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DETERRENCE THEORY AND ANOMIE

*The University of Oklahoma* PH.D. 1980

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

# DETERRENCE THEORY AND ANOMIE

A DISSERTATION

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in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

GEORGE JOSEPH BRYJAK

Norman, Oklahoma

1980

DETERRENCE THEORY AND ANOMIE

APPROVED BY



DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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# DETERRENCE THEORY AND ANOMIE

## CHAPTER I

## STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

### Overview

This dissertation examines the role of deterrence theory and the subjective component of anomie theory (anomia) as explanations for two types of rule violating behavior: cheating and stealing. While the primary purpose of this study is to ascertain the explanatory power of these theories, a secondary goal is to investigate the possibility of an eventual theoretical synthesis of the deterrence and anomie perspectives.

The argument is made that utilitarian philosophy, the intellectual bedrock of deterrence theory, calls for an examination of the rewards, or benefits, associated with a particular act as well as the perceived costs of that behavior. To date, deterrence theorists have focused almost exclusively on costs or punishments and have all but neglected the rewards associated with behavior. The introduction of anomie theory (in the form of anomia) is an attempt to be more consistent with the basic utilitarian position for explaining human behavior; i.e., behavior is the result of the actor's perception of the rewards and costs associated with some contemplated furture action. If perceived rewards outweigh perceived costs, the act in question will be undertaken; if costs outweigh rewards, the act will be rejected. While anomia (the disjuncture between desired goals and

the actor's perception of the availability of means necessary to achieve these goals) is not a "reward" in the usual sense of the word, it may nonetheless like a reward, be thought of as a generative factor, i.e., a factor that produces, causes or in some way acts to motivate an individual to engage in deviant behavior.

The logic of utilitarian thought leads us to deduce that contemplated behavior will not be undertaken, no matter how small or inconsequential perceived costs may be, if the actor sees no reason for engaging in that act; i.e., if he perceives no reward or gain associated with the behavior in question. In similar fashion, no matter how small the costs may appear (perceived punishment associated with an act), the individual will fail to engage in rule violating behavior in the absence of some generative factor.

What we have done, then, is to substitute a generative factor (anomia) for rewards in one of the basic utilitarian propositions. While utilitarians and their contemporary descendants - exchange theorists - speak of rewards and costs, this study examines the relationship between a generative factor (anomia) and two inhibitory factors (moral commitment to norms and fear of punishment).

In an attempt to examine this issue and move toward an integration of anomie and deterrence theory, we advanced three hypotheses. The final, and most crucial hypothesis is as follows:

> People will engage in rule violating behavior only under the pressure of the generative factor (anomia). In other words, the generative factor is a necessary condition for deviance. Thus, prohibitive factors influence rule violating behavior only when anomia is high. When anomia is low, there should be no relationship between prohibitve factors and rule violating behavior.

The data utilized consisted of approximately 300 questionnaires administered to undergraduate students at the University of Oklahoma. The students, both upper and lower division, were enrolled in a variety of social science and business courses. The nature of the data allowed us to use multiple regression techniques as the primary method of analysis.

In regard to the hypothesis of central importance, we discovered that anomia need not be present for the occurrence of self reported violations. In other words, anomia is not a necessary condition for deviant behavior as we had predicted. We also learned that prohibitive factors do not influence rule violating behavior solely under the condition of high anomia. The central hypothesis of this research was, therefore, rejected.

It is concluded, on the basis of our analysis, that anomia as operationalized and measured in this study, is not the generative factor that best accounts for classroom cheating and stealing behavior. Possible explanations for the observed weak relationahip between anomia and the rule violating behavior are offered. Looking at the inhibitory variables, the best predictor of self reported violations was found to be moral commitment. Implications of this finding are also discussed.

## Introduction

Social scientists have long been concerned with the problem of order. This fundamental sociological question can be analytically broken down into two parts: (1) how is order maintained in human collectivities from small groups to large societies, and (2) what causes this order to break down and sometimes disintegrate? How do we account for disruptions in society varying from individual acts of deviance to large-scale collective violence? The answers to these questions represent a wide range of

sociological traditions with functionalism and conflict theory being the two most paramount persepctives.

In the 1920's and 30's sociologists began to express an interest in a particular type of disruptive order-threatening behavior--crime. They focused their attention on the forces in society that generated criminal and deviant behavior: disorganization (Chicago School), anomie and deviant subcultures. While sociologists did express an interest in the control and evaluation of crime, it appears they devoted most of their energy to developing explanations for the genesis of criminal behavior.

Of the efforts aimed at the control of criminal behavior during this period perhaps the most well known was the Chicago Area Project (Kobrin, 1966: 473-482). This delinquency prevention program was conceived and administrated by University of Chicago sociologists under the leadership of Clifford Shaw. This project reflected the ecological and social-psychological perspective of the Chicago scholars. Control of delinquency, it was believed, could best be accomplished by community reorganization and community action.

Arguments for the use of punishment as a mechanism of social control, and specifically as a deterrent, were well understood by these sociologists. This is evident from the writings of Edwin Sutherland (Schuessler, 1973: 167-185) still the foremost name in American criminology. However the punishment alternative was rejected by Sutherland in favor of a treatment strategy. According to Schuessler (1973: 148), Sutherland believed that "ultimately the crime problem can be solved only on the level of the local community through changes in the social organization of the people who live in it."

## Deterrence Theory and Utilitarian Thought

In the past ten to fifteen years, sociologists have renewed their interest in the inhibitory effects of punishment. Deterrence theorists, as these scholars are now called, acknowledge and intellectual debt to utilitarian thinkers.

The system of thought known as utilitarianism is quite old and its origin more or less obscure (Parsons, 1937: 51). A number of thinkers are associated with this position, the most significant of whom are David Hume, Adam Smith, Jeramy Bentham and J. S. Mill (Camic, 1979). According to Camic, utilitarianism has come to mean, or be associated with all of the following: (1) a model of society composed of egoistically motivated individuals who pursue their material ends with rational means (he believes this to be Parsons (1937) interpretation of the utilitarian position); (2) the collective ideas of Bentham, James and J. S. Mill and their followers who called themselves "Philosophical Radicals"; and (3) an ethical principle stating that acts are viewed as morally good, "whose consequences tend to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of individuals."

The utilitarian thought of David Hume is significant in that it influenced the later works of Benthem (Bronowski and Mazlich, 1960: 435) and Beccaria (Becker and Barnes, 1961: 551), both of whom are associated with the classical school" of criminology. This school of thought is reflected in and serves as the intellectual foundation for contemporary deterrence theory. Although the complex philosophies of these two men cannot be analyzed in any depth, considering the scope and direction of this paper, some of their more basic and important ideas must be mentioned.

The first line of Benthams Principles of Morals and Legislation outlines his fundamental position concerning the nature of human nature. "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as what we shall do." For Bentham, intelligent, rational, calculating free willed human beings attempt to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. The ideal government should also work on this maximization--minimization principle and would move toward the achievement of these ends through the administration of sanctions. "There were four sanctions or pains and pleasures annexed to actions: the physical or natural, the political, moral or popular and religion" (Bronowski and Mazlich, 1960: 437). Of these sanctions only political punishment was to be imposed by the government. While punishment in itself was evil, it was considered a necessary evil. The administration of sanctions by the state could prevent some greater wrongdoing. Bentham also developed a mathematical system of pleasure and pain or "felicific calculus." He argued that punishment would act as a deterrent to the extent that it was certain, swift and severe (Chambliss, 1966).

Beccaria, the 18th century Italian humanitarian, lived and wrote in a period of intellectual turmoil and when the philosophical underpinnings of both church and state were being attacked (Vold, 1979: 20; Cressey, 1979). Beccaria's most famous work, Essay on Crimes and Punishment, was "a severe criticism of the contemporary criminal law and its administration, a plea for rational correspondence of the gravity of crime and the severity of punishment and an eloquent denunciation of torture, secret accusations and indiscriminate capital punishment" (Hall, 1964 in

Cressey, 1979). A few of Beccarias more important ideas have been summarized by Vold (1979: 24-25).

1. The state has the right to punish.
2. Pain and pleasure are the basis of human motivation.
3. The act and not the intent is the measure of injury done by crime.
4. Punishment is desireable only as it helps prevent crime.
5. The use of imprisonment should be more fully employed.

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of utilitarian thought, as it is reflected in the classical school of criminology, focuses on the important question of "criminal responsibility." From this free will perspective, criminal responsibility rests clearly and completely with the individual, "Essentially unaffected by social consideration or pressures in his choices" (Becker and Barnes, 1961: 529). Man exercises his freedom of choice as he systematically accepts and rejects various courses of action. This non-deterministic philosophy was a tacit rejection of any explanations using causal factors either internal or external to the actor in accounting for criminal behavior. It logically follows from this "free will" individual responsibility position that rational human beings could be deterred from criminal activity through the utilization of force and force threat.

A criminology grounded in positivism was ushered in by the Italians (Lombroso, Ferri and Garofalo) in the nineteenth century and was a radical departure from the "free will" classical school perspective. The most important feature of positivism was its application of the scientific method (observation, experimentation, the quantification and manipulation of data) to the phenomenon under consideration. Rejecting the free will position of the classicists, the positivists attempted to

discern the "causes" of crime. As a positivist criminology began to take shape and to gain adherents and recognition (the early biological orientation of the Italians was to be replaced by a sociological criminology), there was a corresponding decline in the interest of punishment as a mechanism of social control. If criminal behavior was the result of (i.e., caused by) forces either internal or external to the actor that were to a greater or lesser extent beyond his control, the use of punishment as a mechanism of control made little sense and would be, for the most part, ineffective.

For most of this century criminology has been dominated by sociological theories of crime causation. However, as one observer has noted, in recent years criminological interest has shifted "to an overwhelming concern for political control of crime and criminals" (Cressey, 1978, 1979) Cressey is obviously referring to the prolifieration of deterrence research over the past few years.

The ground breaking for this new era of deterrence research began with a series of articles written in the late sixties. Jack Gibbs (1968) found (with states as the unit of analysis) that, both certainty and severity of imprisonment are inversely related to criminal homicide rates, with the association between certainty of imprisonment and the homicide rate the stronger of the two. Charles Tittle (1969) examined the relation between certainty and severity of punishment and the incidence of various kinds of crimes. Using states as his unit of analysis, Tittle calculated the crime rates for the seven felonies categorized by the FBI in the Uniform Crime Reports. He found that for all crimes taken together there is an inverse relation betwen certainty of punishment and the crime rate.

Jensen (1969) focused on the individual's perception of the severity and certainty of punishment. The belief that law breakers are apprehended and punished was found to be "negatively related to both official and self-reported delinquency and positively related to respect for the law and police."

## Capital Punishment

These findings contradicted past studies dealing with the deterrent effect of punishment (Sutherland 1925, Schuessler 1952, Campion 1925, Graves 1956, Sellin 1955, 1959 and Savitz 1958).[1] Most of the early deterrence research dealt with the relation between capital punishment and homicide rates. The findings were consistent--capital punishment is no more effective in deterring homicide than the threat of life in prison. It was only with the recent renewed interest in deterrence that these past studies were re-examined and subsequently challenged.

Bailey (1974), after a careful examination of some of the studies mentioned above, surmises that they are inconclusive, suffering from a "number of serious theoretical and methodological shortcomings." Tullock (1974), an economist, describes these early capital punishment studies as "extremely primitive statistically." Ehrlich (1975) another economist, using more sophisticated statistical techniques found, "a very sizeable deterrence payoff to the death penalty for murder."

Almost all of these early studies concentrated on only one aspect of punishment--severity--and only one offense--homicide. Very little attention was paid to the certainty of punishment. Consequently, only one

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[1] The works of Sellin, Campion, Savitz and Graves can be found in The Death Penalty in America by Hugo Adam Bedaue, Anchor Books, Garden City, New York 1967.

aspect of the deterrence equation was tested. Since there is some evidence that the frequency of the application of punishment may be more important than its severity in reducing rule-violating behavior, the effectiveness of capital punishment should not have been ruled out, for it has never adequately been put into practice. As one researcher put it, "the lesson to be learned from capital punishment is not that punishment does not deter, but that the improper and sloppy use of punishment does not deter or rehabilitate." (Jeffrey 1965: 294).

It is possible that some sociologists may have generalized what they interpreted as the ineffectiveness of capital punishment in the early studies to the inability of punishment to deter criminal and deviant behavior of every kind. Jack Gibbs (1968: 516) it would appear, has arrived at this conclusion, "Execution is, after all, only one type of punitive reaction to crime, but sociologists tend to extend opinions on the death penalty to punitive reactions generally."

## Deterrence Research

Deterrence researchers soon realized that there were other reasons why individuals did not engage in deviant and criminal behavior besides a fear of formal sanctions--i.e., stigmatization by group members, withdrawal of respect and approval by significant others, etc. Other researchers saw conforming behavior as a result of actors being held in check by their commitment to the normative order rather than a fear of either formal or informal sanctions. The notion of moral commitment, so important in the work of Parsons and his followers, was incorporated into deterrence research.

Still other researchers focused on the type of norms in question. Most people do not engage in murder or armed robbery because these acts are viewed as being wrong in and of themselves i.e., they are malum in se. Smoking marijuana on the other hand is looked at by a substantial number of people as wrong only to the extent that it is illegal--i.e., malum prohibitum. Rules of this type lack support based on moral commitment and are forced to "stand alone."

There are numerous generative factors explicitly or implicitly fond in a variety of sociological theories in the area of crime and deviance. Conflict theory posits a struggle for dominance as the motivating force resulting in deviant and criminal behavior. The Chicago School saw social disorganization--the product of rapid growth, urbanization, and industrialization--as leading to the breakdown of values and norms and eventually to deviant behavior. Subcultural theories argue that individuals conform to the values and norms of groups that deviate from the value system of the larger society. The desire for acceptance and prestige by members of deviant subcultures, although no different from nondeviants, leads to rule-violating behavior.

The generative factor to be considered in this dissertation is grounded in anomie theory. There are at least three reasons for choosing this perspective: First, Anomie theory has a long, rich tradition in sociology in general and the area of crime and deviance in particular. From Durkheim, through Merton to Cloward and Ohlin and other contemporary researchers, anomie theory has had a substantial impact on American sociology. (2) In the past thirty years a considerable amount of empirical work has been done in this area. Anomie as used in this study will hopefully add to this body of knowledge and also remedy some of its

shortcomings. (3) The operationalization and measurement of anomie used in this study fits well within the "perceptual" approach which has become the dominant perspective in contemporary deterrence research.

Even a cursory review of the deterrence literature reveals that researchers in this area have made no attempt to unite theories focusing on the generative variables associated with rule-violating behavior with theories of social control. Generative factors are those factors that are instrumental in causing, producing, or in some way bringing about rule-violating behavior. The inhibitory variables that we will focus on have been utilized by numerous researchers in previous studies. Inhibitory factors may be defined as those factors that restrain, prohibit, or in some capacity function to prevent the occurrence of deviant behavior. The punitive inhibitory variables (both formal and informal), along with moral commitment are readily found in the deterrence literature (Jensen, 1969, Waldo and Chiricos 1972, Burkett and Jensen 1975, Silberman 1976, Kraut 1976, Meier and Johnson 1977, Teevan 1976, a, b, c). This research will attempt to shed light on deviant and conforming behavior within the basic utilitarian perspective--i.e., to bring back in, so to speak, the previously neglected generative factor.

## General Hypotheses

In this dissertation the inhibitory factors as well as the generative aspects of conforming and rule-violating behavior will be examined. To date, emphasis in research has been almost exclusively on the prohibitive factors. This has resulted in an incomplete picture of deviant behavior and the subsequent control of such behavior. To more fully understand the effects of punishment, both its strengths and weaknesses in the

control of rule-violating behavior, we must learn not only how the actor perceives negative sanctions but also what motivates him to deviate. To this end, an integration of anomie theory and the deterrence doctrine has been attempted.

The fundamental position of this dissertation will be that inhibitory variables have a greater effect on behavior when the motivation to deviate--in this case anomia--is high. In the absence of anomia, people will not engage in illegal behavior even if they score low on measures of the inhibitory variables. In other words, punishment will act as a deterrent only in those cases where individuals are motivated to deviate. In those instances where amonia is low, the threat of punishment will have little affect on behavior.

## Dissertation Outline

The overall sociological perspective, as it relates to crime and deviance, consists of numerous theoretical positions and conceptualizations. Our knowlegde of the social world is enhanced and the discipline as a whole moves forward not only when new paradigms are introduced but also when existing ones are successfully integrated. As previously mentioned, the aim of this dissertation is a move toward the integration of a generative theory of deviance (anomie) and a soical control perspective (the deterrence doctrine).

The first step toward accomplishment of this task will be to elaborate the deterrence doctrine and place it within the larger framework of social control. This will allow us to examine the extent to which punishment and the threat of punishment have been considered mechanisms of social control by American sociologists. A review of the deterrence literature

will provide a brief history of the development of force-threat as a mechanism of social control, as well as indicate the strengths and weaknesses of the various research strategies used by deterrence theorists. An argument will be made for the superiority of the "perceptual" approach, the methodological strategy used in this research.

Anomie theory, the generative factor of interest, will also be examined. Of specific concern will be the relationship between anomie and anomia. Some of the major empircal works on anomie will be closely scrutinized. It will be argued that the vast majority of these studies suffer in the operationalization and measurement of "goals" and "means" the crucial components in modern anomie theory. A "new" measure of anomia will also be presented.

In an attempt to integrate anomie and deterrence theory, a study of 300 university students was conducted. A survey instrument was designed to tap respondents' perceptions of the certainty and severity of both formal and informal punishments as they relate to two rule violating acts--classroom cheating and stealing. Other items measured the degree of anomia individuals experienced. Finally self reports of cheating and stealing were obtained. Multiple regression techniques were utilized to test three specific hypotheses.

# CHAPTER II

# THE PLACE OF DETERRENCE THEORY IN THE STUDY OF SOCIAL CONTROL

## Social Control and Sociology

The concept of social control is grounded in the sociological adaptation of Darwinism (Pitts 1968). Where Darwin saw a basic dichotomy between organisms and nature, theories of social control originally focused on what was believed to be an inherent conflict between the individual and society. Control theories argued that if society were to survive, the animal nature in man had to be controlled. These base tendencies that were expressed in each individual pursuing his own self interest would lead to a Hobbesian "state of nature", i.e., a war of all against all. The focus on social control also signalled a decline in utilitarian-grounded theories that postulated a notion of the "natural harmony of self interest" (Janowitz 1976).

The term "social control" was introduced into the literature by Small and Vincent in 1894 (Hollingshead 1941).[2] The first book to deal with the subject was Ross' Social Control: A Survey of the Foundation of Order, published in 1901. In this work Ross makes a distinction between a "natural society" and a "class-based society." In a "natural society"

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[2]Pitts argues that social control is basically an American term although its functional equivalents are readily found in European sociology.

order is maintained, "when basic human impulses are able to work themselves out without interference" (Martindale 1960). Ross believed that men were biologically endowed with a sense of sympathy, sociability and committed to justice and fair play. Under "favorable conditions" these characteristics which manifest themselves in the personalities and actions of men "work out by themselves a true natural order, that is to say, an order without design or art."

The polar opposite of natural societies are class-based societies oriented toward the interest of a particular dominant class. In this situation one class lives at the expense of the entire community and "we no longer have social control in the true sense, but class control." This change in mechanism of control is a direct result of the evolution of societies. More complex societies give way to impersonality and contractual relations as a result of man's weakening "social instincts." When this happens self interest replaces group interest.

> Society at this critical transitional point was faced with the problem of implementing these weakened moral obligations with social mechanisms to control the selfish individuals' relations with others. Therefore, as "natural communities" gave way to "artificial civilized societies" social controls took the place of man's instinctive controls in regulating conduct and assuring to the individual, safety, and to the society, order and continuity (Hollingshead 1941: 218).

It appears, then, that the more civilized society becomes, the more need it has for the social control of its institutions and members. For Ross the amount of social control in society was both increasing and inevitable.

As societies grow and become more complex, human interaction that was previously spontaneous and unforced changes, via institutionalization, to interaction that is forced and coercive. Although Ross was primarily interested in the coercive elements of control in industrial societies, he

was also impressed by the control functions of persuasion and manipulation.

An interesting treatment of social control may be found in the works of Charles Horton Cooley, W. I. Thomas and George Herbert Mead. As founders of the interactionist approach they greatly contributed to our understanding of the development of the self and self control. Self control is an important and effective mechanism for regulating human behavior. The product of interaction, self control is social in nature and not merely an idiosyncratic device.

Sociologists in the heyday of the Chicago School, 1920-1932 (Faris 1967), were also interested in social control. Park, Burgess and their colleagues were concerned with the shift of social control from primary to secondary groups, especially the criminal justice system and political organizations. Social control is the outcome of social organization. When this organization breaks down, mechanisms of control also falter, resulting in deviant and criminal behavior. The rapid growth of cities populated by numerous, often disparate, groups resulted in unstable primary relations, disorganizaiton and, inevitably deviance.

Beginning in the late thirties, functionalist sociologists increasingly became concerned with the issue of social control. In "The Social System" Parsons (1951) dealt at length with this concept. Parsons (and shortly after him, La Pierre) limited the concept of social control to the control of deviance. This is a rather significant step. Prior to Parsons, social control had been a rather loosely defined, all encompassing concept. Social control had been used synonymously with social order, social organization and socialization. Any technique or strategy, intentional or unintentional, by which an individual or group attempted to

control the behavior of another individual, fell under the rubric of social control.

For Parsons, deviance is the motivated tendency to behave in a manner that is contrary to institutionalized norms and values. Social control consists of mechanisms by which deviant motivation and deviant behavior tend to be controlled or counteracted. To be deviant one must first be committed to a normative standard and then depart via motivated action from that standard. For Parsons the phenomenon of deviance is quite straightforward: no original committment--no deviance--no social control.

Social control in a sense quite distinct form that of Parsons is also an integral aspect of the labelling perspective. While labelling theorists offer an explanation for deviance and social control that is at odds with their functionalist colleagues it is more accurate to say that they (labelling theorists) re-constitute (or constitute differently) the meaning of these terms. The major assumptions and sources of difference between the functionalists and labelling perspective have been explicated and examined by Wright and Randall (1979). The three major areas of disagreement identified by these authors are: (1) the temporal element concerning the relation between "rule existence" and "behavioral violation", (2) The distinction between "norm" and "rule" and, (3) the qualitative difference between deviant and nondeviant acts."

For functionalists norms exist in the social system and in the minds of actors prior to their violation. Deviant behavior is behavior that departs from or is contrary to some pre-existing normative standard. "However the labelling theorists assume exactly the opposite time sequence:

behavior occurs and then (perhaps) a rule is invoked and the behavior is reacted to as deviant." (Wright and Randall 1979: 220)

The term "norm", a fundamental sociological concept, is especially significant and of central importance to functionalist theorists. A norm is a "verbal description of the concrete course of action thus regarded as desireable, combined with an injunction to make certain future actions conform to this course." (Parsons 1937: 75) Norms, learned and internalized via the socialization process are shared with a community of actors who collectively comprise a moral system. Individuals deviate from normative standards when as Wright and Randall put it, they find themselves in a "moral bind." "Deviance occurs when the system is disequillibrated in such a manner that the actor is placed under pressure or strain which force him to violate one set of normative expectations or another." (Wright and Randall 1979: 221) The most well known functionalist explanation of system strain resulting in deviance is Robert Merton's (1968) "Social Structure and Anomie".

Advancing an interactionist perspective, labelling theorists focus on rules as opposed to norms. Where norms are relatively "fixed" and "stable" rules are in a state of flux "open to interpretation, negotiation and modification." Rules, unlike norms, are not necessarily shared and, in fact, may be imposed on an unknowing and/or uncommitted actor. Labelling theorists argue that no act in and of itself constitutes deviance, but rather behavior becomes deviant only when it is reacted to in a specific manner. "From the labelling perspective deviance is constituted by reaction to the behavior as deviant--not by the behavior itself. Hence deviance is not an act, it is an interactive relationship." (Wright and Randall 1979: 224)

Examining the qualitative difference between deviant and conforming behavior, the labelling perspective leads us to a rather unique position. If the determining factor in ascertaining if an act will be considered deviant or not is the reaction to that act then no special etiological explanation need be advanced to account for that behavior. Functionalist theorists obviously view this matter quite differently. Norm violating behavior is deviant whether or not there is a reaction to it, and, therefore, an explanation must be put forth to account for that behavior. For functionalists deviant behavior is the product of deviant motivation. Deviant motivation, in turn, is the result of various types of strain within the social system and/or the individual actor himself.

The post-World War II years saw the emergence of conflict theory as one of the more dominant paradigms in American sociology. Conflict sociologists are also quite interested in social control. Unlike Parsons, however, they do not limit social control to the area of deviant behavior although this is of particular interest to some members of the conflict school. Most of these theorists conceive of social control in terms of the question, "how is social order attained?" While functionalists of visualize society as a social system held together by the shared goals, values, and norms of its members, conflict theorists view society as a social arena comprised of various groups, each with a divergent network values, norms and interests, competing for dominance.

If society is characterized by discensus and not consensus, change rather than stability, conflict as opposed to harmony, how then is it held together--how is order possible? The ultimate form of social control

in any society, and one on which conflict theorists place grate emphasis, is power--power not in the Weberian sense of authority, but power based on force and force threat (Goode 1972). The ruling class, through its control of the state, dominates, subjugates, and systematically explits the lower classes. The capitalist class through its management of the police and military, can maintain order and control through force threat and, if necessary, implementation of force.

No society of any consequence, however, can function effectively for any prolonged period of time if its sole mechanism for maintaining order is force or force threat. Conflcit theorists also include socialization as a crucial component of social control. Although the relationship between the dominant and subordinate class is basically an exploitative one, the oppressed class obediently and willingly (most of the time) conforms to standards of behavior that maintain this relationship. Through the socialization process, the oppressed class has come to believe one or more of the following: (1) there are no class distinctions, i.e., everyone is equal (2) if class differences do exist, they are not significant or insurmountable, and (3) position, power and prestiege are achieved rather than ascribed statuses, (4) the existing system of stratification is legitimate and their position within the system as just.

This "false consciousness," or inability to perceive one's "true" objective position in relation to the modes of production, is a powerful mechanism of social control. It keeps most people in line most of the time. Coercive measures of control, force and force threat, will come into play on a large scale only in the latter phase of any historical epoche. For example, force will become more widely used and eventually less effective as we move into the period of advanced capitalism.

Variations of this theme can be seen in the works of Marx, Dahrendorf, and Quinney.

The deterrence doctrine, like conflict theory, is another perspective that focuses on force and force threat as a mechanism of social control. The deterrence perspective, however, is much narrower in scope. Although grounded in the macro theoretical frameowrk of utilitarianism and exchange theory the deterrence doctrine per se does not address itself to questions concerning the struggle for power, causes and consequences of class conflict, social change etc. Of fundamental concern to the deterrence researcher is the degree to which force and force threat can successfully deter people from engaging in rule-violating behavior: i.e., the extent to which punishment is an effective mechanism of social control.

Conflict sociologists utilize concepts such as power, coercive force, and repression extensively and sometimes seemingly interchangeably. More often than not, they are loosely defined. Yet, for concepts that are such an integral part of the conflict perspective, a systematic treatment of the scope, utilization and consequences of force and force threat is lacking. To argue that force and force threat are mechanisms of social control utilized by the state is probably irrefutable and also quite useless. General statements and abstract discussions of force and the power of the state fail to address the fundamental issues concerning these concepts. For example, precisely where is this power located, and under what conditions does the state escalate or reduce its use of force and force threat? Are these decisions made at the local or national level? What is the relation between local and national elites, etc?

The much more narrow, specific question of interest to deterrence researchers is what types of punishment or threats of punishment are effective in controlling certain patterns of behavior in specific groups of people under various conditions. This is the central issue that deterrence theorists are investigating.

The deterrence doctrine, like any other perspective, is not without its shortcomings. Researchers only recently have concerned themselves with the additional inhibitory variables of social disapproval, or informal punishement, and moral commitment. These "new" inhibitory variables are certainly not novel in sociology. The notion of moral commitment is treated extensively in the work of Talcott Parsons, while threat of social disapproval, which is predicated on the belief that man is a seeker of approval, esteem, and a positive self image, has long been a popular theme in American sociology (Wrong 1961).

The threat of social disapproval also provides a link between deterrence theory and Sutherlands "differential association." The crucial variable in differential association concerns definitions favorable or unfavorable to violation of the law (Sutherland and Cressey 1978: 81). To the extent that an actor associates with people who do not violate the law, there is a high probability of social disapproval for the individual should he/she violate the law. Conversely, there is a lower probability of informal sanctions for the actor where associates engage in rule violating behavior.

The overriding question concerning the inhibitory variables (punishment both formal and informal and moral commitment) is to what extent each is a factor in controlling human behavior. Is formal

punishment or moral commitment the crucial variable? Perhaps there is no key variable but a shifting in the importance of these factor according to the behavior, groups, and circumstances in question.

A major shortcoming in deterrence theory and research to date is that generative factors have been neglected. While we are beginning to understand the role that inhibitory variables play in controlling human behavior we have yet to link etiological theories of crime with social control perspectives and test them in any meaningful way. It seems reasonable to assume that various generative factors will be differentially affected by various combinations of inhibitory variables as they apply to specific situations.

## Deterrence Theory

From the deterrence perspective, if criminal behavior is to be curtailed indidviduals must come to believe that costs in the form of punsihment will outweigh any gain associated with rule-violating conduct. The utilitarian position concerning the relation between crime and punishment may be reduced to one direct fairly simple statement: punishment will deter crime to the extent that it is severe, swift, and certain.

The notion that proper levels of and administration of punishment can deter rule-breaking behavior has been hotly debated.[3] The basic tenets of the deterrence doctrine have been uncritically accepted and rejected by many. Becuase so little deterrence research was done,

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[3]This will be discussed more fully in chapter 2 when deterrence research is reviewed.

positions were taken and argued with little reference to empircal work. One of the main reasons for this paucity of research is that the phenomenon of deterrence is enmeshed in a methodological quagmire. Gibbs (1975) argues convincingly that the assertion of the deterrent effect of the severity, certainty and celerity of punishment is not directly testable. This is because the word deter denotes a phenomenon that is not observable, and any assertion that contains the word deterrence is by itself untestable. It can only be tested "when transmitted into the language of space-time relations or, more specifically, the statistical association between properties of punishment and crime." In a word, operationalizing the relevant concepts (i.e., coming up with valid, reliable empirical indicators) so as to test deterrence theory is no easy task. Gibbs is arguing, basically, that by definition the extent of deterrence is unmeasureable.

The fundamental dilema is that of creating a test of deterrence assertions that voids evidential problems. Gibbs (1972: 12) masterfully illuiminates the difficulties inherent in testing the deterrence hypothesis:

> Consider an individual contemplating an act and assume that the individual (1) views the act as contrary to the law (2) knows the prescribed pusnihment, (3) perceives the punishment as severe, and estimates the actual imposition of the punishment as certain. If the individual commits the act, then the threat of punishment clearly did not deter him or her. However, even if the individual refrains, the omission could be attributed to (1) the dictates of personal conscience, (2) the individuals recognition of and respect for the social (extralegal) condemantion of the act, and/or (3) the fear of some extra legal consequences (e.g., stigma). So unless the latter (1), (2), (3) are held constant we have a paradox--regardless of what the individual does (commits or omits the act), it is not evidence of deterrence.

This observation may lead us to believe that the burden of proof is irrefutably stacked against the adherents of deterrence theory. However, the proponents of deterrence theory have also argued convincingly. Take, for example, the actor who commits a criminal act even though he perceives the punishment associated with that act to be certain, swift, and harsh. Opponents will argue that this is a clear-cut example of the inability of punishment to deter criminal behavior. However, deterrence advocates never have claimed that the threat of punishment will deter everyone from committing all types of criminal offenses under any and all circumstances. A similar line of reasoning by opponents of punishment as a deterrent is commonly found in numerous sociology texts. In eighteenth century England, the penalty for picking someone's pocket was death by hanging. The story goes that while large crowds gathered to watch the public execution of thieves, pick-pockets were busy fleecing the audience. This argument is flawed on at least two counts: (1) although the severity of the punishment was obviously high, we have no idea of its certainty and celerity and (2) although the rates of crime were at that time reportedly high and increasing, it is quite possible that without such a severe punishment they would have been even higher. In other words, a substantial number of people may have been deterred from picking pockets.

These "evidential debates," as Gibbs refers to them, indicates that the effects, if any, of deterrence cannot be directly measured but only indirectly measured.[4] Part of the controversy and confusion

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[4]The problem of measurement in deterrence research will be addressed more fully in the methods section.

surrounding the deterrence doctrine results from the inability to distinguish between various types of deterrence. Perhaps the most important distinction is between specific and general deterrence.

Specific deterrence refers to the omission or curtailment of criminal activity by an individual because that individual has been previously punished for rule-violating behavior. The basic principle of general deterrence is that punishment of an individual deters others from committing the same offense. Unlike specific deterrence, general deterrence is not concerned with the punished individual. "It is a message addressed to the public at large. The punishement of the offender deters others by telling them: 'This will happen to you if you violate the law'" (Van Den Haag 1975: 156). General deterrence protects society be restraining potential offencers who may still be deterred. (Durkheim 1960)

A distinction is also made between absolute and restrictive deterrence. The term absolute deterrence refers to an individual or group, from watching others punished, being completely deterred from committing criminal acts because they fear the risk of punishment. Restrictive deterrence occurs when individuals curtail their rule-violating behavior because they fear that continued repetition of that behavior will eventually result in their suffering some punishment. Using society as a unit of analysis it is hard to imagine that any punishment will function (at least for very long) as an absolute deterrent--i.e., all people will be deterred all of the time no matter what the situation or circumstances. However, it does appear that, under some conditions of severity, certainty and celerity of punishment,

higher levels of restrictive deterrence may be achieved resulting in lower rates of criminal behavior.

The concept of deterrence should not be viewed in terms of a dichotomy--i.e., punishment deters across the board and is therefore effective in controlling all manners of rule-violating behavior, or punishment does not deter and is ineffective incontrolling such behavior. This line of thought reduces deterrence to a rather simple, either/or, "take it or leave it" dichotomy. This false dichotomy eliminates the rather large area of possibilities between these two extremes. To think that levels of severity, certainty and celerity of punishment can be attained to the extent that the rate of crime drops to near zero (absolute deterrence) is inappropriate. However, it is just as untenable to believe that under no circumstances will punishment have a deterrent effect.

General deterrence should be viewed in terms of a continuum with the ideal types of "no deterrence" and "absolute deterrence" as polar opposites. We may then proceed to try to determine under what conditions of punishment certain groups of people in particular situations will be deterred from committing specific offenses.

From this brief discussion it should be obvious that the concept of deterrence is quite complex and cannot, or at least should not, be reduced to one general question: Does punishment have a deterrent effect? To begin besides legal or formal sanctions, there are other factors that have to be taken into consideration. The additional inhibitory variables that have found their way into deterrence research are informal punishment and moral commitment. Generative or motivating

factors that lead to rule-violating behavior must also be considered.

Inclusion of generative factors in the deterrence framework is desirable for at least two reasons. First, it is a movement in the direction of theoretical integration, linking causal and control perspectives of rule-violating behavior. Second, an examination of generative and control factors simultaneously will aid in determining what types of deviant motivation are effectively curtailed by force threat and what types of deviant motivations are not.

In the remainder of this chapter, the relevance of informal sanction, moral commitment and generative factors to the deterrence doctrine will be discussed.

## Informal Sanctions

Formal punishments as outlined in the penal code are not the only penalties that may deter rule-violating behavior. Fear of informal sanctions also may act as a powerful deterrent. The stigma resulting from contact with the criminal justice system (being arrested, jailed and accused of a crime) may lead to withdrawal of approval, loss of respect, ridicule or ostracism by significant others in various primary groups. This may be more threatening and subsequently have more of a deterrent effect than fear of legal punishment. Radzinowicz and King (1977: 132) argue rather convincingly on this point.

> And such groups carry their own deterrent sanctions, which may be more powerful than those of the criminal law. The approval or disapproval of those with whom you live, work, share your leisure, interests and affection, have a stronger impact than the remoter sanctions of the state, however impressive. The small group retains the homogeneity and immediacy which the larger remote modern society has lost.

Social disapproval (informal sanctions) is an especially important inhibitory variable because it provides a link between deterrence theory and three formidable statements in the area of crime and delinquency, Reckless' containment theory (1973) Hirschi's Control Theory and Differential Association (Sutherland and Cressey 1978).

The key proposition in Sutherlands theory, as already noted, is the notion of definitions favorable or unfavorable to violation of the law. It follows from this perspective that associates who provide an actor with definitions concerning violations of the law will also provide him with information (at least to some extent) concerning the groups reaction should he engage in rule violating behavior. For example, the actor may internalize definitions favorable to compliance with the law and also learn through word or deed thatlaw violations coming to the groups attention will be met with negative sanctions of some kind. However, the actor may internalize definitions favorable to compliance with the law and learn from the group's reaction, or lack of reaction, that known violations are for the most part ignored; i.e., not met with any informal sanctions.

It has also been suggested (Tittle and Logan 1973) that the threat of legal punichsment (formal sanctions) is an effective deterrent only to the extent that there is a high threat of social disapproval (informal sanctions). From this perspective legal sanctions act as a deterrent because their imposition exposes the offender to his peers who in turn subject him to informal sanctions.

> Therefore, if one's friends would not impose informal sanctions upon exposure (i.e., low threat of social disapproval), the threat of legal punishment would not be an effective

> deterrent. Only under the condition of a high threat of social disapproval should perceived threat of legal punishment be inversely related to involvement in illegal behavior. (Grasmick and Green 1979: 9)

## Moral Commitment

As alluded to earlier in the remarks by Gibbs, there are other factors besides sanction fear which may figure prominently in the individual's decision not to engage in rule-violating behavior. Probably the most important of these additional inhibitory factors is that of moral commitment. Through the socialization process people become aware of, internalize and become committed to a value or norm to such an extent that they normally cannot conceive of acting in a contrary manner. From this perspective people do not steal because they believe that they will be caught and punished but because stealing is for them morally and ethically objectionable. Researchers have tended to look at the deterrent effects of punishment and normative commitment as two rather mutally exclusive explanations for why people refrain from rule-breaking behavior. It could be, however, that the two are more related than we now believe.

Let's take a hypothetical example. For one reason or another in a particular society the severity, certainty and celerity of punishement for a particular criminal offense decreases, resulting in an increase in the number of violations for that offense. The individuals who are now violating the law are the ones who were previously deterred by fear of punishment. As a result of this general increase in the number of violations, those individuals who are committed to the norm in question may now begin to examine and question their commitment to that norm.

They may now come to believe that violation is not really very bad or serious.

Durkehim addressed this topic in "The Division of Labor in Society" (1960: 108). He spoke of the possible demoralization of "upright people" in light of violations of the collective conscience.

> We can thus say without paradox that punishment is above all designed to act upon upright people, for, since it serves to heal the wounds made upon collective sentiments, it can fill this role only where these sentiments exist, and commensurately with their vivacity.

Jackson Toby (1964) has commented on this important point in Durkheim's theory of punishemtn.

> He believed that unpunished deviance tends to demoralize the conformant and therefore he talks about punishment as a means of repairing the wounds made upon collective sentiments. Durkheim was not entirely clear; he expressed his ideas in metaphorical language. Nonetheless, we can identify the hypotheses that the punishment of offenders promotes the solidarity of conformists. (Toby 1963: 334)

The notion that moral commitment and the threat of punishement are mutually exclusive explanations for conforming behavior is best expressed in terms of the "conditional" hypothesis. From this perspective the threat of legal punishment is a potential deterrent only among those people who are not morally committed to the law. Those individuals, on the other hand, who are comitted to the law will not violate the law even if they perceive the certainty and severity of legal sanctions as low. Internalization of the law is thought to be such a powerful factor that it leaves little if any room for deviant motivation.

It follows from this point of view that the effects of moral commitment and perceived threat of legal punishment in rule violations are not additive. Instead the deterrent effect of perceived legal

punishment is contingent upon the level of moral commitment.

The view that moral commitment and deviant motivation are incompatible, the fundamental premise of the conditional hypothesis has been criticized by Wrong (1961) and Blake and Davis (1964).

> What has happened is that internalization has imperceptibly been equated with "learning" or even with "habit-formation" in the simplest sense. Thus when a norm is said to have been "internalized" by an individual, what is frequently meant is that he habitually both affirms it and conforms to it in his conduct. The whole stress on inner conflict, on the tension between powerful impulses and supergo controls the behavioral outcome of which cannot be prejudged, drops out of the picture. (Wrong 1961: 187)

> Actually, the concept of internalization does not necessarily imply that the individual always, or typically, experiences no conscious desire for, or temptation to engage in, contra-nomrative activities. It does not seem necessary to assume that "internalization" involves a blocking out of deviant motives such as would take place in sublimation and repression. Rather, we simply assume that in the face of temptation, one source of resistance to acting out deviant motivation in deviant behavior lies in the person's commitment to norms proscribing the behavior, and in his ability to sympolize significantly to himself the moral reasons for not succumbing. (Blake and Davis 1964: 478)

Blake and Davis argues further that deviant motivation may be so high that the actor risks feelings of guilt and engages in rule violating behavior. In a situation of this nature, "anticipation of formal punishment", one of the five "inhibotors to deviant behavior" discussed by the authors, may successfully deter some actors. Therefore, the threat of formal sanctions should have a deterrent effect even among the morally committed.

## Generative Factors

To a limited degree, deterrence researchers have considered some generative factors, although they have failed to do so in any systematic

fashion. For example, a distinction has been made between "expressive" and "instrumental" crimes. It has been suggested that expressive crimes are ends in themselves and, as such, are manifestations of some strong personal need or emotion. Actors motivated by rage, anger, depression, fear, etc. are temporarily imparied in their ability to reason and, therefore, not likely to be deterred by threats of punishment. Other crimes, like theft or robbery, that are instrumental, simply means to ends, are more likely to be deterred by force threat.

Another genrative factor that has received some attention by at least one deterrence researcher (Buikhusen 1975) is the actor's position in the opportunity structure of society and his definition of the situation concerning that position. An individual who comes to believe that he has no acceptable legal alternative to contemplated rule-violating behavior may eventually engage in that behavior. In this framework the "no other choice" decision brought about by the definition of the situation may be seen as a generative or motivating factor.

The examples above may be viewed as generative factors in only the broadest use of the term. With the exception of Tittle's study (1977), more traditional generative factors--i.e., those found in main-line theories of crime and deviance--have not been considered by deterrence researchers. Using the shotgun approach in an exploratory study, Tittle used "eight independent variables suggested by extant theories to predice self-reported violations." Among the variables used were "relative deprivation" (anomie theory) "alienation" (conflict theory) and differential association. Unfortunately, the operationaliza-

tion and measurement of these variables leaves much to be desired, making the results somewhat suspect. However, Tittle should be praised for breaking new ground in our attempt to more fully understand deviant-conforming behavior. The next step is to consider generative theories individually, attempting to determine what motivates people to engage in specific rule-violating acts and if these acts may be deterred by force or force threat.

# CHAPTER III

# DETERRENCE RESEARCH - A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

## Capital Punishment Studies

Almost all of the early research in deterrence revolved around the debate concerning the abolition or retention of the death penalty. Capital punishment studies relied primarily on two basic procedures: (1) a comparison of homicide rates in death penalty and abolitionist states, and (2) comparison of homicide rates in a state before and after abolition and reintroduction of the death penalty (Andenaes, 1975). Although conducted primarily in the United States, capital punishment studies were carried out in a number of other countries including New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Great Britain. The overall findings were straightforward and consistent--capital punishment is no more effective in deterring homicide than is the threat of life in prison. For Bedau (1967: 264) the issue was settled, "What do all these studies taken together seem to show? The results are negative; there is no evidence to support the theory that the death penalty is a deterrent superior to imprisonment for the crime of murder." Sellin (1966) reached the same conclusion.

The early capital punishment studies (Scheussler 1952, Savitz 1958, Sellin 1959, 1967) were to have significant ramifications. In June,

1972, the Supreme Court of the United States reached a decision in the Furman vs. Georgia case. "The court ruled that the death penalty was unconstitutional as then administered, with trial judges and juries having unguided discretion to sentence to death or life." (Bedau and Pierce 1976: XIV) In writing this opinion, the chief justices cited evidence concerning capital punishment gathered through social science research. "As the court's opinion showed, the evidence carried persuasive effect and provided the basic foundation for this decision." Clearly capital punishment studies had transcended "mere" scholarly interest and academic debate. It was also evident that future court decisions would pay close attention to, and be strongly influenced by capital punishment research. "The Supreme Court's momentous decision in Furman vs. Georgia showed that the nation's highest tribunal would not only take judicial notice of the results of social science research on the issue of capital punishment, but that it would even ask for additional information." (Bedau and Pierce 1976 p XX)

Post Furman studies have not resolved the question concerning the deterrent effects of capital punishment. Research completed after 1972 has resulted in contradictory findings. To date, the most controversial work in this area has been done by University of Chicago economist Isaac Ehrlich. Examining homicide rates and executions in the United States between the 1930's and 1960's Ehrlich (1975) concluded that "each execution prevented between eight and twenty murders." Ehrlichs' entire research procedure, from the data he analyzed to his choice of statistical techniques, has been sharply critized. (Bowers and Pierce 1975, Passel and Taylor 1976)

On the other hand, Bailey (1976A 1976B) in an examination of the relation between first degree murder, rape and capital punishment found no evidence to support the deterrent effect of the death penaly. Parker and Smith (1979) in their examination of victim/offender relationships in homicide found "little support for the deterrence model."

To what can we attribute these incompatible, seemingly contradictory findings? The answer(s) to this question is probably buried in a quagmire of theoretical and methodological issues. It may be that, given the nature of the capital punishment-deterrence phenomenon, its resolution is not possible. Gibbs and Erickson (1976: 478) suggest that, because so many "extralegal complexities" have been introduced into the question of the deterrent effect of capital punishment, "perhaps we have made 'conclusive evidence' an impossibility."

## The Ecological Approach to the Study of Deterrence

Most early deterrence research was carried out at the aggregate level. Investigators were interested in the certainty and severity of punishment with states as the unit of analysis and crime rates as the dependent variable.

Perhaps the groundbreaking for the new era of deterrence research was carried out by Gibbs in a 1968 article entitled "Crime, Punishment and Deterrence." Gibbs found both certainty and severity of punishment to be inversely related to criminal homicide rates. In the following years, numerous deterrence articles conducted at the aggregate level were published (Tittle 1969; Gray and Martin, 1969; Chiricos and Waldo, 1970; Bailey and Smith, 1972; Antunes and Hunt, 1973).

The strategy employed by these researchers was basically the same. Severity of punishment was determined by taking the median number of months served for a particular offense by all persons in a region (usually a state) convicted of that offense. The certainty of punishment was derived by dividing the number of prison admissions for crime "X" during a particular period by the number of "X" crimes known to police during that same period.

These studies, taken collectively, indicate that certainty of punishment is inversely related to crime rates. The strength of the relationship, however, varies considerably. The effects of severity of punishment as a deterrent are not as clear. Most of the associations between severity of punishment and crime rates were in the right direction, although of negligible strength.

Sociologists are not the only scholars interested in the relationship between levels of punishment and crime rates. Economists are also doing work in the area of deterrence. Most of these investigators begin with the assumption that punishment deters crime (Tullock 1974). This is probably a function of their discipline's basic world view and perception of the nature of man. From this perspective, rational men will consume less of something when costs are increased. The work of Ehrlich (1973, 1975) and Becker (1968) indicates the deterrent effects of punishment.

McPheters (1976), in an innovative study, attempted to calculate not only the realtionship between punishment and rates of crime, but also the relationship between gains from robberies and criminal activity. He found that from 1959 to 1971 the "real average take from robbery"

in the United States declined approximately 25%. During that same period the robbery rate increased by more than 350%. Because robbers may be looked at as aiming for "target levels of achievement" additional crimes are required to reach their goal. These criminals are not behaving in an irrational manner even though their profit margin has been steadily declining. This is especially true when one realizes that robbery clearance rates declined from 42.5 to 24.6% and the conviction rate dropped from 64.8 to 31% in the twelve year period under consideration.

## Experiments in General Deterrence

One of the most important, effective and desirable research techniques in all of science is the experiment. In an experiment the investigator manipulates and controls one or more independent variables and then observes the dependent variable(s) for variation concomitant to manipulation of the independent variable (Kerlinger 1973: 378). The fundamental advantage of this technique is the researcher's ability to control the relevant variables. To the extent that the experimentor can control the pertinent variables, he/she may conclude with a high degree of confidence that the variation in the dependent variable(s) is a function of the manipulation of the independent variables.

Experiments and "true" experiments[5] are a rarity in sociology because researchers usually do not have the capacity to manipulate and selectively assign the independent variable.

It is for these reasons that so few experiments have been done in the area of deterrence. The manipulation of the severity and certainty

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[5] In a true experiment the researcher has the power to randomly select subjects and then assign them to various experimental groups.

of punishment is usually difficult. According to Buikhusen (1974) the researcher working to conduct an experimental study in the area of deterrence has several problems to overcome. Among these problems are the following:

1. How to manipulate deterrence; i.e., the introduction of the experimental variable.

2. How to register the behavior of the population at risk before and after the experimental variable (deterrenct) has been introduced.

3. How to be sure than an eventual change in behavior has been caused by the deterrent and not by other intervening variables.

Buikhusen and his associates decided to carry out an experiment to see if punishment had any preventative effect on the behavior of motorists driving with worn tires. Two cities of comparable size and composition in the Netherlands were selected. In the experimental city, the intensive campaign was carried out with the help of local authorities and media. Motorists were urged to check for, and replace if necessary, any worn tires lest they be stopped by the police and fined. No such campaign was conducted in the control city. The results indicated twice as many people in the experimental city, as opposed to the control city, replaced their worn tires.

Another rather ingenious experiment was conducted by Tittle and Rowe (1973) using three introductory sociology classes. One was designated as a control group while the others received the treatment effects during the course of the semester--threat of punishment and a moral appeal not to cheat. In all three classes the testing and grading

system used by the instructor facilitated student cheating. The authors found that a moral appeal had no effect on the level of cheating while the threat of being caught and punished had a significant deterrent effect. "The results appear to support the deterrent argument and to demonstrate that fear of sanction is a more important influence than a moral appeal in generating conformity to the norm of classroom honesty." (Tittle and Rowe 1973: 496)

Shwartz and Orleans (Gibbs 1975: 190-192) interviewed approximately 400 individuals prior to the 1962 tax filing deadline. The first group (sanction threat) was made aware of the penalties for filing false reports, while the conscience-appeal group was remineded of the citizen's moral duty to pay taxes. The third group (placebo) was interviewed on the assumption that the interview situation might have some effect. The control group was not interviewed but considered in the comparative analysis.

The results revealed that in "comparison to the two control groups both treatment groups increased their reported adjusted gross income more, increased their total deeuctions less, and increased their income tax more." These findings support the deterrence doctrine but also suggest that other mechanisms (in this case moral appeal) are effective in realizing compliance to norms and rules.

The small number of studies in deterrence utilizing experimental designs attest to the difficulties inherent in this type of research. The problems encountered in manipulating anything more than minor sanctions should be obvious. The other alternative, utilized by Schwartz and Orleans, is to manipulate people's perception of sanctions. The

difficulties in this type of research are only surpassed by the rewards. As previously mentioned, the experimental approach allows for the greatest degree of control and certainty concerning the validity of findings. The future use of this technique in deterrence research appears to be a function of the ingenuity and resourcefulness of investigators.

## The Perceptual Approach to the Study of Deterrence

The ecological studies in deterrence (which until recently constituted the majority of research in this area) had rather serious deficiences as most of their authors readily acknowledged. At least three of these drawbacks that led to their decline and the subsequent increase in perceptual studies are of sufficient importance to warrant some discussion.

(1) In the first place, these works relied on official statistics in determining the severity and certainty of punishment as well as the crime rates in designated areas (usually states). The problem encountered in utilizing official statistics are well known and have been extensively discussed in the criminological literature.[5] One of the severest critics of the use of crime statistics in research is W. Buickhusen, a criminal justice official in Holland.

> By comparing official data with information gathered by anonymous questionnaires we have found several times that official records are absolutely unrepresentative for the number and kind of offenses actually committed. It is surprising to see time and again that many crimonologists still believe it is better to have invalid data than no data.

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[6]For a succinct yet cogent appraisal of criminal statistics see the disucssion in Sutherland and Cressey, p. 30-35, "Criminology," 1978.

(2) The fundamental assumption underlying the philosophy of general deterrence is that people can be discouraged from engaging in criminal behavior by the manipulation of punishment. It appears that people's perception of the severity and certainty of punishment were not taken into consideration in most of the early deterrence studies. The investigators either: (a) took it for granted that people knew what the certainty and severity of punishment was for a specific crime, (b) did not consider this phenomenon very important, or (c) were satisfied with aggregate-level relationships at this stage of deterrence research. I am inclined to accept the last alternative.

Realizing the limitations of aggregate level research, researchers began conducting studies concerning the individual's perception of punishment. Researchers began to investigate the actor's perception of the certainty and severity of punishment and its association with self-reported violations. The unit of analysis was now the individual. This was a significant step forward in deterrence research. The importance of considering the individual's perception of punishment is nicely summarized by Henshel and Carey (1975: 362).

> Deterrence when and if it exists, is a state of mind. If the mind in question holds no cognition relative to the punitive sanction (e.g., it had not heard of, believed in, or felt applicable) than the objective existence of sanctions with specified levels of severity, certainty, swiftness is of no consequence, . . . deterrence does not exist for this person, but not becuase deterrence does not exist. By concentrating on the objective properties of legal sanctions, studies have presumed that these objective properties are actually correctly conceptualized by the people, or at least by a sufficient number of them.

(3) Deterrence researchers became interested in other variables that were associated with conforming-deviant behavior. Ecological studies were limited to the basic relationship between punishment and rates of

crime. Deterrence investigators expanded their thinking and added new variables to the deterrence equation. The most important of these new variables are informal sanctions, moral commitment, relative deprivation, the nature of the norm in question (male prohibita or male in se) and the actor's reference groups.

The limitations of aggregate level studies, an increasing number of deterrence investigators, and the addition of new variables all were instrumental in this movement away from the ecological line of research. In the remainder of this chapter we will examine this relatively new avenue of inquiry in deterrence research--the perceptual approach.

These works have been classified and reviewed according to the primary variable of interest of the researcher.

## Communications and Sanctions

If people are to be deterred by the threat of punishment, it is obvious that they must have some knowledge of that punishment. Communication of sanction threat, therefore, is an important aspect of deterrence.

According to Zimring and Hawkins (1973) four conditions must be met if punishment in the form of a threat is to be effective in crime control. (1) Members of an audience must know that an act is prohibited if the prohibition is to affect their conduct. Buikusen (1974) and his associates found that 43% of their Dutch sample did not know that smoking marijuana was a criminal offense. Even 21% of a sample of drug users thought that marijuana and hashish were legal substances.

People often have little knowledge of the punishment associated with criminal statutes. The California Study of 1968, commissioned by that state's legislature, revealed that people "were extremely ignorant of

penalties for crime." Of the eleven possible crimes in question, the mean number of correct responses in identifying lawful state penalties was 2.6. On the whole, people underestimated the severity of current pnishments. These studies indicate that a gap exists between criminal statutes and people's perception of what constitutes criminal behavior and sanctions associated with that behavior. How can punishment deter if people do not know what the sanctions associated with particular crimes are? People behave in accordance with what they believe to be true as opposed to the objective realities of the situation.

(2) Unless it is believed that those who commit rule-violating behavior may be punished, the threat of punishment will not affect the rate of behavior. In other words, the threat of punishment in and of itself is not a sufficient deterrent. Actors must come to believe that rule violators will be caught and punished. This is the basic proposition of the deterrence doctrine--i.e., perceived certainty and severity of punishment are inversely related to incidents of rule violating behavior.

(3) Unless differences in the level of threatened punishment are perceived, increases in penalties can have no meaninful deterrent effect. In the Bulkhusen experiment, related earlier, the increase in punishment was apparently perceived and resulted in a substantial number of people replacing their worn tires with new ones. Perception of increased punishment is a necessary although not a sufficient condition in the deterrence phenomenon. Bulkhusen and his associates found that a significant number of people who had worn tires and were aware of the stepped-up police campaign (increased activity of punishment) had no intention of replacing

their worn tires.

An addition in the severity of punishment, along with an increased perception of that severity by an audience, may result in a reduced deterrent effect and/or an increase in the violation of related offenses. In a 1976 paper Ross hypothesized that "increases in formal penalties tend to be subverted by contrary adjustments in the behavior of those who apply the law." Ross reviewed three studies where penalties for driving offenses (drunken driving and speeding) were sharply increased. The overall affect was not a reduction in the offense rate but rather a reduction in the number of arrests and/or convictions for those violations. Ross suggests that when penalties are sharply and quickly increased and actors in the criminal justice system have discretionary power, a mitigation and annulment of the offense takes place. This "neutralization of severe sanctions" comes about when the increased sanctions are perceived to be in conflict with accepted norms of fairness.

(4) If variations in rates of detection are to serve as marginal deterrents, knowledge of those variations must be transmitted in some fashion to potential offenders. In other words, information concerning the severity and certainty of punishment and subsequent changes in that information must be transmitted in some manner.

Parker and Grasmick (1979) examined the effects of two sources of information on people's perception of the certainty of arrest in a community: (1) newspaper crime stories and (2) personal experience with crime and the personal experience of one's acquaintances. A content analysis of newspaper stories portrayed arrest rates well above the official arrest rates (76% and 22% respectively). The authors found no differences

in the estimated certainty of arrest between those who read newspaper regularly and those who did not. "Whatever it is that people get out of reading in the newspaper it apparently is not an estimate of the certainty of arrest." (Parker and Grasmick 1979: 13) The authors constructed a scale for measuring an individual's personal (as perpetrator or victim) and interpersonal (friend or acquaintance of a perpetrator or victim) direct experience arrest rate and concluded that, "estimates of the official certainty of arrest appear to be based to a great extent, on personal experiences of the individual and his acquaintances with crimes that have not resulted in arrest."

The few studies in the area of communications indicate that people by and large do not have a very accurate perception of the certainty of punishment. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the deterrent effect of punishment is reduced or less effective. The extent to which people overestimate the certainty of punishment may compensate for their underestimation of the severity of punishment.

## Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment

Certainty and severity of punishment, the two key variables in deterrence theory, probably have received the greatest amount of attention by investigators working from a "perceptual" orientation. Findings concerning the perceived certainty of punishment have been consistent and lead to the general conclusion that perceived certainty is inversely related to self-reported rule-violating behavior. Three "certainty" studies will be reviewed.

Jensen (1969) examined the relationship between certainty of punishment, deviant behavior, and attitudes toward the police. His sample

consisted of approximately 1000 white males between grades 7 and 13. Students who straongly believed that offenders are very rarely caught and punished were almost four times as likely to engage in two or more deviant acts than respondents who strongly agreed that violators are almost always caught andpunished. Thirty seven per cent of those who felt that offenders are rarely caught and punished indicated respect for the law and police. On theother hand, of those who believed violators are almost always caught and punished, 72% indicated respect for the criminal justice system.

Waldo and Chiricos (1972) interviewed 321 unviersity students to determine relationships between marijuana use, theft and perceptions of the severity and certainty of punishment. The authors found that no relationship exists between the perceived severity of punishment and self-reported violations. However, "perceptions of the certainty of punishment appear most viable as a deterrent when they involve the potential criminal's estimate of his own chances for arrest and harsh penalties for a particular crime--independent of the chances for any "generalized other."

Burkett and Jensen (1975) questioned over a thousand predominantly white high school students in Seattle. Among other things, the investigators were interested in the perceived certainty of apprehension as measured by responses to the following: "If I were to use marijuana, I would probably get caught." Their data indicated that self-reported marijuana use "is inversely related to the belief that one's own use is likely to result in apprehension."

While research findings reveal a consistent, although sometimes

weak, relationship between perceived certainty of punishment and self-reported violations, the evidence concerning perceived severity has been less than clear. Inverse relationships of any consequence between perceived severity and self-reported violations have been rare and some researchers (Meier and Johnson, Silberman, 1976, Teevan, 1976), even have reported positive relationships. This is in the opposite direction predicted by deterrence theory. Of twelve studies reviewed by Grasmick and Bryjak (forthcoming 1980) that tested the perceived severity hypothesis, only one concluded that the perception of the severity of punishment is part of the social control process. These findings have led some researchers (Jensen et.al. 1978, Teevan 1976, and Cohen 1978) to suggest that perceived severity of punishment should be dropped from the deterrence equation and attention focused almost exclusively on perceived certainty of punishment. A good deal, if not all, of the confusion and inconsistent findings concerning perceived severity of punishment probably is related to the way this variable has been measured and tested. Grasmick and Bryjak argue that when properly measured and tested, perceived severity of punishment has a significant deterrent effect on rule-violating behavior. This point will be addressed in the methods chapter.

## Moral Commitment, Mala Prohibita and Mala in Se

Several studies have been concerned with the extent to which actors have been committed to norms and how normative commitment is related to self-reported deviance. Waldo and Chiricos (1972) discovered that when people are highly motivated, i.e., committed to a norm, "the threat of punishment has little if any deterrent effect. For example,

91% of those who claimed never to have stolen anything (N=321) stated they would "not consider stealing" even if laws relating to theft were changed, i.e., reduced. These people conform to the law not because they are deterred by the threat of punishment but because they are committed to a normative standard. This notion of normative commitment as it relates to deviance leads to a distinction that must be made between crimes that are mala prhibita and those that are mala in se.

> In the case of MALA IN SE the law supports the moral codes of society. If threats of legal punishment were removed, moral feelings and the fear of public judgment would remain as powerful crime prevention forces, at least for a limited period. In the case of MALA QUIA PROHIBITA, the law stands alone; conformity is essentially a matter of effective legal sanctions (Andenaes in Waldo and Chiricos 1972: 524).

Waldo and Chiricos found that marijuana use is more likely than theft to be deterred by perceptions of high certainty of punishment. The data revealed that only 25 percent of the respondents disagreed with the following: "possession of marijuana should be legalized for adults." The law against marijuana use, because it is not supported by norms of the student subculture, is forced to "stand alone." If subcultural norms do not deter marijuana use (MALA PROHIBITA), the deterrence effect must be the product of some other force, such as the law. For the crime of theft, however, the law has much more support in the mores. "Because of this, it may be difficult to separate the deterrent effect of the law from other aspects of deterrence."

Teevan (1976) found that the mala prohibita - mala in se distinction did not explain variations in deterrent effects as well as had been expected. Mala prohibita marijuana use is not deterred consistently more by threat of punishment than mala in se shoplifting. One possible

explanation offered by Teevan is that respondents were never asked if they considered marijuana use and shoplifting mala prohibita and mala in se respectively. For example, some people may believe that shoplifting is mala prohibita, i.e., "it hurts no one," "stores should be ripped off," etc.

In 1976, Matthew Silberman administered questionnaires to 174 undergraduate students at a private, eastern university. He attempted to evaluate the additive and interactive effects of several independent variables including moral commitment to legal norms, perceived severity and certainty of punishment and patterns of differential association on self-reported violations. Silberman found that people who are highly committed to norms underlying the law would conform even under a low perceived threat of legal punishment. The conformity of these people ". . . is independent of threats of legal punishment or social disapproval." As Grasmick and McLaughlin (1978) have commented regarding Silberman's work "the importance of this finding should not be overlooked. It reveals that the basic proposition of deterrence theory applies only to part of the population--those with low levels of internalization of the law.

Charles Tittle (1977) attempted to operationalize eight independent variables as suggested by that same number of theories of deviance and conformity and to determine their". . . ability to predict independently nine different kinds of self-estimated furture deviance." The independent variables were moral commitment, social integration, relative deprivation, alienation, differential association, legitimacy, utility and sanction fear. He found that moral commitment has a mean

association of 0.60 (second only to .75 for the perceived utility of the deviant behavior) with the nine self-reported indicators of estimated future deviance.

## Informal Sanctions

Some researchers have taken a rather narrow focus on deterrence theory, limiting sanction threat to formal (i.e., legal) penalties. "If legal officials contribute little to social order, then the deterrence doctrine is an insignificant theory, for it recognizes no other agents of social control" (Gibbs 1977). Other sociologists have attempted to investigate the deterrent effects of informal sanctions and incorporate this variable into the deterrence equation.

Anderson, Chiricos and Waldo (1977) were concerned with informal sanctions and how they interact with formal sanctions in the deterrence process. In this study the authors consider, "the relative and cumulative impact of perception of both formal and informal sanctions upon one type of deviant behavior among college students." They also present data in addressing the question of ". . . how perceived formal sanctions act as deterrents under various conditions of perceived informal sanctions for marijuana use." The authors found that both formal and informal sanctions are strongly and independently related to marijuana use (N=321 college students), with informal sanctions being slightly more of a deterrent. They also noted that the "cumulative impact of perceived certainty and perceived informal sanctions is greater than the separate impact of either certainty or the perceived informal sanctions alone."

Grasmick and Appleton (1977) were interested in how the threat of stigmatization from peers, contingent upon exposure as an offender,

figures into the deterrence formula. To test this notion they offer an interaction model noting that, "Although this model never has been tested directly its implications have been used to interpret other findings." A stratified random sample was drawn in a large midwestern city (N=166). Questions were asked concerning perceived threat of legal punishment, perceived threat of social disapproval contingent upon being exposed as an offender, and self-reported traffic violations. Grasmick and Appleton (1977: 24) found that "at least for speed law violations the combination of a high perceived threat of legal punishment and a high perceived threat of social disapproval if disclosed as an offender is no greater a deterrent than the simple additive effects of the two variables. Both forms of threat have significant deterrent effects of about equal magnitude, and the two effects operate independently of one another."

## Deterrence Research - An Overview

Even a cursory review of the literature reveals that various research strategies have been utilized by investigators in an effort to examine the phenomenon of deterrence. Initially, capital punishment studies were the only empirical attempts made to test the general deterrent effects of formal sanctions. In the mid 60's researchers re-examined the early capital punishment studies and attempted to evaluate the possible deterrent effects of punishment on the remaining "index crimes." These aggregate-level studies revealed a consistent, although weak, inverse relationship between severity and certainty of punishment and crime rates. The limitations of aggregate-level studies along with a re-evaluation of the deterrence phenomenon, led investigators to the

perceptual approach. The perceptual era saw the proliferation of both deterrence researchers and publications in this area. The basic conclusion to be drawn from this initial phase of deterrence research is that sanction threats deter some people from engaging in specific types of rule-violating behavior. However, by itself this finding has rather limited utility. We still had little knowledge of the relation between punishment and other prohibitive factors in the social control process. Toward this end, other inhibitory factors were introduced. The two most important of these are moral commitment and informal sanctions. While these additional inhibitory variables were beginning to receive some attention, generative factors were still ignored. The only exception, as previously mentioned, was the work of Charles Tittle (1977).

It was argued that deterrence investigators have been quite selective in their adherence to and application of concepts drawn from the utilitarians. Bentham was concerned with rewards and pleasures as well as pain and punishment. While deterrence theory "usually begins with a model of man as a profit maximizer that is a calculator of profit from estimates of gain and cost resulting from this projected act" (Geerken and Gove, 1975), deterrence researchers have concentrated almost exclusively on cost or punishment and neglected anticipated rewards. This preoccupation with negative sanctions has resulted in an almost total neglect of generative factors.

Results of existing deterrence research lead us to one general conclusion. People can be deterred to some extent from engaging in criminal and deviant behavior by the threat of punishment. The task now facing researchers is to discover the conditions under which sanction

threat is an effect deterrent. Perhaps the most important of these conditions are the factors that generate rule-violating behavior in the first place. Solving the puzzle concerning the overall effect of punishment on rule-violating behavior cannot and will not be accomplished until generative factors have been considered.

# CHAPTER IV

# DEVIANCE AND ANOMIE THEORY

## The Theory in Perspective

In the final section of Chapter One, the relationship between deterrence theory and social control was examined. We noted that since the work of Parsons (The Social System, 1951) the term social control has been primarily limited to the control of deviance. What constitutes deviance, however, and how it is related to social control is conceptualized quite differently by various theorists. This becomes quite evident when we compare the perspectives of Clark and Gibbs (1965), with that of Parsons. Parsons, it will be recalled, was especially interested in the actor's orientation. Deviant behavior was viewed as a motivated departure from internalized norms. Clark and Gibbs, on the other hand, have no interest whatsoever in the actor's disposition and orientation. These authors believe that sociologists have been preoccupied with the "sources of deviant behavior", to the extent that they have, for the most part, neglected reactions to deviant behavior. In their conceptualization of social control Clark and Gibbs (1965: 402) clearly distinguish between sources of, or causes of deviant behavior and reaction to that behavior (social control). "We are not concerned with why the norms are what they are, or why persons commit deviant acts . . . it is the focus on reaction

to deviant behavior (i.e., behavior socially defined as deviant) that distinguishes the study of social control." While this rejection of the actor's orientation does have some advantages for a general conceptualization of social control, it also poses some formidable problems for deterrence theory.

An increasing number of studies in this current era of deterrence research indicate that the threat of punishment can deter people from engaging in rule-violating behavior. More specifically, it appears that some people may be deterred from commiting particular offenses in given situations. What we are only beginning to understand, however, is just what role the threat of punishment plays in inducing people to engage in nonrule-violating or conforming behavior. The inclusion of additional inhibitory variables to the basic deterrence equation has shed some light on this topic. However, the social control picture will remain incomplete until the actor's orientation concerning generative factors, (i.e., what motivates him to deviance) are empirically and theoretically linked to the strategy of deterrence and other mechanisms of control. It appears likely that the threat of punishment may function in a number of ways. Sanction threat may neutralize and therefore inhibit some types of deviant motivation, partially deter other types and be completely ineffective against still additional forms of motivation to deviate.

An example or two should suffice in illustrating this point. Consider two hypothetical individuals neither of whom are motivated to commit an illegal act. One believes that punishment would be certain and severe should he engage in the deviant behavior. The other does not.

Neither commits the act because threats of punishment are irrelevant to people who are not motivated to criminal activity.

Two youths are motivated to break into a school and engage in the destruction of property. Both youths perceive the punishment as certain and severe should they express their motivation in rule-violating behavior. One youth motivated by a search for pleasure, entertainment or "kicks" is deterred, while the other, motivated by revenge, hatred, getting back at those who have contributed to his humiliation is the classroom, is not.

The salience of the actor's orientation is certainly not new in the field of deviance, although it appears to be relatively foreign or unimportant to most deterrence researchers. It is time that deterrence theorists began examining etiological theories of crime and deviance with an eye to discovering how they are related to the threat of formal and informal sanctions. Only then will we have a more complete understanding of both conforming and deviant behavior.

There is certainly no paucity of theories from which to choose since the bulk of work done by sociologists to date in the area of crime and deviance has focused on the study of the etiology of criminal and deviant behavior. Sociologists, it may be argued, have approached this problem from two perspectives--structure and process (Reid, 1979: 173). The first views crime in relation to the social structure of society and seeks the connection between criminal and deviant behavior and the organization of the social system within which it exists. Social process theories on the other hand, try to explain how individuals or groups of people become criminal. This perspective attempts to zero in on the

very process by which individuals come to engage in deviant behavior as opposed to the relationship between structure and crime.

These orientations, although analytically distinct, may be viewed as opposite sides of the same coin. The first perspective (structural) addresses the question of how much and what type of crime is generated by particular organizational and institutional configurations in a given society, while the second perspective (process) deals with the micro-level question of how people learn and actually engage in deviant and criminal activities.

Each of these perspectives has particular strengths and weaknesses. Pre-Parsonian functionalism and conflict theory offer structural explanations for the causes of crime and deviance at the system or class level while ignoring individual differences among actors and social psychological generative factors. Certainly the Chicago sociologists located the source of deviance within the structure of society, but downplayed individual differences which were still embedded in the "personal pathology" perspective.

Process theories explain how, and under what specific circumstances individuals come to engage in deviant behavior. Some consider the actor's orientation to the situation, although they all neglect the relationship between social structure and crime. Labeling theorists see various institutions of control in society manufacturing deviance and usually focus on the actor's changing definition of self and the situation as a result of his contact with these institutions. Parsons, more than anyone else, examines the social-psychological factors leading to deviant motivation (1951: 249-279). Sutherland (1939) not only downplayed

structural variables but also rejected psychological factors and individual differences in his theory of differential association.[7]

One of the most far-reaching and empirically tested theories of deviance in sociology is the one presented by Robert Merton in "Social Structure and Anomie." Anomie theory is a rather unique sociological perspective in that it links a structural explanation for the genesis of deviant behavior with a series of individual adaptations or types of deviance resulting from the actor's felt strain.

Anomie, or strain theory as it is often called, will be the primary generative factor of interest in this paper. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to: (1) an explication of anomie theory, and (2) a selective review of the empirical studies concerning anomie and deviance, and (3) the relationship between anomie and deterrence theory.

## The Theory of Anomie

Emile Durkheim, the eminent French sociologist, first used the term anomie in his "The Division of Labor" pulished in 1893. Anomie was only a minor component in his treatment of the division

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[7]The original theory contained not nine but seven statements. The final one (seventh) stating, "Social disorganization is the basic cause of systematic criminal behavior." This was a more structural explanation for the genesis of criminal behavior. The influence of the Chicago School is obvious. Sutherland was later to reject this concept and also exclude it from differential association. He substituted the term "social organization" and saw crime as an expression of that organization. "Most communities are organized both for crime and anticriminal behavior, and in that sense the crime rate is an expression of the differential group organization." With this revision, Sutherland eliminated the disorganization approach that linked criminal activity almost exclusively with lower class neighborhoods.

of labor and was used primarily as a descriptive term for one of the abnormal forms of organic solidarity (Clindard, 1964: 4). Anomie was also an important aspect of Durkheim's explanation of suicide.

Anomie literally means "normlessness." It exists in society when there is a breakdown or disruption of the norms regulating people's lives. Durkheim believed that mens aspirations unlike those of animals whose "equilibrium is established with automatic spontaneity", must be held in check and not allowed to rise beyond their capability of fulfillment. When men's appetites "have become freed of any limiting authority" we may speak of an anomic society. It is important to note that anomie is a social and not a psychological phenomenon. It refers to a characteristic of social systems and not of psychological systems.

> It refers to a breakdown of social standards governing behavior and also signifies little social cohesion. When a high degree of anomie has set in, the rules once governing conduct have lost their savor and force. Above all else they are deprived of ligitimacy. They do not comprise a social order in which men can confidently put their trust (Merton, 1964: 226).

Although Durkheim utilized the concept of anomie in his theory of suicide, he did not relate it to a general theory of deviance. This was to be done in 1937 by Robert K. Merton in his now famous paper "Social Structure and Anomie." This statement by Merton is important for at least two reasons: (1) it offered a sociological explanation for deviance when a number of psychological (especially Freudian) and biological theories were popular and generally accepted, and (2) to a large extent it removed deviant behavior from the category of abnormality. Merton was to argue basically that the same forces in society that produce conformity also produce deviance. In this paper he set out to explain ". . . how some social structures exert a definite pressure upon persons

in the society to engage in nonconforming rather than conforming conduct."

There are two sources of strain in societies of the American type that lead to deviance. The first is the overarching emphasis on goals. Merton focuses on goals of success and achievement, especially those of a pecuniary nature. According to Merton, this pressure to succeed is felt at all class levels. The ubiquitous goal to succeed and continually achieve is a fundamental component of our value system and as such is an integral factor in the socialization process. This aspect of Merton's argument is routinely overlooked by many sociologists in their interpretation of anomie theory (Hilbert and Wright, 1979).

The second strain toward anomie resulting in deviance is a product of the disjunction between culturally prescribed goals and means. For Merton, however, anomie ". . . does not operate evenly throughout society." Its greatest impact will be in the lower classes where means in the form of a legitimate opportunity structure are either unavailable or insufficient. The frustrations resulting from structures which limit or block opportunity now manifest themselves in deviant behavior. This is not to say that deviance is to be found only in the lower classes. Nor does it mean that specific adaptations are only located in a particular class. What it does mean is that deviance in general is more likely to be found in one class (lower) than in others.

In the years following its publication, Merton's theory of anomie was to be modified and extended by numerous authors.[8] A good deal of anomie theory has been focused on delinquent behavior. The two most notable theroies in this area are those of Cohen, and Cloward and Ohlin.

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[8]As of 1964 Clinard lists Dubin and Parsons as well as Cohen, and Cloward and Ohlin as major contributors to anomie theory.

Although Albert Cohen (1955) in Delinquent Boys rejects the applicability of "illicit means theory" to explain the phenomenon he has described (lower class male delinquency) the link to anomie theory appears quite evident.[9] For Cohen, lower-class youths cannot measure up to middle-class standards by which they are evaluated. It is not that lower-class boys do not want to be successful as indicated by the "middle class measuring rod", but because of inadequate socialization by middle class standards, they cannot. As a result of their inability to measure up to this standard, lower-class youths face a problem of adjustment for which the deviant subculture is an attractive solution.

In 1960 Cloward and Ohlin published Delinquency and Opportunity, a work that linied anomie theory with Sutherland's theory of differential association. Like Merton, Cloward and Ohlin examined the disjuncture between culturally approved goals and means arguing that lower-class youth are denied access to legitimate opportunity structures in their attempt to reach approved goals. However, it is not simply a matter of substituting illegitimate alternatives if the latter are not available. Within a given society some youths may have access to certain illegitimate opportunities while other youths do not. In neighborhoods where there is no stable pattern of criminality, the disorganized slum, youths are likely to form conflict (engaging in violence) or retreatist (often drug-related) subcultures.

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[9] In commenting on the "illicit means" aspect of Merton's anomie theory Cohen states, "This argument is sociologically sophisticated and highly plausible as an explanation for adult professional crime and for the property delinquency of some older and some professional juvenile theories. Unfortunately, it fails to account for the non-utilitarian quality of the subcultures we have described."

## Anomie and Anomia

The concept of anomie as used by Merton is a sociological term and as such is a property of social systems. There is, however, a subjective component to this phenomenon. In 1956 Leo Srole created a five item scale designed "to measure anomie as subjectively experienced" (Merton 1964: 219). Srole called this subjective aspect of anomie, anomia. It refers to the individual's perception of his social environment and his place within that environment. Merton believed Sroles anomia scale was a step in the right direction, "if the concept of anomie is to be utilized in empircal research".

It is imperative to an accurate understanding of anomie that the relationship between anomie and anomia be examined and comprehended. For as Merton (1964:227) notes the distinction between these two terms is much more than a "terminological debate . . ."It cuts deep into basic problems of extending the theory of anomie and intitiating a new phase in empirical research on anomie."

Although we would expect a significant number of people to experience the subjective component of anomie or anomia in a society characterized by anomie, anomie need not be present for anomia to occur. In other words, an anomic society is a sufficient, although not a necessary, condition for the occurrence of anomia. As Hyman (1953:427) has stated, "if the individual regarded his chances to achieve his goals of success as negligible, when in reality they were good, there would be a psychologically produced strain towards anomie". And conversely we might add that if an individual perceived his chances of success as good when in reality they were bad, there would be little, if any, strain toward anomie. The most critical aspect of anomie research then is the investigation of the

actor's perception of the means available to him in his attempt to secure internalized goals.

This is not to say, however, that the objective existence of anomie is inconsequential or irrelevant to the prevalence of anomia. As previously mentioned, we would expect to find high rates of anomia in a society characterized as anomic. But it must be stressed that an anomic society or social group is of consequence only to the extent that it affects people's lives, producing psychological strains that result in deviant behavior. We should like to take this point even one step further and argue that anomie devoid of anomia is not a useful concept in the area of deviance. Individuals, not societies, commit deviant acts and individuals experience anomia - not anomie.

Predicated on this line of easoning, it is my contention that anomie research should focus primarily (although not exclusively) on the actor's perception of personal goals and his perception of opportunities and/or his present position vis-à-vis realization of these goals. Not only is anomia the link between a structural condition (anomie) and the manifestations of that condition at the individual level (deviant behavior), but, as Merton (1964:228-229) clearly states, anomia also can be used as an index of anomie.

> It seems not to have been widely recognized again, if we are to judge from the appended inventory of research on the subject--that by adopting well-known procedures of analysis, the measures of anomia for the individual can be adapted to serve as a measure of anomie for the social system.
>
> Following now well-developed practices, measures of anomie for individuals in a particular social unit (neighborhood, clubs, gangs, formal organization, and the like) can of course be aggregated to find out the rate or proportion having a designated degree of anomia. This aggregated figure would then constitute an index of anomie for the given social unit.

In "Anomie, Anomia, and Social Interaction" (Clinard 1964:229-239) Merton outlines a three phase research design where he utilizes just such a strategy, using "aggregated measures of anomia as indexes of anomie". Not only is a research focus on anomia more in keeping with Merton's view concerning the testing of his theory, but also, it poses fewer methodological problems.

## A Critical Review of Anomie Literature

The theory of anomie has generated a substantial amount of research. As of 1964 Cole and Zuckerman (Clinard 1964) list no less than 88 empirical works and 101 theoretical studies in the area of anomie. Only a limited number of these empircal studies, however, are related to deviant behavior. Of these, most are in the area of delinquent behavior with a lesser number concerned with adult crime and mental illness.

One of the earliest anomie studies was conducted by Wood in 1942. Analyzing court records and census data from seven small Wisconsin communities he found that crime rates are a function of the lack of access to legitimate means within local opportunity structures. "The factor related to their variations (crime rates) are not those of foreign birth or church attendance but the ability to become successful in economic, political and non-religious group participation."

In 1959, Meir and Bell interviewed 701 adult males in the San Francisco area to examine the relationship between anomie and access to means for the achievement of life goals. They found that ability to achieve goals is inversely related to feelings of anomia. They also suggest that anomia is not limited to inhabitants of large urban centers but may also be found in rural areas as well.

Tuckman and Kliener (1962) examined the relationship between aspiration, achievement and schizophrenia in 1300 male first-admissions to a Philadelphia mental hospital. Controlling for race and religious memberships, they found that, ". . . schizophrenia increased as the discrepancy between achievement and aspiration increased."

A number of anomie studies will be briefly but critically reviewed. We will concentrate on the researchers operationalization and measurement of key terms in anomie theory, namely, goals and the means of achieving these goals. It will be argued that one or more of the following shortcomings is to be found in all but one of these studies.

1. Success goals are treated as both uniform and pervasive. Common success goals are viewed as being shared by all Americans regardless of class or position. The actor's success goals, however, should be ascertained and not assumed to be "uniform and pervasive". Although there is some evidence to support the common success goal position (Pettigrew 1964, Sherif and Sherif 1964), there is certainly no lack of research that resulted in contradictory findings. Sewell et al. (1957) and Haller et al. (1976) provide strong arguments based on extensive research that the level of occupational aspirations (certainly a key component of success goals) of "lower SES youth is systematically lower than that of higher SES youth regardless of sex or grade" (Haller 1974:119-120).

2. Success goals have been measured at a very vague and general level. Instead of zeroing in on specific goals and aspirations of individuals, some researchers have been satisfied to use "success" as an inclusive catch-all category. Specific success goals

should be determined. Not only does some general meaning of "success" vary from individual to individual, but also it is doubtful that people orient their lives toward this overall goal in anything but an indirect way. People plan their activities around numerous smaller goals that collectively make up some distant more inclusive aspiration. For example, an adolescent might state that being successful in life is very important to him. Being successful means becoming a physician. To be a physician one must gain admission to a medical school which means being successful at the undergraduate level or, getting good grades. Eventual long range success is accomplished by the achievement of numerous smaller intervening goals. I would argue that while a long range goal (become a physician) may always be uppermost in a person's mind, everyday activities are oriented towards the achievement of short range goals.

3. Both goals and means are measured from the persepctive of some general other, for example, "people like yourself", or "most people", as opposed to the actor's perception of his own goals and means. The importance of goals and access to means should be measured from the individual, as opposed to "general other" point of view. We are concerned with the individual's "definition of the situation" as it relates to his perception of success goals and life chances. Learning what an individual thinks the importance of being successful is to others tells us nothing of how his perception of the importance of personal goals will influence his behavior.

In 1959 Reiss and Rhodes attempted to answer a number of questions concerning the realtionship between deviant behavior and educational goals among adolescents. The authors, as shown in Table I, used a very broad definition of education as a goal and measured respondent's internalization of their aspiration from the persepctive of some general other, "most people ought to go to college or finish high school or . . . " The means, or opportunity to achieve these goals, was considered to be a function of the respondent's "group position" as determined by a constellation of variables. In other words, it was not the respondent's perception of his/her ability to achieve desired goals that was used to measure opportunity but rather the respondent's psoition in a group as determined by the researchers. This was done primarily on the basis of ascribed characteristics (race, sex, socioeconomic status, and age). Simply stated, Reiss and Rhodes measured a success goal (general education) from the perspective of some "general other" and viewed the means available to achieve this goal as a function of one's position in the class structure of American society.

Elliot (1962) focused his research on two related questons: (1) Do delinquent boys define success in terms similar to those used by non-deliquent bosy?, and (2) Do delinquent boys perceive less opportunity to achieve their success goals than non-delinquents? Although his measures of success goals were quite specific (graduate form junior high school, high school, two year college, etc.), the questions were not posed in terms of the individual's perception of his/her own goals but rather in terms of illiciting a general opinion. The goals question (Table I) read as follows, "How far in school do you think a person ought to go to be successful . . .?" The problem from our perspective is that success

TABLE 1 - OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT OF GOALS AND MEANS AND SAMPLE ITEMS FROM VARIOUS ANOMIE STUDIES

| Author and Year | Operationalization and Measurement of "Goals" | Operationalization and Measurement of "Means" |
|---|---|---|
| Reiss and Rhodes 1959 | Goal - General Education from the perspective of some general other "most people ought to go to college or finish High School, or go to High School until 16 years old, or finish Grade School or get some schooling" | Means - "The adolescents group position in society as represented by his Race, Sex, I.Q., Socioeconomic status and Age" |
| D. S. Elliot 1962 | Goals - Education and Occupation from the perspective of some general other "some people say that school and education are very important for success in later life, how far in school do you think a person ought to go to be successful, circle the school that you think is most important to success" Graduation from:<br>8th grade<br>Junior High School<br>Etc. | Means - Perceived individual mobility respondents were asked, "How far they thought they would go in school." |
| Landis Et. Al. 1963 | Goals - General values from the perspective of some general other<br>Value Orientation Items<br>1. People should only keep promises when it is to their benefit.<br>2. Good manners are for sisses.<br>3. The law is always against the ordinary guy. | Means - Respondents perception of his opportunity (not linked to goals)<br>Awareness of Limited Access to Opportunity items<br>1. I probably won't be able to do the kind of work I want to do because I won't have enough education.<br>2. A guy like me has a pretty good chance of going to College.<br>3. Most people are better off than I am. |

goals, as defined for some nebulous, vague, general population and the individual's perception of his own goals, are obviously two different and most probably different things.

Elliot's measure of opportunity tapped the respondent's perception of his/her own chance of success. However, the opportunity indicator is more suited to tapping educational aspirations than means to goals. Asking respondents, "How far they thought they would go in school", appears to be indicative of the extent to which they value education. An indicator of the perceived opportunity structure would have more aptly been phrased, "How far will you be able to go in school? How far could you go in school if you wanted to?", or something to this effect. Even with this deficiency, Elliot's work can be seen as an improvement over the Reiss and Rhodes research in that the operationalization and measurement of means to goals was brought into the subjective, perceptual realm and not limited to the individual's position in the class structure.

Using a sample of 1,000 sixth and seventh grade youths, Landis et al (1963), attempted to test the rejection of middle class values and awareness of limited opportunity thesis of Cohen and of Cloward and Ohlin. The general value statements relating to goals (Table I) were presented from the perception of some general other. For example, "People should only keep promises when it is to their benefit". The "general other" type of question used in many of these studies has the critical shortcoming of failing to ascertain how the goal being considered is perceived by the respondent as it relates to his/her personal aspirations.

The "awareness of access to opportunity items", on the other hand, were measured from the individual's perception of his/her own chance of success. The Landis et al study was somewhat peculiar in that the authors

did not attempt to measure goals and means that were linked, educational goals and access to schools, for example. Instead, the authors attempted to measure numerous "value orientations" from the perspective of some general other and an array of opportunity items as they relate to the individual respondent.

Mizruchi (1964) attempted to put Merton's theory of anomie to an empirical test. However, before the theory could be tested, one of its primary assumptions had to be validated, i.e., "what is the distribution of success goals among the social "classes?" Mizruchi asked respondents in upstate New York how important it was for them personally to get ahead in life (Table 2). Respondents were asked to list, in order of importance, those things which they believed to be signs of success in American society. The five item list was comprised of education, money, many friends, home ownership, and job security. In utilizing this strategy, Mizruchi allowed respondents to rank a number of success goals as opposed to determining how important a particular goal was to an individual. This technique permits the researcher to ascertain the relative importance of success goals as they are related to other goals in a network of aspirations.

Opportunity questions were asked from the perspective of some hypothetical, supposedly average person and the individual's perception of his/her own chances of goal attainment. Mizruchi also attempted to learn if people felt that they had capitolized on opportunities that were available to them. Respondents were asked, "Have you felt that somehow you have allowed opportunities for success to slip through your fingers?" This item adds a rather interesting and somewhat ingenious twist to anomie theory. A goals-means disjuncture may exist, but not

TABLE 2 - OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT OF GOALS AND MEANS AND SAMPLE ITEMS FROM VARIOUS ANOMIE STUDIES

| Author and Year | Operationalization and Measurement of "Goals" | Operationalization and Measurement of "Means" |
|---|---|---|
| E. H. Mizruchi 1964 | Goals - General goal as it relates to the respondent "How important to you personally is it to get ahead in life?" "Could you list in order of importance those things which you believe to be signs of success in our society? Education, prestiege, money, many friends, and job security. | Means - Perceived opportunity from position of general other and respondents own position "Do you feel that a person with ability has a good chance of achieving success in our society or do you feel that ability has little to do with it?" "Have you felt that somehow you have allowed opportunities for success to slip through your fingers?" |
| A. L. Rhodes 1964 | Goals - Respondents occupational aspiration. Survey items not included in paper. | Means - Objective opportunity considered a function of respondents class, sex, and parents occupation. |
| R. J. Jessor Et. Al. 1968 | Goals - General not measured. Goals were assumed to be uniform and pervasive in American Society. | Means - Objective opportunity considered a function of the respondents position in the American class structure. |
| Elliot and Voss 1974 | Goals - Respondents educational and occupational aspirations. "If you could have any job you wanted, what job would you like to have as an adult?" Describe _____ | Means - Respondents perception of his chances of attaining educational and occupational goals. "What do you think are your chances of ever getting that kind of job?" |

because the means were perceived to be unavailable, but rather, because an opportunity to succeed was overlooked or squandered. An innovative researcher, Mizruchi measured the rank importance of goals as they are perceived by and relate to the individual respondent as well as the means at both the individual and general level.

Rhodes (1964) conducted a study to explore the relationship between occupational aspiration, occupational level (partents) and anomia. Questionnaires were administered to high school seniors in one of the smaller SMSA's in Tennessee and one small rural town. Rhodes asked students (none of the survey items used is provided by the author) if they aspired to professional occupations, other white collar occupations, or blue collar jobs. Class position, the opportunity indicator, was considered to be a function of parrents' occupation ("white collar," "blue collar," or "farm"), community of residence (rural or urban), and sex. This study has some of the same shortcomings as the Reiss and Rhodes (1959) research. Success goals are measured and categorized at a very general level. A clerk in a shoe store and a laboratory technician may both have been classified as "white collar" occupations but represent very different levels of occupational aspiration. The clerk's position would probably require a high school diplomoa or less, while the laboratory technician position might require four years of college or more. Since an objective measure of opportunity was used (class position), it is not possible to know how respondents perceived their chances of aspiring to previously stated occupational goals.

Jessor et al (1968) conducted a study of deviant behavior in a tri-enthnic (Anglo-Spanish-Idian N=221) city in Colorado. Unlike other researchers who attempted to measure goals and means and the disjuncture

between them, Jessor and his associates considered goals to be a constant, i.e., they accepted Merton's assumption that cultural goals are uniform and pervasive throughout American society.

> "The pervasive dissemination of core success values and the broadly shared understanding of the tangible criteria of success are difficult to overestimate in light of the widespread diffusion of contemporary mass media. That the burden of these values has reached into the farthest corners of American society is readily documented," (Jessor et al 1968:56)

Like Reiss (1959) and Reiss and Rhodes (1964), these researchers also assumed that one's position in the class structure determines access to legitimate means.

> The fundamental point is that in American society there is a differential distribution of legitimate resources or channels of access to the goals pervasively stressed by the American culture. The topography of access and, therefore, the topography of value-access disjunctions closely parallels the hierarchy of socioeconomic status and membership in minority ethnic or racial groups. This means that value-access disjunctions will be concentrated in the lower social strata and that this socially structured source of pressure for deviance will consequently be concentrated there. (Jessor et al 1968:58)

If "pressure toward deviance" is greatest in the "lower social strata", it is necessary to determine an individual's rule violating behavior and his position in the class system. Toward this end the researchers constructed two indexes applicable to individuals: "an index of Socioeconomic Status (SES) and an index of Objective Access (OA) in the opportunity structure". The SES index was based on education, job type, income, and neighborhood of residence. The OA index consisted of eight dichotomous variables (Table 2), age, age plus marital status, language spoken in present home, occupation, education, between generation mobility, religion, and social participation. Respondents received scores of either 0 or 1, depending on their characteristics as

they related to each of the eight dichotomous variables. For example, if the language spoken in the home was English, the respondent received a score of 1, any other language received a score of zero; if one's occupation was "semi-skilled or higher," a zero was received. "The final scale consisted of eight dichotomous variables, yielding OA scores running from 0, no favorable attributes, to 8, all favorable access attributes" (Jessor et al 1968:236). No attempt was made to tap the respondent's perception of his position in the class structure or his perception about the opportunities or lack of opportunities available to him.

Jessor's et al work is certainly a unique approach to anomie theory. Merton's basic assumptions (uniform pervasive cultural goals, and a limited opportunity structure available to lower classes) are readily accepted. Self-reported deviance is then accounted for within this framework. In light of this approach, it is not surprising that the authors' findings are consistent with the anomie perspective.

In a 1974 study, Elliot and Voss examined the relationship between delinquency, dropout and a series of independent variables including anomie. Considering their work a "modification and elaboration of Cloward and Ohlin's" thesis, their model utilized the following independent variables: (1) aspiration and opportunity disjuncture, (2) internal-external attributes of blame, (3) alienation, and (4) access and exposure to delinquent groups. Unlike Cloward and Ohlin, the authors attempts to explain delinquency and dropout in all social classes (N=2600). Elliot and Voss identified three sets of goals relating to the community, school, and home. They attempted to measure the success goals held by students and the students' perception of their future success or failure in attaining these goals.

Educational and occupational aspirations (Table 2) were measured as they related to the respondent. The occupational question asked, was as follows "If you could have any job you wanted, what job would you like to have as an adult?" Similarly, respondents were asked if they believed they would believed they would ever get that job, "What do you think are your chances of ever getting that kind of job?"

The work by Elliot and Voss is a departure from and improvement over previous anomie research in at least three ways: (1) specific goals and means are measured as they relate to the respondent, (2) "the goals-means disjuncture was modified to be logically independent of class", and (3) both goals and means are considered valuables.

By way of a brief summary we can see that with the exception of the Elliot and Voss research, the studies just reviewed have one or more of the following shortcomings.

1. Success goals were treated as both uniform and pervasive shared by Americans in all strata of society.
2. Success goals were measured at a vague and general level.
3. Both goals and means were measured from the perspective of some general other.

## A New Measure of Anomia

Sroles (1956) five item scale was the first attempt to develop an empircal indicator of anomia. As Srole clearly acknowledged, this pioneering work was not to be considered the final word on anomia. However, as Merton was to point out eight years later, "no more exacting measure of anomia has since been developed and systematically employed." The five items comprising the scale are listed below.

1. There is little use writing to public officials because they often aren't really interested in the problem of the average man.
2. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.
3. In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse, not better.
4. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world with the way things look for the future.
5. These days a person really doesn't know who he can count on.

Meir and Bell (1959) criticized Sroles scale arguing that it was primarily a measure of despair, hopelessness and resentment and as such resembled Merton's retreatist adaptation.

> We are convinced that the questions for the most measure despair, that is utter helplessness and discouragement. A person agreeing strongly with each of these questons is beyond simple apathy, he is in a condition of sadness and distress in which he is unable to exercise any confidence or trust that his desires or wishes may be realized and in the extreme may reach the point described by MacIver as "unquiet inrospection and self torture".

I agree with Meir and Bells criticism and argue that Sroles scale is not an appropriate indicator of anomie as "subjectively experienced" -- i.e., the compliment of Merton's anomie (an objective condition of group life). If anomie is the disjucture between culturally prescribed goals and means, then anomia should be the difference between the actor's goals and the perception of his present position relative to the realization of these goals.

Also, whenever possible, the intensity of commitment to goals should be measured. Merton (1968:225) makes this point in his review of Hyman's (1953) work.

> As it happens, the survey data available to Hyman do not discriminate between the degrees of commitment to the goal but indicate only the relative frequency with which individuals in the samples drawn from the several social strata express some unknow degree of acceptance of the success-goal and of related values. From the outset, then, it appears that subsequent inquiry might be usefully directed toward studying the intensity as well as the extent to which these values are held in diverse groups, social strata, and communities.

The following questions, used in this research, are indicative of the type of items I contend are more in line with Merton's anomie "as subjectively experienced" and, are therefore, superior to Sroles scale.

College students are often concerned with getting "good grades" at school. I would like to know how important getting good grades are to you.

The scale below ranges from 0 to 100. A score of 100 would indicate that getting good grades is the most important thing in your life these days while a score of 0 would mean that getting good grades is not the least bit important to you. Your answer concerning the importance of getting good grades may take any value (be any number) between 0 and 100.

At the appropriate place on the scale below write and circle the number that indicates how important getting good grades is to you.



100 Getting good grades is the most important thing in my life these days.

50 I am concerned with getting good grades but no more so than I am with a lot of other things.

0 Getting good grades is not the least bit important to me.

THIS IS A PROBABILITY QUESTION

Think for a moment about all the factors that go into getting grades on a test. There are, of course, numerous factors to be considered: your intelligence; how interested you are in the subject matter; the amount of time you have to study for a course given other demands in your life; the circumstances under which you study the difficulty of the tests; whether or not you get nervous taking tests, etc. Taking all of these factors

into account, what would you estimate is the average probability of getting the grade you want on an exmaination at the university?

An answer of 0% would mean that on the typical test you take there is no chance of getting the grades you want while an answer of 100% would mean you are absolutely sure that you will get the grade you want.

Consider all the tests you take. Out of all these tests, for what per cent do you get the grade you want? _____%

You hear and read a lot these days about "life styles," that is, the various ways different people choose to lead their lives. Important aspects of a life style include the ability to do the things that you enjoy (travel, eat out, etc.) and have the material possessions (an automobile, clothes, sporting equipment, etc.) that you would like.

About how much money would it take to lead the life style that you think is appropriate for you at this stage of your life? If you are married consider the amount necessary for your family as well.

On the average, not counting major expenditures like tuition, it would take about $_____ a month to lead the type of life I think is appropriate at this stage of my life.

In the previous question you stated how much money it would take to lead a life style you considered appropriate foryou at this stage of your life. Now I would like to know approximately how much money you actually receive on a monthly basis from all your sources of income (parents, job, GI bill, scholarships, etc.)

In a typical month at this time of my life I can count on approximately $_____.

In the first item respondents determine the extent to which good grades are important to them. It is not assumed that because one is a college student: (1) getting good grades automatically becomes a success goal and (2) this goal is held at the same level of importance by all students. The second item taps the respondent's past accomplishments as they relate to the goal of getting good grades. Anomia is the difference or disjunction between success goals (getting good grades) and means (the ability to achieve the desire goal).

The third item is a measure of the amount of money that is necessary to live the type of life the respondent believes is appropriate

for him/her at the present time. The final question is a measure of the respondents average actual monthly income. Anomia is the difference between the desired monetary goal and actual monthly income.

# CHAPTER V

# HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED

## A Recapitulation

We have seen that positivism brought to criminology via Lombroso and the Italian School, was to have a significant impact on the conceptualization and study of criminal behavior. Lombroso's application of the scientific method to the study of crime had considerable influence on sociologists who "transformed his biological determinism." (Cressey 1979)

The significance of this scientific revolution for the study of human behavior in general and criminal behavior in particular cannot be overestimated. It represented a radical view of the world and a search for natural causes in studying individuals and societies. Man himself was now viewed in a very different manner.

As a result of the monumental work by Darwin, man was considered an animal (albeit the most advanced or highly evolved animal) and as such had no special providence with God. Much like any other animal, man was subject to the laws and limitations of his biological makeup and/or was considered a product of his social environment. His "connection" to the almighty was severed and replaced with a biological and social "link" to the natural world. Man was no longer viewed as a product of a special creation endowed with, among other things, free will. In the field of criminology this represented an alternative, an alternative that was

incompatible with the world view of the classicists. If man's behavior was not the result of his own volition but was caused to a greater or lesser degree by factors outside of his control, then he was not full responsible for his actions.

The belief that criminal behavior was determined seriously undermined the utility of punishment as an effective mechanism of social control. The notion of punishment as a deterrent makes sense only within a larger philosophical framework anchored on a foundation of free will and individual responsibility. The concept of punishment, generally associated with classical criminology, would be replaced by positivists with another response to criminal behavior-treatment. The treatment varies according to theoretical perspective and level of analysis. Biological and psychoanalytic theories are at the individual level and call for manipulation of the psyche (therapy) and in some cases alteration of the central nervous system (shock treatment, chemotherapy, etc.). Sociological explanations of criminal behavior and subsequent treatment of that behavior are at the group level (ranging from changing peer groups to community reorganization) and the macro level (changing the larger economic system from capitalism to socialism for example).

In the past 70 years, criminology in the United States has been dominated by the sociological perspective. Within the last ten to fifteen years some of the ideas of Bentham, Beccaria and the classical school have been resurrected by sociologists who have come to be known as deterrence theorists. These researchers are interested in the extent to which formal and informal sanctions act as a general deterrent.

The basic issues reaised by deterrence theorists are formidable ones. The primary question concerns the relation between force and human behavior. Specifically, to what extent is force threat an effective mechanism in controlling human behavior? This is a question of importance not only for criminology (force threat in the form of legal sanctions) but, as Goode (1972) has noted, for sociology in general. The other significant question, implicit in the issue of force threat and human beahvior, concerns the relation between the deterrence view of man grounded in classical criminology and the determinist view of man anchored in positivist criminology.

Concerning the first question, it appears obvious that force and force threat have been significant factors in the attempt to control human behavior. Even a cursory review of history reveals that the threat and implementation of punishment has been used as a mechanism of social control in countless societies. What is not so obvious, however, is how effective (both in the long and short run) a method of control the use of force and force threat has been. We are only beginning to understand that some types of behavior in which certain groups of people engage, under specific conditions in particular situations may be successfully controlled by the threat of punishement.

The second question (some may argue that this is really the primary issue) concerns the present relationship between a classical and positivist criminology. Although deterrence theorists are not classical criminologists to the extent that Beccerea was (deterrence researchers do embrace the tenets of the scientific method), their doctrine is nevertheless embedded in the "FREE will" perspective. The question then becomes to what extent can this "FREE will" approach be integrated into a

deterministic, positivistic criminology? This issue, to my knowledge, has not been addressed by any contemporary deterrence theorist.

While deterrence researchers have expended a great deal of energy examining various combinations of inhibitory variables, they have neglected to consider the generative factors associated with rule violating behavior. This may be the result of (1) a selective interpretation of utilitarian thought, (2) a strategy that dictates an understanding of inhibitory factors before generative factors are considered or (3) a rejection of causal explanation of rule violating behavior and a complete acceptance of the free will position.

For whatever reason generative factors have been neglected in the past, it is imperative to a more complete understanding of conforming-rule violating behavior that they be considered in the future. In a recent paper Grasmick and Green (1979) reported that 40 per cent of the variance in rule violating behavior was explained by an additive deterrence model containing three inhibitory variables. The unexplained 60 per cent of the variance they suspect, "is due to variation in levels of motivation to violate the law among respondents in our sample." While inhibitory variables are important components of an explanation of conforming-rule violating behavior, by themselves, they are insufficient just as by themselves generative factors appear to be insufficient.

## Hypotheses to be Tested

The hypotheses tested in this dissertation are derived from the model of rule violating behavior that has been developed and discussed

in previous chapters. The model posits that the certainty and severity of punishement and moral commitment (inhibitory variables) will have a greater effect on behavior under conditions of high anomia. In the absence of this generative factor (anomia) people will refrain from rule violating behavior even if they score low on measures of perceived certainty and severity of punishment and moral commitment. Punishment will act as a deterrent only in those cases where individuals are motivated to deviate. When anomia is low the threat of punishment will have little effect on behavior.

The hypotheses were composed of three sets of variables. These included the generative factor of interest, anomia and inhibitory variables--the certainty and severity of both formal and informal punishment--and the dependent variables, self-reported violations. Two violations were considered: theft of an item worth "a few dollars" and cheating on university examinations.

Hypothesis 1.: The higher the anomia score the higher the incidence of self reported violation.

This hypothesis was formulated to test the relationship between the actors perception of a goals--menas disjuncture and self reported violations. It was argued that rule violating behavior is the function of some generative factor(s). In this case the factor is anomia as it relates to monetary success and the achievement of desired goals.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who score high on prohibitive factors (sanction fear and moral commitment) will report fewer violations than those who have low scores on prohibitive factors.

This is a test of the fundamental deterrence hypothesis (an inverse relationship between sanction fear and rule violation) with the

addition of the other inhibitory variable of importance--moral commitment. Norm internalization as an inhibitor of deviance is an important perspective in sociology. Moral commitment and sanction fear (both formal and informal) constitute the key elements of internal and external controls.

Hypothesis 3: People will engage in rule-violating behavior only under the pressure of the generative factor (anomia). In other words, the generative factor is a necessary condition for deviance. Thus, prohibitive factors influence rule violating behavior only when anomia is high. When anomia is low, there should be no relationship between prohibitive factors and rule-violating behavior.

This hypothesis represents an initial attempt to integrate anomie theory and deterrence theory. Not only is the generative factor (anomia) a necessary condition for the occurrence of deviant behavior, but also it is necessary for the possible deterrent effects of the prohibitive factors. Sanction fear will influence rule-violating behavior only when there is sufficient motivation to engage in deviant behavior. Without this motivation to deviance, the perception of punishment (either high or low) will have no effect on rule-violating behavior.

# CHAPTER VI

# METHODOLOGY

The perceptual studies in deterrence have focused on the actor's "definition of the situation" -- i.e., his perception of the certainty and severity of punishment. The strategies used by deterrence researchers to tap respondents' perceptions of punishment and their involvement in deviant activity have been numerous and varied. In this chapter we will present and critique survey items that have been used by deterrence investigators to measure various inhibitory variables including moral commitment. Following the presentation of these measures, the survey items used in this research will be outlined. Items used to tap self-reported violations also will be presented. This chapter will conclude with a brief disucssion of sampling, data collection and the statistical techniques used in this research. A discussion of pre-testing and subsequent item modifications will be found in the appendix.

## Measurement of Perceived Certainty

Perceived certainty of punishement has been operationalized and measured at both the formal and informal level. Perceived formal certainty concerns the actor's perception that the contemplation rule-violtating behavior will come to the attention of the proper authorities. Using stealing as an example, formal certainty would mean the perception of one's chances of apprehension and arrest by the police. Informal

certainty concerns the actor's perception that the behavior in question would be discovered by "significant others."

Deterrence researchers probably have spent more time investigating perceived certainty of punishment, both formal and informal, then perceived severity of punishment. This results from at least two factors: (1) most of the early studies found a stronger association between certainty of punishment and self-reported criminality than between perceived severity of punishment and rule-violating behavior, and (2) some studies for example, have indicated that the effect of severity of punishment is mediated through certainty -- i.e., severe punishment deters only to the extent that it is certain.

Questions to measure perceived certainty have been asked from different vantage points; a general other, "someone like yourself" and the respondent's perception of his own chances of apprehension. Jensen et al. (1978) have divided the "general other" perspective into two categories. The first is "aggregate and qualitative."

"People who break the law are almost always caught and punished."

The second is "aggregate and quantitative."

> Of the last one-hundred cases of (crime X) committed by a juvenile here in Tucson what is your guess as to the number that resulted in the arrest of a subject? (Jensen, Erickson and Gibbs, 1978)

Some researchers have asked certainty questions from the "someone like you" perspective. An example of an item from this vantage point is offered by Waldo and Chiricos (1972).

> How likely is someone like yourself to be arrested for stealing something worth less than $100?

The Likert-type responses ranged from "very likely" to "very unlikely."

Bailey and Lott (1976) were among the first to ask subjects to

"estimate their own chances of apprehension and conviction if they were to violate the law rather than those of a 'generalized other' or 'someone like themselves.'" This strategy was chosen after pretests indicated that people see their own chances of arrest and conviction as quite different from "persons otherwise like themselves." It is assumed that when people are contemplating a rule-violating act they are calculating their own chances of being apprehended and punished.

Bailey and Lott asked the following questions in terms of 0 - 100 per cent certainty.

> If you were to commit each of the crimes listed below, what do you think your chances would be of getting caught by the police?
> If you were to commit each of the crimes below, what do you think your chances would be of getting caught and convicted in court?

After examining the various ways that certainty items may be phrased, the question arises, "What differences, if any, in the perception of certainty result from these alternative positions?" Bailey and Lott report that, "roughly half of the subjects see themselves as either more or less likely to be arrested and convicted than 'persons like themselves.'"

Comparing both "aggregate" measures of certainty (quantitative and qualitative) with perceived personal risk, Jensen et al. (1978:65) concude that:

> Considerably more support for the deterrence doctrine is again realized in the case of the measure of perceived personal risk. All chi-squares for that measure are significant beyond the .01 level, whereas only 3 of 8 values for the aggregate, quantitative measure reach that level of significance. Moreover, each gamma coefficient for the personal measure exceeds the corresponding coefficient for either of the other measures of perceived risk.

Measures of perceived risk are used increasingly not only because they lend the most support to deterrence theory but because, as previously

mentioned, they are more in line with the deterrence doctrine.

In keeping with the current trend in deterrence research, and also striving for theoretical consistency (i.e., continuity with utilitarian thought) questions of perceived certainty in the present research were asked from the respondent's perception of his own chances of apprehension. The measures of perceived certainty, both formal and informal, used in this study are listed below.[10]

If you were to cheat on the next 100 examinations taken here at the university, how many times do you think that you would be caught by the instructor or teaching assistant? _____

Now imagine that you were caught cheating on an examination. What do you think the chances are that your family would find out? (if you are having trouble understanding the nature of the probability please reread the discussion of probability above).

There is a _____% chances that my family would find out if I was caught cheating on a university examination.

Having been caught cheating on an examination what do you think the chances are that your 2 best friends would find out?

There is a _____% that my 2 best friends would find out if I were caught cheating on a university examination.

If you were to steal something worth only a few dollars on 100 separate occasions, how many times do you think that you would be arrested by the police? _____

Now imagine that you were arrested for stealing something worth a few dollars. What do you think the chances are that your family would find out?

There is a _____% chance that my family would find out if I were arrested for stealing.

Having been arrested for stealing something worth a few dollars, what do you think the changes are that your 2 best friends would find out?

There is a _____% chance that my 2 best friends would find out if I were arrested for stealing.

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[10]This type of item was preceeded by an explanation of "probability."

## Measurement of Perceived Severity

Perceived severity has been measured at the formal (sanctions administered by organizations, especially the criminal justice system) and informal (negative sanction of family, friends, etc.) level. Perceptions of perceived severity of punishment like perceptions of perceived certainty have been examined from various perspectives. These positions, along with the type of sanction used, are illustrated in the following table.

TABLE 3 - Type of Sanction and Orienting Perspective Used in Previous Deterrence Research

| | | Type of Sanction | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Formal | Informal |
| Orienting Perspective | The Respondenct | Bailey and Lott | Grasmick and Appleton |
| | General Other | Teevan | |

Teevan (1976) sought to determine how individuals perceived the severity of formal punishment for a "general other."

For all Canadians caught by the police what is their usual punishment?

1. Nothing 2. Informal handling 3. Fine 4. Probation or suspended sentence 5. Jail

In the item above, notice that the question is phrased in terms of "all Canadians" as opposed to the individual respondent. Some researchers have argued that people may have very different perceptions concerning what would happen to them should they be apprehended as opposed to some hypothetical other person. These investigators have chosen to ask the respondent what the severity of punishment would be should he/she be seized by police. An example of this approach, coupled with formal

anctions, is offered by Bailey and Lot (1972).

What do you think would happen to you if you were caught by the police committing the following crimes?

1. release by the police without arrest
2. arrest but no conviction
3. conviction with probation and/or fine only
4. conviction and a jail sentence
5. conviction and a prison sentence

While deterrence investigators initially limited their measures of severity to formal sanctions, in recent years the deterrent effects of informal sanctions have also been investigated. In 1977 Grasmick and Appleton (Table 3) looked at the "perceived threat of social disapproval contingent upon being exposed as an offender." In other words, they examined the respondent's perception of informal sanctions should he/she be apprehended for the violation in question.

> Think of the three people you see and talk to most often. If you were caught and fined by the police for speeding how would each of these three people react if they found out? Would he or she feel that breaking the speed law was something you should not have done?

The final category in the table, perceived informal sanctions for some "general others" makes no theoretical sense. While people may estimate the perceived severity of formal sanctions for others (because they have some idea of how the criminal justice system works), it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the severity of informal sanctions for some general other.

Another type of severity question (not included in the table) is designed to tap the respondents' perceptions of maximum penalties for particular crimes as prescribed by law. The fundamental argument for this type of item is basic to the general reasoning underlying perceptual studies, namely that people behave according to their perception or definition of the situation and not necessarily according to their perception

or definition of the situation and not necessarily according to the objective situation. An item of this type is offered by Anderson et al. (1977).

> Could you estimate the maximum prison penalty in Florida for illegal possession of marijuana--first offense?
> 0 - 2 yrs categorized "low severity"
> 2 - 5 yrs categorized "medium severity"
> more than 5 yrs categorized "high severity"

This type of question is a good example of a rather formidable stumbling block in the area of perceived severity. Notice that the authors have predetermined what level of severity each of these penalties carries -- e.g., 0 - 2 yrs is labelled "low severity," etc. The problem is that individual respondents may have very different ideas of what a severe penalty is. Some respondents may think that any time spent in jail is a severe penalty, while others may view the 2 - 5 year sentence as a moderate penalty.

James Teevan (1976) took a step toward solving this problem when he asked the following question concerning the perceived severity of punishment preceeding deviance,

> Before you smoked marijuana (or if you never smoked it) what do you think the punishment would be if you were caught?
> Very severe Not so bad Nothing to worry about Nothing

A similar, although superior solution, is offered by Grasmick and Bryjak (forthcoming 1980).

> Now, for each of these things we have been talking about, imagine you had been arrested and found guilty and that the court had decided what your punishment would be. Think about what that punishment probably would be for you. Then indicate how big a problem that punishment would create for your life. Please use the list of choices on the card to respond to the statements I will read. The choices are:
> 1. a very big problem for my life
> 2. a big problem for my life
> 3. a little problem for my life

4. hardly any problem for my life
5. no problem at all for my life

These investigators view a punishment as severe to the extent that it is problematic in one's life. This appears to be a logical extension, of or at least a crucial dimension of, the severity of punishment, i.e., a penalty is severe to the extent that it causes a problem in one's life. Conversely, penalties that will cause little if any problwm in one's life cannot be very severe.

Basically, the same measurement strategy used by Grasmick and Bryjak was employed in this study. The following items were used as indicators of perceived severity of formal punishment.

1. Let's suppose that having cheated on an examination you were caught by the instructor. Having been caught for the first time, what do you think would happen to you?
    1. I don't think anything at all would happen.
    2. I would be warned by the instructor about the consequences of cheating on an examination--nothing more.
    3. I would receive an "F" on that exam.
    4. I would fail the exam and also be dropped from the course.
    5. I would fail the exam, be dropped from the course and also suspended from school for an indefinite period of time.
    6. I would fail the exam, be dropped from the course and expelled from the University.

Now imagine that, having been caught cheating on an examination, the penalty that you expected was in fact imposed on you. How serious of a problem would the penalty be for you?

This question will be answered in the same manner that the previous questions were answered. A score of 0 would mean that the penalty you received would present no problem whatsoever for you while a score of 100 would indicate that the penalty you received would present an extremely serious problem for you. Your estimate of the seriousness of the problem may take any value (be any number) between 0 and 100. Remember a score of 0 means the complete absence of any problem for you while a score of 100 indicates a very serious problem for you.

2. At the appropriate place on the scale below write and circle the number that indicates how serious a problem for you the penalty from the university would be.



100 The penalty that I received from the University would present an extremely serious problem for me.

50 The penalty I received from the university would present a problem for me, although not a serious one.

0 The penalty I received from the University would present no problem whatsoever for me.

3. Let's suppose that having taken something that did not belong to you worth a few dollars you were arrested by the police. Having been arrested for the first time what do you think would happen to you?

1. I don't think anything at all would happen.
2. I would be warned by the judge about the possible consequences of stealing--nothing more.
3. I would be convicted and placed on probation.
4. I would be convicted and fined up to $100.
5. I would be convicted and have to spend up to 30 days in jail and fined up to $100.
6. I would be convicted and have to spend a minimum of one but no more than 6 months in the county jail.
7. I would be convicted and have to spend a minimum of 6 months but no more than one year in the state prison.

Now imagine that, having been arrested and convicted for stealing something worth a few dollars, the penalty that you expected was in fact imposed on you. How serious of a problem would the penalty be for you?

4. At the appropriate place on the scale below write and circle the number that indicates how serious a problem for you the penalty from the courts would be.



100 The penalty that I received from the courts would present an extremely serious problem for me.

50 The penalty I received from the courts would present a problem for me, although not a serious one.

0 The penalty I received from the courts would present no problem whatsoever for me.

The first and third items tap the respondents view of what would happen if he/she were caught cheating or arrested for stealing. The second and fourth items are a measure of the perception of the severity

of the problem should the expected penalty actually be imposed. The scores on the second and fourth items were the only ones utilized in calculating perceived severity of punishment. The difference between this item and the one used by Grasmick and Bryjak was in the scale construction. The scale used in the second and fourth items above approximates an interval level of measurement and can be analyzed with multiple regression techniques.[11]

## Measurement of Moral Commitment

Recently, deterrence researchers have been interested in the degree to which individuals have been committed to various norms, rules and laws. Moral commitment, according to some sociological theories, is the primary determinant of conformity. Because it is an important factor in explaining conforming-deviant behavior, it has been incorporated by some researchers into the deterrence equation.

The notion of moral commitment is certainly not new in sociology. Deterrence researchers did not discover it nor are they trying to say that they did. In one form or another, the notion of a shared, internalized moral order has been an important concern in sociology since the discipline's inception. The belief that a shared moral system and a commitment to that system is the cement that holds society together was a major tenet in the sociology of Saint-Simon (Manuel 1956) and Durkheim (1965). While the concept of moral commitment has played a prominent

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[11]Previous authors have used individual Likert-type items and analyzed these findings with ordinal level statistics, most often gamma. Others like Silberman (1976) have constructed scales by summing a respondent's scores on a particular item (perceived severity) for all offenses in the study. These composite scales also approximate interval-level data and were analyzed using multiple regression.

role in the theorizing of many sociologists, few have tried empirically to determine how important it actually is in explaining conforming and deviant behavior.[12] Deterrence researchers are probably the first to utilize the concept of moral commitment, both theoretically and empirically, in their effort to incorporate normative commitment into a more fully developed model of social control.

As compared to perceived certainty and severity of punishment, the measurement of moral commitment poses few problems. For one thing, the measurement of moral commitment as it relates to deterrence research only makes sense from the vantage point of the respondent. Moral commitment items used by other researchers have been quite similar. Tittle (1977) asked respondents how morally wrong they considered each of nine offenses to be. "Five response categories ranging from 'not wrong at all' to 'very wrong' were allowed and were scored from zero to four to indicate strength of moral commitment." Silberman (1976) asked his respondents to rate eleven offenses according to whether they were always wrong, usually wrong, sometimes wrong, or not wrong at all.

The measure of moral commitment used in this study is shown below.

> Most people have a set of standards or rules and values by which they try to live. These rules and values are numerous and cover a wide variety of behavior. A few of them are listed below. I would like to know to what extent you agree or disagree with these rules and values, that is, to what degree you think they are good or bad.
>
> A score of 0 would indicate that you thought the rule or value was very bad and should never be followed, while a score of 100 would indicate you thought the rule was a very good one and should always be followed. Your rating of the rules may take any value (be any number) between 0 and 100.

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[12] Talcott Parsons, probably more than any other contemporary sociologist, has used the concept of moral commitment in his theorizing.

A. _____Causing someone physical harm or injury is always wrong and can never be justified.

B. _____People should always tell the truth no matter what the consequences of their honesty may be.

C. _____Cheating on examinations is always wrong, no matter what the circumstances may be.

D. _____Extra-marital sexual relations are always wrong.

E. _____Stealing--even something worth only a few dollars--is always wrong, no matter what the circumstances may be.

F. _____Drinking alcohol to the point of intoxication can never be justified.

This measure of moral commitment is somewhat different than those previously mentioned. Respondents were not asked to state how wrong they believed a particular offense was but instead to what extent they agreed or disagreed with particular "rules and values." Measurement of moral commitment using this technique more closely approximates an interval-level scale.

## Measurement of Self-Reported Violations

Another area of controversy resulting in the use of alternative strategies concerns the measurement of self-reported rule violations. Most researchers have focused on the number of rule violations the actor has engaged in while others have sought to ascertain the future incidence of criminal and deviant behavior. Each of these approaches has strengths and weaknesses. The problems associated with self-reports of past criminal behavior are discussed by Silberman (1976:44).

> An important criticism of the self-report method that has not been dealt with adequately heretofore is the question of the direction of relationship between measures of deterrence and crime rates. Respondents are asked at a given point in time what their current beliefs are regarding the efficacy of the law enforcement process and then asked to report their past criminal behavior. In order to assert that these beliefs

> affect the individual's behavior, we must assume a degree of stability in those beliefs. However, it is equally resonable to assume that the respondent's current beliefs are a product of his past behavior, particularly if he has committed an offense and was not caught. Are we really testing deterrence theory? Or are we measuring the effects of past experiences on current beliefs regarding the certainty and severity of punishement? The truth probably lies between the extremes.

As Silberman notes, the successful resolution of this problem probably requires a longitudinal study. Silberman is arguing, and rightfully so, that behavior and beliefs are in a condition of continual interaction. This relationship takes the following form: BELIEF-----BEHAVIOR-----BELIEF-----BEHVIOR, etc. Deterrence theorists hope to capture the BELIEF-----BEHAVIOR relationship between perception of punishment and self-reported violations. However, we are not measuring beliefs (perceptions of punishment) before the rule-violating behavior but after the commission of that behavior as outlined in the following:

| T1 | | T2 |
|---|---|---|
| BELIEFS(PAST) | -----BEHAVIOR----- | BELIEFS(CURRENT) |

Insofar as behavior influences current beliefs at time 2, we can never get at the uncontaminated beliefs at time 1.

Tittle (1977) had respondents estimate the probability on a five point scale ranging from "excellent chance" to "almost no chance" that they would commit a number of deviant acts if, "tomorrow they were in a situation where they had an extremely strong desire or need to do so." While this approach may overcome some of the problems outlined in the self-reports of past deviant behavior, it also introduces new obstacles. The chief problem is the often noted discrepancy between attitudes or beliefs, and behavior (LaPierre, 1934; Acock and Defleur, 1972). Simply stated, people do not always do what they say they will do.

> Attitudes always produce pressures to behave consistently with them, but external pressures and extraneous considerations can cause people to behave inconsistently with their attitudes (Friedman, Carlsmith and Sears, 1970:385).

The strength of the "probably future deviance" approach is that it overcomes the problem of using present perceptions to expalin past rule-violating behavior. The question arises as to which of these two measures is superior. It is also possible they are tapping rule-violating behavior equally as well. One possible check on the difference, if any, between self-reported deviance and the probability of future deviance would be to obtain measures of both on the same population and determine to what extent they are correlated. Grasmick and Bryjak (forthcoming 1980) found that the two measurement techniques are quite highly (.71) correlated. It appears that conclusions concerning the deterrent effects of punishment are not substantially altered by different measures of self-reported deviance. Whether one chooses to use self-reports of past behavior or probable future deviance, both are inversely related to the perceived certainty and severity of punishment.

Deterrence researchers must also be concerned with other problems relating to self-reported rule violations. Not the least of these problems are ones concerning the accuracy and honesty of subjects' self-reported violations--i.e., the extent to which they are able and willing to tell the truth. Self-reports of deviant behavior have some of the same difficulties as victimization studies concerning accuracy. For one thing, respondents may forget some incidents of rule-violating behavior. When a time frame is used (e.g., "how many times in the past year did you violate rule x") respondents may "telescope forward" violations that happened prior to the time period under consideration.

Concerning the honesty of answers, respondents may conceal from investigators the commission of, or correct number of, deviant acts. However, utilizing a polygraph test Clark and Tift (1963) asked 45 subjects questions about their deviant behavior after these same subjects had previously answered the identical questions on an anonymous questionnaire. They concluded that the validity of the initial questionnaire was quite high. "The validity of the initial responses on this questionnaire based upon the number of items initially answered correctly (as determined by the polygraph) divided by the total number answered was 81.5 percent." The investigators found a relationship between response inaccuracy and "declared personal norms and reference group norms."

When deviant acts committed were at odds with personally held norms, the number of these acts tended to be under-reported. However, in 23 of 26 cases where reported violations were compatible with reference group norms, the number of self-reported violations was over-reported. Krohn, Waldo and Chiricos (1974) found a relation between interview format (checklist or admitting violations to an interviewer), physical appearance of the interviewer ("straight" vs "hip"), and self-reported deviance.

In this study, as in most deterrence research, a measure of self-reported past rule-violating behavior was used.

> Now I would like you to indicate the number of times you have attempted and/or actually committed these acts since the beginning of the past academic year (August 1978). Please be honest with your answers. A recent study conducted at a large Florida university found that approximately 33% of a sample of students cheated when given the opportunity indicating how widespread this behavior is. A survey at a Pennsylvania university revealed that over 60% of the students questioned had previously stolen something on at least one occasion.

Write down the number of times you have attempted to and/or actually committed these acts since the beginning of the past academic year.

A. _____Took something or attempted to take something worth a few dollars that did not belong to you. (Include such items as magazines and food from supermarkets, school supplies from the bookstore, etc.).

B. _____Attempted to and/or actually cheated on university examination (cheating on examinations may be done in a number of ways: concealing notes on your person, glancing at your textbook, looking at the paper of the person sitting next to you, filling out parts of your bluebook before you take the exam, getting help on a take-home exam you were supposed to do by yourself, etc.).

Two strategies were employed to facilitate the validity of this item: (1) an appeal for honest, frank responses, and (2) a brief report of past studies that revealed a high degree of participation in these activities in a similar population.

## Sampling and Data Collection

The "accidental" sample consisted of approximately 300 undergraduate students at the University of Oklahoma. The students, both lower and upper division, were enrolled in a number of courses (sociology, psychology, political science, economics and marketing) during the summer of 1979. Males and females were equally represented in the sample.

Course instructors were contacted and asked to volunteer their students for approximately 25-30 minutes. The nature of the study was explained to the instructors and their questions relating to the research were answered. A standard set of instructions was read to all respondents prior to their completing the questionnaire. Students were told that their participation was voluntary and that their responses would be anonymous and confidential. Course instructors were not present during

administration of the questionnaire. To discourage students from rushing through the survey, the questionnaire was presented at the beginning of the class period with the scheduled presentation by the instructor to begin when everyone had finished.

## Statistical Techniques of Analysis

The final analysis of the relationship between the independent variables (the inhibitory and generative factors) and the dependent variable (self reported violations) will be undertaken by utilizing multiple regression facilities of the SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) computer program. Multiple regression assumes that a relationship between some dependent variable and a set of independent variables is linear and additive. "The strategy then becomes that of producing the linear combination of independent variables which "best" predicts or explains the values of the dependent variable." (Soroka 1975:14)

The "main effects" will be considered first in the analysis. The assumption in this statistical procedure is that the basic relationship between self-reported violations and various combinations of independent variables can best be understood through a simple additive model.

A second set of solutions will be undertaken to test for interaction effects. A test for interaction is necessary when it is believed that the treatment effects of predictor variables (independent variables) are not independent of each other. If interaction between independent variables is occurring and not taken into account, the "best fit" will not be accomplished yielding inaccurate predictions. A test for inter-

action will be made by including multiplicative terms in the regression equation. Hypothesis 3 from chapter 5 proposes that an interaction effect will be significant.

# CHAPTER VII

# ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

## Introduction

Results of the data analysis will be presented in three major parts. In the first section we will consider univariate statistics--the means and standard deviations. Bivariate relationships (zero order correlations) between the relevant variables will be examined in the second section. Finally the results of the multivarate analysis (utilizing multiple regression techniques) will be presented. In the last section of this chapter we will attempt to synthesize the findings and determine if the three major hypotheses should be accepted or rejected.

## Univariate Analysis

Table 4 contains the means and standard deviations of all of the relevant variables for both self reported violations--cheating and stealing. With the exception of self reported violations and the two variables which comprise the anomia--money item (money needed for desired life style minus monthly income) all of the variables in Table 4 are on a scale that ranges from 0 to 100.

Respondents indicated that they were slightly more committed to norms against cheating than norms against stealing with means for the two offenses of 83.49 and 79.69 respectively. Perceived certainty of formal punishment for cheating is somewhat higher than perceived certainty

TABLE 4 - MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE RELEVANT VARIABLES

| CHEATING | | | STEALING | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MEAN | STANDARD DEVIATION | | MEAN | STANDARD DEVIATION |
| Moral Commitment | 83.49 | 26.80 | Moral Commitment | 79.69 | 28.46 |
| Formal Certainty | 36.20 | 36.28 | Formal Certainty | 30.80 | 34.14 |
| Formal Severity | 76.20 | 22.82 | Formal Severity | 74.25 | 25.68 |
| Family Certainty | 37.87 | 34.58 | Family Certainty | 67.50 | 35.74 |
| Family Severity | 63.14 | 26.08 | Family Severity | 74.10 | 41.17 |
| Friends Certainty | 55.77 | 37.47 | Friends Certainty | 64.32 | 33.72 |
| Friends Severity | 39.73 | 28.80 | Friends Severity | 48.64 | 29.06 |
| Importance of Getting Good Grades | 76.28 | 16.83 | Money Needed For Desired Life Style | 1003.39 | 775.59 |
| Percent of Tests Desired Grades Received | 69.90 | 21.86 | Monthly Income | 682.83 | 561.37 |
| Number of Offenses Cheating | 2.28 | 7.59 | Number of Offenses Stealing | 2.00 | 14.78 |
| Anomia Grades | 6.376 | 1.420 | Anomia Money | 321.011 | 563.55 |

of formal punishment for stealing with means of 36.20 and 30.80. The perceived severity of formal punishment for the two offenses are similar with means of 76.20 for stealing and 74.25 for cheating. The data indicates that the perceived certainty and severity of formal punishment for the two offenses are quite similar.

The analysis of informal sanctions revealed several interesting points. The mean score for perceived certainty-family (cheating violations) is 37.87 while the mean score for severity is 63.14. Looking at the mean scores for perceived certainty and severity-friends (cheating violations) we find them to be 55.77 and 39.73 respectively. In other words, certainty is lower for family than friends, while severity is higher for family than friends. Respondents friends are viewed as more likely to find out about cheating behavior than family members but are perceived to be less likely to administer severe negative sanctions.

Examining self-reported stealing behavior we find that the mean for perceived family severity (74.10) is higher than the mean for perceived family certainty (67.50). The mean scores for informal sanctions-friends are certainty 64.32 and severity 48.64. Perceived certainty of punishement scores are approximately the same for family and fiends while severity (74.10) is considerably higher than friends severity (48.64). This indicates that respondents expected family members to administer harsher sanctions for stealing violations than friends although the perceived chance of discovery is almost identical for the two groups.

Looking at both offenses we find that while friends are perceived as likely (stealing) or more likely (cheating) to learn of the rule violating behavior than family members, they (friends) are not perceived as administering as serious sanctions as are members one one's family.

TABLE 5 - FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR CHEATING AND STEALING VIOLATIONS

| STEALING N = 307 | | | CHEATING N = 308 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of Offenses | Absolute Frequency | Cumulative Frequency (Pct) | Number of Offenses | Absolute Frequency | Cumulative Frequency (Pct) |
| 0 | 226 | 73.6 | 0 | 186 | 60.3 |
| 1 | 29 | 83.0 | 1 | 37 | 72.4 |
| 2 | 23 | 90.5 | 2 | 26 | 80.8 |
| 3 | 3 | 91.5 | 3 | 20 | 87.2 |
| 4 | 3 | 92.5 | 4 | 7 | 89.4 |
| 5 | 9 | 95.4 | 5 | 9 | 92.4 |
| 6 | 2 | 96.0 | 7 | 1 | 92.8 |
| 9 | 1 | 96.4 | 8 | 1 | 93.1 |
| 10 | 6 | 98.0 | 10 | 8 | 95.7 |
| 11 | 1 | 98.3 | 11 | 1 | 96.1 |
| 15 | 2 | 99.3 | 15 | 4 | 97.4 |
| 25 | 2 | 100.0 | 20 | 5 | 99.0 |
| | | | 25 | 1 | 99.3 |
| | | | 40 | 1 | 99.6 |
| | | | 50 | 1 | 100.0 |

As might be expected, respondents indicated that it is more likely that their friends would learn of their cheating behavior than their family. Stealing, however, is as likely to be discovered by family members as by friends. These responses make sense in light of the fact that (1) family members are removed from the goings on of daily campus life, in many cases separted by hundreds of miles, (2) any disciplinary action short of being expelled from the university can probably be kept from one's family, and (3) getting "caught up" in the criminal justice system (i.e., arrested, possibly jailed and appearing in court) probably is more difficult to hide from one's family, especially if it means losing a good deal of school time or incurring legal expenses.

The importance of getting good grades to students in our sample (mean score 76.28) is slightly higher than their ability to achieve these desired grades (mean score 69.00). This is not the case, however, concerning the amount of money respondents would like to have and the monthly income they currently receive. Students reported a mean figure of $1003.00 as the monthly income they believe is necessary to lead the type of life style they consider appropriate at this point in their lives. On the average, respondents reported $682.00 in monthly income. This represents a more substantial goals-means disparity than we found for anomia-grades. This means income score indicates that students desire approximately 47% more money a month than they currently receive.

The number of self-reported cheating and stealing offenses is relatively low with mean scores of 2.8 and 2.0 respectively. The frequency distribution of the dependent variables (Table 5) indicates that 73.1% of the respondents did not report any stealing violations and 60.2% did not report any cheating violations. Of the 83 students who

TABLE 6 - CORRELATION MATRIX - CHEATING VARIABLES

| | MORAL COMM | FORM CERT | INFORM CERT FAM | INFORM CERT FRD | INFORM SEV FAM | INFORM SEV FRD | FORM SEV CHEAT | IMPORT GOOD GRADES | GET GOOD GRADES | NUMBER OF OFFENSES | ANOMIA GRADES |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MORAL COMM | 1.000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| FORM CERT | .1519* | 1.000 | | | | | | | | | |
| INFORM CERT FAM | .1138* | .2062** | 1.000 | | | | | | | | |
| INFORM CERT FRD | -.0174 | .1007* | .2564** | 1.000 | | | | | | | |
| INFORM SEV FAM | .1460* | .0470 | .1411* | .0046 | 1.000 | | | | | | |
| INFORM SEV FRD | .1256* | .1528* | .1494* | -.1032* | .4516** | 1.000 | | | | | |
| FORM SEV | .0699 | .1940** | .0462 | -.0076 | .2003** | .1972** | 1.000 | | | | |
| IMPORT GOOD GRADES | .1617* | .0847 | -.0223 | -.0198 | .1985** | .1284* | .2307** | 1.000 | | | |
| GET GOOD GRADES | .0579 | .0573 | -.0385 | -.1078* | -.0158 | .0718 | .0643 | .1918** | 1.000 | | |
| NUMB.OF OFFENSES | -.2382** | -.0678 | .0111 | .0882 | -.0411 | .0736 | -.1014* | .0871 | -.1264* | 1.000 | |
| ANOMIA GRADES | -.0534 | .0118 | .0193 | .0058 | .1408* | .0239 | .1147* | - | - | .0073 | 1.000 |

*P<.05
**P<.001

TABLE 7 - CORRELATION MATRIX - STEALING VARIABLES

| | MORAL COMM | FORM CERT | INFORM CERT FAM | INFORM CERT FRD | INFORM SEV FAM | INFORM SEV FRD | FORM SEV | MONEY NEED L S | MONTH INCOME | NUMBER OF OFFENSES | ANOMIA MONEY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MORAL COMM | 1.000 | | | | | | | | | | |
| FORM CERT | .1075* | 1.000 | | | | | | | | | |
| INFORM CERT FAM | .1430* | .1608* | 1.000 | | | | | | | | |
| INFORM CERT FRD | .0171 | .0967* | .3126** | 1.000 | | | | | | | |
| INFORM SEV FAM | .1501* | .1250* | .1836** | .0711 | 1.000 | | | | | | |
| INFORM SEV FRD | .1862** | .1604* | .2650** | .0741 | .2190** | 1.000 | | | | | |
| FORM SEV | .2079** | .2605* | .1388* | -.0066 | .1311* | .3481** | 1.000 | | | | |
| MONEY NEED L S | -.1411* | -.1646* | -.0210 | -.0689 | -.1609* | -.0861 | -.1162* | 1.000 | | | |
| MONTH INCOME | -.0925 | -.1109* | -.0056 | -.1172* | -.0688 | -.0248 | -.0495 | .6789** | 1.000 | | |
| NUMB OF OFFENSES | -.1598* | .0859 | -.1270* | .0799 | .0983* | -.1191* | .0429 | .0128 | -.0042 | 1.000 | |
| ANOMIA MONEY | -.1114* | -.1113* | -.0217 | .0060 | -.1428* | -.1093* | -.1077* | - | - | .0239 | 1.000 |

*P<.05
**P<.001

admitted to stealing 52 indicated they had stolen on either one or two occasions. Of the 308 respondents 123, or 38.8%, indicated that they had cheated at least one time during the past academic year. The majority of students who cheated (99) reported five or less violations. By way of summary we can see that most of the respondents did not report any cheating or stealing violations and those who did engage in these acts did so infrequently.

## Zero Order Relations

An inter-correlation matrix (Tables 6 and 7) gives the direction and magnitude of the relationship between two variables. In terms of the strength of the associations, moral commitment, of all the inhibitory variables, is most strongly related to self reported violations with correlation coefficients of -.2822 (significant at the .001 level) with cheating and -.1598 (significant at the .05 level) with stealing.

Concerning the correlations between self reported cheating and five of the six sanction variables (formal certainty, informal certainty family and friends, and informal severity family and firends) the associations are negligible and/or in the wrong direction--i.e., they are positively related to cheating behavior. Only perceived formal severity is negatively and substantially (-.1014 significant at the .05 level) related to self reported cheating violations.

Looking at stealing violations, we see that three of the six correlations with sanction variables (informal certainty--friends, informal severity--family and formal severity) are in the wrong (positive) direction. The remaining associations between self reported stealing and sanction variables (formal certainty -.0859), informal certainty--

family -.1270, and formal certainty--friends -.1191) are in the predicted direction, with the informal certainty relationship significant at the .05 level.

Moral commitment also is fairly strongly related to the sanction variables for each of the two offenses. With the exception of perceived certainty of informal punishment--friends (both offenses) and formal severity (cheating), the correlations between moral commitment and the nine remaining sanction variables are statistically significant and positive in direction. This suggests that respondents who are highly committed to the norms in question are more likely to perceive greater sanction fear for violations related to these norms than those people who are not as committed.

The generative factor of interest, anomie, is negligibly correlated with self-reported violations. The coefficients of .007 with cheating and .030 with stealing indicate that there is virtually no linear relationship between anomia and rule violating behavior in our sample. This constitutes negative evidence for the first hypotheses--i.e., that anomia is positively related to self reported violations.

The relationship between anomia and sanction fear is rather baffling. The coefficients between anomia--grades and the six sanction variables were all positive, although rather small, with informal severity-family (.1408) and formal severity (.1147) significant at the .05 level. Concerning anomia-money, five of the six coefficients with the sanction variables are negative with four of these (formal severity -.1114, family severity -.1428, friends severity -.1093 and formal severity -.1077) significant at the .05 level. While anomia-grades is positively, albeit weakly, related to sanction variables, anomia-money is inversely and more

strongly related to sanction fear.

It is possible that those individuals who experience the greatest anomia-grades have investigated the possibility of cheating, considered the certainty and severity of punishment, and found them to be high. However, the relatively weak relationship between these two variables may be the result of random or chance fluctuation. Those individuals who experienced the highest degree of anomia-money may have considered stealing and concluded that the certainty and severity of punishment is relatively low. It makes little sense to think that the causal sequence is in the opposite direction--i.e., perceptions of sanction fear cause anomia. Another possibility is that the relationship between anomia and perceived sanction fear is spurious.

The relationships between anomia and moral commitment are, as might be expected, negative. The correlation between anomia--grades and moral commitment was -.0534, and -.1114 (significant at the .05 level) between anomia-money and moral commitment. Conceptualizing this as a cause and affect relationship, it could be argued that increasing anomia leads to decreasing moral commitment. As the discrepancy between goals and means increases moral commitment to norms which specify appropriate conduct concerning acceptable behavior in the attainment of these goals decreases. It makes little theoretical sense to think that increasing moral commitment leads to a reduction in the goals--means disjuncture.

Other interesting correlations concern the associations between the six pair of perceived certainty and severity variable,s three each for self reported cheating and stealing. All of these combinations with the exception of informal certainty and severity of punishment-friends (cheating) are positively related and significant at the .05

level. This suggests that respondents who perceive punishment as certain also perceive punishment as severe. In other words, respondents were not likely to view punishment as certain and mild or relatively uncertain yet severe. It appears probable that respondents perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment are not arrived at independent of one another. For example, an individual who comes to believe that the administration of punishment is rather certain may assume that same punsihment will also be severe.

The lone exception to the positive associations between the punishment variables is the inverse relationship between certainty and severity-friends, for cheating violations. This correlation is -.1032 and significant at the .05 level indicating that cheating behavior if not actually condoned by segments of the student population may nonetheless be tolerated. Even those respondents who perceive the certainty of punishment (friends) as high are likely to view the severity of punishment as low. In fact, the informal punishment associated with friends learning of ones cheating behavior may not be viewed as punishment at all, More than one questionnaire contained unsolicited comments to the effect of, "They (two best friends) wouldn't have to find out that I cheated - I would tell them". Knowledge of one's cheating behavior then, in some groups, might not stigmatize the "offender", but rather, function to enhance his/her status.

## Multivariate Analysis

To prevent a seemingly endless and oftentimes confusing presentations of regresson coefficients we will concentrate primarily on those beta weights (standardized regression coefficients) and unstandardized

regression coefficients that are statistically significant. To obtain significance levels for individual beta coefficients a t-value was calculated for each coefficient using the following formula:

$$t = \frac{\text{observed value of B minus predicted value of B}}{\text{standard error of B}}$$

in other words

$$t = \frac{\text{unstandardized regression coefficient minus the predicted value of B which is zero (0)}}{\text{Standard error of B}}$$

The value of t obviously is the unstandardized regression coefficient divided by its standard error. If the number that results from this division is equal to or greater than the critical value of t associated with a particular level of significance. we will report that coefficient. Since our hypotheses are all directional, a one-tailed test is used. We will work at the traditional .05 level of significance.

## Moral Commitment and Sanction Fear

Tables 8 and 9 are summaries of the regression of the dependent variables (self reported cheating and stealing) on various combinations of inhibitory variables. The most substantial relationship is that between self reported cheating and moral commitment (-.244 significant at the .0005 level). Respondents who are morally committed to the norm against cheating engage in significantly less cheating than those who are less committed. The only other statistically significant beta coefficient that resulted from the regression of cheating on the three pairs of prohibitive variables was that of formal severity (-.150 significant at the .025 level). Neither the regression of cheating violations or informal sanctions-family or informal sanctions-friends are statistically significant. In both of these regressions informal severity of punishment

TABLE 8 - REGRESSION OF CHEATING VIOLATIONS ON VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF INHIBITORY VARIABLES

| Regression | Multiple R | R Square | Beta Moral Commitment | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violations on Moral Commitment | .244 | .059 | -.244* | 4.40 | .0005 |

| Regression | Multiple R | R Square | Beta Certainty | Beta Severity | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violations on Formal Sanction Fear | .164 | .027 | -.040 | -.151* | 2.05 | .05 |
| Violations on Informal Sanction Fear (Family) | .045 | .002 | .017 | -.043 | .552 | NS |
| Violations on Informal Sanction Fear (Friends) | .108 | .012 | .080 | -.064 | 1.35 | NS |

| Regression | Multiple R | R Square | Beta Form Cert | Beta Form Sev | Beta Fam Cert | Beta Fam Sev | Beta Frd Cert | Beta Frd Sev | Beta Moral Comm | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violations on Total Sanction Fear and Moral Commitment | .295 | .087 | -.022 | -.138* | .030 | -.026 | .072 | -.020 | -.230* | 2.02 | .0025 |

*P< .05

TABLE 9 - REGRESSION OF STEALING VIOLATIONS ON VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF INHIBITORY VARIABLES

| Regression | Multiple R | R Square | Beta Moral Commitment | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violations on Moral Commitment | .160 | .025 | -.160* | 2.83 | .005 |

| Regression | Multiple R | R Square | Beta Certainty | Beta Severity | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violations on Formal Sanction Fear | .092 | .009 | -.094 | .036 | 1.15 | NS |
| Violations on Informal Sanction Fear (Family) | .137 | .019 | -.137* | .052 | 1.71 | .05 |
| Violations on Informal Sanction Fear (Friends) | .090 | .008 | .083 | -.040 | 1.11 | NS |

| Regression | Multiple R | R Square | Beta Form Cert | Beta Form Sev | Beta Fam Cert | Beta Fam Sev | Beta Frd Cert | Beta Frd Sev | Beta Moral Comm | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violations on Total Sanction Fear and Moral Com | .256 | .066 | -.087 | .081 | -.155* | .060 | .131* | .002 | -.157* | 1.74 | .05 |

*p< .05

is inversely related to cheating violations while informal certainty of punishment is positively related to cheating violations. The final regression in Table 8 is the combined effect of the seven predictor variables on self reported cheating violations. While the value of t is significant at the .0025 level the impact on cheating is primiarly the result of moral commitment and formal severity.

When stealing violations are regressed on the inhibitory variables, the results are quite similar (Table 9). The moral commitment beta coefficient is in the right direction (-.160) and significant at the .05 level. Regressing stealing on the three pairs of prohibitive variables indicates that only one variable, family severity (-.137), is significant at the .05 level or less. The multiple R's for stealing violations and all three pairs of certainty and severity of punishment are .09 and above. The regression of stealing violations on all seven inhibitory variables indicates that family certainty as well as moral commitment have a significant effect on cheating behavior. The beta coefficient for friends certainty is .131 and significant at the .05 level. However, the coefficient was positive--i.e., opposite in the direction that we had predicted.

To test for interaction effects between moral commitment and the other prohibitive variables (Tables 10 and 11) self reported violations were regressed on the three pairs of sanction variables (separately then collectively) within three categories (high, medium and low) of moral commitment. The "conditional" hypotheses, it will be recalled, states that the threat of legal punishment will have a deterrent effect only among those people who are not morally committed to the law. In other words, the effects of moral commitment and sanction threat on self

TABLE 10 - REGRESSION OF CHEATING VIOLATIONS ON SELECT INHIBITORY VARIABLES WITHIN CATEGORIES OF MORAL COMMITMENT

| Regression | Categories | N | Mult R | R Square | b Form Cert | b Form Sev | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cheating Violations on Formal Cert and Severity | Moral Commitment | | | | | | | |
| | High# | 144 | .0217 | .0005 | .0254 | -.0090 | .1824 | NS |
| | Medium | 85 | .1777 | .0316 | -.1665 | .0937 | 1.156 | NS |
| | Low | 77 | .0780 | .0060 | .1110 | -.1886 | .4760 | NS |
| Cheating Violations on Family Cert and Severity | High# | 145 | .0959 | .0072 | .0596 | .1355 | .8095 | NS |
| | Medium | 85 | .1894 | .0359 | .1806* | .0143 | 1.235 | NS |
| | Low | 77 | .2198 | .0483 | .1268 | .5290* | 1.370 | NS |
| Cheating Violations on Friends Cert and Severity | High# | 144 | .0152 | .0001 | -.0124 | -.0223 | .1276 | NS |
| | Medium | 85 | .2430 | .0590 | .1547* | -.1651 | 1.604 | NS |
| | Low | 77 | .1589 | .0252 | .0020 | .4097 | .9793 | NS |

| Regression | Categories | N | Mult R | R Square | b Form Cert | b Form Sev | b Fam Cert | b Fam Sev | b Frd Cert | b Frd Sev | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cheating Violations on all of the Inhibitory Variables | High# | 144 | .1162 | .0135 | .0234 | -.0043 | .0791 | .1817 | -.0484 | -.1157 | .5591 | NS |
| | Medium | 85 | .4049 | .1640 | -.2413** | .0071 | .2678$ | .0834 | .1489 | -.2288 | 1.596 | NS |
| | Low | 77 | .2714 | .0737 | .1451 | -.4092 | .0912 | .5505 | -.1371 | .2629 | .9633 | NS |

#The disproportionate number of cases in this category is due to the large number of respondents who are 100% committed to the norm against cheating.

*p< .05 **p< .025 $p< .01

TABLE 11 - REGRESSION OF STEALING VIOLATIONS ON SELECT INHIBITORY VARIABLES WITHIN CATEGORIES OF MORAL COMMITMENT

| Regression | Categories | N | Mult R | R Square | b Form Cert | b Form Sev | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Moral Commitment | | | | | | | |
| Stealing Violations on Formal Cert and Severity | High# | 126 | .2411 | .0581 | -.2249$ | .2581* | 1.948 | .05 |
| | Medium | 89 | .1371 | .0188 | .0370 | -.1571 | .9075 | NS |
| | Low | 91 | .1490 | .0222 | -.0979 | .0398 | .9998 | NS |
| Stealing Violations on Family Cert and Severity | High# | 126 | .1559 | .0243 | .0076 | .2418 | 1.238 | NS |
| | Medium | 89 | .1700 | .0289 | .0032 | -.1861 | 1.1313 | NS |
| | Low | 91 | .1681 | .0282 | -.1031 | .0230 | 1.1317 | NS |
| Stealing Violations on Friends Cert and Severity | High# | 126 | .0706 | .0049 | .0505 | .0572 | .3086 | NS |
| | Medium | 89 | .4347 | .1889 | .1602** | -.3784$$$ | 10.02 | .005 |
| | Low | 91 | .1986 | .0394 | -.0456 | -.1465* | 1.07 | NS |

| Regression | Categories | N | Mult R | R Square | b Form Cert | b Form Sev | b Fam Cert | b Fam Sev | b Frd Cert | b Frd Sev | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stealing Violations on All of the Inhibitory Variables | High# | 126 | .2903 | .0843 | -.2521*** | .2037 | .0455 | .2256 | -.0320 | -.0235 | 1.351 | NS |
| | Medium | 89 | .4418 | .1952 | .0300 | -.0201 | -.0026 | -.0809 | .1685** | -.3501$$ | 1.820 | NS |
| | Low | 91 | .2863 | .0819 | -.0875 | .0830 | -.0707 | .0999 | -.0125 | -.1804* | 1.1180 | NS |

#The disproportionate number of cases in this category is due to the large number of respondents who are 100% committed to the norm against stealing.

*p< .05 **p< .025 $p< .01 $$p< .005 $$$p< .0005

reported violations are not additive but rather, interactive. We should expect the certainty and severity coefficients in the high category of moral commitment to be near zero while those in the lowest category of moral commitment to be both high and negative. The sanction coefficients within medium moral commitment should, obviously, be somewhere in between.

The findings indicate (Table 10) that coefficients for perceived certainty-family (.1806) and perceived certainty-friends (.1547) within medium moral commitment are statistically significant at the .05 level. These positive relationships are in the opposite direction from what we had predicted. Coupled with the inverse relationship between certainty punishment and cheating violations (-.1665)--medium moral commitment--these coefficients constitute negative evidence for the "conditional" hypothesis. Perhaps a "medium" commitment to the norm against cheating still leaves considerable latitude for engaging in rule-violating behavior. This attitude linked with perceptions of low severity of punishment may explain the positive relationship between cheating violations and certainty of punishment, within the category of medium moral commitment.

The only other significant relationship in this table is the coefficient for family severity and cheating within low moral commitment (.5290) that is also in the opposite direction from our prediction. The expected high negative coefficients for certainty and severity of punishment within the category of low moral commitment are not to be found for cheating violations. These results indicate that the magnitude of the effect or perceived sanction frear is not contingent upon levels of moral commitment in any systematic manner.

The identical analysis performed with stealing violations (Table 11) results in the same non-systematic findings. Within the high moral commitment category, stealing behavior is inversely related to certainty (-.2249) and positively related to severity of punishment (.2581) at the .05 level of significance or lower. We would expect both of these coefficients to be near zero. The regression of stealing violations on certainty and severity of punishment-friends within medium moral commitment results in coefficients of .1662 and -.3784 respectively. The coefficient for perceived severity of friends in low moral commitment is in the expected direction (-.1465) and statistically significant. As we found with cheating violations, the regression of stealing violations on prohibitive variables does not support our predictions nor do they result in any systematic pattern of relationships.

## Anomia and Sanction Fear

In the final hypothesis we predicted that (1) the generative factor (anomia) is a necessary condition for deviant behavior and (2) that prohibitive factors will influence rule violating behavior only when anomia is high. Tables 12 and 13 reveal the results of regressing self-reported violations on various prohibitive variables within high and low categories of anomia. In this analysis a residual measure of anomia was also utilized along with the anomia differences measure, i.e., goals minus means.[13] The results using both of these measures of

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[13]The residual measure of anomia was obtained by regressing (for cheating behavior) the "importance of good grades" on "the percent of tests the desired grades are achieved". It is a measure of grades received, relative to how important they are, compared to those individuals who also placed importance on getting good grades. For anomia related to stealing behavior scores of "money needed for desired life style" were regressed on "monthly income."

TABLE 12 - REGRESSION OF CHEATING VIOLATIONS ON SELECT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WITHIN CATEGORIES AND DIFFERENT MEASURES OF ANOMIA

| REGRESSION | CATEGORIES | N | Mult R | R Square | b Form Cert | b Form Sev | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Anomia Differences | | | | | | | |
| Cheating Violations on Formal Sanction Fear | High | 153 | .0567 | .0032 | -.0870 | .0379 | .4918 | NS |
| | Low | 153 | .1083 | .0117 | -.0013 | -.2115 | .9441 | NS |
| | Anomia Residuals | | | | | | | |
| | High | 155 | .0828 | .0068 | -.1108 | -.0549 | .7249 | NS |
| | Low | 151 | .0389 | .0015 | .0208 | -.0851 | .3355 | NS |

| REGRESSION | CATEGORIES | N | Mult R | R Square | b Fam Cert | b Fam Sev | b Frd Cert | b Frd Sev | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Anomia Differences | | | | | | | | | |
| Cheating Violations on Informal Sanction Fear | High | 153 | .1755 | .0308 | .1237 | .2908 | .1345 | -.2505 | 1.0844 | NS |
| | Low | 153 | .1299 | .0169 | .0838 | .1974 | -.0266 | -.0830 | .7973 | NS |
| | Anomie Residuals | | | | | | | | | |
| | High | 155 | .1468 | .0215 | .1250 | .2136 | .0077 | -.2407 | .9090 | NS |
| | Low | 151 | .1642 | .0269 | .0724 | .2391 | .0756 | -.0281 | 1.0054 | NS |

TABLE 13 - REGRESSION OF STEALING VIOLATIONS ON SELECT INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WITHIN CATEGORIES AND DIFFERENT MEASURES OF ANOMIA

| REGRESSION | CATEGORIES | N | Mult R | R Square | b Form Cert | b Form Sev | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Anomia Differences | | | | | | | |
| Stealing Violations on Formal Sanction Fear | High | 167 | .1432 | .0205 | -.0903 | .1070 | 1.310 | NS |
| | Low | 139 | .1683 | .0283 | -.1660* | .0478 | 1.4078 | NS |
| | Anomia Residuals | | | | | | | |
| | High | 157 | .1449 | .0210 | -.0900 | .1167 | 1.2856 | NS |
| | Low | 149 | .1692 | .0286 | -.1602** | .0426 | 1.466 | NS |

| REGRESSION | CATEGORIES | N | Mult R | R Square | b Fam Cert | b Fam Sev | b Frd Cert | b Frd Sev | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Anomia Differences | | | | | | | | | |
| Stealing Violations on Informal Sanction Fear | High | 167 | .1274 | .0162 | .0063 | .1367 | -.0075 | -.0892 | .8174 | NS |
| | Low | 139 | .1593 | .0253 | -.0257 | .0573 | .0879 | -.1559 | .9336 | NS |
| | Anomia Residuals | | | | | | | | | |
| | High | 157 | .1422 | .0202 | -.0132 | .1627 | .0048 | -.0972 | .8854 | NS |
| | Low | 149 | .1444 | .0208 | -.0072 | .0337 | .0758 | -.1360 | .8757 | NS |

*p< .05 **p< .025

anomia are approximately the same. Therefore, we will discuss only the findings using the goals minus means measure of anomia.

The data in Table 12 indicate that there is no relationship between cheating violations and either certainty (-.0870) or severity (.0379) of punishment within categories of high anomia. All of the regression coefficients within the category of low anomia are, as predicted, near zero. Although we hypothesized an inverse relationship between cheating and the sanction variables under conditions of high anomia, none was found. In fact, all of the unstandardized coefficients for the sanction variables were near zero within both high and low categories of anomia.

This same analysis, i.e., regressing violations on sanction variables within categories of anomia for stealing behavior (Table 13), reveals only one statistically significant relationship. The coefficient for formal severity within low anomia (-.1660) is significant of the .05 level. According to our third hypothesis, however, sanction variables should not influence rule violating behavior within low anomia. We predicted that that relationship would be near zero. When stealing violations are regressed on the four informal sanction variables within both low and high categories of anomia, there are no statistically significant coefficients. We predicted that the informal sanction coefficients within categories of high anomia would be significant and inverse.

The results of this analysis constitute negative evidence for the third hypothesis. Neither the regression of cheating or stealing violations on various combinations of sanction variables within categories of high anomia resulted in statistically significant inverse relationships as we had predicted.

TABLE 14 - EFFECT OF MORAL COMMITMENT ON SELF REPORTED VIOLATIONS WITHIN CATEGORIES OF ANOMIA

1. Effect of Moral Commitment on Cheating Violations

| Category of Anomia Differences | N | r | b | Standard Error | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 153 | -.1541 | -.3493 | .0182 | 1.915 | .05 |
| Low | 153 | -.2136 | -.3474 | .0129 | 2.687 | .005 |

2. Effect of Moral Commitment on Cheating Violations

| Category of Anomia Residuals | N | r | b | Standard Error | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 155 | -.0502 | -.1190 | .0191 | .0622 | NS |
| Low | 151 | -.2985 | -.5055 | .0132 | 3.8177 | .0005 |

3. Effect of Moral Commitment on Stealing Violations

| Category of Anomia Differences | N | r | b | Standard Error | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 167 | .0009 | .0008 | .0068 | .000 | NS |
| Low | 139 | -.0888 | -.1201 | .01151 | 1.0435 | NS |

4. Effect of Moral Commitment on Stealing Violations

| Category of Anomia Residuals | N | r | b | Standard Error | t | p |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 157 | .0110 | .0090 | .0071 | .1224 | NS |
| Low | 149 | -.0905 | -.1201 | .0109 | 1.1180 | NS |

Finally, self-reported violations were regressed on moral commitment within high and low categories of anomia (Table 14). The regression of cheating violations on moral commitment within the high anomia category results in an unstandardized coefficient of -.3492, significant at the .05 level. The regression within the low category of anomia (-.3474) is also significant at the .05 level. This indicates that the relationship between cheating violations and moral commitment is significant within both levels of moral commitment, although the inhibitory effect of normative commitment is strongest at low levels of anomia. The results of regressing stealing violations within high anomia is virtually non-existent (.0008) while the same regression within low anomia is inverse (-.1201), although not statistically significant.

By way of summary we find that moral commitment has a significant inhibitory effect on cheating behavior within both categories of anomia and no significant effect on stealing violations within categories of anomia. Perhaps, among members of our sample, the normative proscription against cheating is more important than the proscription against stealing. If this is the case, then throughout the entire range of anomia (low to high) moral commitment can function to inhibit cheating behavior. Conversely, the value and commitment prohibiting stealing is not as important to students and does not, therefore, have an inhibitory effect on stealing behavior.

## Acceptance and Rejection of the Hypotheses

The previous sections have presented the major findings of this research. In this final section we will relate these findings to the major hypotheses. Table 15 is a summation of the first two hypotheses.

TABLE 15 - NUMBER OF CORRELATIONS AND UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS THAT ARE IN THE PREDICTED DIRECTION AND ARE ALSO STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT

| | HYPOTHESES TESTED | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | | 2 | | | |
| | Cheat | Steal | Moral Comm Cheat | Cheat Sanc | Moral Comm Steal | Steal Sanc |
| Total Number of Coefficients | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 6 |
| Number of Zero Order Correlations in the Predicted Direction | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Number of Zero Order Correlations Significant at .05 or Lower in the Predicted Direction | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Total Number of Coefficients | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 24 |
| Number of Unstandardized Regression Coefficients in the Predicted Direction | | | | 7 | | 15 |
| Number of Unstandardized Regression Coefficients Significant at p. 05 or Lower in the Predicted Direction | | | | 1 | | 5 |

This table indicates the number of correlation coefficients, and unstandardized regression coefficients that are in the predicted direction and are also statistically significant. Hypothesis number three, which predicts interaction, does not lend itself to this type of summation.

The first hypothesis stated that the higher the anomia score the higher the incidence of self-reported violations. Although the zero order correlations for violations and anomia-grades (.0073) and anomia-money (.0239) are in the predicted direction, they are extremely small and obviously not statistically significant. The first hypothesis that predicted a positive relationship between self-reported violations and anomia is, therefore, not supported.

The second hypothesis stated that individuals who score high on inhibitory factors (sanction fear and moral commitment) will report fewer violations than those who have lower scores on inhibiting variables. Both of the correlaiton coefficients between moral commitment (cheating -.2882 and stealing -.1598) and self-reported violations are statistically significant at the .05 level or better. Of the six correlation coefficients between self-reported cheating and the sanction variables, three were in the predicted direction, but only one was statistically significant. The stealing-sanction fear coefficients are only slighty better. Three of these associations are in the predicted direction and two (informal severity family and freinds) are statistically significant at the .05 level. While moral commitment was found to inhibit rule violating behavior, perceived certainty and severity of punishment (both formal and informal) did not have a substantial deterrent effect. The second hypothesis therefore received only partial and selective support.

Although it was not incorporated into any of the formal hypotheses, we did test the "conditional" hypothesis. Table 15 indicates the results of regressing rule violations on sanction variables within three categories of moral commitment. We would expect sanction fear to have the greatest deterrent affect among those individuals who are less than highly committed to the rule or norm in question. Of the 24 regressions of cheating violations on the formal and informal variables within low and medium levels of moral commitment, seven are in the predicted directon, but only one is statistically significant. The same analysis with stealing violations is somewhat more encouraging. Of the 24 regressions of stealing on sanction variables within low and medium levels of moral commitment, 15 are in the predicted direction and five are statistically significant. This data fails to support the conditional hypothesis.

The final hypothesis states that individuals will engage in rule violating behavior only under the pressure of the generative factor (anomia). In other words, the generative factor is a necessary condition for deviance. Thus prohibitive factors influence rule violating behavior only when anomia is high. When anomia is low there should be no relationship between prohibitive factors and rule violating behavior. Concerning cheating behavior, there are no statistically significant regression coefficients when violations are regressed on formal and informal sanctions within high or low categories of anomia. These coefficients are in the predicted direction for low anomia, but within the category of high anomia we expected an inverse relationship between sanction fear and self-reported violations. The results are similar for stealing violations except that within low anomia the regression coefficient for perceived

formal certainty is statistically significant. We had predicted that that coefficient would be near zero. These results indicate that anomia need not be present for the occurrence of self-reported violations and that prohibitive factors do not influence rule violating behavior only when anomia is high. The third hypothesis, therefore, is not supported.

# CHAPTER VIII

# SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

## Introduction

We have argued that, until causal and control theories of deviance have been empirically linked and theoretically integrated, our knowledge and understanding of conforming-deviant behavior will be fragmented and incomplete. In a move toward this end, the present study attempted to link an etiological theory of deviant behavior with a social control perspective of rule violation.

Because of its rich sociological tradition in general and its applicability to the phenomenon of deviant behavior in particular, anomie theory (specifically, the subjective component) was the generative factor utilized in this research. The deterrence doctrine, anchored in the philosophy of utilitarianism and the classical school of criminology, was the social control theory of concern.

In line with Merton's later thinking (1964 and 1968) on this subject, the operationalization and subsequent measurement of anomie was limited to the subjective component; i.e., anomia. Our definition of anomia, unlike Srole's (1956), focused on the actor's perception of specific goals and means and the discrepancy between the two.

In a similar fashion, the operationalization and measurement of the key concepts in deterrence theory focused on the actor's perception

of certainty and severity of punishment as opposed to the objective certainty and severity of sanctions. Both anomia and sancton fear were measured from the perspective of the individual as opposed to that of some "general other". We were interested in how individuals perceived and defined issues (the amount of money they desired, the importance of grades, their perception of punishment) and placed themselves within an opportunity structure (monthly income): i.e., in the actor's definition of the situation. This is not to say that objective circumstances (the extent of anomie in a society, for example) are not important factors in shaping individual perceptions. The objective conditions are likely to have an impact, and very often a significant impact, in determining the actor's definition of the situation; however, as we have argued previously, it is very possible for actors in the same objective situation to have different perceptions of their circumstances, to formulate various definitions of the situation and, subsequently, to engage in different patterns of behavior. Because actors evaluate and eventually choose future courses of action in accord with their own defintion of the situation, perceptual measures of both generative and prohibitive variables were used.

From another vantage point, this research might be seen as an attempt (empircally though not theoretically) to link not only the theories of anomie and deterrence but also the two larger schools of thought in which they are grounded - classical criminology and contemporary positivist criminology. While this question was not the central concern of this study, it is an issue that eventally will have to be considered if criminology continues on its present course (i.e., an increased interest in and prolifieraton of deterrence research). It seems quite plausible that the marriage of various generative theories to the

deterrence doctrine will account for a larger degree of explained variance in conforming - rule violating behavior than either of these perspectives taken separately. In other words, a move towards an empircal linkage of generative theroies and the deterrence doctrine appears to be fruitful and methodologically nonproblematic. Theoretical integration, on the other hand, may be a different, more difficult matter.

## Summary and Interpretations

Viewed from the perspective of either anomie theory or deterrence theory, the results of this research are somewhat less than encouraging. The associations between anomia and self-reported violations, although in the predicted direction, were small and inconsequential (.007 for cheating and .024 for stealing). One possible explanation may be that the average goals-means discrepency for anomia-grades was rather small and that there was little variation. Anomia-grades had a mean of 6.37 and a standard deviation of 1.42.

While this was not the case for anomia-money, perhaps there were measurement problems. It seems plausible that the goals-means discrepency has different meanings at various locations in the distribution. For example, the difference between $1400.00 and $1200.00 and $300.00 and $100.00 are both $200.00 and would, using the operationalization employed in this study, yield the same anomia score. However, it appears reasonable to assume that these two cases might lead to different psychological condtions as they relate to deviant motivation. In the first case the $200.00 discrepency amounts to approximately 17% of the actual monthly income while in the second case the $200.00 discrepency represents a 200% goals-means difference. In addition, the first $200.00

disjuncture is related to a relatively high monthly income ($1200.00) while in the second case the $200.00 discrepency is in relation to a relatively low monthly income ($100.00). Simply speaking $200.00 means one thing to a person who is somewhat well-off and quite another to an individual who is not.

This leads us to another closely related matter. While we asked students how much money a month it would take to support the life style they considered appropriate at this time in their lives, we neglected to gauge the intensity or importance of this response. Respondents A and B might both answer that "money needed" per month was $700.00 while monthly income was $400.00. For A the $300.00 difference represents a desireable sum and would certainly be welcome but is not of significant importance. For B on the other hand, the $700.00 goal is an important one and the $300.00 discrepency represents a serious shortcoming in his life, serious enough to motivate him to rule-violating behavior. Goal importance or intensity, however, was accounted for in the anomia-grades item. The goals scale ranged from zero "Getting good grades is not the least bit important to me" to 100 "Getting good grades is the most important thing in my life these days". This item indicated the range of the goal and the intensity with which it was held simultaneously.

It is also possible that self-reported cheating and stealing were generated by factors other than anomia. For example alienation (an important aspect of conflict theory) or an excess of definitions favorable to violations of the law as postulated by differential association may have accounted for more of the variation in rule violating behavior than anomie. Another possibility, as outlined by Gresham Sykes (1971), is that

a good deal of crime and delinquency, espcially among the young, cannot be explained by "traditional" theories and may more accurately be seen as a form of sport or play. Taking his cue from Thrasher's work on gangs in the 20's and, more recently, Cohen's thesis of nonutilitarian behavior in "Delinquent Boys", Sykes speculates that, "We are looking, I think, at a new kind of crime, in the sense that it does not fit much of the theorizing of criminology at the present."

> There are also many reports that shoplifting is showing a marked growth not simply among the poor, but among those well up the socioeconomic scale and often by people who are stealing neither from need nor compulsion, but from a search for excitement. Secretaries in New York, for example, are reported sometimes to find stealing from Macy's far more appealing than a luncheon at Schraffts. (Sykes 1971:595-96)

If Sykes is on the right track, then shoplifting, for example, isn't stealing at all, but rather a form of amusement and, as such, is not considered to be wrong or in violation of a rule. It would then be possible to strongly agree with our moral commitment item ("Stealing - even something worht a few dollars - is always wrong no matter what the circumstances may be") and still take (not steal) something that doesn't belong to you because the behavior has been redefined as a form of sport or play. The apparent contradiction that would seemingly result in "cognitive dissonance" has been successfully "neutralized" because the behavior has been redefined as one in which criminal intent is lacking.

Turning our attention from generative factors to the inhibitory variables, the best predictor of self-reported violations was found to be moral commitment. Both coefficients (-.244 with cheating and -.160 with stealing) were in the predicted directon and statistically significant. This finding lends support to the work of numerous sociologists from Durkheim through Parsons and his followers concerning the

the effectiveness and power of internalized norms in predicting conforming behavior. If these findings are in any way indicative of the relationship between moral commitment and various self-reported violations among diverse groups of people in different situations, then sociologists interested in social control would be well advised to pay close attenton to this variable (moral commitment) in future research.

Probably the most unexpected finding of this research was the lack of association between self-reported violations and perceived certainty of punishment. Only perceived certainty-family for stealing violations was statistically significant and in the predicted direction. Our findings are unusual in light of the fact that almost all of the previous perceptual studies have found significant inverse relationships between perceived certainty of punishmentand self-reported violations (see, e.g., Anderson et al 1977, Baily and Lott 1976, Cohen 1978, Jensen and Erickson 1978, Karaut 1976, Meier and Johnson 1977, Minor 1977, Silberman 1976, Teevan 1976 abc, Waldo and Chiricos 1972). On the other hand, the lack of relationship between perceived severity of punishment and self-reported violations is not unusual. Of the above mentioned studies "only one research (Kraut) concludes that perceptions of the severity of punishment are part of the social control process" (Grasmick and Bryjak forthcoming 1980).

The regression of self-reported violations on sanction fear failed to support the final hypothesis. For cheating behavior there were no statistically significant relationships between self-reported violations and the certainty and severity of punishment under the condition of high anomia. For stealing behavior only the regression of self-reported violation on formal certainty within low anomia resulted in

statistically significant relationships. We ahd predicted that the prohibitive factors would have a deterrent effect only under the condition of high anomia, with no relation between punishment and violations when anomia was low. If cheating and stealing violations are the result of generative factors other than anomia, as we speculated upon a moment ago, then the absence of a relationship between anomia, self-reported violations, and the punishment variables is not unusual.

With the exception of moral commitment, none of the inhibitory variables was a significant predictor of self-reported rule violations. The amount of variance explained by various combinations of prohibitive variables was negligible (e.g., in the neighborhood of .015 on the average) i.e., regressing violations on all the inhibitory variables--did not increase the explained variance and simply reflected the lack of associaiton of the more limited regressions. Tests for interaction indicated that what effects the predictor variables did have were additive and non-systematic. The one-way ANOVA runs (Appendix) failed to disclose any non-linear relationship.

## Future Research

Given the potential methodological shortcomings disucssed above, it would be a mistake to abandon research attempting to link generative theories of anomie and deviance with the deterrence doctrine on the basis of the results of this one particular study. Nor should we hastily discard anomie theory (as subjectiveoy conceptualized and measured) and move to other genrative theroies. The following is a list of factors that I believe will eventually result in a successful integration of generative theories and the deterence doctrine. These factors are presented as

suggestions for future research.

1. Initially samples should be drawn from larger more representative populations (metropolitan Oklahoma City for example) to try to discern some general pattern of relationships. Later, more specific subgroups of the population could be examined with an eye toward any differences between these groups (e.g. rural-urban, young-old, various levels of income, education etc.).

2. While we are beginning to learn that punishment can deter some people from commiting specific acts in particular situations we may also learn that anomia motivates certain perople to engage in specific rule violating acts in particular situations. Just as punishment cannot countervail all types of deviant motivation, it seem highly unlikely that any generative theory will be able to account for all, or even most, types of rule violating behavior. Research should concentrate on determining what types of rule violating acts are related to specific generative factors and how these factors, in turn, are affected by specific mechanisms of social control.

3. The first step in this direction would be to devise a set of testable propositions from the major etiological theories of crime and deviance. Once these propositions have been operationalized and appropriate measurement techniques developed, we could begin to test these theories and ascertain their explanatory power. It seems to me that, at the present timel two of the major theroies in this area, conflict and labelling theory, are long on theory and short on empircal research. In a 1975 article Tittle (p. 403) remarked that, "A search of the literature reveals only four studies that critically test in a meaningful way the effect of labelling on future conduct." This is not to say that theory

and theorizing are not important. Calhoun (1979) has made some insightful observations on the relation between theory and empirical research in contemporary sociology.

> American sociology--and to an increasing degree that of the rest of the world--has embarked on a hopeless program of trying to substitute evidence for theory. This program is hopeless not just because the "real world" is constantly changing and evidence insufficient, but because the very idea of evidence apart from a substantive argument is quite meaningless (p. 684).

In a later passage Calhoun comments on the relation between theory and empirical analysis.

> The value of looking back at classical sociological work comes in part from the opportunity it gives to see the construction of social theory through concrete empirical analysis, in rich historical contexts. We learn from the "founding fathers" partly because we have ceased to do what they did so well (p. 684).

Therein lies the key to the successful integraton of generative and control theories just as it is the key to the successful application of the sociological perspective to any social phenomenon--"the construction of social theory through concrete empirical analysis in rich historical contexts."

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# APPENDIX

## Pre-Testing

The initial survey instrument was administered to approximately 30 students in an introductory sociology class. Respondents were instructed to comment, criticize and offer suggestions for the improvement of individual items while they were filling out the questionnaire. The following is a summary of the major revisions made as a result of the pre-test.

To facilitate truthfulness and accuracy of responses, the final questionnaire contained a summary of conclusions drawn from a similar study. The following statement was contained in the introduction and initial instruction section.

> A recent study conducted in Oklahoma City, for example, revealed that 23% of the sample admitted to stealing something worth $20 or more, 25% cheated on their income tax and 53% admitted to stealing something worth less than $20. As you can see the violation of some rules is rather common.

The original instrument asked for the respondents' "racial/ethnic identification." In light of the fact that so few minority students would probably participate in this research it was decided to drop this time.

The original moral commitment item asked respondents to indicate to what extent they believed a particular rule e.g., "Dishonest work in the classroom, that is, cheating is prohibited" should be applied. It was decided that beliefs concerning the application of a rule is not necessarily indicative of one's personal commitment to that rule. The revised item was considered a more appropriate indicator of moral commitment.

> I would like to know to what extent you agree or disagree with these rules and values, that is, to what degree you think they are good or bad. A score of 0 would indicate that you

thought the rule was very bad and should never be followed, while a score of 100 would indicate you thought the rule was a very good one and should always be followed.

The order of responses on both of the perceived severity of formal punishment questions was changed. Concerning cheating the, "I don't think anything at all would happen," alternative that was originally last was moved so that it was now the first choice. This allowed for a progression of objective formal severity items ranging from no sanction at all to expulsion from the university.

Let's suppose that having cheated on an examination you were caught by the instructor. Having been caught for the first time, what do you think would happen to you?

1. I don't think anything at all would happen.
2. I would be warned by the instructor about the consequences of cheating on an examination--nothing more.
3. I would receive an "F" on the exam.
4. I would fail the exam and also be dropped from the course.
5. I would fail the exam, be dropped from the course and also suspended from school for an indefinite period of time.
6. I would fail the exam, be dropped from the course and expelled from the university.

Several changes of the perceived formal severity for stealing question were made. The initial and final items are presented below.

Let's suppose that having taken something that did not belong to you worth approximately $5 you were arrested and later convicted. Having been convicted for the first time what do you think would happen to you?

1. I would be warned by the judge about the possible consequences of stealing--nothing more.
2. I would be placed on probation.
3. I would have to spend up to 30 days in the county jail and/or be fined up to $100.
4. I would have to spend up to 6 months in the county jail and/or be fined up to $1000.
5. I would have to spend up to 2 years in the state prison.
6. I don't think anything at all would happen.

Let's suppose that having taken something that did not belong to you worth a few dollars you were arrested by the police. Having been arrested for the first time what do you think would happen to you?

1. I don't think anything at all would happen.
2. I would be warned by the judge about the possible consequences of stealing--nothing more.
3. I would be convicted and placed on probation.
4. I would be convicted and fined up to $100.
5. I would be convicted and have to spend up to 30 days in jail and fined up to $100.
6. I would be convicted and have to spend a minimum of one but no more than 6 months in the county jail.
7. I would be convicted and have to spend a minimum of 6 months but no more than one year in the state prison.

The absence of any sanction alternative was once again moved from last to first. The word "convicted" was made a part of each alternative with the exception of the no sanction response. This avoided the contradiction between "arrested and later convicted" and "I don't think anything at all would happen." An additional alternative, "I would be convicted and fined up to $100," was inserted while other alternatives were changed. For example, response #5 of the initial questionnaire, "I would have to spend up to 2 years in the state prison," was changed. It was decided that few if any subjects believed that a possible penalty for stealing something worth a few dollars was a 2-year prison sentence. A more reasonable response was, "I would be convicted and have to spend a minum of 6 months but no more than one year in the state prison."

The items tapping respondents rule-violations were also revised. Subjects were once again asked to be honest with their responses and informed of the results of similar studies.

> Now I would like you to indicate the number of times you have attempted and/or actually committed these acts since the beginning of the past academic year (August 1978). Please be honest with your answers. A recent study conducted at a large Florida university found that approximately 38% of a sample of students cheated when given the opportunity indicating how widespread this behavior is. A survey at a Pennsylvania university revealed that over 60% of the students questioned had previously stolen something on at least one occasion.

Because the pretest revealed a rather small number of violation, the time frame was extended from January 1979 to August 1979 resulting in a one year period for possible violations. Also, respondents were asked to include the number of times they attempted to commit the violation in question. Including unsuccessful attempts indicates that while the violations had not actually occurred the motivation to deviate was still present.

Finally, the range of behavior that would constitute a violation was listed.

A. ____Took something or attempted to take something worth a few dollars that did not belong to you. (Include such items as magazines and food from supermarkets, school supplies from the bookstore, etc.)

B. ____Attempted to and/or actually cheated on university examinations (cheating on examinations may be done in a number of ways: concealing notes on your person, glancing at your textbook, looking at the paper of the person sitting next to you, filling out parts of your bluebook before you take the exam, getting help on a take-home exam you were supposed to do by yourself, etc.).

Stating the various types of behavior that make up cheating should facilitate the number of self-reported violations. Listing the various forms of cheating should also stimulate the students memory in recalling previous rule-breaking activity.

## Interaction--The Multiplicative Term

A test was conducted to see if there was interaction between perceived certainty of punishment and perceived severity of punishment for each of the six pairs of sanction variables (three each for cheating and stealing violations). The use of a multiplicative term in a regression equation provides a test for interaction (Nie et al 1975).

TABLE 16 - COMPARISON OF $R^2$ FOR ADDITIVE AND INTERACTION SOLUTIONS

| Cheating Violations Regressed on Prohibitive Variables | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Additive $R^2$ | Interaction $R^2$ |
| Formal Certainty and Severity | .026 | .0350 |
| Family Certainty and Severity | .0019 | .0099 |
| **Stealing Violations Regressed on Prohibitive Variables** | | |
| | Additive $R^2$ | Interaction $R^2$ |
| Formal Certainty and Severity | .0085 | .0086 |
| Family Certainty and Severity | .0188 | .0192 |
| Friends Certainty and Severity | .0081 | .0088 |

The equation for such a test takes the form of: $T^1 = A + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_1X_2$. In this equation $X_1X_2$ is the product of the two independent variables and becomes the third "predictor". While this equation is "still additive" in form the multiplicative term represents the "joint effect" of $X_1$ and $X_2$ over and above the sume of $B_1X_1$ and $B_2X_2$ (Nie et al 1975).

Table 16 contains the R squares (both additive and interaction) for the six pairs of sanction variables. The results indicate that the inclusion of the multiplicative term in the regression equations has virtually no effect -- i.e., the increased productive power is negligible. The miniscule R squares in the additive models have not been significantly raised.

## Nonlinear Relationships

The underlying logic of regression analysis assumes not only that the relationships among the variables is additive, but also that the relationships are linear. Standard multiple regression techniques are not sensitive to curvilinear relationships. A nonlinear relationship could exist and consequently remain hidden for the researchers.

Since so many of the predicted associations between sanction fear and self reported violations were not found it was decided to test for the presence of curvilinear relationships. If the underlying bivariate relationship is expected to take a particular form, it may be possible to restate that relationship in a linear form by transforming the original variables (using a log transformation for example). However, if the form of the underlying bivariate relationship is not inown, this method becomes a series of stabs in the dark with success (i.e.,

hitting upon the right solution of form) no more than a matter of luck.

Perhaps the most expedient method for detecting the presence of nonlinear relationships is through the use of analysis of variance (Anova). In this case, a one-way ANOVA was run with the dependent variable and each of the prohibitive variables. A total of twelve one-way ANOVA's were run, six with self reported cheating and the sanction variables and six with stealing and the sanction variables. The dependent variables were divided into quintiles. This five-level breakdown allows us to see if there are any different effects within levels of the dependent variable that are caused by increases in the independent variable. The means of the quintiles of the dependent variable are then plotted. The following is an example of this procedure with stealing violations and frineds severity.

| Quintile | N | Mean |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 68 | 1.397 |
| 2 | 46 | 1.130 |
| 3 | 68 | 1.029 |
| 4 | 64 | .788 |
| 5 | 60 | .833 |

Plotting these mean scores indicates that there is no nonlinear relationship of any kind between these two variables. The same procedure was followed for the remainder of the dependent variable and sanction variable combinations (11). The results indicate that there were no curvilinear relationships of any consequence,