan. However, there is not a fear in the United States on scale with that of what was felt in the 1980's toward Japanese investment in American companies.⁶⁶ While this foreign policy rhetoric of the United States and the European Union may not coincide, the achievements of the European Union are remarkably congruent with America's foreign policy rhetoric of promoting freedom and democracy. The allure of joining the European Union, being able to access its markets, and the conditions to join (notably the Copenhagen criteria, which has required levels of democracy and economic liberalness) have provided incentives for liberal reformations in the 109 countries considered part of the "Eurosphere."⁶⁷ With the potential to access EU markets or even join the EU, periphery nations voluntarily open themselves up to surveillance by the EU, so they may demonstrate to the EU that they are upholding the EU standards. Additionally, every EU state does this with one another to insure they are all in compliance with EU mandates.

The motives of the European Union are transparent. Establishing stability and encouraging voluntary surveillance in periphery countries allows the European Union to maintain the status quo – in which the European Union remains a prosperous entity.⁶⁸ This too should be a goal for the currently hegemonic United States.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 17, 42.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 145.

⁶⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2004), 16.

State Based Commitments vs. Supra-nationally Based Commitments

The United States uses economic incentives and disincentives as the EU does. However, the EU provides a clear set of criteria that is agreed upon either to grant economic partnerships or accession to the union. This is an open and definitive agreement between the member states. In contrast, the United States does not use a binding organization to act as an indifferent arbiter in the criteria set for gaining the economic benefits initially promised. The United States has the ability to much more easily renege on its offered incentives than the European states bound by an EU agreement do. In this regard, inconsistency affects the incentivizing power of the United States making the incentivizing power more limited in scope than that of the EU.

While incentivization may be an area more limited due to being less bound than EU member states, the United States is still able to act swifter militarily and with easier internal coordination given its state as the sole superpower in the world. This lends the United States toward favoring the use of its military compared to the EU. However, the imperialistic connotations that come with a militaristically implemented democracy are not favorable for the United States. The change from a society based on production to one based on consumption in the late 1970's has contributed to the speculation of the true intent of the United States in its military endeavors.⁶⁹ In other words, to many it seems likely that the United States is quickly securing natural resources under the guise of spreading democracy. This is not a cynical observation. It stands to reason that a nation state able to maintain the ability to remain largely unencumbered by the regulations of supra-national entities will be less trusted in acts of benevolence.

⁶⁹ James E. Carter, Jr., The "Crisis of Confidence" Speech. July 15, 1979.

Overall, supra-national organizations have the potential to provide a semblance of consistency when it comes to how and when military interventions should be carried out. Standards set by a supra-national organization, whose members would act on breach of those standards *consistently*, would provide both the credibility of a threat of military intervention and the legitimacy of undertaking one.

Preventive Engagement

While it may seem like the United States is primarily set for quick response compared to the EU, the EU performs quickly responsive military actions as well.⁷⁰ After failure to react to the Bosnian crisis, the European Union adopted a policy of quickly dealing with states that have become unstable. This “preventive engagement” does not have a goal of controlling another country. Instead, the purpose is to establish stability and peace in the region by removing the conditions that initially prompted war or the crisis situation.⁷¹ The European Union’s usual goal is to reform the state into a stable region that is capable of voluntarily seeking to meet the requirements to become part of European Union’s economic network. As demonstrated in Kosovo and Macedonia, preventive engagement has been a successful venture. While the initiation of preventative engagement in Kosovo was through NATO's KFOR (Kosovo Force), it was primarily comprised of EU member states' troops under the EU's own EUFOR. The smaller scale intervention in Macedonia was initiated by NATO but transferred to the EU. Additionally, the figures associated with preventive engagement appear nominal when compared with the cost of intervention after a war has begun. According to Mark Leonard, the cost of each engagement went up substantially the longer it took

⁷⁰ Leonard, *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century*, 59, 63.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 58-59.

to intervene. Indicative of this is the cost of each intervention to Great Britain with Bosnia costing 1.5 billion pounds, Kosovo costing 200 million pounds, and Macedonia costing only 14 million pounds.⁷²

Transnational Legitimacy

It is important to take the quality of legitimacy very seriously concerning military interventions; however, the consideration of legitimacy must be in multiple areas: the national domestic realm, the international realm, and in the perceptions of the denizens of the area in which the intervention takes place. Chapter 3 already explored the significance of the intervening nation's domestic realm on military interventions. There is also certainly importance in a perception of legitimacy by the denizens of the area in which that intervention takes place. This type of legitimacy is a prime factor in the overall outcome of the intervention, be it success or failure. The importance of international legitimacy has been more in question. One popular American attitude has been, "We should do what we want to do, because we will be hated either way." An older Machiavellian conception is that "it is much safer to be feared than loved."⁷³ These views foster feelings that varying levels of international legitimacy don't truly have an impact on military interventions and go as far as suggesting that a show of internationally uninhibited force works better in preventing and optimizing military interventions. Regardless of how one views international legitimacy's importance (or lack thereof), international legitimacy can at least have a significant impact of the other two aforementioned areas of legitimacy. For instance, there could potentially be a lack of resolve with the domestic population to maintain a military intervention that does not

⁷² Ibid., 64.

⁷³ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, (Edinburgh, R&R Clark, Limited, 1903), 66.

have wide and tangible international support. Also, resistance to a military intervention could less easily be quashed with the potential perception that there is higher potential for the intervening powers to withdraw from domestic and international pressures. Lastly, the threat of military intervention that is not supported internationally is less likely to be heeded, as it would not garner as much credibility (this credibility likely being further exacerbated by the nation's inconsistent interventionist history). Overall, credibility of threat of military intervention, a unity of effort that shares the burden of the military intervention internationally, and the political will of the domestic populations of intervening states are all influenced by international legitimacy.

It may seem that the ultimate solution is to create consistency for when and how military interventions are undertaken through the use of a supra-national entity. However, in a significant way the supra-national and national are inverse of one another in the areas in which they acquire legitimacy. The conceptualization of the worth of lives remains primarily state based. This is exemplified by the UN peace keeping mission to Rwanda in which Belgium withdrew from the peace keeping contingent after ten Belgian soldiers were killed.⁷⁴ The catch-22 is that without state interest in the intervention, legitimacy in the domestic realm of the intervening power easily crumbles, and inversely, if a state acts in its interests and intervenes, it essentially breaks the code of the just-war tradition and has a much more difficult time gaining international legitimacy. Michael Ignatieff puts it well in saying, "Principle commits us to intervene and yet forbids the imperial ruthlessness required to make intervention succeed."⁷⁵ One could argue that the EU member states see their national interests fulfilled by acting in

⁷⁴ United States Department of State, "Talking Points on UNAMIR Withdrawal," Telegraph cable, April 15, 1994, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw041594.pdf>

⁷⁵ Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor*, 94.

concert with other member states and by allowing military interventions to take place at the supra-national, EU level. While this is likely true in most cases, anything but a direct relationship between national interest and national military force is too convoluted for a national population to strongly support. To see national soldiers die to for anything other than the nation state *directly* is difficult for nations' populations to cope with.⁷⁶

NATO may be able to gain a modicum of legitimacy from giving more autonomy and responsibility to EU in the area of military interventions. However, the EU is working within the NATO framework, not vice-versa. While a collective framework like the EU works to spread responsibility for action throughout multiple states, it would be unable to lend legitimacy to a nation larger (in terms of economy and military might) than the EU network itself. A larger network is required to lend such legitimacy to the United States. Fortunately, a network for such endeavors already exists.⁷⁷

The United Nations

Unfortunately, the existing network that has the potential to lend such legitimacy is the largely circumvented United Nations. Yet Kiesling states, "The UN, for all its faults, is the broadest and best multilateral source of legitimacy on the planet, and the United States pays in American blood when it fails to make good use of it."⁷⁸ The United Nations lent legitimacy to the First Gulf War and made it inexpensive for the

⁷⁶ To exemplify this concept, consider the Eurozone Debt Crisis. European national leaders run on platforms that favor austerity, which leads to only minor bailouts. While it might be for the good of the nation that is capable to provide substantial bailouts to do so, national domestic politics stands in the way.

⁷⁷ Kiesling, *Diplomacy Lessons*, 62.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 63.

United States. When any nation, especially the United States, circumvents the United Nations to conduct warfare, it creates instability in the world.⁷⁹ The creation of instability directly conflicts with the policy of the European Union, nor does it work in the favor of American hegemony.⁸⁰

Essentially, the European Union is acting as a microcosm of the ideal form of the United Nations. The framework of the European Union allows for mutual surveillance and constant diplomacy between nations. This serves to prevent war between the nations within the European Union. Yet, the network of potential European Union member states has a limit, as indicated by its promotion of other unions between countries, such as the African Union.⁸¹ The European Union cannot be an all encompassing global network like the United Nations. While the United Nations provides the United States with a means of discourse with other nations, it is not yet a clear channel for discourse with the entity of the European Union. With regard to multiple unions, Leonard suggests that, “by forming a series of overlapping clubs ... it might one day be possible to bring them together into a single framework.”⁸² Leonard also suggests that this could happen within the framework of the United Nations.⁸³ A network focused on the voice of unions rather than individual nation states could allow for better discourse directly between the European Union and the United States, as the discussion could potentially focus on actions congruent with the values of the unions rather than member states' direct national interests. It could also potentially shield the

⁷⁹ The sole exception of this being a case in which the United Nations was unable to issue a response soon enough to halt the crisis situation and the United States intervened in the spirit of the UN Charter, as in Kosovo.

⁸⁰ Kiesling, *Diplomacy Lessons*, 62.

⁸¹ Leonard, *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century*, 142.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 143.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 142.

United States from attacks on its legitimacy in any given military intervention by virtue of the UN consensus for military intervention and that an intervention would be primarily rooted in UN interests over national interests,.

While it may appear that the EU has "it all figured out" regarding international legitimacy, the history of the integration of security and defense policies within the EU should be further inspected. The next section will not only shed light on the (often recurring) problems the EU has faced when it came for decisive military action but will establish a reasoning for the manner in how the Common Security and Foreign Policy was established. More importantly this section will highlight some of the motives and conflicting aspirations EU framers have regarding the EU's role in military interventions within and outside of NATO.

EU Security History

Table 1: A Timeline of Treaties and Military Interventions⁸⁴

1992	Maastricht Treaty is signed.
1993	Maastricht Treaty enters force.
1995	Americans broker Dayton Peace Accords.
1997	Amsterdam Treaty is signed.
March 1999	NATO launches Operation Allied Force.
Dec. 1999	Amsterdam Treaty enters in force.
Feb. 2001	Nice Treaty is signed.
Dec. 2002	The Berlin Plus agreement comes into effect.
Feb. 2003	Nice Treaty enters in force.
March 2003	EU launches Operation Concordia in Macedonia.
June 2003	EU launches Operation Artemis in the DR Congo.
Dec. 2004	EU launches Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2007	Lisbon Treaty signed.
2009	Lisbon Treaty enters in force.

⁸⁴ This timeline is not comprehensive but seeks its purpose in clarifying the order of the events that are the focus of this section.

A European security policy independent of NATO had been attempted repeatedly since the end of the Second World War, most notably through the failed European Defense Community and the Fouchet Plan.⁸⁵ It was not until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty that such a notion of independent European security took hold. The Balkans are an excellent place to begin in looking at modern EU security history, as the events there were formative to shaping EU foreign policy and security policy.

After the 1991 declarations of independence from both Croatia and Slovenia, the Yugoslav government used its federal army to respond with force. Such an action goaded the European Community to respond. After the Community hosted a promising peace conference, Jacques Poos declared, "This is the hour of Europe, not the United States."⁸⁶ This was not the case. The European Community (EC) had been operating under the European Political Cooperation agreement since 1970; however, this agreement did not establish any sort of unified foreign policy.⁸⁷ This was seen in the EC's inability to act in this time of crisis. The Americans then intervened, and through the auspices of NATO conducted *Operation Deliberate Force*, an air campaign. Through this and the training of the Croatian army by Military Professional Resources Inc. (under the leadership of Former Army Chief of Staff Carl E. Vuono) the Croatians were able to push Serbian militants (and civilians) out of Croatia in Operation Storm.⁸⁸ The United States then brokered the 1995 Dayton peace accords. Prior to the EC's failure to quickly respond to the 1991 crisis in the Balkans, the incongruence in foreign

⁸⁵ Howorth and Keeler, *Defending Europe*, 7-8.

⁸⁶ McCormick, *The European Union*, 339-340.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 338-339.

⁸⁸ P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 119-125; and Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2000), 175.

policy between EC countries was highlighted with the First Gulf War. Jacques Poos had rightly noted the "political insignificance of Europe" following the Gulf War, and it was only reaffirmed more coarsely with the early Yugoslav wars of the 1990's.⁸⁹ This extreme lack of preparedness (rooted in the incongruence of foreign policies) provided the EC with shame, a useful catalyst in the processes of coming up with a new common foreign policy and common security policy.⁹⁰

A Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was a major focus of the new EU formed by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Demonstrating its importance, the CFSP was made one of the three pillars of the EU. This set in motion a formative process for a nascent CFSP. Despite the development of the CFSP *pillar*, the EU still had not developed the means to deal with crisis situations. In 1997-1998, Albanians in Kosovo attempted to break away from Yugoslavia. Again, the EU was caught unprepared due to incongruence in foreign policy and it was left to NATO (under the preeminence of the United States) to undertake military operations in the form of a bombing campaign.⁹¹ The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, came into force in 1999 (after NATO had already started its bombing campaign in Kosovo). As such, the treaty cannot be judged by the EU's response (or lack thereof) to the crisis situation in Kosovo.⁹² The Treaty of Amsterdam did however, provide a significant step towards a greater CFSP. It created a High Representative for EU Foreign Policy and made decision making more efficient mainly by allowing qualified majority voting the safeguard of "constructive abstention," which allows countries not in support of an

⁸⁹ McCormick, *The European Union*, 339.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 339-340.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 339-340.

⁹² Simon Duke, "From Amsterdam to Kosovo: Lessons for the Future of CFSP," *Eipascope*, no. 1999/2, 2-5.

military intervention to abstain while not hindering the instigation of EU military intervention. Additionally, if there was a direct veto by a member country towards a military intervention, the decision to conduct a military intervention would be directed to the European Council. Prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, a vote of unanimity was required for decision making, greatly slowing the timeliness of a response from the EU.⁹³

Despite the advancements brought by the Treaty of Amsterdam, there were still great divisions within the EU on how to proceed with overall foreign policy. While some member states wished to maintain special involvement with their former colonies, others attempted to maintain a less interventionist stance or one of neutrality. Perhaps the most fundamental difference was between Atlanticists and Europeanists. Atlanticists favored maintaining a close relationship with the United States in security and foreign policy issues through NATO. Europeanists favored a more independent Europe, which might distance itself from NATO.

While a country in the EU, such as Britain, might favor NATO over a European assertion for security independence through the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), it does not mean that they reject the ESDP entirely or the prospect of building it up. Tony Blair demonstrates the Atlanticist notions of the United Kingdom in his statements on the ESDP and NATO: "We believe that a flexible inclusive approach and effective links to NATO are essential to the success to ESDP. We will not agree to anything which is contradictory to, or would replace, the security guarantee established

⁹³ "The Amsterdam Treaty: A Comprehensive Guide," *Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation*, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/a19000_en.htm.

through NATO."⁹⁴ Despite this stance, there is a growing concern about the American commitment to Europe through NATO. This feeling has been exacerbated by the political fallout between many European countries and the U.S. after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as well as the overall reduction of American military bases within Europe.⁹⁵ This growing sentiment is reflected by Gerhard Schröder when he stated, "[NATO] is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies."⁹⁶ Tony Blair's language demonstrates the importance of the ESDP for Atlanticists, who fear the withdrawal of the U.S. from Europe, when he states, "Americans are too ready to see no need to get involved in the affairs of the rest of the world ... We understand that this is something we have no right to take for granted and must match with our own efforts. That is the basis for the recent initiative I took with President Chirac of France to improve Europe's own defense capabilities."⁹⁷ The Treaty of Nice (coming into force in 2003) provided amendments to the EU security policy that reflect the concerns of both Europeanist and Atlanticist countries alike. In particular, the language alone in Article 17 of the Treaty of Nice aptly demonstrates the concern it still has for NATO favoring countries when it states that it "...shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be

⁹⁴ Seth G. Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 55.

⁹⁵ Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation*, 55.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 55.

compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework."⁹⁸

The first true test of an independent EU after the enactments of the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice was Operation Artemis launched in June of 2003 in the Eastern Congo. Here the EU demonstrated its rapid response force by deploying 1,800 mostly French troops just seven days after they were implored to do so by the United Nations.⁹⁹ The operation was a vast success, especially in comparison to the failures of the EU to respond to the crises in the Balkans throughout the 1990's. However, given that the French were the main force in Operation Artemis, a criticism could be that the operation was nothing more than a French national endeavor that flew an EU flag. This is true to a limited extent. Essentially when a crisis situation arises, an EU member state acts as the "framework nation," in which it spearheads the military intervention providing military leadership for the EU response as well as the structure for operational guidance. The French took the lead in Operation Artemis, as France wished to demonstrate and project the autonomous capability of the EU. Other EU members made this a less expensive venture for the French, as not all contributions needed to be strictly in the area of military force. After the initial enforcement stage of the operation, the focus shifted to humanitarian aid and economic relief. Neutral EU countries then declare their preferred ways of contributing to the operation.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ "Treaty of Nice: Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts," *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C80/7, 2001. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf

⁹⁹ Giegerich, Bastian and William Wallace, "Not Such a Soft Power: the External Deployment of European Forces," *Survival* vol. 46 no. 2, (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer, 2004), 165.

¹⁰⁰ César García Pérez de León, "New logics of Integration in European Security and Defence Policy: Transformation of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms in the Intergovernmental Decision-

Not only does Operation Artemis demonstrate an independence of the EU, but it shows the preparedness for the EU to take more responsibility within NATO. It must be emphasized that the EU would not have been capable of conducting Operation Artemis without the Berlin Plus agreement. The Berlin Plus agreement essentially allows the EU to use NATO assets for missions that NATO does not wish to take the lead in.¹⁰¹ The origins of Berlin Plus agreement are rooted in the Atlanticist/Europeanist divide. France has typically favored EU security independent of NATO (and most notably, the United States); whereas, Great Britain has favored strengthening NATO and maintaining these ties. Because of these trends Great Britain had been fast to veto any proposals of an independent EU security apparatus outside of NATO. Concerns about the United States decreasing its budget for NATO as well as the warming of France to NATO, allowed for the St. Malo declaration. In this declaration, Great Britain allowed for the creation of an independent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In exchange, the United States would be "locked into the framework of European security."¹⁰² Essentially the manifestation of this was the Berlin Plus agreement, which came into effect shortly after St. Malo. While it may initially seem that the EU was absorbed by NATO through the Berlin-Plus agreement, it may be better to reassess the situation as one where NATO is largely being influenced by a developing European organization.¹⁰³

The recent Treaty of Lisbon replaces article 17 of the Treaty of Nice and further solidifies a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP, formerly called ESDP) for

Making Process," Working paper, (*ECPR Standing Group on International Relations*, 2007), 15.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 11.

¹⁰² Ibid., 9-10.

¹⁰³ Giegerich and Wallace, "Not Such a Soft Power," *Survival*, 165.

the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon provides a NATO-like alliance, in which any entity attacking one EU member is essentially attacking them all. Also, Article 42 also reiterates the points of the Petersburg Tasks,¹⁰⁴ with a slight but significant change in wording:

The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.¹⁰⁵

While congruent with its prior goals, the EU also establishes itself as capable for essentially any task, as long as it is in "accordance with the principles of the UN Charter."

It should be kept in mind that the UN Charter can be interpreted in a variety of ways. In particular, Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for self-defense from an armed attack. In recent years, this has been the *casus belli* of the United States invoked both in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, it has been used as the defense for conducting military operations in other countries' sovereignty territory, as in the case with the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.¹⁰⁶ Mainly though, the Treaty of Lisbon extends the principle of enhanced cooperation to the area of defense. This would allow the EU

¹⁰⁴ The Petersburg Tasks are the bases for military intervention, which primarily include situations demanding humanitarian, peacekeeping, and/or peacemaking tasks.

¹⁰⁵ "Fact Sheet 5: The Treaty of Lisbon," *European Security and Defense Assembly: Assembly of Western European Union*, 2009, http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/Fact%20sheets/5E_Fact_Sheet_Lisbon.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ Alan Silverleib, "The Killing of bin Laden: Was it Legal?" *CNN World*, May 4, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-04/world/bin.laden.legal_1_al-qaeda-leader-bin-cia-director-leon-panetta?_s=PM:WORLD

member states to act under the EU banner in military interventions without support for the action by all (or most) EU member states. Instead a minimum group of nine EU members could potentially act through enhanced cooperation to launch and carry out a military intervention. Essentially, this makes the EU much more flexible in terms of the operations it is capable of undertaking.¹⁰⁷ Overall, the EU defense policy has coalesced into an organization that has the capability to work largely under its own prerogative, yet is within the framework of NATO.

The Potential of the EU

The United States has largely gone outside of the purview of the United Nations in many of its more recent wars. For instance in the bombing campaign in Kosovo, the grounds for American military intervention, according to the seventh Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, was not covered by international law as it existed and was viewed largely as being "illegal but legitimate."¹⁰⁸ It was illegal in the sense that it did not wait for the United Nations to give it clearance to respond to the crisis situation, yet it was legitimated in preventing the crisis from potentially getting worse. Legitimacy on the ground, however, cannot be maintained by aerial strikes alone. The EU has aptly and uniquely fitted their military to provide what the American military often has trouble in providing, legitimacy and ground troops. The Berlin-Plus agreement essentially embeds the EU military within the framework of NATO, allowing both to share assets and intelligence with one another. Effectively, this has had a significant impact in both Macedonia and Bosnia, where NATO has withdrawn and left the EU in its stead. In this regard, the EU provides a specialized peace keeping task better suited

¹⁰⁷ "Enhanced Cooperation," *Europa: Summaries of EU Legislation*, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/enhanced_cooperation_en.htm.

¹⁰⁸ Alex J. Bellamy, *Responsibility to Protect*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 29, 41.

for the use of ground troops.¹⁰⁹ In both Operation Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Operation Concordia (Macedonia), the EU is providing the same number of military personnel with the same mandate of providing peace and security as NATO had. The EU will also maintain the same rules of engagement as NATO (those rooted in Chapter VII of the UN Charter).¹¹⁰ While these legitimating EU "clean-up crew" operations may signify the coordination and different specializations between NATO and the EU, the EU has also directly intervened without NATO support and with successful results.

EU & NATO Contention

Does the waning influence of the United States mean the end of NATO? The American public opinion favoring NATO has been dropping steadily for over the past 20 years. While NATO provided an alliance and bulwark against the Soviet Union, the years since the Soviet Union's dissolution have likely left many Americans wondering why their country is in a permanent alliance with Europe if there is little to no benefit to the United States. Exacerbating this trend was Germany's refusal to commit troops to the war effort in the first Gulf War. The outrage against Germany for this lack of commitment was felt in both political parties, and the politicians who were most vehement about this issue are currently in power. One example of this is Representative David Obey (D-WI) who stated in 1990:

Germany is absolutely outrageous. They are the worst because they have been the principal lecturers about the behaviors of others, and the principal beneficiaries of the collapse of the Soviet Union . . . For ten years they have lectured us about the international need of American fiscal responsibility, getting our deficits down, until we nearly gagged . . . But here they are, looking

¹⁰⁹ Giegerich and Wallace, "Not Such a Soft Power," *Survival*, 163.

¹¹⁰ Javier Solana, "From Dayton Implementation to European Integration," *NATO Review: Historic Change in the Balkans*, December 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/pdf/0404-eng.pdf>.

after their own interests (financing the merger with East Germany, sending aid to the former Soviet Union, and underwriting the cost of Soviet forces still in Germany) but nickel-nursing when it comes to world interests.¹¹¹

Atop this, 2004 polls showed that 80% of U.S. citizens feel that their government spends too much money on other nations' security. The call for a surge in Afghanistan received an additional commitment of just 80 troops from France, which surely did not engender any easing of these tensions.¹¹²

Despite these doom and gloom predictions, it seems that NATO is being reformed gradually to appropriately account for individual states' interests. Where the United States is hesitant to use ground troops, the EU steps in. Furthermore, the Berlin-Plus Agreement vests more responsibility in the EU, as demonstrated by the EU taking over the peace keeping and policing duties of NATO in both Macedonia and Bosnia. The EU's specialized role in military interventions is complimentary to NATO. As the EU takes more of a role in NATO, the annoyance felt by the U.S. of bearing the brunt of all the NATO tasks will subside. However, this will not be an easy transition, as the Berlin Plus agreement has fostered an environment in which the EU has primarily served in a 'soft power' capacity. While this dynamic will have to change, it does not spell the end for NATO but rather reaffirms the important, complimentary role of the EU within NATO.

¹¹¹ Bateman III, "The Death of NATO," *Proceedings Magazine*.

¹¹² Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

Perceptions and Realities of the EU's Defense Policy, NATO, and Their Relationship

"With great power comes great responsibility."¹¹³ Yet, the inverse is often true; with great responsibility comes great power. Such is the case of international security. The United States wants the EU to share more of the burden of international security with NATO operations, but in reality, giving the EU more decision-making power in developing the means to share the burden also increases EU autonomy, which inherently decreases the hegemony of the United States. The United States must determine an acceptable balance between the relinquishment of control and the acceptance of other contributors to the realm of international security. The primary concerns the United States has about the EU, regarding the EU's increasing role in international security, are "decoupling, duplication, and discrimination."¹¹⁴ The decoupling is the concern about the EU developing as a competing organization to NATO. Another worry is the view that any duplication of NATO abilities by the EU is a redundancy and leads only to further decoupling, as well as costs money that could potentially be going toward better uses within NATO itself. The third worry is of discrimination against non-EU members, who are members of NATO. As former American Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot put it:

We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO, but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Voltaire, Jean, Adrien. Beuchot, Quentin and Miger, Pierre, Auguste. "Œuvres de Voltaire, Volume 48". Lefèvre, 1832.

¹¹⁴ Howorth and Keeler, *Defending Europe*, 11.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

However, by the time that these worries from the United States manifested in 1999, the EU had already overcome most reservations by its members (in particular Great Britain) about pursuing a more autonomous path. While the United States expressed its worries with EU autonomy, it was the initial pressure from the United States about burden sharing that prompted the EU to agree on their quest for more autonomy. The following chapter explores this contention in the relationship between NATO and the EU, with a focus on the potential alternatives. This inspection will determine if there are legitimate fears of a decoupling between NATO and the EU and if there are alternatives to NATO and the EU growing apart.

Berlin Plus Agreement

There is certainly an overlap between NATO and the EU with their contemporary military objectives. Considering that NATO already exists as the primary international defensive community in Europe, it would be wasteful (if not antagonistic) to use resources to create another bureaucracy within the EU that essentially was to serve the same purpose. While former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates reproaches European NATO members for not doing enough, other Americans are wary of the potential for the EU to split off from or even destroy NATO. Colin Powell states his apprehensions about "independent E.U. structures that duplicate existing NATO capabilities."¹¹⁶ These concerns are not just looking at the wastefulness of bureaucratic overlap but are considering the potential of creating two confrontational systems competing for jurisdiction. The Berlin Plus agreement of 2003 highlights this concern.

¹¹⁶ Nile Gardiner and Sally McNamara, "The Bucharest NATO Summit: Washington and London Must Not Give Into French Demands," *The Heritage Foundation*, March 24, 2008, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/03/the-bucharest-nato-summit-washington-and-london-must-not-give-in-to-french-demands>.

The Berlin Plus agreement allows for the EU to use NATO military assets in EU peace keeping missions. Upon initial examination it may seem that this coordination effort is simply the EU slowly taking over the preexisting NATO framework as the Americans attempt to pull away from Europe. This is not the case. Rather, it seems that the Berlin Plus agreement is a way for NATO to maintain its preeminence over the EU. Rather than allowing for the EU to establish a duplicate competitive bureaucracy, NATO tactfully offers resources to the EU -- but not without caveats. For instance, the EU cannot use NATO assets in any given international intervention unless NATO has first declined to be involved in intervention.¹¹⁷ In this regard, the Berlin Plus agreement establishes a sort of hierarchy of the organizations that legitimate international military intervention. Ranked in descending order of legitimating capabilities are the United Nations, NATO, the EU, and then finally ad-hoc coalitions and/or unilateral state action. The second caveat is that the use of NATO assets for the EU must be approved unanimously among member states within NATO. While a large number of EU states are also members of NATO, other NATO members, such as Turkey, have impeded the process.

Military operations illustrate the problems under the established framework of the Berlin Plus agreement. For instance, during the Barcelona summit in March of 2002, the European Council "announced its willingness to take over NATO's operation in Macedonia."¹¹⁸ This would eventually result in Operation Concordia, which exchanged control from NATO to EU forces in Macedonia for a peace keeping mission

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ana E. Juncos, Eva Gross, Michael Emerson, and Ursula C. Schroeder, "Evaluating the EU's Crisis Missions in the Balkans," *Centre for European Policy Studies*, (Brussels, Belgium, 2007) 133.

after the majority of violence had subsided.¹¹⁹ However, there were significant delays due to a disagreement between Turkey and the EU, in which Turkey was concerned about sharing NATO assets with the EU. While Operation Concordia eventually went through and proved to be a success, relations between the EU and Turkey were only briefly assuaged.¹²⁰ The 2004 EU expansion brought Malta and Cypress in as member states. These are not NATO members and Turkey does not recognize the government of Cypress, which was acknowledged as the island's sovereign government *de facto* by the EU despite the clear division of communities on the island. Turkey is concerned about NATO information going to the non-NATO member countries within the EU, and by virtue of the Berlin Plus agreement is capable of blocking the exchange of sensitive information between the two organizations.¹²¹

There are inherent problems of coordination between NATO and the EU that the Berlin Plus agreement did not solve but only highlighted. Despite this, the only two NATO operations that were relinquished to the EU since the Berlin Plus agreement largely succeeded in their goals in the Balkans.¹²² The similar role the EU played in taking over both of these NATO operations helped the EU to better define its niche within NATO. In both of these cases, the EU provided a significant ground force specialized in peace keeping operations. These troops were more localized than NATO troops from across the Atlantic, and by having the more long term peace keeping troops

¹¹⁹ Giovanni Gasparini, "Turkey and European Security," *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, Feb. 2007, 70.

¹²⁰ Juncos, et. al., "Evaluating the EU's Crisis Missions in the Balkans," 70.

¹²¹ "Berlin Minus: There is No Excuse for the Failure of NATO and the EU to talk to Each Other," *The Economist*, Feb. 2007,

http://www.economist.com/node/8669193?story_id=8669193

¹²² Roy H. Ginsberg, *Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2007), 370-372.

coming from a different organization that did not initiate the initial interventional response, the EU was able to maintain a more stable legitimacy in its occupation.¹²³ These roles have helped define the EU's niche in dealing with future international crisis situations.

Conclusion

Overall, the Berlin Plus agreement has promoted a specialization of the EU within the NATO framework that focuses it more on humanitarian and peace keeping intervention. Yet, without this specialization of labor prompted by the hierarchical implications of the Berlin Plus agreement, the EU and NATO could contest one another for the same role. This specialization also serves to promote the EU's complementary role to NATO. Despite the grumblings of the Americans, who are most visible in NATO, the United States is not about to relinquish its global influence to the EU. Furthermore, "Europeans might whine about U.S. hegemony or 'hyper-power,' but they [are] in no position either to challenge it or to replace it."¹²⁴

Overall, there are seemingly grand expectations many have for both NATO and the EU. The optimistic expectations that the Berlin Plus agreement has already effectively coordinated the EU and NATO may lead to a disappointment that the two organizations are not as harmonized as it first appears. However, also upon investigating the problems within and between these organizations, it should be noted that there were potential developments that could have caused a much greater rift between the EU and NATO. While the integration of the EU into the NATO framework may create a problem by specializing the EU role too much, the alternative

¹²³ Giegerich and Wallace, "Not Such a Soft Power," 163.

¹²⁴ Howorth and Keeler, *Defending Europe*, 11.

potential contestation between NATO and the EU would be far less desirable. The concluding chapter delves more into this, looking at the negative perceptions of the EU's relationship with NATO and how the Berlin Plus agreement was the most positive outcome for shaping this relationship.

CHAPTER 6

Negative Perceptions of the EU and NATO

At first glance, it appears that the EU had been taking an ever more active role in global affairs, yet it has largely come under fire for its lack of coordination in responding to the Libyan Civil War. While Representative David Obey had harsh words about Germany's "nickel nursing" when it came to contributing to NATO in 1990, the Libyan civil war (in which Germany did not participate) may demonstrate that not a lot has changed.¹²⁵ In fact, this sentiment is reiterated by former American Defense Secretary Robert Gates at his retirement speech. Regarding the niche the EU has developed, Secretary Gates is greatly disappointed, stating:

In the past, I've worried openly about Nato turning into a two-tiered alliance, between members who specialize in 'soft' humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the 'hard' combat missions ... This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable.¹²⁶

Even the Secretary General of NATO states, "It is astounding how narrow the bandwidth of cooperation between NATO and the [European] Union has remained. There is still a remarkable distance between them."¹²⁷ Another article suggests that there is not just discord between NATO and the EU, but there is great disunity even between EU members. The article states:

The European Union, for its part, has failed miserably. Institutional Europe has not faced up to the challenge. In the North African saga it does not exist. It is incapable of agreeing how to act, on whether to recognize the Libyan opposition and most, of all, on the legitimacy of the use of force. The disunity is total and particularly striking when it is a question of deciding war -- that is to say when

¹²⁵ Bateman III, "The Death of NATO," *Proceedings Magazine*.

¹²⁶ Traynor, "US Defense Chief Blasts Europe over NATO," *The Guardian*.

¹²⁷ "Berlin Minus," *The Economist*.

history becomes tragedy and it is necessary to move from frothy rhetoric about the rights of man.¹²⁸

These negative sentiments condemn the lack of contributions by the EU, as the future challenges for the organization and its relationship with NATO becomes clearer. Is it really as bad as it seems though? The prior quotes demonstrate a fear of the EU becoming too autonomous, if they do not directly state that the EU has *already* become too autonomous. In order to gain some perspective on the current reality, it is useful to consider potential political actions and outcomes that could have shaped the relationship between NATO and the EU in a much different way than the Berlin Plus agreement did.

First, would the United States not pressuring the EU to increase its ability to share the burden of NATO operations have kept a lid on the hypothetical can of worms that contained within these seemingly newfound issues of decoupling and duplication? History professor, Frederic Bozo, who is also a Senior Research Assistant at the *Institut Français des Relations Internationales* in Paris, suggests that the strain put on the Atlantic Alliance from the disparity of power would ultimately cause the EU and United States to break apart. As such, maintaining the status quo was not a good option to prevent any sort of decoupling. Instead the Alliance must be redefined and eventually rebalanced.¹²⁹

Second, there is certainly French intent for the EU to be much more autonomous than it currently is. Consider this wording in the Anglo-French plans of the European Council conclusions at Cologne in 1999:

¹²⁸ Menon, "European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya," *Survival*, 76.

¹²⁹ Howorth and Keeler, *Defending Europe*, 71-72.

The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises *without prejudice to action by NATO*."¹³⁰

The last few words were disconcerting to President Clinton, who was able to pressure the British to fight for changing this wording to what had been agreed upon in St. Malo. The United Kingdom successfully negotiated with France and the established St. Malo phrasing was used ("...where the alliance as a whole is not engaged," rather than, "...without prejudice to action by NATO.")¹³¹ With the language the way it is, the United States has the ultimate authority to make the choice of whether or not to join the hypothetical operation, rather than allowing the EU to exclude the United States from the beginning (which the wording, "...without prejudice to action by NATO," would have potentially allowed the EU to do). This built the foundations for the hierarchical Berlin Plus agreement. In other words, the EU had the potential to become much more autonomous and potentially detached from NATO than it did. Another shift in phrasing was from "no duplication" to "no unnecessary duplication." This phrasing would allow the EU to duplicate some NATO capabilities, but it is still restrictive enough that it would not be politically feasible for the EU to create anything that could be deemed "unnecessary" by NATO (primarily the United States).¹³²

Intervention in Libya

What about the sentiment that the EU has essentially failed as demonstrated by the extreme variance of participation levels of member states in the Libyan conflict? Again looking at the Berlin Plus agreement, this does not appear to be a failure of the EU. NATO chose to take action in the Libyan Civil War, giving it precedence over the

¹³⁰ Ibid., 30.

¹³¹ Ibid., 30.

¹³² Ibid., 31.

EU, which may only use NATO resources if NATO itself first refuses to become involved in military intervention. As such, the varying levels of member state participation in a military intervention is not a problem restricted to the EU but is more of an inherent problem NATO faces. However, Libya does demonstrate a unique intervention, in that it was initially more heavily backed by EU countries, and the United States took a share of more of the burden in the later phases of the intervention. This role-reversal demonstrated the capabilities gap between the EU and United States and the ability of the EU to influence the United States to back a military intervention. This is not to say that the EU has set a new trend with this model. While the EU can serve a useful specialized role in NATO, the Libyan intervention demonstrates that the EU has an influence in NATO but is not overtaking the organization. Likely in the next NATO intervention (potentially in Syria), the EU will be relegated to its specialized role if it takes on a significant role in the intervention at all.

Conclusion

The book, *Defending Europe*, includes two conclusion sections, one that favors the initiatives of the ESDP and one that makes a case for how the ESDP is dangerous and misguided. The book was published in 2003, yet the fundamental issues the ESDP (now CSDP) has faced remain the same. In the pro-EU autonomy concluding chapter, Jolyon Howorth highlights the three obstacles the ESDP must face. These are the creation of new institutional apparatuses that will allow EU members to expeditiously address security and defense issues, the upgrading of military capabilities and budgets, and lastly the maintenance of harmony between EU, the United States, and NATO.¹³³ As the chapter 5 showed, there was potential for the EU to separate itself from NATO

¹³³ Ibid., 223.

and the United States much more than it did. Despite its criticisms, the Berlin Plus agreement has maintained a significant entwinement between NATO and the EU. Chapter 4 demonstrated that after the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU has been militarily capable of quickly responding to crisis situations and taking over NATO and UN operations with a more localized and specialized force. The one aspect that remains largely out of balance in 2012 is the disparity in military budgets between the EU and the United States. However, this is not entirely the onus of the EU; the United States must be willing to allow the EU to take more of the international security burden in exchange for the autonomy it requires to do this.

Chapter 3 highlighted the importance of different types of legitimacy in military interventions. Furthermore, it demonstrated the unpredictable nature of when or if military interventions would be initiated, as well as the resolve to maintain an occupying force. As shown in chapter 4, the EU provides a potential to create a consistency for when military interventions will be conducted. It also has the potential to grant more international, domestic, and regional (as in among the denizens of where the intervention occurs) legitimacy through this consistency and by virtue of being a supranational organization, whose values are more binding than the capricious national interest of its member states.

To conclude, the EU has come a long way in the past twenty years in terms of its CSDP and can now serve a complementary role to NATO in military interventions. The coordination between the EU and NATO under the Berlin-Plus agreement has allowed for the EU to develop as specialized role in which it can take over NATO initiated interventions to provide peace keeping and policing. The EU has the on the

ground man-power to conduct such endeavors and maintains the same rules of engagement as NATO.¹³⁴ This coupled with the EU's improvements enacted in the Treaty of Amsterdam have enabled the EU to quickly respond to and successfully follow up areas that demand an intervention, as demonstrated through Operation Artemis and the takeover of NATO peacekeeping operations in Macedonia and Bosnia. Lastly, the EU has a special relationship within NATO. While the EU is gaining more influence within NATO, this should not be mistaken for overtaking the organization or undermining it. Rather, given its legitimating potential, its successes in military interventions since 1999, and its unique entwinement and specialized role within NATO, the EU may be doing quite the opposite of overtaking NATO and may actually be revitalizing the organization.

¹³⁴ Solana, "From Dayton Implementation," *NATO Review*.

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

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