

INFORMATION TO USERS

This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed the photographer has followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases we have filmed the best available copy.

University
Microfilms
International

300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106
18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND

7923785

HUTCHESON, PETER WESLEY
HUSSERLIAN METAPHENOMENOLOGY: A STUDY OF THE
STATUS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS A SCIENCE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA, PH.D., 1979

University
Microfilms
International

300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106

THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

HUSSERLIAN METAPHENOMENOLOGY:
A STUDY OF THE STATUS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY
PETER WESLEY HUTCHESON

Norman, Oklahoma

1979

HUSSERLIAN METAPHENOMENOLOGY:
A STUDY OF THE STATUS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

APPROVED BY

J.N. Mohanty
J. N. Mohanty
J. C. DeYoung
J. C. DeYoung
R. L. Shul

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to a number of people, but especially to Professors J. N. Mohanty and David Carr, whose careful readings of this dissertation and discussions with me made this a better work. They made extensive comments, criticisms and suggestions on the entire work. Professors Biro and Swoyer helped considerably, too, since they pointed out a couple of specious arguments and made a number of quite useful stylistic suggestions. Professor Shahan likewise made some useful suggestions.

I wish to thank Dr. Wolfe Mays, editor of the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, for permission to include a slightly revised version of my article, "Husserl's Problem of Intersubjectivity," in this dissertation. The article is forthcoming. I wish to thank Dr. D. Lawrence Wieder, too, for permission to include some arguments that appeared in my review of Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, which was published in Phenomenology and Social Science Newsletter (1978). I profited from a number of discussions of the fifth meditation with Dr. Wieder.

A special note of thanks is due to my wife, Cathy. She typed the first and final drafts of the entire dissertation. Moreover, she typed a number of versions of some parts of this work, as I improved former versions in preparation for publication. In short, she made this task much easier (and less expensive) for me. Her patience, moral support and hard work made it possible for me to complete this dissertation.

For Cathy

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Every book and article is cited in the text according to the following abbreviations. If any article appears in a book, only the abbreviation of the title of the book appears in the text. But if an article appears in a journal, then that article is cited by its own abbreviation, enclosed in quotation marks. Footnotes are reserved exclusively for comments that do not fit properly within the text. For full bibliographical information, consult the bibliography.

- "HFM" Aquila, "Husserl and Frege on Meaning."
- I:SMA Aquila, Intentionality: A Study of Mental Acts.
- SFTL Bachelard, A Study of Husserl's "Formal and Transcendental Logic."
- EP Carr and Casey, eds., Explorations in Phenomenology.
- PPH Carr, Phenomenology and the Problem of History.
- IPR Cunningham, Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl.
- H:E&A Elliston and McCormick, eds., Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals.
- LWC Embree, ed., Life-World and Consciousness.
- "HCE&S" Hemmendinger, "Husserl's Concepts of Evidence and Science."
- CM Husserl, Cartesian Meditations.
- CES Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.
- E&J Husserl, Experience and Judgment.
- FTL Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic.
- Ideas Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.
- LI Husserl, Logical Investigations.
- LCR Kahane, Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric.
- SSR Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

R&E Levin, Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology.
 M&O Locke, Myself and Others.
 EL Mates, Elementary Logic.
 PP Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception.
 RHLI Mohanty, ed., Readings on Edmund Husserl's "Logical Investigations."
 W:PI Pitcher, ed., Wittgenstein: The "Philosophical Investigations."
 PPU Pivcevic, ed., Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding.
 OR Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.
 PL Quine, Philosophy of Logic.
 WB Quine and Ullian, The Web of Belief.
 AHP Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology.
 EPS Rollins, "Solipsism," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
 MSPS Salmon, "Bayes's Theorem and the History of Science."
 BN Sartre, Being and Nothingness.
 PI Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination.
 TE Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego.
 CPIII Schuetz, Collected Papers III.
 NT Sleight, ed., Necessary Truth.
 P&A Sokolowski, Presence and Absence.
 "HPL" Solomon, "Husserl's Private Language."
 "PL&S" Swoyer, "Private Languages and Skepticism."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	v
----------------------------	---

Chapter	Page
I. WHAT IS METAPHENOMENOLOGY?.....	1
1. The Problem.....	1
2. The Literature on the Fifth Meditation.....	2
3. Science, Objectivity and Intersubjectivity.....	3
II. 'SCIENCE' AND 'OBJECTIVITY'.....	6
1. Introduction.....	6
2. Two Senses of 'Objectivity'.....	7
3. Two Other Senses of 'Objectivity'.....	12
4. Husserl's Concepts of Science.....	16
5. Further Analysis of the Neutral Concept of Science: Outline of the Thesis.....	23
III. LANGUAGE AND MEANING.....	29
1. Introduction to the Problem.....	29
2. Meanings (Propositions) as Ideal Objectivities.....	30
3. Propositions and the Neutral Concept of Science.....	40
4. Mates' Objections to Propositions and Replies.....	41
5. Quine's Objections to Propositions.....	47
6. Reply to Quine.....	50
7. Husserl's Position on Propositions.....	55
8. Are Propositions Universals?.....	58
9. Concluding Remarks on Propositions.....	61
10. The Status of Language in Husserl's Phenomenology.....	62
11. Background for Cunningham's Arguments.....	64
12. Cunningham's Argument against Private Language 1.....	66
13. Reply to Cunningham's Objections to Private Language 1.....	67
14. Cunningham's Objections to Private Language 3.....	68
15. Cunningham's Misinterpretation of the Phenomenological Reduction.....	70
16. Is Husserl's Post-Reduction Language a Private Language 3?...74	
17. Is Husserl's Post-Reduction Language a Private Language 1?...77	
18. Husserl on Logically Private Languages.....	79

19.	Does Husserl's philosophical language require commitment to the existence of others?.....	80
20.	Husserl on Skepticism and Solipsism.....	83
21.	A Clarification of a Presupposition.....	86
22.	Husserl's Public Language.....	88
IV.	EVIDENCE AND TRUTH.....	92
1.	Introduction.....	92
2.	The Distinction between Formal Apophantics and Formal Ontology.....	96
3.	The Problem which motivates the Distinction between Formal Apophantics and Formal Ontology.....	98
4.	Husserl's Solution to this Problem.....	99
5.	Two Senses of 'Truth' and 'Evidence'.....	104
6.	Dependence Relationships between the Concepts 'Evidence' and 'Truth'.....	106
7.	A Problem with the Definition of 'Truth' in terms of Evidence.....	108
8.	Another Problem with the Definition of 'Truth' in terms of Evidence.....	110
9.	The Horizon of the Scientific Concepts of Evidence and Truth: Repeatability of Evidence.....	112
10.	The Intersubjectivity of Evidence and Truth.....	120
11.	The Meaning of 'Rational Subject'.....	127
12.	Existential Commitments and the Problem of Intersubjectivity.....	129
13.	Further Clarifications of the Horizon of 'Scientific Truth' and 'Evidence'.....	133
	A. The Identity of Judgements.....	133
	B. A Problem Concerning Communication.....	136
14.	Apodictic Evidence in <u>Formal and Transcendental Logic</u>	142
15.	'Evidence' and ' <u>Evidenz</u> '.....	162
16.	Phenomenological and Scientific Truth.....	164
17.	Conclusion: Phenomenology and Epistemology.....	170
V.	HUSSERL'S PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY.....	175
1.	Science and Intersubjectivity.....	175
2.	Two Misinterpretations of the Problem.....	175
3.	Reply to Sartre and Schuetz.....	178
4.	Ricoeur's Interpretation.....	181
5.	Reply to Ricoeur.....	183
6.	Husserl's Problem as Conceptual Analysis.....	184
7.	Physical Objects and Other Subjects.....	187
8.	The Objective World (Objectivity ₃).....	190
9.	Objectively Valid Results (Objectivity ₁).....	191
10.	Objectively Valid Results in Phenomenology.....	192
11.	Different and Other Egos.....	195
12.	The Interlocutor Reconsidered.....	197
13.	Non-Apodictic Evidence.....	198
14.	A New Refutation of Solipsism.....	200

VI. HUSSERL'S FIFTH MEDITATION.....	207
1. Introduction: Résumé of Previous Arguments.....	207
2. Reduction to the Sphere of Ownness.....	209
A. Ostensible Motives for the Second Epoché.....	210
B. The Meaning of 'the Sphere of Ownness'.....	213
C. The Motive for the "Second Epoché".....	221
D. Concluding Remarks on the Sphere of Ownness.....	222
3. Schuetz's Criticisms of the Sphere of Ownness, with Replies.....	227
4. <u>Cartesian Meditations</u> , Paragraph 50: The Mediate Intentionality of Experiencing Someone Else.....	234
5. <u>Cartesian Meditations</u> , Paragraph 50: My Consciousness as Motivating Factor in Apperception of Another Subject....	247
6. Further Analysis of the Experience of Someone Else.....	261
7. The "Two Bodies" Problems.....	265
8. The "Two Worlds" Problem.....	269
9. Concluding Remarks.....	271
VII. CONCLUSIONS	
1. Summary of Conclusions.....	278
2. Is Husserl's Analysis Successful?.....	287
3. The Primacy of Intersubjectivity and Intersubjective Phenomenology.....	290
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	298

HUSSERLIAN METAPHENOMENOLOGY

CHAPTER I

WHAT IS METAPHENOMENOLOGY?

1. The Problem

Husserl calls phenomenology (or at least a "stage" of it) a solipsistic science. Yet he also says that science cannot be solipsistic (LWC, p.16). Can there be any such thing as a solipsistic stage of phenomenology, if we accept Husserl's claim that science cannot be solipsistic? Is there an equivocation on the term 'science'? Just what does 'solipsistic' mean in these contexts? The purpose of this work is to clarify and answer these questions, thereby obtaining a better understanding of phenomenology. But the first order of business is to specify what I mean by the unusual word that is part of the title. Just what does 'metaphenomenology' mean?

Some commentators on Husserl's philosophy complain that Husserl devotes too much space to talking about phenomenology, rather than doing it. I believe that that complaint is misconceived, since a false dilemma is embedded in it. Husserl's clarification of phenomenological reduction in the first volume of Ideas, for example, contains a number of descriptive analyses. The description of the natural standpoint in chapter three is itself a clarification of phenomenological

reduction, insofar as it is a specification of what is "bracketed". Besides, if one engages in a truly philosophical enterprise, one necessarily reflects on what one is doing. Husserl quite rightly, then, conceived of phenomenology as including analyses of its own fundamental concepts. The phenomenological clarification of concepts that are operative in phenomenology itself is what I call "metaphenomenology". This work is a piece of metaphenomenology.

2. The Literature on the Fifth Meditation

Let us be more specific. Commentators on Husserl's fifth meditation take the problem of intersubjectivity to be of "fundamental importance" in Husserl's philosophy, "the touchstone of transcendental phenomenology" (AHP, p. 115). But the way commentators have construed the problem of intersubjectivity renders those claims of fundamental importance largely unintelligible. There are, of course, important distinctions to be drawn among the literature on the fifth meditation. Sartre and Ricoeur, for example, believe that Husserl's analysis is supposed to yield proof of the existence of others. Once Husserl's problem has been so thoroughly misconstrued, it is little surprise to find that they believe that Husserl's "solution" does not work. In addition to misunderstanding the problem as the problem of other minds, Schuetz misconstrues a number of details in the solution to the problem.

Unlike the preceding commentators, David Carr understands that the problem does not call for the existence of others. He clearly perceives that the problem is conceptual (PPH, p. 87). However, Carr believes that the importance of the problem is a function of Husserl's

apparent incapability to account for the objectivity of the world (PPH, p. 86). True, that is an important problem. But it is not the only one, and not the one that concerns the very enterprise of phenomenology. Elliston (but only on this particular point) comes closest to my interpretation, insofar as he recognizes that philosophical understanding of the truths of logic, science, and arithmetic is at stake (H:E&A, pp. 213-214). But Elliston evidently follows Husserl in thinking that only those kinds of truths are at stake, since he mentions only science, logic, and arithmetic, and uses 'science' in a more restrictive sense than I shall here. The issue, however, is broader: phenomenological truths are to be clarified by explicating (in Husserl's sense) the notion of intersubjectivity. My thesis is that Husserl (in some passages) misunderstood his own enterprise on this score, or at least wrote things that betray such a misunderstanding. The paradoxical thing is that tracing the consequences of (and, in some cases, supplementing) Husserl's own analyses shows that some of Husserl's assertions about phenomenology are false--indeed, necessarily false.

More specifically, then, this is a piece of metaphenomenology on problems pertaining to intersubjectivity.

3. Science, Objectivity and Intersubjectivity

Which Husserlian analyses yield the conclusion that Husserl made necessarily false statements about phenomenology? There are two key notions to be clarified here: 'science' and 'objectivity'. Husserl's clarifications of those two concepts (in senses to be specified in the next chapter) in Formal and Transcendental Logic are

the backbone of this work, the thread that connects the various issues that I address in the subsequent chapters. There is a sense of 'science' in Formal and Transcendental Logic that applies to phenomenology as well as to what we ordinarily call sciences. By saying "a sense of 'science'", one should not take me to be saying that it is a strict definition of 'science', or even necessary and sufficient conditions for being a science. My own conviction is that the "neutral concept of science" (as I shall call it) includes necessary, but not jointly sufficient, conditions for being a science. The neutral concept of science is a workable, albeit assuredly inadequate, definition of 'science'. This work will, in part, be devoted to a defense and elucidation of the neutral concept of science, insofar as it contains a set of necessary conditions for phenomenology. In that respect, this work is a bit of apologetics. As we have seen, it is also a criticism of some of Husserl's theses.

Since the concepts of science and objectivity play such a crucial role here, this work is a piece of metaphenomenology on problems pertaining to intersubjectivity, science and objectivity. We want a partial answer to the question "What is phenomenology?", insofar as it can be considered as a science in the neutral sense. It should be noted that science in the neutral sense (which will be specified in the next chapter) is not Husserl's idiosyncratic notion of science. Quine and Ullian share similar views.

Our word 'science' comes from a Latin word for knowledge. Much that we know does not count as science, but this is often less due to its subject matter than to its arrangement. For nearly any body of knowledge that is sufficiently organized to exhibit appropriate evidential relationships among its constituent claims has at least some call to be seen as scientific.... The scientific

community is no private club. In principle, and in the best and broadest sense of the words, scientific inquiry can be undertaken by anyone on almost any subject matter (WB, p. 3, emphasis mine).

But how does Husserl spell out the neutral concept of science?

I say "similar" advisedly, since Husserl and Quine evidently disagree on an important point, which I shall discuss in chapter three. Moreover, what other concepts of science and objectivity are to be found in Husserl's writings?

I shall devote chapter two to an answer to those questions.

CHAPTER II

'SCIENCE' AND 'OBJECTIVITY'

1. Introduction

Since our purpose is to obtain some understanding of phenomenology as a science, it is worthwhile to begin with some discussion of the senses of the term 'science' in Husserl's writings. Terminological precision here, as everywhere in philosophy, is important. We are interested in clarifying a sense of 'science' that includes phenomenology in its extension.

There is another important term that Husserl uses in various senses, and which needs to be clarified provisionally in this chapter. I speak of the term 'objectivity' (and its grammatical cognates 'objective' and 'objectively'). That term's connection with science is relatively straightforward. Science is concerned with knowing and, in knowing, we possess truth (LI, p. 60). Science, then, purports to tell us what is objectively the case. There are more subtle relationships between science and the other senses of 'objectivity', which will emerge in the course of this chapter.

I propose to discuss four senses of the term 'objectivity' (or one of its grammatical cognates) in the next two sections of this chapter. I shall specify some of the relationships that obtain between them. Thereafter, I shall cite some conceptions of science in Husserl's writings, ruling out those conceptions that are too narrow to include phenomenology

in their extensions. This will permit us to identify precisely the senses of 'science' and 'objectivity' that are the terms to be clarified in this work, and to outline the following chapters.

2. Two Senses of 'Objectivity'

The first and primary sense of the term 'objectivity' is mentioned in the introduction to Cartesian Meditations, where Husserl attacks philosophers for engaging in "...a mere semblance of philosophizing seriously for and with one another" (CM, p. 5). Rather than doing that, philosophers should seek objectively valid results.

This hardly attests a mutual study carried on with a consciousness of responsibility, in the spirit that characterizes serious collaboration and an intention to produce Objectively valid results. 'Objectively...valid results'--the phrase, after all, signifies nothing but results that have been refined by mutual criticism and that now withstand every criticism (CM, p. 5).

We shall say that someone seeks (or practices) objectivity₁ when he pursues objectively valid results and does so in the ways that are necessary for yielding such results.

Let us consider this. It seems to me that there are two distinguishable features of objectivity₁ that Husserl does not clarify in the introduction to Cartesian Meditations. Howard Kahane explains the distinction well.

In a sense, all true statements must in some way be considered within the bounds of objectivity. However, for our purposes, a different kind of objectivity is required, although it is not clear exactly what it consists in. The man who luckily utters the truth on the basis of outrageous prejudice has not achieved this kind of objectivity. Now has someone failed to achieve it who unluckily utters falsehoods based on intense research and cogent reasoning. Roughly, we want assertions based on sufficient evidence (and cogent reasoning) to count as objective in this sense, whether or not they later turn out to be true (LCR, p. iv).

Objectivity₁ includes both of the notions of objectivity that Kahane distinguishes. Now any scientific enterprise has objectively valid results as its goal. We want to know the truth, to know that which is objectively the case. When Husserl speaks of objectively valid results (a term that is so broad to include philosophical as well as narrowly construed scientific results), he has truths in mind.

But Husserl is not speaking solely of objectivity in the first sense that Kahane identifies. We would not refer to propositions as objectively valid results if they were proposed on the basis of revelation. Objectively valid results are "refined by mutual criticism". Hence, Husserl speaks of evidence as well as truth when he refers to objectively valid results; one must use methods that we regard as necessary for yielding those results. Objectivity₁ includes objectivity in Kahane's second sense, too.

Now it may be objected that Husserl is speaking only of intense research and sufficient evidence. After all, Husserl mentions only mutual criticism and withstanding it; he does not mention truths. This is an important objection. I shall postpone my final answer to this question until the discussion of evidence and truth in chapter four. But I have a preliminary remark. Husserl is talking about the concepts 'objectively valid result' and 'truth'. Despite the fact that we do not take the present state of sciences as the final word on the matter, we do refer to the results that have been criticized and now withstand criticism as true. There is, then, some sort of conceptual connection between 'objectively valid result' and 'true'. So, I think that Husserl refers to objectivity in both of Kahane's senses when he mentions the definition of 'objectively valid result'.

Two concluding remarks on objectivity₁ are in order at this point. It is noteworthy that Husserl says that objectively valid results are refined by mutual criticism. The very meaning of 'objectively valid result' thus includes the notion of a community of rational subjects. Since any scientific enterprise has objectively valid results as its goal, the very concept of phenomenology includes the notion of a community of rational subjects. This may seem false or paradoxical, since Husserl refers to phenomenology as a solipsistic science and maintains that one is neutral with respect to the existence of others, so long as one does phenomenology. I shall explain and defend that paradoxical statement in the subsequent chapters. Secondly, it is because the goal of science is objectively valid results that scientific activity exhibits a twofold, "zigzag" attitude on the part of scientists, which can be sketched as aiming straight for certain results, only to critically evaluate them subsequently (FTL, p.125). Objectively valid results are refined by and withstand criticism. I shall have much more to say about the zigzag scientific attitude in the chapter on evidence and truth. Clearly, objectivity₁ is the central concept of objectivity in this work.

Objectivity₁ is not the only concept of objectivity in Husserl's works. Consider the following sentence: "The point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it" (CES, p. 189). The context of the passage shows that Husserl is contrasting transcendental phenomenology with Descartes' philosophy. Descartes' purpose is to secure objectivity by deducing "the rest of knowledge" from the ego cogito, whereas Husserl's purpose is to understand objectivity, rather than secure it.

Now I noted that Husserl (indeed, any phenomenologist) attempts to secure objectively valid results (objectivity₁). Therefore, the meaning of the term 'objectivity' in the sentence just cited is not the same as objectivity₁. Let us call it "objectivity₂". What does 'objectivity₂' mean?

We can begin to clarify objectivity₂ by asking "What does Descartes proceed to deduce from the ego cogito?" Those are examples of securing objectivity₂. As is well-known, Descartes argues that God exists and that there is an external world, to cite only two examples. We know that one refrains from passing judgement on the existence of things, once one has adopted the phenomenological attitude. Such existential commitments "set the thesis of the natural standpoint in action"; and the phenomenological reduction is the suspension of that thesis. Rather than asserting (for example) that there is an external world, a phenomenologist attempts to understand the belief. A phenomenologist wants to know what commitments one must make about the course of one's experience if one believes that there is an external world, thereby clarifying the belief (see, e.g., *Ideas*, pp. 91-100). Securing objectivity₂, then, appears to be establishing or making assertions that commit one to the thesis of the natural standpoint.

This interpretation is confirmed by a passage that occurs near the sentence we have been discussing.

No objective truth, whether in the prescientific or the scientific sense, i.e., no claim about objective being, ever enters our [phenomenological] sphere of scientific discipline, whether as a premise or as a conclusion (CES, p. 175, emphasis mine).

On the next page Husserl says that "Objective truth belongs exclusively

within the attitude of natural human world life (CES, p. 176).

Because Husserl uses the term 'objective' to modify 'truth', objectivity₂ pertains to the subject matter of those truths. We say that it is a mathematical truth that $a+b=b+a$. Husserl is using 'objective' in the same way that I used 'mathematical' in the preceding sentence. If a truth is objective₂, it is about objects apart from their (intentional) relationships to transcendental consciousness.

We can speak of sciences as objective₂. Those sciences are those that consist of a body of objective₂ truths, which Husserl frequently calls the "mundane" sciences. We should note that 'objectivity₂' is defined in contrast to phenomenology, which is about the relationships that necessarily obtain between constituting consciousness and constituted object. Phenomenology, then, is not an objective₂ science. In many cases where Husserl says that phenomenology is a subjective science, I suggest that he is merely noting that phenomenology is not an objective₂ science. An apparent false statement (or at least a puzzling one) is thus recognized as true and intelligible.

The adjective 'objective₂' contrasts with phenomenology when it modifies 'truth', too.

Here we discover a first difficulty. Are we not also doing science? Are we not establishing truths about true being? Are we not entering upon the dangerous road of double truth? Can there be, next to objective truth, yet a second truth, the subjective (CES, p. 175)?

If I had not already set the stage for an interpretation of this passage, we would take Husserl to be suggesting a rather Kierkegaardian thesis on truth. Fortunately, Husserl is merely saying that phenomenological truths are not objective₂. Phenomenological truths are objective₁, but not objective₂. Both of the senses of 'objectivity' are themes for

phenomenological analysis. One problem for phenomenology is a clarification of its own objectivity (FTL, pp. 268,273). The importance of this distinction will become clearer later.

3. Two Other Senses of 'Objectivity'

Both objectivity₁ and objectivity₂ pertain to sciences, propositions, and truths. But to what do those propositions refer? Husserl uses the terms 'objective' and 'objectivity' in two different senses, in order to designate the referents of propositions. I propose to discuss those two senses in this section.

Every science (in a broad sense) has a province or subject matter. Husserl uses the term 'objective' to designate the horizon of the province of many sciences. Husserl writes of "the objective (des Objektiven) in a preeminent sense", by which he means "the intersubjectively real" (FTL, p. 166). 'Objectivity₃', then, means 'intersubjective reality'.

Intersubjective reality is, of course, to be distinguished from a body of propositions about intersubjective reality. Now intersubjective reality is not the province of any particular science exclusively, for parts of it are the province of many sciences, such as chemistry, biology, psychology and sociology. Nor is it simply the horizon of the provinces of many sciences. For intersubjective reality is, for the most part, that about which we speak in prescientific life, at least as the co-intended horizon of our everyday speech. It is, similarly, the co-intended horizon of sense-experience. That is, we identify the objects of sense-experience as being part of the intersubjec-

tively real world. But intersubjective reality is the horizon of the provinces of many sciences, including many of those sciences that are objective₂.

But it is not the case that all sciences that are objective₂ are about things within intersubjective reality, or objectivity₃. Some of these sciences are about what Husserl calls "ideal objectivities". Husserl sometimes refers to these as "irreal objectivities", or simply "irrealities". This introduces the fourth sense of 'objectivity', the meaning of which I shall specify presently. Husserl is discussing logic, which treats propositions and propositional forms as its objects, in the following passage:

Thus the objectivities 'treated' here are no realities: The peculiar sense that ideal objectivities possess, in being (as we have said) exactly as originally certain to us in an evidence of their own as are real objectivities coming from experience, is unalterable (FTL, pp. 167-168).

This shows that Husserl distinguishes between real and ideal objectivities. How does he distinguish between the two? Roughly, the distinction is along the following lines. Real objectivities are extended, located, mobile, and outside one another in objective₃ time. Ideal objectivities have none of these properties (FTL, pp. 154-155).

I believe that it is important to distinguish between intersubjective (or objective) reality and real objectivities. The word 'objectivities', where it appears in the phrases 'real objectivities' and 'ideal (or irreal) objectivities' is a counting noun, such that one can say "This is a real objectivity and that is another". But the cognate of the word 'objectivity' in the locution 'objective in the pre-eminent sense' is not a counting noun. One cannot say 'This

is an objectivity₃ and that is another'. That would amount to saying 'This is one intersubjective reality and that is another'. This explains why I repeatedly wrote that objectivity₃ is the horizon of that about which we speak. For the most part, we speak of real objectivities, rather than objective (intersubjective) reality. But when we speak of real objectivities, we are talking about things which are in objective (intersubjective) reality; moreover, that is the way it is for us. Thus, objectivity₃ (or intersubjective reality) is the horizon of objective realities (real objectivities₄), or that about which we speak for the most part. The preceding statement has the status of a definition.

But just what does 'objectivity₄' mean? Despite the fact that there is a sharp contrast between ideal and real objectivities, the meaning of the term 'objectivities' is the same in both cases.

'Objectivity₄' means 'any possible subject of true predications', or 'anything of which we can speak' (Ideas, pp. 80, 345). An objectivity₄ must satisfy one set of conditions if it is to be a real objectivity₄; it must satisfy another set if it is to be an ideal objectivity₄. Some examples of real objectivities are a building, a rainbow, and a cat being on a mat. Some ideal objectivities are the square root of two and the law of non-contradiction.

Objectivity₄ is a very broad notion, insofar as such diverse objectivities as a building and a cat being on a mat are in the same category. The two examples are not parallel; if they were, instead of "a cat being on a mat" I would have said "a cat". This is a rationale for using the odd term 'objectivities'.

"I often make use of the vaguer expression 'objective correlate' (Gegenständlichkeit) since we are never limited to objects in the narrower sense, but also have to do with states of affairs, properties, and non-independent forms, etc., whether real or categorial" (LI, p. 261).¹ Husserl draws more refined distinctions between kinds of objectivities. A cat is an example of what Husserl calls a "substrate objectivity", whereas a cat being on a mat is a "categorically formed objectivity". I shall say more about that distinction in the chapter on evidence and truth.

What does the concept of objectivity₄ have to do with science and objectively valid results (objectivity₁)? Any science consists of a body of truths that are true in virtue of the fact that they refer to actual states of affairs and (thereby) ultimately to substrate objectivities about which one can predicate. If 'All isolated systems are entropic' is true—if it is an objectively valid result—then there are (for the scientists) such things as isolated systems (or, at least, systems that approximate that description, such as a tightly capped thermos bottle) that corroborate its truth. The experiencing of those objectivities (Evidenz), those states of affairs, shows the truth of propositions to us. There is no science without reference to objectivities.

What kind of objectivities are referents in phenomenology? The criterion for distinguishing between real objectivities and ideal objectivities is temporality. Real objectivities are individuated by time; that is not the case for ideal objectivities. To the extent that noeses are spoken of, then, since their identities are bound to time, real objectivities are referents in phenomenology.² Noemata, on the other hand, are ideal objectivities (again, to the extent that they are

spoken of). Both real³ and ideal objectivities are referents in phenomenology.

We now have a preliminary understanding of the four senses of 'objectivity' in Husserl's writings. Let us summarize some of the observations. The goal of any science whatsoever, including phenomenology, is objectively valid results (objectivity₁) (CES, p. 122). Objective₂ sciences are non-phenomenological sciences. Any science is about real or ideal objectivities₄, whereas objectivity₃ is the horizon of real objectivities. Some objective₂ sciences (such as mathematics) are about ideal objectivities₄ exclusively, but are objective₂ for the simple reason that they are not about the relationships that necessarily obtain between transcendental consciousness and its intentional objects. The intersubjectively real world (objectivity₃) is not the horizon of ideal objectivities₄, since it makes no sense to say things like "The square root of two is behind the waste paper basket" or "The number three became older".

4. Husserl's Concepts of Science

We are now in a position to clarify Husserl's concepts of science which, as I have noted, are conceptually connected with the various senses of 'objectivity'. I shall isolate the sense of 'science' that is broad enough to include phenomenology within its extension. That will be the notion of science that will be analyzed further in subsequent chapters.

A certain conception of science is predominant in the Logical Investigations. There Husserl believed that science is, at least

ideally, nomologically ordered. Ideally, science is deductive; it is a set of definitions, axioms and postulates, from which theorems follow. "No truth is, however, isolated in science: it occurs in combination with other truths in theoretical connections bound by relations of ground and consequent" (LI, p. 173, emphasis mine). The position is, of course, stated in other places.

This [that pure logic deals with ideal unities (objectivities)] is clear from the start if we first think of the position logic takes up to the many sciences, the position of nomological science, concerned with the ideal essence of science as such, or, thought in general, taken purely in its theoretic content and connection (LI, p. 233, last emphasis mine).

Now I said that Husserl thought that the ideal of science is to be deductively-ordered in the Logical Investigations. Husserl realized that not every science is in fact so ordered. The following passage occurs within the context of a contrast between sciences which are unified in terms of explanatory principles (i.e., nomological or theoretical sciences) and sciences which are unified by different means.

There are, in the second place, external standpoints which range truths into one science: the nearest to hand is the unity of the thing in a more literal sense. One connects all truths whose content relates to one and the same individual object, or to one and the same empirical genus. This is the case in regard to the concrete ...sciences, such as geography, history, astronomy, natural history, anatomy etc. (LI, p. 230).

Only some sciences, such as mathematics and geometry, satisfy this ideal of science. None of the sciences mentioned in the above quotation are deductively ordered; nor are some others, such as biology and psychology. This includes phenomenology.

Thus the idea of an all-embracing philosophy becomes actualized--quite differently than Descartes and his age, guided by modern natural science, expected: Not as an all-embracing system of deductive theory, as though everything that exists were included in the unity of a computation, but--with a radical alteration of

the fundamental sense of all science--as a system of phenomenological disciplines, which treat correlative themes and are ultimately grounded, not on an axiom, *ego cogito*, but on an all-embracing self-investigation (CM, p. 156, first emphasis mine).

Husserl abandoned the thesis that science is ideally nomological in later works. He even explicitly criticizes the position that he took in the Logical Investigations.

Thus we have learned something very significant for the understanding of logic. It was still lacking in the Logische Untersuchungen. A correct exposition there would have omitted every anticipatory reference to the ideal of 'theoretical' or 'nomologically explanatory' science--an ideal that can by no means be accepted for every science (FTL, p. 102).

His criticism of Descartes in Cartesian Meditations for the same belief is even stronger (CM, p. 24). Since phenomenology and some other sciences are not even ideally nomological, Husserl abandoned the position that 'the ideal essence of science' means 'unified in terms of basic explanatory laws, with all truths relating to one another logically'. That definition became a way of characterizing some of the sciences, rather than science itself.

So far, then, two kinds of sciences have been characterized: nomological and concrete sciences. Nomological sciences are unified in terms of basic explanatory principles. Concrete sciences, on the other hand, are unified only in terms of the same empirical genus; each concrete science is about a certain sort of object (objectivity₄). The same is true of nomological sciences, except that their genera are not (for the most part) empirical. Does Husserl also speak of science in a way that is neutral to the distinction between concrete and nomological sciences? Indeed he does. "Any science whatever is a multiplicity of truths--not haphazardly thrown together, but combined and relating in

any case to a unitary province" (FTL, p. 102). This concept of science does not include any specification of the kind of province; nor does it include any statement about what logical relationships obtain between the propositions of a science, with one exception. The exception is that Husserl believes that the propositions of any science are combinable without contradiction. But that is a much weaker claim, of course, than the contention that the propositions of a science are, ideally, deductively ordered. So this concept of science holds for both concrete and nomological sciences.

Both the nomological and the broader concepts of science include nothing about scientific activity. Husserl often depicts science as a finished product, or simply a set of truths about a province. But such a set of truths is not unrelated to scientific activity. Let us look at a representative example. A truth such as 'At constant temperature, the volume occupied by a fixed weight of gas is directly proportional to the absolute temperature' was true before anyone discovered it. However, it was not a scientific truth--that is, it was not part of the science we call "chemistry"--before its truth was discovered and integrated into a similar body of propositions about the same province. If this example is representative, then the conception of science as a finished product is incomplete or one-sided. The "other side" of the finished product is the activity which produced it. A body of truths about a province is the result of scientific activity. Husserl makes scientific activity the central feature of another characterization of science:

It ['science'] means a certain universe of propositions that arose somehow from theoretical effort and have a systematic order wherein

a certain universe of objects becomes determined (FTL, p. 103, emphasis mine).

We have two sides of the same concept of science.

It is noteworthy that Husserl does not commit himself as to how science arises from scientific activity. But in his last work Husserl does speculate, if you will, about the historical development of science. This constitutes a different concept of science. Husserl refers to it as the "positivistic concept of science", which is characterized in terms of a particular historical development.

Thus the positivistic concept of science in our time is, historically speaking, a residual concept. It has dropped all the questions which had been considered under the now narrower, now broader concepts of metaphysics, including all questions vaguely termed 'ultimate and highest' (CES, p. 9).

Generally speaking, science is depicted as an abstraction from the life-world, which is experienced prescientifically.

But the role of science is not quite that simple in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. For scientific theories, once well-established, affect our everyday interpretations of the world. The sciences are cultural facts as well as theories, and change the content of our life-world. Science may be regarded as both a part of and an abstraction from the life-world, because there is more than one sense of the term 'life-world'. Husserl uses the term 'life-world' to mean, roughly, 'the prescientific perceptual world', the general features of which are the unchanging basis for scientific claims and interpretations. In this sense, science is an abstraction from the life-world, insofar as science offers a certain picture of the world which differs from the world as it is experienced pre-scientifically. But Husserl also uses the term 'life-world' to mean, roughly, 'the

cultural world', which included scientific theories as cultural facts.

In this sense, science is a part of the life-world.⁴

The positivistic concept of science is worth mentioning, insofar as it is one way in which Husserl characterizes science. But it is not a position on science with which I am concerned. Phenomenology is not supposed to be a science which abstracts from the life-world. For Husserl purports to "describe" accurately the structures of the life-world.

I have already mentioned Husserl's concept of the "mundane" sciences, which are equivalent to those sciences that are objective₂. Husserl uses a number of adjectives to designate these sciences. In addition to 'mundane', Husserl refers to them with such words as 'naive', 'dogmatic', 'positive', and 'of the natural standpoint'. These are sciences which are oriented towards the world, and thus ignore the being of objects for consciousness: "Positive science is a science lost in the world" (CM, p. 157).

There is one other concept of science, which Husserl calls "genuine science". A genuine or ultimate science is, as we have seen, a science which answers the question of its own possibility. It is, secondly, a science in which all fundamental concepts are clarified and critically evaluated. It is doubtful that any science is genuine by these standards. At any rate, many sciences are not genuine in this sense.

The truth is that sciences that have paradoxes, that operate with fundamental concepts not produced by the work of originary clarification and criticism, are not sciences at all but, with all their ingenious performances, mere theoretical techniques (FTL, p. 181).

This is a different ideal of science; in this respect, it is like

Husserl's concept of nomological science. But the two ideals are quite

different. It is noteworthy that a genuine science does not have to be deductively ordered, and vice versa.

Husserl vacillates between saying that phenomenology is the only genuine science and saying that phenomenology is in the process of making itself genuine.

But this naively used [phenomenological] 'method' is not yet a genuine method.... Only at the outset is constitutional inquiry such a reflection and progressive uncovering of the method used in fact and 'unconsciously'. As it advances, it is 'criticism'... (FTL, p. 180).

Husserl is suggesting that phenomenology approximates genuine science progressively by analyzing and criticizing itself. Later in Formal and Transcendental Logic, however, Husserl asserts that phenomenology is the only genuine science (FTL, p. 272).

We are now in a position to ask "Which of these concepts of science will help us to clarify 'objectivity₁'?". Since 'objective₁' is predicable of any science and, at the least, not every science is genuine, that is not the concept of science which will be the key to clarifying 'objectivity₁'. Nor is the positivistic concept of science the one for which we are searching. For that concept of science precludes a science of the life-world, which phenomenology is supposed to be. I do not intend to argue that phenomenology is such a science, for I require a sense of 'science' that is true of whatever we are willing to call a science. The concept of nomological science is not the key to clarifying objectivity₁ either. I have pointed out that not every science is arranged as a deductive system.

Therefore, the sense of 'science' that is the key to an analysis of objectivity₁, is what I shall call the "neutral" concept of science.

I call it "neutral" since, unlike the other concepts, it is indifferent with respect to distinctions among sciences. We recall that 'the neutral concept of science' means 'a multiplicity of truths which are not haphazardly thrown together, but which relate to a unitary province'. I have already noted that there is another part of this definition. A science is a multiplicity of truths which relate to a unitary province only if it arose somehow from theoretical (scientific) activity. Accordingly, any science, characterized in the neutral way, is objective₁. It is the purpose of this thesis to elucidate some of the relationships which obtain between the two parts of this single definition of 'science'.

But how can the questions "How does science arise from scientific activity?" and "How are science and scientific activity related?" be addressed without engaging in historical inquiry? The answer consists in the fact that I am not concerned with what disciplines are in fact sciences, nor with how they in fact arose from scientific activity. My question has to do with justification, rather than facts. The central question is "What must be the case if we are justified in calling something a science?". This question will be answered, in part, in terms of the categories of scientific activity. However, such a response will involve no commitment to the past existence of any particular historical event. The following sketch of an analysis of the neutral concept of science should show that this is the case.

5. Further Analysis of the Neutral Concept of Science: Outline of the Thesis

We have arrived at the central theme of this work, the neutral

concept of science. We are concerned with science insofar as it is a multiplicity of truths which relate to a unitary province, and which arose somehow from scientific activity. Let us look more closely at this concept, so that the course of the ensuing chapters can be explained. I shall isolate various parts of this definition.

If any science consists of a multiplicity of truths, then, since any true proposition must be meaningful, any science consists of a multiplicity of propositions. In the next chapter I shall consider the meaningfulness of propositions apart from the question of their truth (or falsity). Generally, I want to know what must be the case if something is a proposition. This will involve asking "What sort of object is a proposition?". We shall also be asking "Under what conditions does a proposition retain (or lose) its identity?".

The thesis that science consists (in part) of a network of propositions is quite controversial. Accordingly, I explain and try to respond to two sets of objections to propositions in the first part of chapter three. Benson Mates' objections are not cited frequently (as far as I know). But I do take them to be a stark statement of a prevailing attitude among some contemporary American philosophers, the attitude that abstract entities are prima facie suspect or, (more strongly) per se objectionable. Moreover, Mates' logic text is widely used. Thus, it is worthwhile to address his objections. Since Quine's objections are cited frequently, I try to respond to his arguments.

Of course, science is (in part) a network of propositions only insofar as we consider science timelessly, disregarding the activity that produces it. No one speaks or writes Propositionese. It is appropriate,

then, to consider the role of language in phenomenology. I say "in phenomenology", since although the neutral concept of science includes many sciences besides phenomenology in its extension, I chose that concept of science precisely because it includes phenomenology. My interest lies in a clarification of phenomenology as a scientific enterprise. A central problem for phenomenology is the accusation that the phenomenological reduction commits one to a private language. So I address that problem in the latter part of chapter three.

Propositions and sentences, of course, cannot be discussed apart from their referring function. In fact, at least one of the ways of describing a private language is in terms of the referents of the language's referring terms. So I shall speak of substrate objectivities and states of affairs somewhat in the chapter on propositions and private languages, a discussion that continues in the chapter on evidence and truth.

But a body of propositions which are about things within a unitary province and expressed in language is not a sufficient condition for being a science that consists of objectively valid results. For any list of prejudices about, say, human nature, satisfies those conditions. More is plainly required. Any science purports to be a body of true propositions, the truth of which is shown by the evidence in their favor. Here the role of scientific activity comes to the fore. For evidence is something which is had (or not had) by scientists. Evidence is something which is produced, and which is taken as corroborating or confuting a proposition or body of propositions. Evidence is that which makes science a part of knowledge which, in turn, points to knowing

subjects.

Chapter four, accordingly, will be devoted to questions about evidence and truth. I shall discuss some of the kinds of evidence that are topics in Husserl's philosophy to some extent. I shall also critically explicate some of the concepts of truth and elucidate their relationship to the concepts of evidence and objectivity, at least to some extent. But the central question has to do with intersubjectivity, as in the preceding chapters. Are evidence and truth intersubjectively constituted? What implications does the response to that question have for the nature of science in general, and for phenomenology in particular? I shall argue that both evidence and truth are intersubjectively constituted. I believe that this has important implications for Husserl's concept of phenomenology in general, and for one of his attempts to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity in particular.

After bringing to light the tissue of relationships which obtain between science, objectivity and intersubjectivity, the problem of intersubjectivity can be seen to be much broader than commentators have recognized. Husserl is not simply trying to analyze the perception of other subjects. He is completing some long-standing analyses of science, including phenomenological science. Husserl's responses to the problem of intersubjectivity, then, are attempts to understand with phenomenological insight the nature of phenomenology. By addressing and trying to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity, Husserl is "answering the question of the possibility of phenomenology" since, as I shall argue, phenomenology is a science only if the evidence and the

results of phenomenological analyses are "there for everyone". Thus, the problem of intersubjectivity is the central problem of phenomenology, and addressing it constitutes an attempt to make phenomenology a genuine science.

Accordingly, the central question of chapter five is "What is the problem of intersubjectivity?". There is a secondary question which I shall address in this chapter, namely "How has Husserl's problem been misconstrued?". I shall present and criticize a few misinterpretations in chapter five.

Clearly, chapter six will be devoted to Husserl's response to the problem of intersubjectivity. I shall simply interpret his response in chapter six, reserving most critical observations for chapter seven. These criticisms will provide a context whereby I can ascertain whether Husserlian phenomenology is a genuine science, with which I shall close this dissertation.

Through an analysis of science and its objectivity, I shall at the same time be clarifying what must be the case if something is an "objectively valid result", or a result that has been refined by mutual criticism and that now withstands every criticism (CM, p. 5). Thereby, I shall have, in part, answered the question "What must be the case if someone knows something scientifically?".

Let us turn, then, to propositions and ask "How are they constituted?".

CHAPTER II

NOTES

1. J. N. Findlay translates the word 'Gegenständlichkeit' as 'objective correlate', whereas Dorion Cairns translates the same term as 'objectivity'. I am adopting Cairn's rendering.
2. I say "to the extent that noeses are spoken of", since noeses are that by which conscious reference to objectivities is achieved.
3. It is important not to equivocate on 'real'. 'Real' in this context means simply 'individuated in time'.
4. This is only a sketch of a solution to the problem of the ambiguities in the concept of the life-world, and lacks the necessary caveats and qualifications. See PPH, chapter 8, for a thorough discussion of this problem.

CHAPTER III

LANGUAGE AND MEANING

1. Introduction to the Problem

At the end of chapter two I said that I intend to analyze the neutral concept of science. I am concerned with science insofar as it is a multiplicity of truths that relate to a unitary province, and which arose somehow from scientific activity. Since a body of truths must be meaningful, and since not every proposition is true, it is appropriate to begin with propositions. Since we approach this topic from a phenomenological point of view, our question is "How are propositions constituted?", or "How do propositions make their appearance in mental life?". In order to answer these questions, it will be necessary to pinpoint the ways in which propositions are concretely experienced. I shall not attempt to answer this question fully, as I only want to set the stage for an analysis of phenomenological language. Before turning to the nature of phenomenological language, however, I shall consider Husserl's commitment to propositions and a couple of criticisms that have been levelled against the proposition theory. Although Husserl sets out a number of necessary conditions for meaningfulness in his analyses of purely logical grammar, I shall not consider that here, as that topic is not directly linked to the concept of

intersubjectivity.

I pointed out that I do not intend to analyze the constituent concepts of science in the neutral sense apart from the scientific activity that produces science. Speaking and writing in a language is the sort of scientific activity to be considered here. I intend to consider the constitution of language in the second major division of this chapter. I shall not attempt to answer this question exhaustively either, since I am interested in a specific problem, whether language is necessarily constituted intersubjectively. The reason for this interest is that Husserl appears to be committed to the possibility of a private language, to which Wittgenstein and others have objected. Although this thesis is about any science whatsoever, I am especially interested in the nature of phenomenology and the conceptual connections between it and intersubjectivity. Accordingly, I shall consider and evaluate Suzanne Cunningham's criticisms of what she takes to be an inevitable consequence of Husserl's reductions—philosophical commitment to the possibility of a private language. Thereby, I shall specify the status of phenomenological language generally.

2. Meanings (Propositions) as Ideal Objectivities

I mentioned that one sense of the word 'objectivity' in Husserl's works (objectivity₄) means 'satisfying the necessary and sufficient conditions for being an object (of a certain sort)' (chapter 2, page 14). Now the word 'object' in this context means 'any possible subject of true predications' or, equivalently, 'anything of which we can speak' (Ideas, p. 345). Now that definition of 'objectivity₄' is

neutral with respect to the question whether a given object is real or ideal. An object must satisfy one set of conditions if it is to be real; it must satisfy another set if it is to be ideal or irreal. I pointed out that real objectivities are extended, located, mobile, and outside one another in objective₃ time. Ideal (or irreal) objectivities, on the other hand, have none of these properties (FTL, pp. 154-155; chapter 2, page 13). Although Husserl mentions all of these criteria for distinguishing between real and ideal objectivities, any one of them is sufficient. But a particular criterion takes precedence in Husserl's works: temporality. My purpose is to show that meanings are irreal (ideal) objectivities; that requires only this rough sketch of the distinction between real and ideal objectivities.

Though this may seem to involve an Aristotelian metaphysics, where real individuals (primary substances) are distinguished from universals (secondary substances), this is not the case. The question here has to do with how propositions make their appearance in mental life as intentional objects (or phenomena). Consequently, the ontological status of real and ideal objectivities is quite irrelevant to our inquiry, since we are concerned solely with the existence of propositions for a thinking subject. So, we should raise the question posed in the first section of this chapter, namely "In what ways are propositions concretely experienced?".

The answer to this question is simple. We grasp meanings by reading and by understanding the speech of others (and ourselves). We also grasp meanings in thinking to ourselves. Moreover, one occasionally imagines a page before one and "reads" a line from that page;

but this is a way of filling in one's memory, and refers us back to the perceptual experience reading. I shall concentrate on the paradigm cases of grasping meanings, when one comprehends one's own speech or that of others, or reads. I want to show how the identity of meanings (for us) implies that they are ideal objectivities.

We are conscious of the meaning of someone's words through language.

Now human thinking is normally done in language, and all the activities of reason are as good as entirely bound up with speech. Furthermore, so far as it is intersubjective, all the criticism from which the rationally true should emerge employs language and, in the end, leads always to statements (FTL, p. 9).

The ordinary case of consciousness of a meaning is in a speech act, in saying something or in hearing someone else say something.

Suppose I say "S is P". The basis upon which one understands the meaning of what I said are the audible sounds of my voice. But those sounds, with their particular pitch, tone, and timbre, must be distinguished from the meaning of what I said. For if the two were identical, then the meaning of the words 'S is P' would be different when uttered by another person (who, naturally, has a different voice).

But the meaning of 'S is P' does not vary simply by being spoken by another person, since the same meaning can be expressed by anyone.

"Multiplication of persons and acts does not multiply propositional meanings; the judgement in the ideal, logical sense remains single" (LI, p. 329). So, the acoustic phenomena, which necessarily takes place in a certain place and has a definite duration (and thus is a real objectivity), is not identical with the meaning of my words. What holds for my voice, naturally, holds for any individual's voice whatsoever.

Nor is the meaning of my words identical with either what I meant to say nor with my hearer's understanding of it. For if the meaning of my words were identical with my hearer's understanding of it, it would be impossible for my hearer to misunderstand what I said. Consequently, my hearer's understanding grasp of what I said (any possible hearer), which has a certain duration and is thus a real objectivity, is distinct from the meaning of my words, since any meaning is given as being misunderstandable. If the meaning of my speech act were (numerically) identical with what I meant to say (my thinking), then it would be impossible for me to say, inadvertently, something other than what I meant to say. The consequent is always false. Moreover, my intention to say something has a certain duration. So even if what I meant to say and what I did say coincide (which is the usual case, after all), that would not justify identifying the two, as if the meaning were a function of the intention. For my intention to say "S is P" comes to be and passes away. This is clearly not the case with the meaning of my words, since the meaning remains the same despite the fact that the intention changes. I may, for example, proceed to intend to say something else. But 'S is P' does not cease to mean what it does if my intention varies. 'S is P', moreover, would mean what it does even if I never intended to say it. The word 'googol' has a meaning, despite the fact that a number of people have never thought of it (LI, p. 329). I may intend to say one and the same thing at two different times. But if my intention were identical with the meaning of my words, then (since the intentions are distinct) it would necessarily follow that I had said two different things. Again, any

two persons' intendings are numerically distinct. So if the meaning of any person's words were identical with his intentions, then the meaning of any two persons' words would necessarily be different, since the intentions differ. But the meaning of one's words are experienced as expressible by any other subject. Any person can say the same thing as I said.

In these ways, the meaning of someone's words exhibit a certain independence of the thinking of the hearer or the speaker, despite the fact that it is in acts of meaningful use and understanding that meanings are constituted.

I have begun to clarify the ideality (irreality) of meanings by distinguishing the meaning of anyone's words from a number of real objectivities. It remains for me to provide a positive argument for identifying meanings as ideal objectivities. If propositions (meanings) are not spatially or temporally individuated, then they are ideal objectivities. Let us consider a representative example in order to show that the antecedent is true, say, the proposition 'If atheism is true, then God does not exist'. Now everyone is aware of the historical changes in the meanings of words. For example, it could be the case that the word 'theism' meant what the word 'atheism' now means. Thus, it seems that meanings change (or can change), and that, consequently, they cannot be called ideal objectivities. But what we are discussing here is not a change in meaning; rather, it is a change in the word(s) we use to express that meaning. After all, if 'theism' meant what we now mean by 'atheism', we say that the two words have the same meaning. So even though the words we use to express meanings change, it does not

seem to be the case that meanings themselves change. The unchangability of meanings is, as the example shows, a condition for the possibility of translation from a language at an earlier time to that of a later time.

A stronger argument is in order. The reason why one might think that propositions are real, rather than unreal (more precisely, that there are no propositions, but only sentences) objectivities, is that propositions necessarily make their appearance to subjects in temporally individuated events of thinking, speaking, and hearing. "It belongs essentially to their [unreal objectivities] appearance that they are subjective formations, therefore localized in worldliness (spatio-temporality) by the localization of the subject" (E&J, p. 260). This is what likely misled Mates, as we shall see. But the spatio-temporality of the appearance of a proposition must not be identified with the "spatio-temporality" of the proposition itself, any more than one should identify the duration of one's perception of a physical object with the duration of the physical object itself. If one did, a number of category mistakes would result. No real objectivity can be in two places simultaneously. But this is not precluded for unreal objectivities like propositions (the meaning of someone's speech act). I can judge (or say) "S is P" while at the same time someone in England, say, judges and/or says the same thing. The two speech acts are identical in meaning. They are not distinguished from one another by their place in time. But since this cannot be true of real objectivities, meanings are not real objectivities. Suppose that we were trying to determine whether a certain revolver R was the murder weapon; imagine that the murder occurred in

place P at time T. Suppose, further, that we ascertained that R was in P_2 , a place far away from P, at T. It follows that R is not the murder weapon. But we do not distinguish propositions in this way. The person in England and I did not say two different things simply because we made our judgements in different places at the same time. Propositions, as Husserl put it, are "everywhere and nowhere" (E&J, p. 261). If one distinguished propositions in that way, it would make sense to say "That proposition occurred at 2:15 P.M. in London", which is absurd. Only that person's asserting of that proposition occurred at a definite time and in a certain place.

Again, suppose that 'the victor at Jena' and 'the vanguished at Waterloo' describe the same person, Napoleon. Now since Napoleon's victory at Jean (T_1) occurred before his defeat at Waterloo (T_3), Napoleon must have lived during the intermediate time (T_2). Moreover, he must have been in definite places during the entirety of T_2 . If we discovered that Napoleon died during T_2 , we would be entitled to infer that the victor at Jena is not identical with the vanguished at Waterloo.

Time is a real feature of the world; individual objects which are in different times and in separate locations can be the same only so far as they endure continuously through these temporal positions, therefore, so far as they are also in the intermediate times; otherwise, they can only be objects which are alike but individually different (E&J, p. 257).

Thus, it is in principle possible, assuming that the victor at Jena is the vanguished at Waterloo, to answer the question "Where was Napoleon during each moment of T_2 ?". Of course, this example can be generalized for any real objectivity whatsoever.

Contrast this with a proposition. Suppose that someone says "Morgens werde ich nicht auf deutsch sprechen" at T_1 and that I say

"Tomorrow I won't speak in German" at T_3 . If a proposition were a real objectivity, it would make sense to ask "Where was that proposition during each moment of the intermediate time T_2 ?" Again, we have a category mistake. So propositions are ideal (irreal) objectivities.

I concur with Mohanty in thinking that talking about meanings as objects is somewhat misleading.

Now this ontological mode of speech is gradually mellowed down. To be sure, the meanings are ideal, their ideality is nothing but 'unity in multiplicity' but they are mediums of reference, not objects of reference. When in an act of reflection they are made objects, they cease to function as meanings (RHLI, p. 78).

If this is so, then I have been speaking in a misleading manner about meanings. Thus, it is incumbent upon me to explain how it is misleading, and to justify speaking in this manner.

What is the source of Mohanty's remark about meanings? His point is that meanings have a referring function; they refer to objects (objectivities), and thus are modes of reference, rather than the referents themselves. Moreover, that is the way that meanings normally appear in mental life. If I am talking about the father of phenomenology, my intention and that of my hearer are (normally) aimed at Husserl, rather than the meaning of my words, the tone of my voice, etc.

Stated more precisely: when speech proceeds in its natural function, actually as speech in which 'such and such is uttered', the speaker's practical intention is obviously not directed ultimately to the mere words, but is directed 'through' them to their signification. The words carry significative intentions; they serve as bridges leading over to the significations, to what the speaker means 'by' them (FTL, p. 22).

But when speech functions normally, the intention is directed "through" what the speaker means to what the speaker is talking about, rather than the significance of the speaker's words.

Similarly, since meanings appear via language (the spoken and written word), they normally function as referrers, rather than referents. As Mohanty observes, it is in reflection that meanings appear as objects (objectivities). Reflection on meanings corresponds to the philosophical practice of placing inverted commas around words or sentences in order to indicate that the word (or sentence) is mentioned (or, referred to) rather than used (or, refers to something else). When meanings function normally in speech, they are used, rather than mentioned. So, when I spoke of meanings as ideal objectivities, I spoke of them as referents of reflective acts, rather than in their normal function.

Nevertheless, I do not regard talking of meanings as unreal objectivities as unjustified, since such talk in a phenomenological context is not "ontological". I spoke of meanings as intentional objects only. Moreover, I have some doubts about the thesis that if meanings are referred to reflectively, they lose their referring function. I grant that meanings as referents are the referent of other meanings (speech acts). But one can talk about the relationship between words and their referents, such that meanings are an isolatable aspect of a complex objectivity ('word-to-object' or 'proposition-to-state-of-affairs'). In such a case, one seems to have two referring functions: first, between the speech act and the complex objectivity; secondly, between the word (a constituent of the complex objectivity) and its referent (another constituent).

If I am correct in saying that reflection on meanings corresponds to the philosophical practice of distinguishing between using and mentioning a term, then reflection on meanings does not imply that they

lose their referring function. For when we reflect on the meaning of a term or expression, we mentally "put it in inverted commas"; and the term (or expression) in inverted commas continues to refer, except only to a different objectivity.

For example, 'The Iliad' denotes the title The Iliad, which in turn denotes the great epic poem. If we wish to speak of the title, we use a name of the title and not just the title itself; thus we may say 'The Iliad' is a short title. According to the rule stated above, omission of the quotation marks here would result in our talking about The Iliad rather than about its name (EL, p. 21, emphasis mine).

'The Iliad' refers to a title, whereas The Iliad refers to an epic poem. The two referents are different; nevertheless, they still refer. When one mentions a term or expression, one simultaneously uses it to refer to the word(s). When one looks up the meaning of a word in the dictionary, one is reflecting on its meaning, and yet it still refers. If I find out the meaning of 'googol', I discover its meaning and the referent(s) of the word without inverted commas.

Even if the preceding argument is unsatisfactory, I still do not believe that my talk of meanings as unreal objectivities is unjustified. For such talk is a function of our point of view. We are talking about science (and, in particular, meanings), rather than doing science. (Although reflection shows that by analyzing science one is also doing science in the neutral sense, I believe that my meaning is clear.) Insofar as we are talking about meanings (as constituents of science in the neutral sense), they appear as the referents of our speech acts. Propositions merely refer when one practices science (of a certain level). Thus, I take Mohanty's point to be a warning against not being self-conscious about what we (philosophers) are doing, such that one ignores

the referring function of meanings. I do not take his point as an objection to saying that meanings are ideal objectivities per se, since we only need to note that the appearance of propositions as ideal objectivities is a function of our reflective standpoint.

If we perform an act and live in it, as it were, we naturally refer to its object and not to its meaning. If, e.g., we make a statement, we judge about the thing it concerns, and not about the statement's meaning, about the judgement in the logical sense. This latter first becomes objective to us in a reflex act of thought, in which we not only look back on the statement just made, but carry out the abstraction (the Ideation) demanded. This logical reflection is not an act that takes place only under exceptional, artificial conditions: it is a normal component of logical thinking. (LI, p. 322).

3. Propositions and the Neutral Concept of Science

It is fair to ask "What does this preliminary description of the way propositions appear to us have to do with an analysis of the neutral concept of science?". Fortunately, this question is relatively easy to answer. But the answer to it, as well as what I have said heretofore, is very controversial. Accordingly, I shall discuss the controversy presently.

Let us recall the meaning of 'the neutral concept of science' in order to show the relationship between it and the preceding discussion.

It ['science'] means a certain universe of propositions [Sätzen] that arose somehow from theoretical effort and have a systematic order wherein a certain universe of objects becomes determined (FTL, p. 103, emphasis mine).

If any science is a universe of propositions, then a phenomenological description of how propositions appear is an analysis of one of the constituents of science in the neutral sense. Thus, Husserl is saying that when we talk about science, we are speaking of something which consists

of a number of propositions. Now logic is for Husserl, as it was for Plato, the theory of science (FTL, p. 2). Logic establishes the ultimate possibilities and necessities of science and scientific inquiry, thereby setting the boundary rules for genuine science and serving as its norm (FTL, p. 1-6). "For a rational practice, theory a priori can be only a delimiting form; it can only plant fences, the crossing of which indicates absurdity or aberration" (FTL, p. 6).

If logic is the theory of science, and science consists in part of a universe of propositions, then logic is partly a theory about propositions.

If all given theoretic unity is in essence a unity of meaning, and if logic is the science of theoretic unity in general, then logic evidently is the science of meanings as such, of their essential sorts and differences, as also of the ideal laws which rest purely on the latter (LI, p. 323).

The thesis that logic is partly a theory about propositions has precipitated some criticisms from Anglo-American philosophers. What are some of those objections? Are any of them decisive? If so, are Husserl's views on propositions subject to those objections?

4. Mates' Objections to Propositions and Replies

Benson Mates argues uncharitably against the position that logic is about propositions and consequence relationships among them. Mates opens his attack by saying that propositions do not exist (Mates, p. 10). Mates provides no argument for this position; but that is irrelevant, since Mates' argument begins with the hypothesis that they do.

Even if they [propositions] did [exist], there are a number of considerations that would justify our operating with sentences any-

way. A sentence, at least in its written form, is an object having a shape accessible to sensory perception, or, at worst, is a set of such objects. Thus 'It is raining' and 'Es regnet', though they may indeed be synonymous, are nonetheless a pair of equally distinguishable sentences. And in general we find that as long as we are dealing with sentences many of the properties in which the logician is interested are ascertainable by simple inspection. Only reasonably good eyesight, as contrasted with metaphysical acuity, is required to decide whether a sentence is simple or complex, affirmative or negative, or whether one sentence contains another as a part.... But matters are quite otherwise when we try to answer the same kinds of questions about propositions... (EL, pp. 10-11).

It is fair to ask "Why does Mates think that if logic is about propositions, then metaphysical acuity is required in order to ascertain whether a proposition is simple or compound, etc.?" The answer is that propositions are abstract entities.

Propositions, we are told, are the senses or meanings of sentences. They are so-called abstract entities and, as such, are said to occupy no space, reflect no light, have no beginning or end, and so forth. At the same time, each proposition is regarded as having a structure, upon which its logical properties essentially depend. If we were to study logic from this point of view, therefore, it would be imperative to having a way of finding out in given cases what that structure is. Unfortunately no simple method is ever given. Since everyone agrees that sentences with different shapes and structures may have the same meaning, the structures of propositions must not be confused with those of their corresponding sentences.... But, when all the rhetoric has been expended, we are left once again with the problem of how in practice to ascertain the structure of propositions expressed by given sentences (EL, p. 11).

It should be noted that 'abstract entities' and 'ideal (irreal) objectivities' are roughly synonymous, except that Husserl does not assert that ideal objectivities exist in the same sense that Mates denies that such entities exist. More on this very important point later.

Let us summarize the central points in Mates' argument.

1. If logic is about consequence relationships among sentences,

then the properties in which logicians are interested can be ascertained by simple inspection (sense-perception).

2. But if logic is about consequence relationships among propositions, then, since propositions are abstract entities, metaphysical acuity would be required in order to ascertain the properties in which logicians are interested.

3. Metaphysical acuity is not required in order to ascertain the properties in which logicians are interested.

4. Thus, only if logic is about consequence relationships among sentences can one explain how in practice logicians ascertain the structure of proposition.

The conclusion (4) is perhaps a bit stronger than what Mates says. However, he strongly suggests that that is his position, since he says that metaphysical acuity is required if defenders of propositions are correct. Let us assess Mates' position.

I do not intend to defend every version of the proposition theory. Indeed, it seems to me that some versions are indefensible. I shall defend one version of the proposition theory, one that I take to be Husserlian. The position that I take to be Husserlian will emerge from my criticisms of Mates and others.

Before attacking Mates' argument, I should note that there is a point on which he and I completely agree. It is that defenders of the proposition theory should explain how, in practice, logicians can ascertain the structure of propositions. But that is a problem that any philosopher of logic ought to address, including defenders of the sentence theory. No philosophy of the subject matter of logic should

render the practice of logicians inexplicable; and such a theory is better if it explains that practice. Dallas Willard has shown that Husserl addressed this problem (H:E&A, pp. 10-17). But Mates' argument renders the practice of logicians inexplicable. I am not saying that no sentence theory can both do justice to the nature of logic and explain the practice of logicians. I am saying that the particular way in which Mates sets up his argument renders that practice inexplicable. What is the justification for this claim?

Note that Mates says that we have no mode of access to propositions, since we do not have metaphysical acuity. But propositions are the meanings of sentences. Therefore, Mates is committed to the position that we have no mode of access (or way of knowing) the meanings of sentences. But consider the following two sentences:

(A) Descartes and Galileo were scientists, and

(B) Descartes and Galileo were contemporaries.

On what basis does a logician know that A is compound, where B is not? How does a logician know that the truth (or falsehood) of A is a function of the component simple sentences 'Descartes was a scientist' and 'Galileo was a scientist', whereas the truth (or falsehood) of B is not a function of the truth of the strings "Descartes was a contemporary" and 'Galileo was a contemporary'? The shapes of 'and' in A and B are exactly the same; so it is not on the basis of eyesight alone that a logician distinguishes between A and B. How does a logician do it? By understanding the meaning of the sentences, of course. But the meaning of a sentence is a proposition. Therefore, it is not the case that logicians have no access to the meanings of sentences (i.e., propositions).

Logicians understand the meanings of sentences; and there is nothing weird or metaphysical about understanding the meaning of a sentence. It is an everyday occurrence. Thus, because Mates maintains that we have no access to the meanings of sentences (= propositions), he cannot explain the practice of logicians.

It may be objected that I have interpreted Mates as saying that non-epistemic seeing is sufficient for a logician to discern the properties of sentences in which he is interested (such as distinguishing conjunctive from non-conjunctive senses of 'and'), whereas that is not what he intends at all. Mates intends to be talking about epistemic seeing. My response is that that may be what he intended to say; but that is not what he said. Such phrases as 'reasonably good eyesight', 'simple inspection', and 'sensory perception' are used by Mates in opposition to any access to the meanings of sentences (i.e., propositions). According to Mates, such access requires "metaphysical acuity". Thus, my former criticism still stands.

It may be objected that, for Mates, the validity of an argument is solely a function of its form; and all that one needs to have in order to know that P is deducible from P & Q is reasonably good eyesight. One does not need to know the meanings of either 'P' or 'Q'. My response is twofold. First, Mates rested his argument on the practice of logicians. Part of the practice of logic consists of translating sentences of a natural language into a formalized language. That, in turn, requires some comprehension of the sentence's meaning. I am entitled to argue on Mates' own grounds. Secondly, it is at least questionable that one needs only reasonably good eyesight (as Mates

uses the phrase) in order to know that P is deducible from $P \& Q$. It is true that one does not need to know the meanings of either ' P ' or ' Q '. But I think that one must know the meaning of ' $\&$ ' in order to know that P is deducible from $P \& Q$. Suppose that I construct a formalized language, according to which the symbol ' $\&$ ' means what is usually symbolized with ' $\vee$ '. In that case P does not follow from $P \& Q$ in the system. If so, then more than reasonably good eyesight (again, in Mates' sense) is required for the correct inferences from $P \& Q$, namely, an understanding of the meaning of ' $\&$ '. I am not suggesting that a person must visualize the truth table for ' $\&$ ' every time he infers P from $P \& Q$. That would be false, since people infer P from $P \& Q$ without reflecting about the meaning of ' $\&$ '. A person who knows that he can infer P from $P \& Q$ knows the meaning of ' $\&$ ' in another way, however. He knows it in the same way that someone can be said to know the meaning of a word when he uses it correctly in conversation. That, of course, does not require reflective thought or the ability to state its meaning (analogously; the ability to produce the truth-table).

Nevertheless, this still does not fully explain how matters are not quite otherwise when we try to answer the same questions about propositions. Surely Mates is correct in that sense-perception plays a role in the practice of logic. My position (and one that I take to be Husserlian) is that one's access to the meanings of sentences is through sense-perception. That is, one sees the written words (characters) on a page, or hears the sounds of spoken words and, upon that basis, understands their meaning. It is in this way that one knows the meanings of sentences (propositions). I grant that this is only the barest sketch

of what happens when one understands what someone said or wrote. But it is, I think, the only way to account for the phenomena. Mates' mistake, then, is in thinking that one must have an unmediated assess to propositions (not mediated by sense perception) if proposition theorists are correct. To use Husserl's terminology, consciousness of the meaning of a word or sentence is apperceptive. I shall say more about apperception in chapter six.

5. Quine's Objections to Propositions

W. V. Quine's objections to propositions are more formidable. Mates' primary complaint against propositions is that they are abstract entities. Quine does not object to propositions on those grounds (PL, p. 3). This is not surprising, since Quine thinks that there are sets, which are abstract entities. Quine's objection is that there are no adequate criteria for the identity of propositions (OR, p. 140). What is his argument?

If two (declarative) sentences are synonomous, they express the same proposition, according to the philosophers Quine is attacking. So some criterion is needed in order to determine whether any two sentences have the same meaning. However, 'meaning the same thing' is itself vague (PL, p. 3). Sometimes it means that one has accurately conveyed someone's attitude, as when one reports someone's remark in indirect quotation, or faithfully translates what someone is saying. At other times it means sameness of objective information, without regard to poetic qualities, attitude, etc. (PL, p. 3). With regard to propositions, only sameness of objective information is in question.

Now Quine grants that one can make sense of sameness of objective information, provided that one has a checklist (or standard) by which to judge that the information is the same, such as the halftone method of photographic illustration (PL, pp. 3-4). But when it concerns propositions, such a standard is lacking. Thus, to say that two sentences express the same proposition when they convey the same objective information is not to solve the problem of a criterion for the identity of propositions (PL, p. 4). It is only to restate the problem.

One may attempt to define 'sameness of objective information' in terms of possible worlds, such that two sentences mean the same thing when they are true in all the same possible worlds. Quine objects to this on the grounds that "...this idea affords us no general way of equating sentences in real life" (PL, p. 4). In this respect, Quine's objection is similar to Mates', since his objection concerns the practice of logicians. There is, however, another objection to this proposal. It is that all logical and mathematical truths mean the same thing (or express the same proposition), according to this criterion. Since logical and mathematical truths are true in all possible worlds, they have the same meaning. But ' $a + b = b + a$ ' does not mean the same thing as ' $[(P \supset Q)] \supset Q$ '. The former means 'the sum of any two numbers is independent of the position of those numbers', whereas the latter means 'for all possible substitution instances of P and Q, if P implies Q, and P, then Q'. Synonymy implies equivalence, but not vice versa.

The explanation for why Quine did not point out this problem is not that he objects to observing that two sentences (words, or phrases) are not synonymous, since he remarks that 'cordate' and 'renate' are

true of just the same creatures (thus equivalent) and yet are not synonymous later in his argument (PL, p. 8). It is for this reason that the attempt to define 'synonymy' in terms of the substitutivity of terms salva veritate will not work. For one can substitute 'cordate' for 'renate' salva veritate, whereas the resulting sentence will not be synonymous with the one from which the substitution was derived.

The preceding objection can be avoided by making use of the concept 'necessity'. The four terms 'cordate', 'creature with a heart', 'renate' and 'creature with kidneys' are, as Quine notes substitutable only in pairs (PL, p. 8). Thus, whereas 'cordate' can be substituted for 'creature with a heart' and 'renate' can be substituted for 'creature with kidneys', 'renate' cannot be substituted for 'cordate', despite the fact that they have the same extension. But if one uses modal terms like 'necessarily', one cannot substitute extensionally equivalent but non-synonymous terms salva veritate. Thus, if one substituted 'renate' or 'creature with kidneys' for either of the occurrences of 'cordates' in

(1) $\square$ (All cordates are cordates),

the result is a change in truth-value, since it is possible that there is a cordate that is not a creature with a kidney.

Quine objects to this solution on the grounds that the concept 'necessity' is as obscure as the notions of synonymy and equivalence--the notions that are explicated (PL, p. 9). Quine does not revive the explication of 'necessity' in terms of possible worlds that he just criticized solely on the grounds that it afforded "no general way of equating sentences in real life" (PL, p. 4). Perhaps the proposal we are now considering (substitution salva veritate), in conjunction with

the explication of 'necessity' in terms of possible worlds, constitutes a general way of equating sentences in real life. In other words, we need an argument for saying that 'necessity' is a vague concept.

Even if no such argument is forthcoming, Quine has an answer.

The doctrine of propositions seems in a way futile on the face of it, even if we imagine the individuation problem solved. For, that solution would consist in some suitable definition of equivalence of sentences; why not then just talk of sentences and equivalence and let the propositions go (PL, p. 10)?

6. Reply to Quine

Quine has shown that some attempts to provide a rigorous criterion for the identity of propositions have failed. But it is fair to ask "Are Quine's demands for rigorous criteria fair?". I do not think so. Let us see why.

For Quine, eternal sentences, rather than propositions, stand in the consequence relationship of implication. Now eternal sentences are relative to a particular language at a particular time, since the meanings of words and symbols can change such that a string such as 'Two is less than five', while true now, could be false at some later time (PL, p. 14). But what are the criteria for a particular language at a particular time? Quine has provided us with no such criteria. Could such criteria be provided? I suspect not, although I remain open to the possibility that such rigorous criteria are forthcoming. But if we apply Quine's demands to eternal sentences, we must have criteria such that we can determine the precise time a string becomes true (or false). But since philosophers have had difficulties in individuating times, the notion of the present being particularly elusive, I suspect

that no criteria for eternal sentences of the sort Quine demands are forthcoming. Besides, any particular language undergoes changes, even incorporating words and phrases from different languages. So one suspects that no rigorous criteria for the identity of a language are forthcoming, either. Eternal sentences, in short, have the same individuation problems as propositions (at least the "weak" theory that I am defending). Quine even admits this (OR, pp. 141-142). The criteria for the identity of a particular language at a particular time are as difficult to devise as criteria for the identity of propositions. Therefore, Quine has not given us a reason in this argument for retaining eternal sentences while rejecting propositions.

I think that there are two possible conclusions to draw from these observations: either (1) Quine's demands are too strong, or (2) we should take Quine's points as preludes to adequate clarification. But I do not think that Quine's argument entitles him to conclude that (3) propositions should be discarded and eternal sentences retained.

One might object that the argument that I quoted at the end of the immediately preceding section supports (3). If the individuation problem were solved, it would consist of some suitable definition of equivalence of sentences. So, why should we not just talk of sentences and equivalence and forget propositions?

That argument, however, presupposes that eternal sentences fare better than propositions in meeting Quine's demands. We have just seen that that is not the case, so long as we construe a proposition as the meaning of a declarative sentence and avoid all temptations to hypostatize propositions. If we loosen Quine's demands, if we can tolerate lack of

strict precision in our account of propositions, then some reasons can be forwarded for continuing to speak of propositions.

In the first place, it offers a convenient way of speaking of the meanings of sentences—a shorthand word, if you will. The term 'valid argument' is usually defined as 'an argument such that if all of the premises were true, then the conclusion would have to be true'. The notion of 'valid argument' thus includes the semantic concepts 'true' and 'false'. But in order to be a candidate for truth or falsity, a sentence must be meaningful. It must at least be syntactically well-formed ('meaningful' in one sense). Quine himself grants that that meaning is a factor in the truth or falsehood of a sentence (PL, pp. 1-2). So the definition of 'valid argument' and Quine's own words refer us to the meanings of declarative sentences; and here we construe a proposition as identical with the meaning of a declarative sentence.

Secondly, it is not as if we have no independent understanding of synonymy apart from the criteria that Quine demands. If we did not, Quine's argument, in which he points out that 'renate' and 'cordate' have the same extension and yet are not synonymous, would be unjustified. But if this is so, then an adequate account of the concept 'proposition' will not permit us to "equate sentences in real life" any better than we could before. Quine's argument suggests the opposite (PL, p. 4). But our prior understanding of the synonymy of particular sentences is what permits us to judge the adequacy of any theory of synonymy, rather than vice versa. Further, as Strawson and Grice have pointed out (in a defense of the related concept 'analyticity'), there is considerable agreement among philosophers about which sentences have the same meaning (NT, p. 74).

Moreover, something very close (if not the same) to the notion of a proposition is embedded in talk of correct and incorrect translations (NT, p. 77). None of these considerations constitute a decisive argument for propositions. But they do create a presumption in its favor, a presumption that is not to be overthrown simply by noting that it does not satisfy Quine's rigorous criteria for an adequate account, criteria that no candidate for the constituents of arguments satisfies.

I think that there is one last argument to be made on behalf of the proposition theorist (at least Husserl, if not the usual advocate of propositions) that militates against Quine's objections. Quine's demands for rigorous criteria for the identity of propositions so that we "can equate sentences in real life" arises, I think, as a result of the way in which the proposition theory is usually presented. An advocate of the proposition theory usually introduces propositions in the following manner. Here are three sentences: 'Snow is white', 'Schnee ist weiss', and 'La neige est blanche'. They are three sentences, since the identity of a sentence varies from language to language. However, since the sentences mean the same thing, all of the sentences express the same proposition. So whereas there are three sentences, there is only one proposition. Once a proposition theorist has asserted that any two given (declarative) sentences mean the same thing and that, consequently, there is one proposition that corresponds to these two particular sentences, Quine makes his demands for rigorous criteria for their identity.

Despite the fact that many advocates of propositions introduce them in that way, no proposition theorist is necessarily committed to

the thesis that any two (declarative) sentences are synonymous. A proposition theorist as such is committed only to the thesis that if any two (declarative) sentences mean the same thing, then they express one and the same proposition. That does not imply that any two sentences are synonymous. That implies only that there can be a many-to-one relationship of sentences to proposition. The proposition theory has been introduced in the way I mentioned first so frequently that logicians have come to regard factual claims about the synonymy of particular sentences as part and parcel of the proposition theory. Since that is not the case, I think that Quine's demands for criteria are not as pressing as they may seem to be at first glance. His arguments do not militate against the essential feature of the proposition theory. If a proposition theorist does not assert that there is a many-to-one relationship between sentences to proposition, but rather claims that there can be such a relationship, then criteria for the identity of propositions are not strictly required. (This is not to say that such criteria are not desirable).

Despite the fact that most advocates of propositions commit themselves to the synonymy of particular sentences, they should not, since the question "Are these two sentences synonymous?" is an empirical question and, as such, has no place in logic. For, as Quine points out when he explains what he means by 'eternal sentence', the meanings of terms and symbols can change. If so, then two synonymous sentences at one time can be non-synonymous sentences at some other time. Since this is so, the question "Are these two sentences synonymous?" is an empirical question. On the other hand, it is a conceptual truth that if two

sentences are synonymous, then they share all logically relevant properties.

There is a certain rationale for Quine's position, as I hope I have shown. His position is not groundless. After all, one does not need to know all possible languages in order to be a logician. That is why I think he is correct in criticizing advocates of the proposition theory for saying that propositions, rather than sentences, are true or false. But I think that Quine is subject to the same criticism for saying that sentences, rather than propositions, are true or false. For a sentence is true (or false) if and only if what the sentence means is true (or false). Both the usual advocates of the proposition theory and Quine are guilty of a false dilemma.

The upshot of my arguments is that either Quine's demands are too strong, or we should take his objections as preludes to clarification of the concept 'proposition', rather than as grounds for rejecting the notion.

7. Husserl's Position on Propositions

I have defended a certain version of the proposition theory against some objections. We need to determine if it is Husserl's position.

I think that it is. Take my criticism of proposition theorists who maintain that only propositions (not sentences) are true or false. Husserl is committed to sentences having truth-values by what he says.

Now human thinking is normally done in language, and all the activities of reason are as good as entirely bound up with speech. Furthermore, so far as it is intersubjective, all the criticism from which the rationally true should emerge employs language and, in the end, leads always to statements (FTL, p. 19).

If what is rationally true is so closely linked with language, then declarative sentences have truth-values. And if all activities of reason are as good as entirely bound up with speech, then logicians deal with sentences in their practice. All of this is, of course, neutral with respect to the question "Does the unconditioned generality of logical truths require the notion of the meaning of a sentence (or proposition)?"

That Husserl thinks that the answer to that question is "yes" is plain if one reads paragraphs 29-35 of the first of the Logical Investigations.

It is clear, secondly, when we note that the theoretic content of a science is no more than the meaning-content of its theoretical statements, disembarrassed of all contingent thinkers and occasions of judgement, and that such statements are given unity by the theory's pattern, which in its turn acquires objective validity through the ideally guaranteed adequacy of its unified meaning to the objective correlate meant by it (which is 'given' to us in self-evident knowledge) (LI, p. 323, second emphasis mine).

If the science logic is disembarrassed of all contingent speakers of contingently existing languages (such as present-day English), then even though any logician is (at best) a speaker of a finite number of contingent languages and thus expresses those results in a particular language, the objective results of the logician's efforts are not limited to any particular language. The objective results of logic are not relative to a particular language at a particular time, as they would be if logic were about consequence relationships among eternal sentences alone. Take $\boxed{(P \supset Q) \ \& P} \supset Q$ as an example. The possible substitution instances of that logical truth are not limited to present-day English or any particular language whatever. One can substitute

any grammatical declarative sentence in any possible language whatever; the result will in every case be a substitution instance of a logical truth.

If, as Quine himself admits, references to time are conspicuously absent from and irrelevant to the theoretical content of mathematical truths, then the same must be true of logical truths (PL, p. 13). But that cannot be the case if consequence relationships obtain between eternal sentences rather than propositions, since eternal sentences are relative to a particular language at a particular time. It is granted that logicians work with sentences. But that does not imply that consequence relationships do not obtain between propositions.

Quine complains about propositions being called "abstract entities in their own right" (PL, p. 2). By 'propositions exist' Husserl means only that 'certain judgements are true of propositions'. Husserl defends a non-substantial theory of propositions.

Meanings constitute, we may say further, a class of concepts in the sense of 'universal objects'. They are not for that reason objects which, though existing nowhere in the world, have being in a *τόπος οὐράνιος* or in a divine mind, for such metaphysical hypostatization would be absurd. If one has accustomed oneself to understand by 'being' only real being, and by 'objects' only real objects, then talk of universal objects and of their being, may well seem basically wrong; no offence will, however, be given to one who has first used such talk merely to assert the validity of certain judgements, such as in fact concern numbers, propositions, geometrical forms, etc., and who asks whether he is not evidently obliged, here as elsewhere, to affix the label 'genuinely existent object' to the correlate of his judgement's validity, to what it judges about (LI, p. 330, emphasis mine).

Husserl's theory of propositions does not require admitting new entities into one's ontology. Thus, Aquila's ontological interpretation, which I shall discuss presently, involves a fundamental mistake, that of taking

Husserl's position to be incipient metaphysics.

It might be objected that since Husserl's theory of propositions is non-substantival, Mates would have no objections to Husserl's theory. So, there was no motivation for responding to Mates' objections.

I do not think so. It is noteworthy that Mates begins his argument by saying that even if propositions exist, there are epistemological problems regarding our access to them. So, Mates' objections are not addressed to the metaphysical proposition theory. He questions our access to them even if they exist. Secondly, he understands 'proposition' the same way we do, as 'the meaning of a (declarative) sentence'. I have merely tried to show that Mates is wrong when he says that we would need metaphysical acuity in order to have access to propositions.

8. Are Propositions Universals?

At the beginning of this chapter I noted that our discussion of propositions does not involve an Aristotelian metaphysics, whereby real individuals (primary substances) are distinguished from universals (secondary substances). Yet in the immediately preceding quotation, Husserl says that propositions are universals. So far, we know this much: to say that propositions are universals is not to say that they are metaphysically hypostatized entities. Moreover, propositions are ideal objectivities, to the extent that we think about them rather than use them to refer to objectivities.

But to say that propositions are universals suggests that the relationship of propositions to acts of understanding is that of a universal to a particular. That is Husserl's position in Logical

Investigations. He abandoned that position in Formal and Transcendental Logic, the main text in this thesis. "Every sort of irreality, of which the ideality of significations and the different ideality of universal essences or species are particular cases, has manners of possible participation in reality" (FTL, p. 115, emphasis mine). Richard Aquila and Dallas Willard regard this shift in Husserl's position as a change for the worse. Aquila prefers the earlier position, according to which propositions are universals, because it involves ontological commitment to fewer entities and is more economical (I:SMA, pp. 115-116). Aquila grants that both theories adequately answer the relevant semantical questions ("HFM", p. 381). Willard complains about the fact that Husserl's later theory is more complex (H:E&A, p. 17). What are Husserl's grounds for rejecting his old position on meaning? Are those grounds adequate to meet Aquila's and Willard's objections?

I think that Husserl's refutation of his earlier position is clear and decisive. Let us recall that Husserl's earlier position on meaning is that propositions are universals, of which acts are particular instances. It is the earlier position that Aquila and Willard defend.

But it is clear, I think, that Husserl's doctrine in the Logical Investigations is, at least from the ontological point of view, the more attractive of the two.... Husserl's doctrine of the 'noema' bears no trace of his earlier view concerning the relation between Meanings and acts. Noemata are not the universal species in which individual acts, or parts of acts, participate ("HFM", p. 381).

Husserl grants that there is a sort of "generality" that is predicable of propositions, but denies that it is generic universality.

...Certainly, the proposition is general insofar as it refers to an infinite number of positional acts in which it is precisely what is intended; but it is not general in the sense of generic universality, i.e., the generality of an 'extension'... (E&J, p. 262).

Consider the generic universal redness. It is general insofar as it has an extension, or an indefinite number of individual things that can be classified truthfully as red--i.e., all and only those things that are red. Now if Husserl's earlier theory were true, then the same relationship would obtain between any given proposition and the acts that intend it. But if that were so, then the individual acts of intending a proposition would be a multiplicity of propositions, just as red things are a multiplicity of things that are red. Clearly, this is not the case. When someone says exactly what he means and is understood by someone else, those two persons understand numerically the same thing, rather than the same thing in kind.

Suppose I am perceiving a red typewriter. Is my perceiving of the typewriter part of the extension of redness? Hardly. The red typewriter, not my perceiving of it, can be classified as red. Just so, an individual's understandings of a proposition are not part of the extension of that proposition. Rather, an individual's understandings of a proposition are instances of the kind "understanding of that (or, a) proposition". Compare perception of a table. Are the perceivings of that table parts of the table? No. Acts of understanding a proposition are no more within the extension of that proposition than perceivings of a table are parts of a table, or a perception of a red typewriter is an individual that can be classified as red.

But this multiplicity of constitutive lived experiences in which it [the proposition] appears is not the extension of the objects which it embraces in the manner of generality. Even if it is given intuitively, so that we intuit the universal from a cogiven object pertaining to this generality as a particularity, it is certainly exemplified in this object, but not in the constitutive lived experience in which it is intuitively given.... Therefore the

'appearance' of general objectivities in a certain givenness-time must be distinguished from their particular exemplification (E&J, pp. 263-264).

Husserl's emphasis of 'in this object' is noteworthy. Even if a proposition could be considered as a universal, the particulars within its extension would presumably be sentences (bearers of meaning), rather than acts of understanding, just as the red typewriter, but not my perceiving of it, "falls under" the universal redness. Although the later theory is more complex, it is preferable in that it does not include the thesis that acts of understanding are instances of a proposition.

9. Concluding Remark on Propositions

Throughout the discussion of propositions I have emphasized the way in which they appear to us, or can be "in" spatio-temporal reality. This is so, despite the fact that propositions are not individuated in time.

This proposition attains original givenness only in a temporal act, which has its determined temporal position, or in several acts, indeed in any number of acts and temporal positions. But the proposition itself has no binding temporal position, no duration in time; and its self-development in becoming, which belongs to it, does not have the individuality of a contingent act. A proposition is not like a real object, individuated in an objective point of time; rather, it is an irreal object which, so to speak, is everywhere and nowhere (E&J, p. 259, first emphasis mine).

Language must be employed if propositions are to be given originally; accordingly, it is appropriate to consider the role and status of language in phenomenology, the specific scientific enterprise with which we are concerned.

The relationship between propositions and language corres-

ponds to the two sides of the neutral concept of science discussed in the previous chapter (chapter 2, page 19). Propositions are constituents of any given theory (E&J, p. 259). This is so, so long as we consider science as a finished product, abstracting from the activity that produces it. Language, on the other hand, is a constituent of science; and this comes to light when we consider scientific activity. What is the status of language in phenomenology?

10. The Status of Language in Husserl's Phenomenology

Some philosophers have supposed that Husserl is committed to the possibility of a private language; accordingly, they believe that Husserl's language is subject to Wittgenstein's objections in Philosophical Investigations. It seems that phenomenological reduction--the methodological device with which Husserl begins philosophical analysis--requires some sort of private language; and if the notion of a private language is incoherent, then Husserl's position is likewise. Unfortunately, these beliefs have rarely been examined. I intend to examine them in this paper. I think that Husserl's language is coherent and that the common beliefs about it are false. I shall defend Husserl's language in this paper.

In a recent book, however, Suzanne Cunningham uses arguments inspired by Wittgenstein in order to argue that Husserl's philosophical position is unintelligible. I say "arguments inspired by Wittgenstein", since there are a number of conflicting interpretations of Wittgenstein's private language argument. Since I have no interest in Wittgenstein scholarship, I intend to set aside the question "Is Cunningham's inter-

pretation of Wittgenstein's argument correct?", and concentrate instead on her arguments. I shall argue that Cunningham's arguments do not work.

This self-imposed restriction on the scope of this paper may not seem to square with my expressed intention to examine critically the beliefs that Husserl is committed to the possibility of a private language and falls victim to Wittgenstein's objections. After all, I cannot show that Husserl's post-reduction language is not vulnerable on other interpretations of Wittgenstein's argument, if I restrict my attention to Cunningham's arguments. This is not so, since I shall argue that Husserl's post-reduction language is not a private language at all. If I am right, then Husserl's philosophical language is untouched by any private language argument.

Before arguing for that conclusion, however, I shall hypothesize that Cunningham is correct in thinking that Husserl's post-reduction language is a private language. I shall argue that even if we make that hypothesis, her arguments do not work. I shall then try to explain why I think her arguments rest on a misunderstanding of the phenomenological reduction. This will, of course, require a partial clarification of what Husserl means by 'phenomenological reduction'. A clear understanding of the reduction makes it possible to argue that Husserl's characterization of the reduction does not permit one to infer that his language is private (or in fact public, for that matter). The analysis of Husserl's post-reduction language, however, leads to broader issues. I point out that Husserl's philosophical position requires the impossibility of any kind of logically private language, since Husserl thinks that language is necessarily publicly accessible. Thus, Husserl and Wittgenstein reach

similar (if not identical) conclusions by different routes (at least on a number of interpretations of Wittgenstein's argument).

But the public accessibility of any possible language does not seem to fit with Husserl's philosophical stance, whereby the existence of others is bracketed. I shall have argued that Cunningham is mistaken in thinking that Husserl must presuppose the actual existence of other subjects. I counter that Husserl must make use of the concept 'other subjects', or suppose that other (transcendental) subjects must possibly exist from the outset of his inquiry. I take this to be a truth that is a consequence of his theories of language, meaning, evidence and truth. But what does it mean to say that Husserl supposes that other subjects must possibly exist from the outset? I devote some time to a clarification of that thesis.

I shall have argued that one cannot ascertain that Husserl's language is either public or contingently private, based on what Husserl says alone. I close this paper by pointing out the respect in which Husserl's language is public.

11. Background for Cunningham's Arguments

Cunningham's interpretation of the phenomenological reduction sets the stage for the arguments against Husserl's "private" language. She believes that the phenomenological reduction has two characteristics: (1) the reduction of real transcendent objects to immanent objects, and (2) the refusal to accept anything as true unless it is "immediately self-evident" (LPR, p. 7).¹ We shall disregard (2), as only (1) is relevant to the argument. A few pages later the author identifies

immanent objects with private objects (LPR, p. 16). In what sense of 'private' are the objects of phenomenological discourse purportedly private?

They are private in the sense that they are inaccessible; and by 'inaccessible' we are to understand 'not capable of being known, understood, or used by other persons' (LPR, p. 18). Something can be either contingently or logically inaccessible. 'Contingently inaccessible p' means 'p happens to be inaccessible to all but one person, but can be made accessible to others', whereas 'logically inaccessible p' means 'the very concept of p requires that it remain inaccessible to all but one person'.

Since language is a means for referring to objects rather than an object itself, it is necessary to classify private languages both in terms of the inaccessibility of their referents, and in terms of the inaccessibility of the mode of reference (i.e., the words that are used to refer). The question to be answered in the first case is "Who has (or can have) experience of the referents of the language?". In the second case, the question is "Who understands (or can understand) the language?". These questions yield a fourfold classification of private languages:

- (1) a language that refers to contingently private objects,
- (2) a language that refers to logically private objects,
- (3) a contingently private language, or a language that only one person understands, but which could be understood by others,
and
- (4) a logically private language, or a language that only one

person can understand (LPR, p. 19).

If Cunningham's interpretation of the phenomenological reduction (according to which transcendent objects are reduced to immanent or private objects) is correct, then Husserl's post-reduction language is a private language in either the first or second category. We should note that private languages (1) and (2) have been described imprecisely. A language does not refer; rather, terms in that language refer. So, private languages (1) and (2) should be described as follows: (1) a language, all of whose referring terms refer to contingently private objects, and (2) a language, all of whose referring terms refer to logically private objects. This is no trifling distinction. We shall see that it is the key to the refutation of one of Cunningham's arguments. Cunningham believes that Husserl's post-reduction language is an example of both kinds of contingent private language.

12. Cunningham's Argument against Private Language 1

What are Cunningham's objections to what she takes to be Husserl's language within the brackets? Cunningham raises the following objection to private languages in the first category.

When seen as a language for dealing with contingently private objects or experiences [language 1], the language of the reduction faces all the difficulties already pointed out with regard to privacy. The language requires connectives, terms of negation, etc., which correspond in no way with private experience or objects. Hence, the language is, at best, a hybrid of public and private terminology. This participation in public ordinary language reinserts it into a social context and vitiates the radical character of the first [i.e., phenomenological] reduction—at least insofar as Husserl had envisioned it (LPR, p. 27).

Let us assume that Cunningham is correct in thinking that every language must have logical connectives.

13. Reply to Cunninghams' Objections to Private Language I

Although Cunningham believes that the preceding objection militates against private language I, her argument actually has nothing to do with a language that is called "private" solely in terms of its referents. Actually, I can show that this is so by using Cunningham's own premises. For she says that logical connectives (i.e., logical connective terms) do not refer (LPR, p. 22). If this is so, then the necessity of connectives in any language cannot constitute an objection to a language that is private only because its referring terms refer to private objects. If the necessity of logical connectives were an objection to languages that are private solely in terms of their referents, then logical connective terms would have to refer to non-private objects. But Cunningham denies that logical connective terms refer at all. Thus, Cunningham has conflated meaning and reference here, since the argument is nothing but an objection to a private language that can be understood by only one speaker. Since Cunningham grants that Husserl's language is not private in that sense, her argument is not an objection to Husserl's post-reduction language at all.

There is, however, a way of construing Cunningham's criticism as an objection to languages that are called "private" solely in virtue of (non-public) referents. One may respond to my criticism of Cunningham's argument as follows: By calling our attention to logical connective terms, Cunningham is pointing out that not all terms refer to objects. So, her criticism is a legitimate attack on a language that has only terms that refer.

But this is no objection to Husserl's language. In the first

place, we should note that Cunningham's criticism is not an objection to private languages per se. It is an objection to any language, public or private, that consists solely of terms that refer to objects (since they do not account for the necessity of connectives).

But is a language that consists solely of terms that refer to non-public objects a private language in the sense we are considering? No. There is absolutely nothing in the description of that kind of private language that requires that all of its terms refer to objects. The only requirement is that none of its terms refer to objects to which more than one subject has actual access. The sole description that one can apply to the kind of private language we are considering is that none of its terms refer to contingently public objects, which does not imply that all of its terms refer to (contingently) private objects. For the following two propositions are consistent: (1) None of the terms of L refer to contingently public objects, and (2) Some of the terms of L do not refer at all. So even if we interpret Cunningham's argument in this charitable way, it is still irrelevant to the point at issue, whether a language that contains no terms that refer to contingently public objects is conceivable.² A language does not refer; terms in a language refer.

14. Cunningham's Objections to Private Language (3)

We have seen that Cunningham's objections to private languages in the first category do not work. We recall, however, that Cunningham contends that Husserl's phenomenological language is also a language that only one person understands, but which could be understood by others.

What objections does Cunningham raise against that kind of private language?

If...the idea is extended to the third case of a contingently private language, where the entire language happens to be private (i.e., all its connectives, negations, etc., are not taken from a public language but are created by the isolated speaker himself), the privacy is established and the reduction not violated. But the question becomes one of utilizability, and raises all the difficulties of not being able to establish its consistency in use. In the first case, it remained a language at the expense of its privacy; and in this case, it remains private at the expense of its character as a usable language (LPR, p. 27).

In other words, either one does not successfully perform the phenomenological reduction, or one does and cannot describe anything (since one is unassured of the consistent use of that language).

Cunningham has redescribed this kind of private language. Formerly, she said that it was understood by only the speaker, but was parasitic on ordinary public language. Now she says it is a language in which the words are not parasitic on ordinary language, but are created by the isolated speaker.

What is the problem of consistency to which Cunningham refers? It is that any possible language is bound by rules for its use. One cannot utter just any string and say something meaningful. That is not to say that there are no problematic cases, but only that there must be some rules that distinguish between the proper use and misuse of words. Thus, there must be some criterion (or criteria) for the proper and consistent use of terms. One's memory cannot be the sole criterion of consistent use, since one's memory can be mistaken (LPR, pp. 27-28). Cunningham believes that the only alternative is commitment to the actual existence of other speakers of that language.

The ability to establish consistency of use of that language requires the existence of something transcendent to consciousness.... Rather, the consistent use of the whole language-game establishes a social context, i.e., actually existing other speakers, which can serve for the criterion of that consistency (LPR, p. 29, emphasis mine).

As is well-known, the phenomenological reduction requires abstention from positing the existence (or non-existence) of other subjects (CM, pp. 18-19). Thus, Husserl cannot assert that other subjects verify that his language is consistent, since such a philosophical assertion implies the existence of other subjects.

Cunningham's conclusion, then, is that no language is conceivable in which (1) a number of true scientific statements are made, and (2) there do not exist a plurality of speakers of that language that can check those statements for consistent use. Since her argument is on conceptual grounds, the point at issue is whether such a language is conceivable. It is not a question of whether there is in fact such a language. But a couple of questions need to be asked before addressing that issue, namely (1) "Is Cunningham's interpretation of the phenomenological reduction correct?", and (2) "Is Husserl committed to the possibility of a private language in the sense that it is (as opposed to 'can be') understood by only one speaker?"

15. Cunningham's Misinterpretation of the Phenomenological Reduction

I do not believe that Cunningham's interpretation is correct, with the exception of one passage that is inconsistent with it. I pointed out that Cunningham believes that phenomenological reduction includes reducing transcendent objects to immanent objects. I also noted the shifts from 'immanent object' to 'phenomenal status', and from there to

'private object'. Let us see why this reflects a misunderstanding.

Cunningham's claim that phenomenological reduction includes the reduction of all transcendent (real) objects to immanent objects would be true only if intentional objects and transcendent objects were two mutually exclusive classes. However, Husserl argues against that thesis. In the case of perception, the intentional and real (transcendent) object are identical (Ideas, pp. 242-243). To assert the opposite is to be involved in an infinite regress (Ideas, p. 243). It is to substitute consciousness of an image of x for perception of x. Husserl, then, believed that he could talk about transcendent realities after performing the reduction; and he did not believe that intentional objects and transcendent objects (even real ones) form mutually exclusive classes.

Evidently, Cunningham is mistaken about what 'bracketing out transcendent reality' means, as this passage illustrates:

The reduction, first of all, brackets out all transcendent reality, and it would be important to have a language which reflects this. Thus, the referents of the language must be exclusively immanent. (LPR, p. 28, emphasis mine).

In the same paragraph that I just cited from Ideas, Husserl explains what 'bracketing real objects' means. Briefly, it means that although one continues to undergo perceptions, one makes no use of the judgments that are based on them (Ideas, p. 244). That is, as a phenomenologist who is describing and analyzing perception (say), one makes no judgment that entails the existence (or non-existence) of the thing perceived.

As phenomenologists we avoid all such affirmations. But if we 'do not place ourselves on their ground', do not 'co-operate with them',

we do not for that reason cast them away. They are there still, and belong essentially to the phenomenon as a very part of it. Rather, we contemplate them ourselves...and we take the thesis of perception and its components as constituent portions of the phenomenon (Ideas, p. 244, last emphasis mine).

The phrase 'the thesis of perception' is important. Part of the thesis of perception is that (generally) the perceived thing exists. Post-reduction, however, one treats the thesis of perception as a thesis, rather than presupposing it. To a perceiving subject in the natural attitude, the thesis of perception does not appear as a thesis; rather, perception reveals the way things are to one in the natural standpoint. If one expressed the belief based on perception in the natural standpoint, the proposition would entail existential propositions. Accordingly, one makes no such assertions after the reduction. But that does not prevent one, qua phenomenologist, from talking about what is "there for him" from the natural standpoint, so long as one treats the thesis of perception strictly as a thesis (i.e., do not use the thesis, but mention it) in order to clarify the meaning of 'perception'.

To speak in an image: The 'bracketing' which perception has undergone prevents any judgement being passed on the perceived reality (i.e., any judgement that has its ground in the unmodified perception, and therefore accepts its thesis as its own). But it does not hinder any judgement to the effect that perception is the consciousness of a real world (provided the thesis thereof is not set in action)...(Ideas, p. 244, first two emphases mine).

To talk about perception as the consciousness of the real world is only to say that we take ourselves to perceive the real world (usually), since (as phenomenologists) we are clarifying the thesis of perception (and thus the meaning of 'perception'). Such observations do not imply commitment to the existence of the real world; they are not involved with such questions at all.

When Husserl initially discusses the phenomenological reduction in chapter 3 of Ideas, characterizing it as the suspension of the thesis of the natural standpoint, his detailed description of what is there for any subject from that standpoint is itself a phenomenological description (Ideas, p. 95). Such a description would be impossible if Cunningham's interpretation were correct, since therein Husserl refers to transcendent realities or, more precisely, transcendent realities for a subject.

So, Cunningham's suggestion that phenomenological reduction would lead to phenomenalism if it were not for the eidetic reduction is simply not true (LPR, p. 10). It presupposes (falsely) that the reduction involves a form of reductionism, whereby physical objects can be reduced to appearances of them (immanent objects) or possibilities of appearances. Such a reduction of physical objects to appearances could take place only if one systematically confused the appearance of a physical object with a physical object itself. Husserl never confused the two. Husserl's analyses of the thesis of perception are incompatible with Cunningham's interpretation (Ideas, chapter 3). For similar reasons Cunningham's contention that "In consequence of its metaphysical neutrality, Husserl's inquiry was to be about consciousness and not about the nature of the objects of consciousness" (LPR, p. 7) is mistaken, too. As we have seen, it is about the objects of consciousness, or the relationships that necessarily obtain between consciousness and any given kind of intentional object. Husserl's works are filled with such analyses. Evidently, Cunningham thinks that phenomenological reduction yields what is "inner" as its object of inquiry, setting aside what is "outer".

The phenomenological reduction has nothing to do with this inner/outer picture. Phenomenological reduction requires only that all objects be intentional, some of which are transcendent.

I opened this response by saying that I believe that Cunningham misinterprets the phenomenological reduction. However, there is a passage wherein Cunningham says something true about the reduction and the referents of phenomenological discourse.

By the first [the phenomenological] reduction Husserl merges both physical and psychic phenomena into the group known as 'intentional objects', suspending consideration of their existence in any natural-scientific or psychological sense. For an object to be 'intentional' the only thing that need be said about its status is that it is intended by consciousness. Whether that object could, under other circumstances, be classified as physical or psychical, immanent or transcendent, is irrelevant. All that has been said by calling it 'intentional' is that the object is meant or intended by an act of consciousness. Its status as intentional does not emanate from any of its own qualities, but rather from its relationship to an intending act (LPR, p. 38, first, third, and last emphases mine).

I agree wholeheartedly. But this is inconsistent with Cunningham's statement that no intentional objects can be transcendent.

16. Is Husserl's Post-Reduction Language a Private Language (3)?

We have not responded to Cunningham's objections to private language (3), and shall not. Let us set aside Cunningham's objections, as our interest lies in the general issue of the nature of Husserl's phenomenological language. Is Husserl's post-reduction language a language that is (in fact, not logically) understood by only one speaker? I believe that this question cannot be answered on the basis of Husserl's philosophical position. If I am right, then there can be no legitimate objections to Husserl's post-reduction language on the grounds that it

is understood by only one speaker. Let us see why.

My clarification of the phenomenological reduction in the preceding section shows that one cannot ascertain that Husserl's post-reduction language is understood by only one speaker on the basis of Husserl's philosophical position. I noted that after the reduction, one is not permitted to assert that others exist. Nor is one permitted to say anything that entails the existence of others. But one is also precluded from saying that others do not exist or anything else that implies the non-existence of others. But since this is so, Husserl is not committed to the thesis that his phenomenological language is understood by many speakers. Nor is Husserl committed to the thesis that his post-reduction language is understood by only one speaker. Since Husserl remains neutral with respect to the existence of others, he remains philosophically neutral with respect to the question "Do other speakers of phenomenological language exist?".

Let us clarify this. When one ordinarily speaks to someone, one takes for granted that person's existence. When one writes, one usually believes that what one writes will be read by someone; in this sense, one "presupposes" the existence of one's potential readers. Since Husserl wrote in German, it may seem that Husserl presupposed the existence of other speakers of the German language. In a sense he did, of course, but not in a sense that is relevant to the successful performance of phenomenological reduction. One does not write books from the phenomenological standpoint.³ Rather, the question is whether Husserl's philosophical statements imply the existence (or non-existence) of others. If those statements do not imply philosophical commitment

to the existence (or non-existence) of others (or anything other than one's own consciousness), and the statements consist of only analyses of the relationships that necessarily obtain between consciousness and any given kind of intentional object, then phenomenological reduction has been performed successfully.

A comparison can be made with the status of intentional objects.

We have already seen that an object is intentional irrespective of its own qualities. What makes an object intentional is solely its relationship to an intending act. Thus, an intentional object can be the same object that, under other circumstances (i.e., when we are no longer adopting the phenomenological attitude), can be classified as existing, not existing, etc. It is simply that I am precluded from saying that it exists (or does not exist), once I have adopted the phenomenological standpoint.

Similarly, the status of phenomenological language is not a function of its own qualities. What makes discourse phenomenological is solely the sort of statements that are made with the words. If the statements constitute analyses of the relationships that necessarily obtain between consciousness and any given kind of intentional object, and none of the statements imply the existence (or non-existence) of the intentional object, then the discourse is phenomenological. It is solely the use of language by a phenomenologist to do phenomenological analyses that makes the discourse phenomenological. Thus, phenomenological discourse is (numerically) the same discourse that, under other circumstances, could be said to be understood by others. But a phenomenologist who has adopted the phenomenological standpoint is

simply not permitted to say that it is understood by others, since such an assertion would involve existential commitments. The fact that a phenomenologist is not permitted to say that his language is understood by others does not imply that his language is not public. Therefore, what a phenomenologist says in the course of his analyses leaves our question ("Is Husserl's post-reduction language understood by only one speaker?") unanswered and unanswerable. Both possibilities (a public language and a language that happens to be understood by only one speaker) are consistent with the phenomenological standpoint. Consequently, the view that Husserl's post-reduction language is understood by only one speaker is unfounded.

17. Is Husserl's Post-Reduction Language a Private Language (1)?

Heretofore I have been entertaining the hypothesis that Husserl's post-reduction language is a language whose referring terms refer to contingently private objects. I did so in order to demonstrate that Cunningham's arguments do not work even if we make that hypothesis. Again, we shall set aside Cunningham's arguments and address the general issue about Husserl's language. I wish to argue that one is not entitled to say that Husserl is philosophically committed to a private language (1).

My argument is of the same kind that I just used. Husserl is not entitled to say that the intentional object being analyzed is actually intended by a number of subjects, since if he said that, he would be philosophically committed to the existence of others. But the fact that Husserl is not permitted to say that a given object is intended

by many subjects (after adopting the phenomenological standpoint) does not imply that it is not intended by many subjects.

As I have already pointed out, the status of objects as intentional (i.e., the referents of phenomenological discourse) is not a function of any of their own qualities. Rather, if an object is intended or intendable by a consciousness, it is an intentional object. This means that under other circumstances (i.e., when we are no longer adopting the phenomenological attitude) we could truthfully say that the object (or, more precisely, a kind of intentional object) is intended by others, provided that that is actually the case. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that all objects that are the referents of phenomenological discourse are contingently accessible to only one subject. If one takes no stand with regard to the actually public qualities of any given intentional object, then it is an open question whether the intentional object is public or private.⁴

Suppose that someone is reading a phenomenological paper at a philosophical meeting. Suppose that the reader used a table at the front of the room as an example, in order to analyze our concept 'physical object'. Now is our imaginary reader precluded from using that table as an example simply because it is actually intended by a number of subjects? Hardly. The only question that we need to ask is "Does the reader make any philosophical statements that imply commitment to the existence (or non-existence) of others or the table?". If not, then his analysis is within the restrictions imposed by the phenomenological attitude, so long as he is analyzing the relationships that obtain between consciousness and a given kind of intentional object. Of course,

our reader may make incidental remarks that betray the fact that he believes that the table exists and others see it. In Husserl's writings, too, one will find the pronoun 'we' and similar locutions. But Husserl recognizes that such locutions are for the sake of ease in making philosophical points only, and are avoidable. Accordingly, the presence of such locutions in Husserl's writings does not constitute an objection to Husserl's post-reduction language. So the view that all of the referents of phenomenological referring terms are private is unfounded, too.

18. Husserl on Logically Private Languages

I have maintained that Husserl's philosophical position does not entitle one to conclude that the post-reduction language is either contingently private or public. But is Husserl's philosophical position consistent with any kind of logically private language? Is that also an open question? No. Although Husserl does not discuss language when he introduces phenomenological reduction in Ideas, his analyses of science, truth and language in Formal and Transcendental Logic imply the impossibility of a logically private language. For Husserl, every scientific statement must be understandable by others. Thus, there can be no language that is understandable by only one subject. Further, if a statement is true, it must be possible for others to confirm its truth (i.e., the evidence for its truth must be intersubjectively accessible). Hence, the referents of the referring terms of a language must be accessible to others (FTL, pp. 125-126). So, Husserl is philosophically committed to the position that his post-reduction language

(indeed, any language in which true statements can be made) is not (indeed, cannot be) a logically private language. The impossibility of a language that can be understood by only one subject is also implied by Husserl's position on meaning in Logical Investigations.⁵

Husserl's commitment to the impossibility of a logically private language, however, does not commit him to the actual existence of other subjects. Rather, Husserl is obliged to admit (as a philosophical thesis) that there must possibly exist other subjects. That, however, is a far cry from being philosophically committed to the actual existence of other subjects.

19. Does Husserl's philosophical language require commitment to the existence of others?

One may grant nearly everything I have maintained thus far and still object to my conclusion, that Husserl can remain neutral on the question of the existence of others. For even if it is an open question whether Husserl's post-reduction language is understood by only one speaker or understood by many speakers, he is committed to the thesis that his language is at least understandable by others. For the language is understandable by others if it is understood by only one speaker; and it is understandable by others, of course, if it is a public language. If the language is public, then the existence of others is required; and if the language is contingently understood by only one speaker, then its status as a language is derivative from a public language. The only contingently private languages are codes; and codes are always translatable into a public language. In either case, then, the existence of

others is required. Therefore, since Husserl is philosophically committed to the thesis that his post-reduction language is understandable by others, Husserl cannot remain neutral with respect to the existence of others.

This objection does not rest on a confusion between Husserl's non-philosophical and philosophical convictions. Rather, it purports to show that one of Husserl's philosophical beliefs must be that other speakers of the post-reduction language exist. But I think that there is a response to this argument.

Consider the solipsist's position. He contends that (1) it is impossible to prove that other subjects exist. Now suppose that our solipsist also maintains that (2) the language in which he expresses his thesis is understandable by others. If the preceding argument were decisive, then the conjunction of (1) and (2) implies a contradiction (or is self-contradictory). Can the solipsist respond to this?

The solipsist can reply that even though his language is understandable by others, there simply are not (as far as he knows) any others to understand it. In other words, the solipsist could teach his language to others, but only if others exist. But as a matter of fact (or, more precisely, as far as the solipsist claims to know) nobody else exists to whom the language could be taught. The solipsist just does not admit that his language is public. So he would respond to the advocate of only public languages (or languages derived therefrom) that the anti-solipsist has moved from 'is understandable by others' to 'is understood by others' illicitly.

But the advocate of public languages has a response to the

preceding argument. If the solipsist's position were true, then the solipsist would have to devise a language that is not parasitic on any public language. In other words, he would have to devise a language by himself. But there cannot be any such language, since the proper use of words can be established only by public institutions, customs, and practices. Regularities in the use of words (and, consequently, the distinction between the proper and improper use of words) are established only in a social context. Otherwise, one is in the same position as the person trying to name his sensation in Philosophical Investigations. According to some commentators, the person trying to establish a use for 'S' succeeds in naming his sensation the first time, but cannot do so on future occasions, since what seems to be correct will be counted as correct (in this imaginary situation). Some other commentators argue that the person trying to name his sensation does not succeed in naming it at all. (W:PI, pp. 70-75). But on either interpretation, the features necessary for a language (specifically, rules) are lacking.

The skeptic may grant that a rule for the use of a word cannot be accomplished instantaneously. But he may reply that it may appear that his language is public, whereas in fact it is not (or, at least, it cannot be proven that the language is public). Things could continue to appear exactly the way they do to non-solipsists (that is, if non-solipsists exist), and yet the solipsist's position could still be true. In that case, there would be systematic, harmonious appearances (including, of course, the appearances of other persons and of the proper use of words), whereas the solipsist is the only subject that he can prove to exist. Chris Swoyer offers a similar argument.

We can imagine the skeptic to grant most of the steps in the private language argument. Having done so, he might conclude that while the argument is seductive and, in most places, sound, apparent or seeming regularities in the ways words are used will suffice to give them a use. A strong skeptical position, Ss, agrees that although I cannot give 'S' a use or function in a flash (simply by asserting that I will take it to be the name of my sensation), still, merely apparent customs, institutions, and forms of life are as good as real ones for allowing us to go on and apply 'S' in new situations. Wittgenstein's argument, the skeptic continues, is verificationistic because it depends on the assumption that we must know (be able to verify) that customs and institutions are real before we can use the framework they provide in order to see that we are really following rules. But how can we distinguish real regularities from fakes, genuine institutions and forms of life from spurious ones? In short, the private language argument defeats skepticism only by assuming its falsity. ("PL&S", p. 47).

Despite the fact that this skeptical position is implausible, it is nonetheless conceivable. Since this is so, what we call ordinary public language could be a language (with all its rules and regularities) which, as a matter of contingent (not logical) fact, is understood by only one speaker. How, the skeptical solipsist asks, can I distinguish between the systematic appearance of custom-established regularities in language and real custom-bound regularities? "I cannot" is his response. Therefore, the solipsist's position is compatible with the thesis that his language is understandable by others.

20. Husserl on Skepticism and Solipsism

But what does this skeptical position have to do with Husserl's post-reduction language? After all, Husserl is neither a skeptic nor a solipsist. In fact, Husserl says that the reduction does not involve skepticism.

If I do this [phenomenological reduction], as I am fully free to do, I do not then deny this 'world', as if I were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as though I were a skeptic; but I use the phenomenological ἐποχή, which completely bars me from using any judgement

that concerns spatio-temporal existence (Dasein) (Ideas, p. 100).

I should emphasize at once that I have not argued for the truth of the skeptical solipsist's position. Rather, I have argued that it is compatible with the thesis that the solipsist's language is understandable by others. For if everything were a set of systematic appearances, then there would be appearances of proper use of words, which would be distinguished from (appearances of) improper uses. The compatibility of the solipsist's position with the thesis that his language is understandable by others requires only that the two theses be conceivably true together.

I suggest that Husserl's phenomenological reduction requires the compossibility of solipsism and the requirement that a language be in principle understandable by more than one speaker. That is the connection between skeptical solipsism and Husserl's post-reduction language.

I think that this interpretation is confirmed by the fact that Husserl describes the phenomenological reduction as an attempt to doubt (not actually doubting) the general thesis of the natural standpoint. The attempt to doubt the thesis of the natural standpoint corresponds to the conceivability of the skeptic's position, whereby a neutral standpoint with respect to spatio-temporal existence is achieved (i.e., the phenomenological standpoint) (see Ideas, pp. 97-98). Doubting the thesis of the natural standpoint, on the other hand, amounts to supposing that the skeptic's position is true, which Husserl refrains from asserting. Phenomenological reduction does not amount to supposing the opposite of what we ordinarily think is true. In this respect, Husserl's route

to suspension of judgement differs from Descartes's methodological doubt, since Descartes thought that the way to suspend judgement involved supposing the opposite in order to balance one's natural inclination to believe that the world exists. Husserl's route is different (see *Ideas*, pp. 97-98).

My interpretation, according to which the phenomenological reduction requires the conceivability of the skeptic's position without at the same time suggesting that the skeptic's doubt is reasonable, is confirmed by the following passage. Husserl is explaining that his so-called "idealism" is not opposed to realism.

Our phenomenological idealism does not deny the positive existence of the real (realen) world and of nature.... That it [the world] exists--given as it is as a universe out there (daseiendes) in an experience that is continuous, and held persistently together through a thread of widespread unanimity--that is quite indubitable. It is quite another consideration, although in the light of the discussions in the text of this work one of great philosophical importance, that the continuance of experience in the future under such form of universal agreement is a mere (although reasonable) presumption, and that accordingly the non-existence of the world although, and whilst it is in point of fact the object of a unanimous experience, always remains thinkable (*Ideas*, p. 14, second and third emphases mine).

Here Husserl says just what one would expect him to say on my interpretation: The existence of the world is indubitable. Thus, the skeptic's doubt of the world's existence is unreasonable. This also explains why Husserl does not characterize the phenomenological reduction as doubting the world's existence. Husserl contrasts the skeptic's doubt with the conceivability of the skeptic's position, which is of "great philosophical importance". I suggest that Husserl regarded it as philosophically significant because the conceivability of the skeptic's position is required by phenomenological reduction. This is confirmed

by Husserl's remark that the skeptic's position is thinkable. Thus, it is no surprise to find that Husserl describes the phenomenological reduction in terms of the attempt to doubt the natural standpoint.

21. A Clarification of a Presupposition

I said that Husserl cannot suspend the philosophical presupposition that there must possibly exist other subjects. This requires clarification. Just what does 'Husserl presupposes that there must possibly exist other subjects from the outset of his analyses' mean? A clarification of this point should elucidate another point that I made, that Husserl is philosophically committed to the impossibility of a logically private language.

In part, of course, the proposition means that 'other subjects exist' is neither self-contradictory nor implies a contradiction. But that is not all. What, after all, does the term 'other subjects' mean in the proposition 'other subjects possibly exist', insofar as the proposition pertains to phenomenology? Does it mean, as Husserl suggests in one passage in Formal and Transcendental Logic, 'every human being or quasi-human being' (FTL, p. 226)? No. To be fair to Husserl, I should note that he is clarifying the presuppositions of the traditional logician in the passage just cited. He is not asserting a philosophical thesis about the genuine sense of 'other subjects' as it plays a role in the constitution of language, science, and objectivity of the world. What, then, does it mean?

The phenomenological truth that we take the world and our knowledge of it to be publicly accessible is a clue for ascertaining the

sense of 'other subjects' in phenomenology. These other subjects are subjects for whom the world exists and is given in harmonious experience. These other subjects are subjects for whom there are truths that are confirmed by evidence. In short, these other subjects are conditions for the possibility of our concepts of knowledge and the world. Since this is so, 'other subjects' cannot be synonymous with 'every human being or quasi-human being'. For to identify someone as a human being is to identify him as something in the objective world. Since this is so, the identification of someone as a human being presupposes the prior constitution of the objective world. But the other subjects in question here are a condition for the possibility of the sense 'objective world'. Thus, the sense 'other subjects' that we are analyzing here must be prior, in some sense, to 'every human being'. It is no surprise to find that Husserl says exactly this in the fifth meditation. "They [genuine difficulties] lie, accordingly, in the transcendental clarification of experiencing 'someone else'--in the sense in which the other has not yet attained the sense 'man'" (CM, p. 108, emphasis mine).

One finds my analysis of the sense 'other subject' in Formal and Transcendental Logic.

Let us start from the fact that for us--stated more distinctly: for me qua ego--the world is constituted as 'Objective' (in the above stated sense: there for everyone), showing itself to be the way it is, in an intersubjective cognitive community. It follows that a sense of 'everyone' must already be constituted, relative to which an Objective world can be Objective. This implies that the first and fundamental sense of 'everyone' (and therefore of 'others') cannot be the usual, the higher-level, sense: namely the sense 'every human being', which refers to something in the Objective world and therefore already presupposes the constitution of that world (FTL, p. 240).

Husserl should not have put the point in terms of reference. Two non-synonymous expressions can refer to the same thing. So, the fact that

the fundamental sense of 'everyone' is prior to and not synonymous with 'every human being' does not require that the referent (if any) of that expression is different. The sense 'everyone' can have the same referent as 'every human being'; what it cannot have is the same sense, since the objectivity of the world (including those human beings) is relative to that sense of 'everyone'. In fact, Husserl's analysis of the perception of someone else in the fifth meditation supposes that the referents are usually the same. For one's consciousness of another's transcendental subjectivity (i.e., another subject in the fundamental sense) is dependent on the bodily presence of another subject (insofar as that subject is given in perception).

In that case of association and apperception which particularly interests us--namely apperception of the alter ego by the ego--pairing first comes about when the Other enters my field of perception (CM, p. 113).

Thus, numerically the same thing can be (and, in the case of other subjects, is) the (intentional) referent of the two senses 'transcendental subject' and 'a human being or quasi-human being'. When I perceive you, for example, I identify you as both a human being (an entity "in" the world) and as a subject for whom the world "is there" (i.e., a transcendental subject).

22. Husserl's Public Language

Husserl's philosophical commitments (as opposed to his practical ones) regarding other subjects have been clarified. We have seen that Husserl is philosophically committed to the thesis that there must possibly exist other subjects. That is the consequence of the position that there cannot be any logically private language. The position that other subjects actually exist is not a consequence of the rejection of logically

private languages, as we have seen. But a relevant question remains unanswered.

I have not referred to Husserl's public language. Yet I have argued that one is not entitled to say that his language is contingently private or public, if one takes into account only Husserl's philosophical theses. Since there is (to my knowledge, at least) no interpretation of Wittgenstein's private language argument according to which either contingently private languages or public languages are objectionable (other than Cunningham's, who presents bad arguments against what she takes to be Husserl's contingently private language), Husserl's post-reduction language is unscathed by any (reasonable) private language argument.

But since I have argued that it is an open question whether Husserl's post-reduction language is public or contingently private, it is appropriate to ask "What is the justification for entitling this section 'Husserl's Public Language'?" Suppose that we abandon the phenomenological attitude for the time being, so that we are no longer barred from making claims about the existence of others, and ask "Is Husserl's post-reduction language understood (not understandable, since we have already answered that question) by a number of subjects?". The answer, of course, is "yes". It is in this sense that Husserl's phenomenological language is public.

Of course, we must distinguish this observation from a non-phenomenological point of view from the sort of language to which Husserl is committed by phenomenological reduction. But once we understand that it is philosophically indeterminate whether Husserl's post-reduction

language is public or contingently private, we see that it is implausible to believe that phenomenological language is vulnerable to objections to a private language.

CHAPTER III

NOTES

1. Readers who are familiar with Husserl's philosophy will recognize that Cunningham has misinterpreted the phenomenological reduction. This is not a quotation out of context. Cf. LPR, p. 14, and below.
2. Throughout this discussion I sometimes say "logical connective terms", whereas at other times I say "logical connectives". This ambiguity can be explained as follows: I distinguish between logical connectives and logical connective terms, except where I cite Cunningham, who does not distinguish between them. Evidently she regards logical connectives as nothing but terms or symbols, since she says that logical connectives (rather than logical connective terms) do not refer. But it seems to me that one ought to distinguish between (say) conjunction and the various symbols for it in formal languages.
3. It is necessary to distinguish between Husserl's philosophical theses and his ordinary convictions, which play no role in his philosophy. My discussion of solipsism and language below involves this distinction.
4. Robert Solomon misinterprets Husserl's post-reduction language just as Cunningham does, in an otherwise fine article. "Similarly, Husserl's language, insofar as it is a 'private' language, is what Casteneda has called strictly private language, a language all of whose terms (i.e., all of whose referring terms) refer to private objects" ("HPL" p. 215).
5. For a somewhat more detailed elaboration of the relationship between Husserl's theory of meaning and logically private languages, see J. N. Mohanty's "Husserl's Theory of Meaning", in Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, ed. F. Elliston and P. McCormick (Notre Dame, 1977). I have discussed the relationship between evidence, truth, and intersubjectivity in somewhat more detail in "Husserl's Problem of Intersubjectivity", forthcoming in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology.

CHAPTER IV

EVIDENCE AND TRUTH

1. Introduction

So far I have discussed only part of the concept of science. The theoretical content of a science is a body of propositions, dis-embarrassed of all contingent thinkers and occasions of judgement. Nevertheless, science arose somehow from scientific activity, which necessarily includes the use of language in order to express the theoretical content of a science. In the previous chapter, accordingly, I defended Husserl's non-substantival theory of propositions, and argued that it is indeterminate whether Husserl's post-reduction language is public or contingently private. That much about the status of phenomenology as a science has been rendered clear.

But a clarification of 'science' in the neutral sense cannot be accomplished without consideration of the related concept of an objectively valid result. A body of propositions expressed in a language is not a sufficient condition for science, since any list of prejudices about, say, human nature, satisfies those conditions. More is plainly required. A science is (ostensibly, at least) a body of truths about a unitary province. We regard those propositions as true because we possess evidence. I propose to devote this chapter to a

clarification of both features of objectively valid results (discussed in chapter two), which is an analysis of the concepts of 'evidence' and 'truth'.

Husserl believed that his theory of evidence and truth in Logical Investigations required further refinements.

I do not find that sufficient attention has been paid to the clarification of evidence and of all the pertinent relationships between mere 'intention' and 'fulfillment', which was first effected in the Logische Untersuchungen II. Teil, and deepened in my Ideen (FTL, p. 162).

Elsewhere Husserl makes a specific criticism of his theory of truth in the "Prolegomena".

A more serious fault of the 'Prolegomena' is, by the way, the following: In connexion with the concept of truth the modalities of truth are not mentioned, and probability is not cited as one of them (FTL, p. 101n).

One of the questions which was left unanswered in Logical Investigations is "How do we know that we have self-evidence when we do?". Husserl's position in Logical Investigations seems to be that self-evidence is its own criterion. But this is philosophically unsatisfying, for, as Naess has pointed out, "...there is nothing in the description by Husserl that eliminates the possibility of mistaking knowledge of less than the strictest kind for a piece of knowledge of the strictest kind" (RHII, p. 72). We demand some further epistemological analyses to accompany Husserl's clarification of self-evidence. Husserl tries to answer this question in Formal and Transcendental Logic. Of course, a response to this question requires a phenomenological method, since the question is about how we can distinguish one phenomenon from another. To answer this question, it is appropriate to adopt the first-person standpoint of the one for whom there is evidence, to refrain from making straightforward

judgements about what is actually the case as opposed to what only appears to be the case, so that we may describe and analyze the differences among the phenomena. The question here is "What are the phenomenological differences between the identification of something as genuine evidence and the taking of something as deceptive evidence?". In this way, we can obtain clarity about our concepts of genuine and deceptive evidence, and thus about our notions of 'what is actually the case' and 'what appears to be the case'.

Once the phenomenological standpoint is adopted, one consequence is that my taking of something as evidence is sufficient for its being called "evidence". This explains Husserl's use of 'evidence' and 'experience' interchangeably in many passages. By 'experience' Husserl means

...the performance in which for me, the experiencer, experienced being 'is there', and is there as what it is, with the whole content and the mode of being that experience itself, by the performance going on in its intentionality, attributes to it (FTL, p. 233).

In evidence, too, something is there for me with a determinate content, which may be expressed or not. To have evidence, then, is to experience in some way or other. Thus, one finds 'evidence' and 'experience' used interchangeably (e.g., FTL, p. 161).

One may think that adopting the point of view of the judger, a standpoint whereby taking something to be evidence counts as evidence, renders one incapable of making the necessary epistemological distinctions. This is not the case, as I shall illustrate with an example. I shall not follow through the analysis completely, as I simply want to provide some intuitive grounds for following Husserl in this move.

This morning I walked into the philosophy department office to get a cup of coffee. On the way to the back room, I glanced over my shoulder and saw a letter in my mailbox. For me, it was evident that there was a letter in my mailbox. My perceptual experience, in this case, was my evidence: I saw it. After filling my coffee cup, I walked over to my mailbox to pick up the letter, only to discover that it was a memo about a (then) forthcoming speaker. For me, then, my first experience (from the back of the room) was deceptive evidence. I reidentified it as such once I obtained better evidence, that of holding the memo in my hands and reading it. I experienced a conflict between my identification of that thing in my mailbox as a letter and as a memo. The latter identification took precedence for me because my perceptual experiences were better and more harmonious. All of this took place from my point of view, and are differences among the way things appear, the phenomena. Likewise, all of this was pre-reflective, at least until I noted that I had been mistaken. At least there was no explicit judging, which is not to say that there could not have been.

So, distinctions between deceptive and genuine evidence can be made along phenomenological lines. (One can consult one's own experience and multiply examples of this sort, and imagine many more.) Of course, there is the open possibility that my evidence was deceptive, since my evidence was perceptual; however, it is difficult to imagine what would count against it. There are other factors that I have not mentioned, but which play a role in drawing the distinction between deceptive and genuine evidence along phenomenological lines. I might have said "This isn't a letter; it's a memo" to the secretary, who

might have said "That's right; the mail hasn't arrived yet". We see the role of other subjects in distinguishing between genuine and deceptive evidence and, corresponding to that, between truth and falsehood.

Husserl makes use of the concept of horizon in his theory of evidence and truth in Formal and Transcendental Logic. This is lacking in Logical Investigations. "In the Logische Untersuchungen I still lacked the theory of horizon-intentionality, the all-determining role of which was first brought out in the Ideen" (FTL, p. 199n). The use of that concept is important and constitutes an improvement in his theory of evidence and truth, as I intend to show.

2. The Distinction between Formal Apophantics and Formal Ontology

But what are the precise details of the theory of evidence and truth in Formal and Transcendental Logic? Now that Husserl's position has been outlined, by contrasting it with his views in Logical Investigations, the details of his position in Formal and Transcendental Logic can be explained. I shall discuss a number of central theses in turn.

Since Husserl's first extended discussion of the concepts 'evidence' and 'truth' occurs within the context of an attempt to distinguish between formal apophantics and formal ontology, the first thesis I shall discuss is:

1. The distinction between formal apophantics and formal ontology is a function of the distinction between the two senses of 'truth' and the two senses of 'evidence'. The concept 'formal ontology' is a correlate of the naive attitude,

whereas 'formal apophantics' is constituted in the scientific attitude.

Of course, it will not be possible to clarify thesis 1 fully until I have specified the precise senses of 'evidence' and 'truth' that are mentioned. That is, I shall not be able to clarify thesis 1 until I have elucidated a number of other theses. For that reason, thesis 1 is a good starting point, as the other central propositions will be organized around it.

That Husserl held thesis 1 can be seen in the following passage:

Obviously the two correlative senses of evidence and the two correlative senses of truth that we cleared up signify two correlative senses of formal logic: Starting with the traditional focusing on judgements as apophantic meanings or opinions—that is to say, giving preference to the attitude of criticism—we acquire an apophantic logic, which, when fully amplified (on the side where lie the categorical sense-forms) to include the apophantic sense-forms of theories, attains the status of mathesis universalis. If we give preference to the focusing on possible categorial objectivities themselves or their forms, we are pursuing from the very beginning a formal-ontological logic, which however will obviously be forced, for reasons of method, to make judgement-senses into objects—though only as a means, whereas its final purpose concerns the objects (FTL, p. 147).

This way of drawing the distinction between formal apophantics and formal ontology fits Husserl's characterization of science well: "...It ['science'] means a certain universe of propositions that arose somehow from theoretical effort and have a systematic order wherein a certain universe of objects becomes determined" (FTL, p. 103). For in that passage Husserl partially specifies the sort of scientific activity from which the sciences formal ontology and formal apophantics arose, respectively. Whatever the historical accidents that have played a role in the development of the science called "formal apophantics", we know that that science must have arisen from scientific activity in the

scientific attitude. Since formal apophantics is a science of possibly true judgements, and since it is characteristically true that in the naive attitude one is conscious of what one's judgement is about rather than the judgement itself, the sense of the science formal apophantics is not constituted in the naive attitude. Such a science requires a reflective, scientific standpoint, since it is in reflective acts that the sense 'judgement' ('proposition') is constituted. Clearly, Husserl's thesis that the sense 'p' implies how it is experienced (constituted) is at work here.

The same holds for formal ontology. It is in the naive attitude that objects, as opposed to the senses through which we intend them, are given. Thus formal ontology, or the science of possible objects, arose from scientific activity in the naive attitude, since it is in that attitude that objects (objectivities₄) are constituted. But since formal apophantics and formal ontology are two sides of one science--formal logic--it follows that formal logic arose from scientific activity in the reflective and naive attitudes.

3. The Problem which motivates the Distinction between Formal Apophantics and Formal Ontology

But what is the problem which prompted Husserl to adopt thesis 1? By clarifying this problem, I can specify what Husserl means by "making judgements into objects" in the passage cited above (FTL, p. 147).

Husserl is defending the thesis that there are two sides to formal logic: formal apophantics and formal ontology. But at this point a problem arises. Formal apophantics, or the formal theory of

possibly true propositions, is at the same time a formal ontology, which sets down the conditions for the possibility of any object whatever (FTL, p. 144). Judgements cohere because of their substrates, which are objects (FTL, p. 120). A string is well-formed, non-contradictory and makes sense because there is a possible object which can be its referent. For example, 'P & $\sim$ P' is self-contradictory because there cannot be any object (state of affairs) that satisfies that description, and vice versa. But since all the objects about which we think ('object' making sense to us only as the possible referent of a judgement) are judgements in the amplified sense (or, whatever we posit in judging), it seems impossible to distinguish between formal apophantics and formal ontology.

4. Husserl's solution to this Problem

The key to resolving this problem is to distinguish two senses of the term 'object'. Husserl does not do this in paragraph 44. Rather, he distinguishes between two attitudes and points out that two different provinces are constituted therein. The following analysis, however, is consistent with and conforms to what Husserl does say. We must distinguish between 'object' (objectivity₄) in the broader sense, which means 'any possible subject of true predications', and 'object' in the narrower sense, which means 'any possible subject of true predications except judgements (propositions)'. 'Object' in the narrower sense is what I think Husserl means by 'substrate of determinations'. In the broad sense, propositions count as objects, since I can not only talk about, say, a red house, but about the proposition

'This house is red' as well. Obviously, propositions do not count as objects in the narrower sense. Judgements (propositions) are the objects of formal apophantics, whereas the possible referents of propositions (excluding use of inverted commas and nominalization) are the objects of formal ontology.

Now since 'object' in the broader sense is equivalent to 'the referent of a possible intention', or 'anything about which we can think', we can understand what Husserl means by "making judgements into objects" (see the passage cited above). Husserl is referring to a shift in standpoint whereby the judgement, rather than what it is about, becomes the theme or referent of an intention. Thus, the judgement "becomes" an object in this shift to the reflective standpoint; the judgement was the means of referring to the substrate prior to reflection, but becomes the referent itself in reflection. (The equivalence of 'any possible subject of true predications' and 'the referent of a possible intention' is a consequence of Husserl's thesis that objects are for us only as possible objects of judgements.) I can shift from thinking about this red house to consideration of the proposition (or judgement) 'This house is red'. 'This house is red' becomes the referent of my intention, and thus an object. Thus, we can distinguish between formal apophantics and formal ontology, just as we can distinguish between judgements and their referents.

The object in the narrower sense remains identical throughout syntactical changes, whereas the object in the broader sense changes (FTL, p. 114). I can talk about a particular house by saying "This house is red", or "The proposition 'This house is red' is true",

or "That this house is red will please my wife". In the broad sense, the object (objectivity₄) changes from a thing to a proposition, and from that to a fact. But the substrate of those determinations is the same; in each case I am talking about a house (however obliquely in the latter two cases). (see FTL, p. 114).

I mentioned that Husserl wants to show how the respective provinces (the two sorts of objects mentioned above) are constituted by the two different standpoints, the naive and scientific. To do this, Husserl adopts the standpoint of the judger for whom something is "there". In the naive attitude one is usually unconcerned with cognition; unless I experience something that disrupts the harmony of my experience, I simply continue to believe. "Through sight, touch, hearing, etc., in the different ways of sensory perception, corporeal things somehow spatially distributed are for me simply there..." (Ideas, p. 91). This does not hold only for physical objects, of course. Nor does it preclude the possibility that my experience will not be harmonious, that things will not turn out to be as I supposed. (The memo-letter example above illustrates this point.) But that is not the only way something can be for me; affirmation and negation are not exclusive disjuncts here. Something can be "modalized" in different ways; for me, something can be doubtful, questionable, presumable, or possible (FTL, p. 121). If something becomes modalized in one of these ways for a subject, that is usually the motivating circumstance for interest in verification, for interest in finding out the way things actually are.

The categorial formations which previously were simply existing objectivities for the judger, and simply the same ones while

the process of identification continued, must be verified by going over to the evidence... (FTL, p. 122).

It is in these sorts of experiences--the perception of disharmony--that the distinction between 'the way I suppose the state of affairs is' ("the supposed objectivities as supposed") and 'what is actually the case' ("the corresponding 'true' or 'actual' objectivities") is initially constituted (FTL, p. 122). In the case of successful verification, there is an identifying coincidence between the objective affair believed in and the objective affair that is given (FTL, p. 123). But the interest in verification is only occasional in the naive attitude.

Husserl has begun to show how the distinctions between judgements in the amplified sense (equivalent to objectivity₄) and objects (substrates or 'object' in the narrower sense) and, correspondingly, that between formal apophantics and formal ontology, are constituted. 'Judgements in the amplified sense' means 'posita generated in activities of judgement, in doxic positings'. (FTL, p. 120). For he has just shown how the distinction between 'what I suppose is the case' and 'what is actually the case' is constituted, the former corresponding to judgements in the amplified sense, without regard to whether they are true (or false). The latter, which is a function of verification, corresponds to actual objects (and, as we shall see, one sense of 'truth').

But the distinction between 'what I (anyone) suppose to be the case' and 'what is actually the case' is fully constituted only in the scientific attitude, wherein one characteristically distinguishes between hypothesis or supposition, and the fact of the matter. This is so, since a scientist leads a "theoretically interested life with

vocational consistency" (FTL, p. 124). Since the scientist's intention is aimed at cognition, the ideal of cognizing his province

...signifies, for the scientist, nothing else but accepting no judgements as scientific results except those that have shown their 'correctness', their 'truth', by adequation to the affairs themselves and can be produced again originaliter, at any time, with this correctness--that is to say, by a reactualizing of the adequation (FTL, p. 124).

The distinction between 'what I take to be the case' and 'what is actually the case' is fully constituted in the scientific attitude, since the scientist's interest in verification prompts him to distrust even the evidence that he has.

But yet another difference distinguishes the cognitional striving of the scientist from the naive cognitional striving of the non-scientific thinker. The latter 'merely looks and sees' whether it is actually thus; and, if he sees, he is satisfied. The scientist, however, has long been apprised, not only that evidence has its degrees of clarity, but also that it may be deceptive evidence. Consequently there exists for him the further distinction between supposed and genuine evidence (FTL, p. 125).

In this way, a standpoint constitutes a sense (in this case, the distinction between 'what is actually the case' and 'what I take to be the case' and, corresponding to that, 'deceptive evidence' and 'genuine evidence'). The goal of obtaining objectively valid results, which is intrinsic to the scientific standpoint, prompts the scientist to draw distinctions on the basis of his experiences which, in turn, constitute the distinctions. Corresponding to these distinctions is the difference between judgements and objects (the actually existent). This latter difference marks the distinction between the provinces of formal apophantics and formal ontology, which is what Husserl set out to show.

5. Two Senses of 'Truth' and 'Evidence'

The concepts 'truth' and 'evidence' appear in the very statement of thesis 1. It is necessary to clarify those concepts in order to have an adequate philosophical account of thesis 1. Let us begin with the concept 'truth', which will quickly become a discussion of 'evidence'.

2. There are two senses of 'truth', which mean 'actuality or true being' and 'a correct critically verified judgement', respectively. The latter is called "the critical concept of truth".

Of course, there is textual evidence for saying that this is Husserl's position:

The final result of criticism--ideally speaking--is either a 'truth' or a 'falsity'. Here a truth signifies a correct critically verified judgement--verified by means of an adequation to the corresponding categorial objectivities 'themselves'.... Besides the critical concept of truth, the concept of a judgement's correctness by virtue of its original (present or past) adjustment to the itself-given actuality, we have then the concept of actuality, as the second concept of truth. The true is now the actually existent or the truly existent, as the correlate of the evidence which gives the actuality itself (FTL, p. 127).

The critical concept of truth is what I have been calling "scientific truth", which is constituted in the scientific attitude. Any result that satisfies the description of the critical concept of truth is an objectively valid result. But just what does Husserl mean by 'a correct critically verified judgement'? What, in particular, does he mean by 'critical verification'. To answer these questions, we must examine the scientific notion of evidence. We noted earlier that the distinction between genuine and deceptive evidence is part of the

scientist's notion of evidence. 'The process whereby the scientist distinguishes between deceptive and genuine evidence' is part of what Husserl means by 'critical verification'.

His judgements must be verified by genuine, by maximally perfect, evidence; and only as so verified shall they be admitted among the results of science as theory. This brings about a peculiar judging procedure on the scientist's part, a zigzag judging, so to speak: first making straight for the givenness of something itself, but then going back critically to the provisional results already obtained—whereupon his criticism must also be subjected to criticism, and for like reasons (FTL, p. 125).

It is noteworthy that the scientific concept of 'truth' is defined in terms of critical verification, and thus in terms of 'evidence'. Thus, it is not surprising to find that Husserl says that truth acquires its legitimacy and its sense from evidence. "It contains no subjective word such as 'evidence', though truth and falsity derive their sense and legitimacy originally from evidence" (FTL, p. 194). Even in the following passage, where Husserl appears to define 'evidence' in terms of 'truth', it is clear that 'evidence' is the most fundamental notion.

In the second and correlative sense evidence signifies itself-givenness of the correctness of the judicial meaning, by virtue of its fitting the evidence in the first sense: that is to say, the categorical objectivity as itself given (FTL, p. 146, emphasis mine).

In order to clarify Husserl's meaning in this passage, it is necessary to state explicitly the two senses of 'evidence' which are discussed in the passage above:

3. There are two senses of 'evidence', which correspond to the two senses of 'truth'. 'Evidence' means either (1) 'the having of actual or true being itself', or (2) 'the consciousness of the correctness of a judgement when it fits a corresponding actuality' (FTL, pp. 128, 146).

'Evidence' in the second sense (hereafter: evidence₂) is the scientific notion of evidence, where the distinction between judgements and actual states of affairs is fully constituted. Accordingly, it is correlated with the scientific concept of 'truth', or 'a correct critically verified judgement'. The fit between judgement and actuality is achieved only by critical verification. Likewise, 'evidence' in the first sense (hereafter: evidence₁) corresponds to the concept of truth as actuality or true being.

6. Dependence Relationships between the Concepts 'Evidence' and 'Truth'

But the relationships between the various concepts of 'evidence' and 'truth' are not that simple. The scientific concepts of 'truth' and 'evidence' are parasitic upon the notion of truth as actuality and evidence as the having of actual or true being itself.

As for the second (but at bottom the intrinsically first) concept of truth, that of actuality Wirklichkeit as trueness of being, we still have to take into consideration its peculiar breadth (FTL, p. 128, emphasis mine)..

The parasitic nature of evidence₂ is a consequence of the passage in which Husserl defines 'evidence₂' in terms of 'evidence₁' (Cf. previous page; FTL, p. 146). 'Evidence' as the consciousness of the correctness of a judgement is possible only if it is a giving of the affairs themselves. Husserl's fourth thesis, then, is:

4. The scientific notions of evidence and truth depend on the non-scientific (or pre-scientific) concepts.

But what is the justification for thesis 4? Husserl does not provide an argument, although I think some intuitive justification can be given. Now 'actuality' (or 'true being') does not mean 'reality'.

If that were the case, then Husserl would be clearly mistaken in saying that the scientific notion of truth depends on truth as actuality. For in that case, every truth about ideal objectivities would be a counter-example to Husserl's thesis. "Naturally the actual [das Wirkliche] in the sense of the real [des Realen] is merely a particular case under this broadest, analytico-formal, concept of actuality" (FTL, p. 127). Since 'actuality' is to be understood in this extremely broad sense, by 'the scientific concept of truth depends on truth as actuality' Husserl means that a state of affairs must obtain for us to be able to determine its truth. To put it differently, the fact that S is P is a necessary condition for 'S is P' being true (as it is for our knowledge of that proposition's truth, of course). This is a necessary presupposition on the part of any scientist. If no state of affairs obtained before the onset of scientific inquiry into whether it in fact is the case, there would be nothing to guide the inquiry, since there would be nothing to be ascertained by it. It would simply make no sense to distinguish between deceptive and genuine evidence under those circumstances. Nor would criticism of evidence and results make any sense, if there were no fact of the matter to be determined by the inquiry. The rigors of science would be pointless. Thus, the presupposition that there are facts of the matter to be ascertained by scientific inquiry is necessary for the scientist. Scientists do not create truths; they discover them. In other words, truth as actuality is a necessary condition for scientific truth.

The dependence of the scientific concept of evidence, which modifies a judgement, on non-judgemental evidence, or the experience

of the actuality itself, can be shown in a similar manner. If a scientist does not (or did not) experience the state of affairs in question, then it would not be the case that the judgement which predicatively expresses that state of affairs is evident to him. One can judge S is P either intuitively or emptily. The intuitive judging of S is P requires that one see that S is P . Accordingly, the evidence of a judgement requires the evidence of experience. In fact, 'evidence₁' and 'experience' mean the same thing for Husserl. "Here 'experience' signifies, with the necessary universalization (in accordance with our earlier exposition): giving of something itself, evidence as such..." (FTL. p. 281). Of course, this does not preclude the possibility that an experience will turn out to be deceptive evidence.

7. A Problem with the Definition of 'Truth' in terms of 'Evidence'

This line of thinking raises a problem. If the scientific concept of 'truth' is defined in terms of critical verification, or the process of distinguishing between deceptive and genuine evidence, then how is that reconcilable with the necessary scientific presupposition that there are truths, or facts of the matter, to be ascertained by the inquiry, before one has evidence[?] The quick answer is that the truths, or facts of the matter, which are necessarily presupposed in order to guide scientific inquiry, are not truths in the scientific sense. They are "actualities", or truths in the non-scientific sense. But is it not likewise necessary for a scientist to presuppose that there are truths in the scientific sense, to be ascertained by scientific

inquiry? Husserl appears to be committed to this thesis by what he says. If objects exist for us only as objects of judgements, then to be committed to actualities is to commit oneself to believing that there are true propositions about them.

The possibility of sciences depends entirely on this certainty that their provinces exist in truth, and that, concerning their provinces, theoretical truths-in-themselves exist, as actualizable by following explorable and gradually actualizable ways of cognition (FTL, p. 199, emphasis mine).

In a word, the truth of a proposition transcends our acts of critical verification. How, then, can Husserl define 'scientific truth' as 'a correct critically verified judgement'?

Husserl does not explicitly address this problem. But I believe that he would respond in the following manner: It may be necessary for a scientist to presuppose that there are true propositions in order to inquire. Nevertheless, completely indeterminate and undetermined propositions are not scientific propositions. It is not necessary for a scientist to presuppose that definite propositions are true, but only that there are propositions, whatever they turn out to be, which are true. Similarly, a proposition is not regarded as scientifically true unless it is critically verified. If someone held that a proposition is true and that there is no evidence to show its truth or that the evidence cannot be re-examined, the claim would be regarded as sheer speculation. At best it would be regarded as a hypothesis. No proposition is regarded as scientifically true unless it is critically verified; and this is quite consistent with the fact that the truth of a proposition transcends our acts of critical verification. Take the proposition 'Every argument with a tautologous

conclusion is valid' as an example. That proposition is regarded as having been true before anyone proved it. But it was not a scientific truth--it was not a proposition in the science called "logic"--until it was demonstrated. Likewise, that proposition is regarded as holding true for all time. But that we regard it as such is a function of the fact that we have demonstrated its truth and could demonstrate it again. Thus, that a proposition bears the sense 'scientifically true' is a function of the fact that it also bears the sense 'critically verified' (for us); and this is consistent with the transcendence of a truth, since the transcendence of a truth signifies the potential to critically verify again (by any rational subject) and the possibility of having critically verified it before it was in fact established. This latter possibility requires certain counterfactual conditions.

8. Another Problem with the Definition of 'Truth' in terms of 'Evidence'

I noted that an apparent consequence of Husserl's positions that (1) 'Evidence₂' means 'itself-givenness of the correctness of the judical meaning' (FTL, p. 146), and (2) 'Scientific truth' means 'a correct critically verified judgement', is that the having of evidence₂ guarantees the possession of scientific truth. At the beginning of this paper, however, I noted that a consequence of adopting the phenomenological standpoint is that my taking of something as evidence is a sufficient condition for it being called "evidence". However, my taking of a judgement to be evident or true does not guarantee that it is true.

Again, Husserl does not address this problem, which is similar

to Günter Patzig's objection to Husserl's theory of evidence and truth in Logical Investigations.

Phenomenally speaking, we cannot separate evidence from the conviction that the judgement is true; in fact however actual evidence and truth of a judgement are inseparably connected. But the transition from phenomenal evidence to actual truth is, as before, unjustified (RHII, p. 194).

But there is an argument which can be marshalled in Husserl's defense.

One can simply note that the ostensible consequence of the two positions just cited does not follow. It would follow only if the positions were as follows:

(1) 'Evidence₂' means 'itself givenness of the correctness of the judicial meaning (or judgement)'.

(2) 'Scientific truth' means 'a correct judgement'.

If (1) and (2) were Husserl's positions, then Husserl would be committed to the proposition that

(3) Evidence₂ guarantees truth.

However, it should be noted that (2) is not Husserl's position. We have eliminated the all-important phrase 'critically verified' from Husserl's definition of 'scientific truth'. Since 'evidence₂' does not mean 'itself givenness of the critical verification and correctness of the judgement', (3) does not follow from Husserl's two positions. The notion 'scientific truth' presupposes that the distinction between genuine and deceptive evidence has been achieved by critical examination. Thus it is quite consistent for Husserl to say that attaining scientific truth is an ideal achievement, the goal of the inquiry. "The final result of criticism—ideally speaking—is either a 'truth' or a 'falsity'" (FTL, p. 127). For it is not true

that Husserl's position commits one to the absurd view that one's taking something to be true guarantees that it is true.

The inclusion of the concept 'critical verification' in the meaning of 'scientific truth' cannot be overly stressed. We shall see that critical verification includes the potential for re-examination of evidence by any rational subject, as well as the possibility of such criticism before certain propositions were in fact established. The latter possibility requires counterfactual reasoning, which I shall discuss presently. Evidence and truth, in a word, have their horizons. Since a truth or a falsehood is the ideal result of critical verification, Husserl's position on apodictic evidence in the Logical Investigations, according to which one has instantaneous insight into the truth of certain propositions in such a way that "future doubt" is precluded, is false. Husserl's position in Logical Investigations abstracts the concept 'apodictic evidence' from its horizons, and thus falsifies our epistemic situation. Thus, Husserl's position on evidence and truth in Formal and Transcendental Logic is an improvement over the theory in Logical Investigations precisely in that Husserl rejects his former position.

9. The Horizon of the Scientific Concepts of 'Evidence' and 'Truth':

Repeatability of Evidence

One of the principal theses of Husserl's phenomenology is that careful analysis of phenomena alone will yield philosophically satisfactory answers to basic philosophical problems. There is no need to abandon the phenomenological standpoint and make assertions

about what is "in-itself". Nor is it desirable to do so. For either the in-itself is an accessible phenomenon, in which case it is amenable to phenomenological analysis--or else it is something other than phenomena, in which case we have no access to it, and thus no means for comparing it to that to which we have access (phenomena).

But experience is not an opening through which a world, existing prior to all experience, shines into a room of consciousness; it is not a mere taking of something alien to consciousness into consciousness. For how could I make a rational statement to that effect, without seeing such a state-of-affairs and therefore seeing not only consciousness but also the something alien to consciousness--that is: experiencing the alien affair? And how could I objectivate such a state-of-affairs as at least a conceivability? Would that not be immersing myself intuitionally in such a countersensical experiencing of something alien to experience?... If what is experienced has the sense of 'transcendent' being, then it is the experiencing that constitutes this sense... (FTL, pp. 232-233, last emphasis mine).

Thus, since a theory of evidence and truth is a philosophical task, Husserl thinks that an adequate theory of evidence and truth can be developed solely along phenomenological lines. What are the phenomena to be analyzed? How can one distinguish between 'seeming to be true' and 'actually true' by analyzing phenomena? 'Scientific truth' requires further clarification.

Some of the propositions which have already been stated are the key to answering these questions. It is simply a matter of explicating the implicit sense or horizon of the concepts 'scientifically true' ('objectively valid result') and 'critical verification'. The relevant propositions include the following:

- (a) 'Scientifically true' means 'a correct critically verified judgement', and

(b) Critical verification includes the process of distinguishing between deceptive and genuine evidence.

An analysis of the concept 'critical verification' is still lacking. What is co-intended when one identifies a judgement as critically verified? What are the necessary presuppositions of such an identification? How does one distinguish between deceptive and genuine evidence?

A fifth thesis is a partial answer to the questions:

(5) It is necessarily the case that genuine evidence is repeatable (and thus reidentifiable).

To my knowledge, Husserl does not express thesis 5 in the way that I have, since he does not include the modal phrase 'it is necessarily the case that'. Nevertheless, I think that 5 expresses Husserl's position.

Thesis 5 (or something close to it) can be shown to be a consequence of other Husserlian positions. Let us begin with the previously stated position that evidence₂ (the property of a judgement when it fits a corresponding actuality) depends on evidence₁, or the consciousness of actual or true being itself. Thus, scientific evidence of the truth of a proposition (or its falsehood, for that matter) requires consciousness of the relevant state of affairs which, in the broad sense, is consciousness of an object. However,

these concern also the universal nature of evidence as a single component of conscious life--and here belongs the property mentioned above: that every evidential consciousness of an object an intentional reference to a synthesis of recognition is included (FTL, p. 160, emphasis mine).

The sense of 'object of consciousness' includes 'being irreducible

to my actual experiences of it', or transcendence₁. Since this is so, any object of consciousness (the consciousness of which serves as the evidence of a judgement) can be reidentified as the same object. Any object of consciousness is the same object that can be experienced at some later time. The same experience ("the same" insofar as it is of the same object) can therefore be repeated. But since evidence is experience of something "in person", evidence itself is repeatable.

Thesis 5 pertains to deceptive evidence, too, insofar as some genuine evidences dispel illusions, or show that a former evidence was deceptive. We recall that critical verification includes the process of distinguishing between deceptive and genuine evidence. Now Husserl grants that an evidence may be deceptive. An evidence may seem to be an experience of P, when in fact it is not. But it would be impossible to determine that some evidence is deceptive if it were not repeatable. If, in the course of evaluating some evidence, I discover that it was deceptive, then I must recollect that I took the evidence to show something else. If the evidence is not recollected, it must be at least retended. In either case, the evidence is reidentified, and thus repeatable. If evidence were not repeatable, then for consciousness there would be only a series of successive experiences, each of which is unrelated to the others, since retention is a necessary condition for constitution of an object. In no case would I be able to say "Things were not as I supposed" with insight. A set of unrelated experiences would, of course, be inconsistent with the identification of the object of consciousness, as that would commit one to a future

course of anticipated experiences (a "synthesis of recognition"). Thus, one's consciousness would consist of contradictory intentions.

The same is especially true of genuine evidence. If a state of affairs in which I believe is confirmed by further harmonious experiences, then one must thereby identify the former experience (evidence) as having been of the same state of affairs. Thus, evidence must be repeatable if ascertaining that it is genuine evidence is possible.

Of course, I have been speaking only of repeatability in memory, which holds only for real objects.

Let us note here, because we might otherwise be misled, that the modification of itself-giving as perception and recollection plays very different roles for real and ideal objectivities, respectively. This is connected with the circumstance that the latter have no temporal loci to bind them individuatingly. Merely because of an essentially possible alteration of attitude or focus, any clear explicit recollection of an ideal species changes into a perception of it--something naturally excluded in the case of temporally individuated objects (FTL, p. 158).

Let us consider an example of a truth about ideal objectivities. Husserl must be excluding cases of remembering that in the passage above. For I can remember that I demonstrated, say, every valid syllogism has at least one universal premise, without thereby intuitively seeing how to demonstrate that theorem. This is shown by the fact that a student may remember that he saw and heard a teacher demonstrate a theorem, and yet cannot reproduce the proof. Husserl's point does seem to be true if we consider only cases where the verb 'to remember' takes a direct object, rather than a 'that clause'. For one cannot remember the demonstration itself without thereby

intuitively seeing the truth of the theorem. Recollection in this case becomes "perception", an intuitive "seeing" of the truth of the theorem, because references to time are irrelevant to its truth.

(I assume, of course, that one remembers the demonstration as a whole, and that this example is representative.) The possibility of recollection is part of the implicit sense, or horizon, of perception.

But there is another sort of reiterability. If we think of evidences as temporally individuated experiences, then they are not reiterable in perception, since one cannot perceive the past. If I am testing Boyle's law that the volume of a gas is inversely proportional to the pressure exerted on it, I cannot return to the experiment that I performed yesterday. Still, I can perform the same test today, perhaps even with numerically the same materials. That is, I cannot reproduce the test within the same time-frame, although I can reproduce the same test. Thus, though I cannot reproduce a temporally individuated event, I can reproduce the evidence. Although my example is of a law about real objects, this sort of repeatability holds for ideal objects as well. For example, one can reproduce the proof of the proposition 'If two valid arguments have contradictory conclusions, then at least one of the premises of one of the arguments is false', which is about ideal objectivities.

But the reiterability of evidence is not merely a matter of fact; it is necessarily the case that it is repeatable if the proposition in question is scientifically true. Suppose that it is impossible to reproduce the evidence of a proposition. If that were so, then it would be impossible for me to criticize the former

evidence, to determine whether it is deceptive or genuine. Only further experiences of the same sort could settle the question. Of course, I may feel assured that the irrepeatable evidence was genuine; but it would not satisfy the scientific requirement for critical verification.

Suppose that a scientist A (an astronomer) believed that he saw some flying saucers through his telescope for a moment, but never saw any flying saucers again. Such a scientist would not regard the proposition 'There are flying saucers' as scientifically verified, and for good reason. (We are ignoring the fact that other persons believe that they have seen flying saucers.) Such a case does not satisfy the rational requirement of critical verification.

This example brings to the fore the "other side" of the notion of 'truth' as 'a correct critically verified judgement'. This is what I shall call "the scientific presumption of falsehood". If what is true is critically verified, then if a proposition lacks such critical verification, it is presumed not to be true. Husserl does not explicitly discuss the scientific presumption (not the assumption) of falsehood, but is committed to it by his theory of evidence and truth. It is a credit to his theory to have justified that rational presumption by implication.

This also helps to clarify another aspect of Husserl's theory of scientific truth. It is the converse of thesis 5, namely that if some evidence is irrepeatable, it is presumed deceptive. This seems to be a special case of the scientific presumption of falsehood. But this engenders a problem. I noted that evidence must be repeatable if

we are to verify that it is deceptive. To say that irrepeatable evidence is thereby deceptive appears to conflict with that thesis. That these two propositions are not inconsistent is a function of the distinction between ascertaining that some evidence is deceptive, and presuming that some evidence is deceptive. To determine that some evidence is deceptive requires repeatability of evidence (given the notion of critical verification), whereas the presumption that some evidence is deceptive does not.

Perhaps a comparison to the legal presumption of innocence will help clarify what I mean by 'the scientific presumption of falsehood'. In legal matters the burden of proof is on the prosecution, just as in scientific and philosophical matters, the burden of proof is on the person who proposes that a proposition is true. If the prosecution fails to make its case, then an ideally rational jury finds the defendant "not guilty". They do not find the defendant innocent. If the person who proposes that a proposition is true fails to make his case by failing to produce evidence, then we say "not true", rather than "false". By 'not true' I mean 'not an objectively valid result'. Since no critical examination has taken place, the proposal is not an objectively valid result and is not, accordingly, admitted as a scientific truth.

Ascertaining that an evidence is deceptive, on the other hand, parallels the finding that the defendant is innocent, that the accusation is false. Imagine that there is a society wherein a jury can find the accused "innocent" as well as "not guilty". A finding of not guilty would require only that the prosecution had failed to make its case. A finding of innocence would require the defense attorney's proof that the

defendant had not committed the crime. Similarly, the scientific presumption of falsehood requires that we say "not true" (rather than "false") if the proposers (or anyone else) fails to show the truth of the proposition. It would require argument on our part to show that the proposition is false. Of course, both presumptions can be defeated. Just as the prosecutor can make his case and obtain the finding "guilty", so evidence can be produced to show that the proposition is true. The "zigzag" procedure in scientific activity presupposes both repeatability of evidence and the presumption of falsehood.

10. The Intersubjectivity of Evidence and Truth

At this point, I have considered the repeatability of evidence only for a solitary subject, setting aside the role of other subjects in determining truth. However, other subjects play an essential role in the constitution of the senses 'truth' and 'evidence'.

6. It is necessarily the case that if a proposition is scientifically true, then its truth and the evidence of its truth are accessible to any rational subject.

Here is one of the many passages wherein Husserl asserts thesis 6:

These, when actualized, are the unqualified truths as themselves-given: cognitional acquisitions abiding from then on, capable of again becoming accessible to insight at any time, and accessible in this manner to everyone as a rationally thinking subject, even as they were before their 'discovery'. Every 'scientific statement' has this sense from the start. It is already addressed to this 'everyone' and states what the substrate-objectivities are in truth--as everyone can see (FTL, p. 125-126, last emphasis mine).

Critical verification is not only the process of distinguish-

ing between deceptive and genuine evidence. It also includes (among other things) determining whether the evidence is of the right kind (whether it shows what someone purports that it shows), and ascertaining the strength of the evidence. This is possible only if communication and access to the evidence are possible for any rational subject.

Familiar facts show the rationale behind thesis 6. It is well-known that persons sometimes take some evidence to show that something is the case when in fact it does not. That person may mistake evidence of the wrong kind to be relevant evidence. After all, this is what is frequently the case when persons commit informal fallacies. That person may be completely fooled. To be able to show that a person has made a mistake requires communication. The same is true of taking insufficient evidence as sufficient.

Suppose that someone claimed that a proposition is scientifically true but that he is the only person that can have (or could have) evidence of its truth. Such a claim would be self-contradictory, since 'This proposition is scientifically true' implies 'The evidence of its truth is accessible to any rational subject'. The use of the words 'can' or 'could have' are important here. For scientific procedures regarding evidence are used in judicial proceedings; and one might conceive of a case like the following: Suppose X murdered Y, and that there were no other witnesses. In that case, it would in fact be the case that only one person is a witness to the crime (i.e., the murderer). But that does not preclude the possibility that any other rational subject

could have witnessed it. The sort of accessibility to others that Husserl is talking about supports counterfactuals such as 'If someone else were where the murder took place, and there were sufficient light, that person was not blind, etc., then he would have seen the murder take place'. Counterfactuals are what I take Husserl to be talking about in the passage just cited when he says "even as they were before their discovery" (FTL, p. 125). So it would not be to the point to object that since no one else witnessed the murder, the evidence is accessible to only one person; for that statement is consistent with the counterfactual just mentioned. I discuss this example only because a scientific procedure regarding evidence is (ideally) employed in courts of law, not because it is representative of scientific truth.

Once we understand how thesis 6 is frequently about counterfactual situations, we can see that the requirement that evidence be repeatable by any rational subject is likewise sometimes about counterfactual situations. If we count history as a science, one can see how thesis 6 would require counterfactuals as well. No historical event can be seen, for the obvious reason that one cannot see what happened in the past. So no direct evidence of historical events can be had except by those who witnessed those events. (I am leaving out of consideration mechanical recordings of those events.) How can this be reconciled with the fact that the evidence for a scientific truth is accessible to any rational subject? It is still the case that if a rational subject lived at that time, were at the appropriate place, were not blind, etc., then he would have witnessed

the event.

I have not mentioned the ordinary cases of corroboration of scientific hypotheses, in which the evidence is in the present. (This includes, of course, the evidence that historians possess for saying that certain events took place.) But these ordinary cases present no problem; thesis 6 obviously is true of them.

While discussing the repeatability of evidence for a solitary subject, I noted that the sense 'object of consciousness' includes 'being irreducible to my (i.e., any subject's) actual experiences of it', or transcendence₁. (Consciousness of an object as itself-given, is evidence₁ which, as we have already noted, is a prerequisite of evidence₂, or the evidence of a proposition.) The requirement that evidence of a scientific truth be reproducible by any rational subject appears to require a stronger sense of the term 'transcendence'. If the consciousness of the object (evidence₁) is repeatable by any rational subject, then the object of consciousness must be irreducible to any single subject's possible consciousness of it (hereafter: transcendence₂). If the consciousness of the object is repeatable by anyone, then it is the same object of which other subjects can be conscious. Thus, since anyone else's intendings are different from mine--since it is impossible for two subject's intendings to be (numerically) identical--any object, the consciousness of which is the evidence of a scientific truth, must be irreducible to my possible intendings of it. This, in turn, appears to require that every object of consciousness which serves as evidence of a scientific truth is public.

These reflections bring a problem to the fore. What are we to say about scientific truths about non-public (private) objects? One might consider some of Sartre's statements about images as examples of scientific truths about private objects. This is in fact no objection to thesis 6 at all. To show that this is so requires clarification of the words 'object', 'the same', and 'private'.

The objection seems plausible at first in part because physical objects are the paradigm case of what we call "public objects". Since images are not physical objects, they do not appear to be public objects either. So, any scientific statement about images appears to be a counter example to thesis 6.

To this it may be objected that the fact that physical objects are the paradigm case of public objects does not mean that they are the only public objects. In fact, they are not. If one pays special attention to the meanings of 'private' and 'public' in this context, it can be seen that images are not private. An object is private if and only if it is impossible for other rational subjects to be conscious of it. But to what does 'it' refer? Thesis 6 requires that it is possible that other rational subjects are conscious of the same object. What Husserl means by 'the same' must be clarified if we are to show that the objection is not to the point.

We require some criterion (criteria) for the numerical identity of images. Two propositions are universally true: (1) No two persons can be intuitively conscious of numerically the same image, and (2) The numerical identity of images changes with temporally separate episodes in one's mental life. Even if neither (1) nor (2)

are acceptable, that will not affect my point. The point is that thesis 6 does not require that two persons can be conscious of numerically the same object. Thesis 6 is not inconsistent with either (1) or (2), since thesis 6 requires only that I can be conscious of the same kind of object.

Consider a passage from Sartre's The Psychology of Imagination as an example:

What shall we say of the image? Is it apprenticeship or knowledge? Let us note first that it seems to belong to perception. In the one, as in the other, the object presents itself in profiles, in projections, in what the Germans designate by the apt term 'Abschattungen' (PI, p. 10).

Of course, Sartre is talking about any image whatsoever, rather than the consciousness of a particular image (say, a cube). But the crucial points are true in both cases. Whether I am talking about any image whatsoever or the consciousness of an image of a cube, it is true that (1) the object is describable, (2) other rational subjects can understand what is being described, and thus (3) other rational subjects can summon up an image with the same properties (provided that the statement is true). But this is all that is required for an object to be public in the requisite sense. Although Sartre (a different person) had an image of a cube at a different time, one can understand what he says and summon up the appropriate image. Thus, it is possible for other rational subjects to be conscious of the same sort of image. Hence, it is possible for any rational subject to consult his own experience and test Sartre's claim. Indeed, Sartre is correct; any image of which I can be conscious is given perspectivally.

One might say that thesis 6 is positivistic doctrine in Husserl's philosophy. For Husserl is saying that any scientific truth must be intersubjectively confirmable. I say "confirmable" rather than "verifiable", since the term 'verification', in the context of a discussion of positivism, has the connotation of complete and exhaustive confirmation. But Husserl expressly rejects the view that all scientific truths are verifiable in this sense. Any science which must rely on sense-experience to confirm its hypotheses and theories cannot achieve final verification. This is a consequence of the nature of sense-experience. There is always the open possibility that it can be deceptive (FTL, p. 281). But this does not prompt Husserl to reject those sciences, their methods, or sense-experience in general. In fact, he thinks that it is positively wrongheaded to do so.

For this same reason, moreover, it is wrong for a criticism of sensuous experience, which naturally brings out its essential imperfection (that is: its being at the mercy of further experience!), to end with rejecting it--whereupon the critic in his extremity appeals to hypotheses and indirect arguments, with which he attempts to seize the phantom of some (absurdly) transcendent 'In-Itself' (FTL, pp. 161-162).

Verification in the strong sense is an unachievable ideal in such sciences, if not in all sciences.

Although one might say that thesis 6 is positivistic, a couple of differences should be noted. First, intersubjective confirmability has nothing to do with the meaning of a proposition in Husserl's philosophy. Secondly, Husserl does not believe that every non-analytic proposition must be confirmable by sense-experience. For Husserl, the situation is the reverse of the positivistic position:

it is the meaning of the proposition which dictates the way it is to be confirmed.

11. The Meaning of 'Rational Subject'

Throughout this discussion of the intersubjective accessibility of scientific evidence and truth I have used the term 'rational subject', rather than 'other subject'. There is a rationale for the use of 'rational subject'. The subjects for whom the evidence of a scientific truth must in principle be accessible must be capable of taking the evidence as evidence (or of identifying the ostensible evidence as irrelevant). Certain abilities must be attributed to the (possible) subjects for whom the evidence is accessible, abilities which not every subject seem to possess. These include the abilities to distinguish between genuine and deceptive evidence, to identify irrelevant evidence as such, and to communicate. If any of these abilities were not ascribable to the subjects who play a role in the constitution of the senses 'scientific truth', 'genuine evidence', 'deceptive evidence', etc., the concept 'science' could be constituted solipsistically. Thesis 6, in a word, would be false. But that would amount to the possibility of the truth of 'There can be only one rational subject to whom the evidence of the truth of a proposition P is accessible'. Thus, the distinction between genuine and deceptive evidence can be constituted only intersubjectively. Since that distinction is a necessary part of the concept 'science', the sense 'science' can be constituted only intersubjectively. The ability to show that someone has misidentified some evidence (or, more generally, has made some

mistake) requires the abilities just mentioned. Put differently, to identify something as a scientific truth that is corroborated by evidence is to be committed to the proposition that it is possible that other subjects with the abilities mentioned above can test it and see that it is so.

But consider the case of my hamster. Suppose that I am experimenting in order to test the hypothesis "All mixtures of X and Y explode". Suppose that there is an explosion on every occasion that I mix what I take to be X and Y. Now my hamster can see the results of my experiments every bit as much as I can. So what is the need to ascribe certain rational capacities to the subjects to whom the evidence of the truth of a scientific proposition is accessible?

The reason is as follows: although in some sense my hamster sees (or can see) the same thing that I do, the experiments do not mean the same thing to her. She does not see that they are scientific tests, nor see the explosions as evidence. Suppose that I have accidentally been mixing Z and Y, rather than X and Y. My hamster is not the sort of subject that can identify the chemical as Z rather than X, and thus correct my error. She cannot show me that I have not been corroborating the hypothesis 'All mixtures of X and Y explode'. Hence, my hamster is not the sort of other subject to which Husserl is referring in thesis 6. Only an open plurality of rational subjects can constitute the sense 'scientific truth'. 'Non-rational' in this context means 'incapable of doing science'.

A passage that I have already cited shows that Husserl holds this thesis.

Every 'scientific statement' has this sense from the start. It is already addressed to this 'everyone' and states what the substrate-objectivities are in truth--as everyone can see (FTL, pp. 125-126, emphasis mine).

If everyone can see that a scientific statement is true by "seeing" (evidence), then they must be able to (1) identify the evidence as evidence, (2) that shows the truth (or falsehood) of a particular scientific statement, and (3) understand the statement. The second requirement is true, since not every evidence confirms any hypothesis. If a subject were incapable of distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant evidence, then he would be incapable of seeing the truth of any particular hypothesis (as opposed to any other). The second, requirement, in turn, implies the third, since it is on the basis of an understanding of the meaning of the statement (and only on that basis) that one can distinguish between relevant and irrelevant evidence. In short, to identify something as a scientific statement is to identify it as something, the truth of which can be seen by any rational subject.

Thus the validity of truth for everyone, and once for all, offers no particular problem. This 'everyone' is every human being or supposable quasi-human being in the actual world (or in a possible world, in the case of absolute truths about it), so far as such a being is at all capable of evidence as cognition of truth (FTL, p. 226, last emphasis mine).

12. Existential Commitments and the Problem of Intersubjectivity

These reflections raise a couple of problems. If to identify something as a scientific statement is to be committed to the position that its truth is "there for everyone", then is every scientist committed to the existence of other rational subjects? A scientist

may as a matter of fact believe that other rational subjects exist. But is he committed to their existence by the very nature of his enterprise? Are science and solipsism compatible?

This problem is important in the context of a discussion of Husserlian phenomenology, since it concerns the possibility of phenomenological reduction. Husserl contends that if one adopts the phenomenological standpoint, one is neutral as to whether other subjects exist.

Other men than I, and brute animals, are data of experience for me only by virtue of my sensuous experience of their bodily organisms; and, since the validity of this experience too is called in question, I must not use it....In short...the whole concrete surrounding life-world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that is (CM, p. 19, emphasis mine).

But if Husserl is doing science (in the sense explicated here), and if that enterprise commits one to the existence of other rational subjects, then a phenomenological science is impossible.

If by 'solipsism' we understand 'the thesis that I am the only subject that exists', then I think that science and solipsism are compatible. A holocaust could kill everyone but me. However, it would still be possible for me to engage in scientific research. I could still confirm and refute hypotheses. And I could still identify some hypotheses as objectively true although, as a matter of practice, I could not be justifiably assured that my results are objective. I hope that the example about mixtures of X and Y illustrates the point that a solitary subject runs the perpetual risk of error (e.g., identifying irrelevant evidence, or mixtures of Z and Y, as relevant evidence). But to say that a solitary subject can be mistaken is not

to say that he always is (or will be) mistaken. As a matter of fact, there are no other subjects to check the results in such a situation, although a solitary subject can reexamine the evidence.

It is fair to object "If this is so, then what is the point of thesis 6?". Doesn't the position that has just been taken conflict with thesis 6? I do not think so. Thesis 6 implies only that, in doing science, one is committed to the possible existence of other rational subjects who can test one's claims. This is compatible with solipsism. The solitary subject who is doing scientific research is committed to the proposition 'If other rational subjects exist, then they can examine the evidence for my claims and see that they are true (or determine that they are false)'.

Let me offer an argument by analogy for the position that science and solipsism are compatible. It seems to me that that situation is analogous to the compatibility of solipsism and realism. We identify the world, and things in it, as being irreducible to my (any particular subject's) possible intentions of it. This is a consequence of our identification of the world and physical objects as existing independently. Thus, the world and physical objects are inter-subjectively constituted. Now, imagine that you are the only subject that exists. Would it be incumbent upon you to cease to identify physical objects as being irreducible to your possible intentions? No. To identify physical objects as such would commit one only to the proposition 'There can be others who can see the opposite side of this physical object at the same time that I see this side'.

If it be objected that this is a weak interpretation of 'exists

independently', my response is that that does not affect my point. If a realist takes 'exists independently' to mean 'existing apart from any relationship to subjectivity whatsoever', then a consequence of that position is that solipsism is compatible with it.

I think that this conceivable situation is comparable to the one concerning science and solipsism. Just as the world and things in it exist in their own right, so scientific truths are true in their own right. It would no more be incumbent upon one to cease to identify certain hypotheses as true in a solipsistic situation, than it would be incumbent upon one to cease to identify physical objects as irreducible to one's possible intentions. Both physical objects and scientific truths are intersubjectively constituted. But in both cases one is committed only to the possible existence of other subjects. Just as 'This is a physical object' implies 'This is perceivable by an open plurality of subjects' but does not imply 'This is perceived by subjects', so 'This is a scientific truth' implies 'Its truth and the evidence of it are accessible to an open plurality of subjects' but does not imply 'Its truth and the evidence of it are seen by other subjects'. In neither case does an existentially quantified proposition follow.

If this argument is sound, then a phenomenological science is possible.

This helps to clarify a couple of points about Husserl's problem of intersubjectivity. If, as I shall argue, Husserl is trying to analyze the neutral concept of science, in part, by responding to the problem of intersubjectivity, then if my argument is sound, then

Husserl does not have to show that other rational subjects exist in order to give a philosophically satisfactory analysis. This is a partial defense of Husserl since, as I shall argue, he does not try to prove that other rational subjects exist. The second point has to do with the concept 'rational subjects'. If, as I have argued, only an open plurality of rational subjects can constitute the sense 'science', then an analysis of the sense 'other subject' is not sufficient for a philosophically satisfactory account of our concept of science. Husserl must show how the sense 'rational subject' is constituted.

13. Further Clarifications of the Horizon of 'Scientific Truth' and 'Evidence'

A. The Identity of Judgements

We recall that scientific evidence. (evidence₂) is the property of a judgement when it fits a corresponding actuality (see thesis 3). Now, we have seen that the scientific truth of a proposition, which we regard as a function of the evidence that shows it, requires critical verification. That is, part of what we mean by 'a scientific truth' is 'a proposition which has been critically verified'. Critical verification, however, is a process. That we regard a proposition as a scientific truth is a function of the fact that evidence relevant to its truth has been produced and criticized (i.e., has been through the process of critical verification). It is possible, then, that there was a time when each scientific judgement has not been critically verified. This exposes another necessary presupposition on any scientist's part, namely,

that a judgement is identical throughout the process of critical verification. The identity of a judgement in part guides the scientific inquiry; it is that for which one gathers evidence. Further, a judgement must be reidentifiable as the same judgement if the process of critical verification is possible. If it were not reidentifiable, then scientists would not know that for which they have, had, or will have evidence. In short, the process of critical verification would break down.

In the first part of Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl distinguishes three sorts of judgements: confused, distinct, and clear. In paragraph 21 Husserl notes that there is a kind of evidence in which the sameness of the judgement throughout the modes of confusion, distinctness and clarity, is given.

With the transition, with the making distinct to oneself of what one truly meant in the vague [i.e., confused] judging process of meaning...with this transition the distinct judgement becomes given as an evident mere explication of the true sense or meaning. There comes to pass a coincidence of identity belonging to an originally peculiar type, which indicates a fundamental type of 'evidence' (FTL, p. 69).

This fundamental kind of evidence is different from the evidence I have been discussing in an important respect. I have been talking about the sort of evidence which, ideally speaking, shows the truth of a proposition. But in order to do that (i.e., to verify critically), one must have the evidence of the identity of the judgement throughout that process. So there are two sorts of evidence that are involved in critical verification: (1) the evidence of the identity of the judgement, and (2) the evidence that, ideally speaking, shows the truth (or falsehood, for that matter) of a proposition. Evidence of the

first kind is a prerequisite for evidence of the second kind.

Now, I said that evidence of the first kind differs from evidence of the second sort in an important respect because, in many respects, they are the same. Evidence of the first kind is evidence of the truth of a proposition, namely 'That is exactly what I meant', or 'This is the same judgement that was formerly unconfirmed'. In a way, then, evidence of the first kind is also evidence of the second sort. But if this is so, then if, as seems plausible, evidence of the first sort is a necessary condition for evidence of the second sort, we land into an infinite regress. But what would be the identical judgement when it becomes evident to one that one's judgement is the same. The regress is as follows: If it becomes evident to me that my judgement J_1 is identical throughout, say, the modes of distinctness and clarity, then since it thereby becomes evident to me that ' J_1 is identical...' is true, then if evidence of the first kind is necessary for evidence of the second sort, there must be another identical judgement, J_2 , the identity of which is evident to me in judging ' J_1 is identical...'. But since I thereby become conscious of the truth of ' J_2 is identical...', there must be a third judgement, J_3 , and so on. I see no way out of this problem for Husserl.

Although the passage I cited from Formal and Transcendental Logic is about the identity of the judgement throughout the modes "confused" and "distinct", the same holds for fulfilled judgements.

Now, in the case of a clarifying fulfillment-synthesis, a focusing of regard and an identification are possible, by virtue of which an empty judgement and a full judgement become identified, merely as judgements, and gain an objectivity of their own as the same judgement; and the like is true of the parallel fulfill-

ment-synthesis that effects the coincidence of a confused and a distinct judgement (FTL, p. 69).

The evidence of the identity of a judgement, like the evidence of the truth (or falsehood) of a proposition, has its degrees of perfection.

This evidence, like any other (any 'experience' in the widest conceivable sense), has its degrees of perfection and its idea—here indeed an ideal limit of perfection, at which the synthetic coincidence would in fact be absolutely perfect (FTL, p. 69).

I think that this passage shows Husserl's sensitivity to the distinction between 'what a person intends to say (meant)' and 'what a person said (the meaning of his words)'. For, if the meaning of someone's words were a function of what he meant, then the evidence of the "synthetic coincidence" of one's judgement would necessarily and always be absolutely perfect. Since Husserl does not think that this is so, his terms 'meaning-intending act' and especially 'meaning-conferring act' are misleading. Husserl recognizes the independence (transcendence) of meanings from acts, despite the fact that it is in acts of understanding use by speakers and understanding grasp by hearers that meanings are constituted. Mohanty has discussed this point in more detail, but cites a different text (H:E&A, pp. 29-30).

Husserl's general point is that judgements must be reidentifiable (by any rational subject) if critical verification is possible.

B. A Problem Concerning Communication

I ascribed to the rational subjects to whom scientific evidence and truths are accessible the ability to communicate. Only on the basis of communication can scientists critically verify ostensible

truths. If they do not (or cannot) communicate, then there is, for scientists, no selfsame proposition to be critically examined. If so, then there is no rational procedure for determining the truth or falsehood of the proposition.

However, Husserl appears to be presupposing that scientists speak the same language. Recently, Thomas Kuhn has challenged that position, arguing that careful study of the history of science shows that even scientists within the same discipline speak different languages and, in some sense, inhabit different worlds. The language that a scientist speaks is a function of the paradigm that he accepts, to use one of Kuhn's technical terms. This aspect of Husserl's philosophy of science, then does not appear to be borne out by the facts.

But Husserl is not presupposing that scientists speak the same language. His thesis implies nothing of the sort. Rather, Husserl's position implies that scientists can communicate if they can determine the truth or falsehood of scientific hypotheses (and theories) on rational grounds. Conversely, if they actually determine the truth (or falsehood) of a hypothesis (or theory) by critical verification, then they are communicating. Thus, Husserl is implicitly committed to the thesis that it is possible to translate paradigm languages, so that critical evaluation can take place.

However, Kuhn has an objection to this thesis, too. In order to translate paradigm languages so that one can adjudicate between competing theories, one must make use of a theory-free, neutral observation language. But there have been many attempts to construct such a lan-

guage, each of which has failed. This reinforces the belief that such a language cannot be constructed (SSR, p. 127). Besides, the very notion of 'a purely observational language' itself presupposes a paradigm.

But their result is a language that--like those employed in the sciences--embodies a host of expectations about nature and fails to function the moment these expectations are violated (SSR, p. 127).

Husserl might respond in this way: "I am talking about the context of justification, rather than the context of discovery. My theses have to do with the evidential considerations that are relevant to the justification of scientific hypotheses, rather than the social and psychological facts surrounding the discovery of such hypotheses. So the fact that scientists who subscribe to different paradigms did not communicate in times of scientific crisis is irrelevant to my theses. My point is that they would have had to communicate if they were to decide on rational grounds which scientific theory is better. To the extent that the history of science deviates from this standard, it does not follow rational procedures."

But this response may be a bit too hasty. For there is no a priori reason why one and the same thing cannot be both psychologically and evidentially relevant. After all, the scientist thinks rationally (for the most part) in discovering and justifying hypotheses. He may observe and gather evidence for a hypothesis, and find that evidence persuasive. Here one and the same thing is both psychologically and evidentially relevant. We must distinguish this factor from, say, certain religious beliefs that persuaded a scientist to accept a

hypothesis. That falls squarely within the context of discovery only. Scientists themselves produce finished research reports, which constitute their rational reconstruction of the process of discovery (MSPS, p. 73). Scientists make logical inferences in arriving at hypotheses, which is of interest to philosophers of science (MSPS, p. 71).

Since the contexts of discovery and justification overlap in this way, we may say that if a philosopher expounds a theory of the logical structure of science according to which almost all of the history of science is methodologically unsound, it would be more reasonable to conclude that the philosophical reasoning had gone astray than to suppose that science is logically misconceived (MSPS, p. 73). If scientists almost never communicate when one paradigm replaces another--if the basic reason why a new paradigm "wins" is that the advocates of the old paradigm die--then something is wrong with Husserl's theory of evidence and truth.

But the history of science is not like that, as Kuhn himself admits in his "Postscript" to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Though the price is often sentences of great length and complexity (think of the Proust-Berthollet controversy conducted without recourse to the term 'element'), many additional research results can be translated from one community's language into the other's ...Counter-arguments are, in any case, always available, and no rules prescribe how the balance must be struck. Nevertheless, as argument piles on argument and as challenge after challenge is successfully met, only blind stubbornness can at the end account for continued resistance (SSR, pp. 203-204).

The position that Kuhn eventually adopts does not conflict with Husserl's at all.

The question naturally arises as to whether I misrepresented Kuhn's position at the beginning of this section. I do not think that

I have. I believe that the explanation for the change in Kuhn's position lies in that he rejected a certain presupposition that he makes in chapters 10 and 12 when he wrote the "Postscript". When Kuhn emphasizes the role of paradigms in determining what one sees, the entities that one believes to exist, the language one uses, even the problems one thinks science must address, and the consequent lack of communication between scientists who subscribe to competing paradigms, Kuhn thinks that in order to translate paradigm languages one must have recourse to some paradigm-free "given" in order to construct a language which adequately expresses this neutral data. Noting that scientists have no access to this "given", and adding that attempts to construct such a language have failed, Kuhn ascribes shifts of paradigm-allegiance largely to non-rational factors.

It must be granted that Kuhn never acknowledges that he rejects the presupposition ascribed to him. That he makes that presupposition can, I think, be seen in the following passage:

...Probabilistic verification theories all have recourse to one or another of the pure or neutral observation-languages discussed in Section X....Apparently some such construction of a neutral language is necessary for the computation of specific probabilities, absolute or relative, and it is hard to see how such a construction can possibly be achieved. If, as I have already urged, there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of language or concepts, then the proposed construction of alternate tests and theories must proceed from within one or another paradigm-based tradition (SSR, pp. 145-6, emphases mine).

According to Kuhn's reasoning here, tests of theories must be question-begging (SSR, p. 94) if there is no access to "the given" and a neutral language which "pictures" it. One can compare this passage with the one cited below, in which it is clear that Kuhn thinks that a language that

is neutral with respect to the competing theories alone is sufficient for theory-testing.

Now one might counter this line of reasoning by saying that all that is required is ordinary language about what is perceived in order to translate. But Kuhn responds that perception itself is paradigm-informed (SSR, p. 113), since it embodies a host of expectations (beliefs) about the course of nature. Accordingly, ordinary language will reflect those beliefs. In Husserl's language, perception has its noema. Thus, ordinary language is not neutral in the requisite sense.

But Kuhn came to realize that one does not require recourse to "the given" or a language which "pictures" it in order to adjudicate between theories. All that one requires is a language that is neutral with respect to those theories, rather than utterly neutral.

Arguments statable in the vocabulary that both groups use in the same way are not, however, usually decisive, at least not until a very late stage in the evolution of the opposing views (SSR, p. 203, emphasis mine).

Husserl's theory, of course, does not require that neutral descriptions be decisive at an early stage in the argument. That has to do with (natural) resistance to change in beliefs; it is a matter of persuasion, rather than justification. But the point is that neutral descriptions can (and have) been persuasive; so, it does not follow from Husserl's theory that the history of science is largely irrational.

Kuhn's eventual position is that scientists who ascribe to different paradigms always talk slightly at cross-purposes. But scientists do not have to communicate always in order to decide rationally which theory is better. Moreover, this is a far cry from

the position that persons who argue for their respective paradigms always use the languages of their paradigms in a question-begging way (SSR, p. 94). Husserl's theory does not require that scientists never talk at cross-purposes, but only that they communicate sufficiently to adjudicate between theories (usually).

14. Apodictic Evidence in Formal and Transcendental Logic

I pointed out that a consequence of Husserl's inclusion of critical verification in the definitions of 'scientific evidence' and 'truth' is that there is no instantaneous insight into the truth of a proposition, in such a way that future doubt is precluded. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Husserl criticizes that interpretation of apodicticity.

Thus it happens that evidence is usually conceived as an absolute apodicticity, an absolute security against deceptions--an apodicticity quite incomprehensibly ascribed to a single mental process torn from the concrete, essentially unitary, context of subjective mental living (FTL, p. 157, last emphasis mine).

The wrongheadedness of such a theory consists in ascribing apodicticity to a single experience (evidence); this renders unexplainable the fact that scientific truths are attained by critical verification. The achievement of scientific truths by refining and correcting hypotheses is inexplicable if truths are apodictically evident in single insights.

And to stick to tradition--which, for motives long forgotten and, in any case, never clarified, reduces evidence to an insight that is apodictic, absolutely indubitable, and, so to speak, absolutely finished in itself--is to bar oneself from an understanding of any scientific production (FTL, p. 161, last two emphases mine).

It is noteworthy that Husserl objects to the ascription of

apodicticity to a single mental process. This leaves open the possibility that apodicticity is properly said of critically verified insights (or truths). Husserl's point in the passage just cited is that one cannot separate a single experience from its horizon and truthfully ascribe apodicticity to it. But is it the case that if one includes the horizon, that one can predicate apodicticity to the entire nexus of critically verified experiences, in which an intended objective affair is given? In other words, does Husserl reject the notion of apodicticity outright in Formal and Transcendental Logic?

Merleau-Ponty thinks that he does: "There is no apodictic self-evidence, the Formale und transzendente Logik (p. 142) says in effect" (PP, p. xvi). Merleau-Ponty refers to the same page which I just cited, where Husserl rejects the position that single experiences are apodictic. Husserl certainly agrees with Merleau-Ponty in thinking that (external) perception is neither adequate nor apodictic (PP, p. xvi). But that is a far cry from saying that there is no apodictic evidence. Richard Zaner concurs with Merleau-Ponty.

If, furthermore, Descartes's appeal to God's veracity and benevolence to guarantee the objective validity of clear and distinct ideas is countersensical, then it is also unsinning to attempt to secure that selfsame objective validity by appealing to 'apodictic principles'. For, epistemically, it is precisely the same appeal which is made (LWC, p. 214).

Zaner's position is somewhat stronger than Merleau-Ponty's, as he claims that there are no legitimate appeals to apodictic principles because there is no apodictic evidence. Still, the two share the position that there is no apodictic self-evidence in Formal and Transcendental Logic.

Suzanne Bachelard disagrees.

But if Husserl denounces the reduction of all evidence to apodictic evidence, he none the less recognizes the place of apodictic evidence. And we think it impossible to interpret Husserl's thought as Mr. Merleau-Ponty does, in the Preface of his Phenomenology of Perception, when he declares: 'There is no apodictic self-evidence, the Formale und transzendente Logik... says in effect'. On the contrary, the notion of apodictic evidence is brought to light everywhere in Husserl's works, from the earliest to the latest (SFTL, p. 106).

However, Bachelard cites very little textual evidence from Formal and Transcendental Logic to support her interpretation, preferring to cite passages from Ideas and Cartesian Meditations. In fact, she cites only one indecisive passage from Formal and Transcendental Logic (SFTL, p. 106n). But the issue is whether Husserl held that there is apodictic evidence in Formal and Transcendental Logic. Husserl's positions in Ideas and Cartesian Meditations are irrelevant to this issue, unless one adds some substantive premises.¹

David Levin agrees with Bachelard: "Nevertheless, it must be conceded to Bachelard that Merleau-Ponty is not justified in claiming that Husserl meant to surrender apodicticity in the Logik". (R&E, p. 106). Levin's interpretation has an added dimension, however; he thinks that Husserl should have repudiated apodicticity outright in Formal and Transcendental Logic.

It would be completely in keeping with Husserl's direction of thought, as well as the temperament expressed in many of his statements in the Logik, were he to announce his abandonment of apodicticity. Evidences are interdependent; they refer backwards and forwards to other evidential decisions; they constitute a harmonious totality only in the infinite dimension towards which they continually advance. There is no place in such a conception for an infallible, absolute, final and unassailable mode of evidence (R&E, p. 106, emphasis mine).

Levin, then, thinks that Husserl's position is inconsistent.

Levin's position raises two additional questions. Thus, we have three questions to answer. The first two are historical; the third is philosophical.

1. Did Husserl completely abandon the notion of apodicticity in Formal and Transcendental Logic?
2. If not, then was Husserl inconsistent in that he did not abandon apodicticity?
3. Should Husserl have abandoned the notion of apodicticity?

I should point out that the answer to question 3 is independent of our response to question 2. We are asking whether it is philosophically correct to make appeals to apodicticity in question 3. That is, do we find Husserl's appeals to apodicticity in Formal and Transcendental Logic convincing (presuming, for the sake of the question, that he does)? If so, why? If not, why not? If Husserl's position is inconsistent--if, that is, we respond affirmatively to question 2--that implies that he must either relinquish apodicticity or the part of his theory of evidence that does not square with it.

I shall address each of these questions in turn.

Here is a passage that suggests that Levin and Bachelard are correct, and that Merleau-Ponty and Zaner are mistaken.

There comes to light in this connexion the difference already described by Descartes, despite all the obscurity: that this Ego--that I, understood as the ultimately constitutive subjectivity, exist for myself with apodictic necessity (without prejudice to my infinite horizons of undisclosed and unknown determinations)...(FTL, p. 251).

Some distinctions need to be drawn in order to ascertain the nature of the dispute and determine which set of commentators is correct. Although Mohanty is not interpreting any one of Husserl's texts in his

article "Towards a Phenomenology of Self-Evidence", he draws some distinctions that are relevant to this discussion. Mohanty distinguishes between self-evidence₁, or consciousness' pre-reflective awareness of itself, from self-evidence₂, which is the experience of truth. Self-evidence₁ is consciousness' non-traditional awareness of itself "... without being an object either of itself (which is absurd) or of another act, simultaneous or successive" (EP, p. 208). Self-evidence₁ is predicable of the existence, though not the content, of consciousness. "It would then seem that self-evidence₁ is nothing but consciousness's awareness of its own existence, and that it does not extend to its contents" (EP, p. 211).

Self-evidence₂, on the other hand, is intentional and pertains to the relationship between the noematic sense and the intentional object.

Apprehension of truth is not just apprehension of the object as it is, even if this apprehension be an intuitive experience. It is an experience of the fulfilling synthesis of identification between the object as intended (i.e., the noematic sense) and the object as it presents itself (EP, p. 215).

No isolated experience counts as self-evident₂, since to identify an experience as an apprehension of truth is to be committed to the proposition that theses 2-6 hold good of it. In short, one is committed to future course of experiences (EP, p. 216). But the question "Did Husserl abandon the notion of apodictic evidence in Formal and Transcendental Logic?" does not seem to be about either self-evidence₁ or self-evidence₂, since we take 'apodictic evidence' to mean "an infallible, absolute, final, and unassailable mode of evidence" that reveals necessary truths (R&E p. 106). The bulk of this paper has shown that

self-evidence₂ plays a role in Formal and Transcendental Logic. If we understand by 'evidence' 'the property of a judgement when it fits a corresponding actuality', questions arise about how we know when this fit is accomplished. Husserl's definition of 'truth' as 'a correct critically verified judgement' is a partial answer. We know only if the ostensible truth and the evidence for it have been critically verified. But this is self-evidence₂. Thus, if apodictic evidence were self-evidence₂, our question would not arise. Thus, apodictic evidence is what Mohanty calls self-evidence₃. Self-evidence₃ is to be understood in the way just explained. Thus our question is "Does the passage just cited from Formal and Transcendental Logic show that Husserl still accepts self-evidence₃, or apodictic evidence?".

Let us set aside this question for the time being, however, in order to clarify the passage. I propose to do this by asking two different questions, namely (1) In the passage cited above, is Husserl saying that he has self-evidence₂ of his existence?; and (2) Is Mohanty correct in maintaining that self-evidence₁ does not entail self-evidence₂? I shall address the second question first.

Mohanty argues as follows:

That self-evidence₁ does not entail self-evidence₂ may be seen from considering the fact that consciousness may be consciousness of truth as well as of error, and that in the case consciousness qua consciousness is self-evidence. If A be a perception by S of an object O, S not only perceives O but is also aware of perceiving it, i.e., has a nonthetic, prereflective awareness of A. Such an awareness is not a guarantee that A is a veridical perception. If A is a false perception or even a hallucination, A may have the same prereflective awareness of it but surely not of it as false or as hallucinatory, just as when A is true, veridical perception, its being true or veridical is not given to S in prereflective consciousness (EP, pp. 210-211).

If I am hallucinating 0, then the same thing is self-evident₁ to me as when I am genuinely perceiving 0. Thus, self-evidence₁ does not guarantee truth. Self-evidence₁ is the "lived unquestionableness" of which Levin speaks (PPU, pp. 60-61).

One might object to Mohanty's argument as follows: Mohanty has introduced a question of content in his example, whereas he distinguishes between the existence and the content of an act (EP, p. 211). Of course, I may mistake a hallucination for a perception. But the question "Is this act a hallucination or a perception?" is a question about the content of the act, and is to be distinguished from the question of the bare existence of this act, irrespective of what kind of act it is. It is granted that the distinctive act-quality is to be distinguished from the noematic content. Still, Mohanty introduces a question about the content of the act (i.e., what sort of act it is) in order to conclude that act A can be self-evident₁ to S and yet S can be mistaken about A. That follows only if one considers A under a certain description (e.g., as a perception or hallucination). The question of the sheer existence of A yields a different conclusion. For if A is self-evident₁ to S, it necessarily follows that A exists. (We are considering 'A' solely as a name for an act of consciousness, irrespective of its kind.) But if A exists, then 'A exists' is true. Therefore, when it concerns the mere existence of an act (though not its act-quality), self-evidence₁ entails self-evidence₂. For, if A is self-evident₁ to S, then 'A exists' is true.

I think that the above criticism is correct in distinguishing between the content of an act and the noematic content. I also

concur in believing that if A is self-evident₁ to S, then A exists and (consequently) 'A exists' is true. However, I do not think that it follows that A's existence (or, more precisely, the truth of 'A exists') is self-evident₂ to S. For, in order for the truth of 'A exists' to be self-evident₂ to S, A must be the intended object of one (or more) acts. But an act cannot take itself as an object. Only subsequent reflection (a different act) can render A as an intended object. To live through an act and to reflect upon it are two different things. An act A is self-evident₁ to S while one lives through A, and can be self-evident₂ to S only if S is not "living through" it. So even though the self-evidence₁ of A to S guarantees the existence of A (and the truth of 'A exists'), it does not follow that the truth of 'A exists' is self-evident₂ to S. However, I do think that it follows that it is possible for A to be self-evident₂ to S, so long as by 'self-evident₂' we understand simply 'consciousness of truth'.

I think that this analysis and argument have shown that Mohanty is correct in saying that the notion of self-evidence₁ is prior to the distinction between truth and falsity, since truth and falsity concern the act's intention rather than the existence or quality of the act (EP, p. 213). This may appear to conflict with my references to the truth of the proposition 'A exists', and Mohanty's references to the truth (or falsehood) of 'A is a perception'. But it should be noted that we are referring to acts and act qualities rather than living through the same; hence, they are the intended objects of our acts. I would revise Mohanty's dictum slightly to say that our knowledge of truth and falsity concerns the intended object, rather

than the existence of quality of the act(s) in which it is intended.

This discussion has been necessary, since in the passage from Formal and Transcendental Logic cited above Husserl says that he exists for himself with apodictic necessity (FTL, p. 251). Our preceding discussion has shown that Husserl can be interpreted as saying the same thing as Mohanty, namely that consciousness as such is pre-reflective consciousness of itself. In other words, self-evidence₁ is an essential feature of consciousness. Things differ from consciousnesses in that they do not exist for themselves.

Since Husserl is talking about self-evidence₁, and since self-evidence₁ does not involve consciousness of truth (or falsity), it may seem that the passage does not show anything about Husserl's position on self-evidence₃. However, it should be noted that since Husserl is talking about consciousness' existence for itself (self-evidence₁), it is a question of truth (or falsity) and consciousness of it. Thus, our question remains.

But what does the phrase 'with apodictic necessity' mean in that passage? Is Husserl saying that he has an apodictic insight into the truth 'Consciousness exists for itself'? Or is he saying that 'Consciousness exists for itself' is a necessary truth? Or is he saying both? Now Husserl is at least saying that 'Consciousness exists for itself' (or, 'I, as a consciousness, exist for myself', to be more precise) is a necessary truth. But is Husserl also saying that he has apodictic insight into its truth? One might respond "yes, since one knows a necessary truth only in an apodictic insight". However, I find no textual evidence that supports the interpretation that

Husserl accepted such a principle in Formal and Transcendental Logic.

Let us take a closer look at the notion 'apodictic evidence (insight)'.

If one had an unassailable insight into a necessary truth, then on Husserl's own principles this would mean an enduring accessibility to insight (FTL, p. 43).

Absolutely any consciousness of anything whatever belongs a priori to an openly endless multiplicity of possible modes of consciousness, which can always be connected synthetically in the unity-form of conjoint acceptance...to make one consciousness, as consciousness of 'the Same' (FTL, p. 160).

Thus, if O is self-evident₃ to S , then O is self-evident₂ to S .

Now, if one understands Husserl's analyses of the senses 'evidence' and 'truth' (as I do) as at the same time setting down a procedure for ascertaining whether an ostensible truth is in fact true, then one can say that such a procedure could not possibly disclose any deception or refine the claim in the case of apodictic insight into a necessary truth. But this would only constitute a further analysis of what it means to have an apodictic insight into a truth. It is not to say that there are any such insights; nor is it to say that we know that we have such insights. The passage that I cited simply does not tell us whether Husserl asserts that there are any apodictic insights.

Levin cites a passage that he thinks shows that Husserl did not deny apodicticity.

Evidence of experience is therefore always presupposed by the process. The conscious 'dispelling' of a deception, with the originality of 'now I see that it is an illusion', is itself a species of evidence...Even an ostensibly apodictic evidence can be disclosed as deception and, in that event, presupposes a similar evidence by which it is 'shattered' (FTL, p. 156; cited in R&E, p. 107).

Now Levin cites this passage in order to attack Husserl's position. But

all Husserl is doing is analyzing the notion 'apodictic evidence'; he is not saying that there are any apodictic insights, which is what Levin apparently finds objectionable. Part of what is entailed by 'apodictic evidence' is 'No two genuine apodictic evidences can conflict with one another' and 'If two ostensible apodictic insights conflict with one another, one is not an apodictic insight'.

There is, however, a passage in Formal and Transcendental Logic wherein Husserl asserts that a truth is apodictically evident.

All its [phenomenology's] results, when freed from factualness and thereby transposed into the realm of free phantasy-variation, become eidetic, become results that (as is apodictically evident) govern a universe of conceivability (a 'pure' allness), in such a manner that the negation of any result is equivalent to an intuitable eidetic impossibility, an inconceivability (FTL, p. 249, emphasis mine).

The answer to our first question, then, is "no". Therefore, both Zaner and Merleau-Ponty are mistaken. Moreover, Levin and Bachelard are correct on this historical question.

The question that Levin posed needs to be answered, namely "Is Husserl's theory of evidence in Formal and Transcendental Logic inconsistent with any appeal to apodictic evidence?". I have already pointed out that if a truth is apodictically evident (self-evident₃) to S, then even though it is consequently self-evident₂ (i.e., subject to critical verification), such critical examination would be pointless insofar as it could not possibly disclose any deception on S's part or refine the claim. 'Impossibility of deception' is simply part of what 'apodictic evidence' means. Since this is so, a single insight into an apodictic (necessary) truth would suffice for apodictic evidence. (But, as we shall see, it does not suffice for knowing that a proposition

is apodictically evident.) That is, the conception of apodictic evidence as predicable of a single insight appears to be the only way to construe apodictic evidence as something that is achieved. But I have already shown that Husserl criticizes theorists of that sort. Thus, Husserl is inconsistent.

I concur with most of the preceding argument, but still think that I can show that Husserl is not inconsistent. It is important to recall that Husserl's analysis of evidence and truth is from the phenomenological standpoint, where everything is treated as a phenomenon of being, rather than something that is. Accordingly, when Husserl claims that a truth is apodictically evident, he is talking about the phenomenon of apodictic evidence of a necessary truth. This is in keeping with the conceptual point that to identify something as a necessary truth is to be committed to the belief that one's insight into it is unassailable. But to claim that a truth appears to be apodictically evident does not imply that it is so, or that it is a necessary truth. The theorists that Husserl criticizes, on the other hand, take apodictic evidence as an "absolute criterion of truth" (FTL, p. 157, emphasis mine). Thus, Husserl does not criticize exactly the same sort of theory to which he must be committed by asserting that something is apodictically evident to him. Thus, Husserl is not inconsistent. Some textual evidence for this interpretation includes the following: "The possibility of deception is inherent in the evidence of experience and does not annul either its fundamental character or its effect..." (FTL, p. 156). [It is noteworthy that this sentence is in the same paragraph that Levin cited as evidence for accusing Husserl of unmitigated rationalism (cited in

this chapter, p. 144), occurring only a few sentences earlier.]

One might object to this defense of Husserl on the grounds that although Husserl refuses to make straightforward claims about what exists, he does make straightforward assertions about phenomena (more precisely, the invariant in phenomena). But according to the above defense, Husserl's assertions about phenomena are not straightforward. In this regard, the preceding defense misinterprets Husserl. After all, any science includes some propositions that are straightforwardly true (or at least ones that we have good reason to believe are straightforwardly true). No science consists of a set of propositions of the form "It appears to me that P". Any science, including phenomenology, consists of propositions of the form "P". Phenomenology differs from other sciences in the subject matter, not in the form, of its propositions. Therefore, the preceding defense will not do.

My paradoxical response is that Husserl's phenomenological propositions are and are not straightforward. Rendering this paradox intelligible is simply a matter of distinguishing two questions and, more importantly, two levels of reflection. It is simply a matter of explaining more fully the defense of Husserl, rather than rejecting it.

Despite the fact that phenomenology begins with the suspension of the naïveté of the natural standpoint, there is a certain naïveté in phenomenology as well--the naïveté of apodicticity.

Only we preferred to sketch in outline the tremendous wealth of problems belonging to the first stage of phenomenology --a stage which in its own manner is itself still infected with a certain naïveté (the naïveté of apodicticity) but contains the great and most characteristic accomplishment of phenomenology; as a refashioning of science on a higher level--instead of entering

into the further and ultimate problems of phenomenology: those pertaining to its self-criticism, which aims at determining not only the range and limits but also the modes of apodicticity (CM, pp. 151-152).

Whenever Husserl makes a straightforward claim that a truth is apodictically evident, he is talking from the naïve phenomenological standpoint. But because phenomenology is supposed to be a genuine science that accounts for its own possibility, phenomenology also includes a second level of reflection wherein he analyzes claims to apodictic evidence. At this second level these claims are treated as claims, as phenomena, whereas at the naïve level they are not. This second-order reflection discloses the role and necessity of critical verification in phenomenology. After all, a phenomenologist's goal is to know, and Husserl recognizes that there is no knowledge without critical verification. These two levels of reflection correspond to the zigzag judging procedure which is present in any science (though the referents of the judgements differ, of course).

His [the scientist's] judgements must be verified by genuine, by maximally perfect, evidence; and only as so verified shall they be admitted among the results of science as theory. This brings about a peculiar judging procedure on the scientist's part, a zigzag judging, so to speak: first making straight for the givenness of something itself, but then going back critically to the provisional results already obtained--whereupon his criticism must be subjected to criticism, and for like reasons (FTL, p. 125).

Husserl, too, aims straight for the givenness of something itself. These are the places where one finds straightforward assertions that apodictic evidence has been achieved. But at the second level Husserl discloses the role of criticism in ascertaining whether he is correct. Actually, one never completely overcomes the naïveté

of straightforwardness, since at the second level one makes straightforward assertions about the procedure for determining whether an ostensible necessary truth is in fact one (i.e., its horizon). In fact, some judgements must be straightforward to have a science (Ideas, p. 99). I submit that this is the explanation for why Husserl says that 'judging simpliciter' is "a completely relative term" (FTL, p. 132). For this reason phenomenology is an endless examination of itself. In fact, Husserl himself recognizes that endless self-examination is part of the essential sense of 'ultimate justification of a science by itself' (FTL, p. 268). For this same reason I find Husserl's talk about the naive level of phenomenology as a "stage" misleading. It is not as if one could complete that stage and move on, for one cannot overcome the sort of naiveté at the first level.

Hence, Levin and I sharply disagree. The position that Levin finds reasonable, but thinks that Husserl is unwilling to adopt, is the position that I ascribe to Husserl.

It is commendable that, in the Logik, he does perceive the crying need for a critique of apodicticity. But, this critique, effected in order to remove the last vestiges of naiveté, is itself supposed to be apodictic. On what grounds is its apodicticity to be shown? Would the apodictic critique itself demand a critique to disclose its apodicticity? How far-reaching is the naiveté which Husserl expects to overcome? Could we not perhaps sustain the view, certainly compatible with some important aspects of his own thinking, that naiveté (in a quite harmless way) is actually unavoidable, in the sense that, if inquiry is never at an end and extends into infinity, evidences (even insights) interweaving with evidences, what is naive is simply that which, at any given stage of signification [sic] [suggest: "inquiry"], is open to further examination and development? In view of the hypothetical nature of apodictic insight (suggested in the passage cited above) and its openness to conflict and cancellation, this interpretation would indeed suggest itself as a reasonable one. Nevertheless, Husserl is plainly unwilling to adopt it (R&E, pp. 108-109).

I think that it is plain that Husserl does adopt it. Levin's position is irreconcilable with the passages I cited, where Husserl conceives of phenomenology as endless self-examination. Here is still another passage wherein Husserl appears to adopt the position that Levin thinks that he is unwilling to adopt. Phenomenological

...investigations take on a painful and yet unavoidable relativity, a provisionalness, instead of the definiteness for which we were striving: Each investigation, at its own level, overcomes some naiveté or other, but is still accompanied by the naiveté of its own level--which must then be overcome in turn by more penetrating investigations of origins. The pre-suppositions of being, as they are uncovered at each level, become indices of problems concerning evidence, which lead us into the vast system of constitutive subjectivity (FTL, pp. 270-271).

This passage also serves another purpose, that of confirming my interpretation.

Throughout Husserl's writings, then, one finds the naiveté of apodicticity. These are the assertions that a necessary truth is apodictically evident. In other places (especially in FTL), however, Husserl analyzes the procedure for determining whether those claims are correct. Husserl recognizes that his claims to apodictic evidence are ostensible at the second-level of reflection. But he could not for that reason revise his assertions such that they are of the form 'It is ostensibly apodictic that P'. For if he did, there would be no scientific proposition to critically verify. How could one show that 'It is ostensibly apodictic that P' is false? Showing that P is not a necessary truth would leave the proposition unscathed. If critical verification disclosed that the proposition P resisted all attempts at criticism, that would not show that 'It is ostensibly apodictic that P' is true.

In order to falsify or confirm that hypothesis, one would have to inspect Husserl's mental states. But as phenomenologists, we are not interested in Husserl's mental history. Rather, we are interested in universal truths about any consciousness whatever. Thus, there is a philosophical proposition to confirm or falsify only if it is of the straightforward form P.

But it is necessary to be quite careful about the referent of the words 'those claims' in the preceding paragraph. Husserl maintains that some propositions are apodictically evident to him. But will critical verification show that such a claim is true? No. To ascertain whether 'It is apodictically evident to Husserl that P' is true would require access to Husserl's mental states, too; I have already pointed out that Husserl's mental history is irrelevant to phenomenology and critical verification of phenomenological propositions. Critical verification, then, will show (ideally) that P is a necessary truth, not that Husserl's (or anyone else's) insight into it is apodictic.

Here is a rationale for this position. Apodictic insight requires a definite clarity of consciousness. Now Husserl may have been inattentive when he wrote 'It is apodictically evident (to me) that P'. Suppose that P is a necessary truth, and that critical verification shows that it is so. It would be an unjustifiable inference if one concluded that Husserl had apodictic insight into it. This would be an illegitimate inference even if Husserl had clear apodictic insight. The clarity of Husserl's insight is a contingent matter that has nothing to do with phenomenology or critical verification. What holds for

Husserl, of course, holds for any individual.

Since critical verification does not disclose the nature of any individual's insight, it may seem to be the case that Husserl should abandon claims to apodictic evidence. But since to identify P as a necessary truth is to identify one's insight into it as unassailable, it is mistaken to expect Husserl to abandon claims to apodictic evidence simply because he recognizes that they are ostensibly apodictic at another level of reflection. Phenomenologically, the two go together. To expect Husserl to do so would be to require him to assimilate the sort of evidence that we have for empirical generalizations to the evidence that we have when (and if) we have insight into a necessary truth. To identify P as a necessary truth is to identify it as unfalsifiable by experience, whereas that is not the case with empirical generalizations.

It should be pointed out that by 'unfalsifiable by experience' I do not mean 'a priori'. Saul Kripke has recently argued that if all necessities are de re (rather than de dicto, a position to which Husserl ascribes), then it is possible to have a necessary a posteriori proposition, such as 'Mark Twain is identical with Sam Clemens'. But I am calling attention to a different feature of necessary truth when I call them unfalsifiable by experience. If one produces a counter example to an empirical generalization of the form 'All s is p', that shows that the generalization is false. It does not show that the empirical generalization is not an empirical generalization. But if one produces a counter example to an ostensible necessary truth, that shows that the proposition is false and that it is not a necessary

truth. This holds for all necessary truths, whether they are a priori or a posteriori. It is noteworthy that Husserl asserts that he has apodictic evidence only for what he takes to be necessary truths. It is important for an epistemologist to account for the privileged position of what we take to be necessary truths. If, for example, some measurement according to a physical theory had the consequence that $4 = 5$, we would consider that a reductio of the physical theory, rather than elementary arithmetic. But at the same time that one accounts for the privileged position of necessary truths, one must also account for our ability to distinguish between the genuine and spurious. I think that Husserl's theory satisfies both of these conditions. But Husserl's identification of a proposition as a necessary truth does not imply that it is one; and this is true on Husserl's own grounds. The question "Is P a necessary truth?" can be answered only if it has been critically verified.

Thus, my argument has shown that it is not surprising to find the naïveté of apodicticity in Formal and Transcendental Logic. But it has also shown how the naïve claims to apodicticity are reconcilable with the theory of evidence and truth in Formal and Transcendental Logic, a theory according to which all evidences are interdependent and refer one to further undisclosed horizons. Since our knowledge that a truth is necessary depends on critical verification, I think that I have also shown how the concepts of apodicticity as an ideal and as an achievement are compatible. Our knowledge of such an achievement lies at infinity.

At the beginning of this argument I referred to two questions

that need to be distinguished. They are: (1) Do we have any apodictic insights? and (2) How do we know that a truth is a necessary truth? At the naive level Husserl confidently answers "yes" to (1). But as a scientist, Husserl is most concerned about the response to (2). Here, at the second level of reflection, we obtain an extensive analysis in response to (2), which I have been clarifying throughout this chapter. Thus, it is simply not true that Husserl never provides a procedure for ascertaining whether, in fact, a truth is a necessary truth.

For nowhere can one find apodicticity employed in a context exhibiting the determination of its temporality and setting forth the conditions necessary for its justification or annulment (R&E, p. 112).

One finds it in Formal and Transcendental Logic.

We have an answer to our second question. No, Husserl was not inconsistent in that he did not abandon apodicticity. Thus, Levin is mistaken (R&E, p. 106).

Unlike Mohanty, I do not think that the notion of apodicticity can be simply "discarded" (EP, p. 227). We can discard it as any sort of criterion for truth or as a procedure for knowing it. Husserl's analysis in Formal and Transcendental Logic gives us the criteria (or, at least, some of them). Claims to apodictic evidence can be discarded as a response to our epistemological questions, but cannot be eliminated from the practice of phenomenology. Whether the naive claims that a proposition is a necessary truth are true is something to be determined by critical verification. If a claim to know a necessary truth is false, its falsehood can be disclosed in argument and counterargument (ideally speaking).

My position, then, is that it is possible to show that P is

not apodictically evident to S, whereas one cannot show that P is apodictically evident to S. One can show that P is not apodictically evident to S simply by proving that P is not a necessary truth.

Apodictic evidence is a guarantee of truth; but that is a conceptual point that has nothing to do with our epistemological situation. To say that apodictic evidence is a guarantee of truth is not to say that it is a criterion of truth, since a criterion lets one know when something else (in this case, truth) is present.

The sharp criticisms of Husserl on apodicticity, I think, have in part resulted from the presupposition that Husserl writes from a single point of view on apodicticity. Hence, some philosophers have thought that Husserl believes that there are either no procedures for ascertaining the truth of claims to necessary truth, or that there is no need for such criteria. But that is not Husserl's position (in FTL). Husserl's position is that only at the second level are epistemological criteria specified. There are at least two modes of phenomenological discourse, both of which must be recognized. These two modes of discourse correspond to the two levels of reflection. Husserl practices phenomenology when he speaks in the first way, and talks about that practice in the second way. (Of course, talking about phenomenology is also doing phenomenology.)

I hope that the distinctions between the two levels of reflection and two modes of phenomenological discourse have rendered intelligible my paradoxical assertion that Husserl's claims to apodictic evidence are and are not straightforward.

15. 'Evidence' and 'Evidenz'

I have (following Dorion Cairns' translation) used the English word 'evidence' as a translation of 'Evidenz'. But since good reasons have been forwarded for saying that such a rendering can be misleading, I propose to discuss briefly some of the relationships that obtain between the two.

Evidenz, for Husserl, is a kind of consciousness of an object. It is not the case that there is a particular sort of experience called "Evidenz" that is distinguished from all other kinds of experience, such as seeing and hearing. Quite the contrary, Evidenz is an experience whereby an objectivity is given "in person". Thus (for example) seeing is Evidenz with respect to physical objects, whereas imagining is not. Now 'evidence' in English has a broader meaning. In a courtroom a physical object (say, a revolver) is called "evidence". But since a physical object is not a kind of experience, it is not Evidenz.

'Evidenz' and 'evidence', however, do have many of the same connotations. Both are grounds for belief and serve as proof of something. 'Evidenz' means the same thing, or nearly the same thing, as the English locution 'in evidence', whereby the latter we understand 'in a situation to be readily seen, or, plainly visible'. When I spoke of producing evidence earlier, I did not literally mean producing experiences. Rather, I meant putting others in a situation whereby the truth of a proposition can be rendered evident. To say that evidence (as justification) is intersubjective is to say that others can have the evidential experiences of the relevant states of affairs.

Since both 'Evidenz' and 'evidence for' have the connotation of grounds for belief, I do not concur with David Hemmendinger's thesis

that the two can never be used in the same context.

Evidence in Husserl's sense of the word should not be confused with evidence for some state-of-affairs; there is evidence for something precisely when the thing is not itself present but is suggested or indicated by something else, which means that it is not evident ("HCE&S", p. 82).

Hemmendinger is not so much mistaken about Evidenz as he is about evidence for. Granted that 'evidence for', in some contexts, has the meaning that Hemmendinger points out. But it is not the case that it has that connotation in every context, since it is permissible to say "My evidence for believing that this handkerchief is white is that I see it".

The context, as well as the explicit discussion, of Husserl's use of 'Evidenz' prior to this section, in conjunction with this digression, would suffice to render Husserl's meaning clear.

16. Phenomenological and Scientific Truth

Husserl identifies phenomenology as a science. Thus, since Husserl's analysis of scientific truth is supposed to be true of any science whatsoever, Husserl is clarifying the notions of 'evidence' and 'truth' in phenomenology as well as in other sciences. This conforms to Husserl's belief that if phenomenology is genuinely radical, it must "...answer the question of its own possibility..." (FTL, p. 268). This includes a critical examination of the basic concepts, as well as the results, of phenomenology.

However, Husserl evidently did not believe that thesis 6 is true of phenomenology.

What about truth and principles of logic there, where true being

is 'merely subjective'? Truth, at least in the province of the most fundamental--the 'purely egological'--phenomenology...is no longer 'truth in itself' in any normal sense, not even in a sense that has relation to a transcendental 'everyone' (FTL, p. 269).

It is noteworthy that the word 'everyone' appears in inverted commas; for it shows that Husserl is saying that the notion of 'truth' in phenomenology has no relation to the sense 'transcendental everyone'.

I agree with Husserl in thinking that to identify something as a scientific truth does not commit one to the actual existence of other subjects. I have already argued this point in my discussion of thesis 6. However, Husserl does not think that he is committed to the possible existence of other subjects by identifying his results as scientific truths.

Thus, at this fundamental level, a remarkable transcendental discipline arises as the intrinsically first transcendental discipline, one that is actually transcendental-solipsistic: with eidetic truths, with theories, that hold good exclusively for me, the ego--that is to say: truths and theories that can rightfully claim to hold good 'once for all', but without relation to actual or possible other egos. And with that discipline there also arises, then, the question of a subjective logic with an Apriori that can hold good only solipsistically (FTL, p. 270).

This is absurd. Before showing just how it is absurd, however, I should point out that Husserl contradicts himself. "Every 'scientific statement' has this sense from the start. It is already addressed to this 'everyone' and states what the substrate-objectivities are in truth--as everyone can see" (FTL, pp. 125-126, emphases mine). If phenomenology is a science, then Husserl's phenomenological statements are scientific. "The whole of phenomenology is nothing more than scientific self-examination on the part of transcendental subjectivity..." (FTL, p. 273). Thus, Husserl's position is inconsistent; for, (on Husserl's own grounds)

to identify one statement as scientific is to be committed to the possible existence of other subjects who can test one's statements and see that they are true (or false). In other words, the concept of 'an open plurality of other subjects' is part of the implicit sense of 'scientific truth' and 'scientific evidence'. 'This is a scientific truth' implies 'there can be other subjects who can (1) have access to the evidence of its truth, and (2) understand the statement of truth'. Since this is so, Husserl's statements about truths that hold "only for me" are absurd. I shall not reiterate the arguments that I forwarded earlier.

Throughout Husserl's phenomenological investigations, therefore, Husserl is implicitly saying "Anyone can consult his experience and see that my analyses are correct". Therefore, Husserl is mistaken when he says that phenomenology does not presuppose the possibility of other egos (CM, p. 72). David Carr's distinction between 'different egos' and 'other egos' will not save Husserl here (PPH, p. 88). For Husserl is committed to the possibility of an open plurality of subjects to whom his results (and the evidence for them) are accessible. That is already to conceive of different subjects as possible intenders of my results, the evidence for them, and of me. In short, Husserl is committed to the possibility of other subjects in the sense explicated by Carr. (I should note that Carr draws the distinction in order to make a different point, though the following argument does count against Carr's defense of Husserl's belief that he does not presuppose the possibility of other egos.)

But is it true that to identify one's results as scientific, is to

be committed to the possibility that other subjects can intend me? Let us recall that a different ego is an ego that is numerically distinct from me and yet is the same in kind (PPH, p. 88). Something more must be true for an ego to count as an other ego. An other ego stands in intentional relationship to me. That is, either I am intended (or intendable) by him, or he is intended (or intendable by me). Now, the question is "Is Husserl, by identifying phenomenology as a science, committed to the possibility of an open plurality of egos who can intend him?". If so, then he, qua scientist, is committed to the possibility of other egos.

I have already shown that Husserl is implicitly committed to the possibility of different egos who can intend his results. But Husserl is likewise committed to the existence of the consciousness for whom objects and senses "are there"—in short, his own consciousness. Now, if Husserl's consciousness is a bearer of the sense 'existence', then, since any sense is intendable by an open plurality of subjects, Husserl is implicitly committed to the possibility of different subjects for whom he (Husserl or, more precisely, the transcendental subject who is philosophizing) exists. Hence, Husserl must conceive of ego and possible alter egos in intentional relation from the outset of his inquiry. As transcendental subject, I am for possible other transcendental subjects. In short, Husserl (like any phenomenologist) tacitly presupposes the possibility of the existence of other egos. Husserl eventually recognized this point. "Now everything becomes complicated as soon as we consider that subjectivity is what it is—an ego functioning constitutively—only within intersubjectivity" (CES, p. 172).

Surprisingly enough, this is Husserl's position in Formal and Transcendental Logic, too.

Likewise as a transcendental ego...I find myself determined from the outside--now, however, not as a spatio-temporal reality determined by an external reality. What do 'external to me' and 'being determined by something external' signify now? It is obvious that, transcendently speaking, I can be conditioned by something 'external', by something that goes beyond my self-contained ownness, only if it has the sense, 'someone else', and, in a thoroughly understandable manner, gains and legitimates in me its acceptance as being another transcendental ego. Starting from here, the possibility and the sense, not only of a plurality of co-existing absolute subjects ('monads'), but also of subjects who affect one another transcendently and, in co-operative acts, constitute community-products as their works, becomes clear (FTL, p. 276, first two emphases mine).

Thus, the "intrinsically first stage of phenomenology" is not to be described as Husserl does in many works (i.e., as a solipsistic stage). For phenomenology is never solipsistic in the sense that it presupposes neither the actual nor possible existence of other egos, although I am willing to grant that it is solipsistic in the more usual sense, in that it does not posit the existence of other subjects. The concept 'being accessible to an open plurality of other subjects' is included in the meaning of 'scientific results of phenomenology'. So, the first stage of phenomenology is one where one has not clarified the sense 'open plurality of other rational subjects'; it is not a stage where Husserl does not make use of that concept.

And, in the same manner, positive science, as achieved by labors in common, becomes understood--and ultimately phenomenology, as having also been achieved by such labors, a phenomenology that finally understands itself as a reflective functional activity in transcendental intersubjectivity (FTL, p. 275, emphasis mine).

Husserl does not challenge my contention that theses 2 through 5 apply to phenomenology. Of course, Husserl frequently speaks of

evidence and truth in phenomenology in the same terms that I have used to talk about scientific evidence and truth. For example, I pointed out that every scientist necessarily presupposes that there is some fact of the matter to be ascertained by the inquiry. Provided that one understands the phrase 'fact of the matter' in the broad sense in which it was intended, this is true of phenomenology. Early in Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl describes phenomenology as "radical sense-investigation", as the attempt to convert the unclear, intensive sense into a clear and fulfilled one (FTL, p. 9). For Husserl, then, there are some clear truths about senses which are to be "discovered" by phenomenological analysis. Thus, Husserl makes use of the concept 'true being' or 'actuality' in his philosophy. Thus, theses 2 and 4 are true of phenomenology.

Again, radical sense-investigation (or phenomenology) includes the possibility of repetition of evidence.

After the living evidence of clarity has passed, the effect this evidence produced in the realm of habit persists, along with the possibility of a restoration, which at first is empty but contains, in empty form, the determinate sense-predelineation. This predelineation brings with it, then, the certainty of possible clear restoration, as renewal of the evidence (FTL, p. 10; emphasis mine).

And, of course, phenomenology includes critical verification; specifically, it includes procedures for distinguishing between genuine and deceptive evidence.

...Original sense-investigation signifies a combination of determining more precisely the vague indeterminate predelineation, distinguishing the prejudices that derive from associational overlappings, and cancelling those prejudices that conflict with the clear sense-fulfillment...in a word, then: critical discrimination between the genuine and the spurious (FTL, p. 10).

Thesis 5, in a word, obtains in phenomenology.

Contrary to some of Husserl's statements, therefore, the concepts 'truth' and 'evidence' are the same in phenomenology as in the other sciences.

17. Conclusion: Phenomenology and Epistemology

I believe that Husserl's phenomenology of evidence and truth is a partial epistemological analysis. That is, I think that Husserl clarifies a number of a priori truths about the meanings of 'evidence' and 'scientific truth' that amount to criteria (or conditions of the possibility) of scientific knowledge. This may seem to conflict with the fact that Husserl's analysis is within the phenomenological attitude, where every object of consciousness is treated as phenomenon of being, rather than something that is. If one sets aside questions of reference, preferring to describe and analyze phenomena in order to elucidate meanings, then isn't one analyzing only one's experience of evidence and truth, rather than doing an epistemological analysis?

I do not think that there is any such dilemma. In the first place, Husserl rejects the so-called "axiom of reference", according to which one cannot refer to what does not exist. For Husserl, there is conscious reference to any sort of object, irrespective of its ontological status. I can, for example, think of a round square or an unicorn, just as I can think of this sheet of paper. It is not as if Husserl's analyses of noemata were sundered from analyses of the (intentional) referents of those meanings. In fact, Husserl frequently elucidates the relationships which obtain between acts, noemata, and intended objects (conscious referents). This is not to deny the fact that

objects simpliciter are, with a change of attitude, themselves put in inverted commas in order to clarify those relationships.

I think that the following passage illustrates my point:

...Any straightforwardly constituted objectivity (for example: an Object belonging to Nature) points back, according to its essential sort (for example: physical thing in specie) to a correlative essential form of manifold, actual and possible, intentionality (in our example, an infinite intentionality), which is constitutive for that objectivity (FTL, p. 246).

For any conscious referent whatsoever, in other words, there are certain a priori necessary truths about how it is and can be experienced, which can be uncovered by phenomenological analysis. But to elucidate a priori truths about how an object can be experienced is to clarify the evidence₁ of an object and, thereby, to show how we can have scientific knowledge of a truth about such an object.

It could be objected that when Husserl speaks of evidence₁, he is talking about the phenomenon of consciousness of the object as "there in person". Hence, no criterion for knowledge is provided, since Husserl is speaking of the phenomenon of knowledge. I think however, that we draw the distinction between 'the appearance of knowledge' and 'genuine knowledge' on the basis of phenomena. Accordingly, I think that as the analysis of consciousness of the object in question proceeds, we obtain epistemological criteria from phenomenological analyses.

Consider a simple kind of example, say a singular proposition about a physical object. Now, it is an a priori truth that any physical object can be given in perception, memory, thinking, and imagination. Likewise, the same physical object can be experienced repeatedly

(indeed, an infinite number of times, provided that one introduces counterfactuals) in each of these modes of consciousness. Another a priori truth that can be extracted by an analysis of 'physical object' is that perception is the mode of consciousness in which physical objects are experienced "in person". Thus, perception is evidence of the truth of a proposition about a physical object, whereas the other modes are not. I do not possess evidence of the proposition 'This pen is black' by imagining or thinking of a black pen, though I do when I see it and/or touch it (two ways of perceiving).

Already we have a criterion for knowledge that has been yielded by phenomenological analysis. If S knows that this pen is black, then S either sees (or saw) and/or is touching (or touched) the pen. (I am presuming that S doesn't know by hearsay). Failing that, S simply does not know. Thus, by examining an instantiation of Husserl's eidetic truths, we have uncovered an epistemological criterion. But there are more. S must be able to see and touch the pen again (presuming, of course, that it hasn't been destroyed), since it is an a priori truth that such evidence is repeatable. Similarly, S must have been able to see and touch the pen on occasions when he did not in fact (introducing certain counterfactual conditions here), since part of what we mean by 'pen' is 'transcending₁ my consciousness'. The same holds for other subjects, since pens are constituted intersubjectively. If S knows that this pen is black, then it is possible that an open plurality of other subjects can see it, too. If any of these conditions do not obtain, then S does not know that this pen is black. Hence, we obtain epistemological criteria from Husserl's phenomenological analyses

of the senses 'evidence' and 'scientific truth'. Since I criticized David Levin's position earlier, it is fitting that I point out that he and I agree thoroughly on this matter.

As such, its [phenomenology's] special contribution to ontology [I would say "epistemology"] lies in the fact that it works out a phenomenologically grounded logic of evidence for every essentially different kind of object and thus a logic of evidence for every particular object as an object of a certain kind. In so doing, it makes possible many further determinations and clarifications of our noematic Sinne and, a fortiori, many further determinations of the (kind of) object itself. For obviously, an eidetic understanding of the nature and limits of evidence, with regard to some (kind of) object, provides precise rules of verification--transcendental rules of intentional 'fulfillment', to use Husserl's own preferred terminology (PPU, p. 64; see also pp. 65-68).

I consider each of the a priori truths about evidential consciousness of the object in question as necessary conditions for scientific knowledge. I stop short, however, of saying that an ideally complete phenomenological analysis will provide sufficient conditions for scientific knowledge. It seems possible that some criteria for knowledge of something are contingent; consequently, phenomenological analyses will not yield them, insofar as phenomenology is an eidetic science.

We want answers to traditional philosophical problems to issue from phenomenological analyses. We want answers to such questions as "What is knowledge?". I have argued that Husserl provides us with a partial answer to the question. By carefully analyzing the way things appear when we take ourselves to know something, Husserl has made some illuminating observations about our concept of justification.

CHAPTER IV

NOTES

1. This is not to say, of course, that there are no good grounds for citing passages from Cartesian Meditations in order to interpret Husserl's position in Formal and Transcendental Logic. Here is an argument that Bachelard could have offered: In the first place, Husserl wrote the two books at approximately the same time. Secondly, Husserl invites us to interpret the two works as a unified position. In a letter to Aron Gurwitsch, dated 15 April 1932, Husserl writes: "I would like very much if you could review Formal and Transcendental Logic. Have you studied this work in connection with Cartesian Meditations?" (LWC, p. xv).

CHAPTER V

HUSSERL'S PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

1. Science and Intersubjectivity

We have already seen how clarifications of the concepts of science and objectively valid result have led, inevitably, to a discussion of the concept of intersubjectivity. The meanings of sentences can be understood by anyone, just as the sounds or written words by which those propositions are expressed can be heard or seen by anyone, certain conditions obtaining (such as not being blind or deaf). Understanding the meanings of sentences is the means by which one can know that to which a speaker (or writer) refers. Those referents, likewise, are accessible to anyone. These are necessary conditions for distinguishing between objectively valid results and all other propositions. This is a unique interpretation of the problem of intersubjectivity, and should be contrasted with other interpretations. It should be shown, further, how my interpretation is justified by the text of Cartesian Meditations. I shall devote this chapter to those tasks.

2. Two Misinterpretations of the Problem

Many of the commentators on Husserl's fifth meditation have not paid sufficient attention to the philosophical problem that Husserl

addresses there.¹ In some cases, this has resulted in misinterpretations or unjust criticisms. For the most part, there are only very brief and incomplete presentations of Husserl's problem. Unfortunately, one cannot understand Husserl's descriptions and analyses fully unless one has a clear comprehension of what Husserl takes himself to be doing in the first place. There is a need, therefore, for a careful analysis and presentation of some aspects of Husserl's problem of intersubjectivity and a response to some of his critics.²

This paper will open with a sketch of two formulations of the same misinterpretation of Husserl's problem. I shall identify a couple of commentators who subscribe to some form of this misinterpretation and criticize their positions. Then I shall explain some aspects of Husserl's problem of intersubjectivity, responding to a few commentators in the course of the explanation.

The first formulation might result from a misunderstanding of paragraph 42 of Cartesian Meditations, especially the title of that paragraph. The title is "Exposition of the problem of experiencing someone else, in rejoinder to the objection that phenomenology entails solipsism" (CM, p. 89). The impression that Husserl proposes to refute solipsism is reinforced by the interlocutor's objection.

When I, the meditating ego, reduce myself to my absolute transcendental ego by phenomenological epoche, do I not become solus ipse; and do I not remain that, as long as I carry on a consistent self-explication under the name phenomenology? Should not a phenomenology that proposed to solve the problems of Objective being...be branded therefore as transcendental solipsism? (CM, p. 89).

By themselves, however, these passages do not directly give one the impression that Husserl proposes to refute solipsism. All that one

may conclude from the passages is that Husserl plans to show that phenomenology does not entail solipsism. One does not need to prove the existence of other minds to accomplish that end. However, the reader is prepared to interpret Husserl's problem as the problem of other minds. For in the second meditation Husserl writes

And yet it is quite impossible to foresee how, for me in the attitude of reduction, other egos—not as mere worldly phenomena but as other transcendental egos—can become positable as existing and thus become equally legitimate themes of a phenomenological egology (CM, p. 30, emphasis mine).

So the interpretation which I believe is mistaken is not entirely without justification. Some references seem to count in its favor. Assuming for the time being that it is correct, we may ask "What is the position that Husserl plans to refute?"

There are two varieties of solipsism, one which expresses a metaphysical thesis; the other is an epistemological one. Metaphysical solipsism is the thesis that only I and my ideas exist. Epistemological solipsism, on the other hand, is the thesis that one cannot know or demonstrate that anyone other than oneself exists. The two positions are not equivalent, inasmuch as one can be an epistemological solipsist without being a metaphysical one. So if Husserl's task were to refute solipsism, then he would argue that "other egos exist" or that "I know that other egos exist". In either case, Husserl would be committing himself to the existence of other subjects, since 'I know that p' implies that 'p' is true.

Sartre believes that Husserl attempts to refute epistemological solipsism.

Because Husserl has reduced being to a series of meanings, the only connection which he has been able to establish between

my being and that of the Other is a connection of knowledge. Therefore Husserl could not escape solipsism any more than Kant could (BN, p. 318, first two emphases mine).

Sartre's complaint that Husserl does not deliver the existence of other subjects corroborates my contention about his interpretation.

The Other here would be a kind of supplementary category which would allow a world to be constituted, not a real being existing beyond the world.... The Other is the object of empty intentions, the Other on principle refuses himself to us and flees. The only reality which remains is therefore that of my intention. (BN, pp. 317-318, first two emphases mine).

Alfred Schütz, at least at one point in his critique of Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity, expresses the belief that Husserl formulates and tries to answer some form of the problem of other minds.

Now we must turn to the question which forms the subject matter of the Fifth Meditation. How can the objectivity of the world as a world for everyone and the existence of Others be established within this egological cosmos? (CP III, pp. 56-57, emphasis mine).³

3. Reply to Sartre and Schütz

I intend to argue that Husserl does not answer either of these problems, since he does not attempt to answer either of them. For the "problem of other minds", as it is called, is a problem that Husserl cannot answer from the phenomenological standpoint. In fact, Husserl does not, and cannot, formulate any version of the problem of other minds within the phenomenological attitude. It is consequently no surprise that he does not answer either of those problems. Husserl understood this quite well, and tried to answer his problem with the phenomenological attitude. What is the evidence for these assertions?

Suppose that Husserl straightforwardly refuted solipsism in the

fifth meditation. If that were so, then Husserl could not do it along strictly phenomenological lines. For an answer to the solipsist in this way would constitute ontological commitment to the existence of other subjects. But performing the phenomenological reduction amounts to abstention from ontological commitment. Post-epoche, one refuses to assert (or deny) straightforwardly that anything (with the exception of one's own consciousness) exists. The objects of one's intentions are considered as "phenomena", or something "constituted" by one's actual and possible experiences, at least prior to the intentional analysis of the perception of other subjects.⁴ Since existential commitments are ruled out of court by phenomenological reduction, problems which require such commitment in order to answer them are impermissible, too. So if Husserl refuted solipsism in the fifth meditation, he did not consistently follow phenomenological method.

Husserl understood quite well that he could not assert straightforwardly that others exist if he were to approach the problem of intersubjectivity phenomenologically.

What are others, what is the world, for me?--Constituted phenomena, merely something produced within me. Never can I reach the point of ascribing being in the absolute sense to others, any more than to the physical things of Nature, which exist only as transcendently produced affairs (CM, p. 52n., emphasis mine).

That passage is weak evidence for believing that Husserl did not attempt to refute solipsism.

Passages in the fifth meditation show that Husserl did not attempt to show that other subjects exist. When discussing the problem that he will address, Husserl writes that

Imperturbably I must hold fast to the insight that every sense that any existent whatever has or can have for me--in respect of its 'what' and 'it exists and actually is'--is a sense in and arising from my intentional life, becoming clarified and uncovered for me in consequence of my life's constitutive syntheses, in systems of harmonious verification (CM, p. 91).

At the end of the fifth meditation Husserl writes

At no point was the transcendental attitude, the attitude of transcendental epoche, abandoned; and our 'theory' of experiencing others, did not aim at being and was not at liberty to be anything but explication of the sense, 'others', as it arises from the constitutive productivity of that experiencing: the sense, 'truly existing others', as it arises from the corresponding harmonious syntheses (CM, p. 148, emphasis mine).

Since Husserl believes that he has sustained the phenomenological attitude throughout the fifth meditation and, as I have shown, understood quite well that that precluded asserting (or denying, for that matter) the existence of other subjects, Husserl did not attempt to answer any form of the problem of other minds. Husserl explicitly says this in the passage I just cited. Thus, Sartre and Schütz are quite mistaken.

One may reasonably object "But what about the sentence cited earlier, wherein Husserl anticipates positing the existence of other transcendental egos?". Is that not a counter-example to the interpretation forwarded here? One could, I suppose, take it that way. But the sentence is so singular, and contradicted by so many other passages (or the implications of them), that I believe that Husserl was not satisfied with that statement. I suggest that this is why Husserl marked the sentence in question for deletion (CM, p. 31n).

Even if one believes that the sentence should be included in the text, it still does not adequately support the interpretation I am rejecting. Note that Husserl says that it is impossible to foresee how the

existence of other egos can be posited. That may be impossible to foresee precisely because that cannot be done. So the interpretation I am rejecting gives too strong a reading of the passage. It reads more into the passage that is there.

4. Ricoeur's Interpretation

Husserl opens the fifth meditation with an interlocutor's objection, which constitutes the second formulation of the misinterpretation. That objection exploits the false proposition 'Husserl is a subjective idealist' as a premise. When the interlocutor challenges that "But what about other egos, who surely are not a mere intending and intended in me, but according to their sense, precisely others?" (CM, p. 89), he is presupposing that Husserl thinks that the being of everything other than the intending ego is to be perceived.

This interpretation is corroborated by what the interlocutor proceeds to say. According to him, Husserl has not given transcendental realism its due (CM, p. 89). Only my ideas are constituted in my consciousness. Beyond that, there is the world that exists in itself (CM, p. 90). Because phenomenology restricts itself to an analysis of my consciousness, there is no way it can account for other consciousnesses.

Paul Ricoeur adopts this interpretation of Husserl's problem.

This objection is well-known to us; it is solipsism. The Fifth Meditation arises from the transformation of this objection received from without into a challenge accepted by transcendental phenomenology entirely from within (AHP, p. 116).

What is this objection which is accepted as an internal criticism?

It is the interlocutor's objection. Ricoeur continues:

Solipsism has always been the common sense objection to idealistic philosophies, since according to common sense the other egos are not reducible to the representation one has of them. They are not even represented objects, unities of sense, which one can verify in a concordant course of experience. Others are other than I; they are other egos. Transcendental phenomenology is obliged to recognize this objection as a difficulty undermining it from within (AHP, p. 116, emphasis mine).

This is a paraphrase of the interlocutor's challenge. So Ricoeur believes that the interlocutor's objection undermines Husserl's philosophy from within.

According to Ricoeur, a conflict results from trying to show how other subjects are constituted.

The whole Fifth Meditation will undergo the tension between the two requirements of constituting the Other in me and constituting him as Other.... But the latent conflict between the requirement of reduction [constituting the Other in me] and the requirement of description becomes an open conflict from the moment that the Other is no longer a thing but another ego, someone other than I (AHP, pp. 116-117).

The reason why there is a conflict is that, according to Ricoeur, Husserl's theory of the constitution of objects is an idealistic thesis (AHP, pp. 130, 136). Ricoeur believes that it is this idealistic thesis that is ultimately responsible for Husserl's failure to resolve "the problem of the Other", as he calls it.

Right up to the end the descriptive spirit and the requirement of constitution tend to meet but fail to blend into each other, for according to the idealistic requirement of constitution, the Other must be a modification of my ego and according to the realistic character of description, the Other never ceases to exclude himself from the sphere of 'my monad' (AHP, p. 130).

Now Ricoeur does not explain what he means, or takes Husserl to mean, by 'the Other must be a modification of my ego'. His endorsement of the interlocutor's objection as a challenge undermining

phenomenology from within, however, offers a clue for interpretation. The interlocutor maintains that other subjects are not "a mere intending and intending in me, or mere unities of possible verification in me" (CM, p. 89). In the next sentence the interlocutor insists that Husserl has not done justice to transcendental realism, and proceeds to say that only my ideas are constituted by me. These ideas are opposed to the world that exists in itself. Presumably, then, these ideas exist in virtue of an individual's consciousness. Their being is to be perceived, since they are images created by me. This is the way that I make sense out of Ricoeur's contention that Husserl is an idealist. He and the interlocutor are saying that Husserl is a subjective idealist.

5. Reply to Ricoeur

I believe that it is a fundamental mistake to interpret Husserl's philosophy, and the concept of constitution in particular, as idealistic.⁵ But I shall not argue that point here, since idealism is irrelevant to Husserl's problem. Ricoeur and the interlocutor, to the contrary, believe that it is because Husserl is an idealist that he faces the problem. "Solipsism has always been the common-sense objection to idealistic philosophies, since according to common sense the other egos are not reducible to the representation one has of them (AHP, p. 116).

Now both Ricoeur and the interlocutor believe that Husserl's problem is the problem of other minds; and they believe that Husserl cannot resolve the problem because the being of other minds is not to be perceived. However, the problem of other minds (as I showed in the first part of this paper) could be a problem even for a realist, provided

that the realist did not take the existence of other minds for granted. Sartre is a prime example of a non-idealist that addresses the problem of other minds. So even if Husserl's problem were the problem of other minds, it would not be essential that Husserl be an idealist.

But there is a much more important issue. The fact is that Ricoeur and the interlocutor have misunderstood Husserl's problem. If they had understood it, they would have seen that Husserl's problem is independent of both realism and idealism. What is Husserl's problem?

Ricoeur's belief that the interlocutor's objection undermines phenomenology from within does not square with Husserl's objection to the interlocutor.

But perhaps there is some mistake in thoughts like these. Before one decides in favor of them and the 'self-understood' propositions they exploit, and then perchance embarks on dialectical argumentations and self-styled 'metaphysical' hypotheses (whose supposed possibility may turn out to be complete absurdity), it might indeed be more fitting to undertake the task of phenomenological explication indicated in this connexion by the 'alter ego' and carry it through in concrete work (CM, p. 90, first emphasis mine).

I emphasize the word 'before' because it tells us how Husserl understands his problem. Husserl is saying that the "task of phenomenological explication", which Husserl takes his problem to be, is a problem that one should try to resolve before committing oneself philosophically to various metaphysical hypotheses about other subjects.

But the priority of Husserl's problem is not simply temporal. Husserl's problem should be addressed before the problem of other minds because it is logically prior to the one concerning existence. I shall try to explain why this is the case in the next section.

6. Husserl's Problem as Conceptual Analysis

Husserl's reply to the interlocutor helps us to understand one aspect of Husserl's problem of intersubjectivity. Here Husserl is suggesting that his critic may not know what he's talking about. In particular, the critic has failed to analyze what 'alter egos exist' means prior to committing himself to the existence of other subjects and to a certain way that they exist. Husserl's problem is to analyze the concept 'other subject', to become quite clear about the meaning of the concept. Husserl's problem is the same for propositions such as 'other subjects exist'. Is this problem independent of both idealism and realism?

Indeed it is. In the passage I just cited Husserl is saying that his critic has been too hasty in deciding in favor of one metaphysical hypotheses and against another. Husserl's reply to his critic is the same reply he would make to anyone who made metaphysical commitments prior to an analysis of meaning. Philosophers, then, have been too hasty in that they have tried to decide for or against such propositions as 'other subjects exist' before becoming absolutely clear about what the proposition means. After all, one must be clear about what a proposition means before one can decide whether it is true or false. For no person could decide on rational grounds whether 'The slithy toves did gyre' is true or false. The metaphysician's practice is something like someone asserting that 'The slithy toves did gyre' is true (or false) without determining what it means, if anything. Husserl warns the interlocutor that his assertions may turn out to be "absurd" in the passage just cited (CM, p. 90). To determine the meaning of a proposition does not involve commitment to its truth (or

falsity). Since Husserl's problem is, in part, to determine the meaning of 'other egos exist' rather than to decide its truth or falsity, Husserl's problem is independent of all metaphysical theses, including realism and idealism. It is for the same reason that Husserl's problem is logically prior to the problem of other minds. For since to elucidate the proposition 'I experience other subjects' (and related propositions and concepts) does not entail commitment to the existence of other egos, and we must know the meaning of an assertion before we can rationally decide on its truth or falsity, the problem of other minds presupposes an answer to Husserl's problem of intersubjectivity, but not vice versa.

Now Husserl objects to the interlocutor's challenge and suggests that his phenomenological problem is prior to any commitments about existence. So, the interlocutor's objection does not "undermine phenomenology from within". Secondly, since Husserl is not trying to respond to the objection to idealistic philosophies (i.e., solipsism), the supposed dichotomy between showing how the other subject is constituted and describing how the alter ego is experienced (at least as Professor Ricoeur interprets those concepts) vanishes. For no idealistic thesis is at stake. Therefore, Professor Ricoeur is mistaken.

Of course, there is more than one passage that supports my contention that Husserl is interested in conceptual analysis, rather than the traditional problem of other minds. After briefly stating what he takes the problem to be, for example, Husserl says that

These experiences and their works are facts belonging to my phenomenological sphere. How else than by examining them can I explicate the sense, existing others, in all its aspects? (CM, p. 90, emphasis mine).

Husserl wants to explicate the concept 'existing others', rather than establish the existence of others. Again, Husserl opens paragraph 44 of Cartesian Meditations by saying

If the transcendental constitution of other subjects are accordingly the transcendental sense, 'other subjects', are in question, and consequently a universal sense-stratum that emanates from others and is indispensable to the possibility of an Objective world for me is also in question, then the sense, 'other subjects', that is in question here cannot as yet be the sense: 'Objective subjects, subjects existing in the world' (CM, pp. 92-93, emphases mine).

The repetition of the word 'sense' and the inverted commas around 'other subjects' are not in the text without reason. Husserl inserted them in order to emphasize that he seeks conceptual clarity.

Some remarks in Formal and Transcendental Logic on the problem of intersubjectivity confirm my interpretation.

Can the transcendental illusion of solipsism withstand this onward march of mere concrete explication? Is it not an illusion that can appear only before the explication, because, as already said, this fact--that others and the world for others have their sense in the from me myself--is a presented fact, and therefore there can be no other problem here than that of clarifying this matter-of-fact, clarifying it, that is, as what is implicit in me myself? (FTL, p. 242, emphasis mine).

Although Husserl speaks of explication of a matter-of-fact here, this matter-of-fact is that others and the world have a definite sense which derives from me. So clarification of this matter-of-fact would be explication of the senses 'others' and 'the world'.

7. Physical Objects and Other Subjects

This does not, of course, exhaust Husserl's "problem of intersubjectivity", as I have called it. There is a host of other concepts that Husserl wants to clarify by explicating the concept of

'other subjects'. Clarification of a few of these central concepts is part of what Husserl understands by the "problem of intersubjectivity". I shall concentrate on the concepts 'physical object', 'objective world', 'objectively valid result' and 'truth'.

The problem of intersubjectivity thus turns out to be, upon analysis, a host of philosophical problems, a "hierarchical set of problems" (FTL, p. 240). For each of the concepts mentioned above presuppose the concept of intersubjectivity, as I shall try to show.

Take the concept 'physical object'. David Carr has rendered a service to phenomenologists who are trying to understand Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity by calling attention to two senses of the word 'transcendence' in Cartesian Meditations (PPH, pp. 86-87). These two senses of the word 'transcendence' are quite helpful in analyzing the concepts of 'physical object' and 'the world'. The first sense of 'transcendence' means 'not reducible to my actual acts of consciousness' (hereafter, 'transcendence₁'). A table, for example, transcends₁ my consciousness in that it is the same table that I could see in further perceptions. Now Husserl can account for 'transcendence₁' prior to introducing the concept of 'other subjects'. He can account for it in terms of possible acts of my consciousness. For all of these acts, actual and possible, are mine. For example, to identify this as a table of which I see the top is to identify it as something which has an underside which I do not see but which I could see if I moved. This synthesis of identification (as the object of further possible acts of my consciousness) occurs whenever one identifies something as a table. This holds, generally, for physical objects, as no physical object is

exhausted by my actual acts of consciousness. .

But more is intended than that. If I identify something as a table, I identify it as something the underside of which could be seen at the same time that I see its top side. That is, I identify it as 'transcending₂' my consciousness in that I take it to be something which is irreducible to my possible acts of consciousness. For if I see only the top side of this table, then it is impossible for me to see the underside simultaneously. Only another subject could see the underside at the same time. Thus, Husserl has to clarify the concept of 'other subjects' in order to make sense of such concepts as 'table', 'chair', and, more generally, 'physical object'.

It is worth noting that Husserl is interested solely in understanding how it is possible for another subject to see, for example, the underside of this table. To identify this as a table is not necessarily to identify it as having an underside that is actually seen. So Husserl's clarification of the concept of 'physical object' in terms of intersubjective intentions yields only the explicated concept, rather than the existence, of the subjects.

Now this still leaves open a legitimate way to construe the conflict between description and constitution. But it is not one that I think Ricoeur recognizes. It is this: The other subject is experienced as irreducible to my possible intentions, or as transcending my consciousness in the strong sense. So, the description of how the alter ego is experienced shows that it is impossible for it to be constituted by me. For the alter ego must be constituted by others as well. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Carr have recognized this problem.

I believe that Carr has given an adequate explanation of how to avoid this apparent circularity (PPH, p. 97).

8. The Objective World (Objectivity₃)

To identify something as a physical object is to intend it as something in the objective world. The concept of 'the objective world' is part of the horizon, or implicit meaning-context, of the concept of 'physical object'. So Husserl must render the concept of 'other subjects' clear in order to make phenomenological sense of 'objective world'.

But it soon becomes evident that the range of such a theory is much greater than at first it seems, that it contributes to the founding of a transcendental theory of the Objective world and, indeed, to the founding of such a theory in every respect, notably as regards Objective Nature. The existence-sense [Seinssinn] of the world and of Nature in particular, as Objective Nature, includes after all, as we have already mentioned, thereness-for-everyone. This is always co-intended wherever we speak of Objective actuality (CM, p. 92; cf. FTL, p. 233).

Husserl's point is quite clear. Whenever we talk about the objective world of nature, we mean something which is experienceable by anyone. Clarification of the concept of 'intersubjectivity' is therefore a prerequisite for comprehending 'nature' and 'the objective world' phenomenologically.

Of course, the concepts of 'space' and 'objective time' are implied by the concepts of 'objective world' and 'nature'. They are intersubjectively constituted. So are all cultural objects (CM, p. 92). We begin to understand the hierarchy of problems to which Husserl referred (FTL, p. 240). Indeed, many conceptual roads lead to inter-

subjectivity.⁶

9. Objectively Valid Results (Objectivity₁)

This is corroborated by the fact that it is not only the concept of 'the world' which involves intersubjectivity; what we meaningfully say about the objective world also implies intersubjective accessibility.

Although he does not discuss the concept of 'objectively valid results' at the beginning of the fifth meditation, it is clear that that notion is conceptually related to the results of a successful response to the problem of intersubjectivity. "'Objectively [objektiv]
valid results'--the phrase, after all, signifies nothing but results which have been refined by mutual criticism and that now withstand every criticism" (CM, p. 5). Clearly, the concept of 'objectively valid results' is connected with 'science' in the normative sense. If a scientist, in the broad sense, arrives at an objectively valid result, then it is testable (and thereby publicly accessible) and something about which other subjects can talk ("refined by mutual criticism"). If the result is objectively valid, and thus withstands every criticism, it is regarded as true. Consequently, the concept of 'scientifically tested true statement' presupposes communication and thus intersubjectivity.

This conception of truth does not hold simply for science. It is the everyday notion. For imagine someone saying that "'S is P' is true", but adding that there is no possible intersubjective evidence relevant to its truth. Rational persons would say that that person is

speaking nonsensically.

Husserl explicitly discusses the connection between the true statements that we make and the concept of intersubjectivity in

Formal and Transcendental Logic.

For what we asserted as a logical characteristic of predicational truth is manifestly a characteristic also of the world of experience, prior to the truth and the science that explicate this world predicatively. World-experience, as constitutive, signifies, not just my quite private experience, but community-experience: The world itself, according to its sense, is the one identical world, to which all of us necessarily have experiential access, and about which all of us by 'exchanging' our experiences--that is: by making them common--can reach a common understanding; just as 'Objective' legitimation depends on mutual assent and its criticism (FTL, p. 236, first and last emphasis mine).

This holds likewise for the truths of logic.

The remarkable sense-determinations of the truth-concept that logic makes fundamental, the concept of an 'Objective' truth --that is to say: an intersubjectively identical truth-- extend to all the propositions that it erects in its theory: its axioms and also its theorems (FTL, p. 195, emphasis mine).

10. Objectively Valid Results in Phenomenology

Husserl is, of course, especially interested in a proper subset of objectively valid results; these are the results of phenomenology itself. Husserl's "Cartesian" task is to make a radical beginning so that he can clarify the fundamental concepts of science (CM, pp. 4-5). If Husserl's philosophy is to be genuinely radical, then he must be able to provide an account of the scientific character of phenomenology itself (as well as of the "mundane" sciences).

If Husserl is to comprehend the necessary conditions for the scientific character of the results of phenomenology, then he must

analyze the notion 'repeatability of evidence' (CM, p. 10). The evidence for Husserl's judgements in particular (and scientific assertions in general) must be repeatable by anyone. This is something that Husserl wants to understand by analyzing the perception of other subjects. For we must be able to identify and reidentify the objects of phenomenological reflection. Furthermore, we must be able to understand the assertions he makes about phenomena. Both of these conditions must obtain if Husserl's philosophy is to be testable. If Husserl's philosophy consists of a set of objectively valid results, a third condition must obtain. Upon testing Husserl's assertions, that is, we find that they are accurate or true. Husserl must be able to say "Anyone can consult his experience and confirm my judgements." A necessary condition for understanding this sentence from a phenomenological standpoint while fulfilling the phenomenological requirement for evidence (or experiences which ground judgements) is to analyze the experience of other subjects.

Even in our fleeting glance at what is constituted in us--in me always, in the meditating ego--as a world, as whole universe of being, we naturally could not avoid being mindful of 'others' and their constitutings. By means of the alien constitutings constituted in my own self, there becomes constituted for me (as has already been mentioned) the common world for 'all of us'. Here belongs also, of course, the constituting of a philosophy as common to 'all of us' who meditate together--ideally, a single philosophia perennis. But will our evidence stand firm...? Will it not become unstable, since we have not carried out our methodic predelineations through to the point where the possibility of the being for me of others (as we all feel, a very puzzling possibility) and the more precise nature of their being for me are understandable and since the complex problem of their being for me has not been explicated (CM, pp. 87-88, first emphasis mine)?

If Husserl is incapable of resolving the problem, then he must give

up the important claim that phenomenology is the foundational science, since in that case he would be incapable of providing an account of one of the fundamental concepts of phenomenology and the "mundane" sciences. Husserl has to understand what it would take for phenomenology to be an intersubjective science. He understood this point quite well.

As beginning philosophers we must not let ourselves be frightened by such considerations. Perhaps reduction to the transcendental ego only seems to entail a permanently solipsistic science; whereas the consequential elaboration of this science, in accordance with its own sense, leads over to a phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity and, by means of this, to a universal transcendental philosophy (CM, p. 30).

Husserl does not seem to have noticed here, however, that a solipsistic science is not a science at all. To be more accurate--if phenomenology is scientific, then Husserl has not phenomenologically grounded his belief that it is until he has clarified the concept of intersubjectivity and such related notions as 'evidence', 'truth' and 'intersubjective identifiability'.

It is noteworthy that I have not said that Husserl would have shown that his analyses are objective upon successfully clarifying the concept of intersubjectivity. Rather, he will have shown what it will take for his analyses to be objective. The objectivity of various phenomenological analyses depends on others, not Husserl. That is, it is contingent upon others understanding Husserl's analyses, honestly consulting their experiences, and finding that what Husserl has to say is true. To be more precise, it is contingent upon the possibility of confirmation of Husserl's contentions by others. I am not begging the question of the objectivity of Husserl's analyses.

Rather, I am pointing out the conditions that would have to be met in order for Husserl's analyses to be objective.

Since Husserl does not show that his analyses are objective, what does he try to clarify with respect to the objectivity of phenomenology? As I have explained, Husserl will have shown (assuming that his analysis is successful) how the objectivity of phenomenology is comprehensible from a phenomenological point of view. This is quite important to Husserl, as he maintains that no basic concept is rendered unanalyzable by adopting the phenomenological standpoint.

11. Different and Other Egos

Like Descartes' Meditations of First Philosophy, Husserl's Cartesian Meditations are ordered more or less according to the priority of each problem. Husserl conceives of his problems in Cartesian Meditations as forming a hierarchal set.

As a matter of fact, we shall see that, in a certain manner a transcendental solipsism is only a subordinate stage philosophically; though, as such, it must first be delineated for purposes of method, in order that the problems of transcendental intersubjectivity, as problems belonging to a higher level, may be correctly stated and attacked (CM, pp. 30-31, emphasis mine).

In particular, it is no accident that the solipsistic stage of phenomenology includes an analysis of the constitution of any ego in the fourth meditation.

The point is that Husserl has to explicate how an ego as such is constituted before he can proceed to clarify how an alter ego is constituted for me. By treating his own consciousness as an instance of the kind "ego", Husserl uncovers the features that must hold if

anything is to be constituted as an ego.

This explication therefore concerns my de facto ego only so far as the latter is one of the pure possibilities to be acquired by his free-fantasy variation (fictive changing) of himself. Therefore, as eidetic, the explication is valid for the universe of these, my possibilities as essentially an ego, my possibilities namely of being otherwise; accordingly then it is valid also for every possible intersubjectivity related (with a corresponding modification) to these possibilities, and valid likewise for every world imaginable as constituted in such an intersubjectivity (CM, pp. 84-85, emphasis mine).

That is, Husserl's investigation is eidetic, or holds for any ego whatsoever.

One feature of any ego whatsoever is that it is a system of intentionalities. "It is thus an essential property of the ego, constantly to have systems of intentionality..." (CM, p. 65). But not all systems are compatible with others.

But in a unitarily possible ego not only singly possible types are compossible, and not all compossible ones are compossible in just any order, at no matter what loci in the ego's own temporality (CM, p. 74).

Instantiations of the universal kind "system of intentionality" are incompatible with one another. But if this is so, then Husserl has already made sense of a plurality of different consciousnesses in the fourth meditation. David Carr has put this well: "The monad as such a system of compossibilities makes no sense except by reference to other possible systems..." (PPH, p. 88).

This permits us to delimit the problem of intersubjectivity more precisely. I concur with Carr in thinking that the concept 'alter ego' is not synonymous with 'a multiplicity of (different) egos' (PPH, p. 87).

But it is necessary to distinguish between different egos and other egos... The eidetic approach conceives of different egos

without conceiving of any relation among them, other than their essence and their difference. But the concept of objectivity, introduced in the Fifth Meditation, places ego and alter ego in intentional relation, since the ego refers his world, or the things in it, to others. The ego in the fullest sense, i.e., the monad, may differ from my own. But the problem now is to make sense of the alter ego for that ego, whoever he may be (PPH, p. 88, first emphasis mine).

What does this have to do with the problem of intersubjectivity?

The first is that addressing the problem of the constitution of any ego is a prerequisite for analyzing how the alter ego is for one's own consciousness. For something must be constituted as an ego if it is taken to be an alter ego. The order in which Husserl addressed problems mirrors the conceptual point that 'alter ego' implies 'ego'. Secondly, Husserl's problem is not to conceive of a multiplicity of different consciousnesses (in the fifth meditation). For that has already been achieved by the eidetic character of phenomenological descriptions. It simply has not been "fulfilled".

12. The Interlocutor Reconsidered

Heretofore I have treated the interlocutor's objection as simply a misunderstanding of Husserl's phenomenology. But there is a legitimate criticism which is, perhaps, implicit in what the interlocutor says.

David Carr explains the point clearly:

A more accurate statement of the phenomenological procedure... is that it considers everything meant purely as it is meant (cogitatum qua cogitatum) and withholds any other attitude towards it.... But...it could be argued that the alter ego is not susceptible to this kind of treatment: he cannot even be considered purely as meant; or, to the degree that he is, he is no longer an ego. Thus the concept of the ego in general is incompatible with the phenomenological concept of something given,

at least if the alter ego is to be considered transcendental and not merely worldly. To the extent that he is given he is not a transcendental ego, and to the extent that he is a transcendental ego he is not given. (PPH, p. 89, last two emphases mine).

I say "perhaps implicit in what the interlocutor says", for I believe that there is a good deal more in Carr's explanation than in the text. Carr's interpretation does explain the interlocutor's dim recognition that the other subject is a special case:

But what about other egos, who surely are not a mere intending and intended in me, merely synthetic unities of possible verification in me, but, according to their sense, precisely others? (CM, p. 89).

But there is no evidence that the interlocutor realizes the way in which the other subject is a special case, as does Carr.⁷

Still, the objection that Carr states more clearly has been advocated elsewhere by Sartre:

Now what ought to be demonstrated is that it is not the parrallelism of the empirical 'Egos' which throws doubt on the person but that of the transcendental subjects. This is because actually the Other is never that empirical person who is encountered in my experience; he is the transcendental subject to whom this person by nature refers. Thus the true problem is that of the connection of transcendental subjects who are beyond experience.... What I must attain is the Other, not as I obtain knowledge of him, but as he obtains knowledge of himself, which is impossible (BN, p. 317).

But most importantly, the paradox which I have presented is one that Husserl must resolve, and thus forms a part of the problem of intersubjectivity. For Husserl has to make phenomenological sense of the co-constitutor of the objective world; and any co-constitutor is on principle a transcendental subject. A consequence of this observation is that not all of Sartre's criticisms are off-base.

13. Non-Apodictic Evidence

Although Husserl has not clarified his belief that phenomenology is scientific (at least prior to the fifth meditation), he does analyze some of the basic concepts of science in the first and third meditations. Since these concepts, which include 'evidence', 'truth' and 'reason', involve intersubjectivity as co-intended, Husserl's analyses of them are not fully grounded prior to the fifth meditation.

But those analyses are not there simply for the sake of conceptual clarity. For the results of these analyses amount to certain rules that Husserl must follow. For example, he must follow his "first methodological principle" to "neither make nor go on accepting any judgement as scientific that I have not derived from evidence..." (CM, p. 13). Husserl is demanding that his analyses be scientific before fully clarifying those concepts (or grounding them) by bringing the concept of other subjects into the picture. (Husserl's "first methodological principle" does not, of course, involve accepting the methods of the de facto sciences. That is, Husserl does not demand that his evidence be of a certain sort, such as the evidence through sense-perception. Husserl's "first methodological principle" is neutral with respect to the kind of evidence, inasmuch as Husserl demands only that there be evidence. In fact, Husserl insists that one must not demand a kind of evidence that is inapplicable to the subject at hand. Rather, one must accept those judgements for which one has the appropriate kind of evidence. But those judgements must be accepted only within the limits that the nature of the evidence permits.) (Ideas, p. 83).

Now if Husserl is to accept judgements only within the limits that the nature of the evidence permits, then he must characterize

the kind of evidence which pertains to various judgements and examine its range. This is, accordingly, a demand that Husserl makes for his analyses (CM, p. 13). Naturally, this applies to the intentional analysis of the concept of 'other subjects'. Husserl's responses to these questions are well-known. The kind of evidence which pertains to other subjects is perceptual, although the other subject's mental life cannot be given directly (CM, p. 111). And the evidence in which other subjects are given is not apodictic (CM, p. 149).

14. A New Refutation of Solipsism

I believe that Husserl's analysis amounts to an indirect refutation of solipsism. I think that this is accomplished by his discussion of the evidence and experience relative to the judgement 'I experience others'. I say "indirect", since it is not the sort of refutation of solipsism mentioned earlier in this paper. Husserl does not demonstrate that alter egos exist. But there is an implicit response to certain arguments that a solipsist might forward.

A solipsist might argue that one cannot know that other subjects exist on the grounds that

...knowledge about existence and non-existence of everything outside the self originates in immediate experience, or 'the given', which is not strictly shared; and second, that to any given person, the intelligibility of existential claims originates in his own immediate experience (EPS, p. 490).

Since the consciousness of other subjects are not "given in immediate experience", one cannot know that there are other subjects. How would Husserl respond to this argument?

My response on Husserl's behalf is, of course, speculative, as

he made only indirect comments on the refutation of solipsism. But I believe that he would complain about the ambiguity of 'immediate experience' first of all. It cannot simply mean that whoever finds out an empirical fact does so on his own, for that is neutral with respect to solipsism.

On one interpretation of the two theses cited above, they imply that a person knows only himself and his mental states. So whenever a person believes that he experiences (and thereby knows) another person, the surrounding world, or things in it, he actually experiences only his mental states. Husserl would point out that there are radical differences between how each of these are experienced.

Of course, that does not settle the issue. That we take our experiences to be of different "objects" does not imply that they are in fact different. Still, Husserl's descriptions clarify the phenomena; and the burden of accounting for these apparent differences lies with the solipsist. What evidence does the solipsist have for his judgement that all of his experiences are of himself or his mental states? If his judgement is scientific, then there must be some evidence from which it is derived.

The evidence which would seem to be relevant to that judgement would be one of two kinds: experiential or conceptual. But experience cannot support the solipsist. For in various kinds of experience we believe that we experience things other than our mental states. It is true that some of the beliefs that we base on experience are "cancelled". I may believe that I see the front of a building, for example, until I walk to the other side and discover that it is a stage-prop. Alter-

natively, one may hallucinate or undergo a perceptual illusion and later discover that that was the case. But the correction of such judgments is based on further experience. It is a lack of harmony in pre-thematic anticipations that leads to cancellations, doubts, etc. However, a great number of our beliefs are never modified in this way. Our experiences of the world are, for the most part, harmonious. Experience never leads to the general conclusion 'I never experience other subjects, but only my mental states', although in a particular case I might conclude that 'I thought I experienced someone else, but did not'. This point about other subjects is a special case of a general truth that Husserl recognized about the natural standpoint.

'The' world is a fact-world always there; at the most it is at odd points 'other' than I supposed, this or that under such names as 'illusion', 'hallucination', and the like, must be struck out of it, so to speak; but the 'it' remains ever, in the sense of the general thesis, a world that has its being out there (Ideas, p. 96).

So, experience cannot constitute the evidence for the solipsist's thesis.

Perhaps a conceptual analysis will show that the natural standpoint is fundamentally confused and thus support the solipsist's thesis. But an analysis of what we mean by 'I experience others', which Husserl does by clarifying the experience of other subjects and the evidence which pertains to that judgement, will not help the solipsist, either. For briefly, what we mean by 'I experience another subject' is 'I have harmonious experience of what I take to be another subject, and none of those experiences conflict with that belief'.⁸ On the other hand, what we mean by 'I believed that I perceived another subject, but did not' is 'My experience of what I took to be another

subject was not harmonious'.

The solipsist would object that harmonious experience of what one takes to be another subject does not guarantee that one in fact experiences another subject. To this Husserl would reply "granted". Indeed, the evidence for the judgement 'I experience others' is non-apodictic. But the point is that the solipsist forwards his thesis only by demanding a sort of evidence which cannot be had. The nature of the case, revealed by an analysis of the judgement 'I experience others', is such that there can be no guarantee (or apodictic evidence) for that judgement. One must carefully analyze the meaning of a judgement in order to understand what sort of evidence is relevant to grounding it. Lack of such analysis can lead to confused theses like that of the solipsist. The solipsist's thesis is thus comparable to the contention that one cannot see a physical object unless one can see all of its content simultaneously.⁹

The sketch of Husserl's response to solipsism is textually supported. Husserl believes that he has accomplished the task at the end of the fifth meditation.

Within the bounds of positivity we say and find it obvious that, in my own experience, I experience not only myself but others-- in the particular form: experiencing someone else. The indubitable transcendental explication showed us not only that this positive statement is transcendentially legitimate but also that the concretely apprehended transcendental ego (who first becomes aware of himself, with his undetermined horizon, when he effects transcendental reduction) grasps others: other transcendental egos, though they are given, not originaliter and in unqualifiedly apodictic evidence, but only in an evidence belonging to 'external' experience. (CM, pp. 148-149, first emphasis mine).

This response indicates a problem that needed to be solved. Part of Husserl's problem of intersubjectivity is to show that solipsism is

an absurd thesis that rests on certain unexamined presuppositions about what evidence confirms the judgement 'I experience others'.

But showing this is very different from giving the kind of straightforward refutation of solipsism which some of Husserl's critics have taken him to be attempting.

CHAPTER V

NOTES

1. I am indebted to Professors John Biro, David Carr, and J. N. Mohanty for their helpful comments on and criticisms of an earlier version of this paper. Whatever errors that remain are, of course, my responsibility.
2. David Carr's publications on this topic are a notable exception to this rule, as he devotes considerable attention to Husserl's problem. However, I discuss some aspects of the problem of intersubjectivity which Carr does not explicate. Whereas he concentrates on the objectivity of the world, I pay attention to the objectivity of some of the things that we say about it.
3. Alfred Schütz, Collected Papers III, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl", trans. Frederick Kersten, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 56-7, emphasis mine. Hereafter referred to as "CPIII". It is somewhat misleading to say that Sartre and Schütz believe that Husserl tries to answer the problem of other minds. For the traditional problem of other minds is stated in terms of minds, rather than transcendental egos. And both Sartre and Schütz recognize, at least, that Husserl's problem is stated in terms of transcendental subjects. Nonetheless, Sartre and Schütz believe that Husserl tries to establish the existence of another transcendental ego. So Husserl's problem, according to Sartre and Schütz, is structurally the same as the problem of other minds. One needs only to replace 'mind' with 'transcendental ego'. According to Sartre and Schütz, then, the only difference is that Husserl does not attempt to establish the existence of something which is part of the world.
4. I say "prior to the intentional analysis of the perception of other subjects", since some phenomena are constituted as irreducible to my possible experiences after grounding that judgement in the fifth meditation. See the discussion of the two senses of 'transcendence' later in this paper.
5. It might be argued that I should classify Sartre's misinterpretation along with Ricoeur's, since Sartre maintains that Husserl is an idealist (BN, p. 9). But Sartre does not interpret Husserl's problem as arising because he takes Husserl to be an idealist. In fact, Sartre (himself no idealist) tries to answer the problem of other minds.
6. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to note that the life-world (Crisis, p. 172) and the world of the natural standpoint (Ideas, ¶ 29) are intersubjectively constituted.
7. But it is quite clear that Carr knows that he is explaining what would make the passage plausible, rather than merely expositing the text.

For he says "it could be argued". The reason that I bother to note that the interlocutor does not realize the way in which other subjects are a special case is that I have maintained that Ricoeur and the interlocutor are mistaken about this very point.

8. .Of course, there could be disharmonious experiences when one still identifies something as another subject. But in cases like these, the disharmonious experiences are "cancelled".

9. This is not to say, of course, that all judgements can be confirmed by sense-experience. Indeed, Husserl strongly objects to empiricism on the grounds that empiricists presuppose that any judgement which is foreign to sense-experience is spurious (Ideas, p. 75). Husserl objects because it is the meaning of the judgement which dictates the way it is to be grounded. But it is clear that the judgement 'I experience others' is grounded in sense-experience.

CHAPTER VI

HUSSERL'S FIFTH MEDITATION

1. Introduction: Résumé of Previous Arguments

Our analysis of science (in the neutral sense) has led us to the conclusion that the problem of intersubjectivity is broader than commentators have taken it to be. Husserl's own analyses of science in Formal and Transcendental Logic uncovered the (necessary) truth that to take oneself to attain objectively valid results is to be committed to the theses that the truth of those results can be ascertained by any rational subject, and that the language in which those results are expressed is understandable by any rational subject. In short, to identify one's results as objectively valid, to take one's activity to be science, is to make use of the concept 'other transcendental rational subjects'. Since Husserl takes phenomenology to be a science, and since he thinks that phenomenology is an ultimate science in that it can and should clarify its presuppositions, Husserl makes use of the concept 'other transcendental rational subject' and thus must address the problem of clarifying that concept. We thus have a rationale for saying that the problem of intersubjectivity is the central problem of phenomenology, since it concerns the scientific status of phenomenology itself, a rationale that is absent in the literature on intersubjectivity. Since

commentators have not recognized that Husserl's analysis is related to the objectivity of some of the things that we say about the world, the problem and analysis involve broader issues than commentators have realized. It is not simply a matter of clarifying our notion of the objectivity of the world.

I say "make use of the concept 'other transcendental rational subject'", since we have seen that the problem of intersubjectivity is not the problem of other minds. Nor can Husserl's solution to the problem (as Husserl understood very well) yield the conclusion 'Others exist'. One may think that Husserl's problem should have been the problem of other minds, and that Husserl should have proven the existence of others. But it has been shown in the chapter on evidence and truth that science and solipsism are compatible; and I have argued in the chapter on language that a coherent and testable language is compatible with solipsism. Throughout the preceding chapters, in fact, it has been argued that one must make use of the concept 'other rational transcendental subject', rather than suppose the existence of such subjects. This is fitting, since Husserl's purpose is to clarify the sense 'other rational transcendental subject'. If I am right, then Husserl can clarify the scientific status of phenomenology without broaching any questions about existence.

It is worth recalling the reason why three adjectives appear in the phrase 'other transcendental rational subject'. I say "other", keeping in mind David Carr's distinction between different egos and other egos in the preceding chapter. In the chapter on language it was argued that 'other subject' in the relevant sense means 'other

transcendental subject', since only a transcendental subject is a subject relative to which there is a world (for us) at all. Although the referents of 'other transcendental subjects' and 'human beings or quasi-human beings' are the same, the senses are not the same, the former being prior to the latter. Since Husserl wants to analyze the sense of 'other subjects' relative to which there is an objective world (for us), and since every human being is identified as "in" the objective world, Husserl's problem is to clarify the sense 'other transcendental subject'.

Any yet it is quite impossible to foresee how, for me in the attitude of reduction, other egos--not as mere worldly phenomena but as other transcendental egos--can become...equally legitimate themes of a phenomenological egology (CM, p. 30, emphasis mine).

If Husserl's problem were to analyze the meaning 'human being', then he would have to make use of the concept 'objective world'. But Husserl intends to analyze 'objective world' by clarifying 'other subject'. Lastly, I say "rational subjects", since I have argued that Husserl must make use of the concept 'rational subjects' from the outset. I pointed out that only an open plurality of rational subjects can constitute the sense 'science' in the chapter on evidence and truth.

The preceding remarks provide us with a criterion (though not the only one) for evaluating Husserl's response to the problem of intersubjectivity in the fifth meditation. We shall judge his response in terms of how well he analyzes the notion 'other transcendental rational subject' from a phenomenological point of view.

2. Reduction to the Sphere of Ownness

A. Ostensible Motives for the Second Epoche'

Husserl's first move is to perform what he calls a "reduction to the sphere of ownness". What is the motive for this step? Just what does 'the reduction to the sphere of ownness' mean? What, specifically, does 'the sphere of ownness' mean? I shall maintain that some of Husserl's statements about the reduction to the sphere of ownness are misleading. I shall then argue that the sphere of ownness, insofar as we can make sense of it, is something that is already yielded by the phenomenological reduction and that, consequently, the so-called "reduction" to the sphere of ownness is not a new reduction at all.

Despite the fact that there is a lot of literature on the sphere of ownness, few commentators ponder the reason(s) for the reduction and identify it correctly. Many of Schuetz's criticisms of Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity are criticisms of the reduction to the sphere of ownness. Yet one finds no discussion whatsoever of the motive for the reduction in Schuetz's paper (CPIII, pp. 57-61).

Ricoeur says that there are two motives. First,

Since the Other figures as a special transcendence, the temptation to hypostatize this transcendence must be thrust aside through an abstention appropriate to this temptation. This Husserl calls 'reduction to the sphere of ownness' (AHP, p. 118).

But if this were the motive, then the reduction to the sphere of ownness would be nothing over and above the phenomenological reduction. However, Husserl takes the reduction to the sphere of ownness to be a reduction in addition to the phenomenological reduction (CM, p. 95). Since the phenomenological reduction includes abstaining from positing the existence (or non-existence) of others, Husserl would simply be re-

asserting his resolution to maintain the attitude obtained by phenomenological reduction, if Ricoeur's interpretation of the motive for the "second epoché" were true and Husserl's "second epoché" is genuine.

Ricoeur thinks that there is another motive.

But this abstraction is methodologically necessary because it allows us to place in correct order a primary sense of the word 'me' and a secondary sense which attaches to whosoever is an Other for me (AHP, pp. 120-121).

This second proposal, however, is not altogether clear. I do not identify another subject as a second "me". Another subject is precisely not me. Judging from the fifth meditation, however, Ricoeur probably means 'consciousness' by 'me', since Husserl proceeds to say that my own consciousness is the original from which I derive the sense 'conscious subject' (CM, p. 112). Still, Ricoeur does not explain just how the reduction to the sphere of ownness allows us to put in proper order these two senses.

Elliston has still another proposal. Elliston thinks that Husserl is trying to avoid begging the question.

Husserl seems in danger of presupposing the phenomenological epoché so as to make his subsequent solution to the problem of others circular: his formulation of the problem would then be infected by the techniques subsequently used to solve it. How can we avoid begging the question in this way? (H:E&A, p. 218).

Elliston believes that Husserl thought he could avoid begging the question by reducing to the sphere of ownness. After all, Husserl introduces the reduction to the sphere of ownness in the following way:

If the transcendental constitution of other subjects and accordingly the transcendental sense, 'other subjects', are in question, and consequently a universal sense-stratum that emanates from others and is indispensable to the possibility of an objective world for me is also in question, then the sense, 'other subjects', that is in question here cannot as yet be the sense: 'Objective subjects, subjects existing in the world' (CM, pp. 92-93, emphases mine).

Although Husserl uses no word that signals a conclusion, the next sentence is

As regards method, a prime requirement for proceeding correctly here is that first of all we carry out, inside the universal transcendental sphere, a peculiar kind of epoche' with respect to our theme (CM, p. 93).

That sentence appears to be a conclusion that is drawn from the preceding considerations. After all, Husserl says that the second epoche' is a requirement for correct procedure right after noting that certain things are in question. So, Husserl seems to be saying that since certain things are in question (i.e., the constitution of other subjects and the sense 'other subjects'), we must start by excluding those things in question (i.e., reduce to the sphere of ownness).

Although there is evidence for Elliston's interpretation, Elliston and I disagree about the nature of the so-called "question-begging". Elliston believes that Husserl is trying to avoid presupposing the phenomenological epoche' so that his formulation of and solution to the problem will not be infected by the method used to solve it. That is what Elliston thinks is question-begging. But Husserl could avoid formulating and solving the problem in phenomenological terms only if the reduction to the sphere of ownness were employed instead of the phenomenological reduction. However, the text shows that the reduction to the sphere of ownness is used in addition to the phenomenological reduction. Toward the end of the fifth meditation, Husserl writes "At no point was the transcendental attitude, the attitude of transcendental epoche', abandoned" (CM, p. 148, emphasis mine). Accordingly, if Husserl is trying to avoid begging the question, Elliston has at least misidentified the nature of the question-begging.

Moreover; there is some reason for believing that Husserl was not trying to avoid begging the question. For something can beg the question only if it is an argument. Although one finds arguments in the fifth meditation, it would be a mistake to say that the fifth meditation as a whole is an argument. Rather, it is an analysis of a certain kind of experience and a corresponding sense. Husserl probably realized this. There is no need, therefore, to avoid begging the question. It is unlikely, then, that Husserl was trying to avoid begging the question.

B. The Meaning of 'The Reduction to the Sphere of Ownness'

I believe that we shall be in a better position to ascertain the philosophical motive for the reduction to the sphere of ownness if we find out what the second epoché and its correlate (the sphere of ownness) are. What, then, is the reduction to the sphere of ownness?

Husserl introduces the "second epoché" in the following manner.

For the present we exclude from the thematic field everything now in question: we disregard all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to other subjectivity and delimit first of all the total nexus of that actual and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a peculiar ownness. (CM, p. 93).

Unfortunately, this passage is ambiguous. There are a couple of possible interpretations. Let us consider each of them in turn.

First, we may ask "What are the constitutional effects of other subjectivity?". That appears to include everything that requires the concept 'other subjects' for its constitution. This would include all cultural objects and the senses corresponding to them. It would

also include physical objects and nature as a whole. This interpretation is confirmed by what Husserl says in the paragraph just preceding the one on the reduction to the sphere of ownness.

The existence-sense...of the world and of Nature in particular, as Objective Nature, includes after all, thereness-for-everyone.... In addition, Objects with 'spiritual' predicates belong to the experienced world. These Objects, in respect of their origin and sense, refer us to subjects, usually other subjects, and their actively constituting intentionality (CM, p. 92).

But not only things (such as tables and stones) require the concept 'other subjects' for their constitution. Throughout the preceding chapters, in fact, I have been arguing that evidence, truth, and language require the sense 'other rational transcendental subjects' for their constitution. But the thesis for which I have been arguing, in conjunction with the fact that Husserl makes scientific statements about the sphere of ownness, does not seem to square with Husserl's statement that all constitutional effects, immediate or mediate, are excluded from the sphere of ownness. For when Husserl describes the sphere of ownness, it is the referent of a number of scientific, phenomenological statements. But if that is so, then, as we have seen, the evidence for those statements is "there for everyone". But the evidence for those statements is derived from the sphere of ownness. Thus, it seems that the sphere of ownness must be "there for everyone". But this does not square with Husserl's statement that all constitutional effects of other subjects are excluded.

It is important to distinguish the sphere of ownness from a particular subject's (say, Husserl's) sphere of ownness. For I might be taken to be saying that each person's sphere of ownness must be numerically the same as everyone else's. Even if each person experiences

a world of private objects (that is, a world of objects that do not require the constitution of other subjects), my point is that each and every person's sphere of ownness must be the same in kind, and recognizable as such, if Husserl's statements about the sphere of ownness are corroborated by evidence. Husserl even says that everyone has access to the sphere of ownness late in the fifth meditation.

Tracing these fashionings, intentional explication has to make constitutionally understandable this primordial core of the phenomenal world—this core, which everyone of us men and, above all, every psychologist can acquire by the already-described exclusion of sense-moments pertaining to 'otherness' (CM, p. 145).

Thus, Husserl probably does not mean that he no longer uses the concept 'other subject' after performing the "second epoché", since the use of that concept is unavoidable for a philosopher. But what else are we to make of Husserl's statement that the sense 'objective' vanishes completely (CM, p. 96)?

Only a world of private objects would be objects that do not include the constitutional effects of other subjects. But Husserl says that one's experience is wholly unaffected by the reduction to the sphere of ownness. "The psychic life of my Ego (this 'psychophysical' Ego), including my actual and possible experience of what is other, is wholly unaffected by screening off what is other" (CM, p. 98, last emphasis mine). But if my experience is wholly unaffected, then I continue to experience what I take to be an intersubjective world (CM, p. 95). Perhaps, then, I have misinterpreted what Husserl means by 'disregarding all constitutional effects of other subjectivity' in the particular passage being discussed. One thing, however, is certain: we have not misinterpreted the meaning of 'the constitutional effects of other subjectivity' as

Husserl uses the phrase throughout his writings. Husserl himself refers to the sentence we are considering as "misleading" (CM, p. 93f).

How can we interpret Husserl's statements such that they do not imply absurd conclusions? One may try to defend Husserl along the following lines. Husserl does not say that he does not make use of the concept 'other subjects' in his analyses. Rather, he says that he excludes the effects of the constitution of other subjects from his theme. One may make use of a concept while not thematizing it. After all, I have been showing throughout that Husserl does just that, as far as the concept 'other transcendental rational subjects' is concerned.

This leads to the second interpretation of the passage in question. Just what does Husserl mean by 'the constitutional effects of other subjectivity'? Husserl gives us a clue.

What is specifically peculiar to me as ego, my concrete being as a monad, purely in myself and for myself, with an exclusive ownness, includes my every intentionality and therefore, in particular, the intentionality directed to what is other; but, for reasons of method, the synthetic effect of such intentionality (the actuality for me of what is other) shall at first remain excluded from the theme (CM, p. 94, last emphasis mine).

But if the synthetic effects of other subjectivity are identical with the actuality for me of what is other, then the reduction to the sphere of ownness is nothing over and above the phenomenological reduction. For it is precisely by phenomenological epoché that I adopt a neutral attitude towards what I took to be actual in the natural standpoint. It should be noted that this reading supports Ricoeur's interpretation, according to which Husserl performs the "second epoché" in order to avoid the temptation to hypothesize the transcendence of other subjects (AHP, p. 118). This reading also supports my interpretation, according

to which the so-called "reduction" to the sphere of ownness is not another phenomenological reduction at all.

There is more textual evidence for this interpretation. In the passage we are analyzing Husserl says that he is "disregarding" or "excluding from the thematic field" the constitutional effects of other subjects so that he can "delimit the total nexus of actual and potential consciousness whereby an ego constitutes his ownness". But to disregard or exclude from one's theme certain phenomena is not to perform a reduction. For one disregards or refuses to thematize certain phenomena every time one analyzes one thing as opposed to another. Thus, if refusing to thematize were a sufficient condition for being a reduction, there would be a reduction for every subject matter to be analyzed. Since that is absurd, the "reduction" to the sphere of ownness is not a phenomenological reduction.

This reading becomes more plausible if one points out that Husserl intends to delimit and discuss whatever falls within the scope of actual and potential consciousness. To use the terminology of the previous chapter, Husserl intends to describe in general terms all and only that which transcends₁ an individual's consciousness. But transcendence₁ is yielded by phenomenological reduction alone. Long before discussion of the reduction to the sphere of ownness (and post-epoché), Husserl refers to the sense of 'object' and 'world' in terms of transcendence₁ (CM, p. 62). Husserl opens the fourth meditation with the following sentence: "Objects exist for me, and are for me what they are, only as objects of actual and possible consciousness" (CM, p. 65). That the sphere of ownness consists of all and only that which transcends₁

one's consciousness is confirmed by the following passage:

As soon as we exclude from consideration the intentional effects produced by 'empathy', by our experience of others, we have a Nature (including an animate organism) that is constituted, to be sure, as a unity of spatial objects 'transcending' the stream of subjective processes, yet constituted as merely a multiplicity of objects of possible experience (CM, p. 104, emphases mine).

Of course, one could object that one is still conscious of objects and a world that one takes to be there for everyone post-epoché. But I have already pointed out that one's experience is unaffected by the reduction to the sphere of ownness. One may object that objects that transcend₂ one's consciousness are still thematized after the phenomenological reduction, whereas that is not the case after the "second epoché". But a change in there is not a sufficient condition for saying that a reduction has been performed. Besides, Husserl is pointing out that one cannot have a full philosophical clarification of the constitution of the world and objects (and their corresponding senses) without clarifying the notion 'other subjects', by describing and delimiting the sphere of ownness. He could not attain any philosophical account of the full sense of the world post-phenomenological reduction, either, at least before answering the problem in the fifth meditation. So, there is no difference between the phenomenological and second epoché to warrant calling the reduction to the sphere of ownness another reduction. Elliston and I concur in thinking that "This new epoché is a selection of phenomena from the field of philosophical inquiry uncovered earlier by the phenomenological reduction in order to solve a particular problem" (H:E&A, p. 218). But a mere selection of phenomena does not make a reduction.

If one checks Husserl's description of the sphere of ownness,

one will find that he considers what one experiences only insofar as it transcends₁ his consciousness. So when Husserl leads us to believe that he performs a phenomenological reduction, he is actually describing and delimiting all and only that which transcends₁ his consciousness, or that which falls within the scope of an individual's actual and possible consciousness. David Carr and I agree on this matter.

As for the other's body, it can be construed as 'transcendent' in the weak sense, i.e., purely in relation to my own actual and possible acts of consciousness. Everything that can be so considered belongs to what Husserl calls the sphere of ownness (Eigenheitssphäre) (PPH, p. 92).

The interpretation of the reduction to the sphere of ownness as not being another phenomenological reduction is further confirmed by paragraph 96a of Formal and Transcendental Logic. There Husserl discusses primordial transcendence and the sphere of ownness. But Husserl does not even mention another reduction. So one suspects that the phenomenological reduction already yields the sphere of ownness, and that Husserl is merely selecting some phenomena for explicit attention when he says that he is performing a "second epoche" (FTL, pp. 237-244).

Before the clarification (but not prior to the use) of the concept 'other subject', Husserl can account for that which transcends₁ his consciousness. I add "but not prior to the use", since Husserl cannot provide a philosophically clarified account of the objectivity of his analyses of the sphere of ownness before explicating the sense 'other transcendental rational subject'. He must, rather, make use of that concept, supposing that the truth of his analysis is "there for everyone". That is, Husserl can account for the sphere of ownness prior to

the analysis of the sense 'other transcendental rational subject', but cannot account for his account. This is consistent, since Husserl merely excludes from his theme the constitutional effects of other subjects. That does not imply that some constitutional effects of other subjects (the objectivity of Husserl's analyses) are not being taken for granted. Those effects simply are not thematized.

Thus, there is a non-vicious circularity in Husserl's clarification of the constitution of other subjects. He must make the philosophical presupposition that if other transcendental rational subjects exist, they can check his analyses and see that they are true, while simultaneously clarifying that presupposition. I say "non-vicious", since I take it to be obvious that one does not have to suppose that one's analyses are untestable in order to clarify the concept 'testability' (and the related concept 'other transcendental rational subject'). If Husserl's analyses were untestable, there would be no legitimate philosophical interest in them.

We have some answers to the questions that we posed. We wanted to know what the reduction to the sphere of ownness and its correlate are. We have seen that the sphere of ownness is everything that can be considered as falling within the scope of one's actual and possible consciousness; and the so-called "reduction" to the sphere of ownness is simply a selection of phenomena from what has been yielded by phenomenological reduction.

The so-called 'reduction' to the sphere of ownness is not another phenomenological reduction at all, but simply a focus on the first or narrow sense of givenness [transcendence] so that the role and nature of the second sense can emerge (PPH, p. 98).

I say "already yielded by the phenomenological reduction", since one can

account only for that which is within the scope of one's actual and possible consciousness if one does not introduce constitution by others. Since one begins from a "solipsistic" point of view post-phenomenological reduction, one does not introduce constitution by others explicitly prior to an analysis of the sense 'other subject'.

C. The Motive for the "Second Epoche"

Since the so-called "second epoche" is not a reduction at all, one may ask "What is the motive for the description of what can be considered as transcending₁ my consciousness?". David Carr has provided us with a partial answer: in order to put in relief the role and nature of transcendence₂. I think that there is another but related motive, that of allowing Husserl to state the problems to be addressed in their correct hierarchial order. What is the evidence for this interpretation?

In the second meditation Husserl writes

As a matter of fact, we shall see that, in a certain manner, a transcendental solipsism is only a subordinate stage philosophically; though, as such, it must first be delimited for purposes of method, in order that the problems of transcendental intersubjectivity, as problems belonging to a higher level, may be correctly stated and attacked (CM, pp. 30-31, emphasis mine).

Delimiting transcendental solipsism, of course, is describing all and only that which transcends₁ one's consciousness. Thus, the purpose of the description of the sphere of ownness is to help one to state the problems of intersubjectivity correctly.

Further evidence for this interpretation lies in the fact that Husserl closes his description and analysis of the sphere of ownness by indicating a hierarchy of problems to be addressed in paragraph 49.

Husserl opens paragraph 50 by saying that the analysis of the sphere of ownness is "very important", directly after setting out the problems. I suggest, then, that Husserl regarded the description of the sphere of ownness as important because it is necessary in order to state the problems of intersubjectivity in their correct order.

Parallel passages in Formal and Transcendental Logic substantiate this interpretation of the motive for the descriptive analysis of the sphere of ownness. Husserl points out that the problems of intersubjectivity must be clarified and "...resolved into a fixed and necessary hierarchy, which maps out the course that must be taken in working out the solution" (FTL, p. 240). Husserl then begins with the problem of the constitution of the objective world, noting that the sense of 'other subject' to be clarified is a sense relative to which the objective world can be objective, namely the sense 'transcendental subject', not 'human being'. Accordingly, Husserl continues, my consciousness, for whom literally everything that falls within the scope of phenomenology is, must be transcendental, too (FTL, p. 240). Husserl immediately proceeds to note that this points us back to what is constituted "in" my transcendental consciousness, and discusses the sphere of ownness (FTL, p. 240). Thus, I take the description of the sphere of ownness to be an integral part of fixing the problems of others in a fixed hierarchy.

D. Concluding Remarks on the Sphere of Ownness

This interpretation cannot be persuasive, however, until I have made it clear just how the description of the sphere of ownness helps

one to set out the problems in a hierarchy. It allows us, in part, to distinguish between what is "founding" from what is "founded", to discern that the world's being for me is a necessary condition for its being for us.

...An important result of the ownness-reduction performed on these experiences was that it brought out a substratum belonging to them, an intentional substratum in which a reduced 'world' shows itself, as an 'immanent transcendency' (CM, p. 106).

And one must address the problem pertaining to the founding "level" of constitution before proceeding to the founded set of problems. If one did not, one would risk overlooking pertinent phenomena (and senses) to be clarified, thus preventing one from attaining the maximum clarification that every serious phenomenologist demands.

It must now be made understandable how, at the founded higher lever, the sense-bestowal pertaining to transcendency proper, to constitutionally secondary Objective transcendency, comes about--and does so as an experience (CM, p. 106).

Thus, the first problem is "What is constituted solely by me?", whereas the second problem is "How do I constitute "another ego" (any ego whatsoever) as transcending₁ my consciousness?". The third problem, then, would be "How do we (the other ego and I) make transcendence₂, and thus the objective world, possible?". The description of the sphere of ownness helps us to distinguish between the first and second questions to be addressed, clearly. But it also helps us to differentiate between the second and third problems, too. For I constitute the other ego; and, as constituted by me, he is constituted only as transcending₁ my consciousness.

What must be understood about this whole account is that, while the alter ego makes it possible that the 'rest' of the world exceeds my actual and possible consciousness, the alter ego does not himself exceed my actual and possible consciousness. That is, he is

described in the Fifth Meditation in the same way that everything else was described before the problem of 'solipsism' was raised, namely, as transcendent only in the weaker sense: not reducible to the particular act or acts in which he is given to me (PPH, p. 97).

That is, the delimitation of the sphere of ownness as all and only that which transcends₁ my consciousness, helps us to avoid the confused belief that we can account for the transcendence₂ of the alter ego while addressing the second question. We see that transcendence₂ (and thus the objective world and things in it) can be accounted for only after one brings co-constituturs into the philosophical picture. Thus, the delimitation of the sphere of ownness permits us to see that the response to the third question is at least a consequence of answering the second question, and not vice versa. I say "at least a consequence", since it seems to me that once one introduces intersubjective constitution, the objective world is thereby constituted.

This last point brings up a certain problem. The other subject and I must belong to the same world in order for my experience of him to be possible. So how can Husserl say that a response to the second problem is a prerequisite for answering the third? It seems that we must suppose that we belong to the same objective world in order to explicate the constitution of the other subject. But doesn't this supposition involve a return to the natural standpoint? The fact that Husserl begins by delimiting the sphere of ownness allows Husserl to avoid this difficulty. Husserl can grant that the other subject and I must belong to the same world in order for my experience of him to be possible. But he can add that 'same world' does not mean 'same objective world'. Rather, it means 'same sphere of ownness'. The other subject must be "in" my sphere of ownness.

This last point, however, raises another difficulty. How can the other subject be "in" my sphere of ownness, while my sphere of ownness includes only that which is constituted by me? There are two answers that can be given to this question. First, the other subject's being "in" my sphere of ownness does not require that his constitutional effects fall within my sphere of ownness. I merely do not thematize the constitutional effects of others when I describe my sphere of ownness. The second answer to the question is that there is a sense in which the other subject and his constitutional effects are "within" my sphere of ownness. After all, I take it to be the case that there are others who experience the same (objective) world; and it is on the basis of my experience that I can analyze those experiences from a phenomenological point of view. All of that is for me, though we are trying to clarify the sense in which it is not merely for me.

The three questions that I distinguished correspond exactly to the problems that Husserl presents in paragraph 49 of Cartesian Meditations (CM, pp. 106-108). There is a fourth problem, however, one that Husserl does not emphasize in Cartesian Meditations, but which is the problem as far as a clarification of phenomenology is concerned. It is a "higher" question, one which requires answers to the first three questions in order to address it.

Among the higher questions are those concerning the constitution of what we may call a theoretical world: the world truly existing in the theoretical sense, or the world pertaining to an unconditionally and Objectively valid theoretical cognition (FTL, p. 243).

This problem does not pertain simply to the objective world, but to any world which is constituted theoretically. This includes the provinces of mathematics, logic, and phenomenology, none of which are identical

with intersubjective reality (or, the objective₃ world). Any world that is (or can be) the province of a science falls within the scope of this problem; and since a province is part and parcel of any science whatever, addressing this problem is clarifying the neutral sense of 'science' and of phenomenology's status as a science.

Let us clarify just how this is a higher-order question. A theoretical world is any world of which one can have objectively valid theoretical cognition. A theoretical world, in other words, is any world about which one can attain "objectively valid results". 'Objectively valid results' means "...results that have been refined by mutual criticism and that now withstand every criticism" (CM, p. 5, emphasis mine). If mutual criticism occurs, then other rational subjects must exist for me. Since Husserl's first problem pertains to any other transcendental subject whatsoever (CM, p. 107), and since the extension of 'other transcendental rational subject' is smaller than that of 'other transcendental subject', answering the first question about the existence of others for me is a prerequisite for showing how a theoretical world is constituted. The constitution of a theoretical world emerges only with the use of the concept 'other transcendental rational subject'.

There is another problem with which I have already dealt. It is the problem of truths. In order for truths about a theoretical world to be possible, one must presuppose that the province of one's science exists.

The possibility of sciences depends entirely on this certainty that their provinces exist in truth, and that, concerning their provinces, theoretical truths-in-themselves exist, as actualizable by following explorable and gradually actualizable ways of

cognition (FTL, p. 199).

For the scientist, then, there must exist a theoretical world to be explored. Otherwise, there would be no truths to be discovered; rather, they would be created, which is counter-sensical. This holds even for phenomenology. A phenomenologist necessarily supposes that his province (ego-cogito--cogitatum) exists in order to do phenomenology. This is not to suppose, of course, that the world (constituted in the natural standpoint) exists.

3. Schuetz's Criticisms of the Sphere of Ownness, with Replies

Schuetz writes that there are "five major difficulties" with Husserl's characterization of the sphere of ownness. I think that only a couple of his points will withstand scrutiny. First, Schuetz believes that there is some difficulty in the fact that "...one must be able to identify what is not 'properly' of the ego and to identify it as such in order to be able to abstract from it" (CP III, p. 59). Schuetz does not develop this point, but proceeds to talk about a "preconstituted substratum". Evidently, then, Schuetz believes that what he mentions is a difficulty by itself. But why should the fact that one must be able to identify what is not constituted solely by me in order to abstract from it involve a difficulty? Without explanation, I can only point out that Schuetz's suggestion that that is a difficulty appears to be false. For Schuetz is taking it to be obvious that in order for the so-called "reduction" to the sphere of ownness to be possible, one must not have to identify that which is not "properly of the ego".

Schuetz appears to be challenging Husserl with the question

with which he closes his first point: "And furthermore, how does that which is not 'properly' of the ego--the not-I from which I must abstract in order to disclose primordial transcendence--manifest itself as such?" (CP III, p. 59). In the first place, Husserl analyzed the givenness of that which is not properly of the ego elsewhere. The analysis of the world of the natural standpoint in Ideas is only one example. I do not see the need to analyze the givenness of that which transcends₂ my consciousness again.

The converse of Schuetz's question is much more interesting: how does that which is properly of the ego manifest itself? How is the sphere of ownness given? The answer to this question is not so easy. We recall that Husserl says that one's experience is "wholly unaffected" by the so-called "reduction" to the sphere of ownness (CM, p. 98). If so, then I continue to experience the intersubjective world. So, the only way that the sphere of ownness can be experienced is as an isolable aspect of intersubjective reality. The sphere of ownness would then be isolated in thought as a theme for phenomenological description. But that does not mean that the sphere of ownness is (or can be) experienced separately. Quite the contrary. The sphere of ownness cannot be experienced separately; one cannot by force of intellect begin to experience things as merely transcending₁ one's consciousness. One does not begin to experience, say, a table as transcending₁ one's consciousness simply by thematizing one's sphere of ownness. But that does not preclude my discussion of only an isolated aspect of my experience (i.e., describing my sphere of ownness). To use the terminology of Logical Investigations, the sphere of ownness is a

"moment" of the world, the latter being taken as intersubjectively experienced.

The second difficulty that Schuetz points out is fluctuation in the meanings of a couple of key terms. It seems that the sense of 'others' is not specified clearly.

Moreover, who are the 'Others' in the sense of 'ego subjects'...? Are they the other personal egos? Or are they the 'centering' other egos as substrata of habits? Of are they the other egos in their full concreteness (CP IIIp. 59)?

One can grant Schuetz's point, but ask "What difference does it make to Husserl's analysis?". It is not as if the referents of these three terms are different, as the way Schuetz's wording suggests. Schuetz may have pointed to a minor difficulty, insofar as we prefer clarified concepts to unclarified ones; but the lack of clarity on this point is anything but "a major difficulty".

Schuetz maintains that the concept 'everyone' is ambiguous, too.

The same ambiguity appears in the correlated concept of 'everyone'. Apparently, everyone is any living being that is ego-like (ichartig); then another time it may be 'any human being', and a third time--at least as far as cultural predicates are concerned--it may be 'everyone of the corresponding cultural communities' (CP III, p. 59).

Unfortunately, Schuetz does not consider whether there are good philosophical reasons for these differences in the meanings of 'everyone'. The fluctuations in the meaning of 'everyone' corresponds to the predicate to be constituted. Animals and members of a foreign culture simply are not other subjects in the relevant sense, when one considers the constitution of, say, European cultural predicates. A dog, for example, does not identify an airplane as a person does. In the chapter

on evidence and truth, I pointed out that only a plurality of rational subjects can constitute the sense 'science'; accordingly, one must shift from 'any other subject' to 'any rational subject'. There is, then, a good philosophical reason for the shifts in meaning of the term 'everyone'; the meaning must change according to the sense to be constituted, since it is not the case that every other subject plays a role in the constitution of every sense.

Schuetz's third criticism pertains to the misleading statement that I discussed above.

Husserl explicitly states (Par. 44) that every reference of sense to a possible Us and We is excluded by the second epoche. But how is this compatible with the retention of all actual and possible experiences of Others...within the sphere of what is 'properly' of the ego (CP III, p. 59).

Schuetz's perplexity is understandable, inasmuch as I have already explained that Husserl's initial characterization of the "reduction" to the sphere of ownness is misleading.

His fourth criticism is that Husserl cannot maintain the distinction that he draws between the constitutional effects of other subjects and the actual and possible experiences of what is not "properly of the ego". Schuetz believes that this is so because all (or nearly all) of our experiences occur "in" the natural world, or are at least interpreted by us in that manner (CP III, p. 60). Since the natural world is a constitutional effect of other subjects, and since my experience of others occurs "in" the natural world, Husserl cannot maintain the distinction between the constitutional effects of others and my experience of others. But the assertion that all (or nearly all) of our experiences occur "in" the natural world is a part of the thesis

of the natural standpoint. But one remains neutral with respect to the thesis of the natural standpoint post-phenomenological reduction. Of course, Schuetz may intend to challenge the possibility of being neutral with respect to the thesis of the natural standpoint. But Schuetz gives no indication of this; so, one suspects that he has merely conflated the philosophical and natural standpoints. The same goes for his point that we interpret our experiences as occurring within the world. The fact that I interpret my experiences of others as "in" the natural world pre-philosophically does not require such a commitment post-reduction. In other words, Schuetz does not distinguish between the standpoints of the transcendental ego and the transcendental observer here, a distinction that he draws in the next criticism.

Schuetz expresses his fifth criticism, once again, in a rhetorical question. It is difficult to see why he is prompted to draw the conclusion that he does. He begins by notion Fink's distinction between three "different egos", and points out that Husserl speaks from different points of view (these points of view corresponding to the "different egos"). One would expect Schuetz to conclude that Husserl should justify these shifts in standpoint, in order to render his account clear. This expectation is frustrated when Schuetz infers the following:

But is that which is not 'properly' of the ego and which should be excluded or screened off, not the apperception of 'another human being', i.e., another mundane ego in his mundane life, even if we grant that it is modified to 'another ego for me' (CP III, pp. 60-61)?

What, one may ask, does the distinction between "three egos" have to do with the apperception of another mundane ego? Perhaps the connection

is the fact that Schuetz cites Husserl as saying the following just before drawing the conclusion: "I experience the Other in 'me' and know that he is constituted in 'me'—although 'mirrored appresentatively', and not experienced originally" (CP III, p. 60). Evidently, Schuetz has taken Husserl to be talking about a mundane ego when Husserl says that he experiences the Other in the passage just quoted. This prompts Schuetz to object that the apperception of another mundane ego is excluded after the "second epoche".

The rationale for Schuetz's objection, then, seems to be the following: The only other egos that I experience are mundane egos. This is the reason why Schuetz replaces 'the Other' with 'mundane ego'. But any mundane ego is something "in" the objective world. Hence, my experience of him requires the prior constitution of that world. However, that is precisely what Husserl excludes from the theme with his "second epoche". Besides, Husserl is trying to analyze the sense of 'other subject' relative to which there is an objective world (for us). Husserl cannot accomplish that goal by describing the experience of a mundane ego. The solution to the problem requires the experience of a transcendental ego. The latter part of the rationale goes beyond the text of Schuetz's article considerably, although I consider the first part of my proposed rationale to be the only possible explanation for his criticism. Thus, I regard the first part of my proposal as Schuetz's thesis.

If I am right about the rationale for Schuetz's criticisms, then it contains a couple of confusions. The only way an analysis of the constitution of other subjects would require the prior constitu-

tion of the objective world is if Husserl's goal were to account for the transcendence₂ of other subjects within the sphere of ownness. But I have already pointed out (following Carr) that Husserl's goal is simply to account for the transcendence₁ of the "first" other subject, and from there to account for the transcendence₂ of everything else (including other subjects).

That is, he [the other subject] is described in the Fifth Meditation in the same way that everything else was described before the problem of 'solipsism' was raised, namely, as transcendent only in the weaker sense: not reducible to the particular act or acts in which he is given to me... Or, if the other is himself given as objective (transcendent in the stronger sense), it is only by reference to another possible alter ego (or the same alter ego) which is transcendent only in the weaker sense (PPH, p. 97).

If Husserl can account for the transcendence₁ of the other subject, and thereby account for transcendence₂, then he does not have to make surreptitious use of the concept 'objective world' in his analysis. Since Schuetz has not shown that Husserl cannot proceed in that fashion, he has not shown that Husserl must make surreptitious use of the concept 'objective world' in his analysis. Schuetz's statement that the apperception of other human beings is excluded may mean that the second epoche alters one's experience. But I have already shown that that is not the case.

This point introduces my criticism of what I take to be the second part of the rationale for Schuetz's criticism. As we saw in the chapter on language and meaning, Husserl mistakenly inferred from the fact that he needed to analyze the sense 'other transcendental subject' that the referent must be different than 'other human being or quasi-human being'. I pointed out that two non-synonymous expressions can have the same referent. Moreover, the referents of 'other human

beings or quasi-human beings' and 'other transcendental subjects' are the same. Thus, it is not the case that Husserl must turn to the experience of something other than a human being or quasi-human being in order to address his problem, that of clarifying the sense of 'other subject' relative to which there is an objective world for us. Schuetz appears to have confused the matter in a similar way. My access to another transcendental subject is through the perception of another's body; and if that other subject's body is considered only as transcending₁ one's consciousness, there is no particular problem. If the "reduction" to the sphere of ownness amounted to "screening out" the apperception of another ego for me (CP III, pp. 60-61), then since my access to another's transcendental subjectivity is mediated by perception of his body, there would be no way of solving the problem of intersubjectivity if one began with the sphere of ownness. Schuetz's notion that the so-called "second epoché" excluded the perception of other egos evidently rests on his previous charge that Husserl cannot maintain the distinction between the constitutional effects of other subjects and the experience of other subjects. For if that distinction cannot be maintained, then the perception of another ego would require the introduction of the other's constitutional effects.

4. Cartesian Meditations, Paragraph 50: The Mediate Intentionality of Experiencing Someone Else

Let us turn to the analysis itself and examine Husserl's arguments. Husserl begins by arguing that the experience of someone else must be a "mediated" intentionality. It will become clear that by 'mediate'

Husserl means 'apperceptive'; I shall explain the meanings of 'apperception' and 'appresentation' ('apperception' being synonymous with 'appresentation') in the course of my analysis.

Husserl's argument for the mediacy of the experience of someone else is as follows:

1. When I perceive someone else, I perceive him "in person".
2. But if I experienced the other ego, his appearances or subjective processes "originally", then the other subject and I would be identical.
3. Obviously, the other subject and I are not identical.
4. Therefore, although I perceive someone else "in person", I experience neither the other ego, not his appearances, nor his subjective processes, originally.

Husserl refers back to premise 2 saying "The situation would be similar as regards his animate organism, if the latter were nothing else but the 'body' [Körper] that is a unity constituted purely in my actual and possible experiences..." (CM, p. 109). That statement is somewhat ambiguous. Husserl appears to be saying that

5. If I experienced the other's animate organism originally (i.e., if the other's Leib were nothing but a Körper that transcends₁ my consciousness), then the situation would be similar to that described in premise 2 (i.e., the "other's" Leib would be identical with my Leib).

If I have interpreted premise 5 correctly, then a couple of questions arise. Why does Husserl say "similar" (ähnlich) in the passage? That locution suggests that there is a difference between

the other's ego and his animate organism (Leib). The same conclusion is suggested by the fact that Husserl discusses the other's Leib in a separate sentence, in a sentence that immediately follows the one in which Husserl talks about experiencing the alter ego originally (see premise 2 and CM, p. 109). If it is true that Husserl is implicitly distinguishing between the other's ego and Leib (and thus between my ego and Leib), then it is fair to ask "What is the phenomenological evidence for that position?". It is not a plainly obvious truth, or one that is uncontroversial. Merleau-Ponty, for example, argues that the distinction between subject and object is blurred in one's body (the body being a Leib-Körper), and that one's body (considered as an animate organism) is one's subjectivity. Moreover, some Anglo-American philosophers have argued for mind-body identity.

Perhaps this is a misinterpretation of the sentence in question, since Husserl believes that some objects are constituted (in part) by the sense of touch. Husserl's description of "my" animate organism (CM, p. 97) requires that one's body is not a mere object, but a constituting subject as well. The premise we are considering (premise 5) appears to have something to do with Husserl's statements that only my body is an animate organism (Leib) within the sphere of ownness, and that every other body is merely a body (Körper) (CM, p. 97). I take those statements to mean that the other subject qua Leib transcends₂ my consciousness and does not, accordingly, fall within the scope of my sphere of ownness. The other's Leib transcends₂ my consciousness (is not "in" my sphere of ownness) because it is the other subject, or

at least presupposes the notion 'alter ego'. But what does that have to do with what I experience "originally"? After all, we are trying to interpret Husserl's remark about other animate organisms (premise 5), which evidently refers us back to the statement about experiencing other egos (premise 2).

A closer analysis of premise 2 should help clarify Husserl's thesis:

2. But if I experienced the other ego originally, the other subject and I would be identical.

Premise 2 appears to involve a confusion between having an experience and experiencing an experience. It is obviously true that if I have any experience belonging to something that is ostensibly not me, then that ostensible other is identical with me. But it is not an obvious truth that I cannot experience another's experience. Thus, Husserl should not have used that premise as if it were an obvious truth.

If Husserl has not conflated the distinction between having and experiencing an experience, then there must be some connection between what I experience originally (what is "directly accessible") and my sphere of ownness. I suggest that the connection is that Husserl is making use of a suppressed premise, namely

6. Everything that I experience originally falls within the scope of my sphere of ownness (i.e., is reducible to my actual and possible consciousness of it).

If we suppose that 6 is a premise in Husserl's argument (Cf. CM, p. 114), then we can explain premises 2 and 5. Since the other's ego, appearances and subjective processes transcend₂ my consciousness (since, being

the other's consciousness, its existence for me is irreducible to my actual and possible consciousness of it), it does not fall within the scope of my sphere of ownness and cannot (by premise 6) be experienced originally. If we interpret premise 2 in light of premise 6, then, premise 2 means

2*. If I experienced an ostensible other ego originally, then (by premise 6) it would fall within the scope of my sphere of ownness, and therefore not be another ego (since an actual other ego transcends₂ my consciousness).

We can also reinterpret premise 5 in light of premise 6.

5*. If I experienced an ostensible other Leib originally, then (by premise 6) that "other" Leib would fall within the scope of my sphere of ownness (i.e., would only transcend₁ my consciousness) and thus not be another animate organism.

If premise 5* is an accurate account of the corresponding part of Husserl's argument, then Husserl is basically restating a position that he took while describing the sphere of ownness, namely, that "I" am the sole animate organism in my sphere of ownness (CM, p. 97).

Now premise 6 is the only way I can make sense out of premises 2 and 5 and save Husserl from the objection that he has conflated the distinction between having and experiencing an experience, or at least has presented no evidence for saying that if I experienced the other's ego "originally", he would be identical with me. But if we accept premise 6, which involves the identification of that which can be experienced originally with whatever falls within the scope of my sphere of ownness, we have a new problem. The new problem arises when we learn

that that which is experienced originally is that which is presented.

This point emerges from Husserl's final conclusion of his argument for the "mediacy" of the experience of someone else.

A certain mediacy of intentionality must be present here, going out from the substratum, 'primordial world',...and making present to consciousness a 'there too', which nevertheless is not itself there and can never become an 'itself there'. We have here, accordingly, a kind of making 'co-present', a kind of 'appresentation' (CM, p. 109).

In brief, Husserl is saying that since I experience others "in person" and yet do not experience their subjectivities "originally", there must be appresentation in the experience of someone else. Here, then, that which is experienced originally is contrasted with that which is appresented. Since that which is appresented is contrasted with that which is presented, what I experience originally is that which is presented.

But that which is presented is not co-extensive with what falls within the scope of my sphere of ownness. My sphere of ownness includes all and only that which is within the scope of my actual and potential consciousness. That which is appresented at one time can be presented at another. For example, although I now feel only the plastic part of this pen, I can touch its tip. Thus, if the sphere of ownness were identical with what I experience originally (which, in turn, is identical with what is presented), then 'sphere of ownness' would have to mean 'whatever falls within the scope of my actual consciousness'. Obviously, it does not.

But we must not leave out of consideration the important difference between appresentation of another subject and different sorts of appresentation. Actually, Husserl points out this difference

in the paragraph immediately following the argument we have been considering. Seeing a physical object, for example, involves appresentation. I see this desk and yet see (strictly speaking) only its top. Since I take myself to see the desk (rather than a top), the other sides are appresented. Even when I say I see only its top, I am implicitly saying the top of this desk. Now the sort of appresentation that is an isolable aspect of seeing a physical object differs from appresentation of another subject in an important respect. In the case of this desk, I can move and see its other sides; but this kind of verification is excluded a priori in the case of experiencing another subject (CM, p. 109).

Since appresentation of another subject is a special case, it appears that we can retain the equation of that which is experienced originally with that which falls within the scope of my sphere of ownness. The only sort of appresentation that is excluded is appresentation of another subject. Thus, Husserl is not saying that that which is experienced originally is identical with that which is presented generally. He is saying that what I experience originally is whatever is presented or presentable (i.e., the sphere of actualities and potentialities in "my" mental life, or "my" sphere of ownness). This understanding of what Husserl means by 'what is experienced originally' or 'what is directly accessible' serves to exclude appresentation of another's mental life while retaining premise 6.

However, treating appresentation of another's mental life as a special case by saying that another's mental life cannot be presented, is simply to assert a straightforward consequence of premise 2. It is

practically a restatement of premise 2, of "If I experienced the other ego originally, the other subject and I would be identical". But the reader will recall that we began this line of interpretation in order to save Husserl from an important objection to premise 2, namely that he either confused the distinction between having and experiencing an experience, or at least did not present evidence for saying that if I experienced "another" subject directly, "we" would be identical. We were looking for a principled way of connecting what I experience originally with my sphere of ownness independently of premise 2, such that Husserl would not be vulnerable to the objection just stated.

Of course, it is possible to understand premise 6 as a definition of 'what I experience originally'. Thus, we could take 'what I experience originally' to mean 'whatever is reducible to my actual and possible consciousness', or 'whatever falls within the scope of my sphere of ownness'. If we take premise 6 in this way, then (presentative) consciousness of other subjects (insofar as it introduces transcendence₂) is excluded and (it seems) we cannot criticize Husserl for offering no justification for premise 2 (and likewise, premise 5). But Husserl uses his argument to justify the conclusion that the perception of another subject involves appresentation. So, there ought to be some principle about presentation and appresentation in general that allows Husserl to infer his conclusion. Instead, he appeals to a consequence of premise 2 in a question-begging manner. The problem can be represented as follows: (1) Why should I believe that my perception of others is appresentative? (2) Premises 1-3 constitute the answer. (3) But my

appresentative perception of physical objects is not excluded. The unseen sides of physical objects can be presented. So why cannot the other's ego be presented? (4) It just cannot. The other's ego is a special case. (5) But that is a restatement of premise 2 which I have just questioned.

The point of the objection is this: Because Husserl asserts premise 2 as if it were an obvious truth, he seems to be supposing a quasi-Cartesian, private notion of consciousness. This is a possible explanation for the fact that Husserl discusses the other's Leib and consciousness separately. We require adequate criteria for distinguishing between that which is (or can be) presented and that which is (and must be) appresented so that we can determine on principled grounds whether Husserl is entitled to premises 2 and 5. What, after all, does Husserl mean by 'presentation (or original experience) of another subject' and why is that impossible? Let us defend Husserl against this objection.

Perhaps we can clarify Husserl's thesis by contrasting the experience of my ego (which is purportedly "original") with the experience of any other ego (which, as we have seen, Husserl believes is and must be "non-original"). This contrast should allow us to specify what Husserl means by 'original experience'; thereby, we should be able to determine whether Husserl's second and fifth premises are defensible. A passage in Formal and Transcendental Logic that parallels what we are discussing is an important clue as to what Husserl means by 'original experience'.

Experience is what tells me here: I have experience of myself with primary originality; of others, of another's psychic life,

with a merely secondary originality, since another's psychic life is essentially inaccessible to me in direct perception (FTL, p. 233).

Clearly, Husserl is equating experience with primary originality (or original experience) with direct perception. So Husserl's thesis is that if I directly perceived an ostensible other, "we" would be identical.

Unfortunately, the substitution of 'direct perception' for 'original experience' does not solve our problem, since we must now clarify 'direct perception'. 'Perceiving' ordinarily means 'seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, or some combination of them'. Now Husserl does not want to deny that I perceive others (at least the other's body) in that sense. Thus, either he means something different by 'perception' or the word 'direct' is carrying the philosophical freight. Now the conclusion of Husserl's argument is that the perception of another ego is appresentative. So the alter ego's relationship to my perception is the same as the relationship of the sides of this desk that I do not (directly) perceive to the side that I do see, except for the fact that I can perceive the other sides of the table.

Husserl does discuss perception of myself.

When I am effecting transcendental reduction and reflecting on myself, the transcendental ego, I am given to myself perceptually as this ego--in a grasping perception. Furthermore I become aware that, although not grasped before this perception, I was 'already given', already there for myself continually as an object of original intuition (as perceived in the broader sense) (CM, p. 101, last emphasis mine).

Now reflection on one's own consciousness post-reduction is "explication" of oneself, which is based on "original self-experience". "In every

case, however, explication is original if, precisely on the basis of original self-experience..." (CM, pp. 102-103, emphasis mine). Thus, since we are interested in original self-experience itself, rather than in something based on it, we are interested in the second sentence in the passage just cited. 'Perceived in the broader sense' is identified with 'original self-experience' (or 'direct perception') in the passage just cited. What, then, is this continuous self-consciousness that I cannot have of any other consciousness?

We have already discussed this sort of self-consciousness in the chapter on evidence and truth. There (following Mohanty) we called it "self-evidence₁". It is what Sartre calls "pre-reflective self-consciousness", the kind of consciousness that makes it possible for any individual to know the way in which he is/was aware of an object. Because I am pre-reflectively aware of not only this table, paper, pen, etc., but of my perceiving of them as well (aware of the "feel" of this pen and paper, aware of my seeing of it), I can recognize these facts reflectively. This pre-reflective self-consciousness does not guarantee knowledge of one's mode of consciousness; it is a necessary, rather than sufficient, condition for such knowledge. Self-evidence₁ (which is perceptual) is consciousness of the "living present", since one recalls one's past and anticipates one's future. "Since it goes on in the living present, self-explication can find, strictly perceptively, only what is going on in the living present" (CM, p. 102). 'Original self-consciousness', then, means 'continuous pre-reflective self-consciousness'. Now any conscious being is necessarily conscious of himself in this way. Obviously, I cannot be conscious of any other

subject in this way. I cannot necessarily have continuous pre-reflective consciousness of another's Leib as the "absolute here", as the "zero point" of perceptual experience, as I have of my Leib. If I perceive another subject, I perceive him as being for himself the zero point of perceptual experience. (Husserl himself points this out later in the fifth meditation.) But that is not the continuous self-consciousness that I necessarily exist qua consciousness. My consciousness of another subject as the zero point of his perceptions is occasioned by my perception of him, and is anything but continuous. When I perceive another subject and identify him as the zero point of his perceptions, I am simultaneously conscious of myself as that around which my perceptual experience is organized. If I necessarily were conscious of both my and the other's Leib as that around which perceptual experience is organized, then I would have to be conscious of the other Leib at all times when I am awake or (what amounts to the same thing), those zero points would have to be identical. Therefore, there is evidence for premises 2 and 5. We have thus defended Husserl against the objections raised against his argument.

Husserl's position, then, is not that consciousness is private in the sense that only one person can know about it. It is not, to use Don Locke's phrase, "epistemologically private" (M&O, p. 6). Rather, Husserl's position is that a person has privileged access to his own consciousness, which is only to say that only a person can have knowledge of his own consciousness in the way that he does (M&O, p. 6). Each person has continual pre-reflective self-consciousness of only his own consciousness, and thus does not have to "find out" what his own inten-

tions are, as he must do for everyone else. Thus, the previous objection, that Husserl appeared to be supposing that consciousness is private, was off the point. The objection involved a conflation of the distinction between 'epistemological privacy' and 'privileged access'. It is objectionable to say that consciousness is epistemologically private, since a person can know about another's intentions, perceptions, etc. (by being told, for example). But it is not objectionable to say that a person has privileged access to his own consciousness, for the simple reason that a person cannot read another's mind. The distinction between epistemological privacy and privileged access must be maintained.

Now, Husserl's position is that my consciousness (its processes and appearances) are, in Don Locke's words, "mentally private". Something is mentally private if only one person can perceive it (M&O, p. 6). Husserl clearly believes this, since he says that only I can directly perceive my mental states. Now Locke maintains that one's thoughts and perceptions are not mentally private (M&O, p. 6). However, Locke is using 'to perceive' in a narrower sense than does Husserl. Note that Husserl says 'perceived in the broader sense'.

Husserl's conclusion is that the perception of any other subject involves apperception (or appresentation). One apperceives x when one does not (directly) perceive x, but takes x to be there, too. As I have pointed out, I do not (directly) perceive the underside of this desk; nevertheless, I see a desk, rather than a "top-appearance" (as sense-data philosophers suggest). The parts of the desk that I do not directly see, but take to be there, are appresented. Of course, what is appresented varies, depending on one's perspective. A side of this

desk that I (at present) apperceive can become perceived. We have seen that the perception of another subject is an exception to that rule. Another apparent exception is when one is conscious of the meaning of a sentence, phrase or word. The audible sounds (in cases of speech) are presented (or perceived). Yet I understand the meaning of those words. My understanding grasp of that meaning (of what is "there, too" for me) is an act of apperception. The same is true of reading, except that I see the presented words, rather than hear them. Since I cannot perceive (see or hear) meanings, meanings are, like other subjects, necessarily appresented. Mates' mistake (pointed out in the first part of the chapter on language and meaning) consists in overlooking the apperception that occurs in understanding the meaning of spoken or written words. Simple sense-perception does not allow a logician to determine all relevant logical properties of sentences. To apperceive, then, is to take something to be "there, too".

5. Cartesian Meditations, Paragraph 50: My Consciousness as Motivating Factor in Apperception of Another Subject

Let us return to Husserl's argument. We have seen that the perception of another subject involves apperception. Only one's own consciousness is given to oneself originally; every other consciousness is given apperceptively. At this point in the argument Husserl introduces an important premise.

How can appresentation of another original sphere, and thereby the sense 'someone else', be motivated in my original sphere and, in fact, motivated as experience—as the word 'appresentation' (making intended as co-present) already indicates? Not every non-originary making present can do that. A non-originary making present can do it only in combination with an originary presentation, an

itself-giving proper; and only as demanded by the originary presentation can it have the character of appresentation-- somewhat as, in the case of experiencing a physical thing, what is there perceptually motivates belief in something else being there too (CM, pp. 109-110, emphasis mine).

Let us add a couple of premises that we have already mentioned to the argument:

7. One's consciousness of another subject is appresentative.

Premise 7 is a straightforward consequence of premise 2. For if the original consciousness (presentation) of "another" subject guaranteed that "we" are in fact identical, then it necessarily follows that if I perceive another subject, that perception involves appresentation (i.e., is not original presentation). I have already pointed out that

8. Only one's own consciousness is presented (so long as we take presentation of a consciousness to be nothing but pre-reflective self-consciousness).

Premise 8 may be regarded as a presupposition of premise 2.

Now if we add the premise that is stated in the quotation just cited, we obtain an interesting consequence.

9. All appresentation necessarily involves (past or present) presentation, and only as motivated by what is presented is there appresentation.

We can see that an ostensible consequence of 7-9 is:

10. One's consciousness of another subject as another subject must be derived from one's own case.

It is no surprise to find this conclusion in the text:

Since, in this Nature and this world, my animate organism is the only body that is or can be constituted originally as an animate organism...the body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended

as an animate organism, must have derived this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my animate organism, and done so in a manner that excludes an actually direct, and hence primordial, showing of the predicates belonging to an animate organism, specifically, a showing of them in perception proper (CM, pp. 110-111, all but last emphasis mine).

I believe that Husserl's conclusion is false. The thesis that one's identification of someone as another subject must be "derived" from one's own case is simply not borne out by the evidence. Let anyone consult his experience. Does one find, even upon close analysis, that one bases one's identification of another subject on one's own case? Does some sort of "transfer" from one's own consciousness take place? I submit that the answers to both of these questions is "no".

Sartre's accurate descriptions of the experience of others is the best evidence against Husserl's conclusion. Suppose that I see a man sitting on a park bench. If I identified him as merely a thing, I would identify him as having only objective properties and relations, such as weighing a certain amount, being a certain distance from a nearby tree, etc. When I identify him as a man, however, I identify him as fundamentally different from things. I identify things as organized around him, as oriented from his point of view. "Rather it appears that the world has a kind of drain hole in the middle of its being and that it is perpetually flowing off through this hole" (BN, p. 343). Objects "converge" around him. True, all of this is for me. That, however, is a fact that I discover upon reflection. One does not find any "transfer" from one's own consciousness, even upon analysis of one's perception of others. For when I identify someone as a man, as someone around whom objects are organized, I take myself as an actual or possible object for him.

....If the Other-as-object is defined in connection with the world as an object which sees what I see, then my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be referred back to my permanent possibility of being seen by the Other. It is in an through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject (BN, pp. 344-345).

I consider the identification of another subject as someone for whom I am or can be an intentional object an isolable aspect of ordinary perception of another subject. Unlike Sartre, however, I do not infer that it is wrongheaded to analyze the perception of other subjects, rather than shame. Moreover, I do not infer that perception of another subject is consciousness of him as an object (where "object" is opposed to "subject", as Sartre interprets it). I shall say more about these points later.

For the time being, the point is to show that my perception of someone as another subject does not involve any "transfer" from my own case. When I identify another subject as someone for whom I am (or can be) an object, I am not "transferring" from my own case since, if I did, I would be identifying myself as an object. I would be the basis for the identification of myself as an object. Further, I would be aware of this fact upon reflection. But I don't identify myself as an object. I identify the other subject as a subject for whom I am or can be an intentional object, which is not quite the same as identifying myself as an object. I identify him as the basis for the identification of me as an object.

It may be objected that one is an object for himself in reflection; after all, one reflects on one's conscious life when one does phenomenology. So, it is not correct to suggest that one cannot

be an object for oneself. My reply is that I did not suggest that one cannot be an object for oneself. I am saying, rather, that one usually is not an object for oneself when one perceives someone else. After all, one must reflect on one's own consciousness to be conscious of oneself as an object. The preceding objection invites us to conflate reflective consciousness of oneself with pre-reflective consciousness of someone else. When one perceives someone else, one is usually not reflectively conscious of oneself. Yet one pre-reflectively identifies another subject as someone for whom one is or can be an intentional object. Pre-reflectively, one is non-positionally conscious of consciousness that one subsequently (upon reflection) identifies as one's own. But if Husserl's position were true, there would have to be pre-reflective and yet positional consciousness of consciousness whenever one perceives someone else. Thus, the identification of someone as another subject does not involve any "transfer" from one's own case.

Of course, Husserl insists that the "transfer" from one's own case is not reflective. Husserl carefully distinguishes between "analogizing apperception" and "inference from analogy". "There would be, accordingly, a certain assimilative apperception; but it by no means follows that there would be an inference from analogy. Apperception is not inference, not a thinking act" (CM, p. 111). But it seems to me that if one's apperceptive consciousness involves a "transfer" from one's own case, then phenomenological reflection on that experience would bear out Husserl's claim.

I suggest that Husserl allows his reflection on the experience

of another subject to distort his description of the phenomenon. This is the same criticism that Sartre made of Husserl on another matter, whether transcendental consciousness is a transcendental ego. I shall summarize Sartre's argument before turning to the point at issue. Sartre points out that philosophers who contend that a transcendental consciousness is a transcendental ego base the thesis on reflective experiences (TE, p. 44). Whenever one reflects on one's own consciousness, the experiences appear as one's own. Defenders of the transcendental ego thesis maintain that an I appears. But they have thereby conflated the distinction between the reflecting consciousness and the consciousness reflected upon. The reflecting consciousness does not take itself as an object; the cogito concerns solely the consciousness reflected upon (TE, p. 44). Since Husserl takes the consciousness reflected upon to be identical with the reflecting consciousness, Husserl has mistaken a product of reflection for the original, pre-reflective phenomena. In all strictness, Husserl should have said that a me, rather than an I, appears upon reflection. The ego is an object for consciousness; thus, the word for this phenomenon should be in the accusative, rather than the nominative, case. Reflection "gives birth to the me", or usually distorts that which is pre-reflectively experienced (TE, p. 45).

Sartre does not rest his entire case on this abstract argument. He turns to a representative example and describes it carefully. Suppose that I am reading and want to describe adequately that pre-reflective mode of consciousness. Should we describe it as "I am reading the book"? No. "There is no doubt about the result: while I was reading, there was consciousness of the book, of the heroes of the novel, but the I

was not inhabiting this consciousness" (TE, pp. 46-47). Although one would answer "I am reading" to the question "What are you doing?", that is not an accurate description of what is there for consciousness while one was immersed in the book. Suppose that one is pursuing a streetcar.

When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken, etc., and non-positional consciousness of consciousness. In fact, I am then plunged into the world of objects; it is they which constitute the unity of my consciousnesses; it is they that present themselves with values, with attractive and repellant qualities--but me, I have disappeared; I have annihilated myself. There is no place for me on this level (TE, pp. 48-49, second emphasis mine).

I am conscious of the streetcar-to-be-overtaken, rather than of myself running after the streetcar.

Now what does this have to do with the consciousness of another subject? Can a similar description be made of ordinary consciousness of another subject? I believe that there is such a description. The description is complicated by the fact that to identify someone as another subject is to identify him as someone for whom one is or can be an intentional object. That fact appears to support Husserl. But let us look more closely. I step off the elevator and see Dr. Merrill walking this way. I do not see myself; I do not, in particular, find myself as a source from which an appresentative transfer takes place. I see Dr. Merrill walking this way--period. Of course, the use of the phrase 'this way' indicates my body as the zero-point of the perception that I, upon reflection, identify as mine. But this point is not sufficient to derive Husserl's conclusion. For I may say that the pack of cigarettes is to the right. 'To the right' points, once again, to my

body's position (or, more precisely, my body as Leib, as that around which "my" experience is organized). 'To the right' is the same kind of phrase as 'this way'. Yet there is no apperceptive transfer from my own case, for the simple reason that I do not identify the pack of cigarettes as another subject. If one insists on the use of the same phrase ('this way'), I invite the reader to imagine that he is playing baseball, and that the ball has just been hit in his direction. One very well might think instantaneously "The ball is coming this way". But no one identifies a baseball as another subject. Thus, the use of such phrases is not sufficient to warrant Husserl's conclusion that one's consciousness of another subject must be derived from one's own case.

We must analyze ordinary perception of another subject more closely. We can approach this problem indirectly by criticizing Husserl's argument. It may be worthwhile to repeat the argument.

7. One's consciousness of another subject is (necessarily) appresentative.

8. Only one's own consciousness is presented (so long as we take presentation of a consciousness to be nothing but pre-reflective self-consciousness).

9. All appresentation necessarily involves (past or present) presentation, and only as motivated by what is presented is there appresentation.

10. Thus, one's consciousness of another subject as another subject must be derived from one's own case.

The rationale for repeating the argument is quite simple. Since I have been arguing against 10, it is incumbent upon me to show that either at

least one of the premises is false, or the argument is invalid.

I think that premise 9 is suspect. It is necessary to clarify the key term 'motivated' (and its grammatical cognates) in order to criticize the premise on solid grounds. Premise 9 is the key to Husserl's argument; and one will find no argument for it in Cartesian Meditations. However, Husserl discusses motivation in paragraph 37 of that work. Laws of motivation are similar to causal laws, except that motivation pertains to the relationships that obtain between consciousness and its intended object, whereas causal laws have to do with regular connections between things. I believe that Husserl is wise to choose another word to talk about those relationships between consciousness and its intended object. For in the first place, talk of causality is in the natural (sometimes the naturalistic) attitude, where the presupposition of the existence of both cause and effect is in play. Moreover, causal talk precludes any talk about transcendental consciousness, as both cause and effect are identified as "in" the world. Clearly, Husserl does not want his discussion of motivation to be conflated with naturalistic talk about two (or more) things. Secondly, talk of causing a consciousness to do x does violence to ordinary usage.

Consider the kind of example that Husserl cites, that of perceiving a physical object. My perception of this side of (say) this desk motivates me to take the other sides to be there, too. We would not say that my perception of this side causes me to believe that the other sides are there. I think, however, that there is an ordinary word for Husserl's topic, namely, 'prompts'. We say that my perception

of this side of the desk prompts me to take the other sides to be there. 'Motive', on the other hand, suggests a reason or explanation, as in 'He was motivated by greed'.

Now Husserl says that I am motivated to appresent content x only on the basis of the presentation of y. Consider the desk example. I believe that the unseen sides of this desk are present, too, only because I see this side; and if I had not perceived this side (or, some side), I would not take the unseen content to be there, too. I say "perceived" advisedly, for one side does not have to be seen in order for the unperceived sides of a desk to be appresented. Suppose that I walk into a dark room and bump into the desk. Clearly, I take a desk (or, at least, some physical object) to be there, although I (my body) touched only one side of the desk (i.e., only one side of the desk was presented).

Now that we understand the meaning of premise 9, we can evaluate Husserl's argument. Since Husserl concludes that my appresentative consciousness must be derived from my own case, it is clear that premise 9 must be interpreted as follows:

9*. All appresentation of something of the kind x necessarily involves (past of present) presentation of the same sort of intentional object, and only as motivated by presentation of the latter is there appresentation of the former.

In short, Husserl is saying that appresentation of any kind of intentional object must be based upon presentation of the same sort of intentional object. Only with 9* can Husserl conclude that my pre-reflective acquaintance with my consciousness and Leib is a precondition

for identifying something as another consciousness and Leib. For if one's appresentative consciousness of another subject is or can be based on the presentation of something other than a Leib-consciousness, then Husserl is not entitled to infer that one's identification of another subject must be based upon one's pre-reflective acquaintance with one's own Leib-consciousness.

Now the question is "Is (or can) the appresentative consciousness of another subject (be) based on the presentation of something other than a Leib-consciousness (i.e., a subject)?" However, it may not even be necessary to raise and try to answer this question, insofar as it requires that we have already answered a prior question in the affirmative. The question we are raising requires that the answer to the question "Is consciousness of another subject necessarily appresentative?" is "yes". That, however, is dubious. I suggest, therefore, that we postpone consideration of 9* until we have considered premises 7 and 8 more closely.

It is noteworthy that I have granted that Husserl is correct in maintaining that only one's own consciousness is presented (premise 8) only insofar as we take presentation of a consciousness to be nothing but pre-reflective self-consciousness. The same qualification is true of consciousness of a Leib. I have defended Husserl insofar as I have accepted his definition of 'presentation of another subject'. But should that definition be accepted? The principle from which that definition follows (in conjunction with the fact that presentation of one's own consciousness is pre-reflective self-consciousness) is that if any two objects are of the same kind, then their modes of "original

presentation" are the same. Since the other subject and I are both subjects, then the way my consciousness is (or can be) presented is the same as any other consciousness is (or can be) presented; and since one cannot have pre-reflective self-consciousness of another subject, one's consciousness of another is necessarily appresentative.

Of course, I can offer no decisive argument against Husserl's stipulative definition of 'presentation of another subject'. I can simply point out some considerations that militate against acceptance of Husserl's terms. I shall offer an analogy. When a skeptic raises the problem of the external world, one finds that the skeptic is not satisfied with any of our ordinary evidences of the existence of external objects. Even paradigm cases of such evidence does not convince him. Soon, it becomes clear that the skeptic is demanding a kind of evidence that cannot be had. At that point, it seems to me that the proper response is that the skeptic's criteria for evidences of the existence of external objects are simply too strong. If someone says that he knows that there are external objects, he does not mean that it is impossible that there are no external objects. Although from 'S knows that p' it necessarily follows that 'p' is true, it does not follow that 'p' is necessarily true. The implicit demand that the evidence be so strong that it cannot be had undercuts the skeptic's problem, and prompts us to point out that the criteria for evidence of the existence of external objects are different.

It appears that the case is similar with Husserl's requirements for presentation of a consciousness. Here we find that the evidential consciousness of another subject (i.e., original presentation) cannot be

had by anyone except the conscious subject himself. Ordinarily (and as Husserl's own analyses of evidence and truth require) we regard knowledge as shared (or shareable), which is to say that no one has knowledge that no one else can have. Moreover, Husserl himself says that when one sees someone else, one sees him "in person". Now it is not my intention to argue against privileged access to one's own consciousness. My point, rather, is that I think there may be different criteria for presentation of another subject than there are for presentation of "one's own" consciousness-Leib. I am suggesting, in other words, a slight limitation to the general principle if two intentional objects are of the same kind, then their modes of being presented (for any subject whatever) are the same. Why shouldn't perception of someone else count as original presentation, since that is perception of him "in person"? This is no conclusive argument against premise 7, although it casts some doubt upon it.

It should be noted that Husserl has an a priori reason for rejecting my suggestion. It is premise 6.

Whatever can become presented, and evidently verified, originally--is something I am; or else it belongs to me as peculiarly my own. Whatever, by virtue thereof, is experienced in that founded manner which characterizes a primordially unfulfillable experience--an experience that does not give something itself originally but that consistently verifies something indicated--is 'other' (CM, pp. 114-115).

This is an unfortunate principle for Husserl to adopt, since it implies that physical objects, which are and can become presented originally in perception, are something that I am or belong to me as peculiarly my own. There is no talk of simultaneous perception of all sides in the statement of the principle above. So, Husserl cannot avoid the absurd

consequence of that principle.

Let us take a closer look at premise 9*. I noted earlier that Husserl is not entitled to infer that one's consciousness of another subject must be derived from one's own case if one's appresentative consciousness of another subject is (or can be) based upon the presentation of something other than a Leib-consciousness. Upon what basis do I identify, say, Dr. Merrill as a person? I identify him as a person on the basis of my perception of his body (Leib), his movements, voice, etc. One simply finds no "transfer" from one's own case, provided that one is careful not to confuse what is experienced pre-reflectively with the products of reflection. I do not mistake my glasses for a person because they do not look, sound, or feel like one. Premise 9*, in short, is false. One's identification of something as another subject is based on the presentation of something other than one's own subjectivity. As I said, one's identification is motivated by perception of (a person's) body, voice, movements, etc. One already has the concept of a person. How one acquired that concept is a question for psychologists to answer. Besides, we should not forget that Husserl's theory is that the "original" from which one ostensibly transfers is livingly present. So, one does not need to speculate about concept formation in order to tell that Husserl's theory is false. Sheer analysis and description simply do not bear out Husserl's position. No I appears in pre-reflective consciousness of another subject. We see the rationale behind raising Sartre's criticisms of the transcendental ego theory. Husserl's theory that one transfers from one's own case requires the descriptive mistake that Sartre discusses.

6. Further Analysis of the Experience of Someone Else

Let us summarize the results of the preceding arguments. We have seen that one's own consciousness does not appear to oneself when one pre-reflectively perceives someone else. That is to say, there is no positional consciousness of consciousness, which would be required if one's perception of other subjects were motivated by acquaintance with one's own consciousness. Accordingly, if consciousness of someone else is apperceptive (appresentative), and if all appresentation requires presentation, it is not the presentation of one's own consciousness (not to mention one's ego) that motivates the appresentation.

Some doubts have been raised against Husserl's thesis that another subject cannot be presented. But that is a far cry from rejecting Husserl's claim. There is evidence for Husserl's position. Although no one's conscious life is private in the sense that no one but that person can know about it, one's conscious life is private in the sense that no one but the particular person (whose conscious life it is) can know about that conscious life in the way that that person does. And to identify someone as another subject is to identify him as someone that has what one may call "privileged access" to his conscious life. It seems, then, that Husserl is correct in insisting that perception of someone else is apperceptive.

It is thus incumbent upon me to show that the analogy to the problem of the external world breaks down. The major difference is that the skeptic with respect to the external world suggests that we do not at all know whether external objects exist. But if I am inter-

preting Husserl correctly, he is not saying that one has no knowledge of other subjects. Rather, he is saying that a person does not know of other subjects in precisely the same way that he knows of himself. This is not to suggest that our knowledge of other subjects is somehow a deficient form of one's knowledge of oneself; it is only to say that it is different. There is a second dissimilarity; the skeptic claims that no one knows of external objects. But even if one's knowledge of oneself were (on Husserl's theory) the only kind of knowledge of a subject (i.e., if Husserl were an epistemological solipsist), there would be one person who knows, rather than none.

We have already examined the first analogy that Husserl uses in order to clarify the perception of someone else: the analogy to perception of a physical object. Even ordinary perception of physical objects involves apperceiving, which is to be distinguished from inferring, imagining, and remembering. When one ordinarily perceives a physical object, one does not infer that there are unseen sides (or, more precisely, unrepresented sides). Nor does one imagine or remember the unrepresented sides. Yet the unrepresented sides are appresented, since one sees a physical object (say, this book), and the book has unrepresented sides. Appresentation is a component of ordinary perception, and makes perception what it is. "What is appresented is always the complement of what is presented, forming a kind of continuum with it" (PPH, pp. 92-93). Perception of someone else is like perception of a physical object in that it involves apperception, except that the other sides of a physical object can be presented, whereas one cannot perceive another's consciousness.

Is there any other kind of experience in which that which is experienced cannot be presented? This introduces Husserl's second analogy. Perception of someone else has some things in common with remembering.

Recollection...is a special sort of...act which 'renders present something present that is not present'; it is distinguished from an act of phantasy, for example, by locating its object in the past, and, what is more, in my past (PPH, p. 94).

Whenever I (or anyone) remembers something, I remember something that I experienced. Say that I recall a performance of The Crucible. Although my intentional object is the performance, I could not remember it unless I had heard and seen it. "Thus with a greater or lesser degree of explicitness, recollection renders present not only the object of the experience...but also the experience itself" (PPH, p. 94, emphasizes mine). Indistinctly, that is, I recall having seen and heard the performance.

Now the similarities to perception of someone else can be noted. Because remembering involves locating something in one's past something which is taken to have been experienced, an experience is constituted in remembering. The same is true of perception of someone else. If one perceives someone else, one perceives what one takes to be another stream of experience. This analogy "...makes somewhat less paradoxical...the idea of a stream of consciousness as object (PPH, pp. 94-95), a paradox to which I referred in the previous chapter. A second similarity is that remembering almost always involves a different spatial location. That is, when I am remembering something, I (anyone) am almost always in a different place than I was when I originally experienced the thing in question. I am in Norman now, although I was

in Jacksonville when I heard and saw the performance of The Crucible. If I perceive someone else, of course, I always identify him as being in a different spatial location. A third similarity is that that which is given in memory cannot be experienced originally (or presented). I cannot see or hear my past; I can only recall it. Remembering in principle refers to a way in which the thing remembered was presented. Similarly, another subject's conscious life is not presented to anyone but him; the appresentative consciousness of another subject in principle refers to the way in which the other's conscious life is presented. That is; to perceive someone else is to take him to be for himself, to take him to have pre-reflective and non-positional consciousness of his consciousness which, as we have seen, is presentation of a consciousness.

But each of these similarities is only partial. Although an experience (seeing and hearing) that is distinct from the present experience (remembering) is constituted by remembering, the experience constituted therein belongs to (indeed, must belong to) the same stream of experience. That is, one and the same person saw and heard the performance of The Crucible and remembers it now. But in perceiving someone else, a numerically different stream of experience is constituted. There is a difference to be found in the second similarity, too. Although one is almost always in a different spatial location when one remembers experiencing something, that is not necessarily the case. Indeed, being in the same location may be the occasion for calling the past experience to mind. I may be sitting in the same seat in the Jacksonville University Theatre when I recall having seen and heard that

performance of The Crucible. To perceive someone else, on the other hand, is necessarily to identify him as being in another place. Even the third similarity breaks down. Although one's past cannot be presented, and necessarily refers back to perception or some other kind of experience in which the thing was originally given, there is still a time at which the thing was presented. But in the case of perceiving someone else, it is necessarily the case that there is no time at which the other's conscious life is presented. There is a fourth dissimilarity to be noted. Whereas one's original experience of the thing in question cannot be simultaneous with the remembering of it, the stream of experience that is appresented when one perceives someone else is simultaneous with the perception. "While the recollected act can never be simultaneous with the recollection, the prime case of Fremderfahrung is precisely that in which the object-act is simultaneous with the subject-act" (PPH, p. 95).

7. The "Two Bodies" Problems

Husserl is not satisfied with noting these similarities. He asks a couple of extraordinary questions in order to free himself (and the reader) from being so immersed in our ordinary perception of others that the experience cannot be properly analyzed. Husserl asks: (1) "What makes this organism another's, rather than a second body of my own?" (CM, p. 113). Ordinarily, one would take it as so obvious that the body over there is another's that one may overlook the intentional performance whereby one identifies the body as another's. Husserl's second problem is related but different. (2) "How can I speak at all

of the same body, as appearing within my primordial sphere in the mode There and within his and to him in the mode Here?" (CM, p. 121).

Husserl's response to the first problem involves some descriptions that are the same as one will find in a much later work by a different author, Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. "As reflexively related to itself, my animate bodily organism...has the central 'Here' as its mode of givenness; every other body, and accordingly the 'other's' body, has the mode 'There'" (CM, p. 116). Husserl is talking about pre-reflective (and non-positional) self-consciousness when he uses the phrase 'reflexively related to itself'. Of course, Husserl is not referring to any particular place in using the word 'here'. Nor does he mean 'the place in objective space where one happens to be at any particular time' by 'here', although one's place in objective space coincides with what Husserl has in mind. The notion of objective space is the product of reflection and theorizing. Husserl has in mind something that involves neither reflection nor theorizing. Pre-reflectively one is conscious of one's body as that around which one's experience is organized, as the means by which distances are measured.

The word 'here' applied to my body does not refer to a determinate position in relation to other positions or external co-ordinates, but the laying down of the first co-ordinates, the anchoring of the active body in an object, the situation of the body in face of its tasks (PP, p. 100, emphasis mine).

Ordinary language frequently reflects this experience of one's body. I say, for example, that the philosophy department is about a half mile away, referring thereby to where I reside, to my place. One can walk away from any particular place in space; but one cannot walk away from one's bodily "here". Merleau-Ponty strikes a distinction that is

relevant here. "Even if the universal form of space is that without which there would be for us no bodily space, it is not that by which there is one" (PPH, p. 101, emphases mine). The term 'there' in this context simply means 'not here'. Insofar as I identify a body as being there rather than here, I identify that body as not my own.

Now one identifies one's lived-body as a natural body that exists and is movable in space like any other. Husserl notes that this

...is manifestly connected with the possibility expressed in the words: By free modification of my kinesthesias, particularly those of locomotion, I can change my position in such a manner that I convert any There into a Here--that is to say, I could occupy any spatial locus with my organism. This implies that, perceiving from there, I should see the same physical things, only in correspondingly different modes of appearance, such as pertain to my being there (CM, p. 116).

We have set the stage for Husserl's response to the first "two bodies" problem.

1. One's own body is necessarily given to oneself in the mode "Here".
2. The body that is ostensibly someone else's is given in the mode "There".
3. One can convert any "there" into a "here" by means of movement.
4. However, appearances from There cannot be had at the same time that one is Here.
5. Moreover, one experiences the body that is ostensibly someone else's as being There at the same time that one is Here.
6. Thus, one can speak of any body that appears over There as someone else's body (CM, p. 119).

One cannot, as Merleau-Ponty points out, be in front of one's own body.

"But I am not in front of my body, I am in it, or rather I am it"

(PP, p. 150, emphasis mine). If my body could appear as There, then it could be either figure or background in my perceptual experience.

Quite the contrary, one's body is a precondition for perceptual experience and thus for the figure-background distinction itself.

Bodily space can be distinguished from external space and envelop its parts instead of spreading them out, because it is the darkness in the theatre needed to show up the performance, the background of somnolence or reserve of vague power against which the gesture and its aim stand out, the zone of not being in front of which precise beings, figures and points can come to light....As far as spatiality is concerned...one's own body is the third term, always tacitly understood, in the figure-background structure, and every figure stands out against the double horizon of external and bodily space (PP, pp. 100-101, first emphasis mine).

Such is Husserl's response to the first "two body" problem.

How does Husserl respond to the second "two body" problem?

How is it that I identify the body over there for me with the body that is here for him? Husserl's response to the question is quite straightforward. He points out that one's experience would have to be quite different in order to grant that the question poses a serious problem.

The other's Leib is appresented on the basis of presentation of his Körper. But presentation and appresentation are complements of one another; there cannot be one without the other.

In this case [experiencing someone else] too it should be noted that experience can appresent only because it presents, that here too appresentation can exist only in the aforesaid functional community with presentation. This implies, however, that, from the very beginning, what this experience presents must belong to the unity of the very object appresented (CM, p. 122).

Since one's identification of that body over there as someone else's is a functional unity of presentation and appresentation, there is simply

no motivation for regarding the body over there for me as different from the body that is here for him. The relationship of the other's Körper to his Leib in one's experience would have to be that of sign to analogue, rather than presented to appresented, in order to regard the second "two body" problem as serious.

...It is not as though the body over there, in my primordial sphere, remained separate from the animate bodily organism of the other Ego, as if that body were something like a signal for its analogue (by virtue of an obviously inconceivable motivation)... (CM, p. 122).

We can see that Husserl's notion of presentation and appresentation, rightly understood in its bearing on the experience of oneself or someone else, renders groundless the objection stated earlier, to the effect that Husserl illegitimately separates constituting consciousness from the body. Husserl's way of distinguishing between presentation and appresentation requires that Leib and Körper are distinct but not separate (Cf. PPH, p. 93).

8. The "Two Worlds" Problem

The other subject's relationship to objects is intentional. That is to say, objects are for him; he is not simply an object among others that has nothing but "objective" relationships to objects. But since that is so, Husserl has a new problem. How is it that one identifies the world for him with the world for me? There seems to be a problem of two worlds here. That one identifies the "worlds" is unquestionable. But how does this identification occur?

Husserl's response is that the answer is implicit in what he has already analyzed.

I do not have an appresented second original sphere with a second 'Nature' and, in this Nature, a second animate bodily organism (the one belonging to the other ego himself), so that I must then ask how I can apprehend my Nature and this other as modes of appearance of the same Objective Nature. On the contrary, the identity-sense of 'my' primordial Nature is necessarily produced by the appresentation and the unity that it, as appresentation, necessarily has with the presentation co-functioning for it--this appresentation by virtue of which an Other and, consequently, his concrete ego are there for me in the first place (CM, pp. 123-124).

This requires some explanation. Husserl's point is that in identifying the other's body as over there, I am implicitly identifying his appearances as those that I should have if I were over there. "It is the same Nature, but in the mode of appearance: 'as if I were standing over there, where the Other's body is'" (CM, p. 123). This would be so even if one identified the body over there as one's own, for the simple reason that only one world appears to me. The identity of worlds is a necessary condition for my appresentative consciousness of the other subject.

It may be objected that this solution to the "two worlds" problem is circular, inasmuch as the identity of worlds is supposed to be explained in terms of intersubjectivity. For one thing, Husserl is not trying to prove the existence of one world. So, the analysis is not circular in the way that an argument can be circular. Further, Husserl does not try to analyze our notion of 'one objective world' into intersubjective experiences. Phenomenology is neither phenomenalism nor subjective idealism. Thus it is not as if Husserl attempted to derive the objective world from intersubjective experiences. Rather, Husserl tries to show how one's concept of 'the one objective world', as a world for everyone, is connected with the perception (actual or possible) of

someone else. Insofar as I perceive someone else, I take it to be the case that we experience one and the same world. Further, I take being "in" the same world to be a necessary condition for my experience of him. The objective world is connected with intersubjectivity in that if a world were not experienceable by others, it would not be the objective world. Since Husserl does not attempt to explain the objective world in terms of intersubjectivity, but rather tries to exhibit the beliefs to which one is committed by identifying something as objectively real, there is no philosophically relevant sense in which Husserl's account is circular.

9. Concluding Remarks

A summary of my position is in order. I argued (contra Husserl, Ricoeur and Elliston) that the so-called "reduction" to the sphere of ownness is not another phenomenological reduction at all. Husserl's discussion of that so-called "second epoché" involves the inconsistent assertions that (1) one's experience is "wholly unaffected" by the second epoché, and (2) the constitutional effects of other subjects are excluded from one's experience by the "second epoché".

Secondly, I pointed out that a few obscurities, which Schuetz takes to be monumental problems, are really relatively minor, after having reinterpreted the discussion of the "second epoché" as an attempt (1) to put in relief the role and nature of transcendence₂ and (2) to set up a host of problems in hierarchial order.

Thirdly, I discussed extensively Husserl's argument for the conclusion that one's consciousness of someone else is necessarily

appresentative. I raised various objections to some of Husserl's key premises. I diagnosed the objections as arising from misinterpretations of the premises in question, settling upon readings of the passages such that they are not vulnerable to objections.

Husserl's position that one's consciousness of another subject is derived from one's own case cannot be similarly defended. I argue that that thesis depends on the descriptive mistake (pointed out by Sartre in The Transcendence of the Ego) that one is pre-reflectively conscious of an ego. I point out that Husserl's argument requires a strong interpretation of a certain premise, an interpretation that shows that the premise is false.

I examine Husserl's analogies of perceiving someone else to remembering and perception of a physical object, and close by discussing Husserl's solutions to the "two bodies" and "two worlds" problems.

It is noteworthy that we have (following Husserl) concentrated exclusively on the perception of other persons. Given our interest in science and rational subjects, this procedure is acceptable, as I explained in the chapter on evidence and truth. In Husserl's case, however, this is not clear, as he says that his analysis concerns any alter ego whatsoever (CM, p. 94).

Husserl's response to this problem is one that I should offer in reply to a similar objection. It might be pointed out that our interest in science does not justify an exclusive preoccupation with the perception of persons, since God and angels (and like entities) are rational subjects. Atheistic objections are off the point here, since we are concerned exclusively with phenomena. It is a fact that some

persons believe that they experience God, angels, and other rational subjects; that is a metaphysically neutral statement. It seems that one cannot account for those experiences if one concentrates exclusively on the perception of persons.

My first response is Husserlian. Rational subjects other than persons are exceptions to the rule--abnormalities--which must be understood in terms of, and in contrast to, the normal case. This is not to dismiss the problem. It is only to point out that it is correct to begin with the analysis of the perception of other persons (CM, pp. 125-126). My second response, as partial justification for not addressing this higher order problem, is that phenomenological description is from a first person standpoint. Since I do not believe that I experience God or angels, it is not for me, but some other phenomenologist, to analyze.

But surely it is possible to imagine what it would be like to experience a rational subject that is not a person. Granted. But in that case, it would be quite similar to the perception of other persons. Unless our imaginary subject exhibits behavior that I understand as rational, I would not identify him as another rational subject in the first place. There must be some similarities (for me) in order to prompt the identification as "rational subject". This is not to exclude doubt, of course, about which I shall say something presently.

But suppose that this other rational subject is incorporeal. Heretofore I have discussed perception of other persons, where one (certain conditions obtaining) would be entitled to say "I know that there is another person over there". But what is one to say about incorporeal rational subjects? Religious literature suggests that there

is some similarity to perception of other persons, as angels (for example) assume a perceptible form. Alternatively, one hears God's voice. Ordinarily, a voice is apperceived as the voice of someone else, taken as a guarantee that a person could be seen if one were in his spatial locality (as when one speaks to someone over the telephone). This may be a difference between perception of a person and experience of God.

Suppose that we abandon the discussion of perception of other persons for the time being. I regard Sartre's description of shame as an important supplement to Husserl's description. It is not always the case that when one undergoes shame that another person is perceived. Consider Sartre's description of a person's shame upon being caught looking through a keyhole (more precisely, believing that he has been discovered). A footstep nearby (something one takes to be a footstep) alone can induce shame. A shudder runs through him, as he wishes that we would disappear among the things around him. He wishes to be inconspicuous, to fade into the background rather than stand out as something wholly unlike the door, walls and rug. He turns, only to find that there was no person walking his way. Of course, there is a perceptual basis for the shame in this case. But there need not be. Suppose that the person is so terrified by the possibility of being caught that he starts without there being any perceptual basis. Although our keyhole watcher takes it to be the case that there is another subject nearby who can be perceived, this kind of consciousness of another subject must be similar to religious experiences. This last description may be regarded as a counter-example to Husserl's

thesis that any appresentative consciousness requires presentation.

Identification of something as someone else involves commitment to more than is experienced at any particular time. As Husserl points out elsewhere, identification of something includes a horizon of protention and retention. To identify something as another person, that is, is to expect one's experience to follow a more or less determinate course. And if one continues to identify something as another subject, one identifies the experience just past as fitting that more or less determinate course.

The experienced animate organism of another continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious 'behavior'. Such harmonious behavior... must present itself fulfillingly in original experience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from phase to phase. The organism becomes experienced as a pseudo-organism, precisely if there is something discordant about its behavior (CM, p. 114).

Careful attention to cases where one re-identifies something as not another subject after having taken the same thing to be someone else is instructive. Consider Husserl's description of perception of a mannequin in Experience and Judgement. Husserl's discussion of the perception of a mannequin is used to illustrate a different point, that the roots of our logical concepts can be traced to perception. Husserl is discussing the perceptual basis of our concept of possibility (E&J, pp. 91-96). But his description can be used to illustrate a different point.

...Perhaps we see a figure standing in a store window, something which at first we take to be a real man, perhaps an employee working there. Then, however, we become hesitant and ask ourselves whether it is not just a mere mannequin. With closer observation, the doubt can be resolved in favor of one side or the other, but there can also be a period during which there is doubt whether it is a man or a mannequin (E&J, p. 92).

What would motivate the doubt, or prompt the identification of the figure as "possibly a man, possibly a mannequin"? For one thing, the setting may dislodge the presumptive certainty that the figure is a man. One finds mannequins in store windows much more frequently than one discovers persons in them. This is one instance of the fact that perception has not only a present horizon (figure and background), but a past one as well. In this instance, one's past experience (what has usually been the case) prompts the doubting identification a "possibly a man, possibly a mannequin". Secondly, the figure's lack of movement may prompt the doubting identification. Past experience shows that only things (with the possible exception of palace guards) remain immobile unless moved by external forces. But the second factor also reveals part of the protentive horizon; it predelineates for the subject the course of future experience if the figure is a person (as well as if it is a mannequin). If one saw the figure move (of its own accord), one would identify the figure as a person. If the figure remained immobile and, upon walking closer, has what appear to be non-human features, one would identify the figure as a mannequin (and cancel the possibility of being a person).

Although the evidence of other subjects is non-apodictic, Husserl is certainly correct in noting that the experienced other subject continues to prove itself as actually another person in its changing and harmonious behavior (CM, p. 114). Of course, I have only pointed out one aspect of the behavior that motivates identification of something as "someone else". Perhaps the most important piece of behavior is the use of language. If someone is talking with me, I live in the

simple certainty that I am speaking with a person. Of course, there are conceivable circumstances that would dislodge, or perhaps even cancel, that certainty. "Someone" may begin to repeat himself ceaselessly, like a broken record. Again, someone may repeatedly respond to questions with completely irrelevant "answers". Barring such conceivable circumstances (including others that I have not mentioned), a skeptical solipsist's doubt about the existence of others is unreasonable. Husserl has sketched the conditions under which, having dropped the brackets, one is entitled to say "I know that there are others".

It is fitting to close by mentioning the role of language in identifying others, since it is the means with which we philosophize with one another.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

1. Summary of Conclusions

Throughout this work I have attempted to clarify the notion of an objectively valid result. Thereby, I hoped to attain a partial understanding of some necessary conditions of science and of phenomenology in particular. I have attempted to clarify some concepts that are both operative and thematized in Husserl's phenomenology, an enterprise that I have called "metaphenomenology". I have tried to demonstrate the centrality of the concept of intersubjectivity in phenomenology, in order to show that the problem of intersubjectivity can be called the central problem for phenomenology. The problem of intersubjectivity can be called the problem of objectivity or, more precisely, the problem of the objectivity of scientific propositions (including phenomenological propositions). Although a list of conclusions only slightly resembles insights won through argument and analysis, perhaps it is worthwhile to summarize some of the conclusions in this work before assessing Husserl's descriptive analysis in the fifth meditation.

Husserl defines the phrase 'objectively valid results' as 'results that have been refined by mutual criticism and that now withstand every criticism' (CM, p. 5). But if objectively valid results

require mutual criticism, then the identification of any of one's judgements as an objectively valid result requires commitment to the existence of other rational subjects. But if that is so, then, since phenomenological reduction requires neutrality on the question of the existence of others, there are no objectively valid results in phenomenology. This is a problem for my interpretation as well as for Husserl, since I have contended that objectivity₁ (objectively valid results) is a constituent of phenomenology as well as what we ordinarily call sciences.

I opt for a reinterpretation of the definition of 'objectively valid results'. I argued that even if we follow Husserl in suspending judgement on the existence of others, the sort of language to which he is thereby committed is coherent. Moreover, I argued that one can render comprehensible the requirement that phenomenological truths must be tested and testable, even if one remains neutral about the existence of others. Those arguments, in conjunction with the fact that Husserl clearly aims for scientifically defensible propositions, are sufficient reason for reinterpreting Husserl's definition of 'objectively valid results'.

One point should be made about the context of Husserl's definition of 'objectively valid results'. The passage is in the introduction to Cartesian Meditations, which is a pre-phenomenological address to a philosophical audience. There Husserl speaks as a man who is offering grounds for philosophizing phenomenologically, not as a phenomenologist who attempts to remain neutral on the question of the existence of others in order to avoid the temptation to lapse into a causal explanatory account. So we need not take the passage as expressing

Husserl's official position.

We have interpreted Husserl's view that science cannot be solipsistic as implying that it is necessarily the case that it is possible that there are other transcendental rational subjects who test the propositions of that science. That, however, implies nothing about the actual existence of other transcendental rational subjects. How, then, can we relate Husserlian phenomenology to our ordinary notion of an objectively valid result, which Husserl has identified correctly? Ordinarily, to be sure, we take it for granted that others exist, and that any objectively valid result has survived and been refined by the criticism of a plurality of actually existing subjects; and our notion of an objectively valid result is derived from the natural standpoint. Yet one is inclined to identify some of the results of phenomenology as objectively valid, while nonetheless maintaining that, as a phenomenologist, one is neutral on existential questions. How can this paradox be resolved?

I think that there are two complementary things that can be said on behalf of Husserlian phenomenology. First of all, one can modify the notion of an objectively valid result, as follows: an objectively valid result is a proposition that has survived and been refined by one's own criticisms, and that would survive the criticisms of all other rational subjects (if such subjects exist). I submit that my proposal accounts for what we ordinarily call objectively valid results while leaving it an open question whether other subjects exist.

An objectively valid result is a result that has been refined

by mutual criticism and that now withstands every criticism (CM, p. 5). Mutual criticism can occur only if it is possibly the case that there are a plurality of rational transcendental subjects who communicate with one another. To take oneself to be doing science is, necessarily, to identify the fruits of one's investigations as objectively valid results. Accordingly, the neutral concept of science (which consists of a set of necessary conditions for any science whatever) and the concept 'objectively valid results' are correlates. This can be seen by reminding ourselves of what we mean by 'the neutral concept of science'. "Any science whatever is a multiplicity of truths--not haphazardly thrown together, but combined and relating in any case to a unitary province" (FTL, p. 102). If any science is a multiplicity of organized truths, then any science consists of a set of objectively valid results. Objectively valid results issue from mutual criticism, or theoretical effort. Theoretical activity is part and parcel of the neutral concept of science, too. "It [science] means a certain universe of propositions that arose somehow from theoretical effort and have a systematic order wherein a certain universe of objects becomes determined" (FTL, p. 103).

It is noteworthy that Husserl says that science consists of a universe of propositions in the quotation just cited. Because there have been a number of objections to propositions since Husserl wrote, I responded to two influential sets of objections to propositions in the first part of chapter three. I think that I have shown that Benson Mates' argument in his widely used logic text Elementary Logic is vitiated by a false dilemma, the position that either there are

propositions, in which case "metaphysical acuity" is required to ascertain logical properties, or there are sentences, which require only "simple sense-perception". I argued that Husserl's theory of propositions is a non-substantial, functional position, and that the meanings of sentences (i.e., propositions) play a crucial role in the practice of logic. My response to Quine's objections, on the contrary, are not decisive, though I think I have provided some grounds for retaining Husserl's functional theory of propositions.

The role propositions play in Husserl's analysis of the meaning of 'science' and theory of intersubjectivity should be put into perspective. It is on the basis of understanding the meaning of a sentence that philosophers and scientists can determine whether what is said (or written) is true or false. Propositions provide the "...intersubjective basis of the phenomena of communication and of the objectivity of scientific knowledge" (H:E&A, p. 13). Without an understanding of what someone said (or wrote), there is no means whereby one can decide, on rational grounds, the truth-value or logical properties of what was said. A Husserlian analysis of science (and of phenomenology in particular) shows, even at this point in the inquiry, the crucial role of intersubjectivity in phenomenology. Of course, the intersubjective identifiability of propositions does not require that there are a plurality of subjects who grasp the meaning of any given sentence, since the intelligibility of a proposition does not imply that it is in fact understood.

I urged that propositions are apperceived in the first part of chapter three. That is, normally one's understanding of the meaning

of a sentence is based on the perception of a sentence. One either hears some sounds or sees some figures, which are understood as having a (more or less definite) meaning. On the basis of one's perception of sounds or figures one identifies something distinguishable from those sounds and figures as "being there, too", to use Husserl's phrase. This apperception is what Husserl rather misleadingly calls the "meaning-conferring" or "meaning-intending" act (H:E&A, p. 29). Our access to propositions is through sentences.

Can we display it [the proposition] in its simplicity, by itself, stripped of its many possible alternative expressions in grammar? We cannot: we can only give one of its grammatical, sentential expressions, with awareness that alternatives are available. Propositions and their parts are accessible only in sentences and their parts, and in no other way; this is why it is so difficult to distinguish between the two (P&A, p. 89).

Thus, if we conceive of science as not only a finished product, but as an activity as well, then some discussion of language is in order. Since the orientation of this work is the problem of intersubjectivity, I concentrate exclusively on the "private language" problem, arguing that Husserl's philosophical position on his post-reduction language renders it indeterminate whether that language is public or (as a matter of contingent fact) private. Hence, Husserl's position on phenomenological language is not subject to any formulation of "the private language argument". We saw that Husserl defends the position that there cannot be any logically private language, the same thesis that Wittgenstein (at least on a number of interpretations of the appropriate passages in Philosophical Investigations) defends.

Words and sentences, whose meanings we grasp when we read or hear someone say something are not, however, that of which we think for

the most part. When we do not reflect on the meanings of words and sentences (as we do when we engage in conceptual analysis) they function as media of reference, rather than objects of reference (H:E&A, p. 28). A friend tells me that he put up the afternoon mail, and that I did not receive any. Although I hear his voice, with its particular pitch and timbre, and understand the meaning of what he said, neither of these phenomena are that of which I think (when I am not reflecting upon them). The intentional object of my act is that about which he is talking, the state of affairs that there is no mail for me.

Now suppose that I wonder whether my friend is speaking seriously; suppose that I suspect that he is joking. If I cared to confirm or confute my suspicion, I would go to my mailbox to see if there are any letters in it. One finds verification even in ordinary life. Here, too, verification (in a broad sense) cannot be neglected. A set of objectively valid results are regarded as true; and we regard them as true only because we are (or can be) acquainted with (in a broad sense) the state(s) of affairs to which the propositions refer. So in chapter four I attempted to elucidate some of the relationships that obtain between propositions, evidence and truth. Language had not been cast aside altogether, since Husserl aptly calls states of affairs "categorically formed objectivities". States of affairs obtain for us as things about which we can (and do) speak.

There appears to be a peculiar kind of evidence when one considers necessary truths, which Husserl calls apodictic evidence. I said that it is on the basis of understanding the meaning of a sentence that philosophers and scientists can determine whether what is said (or

written) is true or false. If I say "The cover of my copy 'of Formal and Transcendental Logic is white", you understand what I said and can, on that basis, determine whether what I said is true. You know exactly what sort of experience (in this case, seeing the book) would confirm or falsify what I said. This neat distinction suggests that understanding the meaning of a sentence is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for knowing whether it is true. The sharp distinction between understanding the meaning of a sentence and knowing its truth-value collapses, however, in some instances. This is the case with some necessary truths. If I say 'S remembers P only if S has (in some way) experienced P', simply understanding what I said is sufficient for knowing that it is true.

This is not to say, of course, that all necessary truths are known a priori. Saul Kripke has shown that some necessary truths are known a posteriori. I am only suggesting that the fact that some necessary truths are known a priori is some evidence for regarding the evidence of necessary truths as distinctive. Another consideration is that a counter-example to an empirical generalization only shows that the generalization is false, not that it is not an empirical generalization. On the other hand, a counter-example to a "necessary" truth shows that the proposition in question is not a necessary truth at all. Being unfalsifiable by experience appears to be a distinctive feature of necessary truths.

Accordingly, I address a couple of the wholesale rejections of apodictic evidence by philosophers in the Continental tradition, arguing that they involve conflating the distinction between necessary truths and

empirical generalizations. Nevertheless, there is a core of truth in those criticisms. How, after all, do we distinguish between taking something to be an evident necessary truth and actually having evidential consciousness of a proposition's necessary truth? Persons sometimes do mistake a falsehood for a necessary truth, just as persons sometimes conflate the modality of a truth (say, taking a contingent truth for a necessary one, and vice versa). Consider the following example of the first kind of mistake mentioned. A fellow graduate student made the uncharacteristic blind judgement that if a tautology could be deduced from a set of premises unrelated to it, then a contradiction could also be deduced. Now it is a feature of logical truths that, if they are true, they are necessarily true, a feature of which my friend is aware. Accordingly, my friend mistook a falsehood (perhaps a necessary falsehood) for an evident necessary truth. How is its falsehood to be shown?

Clearly, its falsehood is shown by pointing out that $A \rightarrow B \vee \sim B$ is valid (using, say, truth tables or relying on intuitions), whereas $A \rightarrow B \& \sim B$ is invalid. Thus, from a complete set of (valid) inference rules, $B \vee \sim B$ can be deduced from A , whereas $B \& \sim B$ cannot. Again, we find that communication and mutual criticism play a crucial role in distinguishing between objectively valid results and falsehoods. Along these lines I try to do justice to both models for interpreting phenomenology: the perceptual (advocated by Mohanty) and scientific (advocated by Levin) models (see EP, pp. 169-183, 208-229).

This is not to say that everyone who believes that he is doing science (in the neutral sense) is committed to the actual existence of other subjects. Indeed, I argue for the opposite conclusion. To identify

one's results as objectively valid is to be committed to the proposition that if there are other rational subjects, then they, too, can have evidential consciousness of the truth of those propositions. Evidence is "there for everyone", despite the fact that it is possibly the case that there is no one but oneself.

Having discussed phenomenology as a particular science (in the neutral sense), and shown how the concept of intersubjectivity arises at every level, the stage was set for a discussion of the problem of intersubjectivity in chapter five. I hope that I have shown two things in chapter five: (1) that some influential interpretations of the problem are mistaken, and (2) the problem is broader than any commentator, to my knowledge, has taken it to be.

Husserl's solution to the problem is, naturally, the subject matter of chapter six. The problem that Husserl addresses in the fifth meditation is, as I have noted, a prerequisite for the problems that I discussed in chapters three and four. Aside from some criticisms of Husserl's descriptions, I postponed criticisms of Husserl's treatment until this chapter. I left open the question of whether Husserl's analysis is ultimately successful, a question to which I now turn.

2. Is Husserl's Analysis Successful?

I shall argue that the answer to the question is "no", since Husserl's method does not permit him to resolve the paradox of treating another constituting subject as a constituted unity (see chapter 5 and PPH, p. 89). I grant that Husserl made great strides toward resolving the paradox. Ultimately, however, it appears that his solution fails

(indeed, must fail).

We may begin by noting two senses of the term 'immanent' that David Hemmendinger distinguishes.

If 'immanent' means 'part of the constituting process', then all objects are transcendent. In a contrary sense, all objects are constituted in intentional processes and thus could be said to be immanent by being an intentional sense--in this meaning of immanence, only other constituting subjectivities are transcendent ("HCE&S", p. 86, emphasis mine).

Considered as an interpretation of Husserl, Hemmendinger's claim is mistaken. Clearly, Husserl believes that he has shown how other constituting subjects are constituted objects in the fifth meditation. But there is a core of truth in what Hemmendinger says for which he, unfortunately, does not argue. I intend to argue for a related, if not identical, conclusion.

We are interested in the second sense of 'immanence', according to which other constituting subjects are transcendent. Husserl believes that he has shown the immanence₂ of other transcendental subjects in the fifth meditation. But has he? We noted, with David Carr, that the other subject that is constituted "in" me does not himself transcend my actual and possible consciousness, although that other subject makes possible the transcendence₂ of everything else (PPH, p. 97). The other constituting subject, in other words, is accounted for merely as transcending₁ my consciousness, although it is a constituting subject. Moreover, Husserl can account for only the transcendence₁ of the other subject, since Husserl's analysis (ostensibly) begins from a "solipsistic" stance; accordingly, all acts, actual and possible, are those of the phenomenologist. Having begun to philosophize "solipsistically", the philosopher can bring

only his actual and possible acts into the philosophical picture.

Here, then, is the upshot of these considerations: Can a co-constituter of the world and the science that explores it merely transcend₁ one's consciousness? Clearly, the answer is "no". Insofar as the other subject co-constitutes the world, he is for himself; but insofar as the other subject is for himself, he transcends₂ any other subject's consciousness. Death, presumably, would be the cessation of one's actual and possible consciousness. Yet that can be true while another constituting subject continues to be for himself. Since this is so, to identify something as another constituting subject is, necessarily, to identify him as transcending₂ one's consciousness. Objections based on a doctrine of immortality are irrelevant here, since the possibility of the cessation of one's actual and possible consciousness is all that is required in order to draw the inference. To take something to be another constituting subject is to identify it as existing independently; and to take it as existing independently is to identify it as transcending₂ one's consciousness. This is part and parcel of the sense 'other constituting subject', part of the thesis of the natural standpoint for which Husserl is supposed to account, and for which he cannot account if we take his analysis as solipsistic.

We can now see a certain difficulty in Husserl's response to one of the "two body" problems, the problem of the identity of that body over there for me with the body that is here for him. Granted that we identify the two. But to identify the other subject as being here for himself is, tacitly, to identify him as transcending₂ my consciousness.

If it were possible for another constituting subject to (merely)

transcend₁ my consciousness, then it would be possible for me to see a side of a physical object at the same time that I do not see it. For if another subject merely transcends₁ my consciousness, then while he is irreducible to my actual conscious acts, that is only by reference to my possible acts. Now I identify another constituting subject as someone who (under normal circumstances) can see a side of a physical object at the same time that I do not see it. If so, then since the other subject sees the side that I do not and, by hypothesis, merely transcends₁ my consciousness, it would be possible for me to see the side that I do not see at the same time. Clearly, however, this is impossible. Consequently, only a subject that transcends₂ one's consciousness can be a bearer of the predicate 'co-constituter of the world', which is part and parcel of the meaning of 'other transcendental rational subject'.

3. The Primacy of Intersubjectivity and Intersubjective Phenomenology

I pointed out what Husserl means by 'genuine science' in chapter two. A genuine science is a science that answers the question of its own possibility and clarifies all of its fundamental concepts (chapter 2, pp. 21-22). Although Husserl does not avoid the problems of clarifying fundamental concepts, and often offers brilliant and instructive analyses, we have just seen that Husserl not only does not, but cannot, succeed in clarifying fully the sense 'other transcendental rational subject' if we say that there is a solipsistic stage of phenomenology. I noted that Husserl vacillates between saying that phenomenology is in the process of making itself genuine and saying that it is in fact a genuine science (chapter 2; FTL, pp. 180, 272). Strong conclusions

issue from the argument in the previous section: (1) Phenomenology is not, in fact, a genuine science, and (2) Phenomenology cannot hope to render itself a genuine science.

Perhaps this is not an undesirable consequence, since it renders genuine science a regulative idea, and reinforces Husserl's conception of science as an activity (which Levin emphasizes). Moreover, it is in complete conformity with Husserl's insistence that a philosopher must repeatedly return to the beginnings. Analyses can be improved and amended. In fact, at one point Husserl characterizes answering the question of phenomenology's own possibility as an endless task (FTL, p. 268).

Perhaps there is an implicit contradiction in the previous argument. Have I not just clarified, on phenomenological grounds, the transcendence₂ of any co-constituting subject? Thus, the conclusion that Husserlian phenomenology cannot hope to be a genuine science was drawn too hastily. How can we respond to this objection?

I concede the first point, that I have just clarified, on phenomenological grounds, the transcendence₂ of any other constituting subject for me. But I can account for that phenomenon only by tacitly supposing the possible existence of other transcendental subjects, who contribute to the constitution of the "first" other subject. Hence, Husserl's statement that he presupposes neither the actuality nor the possibility of other egos is false (CM, p. 72). In fact, that statement is the contradictory of what I have argued throughout this work. I say "other ego" advisedly, bearing in mind the distinction between different and other egos. Husserl must presuppose the possible

existence of other transcendental subjects, subjects for whom his analyses can be recognized as objectively valid results, and thus subjects for whom the "first" alter ego and the phenomenologist can be intentional objects. Thus, Husserl must fail to account for the constitution of another subject, insofar as we take him to conduct the analysis solipsistically--that is, without making use of the concept of the possibility of the transcendence₂ of another subject, who co-constitutes (or, more precisely, can co-constitute) the "first" other subject. The analysis does not necessarily fail, however, if we recognize that phenomenology is intersubjective from the beginning. The only shift is a clarification of the notion of other transcendental rational subjects.

The upshot of all this is that the ostensible distinction between solipsistic and intersubjective phenomenology fails to hold. I shall argue for that thesis presently. For the time being, I should note that Husserl's statement that he presupposes neither the actuality nor the possibility of other egos is not the sole example of Husserl's mistaken interpretation of his own enterprise. Here is another:

What about the logic that furnishes norms for the transcendental investigations that clarify positive logic? One conceives concepts, one forms judgments, drawing them from transcendental experience (experience of the data belonging to ego-cogito); one has empty and fulfilled judgments, one strives for truths and attains them by adequation, one deduces too, and it may well be permissible to proceed inductively: What about truth and principles of logic there, where true being is 'merely subjective'? Truth, at least in the province of the most fundamental--the 'purely egological'--phenomenology...is no longer 'truth in itself' in any normal sense, not even in a sense that has relation to a transcendental 'every-one'. To make this statement understandable I may mention again that other subjects, as transcendental, are not given, within the bounds of my ego, in the manner in which my ego itself is given for me, in actually immediate experience, and that, at its first and fundamental level, the systematic structure of a transcendental phenomenology is free to lay claim to other egos

solely as parenthesized, as 'phenomena', and not yet as transcendental actualities. Thus, at this fundamental level, a remarkable transcendental discipline arises as the intrinsically first transcendental discipline, one that is actually transcendental-solipsistic: with eidetic truths, with theories, that hold good exclusively for me, the ego--that is to say: truths and theories that can rightfully claim to hold good 'once for all' but without relation to actual or possible other egos (FTL, pp. 269-270, emphases added and deleted).

The passage is fraught with difficulties and (if such strong language is acceptable) confusions. Husserl says, first of all, that at the "solipsistic" stage of phenomenology one is free to lay claim to other egos solely as parenthesized, but not yet as transcendental actualities. That statement strongly suggests that at the "intersubjective" stage of phenomenology, one is free to claim that other egos are transcendental actualities. But to contend that there are other transcendental egos would amount to abandoning the phenomenological attitude and inferring a conclusion to which Husserl is not entitled on phenomenological grounds. Husserl understood this point in Cartesian Meditations, though he was inconsistent.

At no point was the transcendental attitude, the attitude of transcendental epoche, abandoned; and our 'theory' of experiencing someone else...did not aim at being and was not at liberty to be anything but explication of the sense, 'others'... (CM, p. 148, emphasis mine).

So long as one remains within the phenomenological attitude, one obtains nothing but clarification of the sense 'others'; one does not establish the existence of those others, since that would be a return to the natural standpoint. Thus, the attempt to distinguish between the "solipsistic" and "intersubjective" stages of phenomenology, by saying that only at the intersubjective stage is the existence of others established, fails. One begins and forever remains neutral on the

question of the existence of others, so long as one is doing phenomenology.

A second criterion for distinguishing between the "solipsistic" and "intersubjective" stages of phenomenology is suggested in the long passage just cited. At the "solipsistic" stage truths hold good "once for all", but exclusively for me, without relation to actual or possible other egos. But we saw that such a statement is self-contradictory in chapter five. As Husserl himself saw in Formal and Transcendental Logic, every scientific statement (phenomenological statements being a special case) has the sense 'accessible to everyone' from the start (FTL, pp. 125-236). There cannot be a solipsistic stage of phenomenology, if the truth of statements without relation to actual or possible other subjects is the criterion for being solipsistic.

We have disqualified two of the "transcendental" criteria for distinguishing between the "solipsistic" and "intersubjective" stages of phenomenology. Naturally, the ordinary definitions of 'solipsism' will not work, either. If one is (and remains) neutral concerning the existence of others (in accordance with the requirements of phenomenological reduction), then one never answers the question "Do other minds exist?" affirmatively or negatively. The same holds true of the related question "Does the phenomenologist know that there are other minds?", since an affirmative answer would involve existential commitments. A negative answer, on the other hand, would go against the grain of phenomenology as a whole. Husserl's procedure is to leave our everyday belief that there are others unquestioned, and to analyze the kind of experience that is relevant to having that belief, the kind of experience that we regard as justifying that belief.

Let us discuss another suggestion for distinguishing between "solipsistic" and "intersubjective" phenomenology. It is that intersubjective phenomenology "...takes transcendental intersubjectivity, instead of individual subjectivity, as the point of departure for a constitutive theory in relation to the world" (PPH, p. 103). I have already explained how, at the so-called "solipsistic" stage of phenomenology, one takes transcendental intersubjectivity as the point of departure. From the outset of phenomenological investigations Husserl must presuppose that it is possibly the case that there is an open plurality of co-constituting subjects such that, if they exist, transcend₂ one's consciousness. The suggestion may be interpreted to mean that one abandons a first-person standpoint at the intersubjective stage of phenomenology. But the phenomenological attitude is, by definition, a first-person standpoint, whereby one can describe and analyze phenomena. Abandoning a first-person standpoint would require relying on hearsay rather than on one's own experience, which is an indispensable feature of phenomenology.

Another suggestion is that at the solipsistic stage of phenomenology the concept 'other transcendental rational subjects' is unclarified, whereas the notion has been rendered clear at the intersubjective stage. I regard this suggestion as a name for what Husserl does in the fifth meditation (and elsewhere), rather than a principled way of distinguishing between two sorts of phenomenology. After all, Husserl is saying that there are two kinds of phenomenology, since he uses the terms 'solipsistic' and 'intersubjective' to modify 'phenomenology'. And a principle is needed in order to justify the claim that there are two sorts of

phenomenology.

The reason is this: the notion 'physical object' was, at one point, unclarified in Husserl's writings. At a later time Husserl clarified it. Does this license talk of non-physical object phenomenology as opposed to physical object phenomenology? Hardly. But I have offered parallel reasons. There must, then, be something special about the concept 'other transcendental rational subjects', and a principle to capture that importance, if talk of solipsistic and intersubjective phenomenology is legitimate. Since the suggestion we are discussing provides no principle, it fails to legitimate such talk.

One final suggestion is that after the clarification of the notion 'other transcendental rational subjects', one builds upon that result. Here is a principle. However, I have argued throughout this work that Husserl builds upon that result from the outset, and, indeed, must do so from the outset. Thus, this attempt meets a similar fate. There is no criterion, therefore, whereby one can distinguish between the "solipsistic" and "intersubjective" stages of phenomenology.

There have been a few criticisms of the so-called "solipsism" of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. We have seen that Husserl is, to some extent, responsible for those criticisms, since he did not always clearly comprehend his own enterprise. I say "to some extent", since those critics (e.g., Strasser and Heidegger) largely base their criticisms on misconstruals of what Husserl says in passages other than the ones I cited. But once we reject Husserl's false descriptions of phenomenology, and note the consequences of Husserl's correct analysis of operative concepts in phenomenology, we can see that objections

based on the identification of phenomenology as solipsistic are misguided. Phenomenology is an intersubjective philosophy.

Is phenomenology a genuine science? If the answer to this question were "yes", two things would have to be true: (1) All of the fundamental operative concepts of phenomenology have been identified, and (2) All of those concepts have been clarified, with no errors in the clarifications. Can phenomenology hope to be a genuine science? If the answer were "yes", then there will be a time at which both (1) and (2) are true. Surely the arguments in this work require that we doubt that there will ever be a time when both (1) and (2) are true; a minor consequence of this is that we have good reason to doubt that (1) and (2) are now true. Genuine science is a regulative idea.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aquila, Richard. "Husserl and Frege on Meaning." Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (July, 1974), 377-383.
- Aquila, Richard. Intentionality: A Study of Mental Acts. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977.
- Bachelard, Suzanne. A Study of Husserl's "Formal and Transcendental Logic." Trans. Lester Embree. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968.
- Carr, David and Edward Casey, eds. Explorations in Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
- Carr, David. "The 'Fifth Meditation' and Husserl's Cartesianism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (September, 1973), 14-35.
- Carr, David. Phenomenology and the Problem of History. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
- Cunningham, Suzanne. Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
- Derrida, Jacques. Speech and Phenomena. Trans. David Allison. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
- Elliston, Frederick and Peter McCormick, eds. Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977, 1-53, 202-231, 325-337.
- Embree, Lester, ed. Life-World and Consciousness. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, 83-100, 207-262, 469-489.
- Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
- Hemmendinger, David. "Husserl's Concepts of Evidence and Science." Monist 59 (January, 1975), 81-97.
- Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
- Husserl, Edmund. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge. Husserliana I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963.
- Husserl, Edmund. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

- Husserl, Edmund. Experience and Judgment. Trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
- Husserl, Edmund. Formal and Transcendental Logic. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
- Husserl, Edmund. Formale und Transzendente Logik. Husserliana XVII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
- Husserl, Edmund. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York: Collier Books, 1962.
- Husserl, Edmund. Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie. Husserliana III. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950.
- Husserl, Edmund. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und transzendente Phanomenologie. Husserliana VI. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.
- Husserl, Edmund. Logical Investigations. 2 volumes. Trans. J. N. Findlay. New York: Humanities Press, 1970.
- Husserl, Edmund. Zur Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivitat. Husserliana XIII, XIV, and XV. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
- Kahane, Howard. Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric. 2nd ed. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1976.
- Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Levin, David Michael. Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
- Locke, Don. Myself and Others. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.
- Mates, Benson. Elementary Logic. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith. New York: Humanities Press, 1962.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Signs. Trans. Richard McCleary. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964, 84-97, 159-181.
- Mohanty, J. N. The Concept of Intentionality. St. Louis: Warren H. Green, 1972.
- Mohanty, J. N. Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning. 2nd ed. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.

- Mohanty, J. N., ed. Readings on Edmund Husserl's "Logical Investigations." The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
- Pitcher, George, ed. Wittgenstein; The "Philosophical Investigations." Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966.
- Pivcevic, Edo, ed. Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 17-92.
- Quine, W. V. O. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 139-160.
- Quine, W. V. O. Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
- Quine, W. V. O. and J. S. Ullian. The Web of Belief. 2nd ed. New York: Random House 1978.
- Ricoeur, Paul. Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology. Trans. Edward Ballard and Lester Embree. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967.
- Rollins, C. D. "Solipsism." Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1967, 487-491.
- Salmon, Wesley. "Bayes's Theorem and the Philosophy of Science." Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science V. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970, 68-86.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press, 1971.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. The Psychology of Imagination. Trans. Anonymous. Secaucus, New York: Citadel Press, 1948.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. The Transcendence of the Ego. Trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. New York: Noonday Press, 1957.
- Schuetz, Alfred. Collected Papers III. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
- Sleigh, R. C., ed. Necessary Truth. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972, 73-88.
- Sokolowski, Robert. Husserlian Meditations. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
- Sokolowski, Robert. Presence and Absence. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.

Solomon, Robert. "Husserl's Private Language". Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 5 (Fall, 1974), 203-228.

Strasser, Stephan. The Idea of a Dialogal Phenomenology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.

Swoyer, Chris. "Private Languages and Skepticism." Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 8 (Summer, 1977), 41-50.

Sukale, Michael. Comparative Studies in Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.

Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, ed. Analyecta Husserliana I. Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971, 11-74, 91-99.

Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, ed. Analyecta Husserliana II. Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1972, 23-54, 90-95, 173-185, 245-251.

Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, ed. Analyecta Husserliana III. Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974, 46-65, 290-322.