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DO RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM AND SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION PREDICT ANTI-CHINA ATTITUDES?

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RESUMEN

Este artículo trata el tema de por qué algunos americanos tienen actitudes negativas hacia el pueblo y el gobierno de China, y el impacto que dichas actitudes producen en sus políticas chinas preferidas. Partimos del supuesto de que los efectos de autoritarismo de derechas (RWA) y la orientación de la dominación social (SDO) en el apoyo de las políticas más restrictivas podrían estar influidas por las actitudes negativas hacia el pueblo y gobierno chino. En el estudio 1 solamente encontramos una escasa evidencia de un efecto entre SDO y actitudes restrictivas. En el Estudio 2 no detectamos evidencia de efectos en dichas actitudes. Los resultados indican que los efectos de RWA y SDO en las actitudes restrictivas son principalmente directos y explican la variación incremental en las actitudes restrictivas más allá de los efectos de actitudes negativas hacia el pueblo y gobierno de China.

ABSTRACT

This paper addresses the question of why some Americans hold negative attitudes toward China's government and people, and the impact that such attitudes have on their preferred China policies. We hypothesized that the effects of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) on support for tougher (containment) policies towards China would be mediated through negative attitudes toward China's government and its people. We found only weak evidence of a mediated effect between SDO and containment attitudes in Study 1 and no evidence of mediated effects on containment attitudes in Study 2. Our findings indicate that the effects of RWA and SDO on containment attitudes are direct and account for incremental variation in containment attitudes beyond the effects of negative attitudes towards China's government and people.

Key words: right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, prejudice, U.S.-China relations

Thirty years of "reform and opening" have led to China's emergence culturally, militarily, and economically. Seeking to reassure the world about the implications of its rise, Chinese spokesmen have insisted that China's rise is inherently "peaceful" (e.g., Peng, 2007). The world's reaction to this message has been mixed, however. China's rise has been accompanied by conflicting perspectives on China and its people. On the one

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hand, China's rise has benefitted many nations around the world, as economic complementarities have allowed for a flourishing of trade and foreign direct investment opportunities. On the other hand, many countries are experiencing increasing trade deficits with China (Ford, 2007). Moreover, many people around the world are ambivalent about the implications of China's increasing military strength for peace and security in the 21st century (Lubman, 2004; Peng, 2007).

In the United States in particular, attitudes towards China vary considerably, and do not necessarily follow the usual left-right ideological divide. Business conservatives on the right and doves on the left share a largely positive view of China as a cuddly panda. To them, China should be welcomed into the community of nations and not be feared. Meanwhile, cultural conservatives on the right, and human rights advocates on the left, wary of China's threat to Christian and democratic values respectively, share darker visions of China as a menacing dragon that needs to be stopped (Lubman, 2004; Greenberger & Rogers, 1997). These contrary American attitudes towards China likely contribute to the volatility of U.S.-China policy, which vacillates between engagement and containment.

This paper addresses the question of why some Americans hold negative attitudes toward China's government and people, and the impact that such attitudes have on their preferred U.S.-China policies. Understanding these American attitudes and policy preferences towards China clearly has important implications for understanding U.S.-China relations, arguably the most important bilateral state-to-state relationship of the 21st century. It also has implications for understanding Americans' reactions to Chinese immigrants and the growing Chinese-American community in the U.S.

In this paper, we argue that two ideological orientations (Duckitt, 2001, 2006), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) play an important role in predicting American attitudes toward China. Although previous research has linked these individual difference factors to prejudice against a wide variety of social outgroups, there has been little effort devoted to examining how these ideological orientations might predict negative attitudes toward the peoples and governments of other nations, such as China.

To date, most of the research addressing associations between RWA and SDO on the one hand and prejudice against people from other countries on the other has centered on attitudes pertaining to immigrants/foreigners viewed as coming into or living within a particular host country (e.g., Van Hiel, & Mervielde, 2005; Nickerson & Louis, 2008). Given that immigrants/foreigners may be considered a unique type of in-group threat to

their host countries, research centering on such groups does not speak to the ways in which residents of one country might perceive individuals living within the borders of another (i.e., their home) country.

Moreover, little research on RWA and SDO has been devoted to understanding perceptions of more abstract groups such as national peoples and governments. Much of the theory surrounding RWA and SDO seems to have been designed to address perceptions of and prejudices against members of concrete outgroups within a common social context. Little has been said, however, about whether the effects of RWA and SDO on outgroup prejudice might generalize with respect to more global outgroup entities such as national governments. Thus, from the perspective of basic research, we sought to address the question of whether the typical effects of RWA and SDO on outgroup negativity generalize to groups that are not typically studied in the prejudice literature.

For the present research, we hypothesized that RWA and SDO would positively predict prejudiced attitudes towards the Chinese people, negative attitudes toward the Chinese government, and support for tougher containment policies towards China by the U.S. government (see Figure 1). Moreover, we expected the effects of RWA and SDO on support for containment to be mediated by prejudiced attitudes toward the Chinese people and negative attitudes toward the Chinese government.

Figure 1
Hypothesized relationships



Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation as predictors of negative attitudes

As noted above, our proposed model posits that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) should differentially predict prejudice against the Chinese people and negative attitudes toward the Chinese government and, by extension, foreign policy preferences. RWA refers to an ideological orientation (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002) that is comprised of three interrelated social attitudes: conventionalism, or the tendency to support adherence to conventional norms, beliefs, and values; authoritarian submission, or the tendency to submit to established (i.e., conventional) social authorities; and authoritarian aggression, or the tendency to aggress against norm violators and outgroup members in a manner that is perceived to be supported by conventional social authorities (Altemeyer, 1998). SDO, on the other hand, refers to a second ideologial orientation (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002) that is marked by a tendency to view the social world in hierarchical terms and a desire for one's own social groups to dominate over other social groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). According to Altemeyer (1998), RWA and SDO represent two types of authoritarian dispositions: authoritarian submission and authoritarian aggression, respectively.

Duckitt's (2006) dual-motivational model postulates that RWA and SDO arise from distinct personality, situational, and belief factors that may orient an individual towards a valuing of social conformity and/or power and competitiveness. Individuals who are high on the personality trait of social conformity (Duckitt, 2001) and/or who perceive greater levels of social threat (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Fischer, 2003; see also Nagoshi, Terrell, Nagoshi, & Nickerson, 2007) are more likely to adopt a set of beliefs that the social world is a dangerous and threatening place. This set of beliefs (see also Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007b), in turn, contributes to the "motivational goals or values of social cohesion and collective security" (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008, p. 250), which are reflected in higher levels of RWA. Individuals who are higher on the personality trait of tough-mindedness (Duckitt, 2001) and/or find themselves in situations marked by greater levels of competition and inequality (Duckitt, 2006) adopt the belief system that the social world is a competitive jungle. These beliefs (see also Sibley et al., 2007b), in turn, contribute to the "motivational goals or values of power, dominance, and intergroup superiority" (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008, p. 250), which are manifested in higher levels of SDO. Tests of structural equation models across several international samples have provided support

for the dual-motivational model, with the effects of tough-mindedness on SDO being mediated by competitive world beliefs and the effects of social conformity on RWA being mediated by dangerous world beliefs (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002). Moreover, a recent meta-analytic study by Sibley and Duckit (2008) provided additional support for the dual-motivational model, as the effects of agreeableness on prejudice appeared to be mediated through SDO while the effects of openness to experience (and conscientiousness) appeared mediated through RWA.

Research studies including both RWA and SDO as predictors of various social and political outcome variables support their conceptual and empirical distinctiveness. Both RWA and SDO have both been found to be positively associated with various forms of anti-immigrant prejudice (Van Hiel & Merveilde, 2005; Roets, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2006; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008), including hostility toward asylum seekers (Nickerson & Louis, 2008), support for restrictions on human rights/civil liberties (Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005; Crowson, 2007; Crowson, DeBacker, & Thoma, 2005, 2006), support for controversial political leaders (Crowson, DeBacker, & Thoma, 2006), prejudice against ethnic minorities (Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007), and support for the use of military aggression (e.g., Crowson, 2009; Crowson, DeBacker, & Thoma, 2006). Moreover, their empirical distinctiveness is further supported from data suggesting that these two variables may differentially predict certain social outcome variables. For example, RWA –but not SDO– appears to positively predict lesbian- and gay-rejecting attitudes and behaviors (Goodman & Moradi, 2008; see also Stones, 2006), traditional role preferences for women (Christopher & Wojda, 2008), benevolent (but not hostile) sexism (Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007), religiosity (Sibley, Robertson, & Wilson, 2006), and prejudice against groups identified as socially dangerous (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). On the other hand, SDO –but not RWA– appears to positively predict employment skepticism for women (Christopher & Wojda, 2008), prejudice (of preservice teachers) against students with disabilities (Brandes & Crowson, 2009), hostile (but not benevolent) sexism (Sibley et al., 2007a), and prejudice in general against groups considered to be "derogated" (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007).

In the present study, we reasoned that both RWA and SDO would emerge as positive predictors of prejudiced attitudes toward the Chinese people, negative attitudes toward the Chinese government, and support for a tougher U.S. containment policy towards China. With respect to RWA, we reasoned that persons scoring higher on this factor should be more inclined to exhibit prejudicial attitudes towards the Chinese people and the

Chinese government, stemming from the perception that the Chinese government and people challenge conventional norms associated with U.S. society, thereby representing a potential cultural and ideological threat (see Duckitt, 2006; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008) to the U.S. (and to Western values more generally). Moreover, persons scoring higher on RWA should be more inclined to hold more negative attitudes toward China out of concern over its increasing military strength and the possibility that its increasing military power could pose a physical threat to U.S. security one day. This heightened negativity toward China among Americans scoring high on RWA should, in turn, lead them to exhibit increased support for tougher containment policies against China.

With respect to SDO, we expected that persons scoring higher on this ideological orientation would be more inclined to exhibit negative attitudes toward the Chinese government and its people – this stemming from the perception that China represents a competitive threat (see Duckitt, 2006) to U.S. dominance. As noted previously, China's rise has been marked by impressive economic and military gains in recent years, gains that threaten the U.S.'s global position in these areas. Assuming that persons high on SDO are motivated by a desire to maintain relative dominance and superiority over other groups (see Duckitt, 2006), these individuals should view China's rise as particularly troublesome, leading them to exhibit a heightened motivation to curtail China's economic and military gains through increased support for tougher containment policies.

In sum, we hypothesized that RWA and SDO would exhibit statistically significant positive predictive relationships with prejudice against the Chinese people, negative attitudes toward China's government, and support for tougher containment policies against China. We expected the predicted relationships between RWA and SDO and support for tougher containment policies to be mediated through negative attitudes toward China's people and government.

Study 1

Methods

Participants

Our sample was comprised of 282 community members (51% female, 72% White) from the Southwestern United States. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 70 (Mean = 35.36, SD = 12.65). Overall, the sample tended to be fairly highly educated, as approximately 65% of participants reported having at least completed a college degree. Five participants reported that

they were not U.S. citizens and, thus, were dropped from all data analyses, leaving an effective sample size of 277.

Measures

Participants were asked to respond to all measures using 7-point rating scales with anchors of "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree." Cronbach's alpha coefficients for the measures are provided in Table 1.

Table 1

Means, standard deviations, and Cronbach's alphas for Studies 1 and 2

Variable	Description	Means	SD's	α's
	Studies	1; 2	1; 2	1; 2
RWA	Right-wing authoritarianism	3.539; 3.595	1.297; 1.139	.94; .71
SDO	Social dominance orientation	2.526; 3.171	1.135; 1.207	.87; .80
Prejudice	Prejudice against the Chinese people	3.314; 2.456	1.042; 1.500	.91; -
Neggov	Negative attitudes toward the Chinese government	4.232; 4.994	1.022; 1.505	.90; -
Contain	Support for tougher containment policies	3.546; 3.592	.930; .936	.81; .65

Notes. Means, standard deviations, and Cronbach's α's for Study 1 and Study 2 are separated by ";". The dashes (-) included in the table for Prejudice against the Chinese people and Negative attitudes toward the Chinese government reflect the fact that single items were used to represent these variables.

Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale (Altemeyer, 1998). This 20-item scale measures Altemeyer's (1981) three dimensions of right-wing authoritarianism: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Items from the scale include "Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us," "Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid o the 'rotten apples' who are ruining everything," and "Our country *needs* free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this upsets many people" (reverse scored).

Social dominance orientation (SDO) scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). We utilized ten items from Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) 16-item scale, measuring an individual's tendency to view society in hierarchical terms as well as a desire for one's social group to dominate over others. Items include "Inferior groups should stay in their place," "To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups," and "It would be good if all social groups could be equal" (reverse scored).

Prejudice against the Chinese people. This eight-item scale, measuring prejudicial attitudes toward the people of China, was constructed for the purposes of this study. All items started with the stem "The Chinese people are…" followed by an adjective of either a positive or negative valence: "peaceful," "uncooperative," "friendly," "trustworthy," "devious," "aggressive," "honorable," and "dishonest". Items were counterbalanced such that every other item was of a negative valence.

Negative attitudes toward the Chinese government. This eight-item scale, measuring negative attitudes toward the Chinese government, was constructed for the purposes of this study. All items started with the stem "The Chinese government is…" followed by an adjective of either a positive or negative valence. The same eight adjectives used in the prejudice scale above were used: "peaceful," "uncooperative," "friendly," "trustworthy," "devious," "aggressive," "honorable," and "dishonest". Items were counterbalanced such that every other item was of a negative valence.

Support for tougher containment policies. This eight-item scale, measuring endorsement of a tougher U.S. policy towards China, was constructed for the purposes of this study. Items included "If China provides military assistance to US enemies like Iran and North Korea, the US government should retaliate by bombing China," "The US government should strengthen its military alliances with Japan, South Korea, and India to contain Chinese power," "The best way to deal with China is to maintain our military dominance and seek ways to contain its influence in the world," and "Our government should adopt a friendlier foreign policy towards China" (reverse scored).

Higher scores on our measures represented higher levels of RWA, SDO, prejudice, negative attitudes towards the Chinese government, and support for tougher containment policies, respectively.

Procedure

Participants were recruited by graduate students enrolled in statistics courses taught by the first author during the spring of 2008. The student researchers were provided with an information sheet that contained guide-

lines for collecting and handling the data they obtained from respondents. Included in the guidelines were instructions for the students seek out approximately equal numbers of males and females (who are U.S. citizens) within the community who are friends, colleagues, acquaintances, family, or anonymous to them to participate in the study. Although the guidelines included no restrictions on community members who were tied to the local university, they did indicate that undergraduate students were not "preferred subjects."

Students were instructed to recruit only one person per household to complete the hard copy questionnaire and to enlist only those whom they believed would provide thoughtful answers to the questionnaire items. Persons agreeing to participate in the study were given a packet containing a copy of the questionnaire and a letter from the first author describing the research project and informing them of their rights as participants (this letter being passed by the university's Institutional Review Board). Upon completing their packets, participants returned them to the graduate student researcher who recruited them.[1]

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations

On average, participants scored below the scale midpoints of 4.0 on most of the variables (see Table 1).

In general, participants scored lowest on SDO, followed by prejudice toward the Chinese people, RWA, and support for tougher containment policies. Notably, participants' negative attitudes were highest when it came to the Chinese government.

The correlations (see Table 2) among our variables were all statistically significant (p's $< .01$). The strongest correlations were obtained between 1) RWA and support for tougher containment policies, 2) RWA and SDO, and 3) negative attitudes toward the Chinese government and prejudice against the Chinese people.

[1] In an effort to add some standardization to the process, the first author provided students with verbal information on the nature of the study and instructed them on preferred conditions for acquiring data from participants (e.g., placing especially strong emphasis on efforts to minimize problems of non-independent responses). Nevertheless, students were left to their own devices when it came to deciding what specifically to say to prospective participants.

Table 2
Correlation coefficients for Studies 1 and 2

	1	2	3	4	5
1. RWA	-	.417**	.174**	.168**	.592**
2. SDO	.322**	-	.312**	.221**	.401**
3. Prejudice	.199*	.345**	-	.413**	.333**
4. Neggov	.091	.051	.292**	-	.388**
5. Contain	.273**	.285**	.285**	.362**	-

Notes: **p < .01. *p < .05. Study 1 correlations are found above the primary diagonal, and Study 2 correlations are found below the primary diagonal. RWA = right-wing authoritarianism, SDO = social dominance orientation, Prejudice = prejudice against the Chinese people, Neggov = negative attitudes toward the Chinese government, Contain = support for tougher containment policies against China

Measurement model

We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using Lisrel 8.52 prior to specifying the proposed causal relationships in our structural equation model (SEM). This analysis was conducted on item parcels created from the original set of items that were utilized to measure our respective constructs. We measured each latent variable with three parcels. The resulting model yielded reasonably good fit to the data: $\chi^2(80) = 151.05$, $p < .05$; RMSEA/90% confidence interval = $.043 \leq .057 \leq .070$; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .98; Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .032; Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .98; $\chi^2/df = 1.888$. R-square values for the indicators ranged from .50 to .94, indicating that the variation in the indicator variables was strongly accounted for by the proposed latent factors.

Structural equation models

We began our SEM analyses by testing a fully saturated model (Model 1), as shown in Figure 2. As such, the fit statistics corresponded fully with those obtained with the measurement model. All paths in this model were statistically significant (all p's < .05) with the exception of the paths running from RWA to (a) prejudice against the Chinese people and (b) negative attitudes toward the Chinese government.

Figure 2
Fully saturated model (Model 1)



Figure 3
Standardized path coefficients for Study 1 trimmed model (Model 2)



Note. All paths in model are statistically significant at p<.05 (two-tailed) with the exception of the path from prejudice to containment (p<.05, one-tailed).

These two paths were trimmed (Kline, 2005) and the fit statistics and parameter estimates recomputed in a subsequent model (Model 2), as depicted in Figure 3. The resulting model also exhibited good fit to the data [$\chi^2(82) = 151.76$, $p < .05$; RMSEA/90% confidence interval = $.042 \leq .056 \leq$

.069; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .98; Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .036; Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .98; χ^2/df = 1.851], with all paths being statistically significant. The R-square values for the endogenous variables in Model 2 were as follows: negative attitudes toward the Chinese government = .064; prejudice against the Chinese people = .12; containment = .55. See Figure 3 for standardized path coefficients. Because a number of different models have the potential to fit the same set of sample data, it is recommended that researchers test their preferred models against other plausible alternatives (see Kline, 2005; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). In the present study, a reasonable alternative to Model 2 is a model in which negative attitudes toward the Chinese people and their government are considered as post hoc rationalizations for support of tougher containment policies against China.

We again tested a fully saturated model (Model 3) with RWA and SDO predicting all variables, but with containment attitudes treated as a predictor of prejudice against the Chinese people and negative attitudes toward the government. The resulting model exhibited the same level of fit as Model 1. Although only one path failed to achieve statistical significance (the path from SDO to negative attitudes toward the Chinese government), the direct paths from RWA to (a) prejudice toward the Chinese people and (b) negative attitudes toward the government were negative and thus not in keeping with theoretical expectations. Two subsequent models (i.e., Models 4 and 5) were run after trimming non-significant paths from the initial saturated model (Model 3). The final model (Model 5), in addition to incorporating a theoretically inconsistent negative path from RWA to negative attitudes toward the Chinese government, exhibited a worse fit [$\chi^2(82) = 153.78$, $p < .05$; RMSEA/90% confidence interval = $.044 \leq .057 \leq .071$; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .98; Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .040; Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .98; $\chi^2/df = 1.875$] to the data than Model 2. The Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for Model 2 and Model 5 was .83 and .84, respectively, again favoring Model 2.

Tests of indirect effects

We tested the indirect effects of SDO on support for tougher containment in Model 2 (see Figure 3) using Kristopher Preacher's online calculator (http://people.ku.edu/~preacher/sobel/sobel.htm). A Sobel test of the indirect effect of SDO on support for tougher containment via prejudice towards the Chinese people revealed that the effect only achieved near significance ($p = .07$). The indirect effect of SDO on support for containment by way of negative attitudes toward China's government, however, was

statistically significant (p = .003). The standardized indirect effects of SDO on containment attitudes via prejudice and negative attitudes towards China's government were .042 and .065, respectively – very small effects, to be sure.

Discussion

The results from Study 1 were largely inconsistent with our expectations that the effects of RWA and SDO on support for tougher containment policies would be mediated through prejudice against the Chinese people and negative attitudes toward China's government. Both RWA and SDO appeared to exert significant direct effects on containment attitudes, while the data addressing the possible indirect effects of SDO on support for greater containment via prejudice and negative governmental attitudes fell quite short. Upon reflection, we considered the possibility that the lack of any strong meditational effects may have been a function of how we chose to operationalize the prejudice and negative governmental attitudes measures. We used measures that asked participants to rate positively- or negatively-valenced adjectives to describe the Chinese people and the government of China. Perhaps these measures elicited more of a "cold" cognitive evaluation (see Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005 for similar discussion) of these entities that are unlikely to correlate particularly strongly with individual differences (e.g., RWA) that are more emotionally "hot".

Secondly, the socio-political context in the United States at the time we collected our data for this study may have contributed to the lack of observed mediation in our models. Our data were collected in early spring of 2008, at a time when the salience of the "China threat" was diminished as the media shifted its attention to the U.S. presidential primaries. As such, Americans completing the survey may not have been adequately primed to respond to a measure about China's government and people, which may have reduced the variation on the prejudice and negative government measures needed for them to function effectively as mediating variables. Persons high on RWA, on the other hand, may not have needed to have their prejudices primed as the mere reference to any kind of potential cultural threat may be all that is needed to produce an association between RWA and containment attitudes.

Based on the abovementioned considerations, we designed a second study to further test our hypothesized model. The data for Study 2 were collected during summer of 2009 using more emotionally "hot" measures of negative attitudes toward China's people and government.

Study 2

Methods

Participants

This sample was comprised of 161 community members (53% female, 62% White) from the Southwestern United States. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 75 (Mean = 40.019, SD = 13.921). Overall, the sample tended to be fairly highly educated, as approximately 57% of participants reported having at least completed a college degree[2].

Measures

Participants were asked to respond to all measures using 7-point rating scales with anchors of "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree". Cronbach's alpha coefficients for the measures are provided in Table 1.

Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale. We used seven items from Altemeyer's (1998) scale to measure RWA. Example items are provided in Study 1.

Social dominance orientation (SDO) scale. We used nine items from Sidanius and Pratto's (1999) SDO Scale to measure social dominance orientation. Example items are provided in Study 1.

Prejudice toward the Chinese people. Prejudice toward the Chinese people was measured using a single item whereby participants rated their level of warmth versus coldness toward the people of China using a seven point format ranging from "extremely cold/unfavorable" to "extremely warm/favorable".

Negative attitudes toward the Chinese government. Negative attitudes toward the Chinese government was also measured using a single item whereby participants rated their level of warmth versus coldness toward the government of China using a seven point format ranging from "extremely cold/unfavorable" to "extremely warm/favorable".

Support for tougher containment policies. Five items were used to measure endorsement of a tougher U.S. policy towards China. Items included "The U.S. government should adopt a tougher stand towards China on human rights issues," "The U.S. government should do more to build a cooperative relationship with China" (reverse coded), "The U.S. government should do whatever it can to weaken China militarily," "The U.S. should do whatever it can to weaken China's economic progress," and "The

[2] Eight participants did not report on gender, and five participants failed to report on their race/ethnicity.

U.S. government should adopt a friendlier foreign policy towards China" (reverse scored).

The abovementioned measures were scored such that higher scores represented greater levels of RWA, SDO, prejudice toward the Chinese people, negative attitudes towards the Chinese government, and support for tougher containment policies, respectively.

Procedure

Participants were recruited by graduate students enrolled in statistics courses taught by the first author during the summer of 2009 using the same procedure described in Study 1.

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations

On average, participants scored below the scale midpoints of 4.0 on most of the variables (see Table 1). Participants scored lowest on prejudice toward the Chinese people, followed by SDO, RWA, and support for tougher containment policies. Participants' scores were highest on negative attitudes toward the Chinese government. As Table 2 reveals, both RWA and SDO correlated positively and significantly with support for tougher containment and with prejudice against the Chinese people. Neither RWA nor SDO correlated significantly with negative attitudes toward China's government. RWA and SDO were significantly correlated in the present sample.

Measurement model

As in Study 1, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using Lisrel 8.52 prior to specifying the proposed causal relationships in our structural equation model (SEM). This analysis was conducted on item parcels created from the original set of items that were utilized to measure our respective constructs. RWA and support for containment were measured using two parcels, whereas SDO was measured using three. Prejudice towards the Chinese people and negative attitudes toward China's government were measured with single item indicators. The resulting model yielded reasonably good fit to the data: $\chi^2(19) = 27.25$, $p = .088$; RMSEA/90% confidence interval = $.00 \leq .054 \leq .094$; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .97; Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .037; Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .95; $\chi^2/df = 1.461$. R-square values for the parceled indicators ranged from .33 to .63, indicating that the variation in

the indicator variables was strongly accounted for by the proposed latent factors.

Structural equation models

Once again, we began our SEM analyses by testing the fully saturated model (Model 1) depicted in Figure 2, which yielded fit statistics that corresponded fully with those obtained with the measurement model. Four paths in this model were statistically significant: (a) RWA to support for greater containment ($p < .05$), (b) SDO to prejudice against the Chinese people ($p < .01$), (c) negative attitudes toward the Chinese government to support for tougher containment ($p < .01$), and (d) SDO to support for tougher containment ($p < .05$, one-tailed). The remaining paths were trimmed, and a path from negative attitudes toward China's government to containment was added prior to re-estimation of the fit statistics and parameter estimates[3]. The resulting model (Model 2; see Figure 4) exhibited adequate fit to the data [$\chi^2(21) = 29.23$, $p = .109$; RMSEA/90% confidence interval = $.00 \leq .049 \leq .089$; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .98; Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .040; Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .96; $\chi^2/df = 1.392$], with all paths being statistically significant. The R-square values for the endogenous variables in the final model were as follows: prejudice against the Chinese people = .22; containment = .53. Standardized path coefficients are presented in Figure 4.

We again tested an alternative model (Model 3) in which prejudice toward the Chinese people and negative attitudes toward China's government were considered as post hoc rationalizations for support of tougher containment policies against China, beginning with a fully saturated model in which RWA and SDO predicted all variables and containment attitudes predicted negative attitudes toward the Chinese people and government.

[3] The path from negative attitudes towards China's government to prejudice towards its people was included in the model since the former effectively became an exogenous variable after deletion of non-significant paths in the fully saturated model. Since LISREL does not provide a mechanism to correlate an exogenous variable with the error term for an endogenous variable, this path appeared to be the only reasonable approach to maintaining the assumption that a relationship between negative attitudes towards China's government and prejudice towards the people of China. In the interest of thoroughness, an alternative trimmed model was tested wherein which prejudice towards China's people served as a predictor of negative attitudes towards China's government. The resulting model exhibited roughly equivalent fit to the data including negative attitudes towards the government as a predictor of prejudice towards the people.

Figure 4
Standardized path coefficients for Study 2 trimmed model (Model 2)



Note. All paths in model are statistically significant at p<.05 (two-tailed). The correlations between negative attitudes toward the Chinese government and SDO and RWA were both non-significant in the model.

The resulting model exhibited the same level of fit as Model 1. For this model, three paths failed to achieve statistical significance: the path from SDO to negative attitudes toward the Chinese government and the direct paths from RWA to (b) prejudice toward the Chinese people and (c) negative attitudes toward the government. One subsequent model was run after trimming non-significant paths from the initial alternative model. This final model (Model 4) exhibited a slightly worse fit [$\chi^2(22) = 32.23$, $p = .074$; RMSEA/90% confidence interval = $.00 \leq .054 \leq .092$; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .97; Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .047; Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .95; $\chi^2/df = 1.465$] to the data than Model 2. The Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for the Model 2 and Model 4 was .48 and .49, respectively, favoring Model 2.

Discussion

Our second study largely replicated the findings of the first. The effects of RWA and SDO on policy preferences were direct, with individuals scoring higher on these two variables exhibiting greater support for a stronger

policy of containment against China. SDO again emerged as a statistically significant (moderate) predictor of prejudice against the Chinese people; however, the proposed meditational routes from RWA and SDO to containment attitudes were completely absent.

General discussion

The results of Studies 1 and 2 were incompatible with our expectation that the effects of RWA and SDO on containment attitudes would be mediated by prejudice towards the Chinese people and negative attitudes towards China's government. Study 1 barely hinted at the possibility of indirect effects of SDO on containment attitudes via prejudice and negative attitudes toward the Chinese government, as these effects were quite small and, in the case of the former mediator, non-significant. In the second study, neither RWA nor SDO demonstrated any type of indirect relationship when it came to predicting containment attitudes.

In both studies, however, RWA and SDO did appear to exert direct effects on participants' support for tougher policies towards China. RWA emerged as the strongest predictor of support for tougher containment policies toward China in Study 1, whereas both RWA and SDO appeared to exert similar direct effects in Study 2. These findings suggest that support for tougher containment policies at the international level may be a function of more generalized needs for safety, security, and conformity (in the case of RWA, see Duckitt, 2001) and/or valuing of power and achievement (in the case of SDO; see Duckitt, 2001) that are not necessarily felt through specific attitudes directed at the populations and governments of other nations (an interpretation that would have been supported had the proposed mediated effects of RWA and SDO appeared in the data).

A second interesting finding in our data was the fact that SDO was more likely to predict prejudice against the people of China (in Studies 1 and 2) and negative attitudes toward China's government (in Study 1) than RWA. Historically, RWA has been a strong predictor of prejudiced attitudes against outgroups and there was no reason in the current study for us to expect otherwise when it came to attitudes towards the government and people of China. Surprisingly, RWA exhibited low and in some cases negligible relationships with our measures of negative attitudes. We considered several possible factors that may account for this finding in our data. First, the effects of RWA on prejudice towards the Chinese people and negative attitudes toward the Chinese government may reflect low levels of knowledge regarding what exactly makes these groups different and, by extension, a potential in-group threat. As noted in the introduction, most of the

prejudice research involving RWA and SDO has focused on groups that are likely to come into contact with the in-group, such as minority groups and immigrants that may reside within one's own country. Perhaps RWA was not related to prejudice in the current study because the likelihood of coming into contact with Chinese people within *their* own country – the U.S. – is so low for most Americans. Moreover, a lack of knowledge may have precluded the formation of more explicit negative attitudes about the Chinese government by many Americans, including those high in RWA. On the other hand, the direct effect of RWA on containment attitudes may reflect a tendency to resonate with the threat-related discourse that is a part of so much of the current media focus on China today (e.g. Bernstein and Munro, 1997; Gertz, 2002).

Secondly, the absence of a relationship between RWA and attitudes towards the Chinese people and government may be methodological, although we attempted to address this possibility with a second study. In Study 1, we asked participants to rate China's government and people on a set of positively- and negatively-valenced attitudes, a cold cognitive approach (see Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). In Study 2, we attempted to use a "hotter", emotion-based approach to measuring prejudice, with participants rating their levels of warmth or coldness toward the Chinese government and people. Perhaps other measures of negative attitudes (e.g., preferred social distance) would have yielded stronger effects had we included them in our study.

Despite the fact that our expectations regarding mediation were not borne out in our study, we nevertheless were able to account for approximately 55% and 53% of the variance in our outcome variable, support for tougher containment policies, in Studies 1 and 2 respectively. Indeed, our final results point to the fact that RWA and SDO are two constructs that may be quite useful in better understanding how American citizens understand international relations and, ultimately, come to support the particular kinds of U.S. foreign policies they do. Nevertheless, more research is needed to identify possible variables that intervene between these authoritarian dispositions and preferred U.S. policies in the international realm.

Limitations

Our study was limited in several key respects. First, the study was correlational in nature, which precludes any type of firm judgment about the accuracy of the proposed causal model or the final re-specified models that we tested. Good model fit only indicates that a model is not falsified, not that it proves a particular causal ordering. This is important to keep in mind

given that it is often the case that a number of alternative models might fit the data as well or better than the model being tested (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Although we attempted to test competing models against our preferred causal ordering, it is impossible to rule out all possible alternatives.

In an effort to expand the range on our variables and to gain a more representative sampling of adult citizens, we asked graduate student researchers to collect data from people in the community – an approach that was very similar to that of other researchers (Altemeyer, 1996; McFarland & Matthews, 2005; Roets et al., 2006) seeking to obtain samples comprised of more than just undergraduate university students. Our use of graduate students as a vehicle for collecting community data, while potentially increasing the observed variation on our response measures, may still have lead to biased estimates when it came to estimating parameters in the U.S. population at large (and even the community from which the sample was drawn). As evidenced in the report of our sample demographics, the education level of our respondents seemed somewhat high, raising questions about the generalizability of our findings. Perhaps the mediated effects that we hypothesized to occur would have become evident in samples comprised of individuals with different, or at least more varied, educational backgrounds. Even so, we believe that our sampling approach afforded an opportunity to obtain participants exhibiting greater variation on age, education level, and gender than those typically obtained through the sampling of undergraduate research participants. Clearly, efforts to replicate the present findings in more diverse population samples within the U.S. are in order.

Conclusions

This study was designed to test a model of predicted relationships between RWA, SDO, and attitudes toward China's government and people. Although our hypotheses that the effects of RWA and SDO on containment attitudes would be mediated by prejudiced attitudes toward the Chinese people and negative governmental attitudes were not borne out, the results were still telling. RWA and SDO exhibited direct effects on support for tougher containment policies across two samples, providing evidence of their consistent influence on containment attitudes. This finding lends additional support for the empirical distinctiveness of RWA and SDO as authoritarian dispositions (see Altemeyer, 1998), while at the same time suggesting that each may have explanatory value when predicting attitudes toward the people and governments of foreign countries. The current findings sug-

gest that attitudes toward China may be driven by two types of motivational orientations: motives toward social cohesion, security, and order, as reflected in scores on the RWA Scale, and motives toward power, achievement, and competitiveness, as reflected in scores on the SDO Scale (see Duckitt, 2001, 2006).

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