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HENRY CABOT LODGE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, 1887-1901

The University of Oklahoma PH.D. 1980

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GRADUATE COLLEGE

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DAVID WENDELL DOTSON

Norman, Oklahoma

1980

HENRY CABOT LODGE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, 1887-1901

APPROVED BY

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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Preface

Until the 1960's, the dominant view of historians of the late nineteenth century was that the political figures of the age of McKinley were unimaginative, dull, pompous, bungling, and corrupt. The political debate of the late nineteenth century was issueless with the quarrel over the tariff an example of the tendency to avoid rather than to confront the central questions before the society. There was an inclination on the part of historians to hurdle over the Gilded Age rather than examine it as a transition to the twentieth century. This negative view of the era has persisted in spite of the effort of a large number of studies in recent years.

Politics in the state of Massachusetts in the last two decades of the nineteenth century was undergoing, if slowly, the same changes occurring in the rest of the nation. The tariff was of vital interest to the manufacturing communities of the state. The influx of foreign-born in the period changed the social homogeneity of the state, accelerated urbanization, and injected an ethnic dimension into the political relationship between town and city. This was reflected in controversies over the American Protective Association, prohibition, compulsory public education, women's suffrage, and immigration restriction.

In 1875, the political world into which Henry Cabot Lodge appeared was a thoroughly nineteenth century setting. In Massachusetts,

there was still a tendency for the political substratum to defer to the leadership of its betters. That attitude changed substantially in the first decade of the twentieth century and Henry Cabot Lodge was compelled to make a difficult transition from the political style of the nineteenth century to that of the twentieth century. More than some of his friends, Lodge had a foot in each century. In 1901, Lodge found the style of domestic politics novel and disconcerting. On the other hand, he made a smooth transition from the foreign policy of William McKinley to that of Theodore Roosevelt.

This study contends that the last two decades of the nineteenth century was a critical transition period and that Henry Cabot Lodge's political career provides considerable insight into the adjustments occurring in the Republican party in Massachusetts and in the nation. The selection of William McKinley in 1896 over Thomas B. Reed signified an important shift in the political center of gravity from New England to the industrial Middle West.

A host of people have assisted in this work. Miss Winifred A. Collins and the staff of the Massachusetts Historical Society patiently and efficiently responded to innumerable requests for manuscript materials for months at a time. The staff of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress facilitated the task of surveying a large number of manuscript collections. The entire staff of the Green Mountain College Library aided with this project from its beginning. Mrs. Margot McKinney and Mrs. Mildred Minton cheerfully processed an endless number of interlibrary loan requests. Mr. Douglas W. Durkee aided with proofreading. Mrs. Elaine Proctor and Mrs. Marjorie Reed provided invaluable help in the

formidable task of typewriting the manuscript. An incalculable debt is owed to my wife Linda, who bore the burden of coping with three small children during my absence four summers in succession. Finally, this biographical study would never have been more than a thought were it not for the aid of my father, Floyd. Unhappily, he never saw even the first page of it.

CHAPTER I

MASSACHUSETTS IN THE GILDED AGE: AN INTRODUCTION

As early as the 1830's, agriculture in Massachusetts began to decline as a major force in the economy of the state. From the eastern part of the state to the river valleys and hill country of the west, agriculture retreated to the most fertile soils. Competition from more fertile western farms was too great for the marginal farms of the state. Abandonment and depopulation appeared in the early part of the nineteenth century, and continued throughout the second half of the century except for those areas where farmers specialized in truck farming, fruit growing, tobacco culture and dairying. The railroad was significant after 1840 in subjecting agriculture in the state to western competition.[1]

The agricultural press in the 1840's described the tendency of New England farmers to encourage their sons to pursue trade and the professions rather than agriculture. A sense of declining status coupled with economic decline drove the population of the western hill communities of the state at an increasing rate either into manufacturing centers or west to more fertile agricultural lands. Villages such as Ashfield, Pelham and Warwick in the Connecticut River Valley showed steady population losses in the period 1850-1900. In these upland towns, the older generation was left behind as the young sought out better opportunities, with agricultural decay the result. Along the

river, where the soils were more fertile, tobacco and onions were grown with success and population actually increased after 1860. In fact, the "new immigrants" of the 1880's and 1890's sought out these areas and contributed to their growth. Labor intensive crops which demanded exertions greater than native labor was willing to provide attracted southern and eastern Europeans.[2]

In the eastern part of the state, there was a comparable development of urban pressure on farmlands, with only the more desirable soils remaining in agriculture. The principal crops in the Boston area were lettuce, tomatoes and cucumbers grown under glass. Dairying and fruit culture became increasingly important as in the western sections, but the subsistence agriculture in corn, turnips, beets, and livestock of the early years of the century waned.[3]

The fundamental changes in agriculture which began in the years before the Civil War were mirrored in the rise of manufacturing. The surplus labor which came from competition with western farms gravitated to budding centers like Holyoke and Chicopee. At first, these relied upon local, native sources of labor, but in the boom years just before the Civil War, the shortage of labor necessitated the recruitment of French Canadians. The Lyman Mills in the spring of 1859 sent agents to Quebec to get all the hands possible, promising money wages which could be sent home or brought back to start small businesses. For two years, the textile mills of Holyoke ran at full capacity using more and more French Canadian and Irish immigrants.[4]

After initial difficulties, the enterprises of Holyoke prospered substantially from wartime demand. As the war ended in 1865, Holyoke

commenced a new phase of development as paper manufacturers discovered the exceptional natural endowments of the area. Like most other industrial communities, Holyoke suffered from the depression of 1873, but the industrial character of the area heightened the effect among the low wage immigrant groups. As economies of scale in the paper industry became more important after 1873, only the larger and better financed mills survived. The Holyoke Water Power Company which provided both power and capital raised the minimum requirements for power for individual mills contributing to increases in mill size.[5]

Between 1865 and 1873, the Irish and French Canadian immigrants usually performed the less skilled and more distasteful chores associated with textile and paper manufacture. The increased flow of immigrants produced a trend to sub-communities contrasting with the social homogeneity of the pre-war years. Religious differences along with linguistic barriers produced segregation of German, Lutheran mill workers from Irish, Catholic paper makers. The tensions associated with economic distress and overcrowding strained the fabric of the community. More than ever before, Holyoke faced a demand for poor relief and improvement of sanitary facilities.[6]

The bruising depression of 1893 forced basic readjustments in the industry of Holyoke and Chicopee. In the case of Holyoke, trusts in the manufacture of thread and paper emerged after the depression of the Nineties. In Chicopee, the introduction of large amounts of outside capital fastened on it the status of "factory town." Because of absentee ownership and the lack of sufficient wage incomes for a local mercantile class, the town failed to generate a native middle class.

In Holyoke, the growth of national markets with demands for large quantities of cheap wood-fibre paper forced a scale of capitalization which small firms simply could not meet. The result of the trend was the creation of the American Writing Paper Company with the consolidation of fifteen Holyoke mills.[7]

In the years between the Panic of 1873 and the depression of 1893, labor in the western mill towns of Holyoke and Chicopee tended to accept its lot with little complaint. While some politicians appealed to immigrant workers and the Knights of Labor won some recruits, the Poles and French Canadians found working conditions in the mills better than what they had left. Not until after 1900 did the operatives of Holyoke question their condition and begin seeking unionization.[8]

In eastern Massachusetts in the shoe making centers of Lynn, Brockton, and Haverhill some of the same patterns were repeated, but the nature of the industry itself produced some basic differences. Low capital requirements for entry into the business, the requirement of skilled labor for many operations and the omnipresent difficulty of excess capacity produced a different pattern of organization. Technological changes throughout the period increased output, lowered the number of hand operations and decreased demand for labor at a ferocious pace.[9] The fisheries continued to be important politically and symbolically if not economically. Throughout the period, Massachusetts politicians disregarded the running dispute between Gloucestermen and Canadians at their peril.

The urbanization of western Massachusetts was symptomatic of the state as a whole. As the Chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor remarked in 1891, "Massachusetts is no longer the

Puritan Commonwealth. It is the Commonwealth of Cities."[10] Using the definition of cities of the census of 1840, there were only three cities in the state and they contained only 17.52 percent of the population of the state. Fifteen years later, the first decennial census showed thirteen cities. In the second half of the century, the process accelerated. In 1875, there were nineteen cities and 50.6 percent of the population of the state was residing in them. The trend was clear, the towns were rapidly losing ground to the cities and a major social, economic and political shift was occurring.[11]

The next fifteen years showed a steady gain of urban areas at the expense of rural regions. By 1890, Massachusetts was predominantly a state of cities. There were then 28 cities and they contained 61.29 percent of the population of the state. Even more significant was the fact that of those cities one-third of them contained 86.42 percent of the urban population. Contemporaries were convinced that this development was a direct outgrowth of the rise of manufacturing in the state, but while manufacturers contributed to the trend, the phenomenon was much more complex than that. It reflected basic social, political, and technological changes occurring throughout the Atlantic community of nations.[12]

While Worcester, Springfield, Lowell and other cities grew markedly in the period, 1865-1900, the premier city was still Boston. It was not entirely representative of developments elsewhere in the state, but it was the cultural, political and social focus of the state. In 1865, Boston contained 192,318 people. Thirty-five years later it was a metropolis of 448,477 with the rapid growth of the Nineties yet to come. One of the more severe strains on the life of

Boston was the congestion of the central city. Because of relatively primitive transportation, expansion was limited until the technological innovations of the post-1870 period. Horse-drawn cars had extended the range of commutation, but only with the electrically powered street-cars of the Eighties did the city grow beyond a range of about three to five miles.[13]

Once the means were provided to move workers from outlying areas to the central city, developers rapidly extended the city to envelope towns like Roxbury and Dorchester. In some cases, the very traction interests responsible for the transportation network also participated in the development of new housing for the burgeoning population. In general, housing rose along the routes of the streetcars. Development between lines waited until sufficient demand warranted connecting routes.

As the more affluent elements fled to the suburbs, the city was given over to commercial, manufacturing, and financial activities. Outside of the Back Bay and other wealthy sections, much of the remaining housing was devoted to the immigrants coming in larger numbers in the last two decades of the century. Even in the expanding suburban areas, a clear-cut class pattern began to develop. The lower middle class absorbed the region on the edge of the old "walking city" in Roxbury and the middle class moved further out into West Roxbury. The increase in congestion in the older sections of the city in the second half of the century produced problems of social control as the history of the Boston police department demonstrated.[14]

After the Civil War, Boston was relatively tranquil from the

perspective of those who maintained law and order. There were disturbances both social and political over the place of the tavern in the life of the city, but until the depression of 1873 the police found the maintenance of order within their resources. The force tacitly participated in the subversion of laws to prevent child labor and were less than energetic in the enforcement of truancy regulations. In 1870, the Chief aggressively attacked prostitution to satisfy Victorian reformers and the press, but openly defended radical opinions for that day. He argued that social and economic conditions accounted for prostitution rather than moral deficiency. He also urged that, if local ordinances were to be vigorously enforced, the customers of prostitutes be brought before the bar of justice.[15]

The decade of the Eighties imposed new demands on the police and the steadily escalating flow of immigrants fractured whatever was left of the homogeneous community of the pre-war years. The commission system interfered with the normal method of applying politics to the appointment of police officers. Instead of aldermanic pressures, the department now felt the impact of a politically changing commission. More and more, the Boston force was called upon to defend property as the tensions between workers and their employers heightened after the panic of 1883.[16]

Even though an Irish mayor was elected in 1884, the General Court continued to put the administration of city affairs in the hands of native Yankees. Increasingly, during the remaining years of the century, Yankees and newcomers clashed over temperance, public education, and poor relief. Boston's emerging urban police force found it difficult

to adjust to changes which pushed it first one direction and then another. The city became more and more a place of strangers with the breakdown of social consensus that had given pre-Civil War Boston the atmosphere of a large village.[17]

Instead of native strangers, Bostonians after 1880 were foreign strangers. The Irish dominated the flow of humanity before the war, but in the Eighties the tide was larger and seemingly less assimilable. While natives of the prewar years might despise the religion, poverty and manners of the Irish, the immigrants at least spoke English and adapted to the political mores of the nation reasonably well. There had been tensions between natives and the Irish over religion, but the nationalizing experience of the war forged something of a tacit consensus between Yankee and Irish. Between 1865 and 1880, the dominant group coming to the Commonwealth was still the Irish, but that changed in the next fifteen years. The importance of immigration to the growth of urban centers was reflected in the growing percentage of foreign born in all major cities of the state. In 1885, thirty-four percent of Boston's inhabitants were foreign born. This contrasted with twenty-seven percent in the towns of the state. A clear division was emerging between the rural, Protestant, native Republican towns and the urban, Catholic, immigrant, Democratic cities which widened in the last decade of the century.[18]

One of the factors that contributed to some degree of peace between natives and Irish was the tendency of the latter to defer to the social and political leadership of the former. The decade of the

Nineties, with its flow of Italians and Jews into Boston, threatened the tenuous peace between native and immigrant. Indicative of the change was the increasing number of Italians in the north and west ends of the city. In 1880, there had been only 1,000 Italians in the north end while the census of 1895 showed almost 8,000. In both districts, there had been only a few hundred Jews earlier, but in 1895 6,330, mostly from Russia and Eastern Europe.

The rise of commercial agriculture in Eastern Europe, religious persecution in Russia, and grinding poverty in Sicily propelled more and more of the "new immigrants" to Boston, New York and other ports of entry. A depression in the early Nineties failed to stem the flow even though the downturn was severe. The stress of rapid urbanization coupled with economic want stimulated a revival of anti-Catholicism in the Nineties. The "new immigrants" committed the unpardonable sin of competing with natives for jobs when unemployment was high. They also added the insult of strange languages, unusual customs and Catholicism.[19]

The general spirit of the decade was optimistic. Most Americans had a virtually unshakable faith in the efficacy of technology to expand living standards, but the flood of seemingly indigestible immigrants seemed to threaten the imminent millenium of order and industrial plenty. Contemporaries concerned about the challenge of the "new immigration" worried about the resilience of their society. After describing the overcrowding of the north and west ends in Boston, one observer noted that "a considerable proportion of the newcomers, instead of finding here opportunities or preparation for a more normal life, will be

overcome by their own numbers ... and will settle back, accepting present conditions as their permanent lot."[20]

The technological changes of the era and the commitment to the welfare of all the residents of Boston prevented the worst fears of contemporaries. With some lag, social mobility in Boston matched the new dimension of surburban living that the electric streetcar made possible. The dream of one Bostonian was a style of life between the extreme of the city slum and the backwoods. Between those extremes, he thought was "that most attractive form of modern life, that which is possible under the best conditions near the city but not in it."[21] This statement reflected an attitude which did much to fuel the suburbanization of America and reflected one of the more potent political divisions in late nineteenth-century Massachusetts, the cleavage between country and city. Many looked back nostalgically to the village society of the prewar years. In that separation there were included the social tensions of native and immigrant and the towns' economic envy of the manufacturing centers.

Immediately after the Civil War, the Republican party in Massachusetts took as one of its principal goals obtaining the fruits of the military victories of the war years. Throughout Reconstruction, the party sought Negro suffrage as one of the instruments to achieve the ideals of the war. Because of its identification as the party of union and the Democratic party's association with Copperheadism, Republicans enjoyed overwhelming electoral successes between 1867 and 1870. The controversies in Washington between Johnson and the Radicals

spilled over into state politics and it was not until after 1870 that state issues again came to the fore.

By 1872, discontent with the inefficiences and corruptions of the Grant administration precipitated the Liberal Republican movement which chose Horace Greeley as its candidate. The Liberals were offended at what they saw as a coterie of corrupt politicians dominating Grant. Spoils politics coupled with a desire for vindication for the ideals of Charles Sumner motivated these genteel reformers.[22]

With the passage of the Fifteenth Admendment in 1870, Republicans in Massachusetts turned again to the question of temperance. From 1855, Massachusetts had had a prohibitory law, but by 1866 violations had become so frequent that in 1867 the matter was considered in the state conventions. The result was the enactment of a license system which gave way to reenactment of the prohibitory law in 1868. The matter continued to agitate the public mind until a local license law was passed in 1871. License and local-option dominated the approach to the problem throughout the Eighties. Prohibition was defeated in 1889, but no-license and total abstinence typified the thinking of temperance advocates in the Nineties.[23]

From Wendell Phillips's speech in 1865 urging stricter enforcement of the state's liquor laws to the work of Theodore Wentworth Higginson, temperance agitation was the work of the "better element" of the society. In 1882 some of the mugwumps and the Boston Irish united against prohibition, but by 1886, their alliance broke down. The Irish found it more to their advantage to back the Republican candidate

for governor in return for support against prohibition. Such expedience typified the issue throughout the period. In general, the Democratic party experienced less confusion of attitude than the Republicans who counted beer-drinking Germans and cold water advocates among their number. In the Nineties, an added complication developed as temperance became deeply intertwined with the woman's suffrage question.[24]

The temperance movement in Massachusetts as elsewhere was heavily evangelical in religion and reformist in politics. As the most recent sutdent of the political arm of the movement observed, the bulk of the leadership came from the Northeast and the goal of the reformers was to create a society in which self-restraint would cure industrial society of exploitation. The middle class virtues of order and discipline dear to the temperance advocate combined well with the ideals of the mugwumps who supplied supporters for the reform.[25]

The two other volatile issues to confront the parties in the Seventies were currency legislation and woman suffrage. The two major parties and their organs of opinion supported sound money, but the representatives of the labor movement urged a legal tender currency. Workers along with other debtors favored "cheap" money to relieve the economic burden of the economic distress of the panic of 1873. Creditors opposed any such attempt to scale down debts. While the Republican platform in 1870 was silent on the question of woman suffrage, there was considerable sentiment in favor, since a resolution favoring female suffrage narrowly failed.

As the idealism of the war years diminished, local issues and intra-party squabbling produced a steady decline in Republican voting strength. In 1874, for the first time in many years, the state elected a Democratic governor, but it was only a temporary aberration. The growing importance of reform sentiment continued after 1874 with Massachusetts Liberal Republicans playing an important role in the movement in 1876.[26]

In the decade of the Eighties, both parties faced root changes occurring in the society and economy of the state. Among Democrats, the division between native Yankees and the urban Irish became more pronounced. After the assassination of Garfield at the hands of a disappointed office seeker in 1881, elements of both parties embraced civil service reform. In the crucial presidential election of 1884, the Democrats chose Grover Cleveland to run against James G. Blaine. Cleveland's success meant the first Democratic administration since before the war and the need to dispense large amounts of patronage. The Mugwumps in the Democratic party were placed in the uncomfortable position of having to reach working agreements with the Irish, urban machines in Boston and elsewhere. The result was a shaky alliance that lasted until the currency battles of the Nineties.

In the Republican party, even before 1884, a growing division between the first generation of the party and the newer generation which had not known the battles of the Fifties began to develop. Reform divided some members of the party, but the test of supporting Blaine in 1884 was crucial for many. Both parties in the state resolved

to do battle on the tariff question, with the Young Democrats having much the better of the contest. William E. Russell's speeches typified the point of view of the young Democrats. Unlike regular Republicans, he urged a sharp revision downward on raw materials which Massachusetts manufacturers used but only a modest drop in duties on their manufactured goods. This ploy was designed to disrupt the traditional consensus among Republicans on the tariff. Armed with statistics and enthusiasm for their candidate, the Mugwumps in the Democratic party in particular rose to the occasion. The result in November was not only a Democratic president but also the launching of a number of careers at the state level. John F. Andrew, a Republican defector, George Fred Williams, Charles Sumner Hamlin and other "Young Democrats" of distinguished education and lineage found a new career and a zest for politics in 1884. Their Irish allies were uneasy with the reform proclivities of these Yankees and particularly when it came time to divide up the spoils. Many Irishmen thought that the choicer offices were reserved for Yankees. A certain euphoria associated with success, however overcame the inherent difference of point of view between the two groups.[27]

One of the happier developments of 1884 was the emergence of William E. Russell. His personal appeal produced three governorships in succession between 1890 and 1893. Russell was the most popular Democratic politician in the state and perhaps the most popular politician of the day in Massachusetts. In his person, he represented a bridge between Yankee and Irishman in the state. His untimely death

in 1896 at the age of thirty-nine broke the tenuous link between the two factions of the party. The tempestuous division between the reform faction of the party which bolted in 1896 to support "gold" and the Irish and native "radicals" who remained to support Bryan produced a breach which did not heal for many years.[28]

With the passage of the McKinley Tariff in 1890, Republicans again faced an assault on the part of the "Young Democrats." The normal mid-term election slump combined with hostility to the "high" nature of the schedules to produce disaster at the polls. The state elected a large number of Democratic congressmen and made "Billy" Russell governor. The reversal was temporary, however. The depression which began in 1893 cast a pall over Cleveland's entire second administration. Although the nativistic American Protective Association presented a moral dilemma with practical political implications for some Republicans, victory seemed certain in 1896.[29]

In the last years of the decade, despite a division within the party over expansion, Republicans enjoyed electoral dominance at both the national and the state levels. The popular Roger Wolcott directed the state through the Spanish-American War and Henry Cabot Lodge steered the party deftly around the shoals of anti-expansionist sentiment within the party. In many respects, in the years after the Civil War and before Progressivism, Massachusetts typified the larger changes in America. She experienced the shift from an agricultural, native society to an urban, pluralistic society. The technological, economic, and social changes were frequently bewildering. As Henry Cabot Lodge remarked in 1913: "The world of Boston, when I opened my eyes upon it,

was a very plain and simple world as I look back at it now in the glare and noise of the twentieth century. There was an abundance of gayety, but expenditures were small. Everybody knew everybody else and all about everybody else's family."[30] Lodge had known the village Boston of 1850 and the urban metropolis of the twentieth century. As painful as it was, he recommended that the changes of the Gilded Age be met with a cheerful termperament and a commitment to the "creed of the nineteenth century, that mankind is steadily advancing and that we are moving slowly upward to perfection."[31]

Footnotes

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2. Richard H. Abbott, "The Agricultural Press Views the Yeoman: 1819-1859, "Agricultural History XLII (January, 1968), p. 39; Lester Earl Klimm, The Relation Between Certain Population..., pp. 35, 40, 79-81, 83-85, 89, 107.

3. Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier, pp. 260-261.

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10. Horace G. Wadlin, "The Growth of Cities in Massachusetts," American Statistical Association n.s. No. 13 (March, 1891), p. 161.

11. Ibid., pp. 161-162.

12. Ibid., pp. 162-166.

13. Horace G. Wadlin, "The Growth of Cities in Massachusetts," p. 164; Sam B. Warner, Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900 (New York: Atheneum, 1973), pp. 15-17, 63.

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15. Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 161-193.

16. Ibid., pp. 195-213.

17. Ibid., pp. 195-224.

18. Oscar Handlin, Boston's Immigrants (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), chps. V-VII, pp. 207, 209-213; Horace G. Wadlin, "The Growth of Cities in Massachusetts," pp. 162-164.

19. Oscar Handlin, Boston's Immigrants, pp. 222-229; Robert A. Woods (ed.), Americans in Process (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1902), pp. 40-49; Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1951). Handlin's work still provides a powerful impression of the forces driving immigrants to America. He succeeded in communicating the mixture of desperation and urge for improvement that characterized the immigration of this period; Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), chps. VII, VIII. Even if misguided on some questions, John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of Nativism, 1860-1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1966) chp. IV provides a reasonably solid picture of the revival of the spirit of Know Nothingism.

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21. Sam B. Warner, Streetcar Suburbs, pp. 32, 66; Horace G. Wadlin, "The Growth of Cities in Massachusetts," p. 172.

22. Edith Ellen Ware, Political Opinion in Massachusetts During Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: Columbia University, 1916), pp. 154, 165, 167.

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24. Ross Evans Paulson, Women's Suffrage and Prohibition, Chps. IV, V; Geoffrey Blodgett, The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 13, 93, 98; Geoffrey Blodgett, "The Mind of the Boston Mugwump," Mississippi Valley Historical Review XLVIII (March, 1962), p. 617; Wendell Phillips, "The Laws of the Commonwealth - Shall They be Enforced?," (Boston: Wright and Potter, 1865).

25. Jack S. Blocker, Retreat From Reform: The Prohibition Movement in the United States (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), pp. 8-14; The mugwump view of the ideal social order is presented in John G. Sproat, "The Best Men," Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

26. Ibid., pp. 189-199.

27. Geoffrey Blodgett, The Gentle Reformers, chps. 1-4: Richard E. Welch, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 105.

28. Geoffrey Blodgett, The Gentle Reformers, chps. 6,8, 10.

29. Geoffrey Blodgett, The Gentle Reformers, pp. 98-99; Richard E. Welch, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans, pp. 188-193.

30. Henry Cabot Lodge, Early Memories (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), p. 217.

31. Ibid., p. 203.

CHAPTER II

EARLY MEMORIES, HARVARD, AND POLITICAL REFORM, 1850-1875

In 1850, the year of Henry Cabot Lodge's birth, the political generation of Daniel Webster, Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun was in its twilight. Clay's last great effort, the Compromise of 1850, did not settle the issue which was to break not only political parties but also the Union itself in 1861. The fugitive Slave Act brought increasing unrest in Lodge's birthplace, Boston, as the decade advanced. In a memoir of his youth, Lodge remarked that "my first impressions of politics were tragic, and I imbibed in this way an intense hatred of slavery, which I connected with Southerners and Democrats. The details were misty and the reasoning vague, but the sentiment was vigorous and the general result fairly accurate."[1] Lodge's recollection of the views of his youth were distorted after years of political warfare, but his championing of the Elections Bill of 1890 aimed at monitoring federal elections was based on sincereity.

From very early in his life, Lodge was acutely aware of the distinction of his family. In his memoir of his youth, Lodge recounted at great length the connection with the Cabots. He was mindful from the beginning of the need to live up to a certain heritage.[2] His father's fortune made in shipping permitted the family to live at first in Winthrop Place near the homes of socially

prominent Bostonians on Summer Street which later became a commercial section of the city. A nostalgic Lodge remembered in later years that "the atmosphere of our old stone house with its lane, its pear-trees, and its garden nymph, indeed of Boston itself, was still an eighteenth-century atmosphere, if we accept Sir Walter Besant's statement that the eighteenth century ended in 1837."[3] The final focus of Lodge's boyhood was No. 31 Beacon Street to which the family moved in 1858.[4]

Throughout much of his life, Lodge admired and emulated a number of "heroes." The first and perhaps the most important of these was his father, John Ellerton Lodge the son of Giles Lodge, the founder of the family in America. His father died in his twelfth year, 1862. The loss of this "Olympian," as he referred to many of the adults of his youth, Lodge felt deeply. Death produced more separations for him than many Americans of the nineteenth century. First he lost his father and then later his close college friend, Harry Simpson in 1872. His mother died at the turn of the century. Then his son George Cabot and finally his wife "Nannie," Anna Cabot Mills Lodge died. All were taken from Lodge prematurely, so it seemed, with the exception of his mother, Anna Cabot Lodge.[5] If Lodge was spoiled as a child, as some observers thought, one of the reasons must have been that his mother served as both parents from the be-beginning of Lodge's adolescence at the age of twelve.[6]

Another of the "Olympians" whom Lodge admired from a greater distance was Charles Sumner, a friend of his father's and grandfather's.

Sumner visited the Lodge house and seemed a sainted figure to young Henry because of the attack of Preston Brooks of South Carolina. The abolitionist proclivities of Sumner and his father conditioned the young Lodge's attitude toward the South and the Democratic party. Those youthful impressions remained with him to some degree during his entire life. Lodge's attitude toward the South as the section of secession and the Democratic party as the party of betrayal was consistent throughout his political career except for a brief flirtation with reform in 1876.[7] Reinforcing the contacts with Sumner was the experience of finding his family's political views unpopular with his playmates. "I knew well how deeply my father was interested in the success of Lincoln. So I wore a Lincoln badge and was told by some of my play fellows, in accents of deep scorn, that my father was a 'black Republican' and a friend of Charles Sumner, and I suppose that I retorted in kind."[8] These taunts faded only as he became a mature politician, and in 1890 his first major bill centered on one of the aims of Reconstruction, a free ballot for blacks and whites alike in the South.

In keeping with the station into which he was born and the cultural interests of his parents, Lodge was sent off to Mrs. Francis Parkman's school at the age of five. At sixty-three, Lodge recollected that his early educational experiences were not as exciting adventures as were his activities with his schoolmates. He received at least one indelible impression - that the key to "education" was the proper use of one's mind. Lodge later repeated Mrs. Parkman's admonition to

"use your mind" to his grandson.[9]

Certainly far more important than the exhortations of the accomplished Mrs. Parkman in guiding young Lodge's literary interests were his father and mother. The former had a passion for Scott, Shakespeare, Gray and Cervantes. John Ellerton Lodge named one of his vessels in the China trade the Sancho Panza and another the Don Quixote.[10] Anna Cabot Lodge, granddaughter of George Cabot, was a major force in Lodge's life both as an example of refined taste and as spiritual support. They corresponded heavily, and she was attuned to the material and moral needs of her son. Every son owes a debt to his mother, but in Lodge's case it was greater than usual. She aided his ambitions with her purse and more importantly with her sympathy and understanding.[11]

As the son of a prominent Bostonian, Lodge had an acute sense of social place and responsibility. The early death of his father, however, contributed to his difficulties in early adulthood in finding an occupational direction. His Republican political views were intensified because of a natural tendency to identify strongly with his absent father. Physically, he retained the plump face of youth, and curly hair.

Before his admission to Harvard in 1867, Lodge attended two additional private schools, Mr. Thomas Sullivan headed the first and the second was under the direction of a Mr. Dixwell. Final preparation for the Harvard entrance examinations took place in Europe at the hands of his mother's cousin, Constant Davis.[12] Lodge's mother had decided to take the sixteen year old on a tour of

the continent in the grand manner and along the lines of her own earlier tour.[13] This was the first of many "crossings" which occurred intermittently from 1867 on into the twentieth century. As the letters from Constant Davis indicated, there was some serious study toward the end of the tour as the time drew near for the entrance examinations, but much time was spent in "seeing the sights."[14] Davis's letters home indicated a growing affection for Lodge and the feeling was apparently reciprocated. Ill with tuberculosis, Davis had taken the job of preparing Lodge for the examinations in order to journey abroad and improve his health. The trip did not achieve this result and he succumbed in the same year while in South America serving as his father's secretary. Lodge and his wife remembered the engaging young Constant when they named their first born, Constance.[15]

Perhaps Davis' comments about Lodge's intelligence and ability were colored because of the family connection, but young Lodge gained entrance to Harvard without conditions as a member of the class of 1871. In spite of the distinguished reputation of the institution, only two events in his four years as an undergraduate made a deep impression on Lodge. The first of these was meeting and falling in love with Anna Cabot Mills Davis, the sister of his former tutor at the end of his sophomore year. Lodge met his future wife in July, 1869 and was attracted to her immediately. Perhaps it was the fabled violet eyes, the subject of controversy as to their exact color but never about their fascinating quality. The two were engaged before the end of the summer. The second and less exciting event of Lodge's undergraduate

years was encountering Henry Adams as an instructor in history. As Lodge himself remarked years later, "in all my four years I never really studied anything resembling active thought until when in my senior year I stumbled into the course in Mediaeval history given by Henry Adams, who had just come to Harvard."[16] The friendship which began in the classes at Harvard extended throughout the remaining years of Adams's life. Adams's impact on a whole generation of historians and students of history at Harvard became legendary.[17]

On the less serious side, Lodge participated in the dramatic efforts of the Hasty Pudding Club with some success. He was elected to the Porcellian and enjoyed club activities. One of the more revealing episodes of a lighter nature was the "Mock Parts" affair of the Class of 1871 which occurred in October, 1869. The purpose of this traditional satire was some witty and light-hearted fun. Cutting jibes were leveled at the clumsy and dull-witted members of the class; the script had been composed earlier through the efforts of many members of the class. To his discomfort, Lodge's delivery was so biting and convincing that he gained entire credit for the performance. Doubtless for some of his contemporaries, this presentation was in complete character with what his opponents viewed later as a capacity for savage sarcasm. In 1869, sarcasm was a weapon he did not then realize he possessed.[18]

In June of 1871, almost immediately after his graduation, Lodge married Anna Cabot Mills Davis who remained, until her death in 1915, a genuine ornament of his life.[19] Soon afterward, the young couple

left for Europe and spent many happy months abroad seeing the sights, taking Italian lessons, and generally absorbing the culture of the continent. As usual, he wrote his mother regularly at considerable length and in detail about their travels.[20]

As a good Protestant tourist, he manifested an attitude of anti-Catholicism. Speaking of the preservation of Ste. Chapelle from fire, he said, "of course all the good Catholics here ascribe its preservation to the care of St. Louis its founder and it is a far better miracle than most in the Catholic Church."[21] For whatever reason - the dominance of the religion in France, the narrowness of the clergy, the contemporary political wars between the clerical and anti-clerical factions - the attitude surfaced again in several letters from Rome in December in one of which he remarked that "everything that tends to pull down Romanism is a good deed."[22] These views did not run deep or last. A repetition of this anti-Catholic sentiment never occurred again in Lodge's correspondence. He later praised the work of his colleague in the Senate, George Frisbie Hoar, for condemning the American Protective Association, a nativist organization devoted to political and economic attacks on Catholics.[23]

Just before leaving Paris for Rome in December, Lodge received a "chatty" letter from his college chum, Harry Simpson, giving all the gossip about their mutual friends. Simpson's letter presented the classic image of the young upper class American "doing the continent." Only four months later, Lodge wrote his mother of Harry's death from typhus. While the death of his friend did not shatter his trip abroad, it did cast a shadow over it.[24] In the fall of 1872, Lodge, his wife,

and their first born returned to Boston. Lodge renewed his friendship with Henry Adams and continued his moratorium on a decision about a career. While enrolled in an advanced seminar with Adams on mediaeval history, they began an editorial collaboration on the North American Review.[25]

As the new year began in 1875, Lodge took more interest in the activities of those Repulbicans disaffected from the administration. Because of his association with Henry Adams and others of the family, Lodge began actively, if discreetly, to promote Charles Francis Adams as a candidate in the coming presidential contest of 1876. His initial reform efforts were not marked with the enthusiasm he manifested later for political life, but he brought youthful zeal, idealism and energy to the cause of the Liberal Republicans.[26]

The Liberals looked upon the confusion and disorder of the Administration's southern policy and decided that the only remedy was to hold a convention in Cincinnati in 1872, and if possible nominate a candidate of their own to oppose Ulysses S. Grant. Many of the Liberals had been supporters of the president initially because he seemed to represent the qualities of order and discipline they prized. In 1872, and again four years later in 1876, they sought a candidate who would represent them and their values. After the Civil War, liberal reform was regarded as the private preserve of the "best men," men of social standing and cultivation.[27]

The young follower of Henry Adams, in 1874-1876, was unquestionably one of the "best men." He represented the ideals of education,

refined intelligence, independence and honesty so highly regarded among members of the Liberal movement. As early as September, 1874, Lodge confided to his diary his distaste for Grant's handling of troubles in Louisiana. "The President is a blockhead & as long as he governs we shall have these troubles."[28] The theme of congressional ineptitude and bungling arose again in 1876 at the Fifth Avenue Conference, another effort at candidate making, when William Graham Sumner argued that Congress' interference had complicated and worsened the situation.[29]

Lodge's interest in politics quickened as he was elected a delegate to the state Republican Convention. He noted in his diary the need for young men of intelligence and social standing to participate in politics. In short, there was a need for men like himself. Reassurance that men of his standing were needed came from other genteel reformers who reinforced his disposition to support Charles Francis Adams in the upcoming presidential contest. One wrote suggesting that the mistakes of the Massachusetts delegation to Cincinnati ought to be avoided and urging Lodge to stand fast for reform principles. "I cannot forget that it was the mean timidity of just such republicans [sic] as seem to be in the majority in your club [Commonwealth], - men who care more for the safety of their country - which left Massachusetts so poorly represented at Cincinnati in 1872 and lost the golden opportunity of nominating Mr. Adams."

Lodge was rising rapidly in the councils of the Liberals for several reaons. Firstly, his personal wealth gave him the lesisure to

devote considerable time to organizing activities. Secondly, his literary and organizational skills were badly needed. Finally, his cultivated and independent background was eminently appropriate for his role as personal emissary for Carl Schurz.[30]

In early March, Lodge went to Washington. His social contacts made the visit an altogether pleasant affair and he was favorably impressed as a result of conversations with the leading figures of the Republican party. But the stirrings of interest in politics were still those of the dilettante. Politics was still seen as an avocation rather than a vocation; the moratorium on his life's work continued.[31] The round of discussions with reform-minded politicians in Washington brought Lodge more familiarity with the leaders of the movement. By the end of the month, his partnership in reform politics with Carl Schurz had begun.

After a distinguished career in politics first as a young revolutionary in the Liberal Revolution of 1848 in Germany and later as an adviser to Lincoln during the Civil War, Schurz was trying to organize a movement to oppose the corruption of the Grant administration.[32] He began developing a network of correspondents among whom was Lodge. It was Schurz's aim to use these geographically dispersed reformers to drum up reform sentiment and provide representatives for a gathering in New York in 1876. Such a collection of reform worthies would not only highlight the cause but also make possible an independent candidacy if necessary.[33] For Schurz reform politics was a serious business, but some of his colleagues saw it as a way of

counteracting the hothouse nature of Harvard, Boston and a narrow intellectual set. Henry Adams observed that, "I care little whether we succeed or not in getting into power, but I care a great deal to prevent myself from becoming what of all things I despise, a Boston prig (the intellectual prig is the most vicious of all) and so I yearn, at every instant, to get out of Massachusetts and come into contact with the wider life I always have found so much more to my taste."[34] Thus, the collaboration of Schurz, Adams and Lodge began with a divergence of goals. While Adams saw reform as a corrective for the artificiality of Boston and an opportunity for his political generation, his comrade Schurz was more serious about the ultimate benefits of reform for himself. For Adams and Lodge, the decision of Schurz to support Hayes in 1876 came as a shock, the shock of those unfamiliar with practical politics.[35]

As the fall, 1875, advanced, the young reformer became more and more active in the organization of Liberal efforts. Lodge traveled to Trenton, Niagara and New York City seeking support and establishing contacts for the effort to counter the corruption of the administration at Washington. After a meeting with Schurz in New York, Lodge returned to Boston with renewed enthusiasm to work through the Commonwealth Club for the success of reform locally. Schurz came to Boston in November to deliver an address entitled, "Centennial Thoughts." The address, as Schurz conceived of it, was to be the opening shot of the liberal campaign for reform in 1876. Lodge regarded the speech admiringly as "certainly a very good address pointing clearly at

Mr. Adams without naming him."[36] At this stage of the movement, Schurz and his associates were confident. Lodge was given the task of setting in motion the Adams movement in Boston. Before the end of the month, he had established a committee to provide organizational direction for the Liberals in Boston.[37] One of his real strengths as a politician emerged in this first significant involvement: administrative energy and organizational acumen. In conversation with Schurz, he urged the unofficial leader of the movement to establish a manager of the movement in New York.[38]

Although the reformers of western Massachusetts supported the Adams candidacy, W. F. Bartlett and Samuel Bowles were less optimistic than Schurz. "I confess in your ear, that I do not consider it as easy a matter to nominate and elect Mr. Adams now as it was in '72," wrote Bartlett from Pittsfield. Bowles supported the cause with enthusiasm but found Schurz's reluctance to make public his differences with the Administration an indication that "Schurz still believes in faith and fate without works."[39] Increasingly, Lodge's own role in the movement was that of corresponding secretary and organizing agent. He continued his efforts to obtain newspaper support and contacted possible supporters in southern New England. The plan was to send an Adams delegation from Massachusetts to the Republican National Convention. If Adams was unsuccessful, his support might go to another reform-minded Republican, Benjamin H. Bristow of Kentucky, Grant's Secretary of the Treasury, thus thwarting James G. Blaine. Bowles regarded Blaine as an unacceptable standard bearer.[40]

As the year ended, Lodge was immersed in reform politics, mediating between reformers who wanted to have a demonstration in Charles Francis Adams' behalf at the upcoming Fifth Avenue Conference, and those who preferred a committee for Adams in the Massachusetts delegation to the Republican Convention at Cincinnati. Schurz favored the latter approach. At this point, the young reformer was much under the influence of Schurz and also supported that strategy. In a tone suggesting the relationship between the two men, Lodge wrote Schurz saying, "I feel guilty of great lack of modesty in the request I am about to make which is; are you willing that I should come to your convention? [Fifth Avenue Conference]"[41] Schurz replied early in January, 1876 that Lodge was to be invited adding, "you have to represent 'Young New England' there."[42]

Schurz's optimism about the reformers' prospects increased throughout January. He wrote Lodge at length about the outlook in the various states. Reform appeared bright in the West, with hope in New Jersey and some support in Pennsylvania. Schurz insisted that the choice of Cincinnati as the site of the Republican Convention was in the interest of the liberal cause. "There is no place in the Union where we are so strong and where we organize so powerful a pressure," he enthused.[43] By early February, the bright outlook of January had faded. It was obvious that Charles Francis Adams should not be nominated and that meant a turn to Bristow. Lodge was charged with contacting J. H. Wilson, a Bristow intimate, who was in New York at the time. In casting about for a nominee, the Liberals sought someone who would take

the candidacy seriously and carry it through to the end. Lodge assured Wilson that Bristow could not win the Republican nomination. Fearing that Bristow might exploit liberal support for his own political gain. Schurz insisted that a sine qua non of liberal support was an agreement to stand by the Liberals.[44]

As the reformers turned more and more to Bristow as a candidate, the discussions between Lodge, Schurz, Wilson and Bristow accelerated. After the conferences in New York of early February the scene shifted to Washington with Lodge as the emissary of the Schurz reformers. Armed with letters of introduction from Schurz and General James H. Wilson, brother of Solicitor of the Treasury Bluford Wilson, Lodge left for the capital with the feeling that the Liberals had found their man. On the morning of the fourteenth, Lodge walked to the Treasury and after a conversation with Wilson, had a short interview with Bristow. The Secretary of the Treasury was extremely depressed at what he regarded as lack of support for his investigations into the Whiskey Ring, a major St. Louis scandal. In fact, Lodge found him on the verge of resignation which Bristow believed Schurz wanted. Lodge quickly disabused Bristow of any such notion and made clear that Schurz did not believe Bristow should be forced out of the Cabinet except on "the squarest terms." While the mental condition of the Secretary appeared serious, and Bristow had been physically ill on account of his anguish, he seemed ready to join with the reformers.[45]

As the negotiations with Bristow proceeded, Lodge received words of advice from his old mentor, Henry Adams. He warned Lodge to

"keep your eyes about you and do your best to secure them ultimately to us instead of securing us ultimately to them."[46] Adams suggested that Lodge test the sincerity of the Bristow faction by gaining their pledge to support the Liberals if they were beaten in the Republican Convention. Adams believed that Bristow's friends sought liberal aid for the nomination, but would not enter into a mutual commitment. "Bristow is a Kentucky republican [sic] and has all the old traditions of party fealty," insisted Adams.[47]

As Lodge's mission lengthened, he was drawn further into the confidence of Bristow and his supporters. Lodge was shown official communications revealing the obstacles Bristow faced in cleaning up the corruption in the Department. Lodge confided to Schurz that while the liberal prospect had not dimmed, the picture of official rottenness grew bleaker. Bristow was torn on the issue of whether to resign and sought the advice of Lodge and the Schurz group of reformers. Worried that the oppisition of the Attorney General would continue to thwart his efforts, Bristow feared the destruction of his political future.[48] While Lodge listened sympathetically to Bristow's description of his plight, Adams was urging Lodge to test Bristow's intentions and his understanding that the party system was responsible for the grave situation.[49] After consultation with Schurz, Lodge informed Bristow that the Liberals did not seek Bristow's resignation. Whether Bristow was removed or replaced, it would embarrass the administration and help the liberal cause.[50]

As the end of the negotiations neared, Bristow took the young

reformer into his confidence. He thought he had alienated many of the professionals in the Republican party and feared more than anything "the freezing out process in the future which he could not stand."[51] The ostracism and reprisals Bristow feared were heaped on Lodge's head after Lodge chose to support Blaine in 1884. Lodge could not then have understood the hurt Bristow felt and which he himself later was to know so well.

Lodge departed Washington at the end of the month without any firm commitment from Bristow and his supporters. But he sensed their sympathy for the cause of reform and their desire to continue to advance the candidacy of their man.[52] Just before Lodge's return to New York and Boston, Henry Adams wrote urging the convening of some sort of liberal conference. Adams contended that such a meeting ought to include a galaxy of outstanding names but should not be used to put forward an independent nomination, which he felt would be a desperate act. More and more the reformers were acutely aware of their weakness and wondered about the attitude of "the people."[53]

On his arrival in New York on the first of March, Lodge began a round of dinners and interviews with Schurz and other reformers. Increasingly, the pusillanimity of the Republican leadership fatigued and frustrated Lodge. Schurz had evolved the idea of an open letter to himself to which he could reply with an avowal of Bristow's candidacy. The response of the New York Republican establishment brought Lodge to vent his anger in his diary: "usual cowardice and idiocy of what are called respectable leaders in Rep. party. I choked with disgust & went

away. They refused to sign."[54] As a young idealist in politics, Lodge had none of the caution of the seasoned veteran. What Lodge took for cowardice was the reserve of men who feared an abrupt termination to long careers in politics. As discussion about strategy continued, Lodge wrote Schurz suggesting that he saw only two possibilities, to nominate Bristow by address or to wait until after the regular party conventions and nominate Charles Francis Adams. Clearly, in spite of Henry Adams' suggestion of a conference of reformers in New York, the decision had not been made as late as the second week of March. Contact with Bristow's supporters continued, but in spite of J. H. Wilson's enthusiastic report on conditions in the West the weakness of the Liberals appeared ever clearer.[55] A free conference appeared the only lever available to move the regular parties in the direction of reform.

Footnotes

1. Henry Cabot Lodge, Early Memories (New York: Charles Scribner's & Sons, 1913), p. 50.

2. Ibid., pp. 7-13.

3. Ibid., pp. 14-18.

4. John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p.6.

5. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, April 12, 1872, Lodge Papers, MHS; Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 14 & 4; Lodge, Early Memories, p. 39.

6. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 14.

7. Lodge, Early Memories, pp. 45, 46, 49-51.

8. Ibid., p. 113.

9. Lodge, Early Memories, p. 21; Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge p. 9.

10. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 4; Lodge, Early Memories, pp. 27 ff.

11. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, September 5, 1871, Lodge Papers, MHS; Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 5.

12. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 91

13. Ibid., pp. 15-20.

14. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 18; Harold Dean Cater, Henry Adams and His Friends (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1947), p. ciii; Constant Davis to his father, September 12, 1866, Lodge Papers, MHS; Constant Davis to his mother, March, 1867, April 20, Lodge Papers, MHS.

15. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 16, 30, 35.

16. Lodge, Early Memories, p. 186; Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 21, 30.

17. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 28-29.

18. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 24-25; Lodge, Early Memories, pp. 182-183.

19. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 24, 1872, Lodge Papers, MHS; Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 31, 319.

20. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 17, 1871, Lodge Papers, MHS.

21. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, October 1, 1871, Lodge Papers, MHS; Italics in original.

22. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 3, 10, 1871, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Charles Henry Davis, March 24, 1872, Lodge Papers, MHS.

23. Richard E. Welch, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 188-195; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, August 15, 1895?, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, July 20, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; The current authority on the A.P.A. is Donald L. Kinzer, An Episode in Anti-Catholicism: The American Protective Association (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964). The work of John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New York: Atheneum, 1965), is also useful on the aims and methods of the A.P.A.

24. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, April 12, 1872, Lodge Papers, MHS.

25. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 37.

26. Lodge to Carl Schurz, January 8, 1875, Schurz Papers, LC; Bowles to Henry L. Dawes, May 21, 1872, Dawes Papers, LC.

27. John G. Sproat, "The Best Men," Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 7, 72, 78-84, 91-93; Richard A. Gerber, "Liberal Republicanism, Reconstruction, and Social Order: Samuel Bowles as a Test Case," New England Quarterly XLV (September, 1972), p. 394. Gerber's study is useful in explaining Bowles' general social philosophy particularly in relationship to the Liberal movement of 1872, but has nothing on the Lodge-Bowles relationship in 1875-1876.

28. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, September 15, 1874, Lodge Papers, MHS.

29. New York Times, May 17, 1876, p. 1.

30. W. F. Bartlett to H.C. Lodge, January 27, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS; A.M. Howe to H.C. Lodge, January 10, 13, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, September 23, 1874, Lodge Papers, MHS.

31. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, March 2, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS.

32. Claude M. Fuess, Carl Schurz (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1932) Vol. I, p. 219.

33. C. Schurz to Mr. Larkin?, March 25, 1875, Schurz Papers, LC.

34. H. Adams to H.C. Lodge, May 26, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS.

35. H. Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr., November 21, 1862, Adams Papers, MHS.

36. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, October 19, November 12, 18, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS.

37. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, November 18, 19, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS.

38. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, November 26, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS.

39. S. Bowles to H.C. Lodge, December 13, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS; W. F. Bartlett to H.C. Lodge, December 13, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS; Italics in original.

40. S. Bowles to H.C. Lodge, December 21, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, December 10, 18, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS.

41. C. Schurz to H.C. Lodge, December 25, 1875, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Carl Schurz, December 28, 1875, Schurz Papers, LC.

42. C. Schurz to H.C. Lodge, January 7, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

43. C. Schurz to H.C. Lodge, January 16, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

44. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, February 5, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

45. Lodge to Carl Schurz, February 10, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, February 11, 14, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

46. Adams to H.C. Lodge, February 15, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

47. Adams to H.C. Lodge, February 15, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

48. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, February 16, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Carl Schurz, February 16, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC.

49. Adams to H.C. Lodge, February 17, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

50. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, February 17, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS; White to Carl Schurz, February 17, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC; Adams to H. C. Lodge, February 20, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

51. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, February 22, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

52. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, February 25, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

53. Adams to H.C. Lodge, February 27, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

54. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, March 1, 4, 5, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

55. Lodge to Carl Schurz, March 8, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC; Wilson to H.C. Lodge, March 9, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

CHAPTER III

THE FIFTH AVENUE CONFERENCE AND POLITICS AS AN AVOCATION, 1876-1882

On March 22 the reformers moved to embrace the idea of a free conference. Lodge breakfasted with Schurz on the twenty-sixth and found him stricken as a result of his wife's death, but determined to call a conference. The two men discussed a list of names of leading reform-minded individuals of stature to invite to such a conference. William Cullen Bryant and President Theodore Dwight Woolsey of Yale headed the list initially. After a round of discussions with Parke Godwin and other reformers, the decision was made to go ahead with a conference.[1]

Meanwhile Lodge's associate in reform, Samuel Bowles cautioned H. L. Dawes that a failure to undertake reform in the Republican party would mean a "democratic president next fall,..."[2] Bowles urged a revolution within the party to eliminate the corruption of the administration or at least a change that "they [voters] can see and feel," warning "if the republican [sic] party doesn't give it to them, they'll take it from the other fellows."[3] Bowles encouraged Lodge to launch a movement for a reform conference. As Schurz and Lodge set in motion the machinery for the Fifth Avenue Conference, Bowles wrote that the only "difficulty will ... be in the starting."[4]

Upon his return to Boston in April, Lodge turned to fashioning

the organizational network necessary for a good representation of New England at the projected conference. Lodge sought advice from Alexander H. Bullock of Worcester about names of reform sympathizers in western Massachusetts. Lodge felt the counterthrusts of Blaine's supporters. He wrote Schurz that the battle in Massachusetts for a reform delegation to the Republican National Convention was losing ground. The downcast young reformer closed with the hope that "the Free Conference has not miscarried. On that I pin all my hopes of beating Blaine."[5]

With the arrival of the invitations he had anxiously awaited, Lodge increased his efforts. He contacted E. B. Haskell of the Boston Herald and arranged for the publication of the circular invitation. Henry Stockton helped him send off the invitations and he acted the role of midwife for those striving to organize a Bristow club. The alarm of early April gave way to a sense of purposeful activity by the middle of the month. Lodge's efforts within the Commonwealth Club were beginning to produce results for Bristow's candidacy and the reform cause generally. With satisfaction, he told Schurz that newspaper help had been obtained. The Herald and the Transcript supported the Liberals and the Fifth Avenue Conference. Forty invitations had gone out to Massachusetts, Vermont and Maine.[6] Lodge had fulfilled the role of corresponding secretary, emissary and organizational impressario with aplomb. Schurz had played the role of "front man" and Lodge had done the logistical support. The experience was invaluable and the "behind-the-scenes" activity suited Lodge in every respect, since he lacked both experience and political contacts.

As the time neared for the meeting in New York, Lodge worried about the arrangments for the press, tickets, and hall. Fearing Schurz's insensitivity to detail, Lodge urged that Parke Godwin oversee such matters. Both Lodge and his friend Bowles exhibited all the symptoms of amateur thespians about to debut. Bowles confirmed that "Schurz needs constant help in organizing the details."[7] Clearly, both men feared a collapse at the last minute and the discomfiture of the entire movement. That was not the sort of image the "best men" believed consistent with their dignified view of themselves.

Fortifying the reformers' enthusiasm was a victory of sorts at the end of April in the Massachusetts Republican Convention. The Blaine forces suffered a setback which assured a delegation to the Republican National Convention in Cincinnati with a reform outlook. Lodge assured Schurz that Richard Henry Dana, A. S. Chadbourne and J. M. Forbes were for Bristow and that others had indicated their support. Bristow might not win the nomination, but Lodge believed that "the one really valuable result of our convention the other day is that it has ruined Blaine."[8]

On May 12, Lodge journeyed to New York to help Schurz straighten out the arrangments for the conference of the fifteenth. In spite of the fears of Lodge and Bowles, the meeting opened as scheduled and even though the press harassed him, Lodge felt that "the first day's proceedings went off well."[9] The Conference resumed on the sixteenth and received favorable coverage in the New York Times which noted that "Mr. Carl Schurz is the active spirit in the conference at the Fifth

Avenue Hotel."[10] The highlight of the meeting was Schurz's statement of liberal faith. On the seventeenth, the Conference adjourned at one in the afternoon. Lodge considered the meeting a success.[11]

While the reformers congratulated one another on the meeting, little except a statement of political faith had been achieved. Nearer the truth in its assessment of the Conference was an unattributed statement appearing in the New York Commercial Advertiser, an Administration organ. The piece scored the participants as political neophytes with the exception of Schurz and Godwin who were charged with "assum[ing] a virtue they have not."[12]

With self-satisfaction in their example for both political parties at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, the reformers returned to political activities more congenial to their tastes. They watched the principal parties and fortified their own sense of rectitude in letters to one another. As the Republican Convention approached in June, Lodge and his reform associates focused on James G. Blaine's chances for the nomination. The revelations about the "Mulligan" letters and the shadow they cast over Blaine's chances produced joy in the reformer's camp. But Henry Adams, hoping for the ruin of both parties, thought that had the revelations followed Blaine's nomination, reform would have won. Ever the spoiler, Adams wanted the two regular parties exposed as hopelessly corrupt and undeserving of rehabilitation. As things stood, however, "we may still be pestered with Washburn or Hayes."[13]

In the wake of Hayes' nomination at Cincinnati, Adams's first

ruminations to Lodge indicated a greater willingness to accept Hayes as a reform-minded candidate. By the end of June, however, Adams had resolved to "shut my mouth on politics." The oracle of Quincy was convinced "that the machine can't be smashed this time. As I feared, we have ourselves saved it by a foolish attempt to run it, which we never shall succeed in," he went on "the caucus and the machine will outlive me, and that being the case I prefer to leave this greatest of American problems to shrewder heads than mine. When the day comes on which it will be considered as disgraceful to be seen in a caucus as to be seen in a gambling house or brothel, then my interest will wake up again and legitimate politics will get a new birth."[14] Adams's determination to eschew active involvement in politics was lifelong and issued from the sense of the intellectual at war with a system that repudiated his ironic fatalism. His younger correspondent who was under his sway at the time later found an identity and purpose in the life of a professional politician which seemed so repugnant in 1876. Unlike Adams, Lodge learned to admire the craft and skill of professional politicians. Lodge's sense of social obligation also found an outlet in the active arena of politics. Finally, he found an opportunity to unite the worlds of the scholar and the man of action.

With July and the Democratic National Convention, the Liberals began discussing whom they should vote for in the November elections. Henry Adams resolved to vote for Tilden because of the latter's efforts in the Erie War, a struggle for control of the Erie Railroad with both sides resorting to bribery of legislators. Lodge wrote Schurz that

like Charles Francis Adams, Jr., he was "on the fence." Schurz indicated that he was gravitating to the Hayes camp. From the beginning of the collaboration between Lodge, the Boston reformers, and Schurz, the relationship had been that of brilliant but callow amateurs and a reform-minded professional. Schurz detected in Hayes not only a man of reform tendencies but also a winner, a man of honesty who might redeem the reputation of the Republican party. Hayes was precisely the sort of compromise candidate who persuaded the reformers they had prevailed in the Convention but did not alienate the regulars. All factions thought they had won.[15]

As Schurz embraced Hayes's candidacy, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., vacillated but disagreed with Schurz's course. Adams believed that in spite of Hayes's good intentions the group which controlled the Republican party would "resolve to be good and live corruptly," adding that "the Republican party will ... in opposition ... do more to hasten results than it has done or is likely to do in power."[16] Adams cherished no illusions about Tilden, but thought he ought to vote for him to rebuke the Republican party.

With that historic familial percipience, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., foresaw what neither Hayes nor Schurz nor other reformers saw. "I do not doubt that Gen. Hayes is a worthy gentleman, but he will have his choice between going under himself, or knuckling under to the 'Senatorial group' - that party, or its leaders now at Washington - haven't the faintest intention of doing anything about the currency, or the civil service or the tariff - and Gen. Hayes can't make them."[17]

After four painful years, Hayes would have agreed. The battle over the New York Customshouse was eloquent testimony to the intransigence of the Stalwarts.[18] In late July, Lodge told his mother that he would vote for Hayes "but I am nobody's partisan & I am quite prepared to cordially support Tilden if he comes in & reforms in earnest."[19] More importantly, Lodge continued to view the political scene as an interested observer.[20]

While the reformers watched the two parties prepare for the campaign, the professionals such as Schurz and Whitelaw Reid were assessing the situation. By late July, the two had cast their lot with Hayes.[21] Reid was particularly concerned that the reformers of the Fifth Avenue Conference be gathered into the Hayes fold. In particular, he thought that Schurz, as the leader of the movement, should reply to Parke Godwin whose statements lent encouragement to the Tilden forces.[22]

In early August, Tilden presented his views. Completely consistent with the pattern of the intellectual in politics, Adams outlined to Lodge the pros and cons of Tilden's candidacy versus Hayes'. Adams pointed out that while Tilden offered the best hope of currency reform, Hayes's election would prevent the wholesale removal of federal officeholders, which Tilden had promised, with all of the attendant problems. With the mood of the intellectual spurned which became Adams' trademark, he concluded that "my real object is of course to increase the independent power, and to that object all others are in my mind subordinate. Whether the election of Tilden or Hayes will do most towards this, is a point which depends on many accidents and is incapable of

solution. Others may rush into the fray. I shall read history."[23]

Lodge wrote Schurz in terms of certainty about his own vote for Hayes but in fact his mind was undecided. Looking over the political battlefield, Lodge was not sanguine: "when I see Blaine speaking with applause in Maine, Morton in Indiana & Chandler at the head of the [Republican National] Committee I sicken at the possibilities of a Republican victory. Yet we have done much in the past four years. How infinitely better is this than Grant & Greeley. If we do as well in the next four we shall be well on the road which leads to thorough reform."[24]

With characteristic acerbity and lack of patience for human weakness, Adams condemned Schurz's course. He thought Schurz had sold his virtue for a mere cabinet office. As men of independent means, Adams and his young follower were able to afford a more moralistic view than Schurz.[25] Adams completely broke off relations with Schurz, but Lodge continued to write Schurz about the political situation in Massachusetts. Their relationship had changed, however, and after 1884 was completely severed. In 1876, Lodge shared Adams's contempt for Schurz's course. Increasingly, Lodge's attention focused on the state scene.[26]

With the approach of the election in November, the campaign intensified, with fraud, vote buying and intimidation on both sides. The result was a contested election with neither candidate receiving a clear majority. Lodge apparently voted for Tilden in spite of the frequent assurances he gave Schurz that he would vote for Hayes. Like

J. H. Wilson, Lodge was unsure what ought to be done in the face of the election frauds in North and South alike. Wilson's answer was that the candidates ought to recommend to the electoral college a compromise candidate like Benjamin F. Bristow, "whose election would give satisfaction."[27] Lodge thought Tilden "entitled to the Presidency & if he is excluded it will be the greatest outrage & one of the most dangerous things that has ever happened in this country."[28] Lodge was most concerned about obtaining a "clean title" for whoever became President. After defending his vote for Tilden, Lodge issued a warning on the prospect of Hayes' election. "If Hayes comes in there will be in a few years no Republican party left," adding that "I can't say I should regret it as opening the way to better things."[29]

As the negotiations in Congress ground on slowly, Lodge reluctantly accepted the concept of Congressional compromise. Hayes continued to write Schurz of his plans for his cabinet and finally offered him the post of Secretary of the Interior. Schurz preferred the place of Secretary of State or Secretary of the Treasury, but decided to accept the place proferred reasoning that he could better aid the liberal cuase inside the administration.[30] The end of the electoral crisis on March 2 cleared the way for the creation of Hayes's cabinet officially. As the news of Schurz's appointment became public, Lodge took the occasion to write his associate in reform politics congratulating him and urging him to overcome his earlier expressed "distaste for ... a department & lend your service again to the country."[31] While Lodge expressed in the stylized manner of the mid-nineteenth

century the pleasantries of the moment, his real feelings more closely approached the sense of betrayal he had earlier expressed in his letters to the Adamses, Henry and Charles Francis, Jr., on the occasion of Schurz's support of Hayes prior to the election. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., himself wrote Schurz a congratulatory note, but it fairly exuded the proverbial Adams pessimism.[32]

In the coming months and years, Carl Schurz settled into the business of handling the public lands, dealing with the Indian tribes and administering the patent department. Lodge in the next few years devoted the bulk of his time to his scholarly career, teaching history at Harvard and editing the International Review. The political interest generated in his work for the Liberals in 1876 remained and grew until his own active involvement in 1879 in state politics leading to his complete immersion after 1887.[33]

In the interim between the Fifth Avenue Converence and his election to the Massachusetts General Court, Lodge maintained contact with the Liberals in Washington and the reform faction in Massachusetts. From his position in the world of letters, Lodge watched, as did many of his fellow reformers, the struggle for office and political position with an attitude of interested detachment. He maintained contact with Schurz and urged the newly-minted Secretary of the Interior to visit him when in Boston in June.[34] The invitation was insincere, however, and designed to put Schurz at a disadvantage. He was not the rather apologetic young neophyte in politics of pre-Fifth Avenue days, but a man who felt betrayed and now wished to put

his teacher in an awkward and uncomfortable position.

Considering the difficulties of Hayes's administration in New York with the Cornell-Arthur faction and its implication for civil service reform, an issue near the hearts of the Liberals, it was inevitable that Lodge declare himself on the feud between William A. Simmons and Alanson W. Beard for the Collectorship of the Port of Boston. Lodge supported civil service reform as a way of eliminating incompetence in the public service and purification of the political process. "We are somewhat adrift as to what civil service reform means in the President's mind & the reform element is sadly dispirited," Lodge wrote Schurz. "The indignation at the appointment of Filley [Boston Post Office] particularly strong among your friends has by no means subsided. We have but small hopes in the present state of affairs that Simmons will lose his office though he is one of the most dangerous of workers & all the more so from his executive capacity & his nauseous religious cant & hypocrisy about reform."[35]

With the Collectorship settled, Lodge devoted himself more vigorously to his scholarly and literary pursuits. In the middle of the summer, however, he did find time to answer a letter from his old friend, Roger Wolcott who had joined Moorfield Storey and others of a liberal persuasion within the Republican party. Wolcott had written asking for financial aid to which Lodge replied, "though my principles are not acceptable to the young reformers ... I enclose you a small sum for the propagation of good doctrine."[37] His stand on the question of the Collectorship, his views in general of civil service reform, and

somewhat later his attitude on a third term move for Grant, all marked him as an independent. Without being solicited on the matter, Lodge set forth his political views to Wolcott. They had a peculiar ring in 1884 and afterward when he was playing the role of party regular.

> Broadsides are all very well but as long as you tie yourself to the apron string of one party you will never effect anything at such a juncture as the present. If you are not prepared to run an independent candidate or support a democrat when the Republicans put up a bad man you will never in my opinion reach any practical result. You proclaim your intention of sticking by the party at all events & as long as you do that the party managers, & they are quite right, laugh at you & use you & do not care a rap what you say or desire. I have no faith in reform inside the church. It is true to get anything done in politics you must work through the medium of the great parties but you must be prepared to use one against the other & then you may do some thing & make them bid up instead of down. No other way can the young reformers be aught but a laughing stock.[38]

Much of Lodge's attitude at this point was doubtless a result of his experiences with the Fifth Avenue Conference, and the vacillation of the Hayes administration.

In the fall of 1878, his associate from Fifth Avenue days, James H. Wilson, wrote asking the attitude of New England about the third term movement for Grant. Wilson opined in a distressed fashion that "the failure of Hayes' administration has made the Machine all powerful again - and it is for the man on horseback and the great question of the near future is what are we going to do about it?"[39] In a state of bewilderment, Wilson closed his letter with the plaintive words, "who is <u>our man</u>. What can we do?"[40]

The autumn elections diverted Lodge's attention from the question of a third term for Grant to the local contests in Massachusetts. With Ben Butler running for Governor, there was an acute sense of emergency among the "best men." While not yet established in local politics, Lodge was doing yeoman labor. In the interest of fighting the good fight against Butler and the minions of disorder and political immorality, George Frisbie Hoar attempted to enlist Schurz to speak during the campaign to reach "the Germans whom you can reach better than any other person."[41] The efforts of the "better element" were rewarded in November with a vote of 136,728 for Thomas Talbot, the Republican candidate, to 109,149 for Butler on the Democratic ticket.[42]

At year's end, Lodge renewed his correspondence with J. H. Wilson on the third term movement for Grant. In casting about for a candidate to oppose Grant, Benjamin Harrison of Indiana's name had surfaced, but Wilson wrote that "from the best information I can get he is neither high enough nor strong enough to serve as a successful candidate for the presidency on the Republican ticket, though he has certain elements of availability which are undeniably strong."[43] Lodge answered that it was unfortunate that Harrison was not strong enough to challenge the Grant forces and cautioned against putting up Bristow. The general political mood in Boston was one of "great political lassitude ... since the Butler campaign,"[44] Lodge noted.

Early in January, Lodge sent Wilson a full description of the Grant movement locally remarking that it was well led. The general opinion was that were he to be put up at that time in convention,

"he would be nominated."[45] The strategy of the Liberals was to press Blaine with the hope that the two would kill one another off thus providing an opening for someone more acceptable.[46]

With new responsibilites of editing the International Review, Lodge found little time for political correspondence except to beseech Schurz for some articles on the current political situation. In late September, he paused from his editorial labors long enough to reflect on the current political situation and pen a brief reflective article for the Nation. As in his letter to Wolcott of July the year before, Lodge urged another Fifth Avenue-like conference to be used as a lever to elevate the tone of the candidates put up by the major parties. In view of its original purposes Lodge thought the Fifth Avenue Conference a failure. It had succeeded, however, in forcing a "respectable" candidate on the Republicans. Another conference might prevent a dismal choice between Grant and Tilden.[47]

Deciding to take the plunge into politics himself, Lodge stood for the Massachusetts General Court in November and was successful.[48] His friend Henry Adams quickly congratulated him on his political success and recommended that he court favor with the Speaker to obtain favorable appointments. Lodge chose instead to set himself to the task of learning the political craft. His apprenticeship was undistinguished but productive of some minor results in getting rid of a Civil Damages Law which attempted to make the owners of saloons responsible for their patrons's actions. Perhaps most importantly, Lodge was learning the value of carefully cultivating political contacts and party regularity.[49]

Late in December, the third term question surfaced yet again. Schurz had been in active consultation with George William Curtis of Harper's Weekly. He requested a report on the situation in Massachusetts from Lodge volunteering, on the basis of his contacts with Curtis, that the Grant boom was losing force in the Philadelphia area. Lodge observed that reaction against the third term was growing in Boston, "but I still fear his nomination."[50] In January, Lodge believed that Sherman was the candidate to support.[51]

Once more the reformers were ready to do battle along the lines of 1876 if necessary. This time, however, Lodge had acquired a deeper interest in local politics as a result of his election to the legislature. His growing interest in state politics prompted a letter to Governor John D. Long suggesting the need to reform the state's election laws to avoid the problems which had recently emerged in Maine. Linking his practical and scholarly interests, Lodge had recently completed an unsigned article for the Atlantic Monthly on reform of the suffrage. This concern about electoral and franchise reform became a consistent theme in his later career in his struggle for a free ballot in the South in 1890. There were also intimations of concern about the "purity of the ballot" in Lodge's later championing of immigration restriction.[52]

The third term question, however, claimed the better part of Lodge's interest in early January. Schurz responded to his New Year's letter with promptness. The best strategy, claimed Schurz, was for those who opposed the third term to "make it known, boldly and loudly,

before the elections of delegates to the National Conventions take place...."[53] Although the issue of a third term had arisen earlier, the reformers's concern was heightened as 1880 opened. The little band of enthusiasts who had done so much to produce the Fifth Avenue Conference was again frenetically conferring to determine who ought to be supported and then to bring reform strength to bear.[54]

Lodge, who was participating in the councils of the reformers, consulted with Henry Adams who thought that Sherman might be approached with the specific condition that he not sell out the independents to Grant. If that were not possible, then "I should think about maneuvering for a renomination of Hayes. What we want is to preserve the present status. Obviously we have not strength to improve it. Therefore- Hayes."[55]

By the Ides of March, the independents were ready to pass from epistolary condemnation of the third term to some open and active opposition. Schurz's friend in New York, Horace White, had begun setting up meetings at which prominent liberals would criticize the Grant movement. The Boston reformers were still confused about whom to support. A few favored Sherman but the majority seemed to be gravitating in the direction of George F. Edmunds of Vermont.[56]

While Lodge opposed Grant and Blaine, he had not firmly decided whom to support among the other candidates. As early as mid-March, however, he had determined to stand as a candidate for delegate to the National Convention of the Republican party. His early political mentor in state politics, Joseph T. Wilson, advised him

that there was a strong movement in his favor in Lynn. Lodge had not yet forsaken his reformist impulses, and he continued to take an interest in the movement for a reform convention in St. Louis scheduled for early May. While the National Anti-Third Term Republican Convention grew directly out of the contemporary anti-Grant movement, its personnel, organizational characteristics and objectives were reminiscent of the Fifth Avenue Conference of May, 1876. In particular, the Boston "young reformers" who had earlier founded the Bristow Club were very much involved in the St. Louis movement although they feared that it might be used for Blaine.[57]

While Horace White and other liberals of '72 were deciding to leave the St. Louis Convention to the 'younger men,' Lodge was directing his efforts more and more to state politics. In mid-April, he wrote his mother with pride of his part in the Massachusetts Republican Convention and his work on the Committee on Resolutions. With some dissimulation he said, "although I like the work of legislation very much I hate political conventions & political fights & yet [it is preliminary] to the last and most important part of politics."[58] For a man who professed to dislike political conventions, he would participate in a great number both at the state and national levels.

Just prior to his election as a delegate to the Chicago Convention, Lodge outlined his view of the political situation and his own intention to this mother: "I feel that Grant is going to be nominated but I have decided to make my fight inside the party because I can do more there than by going outside & if I am elected this week

as now seems probable a delegate to the National Convention from the 5th District I shall go fight again at Chicago," he wrote. "If I am beaten as is probable I shall have made my fight again & spent my force & shall quietly retire & leave them to fight the outside battle for which I shall be disqualified."[59] Slowly but irrevocably the "rebel" who had criticized from outside was becoming the loyal party member who thought he was precluded from "bolting" through his own decision to work from within.

Lodge and his friends who supported the St. Louis movement elicited favorable response from many who had participated four years earlier including George William Curtis. But more important, the reformers solicited the aid of Blaine in checking the Grant movement. One of the leaders of the Convention at St. Louis, J. B. Henderson of Iowa, wrote Blaine asking his assistance in getting up delegations to St. Louis from Iowa, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana and other states.[60] In spite of St. Louis, Horace White still wrote Schurz in tones of distress about a Grant nomination at Chicago. The Collector of the Port of Boston, Alanson W. Beard whose nomination had been so hard fought in 1877, counseled Lodge that "backbone and square fight in the Repbulican Convention ... against any gag like unit rule..." would prevent Grant's nomination.[61] With somewhat confused political intelligence about the likely outcome but a firm commitment to oppose Grant and Blaine, Lodge began making plans for his attendance at the Chicago Convention in June.[62] Lodge gave Schurz a view of the attitude of the Massachusetts delegation from the inside. He did not think at that time that Grant would be nominated on the first ballot,

but Grant's strength had increased since the state convention earlier at Worcester. Lodge predicted that, with the exception of George S. Boutwell, the delegation would be solid against the unit rule. Even before the meeting of the Convention, the members of the Massachusetts delegation were determined to control the Convention against the Cameron-Grant faction if possible.

As the delegation began its business at the Convention, Lodge was elected secretary and George Frisbie Hoar chairman. Lodge's selection as secretary was probably less a result of his prestige and standing than as a result of his industry and reputation as a man of letters. In any event, the position provided him with a unique opportunity at his first national convention to observe the political brokering at which he himself became so adept. The convention also contributed to his growing identification with the regular elements of the party. Blaine's forces had more to do with the choice of James A. Garfield of Ohio than did Hoar, but the latter's determination to prevent the control of the convention in the interest of the Stalwarts was influential.[63]

Garfield was not an ideal choice but he seemed better than Grant and so the leaders of the liberal Republicans closed ranks around him. Schurz wrote Lodge not long after the Chicago Convention that he had conferred with the nominee and was satisfied that the charges made against him in the Credit Mobilier scandal would be properly refuted. Schurz commended in general terms the work of the anti-Grant forces at Chicago, but he criticized the failure to counter Conkling's attempt to

force through a resolution to support the choice of the Convention whomever it might be. Lodge responded that he too had been alarmed at the Conkling move, but the members of the Massachusetts delegation did not feel they ought to waste their energies fighting that piece of "buncombe." Lodge was still the good reformer although his sense of obligation to the party was deepening.[64]

Of immediate interest to Lodge was the question of the Congressional race in his district. He had considered for some time seeking the seat and even his cynical friend Henry Adams encouraged him if a seat in Congress came his way to take it, but cautioned "as for 'openings,' they lead as a rule to Hell. Blaine and Ben Butler are the ideal of men who go for openings."[65]

Meanwhile, Lodge was exploring the Congressional possibility through his reform friends, a circle collected from the Fifth Avenue days. The counsel he was receiving in late July was to be patient, a difficult task for the young, ambitious, energetic Lodge. His lifelong friend, John T. Morse wrote approvingly that, "you have done wisely to bide your time instead of pushing in & making enemies for the future, without perhaps winning in the present."[66]

Lodge continued to interest himself in the campaign as he devoted himself to the editorship of the Review. From Henry Adams and other reformers, he heard criticism of the waving of the "bloody shirt." He continued to share the reform sentiments of his friends, but his correspondence with George Frisbie Hoar about the patronage of the Charlestown Navy Yard reflected an increasingly "practical" turn of mind. He recognized that, if he were to be successful not

only in state contests but also in any Congressional race, he would have to use the patronage in his own interest in spite of his commitment to the principle of appointment on the basis of merit.[67]

At the state and Congressional level, the case of George W. Cook of the Charlestown Navy Yard stirred up considerable controversy. As a zealous Republican, Cook had attempted to intimidate some fellow Republicans at a caucus. Because he was a foreman of shipwrights at the Charlestown Yard and his behavior violated the Administration's civil service rules, he was at first demoted from the position of foreman and finally dismissed from employment and "blacklisted." Lodge entered into a lengthy correspondence on the matter with the Attorney-General, Charles Devens and Carl Schurz with the object of procuring a somewhat milder punishment for Cook. Finally, under Garfield's Secretary of the Navy, William H. Hunt, the case was brought to a satisfactory conclusion with Cook's impediment to future employment being removed.[68]

The spring brought little in the way of political activity so the bulk of Lodge's efforts were directed at the editing of the Review and other literary labors. He received an unsolicited article from Woodrow Wilson on the condition of affairs in the South which he rejected, and he sought an article from George Frisbie Hoar on the controversy in the Senate.[69]

As part of his service in state politics, Lodge was given the thankless task of serving as Chairman of the Finance Committee of the State Central Committee of the Republican party. While his reputation

as the scion of a prominent and wealthy Boston family was part of the reason for his selection, his personal energy and administrative ability, first noticed in 1876, were also important. With obvious discomfort, he wrote a "begging" letter to Governor John D. Long entreating him that even though it was an off year, "we have to have some money for absolutely unavoidable expenses." [70]

In the fall, Lodge stood for the Massachusetts State Senate but was beaten through "treachery in my own party against which no one can guard & it was done to kill me off for Congress but looks as if it might be electing me." [71] Upon hearing of his defeat, Henry Adams wrote a letter of caution. After pointing to the cases of his two brothers, John and Brooks, Adams remarked that "no man should be in politics unless he would honestly rather not be there. Public service should be a corvee; a disagreeable necessity. The satisfaction should consist in getting out of it." [72] In spite of his defeat, Lodge's importance in the party was increasing. He was gaining invaluable experience and influence serving on the State Central Committee, a service which was to continue through 1884. While the post of Chairman of the Finance Committee was not a particularly pleasant one, as producer of the party purse, it was powerful. Even at the age of thirty-one, Lodge was demonstrating the ability to convert thankless, onerous tasks into springboards of political opportunity through intelligence and hard work.

His stature within the party increased steadily, but he was still unseasoned and lacked the sort of standing with the regular

organization essential to future success. Within his own small circle of "respectable" Bostonians, his political adventures were applauded, but the regular elements of the party demanded substantive and loyal service at the state level. For Lodge, politics held a fascination that was moving toward professional commitment. Unlike other Liberals, familiarity with the craft bred understanding rather than contempt.

Footnotes

1. Lodge to Carl Schurz, March 22, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, March 26, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

2. Bowles to H. L. Dawes, March 27, 1876, Dawes Papers, LC.

3. Ibid.

4. Bowles to H.C. Lodge, March 30, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

5. Lodge to Carl Schurz, April 4, 5, 11, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC; Bullock to H.C. Lodge, April 8, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

6. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, April 15, 17, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Carl Schurz, April 17, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC.

7. Bowles to H.C. Lodge, April 24, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS: Lodge to Carl Schurz, April 20, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC.

8. Lodge to Carl Schurz, April 28, 30, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC.

9. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, May 12, 15, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

10. New York Times, May 16, 1876, p. 4.

11. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, May 16, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

12. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, May 22, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Carl Schurz, May 18, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC; Hill to H.C. Lodge, May 22, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

13. Burnett to H.C. Lodge, June 1, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, June 1, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS; Motley to H.C. Lodge, June 2, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS; Brimmer to H.C. Lodge, June 3, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS; Adams to H. C. Lodge, June 4, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

14. Adams to H.C. Lodge, June 21, 24, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

15. Schurz to H.C. Lodge, July 9, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Carl Schurz, July 9, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC; Adams to H.C. Lodge, June 30, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

16. Adams to Carl Schurz, July 11, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC.

17. Ibid.

18. Leonard D. White, The Republican Era, 1869-1901 (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1958), p. 33.

19. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, July 20, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

20. Wilson to H.C. Lodge, July 19, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

21. Reid to Carl Schurz, July 25, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC.

22. Ibid.

23. Adams to H.C. Lodge, August 5, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS. Italics added.

24. Lodge to Carl Schurz, August 16, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC.

25. Adams to H.C. Lodge, August 25, 31, September 4, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS.

26. Lodge to Carl Schurz, September 6, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC.

27. Wilson to H.C. Lodge, November 17, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, December 12, 1876, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hayes to Carl Schurz, October 12, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC. [A diary entry for December 12, 1876 indicated that he had voted for Tilden, but the entry appears added at a much later date so Lodge's vote was shrouded in some mystery.]

28. Lodge to J. H. Wilson, November 21, 1876, Wilson Papers, LC.

29. Lodge to Carl Schurz, December 22, 1876, Schurz Papers, LC.

30. Schurz to Murat Halstead, February 19, 1877, Schurz Papers, LC; Hayes to Carl Schurz, February 4, 25, 1877, Schurz Papers, LC; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 28, 1877, Lodge Papers, MHS.

31. Lodge to Carl Schurz, March 8, 1877, Schurz Papers, LC; C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, p. 202.

32. Adams to Carl Schurz, March 10, 1877, Schurz Papers, LC.

33. John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 51-61.

34. Lodge to Carl Schurz, June 24, 1877, Schurz Papers, LC; Adams to Carl Schurz, June 26, 1877, Schurz Papers, LC.

35. Beard to H.L. Dawes, January 7, 11, 15, 31, February 8, 1878, Dawes Papers, LC; Simmons to H.L. Dawes, January 18, 25, 1878, Dawes Papers, LC; Lodge to Carl Schurz, January 20, 1878, Schurz Papers, LC.

36. Solomon B. Griffin, People and Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1923, p. 188.

37. Lodge to Roger Wolcott, July 15, 1878, Huntington-Wolcott Papers, MHS.

38. Ibid.

39. Wilson to H.C. Lodge, August 1, 1878, Lodge Papers, MHS.

40. Ibid.

41. Hoar to Carl Schurz, October 13, 1878, Schurz Papers, LC; Howe to Carl Schurz, October 7, 1878, Schurz Papers, LC.

42. "Gubernatorial Elections in Massachusetts," Massachusetts State House Library.

43. Wilson to H.C. Lodge, December 7, 1878, Lodge Papers, MHS; Schurz to H.C. Lodge, December 6, 1878, Lodge Papers, MHS.

44. Lodge to J. H. Wilson, December 16, 1878, Wilson Papers, LC.

45. Lodge to J. H. Wilson, January 11, 1879, Wilson Papers, LC.

46. Ibid.

47. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, September 25, 1879, Lodge Papers, MHS; The Nation, September 25, 1879.

48. Lodge to Carl Schurz, November 30, 1879, Schurz Papers, LC; John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 61.

49. John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 63; Adams to H.C. Lodge, December 20, 1879, Lodge Papers, MHS.

50. Lodge to Carl Schurz, January 1, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC; Schurz to H.C. Lodge, December 29, 1879, Lodge Papers, MHS; Schurz to George W. Curtis, December 20, 1879, Schurz Papers, LC.

51. Lodge to Carl Schurz, January 1, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC.

52. Lodge to John D. Long, January 2, 1880, Long Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, "Limited Sovereignty in the United States," Atlantic Monthly XLIII (February, 1879), pp. 184-192.

53. Schurz to H.C. Lodge, January 3, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS.

54. Wilson to Carl Schurz, February 15, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC.

55. Schurz to J. H. Wilson, February 16, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC; Wilson to Carl Schurz, February 22, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC; Adams to H.C. Lodge, February 22, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS.

56. White to Carl Schurz, March 15, 20, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC; Wilson to Carl Schurz, March 21, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC.

57. Lodge to G. T. Newhall, March 22, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; Wilson to H.C. Lodge, April 2, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; Bowles to H.C. Lodge, April 5, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; National Anti-Third Term Republican Convention to H.C. Lodge, April 9, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; Bowles to Carl Schurz, April 10, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC.

58. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, April 18, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; White to Carl Schurz, April 10, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC.

59. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, April 18, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS.

60. Henderson to James G. Blaine, April 27, 1880, Blaine Papers, LC.

61. White to Carl Schurz, May 20, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC; Beard to H.C. Lodge, May 22, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS.

62. Sanford to H.C. Lodge, May 22, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; Schurz to H.C. Lodge, May 23, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Carl Schurz, May 27, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC.

63. Hoar to H.C. Lodge, June 16, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years Vol. I (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), pp. 396-398; Caucus Notes, June 3, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; Claude M. Fuess, "Carl Schurz, Henry Cabot Lodge, and the Campaign of 1884," New England Quarterly V (July, 1932), p. 464; Richard E. Welch, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 96-97.

64. Lodge to Carl Schurz, June 28, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC; Schurz to H.C. Lodge, June 22, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS.

65. Lodge to Carl Schurz, June 29, 1880, Schurz Papers, LC; Adams to H.C. Lodge, July 9, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS.

66. Morse to H.C. Lodge, August 31, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; Haskell to H.C. Lodge, July 29, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS.

67. Hoar to H.C. Lodge, December 25, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; Adams to H.C. Lodge, October 30, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS; Mills to H.C. Lodge, September 4, 1880, Lodge Papers, MHS.

68. Hunt to Wayne MacVeagh, April 19, 1881, Lodge Papers, MHS; Schurz to H.C. Lodge, February 18, 28, 1881, Lodge Papers, MHS; Devens to H.C. Lodge, January 12, 17, February 1, 1881, Lodge Papers, MHS.

69. Wilson to H.C. Lodge, undated [April or May, 1881], Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to G.F. Hoar, April 24, 1881, Hoar Papers, MHS.

70. Lodge to John D. Long, October 30, 1881, Long Papers, MHS.

71. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, November 13, 1881, Lodge Papers, MHS.

72. Adams to H.C. Lodge, November 15, 1881, Lodge Papers, MHS.

CHAPTER IV

CONGRESSIONAL AMBITIONS AND THE ROAD TO PARTY REGULARITY, 1882 - 1886

In April, 1882, as Lodge assessed his chances for the Republican nomination for Congress in the Sixth District, he brought out the first of three biographies for the American Statesman series under the editorship of John T. Morse. The first was a life of Hamilton. Both Morse and Lodge saw the series as essentially a commercial venture, but Lodge chose his men carefully both because of their conservative political philosophies and because of his conviction that he could bring a needed correction to the traditional view of his subjects. His biography of Webster came out in 1883 and a two volume study of Washington appeared in 1889.

The most important of the biographies was the first. It was in his study of Hamilton that Lodge "discovered" his own Hamiltonianism. Although Lodge was not deeply involved in politics in 1882, his comments in his Hamilton were often bluntly "political" and clearly announced his change from liberal, Republican tariff reformer to protectionist. In keeping with the attitude of his age, Lodge indulged in hero worship on occasion and nowhere more obviously than in his Hamilton. Even Morse admitted in the editor's preface that Lodge succumbed to Hamilton's charm but believed it excusable since "he at least practiced a strictly intelligent and reasonable worship."[1]

Lodge was drawn to Hamilton's youth, intelligence and political realism. He identified strongly with Hamilton's positions on the tariff, currency, and foreign affairs. As Lodge progressed through the biography, his adulation increased and his own views on the tariff changed coincidentally with his work on Hamilton. He described Hamilton's general philosophy of taxation emphasizing that as much as possible the central government should rely on indirect taxation and levies on luxury items. He concluded that "no one now will question that by all the best principles of political economy Hamilton was right in his choice, and that he selected the most appropriate subjects for taxation."[2]

In dealing with Hamilton's reports to Congress, Lodge telegraphed his own views on the currency as well as the tariff. He emphasized repeatedly that Hamilton supported a "double standard" including both silver and gold coin. Lodge's later championing of bimetallism rather than gold monometallism was partially a result of this earlier study of Hamilton. Referring to the contemporary debates on silver, Lodge maintained that "we now depart from the views expressed by Hamilton with reference to a double standard by disregarding our relations on this point with our principal customers and by grossly overvaluing the inferior metal."[3] Without flatly stating his own protectionism, Lodge wrote of Hamilton's Report on Manufactures in tones that left little doubt of his own prejudices. "It remains the best and most complete argument for a protective policy in the United States which we possess. No new and fundamental principle has been

added to Hamilton's reasoning, but his report has been a welcome armory to generations of disputants, and is still waiting to be successfully answered and overthrown."[4]

In a section devoted to early party battles and party formation in the Federalist era, Lodge sided with Hamilton and the Federalists. In fact, his growing partisanship appeared when he criticized Jefferson and Madison for their tendency to embrace Hamilton's positions and then claim credit for them. He revealed his own political attitudes when he charged that the "Democratic party of the future had no better name than anti-Federalists, and no better cry than that of opposition to everything emanating from the government."[5]

In general, Lodge's work on Hamilton was better received among critics than this biography of Webster. Lodge himself feared that it would receive rough treatment but maintained that "it is written without any prejudice or bias & I have studied everything to arrive at the truth."[6] Unlike Hamilton, Webster did not provide a model political theoretician. Lodge found Webster's oratorical powers imposing and pointed out that when a speech "which we know to have been good in delivery is equally good in print, a higher intellectual plane is reached."[7] Some of Webster's speeches reached such a high plane thought Lodge. While Lodge believed Webster's position on the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 reprehensible, he defended Webster's change of position on the tariff in 1828. Webster's speech in 1828 regarded protection "in its true light, as a mere question of expediency," maintained Lodge. While Webster's course "was a sectional one ...,

everybody else's was the same, and it could not be, it never has been, and never will be otherwise."[8] Later in 1891, Lodge himself emphasized the expedient quality of the tariff issue. "In this matter of the tariff ... we have before us a question which is not new, which is not moral, but which deals simply with matters of self-interest according to the dictates of an enlightened selfishness."[9]

Lodge was sympathetic to Webster's Whig views, but thought that Webster was constitutionally indolent and unable to translate those brief bursts of profundity which produced his reply to Hayne into a coherent system. By 1883, Lodge's work on Hamilton and Webster had helped him to develop his own views on the tariff which remained consistent throughout the remainder of his political career. Unlike the Young Democrats who emerged in Massachusetts in 1884 and espoused protection for Massachusetts manufactures and free raw materials, Lodge consistently contended that "our economic system must be national: it must be free trade for all or protection for all. It is impossible to have protection for New England and free trade in the products of the rest of the country...."[10]

By 1889, Lodge himself had entered fully into the political life. When he brought out his life of Washington, it was with the perspective of a "practical" politician. English critics thought his portrait of Washington a refreshing antidote to the "nonsense of Weems and the painful worship of Sparks."[11] American critics read into his narrative political allusions which in some cases perhaps did not exist. Lodge made the necessary obeisances to the Washington myth,

but made clear his goal was to bring an attitude of modern scholarship to his task.[12]

After lamenting that foreign relations "to-day fill but a slight place in American politics, and excite generally only a languid interest," Lodge outlined Washington's policy. He praised its aim of guaranteeing the recognition of American interests without "humiliating concessions." The most important section of Washington, however, for an understanding of Lodge was a chapter on Washington as a party leader. From the beginning of this section, Lodge emphasized that Washington's early hostility to parties and partisanship soon began to dissolve in the heat of the political contests of the day. The intrigue and counter-intrigue of the factions around Hamilton on the one hand and Jefferson on the other fatigued Washington, but brought him to the conclusion that "I shall not whilst I have the honor to administer the government, bring a man into any office of consequence knowingly, whose political tenets are adverse to the measures which the general government are pursuing."[13]

Frequently stung by the charge that he was blindly partisan, Lodge found comfort in the discovery that Washington experienced attacks which drove him more and more into an attitude of party feeling. After three years of intense party conflict under a Democratic president in 1889, Lodge identified with Washington's travails and principles. He saw himself like Washington "in policies and politics ... an American and a Nationalist."[14]

After 1889, Lodge continued to turn his pen to historical subjects on occasion, but his aim was more obviously economic and

political when he did so. In 1897, he brought out a collection of essays entitled, Certain Accepted Heroes. In this collection, even the lead essay which provided the title of the collection was turned to a political aim. Reflecting the tendency of the nineteenth century to hero worship, Lodge contended that Wagner's Nibelungs and the ancient Romans made better heroes than the ancient Greeks. The Roman creation of an empire Lodge thought a much better achievement than the exploits of an Achilles. The bulk of the remainder of the essays were more obviously political. One of them was a reprint of an article on contemporary foreign policy questions in which he criticized the Cleveland administration.[15]

While his work on Hamilton was useful in clarifying his attitude about the tariff, the most immediate problem in the spring of 1882 was the need to face the tariff in Massachusetts politics.

Lodge consulted with John D. Long late in April, about the prospective field of candidates in the Sixth Congressional District, but found it impossible at that early date to determine who might enter the lists.[16] Two days after his conference with Long, Lodge met his old friend from Fifth Avenue days, Henry Stockton, at Lee, Higginson & Co., the Boston investment banking firm. Stockton raised Lodge's hopes of political advancement when he mentioned that New England manufacturers would be permitted to name one member of the proposed tariff commission and inquired if Lodge would take the position. Lodge outlined his position on the tariff as a moderate revisionist and cautioned that his views might not be consonant with

those of the New England manufacturers. Lodge knew that moderate protectionism would not satisfy the shoe trade which wanted free hides and protected shoes. Stockton explained that his friends were looking for someone with moderate views. Unfortunately for Lodge's political career, the Arkwright Club chose David A. Wells for the Tariff Commission. Even though he was denied the opportunity, Lodge regarded Stockton's inquiry as a mark of his regard and it did signify Lodge's rise within the party.[17]

A second conference with Long at a dinner at the Bird Club left the Congressional question still unresolved. Long was appraising his own chances in the Second District and doubted that he could win if he decided to run. The dinner did, however, produce one promising note when Charles Field, an officer in the Boston Post Office, urged Lodge to run. Lodge later learned from a friend in Charlestown that Field was a man of some influence whose support would count.[18]

In spite of the prospect of stiff opposition, Lodge decided to seek the nomination. The Civil Service Reform League solicited his views on merit appointment to public offices so that the candidates for the nomination might be properly evaluated on what was a major reform issue in the wake of Garfield's assassination in July, 1881. In a long letter to William B. de Las Casas dated July 5, 1882, Lodge presented his view of the question. While he believed in reform of the system, he was not a radical. "I am not one of those who regard our civil service as a mass of inefficiency & even of corruption...," he wrote. "The evils of the present system as it seems to me have

their root in the constant changes which are made among those holding office."[19] Lodge added that as much as possible officers ought to be appointed and promoted on the basis of character and capacity. The latter quality ought to be determined through "suitable & simple tests...." Veterans, especially those who had suffered wounds, ought to be given some preference.[20]

As his campaign for the nomination was taking form in mid-August, Lodge wrote de Las Casas with acerbity that his letter on civil service reform had not been read at a meeting of the Association. In the interest of fairness, Lodge urged that the views of all the candidates in the Sixth District be published, including his letters of July 5 and August 14. Countering charges of evasion, Lodge made clear that, "I have always been & am now thoroughly opposed to the so-called 'spoils system' & let me add to political assessments, of which you made no mention in your letter of inquiry."[21]

Early in September, approximately sixty prominent Republicans endorsed Lodge's campaign for the nomination including Jerry J. McCarthy, who was to remain a long term political associate. The Boston Daily Advertiser, an old-line Republican newspaper hailed Lodge's candidacy in effusive tones. The editor presented a telling indictment of the reformers of the Fifth Avenue Conference, Moorfield Storey, the "Young Republicans," Henry Adams, and even Lodge himself when he initially began his involvement in politics. The editor condemned bitterly the tendency of other "men of somewhat delicate breeding and of scholarly and refined tastes," to stand on the sidelines and criticize. In

commending Lodge for his decision to exchange the role of political activist in print for political activist on the hustings, the editor spoke for many of the faithful party workers.[22]

The party was suffering from its identification with temperance reform in urban areas, whereas, in rural areas, country folk sometimes saw the party as lukewarm on restricting the sale of alcoholic beverages. Lodge carefully avoided the issue as much as possible, but his colleague John D. Long found it necessary to declare himself on temperance reform, woman's suffrage and labor legislation.[23] Lodge recalled that his opposition to a Civil Damages Law in 1878 not only earned him the political support of liquor interests in Lynn but also brought him the enmity of "respectable" elements in his party.

Lodge's struggle for the nomination was a long and convoluted test. He had started in late April and the climax came in late September. He was so physically and emotionally involved in the long balloting of September 28 - October 3 that he was unable to commit an account of the battle to his diary until October twentieth. At thirty-two years of age, he thrived on such strain and generally rose to such occasions throughout his political career, but the toll on his body increased as the years passed. His defeat at the hand of Elisha S. Converse left him "disappointed but the fidelity of my friends (I had 39 votes my full strength on the last ballot) & the perfect fairness & decorum of my campaign took all sting out of it & left no regrets." The steadfastness of his supporters contributed to his political reputation. The nomination was denied because of "gross

trickery in Chelsea where Converse delegates were elected under Mr. Frost's name."[24]

Two weeks after his defeat, Lodge began an arduous schedule of speaking engagements. He spoke on October 19 when he was re-elected to the State Central Committee by acclamation. Four days later, he shared a platform with Governor Long in Medford. Three days after that he and Senator William P. Frye of Maine spoke to an enthusiastic audience of approximately 4,300 at Lynn. The Senator showered praise on the recently defeated candidate which the crowd echoed. Between October 31 and November 6, Lodge spoke at Revere, Saugus, Reading, Winthrop, Everett, Swampscott and Stoneham. A true loyalist, he fought hard for the candidates of the party with an energy and commitment that would surely bring reward.[25]

Unfortunately, Lodge's efforts did not produce electoral victories. Converse lost to Henry Lovering, and the controversial Benjamin F. Butler was elected Governor over Robert R. Bishop. To Lodge, Butlerism stood for spoils politics and offensive appeals to the class interest of voters. Butler's emphasis on issues that appealed to the poor and disinherited was demagoguery of the worst sort to the "best men." Lodge was properly outraged that Butler was elected, but he agreed that Butler's victory was a protest against a party that appeared blundering and corrupt.[26] It is a deserved punishment. We have clung to past issues & fallen into bad nominations, spoils & neglect of questions of the day. In Massachusetts it is a rebuke for putting up by manipulation unfit men whom nobody really wanted."[27]

Meanwhile Lodge had been elected Chairman of the State Central Committee of the party. This was an honor he earned as a result of his showing in the Congressional contest and his vigorous efforts on the stump in the fall elections. The young Samuel Bowles realized that, while it was a position which carried with it much gratuitous criticism, it also ought to lead to political office. Even the politically disillusioned Henry Adams wrote Lodge the day after Christmas that, "as far as I can see, you are about the only man who is to be congratulated on the result of the Massachusetts election. You have lost nothing, and saved your chances for 1884."[28]

In mid-January, Lodge went to Washington to act for J. M. Forbes on the National Committee of the party. Most important to the young loyalist was an increase in the representation of the traditionally Republican states in the councils of the party. Lodge supported with some energy the plan of William E. Chandler of New Hampshire to accomplish that end. His efforts were thwarted as a result of the votes of what he called, "the rotten borough Southern members voting with [John A.] Logan & the Stalwarts."[29] While Lodge and his colleagues lost the contest for greater representation for traditionally Republican states, he learned a good deal about the role of the southern delegates in the party which doubtless embittered him then and later. He also had an opportunity to assess some of the leaders within the party. He was favorably impressed with Chandler but thought him unscrupulous in gaining his ends. John A. Logan of Illinois he thought coarse and ambitious for the presidency. Hoar was

cordial in part because of his recent sharp contest for the senatorship. He urged Hoar to conciliate the faction recently defeated in the contest, but complained that Hoar "seemed hardly to know what conciliation meant. It is not a habit he is much addicted to."[30]

This venture into national party politics was thoroughly educational as were Lodge's duties as Chairman of the Central Committee in the year after Benjamin F. Butler's election to the governor's chair. The party official for whom he had substituted in Washington wrote early in February approving of the course Lodge had taken and complaining that if the decision of the National Committee were to stand it would be "very damaging to our chances of success."[31]

As the party official charged with directing the affairs of the party on a day-to-day basis, it fell to Lodge to begin planning the campaign against Butler in the fall. He received advice on that subject in March from Hoar. The junior Senator noted that an editor of a French language newspaper had been to see him and informed him that Butler's forces were making inroads among the French Canadians. Hoar recommended that the wealthier Republican manufacturers be approached and asked to fund two weekly papers, one directed at the French and one at the Irish, to negate the effects of Butler's forces. Such journals should take the following tack:

> They should be republican, [sic] temperance & should contain simple and telling statements as to the effect of the tariff and of republican [sic] policies generally on wages. They should be so conducted as to give no cause for jealousy or opposition to the Catholic clergy & that intended for circulation among the Irish sympathetic within the bounds of decency and propriety with Ireland in her contest

for a more just policy in managing her land.[32]

Hoar was convinced that the party had not been managed with an eye to the future and that "unless we can break this compact foreign vote, we are gone, and the grand chapter of the old Massachusetts history is closed. You have a difficult task before you to dislodge Butler this fall, and some of our friends are not making it easier."[33]

Although Lodge and the liberals were growing further apart in political philosophy, the impending battle against Butlerism, the evil effect of which seemed confirmed in the Tewksbury investigation along with Butler's educational "reforms," brought them into cooperation. Moorfield Storey wrote him in June suggesting that a pamphlet of quotations from Butler's speeches to be compiled to be used in the campaign as was done in 1878. Storey was particularly concerned that younger men be informed of Butler's political history.[34]

At the end of June, the matter of a candidate to oppose Butler became uppermost in the minds of party leaders. J. M. Forbes suggested to Lodge that Henry L. Pierce be sounded on the possibility of drafting W. W. Crapo. Moorfield Storey urged Charles Francis Adams, Jr. as the gubernatorial candidate arguing that he would attract not only considerable liberal support but some Democratic votes.[35]

Surveying the situation in early August, J. M. Forbes gave Lodge some sound political advice about how the campaign against Butler ought to be run. He pointed out that in the past a few businessmen had had too much influence over the direction of the party and that had created considerable animosity. Forbes cautioned that Butler would exploit that

fear if given the opportunity. In a very practical vein, Forbes emphasized that Lodge should not "let anybody except perhaps [William] Endicott know the whole of your resources. The workers who know or imagine that there is a larger sum available will go for it & help you spend it rapidly."[36]

In late August, before the gubernatorial candidate had been chosen, Lodge received a most peculiar letter from John T. Morse. Butler had made gestures toward the woman suffragists which Morse thought could be countered with a plan which he put to Lodge. The thrust of Morse's proposal was that his sister-in-law, Marian Hovey, recruit a Mrs. Livermore to address suffragists on the sham nature of Butler's support of the reform. Morse proposed that the Republican Committee covertly support Mrs. Livermore's efforts since it would probably not want to become involved openly. While there was no record of such an alliance, Morse's letter indicated that all the "better elements" were combining forces to drive the "Beast" from office.[37]

As the fall elections season approached, Lodge received word from Henry L. Pierce that he must decline the nomination for governor on account of poor health and a lack of support. Since Pierce had been the leading contender until mid-September, there was considerable consternation about finding a candidate who could make a successful campaign against such a difficult opponent in the remaining month and one-half. In the third week of September, Lodge found his candidate in the person of George D. Robinson, a member of Congress. Alanson W. Beard, former Collector of the Port of Boston, prepared the way for a

meeting between Lodge and Robinson which resulted in a very successful partnership. As the state convention met on September 20, to select Robinson as its candidate, it became clear that a united party including the Mugwumps, regulars, woman suffragists, young Republicans et. al. were pulling out all the stops to dethrone Butler.[38]

In many respects, Butler and Lodge were diametric opposites. Lodge was the polished patrician, Harvard graduate, man of letters. On the other hand, Butler was sometimes coarse in speech and, "his standards were those of the criminal lawyer. Any tactics, any ethics were acceptable if they satisfied the technical requirements of the law."[39] The Republican candidate, George D. Robinson contrasted sharply with Butler, whose chief threat was his appeal to certain ethnic and economic groups in Massachusetts. Specifically, the French, the Germans, the Irish, factory workers, Negroes and woman suffragists found a champion in Butler. Recognizing Butler's attractiveness to such groups, the Republicans had started early in 1883 to neutralize Butler's popularity. They publicized Butler's checkered career in the Civil War, his reputation as a spoilsman and corruptionist. They offered efficient and honest administration in the Governor's office. From George F. Hoar's letter of mid-March to Lodge's own appeal to Carl Schurz in October to come and address German voters, the leadership appreciated the need to oppose Butler's strength among ethnic groups and organized labor.[40]

In the midst of a furious campaign, in which Lodge and Robinson cooperated to refute Butler's speeches, Lodge was re-elected a member of the State Central Committee in the first Essex Senatorial District.

This position, which was later converted into another term as Chairman, became awkward in 1884 because of his candidacy for Congress. Lodge's strategy in the campaign was to use the strengths which had served him so well before - skill in organization, careful research and the energy of youth. He was particularly blessed with a candidate who looked the part of the ideal foil for Butler. Robinson's physical solidity was matched by an evenness of temperament and an air of complete honesty which hit precisely the right political note.[41]

Lodge's efforts were rewarded with a narrow victory over Butler on November 6, 1883, a ten thousand vote margin out of 256,258. Certainly, many of the "best men" in Boston sighed with relief at the November election results. The old values of honesty, integrity and the leadership of those best fit to govern seemed to have triumphed. A political order built upon deference rather than political brokerage had triumphed for the moment.[42] Interviewed the day after the election, Lodge restrained the feeling of exhilaration which he doubtless felt and emphasized in a sober way what he saw as the achievements of the election. He remarked that the contest against Butler had crossed party lines and he appealed for a return to the old two party system.[43]

In spite of their strictures against the practices of Butler and his henchmen, one of the first matters to concern the victors was how patronage should be dispensed to obtain the maximum effect. One party loyalist wrote to Lodge asking if it would not be wise to reward the Germans with an appointment of one of their number to the Governor's staff. Even the newly elected governor quizzed Lodge about places for

some who had worked on the secretarial staff of the Central Committee. Supplementing the concern of some about the Germans, Robinson urged that any appointee not only have the right ethnic affiliation but also be a veteran.[44]

Just before Christmas, Lodge received a letter from his boyhood chum, William Sturgis Bigelow who also reveled in Lodge's victory. Bigelow struck the appropriate tone when he spun out a fanciful image of Lodge riding in a chariot drawing after him, in true Roman style, the defeated Butler and "the Dem. Cent. Com. chained with a baggage strap to the rear of your chariot."[45]

Still sharing some of the reform attitudes of the Young Republicans, Lodge watched anxiously as the presidential sweepstakes started. Like other Liberals, he favored the candidacy of George F. Edmunds (R.-Vt.). Blaine he thought a disastrous possibility.[46] Before the meeting of the Convention in June, Lodge received contrasting warnings from Theodore Roosevelt and George Frisbie Hoar. Roosevelt congratulated Lodge on his handling of affairs in Massachusetts comparing it with his situation in New York and then warned that, "unquestionably Blaine is our greatest danger; for I fear lest, if he come too near success, the bread-and-butter brigade from the South will leave Arthur and go over to him."[47] Lodge had had some experience with the Southern delegates when he attended the National Committee meeting the year before. He knew how troublesome they could be even when the stakes were not the presidency. Hoar's message indicated that the Blaine managers were not serious in putting him forward, but rather "Arthur is the danger and the

only real danger."[48]

Late in April, Lodge was again elected as a member of the Massachusetts delegation to Chicago. Seeing that the Blaine boom was in earnest, Lodge and his new friend Roosevelt, began casting about to find a way to stop Blaine without throwing themselves in the arms of Arthur. They went to Washington to try and form a coalition around Robert T. Lincoln but found that impossible. So on May 30 Lodge boarded the train for Chicago nominally committed to Edmunds as was the bulk of the delegates, but without a real candidate to block Blaine or Arthur.[49]

As the Convention opened, the anti-Blaine forces scored a momentary triumph when Lodge successfully substituted John R. Lynch of Mississippi for Blaine's man, Powell Clayton of Arkansas, as Temporary Chairman. Lodge and Roosevelt attempted to make anti-Blaine coalitions but as he himself said later we "plunged from one failure to another."[50] Finding that neither Harrison nor Lincoln had any strength, they turned to William T. Sherman only to find that Blaine had gotten him to send telegrams to the Convention declining the nomination. This left them stymied. Lodge turned some of his energies to pushing through the Committee on Resolutions a plank for civil service reform and one for the removal of the surplus. As the Blaine drive gathered force, Lodge desperately tried to get the delegation to support John Sherman or William T. Sherman, but the rest of the delegation had lost interest in the result.

As if to apply balm to his wounds, Lodge repeated his reasons for adhering to Blaine's nomination when recording the events of the

convention a year later.

He observed that he had fought Blaine's nomination from the beginning of 1884, but believed it was his duty as a delegate to the convention and Chairman of the State Committee to support the party's nominee. "It was the bitterest thing I ever had to do in my life. All my friends with few exceptions went into the bolt & there was no harsh thing that was not said of me ... that I had sold my conscience for a congressional nomination."[51] Lodge's decision to support the party's nominee was indeed a fateful and certainly a painful decision.

The importunities to abandon Blaine came almost immediately after the convention, in some cases from his fellow delegates. Charles R. Codman, whom J. M. Forbes thought absolutely essential at Chicago before the convention, wrote Lodge a letter June 18 which must have made Lodge writhe in pain. Codman outlined with devastating logic Lodge's predicament. He noted that if Lodge chose to run in the Sixth District for Congress, he would find himself obliged to defend Blaine against charges which Lodge himself believed. Neither did Codman believe Lodge could defend the platform of the party since it contained statements on the tariff which did not fit his views. If Lodge did not bolt, his position would be "very embarrassing." With an appeal calculated to strike home, Codman closed his letter: "The worst thing it seems to me, that can happen is that a discredited statesman (whether he succeeds or not) should receive the support of men who represent the educated conscience of the country."[52] In spite of his sometimes haughty air of reserve, such thrusts penetrated Lodge's protective veneer. Although

he cast obloquy on the Mugwumps in 1884 and after, a clearly defensive reaction, Lodge always believed himself part of that "educated conscience of the country."

The Lodge-Roosevelt camaraderie that began at the Chicago convention deepened thereafter as the two friends met attacks such as Codman's. Lodge had met Roosevelt casually before, but the foundation of their friendship was cast in 1884 in the heat of the presidential contest. The two men were drawn together because of the similarity of their educational, social and political backgrounds. Both were Harvard educated, representatives of distinguished families, and seeking a place for their talents in politics. Their agonizing over whether to support Blaine brought them closer, but the criticism of the Mugwumps made fast their friendship. Roosevelt in his typical open fashion expressed his friendship for Lodge and commiserated on their common plight. He contended that while they were obliged to support the Blaine candidacy "I do not think we need take any active part in the campaign."[53] Roosevelt could follow such a course, but Lodge's position as Chairman of the State Central Committee made such a choice impossible. As the Independents intensified their campaign, Roosevelt turned their assault aside with his famous humor. Referring to a misplaced hairbrush, Roosevelt wrote Constance Lodge the following:

> Now about the hairbrush, alas! It isn't mine. I have a hairbrush; but I took it away with me; and in what the newspapers call 'the present crisis' I don't like to accept a gratuity for fear of the mugwumps. If I did and the story leaked out I think the transcript would come out something like this: Scandalous Disclosure! The True Reason for an Alleged Reformer's

> Support of Blaine! The Infamous Roosevelt Bribed by the Notorious Lodge! He sells his Birthright for a Mere Hairbrush! Decent Citizens Disgusted![54]

There was, of course, a kernel of truth in Roosevelt's satirical jabs at the Mugwumps. While Codman's letter stung Lodge and Roosevelt's ministrations soothed him, Lodge was perhaps most injured when Carl Schurz wrote condemning his course. Lodge's support of Blaine's candidacy was no mere slight difference over policy which might be overlooked but rather was "one of those moral questions which touch the most vital spot in the working of our institutions."[55] Schurz had introduced Lodge to national politics in 1876 and appealed to him on the basis of their long friendship to bolt the nomination. The old reformer also warned Lodge that social ostracism might result, which caused Lodge to bristle in his reply to Schurz's letter: "If social ostracism is to be attempted in this business I confess a feeling of revolt would master me completely. My people have lived here for generations. I have been born and brought up here. I have never done a mean, dishonorable or cowardly thing in my life as far as I know. I have never injured a man or wronged a woman."[56]

Lodge gave Schurz an explanation of his conduct almost identical to what he wrote in his diary a year later. He had gone to Chicago to fight Blaine's nomination, but as the head of the Republican State Committee, felt obliged to support the choice of the convention. He outlined to Schurz a plan of action in which he would resign as Chairman of the State Committee and run for Congress. He also complained that the independent criticism of his nomination was hypocritical.[57] While there

was a good deal of self-justification in Lodge's comments and some effort to soothe his obviously troubled conscience, there was great clarity of vision in his observation that a double standard was being applied to him. Lodge had been bitter and had felt betrayed in 1876 when Schurz came out for Hayes. The reformers, including Lodge, who voted for Tilden believed that Schurz had sold out for a cabinet post. That was a situation very similar to Lodge's in 1884 when he was accused of selling out for a Congressional nomination. Lodge's criticism of the narrowness of some of the Independents was well founded.[58]

As Lodge attempted to line up speakers to aid him in what he believed would be a close contest in the Sixth District Congrssional race, a Boston Daily Advertiser editorial countered a move to place an independent candidate in the race against Lodge. The paper contended that local reformers did not support such a move because it would most likely result in the election of Henry B. Lovering again.[59]

Late in August, John Sherman responded to a Lodge appeal for assistance in his race in the Sixth District. Sherman initially agreed to help but later declined. He reported that the outlook in Ohio was uncertain on account of the difficulties the party had experienced with the German vote on the prohibition question. The last day of the month Lodge's cousin, T. W. Higginson, wrote John F. Andrew, son of Massachusetts's famous Civil War governor, urging him to run for Congress in his district. Lovering, who opposed Lodge in the Sixth District, had brought out a pension bill which, "Lodge must support ... or be defeated & I suspect he will be defeated at any rate."[60]

Having had to retain his position as Chairman of the State Committee in spite of his assurances to Schurz and his desire to resign, Lodge chaired the State Convention September 4. Lodge himself renominated George D. Robinson for governor and delivered the typical encomia on Robinson's first year in office. Assessing Lodge's own prospects against Lovering, an Advertiser reporter emphasized the pension Lovering had introduced alloting $8 per month to every soldier regardless of whether he was wounded or not. This the reporter thought would appeal to Butler's supporters whereas others would be drawn to Lodge on account of his efforts for Robinson in 1883. He did project, nevertheless, a Democratic majority in Lynn which was a crucial town in the District.[61]

On September 11, Lodge was nominated for Congress in the Sixth District by acclamation. Lodge's efforts in 1883 and the loyalty of his followers through 130 ballots in 1882 were rewarded with the full support of the regular party apparatus. The opposition of Independents, however, cast a shadow over his victory. Knowing his opponent's weakness, Lodge underscored in his acceptance speech the need to address the issue of the tariff. Meanwhile, the Advertiser was trying to conciliate the Independents. The editor reasoned that reformers would do "well... to pass lightly over the obnoxious features of his [Lodge's] recent career, to give their attention to the practical advantages of securing so excellent a representative as he will make, and therefore... give him their hearty support."[62]

Since the veteran's vote was so important, Lodge addressed the

issue of Lovering's pension bill immediately. He condemned the bill not only for the "vast" sums of money it would require but also because of the bureaucratic paperwork it would generate. The next issue to receive his attention was the tariff. Responding to an open letter of Josiah Quincy, he made clear that he favored revision to eliminate the surplus, but rejected the Morrison bill as a "thoroughly bad measure,..."[63] His letter to Quincy received a positive reception from Abbot Lawrence, a manufacturer of woolens, who endorsed it completely. On the eve of the election, Lodge addressed the voters of Swampscott and emphasized the importance of the tariff as a "protection for labor." He also hit the correct note when he argued for the protection of Swampscott's fisheries.[64]

As late as November 3, the Advertiser was still predicting a Lodge victory, but when the vote came in the next day, he had lost on a very narrow margin of 173 out of a total vote of 29,633. The expressions of sympathy came pouring in from a wide range of his friends. Thornton Lothrop bitterly observed that, "I am extremely sorry that the only victory the Independents can claim in this state is your defeat."[65] Roosevelt wrote consoling his friend and expressing hostility toward the Independents whom he blamed for Lodge's defeat.[66] Lodge himself believed that he had been beaten at the hands of the Independents.[67] Bravely, he wrote to John D. Long that his defeat was the result of his office as Chairman of the State Central Committee, but he was not "cast down but ready to fight again."[68] While the now thoroughly committed politician was indeed cast down, his fierce determination, which had been such a

bulwark in the past, remained.

At his farewell address to the State Central Committee, he contrasted the condition of the party in 1883 when he became Chairman and in 1884 when he left. With genuine modesty, he noted that he found the party soundly defeated at the hands of Butler and left the Central Committee with a Republican legislative majority and Republican officers from the Governor down.[69]

The year had been fateful. Lodge faced his first and perhaps thorniest political dilemma and chose the professionals and the party. In view of his letter to his mother, April 18, 1880, his choice was predicatable. Four years earlier, he had seen that, if he was to accomplish anything, it must be done from inside the party. His experience with reformers in 1876 and after had been disheartening. They were timid, vacillating, self-righteous and vindictive. Perhaps rightly, Lodge had become tired of their moralizing and posturing. As so often with a convert, Lodge became deeply orthodox and even doctrinaire in his attachment to the party and party regularity.

After the bitter defeat of November, 1884, Lodge turned to writing to find consolation. The editing of the Hamilton papers blunted the pain of political defeat. While Lodge may have had reason to renounce politics entirely for tamer pursuits, he remained active in the months between his unsuccessful race of 1884 and the successful campaign of 1886. There was a change, however, in his attitude toward the party and his former associates in reform, the Mugwumps. The friendly relations with Carl Schurz from 1875 to 1884 gave way to a

coolness and even distaste because of Schurz's bitter condemnation of his failure to bolt Blaine's nomination.[70]

Like many men who come late to an understanding of their course in life, Lodge took the occasion of his thirty-fifth birthday to reflect on his progress: "The anniversary is a solemn one. I dislike it exceedingly - It is half way to the age of the Psalmist. So little done. I can only say that if I have not been very successful I have at least been very happy & not utterly useless."[71] Like his friend Theodore Roosevelt, he was concerned that he make use of his advantages of wealth and education to be of some value to society.

Most of the year following his defeat was taken up with literary activities, but involvement in state politics brought him into consultation with John D. Long about the party's platform. Like other Massachusetts politicians in 1885, Long was feeling the impact of the temperance question. He was fundamentally sympathetic to temperance if not prohibition; he urged Lodge in writing the state platform to oppose "the 'rum power' (using that term) as a political organization."[72]

There was considerable sentiment within the party for some sort of action against the influence of the liquor lobby in politics. Perhaps more importantly, he saw that the issue disrupted party unity. To neutralize the problem, Long suggested two resolutions in the platform. One put the party on record as being opposed to the influence of the "rum power." The other proposed submitting a constitutional amendment to the people on the matter of prohibition. Such an approach "takes the matter out of politics and out of the campaign," Long emphasized.[73]

As Lodge and his fellow members of the State Central Committee began putting together the platform, they decided to give due weight to Long's suggestions on the temperance question and in doing so recognized its importance. Unlike Long, however, they believed that a firm statement of the party's commitment to enforce current laws was a sounder course than proposing a constitutional amendment to escape the perils of the issue.

In addition to the plank on temperance, Lodge's platform contained the obligatory statement of support for the veterans of the Civil War. It recommended a general bankruptcy law, unconditional suspension of the coinage of silver, extension of the civil service law, support for a protective tariff, sectional reconciliation but condemnation of disfranchisement of blacks in the South, support for arbitration of labor disputes, regulation of convict labor, and more frequent payment of wages. For the time, it was a progressive platform but still soundly rooted in traditional party doctrine. Roosevelt wrote from New York that it received general support from the New York press with the exception of the New York Post.[74] In November, 1885, the party scored yet another victory with George D. Robinson at the helm. The man who had drubbed Butler in 1883 handily defeated his Democratic opponent with a margin of more than twenty thousand votes. As Robinson began his third term, which had become the traditional number for Republican governors, Lodge turned his attention to the emerging senatorial contest.[75]

Two political concerns loomed in Lodge's firmament in 1886, the contest for Henry L. Dawes's senate seat and his own struggle in the

Sixth Congressional District. There was no question in his mind about running again for the seat. In spite of the defeat of 1884, there were no written expressions of anxiety.

On September 29, Lodge delivered the keynote address at the State Convention.[76] He attacked the policies of the Democrats at both the national and the local levels. He scored the Cleveland administration's foreign policy pointing specifically to the issue of the fisheries, the approach to civil service reform, and the failure to admit Dakota to the union. At the state level, Lodge assailed the Democrats for their failure to take a satisfactory stand on temperance and commended the Republican party for the passage of the state law requiring weekly payment of wage laborers and the creation of an arbitration board. Lodge closed his address with a sharp statement refuting the idea that there were no differences between the parties.[77]

The speech provided the appropriate opportunity to launch his campaign for the Sixth Congressional District. In truth, Lodge had begun his campaign in January when he purchased controlling interest in the Boston Daily Advertiser, a distinguished old-line Republican newspaper noted for reporting financial news. Although Lodge had commenced his venture in newspaper publishing with the noble purpose of bringing back to life a formerly widely respected Republican organ, Lodge certainly saw the purchase as a useful adjunct to his political goals in 1886.[78]

Lodge faced Henry B. Lovering who had been elected in 1882 and again in the bitter contest of 1884. The intensity of the campaign was reflected in the assault upon Lodge in the Nation written three years later.

Speaking for the mugwumps, E. P. Clark referred to Lodge's address to the Republican Convention as one of the "slang-whanging order." Clark contrasted Lodge with John F. Andrew who was running for governor on the Democratic ticket. Andrew was one of the darlings of the Mugwumps because he had bolted the Blaine nomination after the Chicago Convention of 1884.[79]

On October 7, Lodge accepted the nomination for Congress and gave a short speech in which he highlighted the tariff question as the central issue of the race against Lovering. The Boston Traveller quoted Lodge's indictment of Lovering's position on the tariff as incompatible with the general interests of the voters of the District and specifically harmful to laboring men.[80]

Fifteen days later Lodge spoke at a rally at the Coliseum in Lynn to a large and enthusiastic audience of supporters. Hammering away at Lovering's position on the tariff, Lodge played on the theme of the relationship between the protective tariff and the rate of American wages. The protective tariff might not bring "the millenium, perfect happiness and bliss to the workingman." But "I say it enables the workingman to earn better wages and it protects him from competition with the workmen of English free trade."[81] Lodge knew his choice of the example of the wages of shoemakers would hit a responsive chord in Lynn, a major center of the boot and shoe trade.

As voters prepared to go to the polls on November 2, Lodge made the necessary ceremonial calls on those communities crucial to the election. He stopped again in Lynn and thanked the Lodge cadets for

their labors on his behalf. As was his custom, he had conducted a thorough and energetic canvass; it only remained to await the results.[82]

The returns began coming in the evening of the second and although the contest was close, Lodge was clearly the victor. He received 13,496 votes to Loverings's 12,768. With the exception of the Boston wards and Lynn, Lodge carried the district. In a short victory speech at Fanueil Hall, the new Congressman emphasized standard Republican doctrine, an honest silver dollar, forceful legislation on the dispute with Canada over the fisheries and civil service reform. A bit later, he confided to his diary that although the independents pursued him as they had in 1884, he had triumphed and took real pleasure in the fact.[83]

Letters of congratulation came from all directions, but there were two of especial importance. Roosevelt, who had been embroiled in his own unsuccessful election struggle in New York asked his friend to come to New York doubtless seeking the soothing ministrations which he knew Lodge's visit would bring. His old friend Richard Henry Dana also congratulated Lodge but outlined his disagreement on the issue of the tariff.[84]

Since the Fiftieth Congress would not assemble until December, 1887, Lodge renewed his efforts in the senatorial campaign to be decided in January, 1887. As a representative of the younger element of the party, John D. Long chose to challenge Henry L. Dawes. Aside from generational differences, the east-west geographical division also separated the two principal candidates.[85]

January brought a resolution to the senatorial contest and tested Lodge's skills as a political manager for Long. In the first week of the

month, Lodge and his associates counted votes and planned caucus strategy. Elihu B. Hayes, a long time associate, wrote urging Lodge to maintain the pressure on Dawes's candidacy and look to the organization of the press in Long's favor. Hayes also noted that one of the larger stakes in the contest for Lodge was the leadership of the party in the state.

Alanson W. Beard a former Collector of the Port of Boston, and representative of the Old Guard of the party, was managing the Dawes forces. The conflict between Long and Dawes spilled over to their managers according to Hayes as the contest became a personal one between Beard and Lodge. The generational dimension to the contest compounded the bitterness and signaled an important cleavage in the party in January, 1887 and later. The most important warning Hayes issued was the rumored solicitation of Democratic votes in Dawes's behalf.[86]

As Lodge prepared to open headquarters at the Parker House, he reported to his candidate that the contest in caucus was close. A Republican senator might emerge through the action of the Democrats. Convinced of the basic loyalty of his intra-party opponents, Lodge dismissed the possibility. On the ninth, Lodge sent out a flurry of letters trying to mobilize the Long forces. He was calling in political debts and rallying for the final battle.[87]

The bitterness of the contest was confirmed in the motives Dawes's supporters atributed to their opponents. A long time political associate of Dawes from the western part of the state, Edward Tinker, assailed Lodge for having only his own interests at heart while managing Long's campaign. "This is what I look on as the great difficulty," he

wrote, "that Lodge, who don't care a cent for Long only to push his scheme to be leader, will leave Long & transfer his forces, or all he can for Robinson."[88] Even some of Long's supporters feared that Lodge might throw over Long at the last moment if Robinson's candidacy gathered force. In reality, Lodge was committed to Long's effort, although he clearly calculated how his management of Long's canvass might aid his own future career.[89]

As early as the thirteenth, Dawes's battle plan emerged. Walter Allen, who was working with Beard from the Tremont House in Boston, wrote the senator that his Democratic friends might form around Patrick Collins who would be a stalking horse candidate among the Democrats for Dawes. This plan ultimately succeeded on the eighteenth, but Long's supporters knew as early as the fourteenth that the Democrats were to be responsible for the election of a Republican senator.[90]

Lodge was disappointed at the events of the eighteenth not only for himself but also for the party. He wrote Long at some length about the successful tactic of Dawes's managers. On the first ballot Dawes garnered 76 votes to Long's 53 and Robinson's 53. The Democrats cast 89 votes for Collins but then 78 of Collins supporters went to Dawes and made him Senator. As Lodge observed, "we knew the trade was to be tried. We did not believe it could succeed & least of all today. My new disappointment at your defeat is great enough but it is infinitely increased & even overshadowed by the methods used to elect Mr. Dawes.... I am sick at heart over the tone of the party."[91] As Hayes had warned might happen in the closing days of the contest, Lodge and his friends had been outgeneraled.[92]

Chester Dawes exulted in his father's success and ruminated that "I should think that Henry Cabot would wish to be a 'Lodge in some vast wilderness' this morning."[93] Meanwhile Lodge and Long exchanged letters charging bad faith on the part of Robinson. Long believed that Robinson had misled him from the start in March, 1886 and used Long as a stalking horse in his contest with Dawes. Robinson vigorously denied that he had played Long false and enlisted Lodge's help in trying to convince Long. The recriminations poisoned the relations of those who considered themselves the young men of the party.[94]

Several important developments came out of the senatorial contest of 1887. The old guard in the party demonstrated that the political generation which won its spurs in the 1850's was still capable of sharp maneuver and skillful management. The wing of the party Lodge, Long and Robinson represented was not yet skilled enough to control it. Unhappily, another result of the contest was a new element of bitterness in the relations between these two political generations. This climate of hostility and suspicion remained and complicated cooperation between these two factions of the party for many years.[95]

With the senatorship settled, Hayes turned to less volatile political issues such as instructing Lodge on the finer points of maintaining a rapport with the voluntary associations of his district.[96] With great political common sense, Hayes further instructed Lodge that with careful attention to providing free seeds to the real farmers in the Sixth District, he could win their support. This sage political advice from Hayes continued uninterruptedly from the beginning of

Lodge's national political career into his years as senator.

Realizing his callowness in politics, Lodge sought the assistance of his friend John D. Long. Even though he had not yet been sworn in, he made a trip to Washington in mid-February to begin learning how to cope with one of the more important executive agencies of the day, the Pension Office. No Congressman could afford to leave pension matters to chance.[97]

As a party loyalist, Lodge actively campaigned in October, 1887 for the Republican candidate for governor. As was customary in the party, Oliver Ames had been "promoted" from his post as Lieutenant Governor to Governor in 1886 and was running for re-election in 1887. While Lodge may have shared some of his friend John T. Morse's disdain for Ames, the candidacy of his old foe Henry B. Lovering on the Democratic ticket whetted his eagerness for the contest. In a ratification meeting on October 25, Lodge scornfully attacked the Democratic party as a preserve of the mugwumps. In the vitriolic manner of the day, with metaphors thoroughly mixed, Lodge compared the Democratic party first to a hungry dog lusting after political offices and then to a prehistoric lizard with a pea-sized brain. He closed his assault with a slashing attack on Cleveland's handling of civil service matters in Maryland and rhetorically asked if that was what the citizens of Massachusetts wanted. The general election produced another majority for Ames of eighteen thousand votes over Lovering.[98]

As the time for Lodge's swearing in approached in December, he began settling in a new residence in the District of Columbia. A letter

to his mother recounted his entrance into society and more importantly revealed his delight with at last being a member of Congress. Disingenuously, Lodge apologized for using stationery marked "House of Representatives U.S." Clearly, he was pround of what that stationery signified and knew that his mother would likewise take pride in her son's achievement. Ten days later he complained that his seat in the chamber of the House was one of the worst since he drew at the last but "I got a seat... next [to] Mckinley of Ohio who is a first rate man, one of the leaders of the House & quite a friend of mine."[99]

After the long hiatus between his election in November, 1886 and his swearing in in December, 1887, Lodge was at last beginning his work as a legislator. With the exception of his friendship with McKinley and the social contacts with John Hay, Joseph Chamberlain at the British Embassy, Henry Adams, and other Washington worthies, the start of Lodge's Congressional career did not appear especially auspicious. A Democratic administration under Grover Cleveland controlled the executive branch, which meant that he could not expect much patronage. His committee assignment on the Committee on Elections was relatively obscure. The resolution of disputed elections did, however, concern the party leadership and provided Lodge with an opportunity to become known as a loyal party worker. It would require all of his youthful energies, unusual capacity for work and intelligence to make a mark in Congress.

Footnotes

1. Henry Cabot Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1882),pp. v-viii.

2. Henry Cabot Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1882), pp. 84, 89, 95-96.

3. Ibid., pp. 106-112.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., pp. 130, 135.

6. Atlantic Monthly L July, 1882, pp. 125-126; Atlantic Monthly LII October, 1883, pp. 570-573; The Spectator LVI part 2, September 22, 1883, pp. 1225-1226; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, March 13, 1883.

7. Henry Cabot Lodge, Daniel Webster, (Boston: Hoghton Mifflin and Co., 1883), p. 190

8. Ibid., p. 170.

9. Henry Cabot Lodge, "Protection or Free Trade-Which?," The Arena IV, November, 1891, p. 654.

10. Henry Cabot Lodge, Daniel Webster, pp. 196-209, 333-362; Lodge to E. J. Burbank, March 14, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS; William E. Russell, "Significance of the Massachusetts Election," Forum XII, December, 1891, p. 440.

11. The Spectator LXIII, December 21, 1889, p. 889.

12. Atlantic Monthly LXIV, November, 1889, pp. 707-714; Henry Cabot Lodge, George Washington Vol. 1, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., pp. 9-13.

13. Henry Cabot Lodge, George Washington Vol. II, pp 129, 211-214, 216, 224, 234-235, 242-243.

14. Ibid., pp. 243, 268-269.

15. Henry Cabot Lodge, Certain Accepted Heroes, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1897), pp. 11, 19, 23; George Merriam Hyde, "Adventures in Criticism," The Bookman VI, January, 1898, pp. 466-468; The Dial XXVII, November 16, 1899, pp. 363-366; The Spectator LXXXII, June 3, 1899, 791-792.

16. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, April 26, 1882, Lodge Papers, MHS.

17. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, April 28, May 12, 1882, Lodge Papers, MHS.

18. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, April 29, 1882, Lodge Papers, MHS.

19. Lodge to William B. de Las Casas, July 5, 1882, Lodge Papers, MHS.

20. Ibid.

21. Lodge to William B. de Las Casas, August 14, 1882, Lodge Papers, MHS.

22. Boston Daily Advertiser, September 5, 13, 1882, p. 4.

23. Hayes to Carl Schurz, October 12, 1882, Schurz Papers, LC; James W. Hess, "John D. Long and Reform Issues in Massachusetts Politics, 1870-1889," New England Quarterly XXXIII (March, 1960, pp. 57-73; Brockton Daily Enterprise, May 4, 1881, p. 1, John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 62-63.

24. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, October 20, 1882, Lodge Papers, MHS.

25. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, October 23, 26, 30, 31, November 2, 3, 4, 6, 1882, Lodge Papers, MHS.

26. Richard Harmon, "The 'Beast' in Boston: Benjamin F. Butler as Governor of Massachusetts," Journal of American History LV (September, 1968), p. 268; Boston Daily Advertiser, November 8, 1882, p. 4. Professor Harmon argues convincingly that no matter how inept Butler may have been, he reminded the "better elements" "of the well-founded unrest at large in Massachusetts," p. 280. Harmon contended that Butler's campaigns previewed the interest group politics of the twentieth century.

27. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, November 8, 1882, Lodge Papers, MHS.

28. Bowles to H. C. Lodge, 1882?, Lodge Papers, MHS; Adams to H.C. Lodge, December 26, 1882, Lodge Papers, MHS.

29. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, January 16, 17, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS.

30. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, January 17, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS.

31. Forbes to H.C. Lodge, February 5, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS.

32. Hoar to H.C. Lodge, March 18, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS.

33. Ibid.

34. Storey to H.C. Lodge, June 24, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS. The Tewksbury investigation sought to confirm or refute rumors about corruption in the administration of asylums under Butler's administration.

35. Forbes to H.C. Lodge, June 26, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS; Storey to H.C. Lodge, July 18, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS.

36. Forbes to H.C. Lodge, August 7, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS; Italics in original.

37. Morse to H.C. Lodge, August 26, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS.

38. Pierce to H.C. Lodge, September 17, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, September 20, 1883, p. 1; Solomon B. Griffin, People and Politics, p. 252.

39. William D. Mallam, "Butlerism in Massachusetts," New England Quarterly XXXIII (June, 1960), p. 187.

40. Richard Harmon, "The 'Beast' in Boston: Benjamin F. Butler as Governor of Massachusetts," p. 277; Lodge to Carl Schurz, October 4, 1883, Schurz Papers, LC.

41. Solomon B. Griffin, People and Politics, pp. 254-255; Boston Daily Advertiser, October 24, 1883, p. 1; John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 73; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, February 5, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS.

42. "Gubernatorial Elections in Massachusetts," Massachusetts State House Library; Sturgis to H.C. Lodge, November 6, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS.

43. Boston Daily Advertiser, November 7, 1883, p. 2.

44. Ely to H.C. Lodge, November 13, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS; Robinson to H.C. Lodge, December 6, 12, 15, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS.

45. Bigelow to H.C. Lodge, December 23, 1883, Lodge Papers, MHS.

46. Rice to H.C. Lodge, March 5, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS; Edmunds to Carl Schurz, March 11, 1884, Schurz Papers, LC.

47. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, May 5, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS.

48. Hoar to H.C. Lodge, May 26, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS.

49. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, March 20, 1885, Lodge Papers, MHS.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Forbes to H.C. Lodge, March 19, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS; Codman to H.C. Lodge, June 18, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS.

53. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, June 18, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS; Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 76.

54. Roosevelt to Constance Lodge, July 20, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS.

55. Schurz to H.C. Lodge, July 12, 1884, Schurz Papers, LC.

56. Lodge to Carl Schurz, July 14, 1884, Schurz Papers, LC.

57. Ibid.

58. Claude M. Fuess, "Carl Schurz, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Campaign of 1884," pp. 453-482.

59. Lodge to John D. Long, August 23, 1884, Long Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, August 16, 1884, p. 5.

60. Sherman to H.C. Lodge, August 28, September 5, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS; Higginson to John F. Andrew, August 31, 1884, Andrew Papers, MHS.

61. Boston Daily Advertiser, September 4, 6, 1884; Lodge to W. W. Clapp, July 16, 18, 22, 1884, Clapp Papers, Harvard University.

62. Boston Daily Advertiser, September 11, 1884, pp. 1 & 4.

63. Boston Daily Advertiser, October 2, 14, 1884.

64. Lawrence to H.C. Lodge, October 24, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, October 31, 1884.

65. Boston Daily Advertiser, November 3, 6, 1884; Lothrop to H.C. Lodge, November 5, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS.

66. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, November 7, 1884, Lodge Papers, MHS.

67. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, March 20, 1885.

68. Lodge to John D. Long, November 8, 1884, Long Papers, MHS.

69. Boston Daily Advertiser, November 14, 1884, p. 8.

70. John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 88: Lodge to George D. Robinson, February 18, 1885, Lodge Papers, MHS.

71. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, May 12, 1885, Lodge Papers, MHS.

72. Lodge to John D. Long, September 23, 1885?, Long Papers, MHS; Long to H.C. Lodge, September 23, 1885, Lodge Papers, MHS.

73. Long to H.C. Lodge, September 23, 1885, Lodge Papers, MHS.

74. Long to H.C. Lodge, September 23, 1885, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, December 15, 1885, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, October 3, 1885, Lodge Papers, MHS.

75. "Gubernatorial Elections in Massachusetts," Massachusetts State House Library.

76. Greenhalge to H.C. Lodge, August 18, 1886, Lodge Papers, MHS; Burden to John D. Long, September 21, 1886, Long Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, September 21, 1886, p. 4; Barrett to John D. Long, September 24, 1886, Long Papers, MHS.

77. Lynn Evening Item, September 29, 1886, p. 1.

78. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, January 21, 1886, Lodge Papers, MHS.

79. Lynn Evening Item, October 4, 1886, p. 1; E.P. Clark, "Politics in Massachusetts, 1886," Nation XLIII (October, 7, 1889), p. 284.

80. Lynn Evening Item, October 13, 1886, p. 1.

81. Lynn Evening Item, October 22, 1886, p. 1.

82. Lynn Evening Item, October 27, 1886, p. 1.

83. Lynn Evening Item, November 3, 1886, p. 1; Boston Daily Advertiser, November 2, 1886, p. 2; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, November 2, 1886, Lodge Papers, MHS.

84. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, November 2, 1886, Lodge Papers, MHS: Dana to H.C. Lodge, November 4, 10, 1886, Dana Papers, MHS: Henry Blanchard of Fifth Avenue days wrote protesting that Lodge's earlier views had been free trade which Lodge admitted, but explained he had renounced after studying the Hamilton papers. Blanchard to H.C. Lodge, November 23, 24, 1886, Lodge Papers, MHS.

85. Lodge to John D. Long, November 10, 1886, Long Papers, MHS; Long to H.C. Lodge, November 13, 1886, Lodge Papers, MHS; Burden to John D. Long, November 24, 1886, Long Papers, MHS; Haskell to John D. Long, December 23, 1886, Long Papers, MHS.

86. Hayes to H.C. Lodge, January 3, 7, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS.

87. Lodge to A.E. Cox, January 7, 1887, Letterbook I, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to John D. Long, January 11, 1887, Long Papers, MHS.

88. Tinker to Henry L. Dawes, January 12, 1887, Dawes Papers, LC; Anna L. Dawes, "Henry L. Dawes," p. 45, Dawes Papers, LC: Dawes daughter also shared this jaundiced view of Lodge's motives.

89. Burden to John D. Long, January 13, 1887, Long Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, January 19, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hayes to H.C. Lodge, January 27, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS.

90. Burden to John D. Long, January 14, 1887, Long Papers, MHS; Allen to Henry L. Dawes, January 13, 1887, Dawes Papers, LC; Crosby to Henry L. Dawes, Janury 16, 1887, Dawes Papers, LC.

91. Lodge to John D. Long, January 19, 1887, Long Papers, MHS.

92. Hayes to H.C. Lodge, January 3, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS.

93. Dawes to Henry L. Dawes, January 20, 1887, Dawes Papers, LC.

94. Robinson to H.C. Lodge, January 19, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to John D. Long, January 19, 1887, Letterbook I, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to John D. Long, January 20, 1887, Long Papers, MHS; Long to H.C. Lodge, January 21, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS.

95. Claflin to Henry L. Dawes, February 7, 1887, Dawes Papers, LC; Hayes to H.C. Lodge, January 27, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS.

96. Hayes to H.C. Lodge, February 2, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS.

97. Lodge to John D. Long, February 14, 1887, Long Papers, MHS.

98. Morse to H.C. Lodge, October 22, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, October 25, 1887; "Gubernatorial Elections in Massachusetts," Massachusetts State House Library

99. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, November 27, December 7, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS.

CHAPTER V

MONEY, THE TARIFF AND THE LODGE BILL, 1877-1890

The Boston Post criticized Lodge's appointment to the Committee on Elections claiming he could get nothing else. Bristling at the article, Lodge defended his appointment in a letter to his mother. The assignment was "a very important ... [one] & it is creditable to be put on by the Speaker but to be put on as I was by my own party in caucus was a very high compliment indeed & one which I prefer to any other. It is universally so considered here."[1] Clearly disgusted with congressional temporizing and anxious to get started, Lodge noted sarcastically that Congress made a violent effort at the end of December and "adopted some rules & then exhausted by the strain adjourned for two weeks." During the obligatory New Year's socializing, Lodge paid his respects to the President whom he snidely referred to as the "'highest type of American'."[2]

His first case on the Committee on Elections involved the Democratic Speaker of the House, John G. Carlisle, a representative from Kentucky. Carlisle's opponent, George H. Thobe, charged that his election had been obtained through fraud and withholding of ballots. The preliminaries of the case were presented to the Committee on January 6. Thobe and his counsel charged that Carlisle polled 2,000 fewer votes than Thobe. The New York Times gave the case front page coverage and Lodge himself noted its importance. He found the labors of the Committee tedious but was consoled by the fact that this case was "going to be the most celebrated

election case we have ever had for never before has the Speaker's seat been contested & evidence looks at the outside very ugly."[3]

On January 14, the Committee again convened to hear the reply of Carlisle's counsel, T. F. Hallam. The charges of Thobe and his counsel were denied, and affidavits were presented in support of Carlisle. Three days later the Committee voted not to extend consideration of the case, but the maneuvering was not over. On the twenty-second, the Times reported with considerable fanfare that Thobe's lawyer, J. H. Sypher, had prevailed on Lodge to extend review of the case on the basis of affidavits which the Times called "pure fabrications." The Times charged that Lodge was currying favor with the working class through his support of Thobe, a labor candidate. The case was finally laid to rest on the twenty-third when Carlisle was upheld in his right to his seat. A large number of Republicans voted with the Democrats to seat the Speaker in spite of what the Times said was an effort on Lodge's part to withhold the Republican vote completely.[4]

Lodge's own interpretation of the proceedings differed markedly from the newspaper version. In defending his position to his mother and to Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge contended that he felt justice would be served only if Thobe's case were given a full hearing. In the debate in the House, he emphasized the importance the case had for working men. He charged that Thobe's case was mismanaged from the outset and that Thobe had come to Congress virtually at the mercy of the Committee. Lodge alluded to the widespread belief that "the power of corporations, the power of 'trusts,' the power of 'rings,' the power of men in high

authority, backed by money and influence, has enormous weight in all legislative bodies in this country." Lodge rejected that notion but clearly warned that the handling of the Thobe case lent credence to that popular belief.[5]

In his first congressional contest, Lodge discovered again that political interest and principle could be fortuitously combined in the same situation. His observations to his mother suggested a genuine belief that Thobe deserved to have a full investigation of the case, and, at the same time, he realized that the case placed him and the party in the role of protector of the laboring man. At the outset, Lodge recognized that there was much political capital to be made in the case both for him and the party.

The next case to come before Lodge's committee involved James S. White, a representative from the Twelfth Indiana District. White's Democratic opponent, Robert Lowry, charged that White's application for citizenship was incomplete, and, consequently, the election was invalid. The case was considered quickly and decided cleanly without efforts to reopen. In his maiden speech before Congress, Bourke Cockran, a Democrat from New York, defended White's claim to his seat. He earned Lodge's respect and thus began a friendship which was to continue throughout the years they were in Washington. On February 7, the case was concluded with White's confirmation.[6] The experience Lodge gained in these election cases early in his congressional career sharpened his partisanship and also provided both the experience and interest which later resulted in a proposal to police congressional elections.

As Lodge wrestled with the intricacies of election cases, others began calculating how to make best use of the tariff issue. In his annual message to Congress in 1887, Cleveland opened the presidential contest recommending reform of tariff schedules. On the advice of William C. Whitney and others, Cleveland had decided to make tariff reform the centerpiece of his campaign in 1888. Lodge and other Republicans reacted with enthusiasm, believing that Cleveland and the Democratic party were vulnerable on tariff reform.[7]

Only three days after Cleveland's message, Lawrence M. Sargent of the Lawrence Manufacturing Company wrote Lodge outlining the attitude of Massachusetts' manufacturers toward Cleveland and tariff reform. Sargent made it very clear that Massachusetts' manufacturers might tolerate some moderate revision, but he and his friends from the Home Market Club, a vigorous protectionist society, did not favor any change from a general policy of protection of native manufacturers. Sargent had no need to fear Lodge's views. Unlike his outlook in the days of his association with Carl Schurz and the Liberal Republicans, Lodge had embraced protectionism. His reading of the Hamilton papers had altered his views, but political reality aided his scholarly conversion.[8]

In addition to proposing a revision in tariff schedules, the Cleveland administration championed the negotiation of reciprocity agreements, especially with Canada. Lodge saw such a move as an intregal part of the steadily worsening predicament of Gloucester's fishing fleet. In February, he wrote an article for the North American Review accusing the Canadians of harassing American fishermen. The question of the

fisheries was not just a parochial concern of an isolated New England community but involved "the dignity and honor of the United States."[9]

In yet another clue to Lodge's approach to politics, the fisheries question and the proposed reciprocity agreement combined an emotional defense of the interests of his constituents with the chance to score Cleveland's tariff policy. As with many politicians, Lodge perhaps truly identified the interests of Massachusetts with those of the nation without indulging in cant. In the North American Review article, he insisted that the historic contribution of seamen from Marblehead, Gloucester and other fishing communities in times of war entitled them to the nation's consideration. He saw those fishing communities as "nurseries of seamen" for the navy. Previewing his later views on expansion, Lodge asserted that the "ultimate solution of all these recurring troubles with Canada will be found, no doubt, in union with the United States. Such an outcome will benefit both sides, but Canada far more than us. We can afford to bide our time and await the inevitable result of the laws of political, financial, and social gravitation, for it is a case of manifest destiny."[10]

Lodge called upon his old friend, W. W. Clapp, to mobilize the Boston newspaper community to aid the cause. At the same time, he received an invitation to speak at Sanders Theatre at Harvard on the tariff. The foremost academic expert on the tariff, Frank W. Taussig wrote asking Lodge to address the Harvard Finance Club on April 2. Lodge asked the editor of the Boston Daily Advertiser to print his speech and explained that he had consented to appear because of Harvard's

reputation as a free trade center. Doubtless he also relished the opportunity to strike at the mugwumps, in their very lair.[11]

In Congress in early April, 1888, the Administration acting through the tariff reformer, Roger Q. Mills of Texas, introduced a tariff measure. After considerable review in committee, the bill was called up on April 17. Lodge was disappointed in Mills' effort to defend his measure judging the speech as "not so good as I had expected it would be." Reflecting further discontent with the older element of the Republican party, Lodge condemned the reply of Judge William D. "Pig Iron" Kelley of Pennsylvania. "He is 74 years old & altho' his speech was sound he read it & it was rather heavy & the effect was lost," complained Lodge. It would have been better to "have had McKinley with his powerful oratory & complete command of the subject."[12] The Mills' bill did not effect a sweeping reduction in rates, but did revise some of the schedules affecting New England interests. While some manufacturers welcomed the proposed reductions on raw materials, the revisions downward on woolen goods directly affected the Massachusetts economy.[13]

At the end of April, the House was still considering the Mills bill, but the speeches were largely for the benefit of home districts. Not until the bill was taken up by items would the debate grow more lively thought Lodge. The end of the debate came in mid-May with Thomas B. Reed and John G. Carlisle closing for the Republican and Democratic parties respectively. Lodge had earlier written his mother glowing accounts of Reed's abilities, but he praised lavishly the

style and force of Reed's speech.[14] As tariff reform ground to a halt in a protectionist-minded Senate, Lodge's attention turned to presidential politics and his own upcoming campaign.

Lodge and Roosevelt began speculating privately and publicly about the nomination as early as January, 1888. In a newspaper interview, Lodge pointed to Blaine as the leading contender at that time only to have the mugwumps criticize him. Other president makers such as Wharton Barker, investment banker turned journalist, early boomed the candidacy of John Sherman only to turn to Walter Q. Gresham and finally Benjamin Harrison. After Blaine's letter in February taking himself out of contention, Lodge wrote his old political associate, Robert A. Southworth, saying much the same thing that he had said to the reporter for the Boston Daily Advertiser, that Blaine's letter was definitive and should be taken at face value.[15]

Sensing the opportunity the party had to win in 1888, Lodge was eager to go to the convention in June. Lodge emphasized in his letter to Southworth his previous experience in the conventions of 1880 and 1884 and his desire to go as a delegate-at-large in 1888. To be a delegate from a district was an honor, but to be elected a delegate-at-large was political recognition of a higher order. With a keen eye for the interests of Massachusetts and himself, he noted that "there is a very fair chance that the Vice-Presidency might come to us if we handle matters rightly & a western soldier should be nominated."[16] Lodge thought that his contacts with leaders of the party would aid in handling Massachusetts' interests, and he saw clearly the need to have

a soldier on the ballot.

Unhappily, Alanson W. Beard who had managed Dawes' campaign for the Senate in 1887 was also seeking the post. The bitter division between the older element of the party and the "young men" continued to boil. Lodge's friends urged him not to run for delegate-at-large fearing that a contest between Lodge and Beard would open up old wounds and fracture the party when unity was essential. Initially, Lodge's fighting instincts were aroused, and he urged W. E. Barrett of the Advertiser to mobilized the young men of the party and make a real fight for the post. After some reflection and the advice from W. W. Clapp that "elected or defeated the position of delegate is not worth what it will cut you,"[17] Lodge decided to withdraw from the contest. The Lodge-Beard contest was known even to Mark Hanna who was promoting John Sherman's candidacy.[18]

In late May and early June, Lodge unburdened himself to his successor on the State Central Committee and Robert A. Southworth. Lodge was still nursing a grievance against Beard for knocking him out as a delegate-at-large and rueing the lost opportunity not only to aid in president making but also to further his own career. To both men, Lodge repeated his desire that the party choose coolly and carefully a candidate "who can command every Republican vote."[19] Lodge insisted that he had no particular preference but leaned toward Gresham, Sherman, Harrison, or Russell A. Alger, Governor of Michigan.

Revealing the political insight which would make him a major figure in the Senate, Lodge insisted that the candidacy must combine

either a western soldier and an eastern civilian or the reverse. He ruled out Chauncey Depew because of his unpopularity in the West and his connection with the New York Central. As to Sherman, he believed him "the best equipped man among the candidates [but] would run less well than any of them...."[20] Alger was weak because of his great wealth which Lodge thought ought not make a difference but unhappily did. Harrison could carry Indiana which was a major point in his favor, but seemed weak outside of his own state. Unlike his attitude in 1884, Lodge did not have a candidate, nor did he especially oppose any of the contenders. Most of all, "I want to win with an earnestness which I cannot express & which comes from a close view of Democratic administration & southern rule."[21] Clearly, his experience with election cases and especially cases involving Republicans in the South deepened his desire for a winner in 1888.

Early in June, the Democrats met and nominated Cleveland as everyone expected with the platform trimming somewhat on the reduction of the tariff that Cleveland had first recommended in his annual message of December, 1887. Lodge believed the Democratic platform precisely what the Republican party needed for victory in the general election in November. On June 19, without Lodge's assistance, the Republicans met in Chicago and the struggle began. On the twentieth, the platform was reported with a traditionally high tariff posture being the focus of the document. As the days passed and the Sherman, Alger, Blaine, Harrison and Gresham forces maneuvered, Lodge grew ever more nervous about the result. He was greatly concerned that the furious struggle for the nomination might result in serious damage to

Republican chances. Doubtless, Lodge congratulated Harrison, the nominee, on June 27 with genuine pleasure and considerable relief. A bitter fight had been avoided, and the party entered the contest with no internal wounds. Republicans directed their energies against Democrats instead of against one another.[22]

On July 24, in a speech at Tremont Temple, Lodge repeated the stock Republican positions on soldiers' pensions, protection of American industry and civil service reform. In the partisan manner of the day, he assailed the Democratic party as the party of the South and free trade. With only slightly veiled references to the mugwumps, he courted the increasingly important Irish vote and Anglophobes in general.[23] This was not the first time Lodge twisted the British Lion's tail to the delight of his Irish constituents, nor was it the last. His jaundiced view of the British was deeply rooted in his historical studies and family history. This was another one of those happy occasions when political self-interest coincided with personal conviction.

With the presidential contest going well, Lodge turned his attention to his own re-election in 1888. His opponent in the Sixth District was Colonel R. G. Usher, a former U.S. Marshal, paymaster, Mayor of Lynn and member of the governor's council. Lodge conducted his usual thorough and energetic campaign with a convincing victory in November. Lodge defeated Usher 19,598 to 14,272 and ran ahead of Harrison and the gubernatorial candidate. Although he still had difficulty with the Boston wards, his margin in traditionally Democratic Lynn was 800. He also picked up one Boston ward where he had lost all three in 1884.

While he basked in congratulations, he nonetheless found time to write a note to Harrison. Lodge shrewdly understood the need to keep his name in the presidential mind and to cultivate presidential favor.[24]

In spite of the rigors of his committee work in January, 1888, Lodge devoted some of his time to civil service reform. In a letter to his mother, he remarked with pleasure at his sponsorship of a bill to extend the operation of the reform. In May, he worked for the appropriations bill for the Civil Service Commission. With fully twelve years of work in behalf of the reform behind him, he urged Benjamin Harrison in June to give full support to civil service reform. Lodge maintained that such a posture would benefit his campaign. After Harrison's election, Lodge quietly campaigned for the reform in principle and the appointment of his friend, Theodore Roosevelt, as a civil service commissioner.[25]

Lodge enlisted Reed in his efforts to secure Roosevelt's nomination, and Reed willingly agreed to help. He also solicited the support of James G. Blaine and his son, Walker. With the appointment of Blaine as Secretary of State, Lodge and his wife grew ever closer to Blaine and his family. In March, 1889, Lodge approached Harrison to urge Roosevelt's appointment, but found Harrison characteristically "reserved" at that point. The news about Roosevelt's appointment finally came from Blaine in a note to Mrs. Lodge.[26] As early as 1876, Lodge had supported civil service reform, but after Roosevelt's appointment to the Civil Service Commission, he took an even greater interest in the reform. Roosevelt quickly conflicted with John Wanamaker, Harrison's Postmaster General.

Lodge was called upon to play the role of intermediary between Roosevelt and Harrison whose policies on civil service reform Roosevelt thought "boneless." Lodge consoled his friend, and he carefully reassured Roosevelt about Harrison's attitude to prevent the sometimes brash Roosevelt from openly breaking with the administration. Over the next few years, Lodge used every opportunity to advance the cause of civil service reform and his friend's political career.[27]

Concurrently with his work on behalf of civil service reform, Lodge attended to patronage matters and state politics. At stake in 1889 was the Collectorship of the Port of Boston, one of the more important patronage plums in Massachusetts. He launched early in February, 1889, Frank L. Burden's campaign for the post almost a year before the appointment was made. Unhappily, his old nemesis of 1887, Alanson W. Beard, was also a contender for the place. The unpleasant division between the "young men" of the party and the "elder statesmen" continued to trouble the party. A positive note was Lodge's success in securing the post of Assistant Secretary of State for William F. Wharton. Still smarting from the attacks of the mugwumps, Lodge observed that Wharton was "one of the few who stood firm in 1884. That little group in Boston whom he represents in this respect deserve the recognition which they get in him."[28] Other patronage matters weighed more heavily and less agreeably in the spring. The ever insatiable Jerry J. McCarthy attacked Lodge for reneging on a promise to secure his appointment as Collector of Internal Revenue. The Charlestown Navy Yard likewise caused considerable anguish, but as the fall election season approached,

a more amiable task came to him, chairing the Committee on Resolutions of the State Republican Convention.[29]

The convention met in late September with George D. Robinson presiding. After five years of close political association, Lodge felt very comfortable with Robinson heading the Convention. The Advertiser praised Lodge's work on the platform of the party as "the ablest platform which any republican convention has adopted this year.... It breathes a spirit of progressive and aggressive republicanism worthy of the best days of the grand old party in Massachusetts."[30] In fact, the platform was very tactful and inoffensive but hardly a masterpiece of progressive republicanism. It commended Harrison for his appointments, supported the civil service concept, reaffirmed traditional doctrine on the tariff and deftly straddled on the temperance question. Roosevelt quickly congratulated his friend on his handiwork adding that it appeared Lodge had beaten Beard on the Collectorship. He expressed concern, however, about J.Q.A. Brackett, the party's candidate for governor.[31]

Roosevelt was right in his assumption that the matter of the collectorship was coming to an issue, but wrong about the ultimate outcome. After the Republicans scored a narrow victory in early November, Lodge turned his efforts to Burden's pursuit of the collectorship. He attempted to mobilize that part of the press which he thought might be receptive to Burden's cause. Energetically but unconvincingly, Lodge contended from mid-November until the conclusion of the contest in December that his attacks on Beard were not personal but emanated from his concern for the welfare of the party, Late in November, he appealed to a number of

the younger members of the party to wage a vigorous campaign of letter writing to the senators from Massachusetts, Henry L. Dawes and George Frisbie Hoar, who had chief responsibility for filling the place. On December 9, he wrote Burden explaining that he would not only present his papers to the President, but make sure "that they are properly laid before the Public in the press,..."[32]

In spite of letter writing, personal interviews with Senator Hoar, and lobbying with Blaine, Lodge sensed that he had lost the struggle as he came away from a meeting with Harrison on the evening of the fourteenth. His premonitions were confirmed when Harrison sent in Beard's name. In two years, the wily Beard defeated Lodge three times. Lodge's energy and youth were no match for the seniority and political acumen of the generation that had spawned the party.[33]

A major contest within Congress which consumed a year of Lodge's time was his successful management of Thomas B. Reed's candidacy for Speaker of the House. In December, 1888, Lodge asked his friend, W. W. Clapp of the Journal to promote Reed in the press. Lodge appealed to Clapp's New England chauvinism pointing out that a solid Massachusetts delegation for Reed would strengthen the region's congressional position. As the lame duck Congress ground on with the Democrats obstructing any substantive action, Lodge's enthusiasm for Reed increased. He consulted his sources in Massachusetts as to whether Reed could expect to receive the support of the veteran element of the state.[34]

At Christmas, the Boston Daily Advertiser interviewed him, and the reporter repeated a rumor that Lodge himself was a candidate for Speaker.

Lodge "laughed and remarked that while he appreciated the compliment of such a mention, either by newspapers or among his fellow members, still he did not think it was a statement which required either comment or denial. He was strongly and unqualifiedly for Mr. Reed, as he supposed every other New England member was...."[35] While he lightly passed off the suggestion to the reporter, Lodge took pride in the rumor. As Lodge fended off reporters and discreetly contacted fellow members of the House, Reed complemented these efforts on the floor of the House through his sponsorship of a rules change aimed at overcoming the filibustering tactics of the minority.[36]

On Roosevelt's western trip to investigate post office corruption, he also pushed Reed's quest for the speakership. Roosevelt exhorted Lodge to write the Governor of Minnesota and try to secure his support for Reed. In late July, 1889, Roosevelt saw the governor and reported that he was "all straight for Reed," but was uncertain exactly what the governor would be able to do for Reed. The candidate himself was quietly working his way with Matt Quay, the Pennsylvania boss, and assured Lodge that Roosevelt's work would be of real value.[37] In the heat of August, it became ever clearer that Reed's chief opponent was William McKinley who had befriended Lodge when he first entered the House in 1886. Lodge liked McKinley, but thought Reed better qualified for the speakership.

In September and October, Reed looked after the delegations from Kansas and Pennsylvania observing that Don Cameron of Pennsylvania thought Quay would help. Reed rejected speculation in the press that

Kansas might go for McKinley. Drawing on his previous organizational experience, Lodge suggested that key members be contacted and asked to provide lists of their congressional delegations marked as to their likely votes in the speakership contest.[39] As the final lap of the race approached, Roosevelt wrote that Frank Hiscock (R-N.Y.) had told him that the New York delegation was "practically solid' for Reed." Encouraging words also came from his old political mentor, Elihu B. Hayes in Lynn. In spite of apparent victory, the ever cautious Lodge felt that the unified campaign of the other candidates against Reed was damaging and indeed "some of it is not very creditable."[40] Reed's victory in December, 1889, put Lodge in the familiar role of intermediary. With pride, he wrote his mother that "as I am thought to be very near the throne I am besieged with requests from members all over the country to intercede for them. So I carry these requests to Reed as he desires & am kept busy thereby."[41]

While Lodge managed Reed's candidacy because of his friendly feeling and a genuine conviction that Reed was the best candidate, the practical result was his appointment to the chair of the Committee on Elections. This was a special mark of favor in view of the importance of elections legislation in the first session of the Fifty-first Congress. He also received second place on the Naval Affairs Committee, an appointment of importance to a Congressman from a seaboard state. Lodge's talents at quiet organization and his urgings of verbal restraint to Reed brought a success which both men relished. The victorious campaign for Reed helped to offset the disappointment of Burden's loss.[42]

As Chairman of the Elections Committee in the House, Lodge had great influence in the formulation of a Federal Elections Bill. As early as 1874, Lodge evinced a concern for honest elections, particularly in the South, which would protect the right of the blacks to the ballot. Later, in 1879, he wrote an article for Atlantic Monthly, this time to buttress his work on electoral reform in Massachusetts. In spite of his critics, Lodge's sponsorship of the Force Bill issued out of a compound of idealism and practical politics. Lodge remembered fondly his father's connection with Charles Sumner, and his first introduction to national politics came as a Liberal Republican at the end of the Reconstruction era. Lodge was no ideologue determined to stir anew the sectional animosities of Radical Reconstruction, but neither had he abandoned all of the ideals of his youth.[43]

Dishonest election practices involving blacks arose in the contested McDuffie-Davidson election case in March, 1888. John V. McDuffie of Haynesville, Alabama, questioned the election of Alexander C. Davidson of Uniontown. On March 5, Lodge systematically outlined the pattern of fraud and deception used to deny McDuffie his place in the House. First, a sham candidate was introduced to "divert attention." More infuriating than such stalking horses was outright fraud of the most blatant sort. "We have testimony, for instance, in the city of Selma, that nine men voted who were not there. Most of them were dead. We know, sir, on the highest literary authority, that -

> In the most high and palmy state of Rome
> A little ere the mightiest Julius fell,
> The graves stood tenantless, and the sheeted dead
> Did squeak and gibber in the Roman streets.

The sheeted dead did much better than that in Selma, Ala. - they voted."[44]

Although the "'jack-boot and saber policy'" had been discontinued, Lodge maintained that gerrymandering of black districts was practiced along with very basic fraud on the part of county election supervisors who simply discarded precinct returns if necessary. The McDuffie-Davidson situation contained all of the abuses which cried out for federal supervision through an Elections bill. Without cant, Lodge assailed the actions of elections officials in Alabama charging that because a "man is helpless and ignorant and black it is all the more discreditable to cheat him; the more helpless he is, the more he is at a man's mercy, the more unworthy and unmanly to do him wrong."[45] Lodge's upper class sense of noblesse oblige and New England conscience were showing. After Davidson was seated, Lodge wrote with bitterness that "to Southern Election frauds the Northern conscience is dead and the Democratic party profits too much by them to do otherwise than uphold them."[46] It was small wonder that Lodge relished the thought of a Republican candidate in 1888 who could win and possibly aid in bringing remedial legislation.

After Harrison's victory in November, 1888, Lodge continued to worry about elections fraud, confiding to a political associate that it might be necessary to organize protests in northern cities against abuses in the South and wherever Republicans had been denied fair treatment. Lodge was not alone, however, in addressing the issue. In a very long letter, William E. Chandler (R.-N.H.) wrote the President-elect

outlining what he saw as the chief issues before the new administration. The first matter Chandler mentioned was the enforcement of the 15th Amendment to the Constitution. Chandler was of the same political generation as George F. Hoar, and the two men shared a deep concern for fair elections.[47]

With the inauguration of Harrison in March, 1889, and Reed's successful race for the Speakership, Lodge looked more confidently to the future in general and more specifically to the question of elections legislation. In September, he wrote an article for the North American Review on the upcoming Congress. Lodge contended that an elections law was more important even than the tariff, which must have seemed rank heresy to some. He denied that there was any intention to use the issue as a party cry or to obtain sectional advantage. The idea that such a law could not be enforced in some sections of the nation, he claimed, was idle. With satisfaction, he pointed to the adoption of the Australian ballot in Massachusetts as a model. In November and December, Lodge and William E. Chandler both received letters on election reform. Lodge wrote one constituent that he would have Senator Chandler's clerk forward a copy of Chandler's bill and would see that copies of bills introduced in the House would be sent as well when they were introduced. It was with this background that Lodge began his direction of the House Committee on Elections in 1890.[48]

As Chandler received tales of fraud and intimidation from Mississippi, Lodge outlined his views of reform legislation to Elihu B. Hayes. Lodge thought that efforts to make the bill apply only to the

South should be rejected. Something similar to Massachusetts's new election law was most desirable. By hearsay, he had learned Hoar's views, which he thought simply confirmed "how completely some of the older leaders in the state are out of touch with the issues and the public sentiment of today."[49] Thus the generational issue in the party which had surfaced in 1887 and again in 1890 continued to boil. In March, 1890, after consultations with a member of the Republican State Central Committee in Massachusetts, Lodge was ready to introduce an elections bill into the Committee on Elections. The bill provided for federal oversight of elections through the appointment of federal registrars. Upon appeal, district judges would appoint these registrars who would monitor activities at the polls. The intent was to circumvent the political and racial pressures which were frequently brought to bear on local election officials in the South.[50]

In some areas, the response of the press was positive, with the New York Times praising the bill editorially. Lodge was pleased with the attitude of the Times since it was a "bitter Mugwump & Cleveland paper," as he told his mother. The German language press also accorded the bill a favorable reception. The reaction of organized labor was not as positive, however, with criticism that Lodge's bill would undermine local control of elections.[51]

The wife of the chairman of the Republican State Committee of Georgia wrote Lodge protesting that rather than an election law, what the Republican party in the South needed was a Republican press. She also pointed out that it was much more comfortable for Lodge to present

such a measure a thousand miles from the South than for her husband to have to deal with the attacks of the Atlanta Consitution. With great effect, she observed that fair elections ought to have been assured years before during Reconstruction. Lodge keenly felt her criticisms and admitted the justice of most of them.

By contrast, from Mayville, New York, came words of praise and support from Albion W. Tourgee, the novelist and social critic. Tourgee, who was a representative of the liberal, northern conscience on the question of race, wrote Lodge constructive suggestions on the bill and encouragement. In March, April and May, he consulted with Speaker Reed, lobbied the president and testified before the Committee on Elections. Tourgee's commitment to the measure was complete and established an important link between the Federal Elections bill and the ideals of Reconstruction. For Tourgee, it must have rekindled memories of the crusades of his youth for racial justice in North Carolina.[52]

Meanwhile, the legislative machinery ground on. With the heat of summer coming on in June, Lodge looked forward to hammering out a final version of the bill which could be passed and would complete his winter's work. With the agreement of the party caucus on the sort of bill wanted, he hoped for "a little vacation" at home to recuperate from the rigors of the session. The final round of the battle for an elections bill was approaching, and Lodge threw himself into the task. On June 26, 1890, he defended the measure on the floor of the House in what was his first really significant speech.[53]

Unlike his performance in the McDuffie-Davidson case, the speech

Lodge delivered on June 26 was one in which he took justifiable pride. It was greeted with applause from the galleries and clearly explicated both the bill and the position of those who supported such legislation. Lodge started with an explanation in general terms of the goals of the legislation. He maintained that one of the essential aims of the measure was to create an open election process where votes would be cast honestly and without intimidation. Additionally, the intent of the bill was to protect voters in the exercise of their rights from physical threat or danger.[54]

Lodge then refuted the criticism that the bill was an unconstitutional interference in local affairs. He insisted that the decisions of the Supreme Court clearly confirmed Congress' power to deal with the matter. As to the complaint that the bill was aimed at the South Lodge countered that "this bill is a national bill, intended to guard Congressional elections in every part of the country when it may be demanded." Admitting that the proper remedy for many electoral abuses was the Australian ballot, Lodge emphasized that "we have gone as far in this bill ... as we can go in a bill which does not provide for a secret and official ballot."[55]

He closed his speech with some prescient comments about the nature of the elections question in the South and its relationship to the question of race. Denying that he wished to cast stones at his southern brethren, Lodge observed that the blacks had been for the most part loyal to their masters during the Civil War and that "such loyalty and fidelity as this demand some better reward from the people

of this country both North and South than the Negro has received. What he needs is neither brutality on the one hand nor sentimentality on the other. He should not be petted and coddled because he is a negro-American, nor should he be intimidated and cast out for the same reason."[56]

Arguing that integrating the black into society ought to be the goal of all sections, Lodge maintained that "the first step... toward the settlement of the negro problem and toward the elevation and protection of the race is to take it out of national party politics." With an eye to the future, he warned that "the United States must extend to every citizen equal rights. It is a duty which they cannot avoid. If they do not perform it now they will perform it later, and the longer it is postponed the worse the consequences will be." The appeal to race supremacy in the South denied whites as well as blacks their rights.[57]

The reaction to the speech in Massachusetts came quickly and was generally positive. In the blistering heat of July, the bill was brought to a vote, barely passing 155 to 149. The battle had taken its toll for the Advertiser correspondent described Lodge as "tired and careworn."[58]

It was now up to the Senate to work its way with the issue, and Lodge urged careful and prompt attention. Lodge and Reed asked Chandler to take the matter in hand. Chandler, Eugene Hale (R.-Me.), George F. Hoar, Orville H. Platt (R.-Conn.), and others were sympathetic to reform if not necessarily to the Lodge bill. But action on the question depended not only on a rules change to prevent filibustering but also

on the good will of Senators more concerned with other issues. As the Lodge bill stirred controversy both in the Senate and outside in the general population, Lodge watched the proceedings with trepidation and a sense of helplessness. He urged the merits of the measure on Harrison who was sympathetic but unwilling to push for the legislation.[59]

In August, Lodge continued to champion the reform in a speech in Portland, Maine. In the Senate, members were receiving sometimes vicious letters condemning the Lodge bill and threatening that its passage would prompt economic retaliation of the South against the North. Lodge and Nannie received letters supporting the bill from friends inside the government and in the general public.[60]

For Lodge, the fight turned to the public prints in September. In an article that purported to deal with the bill, Terence Powderly assailed the law, but gave a good deal of attention to indimidation of employees at the hands of their employers. Lodge answered Powderly's criticism that the bill undercut local control of elections insisting that "it interferes with no man's rights." He also denied that it was a force bill pointing out that there "is absolutely no allusion to anything or anybody remotely connected with bayonets..."[61]

In spite of Lodge's efforts in the press and quiet lobbying, the bill did not reach the floor of the Senate in the first session of the fifty-first Congress. The measure was bound over until the second session which began in December, 1890. As Congress resumed its operations after the holidays, Blaine prepared Mrs. Lodge for the

ultimate defeat of the Lodge bill and blamed its demise on Senator Hoar who he said had "antagonized everybody in the most provoking way & has put Senators by the ears in such [an] angry mood as has not been seen since the downfall of the Rebellion."[62] To Blaine, Hoar had antagonized many who might otherwise have ignored the sectional dimension in federal supervision of elections.

Lodge continued to hope that the bill would finally pass in spite of the threats from outside Congress and the maneuvering within. He lobbied Senator Stephen B. Elkins of West Virginia and found him friendly. When he reached home January 5, however, he discovered that the election bill had been laid aside in favor of silver legislation which elicited the bitter comment that "it was sold & sold for dishonest money ...." In the Senate, some supporters hoped to get the measure back up after the silver bill, but were not overly optimistic.[63]

In spite of a few false hopes in January, Lodge realized that the bill was dead. Senator Hoar virtually pronounced its eulogy in an article for Forum in March, 1891. Hoar reaffirmed his commitment to the principles of the Republican Platform of 1888 which called for election legislation to remove abuses, and he assailed the business interests of the country for avoiding the question for the past fifteen years. Hoar continued to believe, but the nation and Congress had turned their backs on the black and on federal supervision of elections. Lodge, who had been drawn to the reform because of political pragmatism and idealism, underlined the death of the reform in 1892 in a letter to a consituent when he observed that another such bill "would never be heard of after it was introduced."[64]

While the struggle for an Elections bill ended in bitter defeat, Lodge learned much about the difficulties of shepherding a measure through Congress and the mood of the nation on black rights. Positively, he had brought forward a measure which identified his name with a particular issue even if it was controversial. His work on the bill had also raised his stock among party leaders. In a very real sense, Lodge had advanced his political career even if being identified with elections legislation did injure him in some quarters.

Footnotes

1. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 18, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS.

2. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 25, 1887, January 8, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS.

3. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 8, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS; New York Times, January 7, 1888, p.2.

4. New York Times, January 7, 15, 18, 23, 24, 1888.

5. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 15, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record, January 20, 1888, 50th Cong. 1st sess., p. 601; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, January 17, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS.

6. New York Times, February 3, 5, 7, 1888; Congressional Record 50th Cong. 1st sess., February 6, 1888, pp. 175ff.; Lodge to A. C. Lodge, February 5, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS.

7. H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969), pp. 271, 274; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 11, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS.

8. Sargent to H.C. Lodge, December 9, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS; Blanchard to H.C. Lodge, November 23, 24, 1886, Lodge Papers, MHS.

9. Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Fisheries Question," North American Review CXLVI (February, 1888), pp. 121ff.

10. Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Fisheries Question," pp. 128-130; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 26, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS.

11. Taussig to H.C. Lodge, March 14, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS: Lodge to W.E. Barrett, March 23, 1888, Lodge Letterbooks, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. W. Clapp, March 4, 1888, Clapp Papers, Harvard University.

12. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, April 22, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS.

13. Sargent to H.C. Lodge, February 11, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS: Wharton Barker likewise regarded protection as virtually an article of Republican faith and virtually demanded that Gresham as a candidate in 1888 take the oath. Barker to Walter Q. Gresham, May 25, 1888, Barker Papers, LC; F.W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931, pp. 254-255.

14. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 8, April 28, May 20, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS.

15. Barker to John Sherman, January 13, 21, 1888, Sherman Papers, LC; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, January 15, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, February 14, 1888, p. 1.

16. Lodge to Robert A. Southworth, February 14, 1888, Lodge Letterbooks, Lodge Papers, MHS.

17. Clapp to H.C. Lodge, March 19, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. E. Barrett, March 19, 23, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS; Italics in original.

18. Hanna to John Sherman, May 3, 1888, Sherman Papers, LC: Italics in original.

19. Lodge to F. L. Burden, May 21, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS; Italics in original.

20. Lodge to R. A. Southworth, June 3, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS.

21. Lodge to F. L. Burden, May 21, 1888, Lodge Letterbooks, Lodge Papers, MHS.

22. Lodge to Benjamin Harrison, June 27, 1888, Harrison Papers, LC: Lodge to A.C. Lodge, June 16, 24, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, July 14, October 19, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS; Sherman to Mark Hanna, June 19, 1888, Sherman Papers, LC; Sherman to George F. Hoar, June 23, 1888, Sherman Papers, LC; H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, pp. 295-300.

23. Boston Daily Advertiser, July 25, 1888, p. 9.

24. Lodge to Benjamin Harrison, November 9, 1888, Harrison Papers, LC; Boston Daily Advertiser, October 11, 21, November 7, 1888.

25. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, May 11, 1889, January 8, 1888, May 27, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Benjamin Harrison, June 27, 1888, Harrison Papers, LC; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 29, 1889, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

26. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, May 11, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 29, 1889, Roosevelt Papers, LC; Blaine to Mrs. H.C. Lodge, Spring, 1889 [probably April or May], Lodge Papers, MHS.

27. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, July 1, 11, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, July 13, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, July 13, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, August 15, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, September 18, 28, October 8, 17, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Coming Congress," North American Review CXLIX (September, 1889), pp. 299-300. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 21, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS.

28. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 31, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to F. L. Burden, February 9, 1889, Letterbook I, Lodge Papers, MHS.

29. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 23, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Robert A. Southworth, April 22, 1889, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser August 27, 1889, p. 4.

30. Boston Daily Advertiser, September 26, 1889, p. 4.

31. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, September 26, 27, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS.

32. Lodge to W. W. Clapp, November 18, 20, 1889, Clapp Papers, Harvard University; Lodge to F. L. Burden, November 25, December 9, 1889, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Curtis Guild, Jr., November 25, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to J. O. Burdett, December 9, 1889, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Charles W. Fairchild, December 9, 1889, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS.

33. Lodge to Charles W. Fairchild, December 10, 14, 1889, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 15, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to J. Otis Wardwell, February 8, 1890, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS.

34. Lodge to J. J. McCarthy, December 17, 1889, Letterbook I, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 9, 16, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. W. Clapp, December 4, 1889, Clapp Papers, Harvard University.

35. Boston Daily Advertiser, December 27, 1888, p. 1.

36. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 30, 1888, January 6, 13, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS.

37. Roosevelt to Constance and H.C. Lodge, June 12, August 1, 8, 1889, Lodge Papers MHS; Reed to H.C. Lodge, August 22, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS.

38. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 9, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS.

39. Lawrence F. Kennedy (comp.), Biographical Directory of the American Congresses (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 243-248; Reed to H.C. Lodge, September 3, 13, October 14, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to T. B. Reed, October 8, 1889, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College.

40. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, October 30, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, November 24, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hayes to H.C. Lodge, November 25, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS.

41. Lodge to C.A. Coffin, December 7, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 8, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS.

42. Reed's penchant for quick acid remarks was notorious and certainly hurt his career. Even he himself recognized this weakness. He wrote Lodge that he did not mind "your stilling me up. I need it." Reed to H.C. Lodge, September 3, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 21, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Samuel W. McCall, The Life of Thomas Brackett Reed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), p. 163.

43. Henry Cabot Lodge, "Limited Sovereignty in the United States," Atlantic Monthly XLIII (February, 1879), pp. 184-192; Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, September 15, 1874, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Early Memories, pp. 45, 46; Henry CAbot Lodge, "The Coming Congress," p. 297.

44. Congressional Record 50th Cong. 1st sess., March 5, 1888, pp. 1751-1752.

45. Congressional Record 50th Cong. 1st sess., March 5, 1888, pp. 1750-1753; Boston Daily Advertiser, March 6, 1888, p. 2.

46. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 11, 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS.

47. Lodge to F. L. Burden, November 23, 1888, Letterbook I, Lodge Papers, MHS; Chandler to Benjamin Harrison, December 22, 1888, Harrison Papers, LC; Boston Daily Advertiser August 5, 1886, p. 4; George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years Vol. I (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), p. 377.

48. Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Coming Congress," pp. 297-299; Stamps to William E. Chandler, November 27, 1889, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to Wellington Wells, December 20, 1889, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS.

49. Lodge to E. B. Hayes, January 9, 1890, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS; McGill to William E. Chandler, January 8, 1890, Chandler Papers, LC.

50. Lodge to J. Otis Wardwell, February 8, 1890, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 17, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Eckley to H.C. Lodge, April 21, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS.

51. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 17, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Sleicher to H.C. Lodge, March 19, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; "The Lodge Bill," Review of Reviews VIII (March 22, 1890), pp. 551-553; Eckley to H.C. Lodge, March 17, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS.

52. Buck to H.C. Lodge, March 20, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Tourgee to H.C. Lodge, March 31, April 9, 30, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Tourgee to Benjamin Harrison, April 12, May 2, 1890, Harrison Papers, LC; Albion W. Tourgee, A Fool's Errand (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), "Albion Tourgee, Social Critic," John Hope Franklin, pp. vii-xxviii.

53. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, June 8, 15, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 51st Cong. 1st sess., June 26, 1890, pp. 6538-6544.

54. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, June 29, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 51st Cong. 1st sess., June 26, 1890, pp. 6538-6544.

55. Congressional Record 51st Cong. 1st sess., June 26, 1890, pp. 6538-6544.

56. Congressional Record 51st Cong. 1st sess., June 26, 1890, p. 6543.

57. Congressional Record 51st Cong. 1st sess. June 26, 1890, p. 6544.

58. Guild to H.C. Lodge, June 28, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS: Hart to H.C. Lodge, August 13, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Butler to H.C. Lodge, November 10, 25, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Thomas B. Reed, "The Federal Control of Elections," North American Review CL (June, 1890), pp. 671-680; Boston Daily Advertiser, July 3, 1890, p. 5.

59. Chandler to H.C. Lodge, July 7, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. E. Chandler, July 10, 1890, Chandler Papers, LC; Platt to W. E. Chandler, July 22, 1890, Chandler Papers, LC; Hale to W. E. Chandler, July 24, 1890, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to E. B. Haskell, August 8, 1890, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Benjamin Harrison, August 18, 1890, Harrison Papers, LC; H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, pp. 339-342; David J. Rothman, Politics and Power: The United States Senate, 1869-1901 (New York: Atheneum, 1969, pp. 98-100; George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years, Vol. II, p. 377.

60. Bateman to John Sherman, August 5, 1890, Sherman Papers, LC; Clifford to H.C. Lodge, August 20, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hoar to John Sherman, August 26, 1890, Sherman Papers, LC; Blaine to Mrs. H.C. Lodge, August 31, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS.

61. Terence V. Powderly, "The Federal Election Bill," North American Review CLI (September, 1890), pp. 268-273; Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Federal Election Bill," North American Review CLI (September, 1890, pp. 257-264.

62. Blaine to Mrs. H.C. Lodge, January 4, 1891, Lodge Papers, MHS.

63. Henry CAbot Lodge, Journal, January 5, 1891, Lodge Papers, MHS; Davenport to W.E. Chandler, January 8, 1891, Chandler Papers, LC.

64. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 18, 1891, Lodge Papers, MHS; George F. Hoar, "Fate of the Election Bill," Forum (March, 1891), pp. 127-136; Boston Daily Advertiser, March 7, 1891, p. 1; Lodge to Nathan Appleton, January 17, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Vincent P. DeSantis, Republicans Face the Southern Question (New York: Greenwood Press, 1959), pp. 198-210.

CHAPTER VI

NATIONAL POLITICS AND THE SENATE, 1890-1893

The three major issues before Congress in 1890 were elections legislation, the tariff and the regulation of trusts. Lodge was active in only the first of these questions, but he did take an interest in the McKinley Tariff passed September 30 and the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of July 14. In May, 1890, he commented briefly on the tariff bill in the House, but was most impressed with what he called "wrangling over the tariff culminating in a disgraceful exchange of personalities...." While Lodge tried to be a good party soldier and defend the general principles of the McKinley bill, he felt uncomfortable with some of its features. In May, he assured his constituents that he favored some reductions from the levels contemplated in the bill. In its final form, the measure disappointed him as it did Roosevelt.[1]

On the money issue, Lodge heard from his associates in the Boston financial community who opposed free coinage, but favored the Sherman Silver Purchase Act as a desirable compromise. Lodge's cousin, Henry L. Higginson of Lee, Higginson & Co., admitted that there might be insufficient stocks of gold to provide a flexible supply of money. To meet the needs of a growing industrial society for money, Higginson suggested that the government move in the direction of bimetallism. Lodge replied with a defense of the McKinley tariff and some strictures on the

financial policy of England. He charged Whitehall with trying to keep London the financial capital of the world at the expense of normal financial relations. As to silver, he believed that bimetallism was the proper course as it had been the choice of Hamilton, and "we have had very few financiers who equalled him." The demand for free coinage was deplorable since it was nothing more than a way for debtors to pay their obligations at a 25 percent discount.[2]

Of greater interest to Lodge than silver legislation was the battle in the spring for appropriations for the Civil Service Commission. He began as early as January coaching Richard Henry Dana on how to bring pressure to bear in behalf of appropriations for the Commission. He urged Dana to get up a petition and write William Cogswell, a fellow member of the Massachusetts congressional delegation. By April, the appropriations had been assured, but Lodge continued to consult with Roosevelt whose career in civil service reform he had launched in 1889. Since it was difficult for Roosevelt to attack the opponents of the reform, Lodge obliged and not only presented a spirited defense of civil service on the floor of the House but also assailed those who Roosevelt dared not attack.[3] At long last in June, the Civil Service Committee of the House issued its report on the work of the Commission and gave it a "clean bill of health." Nonetheless, Lodge looked after Roosevelt when a representative from Ohio attacked Roosevelt's work. In October, Lodge wrote an article for Century on the evils of patronage.[4] Lodge argued that dispensing offices took great quantities of a representative's time and distracted him from his primary task of legislating.

In the spring, as he and Roosevelt fought for civil service reform, the international copyright bill came up only to go down to defeat. As an author and a representative of a state with a literary tradition, Lodge was deeply saddened at the defeat of the measure. Late in the summer, he wrote on behalf of international copyright in the Atlantic Monthly. Admitting that it was not a panacea, he argued that it was the most basic sort of protection of property, the property of ideas. He denied that it would mean the end of inexpensive books and the creation of a trust in publishing. He closed his argument with an appeal to national honor. "It does not become the United States, holding a high place in the forefront of the nations, to stand like a highway robber beside the pathway of civilization, and rob the foreign author of his property with one hand, while it deprives the American author of his rights with the other."[5]

Only one month after the copyright bill was defeated, Lodge experienced a more personal kind of loss. He was not re-elected as an overseer at the Harvard graduation. In spite of the reassurance and righteous indignation of his friends, the rebuff stung deeply. One of his friends thought that it was political as Lodge's views on the tariff were not popular among the Harvard faculty. Roosevelt was so concerned about the affair that he wrote Dana and asked for an explanation. Dana answered that politics had not played a role in Lodge's defeat, but rather it had been Lodge's attacks on the faculty and the profession of political economy. According to Dana, much had been expected of Lodge because of his study of the issue and he had simply restated the old

fallacies about the tariff. In spite of Dana's disclaimers, it appears that there was a political motive behind the attack on Lodge as overseer.[6]

As early as February, Lodge began his second campaign for re-election to the House. Ever thorough and systematic, Lodge began looking after affairs in the Sixth District to be prepared for what he believed would be a tough campaign in the fall. He reported to his old associate, Robert A. Southworth that he was going to get the necessary appropriations to put the Charlestown Navy Yard in order, and he thought that the funds for public buildings in Lynn would eventually come through. In March, as he had hoped, the Committee of the Whole passed his bill for Lynn. This relieved his mind some, but he still fretted that the party was not ready for the fall elections. He repeatedly emphasized that Congress must pass a tariff bill with some reduction of rates and an election bill, or the ranks of the faithful would be badly decimated in November.[7]

In July, Blaine also expressed his concern about the outcome of the fall elections reassuring Nannie that Cabot seemed safe, but expressing alarm at rumors of corruption in the Massachusetts legislature. By October, Lodge knew that his opponent was to be William "Piggy" Everett. The Advertiser characterized the contest as one got up in a "serio-comic" spirit. No one wanted to be the sacrificial lamb in the Sixth District, but finally Everett agreed. Lodge, however, plunged into the contest just as if he were fighting for his political life, and, judging from the result, he was not far wrong. After a

vigorous and partisan speech in October in which he waved the "bloody shirt" and then denied having done it, he wrote an article for the North American Review appearing in November emphasizing the accomplishments of Congress and in particular the Election bill. His energy was rewarded at the polls with a slim thousand vote margin.[8]

In fact, Lodge was fortunate since the elections in general went heavily against the party everywhere with much bloodletting in Massachusetts. According to some observers, Lodge had been singled out for special attention because of his sponsorship of the Federal Elections bill, but Roosevelt believed the general debacle was a result of the McKinley tariff. In Massachusetts, at the gubernatorial level, the winning personality of William E. Russell and the effective campaign work of the "Young Democrats" made the difference. The prohibition issue also injured Russell's Republican opponent, J.Q.A. Brackett. The temperance people saw as a betrayal Brackett's failure to push hard the constitutional amendment defeated in the spring of 1890. At the congressional level, Russell and his supporters had conducted a spirited campaign against the McKinley bill and had made a persuasive case.[9]

Late in December, Lodge took stock of his career once again as he had done five years before and viewed the past fifteen years somewhat more charitably than before. Reviewing his experience as an independent fifteen years earlier, Lodge believed he had learned a number of lessons but most particularly the need to "show some liberality towards those who differ from me. I have learned this from the ferocity with which I have been pursued because I took a course different from that of most of

the men with whom I once acted."[10] He described himself as a moderate protectionist who found the McKinley tariff unsatisfactory but felt bound to defend it as a party measure. On civil service reform and federal election legislation, he had fought the good fight and had taken the correct position even if the nation was to be denied an honest ballot in congressional elections. It was this sense of being "right" in 1890 which made the defeat of the party at the polls in 1890 so stinging. As a representative of the "young" element of the party in Massachusetts and the nation, Lodge looked to the future and saw the Farmer's Alliance as a communistic movement which will "ultimately fail but it will leave damage in its track. The Democrats in building it up have constructed a Frankenstein I think & the country will suffer." To counter the threat in Massachusetts, "we must have new men & young men...." he concluded.[11]

In keeping with these views, Lodge began at once to look to the rebuilding of the party in Massachusetts. The health of the party at the state level was important to him for personal reasons as well as for reasons of party loyalty and pride. If he ran for the Senate seat of Henry L. Dawes, who was expected to retire in 1893, the party would have to be healthy and unified. As a former Chairman of the Republican State Central Committee, Lodge advised J. O. Burdett that he consult "everybody, such as the Editors, Chairmen of Town Committees and leading Republicans generally as to what ought to be done to regain the state." This would flatter the <u>amour propre</u> of those so treated, but "at the same time say nothing about your plans or what you are doing or

what you intend to do. Let the people whom you consult think that the responsibility is resting on them."[12]

In a more substantive vein, Lodge suggested that the next candidate for governor be very carefully chosen. He recommended Roger Wolcott, yet another member of the younger element of the party. Wolcott was physically attractive, cultivated, socially prominent and ultimately one of the more popular governors of the state in the last years of the century. These were the suggestions of a man who was no longer a maturing politician but a politician matured.

A useful adjunct to the process of party reconstruction was the creation of a State Republican Club in imitation of the Young Men's Democratic Club which had helped produce the victories of 1890. Lodge wholeheartedly supported the efforts of Samuel W. McCall, Roger Wolcott, Elihu B. Hayes, Arthur L. Devens and others to organize such a club. He saw such efforts as not only an extension of the generational division within the party but also as complementary to his pursuit of Dawes' senate seat.[13]

In the late winter and early spring of 1891, two issues at the state level threatened the tranquillity of the Republican party and Lodge's political interest. Perhaps second only to the office of Collector of the Port of Boston stood that of postmaster of the Boston Post Office as a patronage position. John Murray Corse and Washington B. Thomas contended for the position. At the urging of Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge supported the cause of Corse who had the backing of Richard Henry Dana and the civil service reformers in the state. William E. Barrett,

editor of the Boston Daily Advertiser and Speaker of the Massachusetts House stood with Thomas. The broader significance of the conflict for the place was that it threatened to split the party, and Barrett was one of the unannounced candidates for Dawes' senate seat against Lodge. The appointment of Corse also threatened to cut Lodge in his own district where he would be up for re-election in 1892.[14]

The other delicate problem was the move to redistrict the state. With the Democratic victory of 1890 in the near past and his re-election coming in 1892, Lodge asked his associates to look after the matter of redistricting so that the districts in the Boston area were not gerrymandered in the interest of the Democrats. He was convinced that there would be an attack on his own district, which he thought was oversized. The logical thing was to separate Charlestown from the remainder of his district, which would bring the district back to a size more equal to others and eliminate some Democratic voters. Believing in the need to have a battle plan in readiness, Lodge consulted with his colleague from Ashburnham, Frederick S. Coolidge, and drew up a plan for redistricting the entire state. He forwarded it to E. D. Hayes and J. O. Burdett with the warning that even though the plan was eminently fair, it was not to be associated with Lodge in any way since his colleagues might resent his redistricting for them.

In mid-March, he enlisted the aid of two of his old colleagues in state affairs, Robert A. Southworth and Arthur Breed. "The main thing is not to allow the district to be torn to pieces ... as would be done if the Middlesex towns were to be cut out and Charlestown connected with

Lynn by a very narrow strip," he emphasized to Breed.[15] Answering Democratic criticism of this lobbying, Lodge defended it as his right as a citizen. He further contended that it was not rooted in any pursuit of self-interest, which was disingenuous at best. To Democrats, perhaps the most serious indictment of Lodge's work on the measure was that it was successful.[16]

In spite of some maneuvering, Lodge was ultimately chosen to preside over the Republican State Convention. The meeting convened in Boston on September 16, 1891, and Lodge presented an address in which he praised the work of the Harrison administration and Congress. The platform supported the liberal pension law recently passed, immigration restriction, the tariff and Lodge's election bill. At the state level, the platform assailed the evils associated with the sale of intoxicating beverages and the Democratic position on public education. Charles H. Allen was chosen as the candidate for governor to oppose William E. Russell.

Hoping to retire Russell in 1891 as he had Butler in 1883, Lodge pitched into the campaign. Late in September, while speaking in behalf of Allen's candidacy, he attacked the attitude of Boston's Democratic mayor, Josiah Quincy, on public education. Lodge rejected the mayor's view that public education and silver were false issues.[17] Lodge pointed out that the issue of compulsory education had decided the results of a state election in Wisconsin and a Democratic governor struck down a law for compulsory education in Pennsylvania. In Massachusetts, Quincy had spoken negatively about compulsory education. Ultimately,

compulsory education brought into sharp relief the political, social and religious differences between Lodge's constituents who were Republican, non-urban, and Protestant and Quincy's Irish, Catholic and urban Democratic supporters.

Later in the 1890's, the public education question in Massachusetts was further complicated through its association with the American Protective Association, a nativist anti-Catholic organization.

In October, Lodge continued the attack when he agreed to meet Russell in public debate. The mugwump Nation attacked Lodge because, as the challenged party, he specified the topics of the debate. The contest between the two men was a rousing one with the public treated to an unusually competent performance. While Lodge's experience may have told on the platform, Russell clearly won at the polls on November 3. The governor's vote was narrowed slightly from the contest of 1890, but he commanded a margin of over 6,000 ballots.[18]

Lodge turned to the organization of the Republican State Committee as he planned his campaign for Dawes' senate seat. Some members of the party wanted to enlarge the Committee, and this opened the way for manipulation. Lodge had heard rumors that the Committee was to be organized in the interest of W. W. Crapo or Barrett. Lodge urged his friends to counter a move to organize the Committee in anyone's interest. In spite of his disclaimers about interfering with the Committee, Lodge's supporters were on the Committee and in a position to look after his interests.[19]

The party leadership continued to seek a man who could beat the popular Russell. In September, 1892, the Republicans chose William H.

Haile to run for the governorship and the attractive Roger Wolcott as his running mate. Haile narrowed even further Russell's margin, but it was not until Russell's retirement voluntarily in 1893 that former congressman, Frederick T. Greenhalge, beat the Democratic candidate, John E. Russell.[20]

The battle over the McKinley tariff bill continued into the Fifty-second Congress, and Lodge did his part in defense of the law despite the sharp rebuke at the polls in November, 1890. In an article for the Arena in November, 1891, he attacked the idea that the issue of free trade or protection was a moral question and that political economy was an exact science. Pointing to Great Britain, Lodge denied that free trade has ushered in a millenium of peace or that it has brought an end to labor strife.[21]

In a practical sense, Lodge believed that the issue of the tariff could be reduced to the following: "shall we protect new and nascent industries, and shall we continue to guard existing industries and existing rates of wages against undue competition?" To Lodge, the McKinley bill had to be evaluated in a simple fashion. Had it stimulated the growth of the industries it was designed to foster, and had it produced the price increases claimed? He presented statistics that supported his claim that the prices of products so protected had not risen.[22]

As the first session of the Fifty-second Congress commenced, Lodge expressed grave reservations about the Democratic leadership of the House Ways and Means Committee to the Boston business community.

William M. Springer (D-Ill.) was most likely to succeed to the chair; Lodge believed him amiable and a sharp parliamentarian but unsuited to handle tariff legislation. It seemed likely that Springer would adopt the "pin-sticking method of tariff revision." He would try to place a small number of items on the free list and thereby foster the view that no interest had really been injured. Lodge thought that woolens would be singled out for such treatment and recommended to one of his constituents that a program should be started at once to counter such an approach. Lodge thought a concise statement should be drawn up showing that such tariff revision would mean either a reduction of wages or the closing of mills. Such a statement should be placed in the hands of every millhand.[23]

Just as in 1890, the question of money and free coinage of silver remained topical in 1891-1892. As March 4, 1891 approached, Lodge breathed more easily in the hope that the Fifty-first Congress would close without passage of a free silver measure. The scenario Lodge suggested to one of his constituents was not entirely accurate, but was remarkably prescient in its general outlines. He predicted that the next Congress would pass a free coinage measure, Harrison would veto it, and an educational campaign would ensue in 1892 with the Republican party going down to defeat and severe financial dislocations following. History did not follow precisely the path Lodge set out, but free silver was a more important issue in Congress in 1891-1892 than Cleveland and Harrison wished. While the depression of 1893 was not attributable to free silver, it followed rather quickly on Cleveland's inauguration.[24]

A year later, the silver question continued to disturb Lodge's peace of mind as some of his constituents pressed him to support bimetallism more vigorously both as a reasonable approach to expanding the money supply and as a way of heading off the threat of free coinage. Lodge's cousin urged him to oppose free coinage, but support genuine bimetallism. Lodge answered with the observation that the thrust of the free silver movement came from the debtor element of society rather than the silver mine owners. Rather bitterly, Lodge noted that, in the previous Congress, the Republicans had stymied the free silver movement only to pay a terrible price at the polls. In March, as the pressure for free silver mounted, Lodge predicted that the Democrats would pass such a measure, but Harrison would "do his duty" and veto it. Beyond that point, Lodge believed the prospect was grim.[25]

Later in the month, Lodge not only spoke against free silver but also introduced a bill to repeal the silver purchase clause of the Sherman Act. Conceived as a conservative measure to silence proponents of free coinage, the Sherman Act had provided for the purchase of silver on a limited basis and Treasury notes. By the spring of 1892, these provisions of the Sherman Act seemed to some observers to threaten the stability of the currency. Lodge's efforts to have the bill repealed received the support not only of traditional elements of the Republican party's constituency but also of conservative Democrats as well. Charles C. Jackson, a Boston entrepreneur, warned one of the "Young Democrats" of 1890, George Fred Williams, that the Democratic members of the

Massachusetts congressional delegation ought to get behind Lodge's bill with its provision for repeal of the purchase provisions of the Sherman Act and its call for an international conference on bimetallism. Jackson agreed with Williams' desire for a banking bill, but rejected Williams charge that Lodge's motives were impure.[26]

Even though Lodge's efforts for repeal were unsuccessful, he did succeed in putting the Democrats in Massachusetts in an awkward position as George Fred Williams charged, and he did take a position which endeared him to the conservative business community and the party leadership. This was yet one more of those happy situations where conviction and personal political interest coincided.[27]

Surveying the work of the Fifty-first Congress, Lodge found much to praise in the accomplishments of his fellows. In spite of the petty malice of the Democrats, he rejoiced in the passage of the International Copyright bill, the appropriations for the Civil Service Commission and the French Spoliation Claims. On the other hand, with the Democratic victories in the fall of 1890, Lodge looked forward with trepidation to the Fifty-second Congress. As he later complained to his mother, being in the minority was restful but not entertaining.[28]

Recognizing that Harrison was vulnerable in 1892, several Republican hopefuls began testing the political waters in 1891. Lodge's friend Reed wrote repeatedly in the summer and fall of 1891 suggesting his availability. Lodge's admiration for Reed was considerable, but the powers of an incumbent president were large. Other possible contenders were John Sherman, who still smarted from his rejection in 1888, and

James G. Blaine, who still had a large following in the party. There was little enthusiasm among the faithful for Harrison's candidacy which made all the more difficult the process of organizing an enthusiastic campaign organization. As a loyal party member, Lodge was concerned, but was not actively engaged in president-making as he told his mother.[29]

Although not involved in the preliminaries to the Convention, Lodge did exert some pressure on the party organization in Massachusetts to recognize the interests of his followers. To McKinley, he recommended a strong plank against free silver and one in support of civil service reform. The plank against free silver was so important in Lodge's mind that he urged Charles Fairchild, a partner at Lee, Higginson & Co., who was on the Committee on Resolutions, to champion an anti-free silver plank too. To Fairchild, he hinted that he believed Blaine a much better candidate than Harrison in spite of some question about the former's health.[30] In June, the Conventions met and named Harrison to carry the Republican standard again and Cleveland won the prize for the Democrats. The Republican professionals realized that the party had a hard fight before it and required the full efforts of all.[31]

In spite of the sympathy generated for Harrison on account of his wife's illness and the constructive achievements of his administration, the party went down to defeat in November. Looking over the wreckage, Republicans immediately began assessing the damage to the party and its prospects. Lodge reported that the party had remained faithful to Harrison in Massachusetts where ten of thirteen congressmen

were Republicans even though William Russell was re-elected. Lodge thought that four years of hard times would follow Cleveland's election with the nomination of David B. Hill in 1896 and a Republican victory. Others analyzed the situation differently. Orville H. Platt told the Philadelphia journalist and financial commentator, Wharton Barker, that the Republicans were defeated because of a general tendency to stand society on its head: "Socialists, anarchists, communists, hoodlums, as well as farmers, laborers and people of small means, and the discontented everywhere, expect now that all their ideas whether reasonable or wild, are to be carried out in practical legislation by the Democratic party."[32] The outlook appeared gloomy, but all Republicans were not as pessimistic as Platt.[33]

With agrarian discontent, free silver, tariff agitation and the Homestead strike, a number of "respectable" Americans were confused. Neither the political generation of Hoar nor that of Lodge fully understood the changes that were occurring.[34]

Just as the presidential contest had begun in 1891, so too had a race of more personal concern to Lodge. Casting his lot with the young men of the party, Lodge wrote Curtis Guild, Jr. upon the founding of the Republican Club in January, 1891, that he was an avowed candidate to replace Dawes in 1893 and earnestly wanted the support of the Club. He rejected any possibility of his old friend George D. Robinson being an active candidate since Robinson had had an opportunity in 1887 and had only succeeded in knocking John D. Long out then. Geographically, Lodge thought that the eastern portion of the state was entitled to a

Senator since it had not had one since the death of Summer.

While giving considerable attention to rebuilding the party in the summer and fall of 1891, Lodge also kept close watch on the senatorial contest. In keeping with his general thoroughness, he explained to Robert A. Southworth that he wanted exact political intelligence on the attitudes of the members of the Legislature. This sort of political calculus continued right up to January, 1893.[35] As the new year commenced, he called upon his political lieutenant, Jerry J. McCarthy, a practical politician of considerable wile, to check on the attitude of the holdovers from the previous legislature. He denied that he had attempted to apply pressure in the reorganization of the Republican State Central Committee, "but of course you know what my personal interest would be ...." Lodge was never coy in stating his candidacy or his desires. With the Central Committee reorganized acceptably, Lodge encouraged his managers to concentrate on some of the candidates for the next legislature, emphasizing that the veteran vote must be cultivated.[36]

From Lynn, he heard that William E. Barrett was making trouble. Lodge replied that Barrett himself was a candidate for the senatorship even though he concealed the fact by pushing the candidacy of William W. Crapo, the candidate of the Old Guard. According to Lodge, Barrett was using his newspapers to further his candidacy and making promises of committee assignments which were at his disposal as Speaker of the Massachusetts House. To counter such tactics, Lodge urged Hayes to organize a campaign against Barrett's pursuit of a delegate-at-large

position in the Massachusetts delegation to the Republican presidential nominating convention in Minneapolis.[37] This sort of thrust and counterthrust continued throughout the winter and spring, with Lodge organizing newspaper support and carefully orchestrating his renomination for Congress in his district. He realized that a successful run for the House was essential to his senatorial ambitions. Hayes worked energetically in his interest in his district while others tested his support in other districts.[38]

Lodge's management of John D. Long's campaign for the Senate in 1887 alerted him to the possibility of treachery within his own party. A coalition of Democrats and Republicans in 1887 had elected Dawes, and Lodge wanted to avoid such a possibility in 1893. He began in July, 1892, to press the party leadership for a caucus to choose a Republican candidate. Privately, Senator Hoar agreed that an informal meeting of a few discreet friends of the principal candidates might be called but nothing like a caucus resulting in a designated nominee. Lodge respected Hoar's views but continued to press for a caucus, observing that eventually Hoar would be able to support such a move without dictation being charged against him.[39]

With the fall election season beginning, Lodge gave the senate race all the energy he possessed. Speaking of his campaign to one of his supporters, he noted that "I devote all my waking hours to it, seeing and reaching by correspondence people all over the state." Indeed, he had counted and recounted votes since January, 1892. His organization was running efficiently and smoothly according to his friends and his

enemies, but there remained one more hurdle before he could snatch the prize, his re-election to the House.[40]

Partly for dramatic effect and partly on account of genuine concern, Lodge entreated his friend, Thomas B. Reed, to come and deliver a speech in his district because "they [the Democrats and mugwumps] are making a terrible fight on me .... You see the Senatorship will be mine if I win for Congress. It is right in hand. Ergo they want to beat me for both & are striving accordingly."[41] His opponent in the congressional race was the irrepressible William Everett whom he had beaten in 1890. In spite of the efforts of his opponents, he was re-elected with a margin of 1,200 according to the Boston Daily Advertiser and 2,700 according to his own count. The senatorship seemed within his grasp but, ever cautious, "I take nothing for granted & am steadily working & seeing everybody & mean to keep at it until it is settled."[42]

William E. Barrett and William W. Crapo were still in the field, but Crapo's campaign was put in motion late and was poorly managed, while Barrett's effort had been sub rosa from the start and depended upon Lodge's stumbling. Trying to soothe the injured sensibilities of the Old Guard, Lodge put out some feelers to Alanson W. Beard in the hope that a repeat of 1887 might be avoided and that party harmony would prevail. Lodge wanted to avoid an open rupture for the sake of the party but was prepared to declare war if Barrett did not call for a senatorial caucus early in the next session in January, 1893.[43]

The campaign entered a more intense phase in December as the matter of an early caucus call became crucial. Lodge's friends were

counting votes and worrying about the speakership contest with Barrett at the center of that problem. As most leaders of the party expected, the caucus met early in January, 1893, and chose Lodge as their candidate for the senatorship. The "iron man" of 1883 who had defeated Butler, George D. Robinson, quickly congratulated Lodge not only on his nomination but on his election as well so certain was he of the result. In the euphoria of the moment, Lodge renounced any intention of revenge against those who had opposed him and assured his followers he was not inclined to carry grudges. On January 17, 1893, the legislature made official the decision of the caucus; and Lodge entered upon a career of over thirty years in the Senate.[44]

The old guard of the party did not gracefully accept the result, however. Joseph H. Walker, a close friend of Henry L. Dawes and a congressman from Worcester, sent a mammouth address he had intended to publish for his constituents outlining why Lodge should not receive Dawes' seat. This document of fifty-seven pages rehearsed exhaustively the charge that Lodge had obtained the seat through the operation of a "machine" and that his reputation as a congressman had been built on the work of others. Walker may have considered printing the address or may merely have sent it to Dawes as a stratagem for currying favor. In any case, Walker was not alone in charging Lodge with winning the seat through "machine" politics. Shortly after Lodge's election on the seventeenth, Harper's Weekly had expressed the same view from a mugwump stance. Charles Fairchild of Lee, Higginson, & Co. answered Harper at some length, pointing out that he himself had managed Lodge's campaign

and there had not been any "machine" manipulation.[45]

As with most successful politicians, Henry Cabot Lodge was accused of using "machine" tactics to win election more than once. Classically, those who supported Lodge and his views thought of his organizational work as careful and craftsmanlike while those who opposed him cast aspersions upon him as a "boss." Lodge's most grievous sin in the eyes of the old guard was that he was young, insufficiently respectful of his elders and successful. Although Lodge entered the Senate with the disadvantages of again being a freshman and having a Democrat in the White House, he had reason for optimism. He was achieving one of the major goals of his youth, election to the seat of his hero, Charles Sumner. At 43, he was physically vigorous. Politically, he had gained the attention and respect of the party leadership through his sponsorship of the Lodge Bill. In Massachusetts, his victory in the race for the senatorship conclusively demonstrated the efficacy of his organization and signaled the transer of power from the generation of Dawes to that of Lodge.

Footnotes

1. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, May 18, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Messrs. R & J Gilchrist, May 19, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, November 10, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS.

2. Dalton to H.C. Lodge, December 6, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Coolidge to H.C. Lodge, April 26, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Higginson to H.C. Lodge, November 17, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to H.L. Higginson, November 24, 1890, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS.

3. Lodge to Richard Henry Dana, January 11, 1890, Dana Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March-April, 1890?, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 51st Cong. 1st. sess., April 24, 1890, p. 3801; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, May, 1890?, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to Richard Henry Dana, May 27, 1890, Dana Papers, MHS.

4. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, June 15, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Richard Henry Dana, June 16, 1890, Dana Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.W. Beard, June 27, 1890, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, August 27, September 23, October 4, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS: Henry Cabot Lodge, "Why Patronage in Offices is Un-American," Century XVIII n.s. (October, 1890), pp. 839-840.

5. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, May 3, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, "International Copyright," Atlantic Monthly (August, 1890), p. 270.

6. Roosevelt to Richard Henry Dana, June 16, 1890, Dana Papers, MHS; Hayes to H.C. Lodge, June 27, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Amory to H.C. Lodge, June 29, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Dana to Theodore Roosevelt, June 30, 1890, Dana Papers, MHS.

7. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 9, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to R.C. Southworth, February 18, 1890, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.E. Barrett, March 26, 1890, Letterbook II, Lodge Papers, MHS.

8. Blaine to Mrs. H.C. Lodge, July 20, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, October 7, 11, November 5, 1890; Henry Cabot Lodge, "What Congress Has Done," North American Review CLI (November, 1890), pp. 518-520.

9. Michael Henessy, Twenty-Five Years of Massachusetts Politics (Boston: Practical Politics, Inc., 1917), pp. 4, 6; Lodge to H.C. Lodge, November 10, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Geoffrey Blodgett, The Gentle Reformers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 90-99.

10. Henry Cabot Lodge, Diary, December 20, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS.

11. Ibid.

12. Lodge to J.O. Burdett, January 10, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS.

13. Lodge to Samuel W. McCall, January 11, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Michael Henessy, Twenty-Five Years of Massachusetts Politics, p. 15.

14. Lodge to W. E. Barrett, February 28, 1891, Letterbook Iv, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to Richard Henry Dana, February 27, 1891, Dana Papers, MHS; Dawes to D.W. Farquhar, February 11, 1891, Harrison Papers, LC; Lodge to W.E. Barrett, March 1, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS.

15. Lodge to E. B. Hayes, February 28, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Robert A. Southworth, March 14, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.B. Breed, March 20, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS.

16. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, June 8, 1891, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, October 2, 1891, p. 1.

17. Boston Daily Advertiser, September 29, 1891, p. 1; Michael Henessy, Twenty-Five Years of Massachusetts Politics, p. 17; Spring-Rice to Elizabeth Cameron, August 14, 1891, Henry Adams Papers, MHS; Richard Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 122-139.

18. Henry White, "Mr. Lodge and His Dodge," Nation LIII (October 8, 1891), pp. 270-271; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, October 10, 1891, Lodge Papers, MHS; Swift to H.C. Lodge, October 24, 1891, Lodge Papers, MHS; Swett to W.E. Russell, October 26, 1891, Russell Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, November 5, 1891, p. 1.

19. Lodge to A.E. Pillsbury, December 4, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to J.O. Burdett, December 5, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS.

20. Boston Daily Advertiser, September 15, 1892, p. 1; "Gubernatorial Elections in Massachusetts," Massachusetts State Library.

21. Henry Cabot Lodge, "Protection or Free Trade-Which?" The Arena IV (November, 1891), p. 654.

22. Henry Cabot Lodge, "Protection or Free Trade-Which?," pp. 657-658, 659-660.

23. Lodge to Eben Draper, January 13, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Stephen O'Meara, December 17, 1891, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS.

24. Lodge to J.C.B. Adams, January 26, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS; H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, pp. 423-436.

25. Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, March 3, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS.

26. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 25, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS; Jackson to George Fred Williams, April 2, 9, 11, 14, 20, 1892, Williams Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, April 15, 1892, p. 1; Lodge to Benjamin Harrison, August 5, 1891, Harrison Papers, LC.

27. Jackson to H.C. Lodge, April 22, 1892, Williams Papers, MHS; Jackson to George Fred Williams, April 23, 1892, Williams Papers, MHS; Lodge to E.A. Adams, December 13, 1892, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS.

28. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 1, 8, April 26, 1891, January 31, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry Adams, March 22, 1891, Henry Adams Papers, MHS.

29. Reed to H.C. Lodge, July 2, August 27, September 11, 22, 29, 1891, Lodge Papers, MHS; Bateman to John Sherman, February 23, 1892, Sherman Papers, LC; Hanna to John Sherman, June 14, April 7, 1892, Sherman Papers, LC; Burleigh to M.A. Hanna, May 4, 5, 1892, Sherman Papers, LC; Grosvenor to John Sherman, May 9, 1892, Sherman Papers, LC; Herrick to John Sherman, May 11, 1892, Sherman Papers, LC; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, May 29, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS.

30. Lodge to J.J. McCarthy, April 7, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Reed to H.C. Lodge, April 30, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William McKinley, May 2, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Eben S. Draper, May 16, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Charles S. Fairchild, May 28, 1892, Letterbook B. Lodge Papers, MHS.

31. H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, pp. 410 ff.; Woodhale to W.E. Chandler, July 28, 1892, Chandler Papers, LC.

32. Lodge to T. B. Reed, November 10, 1892, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College; Lodge to Benjamin F. Tracy, November 14, 1892, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Platt to Wharton Barker, November 15, 1892, Barker Papers, LC.

33. Hoar to Wharton Barker, November 19, 1892, Barker Papers, Barker Papers, LC.

34. Richard E. Welch, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Unive-sity Press, 1971), pp. 166-168.

35. Lodge to Curtis Guild, Jr., January 13, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Robert A. Southworth, December 21, 1891, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS.

36. Lodge to J.J. McCarthy, January 2, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Curtis Guild, Jr., January 17, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS.

37. Hayes to H.C. Lodge, January 20, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to E.B. Hayes, January 22, 25, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS.

38. Lodge to John L. Parker, January 26, February 15, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to E.B. Hayes, March 30, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Greenhalge to H.C. Lodge, May 13, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS.

39. Hoar to H.C. Lodge, July 26, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George F. Hoar, August 11, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS.

40. Lodge to A.E. Cox, August 25, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, September 25, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS; Walker to Henry L. Dawes, January 18, 1893, Dawes Papers, LC.

41. Lodge to Thomas B. Reed, October 3, 14, 1892, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College.

42. Lodge to Thomas B. Reed, November 10, 1892, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College; Boston Daily Advertiser, November 9, 1892; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, November 10, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS.

43. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, November 16, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Thomas B. Reed, November 24, 1892, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College; Lodge to W. Murray Crane, December 7, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS.

44. Lodge to William B. Larence, December 8, 9, 1892, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to H.A. Thomas, December 10, 1892, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Robinson to H.C. Lodge, January 5, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to J.J. McCarthy, January 8, 1893, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, January 18, 1893, p. 4.

45. Walker to Henry L. Dawes, January 18, 1893, Dawes Papers, LC; Fairchild to J. Henry Harper, January 19, 23, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Harper's Weekly, January 21, 1893, XXXVII, p. 50 in John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 132.

CHAPTER VII

STATE AND NATION DURING THE SECOND CLEVELAND ADMINISTRATION, 1893-1897

The six-year term of Senator gave Lodge some respite from the perpetual "running" for office, but Lodge still found himself heavily involved in state politics. In fact, his involvement after his election to the Senate was, if anything, greater than before. His new stature meant that he was frequently called upon to lend his prestige to a particular political move or to adjudicate intra-party disputes. The first major quarrel was that over his old seat in the Seventh District. His old friend, Elihu B. Hayes opposed William E. Barrett and their conflict threatened to disrupt party harmony.[1]

Barrett had been an unannounced candidate for the Senate in 1892 hoping Lodge would falter. Even then, Barrett had begun planning to run for Lodge's old House seat. When Barrett came out as a nominee, he encountered bitter opposition from Lodge's friends. Curtis Guild, Jr., compared him to David B. Hill, the Democratic "machine" politician in New York. Late in January, 1893, Barrett began trying to discover who opposed him for the nomination. He approached Lodge to learn whether or not Hayes would be a candidate. In spite of limited financial resources, Hayes finally chose to challenge Barrett.[2]

The relationship between Hayes and Lodge dated back to Lodge's entrance into state politics in the late 1870's. Now, Lodge was faced with a serious dilemma. As a matter of personal loyalty to both Hayes and those who had supported him for the House and the Senate, Lodge felt a need to aid Hayes. On the other hand, as a good party man, he wanted to be "in a position where I can support the nominee cordially, as the object I have most at heart is to keep the district safely Republican." Lodge insisted that while he felt great sympathy for Hayes, he wanted to keep the contest at arm's length. Unhappily for Lodge, the contest threatened from the outset to draw him into a compromising position because of the intensity of feeling of his friends. They regarded Barrett, perhaps with reason, as a scoundrel and appealed to Lodge on personal and moral grounds to intervene in the contest.[3]

The struggle for the nomination continued into March with Hayes' supporters finding the going difficult against Barrett's superior financial resources and the weight of his newspapers. The most telling force against Hayes was his late start. Although Lodge proclaimed his refusal to interfere in the district and indeed did keep some distance, he urged the new head of the State Central Committee to give careful attention to the Seventh District. Lodge was eager to keep the district in the Republican ranks and pushed his friend Hayes as a man who would win "a handsome majority...." Doubtless, Lodge's ego was involved in spite of himself. As the district convention approached in early April, the reports from Hayes' supporters grew steadily gloomier.[4]

At the convention on April 4, Hayes' delegates bolted the meeting, charging that the ward four delegates for Barrett should be thrown out. Barrett's friends counterattacked, attributing hypocrisy and bad faith to Hayes' group. The former appealed to Lodge to settle this conflict. Jerry J. McCarthy urged Lodge to "telegraph Hayes, Turner and Al Cox to support Republican nominee and authorize interview pledging your support to Mr. Barrett." Lodge's position was becoming increasingly delicate and was to continue perilous for months. If he did as Barrett's friends wanted in the interest of party harmony, he would alienate Hayes' friends and be untrue to his own instincts. If he did not give at least formal acknowledgement and support to Barrett's candidacy, he would injure his standing throughout the state. The most immediate problem was whether to become active in the interest of Barrett's candidacy.[5]

From McCarthy came the opinion that the Barrett men had been fairly treated while from Cox in Malden came the comment that "there were razors flying in the air!" With great foresight, Cox prophesied that Barrett could not win with the party so badly split in the district. Hayes and his followers repeatedly urged Lodge not to stump the district for Barrett arguing that it would injureLodge and the party. Indicative of the feeling was the comment of one participant. "Mr. Barrett is a 'dead dog in the pit' and your support would in the estimation of the better class place you in the same category. You would be expected ordinarily to support the nomination of the party, but not when that nomination is secured by fraud and political manipulation."[6]

Contradictory reports continued to flow from the district making it difficult for Lodge to make a decision whether to sustain Hayes' friends or Barrett's. One of Barrett's supporters assured Lodge that "the trouble is healing and all will be well." Curtis Guild insisted that Lodge must openly join with the opponents of Barrett's nomination. Guild urged him not to attend a dinner where Barrett would be in attendance. Lodge replied that he had been invited to the dinner before the caucuses and not to attend would be an insult to those party faithful who had made him senator. As to supporting Barrett's nomination, since the charges of fraud were unsubstantiated, "I do not see how in my own District I can refuse to say as I intend to do so in an interview that the ticket will have my support."[7] Lodge gave an interview in support of Barrett's candidacy and provided some lukewarm support in published letters, but Barrett and his friends continued to apply pressure to get him to come out openly and stump the district. To Barrett's entreaties, Lodge answered that the press of business in Washington prevented him from getting away. Barrett sought endorsement from Senators Aldrich and Hawley, who inquired of Lodge what course to take. A general expression of desire for Republican success everywhere would be the best course Lodge advised.[8]

Through illness, Lodge escaped the task of speaking in the district for Barrett. He contracted a cold the middle of the month which developed into bronchitis and prohibited his taking to the hustings. There was no reason to doubt Lodge's complaint of illness, but the malady had come at a most appropriate time. Barrett went down to defeat at the

hands of William E. Everett with only fourteen votes separating the two men. This was the first major test of Lodge's political adroitness after winning election to the Senate, and he proved exceptionally skillful at such maneuvering. He avoided the charge of failing to support the party nominee, and at the same time his support of Barrett was so faint as to damn Barrett to defeat. It was unfortunate that the district was lost to the party and he thought it "sad to see that District thrown away by such a candidate."[9]

The residue of the Hayes-Barrett contest was wormwood and gall. Many of the rank and file of the party were pleased that Barrett had been defeated, and even those who were neutral thought that Barrett's defeat would chasten him. Lodge turned to the gubernatorial race and began counseling Frederick T. Greenhalge, the former congressman, on how to proceed. He recommended that Greenhalge contact Hayes whom he believed would be of help. Lodge urged Greenhalge to pay careful attention to affairs in Springfield and Worcester where his opponent, the Attorney General, Albert E. Pillsbury, was particularly strong. Greenhalge followed up Lodge's suggestion to contact A. P. Christy, the editor of the Worcester Telegram; and he attended to Fall River and Taunton. As the maneuvering contined, Greenhalge thought he saw the old division between the young men and the Old Guard in the party. Confidently, he predicted the former would dominate the party apparatus.[10]

In late August and early September, Greenhalge's work for the nomination began to develop into a boom. As his bandwagon gathered speed, even Barrett who had opposed him came around, but it was too late

as far as Greenhalge was concerned. Sensing that the struggle for the nomination was approaching a turning point, Robert A. Southworth inquired if Lodge would write him a letter which he could show to Jerry J. McCarthy to keep him from supporting Pillsbury. The state convention met on October 7 and nominated Greenhalge who won election a month later with 35,000 votes more than his Democratic opponent, John E. Russell. Lodge was unable to participate in the campaign to the degree he wanted, but he did provide counsel to George D. Robinson, the Chairman of the Committee on Resolutions.[11]

In 1894, two issues in particular, women's suffrage and the American Protective Association, disturbed the tranquillity of the state. Early in April, Lodge began mobilizing a campaign against suffrage for women in municipal elections. If it were not possible to defeat the measure in the state senate, then the next best possibility would be to conduct a referendum to determine public sentiment. He was assured that in its present condition the bill for women's suffrage in municipal elections could not pass. A member of the General Court, William B. Lawrence, concurred with Lodge that the way to deal with the measure was through a referendum.[12]

While a particular view of the sexes was certainly at work in Lodge's attitude of almost equal importance was the possible political result of female voting in municipal elections. In 1890, the Republican gubernatorial candidate, John Q. A. Brackett was mortally wounded through his involvement with a prohibition amendment which failed. In 1894, the issue of women's suffrage was intimately bound up with prohibition. William B. Lawrence made clear in his communications to Lodge

that there was concern about the sexes mingling in political caucuses, but also there was the problem that women would vote for no license for liquor in the cities which would cause the cities to go Democratic. The support of the Women's Christian Temperance Union for the suffrage movement lent credence to Lawrence's view. Also disturbing to Republican leaders was the connection of members of the A.P.A. to the women's suffrage movement.

With this prospect and mass voting of ignorant women, the "better" element of society organized to defeat the referendum at the polls. Both a women's group and a Man's Suffrage Association were organized to defeat the referendum. In 1895, female suffrage in municipal elections was overwhelmingly defeated. Since it was the only significant test of public sentiment on the question for two decades in the East, it was cited repeatedly in numerous publications and helped account for the anti-suffrage position of Lyman Abbot of the Outlook and Edward Bok, publisher of the Ladies' Home Journal.[13]

The American Protective Association, an heir of the anti-Catholic nativist Know Nothing movement of the 1850's, first appeared in Massachusetts in 1892 but did not begin to make significant inroads until 1894. As in many other states, the A.P.A. disrupted the politics of Massachusetts but because of its increasingly religio-ethnic makeup, the Democratic party of the state experienced no confusion about the A.P.A.'s. By contrast, the Republican party tended to be the party of native, Protestant elements of Massachusetts society and Republicans sometimes reacted to the A.P.A. movement with divided minds. The A.P.S.'s opposition to immigration and particularly its hostility to Catholic

immigration found support among traditional, native stock supporters of the party. Some Republicans also sympathized with the A.P.A. because of its support for compulsory, public education. Among party leaders, there was the fear that one element of the party might affiliate with the A.P.A. to injure another. A mood of wariness, suspicion and paranoia developed.[14]

In the spring of 1894, William E. Barrett, undaunted by his defeat of a year earlier, began organizing to obtain the Republican nomination for the congressional seat in the Seventh District. Painfully, he discovered that the wounds of the previous year had not healed. Elihu Hayes and his supporters were unwilling to reconcile their differences, and Lodge continued to oppose him for the nomination. This time the A.P.A. was to complicate the fight in the District.[15]

The Surveyor of the Port of Boston thought that the A.P.A., which was powerful in the district, could be used against Barrett since he had a Catholic as his business manager. Recognizing his vulnerability, Barrett made overtures to the A.P.A. element in the party and attacked his opponent, Hayes, within the organization. Lodge expected that the A.P.A. might put up a candidate of its own but did not expect it to support Barrett. Clearly, using the A.P.A., like prohibition, in intra-party struggles was dangerous and liable to backfire. Barrett's campaign was successful as he obtained the nomination in September and went on to a major victory over his Democratic opponent in November, riding the Republican wave of the mid-term elections.[16]

The A.P.A. involvement in the Seventh District contest was merely

symptomatic. The organization continued to plague the party nationally as well as in Massachusetts. Governor Greenhalge suspected that members of his own staff had such sympathies and were at work to further the cause of the organization to his injury. Nationally, the Republican Headquarters wrestled with the problem of disassociating itself from the A.P.A. definitively.

A more immediate problem, however, was the state platform. The goal was to present a platform with wide appeal and at the same time neutralize the A.P.A.'s emphasis on particular issues such as public education and religious discrimination. George Frisbie Hoar authored the platform in 1894 and recalled his work with pride years later in his autobiography. To answer the A.P.A. the platform called for "no distinction of birth or religious creed in the rights of American citizenship." Lodge thought his colleague's handiwork admirable and certainly "meets the A.P.A. squarely...." Roosevelt agreed and sympathized with Lodge's difficulties with Barrett.[17]

In November, Greenhalge was re-elected with a majority of more than sixty thousand. Barrett received 6,700 votes more than his opponent, and ten of the thirteen members of the House delegation were Republicans. Sadly, the platform did not eliminate the A.P.A. issue. Its subtle answer to the A.P.A. was too timid, as Theodore Roosevelt pointed out.[18]

In 1895, the A.P.A. continued to present a serious problem to the party leadership as it exploited religious animosities over public education. In July, a group "supporting" public education called the

"Little Red Schoolhouse" aligned itself with the A.P.A. and conducted a violent demonstration at which several were injured and one man was shot to death. In spite of the clearly dangerous tendency of this organization to appeal to the lowest impulses of citizens, it was not until August, 1895, that a Republican leader, George Frisbie Hoar, publicly condemned the A.P.A. and repudiated its philosophy. The party leadership did not sympathize with the aims of the group, but feared the political damage which might result from an attack on it. Even as Roosevelt, Lodge and others congratulated Hoar privately for speaking out on the subject, the Chairman of the Republican State Central Committee, George H. Lyman, expressed concern that friction with the A.P.A. might injure fall election prospects. With open opposition from the two major parties in the state, the A.P.A. lost strength after 1895. The religious animosities which made it erupt did not disappear, but rather simply submerged to reappear later in other forms.[19]

With the success of the mid-term elections of 1894, state leaders of the party began thinking about 1896. Lodge was active at both the state and national levels in pushing for his candidate, Thomas B. Reed. As with other presidential contests, members of the party at the state level began calculating in 1895 how best to position themselves to win election as delegates to the National Convention. Lodge wanted to orchestrate affairs in Massachusetts to produce a solid delegation for Reed, and that meant not only attending to the election of delegates to the Convention but also countering the moves of other candidates. George H. Lyman carried most of the responsibility for ensuring that candidates

for delegate-at-large friendly to Reed were lined up and key party leaders cultivated.[20]

In the winter and spring of 1896, it was even more important to manage the party apparatus carefully, and Lodge devoted more attention to Reed's cause. He denied that he coveted the post of Chairman of the Committee on Resolutions at the State Convention or the office of delegate-at-large at the National Convention for reasons of personal ambition. He shouldered those burdens only because "I think I can be of service to Reed and because he expects it...." However much Lodge genuinely disliked the grind of the conventions, the elections of the slate of delegates he had chosen spoke eloquently of his control of the party mechanism of the state. While he was not a "boss" in the mold of David B. Hill of New York or Matt Quay of Pennsylvania, his vigilance, organizational skill and political craft were formidable. Unlike Hill and Quay, he relied more on attention to detail than on patronage.[21]

In the State Convention in March, Lodge saw an opportunity not only to advance Reed's cause but also to defend his own position on a couple of questions. Along with Hoar, Reed and others, Lodge wrote the state platform of the party with emphasis on the money plank and foreign policy. Late in the month, he presented the platform to the Convention in a speech that Hoar thought "wonderful."[22]

In the thirty-two years between 1870 and 1901, Republicans held the governorship in Massachusetts twenty-seven years; nine of the men elected to the office held it for three years. Particularly in Republican circles, a tradition of three one-year terms developed. In this

period, it was also conventional for the Lieutenant Governor to succeed to the governor's chair. In 1895, Lodge urged Greenhalge to end speculation and announce that he would seek the traditional third term. Lodge believed that such a move would aid party harmony and enhance the chances of Roger Wolcott to inherit Greenhalge's place. Greenhalge assented to Lodge's suggestions and announced his candidacy. In the fall, the Democrats put up George Fred Williams to oppose him. Williams was overwhelmed.[23]

After Greenhalge's death in office in March, 1896, attention shifted to the nomination for Lieutenant Governor with W. Murray Crane as the chief contender. Lodge urged Crane to let the matter lie until after the Convention in St. Louis, but George Lyman thought that waiting would create difficulties. Lyman believed that as many as four men might enter the field if Crane were put off and that would produce a destructive fight. Despite Lyman's urgings, Lodge kept the contest for the nomination at arms length. Crane eventually decided to run and obtained the nomination, succeeding to the traditional three terms as governor when the time came. In November, 1896, the Wolcott-Crane team won a smashing victory. Lodge had wanted Crane's nomination from the outset but wanted to avoid the appearance of meddling. He preferred to reach his goal more indirectly.[24]

Even though Lodge was no longer a resident of Boston, he continued to take an interest in the politics of the city. As a congressman, he had had a good deal of experience with fraudulent voting practices and consequently took an interest in changes in the Boston Police Commission.

He feared that "the moment the Police Commission passes into the hands of the Democratic party ... we should have vast fictitious majorities rolled up in Boston and that in certain wards even free speech would be denied."[25] While Lodge was indeed concerned about the fairness of elections, he also viewed control of the Police Commission as necessary to the success of the party. While he did not share the desires of his friends in regard to the nomination of Charles Curtis, he found Curtis an acceptable choice.[26]

Another local issue which concerned Lodge and the party generally was a proposal for biennial elections. Introduced in 1893, the reform had passed the Senate but ran into difficulties in the House. As Chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Lodge's friend, Jeremiah J. McCarthy, told Lodge he intended to push it in the 1896 session of the Legislature. Senator Hoar supported the measure along with other members of the state's delegation in Congress. McCarthy thought the measure should be resolved through a referendum. Lodge was indifferent to the whole question of biennial elections, but insisted that they be timed so as to fall in the same year as presidential elections and mid-term elections. He emphasized that "our party suffers more than our opponents from the stay-at-home vote and if we put the state elections upon the odd years, we should enhance all the difficulties of our campaign...." While he reaffirmed his desire to keep clear of issues before the legislature, if there was any chance of placing the elections on the odd years, "I should wish to be heard before the Senate committee before such a change is determined upon."[27] In spite of

McCarthy's success in the Senate, biennial elections had to wait until the twentieth century.

As a newly elected senator in 1893, Lodge was again a freshman, but his experience in the lower house, his energy and ambition virtually guaranteed that he would not keep a low profile. One of Lodge's first tasks was to develop a working relationship with his colleague, George Frisbie Hoar. From 1893 until Hoar's death in 1904, the two men emphasized whenever possible their shared views and avoided as much as possible exacerbating their differences. Although Hoar was a much older man, they shared a common educational background, a deep attachment to the the history and ideals of Massachusetts and New England, an antipathy to mugwumps, and a commitment to the Republican party. In later years, Lodge and Hoar differed sharply on imperialism but never let their disagreement grow into open warfare. Hoar presented himself as an example of the old conscience of New England, but Henry Cabot Lodge represented the views of the majority in Massachusetts and the nation.

As Lodge entered upon his duties in the Senate in 1893, he discovered that one of the duties of a junior senator was to take charge of patronage in the state. His colleague avoided such questions as much as possible. If Lodge's repeated criticisms of the system and support for civil service may be believed, he did not assume the task with enthusiasm, but his record in the House showed his skill in such matters. After 1893, he frequently complained about the burdens of patronage but showed a consummate mastery of the most ticklish situations.

The first patronage battle Lodge had to face involved the post

of Appraiser at the Port of Boston. The Customs houses in Boston and other major ports were fertile sources of political manipulation throughout the nineteenth century. Lewis A. Dodge held the post of Appraiser in 1893, and the new administration wanted to replace him with one of its partisans, Albert B. Stearns. The charge made against Dodge was under evaluation. Dodge countered with the charge that Stearns had broken the law repeatedly when he was an employee of the Customs house before. To Lodge's discomfort, the fight between Stearns and Dodge threatened to produce a rift in the party as Stearns mobilized support among Republicans. The struggle continued through 1894 and 1895 with Dodge eventually succumbing to Democratic pressure. Lodge carefully avoided being drawn into an intra-party battle and yet attempted to sustain those Republican placeholders remaining in the customs house.[29]

Just as in his first years in the House, Lodge was placed on less prestigious committees in 1893. In keeping with his wishes, he received a place on Immigration and Civil Service; but his third assignment was on Organization, Conduct and Expenditures of the Executive Departments. A place on the Foreign Relations Committee eluded his grasp. He discovered quickly that the traditions and customs of the Senate were more binding on members than in the House. An apprenticeship would be required for advancement, but he was equipped socially and otherwise to make rapid progress in the "club."[30]

In 1890, Lodge had applauded Reed's changes in the rules of the House. He believed essential Reed's demand that a Representative who was present must be counted as present for the sake of a quorum and voting.

In 1893, with a brash disregard of Senate traditions, Lodge condemned Senate rules which he believed paralyzed Senate action. He chafed under a Democratic majority in both Houses and wrote gloomy letters to his mother about Democratic management of affairs. He was, however, always consistent in opposing practices which impeded the work of the Senate. In spite of Lodge's resolutions to remedy a cumbersome mode of operation, the Senate persisted in its leisurely fashion of legislating or at times of failing to legislate. No doubt Lodge remembered bitterly how a failure to change the rules in the Senate in 1890 had helped to defeat his election bill.[31]

Late in 1893, the Democrats introduced a bill to repeal federal legislation governing the election of congressmen. As Lodge predicted at the time, it generated sectional hostility and partisan strife. The question came up again in the second session of the Fifty-third Congress, and Lodge was determined to give the Democrats full measure if they wished to join battle. On January 24, 1894, he delivered a speech against repeal which was significant not only as revealing his devotion to the principles of 1890 but also his view of blacks in general. He challenged the idea that federal election laws ought to be repealed, insisting that "the real trouble with these laws is ... that they are ill constructed and do not go far enough." The question of the constitutionality of such laws had been repeatedly affirmed. He admitted that the problem of the Negro in American society was "one of the gravest problems to be met by the American people," adding that "it is not a problem which can be

settled this year or next. It will remain with us and with our childrens' children for many years to come." Finally, he granted that slavery had grown as a result of "the active support of the South and ... the assent of the North."

While Lodge accepted disfranchisement of blacks and whites on grounds of illiteracy, "it is this discrimination against a man on account of his color which is repugnant to justice and honesty." He applauded the impact of the Populist party in the South, arguing that it had helped to divide the white vote and restore "in some measure political discussion and activity among the white voters." While he was charged then and later with playing the role of a partisan, there was an element of sincerity in Lodge's comments. He did not abandon the black in later years as his support for appropriations for Hampton Institute demonstrated in February, 1895. And the views he expressed in 1894 doubtless persisted though he did not express them openly and vigorously in later years.[32]

As a member of the Committee on the Civil Service and Retrenchment and a friend of Roosevelt who continued to serve on Civil Service Commission until 1895, Lodge took an active interest in the extension of the reform. The post office department continued to attract the attention and effort of reformers. Roosevelt kept Lodge fully informed on the cases as they developed, and Lodge championed the work of the Commission on the floor of the Senate. Somehow, in spite of the testimony of Roosevelt and his former associate Hugh S. Thompson, reformers such as Richard Henry Dana continued to doubt Lodge's sincerity in

supporting the reform. Roosevelt asked Dana to judge Lodge as he would judge other politicians, insisting that he "is a better friend of civil service reform than we ever had in either House of Congress during the entire time of his service, and it seems to me that this is saying a good deal." While Dana had never felt the animosity toward Lodge that others had in 1884 and after, the mugwumps increased their attack on Lodge because of his former association with them and because of his background as one of the "best men."[33]

Only one month after Cleveland's inauguration, the most severe depression of the second half of the nineteenth century hit the nation. The economic distress of the next five years cast a pall over Cleveland's administration and offered the Republican party a lever with which to counter the Democrats' position on the tariff and money policies. Far more general and painful than the panics of 1873 and 1883, this one began with the failure of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad in February and deepened sharply with Cleveland's belated affirmation of the gold standard.[34]

Lodge and his friends were not immune to the ravages of the general downturn. In December, he explained to his mother how his purchase of a new house in Washington along with too great an investment in General Electric had placed him in a bind. His mother offered assistance, but Lodge reassured her that he would be able to cope with the squeeze even if some personal retrenchment were necessary. A year later, he was still pressed and had to resort to writing pot boilers in the form of magazine articles and subscription histories, for which he made no excuses,

so great was his need for money.[35]

While the silver question did not produce the collapse, its bearing on the depression contributed to the struggle over the tariff in 1893-1894. Knowing that the Democrats would attempt to make good on their pledge of tariff reduction, Lodge joined the battle in April with an article for the Forum. He designated tariff legislation one of the two signal questions before the country. He thought the country would have to suffer the pain of free trade before the error of the Democratic position could be exposed. To Lodge, that course had the merit of giving the business community a rest from the agitation of the issue. With increasing discussion of the sort of bill the House Ways and Means Committee would present, Lodge received the views of his constituents. One argued for the old Massachusetts position: free raw materials and protected finished goods. Lodge had opposed that sort of revision in 1888 and 1890; he consistently advocated protection in general and criticised revisions which would be sectional in impact.[36]

As William L. Wilson, Chairman of Ways and Means, presented his revision of the tariff in November, Lodge received cries of distress from both professional politicians and manufacturers. They complained that this was the worst sort of treatment of business in its depressed condition. Curtis Guild, Jr. remonstrated that Wilson's bill not only protected raw materials and made some finished goods free but also discriminated sectionally, protecting Tennessee marble but making Massachusetts granite free. In his own way, Lodge shared the angry reaction of his constituents to Wilson's tariff bill. With feeling, he

spoke to his mother of the letters he received not only from manufacturers "but from the poor working people who are left to face .... mills closed & no prospect of work."[37]

In February, the tariff came over from the House and was buried in the recesses of the Senate Finance Committee under the direction of Daniel W. Voorhees of Indiana. As the maneuvering continued into March and the depression took its human toll, Lodge complained, "the door is open to the great trusts & closed to the small people & working men. It is infamous."[38] Lodge believed that the Senate Finance Committee was insensitive to the impact of the tariff on the lives of the mill operatives of Massachusetts and other states with light industry. Lodge was not alone in his grim view of the tariff. Joseph H. Manley, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, thought the tariff ought to be entitled, "'An Act to Destroy the Industries and Prosperity of America.'"[39]

The bill which Lodge attacked on April 10 was not the measure Wilson had presented the previous November. Arthur Pue Gorman of Maryland and other protectionist Democrats had made significant modifications, but the measure represented neither protection nor free trade. It included an income tax provision which was clearly sectional in impact. With the biting sarcasm and ridicule which became his trademark, Lodge assailed the free trade position as <u>laissez-faire</u> and began arguing horrible extremes of such an outlook. He contended that if such a view were wrong in any particular then it was wrong in general. He accurately pilloried the tendency of tariff revisionists to present their position

in simplistic terms; i.e. elimination of the tariff would bring the millenium. On the other hand, Lodge failed to observe with honesty that those who supported protection frequently claimed too much for their stance. He defended the right of government to regulate the hours of labor and to provide public education. He concluded that, if the principle of laissez-faire was wrong in those particular instances then, it was wrong in general; hence the free trade position which depended on laissez-faire was incorrect. As Lodge warmed to his subject, he broadened his attack on the tariff to include immigration restriction and protection of the American wage structure.[40] Finally, through selective schedule changes, the bill looked after the interests of the great trusts "like sugar, and lead, and petroleum... while the industries of my part of the country ... have been smitten by ruinous cuts in the rates."[41]

Predictably, the mugwumps in Boston assailed Lodge's speech and claimed he espoused socialism without realizing it. In April and May, he replied in kind charging that the mugwump view of free raw materials and protection for finished goods common in Massachusetts was untenable singling out William E. Russell in particular. Using every opportunity to discredit the handling of the tariff, Lodge condemned the failure to hold public hearings, pointing out that this denied opponents of the tariff the benefit of expert testimony on individual schedules. As a conscientious representative of the interests of his state, he attempted to protect the glycerin and cod liver oil industries. Recalling his efforts to protect the Gloucester fishing community in the 1880's, Lodge

again affirmed the importance of the fishing industry as a source of seamen for the Navy.[42]

As the debates dragged on in May and June from morning until evening, it became ever clearer that the tariff that was to emerge would ultimately benefit the Republicans politically. Although free wool would have been in the economic interest of Massachusetts, Lodge remained true to his principles and presented an emotional defense of the growers who were exceptionally vulnerable because of the decentralized nature of the industry. He blasted the mugwump manufacturers of woolen cloth while he defended the workers' stake in protection. Condemning the sectional nature of the cotton schedule, he pointed out that the protection accorded cotton goods testified to the growth of that industry and the political importance of the South. In the wake of the Pullman Strike in the heat of July and August, the process moved toward its disastrous conclusion on August 13. Instead of a tariff which would keep the platform pledge of 1892 and provide a secure foundation for the mid-term elections of 1894, the bill which was finally passed was virtually an orphan for which no one wished to take credit.[43]

Theodore Roosevelt saw clearly when he observed in September that "the drift is all our way!" The tariff provided the Republicans with an issue to take to the people, and they made superb use of it. Lodge contrasted the drift and weakness of the Democratic party with the Republican party which "has never been a weakling and a failure."[44] The

results in November exceeded the expectations of the optimistic Roosevelt. It was not the normal adjustment of mid-term elections; it was virtually a deluge.

Over the next two years, the tariff continued to provide grist for political will. The first problem the administration encountered was a loss of revenue from the new rates. The inclusion of an income tax was supposed to compensate for the reduction in duties. As the administration introduced machinery for collecting the tax, the provision drew more and more fire from Republicans. Lodge and Hoar joined in condemning the income tax and pressed the Secretary of the Treasury, John G. Carlisle, to enforce the provision of the Wilson Bill exempting alcohol because of its importance to the manufacturers of patent medicines in Massachusetts. While Lodge said very little about the constitutionality of the income tax in the fall of 1894, he assailed the measure in January because of its class nature and its negative impact on protection as a principle.[45]

The Supreme Court resolved any doubts about the constitutionality of the income tax in May in a rehearing of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust with a narrow 5-4 margin against the tax. With the excitement of the silver question and the presidential election, the tariff receded into the background until after William McKinley's election in 1896 again brought the issue to the forefront. In the fall of 1895, on his return from Europe, Lodge reported what he saw as the favorable impact of the Mills tariff bill on European industry. In the spring of 1896, Lodge was confident that with the Republicans controlling both houses of

Congress and the White House, the tariff would "come out all right in the next Congress...."[46] After the November elections, he continued to be optimistic about tariff revision in an upward direction, but thought that the Dingley bill ought not be passed in its condition in December. Lodge assured his constituents and his political associates that revision would come but would have to wait until a special session.[47]

In his speech to a group of the party faithful two days after his return from a tour of Europe in 1895, Lodge linked protection and immigration restriction. While his interest in reducing the flow of immigrants to America most certainly preceded 1891, Lodge's first legislative proposal for a literacy test was presented in that year. The Committee on Immigration preferred its own measure, but on February 19, Lodge spoke in favor of the Owen bill in spite of the fact that it did not go far enough.[48]

In response to the murder of eleven Italian immigrants in New Orleans in March, 1891, Lodge published an article in the North American Review entitled, "Lynch Law and Unrestricted Immigration." In the article, he cited a report of F. L. Dingley which he thought corroborated a series of generalizations about the flow of immigration in 1891. First, this "new" immigration was different in that it originated in southern and eastern Europe. Secondly, the "new" immigrants did not become citizens, according to Dingley. Finally, this "new" immigration undercut the wage structure of native Americans. Lodge thought the incident in New Orleans illustrated the pressing need to close out certain "classes" which provided the social material for the Mafia and the Molly Maguires. He

concluded this article with a recommendation for consular inspection in the country of departure and a literacy test.

In keeping with his work on immigration restriction, he published an article in Century in September, "Distribution of Ability in the United States." In this article, he surveyed Appleton's Encyclopedia of American Biography and came to the conclusion that certain "races" had made a greater contribution to the nation than their numbers might warrant. In particular, he singled out for praise the British and the French. Not surprisingly, he discovered that the Northeast had been more culturally and intellectually productive than the South. He attributed this to the effect of slavery. The significance of the article was that it presented his early views on "race" which played an increasingly important role in his work on immigration restriction.

While Lodge's efforts for restriction may have been in advance of public opinion in Massachusetts and elsewhere, there were members of old stock, Boston society who shared Lodge's concern about the "new" immigration. In the early 1890's, he found it necessary to "educate" his constituents and his party on the issue. As the flow of immigrants increased and they joined the Democratic party in disproportionate numbers, Lodge encouraged his friends in Massachusetts to urge a stricter procedure for naturalization.[49]

After entering the Senate in 1893 and receiving appointment to the Committee on Immigration, he increased his legislative efforts for restriction. The depression which hit in the spring seemed to underscore the need to exclude illiterate, poor and unskilled immigrants whose increased numbers exacerbated the condition of a badly damaged wage structure. Nativism peaked in 1893-1894 with the rise of the A.P.A.

and the founding of the Immigration Restriction League. In St. Paul, even the normally tolerant Senator Cushman K. Davis expressed a desire for some sort of restrictive policy after encountering anarchism among the children of recent immigrants. Lodge always rejected the bigotry of the A.P.A. and kept his relations with the Immigration Restriction League formal and sub rosa.[50]

Depression, nativism and a growing tide of immigrants combined to produce a climate of opinion more hospitable to restriction. Late in 1895, Lodge received a letter from the redoubtable Elihu B. Hayes urging a change in the immigration laws. Lodge encouraged him to be patient, observing that restriction of immigration had to proceed step by step. In February, 1896, Lodge introduced a bill embodying the literacy test. The reaction of some of his supporters was constructively critical and led to some significant modifications in his bill. On March 16, on the floor of the Senate, he spoke at length in defense of the bill admitting that a literacy test would fall most heavily upon Italians, Poles, Russians, Greeks and Asiatics and very lightly upon northern Europeans. He made no apology for the fact but rather explained that the attempt to assimilate the former social elements seemed a dangerous experiment. He closed his speech with a warning that unrestricted immigration "involves in a word, nothing less than the possibility of a great and perilous change in the very fabric of our race."[51]

In the next nine months, he received considerable support for his bill but the real test came in December when he tried to get a vote on the bill. His friends in the Immigration Restriction League had

lobbied vigorously with those members who might be expected to be friendly to the measure, but on December 10, Lodge ran headlong into a clever and successful program of parliamentary stalling. Lodge and Chandler carefully steered the bill to prevent any damaging amendments which might return it to a hostile committee in the House and obtained an affirmative vote on December 17. The bill passed 52-10 which encouraged Lodge, but the Conference Committee had to be hurdled.[52]

The leaders of the Immigration Restriction League and Lodge began applying pressure to the Conference Committee to counter the work of representatives of the steamship lines. The North German Lloyd Line started its work in December and continued it into 1897. Even before the bill emerged from conference, Lodge fretted about a veto at the hands of the President. He urged Prescott F. Hall of the League to bring the issue to Cleveland's attention if there were any way of doing so. Late in January, 1897, Lodge implored Hall to use every exertion to get a favorable vote in the House for the Conference Committee's report. The result was success but at the expense of considerable anxiety for Lodge.[53]

On February 2, the Conference Committee report came before the Senate and the partisan fire began at once. Charles H. Gibson of Maryland did a section-by-section critique of the report clearly intended to discredit it. His colleague, Arthur Pue Gorman, joined in with some disingenuous remarks about favoring a "fair" bill which would restrict immigration. Lodge answered the attacks on the report and the bill pointing out that the steamship companies would prevent the separation

of families some critics believed would occur. "Does anyone suppose for one moment that the steamship companies, charitable organizations as we know they are, are going to bring 75,000 illiterate immigrants to this country for the pleasure of having it discovered at Ellis Island that they are illiterate, and then taking them back again?"[54]

In spite of tactics of delay and obstruction, Lodge got a favorable vote the second week of February, only to have Cleveland veto it in the last days of his administration. The intensity of Lodge's commitment and the depth of disappointment that must have resulted from the veto emerged in his comments to Elihu B. Hayes. "I am vain enough to think that if I succeed in getting that bill, I shall have rendered one great public service."[55] He made every effort for the bill, even seeking a personal interview with Cleveland. Lodge argued the case for the bill and came away still hoping, but the formal message of veto came to the Senate on March 3 one day before McKinley's inauguration.[56]

Throughout his comments on immigration restriction, Lodge repeatedly used the word, "race." Like many of his contemporaries, Lodge used the word loosely to refer to national groups as well as to what modern anthropologists recognize as races. On one occasion in 1891, Lodge alluded obliquely to the racial problems growing out of the position of blacks in American society and compared them to the problems of the "new immigration. This was an unusual comment, however, and not at all representative of Lodge's views of "race" as applied to immigrants. In fact, Lodge's confusing use of the word prevented casting an interpretation of him as a full-blown bigot. Indeed, if a modern definition

of "race" were used, most of his contemporaries were bigots. Lodge's support for restriction of immigration was rooted in a fear of rapid social change, a nationalistic desire to protect the American wage structure and political self-interest.[57]

Over four years, Lodge had had several opportunities to observe Cleveland and his handling of domestic affairs. In September, 1893, Lodge called on the President and found him cordial and possessed of "a certain rough force but he gives no sign of originality of intellectual capacity of wide information or even great natural ability." Unlike his mugwump contemporaries, Lodge was unable to understand why Cleveland had been "made into an idol & a myth by the cultivated classes of the country. Yet such has been his fate & he is withal an idol of clay & pretty rough & common clay at that."[58]

In spite of his agreement with some of Cleveland's policies, he still saw Cleveland as he had three years earlier as "a man of force & stubbornness but with no breadth of view, no training in our traditions & essentially coarse-fibred...."[59] Surely, the next four years would bring to the White House a man more to Lodge's liking.

Footnotes

1. McCarthy to H.C. Lodge, April 5, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Burbank to H.C. Lodge, April 6, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

2. Guild to H.C. Lodge, n.d., 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hayes to H.C. Lodge, January 20, March 15, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to E.B. Hayes, January 23, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

3. Lodge to George V.L. Meyer, January 31, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hayes to H.C. Lodge, January 27, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Cox to H.C. Lodge, March 26, 29, 31, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

4. Lodge to Samuel E. Winslow, March 23, 1893, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Parker to H.C. Lodge, March 28, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Guild to H.C. Lodge, March 31, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Edgerly to H.C. Lodge, April [?], 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Cox to H.C. Lodge, March 31, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

5. Winship to H.C. Lodge, April 4, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Preble and McCarthy to H.C. Lodge, April 5, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

6. Turner to H.C. Lodge, April 5, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hayes to H.C. Lodge, April 7, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Cox to H.C. Lodge, April 5, 6, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Greenough to H.C. Lodge, April 7, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; McCarthy to H.C. Lodge, April 5, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

7. Buttuch to H.C. Lodge, April 7, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Curtis Guild, Jr., April 7, 1893, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; The draft of the letter supporting Barrett's candidacy appears in the Lodge Papers. Lodge to Alfred W. Brown, April [?], 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS. There is no indication that Lodge ever sent this letter.

8. Meech to H.C. Lodge, April 8, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.E. Barrett, April 10, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Guild to H.C. Lodge, April 13, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Draper to H.C. Lodge, April 14, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hayes to H.C. Lodge, April 14, 20, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Joseph H. Hawley, April 18, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Barrett to Nelson W. Aldrich, April 11, 1893, Aldrich Papers, LC; Hoitt to H.C. Lodge, April 15, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

9. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, April 23, 29, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hayes to H.C. Lodge, April 25, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

10. Lodge to Frederick T. Greenhalge, August 4, 1893, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Greenhalge to H.C. Lodge, August 5, 11, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

11. Greenhalge to H.C. Lodge, August 20, September 3, 8, 16, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Southworth to H.C. Lodge, September 9, 13, 16, October 30, November 1, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Robinson to H.C. Lodge, September 25, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, September 24, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

12. Lodge to Curtis Guild, Jr., April 2, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Guild to H.C. Lodge, April 4, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William B. Lawrence, April 4, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lawrence to H.C. Lodge, April 3, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS.

13. Lawrence to H.C. Lodge, April 3, 7, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; James J. Kenneally, "Woman Suffrage and the Massachusetts Referendum of 1895," The Historian (August, 1968) pp. 617-633. Lawrence believed the use of the initiative and referendum in the state an unfortunate development. He believed that the initiative would impair the operation of the legislature and injur party discipline. According to Richard M. Abrams, Conservatism in a Progressive Era (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 1-24, such reforms came to Massachusetts long before the rest of the nation.

14. Dodge to H.C. Lodge, April 17, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Alfred E. Cox, July 24, 1894, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Michael Henessy, Twenty-five Years of Massachusetts Politics, p. 27; Religious undertones which fed the A.P.A. appeared even before 1892 in the agitation over public education in the gubernatorial campaign between Charles H. Allen and William E. Russell in 1891; Boston Daily Advertiser, September 29, 1891, p. 1: Geoffrey Blodgett, The Gentle Reformers, pp. 151-153; For the A.P.A. nationally, see the following works: John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New York: Atheneum, 1966), chp. 4 and Donald L. Kinzer, An Episode in Anti-Catholicism: The American Protective Association (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964. Some opponents of the A.P.A. actually referred to them as Know Nothings. That was particularly common among older Republicans such as Hoar.

15. Guild to H.C. Lodge, April 7, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Barrett to William E. Chandler, April 10, 1894, Chandler Papers, LC.

16. Dodge to H.C. Lodge, April 17, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Alfred E. Cox, July 24, 1894, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, September 20, 1894, p. 1; Southworth to H.C. Lodge, March 16, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS.

17. George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years, Vol. II, pp. 263-264; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, October 7, 1894, Roosevelt Papers, LC; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, October 11, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS.

18. Michael Henessy, Twenty-Five Years of Massachusetts Politics, pp. 52-53; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, October 11, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS.

19. Boston Daily Advertiser, July 5, 1895, p. 1; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, August 15, September 27, October 25, 31, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Richard E. Welch, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans, pp. 189-193, Welch explains at some length the philosophical differences between Hoar and Lodge. George H. Lyman was a boyhood friend of Lodge's Henry Cabot Lodge, Early Memories (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913, p. 66.

20. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, February 19 ?, April 24, August 15, 1895, February 2, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

21. Lodge to Curtis Guild, Jr., February 15, 18, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

22. Lodge to George H. Lyman, March 17, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hoar to Ruth A. Hoar, March 29, 1896, Hoar Papers, MHS.

23. "Gubernatorial Elections in Massachusetts," Massachusetts State Library; Lodge to Frederick T. Greenhalge, February 12, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Greenhalge to H.C. Lodge, February 14, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

24. Lodge to George H. Lyman, April 2, 8, 25, 1-96, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, April 2, 6, 23, May 20, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Russell to H.C. Lodge, September 18, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

25. Lodge to Charles Fairchild, April 2, 1893, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS.

26. Plunkett to H.C. Lodge, January 19, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, April 13, 24, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 13, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

27. McCarthy to H.C. Lodge, April 8, 1893, January 21, February 23, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George V.L. Meyer, February 8, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS. Meyer was Speaker of the House at the time and successor to George H. Lyman as Chairman of the State Committee of the party.

28. Hoar to Henry L. Dawes, November 14, 21, 1888, Dawes Papers, LC; For Lodge's relationship with Hoar on patronage, see the Hoar Papers for 1893, MHS. To some degree, it was Lodge's responsibility for patronage and Hoar's avoidance of it that resulted in Lodge being tagged a "politician" and Hoar a "statesman." Hoar to H.C. Lodge, October 3, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George F. Hoar, October 6, 1893, Hoar Papers, MHS; Lodge to George F. Hoar, June 5, 1895, Hoar Papers, MHS; The two men shared not only an enthusiasm for regional history but also history in general. This letter deals with their common interest in a recently discovered letter related to the Junius conspiracy; The Lodge-Hoar relationship is dealt with extensively in Richard E. Welch, "Opponents and Colleagues: George Frisbie Hoar and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1898-1904," New England Quarterly XXXIX (June, 1966), pp. 182-184 and Richard E. Welch, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans, pp. 190-302. Welch's view of Hoar seems rather too favorable.

29. Draper to C.S. Hamlin, February 18, 1893?, Hamlin Papers, LC; Robinson to H.C. Lodge, February 24, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 53d Cong. 2d sess., February 14, 1894, p. 2162; Dodge to H.C. Lodge, February 10, 16, 19, April 4, 1894, January 27, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS: Baldwin to H.C. Lodge, July 23, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Draper to H.C. Lodge, January 30, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, February 20, 23, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Dodge to W.E. Chandler, February 21, March 23, 1895, Chandler Papers, LC; Smith to W.E. Chandler, March 8, 1895, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to C.S. Hamlin, September 26, October 16, 1896, Hamlin Papers, LC. Some of the party leadership vigorously supported Dodge while others charged him with lack of party loyalty. In some respects, the significance of Dodge's removal was that it brought others in its train and tested indirectly the commitment of the Cleveland administration to the concept of civil service.

30. Congressional Record 53d Cong. spec. sess., March 15, 1893, p. 16; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, September 3, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; David J. Rothman, Politics and Power: The United States Senate 1869-1901 (New York: Atheneum, 1969), pp. 132-158; John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 165.

31. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 12, February 2, 16, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Blaine to Mrs. H.C. Lodge, August 31, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, September 17, December 16, 1893, January 28, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to John T. Morse, September 20, 1893, Morse Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 53d Cong. 1st sess. September 21, 1893, pp. 1636-1638, October 16, 1893, pp. 2536-2537; Lodge also received support from his colleague in the changes he proposed to the Senate rules governing a quorum, reading long speeches into the Record and determining if a member was present.

32. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, September 17, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 53d Cong. 2d sess., January 24, 1894, pp. 1313-1320, February 21, 1895, pp. 2498, 2504. W.E. Chandler was also concerned about federal elections legislation as this letter indicates. Brayton to W.E. Chandler, January 24, 1894, Chandler Papers, LC. Chandler was a member of the Committee on Elections.

33. Roosevelt to Richard Henry Dana, March 2, 1894, January 28, February 7, 1895, Dana Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, September 2, 1894, January 14, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 54th Cong. 1st sess. February 11, 1896, p. 1594; John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 83-85; Gordon S. Wood, "The Massachusetts Mugwumps," New England Quarterly XXXIII (December, 1960), pp. 436-444.

34. H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, pp. 446-450; Rendig Fels, American Business Cycles, 1865-1897 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), pp. 184-188. Fels suggests that it was a combination of a weak underlying economy, a weak banking structure and the impact of the silver law which produced the depression of 1893. The failure of the Reading railroad was typical of the contraction with many railroads plunging into bankruptcy; Samuel T. McSeveney, The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893-1896 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 224-225, documents how the Republicans capitalized on economic distress to their political advantage in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.

35. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 4, 1893, December 30, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Higginson to H.C. Lodge, April 23, 1894, April 27, 30, May[?], 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

36. Henry Cabot Lodge, "Outlook and Duty of the Republican Party," Forum XV (April, 1893), p. 255; Lodge to Arthur Lyman, September 29, 1893, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS.

37. Guild to H.C. Lodge, November 28, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, November 30, December 16, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to John H. Sutton, December 20, 1893, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Worker support for tariff protection is confirmed in Richard J. Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

38. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 11, March 2, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, pp. 463 ff.

39. Manley to W.C. Chandler, March 30, 1894, Chandler Papers, LC.

40. Congressional Record 53d Cong. 2d sess. April 10, 1894, pp. 3611-3624, 4317.

41. Congressional Record 53rd Cong. 2d sess. April 10, 1894, p. 4317.

42. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, May 6, 13, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Atkinson to George F. Hoar, May 10, 1894, Hoar Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 53rd Cong. 2d sess. May 12, 15, 21, 1894, pp. 4659, 4759 ff., 4772-4773, 5000-5001.

43. H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, pp. 474-475; Hay to H.C. Lodge, June 5, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 53d Cong. 2d sess. June 14, 1894, pp. 6257-6261. The chief student of the tariff, F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York: G. P. Putnams Sons, 1931), p. 320, says of the Wilson Bill that it was an "inglorious result."

44. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, September 2, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, October 16, 1894, p. 1.

45. Carnegie to Grover Cleveland, December 14, 1894, Carnegie Papers, LC; Hoar to H.C. Lodge, January 11, 19, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George F. Hoar, January 12, 1895, Hoar Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 53d Cong. 3d sess. January 12, 1895, pp. 903-904; Richard E. Welch, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans, pp. 179-181.

46. Boston Daily Advertiser, November 26, 27, 1895; Alfred H. Kelly & Winfred A. Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origin and Development (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970), p. 573; Lodge to Moreton Frewen, March 11, 1896, Frewen Papers, LC.

47. Lodge to Curtis Guild, Jr., November 27, December 10, 1896, Letterbook IX, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Edwin U. Curtis, December 2, 1896, Letterbook IX, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Justice, Bateman & Co., December 7, 1896, Letterbook IX, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge's constituents were growing anxious for relief from what they saw as the obnoxious Wilson Bill.

48. Boston Daily Advertiser, November 27, 1895; Lodge to Alfred R. Conkling, January 16, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Wallace Foster, February 27, 1891, Letterbook IV, Lodge Ppaers, MHS; Congressional Record 51st Cong. 2d sess., February 19, 1891, pp. 1553, 2956.

49. Higginson to H.C. Lodge, October 26, 1891, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Charles Allen, January 7, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to James A. Moore, January 23, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Bernard O'Kane, May 1, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Neil J. Deering, May 1, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge denied O'Kane's criticism that his stand on restriction was rooted in religious or racial prejudice.

50. Barbara Miller Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants: A Changing New England Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p.1 102: Henry C. Lodge, "The Census and Immigration," Century XLVI (September, 1893), pp. 737-739: Davis to H.C. Lodge, September 9, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, January 16, 1895, p. 4; Lodge to Thecdore Roosevelt, October 7, 1894, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

51. Lodge to Elihu B. Hayes, December 20, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 16, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Samuel Closson, February 21, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Charles Grattan, March 13, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 54th Cong. 1st sess. March 16, 1896, pp. 2817-2819.

52. Lodge to Robert D. Ward, May 30, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 54th Cong. 2d sess. December 10, 1896, pp. 67-69; Hall to W. E. Chandler, December 10, 1896, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to W.E. Chandler, December 14, 1896, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 20, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

53. Hall to W. E. Chandler, December 18, 1896, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to Prescott F. Hall, December 24, 28, 1896, January 1, 9, 29, 1897, Letterbook IX, Lodge Papers, MHS;

Lodge to F. W. A. Poppie, January 28, 1897, Letterbook IX, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 31, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

54. Congressional Record 54th Cong. 2d sess., February 2, 1897, pp. 1423-1425, 1431-1432, February 4, 1897, p. 1521.

55. Hoar was criticized for his support of Lodge's immigration bill. Garrison to G.F. Hoar, February 18, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 54th Cong. 2d sess. February 4, 1897, p. 1523; Lodge to E.B. Hayes, February 15, 1897, Letterbook IX, Lodge Papers, MHS.

56. Lodge to Grover Cleveland, February 19, 1897, Letterbook X, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Robert D. Ward, February 20, 1897, Letterbook X, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 28, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS: Congressional Record 54th Cong. 2d sess., March 3, 1897, p. 2728.

57. Congressional Record 51st Cong. 2d sess., February 19, 1891, p. 2956; 54th Cong. 1st sess., March 16, 1896, p. 2819; Lodge's comments about "race" defy any simple categorization. He repeatedly denied that he intended "to make any attack upon any race..." Lodge to Prof. L. Amateis, March 21, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Yet his comments viewed from the perspective of today sound racist. Barbara Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants, has studied Lodge's work for immigration restriction and classified his outlook as racist, but her work seems too much present-minded. Lodge had read the work of Gustave LeBon and other Social Darwinists, but Lodge does not seem to have developed a systematic, "naturalist" philosophy nor does he seem to have been an intellectual progenitor of fascism. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, April 30, 1896, Roosevelt Papers, LC. The thought of "racial selection" in any modern sense would have appalled Lodge. The most accurate treatment of Lodge's view of race and the general confusion which surrounded his contemporaries' attitude about race appears in Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1956), pp. 27-32.

58. Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, April 24, September 8, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

59. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 16, February 18, 1894, May 31, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Edward Everett Hale?, January 30, 1894, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Samuel Gilder, February 16, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, January 21, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge's last contact with Cleveland came in February, 1897 on the immigration bill which must have left Lodge with a sour impression. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 28, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

CHAPTER VIII

FREE SILVER AND THE ELECTION OF 1896

Just before his election to the Senate in January, 1893, Lodge supported the repeal of the silver purchase clause of the Sherman Act of 1890. In the months before Cleveland's inauguration, Lodge found little chance of repeal. The free silver forces had a slight voting edge and prevented any effort to bring forward a resolution of repeal, but Lodge continued to do what little he could to press the cause of repeal.[1]

In February, he discovered that the silver forces were remarkably shrewd and able in the use of parliamentary stalling tactics to prevent the bill for repeal from coming up. Steadfastly, he and his friends in the House refused to compromise and permit the coinage of a smaller amount of silver. As the nation entered the most severe depression of the period, Lodge called on the new administration to request a special session to deal with the monetary crisis and use the "honeymoon" period to push through repeal. A special session of the Senate began in March, but accomplished nothing on the question of repeal. Not until August was anything done on repeal, and then matters went at a painfully slow pace from Lodge's point of view.[2]

The currency question and the role of silver in the American monetary system had troubled the political system for many years prior to the Sherman Act and the fight for repeal. The depression, however,

sharpened class lines in the repeal question. The urgency Lodge felt in the fall of 1893 came out of the pressure he received from his constituents and a genuine conviction that uncertainty about Cleveland's ability to maintain the gold standard had contributed to the depression. "Repeal will bring a measure of relief because the business world believes it will,"[3] asserted Lodge. Lodge was convinced that in the business community a magic word was "confidence." Repeal would help to restore the confidence essential to an economic recovery.

The silver senators were not persuaded, and the progress of repeal was slow and acrid. Lodge's argument that repeal was necessary from a long term point of view brought a sharp rebuff from Edward O. Wolcott (R.-Col.). He insisted that such an argument would be small comfort to a western miner who was suffering deprivation in the present. Wolcott argued that prosperity would come when the nation embraced bimetallism and free coinage of silver.[4]

After much rancorous debate and filibustering, a vote was taken and repeal achieved. Lodge was not pleased with the result, but was much relieved to have the question decided at the end of October, 1893, three months after the beginning of the special session. The silver question, however, was not finished.[5]

On the basis of personal financial interest, Lodge ought to have favored a gold monometallic standard; in fact, he favored bimetallism through international agreement. As the choice of the Founding Fathers, he believed that bimetallism was the proper system. Another factor influencing his views was his contact with Brooks Adams, who championed

the cause of bimetallism with or without international agreement. Adams had married the sister of Lodge's wife, and the contact between the Lodges and the Adamses increased afterwards. While Lodge declined Adams' invitation to join a bimetallic organization, he did all in his power to further Adams' contacts with the representatives of silver states in Congress.[6]

As bimetallism grew in appeal both in Washington and in Boston, the administration found it necessary to borrow, at great cost, to replenish the gold reserve. Lodge found the administration's course bungling and inept. As with the tariff, Lodge thought the Republican party had a great opportunity to capitalize on Democratic failures in handling financial policy. In March, a bill was introduced and passed to monetize the government's charges for minting as a gesture to the silver forces who had lost on the repeal fight. Lodge thought that such a policy "is worse in character than free silver for that is at least an avowed monetary policy. But this bill is paper inflation & dishonest at that."[7]

The tariff came before the Senate in April, and Lodge used the opportunity to attack the various schedules of the Wilson bill and advance international bimetallism. He proposed an amendment to apply discriminating" duties upon the products of Great Britain ... until Great Britain shall assent to and take part in an international agreement together with the United States, for the coinage and use of silver."[8] Adams congratulated him for this move, but suggested that debate on it be delayed until after debate in the House of Commons. With Cleveland's prestige at a low

ebb, Adams thought that many in Congress might embrace Lodge's amendment. There was a good deal of shrewdness behind Lodge's approach. Many of those in the Senate who spoke for silver interests were strong protectionists, and Lodge's proposal had the merit of offering a compromise between proponents of free coinage and those who favored gold monometallism.[9]

While the tariff battle dragged on, proponents of bimetallism organized and pushed for action. The intensity of feeling between silverites and gold "bugs" was exemplified in the refusal to admit Edward O. Wolcott to the Metropolitan Club. In spite of their differences on the money issue, Lodge and Wolcott were close personal friends and Lodge, perhaps remembering his own treatment in 1884, defended Wolcott energetically. His amendment to the tariff to pressure Great Britain for bimetallism through discriminatory duties came up for debate in May, and he defended it as the only way of "reaching England." Lodge's efforts were in vain; the amendment died on a strict party vote.[10]

The extent and quality of English reaction to his proposal surprised and pleased Lodge as he explained to Moreton Frewen, an English investor in American silver mines. The failure of the Republican press to discuss and support this measure irritated Lodge. He pointed to the endorsement of the idea in party conventions in Ohio and Maine. With the tariff wrangle over and the elections heavily favoring his own party, he told Frewen that more than ever something must be done about bimetallism; but he was not hopeful that it could be

achieved through international agreement, which was "the only true settlement."[11]

Near year's end on Christmas day, he took occasion to reflect on the events of the year as they bore on the money question. In an extraordinarily long letter to Charles C. Jackson, a Boston stock broker, he outlined the situation. First, the drain of gold was not precipitated because of lack of faith in American greenbacks but rather because the United States was a debtor nation. He denied that the gold outflow was going to pay for an unfavorable trade balance; he believed that the excess of expenditures over revenues also contributed to the low gold balance at the Treasury. Secondly, the Secretary of the Treasury's suggestion for a revision of the banking system would not end the crisis. Carlisle's idea of replacing the national banks with state banks was a "thoroughly bad one." The answer to this deplorable situation was to "stop further attacks upon our industries and our finances and to give the country a chance to rest and gather a little confidence."

As to the banking system, "before the next Congress meets there will be opportunity to prepare some simple and moderate measure for the improvement of our banking system...."[12] While the continuing depression was international in nature, "the schemes which are proposed to remedy these evils are domestic, like closing our mints to silver and withdraw [sic] the greenbacks. No matter how good they are in themselves, they have the defect which all remedies must have that are not coextensive with the disease." Fear of abandonment of the gold standard had also contributed to the drain.[13]

Unlike some of his contemporaries, Lodge saw the repeal of the Sherman Act, free coinage of silver, the reform of the banking system and the depression as pieces of a whole. To him, the proposals for a system of state banks seemed ill-conceived and detrimental to the goal of expanding the money supply. Instead, he thought that the national banking system ought to be strengthened. "A movement to withdraw the greenbacks and Treasury notes, fund them in bonds and allow these bonds to be used as a basis for bank circulation at more than the par value instead of less is to my thinking what we want to get at and the object for which our business men should move."[14]

Both personally and politically, Lodge had close ties with the Boston financial community. That, coupled with the fact that the financial question was at the center of the stage, compelled Lodge to give it a good deal of attention in the next two years. To his cousin who served as his broker, he reaffirmed his views on banking legislation and emphasized that at the heart of the current financial problem was the use of bond sales to meet current expenditures. Lodge thought revenues should be increased so as to restore the gold reserve. The shortfall in income was a result of the tariff revision, according to Lodge. "If we enter on another crusade for currency reform before we well know what we want, we may land in a reform of the currency under Democratic and Populistic auspices by the side of which the industrial ruin of the tariff performance would seem very mild,"[15] he warned.

With an overwhelming victory at the polls in November, 1894, it was natural that Republican hopefuls began putting themselves on record

on the money issue which promised to be central in the next presidential race. In the next two years, Cleveland's strength declined without interruption except for his handling of the Venezuelan crisis. As in 1888, candidates for the Republican nomination believed that a Republican victory in 1896 was virtually certain. Lodge's choice, Thomas B. Reed, spoke out on the money question in February only to receive a lukewarm reception at the hands of the business community. Lodge reprimanded his cousin for the failure of State Street to stand behind the representatives of its interests as firmly as the silver interests stood behind their men in Congress. He contrasted the response to Reed's speech with the support for Cleveland who had misled the Republicans on the currency question and had entered into a bond deal "to put a large sum of money in the pockets of a small syndicate of bankers."[16]

Throughout the next few months, Lodge continued to rail against Cleveland's negotiation with the syndicate of New York bankers. Lodge felt that Cleveland had invited the cooperation of Republicans in defending sound money and then betrayed them. The bond sale through the syndicate lent credence to Populist charges that there was a conspiracy of "international bankers" at work to exploit the public. "It has strengthened the silver men and made votes for them here and will make votes for them all over the country I fear before its force is spent,"[17] he complained. Cleveland's deal with the New York syndicate offended Lodge's sense of political tactics and open dealing. The entire affair confirmed Lodge's distrust of Cleveland and his view of the administration as bungling.

While Reed defended sound money in the House and received little appreciation from the financial community, Cleveland garnered the praise of the financial communities and the mugwumps. Lodge thought the disparity in treatment displayed the bias of the press. "If a Republican President had made such a deal as that [with the syndicate] with his partner's name at the bottom of the contract, a Democratic House would have impeached him within forty-eight hours amid the approving shouts of all the mugwumps in the land."[18]

The depression reduced his income somewhat, but Lodge decided to go to Europe in the summer anyway and did not return until after the fall elections. He combined pleasure with politics during his stay in England which included dinners with members of the political leadership in the Commons and Lords. In July, he dined with Joseph Chamberlain whose political views he did not share, but found him interesting all the same. During the festivities, he talked with Chamberlain at some length about the official English view of an international agreement on silver and learned that there was little prospect of such an understanding. He also talked with Lord Balfour, but took such a rigid position that he discouraged Balfour.[19]

Refreshed by his tour of the Continent, Lodge plunged into the political fray first in Boston and then later in Washington. As the first session of the Fifty-Fourth Congress began, he resumed his attack on the problem of the gold drain and emphasized that central to the problem was the excess of government expenditures over revenues. He reassured Henry L. Higginson about the agitation over silver. "Although

the free silver men still hold a majority in the Senate, which impedes currency legislation, there is no doublt of the subsidence of the feeling in the country."[20]

As Cleveland's message on Venezuela sent ripples through State Street, Lodge failed to recognize that fears of war could aggravate the problem of the gold drain. In January, 1896, he returned to his theme of increasing revenues not only to meet expenditures but also to produce a surplus. He thought that paying off the debt, subsidizing American shipping and acquiring Cuba would help to eliminate several drains of gold. As to currency, it "is not the source of prosperity. It is merely the instrument of commerce," he reasoned. Like many of his contemporaries, Lodge had a very limited view of money; but his attitude about elimination of the debt was not in keeping with his general Hamiltonian outlook. In fact, his views on finance were much more in keeping with those of Jefferson than those of Hamilton. Like others in the nineteenth century, Lodge failed to recognize that increasing government revenues in a period of economic distress would only make that distress greater.[21]

With anti-British sentiment flaring after Cleveland's message, Lodge explained to Moreton Frewen that the English position on bimetallism had intensified the outburst of Anglophobia. In March, he turned his attention to writing the money plank for the state convention which would be important not only in Massachusetts but also at St. Louis. In Massachusetts, there was widespread support for the gold standard within the party, but Lodge was successful in pushing through the state convention

a resolution supporting bimetallism. In the Democratic party, the coalition of Yankees, Irish and mugwumps was in disrepair. The careful work of 1884 was undone in the struggle between George Fred Williams representing the "Young Democrats" who embraced free silver and radicalism and William E. Russell who supported the gold standard. As party loyalists, the Irish supported Bryan but his failure to recognize the importance of the Irish in the party completed the smash up that left the party a shambles after 1896.[22]

Lodge had reason to take satisfaction in his own handiwork in maintaining party harmony and watched with pleasure the explosive impact of the money question on the Democratic party. After both conventions in July and a careful compromise in the Republican platform, he criticized the free silver platform of the Democrats as "revolutionary and anarchistic." While still advocating bimetallism through international agreement, he echoed Roosevelt's sentiments that "at the bottom the cry for free silver is nothing but a variant of the cry for fiat money ... [and] simple dishonesty...."[23]

In October, as the campaign neared its conclusion, Lodge's colleague, George Frisbie Hoar, reminded him that "while the whole emphasis of the present argument must be put on the necessity of keeping the gold standard and defeating silver monometallism, we must never forget that we also mean to restore bimetallism by International Agreement whenever the time shall be ripe."[24] Lodge did not have to be reminded of the pledges of the platform. He followed with interest and enthusiasm the mission of Edward O. Wolcott in January, 1897, to sound

out British sentiment for an agreement on bimetallism. Although American efforts to bring about such an understanding failed, Lodge faithfully supported the concept until it appeared unnecessary.[25]

Before the elections in November, 1894 made Democratic vulnerability obvious, Thomas B. Reed quietly began testing the political waters for a run in 1896. His chief opponent, William McKinley of Ohio, began sounding out sentiment in Lodge's home state. At this early stage, Reed did not think that it helped to make a speaking tour as McKinley was doing. With Democratic weakness ever clearer, Lodge's friendly advice to Reed about his pursuit of the nomination changed to active management. Meticulously, Lodge not only suggested that Reed make such a speech in New England but also outlined the tone he should take. "We have no programme beyond giving repose to the broken business of the country," Lodge suggested. Reed should take a serious tone, but "do not be too solemn, but rejoice in due measure with them that do rejoice."[26]

In the spring of 1895, Lodge's work in Reed's behalf gathered force as an "organization" for Reed began to take shape. Lodge looked after organizing sentiment among senators from New England while Theodore Roosevelt maintained a close watch on political events in New York from his new post as Police Commissioner. Roosevelt had been reluctant to take the post because it would mean losing contact with Lodge and his other friends in Washington, but it offered the prospect of political advancement, the chance to do some important work and a position where he could be of help to Reed.[27]

In New Hampshire, William E. Chandler looked after Reed's interests to the degree possible; and Lodge used his lieutenant, George H. Lyman, to communicate with Nelson Aldrich about Reed's chances in Rhode Island. The early plan was to make New England solid for Reed. Unhappily, there were already signs of a significant movement for McKinley in Massachusetts. The trouble centered in the Tenth Congressional District in Boston under the control of Harrison H. Atwood. From March, 1895 until June, 1896, Lodge struggled to deliver a solid Massachusetts delegation for Reed at St. Louis both as a matter of pride and personal loyalty.[28]

With matters in New England in competent hands, Reed began looking to other areas and observed that McKinley was doing the traditional hunting for potential delegates among southerners. In the West, he was less confident about the state of things and asked Lodge if he thought it would be wise to promote a favorite son strategy in Minnesota. Reed was convinced that his run for the nomination was proceeding well in the South with Chandler and Lodge using the contacts they had made during the elections bill fight in 1890-1891; but Vermont and New York seemed to be trouble spots.[29]

Early in May came disconcerting news that McKinley had made inroads in the Massachusetts press. Lodge and his political comrades were always hypersensitive to the direction of the press. When it appeared that the Boston Journal under Francis M. Stanwood might support McKinley, they overreacted. George Lyman thought that superficially the reason for Stanwood's support for McKinley was the application of the latter's famous charm in a personal meeting. Behind the appearance, however,

Lyman suggested that Stanwood's move was rooted in financial problems and the desire to back the winner whoever it might be. Lyman decided that the Journal must be made "safe" and began planning a change of ownership. Either because of confidence or complacency, Lyman noted that that "there is a very decided hustling going on throughout the state in behalf of McKinley [,but] the promoters of this movement are all little acorns." Without alarm, he wrote Lodge that McKinley Clubs were growing in numbers; but the movement was outside the regular organization and "made up of the boodle element, working for pay or reward or both, in the present or the future."[30] In retrospect, Lyman ought not to have been so confident that the regular organization under the leadership of the "best people" would easily deliver a delegation for Reed.

Regardless of his speeches on the money question, Reed was still viewed as straddling the question within the financial communities of Boston and New York. Roosevelt was upset that such was the case, and George Lyman engineered a resolution in the Republican Club in Boston in support of gold, hoping that Reed could endorse it. Roosevelt did missionary work among businessmen convincing Cornelius Vanderbilt among others of Reed's orthodoxy. In the political climate of 1895-1896, It was crucial that any doubts about Reed's position on the money issue be resolved. Despite Roosevelt's work, somehow a cloud lingered.[31]

Meanwhile, Lodge worked to keep Aldrich and Rhode Island behind Reed. Privately, the candidate vented his anger on the banking community. After accusing the leaders of finance of being ungrateful for

his actions as "the only man who ever took any risks on this silver question," he made one of those world-weary statements which frequently found their way into his letters. "I wish I had a dollar and a half surplus wherewith to roam the world. I would tell the whole lot to apply for consulates in warm climates."[32]

With warmer weather, Lodge made plans to set sail for England and the Continent; and Reed began considering a counter strategy to McKinley. Since McKinley was posing as the pre-eminent champion of protection, Reed theorized it might be well to address the Home Market Club in Boston. Ominously, Roosevelt sent word from New York that the situation there was not shaping up well for Reed's cause. The division between the Platt and anti-Platt factions complicated the picture, and Governor Levi P. Morton was running as a favorite son. Roosevelt was concerned about the Morton boom, but believed that it would "die of senility."[33]

Something of an interlude in Reed's pursuit of the nomination occurred while Lodge was abroad from June until November, 1895. Roosevelt continued to report on the situation in New York and on general political prospects. For his part, Lodge sent back information on the English attitude on bimetallism and Venezuela. Late in July, Roosevelt bewailed Reed's failure to "make a strong anti-free coinage speech when he voted for the Gold Bond [of the previous winter]." Such an action would have put to rest the rumors about Reed's position. As to the general outlook, Roosevelt believed that in 1896 the South would go for the Democrats regardless of their view of silver. If Cleveland

were to be the nominee, there would be an intense struggle in the Northeast unless the Republicans declared for gold so strongly that they lost the far West. Even though the silver "craze" had subsided, "there will be much trouble for the Democratic leaders on the financial question," Roosevelt believed. With the state conventions from Iowa east coming down soundly on the financial question and chances for good crops injuring the Populists, he thought the party's chances were excellent.

Lodge encouraged Roosevelt to continue refuting the charges against Reed on the money issue and presented his own view of the general outlook. He thought that Cleveland could be beaten on the third term. As to free silver, Lodge believed that the Democrats could be beaten on that question after a sharp fight, "and we will whip the life out of them on the tariff, foreign policy & general incompetency."[34]

In August, Lodge received confirmation on the potential for a good harvest. With yields of 15 to 30 bushels of wheat per acre and 60 to 100 bushels of oats per acre, "Agricola is ceasing to think of fiat money and wants the honest dollar for what he has to sell. He is becoming one of the creditor class," remarked Cushman K. Davis (R.-Minn.). A month later, Roosevelt thought the political situation in New York had worsened. His chances of going to St. Louis in 1896 were dim. Platt's henchmen would probably control his district and he was faced with a large number of able candidates for delegate, including Chauncey Depew, Elihu Root, Joseph Choate, and Anson G. McCook. "The shrewdest among them are ... McKinley men,"[35] he thought.

Lodge cautioned Roosevelt not to make an open fight against Platt. That would be playing Platt's game. He suggested that Roosevelt organize the anti-Platt people and work for delegates for Morton. The favorite son strategy would ultimately favor Reed Lodge thought. From Minnesota, Cushman K. Davis sent word that Lodge's interest in the Foreign Relations Committee would not be forgotten when the Fifty-Fourth Congress met in December. He also reported that Quay commanded Pennsylvania as a favorite son while Morton's candidacy knocked out Harrison. In late September, "McKinley leads and Reed is a close second," but the "velvet-footed uncle William Allison is treading softly in the same direction."[36] Unlike the caustic and flamboyant Reed, Allison was a formidable contender as a possible compromise choice at the Convention, but would remain in waiting for the front runners to make a fatal error.[37]

With Lodge's return from Europe imminent, George H. Lyman reported that the state elections had gone well with a larger vote than the year prior. As to Reed's campaign, Lyman was not clear on his chances, but believed that he had the inside track. In New England, Reed was growing in strength while "McKinley has hurt himself here by pushing his boom forward too rapidly."[38]

Lodge returned to the Hub late in November and, after the requisite political speeches, made his way to Washington for the opening of Congress early in December. After hearing again from Roosevelt on the situation in New York and of his troubles with Platt, it was clear that someone must establish an organization for Reed to collect information and coordinate work in his behalf. Lodge looked to Joseph H.

Manley of Maine as the person to provide such staff work. Lack of political intelligence particularly on western states and lack of effective staff work plagued Reed's campaign outside of New England.[39]

In spite of Roosevelt's woes in New York, the situation seemed to have brightened at the end of December, 1895. With the financial markets upset over the Venequelan situation, Reed pushed through the Republican dominated House a series of measures to establish his own position on financial matters. The House went on record as favoring a temporary modification of the tariff to provide adequate revenue, a measure to authorize bonds to protect the gold reserve and short term certificates to cover any short term deficit. All of this coupled with disclosures of misdeeds on the part of one of McKinley's representatives in New Orleans created a strong drift to Reed. What Lodge most had at heart, however, was "that Massachusetts should send staunch Reed men [to the Convention]."[40]

With Reed's election as Speaker of the House and the appearance of irregularities in the actions of McKinley's supporters in Louisiana, the outlook appeared bright for Reed as the year opened. Roosevelt was discouraged at the condition of things in New York because he received as much trouble from the anti-Platt faction as from the Platt group. Meanwhile, Lodge communicated with George Lyman about difficulties in Massachusetts. There had been problems the year prior in the Tenth Congressional District and his old district, the Seventh. Lyman arranged a strategy to deal with a local politician, Jesse Gove, who was doubtful and in a crucial position for Reed's candidacy. All concern about the

position of the Boston Journal had been laid to rest with the change in ownership. In fact, Lyman reported that the Journal would be run in Reed's interest.[41]

In February, the news from New York remained grim; and Roosevelt was only able to take ineffective action to help Reed's campaign. Lodge looked to his own state where the maneuvering in anticipation of the March state convention had already begun. He explained to Robert A. Southworth, a local political leader in the Seventh District, that he had no intention of trying to "dictate" the delegates to the National Convention; but at the same time he made his desires known. Winthrop Murray Crane advised that it was best to let the McKinley people "do the brass band work" and conduct a quiet campaign for Reed. Crane's suggestion was in keeping with his own political style which was one of careful organization and management, but not colorful campaigning. Such a mode might find favor with some of the "best people" and perhaps New Englanders, but it displayed real limitations as a general approach.[42]

As Chairman of the Republican State Committee, Lyman began making plans for the State Convention. Initially, perhaps in response to McKinley's increasing activity in Massachusetts, Lyman planned to have a good deal of "brass band" at the Convention for Reed with a large picture of Reed in the hall. He later decided that that would not be in keeping with the style of the campaign. Lodge concurred with Lyman's plans and warned him to look after the delegates from the Seventh Congressional District. Early in March, Lodge received news that there was an anti-Reed movement among members of the A.P.A. in the Tenth District.

McKinley's managers had resurrected an old charge against Reed that he was an atheist and undeserving of the support of religious-minded voters. Lodge recommended that the best course was to maintain silence since any comment would only provide more grist. More alarming news came from Murray Crane that the McKinley men had made significant inroads in Vermont and Connecticut.[43]

Crane urged Joseph Manley who was directing the search for southern delegates to ease up a bit there. Lyman, meanwhile, continued to wrestle with difficulties in Massachusetts in the Seventh and Tenth Congressional Districts. In New York, Roosevelt was forced to support Platt's delegate to prevent an openly anti-Reed man from being chosen. Roosevelt believed his support of Reed was costing him dearly. Most important to Lodge, still, was the struggle in Massachusetts where the fortunes of political warfare ultimately flowed in Reed's favor but only after serious exertions on Lyman's part. By March 19, Lyman felt confident that a solid delegation for Reed would be chosen, but he was uncomfortable about the outlook in other sections of the country.[44]

From his vantage point, Lyman assured Lodge that the Tenth District would go for Reed and the state Convention would declare for him. Other observers were not so optimistic about Reed's prospects. From Cairo, Brooks Adams wrote that "I am told Reed's chances decline," adding that "I have never believed he could be nominated, since last year when he broke away from Wall Street on the bond question."[45] Adams' explanation for Reed's weakness may have been too narrowly based, but he was right about Reed's likelihood of getting the nomination.

Lodge himself believed that Reed held the confidence of the business community. More important in the short term was the refusal of the party leadership in Vermont to permit Curtis Guild, Jr. to come and speak for Reed. Lodge thought their action "abominable", but he was stunned when it became apparent late in April that Senator Redfield Proctor had instructed the delegation for McKinley. Lyman was likewise angered at what he saw as perfidy to the cause of a fellow New Englander.[46]

The actions of Vermont and Illinois were mortal blows and were perceived as such among Reed's managers. The defection of Vermont from New England's candidate was symbolic. As professionals, Lyman and Lodge both realized that one of the essential weaknesses of Reed's campaign was what Lyman called the lack of a "bass drum and brass band" approach. In a word, Reed's campaign lacked "enthusiasm." While Lyman admitted that McKinley had "outgeneraled us all to pieces, I have nothing to say against those who lead our forces, but our sub-lieutenants are not 'in it' with McKinley's." One other crucial reason for McKinley's success was the notion "that McKinley embodies in his own corpus, and in his alone, all the elements of protection," Lyman complained. Clearly, a bandwagon effect had been generated; and states such as Vermont and Illinois who were "only for the winner" were eager to climb aboard so as to be in position to claim their reward later.[47] McKinley's victory not only represented the triumph of one personality over another but also codified a significant political and economic shift from the East to the Midwest.

Lodge's disappointment was great as his letters to Lyman, Crane and others indicate; but he was a professional. He quickly adapted to reality while not abandoning his friend until the nomination of McKinley at St. Louis made the outcome final. Lodge agreed that Reed had suffered a failure of management, but "there is no use crying over spilt milk." He thought that the faithful would do well to look to St. Louis, and he believed it was his duty to go on the committee on resolutions "because the sound money plank is going to be of as much importance as the nomination."[48] Reed seemed stoic in the face of his defeat in Vermont and Illinois, but in fact seethed at his treatment and resented McKinley's success. Lyman agreed with Lodge that there was no point in spoiling over the defeat, but he was not prepared to relinquish the field without further fighting. He suggested that perhaps if Lodge, Reed and Aldrich "took off their coats" and addressed the questions of protection, McKinley's straddle on the currency question and the promises of his managers of patronage that something might yet be done. Such a move might result in a brass band for Reed thought Lyman.[49]

In mid-May, Lodge agreed with Lyman that Reed's friends ought to do all that they could for him at St. Louis, but "all this talk of beating McKinley is nonsense," he declared adding "if he is nominated, we shall carry him high and dry." A worrisome report came from Crane who related that there was a movement to put William B. Plunkett, a manager for McKinley, on the National Committee from Massachusetts. Crane believed that the goal was to use Plunkett to distribute patronage.

Such a move would threaten the control of the regular organization in the state which Lodge thought a serious problem. He delegated the task of blocking such an effort to Crane. By May 23, Crane had arranged things so that Lyman's election to the National Committee was assured.[50]

As he prepared to depart for St. Louis in June, Lodge was amazed to find how thoroughly enervated Democratic leaders were. Accurately, he predicted that the Republicans would declare for sound money and the Democrats for silver with a "very severe struggle" ensuing and a Republican victory. As the Massachusetts delegation prepared to leave for St. Louis, Lodge and Curtis Guild spoke out for Reed and the gold standard. Other members of the delegation shared Lodge's concern for the money plank; thus a good deal of attention was given to that just before the meeting of the Convention on June 16.[51]

In the week before the convention, it had become very obvious as Theodore Roosevelt remarked that "McKinley has it hands down." Reed also recognized his undoing and sadly told Lodge, "I don't know of any instructions to give you except what you don't need to be brave and not lower the flag," adding "all I fear is there may not be much to do."[52] On June 19, Lodge did his duty and placed Reed's name in nomination in a flowery speech emphasizing Reed's courage and his financial acumen. By June 20, the battle was over and McKinley had the nomination as all expected. Roosevelt was "dreadfully sorry and sore about Reed," but as a good party man thought "we must do all we can for McKinley."[53]

During the convention, while foreign policy questions and traditional Republican tariff views received due attention, the central issue in the platform was the currency plank. After the passage of the Sherman

Silver Purchase Act in 1890, the issue of the coinage of silver had become an ever increasing problem for both parties. By June, 1896, Lodge had reached the conclusion that a declaration for the gold standard was essential until such time as bimetallism could be effected through international agreement. At the end of May, he asked Crane to make sure that he received a position on the Committee on Resolutions at St. Louis and "take in hand at once the matter of the money plank," emphasizing that "we must not straddle."[54]

Contrary to Charles Sumner Hamlin, one of the "Young Democrats" from Massachusetts in Cleveland's administration, Lodge's position in favor of gold was unequivocal long before June 16. After the convention adoped a gold plank, there was much discussion then and later about Lodge's role in the drafting of the plank. The plank in its original form reads as follows:

> We are unalterably opposed to every measure calculated to debase our currency or impair the credit of our country. We are therefore opposed to the free coinage of silver except by international agreement with the leading commercial Nations of the world, and until such agreement can be obtained the existing gold standard must be preserved. All our silver and paper currency now in circulation must be maintained at parity with gold, and we favor all measures designed to maintain inviolably the obligations of the United States, and all our money, whether coins or paper, at the present standard, the standard of the most enlightened Nations of the world.[55]

During the deliberations of the sub-committee of the Committee on Resolutions on the currency plank, the words "which we pledge ourselves to promote," were inserted after "international agreement." Because of his bimetallist proclivities, William E. Chandler offered $100 to the

man who was responsible for that phrase. Ultimately, Lodge claimed the honor, but refused the money. He chose instead the gift of a silver cigar-box. There was some debate about the author of the phrase, but Joseph B. Foraker ended the discussion when he found such a phrase in pencil in Lodge's hand. Most likely, the phrase had been the work of the entire sub-committee.[56]

While most Republican leaders looked confidently to a victory in November, some of the older members of the party philosophized about the events of St. Louis with a jaundiced view. Senator Frye of Maine wrote his friend Chandler that late June was a very poor time to go camping in Maine because of the black flies and mosquitoes, adding "think of Hanna, Lodge and others in a newspaper contest over the question as to who drafted the money plank, Platt, Miller et. al. in a quarrel equally foolish." Senator Platt from Connecticut gave a rather cool analysis of prospects, wondering "whether McKinley sentiment was real and spontaneous or whether it was worked up by Hanna and his organization." Platt thought that more emphasis ought to be placed on the theme of protection and worried about silver sentiment among the rank and file of the party. Chandler himself was still sore about Reed's defeat at the Convention and remained conviced that Reed ought to have declared for bimetallism.[57]

As these worthies wrung their hands, Lodge was more concerned about the possibility of William B. Plunkett using his connection with McKinley to dispense patronage in Massachusetts. The matter was so vital that Lodge contacted John Hay who was abroad. As a "personality"

in Ohio Republican circles, Hay had direct access to McKinley which Lodge asked him to use to get at McKinley's intentions on Massachusetts patronage. Hay complied with Lodge's request and found that "no such course was contemplated, nor would be pursued."[58]

In mid-July, the Democrats met at Chicago and unexpectedly nominated the most vocal proponent of free silver in the Democratic party, William Jennings Bryan. Theodore Roosevelt thought that the work at Chicago had been a veritable "Witches Sabbath." While he hoped that Bryan would have talked himself out by November, he concurred with Lodge's view that "the hardest fight the democracy could give us this year was on the free silver issue." With customary overstatement, Roosevelt theorized that "there is not a crank or criminal in the entire country who ought not to support them."[59] Lodge shared Roosevelt's contempt for Bryan, but neither took him lightly as a candidate.

With the lines drawn, Lodge and the other professionals began "taking off their coats." In a ratification meeting for McKinley, Lodge assailed Cleveland's record and roundly condemned Bryan's platform as "dishonest." With more than usual fervor, he called upon Republicans to remember Washington and Lincoln "when ideas hostile to American liberty and American beliefs are rampant in the land."[60]

From George Lyman, who had been elected to the Republican National Committee, Lodge learned of organizational plans for the campaign. Joseph Manley of Maine was to have charge of New England and told Lyman that he would do whatever the regular organization in Massachusetts wanted. Roosevelt had also been in contact with Hanna

and confirmed Lyman's news. Roosevelt emphasized in a conference with Hanna that financial assistance from Massachusetts depended on his cooperation with Lyman and Lodge on patronage. He thought Hanna would have to be handled carefully because while "he is a good-natured, well meaning, coarse man, ... he has a resolute, imperious mind...."[61] Lyman had a conference with Hanna and the rest of the National Committee where Massachusetts was given the task of raising $400,000 for the campaign. Lyman left New York with a sense that Hanna would recognize Massachusetts' interests, but was prepared if "the wily Chioans ... kick up rough later."[62]

The campaign progressed well in August and September with Lodge doing more as time passed. Those responsible for appealing to the veteran vote found that even in silver states veterans responded well to the "sentiments of loyalty and patriotism and especially to the love and affection which the old veterans have for their comrade, Major McKinley." Even the worldly Orville H. Platt of Connecticut began to be more optimistic. The most significant index of Republican confidence, however, was Henry White's consideration of renting or buying a house in England. White had been Secretary at the American legation in London under Republican presidents from the administration of Arthur and getting a house was, indeed, a vote of confidence in McKinley's chances.[63]

As Lodge surveyed the scene in early September, he was concerned about the "middle states," but vastly encouraged at the results in Vermont where the Democratic party was badly split and consequently crushed. He thought that, if it was clear that the campaign was going

against Bryan in October, it would mean a rout. Cushman K. Davis wrote that the Vermont results had helped immensely in the Northwest although McKinley would probably lose South Dakota. Lodge answered that he had just returned from Maine where the canvass was going even better than in Vermont. Roosevelt reported on conditions in the West. He found Illinois all right, Indiana "venal as usual," Ohio certain, and "the Germans make Wisconsin as safe as New York." He was unsure of Iowa, but Michigan would go for McKinley in spite of difficulties. In sum, the prospect was bright as Lodge took to the road in mid-September to speak in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York.[64]

While visiting McKinley in Canton in October, Lodge and Roosevelt predicted that New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota and Michigan would definitely go for McKinley. Possible states were South Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, Wyoming, Washington, California and Kentucky. As it turned out on November 3, Lodge and Roosevelt were extraordinarily accurate. All of the states which they predicted as certain and probable went for McKinley while the remainder went for Bryan or split their electoral vote.[65]

Having completed the struggle over silver and the battle of the standards, Lodge looked forward to a Republican in the White House and Republican control in Congress. Lodge had begun as a firm Reed supporter and could traditionally have expected to have been treated accordingly when the time came for dispensing the patronage. Lodge and Roosevelt made the pilgrimage to Canton in October and found McKinley

mild in his reception showing no rancor or vindictiveness. As eight years earlier with Harrison, Lodge impressed upon McKinley that he had two interests. One was Roosevelt's advancement, and the other was the matter of the post of Secretary of State and the direction of foreign policy. In the months ahead, Lodge continued to lobby for Roosevelt's appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and his record of success in this endeavor and others was remarkable.[66]

Footnotes

1. Lodge to E. A. Adams, January 16, 1893, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 11, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to C.C. Jackson, February 11, 1893, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS.

2. Lodge to Henry B. Peirce, February 24, 1893, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, "Outlook and Duty of the Republican Party," Forum XV (April, 1893), p. 256; Higginson to H.C. Lodge, May [?] 16, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 53d Cong. 1st sess., August 15, 1893, p. 337.

3. Congressional Record 53d Cong. 1st sess., August 15, 1893, p. 337; Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United State, 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 113.

4. Congressional Record 53d Cong. 1st sess., August 15, 1893, pp. 338-339; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, August 17, 22, September 7, 10, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

5. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, October 22, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

6. Lodge to Wharton Barker, April 17, 1894, Barker Papers, LC; Adams to H.C. Lodge, November 24, 29, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 16, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS.

7. Adams to H.C. Lodge, January 13, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 21, March 17, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Adams was making every effort to apply pressure on the Cleveland administration to adopt bimetallism with no success. Adams to H.C. Lodge, March 22, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Opportunity of the Republican Party," Harper's Weekly XXVIII (February 17, 1894), pp. 150-151; Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Results of Democratic Victory," North American Review CLIX (July, 1894), pp. 268-277.

8. Congressional Record 53d Cong. 2d sess., April 17, 1894, p. 3768.

9. Jones to Wharton Barker, August 31, 1893, Barker Papers, LC; Adams to H.C. Lodge, April 23, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Wharton Barker, April 17, 1894, Barker Papers, LC; Teller to Moreton Frewen, April 23, 1894, Frewen Papers, LC.

10. Wolcott to H.C. Lodge, May 7, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Adams to H.C. Lodge, May 7, 10, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS;

Congressional Record 53d Cong. 2d sess., May 9, 1894 p. 4529; Frewen to H.C. Lodge, May 24, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS.

11. Lodge to Moreton Frewen, June 4, 11, November 16, 1894, Frewen Papers, LC.

12. Lodge to Charles C. Jackson, December 25, 1894, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS.

13. Lodge to Charles C. Jackson, December 25, 1894, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, pp. 104-113.

14. Lodge to Charles C. Jackson, January 4, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS.

15. Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, January 28, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Coolidge to Henry Cabot Lodge, February 3, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Higginson's interest in banking legislation resulted in participation in the Indianapolis Monetary Convention of 1897 which was broadly concerned with the relationship between banking, currency and the general health of the business community. Fritz Redlich, The Molding of American Banking (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1968), part II, p. 210.

16. Reed to H.C. Lodge, February 14, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, February 15, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge clearly shared the populist view that this "secret" syndicate had exploited the public, but there was no evidence of anything other than hard bargaining. Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, pp. 111-119; Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1934), pp. 649-666.

17. Lodge to Curtis Guild, Jr., February 15, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge attacked Cleveland's handling of the bond question and anticipated accurately, as he told his mother, that he would be attacked for it in Boston. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 17, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to C.C. Jackson, February 23, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS.

18. Lodge to C.C. Jackson, February 23, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge's cousin, Henry Lee of Lee, Higginson & Co. wrote him a blistering letter in which he condemned Lodge's attack on Cleveland's bond deal. Lee to H.C. Lodge, March 26, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

19. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, July 11, 16, 18, August 9, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Frewen to George F. Hoar, June 10, 1896, Hoar Papers, MHS.

20. Lodge to C.C. Jackson, December 3, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, December 5, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, December 14, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, November 27, 1895, p. 2.

21. Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, January 10, 1896, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Rendig Fels, American Business Cycles, 1865-1897, pp. 200-201; Lodge despised the reaction of State Street to the Venezuelan crisis. George H. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, December 26, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

22. Lodge to George H. Lyman, January 18, 1896, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Geoffrey Blodgett, The Gentle Reformers, chp. VIII.

23. Lodge to Moreton Frewen, January 9, 17, July 14, 1896, Frewen Papers, LC; Lyman to Arthur L. Devens, March [?], 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, March 18, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, August 19, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, July 24, 1895, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

24. Hoar to H.C. Lodge, October 7, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

25. White to H.C. Lodge, January 5, 8, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Joseph B. Foraker, "The Gold Plank," September 21, 1896, Hanna McCormick Papers, LC.

26. Reed to H.C. Lodge, September 29, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Thomas B. Reed, November 10, 1894, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College.

27. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, April 28, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, April 3, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to Thomas B. Reed, April 20, 1895, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College; Chandler to Thomas B. Reed, March 12, 1895, Chandler Papers, LC; Roosevelt later thought the position on the Police Commission had done him in politically. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, August 27, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

28. Reed to H.C. Lodge, March 25, April 1, 13, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Reed to William E. Chandler, April 10, 1895, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to Nelson W. Aldrich, May 17, 1895, Aldrich Papers, LC.

29. Reed to H.C. Lodge, April 19, 26, May 4, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, June 5, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Reed to Theodore Roosevelt, June 7, 1895, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

30. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, May 7, 9, 16, 22, December 28, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Reed to H.C. Lodge, May 16, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

31. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, May 22, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to T.B. Reed, May 23, 1895, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College; Crane to H.C. Lodge, May 30, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, June 5, July 30, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Reed to Theodore Roosevelt, June 7, 1895, Roosevelt Papers, LC; Roosevelt to T.B. Reed, June 8, 1895, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College; Lodge felt it necessary to set the record straight to Roosevelt on Reed's position on gold so he wrote at length about Reed's stand for gold. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, June 9, 1895, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

32. Reed to H.C. Lodge, June 29, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Nelson W. Aldrich, June 9, 1895, Aldrich Papers, LC.

33. Reed to H.C. Lodge, June 29, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to T. B. Reed, June 12, 1895, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College.

34. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, July 30, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, August 10, 1895, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

35. Davis to H.C. Lodge, August 10, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, August 27, September [?], 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

36. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, October 31, 1895, Roosevelt Papers, LC; Davis to H.C. Lodge, September 28, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

37. H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963), p. 196.

38. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, November 6, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

39. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, December 2, 13, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Joseph H. Manley, December 17, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS.

40. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, December 20, 23, 27, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 23, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Curtis Guild, Jr., December 23, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, December 15, [1895?], Roosevelt Papers, LC.

41. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, January 2, 16, 19, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 13, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, January 4, 17, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

42. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, February 16, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Robert A. Southworth, February 19, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Crane to H.C. Lodge, February 22, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America, p. 198.

43. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, February 24, 28, March 2, 3, 5, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, February 26, 28, March 1, 4, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, February 27, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Crane to H.C. Lodge, March 3, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

44. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, March 10, 17, 18, 19, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, March 13, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Italics in original.

45. Adams to H.C. Lodge, April 13, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, March 23, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

46. Lodge to J.G.B. Adams, April 24, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Curtis Guild, Jr., April 29, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS.

47. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, April 30, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

48. Lodge to George H. Lyman, May 2, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Paper, MHS.

49. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, May 3, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. Murray Crane, May 4, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, May 9, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America, p. 198.

50. Lodge to George H. Lyman, May 11, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Crane to H.C. Lodge, May 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 23, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. Murray Crane, May 25, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

51. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, May 24, 1986, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, May 25, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. Murray Crane, May 31, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, June 10, 13, 15, 1896.

52. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, June 10, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Reed to H.C. Lodge, June 10, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

53. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, June 20, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, June 19, 1896, p. 1.

54. Lodge to W. Murray Crane, May 31, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

55. Joseph B. Foraker, "The Gold Plank," September 21, 1896, Hanna McCormick Papers, LC; Charles Sumner Hamlin, Diary, October 13, 1896, Hamlin Papers, LC.

56. John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. 171-172; Joseph B. Foraker, "The Gold Plank," September 21, 1896, Hanna McCormick Papers, LC.

57. Frye to W. E. Chandler, June 25, 1896, Chandler Papers, LC; Platt to W. E. Chandler, June 26, 1896, Chandler Papers, LC; Chandler to Charles Emory Smith, July 2, 1896, Chandler Papers, LC.

58. Hay to H.C. Lodge, July 4, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

59. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, July 14, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

60. Boston Daily Advertiser, July 15, 1896, p. 8.

61. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, July 18, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, July 29, 30, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

62. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, July 31, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

63. Henry White to ?, August 11, 1896, White Papers, LC; Platt to W. E. Chandler, September 1, 1896, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, September 1, 6, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Dudley to W.E. Chandler, August 25, 1896, Chandler Papers, LC.

64. Lodge to W.E. Chandler, September 3, 1896, Chandler Papers, LC; Davis to H.C. Lodge, September 7, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Cushman K. Davis, September [?], 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, September 14, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, September 15, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

65. Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, October 2, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Davis to H.C. Lodge, November 4, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, November 5, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Paul W. Glad, McKinley, Bryan and the People (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964), p- 201. Glad's work provides a sound view of the campaign nationally.

66. Lodge to William McKinley, November 9, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

CHAPTER IX

PATRONAGE, BIMETALLISM AND THE TARIFF IN THE MCKINLEY YEARS, 1897-1899

Only days after McKinley's election in November, 1896, Henry Cabot Lodge began lobbying for a place in the new administration for Theodore Roosevelt. Over the next five months, Lodge used every resource at his disposal to plead Roosevelt's case. Lodge even made a trip to Canton in November to visit with McKinley and found him as "cordial & friendly as possible." After discussing Hawaii, Cuba and the appointment of a Secretary of State, "we talked about Theodore whose appointment as Ass't Sec. of the Navy I urged in all ways I could."[1]

In this endeavor, Lodge enlisted the assistance of men as diverse as Bellamy Storer, William Howard Taft, George H. Lyman, Winthrop Murray Crane, Cushman K. Davis and Edward O. Wolcott. A formidable opponent was the boss of New York Republican politics, Thomas C. Platt. Roosevelt's zeal as Police Commissioner had produced conflict with Platt earlier. Platt was concerned that Roosevelt's appointment would be charged to the "machine" in New York and hence deprived Platt of reward for his followers. More importantly, Platt thought Roosevelt might use the patronage of the Brooklyn Navy Yard against him. Over the next few months, Lodge and his colleagues were constantly reassuring

Platt, frequently through intermediaries, of Roosevelt's good will.[2]

In January, Lodge learned that Roosevelt had an opponent for the place in the person of William H. Jaques, the brother-in-law of Senator William E. Chandler of New Hampshire. Jaques was a graduate of the Naval Academy and had served for many years before he resigned his commission and entered the employment of Bethlehem Steel Co. as a consultant on armor and naval design. He now wanted to re-enter the naval service as assistant secretary to complete his career. Jaques' candidacy was in every respect a nineteenth-century example of the revolving door relationship between the Navy and the industrial suppliers of the service.[3]

Jacques was a formidable candidate and particularly since his brother-in-law was one of the ranking members of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. Through the first part of February, 1897, Jaques applied as much pressure on the appointing power as possible. As late as the third week of March, he remained in contention, but then wrote the Secretary of the Navy that he was asking that his name be withdrawn from consideration. Meanwhile, Lodge found the going difficult. Early in March, he asked William Howard Taft to write McKinley a letter supporting Roosevelt. Taft agreed to do so and learned that McKinley was holding off on Roosevelt's appointment because of some lack of enthusiasm for him on John D. Long's part. Four days after McKinley's inauguration, Lodge wrote Roosevelt a reassuring letter, but only two days before had written Taft that "I do not feel over sanguine."[4]

So grave did the situation seem in the middle of March that

Roosevelt wrote Lodge a very gloomy and bitter letter assailing the "machine" in New York for opposing his candidacy. Roosevelt frequently used Lodge as a therapist. "There! I feel easier, having burdened you, as usual, with my parochial woes,"[5] he observed. For some reason, William E. Chandler supported Roosevelt's cause even though his brother-in-law was still in contention for the place. Lodge explained that while Vice-President Garret A. Hobart was friendly to Roosevelt "Chandler is a host to himself," but cautioned Roosevelt "you must on no account let anyone know what I tell you about Chandler and his doings."[6]

Shrewdly, Chandler suggested that things could be fixed up with Platt if an appointment satisfactory to him could be made at the time Roosevelt was named. The other obstacle to Roosevelt's success was John D. Long. Lodge went to work immediately on that problem, mobilizing support for Roosevelt among his supporters in Massachusetts. Roosevelt did some missionary work of his own in New York City and found the "machine" was not irrevocably opposed to his appointment and in fact "would be quite willing to see me appointed so as to get me out of the city."[7]

On March 23, Lyman reported that Roosevelt's chances were improving because the administration had learned that Reed wanted Roosevelt and "it is their feeling that everything must be done that Mr. Reed wants."[8] Early in April, Lodge directed the final push for Roosevelt's appointment and brought Crane and Lyman to bear. The former had great influence with Platt and seemingly used all his good

offices on Platt to obtain Roosevelt's nomination. On April 6, Roosevelt's name was forwarded to the Senate; and Lodge sent congratulations to Lyman. Almost immediately, Sturgis Bigelow and Henry White complimented Lodge on his successful management of Roosevelt's campaign.[9]

Securing Roosevelt's appointment was an arduous enterprise, but Lodge was placed in a delicate position with the appointment of John D. Long as Secretary of the Navy. Quite naturally, McKinley consulted both Lodge and Hoar on Long's appointment. On January 15, Lodge replied that "any opportunity for public service that may come to Governor Long will give both [Hoar and Lodge] of us very great personal pleasure and will gratify the whole Republican party of Massachusetts. But we are, from very recent statements that have come to us, very anxious in regard to his health and hope that the President elect will take steps to satisfy himself in that matter beyond doubt."[10]

Lodge found it very difficult to oppose Long's candidacy because of their long friendship. Both Lodge and Hoar favored the appointment of T. Jeferson Coolidge rather than Long, but Lodge learned that McKinley was determined to have Long. In the circumstances, Lodge decided he could not fight his old friend's appointment. Unhappily, some of Lodge's constituents began pressing Coolidge which threatened to embarrass Lodge.[11]

On Janury 28, the situation seemed about to get out of hand. Lodge feared that he and Hoar had been misrepresented in their attitude about Long and a rupture in their personal relations might ensue.[12] The whole matter was smoothed over when Lodge heard from Lyman and Long himself that all parties were content. Above all, Lodge wanted to avoid wounding an old friend and upsetting the even tenor of the party at home.[13]

Dealing with patronage questions at the cabinet level was difficult, but Lodge was beset with a hungry set of office seekers at the state level. The exertions of November, 1896, produced a line of the party faithful seeking their just reward. Lodge favored civil service out of principle and resented the intrusion upon his time and energy of importunate office seekers. He realized, however, that, as long as a system of spoils existed, he would have to use finesse to avoid generating intra-party conflict.

The first major state appointment was that of Collector of the Port of Boston. For decades, such places had been the core of political organizations sometimes even making presidential candidates or destroying presidencies. Lodge knew that such a place in the hands of a friend would help to produce a potent organization for him. He was determined to have his boyhood chum, George H. Lyman, appointed in 1897. So carefully had he prepared the ground and so confident was he, that he wrote Lyman, "do not worry yourself about the Collectorship. That thing is settled."[14] Lyman was thoroughly loyal and his political sagacity had been demonstrated in the battle of the standards in 1896.

Lodge was extremely fortunate in having Lyman at the Customshouse during the next four years, not only because of his competence and good judgement, but also because he maintained an extraordinarily close watch on the entire state. He closely monitored patronage situations likely to cause trouble.

As McKinley began his administration, the scramble for offices intensified and the pressure on Lodge and Lyman accelerated. Inevitably,

there were losers in the race and Lodge was naturally concerned about their impact on the party and his re-election.[15] At the end of March, the situation seemed to have eased a bit with only one faction of the party mildly discontented. Lyman thought that eventually that faction would be satisfied with its share of the spoils, but he was taking considerable abuse from the mugwumps. "I got a dose the other day from my dear friend, [Moorfield] Story [sic], who compared you to Ben Butler, and seemed to think it was flattering to me, to all intent and purposes, to liken me unto a jackal: - but then he is a most eminent citizen."[16]

Things did not remain calm, however, at the end of May, Lodge heard disquieting news from Murray Crane about the situation in Worcester. One of Lodge's old enemies, Joseph H. Walker, was again at work. He had opposed Lodge's campaign for the Senate in 1893. This time post office patronage was at issue. Crane sagely advised Lodge to ignore Walker's supporters and the situation would take the right turn. Lodge was nervous even though his re-election was two years away.[17]

By August, even Roosevelt had heard of Walker's opposition to Lodge's re-election. Roosevelt advised Lodge that "your attitude can afford to be that of the Texan who examined the tenderfoot's 32 calibre revolver — 'Stranger, if you ever shot me with that, and I know'd it, I would kick you all over Texas.'"[18] The reassurance of Crane and Roosevelt doubtless helped to calm Lodge's mind, but his natural circumspection prevented complacency. He carefully arranged to put Roger Wolcott's name before the State Convention for governor. He realized that his presence would be a salutary reminder and "set at rest a good deal of talk."[19]

The conventional view of Lodge was that he was fond of dealing with patronage questions and used patronage to build a formidable organization. The latter notion was correct, but he did not bear any similarity to Benjamin F. Butler as a spoils politician. Lodge abhorred the task of dispensing offices, but believed that as long as the system existed he should use it to his advantage. As the junior Senator, Lodge carried more of the burden of awarding offices than did Hoar but Lodge brought Hoar into all of the major patronage questions. The view of Hoar as a statesman and Lodge as a political mechanic was not accurate. Out of deference, Lodge assumed more of the burden of dealing with patronage but both men found the task unpleasant, time consuming and dangerous.[20]

As one of the authors of the money plank in the platform in 1896, Lodge took a keen interest in the efforts of the new administration to obtain an international agreement on bimetallism. In November and December after the election, Lodge continued to correspond with Henry L. Higginson about the need for currency and banking reform. Lodge explained to Higginson, with some petulance, that he agreed with Higginson; but without a working majority in the Senate, nothing constructive could be accomplished. In January, two months before his inauguration, McKinley began consulting with various Senators about a bimetallic agreement with Great Britain. Finding some support for the idea, McKinley selected Edward O. Wolcott, a Senator from Colorado, to make a trip to Great Britain to sound out the government on the possibility of such an agreement.[21]

Henry White wrote Lodge at some length that he had heard from Wolcott and had advised him that his mission would carry more weight after McKinley's inauguration. Nevertheless, Wolcott was coming before then because McKinley wanted information about the English attitude prior to March 4. White told Lodge that he would try to keep Wolcott out of the hands of bimetallic enthusiasts and particularly away from Moreton Frewen. White observed that "I do not believe ... any result will come of Wolcott's mission at present." Such a mission could be conducted "most effectually by our leading bankers whom those of London consider in the same boat with themselves and whose representations as to the danger & probability of our going on a silver basis in the U.S. four years hence if an international bimetallic arrangement be not meanwhile brought about would have far greater attention & weight than those of a silver Senator or anyone but a fellow craftsman."[22]

From January through May, 1897, Wolcott met with English leaders and traveled to the Continent to consult there with heads of government about an international agreement. By the fall, some former advocates of silver and bimetallism were prepared to abandon the cause. With a general economic recovery, improved prices for farm goods and increased output of gold, there seemed less urgency about silver. In January, 1898, Wolcott delivered a speech on the work of his Bimetallic Commission which Lodge thought a fine piece of work; but the war pushed aside all such financial questions at least until the fall.[23]

Another key item in the Republican platform and campaign in

1896 was the tariff. Lodge and others had stressed throughout the campaign the need to return to traditional Republican doctrine on the tariff, both to protect and to raise badly needed revenue. In November, 1896, Nelson A. Dingley of Maine had introduced a tariff measure in the House; but no substantive action was taken until March, 1897. Because of the interests of his state, Lodge was at the very center of the tariff issue in the Senate. The House sent over its version on March 31, and then the Senate proceeded to work on the question. Having participated in such tariff debates before, Lodge knew that it would be a "long & wearisome contest...."[24]

While Lodge's attitude that there must be trades was perfectly reasonable, his political friends at home were feeling the hot breath of members of the manufacturing community on their necks. One of the more unreasonable elements of that community was the boot and shoe industry which pressed hard for free hides and protection for American shoes.[25] Their insistence threatened at times to erode his composure. "I most fully appreciate the feeling in Massachusetts in regard to it [free hides] and if you could see my daily mail I think you would understand that unless I was exceptionally dull I could not fail to appreciate Massachusetts opinion on this point,"36 he retorted to one constituent.

From his experience in other tariff battles, Lodge knew that whatever action he took to aid one group would more than likely produce "a new set of dissatisfied people writing me." By mid-May, Lodge and Hoar both were receiving a veritable stream of letters asking for protection for one or another interest. As a neo-Hamiltonian, Lodge was

receptive to protection for the infant Massachusetts' linen industry, but found the whole exercise extremely fatiguing.

The end of May brought yet another struggle on the issue of free hides. He found the manufacturers of shoes adamant against protection for hides, but used Lyman and Crane to try and "sell" the concept of a compromise. Murray Crane understood that Lodge could protest the schedule on hides in the caucus, but could not openly oppose the caucus position. Lodge told Crane that "if I do not hold out [in caucus] against them, we can undoubtedly get some larger concession in the way of reductions and compensatory duties." Crane fully understood such "trading," but the manufacturers were less sympathetic.[28]

By the first week of June, the strain was beginning to tell. Lodge developed a gastrointestinal complaint that was almost certainly related to the pressure he was receiving on the tariff. Hoar assumed the responsibility of looking after Massachusetts' interests until Lodge could recover. Even as Lodge obeyed his doctor's orders to seek a change of scene, he wrote Hoar at length about the sections of the tariff dealing with watches and cranberries. On June 10, Hoar received a letter from his nephew who was lobbying for the watchmakers and with the June heat, the enterprise was wearing on Hoar's nerves as well.[29]

Back at his post on the first of July Lodge lobbied with the author of the Dingley tariff for Massachusetts' interests. He urged changes in the House version to protect the Massachusetts' chemical

industry, the cane furniture makers, the linen business and not least the shoe manufacturers. Hoar was doing his own work along this line with Senator William B. Allison (R.-Iowa). Hoar was particularly concerned about industries based in Worcester. Early in July after arranging tariff matters to suit himself, Lodge escaped Washington for a short visit with his son who was just back from an eight month stay in Europe.[30]

The tariff finally signed on July 24 represented a return to protectionism with a vengeance. In spite of the appeals of some of Lodge's constituents for moderation, the Dingley tariff ushered in twelve years of high rates. While not every industrial interest was thoroughly satisfied with the schedules, virtually every interest had been recognized.[31]

Another financial matter threatened to disturb Republican tranquillity at a critical juncture in January, 1898. Senator Henry M. Teller introduced a measure to pay United States bonds in silver. Lodge regarded the Teller resolution as "dishonest & dangerous." Certainly, it came at a most inopportune moment. In spite of the oratorical efforts of Lodge and Hoar, the measure passed the Senate only to be defeated in the House. From Lodge's point of view, the only pleasant dimension to the affair was that his traditional enemies in State Street and Harvard College applauded his work against the Teller Resolution.

While the fight over the Teller Resolution boiled, Lodge received suggestions from Higginson about the need for banking legislation. Lodge agreed wholeheartedly but pointed out that with a free

silver majority in the Senate, nothing could be accomplished. In April, the war intervened and the issue was postponed.[32]

The other domestic issue to interest Lodge in this period was immigration restriction. In spite of Cleveland's veto of his bill, Lodge continued to push the cause. He regarded the veto as a setback not a killing blow. Five days after McKinley's inauguration, Lodge was advising his friends in the Immigration Restriction League on pressure tactics to aid in the passage of a restriction measure. On March 11, 1897, he wrote one of the officers of the League, Robert DeC. Ward, that his measure would be reintroduced substantially in its original form and asked Ward to pressure the Speaker of the House for a committee favorable to immigration restriction.[33]

The tenacity with which he pursued a literacy test as a tool for restricting immigration might have suggested racism, but if Lodge's attitude was racist, it was so in the sense of the nineteenth century as a whole. In late March, one of the consuming reasons for wanting to reintroduce the measure was to offset the effect of the depression of 1893, the impact of which lingered. "Personally I should like to see all immigrants stopped until all our own people were again employed, but in this view I am in a small minority."[34]

In December, Lodge succeeded in getting his bill made "unfinished business" which gave it important parliamentary standing. In January, 1898, he defended the measure at some length; and the bill passed the Senate on January 21. In February, the bill ran into the same

opposition from steamship companies that it had encountered in 1896-1897. Lodge carefully coached Prescott Hall of the Immigration Restriction League on the use of pressure group tactics to get the bill through the House, but to no avail. Even with the support of the American Federation of Labor, the bill did not pass the House. Opposition from immigrant groups and the all consuming passion of war overwhelmed Lodge's efforts. The literacy test would have to wait until the twentieth century.[35]

Footnotes

1. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 1, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, December 2, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

2. Lodge to Bellamy Storer, December 2, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, December 4, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, December 7, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

3. Jaques to William E. Chandler, January 1, 1897, Chandler Papers, LC; Oliphant to Anson G. McCook, January 7, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

4. Chandler to John D. Long, February 15, 19, 1897, Chandler Papers, LC; Thompson to John D. Long, February 15, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William H. Taft, March 6, 11, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 8, 1897, Roosevelt Papers, LC; Long to W.H. Jaques, March 29, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

5. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, March 17, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

6. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 18, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

7. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 18, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, March 19, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, March 20, 22, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

8. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, March 23, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

9. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, March 29, April 2, 5, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, March 29, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, April 7, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William E. Chandler, April 9, 1897, Chandler Papers, LC; Bigelow to H.C. Lodge, April 13, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; White to H.C. Lodge, April 20, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Through Lodge, Bigelow and Roosevelt became close friends and Lyman's relationship with Roosevelt grew ever closer after 1896-1897.

10. Lodge to William McKinley, January 15, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

11. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 17, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Weld to G.F. Hoar, January 18, 29, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, January 19, 25, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

12. Lodge to George H. Lyman, January 28, 29, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to E.B. Haskell, January 29, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, January 22, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

13. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, January 30, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Long to H.C. Lodge, February 2, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

14. Lodge to George H. Lyman, January 25, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

15. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, March 25, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, March 29, 1-97, Lodge Papers, MHS.

16. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, March 30, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

17. Crane to H.C. Lodge, May 24, 19, June 25, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. Murray Crane, May 26, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, July 1, 6, 20, 21, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, July 6, 26, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

18. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, August 3, September 15, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Italics in original.

19. Lodge to W. Murray Crane, August 12, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

20. Hoar to G. F. Hoar, July 22, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Draper to G. F. Hoar, March 18, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Richard E. Welch, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans (Harvard University Press, 1971). Implicit in Welch's argument is the notion that Hoar was too high-minded to concern himself very much with the mundane business of distributing offices. Indeed, Lodge was at times much more frank in expressing his attitude toward specific appointments. Lodge to W.E. Chandler, July 30, 1897, Chandler Papers, LC; Hoar to H.C. Lodge, July 30, 1897, September 8, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 4, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

21. Platt to W.E. Chandler, November 9, 1896, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, December 31, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Storer to G. F. Hoar, January 2, 1897, [?], Hoar Papers, MHS; White to H.C. Lodge, January 5, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

22. White to H.C. Lodge, January 5, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

23. White to H.C. Lodge, January 8, May 14, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; McKinley to John Hay, May 29, 1897, Hay Papers, LC; Reed to H.C. Lodge, August 27, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.E. Chandler, October 23, 1897, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 17, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, pp. 519 ff.

24. H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America, pp. 276-277; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 21, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

25. Lodge to Stephen Minot Weld, March 29, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS, Lodge to Edwin Upton Curtis, April 1, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

26. Lodge to W.M. Bullivant, April 26, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.M. Crane, May 25, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, May 25, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

27. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, May 9, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Moen to G.F. Hoar, May 18, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Coolidge to G.F. Hoar, May 12, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Lodge to Stepehen M. Weld, May 24, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

28. Lodge to George H. Lyman, May 25, 31, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Coolidge to G.F. Hoar, May 26, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, May 27, 28, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Crane to H.C. Lodge, May 29, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.M.Crane, May 31, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to E.B. Haskell, June 9, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

29. Lodge to G.F. Hoar, June 7, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Hoar to H.C. Lodge, June 18, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hoar to Ruth A. Hoar, June 11, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Hoar to G.F. Hoar, June 10, 14, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS.

30. Lodge to Nelson A. Dingley, July 1, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, July 3, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS: Hoar to H.C. Lodge, July 7, 9, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to G.F. Hoar, July 10, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Lodge to E.B. Hayes, July 22, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

31. F.W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, pp. 321-362.

32. Lodge to William P. Sohier, January 24, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 29, February 6, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, January 31, February 3, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Higginson to H.C. Lodge, February 19, 1898, MHS.

33. Lodge to Stephen Collins, March 9, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Robert DeC. Ward, March 11, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

34. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, March 19, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Charles K. Landis, March 26, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge maintained a close working relationship with elements of organized labor on the question of restricting immigration.

35. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 12, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 55th Cong. 2d sess., January 17, 21, 1898, pp. 686-687; Lodge to Prescott G. Hall, February 3, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Roy Wilson White, February 11, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 106-108.

CHAPTER X

THE ROAD TO EMPIRE, 1888-1898

Few men in America in the late nineteenth century were better equipped to deal with foreign affairs than Henry Cabot Lodge. While most Americans possessed a narrow, provincial outlook Lodge was introduced to European culture, history and language even before his admission to Harvard College in 1867. In the best traditions of Boston upper class society, Lodge made the obligatory tour of the Continent in 1866-1867 with his mother and cousin, Constant Davis. This was only the first of many trips to Europe. While Lodge could claim no such familiarity with oriental civilization, the eastern seaboard society out of which he had come looked in many ways to western Europe. His ignorance of the Far East was in every way typical. His competence in French and German was not unusual within the confines of his slice of society, but certainly uncommon within American society as a whole.[1]

In the 1890's Lodge used every opportunity to aid the growth of the navy and efforts to establish bases for the projection of American power. At the beginning of the decade, as a conservative, he had no ambitions for an extensive overseas empire. However, as a realist, he understood the importance of power in foreign relations. Lodge moved steadily toward a more aggressive posture along with the rest of the nation as the decade ended. As did most Americans, he failed to recognize

that expansion generated a logic which had no limits.

The first foreign affairs question to excite Lodge's interest was one deeply rooted in New England history and the welfare of Massachusetts, the fisheries off the coast. From the days of John Adams' negotiations in 1783, New England had insisted on the right of access to those fisheries. The Treaty with England of 1818 was superseded in 1871 with the Treaty of Washington which produced a degree of peace on the question until 1886. At that time, the issue became thoroughly intertwined with party politics both at the national and at the regional levels. While Lodge did not share Blaine's desire to use the fisheries question as a lever in the presidential contest of 1888, he spoke out against Cleveland's policy because it was good politics to do so and because he sincerely believed Cleveland's policy one of impotence.[2]

Although Gloucester was not part of his district, Lodge felt an emotional interest in the welfare of Massachusetts' fishing communities. He remembered watching the fleet go out when he stayed at Nahant as a boy and so political self-interest and personal conviction happily united. Early in 1888, Cleveland made tariff reform one of the central elements of his run for a second term, and reciprocity with Canada was part of his plan for reform. Lodge assailed the revision of the tariff in general and reciprocity specifically because it sacrificed the interests of the fishermen. In February, he wrote emotionally of the contributions of the sturdy seamen of Gloucester and Marblehead to the national defense in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. Ultimately, Lodge thought

that union with Canada would end the troublesome difficulties. In tones of 1848, he argued that annexation of Canada was a "case of manifest destiny." While his views on annexation of other territories later sometimes vacillated, he retained this view of America's relations with Canada.[3]

Cleveland's secretary of state, Thomas F. Bayard, reached an agreement with the Canadians in mid-February, but partisan politics prevented its ratification. In June, Lodge added his efforts to those of Blaine and Frye who assailed the treaty as pro-British. In a rather truculent speech, Lodge complained that the administration had not retaliated on Canadian fishermen when American were attacked. He thought that Cleveland displayed timidity and had played politics with the issue when "party animosities [should have] ceased at the water's edge." In fact, both parties used the question as a vehicle for domestic political warfare. A modus vivendi with Canada was finally reached which ended the problem until the arbitration of 1910.[4]

With a Republican victory in the fall, Lodge looked forward to a brighter prospect even if Harrison's secretary of state was to be James G. Blaine whom Lodge had opposed in 1884 and 1888. The courtly Blaine found Lodge's wife fascinating, and an intimate friendship developed between them. While Lodge felt a bit uncomfortable initially with Blaine because of his earlier opposition to him, Blaine treated Lodge with the forgiving kindness of a true professional. The relationship between Nannie and Blaine grew closer after Harrison's inauguration in March, 1889, and by mid-May Blaine was writing her poetry and taking her for frequent afternoon carriage rides. In a later day, such friendship would

have suggested an affair, but it was thoroughly proper. Blaine's professions of affection were always cast in the stylized manner of the day.[5]

Important for Lodge was the fact that this friendship opened up both a confidential channel of information on foreign affairs and access to the highest levels of the administration including Harrison himself. Even though Lodge had been disappointed in his pursuit of an appointment to the House Foreign Relations Committee, he took an interest in foreign policy. Blaine shared with Nannie his instructions to the commissioners' negotiating a settlement at Berlin on the Samoan crisis of 1888-1889. While there is no direct evidence that Nannie showed such documents to her husband, Blaine expected her to do so when he gave her confidential papers on the Bering Sea negotiations in August, 1889. "You will of course show these papers to Mr. Lodge & then please commit them to the waste basket or the flames,"[6] he directed.

In February, referring to the Samoan problem, Lodge complained to his mother that "we have been so careless in foreign matters that there is a disposition on the part of other nations to treat us slightingly." He thought that a firm stand should be taken and was pleased with Blaine's work when a settlement was reached in June. He congratulated Blaine on a brilliant success at Berlin, but regretted that "this really fine piece of work passes by with slight comment & public attention is absorbed in the distribution of offices."[7]

In the heat of late August, Blaine shared with Nannie his note to Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Minister, on pelagic sealing in

the Bering Sea. Like the dispute over the fisheries, the problem involved a conflict between Canadians and Americans in an offshore area. The practice of killing seals in the open sea threatened to destroy the valuable seal herds of the Pribiloff Islands, and American naval vessels had seized offending Canadian vessels. Diplomatic discussions with Great Britain ranged over the entire extent of the Harrison administration with an agreement finally being reached to submit the question to arbitration in 1893. The court of arbitration decided against the American position, but the problem troubled Canadian-American relations through the Cleveland administration and beyond. The Lodges, husband and wife, were better informed than most on the question because of Nannie's contact with Blaine and their joint connection with Sir Cecil Spring-Rice at the British Embassy.[8]

In December, Thomas B. Reed became Speaker of the House and appointed Lodge to the Naval Affairs Committee. Lodge had asked for the appointment because the Charlestown Navy Yard was in his district. Naval affairs traditionally interested New England's representatives, and members of his wife's family were naval officers. It was fateful that Lodge was on the committee when the American Navy and its relationship to foreign policy were going through a major change.[9]

Even with a Republican president in the White House, Lodge encountered difficulty in defending a naval appropriation bill in the spring of 1890. The process of rebuilding the Navy after years of neglect had begun in Arthur's administration and had been continued in Cleveland's administration under William C. Whitney. Lodge praised the

work thus begun and urged its continuation. Arguing that the best sort of coast defense was a strong navy, he disclaimed any intention to construct an offensive force but rather "one which is true to ... the American idea of the Navy," which was "to have a comparatively small navy, but one composed of vessels of the highest type, able to meet the best vessels which any other nation of the world can put afloat."[10] While he recognized that the first duty of the navy was coastal defense, Lodge, unlike others, saw that a strong navy was needed to "back up American diplomacy." When the Cleveland administration negotiated with Canada on the fisheries and the Bering Sea question arose, Lodge felt the need of a stronger navy to even the relationship with Great Britain. He claimed that with a stronger navy "those negotiations would have ended long ago."[11]

While Lodge's connection by marriage to Admiral Stephen B. Luce may have been important in molding some of his views on the importance of the navy, he also developed a close relationship in these years with William E. Chandler. As Arthur's Secretary of the Navy, Chandler presided over the beginnings of the "new Navy" and retained a deep interest in naval affairs while in the Senate. He too saw the importance of naval power to the conduct of diplomacy. Indeed, the social, family and political circles in which Lodge moved reinforced his views of naval power.[12]

In the floor fight for naval appropriations the following year, Lodge's comments clearly reflected his reading of Alfred Thayer Mahan's study, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. As an historian and supporter of the navy, Lodge was predisposed to embrace Mahan's argument.

While Lodge may have learned very little from Mahan's work, it was the sort of analysis and synthesis that provided confirmation for his own thinking. After some debate, the appropriations were gotten up and passed. Before his election to the Senate in 1893, he looked after the interest of some members of Nannie's family who were attached to the Naval Observatory in Washington.[13]

While Lodge was not appointed neither to the Naval Affairs Committee nor to the Foreign Relations Committee, both of which he desired, his interest in naval matters continued in 1893. He appealed to Cleveland's secretary of the navy, Hilary A. Herbert, to prevent Mahan's detachment from the Naval War College to a sea command. Herbert replied that it would be necessary to send Mahan to sea. Lodge countered that Mahan's work as a scholar was so important that he ought to be assigned to the Miantonomah and not be taken away from libraries for an extended period. Lodge's efforts ultimately failed in spite of his enlisting the support of Luce, Chandler and Roosevelt. Luce thought that Mahan's removal from the War College was the work of William G. McAdoo who was the assistant secretary. Lodge explained the real source of the attack on the War College was from two career officers. With a secretary who was lukewarm in this support for the College and a Democratic administration, Lodge thought that the best that could be done was to support the appropriations for the College and wait for better days.[14]

While much of his attention was taken up with Mahan's problems, he still found time to intercede with the Department in behalf of the Nautical Training School in Massachusetts. Governor Greenhalge entreated

him to seek the removal of a lieutenant in charge of the school ship, Enterprise. Unlike Mahan's case, Greenhalge's problem yielded to Lodge's intercession. Perhaps senatorial prerogative was the deciding factor.[15]

In March, 1895, Lodge not only looked after the interest of Boston in pushing for a naval dry dock but also spoke at length for the naval appropriations bill. On five separate occasions in the spring and early summer, Lodge spoke out in defense of a strong navy. His comments were important because they exemplified his recognition of the intimate relationship between military power and diplomacy. His comments also reflected a growing consensus on the need for a naval power commensurate with America's changing position in the world. He contended that a strong navy was essential to the expansion of American commerce, the protection of our shores and the maintenance of national honor. With the Venezuelan crisis looming, he observed that England seemed to be our most obvious potential opponent but warned of "Japan as a danger in connection with Hawaii...."

In May, after pleading for an amendment to the appropriations bill for torpedo boats, he assailed the Democratic economy drive focused on the Navy. To him, the Democrats wanted to "economize only at the very point where money should never be considered, because it concerns national safety and defense." The real source of the opposition to the appropriations measure was not economy but rather a desire to prevent the country from taking "the part that she ought to take in all foreign questions affecting her interest." Given Lodge's rhetoric,

it might appear that he had reached a position of full-blown imperialism, but such was not the case. Lodge was moving toward a more active foreign policy only as fast as his intuitive political sense permitted. He had no grand design of empire like that of Mahan's, but rather, in keeping with his conservative temperament, he wanted to move slowly with opinion.[16]

Early in 1892, Lodge was embroiled in an important foreign policy crisis. Several sailors from the vessel, Baltimore, had been killed during a brawl. The situation threatened to escalate into war between Chile and the United States in January. Through his connection with Blaine, Lodge was privy to the most confidential diplomatic communiques. Contrasting Blaine's attitude with that of other members of the administration, Lodge told his mother that "now he is going to come up like Disraeli in Punch's picture after the Treaty of Belin, through a trap door & in a blaze of fireworks bringing 'Peace with Honor' in both hands." Two weeks later, however, such an outcome seemed less likely. It looked as if there would be war after all. Henry Higginson gave Lodge a sample of the Boston business community's attitude, which did not support the administration. Lodge agreed that war should be avoided if at all possible, but insisted that more than a drunken brawl was involved. He regarded the affair as an insult to our national honor, but claimed that the American minister, Patrick Egan, and Blaine had been pacific from the outset. He reassured Arthur Lyman with the same explanation.

On January 24, he told Brooks Adams that things seemed to be coming to a head and surmised that the Chileans would refuse the ultimatum

and war would result. He complained to Adams that he had received some pressure from the financial community, but that the mugwumps had put up the greatest howl for peace at any price. A few days later, he went to the White House with W. W. Hitt to persuade the President to take a more moderate position. The result was not encouraging, and Lodge continued to despair that war would come. On the twenty-eighth, he wrote Adams that the administration had received an apology from Chile, and he and Blaine had gone to the White House to implore Harrison to accept it. Happily, Harrison accepted the apology even if reluctantly and only after some pressure. Lodge thought that the incident had been properly resolved with firmness prevailing. He was pleased that war and the appearance of bullying Chile had been avoided.[18]

In spite of some blundering and bellicosity, Harrison escaped the worst possible outcome despite the wounding of Chilean sensibilities. The Cleveland administration also encountered difficulties with Latin America when the Venezuelan government called upon Washington for assistance in dealing with a border dispute with British Guiana. After the Venezuelans discovered that Cleveland's Secretary of State, Walter Q. Gresham, was not going to pursue the matter with enthusiasm, they hired William Lindsay Scruggs, a self-styled specialist on Latin American border disputes. Scruggs began a propaganda campaign to generate interest in the border dispute in the American press.

In January , 1895, Scruggs contacted Lodge but thought him uninterested at that time. What Scruggs viewed as a lack of enthusiasm

was probably an intense preoccupation with Reed's candidacy for the presidential nomination, the silver question and the tariff. In response to the mounting agitation in the press on the relationship between Venezuela and the general question of the Monroe Doctrine, Lodge attacked Cleveland's foreign policy in an article for Forum in March. Much of the article was devoted to general criticism of Cleveland's handling of foreign questions and particularly Hawaii and the fisheries question. He did single out the Venezuelan case as an example of British disregard of the Monroe Doctrine. Cleveland and the Democratic party were criticized for Anglophilia. While some of the attacks on Great Britain were pitched to his constituency, his concern about English sea power and policy in the Americas was genuine. American expansion to the South was undesirable, but "from the Rio Grande to the Arctic Ocean there should be but one flag and one country,"[19] he asserted.

Gresham's sudden death in May brought the Venezuelan situation to a new stage. He had begun a note to Great Britain before his death, the main thrust of which his successor Richard Olney followed. Lodge was so pleased that a Boston man was to head the State Department that he wrote Olney congratulating him upon his good fortune. Lodge may have learned of a more aggressive stance on the part of the administration, or perhaps he simply felt that the time was right to follow up Scruggs' suggestions of January. In any event, he brought out an article in the North American Review in June entitled, "England, Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine." A large part of his article was devoted to anti-British rhetoric, but he made clear his opposition to British policy on

the boundary issue. Lodge's strident comments about the Monroe Doctrine perhaps overstated his devotion to the Doctrine, but he perceptively recognized that only such an appeal to tradition and myth-making would make it possible to lead public opinion from isolationism into a more active foreign policy. A more candid statement of self-interest as a source of policy might have alienated opinion, and Lodge recognized the intimate relationship between politics and foreign policy.[20]

As the English government took its time in responding to Olney's note of July 20, 1895, Lodge departed for Great Britain and the Continent. During a festive round of visits with leading elements of English society and government, Lodge talked not only of an international agreement on bimetallism but also Anglo-American differences in Latin America. He impressed upon Joseph Chamberlain, for whom he had respect if not affection, that America's special position in the Western Hemisphere must be recognized. Lodge returned from Europe in late November in time for the opening of Congress and the critical phase of the Venezuelan crisis.[21]

Cleveland's message to Congress asking for funds for a commission to settle the Venezuelan boundary dispute brought Lodge's approval even though he criticized Cleveland as a "late convert." Supporting the administration, Lodge appealed to his fellow Senators to grant Cleveland latitude in handling the problem. There was none of the rancor of his article of March when he scored Cleveland's policy as blundering. By avoiding the impression of division between the White House and Congress, Lodge thought that the wave of selling of American securities in London

could be stopped and further aggravation of the gold drain prevented.

The response to Cleveland's message and Lodge's support for it was immediate. With the exception of Theodore Roosevelt, many of Lodge's correspondents condemned Cleveland's call for a commission and Lodge's support for the concept. The business community in particular was uneasy as it had been in the Chilean crisis of 1892. Lodge quickly began trying to persuade people such as Elihu B. Hayes, George H. Lyman and Henry L. Higginson that the President's course was correct. It must have been a very odd feeling, indeed, for Lodge to defend a Democratic administration considering both his personal partisanship and that of the day. He defended Cleveland's policy to his mother and assured her that Congress was prepared to stand by the President.[22]

As the year ended, Lodge thought that the furor in the Boston financial community was subsiding. He had earlier spoken of the need for tranquillity for the financial community to recover from the ravages of the contraction of April, 1893, so he must have been more sympathetic to the woeful cries of stockbrokers than some of his letters suggested. In a despondent mood, he suggested to Henry L. Higginson that perhaps there was a lack of patriotism in the business community.

Unhappily, his estimate of opinion late in December was inaccurate, and he was forced to spend the month of January, 1896 defending his position on Venezuela. He continued to reassure Higginson of the rectitude of Cleveland's policy and encouraged George H. Lyman to assuage the fears of the political faithful. He explained to correspondents as diverse as his English friend, Moreton Frewen and the

historian, Albert Bushnell Hart, that at the core of the dispute was a principle rather than pursuit of gain.[23]

The intransigence of Salisbury brought a reaction from Arthur Balfour who sent Lodge a copy of his remarks in Parliament. On his trip of the previous year, Lodge had met Balfour and liked him. Lodge took the occasion to outline the American position on Venezuela and also explain how the earlier difficulties over the seals and the issue of international bimetallism added to the problem. Agreeing with Balfour that war should be avoided, Lodge insisted that "all we ask is arbitration which seems to us not unreasonable." After contrasting the attitude of men in Parliament such as Balfour and Chatham with that of men in the ministries, Lodge closed with the hopeful note that "we shall come out of this difficulty with a better understanding than ever." Those were indeed prophetic words as the negotiations moved toward the desired end of arbitration. In July, Lodge's friend at the American Embassy in London, Henry White, wrote that the English government wanted to settle and was willing to arbitrate. The final settlement came in October, 1899, with the English receiving nine-tenths of the land they claimed.[24]

In spite of the attacks of State Street, nervousness among political supporters and open hostility from the mugwumps, Lodge gained two things of value from the Venezuelan crisis. He received an appointment to the Foregin Relations Committee, a post he had been seeking since his entrance into Congress in 1886. And the success of the administration's policy of firmness in insisting upon the Monroe

Doctrine provided, along with the Chilean experience, confirmation of a new role for America in the Western Hemisphere and perhaps in the world.[25]

The successful arbitration of the Venezuelan trouble brought a spirit of friendliness to the relations between the two countries. It was out of this improved relationship that a general arbitration treaty was brought forward. The Olney-Pauncefote Treaty bound the two nations to submit to arbitration any differences not involving claims to territory and not adjustable through diplomacy. Cleveland and the English were enthusiastic about the treaty, but the Senate saw it more skeptically. Lodge shared the concern of those Senators alarmed about what issues might be arbitrated. Along with others, he thought any matter bearing on a trans-isthmian canal or any other question falling under the Monroe Doctrine ought to be exempted from the Treaty.[26]

Boston and Massachusetts in general supported the treaty, and Lodge's constituents maintained a steady flow of letters supporting the treaty through the winter and spring. Lodge was compelled to defend not only his own action but also that of the Senate in general against the charge of willful obstruction. He denied that any personal hostility toward Olney or Cleveland motivated him but charged that "this administration has not behaved judiciously toward Congress and has made the mistake ... of sneering at it and separating itself from it as far as possible."[27] His correspondence provided no evidence of vindictiveness toward the administration. He did, however, support amendments which would have reduced the Treaty to little more than a statement of good will and prevented the Treaty from being used to arbitrate anything of

substance. After professing his commitment to "peace, progress and civilization," he told one friend that he would support the treaty with an amendment the Committee on Foreign Relations had attached which he had written. As amended, the treaty was "entirely harmless," he thought; but it would probably not pass anyway because of the opposition of the silver senators.[28]

As the pressure from respectable Boston mounted, Lodge became fatigued with the whole matter and was greatly relieved to hear from Elihu B. Hayes who supported his position on the treaty. He explained to Hayes that he believed his efforts on the immigration bill were much more important than the arbitration treaty. Some of the telegrams on the treaty were abusive, and clearly Lodge and Hoar were being criticized for the foot-dragging of the whole Senate. The entire process dragged on into late March, and Lodge's patience wore thin. "We have had a week chiefly of executive sessions talking about that blessed treaty which I heartily wish was out of the way,"[29] he complained wearily.

The English attempted to keep the negotiations open and tried to meet the objections of the Senate, but Lodge's estimate of the situation was correct: the treaty failed. Lodge learned of Sir Julian Pauncefote's disappointment through William E. Chandler, who concurred with Lodge that nothing further should be attempted at that time.[30]

Only two weeks after Lodge's election to the senate, the Harrison administration presented a treaty of annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. Representing the Cleveland administration, John G. Carlisle went to Washington and persuaded enough Democratic Senators to block action on it. From 1893 to 1898, the Hawaiian question presented two

administrations with serious problems although McKinley's administration suffered none of the confusion of attitude that initially troubled Cleveland's. Less than a week after his inauguration, Cleveland withdrew the treaty of annexation because of serious doubts about the propriety of the actions of the American minister in Hawaii and the legitimacy of the new government there. The report of a Special Commissioner, James H. Blount, satisfied Cleveland and Gresham that the actions of Harrison's minister, John L. Stevens, had been improper. Cleveland was not irrevocably opposed to annexation, but wanted it accomplished correctly.[31]

Cleveland and his advisers sought a thoroughly honorable solution to the situation while many outside the administration opposed what they saw as a policy of pusillanimity. Olney learned that Gresham intended to put the Hawaiian Queen, Liliuokalani, back on the throne and sent Gresham a long letter outlining his view of the situation. Olney recognized that such a course would not be easy, for, as a practical matter, the provisional government had become the de facto government; but Gresham went ahead with his plan.

Lodge looked on as confusion reigned about the status of the provisional government and the proper course the administration ought to take. Doubtless, he was much impressed with a letter from Charles Brewer, a Boston commission merchant, who had traded with Hawaii for fifty years. Brewer thought that the American minister in Hawaii, Albert S. Willis, should be given explicit instructions recognizing the provisional government as both the de facto and de jure government. Lodge himself

did not record his views on the Hawaiian imbroglio until January, 1894. Then he characterized Cleveland's Hawaiian policy as "grotesque and miserable."[32]

Even with the pressures of the tariff battle in the spring of 1894, Lodge still found time to unburden himself to one of his constituents on the Hawaiian matter and expressed a desire to acquire both Hawaii and Cuba. Having freed himself of the tariff, he told his mother that he planned to introduce a resolution inquiring why American vessels had been removed from Hawaiian waters. True to his word, in January, 1895, he offered such a resolution and a major debate ensued on Cleveland's policy. As much as possible, he aimed to embarrass the administration and make political capital out of the situation.[33]

In the course of the debates, Lodge developed the notion that the English had designs on the islands as a base for their cable. He claimed that the English supported the royalists in the islands against the provisional government and evoked images of British aggression there. While such was not the case, Lodge's concern was reasonable. Senator George Gray of Delaware replied for the administration and denied that England sought Hawaii for herself and accused Lodge of "twist[ing] the tail of the British lion" for domestic consumption among the Irish. Lodge denied that he was playing politics with the situation and outlined his view of English action there and elsewhere.

> England ... is taking possession of every island upon which she can conveniently lay her hands. it is a part of the conquering and aggressive policy of England. I am the last to find fault with her. I believe she is wise in doing so. My criticism is that we do not exhibit the same spirit, the true spirit of our race, in protecting American

> interests and advancing them everywhere and at all times. I do not mean that we should enter on a widely extended system of colonization. That is not our line. But I do mean that we should take all outlying territory necessary to our defense, to the protection of the Isthmian Canal, to the upbuilding of our trade and commerce, and to the maintenance of our military safety everywhere. I would take and hold the outworks as we now hold the citadel of American power.[34]

Lodge's comments were extremely significant because they epitomized an attitude of ambivalence about expansion which became typical of those who supported the acquisition of Hawaii and later Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Lodge clearly agreed with the views Mahan had expressed on Hawaii in Forum in March, 1893, that the islands were important to America's military posture. Unlike Mahan, however, Lodge either failed to see or chose to ignore the momentum of events which would carry the nation from acquiring outposts to annexing colonies.[35]

Lodge's criticism of the administration's Hawaiian policy stung Gresham who suggested to Roger Mills of Texas that Lodge should be answered in some fashion. As the debate boiled in Congress, the mugwumps took aim at Lodge and Hawaii, with Godkin of the Nation leading the charge. Lodge seemed to relish their attack and gave them a "searing." Early in February, the battle was rejoined; and he defended the expenditure of $3,000,000 to lay the cable to Hawaii. Using the same argument as in his speech of January 22, he repudiated the idea that he wanted to acquire overseas, colonial possessions. "I advocate the building of this cable, as I advocate the building of the Nicaragua Canal, or the taking of other islands on our Atlantic Coast because they are all necesary to the protection and to the development of the United States."[36]

In March, he defended the acquisition of Hawaii not only because of its importance to American commerce but also because of its obvious naval value. Without naming Mahan specifically, he used his work on sea power to justify taking Hawaii. Giving the Senate a gratuitous lecture, he contended that "sea power consists, in the first place, of a proper navy and a proper fleet; but in order to sustain a Navy we must have suitable posts for naval stations, strong places where a navy can be protected and refurnished."[37] He was thoroughly pleased with his own performance but realized that annexation would not come until a change of administration.[38]

After McKinley's election in November, 1896, Lodge wrote him concerning his desires for Roosevelt and his interest in who would be the new secretary of state. He also spoke to McKinley about Hawaii and Cuba in November so it was surely no surprise when McKinley asked Lodge's opinion on Hawaii after a presidential dinner in May, 1897. Lodge admitted that the question was a delicate one considering the "timidity which afflicts the country," but suggested to McKinley "the idea of a protectorate - annexation is what people shy at - & the idea seemed new to him. He appeared to like it & asked me to draft a scheme."[39] There is no evidence Lodge drafted such a plan, but he had certainly provided McKinley with another policy option.

In June, a treaty of annexation was presented to the Senate, but no action was taken on it. As the issue seemed about to come to a head in December, pressure was applied on Hoar to reconsider his position on annexation. On December 19, Lodge wrote his mother that he had been to

see McKinley on the Hawaiian treaty and predicted that "we are going to have a hard fight on the treaty but I believe we shall win."[40] He retained his optimism into January, 1898, but found the domestic sugar interests deeply opposed to annexation. He was incensed at the misrepresentations in the arguments of the sugar men and enlisted the assistance of the Boston press in the cause of annexation. He maintained his exertions in behalf of the Treaty, but recognized, as he explained to Henry White, that the debate was dragging. Only after it was clear that the Treaty would not pass was the device of a joint resolution chosen in March. Even then,it was not until the enthusiasm of the victories of the Spanish-American War that the resolution passed the House June 15, the Senate on July 6 and McKinley signed it July 7. On August 12, the islands officialyy passed into American jurisdiction.[41]

In the cases of Chile and Venezuela, a policy of firmness had produced an apology in one instance and recognition of the Monroe Doctrine in the other. The most fateful foreign policy question of the 1890's was the revolution in Cuba. Ultimately, firmness in this instance produced war.

Lodge's first comment about Cuba came in a letter to William F. Atkins, a Boston commission merchant who imported sugar from Cuba. Atkins was particularly interested in changes being made in the tariff concerning reciprocity. Lodge theorized that the change concerning Hawaii was probably rooted in the fact that the United States intended to take Hawaii and added "we ought to have Cuba also unless I am greatly mistaken."[42] His comment was somewhat rhetorical, but it was consistent with his views

as expressed in the Hawaiian debate of January, 1895.

His first active involvement in the Cuban question came during his European trip of late summer and early fall, 1895, In 1872, during his honeymoon, he had planned to go to Spain; but the death of his close friend, Harry Simpson, so upset him that he cancelled the trip. He disliked the architecture, and the scenery was "wild & imposing but the whole seen as far as the eye could reach ... was one of wildness & desolation. As bold & even savage scenery, it was impressive & fine but as the abode of civilized man for 2,500 years it was hardly a success."[43] The people he thought "repellent ... they are a beaten & broken race who once had a great position & are conscious of its loss only their pride sustains & this has its pathetic side."[44] While the scenery was desolate and the people unappealing, he thought the Prado magnificent.

In mid-October, he met with the Spanish Prime Minister, Antonio Canovas, who sent the infamous General Valeriano Weyler to Cuba. They chatted about art galleries, travel, elections and socialism; but Cuba finally came up in the conversation. Lodge thought that Canovas talked very sensibly about the Cuban situation and seemed to realize that the Spanish government must put down the rebellion quickly or the United States would have to intervene "on account of the injury now going on to our great business interest in the islands."[45] By his own account, Lodge asked Canovas a good number of questions and elicited some information while giving virtually nothing in return.

On New Year's Day, 1896, Lodge received a most welcome letter

from his cousin, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, concurring with his view on Cuba. As a new member of the Foreign Relations Committee he was given the unusual honor of being appointed to a sub-committee to which all questions relating to Cuba were to be referred. "I have never been engaged in public work which interested me like this & which is to have such far-reaching effect,"[46] he enthused to his mother.

In February, as Weyler initiated the "reconcentration" policy, Lodge participated in a general debate on the situation in Cuba and the sort of policy the United States ought to pursue. He thought that the United States should use its good offices to bring hostilities to an end. Commercial advantages would flow to the United States if Cuba were in the hands of the United States or in the hands of the Cubans. "We should never suffer Cuba to pass from the hands of Spain to any other European power," he emphasized. While Lodge gave considerable attention to American economic interests in the island, he thought the crucial consideration justifying American intervention was "common humanity."[47]

His speech was well received and most of his mail was congratulatory. Hoar, however, was not so fortunate; he complained to his wife, who was preparing for a European trip, that "I am in the midst of a Cuba debate where I am acting the part of target."[48] Lodge outlined to Moreton Frewen how the Monroe Doctrine applied to the Cuban case or in so far as the non-colonization principle was concerned how it did not apply to American action. With real pleasure, he agreed with his cousin that "the logic of events compels this country to take a new departure & come more upon the battleground of nations in diplomacy, if not in war."[49]

As he orchestrated the Massachusetts Republican State Convention for Thomas B. Reed, he prepared an article for Forum on the Cuban question. The title, "Our Duty to Cuba," had overtones of the "white man's burden." He opened his comments with quotations from John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay whom he thought would have been accused of jingoism in 1896. In a thinly veiled reference to E. L. Godkin, he said that "many excellent persons, who know nothing of the history of their own country and acquire their knowledge of current events from the headlines of one or two newspapers edited by aliens, appear to be laboring under the impression that the Cuban question had just been precipitated upon us for the first time by a few violent and dangerous men in both Houses of Congress."[50]

Throughout the article, Lodge praised the efforts of the Cuban rebels and contrasted their successes with the Ten Years' War of 1869-1878 in the island. He emphasized the fact that the officers of the provisional government were "white men, and of good family and position. Among the principal military officers there are only three of negro blood,..."[51] Assailing the Cleveland administration for indifference to the miseries of the Cuban people and interference with the military activities of the rebels, he catalogued the reasons for American intervention and repeated that the humanitarian impulse was the most important. He threatened that "if one Administration declines to meet our national responsibilities as they should be met, there will be put in power another Administration which will neither neglect nor shun its plan duty to the United States and to the cause of freedom and humanity."[52] Cleverly, he was pressuring Cleveland politically and pushing a more aggressive stance on his own party.

As the Democrats prepared to meet in Chicago to select their standard bearer, Lodge learned from Henry White that the English were on friendly terms with the Spanish government, but would not interfere with any action the Americans might choose to take in Cuba. With the campaign focused on silver and the tariff, Lodge consulted with Richard Olney about Cuba. He was told that there was "no possibility of getting anything done in regard to Cuba under the present conditions."[53] Two months later, after McKinley's victory, Senator J. Donald Cameron of Pennsylvania brought the Cuban question back to the national political stage, introducing a resolution to recognize Cuban independence. Cameron's resolution was regarded as embodying the most radical position on Cuba at that time. Both Lodge and Hoar supported the Cameron resolution, receiving considerable criticism at home over the next few months for their pains.[54]

The financial community, in particular, was upset about Cameron's resolution because it was yet another alarm of war and sent stock prices down. Lodge mustered as much tact and patience as possible and explained to his stockbroker friends in Boston that "firmness and determination [will] put an end to the disgraceful state of things as quickly and effectively as they did in the case of Venezuela." With a tone of reassurance, he told Stephen M. Weld that "I do not want war. I am most anxious to preserve peace, but from the purely business standpoint business would not suffer from a fight with Spain."[55]

At the end of December Lodge continued to take a pounding on the Cameron resolution from the financial community and "respectable Boston." His boyhood friend, Sturgis Bigelow, thought that Cameron and the Foreign Relations Committee were playing politics with the Cuban question. He

suggested that Lodge was wrong in thinking that if the Republicans did not force the Cuban question on the Democrats that they would force it on the Republicans after March, 1897. Charles Francis Adams thought that the agitation over Cuba simply played into the hands of the free silver people who knew that war would mean free silver.[56]

After McKinley's inauguration, Lodge was swamped with requests for patronage, but he found time to inquire of Elihu B. Hayes how his position on Cuba was regarded. Lodge was staring his campaign for re-election in 1899 early. In the spring, as the military actions of the rebels intensified, bankers again developed a bad case of nerves. Henry L. Higginson wanted Lodge to give him some advance notice "if we are to have a scare." Lodge explained to Higginson that he did not think war likely, but Cuba would continue to be a source of scares "just so long as we shirk our duty and try to avoid the inevitable ...."[57]

Early in the fall, Lodge tried to persuade Thomas B. Reed that an aggressive position on Cuba was essential. Reed's outlook was pacific at this point, and he retained an anti-imperialist stance after the Spanish-American War. He did not think that the United States had any obligation to help colonies throw off the imperial yoke. He warned that such a line of reasoning might be applied to Canada. With remarkable foresight and realism, Reed outlined what became the dominant view in the twentieth century.

> If we help another people to liberty we either do it for our own interests or it will seem so when their interests become diverse. In fact until the federation of the world come let each nation look out for itself. Of course all this is crude and sound [sic] almost cynicle[sic]....[58]

Lodge's idealistic arguments had not persuaded the worldly-wise Reed, and years later, during the League debates, Lodge perhaps recalled Reed's letter.

With Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Lodge received a good deal of information on the disposition of American naval vessels and contingency plans for war. Cleverly, Roosevelt not only prepared possible battle plans for a war with Spain but also communicated those plans to McKinley. The navy was in excellent fighting condition and efficiently commanded. Roosevelt did not think that such plans would have to be implemented as "I haven't the slightest idea that there will be war."[59]

Lodge told one of his constituents that "I do not think we disagree much about Cuba, for I have never been for annexation and feel the same opposition to it that you do...."[60] This contrasted sharply with the views he expressed to William F. Atkins two years earlier. Throughout the next few years, he maintained a consistently negative view of annexation of Cuba.

In late December, 1896, Lodge warned Henry L. Higginson that "at any moment some outrage by Spain may sweep this country into war with her." It did not require a seer to observe that the situation was ripe with possibilities. Now, a year later, in January, 1898, he informed Henry White that the administration had a battleship in the harbor at Havana adding "there may be an explosion in Cuba any day which would settle a great many things."[61] Lodge was neither psychic, nor did he have advance information on the destruction of the Maine on February 15. As he explained to Higginson shortly after Dupuy de Lôme

was sent home, "as long as Spain is in the island war will continue, and as long as war continues there is always a chance for complications which may seriously involve us."[62]

From Boston, Lodge heard from John T. Morse about opinion among "our class" on the sinking of the Maine. Morse reported that he and others of respectable Boston thought that the ship had been sunk as a result of some accident from within. He admitted, however, that "amid the mass of your constituents, ... [no] more than one in fifty holds any such opinion."[63] Henry White reported that English opinion was very sympathetic. Lodge conferred with John D. Long about the readiness of the fleet and emphasized the need for effective preparations for harbor defense. He thought that the Senate showed sound restraint in view of a lack of information about the incident.[64]

Early in March, the business community protested his stand on Cuba and warned that war would not benefit either the United States or Spain. Still, Henry Higginson thought that provision for harbor defense ought to be accelerated. Since there seemed to be some confusion within his constituency about the Maine affair, he decided to test opinion on a trip to Nahant and Boston. He found that there was a general feeling that, if the vessel were blown up from a charge from the outside, then virtually all of his constituents wanted appropriate reparation from Spain; even the business community felt that way. In a nine page letter to the president, he reported on sentiment in Massachusetts.[65]

As tension in the Capitol mounted, Lodge applied pressure wherever possible for a settlement on the Maine. He insisted that the

people demanded reparation and "that reparation to be peace & freedom in Cuba."[66] William E. Chandler thought that public opinion was beginning to have some impact on McKinley who "has adopted a firmer attitude toward Spain and is insisting upon Cuban independence as a condition of any further delay of American action."[67]

Lodge tried to aid the president in preventing a break away on the part of Congress while his constitutents urged him and Hoar to support the president in trying to find a peaceful solution In early April, businessmen continued to oppose any aggressive action which might lead to war. Privately, Lodge railed at the "peace at any price" letters and telegrams. He believed that the sinking of the Maine in itself was sufficient justification for war. McKinley's inaction would likely cause the Congress to "break away from him and we shall have a savage and discreditable debate about going to war. With the parties split in two we shall be defeated at the polls, and your humble servant among others will go down in the wreck." Clearly, he was thinking about 1899 and the impact of the war on his campaign for re-election.[68]

Murray Crane alerted Lodge to a movement in Boston among businessmen to organize a meeting calling for Lodge to support the President. Crane stopped the move, but such news caused Lodge to test the political waters. He consulted George Lyman who in turn talked with Elihu B. Hayes. Lyman recommended that Lodge support McKinley even if he disagreed with his policy "because he was the President." Such a course would raise Lodge to "a pinnacle in this Commonwealth," advised Crane.[69] Clearly, the situation was delicate, and Lyman's letter was an amber light.

The strain of the situation was beginning to have its effect on Lodge when he wrote his mother on April 9 of a meeting with Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye and himself at the White House. The long waiting period was over. McKinley had decided to draw the issue and was convinced that war would be the result. Lodge was still bitter about the carping of the financial community, but was relieved that a decision had been made. On April 10, he consulted with Nelson W. Aldrich and McKinley about the wording of a note to Spain. On April 11, McKinley submitted his message and on April 12, Lodge spent the better part of the day in a Foreign Relations Committee meeting considering the president's message. Throughout the rest of the week, the Senate debated whether or not to recognize the Cuban provisional government or simply to recognize the independence of the Cuban people.[70]

In the debate of April 13, Lodge spoke emotionally of the strain of the situation. In a gesture to the commercial element, he emphasized that the current uncertainty was "killing to business." As Lodge rose to the occasion, his rhetoric became more and more strident. He started with an appeal to give the president the power to intervene in Cuba and then emphasized that any American intervention should be aimed at removing Spain from the island. In tones of manifest destiny and the irrevocable march of history, he blamed Spain for any intervention which might come.

> Mr. President, we are not in this crisis by an accident. We have not been brought here by chance or by clamorous politicians or by yellow journals. We are face to face with Spain today in the fulfillment of a great movement which has run through the centuries. Out of the war which Spain wages and the manner in which she wages it have come starvation

> and the destruction of the Maine. The war comes out of Spanish misgovernment and Spanish corruption. That corruption is not of yesterday. It is very, very old....[71]

The response to his speech on the part of the worthies of Boston was hardly comforting. Lodge sincerely emphasized the humanitarian impulse in the situation to which his old friend, John T. Morse, replied that among "the aristocratic upper crust in which you & I are imbedded the 'humanity' element seems to be regarded as bunkum."[72]

Angrily, Lodge answered Morse's letter. He complained that "the forces which are fighting for Spain and to compel us to peace at any price are the money power, largely represented by the very rich Jews in Europe and the Roman Catholic Church, which holds sixty millions of Spanish bonds in the treasury of the Vatican, and which has been tremendously in evidence here during the last few days."[73] In an obscure reference to the Dreyfus Affair in France, Lodge warned that while "England and the United States have not yet been touched by the anti-semitic excitement," such a result could occur "if this country should be forced to a degradation of its honor...."[74] The sentiments of the business community were far less obscure in origin than the religio-conspiratorial images Lodge evoked. Perhaps, the anti-Semitism of Brooks Adams was beginning to affect him.

Meanwhile, the House and the Senate moved closer to a resolution of war. By April 19, the House concurred in the resolutions as reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Augustus P. Gardner, Lodge's son-in-law, sounded out Crane as to the political impact of Lodge's position and ascertained that Lodge's vote on the resolutions would not injure him. Pleased that war had come finally, he was anguished

at his son Cabot's decision to join the Navy.[75]

Over the ten years, 1888-1898, Lodge's involvement and perspective on world affairs broadened markedly; but his interest in foreign relations dated from his authorship of the state Republican platform in September, 1886, just before his first successful run for Congress. Lodge was deeply impressed with the "Olympian" of his youth, Charles Sumner, whose interest in Cuba and foreign affairs he emulated. Lodge wanted the Nicaraguan canal, the Hawaiian Islands and continued American influence in Samoa; but his vision did not include an overseas empire after the fashion of Great Britain. As he said, "that is not our line." He sought outposts for the defense of the United States. There was a naivete in his failure to see that such "natural frontiers" would inevitably lead to expansion and colonies, but few saw clearly and accurately beyond the immediacy of war in 1898. The charge of jingoism that he confronted repeatedly after 1895 rankled deeply and was unfair.

Most importantly, these years produced a growing attitude of realism on Lodge's part which remained with him afterward. "If we stand alone in the world, as we necessarily do, it is preeminently our duty to take care of our interests and see to it that we are in a position where we can command peace."[76] The realism he applied to foreign policy flowed from his perception of America's interest in the community of nations. Equally as important, however, was his politician's sense of the limits public opinion impose on policy. While he tried to lead, he also recognized that being too far ahead of opinion imposed severe penalties.

Footnotes

1. Henry Cabot Lodge, Early Memories, pp. 135-179; 225-243; 25-28; Contrary to the views of John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 208-209, Lodge's interest in the world outside of Boston dated from his childhood and his interest in foreign affairs began with his service in Congress in 1887. Lodge to Anna Lodge, December 11, 18, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS.

2. John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917, pp. 63-66; Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Fisheries Question," North American Review CXLVI (February, 1888), pp. 128-130.

3. Ibid.

4. Congressional Record 50th Cong. 1st sess., June 7, 1888, pp. 4993, 5011; John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, pp. 67-72; Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 355.

5. Blaine to Mrs. H. C. Lodge, May, 1889 [?], May 13, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 147.

6. Blaine to Mrs. H.C. Lodge, May 9, August 24, 27, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Blaine to H.C. Lodge, June 21, July 26, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 11, 18, 1887, Lodge Papers, MHS.

7. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 3, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to James G. Blaine, June 24, 1889, Blaine Papers, LC; Phelps to James G. Blaine, May 17, 24, 1889, Blaine Papers, LC; Lodge deplored the failure of the public to recognize the importance of the Samoan question and Blaine's success with it which belies the notion that Lodge was himself insensitive to foreign questions. John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, pp. 207-221, contend that Lodge "suddenly" awoke to foreign affairs. The are mistaken in this view. Like other shrewd politicians, Lodge recognized that you must get behind the people so as to lead them. If public opinion was not ready for a more energetic foreign policy, it would be necessary to wait until such a consensus existed.

8. Blaine to Mrs. H.C. Lodge, August 24, 1889, March 25, August 31, 1890, Lodge Papers, MHS; Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, pp. 355-359; Charles Sumner Hamlin, Diary, January 22, February 12-16, May 17, 1895, November 5-16, 1897, Hamlin Papers, LC; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, May 21, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Salisbury to Henry White, February 11, 1898, White Papers, LC; Lodge to William Sturgis Bigelow, March 4, 1898, Letterbook XIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Spring-Rice to H.C. Lodge, October 28, 1891, Lodge Papers, MHS.

9. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 21, 1889, Lodge Papers, MHS; John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, pp. 208-210.

10. Congressional Record 51st Cong. 1st sess., April 8, 1890, pp. 3170-3171; H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, p. 357.

11. Congressional Record 51st Cong. 1st sess., April 10, 1890, pp. 3267-3268.

12. Chandler to John Sherman, June 26, 1890, Sherman Papers, LC; John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, pp. 210-212; H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, p. 358.

13. Congressional Record 51st Cong. 2d sess., January 23, 1-91, pp. 1803-1804; 52d Cong. 1st sess., March 30, 1892, p. 2703; On the recommendation of Nannie's family, Lodge opposed H.R. 3996 which was aimed at reorganizing the Naval Observatory; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 25, 1891, Lodge Papers, MHS; John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, pp. 218-221; The argument of Grenville and Young about Lodge's view of Mahan's work is misguided along with their contention that Lodge's article for Forum in 1892 proved his lack of understanding of "America's role as an emergent power." That article accurately specified silver and the tariff as the most important issues in 1892. Foreign affairs were simply not at the head of any politician's list in 1892.

14. Lodge to Hilary A. Herbert, April 18, 29, 1893, Letterbook VI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Luce to William E. Chandler, August 4, 1893, Chandler Papers, LC; Taylor to William E. Chandler, January 18, 1894, Chandler Papers, LC; Taylor was Mahan's replacement as president of the War College; Lodge to Stephen B. Luce, January 22, 1894,

Luce Papers, LC; Mahan to H.C. Lodge, February 25, June 6, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 53d Cong. spec. sess., March 15, 1893, p. 16.

15. Greenhalge to H.C. Lodge, January 5, 8, 19, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

16. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, February 28, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt urged Lodge to fight for the torpedo boats; Congressional Record 53d Cong. 3d sess., March 2, 1895, pp. 3041, 3042-3043, 3061, 3107, 3108, 54th Cong. 1st sess., May 1, 1896, p. 4657, May 2, 1896, p. 4713, June 3, 1896, pp. 6048-6049; April 28, 1896, p. 4508, Lodge was something of a pioneer in noting the tendency of retired naval officers to seek employment with defense contractors. He thought that they should be barred from doing so or lose their pensions. In this instance, his comments may have been a result of the fact that Roosevelt's chief opponent for the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy was a former captain in the service, W. H. Jaques, who was employed at Bethlehem Steel Co. In general, the view of John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young in Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, pp. 224-227 that Lodge was neither a jingoist nor an imperialist appears correct, but they imply that Lodge's tendency to follow rather than lead opinion prevented him from correctly assessing in a timely way the Venzuelan question. His caution reflected political shrewdness.

17. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 3, 17, 24, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, January 19, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Arthur Lyman, January 21, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS.

18. Lodge to Brooks Adams, January 24, 28, 1892, Letterbook V, Lodge Papers, MHS; Adams to H.C. Lodge, January 26, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, January 27, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 31, 1892, Lodge Papers, MHS.

19. John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, pp. 120-177, 226-228; The authors are wrong in accepting unquestioningly Scruggs' view that Lodge was disinterested in the Venezuelan question. Lodge was occupied with many other questions and a failure to respond to Scruggs immediately meant very little; Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," The Forum XIX (March, 1895), pp. 11-17; While

it was indeed true that Lodge did not devote an entire article to the Venezuelan question until June, his interest was sufficient that he included mention of Venezuela in March.

20. Butler to Richard Olney, May 28, 1895, Olney Papers, LC; Lodge to Richard Olney, June 4, 1895, Olney Papers, LC; Henry Cabot Lodge, "England, Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine," The North American Review CLX (June, 1895), pp. 651-658; Lodge was capable of asking that a given foreign issue be treated in a bipartisan manner and then later a-tack a Democratic administration's direction of policy with vigorous partisanship. See Congressional Record 50th Cong. 1st sess., June 7, 1888, p. 5011; Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," pp. 11-17; Lodge to Henry White, June 5, 1895, White Papers, LC.

21. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, July 16, 26, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, August 10, 1895, Roosevelt Papers, LC; Lodge was very exercised that George Smalley, a correspondent for the London Times was sending back dispatches saying that the Monroe Doctrine was taken seriously only among a few jingoes. Lodge asked Roosevelt to impress upon Smalley that talk of the Monroe Doctrine and attacks on English policy were not the standard twisting of the English lion's tail for the benefit of the Irish vote.

22. Congressional Record 54th Cong. 1st sess., Decemver 20, 1895, p. 259; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 18, 22, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, December 20, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boutwell to H.C. Lodge, December 20, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Elihu B. Hayes, December 20, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, December 21, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, December 21, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boutwell steadfastly maintained an anti-expansionist attitude from this point on. Implied in the work of John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, pp. 225-228, is the notion that Lodge did not lead on the question of Venezuela. In a letter to his mother, Lodge clearly felt that Cleveland was a late comer on Venezuela while he took considerable abuse for his artilce in June. "I first alone in the wilderness cried out about Venezuela last June & was called a Jingo for my pains. I am no longer lonely. Jingoes are plenty enough now." The

criticism he got from State Street tended to confirm his view that he was ahead of opinion. "It was painful to read the telegrams & letters from frightened stockbrokers & bankers sent me on Friday asking me to eat my words swallow my convictions fight the message [Cleveland's of the eighteenth] & abandon the country because stocks fell." Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 22, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

23. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 22, 29, 1895, January 1, 26, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Curtis Guild, Jr., December 30, 1895, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, January 5, 20, 1896, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Moreton Frewen, January 9, 1896, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, January 18, 1896, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Albert Bushnell Hart, January 18, 1896, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to L.C. Louthard, January 23, 1896, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS.

24. Lodge to Arthur Balfour, February 1, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; White to H.C. Lodge, July 2, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, pp. 348-351.

25. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, April 29, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; As his letters to Cushman K. Davis confirm, Lodge began campaigning for a position on the Foreign Relations Committee in March, 1895. Davis to H.C. Lodge, March 30, April 15, 22, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; George E. Paulsen, "Secretary Gresham, Senator Lodge, and American Good Offices in China, 1894," Pacific Historical Review XXXVI (May, 1967), p. 142 suggests that Lodge conducted a highly partisan and disingenuous campaign against Gresham's policy in Hawaii and the Far East. While Lodge was certainly capable of asking for bipartisanship when it suited his purposes and then do an about face, his criticism of Gresham's handling of the Hawaii question was sincere. Paulsen shares E. L. Godkin's view of Gresham's policy and perhaps Godkin's mugwump view of Lodge. Paulsen suggests that Lodge's ambitions were large including not only the Foreign Relations Committee, but the post of Secretary of State as well. Nothing in the Lodge papers would confirm that. Lodge may have been poorly informed about Gresham's handling of the dispute with China in 1894, but he was not alone in his views. Davis to H.C. Lodge, August 10, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, December 1, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS.

26. Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Relations, p. 351; Lodge to Richard Henry Dana, February 6, 1897, Dana Papers, MHS.

27. Lodge to Stephen O'Meara, January 16, 1897, Letterbook IX, Lodge Papers, MHS.

28. Lodge to William ?, January 30, 1897, Letterbook IX, Lodge Papers, MHS.

29. Dana to H.C. Lodge, February 4, 10, 1897, Dana Papers, MHS; Lodge to Richard Henry Dana, February 6, 12, 1897, Dana Papers, MHS; Lodge to Elihu B. Hayes, February 15, 1897, March 28, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hoar to Edward F. Atkinson, March 3, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS.

30. Pauncefote to George F. Hoar, May 11, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, May 11 [?], 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

31. John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, pp. 102-113, Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1959), pp. 34-187. Grenville and Young seem absolutely correct in saying that, on Hawaii, Cleveland's administration was searching for a policy and doing a good deal of floundering.

32. Schurz to Walter Q. Gresham, September 24, 1893, Gresham Papers, LC; Olney to Walter Q. Gresham, October 9, 1893, Gresham Papers, LC; Brewer to H.C. Lodge, December 19, 1893, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, January 22, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Even rather friendly historians such as John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, pp. 110-112, saw Gresham's policy in the fall of 1893 as inept.

33. Lodge to William F. Atkins, June 18, 1894, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 23, 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 53d Con. 3d sess., January 4, 1895, p. 622.

34. Congressional Record 53d Cong. 3d sess., January 8, 19, 22, 1895, pp. 716 ff., 1136-1137, 1172, 1210-1211.

35. Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea-Power," Forum XV (March, 1893), pp. 1-11.

36. Gresham to Roger Q. Mills, January 23, 1895, Gresham Papers, LC; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 28, February 3, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 53d Cong. 3d sess., February 9, 1895, pp. 1983-1984.

37. Congressional Record 53d Cong. 3d sess., March 2, 1895, p. 3082.

38. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 6, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

39. McKinley to H.C. Lodge, November 12, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, December 2, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, May 2, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

40. Storey to G. F. Hoar, December 8, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Appleton to G.F. Hoar, December 10, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Southwick to G.F. Hoar, December 10, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 19, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

41. Lodge to Stephen O'Meara, January 3, 11, 1898, Letterbook XII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 9, 17, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, January 31, 1898, Lodge Papers, Letterbook XIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, pp. 373-374, 391-392.

42. Lodge to William F. Atkins, June 18, 1894, Letterbook VII, Lodge Papers, MHS.

43. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, October 7, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

44. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, October 8, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

45. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, October 14, 1895, Lodge Papers, MHS.

46. Higginson to H.C. Lodge, January 1, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 13, 19, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

47. Congressional Record 5th Cong. 1st sess., February 20, 1896, pp. 1971-1972; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 23, March 1, 1896, Lodge papers, MHS.

48. Erland to H.C. Lodge, March 10, 1896, Lodge papers, MHS; Hoar to Ruth A. Hoar, March 12, 1896, Hoar Papers, MHS; Higginson to H.C. Lodge, March 23, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; William A. Draper, a Boston merchant, wrote Hoar approving his position on Cuba and made some veiled criticisma of Lodge. Draper to G.F. Hoar, March 13, 1896, Hoar Papers, MHS.

49. Lodge to Moreton Frewen, March 11, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Dudley Pickman, March 12, 1896, Letterbook VIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Higginson to H.C. Lodge, March 23, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to T. W. Higginson, March 25, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; The change in attitude on the part of Higginson was significant in that he continued to support the Cleveland administration on Hawaii; Italics in original.

50. Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Duty to Cuba," Forum XXI (May, 1896), pp. 278-279.

51. Ibid., p. 282. Italics added. The blatant bigotry of Lodge's comments were not exceptional in this period both among interventionists and non-interventionists. They do contrast, however, rather markedly with his work on the Lodge Bill in 1890.

52. Ibid., pp. 285-287.

53. White to H.C. Lodge, July 2, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.E. Chandler, October 6, 1896, Chandler Papers, LC.

54. John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, p. 232; Bigelow to H.C. Lodge, December [?], 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, December 31, 1896, Letterbook IX, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hoar to Edward Atkinson, January 6, 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 20, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

55. Weld to H.C. Lodge, December 18, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Stephen M. Weld, December 19, 1896, Letterbook IX, Lodge Papers, MHS.

56. Bigelow to H.C. Lodge, December 28, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Adams to H.C. Lodge, December 28, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS.

57. Lodge to E.B. Hayes, March 10, 1897, Letterbook X, Lodge Papers, MHS; Chandler to H.C. Lodge, May 23, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Chandler wanted Lodge to try and do something about the efforts being made to stop the flow of arms to the Cuban rebels; Higginson to H.C. Lodge, June 9, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to H.L. Higginson, Letterbook XI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, June 30, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

58. Lodge to Thomas B. Reed, August 25, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS; Reed to H.C. Lodge, September 13, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

59. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, September 21, 1897, Lodge Papers, MHS.

60. Lodge to William F. Draper, December 20, 1897, Letterbook XII, Lodge Papers, MHS.

61. Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, December 21, 1896, Letterbook IX, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, January 31, 1898, Letterbook XIII, Lodge Papers, MHS.

62. Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, February 14, 1898, Letterbook XIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 12, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

63. Morse to H.C. Lodge, February 23, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

64. Lodge to John D. Long, February 25, 1898, Letterbook XIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; White to H.C. Lodge, March 5, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 26, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt's cable of February 25, 1898, ordering Dewey to prepare to attack the Philippines was not the result of a Lodge-Roosevelt conspiracy but an outgrowth of a military contingency plan devised in 1896; John A.S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy, pp. 267-278.

65. Higginson to H.C. Lodge, March 8, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry L. Higginson, March 9, 1898, Letterbook XIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William Sturgis Bigelow, March 25, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William McKinley, March 21, 1898, McKinley Papers, LC.

66. Lodge to William R. Day, March 30, 1898, Day Papers, LC; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, March 30, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

67. Chandler to Paul Dana, March 30, 1898, Chandler Papers, LC.

68. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, April 3, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Higginson to H.C. Lodge, April 4, 14, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to H.L. Higginson, April 4, 1898, Letterbook XIII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lorimer to G.F. Hoar, April 4, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; Lodge to William Sturgis Bigelow, April 4, 1898, Letterbook XIII, Lodge Papers, MHS.

69. Crane to H.C. Lodge, April 5, 8, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, April 6, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Italics in original.

70. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, April 9, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, April 10, 12, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

71. Congressional Record 55th Cong. 2d sess., April 13, 1898, pp. 3781-3784.

72. Morse to H.C. Lodge, April 14, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Johnson to G.F. Hoar, April 14, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; This telegram specifically criticized Lodge's remarks and reflected the generally anti-war attitude of the Boston financial community.

73. Lodge to John T. Morse [?], April 15, 1898, Letterbook XIV, Lodge Papers, MHS.

74. Lodge to John T. Morse [?], April 15, 1898, Letterbook XIV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Perhaps, it was the strain of the situation, but Lodge was succumbing to anti-Semitism and anti-Catholicism. There is confirmation of the anti-Catholicism in his comments in his speech in Congress April 13, 1898. He made some laudatory references to William the Silent, the Dutch hero of the revolt of the Netherlands in the sixteenth century. William became both a Protestant and Whig hero; Congressional Record 55th Cong. 2d sess., pp. 3781-3784.

75. Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, April 18, 19, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Gardner to H.C. Lodge, April 20, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, April 23, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

76. Lynn Evening Item, September 29, 1886, p. 1; Henry Cabot Lodge, Early Memories, pp. 49 ff. 279-280; Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," p. 17; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 17, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Clark to H.C. Lodge, March 14, 1896, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 53d Cong. 3d sess., January 22, 1895, p. 1211, 54th Cong. 1st sess., June 3, 1896, pp. 6048-6049.

CHAPTER XI

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE POLITICS OF EXPANSION, 1897-1899

The country rejoiced early in May, 1898, at Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet at Manila, little expecting the embarrassments that the months after April would produce for the army. In keeping with the spirit of the day, Lodge's son-in-law, Augustus P. Gardner, and his son Cabot entered the armed services. Cabot joined the naval reserve and Gardner the army. From Gardner, Lodge learned very early of the ineptitude of army supply officers; and from May to the end of the brief conflict, Lodge received detailed reports on the situation among the troops.[1]

Just two days after Dewey's stunning triumph, Lodge spoke privately of his desire that the Philippines and Puerto Rico be taken as war indemnities. At this early date, Lodge saw the Philippines as a strategic outpost critical not only for military purposes but also for commercial reasons. While some of his correspondents spoke only of Manila as a coaling station, Lodge had larger ambitions for the new conquest. Echoing the expansionists of an earlier day, he wrote George Lyman "we hold one side of the Pacific and with Manila we have our foothold on the other." In the months after Dewey's victory,

Lodge never swerved from his view that all the Philippines must be retained. In June, fearing that Secretary of State William R. Day might be less than completely enthusiastic about retaining them, Lodge wrote him a lengthy memorandum outlining the importance of the Philippines as a commercial outpost for the lucrative China trade.[2]

Another reason for keeping the Philippines in Lodge's view was that "the intense commercial rivalry of the present times has developed a new system of obtaining markets. The markets go with the territory. For this reason Europe has divided Africa and is now in process of dividing China."[3] Lodge cited the example of Madagascar where French imperialism closed local markets to the manufactures of Massachusetts mills. With an expanding industrial output, new markets must be found for surplus American products to sustain the new prosperity which barely overshadowed the memories of the depression of 1893-1897.

At the beginning of the conflict, Lodge and his associate in Massachusetts carefully assessed the political advantages that might flow from the war. George H. Lyman attempted to find commissions for the faithful who wished military service. Curtis Guild, Jr., among others, sought the opportunity to kill a Spaniard. Augustus P. Gardner finally found a place on James H. Wilson's staff, and both he and his father-in-law looked forward to the advancement that military service might give his budding political career.[4]

In the first week of conflict, William E. Chandler complained to Paul Dana of the expansionist New York Sun that there seemed to be some foot-dragging on the part of the administration about sending

troops to Dewey in Manila. Ten days later, Chandler and Lodge worried that a pro-Spanish party had the presidential ear. Lodge contacted William S. Laffan, publisher of the Sun, with a plan to flush out the pro-Spanish group. Laffan went to McKinley and was told that the President was committed to a "large" policy. On May 25, Lodge went to the White House with Stephen B. Elkins (R.-W. Va.) and heard McKinley say he intended to send Dewey 20,000 men. As a faithful political soldier, this was sufficient to convince Lodge of McKinley's goals.[5]

At the end of the month, the ineptitude in the War Department was so obvious that Lodge was receiving complaints from State Street about it. More distressing to Lodge, however, was that reserve batteries could not be outfitted and sent to Cuba because they lacked guns, and "Gussie" Gardner's unit lacked the most essential supplies. Gardner urged Lodge to intervene with the Department but exercise caution to prevent any hint that Wilson was using political pressure. From Roosevelt, he heard of devastating delays in loading and debarking troops and a lack of horses for Roosevelt's "cavalry" regiment. He entreated Lodge to bring to the attention of the president and "if necessary the Secretary of War, just what is going on here and the damage that is being done."[6]

Lodge attempted to give what assistance was within his power, but the paralyzing rot within the Department was massive. He pushed to get Gardner's unit paid to try and offset the debilitation of morale resulting from unhealthy billeting and lack of supplies. To Roosevelt, he wrote that he would try to help in the matter of horses, but "my

power is very little and I feel very helpless when I come up against the immobility of the War Department."[7] In mid-June, Lodge maintained his stance of loyalty to the administration and did not publicly attack the Department, but the effort was trying. "The rust & red tape & incompetency in certain divisions of the War Department are beyond belief & the Secretary is to blame for not doing some vigorous head cutting,"[8] he complained privately to John Hay.

As the fighting intensified toward the end of June, Lodge praised the work of the navy, but expressed concern about Roosevelt's situation. Most likely, he worried as much about the impact of incompetence on the part of the War Department as he did about Spanish bullets. Roosevelt wrote lengthy letters about the fighting and the heroism of members of his "rough riders." With less than his customary boisterousness, Roosevelt described the depredations of the land crabs on the wounded and dead.[9]

Even with the euphoria associated with the victory of Sampson's fleet over Cervera on July 4, Lodge continued to receive critical letters about Secretary of War Russell A. Alger. Responding to a letter from his cousin, Lodge outlined in frightening detail the confusion and disorder in the War Department. "Nothing can help the situation but public opinion acting from outside. As it now is the President does a large part of the War Department work which ought to be done exclusively by the Secretary,"[10] he complained glumly. Lodge understood the need to sustain Alger publicly while the administration was in the heat of military conflict, but Lodge must have winced at the comments of his friend, Roosevelt. "I know we must stand by the administration; but the

President & Secretary are causing dreadful loss of life & suffering, by what they do & leave undone."[11] Clearly, the price of loyalty came very dear.

With tempers flaring in August, Roosevelt and Alger exchanged public, verbal thrusts with both men suffering. Roosevelt, however, seemed to emerge none the worse for wear. The active phase of military operations against the Spanish wound down in late August with Lodge praising the Navy and giving thanks for the safety of his son-in-law, son and Roosevelt. In September, he turned his attention to protecting the Naval War College which he deemed even more important than before the war. Early in the war, he received with favor a suggestion of a chief of staff for the navy from Stephen B. Luce. With the war virtually completed, he directed his attention to the military lessons of the war experience. He defended the administration against the charge of making bad appointments of volunteer officers with the observation that the Army had to be enlarged rapidly, but later sang the praises of the reforms of Elihu Root, Alger's replacement.[12]

In 1899, as it became politically easier and even necessary to release Alger, Lodge explained to Roosevelt that it mattered little whether Alger was at fault for the bungling in the Department. "The country ... has entirely lost confidence in him. Every day that he remains in the country loses confidence in the administration as a whole."[13] Lodge fervently wished that McKinley would choose Roosevelt for the post, but he found Root's appointment "most admirable & a great relief to my mind."[14]

With a national consensus for expansion developing, the administration again sought to annex Hawaii. Lodge sympathized fully with the move, but feared the machinations of Thomas B. Reed and his colleague from Maine, Nelson Dingley, who sought to foil the administration. By May 12, 1898, however, Lodge was reassured that the House could be brought into line on the question and on June 15 a resolution of annexation passed. The fight then shifted to the Senate where the maneuvering and delay of the opposition was frustrating. He cooperated with the administration in preventing adjournment so that the Senate would consider the House resolution after disposing of a war revenue measure. At the end of the Senate debate, Lodge's old friend, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, congratulated him on the decision to take Hawaii. Spring-Rice thought that it heralded a new day for Anglo-American civilization in the Pacific.[15]

The debate about territorial goals that began with Dewey's victory in May continued into June with Lodge impressing on Day the need to take both the Caroline and Ladrone islands. Luce wrote Lodge repeatedly concerning the strategic importance of the groups. As Sampson and Schley scored naval victories in Cuba in early July, Lodge again urged the Secretary of State to retain the Philippines. Somehow, Lodge knew that Day's attitude about holding the Philippines was lukewarm.[16]

In mid-July, the publisher of the New York Sun, William S. Laffan, accurately reflected the administration's views on territorial goals. Laffan reported that McKinley intended to take the Philippines,

the Ladrones, the Carolines and Puerto Rico, and, when they were securely in American hands, look them all over at our leisure and do what seems to be wisest."[17] Laffan might well have added that McKinley intended to do what was politically wisest and feasible. To quiet the fears of William E. Chandler, Lodge wrote him late in July that he had seen McKinley and learned that he was "entirely clear about Cuba and Puerto Rico, and in the Pacific means to go much further than anyone I think guesses." Faithfully supporting the administration, Lodge reflected the outlook of McKinley that it was unwise in July to make any sort of definitive statement as to how much of the Philippines should be retained. Privately, however, he argued that it would be infamous to "hand back to Spain Aguinaldo and his men...."[18]

At the end of July, Lodge heard alarming news from John Hay that the Germans had designs on the Philippines, Carolines and Samoa. "They want to get into our markets and keep us out of theirs. They have been flirting and intriguing with Spain ever since the war began & now they are trying to put the Devil into the head of Aguinaldo," warned Hay. This news, coupled with word that Day still wanted only a coaling station in the Philippines, exemplified a basic division developing in the administration on the Philippines. Because of his personal contact with McKinley, he knew that the President had more ambitious goals than Day; but the latter was in a critical position. Lodge learned of Hay's appointment as Secretary of State with genuine relief.[19]

Early in August, Alfred Thayer Mahan encouraged Lodge to seek

the acquisition of St. Thomas as well as Puerto Rico. One of Lodge's consituents echoed his own view that the Philippines were crucial to America's China policy and added that "old questions (such as that of Protection, in its narrow sense) must assume new forms & have new solutions. The development of a wise & successful colonial system is a problem which will need great statesmen."[20] With the fighting approaching a conclusion, Lodge wrote Henry White in London to do all that he could to get the administration to keep at least Manila and Luzon.[21]

As a shrewd politician, Lodge constantly attempted to monitor public opinion, and there was no time more critical in that regard than May to November, 1898. While his measurement of public opinion lacked precision, it gave him some impression of the public's attitude. The first group from whom Lodge heard on the question of expansion was his fellow professional politicians in Massachusetts. Knowing that some of them may have lacked enthusiasm for the goals of the administration, he started in June to convert them. "The extension will help us industrially and this new foreign policy will knock on the head silver and the matters which have embarrassed us so much at home,"[22] he observed. After some agonizing on the question, George H. Lyman testified to his conversion to expansionism observing that he had not favored the acquisition of Hawaii, but now "we must have Hawaii because we must have Manila...."[23] Clearly, Lyman recognized that the war had established a certain momentum and logic from which it was not possible to turn.

Others were not so easily persuaded, however, one correspondent who resisted the new trend in foreign policy saw a host of problems in taking the Philippines centering on racial differences. As if to reassure himself, Lodge declared to George Lyman and Theodore Roosevelt in late June that opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of expansion. Perhaps placing too much emphasis on state Republican Conventions, Lodge thought they reflected the general view that "where the flag has gone up it ought never to come down."[24]

In September, politicians in Massachusetts began considering the advisability of convention resolutions supporting expansion. Frederick H. Gillett, a Representative from Springfield, consulted Lodge about such resolutions. Gillett was the son-in-law of George Frisbie Hoar who opposed the acquisition of the Philippines. In addition, Gillett was concerned about the support of the mugwump newspaper, the Springfield Republican. Lodge advised Gillett to do nothing rash and assured him that a resolution could be framed upon which everyone could stand.[25]

In October, as the State Convention approached, Lodge was pushed first one way and then another on the question of resolutions on expansion. As he explained to William E. Chandler afterwards, "it was not easy to hold all together & yet keep right straight on the great main issue." A disastrous split in the party had been avoided, but he was still fearful that the agitation of anti-expansionists might bring the loss of the House of Representatives "& muddle up a peace & then we shall be slaughtered for doing that."[26] The elections did not provide an overwhelming endorsement for expansionism, but they assured

McKinley of a Republican Congress and dispelled Lodge's fears.[27]

Although Lodge managed to avoid a damaging party split in the fall elections, the anti-expansionists were a constant threat from the Faneuil Hall meeting of June, 1898 through the next several years. Lodge dismissed the opponents of expansion a few days after the Faneuil Hall meeting and observed to Brooks Adams that the meeting was "very small, utterly ineffectual, and chiefly composed of elderly people."[28] Indeed, the difference in age between those who favored expansion and those who opposed it was significant. A list of the Republican leaders of the opposition movement was a roll call of the elder statesmen of the party: Carl Schurz, George Sewall Boutwell, George Frisbie Hoar, Moorfield Storey, George F. Edmunds and John Sherman. Many of these men participated in the birthing of the party, worked for reform in the days of Grant and clung to the foreign policy posture of the Founders. One of the practical results of the generational difference was that they not only had difficulty in reaching the younger leaders of the two political parties but also in establishing rapport with the younger element of the population as a whole. Schurz, for example, "without knowing it, was out of touch with the spirit of the age,"[29] concluded his biographer.

The military successes of July, 1898, deepened the differences between those who favored the "large policy" and those who supported the "small policy." Lodge, however, did not permit the differences between him and George Frisbie Hoar to develop into either personal or open political hostility. In fact, Lodge helped to prevent the

introduction of resolutions which would have embarrassed Hoar at the state convention in October, Certainly, Lodge's efforts were aimed as much at protecting himself and the party as shielding Hoar. Just before the elections, the anti-expansionists urged Hoar to take a firmer position against expansion calling on him to speak in tones of the New England conscience. Charles Francis Adams asked him to speak out and educate younger men as his grandfather had on the slavery question. This was the sort of appeal which Hoar found difficult to reject, but he had no desire to break openly with the administration and possibly to injure Lodge's re-election prospects.[30]

Increasingly, Hoar found support for his anti-expansionist point of view among members of the business community and traditional mugwumps. Albert Clarke sought his assistance in preparing a resolution against acquiring the Philippines for the annual meeting of the Home Market Club. Edward Atkinson, a Boston businessman and old-line mugwump, became a regular correspondent on the question. In spite of this encouragement from home, Hoar refused to transfer his differences with Lodge from the Senate to Massachusetts.[31]

In December, the two men continued to maintain a friendly personal relationship in spite of the obvious philosophical differences between them. By the end of the month, Hoar was in virtually an untenable position. On the one hand, he was telling Lodge that the differences between them were not so great while, on the other hand, his letters to Edward Atkinson conveyed the clear impression that he sympathized with Atkinson's position. For his part, Lodge avoided as

much as possible a rupture of their relationship.[32]

In January, 1899, maneuvering on the Treaty of Paris began, and Hoar's party regularity and philosophical anti-expansionism rendered him an ineffective opponent of the Treaty. Hoar had fewer illusions about the strength of the anti-expansionist position than did Carl Schurz and George S. Boutwell. After their failure to block the treaty, Hoar thought that the crucial error had been one of timing. In fact, the opponents of the treaty had seriously underestimated President McKinley. Postponement of the vote until March would have aided the cause of anti-expansionism. The ratification of the treaty February 6 was a sharp setback to the anti-expansionists, but they regrouped and prepared for the presidential contest in 1900.[33]

From the beginning of hostilities in May, 1898, Lodge steadfastly supported the expansionist policy and the administration. Sometimes the role of faithful soldier had been difficult and especially when the blundering in the War Department threatened the health and safety of his friends and family. It was reasonable for Lodge to aspire to a place on the peace commission which would negotiate a treaty with Spain if, as seemed certain, members of the Senate were to serve. Both for his loyal support and his knowledge of foreign affairs, he deserved such an appointment. As early as late July, 1898, Lodge heard musings from Henry White about the imminence of peace negotiations. On July 27, Lodge heard that there was serious consideration within the administration of selecting members of the Foreign Relations Committee to serve on the peace commission. Very discreetly, Lodge's friends

urged Secretary of the Navy Long to recommend Lodge's name. Long thought that there might be some resistance to Lodge's name because of his views on the Philippines.

Never reticent about asking for a place he desired, Lodge began something of a campaign for the appointment in early August writing first to his friend William E. Chandler.[34] On August 9, he heard from one of his friends that McKinley seemed determined to have a "weak" commission which would injure Lodge's chances. Long reported on the tenth that he had heard little from the President about the Commission, but knew that Day, who would be a member, was advising McKinley on the subject. That news must have given Lodge a sinking feeling since Day had resisted from May the notion of keeping the Philippines. Long thought that Cushman K. Davis, as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, would be given first consideration among possible senatorial appointees.[35]

Lodge thought that it would be acceptable not to appoint members of the Senate; but if senators were to go they should be drawn from the Foreign Relations Committee. As it became clearer that he was not to be selected, Lodge turned his efforts from "campaigning" for an appointment to influencing the commissioners. His failure to receive the appointment was a product of McKinley's shrewd preference for experience and political strength. He started his educational efforts on peace terms with Day who had been a "hard case" from the beginning. He then directed his attentions to the new Secretary of State, John Hay, with whom he had close personal relations.[36]

William Laffan reassured him that Day would at least support taking Luzon, or he would not have been named to the Commission. This may have been some comfort, but Lodge continued to cultivate members of the commission who did not share his views. Late in October, he got a full report on the work of the commission and on individual members' attitudes from Henry White. Importantly, he learned that "Senator Gray is in favor of taking none of the Philippines at all; but he admitted that if we should take any part of them it would be necessary to take the whole." White thought that if the United States withdrew from the Philippines, the Germans would immediately seize the islands, as Hay had warned in late July, 1898. This seemed to loom in the back of his mind when he wrote Davis that the peace commissioners ought to take not just one island in the Ladrones and Carolines but rather all of them or "we shall have uncomfortable neighbors...."[35]

The next battle was getting the treaty ratified. Lodge knew that his colleague, Hoar, would be one of the leading critics of the treaty, and he attempted to prevent an open break between Hoar and the administration. In November, he tried to find ground upon which all Republicans could stand, urging Hoar to wait until a treaty had been concluded. At the end of November, he had a conference with McKinley and came away "greatly [impressed] by his statesmanship & strong grasp of the future."[36]

As well informed as any member of the Senate about the difficulty of ratifying a treaty, Cushman K. Davis fretted over the attitude of Hoar in the Senate and Reed in the House. There was to be a tough fight

and all of Lodge's skills at political management would be required. His son-in-law, who reflected the outlook of some members of the business community, urged him to emphasize the commercial advantages to be gained from ratification. In particular, Gardner thought that the importance of the China trade should be underlined. To one of his constituents Lodge sketched out part of the line of attack he later took in the debate. He observed shrewdly that the rejection of the Treaty would simply restore a state of belligerence between the United States and Spain and place the control of the territories in the hands of the President. In the debate, however, he emphasized that "every sensible man in the country, every business interest, desires the reestablishment of peace in law as well as in fact." He knew that the rejection of the treaty would injure the administration politically at the very moment when the Massachusetts legislature would be acting on his re-election to the Senate.[37]

The anti-expansionists had a reasonable prospect of defeating the treaty in mid-January until William Jennings Bryan withdrew his active opposition. As Hoar reported to Carl Schurz, "Bryan has undoubtedly demoralized some of our Northwestern Democrats and one or two of the Populists." Bryan's stance grew out of his desire to neutralize the expansion question so that the debate over the currency could be resumed.[38]

On January 24, Lodge presented a brief but powerfully persuasive speech in support of the treaty. He started with an affirmation of faith in the ability of American civilization to bring peace and

ultimately self-government to the Philippines. Then he scored those critics of the treaty "who for three years watched unmoved the torture of Cuba, pleading with fervid eloquence for the Filipinos, just rescued by us from Spain, against the possible cruelty which Americans might inflict upon them." In concluding, he disingenuously argued that he had said nothing about commercial advantages because "the opponents of the treaty have placed their opposition on such high and altruistic grounds." In fact his reference to the "markets of China, of which we must have our share for the benefit of our workingmen" was more effective because of his spare reference to it.[39]

The congratulations he received did not dispel his anxiety about the treaty's chances. He tried to allay the fears of his colleague from Illinois, William E. Mason, and received encouragement from Roosevelt and Hay. The strain was taking its toll as he explained to his mother that "all the waking hours except in the evening have been taken up in the struggle over the treaty." A week before the vote, he was pessimistic and worried about the humiliation "in the eyes of the world" which would result from rejection.[40]

On February 2, he wrote an article for the New York Sun in which he rebutted those critics of the Treaty who assailed it on constitutional grounds. His hard work, the arm twisting of his fellow managers Nelson W. Aldrich and Marcus A. Hanna, and President McKinley's efforts all produced a narrow vote of 57 to 27 for the Treaty on February 6. Alfred Thayer Mahan congratulated him the next day and expressed dismay at the comments of opponents of the treaty about self-government as applied to a "people [Filipinos] in the childhood stage of race

development."[41]

The Treaty of Paris and the insurrection in the Philippines demonstrated a need for a clearly defined policy to deal with the overseas territories. As early as August, 1898, it was apparent that the United States had managed to defeat the Spanish, but had not planned for an administrative structure to follow up the battlefield successes. On September 11, 1898, Lodge learned from a member of the Army that the commanders of troops in the Philippines lacked finesse in dealing with Aguinaldo and his forces. The number of incidents at this early date was small, but they hinted at what was to become a significant problem both in the Philippines and Cuba.[42]

The first order of business was to establish a military command structure to act in the interim until a civil government could be created. Very early, Lodge recognized the need for such a military, administrative framework and made suggestions about personnel. Some of the problems that plagued the War Department during the war persisted into the period of occupation, pacification and rehabilitation. Much of Lodge's information about conditions in Cuba came from Generals Leonard Wood and James H. Wilson both of whom were later appointed to head military departments. Leonard Wood had commanded Roosevelt's regiment of "Rough Riders," and James H. Wilson had been "Gussie" Gardner's commander. Not surprisingly, Lodge used all of his powers of persuasion to seek appointments for these men. Lodge had known Wilson since his days as a Liberal Republican when the two had fought corruption in the Grant administration. More importantly, however, Lodge knew that both men possessed exceptional organizational and administrative skills.[43]

Throughout the fall, Lodge received more reports on conditions in Cuba from Leonard Wood and Wilson. He sympathized with their difficulties with General John R. Brooke and praised their efforts. Late in October, he wrote Wilson of his astonishment that General James Wade was to be given chief command explaining that he had hoped Wilson would receive the position. Wilson thought his failure to win appointment the product of internal politics in the War Department. In any event, Leonard Wood and Wilson both showed considerable political craft. Aside from their sometimes destructive sniping at Brooke, both men possessed real talent and made genuine contributions to the rehabilitation of Cuba.[44]

In 1899, Lodge continued to take an interest in conditions in Cuba and Wilson's feud with Brooke. However, most of his attention was taken up with the Philippines because of the native insurrection. In October, he angrily rejected the suggestion that the United States withdraw from the Philippines. He thought such an idea "cowardly ... [and] simply incomprehensible."[45] With elections approaching in November, Lodge went on the hustings and defended the administration's policy of overseas expansion. He also supported McKinley's efforts at developing an administrative policy to govern the new territories. On November 3, he wrote McKinley at some length urging that Puerto Rico be taken into the American tariff system with a civil government to follow. The source of Lodge's concern about the island was the business interests there of members of his family. Because of the resistance of the Senate Finance Committee to the idea of bringing Puerto Rico into the

American tariff system, Lodge requested the assistance of Paul Dana of the New York Sun.[46]

By the end of 1899, a fully matured policy for dealing with America's new possessions had not evolved, but a beginning had been made. Lodge had worked hard to leave his imprint on the policies. In the years to come, Lodge participated further in the process of developing a uniquely American approach to administering overseas territory.

From his first election to the House of Representatives, Lodge took a keen interest in Anglo-American relations. When the Spanish-American War brought the two nations closer, Lodge naturally watched the revived negotiations on the fisheries, the Bering Sea and the Alaskan boundary with great attention. Even before the outbreak of war and the tacit cooperation of the British Navy with the American Navy in the Philippines, Lodge was receiving news from Henry White of the negotiations with Canada. With the fighting over in August, 1898, and a rising sentiment of good feeling between the two nations, the possibility of resolving some long standing differences appeared bright.[47]

Lodge was not overcome with the friendliness of the moment, but he did realize that a significant shift had occurred in the relations between the two countries. He told his friend Spring-Rice that "one of the great results of the war has been the coming together of the English speaking people" adding that "I am optimist enought to believe that it is going to last."[48] Meanwhile, however, he and Senator Hoar agreed that the interest of the fishermen at Gloucester must be

protected. Both men believed that aside from any considerations of the financial value of the fisheries, they were crucial as "nurseries of seamen." Lodge pointed to the large contingent of Gloucestermen who had just served in the War. Lodge cooperated with Hoar in pressing T. Jefferson Coolidge to watch out for Massachusetts' interest. Lodge had not been consulted about Coolidge's appointment to the Canadian Commission but had every reason to think that Coolidge would be friendly to the fisheries.[49]

On September 8, Lodge had a long discussion about the Canadian Commission's work with Coolidge and discovered that there was a move in the Commission to sacrifice the interests of Massachusetts. He told Hoar that Coolidge was fighting the proposal for landing Canadian fish in Massachusetts ports without duty, but needed help in resisting pressure from his fellow commissioners. Lodge turned to Paul Dana of the Sun for aid. He urged Dana to mount a campaign at once against free fish. On September 15, Dana obliged with an article pointing out the damage that would occur to the American fishing industry and the importance of the fisheries to the navy. The crisis passed when Lodge heard from Senator Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana, a member of the Commission. Lodge considered Fairbanks as not hostile to the fisheries but unaware of their importance. For his part, Fairbanks wrote Lodge that "the Commission will certainly not do anything that will be prejudicial to your interest."[50]

In the heat of the moment, Hoar reflected on the practice of using members of the Senate to serve on such commissions. He thought that it challenged the principle of separation of the three branches of

government. He pointed out that a Senator serving on such a commission might be embarrassed in fulfilling his duties in the Senate after the negotiations. Furthermore, if such a commission ignored the instructions of the president, that would impair the executive's constitutional prerogatives. Lodge agreed that "it is a practice of very doubtful wisdom," but "I do not go as far as Chandler, who thinks it is unconstitutional."[51]

As the negotiations dragged on into December, Lodge watched closely the question of free fish and kept abreast of opinion in London through Henry White. On one occasion, he discussed the negotiations with Lord Herschell, one of the English commissioners. When John Hay assumed the reins at the State Department, Lodge urged him to protect the fisheries. The insistence of the Canadians on free fish as a condition to treat other matters created a stalemate. In January, the Senate turned its attention to the Treaty of Paris; and the modus vivendi was continued until the arbitration of the matter in 1911.[52]

Lodge was completely sincere in believing that the fisheries were important to national defense as a training ground for the navy, but he also knew that protection of the fisheries was politically crucial and he was up for re-election. It was yet another one of those happy situations where principle and political self-interest converged.

From the first days of the war, Theodore Roosevelt and others realized that conflict offered many opportunities for aspiring politicians. George H. Lyman wrote Lodge that "I had rather shoot a Spaniard than a moose or bear."[53] At the end of May, 1898, Roosevelt was worried

that he might not have the sort of chance that Lyman described; and he knew that killing a few Spaniards would do for his career what killing a few Mexicans had done for Zachary Taylor's in 1848. "We [Rough Riders] most earnestly hope we can be sent to Cuba, and if for any reason Cuba should fail, then to the Phillipines [sic] - anywhere so that we can see active service,"[54] Roosevelt wrote to Lodge. To be sure, in keeping with his nature, Roosevelt was spoiling for a fight; but the political motive was ever present.

Lodge took a keen interest in Roosevelt's military exploits and their potential for reward in the political arena. By the end of June, Lodge reported that the press was touting Roosevelt as a candidate for governor in New York in the fall. Lodge thought that Roosevelt could go to Congress "and if you keep on as you have been doing and succeed in living through the war you can hope for much better things than a seat in Congress."[55] After the naval victory in Cuban waters in July, Lodge downplayed the discussion of Roosevelt as governor, but thought that a seat in Congress could be had for the asking. Paul Dana and William Laffan of the New York Sun thought that Roosevelt could be elected governor and possibly senator. Lodge believed the one negative factor in the political outlook was the impact of the Secretary of War's mismanagement of his department.[56]

The war ended in August and both men began taking stock of Roosevelt's chances. They decided that the goal should be the governorship. Lodge urged Roosevelt to place in the platform in New York a plank supporting the retention of the Philippines and in general supporting the administration. "I shall try to place a similar declaration in

our platform here,"[57] he noted. The possibility of nominating Roosevelt looked brighter as September wore on, but Lodge urged Paul Dana and Laffan to mobilize the press for Roosevelt, who finally received the prize. With the campaign entering its last phases in mid-October, Roosevelt told Lodge that "the canvass is not looking well and I shall evidently have to work like a beaver for the next three weeks." His managers had convinced him to assume a low profile and the results of their advice were not salutary. He was now trying to remedy the situation. Roosevelt was not alone in thinking the fight a difficult one; George Lyman also thought the situation tenuous. Lyman thought that Roosevelt's managers had overdone the "Rough Rider business" and had not devoted enough attention to state issues.[58]

Sensing that his friend was discouraged, Lodge tried to cheer him up and again blamed Russell A. Alger for many of the difficulties Republican candidates faced in the upcoming elections. Winthrop Murray Crane, upon whom Lodge relied heavily for political advice, also urged Roosevelt to emphasize state issues more and his war record less. At the end of October Lodge became more active in trying to aid Roosevelt. He wrote McKinley urging him to award Roosevelt a Congressional Medal of Honor which Roosevelt certainly deserved, but Lodge must have been thinking that such recognition would complement his campaign. He also spoke out in an address in New York City on October 24 at the Cooper Union. Lodge warned that Roosevelt's defeat would mean a Tammany victory and the waste of the taxpayer's money. Linking the war to Roosevelt's candidacy, Lodge closed with the observation that "the election of Col. Theodore Roosevelt will be striking notice to this country and to the

world that the people of the great state of New York endorse and stand by the President of the United States in his endeavor to secure the full fruits of the victories well earned in the war."[59]

George Lyman thought that this last minute push on the part of Roosevelt, Lodge and others would have the desired effect and indeed Roosevelt won. Throughout the struggle, Lodge was concerned about Roosevelt's success both because of their friendship and an emotional investment in one of his political proteges. An added factor was that Roosevelt's campaign was something of an index of the sentiment of the country on the policy of expansion, and Lodge himself faced re-election in January, 1899.[60]

The Spanish-American War helped thrust Roosevelt from a relatively obscure cabinet post to the governorship of the most populous state. It also imbued his political career with an energy that carried beyond his election in November, 1898. In the summer of 1899, Roosevelt and Lodge began a correspondence about Roosevelt's accepting the nomination for vice president with McKinley in 1900. While Roosevelt struggled with the problems of the state and managed the legislature, he began looking forward to 1900 as early as April, 1899. Roosevelt was unable to be enthusiastic about the vice presidency because it did not offer as much activity as he liked, but in July, he thought it an honorable position. By December, Roosevelt had experienced a change of heart and resisted Lodge's urgings to take the place. He complained that "if I am Vice-President I am 'planted' for four years."[61] The debate between the two men about the Vice Presidency extended into 1900 with Roosevelt finally embracing the notion.[62]

Roosevelt was not the only one watching the political results of the war closely. Lodge himself had a large stake in the interaction of the war and his own re-election campaign in the years 1898-1899. Lodge had begun his campaign for re-election as early as 1897, watching carefully the slightest signs of opposition. In June, 1898, he began planning the state convention and orchestrating it so that his own position and the administration's would be sustained. As in previous cases, Lodge "suggested" particular individuals for Chairman of the Committee on Resolutions and Presiding Officer. He left nothing to chance.[63]

In the middle of June, Lodge devoted considerable attention to selecting a Presiding Officer for the Republican State Convention. Increasingly, he heard discordant notes from the anti-expansionists and felt more keenly the need to have the convention in the hands of "safe" men. He did not want to preside himself but did ask to have the opportunity to speak. George Lyman reported that Governor Roger Wolcott was having difficulty satisfying all of the faithful who wanted military appointments, but that Murray Crane and he had the convention pointed in the right direction.[64]

In the style of the nineteenth century, Lodge always used a certain reserve in asking for a political favor, but always made clear what he wanted. "I should like very much, as I am up for reelection, to have a word of endorsement at the State Convention, which it seems to me would be proper enough, but I do not want to force the thing." Thinking of his speeches on expansion, "I have been engaged in some pretty stiff fights since I have been in the Senate, and I should like

to know that my party represented in convention was behind me,"[65] he explained. As he anticipated, Lyman and Crane supported his request for such a resolution and he apologized for thinking of crass, political interests when "men are dying for the flag down in Cuba."[66]

At the end of July, a crisis seemed about to erupt. His close adviser, Crane, was very discouraged at the prospect of serving another term as lieutenant governor. Crane complained that it would injure his business, and commuting from Dalton to Boston was wearing him down. Lyman intimated that Crane's return to the State House was crucial to Lodge's own re-election in January, 1899. If Crane were to leave the office, a disruptive scramble for his place would ensue with possibly damaging results to party unity. At all costs, Lodge wanted to avoid any erosion of party integrity; consequently, he wrote an irenic letter to Crane who finally agreed to remain.[67]

In October, as the State Convention approached, Lodge kept careful watch on the formulation of the platform. He wrote one of his supporters on October 4 that William S. Knox, a congressman from Lawrence, had charge of the platform and it "will declare that we should not return to Spain any of the people whom we have freed from Spanish tyranny."[68] When the members of the convention actually gathered on September 6, Lodge managed to avoid any embarrassment on the expansion issue.[69] The gathering gave Lodge an enthusiastic reception, and he felt much relieved afterward.

Lodge now turned to the business of organizing the press for his candidacy and lining up votes in the State legislature. His old friend, Jerry J. McCarthy, looked after the legislature and tried to find out

whether the Boston Daily Advertiser would support him. At the end of October, McCarthy learned that the Advertiser would support Lodge for Senator. With the press under control and Hoar minimizing their differences over expansion, Lodge's re-election chances looked bright. On November 1, while campaigning in Massachusetts, he thought that politics ought to stop at the water's edge. At this time, he wanted to play the role of bipartisan. On November 8, the Republicans swept the state; and Lodge interpreted the results as an endorsement of his stand on expansion.[70]

Jerry McCarthy continued to look after Lodge's interests in the legislature, but one of the conditions of McCarthy's work was that he be appointed Surveyor of the Port of Boston. Lodge found his position difficult and embarrassing because McCarthy had the reputation among some Republicans of being a "boodle" politician. Lodge knew that McCarthy sometimes entered into questionable arrangements, but kept him on a short leash. Unless there was a crisis over his appointment, Lodge's re-election would go smoothly.[71]

Unhappily, another problem arose at the end of December. There was a movement among the Republican members of the state legislature to pass a series of resolutions in caucus in support of expansionism threatening to provoke an intra-party fight. The question seemed likely to emerge early in January almost exactly at the time of the caucus to select a Senatorial candidate. Through careful management, all the pitfalls that threatened in late December and early January were avoided. The resolutions on expansion were "managed" and McCarthy's appointment did not disrupt party harmony.[72]

On January 5, Lodge wrote Lyman that Hoar's vacillation on expansion threatened to open a breach between the two men that would injure Lodge's re-election. On January 11, he warned one of his supporters that there was a move to introduce in the state legislature a resolution supporting Hoar's speech against expansion and instructing both Senators against the Treaty of Paris. He thought that talk of such resolutions would disappear after his re-election, but was clearly concerned that it might prove troublesome in the short term. Winthrop Murray Crane reassured him that he would be re-elected with ease on January 17 as was actually the case.[73]

Perhaps because of his painful experiences in the early years of his political career, Lodge worried excessively when he was up for election; but there was usually some substance to his fears. Contrary to his anticipation in early January that the resolutions on expansion would fade after his election, the issue continued to threaten party concord. While Lodge struggled to muster the troops in the Senate in support of the Treaty of Paris, a close associate of Hoar was introducing resolutions in the state legislature in support of Hoar's position. Lodge complained to Crane that neither he nor Hoar should be instructed, but if a resolution were to be passed, it ought to support the ratification of the treaty.[74]

The issue of expansion continued to complicate Massachusetts' Republican politics with the question surfacing again in the maneuvering over the platform of the party in the fall of 1899. George Lyman explained that the platform would not be what anyone wanted,

but was innocuous enough so that all could stand on it. Lodge observed with some trepidation the younger members of the party whose careers the war had launched, but found comfort in the election of Crane to the Governor's chair in November. As early as December, preparations were made for selecting delegates-at-large to the National Convention. Another political generation was emerging, and there was every possibility that it would be no more respectful of its elders than Lodge had been of the generation of Dawes. Meanwhile, his colleagues in the senate saw fit to give him more and more marks of esteem. In December, 1898, he had been placed on the prestigious Committee on Committees. He had served only one term in the exclusive club of the Senate, but he had gained appointment to the prestigious Foreign Relations Committee. His position as Chairman of the Committee on the Philippines guaranteed him a prominent role in the formulation of colonial policy. Finally, his assistance in the fight for the Treaty of Paris meant his stock with McKinley would continue to increase.[75]

Footnotes

1. Lyman to G.F. Hoar, May 2, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; Gardner to H.C. Lodge, May 2, July 10, May 12, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to James H. Wilson, May 4, 6, 1898, Wilson Papers, LC; Lodge was never shy about asking for preference for members of his family so far as military appointments were concerned.

2. Lodge to Louis S. Amonson, May 3, 1898, Letterbook XIV, Lodge Papers, MHS; White to H.C. Lodge, May 4, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, May 5, 1898, White Papers, LC; Lodge to George H. Lyman, May 4, 1898, Letterbook XIV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Elihu B. Hayes, May 12, 18, 1898, Letterbook XIV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William R. Day, [June, 1898?], Day Papers, LC; Richard H. Werking, "Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and the Philippines: A note on American Territorial Expansion," Pacific Historical Review XLII (May, 1973), pp. 234-240. Werking suggests that this memorandum was the first Lodge expression of the commercial value of the Philippines, but the Lodge papers clearly reveal that from the very beginning of May, he was saying to whomever would listen that the Philippines would form an important post in the expansion of American trade into the Chinese market. As a student of history and a sentimentalist, Lodge remembered that the expansionists of 1848 had looked West so as to go East and his family's personal participation in the old China trade must have had a part in his attitude. H.C. Lodge, Early Memories, pp. 22-23.

3. Lodge to William R. Day [June, 1898?], Day Papers, LC; The Lodge papers tend to confirm Walter La Feber's thesis on the Philippines. Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 91

4. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, May 6, 26, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Augustus P. Gardner, May 10, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

5. Chandler to Paul Dana, May 8, 1898, Chandler Papers, LC; Chandler to John D. Long, May 18, 1898, Chandler Papers, LC; Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, May 23, 25, 28, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

6. Higginson to H.C. Lodge, May 26, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, June 2, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Gardner to H.C. Lodge, June 3, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, June 10, 12, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

7. Lodge to A.P. Gardner, June 15, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, June 15, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

8. Lodge to John Hay, June 18, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

9. Lodge to Henry White, June 21, 1898, White Papers, LC. Roosevelt to Edith Roosevelt, June 27, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

10. Higginson to H.C. Lodge, July 4, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to H.L. Higginson, July 7, 1898, Letterbook XV, Lodge Papers, MHS.

11. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, July 22, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

12. Lodge to John Hay, August 17, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Charles H. Allen, August 17, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to S.B. Luce, September 14, 19, 21, 23, 1898, Luce Papers, LC; Crowninshield to H.C. Lodge, September 24, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, October 18, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Arthur Lyman, October 19, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Coolidge to H.C. Lodge, August 6, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

13. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, July 12, 1899, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

14. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, July 12, 26, 1899, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

15. Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, May 11, 12, 26, 31, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William S. Laffan, May 31, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Paul Dana, June 1, 1898, Letterbook XV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, June 21, 1898, White Papers, LC; Spring-Rice to H.C. Lodge, July 8, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

16. Lodge to S.B. Luce, June 9, 1898, Luce Papers, LC; Lodge to William R. Day, July 9, 1898, Letterbook XV, Lodge Papers, MHS.

17. Laffan to H.C. Lodge, July 14, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

18. Lodge to William E. Chandler, July 23, 1898, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to Mrs. Charles Russell Lowell, July 23, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

19. Hay to H.C. Lodge, July 27, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Coolidge to H.C. Lodge, July 27, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to John Hay, August 17, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

20. Mahan to H.C. Lodge, August 4, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Peirce to H.C. Lodge, August 12, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

21. Lodge to Henry White, August 12, September 28, 1898, White Papers, LC; As the peace talks began, Lodge again asked White's help in working for the acquisition of Manila and Luzon at the very least.

22. Lodge to George H. Lyman, June 13, 1898, Letterbook XV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, June 13, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Ernest R. May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New York: Atheneum, 1968),p. 40

23. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, June 9, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

24. Ward to H.C. Lodge, June 11, 18, July 20, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William R. Day, July 24, 1898, Day Papers, LC; Lodge to George H. Lyman, June 22, 1898, Letterbook XV, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, June 24, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

25. Gillett to H.C. Lodge, September 21, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Frederick H. Gillett, September 23, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

26. Hammond to H.C. Lodge, October 2, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, October 14, 1898, p. 8; Lodge to William E. Chandler, October 16, 1898, Chandler Papers, LC.

27. H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire: The War With Spain and Overseas Expansion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), p. 92; This brief study provides not only a superb interpretation of McKinley's role in the war but also a sensible explnation of the sources of American intervention in Cuba and the acquisition of overseas territory.

28. Lodge to Brook Adams, June 20, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

29. Claude Moore Fuess, Carl Schurz (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1932), p. 351; E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate 1890-1920 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), pp. 140-160.

30. Lodge to George F. Hoar, July 16, 31, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; Hoar to W.S. Knox, October 1, 1898, Lodge Papers MHS; Adams to G.F. Hoar, October 26, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; Schurz to G.F. Hoar, October 30, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS.

31. Clarke to G.F. Hoar, November 14, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; Hoar to Edward F. Atkinson, September 2, November 17, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; Reed to W.M. Crane, September 23, 1898, Reed Papers, Bowdoin College; Richard E. Welch, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans, pp. 226-227.

32. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 4, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Atkinson to G.F. Hoar, December 27, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; Lodge to G.F. Hoar, December 28, 1898, September 13, 1899, Hoar Papers, MHS.

33. Boutwell to G.F. Hoar, December 30, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; Schurz to G.F. Hoar, January 16, 1899, Hoar Papers, MHS; Hoar to Carl Schurz, January 17, February 9, 1899, Hoar Papers, MHS; Atkinson to G.F. Hoar, November 17, 1899, Hoar Papers, MHS; Hoar to Edward F. Atkinson, November 18, 21, 1899, Hoar Papers, MHS; Bryan to Andrew Carnegie, December 24, 1899, Carnegie Papers, LC; Claude M. Fuess, Carl Schurz, pp. 359-360, 365-366, confirms that Schurz was generally naive about blocking the treaty and out of tune with the times.

34. White to H.C. Lodge, July 27, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Coolidge to H.C. Lodge, July 27, August 6, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.E. Chandler, August 8, 1898, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to John D. Long, August 8, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

35. Long to H.C. Lodge, August 10, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Coolidge to H.C. Lodge, August 9, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Elins to H.C. Lodge, August 10, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

36. Lodge to L.A. Coolidge, August 11, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Cushman K. Davis, August 11, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William R. Day, August 11, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William R. Day, July 29, 1898, Day Papers, LC; Lodge to S.B. Elkins, August 15, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to John Hay, August 17, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America, pp. 400-401.

37. Laffan to H.C. Lodge, August 23, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George Gray, September 30, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; White to H.C. Lodge, October 24, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Cushman K. Davis, October 31, November 18, 1898; Lodge Papers, MHS; Hay to H.C. Lodge, July 27, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

38. Lodge to G.F. Hoar, November 5, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, November 28, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; C. K. Davis to H.C. Lodge, November 11, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

39. Davis to H.C. Lodge, December 8, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Gardner to H.C. Lodge, January 10, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Mayo W. Hazeltine, January 12, 1899, Letterbook XVI, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 55th Cong. 3d sess., January 24, 1899, p. 959; Lodge to George E. Smith, January 27, 1899, Letterbook XVII, Lodge Papers, MHS.

40. Hoar to Carl Schurz, January 12, 1899, Hoar Papers, MHS; Bryan to Andrew Carnegie, December 24, 1898, Carnegie Papers, LC; Winslow to G.F. Hoar, January 12, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS.

41. Congressional Record 55th Cong. 3d sess., January 24, 1899, pp. 959-960.

42. Lodge to William E. Mason, January 24, 1899, Letterbook XVII, Lodge Paper, MHS; Hay to H.C. Lodge, January 25, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Paul Dana, January 26, 1899, Letterbook XVII, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, January 26, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, February 12, 1899, Roosevelt Papers, LC; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 31, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS.

43. Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, February 2, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Mahan to H.C. Lodge, February 7, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire, pp. 107-109; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 12, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, March 18, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS.

44. Ward to H.C. Lodge, August 15, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Wilson to H.C. Lodge, October 20, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Wadsworth to H.C. Lodge, September 11, 19, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), p. 53.

45. Lodge to Leonard Wood, September 28, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Nelson W. Aldrich, September 30, 1898, Aldrich Papers, LC; Lodge to George Gray, September 30, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, October 18, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William McKinley, September 1, 1898, McKinley Papers, LC; Wood to H.C. Lodge, September 13, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to James H. Wilson, September 14, October 22, 1898, Wilson Papers, LC.

46. Wilson to H.C. Lodge, October 20, 28, November 1, 2, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Wood to H.C. Lodge, October 22, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to James H. Wilson, October 31, December 1, 1898, January 25, 1899, Wilson Papers, LC; David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba, pp. 89-94.

47. Lodge to James B. Scott, February 17, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.E. Chandler, October 19, 1899, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, August 10, 1899, Roosevelt Papers, LC; Wilson to H.C. Lodge, November 1, 1899, Wilson Papers, LC; Lodge to James H. Wilson, December 21, 1899, Wilson Papers, LC.

48. Lodge to William McKinley, November 3, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, November 1, 1899; Lodge to J.D.H. Luce, November 27, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Paul Dana, December 7, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS.

49. White to H.C. Lodge, January 18, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Chandler to H.C. Lodge, June 16, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, August 12, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, August 18, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hoar to T. Jefferson Coolidge, August 23, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; Lyman reported that there was considerable sentiment within the party in Massachusetts favoring reciprocity

with Canada. Lodge urged him to be careful since there was still the matter of the fisheries and the interests of Gloucester to be protected: Lodge to George H. Lyman, August 19, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

50. Lodge to C.A. Spring-Rice, August 12, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

51. Coolidge to G.F. Hoar, August 26, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS; Hoar to H.C. Lodge, August 24, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to G.F. Hoar, August 26, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS;

52. Lodge to Paul Dana, September 8, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to G.F. Hoar, September 9, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Charles W. Fairbanks, September 14, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Fairbanks to H.C. Lodge, September 23, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William S. Laffan, September 16, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

53. Hoar to H.C. Lodge, September 13, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to G.F. Hoar, September 16, 1898, Hoar Papers, MHS.

54. Lodge to John Hay, October 5, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hay to H.C. Lodge, October 7, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 11, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; White to H.C. Lodge, December 27, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, November 19, December 3, 1898, January 7, 17, 1899, White Papers, LC.

55. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, June 1, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 253.

56. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, May 25, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Italics added.

57. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, June 29, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

58. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, July 6, 7, 12, September 1, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

59. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, September 1, 8, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

60. Lodge to William M. Laffan, September 12, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, September 12, 23, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, October 16, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, October 18, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

61. Boston Daily Advertiser, October 25, 1898, p. 1; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, October 19, 25, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.M. Crane, October 21, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Crane to H.C. Lodge, October 24, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William McKinley, October 25, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

62. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, October 28, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Crane to H.C. Lodge, November 2, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.M. Crane, November 3, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, November 4, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

63. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, April 27, July 1, August 10, December 11, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, December 6, 7, 1899, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

64. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, December 7, 13, 29, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, December 29, 30, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS.

65. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, June 30, 1897, January 7, June 1, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to E.B. Hayes, May 9, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.M. Crane, June 16, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

66. Lodge to George H. Lyman, June 16, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, June 24, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

67. Lodge to George H. Lyman, July 1, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

68. Lodge to George H. Lyman, July 7, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

69. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, July 26, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Crane to H.C. Lodge, August 2, September 12, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge wrote Crane that his remaining in the office "rendered a great service to the party...." Lodge might have added that Crane rendered him a great service in staying on.

70. Lodge to J.C. Hammond, October 4, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

71. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, October 6, 7, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

72. McCarthy to H.C. Lodge, October 12, 30, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Boston Daily Advertiser, November 1, 1898, p. 5: Hoar to H.C. Lodge, November 4, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

73. Lodge to J.J. McCarthy, December 1, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Edgerly to H.C. Lodge, November 5, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, December 6, 1898, February 21, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Elihu B. Hayes, December 12, 17, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; McCarthy to H. C. Lodge, december 16, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS: Lyman to H.C. Lodge, December 21, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS.

74. McCarthy to H.C. Lodge, December 5, 16, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, December 22, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Smith to George H. Lyman, December 2, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.M. Crane, cecember 17, 1898, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George M. Smith, January 3, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, February 6, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS.

75. Lodge to George H. Lyman, January 5, 7, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 5, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.M. Crane, January 10, 14, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George E. Smith, January 11, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Crane to H.C. Lodge, January 16, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Gardner to H.C. Lodge, January 18, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, January 21, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS.

76. Lodge to George E. Smith, January 23, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. Murray Crane, January 28, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Crane to H.C. Lodge, January 30, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; The picture of Crane that emerges from the Lodge Papers for this period suggests that Crane may have been one of the more able New England politicians of his day and he deserves careful study. The biographical sketch, Carolyn W. Johnson, Winthrop Murray Crane: A Study in Republican Leadership, 1892-1920 (Northampton: Smith College, 1967), makes use of extant Crane papers in the hands of his descendants, but is merely an introduction to his life at best.

77. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, May 24, August 3, 16, 18, September 26, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Crane to H.C. Lodge, October 16, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to? Reynolds, December 6, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Gardner to H.C. Lodge, December 7, 13, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.P. Gardner, December 15, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, July 12, August 25, September 9, 1899, Roosevelt Papers, LC; Lodge to Theodore December 13, 16, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, December 10, 1899, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge explained to Roosevelt that "I have shot my bolt. I hope I shall have some years of honest & useful public service but I go no higher & I am content."

CHAPTER XII

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE END OF AN ERA, 1899-1901

In 1900, the policy of expansion again faced a political test. For almost two years, Lodge and his friends discussed Roosevelt as a running mate for McKinley. Not only was Roosevelt an articulate spokesman for the policy of expansion, but his military exploits made him the virual embodiment of the "large policy." Roosevelt's popularity among the younger members of the party, his energy and his strength in the key state of New York made him an excellent choice for Vice President. Unhappily, he resisted the urgings of his friends to seek the place fearing that it would mean political death.

From January to June 1900, Lodge, Lyman and Crane pressed Roosevelt to take the place for his own personal good and that of the party. Late in January, as Roosevelt hesitated and rationalized, Lyman took the approach that he ought to accept the position to avoid a political scrape in New York. Lodge, on the other hand, emphasized that the leadership of the party in New York wanted him to take it so that the state would not lose the office and the patronage that went with it.[1]

Thoroughly distrusting the regular organization in New York, Roosevelt attempted to discover the real reason why the organization was supporting his candidacy. In strictest confidence, he explained to Lodge that Platt was "really fond of me, and is personally satisfied with the way I have conducted politics; but the big monied men with whom he is in

close touch and whose campaign contributions have certainly been no inconsiderable factor ... have been pressing him very strongly to get me out of the State."[2] Like a wavering bridegroom, Roosevelt agonized over the situation and chafed at the attitude of the organization in New York. On February 8, Lodge was convinced that Roosevelt would not run; but on the next day, George Lyman wrote Lodge that Roosevelt had asked Crane and Lyman to come to Albany to consult on the question.[3]

In late March, Lyman thought that he and Crane had made some progress in recruiting the reluctant Roosevelt; but he indicated that the discussion in the press made his task more difficult. By mid- April, Roosevelt was tilting in the direction of accepting the nomination if it came to him but worried that his handling of rioting workers in New York might make him unacceptable as a candidate. Mearwhile, Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of Columbia University, opposed Roosevelt's acceptance of the nomination contending that he was needed in New York. The machine should be resisted thought Butler.[4]

When the convention met in mid-June, Roosevelt wanted to be courted and wished the convention to "draft" him for the place. Lodge believed that Roosevelt's popularity swept the convention and made him the vice presidential nominee. In fact, while Mark Hanna was openly opposed to Roosevelt's candidacy, McKinley himself assumed the attitude of a disinterested, wise old politician. McKinley recognized that the vice presidency would be a safe place for a potential rival, and Roosevelt's energy could be harnessed to his own cause.[5]

While Roosevelt vacillated, Lodge confronted his own problems. He learned in February that his name was being discussed for the post of Permanent Chairman of the Convention. Never one for false modesty, Lodge made clear that he desired the position. By mid-February, he was campaigning for the place, with George Lyman doing the political advance work. A month later, in conference with McKinley, he learned that the president supported his selection, which virtually settled the matter. McKinley recognized that expansion would be one of the central themes of the platform and the campaign. Lodge had been a trustworthy supporter of McKinley's policy in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. McKinley needed someone who would push for a Committee on Resolutions satisfactory to the White House and a Chairman who would control the Convention in the interest of the administration.[6]

Before Lodge's orchestration of the convention in Philadelphia, in June, his leadership was tested in Massachusetts in the months between January and June. Not only were the anti-expansionists outside the party challenging the administration's policy but also party loyalists within threatened to embarrass Lodge in his home state. Even before learning of his chance to be chosen Permanent Chairman of the Convention, Lodge was anxious to have the State Convention managed for the administration and the policy of expansion. After February, that desire grew stronger.[7]

When Congressman Samuel W. McCall of Winchester came out against the administration's Philippine policy and threatened to generate a messy debate within the party, Lodge bent all of his efforts to isolate and

to neutralize McCall politically. McCall had spoken in Congress in favor of extending the guarantees of civil rights of the constitution to the Filipinos. Lodge made plain to George Lyman that he disagreed with McCall but would have been more tolerant if McCall had waited until after November to publicize his attitude about the extension of the Constitution to the Philippines.[8]

With McCall's defection spreading from the Philippine policy to the Puerto Rican policy, Lodge began mobilizing the Republican organization to deny McCall a place on the Committee on Resolutions at Philadelphia in June. By March, Lyman and Lodge were determined to take severe action against McCall if he failed to support the party platform. The next hurdle was the state convention meeting in April. In March, Lyman and Crane carefully arranged matters so that a platform would be presented upon which Lodge could stand. Leaving nothing to chance, Lodge suggested to the author of the state platform that Senator Hoar's language in the platform of 1894 be used. "'Americanism everywhere. The flag never lowered or dishonored. No surrender in Samoa. No barbarous queen beheading men in Hawaii.' We now repeat these words. We say Americanism everywhere. The flag never lowered or dishonored. No surrender in the Philippines. You could not put it better than by using his own words."[9] Clearly, Hoar was to be thrust with his own sword.

With the State Convention over and the platform smoothly managed, it only remained to decide the assignment of members of the delegation to Philadelphia. Since Lodge was going to be permanent chairman of the convention and chairman of the Massachusetts delegation, the selection of a vice chairman would be critical. In reality, the

vice chairman of the Massachusetts delegation would direct the group. An early McKinley supporter in 1896, William B. Plunkett, was chosen; Walter Clifford was selected to go on the Committee on Resolutions; and Samuel McCall was buried on the Committee on Credentials. Everything was handled to Lodge's satisfaction even if the organization had to resort to some arm twisting to maintain the image of party harmony and the stance on expansion Lodge wanted.[10]

Late in May, George Lyman pointed out that Massachusetts "had distinguished herself as the hot bed of anti-imperialism, Heraldism (which is generic of all sneak business), and has hatched for the country such vipers as Atkinson, Winslow, and men like Boutwell."[11] Lyman thought that these leaders of the Anti-Imperialist League should be answered in a mass gathering immediately after the convention. Lodge did not wait. On June 20, in his speech to the national convention at Philadelphia, he delivered a "stirring" address in which he praised the administration's course in the Philippines and alluded to what would happen if the "candidate of the democrats, the populists, the foes of expansion, the dissatisfied, and the envious should come into power."[12]

In general, Republicans were confident of victory in November; but Lodge, ever cautious, warned against overconfidence. As the campaign started, Lodge forecast that the debate between the two parties would center on foreign policy and expansion even though Bryan tried to make silver the principal issue. Indeed, Bryan's preoccupation with the money question worked to the advantage of McKinley. The issue of expansion, however, was troublesome.[13]

Roosevelt provided the action of the campaign for the Republicans

as he spoke frequently and effectively throughout the West. Doubtless with an eye to 1904, Roosevelt threw himself into the campaign with the same ardor he had displayed when he went off to war in 1898. In fact, he took Curtis Guild, Jr., a veteran of the war from Massachusetts and a friend of Lodge, with him on a western tour. Wherever possible and appropriate, Roosevelt reminded his audiences of his own war record and the need to sustain the administration in its overseas policy. Perhaps fearing that Roosevelt's "strenuous" campaigning might seem to threaten the President, Lodge cautioned that "we must not permit the President, or any of his friends, who are, of course, in control of the campaign, to imagine that we want to absorb the leadership and the glory."[14]

With Roosevelt looking after the western states, Lodge watched the situation in Massachusetts. The Boston and Albany Railroad had been leased to the New York Central and there were rumors that the Central was about to reduce wages on the line. Such a move would cost the party votes, Lodge thought. He contacted Mark Hanna and asked him to consult the Central's management if there was any substance to the rumor. Fortunately, no such action was planned. The campaign progressed satisfactorily in the late summer and early fall with Lodge devoting much of his attention to the congressional contests in Massachusetts. In early August, he complained to James Ford Rhodes that the campaign was too quiet, which he hoped meant that McKinley's election was a forgone conclusion. His native conservatism, however, kept him from relaxing into overconfidence.[15]

On September 10, McKinley formally accepted the nomination of

the convention and wrote a long letter of acceptance to Lodge which formed the basic position paper for the campaign. McKinley repeated his stance on the money question and then went on to dwell at length on foreign policy. He mentioned American efforts to mediate the Boer War and his support for an isthmian canal, referred to the Boxer Rebellion, and defended at length the administration's policy in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. In keeping with Lodge's address to the Convention on June 20, McKinley emphasized throughout his remarks the economic underpinnings of American policy with respect to the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Like Lodge, McKinley expected overseas expansion to yield commercial and industrial dividends.[16]

In October, the outlook continued to be promising, but Lodge learned from William Howard Taft in the Philippines that the Filipino rebels were keying their activities to the campaign. McKinley released a report in mid-September which showed progress in meeting American goals in the islands, but lurid reports of the war coupled with an increase in fighting could have injured the administration. Luckily, Bryan was unable to capitalize on the issue. From Manila, Taft saw that McKinley's election and action in Congress on a bill to organize a civil government in the Philippines would end the rebellion. Taft saw the election as a referendum on the administration's expansionist policy even if the public was not alert to the significance of the election.[17]

While the reports from the West indicated a larger McKinley vote than in 1896, Lodge worried about Hoar's connection with the anti-expansionists and whether he would remain loyal to the party. Hoar's

relationship with his mugwump friends on the question of expansion was always tenuous at best. "I have a strong faith the Republican party will yet work out our great problems to the satisfaction of all honest lovers of justice and liberty. I can see nothing to hope for either in Mr. Bryan or his party,"[18] he reassured Lodge.

With the campaign in its final states, Lodge's associates in Massachusetts intensified their attacks on the anti-expansionists. Congressman William H. Moody assailed George S. Boutwell in the press. The ensuing exchange between the two men revealed that the politicians viewed the election as a referendum on overseas expansion even if the electorate was more concerned with the maintenance of prosperity and sound money. On election day, Lodge's prediction that McKinley would receive more electoral votes than in 1896 was confirmed. And Murray Crane swept the governorship with a majority of more than 90,000 votes. There was reason for congratulations all round. Without pretense, Roosevelt thought "that I did as much as anyone in bringing about the result - though after all it was Bryan himself who did the most."[19]

From the very beginning of the year, the Philippines had been an issue in the presidential politics of 1900. As Chairman of the Committee on the Philippines, Lodge was repeatedly obligated to fend off the attacks of his Democratic colleagues. Senator Richard F. Pettigrew of South Dakota introduced a resolution on January 8, 1900 asking for information from the executive branch on the outbreak of hostilities between American soldiers and the Filipinos. Lodge offered a substitute resolution and then proceeded to defend the administration against the charge that

American troops had attacked an ally. He argued that the government of Aguinaldo was the "Government of a dictator, set up by himself to impose his authority on other tribes."[20] Another angry exchange occurred on January 11 in which Pettigrew's attacks were crudely political. "The trouble with these imperialists is that they confound the Government of the United States with their puny President. The trouble is that his interests are paramount to the interests of the whole people of the country, and that the desire for political success has more bearing upon grave questions than the mere encouragement or non-encouragement of the insurgents,"[21] complained Pettigrew.

Lodge sensed the potential trouble in the course Pettigrew was taking and went to the White House to consult McKinley about it. He suggested to McKinley that Pettigrew's resolutions requesting information be broadened so as to make public information that Pettigrew did not want revealed. McKinley agreed with his plan, and Lodge proceeded to ambush his opponents. Lodge broadened Pettigrew's resolution so that McKinley could present information embarrasing to the anti-expansionists. Indeed, his adroit handling of Pettigrew may have contributed to McKinley's desire that he be made permanent chairman of the convention in June. In any case, the Philippine question continued to cause Lodge considerable difficulty. One of the troublesome dimensions to the issue was the stand of his colleague, Senator Hoar.[22]

At the end of January, the Democrats continued to press for information on the circumstances under which violence began. Charges were leveled that Dewey employed treachery in his dealings with the

Filipinos prior to hostilities with Spain. Lodge talked with Dewey at some length and came away convinced that his dealings with the Filipinos had been blameless. On January 31, the combat between Lodge and Pettigrew resumed over the publication in the Record of a pamphlet in which Aguinaldo described his relations with Dewey. Lodge countered with a letter from Dewey denying the charges of Aguinaldo. The whole business was becoming very fatiguing because "I have to be on the fighting line every morning to watch over my charge & repel assault."[23]

In February, Lodge learned that the "Spooner Amendment" to the Army Appropriations bill was making no progress in the Committee on Appropriations. The Spooner Amendment named for the senator from Wisconsin provided for the creation of a civil government in the Philippines and was eventually passed in March, 1901. More pressing in March was the debate on the applicability of the Constitution to the newly-acquired overseas possessions. Some Democrats and even some Republicans contended that the Constitution's guarantees of civil rights applied to the residents of the Philippines. Lodge aligned himself with those who believed that the Constitution did not apply to "territory newly acquired unless extended to it by act of Congress, as has been done in the case of California, New Mexico and the District of Columbia."[24]

On March 7, in a long set speech, he defended at length the administration's Philippine policy. Consistent with the racial attitudes of the day, Lodge cast aspersions on what he called the "Asiatic mind." The Filipinos were not ready for self-rule and "negotiations, concessions, promises, and hesitations are to the Asiatic mind ... merely proofs

of weakness, and tend only to encourage useless outbreaks, crimes, and disorder." As to the fact that the "consent of the governed" had not been sought in the case of the Filipinos, Lodge responded with a long historical review pointing out that the 30,000 French citizens of Louisiana had not been consulted in 1803. Lodge argued that we used Aguinaldo as a military ally, but never recognized the legitimacy of his government. In closing, he rejected the complaint that the Philippines would mean a larger navy by pointing out that our needs, aside from the requirements of the Philippines, dictated a larger navy. Just as in 1898, he emphasized the commercial value of the Philippines and introduced an appendix with import and export statistics on our trade with China in the period, 1889-1899. The Philippines were still the gateway to the China trade.[25]

The reaction to the speech was immediate. The mugwump Nation attacked it in tones of righteous fervor and personal invective. "Of his [Lodge] political and moral principles, as freshly avowed, it is enough to say that he has gone over completely to the pro-slavery doctrine of expansion by filibustering, which Massachusetts and her Senators used to denounce as dangerous and unholy." By contrast, old John Sherman wrote Lodge congratulating him on the speech adding that "it expressed a policy that ought to be adoped by Congress not only as to the Philippines but to all outlying countries - provinces or Islands within the reach of our influence."[26]

On April 17, Lodge's colleague presented the case for the anti-expansionist position. In a speech of ninety pages, Hoar attacked

expansionism on moral grounds, arguing that it contravened the Constitution and betrayed the principle of self-determination upon which America had been founded. Lodge regretted that Hoar should differ with him, but rather than openly embarrass the old man, he quietly organized the state convention so as to isolate him.[27]

After the frantic activity of the convention in June, the Philippine question once again surfaced with the publication of McKinley's instructions to the Taft Commission. While these instructions may have helped Republican managers to meet Democratic criticisms, Taft himself realized that more substantial commitments were necessary to reach the goal of economic development and political education in the Philippines. On September 21, Taft wrote Lodge that the Spooner bill must be passed after the opening of Congress. "The crying need of this country is the construction of railroads, and no railroad can be constructed until we have the right to authorize it by the granting of charters,"[28] Taft observed.

A month later, Lodge wrote back explaining that the Spooner bill did not pass because of the overwhelming desire for adjournment so that members could get back to their home districts and campaign. Lodge suggested that Taft write McKinley asking him to push for the legislation at the next session of Congress in December. With that sort of support, he thought the measure could be passed. With the election safely over in November, both supporters and opponents of the administration's policy thought that matters affecting the Philippines should be taken in hand. Hoar reported that he heard more and more comments from his

constituents that "this Philippine question shall be settled in accordance with our ancient doctrines of justice and liberty." Lodge, on the other hand, thought the Philippines an "important market ... for our finished goods [and] what is still more important would furnish a great opportunity for the investment of surplus capital, and thus reduce the competition of accumulated capital at home, which is tending to lower very much the rates of interest and to create, in many places, needless competition by the establishment of plants which cannot hope to earn and decent return." Clearly, the two men possessed very different visions of the Philippine Islands and of their relationship to metropolitan America.[29]

In January, 1901, Lodge continued to emphasized the economic importance of overseas possessions and presented an economic explanation for European expansion. "They [Europeans] are gasping for breath in parts of Europe. They are struggling everywhere to get an opening for an overcrowded population, for an overproduction. That is why they have seized Africa. That is why they have seized the islands of the Pacific. China got into trouble and in a moment the European nations thought that there would come a new division and that they could all get in there and find economic relief."[30] Prohibitionists and anti-expansionists did not share this vision of economic development. They were more concerned about the appearance of saloons in the Philippines which catered to American soldiers. Lodge responded with an amendment to the Army appropriations bill to prohibit anything but the Army-sponsored canteens which served only beer to the soldiers.[31]

While the ruckus over the canteens was irritating and embarrassing, much more important was the effort to get the Spooner bill passed. Lodge had written Taft early in January that there did not appear to be much chance of getting the bill through. By mid-February, the situation had improved. With the administration pushing the measure, it was finally passed in March.

With the approaching change from a military to a civil government, a scramble began to obtain exclusive economic privileges. In May, Taft explained that the Philippine Commission had already been approached by a group styling itself the Philippines Company which bought a franchise to build railroads. Taft explained that the Commission had rejected the application both because it lacked the power to make such a grant and "on account of its unreasonable and grasping character." On June 21, Secretary of War, Elihu Root, issued the order relieving the military governor of his responsibility and transferring administration of the Islands to the President of the Philippine Commission. The next major step was to fashion an organic act. Root began consulting with Lodge about such a move in July while Lodge was visiting the Wagner festival at Bayreuth. Lodge agreed with Root's outline of such a measure and recommended that the bill originate in the Senate where the measure could be acted on more quickly. The Philippine Organic Act was not passed until July 1, 1902, almost a year after Lodge's letter to Root.[32]

While the question of the Philippines was central in the politics of 1900, Lodge was involved in many other foreign policy questions that year. With the acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines, the question

of a trans-isthmian canal became more important. In April, 1850, Great Britain and the United States had signed the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in which they bound themselves never to maintain exclusive control over such a canal, never to fortify and area around a canal and never to colonize any part of Central America. Both nations agreed to guarantee the neutrality of any such canal. Now, in 1900, the United States wished to be released from that treaty obligation.[33]

In February, Secretary of State John Hay and the British ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, signed a treaty superseding the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Lodge took a keen interest in the treaty from its first negotiation until the ratification of the second such treaty, December 4, 1901. Lodge was eager for a treaty which would repudiate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, but when the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty came before the Foreign Relations committee, he joined with the Chairman, Senator Cushman K. Davis, in attaching a reservation rejecting neutralization of any canal. Throughout February and March, Hay and White pressed Lodge to support the treaty without any reservations. But Lodge read sentiment in the Senate carefully and concluded that the treaty could not pass in its original form. Thinking that the Suez Canal Convention provided an acceptable model, he and Davis formulated an amendment to the treaty based on it. Lodge and Davis correctly interpreted Senate sentiment, but the risk in their position was that an amendment might mean no treaty at all. Indeed, Hay's treaty was better for American interests than no treaty.[34]

Eight months later, the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty came before the Senate with three amendments. In addition to the substance of Davis' reservation, the Senate wanted an explicit repudiation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and elimination of the provision for the adherence of other nations. The treaty was reported initially with the Davis amendment alone, and the debate convinced Lodge that further changes were necessary before approval could be obtained. In late November, Davis died of a heart attack; and Lodge was given responsibility for managing the measure on the floor of the Senate. In late November and early December, the administration continued to seek an unamended treaty. But in early December, it became apparent that there was a majority against the treaty without the Davis amendment, so Lodge called up the treaty with the Davis amendment. The amendment passed, but the treaty was still six votes short of approval. Lodge, Aldrich and Foraker went to the White House and explained their situation to McKinley. Hay and McKinley still wanted the treaty without amendments but agreed that a treaty with amendments was better than none. Lodge went back to the Foreign Relations Committee and reported out two more amendments one of which superseded the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in explicit terms. On December 20, the Treaty was ratified with the three amendments. Lodge was satisfied that, if the Treaty were rejected, responsibility would rest with Great Britain.[35]

Recognizing that there might be resistance to the amended treaty in Great Britain, Lodge wrote Henry White in London explaining the need for the amendments. "The plain facts of the case are these: The American

people will never consent to building a canal at their own expense, which they shall guard and protect for the benefit of the world's commerce, unless they have virtually complete control." Lodge contended that Great Britain did not care enough to go to war to prevent the United States from building a canal, and since the canal would benefit British interests, why not accept the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with amendments? Lodge clearly expected White to show portions of the letter to members of the English government in hopes of persuading them to accept the amended treaty.[36]

Lodge maintained his correspondence with White defending the course of the Senate throughout the next two months, but White found the Foreign Office unresponsive. In fact, at the end of January, White heard rumors that the Foreign Office would reject the amended treaty. "I think the feeling is that they gave us everything we asked without a quibble or a condition of any sort; that the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty as originally negotiated did not provide for the complete revocation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and that, while there would probably be no real objection to the supersession of the latter in this country, if asked politely and by regular negotiations to do so, they have not been courteously treated in having the Treaty sent back with no explanations as to the Senate's reasons...."[37] The manner of handling the treaty more than the substance of the Senate's amendments offended British sensibilities.

In March, White's appraisal of English sentiment was confirmed. The Foreign Office rejected the revised treaty. In spite of his earlier

disclaimer, Lodge must have felt a twinge of guilt and anxiety. His public reaction to the news was to defend the Senate's role in the treaty making process, and privately he and Roosevelt began discussing the need to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Hay's response to talk of abrogation was surprise and alarm. Hay was not inclined to resume negotiations again, but McKinley thought that another effort should be made. Meanwhile, Lodge began a lengthy debate with Hay about the legality of abrogation. Anticipating the worst, Lodge wrote his son, "I have been preparing the American case for abrogation, and if I have to make it I think it will be unanswerable."[38]

The situation appeared grim throughout March and April. Lodge continued to argue defensively that abrogation would be justified under international law. By May, the outlook for a resumption of negotiations brightened; and Lodge briefed Hoar on his correspondence with Hay. In late September and early October, Lodge was brought into consultation with the American ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph H. Choate, and Lord Lansdowne. Lodge suggested a slight change in the second treaty, and with that change, the treaty received Senate approval with a vote of 72 to 6 on December 16, 1901.[39]

Except for the final stages of negotiation of the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Lodge did not appear to advantage. Doubtless, he was in a delicate position from the start when he found that he was unable to be a loyal administration follower and win Senate approval of the first treat. His desire to put responsibility for the failure of the first treaty on the English displayed a lack of honesty. The blustering talk

about abrogation was designed as much to convince him of his own rectitude as to persuade others. There was an element of arrogance and hauteur in his manner. Most important, his tenuous relationship with John Hay was seriously wounded.

In the first two years of the twentieth century, Lodge took an interest in every foreign policy question affecting American interests including the Boer War, legislation to deal with Cuba and Puerto Rico, and American efforts to purchase the Virgin Islands and Greenland. Aside from the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, America's relations with China absorbed much of his attention in these years. In June, 1900, just as Lodge and others were getting ready for the fatiguing exercise of another national convention, word came of an uprising in China. A reactionary group called "Boxers" spearheaded the rebellion. They directed much of their violence against foreign missionaries and besieged embassies in Peking.

Just three days before Lodge began his work as permanent chairman of the Convention in Philadelphia, Henry White wrote him a long letter in which he repeated rumors that Germany and Russia were behind the affair. White thought that Russia was taking advantage of England's preoccupation with the Boer War and the United States' involvement with presidential politics to widen her interests in China. Germany's goal was to exchange Kiaochow for something more to her liking. For some time, White continued to think that the great powers had masterminded the unrest for their own advantage.

At the end of the month, White bemoaned the fact that no information had come about the fate of his diplomatic colleageues in Peking;

but he was pleased that the administration had decided to send troops from the Philippines. White thought that the incident might prove embarrassing in an election year but would nicely underline the importance of the Philippines. On June 29, with better information than White's, Lodge responded rejecting the notion that the Russians had stirred up the trouble. Lodge claimed he had expected China to present problems for American policy, "but as always, it has come more suddenly than I expected and in a totally different way."[40]

Just three days before Hay's circular note to the powers which formed the basis of American policy in China, Lodge wrote White that "if we act properly together we can prevent the absorption of China by Russia and keep the Empire open for our trade and commerce, which is all we want." Hay's note of July 3 in greater detail spelled out the same goal for American policy. It is possible that the two men had discussed the situation. If not, it was a remarkable coincidence that they took the same view.[41]

On July 7, McKinley inquired of John Hay what he should say about the Chinese situation when Lodge and the notification committee came to Canton to notify him officially of his nomination. Hay replied that he should make a simple statement reaffirming the basic outlines of Hay's circular note of July 3 with emphasis on protecting American lives, treaty rights and commercial privileges. The response of the European powers to Hay's circular note was positive, and White told Lodge that it was evidence of the new status of the United States.[42]

In late July, W. W. Rockhill who had served as Hay's adviser on

Far Eastern affairs prepared to leave for China. Just before his departure, he wrote Nannie Lodge a note in which he described a conference with McKinley. In that conference, McKinley instructed Rockhill to "make a settlement equally honorable to China and to the greater glory of the U.S."[43] Early in September, news came of the safety of the diplomats in Peking. Unfortunately, however, the powers still maneuvered for position rather than embracing the American position. Most surprising to Lodge was the apparent fumbling and delay of Great Britain. "Our policy, which ... is to prevent partition of the Empire, set up a decent government under proper guarantee, and keep an open market for all China ... which England wants, yet instead of standing by us ... she seems to be perfectly helpless and not to know what to do." complained Lodge to White. Such hesitation was driving the United States into the arms of Russia according to Lodge.[44]

In mid-September, McKinley began planning the withdrawal of American diplomats and nationals from Peking to Tien-Tsin. Henry White thought that the Anglo-German accord of October was a promising development. It might lead to cooperation of the major powers in dealing with the questions of indemnification and maintenance of open access to China's trade.[45]

The American special envoy on the scene in November found acute division and diplomatic maneuvering among the powers as much of a problem as dealing with a Chinese government debilitated from corruption and dissension. As Rockhill reported to Hay, the soldiers of the powers ruthlessly exploited Chinese weakness with "open acts of lawlessness...

for the most part ... unpunished though duly reported to their commanders. The Germans, French and Italians are the chief culprits."[46] Two weeks later nothing had changed. "From the Ministers of the Powers to the last attache, from the Bishops to the smallest missionary everyone has stolen, sacked, pillaged, blackmailed and generally disgraced themselves - and it is still going on,"[47] Rockhill reported to Nannie Lodge.

Having read Rockhill's letter to Hay of November, Lodge wrote Rockhill and tried to encourage the minister, who was depressed at the condition of things in Peking. Lodge understood Rockhill's desire to escape the "Chinese imbroglio," but knew that the United States needed his skills there. Rockhill continued to report to Hay that the United States was in bad company in trying to cooperate with the other powers in China. Rockhill made plain that the powers were intent on extracting large indemnities from China for the Boxer uprising, but were in no hurry to reach a decision about the size of those indemnities. In April, 1901, Rockhill tried to arrange a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps to discuss American recommendations, but was not optimistic about a substantive result.

In late May, Rockhill told Lodge that progress was slow and the American position difficult because we were not aligned with any of the other powers. Progress on the indemnity question and reforms in Chinese commercial laws continued through the summer and fall with Lodge recommending that a Mr. Rothstein, head of the Russo-Chinese Bank, represent American interests on the Chinese Indemnity Commission. Predictably, the two major powers in the region, Russia and Japan

ultimately sought to widen their presence in China with war resulting in 1904.[48]

Lodge's interest in China in the period was a natural outgrowth of his vision of a rapidly expanding market for American goods which dated from 1898. In fact, Lodge's interest may well have been rooted in his childhood memories of his father's involvement in the China trade of the 1850's. In any event, publicly and privately, he emphasized the commercial importance of the Philippines for their own sake and for their importance to American participation in China's markets.

Before he entered Congress, Lodge aspired to a place on the Foreign Relations Committee first in the House and later in the Senate. After 1895 and his appointment to the Foreign Relations Committee, his knowledge of and skill in dealing with foreign policy questions increased steadily. While he had no ambition for a line position in the foreign service, he fancied himself rather skilled at the business of diplomacy. He never hesitated to involve himself in negotiations whether in an official or an unofficial capacity. When Senator Cushman K. Davis, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, died in late November, 1900, Lodge expected the chairmanship to come to him not because of his seniority but because Senator William P. Frye of Maine did not want it and Senator Shelby Cullom of Illinois had taken little interest in the work of the committee. With Davis' death, Lodge took over management of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. He assumed that he would become Chairman and continue directing the work of the committee.[49]

Not until the first session of the Fifty-seventh Congress was

the matter of the chairmanship finally resolved. Lodge spent the year following Davis' death lobbying for the position. He encouraged his friends to bring pressure on Cullom to remain at the head of the Committee on Interstate Commerce. Lodge wrote Senator Spooner in May, 1901 that it was unlikely that Senator Frye could be persuaded to leave the Chairmanship of the Committee on Commerce and head the Foreign Relations Committee. Perhaps failing to appreciate his opponent adequately, Lodge took as a matter of course that Cullom would remain on Interstate Commerce and that he would succeed to the Foreign Relations Committee. Lodge suggested to Spooner that he contact railroad interests in New York and ask them to press Cullom to remain on the Interstate Commerce Committee.[50]

Henry White realized not only how much Lodge wanted the place but also how important it could be to him. White spoke with Pierpont Morgan who was deeply opposed to Stephen B. Elkins becoming head of the Interstate Commerce Committee, the normal chain of events if Cullom took the Foreign Relations Committee. White encouraged Morgan to talk with Mark Hanna about keeping Cullom at the head of the Interstate Commerce Committee. White also consulted with Albert J. Beveridge of Indiana who said he had powerful friends in Illinois and offered to help Lodge's campaign for the Chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee.[51]

Just before sailing for Europe in June, Lodge wrote Senator Aldrich about the matter of the chairmanship and insisted that he himself was not anxious to have the place, but thought that it would be in the best interests of the Senate that Frye have the place rather than Cullom.

While Lodge was certainly sincere in his view that Frye would do a better job than Cullom, he knew that Frye would not take the place. In reality, he was still hoping to be the "obvious" candidate after Frye.

When he returned in the fall, he recognized that Cullom was digging in his heels and strictly on the basis of seniority could have the place. An old friend from the Fifth Avenue Hotel days, Wayne Mac Veagh of Philadelphia, wrote in October that he had talked with Cullom and had appealed to him to stay on the Interstate Commerce Committee on the ground that "it is his true interest to stay there." With McKinley's assassination, Lodge was all the more eager to have the chairmanship and thought that "it was a little strange ... that Senator Cullom knowing the relations between the President [Roosevelt] and myself, should not give some weight to it." Believing that Mac Veagh would likely show the letter to Cullom, he remarked that "it is needless for me to say what the President's wishes are in regard to this."[52]

Mac Veagh understood very clearly the situation and applied all the pressure he could to Cullom. Mac Veagh obtained assurances from the Pennsylvania Railroad Company that they would cease opposing a bill in which Cullom was interested and instead help him in passing it. Mac Veagh continued the fight into mid-November, but learned that the real force behind Cullom's wish for the place was his wife. By November 18, the struggle was over. Cullom announced that he was taking the chairmanship and had never intended anything else. Lodge attempted to take the outcome philosophically, but clearly the defeat was bitter. He consoled himself with the fact that he would be heading the Committee

on the Philippines where important legislation would be coming up. Henry White tried to ease Lodge's disappointment with the observation that he would likely continue to manage all of the important issues which came before the Foreign Relations committee even if he did not hold the Chair of the Committee.[53]

While banking and currency reform and direct election of Senators took some of Lodge's time in these years, the domestic issues which gave him the most concern were patronage questions and redistricting of congressional districts. In addition to minor posts which had to be filled, Lodge again wrestled with the irrepressible Jerry McCarthy. While Lyman and McCarthy supposedly had a working agreement about the filling of Customshouse places and an understanding about McCarthy's political activities, Lodge was repeatedly compelled to mediate between the two men. Lyman thought that he could handle the obstreperous McCarthy, but "it would be better all around to have it done from Washington."[54]

The feud between Lyman and McCarthy threatened at times to disrupt party harmony and certainly created some ugly situations for Lodge. The patronage problems of George von Lengerke Meyer and William H. Moody were, however, far more important. In Meyer's case, he was given the post of Ambassador to Italy. Initially, McKinley offered the place to Edward O. Wolcott of Colorado who had been defeated in his re-election bid for the Senate. Wolcott declined, and Meyer was next in line. Lodge recommended Meyer because of his services to the party as Speaker of the Massachusetts House not knowing that Henry White had

ambitions for the place. After Meyer was named, Lodge wrote White at great length explaining that he had been unaware of White's desire for the office. The appointment did not fracture their friendship, but the courtly White was definitely disappointed at the result.[55]

William Moody's problem was somewhat more complex and thorny. Moody was the Congressman from Lodge's district. The two had cooperated on the state platform in 1900 just before the national convention, and Moody had delivered a number of speeches in support of Lodge's view of the Constitution's application in the overseas territories. Lodge precipitously promised Moody that one of his constituents would be named to the Customshouse without having consulted Senator Hoar. Finding the Moody's candidate lacked experience for the place of Appraiser, Lodge was in the awkward position of having to back out of the appointment.

With real ingenuity, Hoar found a way out of the predicament. Moody's candidate for appraiser was named assistant appraiser, and the public purse suffered a bit, but Lodge was saved from a very distressing situation. Moody could easily have been made an irreconciliable political enemy and the harmony of the party could have been seriously distrubed. Instead Moody's loyalty was maintained and even strengthened.[56]

Just as in 1891, Lodge took a great deal of interest in the bill to redistrict the congressional districts of the state. In 1891, Lodge had had a more direct interest in the outcome since he was still in the House. Now, in 1901, he could more easily assume the role of elder party statesman. Still, he knew that the matter of districting carefully was crucial both for the sake of party unity and to prevent any centers of

intra-party opposition. From January, 1901 until late spring, leading members of the state party consulted Lodge; and he in turn consulted them about their progress in redistricting.

All the important members of Lodge's organization from Jerry J. McCarthy to George Lyman, Murray Crane, James B. Reynolds and Albert H. Washburn were involved in the redistricting operation. Lodge himself carefully examined the map and tables used in the process and pronounced them satisfactory. He consulted with all of the members of the congressional delegation and found them in agreement. Samuel W. McCall, who had vocally criticized the party position on expansion, was more pleased than most. He was to receive a "safe" district with a 10,0000 Republican majority. Lodge urged James B. Reynolds to consult with members of the State Republican Committee, chose the members of the Committee on Redistricting carefully, and "take it [the plan for redistricting] in and pass it through the Legislature as a party measure which is what it is."[57] Lodge accurately perceived the redistricting matter as totally political and thought it ought to be handled with political force.

With a comfortable Republican majority, there was never any question about the outcome of the redistricting measure, but Washburn found it essential to ask Lodge's help in giving it a shove to prevent its being held over for another year. With Murray Crane in the Governor's chair, the matter was easily dispatched in 1901.[58]

In 1900 and 1901, two deaths changed Lodge's life dramatically. In February, 1900, his mother succumbed to old age. While her advanced

years and poor health gave adequate warning of the imminence of her demise, Lodge was left disconsolate. "For her the end was blessed. To me a great blank has come, a great silence fallen when all my life there has been ever at my side a loyal, perfect, unselfish unquestioning love," Lodge recorded in his Journal. She had had the difficult task of being both parents from the time Lodge was ten years old. If she indulged him on occasion, it was not exceptional and her enthusiasm for his interests, political and literary, nurtured him for fifty years. As he wrote his friend Roosevelt, "she loved me so much - better than all else - It was the love that would have been the same whether I had mounted a scafforld or a throne - the love that only a mother gives."[59]

The other death was that of William McKinley at the hands of an assassin at the Exposition in Buffalo, New York. In early September, 1901, Lodge was abroad, but Roosevelt's cable reached him shortly after McKinley was struck down. Lodge had thought for some years that Roosevelt was presidential stock, but had wanted his friend to reach the office under different circumstances. Lodge's first reaction was fear for Roosevelt's safety and concern for his mental state in the face of such a tragedy.[60]

Initially, the relationship between the two men did not seem to change much. As the senior member of the duo, Lodge had always commanded a certain deference from Roosevelt. Even George Lyman noted that "he [Roosevelt] still has that lurking veneration for you the righteousness of which it might be either wise or kindly to discuss."[61]

As the years passed and the burdens of the presidency weighed more heavily, Roosevelt had less time to take afternoon horseback rides

with Lodge, but the two still maintained a close friendship. Although the change of leadership from McKinley to Roosevelt meant virtually no interruption of America's foreign policy, Roosevelt represented in his person the nation's acceptance of an increased role in the world arena. As to domestic policy, McKinley perceptively recognized the importance of action to deal with the place of large corporations in American economic life. Roosevelt carried out the tendencies of McKinley's policies, but in a symbolic sense he represented in a way McKinley did not a twentieth century approach to the problems of the day. Brashly, Roosevelt projected a new political style and a new era in politics. Lodge was less comfortable with the politics of the twentieth century than was Roosevelt.[62]

Footnotes

1. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, January 20, 22, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, January 25, 27, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, January 26, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

2. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, February 3, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

3. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, February 2, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, February 8, 10, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, February 9, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

4. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, March 30, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, March 31, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, April 17, 23, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Butler to H.C. Lodge, April 24, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, April 25, 1900, Roosevelt Papers, LC.

5. Lodge to Henry White, June 23, 1900, White Papers, LC; Lodge to John Hay, June 23, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America, pp. 494-500.

6. Lodge to George H. Lyman, February 8, March 13, 17, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, February 9, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to Joseph H. Manley, February 15, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, March 13, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

7. Lodge to George H. Lyman, January 22, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. Murray Crane, February 6, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

8. Lodge to George H. Lyman, February 10, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

9. Lodge to H.M. Knowlton, April 18, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. Murray Crane, February 10, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, February 15, March 19, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, March 9, 12, 20, April 25, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

10. Lodge to George H. Lyman, May 3, 19, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, May 23, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Crane to H.C. Lodge, May 23, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

11. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, May 28, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

12. Boston Daily Advertiser, June 21, 1900, p. 1.

13. Lodge to Brooks Adams, June 29, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to James F. Rhodes, August 6, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America, pp. 502-508.

14. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, June 29, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

15. Lodge to M.A. Hanna, July 18, August 6, 18, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hanna to H.C. Lodge, July 25, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George F. Hoar, August 1, 1900, Hoar Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, August 1, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Roger Wolcott, August 2, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to James F. Rhodes, August 6, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

16. McKinley to H.C. Lodge, September 8, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William McKinley, September 10, 1900, McKinley Papers, LC.

17. Burrows to W.E. Chandler, September 26, 1900, Chandler Papers, LC; Lodge to W.E. Chandler, October 5, 1900, Chandler Papers, LC; Taft to H.C. Lodge, October 17, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America, p. 503.

18. Hoar to H.C. Lodge, October 6, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

19. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, August 30, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, November 20, 1900, White Papers, LC; Boston Daily Advertiser, October 19, 1900, p. 4; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, November 9, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

20. Congressional Record 56th Cong. 1st sess., January 8, 1900, pp. 669-670.

21. Congressional Record 56th Cong. 1st sess., January 11, 1900, p. 766.

22. Lodge to A.C. Lodge, January 14, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Eben S. Draper, January 18, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, January 27, 1900, White Papers, LC; Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, March 13, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

23. Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, January 28, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 56th Cong. 1st sess., January 31, 1900, pp. 1328-1331; Lodge to A.C. Lodge, February 4, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

24. Proctor to H.C. Lodge, February 20, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Russell Hastings, March 6, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901-1913 (New Haven: The Shoe String Press, 1968), p. 33.

25. Congressional Record 56th Cong. 1st sess., March 7, 1900, pp. 2616-2630.

26. Sherman to H.C. Lodge, March 7, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; "Senator Lodge's Speech," The Nation LXX (March 15, 1900), pp. 198-199.

27. Richard E. Welsh, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans, pp. 269 ff.; Lodge to H.M. Knowlton, April 18, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

28. Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, p. 37; H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America, p. 503; Taft to H.C. Lodge, September 21, 1900, Lodge Ppaers, MHS.

29. Hoar to H.C. Lodge, November 10, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to William Howard Taft, October 25, November 22, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

30. Congressional Record 56th Cong. 2d sess., January 7, 1901, pp. 634-636.

31. Lodge to A.H. Plumb, January 8, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Congressional Record 56th Cong. 2d sess., January 9, 1901, pp. 757-760; Lodge to Rev. John D. Pickles, January 9, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to John Hay, January 22, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS.

32. Taft to H.C. Lodge, May 12, February 16, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Elihu Root, July 29, December 4, 1900, Root Papers, LC; Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, pp. 33-35; Lodge rather resented the credit Spooner received for the Spooner amendment. Lodge to Lyman Abbott, February 19, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS.

33. Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, p. 289.

34. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 10, 1900, Roosevelt Papers, LC; Hay to H.C. Lodge, February 7, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; White to H.C. Lodge, February 9, March 24, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; It seems that Hay hoped to reach Lodge through White with whom Lodge had a friendlier relationship. Hay's biographer argeues that the Hay-Lodge relationship was never a close one in spite of a surface conviviality. Unquestionably, the Hay-Pauncefote debate strained their connection even further. Allan Nevins, Henry White: Thirty Years of American Diplomacy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1930), p. 155; Tyler Dennett, John Hay: From Poetry to Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1933), pp. 257-258, 421.

35. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, December 14, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, December 15, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, December 21, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hay to William McKinley, December 12, 1900. McKinley Papers, LC; White to H.C. Lodge, December 14, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; There is a self-serving quality about Lodge's Journal entry. Clearly, he was justifying his actions for posterity.

36. Lodge to Henry White, December 18, 1900, White Papers, LC.

37. White to H.C. Lodge, January 25, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, December 24, 1900, February 6, 1901, White Papers, LC.

38. Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, March 12, 27, 1901, Lodge papers, MHS; Lodge to George Cabot Lodge, March 29, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; White to H.C. Lodge, March 13, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, March 27, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to John Hay, March 28, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; White emphasized that the principal source of English opposition to the amended treaty was the Davis amendment which they believed made it possible for the United States to use control over the canal against Great Britain or other nations in times of war or peace; Hay to H.C. Lodge, March 30, 1901, Lodge papers, MHS.

39. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 30, 1901, Roosevelt Papers, Lc; Lodge to John Hay, April 2, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George F. Hoar, May 21, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, September 28, 29, 30, October 1, 3, December 16, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS.

40. Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, pp. 434-439; White to H.C. Lodge, June 16, 25, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to James F. Rhodes, June 29, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, June 29, 1900, White Papers, LC.

41. Lodge to Henry White, June 29, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, p. 438.

42. McKinley to John Nay, July 7, 1900, Hay Papers, LC; White to H.C. Lodge, July 14, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

43. Rockhill to Mrs. H.C. Lodge, July 25, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

44. McKinley to John Hay, August 20, 1900, Hay Papers, LC; Adams to H.C. Lodge, August 30, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Brooks Adams, September 3, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, September 3, 1900, White Papers, LC.

45. McKinley to John Hay, September 14, 1900, Hay Papers, LC; Lodge to Henry White, October 8, 1900, White Papers, LC; White to H.C. Lodge, September 26, October 24, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

46. Rockhill to John Hay, November 20, 1900, Hay Papers, LC.

47. Rockhill to Mrs. H.C. Lodge, December 2, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS.

48. Lodge to W. W. Rockhill, January 10, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Rockhill to John Hay, February 18, April 18, June 16, 1901, Hay Papers, LC; Rockhill to H.C. Lodge, May 27, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to John Hay, September 23, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS.

49. Lodge to E.B. Hayes, December 3, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, December 7, 1900, Roosevelt Papers, LC; Lodge certainly craved a place on the Paris Peace Commission in 1898-99 and did not hesitate to sound the Spanish Prime Minister when in Spain in 1895. He later served on the Alaskan Boundary Commission. John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 244; While Lodge was very candid in explaining his desire for the place to Hayes, he rather disingenuously told Senator Aldrich in a letter dated June 20, 1901 that "personally I am not anxious about taking the chairmanship myself at all." explaining that he was more eager to head the Committee on the Philippines.

50. Lodge to John C. Spooner, May 13, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS.

51. White to H.C. Lodge, May 31, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge did a good deal of arm twisting, but Cullom did not harbor a grudge. In his autobiography, he spoke kindly of Lodge. Shelby M. Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service (Chicago: A.C. MClurg & Company, 1911), p. 351.

52. Mac Veagh to H.C. Lodge, October 22, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Wayne Mac Veagh, October 24, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Nelson W. Aldrich, June 20, 1901, Aldrich papers, LC.

53. Mac Veagh to H. C. Lodge, November 6, 16, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Wayne Mac Veagh, November 18, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to O.L.H. Platt, December 6, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; White to H.C. Lodge, December 12, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Henry White, November 21, 1901, White Papers, LC.

54. Lodge to Nelson W. Aldrich, January 6, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. Murray Crane, May 17, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge opposed direct election of Senators although his attitude was not as hostile as that of his colleague, Hoar; McCarthy to George H. Lyman, January 26, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, January 27, 29, February 8, 12, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, January 18, 23, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to J.J. McCarthy, January 22, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS.

55. Hay to H.C. Lodge, August 2, October 18, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hoar to William McKinley, October 1, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to T. Jefferson Coolidge, October 5, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George F. Hoar, October 11, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hoar to H.C. Lodge, October 12, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to John Hay, October 22, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George V.L. Meyer, November 19, December 3, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to Roger Wolcott, September 27, 1900, Wolcott Papers, MHS; Lodge to William McKinley, November 25, 1900, McKinley Papers, LC; Lodge to Henry White, February 23, 1901, White Papers, LC.

56. Lyman to H.C. Lodge, March 29, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W.H. Moody, April 1, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George F. Hoar, April 1, 2, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Hoar to H.C. Lodge, March 29, 30, April 25, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS.

57. Washburn to H.C. Lodge, January 12, 16, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to James B. Reynolds, January 19, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to George H. Lyman, January 22, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS.

58. Washburn to H.C. Lodge, March 1, 7, April 5, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to W. Murray Crane, March 18, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, April 6, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; McCarthy to H.C. Lodge, January 28, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS.

59. Henry Cabot Lodge, Journal, February 19, 21, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, February 21, 1900, Lodge Papers, MHS; One of Lodge's biographers, John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, p. 5, has appropriately pointed to the importance of the mother-son correspondence which he rightly observes was among the longest of the nineteenth century. The correspondence also provides an important resource for the psycho-historian.

60. Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, September 12, 15, 19, October 17, 1901, Roosevelt papers, LC.

61. Roosevelt to H.C. Lodge, October 11, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS; Lyman to H.C. Lodge, November 13, 1901, Lodge Papers, MHS.

62. H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America, p. 504.

CHAPTER XIII

A NINETEENTH CENTURY APPRENTICESHIP

Henry Cabot Lodge's political life invited categorization from its beginning in 1875. Unlike most political figures of his day, he had exceptional opportunities. Family wealth, educational advantages and superior intellectual endowments provided him with a set of mixed blessings. In the reform movement of the seventies, his background brought an immediate entree into the small circle of reformers who led the movement against corruption in the Grant administration. As his career moved from politics as avocation to politics as vocation, his "advantages" sometimes became disadvantages. His social standing and financial independence brought sneers from those less fortunate. When he broke with the reformers in 1884 and chose party regularity, he suffered the most stinging rebuke any individual can suffer, social ostracism and the charge of class betrayal.

Lodge's mannerisms provoked caricature and attack. His intense commitment to the Republican party produced the charge of bitter partisanship then and later. The intensity of political warfare in the nineteenth century brought to the surface Lodge's natural tendency to defensiveness and biting sarcasm. His propensity to use all of the contemporary rhetorical devices to discredit an opponent's argument gave him a reputation of blind devotion to party which was inaccurate. Unhappily, the strictures of his fellows persisted and molded the

judgements of posterity.[1]

Unrepresentative of the career patterns of most nineteenth-century politicians, Lodge's initial experience came in national politics. His flirtation with reform in 1875-1876 was that of a young man unsure of his career goals. He had difficulty empathizing with older reformers whose lives were closely tied to politics. After rejecting a career in literature, he slowly moved toward a full scale commitment to politics as his life's work. The critical point came in 1884 when he embraced the regular party organization. In doing so, he relinquished his amateur status.

In the late seventies, he served in the state legislature and generally followed the pattern of other aspiring politicians. After useful but not exceptional service in the legislature, he was prepared to do the sort of work for the party as Chairman of the Republican Central Committee in 1883-1884 which brought him a place in the House in 1886. In his battle against Butler in 1883, he learned again the value of attention to detail and careful organization. He also started building a state organization which produced electoral success for him time after time. In spite of defeat in 1884 for Congress, the friends he made in that period formed the backbone of his organization in later years.

His first term in Congress came under a Democratic president and his responsibilities as a freshman limited his opportunities. While he was never dependent on politics for his livelihood, his outlook became that of a professional. The experience he received on the

Elections Committee furnished him with more reasons for party regularity. As important as learning the workings of Congress was the lesson of Elihu B. Hayes to pay close attention to the material and moral needs of his constituents. Hayes, who never rose as high as his pupil, forcefully impressed on Lodge the need to attend the meetings of constituents, even if he felt such affairs a waste of time.

His second term brought the sort of notoriety which Hayes had advised him was essential to his progress. His workmanlike efforts on the Elections Committee brought praise from the party leadership; his association with Thomas B. Reed yielded an appointment as the Chairman of the Committee on Elections. The Lodge Bill of 1890 succeeded in bringing his name to the attention of party leaders and the country as a whole. It also gave Lodge a chance to accomplish several goals at once. It struck at electoral fraud particularly in the South and was consequently a good party measure. It reinforced the image of the party as the party of rights for blacks, and finally it connected the ideals of his youth with his career as a professional politician. His devotion to the principles of the bill was sincere and continued in later years.

In the crucial decade of the 1890's, Lodge supported the party position on all of the crucial issues. He abjured his earlier tariff views when a Liberal Republican. For political reasons and as a faithful advocate of the interests of his state, he became an ardent supporter of protection. As the agitation over silver increased, he became a vocal exponent of bimetallism. It would have been easy for him to cater

to the gold monometallism of the Boston financial community, but he was sincerely convinced that bimetallism through international agreement would be fairer to the interests of creditor and debtor alike. Bimetallism would also improve the flexibility of the money supply which Lodge rightly saw as necessary for the sort of industrial economy emerging in America.

As the flow of immigrants increased in the decade, Lodge watched the pressures increase on the society, politics and economy of Massachusetts and the nation. Out of personal prejudice, political self-interest and pseudo-science, he concluded that restriction was the proper course. As the decade progressed, he found that labor unions and elements of old stock Massachusetts favored restricing the flow of immigrants, if not stopping it. To some degree, the economic impact of immigration motivated Lodge's efforts. The pain and suffering associated with the Depression of 1893-1897 was a powerful influence, but his comments on the floor of Congress about the "new" immigration clearly revealed a conviction that the "new" immigrants were inherently inferior. He did not, however, subscribe to the views of some contemporary Social Darwinists.

At the state level, the tensions of immigration spilled over into political issues. Prohibition sentiment which was rooted in a long standing temperance movement gathered new force from the association of the "new" immigration with the society and politics of the urban "saloon." Lodge attempted to steer clear of the question because of its general danger and the relationship between the issue and traditional elements

of the party such as the Germans. Anti-Catholicism, which also had a tradition dating back to the 1830's, received impetus in the 1890's. The combination of immigration, rapid urbanization and economic distress provided fertile ground for the demagogic American Protective Association. Like Prohibition and Women's suffrage as an issue, the A.P.A. threatened to split the Republican party, which would mean almost certain defeat. Lodge shared the contempt Hoar, Roosevelt and others felt for the organization, but as a practical politician, he realized the danger the group posed. Like George Lyman, he preferred quiet maneuvering to neutralize the impact of the A.P.A. rather than open confrontation.

On domestic questions, Lodge was thoroughly in harmony with his party and his age. He shared the disdain of his colleague, Hoar, for the pretentiousness of the rising industrial elite. The nouveau riche lacked breeding, education and the sense of noblesse oblige of Lodge's class; but he recognized that the economic future of the nation lay with large scale industry. He worried about the survival of the smaller enterprises of Massachusetts, but his support for the tariff and the expansion of overseas markets reflected his acceptance of the change.

It was in the arena of foreign affairs that Lodge most clearly parted company with some of his fellow Republicans. In the decade of the 1890's, he moved steadily toward a more aggressive posture in foreign policy. As a shrewd politician, he carefully avoided being too far in advance of public opinion, but he bridged the gap from the

policy of the nineteenth century to that of the twentieth. Unlike Hoar, Boutwell, Schurz and others of that generation, Lodge saw that America could no longer deny her strength as a nation. Perhaps, overseas expansion was the wrong way to assert America's new role in world affairs. Considering the example of Western Europe at the time, however, the choice of Lodge, McKinley and Chandler was understandable.

In the twentieth century, Lodge experienced difficulties in dealing with the domestic issues of Progressivism, but he was thoroughly at ease in confronting the foreign policy questions. His friend, Roosevelt, made the transition to the domestic issues and polticial methods of the twentieth century more easily. Lodge understood the increasing importance of the ethnic factor in politics, but disliked its implications. In many respects, Lodge was more representative of Americans in his ambivalence about the new century. In the years after 1901, he continued to have at least one foot in the nineteenth century. His conservative temperament made it difficult for him to embrace the Progressive style. In fact, he was sometimes bewildered when faced with the Progressive approach. At times, it struck him as demagogic and he looked back fondly on the politics of deference of the nineteenth century.

Footnotes

1. John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, pp. vii, 376 ff.

CHAPTER XIV

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The principal manuscript collections used in this study are the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston and the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. The single most important collection of papers is the Lodge family collection at MHS. There are several different series of letters in the collection including letters from Lodge to his mother which provide considerable insight into a relationship covering half a century. There is also a separate group of letters from Anna Cabot Lodge to Henry Cabot Lodge. In addition, there is a diary kept rather infrequently between 1878-1900. While the entries are not continuous, they do provide a picture of Lodge's changing political outlook. The Roosevelt-Lodge letters are separately filed in three groups and contain originals and copies of a very voluminous correspondence. The General Correspondence runs from 1866 to 1924. In this study, only the correspondence for the period 1866 to 1901 was reviewed. It is the grossest understatement to say that this correspondence is massive. The entire collection consists of 164 boxes which hardly hints at its richness not only for Lodge's personal and political development but also for the political history of Massachusetts and the nation.

Another collection of considerable importance for an understanding of Massachusetts Republican politics and Lodge's early political

career is the John D. Long collection also at MHS. It is not as large a collection as the Lodge Papers, but is nonetheless formidable. For this study, the Long Papers contributed some information on the division between the younger members of the party and Henry L. Dawes. After 1888, the Lodge-Long relationship cooled as the two men drifted apart until Long was appointed Secretary of the Navy in 1897.

The George Frisbie Hoar Papers have only recently been organized. They include materials useful for understanding the Lodge-Hoar relationship from 1893 to 1901, much information on Hoar's legal career and his role in the anti-imperialist movement after 1898. In spite of their differences on the question of expansion, both the Lodge and Hoar Papers confirm that the two men avoided letting their difference rupture their friendship.

Other collections of some importance at the Massachusetts Historical Society include the following: The Charles Francis Adams Papers, the Henry Adams Papers, the John F. Andrew Papers, the Richard Henry Dana Papers, the Theodore F. Dwight Papers, the Wolcott Family Papers, the Huntington-Wolcott Papers, the George von Lengerke Meyer Papers, the John T. Morse Papers, the William M. Olin Papers, the Robert Treat Paine Papers, the William E. Russell Papers, and the George Fred Williams Papers.

The papers of the two Adamses aid in understanding Lodge's early political development as a Liberal Republican and contain material on the personal relations of the three men. The Henry Adams papers are rather disappointing in that they contain no information on the partnership between Lodge and Adams on the North American Review and little of

a political nature after 1884. The John F. Andrew collection is useful on the bolt from Blaine in 1884 of the Liberals. The Richard Henry Dana collection contains much on the civil service question and Lodge's failure to be re-elected an Overseer at Harvard. The Dwight papers are exclusively devoted to Lodge's editing of the Hamilton papers. The Wolcott papers contain little on Lodge, but one of the letters is extremely important for understanding not only Lodge's decision to abandon liberal Republicanism but also his changing attitude toward politics. The George von Lengerke Meyer papers explain his appointment to the Roman embassy in 1900. The John T. Morse collection is small but rich in material on Lodge's work for the American Statesman series as well as some revealing letters on his political attitudes. The William E. Russell and George Fred Williams Papers contain useful information on the mugwump alliance in Massachusetts with the Young Democrats after 1884. These collections are small and have none of Lodge's letters, but do include letters describing the Democratic view of Lodge.

At the Library of Congress, two manuscript collections stand out as important in explaining Lodge's involvement in Liberal Republicanism and the Massachusetts political context in the 1880's. The Carl Schurz papers provide considerable insight into Lodge's mission to Washington in 1875 and his part in the Fifth Avenue Conference. The Henry L. Dawes collection is large and useful for any study of Republican party politics in Massachusetts from 1871-1893. While there is nothing directly critical of Lodge in the Dawes papers except a long

letter from J. H. Walker, the draft biography of Dawes by his daughter makes clear the hostility Dawes felt for Lodge. While the focus of Dawes' correspondence was on western Massachusetts, there is considerable material on the fight for the Collectorship of the Port of Boston.

The James G. Blaine papers are useful in documenting the growing relationship between the Blaines and Lodges after 1889. Interestingly, however, the Lodge papers are much more important for the Nannie Lodge-Blaine relationship. Very few of Nannie's letters appear in the Blaine papers. Lodge's interest in foreign relations is reflected in the Henry White papers which provide a view of English-American relations from the Arthur administration to the Roosevelt administration. While there is little of direct relevance to Lodge in the Walter Q. Gresham papers, they do contain some interesting information on James H. Wilson and other Liberal Republicans. Gresham's brief tenure as Secretary of State under Cleveland resulted in some correspondence on the Bering Sea arbitration and the Hawaiian question.

The William R. Day papers span only the years, 1897-1899, but contain invaluable information on the Spanish-American War. Lodge wrote Day at length on his view of the goals of the War and encouraged John Hay and Henry White to do likewise. The John Hay collection was rather disappointing in that it contained few of Lodge's letters, but large numbers of letters on the Chinese situation in 1900-1901 in which Lodge was interested. The Elihu Root papers contain few letters from Lodge until after 1900. It is clear, however, that Lodge and Roosevelt had a profound respect for Root's administrative abilities as early as

1899. The Charles Sumner Hamlin and Richard Olney collections are useful for the foreign policy of the Cleveland administration. Hamlin's diary is helpful on the Bering Sea question and there is one important Lodge letter in the Olney papers on the Venezuelan question. The Alfred Thayer Mahan and Stephen Bleecker Luce papers are important on Lodge's concern for a larger navy. Neither one of these collections is very large, but both contain some important letters.

Other collections of lesser importance for a biography of Lodge at the Library of Congress are papers of the following: James H. Wilson, Moreton Frewen, Benjamin Harrison, John Sherman, George Sutherland, Moorfield Storey, Theodore Roosevelt, Nelson W. Aldrich, Wharton Barker, Charles J. Bonaparte, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, Andrew Carnegie, William Chandler, William A. Croffutt, Hanna-McCormick Family, Joseph Hawley, Rutherford B. Hayes, John Bassett Moore, and Justin S. Morrill. The James H. Wilson papers are revealing on Lodge's interest in colonial policy in Cuba and the Moreton Frewen papers contain some insight into Lodge's relationship to the proponents of silver and bimetallism. Very disappointing are the John Sherman papers which are rich with material on Ohio, but contain not a single Lodge letter. The Moorfield Storey and William A. Croffutt papers provide information on the attitude of the anti-imperialists toward Lodge.

Two small manuscript collections of some importance are the Thomas B. Reed papers at Bowdoin College and the William W. Clapp papers at Harvard University. The Reed papers have obviously been sanitized but still contain some important information on Lodge's management of

Reed's candidacy in 1896 and the Clapp papers contain a handful of important Lodge letters from the 1880's. Lodge regarded Clapp's place in the newspaper fraternity as very important to his political success.

Two of the more important newspapers for this study were the Boston Daily Advertiser and the Lynn Evening Item. The Advertiser had a distinguished history as a newspaper that specialized in financial news and sound Republicanism. Every issue was checked for the period, 1878-1901. The Lynn Evening Item was particularly useful for Lodge's early political career and his successful Congressional campaign in 1886. Lynn was a pivotal town in his district and Lodge campaigned there vigorously to overcome a traditional Democratic majority. All issues were examined for the decade 1878-1888. The Brockton Daily Enterprise provided a picture of society and politics in an eastern Massachusetts shoe town in the period, 1880-1892. The editorial point of view was pro-Knights of Labor and staunchly prohibitionist. Scattered issues of the New York Times and the Nation provided information on Lodge's work on the Committee on Elections and the mugwump view of Lodge respectively.

The monographic literature on Massachusetts in the Gilded Age is limited in virtually every major category. Fred A. Shannon's, The Farmer's Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1945) describes in the most general fashion the readjustment of eastern agriculture from diversified, subsistence agriculture to specialized truck farming and dairying. The most useful and precise

study of the reorientation of agriculture and the rural depopulation characteristic of the Gilded Age is Lester Earl Klimm's, The Relation Between Certain Population Changes and the Physical Environment in Hampden, Hampshire and Franklin Counties Massachusetts, 1790-1925 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1933). Klimm's work was a dissertation in geography at the University of Pennsylvania, but does a thorough job of explaining the historical movement from upland villages to river valleys in the period with subsequent decay in the hill communities of western Massachusetts. Klimm also describes the influx of eastern Europeans in the 1890's to replace native labor in the onion and tobacco fields of the Connecticut River Valley. Surely, the same specialization was occurring in the eastern part of the state.

Complementary to the readjustment of agriculture came the rise of the factory town which began before the Civil War, but accelerated after the war. Two important studies on the evolution of western manufacturing communities are Vera Shlakman, Economic History of a Factory Town: A Study of Chicopee, Massachusetts (Northampton: Department of History of Smith College, October, 1934-July, 1935, Smith College Studies in History XX) and Constance Green McLaughlin, Holyoke, Massachusetts: A Case History of the Industrial Revolution in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939). The evolution of these two manufacturing centers was different, but both communities grew in size because of rural depopulation and immigration. Both communities suffered similar problems associated with rapid urbanization. The nineteenth century shoe trade is treated in Thomas L. Norton's, Trade

Union Policies in the Massachusetts Shoe Industry, 1919-1929. Norton's study confirms that native labor dominated the shoe industry in the nineteenth century. The Lodge papers confirm that Lodge was very responsive to the immigration restrictionist attitude of the labor movement. Lodge's appeal to native workers helped him overcome the Democratic bias of Lynn.

There is no single, comprehensive political history of Massachusetts in the Gilded Age. The barest outlines of the political history are provided in the work of two contemporaries, Solomon B. Griffin, People and Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1923) and Michael Henessy, Twenty-Five Years of Massachusetts Politics (Boston: Practical Politics, Inc., 1917). Both men were newspaper reporters in the period and their work suffers accordingly. The only sound political history of any portion of the period is the work of Geoffrey Blodgett, The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). Blodgett focuses on the Irish-Mugwump-Native Democrat alliance in the years, 1884-1896. A comparable sort of study should be done of both parties starting with 1865. Edith Ellen Ware, Political Opinion in Massachusetts During Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: Columbia University, 1916) concentrates on the war years and is badly out of date.

Immigration into the Bay state is treated in Oscar Handlin's Boston Immigrants (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). Handlin's study does a superb job of describing the Irish immigration both before and after the Civil War. The most serious limitation of the work is that

it does not go beyond 1880 after which the character of immigration changed dramatically. A contemporary collection of essays, Robert A. Woods (ed.), Americans in Process (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1902) provides some statistics on the changing composition of immigration and the changing ethnic patterns in sections of Boston. The two more glaring defects of Woods' work is the obvious anti-immigrant bias and the settlement house orientation of the authors.

The last two decades of the nineteenth century in Massachusetts produced a veritable transformation from a state of towns into a state of cities. The most valuable study of urbanization was the pioneering statistical work of Horace G. Wadlin, "The Growth of Cities in Massachusetts," American Statistical Association n.s. No. 13 (March, 1891). Wadlin was one of those Yankee "reformers" who was very alarmed about the social changes occurring in the period and the urbanization that was a direct outgrowth of the "new immigration." Still, Wadlin's statistical analysis was essentially correct and he saw clearly the political conflicts emerging between urban, Catholic, wet, Democratic Boston and small town, Protestant, prohibitionist, Republican Nahant. Two useful studies of Boston are Sam B. Warner's, Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900 (New York: Atheneum, 1973) and Roger Lane's Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). Warner's work does a superb job of explaining the relationship between new transportation technology, the physical expansion of the city and the real estate industry. While Warner provides much insight into the social development of the city, it would have been

useful if he had explained in greater depth the economic and industrial impact of the electrified streetcar. Roger Lane's treatment of the rise of a metropolitan police force makes a real contribution in explaining the connection between the police and social welfare, but a treatment of the police interacting with the "new immigration" of the 1890's would be useful.

Outside of the Lodge papers, the most important source for information on Lodge's early years is his own memoir, Early Memories (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913). His narrative of life in Boston at mid-century is not only useful for a biography of Lodge but also provides insight into the "village" quality of life in Boston during and after the Civil War. Early Memories is also important to an understanding of Lodge's hero worship of his father, Charles Sumner and other worthies of his childhood. The best scholarly biography of Lodge is John A. Garraty's, Henry Cabot Lodge (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953). Garraty's biography was the first to present a reasonably balanced view of Lodge, but concentrates much of its attention on the period after 1901. It also contributes little to an understanding of Lodge's relationship to the Republican establishment in Massachusetts. Harold Dean Cater, Henry Adams and His Friends (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1947) sheds some light on the Adams-Lodge relationship in the 1870's after their collaboration on the North American Review. Nannie Lodge was a member of Adams' famous five of hearts club. With the marriage of Brooks Adams to Nannie's sister, the relationship between "Uncle" Henry and the Lodge children grew steadily closer. In his letters, Lodge made clear the deep influence Adams had upon him at

Harvard and later. Bliss Perry, Life and Letters of Henry Lee Higginson (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1921) fails to discuss the close relationship between Lodge and his cousin who acted as his financial adviser and sometime unwanted political consultant.

The Adamses and Carl Schurz introduced Lodge to national politics in the liberal Republican movement in 1875. The standard biography of Schurz is Claude Moore Fuess, Carl Schurz (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1932). In this work and his "Carl Schurz, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Campaign of 1884," New England Quarterly V (July, 1932), Fuess takes a pro-Schurz position and condemns Lodge as a crass political opportunist. The best general study of the liberal Republican movement is John G. Sproat, "The Best Men," Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). Sproat emphasizes that the Liberals viewed themselves as clearly more fit to govern than others and were remarkably naive about the political game. The concern of the Liberals for social order is treated in two works on Samuel Bowles, who assisted Lodge in organizing work in Massachusetts in 1875-1876. Richard Gerber, "Liberal Republicanism, Reconstruction and Social Order: Samuel Bowles as a Test Case," New England Quarterly XLV (September, 1972) and George S. Merriam, The Life and Times of Samuel Bowles (New York: The Century Company, 1885) do an excellent job of covering Bowles' social philosophy and his career as a newspaper publisher respectively. Merriam's biography, however, is badly out of date and a new biography should draw on the Bowles papers at Yale and explain Bowles relationship to the Liberal movement in Massachusetts. Two other

works on the Independents are Gordon S. Wood, "The Massachusetts Mugwumps," New England Quarterly XXXIII (December, 1960) and Geoffrey Blodgett, "The Mind of the Boston Mugwump," Mississippi Valley Historical Review XLVIII (March, 1962).

One of the more important early political tests of Lodge was his direction of George A. Robinson's campaign against Benjamin F. Butler in 1883 for the governorship. William D. Mallam, "Butlerism in Massachusetts," New England Quarterly XXXIII (June, 1960) and Richard Harmon," The 'Beast' in Boston: Benjamin F. Butler as Governor of Massachusetts," Journal of American History LV (September, 1968) contribute considerable insight into Butler's appeal to labor, blacks and immigrants. They do not, however, explain the depth of hostility that "respectable" citizens such as George Frisbie Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903) felt toward Butler. The Lodge papers make clear that Butler united individuals as ordinarily antagonistic politically as Hoar and Moorfield Storey.

In the early years of his political career, Lodge managed to avoid the dangerous issues of temperance and women's suffrage unlike his friend John D. Long, James W. Hess, "John D. Long and Reform Issues in Massachusetts Politics, 1870-1889," New England Quarterly XXXIII (March, 1960). Lodge chose instead to focus on the less controversial question of elections legislation, "Limited Sovereignty in the United States," Atlantic Monthly XLIII (February, 1879).

During his tenure in the House, Lodge focused on two issues, elections legislation and the tariff. Vincent P. DeSantis, Republicans Face the Southern Question (New York: Greenwood Press, 1959) argues that

the public turned against the Lodge Bill in the summer and fall of 1890 because it threatened to reopen the sectional wounds of Reconstruction. David J. Rothman, Politics and Power: The United States Senate, 1869-1901 (New York: Atheneum, 1969) contends that the bill was a party measure aimed at reviving Republican power in the South. Rothman contends that Lodge offered the measure not out of any sense of moral duty, but rather as a way of gaining entrance to the inner circle of an exclusive club, the Senate. Contemporary articles are very useful for sampling the range of attitude toward the bill. A compendium of newspaper editorials appears in "The Lodge Bill," Review of Reviews VIII (March 22, 1890). Most of the editorials supported the bill. Lodge and his friends mounted a campaign for the bill in magazines in 1890-1891. Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Federal Election Bill," North American Review CLI (September, 1890) denied that the bill was a force bill; Thomas B. Reed, "The Federal Control of Elections," North American Review CL (June, 1890) refuted the notion that such legislation was unconstitutional; and George F. Hoar, "Fate of the Election Bill," Forum (March, 1891) blasted the business community for failing to support black voting rights in the South. Terence Powderly, "The Federal Election Bill," North American Review CLI (September, 1890) contended that the bill unconstitutionally interfered with local control of elections.

On the tariff, F. W. Taussig's, The Tariff History of the United States (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931) is still the first place to look. For Lodge's own attitude toward protection, his article, "What Congress Has Done," North American Review CLI (November, 1890) is a

spirited if not entirely convincing defense of the McKinley Tariff of 1890. More important for Lodge's general philosophy is his "Protection or Free Trade-Which?," The Arena IV (November, 1891). Much of this article is taken up with a complex discussion of the impact of the tariff on the price of consumer goods. The Democratic point of view in Massachusetts appears in William E. Russell's, "Significance of the Massachusetts Election," Forum XII (December, 1891). Russell and his fellow "Young Democrats" sensed that Lodge and his fellow Republicans were in difficulty with the high protective duties on raw materials in the McKinley Act. They proceeded to capitalize on that vulnerability with Russell winning election to the governorship in 1891. In characteristic mugwump fashion, E. D. Clark, "Governor Russell on the Massachusetts Election," Nation LIII (December 3, 1891) and Henry White, "Mr. Lodge and His Dodge," Nation LIII (October 8, 1891) cheered Russell's election and blasted Lodge's views on the tariff.

In the fall of 1890, Lodge published one article on civil service reform and one on international copyright. In "International Copyright," Atlantic Monthly (August, 1890), he argued that such a measure would serve the interests of justice and fair play. His argument in "Why Patronage in Offices is Un-American," Century XVIII n.s. (October, 1890) centered on the notion that patronage was an aristocratic institution and consequently out of tune with America's history.

When Lodge came to Congress, Grover Cleveland was president and when Lodge was elected to Senate, Cleveland was in the White House. Lodge did not share the generally positive view of Cleveland of his

principal biographer, Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1934). With the commencement of his career in the Senate, Lodge began a relationship with George Frisbie Hoar which lasted until the latter's death in 1904. In spite of the general disarray of the Hoar papers at the time he was doing his work, Richard E. Welch, George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) is a very creditable biography. In both his biography and a shorter article, Richard E. Welch, "Opponents and Colleagues: George Frisbie Hoar and Henry Cabot Lodge," 1898-1904," New England Quarterly XXXIX (June, 1966), tends to confirm the stereotype that Lodge was the more partisan man of the two and more fond of patronage. A thoroughly uncritical view of Hoar is presented in the work of his son-in-law, Frederick H. Gillett, George Frisbie Hoar (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1934). Gillett's study is not only clearly biased but also less complete than Welch's.

The first major issue Lodge confronted in 1893 was the devastating depression that struck the nation in the spring. Three monographs are particularly useful for understanding the most severe depression of the nineteenth century. Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwart, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) present a monetarist explanation of the crisis, but clearly the rigidity of the monetary system did exacerbate the collapse. Rendig Fels, American Business Cycles, 1865-1897 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959) emphasizes that the debacle was a product of a confluence of factors including a weak underlying banking structure.

Fritz Redlich's, The Molding of American Banking (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1968) provides an invaluable view of the decentralized and laissez-faire nature of much of the banking system.

A fine study of the political impact of the depression is the work of Samuel T. McSeveney, The Politics of Depression:Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893-1896 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972). McSeveney's work centers on the political reaction in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, but the Lodge papers confirm that the reaction in the mid-term elections in Massachusetts in 1894 was similar. Lodge himself sensed the opportunity and effectively attacked the Democrats. In "Outlook and Duty of the Republican Party," Forum XV (April, 1893), he tied the tariff question to the panic. With the mid-term elections coming up, he painted a dismal picture of the results of a Democratic victory in "The Results of Democratic Victory," North American Review CLIX (July, 1894).

Lodge began championing immigration restriction as early as 1887, but found more opportunities to advance the cause after his election to the Senate in 1893. Still a valuable introduction to the history of immigration is the work of Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). On nativism in general, the work of John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of Nativism, 1860-1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1966) is the standard work, but his view of Lodge is wrongheaded. Both Higham and Barbara Miller Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants: A Changing New England Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956) see Lodge in a rigid racist matrix which

fits more with their individual prejudices than the evidence. Lodge's attitude toward "race" was much closer to Howard K. Beale's, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956) description of Roosevelt's view. Lodge supported immigration restriction for a complex of reasons including personal prejudice, social conservatism, and practical politics. Lodge in his own article, "The Census and Immigration," Century XLVI (September, 1893) left little doubt that he thought the "new immigration" was inferior, but the numerous petitions to restrict immigration he introduced for individual assemblies of the Knights of Labor suggest he was getting political support and pressure for his position.

In Massachusetts in the 1890's, Lodge was confronted with the nativist American Protective Association, women's suffrage, and prohibition. Richard Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971) makes clear that these issues were not confined to Massachusetts. James J. Kenneally, "Women's Suffrage and the Massachusetts Referendum of 1895," The Historian (August, 1968) and Ross E. Paulson's, Women's Suffrage and Prohibition: A Comparative Study of Equality and Social Control (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1973) make clear the link between the volatile prohibition question and women's suffrage. The most recent study of the social background of the temmperance movement is Jack S. Blocker, Retreat from Reform: The Prohibition Movement in the United States (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976) Blocker confirms the essentially mugwump quality of the movement and its reformist goals.

Henry Cabot Lodge was one of the few politicians of his day who started in national politics rather than in local politics. In 1896, he managed the candidacy of Thomas B. Reed with much the same success he had in managing John D. Long's candidacy for the Senate against Henry L. Dawes in 1887. The best single volume study of the politics of the Gilded Age is H. Wayne Morgan's, From Hayes to McKinley (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969). Useful for the campaign for the nomination is Morgan's, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963). The only helpful biography of Thomas B. Reed is the laudatory work of Samuel W. McCall, The Life of Thomas Brackett Reed (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1914). McCall was a contemporary of Reed's and served with him in the House. The two men shared an anti-expansionist stance in foreign policy. A modern, scholarly biography of Reed is needed badly, but the nature of the Reed papers part of which are at Bowdoin College will make such an effort difficult. Reed was unquestioningly one of the more capable men of his day, but suffered from vindictiveness, an acid wit, and the twisting effect of political envy. One of the more serious gaps in the story in Massachusetts is the lack of a good biography of Winthrop Murray Crane. Carolyn W. Johnson, Winthrop Murray Crane: A Study in Republican Leadership, 1892-1920 (Northampton: Smith College, 1967) has written a biographical sketch, but it does not do justice to Crane's role in Massachusetts politics. For the election of 1896, Paul W. Glad, McKinley, Bryan and the People (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964) provides a sound interpretive framework.

Two biographies useful for the diplomatic history of the 1890's are Tyler Dennett, John Hay: From Poetry to Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1933) and Allan Nevins, Henry White: Thirty Years of American Diplomacy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1930). The first public evidence of Lodge's interest in foreign affairs came in 1888 when he wrote "The Fisheries Question," North American Review CXLVI (February, 1888). At this early date, he argued that Canada would ultimately be annexed and thus would the question of American fishing rights be resolved. By 1893, Alfred Thayer Mahan was influencing Lodge with such work as "Hawaii and Our Future Sea-Power," Forum XV (March, 1893). One of the more misdirected works on Lodge's part in foreign affairs is George E. Paulsen, "Secretary Gresham, Senator Lodge, and American Good Offices in China, 1894," Pacific Historical Review XXXVI (May, 1967). Paulsen is certainly correct that Lodge wanted to embarrass Gresham and the Cleveland administration on the Chinese problems, but there is no support anywhere for Paulsen's statement that Lodge wanted to be Secretary of State. In 1895-1896, Lodge's involvement in foreign policy increased as the following articles indicate: Henry Cabot Lodge, "England, Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine," North American Review CLX (June, 1895) and Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Duty to Cuba," Forum XXI (May, 1896).

On the background to the Spanish-American War and McKinley's role, the best study is H.Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire: The War With Spain and Overseas Expansion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965). A treatment more sympathetic to Spain is Orestes Ferrara, The Last Spanish War (New York: The Paisley Press, 1937). A good survey of American policy

from 1858 to the Batista regime is Lester D. Langley, The Cuban Policy of the United States (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968). The problem of developing a policy for governing the overseas territories is treated in David F. Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902: Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963). On the question of keeping the Philippines, Richard H. Werking, "Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and the Philippines: A Note on American Territorial Expansion," Pacific Historical Review XLII (May, 1973) emphasizes the importance of a long memorandum from Lodge to William R. Day in which Lodge argued that the Philippines should be kept to provide access to the Chinese market. In fact, Lodge had been making much the same argument to Day long before the memorandum and to anyone else who would listen. Two works of value on the Philippine question are Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Dodd, Mead & Comapny, 1938) and Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901-1913 (New Haven: The Shoe String Press, 1968).

The sources of American expansionism and Lodge's relationship to the movement have provided grist for a multitude of scholarly mills. The most sensible treatment of Lodge's attitude toward expansion is the work of John A. A. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). The authors have made good use of Lodge's own work, Early Memories in determining Lodge's general outlook on foreign policy which was conservative, defensive, and realist. The authors are generally accurate in distinguishing Lodge's outlook from

Mahan's. They are wrong, however, in arguing that Lodge did not take an interest in foreign questions until the 1890's.

One of the more interesting explanations of American expansionism is Ernest R. May's, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New York: Atheneum, 1968). May argues that Americans as part of the Atlantic community of nations emulated the example of Europe in looking outward in the last decade of the century. May is certainly correct in arguing that Lodge moved very carefully with public opinion. May's analysis seems flawed, however, in that it is ahistorical. Americans acquired the overseas possessions and then looked to Europe's example for justifications. The currently dominant explanation of America's expansion in the 1890's is that of the "new left." The father of the movement is William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1962). The following have pursued Williams' lead to one degree or another: Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), Milton Plesur, America's Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs, 1865-1890 (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971), and John M. Dobson, America's Ascent: The United States Becomes A Great Power, 1880-1914 (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1978).

Two studies of the relationship between foreign policy and naval expansion are Walter R. Herrick, The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966) and Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1912 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). Herrick commits the common error of

lumping Lodge together with Mahan and Roosevelt as an expansionist whereas in fact, Lodge came slowly and reluctantly to expansionism. Challener tends to identify with the "realist" school of foreign policy with George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) and Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) at its head. Challener does, however, steer a less ideological course than Williams and his followers.

On anti-expansionism, the work of E. Berkeley Tompkins, Anti-Imperialsim in the United States: The Great Debate 1890-1920 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970) explains the difference between supporters and opponents of expansion. Tompkins rightly observes that there was a generational difference between Hoar and Lodge. According to Tompkins, Schurz and his fellow anti-expansionists were intellectually linked to the political principles of the 1850's rather than the 1890's. That notion is confirmed in Claude M. Fuess, Carl Schurz (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1932).