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HOW FAR "ABOVE THE FRAY"?
UNPACKING THE MECHANISMS OF THE MONARCHICAL ADVANTAGE
IN THE ARAB UPRISINGS

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By

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HOW FAR “ABOVE THE FRAY”?
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IN THE ARAB UPRISINGS

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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To Chardonnay Margaux

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No project of this magnitude is a solitary effort. Since the first sparks of the inchoate idea that led to this dissertation as I watched Tunisians force Ben Ali to flee to Jeddah and as tanks refused to fire on their fellow Egyptians in Alexandria and Cairo, and protests spread further, several people were instrumental in making this project come from idea to completed dissertation.

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Abstract

Every one of the eight monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remained standing in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings, giving rise to claims of a "monarchical advantage" or "monarchical exceptionalism." This dissertation examines the claim of monarchical advantage as it relates to popular protest, asking three research questions: are monarchies better than non-monarchies in *forestalling* popular protests in the 21st century MENA? Are monarchies better than non-monarchies in *withstanding* protests that do occur? Do monarchies exhibit *patterns of response* to protests that differ from non-monarchies? Making use of interviews and an original data set of protests and regime responses in the linchpin monarchy of Jordan, the dynastic monarchy of Bahrain, and the republic of Tunisia, this dissertation finds that while both monarchies successfully withstood protests, the monarchies were not better at preventing protests or at controlling protests than the republic. The pattern of persuasion and coercion in preventing and controlling protest does not vary systematically between the monarchies and the republic in this sample. This dissertation finds little evidence of monarchical advantage with respect to popular protest during the Arab Spring.

Chapter 1

Defining the Problem: Mechanisms and Methods

The massive protests of the Arab Spring uprisings put long-standing authoritarian and hybrid regimes in the Middle East to the test. Seemingly solid understandings of authoritarian regimes and their ability to retrench or upgrade came into question. One fact soon became clear: as authoritarian presidents fell in Tunisia and Egypt, and Libya, Syria, and later Yemen, descended into civil war, all the eight monarchies in the region remained standing. Many of these monarchical regimes were no less susceptible to the socioeconomic and political conditions that led to Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia and massive protests in Egypt's Tahrir Square. Still, no monarchies fell during the Arab Spring wave of protests.

The Arab Spring uprisings were the result of the diffusion of shared collective action frames that mobilized protests against states that had repeatedly broken promises about delivering political and economic reform.[1] Dafna Rand

[1] The term typically used here is "modular" and is most frequently associated with Mark Beissinger's work on the "color revolutions". Mark R. Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of the Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 2 (June 2007): 259–76. Beissinger borrows the term from Tarrow (1998; 2005). For both Tarrow and Beissinger, "Modular action is action that is based in significant part on the prior successful example of others" (Beissinger 2007, 259). Cf, Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass Politics in the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

identifies common drivers of political change in monarchies and republics across the region and affirms that

> the autocrats in the region were not all uniformly 'robust'. [Instead]…most were nervously trying to manage the varied political changes occurring around them. Some were doing so more successfully than others. …But their ability to stay a step ahead of the game was precarious at best.[2]

Although these shared frames and related protests repeated in monarchies and non-monarchies across the region, the outcomes were markedly different.

The "monarchical advantage" thesis has been proposed to explain some of the most notable differences in outcome of protests across regime type in the Arab Spring. This notion is not *terra incognita.* Scholars have done exhaustive work cataloging cases of monarchical resilience and failure in the past.[3] Some scholars suggest that monarchy remains stable in the region because it is traditional and culturally legitimate, seeing it as but an extension of tribal and other patrimonial systems supposedly inherent to the region.[4] Others argue that monarchies are no more indigenous to the region than liberal democracy, but that they have a

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[2] Dafna Hochman Rand, *Roots of the Arab Spring: Contested Authority and Political Change in the Middle East* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), viii.
[3] See Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999); Andre Bank, Thomas Richter, and Anna Sunik, "Long-Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle East: A Configurational Comparison, 1945-2012," *GIGA Working Papers* 215 (February 2013): 1–35; Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall? An Analysis of Old and New Explanations," in *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity* (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 37–52; Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Patterns of Monarchy in the Middle East," in *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 71–84; Marc Lynch, "Does Arab Monarchy Matter?," *Foreign Policy* (blog), August 31, 2012, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/31/does-arab-monarchy-matter/.
[4] Victor A. Menaldo, "The Arab Spring and MENA's Historical Development: Oil Curse or Monarchical Exceptionalism?," SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, September 6, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1977706.

particular staying power due to their unique affinity for state-and nation-building.[5] Some argue that monarchies are particularly adept at divide-and-rule, coalitional, and clientelistic politics. Others highlight how some monarchies design institutional safeguards - including the peculiar institution of the royal family – to insulate themselves from the ebb and flow of authoritarian politics. Still others argue that monarchies only seem exceptional because they benefit from hydrocarbon rents and the support of international patrons because of a regime's geostrategic importance. Less frequently examined is the relationship between monarchy as a regime type and how it confronts threats from popular mobilization.[6]

Why This Matters

The feeling of limitless possibility that swept the Middle East in the Arab Spring has been replaced with dashed hopes and retrenched autocracy. The greatest puzzles remaining in the wake of the Arab Spring center on why some regimes fell, others survived despite protests, and some have collapsed into the worst humanitarian crises in a generation.

That feeling of dashed hopes varies, for example, among activists in Jordan. But, if the experience of those activists in Jordan is generalizable, the observation that "the revolution has moved on" is paralleled by questions about how that revolution managed to fail in the first place. Perhaps the greatest

[5] Anderson, Lisa, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly* 106, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 1–15.
[6] See Russell E. Lucas, "Path Dependencies or Political Opportunities? Monarchical Resilience in the Arab Uprisings" (Middle East Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, 2013); Adria Lawrence, "Collective Protest and the Institutional Promise of Monarchy" (Association for Analytic Learning about Islam and Muslim Societies (AALIMS), Princeton, NJ, 2014), http://aalims.org/uploads/LawrenceMonarchy040114.pdf.

theoretical and practical implication of this work presents answers to the questions on scholars', policymakers', and activists' minds: are monarchies just inherently more stable than their republican counterparts or are they only surviving by ingenuity? Is this a coincidence among monarchies in the Middle East or does the phenomenon called the monarchical advantage actually exist?

There are several ways in which monarchical advantage could affect and respond to popular mobilization and protest. Monarchical advantage could enable monarchies to prevent popular mobilization and protest. Monarchical advantage could enable monarchies to withstand protests by allowing the regime to control protests that occur. Finally, monarchical advantage could be the result of monarchies responding to protests by emphasizing preventive, controlling, persuasive and coercive actions at levels distinct from those seen in non-monarchies. Monarchies survived the Arab Spring uprisings. This dissertation will show that the monarchical advantage allegedly behind their survival is not explained by any of the above mechanisms.

The Research Questions

Are 21st century monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa better than non-monarchies in forestalling protests? Are they better than non-monarchies in withstanding protests that do occur? If monarchies can withstand protests that do occur, is it because they exhibit patterns of response in preventing and/or controlling protests that differ from non-monarchies?

Testable Hypotheses

If 21st century monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa prevent or withstand protests better than non-monarchies, what should we expect to see if this monarchical advantage is present? To answer these questions, I examine a set of three hypotheses.

If the monarchical advantage is to hold, one or both of two hypotheses must be true. Hypothesis (H1) states that MENA monarchies are better than MENA non-monarchies at *preventing* protests. Hypothesis (H2) states that monarchies are better at *withstanding* protests than non-monarchies. The premise of the monarchical advantage argument in the Arab Spring is the fact that all of the Arab monarchs survived while four of the Arab presidents did not. If we find no evidence for Hypothesis H1 – if monarchies were not significantly better than non-monarchies at forestalling protests – then Hypothesis H2 must be true – monarchies must be better than non-monarchies at withstanding and controlling protests.

As a matter of course, this dissertation will not directly examine Hypothesis H2. It serves as the logical starting point for investigating the monarchical advantage – monarchies survived the Arab Spring, so they must have withstood protests. I conclude, as a logical matter, that if H1 is false (monarchies are *not* better than non-monarchies at preventing protests), then H2 must be true (that monarchies *are* better than non-monarchies at withstanding protests). I will demonstrate that, once we accept that monarchies saw high levels of mobilization

– indicating that they are not better at preventing protests (H1) – that it becomes logically inescapable that they must be better at withstanding protests (H2).

We are accepting that Hypothesis H2 is supported, given the outcomes we have observed. As a result, I will not be examining Hypothesis H2 directly. But I will still examine how and why monarchies' ability to withstand protests operates and ensure that this, though true, is not also spurious. Therefore, this dissertation examines two subhypotheses related to Hypothesis H2. First, are monarchies better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling protests (Hypothesis H2a)? Second, do monarchies, display a distinct and discernable pattern in their response to protests, compared to republics (Hypothesis H2b)?

What would be indicators of the monarchical advantage regarding the *prevention* of protests, if it exists? The maximalist version would posit that monarchies can so effectively forestall mobilization that protest is comparatively rare and no public demonstrations occur. This is demonstrably false. A more nuanced version of Hypothesis H1 posits that monarchies are better able to forestall mobilization such that protests take place at much lower levels of intensity compared to protests in MENA republics. By "lower levels" I mean 1) fewer protests; 2) smaller protests; 3) less geographic dispersion of protests; 4) less demographic and ideological diversity of the protest coalition, and finally 5) protests whose goals were less extreme and less likely to be regime change and more likely to be a change in policy or in policymakers.

What would be indicators that monarchies, compared to republics, more effectively *controlled* protests? More specifically, what would be indicators that monarchies are better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling protests (Hypothesis H2a)? If H2a is true, we should see 1) fewer protests, 2) shorter protests; 3) less geographic dispersion of protests; and 4) protests whose goals were less extreme and less likely to be regime change and more likely to be a change in policy or in policymakers.

There are clearly overlapping indicators for Hypotheses H1 and H2a, but there are important differences. The most essential difference is one of timing. Where Hypothesis H1 applies to prevention of protests that have not yet occurred, Hypothesis H2a applies to protests that have occurred or are underway.

Fewer protests, for example, is an indicator for both H1 (prevention) and H2a (control). It is an indicator for H1 because if a regime is able to successfully interrupt the process of mobilization before collective action can take place, we should logically see fewer incidents. Yet, fewer protests are also part of control, because controlling protests that are occurring could logically result in fewer protests in the future. Again, however similar the indicators are, it is important to recognize the temporal distinction I am drawing, because control (Hypothesis H2a) only takes place after protests have already occurred.

Protests less extreme in intensity of demands are likewise an indicator of both H1 (prevention) and H2a (control). A proactive regime, backed by a robust surveillance and security apparatus will likely work diligently to prevent the most serious forms of dissent among activist networks. So long as this occurs in the

form of increased surveillance of civil society, arresting activists and breaking up networks prior to protests, this is a matter of prevention and an indicator of hypothesis H1. At the same time, regimes can fail (or neglect) to prevent such intensely critical actions until they become placards and chants at demonstrations. Because these demands are occurring after mobilization is complete and collective action has occurred, it becomes a matter of control and can thus likewise be an indicator of hypothesis H2a.[7]

What would be indicators of our second subhypothesis to H2 – that monarchies display a distinct and discernable pattern in their response to protests (Hypothesis H2b)? Regimes respond to protests in some ways preventatively, before protests have gotten underway, and in other cases in a controlling manner, once protests are already happening. Regimes also use greater and lesser degrees of persuasion and coercion to prevent and control protests. If H2b is true, monarchies should respond to protests by emphasizing preventive, controlling, persuasive and coercive actions at levels distinct from those seen in non-monarchies. Likewise, if H2b is true, the severity of government repression should be different for monarchies in comparison to non-monarchies.

I will examine these strategies based on a two-dimensional matrix. Did monarchies use more or less prevention or control than their republican neighbors? Did monarchies use more or less persuasion or coercion than their

[7] Prevention and control are temporally distinct processes that are constantly weaving into and out of one another as regimes confront protests. Preventing protests will tend to stifle the spread of dissent and should theoretically therefore be illustrated by the appearance of fewer protests. There is of course a reflexive effect as well. Control of protest in an initial site could likewise control the dispersion of protests and prevent future mobilizations. We don't know if control will prevent dispersion and future mobilizations. At this point it becomes an almost impossible measurement problem.

republican neighbors? The four hypotheses and their associated indicators are displayed in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Hypotheses and Associated Indicators

	HYPOTHESIS H1	HYPOTHESIS H2	HYPOTHESIS H2a	HYPOTHESIS H2b
ASSERTION	Monarchies are better than non-monarchies at preventing protests.	Monarchies are better than non-monarchies at withstanding protests.	Monarchies are better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling protests.	Monarchies, compared to republics, display a distinct and discernable pattern in their response to protests.
INDICATORS	• Fewer protests • Smaller protests • Less geographic dispersion of protests • Less demographic and ideological diversity of the protest coalition; • Less extreme goals of protests		• Fewer protests • Shorter protests; • Less geographic dispersion of protests; • Less extreme goals of protests.	Monarchies should respond to protests using • Preventive • Controlling • Persuasive and • Coercive actions at levels distinct from non-monarchies. Severity of government repression should be different in monarchies compared to non-monarchies.

In all, if I am correct about hypothesis H1 (prevention) being false, and, by logical extension, coupled with observation, that hypothesis H2 (withstanding protests) is true, then, when it comes to whether that ability to withstand protests is a function of control (H2a) and patterns of response in exercising prevention and/or control (H2b) there is no evidence of monarchical advantage via these mechanisms.

Case Selection

The substantive chapters of this work feature examinations of three cases – Jordan, Tunisia, and Bahrain – to examine the hypotheses and answer the research questions I have posed.

Jordan represents a good case to examine the monarchical advantage as a linchpin monarchy whose economy is not based on hydrocarbon rentierism. Jordan is also interesting because it experienced significant and sustained collective action in the Arab Spring but did not succumb to protests. Moreover, Jordan has a history of protest dating at least to the 1980s, and is generally seen, especially in policy circles, as comparatively open and liberalizing in terms of mobilization.

Jordan is also an interesting case because Jordan continued to experience significant and sustained collective action even after several republics had fallen, Syria and Libya had descended into civil war, and monarchies in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait had seemed to have successfully mollified their own protest movements. Finally, many analysts went to great pains to downplay the

"Jordanian Spring" and hold the Hashemite regime up as a model of the predictive power of the monarchical advantage thesis.

Tunisia serves as a comparative case of a republican authoritarian regime that fell to popular mobilization and, like Jordan, has an economy that is not dependent on hydrocarbon rentierism. Crucially, Tunisia was the starting point for the Arab Spring uprisings, and the point from which demonstration and diffusion effects swept the region after the departure of Ben 'Ali. This provides us with a crucial baseline of the Arab Spring as the earliest protesters conceived of them and as they tried to conceptualize the constraints the regime was likely to place upon them. Because the Ben Ali regime fell within a month, I believe Tunisia should provide a glimpse into the dynamics of a republic which failed to both prevent and control protests. Comparing Tunisia's approach to the protests to that of Jordan and Bahrain should illuminate potential differences in strategies.

Including Bahrain allows us to examine intra-monarchy variance. More specifically, Bahrain was chosen because, although a monarchy like Jordan, is different from Jordan in three ways. Bahrain is a dynastic monarchy – in contrast to Jordan's linchpin monarchy – and one which, also like Jordan, experienced sustained protest activity but still survived.[1] It is true that Bahrain relies at least in

[1] First conceptualized by Herb (1999), dynastic monarchies are those in which members of the ruling families monopolize the highest state offices, including the premiership and the heads of the cabinet ministries. This familial power further extends as "the ruling families also distribute members throughout lower positions in the state apparatus, especially in the key ministries" (Herb 1999: 8). Consensus and tension among members of the ruling family (and their respective fiefdoms), and agreed upon succession mechanisms, further characterize dynastic monarchy and, for Herb, help to explain their unique resilience (Herb, ibid., 8-10; Lucas, Russell E. 2004. "Monarchical Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern Regime Type." International Journal of Middle East Studies 36: 108-110). "Linchpin" monarchies, by comparison, are defined by Russell Lucas as those in which the ruling family generally participates only in the political institutions of the monarchy – not in the state bureaucracy (the

part on hydrocarbon rents and international and regional patronage (two of the other proposed mechanisms of the monarchial advantage). Jordan enjoys regional patronage from the United States and Saudi Arabia, like Bahrain, but it does not enjoy hydrocarbon rents, leaving it in a more precarious economic state than Bahrain. Finally, Bahrain allows us to examine the role played by ethnic cleavages in monarchies' prevention or control of protests. It is true that Jordan also features frequently-instrumentalized demographic cleavages. But in Bahrain we have a regime that, as Michael Herb has observed, among the dynastic monarchies, "is the monarchy in which the ruling family enjoys the least support amongst its people – or, to be more precise, amongst the Shiite majority of the Bahraini citizenry" and, after all, the Al-Khalifa "have built a regime on the basis of the repression of the Shiites."[2]

The initial wave of the Arab Spring protests that swept the Pearl Roundabout in Bahrain was met with significant violence by the Bahraini police and security forces and ultimately led to the intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) "Peninsula Shield" forces, led by Saudi Arabia. But because Bahrain has seen some of the most sustained protest activity of the region since 2010 – some of which continued long after the GCC intervention – it remains a viable and valuable case to examine the monarchical advantage with regard to preventing or controlling protests. Moreover, Bahrain allows us to test Herb's and

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military excepted). The monarch exists above the fray of everyday politics, but serves as a linchpin, holding the system and competing social cleavages together (Lucas, ibid., 108). "Finally," Lucas notes that "linchpin monarchies encourage social pluralism and mobilize it along vertical lines to participate in the governing of the state, underneath the leadership of the monarchy" (Lucas, ibid., 108).

[2] Herb, Michael, "Monarchism Matters," *Foreign Policy: The Middle East Channel*, November 26, 2012, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/26/monarchism_matters.

Lucas' contentions that the institutional differences between dynastic and linchpin monarchies translate to greater regime survival in dynastic monarchies as compared to those in linchpin monarchies.

Methodology

I utilize various methods to answer my research questions. In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine hypotheses H1 (prevention) and H2a (control) using narrative process-tracing and semi-structured interview data. I carried out interviews in Jordan from June to September 2016 in Amman, Madaba, and four other sites in the country. In all, this yielded interviews from over 25 people. The sample included students, NGO directors and other civil society actors, freelance researchers, journalists, lawyers, and activists, including members of the Jordanian *Hirak* (movement).

These methods allow me to examine collective action and regime reactions as well as the "view from the ground" of protests in a monarchy. In Chapters 5 and 6, I again examine hypotheses H1 and H2a using narrative process tracing, this time comparing Tunisia and Bahrain to each other and to Jordan.

In Chapter 7, I further examine H1 and H2a with an original dataset of collective action events.[3] The dataset was constructed using both the interview data gathered in Jordan as well as a variety of news sources including *al-Jazeera, The Guardian*, BBC Arabic news service, *Agence France Presse*, *Reuters, The New York Times, The Washington Post,* as well as local news outlets in Jordan (e.g., *Ammonnews, Petra News Agency, al-Dustour, The Jordan Times*, and

[3] The codebook for this dataset is included in Appendix A. The complete dataset is available at http://bit.ly/Brown_CAEvents

prominent Jordanian blogs like *The Black Iris* and *7iber* and, where applicable, Facebook and Twitter accounts of relevant people and groups. Finally, I cross-referenced these media accounts as far as possible using government and NGO publications – including, for example, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group, and the Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, and, finally, previously published scholarly accounts of the pre-Arab Spring and Arab Spring periods regarding both protest activity and regime responses to that activity.

The dataset – as the codebook included in the appendix demonstrates – coded single "collective action events" based, where data was available, on the following six dimensions: Date, Event Description, Size of the Action, Demands of the Action, Targets of Regime Response, and the Regime Response. Both the demands of the action and the regime response were open-coded. Finally, based on the nature of the regime response and the timing relative to the event, each event was open-coded to reflect one of four possible categories: Persuasive Prevention, Persuasive Control, Coercive Prevention, or Coercive Control. This is presented in the data as the "Matrix Code".

Ultimately, the Matrix Code of each collective action event forms the data presented in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 features the principal examination of Hypothesis H2b using the open-coded "Matrix Code" to explore variations in regime responses to popular protests across the cases. Ultimately, these event count data are graphically presented in what I am calling the Prevention-Control/Persuasion-Coercion Matrix. The matrix consists of the aforementioned

Matrix Code operationalized as event counts. The final comparative data in Chapter 7 come from the Political Terror Scale. All of these data are used to examine Hypothesis H2b (monarchies display a distinct and discernable pattern in their response to protests, as compared to republics) and to visually demonstrate those comparisons between the cases.

Outline of the Dissertation

To answer these questions, the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 will ground my research questions in the context of the broader the literature on monarchical advantage, authoritarian regime dynamics, and social movement theory. Chapter 3 will present a detailed narrative of Jordanian activism both before and during the Arab Spring wave. Chapter 4 then systematically explores hypotheses H1 (prevention) and H2/H2a (control) as they relate to the Jordanian case, using narrative process tracing as well as data collected through semi-structured interviews.

Chapters 5 and 6 replicate this process in Tunisia and Bahrain, making comparisons to each other and to Jordan along the way. Chapter 7 will further examine hypotheses H1 and H2a with the collective action event count dataset and will present and examine hypothesis H2b (monarchies display a distinct and discernable pattern in their control of protests, as compared to republics) using my Prevention-Control/Persuasion-Coercion Matrix and the Political Terror Scale.

Finally, Chapter 8 will revisit the research questions and each of the hypotheses, summarize the findings, draw conclusions, and discuss the implications of my findings for theory and for empirical politics. Based on the

analysis ahead, we cannot say that there is no monarchical advantage. I will show that monarchical advantage does appear to be supported by the ability of monarchies to withstand protests. But I will also show that I have found no evidence of monarchical advantage with respect to prevention of protests, control of protests, and the distinct patterns of monarchies' responses to protests, compared to non-monarchies.

Chapter 2

The Monarchical Advantage in Context

Why should the monarchical advantage matter? Why should it matter to scholars, to policymakers, and to the general reader? The monarchical advantage provides a potential explanation for the variety of outcomes in the Arab Spring. But it also fits within the established literature on the dynamics of non-democratic regimes, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. In this chapter, I will first discuss the scholarly terrain surrounding the monarchical advantage. Then I will examine the connection to relevant work on authoritarian regime dynamics that will impact the analysis to follow.

As I affirmed in the previous chapter, the Arab Spring was the result of the diffusion of shared collective action frames that mobilized protests against states that had repeatedly broken promises about delivering political and economic reform.[1] Crucial to this observation is the idea that the Arab Spring *could*, and *did*, spread regardless of regime type. Dafna Rand identifies common drivers of political change in monarchies and republics across the region and affirms that

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[1] The term typically used here is "modular" and is most frequently associated with Mark Beissinger's work on the "color revolutions". Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of the Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions." Beissinger borrows the term from Tarrow (1998; 2005). For both Tarrow and Beissinger, "Modular action is action that is based in significant part on the prior successful example of others" (Beissinger 2007, 259). Cf, Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Mass Politics in the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

> the autocrats in the region were not all uniformly 'robust'. [Instead]…most were nervously trying to manage the varied political changes occurring around them. Some were doing so more successfully than others. …But their ability to stay a step ahead of the game was precarious at best.[2]

Although these shared frames and related protests repeated in monarchies and non-monarchies across the region, the differences in terms of outcome were markedly different.

The "monarchical advantage" thesis has been proposed to explain some of the most notable differences in outcome of protests across regime type in the Arab Spring. This notion is not *terra incognita.* Previous authors have done exhaustive work cataloging cases of monarchical resilience and failure in the past.[3] Some scholars suggest that monarchy remains stable in the region because it is traditional and culturally legitimate, seeing it as but an extension of tribal and other patrimonial systems supposedly inherent to the region.[4] Others argue that monarchies are no more indigenous to the region than liberal democracy, but that they have a particular staying power due to their unique affinity for state-and nation-building.[5] Some argue that monarchies are particularly adept at divide-and-rule, coalitional, and clientelistic politics. Others highlight how some monarchies design institutional safeguards - including the peculiar institution of the royal family – to insulate themselves from the ebb and flow of authoritarian politics. Still others argue that monarchies only seem exceptional because they benefit

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[2] Rand, *Roots of the Arab Spring*, viii.
[3] See Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*; Bank, Richter, and Sunik, "Long-Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle East: A Configurational Comparison, 1945-2012"; Maddy-Weitzman, "Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall? An Analysis of Old and New Explanations"; Ben-Dor, "Patterns of Monarchy in the Middle East"; Lynch, "Does Arab Monarchy Matter?"
[4] Menaldo, "The Arab Spring and MENA's Historical Development."
[5] Anderson, Lisa, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East."

from hydrocarbon rents and the support of international patrons because of a regime's geostrategic importance. Less frequently examined is the relationship between monarchy as a regime type and popular mobilization.[6] It will be the purpose of this chapter to examine past and current work on the monarchical advantage.

Development of the Monarchial Advantage Thesis

We may divide the existing literature into those scholars who affirm that there is a monarchical advantage and point to inherent qualities of monarchy as an explanatory variable (or those that affirm that there appears to be a monarchical advantage but who do not explicitly specify an explanation inherent to the regime type) and those that deny that there is such an advantage or exception and point to other explanations. I will begin with the latter.

Dynamics of the Monarchical Advantage Over Time

In a 2013 article, Andre Bank, Thomas Richter, and Anna Sunik outline three historical stages in the monarchical advantage literature.[7] The 1950s and 1960s witnessed modernization-theory approaches to these newly independent monarchies. Hence Huntington's "king's dilemma" posited that these regimes could not institutionally handle the pressures of modernity expected and thus we should expect a teleological process of rapid breakdown and the transition to "modern" democratic republics.[8] The second stage saw a marked culturalist turn.

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[6] See Lucas, "Path Dependencies or Political Opportunities? Monarchical Resilience in the Arab Uprisings"; Lawrence, "Collective Protest and the Institutional Promise of Monarchy."

[7] Andre Bank, Thomas Richter, and Anna Sunik, "Long-Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle East: A Configurational Comparison, 1945-2012," *GIGA Working Papers* 215 (February 2013): 1–35.

[8] Bank et al (2013): 8.

Those espousing a historico-religious legitimation explanation point to a peculiar kind of legitimacy garnered by the Jordanian, Moroccan, and Saudi Arabian kings through ideological connections forged between monarchy and Islam.[9] Others point to patriarchal and neo-patriarchal social structures as independent variables.[10] Finally, others credit a "monarchical political culture" – one that "allows for credible commitment 'through the strategic use of constitutions, formal political institutions, Islamic principles and informal norms.'"[11]

This culturalist current carried scholarship into the early 1990s, where we witness a turn to four main analytical perspectives and explanations for the survival of monarchies: Geostrategic explanations (i.e., external military support of either global or regional powers); Political-economic/Rentier State perspectives; Institutionalist or intra-family explanations; and Legitimation (including Religion, Tradition, Ideology, and Material Legitimation).[12] I will return to these explanations and Bank et al's work in the section on those proponents of monarchical advantage theory.

Though often cited as a progenitor of the debate on monarchical advantage, though a wider lens, one can see that Lisa Anderson's seminal piece has little to say about the survival of this regime type being inherent to characteristics of the regime, per se, and even less to say about monarchies under stress from popular mobilization. What Anderson does do, and well, is to

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[9] Bank et al., ibid. Cf, Lewis 2000.
[10] Bank et al., ibid; Cf, Ben-Dor 1983, Sharabi 1988.
[11] Victor A. Menaldo, *The Arab Spring and MENA's Historical Development: Oil Curse or Monarchical Exceptionalism?*, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, September 6, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1977706. Cited in Bank et al., ibid. See also Victor Menaldo, "The Middle East and North Africa's Resilient Monarchs," *The Journal of Politics* 74, no. 03 (2012): 707–722, doi:10.1017/S0022381612000436.
[12] Bank et al., 8-11.

interrogate the argument that monarchy survives and thrives in the Middle East among all other regions because it is culturally traditional and therefore legitimate. She finds these arguments, as well as Huntington's "king's dilemma" argument that monarchy as a regime type was doomed to failure in the face of modernizing forces, lacking.[13] For Anderson,

> the relative strength of monarchy in the Middle East is not due to its evocation of regional traditions – hereditary monarchy as understood today is not a traditional regime type in the Middle East – but to its affinity with the projects of nation building and state formation, which consume the attention of all the rulers of the Middle East and North Africa. Huntington may be right that monarchy is ultimately too brittle and restrictive a regime to accommodate the political demands of new social groups. In the less than long run, however, monarchy is particularly well suited to the requirements of state formation, especially in its early stages.[14]

Joseph Kostiner summarizes that "monarchs were thus able to exercise the two fundamentals of monarchical rule: generating state development and exercising patrimonial segmentary social control."[15] In fact, Kostiner reverses the lament of Hisham Sharabi that Arab regimes, particularly monarchies, are but repackaged (and apparently more resilient) neopatriarchy, arguing that this actually serves as a profound stabilizing factor.[16] For Kostiner, Lisa Anderson's thesis describes how the monarch served as the linchpin tying together these segmentary societies: "He was thereby also able to become the medium through

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[13] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies,* 1968.
[14] Anderson, Lisa, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East," 4.
[15] Kostiner, Joseph, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 9; See also Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: Vertigo, 1974): 17-18 quoted in Anderson, Lisa, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East," 4.
[16] Kostiner, ibid.

which such groups were integrated into their state: the center that kept ties and open contacts with all the groups in society."[17] In Anderson's words:

> The monarchies no less than the republics in the Middle East reflect the imperatives of state formation where state institutions are few and weak. The monarchies provide a regime compatible with (though not, obviously, required by) those imperatives – centralized, personalistic, actually or potentially coercive. Moreover…the monarchs of the Middle East can oversee vast changes in the name of preservation, inventing traditions as they go along. Indeed, one of the interesting recent preoccupations of the oil-rich Arab states around the Gulf has been in academic research that contributes to 'reconstruction of the local heritage [*turath*].' Finally, insofar as state formation requires building coalitions with representatives of social groups, monarchies are relatively well equipped to reassure the previously privileged, a stratum often of particular importance in the early stages of national transformation.[18]

Yet Anderson still argues that monarchs that remain in power are no more or less adept at the politics of state formation than their counterparts in presidential republics.

Marc Lynch, despite organizing a POMEPS briefing on the "Arab Monarchy Debate," is avowedly skeptical of what he sees as the taken-for-granted nature of the advantages of monarchy. He is particularly skeptical of the arguments that attach unique legitimacy to monarchies, but also skeptical of the arguments that monarchies are better at divide-and-rule and selective co-optation and repression coupled with controlled legislatures. His skepticism crucially stems from the observation that these are identical to those means used by presidential republics.[19]

Sean Yom has deployed a more structural argument – and in turn downplayed the cultural and institutional alternatives – wherein the exogenous

[17] ibid.
[18] Anderson 1991: 13.
[19] Lynch, Marc, "Does Arab Monarchy Matter?" 2012.

factors of rentierism and geopolitics (international patrons) are those that account for the survival of monarchies. In his view, if you remove oil rents and external support, monarchies would fall just like any other in the region: "In short, the Arab monarchies are exceptional but not because they are monarchies. They are beneficiaries of geological fortune, geographic providence, and strategic attention by outside powers."[20]

Yom and Gause argue that there does appear to be a monarchical advantage while rejecting cultural and most institutional explanations. The authors argue that "cross-cutting coalitions of popular support" are one persuasive institutional argument, but they object to it, arguing that it "restates the unobjectionable adage that autocrats pursue policies to maximize their survival. Royalism presents different institutional options than republicanism, but not all kings adopt them; if they did, no ruling monarchy would collapse."[21] Nevertheless, they argue that the failure of both previous monarchs and current presidents to cultivate and maintain these coalitions led to their downfall. Ultimately, they lean toward structural geostrategic explanations of rentierism and the backing of foreign patrons as maintaining autocratic monarchical rule.[22]

Finally, it might also be asked at this stage how the monarchical advantage operates through time and whether the previous collapse of monarchies in the Middle East (Egypt 1952; Libya 1969; Iraq 1958; North Yemen 1962, and the Pahlavi regime in Iran 1979) disproves the monarchical advantage theory. This discussion also serves as a useful point of transition between detractors and

[20] Yom "The Survival of the Arab Monarchies" ibid.
[21] Yom and Gause, "Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On," 2012: 75.
[22] Yom and Gause, "Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On": 2012.

adherents of the monarchical advantage theory. It certainly seems that the period between 1945 and 1979 was not kind to monarchies, but that the monarchical advantage suddenly somehow sets in after the fall of the Shah in 1979. It certainly could be an accident of time and history: these monarchies had to contend with the real and spreading threat of Arab nationalism as a viable organizing alternative, and at this time, most of the regimes were hesitant to use the full force of repression at their disposal.[23] Herb takes a qualitatively different tack, noting that all of the monarchies that fell did so because of one fundamental and overarching reason: they were not dynastic monarchies. Examining several alternative hypotheses, he argues that it is not rentierism, nor the rise of an educated urban middle class that best explains the continuing survival of most of the standing monarchies, but dynastic monarchism as an institution. Those monarchies that survived are rentierist and non-rentierist just as those that fell. The surviving monarchies have larger (and still growing) educated urban middle classes.

Andre Bank and his colleagues have re-tested these arguments and found that while breakdown was rare and occurs only under specific historical circumstances – and thus all other conditions beyond anti-government protests and lack of family participation differ depending on the case in question – many of the existing explanations are found deficient. In Egypt (1952), all of the supposedly stabilizing conditions (e.g., external military support, rentierism, historical-religious legitimacy) were absent and the regime experienced strong

[23] See Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall? An Analysis of Old and New Explanations," in *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity* (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 37–52.

anti-government protests, contributing to the breakdown of the monarchy. Conversely, in Iran (1979) we see strong stabilizing conditions (US military support, high rent revenues) but also high levels of anti-government protests, and the monarchy fell. Finally, in Iraq (1958) and Libya (1969) we see two regimes with high rent revenues and claims to historical religious legitimacy to bolster them, yet both monarchies fell.[24]

Libya and Afghanistan both failed as a result of conflict of succession within the regime, something that Herb argues dynasticism might have prevented. The Libyan monarchy in particular was similar in many ways to the dynastic Gulf monarchies – "…small, oil-rich, and bedouin…"[25] The military was thoroughly staffed with loyal bedouin and tribal allies. The monarchy did have some measure of religious claim to legitimacy and a parliament coexisted with the monarchy, but they played no role in the fall of the monarchy. Opposition activity was present but low in comparison even to standing monarchies like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Significantly, the regime didn't make a concerted effort to repress protests nor did they truly attempt to convince the public that the survival of the regime was in their best interest. When it came down to it, a lack of dynastic rule meant that there was no succession plan for the octogenarian King Idris in 1969. This looming and compounding crisis also led to a critical relaxation in the monitoring of the military's loyalty, providing an opening for Qaddafi to emulate his Arab nationalist hero, Nasser in leading a military coup.[26]

[24] Bank, Richter, and Sunik, "Long-Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle East: A Configurational Comparison, 1945-2012."
[25] Herb 1999: 183.
[26] Herb 1999: 183-196.

Similarly, in Afghanistan, a power struggle within the regime caused the downfall of the monarchy. Like Libya, the Afghani monarchy made significant liberalizing inroads, opening and cooperating with a parliament and encouraging fair elections. In the Afghani case, there was a concerted effort to operate according to the dictates of dynastic monarchism, but the downfall of the regime didn't come from the Muhammadizi clan failing to monopolize key cabinet posts. Instead, the difference was in the system of separation of powers or division of power between the palace and the premiership.[27] The gradual erosion of dynastic power in the top state offices led directly to the fall of the monarchy. For Herb, this is a crucial distinction that doesn't occur in the successful dynastic monarchies.[28]

In Egypt and Iraq, the pattern changes somewhat but the outcome of monarchical breakdown remains the same. Egypt was characterized by a corrupt network of king and cronies at the top of the regime overseeing an equally corrupt and hollow parliament. Unlike the Libyan and Afghani cases, the Egyptian military's officer corps was knowingly staffed with the new urban educated middle class rather than the landowning elite or bedouin and tribal allies. The parliament was seen as no more than a patronage machine and was widely disdained. The Egyptian monarchy (unlike the Iraqi) did make a concerted attempt to employ Islam as a legitimating tool. This can be seen in the throne's courting of the bastion of Egyptian *ulama,* al-Azhar, pitting religious elites in

[27] Herb 1999: 201.
[28] Interestingly, Herb notes that this same separation of powers pattern has occurred in Bahrain, increasing intra-regime tension, which seemed to play out within the regime during the uprising and will be theoretically interesting and crucial to watch.

tension with the regime's sometimes-opponent Wafd party.[29] This failed because of the incompatibility of King Farouq's hedonism with al-Azhar's values along with the institution's desire not to be seen as a mere appendage of the corrupt regime, especially in light of the growing successes of the Muslim Brotherhood.[30] Islam was off the table as a legitimating mechanism. The other avenue of legitimation – liberalization by opening a parliament – failed as dramatically in the Egyptian case as it later would in the Iraqi case.[31] Finally, to add insult to injury, King Farouq was incompetent; a fact that, Herb observes, the public and especially the Free Officers could no longer countenance. Ultimately, what led to the downfall of Egypt was predictably familiar as an intraregime conflict: "…the divorce of those who profited from the standing order and those who defended it…"[32] Iraq took the problems of the Egyptian monarchy and made them worse, being the only case which Herb and Kedourie argue that the fall of the monarchy was inevitable.[33] Again the Iraqi military officer corps was staffed with the new middle class while the regime represented the landed elite and wealthy politicians. The Iraqi public and the military officers saw the regime as manufactured and a

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[29] Kedourie, "Egypt and the Caliphate Question, 1915-1952," in Elie Kedourie (ed.), *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Easter Studies* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1984): 177-207; Michael Winder, "Islam in the State: Pragmatism and Growing Commitment," in Shimon Shamir (ed.), *Egypt: From Monarchy to Republic* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995): 44-48. Cited in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall? An Analysis of Old and New Explanations," in *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity* (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2000): 39.
[30] Maddy-Weitzman, 39-40.
[31] Maddy-Weitzman, 40.
[32] Herb 1999: 211.
[33] Herb 1999: 214; Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall? An Analysis of Old and New Explanations," in *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity* (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2000): 45. See also Marr, Phoebe *Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder: Westview, 1985), Kedourie, "The Kingdom of Iraq: A Retrospect," in Kedourie (ed.) *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies* 2nd Ed. (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1984).

British vassal; disdain for it was therefore widespread. The corrupt parliament (again, even more corrupt that the Egyptian parliament) did nothing to aid the survival of the monarchy either. In the end, neither the Iraqi nor the Egyptian monarchies made an attempt to assuage the anger of their populations by shifting their alliances away from the shaykhs of the landed and tribal elite and away from the British and toward the growing nationalist blocs. Monarchs in both Egypt and Iraq likewise overestimated the control they had over the military and their ability to keep the army in its barracks.[34] Ultimately it was those nationalist blocs, led by the educated urban middle class with the officer corps as its vanguard that toppled these regimes. Lastly, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman presciently observes another commonality between the Egyptian and Iraqi cases. All scholars now note in the retrospect that both the Egyptian and the Iraqi monarchies sat atop societies undergoing profound social and economic changes instigated by the twin demographic pressures of a population explosion and concomitant urbanization. Add to this the expansion of the educational system (and thus an increase in the politically conscious), stagnating economies, rampant frustration amongst the cadres of officers in the military, all in the midst of a corrupt, "dysfunctional and discredited" regime, and we have a recipe for revolutionary upheaval not unlike those patterns that appeared in the Arab Spring.[35]

Finally, the Pahlavi Shah's monarchy in Iran is an interesting and unique case. As Herb argues,

> the Iranian revolution is unlike any other in the Middle East, for the *ancien regime* collapsed while its leader, the Shah, retained control of the organs

[34] Maddy-Weitzman, "Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall?": 46-47.
[35] Maddy-Weitzman, "Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall?": 44.

> of the state. The army did not rebel, as it did in Iraq and in Egypt; nor did the regime split, as it did in Afghanistan and Libya. Street demonstrations and strikes, absent any mutiny within the army or fracture in the regime, overthrew the monarchy.[36]

Herb attributes the decay and downfall of the Iranian monarchy to serious miscalculations and missteps by the Shah; missteps so egregious that Herb asks us to question whether the Shah was lacking any political (or common) sense about the consequences of his policies. For Herb this is nowhere more pronounced than when we recognize that

> When [the Shah's] policies bore their bitter fruit he did not ruthlessly repress, despite the urgent pleas of his generals to defend the regime. Only thus could a regime facing no threats from within the organs of the state, nor from armed insurgency, nor from foreign powers, fail in the face of demonstrations in the streets.[37]

Said Arjomand blames the dramatic influx of oil revenue for bestowing unprecedented autonomy on the Pahlavi monarchy such that the Shah felt he could ignore those socio-political forces that might have been his natural allies: the rising middle class.[38] The Shah mistakenly did not entertain the possibility of liberalization through a parliament because he saw no reason to gather and incorporate the opinions of his subjects. However, he did seem to be cognizant that a single-party regime was more stable, thus creating the *hizb-i-Rastakhiz* to facilitate (or create the image of) political participation. The Shah was of a single mind to create radical modernization from above using his increasing oil wealth,

[36] Herb 1999: 217.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) cited in Maddy-Weitzman, ibid., 44.

and his "efforts to create political participation were little more than determined expressions of autocracy."[39]

By 1977 it was clear even to the Shah that the monarchy was in serious trouble and he was without a "moderate middle" to support his rule against the united leftist and religious opposition.[40] In this vein, 1977 and 1978 saw a massive increase in liberalization measures, designed to take the sting out of the "reforms" the Shah had pushed through before. Included in these liberalizations were the promise of free and fair parliamentary elections. But as Herb observes

> each new concession, instead of garnering the Shah the support of the moderate middle, seemed an admission of weakness to the opposition elites on the left and on the right who correctly gained the impression that more and greater pressure would induce a collapse. …The Iranian monarchy fell because the Shah unnecessarily provoked his people, then would not defend his regime from them.[41]

Ultimately, as Bruce Maddy-Weitzman concludes, the failure of these monarchies was a natural result of their lack of leadership skills, the looming alternative of Arab nationalism, attractive to those opposition groups shunned in nearly every case by the regimes, the urban, educated middle class, who eventually played a central role in overthrowing the monarchy. Because the monarchies did not seek to ally themselves with this rising nationalist current, and failed to position themselves as "the repositories of the national will and the nation's hopes" they could not build the theoretically crucial elite pacts and cross-cutting coalitions that would so deftly serve later monarchies. Put simply, by the end they had so alienated all sectors of society that they could not hope to perform

[39] Herb, 218.
[40] Ibid., 219.
[41] Ibid.

the crucial act of balancing their rule among multiple pillars by "manipulat[ing] diverse political forces."[42]

Proponents of the Monarchical Advantage

Much of the literature identifies crucial institutional variables that explain the characteristics and dynamics of Arab authoritarian regimes but that they also frequently make no differentiation between regime types in describing those dynamics and characteristics. In a discussion of whether past failed monarchies in the region are any indicator of the reliability of the monarchical advantage, we have also uncovered explanatory variables that will naturally bleed over into our review of the arguments in favor of the monarchical advantage.

In a smooth transition from the broader authoritarian elite dynamics literature to the monarchical advantage literature, Daniel Brumberg observes that Arab autocracies are indeed characterized by "protection rackets" which he defines as clientelist institutions that represent "an exchange by which regimes provided a diverse range of groups – ethnic or religious minorities, the business sector, and secular activists – with a haven from the uncertainties of an open democratic process" that elites fear would produce institutions that could undercut their *de facto* power and patron-client privileges.[43] While the general strategy is still one of divide-and-rule, Brumberg observes that each individual racket differed from regime to regime based "on their institutional mechanisms, and in terms of the groups that received protection."[44] While Brumberg doesn't explicitly set out to discuss only the sustaining mechanisms of *monarchical* Arab

[42] Maddy-Weitzman, 49.
[43] Brumberg, Daniel "The Sustaining Mechanisms of Arab Autocracies" 2011.
[44] Ibid.

autocracies, he does ultimately point to "structural difference between monarchies and presidential, party-machine systems" as explanatory of the monarchical advantage: Presidents have no *real* moral bond with the people, and even if they wanted to break free from the regime and demonstrate that they were indeed different, individually legitimate, trustworthy, etc., they are still implicated with the ruling party and other apparatuses by the nature of the institutional arrangement. Monarchs, by contrast, operate at a physical and symbolic distance. This argument, which I will refer to as the "above-the-fray" argument or characteristic, will return throughout the proponent literature. Ultimately, Brumberg concludes that republican presidents are "especially poor manipulators of the protection racket system" and, conversely, that "protection racket politics have a certain elective affinity for monarchical systems."[45]

Lisa Anderson's arguments underlie Brumberg's. Focusing on the particular elective affinity of monarchies for state- and nation-building, Anderson presents the monarch as the anchor of the nation

> Unlike nationalist regimes, monarchies acknowledge, sustain, even encourage heterogeneity among their subjects. Monarchs are better able to serve as the central focus in balancing, manipulating, and controlling societies characterized by such vertical cleavages, particularly when those are reinforced by "antiquity of blood." The continued emphasis on tribal and family divisions in the Arabian peninsula [for example] not only reinforces the legitimacy of the constitutive principle of [kinship] but also permits the monarchs to exercise their skills as patrons and mediators.[46]

In doing so she also points out that the differences in legitimation between monarchies and republics mean that monarchies can avoid the modern, nationalist

[45] Brumberg, ibid.
[46] Lisa Anderson, "Dynasts and Nationalists: Why Monarchies Survive," in *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 60.

convention of political sovereignty that makes all citizens interchangeable. Instead,

> monarchies promote and defend definitions of the roles of kinds and their subjects that emphasize inequality, diversity, and personal fealty. As a result, kings not only endorse societal diversity, inequality, and multiplicity as constitutive principles of politics: they deliberately create and maintain complex social structures in practice[47]

I believe Anderson would agree with Brumberg by saying that the dynamics she is describing bolster Brumberg's assertion that monarchies are simply better at cultivating the crucial cross-cutting coalitions and other elite pacts that stabilize monarchical rule. Ultimately, she points out that the pattern of monarchical rule is one of patron client relationships. It is interesting to note compared to Herb, that she makes no distinction between linchpin monarchies that seek social bases of rule among clients in the business, religious, and other sectors, and dynastic monarchies that consolidate and bolster their rule through the cultivation of existing kinship loyalties. Gabriel Ben-Dor attributes this characteristic behavior of monarchies as stemming from the fact that "there is more fluidity within the royal elite, and there is more contact between that elite and other elites in society than is normally the case for classic 'active' monarchies."[48] In any case, Anderson observes that monarchies are able and willing to favor particular communities (e.g., religious minorities in her example) because "such favoritism reinforces the arbitrary power of the king to create and legitimate social distinctions and to sustain the resulting groups as his clienteles

[47] Anderson, "Dynasts and Nationalists: Why Monarchies Survive," 66.
[48] Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Patterns of Monarchy in the Middle East," in *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 77.

and constituencies."[49] By presenting himself as protector, the king establishes a patron-client relationship that can likewise be used in times of opposition when the palace must confront the emergence of non-kin groups. Such groups might build themselves around particular economic or political-ideological commitments (e.g., labor unions, inchoate parties, interest groups, or newspapers).

In any case, the reaction from the monarchy is the same: to accommodate "these developments in royal fashion, using their patronage to encapsulate and incorporate potential challenges based on ideology and interest."[50]

In a 2012 article, Herb argues that the monarchical advantage is explained and characterized by two things: first, the monarch's ability to make credible promises of reform, and second, citizens' view of monarchies as perhaps not ideal but ultimately better than republican alternatives.[51] The first is a result of the ability of the monarch to promise reform *and* carry those reforms – or at least some semblance of them – through, while maintaining power. This theme – an operational variant of the "above-the-fray" argument – will likewise return numerous times in the literature and represents the ability of the ruler to make credible and liberalizing changes without endangering his own power; A monarch can make credible changes to the institutional make-up of the regime and maintain his power while the sands shift beneath his feet.[52] Herb observes, as many dissenters have, that this could be similar across regime type, but the key is

[49] Anderson, op cit.., 63.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Herb, Michael "Monarchism Matters" 2012. Note that the element at work in the second explanatory factor is essentially regime legitimacy if we define it as the belief among the people that a particular regime is the best at that time, given the alternatives.
[52] See also Lucas 2004.

how citizens view the endpoint: an absolute monarchy can feasibly become a constitutional monarchy; a president cannot innovate in this same way. This same argument is presented by Brumberg and in a 2013 Working Paper by Adria Lawrence. Lawrence also observes that monarchies have this unique institutional feature that other authoritarian regimes lack in that they can liberalize by becoming constitutional monarchies without destabilizing the leadership. Moreover, becoming a constitutional monarchy, according to Lawrence, "complicates coordination among regime opponents and affect[s] the kinds of claims [opponents] make".[53]

The second – the citizens' view of monarchies as not ideal but better than republican alternatives – is advanced as the difference between protests in republics and in monarchies. This is essentially a matter of comparative regime legitimacy. The aims of protests were different in monarchies versus republics because there was some respect retained for monarchs as opposed to presidents (or at least caution about the costs of revolution if the result might be a republic on the level of Mubarak's Egypt, Ben 'Ali's Tunisia, or Asad's Syria). For Herb, this shows that the monarchical advantage in terms of protests has nothing to do with oil. In a 2013 working paper, he reiterates this argument by saying that the monarchical advantage stems from preference in Arab public opinion for the reform rather than the overthrow of monarchies.

Russell Lucas argues that monarchies simply have an easier time adapting to emerging challenges and interests because of their capacity for greater institutional flexibility, and – echoing others' arguments – the greater ability to

[53] Lawrence, "Collective Protest and the Institutional Promise of Monarchy."

liberalize without a real threat to the palace. Particularly in constitutional monarchies, parliaments allow monarchs to tolerate a challenge from opposition because the opposition is competing for control of the parliament, not to wrest control from the monarch. This contributes to and is a part of the aforementioned "above-the-fray" argument, as the monarch can remain out of quotidian politics of the legislature and use divide-and-rule strategies to control opposition elites. Clientelist strategies force different elements of the regime coalition to compete for the monarch's attention and favor, making any regime splits centripetal and reinforcing. Comparing dynastic versus linchpin monarchies, Lucas argues that the former are able to rule through patronage and co-optation alone, while the latter, in addition to those strategies, are better able to use liberalization as a stabilizing tool.[54]

Bank et al., examine four existing explanations, as noted above: Geostrategic; Political-economic/rentierist; institutionalist/intra-family/dynastic; and Legitimation. Geostrategic explanations argue variously that external military support from global powers (American or, historically, the Soviet Union) or regional powers (Egypt, Iran, and/or Saudi Arabia) serve to bolster authoritarian monarchies against forces that might otherwise topple them or comparable republics. In a slightly different take, this external support can go beyond broadly bolstering a regime and manifest in the performance of domestic politics. Brand and Yom both point to unconditional foreign aid that finances repression and co-

[54] Lucas, Russell E., "Monarchical Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern Regime Type," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36 (2004): 103–119;

optation of the domestic opposition.[55] Snyder likewise points to military aid as a tool used to support "domestic patronage networks" and argues that arms deals negotiated between the parties serve to strengthen the relationship and ensure continued support.[56]

Political-Economic/Rentier state explanations frequently work in conjunction with Geostrategic explanations, one complimenting and extending the other. In short, political economic or rentier explanations speak to authoritarian regimes that are blessed with hydrocarbon or other mineral deposits on which to rely for revenue. These regimes are supposedly more stable because they are either able to weather what domestic and regional storms do arise or because they do so by using that disposable wealth to buy off a population which they don't have to tax in the first place. Rentier explanations were the unquestioned standard (at least according to Herb's view of the field). Herb interrogates the theory, pointing out that rentierism only predicts that these states will be authoritarian, not that they will be immune to revolution. Gause points out the crucial distinction for our purposes, however, when he say that "[oil] wealth and *how it has been used,* explains why these purportedly fragile regimes have been able to ride out the domestic and regional storms of the last two decades."[57] As the emphasis demonstrates, it is not merely the passive presence of wealth, especially

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[55] Laurie Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Sean L. Yom, "Jordan: Ten More Years of Autocracy," *Journal of Democracy* 20, no. 4 (2009): 151–166.

[56] Richard Snyder, "Paths Out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives," in *Sultanistic Regimes* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 1998): 58. Quoted in Bank et al.: 8.

[57] F. Gregory Gause, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994): 4. Quoted in Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999): 11. Emphasis added.

hydrocarbon rents, but how the wealth is used. What do hydrocarbon rents buy such regimes? The answer to this question is similar to the arguments by Brand, Yom, and Snyder about what military support affords regimes. For Herb, there is another element that should be noted: the dynastic monarchies had the structures of dynastic rule in place prior to oil and the ruling families were thus ideally-placed to capitalize on this wealth and construct a modern state around the family as an institution.

Institutionalist or intra-family explanations encompass the distinction between what Herb calls dynastic monarchies and what Lucas calls linchpin monarchies.[58] In examining the cases of failed and surviving monarchies, Herb observes that the vast majority of stable monarchies have in common the dynastic characteristic of their institutions – that the royal family "monopolizes the central positions in both the administration and the security apparatus."[59] For Herb, dynasticism – the unity and solidarity of ruling families who monopolize the highest offices of the regime and place members ubiquitously through even the lower posts of the regime apparatus and who thereby "have developed robust mechanisms for the distribution of power among their members, particularly during successions, and exercise a thus far unshakable hegemony over their states" – represents the most persuasive explanatory variable for the survival of some monarchies and the collapse of others.[60] Dynastic monarchies are able to weather storms because of their ability to circumvent challenges to power from

[58] Cf, Herb 1999 and Lucas 2004. What Lucas calls "linchpin" monarchies might just as easily be called nondynastic monarchies, personalist monarchies, or single-ruler monarchies.
[59] Herb 1999: 235.
[60] Herb 1999: 7-8.

within. Because no outsiders are able to control the higher institutions of the regime, they also cannot build up positions of power at the top of the regime from which to launch or coordinate a coup. In no case of monarchical breakdown does Herb find an instance of dynastic monarchism. As Bank et al. – and I – argue, this does not explain the survival of non-dynastic monarchies in Jordan and Morocco.

Finally, Legitimation, which Schlumberger identifies as composed of four "core competencies" for survival: 1) Religion, which is particularly useful when used against Islamist opposition and is frequently invoked in Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia; 2) Tradition, frequently invoked by the dynastic monarchies and consistently reinvented and redeployed as it suits a regime;[61] 3) Ideology, which has historically been more often employed by the republics whom Schlumberger notes based their claims to leadership on revolutionary and often socialist and/or Arab nationalist ideologies, but is also frequently used by monarchies (Bank et al highlight Jordan's King Hussein and the debates about Hashemitism and dynastic modernism);[62] Finally 4) Material Legitimation serves as a nexus between rentierism and other political-economic explanations and the allocation and distribution of state resources, ensuring the support and loyalty of influential social groups. Bank et al also include opposition as the "other side of the equation – the acceptance of those strategies by the target audience."[63]

[61] Bank et al., are surprisingly brief about this, going no further than I have above. I believe the case could be made that republics are just as adept at attempting to reinvent and redeploy tradition as a legitimating tool, given their longevity is sufficient to warrant salience with the public.
[62] Bank et al., 10-11. See also Nantes 2010 and Shyrock 2000.
[63] Bank et al., 11.

In their comparative historical analysis, Bank et al. conclude that there are two main explanatory variables common to all cases of breakdown: anti-government protests and lack of family participation. All other cases differ depending on the case in question. What their analysis ultimately shows, unsurprisingly, is that explanations of breakdown and survival require complex interactions with other conditions or factors, which naturally makes generalizability difficult. Breakdown is rare and occurs only under very specific historical circumstances. Bank et al cast doubt on historical-religious legitimacy arguments (breakdown occurred in two out of four monarchies that exhibited strong historical-religious legitimacy), and confirm Herb's argument about the weakness of the rentier theory in explaining revolution (breakdown occurred in three out of the four monarchies exhibiting high rent revenues). Finally, while family participation (dynasticism) is absent in all cases of breakdown, they undermine Herb's argument to some degree by pointing out that it is neither sufficient nor necessary as a condition for breakdown. It is not necessary because there *was* family participation in the North Yemeni Imamate before its breakdown. It is not sufficient because the linchpin monarchies survive without high levels of family participation. They do also note, however, that outside support alone cannot guarantee survival in the face of strong anti-government protests, but if external support were absent and legitimacy were eroded at the same time, even the stable linchpin monarchies can be destabilized, similar to Egypt's fate in 1952.[64] Speaking to the present survival of the linchpin monarchies in Jordan and Morocco, Bank et al. point to the explanatory variable

[64] Herb 1999: 25.

of historical-religious legitimacy even in the absence of resource rents and dynasticism.

For Herb, however, the explanation for the survival of the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies is an institutional one and a logical extension of his argument about the primacy of dynastic monarchism. In lieu of the stability afforded by dynasticism, the linchpin monarchs are adept at balancing forces within their regime while ensuring that the monarchy as an institution is not threatened. Hence, Herb makes the case that the successful non-dynastic monarch must be accomplished in statecraft. For him, the difference between the surviving linchpin monarchies and the failed monarchies such as the Shah's is that the Jordanian and Moroccan kings realize that they must play the game. Comparing the Pahlavi monarchy with the Moroccan, Herb says

> It is perhaps most revealing to set [former Moroccan king] Hassan's survival against the Shah's fall. The Shah, awash in oil, did nothing to build political organizations – and parliament and parties – that could create support for his regime. Instead, he tried to build a single-party monarchy, and failed. King Hassan, poorer and wiser, might play a cynical game with his parliament, but at least he plays it. The Shah thought himself above such things, but found out he was not. In the absence of dynastic monarchism, kings must be politicians, and good ones: they must strive to make themselves useful and popular among their people.[65]

This is of course at least a two-player game, and the opposition (and the dynamics between opposition, palace, elites, and the public) must be considered. Here things return to a somewhat traditional examination of authoritarian elite dynamics. The job of the linchpin monarch is to ensure that the game continues, that the opposition realizes that its preference ordering should take into account the potential chaos that revolution and deposing the monarch would evoke. The

[65] Herb 1999: 225.

opposition must "balance between the rewards of playing the game, the demands of their cadres, and the need to maintain a popular base (by which they maintain their value in the game). Meanwhile both must attempt to ensure that the cynicism of the public about the dynamics between the ruler, elites, and opposition or about the efficacy of the parliament should be prevented if not eliminated or at least minimized. As Herb warns,

> Cynicism is the danger of this sort of political game. When everyone recognizes that it is a game, they cease, or may cease, to think that the parliament provides a method of constraining the power of the elite – monarch and party leaders alike – in a way that impels this elite to pay some heed to the interests of others in society.[66]

The Jordanian monarchy even more starkly demonstrates not only the differences between dynastic and non-dynastic monarchies, but also the steps that non-dynastic monarchies must take if they are to avoid the fate of their predecessors. Like the Iraqi Hashemite regime, Jordan's king Hussein experienced similar disdain from the urban educated middle classes and public who saw the Hashemite regime as an artificial transplant and vassal of the British. Luckily for Hussein, the British commander who organized the Jordanian military had staffed its ranks with loyal bedouin rather than townspeople. These bedouin were easily convinced to choose the king over their officers when a coup attempt occurred. Hussein continued this pattern of making the military a thoroughly loyal, Transjordanian, (and decidedly non-Palestinian), non-nationalist institution, allowing the king to effectively repress rather than negotiate with the nationalist and Palestinian opposition forces over the years.[67] This rural bedouin support was not static, however, and even the Hashemite monarchy was rocked by significant

[66] Herb 1999: 224.
[67] Herb 1999: 226.

riots in response to IMF economic policies in 1989. Importantly, Herb observes that the riots were "worst in traditionally loyal royalist cities like Ma'an, Kerak, and al-Tafilah."[68] Taking proactive steps that the failed monarchies did not or could not, Hussein responded with liberalization, albeit a controlled one – that sought to assuage the traditionally loyal bedouin constituencies but also to broaden his base of support to new pillars, namely the Palestinians, partially for their unwillingness to participate in the riots of 1989. The king maintained his tight hold on the bedouin-palace alliance by ensuring that electoral districts were drawn to favor those same districts that rebelled in 1989. The monarchy's liberalization program at the time also included drafting a pact to delineate the constitutional monarchy, still giving prominence to the throne but promising to respect and expand pluralism in the parliament.[69] The monarchy in Jordan, at least during Hussein's rule, attempted to better its chances for survival by enshrining succession mechanisms similar to dynastic monarchism but the regime ultimately still benefits from the socio-political cleavage between Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians. By staffing the military with East Bank loyalists, the monarchy can solidify its rule while maintaining its ability and willingness to repress challenges, thereby avoiding the mistake of passivity that we observe in the Shah's Iran, as well as monarchical Egypt and Iraq.

Clearly there is some debate on the question of the monarchical advantage. The scope of this project is such that it cannot engage and satisfy the entire debate. We must restrict our examination to particular elements. Given that the

[68] Herb 1999: 227.
[69] Herb ibid.

comparison between a republic (Tunisia) and both a dynastic (Bahrain) and linchpin (Jordan) monarchy, is a central element of this dissertation, it is necessary to examine, at least briefly, the literature on general authoritarian regime dynamics.

Dynamics of Autocracy in the Middle East

There is a substantial body of work on the dynamics of non-democratic regimes and not all that literature can or should be covered here. The events of the Arab Uprisings were astounding to many not only because they uprooted the dictators of two of the most repressive regimes in the region, but also because of protesters' brazen confrontations of entrenched regimes – regimes that many believed would never fall. Steven Heydemann's work on "authoritarian upgrading" – still a useful analytical tool – is a relic of that time period as we saw many dictators enter their third decade of rule with either no end in sight or a monarchy-like succession plan in the wings. Clearly, nondemocratic regimes in the Middle East had found a way to "stick around".

Ghalioun and Costopoulos are scathing in their description of the post-populist forms that the authoritarian and hybrid regimes in the Middle East have taken. In the course of their criticism, they observe that the contemporary Arab regimes are not as dependent upon popular legitimacy as they might have been in the past, but instead exist as repositories of clan-based clientelistic power, bolstered by coercion. The very *raison d'être* is to "put the state in the service of elites corrupted against the nation. Such an organization of power presupposes

and demands the *dis*-organization – which is to say the oppression – of society."[70] Reiterating, Ghalioun directs this charge against all autocratic regimes in the region, effectively denying a monarchical advantage. It is interesting to note, however, that he highlights the very coalitional politics and patron-client variables that others have identified as peculiar to some monarchies.

Ghalioun describes the strategy as the feudalization of the modern Arab states precisely because of the lack of turnover or renewal of these entrenched elite-regime relationships, which has resulted in a *de facto* hereditary aristocracy. But the crisis of "stagnation of power" is justly leveled, in his eyes, against both monarchies and republics in the region.[71] Interestingly, contrary to the assertions of many previous scholars that the monarchical advantage and authoritarian durability in the region were the results of traditional cultural foundations, Ghailoun names the chaotic "modernization from above" that effectively severed the connection between citizens and the reference points of tradition: the state grows stronger and more centralized while society and the individual grows weaker, the two separated from their ostensibly common foundation.[72] An interesting comparison here can be drawn to the different relationships between institutions and the monarchy and between the monarchy and the people in the two principal types of monarchies: linchpin and dynastic monarchies.

But Ghalioun's work simply tells us that regimes throughout the region share in this endemic stagnation of power, not how it relates to and shapes their

[70] Burhan Ghalioun and Phillip J. Costopoulos, "The Persistence of Arab Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (October 2004): 127.
[71] Ghalioun, ibid.
[72] Ibid., 128

methods of rule and their durability. Albrecht and Schlumberger, together with Sharabi, demonstrate that the predominant strategy of nondemocratic regimes in the region is neopatrimonialism, which relies on corporatism and co-optation to maintain political power.[73] Co-optation as a strategy is generally understood to mean a strategy of patronage and nepotism wherein elites outside of the regime are brought into the ruling/incumbent elites' orbit in exchange for rewards; a process of rent-seeking. Importantly, however, political power is always carefully segregated from the co-opted elites, thus making them dependent upon the ruler for continuing patronage. It will be important later to draw attention to the parallels of this argument among those who support that there is a monarchical advantage by arguing that these characteristics may be common across regime type, but monarchies do it better.

Hamladji addresses the lacuna directly, pointing out what we know – that authoritarian Arab regimes are particularly adept at combining policies of elite co-optation and opposition repression to ensure durability – and what we don't: how the mechanisms of elite co-optation stabilize the regime rather than destabilize it.[74] In Ellen Lust-Okar's examination of incumbent-opposition dynamics, we find a description of the very elements on which monarchical advantage theorists focus but as yet advance no explanation for. We know that institutions affect how and whether groups within a regime are able to have their demands met from

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[73] Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, "'Waiting for Godot': Regime Change Without Democratization in the Middle East," *International Political Science Review* 25, no. 4 (October 2004): 372; Cf, also Sharabi, Hiram, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[74] Noura Hamladji, *Co-optation, Repression and Authoritarian Regime's Survival: The Case of the Islamist MSP-Hamas in Algeria*, EUI Working Paper SPS (Florence: European University Institute, 2002): 1.

within the system. It follows, for Lust-Okar and Widener that institutional arrangements that foreclose meeting the demands of all opposition groups will make contentious politics against the state more likely.[75] But this would seem to damage assertions that co-optation and corporatist policies and institutional structures are supportive of authoritarian regimes. For Lust-Okar, however, the real difference between corporatist and non-corporatist arrangements is not the desire of the opposition to mobilize against the regime, but rather the ability of opposition elites to overcome the collective action problem.[76] This would seem to lend credence to the institutional aspect of my hypothesis: that cross-cutting coalitions are useful for incumbent regimes to create collective action problems and obstruct mobilization.[77]

Linz also proves particularly useful in this first cut where his definition of authoritarian regimes explicitly includes the central processes of co-optation, whereby co-opted leaders come to act and represent an imagined, "semi-opposition" composed of "those groups that are not dominant or represented in the governing group but are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the regime."[78] As Hamladji correctly notes, elites might seek to

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[75] Ellen Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 29-30; Jennifer Widner, "Political Reform in Anglophone and Francophone African Countries," in *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994),

[76] Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World* (30). Cf, also, Jennifer Widner, "Political Reform in Anglophone and Francophone African Countries," in *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 49–79. It is somewhat unclear whether Lust-Okar is only seeking to understand whether the opposition elites mobilize or whether they are able to mobilize supporters among the public.

[77] Admittedly, it is unclear in my reading of Lust-Okar whether we are on the same page with this argument.

[78] Juan Linz, "Opposition to and Under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in *Regimes and Oppositions*, ed. Robert A Dahl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 191.

participate with the hope of garnering strength vis-à-vis the regime, but its very cooperation – and often collusion – with the regime discredits any credibility it might have had as a legitimate opposition. Because these effectively co-opted elites cannot act as an effective opposition, they paradoxically come to act more like pillars of the regime "allowing it to function as a kind of permanent coalition between different tolerated groups…[and playing] the double role of supporting the regime by increasing its responsiveness and sharing with it the responsibilities of unpopular policies."[79]

Lust-Okar again helpfully fills in crucial details. She makes the connection to social movement theory – in particular, political opportunity structure frameworks – which describe exactly the thing in which many monarchical advantage scholars are concerned: the ability of regime incumbents to structure institutions 1) to determine "insiders" and "outsiders" 2) to play groups off of each other, and 3) thereby control the ability of the opposition to mobilize against the regime.[80] To wit, regimes choose from among three ideal institutional arrangements or strategies which she calls "Structures of Contestation" (SoCs):

- Exclusive, unified SoC: No political opponents are allowed to participate in the formal political institutions; power is centralized around the incumbent elites alone;
- Divided SoC: Elites allow some opponents to participate in the regime while continuing to exclude others, and;
- Inclusive, unified SoC: All opponents are incorporated into the regime, but the incumbent elites carefully limit their participatory role.[81]

[79] Hamladji, ibid., 15. But what might the differences be between Linz's definition of co-opted elites as a semi-opposition and a powerless or rubber stamp legislature, beholden to the dictator? Both are effectively without teeth.
[80] Lust-Okar, 30-32.
[81] Lust-Okar, 38-40.

Presumably, the divided SoC represents what the monarchical advantage theorists like Yom and Gause consider the role of cross-cutting coalitions. Lust-Okar is careful to point out that these structures of contestation are malleable and independent of regime type and individual leadership style. Therefore, incumbent elites can change the institutional structure from among these ideal types in order to better maintain control. For our purposes vis-à-vis the monarchical advantage argument, these structures of contestation represent institutional arrangements that likely play some significant role in ensuring regime resiliency. The trick for my particular argument lies in unpacking the mechanics of these types of categories and determining whether these represent cross-cutting coalitions, and whether it matters (for the argument about mobilization as the dependent variable) if they are not. The utility in pairing social movement theory, particularly the more institutionalist subtypes, with these arguments should be obvious from the similarity of language.

Albrecht and Schlumberger focus closely on these co-opted elites. The authors identify these potential coalition members as Politically Relevant Elites (PREs): those that are most closely affiliated with the regime leadership.[82] Going some way in identifying the puzzle of the mechanisms by which co-optation strategies serve to stabilize regimes, they show that the aim of such strategies is to both extend the influence and reach of the regime into different sectors of society, thereby restricting populism and widening the regime's power base, while also attempting to seal the individual leader off in an uncontested office, away from the co-opted elites. Importantly, as we also noted in Lust-Okar's model, these

[82] Albrecht and Schlumberger, ibid., 378.

coalitions are in constant flux as the leader continuously reshuffles elites so that no individual or group becomes strong enough to develop an independent power base; keeping those with proven loyalty in their posts; all as the regime internalizes new political and economic developments. As internalized developments change, the composition of the elite coalitions likewise changes, including, for example, technocrats and private-sector business elites.[83]

What becomes clear in these practices is that regimes reinforce these informal co-optation strategies by intertwining them within formal institution building strategies. As Albrecht and Schlumberger note, one difficulty (or strength, as it were, for the authoritarian regime) in the region is the incongruity between formal and informal institutions and between institutions and real power. In many regimes, centralization around personalized rule is commonplace, where formal institutions exist (such as parliaments, political parties, and governmental committees) but power is systematically diverted around to informal institutions or back to the leader. In some regimes, for example (Albrecht and Schlumberger note Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen), by pairing PRE co-optation strategies and institutional strategies, parliaments do, in effect, represent society at large, but seats are tightly controlled and "filled with the representatives of strategically important social groups" and "...function essentially as indicators of public opinion. Without risking much, the regimes can assess whether specific policies face serious resistance among the social groups and segments that their power is based on."[84] Regimes likewise use these same strategies to create the

[83] Ibid., 379-380.
[84] Albrecht and Schlumberger, ibid., 381.

semblance of competition or contestation paired with co-optation by allowing NGOs and even new political parties to form. But these are governed by the same PRE co-optation strategies.

Regardless of the individuals co-opted or the coalitions to be constructed, the purpose of these institutions is to "serve as a tool for creating networks and loyalties and as channels for upward social mobility."[85] Albrecht and Schlumberger discern allocative and inclusionary co-optation strategies, with the aim of the former to transform institutions from forums for competing ideas or programs into arena for the allocation of access to decision-making power and rent-seeking, and the aim of the latter to create "a more pluralist formation of heterogeneous and competing interests within the PRE [that] matches perfectly with the core trait of patrimonialism: the strategy of 'divide and rule' by which rulers balance competing elite factions."[86] In sum, it seems that the stability provided by clientelist and co-optation strategies is focused on "a process of widening the regimes' social bases and has greatly helped leaders maintain their ruling positions: a successful strategy for avoiding change *of* regime is change *in* regime."[87]

The reader will note, however, that few if any of these observations are reserved exclusively to either monarchical or republican authoritarian regimes. It would appear, based on the literature, that there is no distinction between regime types in terms of the cross-cutting coalitions and broader regime strategies of co-optation and clientelism as they pertain to regime survival.

[85] Albrecht and Schlumberger, 383.
[86] Ibid., 383-384.
[87] Ibid., 380.

Chapter 3

Jordanian Protest – *Ex Nihilo*?

In April 2002, tit-for-tat violence persisted between Palestinians and Israel as the al-Aqsa Intifada continued to flare, two years on. Protests against Israel's bombing campaign and against perceived American bias and complicity in the campaign – as well as anxiety at the Bush administration's march to war with Iraq – materialized across the Arab world. In Amman, the confluence of shifting weather and inflammatory Friday sermons brought crowds into the streets. Waiting for them outside the mosques were police, adorned in riot gear, who warned potential protesters to remain calm, to avoid approaching the Israeli embassy – presumably the intended destination of the protesters – and of the continued ban on all marches declared by the Interior Ministry the previous day. As reported by the *New York Times*, the police commander instructed the crowd in no uncertain terms: "We understand your feelings…. We don't want sedition. Please stay where you are and shout the slogans you want and don't move."[1]

The crowd – composed predominantly of "angry young men" – complied with the orders until "after milling about briefly, thousands of young men surged toward the line of police officers blocking the route to the embassy, and mayhem ensued."[2] Police began with numerous salvos of tear gas but immediately escalated to running baton attacks, supported by a water cannon. The melee intensified as protesters climbed onto roofs to retaliate against the police, "where

[1] Neil Macfarquhar, "Mideast Turmoil: Demonstrations; Arab Protesters Focus Ire on U.S.," *The New York Times*, April 6, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/06/world/mideast-turmoil-demonstrations-arab-protesters-focus-ire-on-us.html. Accessed July 26, 2017.
[2] Macfarquhar.

they hurled stones and plastic garden furniture down at the police."[3] Police chased protesters and bystanders into buildings, arresting people as they went.

The April 2002 episode in Amman might be considered indicative of the one strategy of Jordanian security forces in confronting protests. This episode occurred in the fervor of the al-Aqsa Intifada and growing anxiety at the American push for war with Iraq. Jordan, of course, lies in the middle. Another episode later in the month provides yet another angle on the kingdom's view of ongoing dissent. King Abdullah called a meeting of "35 opposition politicians and members of the professional associations at the Interior Ministry." When opposition members pressed him on his refusal to expel the Israeli ambassador, "the king cut [them] off: "Don't play with me, and don't play with the security of the country,' the official recounted him saying. Another account by opposition activists had the king telling [independent Islamist activist Saleh] Armouti that he had compiled a thick file on him."[4]

By October 2002, the Hashemite regime, fearing the coming war and the inevitable tension from a deluge of Iraqi refugees and the kingdom's reliance on Iraqi oil, began "arrest[ing] foreign and local journalists, detained prominent professionals for their political activities, and cracked down on 'Wahhabis' who it fears might foment opposition."[5] This is only the external expression of the

[3] Macfarquhar.
[4] Anthony Shadid, "Pressure Builds Under Jordan's King: As Traditional Support Ebbs, Abdullah Stifles Dissent," *The Washington Post*, February 5, 2003, http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=47VN-TPH0-010F-94HY&csi=8075&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true.
[5] Jillian Schwedler, "Occupied Maan: Jordan's Closed Military Zone," Middle East Research and Information Project, December 3, 2002, http://merip.org/mero/mero120302.

hundreds of “temporary laws” passed by the regime since 1999. As Jillian Schwedler affirms, these laws

> severely limit freedoms of expression and assembly, broadening the penal code to such an extent that criticizing "friendly nations" or even signing a petition may be punishable as a threat to state security. Professional associations have also come under attack, with several leaders arrested for criticizing state policies, notably toward Israel, Iraq and the US. Protests and rallies are illegal without a permit. Press freedoms have been dramatically curtailed with the closing of the Amman office of the satellite TV network al-Jazeera and arrest of foreign and local journalists attempting to cover the protests.

Juxtaposed against the April 2002 episode above, from November 8-14, 2002, police and the *Darak* Special Forces units placed the entire Southern city of Ma’an on a six-day curfew. Ma’anis report widespread abuses of property by security forces and, during the heaviest fighting, soldiers “fired heavy machine guns at buildings from which gunfire came.”[6]

As both Jillian Schwedler and the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) reporting attest, the November 2002 Ma’an clashes were a flare up of long standing tensions in a part of the kingdom known for its restiveness. As the ICG notes, “the November 2002 clashes were the fourth eruption of political violence in Maan since 1989, a period of less than fourteen years during which similar clashes also occurred in nearby Kerak and Tafileh.”[7] Already, as early as 2002, Ma’an demonstrates the societal frustrations at failed economic policies and corrupt politics that would topple the Ben Ali regime in 2010-11. Instead of a polite police cordon that confronted protesters in Amman in April 2002 and expressed sympathy with their feelings, the regime invaded Ma’an by force.

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[6] Schwedler.

[7] “Red Alert In Jordan: Recurrent Unrest In Maan,” Crisis Group, February 19, 2003, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/jordan/red-alert-jordan-recurrent-unrest-maan.

The accounts juxtaposed above show a mixture of dramatically different responses to dissent. Ma'an would find itself under even more aggressive siege nine years later, as the Arab Spring rolled through Jordan. The Jordanian experience of the Arab Spring would feature a mixture of concession and repression as the regime tried to keep its head above water. Given these, are we to believe the opinions of some analysts, who argue that protests in Jordan were at worst coincidental and at best insufficiently widespread or large to support the idea of a "Jordanian Spring"?

A 2012 International Crisis Group report on the Jordanian uprising dates the beginning of the uprisings in 2010, but notes that protests took off in 2011 featuring crowds "of modest size but not modest significance."[8] The analysis in the ensuing chapters focuses primarily on the period 2010-2012, during the fever pitch of the Arab Spring uprisings. But based on existing research as well my own interview responses, Jordanians were well-practiced in collective action before the Arab Spring wave arrived in 2011.

In terms of the appropriate period of analysis, all the interviewees argued that my assumed placement of the beginning of the protest cycle in 2011 was incorrect. Instead, the majority placed it in 2007. 'Abu Shuji'a', a seasoned activist from the Dhiban/Madaba area (south-southwest of Amman) even traced the beginning of the protest cycle in Jordan to the May 1, 2006, teachers/workers strike in Dhiban as the catalyst for demonstrations demanding more of the government. In Abu Shuji'a's view, 2010 appeared on the radar not from *de novo*

[8] International Crisis Group, "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IX): Dallying with Reform in a Divided Jordan," *Middle East Report* 118 (March 12, 2012), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4683/dallying-with-reform-in-a-divided-jordan.

mobilization or by diffusion from the Arab Spring. Grassroots activism appears repeatedly in Jordan. The bread riots of the late 1980s and 1990s[9]; The 2002 protests and crackdown in Ma'an[10]; the 2005 sit-ins and protests against attempts to depoliticize all professional associations[11], the 2006, 2007 and 2009 Teachers' and Farmers' protests in Dhiban/Madaba.[12]

An editorial in *Ammon News* in May 2010 appeared as another foreshock to the volatile and potentially mobilizable mood in the kingdom. The "National Committee of Retired Servicemen, representing some 140,000 veterans including officers of the highest rank…published an unprecedented attack on King Abdullah's record in rule."[13] Even after this unprecedented "Veteran's Letter" – the shock of which may have been more easily absorbed by the regime because its basic message was of East Bank nationalism and anti-Palestinian resettlement paranoia rather than regime overthrow – the regime remained afloat. As Asher Susser summarizes,

> all seemed like business as usual in the Hashemite Kingdom. The regime periodically generated expectations for reform. Parliamentary elections were held at more or less regular intervals, and frequent cabinet replacements or reshuffling repeatedly created an illusion of imminent change that never fully materialized. The modus operandi of governance in Jordan was in effect an endless process of treading water that had

[9] Curtis R. Ryan, "Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund," *Middle East Policy* 6, no. 2 (October 1, 1998): 54–66; Laurie A. Brand, "The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 2 (1999): 52–67, https://doi.org/10.2307/2537934.
[10] Shadid, "Pressure Builds Under Jordan's King: As Traditional Support Ebbs, Abdullah Stifles Dissent"; Marwan Muasher, "A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience of the Rentier System," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 11, 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/05/11/decade-of-struggling-reform-efforts-in-jordan-resilience-of-rentier-system-pub-43939; Schwedler, "Occupied Maan: Jordan's Closed Military Zone."
[11] Muasher, "A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan."
[12] Jacob Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," in *Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and Disasters* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2016), 169–93.
[13] Interview by author, September 2016; Amis, 172.

> reinvented itself for decades, continually offering an array of essentially meaningless cosmetic reforms.[14]

The regime evidently believed that this veneer of illusory reform would buoy them through the growing public frustration at rampant corruption and perceived bias in the elections to the diminished parliament. On December 23, 2010, the newly-formed government of Samir Rifa'i received an unprecedented 111-8 vote of confidence from the 120-member *Majlis an-Nuwwab* (Chamber of Deputies). Susser aptly notes that "This was a vote of arrogance and detached disregard for the general public that the deputies would live to regret. …Their unbridled confidence in the government lost them the confidence of the people."[15]

The first sparks of a new uprising appeared, unsurprisingly, in Ma'an. Riots and destruction erupted due to anger over perceived government failure to arrest those responsible for the murder of two residents during a brawl at the Disi Water Conveyance Project in Shidiyeh. What appeared to be a relatively simple grievance, expanded by tribal backing, evolved easily to politics, as one witness at al-Hussein University intimated: "Angry youths were shouting that they do not believe in the system and that was why they were destroying public properties."[16] For its part, the regime warned that "it would not be lenient with the 'small group' who 'took advantage of the incidents in Maan Governorate to destabilise the area

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[14] Asher Susser, "Jordan 2011: Uneasy Lies the Head," *Brandeis University - Crown Center for Middle East Studies - Middle East Brief*, no. 52 (June 2011): 1–9.
[15] Susser, 3.
[16] Rana Husseini, "Government Threatens Tough Measures against Maan Rioters.," *The Jordan Times*, January 5, 2011; Rana Husseini, "Authorities Restore Normalcy to Maan after Two Days of Rioting.," *The Jordan Times*, January 6, 2011.

and disturb the life of its residents", downplaying and counter-framing the protesters' grievances.[17]

Security forces were deployed to open the main road from Ma'an to Aqaba after mobs had closed the road and attacked cars. A handful blocking the road were arrested. By the second day of rioting, police threatened that they would arrest those involved in riots and destruction of property and would "not allow the reoccurrence of violence, rioting, and vandalism". Police reported that rioters attacked the police station, and masked men "showered [Ma'an] Police Station with live rounds but no one was hurt."[18] Police responded with tear gas to disperse protesters and the *Darak* was called in to control the situation, placing roadblocks at the entrance to the city.[19]

Four days after the Ma'an riots began demonstrations in line with the modular themes of the Arab Spring appear definitively in Jordan. January 7 saw a group of approximately 500 gathered in Dhiban/Madaba to protest increasing unemployment and poverty rates.[20] Activists like Hatem Irsheidat and Dr. Khaled Kalaldeh underestimated both the popularity and the tone of the protests. Kalaldeh, leader of the Social Left movement, had suggested a march of 200 to the youth activists. Bolstered by "a new popular receptivity of protest", the demonstration was attended by 5,000.[21] Similarly, Irsheidat's planned protest frames were soon "infused with the emerging regional language of revolt: the

[17] Husseini, "Authorities Restore Normalcy to Maan after Two Days of Rioting."
[18] Husseini, "Government Threatens Tough Measures against Maan Rioters."
[19] Husseini; Husseini, "Authorities Restore Normalcy to Maan after Two Days of Rioting."
[20] "Abu Shuj'ia'" Interview with the author, Dhiban, Jordan. September 2016; Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 172–173.
[21] Amis, 173.

soon to be ubiquitous call for 'bread, freedom, social justice'."[22] Irsheidat likewise underscores the underestimated targets of grievances, saying

> we hadn't planned on mentioning the Prime Minister, let along the King. Back then this was a red line. We were scared – there were only seven of us, and no one knew what might happen. But to our surprise, others started to join us and take part…before we knew it we were calling for the fall of the Samir Rifa'i government.[23]

On January 11, 2011, the government announced a $169 million plan to reduce commodity prices, materially backing the orders of King Abdullah to the government to "take immediate and effective measures to improve the living conditions of citizens."[24] With the bolstering of events in Tunisia, however, this concession failed to mollify protests. Ahead of planned protests for January 14, the government attempted to prevent wider mobilization. Prime Minister Rifa'i announced that the regime "respects the people's right to peacefully express their opinions as long as the process goes in accordance with the law." But he added the caveat that "the government will protect the interests of the country and people from any attempt by whomsoever to exploit the situation to cause any damage to public or private priorities."[25]

A week after the initial Dhiban protests, on January 14, 2011 after Friday prayers, which protesters on social media explicitly identified as the "Jordanian Day of Rage", the target of protesters ire was fully-articulated as both economic and political. The demand for reforms addressed economic grievances such as

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[22] Amis, 172–173.
[23] Amis, 173.
[24] "Jordanians March against Inflation," *Al Jazeera English*, January 14, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/20111141219337111.html; Omar Obeidat, "Gov't Announces Measures to Address Rising Cost of Living," *The Jordan Times*, January 12, 2011.
[25] "Prime Minister Says Jordanian Government Respects Peaceful Expression of Opinion," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, January 14, 2011.

unemployment; and politically, protesters across the began to call for the resignation of Prime Minister Samir Rifa'i, whom they called a coward. Protests had also, by this time, quickly spread from the Madaba governorate to Amman, Ma'an, Karak, Salt, Irbid, and other parts of the country. All the protests were reportedly coordinated by youth committees "comprised of university students and day labourers."[26]

Signaling a salient frame, both from Tunisia and within Jordan, the January 14 protests mimicked the January 7 and 11 Dhiban protests, using signs with a piece of bread attached to them. Chants and banners at January 14 protests featured significant collective action grievance frames including "Jordan is not only for the rich. Bread is a red line. Beware of our starvation and fury." and "Down with Rifa'i's government. Unify yourselves because the government wants to eat your flesh. Raise fuel prices to fill your pocket with millions."[27] Activists outside Amman characterized their protest as against "the policies of the government, high prices and repeated taxation."[28]

But emulation in the Jordanian case went beyond just intra-Jordanian protest frames. Amis has carefully examined the connections between the January 14 protests and the Tunisian uprising. On a macro-level, it is important to note that the January 14 protest in Amman "was the first link beyond Tunisia in the famous chain reaction of emulation, and took place some hours before the

[26] "Jordanians March against Inflation"; "Activist Says 14 January 'Peaceful' Demos Seek Downfall of Jordanian Government.," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, January 12, 2011.
[27] "Jordanians March against Inflation."
[28] "Jordanians March against Inflation"; "Activist Says 14 January 'Peaceful' Demos Seek Downfall of Jordanian Government."

departure of President Ben Ali later that day."[29] Amis goes further in connecting the emulation of the "Day of Rage":

> "This told you it was something different, something special," one participant affirmed. "It was a transmission, an idea we took from Tunisia." Conscious emulation of events abroad differentiated the new mobilization [in Jordan] from the activism of preceding years, and the protest also replicated the non-partisan and youth-led character of the Tunisian uprising.[30]

Islamists and some other established parties and professional associations stayed away from the grassroots demonstrations. But on January 16 the National Coalition of Opposition Parties, an umbrella organization of six leftist and Islamist parties), the Islamic Action Front, and other professional associations stage a sit-in against price increases in front of the parliament.[31] Like their sister protests on January 14, the professional associations protest on January 16 targeted Rifa'i for resignation. Signs read "We Must Fight Corruption" and "Enough High Prices and Yes to a Decent Life".[32]

At both the January 14 protests and the January 16, there were no reports of clashes or repression by security services.[33] In fact, during the January 14 protests, police and plainclothes officers formed a cordon around the demonstrators to contain the protests, but there were no reports of arrests or violence.[34] After the January 16 Islamist-led sit-in, however, Speaker of the Lower House Faysal Fayiz reportedly requested a meeting with the organizers of

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[29] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 173.
[30] Amis, 173.
[31] Mohammad Ben Hussein, "Activists Protest Economic Situation," *The Jordan Times*, January 17, 2011, http://bit.ly/2hlyleO.
[32] "Jordanian Islamists Not to Participate in 14 January Protests," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, January 14, 2011; "Al-Jazirah TV Highlights Jordan's Protests over Economic Situation," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, January 17, 2011; Hussein, "Activists Protest Economic Situation."
[33] "Jordanian Islamists Not to Participate in 14 January Protests."
[34] "Jordanians March against Inflation."

the protest, but they refused. Fayiz argued that the doors of the Parliament were always open to meet with parties and professional associations and chastised the protesters for not having informed the Parliament, or met with him or other MPs instead of protesting since the parliament is supposed to be the representative of the people.[35] One can hardly blame the protesters for not trusting the official channels, considering the climate regarding corruption.

The government announced a further $425 million subsidies package, this time including raises for civil servants and military and security personnel on January 20.[36] But this again failed to mollify protests. Between 2,000[37] and 5,000[38] people, mobilized by parties, political associations, and activists gathered on January 21, 2011, to march from al-Husseini Mosque in downtown Amman to the Greater Amman Municipality Headquarters even in the face of government subsidy concessions. Activists and the public expressed disbelief that the government measures were any more than "temporary measures meant to contain the public's anger."[39] One former MP Mansour Murad "urged the King to dissolve the Lower House for 'failing to defend the public's interests' by giving the government a record vote of confidence last month."[40] Members of the IAF, the Jordanian Communist Party, al-Wihda Party (a Leftist/PFLP affiliate), and

[35] Hussein, "Activists Protest Economic Situation."
[36] "'Jordan Raises Salaries, Boosts Subsidies.' Daily the Pak Banker. January 24, 2011 Monday .," *Daily the Pak Banker*, January 24, 2011; Hani Hazaimeh, "Opposition Decries Government Policies in Peaceful Protests," *The Jordan Times*, January 23, 2011; "Thousands Protest in Jordan: Protesters Gather Across the Country, Demanding the Prime Minister Step Down," *Al-Jazeera (English)*, January 28, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112812515750919 6.html.
[37] Hazaimeh, "Opposition Decries Government Policies in Peaceful Protests."
[38] Mohammed Yaghi and Janine A. Clark, "Jordan: Evolving Activism in a Divided Society," in *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2014), 238.
[39] Hazaimeh, "Opposition Decries Government Policies in Peaceful Protests."
[40] Hazaimeh.

National Front Party as well as Professional Associations Council inverted the typical regime strategy and "called for greater political freedoms as a first step towards economic reform".[41]

The aims were dismissal of the government and parties, not the monarchy. Some even argued that "we have lost all hope in parties, we only look to His Majesty King Abdullah to secure people's rights and interests" and "We are not against individuals; we only oppose the policies that have caused living standards to deteriorate." Hazaimeh reports that some bystanders expressed mixed feelings about the protests.[42] Even at what were clearly widening protests ostensibly immune to the government's attempts to mollify them, the only security forces present were traffic police "who blocked off King Talal street to vehicles and handed out water and juice to demonstrators."[43] This incident would become a favorite anecdote of those who denied that the Arab Spring could get purchase in Jordan.

January 21 also saw parallel protests in Zarqa, Madaba, Irbid, Karak, and Tafileh.[44] Protests in Zarqa were organized by the Higher Coordination Committee of the National Opposition parties and imitated the Amman march by marching from the Umar Bin al-Khuttab mosque.[45]

This time the regime responded with positive counter-framing. On January 26, Senate President Tahir al-Masri "said that the freedom of expression that

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[41] Hazaimeh.
[42] Hazaimeh.
[43] Hazaimeh.
[44] "Jordanians Protests Against Rising Food Prices," *Petra-Jordanian News Agency*, January 21, 2011.
[45] "Jordanian Opposition Parties to Organize March After 21 January Friday Prayers," *Al-Dustur*, January 20, 2011.

Jordan is currently witnessing is part of the country's democratic march led by His Majesty King Abdallah II."[46] "The recent marches and sit-ins in the Kingdom" added al-Masri, "reflects [an] awareness of Jordanians and their keenness to protect their march and reject uncivilized behaviour during these marches."[47] Protests continued for the fourth consecutive Friday with thousands flooding the streets of Amman. Some were urged by the Islamic Action Front (IAF). But trade unionists joined with the Islamists, with banners and chants including "Send the corrupt guys to court" and "Rifa'i go away, prices are on fire and so are the Jordanians."[48] Another 2,000 – 5,000 people gathered in repeat demonstrations Karak, Irbid, Ma'an, Aqaba, and two other cities after Friday prayers on January 28 all denigrating the price increases and calling for early parliamentary elections and the ouster of Prime Minister Rifa'i.[49] Separate protests were held on January 29 by "independents and opposition groups" including public sector day laborers and military retirees.[50]

King Abdullah conceded to one of the – at least symbolic – demands of the protesters by dismissing Prime Minister Rifa'i and his cabinet on January 31, 2011. Rifa'i was replaced with Ma'arouf Bakhit who was "allegedly not tainted

[46] "Jordanian Speaker Lauds State of Democracy in the Kingdom," *Jordanian News Agency - Petra*, January 26, 2011.
[47] "Jordanian Speaker Lauds State of Democracy in the Kingdom."
[48] "Thousands Protest in Jordan: Protesters Gather Across the Country, Demanding the Prime Minister Step Down."
[49] "Thousands Protest in Jordan: Protesters Gather Across the Country, Demanding the Prime Minister Step Down."
[50] "Independents, Opposition Hold Protests Calling for Reform," *The Jordan Times*, January 30, 2011.

by allegations of corruption."[51] A second concession came on February 2, when the Interior Minister announced that protests in Jordan would no longer require government permission. Protesters would still be required to inform authorities of any planned gathering within two days, but this decision no doubt sought to appease protesters by appealing the April 2002 Public Gatherings Law – a ban against all marches.[52] The new government, under Bakhit also quickly "announced the historic concession of an independent teachers' union."[53]

The shuffling of Prime Ministers to assuage those suffering from bruised pocketbooks and chafing under promises of political reform with nothing to show for their patience is not a new strategy in Jordan. In fact, this "time-honored shock absorption tactic" forms a crucial part of the 'above the fray' argument inherent in the monarchical advantage thesis.[54] The king is supposed to be a neutral arbiter between the chaotic forces of a demanding public and the government, represented by the parliament and the Prime Minister. In this way, a simple reshuffling of the deck of candidates for Prime Minister allows the king to appear to be advancing concessions or reforms, though they will turn out to be short of the mark or merely cosmetic.

Also on February 2, 2011 the regime received a propaganda boost when "about 3000 tribal leaders and key figures – including lawmakers, retired security personnel and academicians – renewed their allegiance to the king in an emotional

[51] Joel Greenberg, "Jordan's King Abdullah II Ousts Prime Minister, Cabinet in Wake of Mass Protests," *The Washington Post*, February 1, 2011, sec. World, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/31/AR2011013103692.html.
[52] Yaghi and Clark, "Jordan: Evolving Activism in a Divided Society," 238; Halaby, "Jordan Revokes Restrictions On Public Gatherings," *Huffington Post*, February 15, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/15/jordan-restrictions-public-gatherings_n_823373.html.
[53] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 175.
[54] Amis, 174–175.

letter, praising his reform efforts."[55] Demonstrations continued apace, now demanding the resignation of newly-appointed PM Bakhit, calling him not satisfactory for reform because even if he is perceived as less corrupt, protesters doubt his democratic bona fides.[56]

By mid-February 2011 the tenor and intensity of protests, which had, by this point continued for seven weeks, increased. February 18 saw pro-government counter-protesters attack pro-reform protesters with sticks and stones.[57] Undeterred, 5,000 – 6,000 pro-reformists protest in Amman (BBC places the number between 7,000 – 10,000) on February 25, calling for lower prices, new elections and constitutional reform. Chants and banners included "The people want to reform the regime"; "We want a fair electoral law"; and "the people want an elected government." Though Islamists were reportedly joined by the supporters of 19 other political parties, Sheikh Hamza Mansour of the Islamic Action Front helped spearhead the vocal support for reform, which "has become a necessity that cannot wait."[58]

On March 24-25, 2011, an estimated 500 university students, unemployed graduates and other members of the variegated *hirak* set up a protest camp at Gamal Abdel Nasser circle (hereafter "*Diwar Dakhilliyeh*" (interior ministry circle)). Ziad al-Khawaldeh whom Al-Jazeera identified as the "Jordanian Youth

[55] Halaby, "Jordan Revokes Restrictions On Public Gatherings."
[56] Alice Fordham, "Jordan, Yemen Grapple with Effects of Protests," *USA Today*, February 3, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-02-03-egyptregion03_ST_N.htm.
[57] Yaghi and Clark, "Jordan: Evolving Activism in a Divided Society."
[58] Regarding the number of parties, see "Jordan Braces for Its 'Largest' Rally," February 25, 2011, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/166928.html; Mansour's statement via Harriet Sherwood, Tom Finn, and agencies, "Thousands Join 'Day of Rage' across the Middle East," *The Guardian*, February 25, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/25/thousands-join-day-of-rage-across-middle-east.

Movement" spokesman, said that the demands focus on the resignation of the pusillanimous parliament led by PM Marouf al-Bakhit, the dissolution of the much-feared General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and devolution of powers to the people, particularly those powers of choosing the Prime Minister.[59] Banners seen at the encampment included those calling for a "New Jordan: Clean of Corruption and Corrupt Officials" and chants including "Intelligence Department: We Want Your Hands Off Politics!"[60] The political aims of the March 24 Youth were consistently composed of seven broad demands: "a representative parliament, elected government, 'real' constitutional reforms, corruption prosecutions, tax reform, 'lifting of the security grip', and 'realization of national unity'."[61]

The initially peaceful character of the protest encampment – which had included protesters singing patriotic songs beneath pictures of the king and waving Jordanian flags[62] – began to devolve with the arrival of loyalist counter-protesters throughout the afternoon and evening of March 24. The two groups of protesters were separated by regular police and occasional breakthroughs of violence by loyalists were repelled by the police. Loyalist rock-throwing was coupled with slogans framing the reformist mission as driven by sectarianism

[59] "Protest Camp Set Up in Jordan Capital," Al Jazeera English, March 24, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/201132414304102344.html.
[60] "Protest Camp Set Up in Jordan Capital."
[61] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 177.
[62] According to Naseem Tarawnah, March 24 organizers explicitly banned any flags other than the national flag, ostensibly to maintain the neutrality of the group and avoid being painted as separatists of one stripe or another. Cf, Naseem Tarawnah, "The Quick Death Of Shabab March 24 And What It Means For Jordan," *The Black Iris* (blog), March 26, 2011, http://black-iris.com/2011/03/26/the-quick-death-of-shabab-march-24-and-what-it-means-for-jordan/.

(accusing the *hirak* of being either Palestinian Islamists or Shi'a *agents provocateurs* from Iran.[63]

During the afternoon and evening of March 25, the numbers of pro-reform and loyalist protesters swelled, as did the security presence. Security services closed off traffic to the area and police formally warned the encamped March 24 Youth protesters to disperse. Tension continued to ratchet up as the *Darak* (gendarmerie/riot police) – who, as respondents noted, compared to the police are at the least not trusted by the people, if not feared – arrived behind the pro-reform protesters, who were now pressed between the *Darak*, the regular police (who then joined with the *Darak* in repression), and the pro-regime protesters.[64] Participants also described loyalist protesters arriving shortly after by bus and dozens of cars from typically-loyalist areas like Karak.[65] For the first time (at least on a mass and public scale and in the capital) the pro-reform protest camp was attacked by a pro-government, loyalist mob in *diwar dakhilliyeh*, leading to one casualty and 100 wounded. Importantly, multiple reports note the involvement of pro-government counterprotesters, in the violent clearing of the square. Naseem Tarawnah, reluctant to use the sobriquet "*baltajiyya*" because of the negative connotations and connection to the violent breaking up of the Tahrir Square protests in Egypt – labeled these *zu'ran* ("troublemakers"). But the pro-government protesters insisted on referring to themselves as *baltajiyya*

[63] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 178. Amis' accounting comes from his own interviews with March 24 Youth Movement activists and participants during August 2011-February 2013. These events were confirmed in my own interviews.
[64] Some mix of police, plainclothes security forces, and pro-regime "baltajiyya" were reportedly gathered on an overpass above the pro-reform camp, poised to throw rocks, bottles, and other objects down at the pro-reform protesters. Author interview, Amman, Jordan July 2016. Cf, also Amis, 178.
[65] Author's interview, Amman, Jordan, August 2016. This is confirmed in Amis, 178.

("thugs"/"hatchetmen").[66] Amis suggests that they "actively asserted [this] *baltajiyya* identity – in emulation of the Egyptian pro-regime thugs who attacked demonstrators in Tahrir Square in February 2011 – a reminder that Arab Spring 'mirror effect' inspiration was also available to anti-reform elements."[67]

Juxtaposing this to the police response to protests on January 21, 2011, when they handed out water and juice to protesters, as Marsh, Finn, and Chulov noted, this "Violence was the first of its kind in Jordan in more than two months of protests which have seen the king sack his cabinet and pledge reforms."[68] Amis, Tarawnah, and others noted that after the Darak-led pro-government forces cleared the square, "uniformed police and plain-clothes thugs were seen openly celebrating together, chanting loyalist slogans."[69]

IAF leader Hamza Mansour blamed the killing of one of the Brotherhood's members directly on the Prime Minister, Marouf al-Bakhit, and his cabinet and called for their resignation immediately.[70] Prime Minister Bakhit took this opportunity to counter-frame by placing blame at the feet of Islamists and accused them of taking orders from Egypt, saying "Enough playing with fire. I ask you, where are you taking Jordan?"[71]

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[66] Tarawnah, "The Quick Death Of Shabab March 24 And What It Means For Jordan."
[67] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," n. 28.
[68] Katherine Marsh, Tom Finn, and Martin Chulov, "Syria Unleashes Force on Protesters Demanding Freedom as Unrest Spreads," *The Guardian,* March 25, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/25/syria-protest-spreads-troops.
[69] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 178; Tarawnah, "The Quick Death Of Shabab March 24 And What It Means For Jordan."; Author's interviews Amman, Jordan July-September 2016.
[70] Marsh, Finn, and Chulov, "Syria Unleashes Force on Protesters Demanding Freedom as Unrest Spreads."
[71] Marsh, Finn, and Chulov; Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 177.

Interestingly, after the violence at *diwar dakhilliyeh*, the government reportedly "decided to ban its supporters from demonstrating in the capital, while the opposition was allowed to demonstrate in specifically designated areas in Amman." The King, for his part, took the opportunity to condemn the violence and "vowed to fight attempts to 'sabotage' the country's reform drive." 400 police were deployed to break up hundreds of rival pro-reform and pro-government protesters outside municipal offices in Amman on April 1, 2011. Pro-reform slogans included "Down with oppression. The people want regime and constitutional reforms, and trials for the corrupt. We want national unity." Rival, pro-government demonstrators carried large pictures of King Abdullah and expressed their "loyalty and allegiance" to him, along with their "commitment to the kingdom." No violence was reported by authorities or by observers from Jordan's National Centre for Human Rights. Pro-reform activists were uncowed by the violence of the previous week, saying that it in fact emboldened them instead.[72]

Despite the ban on loyalist demonstrations in the capital and the government's official regret concerning violence, two weeks later, eyewitnesses in Zarqa placed the blame for a clash between Islamists and loyalists on plainclothes security personnel who were alleged to have provoked the violence. Eighty-three policemen were wounded, allegedly by Salafis armed with clubs and knives. Police responded with tear gas. Al-Jazeera identified the "Islamists" as "Salafis" (a group technically banned in Jordan) and points out that the rally in

[72] "Jordanian Police Separate Rival Rallies," April 1, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/04/2011411707284653.html.

question is only one of several held in recent weeks across the country, arguing that "these are separate from the 14-week-old wave of anti-government protests demanding democratic reforms." Nevertheless, the alleged behavior of the regime toward the Islamists' challenge during the rally – which denounced the government's ties to the US and demanded the institution of *Shari'a* in the kingdom – tells us something about the willingness and tactics of the government toward dissent that approaches apparent red lines.[73]

Also on April 15, in Amman, more than 2,000 protesters demonstrated in Amman – 1,000 of those outside the Amman municipal building after Friday prayers, again demanding more representative and plural reforms.[74] Though protests ostensibly continued through April and May, they were underreported. Early-to-mid-June, saw a return to regularly reported protests. Particularly in the southern town of Tafileh – usually a stronghold of regime support, considering, as one activist interviewed by Amis noted, "they are loyal all their lives…[even] the royal guards are drawn from Tafileh – routine protests continued with renewed vigor.[75]

In the face of continued and renewed protest, King Abdullah appeared in a television address on June 12, 2011. The king appeared to concede to many of the core demands of the protesters, at least in theory. He pledged to allow elected rather than royally appointed ministers "at some unspecified point in the future".

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[73] "Clashes Erupt in Jordanian Town," accessed January 15, 2018, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/04/201141515383918547 3.html.
[74] "Clashes Erupt in Jordanian Town."
[75] Ian Black, "Jordan Denies Reports about Attack on King Abdullah," The Guardian, June 13, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/13/jordan-king-abdullah-attack-denied; Amis, interview with Dr. Khaled Kalaldeh, Amman August 2011, quoted in Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 182.

He instructed the Prime Minister to "take 'practical, swift, and tangible steps to launch a real political reform process, in line with the king's vision of comprehensive reform, modernization, and development'" and create an electoral law that will allow for "active party representation." But the king gently warned that the path of reform had to pass through the legitimate channels of the regime, saying "We seek a state of democracy, pluralism, and participation through political reforms...away from the dictates of the street and the absence of the voice of reason" and "warned that sudden change" as the government apparently believed was advocated by protesters, "could lead to 'chaos and unrest'."[76] Oppositionists downplayed the promises as only promises; just as amorphous as those the king perennially promised in the past.

In support of promised infrastructure, job-creation, and medical care subsidy reform projects, King Abdullah visited restive Tafileh the following day (June 13, 2011). Surprisingly, protesters – angry at the failure of the government to initiate real reforms and fight corruption and calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister and the cabinet – now paired their continuous crossing of rhetorical red lines with a physical crossing, throwing stones and empty bottles at the royal convoy as it passed through town. Eyewitness reports described clashes between crowds and security forces, and Ammon News reported that at least 25 people had been injured by security forces. Regime spokesmen moved quickly to control this narrative, instead insisting it was simply enthusiastic youth attempting to greet the king who had unexpectedly mobbed the motorcade.[77]

[76] Black, "Jordan Denies Reports about Attack on King Abdullah."
[77] Ammon News cited in Black, ibid.

Events come to a boil again a month later. On July 15, 2011, members of the March 24 coalition, unbowed by the repression of March 25, 2011, attempted another sit-in at al-Nakheel Square, near the Greater Amman Municipal Building.[78] This time, however, security forces refused to allow another occupation of public space, however small. They attacked both protesters and journalists as soon as the sit-in began. Beyond "dealing out beatings…on sight", protesters reported the presence of plain-clothes mukhabarat agents, who warned them that snipers positioned on the rooftops would begin firing down on the protesters if they did not disperse within two hours.[79]

The Public Security Department ultimately admitted responsibility for the incident and four policemen were arrested as a result. But the government maintained that "the pro-reform protesters and the Muslim Brotherhood...[provoked] the police and [instigated] the violence."[80] It is notable that the two subsequent protests – July 16, and July 20 – saw no violent repression from the security forces.[81] Both dates saw protests in both the capital and in tribally-loyalist centers like Karak and all of the protests not only pursued the overarching frames of the previous months' protests but also directed attention to

[78] "What Lies beneath Jordanian Calls for Reform," *Al Jazeera Blogs*, July 21, 2011, http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/middle-east/what-lies-beneath-jordanian-calls-reform; Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 179.
[79] Author's interviews, Amman, Jordan July-August 2016; Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 179; Banan Malkawi, "Downtown Amman: Security Attack Protestors, Journalists in Pro-Reform Demonstration | Editor's Choice | Ammon News," Ammon News, July 15, 2011, http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=12876#.WWlTMIgrLIU. cited in Amis, n. 31.
[80] "What Lies beneath Jordanian Calls for Reform"; Associated Press and Raad Adayleh, "Jordan Detains 4 Policemen for Beating Protesters," NBC News, July 17, 2011, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43783918/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/jordan-detains-policemen-beating-protesters/.
[81] "What Lies beneath Jordanian Calls for Reform."

the security services' overreach on both March 24-25 and July 15.[82] It appears that the regime gave protests a wider berth after the July 15 incident.

On July 22, 2011, the London-based expatriate Jordanian opposition coalition calling itself the Jordanian Overseas National Assembly (JONA) upped the ante without a physical protest. JONA released a statement calling for the overthrow of the king and to "hold [him] legally responsible for all corruption in Jordan'…and to establish the 'Jordanian Arab Republic'. The statement also called the royal family 'a gang of parasites' and accused it of 'occupying the land'."[83] Varulkar presents this as the first group to call for the explicit overthrow of the regime before October 2011.

Three weeks later, King Abdullah welcomed proposed constitutional amendments, but critics continued to characterize them as insufficient. Jamal Halaby immediately points out that "the 42 proposed changes…would still allow King Abdullah to retain most of his absolute powers, according to a 15-page document distributed by the royal palace." The proposed changes did not address protesters' demands allowing public election of the prime minister, instead retaining the ability to appoint the post solely to the king. In what oppositionists characterized as its typical fashion, the government said that a separate document would address this core issue "at a later unspecified date". "King Abdullah said the basis of Jordanian reform 'is wider public participation' and 'the separation

[82] "Karak Gears up for Friday pro-Reform Protest," *Ammon News*, June 16, 2011, http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=12429#.VGFPh4XhDek.
[83] The JONA statement was published on jordaniantribune.com on July 22, 2011, quoted in H. Varulkar, "The Arab Spring in Jordan: King Compelled to Make Concessions to Protest Movement," Inquiry & Analysis Series (The Middle East Media Research Institute, December 12, 2011), https://www.memri.org/reports/arab-spring-jordan-king-compelled-make-concessions-protest-movement.

between the branches of government.'" Outside the palace in Amman, about 200 pro-reform activists protested the changes. Meanwhile, four injuries were reported in clashes between reformists and "hundreds of government loyalists" in Karak.[84]

No protests were reported again until October 1, 2011. An Islamist opposition rally led by veteran oppositionist Layth Shubaylat in Sakeb (Jerash province) was allegedly attacked by regime-coordinated *baltajiyya* attack. Though Shubaylat had a history of criticism of the monarchy and calling for the fall of the king, this alleged attack occurred despite the tone of the protest being one of political reform, not open demands for the removal of the regime.[85] Varulkar describes the significance of the situation and Shubaylat as an activist personality at length:

> [Shubaylat's] talk in Jerash was part of a series of lectures he gave throughout the kingdom in recent weeks, in which he spoke to thousands and presented a document of principles – a kind of "road map" for political reform in Jordan. In these talks, he leveled unprecedented criticism at the king, saying that the king had no legitimacy without the consent of the people, and calling upon him to give back the lands he had taken from the people, to abolish the corruption that has spread among his court officials, and to stop the interference of the security forces and the intelligence apparatuses in public life.[86]

It is no doubt significant that Shubaylat represents a notable and centralized threat to the regime; a prominent individual brazenly crossing rhetorical red-lines against the regime. According to Varulkar, Shubaylat told journalists at a press

[84] Jamal Halaby, "Proposed Reforms Not Enough for Jordan Protesters," U-T San Diego, August 14, 2011, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/aug/14/proposed-reforms-not-enough-for-jordan-protesters/.
[85] Varulkar, "Varulkar, 'The Arab Spring in Jordan.'"
[86] Varulkar.

conference shortly after the attack in Sakeb that "the security apparatuses had tried to dissuade him from his activity."[87]

This alleged repression sparked a dramatic cascade of marches and demonstrations from many movements in Amman, Jerash, Al-Tafileh, and Dhiban in solidarity with the Shubaylat rally. As Varulkar notes carefully, these events were also notably characterized by their increasingly aggressive tone, threatening revolution rather than (or along with) reform. In one march from the loyalist al-Tafileh neighborhood in Amman to the offices of the Royal Court protesters chanted "al-Tafaila will not obey and can topple the regime."[88] More widely, the Popular Association for Reform released a communiqué in the same spirit, saying that "the monopolist [character] of the Jordanian regime, and the fact that [power] is concentrated in the hands of the king, mean that the king is solely responsible for the corruption, violence and brutality [in the country]…Every drop of civilian blood spilled will fuel the [people's] fury…"[89]

The regime's fears of Shubaylat and the growing calls for revolution rather than reform were undoubtedly confirmed two days after the Sakeb rally incident. On October 3, 2011 the "Second National Convention for Reform" – a rally "held at the home of former parliament member Ghazi Abu Jneib Al-Fayez in Al-Lubban" (approximately 20 kilometers south of Amman, between Amman and Madaba) and was "attended by approximately 1,000 representatives of all the protest movements, tribes and political forces, including prominent oppositionists such as Ahmad 'Uwaidi Al-'Abadi and the former general guide of the Jordanian

[87] Varulkar, n. 18.
[88] Varulkar, "Varulkar, 'The Arab Spring in Jordan.'"
[89] Albosala.com, October 4, 2011 cited and quoted in Varulkar.

Muslim Brotherhood, Salam Falahat."[90] A meeting crossing such diverse ideological boundaries should be concern enough, but the meeting reportedly crossed significant rhetorical boundaries as well: calling for a constitutional monarchy (or at least serious limitations on royal power), for revolution rather than reform, assertions by al-'Abadi that "the people wanted to topple the Hashemites" (note, not just the king, but the entire regime implicated here) and calls by Dr. Sabri Jar'a "who called on the king to 'apologize and resign'."[91] Varulkar notes that Al-Fayez "said in his opening speech that 'the Hashemite kings are a red line' (meaning that questioning their legitimacy, as opposed to criticizing them, is taboo). After several participants left in protest over this remark, Al-Fayez recanted and said that 'the only red line is the homeland'."[92]

Former prime minister and (perhaps more importantly) former head of the feared General Intelligence Directorate (GID) (*mukhabarat*), Ahmad 'Obeidat also likely drew a panicked reaction from the regime when he led a march of more than 2,000 in front of the Grand Husseini Mosque in Wasat al-Balad, downtown Amman.[93] 'Obeidat was also present at and helped to organize – along with the Islamic movement and the "Four-Tribe Coalition" – a follow-up rally on October 15, 2011, reported attended by 2,000 people in the village of Salhoub in Jerash province. Like the Sakeb rally, this was allegedly attacked again by *mukhabarat*-dispatched *baltajiyya*. This time, however, the *baltajiyya* allegedly

[90] Varulkar.
[91] Varulkar.
[92] Varulkar.
[93] Varulkar; Yaghi and Clark, "Jordan: Evolving Activism in a Divided Society," 239.

opened fire on the rally, injuring dozens of people.[94] The regime, through state-run media, disputed this allegation, downplaying the numbers injured and claiming instead that the anti-regime tone of the rally angered villagers, who then attacked the rally, and the rally participants first began shooting and throwing rocks.[95] State-owned daily newspaper Al-Rai portrayed the event as an overblown violent confrontation between tribes in Salhoub, a claim which greatly angered the rally activists and was disputed.[96] Also reported are marches in Karak, Tafileh, Ma'an, Jerash and al-Salt.

A press conference held primarily by leaders of tribal movements became a panel of increasing criticism of the monarchy after the Salhoub incident. Some warned the king not to "mess with the tribes. That is a dangerous [move]. If the regime takes it, we will all be harmed. Be careful." Another tribal representative ominously warned "From now on…the thrones of the monarchy will be shaking." Yet another stated unequivocally, "the contract between us and the Hashemites will soon be wiped out."

King Abdullah evidently took these events seriously, but did not initially stray far from the standard playbook in seeking to mollify the protests and the tribes. Cross-pressured by the tribes and a call from 70 MPs, the king dismissed Prime Minister al-Bakhit on October 17, 2011 "amid charges of incompetence, economic problems, a cover-up and suspicions that the regime had orchestrated

[94] Varulkar, "Varulkar, 'The Arab Spring in Jordan.'"
[95] Varulkar, n. 39.
[96] *Al-Rai*, October 16, 2011, cited in Varulkar, "Varulkar, 'The Arab Spring in Jordan.'"

attacks on pro-democracy demonstrators."[97] In his place, the king appointed former judge at the International Court of Justice and former legal adviser to the king's father, the late King Hussein.

Former prime minister Samir Rifa'i had been fired for connection to corruption to mollify protesters, and the supposedly clean former general Ma'arouf al-Bakhit had been appointed in his place. The logic of replacing al-Bakhit with al-Khasawneh was clearly an attempt to find a prime minister to appease the protest coalition, particularly the tribes. Khasawneh, having been out of Jordan serving in The Hague, might have appeared to be an impartial outsider rather than a corrupt insider. Yet he was also a close advisor to the nostalgically popular King Hussein. Most importantly, Khasawneh has openly welcomed the participation of Islamists, particularly the IAF and promised to dialogue will all elements of the protest coalition, Islamists or otherwise, *hirak* and traditional opposition parties.[98]

These represented only a few of the several attempts at reform spearheaded by King Abdullah throughout October. At least one five-day meeting at the southern resort town of Aqaba resulted first in an attempt at rapprochement with the Islamist Movement, matching PM Khasawneh's promise of dialogue. Most concerning to the regime was the threat by the Islamists to boycott municipal elections that had been planned for December 2011. This would not be the first time Islamists or others would boycott elections based on the much-

[97] Ian Black, "Jordan's King Sacks Prime Minister," *The Guardian*, October 17, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/17/jordan-king-sacks-prime-minister.
[98] Varulkar, "Varulkar, 'The Arab Spring in Jordan'"; Black, "Jordan's King Sacks Prime Minister."

maligned electoral law. In this context, "the regime [knew] that if this party, the largest and most prominent in Jordan, boycotts the elections, it will severely damage its credibility and fan the flames of the protest even further."[99] Dozens of prisoners were released, as a further concession.

On October 21, 2011, a variegated protest coalition organized a demonstration of approximately 10,000 in Amman, invigorated by events in Salhoub. Perhaps more dangerous than the volume of protesters were the chants and banners at the protest, including "O regime, listen, the Jordanian people will not obey and [are] capable of toppling a regime" and "You Can't Scare Us". Days after the October 21 protest, the leader of the tribal Faction of 36 said "the king is not at all interested in reform, and must be replaced."[100]

Where the regime departed from the standard playbook in dealing with protest and reform, King Abdullah also fired the head of the General Intelligence Directorate, the royal court chief, and "replaced 43 of the 60 members of the Jordanian senate." Many of the 43 senators were replaced with members from the southern provinces, tribes, and military veterans, many of whom were part of or close to the protest movements.[101] Moreover, the regime made overtures to former PM and GID director-turned-oppositionist Ahmad 'Obeidat, inviting him to serve in the Senate – a position he declined. The king met with representatives of the army veterans and tribes "praised the contribution to the homeland, and instructed

[99] Varulkar, "Varulkar, 'The Arab Spring in Jordan.'"
[100] Jordaniantribune.com, October 23, 2011. Al-Ajarme's statements at the Faction of 36 meeting is cited by Varulkar at http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=MuGV-bKZmNo cited in Varulkar, n. 43; Varulkar, "Varulkar, 'The Arab Spring in Jordan.'"
[101] Varulkar, "Varulkar, 'The Arab Spring in Jordan.'" This senate reshuffling was not lost on Fahd al-Khitan, the editor of the independent newspaper *Al-Arab Al-Yawm*. Varulkar quotes al-Khitan as saying that politically inexperienced tribesmen had replaced 'liberals close to decision-making circles" (Varulkar n.78).

to raise their pensions."[102] Finally, the king announced on October 26 that after the upcoming elections, "the parliament's opinion would be considered in appointing the prime minister."[103]

Varulkar is careful to note that the sentiments of this *hirak*-and-tribal coalition-led protest movement was not shared among all Jordanians, let alone among all tribes. Despite the public denouncements of the tribal actions by some members and leaders of the tribes, "the regime seems to be troubled by the weakening of its tribal support-base, and has made efforts to organize pro-regime demonstrations among the tribes."[104] One such incident noted by state-sponsored daily *al-Rai* and Varulkar, featured thousands of members of Jordan's largest tribe, the Bani Sakher, at a rally in front of the king's office in Amman, expressing loyalty to the monarchy and support for the extant reforms.[105] Another rally occurred October 30 in al-Tafileh, the same site of some of the most virulent protests.[106]

By November 2011, Varulkar notes that the dramatic escalation of the protests had resulted in "the regime [having] taken numerous steps to appease the Islamic movement and the tribes, including attempts to buy them off with money and positions of power."[107] Moreover, Varulkar notes that the regime, and especially King Abdullah, appeared to be willing to approach – at least rhetorically – previous boundaries of reform, including curtailing the king's

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[102] *Al-Rai* (Jordan), October 26, 2011. Cited in Varulkar.
[103] Varulkar.
[104] Varulkar.
[105] *Al-Rai* (Jordan), October 13, 2011. Cited in Varulkar, n. 45.
[106] *Al-Rai* (Jordan), October 30, 2011. Cited in Varulkar, n. 45.
[107] Varulkar, "Varulkar, 'The Arab Spring in Jordan.'" Assabeel.net, October 11, 2011, cited in Varulkar, n. 46.

powers – demands that former prime minister Ma'arouf al-Bakhit denounced as "'harmful to the balance and the foundations of the political regime,' 'a violation of the constitution,' 'nonsense,' and an attempt to incite the public."[108] Prime Minister Khasawneh continued to hold several high level meetings with the Islamist movement and the National Reform Coalition leader Ahmad 'Obeidat. By this time, the meetings between the Islamists and the regime were public knowledge. Rumors naturally began to circulate which only confirmed *Al-Dustour* columnist Hussein al-Rawashdeh's assertion that the Islamist movement sought to have "one foot in the court of the popular [protest] movement and another in the political arena, with all the options and deals this entails. They do not want to leave the influential pressure [group represented by the protesters] on the street, and they cannot afford to jeopardize their popular support" yet the Islamists appeared to have every intention of cooperating with the regime.[109] Though the Islamists held a rally November 18, 2011 to dispel rumors that they had been convinced to abandon the uprising, Varulkar notes that this march was notably held separate from the marches of the tribal *hirak*.

While some of the tribes and Islamists may have agreed to decrease or remove their presence in the streets, the overall opposition movement was hardly dismantled, let alone dissuaded. Protests continued apace in several governorates, through the end of October, into November, denouncing the perceived cosmetic changes as business-as-usual, a mere reshuffling of the deck, and marching

[108] Varulkar. Varulkar cites *Al-Dustour* (Jordan), November 15, 2011 and *Al-Rai* (Jordan), November 16, 2011 as sources for the regime's and King Abdullah's willingness to approach these reforms.
[109] Hussein al-Rawashdeh, *Al-Dustour* (Jordan), November 10, 2011. Quoted in Varulkar.

"under the slogan of 'You Misunderstood Us', demanding to enact real reforms, including significant constitutional changes."[110]

By November and December 2011, Varulkar notes that the comparatively orderly marches and demonstrations were increasingly paralleled with outbreaks of violence, particularly in Southern governorates. Clashes between hundreds of youths of different clans in al-Zarqa and rioting in al-Ramtha by tribes over an accused wrongful death were paralleled in Amman by a November 4, 2011 rally organized by the Islamists, tribal movements, and the youth *hirak* and attended by approximately 7,000 people. The combination of these protests as well as apparently ensuing anarchy in the periphery – especially given reports that it took the security forces nearly two weeks to control the rioting and clashes in al-Zarqa – fed into a feeling of anxiety by both the people and the regime that the expanding anarchy in Syria was on the verge of spreading to Jordan.[111]

At the November 4 Amman rally, the authority and legitimacy of the regime was challenged directly by speakers. But more important was the specific nature of the message in which a member of the Four Tribe Coalition warned "'the people find themselves in a state of security anarchy'… [and] that the people were rallying around the tribes, which had begun to fill the vacuum left by the state."[112] Several state-sponsored daily newspapers featured op-ed pieces warning against the danger of pushing too far. Varulkar cites an *al-Rai* article by Roman Haddad "denouncing those who dared come out against the king" saying: "'Jordan rests upon a sacred trinity [consisting of] the citizen, the king, and the

[110] Varulkar; Varulkar, n. 83.
[111] Varulkar, "Varulkar, 'The Arab Spring in Jordan.'"
[112] Varulkar.

state. Together the three create a single [entity] – the homeland – which cannot be envisioned with one of its [components] missing.'" Haddad further hinted at the events being an externally-directed plot saying "this is an act learned and planned in advance, which is heading in a dangerous direction… It obliges the king and the state to employ special solutions, suited to this special situation…'."[113] Another columnist, Maher Abu Tir, in *Al-Dustour*, likened the kingdom to a pyramid "'in which each stone supports the other thanks to the [keystone] that is the Hashemite family. If it is taken apart, its stones will collapse over our heads, and no one will be spared…'."[114]

Nevertheless, more than 1,000 Jordanians, composed of opposition Islamists and youth *hirak* gathered in central Amman to close out 2011, demanding that the country be saved from corruption, amongst other calls for reforms. The cortege took the well-practiced route of marching from al-Husseini mosque in downtown Amman to the nearby city hall. Lebanon's Daily Star notes that one banner carried by protesters read "Saving Jordan from Corruption is a National Duty", presumably countering the recent nationalist rhetoric from the state about the damage inflicted against national unity and the *gestalt* regime. Similar protests occurred outside Amman, in the Southern cities of Karak, Tafileh, and Ma'an.[115]

Far from succumbing to fatigue, January 2012 saw a continuation of the contentious politics patterns of 2011. Contravening the supposed agreement by

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[113] Roman Haddad, *Al-Rai* (October 6, 2011), quoted in Varulkar.
[114] Maher Abu Tir Al-Dustour (Jordan), November 5, 2011 quoted in Varulkar.
[115] "Protesters Demand 'Saving' Jordan from Corruption," *The Daily Star*, December 2, 2011, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2011/Dec-02/155857-protesters-demand-saving-jordan-from-corruption.ashx#axzz3HlwpkfYf.

Islamists to recede from the streets and their support for the reform coalition, (who had notably backed down from street-level protests in the previous months) Islamist youth held a "paramilitary procession" in the streets of Amman. A source of worry for the regime after the 2005 al-Qa'ida hotel bombings in Amman, the prime minister, King Abdullah, and the intelligence apparatus hold another series of discussions with the Islamist leadership. Islamist leadership expressed a commitment to nonviolence in calling for "reform in the regime". This agreement again furthered rumors on the streets that the Islamists were no longer fully committed to the mission of the *hirak*.[116]

Economic grievances came to the fore again in January as Jordanian Ahmad Al-Matarneh self-immolated outside the royal court, complaining that he could no longer support his family. This "Jordanian 'Abu 'Azizi" sparked demonstrations across the kingdom as well as numerous articles critical of the economic policies that would lead a Jordanian citizen to commit one of the gravest sins in Islam out of sheer frustration.[117] Criticism from the tribes continued unabated and one of their primary rhetorical frames continued to orbit around King Abdullah's neoliberal economic policies. In the view of the tribes, these neoliberal policies are not only leaving them behind, but also replacing their favored position with greater Palestinian-Jordanians into positions of power, and, finally, stealing what they perceive as their hereditary lands.

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[116] H. Varulkar, "The Arab Spring in Jordan – Part II: Oppositionists Challenging the Legitimacy of the King and Hashemite Royal Family," Inquiry & Analysis Series (The Middle East Media Research Institute, March 4, 2012), https://www.memri.org/reports/arab-spring-jordan-%E2%80%93-part-ii-oppositionists-challenging-legitimacy-king-and-hashemite-royal.
[117] Varulkar, "The Arab Spring in Jordan - Part II".

King Abdullah continued in early 2012 in attempting to mollify protesters' demands – but without devolving too much power from the throne. In January and February 2012, the king announced early parliamentary elections. Perhaps more importantly in the immediate in terms of sending a message to the opposition, he declared his intent to fight corruption, firing GID (mukhabarat) chief Muhammad al-Dhahabi on suspicion of money laundering, and appeared to be heading next for former royal court chief and finance and planning and international cooperation minister Bassem 'Awadallah. None of these moves appeared to appease the streets.[118]

On January 11, 2012, 'Udai Abu 'Issa, activist in the Youth Movement for Reform *hirak,* torched a mural of the king in the streets of Madaba. Though the king later pardoned Abu 'Issa a month later, he was initially sentenced by the State Security Court – effectively military tribunals used for civilians – to two years in prison for "harming the king's dignity."[119] A week later, oppositionist and military veteran Dr. Ahmad 'Oweidi al-'Abbadi led a protest outside the prime minister's residence. While the protest focused initially on demanding an increase in military pensions, it soon devolved into pitched battles with the security forces when hundreds of protesters broke down the police cordon barrier in front of the residence. Al-'Abbadi's rhetoric only grew more dangerous as he "threatened that the veterans would lead an armed revolution against the regime if

[118] Varulkar.
[119] Ammonnews.net, January 26, 2012; Assabeel.net, January 12, 2012, cited in Varulkar, "The Arab Spring in Jordan - Part II".

the latter did not agree to their demands by the beginning of February 2012."[120] In a television interview, he elaborated, saying

> A republican regime in Jordan is bound to come. I don't think it will take more than two years at the most. A republican regime embodies the will of the people through elections, whereas the monarchic regime has become a thing of the past, which does not reflect the will of the people. The king does not rise to power by the will of the people, but by his own will, and he therefore treats the people as a herd of subjects. We want to have a president of a republic who will treat the people as the ones who elected him, and who brought him to his position... We don't want a civil war. We want life in our country to be good and honorable. Therefore, the king must return to his senses, and realize that the will of the Jordanian people, and especially that of the tribes and the army veterans, is not what it used to be.[121]

Al-'Abbadi even denigrated the potential of a negotiated position of a constitutional monarchy, calling it "unacceptable", questioning whether that would solve problems of corruption, and even challenging the current and historical legitimacy of the Hashemites to rule Jordan, saying

> "'By their own logic they are occupiers, not by mine. He calls himself an occupier but he wants us to call him king? He is an occupier and Jordan must be liberated from this Hashemite family… [King Abdullah I] "said in October 1920 in Ma'an: "I have come to visit [Jordan] in order to occupy [it]." I am telling them now, the visit is over'."[122]

Unsurprisingly, al-'Abbadi was arrested, for "inciting to topple the regime" but not before holding a press conference in which he implored his followers and other hirak members to realize that an attack on him was an attack on the entire reform movement. He asserted, finally, that had he accepted the offer the regime had allegedly made to him in order to silence him, he "could have been a minister, prime minister, or [even] head of the [Jordanian] Senate, and earned

[120] Varulkar.
[121] Varulkar.
[122] Varulkar.

tens of millions. …The state [tried to] bargain with me, but I declined [the offers]…"[123]

His arrest incensed his supporters and fellow tribe members. On February 2, 2012, Hundreds demonstrate for the release of al-'Abbadi, holding up traffic at 8th circle and promising to stay until he was given access to his family. The group threatened to spread protests to other areas. A 2,000-strong rally in support of al-'Abbadi, saw a dramatic escalation of anti-regime rhetoric from a diverse crowd including his tribe members, supporters, and a cross-section of the different protest movements, primarily of the tribal hirak. On top of criticizing King Abdullah, Queen Rania and other regime members, the crowd's chants included

> "the people want to topple the regime"; "if we want we can topple the regime," "death but not humiliation," "we want peaceful reforms, otherwise, we have an alternative plan," "today it's Al-'Abbadi, tomorrow it will be all of us," "revolution until the regime falls," "down with the regime" and "down with the king."[124]

In al-'Abbadi's absence, another Jordan National Movement spokesman leveraged Qur'anic verses against kings and autocratic rule. Going further, he said that King Abdullah was "unworthy of his position and that his rule was illegitimate due to its 'autocratic [character] and total corruption'." In perhaps the most dangerous transgression, he "compared [King Abdullah] to Pharaoh who ignored the danger and rode on until the sea swallowed him."[125] The protesters pledged a civil disobedience campaign aimed at turning the Eighth Circle into Tahrir square.[126] Predictably, once the protesters returned to eighth circle to make

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[123] Varulkar.
[124] Varulkar, "The Arab Spring in Jordan - Part II".
[125] Varulkar, ibid.
[126] Jordandays.tv; najemnews.com; *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*(London), February 3, 2012, cited in Varulkar, ibid.

good on their promise, events devolved as they started fires, began looting shops and throwing stones at police and security forces. The latter responded with tear gas and dozens of arrests. Varulkar again notes that al-'Abbadi's tribe was not unanimous in its support of him. At least one delegation from the tribe met with the Interior minister and "declared that the tribe is completely loyal to the king and that [it believes] that harming the homeland is a red line that must not be crossed."[127]

The regime was undoubtedly unnerved when veteran oppositionist Laith Shubaylat visited al-'Abbadi in Jweida prison. Though Shubaylat admitted that he did not agree with all of al-'Abbadi's statements, he nevertheless stressed al-'Abbadi's freedom of expression. More important, Shubaylat began rhetorically dismantling the king's position "above the fray", connecting him directly to the economic problems and corruption at the core of the protest demands. In one particular instance, he ridiculed the regime's attempt to appease the public by firing and arresting former mukhabarat chief Muhammad al-Dhahabi:

> Facing a crisis, the regime has started tossing us one corrupt [figure] after another from among [its] 40 thieves, hoping that this will silence the demands of the people, which has started pointing a finger at Ali Baba [himself i.e., the king], without whom there would be no corrupting thieves here [in the first place].[128]

More pointed, he demonstrated how crucial al-'Abbadi's critiques of the regime itself were, arguing that the current situation

> …requires a rapid and serious response, and that nothing will prevent an explosion among the masses except negotiations with the single man who has no peer, i.e., the king. The king must present us with his proposals for

[127] Varulkar, ibid.
[128] Varulkar, "The Arab Spring in Jordan - Part II".

> reform, which [must], first and foremost, address [the king] himself and the people surrounding him... Reform can only start with him.[129]

Curiously, though, Shubaylat retreated slightly, leaving a wide berth for the devolution of the regime to a constitutional monarchy rather than a republic, still apparently believing that the king was the linchpin that held together the nation.

> For the king to remain on his throne – and I still believe that it is important for the kingdom's stability that he does remain – his fitness [to rule] and his commitment to his throne, country, and people must be [subjected to the scrutiny] of the people. [The king] must be approved by the people [and must subject himself] to their oversight. Moreover, the constitutional limitations regarding who is suited for the throne must be reinstated... If the king does not make haste in this direction, without hesitation or beating about the bush, we can expect the worst.[130]

Between July 15 and October 4, 2012, the regime embarked on a concerted campaign to round up and arrest twenty pro-reform activists either during or following peaceful protests. Amnesty International lists the charges against them as including

> ‘carrying out acts that undermine the political system in the Kingdom', participating in an 'illegitimate gathering', 'insulting the King', spreading news that aims at 'weakening national sentiment or inciting sectarian and racial strife', and 'attempting to change the state's constitution'[131]

Sa’oud al-‘Ajarmeh, a member of the *Tayyar al-Urduni* 36 (Jordan 36 Movement) for instance, was arrested in Amman in July 2012 during a protest against the controversial electoral law. He is alleged to have publicly criticized the king and others and “is ‘being tried on charges of ‘carrying out acts that undermine the political system in the Kingdom’ and ‘inciting others to carry out illegitimate acts’.” Fadi Masamreh, an activist and reporter for blog-zine *Khabarjo* was

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[129] Varulkar, ibid.
[130] Varulkar, ibid.
[131] “Arrest of 20 pro-Reform Activists in Jordan Is Part of Ongoing Crackdown,” Amnesty International UK - Press Releases, October 12, 2012, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/arrest-20-pro-reform-activists-jordan-part-ongoing-crackdown.

arrested along with 19 others on September 12, 2012 for "cursing the king, gathering illegally, inciting against the Constitution and the government."[132] Viewed cynically by activists and others, King Abdullah penned an open letter to the incoming prime minister "emphasizing the 'government's responsibility to respect freedom of expression…and the right to peaceful protest'" while the twenty activists arrested since July remained in prison.[133]

The Muslim Brotherhood vowed to flood the streets with thousands of protesters on September 5, 2012, warning the regime that it faced "its 'final chance to usher in democratic reforms." At the same time, Islamists launched the "Higher Council for Reform" to save Jordan from the economic, social and political crises caused by the regime. The regime cast this move in a conspiratorial light, accusing the Islamists of "seeking to 'form a new political regime in Jordan'," something the authorities knew would resonate with East Bank loyalists concerned with King Abdullah "selling" the country to the Palestinians-Jordanians.[134]

One month later, King Abdullah attempted to head off a planned Islamist-led rally on October 5 by announcing the dissolution of the parliament for the second time in a year, calling for early elections by the end of 2012. The IAF responded – just as it had in 2010 – by promising to boycott the elections to

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[132] Jodi Rudoren and Ranya Kadri, "Jordan Protests Turn Deadly on Second Day," *The New York Times*, November 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/middleeast/jordan-protests-turn-deadly-on-second-day.html.
[133] "Arrest of 20 pro-Reform Activists in Jordan Is Part of Ongoing Crackdown."
[134] "Muslim Brotherhood Vows to 'flood' Jordan's Streets to Press Reform Demands," Trend News Agency, September 5, 2012, https://en.trend.az/world/arab/2061860.html.

protest the sluggish-to-non-existent pace of promised reforms.[135] The Islamist-led "Friday to Rescue the Nation" rally went forward as planned on October 5. The central demand was the familiar demand for the king to accelerate promised reforms. But, especially for Islamists and Palestinian-Jordanians, there was the added aim "to push for broader representation and a more democratic parliament" – the central reason for the promised boycott by the Muslim Brotherhood.[136]

Demonstrators estimated at 10,000 – 15,000, and comprised of both Islamists and some elements of the tribal *hirak*, made this the largest protests in Jordan to this point.[137] Al-Khalidi reported that the protesters converged from across Jordan to the Husseini mosque in downtown, changing "Listen Abdullah, our demands are legitimate" and "People want to reform the regime." Others were seen carrying signs "denouncing corruption and the pervasive role of the security apparatus in daily life."[138] Al-Khalidi also notes that tensions had been rising during the week with word of a planned pro-regime counter-rally at the same location by "loyalists with links to the security forces", but it was called off inexplicably at the last minute.[139]

November 2012 saw a remarkable escalatory shift in events. Protests began in Irbid and other cities after the newest neoliberal maneuver saw the

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[135] Ruth Sherlock, "Thousands Rally to Demand Reform in Jordan," *The Telegraph*, October 5, 2012, sec. World, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/jordan/9590706/Thousands-rally-to-demand-reform-in-Jordan.html; "Jordan's King Dissolves Parliament," *The New York Times*, October 4, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/middleeast/jordans-king-dissolves-parliament.html.

[136] Suleiman Al-Khalidi, "In Biggest Protest, Jordan Islamists Demand Change," *Reuters*, October 5, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/05/us-jordan-protests-idUSBRE8940ZF20121005.

[137] Sherlock, "Thousands Rally to Demand Reform in Jordan"; Al-Khalidi, "In Biggest Protest, Jordan Islamists Demand Change."

[138] Al-Khalidi, "In Biggest Protest, Jordan Islamists Demand Change."

[139] Al-Khalidi.

regime cut subsidies, most notably on fuel – both petrol and cooking gas. The regime had tried to reduce subsidies once before, on September 10, only to reverse the decision in the face of protests. The cabinet announced an even greater "drop in subsidies that would result in increases of 14 percent on prices at the pump, and more than 50 percent in gas used for cooking."[140] This sparked demonstrations across the country on November 13th in which protesters burned tires, smashed traffic lights, and blocked roads. Most notable, however, was the mass and blatant crossing of the red line surrounding criticism of the king. Protesters throughout the country were heard questioning the continuing rule of Abdullah. In Dhiban, protesters burned pictures of the king, in Salt, protesters destroyed two cars outside the Prime Minister's home. In Amman, thousands marched again to occupy *Diwar Dakhiliyyeh*, near midnight, changing "the people want the fall of the regime."[141]

Crucially, events in Irbid turned violent as citizens alleged that police shot and killed 22-year-old Qasi Omari after he and a crowd of thirty other young men went to the police station to confront authorities about why police had used deliberately abusive language in breaking up the previous day's protest.[142] In a

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[140] Jodi Rudoren, "Jordan Faces Protests After Gas-Price Proposal," *The New York Times,* November 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/world/middleeast/jordan-faces-protests-after-gas-price-proposal.html.

[141] David D. Kirkpatrick, "Protesters in Jordan Call for Ending King Abdullah II's Rule," The New York Times, November 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/middleeast/protesters-in-jordan-call-for-ending-king-abdullah-iis-rule.html;
Jodi Rudoren, "Jordan Faces Protests After Gas-Price Proposal," The New York Times, November 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/world/middleeast/jordan-faces-protests-after-gas-price-proposal.html.

[142] David D. Kirkpatrick, "Protesters in Jordan Call for Ending King Abdullah II's Rule," The New York Times, November 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/middleeast/protesters-in-jordan-call-for-ending-king-abdullah-iis-rule.html.

series of events that will later become familiar in the case of the Bahraini uprising, this drastic overreach by security services was met with another flare in protests across the country. Beginning on November 14, protesters set fire to several government vehicles and a municipal building in Irbid. Teachers went on strike and other unions announced a planned two-hour work stoppage for the following Sunday (November 18). Students blocked the main road near the University of Jordan campus in Amman while crowds gathered again at *Diwar Dakhiliyyeh.* Protesters in Madaba tore down the king's picture and burnt it and severely vandalized several banks. Protesters in Salt looted a discount store for government employees and protesters in Tafileh were met with riot police firing live ammunition in the air to disperse crowds.

Throughout this, security forces attempted to disperse crowds with tear gas.[143] During the November 14, 2012 protests in Amman where crowds approached *diwar dakhiliyyeh*, riot police in helmets and body armor attempted to control access to the square. Hundreds of protesters crowded in front of the police cordon, chanting "The people know who is the corrupt [one]." Presaging the unrest of mid-November, Zaki Bani Irsheid, spokesman of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan asked in an interview: "Is the regime waiting for an explosion in Jordan so [King Abdullah's] end will be like the Egyptian end or the Tunisian end? …We are insisting on creating the Jordanian spring with a

[143] It should be noted that it is difficult to determine whether the reporting was meant to indicate that this occurred at most or all locations throughout the country. I believe it's safe to assume that the orders could have been the same regardless of location.

Jordanian flavor, which means reforming our regime and keeping our [*Hirak*] peaceful."[144]

By November 15, 2012, in scenes that would later appear more akin to the Bahraini uprising that the Jordanian uprising, thousands of young men occupied the streets of cities and towns across the kingdom, most notably in Irbid. State-sponsored Petra news agency reported "protests in at least seven municipalities" across the kingdom.[145] Tit-for-tat volleys of stones and tear gas between protesters and security forces persisted. CNN reported seeing "police beat one man and take him away, and…plainclothes intelligence officials take away two [other] young men as demonstrators threw rocks at the police." Meanwhile, even Jordan's Public Security Department reported that "previous protests have left 14 people injured – 10 of them by police gunfire."[146] Most notably, demonstrations were unique in their chants attacking the monarchy and the call for the end of Abdullah's rule, calling for the "fall of the regime" and, borrowing – knowingly or otherwise – from Layth Shubaylat's earlier critique "added their own dances and rhymes comparing the king to Ali Baba, the legendary thief."[147]

> "'Hey Abdullah, don't be fooled, look around and see what happened to your peers,'."
> "'Oh, Abdullah ibn Hussein, where is the people's money? Where?' … 'Raising the prices will set the country on fire!'."

[144] Rudoren, "Jordan Faces Protests After Gas-Price Proposal."
[145] Ben Brumfield and Arwa Damon, "Jordanian Protesters Make Rare Move: Speak out against King Abdullah," CNN.com, November 15, 2012, https://www.cnn.com/2012/11/14/world/meast/jordan-gas-prices/index.html.
[146] Brumfield and Damon.
[147] David D. Kirkpatrick, "Protests in Jordan Continue, With Calls for Ending the King's Rule," *The New York Times*, November 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/middleeast/protesters-in-jordan-call-for-ending-king-abdullah-iis-rule.html.

> "'Hey Abdullah, listen, listen very well, we will kneel to no one but God!' along with, 'God is mightier than all tyrants'."[148]

One protester said the grievances had spread beyond mere price increases to what they represent: "the audaciousness of the corruption." Invoking the familiar master frame of the Arab Spring he said, "It is about democracy, freedom and social justice".[149]

Overall, the story from November 13 to November 16, was one of spreading protests that may even have begun peacefully devolved into throwing rocks and burning tires while police responded with tear gas. *Wall Street Journal* coverage of local media said that 280 people were arrested relating to recent events. Heavy security was reported in Amman on November 16, ostensibly in anticipation of the now-normal exchange of rocks and tear gas, but there were no reports of police using water cannons or tear gas to disperse protesters downtown. Riot police did, however, beat protesters with batons when they tried to move toward the palace.[150] In all, Amnesty International later cited reports that dozens of people were detained in 2012, "solely for peacefully calling for economic and political reforms" and that detention without trial continued to be an ostensible punitive measure against peaceful and legitimate protest.[151]

This chapter was not meant to result in drawing any conclusions. Yet, if one feels the need to do so, it should be clear that the Jordanian uprising during

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[148] Brumfield and Damon, "Jordanian Protesters Make Rare Move: Speak out against King Abdullah."
[149] Kirkpatrick, "Protests in Jordan Continue, With Calls for Ending the King's Rule."
[150] Bill Spindle and Suha Philip Ma'ayeh, "Jordanians Call for End to Monarchy," Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2012, sec. World, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324556304578122784202064810.
[151] Amnesty International UK, "Jordan: Intended Release of 116 Detainees Is 'Too Little, Too Late,'" Press Releases (Amnesty International UK, December 11, 2012).

the Arab spring wave was far from the vacuous action and series of non-events that many analysts have diagnosed it as. Having established in detail the timeline of the Jordanian uprising, the next chapter will systematically examine the events through the hypotheses I set out in the first chapter.

Chapter 4

Jordanian Spring or Fractured Revolt?

Does Jordan represent a monarchy in the Middle East that exhibits an advantage over republics in forestalling protests? Is the Hashemite regime better at withstanding protests that occurred during the Arab Spring uprisings?

The last chapter examined the history of mobilization in Jordan during the Arab Spring wave. In this chapter, I leverage that process-tracing data to begin answering the research questions by examining the set of four hypotheses. Naturally, a truly comparative analysis cannot come until the other case studies of Bahrain and Tunisia are examined. Only the first three hypotheses will be examined in this chapter. The first hypothesis (H1) holds that MENA monarchies are better than MENA non-monarchies at preventing protests. The second hypothesis (H2) holds that monarchies are better at withstanding protest than non-monarchies. We already know that monarchies survived and hypothesis H2 is supported. So, if the evidence does not show that they are better at preventing mobilization (H1), then they must be better at withstanding it (H2). This leads us to two sub-hypotheses, only the first of which I examine systematically in this chapter. If it is true that monarchies are better at withstanding protest than non-monarchies (H2), I assess if this is because monarchies are better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling protests (Hypothesis 2a).

If H1 is supported, the Jordanian regime will have acted proactively and have been able to confine protests to relatively fewer and smaller incidents. Those

incidents will be less geographically dispersed. The opposition will be less ideologically diverse, and their goals and tone will be less extreme and less likely to call for regime change and more likely to call for changes in policy or in policy makers. These elements would indicate support for Hypothesis 1 in that the Hashemite regime was better able to prevent protests on a scale, intensity, and tone that threatened to topple the regime.

As a monarchy, the Jordanian regime obviously survived the uprisings that swept the region. Again, this satisfies Hypothesis 2 but, again, H2 is not directely tested. H2 is tested through its sub-hypotheses; the most crucial for this chapter being H2a - monarchies are better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling protests. If hypothesis H2a is supported, the Jordanian regime will have focused on controlling the protests that emerged, resulting in fewer and shorter protests that are less geographically dispersed. Those protests will focus more on the goals of change in policies or policy makers below the King, and those that directly challenge the existence of the monarchy or otherwise cross regime red-lines will be quickly disrupted. If Hypotheses 2a is upheld, we should see a Jordanian regime that quickly disrupts protests, but that may move to concede as quickly as it represses, so long as challenges to the regime are controlled.

As I will do in each chapter featuring my three cases, to aid in examining Hypotheses H1 and H2a, I borrow and amend Michele Angrist's criteria as a testable metric for successful mobilization to overthrow the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia. I will operationalize her criteria after amending it slightly to act as an

outline for this chapter and to fit the proposed hypotheses. I begin by examining the intensity of protests in terms of scale (number, size, and geographic dispersion across Jordan). Next, I examine the character and composition of the protest coalition in Jordan, looking for a diversity of actors across identity and demographic cleavages. This will be followed by an examination of the character of the grievances expressed and used to mobilize protests in the Jordanian uprising and the intensity of protests in their demands. Finally, I will review the findings regarding the regime's capacity for prevention of (H1) and control of (H2a) protests.

As presented in previous chapters, Angrist shows that in Tunisia, several factors combined to provide a perfect recipe for the fall of the Ben Ali regime during the Arab Spring. Revolution in Tunisia succeeded because the regime alienated key constituencies while the opposition forged alliances across identity and ideology cleavages the regime assumed were unbridgeable. This situation was balanced precariously on a powder keg of economic and political grievances that reflected the regime's inability to keep up with citizens' rising expectations. The final ingredient in this volatile mix is the presence of broad-based protests across most of the country for a significant period of time. Finally, these protests outpaced the capacity of the security services to repress them.[1]

While previous scholarship and existing data help in exploring my research questions and examining the hypotheses, it was necessary to gather original data to better understand what organizing and social mobilization is like

[1] Michele Penner Angrist, "Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal* 67, no. 4 (Autumn 2013): 547–64. See also Chapter 2 in this volume for more detail on Angrist's argument.

in a monarchy and determine what any potential monarchical advantage looks like "on the ground". Fieldwork in Amman, Dhiban, and Madaba, Jordan in summer 2016 was designed to illuminate this "view from the ground" of activists, protest participants, bystanders, and analysts in a monarchy experiencing protracted collective action. This chapter draws on data collected via approximately thirty semi-structured interviews collected between June and September 2016. Interviewees included activists, civil society agents, lawyers, academics, and journalists (including freelance journalists and bloggers).

Intensity of Scale of Protests

As Marty Harris reports,

> The first major protests in Jordan occurred on 14 January 2011, when nearly ten thousand people marched in cities throughout the country.[2] […] For the next two years, Friday protests became a regular feature of life in Jordan, and something like 6000 demonstrations occurred in the country between January 2011 and mid-2014.[3] In 2011, there were more than 800 documented labour actions, with a similar number of labour protests in 2012.[4]

The all-too-common reason for the casual dismissal of Jordan as an important case in the Arab Spring is the relative paucity of protests, especially in terms of size. The assessment of the International Crisis Group in 2012 was that

[2] Johnny McDevitt, "Jordanians Protest against Soaring Food Prices," The Guardian, January 15, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/15/jordanians-protest-over-food-prices. Cited in Marty Harris, "Jordan's Youth after the Arab Spring" (Lowy Institute, February 5, 2015), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/jordans-youth-after-arab-spring.
[3] Amin Al-Azzam and Sayel Al-Serhan, "Youth Bulges and Political Demonstrations in Jordan: Level of Acceptance of Demonstrations Among Youth After the Arab Spring," *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 15, no. 5 (2014): 271. Cited in Harris, "Jordan's Youth after the Arab Spring."
[4] Harris, "Jordan's Youth after the Arab Spring." At this point in the original text, Harris places his own endnote, citing Fida Adely, "The Emergence of a New Labor Movement in Jordan," *Middle East Report*, vol. 264 (Fall 2012), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer264/emergence-new-labor-movement-jordan; and Phenix Center for Economic and Information Studies and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, "Labor Protests in Jordan in 2013," *Labor Watch Reports* (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, March 2014).

the protests "featur[ed] crowds of modest size but not modest significance."[5] Ziad Abu-Rish asserts that collective action in Jordan during the Arab Spring wave did not evince the same intensity either in numbers or in calls for regime change, though it did not escape mass mobilization. He characterizes the nature of the Jordanian uprising as containing "a series of weekly demonstrations, an attempted Tahrir-like occupation, labor agitation, impromptu rioting, and more."[6] Finally, he notes that the protests in Jordan did not center on the demand for the fall of the regime, though that demand "surfaced episodically and in isolation."[7]

Abu Rish's assertions regarding the smaller size, lower overall number of protests and infrequent calls for regime change in Jordan would seem to point toward the monarchical advantage. But this is only one aspect of intensity and goes only part way to confirming either preventing mobilization or withstanding protests by controlling them.

Size of Protests in Jordan

Protests that began in Dhiban in December 2010-January 2011 featured the modestly sized 200-500 participants. But as noted in the previous chapter, even this early mobilization, riding "a new popular receptivity of protest" quickly (albeit unexpectedly) swelled to 5,000.[8] From 2011 onward, smaller protests regularly featured 200-500 protesters, to "thousands". The largest reported protests ranged from 10,000-15,000.

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[5] International Crisis Group, "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IX): Dallying with Reform in a Divided Jordan."

[6] Ziad Abu Rish, "Doubling Down: Jordan Six Years into the Arab Uprisings," E-Zine, Jadaliyya, April 21, 2017, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/25886/doubling-down_jordan-six-years-into-the-arab-upris.

[7] Abu Rish, ibid.

[8] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 173.

Duration of Protests in Jordan

Though these protests were comparatively small, they were sustained. This longevity applies both longitudinally (duration of the overall protest "wave") and protests ad interim (length of protests within that wave). As Chapter 3 established, from the initial protests as reported by interview respondents in 2010/11, protests typically occurred every week until the end of the sample period in December 2011. In several cases, protests in response to security services overreaction resulted in multi-day, sequential protests. Examples include the March 24-25 *diwar dakhilliyeh* sit-in, the July 15-16 al-Nakheel Square protests in Amman in response to the crackdown on March 24-25 (which were themselves the subject of overreaching repression), the October 1 Islamist rally in Sakeb and imprisonment of Ahmad al-'Abadi, and resulting protest cascade, and (though outside the sample range) the killing of Qasi Omari in November 2012.

In terms of time, overall, the pattern is slightly less constant. From January 7, 2011, protests continued systematically through April. Protests resume June through July, break in August and September, and continue in October. Protests resume in January 2012 until the end of February. They break until July and restart again consistently until the end of the year. Seen another way, the protests seem to cycle, winding down in May 2011, September 2011, March – June 2012. There may be something to be said for protest weariness by the public, a gap in reporting by the press, or simply the normal cyclical or wave-like modulation of contentious activity. There is one instance in which activists self-consciously acknowledged a loss of protest momentum. As discussed in Chapter 3, the March

24 Youth movement sought to capitalize on the momentum after the regime's overreaction at *diwar dakhilliyeh*. The July 15, 2011 al-Nakheel Square sit-in was supposed to be that moment. After it was broken up by security services and threatened by mukhabarat agents, Amis notes that "the thirteen-member steering group broke off the sit-in to avoid bloodshed." But one member, Khalid Kamhawi, believed that backing down was a mistake. According to Kamhawi,

> There are certain historical moments which you should capture. These moments, if you don't take them when they come by, it's very difficult to reproduce them. I think it showed the regime that the youth movements, like their elders [the Islamists and established Leftist parties] are willing to compromise on certain positions…because it was a battle of wills at that point, and whoever flinches first loses. And there was a flinch from the youth movement.[9]

Illustrating Kamhawi's point, the March 24 Movement attempted a follow-up rally at the Fourth Circle the following day, July 16, 2011, "but the crowd was small and the sense of disappointment palpable. 'People were disillusioned with us', said Kamhawi, 'and I think they were right to be so'."[10]

It is at this point that Amis suggests that the option for an "open-ended occupation style" protest disappeared from the Jordanian uprising. There would be no Jordanian Tahrir Square. He also suggests that it was at this point that most of the members of the youth hirak moved their activism underground and online. It is true that this move occurred, but I believe Amis' timing of this event is incorrect as the data and my own interviews demonstrate that the protests continued for more than a year beyond the Al-Nakheel Square events.

Protests in Jordan were as geographically widespread and

[9] Amis, 179.
[10] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring." 179.

demographically inclusive as they were sustained. In terms of geographic diffusion, respondents noted that protests that would form the Jordanian uprising during the Arab Spring initially began not in the capital, but in smaller rural areas such as Dhiban and Madaba. Within days of those initial actions, protesters were calling for parallel and repeated protests in Amman, Karak, Salt, Irbid, and Ma'an. In the case of Jordan, as compared to Tunisia, protests were quickly able to spread to the capital.

As reported in Chapter 3, protests in either the periphery or the capital would be routinely paralleled in the other. Protests were routinely reported in Amman, Madaba, Jerash, Ma'an, Irbid, Karak, Tafileh, and Zarqa governorates – comprising approximately eight out of the twelve total governorates and encompassing each of the three regions of the country. Contrary to popular assertions and common refrains among media and scholars, protests in Jordan were hardly "of modest size," just as they were hardly insignificant and geographically sustained. The relative size of the Jordanian uprising will not come into focus until properly compared with Tunisia and Bahrain in the subsequent chapters.

Character and Composition of the Protest Coalition in Jordan

Abu Rish, among others, downplays the size and intensity of protests. But the previous chapter demonstrates that, even in Jordan, the spectrum of participants was wide and crossed several crucial and dangerous ideological and demographic cleavages. As Jacob Amis' (inter alia) research demonstrates, all the regime's usual tactics for mollifying protesters and neutering dissent – increasing

crackdowns on the media and activists and especially when king Abdullah fired beleaguered prime ministers Samir Rifa'i and Ma'arouf al-Bakhit – the protest coalition widened and deepened rather than dissipating.[11]

At least in the beginning, this diverse protest coalition, which would come to be known in Jordan as the *hirak* (movement), from *harakat sha'abiyya* (popular movements) coalesced around core grievances "expressing anger with the state of the economy, ostentatious corruption, unaccountability and the concentration of power in the hands of the few."[12]

There is some conceptual slippage in what constitutes, for analysts as well as Jordanians, the *hirak.* For many respondents, mention of the *hirak* elicited the idea of the reform/protest coalition in general terms.[13] For others, like Rami Khouri and Sean Yom, inter alia, the *hirak* specifically "encompassed nearly 40 East Bank tribal youth activist groups representing rural communities long thought to be unflagging supporters of the…regime."[14] Yom makes this distinction carefully to draw out the unique character of the Arab Spring wave Jordanian uprising. The *hirak* in this sense, then, is juxtaposed against the traditional opposition in the form of Leftist and Islamist activists and parties; "the upstart *hirak* represented a significant new vector in Jordanian politics. Rarely had so many tribal Jordanians in so many different localities pushed for change through nonviolent protests that defied both state repression and communal

[11] Amis, 175.
[12] International Crisis Group, "Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IX): Dallying with Reform in a Divided Jordan," i.
[13] Field Observations, May-September 2016.
[14] Rami Khouri, interview with the author May 7, 2016; Sean L. Yom, "Tribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan: The Case of the *Hirak* Movement," *The Middle East Journal* 68, no. 2 (May 15, 2014): 229.

pressures."[15] Amis likewise identifies these *harakat sha'abiyya* (popular movements) in the form of local activist committees which were "soon to be found in every major settlement in the country."[16]

Jamal al-Shalabi does not use the term "*hirak*", but essentially divides the *hirak* along the same lines as Yom. Al-Shalabi identifies at least three groups separate from the traditional opposition forces: the army (represented by the "Military Retirees Committee"), the tribes (represented by the Group/Faction of 36) and the "youth, teachers, etc." (represented by the 24 March Youth Movement).[17] Amis echoes Yom's understanding of the birth of the variegated *hirak* movement.

The novelty, depth, and influence of the *harakat sha'abiyya* (popular movements) must have been quickly evident to the regime. Even after early attempts to mollify protesters,

> Beyond a steady street presence, the protest movement quickly gained organizational depth across diverse sections of society. Even as established political parties and trade unions joined the fray, bringing with them urban and largely Palestinian-origin followings, new reformist alliances were emerging with grassroots connections to the towns and villages of the East Bank. Building on increased cooperation over the previous decade, an array of non-party-based reform movements came together. … In addition, a specific role for tribally identifying reform coalitions was announced with an open letter to the king, signed by thirty-six dignitaries of prominent tribes, calling for urgent political reform lest "the Tunisian and Egyptian deluge come to Jordan sooner or later". While this mixture of societal forces did not immediately unite behind a coherent platform, the simultaneous flush of anger very much resembled what Curtis Ryan has called "a kind of *de facto* national 'street coalition' for change".[18] Since

[15] Yom, 229.
[16] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 181.
[17] Jamal Al-Shalabi, "Jordan: Revolutionaries without a Revolution," *Confluences Mediterranee* 2, no. 77 (February 2011): 96–100.
[18] Curtis R. Ryan, "Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 3 (2011): 382. Quoted in Amis, "Hirak!": 175.

> the 1970s, Jordanians of Palestinian and East Bank heritage had all too often vented their frustrations with the state separately – and with one eye over their shoulder. Now they were marching at the same time, if not quite with one voice.[19]

Though the tendency among analysts has been to point out the *sui generis* nature of the Jordanian *hirak*, this diversity in terms of geography and identity in Jordanian protests predates the Arab Spring wave. Schwedler makes note of this diversity even as early as the 2002 protests: "political parties, professional associations, civil society organizations, independent activists, and passersby. Protesters spanned the political spectrum, from secular Marxists to conservative Islamists and many events were organized and coordinated across ideological divides."[20]

Several of my respondents in Jordan characterized the *hirak* in different but overlapping ways. First, recall that Dhiban activist 'Abu Shuji'a' insisted on the beginning of the protest cycle in Jordan to the May 1, 2006 teachers/workers strike in the southern town of Dhiban as the catalyst for demonstrations demanding more of the government that spread into the Arab Spring time frame.[21] In Abu Shuji'a's view, 2010 appeared on the radar not from *de novo* mobilization or solely by diffusion from the Arab Spring. Instead, he argues that by the end of 2010, three related but separate grievance networks – teachers, workers and retired military – converged around the issue of thousands of workers, including himself, who had been fired from the ministry of agriculture at the end of 2010. The 2006-7 protests previously mentioned likewise sought to improve the equality

[19] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 175.
[20] Jillian Schwedler, "More Than a Mob: The Dynamics of Political Demonstrations in Jordan," *Middle East Report*, no. 226 (Spring 2003): 19.
[21] "Abu Shuji'a" interview with the author 29 August 2016, Madaba/Dhiban, Jordan.

of workers in the government and to be reinstated in their jobs. This widespread view, that protests in Jordan were in some ways separate and only coincidentally overlapping with the Arab Spring wave, recurred throughout the interviews and across respondents.

Other respondents characterized the *hirak* in terms of composition as a confederation of labor unions, including teachers, day laborers, students, and, in some instances, specific sectors (e.g., the "electricity *hirak*"). By the time the 2006-7 Dhiban protests occurred, the composition of the opposition had begun to change. Shifting from the traditional parties and professional associations to include first a widespread labor movement of which the teachers' and workers' protests were a part, later, in 2010-11, the same networks and their tactics and grievance frames were spliced with newly emerging groups. The seeds of the *hirak* that would take the streets in 2011 germinated among the "alternative opposition" which included the Jordanian Social Left Movement (*Harakat al-yasar al-ijtima'i al-Urduni*), among many others.[22] These groups coalesced to greater and lesser degrees under banners of the "Movement of the Jordanian People" and "The Jordanian Campaign for Change – *Jayeen*".[23] These groups, along with more decentralized youth movements – the *hirak* proper – and their willingness to work on the margins, nearer to established 'red lines', helped to motivate and mobilize youth and the existing economic-grievance frame

[22] As Amis correctly notes, the term "alternative opposition" is Hisham Bustani's. Bustani, Hisham. "The Alternative Opposition in Jordan and the Failure to Understand Lessons of Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions." *Jadaliyya,* March 22, 2011. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/959/the-alternative-opposition-in-jordan-and-the-failu. Cited in Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 173.
[23] Hisham Bustani, "The Alternative Opposition in Jordan and the Failure to Understand Lessons of Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions," *Jadaliyya,* March 22, 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/959/the-alternative-opposition-in-jordan-and-the-failu.

networks. Ultimately, Amis notes that in an increasingly mobilizing environment, and

> Distinguished by cross-ideological collaboration and the participation of youth never before engaged in politics, the movements also followed the existing grain of their local communities, harnessing the solidarity of tribal structures (*al-asha'ir*). Outside the capital, they spearheaded and to a large extent embodied the novel activism now widely known as *hirak.*[24]

As Amis correctly notes, the May 2010 editorial by the veterans' committee was a crucial bolstering factor but also presented with more than a tinge of East Bank chauvinism. But it went beyond this and communicated an even greater danger to the regime; "it reflected the wider current of mounting activism, and revealed serious discontent within even this praetorian sector of Jordanian society."[25]

Even if the regime could somehow absorb or mollify the more nativist demands of the Military Veterans/Retirees Committee, it was only one of several dangerous movements. As both Jamal al-Shalabi and several interview respondents argued, the pro-East Bank Jordanian chauvinism of the Veterans letter led former PM and mukhabarat chief Ahmad 'Obeidat to both stress national unity and criticize the nativist message while still criticizing the regime.[26]

Amis' research mirrors the responses of my interviewees in Dhiban on the emergence of protests and the connections between 2006-7 in Dhiban and the ignition of the Arab Spring wave in Dhiban. Amis notes that in the late 2000s, "Dhiban had become a hub of activism associated with the Social Left and the

[24] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 181.
[25] Amis, 172.
[26] Al-Shalabi, "Jordan: Revolutionaries without a Revolution," 98. Author interview, August 17, 2016, Amman, Jordan.

movement for public-sector day-workers' rights."[27] It should be evident that a strand of common grievances and mobilization exists between 2006-7 and 2010-11.

Interviewees were asked to reflect on the overall nature and history of Jordanian activism, aimed at understanding not only how Jordanians mobilize but also how the regime typically responds to contentious displays. I asked the interviewees about their willingness to participate in a hypothetical protest within the week. Roughly one third said they would participate. Another third demanded more information on the hypothetical protest, particularly the organizers' goals. A final third asserted that there was no point and that "revolution has moved on". Some of those in this third group said they would find it difficult to mobilize people because of increased apathy regarding protests as a useful tool. In one instance, a young man of approximately twenty years old, continually asked for clarification, ultimately asking "but what is the reason for me to protest? What is going wrong?"

In retrospect, the hesitance of this young man, along with similar but more nuanced responses from others who indicated they would need more information before entering the fray, tells us several things that escape cursory analysis. First, in most regimes, citizens who turn to protest to bring challenges to the state must engage in a cost-benefit analysis. There is real cost in challenging the state, even in a democracy. In this case, at the very least his hesitance indicates not apathy but rather a realistic view that the reasons for confronting the state must be worth the potential price. In the case of non-democratic regimes like Jordan, this price

[27] Amis, "Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 172.

includes physical violence against not only oneself, but threats against one's family. Participants also run the risk of political imprisonment, torture, or death at the hands of police and security forces. Second, this young man's statement represents one facet of an overall theme among Jordanians interviewed. Jordanians, even in their apathy, remain politically savvy. In practice, this attitude translates to a careful and selective approach toward protest campaigns.

Comparably, members of the last group – those who believe the revolution has "moved on" – many of whom were and are active in the reform movement and who were on the front-lines of protests in 2010– are now among the most difficult to mobilize. The activists within this group varied in their view of whether continuing their more aggressive political work was worth it in such a context. One activist and researcher argued that people had left the streets and outwardly displayed apathy. But since 2011, which she says people began to call "the year of getting away with it" – people are more insularly active – i.e., people continue to be politically aware, if altogether less outwardly active. They had definite opinions about politics, but the willingness to go back into the streets was suppressed. This has resulted, as both my respondents and other analysts have noted, in a move of activists and activism out of the streets and onto the internet. This is easily observed in the work of the *7iber* (حبر ("ink")) online magazine and media collective – which presents dissident voices and analysis from among young Jordanians and the reform coalition at large. Naturally, the website is periodically shut down by the regime.

Intensity of Demands and Aims of Protests

Another ingredient to be examined in this case is the intensity of the protest movement. Intensity in these uprisings cannot be measured only in numbers, but also must account for the demands of protests. It is also worth examining the targets of mobilization to determine the gravity of the challenge to the regime and the realism of a strategy and aims of contentious actions.

In the Arab Spring, mobilization occurred around policy-based grievances, government-based grievances (i.e., against those in charge); and regime-based grievances (i.e., ranging from reform of existing institutions to the removal of institutions), or a combination of the above. Of course, protests can be based initially on policy grievances and evolve to include grievances against policy-makers or institutions. In Jordan, both historically and during the Arab Spring, protests have frequently centered around economic policy grievances. But as we saw in the previous chapter, these have quickly expanded to specific policy grievances (e.g., corruption). They also easily escalated to calls for the removal of various policymakers, including prime ministers, MPs, heads of the security services. The extension to policymakers is even easier if the policy-grievances can be pinned on them as well. The consistent collective action frames in Jordan – as we saw in the last chapter – easily made these connections.

Like most of the countries touched by Arab Spring protests, in many cases, Jordan and Tunisia both feature uneven economic growth across demographic and geographic categories. The repeated unrest in the peripheral towns of Ma'an in Jordan, and Gafsa in Tunisia illustrate such gaps in economic development. As communities that feel left behind, both economically and politically, these two

towns have been more prone to become sites of protest. In both Ma'an and Gafsa, this unrest occurred despite some measure of nationwide economic advancement. Hence the allure and modularity of the economic and political master frames of the Arab Spring. Moreover, as Ma'an and Gafsa (and the previous chapter on Jordan's uprising) demonstrate, economic growth does not necessarily stall dissatisfaction with political conditions.

Several common patterns appeared in the interviews that warrant attention. First, with few exceptions, interviewees proudly identified Jordan as having a rather rich history of activism and protest. Particularly beginning with the 1989 price riots in traditionally loyalist parts of the country, interviewees highlighted the frequency with which Jordanians have been willing to take to the streets – particularly regarding economic grievances. Respondents almost without exception pointed to the period of 1989 as crucial to understanding the salience of economic grievances. It is also well known that 1989 marked the beginning of the regime-led liberalization program, cutting into employment and livelihoods of those elements historically most loyal to the monarchy. As in other countries, especially Tunisia, these neoliberal policies returned to haunt the Jordanian regime during the pre-Arab Spring period. This is particularly evident in the Ma'an uprisings of 2002, 2006-7. But again, these economic-cum-political grievances would be the fertile medium from which the Arab Spring emerged only a few years later.

King Abdullah's tactics of delayed political reform and fluctuating neoliberalism have undoubtedly inspired unrest. Not only has Abdullah built his

regime on a closer relationship with business elites, to the ostensible detriment of traditional East Bank-dominated tribal elites, but unlike his father, Abdullah's regime has been less willing to concede to public demands for liberalization. Like his father before him, Abdullah was faced with IMF-induced spending cuts, which caused protests in the early and mid-2000s. But to add insult to injury, by 2010-11, and especially in 2012, the regime was making incredibly crass decisions to cut subsidies on basic necessities, all but daring the public to move into the streets. The public obliged.

The Arab Spring master frame that diffused across the region included the famous calls for bread, freedom, and social justice. Wrapped in this frame was a cry against corruption and demands for fundamental political and economic reform. This appears repeatedly in Jordan. The 2007 and 2009 Teachers' and Farmers' protests in Dhiban/Madaba; the 2005 bread riots in Ma'an. Even the riots that began in Ma'an in January 2011 after the deaths of members of one tribe at a water treatment facility quickly swelled into general denigration of government corruption and inefficiency.[28]

The reason the Arab Spring diffused so readily was precisely because of the commonalities among economic and political grievances. Yet we also observe variance in regime survival. The size of resulting protests and the character of the protest coalition that forms to advance these grievances is the important next step in analyzing these events in Jordan and examining our hypotheses.

Again, size is only one aspect of intensity and goes only so far in

[28] Husseini, "Government Threatens Tough Measures against Maan Rioters."; Husseini, "Authorities Restore Normalcy to Maan after Two Days of Rioting."

examining either hypothesis H1 – preventing protests – or Hypotheses H2a – controlling protests. As a result, it is somewhat misguided to take Abu Rish's characterization of the uprising at face value based on its success in overthrowing or seriously threatening the regime. First, there is the issue of whether economic grievance protests should be seen as isolated or less threatening. Second, in nearly as many instances, economic grievance frames and corresponding protests are easily expanded and escalated to political grievance frames and protests. Because of their tendency to transform into political demands or because of their ability to serve as a façade for political demands, it behooves us to take economic grievances and demands seriously as mobilizations in their own right.

Of course, even if we take economic grievance-based protests as serious mobilizations, it remains to be seen whether those protests rose to the level of anti-regime protests. If they do call for regime change, we should consider this a blow against hypothesis 2a and should likewise examine whether it counts as a blow against monarchical advantage as regime control of protests. Abu Rish does point out that the Jordanian uprising featured occasional calls for the fall of the regime, though far less than in other cases. This is assumed to be evidence of the legitimacy aspect of the monarchical advantage or of the structural and institutional elements that Abu Rish identifies.[29] At the least, I believe we should challenge the implication that the absence of mass and systematic calls for the fall of the regime, or the absence of coalescence around a particular grievance or other collective action frame, is evidence that the protests were interpreted as less challenging for a particular regime. At first glance, it might seem specious to

[29] Abu Rish, "Doubling Down."

argue that protests that were lower in intensity could be anything but less challenging to the regime. But this depends on what we mean by “intensity” and how a regime defines and demarcates ‘red lines’.

Protests in Jordan were indeed smaller in size of protests. Simultaneously, however, those protests were more numerous and certainly aggressive in their geographic diffusion, and represent, overall, a sustained campaign of collective action. Amis describes the Jordanian uprising during the Arab Spring as "a highly contentious but assiduously non-violent campaign of civic action, from demonstrations and sit-ins to strikes and boycotts."[30] Ultimately, Amis highlights the importance of the Jordanian uprising, even absent an overthrown monarchy as the outcome:

> Activists demands were self-limiting, but still taboo-smashing. In turn, a restrained regime response - generally non-lethal if not entirely non-violent - locked both sides in a closely fought and sometimes explosive contest for the “red lines” of acceptable expression in the post-2011 climate.[31]

The People Want the Fall of the King?

When did the Jordanian protests escalate from economic to political grievances? And when did those grievance frames include calls against the monarchy as an institution? Figure 2 provides an overview of the instances in which protesters actively advocated regime change. What should be clear is that this is not a one-off incident, nor is it advocated by one group. This evinces a pattern of direct criticism of the monarchy and calls for its removal or criticism of King Abdullah himself. These were explicit calls and they were diffusing across

[30] Amis, “Hirak! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring,” 169.
[31] Amis, 169.

the country. The pattern begins officially with the July 2011 call by the London-based Jordanian Overseas National Assembly (JONA) to remove the monarchy and replace it with a republic. This could feasibly be dismissed as easier because the group is outside the regime's jurisdiction. Therefore, the participants have comparatively less to fear from the regime in terms of direct repression as a response. But the incidents steadily march on until mid-November 2012.

The idea of thousands protesting across Jordan, blocking major thoroughfares like al-Jama'a street (formerly Queen Rania Street) in front of the University of Jordan, and calling explicitly for the fall of the regime is significant enough. But the idea of the *dabket al-fasad* ("Corruption Dance") coupled with songs and chants comparing King Abdullah to 'Ali Baba, the legendary thief of *One-Thousand and One Nights*, and his forty thieves to members of the royal family and political establishment, and referring to King Abdullah in an intentionally casual and disrespectful way by chanting "Hey Abdullah, the son of Hussein: Where is the people's money?" in lieu of "His Majesty and our beloved king" is a staggering indictment of both hypotheses of the presence of monarchical advantage.[32]

Events in Jordan featured a combination of these things. Economic grievances shaded into political grievances almost effortlessly. In the case of Dhiban, this was accomplished by economic grievances being overtly political in the first place (e.g., refusal to allow teachers to form a union; refusal to reform labor laws to accommodate the living wages required for day-laborers). The

[32] Kirkpatrick, "Protests in Jordan Continue, With Calls for Ending the King's Rule."Yaghi, Mohammed, and Janine A. Clark. "Jordan: Evolving Activism in a Divided Society." In *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism*, 236–67. Baltimore: JHU Press, 2014: 246.

boundaries are fuzziest and transitions most slippery where a corruption frame is appropriate. This is true, not only in Jordan, but also in Bahrain and Tunisia, where we find master frames of anti-corruption. At demonstrations, chants and placards actively illustrate this overarching grievance. As this grievance is translated into action, the Prime Minister, an MP or Ministers of Labor, Education, or Interior are identified as targets to be removed and replaced.

It is probable, and in some cases verifiably true, that the *hirak* or certain sections of it switched aims or targets in midstream, possibly to take advantage of growing momentum. As one activist noted, "the opposition became arrogant." The activist intimated that, when the government met with long-time reformer Marwan Muasher and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, it initially met some demands, but the opposition stubbornly pressed for more. As a result, already surreptitious negotiations collapsed.[33] In other words, it is possible to meet with initial success by pursuing, for example, policy-based grievances. It is another thing altogether to call for the abdication of the king, in which case the frame and the case can quickly become delegitimized in the eyes of bystanders. This is undoubtedly indicative of monarchical advantage

Still, this suggests that Jordanians are more accustomed to and mobilized by frames or campaigns with clearly defined goals. Given the known repressive capacities of regimes in the region, any rational citizen or activist would pause to consider the risks and benefits to collective action.

Yaghi and Clark describe this time as a moment when "the wall of fear has fallen." From this point onward, there were few reform protests that did not

[33] Interview with the author, Amman, Jordan 24 August 2016.

feature the aim of calling for the fall of the regime. If they don't explicitly do so, they imply it by calling for "more than cosmetic reform" that deals with both constitutional reforms and economic reforms. The former entails at least devolution of executive power from the king to an elected – not royally appointed – parliament and perhaps even the formal declaration of a constitutional monarchy.[34]

It could be argued that this was unconnected or unrelated to the wider protest wave of the Arab Spring if it were not for three facts. First, these events all shared the relatively unprecedented frame of calling for actual regime change. Second, along with the obvious diffusion of the signature "The People Want the Fall of the Regime" – a notable change from the previous years' chants of "the People Want to *Reform* the Regime", November 15, 2012 saw the modulation of that signature chant/frame, coupling it with the use of dances and rhymes comparing King Abdullah to 'Ali Baba, the legendary thief of *One-Thousand-and-One Nights*. One protester pointed to the obvious rights discourse of the wider Arab Spring, but also said it was not just about the price increases, but what they represent: "the audaciousness of the corruption."[35] Finally, when protesters connected with the burning of the governor's house in Karak on November 14,

[34] Yaghi and Clark, "Jordan: Evolving Activism in a Divided Society," 246–247.
[35] David D. Kirkpatrick, "Protesters in Jordan Call for Ending King Abdullah II's Rule," The New York Times, November 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/middleeast/protesters-in-jordan-call-for-ending-king-abdullah-iis-rule.html.

2012 were questioned about their rationale, they argued "He's [the governor] representing the king and our problem is with the king today."[36]

Regime Responses

We have seen that protests in Jordan during the Arab Spring-wave uprising were comparatively smaller than elsewhere in the region. But we also established that the protests coalition crossed several significant demographic and ideological cleavages. That reform coalition was able to expand protests beyond initial protests in Dhiban and protests were not simply confined to the capital. Finally, the aims of protests were not as simple and benign as other analysts have suggested. Instead, we see a sustained, geographically diffuse protest campaign focused on economic as well as political grievances. The demands against those grievances did not stop at policy change or removal of lower level leadership. At times, the *hirak* pointed direct and relatively unprecedented criticism directly at the monarchy, there were calls to instate a true constitutional monarchy, to move beyond cosmetic reforms. All this crossed significant red lines for the regime. But this is only the first part of our task. The other half of this analysis must be composed of the regime's responses to the above events through the lenses of our hypotheses regarding prevention and control.

If Jordan's status as a monarchy makes it either particularly immune to protest or particularly well-suited to weather the mobilization, we should expect to see some different approach of the regime to confront protests or counterframe

[36] Jodi Rudoren and Ranya Kadri, "Jordan Protests Turn Deadly on Second Day," *The New York Times*, November 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/middleeast/jordan-protests-turn-deadly-on-second-day.html.

and mitigate mobilization.

It is not hard to posit a thought experiment or simulation in which one puts oneself into the position of the King and/or the head of the internal security services, confronted with the specter of the rapidly-diffusing, sizeable protests. Their goal is to keep people off the streets and prevent them from returning.

Where protests appear on the streets, prevention ceases to be an option where the regime intervenes on the immediate eve of planned protests and prevents protests by arresting leadership. Regime action in the ensuing days or weeks of an event will be considered – pending deeper examination – causally-connected and, thus, deemed matters of control rather than prevention.

For example, one could flex the muscles of the deep state by increasing surveillance of known movement leaders and opposition activists, increasing the presence of the security services on the streets, or arrest the leaders of the movement(s) thereby engaging in prevention by breaking up the physical organizations (for example, NGOs), their social networks, and controlling the discursive space of the internet by monitoring or blocking traffic, or harassing civil society or other important agents. Alternatively, (or simultaneously), one could prevent by flooding the discursive space with counter-narratives to mitigate and counteract opposition narratives.

Employing control mechanisms could take the form of one or more of the following: arresting movement leaders on the day of protests or immediately prior, a sample of the protesters, disperse the rest of the crowd, and then, crucially, mobilize counter protesters to organize against the opposition and

undergird whatever support exists for the government. Finally, given mobilization or immediately prior to a protest, one could use the blunt force of repression and mass arrests as a control mechanism. Again, I want to draw attention to the point that there is some retrograde action between the two conceptual categories, as repression as control in one instance could serve as a teaching tool and thus shift into the category of prevention or prophylaxis.

H1 – Strategies of Prevention

The easiest way to survive collective actions is to prevent them from occurring in the first place. To review, preventative actions against protests can take numerous forms including internet censorship, harassment and breaking up of potential ideational or physical spaces of mobilization, arresting activists and leaders prior to protests, attempting to head-off mobilization through concessions or the construction of counterframes, or, finally, the constraint of collective action through legitimate legal channels. Any of these can be done by a variety of methods and agents of the state. I will begin with the latter.[37]

Unlike countries such as Egypt under Mubarak, where the oppressive emergency law was widely known and excoriated by Egyptians and the international human rights community, Jordan under Abdullah manages to avoid the same stigmatization. But this should not be confused with a lack employment of preventive tactics by the regime. Every regime must maintain some level of baseline monitoring and control of the population. The level of malevolence and

[37] Again, I am considering arrests or disruption prevention when they occur up to one day prior to or the day of planned protests before they can occur. At that point, any harassment and arrests or other actions should be considered "control" rather than "prevention". A more detailed breakdown of such incidents and coding decisions can be found in the appendix.

visibility of this monitoring varies by regime, as do the strategies and resources used to maintain that status.

Since September 11, 2001 two laws promulgated by royal decree, bypassing the legislating channel of the parliament and known as temporary laws, have proffered a rather vague definition of terrorism. This declaration effectively criminalized even peaceful protests entirely unconnected to terrorism and equated the very real violence that characterizes terrorism to the damage caused by riots, for example. Simultaneously, these laws threaten freedom of expression and association, specifically by requiring protestors to gain permission prior to holding a protest; re-routing trials for dissidents from normal civilian courts to State Security Courts (effectively military tribunals used against civilians); and giving the government the right to shutter newspapers and silence journalists.[38]

To some degree, we can consider this doing double-duty as active and passive prevention. These laws can actively prevent mobilization, but also ideationally send a message of delegitimization or demonization through the false equivalence of dissent and terrorism.

In the wake of these laws, we get a glimpse into the foundational Prevention-Control/Persuasion-Coercion mechanisms in the context leading up to the Arab Spring. We can move beyond the level of generalities and point to specific instances and individuals targeted by the regime's prevention or control

[38] Robert Swift, "Journalists Fear Government Repression in Jordan," *The Media Line* (blog), August 25, 2015, http://www.themedialine.org/featured/journalists-fear-government-repression-in-jordan/; Jillian Schwedler and Sam Fayyaz, "Locating Dissent: Space, Law, and Protest in Jordan," in *Policing and Prisons in the Middle East: Formations of Coercion* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 279–94; Jillian Schwedler, "Don't Blink: Jordan's Democratic Opening and Closing," Middle East Research and Information Project, July 3, 2002, http://merip.org/mero/mero070302.

mechanisms. Former MP, journalist, and human rights activist Toujan al-Faisal was arrested under the new (Aug/Sept 2001) temporary laws after her public criticism of the government. Brought before a State Security Court, she faced charges of "tarnishing the Jordanian state', 'defamation of the judiciary', 'uttering words' before another deemed to be 'detrimental to his religious feeling', 'publishing and broadcasting false information abroad which could be detrimental to the reputation of the state', and inciting 'disturbances and killings'."[39] Because her actions neither directly incited protests, nor occurred in the midst of the mass mobilization, this is an excellent example of prevention rather than control.

NGOs, just as often as individuals, are subject to harassment by the regime, including open threats. In one instance in October 2002, the interior ministry demanded the closure of the Jordanian Society for Citizen's Rights (JSCR) and cancellation of its official registration based on its alleged failure to report its activities and finances, and its refusal to allow Ministry of the Interior to search the documents and premises of the NGO. While not occurring during mass mobilization, the JSCR example demonstrates the approach of the Jordanian regime, particularly in managing dissent in civil society.

In another case, the government arrested three members of the Anti-Normalization Committee to disrupt their activities. More malevolently, during the same time period, the government enlisted the unwilling participation of some of the most prominent tribal trade unions and professional associations to cross-

[39] "Jordan: Sentence against Toujan Al-Faisal a Blow to Freedom of Expression," *Amnesty International UK - Press Releases*, May 17, 2002, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/jordan-sentence-against-toujan-al-faisal-blow-freedom-expression.

pressure the Anti-Normalization Committee. It then increased pressure by threatening the other trade unions and professional associations to force the ANC to close or risk being liquidated themselves.[40] Amnesty International noted that this move was more than likely politically-motivated, and "constitute[s] yet another attempt by the Jordanian government to gag civil society."[41] Because this occurred outside a period of mass mobilization, this constitutes a particularly persuasive form of prevention, rather than control.

By the time the Arab Spring wave arrived in Jordan in early 2011, the regime's strategy shifted to accommodate what it must have believed were going to be rough seas ahead. On February 2, 2011, the regime pursued an ingenious prevention campaign by diminishing or rolling back previously controversial aspects of the 2001 laws. In particular, the interior minister announced that protests in Jordan would no longer require pre-approval from the government, though protesters were still required to inform authorities of any planned gathering within two days.

It is worth questioning why the regime would do this, given the time frame. First, on February 1, 2011, King Abdullah dismissed Prime Minister Samir Rifa'i, and his cabinet, replacing him with ex-general Marouf Bakhit with the not-so-obvious advantage being that Bakhit has been historically not stained by corruption allegations in comparison with other prime ministers, especially Rifa'i.

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[40] "Jordan: Right to Freedom of Expression and Association Denied," *Amnesty International UK - Press Releases*, November 11, 2002, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/jordan-right-freedom-expression-and-association-denied. (accessed January 16, 2017).
[41] "Jordan: Right to Freedom of Expression and Association Denied," *Amnesty International UK - Press Releases*, November 11, 2002, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/jordan-right-freedom-expression-and-association-denied. (accessed January 16, 2017).

As Joel Greenberg notes, citing the late veteran activist Nahedh Hattar, Rifa'i was viewed by many as the visible head of a "'club of businessmen, serving their financial interests.'" He was seen as having "personally profited from the sale of state companies as part of the king's policy of privatization" and other neoliberal maneuvers. Protests and calls for the removal of Rifa'i continued even as he attempted to defuse tensions by unveiling a package of fuel and staple goods subsidies along with pay raises for civil servants and promises to increase pensions and create new jobs.[42] Clearly these measures at appeasement failed, as the regime announced the roll-back of the laws against protesting only a day later.

Of equal importance to note here is the timing and regional context. By this time, January 14, 2011, Ben 'Ali had already fled Tunisia. The initial protests of the Arab Spring wave arrived in Jordan on January 28, 2011, three days after massive crowds occupied Tahrir Square in Cairo, and the very day that Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that Mubarak would be ceding power to the military.[43] Within days, protests began in Libya that eventually lead to a bloody and protracted conflict. Given these events, the logic of the decision to ease the punitive laws from 2001, was clearly an effort at appeasement and an attempt at prevention of further protests in the kingdom. The ingeniousness comes into focus when one considers that the regime was faced with the choice of appeasement and concessions, or repression and it chose the former.

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[42] Joel Greenberg, "Jordan's King Abdullah II Ousts Prime Minister, Cabinet in Wake of Mass Protests," *The Washington Post*, February 1, 2011, sec. World, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/31/AR2011013103692.html. (accessed October 31, 2014).

[43] Peter Beaumont and Harriet Sherwood, "Egypt Protesters Defy Tanks and Teargas to Make the Streets Their Own," *The Guardian*, January 28, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/28/egypt-protests-latest-cairo-curfew. (accessed November 6, 2014).

Simultaneously, as Jamal Halaby indicates, "about 3,000 tribal leaders and key figures – including lawmakers, retired security personnel and academicians – renewed their allegiance to the king in an emotional letter, praising his reform efforts."[44] It is difficult to know whether that move was genuine (and truly emotional) or merely perfunctory or otherwise *pro forma.* Does this letter and the intention and action behind it provide a view into regime support or even a potential element of monarchical advantage? One might begin by asking whether they truly believe that the king is a legitimate and successful reformer.

Reports at the time noted that the king supposedly met with members of parliament and royally-appointed Senate, personally urging reforms. A palace statement released at the time intimated that the king, in meeting with members of the government, urged that "more should be done to address the concerns of ordinary Jordanians, and that 'openness, frankness and dialogue on all issues is the way to strengthen trust between citizens and their national institutions."[45] He reportedly also consulted trade unionists and Islamists on their grievances and traveled to poor areas of the country to "get a firsthand look at people's needs."[46] According to one of my interviewees, gestures like this by Abdullah are far from unheard of. In some cases, the king even responded to specific concerns about conditions in hospitals or other institutions by appearing in disguise to see the situation for himself. Though the interviewee herself noted that these motions

[44] Yaghi and Clark, 238; Halaby, "Jordan Revokes Restrictions On Public Gatherings," *Huffington Post*, February 15, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/15/jordan-restrictions-public-gatherings_n_823373.html.
[45] Joel Greenberg, "Jordan's King Abdullah II Ousts Prime Minister, Cabinet in Wake of Mass Protests," *The Washington Post*, February 1, 2011, sec. World, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/31/AR2011013103692.html. (accessed October 31, 2014).
[46] Greenberg, ibid.

often go no further than public relations events and few concrete reforms are seen.[47]

Zaki Bani Irsheid, spokesman and head of the political department of the country's largest opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic Action Front, echoed beliefs that the moves taken so far had been nothing more than political theater and the king needed to make more substantial moves toward reform. Before Rifa'i's dismissal, Bani Irsheid argued that the king's response so far had been "'just a public relations campaign that doesn't solve the crisis.' … 'The regime wants a solution without paying the price, and it is offering cosmetic changes. We told them that what was acceptable yesterday is not acceptable today, and what could resolve the problem today may not be a solution tomorrow. Delaying and hesitation will only complicate matters.'"[48]

Again, is it that the authors of the letter and other regime supporters are pledging loyalty to the regime at a tumultuous time to avoid trouble? Is it that they want to keep the status quo? Or is it that they in fact favor reform, just like the protesters, but believe that the king is the pathway to reform? While affirming the first two is more difficult, there is evidence that the third option – that they might favor reform but believe the king is the better bet than collective action – is not only believed by those who might be called pro-reform loyalists, but that the king's statements (if not his actions) play to that strategy as well.

Greenberg's interview with retired general and reform advocate Ali Habashnah sheds some light on the question of how genuine these acts of

[47] "Maryam" interview with the author August 18, 2016, Amman, Jordan.
[48] Greenberg, ibid.

allegiance to the king may be. Habashnah was one of the retired generals who, in 2010 published a manifesto outlining their opinions on reform and the way forward in Jordan. The editorial by the veterans was clearly presented with more than a tinge of East Bank nationalism – it took the opportunity to warn against the potential for permanent resettlement of Palestinians in Jordan – it deeply criticized the royal family, especially Queen Rania and in a manner comparable to Tunisians' criticism of Ben Ali's wife, Leila Trabelsi. But as Amis argues, it communicated an even greater danger to the regime because "it reflected the wider current of mounting activism, and revealed serious discontent within even this praetorian sector of Jordanian society." [49] That same manifesto, while a semi-unprecedented move and described as "chauvinistic" by a number of my interviewees, simultaneously featured the generals asserting their loyalty to King Abdullah and their desire to seek reforms *under the monarchy*.[50] For Habashnah, presumably among many others, the monarchy is the only force in the country able to unite Jordan as a "nation made up of disparate tribes and other groups."[51]

By all accounts, this action by the loyalist veterans was organic. Though it clearly represented a serious vein of discontent across usually reliable identity boundaries, the publication of the letter was certainly utilized by the regime as an effort at prevention through counter-framing. In July 2011, prevention through concessions and counterframing appear in a televised address by the King,

[49] Amis, "*hirak*! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," 172.
[50] Emphasis added. Based on my interviewees' responses, "chauvinist" and "chauvinism" was frequently understood to mean that a certain person, action, or comment displayed a nationalist pro-Transjordanian *weltanschauung*. In other words, it implies an activation of the East Bank Jordanian (Transjordanian or *urduni asli*) – West Bank Jordanian (Palestinian-Jordanian) identity cleavage.
[51] Greenberg, ibid.

wherein he pledged to allow for the election of ministers (especially the Prime Minister) who had previously been appointed by the throne. Yet the king carefully used caveats to navigate through concession and counterframing. He Promised reforms "at some unspecified point in the future." More importantly, the king stated, "We seek a state of democracy, pluralism, and participation through political reforms…away from the dictates of the street and the absence of the voice of reason." He ultimately "warned that sudden change" – one the government apparently believed was advocated by protesters – "could lead to 'chaos and unrest'."

As an elegantly simple counterframing campaign, the king's statements at once present concessions while also subtly denigrating protesters by presenting the status quo (or a status in the near future) as democratic, pluralist and participatory and the protesters' unconventional participation as composed of the "dictates of the street and the absence of the voice of reason", branding them rebels rather than reformers, and inherently undemocratic. With statements like these, the king can not only counterframe against pro-reform protesters, but signal to and reassure pro-reform loyalists. He implies that keeping him in power is the pathway to reform, rather than an obstacle. Compared with regime change, the king is a better bet.

Finally, whether intentional or not, the king's assertion that sudden change could lead to 'chaos and unrest' may have begun to lay the ground work for fear among Jordanians (activists and non-activists alike) that pushing any further for reform or – more especially regime change – could leave Jordan in a similar

position as Syria.[52] As much is argued by Tarek al-Masri a Jordanian lawyer who, while interviewed by Greenberg in 2011 noted that he had mixed emotions about the protests in Jordan. He was "happy that the Egyptians have finally risen up against an oppressive ruler, but worried about a power vacuum in the streets." When it came to Jordan's protests, he affirmed solidarity with the grievances of the protests, but in the same breath states that he "cannot imagine the country without the royal family. They strike a balance between the people and the government. I trust them."[53] But what does it say that Jordanians express trust and support for the monarchy as a buffer, striking a balance between the people and the government, which is widely seen as corrupt, but at the same time they know well that, as the late activist Nahedh Hattar intimated, "the king is a member of the [same corrupt] club"? [54]

Abu Rish discounts the relatively lower number and size of protests in Jordan as evidence of a broad monarchical advantage, saying that these events "have little to do with the alleged benevolence of the monarchy or the loyalty of the population." Instead, he argues for a monarchical advantage issuing from "the same sets of historical, institutional, sociopolitical, and strategic factors that help explain the divergent trajectories of those countries that did feature anti-regime mass mobilizations."[55] This is left rather vague, and Abu Rish quickly shifts to a discussion of the attempts by the regime to prevent mobilization and curb protests.

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[52] Ian Black, "Jordan Denies Reports About Attack on King Abdullah," The Guardian, June 13, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/13/jordan-king-abdullah-attack-denied.
[53] Greenberg, ibid.
[54] Greenberg, ibid.
[55] Abu Rish, "Doubling Down."

Members in this camp varied considerably. But frequently, individuals highlighted a varied mix of a "Jordanians just don't know how to effectively protest" view and a related but more important and less ideologically chauvinistic idea. The *hirak* and the protests dissipated in Jordan not necessarily because of anything that the regime did – not directly, at least. Instead they dissipated because the *hirak* and all other protesters and parties managed to successfully mobilize but did not arrive on the streets with any discernable, realistic, and practicable platform for reform once the regime was removed from power, if the monarchy was indeed removed. From one social movement theory perspective, this would mean not that the regime foreclosed or broke up political opportunity structures for the protesters, but that circumstances themselves foreclosed the political opportunity structures.

Though the demands of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions for regime change were unlikely to be considered by the regime as "realistic and practicable" but this fact carried more weight in Jordan than it did in Egypt or Tunisia. This should be considered evidence of monarchical advantage in terms of control. Specifically, this speaks to the ability of the regime to control the discursive space via counter-narratives but also to the ability to play divide-and-rule against the opposition.

But the assertions of the group who believes the "revolution has moved on" and those who believe that the *hirak* failed because the protesters did not have a realistic or practicable plan for reform if the protests succeeded, shared these sentiments not out of callous cynicism, but of steely-eyed realism.

The fact that so many of the interviewees identified the long history of Jordanian activism and mobilization on the one hand, but then seemed to suggest that those that arrived on the streets in 2011 were relative dilettantes should give us pause. It could simply be that the two are not mutually exclusive and the mobilization in the Arab Spring wave was qualitatively different and the activists qualitatively less-experienced and savvy than their predecessors. Existing work on the composition of the *hirak* in 2011 attests to this fact.[56] But the fact that so many of the interviewees who were present/involved in 2011 were experienced activists and well-versed in the history of mobilization in Jordan and that the protests in 2010-11 were redeployments of frames and tactics forged and tested in 1989, the mid to late 1990s, and 2006-7 suggests that it cannot simply be an effect of inexperienced activists showing up on the streets, merely caught up in a wave and unprepared for the effects of or the next steps in the cycle of mobilization. Rather, striking against the monarchical advantage in terms of keeping the opposition one-dimensional, the distinct nature of the Arab Spring wave in Jordan was that, for the first time, the usual suspects of mobilization (the Islamists, Leftists, etc.) cooperated in the streets with grassroots youth movements cutting across several social cleavages. Respondents disagreed on the efficacy of these coalitions. Either the *hirak* was ruined by the inexperienced youth or was coopted and misdirected by the stalwart veteran oppositionists such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

What does this illustrate about the ability of the regime to foreclose particular mobilization opportunities or effectively repress mobilization? First, it

[56] Yom, "Tribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan."

could be that the regime simply was not ever pushed close enough to or far enough over its "red line". Second, it may be that repression is not a preferred tactic for the regime as it was in Tunisia. As a result, it may be that the regime believes that more precise tools it has at its disposal are more expedient than the "heavy machinery" of bald repression.

Echoing work by Jillian Schwedler, activists intimated that the regime has a particular benchmark for acceptability of contentious actions. For example, the regime is more willing to allow protests and other dissenting actions outside Amman than inside. Inside Amman, the regime will readily control protests by restricting physical space. Outside of *Wasat al-Balad* (Downtown), there is no truly central part of Amman that serves as a central gathering point in the way that Tahrir Square and Pearl Roundabout did in Cairo and Manama. Though the same could be said for Tunis, though Avenue Habib Bourguiba, as a main thoroughfare, was a frequent site of protests. Protesters wishing to emulate other uprisings and gather in front of the Interior Ministry or the Prime Minister's office find themselves gathered rather ineffectively beneath an overpass or awkwardly on a median in one of Amman's eight landmark "circles".[57]

"Abdullah" a prominent young activist describes the regime's overall strategy and approach as "surgical" rather than brutally overwhelming in its approach to policing protests – a sentiment agreed upon by the other interviewees. He first emphasized the ability of the regime to negotiate and renegotiate the neoliberal social contract, making attendant choices and changes regarding the

[57] Jillian Schwedler, "The Political Geography of Protest in Neoliberal Jordan," *Middle East Critique* 21, no. 3 (2012): 259–70.

divide-and-rule patrimonialism characteristic of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes. Building on this, Abdullah relates an intertwining personal story of encountering the regime. His general comportment, common across the interviews, didn't evince an overly fearful or paranoid view toward the Hashemite regime that is reportedly tangible in other regimes in the region. When asked about how the regime represses or punishes those who cross red lines or run afoul of the deep state, it is clear that the first approach to the regime seems to be to politically and socially neutralize the threat of particularly contentious individuals. Abdullah, while soft-spoken but confident, is outspoken when it comes to his criticism of the regime and Jordanian life and politics in general.[58]

Another respondent's case is illustrative in another way: She happens to be from a prominent Jordanian family. This doesn't mean that red lines do not exist for her. But as is evident from her own description, bolstered and validated by other interviewees' observations, it does frequently mean that the regime is more constrained in its options for pressuring and punishing her. Having crossed the regime one too many times – or once too far – the regime communicated to her family that she might do well to take a vacation overseas. She took the opportunity during this time in "exile" to enter postgraduate studies in Europe. But she was able to return and has continued her blogging and online activism.

Conversely, others told me a story of a prominent activist from the traditionally loyalist city of Karak. He was known to the regime not only for his activism but also for his travels between cities and governorates, bringing activism in booklets and seminars to networks throughout the country. When this

[58] Interview with the author. Amman, Jordan 28 July 2016.

man was arrested during a large and now-infamous protest at the interior ministry circle, activist Abdul Rahman reported that the regime was forced to release the man within a day or two without being abused or egregiously tortured. This was not because the regime was particularly fearful of his popularity among activists, fearing that his death might galvanize activist networks. Rather, it was his lineage from Karak that earned him his freedom. More specifically, the fear that his familial/tribal network could swiftly mobilize against the regime and seriously upset the balance of power that earned him his freedom. Taking a step back to compare, note that the regime appears less fearful to let protests occur in Karak or elsewhere outside Amman. By comparison, in a story related some respondents, a relatively socially unconnected young man was arrested at the same protest. He was systematically tortured and only released under the condition that he leave Jordan and never return. To this day, he is reportedly still living in Turkey.[59]

Despite this, Abdul Rahman, his close friend, and another activist and NGO leader all argued that while arrests and harassment of activists – especially protesters actively engaged in a protest against the regime – are relatively common, the regime does not engage in routine and systematic torture of activists, civil society actors, and other social and political intelligentsia. This is contradicted in the story of dentist and leftist activist Hisham Bustani. In 2002, Bustani was arrested and detained for six days after writing an article in a Lebanese magazine about an earlier detention during which he not only suffered abuse, but witnessed far worse at the notorious Jweideh prison. For bringing attention to the human rights abuses he observed in the prison – including "guards

[59] Interview with author, 28 July 2016, Amman, Jordan.

practic[ing] karate on inmates and beat[ing] them with cables."[60] Far more "high profile" opposition figures like Islamist MP Laith Shubailat have been subjects of chronic and systemic abuse in a revolving door cycle of harassment and imprisonment for their criticism of government corruption and policies.[61]

But this could be a function of the "surgical" strategy of the regime; preferring to use subtler intimidation methods first. Of course, the Information Minister, Mohammed Adwan, has a particular view of how the regime has been able to weather demonstrations: "I think the vast majority of public opinion in Jordan is with the government and the king."[62] But activists like Bustani have a shrewdly different view of the phenomenon: "We have tyranny dressed up in a suit cleanly shaven talking about democratic rights. …We have this repression that's neat."[63]

Here one female activist's example returns. A corollary of the new social bargain is a public sector as the nexus of employment and patrimonial control. In Jordan, while this bloated public sector is not economically tenable, especially given increased immigration rates from neighboring Syria and Iraq, it serves in the realm of repression as a further pressure point to neutralize dissenting challenges to the regime. In the activist's example, a family member's prominent position in a government ministry was not a ticket to increased insulation from the

[60] Shadid, "Pressure Builds Under Jordan's King: As Traditional Support Ebbs, Abdullah Stifles Dissent."
[61] International Crisis Group, "The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratisation and Regional Instability," Middle East Briefing (Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group, October 8, 2003), n. 35, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/jordan/challenge-political-reform-jordanian-democratisation-and-regional-instability.
[62] Shadid, "Pressure Builds Under Jordan's King: As Traditional Support Ebbs, Abdullah Stifles Dissent."
[63] Shadid.

repression of the regime. Instead, she received a phone call from the security services, gently reminding her that her behavior does not only affect her, but endangers the employment of her family member – lucky already to have a job in an economy stretched dangerously thin. Similar scenarios were reported by blogger and freelance researcher Mariam, scholar Fatimah, and others. Respondents frequently recounted stories of themselves or friends being called in to the police station, being made to wait all day before being sent home. Presumably this subtle tactic is used to intimidate by suggesting that the regime can compel even the most asinine behavior. The punishment itself is decidedly non-violent, and even inane. But the message is clear.

What King Abdullah's regime lacks in charisma, it supplements in nationalist campaigns. The 2002 "Jordan First" campaign – "designed to mold citizens in 'a unified social fiber that promotes their sense of loyalty to their homeland'" and create a 'common denominator between all Jordanians regardless of their origins, orientations, views, talents, faiths [or] races'" – is clearly designed to unite a seemingly fragmented Jordanian polity.[64] Likewise, the 2006 "We Are All Jordan" campaign was designed explicitly as a

> forum, an initiative of His Majesty King Abdullah II bin Al Hussein, created to give all Jordanians an unprecedented opportunity to speak out. The declaration is a list of urgent issues facing the country on various levels: strengthening internal capacity, political reforms, economic reforms, social security, and regional challenges."[65]

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[64] Ahmed Shihab-Eldin, "Jordan First: A King's Modernization Motto Obscures a Palestinian Past and Iraqi Present," *Huffington Post* (blog), January 5, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ahmed-shihabeldin/jordan-first-a-kings-mode_b_148589.html.

[65] "إعلان مبادرة كلنا الأردن – النص النهائي(Final Text - Declaration of 'We Are All Jordan' Initiative)," خبّر Inform: Open Government for a More Informed Society, 2006, http://bit.ly/2I4sXKd. *Note*: I have used a shortened URL here for the sake of space.

Combined, these initiatives are intended to confer a nationalist legitimacy with a veneer of neoliberal economic and political reform.

Finally, the 2004 "Amman Message" represents an official interpretation of Islam endorsed by the regime to marginalize more Salafist elements within the opposition.

Uniquely, when asked about how the regime responds to protests and how it deals with or manages them, one activist and freelance researcher cites the theory of "political technology", which she describes as originating in and perfected in contemporary Russian politics. Neoliberalism, she argues – and what other activists and journalists call the "new social contract" – may appear to be reforms, but they are in fact just one form of political technology. In this paradigm, outright repression and the stealing of ballot boxes – behavior that might characterize traditional authoritarianism – is replaced with a complex gaslighting process by the regime to create a virtual politics whereby elites manage and manipulate democracy.[66] By this process, even the public perception of the regime itself or societal dynamics can be manipulated. If this is true, it may explain why the Jordanian regime can afford to be less repressive (at least in the initial stages); because it can neuter protests and large-scale dissent through this subtle strategy.

Strategies of Control

The first point of transition from prevention to control looks, at first glance, to be the same. Indeed, the actions are frequently indistinguishable with

[66] Andrew Wilson, *Virtual Democracy: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005).

the exception of the temporal criteria. For example, the government rounded-up and arrested twenty pro-reform activists as part of a crackdown on dissent in the Arab Spring wave. Rounded up between mid-July and early October of 2012 either during or following peaceful protests in Tafileh, Karak, and Amman,

> [c]harges against them include 'carrying out acts that undermine the political system in the Kingdom', participating in an 'illegitimate gathering', 'insulting the King', spreading news that aims at 'weakening national sentiment or inciting sectarian and racial strife', and 'attempting to change the state's constitution' - a charge which is punishable by death. In a useful parallel of control, to the previous example of Toujan al-Faisal

under prevention: Sa'oud al-'Ajarmeh, member of the tribal leaders' reform coalition, the "Jordan 36 Current" (*Tayyar al-Urduni 36*) faces potential life imprisonment for what Amnesty International believes amounts to penalizing him for peaceful protest to criticize the government. Al-'Ajarmeh was arrested in Amman in July 2002, "reportedly for publicly criticizing the King and other officials during a protest against the new elections law". He, like many others, is "being tried on charges of 'carrying out acts that undermine the political system in the Kingdom' and 'inciting others to carry out illegitimate acts'." Amnesty International connects these events with a wider crackdown on protests and legitimate criticism of the regime. In another example of control, in March 2002, six men reportedly belonging to or protesting with the Free Tafileh Movement are detained without trial for several weeks for their alleged involvement in a previous protest by Tafileh residents that turned violent. There is no evidence that

the men were involved in the violence or the organization of the protest. Among others, the accusations made against the men, included 'insulting' the King.[67]

In contrast to the prevention tactics and counter-framing prior to protests, a notable event in June 13, 2011 in Tafileh saw the regime scrambling to use the same tactics for control. While on a tour ostensibly inspecting construction projects in the city of Tafileh, the royal convoy was purportedly attacked by protesters throwing stones and bottles. Protests in Tafileh had occurred since June 10, 2011 with demands highlighting anger at the regime's failure to initiate reform and combat corruption as well as the failure of the regime to remove the prime minister and cabinet. In terms of control, security forces briefly clashed with the crowds and those protesters attacking the convoy, with reports of at least 25 injured by security forces.[68] But we also see counterframing as a measure of control. The regime quickly moved to frame the attack narrative as simply enthusiastic youth rushing forward toward the motorcade, attempting to greet the king.

In a textbook example of control, an Amnesty International press release dated February 5, 2002 records that dozens of people were arrested in the wake of September 11th, frequently for no other reason than being connected to demonstrations against the killing of Palestinians during the Second Intifada and against the U.S. bombing campaign against Afghanistan.[69]

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[67] "Jordan: Intended Release of 116 Detainees Is 'Too Little, Too Late,'" *Amnesty International UK - Press Releases*, December 11, 2012, https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/jordan-intended-release-116-detainees-too-little-too-late.
[68] Black, ibid.
[69] "Jordan: New Security Measures Violate Human Rights," Amnesty International UK Press Releases (Amnesty International UK, February 5, 2002),

The Palestinian cause is embedded in the Jordanian national consciousness, and protests such as these should normally be "safe" protests and thus generally allowable.[70] In other words, we should expect not to see prevention or control of these collective actions by the regime both because the actions aren't directed usually at the regime itself and because the regime loses more than it would gain by repressing the protests, even symbolically. If even these "normal," "safe," protests were repressed after September 11, that would suggest that something changed in the logic of the regime. What was normally allowable is no longer allowable.[71]

By 2002, the regime was openly intensifying its prevention strategy. Most obvious during the pre-Arab Spring period, was the decision to implement over 100 "temporary laws" (temporary because they are effectively royal-decrees while the parliament was then dissolved). Most of these laws have been explicitly intended to prevent (and as necessary) control mobilization.[72]

In a highly significant event, protests in the city of Ma'an in November 2002 featured heavy surveillance bordering on house-arrest of prominent tribal

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https://www.amnesty.org.uk/pressreleases/jordannewsecuritymeasuresviolatehumanrights. (accessed January 16, 2017).

[70] See Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust, *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2014). It should be noted, however, that the Jordanian regime, despite having a formal peace treaty with Israel, but having a population composed of approximately 70 percent "West Bank Jordanians" (i.e., temporarily resettled Palestinian refugees) has a complex relationship with protests against Israel. In one particular instance noted by one interview respondent, the security services were quick to respond with notable force to disperse a sizeable crowd protesting outside the Israeli Embassy.

[71] Khatib and Lust et al argue that space for these kinds of thematic protests was usually left relatively open for demonstrators as a political opportunity space. In other words, for example, it behooved of Tunisia not to crack down on protests in favor of women's rights because the Ben 'Ali regime touted itself as a supporter of women. Clever activists seized on this opening and frequently tied demonstrations to these key "safe" issues, knowing it would be more damaging to the regime to violently repress or forcedly disappear them after it had publicly championed the relevant rights. But this seemed not to be the case in Jordan, or at least in the 2002 protests.

[72] Schwedler, "More Than a Mob," 19.

and religious leaders such as Sheikh Subji Mughribi. During this same period, Shadid notes that the regime had increasingly clamped down on outspoken unions and opposition parties and journalists.[73] Frequently in the case of journalists, this began to result in self-censorship – the ultimate form of prevention. While this could be argued to straddle my conceptualization of "prevention" versus "control", it is clear that effective control breeds future prevention.

Six people were killed in Ma'an in clashes with authorities during protests. According to both protesters and residents, protests and violent unrest were both caused or bolstered by "poverty, neglect, anger over U.S. policy in Israel and Iraq, *and the heavy hand of a worried government*".[74] The last part is important to note here because worry is associated with a heavy hand, whereas elsewhere during my interviews, for example, worry is associated with hesitation on the part of the authorities, rather than a doubling down on repression. Here, Shadid reports that King Abdullah responded to unrest in Ma'an with an iron fist, sending "tanks and thousands of police officers and soldiers." Shadid's sources within the government said that such a heavy-handed response was "part crackdown, part message of what was in store in the event of wartime unrest."[75] Again, the line between an action being preventive or controlling is blurry here. Control measures (especially coercive ones) are always serving two purposes: they stop mobilization that has already happened, and serve as a signal against future mobilization. They are controlling but may inspire prevention through self-

[73] Anthony Shadid, "Pressure Builds Under Jordan's King: As Traditional Support Ebbs, Abdullah Stifles Dissent," *The Washington Post*, February 5, 2003:
[74] Anthony Shadid, "Pressure Builds Under Jordan's King: As Traditional Support Ebbs, Abdullah Stifles Dissent," *The Washington Post*, February 5, 2003: emphasis added.
[75] Shadid, ibid.

censorship or self-policing. For the purposes of analysis, I am still using the temporal criteria.

Seasoned Dhiban activist "Abu Shuji'a" has experienced the gamut of the slightly more aggressive but not outright repressive strategies of the regime. Abu Shuji'a has been imprisoned many times, the most recent in Dhiban in June 2016. One year before he had been imprisoned in Zahran for six months for insulting the king. While in prison, he refused to engage in the daily practice of prisoners being required to publicly wish good will on the king. When asked why he refused, he argued that he could not say "long live the king" when the king causes such suffering.[76] A year was consequently added to his sentence.

Before and between his periods of incarceration for protesting and criticizing the government, corrupt practices and laws, Abu Shuji'a has felt the subtle pressures of the regime's surgical strategy. He was fired three years ago for his association with Dhiban workers' social movements and protest activities. Since then he can scarcely travel, can't spend the holidays with family because of time spent in the legal system. He was refused a loan from the government and when he confronted the director of laws – who happens to be a close relative – police arrested him for insulting the king and his own relative. He stressed that the government refused his request for a loan even while they were simultaneously preventing him from working. Once released, the court refused to give him some particularly crucial form of documentation and consequently he lost approximately 300 dinars from his already thin paycheck. For Abu Shuji'a, who remains indefatigably optimistic, his driving motivation is to "speak truth to

[76] Interview with the author, Dhiban, Jordan, 29 August 2016.

power". And he asserts that the reason behind his "long tongue" (*tawiil al-lisaan*) is because of the government's "long hands" (*tawiil ayyed*). For Abu Shuji'a "the king believes that he is bigger than God". This is evidenced for him in practical experience: if you insult God, you receive two days in prison. Insulting the king will earn you a year.[77]

More aggressively, the Dhiban protests in particular also serve as an example of the strategy of the regime in approaching the protests in Jordan's wave. Over time, according to Abu Shuji'a, protesters in Dhiban strikes began to call for the fall of the regime.[78] This, unsurprisingly, served as a red line for the regime as the police not only arrested peaceful protesters but began to escalate with greater violence. Abu Shuji'a was himself arrested as the *Darak* forces used tear gas on protesters who reacted in kind with stones. In one instance, he relates that the *Darak* forces demolished a tent where people were gathered seeking employment, beating and arresting those in the tent despite the generally peaceful tenor of the surrounding protests. In fact, interviewees reported, Dhiban suffered thirteen days and nights of tear gas from security forces in addition to general harassment of the populace including arbitrary alcohol arrests.[79] Dhiban featured more tense exchanges between youth protesters and the *Darak* security forces. At one point, youth activists were cursing the security forces, but the media only picked up the story at this point. As a result, the media didn't capture the initial

[77] Interview with the author, Dhiban, Jordan 29 August 2016.
[78] Interview with the author, 29 August 2016.
[79] "Abu Shuji'a", "Abdul Rahman", "Abdullah", and "Mariam" interviews with the author, 29 August, 24 August, 28 July, and 17 August, respectively.

violence of the *Darak* and the thirteen days of tear gas.[80]

From the sample of interviews, we can glean a number of tactics: The regime was more than willing to arrest protesters and activists. But apart from notable *Darak* activities against activists in Dhiban (6-7 January 2011) and *baltajiyya* attacks at *diwar dakhiliyyeh* protests (24 March 2011), the former of which was widely considered a drastic overstep, the regime appears to have avoided the type of violent crackdowns that characterized the Tunisian and Bahraini uprisings. As mentioned previously, several respondents noted that the regime arrested many people at each protest. But in a particularly crucial moment, soon after regimes collapsed in Tunisia and Egypt, the regime pulled back, leaving protesters free to demonstrate at the 4th circle in from of the prime minister's office and the "*diwar dakhilliyyeh*" (interior ministry circle) protests – particularly on 24 March 2011. One activist argued that the regime lost its nerve and feared the backlash of popular sentiment if it responded too harshly, echoing Tahrir.[81] Another activist and civil society manager argues that for a time after Tunisia and Egypt the security forces did not arrest anyone at first. In his view, this is because the regime feared the result of too aggressively repressing protesters, leaving them free to demonstrate for fear of sparking violence.[82] Finally, there is the episode held out by some as the monarchy-reaction *sine qua non*: the 24 January 2011 march of thousands from the Grand Husseini Mosque in *Wasat al-Balad* (downtown) to the Greater Amman Municipality building saw not

[80] "Abu Shuji'a" interview with the author 29 August 2016.
[81] "Abdul Rahman" interview with the author, Amman, Jordan 23 August 2016.
[82] "Mahmoud" interview with author. Amman, Jordan 24 August 2016.

widespread crackdowns but police handing out water and juice.[83]

Once again, we must ask ourselves what this data means as interpreted through the lens of the pertinent research questions. By the attestation of numerous interviewees, the regime either backed off or help off on outright repressive actions for fear of either tribal backlash (thus costing the regime potentially valuable political support) or of sparking a "Jordanian Tahrir." Yet we can also deduce that this level of care and nuance is not a function of the Arab Spring protest cycle. Instead, the Hashemite regime appears to have a deeply-embedded and well-practiced strategy.

How Far "Above the Fray"?

As I mentioned before, there is an important difference in any regime between protests against policies, protests against policymakers, and protests against the regime.

There was some notable back-and-forth between the myself and interviewees regarding the reform movement's and much of Jordanian society's condemnation of the parliament and MPs but the reform movement's general lack of willingness to push harder against the institution of the palace. Several interviewees have criticized the monarchy in the past and have paid the price for doing so. The most common response was that the parliament is the most outward manifestation of corruption and other ills of the regime. The logic is weak, considering that the parliament – or at least one half of it – issues directly from the king and the king holds broad veto power over both chambers, but understandable considering the considerable punishment for criticism of the king.

[83] Hazaimeh, "Opposition Decries Government Policies in Peaceful Protests."

Two interviewees were willing to criticize King Abdullah: The first, a prominent lawyer whose father was a highly placed intelligence official, calls the regime the "fourth kingdom of Abdullah" and asserts that "the country has developed negatively since the very beginning of his rule."[84] He argues, not surprisingly, that the king has long proposed empty reforms and failed to deliver on promises. The same applied to proposed reforms as a result of the Arab Spring uprisings. The lawyer has some greater wiggle room for criticism given his father's former position.

The other interviewee, Abu Shuji'a, has been arrested numerous times for his involvement in demonstrations, his criticism of King Abdullah, Queen Rania and the government. The regime has squeezed him in numerous ways, depriving him of his job and ensuring the denial of a loan to support a farm, but he is remarkably fearless in his willingness to speak out against not only the corruption of the parliament but of the palace as well.[85] In comparison to other interviewees who tended to demur when pressed on why the parliament should be criticized but not the monarchy, both the lawyer and Abu Shuji'a did not. In a nod to the very nature of both my project and theirs, they see King Abdullah's desire to not only reign but rule as a distinct stumbling block on the path to reform. This is the case despite the fact that the lawyer falls into the camp of those who believe the *hirak* failed because it was not prepared to cope with the governing reality after a regime change, whereas Abu Shuji'a is a committed activist who insists on the

[84] Interview with the author, 17 August 2016, Amman Jordan
[85] "Abu Shuji'a" interview with the author 29 August 2016.

viability of the reform project and the need for more than simple cosmetic reforms.

Another example occurs in protests and regime response from July 15 2011 to July 20, 2011. Protesters and journalists surrounding the July 15, 2011 protests were reportedly attacked by the police. The Jordanian Public Security Department admitted responsibility although it defaulted to a narrative that blamed the protesters and the Muslim Brotherhood for provoking the police.[86] Protests carrying the original message of economic and political reform grievances also became protests against police attacks on protesters and journalists and occurred on the following Saturday and Wednesday (July 16 and July 20) without incident, suggesting the regime made the decision to back off and allow the protesters some breathing room to release pressure. This would not be the first time that the regime appears to have acted aggressively and then withdraw, ostensibly to give protesters room to breathe and to hopefully prevent the kind of mass uprising that both sides were seeing in Tahrir Square in Cairo. Similarly, protests in the southern city of Karak were not attacked or disrupted by the regime. As Jillian Schwedler notes, however, this could be not an innovation, but rather a manifestation of practiced strategy: if protests occur in hinterland cities and can be kept confined and not spread to larger cities like Irbid, Salt, or the capital, the regime will allow the protesters to burn off their frustration unperturbed.[87]

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[86] "What Lies Beneath Jordanian Calls for Reform," *Al Jazeera Blogs*, July 21, 2011, http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/middle-east/what-lies-beneath-jordanian-calls-reform.
[87] Schwedler and Fayyaz, "Locating Dissent: Space, Law, and Protest in Jordan," 284–285.

Ultimately, however, if this was pursued as an actual strategy to dampen protests or decrease tension, it failed, as August and October of 2011 saw protests in Karak and Sakeb (Jerash province) that were met with resistance either from pro-government counter-protest forces or by *Baltajiyyeh* thugs that were widely seen as de facto enforcers and even *agents provocateurs* for the state.[88]

From this point onward, until at least late 2012, protests increase in frequency, size, and geographic distribution. Concomitantly, the protests became bolder in calling for actual regime change or placing the blame not on the shoulders of the prime minister and cabinet, as is the norm, but at the feet of the king himself. The turning point here appears to me to have been a July 22, 2011 communique by the London-based expatriate Jordanian opposition coalition, the Jordanian Overseas National Assembly (JONA). For the first time since at least the beginning of the contemporaneous Arab Spring wave, calls for the overthrow of the king emerged, holding him responsible for corruption in Jordan. The JONA also refers to the royal family as "a gang of parasites" and accused them of "occupying the land."[89] This frame would be repeated by domestic activists (frequently Islamist in ideological orientation) such as Layth Shubaylat in October 2011, and a cascade of marches in solidarity with Shubaylat after his rally was allegedly attacked by regime-coordinated *baltajiyyat* (thugs). Contentious actions

[88] Cf, Jamal Halaby, "Proposed Reforms Not Enough for Jordan Protesters," U-T San Diego, August 14, 2011, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/aug/14/proposed-reforms-not-enough-for-jordan-protesters/; Varulkar, H. The Arab Spring in Jordan: King Compelled to Make Concessions to Protest Movement. Inquiry & Analysis Series. The Middle East Media Research Institute, December 12, 2011.

[89] Jordaniantribune.com, July 22, 2011, quoted in Varulkar, H. The Arab Spring in Jordan: King Compelled to Make Concessions to Protest Movement. Inquiry & Analysis Series. The Middle East Media Research Institute, December 12, 2011. Varulkar presents this as the first group to call for the overthrow of the regime before October 2011.

continue through at least March 2012 where the Jordan National Movement chairman, former MP and retired military veteran Dr. Ahmad ‘Oweidi al-‘Abbadi begins to overtly chastise the regime and call for the removal of the king/royal family and for the transformation of Jordan into a republic.[90]

Former Information Minister Mohammad Adwan argued in 2003 that the regime had been able to “contain” demonstrations in 2001-2003 not by force or intimidation, but because the “vast majority of public opinion in Jordan is with the government and the king.” Such counterframing is not unexpected by any regime. In many ways it is effective without being bound by the need to be factual. Yet leftist activist and professional activist Hisham Bustani, twenty-nine, counters acerbically: “We have tyranny dressed up in a suit, cleanly shaven, talking about democratic rights. …We have this repression that’s neat.”[91] Bustani encountered the reaction of the Hashemite regime first-hand when he was arrested and detained for six days over an article he wrote in a Lebanese literary magazine. Ironically, the article that had him first imprisoned was effectively a whistle-blowing on the very coercive apparatus of the state and its prisons and describing the abuse Bustani had witnessed during that previous sentence, particularly overt physical violence by guards against inmates.[92]

Jillian Schwedler has pursued a highly interesting thread of this research agenda in Jordan, ultimately arguing that “Jordan’s liberal constitutional order

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[90] Varulkar, H. The Arab Spring in Jordan: King Compelled to Make Concessions to Protest Movement. Inquiry & Analysis Series. The Middle East Media Research Institute, December 12, 2011.
[91] Anthony Shadid, “Pressure Builds Under Jordan’s King: As Traditional Support Ebbs, Abdullah Stifles Dissent,” *The Washington Post*, February 5, 2003.
[92] Shadid, ibid.

employs both a rights discourse, e.g., legal codes such as the permit system, and a range of surveillance and policing practices to constraint the use and expansiveness of public space."

Analyzing the push and pull of reform and control in the Jordanian regime since the succession of King Abdullah, veteran reform oppositionist Marwan Muasher was more sanguine about the regime's promises of reform than other oppositionists might prefer. But combining his insights with reports of activists and other analysts, one begins to observe an interesting dynamic. Muasher records, for example, the dynamic between legislation or royal proclamations that run counter to the public statements by King Abdullah. The Arab Summit in Tunisia in 2004 birthed the Tunis document. Self-reflection spurred by a desire for an alternative to what was seen as externally-imposed reform of "The Greater Middle East Initiative" being pushed by the Bush administration, the Tunis document diagnosed crucial areas of political reform in Arab states. These included "respecting human rights and freedom of expression; ensuring the independence of the judiciary; pursuing the advancement of women; acknowledging the role of civil society; modernizing the educational systems; and adhering to the values of tolerance and moderation."[93]

In one of his more sanguine moments, Muasher argues that King Abdullah's attempts to reinvigorate Jordanian efforts at domestic political reform "fell on deaf ears yet again" and reform fizzled out by the end of 2004 at the feet of an intransigent parliament.[94] The schizophrenic inclination of Jordanian reform

[93] Muasher, "A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan," 10.
[94] Muasher, 10–11.

efforts emerged in March 2005 when, instead of wider reforms the Interior Ministry introduced a “government-approved” bill to parliament to further regulate activities of all professional associations. The bill "required associations to keep discussions apolitical and called for the creation of a disciplinary structure to penalize those who broke the law."[95] When civil society spawned a series of collective action events to protest the reduction of political space by the bill, they were quickly repressed with crackdowns and arrests. This entire process, Muasher notes aptly, contradicted the public message from the palace in which King Abdullah “called for a ‘democracy based on dialogue and respect of others’ viewpoints’.”[96]

Again, this schizophrenic dynamic itself is neither abnormal in Jordanian politics, nor would it feel out of place in many other regimes in the region. King Abdullah or the individual who happens to be lucky enough to be sitting in the Prime Minister’s chair that month, continually promise reform in one form or another. Those fluent in this language of reform know that reforms that do occur are more often symbolic and toothless at best or so heavily transmogrified so as to be indistinguishable as any attempt at real reforms. But what is truly interesting and documented in the Arab Spring wave, is that moderate protesters, and even the “traditional” opposition, often use exactly the same language and imagery of reform that the regime has used in the past. Respected blogger Nassem Tarawneh identified this phenomena during one of the most contentious episodes of the

[95] Muasher, 11.
[96] Muasher, 11.

Jordanian Arab Spring – the March 24-25, 2011 protests at *Diwar Dakhiliyyeh* (Interior Ministry/Gamal Abd al-Nasser circle). As Tarawneh observed,

> As the hours progressed the March 24 *shabab* ["youth"] began to make a few declarations of what they sought to achieve. *I do not recall a single thing that they said, which the King himself has not either said in the past few weeks, let alone the past few years*. At the top of their list was having an elected government under a constitutional monarchy where the King is the sovereign ruler. [Also] at the top of their list was cutting off the interference of the security apparatus (the mukhabarat) in the lives of the average Jordanian, or more specifically, the lives of Jordanian youth, especially on campuses. This last point likely emerged due to the King having had expressed the exact same sentiment not one week ago. …The feeling [among those I spoke to was] that if they presented themselves publicly, that this would some how [sic] offer political capital for the King to carry out reforms amidst an apparatus that has difficulty accepting change.[97]

There is something ingeniously simple here that perhaps embodies the "above the fray" element of politics. The regime has managed to discursively differentiate the role of the king from the government. He is part of the debate, but his position is to be seen as not up for debate. In this case, the king can safely rest behind this artificial wall, built and maintained with "virtual politics", and fire volleys of suggested reforms at an imagined point in the future.

One might say that this represents monarchical advantage, but in hindsight, the regime quickly cracked down on the March 24-25, 2011 *Diwar Dakhilliyeh* protests, and the Jordanian protest wave continued unabated, even reinvigorated. So, the regime clearly doesn't believe that the virtual politics of the trained discursive discipline and established 'red lines' are enough to preserve the regime. Even when the protesters are repeating demands for reform that the king has already, in theory, conceded to. Moreover, it is clear – referring to Figure 2 –

[97] Tarawnah, "The Quick Death Of Shabab March 24 And What It Means For Jordan." Emphasis added

that the *hirak* do not believe the king's empty promises. It may have been an effective method in the past, but the protesters clearly see the writing on the wall.

After the initial salvo of 2010 protests in Dhiban, the contemporaneous Prime Minister Samir Rifa'i penned an editorial in the popular independent newspaper, *al-Ghad.* In this editorial, we see the initial framing response of the regime to protests. Rifa'i maligned the striking workers and teachers, asserting that the regime would not surrender to the "oppression" of the protesters. Instead of returning home and abandoning their campaign, this only emboldened the demonstrators and caused protests to begin to spread from the countryside to Amman. The regime's response in this first salvo evinces a persuasive-control strategy through a transparent warning. But more importantly, it represents counter-framing, presenting the protesters as oppressive and illegitimate as compared to the legitimacy of the regime.

The protesters called for Rifa'i's firing or resignation. Meanwhile the teacher's movement protesters present at the 2010 demonstration added the demand that the head of the ministry of education be fired or resign. Numerous interviewees noted that the police and special gendarmerie (*Darak*) made significant attempts to hamper the demonstrations in Dhiban. The deployment of the *Darak* could be interpreted as a sign of how seriously the regime takes the problem, rather than simply allowing regular police to handle domestic protests.[98]

[98] It should be noted however, that the *Darak* as an organization is a permanent fixture of the Jordanian security apparatus. Or at least the regime projects an image of its balaclava-clad officers as omnipresent. Whether to interpret that as indicative of a regime ready to use heavy-handed repression to stifle dissent or as a normal safeguard of any regime to maintain state capacity is difficult. It could conversely be argued that the deployment of paramilitary forces between the regular armed forces and the police is a frequent fixture of authoritarian regime politics, and thus not particularly worthy of excessive attention.

Despite this initial reaction and attempt to hamper protests, on December 23, the newly elected parliament proclaimed an unprecedented vote of confidence in the newly formed cabinet of Samir Rifa'i. Given tensions in the kingdom, this vote was seen by the public as a crass rejection of public demands for reform, and indicative of the government's disregard of the public.[99] Unbelievably, on December 31, 2010 the government decided to increase the price of gas for the fifth time without raising salaries – a decision guaranteed to instigate riots.[100] Abu Shuji'a reports that in Dhiban, there was no immediate strike, perhaps to the satisfaction of the regime.

More dangerously, the youth organization of Dhiban did decide to gather on 7 January 2011 in front of the mosque in Dhiban to protest.[101] Some one thousand citizens participated in this 7 January Dhiban demonstration, chanting the slogan: "Down with the Government Price Increases." According to activists and other participants, the government was surprised by the number of protesters gathering to wait for the march to begin. General anger with the government carried protesters to the end of the demonstration. At the end of the day, activists called for widespread mobilization, urging all major cities to gather together and demonstrate as well.

We can say unequivocally that this is the moment at which the events transcended mere local economic grievance demonstrations. A repeat of the 7 January protest was scheduled for a week later under a similar slogan: "Down with the High-Priced Government." Protests spread from Dhiban to the capital,

[99] "Jordanian Parliament Facing Credibility Crisis," *Jordan Times*, January 25, 2011.
[100] Interview with the author, 29 August 2016, Madaba/Dhiban, Jordan.
[101] Interview with the author, 29 August 2016, Madaba/Dhiban, Jordan.

Amman, as well as the traditionally loyalist city of Karak. By the third week, protests spread to other governorates. Most interestingly, Abu Shuji'a and a number of other interviewees noted with pride that the 2006, 2010, and 2011 protests utilized bread as a symbolic frame – reportedly attaching bread directly to placards – prior to its famous appearance in Egypt's revolution.[102] Such a picture is featured in Amis' chapter with the caption "أين أنت يا عزيزي؟" ("Where are you, my dear?").[103]

It seems relatively clear that the activists in this case were able not only to spark and sustain protests, but also that the protests were innovative in their techniques. None of the frames differs significantly from those deployed in the parallel protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, or elsewhere in the region. As a result, the idea that the protesters did not mobilize with a coherent message seems dubious.

It is clear and commonly accepted among the interviewees that the *hirak* splintered and was neutralized without accomplishing the characteristic Arab Spring goals of regime removal. There was likewise broad agreement on a few common reasons for this splintering. First, the regime strategy of divide-and-rule helped to prevent full-integration of the two ends of the protest movement – Transjordanian and Palestinian – into a cohesive unit comparable to that in Tahrir square.[104] Second, while Tunisia and Egypt breathed fire into the Jordanian protests, Syria extinguished them. Every interviewee identified fear of either government reprisal because of government fear that things might escalate into a

[102] "Abu Shuji'a", "Abdul Rahman" and "Mahmoud" interviews with the author.
[103] Amis, "*hirak*! Civil Resistance and the Jordan Spring," Figure 7.1, 174.
[104] However, as a note for future research, this identity cleavage is variously disputed among interviewees.

"Syria situation" or fear themselves that the natural progression of pushing too far too fast with the regime would be civil war akin to Syria. The final element requires further investigation but is consistent enough: the internal division among the *hirak* as to the merits of pushing past simple socio-economic reform and into political demands only served to split the movement when tensions rose. That "Jordanians don't know how to protest" may not be as chauvinistic as it first appears. It may reflect a feeling that the *hirak* couldn't cohere enough to decide on and present a united front, realistic demands, or a plan for follow through if the demands were indeed met. Even this sentiment, however, is perhaps too ad hoc and swift a judgement, as we can see from the Dhiban protest mobilization and the anecdote of a Karak-born activist seemingly doing the networking work of the entire Egyptian April 6th youth movement.

Conclusions

Did the Jordanian regime survive the Arab Spring uprising wave because of the hypothesized mechanisms of monarchical advantage? Let us summarize the evidence examined in this chapter.

Was Jordan's monarchy better able to forestall protests such that mobilization took place at much lower levels compared to MENA republics? Based on the evidence, the Jordanian protests were fewer and smaller in comparison to other Arab Spring uprising cases. This would lend credence to the existence of the monarchical advantage and support for the first hypothesis. On the other hand, we have to acknowledge that these protests were sustained. Of course, when we make the crucial comparisons to Tunisia, Tunisia's uprising was

necessarily shorter than Jordan's (and Bahrain's) because the Tunisian uprising had a natural endpoint in the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime.

But the duration of protests is, analytically, a double-edged sword. It means that the regime is not particularly adept at forestalling protests. Activists are clearly capable of carrying out protests. This lends credence to the idea of discursive and networking space as well as physical space to protest. It also indicates that the regime's concessions were either not trusted or the protesters took the opportunity to press for further demands. In the case of Jordan, both are true. Protesters clearly did not vacate the streets, even after numerous economic and political concessions. On the other hand, it could be an indicator of the monarchical advantage as an indicator of the strength of the regime. In other words, if protests persist it may be because the regime is weak or because it is strong enough to withstand them. Further, it is related to the dimensions on geographical intensity, size intensity, but perhaps most of all the dimension on intensity and targets of claims. In other words, a regime can withstand a protest if it is isolated to the periphery or small parts of the capital, if the protests are comparably small, or the protesters were not calling for the fall of the regime, beyond which the regime must either brutally repress them or reconsider the continuing nature of the regime as authoritarian.

Interviewees and other sources indicated clearly that this mobilization in Jordan in 2010-2012 was both qualitatively and quantitatively different than previous waves. This indicates an inability of the regime to prevent protests in several time periods, damaging assertions of hypothesis 1. Regarding the

geographic dispersion of the Jordanian Spring, protests began in the periphery but the regime's intransigence gave them swift purchase in Amman. Beyond geographical dispersion, protesters in Jordan represented a cross-section of society as never before. Both these dimensions of dispersion (geographical and demographic) were sustained over time. Both of these evince a weakness in hypothesis 1, but also in hypothesis 2 to the extent that the indicators overlap. So we are left, with, at best, a mixed record in the case of Jordan. We see in the single case of this Jordanian monarchy, we see different levels of each of the hypothesis indicators. Though, admittedly, it is powerful evidence of monarchical advantage that the protests were smaller in quantity, even if they persisted.

On the final dimension – intensity of aims/goals of protesters – the record is likewise mixed. We can definitively say that the legitimacy of the monarchy does not stand as a persistent bulwark against protests. On several occasions and persistently in 2012, protesters frequently and undeniably made the monarchy the target of their ire. But this means that nearly a year passed before these calls for regime change appeared. Unfortunately, the full examination of this final measure cannot be presented in this chapter alone, but must wait for comparison to Tunisia and Bahrain.

Chapter 5

Tunisia – Early Riser

Tunisia's ostensibly successful transition after its inspiring revolution has been the silver lining of the Arab Uprisings and remains the hopeful spring in what some began to call the "Arab Winter" as Libya imploded and Syria exploded. But perhaps the most tragic story of the Arab Spring is its smoldering embers in Bahrain.

The previous chapter provided crucial insights on the dynamics of collective action in Jordan. But it leaves questions unanswered. What is notably missing from these findings is any comparative indication that variables crucial to explaining the survival of the Jordanian regime rest on its status as a monarchy rather than a republic. Jordan on its own does not tell us enough and provides too little in the way of external validity. Remember that the purpose of the comparison of the primary case of Jordan to Tunisia and Bahrain is intended to show the potential monarchical advantage in relief. Tunisia was chosen as a republic of comparable size and an "early riser" in the Arab Spring wave. A comparison between Jordan and Tunisia alone might be sufficient to tease out the existence of the monarchical advantage. However, Bahrain was chosen as a third case to help compare conclusions about Jordan to another monarchy, but also to juxtapose a dynastic monarchy against the Jordanian monarchy.[1] Comparisons to Tunisia and Bahrain are designed to draw out and scrutinize what I think I know

[1] For more on the distinction between linchpin and dynastic monarchies per Michael Herb, please refer to Chapter 2.

from Jordan and possibly highlight those things that are still missing and to widen the circle beyond Jordan.

Before comparing Tunisia and Bahrain to Jordan, it is important to review the questions and hypotheses driving those comparisons. Protests in Tunisia led quickly to regime change. But Jordan and Bahrain experienced protests but remained standing. Recall that the examinations of the hypotheses laid out in the previous chapter were modeled on the assertions of Michele Angrist, examining why the Tunisian uprising resulted in regime change. Hypothesis 1 (H1) holds that monarchies are better than non-monarchies at preventing protests. The second hypothesis (H2) holds that monarchies are better at withstanding protests than non-monarchies. Finally, Hypothesis 2a asserts that monarchies are better at withstanding protests (H2) because they more effectively control protests that do emerge.

As I have re-worked and operationalized Angrist's original argument, the Tunisian uprising resulted in revolution and regime change because it ultimately failed to control protests, resulting in protests that were larger, of longer duration, and geographically diffused over most of the country. Protests in Tunisia will be more aggressive in calling for changes to policies and policy-makers, including the executive, Ben Ali. As in the previous chapter, after establishing the timeline of the Tunisian uprising, I will begin by examining the intensity of protests in terms of scale (number, size, and geographic dispersion across Tunisia). Next, I examine the character and composition of the protest coalition in Tunisia, looking for a diversity of actors across identity and demographic cleavages. This will be

followed by an examination of the character of the grievances expressed and used to mobilize protests in the Tunisian uprising and the intensity of protests in their demands. Finally, I will review the findings regarding the regime's capacity for prevention of (H1) and control of (H2a) protests.

Before comparing Tunisia and Bahrain to Jordan, it is worth pausing to review my tentative conclusions from Jordan. A couple of things are clear from the analysis of collective action and regime response in Jordan. First, and easiest to determine, is that Jordanian activism, even in the Arab Spring wave, had been long-simmering. Jordanian activists and protesters were well-practiced in the act of mobilization for political grievances. Moreover, they have a rich cultural reservoir from which to pull both tactics and frames. Second, it appears that the Hashemite regime does not have any particularly special capacity to either prevent or control protests. However, the regime does appear to have a talent for resiliency based on a careful but not especially convoluted mixture of concessions, framing, and selectively targeted or surgical use of repression. It should be no surprise that the Jordanian regime seems quick to learn from mistakes not only of other regimes but of its own in the past. Third, activists in Jordan note that the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt did buoy support for mobilization toward reform and made it possible for them to mobilize people around effective frames, move into the street, and visibly and vocally challenge the regime. The commonality of grievance frames as well as the cultural reservoir of past uprisings in Jordan were key in making it possible to mobilize people across different identity and ideology cleavages. But the regime still deployed its

usual "divide-and-rule" strategy vis-a-vis ethnicity and identity among Jordanians. In this instance, unlike others in the past, however, the regime perhaps only cynically played its divide-and-rule hand to separate East Bank Jordanians from West Bank Jordanians. The *hirak* movement was composed of cross-cleavage youth that was more difficult to divide on identity lines. Since the Arab Spring fervor has subsided and the tide has receded, activists report that people remain politically aware and engaged but it is more difficult to get them off the balconies and into the street. Lastly, the Jordanian *hirak* movement appears to have dissolved under what interviewees report as a lack of cohesion in its message on the streets, lack of a practicable plan for reform if a potential revolution had succeeded. Externally, worries among the protesters and activists that any collective action sufficient to topple the Jordanian monarchy would invite the same destabilizing chaos that was happening in Syria or might weaken Jordan to the point that spillover from Syria would become increasingly likely.

Characteristics of the Tunisian Uprising

Unlike any other case in the Arab Spring wave, the Tunisian revolution consisted primarily of only one month of protests before the fall of the Ben Ali regime.[2] Ben Ali, ruled Tunisia with a draconian grip for 23 years before departing with his wife, Leila Trabelsi, and their children for Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011, marking the end of the Tunisian uprising and the beginning of

[2] Though widely reported in the international press, it appears that the name "Jasmine Revolution" was a moniker used only outside Tunisia and never by Tunisians themselves to refer to the 2010-11 uprising. I will use only the less colorful but contextually accurate "Tunisian revolution" in my analysis. Cf, Issandr El-Amrani, "Why You Shouldn't Call It the 'Jasmine Revolution,'" The Arabist, January 17, 2011, https://arabist.net/blog/2011/1/17/why-you-shouldnt-call-it-the-jasmine-revolution.html.

the Arab Spring. The Tunisian regime under Ben Ali was widely known for its repression. Though, like many of his contemporaries among Arab leaders, he began as a promising reformer, expanding press and electoral freedoms, repression and the closure of freedoms crept steadily back into Tunisian life and politics. As in Egypt, the police and security forces were long feared, and brutally effective in controlling regime opponents.

Tunisian mobilization prior to the Arab Spring

"Graduate's self-immolation sparked 10 days of violent protest that left at least two dead in nation where dissent is rare."[3] This *Guardian* article's subtitle pithily tells the story of Tunisia that belies a much more active backstory. In what has become a common theme, the uprisings in Tunisia that became the Arab Spring did not emerge from a vacuum, nor did they emerge solely based on *WikiLeaks* cables that already confirmed what Tunisians and others already knew about repression and malfeasance.

Laryssa Chomiak catalogues in detail the collective action events in the decade that preceded the December 2010 uprising. The juxtaposition of two similar protests shows an interesting (and representative) if altogether unsurprising dynamic in pre-revolution Tunisia. On April 3, 2002, a pro-Palestinian protest organized by the ruling party and featuring state-created or otherwise co-opted women's organizations, labor and professional unions, and student and youth groups. Naturally, there was no regime repression of this

[3] Julian Borger, "Tunisian President Vows to Punish Rioters after Worst Unrest in a Decade," *The Guardian*, December 29, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/29/tunisian-president-vows-punish-rioters.

action. It was not only regime-sanctioned, but in support of a "safe" subject area, and thus ostensibly far enough from regime redlines.

Three days later, leftist students, some associated with the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) and the outlawed Tunisian Communist Party (PCOT), staged a copycat protest. Despite the same subject of the rally, the leftists were unable to obtain a permit for the protest. Hundreds of protesters nevertheless showed up to the illegal rally. Probably strategically, but to the eventual detriment of the protests, the protesters converged on Avenue 9 Avril in downtown Tunis – near the crucially symbolic area of the Kasbah, which housed the Tunisian parliament and a major university campus, among other sites.[4]

Unlike the previous demonstration, the police swarmed this protest within minutes. This quickly devolved into clashes between police and protesters. Once these clashes began, Chomiak reports that the protesters began chanting slogans against the police forces, the most visible embodiment of the regime's repression and illegitimacy.[5] It is doubtful that the protesters would have been surprised by the security forces' reaction. And to organize what amounts to essentially a redundant or copycat protest could be a deliberate attempt to push the regime or to force it to define the physical and rhetorical red lines. A secondary benefit could have been that activists wanted to shine the spotlight on the abuses of the Ben Ali regime and expose the hypocrisy of the West's support of the regime as a paragon of human rights in the region.

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[4] Laryssa Chomiak, "Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia," in *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2014), 26.
[5] Laryssa Chomiak, "Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia," in *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2014), 26.

Regardless, Chomiak highlights the importance of these two juxtaposed events in retrospect. The April 6, 2002 protest marked the first time that a protest organized around one of the "safe" topics with the support of a major political party, professional associations, and student activists would immediately switch to deploy a domestic grievance frame once the security forces turned to repression.[6] This entire process would recur a year later in Tunis and the Gafsa mining region, with the PCOT and student activist networks protesting the American invasion of Iraq. This time protesters deployed another human rights-specific grievance frame, criticizing police for restricting their freedoms of assembly and expression.[7] It recurs yet again in approximately August and October 2006. This time, however, protesters from the PCOT and the newly organized illegal Union of Unemployed Graduates – an alternative to the corrupt and co-opted Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) – began to make a serious tactic of the piggy-backing protest.

Activists mobilized in August and October 2006 again in the towns of Gafsa and Redeyef around the frames against corruption and illegitimacy of the regime. Frames specifically focused on these grievances as manifested in the regime's lackluster efforts to fight unemployment in the hinterlands, corruption and co-optation of the large UGTT union, in the unfair hiring practices of the Gafsa Phosphate Company, and the nepotism of a small coterie of regime-linked families. These regional protests continued in January and February of 2008, manifesting as demonstrations as well as sit-ins and hunger strikes in Redeyef. In

[6] Laryssa Chomiak, "Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia," in *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2014), 26.
[7] Chomiak, 27.

March of 2008, local activists networked with a larger protest movement supported by left-wing student activists across the country. These urban activists, including members of the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET) and members of the Communist Party (PCOT) and Parti Socialiste de Gauche (PSG), used this political opportunity space of the Gafsa-Redeyef protest wave to add their broader grievance frames to the existing unemployed workers' claims.[8] Large protests began to break out in Redeyef in response to the failure of previous protests and the arrest of activists. Wives and mothers of jailed husbands and sons began planning "women's protests" hoping that the regime would be less repressive against protests by women. By March 2008, this tactic spread to the wives of unemployed miners, school teachers, and local union members.[9] These protests increasingly resulted in police clashes with protesters and the regime sending greater numbers of police to quell protests, ultimately arresting and jailing hundreds over the course of three months and shooting and killing at least two protesters. In April 2008, leftist activists organize a national day of solidarity, attempting to spread support throughout the country. At the same time, activists across the country begin using the networking powers of Facebook and Twitter to spread information about grievances and regime repression. This proves to be crucial in both this period and the 2010-2011 period as the regime maintained a stranglehold on media, including foreign media. France 24 was the first outside news source to cobble together a documentary on the activities within Tunisia based on material shared by activists online. In response to this, Ben Ali did not

[8] Chomiak, 31-32.
[9] Chomiak, 31-32.

back down, but instead sent an additional 12,000 police forces to the restive areas to help quell the protests.[10]

After April 2008, protests lost momentum, however. Ben Ali responded with minor concessions, authorizing the release of some political prisoners if they would sign a pledge never to engage in organized collective action against the state again. Paired with his concessions, however, Ben Ali still reserved the ability to brutally crush dissent that emerged. Accordingly, regime repression escalated dramatically in response to the next protest a month later. Police swarmed a sit-in outside the offices of the Tunisian Electricity and Gas Company (STEG), which had assembled to protest rampant electricity and gas outages in the Redeyef area. After arresting everyone involved, police electrocuted to death protester Hisham A'Alemi after he refused to leave and held onto a power cable that had been turned off.[11]

This dramatic overreach by the regime only fueled protests in response throughout May 2008. The regime deployed a counterframe, "labeling the nonviolent and peaceful protests as an organized coup attempt and terrorist strategy to destabilize Tunisia."[12] Unemployed workers in Redeyef continue to take to the streets on June 6, 2008, despite increased repression. By July-August 2008, the regime has effectively suppressed the uprising in the Gafsa-Redeyef mining region, having shot two more protesters during the June 6 protest. During this period, while street-protests were suppressed, left-wing activists continued networking, particularly on university campuses and on Facebook and Twitter.

[10] Chomiak, 32.
[11] Chomiak, 32-33.
[12] Chomiak, 33.

Police deployment may have receded, but activists found themselves under increased surveillance, continuous random arrests, harassment, and censorship. By August-September 2008, Ben Ali ordered Facebook blocked for a month in response to activists evading regime censors by using proxy servers among other methods.

Until 2005, Chomiak observes, activism against the Ben Ali regime was geographically disconnected. Techniques ranged from an increasingly contentious cyberspace willing to critique the regime, to those street protests than began as normal, non-anti-regime or anti-police protests and occasionally morphed after meeting with police repression. After 2005, mobilization became more focused, particularly around issues of internet censorship and freedoms of expression. Perhaps more importantly, as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way would likely affirm, was the bolstering of Tunisian activist networks through interconnection with parallel international activist NGOs.[13]

Previous analysts viewed the pre-2010 collective action, however widespread and increasingly dense in networking, as effectively mobilizing only those directly affected by the specific grievance frames. In this case, the grievance frame and mobilization was specific to the anti-corruption/unfair practices protests in the mining hinterlands of Gafsa and Redeyef. While notable as evidence of mobilization and networking ability of the activists and protesters,

[13] Chomiak, 27; Cf, Levitsky, Steven and Way, Lucan, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

previous analysis argued that this crucially left out the urban, coastal middle class.[14]

Yet, Chomiak also argues, this ignores one of the most significant mobilizations in the lead up to the Tunisian revolution. May 22, 2010 was the first substantive protest event since the regime effectively repressed the Gafsa Phosphate workers' strike of June 2008 and Ben Ali had blocked Facebook from August to September 2008. Six internet activists – all of whom had been involved in the leftist efforts to mobilize national solidarity around the Gafsa/Redeyef protests and whose activity online after that protest wave caused the regime to block Facebook – organized a protest on Facebook known as "*Tunisie en Blanc*" ("Tunisia in White"). The mobilization called for Tunisians affected by internet censorship (virtually everyone) to simply dress in white and have a coffee on any one of the many cafes in Tunis' main thoroughfare, Avenue Habib Bourguiba. They planned to pair this innovative flash mob protest with calls for traditional protests in front of the Ministry of Communication and Technology.[15]

The intelligence services quickly shut down the "Tunisia in White" Facebook page. Police quickly dispersed the potential flash mob protest and arrested those involved in organizing both it and the physical protests. Regardless of the ostensible failure of this incident, Chomiak asserts that this represents a crucial convergence of Tunisian activist networks. By this point, "activists,

[14] Laryssa Chomiak, "Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia," in *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2014), 22–51.
[15] Chomiak, 35-37.

bloggers, and oppositional journalists were supporting and covering any attempt to transgress and contest the Ben Ali regime."[16]

Despite increased security forces surveillance of activists, after passing through the period from 2002 to 2008, regime counterframing and violent repression, activists and protesters had all been learning in that crucible and refining their methods. Thus, the "Tunisia in White" campaign does represent a failure of a protest, though it was aborted less violently than in the past and the future. But more importantly, it was an innovation in tactics. That innovation crucially drew together a newly mobilized middle class, and youth, students, and others growing disgruntled with the regime's overreach and blasé corruption around effective past collective action frames and networks. By May 2010, despite repression and surveillance, activist networks were able to marry any small-scale grievance such as a hinterland miners' strike to a larger master frame of regime corruption and excesses as crimes against the public writ large. Seven months later, Mohamed Bouazizi would prove just how fecund the grievance networks and cultural reservoir were.

On December 20, 2010, days after Bouazizi's self-immolation in the southern hinterland town of Sidi Bouzaid, the government dispatched development minister Mohamed al-Nouri al-Juwayni to the impoverished southern epicenter. There he dangled a new $10 million development program concession to appease protesters and halt the further diffusion of protests. But, in the ensuing days, 22-year-old Houcine Falhi electrocuted himself to death in Sidi Bouzaid at a demonstration against unemployment. His reported last words were

[16] Chomiak, 37.

"No to misery; no to unemployment!"[17] December 24 saw protests spread throughout the southern hinterlands. Numerous protesters, after reportedly setting police cars and buildings on fire in the central Tunisian town of Menzel Bouzaiene, were met with police opening fire on the crowds, killing two. [18] The interior ministry argued this was justified in self-defense after protesters failed to disperse when police fired shots into the air.

Nevertheless, this sets off a pattern of violence over the ensuing days, punctuated by the regime's attempt to alternatively counterframe and concede to the demands of the protesters. A December 25 rally attended by hundreds in the central towns of al-Ragab and Miknassi featured clashes with security forces when security forces staged an overnight crackdown campaign. Protests continued to diffuse to Kairouan, Sfax (the capital of the southern governorate and the second largest city), Gassa, and Ben Guerdane, while clashes erupted in Souk Jedid. During this time, protests take on a decidedly political turn, with chants (including some of the first in Tunis) beginning to appear, calling for Ben Ali not to stand for re-election in 2014.[19] On December 26, 2010, amid these clashes and protests in which unemployment was highlighted as a grievance frame, and a day before protests reach Tunis, beleaguered development minister al-Juwayni announced that the Tunisian government conceded the legality of the protesters' employment

[17] Ryan Rifai, "Timeline: Tunisia's Uprising," January 23, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/201114142223827361.html.
[18] Rifai, ibid.
[19] Bilal Randeree, "Protests Continue in Tunisia," December 26, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010122682433751904.html; Ryan Rifai, "Timeline: Tunisia's Uprising" January 23, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/201114142223827361.html; Julian Borger, "Tunisian President Vows to Punish Rioters after Worst Unrest in a Decade," The Guardian, December 29, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/29/tunisian-president-vows-punish-rioters

demands. Just as in Jordan, however, the government, through al-Juwayni, underlined that its concessions were tied to demands "only through dialogue. …'what is unacceptable is for those parties to resort to violence, which is not in anyone's interest."[20] A member of the then-outlawed opposition Ennahda movement deployed a vehement counterframe, arguing that the problem was more widespread than unemployment and salient beyond Sidi Bouzaid. Regarding the inexcusability of violence, he argued that "these disturbances have never been violent – it is the government that incites violence. [The government is] highly corrupted and there is a denial from them about how they treat people."[21] Likewise, Lina ben Mhenni maintained that the government's use of money to prevent potential protests was too little, too late: "They [the government] are trying to solve the problem by making promises. They did the same thing in 2008, but these are not real solutions."[22]

Journalist Yasmine Ryan points to the massacre by paramilitary forces as a turning point in the Tunisian Uprising. A local high school teacher characterized the flow of events, saying, "Mohamed Bouazizi broke the wall of fear. But the real centre of this revolution is Kasserine, and the neighborhood of Ezzouhour [in particular]."[23] Though protests in the Kasserine region had already increased to a steady tenor after a copy-cat self-immolation by a man in the town of Kasserine. The tipping point within Kasserine came when the local police were replaced by

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[20] Randeree, ibid.
[21] Bilal Randeree, "Protests Continue in Tunisia," December 26, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/2010122682433751904.html
[22] Randeree, ibid.
[23] Yasmine Ryan, "The Massacre behind the Revolution," *Al-Jazeera English*, February 16, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/02/2011215123229922898.html. (accessed March 13, 2017).

the security services. Specifically, Ryan notes that large numbers of riot police units known as the *Brigades de l'Ordre Public* (BOP) were mobilized from other towns. While protests were largely peaceful in the beginning, physical violence by the BOP agents – including beating and the use of teargas and rubber bullets – resulted in youth throwing stones and allegedly Molotov cocktails at police and security forces.[24]

At some point, Ryan discloses, "then came a number of unidentified agents wearing different, slicker uniforms from either the BOP or the local police. They used live bullets for the first time on January 8."[25] After shooting several protesters at the Monguela roundabout in the neighborhood of Ezzouhour, things escalated dramatically the next day, January 9, 2011. Per Ryan's account, on January 9, four agents of the unidentified paramilitary force stormed the women's bathhouse near the same Monguela roundabout. The agents shot teargas into the bathhouse, trapping women and children inside for several minutes before allowing them to flee and giving chase. When young men approached to help the women, they were shot by the paramilitaries. Some eyewitnesses argued that this was a deliberate tactic to draw protester-age young men into the open to neutralize them.[26]

Security officials escalated brazenly by opening fire on the funeral procession of Mohamed Mbarki on January 9. The procession for his friend Walid Massoudi – one of those fatalities – on the following day, was attended by more

[24] Yasmine Ryan, "The Massacre" ibid.
[25] Ryan, "The Massacre" ibid.
[26] Yasmine Ryan, "The Massacre behind the Revolution," al-Jazeera English, February 16, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/02/201121512322992289 8.html.

than 200 people, despite being forbidden by security officials. BOP riot police blocked the funeral cortège and attempted to disperse the crowd with tear gas. Youth protesters responded with rocks. This continued apace until the afternoon when eyewitnesses said at least five snipers started firing on the procession from rooftops. Eyewitnesses noted that this was an escalation from previous encounters with security forces and police, when even live rounds were announced and used to incapacitate by shooting at non-vital locations like the arms or legs. Eyewitnesses and the head of forensics at the local hospital noted that these were clearly shots intended to kill. Eyewitnesses, meanwhile, noted that the snipers appeared to "target the youths who were leading the protests, those who were the most courageous, those who had a camera or a cellphone."[27]

Notably, this occurred on the weekend of January 8-12, 2011, nearly one month after Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation. Emphasizing this point, this means that, as Yasmine Ryan notes, (though less critically) it took nearly a month for the critical mass of the middle classes to join the protests and push the uprising nationally and onto Avenue Habib Bourguiba in Tunis.

Intensity of Scale of Protests

Michele Angrist's criteria for "sustain[ing] physical protests across most of a state's territory for a significant period of time" uses the very narrow period of one month (December 2010 – January 2011) as a benchmark. Because the Tunisian revolution only persisted for a month and ended not in devolution to civil war as in Libya, Syria, or Yemen, but in regime change, we might assume

[27] Ryan, "The Massacre" ibid.

that there is a relationship with intensity of scale. Conversely, in Jordan, because the protests persisted for over a year and did not result in regime change, we might assume the protests were small and sporadic. Yet either of these assumptions could easily be incorrect.

In Tunisia, protests regularly ranged from hundreds to several thousand people during the various sit-ins, strikes, and protests across the country. By the time protests reached Tunis in early January 2011, participants numbering in the tens of thousands were marching down Avenue Habib Bourguiba toward major government offices. On February 26, 2011, 100,000 people - the largest crowds since Ben Ali's ouster - turned out to demand the resignation of interim prime minister (and former Ben Ali regime insider) Mohammed Ghannouchi and the prohibition of any other former ruling party or Ben Ali regime insiders from any future government.[28]

We know that the 2010-11 protests began in interior towns and villages and spread to Tunis only in the last few weeks of the uprising. Protests in the month-long uprising occurred in Gafsa; Redeyef; Sidi Bouzaid; Menzel Bouzaine; al-Ragab; Miknassi; Kairouan; Sfax (the capital of the Southern governorate and the second largest city in the country); Benn Guerdane; Souk Jedid; Kasserine; Jendouba; and of course, Tunis. In Tunisia, protests were reported in 11 of 24 governorates, a geographic dispersion of approximately fifty percent. Laryssa Chomiak illustrates the geographic spread of protests in Tunisia after protests first erupted in Sidi Bouzaid. In those very hinterland towns that had remained

[28] Aidan Lewis, "Middle East Protests: Major Rally in Tunisia Capital - BBC News," BBC News, February 26, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12585935.

seemingly cowed since the violent crackdown in 2008, the protests began to spread systematically: "the first towns to engage in ongoing protests were Thala, Kasserine, Gafsa, Redeyef, and Metlaoui, before heading north long the Algerian border, through Jendouba, and finally reaching Tunis in early January."[29]

Composition of the Protest Coalition

The composition of the protest coalition in the Tunisian uprising can be examined from two related but distinct angles. As in Jordan, parties to the protest ranged from decentralized grassroots youth movements to NGOs, professional associations, and labor unions. The 2002, featured an amalgamation of students, and members of the Progressive Democratic Party and outlawed Tunisian Communist Party. As discussed previously, during the 2008 Gafsa protests against the UGTT union and the Gafsa Phosphate Company, local activists in Gafsa started networking with larger left-wing student activists throughout the country, combining their respective grievances. 2008 also witnessed an effluence of specialized protests and groups – the wives and mothers of jailed husbands and sons, wives of unemployed miners, school teachers, and local union members. Of course, the "Tunisia in White" flash mob protest was unique in that it mobilized ordinary Tunisians, particularly middle-class Tunisians in the larger coastal cities who had been affected by the regime's increasingly clampdown on the internet. They merely had to wear white and purchase a coffee at a pre-coordinated date and time. As Chomiak reveals, the foundation for 2010 was laid in 2008 when the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET), the Tunisian Communist Party

[29] Chomiak, "Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia," 40.

among others "used the waves of [previously disorganized and weak] protests as a political opportunity to mobilize others with broader political goals."[30] It appears, overall, that left-wing student activists provided a network throughout the country to expand and spread protests that began in the interior.

It is true that the urban middle-class and intelligentsia were among the last to move into the streets in Tunis to demand the ouster of Ben Ali. But, as Chomiak illustrates, the cascade of constituencies that went into the streets or that defected from the regime was unprecedented and spelled the end of the regime. Within the first two weeks of January, opposition parties, lawyers, and professional organizations had joined the protests in ever greater numbers and with increasing frequency. Most damaging to the regime, perhaps, was the defection of the UGTT, the largest union in the country, which then called on thousands of protesters to join them in the streets of Sfax on January 11 and in Tunis on January 13, 2011.[31] Within 24 hours, Ben Ali had fled to Saudi Arabia.

A second crucial aspect of the protest coalition in Tunisia, as discussed previously, underscores the presence of activism across (real or potential) societal cleavages.[32] The heterogeneity of Tunisia's mass collective action was bolstered and fostered by Tunisia's secular opposition actors reasoning that the regime under Ben Ali was more of a threat to their interests than the possibility of sharing

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[30] Chomiak, 31.

[31] Chomiak, 38; Michael J. Willis, "Revolt for Dignity: Tunisia's Revolution and Civil Resistance," in *Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and Disasters* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2016), 36.

[32] Here I'm alluding to the idea that some cleavages exist *in potentia* and only come alive when instrumentalized or activated by the regime or by in-group elites against another group. On the other hand, some cleavages are persistent (e.g., class, economic equality gaps, rural vs. urban, religious, etc.).

power with the Islamist opposition. In short, from the 2000s to the revolution, bridge-building across the secularist-Islamist divide had been steadily cultivated. Finally, by the time the UGTT joined the angry streets and protests had reached Tunis, Angrist observes the "refusal of civilians to stand with and for the status quo by not demonstrating, or by counterdemonstrating in support of the regime."[33]

Intensity of Demands and Aims

In large part, Tunisian activists were not deploying grievance frames any different from their counterparts in Jordan, either in the period immediately preceding the Arab Spring uprisings, or the revolutionary uprising itself. Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation unfortunately served as a stark emphasis of the grievances in Tunisia. As Angrist demonstrates, though economic grievances were central to the Tunisian uprising,

> many Middle Eastern societies faced greater economic hardship than Tunisia. Despite its economic challenges…Tunisia could boast a relative low poverty rate, high literacy rates, impressive school enrollment rates for both sexes, high life expectancy, decent health care provision, and a large middle class for the region.[34]

Angrist reconciles these indicators with the apparent quotidian reality for most Tunisians through relative deprivation. This was most marked in the rural interior, where past uprisings as well as the 2010 revolution began. Michael J. Willis captures the view from the ground, particularly in these hinterlands, saying

> Progressive neglect of the region during the rule of Ben Ali, who channeled resources and especially jobs disproportionately to the capital and the coastal towns and cities, stoked resentment. …Official rhetoric about Tunisia's "economic miracle" failed to chime with local

[33] Angrist, "Understanding", ibid.
[34] Angrist, "Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia," 548–549.

> experiences, and the marked growth of clientelism and nepotism, particularly during the latter part of Ben Ali's presidency, led to widespread local feeling of being excluded and cheated out of the fruits of Tunisia's supposed economic success.[35]

As in Jordan, economic grievances were quickly and easily packaged together with corruption grievances. This is not the only substantive parallel between Jordan and Tunisia. Just as the Jordanian teachers' and workers' movements that predated the Jordanian Spring in Dhiban in 2006-7, and 2009 so the 2008 Gafsa uprising predated the 2010-11 Tunisian uprising. Another quite interesting parallel can be drawn between the socio-economic and geographical similarities between the hinterlands of the two states. Perhaps a more apt comparison to Gafsa in Tunisia is the Jordanian town of Ma'an.

Chomiak summarizes the grievance framework and its implications:

> In following the flow of protests in 2010 and 2011, one can see that grievances developed from basic economic demands in Sidi Bouzaid, Thala, Kasserine, and the mining region in the South, along the Algerian border toward the north of the country and also to Jendouba in the north-west, to over demands for increased civil liberties. … By the time the popular protests reached Tunis on January 8, 2011 …regional variation in grievances mattered less…when Tunisians felt united in their collective grievance towards the Ben Ali regime.[36]

Again, in protests in the interior in 2008, activists were focused not necessarily on the removal of Ben Ali but on alleviating economic pressures. This goal easily shaded into an anti-corruption frame and at times took on an anti-policy or anti-personnel goal. Early protests, for example, frequently criticized the police as the most visible manifestation of the Ben Ali regime's repressive capacity.[37] As time progressed, even anti-police or anti-repression slogans became more specific, as

[35] Willis, "Revolt for Dignity: Tunisia's Revolution and Civil Resistance," 33.
[36] Chomiak, "Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia," 38.
[37] Chomiak, 26.

in a 2003 protest in which protesters deployed a specifically human rights-oriented frame, criticizing the police for restricting their freedoms of assembly and expression.[38] Overall, the picture in the lead up to the 2010/11 uprising was of grievance frames highlighting economic injustice, a lack of dignity, and unfair practices by clientelist unions and companies in the hinterlands, and protest goals of righting those unfair practices and reforming job allocation processes and perhaps dismantling particular companies or breaking union monopolies.

After December 25, 2010 protests for the first time take on a decidedly anti-policymaker goal, as protesters began to call for Ben Ali not to stand for re-election in 2014/15.[39] By January, Willis notes, once the UGTT had thrown its lot in with the protesters, and middle-class activists and networks – especially including large numbers of lawyers and professional associations – joined the existing youth and leftist grassroots activism, calls for Ben Ali's removal became increasingly common. It is important to note here that, unlike what one might assume, given the outcome, the calls for the ouster of Ben Ali were not present from the beginning, just as in Jordan, calls for the institution of a constitutional monarchy or the removal of the king/monarchy, were neither immediate nor ubiquitous. Nevertheless, as both Willis and Chomiak note, unprecedented solidarity, paired with a singular goal of ousting the regime, especially after the

[38] Chomiak, 27.
[39] Bilal Randeree, "Protests Continue in Tunisia," December 26, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/12/201012268243375190 4.html; Ryan Rifai, "Timeline: Tunisia's Uprising - Al Jazeera English," January 23, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/201114142223827361.html; Julian Borger, "Tunisian President Vows to Punish Rioters after Worst Unrest in a Decade," *The Guardian*, December 29, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/29/tunisian-president-vows-punish-rioters.

January 2011 Kasserine Massacre, may have been the deciding factor in the fall of the Ben Ali regime.

Regime Responses

What should be obvious is that Tunisian activists have not only been active but quick to learn and innovate during the period from 2002-2011. But what should have been just as obvious to activists involved anywhere during that period (2002-2011) that the regime would not tolerate this level of dissent and active, public rejectionism. The Ben Ali regime was quick to snuff out any serious or sustained challenges to its rule and was swift to deploy counter-narratives to try to prevent mobilization of bystanders or warn off protesters. The latter includes the willingness to move co-opted professional associations or extensions of the ruling party into the streets to delineate space for acceptable collective action.

But none of this appears to have worked. The Ben Ali regime is no better than the Jordanian regime at the prevention of protests. In fact, especially in the case of the 2002-2005 protests activists were active in experimenting with new tactics, welding together grievances, and testing the red-lines of acceptable behavior for the regime. By 2006-2008, activists are learning from the crucible outside of those red-lines and showing a willingness and ability to mobilize protests in both the hinterlands and the coastal urban centers.

In terms of regime strategies, there is a noticeable pattern of a foundation of persistent surveillance. As with Egypt, the military in Tunisia was not the primary agent of regime repression, and ultimately, the military, when deployed, would refuse orders to fire on protesters. Likewise, the regime was more than

willing to deploy police to disperse protests, arrest activists and participants, or even attack and kill protesters. Overall, however, the regime appears willing to vary its strategies for prevention and control. In all cases, police were quick to descend on protests that materialize. The use of tear gas and live ammunition was commonplace.

During the precedent-setting 2008 protest cycle, protests increasingly resulted in clashes with the police. Police would arrest hundreds over the course of March and April 2008 and two would be killed in clashes while the regime simply continued to pour more police into restive areas in an attempt to quell them.

The Ben Ali regime was not averse to more subtle methods of prevention and control, however. After it had effectively controlled protests in April 2008, Ben Ali responded with minor concessions, promising to release some political prisoners on the condition that they sign a pledge never to engage in organized collective action against the state again. Nevertheless, the regime response to protests a month later was swift and brutal. Police swarmed the sit-in protest at the Tunisian Electricity and Gas Company, arresting all participants, and publicly and extrajudicially executing Hisham A'alemi by returning power to a power cable that he refused to abandon.

As discussed previously, the public backlash to this dramatic overreach resulted in a counterframing effort by Ben Ali, "labeling the nonviolent and peaceful protests as an organized coup attempt and terrorist strategy to destabilize

Tunisia."[40] During this same time, the regime continued to use police to repress protests, but it also sought to prevent and control simultaneously by shutting down Facebook. At the same time, the regime increased mukhabarat surveillance and harassment of activists. Surveillance of this type undoubtedly allowed the regime to quash the "Tunisia in White" attempted protest as soon as it started.

The regime was not without the wherewithal to purchase appeasement. Ben Ali dispatch development minister Mohamed al-Nouri al-Juwayni to the restive southern epicenter with an offer of a $10 million development program designed explicitly to halt the protests and prevent future outbreaks. When this fell flat, however, the police were more than willing to repress protesters with live ammunition on December 24. Two days later, al-Juwayni delivered a statement featuring a mild concession to the legality and legitimacy of the protesters' employment grievances. But this was to come with a caveat as al-Juwayni underlined that the concessions were tied to demands "only through dialogue. …'what is unacceptable is for those parties to resort to violence, which is not in anyone's interest.'"[41] Ben Ali would emerge only three days later, on December 29, 2010, appearing on television with a promise to both create jobs and punish protesters, whom he labeled terrorists. He simultaneously deployed the military to stifle protests.[42]

By the first week of January, the regime effectively switched to a repression-only strategy and increased the level of violence to a new high. The events of January 8-9 in Gafsa and Kasserine, with paramilitaries from the BOP in

[40] Chomiak, 33.
[41] Randeree, "Protests Continue in Tunisia."
[42] Chomiak, "Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia," 41.

sanitized uniforms opening fire on protesters and a funeral cortège from snipers' nests and specifically targeting those recording events with cell phones, would later become known as the Kasserine Massacre and represents the most brutal episode in the Tunisian uprising.

The 2010/11 Revolution, what had been clashes between protesters and police earlier in the decade turned to pitched battles between protesters and the police or security services, featuring burning tires, Molotov cocktails, tear gas and live ammunition. Finally, what is notably different from the Jordanian but similar to the Bahraini uprising is the remarkable and routine violence used by the Ben Ali regime.

Chapter 6

Bahrain – Smoldering Embers

If the prevailing view of the Tunisian revolution was of swift victory and a promising transition, and the Jordanian uprising was of protracted but ultimately ineffective mobilization, the view of the Bahraini uprising may be of its protracted violence. We could challenge the monarchical advantage and compare Jordan and Bahrain simply on one dimension, represented by the following question: why did similar realities faced by the Jordanian and Bahraini regimes result in a careful and mixed strategy in the former and a brutal crackdown in the latter?

Apart from those places that have descended into civil war, like Syria, Libya, and Yemen, Bahrain has seen some of the most sustained protest activity of the region since 2010. Protest in Bahrain has been markedly sustained and yet the Al-Khalifa regime remains standing. Recall that Bahrain represents a dynastic monarchy and a regime that relies at least in part on hydro-carbon rents and international and regional patronage (two of the other proposed mechanisms of the broader monarchial advantage).[1] This allows us to explore potential variance between the two monarchies. Bahrain also presents us with the ability to generalize a bit more beyond Jordan, as Bahrain has comparable issues of ethnic cleavages. Finally, Bahrain also allows us to examine Herb's and Lucas'

[1] Cf, Yom, Sean L. and F. Gregory Gause III, "Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On," *Journal of Democracy* 23, no. 4 (October 2012): 74–88; Yom, Sean L., "The Survival of the Arab Monarchies," *Foreign Policy: The Middle East Channel*, November 12, 2012, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/12/the_survival_of_the_arab_monarchies; F. Gregory Gause, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994); Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*.

contentions that dynastic monarchies are substantially and structurally different. The selection of these dynamic cases allows for plenty of ground on which to make claims and draw at least mid-level generalizations.

Finally, recall once more that Bahrain will be subjected to the same hypothesis tests as Tunisia and Jordan have been. If Hypothesis 1 (H1) is supported, the Bahraini regime will have successfully acted to confine protests to relatively fewer and smaller incidents. Those incidents will be less geographically dispersed. The opposition will be less ideologically diverse, and their goals and tone will be less extreme and less likely to call for regime change and more likely to call for changes in policy or in policy makers. These elements would indicate support for Hypothesis 1 in that the Al-Khalifa regime was better able to prevent protests on a scale, intensity, and tone that threatened to topple the regime.

As a monarchy, the Bahraini regime obviously survived the uprisings that swept the region. In a way, this satisfies Hypothesis 2 (monarchies are better at withstanding protest than non-monarchies), but, again, H2 is tested through its sub-hypotheses – most notably for this chapter being H2a – that monarchies are better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling protests. In other words, it will have focused on controlling the protests that appeared, resulting in shorter protests that are less geographically dispersed. Those protests will focus more on the goals of change in policies or policy makers below the King, and those that directly challenge the existence of the monarchy or otherwise cross regime red-lines will be quickly disrupted. If Hypotheses 2a is upheld, we should see a Bahraini regime that quickly disrupts protests, but that

may move to concede as quickly as it represses, so long as challenges to the regime are controlled.

As I will demonstrate, the Bahraini case evinced a mixture of preventative and controlling measures through both intimidation and violence. Both collective action and violent reactions by the regime continued apace. Violence comparable with that exercised by the mysterious unidentified security services in Tunisia occurred regularly in Bahrain. Yet the Al-Khalifa regime remained standing.

Narrative of the Bahraini Uprising

Like the Tunisian revolution, the initial uprising in Bahrain – from the "Day of Rage" on February 14, 2011 to the arrival of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces to help put down the uprising on March 14, 2011 – lasted only about a month. But as I have asserted before, the Bahraini uprising began as smoldering embers and continued as such for much longer.

The dynamics of the Arab Spring uprising in Bahrain must be understood in the context of the previous "Uprising of Dignity" (الانتفاضة الكرامة) from 1994-1999. Nevertheless, my coverage of this period will remain largely confined to a discussion of generally observable patterns and their relation to collective action in later time periods. Though the Arab Spring wave of Bahraini collective action continues until at least 2017, as in Jordan and Tunisia I am focused here on a decade-long window of approximately 2000-2012.

The axis around which Bahraini activism has orbited since at least the 1994-99 "Uprising of Dignity" has been the consecutive issues of the abrogated 1971-3 Constitution and Parliament and the 2001 promulgation by King Hamad

Al-Khalifa. The latter, embodied in the "National Action Charter" "promised to end twenty-five years of national emergency and to reinstate the country's constitution and elected parliament." The Charter, "when put to a referendum…gained the approval of 98.4 percent of voting citizens and an outpouring of support for the king."[2]

This support would be short-lived, as the result was instead an imposition of a new Constitution, drafted secretly and differed significantly from the 1973 Constitution that the referendum had people believe their vote was supporting. Interestingly, the 2002 Constitution created an institutional arrangement not unlike Jordan's:

> …replacing the country's unicameral parliament with a bicameral legislature in which an upper chamber, appointed by the king, shared equal law-making powers with a lower, popularly elected chamber. Oversight of government spending was delegated to the Royal Court, a body under the direct authority of the king. New electoral districts were also drawn up along sectarian lines, providing voters in Sunni-majority areas with relatively greater representation than their counterparts in larger, Shi'a-dominated districts. Media restrictions were loosened. A sweeping amnesty law provided immunity for government officials implicated in abuses and for opposition figures in exile and detention, who had been accused by the government of security-related crimes.[3]

Elham Fakhro points out that political parties remained banned (despite a new parliament in which they were supposed to take part) but political societies, many of whom sprung up along sectarian lines, and many of whom would feature prominently in the coming 2011 uprising, appeared after the 2001-2 National Charter period.[4]

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[2] Elham Fakhro, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Bahrain," in *Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and Disasters* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2016), 98.
[3] Fakhro, 99.
[4] Fakhro, 99.

An April 2004 petition submitted to the king and reportedly signed by up to 75,000 people, objected to the 2002 Constitution and called for "exclusive legislative power for the elected parliament" rather than for the appointed upper chamber. The regime responded that petitions – a long-used tool of Bahraini citizens and opposition groups to seek redress from the government – were no longer legitimate per the creation of the popularly-elected 2002 parliament. Then the regime turned to arresting numerous activists from the Shi'a political society al-Wefaq.[5]

A 2005 International Crisis Group report noted with some concern from residents that events in 2004 and 2005 – regularly featuring protests of thousands and frequent occasions of stone throwing and Molotov cocktails by the more radical elements of the protesters, returned by volleys of tear gas and rubber bullets by the security forces – had begun to resemble the ramping up period that had preceded the 1994-99 uprising.[6] By March 2005 the regime instituted a ban against demonstrations. Despite this, crowds reportedly as large as "tens of thousands" turned out to protests organized by al-Wefaq in Sitra and Manama demanding democratic reforms – specifically the demand that the elected lower house be given greater powers. At these protests Bahraini flags began to appear emblazoned with "Constitutional Reform First".[7]

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[5] Frederic M. Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 46; International Crisis Group, "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge" (International Crisis Group, May 6, 2005), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/bahrain/bahrains-sectarian-challenge.

[6] International Crisis Group, "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge," 3–4.

[7] Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf*; "Bahrain: Thousands March for Reforms," *New York Times*, March 26, 2005, http://bit.ly/2vzUIiR.

In 2005, the regime also began detaining prominent activists and political society leaders as they departed from or attempted to re-enter Bahrain from trips abroad. Al-Haqq society activists were particular targets of this tactic. Abdul Jalil Singace – whose blogging to catalogue human rights abuses in the kingdom and his frequent trips abroad to lobby American and British governments against further support for the repressive Al-Khalifa regime – was detained at the airport after traveling to Washington, D.C. in March 2005. The detention of Haq society leader Sheikh Muhammad Sanad in December 2005, also returning from abroad, sparked a series of sit-ins and demonstrations throughout December. In one incident, protesters swarmed the main shopping mall and Formula One racetrack.[8] By December 2008, the Interior Minister asked Parliament to enact legislation "making street protests subject to harsher penalties."[9] Al-Singace was arrested again for blogging and having "incited hatred against the regime" in January of 2009 and his blog, al-Faseelah, was blocked by the authorities a month later.[10] He was arrested again in August of 2010 By December of 2009, Abdulhadi al-Khawaja had begun calling explicitly for the downfall of the regime during an Ashura holiday speech entitled "Let's Bring Down the Ruling Gang". He was consequently arrested on charges of "giving sectarian legitimacy to the potentially violent overthrow of the government."[11]

By August of 2010, the government began a campaign of rounding-up prominent activists and opposition leaders. The initial arrests were of members of

[8] Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf*, 52.
[9] Wehrey, 52.
[10] "Detained Blogger Abduljalil Al-Singace on Hunger Strike," Reporters without Borders, September 6, 2011, https://rsf.org/en/news/detained-blogger-abduljalil-al-singace-hunger-strike.
[11] Fakhro, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Bahrain," 100.

the Haq movement – a rejectionist splinter from the mainstream Shi'a opposition party, al-Wefaq. Frederic Wehrey argues that Haq was formed with intentionally provocative civil disobedience at its core strategy. These tactics ranged from protests, marches, boycotts and barricades, to the escalatory destruction of property, and particularly at key junctures later in the uprising, the use of Molotov cocktails and firebombs – all intended to elicit repression by the security forces.

In Wehrey's estimation, these tactics are designed to draw public outrage and mobilize more of the public, particularly their compatriot Shi'a. It is also likely that the group engages in these actions to subvert the capitulatory efforts of its progenitor, al-Wefaq, and to increase pressure on the regime. Yet, Wehrey also notes, Haq is also leading the charge alongside the ubiquitous Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR) in directing Western attention to the systemic plight of the Shi'a.[12] In this way, the group may have been risking a great deal in provoking the regime, but it was also attracting the kind of attention to the uprising that could pressure the regime into concessions.

In any case, this may have been the rationale of the regime in going aggressively after leaders and members of Haq. But it is worth nothing that the dragnets between August and September 2010 were less discriminatory in their targeting. Arrested alongside Haq leaders and activists and twenty-three other individuals were Abduljalil Singace, Sheikh Mohammad Sa'eed al-Miqdad, director of al-Zahra'a Association for the Care of Orphans, Sheikh Sa'eed al-Nouri, religious leader and member of the al-Wafa movement; Dentist Mohammad Sa'eed al-Sahlawi; Ali Hassan Abdullah Abdelimam, a thirty-year-

[12] Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf*, 50.

old blogger and owner of opposition website bahrainonline.org.[13] Nabeel Rajab, president of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, likewise fell victim to the dragnet. Between September and December 2010, he was repeatedly harassed, including having his computer confiscated at the airport. He was finally accused of "being part of a 'terrorist network' and passing 'false information' to international organizations for the purpose of 'harming Bahrain's reputation'."[14]

Despite the extended activity in the years leading up to the 2011 uprising, the Arab Spring wave of the Bahraini Uprising began starkly with Bahraini activists' call for a commensurate "Bahraini Day of Rage" on February 14, 2011. The chosen date (and name of eponymous grassroots movement) were not accidental. February 14 holds symbolism for the opposition as it represents the 2001 referendum of the National Action Charter and its calls for devolution toward a constitutional monarchy. It also represents the rescinding of that charter by royal promulgation of a new, less reformist constitution only a year later in 2002.

As in previous uprisings, the reaction of the regime was immediate. Numerous protesters were injured as protesters clashed with police and security forces in Nuwaidrat, Sitra, and the capital, Manama.[15] Within twenty-four hours, the revolution would claim its first martyr in twenty-one-year-old 'Ali Mushaima.

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[13] "Crackdown in Bahrain: Human Rights at the Crossroads" (London: Amnesty International, 2011), 11, http://www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/dateien/bahrain_ai_2011_hr_crossroads.pdf.
[14] Mark Tran, "Bahrain Accuses Human Rights Leader of Faking Pictures of Beating," *The Guardian*, April 11, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/bahrain-human-rights-activist-accused.
[15] Louër, ibid., 190.

Mushaima was shot in the back with a shotgun at close range by riot police at a protest on the outskirts of the capital, Manama. He died en route to the hospital.[16]

More than ten-thousand people attended 'Ali Mushaima's funeral the following day, February 15. After police opened fire on the funeral cortège – which the regime had approved as a legal gathering – the procession marched toward Pearl Roundabout in Manama. Shortly after, a second man, Fadhel al-Matrook, (31) was killed in a similar fashion, being shot in the back and chest with riot shotguns at close range. Twenty-five others were reportedly injured.[17]

Presumably, seeing the outpouring of support and anger from protesters gathered at Pearl Roundabout – whose number had by now reportedly swelled to ten-thousand – King Hamad publicly expressed sorrow at the deaths of Mushaima and al-Matrook and pledged to investigate their deaths for wrongdoing. Interestingly, former defense force officer Mohammed al-Buflasa addressed protesters gathered at the Pearl Roundabout, calling for unity across sectarian lines. He was detained by security forces immediately after this speech and effectively disappeared. The government finally reported that he had been in their custody nearly a month later, on March 4, 2011.[18]

On February 17, 2011, the 1,500 protesters camped out at Pearl Roundabout were ambushed in the early hours of the morning by five hundred police officers. Three were killed, two hundred injured, and thirty-one reportedly

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[16] Jenifer Fenton, "Protester Shot during Bahraini Demonstrations Dies," February 15, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/02/15/bahrain.protester.death/index.html. (Accessed March 28, 2017).

[17] "قتيل ثان في الاحتجاجات و«الوفاق» تعلق نشاطها البرلماني... ومتظاهرون يحتشدون في دوار اللؤلؤة," *صحيفة الوسط البحرينية*- *Al-Wasat*, February 16, 2011, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/527451.html. (Accessed March 28, 2017); Cf, Louër ibid., 190.

[18] Louer, ibid., 190.

missing by morning. In response, nearly four-thousand protesters gathered outside Salmaniya Hospital to protest against the violent raid on the encamped protesters and the deaths of ‘Ali Mushaima and Fadhel al-Matrook.[19] This ambush on encamped protesters in the Pearl Roundabout is a pivotal point in the uprising. During the February 17, 2011 protest outside Salmaniya hospital, a doctor is alleged to have addressed the crowd in anguish: “People of Bahrain, you will win your rights and your dignity. What they have done to you will be avenged.” The crowds reportedly responded with chants of “Down with the king; down with the government!”[20]

Intensity of Scale of Protests

Compared to both Tunisia and Jordan, the sheer size of protests in Bahrain was significantly larger. It must be noted, however, that Bahrain is also significantly smaller than both Tunisia and Jordan in terms of both total population and in total land. Tunisia has a total land area of 155,360 square kilometers, and a population of 11.4 million.[21] Jordan comprises a total land area of 88,802 square kilometers, with a population of 10.2 million.[22] Bahrain, by contrast, comprises only 760 square kilometers, and a population of 1.4 million.[23]

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[19] Louer, ibid., 190.
[20] Laurence Louër, “Activism in Bahrain: Between Sectarian and Issue Politics,” in *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 172–98; Martin Chulov, “Bahrain’s Quiet Anger Turns to Rage,” *The Guardian*, February 17, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/17/bahrains-quiet-anger-turns-rage.
[21] “Tunisia,” The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency, February 22, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html.
[22] “Jordan,” The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency, February 22, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html.
[23] “Bahrain,” The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency, accessed February 26, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ba.html.

These stark differences would impact the scale of protests in terms of both size of protests and geographic dispersion of protest activity.

Protests in Bahrain, like Jordan, ranged from hundreds of protesters to tens of thousands. According to figures presented by Fakhro, the median size of protests could be safely placed in the tens of thousands.[24] Of the three cases, protest activity in Bahrain most closely resembled the occupation-style protest tactics used in Tahrir square in Egypt. The encampments of the Pearl Roundabout initially featured several thousand protesters. Fakhro reports that tens of thousands visited the Pearl Roundabout encampment over the initial two-days of the sit-in. Even the comparatively small crowd that gathered at the Salmaniyya Medical Complex after the February 17, 2011 ambush of the Pearl Roundabout was not insignificant at 2,500-4,000 people.[25]

During the February 20 cascade of strikes by professional associations, labor unions, and students, "according to official records, an estimated 80 per cent of the total workforce stayed away from work." Fakhro claims that this number was also no doubt influenced by the geographic dispersion of the protests on the tiny island nation – protesters forced the "closure of key roads and highways…which prevented others from accessing their workplaces."[26]

Even the so-called counter-demonstration by the Sunni loyalist National Unity Gathering (NUG) – which "called on the government to implement many of the same demands made by the political opposition, including the removal of all forms of ethnic and sectarian discrimination and an end to the misappropriation of

[24] Fakhro, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Bahrain," 88–97.
[25] Fakhro, 90.
[26] Fakhro, 91.

wealth" – was attended by an estimated 50,000 to 300,000. The week after the NUG demonstration, a Martyr's March to protest the killing of six protesters recently killed by security forces featured crowds of 100,000 to 150,000.[27]

In Tunisia and Jordan, protests spread throughout the country, from hinterlands to major cities and the capitals. By comparison, protests in Bahrain were less geographically dispersed. For the most part, the Bahraini uprising centered around the capital Manama, the predominantly Shi'a cities of Sitra and Nuwaidrat, and Hamad Town, and Riffa. But, again, we must keep in mind the relative size of the island and the distances from relative "hinterland" cities to the capital of Manama. By comparison, the distance from Sidi Bouzaid or Gafsa to Tunis (273.2 km and 364 km respectively) or Ma'an or Madaba to Amman (216.6 km and 36.6 km respectively) is compared to Sitra or Nuwaidrat to Manama (11.8 km and 15.1 km respectively). We must also keep in mind that the population centers of Bahrain are concentrated in the north-northwest of the island. Tunisia is comparable in that the major population centers are on the coast. But population in Jordan is significantly more dispersed, even though it is concentrated in major population centers like Amman, Irbid, Karak, or Salt.

Character and Composition of the Protest Coalition in Bahrain

As a case, Bahrain also interesting splits the difference between the highly decentralized hirak of the Jordanian uprising and the mixed grassroots-labor union/professional association coalition of the Tunisian revolution. Like many other sites of Arab Spring wave protests, Bahrain was saw a sharp increase in

[27] Fakhro, 91.

decentralized grassroots youth mobilization led by the February 14 Coalition. Recognizing the realities of organizing in the Bahraini context, Louër notes that the "loose network of activists…insisted on its goal to set aside sectarian identities and create a 'democratic current'."[28] Just as in Tunisia – when the formal labor unions and professional associations (as well as the middle classes) were pressured to join the protests as the revolution wore on and the regime's repression became more bold – organized "political societies" in Bahrain were pressed into the streets by the overwhelmingly violent character of the security forces' reaction to the grassroots protests.[29]

It remains quite difficult to gather data on the sectarian composition of protesters in the Bahraini uprising. But we can piece together a likely picture based on existing sources. First, we know from work by the International Crisis Group field researchers during the 1994-99 "Uprising of Dignity" that the goal of greater democracy and a return to the abrogated 1973 constitution and dissolved parliament was one shared by both Sunni and Shi'a activists. In other words, in terms of Angrist's guidelines, we know that the willingness of tens of thousands to sign pro-reform petitions signals the ability of activists to bridge substantial regime-created sectarian divisions by using the grievance frame against the abolished parliament and constitution.

As in Jordan, where many tribal coalitions remained steadfastly pro-regime, while others either founded the *hirak* or joined later, likewise, Louër observes that when Shi'a parties such as al-Wefaq focus on the issue of

[28] Louër, "Activism in Bahrain: Between Sectarian and Issue Politics," 185.
[29] Louër, 181.

establishing genuine democracy, Sunnis were willing to join the campaign.[30] Justin Gengler reports that at the peak of protests at the Pearl Roundabout, "a number of Sunni personalities…appealed to their co-religionists to join the protest movement."[31] Gengler observes

> These Sunnis insisted the movement was in the interest of all citizens and not simply Shi'a. Protesters donned stickers and badges bearing the slogan, "No Sunni, No Shi'i, Just Bahraini." While these attempts to bridge the sectarian-cum-political divide never gained traction, and few Sunnis were likely to be persuaded in any case, even the outside chance of crosssectarian coordination was enough to elicit a furious government effort to brand the uprising an Iranian conspiracy and to ostracize and punish any Sunni who dared to join it.[32]

As part of the strategy to alienate Sunnis from the protest movement, Gengler notes that those people caught wearing the aforementioned "Just Bahraini" paraphernalia found themselves "singled out for harassment at checkpoints."[33] One former Sunni army officer Mohammed al-Buflasa addressed protesters gathered at the Pearl Roundabout, calling for unity across sectarian lines. He was detained by security forces immediately after this speech and effectively disappeared. The government finally reported that he had been in their custody nearly a month later, on March 4, 2011. A few months later, he was trotted out on state-owned television where he issued an apology and retraction of his earlier statement.[34]

Ultimately, Louër argues, that

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[30] Louër, 177.
[31] Justin Gengler, "Bahrain's Sunni Awakening," *Middle East Report Online: Middle East Research and Information Project*, January 17, 2012, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero011712.
[32] Gengler.
[33] Gengler.
[34] Gengler; Louër, "Activism in Bahrain: Between Sectarian and Issue Politics," 190.

> the presence of at least one Salafi among the protesters gathered on the Pearl Roundabout showed that some Sunni activists are tempted to advance an agenda that does not fully support that of the regime. In other words, there was probably no consensus on a strategy of unquestioned support of the regime.[35]

Intensity of Demands and Aims

Like Jordan and Tunisia, Bahrain experienced collective action that presaged the Arab Spring uprising. But Bahrain's experience of the Arab Spring wave was least spontaneously connected to the overarching grievance frame of the Arab Spring. Bahrainis did mobilize for freedom and social justice and against corruption, just as Jordanians and Tunisians. But Bahraini activism has long been centered on the issue of the reinstitution of the National Assembly and the abrogated 1973 Constitution. For Bahraini Shi'a, this fundamental issue is paralleled with further issues of sectarian discrimination.

Laurence Louër summarizes the history and character of activism in Bahraini along roughly four points. First, Bahrainis are no strangers to mobilizing collective action. Prominent activist Maryam al-Khawaja argues that Bahrain has hosted a protest movement every decade since the 1920s.[36] Second, the collective memory of Bahrainis is populated with this history of activism. Though Louër does not make note of this, what this also means for my purposes is that the Bahraini cultural reservoir is deeply populated with activism and the tactical and collective action framing repertoires available to activists is likewise quite rich.

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[35] Louër, "Activism in Bahrain: Between Sectarian and Issue Politics," 179; Gengler, "Bahrain's Sunni Awakening."

[36] Maryam al-Khawaja, "Activism Challenges in Bahrain," in *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 186–87.

This is particularly the case with Shi'a activism. Third, the longest cycle of mobilization and protest in Bahrain (prior to the Arab Spring wave) lasted four years (from 1994 to 1999). This not only evinces a "staying power" or persistent undercurrent for Bahraini activism – comparable to Jordan – but as Louër points out, this helped to set the context for the Arab Spring uprising in 2011. Despite this, Louër asserts that the 2011 uprising was still "a shock to the Bahraini political system, fundamentally altering the relationship between the opposition and the regime."[37]

Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is significant overlap in the Bahraini case between grievances, regime reactions to dissent and collective action, and the composition of the protest coalition. But what mobilized so many for five years (1994-1999) during the "Uprising of Dignity" (انتفاضة الكرامة) – aptly named comparable to the later 2010-11 Tunisian uprising – that they would withstand inevitable regime repression? Again, the circumstances of this earlier uprising are not dissimilar to those grievances raised in 2011: demands for the reinstitution of the Constitution and elected parliament, grievances aimed at the blatantly sectarian and discriminatory policies of the Al-Khalifa regime, and, finally, the process of repression itself – in 1994-99 personified by the ruthless British security advisor Ian Henderson.

At independence in 1971, Bahrain appeared to be on a path to at least modest liberalization. The ruling Al-Khalifa dynasty allowed the first

[37] Laurence Louër, "Activism in Bahrain: Between Sectarian and Issue Politics," in *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 172–98.

parliamentary elections in 1973. But when that parliament failed to ratify the State Security Law, the Amir, Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa, moved quickly to dissolve the parliament. It is not hard to see how the newly-elected parliament decided to reject the proposed law, also known as "the precautionary law". The law was drafted by the notoriously ruthless British advisor Ian Henderson, who had been retained by the regime to streamline and modernize the Bahraini security services, beginning in 1966.[38] As Adam Curtis describes it, the law "said that any Bahraini could be held for three years without charge or trial on just the suspicion that they might be a threat to the state." Understandably, he continues, "it caused an outrage – because it meant that anyone could be imprisoned just on the imaginative suspicions of Colonel Henderson and his State Security acolytes."[39]

The rejection of the bill by the nascent parliament sparked a standoff between the parliament, the ruling family, and Henderson himself. It ended in the simplest and most autocratic way possible – the Amir simply suspended Constitutional articles guaranteeing freedom to Bahrainis and then suspended the parliament entirely.[40]

Exacerbating the situation, the regime arrested one of the most prominent Shi'a clerics in the kingdom. Protests quickly erupted. But the regime was far from caught off-guard. Instead, the machinery of Henderson's feared "General Directorate for State Security Investigations" (الإدارة العامة لمباحث أمن الدولة) kicked into high gear. Henderson and the security services began filling Bahrain's jails

[38] Adam Curtis, "If You Take My Advice, I'd Repress Them," BBC - Adam Curtis Blog, May 11, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/2012/05/if_you_take_my_advice_-_id_rep.html.
[39] Curtis.
[40] Curtis, Ibid., Stork, "Bahrain Regime Stages Confessions, Rejects Compromise," 44.

with activists and dissidents – including, Curtis notes, members of the erstwhile parliament. Curtis cites opposition activists and human rights groups, whose allegations against Henderson and company included "widespread torture, the rolling imprisonment without trial of thousands of people, deaths and assassinations."[41]

Of all the cases, Bahrain demonstrates the most blatant and institutionalized preventative measures against widespread collective action. Henderson was the spear point of a ruthless, sectarian policy designed explicitly to keep the Al-Khalifa in power and safe from mass protests. The opposition explicitly accused Henderson and the regime of deliberately using divide-and-rule policies that purposely resulted in "fomenting sectarian hatreds".[42] From this crucible, the Constitutional Movement which would emerge in force in 1994 was birthed. Remarkably, despite the regime's efforts, the Constitutional Movement united activists across sectarian lines – secular left and Islamists – around a devastatingly simple grievance frame that would become the clarion call of the "Uprising of Dignity": The constitution and the parliament should be restored. Added to this was the targeted demand that Henderson himself be removed. Curtis quotes the opposition at length:

> Security and special branch chief General Henderson, along with a bunch of British mercenaries who are in control of the security apparatus bear full responsibility for the deterioration of relations between people and regime and for the festering political crisis – by their policy of sectarian discrimination, by waging large scale arrests and killing campaigns, and by fabricating plots designed to alienate the masses from the movement.[43]

[41] Curtis, "BBC - Adam Curtis Blog."
[42] Curtis.
[43] Curtis.

Frederic Wehrey is careful to note that "The calls for demonstrations were largely non-sectarian in outlook; most demanded peaceful reforms and refrained from directly criticizing King Hamad or calling for the overthrow of the Al Khalifa. A few Facebook pages did, however, call for 'revolution' and the 'fall of the regime'."[44] Other sources directly contradict Wehrey's estimations. Similar to Jordan and Tunisia, more specific calls for the removal of policy-makers or the fall of the regime occurred with greater frequency as time wore on. In the case of Bahrain however, the calls came faster and in direct proportion to the violence utilized by security services in putting down even the most mundane and peaceful of demonstrations. In contrast to both Tunisia and Jordan, calls by activists in Bahrain for the removal of policy makers and the fall of the regime appeared early. In September 2004, Human Rights activist Abdulhadi al-Khawaja denounced the prime minister as corrupt and abusive, resulting in al-Khawaja's arrest and detention for "'inciting hatred' and accusing a member of the royal family of corruption." The regime also shuttered the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights and the 'Uruba Club where al-Khawaja had delivered the speech denouncing the prime minister. This set off weeks of protests demanding the release of al-Khawaja, with participants regularly numbering in the range of 3,000-4,000.[45]

The regime turned its sights on online activists in February 2005, arresting three bloggers who criticized the regime and the monarch on the infamous

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[44] Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf*, 76.
[45] International Crisis Group, "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge," 3; Human Rights Watch, "'Interfere, Restrict, Control': Restraints on Freedom of Association in Bahrain," Human Rights Watch, June 20, 2013, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/06/20/interfere-restrict-control/restraints-freedom-association-bahrain.

opposition site, bahrainonline.org. The bloggers were detained for "insulting the royal family", "defaming the monarch, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, spreading false rumours and spreading hatred of the regime" on the internet.[46] The bloggers were released a month later after a tense standoff with several hundred protesters and riot police. Organizers themselves called off the protests "after the event threatened to escalate into a more violent showdown."[47] As previously discussed, activists and leaders of political societies are frequently subjected to arrest and arbitrary detention, often incommunicado. In one additional case, al-Singace and Abdul Ghani al-Kanjar were amongst several prominent human rights activists targeted in a media defamation campaign after the release of a Human Rights Watch report on the use of torture in the country in February 2010.[48]

Regime Responses

Unlike many other countries in the region, wherein the *modus operandi* seemed to be to allow protests around "safe" topics so long as they did not implicate or threaten the government directly, the Al-Khalifa regime bucks this trend. But the very bucking of this trend in one instance may belie how close the sectarian red line is in the minds of the Bahraini regime. A May 2004 protest by approximately 4,000 Shiite demonstrators in Manama against the US military siege of the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala was met with tear gas and rubber bullets and resulted in several being seriously wounded, including a leader of al-

[46] Jon Swain and Sarah Baxter, "The Arabian Spring," *Sunday Times*, March 6, 2005, http://bit.ly/2vg3jbm.
[47] International Crisis Group, "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge."
[48] "Front Line – Human Rights Defenders Dr. Abduljalil Al Singace and Mr Abdul Ghani Al-Kanjar Arrested," Bahrain Center for Human Rights, August 15, 2010, http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/3219.

Wefaq and member of one of Bahrain's Municipal Councils, Jawad Fayruz. In the interest of transparency, the protesters were alleged to have "turned over a public security vehicle and set it ablaze while chanting anti-American slogans."[49] But note that this protest could be considered decidedly unsafe by the government: Shi'ite protesters, angered at American military actions against two important Shi'i cities in Iraq, Najaf and Karbala, were chanting anti-American slogans in Bahrain, home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet. This incident is also notable because it is one of the only times King Hamad has struck a mildly conciliatory tone, "denounc[ing] the heavy-handed use of force by the police and respond[ing] by sacking the minister of interior, Sheikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Khalifa."[50] This even though police routinely utilized these levels of force in 1994-99 and continued to do so in 2011.

As discussed previously, the Bahraini regime utilized a calculated strategy of intimidation and physical violence to confront dissent. But, as Laurence Louër reports, "the situation appeared to be heading in the direction of major concessions to the opposition when some 2,500 troops from the Peninsula Shield, the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) joint military force, arrived in Bahrain" attacked and razed the Pearl Roundabout, and signaled a definitive end to the willingness to engage in dialogue.[51]

With few exceptions, unlike the Jordanian uprising, the Bahraini regime did not seem to make any attempt to bargain with protesters or parlay with the opposition. Cortni Kerr and Toby Jones note that prior to the February 14, 2011

[49] International Crisis Group, "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge," n. 14.
[50] International Crisis Group, n. 14.
[51] Louër, "Activism in Bahrain: Between Sectarian and Issue Politics," 173.

"Day of Rage" protests, King Hamad attempted to use the ostensibly-successful Saudi tactic of purchasing quiescence. Ahead of the planned protests, "and cognizant of the fates of autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt, Hamad announced that every Bahraini family would receive a lump-sum payment of 1,000 Bahraini dinars (approximately $2,650)."[52] When this failed to mollify protesters, the regime effectively pivoted back to a strategy of staggering repression.
Also notable was the attempted intercession of Prince Hamad to forestall the deterioration of the uprising. These prescient maneuvers of the Crown Prince toward reform or at least partial concessions were paralleled by seemingly oblivious maneuvers of the King and the rest of the regime. This culminated in the intercession of Gulf Cooperation Council troops led by Saudi Arabia on March 14, 2011, exactly one month after the beginning of the uprising.

As support was coalescing around the youth-activist calls for a February 14, 2011 "Day of Rage", the regime and the al-Wefaq leadership – especially leader 'Ali Salman – began secret negotiations. The regime requested that Salman call off the planned protests, which of course he had no control over. Salman responded by suggesting that the King announce key reforms. Central was the suggested stipulation that the prime minister would be elected from outside the royal family and that the sitting prime minister be dismissed. Crucially, Wehrey notes that the regime, "deploying a longstanding argument…stated that the GCC

[52] Cortni Kerr and Toby C. Jones, "A Revolution Paused in Bahrain," *Middle East Report Online: Middle East Research and Information Project*, February 23, 2011, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero022311.

states – Saudi Arabia in particular – would not countenance the removal of the prime minister."[53]

In August 2010, the regime began the campaign to round up Shi'a oppositionists, mainly from the Haq movement. At the same time, the regime was growing more threatened by cross-sectarian cooperation in the parliament. This became particularly intolerable when al-Wefaq won all eighteen of the seats it contested in the October 2010 elections. In response, the regime shut down the political society's media outlets and several popular blogs. It then shut down a Facebook page for a popular leader of the 1994-99 uprising, and the security services directly shut down Blackberry messenger service – used extensively by al-Wefaq for constituent communication.[54]

Because of this assault on al-Wefaq's operational and communications infrastructure, social media and technology space were evacuated of traditional or institutionalized Shi'a opposition. Youth activists filled the vacuum. It is unclear whether this was an intentional strategy of the regime. It would make sense to divide the opposition not based on any known cleavage if unavailable, but simply by giving existing doubts among the grassroots of the viability of al-Wefaq's parliamentary experiment a little nudge. With a little cross-pressure on al-Wefaq and harassment of Haq, the regime could have been trying to ensure that the moderates would vacate the Shi'a field. This would in turn populate the uprising with potentially unexperienced and hot-headed grassroots youth activists. Because the previous periods of uprising quickly devolved into escalating violence by the

[53] Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf*, 77.
[54] Wehrey, 74–75.

regime and protesters, this conclusion is hardly out of the question. This is of course *post hoc* reasoning, but the behavior of the regime vis-à-vis al-Wefaq and the youth protesters as well as the previous patterns lends at least some credence to the conclusions that this was a possible strategy.

Anyone having followed observed the uprising of 1994-1999 should not have been surprised at the uprising that began in 2011. Unfortunately, activists and protesters should not have been surprised at the reaction of the regime either because it likewise used the 1994-1999 uprising to create a template.

Joe Stork, advocacy director at *Human Rights Watch-Middle East* chronicled first-hand the 1994 uprising and shed useful light on the comparative nature of both the 1994 and 2011 uprisings. Writing in mid-1996, Stork describes the government having summoned the international press corps (of which he was a part) to the capital for what promised to be a significant announcement. The "Uprising of Dignity" had persisted for two years. Some in the opposition believed that the announcement would finally be some liberalizing reforms, though likely falling short of the demanded reinstitution of the National Assembly and 1973 Constitution. In the week before, opposition groups, namely the Bahrain Freedom Movement, the Popular Front, and the National Liberation Front, issued a joint statement preemptively condemning and rejecting any "cosmetic concessions" at the planned press conference and reiterating the uprising's collective chorus of "restoration of constitutional law to Bahrain."[55]

[55] Joe Stork, "Bahrain Regime Stages Confessions, Rejects Compromise," *Middle East Report* 200 (September 1996): 44.

Far from announcing liberalizing reforms, the regime instead announced that the security forces had extracted confessions from dozens of detainees, arrested and no-doubt tortured during the foregoing protests. They allegedly also confessed to establishing the terror group "Hizb-Allah Bahrain – Military Wing". Moreover, the regime asserted, this organization and its conspirators were mobilized by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard – the greatest *bête noire* in the small gulf kingdom.[56] As Stork notes, no group in Bahrain used this moniker. What was real was a campaign of Shi'a activism against the regime's actions. Field interviews by International Crisis Group members indicated that though "Shi'ites formed the bulk of protesters, … Sunnis embraced the goal of returning to the 1973 constitution and holding national assembly elections, and helped organize pro-reform petitions signed by tens of thousands."[57] The regime now had an insurrection on its hands that it felt justified in quelling. But more importantly, the regime could counter-frame and counter-mobilize fearful and hesitant Sunnis by pointing to this evidence as proof for its claim that insurrection was inspired, coordinated, or aided and abetted by the Islamic Republic. Stork describes the effects plainly, saying "the past two years of political unrest and agitation on behalf of the abrogated constitution was again dismissed as part of a 'scheme of sabotage and terrorism'."[58] Every Arab leader under siege by mass protests, especially Bashar al-Assad and Ben Ali, deployed the same attempted counter-frame of foreign insurgent interference. It appears to have worked in Bahrain to the extent that it eventually caused many Sunnis to vacate the streets.

[56] Stork, 44.
[57] International Crisis Group, "Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge," 2.
[58] Stork, "Bahrain Regime Stages Confessions, Rejects Compromise," 44.

Stork's examination of the 1994-1999 uprising illustrates a more nuanced approach of the al-Khalifa regime security services to protests. Protests since 1994 had been pressuring the regime through the simultaneous tactics of public petitions and large-scale protest mobilization. In terms of tactics in the contentious repertoire of Bahrainis, Stork notes that the petitions and demonstrations "have been alternately requesting and demanding" attention and concessions from the regime.[59]

Again, the regime's reaction in 1994-1999 presages its reaction in 2011. Stork catalogues the response as "cracking down hard on all demonstrations, by indiscriminate arrests and arbitrary detention of several thousand persons, by abuse and torture of prisoners, by deporting alleged ringleaders, and by tightening restrictions on all forms of meetings and public expression."[60] He cites one instance in which security authorities detained several Bahrainis for having helped a BBC reporter arrange meetings and translate the proceedings.[61]

The al-Khalifa regime is also fond of using deportation and long-term imprisonment to prevent and control dissent, particularly among Shi'a clerics and other activists and movement leaders. "In 2001," Abdurrahman al-Nu'eimi notes, "the number of deportees was in the thousands." This does not include Bahrain's prisons which "are full of tens of thousands of political prisoners" subject to brutal torture or even killing at the hands of the police.[62]

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[59] Stork, 44.
[60] Stork, 44.
[61] Stork, 44.
[62] Abdurrahman Al-Nu'eimi, "Arab Initiatives for Reform: Achievements and Failures in the GCC Countries - Bahrain as a Case Study," in *Reform and Change in the Arab World: Conference Proceedings* (Amman: Al Manhal, 2005), 70.

Where the strategies of the two monarchies perhaps converge is in the subtle, non-violent methods of coercion and persuasion. Here Stork's insight is again helpful. The regime's response to the riots hardly stopped with these public confessions. Masterfully, the regime mustered the voices of the country's two newspapers, *al-Ayyam* and *Akhbar al-Khalij*, as well as advertisements by private companies and sports clubs, to publish pieces lauding the vigilance of the security services under the mast of the Interior Ministry.

In addition to this, Stork reveals that the regime extended an "invitation" to upper-level civil servants, heads of civic organizations, and religious leaders, to come to the palace to discuss the most recent developments in the unfolding crisis. What might appear to be a measure of transparency or inclusivity carries a not so subtle message that declining the invitation could result in dismissal if a civil servant and a de facto blacklisting. Perhaps more illustrative, Stork reports that "for a Shi'i cleric, a no-show would likely produce a rude wee-hours summons to Interior Ministry headquarters on the grounds of the old prison fort in central Manama."[63] In a 1995 move to cow Shi'i villages that had been the frequent headwaters of the uprising, the regime went so far as to demand that each club in the General Organization for Youth and Sports sign a pledge of loyalty to the Amir.[64]

These might seem like insignificant or even puerile actions by the regime. But meditating on these seemingly arbitrary actions, one notes the truly sinister character of such seemingly small gestures. It could be argued, in fact, that the

[63] Stork, "Bahrain Regime Stages Confessions, Rejects Compromise," 44.
[64] Stork, 44.

"Uprising of Dignity" ended in 1999 not because of any real actionable reforms vis-à-vis the constitution or parliament, but because the incoming Amir finally dismissed Henderson and abolished the State Security Law.[65] I said earlier that no one in Bahrain who experienced the 1994-99 uprising should have been surprised by the reaction of the regime in 2011. Unfortunately, this is because not only was there little to no reform, but because Henderson departed but the ruthless system he helped to engineer remained.

Wehrey notes that the casualties of February and March of 2011 included not only those killed in the attack on Pearl Roundabout and Mushaima and Matrook. Also included were eighteen other civilians killed by torture and excessive use of force. Simultaneously, the regime reportedly engaged in "arbitrary imprisonment, denial of medical care, and the prosecution of medical professionals for providing care to protesters."[66] Salmaniya medical center was at one point occupied by the military and used as an informal detention center. Not only were medical professionals intimidated and occasionally beaten to dissuade them from caring for protesters, protesters who dared seek medical attention found that they had delivered themselves into the hands of the security services and were frequently interrogated within the hospital itself – now a makeshift interrogation center as well.[67]

An extended account by an anonymous Bahraini source published in April 16, 2011 demonstrates the coercive strategy of the regime, particularly after the

[65] Curtis, "BBC - Adam Curtis Blog."
[66] Wehrey, *Sectarian Politics in the Gulf*, 77.
[67] 'Mahmoud', "A Chilling Account of the Brutal Clampdown Sweeping Bahrain," *The Guardian*, April 16, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/16/bahrain-eyewitness-riot-police.

arrival of Saudi troops with the GCC – dispelling any pretense that might have existed about the use of mercenary troops before. “Mahmoud’s” account bears striking similarities to narratives from the Tunisian uprising.

“Mahmoud”, who lives in a Shi’a village near the capital of Manama describes nightly rituals of groups of “armed and masked thugs [who] were not in security forces uniforms… some [of whom] had Saudi accents; they are very different from Bahraini and easy to tell” detaining people at the point of shotguns, and chasing those who fled through streets and houses, breaking into and vandalizing cars along the way. Around eight in the evening every night, people would shout the *takbir* (“Allahu Akbar”) from their rooftops, safe from the streets littered with tear gas grenades and rubber bullets and the armed thugs who would shoot at the air and the rooftops. He describes systematic hunting and beating of demonstrators, even in small and easily dispersed gatherings, often to the point of death.

Shi’a Bahrainis are systematically hunted using checkpoints, usually strategically-placed at the entrances to Shi’a villages and manned by masked and heavily armed men with Saudi accents. Because Bahraini identity cards include the individual’s birth town and name, security forces and other groups of enforcers could single out Shi’a for taunts and further questioning. The security elements were particularly interested in whether the detainees were “at Lulu Square”, the name for Pearl Roundabout. The authorities reportedly had lists containing names and pictures of protesters and activists known to be present at the roundabout, and would check IDs against the lists at checkpoints. The same

lists with names and pictures were reportedly posted to Facebook “with notices saying: ‘Bring these people to justice, they are guilty people’.”

Intimidation tactics ran the gamut from relatively indirect to grossly personal. Indirectly, people experienced daily flights of F-16s low over Shi’a villages amidst the constant police helicopters and routine searches by troops looking for weapons. These were dismissed by “Mahmoud” as “obviously put there by them - they are government-issue weapons.” Under the pretense of the searches, the authorities also demolished several Shi’a mosques.

More personally, “Mahmoud” reports that three of his cousins - two women and one man - all of whom are teachers, have been arrested in their classrooms “for joining the strike and signing a petition to remove the education minister. Tanks were surrounding the school and riot police entered and arrested them.” “Mahmoud’s” 15-year-old brother was returning from school when the school bus was stopped at a checkpoint. Riot police attempted to single-out Shi’a students on the bus and questioned why a photo of King Hamad was not featured on the bus.

In one instance, masked Saudi troops manning a checkpoint near the military hospital in Hamad Town turned “Mahmoud” and his ailing mother away despite her appointment at the military hospital, evicting them with sectarian insults. “Mahmoud” was unable to divert to the Salmaniya medical complex because it “has been under military occupation for three weeks”, with doctors

detained and Shi'a employees harassed and beaten after being accused of racism for not giving appointments to Sunnis.[68]

Conclusions

Rather than falling in the same category or pattern of collective action and regime reactions as Jordan – and thus affirming some pattern inherent to monarchy as a regime type, Bahrain differs significantly. In terms of size of protests, Bahrain is exponentially larger. But perhaps more notable is the category of regime reactions. The al-Khalifa regime made a few attempts to mollify protesters early in the process. But, as it had in the 1994-99 uprising, the regime defaulted to violent repression. The February 17, 2011 Pearl Roundabout ambush is unprecedented in the sample of cases, but is most comparable to the Kasserine massacre in Tunisia.

More interestingly, the Bahraini regime did not use subtle tactics like the Jordanian regime. Instead, harassment, arrest, and deportation of activists, direct attacks on protesters using lethal and less-than-lethal force, and the use of state-run media to defame the opposition was unique in Bahrain. Finally, though perhaps least surprising, is the centrality of institutionalized sectarian divide-and-rule policies played a distinct role in fracturing the opposition and preventing a successful uprising even while Sunni and Shi'a Bahrainis were appalled by the increasingly violent nature of the regime's treatment of dissent.

[68] 'Mahmoud'.

Chapter 7

Monarchical Advantage and Regime Responses

Moving beyond the data provided in the previous process tracing narratives, in this chapter I will to marshal both existing quantitative data and an original dataset of protest event counts and regime reactions to systematically test the hypotheses about the theory of monarchical advantage. We know from narrative data presented in the previous chapters that the cases represented in the three cases illustrate different responses to the mass mobilizations of the Arab Spring uprisings. Was Bahrain truly more violently repressive than Tunisia? Was Jordan an outlier in terms of its more variegated and measured strategy in responding to protests compared to the overt violence punctuated occasionally by crass attempts at concession or negotiation exhibited in Tunisia and Bahrain? Do the monarchies in our sample show similar patterns of repression or use the same strategies of control? What can quantitative data tell us about these cases and the monarchical advantage that we didn't already know? Does the monarchical advantage exist in terms of prevention or control of protests but in a way that is missed by the narrative data presented in previous chapters?

Recall that the second subhypothesis of hypothesis H2, H2b, builds on the assumption that monarchical advantage in the form of withstanding protests (H2) is a function not only of greater control of protests (H2a), but of monarchies displaying a distinct and discernable pattern in their control of protests as compared to republics (H2b).

Recall also the indicators for hypothesis H2b: Regimes respond to protests in some ways preventatively, before protests have gotten underway, and in other cases in a controlling manner, once protests are already happening. Regimes also use greater and lesser degrees of persuasion and coercion to prevent and control protests. If H2b is true, monarchies should respond to protests by emphasizing preventive, controlling, persuasive and coercive actions at levels distinct from those seen in non-monarchies. Likewise, if H2b is true, the severity of government repression should be different for monarchies in comparison to non-monarchies.

I will begin by presenting data based on counts of collective action events in the cases in the pre-Arab Spring and Arab Spring periods. Next, I will introduce the Prevention-Control/Persuasion-Coercion Matrix. This matrix will allow us to examine regime reactions to protest in finer detail by operationalizing the principal hypotheses of prevention of mobilization (H1) or control of protests (H2a). More importantly, the matrix and this chapter will examine Hypothesis H2b: If it is shown that monarchies are more effective at controlling protests (H2a), is it because monarchies, compared to republics, display a distinct and discernable pattern in their response to protests (H2b)?

Collective Action Events, 2000-2012

As previously discussed in the individual narrative chapters, the Arab Spring wave was a more contentious and contemporaneous manifestation of a much longer process but it was also quantitatively and qualitatively quite different. Qualitatively, it put into question the survival of regimes in a way that

had not happened before. This is borne out in Figure 7.1, which presents the number of collective action events from 2000-2012.[1] In Figure 7.1, we can see three small but distinct peaks in the period leading up to the Arab Spring, in Jordan in 2002, Bahrain in 2004-5, and Tunisia in 2008. Occurrences of collective action events increase sharply in each case, beginning from baseline in 2009 in Tunisia, and reaching nearly 25 in 2010 and more than double that in 2011, followed by a sharp drop in 2011 to 2012. In Bahrain, we see a gradual increase beginning in 2008 before events spike exponentially from 2010 to 2011, only to fall just as fast from nearly 100 events by 2012. Finally, in Jordan, the sharp increase is present but more shallow, beginning in 2010 from nearly zero and arriving at nearly thirty events in 2011 before beginning a much more gradual decline from 2011 to 2012.

Already, the data present some important findings. No country could avoid collective action altogether, either in the pre-Arab Spring phase or during the Arab Spring itself. This would seem to discount the hypothesis (H1) that monarchies are better able to prevent protests than non-monarchies. In fact, glancing at the data in Figure 7.1, before 2008, a more convincing argument could be made that Tunisia – the republic in the sample – was better at preventing collective action than either of the two monarchies. Looking at the period 2000-2009, the pattern in collective action events in Tunisia resembles Jordan more than either one resembles Bahrain. In short, leading up to the Arab Spring, we have significant variation across regime types. By the time we arrive at the Arab Spring, in each case there is a predictably aggressive spike in collective action

[1] Recall that I am limiting myself to a data range of roughly 2000-2012.

events. But interestingly, the country with the highest collective action event count, Bahrain is a monarchy, and the country with the lowest collective action event count is Jordan – the second monarchy. There is still not a clear breakdown with republics on one side and monarchies on the other.

Collective Action Events in the Pre-Arab Spring Period

Examining the pre-Arab Spring period should provide a view of wider patterns of collective action and the difference in how the three regimes interact with collective action challenges outside the diffusion action of the Arab Spring wave.[2] But most importantly, including this period will take us that much further toward uncovering whether monarchies are better able to prevent or control mobilization and whether they use persuasive or coercive techniques.

In Figure 7.2, we see collective action events by year specifically during the Pre-Arab Spring phase. A few interesting dynamics within the data are evident. Jordan saw the greatest number of events in the earlier part of the time period – corresponding with uprisings in Ma'an and Tafileh that presaged the Arab Spring uprisings. Activity in Jordan drops precipitously in the space of a year (2002-2003) and with the exception of a small increase in 2005, remains low to non-existent for the remainder of the decade, only ticking upward slightly between 2008 and 2009.

An almost opposite effect is evident in Tunisia with more collective action events occurring at the end of the decade in 2008. This too drops precipitously in

[2] In addition to "pre-Arab Spring period" we could refer to this period as the "reignition period" because it represents the reemergence of collective action that occurred in many countries in the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s and served as an incubation period for the ideas and tactics utilized in the Arab Spring, for both activists, citizens, and regimes.

the space of a year (2008-2009). This corresponds to both the uprising in the Gafsa mining district and the time period that Laryssa Chomiak argues the Ben 'Ali regime had effectively neutered collective action in putting down the Gafsa revolt with severe repression.[3] However, the comparison of dynamics of events to Jordan are not exact, as Tunisia's collective action events show a wavelike pattern of increased activity roughly every three to four years until the exponential rise from 2007-2008. There is also the matter that Jordan's early "spike" is actually slightly longer than Tunisia's. The pre-Arab Spring Jordanian collective action spike ultimately peaks at fifteen collective action events in 2002, comparable to but slightly higher than Tunisia's single-year-spike in 2009. But a slightly closer look reveals that Tunisia begins 2007 at zero events, spikes exponentially to fourteen events in 2008, only to drop just as fast to baseline in 2009. Jordan, meanwhile, saw six collective action events in 2001, followed by a sharp increase to fifteen in 2002, and a slightly more shallow but nearly identical expoential drop to Tunisia from 2008-2009.[4]

Returning to Figure 7.2, collective action events in Bahrain during this period do not increase and decrease as significantly as they do in Jordan and Tunisia. Nor do they reach the fever pitch that events during those spikes in activity do in Jordan and Tunisia. Instead, Bahrain exhibits a slowly sloping increase dynamic between 2003 and 2006. This highlights a subtle but important

[3] Chomiak, "Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia," 33.

[4] It is especially interesting that Jordan and Tunisia should generally mirror each other during this pre-Arab Spring period because the two largest exponential increases (2002 in Jordan and 2008 in Tunisia) correspond to the Ma'an revolt and Gafsa revolt, respectively. Gafsa and Ma'an are strikingly similar in their positions as formerly major economic hubs outside the capitals, now economically "forgotten" hinterlands, suffering similar socioeconomic distresses as a result of personalism and neoliberal economic policies.

fact, however. True, Bahrain does not exhibit a sharp and concentrated rise in the space of a year, as Jordan and Tunisia do in 2002 and 2008 respectively. But, what the Bahrain data show is instead a steady rise in collective action over a period of two years in 2004 and 2005. If we superimposed event count labels on Figure 7.2, the spikes in Jordan in 2002 and Tunisia in 2008 featured 15 and 14 events, respectively. In Bahrain, 2004 witnessed seven events and 2005 witnessed eight. Taken together, therefore, Bahrain's total collective action is also directly comparable to Tunisia and Jordan, with an overall event count during 2004-2005 of fifteen events. In other words, if we compressed a steady but lower incident period of two years into one year, as in Jordan and Tunisia, the data would feature a nearly identitical spike for Bahrain as we witness in Jordan and Tunisia. Ulimately, Bahrain ends 2009 with a slight uptick similar to that seen in Jordan during the same time. Bahrain's event count during the period of uptick was slightly higher than Jordan's but in the same direction and both trend upward at the same rate.

Collective action in Bahrain was likely relatively flat before 2003 because it was coming on the heels of the 1994- 1999 Uprising of Dignity. We could make the same observation about the precipitous drop of Tunisia's 2008 spike. After a short period of intense collective action in the hinterlands, and the correspondingly intense repression of the state, Tunisian collective action seems to go abruptly dormant. We could perhaps attribute this to natural cycles or waves of contention, or – and, not mutually exclusively, – to weariness on the part of the grassroots opposition after the intensity of the regime's reaction to that previous

uprising. Interestingly, while events in Tunisia go dormant, dropping off precipitously in 2009, – in this particular snapshot of data at least – collective action in both of the monarchies, Jordan and Bahrain, are on an uptick heading out of the decade and toward the Arab Spring. Referring back to Figure 7.1, however, we can see that this uptick in Bahrain in 2009 will continue into 2010 before catapaulting into 2011.

So, for the pre-Arab Spring era, there are no discernable patterns that would point to the monarchical advantage with respect to collective action events. Clearly the hypothesis about monarchies being better able to prevent mobilization is unsupported. In both of the monarchies we see spikes, albeit at different times, but which nevertheless illustrate not only a failure to prevent mobilization, but an inability to control it as well. Both Jordan and Bahrain exhibit spikes of collective action that last for multiple years. Tunisia also presents a spike in events, but it manages to more quickly bring it under control.

Interestingly, in Bahrain during 2004-5, as it illustrates a collective action campaign with a modest degree of staying power. Again, the Bahrain "spike" appears to be smaller, but it also represents the same number of collective action events as in the Jordan and Tunisia "spikes", only spread across two years. Even without this data, however, we know from the narrative that, out of the sample, Bahrain appears to have been the most systematically and brutally repressive in its response to collective action. I will return to this in the coming discussion of severity.

Collective Action Events in the Arab Spring Period


How does this dynamic change with the arrival of the Arab Spring? Figure 7.3 presents data from 2010 – 2012, quarterly. Entering 2010, all cases remain relatively inactive with the exception of a small increase in Bahrain in mid-2010. By the last quarter of 2010, however, we see that Tunisia becomes the "early riser". It then continues to rise for another quarter, and then falls quickly as the Ben Ali regime is toppled in just under a month. Among the two monarchies, Bahrain is "infected" before Jordan, rising even faster than Tunisia albeit behind by a quarter. Jordan's collective action begins at roughly that same time as Bahrain - January - February 2011. But Jordan's event count is dramatically smaller than both Tunisia and Bahrain, although Jordan was experiencing an uptick at the end of this period, unlike Bahrain and Tunisia.


In all three cases, there is a strong effect in the first quarter of 2011, particularly from mid-to-late January 2011 until mid-to-late February 2011. But are the patterns different enough to dissuade any conclusions about the monarchical advantage as a positively correlated causal factor?

Figures 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 disaggregate the individual cases during the Arab Spring period and change the scope of the data from quarterly to approximately monthly event counts. The same patterns are present as in Figures 7.1 and 7.3, but disaggregating them by case allows us to view the data in greater detail. With the exception of the lead-in to the time period, note that Tunisia and Bahrain exhibit similar peaks and valleys in mobilization during the Arab Spring period. This is in contrast to Jordan. Jordan has a similarly placid period leading up to

December 2010-January 2011. There is an exponential rise in events at the end of 2012, but what makes Jordan stand out in comparison to Tunisia and Bahrain is the fact that lower levels of collective action were sustained in Jordan, compared to more dynamic swings in Bahrain and Tunisia. In this case, the Arab Spring wave data for Jordan is not unlike Bahrain in pre-Arab Spring period.

As the data demonstrate, Bahrain and Tunisia are most similar in their patterns, compared to Jordan, undermining the argument for a monarchical advantage. Like the narrative chapters, these data suggest that hypothesis (H1) (monarchies are better able to prevent protests compared to non-monarchies) is not supported. Hypothesis 2a (monarchies are better able to control protests compared to non-monarchies) appears to be in doubt as well.


Figure 7.1: Collective Action Events (2000-2012)
Jordan
Tunisia
Bahrain
Events
100
75
50
25
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012


Figure 7.2: Collective Action Events – Pre-Arab Spring
Events
20
15
10
5
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Jordan
Tunisia
Bahrain
0
6
15
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
3
0
2
3
0
1
14
0
1
3
1
0
7
8



Figure 7.3 Collective Action Events - Arab Spring (Quarterly)
60
40
20
0
Jordan
Tunisia
Bahrain
JAN-MAR 2010
APR-JUNE 2010
JULY-SEPT 2010
OCT-DEC 2010
JAN- MAR 2011
APR - JUNE 2011
JULY - SEPT 2011
OCT - DEC 2011
JAN-MAR 2012
APR - JUNE 2012
JULY - SEPT 2012
OCT-DEC 2012

Figure 7.4 Tunisia Collective Action Events - Arab Spring (2010-2012)






Figure 7.5 Bahrain Collective Action Events - Arab Spring (2010-2012)





Patterns of Regime Responses

To assess the second subhypothesis of H2, which I am calling H2b, it is necessary to examine not protests and protesters actions in a vacuum, but to systematically examine the responses of the regimes. To reiterate, Hypothesis H2b states that monarchies will evince a different pattern in their responses to protests than non-monarchies. The previous figures illustrate when collective action occurred in both the pre-Arab Spring "re-ignition" and the Arab Spring waves. But none of the data presented illustrate when regimes select coercion, persuasion, or to take no action. Regarding the latter first, all three cases have instances of no regime response to a variety of collective actions, and there does not appear to be any consistent pattern to types of actions that warrant no reaction

by the regime.[1] Interestingly, all three cases evince essentially similar patterns of regime non-response, as the Table 7.1 illustrates.

Table 7.1 Regime Response vs. Non-Response

	Regime Non-Response	Total Events	Percent Non-Response
Tunisia	37	105	0.35
Bahrain	39	125	0.31
Jordan	22	70	0.31

Despite number of collective action events, each case did not respond (or no response was reported) at virtually the same rate – about 1/3 of the time. Besides being curious in general, this points again to a lack of variance across regime type when confronted with protests. But regime non-response is hardly the only data on which we should hinge our examination. When regimes did take action, what patterns do we observe? For this I will turn to the Prevention-Control/Persuasion-Coercion Matrix.

Prevention/Control-Persuasion/Coercion Matrix

I am interested in categorizing regime actions and reactions on two basic dimensions: prevention or control of protests, and whether the action taken is persuasive or coercive. Again, this is designed to address one of the central

[1] In the case of Jordan, for example, we should expect that burning pictures of the king, when even defaming him in public is illegal, would illicit a strong crackdown from the regime. This event occurred at least twice in the Arab Spring phase with quite different reactions by the regime. In Madaba on January 11, 2012, a single activist caught torching the portrait was sentence to two years imprisonment for "harming the king's dignity", but he was pardoned by King Abdullah only a month later.[1] Conversely, on November 13, 2012 in Dhiban, protesters burned pictures of the king and protesters en masse were confronted with tear gas.[1] The latter scenario was in the context of a much wider uprising and more aggressive actions by protesters, frustrated with price increases and some calling for ending King Abdallah's rule.

elements of the overall argument: whether monarchies are better at withstanding collective actions or preventing their occurrence.

Table 7.2 "Basic Matrix of Regime Responses with short-hand codes and strategies in quadrants"

	PREVENTION	**CONTROL**
PERSUASION	*Persuasive Prevention*	*Persuasive Control*
COERCION	*Coercive Prevention*	*Coercive Control*

How do we know whether to classify an action as prevention or control? In my formulation, control is only meaningful in the face of protests; prevention is about undermining the causes thereof. The Prevention-Control differentiation is meant to mark time. The distinction I am making is whether something occurs as a reaction to something (control) or in anticipation of something (prevention). Actions that occur after a protest is underway or has already taken place will be considered "control". Actions that take place before will be considered prevention.

The second dimension that I will examine is the difference between persuasion and coercion. I also include the criteria of "Persuasion" and

“Coercion”. Coercion is punitive action or actions designed as negative inducements. Any inducement in which the threat of pain and suffering plays an important role – even if there's a positive inducement alternative – I will classify as coercion. In any incident, persuasion and coercion may be combined, but if there's a significant element of coercion involved, I will classify it as coercive. Persuasion and coercion concern the use of ideas versus the use of force, respectively.

Persuasion itself encompasses a quite wide range of activities. All the activities are about changing perception and ideas as a tool to either prevent or control collective action. But persuasion, interestingly, can have a wide range of target audiences as well. It can be targeted at activists or protesters to persuade them either that they should not protest because the regime is watching them or increasing security forces in advance of a protest or can persuade them by offering concessions. It can also be targeted more widely toward society to either convince potential bystanders that could be mobilized that the regime is willing to negotiate or conversely that it would be in citizens’ best interest not to support or show up to a protest because it may be willing to show force. In the case of counterframing, the regime can whitewash its own actions, clear the discursive field of competing narratives about events, and/or defame the actions or intentions of activists to disrupt mobilization networks.

With this additional dimension of Persuasion-Coercion, we can more clearly illustrate patterns of regime actions and reactions. So now regime actions that might fall on a blurrier line such as arresting or intimidating citizens,

activists, or even NGOs or the press can be categorized as either prevention or control based on time and, further, as either persuasive prevention/coercive prevention or persuasive control/coercive control depending on the combination of the quality of the action and its timing.[2]

As much as possible – while acknowledging the interrelation and interconnection of protest events and regime strategies to deal with them – I am considering each event as relatively distinct or at most dyadic (action-reaction and vice versa). This event-count method, while not perfect, will help to demonstrate two different patterns. First, I will show overall patterns of regime action vis-à-vis patterns of mobilization resulting in collective action. In other words, by coding each discrete event or event-pair/event group by its placement on the Prevention-Control Matrix as illustrated in Table 7.2, a pattern will emerge in the form of a table that shows the prevailing patterns (i.e., predominant regime action) for each regime. Each data point would represent one event or event dyad. For example, a predominance of events in the left two quadrants of the table would illustrate a regime relying largely on prevention rather than control. Conversely, a cluster of events in the bottom right quadrant would illustrate a regime relying largely on coercive forms of control rather than subtler, more persuasive measures.

[2] I recognize that there is some recursive action between the two conceptual categories. Repression as control in one instance could serve soon after as a teaching tool in relation to future collective action and thus shift into the category of coercive prevention or prophylaxis. Similarly, the feedback effect of internal security surveillance, for example, shades easily back and forth between prevention and control. In short, as protests are typically best viewed as campaigns or waves, constantly fluid between planning and deploying, so are regimes' actions realistically both preventing and controlling in the same action.

Table 7.3 Example Events Coded within Prevention/Control-Persuasion/Coercion Matrix		
	PREVENTION	**CONTROL**
PERSUASION	• Counterframing/Pro-regime propaganda; • Targeted concessions/liberalization prior to protests; • Explicit surveillance to dissuade; • Co-optation • Delegitimize opposition by *kompromat* or propaganda	• Post-hoc counterframing; (i.e., clear discursive field of competing narratives about events.) • Explicit surveillance to dissuade; • Delegitimize opposition by *kompromat* or propaganda
COERCION	• Arresting/Harassing Misc. Citizens; members of press; bloggers; NGO organizations or members. • Arrest/detention of activists prior to collective action • Curfew or emergency law prior to collective action; • Censorship/closure of discursive space online/in press/physical space. • Restricting access to physical sites.	• Arrest/detention of activists or participants at or shortly after a protest. • Disperse protesters with tear gas/water cannon/less-than-lethal physical force; • Disperse protesters with lethal violence; • Overwhelming violent crackdown by regime agents or by proxy agents. • Curfew or emergency law immediately prior to collective action; • Censorship/closure of discursive space online/in press/physical space immediately prior to collective action. • Restricting access to physical sites immediately prior to collective action.

The example events from ta represent more specific actions or reactions and their corresponding quadrant on the Prevention-Control Matrix.[3] Again, whether a particularly coercive event like arrests of activists, a raid on a café, or closure of physical or virtual space is preventative or controlling depends entirely on the timing of the event vis-à-vis collective action. Let us take, for example, the upper two quadrants. Note that both feature regime actions of "Explicit surveillance to dissuade", "Co-optation", and actions to "delegitimize opposition by *kompromat* or propaganda". These actions can cross the line between prevention and control depending not on the quality of

[3] Regarding the timing criteria for Coercive Prevention or Coercive Control for example, if a protest begins at noon, and the regime immediately deploys a curfew/emergency law/martial law for that specific day, this would qualify as control. The same criteria should apply to censorship, and the arresting of journalists, shutting down social media and the restricting of access to physical sites.

the reaction, per se, but on the timing of the reaction relative to protests. Conversely, we could not put "explicit surveillance to dissuade" under coercive prevention or coercive control, because the point of explicit surveillance, as I am using it here, is that security forces want to intimidate by not taking care to hide their surveillance efforts. This is a matter of persuasion by intimidation, but stops short of the use of coercion.

Figure 7.7(a-c) Event Counts by Prevention/Control-Persuasion/Coercion Matrix

Figure 7.7a "Event Counts by Prevention-Control Matrix – Tunisia (2002-2011)

	PREVENTION	CONTROL	
PERSUASION	*Persuasive Prevention* 9 (13%)	*Persuasive Control* 12 (17%)	*30%* — *Percent Persuasion*
COERCION	*Coercive Prevention* 9 (13%)	*Coercive Control* 40 (57%)	*70%* — *Percent Coercion*
	26% — *Percent Prevention*	*74%* — *Percent Control*	

Figure 7.7b "Event Counts by Prevention-Control Matrix – Bahrain (2004-2012)

	PREVENTION	CONTROL	
PERSUASION	*Persuasive Prevention* 8 (9%)	*Persuasive Control* 12 (14%)	*23%* — *Percent Persuasion*
COERCION	*Coercive Prevention* 31 (36%)	*Coercive Control* 36 (41%)	*77%* — *Percent Coercion*
	45% — *Percent Prevention*	*55%* — *Percent Control*	

Figure 7.7c "Event Counts by Prevention-Control Matrix – Jordan (2001-2012)

	PREVENTION	CONTROL	
PERSUASION	*Persuasive Prevention* 9 (13%)	*Persuasive Control* 15 (21%)	*34%* — *Percent Persuasion*
COERCION	*Coercive Prevention* 10 (14%)	*Coercive Control* 37 (52%)	*66%* — *Percent Coercion*
	27% — *Percent Prevention*	*73%* — *Percent Control*	

Comparison of the Cases on the Prevention-Control Matrix

Figures 7.7(a-c) represent the coded data for each case for the entire time period 2000-2012. Comparing across the matrices, two things are immediately apparent. First, there does appear to be a pattern of greater reliance on Coercive Control than any other strategy. As a reminder, this means that all the regimes choose to repress protest during or soon after it occurs. By extension, this means that regimes are failing to prevent mobilization from happening (hypothesis H1) or are explicitly choosing to crush protests once they have materialized rather than attempting to persuasively or coercively prevent them.

Second, the overall pattern I just described holds across regime types. The intra-matrix boxes in the lower right corner of each quadrant show the frequency distribution of each category in the matrices in Figures 7.7(a-c). Again, all the events coded fall into the category of Coercive Control more than any other category – Tunisia deployed Coercive Control 57 percent of the time, Bahrain 41 percent of the time, and Jordan 52 percent of the time. But beyond this, commonalities diverge. In the case of Bahrain, Coercive Control is followed closely behind by Coercive Prevention at 36 percent. In Jordan and Tunisia, however, Coercive Control is followed instead by Persuasive Control. Compared to Bahrain, if we hold constant the most frequent strategy of Coercive Control, the frequency of all other categories is quite close.

The Bahraini regime is almost as likely to choose Coercive Prevention (36 percent) as Coercive Control (41 percent). This is partly borne out in the cells to the bottom and right of the main matrix table, which illustrates the frequency

distribution by category (Prevention, Control, Persuasion, and Coercion). Here, Bahrain deploys control strategies 55 percent of the time and Prevention strategies 45 percent of the time. Compare this to Jordan and Tunisia, which are impressively close vis-à-vis Prevention vs. Control. Jordan used Prevention strategies 27 percent of the time but overwhelmingly used Control 73 percent of the time. Likewise, Tunisia used 26 percent of the time and Control 74 percent of the time.

The commonalities in these cells at the borders of each matrix are in the categories of coercion and control. Tunisia used coercion 70 percent of the time. Jordan is slightly lower at 66 percent and Bahrain is the highest at 77 percent. Overwhelmingly and across regime type, coercion is the most commonly used strategy. Likewise, control is preferred by Tunisia at 74 percent, Bahrain at 55 percent, and Jordan at 73 percent. This is a significant difference for Bahrain. Overall, comparing the percentages within the matrix and the percentages on the borders of the matrix, it is clear that Jordan and Tunisia are more like each other than Bahrain is to either of them. In all cases, coercion is preferred over persuasion and control over prevention. Diverging from the pattern, though not entirely, Bahrain only used control over prevention by 55 percent and 45 percent respectively. In sum, Bahrain is the most likely of the three cases to use coercion, but the least likely (though still likely relative to prevention) to use control. Looking at the percentages in the matrix figures 7.7(a-c), we can see that there is a fairly even split between prevention (45 percent) and control (55 percent) in

Bahrain, whereas in Tunisia and Jordan the gap is much wider – roughly 75 percent control and 25 percent prevention.

Bahrain's affinity for the use of coercion is apparent from the narrative in Chapter 6. But recall that the Tunisian regime was quite coercive and repressive as well, with paramilitary and possibly mercenary forces freely using lethal force, sniping protesters and flushing women and children from bathhouses with tear gas. The data in the matrices bear this data out quantitatively. But the data also provide important nuances that are not clear in the narratives.

Per the matrices, the Tunisian regime is almost as likely to choose Persuasive Prevention (13 percent) as Persuasive Control (17%). If the regime selects on prevention, it is just as likely to favor persuasion as coercion (13 percent).

Lastly, the sheer event counts between the cases are roughly similar in proportion even though the Tunisian revolution proper lasted just over a month, while Jordan and Bahrain continued to simmer long after Ben 'Ali fled. As of 2017, Bahrain was still experiencing routine running battles between youth protesters and security forces on a nightly or semi-nightly basis.[1]

The predominant pattern observable in the Bahrain data was overwhelmingly in the coercive quadrant. The overall pattern of heavier reliance on coercive control holds across regime types and across the pre-Arab Spring period of the early-to-mid 2000s and through the Arab Spring period. In Jordan, however, the contrast is stark regarding the strategy of the regime. Far and away,

[1] "Bahrain: An Inconvenient Uprising," VICE News, November 10, 2014, https://news.vice.com/video/bahrain-an-inconvenient-uprising.

the Jordanian regime employs coercive control measures to deal with collective action. Though it is the least likely to use Coercion in comparison to the other cases, its propensity for Control is nearly identical to Tunisia's rather than Bahrain's.

The foregoing analysis should cast doubt upon the last of the three hypotheses (H2b) which holds that monarchies are not only more effective at controlling protests (H2a), they Jordan and Bahrain would display a distinct and discernable pattern in their control of protests.

Severity of Repression

The Prevention-Control/Persuasion-Coercion matrix and the corresponding frequency tables in Figures 7.7(a-c) already provide greater nuance to the narratives presented in previous chapters. But the matrix and frequency tables do not tell us anything about the severity of repression. To begin to address this gap, I will rely on the Political Terror Scale (PTS).

The Political Terror Scale (PTS) aims to measure the level of state violence (therefore excluding non-state actor violence) and terror in each country. Based on a 5-point scale, each country receives a score from each of two different sources: Amnesty International Country Reports, and U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Table 7.4 illustrates the meaning of each score in the 1-5 scale.

Table 7.4 - Political Terror Scale Categories	
Level	**Interpretation**
1	Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
2	There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
3	There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
4	Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
5	Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.



Figure 7.8 Political Terror Scale Averages (2000-2011)
5
4
3
2
1
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Tunisia
Bahrain
Jordan

Figure 7.8 features a plot of the Political Terror Scale scores for Tunisia, Bahrain, and Jordan from 2000-2011 (the furthest extent of the data). As a reminder, the Political Terror Scale ranges from 1 (least use of political terror tactics) to 5 (thoroughly repressive totalitarian state). The PTS uses US State Department Human Rights Reports and Amnesty International Scores, and thus presents a pair of scores per year. For the purposes of simplicity, I have used the average scores for each year.

All three regimes begin the decade in roughly the middle of the scale, indicating extensive use of political imprisonment, execution or other political murders and brutality. Tunisia begins with the worst score of the sample and Bahrain and Jordan both begin slightly below Tunisia, at 2.5. From here, Bahrain makes a surprising improvement, moving from 2.5 to 1, returning to 2 in 2002 and back to 1 in 2003-4. After this, Bahrain begins a gradual ascent into worsening levels of political repression until it ends the decade tied with Jordan for the worst score of the sample. This roughly corresponds with the data I presented showing the event count that spiked in 2004-5, and increasing gradually during the Arab Spring. This might suggest a period of initial crackdown in 2004-5 followed not by a return to baseline (a retreat of security services) but instead a regime that is gradually asserting greater control of the population. Looking back at Figure 7.2, Bahrain is exiting 2009 with an uptick in collective action events from 2008-2009. Comparing this with PTS scores in Figure 7.8, we see a slight decrease in the repressive environment, from 2 to 1.5. From 2009 onward as the

Arab Spring takes root in 2010/2011, the environment becomes more repressive overall.

Tunisia maintains a far less dynamic pattern from 2000-2011. Apart from slight improvements in 2002 and 2005, Tunisia remains in the middle-range even throughout the Arab Spring until making a sharp dive from 2010 to 2011. This is perhaps to be expected given the removal of Ben Ali. This would seem to match with the overall narrative of the Ben Ali regime as one of the most draconian in the region. We might interpret this data as not less dynamic, per se, but as depicting a regime that maintains a constant press on the citizenry. Comparing this data with Figure 7.2, again, this may explain the overall lower levels of collective action in Tunisia until 2010-11. Yet, even the constant pressure of the Ben Ali regime as depicted by the PTS data in Figure 7.8 does not explain the wave-like pattern of collective action in the pre-Arab Spring phase (Figure 7.2).

Jordan was the more repressive of the two monarchies in the sample and hovered around the same middle-range that Tunisia did until 2010-11. Two things stand out about Jordan in this data. First, Jordan is on average the most repressive regime of the sample, rising in 2008 and 2010 to 3.5. Second, and more interesting because it does not track with the rest of the data presented thus far, though they do so at opposite ends of the score spectrum, Jordan and Bahrain essentially track each other in overall direction up and down the scale, until the scores converge at 3 in 2011. For Bahrain, this is an increase from 2.5 to 3 - a worsening of repression/political terror. For Jordan, the same period saw a decrease of 3.5 to 3 - a modest improvement of repression/political terror. So,

both monarchies essentially track each other across the PTS data at different levels, yet they are only one point apart on the scale. Nevertheless, from the other data I have presented, Bahrain and Tunisia differ from Jordan in their use of coercion and repression in response to collective action.

It should come as no surprise that these regimes would display high levels of repression on most scales. Especially given the matrix scores and frequency distributions and the narratives presented previously, which seemed to paint a picture of highly repressive regimes. While there is no apparent commonality among the monarchies that might be called an advantage, there is certainly a distinct difference in each regime's approach toward collective action over the years.

A Matrix of Advantage?

This chapter aimed to examine the hypotheses regarding monarchies' greater ability to prevent mobilization (H1), to control protests that occurred (H2a) and to finally explore whether the ability to prevention or control protests could be illustrated as a distinct and discernable pattern of behavior (H2b). Again, previous chapters analyzing the first two hypotheses through process tracing allowed us to travel some distance in answering these questions. But the data presented in this chapter paint a definitive picture that discounts the monarchical advantage, in terms of these hypotheses, among these cases.

Chapter 8

Conclusions and Implications

Are 21st century monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa better than non-monarchies in forestalling protests? Are they better than non-monarchies in withstanding protests that do occur? If monarchies can withstand protests that do occur, is it because they exhibit patterns of response in controlling protests that differ from non-monarchies? The research questions driving this analysis were composed of two elements: prevention of potential protests and control of occurring protests. If the evidence has demonstrated that monarchies have an exceptional ability to forestall protests or to control and therefore withstand protests that do occur, this should constitute evidence of a monarchical advantage.

To answer these questions, I examined three hypotheses.[1] In general, if the monarchical advantage was to hold, one or both of two hypotheses must have been true. Hypothesis (H1) states that MENA monarchies are better than MENA non-monarchies at *preventing* protests. Hypothesis (H2) states that monarchies are better at *withstanding* protests than non-monarchies. The premise of the monarchical advantage argument in the Arab Spring is the fact that all of the Arab monarchs survived while four of the Arab presidents did not. If we find no evidence for Hypothesis H1 – if monarchies were not significantly better than non-monarchies at forestalling protests – then it would seem that Hypothesis H2 must be true – monarchies must be better than non-monarchies at withstanding protests.

[1] These hypotheses and indicators are also presented collectively in Chapter 1 as "Table 1.1. Hypotheses and Associated Indicators".

As a matter of course, this dissertation did not directly examine Hypothesis H2. The facts underlying Hypothesis H2 served as the logical starting point for investigating the monarchical advantage – monarchies survived the Arab Spring, so they must have withstood protests. I concluded, as a logical matter, that if H1 was false (monarchies are *not* better than non-monarchies at *preventing* protests), then H2 must be true (that monarchies *are* better than non-monarchies at *withstanding* protests). By the end of this concluding chapter, I will have demonstrated that, once we accept that monarchies saw high levels of mobilization – indicating that they are not better at preventing protests (H1) – that it becomes logically inescapable that they must be better at withstanding protests (H2).

Again, we are accepting that Hypothesis H2 is supported, given the outcomes we have observed. This is why, over the course of the preceding chapters, I did not examine Hypothesis H2 directly. But I will still examine how and why monarchies' ability to withstand protests operates and enquire whether this, though true, is not perhaps spurious. To this end, this dissertation examined two subhypotheses related to Hypothesis H2. First, are monarchies better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling protests (Hypothesis H2a)? Second, do monarchies display a distinct and discernable pattern in their control of protests, compared to republics (Hypothesis H2b)?

What would be indicators of the monarchical advantage regarding the *prevention* of protests, if it exists? The maximalist version would posit that monarchies can so effectively forestall mobilization that protest is comparatively

rare and no public demonstrations occur. This is demonstrably false. A more nuanced version of Hypothesis 1 posits that monarchies are better able to forestall mobilization such that protests take place at much lower levels of intensity compared to MENA republics. By "lower levels" I mean 1) fewer protests; 2) smaller protests; 3) less geographic dispersion of protests; 4) less demographic and ideological diversity of the protest coalition, and finally 5) protests whose goals were less likely to include regime change and more likely to be a change in policy or in policy-makers.

What would be indicators that monarchies compared to republics, more effectively *controlled* protests? More specifically, what would be indicators that monarchies are better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at controlling protests (Hypothesis H2a)? If H2a is true, we should see 1) fewer protests, 2) shorter protests; 3) less geographic dispersion of protests; or 4) protests whose goals were less extreme and less likely to be regime change and more likely to be a change in policy or in policymakers.

Hypothesis H1 and hypothesis H2a may appear to be similar, and there are overlapping indicators for the two hypotheses, but as I discussed in Chapter 1, there are important differences. The basic difference is one of timing: Where Hypothesis H1 applies to the prevention of protests that have not yet occurred, Hypothesis H2a applies to protests that have occurred or are underway.[2] Fewer protests, for example, is an indicator for both H1 (prevention) and H2a (control). It is an indicator for H1 because if a regime is able to successfully

[2] See Chapter 1 "Testable Hypotheses" subsection for a discussion of my argument regarding the conceptual and methodological separation of Hypotheses H1 and H2(a).

interrupt the process of mobilization before collective action can take place, we should logically see fewer incidents. Yet, fewer protests are also part of control, because controlling protests that are occurring could logically result in fewer protests in the future. Again, however similar the indicators are, it is important to recognize the temporal distinction I am drawing, because control (Hypothesis H2a) only takes place after protests have already occurred or are underway.

Protests less extreme in intensity of demands are likewise an indicator of both H1 (prevention) and H2a (control). A proactive regime, backed by a robust surveillance and security apparatus will likely work diligently to prevent the most serious forms of dissent among activist networks. So long as this occurs in the form of increased surveillance of civil society, arresting activists and breaking up networks prior to protests, this is a matter of prevention and an indicator of hypothesis H1. At the same time, regimes can fail (or neglect) to prevent such intensely critical actions until they become placards and chants at demonstrations. Because these demands are occurring after mobilization is complete and collective action has occurred, it becomes a matter of control and can thus likewise be an indicator of hypothesis H2a[3].

There is a reflexive effect as well. Prevention and control are temporally distinct processes that are constantly weaving into and out of one another as regimes confront protests. Preventing mobilization will tend to stifle the spread

[3] Prevention and control are temporally distinct processes that are constantly weaving into and out of one another as regimes confront protests. Preventing protests will tend to stifle the spread of dissent and should theoretically therefore be illustrated by the appearance of fewer protests. There is of course a reflexive effect as well. Control of protest in an initial site could likewise control the dispersion of protests and prevent future mobilizations. We don't know if control will prevent dispersion and future mobilizations. At this point it becomes an almost impossible measurement problem.

of dissent and should theoretically therefore be illustrated by the appearance of fewer protests. Control of protest in an initial site could likewise control the dispersion of protests and prevent future mobilizations.

Entirely different indicators were presented for the second subhypothesis that monarchies display a distinct and discernable pattern in their control of protests (Hypothesis H2b). Regimes respond to protests in some ways preventatively, before protests have gotten underway, and in other cases in a controlling manner, once protests are already happening. Regimes also use greater and lesser degrees of persuasion and coercion to prevent and control protests. If H2b is true, monarchies should respond to protests by emphasizing preventive, controlling, persuasive and coercive actions at levels distinct from those seen in non-monarchies. Likewise, if H2b is true, the severity of government repression – measured in terms of the Political Terror Scale, which measures the level of state violence in each country based on a five-point scale – should be different for monarchies in comparison to non-monarchies.[4]

Principal Findings

The previous five chapters examined in detail and from several methodological angles the potential for monarchical advantage by examining the three hypotheses. In the sections that follow, I will review the findings across those chapters based on the hypotheses.

Hypothesis H1 – Prevention

[4] Mark Gibney et al., "Political Terror Scale 1976-2016," 2017, http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/. For more detail on the substantive meaning of each of the five levels, see Chapter 7, this volume, or Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, and Attilio Pisano. "Political Terror Scale Levels." Political Terror Scale 1976-2016, 2017. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Documentation.html#PTS-Levels.

Chapters 3-6 examined the individual narratives of each of the three cases' uprisings and systematically tested hypothesis (H1) (that MENA monarchies are better than MENA non-monarchies at *preventing* mobilization). Here I review the findings with regard to hypothesis H1 by indicator (fewer protests, smaller protests, less geographic dispersion of protests, less demographic and ideological diversity of the protest coalition, and less extreme goals of protests).

H1 – Number of Protests

Event count analysis from Chapter 7 clearly demonstrates the inability of any of the regimes to forestall protests, either in the pre-Arab Spring or Arab Spring phases. This is most clearly demonstrated in the Pre-Arab Spring phase by Figure 7.2, showing the total event count for each of the three cases from 2000-2009. It is immediately apparent that no relationship between monarchy and the number of protests exists during this period, so there is no evidence here of monarchical advantage. Looking at event counts on a year-by-year basis, Tunisia's republic and Jordan's monarchy are more similar to each other than either is to Bahrain's monarchy. If we take the totals for each case across two-year periods, Jordan becomes the outlier with 21 events. While Bahrain and Tunisia have 15 and 14 events, respectively. The republican case, Tunisia, is always more similar to one of the two monarchies than the two monarchies are to each other. This is a particularly robust finding that the monarchical advantage is unsupported for these countries, at least during the pre-Arab Spring period.

Figures 7.4-7.6 in Chapter 7 demonstrate that the lack of monarchical advantage and relationship to regime type also holds during the Arab Spring

period as well. Both Tunisia and Bahrain saw large spikes of protests, followed by a sharp drop from peak levels. In both of those cases, this sharp drop is followed by ongoing mobilization and recurring protests, but post-peak numbers of events never approach the numbers evident in the peak periods. Jordan, by comparison, is not characterized by a sharp peak. In the Arab Spring period, the event count data for Jordan show a wavelike pattern of consistently recurring protests, beginning in January 2011.

In total, we can say two things about the cases in the Arab Spring period based on the event count data. First, of all the regimes, Jordan is the one that has the fewest protests, but Bahrain is the case that has the most protests, providing little support for hypothesis H1. Second, Figures 7.4 and 7.5 – showing event counts for Tunisian and Bahrain, respectively – appear more similar to each other than either does to Jordan. Post-peak, all three regimes look more similar to each other than different. So, during the peak periods, one monarchy and the republic resemble each other closely, and post-peak, the regimes are more similar than different. Based on fewer protests as an indicator, there is little support for the ability of monarchies to prevent protests (Hypothesis H1).

H1 – Size of Protests

A dataset of events as of May 2011 developed by Andy Kirk and Christopher Wilson demonstrates the high levels of mobilization and contentious activity in Bahrain, with 17.6 percent of the population involved, which far outpaced Egypt (2.4%), Tunisia (0.9%), and Jordan (0.1%).[5] But these stark

[5] Andy Kirk and Christopher Wilson, "New Visualization Design Project: Protests and the Media," *Visualizing Data* (blog), May 25, 2011,

numbers belie a more complex picture on the ground, as the preceding chapters aptly illustrated.

In Tunisia, protests regularly ranged from hundreds to several thousand people during the various sit-ins, strikes, and protests across the country. By the time protests reached Tunis in early January 2011, participants numbering in the tens of thousands were marching down Avenue Habib Bourguiba toward major government offices. On February 26, 2011, 100,000 people - the largest crowds since Ben Ali's ouster - turned out to demand the resignation of interim prime minister (and former Ben Ali regime insider) Mohammed Ghannouchi and the prohibition of any other former ruling party or Ben Ali regime insiders from any future government.[6] In Jordan, the size of protests ranged from 200-500 participants, to 2,000-6,000, to the largest reported protest during the samples, in September and October 2012, attended by 10,000-15,000.[7] Most frequently, protest attendance was reported in the low thousands. Finally, in Bahrain, the first day of rage protests were attended by at least 6,000 people across the country, with individual demonstrations ranging in size "from tens of persons to over 1,000 persons."[8] More than 10,000 were reported to have attended 'Ali Mushaima's funeral and subsequent march to Pearl Roundabout in Manama.[9] The

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http://www.visualisingdata.com/index.php/2011/05/new-visualisation-project-protests-and-the-media/. The raw data is available as a Google Documents Spreadsheet at http://bit.ly/2pmb7XI

[6] Lewis, "Middle East Protests: Major Rally in Tunisia Capital - BBC News."

[7] Al-Khalidi, "In Biggest Protest, Jordan Islamists Demand Change"; "Muslim Brotherhood Vows to 'flood' Jordan's Streets to Press Reform Demands"; Sherlock, "Thousands Rally to Demand Reform in Jordan."

[8] Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni et al., "Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry" (Manama, Bahrain: Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, November 23, 2011), 68.

[9] Ian Black, "Bahrain Police Open Fire on Funeral Procession Leaving One Dead," *The Guardian*, February 15, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/15/bahrain-police-funeral-procession; "Protests Boil Over In Bahrain After Bloody Clashes With Police," NPR.org,

subsequent occupation of Pearl Roundabout before its destruction on February 17, 2011, featured as many as 12,000 protesters.[10] And 100,000-150,000 gathered in Manama in the Martyr's March against repeated government repression.[11] Data from Kirk and Wilson as well as that presented in preceding chapters illustrates that there is no relationship between regime type and size of protests. Bahrain and Tunisia are more similar to each other than either is to Jordan with respect to the size of protests. Based on the size of protests, there is little support for the ability of monarchies to prevent protests (Hypothesis H1).[12]

H1 – Geographic Dispersion of Protests

With respect to the geographic dispersion of protests, the narrative data says that there remains neither persuasive evidence for any regime's ability to prevent the spread of protests, nor any support for the monarchical advantage on this measure. Both Tunisia and Jordan in the pre-Arab Spring and Arab Spring periods feature protests that begin in the economically and politically neglected hinterlands and center almost predictably around a handful of particularly restive municipalities. Taking into consideration Bahrain's comparatively much smaller size, in Bahrain, protests spread from particular municipalities to surrounding villages and the capital. And they did so with remarkable speed.

February 15, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/02/15/133775176/protests-boil-over-in-bahrain-after-violence.

[10] Bassiouni et al., "Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry," 72.

[11] Fakhro, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Bahrain," 91–92; Louër, "Activism in Bahrain: Between Sectarian and Issue Politics"; Michael Slackman and Nadim Audi, "Bahrain Protesters' Calls for Unity Belie Divisions," *The New York Times*, February 22, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/middleeast/23bahrain.html.

[12] It is worth questioning what relative weight to assign to protests in Jordan that might be smaller than gatherings of hundreds of thousands as in Bahrain and Tunisia versus a gathering of approximately 1,000 heads of different tribes, coalitions, and protest movements at once at the "Second National Convention for Reform" rally that was held in al-Lubban (approximately 20 km south of Amman). See Varulkar, "Varulkar, 'The Arab Spring in Jordan.'"

In Tunisia, protests were reported in 11 of 24 governorates, a geographic dispersion of approximately fifty percent. Laryssa Chomiak illustrates the geographic spread of protests in Tunisia after protests first erupted in Sidi Bouzaid. In those very hinterland towns that had remained seemingly cowed since the violent crackdown in 2008, the protests began to spread systematically: "the first towns to engage in ongoing protests were Thala, Kasserine, Gafsa, Redeyef, and Metlaoui, before heading north long the Algerian border, through Jendouba, and finally reaching Tunis in early January."[13]

In Jordan, protests were routinely reported in eight out of the twelve total governorates encompassing each of the three regions of the country, a geographic dispersion of approximately 67 percent. In Jordan, protests not only covered a comparably larger geographic dispersion (in terms of municipalities and governorates involved) than Tunisia and Bahrain. Jordanian protests were also frequently held in tandem across the country. Protests and strikes called for in Dhiban, for example, would be paralleled in Ma'an, Irbid, Salt, Karak, and Amman. The fact that my interview respondents frequently spoke of activist organizers traveling from outlying municipalities like Karak to Amman and elsewhere attests to a geographic dispersion every bit as effective as the social media mobilized protests in Tunisia and Bahrain.

Finally, in Bahrain, protests were routinely reported in both Shi'a and Sunni municipalities but also in the capital, Manama, and in notable locations in close proximity to royal court buildings. Protests were routinely reported in Sitra, Manama, Nuwaidrat, Hamad Town, and Riffa, comprising 2 of 4 governorates, a

[13] Chomiak, "Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia," 40.

geographic dispersion of fifty percent. If the benchmark republic, Tunisia, featured 50 percent dispersion, one monarchy, Jordan, at 67 percent surpassed both Tunisia and the other monarchy, Bahrain, at 50 percent, I can find neither a relationship to monarchy, nor support for Hypothesis H1 with regard to geographic dispersion of protest.[14]

H1 – Ideological and Demographic Diversity of Protests

With regard to the ability of activists to construct protest coalitions crossing crucial demographic and ideological cleavages, there was no discernable monarchical advantage in the ability to prevent such mobilization. Activists in Bahrain and Jordan, like those in Tunisia, constructed protest coalitions that crossed important ideological and demographic cleavages. As the baseline, the Tunisian protest coalition ranged from previously-mobilized miners and rural unemployed to trade unions and professional associations – especially the majority of lawyers in the country – and the crucial middle class in Tunis and other coastal cities. Importantly, as Angrist reiterates, hatred of Ben Ali and the sycophantic circle of family and friends, fostered mobilization across secular and Islamist cleavages that the regime thought impossible.

Jordan's *hirak* was composed of a crucial cross-section of the March 24 Youth Movement, various tribal coalitions, and the established Islamist and Leftist parties. But even the *hirak* represented a microcosm of the entire coalition

[14] It must be said that Bahrain's geographic size makes it a special case. The sheer size of Bahrain makes dispersion of the kind that Angrist arguably intended in the analysis of Tunisia more difficult. Moreover, the effective cantonization of major Shi'a areas in Bahrain disrupts our understanding of geographic dispersion by either a) falsely showing a beginning level of dispersion or b) falsely showing a limited dispersion even though a major protest that began on the island of Sitra can easily spread to the capital of Manama in the form of a march. By comparison, there were no marches from Dhiban to Amman or Sidi Bouzaid to Tunis.

– grassroots Palestinian and tribal youth, established tribes, labor movements and teacher's movements – e.g., the "electricity *hirak*" – and professional associations. That the *hirak* protests were paralleled by established opposition parties and other tribal coalitions was unprecedented in Jordanian collective action. But perhaps most important was, at least among the grassroots hirak groups, the minimizing of the East Bank-West Bank identity cleavage that was so often used by the regime to divide-and-rule in the past.

In Bahrain, the February 14th Movement similarly drew from Bahraini youth activist networks, creating a grassroots coalition quite similar to the Jordanian *hirak*. The Bahraini uprising was, for the most part, dominated by Shi'a activists and movements. But the grievance frame demanding a return to the abrogated constitution united, at least briefly, both Shi'a and Sunni activists and movements, including the established "political associations". Even groups like the National Unity Gathering – which inclined toward maintaining the regime more or less in power – shared many grievances with both the Shi'a professional associations like al-Wefaq and with the February 14 Youth Movement.

Ultimately, a crucial difference between the uprising in Bahraini as compared to those in Jordan and Tunisia was that in the former the regime was still largely able to play the divide-and-rule card with the sectarian cleavage. This was exacerbated by the regime's constant framing of the protests as the work of the kingdom's bête noire, Iran. But the Bahraini uprising was beset by even intra-sectarian divide-and-rule. As the uprising wore on, the aims, tactics, and

successes of the traditional opposition parties diverged sharply from those of the February 14th movement. As Kristian Ulrichsen observes,

> The result has been the empowerment of radical voices across the political spectrum and the marginalisation [sic] of Bahrain's political middle ground. The emergence of radicalised [sic] splinter groups means that it is no longer possible to speak of a 'regime-opposition' dichotomy. Elements of the opposition are growing more violent, and calls have intensified from extremist groups urging the regime to crush the opposition once and for all.[15]

In terms of preventing protests, by limiting the demographic and ideological diversity of the protest coalitions, none of the regimes was successful. As the Bahraini revolution wore on, we saw that divisions emerged and were subtly exploited by the regime. But in the cases of Jordan, Tunisia, and Bahrain there is no relationship between monarchy and the ideological and demographic diversity of protests.

H1 – Demands and Aims of Protests

In Tunisia, as Michele Angrist observed, the situation leading into 2010 was balanced precariously on a powder keg of economic and political grievances that reflected the regime's inability to keep up with citizens' rising expectations.[16] This had been the case in Tunisia in the decade prior to December 2010. That this was the case throughout the region made the diffusion of protests possible in the first place. When examining the indicator of intensity of tone and goals of protests for Hypothesis H1 and Hypothesis H2a, the starting point was to compare grievance frames deployed by activists across the cases. Here I will reiterate that,

[15] Kristian Ulrichsen, "After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?: Bahrain's Aborted Revolution," IDEAS Report (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012), 30, http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/Home.aspx.
[16] Angrist, "Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia."

in terms of the demands and aims of the protests in each case, I find no relationship to monarchy. Moreover, despite the fact that monarchical advantage does exist in the form of H2 (ability to withstand protests), I find no support for the ability of either monarchies or republics to prevent the more extreme demands and aims of protesters.

Because the Arab Spring wave of uprisings was defined at least partially by its remarkable diffusion and broad resonance of its collective action frames, it is hardly surprising that grievances across the three cases were nearly identical. In each case, grievances centered on rising costs of basic food and fuel subsidies with stagnant employment or dead-end opportunities for economic and social advancement. Added to these socio-economic grievances were political grievances. Among the latter were corruption grievances that ranged from general grievances to targeting specific policies and policymakers. Finally, grievances against the security apparatus in each state also ranged from outrage at specific instances of abuse and overreaction by security services (especially as each uprising progressed) to general resentment at the pervasive presence of the security apparatus and its involvement in politics. The latter was particularly an issue in the minds of Jordanian activists.

Interview respondents who had participated in the early protests of the Arab Spring wave in Jordan were adamant that some of the popular frames that the public knows best from Egypt and Tunisia, were first deployed in Jordan. Moreover, in both Bahrain and Jordan, mobilization was spurred not only by the common themes of bread, freedom, and social justice, but by the specific feelings

of social, economic, and political disenfranchisement of particular constituencies – Shi'a Bahrainis and several tribal constituencies in Jordan.

In Tunisia, protests began by calling on familiar grievance frames of corruption, unemployment, and unfair hiring practices, inter alia, inspired by the frames of the past mining region protests. Rather than a gradual escalation from policies, to policymakers, to the call for regime change, within a week after Bouazizi's self-immolation protests in Tunisia had taken a decidedly political turn, with chants in Tunis calling for Ben Ali not to stand for re-election in 2014. As protests continued apace, demands for changes in policy and specific policymakers were scattered among the protesters' demands. On January 14, 2011, the thousands who stormed Avenue Habib Bourguiba explicitly expressed the now-central and non-negotiable demand of the revolution, calling explicitly for Ben Ali's removal as a central goal of the protests.

In Bahrain, calls for the dissolution of the monarchy came early and often. Because the majority-Shi'a protesters understood intimately the systematic discrimination alleged by Bahrain Shi'a at the hands of the Al-Khalifa regime, it is hardly surprising that the protest coalition's demands quickly and effectively targeted not only policies and policymakers, but quickly targeted the monarchy as an institution. As early as December 27, 2009, noted activist Abdulhadi al-Khawaja called for the downfall of the Al-Khalifa regime during an Ashura speech entitled "Let's Bring Down the Ruling Gang."[17] Before the February 14, 2011 Bahraini "Day of Rage" protests even arrived on the street, "The Youth of the February 14th Revolution" had issued its first statement. That statement

[17] Fakhro, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Bahrain," 100.

simultaneously called for policy reform –guarantees of the freedom of expression, press, internet and television and ending the role of the security agencies in the media; and an end to the political naturalization policy. It called for changes in policy makers – specifically the firing of the royally-affiliated Prime Minister, and a desire for a fully-elected parliament and prime minister. And it brazenly called for regime change - disbanding the National Assembly; redrafting of a Constitution, and most importantly, for members of the royal family to be barred from holding top positions in the three branches of government. They did not call for the removal of the Al-Khalifa monarchy and its replacement with a republic. They instead insisted that the family remain and become a true constitutional monarchy. The Al-Khalifa could reign, but they could no longer rule. They were to devolve power to an elected parliament and prime minister.[18] The Bahraini uprising – at least in the grassroots movement incarnation – was explicit in its calls for regime change.

The first protests calling for the downfall of the Bahraini regime came sooner than in either Jordan or Tunisia. By the day after the first organized protests of the "Day of Rage" we saw the first recorded calls for the downfall of the regime, with chants of "Down with the al-Khalifa". Protest organizers said this was not a planned chant, but one born from rage at the regime's actions in attacking the previous day's funeral cortège.[19] This pattern would continue for more than a year. By February 17, 2011, after the seminally violent clearing of the Pearl Roundabout by police, the February 14th Youth Movement officially

[18] Bassiouni et al., "Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry," 66.
[19] Black, "Bahrain Police Open Fire on Funeral Procession Leaving One Dead"; "Protests Boil Over In Bahrain After Bloody Clashes With Police."

followed suit. Its Facebook page "escalated its demands from the creation of a constitutional monarchy to the downfall of the regime."[20]

In Jordan, protests centered foremost on economic and political grievances, especially corruption. Importantly, Jordanian protesters clearly drew connections between policies, amorphous concepts like corruption and the absence of legitimacy, and specific policymakers. As we saw in Chapters 3 and 4, criticism of King Abdullah or the monarchy as an institution were not initially frequent, though not uncommon. Frequent and sustained calls for the end of the monarchy and the end of Abdullah's rule began much later in Jordan than in Tunisia or Bahrain, beginning in earnest in late 2011 (October) and early 2012. But once those protests turned to calls for regime change, they were vociferous.

Finally, Chapters 4-6 compared the cases in terms of the aims of protests with interesting results. Table 8.1 combines the "Comparative Aims of Protests" tables from each of the case chapters.

Table 8.1 - Comparative Demands of Protests	Tunisia	Jordan	Bahrain	Average
Protests against Policy	56% (30)	48% (25)	64% (52)	56%
Protests against Policymakers	35% (19)	44% (23)	25% (20)	35%
Protests calling for Regime Change	9% (5)	8% (4)	11% (9)	9%

In each case, more of the protests were against policy rather than against policymakers or regime change.[21] Again, Jordan and Tunisia, were more similar to each other than the two monarchies were to each other. In Bahrain, we see

[20] Fakhro, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Bahrain," 90–91.
[21] As mentioned in each chapter, it should be stated that in cases where the aims of protests were unclear, unreported, or ambiguous, such cases were coded as "Policy (General Reform)".

more protests aimed at policies and regime change than in Jordan and Tunisia, and fewer instances of protests against policymakers.

Finally, contrary to some views that see fewer protests against the regime in monarchies because of some preternatural legitimacy, Bahrain saw higher rates of protest calling for regime change than in Jordan and Tunisia. Moreover, though only slightly higher, Tunisia saw higher rates of protest calling for regime change than Jordan.[22] It is hard to imagine a scenario in which this quantity and quality of vociferous protest demands could be construed as effectively prevented. This finding is applicable to all the cases, regardless of regime type. I can find no monarchical advantage with respect to preventing more extreme demands and aims of protests.

Hypotheses H2 & H2a – Control

Chapters 3-6 likewise examined the three cases to systematically test Hypothesis H2a (monarchies are more effective at controlling protests). The foregoing analysis of Hypothesis H1 already presented the results of the analysis of number of protests, geographic dispersion of protests, composition of the protest coalition and the level of demands. I have failed to find evidence of a monarchical advantage with regards to preventing mobilization on these indicators of Hypothesis H1.

As I set out at the beginning of this dissertation, if it is not true that monarchies are better at forestalling protests than non-monarchies, the survival of

[22] It should be noted that only two of the five recorded demands for regime change were against the Ben Ali regime. The remaining three instances were against the interim government after the fall of the Ben Ali regime. It is unclear to me why this is comparatively underreported in media sources as compared to the reporting in both Jordan and Bahrain.

monarchies (such as Bahrain and Jordan) at a time that some non-monarchies (such as Tunisia) were falling suggests that monarchies are better than republics at *withstanding* protests (Hypothesis H2). The Ben Ali regime fell within a month, but protests in Tunisia continued for months afterward against various policy- and policymaker-related grievances. The Jordanian and Bahraini monarchies withstood protests while the Tunisian republican regime fell, in line with Hypothesis H2. I distinguished two sub-hypotheses: H2a says that monarchies are better able to withstand protests because they are more effective at *controlling* protests. H2b says that monarchies will display a distinct and discernable pattern in their control of protests as compared to republics.

H2a – Duration of Protests

The duration of protests was one of the central indicators of control in Hypothesis H2a. Duration can be understood in two ways: longitudinally (duration of the overall protest "wave") and protests *ad interim* (length of protests within that wave). Longitudinally, a protest wave can last for months or years. Protests *ad interim* could last hours, days, or weeks.

Event-count data from Chapter 7 demonstrated that, with respect to longitudinal duration, the three cases were roughly similar. In the pre-Arab Spring phase, there were spikes in collective action in all three cases, albeit at different times. In general, as the narrative data also support, each case experienced at least one pre-Arab Spring wave of collective action. We have seen from the foregoing analysis, that in all three cases during this phase, the event counts viewed on a two-year period demonstrate a roughly similar number of collective action events.

But, again, Tunisia's republic is always more similar to one of the two monarchies than the two monarchies are to each other.

During the Arab Spring phase, longitudinally, collective action events lasted throughout the sample period of one year (December 2010-December 2011). As Figures 7.4-7.6 in Chapter 7 illustrate, in each case, mobilization and protest continued, though not at peak levels, in shorter spikes and a more wave-like pattern until the end of the period.

More specifically, we see in Tunisia and Bahrain, short, sharp spikes of events from December 2010-February 2011, and January 2011-July 2011, respectively. Again, both peaks decline precipitously compared to Jordan, in which repeated, though much smaller, peaks begin in December 2010 and continue through December 2011. As mentioned previously, and as Figure 7.6 in Chapter 7 illustrates, the pattern in Jordan is characterized by smaller wave-like actions rather than sharp spikes followed by sharp drops in Tunisia and Bahrain.

In Tunisia, the peak period of collective action events last roughly two months, falling in the months after regime change. In Bahrain, by comparison, the principal spike of collective action events lasted roughly 2 months, followed by several months of alternating high and low activity. In Jordan, the overall undulating protest wave within the period lasted from December 2010 to April 2012. After a period of apparent dormancy, protests in Jordan in December 2010 spiked dramatically. Comparably to Bahrain in all but the number of events, this initial spike of collective action events in Jordan lasted roughly 2 months,

followed by several months of alternating high and low activity. There were important differences all the regimes, however.

In comparison with Tunisia, whose uprising against the Ben Ali regime was effectively complete by February of 2011 (even though the data continue to show Tunisian mobilization and collective action until the end of the year), Bahrain and Jordan show much longer periods of mobilization and collective action and withstood them successfully. These data are consistent with Hypothesis H2: the Tunisian republic fell to protests while the two monarchies withstood protests. Pivoting to Hypothesis H2a, however, no regime managed to *control* protests to keep them down entirely.

Two observations are in order, however. First, in Bahrain and Tunisia protests spiked but were brought back down to the status quo ante. After the peak spike, both Tunisia and Bahrain experienced returns to smaller spikes, but, again, post-peak numbers of events never approached the numbers evident in the peak periods. In post-peak Tunisia, we see a pattern of recurring events in smaller peaks of roughly two-month intervals. In post-peak Bahrain, by contrast we see fewer post-peak spikes, but the largest spike lasts three months (August 2011 – October 2011) rather than two months as in Tunisia.

The large, multi-month peak evident in Tunisia and Bahrain is absent in Jordan, as noted above. Instead we see a recurring rise and fall of protests in roughly one or two-month intervals, similar to Tunisia. In other words, protests rise from December 2010 until dropping (though not to zero) by March 2011. They rise in April, only to drop to zero in May. They rise again beginning in June

2011 and last until August. A smaller spike appeared in October and returned to zero in November. Another, comparably-sized spike began in January 2012. Though this spike also declined, it did so more gradually, lasting through March 2012. Protests appeared to die down from April through June 2012. As we enter July and August of 2012, events begin to increase again. The most dramatic spike in Jordan occurred in November 2012. This October-December 2012 spike in Jordan corresponds to inflammatory price increases. It also corresponds to the greatest consecutive number of protests calling for the downfall of the regime.

In terms of overall longitudinal duration data, there is no support for the monarchical advantage. As in the foregoing analysis of prevention of mobilization (Hypothesis H1) illustrated, Tunisia is always more similar to one of the two monarchies than the two monarchies are to each other.

With regard to protests *ad interim*, as part of the tactical repertoire of collective action in the Middle East, protests often occur sequentially on Fridays after congregational prayers. In Tunisia, during the pre-Arab Spring period, day-long strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations, particularly by activists in the economically marginalized hinterlands, were frequent. In sporadic cases, protests and other collective action became multi-day, sequential protests. For example, in November 2005, seven Tunisian opposition activists engaged in a month-long hunger strike, calling for the release of political prisoners and a lift on restrictions on freedom of expression. Likewise, on April 16-17, 2008 two newspaper editors began a hunger strike against government harassment of opposition newspapers.[23]

[23] "Tunisian Opposition Leader Comments on Government 'Harassment' of Paper," *BBC Monitoring - Middle East*, April 27, 2008.

In February-March 2008, those weekly protests of miners and other laborers spread to a larger movement network of leftist students and the Tunisian Communist Party (PCOT). In the Arab Spring phase, protests continued every day from Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation on December 17, 2010 until Ben Ali's ouster on January 14, 2011.

As Chapters 3-4 established, beginning with the initial protests as reported by interview respondents in 2010/11, protests in Jordan typically occurred every week until the end of the sample period in December 2012. In several cases, protests in response to security services overreaction resulted in multi-day protests. Examples include the March 24-25, 2011 *diwar dakhilliyeh* sit-in, the July 15-16, 2011 al-Nakheel Square protests in Amman in response to the crackdown on March 24-25, 2011 (which were themselves the subject of overreaching repression), the October 1, 2011 Islamist rally in Sakeb and imprisonment of Ahmad al-'Abadi, and resulting protest cascade, and the killing of Qasi Omari in November 2012.

H2a –Geographic Dispersion of Protests

The results of the previous analysis of geographic dispersion apply equally to examining Hypothesis H2a (control of protests). There thus remains no evidence of monarchical advantage in terms of monarchies being able to more effectively control protests through control of geographic dispersion.

H2a – Demands and Aims of Protests

We have already seen that Tunisia, Jordan, and Bahrain all failed to prevent the most extreme demands and aims of protests and that there is no

support for hypothesis H1 on this indicator. Regarding demands and aims of protests as an indicator of hypothesis H2a (control), if H2a is supported, we should expect to see fewer protests that feature calls for regime change. If monarchical advantage is supported, especially in the sense that the king is "above the fray" of politics, we should expect to see greater calls for the removal of policymakers and fewer calls for the abdication of the monarch or the dissolution of the monarchy and regime change. There is a paradox inherent in examining this aspect of hypothesis H2a: Greater control – whether persuasive or coercive – could result in a lowering of the intensity of demands and a reduction in the maximalist positions of protests. Yet, control, particularly among the more pernicious forms of coercive control, could also have the opposite effect, increasing demands for the fall of the regime rather than the removal of lower-level policymakers and changes in policy.

Both the narrative and event count and matrix data demonstrate that there is little support for either monarchies or republics to control the most extreme demands of protests. In all of the cases, instances of overtly violent repression often resulted not in diminishing demands or even diminishing protests. Rather, such instances frequently exacerbated mobilization and offered greater opportunities for mobilization on even more grievance frames such as security services' brutality.

In the cases of Tunisia and Bahrain, this is illustrated in both punctuated instances – e.g., the Kasserine Massacre and the Pearl Roundabout raids, respectively – but also in cumulative events. Continuing attempts to put down

unrest in the outlying mining towns in Tunisia and repeated attacks by the Bahraini regime against the funeral cortèges of the previous day's repression victims only fueled public anger and calls for the fall of the regimes. In Jordan, we see fewer instances of overwhelmingly violent repression. But we also see no relationship between that fact and fewer calls for the fall of the regime. In the case of Jordan, instances of the call for the removal of the Hashemite regime only increased with time.

In general, the findings for this indicator in H2a (control) mirror those presented for H1 (prevention): With regard to the indicator of intensity of demands and aims of protests for hypothesis H2a, I can find no support for a monarchical advantage.

Hypothesis H2b – Patterns of State Response

Finally, principally in Chapter 7, I used event-count data on collective action and regime reaction to probe the assumptions of Hypothesis H2b, that monarchies, compared to republics, display a distinct and discernable pattern in their response to protests. If Hypothesis H2b is supported, evidence should show that monarchies use a distinct strategy in terms of either of two dimensions of the matrix: prevention and control, persuasion and coercion.

With regard to ability to control protests the narrative data demonstrated that both the Tunisian and Bahraini uprisings featured remarkably brutal regime reactions. The Jordanian regime demonstrated a more mixed strategy, never cracking down on protests in nearly the same way that either its fellow monarchy

or the republic in Tunisia did. All three regimes attempted to utilize concessions at one time or another, but only Jordan pursued a truly mixed strategy.

First, in terms of null responses, all three cases have instances of no regime response to a variety of collective actions, but there does not appear to be any consistent pattern to types of actions that warrant no reaction by the regime. Second, instead of monarchy having a pattern distinct from republics, the three cases have similar proportions of persuasion and coercion, ranging from 66 percent (Jordan), to 77 percent (Bahrain), to 70 percent (Tunisia) in terms of preference for coercion over persuasion. Bahrain differs from both its fellow monarchy, Jordan, and from Tunisia, in terms of the balance of prevention (45 percent) and control (55 percent). By comparison, Jordan and Tunisia are virtually identical (27 percent Prevention/73 percent control and 26 percent prevention/74 percent control, respectively). Finally, the proportion of coercive preventive acts carried out by Bahrain is, again, greater than both Tunisia and Jordan. Looking again at the data, we might overly simplify them by saying that Bahrain is sometimes an outlier. When it is not an outlier, all three cases are virtually the same. In no case do the two monarchies differ systematically from the Tunisian republic as a group.

There is an interesting element that does illustrate a potential monarchical advantage. In both Bahrain and Jordan, a potential reason for the survival of the regime was that the protest coalition fell apart. In Bahrain, the regime's ability to divide the opposition along the sectarian cleavage and force the grassroots movements to diverge in goals from the established parties was central to the

survival of the regime. In Jordan, several of my interviewees affirmed that the Jordanian uprising of the Arab Spring failed not because of regime prevention or control, but because "Jordanians just don't know how to protest." This at first appeared to me to be chauvinism of one sort or another. It was only upon reflection, analysis, (and comparison to Bahrain) that I realized that it was actually not a critique of the ability of Jordanians to protest. It was, in fact, a criticism of the inability of the *hirak* to present a practicable agenda for the next step if the regime were to fall or be fundamentally changed. As interview respondents observed, even an uprising that crossed ideological and demographic cleavages and managed to avoid the regime's divide-and-rule strategies was bound to fail if the participants did not have a plan to follow through.

In all, despite variegated findings, while there is support for the hypothesis that monarchies are able to withstand protests (H2) there is no support for the subhypothesis (H2b) that monarchies, compared to republics, display a distinct and discernable pattern in their control of protests.

Conclusions

At the beginning of this project, I laid out a set of hypotheses that, if satisfied, would constitute evidence of a monarchical advantage with respect to protests in the Arab Spring. The evidence produced in this dissertation does not support Hypothesis H1 (monarchies are better than non-monarchies at preventing protests), as it was clear that all the countries in questions displayed high levels of mobilization – in both pre-Arab Spring and Arab Spring time periods. Moreover, none of the countries in question successfully prevented protests in terms of

number, size, geographic dispersion, ideological diversity of the protest coalition or mitigating the demands and goals of protests. If Hypothesis H1 is false – if it is not the case that monarchies were more successful than republics in *preventing* mobilization—then the fact that monarchies survived the Arab Spring much better than republics entails that they must be better at *withstanding* protests.

The evidence in this dissertation does not support, however, either of two possible mechanisms for withstanding protests. The evidence does not show that monarchies were better than republics in *controlling* protests (hypothesis H2a), nor does it show that monarchies displayed a pattern of prevention and control in the face of protests that was distinct from that of republics (H2b).

Implications

If monarchical regimes neither prevent protests better than republican regimes, nor control protests better, nor demonstrate a pattern of state responses to collective action that is different from republics, what are some of the implications?

The monarchical advantage thesis holds that monarchies survive better than republics for a variety of reasons. Many of these—such as monarchy's purported greater legitimacy, or monarchy's alleged abilities to build cross-cutting alliances—should manifest themselves in the form of less protest against monarchical regimes. Whether measured in number, intensity, or in terms of whether the protesters pursue mostly policy or political changes, rather than regime change, the evidence presented in this dissertation undermines this version of the monarchical advantage thesis.

If the monarchical advantage thesis holds that it is not in preventing protest, but in controlling protests once they emerge or in responding to protests in a way that is distinct from republics that makes monarchies more durable, the evidence presented in this dissertation again tends to contradict these views.

It will be noted by the reader that the principal finding of this dissertation is a mixed or negative finding. This dissertation has not explained how the monarchical advantage operates. But, it also did not set out with this as a goal. What the dissertation does is to unpack assumptions about the mechanisms by which monarchies survived the protests of the Arab Spring. With that in mind, the findings still carry powerful implications for our understanding of the operation of the monarchical advantage. We know that the survival of Jordan and Bahrain even when confronted with protests is not because of some inherent ability, bestowed by monarchy, to prevent or control protests. We know that, when confronted with protests, there is not a pattern of response that differentiates the monarchies, as a group, from the republic.

The dissertation does not directly challenge alternative explanations for the survival of Middle East monarchies, such as cross-cutting elite coalitions, hydrocarbon or patronage rents, or external support mechanisms, as explored by other scholars. But are the findings represented here compatible with those other explanations? Some may argue that the monarchical advantage lies in the special ability to forge clientelist coalitions and thereby short-circuit the ability of the opposition to mobilize. The findings presented here cast doubt on this variable.

Recall that the two monarchies were chosen to explore intra-monarchy variance and determine, albeit indirectly, if the mechanisms proposed by other scholars would make any difference in terms of the regimes' ability to prevent, control, or demonstrate different patterns in their responses to protests.

According to Herb's work, dynastic monarchies are more stable because the centripetal forces of the royal family serve as a ubiquitous institution, preventing the infiltration of widespread opposition and increasing the "ability of the ruling elites…to solve internal disputes without threatening their control of the state."[24] Linchpin, monarchies, like Jordan, do not utilize the same strategy. Instead the king both reigns and rules, but he does so from "above the fray" of politics, acting as the impartial arbiter of last resort.[25]

In this sense, the dissertation contributes to Michael Herb's and Russell Lucas' work on the potential differences between linchpin and dynastic monarchies. While I do not delve deeply into differences between Jordan and Bahrain in terms of the institutional effects of the linchpin versus dynastic monarchy categories, the findings demonstrate both similarities and differences between the two monarchies. On the one hand, we see that patterns of protest demands and state responses to collective action in Jordan, a linchpin monarchy, are different from those in Bahrain, a dynastic monarchy. In terms of the events in each monarchy during the pre-Arab Spring and Arab Spring protests, Jordan had the fewest protests and Bahrain the most. On the other hand, the monarchies' overall ability to prevent and control protests are similar. The evidence presented

[24] Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*, 253.
[25] Herb, 223.

in this dissertation tends to contradict the view that either dynastic or linchpin monarchies provide an institutional advantage that allowed either monarchical regime to prevent or control protests. Moreover, neither monarchy was able to do this better than the other, nor did the two monarchies differ substantially from Tunisia.

Connecting the implications for contentious politics and those for monarchical advantage and Middle East politics, the dissertation also speaks to how incumbents respond to protest. The data presented here show that patterns of response are not determined by whether a regime is a monarchy or republic. Regardless of type, all these regimes had a hard time keeping people off the streets, even with the array of tools at their disposal – propaganda, concessions, repression, and cooptation – to try to stop them.

Those studying protest waves and cycles may find useful data in the event counts presented in Chapter 7. Those interested in regime responses to protests may find useful the distinctions and definitions that underlie the matrix of Prevention/Control-Persuasion/Coercion

Many of the theoretical implications overlap with substantive ones as well. As Dafna Rand has already pointed out, policymakers before the Arab Spring not only believed in the durability of Middle East regimes, but that any policy changes would be regime-led rather than championed by popular grassroots movements.[26] This should lead both scholars and policymakers to revisit views of civil society in both monarchies as well as non-monarchies. Scholars and policymakers similarly overlooked the potential for change in the region, and

[26] Rand, *Roots of the Arab Spring*, viii–ix.

instead focused – not unreasonably – on the causal factors that explained authoritarian resilience. But in the process, scholars too lost sight of the groundswell of bottom-up mobilization against ostensibly ossified regimes.[27]

While scholars appear to have learned from this myopic approach and made appropriate course corrections, this dissertation further demonstrates a failure of that pattern of thinking. Not only did citizens in republics mobilize to topple entrenched regimes, based on this dissertation, we can now see the same potential among motivated citizens in the region's monarchies as well. Dafna Rand saw autocrats struggling to contain strained societal forces rather than resting on their laurels. She and others believed that regimes may indeed have reached a point where their "upgrading" strategies may be tested and fail.[28] This dissertation tested whether monarchies were the exception to this rule. Though they survived, we can see that they are subject to the same stressors and are likewise, far from failproof.

Asef Bayat's view of new "refolutions" – those that seek aggressive sociopolitical and economic reform but without the bloodshed and chaos of revolutionary upheaval – led by previously under-examined sectors of the region's civil society actors and "ordinary" people, is furthered by this dissertation.[29] Though not intentionally, this dissertation contributes to the line of inquiry sparked by Bayat's view of the Arab Spring as "revolutions without revolutionaries" – i.e., that the protests of the Arab Spring were remarkable in

[27] Rand, viii–ix.
[28] Rand, 5.
[29] Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*, 2nd ed. (Stanford University Press, 2013); Asef Bayat, *Revolution without Revolutionaries: Making Sense of the Arab Spring* (Stanford University Press, 2017).

their ability to mobilize and resist. They came to the streets in some cases to overthrow the regime, but with no plan for reforming or rebuilding institutions in the aftermath.[30] The Jordanian *hirak* may have dissolved, and the protests receded from the streets, but they hardly disappeared. They simply went underground and continued their activism in different arenas and using different methods. After the legal opposition groups abandoned the uprising in Bahrain, splinter groups of grassroots movements continued nightly pitched battles with security forces, with no foreseeable goal, for months. Yet, returning to Bayat's argument, that "revolution in terms of change, and in terms of having a vision about change, and about how to [wrest] power from the incumbents...was quite lacking" in the Arab Spring uprisings was as much present (as he argues) among Egypt's revolutionaries, as my interview respondents indicate it was among the Jordanian *hirak*.[31]

Robustness of Findings and Future Directions

We cannot prove or disprove the existence of the monarchical advantage using such a limited sample. But this work does provide a theoretical and methodological launching pad for future testing. We know that there is evidence of the monarchical advantage when it comes to withstanding protests (H2). But there is no support for the hypotheses that monarchies are better at preventing protests (H1), better at controlling protests that do occur (H2a) or that monarchies

[30] Bayat, *Revolution without Revolutionaries*.
[31] Linda Herrera and Heba Khalil, "Critical Voices in Critical Times: Revolution without Revolutionaries, an Interview with Asef Bayat," OpenDemocracy - NAWA (North Africa, West Asia), December 14, 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/linda-herrera-heba-khalil/critical-voices-in-critical-times-revolution-withou.

demonstrate a different pattern of state response than non-monarchies when confronted with collective action (H2b).

Expanding the Study

Going forward, how do we expect the findings to hold up as we expand the sample? Are the findings in Jordan and Bahrain generalizable to other countries in the region? What patterns might we see if we expand this inquiry throughout the region? The findings of this dissertation present three cases without significant variation on the ability to prevent or control protests. As we expand the inquiry throughout the region we will encounter cases that experienced significant protests and others that did not, and introduce a level of variation that is not present in the current sample.

Remaining Monarchies

The remaining monarchies in the region may be divided into linchpin monarchies (Morocco (0.13%)) and dynastic monarchies (Saudi Arabia (0.01%), Kuwait (0.0%), Oman (0.1%), Qatar (0.0%), and the Emirates (0.0%)).[32] The Moroccan monarchy as the only other linchpin monarchy is most immediately comparable to Jordan But, as Mohamed Daadaoui illustrates, ritualistic political culture and the institution of the *Makhzen* that surround the regime go some way in explaining its survival against both opposition forces in the parliament and

[32] For the purposes of comparing basic levels of mobilization between other regimes in the region that might be included in future analyses, I am parenthetically including the percentage of population involved in protests as of May 2011 from the dataset compiled by Kirk and Wilson. See Kirk and Wilson, "New Visualization Design Project: Protests and the Media." Again, it should be noted that this data comes from a snapshot of the uprisings up to May 2011. The raw data is available as a Google Documents Spreadsheet at http://bit.ly/2pmb7XI

popular protests.[33] Morocco and Jordan are frequently compared by both scholars and policymakers. Only a systematic examination of the same hypotheses presented here will illustrate just how far those similarities carry.

Expanding the study to the other monarchies in the region will introduce variation on several variables. Including Kuwait (0.00%), for example, would both continue the systematic examination of dynastic monarchy and introduce variation on both prevention and control, as Kuwait experienced few protests and successfully controlled them. The same variation would be introduced by including Qatar (0.00%) and the Emirates (0.00%).

Conversely, Kuwait is frequently compared with Bahrain in terms of the sectarian cleavages, but Kuwaiti political activism has historically taken a different path and tone with the Al-Sabah regime. Including Kuwait would also add intervening variables of potentially differing grievances. Until 2009, Kuwait held the highest Human Development Index score in the Arab World and the highest level of female political participation.[34]

The remaining monarchies of Saudi Arabia (0.01%) and Oman (0.1%) may have experienced mobilization at comparable levels to Jordan (0.1%). The Saudis, for example, likewise failed to prevent protests, but largely managed to mollify initial protests with monetary concessions. Later protests, particularly in the predominantly Shi'a Eastern province, looked similar to those just across the

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[33] Mohamed Daadaoui, *Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining Makhzen Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011); Daadaoui, Mohamed, "A Moroccan Monarchical Exception?," *Foreign Policy: The Middle East Channel*, December 13, 2012, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/13/a_moroccan_monarchical_exception.

[34] Ahmad Faraj, "Kuwait Ranks Top among Arab States in Human Development - UNDP Report," Kuwait News Agency, August 25, 2009, https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=2021741&language=en.

causeway in Bahrain. Saudi forces likewise utilized greater repression to put down protests based on sectarian grievances.

Remaining Republics

Continuing the comparative nature of the research arc moving forward also requires examining different republics. But as in the expanded sample of monarchies, we will also find variation in prevention (H1) and control (H2a). But we will also encounter republics that managed to withstand protests rather than fall. Arguably the next most testable case is Egypt (2.4%). Beyond Egypt, several of the remaining republics either saw protests but withstood them (H2) because the protests fizzled or were effectively controlled (H2a). Such regimes include Algeria (0.01%), Lebanon (0.05%), and Iraq (0.03%). Other republics have seen initial uprisings devolve into horrific and destabilizing civil wars. In the latter category we must consider those regimes that survived (H2), but devolved into civil war in defense of the regime (i.e., while attempting to control protests (H2a)) and those that fell (failure of H1 and H2) but experienced civil war after the regime fell (e.g., Libya (0.4%), and Yemen (0.4%)).

Within the remaining sample of republics, we likewise see variation among the variables and hypotheses of the initial study. If being a monarchy is a specific condition for survival, according to monarchical advantage, this suggests that being a non-monarchy should leave these republics vulnerable. As I mentioned above, however, there is variation among republics that survived, those that effectively controlled and withstood protests, and those that did not withstand

protests either fell and devolved into civil war after the fact or that withstood protests but, while exerting strategies of control, devolved into open conflict.

Epilogue

The Hashemite and Al-Khalifa regimes survived the vociferous protests of the Arab Spring. The kings remain enthroned, comfortably above the fray of quotidian politics. My research questions specifically addressed the relationship between monarchical advantage and popular protests. This dissertation examined whether these monarchies, compared to the Ben Ali regime, survived the Arab Spring uprisings because they were able to effectively control protests and whether they exhibited different patterns of response in controlling protests than non-monarchies. But, as of this writing, the tremors of aftershocks continue, especially in Jordan. Confirming, on one hand, existing theories of monarchical advantage, the monarchs have reason to feel at least somewhat secure based on my findings – they have been able to withstand protests. Yet, the aftershocks themselves only underscore these regimes' inability to prevent future protests. Perhaps more alarming, the findings presented here should serve as a caveat for the kings: they have also not been able to prevent or control protests and they exhibit patterns of response in controlling protests no different than their republican counterparts.

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Appendix A

Codebook

I. PROTESTER DEMANDS CODES	
DEMAND	**CODE**
CORRUPTION	
End to Generalized Corruption	POL_GENCORRUPT
End to Parliamentary Corruption	POL_PARLCORRUPT
End to Police Corruption	POL_POLICECORRUPT
End to Security/Intelligence Services Corruption	POL_MUKHCORRUPT
End to Monarchy/Royal Family Corruption	POL_MONARCHYCORRUPT
Specific Individual Corruption	POL_CORRUPT_*INDIV* *_PM* *_MP* *_MIN-EDU* *_MIN-INT*
CRITICISM OF REGIME ACTIONS OR PERSONNEL	
Criticism of Regime's Character	POL_CRITQ_REGCHAR_*GROUNDS*
Criticism of regime's legitimacy	e.g., Criticism of Regime Legitimacy = POL_CRITQ_REGCHAR_LEGIT
Criticism of regime in general	POL_CRITQ_REGGEN
Criticism of the Monarchy	POL_CRITQ_MONARCHY
Criticism of the King	POL_CRITQ_KING
Criticism of Prime Minister or MPs	POL_CRITQ_PM or POL_CRITQ_MP
Criticism of Other Elites	POL_CRITQ_OTHELITE
Criticism of Policymakers	POL_CRITQ_POLICYMAKERS_*NAME OF TARGET(S)*
Criticism of Policy	POL_CRITQ_POLICY_*TYPE POLICY*
Criticism of Actions of Agents of the State _Police_Gendarmerie_Military	POL_CRITQ_AGENT _POLI _GEND _MIL
Criticism of Regime Reaction/Repression	POL_CRITQ_REPRESS
Solidarity with pro-reform demonstrations	POL_SOLIDDEMOS ECON_SOLIDDEMOS
CALL FOR SPECIFIC ACTIONS	
Demand for Human Rights reforms	POL_REFREG_HUMRIGHTS
Demand for political participation	POL_REFREG_POLPART

Reform Regime Structure_Institution	POL_REFREG *_NEWCONST* *_ELECTIONS* *_MUKH* *_POLICE* *_JUD* *_PARL* *_EDUC*
Removal of Specific Personnel	POL_REMPERS*_INDIV* *_PM* *_MP* *_MIN-EDU* *_MIN-INT*
Removal/Fall of Regime	POL_FALLREG
Release of Political Prisoners	POL_REL_PRISON
Resignation of Government	POL_RES_GOVT
Removal of security services from streets	POL_REM_MUKH
Removal of police from streets	POL_REM_POLICE
Removal of military from streets	POL_REM_MIL
ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES	
Economic critique or demand for general economic reforms	ECON_REFORM
Unemployment	ECON_UNEMP
Poverty	ECON_POVERTY
Price increases; Austerity measures	ECON_CRITQ_PRICES ECON_CRITQ_AUSTERITY
Nepotism/Corruption with economic consequences	ECON_CORRUPT
Against neoliberal development policies	ECON_NEOLIBDEV
COUNTERPROTESTS	
Support for regime	CP_POL_SUPPREG
Denouncing opposition/protesters	CP_POL_DENO_OPPPROT
Shared grievance with opposition protesters but support government	CP_*POL/ECON*_SHRGRIEVE_SUPPREG
Shared grievance with opposition protesters but prefer negotiated solution/working through institutions	CP_*POL/ECON*_SHRGRIEVE_NEGOT

II. REGIME ACTION OR REACTION	
ACTION	**CODE**
PREVENTION	
Arresting activists or leaders before collective action	PREV_ARRACTLEAD
Harrassing/intimidating activists/leaders before collective action	PREV_HARACTLEAD
Harassing/intimidating/Arresting protesters/participants before collective action	PREV_HARPART PREV_ARRPART
Arresting/Harassing misc citizens	PREV_ARRCITIZ; PREV_HARCITIZ
Arresting/Harassing/Intimidating members of the press or bloggers	PREV_ARRPRESS PREV_HARPRESS
Arresting/Harassing civil society or NGO organizations or members	PREV_HARCIVNGO
Co-optation or Corporatism of NGOs or other civil society organizations	PREV_COOPCORPORATE
Delegitimize Opposition activists or protesters by kompromat	PREV_DELEGACT/DELEGPROT PREV_DELEGACT_KOMPROMAT PREV_DELEGPROT_KOMPROMAT
Delegitimize Opposition by propaganda	PREV_DELEGOPP_PROP
Enacting curfew or emergency laws prior to a collective action event;	PREV_CURFEW PREV_EMERLAW
Physically breaking up opposition networks prior to collective action	PREV_BRKNET
Censorship or controlling discursive space online	PREV_CENSCONTONLINE
Censorship or controlling discursive space in the press/in print	PREV_CENSCONTPRINT
Censorship or controlling discursive physical space (e.g., meetings, coffee shops, clubs)	PREV_CENSCONTPHYS
Restricting Freedom of Expression	PREV_FREEEXP
Restricting Freedom of Assembly	PREV_FREEASS
Restricting Access to Physical Protest Sites	PREV_ACCESS
Threatening Individual's Job or Livelihood	PREV_THREATINDJOB
Threatening Family Members Jobs or Livelihoods	PREV_THREATFAM PREV_THREATFAM_JOB
Regime concessions_type	PREV_REGCONC *_STMT_REGRET* *_STMT_RIGHTSNORMS* *_ALLOWDEMO*

	_POLREFORM *_ECONREFORM* *_POLICYCHNG* *_REVDEC (Reverse Decision)* *_FIREPM/MP* *_FIRESHUFFCAB (Fire/shuffle cabinet)* *_PUNISHAGENTS* *_FREEPRISONERS*
CONTROL	
Enacting curfew or emergency laws after a collective action event;	CONTROL_CURFEW; CONTROL_EMERLAW
Arrest leadership day of collective action	CONTROL_ARRLEAD
Arresting protesters/participants day of or at collective action	CONTROL_ARRPART
Disperse protesters with tear gas	CONTROL_DISP_GAS
Disperse protesters with water cannon	CONTROL_DISP_WATER
Disperse protesters with lower level physical violence (i.e., batons, less than lethal weapons but not water cannons or tear gas)	CONTROL_DISP_LTL_VIOL
Regime agents' disperse protesters with lethal violence against protesters (selective but more than CONTROL_DISP_LTL_VIOL)	CONTROL_DISP_VIOL
Targeted killing/assassination	CONTROL_ASSASS
Regime violence by proxy (i.e., baltajiyya; counterprotesters)	CONTROL_REGVIOL_PROXY _BALT _COUNTERPRO
Overwhelming violent crackdown by regime	CONTROL_CRACKDOWN _POLI _GEND _MIL
Arresting/Harassing misc citizens	CONTROL_ARRCITIZ; CONTROL_HARCITIZ
Detainment/Torture of activists during or after collective action	CONTROL_DETTORACT
Detainment/Torture of participants during or after collective action	CONTROL_DETTORPART
Collective punishment related to collective action	CONTROL_COLLPUN
Collective punishment targeted to those affiliated with activists or protesters.	CONTROL_COLLPUN_TARGACT CONTROL_COLLPUN_TARGPROT

Delegitimize Opposition activists or protesters by counterprotest	CONTROL_DELEGOPP_COUNTER PRO
Delegitimize Opposition activists or protesters by kompromat	CONTROL_DELEGACT/DELEGPRO T CONTROL_DELEGACT_KOMPRO MAT CONTROL_DELEGPROT_KOMPRO MAT
Delegitimize Opposition by propaganda	CONTROL_DELEGOPP_PROP
Threatening Individual's Job or Livelihood	CONTROL_THREATINDJOB
Threatening Family Members Jobs or Livelihoods	CONTROL_THREATFAM CONTROL_THREATFAM_JOB
Regime concessions_type	CONTROL_REGCONC *_NEGOTOPPOS* *_STMT_REGRET* *_ALLOWDEMO* *_POLREFORM* *_ECONREFORM* *_POLICYCHNG* *_REVDEC (Reverse Decision)* *_FIREPM/MP* *_FIRECAB (Fire/shuffle cabinet)* *_PUNISHAGENTS* *_FREEPRISONERS*
Threaten to shutter NGOs,professional associations/unions, political parties/societies, or opposition groups	CONTROL_THREATNGOCLOSE CONTROL_THREATPARTYSOCICL OSE CONTROL_THREATASSOCUNION CLOSE CONTROL_THREATOPPCLOSE
Shutter NGOs, professional associations/unions, political parties/societies, or opposition groups	CONTROL_NGOCLOSE CONTROL_PARTYSOCICLOSE CONTROL_ASSOCUNIONCLOSE CONTROL_OPPCLOSE
III. FRAMING/COUNTERFRAMING	
FRAME/COUNTERFRAME	**CODE**
National Unity Cross-cleavage unity	FRAME_NATLUNITY FRAME_CROSSCLEAVEUNITY
Pro-regime frame co-opting or taking credit for pro-reform organizations' claims/demands/successes	FRAME_CO-OPT_REFORM_MSG
General nationalist framing device or campaign	FRAME_PRO-REFORM_NATIONALIST

	PREV_FRAME_NATIONALIST CONTROL_FRAME_NATIONALIST
Targeted/Specific nationalist framing device or campaign	PREV_FRAME_TARGNATIONALIST CONTROL_FRAME_TARGNATIONALIST
Pro-regime group counterframing device or campaign praising reform efforts or regime policy.	PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEPOLICY CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEPOLICY
Pro-regime group counterframing device or campaign praising regime's character.	PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEREGCHAR CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEREGCHAR
Pro-regime group counterframing device or campaign praising leader's character.	PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEKING PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEPRES PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEMPS PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEPM PREV_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEOTHELITE CONTOL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEKING CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEPRES CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEMPS CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEPM CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_PRAISEOTHELITE
Frame/Counterframe device or campaign pledging loyalty to leader or regime	CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_LOYALTYKING CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_LOYALTYPRES CONTROL_FRAME_PROREG_LOYALTYREG
Frame/Counterframe chastising protesters as troublemakers or for working outside established channels of politics.	CONTROL_FRAME_CHASTISEPROTEST
Frame/Counterframe device or campaign accusing OR warning against	PREV_FRAME_ENDANGER PREV_FRAME_WARN_ENDANGE

activists/leaders/protesters/opposition of damaging reputation, economy, or politics or endangering the country Frame/Counterframe device or campaign accusing OR warning against activists/leaders/protesters/opposition of collaboration with outside forces or of being terrorists.	R PREV_FRAME_DAMAGE_REP PREV_FRAME_WARN_DAMAGE_ REP _ECON _POL CONTROL_FRAME_ENDANGER CONTROL_FRAME_DAMAGE_REP _ECON _POL PREV_FRAME_COLLUDE CONTROL_FRAME_COLLUDE PREV_FRAME_TERROR CONTROL_FRAME_TERROR
Frame/Counterframe device or campaign accusing activists/leaders/protesters/opposition of inciting violence by security forces.	CONTROL_FRAME_OPPINCITE
Pro-reform frame for constitutional reform;	FRAME_PRO-REFORM_CONST
Pro-reform frame for economic reform;	FRAME_PRO-REFORM_ECON