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FRANCISCO ROMERO'S THEORY OF MAN.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1973  
Philosophy

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA  
GRADUATE COLLEGE

FRANCISCO ROMERO'S THEORY OF MAN

A DISSERTATION  
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY


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
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
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FRANCISCO ROMERO'S THEORY OF MAN

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DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

TO PEGGY

THE MOST GENTLE SPIRIT OF ALL

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## PREFACE

My chief purpose in this dissertation is to explain Francisco Romero's theory of man. In doing so I shall raise some critical questions concerning a number of problems in his theory. I shall also show the points at which I disagree with others who have written on Romero's philosophy of man.

In fulfilling my purpose three ancillary matters must be treated to make the work come alive. These are: (a) the philosophical ambience of Argentina immediately prior to and during the life of Romero, (b) the philosophical influences assimilated by Romero, and (c) consideration of the man himself--biographical material. All these, however, are merely supportive of the task, which is to present Romero's philosophy of man.

In this brief Preface I wish to give my reasons for selecting Francisco Romero's doctrine of man as a topic. In addition, I must justify the inclusion of the partial history of Argentine philosophy and the biographical material on Romero himself. Furthermore, I shall outline here the chapters ahead. Finally, for purely personal reasons, I wish to acknowledge the part others have had in the completion of this work.

During my research and writing on Romero, I have been asked repeatedly, "Why does one select a Latin American for a dissertation topic in philosophy?" The reason is clear: there are many fine

philosophers in both Spanish and Portuguese America. Besides Romero, the following are representative: Raimundo de Farias Brito and Tobías Barreto of Brazil; Antonio Caso and José Vasconcelos of Mexico; Alejandro Deustua of Peru; Carlos Vaz Ferreira and José Enrique Rodó of Uruguay; José Ingenieros and Alejandro Korn of Argentina; Enrique Molina of Chile; and Enrique José Varona of Cuba. One could justify a doctoral dissertation on any of these.

As for my reasons for selecting Romero and his philosophy of man, let me point out that at the time of his death in 1962 Francisco Romero was probably the leading philosopher of South America. Through his writings and lectures he had earned the title of dean of Latin American Philosophers. Because of his intellectual stature I hope that my work will result in his being better known to the English-speaking world. This is, however, quite incidental to my basic intention.

Man's unique place in the universe excited Romero's persistent curiosity. What are we to make of man, who is not merely in the world but who has the world? Man is the being who gives the world objective identity, meaning, and value. He inhabits the world that actually is, but also possesses great interest in the world that should be but is not.

I have concentrated on man and his culture. Romero's philosophy of man is a cultural philosophical anthropology and, as such, concerns itself with the production and meaning of culture as well as the reciprocal influence between man and culture.

I have incorporated into this study an account of Romero's work in comparative culture and his analysis of the crisis of the West. As that portion unfolds, it will be evident to the reader that Romero's

treatment of these topics is strongly influenced by and connected with his philosophy of man.

The material on positivism in Argentina and Romero's biography support my purpose of delineating, interpreting and analyzing Romero's theory of man. His work is better understood in the context of the philosophical background out of which it develops. Romero's philosophy is a contrast to positivism. He was opposed to the positivistic scientism, determinism and mechanism. He found metaphysics meaningful. The reaction against positivism in Argentina initiated passionate conflict between the older generation committed to a deterministic view and a younger one committed to the survival of freedom in both philosophy and political life. Romero took an anti-positivism position, but acknowledged positivism as the schoolmaster that taught the Argentine intellectuals to do philosophy.

The information on Romero's life and work is intended to enhance and enliven the study. In that portion of the material I have attempted to establish the identity and stature of this man as writer, educator, and philosopher. Romero was not merely the leading philosopher of Argentina in his own lifetime but a scholar of enormous international reputation as well.

The work I offer here on Romero's philosophical anthropology is, to a great extent, expository. I have endeavored to show that his doctrine of man is within the framework of a descriptive phenomenology, influenced chiefly by German philosophers. I have attempted to specify the precise points at which his philosophy is indebted to Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Nicolai Hartmann.

In interpreting Romero I have taken issue with some esteemed scholars whenever I believed their treatment of Romero's ideas to be in error. Some of these issues focus on items of translation while others are concerned with interpretations of Romero's philosophy.

The criticisms I offer of Romero's theory of man are sometimes my own. However, previous studies on his philosophy have yielded some fruitful insights and I have made use of these. As with any philosophy, Romero's has weak points, and I have attempted to treat them candidly and justly.

The organization of this work will be made clear by the following preliminary statements.

Chapter One has five basic tasks: (1) to review the significant developments in Argentine philosophy during a fifty-year period crucial to an adequate understanding of Romero's philosophy, (2) to provide biographical material on the man Romero, which will make the study of his theory of man "come alive," (3) to establish that the influences on Romero's philosophy were from four German philosophers--Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Nicolai Hartmann, (4) to show that Romero's method of doing philosophy is a "problems approach" as differentiated from a system-building approach and that realizing this is an aid to understanding Romero's theory of man and its place in his philosophy as a whole, and finally, (5) to offer an introductory statement of Romero's theory of man.

Chapter Two is intended to: (1) develop the points at which Romero regarded several other theories of man as either inadequate or erroneous, (2) show that Romero held to the doctrine that "mere

intentionality" is the essence of natural (minimal) man. In connection with this second intention Romero's analysis of the intentional consciousness is treated, along with his position on the objects of intentionality, and his ontology of the self. This chapter also (3) presents Romero's theory of individuals and shows its relation to his theory of the identity of human individuals and the intentional community, (4) deals with Romero's theory of culture on the natural level with special attention to objective culture, the creative process, and cultural life, and finally, (5) offers criticisms of Romero's philosophy of the natural man.

Chapter Three, "Man as Spirit," undertakes: (1) to show that "spirit" in Romero's work is a nonsubstantialist concept, despite some apparent disagreement on the subject among writers on Romero's philosophy, (2) a brief presentation of Romero's theory of reality with particular attention to man's place in the scheme, (3) an explication of the essential characteristics of spirit, (4) an exposition of Romero's theory of the necessary duality of man, (5) a partial treatment of Romero's theory of value and ethical theory as they relate to the dualism of man, (6) a statement on the ontology of the spiritual self, (7) a clarification of the distinction made by Romero between the individual and the person, (8) an assessment of the spiritual dimension in culture, and (9) some criticisms of Romero's theory.

Chapter Four is largely an exposition of the use Romero makes of some of the positions he took in his philosophy of man in his studies in comparative cultures and in his analysis of the "crisis of the West." The following divisions are made in this brief chapter: (1) Romero's

analysis of three great and enduring world cultures which culminated in his persuasion of the superiority of the Western culture based on its more suitable view of the individual man, its concept of the transcendence of the individual, and its concept of time, and (2) Romero's analysis of what he took to be a major turning point in Western culture expressed in the three-fold crisis involving intellectualism, activism, and individualism.

Chapter Five is the conclusion and as such will bring together in the form of a summary the contents of the study as a whole. In addition, this final chapter undertakes to (1) assess the place and significance of Romero's theory of man in contemporary Latin American philosophy, and (2) reflect on the value of my own work on Romero's theory of man.

My appreciation goes to three groups of people whose kindness and patience have made possible the completion of this work. These include my dissertation committee, manuscript typists, and family.

Some of Plato's remarks in "Epistle Seven," 340b-341a, are an appropriate preface to acknowledging the members of my committee. Plato's insight into what constitutes a "genuine convert" to philosophy is particularly worth recalling here. One who would take up philosophy, he says, should see the course ahead as "a path of enchantment, which he must at once strain every nerve to follow, or die in the attempt. Thereupon, he braces himself and his guide to the task and does not relax his efforts until he either crowns them with final accomplishments or acquires the faculty of tracing his own way no longer accompanied by the pathfinder."

I am about to "trace my own way." I assume that the members of my committee believe that I have, as Plato put it, "a natural affinity and fitness for the work," and I think none have ever questioned my devotion to philosophy.

I am acutely aware of the inadequacies of this study. However, none of the weaknesses that remains either in this work itself or in my development in philosophy should be attributed to this committee of "guides." They have endeavored to show me as Plato said, "how many subjects there are to study, how much hard work they involve, and how indispensable it is . . . to adopt a well-ordered scheme of living." They have done what they could. The deficiencies remain in spite of their efforts and I must myself bear that responsibility.

The chairman of my committee, Dr. J. Clayton Feaver, who is David Ross Boyd Professor of Philosophy and Kingfisher College Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Ethics, made possible my commencement in graduate work by permitting me the privilege of working as a Kingfisher fellow in Philosophy from 1966-1968. Furthermore, I am grateful for the many hours he has spent on my study of Romero during the months this manuscript was in preparation.

My sincere appreciation is extended to the other members of the committee: Dr. Carlton W. Berenda, Dr. William Horosz, Dr. Kenneth R. Merrill, and Dr. Jitendra N. Mohanty. All have been a great encouragement and their professional judgments have been invaluable.

Typing of the reading copy was shared by Miss Donna Erickson and Mrs. Treva Whinery. They have shown themselves unbelievably adept in following my notations and repeated changes which, without a doubt,

was often like trying to find a single correct route through a maze. I owe a hearty thanks to them for their indomitable spirit. Mrs. Marilyn Buchanan typed the final draft of the manuscript and her professional expertise is evident, indeed.

Words cannot convey the sentiment I have for my wife and children. During the months consumed by my work on Romero, as well as the years in graduate study, they have accepted my near abandonment of them with rare understanding. My wife, Peggy, has remained patiently near in quiet hope that some day the years of effort would come to fruition. Our children, Judi and Mark, have grown up during the years of my graduate work and have never shown any spirit but that of acceptance of the sometimes severely limited time I have spent with them.

I must include my father and mother, Monroe and Edna Parker of Ada, Oklahoma, in my acknowledgment of family help. Their eagerness to contribute to the completion of this degree has known no bounds, and I am grateful.



CHAPTER I

THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHY IN ARGENTINA AND  
FRANCISCO ROMERO'S DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter I shall show that French thought, particularly Comtian positivism, was of significant influence in the development of philosophy in Argentina during the nineteenth century and especially in its last twenty-five years. Furthermore, I shall establish that the positivistic philosophy was discarded by the leading thinkers of the Argentine and that Romero, while aware of the utility of positivism in his country, developed a philosophy that is in disagreement with it.

In order to add vitality to my work on Romero's philosophical anthropology, the material on Argentine philosophy will be followed by biographical information designed to establish the identity and stature of Romero the man and philosopher. These inclusions, I believe, give a personal dimension to the work which it would not otherwise possess.

Following the biographical account, my concern will be to show what were the most direct and forceful philosophical influences on Romero's philosophy of man. I shall be specific as to the precise points at which he is influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Nicolai Hartmann. Many writers allude to those influences but few specify clearly the positions and views taken by Romero that are traceable to these men. My suggestion in these

matters, while not extensive, are sufficient, I believe, to serve as a foundation for future work in this area.

The account of the philosophic influences on Romero will be followed, in turn, by an account of his manner of doing philosophy--a method I refer to as the "problems approach" and which I contrast with the system approach. An accurate and careful presentation of the philosophic method used by Romero will aid our understanding of his philosophy as a whole and help the reader to see that among the many problems of philosophy Romero saw the problem of man as the most important enigma to be solved.

As is expected, the final concern of this introductory chapter will be to present to the reader an opening statement on Romero's theory of man. In so doing, I offer what I believe to be an accurate and concise account of his philosophical anthropology. Understandably, the greater portion of my dissertation will be concerned with expanding and clarifying this initial statement.

An adequate introduction to Romero's philosophy of man requires the context of the philosophic history within which it was generated. Prior to developing his own philosophy Romero distinguished himself as a student of the history of philosophy, and it is quite clear that he was very well acquainted with the development of philosophy in his own country. The portion of Argentine philosophic history which requires our attention spans the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth centuries. By the end of that time Romero was publishing his early essays and becoming known for his work in philosophy.

The fifty years from approximately 1875 to 1925 comprise the inception, expansion, and decline of positivism in Romero's country. I shall take notice of the inception of French philosophy in Argentina and of the national significance of positivism in that country. Romero's predecessors had waged the successful antipositivist attack. Although he was not involved in the polemic, his philosophy clearly espouses positions in direct opposition to positivistic tenets.<sup>1</sup>

Before treating the role of positivism in Argentina I wish to suggest the beginnings of the French philosophic influence in that country. French philosophy had been in Argentina since at least the second decade of the nineteenth century. In 1819 Father Juan Crisóstomo Lafinur taught philosophy in Buenos Aires at the Colegio de la Unión del Sud. He was committed to the views of Condillac and French Ideology, which was a plan of reductive semantic analysis sometimes called a "science of ideas." The commitments enthusiastically expressed by Lafinur constituted a philosophy of sensationalism. He regarded the senses as the origin of all the ideas of the mind and "as the origin of all the affections of the soul."<sup>2</sup> All ideas were to be analyzed according to the sensory elements to which they were traceable, and in the event an idea would not yield itself to such an explanation it was regarded as groundless. Since numerous religious ideas cannot be so analyzed it seemed to follow that they should be discarded.

Even though Lafinur had made provision in his teaching for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, he found himself having to defend his sensationalistic views, especially against charges from the church of naturalism and materialism. After being tried he was

exiled, but the French influence had begun and with it the scholastic order had been called into question by the introduction of a "modern" philosophy into the schools of Argentina.

In addition to Lafinur's teaching there were other early traces of French influence in the intellectual development of Argentina during the early years of its independence. Father Juan Manuel Fernandez de Agüero, the first professor of philosophy at the University of Buenos Aires (1822), was strongly influenced by the French Ideology of Destutt de Tracy and others. Through Agüero's and Lafinur's acceptance of French Ideology and its sensationalistic epistemology, a departure from the church's theology was initiated. Additional French philosophers who found a ready Argentine audience are Saint Simon and his followers, including Pierre Leroux. Their views found expression in the work of Alberdi and Sarmiento.

Between the earliest French influence and the arrival of positivism in Argentina there was an interim during which French and German romanticism inspired the growing patriotism and sense of destiny in the republic. By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, however, positivism had won out against all contenders for the support of Argentine thinkers and educators.

Positivism was appropriated in Argentina in part for a negative task--to supplant scholasticism in the republic's struggle toward a secure independence from Spain. But this was not merely a desire to be free from colonialism; it was a struggle for philosophical and intellectual identity. During the final twenty-five years of the nineteenth and the first decade or so of the twentieth century the philosophies of Comte and Spencer served to break with the prevailing theology and metaphysics.<sup>3</sup>

Leopoldo Zea, in his excellent history of positivism in Latin America,<sup>4</sup> provides a simple division of the groups responsible for the rise and spread of positivism in Argentina.

One comprised the so-called positivists sui generis, or pre-positivists, the most prominent of whom were Sarmiento, Alberdi, and Echeverría. The second was the Comtian Paraná school [the Normal School at Paraná] . . . . Another powerful group was formed at the University of Buenos Aires, which combined Comtian positivism with English positivism, especially that of Spencer.<sup>5</sup>

One person often associated with Argentine positivism is José Ingenieros, a member of the Argentine Socialist party. Although he held "that science can give us both truth and ideals"<sup>6</sup> and also subscribed to the three stages of history made famous by Comte, Ingenieros probably was not, strictly speaking, a positivist.<sup>7</sup> One assumes that no positivist views metaphysics as necessary, yet Ingenieros held such a view. In the following statement Aníbal Sánchez Reulet confirms that this position was taken by Ingenieros. "Although Ingenieros always denied the existence of a transcendent reality, he believed in the necessity of a metaphysics."<sup>8</sup> According to Romero, Ingenieros "belonged to the general trend of positivism, but with a scientific emphasis and a rejection of the rigorously positivist postulates that finally converted him into an enemy of doctrinaire positivism."<sup>9</sup> Regardless of what label may be correct for Ingenieros, his philosophy was "naturalistic, deterministic and evolutionary."<sup>10</sup>

Without doubt the leading figure allied with positivism at Paraná was J. Alfredo Ferreira under whose hand much of Argentina's philosophy of education received a positivistic impress. According to Ferreira, Comte was to be interpreted to aid the democratic cause of Argentina. His reforming fervor in education aimed at the destruction

of what he regarded as the despotism of Spanish tradition. In opposing uniformity and absolutism in education, he strongly favored personal freedom and individual expression and saw democracy as coincident with "the civilizing march of humanity."

In keeping with Comtian positivism, Ferreira contends for the primary value of observation and experimentation. In the same tradition, he held that whatever lay outside one's field of experience was meaningless and, thus, he turned away from any inquiry other than that concerned with the Argentine and his experienced world.

The spread of positivism in Argentina succeeded in establishing intellectual independence from Spain but it did not succeed in furnishing a foundation for a new age. The scholastic philosophy was thrown off as an outgrown garment but there was no new philosophic attire ready for wear. To the present day, Argentina remains uncertain of its philosophical identity. Although our interest here is with philosophy, it should be said that Argentina accomplished its political and religious, as well as philosophical, liberation from Spain without being prepared to take on its own national identity in these areas. There was, indeed, an eagerness for freedom but sufficient preparations were not made for the transition to independence. Positivism was not retained by the Argentine thinkers. The revolt against the past was, perhaps, untimely. It was as if a new national mind was born without thoughts of its own. A freedom had been gained but the new direction to be taken was unclear.

Positivism's role in Argentina is unique. Those in Argentina who turned to it were convinced that it was the philosophy for a new order in an era of independence. Other European currents of thought

such as sensationalism, Cartesianism, Ideology, eclecticism, and utilitarianism had also helped undermine Scholasticism; but, unlike the rest, positivism

tried to be in. . . independent America what scholasticism had been in the colony--an instrument of intellectual order. Those who advocated it attempted to carry out something which had not been possible up to that time in spite of political emancipation: intellectual emancipation.<sup>11</sup>

The positivistic philosophy, however, failed to meet these expectations. The failure to make education available to all the people, a growing materialism that created an economically elite bourgeois class, and the resurgence of tyranny in new forms were sources of dissatisfaction.

Less Comtian than Spencerian, the positivists who were entrenched in the University of Buenos Aires during the opening decades of the twentieth century had "conceived of civilization as the triumph of personal effort as expressed in wealth obtained by means of industrial exploitation."<sup>12</sup> Theirs was the generation of 1880, as it was called, and Korn viewed it as an Argentine bourgeoisie. Zea recalls Alejandro Korn's assessment of these men.

The men of 1880 warmly embraced Spencer's agnostic and evolutionary doctrine while at the same time keeping abreast of the related currents of the universal movement. . . . They professed the individualistic tendencies of English liberalism, they proclaimed the excellence of the experimental method; sometimes they used it, and they distinguished themselves by adhering to a just and honest criterion. [But,] absorbed by European culture, they placed no value on the innate strength of the Argentine soul, and for the solution of our troubles, they sought exotic remedies. They had the mentality of office-holders and never identified themselves with the masses; men of thought, they lacked a militant push.<sup>13</sup> Others fought with the ideas that they disseminated.

These failures of positivism to provide for democracy and individual freedom in Argentina were the source of general disappointment among the people.

Korn's attack against positivism and naturalism had as its main intention the discrediting and rejection of the doctrines of mechanism and the deterministic view of man. One account of Argentine intellectual history offers the following explanation of Korn's anti-positivism:

With [positivistic philosophy] Korn had scant sympathy. It seemed to give man only a subordinate place in a world of blind and mechanical force; in opposition to its naturalism and determinism, he offers us a philosophy of personality, of freedom, of values. Science can give us only a mathematical interpretation of spatio-temporal reality. But man, although he lives in a world of space and time, is not defined by it; His personality is defined by the values that he freely chooses. . . Korn's philosophy goes straight to the subjective. The heart of the subjective is the reaction of the person before a fact, the value that he attaches to the fact.<sup>14</sup>

Torchía Estrada expresses a similar view.

According to Korn, positivism ought to be overcome in order to reclaim man's free personality, to restore responsibility of human conduct and with it to establish ethics. For that reason, essentially, Korn is an antipositivist and for that reason also his great theme is that of liberty.<sup>15</sup>

Korn's Creative Liberty clearly suggests by its title that liberty is his "great theme."

Although the defeat of positivism in Argentina is attributable to the efforts of Alejandro Korn more than to those of any other man<sup>16</sup> there is an anachronism in Korn's attitude toward metaphysics. Positivist philosophies are generally regarded as inclined toward the rejection of metaphysics and it would be expected that a polemicist against positivism might wage his attack in defense of metaphysics. However, Korn maintained that metaphysics is not a legitimate part of philosophy.<sup>17</sup> In contrast, Ingenieros, the reputed positivist, held to the possibility--even the necessity--of metaphysics.



Curiously--and surprisingly to some--the supposed positivist Ingenieros advocated limiting philosophy to metaphysics and supported the legitimacy of metaphysics as a group of credible hypotheses, while the antipositivist Korn attacked him and denied the possibility of a doctrinary metaphysics, excluding it from the preserve of legitimate philosophy and attributing to any metaphysical position merely the scope of a conviction for private individual use.<sup>18</sup>

Korn was aware that the Argentine positivists had applied the views of Comte and Spencer according to the specific Argentine needs. What they had no use for in positivism they rejected. Leopoldo Zea recalls Korn's judgment concerning what in positivism was most fundamentally unacceptable to the thinkers of Argentine:

In short, Comte upheld the realm of authority and was in disagreement with all democratic tendencies; he had also committed the error of rejecting the concept of evolution. These ideas were irreconcilable with our milieu; it was necessary for us to affirm evolution and democracy. The Normal School group [at Paraná] took from Comte only his theory on the three stages of knowledge and a certain anticlericalism which fundamentally was liberal, not Comtian.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to Alejandro Korn--whose success in opposing positivism is probably as much to be attributed to the captivating, compelling strength of his personality as to his arguments--the successful struggle against the ideas of positivism was carried on principally by Coriolano Alberini, Alberto Rougés, and Juan Agustín García. According to the last of these three all the ills of the country were attributable to the influence of Spencerian ideas. Argentine society as seen by García had become a super-organism which he likened to

a colossal ranch bustling with railroads and canals, full of factories, with populous cities abounding in wealth of all kinds, but without a single learned man,

artist or philosopher. . . . I should prefer to belong to the most wretched corner of the earth where there still lives a feeling for beauty, truth, and goodness.<sup>20</sup>

Indeed, García's attack on positivism is most vehement and emotional, but at times not as carefully planned as the polemics of the others.

By means of public speeches, essays, and books Korn, Alberini, Rougés, García, and others like them were able in a generation to change the philosophical climate of their country. With the discrediting of positivism a genuine transition appeared on the intellectual horizon of Argentina. There were new and varied trends in philosophy. Neo-Thomism found a place in the panorama. Although the post-positivist era exhibited various French influences (notably that of Bergson in the works of Korn and others), the strongest and most abiding appeal to the awakening Argentine philosophical consciousness came from Germany.

Any review of positivism in Argentina would be misleading, indeed, if it left the impression that in the final analysis that philosophy yielded no benefits. Positivism did contribute to the progress of Argentine philosophy. Some of the most generous eulogies in its behalf were expressed by Romero himself.

Positivism was a breeze of realism and renovation that swept away many remnants of the colonial past and helped to raise Ibero-America to modernity. From the political and social point of view, the benefits it brought are undeniable.<sup>21</sup>

Writing in 1951 Romero acknowledged that since "positivism in philosophy has been discredited . . . and the echoes of the frequently bitter debate that accompanied its downfall have died out"<sup>22</sup> it is appropriate to give credit to the "civilizing influence" positivism had on the culture of Argentina. Through its esteem of science and its appeal

to experience the Comtian philosophy, Romero affirms, was responsible for whetting the intellectual appetite of the Argentine thinker, so that he was aroused to do philosophy. "In short, positivism came to be the school where we learned to philosophize, the primer that made it possible to take philosophical studies out of academic circles and convert them into a habitual concern of the educated man."<sup>23</sup> As both Risieri Frondizi and Romero point out, positivism, even with its limitations, was responsible for furnishing the intellectual expertise for the successful repudiation of positivism's own tenets. The positivistic interlude made possible the prolific philosophical activity of the ensuing years.

Our interest has centered thus far on two periods of philosophical history in Argentina--positivism and post-positivism. The latter period, as we noted, witnessed the entrance of other European philosophies into argentina, particularly those from Germany. Romero's philosophy gives evidence of some of the most notable German influences of the twentieth century, and Argentine philosophy since 1930 has been formed in large part by Romero's philosophy. The major European influences on Argentine philosophy since the 1920's are from German phenomenology.<sup>24</sup>

The vitality of German thought in Argentina in the post-positivist period is evidenced in part by its influence on Romero's philosophy. The manner and extent of that influence will be dealt with below. First, however, the quality of Romero the man will be brought into focus by means of some pertinent information on both his biography and professional accomplishments.

Spanish by birth, young Romero came to Argentina as an immigrant--the eldest of eight children. His father, an industrialist, was an idealistic but impractical individual. Young Francisco completed military training in the military College of Argentina at Buenos Aires and served in the Corps of Engineers with the military service from 1912 to 1931, at which time he began his teaching career in philosophy. In 1923 Romero and Korn met for the first time and it was at the latter's urging that Romero undertook the new career. He taught until his retirement in 1960, excepting the years of the Peron government.

Romero was married to Ana Luisa Fuchs in July of 1934 and between 1936 and 1941 the marriage produced two daughters and a son.<sup>26</sup> Romero's father-in-law was a philologist by profession, a field which had been an early interest of Romero's before he turned to philosophy. Ana Luisa was of German parentage, but born and reared in Argentina. She had pursued to completion her studies under the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras at the University of Buenos Aires and had taken courses with Professor Romero prior to their becoming personally involved with each other.<sup>27</sup>

Like Alejandro Korn before him, Romero's imposing personality impressed those who knew him well. Friends and students admired his fervent concern for truth and his dedication to great principles. Salvador Cañas records his impression of Romero.

I still feel the radiant mental strength of Francisco Romero. Facing this simple but great man. . . one undeniably realizes that a conflict exists between what is mundane and coarse and that which is radiant and true. Above all, in these times of the denial of substantive principles, the struggle to recover the realms of creative mind ought to be emphasized.<sup>28</sup>

Romero lived in Martínez in Buenos Aires province and retired from his teaching career in 1960 after an intensive career as a professor of philosophy. He had traveled and written extensively, and during retirement years intended to publish other works, some of which were nearly completed. He died suddenly on October 7, 1962, shortly after returning from a trip to Europe.

Romero's career as a writer started at age seventeen, when he began publishing resumés and memoranda on his varied interests in philology and philosophy. His first published essay was in 1916, with his initial article in philosophy appearing probably in 1918. From then until his retirement he wrote and published scores of essays and several books.

In philosophy he was largely self-taught and, as his own writings began to appear, he was instrumental in educating the people of Argentina in the philosophies of Europe--particularly those of the German thinkers with whom he increasingly found his intellectual home. Romero recalled these contributions of his in a personal letter that has had little publicity.

Beginning in 1923 or 1924 I initiated a work of philosophic information which nothing has interrupted. In notes or articles published in Verdum, . . . Nosotros and in other places I reviewed books, ideas and authors, preferably the recent German ones who were very much unrecognized in Iberoamerica at that time. I believe that I first published on Dilthey in an article that appeared in 1928. I also had been the first to introduce here all the recent philosophy of culture, Husserl and the like. I worked steadily in putting together many books on everything in contemporary philosophy. I thought to possess the best philosophy collection in our countries and joined many other philosophers in literary exchanges.<sup>29</sup>

When he addressed himself, as he did on occasion, to the weaknesses and strengths of positivism in his country, Romero spoke as

one well informed, for after completing his military college training he had studied under the positivist Juan Alfredo Ferreira. Rodríguez-Alcalá recalls that relationship.

Ferreira was a sincere and fervent Comtian for whom positivism constituted "science spiritualized, naturalized, and generalized." [That is the way Romero expressed Ferreira's view.] He became fond of the studious and serious young [Romero]. It was Ferreira who for many years was the leading Comtian positivist in Argentina--in fact until his death in 1938.<sup>30</sup>

Romero spoke warmly of his friendship with Ferreira.

The vast writings of Romero at first appear as an unmanageable and confused collection. However, he has given them some organization by suggesting that they generally fit into the following categories:<sup>31</sup> (1) the interpretation of reality--which Romero said in 1947 "most preoccupies and continues to occupy me"<sup>32</sup>; (2) the history of philosophy, especially modern and contemporary; (3) logic; (4) man and culture, which he admitted probably should be divided into theory of man, theory of culture, and theory of the conceptions of the world (Weltanschauungslehre); and (5) the culture of the West: its meaning and crisis.

In inquiring into any philosophical problem Romero was not quick to assert and defend his own position on an issue. He first acquainted himself thoroughly with the history of the problem and only then undertook its solution himself. Most of his books were compilations of essays and articles published over a period of years, many of which were critical perusals of the problems of philosophy and their proposed solutions throughout the history of philosophy. His own philosophical positions are most expressly brought out in four of his works: Filosofía de la persona, Ideas y figuras, Papeles para una filosofía, and--most important--Teoría del hombre.

Other books he had intended to produce and on which he had long worked included a philosophy of culture, an ethics, and a metaphysics.<sup>33</sup> In addition to these he had planned to publish a volume on comparative culture and the crisis of the West. At his death he was alert and active and it is likely that had he lived a few more years some of these would have been completed.

In addition to his writings, Romero's other professional accomplishments are impressive. In 1929 he and Korn founded the Kantian Society of Buenos Aires--a highly successful and influential organization. He held two chief academic posts simultaneously at the Universities of Buenos Aires (1931-1946; 1955-1960) and La Plata (1936-1946; 1955-1960). At Buenos Aires he occupied the Chair of Epistemology and Metaphysics, while at La Plata he was Professor of Contemporary Philosophy and Logic. In addition, he was Professor of Scientific Knowledge at the National Institute of Teaching, and from 1940 he occupied the Alejandro Korn Chair of Philosophy in the Free College of Higher Studies in Buenos Aires. He also served for a time as president of the Argentine Philosophical Society.

Various academic posts and many lecture opportunities were extended to Romero. He declined positions in Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and the United States. He was invited to lecture in the United States at Yale, Columbia, and Chicago Universities, and at the New School of Social Research as well as at the Universities of Chile, Havana, La Paz, Lima, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Rio de Janeiro, and Uruguay.<sup>34</sup> Upon retiring from his university positions in 1960 he was elected to the status of Emeritus Professor at full salary with no teaching responsibilities.

Romero was founder and for years editor of the philosophical journal Realidad and in 1938 he became the director of the "Library of Philosophy," a special shelf of philosophical publications at the Losada Publishing Company in Buenos Aires. He was a member of the editorial boards of Erasmus, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, The Personalist, Sur, and Philosophic Abstracts.

The following are academic awards and distinctions he was accorded: Vice President of the Academy of Sciences in Buenos Aires, titular member of the Argentine Institute of Juridical and Social Philosophy, Vice President of the Argentine Gerontology Society, recipient of the Vaccaro prize, the Grand Award of Honor of the Argentine Society of Writers, and after the collapse of the Peron government, first literary prize for his Teoría del hombre.<sup>35</sup> Concerning one of these awards, Rodríguez-Alcalá offers the following explanation: "The Vaccaro Prize was conferred upon [Romero on June 7, 1951 in a ceremony which, under the Peron dictatorship] constituted. . . the highest homage to the merits of a writer, an educator, and a citizen representative of the best Argentine liberal tradition."<sup>36</sup>

Finally, he was honorary member of the National Academy of Arts and Literature in Cuba, as well as of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States, a member of the Council of Directors of both the International Federation of Societies of Philosophy and the International Phenomenological Society, and a Fellow of Honor in each of the following: Bolivian Society of Philosophy, Chilean Society of Philosophy, Cuban Society of Philosophy, Peruvian Society of Philosophy, and the University of Chile.<sup>37</sup>



During Romero's long and productive career he was influenced in the formation of his philosophical views by some of the new currents pervading the intellectual atmosphere of Argentina in the post-positivist era. The German philosophers Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl and Nicolai Hartmann were the most influential in Romero's theory of man. I shall consider these influences individually, expanding the treatment of them beyond the topic of the philosophy of man in order to provide a more nearly complete view of the German influences on Romero. My remarks concerning the German sources should not be regarded as exhaustive. I have encountered references to these influences in several works on Romero, but I have attempted in the following material to offer substantial information on the specific views found in Romero's thought which are attributable to the influence from Germany. These influences, however, are worthy of further investigation.

Dilthey's analysis of a lived experience (Erlebnis), as in the following excerpt, expresses a structuralism with which Romero is identified. A life is not merely composed of its individual parts or events, Dilthey held, but

there exist experienceable connections which link the parts of the course of a life from birth to death . . . . In brief, there are connections quite independent of the temporal sequence and the direct causal relations in it, which join the parts of a life into a whole. Thus the unity of life is actually experienced and is securely based on such experience.<sup>38</sup>

In point of fact, "The only complete, self-contained and clearly defined happening encountered everywhere in history and in every concept that occurs in the human studies, is the course of a life."<sup>39</sup>

The structuralism of Romero is expressed at all levels of reality in his insistence that the whole exceeds the sum of its parts. On this ground he opposed reductionism on every front, particularly in his ontology.

Dilthey held that just as there are categories according to which we interpret or understand external reality (as Kant had shown), so there are categories by which we interpret our lives. The distinction between "occurrences within us and objects outside us" is such a category and that distinction is basic to symbolizing. The attention Romero gives to symbol and to cultural objectification brings out his acceptance and use of Dilthey's views.

The significance of history is shared by the two philosophers. Dilthey provided an important place for history or temporality in his analysis of all levels of reality, and Romero follows his example. Both agree that human studies, Geisteswissenschaften, and the method of approach to them require emphasis on the historical perspective, on duration.

Dilthey's analysis of the structure of a world-view presents some of the framework for Romero's philosophy of man. In that analysis Dilthey distinguishes three stages through which the development of a Weltanschauung proceeds. The first is the psychological life, in which we are aware of the difference between our experiences with inner occurrences and with objects outside us. Through judgment and the use of concepts the spirit achieves a comprehension of reality. Here, also, self-consciousness occurs. The value attached to other persons and objects is in terms of the ability they are believed to have for

enhancing and broadening our own existence, i.e. their "prospective influence." All the while "we are seeking an absolute standard of measurement."<sup>40</sup>

In the second phase, by means of the construction of a Weltanschauung "the cosmic picture becomes the foundation for a full evaluation of life and for a comprehension of the world."<sup>41</sup>

The third stage achieves "an upper level of our consciousness," which develops comprehension of "ideals, the highest good, and the supreme principles" and which in turn penetrate the individual life. At this level the world-view is creative and reforming. Intent, striving, and tendency take on permanence with directedness. Differences are made between means and ends, selections are arrived at among particular alternatives, and comprehensive life plans, as well as ideal societies, are conceptually formed.

Romero presents his ideas on the development and significance of world-views in Theory of Man under the heading "The Self and the World: The Natural Man."<sup>42</sup> Here he expresses his chief difference with Dilthey in the matter. "The world view does not necessarily include the spiritual element, although, to the actual man, it may normally presuppose it. Mere intentionality is sufficient to give an account of it."<sup>43</sup>

In turning to Scheler's influence I discern, first, a number of views which both men reject. They both reject the idea of Cartesian substances, as well as mechanism, naturalism, and reductionism in the explanation of reality. Furthermore, they are in agreement that any telos external to the world-process must be rejected as an explanation for that process.

Scheler's influence in Romero's philosophy is evidenced by the importance given to spirit. I wish to emphasize, however, that although Scheler regarded spirit as the identifying essence of humanity, Romero held that mere intentionality is adequate to distinguish man as a unique form of life and that spirit is the higher development in humanity--"intentionality made spiritual," as he called it.

Scheler, as well as Dilthey, expounded a structuralistic philosophy which influenced Romero. Perhaps it was Scheler, more than Dilthey, who was influential in this regard. This is a difficult matter to judge.

There are four important points in Romero's indebtedness to Nicolai Hartmann. The first is that Romero follows Hartmann in a "problems approach" to philosophy.<sup>44</sup>

Second, in accord with Hartmann, Romero adopts a four-level ontology. In Romero's philosophy these are often identified as the physical, the living, the intentional psychical, and the spiritual.

In the third place, Romero agrees with Hartmann that it is necessary to reject the rationalistic assumption of complete agreement between the categories of reason and those of being.

Finally, Romero identifies himself with Hartmann's views concerning the two primary realms of being--the real and the ideal.<sup>45</sup> Neither Hartmann nor Romero stratifies ideality.

The last German influence on Romero to be accounted for is that of Edmund Husserl. Romero regards the intentional consciousness as the definitive identity of "minimal" man.<sup>46</sup> In Theory of Man, the first section is entitled "Intentional Consciousness" and extensive traces of Husserl's thought are discernible there.<sup>47</sup> However, Romero

is not the rigorous analyst of the intentional act that Husserl is. He shows little or no inclination to trace the steps meticulously laid out by Husserl in the eidetic and phenomenological reductions. The foundation work Husserl found necessary but painful and which kept him from work on the philosophical "superstructure," is generally simply accepted by Romero. He uses the idea of intentional consciousness as the essential characteristic of natural man.<sup>48</sup>

In addition to the verifiable German influences, questions regarding the influence of Ortega and Korn on Romero's philosophy of man often arise in works on Romero. The apparent Ortegan influence is concerned with the view both men take of the "programmatic" nature of the life of the human individual, whereas the supposed influence from Korn is in reference to the importance given to liberty in human existence.

Although Romero regarded Ortega as a genuine "spiritual leader" in the cultural life of Spain and held his friend Korn in high personal esteem, his philosophical views developed quite independently of both these men.

In an essay written in the mid-1950's Romero expressed his belief that for the last one hundred years in Spain's intellectual history only Ortega and his students have been of primary importance.<sup>49</sup> Our concern here, however, is whether Ortega's philosophical views directly influenced Romero's formations. The period of Romero's philosophical maturity--a period beginning with the appearance of Papeles para una filosofía in 1945--does not reveal an Ortegan influence.<sup>50</sup>

The positive influence of Ortega on Romero, which has been assumed because of the terminological similarity in their views of individual human life as "program," is dispelled by careful attention to what each of them means by "programmatic." The manner in which each develops the theme over a period of years reveals the differences. For Ortega the individual man's "program" is to develop an existential authenticity or responsibility. For Romero it is the obligation to conduct oneself "in keeping with the spiritual dimension of one's character. To act in this way means to focus on what an object is in its essence, regardless of what that object may be so that the object is never merely used."<sup>51</sup>

Alejandro Korn exerted a profound and unique personal influence on Romero; for example, in his persuading Romero to seek Korn's former academic posts upon his (Romero's) military retirement. Neither man held that Romero's philosophy was influenced by Korn's ideas. Romero was well known for his writings by the time he met Korn and, although he was late developing his own theories, his philosophy is not an extension of Korn's. The informed opinion on this point is expressed by one writer as follows:

In 1927, Korn stated in a letter to Alberto Rougés that Romero's philosophical position differed from his own in that Romero reflected much more of the recent German philosophy. . . . Some years later, Romero confirmed this view, stating that he was not influenced in his own intellectual development by Korn's works.<sup>52</sup>

Romero reveals his personal esteem for Korn in investing a great deal of time and energy in his memory. In an interview published after his own death Romero refers to Korn, as he had often done, as a founder (fundador) of philosophy in Argentina.<sup>53</sup>

Romero's writings on Korn, his editing of Korn's works, the establishment of the Alejandro Korn Chair of Philosophy in the Colegio Libre, all attest to Romero's personal regard for the man who effected a new day in the philosophy of Argentina. In Korn, Romero and the new generation of Argentine intellectuals discovered "the manly exemplar [who] reveals the hidden and converts himself into model and guide; not as the commanding officer who orders but as the light which reveals the way in darkness."<sup>54</sup> In Korn, the physician turned philosopher, Romero and others saw such a light and guide. Because of his work and person they could see better the path for bringing the people of their Republic into an era which could become more truly theirs.

In the preceding pages I have endeavored to give some of the background information that is necessary for an understanding and appraisal of Romero's major philosophical contribution--his theory of man. In laying that groundwork I have felt it advisable to offer an account of the important transitions and trends in the philosophy of Argentina, a pertinent statement of Romero's achievements in areas that are significant to his intellectual biography, and, finally, a review of the formative influences in his development as a philosopher.

Let us turn now to Romero's philosophic method--a method which, as I have said, is close to Hartmann's. My chief concern with Romero's method of doing philosophy is that his philosophical anthropology is developed by means of that method. The notions of "structure," "emergence," "colonization," and "transcendence"--especially as they apply to the theory of man--are introduced and their uses expanded through his employment of the "problems approach." This method of

undertaking one philosophical enigma after another while bearing in mind previous solutions to other problems results in a coalescent and coherent whole. This effect is evident in Romero's philosophy of man and in the manner in which the theory of man fits into the larger scheme of Romero's metaphysics.

I prefer calling Romero's method a "problems approach" rather than a "problematic" one. Speaking of it as a "problematic approach," as some have, is unacceptable for the obvious reason that such a term carries the wrong meaning.<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, using the designation I have chosen will permit me to employ a similarly-constructed term in reference to an opposing philosophic method, i.e. the "system approach," to which Romero quite sternly objected.

I need to explain what I take these two terms to mean. What is the "system approach" against which Romero inveighs? It has been referred to as "speculative philosophy in the grand style" and, whether it be performed by Paul Heinrich Dietrich d'Holbach with the materialistic grandiloquence found in his Système de la nature or by G. W. F. Hegel in the commanding style of that comprehensive idealism, it is regarded by Romero as unpalatable--indeed, dangerous in terms of its failure to contribute to increasing our knowledge of ourselves and the world.

Hegel is very likely the best example of a philosopher of system. In his philosophy one sees not merely a systematic approach--which would be largely an organized, step-by-step procedure--but a method, in this case a triadic dialectic, that must be employed in every area of one's probing into the nature of things. There is a



systematization in the organization of Hegel's works themselves. The Encyclopedia, for example, is constructed triadically in its main divisions with a triplicate arrangement provided in many (although by no means all) of the subdivisions.

It is therefore clear that Hegel himself regarded his whole work as a dialectical construction, with thought and nature as opposites united in mind and society, in the artistic and religious products of man, and, ultimately, in the activity of philosophical self-consciousness.<sup>56</sup>

All things must conform to the affirming, negating, cancelling-preserving process--the positing, op-positing, and gathering up dialectic. In order to comprehend any part of the world, minute or massive, one must see it as falling under the cosmic orthodoxy of being "transcended without being wholly discarded [aufgehoben]." <sup>57</sup>

Romero was opposed to such uniformity of philosophical method and to the metaphysical assumption that prompts it--the belief that reality is truly developing in precisely this manner. In addition, the cosmic essentialism that marks Hegel's philosophy is foreign to Romero. Perhaps it is Hegel's monism that is most unacceptable to Romero, for his own philosophy includes a dualistic metaphysics: nature and spirit, reality and ideality, transcendence and immanence. It seemed to Romero that the "system approach" rests on the error of developing a commitment antecedent to investigation. To him, such an approach devises a rationally coherent theory and imposes it on all reality.

Romero was in agreement with Nicolai Hartmann's<sup>58</sup> belief that the system-building philosopher has notoriously neglected the philosophic problems and the data of experience that do not conform to the system he has constructed. In the "system approach" the data are

made to fit the scheme of the system despite the necessity of considerable stretching or forcing. Both Romero and Hartmann felt that the age of system-building was over.

Romero pursued philosophy one problem at a time, attentive to the bearing that the solution of one problem may have on another. What Romero apparently most admired in Hartmann's approach to philosophy was Hartmann's view of philosophy as a series of problems, not a body of doctrines.

It is important to emphasize that Romero's method is not a disorganized, directionless, unsystematic, piecemeal undertaking. His method is systematic. That is to say he selected the problems on a basis of human priority and proceeded in an orderly progression of inquiry, mindful of results already achieved in the study of problems other than the one at hand. He was, indeed, aware of, even dedicated to, an increasing synthesis among the problems he investigated. In 1947 Romero wrote some of his thoughts concerning the issues with which we are concerned here.

In philosophy, reference to the whole may never be completely left aside. One of the conditions that define [sic] the philosopher is to think always on a duality: on "this" (that which occupies him at present) and on "the other" (that which does not occupy him at the moment, but which is available to him--and which is all the rest) . . . . It is as if he would continually say to himself: Let us see how this is, but let us not forget that all the rest exists: since this is what it is because all the rest exists and is as it is.

. . . . .  
If there is a fundamental and unquestionable experience, it is this: that we are in a "cosmos" of which we are part, and which surrounds us; an ordered reality completely linked by relations and crossed by influences and inhabited by consonant resonances. If reality were only a mere heap of

things, a disordered dispersion, the investigator of philosophy could limit the object of his study or the zone of his occupation, freely within each case. As plural and immemorial experience, and even the mere consistency and permanence of reality testify that this reality is a cosmos, a continued series and mutual penetration of its partial instances, then the philosophic study is obliged to attend to that unitary and solidary quality of reality. To think in philosophy is, therefore, to remember all the rest in thinking of any special subject.

I think I have been faithful to this fundamental requisite of philosophical work; I do not pretend to justify,<sup>59</sup> with the above statements, the possible reproach of dispersion that might be made to what I have written up to now, for if that dispersion exists, it is due to reasons which are, for me, sufficient and worthy of respect.<sup>60</sup>

The conclusions arrived at by the "problems approach" are always tentative. No position is taken dogmatically. Romero even suggested the possibility that his conclusions were erroneous.

In Contemporary Philosophy (Filosofía contemporánea) Romero expressed the difference between his own method of philosophical inquiry and that of the system-builder. The quotation that follows, although excerpted from a study on Romero, incorporates a brief quotation from the work mentioned immediately above.

[Rejection of the "system approach"] does not mean that the attempt to arrive at a coherent view of reality is abandoned, but the "system" must be an a posteriori synthesis, not an a priori scheme, and it must remain open. "It is possible to arrive at a systematic and comprehensive conception," states Romero, "but not immediately (sin mas ni mas) [i.e. "all at once"] . . . . Only a long and troublesome effort of investigation, of distrustful probing, of groping, of rectification, can approximate us to this end."<sup>61</sup>

And regardless of the "end" any investigation reaches, all conclusions achieved by the "problems" approach are tentative. On the contrary,

every system-builder, according to Romero, "begins with an a priori scheme or presupposition and the consequent product of such a beginning is inevitably an artificial fabrication."<sup>62</sup>

Romero identified three stages in the procedure of philosophical investigation: 1. The phenomenon is encountered. 2. The data are perceived as an enigma or problem. 3. Finally, an explanation or solution is arrived at. In keeping with Hartmann, these three steps are identified respectively by Romero as the phenomenological, the problematical, and the theoretical.<sup>63</sup>

Romero expressed an intention that his "problems approach" incorporate an empirical method.

The method will be, therefore, empirical, but assuredly [desde luego] an empiricism different from that which is the epitome of this caption in the history of philosophy. [It must be] an empiricism on the style of that proposed by Husserl and put to work by phenomenology, which expands the notion of experience to provide room within it for essences and values; above all an empiricism without prejudices or predilections, which does not shut itself off from accepting transcendence, as the traditional did, dazzled by the tangibility and consistency of "things"--of immanences.<sup>64</sup>

He believed that this "expanded empiricism" could investigate the realms of reality and ideality, trace the path of transcendence, discover meaning in all of reality, and produce a "descriptive and neutral ontology."<sup>65</sup> It was Romero's hope that this "empirical transcendentalism" would be increasingly accepted by contemporary philosophy.

Romero kept up "a fruitful dialogue with the philosophical heritage of mankind." He never abandoned his commitment to the belief that the "problems" philosopher must comprehend those enigmas investigated by the philosophers of the past. Furthermore, he regarded philosophy's history as a significant problem itself.

Besides the philosophers and their doctrines individually, I am interested in the history of philosophy itself as a special problem, that is, in the criteria of historical-philosophic interpretation as they have been successively applied, the several theories of philosophic evolution, the different conceptions of the interconnections and inflections in the march of ideas, the estimation of the various kinds of influences capable of affecting philosophic thought.<sup>66</sup>

The problems in which Romero took greatest interest were concerned with man and culture. All his other studies seem to grow out of these. He begins with man as the central philosophical enigma and relates all other problems to the human situation. He investigates problems of value, time, history, logic, epistemology, comparative culture, and metaphysics and finds them all related to man. That there are relations among all things, that the temporal and historical process is a unity, that being is a structured whole--all these are continuing beliefs in his approach to the problems of philosophy.

The "problems approach" led Romero into some philosophical work that was never published. I mention only those which impinge on the content of this present study, i.e. those concerned with cultural philosophical anthropology. In an Américas interview with Rodolfo Vinacua during the last year of his life, Romero spoke of working on a Theory of Culture (Teoría de la cultura). In addition, he stated that he was preparing

various other books for which I am constantly collecting material. Many of the ideas that I will develop in them (about culture, values, ethics, the theory of knowledge and even metaphysics) are found in embryo, or as indications, in my Theory of Man, in the central theme of that book or interwoven with it.<sup>67</sup>

In 1953, the year following the appearance of Teoría del hombre, Romero

had expressed his intention to publish two important books that would bring together his views on culture.

I have given considerable attention to the problem of culture. I have written several papers about it and am preparing two books, one on the question of its grounds: Theory of Culture and the other characterizing the great historical cultures and dealing with the present situation and crisis of Western culture.<sup>68</sup>

He had referred to his anticipated work on the crisis of Western culture as early as 1947:

Soon I shall be able to publish the work where I examine all these problems [i.e. those concerning the three principles of intellectualism, activism, and individualism, which to Romero are constitutive of Western culture's crisis], and which I have tentatively entitled El sentido del Occidente [The Meaning of the West].<sup>69</sup>

In a letter dated February 25, 1962, scarcely more than seven months before his death, Romero wrote a friend:

The theme which concerns me most at the present moment, and to which I devote hours on end, is an Ética, an extension and supplement of points of view advanced in Teoría del hombre. . . I don't know when my Ética will jell; I think about it, and I let it ripen.<sup>70</sup>

It is unfortunate that the manuscripts on these problems are not yet published and thus are unavailable. However, Romero has left a large corpus of published material on his philosophy of man and culture. The quantity is ample for our work. In addition, we have at hand the record of interviews and statements Romero offered in the last few years of his life. These refer to his continued work on man and culture and express no changes in his philosophical anthropology.

In the author's prologue to the English edition of the Theory of Man, Romero draws a distinction between the problem of man per se

and that of man in relation to the whole of reality--a distinction which we must recognize at the outset of our study. Man is an enigma which, like all other problems for Romero, must be investigated while one bears in mind the rest of reality. Although we can investigate the nature of man as an isolable problem, we must bear in mind that man is a part of all that is and that no adequate understanding of man is possible if his relation to the rest of reality is forgotten. This "totality" concern is an integral part of Romero's method.

Many studies concerning man--as indicated in their titles--<sup>71</sup> purport to inquire into his place within the whole of reality; for, actually, it does not seem possible to engage in philosophical discourse about man without assigning a place to him or searching for his meaning in the complex of what exists. The author has sought to satisfy the dual demand of setting forth a theory of man which rests on its own foundations and is sufficient to itself, as well as to formulate a hypothesis concerning the situation and the significance of man in reality in keeping with his theses of an anthropological scope [i.e. in keeping with what he had asserted the scope of any philosophical anthropology should be], which completes these theses yet is at the same time separable from them. This hypothesis differs from the rest of the investigation in its decidedly metaphysical character.<sup>72</sup>

Our plan is to trace Romero's doctrine of man as a theory "sufficient to itself." Chapters II and III develop Romero's idea of man as a duality in terms of nature and spirit. In doing this we shall need to include some aspects of the more comprehensive issues of "the situation and the significance of man in reality," but our primary interest will be to analyze his theory of man that rests "on its own foundations and is sufficient to itself." Romero maintained that his philosophical anthropology could be defended without the necessity of his metaphysics and I wish to take seriously that contention.

Let me offer here an initial statement of Romero's idea of man as a duality of nature and spirit. The clarification of this statement will comprise most of our work in the next two chapters. The concern of Chapter IV will be to see Romero's theory of man as it applies to his work on comparative culture and the crisis of the West.

Man is minimally and essentially constituted by his permanent ability to objectify his world. This is his class-defining characteristic. Intelligence requires objectification and, therefore, can belong only to man. The cognitive acts of this initial level of intentionality (i.e. "mere intentionality," as he calls it) regard the object in reference to the interests of the subject. Objectifications at this level refer the identity and value of the object back to the subject. This is called the "subjective return," and is the failure of the intentional act to complete its objectification. Such acts of consciousness are indigenous to natural man.

There is, however, a higher form of objectification which is purged of the subjective return. In this higher objectifying activity the object is regarded in and for itself. This, for Romero, is the level of spirit. It is the spiritual act.

The individual man exists on both these levels--the natural and the spiritual. Some acts of cognition are natural acts of mere intentionality marred by subjective return and others are spiritual acts of purified intentionality purged of self reference. The latter is the highest kind of intentional act--it exhibits "absolute transcendence." All this requires a great deal of clarifying and that, of course, is the task of the next chapter.



This introductory chapter has been concerned with matters having to do with the philosophical ambience of Argentina prior to and during the life of Romero. I have shown that strong French influences were introduced in the early modern period and that both French and English positivism became important as the people of Argentina broke the national ties with Spain. There were disappointments, however, in positivism's failure to accomplish all that was dreamed by its adherents. It had introduced the Argentine intellectual communities to philosophical ideas that brought about liberation from the domination by Spain, but it had no lasting appeal as a foundation on which to build. In light of this a new generation sought and achieved the discrediting of the positivistic tenets, largely on the basis that positivism declared its support of naturalism and determinism. Korn and others of his generation assailed the positivistic philosophy in the name of human freedom and dignity, for which positivism had not provided, according to Korn.

Furthermore, I have presented here the pertinent facts on Romero's life, including his publications, professional positions, and international reputation as a philosopher and educator. I have incorporated into that section the treatment of his method of doing philosophy and of his opposition to system building.

I have, in addition, shown that the chief influences on the formation of his thought were neither Argentine nor Spanish, but German. I have documented the points at which his ideas are structured after Dilthey, Scheler, Hartmann, and Husserl.

Finally, I have indicated that Romero defines man in terms of the intentional consciousness. The occurrence of the subject-object dichotomy is the basis of humanity and man is, for Romero, a duality of nature and spirit. I am prepared now to pursue the first phase of this dualism--the natural man.

## Notes

### Chapter One

<sup>1</sup>Positivism was adopted in various forms in several Latin American republics. In every case it served a purpose and then was discarded. Whether in Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Cuba, or Argentina, positivism served to break the ties with Spain and Portugal. In the burgeoning new republics the doctrines of this philosophy were employed to supplant the church's theology and the scholastic metaphysics.

Romero wrote concerning one variation of Comtian thought as used by the reformers of Brazil: "The mysticism which pervades Comte's later doctrine, his attempts to replace traditional dogma with a 'religion of humanity,' found no echo [in Latin America] except in Brazil. Their influence there was not by chance but in conformity with the emotional nature of the Brazilian spirit, which distinguishes it in the Latin American community and gives Brazilian culture some of its most original features." See Romero's article, "Latin America's Twentieth Century Sages," in Américas, III (February, 1959), 19.

Any reader interested in positivism in Latin America (including the influence of Saint Simon, Comte, Mill, and Spencer) will find a great deal of information on the subject in the following volumes: Leopoldo Zea, Dos etapas del pensamiento en Hispanoamérica, México, El Colegio de México, 1949; Guillermo Francovich, La filosofía en Bolivia, Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, S. A., 1945; Guillermo Francovich, Filósofos brasileños, Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, S. A., 1943; Antonio Gomez Robledo, La filosofía en el Brasil, Mexico, Imprenta Universitaria, 1946; Medardo Vitier, La filosofía en Cuba, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1948; Leopoldo Zea, Apogeo y decadencia del positivismo en México, México, El Colegio de México, 1944; Samuel Ramos, Historia de la filosofía en México, México, Imprenta Universitaria, 1943. The best work available on positivism in Argentina is found in the writings of Korn and Romero.

<sup>2</sup>Juan Carlos Torchía Estrada, La filosofía en la Argentina (Washington, D. C.: Unión Panamericana, 1961), p. 75, quoting Lafinur in Curso filosófico dictado en el Colegio de la Unión del Sud de Buenos Aires en 1819 (Buenos Aires, 1938), pp. 78-79. Note concerning translations: All source footnotes which are shown in Spanish will identify the quotations in the text as my own translations. All other translators will be identified in the footnotes as necessary.

<sup>3</sup>See Risieri Frondizi, "Contemporary Argentine Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, IV (December, 1943). It should be noted, however, that the "anti-metaphysical" attitude

developed by Argentine philosophers in the positivistic stage of their history was generally overcome afterward. Frondizi is careful to point out this subsequent repudiation.

<sup>4</sup>Leopoldo Zea, The Latin-American Mind, trans. by James H. Abbott and Lowell Dunham (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963). This work was originally published in Spanish as Dos etapas del pensamiento en Hispanoamérica (Mexico City, 1949).

Zea's work traces the movement of positivism through its two massive stages (dos etapas)--its inception in Spanish America and its development during its adoption there. Although there are publishing reasons for the English title, The Latin-American Mind the title is misleading on two counts: (1) A history of positivism in Central and South America is by no means descriptive of the philosophic mind of these people. In point of fact, it is a philosophy through which the Latin Americans have come and which they have now repudiated. (2) The volume, in light of the fact that it does not treat Portuguese America, Brazil, should be more accurately referred to as a book on "Spanish-American" rather than "Latin-American" thought.

<sup>5</sup>Zea, Mind, p. 31. For a clear and extensive treatment of positivism in Argentina (in addition to Zea's work) see Ricaurte Soler, El positivismo argentino (Panamá: Imprenta Nacional, 1959).

Zea refers to the English philosopher Herbert Spencer as a positivist. Spencer was quite generally regarded as such by the Latin Americans of the period during which positivism was dominant in Spanish and Portuguese America.

<sup>6</sup>William Rex Crawford, A Century of Latin-American Thought (rev. ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 120.

<sup>7</sup>For an extensive treatment of the work of José Ingenieros see Crawford's work (previously cited), pages 116-142.

<sup>8</sup>Aníbal Sánchez Reulet, La filosofía latinoamérica contemporánea (Washington, D. C: Unión Panamericana, 1949), p. 196. See also Romero, "Sages," p. 19.

<sup>9</sup>Romero, "Sages," p. 19.

<sup>10</sup>Arthur Berndtson, "Latin American Philosophy," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, IV, p. 398.

<sup>11</sup>Zea, Mind, p. 27.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 217.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 216.

<sup>14</sup>Crawford, Century, p. 143.

<sup>15</sup>Torchía Estrada, La filosofía, p. 250.

<sup>16</sup>For an excellent account and appraisal of Korn and his philosophy see Francisco Romero's Alejandro Korn, filósofo de la

libertad (Buenos Aires: Editorial Reconstruir, 1956). A brief but memorable assessment of Korn is given in Romero's article, "Alejandro Korn," in Les grandes courants de la pensée mondiale contemporaine, III<sup>e</sup> Partie: Portraits, Second volume. The work was edited by M. F. Sciacca and published in Milan in 1964. See pages 821-830. See also Crawford's work cited above, pages 142-148.

<sup>17</sup>For a clear statement of Korn's position on metaphysics, see Alejandro Korn, La libertad creadora (Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridad, 1937), especially the chapter entitled "Esquema gnoseológico," which was originally written in 1934. See also Alejandro Korn, Obras (La Plata, 1938-1940). Korn committed himself to the position that philosophy rightly understood is axiology revealed in history. Values are divided according to three groups with multiple types discernible in each group. They are (1) biological (economic, instinctive, and erotic), (2) social (vital or those having to do with power, and social, which have to do with justice), and (3) cultural (religious, ethical, logical and aesthetic). For a brief but helpful explanation of this scheme see Torchía Estrada, La filosofía, pp. 256-257. M. F. Sciacca makes the plausible claim that it was Kant who "cured" Korn of metaphysics. See Sciacca, Philosophical Trends in the Contemporary World, trans. by Attilio Salerno (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1964), p. 646.

<sup>18</sup>Romero, "Sages," p. 19. See also Torchía Estrada, La filosofía, p. 259 and Frondizi, "Contemporary Argentine Philosophy," p. 183.

<sup>19</sup>Zea, Mind, p. 207, quoting Alejandro Korn in "Influencias filosóficas en la evolución nacional," in Obras, III, no page given.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 217, quoting Juan Agustín García in Sobre nuestra cultura, no other information given.

<sup>21</sup>Romero, "Sages," p. 18.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>See Berndtson, "Latin," p. 399. The subject of Heidegger's influence in Latin America is explored in John Lawrence Grove's dissertation, The Influence of Heidegger in Latin American Philosophy (Boston, 1960). Concerning Romero and Heidegger, Groves offers the following summary: "Romero has thought through many of the details, as well as some central features and problems, of Heidegger's philosophy. He has rejected Heidegger, as compared to his own system, although he seems to admit the growing importance of Heidegger and existentialism in the future." Groves, p. 360.

<sup>25</sup>The information here is gathered from the following sources in which further details of Romero's achievements are to be found: Marjorie S. Harris, Francisco Romero on Problems of Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1960), pp. 1ff. Humberto Piñera Llera,

"Vida y obra de Francisco Romero," Revista Cubana de Filosofía, II (July - December, 1951), 5-14. Hugo Rodríguez-Alcalá, Francisco Romero: vida y obra; bibliografía, antología (New York: Hispanic Institute, Columbia University, 1954), pp. 7-31.

<sup>26</sup>Romero named the son Francisco Alejandro in honor of his friend, Alejandro Korn.

<sup>27</sup>Rodríguez-Alcalá, Francisco Romero, p. 28.

<sup>28</sup>Salvador Cañas, "Refugio de paz y trabajo de Francisco Romero," Reportorio Americano, XLVI (1950), 280.

<sup>29</sup>Rodríguez-Alcalá, Francisco Romero, pp. 23-24 quoting Romero's letter of March 14, 1950.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 15. For further study on Romero and positivism see Hugo Rodríguez-Alcalá, Misión y pensamiento de Francisco Romero (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1959), pp. 11-55.

<sup>31</sup>Francisco Romero, "Notes on My Work and Writings," Social Sciences in Mexico, I (Fall, 1947), 72-77.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>33</sup>See Romero, "Notice on My Philosophy," The Southern Philosopher, II (May, 1953), 4.

<sup>34</sup>Piñera Llera, "Vida y obra," p. 14.

<sup>35</sup>Harris, On Problems, p. 2.

<sup>36</sup>Hugo Rodríguez-Alcalá, "Francisco Romero on Culture East and West," Philosophy East and West, II (July, 1952), 155.

<sup>37</sup>Piñera Llera, "Vida y obra," p. 14.

<sup>38</sup>Wilhelm Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 98.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>40</sup>Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey's Philosophy of Existence: Introduction to Weltanschauungslehre, trans. by William Kluback and Martin Weinbaum (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), p. 26. Although I shall treat the matter in detail in Chapter III, I wish to note here that Romero disagreed with Dilthey's attributing man's psychological life in its entirety to spirit.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>42</sup>Francisco Romero, Theory of Man, trans. by William F. Cooper (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 122-130.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 129

<sup>44</sup>See Romero's, "Un filósofo de la problematicidad (Nicolai Hartmann)," Revista Cruz y Raya, No. 21 (1934).

<sup>45</sup>See J. N. Mohanty, Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead: A Study in Recent Platonism (Calcutta: Progressive Publisher, 1957), pp. 10-11. For Romero's views on this distinction see Theory of Man, p. 151.

<sup>46</sup>There is a similarity between Husserl and Romero in their respective awe concerning intentionality. Herbert Spiegelberg quotes Husserl: "The wonder of all wonders is the pure ego and pure subjectivity," Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: 1960), Vol. I, p. 87. Spiegelberg remarks: "The central mystery was to Husserl not Being as such, but the fact that there is such a thing in the world as a being that is aware of its own being and of other beings." (Ibid.) This sense of wonder at the development of intentionality and self consciousness in the realms of reality is implicit throughout all of Romero's philosophical anthropology.

<sup>47</sup>Romero, Theory, pp. 3-81.

<sup>48</sup>There are some suggestions of Kantian influence in Romero's moral philosophy. I believe that Kant's influence on Romero was largely through Alejandro Korn.

<sup>49</sup>See Francisco Romero, Ortega y Gasset y el problema de la jefatura espiritual (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1960), Chapter I.

<sup>50</sup>See the discussion of this matter in Cooper's Francisco Romero's Theory of Value (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University, 1966), pp. 21-28. Cooper arrives at the position I have taken.

<sup>51</sup>Cooper, Value, p. 26. For Ortega on authentic individual existence see "En torno a Galileo" in his Obras completas (5th ed.; Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1961), pp. 136-137.

<sup>52</sup>Cooper, Value, n., p. 17. Romero's statement referred to in this quotation is from a conversation that Cooper had with Romero in 1955.

<sup>53</sup>Francisco Romero, "On the Humanities and Science," Américas, XIV (November, 1962), 7-10.

<sup>54</sup>This eulogy of Korn was given by Romero on the occasion of the third anniversary of Korn's death.

<sup>55</sup>It appears to me that one can no more refer to a philosopher using the "problems approach" as a "problematic philosopher" than one could refer to a philosopher who does not construct a system as "unsystematic." William Cooper, however, does choose to do so. (See his work cited, pp. 36ff.) Using the Spanish label with which Romero

identified Nicolai Hartmann, we may speak of Romero himself as un filósofo de la problematicidad. In a casual conversation with Julián Marías in 1969 I brought up the need for an English translation of this that is simple and clear. He agreed that there is no perfect solution to the problem. It is not a significant issue, but I think the term "problems approach" is better than the alternatives.

<sup>56</sup>H. B. Acton, "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, III, p. 436.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>See the essay by Romero, "Un filósofo de la problematicidad (Nicolai Hartmann)."

<sup>59</sup>The term "justify" does not say what Romero must have been intending to express here. If one reads "assuage" in place of it the meaning seems to be more accurate. As an alternative change that will make clear the meaning intended here I would suggest that the portion in question read, "I do not pretend to justify . . . my reproof of the dispersion . . . ."

In any event, the original Spanish is not available at all now and there is, therefore, no way to adjudicate the issue.

<sup>60</sup>Romero, "Notes," pp. 72-74.

<sup>61</sup>Raymond A. Valenzuela, The Emerging Concern for Transcendent Values in Spanish America Philosophy (Madison, N. J.: Drew University, 1955), p. 371. The quote from Romero found in this excerpt is in his Filosofía contemporánea (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1941), p. 14.

<sup>62</sup>Romero, Filosofía contemporánea, p. 20.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>64</sup>Francisco Romero, Papeles para una filosofía (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1945), p. 29.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup>Romero, "Notes," p. 75.

<sup>67</sup>Romero, "On the Humanities," p. 9. See also Romero's statements in his "Author's Prologue to This Edition," in Theory of Man, p. xxxiv. Although that edition was not published until the second year after Romero's death the translator had the foresight to procure the prologue long before publication.

<sup>68</sup>Romero, "Notice," pp. 2-3.

<sup>69</sup>Romero, "Notes," p. 77.

<sup>70</sup>Solomon Lipp, "Francisco Romero (1891-1962): In Memoriam," The Philosophical Forum, XXI (1963-1964), 85.



<sup>71</sup>In the opening chapter of his The Place of Man (Ubicación del hombre), which is itself primarily concerned with man's place or position in reality, Romero lists several authors of works concerned with that broader subject of man in the universe. The authors he documents are T. H. Huxley, C. Vogt, L. Buchner, A. R. Wallace, D. Drake, C. D. Broad, M. Scheler, A. H. Compton, A. Gehlen, B. von Bardenstein, and A. Müller. Romero also offered a partial bibliography of Latin American studies in philosophical anthropology in his essay "Miradas sobre el hombre" in Reportorio Americano, XLVI, 281-283 and in La Nación, May 21, 1950.

<sup>72</sup>Francisco Romero, "Author's Prologue" in Theory of Man, trans. by W. F. Cooper (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. xxxiii.

## CHAPTER II

### MAN AS MERE INTENTIONALITY

In this chapter I wish first to establish that Romero rejected several current theories of man, and indicated the differences he had with each of them.

In the second place I establish that Romero identified man's minimal essence as "mere intentionality" and indicate what this signifies. To do this it will be necessary to present Romero's idea of intentional consciousness and its objects, and his ontology of the self.

Next I treat the theory of individuals because human individuals are included in this theory and the unique human intentional community is composed entirely of human individuals.

Human society and the intentional community (which is an advancement over mere society) are the necessary conditions for the production of culture. In inquiring into Romero's theory of culture at the natural level it is important to clarify his notions of objective culture, the creative process, and cultural life as they serve to reveal the nature of rudimentary intentionality. In this portion of the chapter I establish Romero's views on the reciprocity between man and culture.

The final division of this chapter contains criticisms of this portion of Romero's philosophy. There are some difficulties in it. Notable among these are: (1) his inclination to resolve

terminological problems arbitrarily rather than by means of argumentation and reason. (2) Furthermore, he is not consistent in the appeal he makes for establishing acceptance of his terms. Sometimes ordinary usage is invoked, but when it would count against the use of the terms he wishes to adopt he neglects that criterion. (3) In addition, there are some anomalies in Romero's theory of individuals which require attention.

Romero was interested in attempting to answer the question "What is man?" In reviewing previous works on philosophical anthropology he gave more attention and praise to Max Scheler's Man's Place in Nature than to any other work on the subject.<sup>1</sup> Although the Argentine philosopher was complimentary of Scheler's work, he held that there was considerable difference between his and Scheler's views regarding what constitutes man as uniquely human. Scheler pointed out that some hold that man is essentially distinguished from the animals by possessing intelligence and being able to choose.<sup>2</sup> Others maintain, he observed, that there is no difference between higher animals and man except in the degree to which man's intelligence has developed--the animals themselves also being possessed of intelligence.<sup>3</sup> Scheler's position was that animals do have intelligence but are differentiated from man in that man possesses spirit, which is characterized by objectivity, freedom, and consciousness of self. Spirit is the class-defining essence of man in Scheler's philosophy.

Scheler and Romero seem to be in agreement as to what constitutes man as a unique being but there is a difference in terminology. Scheler wrote: "spirit is objectivity, or the determination of the

objective nature of things"<sup>4</sup>. . . . "To become human is to acquire [an] openness to the world by virtue of the spirit. . . . Objective being or objectification, therefore, is the formal category of the logical aspect of spirit."<sup>5</sup> All this Romero refers to as "mere intentionality, not spirit." He prefers to withhold the term "spirit" for reference to those acts of the intentional consciousness which achieve a complete objectification by affirming the identity and value of the object in and of itself without reference to the self-interest of the subject.

Romero's differences with Scheler regarding "minimal man" are best understood in terms of their differences on "intelligence" and "spirit." In Romero's thought the extension of the term "intelligence" does not include animals nor does he consider man an animal.

So-called intelligent operations . . . are known to ascertain solutions of new problems, to choose means in view of ends, to fabricate tools as a normal and habitual performance (and not as the result of a chance discovery or an accidental achievement both of which can be attributed to mere associative memory).<sup>6</sup> All these activities presuppose an analysis or decomposition of reality and conceptual recomposition of the elements resulting from such analysis. An intelligent being possesses two versions of reality: a primary one of things as they are perceived, and a conceptual one in which the natural entities and their elements appear reduced to classes, genera, and concepts according to a certain systematic order.<sup>7</sup>

This, of course, suggests that for there to be intelligence in Romero's sense of the term there must be objectification--"intelligence relies on objectification." This requires "turning sensations into perceptions and states into entities."<sup>8</sup>

Romero draws a distinction between sensations and perceptions. Sensations fill the consciousness and are not objectified as something "other." A sensation, as such, constitutes an undifferentiated state. Such a situation in human experience may be illustrated, for example, by an extreme and overwhelming pain. But man can and does objectify this and other sensory states and identifies the pain as a "that" and as "mine." "In passing from sensation to perceptions, the dawning consciousness of merely sensorial being is transformed, clarified, and split up into the polarity of subject and object."<sup>9</sup> This level of performance where sensations are transcended and perception, in Romero's sense, occurs is the achievement of objectification.

Unlike Scheler, Romero does not attribute objectification merely to spirit but first of all to "mere intentionality." For Romero spirit is the culmination and perfection of the objectification begun in mere intentionality. It is in mere intentionality that the subject begins to perform an "intentional function"--a term used by Romero in accordance with Husserlian phenomenology. But, in addition to its epistemological and psychological uses, Romero regarded the intentional consciousness as the definitive essence of man. The intentional consciousness as a permanent condition is the sine qua non of minimal man. This objectifying activity of man constitutes a difference in kind, not merely degree, from other forms of biological life.

The position that sees spirit as constituting man's uniqueness, i.e. Scheler's position, attributes the entire human psychical activity to spirit. Romero sees this view as holding that man is

"characterized as being what he is." Such a view makes no distinction between natural man and man as spirit--a difference Romero believes needs to be made and understood. He appeals to ordinary language to justify his rejecting spirit as the essence of man by remarking that we commonly identify some human acts as "spiritual" and others as not. The religious application of the term "spiritual" is not necessary here. Romero rejects that connotation when he develops the term in reference to his own theory. "Spiritual" may be understood here as "altruistic," or "self-transcending." The significant point is that from Romero's perspective Scheler, in attributing all the Geisteswissenschaften to the work of spirit, appears to have no way to make the distinction which Romero holds must be made between the incomplete objectification of mere intentionality and the complete objectification of spirit--the difference between natural and spiritual acts. (The term "acts" here may be applied both to cognition and behavior.) As distinct from the incomplete objectifications of the acts of mere intentionality "spiritual acts are absolutely 'disinterested' acts, of clear objective direction, in which the subject transcends himself and severs all connections between his own concrete subjective interest and the fulfillment of the act."<sup>10</sup>

In his identification of man as the being who objectifies Romero was aware of the complex role of the affections and the will in the objectifying judgment.

Besides the objectivizing intentionality which gives us the objects, the world, there is the volitive and affective intentionality, i.e., the projection of the affections and the will towards objectivities as such and relying on what those are in themselves; with this what is proper and exclusive of the feelings

and volition of man is configured. All this constitutes the human basis, what we may call natural or minimal man, already quite different from the animal.<sup>11</sup>

Simple objectification is, of course, not the entire function of the intentional consciousness. It is the initial stage--that which turns states into entities and accomplishes the subject-object polarity. It not only gives man his world and the awareness of himself, but also provides the cognitive data for the comprehension of reality through concepts. The intentional consciousness further provides for the development of culture and ethics and is active throughout the development of these areas.

Romero took little interest in attacking the theories of man with which he disagreed. He was convinced that the best procedure to follow is to give the clearest account of his own theory of man, being careful to specify the points of difference between his and other theories, and let the case speak for itself. Although he lists in the Theory of Man no less than five theories concerning the uniqueness of man,<sup>12</sup> all of which are in contrast to his own, he avoids a full-scale polemic against them, confessing that his lack of interest in such stems both from a "distrust of its efficacy" and from his own temperament. He does, however, point out what he regards as the flaw in each of the theories he treats.

Besides contrasting his view of man with Scheler's, Romero reviews other theories. One of them is "the view that maintains that man lacks a fixed nature and that he is to be understood in terms of his becoming, in terms of history."<sup>13</sup> Such is held by existentialism, which Romero regarded not as philosophy but anthropology. Ortega was

committed to this notion of the human individual. Such views, Romero contended, must hold either that there are some norms or guidelines that order the becoming--in which case these would constitute man's essence (a view quite compatible with Romero's)--or that no such norms exist, which would entail that the becoming is utter "confusion and arbitrariness."

The belief that man is essentially defined in terms of his "practical or manual experience [which makes possible] the appearance of the conception of an objective world" is a view that reverses the correct order, according to Romero. It is intentional consciousness which is the necessary condition for purposeful handling of tools and not the reverse. "To fabricate tools as a normal and habitual performance (and not as the result of a chance discovery or an accidental achievement . . .)"<sup>14</sup> is an act of intelligence requiring objectification rather than producing it. As Romero himself put it, "The whole zoological spectrum testifies that the mere manipulation of things does not usher in humanity."<sup>15</sup>

The successful handling of things presupposes the capacity for objectification. To manipulate things to the degree necessary to derive knowledge from their handling presupposes the possibility of discerning them as things, of being aware of their relations, modes, and properties.<sup>16</sup>

The thesis that opts for the priority of the emotions and will over the intellect as definitive of human nature is also rejected by Romero. There assuredly are emotive-impulsive elements "in the dark procession of pre-intentional psychism," and Romero has no intention of denying the "role of the affections and impulses in the formation of intentional consciousness."<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, human



emotions and the will are intentional already, i.e. they are raised above the subhuman or mere psychic states through the objectifying judgment.

The nonintentionalized portion of emotive-impulsive elements remains outside the boundary of the specifically human, as does all that is strictly organic and further removed, yet, all that is mere physical condition, such as taking up space, lengthening one's existence in a given part of general cosmic time, and finding oneself subject to gravity.<sup>18</sup>

This is simply to say that there is much about man that is nonintentional--the physical and the living aspects per se--and Romero insists that in his philosophy of man there is no "intention to ignore or forget what is nonintentional in man."<sup>19</sup>

Finally, Romero contrasts his view with those "that give the dominant role to certain organic or impulsive tendencies, such as the sex or power instincts."<sup>20</sup> The forms that such views take are "pan-sexualism" and "will to power." In either case it is a mistake to hold that man's unique characteristic is sexual conduct or his supposed necessity to dominate through power. Human sexual conduct and particularly man's interpretation of it surely are unique, but such must be accounted for by the prior fact that man objectifies his world and reflects on himself and his behavior.

Romero emphasizes that the will to power is such a widespread natural tendency that it certainly cannot be regarded as man's defining characteristic. As he points out, even two hens will not live together without determining which is to dominate. On the other hand, man struggles against the tendency to dominate. That tendency "is gradually replaced by a universal domain where all actual domination

of one's fellow creatures is excluded, placing in its stead a domination of reality by the spirit which is quite contrary to that primitive principle."<sup>21</sup> Human history is not the march of the increasing domination of man over man--rather, it is the march toward liberty.

None of the foregoing efforts to define man is successful. Man, according to Romero, is the unique form of life that has transcended the merely lived states of animal preintentional psychism characterized by sensation states lacking perception. He has become an intentional consciousness which permanently objectifies its world. Romero calls the intentional consciousness at its lowest level of objectification "mere intentionality"; its cognitive acts are imperfect objectifications, but this is the activity that constitutes the natural or minimal man.

Mere intentionality objectifies with a subjective return (regreso subjetivo), which is the term Romero uses to speak of the manner in which the attention given to the object is in terms of the subject's own interests, needs, or desires. The object is not affirmed in its own right. As the term suggests, this is a regress--a falling back from full or complete objectivity. It reveals these intentional acts as incomplete objectifications. Such intentional activity alone will not account for all that the human person is, but it is sufficient, Romero believed, to clearly distinguish the essential difference between animals and humans.

Romero confessed that this theory of man is intellectualistic, but insisted that intentionality is merely the essential identification

of man and that all else in man should be seen as structured on that. I wish to emphasize that he did not maintain "that man governs his conduct solely and constantly in the light of his objective apprehensions or that these apprehensions are never distorted by the pressure of the emotions or the will."<sup>22</sup>

All intentional consciousness is consciousness of some object. Romero held that there is no consciousness without awareness of an object. In this he agreed with Husserl, who has made the point very clear: "In this manner, without exception, every conscious process is, in itself, consciousness of such-and-such, regardless of what the rightful actuality-status of this objective such-and-such may be. . . ."<sup>23</sup> Romero expressed the same in his Theory of Man: "One cannot properly speak of consciousness when there are only lived states. Consciousness is inevitably consciousness of something."<sup>24</sup> To be "conscious of" is to turn a sensorial state into a group of perceived entities. "The subject and the object emerge simultaneously, and, with their simultaneous appearance, the intentional consciousness, which they constitute, is founded. To be an object means to be given to a subject."<sup>25</sup>

Animals, including the higher primates, exist, for Romero, in a condition of pre-intentional psychism which consists only of lived states. He often used such expressions as "dim," "blind," "darkness," to characterize the psychic states of animals and he appealed to psychologists and their experiments with animals to corroborate his view in the matter.<sup>26</sup> Especially useful to him were Aloys Müller's views on the preconscious states of animals.<sup>27</sup> In

writing an exposition of Romero's "anthropological conception" in 1956, Torchía Estrada recalls that Müller had held that an "animal does not live, he is lived."<sup>28</sup> This pre-intentional state, being devoid of both intelligence and consciousness in the exact sense of these terms, is such that the psychic state knows nothing of itself as subject nor of any "other" as object. Indeed, there is neither subject nor object in such states.

Romero acknowledges that some animals do achieve brief, sporadic, unpredictable objectifications. Such happenings are exceptionally rare and are like minute sparks in darkness. Romero believed that such facts do not weaken either his claim that man is the only creature who lives intentional consciousness, or his insistence that between man and animal there is a distinction of kind and not merely degree. Man alone is the permanently objectifying being. The permanence in large part is attributable to language, which embodies concepts.

If there is objectification in animals, it is rudimentary and arrested after its first steps, as is shown by the clumsiness and limitation of the intelligence [?] even of higher animals and their lacking an objective language, the indispensable means of a permanent and normal objectification.<sup>29</sup>

Since the intentional consciousness is always a consciousness of something it is necessary to understand what an object of consciousness is. Romero lists a variety of objects discernible as the content of consciousness.

Objects [in the most non-restrictive sense] include the bodies distributed in space, their parts taken

separately, psychical acts, souls, the creations of fiction, the ideal entities of mathematics (numbers, figures), relations, qualities, properties, modes, and so forth. Object, in this general sense, is anything to which one turns his attention, whether presented in perception or in intellectual insight, whether the result of one's own imagination or that of another, of a conjecture or a conclusion of any kind. From this point of view, which presupposes the profile and existence of the subject, an object is anything that testifies to its presence before a subject.<sup>30</sup>

But in addition to enumerating objects, we can classify them according to type. There seem to be three types of objectivities. They are

first, complete or whole objects, such as the sheet of paper I am using now; second, objects isolated within the complete objects, yet perceived in them, such as the white color or the form of the sheet of paper. I am able to consider such an object either individually as a single fact or in its universality, as something identical with itself, regardless of the complete object in which it may appear; and, third, objects created through the synthesis of the features common to many primary objects. Many objects of this type are referred to as specific objects. All this is the consequence of the same objectifying capacity, though exercised on different levels, which is constituted simultaneously with man. That is, what we call man is the being capable of these objectifications.<sup>31</sup>

Romero emphasizes the uniquely human ability to compare and relate individual objects so as to form concepts as one type of intentional objects. That capacity has made possible the advancement of man. Conceptualization gives names to these generalized objectivities--"house," "rock," "number," "condition," "quality," etc. "This means that the objectifying and nominating functions emerge side by side and work in harmony. In effect, objectification requires or gives rise to nomination and would seem to be imperfect without it."<sup>32</sup>

Let us turn our attention now to Romero's analysis of objectification. There are two elements or "moments" in this process

by which an object is presented to a subject. Romero calls them the "transcendental" and the "perceptive." The transcendental element of objectification is the undisclosed activity which constitutes the object. One cannot explain how, in the inscrutable process of man's "transcendental activity," the object of consciousness is constituted. The manner by which this occurs seems hidden even to consciousness itself. But the object is formed though the constituting activity is beyond the subject's perception.

The other element in the accomplishment of objectification is the perceptive, "in which the constituted object is given to the subject."<sup>33</sup> It is sufficient to say that this presentation of the object is the second moment or element. Although the two elements can and should be differentiated, they are in actuality inseparable.

Romero regarded the occurrence of objectification as man's cosmic birth and, just as Fichte gave a party when his young son gave evidence of self-awareness by using Ich for the first time, Romero exults at the achievement of intentional consciousness as a new level of reality. "One of the most important and surprising events in the history of the cosmos occurs with the transformation of the undivided, vital, psychical flux into intentional consciousness."<sup>34</sup> There is only one level of reality that transcends man as mere intentionality and that is man as spirit.

In the signal act of objectification, the "I" is born, not as a separate entity but as a necessary part of this "new form of reality." And, of course, the self as a subject in the initial objectifying activity is not conscious of itself.

According to Romero, perceiving a thing as a "that," or as "there," which is the act of the intentional consciousness, involves a rudimentary prelogical judgment. The year following the publication in Spanish of the Theory of Man Romero explained his use of "judgment" in this context.

The root of intentional activity, in both the natural and spiritual intentionality, is the judgment. To perceive beings and things as existing entities endowed with special features which are peculiar to them is the same as to say, judging: that is, that is there, that is in a mode or another. Judgment is inside the objectification, not an explicit and conscious judgment as that studied by logic but a tacit, implicit judgment, though of the same logical order, as admission or rejection. We may say therefore: "Man is the being that is a subject" or "Man is the being that perceives objectively and also directs his acts of emotion and will towards objects" or "Man is the being who can judge." These three propositions are equivalent since to be a subject is the same thing as to perceive objectively and because the root of this objective perception is the capacity to judge.<sup>35</sup>

In merely lived states which are characteristic of animal life, there is no consciousness and thus no judgment or affirming of entities. "The primary function of the pure self, of the subject, is to direct its glance toward the states and bring them out of their condition as states, elevating them to objective dignity through the mere act of being aware of them."<sup>36</sup> (There is here an apparent implication that existence of the subject precedes that of the object. That is not held by Romero and the hint of such a view should be attributed to a degree of imprecision in word choice.) Judging is, in the sense at hand, a predicating of presence, which is identical with objectification.<sup>37</sup>

Romero draws a comparison between this prelogical judgment that affirms an object's presence and the judgment of existential import in logic. I suggest that what intentional consciousness affirms might be referred to as "presentational import." In looking at the matter, however, in terms of predication, Romero asserts that in the affirmation made by the judgment in objectification there is no clear subject of which some characteristic is being predicated as in a propositional form. In logical predication one has a propositional subject already constituted as an intentional object. But with "the objectifying judgment there is a subject of a quite distinct kind because it is a state which in that instant ceases to be such, since it is precisely in its change from a state to an object that it becomes the subject of the objectifying judgment."<sup>38</sup> (Note that "subject" as here used is in a logical frame of reference rather than the heretofore phenomenological context.) What is common to and unites these two levels of consciousness is judgment.

Although the intentional subject and object are both necessary to the prelogical judgment of intentionality, Romero held that the subject's knowledge of self is a fairly mature objectification. Humanity is begun with consciousness of any object, but requires self-consciousness for its fulfillment. "Although self-consciousness is not a basic element of the human, eventually, and in all probability, it becomes a necessary element without which the humanity of man would be incomplete."<sup>39</sup>

"In a certain sense" the act of self-knowledge, or the subject viewing itself as an object, "contradicts the proper course



of perception,"<sup>40</sup> for in this act of objectification the subject alters its nature so as to become its own object. Romero suggests a parallel between consciousness of the merely external and metaphysics on the one hand, and consciousness of self and epistemology on the other hand.

Metaphysics is inquiry in the direct sense and is concerned with the being of things. Normally, it is prior to the theory of knowledge. The latter is an investigation of an indirect or reflexive kind. Here, the philosopher must turn back toward himself, freeing himself from things and concerning himself with his knowledge of them, giving attention to the modes by which he apprehends and interprets reality. Something similar also occurs in the development of man in the first stages of his existence: the child is more lucidly aware of the external reality than he is of himself, and the so-called crisis of adolescence, in large part, is the discovery of one's own inner reality. The delay in the appearance of self-consciousness confirms the role of objectification, which, understandably, falls first on what is external, on what is foreign, on what comes before the subject (a category that includes the subjective things which are not the self), and only later turns to the hidden reality of the ultimate subjective being.<sup>41</sup>

In point of fact, Romero's view is that "it seems undeniable that both the consciousness of the 'we' and of the 'you' are temporally prior to that of one's own self."<sup>42</sup> He suggests that the community and one's intentional recognition of it--i.e. the objectification of the "we"--are necessary in order for the self to become reflexive. The human community is seen, then, as necessary to man's becoming fully and completely human.

Important to an understanding of Romero's position on intentional consciousness as definitive of humanity is a statement of

his view concerning the ontology of the self. In his Theory of Man Romero recalled three concepts of the self in Husserl's writings and identified his own view with what he called Husserl's third interpretation.<sup>43</sup> The self thus conceived is "something that lives and is modified through living, as an essentially historical being."<sup>44</sup> He quotes Husserl:

With every act it carries out and which has a new objective meaning, the self . . . acquires a permanently new characteristic. If I decide, for example, for the first time in an act of judgment regarding the existence of some being and for some given determination of that being, the act passes on, but I am and hereafter remain a self that has decided in thus and such a manner.<sup>45</sup>

Each intentional subject is a human individual and Romero's theory of human individuals is better understood if his general doctrine of individuals is examined. Taking individuum in a radical sense of its meaning, Romero held that individuality is not constituted by anything external to the individual but by an "internal principle." A rock is not an individual--if it is broken nothing is lost, for it was kept together in a merely apparent individuality by something outside or external to it. It is easily thought of as a part of a larger rock. Individuality, properly understood, "is dependent upon the action or control of an internal principle."<sup>46</sup> If, for instance, an atom (or its elements), a molecule, a crystal, a plant, or an animal is divided, something essential is lost--there is mutilation of an individual, even if the separated portion can be replaced by the individual.

Individuals on one scale may form together to constitute a new individual on another scale. These corporate or socializing individuals are "functional collectives," also dependent upon an "internal principle." Examples of such are ant hills, beehives, and various human organizations. The criterion for corporate individuality is that it be "centered in itself and organized by an inner necessity." Individuals at all levels will be indivisible, separate, and relatively autonomous.

Romero held that there are degrees of individuality, and that the degree of individuality is a function of the intensification of the individual's unity of structure and function. The higher in the natural order the unit is, the more of an individual it is. Because of its intensified structure and expanded function the animal is more of an individual than a plant. A plant exhibits, by the same token, a higher degree of individualization than a molecule. The most individualized individuum is man, who is constituted as an individual intentional consciousness.

The final point in Romero's doctrine of individuals is that as there is an increase in the degree of individualization there is advance toward universality--"toward liberation from enclosure in the particular."<sup>47</sup> Growth toward universality must not be achieved, however, at the expense of the individual. Romero's position that progress in individualization is also movement in the direction of universality is paradoxical. He comments on this apparent contradiction in the following remarks.

The increasing individualization . . . is an increase in the radius of action of the entity, which while it becomes

more itself, intensifies its jurisdiction, its capacity to project itself into areas increasingly varied and extensive so that it gradually amplifies its relationships with things and beings. The meaning of the direction of this development is seen when one thinks of the ordered series of individualities, from those of plant life and animal life in the most primeval ages to the anthropoids. With their more active processes, with their mobility, animals are far ahead of plants in their relations with things. Psychically, the animal species in general gradually open up to the world as they climb in the zoological hierarchy, and we are able to imagine something like a fog between them and reality, which little by little is dispersed. Intentionality releases the gust of wind that blows the fog away completely and with it pure animal life has come to an end.<sup>48</sup>

In these remarks Romero is insisting that growth in individualization necessarily proceeds toward universalization. That is, at these successively higher levels the greater individual "has extended its outreach, . . . making use of its environment, . . . creating new individuals"<sup>49</sup> through its 'socializing' tendency.

Human individuals, of course, compose the human intentional community and Romero distinguishes between it and the preintentional animal community.

In an animal group, beings are joined that have no objectified inner world and are not endowed with an instrument of expression suited for communicating this world and thus making it a common property of the group. But it is exactly this which occurs in a human association and imparts to it the essential quality for which it may be called an intentional community.<sup>50</sup>

The human community is composed of individuals each of whom is possessed of both a need and an ability to communicate the content of his intentional consciousness. In this the human community is distinguished from an animal community. The intentional community "is a mere aggregation of intentional unities, based on the spontaneous tendency

of intentionality to sally forth from itself and communicate with others."<sup>51</sup>

As a result, "the human community is an association of subjects and common storehouse of their objectifications, which are at the disposal of each member so far as he is capable of receiving them as significant things."<sup>52</sup> "To a considerable extent, a community is a tradition, an accumulation."<sup>53</sup> (Romero distinguished between "tradition", which is desirable and necessary for human advancement, and "traditionalism", which is stultifying and counter-productive.) "The whole community is a vast school, which teaches and instructs man from the time his intellect is first kindled until the time it finally goes out."<sup>54</sup>

But the human community, and it alone, is capable of becoming a society. Although one may correctly speak of "social life" in animal community, it never achieves a society.<sup>55</sup> Society "is based on the capacity of external objectification. A rudimentary society begins to emerge as soon as the individuals have gained objective perception of their community."<sup>56</sup> This is stated a bit more fully in Theory of Man.

A society [is] a grouping with norms and purposes more clearly established. In general, . . . a human grouping is properly a community which, through the objectification of ends and means, engenders a great variety of partial, well-defined groups, but in addition tends to change from the communal to the social [societal]<sup>57</sup> because of the objectification of the communal relations.<sup>58</sup>

To put the distinction in other words, the intentional, pre-societal community is a group of objectifying individuals who exist without an awareness of their interpersonal relationships. Society exists once individuals begin to objectify those relationships and especially once language and other symbols are developed and

employed. Society is an advancement in humanization over the bare intentional community.<sup>59</sup>

The intentional community is freighted with its own historicity. Just as "the self . . . acquires a permanently new characteristic"<sup>60</sup> with each act of objectification or judgment, so the intentional community, in the course of its achievements, is permanently changed into a society by means of the cultural objectifications it accomplishes.

Culture, like man himself, begins on what Romero identifies as the natural level of reality and develops to the spiritual. This transition is explained in terms of the intentional consciousness and its development from a basic "mere intentionality" to "intentionality made spiritual." The basic difference in these two types of intentional consciousness is that the former performs acts of objectification that are marred by the subjective return. The acts of spiritual intentionality have no such defect. Objectification in such acts is complete--"absolute," as Romero expresses it.

In treating Romero's theory of culture on the natural level, one must show the crucial role of language in the achievement of culture. Romero emphasized the auspicious contribution of language toward the advancement of humanity by showing that it is unique among the cultural products. Although the intentional consciousness is definitive of humanity, language is essential to sustain and extend that new level of reality. "Language is at once the result and the condition of intentionality as a normal function."<sup>61</sup> "Objective language [is] the indispensable means of a permanent and normal objectification."<sup>62</sup>

In human language there are terms for concepts, and concepts constitute one class of objects. Concepts and the terms by which they are identified are essential to the advancement of man, "for a non-conceptual objective language would be a language in which each individual object had a linguistic sign of its own, which is practically impossible."<sup>63</sup> "What cannot be doubted, so far as we are concerned, is that man emerges at the same time as does significant or objective language."<sup>64</sup> In Theory of Man Romero suggest the manner in which language enhances objectification.

The primary function of language, then, would be expression; but it also includes communication, which is understood as the communication of the subject with himself, his saying to himself that he perceives, that he is aware of a presence, that he has something in sight. Man possesses non-significant language, in common with the animals, yet the superiority and the fullness that it attains in him is due to that in the emotions and volitions which is specifically human. It stems from the fact that emotions and volitions are phenomena which occur in a subject who is ever conscious of a vast world of objectivities. Communication in the proper sense, which is the transmission of objectifications to other subjects through signs, may undoubtedly stimulate nomination, and, perhaps by reflection, it may stimulate the objectification contained in the foundation of nomination; but this is only an incentive to continue the task that the subject already carries on by inclination and even by intrinsic necessity. To perceive in terms of objectivity already implies something akin to telling oneself that something on the horizon of consciousness stands out. To speak is to tell it to oneself and then to tell it to others.<sup>65</sup>

Despite its uniqueness language is produced analogously to other cultural productions. In the creation both of language and of other cultural products there is a distinction between expression and communication. The "expressing activity," which is a subjective activity of an individual intentional consciousness, is "a spontaneous

prolongation of the objectifying attitude."<sup>66</sup> "The initial sources of language and of art are one and the same, and they ought to be related not to special values but to a spontaneous exteriorization of something inward."<sup>67</sup> The initial stage of externalization is expression, which prolongs the objectifying act. Communication is subsequent and subsidiary to expression.

Romero uses the terms "objective culture" and "cultural life" to distinguish between man's cultural products, on the one hand, and his existence amid those productions, on the other hand. In an excellent article published in 1949 Romero characterized the former as consisting "of the unending succession of man's creations. . . which constitute his environment; an environment which is something like his own inner being materialized and externalized."<sup>68</sup> Later, in Theory of Man, he expressed a more precise meaning: "Objective culture includes all of man's creations that achieve substantiality and autonomy with reference to their creator and thus have a relatively separate existence, such as institutions, works of art, theories, and customs."<sup>69</sup>

Romero is not altogether consistent in his characterization of objective culture. In 1941--eleven years prior to the appearance of Theory of Man--he wrote: "Cultural products are realizations of the spirit, spiritual objectifications or materializations."<sup>70</sup> This attribution of objective culture entirely to spirit is negated in Theory of Man.<sup>71</sup> There his position is that cultural productions come about first within the prespiritual community--even the presocietal community.



On another occasion prior to the publication of Theory of Man he wrote: "[In] graphic terms, although not wholly proper ones: [Objective culture is] the transformation of spirit into thing."<sup>72</sup> The statement has the questionable virtue of having only one asset-- it is graphic. Its liability is that in light of Romero's later statements on the subject it is misleading, even erroneous, on two counts: (1) Spirit does not really become "things"--the statement is a metaphor. (2) According to Romero's later work (Theory of Man) objective culture is not restricted to the productions or activities of spirit. In his most definitive statements on his theory of culture the highest achievements of culture are to be understood as expressions of spirit. But in the vast majority of cultural objectifications it is mere intentionality that is responsible.

The division of cultural productions or "objective culture" has been made by other philosophers of culture and Romero reviewed some of those efforts. One such classification is the following: art, religion, philosophy, science, technology, mythology, morality, customs, society, the state, language, etc.<sup>73</sup> Such a breakdown seemed to Romero organizationally deficient, as indeed it is. It is an attempt to arrange the productions "according to the content," whereas the effort should be to classify "according to the manner and direction of the objectification."

In his Contemporary Philosophy (Filosofía contemporánea) Romero praised the classification and division outlined by Hans Freyer in his Theory of the Objective Spirit, a work which Romero believed comprised "solid and durable material for a complete theory of culture."<sup>74</sup> The five following general types or categories of

objective cultural productions are approbatively treated by Romero and are attributed by him to Freyer: (1) those objects that are "formations or creations," including art, all theory, religious doctrines, the sciences, philosophy; (2) the useful -- that which is made or devised for the purpose of practical utility such as tools, machinery--even houses, streets, ships, etc; (3) signs, such as language, mathematical formulae, landmarks, and road signs, which "serve expressly to signify something"; (4) social forms, including human relations, customs, and law; and finally, (5) education, which includes the cultural benefits generally made available to the individual, as well as general education and education in specific areas such as medicine and jurisprudence.<sup>75</sup> Although this scheme is by no means exhaustive, it does suggest the breadth of the term "objective culture."

Romero rejected the proposal made by some that culture and civilization be differentiated so as to make the latter term applicable only to the realm of the practical and technical, and thus exclude such from culture. He held that "the notion of culture [should include] every human product and all human conduct."<sup>76</sup> Objective culture may even be broadened in its application so as to include "not only what man produces or purposely alters but also everything to which he actually ascribes a meaning by his own self and his needs, everything that in one way or another he brings into his own environment and places in reference to himself."<sup>77</sup> But to adopt such a broad meaning for objective culture would result in a far too general inclusiveness. Romero states that his interpretation of objective culture "will consider only human artifacts and actual

modifications of things." This statement, however, will need to be considered as complementary to those above concerning language, custom, laws, and institutions.

Romero considered the meaning of the cultural object the greatest problem in the philosophy of culture.

The essential problem of the cultural is in general a problem of significance, of meaning. Almost all cultural objects manifest themselves to us outwardly as physical objects. . . . But what distinguishes the cultural object from the natural object is that the natural object is, above all, a physical constitution, while that which is essential in the cultural object is that its physical, external reality is only the support of the meaning, the receptacle of the spiritual content. . . . The interpretation of the cultural consists in every case, then, in going on from those signs, receptacles, vehicles to that expressed by them, to that which is contained, to the human intention which they enclose.<sup>78</sup>

We shall grasp the meaning of any cultural object only by succeeding in this effort.

This is not to say that Romero would attempt to ground aesthetic value in the intention of the creator of the objective article. One would not attempt to judge the aesthetic value of a work of art on the basis of whether or not the artist accomplished his purpose. What is the issue here, instead, is the meaning of a given article produced by an intentional consciousness within a particular culture. That meaning cannot be separated from the meaning intended by the intentional consciousness of the one who produced it by a creative act. Furthermore, the object's full meaning must include the meaning given to it by the culture within which it is included.

There are various characteristics postulable of different portions of objective culture. These are not intrinsic qualities of

the cultural object itself; rather they are relational characteristics of objective culture to the life of man. They refer to the function of cultural products in human life. One or another of these qualities or characteristics may be asserted of all cultural objects.

In the first place, objective culture provides concrete representations of human objectifications. These objectifications have meanings of their own which are expressed through the concrete and physical existents. Second, objects of culture offer guidance, stimulation, and instruction to man's subjective life individually and communally. Third, some cultural productions contribute to the establishment of the societal order. Fourth, they increase man's "rule over nature" and prepare the way for his emerging spirituality. Finally, objective culture "is a veritable medium and atmosphere for man."<sup>79</sup> "It is part of the fate of man that he cannot jump across his culture, any more than he can jump across his own shadow."<sup>80</sup> These five characteristics reveal that objective culture is, on the one hand, the external expression or projection of man's inner life, and, on the other hand, the result and evidence of his humanization of the natural order--of the human colonization of the nonhuman.

Romero was aware that he had not succeeded in developing a complete theory of culture although he had hoped to some day publish such a work. He often acknowledged the fragmentary, tentative character of his work on the philosophy of culture. What he did accomplish in this area, however, is an account of objective culture that corresponds to his theory of man as intentional consciousness and spirit. Man is an objectifying being whose essential nature impels him to express to himself and to communicate to others the objects of

his individual intentionality. Some of these objects are physical, others are ideal, imaginative, or hallucinatory. Still others are generalizations of particulars, or perhaps attitudes, and even relations as well as a myriad of other types of objectifications. Man communicates them all in cultural objects, including institutions, laws, artistic products, mechanical inventions, philosophy, and religion.

The creative process needs our attention now, for this is the process by which intentionality produces objective culture. Romero called it "creative objectification." The most notable passage he has written on the subject is in Theory of Man, which will be paraphrased here so that his idea of creativity as process and product may be understood. Since there is such a variety of cultural objects--institutions, creeds, tools, sculpture, laws--and since there is some variance in the steps by which intentionality externalizes these extremely varied objects, an attempt should be made to avoid excessive formalizing of the creative process.

First of all in the creative process the objectifying subject imaginatively forges the idea. It may seem that it even comes to possess him--the song sings in his soul, the tool is felt in his hand, the formula dictates itself to him. Of the multitude of man's "imaginings," however, few become objectified creations, and even fewer attain acceptance into objective culture. Just as some seeds never break the soil, failing to complete fertilization, so some objectifications are abortive. These are the objects entertained by an intentional consciousness, but never externalized. Others see the light of day as futile efforts. These are the creations which are not assimilated in the "collective consensus" of the people in the

culture. The song that does not speak to anyone, the tool for which none find a use, the formula that is not needed or is in error--these, to borrow Hume's term, will fall "dead-born" into the world. If a cultural object is persistently neglected by society it becomes either a cultural oddity or a biographical curiosity, somehow deprived of full cultural status.

In its creative process an intentional consciousness is judging that something ought to be which is not. The inventor of a machine judges that it ought to be built. The writer of a song, that it should be heard. The framer of a law or moral code, that it should be adhered to. These judgments, Romero held, are necessarily made when the creative intentionality externalizes its objectification. Culture is built by the agreement between the judgment of individual or collective creators and the consensus of society. When the creator's judgment concerning his creation finds corroboration in the community, the object created then lives in objective culture, taking up an identity no longer dependent upon the mind and efforts of its creator.

I wish now to turn to the second of the important distinctions Romero makes within the realm of culture. The first, which has been covered above, was "objective culture." The other, to which we now turn, is "cultural life." The two terms identify the relationship between man and his cultural creations. Initially, man creates them but they become the milieu within which he exists and by which his life is fashioned.

"Cultural life" specifies the state of man among the vast array of the creations of intentionality. The influence of culture upon man is profound and pervasive.

To say that culture influences man is not enough, because one could imagine an effect of a more or less occasional and restricted reaction. In truth, culture collaborates in an enormous and irreplaceable manner in the constitution, maintenance, and accretion of human intimacy, of that which is human in man. If it is certain in general that we are fathers and sons of our works, this is most true when our works are not acts that pass, but objective realizations, and when we attend . . . to the community in time, which in every stage carries its contribution to the multiseccular culture and simultaneously assimilates and improves the total legacy of past generations.

An entire world of forms, institutions, usages and norms welcomes man when he is born, and is as an invisible school which indoctrinates him from his first years and does not cease instructing and molding him until his death.<sup>81</sup>

Whereas an animal's inheritance is merely biological or organic, man's heritage is far more extensive. The legacy that is exclusively man's includes in addition to the somatic a large content of the psychic, even psychic-spiritual, possessions of previous generations. Theoretically, each man inherits all the vast store of cultural realities that have been produced and preserved in his cultural past. The enormous heritage is such, however, that no individual can fully appropriate it. The extent to which he really receives it depends on "the breadth of his comprehension" as well as his own unique situation in time and place.

The risk of losing the cultural heritage is as great as the legacy is massive. Man may lose large segments of his inheritance if it is hidden, or taken from him, or if he is "careless in appropriating it." And the real tragedy in such a loss is that

during the interval between the extinction and the restoration, the area in crisis seems simply abolished, nonexistent, and that phase of the human soul which looked toward it and was nourished by it remains empty

and at times retreats to much earlier stages, and in some instances, to a lamentable primitivism.<sup>82</sup>

Romero contended that the acknowledgment that the human being is shaped through his culture is not in conflict with his persuasion that man possesses a principle (principio) "in him" that makes culture possible. That principle, for Romero, is man's capacity to objectify and, ultimately, his potentiality to become a spiritual being. Romero recalled that Ortega maintained that man has no being or essence (ser), that he is a mere becoming (devenir). Such a view "denies in advance the marks of man's being [ser] that might be deducible from the constants of that same becoming, inasmuch as that becoming is not pure chance, and it overlooks also the question of the spring or origin of the specific human becoming [devenir]."83

Man's cultural heritage becomes most truly his through philosophy. In philosophy of culture the intentional consciousness analyzes and evaluates the cultural life within which it dwells and for which it is responsible. By this means man becomes reflective about his cultural productions and consciously makes changes in the cultural life.

Philosophy is culture as idea or problem. The human spirit, which in great part has created culture [spirit in culture will be dealt with in Chapter III], spontaneously and even unconsciously turns above it to comprehend it and judge it, to discover its source, to make clear its ends and to estimate its meaning.<sup>84</sup>

Furthermore,

A philosophy of culture is able to reduce the various human values to seven, in the following order: Scientific, religious, ethical, juridical, economic, political, and aesthetic. None of these values are wholly independent of the others. The most independent and also the most difficult of all the values to understand, is the aesthetic value.<sup>85</sup>



The unfinished nature of Romero's philosophy of culture left the particularities of the human values undeveloped. Had he completed a genuinely comprehensive theory of culture it would have been necessary for him to show both the relations among these various values and the hierarchy they form. It seems to me that these are matters which Romero is here committing himself to clarifying in such a work. In addition, he held that any adequate philosophy of culture must include ontological and epistemological, as well as axiological, analyses.

I have to this point in the present chapter presented Romero's theory concerning the essence of humanity at its minimal level. I have expressed the definitive characteristic of man--that which separates mankind from all other forms of life. It is the intentional consciousness as a permanent state that differentiates him from the rest of reality. This, in its most elementary state, is what Romero calls "natural man."

In addition, I have presented the features of Romero's philosophy of culture and have pursued to considerable length his positions on objective culture, the creative process, and cultural life. Individual objectifying consciousnesses existing in relation as an intentional community develop into a society by means of becoming conscious of the externalizations of each other's subjective life, and thus create a growing culture. The massive cultural milieu which results encapsulates man, molding him after its fashion, and he, being aware of that shaping, remolds his culture.

I turn now from the presentation of Romero's views of natural man and culture to consider a few criticisms of his theory of man up

to this point. The first point of criticism I wish to treat in Romero's theory of man and culture on the natural level is his choice of terms. Romero is inclined to settle some problems of terminology by arbitrary stipulative meanings rather than by methodical analysis of the problems and by argument.<sup>86</sup> Such terms as "intelligence," "sensation," "perception," "community," and "society" are examples of this. He is not altogether convincing in his insistence that we cannot predicate intelligence of animals simply because they do not objectify their lived state or its constituents. His contention that sensations are to be distinguished from perceptions in that only the latter are objectified also has an arbitrary element. And surely, his declaration that the term "society" should apply only to a certain level of the intentional community, that animals have communities but not societies, is quite arbitrary. One can find no good reason, and Romero offers none, for not reversing the order of these terms.

In his treatment of the term "spirit" Romero applied a criterion that he does not use in the other questions involving terminology. That criterion is the ordinary use of language. In defending his use of "spirit" as applying to only some human cognitive acts and behavior, Romero observed that the ordinary man reserves the term "spiritual act" for the most praiseworthy human deeds, and that, therefore, such a distinction ought to be maintained in the philosophic use of the term. He does not appeal to ordinary usage in arriving at the meanings of the other terms, although I find no reason, in principle, why this index should not apply to other terms. Of course, if that standard were applied to the terms in question, it would, in most if not all cases, count against Romero's use.

Romero's theory of individuals has some problems. What precisely is an "internal principle" whose action or control provides individuality in the ontological sense he describes? I do not find any denotation of these principles in his development of the theory. In what manner, for example, is it correct to say a rock is not held together by an internal principle and is, therefore, not an individual?

Furthermore, if a rock is not an individual on the grounds that it may be thought of as a separated part of a larger entity, why must an atom or a graft from a plant be considered an individual when these also may be so considered?

The most troublesome statement in Romero's theory of individuals is his contention that an individual is more of an individual in direct ratio to its inner complexity. In terms of indivisibility, exactly the opposite would appear more defensible--the more simple the structure and function, the more individual the entity. It is understandable that Romero needed to regard the human individual of superior value and tending much more toward universalization than more simple individuals. However, this could have been done without claiming that the more complex the structure and function of the individual, the more individual it is.

In summary, I have shown the differences Romero himself pointed out between his philosophy of man and others. I have shown that Romero held to the intentional consciousness as the essential constitutive element of minimal or natural man and that man is the sole repository of intelligence and consciousness. This view purposely rejects characterizing man at this natural level as "spirit," reserving that term for man at a higher, transcendent level of being. Natural man is minimal man and as such he is nonspiritual.

In dealing with the intentional consciousness of natural man I have shown that Romero refers to human consciousness at this level of reality as "mere intentionality" and that as such each act of human intentionality is flawed by the subject's necessity of referring the object to himself. This "subjective regress" is overcome by man as spirit and is the difference between the act of mere intentionality and spirituality. I have shown that the "subjective regress" is the failure of an intentional act to be a perfect act of objectification.

I have shown here that the process of objectification includes both a transcendental and a perceptive element, according to Romero, and I have treated the diversity of the intentional objects he recognizes, both the perceptual and the conceptual.

Self-knowledge has been seen as an advanced act of intentionality, one which is a more mature objectification than the awareness of objects external to the subject. The consciousness of self is also viewed as a more mature act of consciousness than the awareness of the "we" of community and society and somewhat dependent on that awareness.

Next I have offered an exposition of Romero's theory of individuals and shown its relevance to his theory of man and culture on the natural level of reality.

I have shown that the intentional community, as distinct from animal communities, is comprised of intentionalizing individuals who may or may not be reflectively aware of their relationship in community. Because of the permanence and persistence of intentional consciousness, however, community is transformed into society. That is achieved when individual men express and communicate the content of

their own consciousnesses and when individuals in community become aware that others are sharing their subjective life through objective cultural creations. Throughout the growth of community and rudimentary society, language develops first as a subjective prolongation of the "that is" or "that is there" in consciousness. This inner affirming is expressed in objective language and subsequently communicated to other consciousnesses in that medium.

The reciprocal relationship that exists between man and his culture has been discussed in terms of "objective culture" and "cultural life." I have shown how objective cultural productions are the creative results of the objectifications of the intentional consciousness. Man creates his cultural environment and is, in turn, himself fashioned by it. Objective culture incorporates all the productions of man as well as the process of the creation of the cultural objectivities. All of the varieties of cultural production are, despite the apparent dissimilarities, the work of the objectifying nature of man.

I have treated Romero's idea of the problem of determining the meaning of objective culture. In order to understand any phase of cultural production it is necessary to go beyond the institutions, the physical objects, written words, and works of art to the meaning intended by the intentional consciousness responsible for their initial and continued existence. Only thereby can meaning be found. Romero does not explain how one discovers the intentional content of a consciousness.

Every man enters a world that is heavy with culture and tradition. The pre-human world is not available to him. His culture envelops him with language structured conceptually in terms of the

composite intentionalities of its past communal and societal generations. There is no Adam entering an unhumanized world. A prepared atmosphere is provided in which the ongoing creational process is continuously pursued and, despite the fact that the cultural life can be and is being transformed in varying degrees, every man begins his life in a cultural, humanized environment.

The theory we have here is that man has an irreducible essence which constitutes his nature--he is the being that permanently and uniquely objectifies his environment. He is an intentional consciousness and thus is differentiated from all other forms of life. He is a new level of reality and has the potentiality for perfecting the propensity to objectify.

It is a theory that man is also a becoming--he is in process of not only colonizing the world by humanizing it but of being shaped in his becoming by the mass of cultural realities he continually produces and which each succeeding generation of his kind inherits. And, as we shall see, he is in the process of becoming spiritual.

We are prepared now to deal with the spiritual man--the being in whom intentionality is expressed in full objectification, in whom mere intentionality is transcended and cognitive acts occur with no subjective regress. In such, the object of consciousness is viewed in its own right, affirmed for itself, is identified and evaluated without respect to the interests, needs, ambitions, or desires of the subject. This is the act of completed objectification. In such an act of cognition the subject transcends himself. We shall see that man as spirit has implications for culture.

## Notes

### Chapter Two

<sup>1</sup>Romero's commendations of Scheler's Man's Place in Nature were offered from a wide acquaintance with works on man and culture in various languages. Romero wrote "[Scheler's] exposition ranks, in my opinion, among the clearest and most apposite." See the essay "Man and Culture" by Romero, trans. by Helene Weyl as Chapter 18 in F. S. C. Northrop, ed., Ideological Differences and World Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), p. 386.

<sup>2</sup>Max Scheler, Man's Place in Nature, trans. by Hans Meyerhoff (N. Y.: Farrar, Strauss and Co., 1961), p. 35.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid. Scheler attributes this position to the Darwinian-Lamarckian school.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>6</sup>Romero defines "associative memory" as the "retention of whole situations, be they natural or arranged, as those used by man in training animals." Such mental activity "requires no analysis and recomposition of reality." See Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 386.

<sup>7</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 387.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 16.

<sup>11</sup>Romero, "Notice," p. 2. "Already" is a word well chosen, for it points up Romero's other difference with Scheler concerning the basic character of man. It is unnecessary to introduce "spirit," as Scheler does, in order to make manifest the uniqueness of man. For Romero, mere intentionality does not constitute the spiritual being of man. He has no intention of denying the legitimacy of either the term "spirit" or of its employment in philosophical anthropology, but he does insist that it is not only unnecessary but incorrect to use it as the defining characteristic of man. On this point he repeatedly affirms his disagreement with Scheler.

<sup>12</sup>Romero, Theory, pp. 14-27.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>14</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 387.

<sup>15</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 17.      <sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 21. "Finding oneself" (encontrarse) is an unfortunate choice of words. Surely the cognitive act of "finding oneself subject to gravity" is an intentional act. What Romero wished to refer to here is simply "being subject to gravity" and it should be so translated.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>23</sup>Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 33.

<sup>24</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 10.      <sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>See, for example, Romero, Theory, pp. 5-6.

<sup>27</sup>See Romero, "Una nueva teoría del hombre," Revista de Cultura Moderna, no. 15 (1950), 9-19. The article was written in February, 1949.

<sup>28</sup>This brief quotation was lifted from Torchía Estrada's article "La concepción antropológica de Francisco Romero," Ciudad, nos. 4-5 (1956), 25.

<sup>29</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 388.

<sup>30</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 7. For a more extensive development of the content of the intentional consciousness see Romero's essay "Sobre los objetos y el conocimiento," Cursos y Conferencias, XXXV (1949), 261-279.

<sup>31</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 47.      <sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Romero, "Notice," p. 2.      <sup>36</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 3.

<sup>37</sup>Romero's idea of the "implicit judgment" of intentionality is similar to Brentano's. The latter's position, however, was that judging presupposes a thing-perceived (Vorstellung).

<sup>38</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 34.      <sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 84.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.



<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>43</sup>According to Romero the first two Husserlian positions on the self are as follows: In the first Husserl dispensed "with the subject as a special and distinct entity." (Theory, p. 31) In this interpretation consciousness is but the flow of "lived experiences in inner time."

A second position held by Husserl, according to Romero, is that the self is "something, and something exceedingly important, though it is difficult to imagine the how of this something. . . . The explicit form 'I think of' remains undisturbed [after the phenomenological reduction], with one of the arms of its bipolar structure pointing toward the subject. . . . [It is something] that is strictly sui generis" (Theory, p. 32).

Romero held that the second position is a correction of the first and, in turn, the third (with which I deal in the text) a correction of the second.

<sup>44</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 32.

<sup>45</sup>The quotation Romero uses here on pp. 32-33 of Theory of Man is from Husserl's Méditations cartésiennes (Paris: Colin, 1931), pp. 56-57.

<sup>46</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 73.      <sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp. 79-80.      <sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 79.

<sup>50</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 391.

<sup>51</sup>Romero, Ibid., p. 398.

<sup>52</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 88.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 89. This quotation employs the term "tradition" which is used by Romero to refer to positive and progressive use of the past by man. He regarded "traditionalism" as counter-productive. In terms of Romero's evaluation toward the two, "tradition" is an asset to the development of man while "traditionalism" is a decided liability.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>55</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 85. Romero here quotes Morris Ginsberg with approval: "Social intercourse [sociabilidad] is not what distinguishes man from the animals." (See Ginsberg, Manual de sociología (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1942), p. 109.

<sup>56</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 398.

<sup>57</sup>I have suggested here that Romero's use of the Spanish social should be translated "societal" on the grounds that this tends to preserve the distinction he wished to make between "social life" (sociality), which animals as well as men may be said to enjoy, and "society", which is the achievement of man only.

<sup>58</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 92.

<sup>59</sup>For Romero, all progress in humanization is an increase in "the objectifying and judging capacities." This point in his philosophical anthropology is clearly related to his metaphysics, especially as set forth in "Program of a Philosophy" ("Programa de una filosofía") and "Transcendence and Value" ("Trascendencia y valor") in his Papers for a Philosophy (Papeles para una filosofía), published in 1945. Cf. "Intuition and Discourse" ("Intución y discurso") in the same publication and "Persons and Transcendence" (Personas y trascendencia) in Philosophy of the Person (Filosofía de la persona), 1944.

<sup>60</sup>Edmund Husserl, Méditations cartésiennes (Paris: Colin, 1931), p. 56.

<sup>61</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 389.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 388. The term "objective language" refers to communication of one intentional consciousness with others. Romero does not speak of "subjective language," but he does distinguish between expression and communication. Expression is translated into communication by means of language. His theory of language implies that an intentional consciousness subjectively forms rudimentary language when it attempts to prolong the objectifying act.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 389.

<sup>64</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 48.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., pp. 48-49.

<sup>66</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 393.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., pp. 391-392. In Theory of Man, p. 112, Romero states: "Culture, in the proper sense, is human life, both spiritual and nonspiritual, which develops according to its peculiar mode of being and necessarily includes the production and use of cultural objectifications."

<sup>69</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 96.

<sup>70</sup>Francisco Romero, Filosofía contemporánea (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1941), p. 147.

<sup>71</sup>Romero, Theory, pp. 96-121, passim. Note that the material on culture in Theory of Man is in "Part I: Intentionality" and not in "Part II: Spirit."

<sup>72</sup>Francisco Romero, El hombre y la cultura (Buenos Aires: Editorial Espasa-Calpe, 1950), p. 12.

<sup>73</sup>Romero, Filosofía contemporánea, pp. 147ff.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>See Ibid., pp. 148-150.

<sup>76</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 97.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>78</sup>Romero, Filosofía contemporánea, pp. 139-140.

<sup>79</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 392.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>Romero, El hombre, p. 13.

<sup>82</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 120.

<sup>83</sup>Romero, El hombre, p. 16.

<sup>84</sup>Francisco Romero, Filósofos y problemas (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1947), p. 150, quoted by Marjorie S. Harris, Francisco Romero on Problems of Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1960), p. 92.

<sup>85</sup>John Hershey quoting Francisco Romero, "Nature, Man and Culture," in Latin American Thought, I (October, 1945), 4.

<sup>86</sup>This problem has become obvious as I have read Romero's philosophy and I find that W. J. Kilgore has focused some attention on the matter in his "Introduction to the Philosophy of Francisco Romero" in Theory of Man, p. xxv.

Romero's tendency to invest well-known terms with special meanings without due regard for either their ordinary usage or for adequate justification of the altered meaning is sufficiently widespread to treat it here as a single problem rather than touch on it each time the difficulty is encountered.

## CHAPTER III

### MAN AS SPIRITUAL INTENTIONALITY

In this chapter I make clear at the outset the function of the term "spirit" in Romero's philosophy and show the difference between spiritual and nonspiritual intentionality.

In the first place Romero's meaning of "spirit" must be made clear. It is important to establish that the expression "the spirit," whatever use it may have, and regardless of the grammatical facility with which it is used, connotes a substantiality, an agency, that results in obscuring Romero's meaning. I shall show that "spirit" in Romero's theory of man conforms entirely to the human level of reality and carries with it no more suggestion of ontological separateness from man than does the term "the intentional consciousness." Indeed, I will show that "spirit" is Romero's means of identifying intentional acts in which complete objectification occurs--acts which are fully objective in that they have no subjective return or regress.

The next task will be to show the place of the spiritual in reality. In order to do this it will be necessary to introduce Romero's metaphysics. The schemata presented in this portion will aid in illuminating the relation of the spiritual to the natural in the order of temporality.

Romero, as I will show, held that his philosophy of man is not dependent on his metaphysics and I see no sufficient reason to take

issue with him on that point. However, I believe my efforts to show man's place in reality succeed in revealing the relation between Romero's philosophy of man and his metaphysics.

It is, of course, not sufficient merely to identify spirit by its location in the general scheme of things. It is necessary to make manifest its specific and unique characteristics. These are absolute objectivity, universality, freedom, unity, historicity, responsibility, and absolute transcendence. These characteristics will be seen as the identifying marks of both the spiritual act and the spiritual man.

Romero's theory of man as a dualism of nature and spirit will be treated and it will be shown that Romero holds to both a descriptive and prescriptive dualism in his philosophical anthropology.

The dualistic nature of man gives rise to questions of value, especially moral value. I shall show that Romero's ethics rests on his theory of transcendence and that, since the spiritual act of complete objectification transcends the flawed objectification of mere intentionality, it is of greater value and, therefore, coincides with moral right.

Next I shall introduce the issues of ontology regarding the spiritual self and Romero's distinction between the human individual and the person. These efforts attempt to make clear Romero's concept of the basic human entity.

The significance of man as a spiritual being to culture is next analyzed and I show the role of "spiritual intentionality" in objective culture.

Finally, I treat several problems that I find in this portion of Romero's theory and offer my criticisms of his view of man as spiritual being.

Let us turn now to our first task--the clarification of spirit. The term "spirit" in Romero's writings is used exclusively in reference to man. It has no other denotation. Although he uses such expressions as "promise of the spirit" and "coming of the spirit" they are devoid of otherworldly implication. As Solomon Lipp observed: "For Romero, the concept 'spirit' does not partake of the supernatural, mysterious character. 'Spirit' is human, peculiarly human."<sup>1</sup>

In Theory of Man Romero divides his exposition of spirit into three parts, a division which I shall find useful here. These divisions are: (1) the general identification of spirit in terms of the natural man and mere intentionality, (2) the place of the spiritual in reality, and (3) the unique, specific characteristics of spirit. I shall take up first the general identification of spirit.

It is more accurate in explicating Romero's meaning of spirit to speak of "spiritual intentionality," or "the spiritual act," or even "the spiritual man" than to speak of "spirit" as though it were a substantial reality with an existence of its own. "Spiritual" is a modification, a correction, of mere intentionality. To state the matter clearly: the acts of mere intentionality are acts whose objectification is incomplete, marred by subjective regress, whereas the acts of spiritual intentionality exhibit intentionality completed--objectification without a flaw.

For this reason, I believe the tendency to translate Romero's references to espíritu in Theory of Man as "the spirit" is misleading. I confess that on occasion it is difficult to avoid some sentence constructions that encourage unwarranted emphasis. At other places, however, the translation could reasonably avoid this error. A case in

point is the phrase lo psíquico intencional y lo espiritual which Cooper translates "psychical intentionality and the spirit."<sup>2</sup> A more parallel structure is desirable, such as "the psychic intentional and the spiritual." This at least has the advantage of refusing to introduce an apparent substantialization of spirit which is not in keeping with Romero's views.

I maintain that since the term "spirit" is used by Romero to refer to a level of human intentional consciousness and to nothing more, the most profitable way of clarifying what the term has reference to is to take note of the difference between an intentional act that is not spiritual and one that is. In the former the interest taken in the object of consciousness by the subject is always related to the subject's self-interest. There is in all such acts a subjective return or regress (regreso subjetivo). The subject, whether as a separate individual or as a member of a group, relates the object to his own individual egoistic center or to that of the group with which he is identified. "The merely intentional act is characterized by its two moments: its objective projection and its subjective return [regreso subjetivo]."<sup>3</sup> It is important to insist that this "return" be recognized as a regression from "radical objectivity." In writing about the general significance of spirit in Theory of Man, Romero clearly identified the negative value of this moment of the objectifying act of mere intentionality:

The subjective return [regreso] does not emerge as a plus, but rather as a decrease in the objectifying intention. . . . What happens before the appearance of the spirit is that the objective direction, not entirely fulfilled, is delayed by a ballast that hinders its free advance. That ballast is the structure of the self as a sheaf of individual

interests. Mere intentionality, therefore, is revealed to us as something incomplete and mutilated, as an impetus of the subject toward what he is not--an impetus that later weakens and returns to the subject, bringing to it, one might say, the usable spoils of the object.<sup>4</sup>

My point here is that Romero has in the words above revealed his view of the subjective regress as precisely that--a falling back, a coming short, a weakness, as incompleteness.<sup>5</sup>

In the case of the spiritual act of consciousness there is no such return or regress. The object is identified or evaluated in and for itself and neither what it is nor the value the intentional consciousness sees in it is taken to be a function of its relation to the subject's needs or purposes. The spiritual act of consciousness is the intentional act purged of its impurity, so to speak, and thereby made most fully intentional. "In the spiritual . . . [the subjective return tendency] is suppressed, [and] what occurs is not, properly speaking, a simplification, but a purification of the act."<sup>6</sup> The term "spiritually intentional" seems to me to suggest the distinction he had in mind. "Mere intentionality" and "spiritual intentionality" are set in contrast to each other, and these two terms help to concretize the relation between the two levels of the intentional consciousness. "The spiritual act is an intentional act of a special kind"<sup>7</sup> [emphasis mine].

The constitutive elements of an act of mere intentionality and an act of spirituality are the same. The difference between the two types of intentional acts is in their respective "directionalities." The subjective return is not regarded as an element in the composition of the act as an intentional act. Instead, it is the "set" or attitude of the intentional act. Romero held that the difference between the two



sorts of acts is a formal difference rather than "material." The spiritual act is "the intentional act in which the subject yields himself to the object."<sup>8</sup> "Otherness" becomes the self's interest.

In one sense, then, their difference is small; in another sense (and Romero contended the truer sense) they are immensely dissimilar. "Radical objectivism . . . defines the purely spiritual act, . . . even a particle of the divine--nothing less--is restored in humanity."<sup>9</sup> He does not explain this use of "divine."

Romero thus did not hold that intentionality and spirit are mutually exclusive and, therefore, the following statement of Cooper's in 1967 is misleading. "In addition to intentionality, however, the spirit has an essential role in man's being. . . . The whole or complete man is constituted by this duality of intentionality and spirit."<sup>10</sup> "The spirit has [a] role" casts doubt on the nonsubstantiality of spirit and the manner in which Cooper here juxtaposes unqualified intentionality and spirit suggests that spiritual acts are not intentional acts. "The spirit" is not something "in addition to intentionality." In point of fact, it is Romero's view that the only fully intentional or objectifying act is the spiritual act.

I have shown above that spirit in Romero's philosophy is not a substantial entity. It should be evident that the term "spirit" is devoid of supernatural implications. Romero's philosophy does not provide for a transcendental will or power. Thus his is not a philosophy with a "religious posture" such as incorporating worship of a transcendental reality or a doctrine of human reconciliation to that reality. Such a philosophy, as a result, would be no longer a philosophy but a

"philosophy-religion." "Precisely because of this, those great systems of the Orient are not pure philosophies, according to our understanding, but philosophy-religions, roads of salvation established on certain intuitions or theorizations of resolute mystical predisposition."<sup>11</sup>

A philosophy does not involve itself in laying "roads of salvation" nor devise its views in terms of a "resolute mystical predisposition."

However, some philosophers have posited an Absolute without committing themselves to a reverential or worshipful attitude toward that absolute reality. Notable among these, it seemed to Romero, were the German idealists.

Romero confronted squarely the quest of whether to postulate a transcendent being in his philosophy and decided firmly against it. One of the most direct statements he made on the issue was in Philosophy of the Person (Filosofía de la persona).

Let us not risk the supposition that an obscure purpose, innate in the cosmos, or a transcendent will, desires to carry forward the individualization, to produce individualities that would be each time more right, more complete and exacting. We will not venture that supposition, not even in the character of a hypothesis. But the fact is that everything occurs as if such a purpose existed.<sup>12</sup>

He found such a postulate neither logically necessary nor systematically helpful.

I have taken some pains to establish the non-religious position taken by Romero in order to avoid faulty interpretations on points that lie ahead in our exposition of man as spirit. The remaining issue in the general identification of spiritual intentionality, before the traits of spirit are investigated, is its place in reality. This requires treatment of some of the basic notions in Romero's metaphysics.<sup>13</sup>

Romero sees reality as a dualism of nature and spirit. Nature is divided into the physical, the vital, and the psychical. Mere intentionality belongs to the realm of the psychical and therefore to nature. Spirit is a new ontological level of reality and is undivided.

Romero's metaphysics is thus a four-level ontology: The physical, the living, the psychic intentional, and the spiritual. The intentional portion of the psychical and all of the spiritual compose the entirety of intentionality and can be referred to respectively as the levels of mere intentionality or psychical intentionality and spiritual intentionality. These terms apply only to man--the first to natural man, the second to spiritual man or man as spirit.

Spiritual intentionality stands over against the three levels of nature and, like the others, comes to be in the course of time. It is a product of temporality in the same sense that mere intentionality and biological life are temporal products. It is neither an ever-present constituent of reality nor a transcendental factor that enters the temporal development of the world from outside.


In almost all cases Romero employs the term "natural" in reference to the realm of nature in reality. However, at one point in reference to spiritual intentionality he uses the term "natural" in an ordinary, nontechnical sense. He asserts that once reality has produced intentional acts--that is, once consciousness has been achieved and objectification has occurred in the temporal process--it is "natural" (that is, in the "nature" of things) that spiritual intentionality should supervene.<sup>14</sup> This imprecise use of the term is certainly an equivocation, but one that is readily understood.

It is evident by now that the term "spiritual" in Romero's philosophy of man does not denote as extensive a field of consciousness, acts, and productions, as it does in some other leading philosophies of man, such as Dilthey's. Thus the dualism of nature and spirit that coincides with the latter's distinction between the natural sciences and the sciences of the human spirit is not the same dualism as Romero's, despite the identical terms. Dilthey's denotation of "spirit" would embrace Romero's spheres of both mere intentionality and spiritual intentionality.


Throughout the arrangement of reality there is an impetus which Romero most commonly calls "transcendence" and which he describes as the "positive element of reality."<sup>15</sup> Each level is the foundation of the next. Every level emerges from the preceding one, and, by virtue of being a new structure, surpasses it. As the arrangement of reality is traced from the physical or inorganic to the final level of the spiritual there is an increase of transcendence, for as one after another of the four stages is surpassed there is more of reality produced and transcended. The level of life exhibits a transcendence or surpassing merely of the physical, whereas at the last level in the order the spiritual is a transcendence of all three preceding levels.

Man alone as spirit incorporates all the ontological levels of reality. He is physical and subject to the laws of the physical realm of reality; he is a living being of the vital realm; he is the sole occupant of the intentional realm; and, finally, he alone transcends all these to become the unique spiritual being in all of reality. He is the bridge that unites the natural and the spiritual.<sup>16</sup>


For Romero "History is a march from nature to spirit."<sup>17</sup> The process of reality is a movement toward the goal of "humanization." It appears that when once the spiritual level has been achieved there are no "additional" realms to be introduced and future advances must be in terms of a growing "colonization" of reality by the spiritual intentionality. The following diagram from Theory of Man will illustrate the "sections of reality."<sup>18</sup>



But reality may be schematized also in terms of the types of entities that compose it; so Romero classified the entities constituting reality in terms of genus and species. Although he did not consider the results exhaustive, he contended that such an effort would help to illustrate some of his ideas. Notably missing from the schema of "real entities" are the objects of culture. The two genera of entities are the spatio-temporal, comprising the organic and the inorganic levels, and the solely temporal which includes the intentional in both its nonspiritual and spiritual dimensions. As reality progresses toward the spiritual, there is an increase of freedom and a decrease of "mathematical determinism."<sup>19</sup> The path of transcendence from the inorganic to the spiritual is the path of increasing freedom and decreasing determinism.



However, reality is only a part of totality. Some objects do not belong to reality. Again cautioning that his classification is not exhaustive, but rather "imperfect and provisional," Romero offers a schema of the totality of objects.<sup>20</sup> It is a tentative outline or "classification of objectivities." A complete classification of all objects constituting totality must include, at least, those objects that are real, those that are ideal, and those concerned with metaphysical values. In the first of these (the real) are included the temporal-spatial objects such as physical bodies and living beings as well as the temporal-nonspatial-sensible objectivities such as psychical intentionality and spirit. The ideal objects are mathematical entities, essences, and relations. Metaphysical values are the objectively real and discernible degrees of transcendence possessed by any part of reality.



The schemata are an aid to an understanding of the relation Romero's theory of man has to his metaphysical views and they offer some assistance in understanding the place of man in reality. Although his philosophy of man and his metaphysics are not logically dependent there are some ideas, such as transcendence, central to both. As to man's place in reality, it is clear that full humanity is the ultimate achievement of the transcending impetus.

At every level, transcendence is important to the being of an entity. "The series physical body, living being, psyche, spirit, exhibits an increase of transcendence, and this increase becomes the maximum possible in the spirit."<sup>21</sup> "Even if only provisionally, we may put forward this thesis: to be is to transcend."<sup>22</sup> That is, the nature of reality is such that any entity survives only by means of changing--proceeding beyond its present identity. Its being depends upon its development in accordance with the expansion of reality. Failure to transcend is counter to the nature of reality and is, therefore, opposed to true being.

There are unsolved problems in Romero's diagrams depicting reality, the classes of real entities, and the totality of objects. It is not at all clear just how entities at the physical level are transcending themselves. Of course, Romero does not contend that they are presently doing so. The theory is that the class of living beings may be accounted for by regarding them as a transcendence of mere physical existence. Living beings are physical entities but they are much more. They incorporate all that is physical but, in addition, exhibit a new structure. Life as a new ontological level "colonizes" the physical--to use Romero's term. That is to say, while possessing all that

is necessary to physical entities, the level of life proliferates its new structure throughout much of the merely physical world, thereby extending a new dimension to reality. A similar colonization occurs at each of the two remaining levels of reality as transcendence continues. When illustrating transcendence, however, Romero prefers to speak of the more advanced stages of reality rather than of the physical. Thus the manner in which a physical object may be said to transcend itself is not at all clear. It can, however, be said that its transcendence is minimal. It shows the greatest tendency toward immanence or particularism of any level of reality.

Romero insists that there is an increase of transcendence as each successive stage in reality is reached. The vital, he claims, is more transcendent than the physical, the psychic intentional more transcendent than the vital, and the level of spirit represents the ultimate transcendence. I find no difficulty in speaking of "more transcendent" or "less transcendent," but I do confess to being disturbed by the quantitative implication of "more transcendence" and "less transcendence." The reason for Romero's contention, however, is that as the various stages are reached there is more of reality colonized so that man as spirit is colonizing all levels--the physical, vital, and psychical. Thus, it may be said that spiritual intentionality is engaged in colonizing all the other levels of reality and is therefore "more transcendent" than all the others.

The place occupied by spiritual intentionality in the whole of reality and in the class of real entities is evident from the first two schemata above. In addition, Romero's effort to account for all the objectivities in the schema representing totality reveals that the



objects of consciousness, whether spiritual or nonspiritual, include much more than the real. They include ideal and metaphysical objectifications, as well.

If the process of transcending ends in spiritual projection to essence and value, this is not because it becomes fixed in a higher type of immanent structure [i.e. "possible transcendences in so far as they are not realized"] but because it has reached its degree of absolute purity, because no more transcendence is possible, because the given being has become resolved into transcendence, with no remainder. The final structure spirit-value, far from making up another immanence, is the formula of total transcendence; the personal center as unity and auto-consciousness of spiritual acts is not a moment of immanence, but consciousness of and will to transcendence, as well as the indispensable condition if transcendence is to be an effective act and not an abrogation or dissolution.<sup>23</sup>

The relations between the ontological levels from the mere physical to the fully spiritual are such that the higher (more transcendent) in each adjacent pair of ontological levels may be said to be supported by the previous level. That is to say, for example, in reference to the relation between mere intentionality and spiritual intentionality, that the former is the necessary condition of the latter. Spirit uses mere intentionality and thus the preceding structure supports the succeeding one. As a structuralist, Romero rejected the idea that the preceding level is the "absolute determination" of the succeeding one or that the succeeding level could be reduced to the preceding one. Thus, he opposed both mechanism and reductionism. Mistakenly, "the spirit is said to be only psyche (psychologism), the psyche in turn to be only life (biologism), and life could be resolved into a particular complication of the physical (materialism)."<sup>24</sup> Such reductionisms seemed to Romero to result from a failure to give proper place to transcendence and the structural nature of reality.

Thus far the present chapter has concentrated on (1) the general idea of the spiritual level in reality as it compares with and is related to that of mere intentionality and (2) the place of man in reality. We shall now identify the specific characteristics Romero attributes to the spiritual level. It will be convenient to speak at times of "spirit," but it must be remembered that the term designates nothing more than the level of "intentionality made spiritual." Romero often used the Spanish el espíritu, so my practice here is in keeping with his and should be acceptable so long as the meaning of the term is remembered.

In all there are seven characterizing traits of spiritual intentionality: absolute objectivity, universality, freedom, unity, historicity, responsibility, and absolute (final) transcendence. The first six are considered to be relatively equal in importance. The seventh, however, is the "essential trait" of spiritual intentionality. None are properties existing apart from spiritual intentionality and its acts; they are expressions of the character of the spiritual act.

Spirit<sup>25</sup> possesses among its traits absolute objectivity. Although Romero's word here is objetividad, the meaning is clearer if it is translated "objectification." In an act that expresses absolute objectification the subject regards the object with a "disinterested interest" and acknowledges its "otherness." Spiritual knowledge is concerned with the object insofar as it exists in its own right. The object is not merely presented to consciousness; the spiritual intentionality affirms the object as well as its autonomous character. In this affirmation the intentional act avoids all subjective return.

Furthermore, the absolutely objective intentional subject objectifies himself as he does others. However, the self is not denied or eradicated. "The spiritual subject does not deny itself; rather it recognizes in itself an objectivity parallel to others. It is doubtlessly concerned with itself, but only as its being and meaning are conceived objectively."<sup>26</sup> That is, the spiritual subject regards its being and meaning in the same objective manner it does any other subject's being and meaning, without a subjective return.

Universality as a trait of spirit is a function of thoroughgoing, unqualified or, as Romero calls it, absolute objectification. Egoistic particularism is annulled; the subject finds a new vitality resulting from deliverance from the immanence indigenous to particularism. He is open to reality and reality is open to him. Romero finds fault in attempts at universality through a fusing of the spiritual subject with reality in a mystical union of identity. In such efforts

the subject, in being projected toward reality, attempts to empty himself into it, to be assimilated in it, but in the attempt he is shipwrecked by reality and disappears as a subject. Hereby the spiritual instance, [instant], which is absolute transcendence, is annulled; it becomes one with a reality lifted above natural particularism only through spirituality. In the order of reality, universality is obtained only by the spiritual subject; and when his thrust is exhausted in the identifying purpose, he is annulled as spirit, and reality is deprived of the universal moment that the spirit alone brings to it.<sup>27</sup>

The universal moment as an experience of intentionality is lost if the spiritual subject is eradicated. Mystical union is a meaningless effort to achieve universality. Romero takes this position toward the idea of mystical union with reality because even the momentary loss of the subject contradicts experience as an intentional act.

This impetus toward universality by the spiritualized human intentionality moves toward ultimacy or finality in all areas, including knowledge, ethics, and aesthetics. This "universality of projection" is an expression of spiritual intentionality; it is the spiritual man's native air. He strives to know all things fully in all their relations, he strains to inaugurate and spread a perfect ethical order, to establish beauty in every part of the earth.

Freedom as a trait of the spiritual man is a "setting free, with respect to a determined constriction, that of the requirements of the natural order."<sup>28</sup> It is a transcendence of individual interests and incentives. The natural, especially exhibited in man as mere intentionality with its subjective return, is a bondage; and the setting free or movement toward increasing freedom is accomplished in direct proportion to the degree to which spiritual intentionality spreads in the life and acts of the individual. The subject performing as spirit is no longer restricted by the immanence of nature's particularism and selfbound regression. As the spiritual dimension grows, freedom advances; but, in light of the necessity for the natural dimension to remain in man, there is no absolute freedom.

Romero confessed his inability to decide whether the "autocratic rule" of spirit is "determined by a rigorous necessity: or whether it eludes all strict determination."<sup>29</sup> It can only be said that the freedom he postulates is a "setting free" that is requisite to absolute objectification and a reaching for universality in all things.

An additional mark of spiritual intentionality is the unity of the subject with its act and with all other spiritual acts and their subjects. Unity as a spiritual trait is expressed in both these

relations. There is no such unity in mere intentionality. In practical, social, and political relationships formed by the non-spiritualized subjective center there is always a marked pluralism, "a fundamental divergence," in the acts of mere intentionality, which breeds conflict as a result of each subject's referring the intentional object back to himself. In nonspiritual intentionality there is a failure of unity both between the subject and his acts and between the subject and other objectivizing subjects. Whenever mere intentionality forms a "we" it is always a particularized, or factional, union marked by a failure to relate freely and objectively to any other "we."

Unity has been variously interpreted, Romero said, by philosophers both past and present. In Socrates it "consisted primarily in showing the identity of the concepts and the norms grasped by reason"<sup>30</sup>--a unity for which he contended against the "sophistic skeptics." In Plato it is given support "through contemplation of the immutable world of ideas"<sup>31</sup> and his contention that all souls are "equally suited to perceiving"<sup>32</sup> the ideal world. In Aristotle the idea of unity is seen in the notion of the active intellect. Out of this Averroës draws his doctrine of "literal or numerical unity in the conception of the one intellect, a single spiritual entity that hovers above individuals and makes possible in them the superior forms of knowledge."<sup>33</sup> In addition, some Christian speculators have contributed to an interpretation of unity in their concept of God as holding a vision of all the ideas. According to Romero, the development of the a priori in modern philosophy has contributed more to the idea of unity than has any other recent notion. "One might say that in Kant one can conceive of the one subject, a supra-individual complex of forms or

norms that is imposed on individual subjects and is a central part of each one."<sup>34</sup>

Although some of Romero's historical examples of unity illustrate the idea that the subjects of spiritual acts "come together and feel completely linked together"<sup>35</sup> others exemplify the unity between the subject and its act. Those spiritual acts in which the sense of unity with the subject is probably the greatest and most obvious are,

for example, when the objective demands of reason, the strict rules of logic, the incontrovertible evidence of mathematics are obeyed, or when fundamental ethical postulates are recognized. In such cases, the subjects, compelled by objectivity, feel as if they coincide completely in their acts.<sup>36</sup>

The reference to the "incontrovertible evidence of mathematics" as a positive example of the subject's identifying with the object of his intentionality is merely an instance given by Romero in his phenomenological analysis of unity. Romero's position that spiritual entities exhibit a maximum of freedom and a minimum of "mathematical determinism" is an ontological position and is not incompatible with his use of mathematics as an exemplification of spiritual unity. His point, however, could have been made without the use of such a problematical illustration.

In Theory of Man Romero gives more space to the explanation of unity than to any other one trait of spirit, with the exception of absolute transcendence. In summing up unity he asks what the metaphysical significance of the trait might be and answers:

. . . one might risk the following hypothesis. Reality, which is one with respect to logical or historical priority, is divided and diversified in a process of particularization. The partial instances, as they increase in their particularism, at the same time gradually

open up to totality, leaning toward it without neglecting the individual foci that are being constituted, in such a way that simultaneously the individuality is purified and the striving for totality is intensified. An animal, for example, is more an individual than a plant, and it is also more open to reality. In the spiritual individual this double process comes to a close because it achieves maximum individuation, and correspondingly it becomes completely open to totality. In the spirit, totality experiences a reëncounter and a recognition of itself, coming to possess itself in terms of consciousness. Suppositions of this kind are not rare in the history of philosophy; and with adequate modification, they serve as different interpretations of the whole.<sup>37</sup>

It is evident from all that Romero has said on the subject that unity is open to a variety of interpretations. It is an identification the subject feels with its intentional object and with all other intentionalizing subjects. It is on the one hand the sense of identity that one gets with the object when doing mathematics or logic or, for that matter, in the commitment to axiomatic ethical postulates. It is also the closure between the single spiritualizing subject and all other such subjects.

Historicity is a characteristic of spirit. That is, spirit comes to be in time. Individual acts, however, do not undergo a temporal process so as to become spiritual acts by degrees. There is an absoluteness concerning whether an act, either cognitive or behavioral, is spiritual. Each act as a whole expresses either mere intentionality or spirituality. There are no degrees in this respect. However, it is Romero's position that in the temporal development of the subject that becomes spiritual, and probably all men do, there is that occasion on which the dimension of spirit first occurs in an act of consciousness. Furthermore, there is growth in spirituality for a subject and for a culture as well. In any subject or culture there may be a numerical

increase in spiritual acts. There is increased awareness of the value of spiritual acts over merely psychical (non-spiritual) intentional ones and in some subjects and cultures an increasing commitment to the spiritual level of intentionality. That spirit has historicity as one of its traits is simply to say, then, that it is achieved and developed in time..

Responsibility characterizes spirit. "The responsibility of the subject to himself as a spiritual subject, as a person, presupposes responsibility to other persons conceived as entities of equal worth."<sup>38</sup> The spiritual subject shows a sense of responsibility not merely toward any detriment or flaw it finds in itself but also toward whatever it sees as deficient or as that-which-should-not-be in the world about it.

It is as if every violation of spiritual demands is the subject's fault, remote though the violation may be from the subject who experiences this feeling. The spiritual subject feels himself to be the bearer of a supreme and universal principle that he accepts as justified and responsible, and he suffers when he ascertains that this principle has not succeeded. In every spiritual attitude there is the impression of an unlimited responsibility, because the command to take charge of totality, to be the meaning of totality, and to carry out complete spiritual colonization, is inherent in the spirit.<sup>39</sup>

For man to experience responsibility in this sense is for him to feel the most intensive and extensive sense of obligation.

These, then, with the exception of absolute transcendence, are the traits of spirit and Romero points out that self-transcendence is not included. Max Scheler and others are incorrect in attributing self-consciousness to spirit. The division Romero makes between mere intentionality and spiritual intentionality will not permit such an attribution, since self-consciousness occurs also in mere intentionality. Nevertheless, self-consciousness changes from the natural to the



spiritual. Self-consciousness without spirit is egoistic and thereby is diametrically opposed to what spiritual intentionality represents. Spiritual intentionality, even in acts of self-consciousness, either tends to be or is totality-conscious. Although mere intentionality may be self-aware, only "spiritual self-consciousness . . . is consciousness of a self in spiritual relation to the whole."<sup>40</sup>

Spiritual self-consciousness is

the self-possession of the center of objectively directed acts, understood as a focus whose incomparable value derives not from the more or less suspicious secrets of the so-called "inner life" but from the clean spiritual life that is a generous acceptance of all that is. From this comes the material for an intimacy in which the objective and the subjective are two sides of the same coin.<sup>41</sup>

The final and most significant trait of spiritual intentionality is absolute transcendence--transcendence completed or fulfilled. This is "the essential trait" of spiritual intentionality. The term does not suggest, however, accomplishment of complete universality or freedom or responsibility. In spiritual intentionality the transcending impetus of reality achieves the final ontological level. The goal of the world's process is humanization and the spiritual level is the final step toward humanization.

We have seen that transcendence is "the positive element of reality in Romero's metaphysics."<sup>42</sup> He also states that "the truth of being is transcendence."<sup>43</sup> He chose the term "transcendence" because it

seems to side step accusations of partiality [a charge to which Bergson's *elan vital* seemed vulnerable] and to have the indispensable breadth needed to include all events. . . . The monism of transcendence is diversified in the pluralism of the different rules of transcendence, according to the four orders of reality.<sup>44</sup>

This monistic impetus enters its final stage in spiritual intentionality--the last of the four levels of reality. In man as spirit transcendence has reached its highest ontological level.

All the other traits of spiritual intentionality are consequences of total or absolute transcendence. "In the spiritual act, transcendence works without obstacles or limitations: its strength yields to no opposition."<sup>45</sup> The level of absolute transcendence is contrasted with the limited levels of transcendence. Romero insists, "we must distinguish here between restricted and total transcendence, between a transcendence that later becomes immanent [as in the subjective regress of the acts of mere intentionality] and a pure or spiritual transcendence."<sup>46</sup>

It seems fair to ask what the future of reality is in light of the claim that the "positive element" of reality has reached its "highest possible attainment." With no "sleeping transcendences" to be awakened--no new structures forthcoming--what will the future be? One can only respond that increasing proliferation of the evidences of absolute transcendence--exhibited in spiritual activities--is expected by Romero. A new day has dawned with spiritual man, but that dawn has only faintly broken the gloom of a world wrapped in particularism, self-interest, and immanentism. Spirit has scarcely begun the colonization or gradual domination of mere intentionality. The possibilities for the expansion and expression of spiritual being are enormous. But those possibilities do not include a new level of ontology.

In light of the idea of absolute transcendence as the essential trait of spiritual intentionality and of the direct correlation between transcendence and freedom in Romero's philosophy, I wish to raise the

issue of absolute freedom. "Transcendence is always a setting free and, in its turn, freedom is a mode or an aspect of transcendence."<sup>47</sup> Individuals of the intentional order are more free than those of the organic order. Furthermore, the characteristics of spirit reveal, also, that the spiritual order is one of greater freedom than that of mere intentionality. Since there is a positive correlation between transcendence and freedom, one might surmise that absolute transcendence ushers in absolute freedom as well. That position, however, Romero rejects.

The parallelism between freedom and transcendence is evident: to the partial transcendence of the merely intentional act corresponds a partial freedom; and to the absolute transcendence of the spiritual act corresponds an obviously greater freedom, because all natural compulsions have been suppressed. We do not wish to designate this freedom as absolute, since, as we have seen previously, we have no desire to include in this discussion the difficult topic of freedom in its ultimate metaphysical reaches.<sup>48</sup>

Having presented the human spirit as an intentional consciousness of a high order, along with its traits, I must now show that being fully human requires both mere intentionality and spiritual intentionality--both nature and spirit.<sup>49</sup> "Duality is the constitutive event of the complete man."<sup>50</sup> "The fundamental characteristic of man . . . is not spirituality nor naturalness [naturalidad], but 'duality,' a militant duality, in which one element, the natural, is more ancient and hard, and the other, spirit, more recent and fragile."<sup>51</sup> The short-term advantage seems to reside with the natural, but Romero held that the future belongs to the spiritual. Yet man remains necessarily a composite of the two. There is no wholly spiritual person and, for that matter, probably no entirely natural man either. Complete humanity requires a homeostasis between the two.

We exclude the possibility of a purely spiritual man. In his fullness, man is a dual, composite being. His integrity demands the confluence of mere intentionality and of the spirit, and there is no true humanity without the mixture of these two components and the tension that grows between them, even to the point that the most characteristic aspect of man does not stem from one or the other of these elements, but from their dual indwelling within the human unity.<sup>52</sup>

An analysis of Romero's value theory is outside the scope of the present work, but, in light of his dualistic theory of man, some attention to his axiology is called for, especially as it relates to his moral philosophy. Let us first note the basis on which his general theory of value rests and then see how this applies to his ethical theory.

How does one decide what value is, according to Romero?

"Value is the degree of transcendence and therefore the degree of the actual reality of being."<sup>53</sup> Being is actualizing itself throughout the ascending levels of the physical, vital, mere (or psychical) intentionality, and spiritual intentionality. The degree of transcendence is invariably on the increase as the ascending stages are achieved. Failure to actualize possible transcendent capabilities is a disvalue, called "immanence" by Romero, and such "can be considered as that kernel of transcendent acts which have not been actualized and are held in reserve."<sup>54</sup> Thus value is measured by transcendence.

A value may be either spiritual or nonspiritual. Spiritual values are absolute or ultimate in that there are no higher values. Nonspiritual values are relative in that they "allow for degrees and nuances in magnitude and dignity that, regardless of the grade they attain, never equal the magnitude and dignity of absolute values."<sup>55</sup>

Since he makes no provision for degrees of absolute objectivity the position Romero espouses appears to be that all spiritual acts are

expressions of absolute value. The "degrees and nuances in magnitude and dignity" that are applicable to relative values are not applied to absolute value. The essential problem of this position is its failure to offer a basis on which one spiritually intentional act can be judged as more valuable than another. Such difficulties as this surely account in part for Romero's failure to publish his Ética.

Since transcendence is the measure of value it follows that value is not subjective. The degree of value corresponds to the degree of transcendence. It is in this sense that transcendence is the determinant of value and it is apprehended

by means of special emotional acts. We therefore accept the objectivity of value yet restrict its reference to the metaphysical structure of what is, and, likewise, we accept the apprehension of value through feeling and not through the intellect, a position taken by many eminent writers on value.<sup>56</sup>

In Romero's theory of moral value there are two additional points that must be made. The first is that absolute ethical value can apply only to spiritual acts and persons, since "full ethical activity . . . is personal because only a person is capable of fully transcendent acts . . . ." <sup>57</sup> It is the intention of the act that constitutes its ethical value.

The second point, somewhat subsidiary to the first, is that the ethical value of an institution, custom, or law cannot rest on the basis of intention. The moral worth of these "does not depend on the intentions that created them, but on their inherent structure and meaning, on their objective insertion in the ethical order, on their ethical adequacy and efficiency." <sup>58</sup>

There is no enigma here if one remembers that the important thing in the act from the point of view of

value is the intention; and the important thing in what is produced and objectified is the proper consistency of the product and not the intentions of the producer, since his intentions are necessarily set aside when there is complete objectification and when the product takes on its own meaning.<sup>59</sup>

"The act transcends in accord with its intention and the objectification ["product"] transcends to the extent that it is adequate to its purpose."<sup>60</sup> Just how the purpose or meaning of an institution or law may be determined apart from the intention of its creators or sustainers is not at all clear.

Finally, transcendence as the measurement of value provides a categorical imperative in Romero's ethics: "Act in such a way that the direction of your act accords with the essential direction of reality."<sup>61</sup> And, of course, reality's essential direction is from particularism to universality, from individual subjectivism to superlative objectivity, from various degrees of partiality to totality. Whether the act is an expression of conscious and reflective duty ("the ethic of effort") or, on the contrary, springs forth spontaneously (the ethic of "grace") is of small consequence as a value determinant. "In our opinion, the only thing that is decisive is the intention clearly supporting transcendence."<sup>62</sup>

Romero contends that "strictly speaking, absolute obligation is toward a spiritual subject, toward the spiritual face of man."<sup>63</sup> Romero's position, Martin Buber notwithstanding, is that the most desirable human relationship is not in terms of "I-Thou," but "I-Him." The "thou" of the "I-Thou" relation tends to be defined in terms of the relation it has with the "I" and, hence, it is somewhat informed by the subject's egoism. Only when the "thou" becomes objectified as a "him"

is transcendence complete in the relationship and the genuinely disinterested attitude achieved. The "him" is "an 'I' that is not related to our own self in any particular concrete relation."<sup>64</sup> By the same token, the "I" is ethical in the fullest sense only when one turns to his own "I" as he would to any other as a "him." ". . . the spiritual or absolute ethical quality demands the changing of the 'other,' of the 'thou,' [and] of 'myself' to 'him.'"<sup>65</sup>

Throughout his published works Romero avoided a thorough treatment of ethics and, for that matter, of general value theory. The most he wrote on either of the subjects is to be found in Theory of Man, and it is from that material that I have drawn in the preceding paragraphs. It is surely clear that the ethical man is the spiritual man and that the extent to which one is ethical is dependent upon the extent to which one's acts are correlated with the essential transcending character of reality. Even though "the transition from nonspiritual to spiritual interest is a 'conversion' in the full sense of the word,"<sup>66</sup> there is, nevertheless, no such thing as entirely putting off all the works of "the old man." In terms of nature and spirit, being human is an incurable duality.

In the previous chapter I established that for Romero the self as the "subject" of intentionality is "something that lives and is modified through living, as an essentially historical being."<sup>67</sup> He considered the human self "a concrete reality that lives and develops historically."<sup>68</sup> This explicit language, together with the theories of the self Romero rejected (see Chapter II, footnote 43), sufficiently reveals that his ontology of the self is a substantialist theory. What I need now to make clear is the view Romero held concerning the

spiritual self. He offers the following statement of his position:

In functioning as the agent of [the spiritual] act, the subject does not change in what we might call his subjective makeup but rather in his implantation within reality, in his meaning, in his posture or attitude. One cannot say, however, that for the subject the spiritual state is only a mode of working and not a mode of being, because the subject is constituted by his acts, and what he is depends on the character of his acts, with reference both to actuality and to acquired habit.<sup>69</sup>

Although there is no change in the "subjective makeup" when the subject becomes spiritual there is an important terminological distinction made by Romero here. He uses "individual" to refer to the human being as the agent of nonspiritual acts. "Person" is the spiritual subject. Thus the term "natural individual" may be used for emphasis in reference to the human agent of solely non-spiritual activities. However, the term "person" in Romero's vocabulary is reserved for reference to the agent of the act of full objectification, of the spiritual act.

Thus the individual and the person are the two poles of the human duality. Their relationship in any given human being is such that the individual may be considered an actor and the person the role he enacts or character he becomes. But being a person is no pretense--the individual takes on the character of the person. The person "is a role we [as individuals] carry out, a direction outlined in advance, a succession of foreseen or foreseeable attitudes [or intentions]."<sup>70</sup> The individual and the person "embody our double nature, the common human condition, in which one pole [the individual] affirms the empirical individuality and the vital contingency, and the other [the person] the love of value and of the absolute."<sup>71</sup>



I wish especially to emphasize here that "person" in Romero's sense of the term does not identify an entity separate from the individual.

The person is the spiritual individual. It is not substance, nor is it an entity of which acts are the manifestation or consequence; it is activity, pure actuality. The person is but the whole of spiritual acts in every subject, but that whole is rigorously unitary, of such manner that the person is manifested to us at the same time as a complex of spiritual attitudes, and as the ideal center from which those attitudes radiate.<sup>72</sup>

Now that spirit has been identified and its traits explained, what difference does it make in objective culture? It will be remembered that for Romero spirit is not essential to the initial production of culture; that natural man produces cultural objectifications. Nevertheless the proximity of spiritualized culture to segments of purely natural culture results in a spiritualizing influence on the latter.

In principle, there is no absurdity in a cultural creation deprived of the spiritual ingredient, and in effect, there are sectors of human culture that appear to have little or nothing that appears as spirit. A mere subjectively centered psychic activity is sufficient for explicating certain zones or achievements of objective culture . . . [but] it is probable that the cultural zones that privately are constituted without interference of spirit, receive an indirect spiritual influence inasmuch as they are necessarily integrated into the total human culture, because in this entirety nothing is found from which spirit is absent.<sup>73</sup>

Since "spirit" in Romero's philosophy means "spiritual intentionality," our concern here must also be with the effect of this level of intentionality on the creative process by which the products of objective culture are brought into being. Since the act of spiritual intentionality has no subjective regress in which the object is referred

back to the needs and ambitions of the subject, it appears that objects conceived and produced by spiritual man are created and affirmed in their own right--in and for themselves.

In addition, whether or not a cultural object has been produced by a human creator at the level of mere intentionality or of spiritual intentionality it may be considered, nevertheless, in a spiritual manner by men or cultures. As individual men and cultures become spiritual objective culture is both produced and regarded in accordance with the traits of spirit.

Furthermore, it is apparent that spiritual intentionality must be chiefly responsible for both the production and experience of aesthetic objects as such. Objects viewed aesthetically are regarded with a "disinterested interest," which is a term Romero uses in connection with complete objectification.

The effect of spiritual intentionality on cultural products such as tools and other utilitarian objects, which Romero treats in his explanations of objective culture, is not at all obvious since these objects are brought about by the immediate and individual needs of men. And these are, of course, cultural objects. There likely is no difficulty in understanding that an attitude of full objectivity might be accorded such objects once they are created, but their creation requires attention to the "immediate interests" and "practical considerations" for which they are produced. Such interests in the object seem necessarily marks of mere intentionality. Thus, insofar as utilitarian objects are created not for themselves but rather for what they can do, it is unlikely that such cultural objectifications result from the spiritual intentionality. Thus some cultural objects are less susceptible to "spiritualizing" than others.

I have attempted in this chapter to give an accurate and comprehensive analysis of man as spirit. Before summarizing the chapter, I wish to discuss some of the questions and problems of Romero's idea of man as spirit. One scholar of Latin American philosophy has raised three questions which I believe require attention:

1. What is the origin of the spirit? 2. Why is there an oscillation in each person between spirit and mere intentionality? 3. Does the spiritual act appear suddenly, without cause?<sup>74</sup> As to the first question, one had as well ask the origin of mere intentionality as to inquire into the origin of spirit for, as we have seen, spirit is simply "spiritual intentionality." If the question is intended to inquire into the means by which mere intentionality is able to become spiritual then one must reply that Romero is content to affirm that such is the case and that it is natural. He no more undertakes to explain the "how" of this than he undertakes to give an account of how the physical yields the living, or the living the psychical. The general explanation is in terms of structuralism. As has been shown, the term "spirit" refers to a function, a level of activity, a class of specific and unique workings of the intentional psyche. This being the case, it would appear that no explanation is really possible as to the origin of spirit other than to say that it is in the nature of reality to perfect the objectifying capacity of intentionality once it has occurred in the imperfect form expressed by mere intentionality.

Let us look at the second question: Why is there an oscillation in each person between spirit and mere intentionality? Romero's theory of man maintains that human nature is incurably dualistic. Romero

regards the dualism as not only descriptively accurate but normative as well; i.e., every person necessarily is and ought to be a duality of nature and spirit. According to Romero spirituality is necessarily intermittent. The question at hand apparently is why Romero holds this position as the necessary human condition. However, to maintain otherwise would be to treat the relationship between the two highest ontological levels of reality differently from all the others. As has been shown, each succeeding level in reality colonizes the level immediately prior to it--it does not destroy it. It does, however, "populate" it with its own characteristics and gradually succeeds in dominating it. Romero expected that this would be the case in regards to the long-range superiority of spiritual intentionality over mere intentionality. This seems to be a sufficient reason--that of a consistent theory of reality--for declaring the impossibility of a thoroughly spiritual person, and the necessity for a duality which intermittently expresses both types of intentional acts.

The third question in this series is concerned with whether or not spiritual acts occur "without cause." Solomon Lipp suggests that Romero has failed to provide an account of the causal antecedents of the spiritual act and that that failure is a "vulnerable spot in the impressive edifice erected by Romero in his attempt to combat the deterministic thesis which denies freedom to man."<sup>75</sup>

I agree that the explanation concerning what causes spiritual acts to occur is not given in Romero's philosophy. Neither does he attempt to relate the causes for the emergence of life or psychological intentionality on the preceding levels of reality. Such matters are not problems of philosophy although explanations regarding these issues

may produce such problems. It is my opinion that Romero is, indeed, intent on describing each level of reality within the framework of his theory and shows little inclination to defend or justify his theory. This is a general weakness in his writings. As to why intentionality develops into acts that are entirely without subjective return, Romero merely says that once there is imperfect objectification, it is in the nature of things that it be perfected. It appears to me that the insistence on a causal explanation of rudimentary intentionality is much more to the point. However, even that lies outside the province of philosophy.

The charge has been made that Romero failed to achieve a complete system in his philosophy and that this failure is especially evident in his not developing "an explanatory principle to account for the activities of transcendence or of regression into immanence."<sup>76</sup> To the general complaint that there is an incompleteness in his philosophy Romero would doubtless plead guilty, for it is in the nature of his philosophical method that such should be the case. Although I contend that there is a growing synthesis in his work, I am aware that he never arrived at an architectonic completeness. However, the present criticism is chiefly concerned with the absence in Romero's philosophy of an all-embracing principle of explanation which would supply both a criterion for predicting instances of transcendence as well as of immanence and a means of identifying them as they occur at various ontological levels. The problem thus stated is involved with sweeping metaphysical concerns. Since the issue has to do with all levels of reality it is not suitable to attempt a response merely in terms of how a spiritual act may be recognized. The question, put simply, is "How

does one decide the degree to which a 'thing' is transcendent or immanent?" Since the value of anything depends on its degree of transcendence and, further, since the recognition of value is by means of an "emotional act" or intuition, it follows that transcendence and immanence are discerned in this manner. There are no empirical sense data or chain of deductive analyses that will reveal the transcendence or immanence with which any particular thing is endowed. The problem posed here is not solved by Romero. He does insist, of course, that both transcendence and immanence are objective characteristics of concrete things, although he confesses that the cognition of those qualities may be extremely difficult--perhaps, on occasion, impossible.

In light of Romero's position that all spiritual values are absolute or ultimate, it has been pointed out by one writer that Romero has

the difficulty of any self-realization ethic. . . .  
[He] does not take sufficiently into account the  
difficulty that in acting on his proposed trans-  
cendent level the attainment of some states of  
affairs might be more praiseworthy than others.<sup>77</sup>

This criticism is well founded in that Romero avoided taking the time or space in Theory of Man to develop his moral philosophy. Surely, the issue of the conflict of values must be handled in any adequate ethics. The difficulties of Romero's axiology on this issue is, I believe, one reason his Ética was never published.

In presenting Romero's theory of man as spirit I have shown his views on a number of issues central to that theory and, in order to set them in focus, I wish now to summarize the major points. Among the important matters are those dealing with what spirit is. I have shown that spirit is not an entity and that it refers to intentional acts

whose objectification is complete--those in which there is no subjective return or regress. In light of this, I have contended that "spiritual intentionality" is a preferable term to "spirit."

In addition to clarifying what spirit is, I have shown the place of spiritual intentionality in the whole of reality and its relation to natural man or mere intentionality. The level of spirit is the last of the four ontological realms of reality and thus exhibits the final structural order of the cosmos.

In clarifying what spirit is, I have presented the seven traits of man as spirit. These are absolute objectivity, universality, freedom, unity, historicity, responsibility, and absolute transcendence. I have shown that insofar as an act, a man, or a culture is spiritual, it expresses these traits.

I have shown that Romero unites the doctrines of natural man and spiritual man in his philosophical anthropology and develops the theory that man is and must be a dualism of both mere intentionality and spiritual intentionality. Being fully human requires the presence of both levels of the intentional consciousness as well as the necessary conflict that is requisite to the tension between the two. This is a militant dualism in which the subjective-return tendency, on the one hand, and the impetus toward full objectivity and universality, on the other, are opposed. The entrenched egoism expressed in the subjective return appears the more forceful of the two, but Romero believes that the more transcendent spiritual tendency proves in time to have the advantage. The consequences of similar conflicts between two adjacent ontological realms on less transcendent levels of reality seem to bear out this projection.

I have pursued some of the axiological implications of Romero's dualistic view of man so as to show that value coincides with the degree of transcendence and that, since transcendence is absolute in spiritual intentionality, ethical value at that level is also absolute.

The introduction of the spiritual dimension into culture I have shown results in the creation and maintenance of cultural objects in and for themselves. This, I have indicated, has fundamental implications for aesthetics. I have brought out, furthermore, that, although many objects of culture can be produced and confirmed in their own right without reference to a subject's own needs and uses, other objects, including such diverse utilitarian creations as tools and institutions, seem necessarily created out of immediate, subjective human needs. These are not so susceptible to spiritual influence.

Romero's theory of man has a great deal to do with the manner in which he compares cultures. The value of the human individual, the idea of self-transcendence, the importance of time in human development, and the nature of reality are all employed in Romero's study of three great cultures. We turn our attention now to his application of some of these ideas to comparative culture and his analysis of the present crisis of the West.



## Notes

### Chapter Three

<sup>1</sup>Solomon Lipp, "Francisco Romero," The Philosophical Forum, XXI (1963), 75. Lipp observed: "Romero seems to shy away from attributing a substantive quality to spirit. It would appear that spirit is something built into the structure of Romero's scaffolding. It is program, plan and purpose. It is 'the role we play.'" (p. 78) See also Hugo Rodríguez-Alcalá, Misión y pensamiento, p. 77.

<sup>2</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 147. Valenzuela has avoided this error in his dissertation on Spanish American Philosophy (see bibliography), in which he treated Romero's work extensively. On the other hand, Cooper has fallen into what I believe is an undesirable extensive use of the definite article in both the 1967 paper cited above and in certain places in his translation of Theory of Man. A great deal of praise is due Cooper, however, for the genuine landmark he has created in introducing Francisco Romero to the English-speaking world. Through his efforts many have become acquainted with Romero's views.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 140.

<sup>5</sup>There is some similarity between Romero's treatment of the subjective regress and the idea in Christian ethics that sin is in some sense equivalent to self-centeredness. In his Papers for a Philosophy (Papeles para una filosofía), in 1945, Romero wrote: "... also it is a primary and common intuition in strict ethics that there is no greater sin [pecado] than egoism, that is, the centering of action on the subject as an individual self and referring it only to himself, acting in the sense of immanence." p. 41.

<sup>6</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 135.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 136.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 138.

<sup>10</sup>These remarks are W. F. Cooper's and were included in a monograph mimeographed at Baylor University in Waco, Texas on September 25, 1967. The paper was read by the author at the Southwestern Philosophical Society meeting in New Mexico in the Fall of that year. The title of the paper was "The Concept of Man: Francisco Romero and José Ortega y Gasset." The quotation used here comes from pp. 9-10 of that paper. Harris in On Problems committed the same error on page 77 of that volume.

<sup>11</sup>Francisco Romero, Relaciones de la filosofía (Buenos Aires: Perrot, 1958), p. 13.

<sup>12</sup>Francisco Romero, Filosofía de la persona (3d ed.; Buenos Aires: Losada, 1961), pp. 50-51. Quoted in part by Valenzuela, Emerging Concern, p. 403.

Raymond A. Valenzuela has certainly proposed a simplistic, uncritical alternative to what he regards as Romero's untenable position in refusing to hypothesize the existence of a transcendent will. "If things happen as if a purpose existed, is it not more reasonable to accept the Biblical view and to say 'In the beginning God. . . .'? Reality is not self-explanatory, and if we reject the theistic hypothesis we only end by introducing another and inferior concept--Romero's word is 'transcendence,'-- to account for what the Biblical cosmology attributes to the work of God." See Valenzuela, Emerging Concern, p. 403.

There are three points in Valenzuela's remarks which should have individual attention: (1) Things happen as if there were a transcendent will at work. (2) Reality must be explained by some principle outside itself, and (3) Any explanation other than the Biblical view ("theistic hypothesis") is an inferior account.

In response: (1) The "as if" postulate merely asserts that a certain explanation, viz. a transcendent will, would be sufficient to account for the manner in which things happen. That does not mean that such an account is necessary. Valenzuela quite obviously would be pleased were Romero to posit a transcendent will (which Valenzuela apparently regards as equivalent to Biblical theism) but Romero stated that an innate purpose within the order of reality could account for things being as they are, also. Just as obviously, Valenzuela would not approve this hypothesis even if it is adequate. (2) It is not at all self-evident that the explanation of reality requires resorting to the postulation of something outside it that pre-exists it and is essentially other than reality. (3) There is no such thing as the Biblical view. If Valenzuela would be content to have the assertion made that the natural order is "the work of God," I dare say there are many philosophers and theologians who will and do readily assent to this but whose views, if and when they are adequately understood, are extremely unsatisfactory to Mr. Valenzuela.

Romero does contend for a monistic transcendence that is exhibited throughout the entire four-level ontological structure of reality, but he consistently resists the temptation to attribute a cosmic purpose or will to the nature of things. Transcendence is an innate cosmic principle but is not to be construed as exhibiting an obscure purpose, "innate in the cosmos."

<sup>13</sup>Although Romero maintained that his theory of man was not dependent on his metaphysics, he confessed that they occurred to him at the same time. See Romero, Theory, p. 175. For an outline of Romero's metaphysics see his Papeles para una filosofía (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1945), pp. 9-45.

<sup>14</sup>Valenzuela, Emerging Concern, pp. 383-384.

<sup>15</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 176.

<sup>16</sup>Francisco Romero, Teoría del hombre (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1952), p. 144.

<sup>17</sup>Francisco Romero, "La filosofía, la cultura, y el hombre," La Nueva Democracia, XXIV (July, 1943), 7. Schelling subscribed to a similar idea.

<sup>18</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 152 and Teoría, p. 144.

<sup>19</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 139 and Teoría, p. 132.

<sup>20</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 146 and Teoría, p. 139.

<sup>21</sup>Aníbal Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary Latin-American Philosophy, trans. by Willard R. Trask (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1954), p. 257, quoting Romero, Papeles, p. 14.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 258, quoting Romero, Papeles, p. 14.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 260, quoting Romero, Papeles, pp. 16-17.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 260, quoting Romero, Papeles, p. 17.

<sup>25</sup>I remind the reader that "spirit" in Romero's philosophy is the human spirit much more restrictedly construed than by some others, such as Max Scheler. Primarily, it is to be understood as a new dimension in the intentional consciousness. It has important ethical implications which I shall mention farther on in this chapter. The characteristics which are discussed here will bring to light what Romero regards as a "spiritual cognition" or "spiritual act."

<sup>26</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 163.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 164.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Romero, Teoría, pp. 156-157. I am offering here an alternative translation to Cooper's. The original reads: "En Platon . . . las almas son identicas en cuanto igualmente aptas para recibir ese mundo ideal . . ." W. F. Cooper translates this sentence: "In Plato . . . the souls are identical in that they are equally capable of perceiving this ideal world . . ." My reading of ". . . equally suited to perceiving . . ." is a slight change but I think it avoids the suggestion that Plato held that all souls are possessed of an identical capacity in their earthly existence for fully grasping the ideas. For Plato there are pre-existent factors that, in part, make capacities for knowing idealities differ from one soul to another.

<sup>33</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 166.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 166.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 167. For a discussion on Romero's theory of individuals, see supra, pp. 58-60.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 169.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 170.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 182; supra, p. 92

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., supra; p. 95.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 180.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 174

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>48</sup>Romero, Theory, pp. 173-174. See Norberto Rodriguez Bustamante, "Persona y libertad en la filosofía de Francisco Romero," Ciudad, Nos. 4-5 (1956), 36-42. I confess to some dissatisfaction concerning the "reason" Romero gives in this statement for not affirming absolute freedom. I think his refusal to do so is wise but the "reason" is surely inadequate.

<sup>49</sup>Romero uses the term intencionalidad espiritual in Papeles, p. 17.

<sup>50</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 207.

<sup>51</sup>Francisco Romero, "Reflexiones sobre el hombre," La Nueva Democracia, XXXIV (July, 1954), 19. For additional treatment of Romero's concept of the duality of man, see J. Kogan Albert, "La dualidad del hombre en Francisco Romero," in Ciudad, Nos. 4-5 (1956), pp. 30-35.

<sup>52</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 155.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 182.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 198.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 200.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 189.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 201.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 202.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 198.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 199.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 200.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 203. See W. F. Cooper, Francisco Romero's Theory of Value, Ph.D. dissertation (Indiana University Press, 1967), pp. 84-115 for a more extensive treatment of "Value in the Context of Transcendence." Ethical value is discussed on pages 105 through 115.

<sup>67</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 32, supra, p. 58.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., pp. 136-137. For further discussion of this subject see Solomon Lipp, "Francisco Romero," pp. 78-79 and Hugo Rodríguez-Alcalá, Misión y pensamiento, pp. 75ff.

<sup>70</sup>Romero, Persona, p. 25. Perhaps this is an apt moment to acknowledge a change in Romero's terminology from the work here cited and Teoría del hombre. As the passage here reveals, Romero distinguished between "person" and "individual." The former term was used by him prior to 1952 to identify the man in whom spirit is actualized, whereas the individual is the nonspiritual subject or self. However, in Teoría del hombre there is almost a total lack of such a distinction and of such employment of these terms. It is because of this that I believe Marjorie Harris is ill-advised in her work on Romero, written in 1960, to make such extensive use of this distinction. See Harris, On Problems, pp. 63-66.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>73</sup>Romero, "El hombre, el espíritu, y la cultura," Sur, Nos. 192-194 (Oct.-Dec., 1950), 67.

<sup>74</sup>Lipp, "Francisco Romero," p. 79. Solomon Lipp expresses these questions in a more extensive formulation without attempting to formulate any possible reply to them. He concludes that the mere posing of the questions "would seem to be a vulnerable spot in the impressive edifice erected by Romero in his attempt to combat the deterministic thesis which denies freedom to man."

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>William J. Kilgore, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Francisco Romero," in Romero, Theory, p. xxvi. This is one of several points of criticism raised by Kilgore. The criticism is well taken but I am at a loss to understand Kilgore's suggestion that "impetus" might possibly be considered as the principle to explain transcendence. I surely agree with him that it does not do so, but fail to see how it could possibly be conceived of as offering such an explanation. Transcendence might explain the impetus, but surely the converse is not comprehensible.

<sup>77</sup>Kilgore, in Romero, Theory, p. xxviii.

CHAPTER IV  
THE THEORY OF MAN AND THE CRISIS  
OF WESTERN CULTURE

The relationship between Romero's theory of man and his view of the current crisis in Western culture will become clear if we first investigate his accomplishments in comparative culture. We shall need to see what are the great cultures of the world in Romero's judgment and the reason he gives for their extraordinary survival. Among those enduring cultures there are philosophical differences that set one of them above the others and it will be necessary that I show the basis of this divergence as well as the reason why, according to Romero, it results in a superiority for one of the cultures over the others. Only then will it be possible to undertake an analysis of the twentieth-century crisis of the West as well as Romero's proposed solution and, finally, his idea of the future of man.

According to Romero there are three great cultures that have outlasted all others: The cultures of India, China, and the West. Their perdurance is attributable to their philosophical principles. Each of them provides for individual human identity and personal meaning through self-transcendence. In each there is an absolute value toward which the individual is directed. But each culture's provision for these is different from the others and it is in these differences that Romero discovers a basis for regarding Western culture as higher than those of India and China.

According to Romero, from the moment the individual emerges as an objectifying being in any culture he is reaching beyond his own self-identity to the knowledge of others, attempting to understand his relationship to those about him, and ultimately, desiring to expand his consciousness to grasp the whole of objective reality. There is a thrust in man toward objectivity, universality; a reaching toward totality. He regards this tendency in man as evidence that "he needs the goal and lodestar of a supreme and absolute object to set his mind at rest."<sup>1</sup> Romero holds that spiritual intentionality reaches toward that end. When man transcends himself by becoming a spiritual being he is reaching toward the absolute--toward total knowledge and the absolute good. Such a man endeavors to comprehend objectivities in their own right. He desires to achieve an understanding of all that is. As spirit, man finds liberation from individual particularism and seeks unity with all others, and ultimately, with totality.

I have said that Romero was persuaded that all three cultures mentioned offer some absolute for which individual man may aspire and that each provides a means for fulfilling that aspiration. However, the differences of those means convinced Romero that Western culture is preferable to those of Asia. The divergence of East and West is revealed, according to Romero, in their respective treatments of two very important subjects. These are: (1) the survival of the subject in the self-transcending moment, and (2) the necessity of time for human self-transcendence. I shall treat these two matters separately.

In the case of Indian culture, with rare exceptions, the individual finds reality by resigning himself to an undifferentiated whole--"the cosmic infinity into which the individual yearns to dissolve

divesting his separate personal existence of all value."<sup>2</sup> The self is abandoned in deference to a selfless totality in which there are no individuals or particulars. "In the classic culture of India one aspires to the dissolution of human individuality in the cosmic totality."<sup>3</sup>

What is undesirable in this is that it requires a self-negation based on value being posited in the "metaphysical or cosmic totality" rather than in the human subject. Confronted by such an overwhelming reality "the individual, with its particularism and transitory state, judges itself devalued and almost nonexistent . . . it is a sheer appearance."<sup>4</sup>

In the culture of the Chinese one discovers that, with the exception of the Taoist hermit and the Buddhist monk, the transcendence of the individual is accomplished through identification with the family and particularly the ancestors. The individual finds himself only through "that vast community in which the ancestors live together with their descendants and rule over them, an immense family, held in religious reverence, of which the State is only a political continuation."<sup>5</sup>

But in this, as in the Indian tradition, the result is a negation, a denial, of the individual subject. "Just as in India the individual feels himself devalued before the cosmic and metaphysical reality, and seeks to return to it, so in traditional China the individual above all lives the experience of the total community,"<sup>6</sup> and thus the price of transcendence in terms of meaning and value is the loss of the individual's sense of personal worth. In both the Indian and Chinese traditions the individual must give way to a value that is greater than himself at the cost of self-identity.



Although neither of these is desirable from Romero's perspective, each has, nevertheless, provided a way for man's personal transcendence and this accounts for their endurance. In a unique fashion, each of the two Eastern cultures has provided an answer "to the most profound and permanent questions and needs of man."<sup>7</sup>

The clue of Indian culture is the whole, the cosmic infinity into which the individual yearns to dissolve, divesting his separate personal existence of all value. In traditional Chinese culture, the clue is the social reality, that vast community in which the ancestors live together with their descendants and rule over them, an immense family, held in religious reverence, of which the State is only a political continuation, and which interlaces, through the ties of magic, with the supernatural powers.<sup>8</sup>

The point here is that in both the above cultures there is a "premature resignation" of individuality. As a result of this abandonment of the individual, "these cultures ignore or deny ideally the fundamental condition of man as being a subject. They try to dilute the individual in complexes which they consider superior to him in value and dignity."<sup>9</sup>

Romero believed, on the other hand, that the Western tradition has made provision for man as an objectifying subject who finds his identity, his value, and his dignity in transcending himself without losing himself as subject. In the West, man as personal subject is affirmed, not devalued:

the "I" as person or absolute subject, . . . as spiritual "I"--requires constant progress in self-objectification and persistence in that objectifying exertion which, as we have seen, constitutes man as such . . . . It becomes clear that the success of Occidental man [results from] the fact that the course of his culture coincides sufficiently well . . . with the general trend assigned to man by his inmost essence

. . . . For the person taken in his plenitude is a complex of disinterested and reverent intentions toward all that exists. Recognition of the equality of persons is by no means alien to him. Such a cosmic and social union, however, Occidental man will try to accomplish not through annihilation and surrender of his own "I" but, on the contrary, through an ascent from his intentional individual "I" [i.e., the "I" of mere intentionality] to the spiritual "I."<sup>10</sup>

The difference among the three cultures regarding personal finite existence and its meaning has been expressed cryptically by one writer: "India says, 'All'; China says, 'We'; the West says, 'I'."<sup>11</sup> In both Oriental cases the self is lost, given up. Only in the West is it affirmed.

Romero placed a special emphasis on the difference between the Oriental and Occidental man's confrontation with reality. Whereas in both Asiatic approaches to the cosmos, there is an effort to eradicate the distinction of the subject and object, there is in the West an effort to understand it by means of reason. He writes concerning the Western man:

He trusts his capacity to know, to penetrate a reality from which he remains radically separated: he is a cognitive subject facing a cognizable cosmos. In short, he is a microcosm scrutinizing a macrocosm. Instead of this Western separation [distinction] of subject and object, the Oriental wants union, fusion, integration.<sup>12</sup>

It is, of course, with this effort to know via "union, fusion, integration" that Oriental mysticism has become identified.

In addition to the differences between East and West on the survival of the subject in self-transcendence, the concept of time is significant. "The classic Indian culture is nontemporalist. It despises the particular, change, history, time. The Chinese equivalent is 'eternalist,' it fixes time, immobilizes it by putting all present

under the rule of the past."<sup>13</sup> In each case--in one a denial, in the other a paralyzing--time is not affirmed.

On the other hand, in the West temporality is affirmed. According to Romero only Western culture has history in the true sense. Romero sees the West's affirmation of temporality as closely related to the importance it provides for personal identity, inasmuch as the fulfillment of the latter requires time and history. This he called the West's "conjugating individuality with temporality."<sup>14</sup> Whereas the Asiatic cultures' doctrines of the individual's abandoning himself to either a cosmic or social whole results in a denial of time, the affirmation of the "I" in the West requires the affirmation of time.

The empirical "I"--the imperfect subject, chained to nature in many ways--is aware, and conceives, of the person as an object to be realized, a duty or task . . . . All this signifies nothing if not the gradual triumph of the personal or spiritual principle over concrete individual man who lives immersed in his particular aims and interests. Occidental man believes in time, in history, in progress because his being is given to him as something latent and potential. He endeavors to realize it in time and in history, valiantly taking upon himself the long task of giving existence to what ought to be, of implanting the ideal in the real.<sup>15</sup>

In summing up his assessment of Western culture, Romero touches on what he was convinced was the heartbeat of the Western World:

I believe that, despite its mistakes, faults and even crimes, our culture is the only one that remains faithful to the profound and essential nature of man. The only in which destiny is to be an ecumenic culture. If, in fact, it is becoming a world culture, it is not by chance, technical superiority or material force; it is because the citizens of other cultures discover in it a higher principle, a capacity to satisfy, more widely and deeply than their own, the great human ends. This does not mean that we have nothing to learn from the other cultures. Probably the Indian has much to teach us in cosmic feeling, so scarce in ours, and the Chinese in social or communal feeling. But these would

be moments of integration and would not modify substantially the basis of the West.<sup>16</sup>

Romero highly regarded the three great cultures but found Western culture more desirable on the two counts stated above--the importance of the individual and the significance of time or temporality.

In interpreting the West's theory of man in terms of his own philosophic framework, Romero found that only the West adequately provides for man as an objectifying subject that develops in time toward the absolute transcendence or spirituality without the loss of the subject's identity in the process. "For the culture of the West, the supreme reality is the marching spirit, in its personal form, which colonizes nature and develops in a manner ever more inclusive and perfect."<sup>17</sup>

However, despite its commendable qualities, all is not well with the culture of the Western world and Romero undertook to diagnose its ills--to take un inventario de la crisis. The West faces, it seemed to him, an imminent crisis. His analysis of the problem revealed that the crisis has three fronts.

The fundamental characteristics of the West, which show an evident unity of origin and meaning are three: intellectualism, activism, individualism. If the present crisis is completely studied, it is easily seen as a crisis of these three principles: a crisis of intellectualism (bankruptcy of the rational conception of mechanism, irrationalist attacks, necessity of accepting the irrationalities of a superior type such as the values, etc.); the crisis of activism (submission of man to production, the revolt of technique, economic disorder, weakness of the inner life, etc.) and the crisis of individualism (conflicts of the individual with the State, of the individual with society, general conflict of individuality with all the attempts at socialization and planning).<sup>18</sup>

Thus the formidable crisis is not economic or technological. It is a crisis of the human spirit. A better understanding of Romero's

diagnosis of the problem is possible by taking each of the three phases of the crisis separately.

In reference to the crisis of intellectualism, Romero held that the rationalism of Descartes and his successors contributed to what he called "immanentization," resulting in the mechanistic concept of the universe. In this context "immanentization" refers to a concept of reality that posits immutable substances, each of which is separate from the others, identical with itself, and incapable of developing beyond itself. It regards all transcendence as illusory. Rationalism, with its mechanistic view of the cosmos, was man's grandest effort to comprehend reality by reason alone. It assumed that the categories of human reason and those of reality coincide and that the mind is capable of understanding with mathematical accuracy the nature of the universe. As one writer expressed it: "From Galileo and Descartes to Spencer and Darwin a colossal prowess of immanentization was put into effect with pride and enthusiasm."<sup>19</sup>

To Romero, the culmination of these trends was positivism. Under its commitments man became euphoric over the perfectibility of man--a perfection believed to be possible by means of the sociological implementation of the principles of positivism itself. As Hugo Rodríguez-Alcalá observed, "If positivism . . . rejected the traditional eschatological faith, it was able to offer man a faith in man replacing the faith in God."<sup>20</sup>

But in the twentieth century positivism yielded before non-rational attacks from various quarters. Romanticism, intuitionism, and existentialism took their toll on the positivistic doctrines.

The Western mind faced the undeniable evidence of the irrational. It was an appalling realization. The bankruptcy of science was announced, that is, the failure of reason. Irrationalistic philosophies came to the fore. The West grew bitter and despondent.<sup>21</sup>

Although the collapse of positivism in the present century is one major precipitating factor in the crisis of Western culture, Romero applauds the collapse since the positivistic voices were false prophets. However, Western man has suffered a lamentable loss that was subsidiary to the demise of positivism. Man has lost faith in his own future. Rodríguez-Alcalá describes it well as "the extinction of a faith--a faith in science, a faith in progress, a faith in the perfectability of man, in the ultimate triumph of intelligence over the forces of evil, ignorance and superstition."<sup>22</sup>

There are no regrets expressed by Romero over the discrediting of positivism. Since he saw it as the outgrowth of rationalism and mechanism, and since these represent what he called "immanentization," which is opposed to transcendence, it follows that he would necessarily approve the collapse of positivism. Its assumptions and doctrines were unwarranted and false.

It is, however, Romero's contention that there should not have been a surrender of hope and faith in man's future when positivism was laid aside. The fact is, he contends, the culture of the Western hemisphere is capable of bringing about that unity of mankind that continues to be the ambition of succeeding human generations. He is not quite willing to abandon hope in the perfectibility of the human species. Positivism did not have the right answer, but it had the right expectation in its belief that man can solve his deepest problems and perfect his world.

The final question is whether our culture is capable of becoming a total or ecumenical culture. I believe that it is, because it is the culture that responds to the peculiar essence of man with the greatest accuracy.<sup>23</sup>

That is to say, if any present culture is to become the solution to the present crisis it must be that of the West itself.

The crisis of activism in Western culture, according to Romero, results in part from the fact that our planet now has been explored, and quite generally populated. The consequence is that there is a deep discontent in man as the species that has thrived on a continual activism that accompanied the fascination of undiscovered continents and seas.

There is also the industrialization and automation of the means of production in the West that require men to become manipulators of machines. As a result man finds himself diverted from more human and meaningful activity. In this devaluation, he suffers a loss of dignity which compounds the crisis.

Romero sees this subversion of human activity by technology as an obstacle that detains man from achieving "spirit and universality by way of the personality."<sup>24</sup> The powers of Western economy and industry have turned aside from the high humanitarian purposes to which they should aspire until it seems "at times [Occidental man] thinks he was born to fabricate countless things."<sup>25</sup>

The crisis of the West is manifest not only in intellectualism and activism, but also in its third characteristic--individualism. This is evidenced by the conflicts between the individual and both the state and society. Society at various levels is engaged in socializing the individual man and the state has undertaken to plan the personal

well-being of its citizens and to provide for their individual needs. Societal and governmental molding of the individual is practised in all sorts of institutional forms and, regardless of the good intentions, it is a curtailing of freedom in the life of the individual man.

Socialization of the human individual is necessary, however, and, according to Romero, not undesirable. But it carries with it certain hazards. The chief danger is that it can work against the tendency of spiritual intentionality to universalize every man. Socialization can contribute to developing spiritual men, but it can also hinder that process. Rodríguez-Alcalá has summarized Romero's position in this matter quite well. Since "individual liberty and socialization are antagonistic, and since Romero considers socialization inevitable and necessary, the philosopher proposes a formula. Man is a duality of individual and person; socialize the individual; spare the person."<sup>26</sup> Socialization should have universal dimensions.

Romero diagnosed the cultural crisis of the West as, at base, the result of the loss of a Weltanschauung without a subsequent replacement. Twentieth-century Western man finds himself cut off from the old mechanistic view of himself, his world, and values and presently without an adequate substitute. Concerning the situation he wrote:

What about our own time? When values change, Ascárate y Rosell says, "there is a transformation or transmutation of values, but at times the ancient forms are destroyed and new ones do not arise to replace them. This is the tragedy of present humanity."<sup>27</sup>

From Romero's perspective the crisis expressed in terms of intellectualism, activism, and individualism is, however, not merely an axiological crisis but a total crisis of the human experience expressed as the loss of one world-view without another to take its place.



But it is one thing to diagnose the problem and quite another to prescribe a remedy. Romero has done both. His analysis of the crisis is a plausible one in that it avoids confusing the symptoms with the real source of the difficulty. In addition, he has offered some suggestions for improving the current situation. Those prescriptive offerings are in terms of his own philosophy of man.

What is the Romeroan prescription for the recovery of man-in-crisis? Certainly, to begin with, there must be an acknowledgment of the limitations of reason in knowing reality. The old rationalism is discredited. Reason by itself is incapable of providing man with a theory of reality that adequately provides for meaning and value, and which combines with it purely rational principles for action. Romero insisted reason is incapable of presenting man with the world-view by which he is to live. A Weltanschauung is not a rational construct. As Rodríguez-Alcalá says, "reason must humble itself, give up its excessive demands so that the irrational may be apprehended by means other than rational analysis."<sup>28</sup> Romero believed that philosophy to a great extent has already passed through the crisis by virtue of the defeat of positivism and the rise of phenomenological theories of man and culture which, like his own, view man as an objectifying entity capable of the spiritual dimension. There must be a growing rehumanization of society and, to put it into a sentence: Men must consciously engage in turning all individual and societal endeavor into incessant eagerness to spiritualize the world. This is the "pilgrimage of the individual in search of the person."<sup>29</sup>

Reality cannot be comprehended by reason alone because reality proceeds from one ontological structure to another and rational

analysis is incapable of either discovering or proving the principles of structuralism. The idea that a whole is more than the sum of its parts is nonrational. The idea of a novelty in reality resulting from a previously unrealized structure of reality is also nonrational. Transcendence is another idea not within the grasp of reason. These considerations suggest the inadequacies of reason as the sole means of knowledge.

In light of his expressions of hope in man's future and the sense of importance he attached to his own theory of man, it is obvious that Romero did not view the present crisis as a demise of Western culture or, for that matter, even as an evidence of its weakness. He wrote

In my opinion, the crisis does not signify the end or even the decline of Western culture. It is a crisis. . . of growth, of those three principles [intellectualism, activism, individualism].<sup>30</sup>

I believe that Romero saw his own theory of man as offering the most promising means of "enlarging" the West's principles of intellectualism, activism, and individualism. The traits of spiritual intentionality commend to us spiritual man as the being who above all others is capable of giving an expanded meaning to the three principles that characterize Western culture. Man as spirit in Romero's philosophy is a being who desires to know all. The objects of intelligence and understanding are not all comprehended by reason. Some intellectual curiosity is satisfied by means of an intuitive grasp of the structural nature of reality and of metaphysical values. The activism of spiritual man takes on new dimensions beyond that of the natural man in that spirit directs the activities of the human individual beyond all restrictive social and cultural boundaries to the universality of

mankind as a whole. And, as I have already shown, Romero held that the individual who becomes spiritual expands his own existence so as to see himself as well as others with complete objectivity. The narrowness of subjectivity is transcended and the result is the expansion of individual existence toward totality. All the traits of spirit seem to contribute toward making the present crisis one of growth.

I have shown in this chapter that Romero analyzed and compared the three cultures of the present which he considered the most durable--the cultures of India, China, and the West, which includes Europe and the Americas. My review of his studies reveals that Romero felt the reason for the endurance of those cultures is that they each provided a means of self-transcendence for the individual human being. However, of the three, only the West offers a theory of self-transcendence in which the individual is not devalued or negated. Furthermore, only the West makes an adequate provision for time as the dimension within which all transcendence must occur. For these reasons Romero held that the culture of the West is more in accord with the true nature of man and reality and is thus preferable to those of Asia.

In addition, I have shown that, according to Romero, the Western world is, and has been for generations, in a state of crisis, which is expressed in each of the fundamental characteristics of Western culture: intellectualism, activism, and individualism. The crisis, however, is one of growth. Western man can assimilate into his philosophy some commendable traits of the Asian cultures and can become the instrument of advancement and progress in the world for the future.

However implicitly, Romero commends his theory of man to us as the answer to the present crisis. Spiritual man is the answer to the present problem, the hope of the future. And, although Romero was careful not to evangelize in behalf of his theory of man or his own metaphysics, I believe his persuasion was that his own view of reality could fill the void occasioned by the loss of a former world-view.

## Notes

### Chapter Four

<sup>1</sup>Francisco Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 403.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Romero, "Notice," p. 3.

<sup>4</sup>Francisco Romero, "Sobre el espíritu y la actitud espiritual en las grandes culturas," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, IX (March, 1949), 435. This paper was read to the Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy in Romero's absence by E. S. Brightman. The Congress was held at Columbia University in New York City, December 28-31, 1947.

<sup>5</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 403-404.

<sup>6</sup>Romero, "Sobre el espíritu," p. 435-436.

<sup>7</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 403.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 403-404.

<sup>9</sup>Romero, "Notice," p. 3.

<sup>10</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 404. Romero felt that the "I," ascending from the level of mere intentionality, grows "in strength and depth, evolves within himself the person in the image of the personal God who is exclusively characteristic of Occidental culture" ("Man and Culture," p. 404). This reference to the personal God of Western man touches on an interesting dimension to Romero's thought. Although Romero gave no assent to the Christian faith in his philosophical writings, he confessed he found no conflict between Christian belief in a future life of happiness and his own view, although he seems not to have subscribed to Christian ideas. At one point, in 1953 (one year after the publication of Teoría del hombre), Romero characterized his own view as "the faith that the supreme ideal values are reached in this world and that the present is incubating a happier and better destiny, a future time on whose shores the spirit will glow, realized in the harmony of the human person" (Valenzuela, Emerging Concern, p. 397, quoting Romero, Estudios de historia de las ideas; Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1953, p. 157).

<sup>11</sup>Hugo Rodríguez-Alcalá, "Francisco Romero on Culture East and West," Philosophy East and West, II (July, 1952), 157.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 159.

<sup>13</sup>Romero, "Notice," p. 3.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 405.

<sup>16</sup>Romero, "Notice," p. 3.      <sup>17</sup>Romero, Theory, p. 314.

<sup>18</sup>Romero, "Notes," p. 77.

<sup>19</sup>Rodríguez-Alcalá, "East and West," p. 161. To Romero the terms "rationalism," "immanentism," and "mechanism" were quite similar. According to his view, the Renaissance had "prefigured" the coming immanentizations of the seventeenth-century rationalists and the culmination of mechanistic rationalism was positivism.

Rodríguez-Alcalá recalls Romero's sweeping generalization that medieval transcendentalism was replaced with a "universal immanentization" resulting from rationalism. "Romero . . . asserts that the . . . program of immanentization is shown in Cartesianism, which is an immanentization of knowledge; Protestantism, which is an immanentization of belief; and, finally, the Natural Law, which is an immanentization of power in society. It was left to positivism to perform the last immanentization, and this one proved to be the immanentization of life carried out by Darwin" (Ibid., n. 16).

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 162.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Romero, "Notes," p. 77.

<sup>24</sup>Romero, "Notice," p. 3.

<sup>25</sup>Romero, "Man and Culture," p. 406.

<sup>26</sup>Rodríguez-Alcalá, "East and West," p. 163. Cf. Francisco Romero, "Reflexiones sobre la libertad política," La Nueva Democracia, XXVIII. (April, 1948), 18-24.

<sup>27</sup>Francisco Romero, "Nature, Man and Culture," Latin American Thought, I (October, 1945), 4.

<sup>28</sup>Rodríguez-Alcalá, "East and West," p. 163.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 164.

<sup>30</sup>Romero, "Notes," p. 77. In this article, after expressing his belief that Western culture has defined the true nature of man and his hope in the West's future, Romero concluded expectantly: "Soon I shall be able to publish the work where I examine all these problems, and which I have tentatively titled El sentido del Occidente [The Meaning of the West.]" That work was never brought to press. See Romero, "Notes," p. 77.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

There are three things to be done in the closing chapter of this study: (1) a summary of my study on Romero's philosophy of man as presented in the preceding pages, (2) a statement of the place of Romero and of his theory of man in Latin American philosophy, and (3) a suggestion of the significance of my exposition of Romero's theory of man in light of the present literature on his philosophy.

I have presented Francisco Romero's philosophy of man as a doctrine in the phenomenological tradition. He has described man as the being that becomes aware of isolable entities within a previously lived state of preconsciousness. Man is the only creature that has an existence that can be properly termed "consciousness." The condition of the preconscious animal mentality is a sensorial state, whereas man has a perceptual awareness of objects.

Furthermore, man objectifies the relations he finds among the objects of consciousness, and with the aid of memory develops concepts which are in turn treated as another class of objects of consciousness.

There are still other types of objects of consciousness such as numbers and other Ideal objects. Values are objects of the intentional consciousness, are held to be actual characteristics of real

objects, and are known by nonrational means. Finally, intentional consciousness reflects on its own subjectivity and thus becomes its own object.

Man's ability to permanently objectify, however imperfectly, is what constitutes him human. He is the only creature that possesses a world. He alone has intelligence and achieves a language, which includes terms that refer to concepts and idealities. It is not a "nature" as such, but a function, or activity. As consciousness, man is the highest level of reality, incorporating all the lower levels, and, as such, he has inherited the earth.

Man is the sole creature to have developed--by means of the intentional community--a society in the proper sense. The intentional consciousness necessarily produces culture, but that culture forms man as well. The world into which every human comes and within which he matures is inevitably lined through and through with culture so that human existence is unavoidably a culturally-molded life.

There not only is a reciprocity between man and the culture he produces, but, as Romero remarks, man is aware of that relationship. That awareness makes possible the philosophy of culture and also leads to extensive and deliberate human efforts to influence and redirect the future of humanity by altering the cultural milieu. The reciprocal influence between man and culture, thus, becomes increasingly complex.

As I have here shown, Romero held that in its inception, and to some extent in its continuation, human culture is the product of mere intentionality--sometimes called psychic intentionality. Given the objectifying capacity, man necessarily creates objective culture



as a result of the affirming judgment of the intentional consciousness. An object of culture is the externalizing of an idea of some individual consciousness. In the act of creating, one is affirming that that which is being produced should exist in external reality. This suggests the two "worlds" within which men live--that which is and that which should be; and the latter is expressed in the entirety of cultural productions, including, of course, ethics. The artist, the inventor, the founder of an institution, the writer of a law all affirm in the very process of creating that the work of art should be seen, the tool used, the institution joined, the law obeyed.

Language, like all other cultural products, is a result of the prolongation of the objectifying judgment of intentional consciousness. That is to say, language is, first of all, an affirming to oneself that a thing is an object of consciousness. Then language becomes communication of the content of a consciousness with others. It is doubtless through language that the objects of intentionality are developed beyond single, isolated objectified particulars in such manner that concepts are formed. Language enhances the intentional consciousness, enriching the capacity for more complex experiences and adding new dimensions to the content of consciousness.

We have seen, however, that the objectification of natural man is imperfect. The object is referred back to the intentional subject so that the identity, meaning, and value of the object of consciousness is ultimately regarded by natural man in reference to the subject's own needs, interests, and ambitions. This tendency of the incomplete intentional act is called the subjective return and, since

it exhibits a failure of full objectification, is an imperfection. The subjective return expresses an attitude of regression from absolute or entire objectification. It constitutes a failure of the intentional consciousness to complete its objectification in the intentional act.

It is in the nature of things that the objectifying function, which begins imperfectly as mere intentionality on the natural level, should be perfected. There is, then, a higher order of cognitive activity of which intentionality is capable; viz., that sort of act in which there is complete objectification--in which the object of consciousness is affirmed in its own right and evaluated without reference to the subject's needs or ambitions.

Man as spirit confirms the object of consciousness purely in its own right regardless of the ontological level to which the object belongs. In human relations the spiritual attitude regards both "I" and "Thou" as "he." Thus in the spiritual dimension there is no interest in "my rights" or "your rights," but merely rights as such. This is the disinterested interest of objectivity.

The act of full and complete objectification is called a spiritually intentional act, and every human being does, indeed, perform some such acts. These spiritually intentional acts exhibit reality's transcendence to a new ontological level, the spiritually intentional, at which level of objectification there is no subjective return.

Transcendence occurs, of course, on each of the levels of nature prior to the supranatural level of spirit,<sup>1</sup> but, since more and more of reality is surpassed, the degree of transcendence increases

at each ontological level of reality until spiritual intentionality achieves the most extensive move away from individual particularism toward universality. The transcendence of intentionality made spiritual, which performs acts of "absolute" or perfect objectification, is a transcendence of all previous levels of ontology--the physical, the vital, and the merely psychical. The spiritual level subordinates the preceding, less transcendent realms, "colonizing" them in behalf of unity, objectivity, and universality, and the other traits of spirit.

The spiritual self is the self of mere intentionality with a new program or role to carry out. That role involves a radical expansion of the self's interests so that it becomes the agent of universality and unity. The program for the spiritual self breaks down particularism, party spirit, division, and prescribes the common good of all men as its goal and thereby supplies an adequate ethical basis for human existence.

The spiritual individual, however, does not become wholly spiritual either in his intentional acts or in his ethical conduct. Fully human consciousness is a duality. Mere intentionality and spiritual intentionality co-exist in each member of the human species. In point of fact, there is neither a human being who is entirely given to mere intentionality nor one wholly committed to the spiritual. Both kinds of intentional acts, some with and some without subjective regress, are equally necessary to the human condition. Romero held that the fully human condition requires a homeostasis between the two sorts of intentional acts, although there can be no doubt that the completed objectification of the act of spiritual intentionality carries ethical value.

Such, then, is Romero's philosophical anthropology insofar as it is a theory of man in the more restricted sense. However, I have shown that, although Romero insisted that his concept of man and culture would stand without his metaphysics, he did develop a metaphysics at the same time he devised his theory of man and that he gave attention to the place of man in reality. I have found it advisable to show the place of man in the cosmos in order to adequately treat Romero's concept of man.

Romero's metaphysics, like Hartmann's, was a four-level ontology: the physical, the vital, the intentional psychic, and the spiritually intentional. At other places in this work I have listed this quadruple ontological scheme by using slightly different identifications for some of the four realms. The differences are merely apparent. Romero was not altogether consistent in the labels he gave them.

There is a cosmic impetus which Romero called "transcendence," and this principle in his metaphysics is the cohesive force of reality, giving it order and direction. By means of the impetus reality is a march toward the full being of humanity. As each successive ontological level is transcended, reality exhibits increasing freedom and decreasing mathematical determinism. The highest freedom is expressed in spiritual intentionality.

I am convinced, as I have indicated, that "spirit" and "transcendence" have sometimes been misinterpreted by those who deal with Romero's philosophy and I have shown my reasons for this persuasion. "Spirit," insofar so feasible, should not be referred to as "the spirit," but should be consistently equated with either intentional acts that

have no subjective return and, hence, are perfect objectifications, or with the individual intentionality which performs such acts. In neither case is spirit personified or given the status of entity.

I have shown that in his treatment of transcendence Romero refused to posit a transcendental will or innate cosmic purpose. Although he might have done so, I believe he had sufficient reason for avoiding such postulates. His suggestion that once imperfect objectification occurs in the temporal order, it is in the nature of things that it be perfected into "absolute objectification" is the nearest he comes to introducing the idea of a purposive element into his metaphysics. Transcendence, however, is not to be treated as a cosmic purpose or telos. Even in his remarks that time is a march toward humanity in the world's process he avoids the idea of purpose.

One of the most succinct summary statements Romero ever gave of his theory of reality was written the year following the publication of Teoría del hombre:

To me, the being of reality or its capital and positive element is transcendence (an expression not to be understood in a religious sense). Transcendence fosters the apparition in reality of orders more and more complicated and of higher dignity. Thus life with its vital psychism rises above physical materiality. Above life, rises autonomous or intentional psychism defined by the object-subject structure. Above this psychism, the spirit. Each order indicates an increase in transcendence up to spirit where transcendence is absolute or total. Spirit is therefore the apex of reality, since in it, transcendence, the impulse that animates all reality and moves it from its lower steps, is fulfilled in its complete, last and supreme form. The capital feature of properly spiritual acts is the transcending direction.<sup>2</sup>

The place of man in this scheme is, of course, that of highest dignity. He alone incorporates all levels: "Physical materiality,"

"vital psychism," "intentional psychism," and "spirit." Although other beings exist in the physical, vital, and pre-intentional psychistic realms, only man inhabits the realms of intentional psychism and spirit. And as the sole inhabitant he is unique in both possessing the world as object and in creating the highest order of value.

In this work I have also shown that Romero studied various world cultures and that he compared other theories of man and philosophies of culture with his own. His work in comparative cultures resulted in two main conclusions: (1) that of all the cultures in the world past and present three stand out as great and enduring: those of India, of China, and of the West, and (2) that Western culture, which includes principally Europe and the Americas, embraces a philosophy of man more coincident with the nature of reality and is thus preferable to the other two.

I have presented Romero's ideas concerning why the cultures of India, China, and the West have endured. The lasting quality of a culture, he says, is in the provision it makes for individual self-identity and for individual self-transcendence. All three of these cultures have a viable provision for both these.

The theory of man and culture in the West, however, is preferable to those of Asia in that the prevailing Western philosophy provides for a self-transcendence that does not annul the meaning and value of the individual. Rather, it affirms the primacy of the individual. The two Oriental philosophies are faulted for their loss or devaluation of the individual in the process that provides for self-transcendence.

When Romero writes of the importance of temporality in the West he apparently has in mind especially his own theory, which makes much of the significance of the temporal process of becoming. He sees the cultural philosophy of India as a denial of time, and that of China as an attempt to hold back the temporal flow. Only in the West, he maintains, is time affirmed, and that results from the necessity of time for individual self-transcendence. It is necessary to the spiritualizing of men and cultures.

Nevertheless, the Occident is, Romero believed, in a state of crisis--a crisis occasioned by the loss of a past world-view and the failure to develop another. The lost Weltanschauung was a mechanistic one resulting from rationalism and, although it has suffered general discredit, no other has taken its place.

The Occidental crisis is one of growth, according to Romero, despite the fact that it involves the basic characteristics of Western culture--intellectualism, activism, and individualism. Western man can and should profit from the collapse of such previous philosophies as rationalism and positivism. In order for there to be advancement from the present crisis, man must regain his hope in the future.

The former belief in the identity of the categories of reality with those of reason has been seriously damaged. So also the belief in the perfectibility of man in accord with the positivistic anthropology and sociology has been frustrated. These disillusionments, Romero believed, are largely responsible for the twentieth-century crisis of Western man. But he must see that the crucial situation in which he exists is the result of a growing humanity. He must regain his hope in his own future and make it what it can be--the hope of the entire human world.

Some of the criticism I have made of Romero's philosophy of man has been concerned with problems of terminology. On occasion I have suggested solutions to these difficulties by offering alternative translations. The distinction between "absolute objectification" and "absolute objectivity" is a case in point. However, there remain two unresolved terminological problems. One of these is Romero's persistent use of the terms "spirit" and "spiritual." I have stated that their reference is entirely to the human realm and that "spiritual intentionality" simply identifies an advanced level of self-transcendence. Just as I believe that "completed objectification" is a clearer term for Romero's meaning than "absolute objectivity," so also I believe "spiritual intentionality" is preferable to "the spirit." The term "spiritual intentionality" identifies completed intentionality.

The other unresolved problem in Romero's philosophical vocabulary is "absolute transcendence." The transcendent cognitive acts denoted by this term are those in which the subject affirms the object and evaluates it as it is in itself and not as it is seen in relation to the subject's interests and goals. Why should this be called absolute transcendence? Such acts may very well be the apogee of self-transcendence in human intentionality, but what necessity is there for regarding completed intentionality as the final developmental stage of reality? Our inability to imagine further transcendence in the cosmic process is not sufficient reason to declare that the highest level of human development is the final level of transcendence in reality.

In some ways Romero shows no great independence of thought. His doctrine of man is within the framework of descriptive phenomenology



and he is greatly indebted to German philosophy. The numerous points at which he borrowed from Dilthey, Scheler, Husserl, and Nicolai Hartmann have been noted in this study. Although Romero's philosophy differs from all his predecessors, his deep respect for the philosophers of the past and for the achievements of philosophy prior to his time mark him as a man who does not highly prize for himself a radical new beginning in philosophy.

But Romero was often called the dean of Argentine philosophers and must be counted as one of the most outstanding philosophic minds of South America. While he still lived, one scholar offered the following appraisal of his work:

[Francisco Romero] is almost universally respected as the greatest living Latin-American philosopher. His Theory of Man could be interpreted as a Herculean effort to turn the tide of existentialist irrationalism.<sup>3</sup>

His philosophical leadership throughout Central and South America is virtually without dispute.

Following Romero's death on October 7, 1962, Solomon Lipp published an evaluation of Romero's contribution to the philosophy of the Spanish speaking world.

Of Romero it has been said that he created a philosophical climate in Hispanic America.<sup>4</sup> There is no doubt but that he injected new energy into the bloodstream of Argentina's philosophical organism, an organism which had emerged with faltering steps from an era of overwhelming positivistic influence, and was struggling to achieve a greater degree of maturity.<sup>5</sup>

Romero has left behind him a few men who attest to his continuing influence. Romero's "eminent disciples," as Izquierdo Ortega refers to them--Risieri Frondizi, Torchía Estrada, and Francisco Aguilar--have been prestigious writers for some time in the field of philosophy.

They have done much to extend Romero's influence and reputation to a new generation.

The philosophy of man developed by Romero should find a place in the political life of his people. The stress he laid on human freedom and the intrinsic worth of every human being requires the rejection of political oppression and the domination of some men over others. It is an implicit rejection of totalitarian rule.

Romero and his philosophy of man have a permanent place in Latin America. An enthusiastic, hopeful, radiant humanist he was: One of the many fine eulogies that have echoed from three continents following the death of this great Argentine is from Solomon Lipp, formerly of Boston University.

The philosophy of Romero can perhaps be said to be a refreshing contrast to the all-prevailing anguish, melancholy and overpowering sense of absurdity and desolation, so characteristic of contemporary existentialist metaphysics. Romero's life and works are characterized by a dynamic sense of human vigor and creativity, by a giving of oneself to an attempt to spill over beyond the confines of the narrowly individual and egocentric.

. . . . . A few months before his death, he wrote that it was necessary to conquer the "absurd pessimism" of the moment, and "to strengthen the creative energies." And further: "I have infinite faith in man . . . ; all life, especially the spiritual aspect, is overflowing, generous, creative and self-giving."

These last words may well serve as a self-portrait of Francisco Romero.<sup>6</sup>

In order to identify the significance of my own work I must recall my original intent. I stated at the beginning that my intention was chiefly expository. In the twenty years since Teoría del hombre first appeared, there has been no dissertation written in United States universities on Romero's philosophical anthropology and,

it seemed to me, some such work was long overdue. This effort is a beginning toward filling that void. Perhaps now other more critical works will be forthcoming.

As I read Romero I became convinced that others who had completed works on Romero were not sufficiently careful on such matters as Romero's philosophical method, his doctrine of the self, and the meaning of spirit and I have made some contributions in those areas. I have attempted to differentiate between his "problems approach" and the system-building approach to philosophy. I have shown that he subscribed to the idea of self as agent and identified this view with a late concept in Husserl. Furthermore, I have brought out that spirit in Romero's philosophy is often misunderstood in that some have regarded "the spirit" to be something other than full intentionality. I have shown that it is identical with intentional acts and intentional consciousness in which objectification is complete. I have documented with care the traits of spirit in Romero's philosophy.

There are several areas of my work on Romero that I believe offer genuine opportunities for future development by others. Possibilities for greater depth of treatment include: (1) The German influences, (2) Romero's metaphysics, (3) his ethics, and (4) his aesthetics.

The brief material I have included on the first of these is sufficient as a guide to further study on the topic. Most writers merely refer to the German influences on Romero. I have explicitly stated the points at which these influences are manifest. There is a great deal of work to be done in the broader area of German philosophical influence in Latin America as well as additional development of those influences on Romero himself.

In reference to the metaphysics of Romero, the present work has offered the general outline and the fundamental ideas that comprise his theory of reality. The place of man in the cosmic order has been presented as a part of my work. There is still the need of an extensive study of Romero's metaphysical scheme as a whole.

Romero's value theory has been presented by William F. Cooper but separate studies are now warranted on his ethics and aesthetics. Some of my work touched on those areas. Explication of the first of these would require perusal of the unfinished and unpublished manuscript of Romero's Ética. An exposition of his aesthetics would require the pursuit of inferences drawn from various statements in Theory of Man and other writings.

The foregoing are, in a way, accomplishments of this present work. By introducing briefly some of the areas of Romero's work without treating them in full, I invite others to join in the work of Latin American philosophic studies. Admittedly, there are areas in this work that could be expanded and additional criticisms that could be offered of some of Romero's philosophy. In spite of the weaknesses, however, I am convinced that the time and effort of this work are justified. It has been an enjoyable and personally profitable enterprise. I have long felt that the philosophers of the Americas can profit from each other and it is my hope that future generations of philosophers in North America will become increasingly open to the work of philosophers in Central and South America. I find it lamentable that both English-speaking and Spanish-speaking America are more open to the philosophical winds of Europe than they are to each other.

## Notes

### Chapter Five

<sup>1</sup>The transcendence of which purely physical individuals are capable and which is manifest by them is expressed by means of merely the tendency of atoms to cohere and of masses to mutually attract each other. Such characteristics of matter are regarded by Romero as evidences that physical "individuals" can and do transcend the immanence of a wholly individual particularism.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 3-4.

<sup>3</sup>John Lawrence Groves, The Influence of Heidegger in Latin-American Philosophy, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1960), p. 361.

<sup>4</sup>Lipp is referring here to a tribute to Romero in Julián Izquierdo Ortega's article, "La obra de Francisco Romero," Cuadernos (Paris), No. 69 (February, 1963), pp. 33-37.

<sup>5</sup>Lipp, "Francisco Romero," p. 69.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 84-85.

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