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CLASS, RELIGION, AND POLITICS

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THE COLLEGIATE SILENT MAJORITY: SOCIAL
CLASS, RELIGION, AND POLITICS

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THE COLLEGIATE SILENT MAJORITY: SOCIAL
CLASS, RELIGION, AND POLITICS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Silent Majority" is a term which came into political usage in 1968. President Richard M. Nixon has used this term seemingly to describe those citizens who do not protest or demonstrate, who seldom make themselves heard with respect to the workings of the political system, and who therefore tend, perhaps, to be overlooked in the pressures that play upon the government. There is the implication, too, that this silent majority consists of those who are in the middle; that is, those who are neither poor nor rich. By and large, then, they would be persons who are members of either the lower middle class or the working class -- the "solid citizens" or "middle Americans." (Mr. Nixon has also used the term "forgotten Americans," but as syndicated columnist Tom Wicker and others have indicated, such people are not forgotten -- particularly in an election year.)

The present study does not aim at the opinions of this group directly. Rather, it aims to explore in some depth the attitudes of a set of students attending three Oklahoma colleges widely recognized as tending to draw from the less well off families in the state.

CBS, Fortune, Newsweek, Jeffrey Hadden, and Playboy have all polled college students fairly recently.¹ As far as has been determined, however, no one has attempted to tap the beliefs and attitudes, and the factors that influence such attitudes, among college students drawn from families of the "silent majority." The previously mentioned Fortune survey did include interviews with students from blue collar families, but no extensive analysis was involved.

The members of this group are important for reasons that go beyond their comparative neglect. For one, because they are college students they should be among the more articulate members of the silent majority. For another, they and their opinions may be of considerable importance in years to come. Additionally, intensive study of a selected population may reveal important interrelationships in attitudes. In short, it is important to know what these people think and how their attitudes -- political, social, religious, or whatever -- are related. Therefore, the general purpose of this dissertation is to examine the attitudes of college students who come predominantly from lower middle and working class backgrounds. Thus, the focal point is on the college-attending sons and daughters of what we may surmise to be the "silent majority" or "middle Americans" for whom President Nixon and Vice-President Agnew have often claimed to speak.

One initial question meriting attention concerns levels of political motivation, information, and activity. Many studies have

¹CBS Poll, (April, 1969); Fortune (January and June, 1969); Newsweek (December 29, 1969); Jeffrey Hadden, "The Private Generation," Psychology Today (October, 1969); Playboy (September, 1970).

shown that persons of higher social class are more interested in politics and more likely to be involved in political activities, while those lower in the social strata are less interested and less likely to be active.²

Other questions prompting this study concern the extent to which these collegiate "middle Americans" may be categorized as being liberal or conservative. In what sense may the terms "liberal" or "conservative" be used in this respect? That is, what are those students' attitudes with regard to civil liberties, racial questions, the welfare state (economic liberalism or conservatism), and international affairs (specifically the Indochina War)? What percentage of them might be classified as authoritarians? How do all of these attitudes relate to a general knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of political affairs? And how do these attitudes interrelate? These questions are of obvious importance in trying to understand the presumed conservatism of the "silent majority."

A review of the literature suggests two underlying factors which affect these attitudes: religion and social class. The sociologist, Gerhard Lenski, demonstrated a clear difference in the attitudes of

²Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner, Human Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 422-424; Hugh Bone and Austin Raney, Politics and Voters (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), Chapters 1 and 2; Angus Campbell et al, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1964), Chapter 12, abridged edition; William Flanigan, Political Behavior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968); Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), Chapter 6; Kenneth Langton, Political Socialization (New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 48; Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), Chapter 5; Robert Lane, Political Life (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 220-222.

middle and working class respondents in Detroit.³ The present study showed a similar differentiation with respect to civil liberties, authoritarianism and attitude toward domestic Communism, but not with regard to racial attitudes. Thus, it may be surmised that "silent majority" opinions are somewhat divided and should not be thought of as monolithic. Another significant point made by Lenski was the finding that religious liberalism (which he also calls doctrinal heterodoxy) "has little or no relationship to the types of political liberalism" with which his study dealt.⁴ The phrase "types of political liberalism" refers to attitudes toward the welfare state, racial issues, civil liberties, foreign affairs, and personal morality (especially legislation of morality). Another scholar who also has stressed the lack of a relationship between religious and political liberalism is Samuel Lubell.⁵

Lenski observed that the only exception with regard to a link between political and religious liberalism was in the area of freedom of speech where he found what appeared to be a "modest relationship" between these two types of liberalism.⁶ Glock and Stark, however, demonstrated that the less orthodox (or modernist) denominations such as the Congregational, Disciples of Christ, Episcopal, Methodist, and

³Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), Chapter 4.

⁴Ibid, p. 211.

⁵Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), p. 122.

⁶Lenski, op. cit., p. 211.

Presbyterian were more predisposed in favor of civil liberties and against racism and anti-Semitism than were the fundamentalist religious organizations such as the Church of Christ, Nazarene, Southern Baptist, and Pentacostal groups.⁷ Rokeach's observations that the "religiously devout are on the average more bigoted, more authoritarian, more dogmatic, and more anti-humanitarian than the less devout" seemingly lend weight to Glock and Stark's findings.⁸ Balswick's findings were like those of Rokeach and Glock and Stark. His study of clergymen revealed a strong relationship between theological liberalism and political liberalism in two areas: civil rights and civil liberties, and a less strong but definite relationship in the areas of welfarism and internationalism.⁹

In addition to these relationships it was deemed important to further explore Lenski's observation regarding the lack of relationship between religious and political liberalism, especially because Balswick's findings contradict the contention that there is little or no relationship between the two types of liberalism with respect to civil liberties, civil rights, internationalism, and ideas about the welfare state.

⁷Charles Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), Chapters 5, 7 and 10.

⁸Milton Rokeach, "Faith, Hope and Bigotry," Psychology Today (April, 1970).

⁹Jack Balswick, "Theology and Political Attitudes Among the Clergy," The Sociological Quarterly, 11 (Summer, 1970), 397-405.

Dean Peabody found that in his sample economic conservatism showed no correlation with authoritarianism, dogmatism, and anti-Semitism.¹⁰ This suggests that the fundamentalists discussed by Rokeach and Glock and Stark may not have been economic conservatives and that this religious belief and welfarism belief contrast merited further investigation. It is relationships such as these that are herein explored through a sample of the college attending offspring of the silent majority.

Located in the Greater Oklahoma City Area, which has a total population of close to 650,000, the three colleges are Bethany Nazarene College, Central State University, and Oklahoma Christian College. Students attending these schools are overwhelmingly from Oklahoma and the majority are from the previously mentioned metropolitan area.

Bethany Nazarene College was founded in 1899 and has about 1500 students. A Nazarene school, as its name indicates, the college is located in the city of Bethany (population about 23,000) which is in the western section of the Greater Oklahoma City Area. Both the town and school are generally thought of as having rather "conservative" and perhaps somewhat authoritarian views; long haired males, who drive through Bethany on U.S. Highway 66, have their cars stopped by local police with more than normal regularity. Additionally, a number of Bethany citizens are members of the John Birch Society, and the town

¹⁰Dean Peabody, "Attitude Content and Agreement Set in Scales of Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, Anti-Semitism, and Economic Conservatism," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63 (1961), 1-11.

itself is considered a Birch stronghold by those who regularly follow the activities of such groups.

Central State University was founded in 1890 and has a student population of over 10,000. Located in Edmond, a town of 16,500, which is bounded on the south, east, and west by Oklahoma City, Central State is a part of the state college system and is the third largest institution of higher education in Oklahoma (behind the University of Oklahoma at Norman and Oklahoma State University at Stillwater). The college is rightly known as a "commuter's school," having over three quarters of its students in that category. Offering many night courses, Central State has a large number of older, part-time students.

Affiliated with the Church of Christ, Oklahoma Christian College is located in the northern part of Oklahoma City, just south of Edmond. Since its founding in 1950, the college has grown to over one thousand students. It is generally considered to have a largely fundamentalist outlook, both politically and religiously. This outlook is reinforced by annual Freedom Forums at which speakers, who are typically either conservative or far right in their political philosophy, lecture the students on Communism, socialism, free enterprise, etc. A frequent speaker at these forums has been George Benson, former Chancellor of both Oklahoma Christian and Harding College in Searcy, Arkansas. Dr. Benson has been a mainstay of the American radical right for many years.

This study proceeds in the following manner: Chapter Two concerns methodology. Chapters Three, Four and Five explore the relationship of social class to religious belief, civil liberties attitudes,

racial attitudes, authoritarianism, domestic Communism, welfarism and level of political information. Chapters Six, Seven and Eight examine the relationship of religious belief to all of these factors, plus attitudes toward the Indochina War and demonstrations. Chapter Nine compares the three colleges in relation to the issue areas dealt with in the three chapters on social class.

Chapter Ten concentrates on party and presidential candidate preferences for 1968 and 1972, and relates them to attitudes of the respondents. For instance, does it hold true that Wallace supporters are more likely to be racists? Are Nixon supporters more or less authoritarian than Humphrey supporters? Which supporters are the most civil libertarian?, etc. Chapter Eleven consists of a summary and conclusions.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY AND BASIC SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

The sites for sampling were selected because they are generally recognized as colleges which tend to attract persons from lower social strata than the two large state universities. Testing by means of a preliminary sample indicated that those attending were predominantly from lower middle and working class families. The final results of the sample revealed that 94% were from such backgrounds, with 38% from the lower middle class and 56% from the working class. To insure that the sample would be more nearly representative, the questionnaires were given in a course which is required of every Oklahoma college student, American National Government. Seventeen of such classes were available for sampling and ten of these were chosen at random. All sampling was done in daytime classes.

The two church-affiliated colleges together have an enrollment of just over 2500 students: Oklahoma Christian has one thousand plus, while Bethany Nazarene has over fifteen hundred. Central State has in excess of 10,000 students. The number of usable questionnaires obtained from each school was: Bethany Nazarene - 110, Central State - 216, and Oklahoma Christian - 118. The total was 444. Attitude comparisons have been made not only with respect to religious categories and social classes, but also among the three colleges and among those

respondents of differing political candidate preferences. A statistical test, the chi square, was utilized to check the significance of findings. All significance tests in this study are of this type and are listed with the appropriate tables.

Before the questionnaires were passed out in each class, the following explanation was given verbally:

We appreciate your help with this study. It is related to important research at the University of Oklahoma. Let me emphasize that this will in no way effect the grade you receive in this course. You are not required to participate if you don't want to. We simply want to collect information and we feel that you will respond freely and honestly if we are unable to identify you personally, so please do not write your name on this questionnaire. Also, please answer the questions based on your own ideas and opinions and do not discuss them with your neighbors. With the exception of a few information questions there are no right or wrong answers. What is important is your opinion. If you have any questions please raise your hand.

The methods used to determine the respondents' social class and the particular religious categories in which they should be placed are discussed in the chapters dealing with these subjects.

Almost all of the questions which were utilized in gathering information were taken from previous studies. Foremost among these are investigations by Adorno, Comrey and Newmeyer, Free and Cantril, Glock and Stark, Lenski, McClosky, Schonbar, and Sheatsley.¹ The

¹Theodor W. Adorno, et al, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950); A. Comrey and J. Newmeyer, "Measurement of Radicalism-Conservatism," Journal of Social Psychology, 67 (1965), 357-369; Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans (New York: Clarion Books, 1968); Charles Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963); Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American

appendix contains the questionnaire and notes sources from which questions were drawn.

Ninety-three percent of the respondents identified themselves "racially" as caucasian, 3% as black, 2% as American Indian, and 2% as "other." With regard to sex, the sample was exactly half male and half female. As to age, 81% fell into the category of 17-20, 14% were 21-24, 3% were 25-28, and 2% were 29 and above. Sixty percent were freshmen, 26% sophmores, 10% juniors and 4% seniors. Thus, 86% were freshmen or sophomores and 95% fell into the age bracket of 17-24. Internal evidence from the survey confirmed that the students are overwhelmingly the offspring of parents who are either lower middle or working class.

Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 361-382; Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, (New York: Basic Books, 1960); Rosalea A. Schonbar, "Students' Attitudes Toward Communists," Journal of Psychology, 27 (1949), 55-71; Paul Sheatsley, "White Attitudes Toward the Negro," Daedalus, 95 (1966), 217-238.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL CLASS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND RACE

The effect of social class on political attitudes has been noted by numerous writers, including Berelson and Steiner, Bone and Raney, Campbell, Flanigan, Free and Cantril, Langton, Lenski, Lipset, and Milbrath.¹ Virtually all of these and others who have written on the subject have made the observation that people of higher social class show greater interest and greater involvement in politics than do those of lower social class. Also noted has been the tendency of the working class to be more liberal in terms of economic policy or welfarism, while being less liberal with respect to racial attitudes and civil liberties than those higher in class.

It is the purpose of this chapter and the two following to examine the effects of social class in relation to religious beliefs, civil liberties, racial questions, authoritarianism, domestic Communism, and

¹Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner, Human Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 422-424; Hugh Bone and Austin Raney, Politics and Voters (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), Chapter 2; Angus Campbell et al, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1964), Chapter 12, abridged edition; William Flanigan, Political Behavior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), Chapter 3; Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans (New York: Clarion Books, 1968), Chapters 2 and 3; Kenneth Langton, Political Socialization (New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), Chapters 4, 5 and 6; Gerhard Lenski, The Religious

welfarism. The effect of social class on levels of political information among these college attending offspring of the silent majority was also considered important enough for examination.

John Cuber's discussion of social class which in turn relies principally on the writings of Joseph Kahl, stresses the idea that the lower-middle class and the working class together comprise about 80% of America's population with each class making up half this total.² Roach, Gross, and Gursslin estimate the working class as being 30-40% and the total middle class as 40-50%.³ Keeping in mind that the upper middle class comprises no more than 10% of the population, we may safely assume, then, that the two classes in question (lower-middle and working classes) comprise more or less three-quarters of the total United States population.

Utilizing Kahl's five class model we see the following brief profile of each class:

1. Upper Class - Fewer than one percent of families in the majority of communities fall into this category. Containing mostly persons with a long family tradition, this

Factor (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), Chapter 4; Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), Chapters 4, 5 and 9; Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), Chapter 5.

²John Cuber, Sociology: A Synopsis of Principles (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), Chapter 22; Joseph Kahl, The American Class Structure, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1957), Chapter 7.

³Jack Roach, Llewellyn Gross, and Orville Gursslin, Social Stratification in the United States (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), Chapter 4.

class also has a few newcomers who might be most accurately described as "self-made men." The main values of the upper class include "gracious living," the importance of family and reverence for the past.

2. Upper Middle Class - Less than ten percent of the families in most communities fall into this class. Family heads are typically independents in business and the professions, but also may be bureaucratic officials or persons who have risen in large corporations. Almost all of them are college graduates who generally pay very careful attention to their public behavior and are greatly concerned with their reputations. There is not much attention to family tradition in this class, but a strong career orientation.
3. Lower Middle Class - Approximately forty percent of the families in most communities may be placed in this category. Typical occupations include foremen, skilled craftsmen, owners of small businesses, and clerks. Most persons in this class completed high school and some have attended college or received special technical training. These people attend church more regularly than those in any other social stratum. They have very strong "moral" attitudes (which in this context usually refers to sex, drugs,

and drinking) and appear to view themselves as solid citizens.

4. Working Class (also called upper lower class) - Comprising about forty percent of the families in most communities, this class is typified by blue collar workers. Their work is generally routine and "work life" and "home life" are, except in rare instances, completely separate.
5. Lower Class (also called the lower lower class) - Comprising about ten percent of the families in most communities, this class contains many people who work irregularly and who live in poverty. An unstable family life is quite common. Lower class persons do not have much hope of a better future.

According to August B. Hollingshead's method for determining social position (which we shall discuss shortly), the class structure of the sample taken at the three colleges turned out to be: no upper class, just under 5% upper middle class, 38% lower middle class, 56% working class, and under 2% lower class. Compared with Kahl's assertions about the total United States population, such a distribution shows an under-representation of people from the upper, upper middle, and lower classes, a normal representation of lower middle class persons, plus an over-representation of working class persons. But an even larger discrepancy becomes apparent when the Oklahoma sample is compared to the United States college population only. With reference to American colleges in 1960, Mayer and Buckley have shown

that although families with incomes above \$10,000 per year comprised only 15% of the population, they furnished 29% of the people in college. Families with incomes ranging from \$7,500 to \$10,000 were 13% of the population, but supplied 21% of the college students. Conversely, the families with yearly incomes of \$5,000 or less comprised 47% of the population, but supplied only 25% of the college population, while those whose income range was \$5,000-\$7,500 furnished 25% of both populations.⁴ These figures are not surprising, since, in addition to the financial problems involved in attending college, Hyman found strong evidence that the value of a college education is emphasized less in the lower social strata.⁵

Determination of social class has traditionally been approached in three ways: subjective, objective and reputational. The subjective approach consists simply of asking a person what class he belongs to. The reputational approach involves asking people about each other. The objective approach, however, involves consideration of several factors, including: income and property, education, occupation, family background, place of residence and time one has resided there, religious affiliation, and other affiliations (clubs, fraternal organizations, etc.). The method used to determine social class in the current study employs the objective approach and utilizes August B. Hollingshead's Two Factor Analysis of Social Position (privately mimeographed, 1957). The two factors used are education and occupation. Hollingshead devised an

⁴Kurt Mayer and Walter Buckley, Class and Society, (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 75.

⁵Herbert Hyman, "The Value Systems of Different Classes," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, Class, Status, and Power, (New York: The Free Press, 1966).

Table III - 1

Social Class of Oklahoma Students and Total U.S. Population

Social Class	Oklahoma Students	Kahl's U.S. Population
Upper	0%	1%
Upper Middle	5	9
Lower Middle	38	40
Working	56	40
Lower	2	10
Total*	101	100

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Table III - 2

Family Incomes in 1960⁶

Income	U.S. Population	U.S. College Population
Above \$10,000	15%	29%
\$7,500-\$10,000	13	21
\$5,000-\$7,500	25	25
Under \$5,000	47	25
Total	100	100

⁶Mayer and Buckley, op. cit., p. 75.

Occupational Scale, which lists almost every conceivable type of work, and has assigned numerical values of one through seven to various occupations. His categories include:

1. Higher Executives, Proprietors of Large Concerns, and Major Professionals
2. Business Managers, Proprietors of Medium-Sized Businesses, Lesser Professionals
3. Administrative Personnel, Small Independent Businesses, and Minor Professionals
4. Clerical and Sales Workers, Technicians, and Owners of Little Businesses (Value under \$6,000)
5. Skilled Manual Employees
6. Machine Operators and Semi-Skilled Employees
7. Unskilled Employees

In assigning numerical values to levels of education, Hollingshead's Educational Scale reads as follows:

1. Graduate and Professional Training
2. Standard College or University Graduation
3. Partial College Training
4. High School Graduates
5. Partial High School
6. Junior High School
7. Less Than Seven Years of School

Once the Occupational and Educational Scale scores have been determined, a factor weight is assigned. The factor weight for occupation is seven; that for education is three. Thus, if a respondent has an Occupational Scale score of three and an Educational Scale score of three, his social class would be determined thusly:

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Scale Score</u>	<u>Factor Weight</u>	<u>Score x Weight</u>
Occupation	3	7	21
Education	3	4	<u>12</u>
Index of Social Position Score			33

Since his score is 33, the respondent would fall into class III (which is called Lower Middle Class in the current study). Hollingshead in elaborating his scale explained that he "found the most meaningful breaks for the purpose of predicting the social class position of an individual" to be the following:

<u>Social Class</u>	<u>Range of Computed Scores</u>
I	11-14
II	15-27
III	28-43
IV	44-60
V	61-77

When (in the present study) the computed score for an individual turned out to be borderline, the mother's education and occupation were taken into consideration in finally determining the respondent's exact position.

A more recently devised method of determining class through the use of two factors is the "Index of Class Position" developed by Ellis, Lane, and Olesen.⁷ This method uses the father's occupation and the

⁷Robert A. Ellis, W. Clayton Lane, and Virginia Olesen, "The Index of Class Position: An Improved Intercommunity Measure of Stratification," American Sociological Review, 28 (April, 1963), 271-75.

student's class identification. While this technique was used with good results at Stanford University (and presumably at other universities), it was of dubious value in the present study. A considerable number of respondents had very little idea of their class position and tended to identify as members of a higher social class (although a few identified with a lower one) than that in which an objective determination placed them. For instance, a number of those whose fathers were blue collar workers with less than a highschool education, placed themselves in the upper middle class and one such respondent placed himself in the upper class. In fact, 41% of those who were objectively determined to be from working class families, considered themselves to be upper middle class and 36% considered themselves lower middle. Thus, better than three-quarters of the working class considered themselves to be middle class. In addition, almost two-thirds of the lower middle class respondents believed themselves to be upper middle

Table III - 3

Social Class: Objective vs. Subjective

Objective Social Class Using Hollingshead's Method	<u>Social Class Self Identification</u>						(N)
	Upper	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working	Lower	Total*	
Upper Middle	0%	90%	10%	0%	0%	100%	(21)
Lower Middle	1	64	27	9	0	101	(168)
Working	1	41	36	23	0	101	(248)
Lower	0	0	57	43	0	100	(7)

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

class. The preceeding table illustrates the futility of using the Index of Class Position (or any other measure in which the respondent is asked to classify himself) in this study. The question upon which the table was constructed was phrased in the following manner: Would you say that you belong to the: (1) Upper Class (2) Upper Middle Class (3) Lower Middle Class (4) Working Class (5) Lower Class.

The question may arise as to why a respondent's father's income was not used as a factor in the measure of social class. One problem of such a method is that the majority of students do not know their father's incomes. Second, many who do know are reluctant to give such information. Third, some people who make twenty or even thirty thousand dollars per year never finished high school and have occupations which are not considered prestigious. Thus, a knowledge of a respondent's father's income would be of only limited value in this study.

Since fewer than two percent of the respondents were objectively determined to be from lower class backgrounds, and since their attitudes proved not to differ significantly from those of the working class respondents, the lower class has been combined with the working class for purposes of simplification. Thus, the present study deals with three classes as follows:

Upper Middle Class	5%
Lower Middle Class	38%
Working Class	57%

When the relationship between social strata and religious belief was examined, a definite difference could be noted among the classes. Three percent of those respondents categorized as "fundamentalists"

were of upper middle class background, while 6% of the "modernists" and 14% of the "unbelievers" were of this origin.⁸ Conversely, although 59% of the fundamentalists and 62% of the modernists were of working class origin, only 44% of the unbelievers came from such backgrounds. Thus, while the total percentage of middle class respondents (both upper and lower) was 41% for the fundamentalists and 39% for the modernists, fifty-six percent of the unbelievers were middle class. The following table illustrates these differences.

Table III - 4

Social Class and Religious Belief

Social Class	Fundamentalists	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>			(N)
		Modernists	Un-believers	All Respondents	
Upper Middle	3%	6%	14%	5%	(21)
Lower Middle	38	32	42	38	(168)
Working	59	62	44	57	(255)
Total	100	100	100	100	(444)

$p < .01$

We may infer, then, that social class can have some bearing on the general religious philosophy of an individual. And, of course, fundamentalism decreases with an increase in the level of education, which can be correlated with social class to a great extent. Class

⁸The method for determining the religious belief category to which an individual belongs is explained in Chapter Six.

differences in relation to religion have been noted by Lenski and Berelson and Steiner, among others.⁹ We now turn to the effect of social class on silent majority attitudes about civil liberties.

Civil Liberties

The determination of whether a respondent's attitude could be called favorable, ambivalent or unfavorable toward civil liberties was made in the following manner: Nine statements were utilized which involved the concepts of free speech and assembly, censorship of books and films, rights of the accused, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, private sex-related behavior, and the question of women's rights in relation to abortion. The statements are as follows:¹⁰

1. Constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly should not apply to American Communists.

⁹Lenski, op. cit., pp. 79-80, 323-327; Berelson and Steiner, op. cit., pp. 393-394. A paper by John Alston and Jack Balswick presented to the Society of the Scientific Study of Religion in October of 1970, emphasized that persons who answered "none" when questioned about their religion (by the Gallup polling organization) tended to be more affluent. These people proved to be disproportionately young, well educated, male, and in business and executive positions. They also are more likely to be more liberal with respect to political questions, especially those of race. These findings were reported in an article entitled "Irreligionists More Affluent" which appeared in the Oklahoma Journal (October 26, 1970).

¹⁰Statement number 1 is an original. Statements 2 through 5 (2 and 4 slightly modified) are from Comrey and Newmeyer, "Measurement of Radicalism-Conservatism," Journal of Social Psychology, 67 (1965), 357-369. Statement 6 is a slight modification of a question used in a CBS News poll on the Bill of Rights, March 20, 1970. Statements 7 and 8 (7 slightly modified) are from Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), 361-382. Statement 9 is from an undated mimeographed sheet distributed by the Citizens Committee for Humane Abortion Laws.

2. Our laws give too much protection to suspected criminals.
3. If a man is showing a sex movie to friends in his own home, the police should stop it.
4. Every city should ban objectionable books and movies.
5. The police should hunt down homosexuals and put them in jail.
6. If police suspect that drugs or guns, or other criminal evidence is hidden in someone's house, they should be allowed to enter the house without first obtaining a search warrant.
7. A book containing wrong political views should not be published, much less put in our libraries.
8. No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.
9. It should be a woman's right to decide whether or not she should have an abortion.

Respondents were asked to answer these statements with one of the following five choices: (1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral or not sure, (4) Agree, or (5) Strongly agree. Using the number preceding each answer, a mean was computed and the following civil liberties attitude categories were devised:

Mean of 1.00-2.75, Favorable toward civil liberties

Mean of 2.76-3.25, Ambivalent toward civil liberties

Mean of 3.26-5.00, Unfavorable toward civil liberties

Note that the limits of the ambivalent category are 0.50 of one point, while those of the other two categories cover 1.75 points. The reason for using these particular limits should be explained. It is believed that persons who are uninformed or have a lack of interest in a subject may be likely to select more "not sure" or "don't know" answers than

other respondents. Therefore, the purpose of narrowing the limits of the ambivalent category was to facilitate in distinguishing trends toward one polar direction or the other.

For that matter some researchers consider an ambivalent attitude to be actually unfavorable. In their book The Tenacity of Prejudice, Gertrude Selznick and Stephen Steinberg illustrate that respondents who give "don't know" answers to questions about Jews are highly susceptible to anti-Semitism. They also demonstrate that such answers reveal an indecisiveness which in turn indicates an unwillingness to express opposition to anti-Semitic bigotry.¹¹ Such findings further indicate why a narrowing of the "middle ground" ambivalent responses was deemed desirable in the present study.

Among the Oklahoma collegiate silent majority respondents, a check of civil liberties attitudes found over two-thirds to be favorably disposed with one in five ambivalent and one in ten unfavorable. When the sample was divided into social classes, however, differences emerged. Eighty-six percent of the upper middle class, as compared to 71% of the lower middle and 64% of the working class, exhibited favorable attitudes. Ambivalent and unfavorable attitudes together totaled only 14% among upper middle class respondents. These findings regarding the relationship between social class and civil liberties attitudes are akin to those of Lenski who, in his study of Detroiters, catalogued differences between middle and working class respondents. Using questions which dealt with criticism of the President of the United States

¹¹Review of Religious Research, 12 (1971), p. 56.

verbal attacks on religion, and free speech and assembly for Communists and fascists, Lenski found a mean difference of 19% and 8% between middle and working class white protestants and white Catholics respectively.¹² As the following table illustrates, the upper middle class students had 15% more who were favorable toward civil liberties than the lower middle class, and 22% more than the working class. Comparison may also be made with Stouffer's findings that community leaders (who are more likely to be fairly high in the social strata) are more likely to be civil libertarian than the general public, who, on the average, would be lower in the social strata.¹³

Table III - 5
Social Class and Civil Liberties

Attitude Toward Civil Liberties	<u>Social Class</u>			All Respondents
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working	
Favorable	86%	71%	64%	68%
Ambivalent	10	21	24	22
Unfavorable	4	8	12	10
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(21)	(168)	(255)	(444)

$p < .05$

Racial Attitudes

In attempting to determine racial attitudes, four questions were asked which involve the concepts of having neighbors of another race,

¹³S.A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), Chapter 2.

integration or segregation in schools, dining in one's own home with a person of another race, and racial intermarriage.¹⁴

The questions used in determining racial attitudes are as follows:

1. It would probably be better if black and white children attended separate schools.
2. I would prefer to live in a segregated neighborhood.
3. Two persons of different races should not marry.
4. I would object if a member of my family brought a person of another race home to dinner.

As in the case of the civil liberties questions, the choice of answers covered from (1) Strongly disagree, to (5) Strongly agree. The range of means for the categories follows:

Mean of 1.00-2.75, Integrationist

Mean of 2.76-3.25, Ambivalent

Mean of 3.26-5.00, Segregationist

Six in ten respondents fell into the integrationist category.

One in five was ambivalent and about one in five was a segregationist.

There were no significant differences in racial attitudes among the

¹⁴The question about black and white children attending separate schools is from Glock and Stark, *op. cit.*, Chapter 10. The other three are modifications of questions used by Paul Sheatsley in "White Attitudes Toward the Negro," *Daedalus*, 95 (1966), 217-238. The term "race" has been used in the current study because it is more familiar to the general populace than the term "ethnic group." Many people refer to the "Jewish race" or "Mexican race" or "Irish race" when, in such cases, the term "ethnic group" would be more proper. It is quite possible that the phrase "person of another race" brings to mind various ethnic groups to some people, but to the overwhelming majority of caucasians it means blacks, and vice versa.

three classes, with integrationist views ranging from 61% to 67% and segregationist feelings from 17% to 20%. Even when the twenty-nine non-caucasians were eliminated, there was still no essential difference in the racial attitudes of the three classes. These findings differ from those of Lenski who stressed that "one finds a higher percentage of segregationists among the working class."¹⁵

Table III - 6

Social Class and Racial Attitude

Racial Attitude	<u>Social Class</u>			All Respondents
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working	
Integra- tionist	67%	62%	61%	61%
Ambivalent	14	18	22	21
Segrega- tionist	19	20	17	18
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(21)	(168)	(255)	(444)

Chi Square non-significant at the .05 level.

Accounting for this difference in findings is difficult. We may speculate that racial attitudes are more closely related to level of education and level of political information than to social class. Thus, once a person has reached college, class differences in racial views may narrow. As will be shown in a later chapter, significant

¹⁵Lenski, op. cit., p. 209.

differences in racial attitudes do occur among those with varying religious beliefs. This will be explored in Chapter Six.

Table III - 7

Social Class and Racial Attitude (Caucasians Only)

Racial Attitude	Social Class		
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working
Integrationist	67%	60%	60%
Ambivalent	14	19	22
Segregationist	19	21	18
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(21)	(159)	(235)

Chi Square non-significant at the .05 level.

In this chapter, Hollingshead's "Two Factor Analysis of Social Position" was explained and was used to place respondents in one of the following social classes: upper middle, lower middle, or working class. A relationship was illustrated between religious belief and class with unbelievers being higher in social position than either fundamentalists or modernists.

An attempt was made to gauge the effect of social class on college students attitudes toward civil liberties and race. The data revealed that class has a significant bearing on beliefs about civil liberties with the upper middle class more favorably disposed than the lower middle which, in turn, was slightly more favorable than the working class.

Although investigations by others produced different results,

in the current study social class did not have a significant effect on racial attitudes. This finding was unexpected, and it was surmised that racial attitudes may be more closely related to amount of education and level of political information than to class, and once the individual reaches the college level class differences regarding racial attitudes tend to lessen. Racial attitudes are further explored in relation to religious belief in Chapter Six; in relation to level of political information in Chapter Eight; and in relation to candidate preference in Chapter Ten.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL CLASS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: AUTHORITARIANISM AND DOMESTIC COMMUNISM

The concept of authoritarianism or the "authoritarian personality" involves a particular set of traits including strong tendencies toward conformity, dependence on authority, rigidity in thought patterns, over-control or suppression of certain feelings and impulses, and a high degree of ethnocentrism. Those individuals having such traits cling to conventional values and are concerned with status and power. They "are generally hostile to members of minority or other outgroups." Further, "these traits belong together in such a way that a person who is high, low or average in some of them tends to be high, low or average in all of them."¹

The authoritarian syndrome was first given prominence by the work of Theodor W. Adorno and his collaborators in the 1950 book entitled The Authoritarian Personality. Although their basic purpose was to study anti-Semitism, "the authors concluded that anti-Semitism, with its prejudicial, anti-democratic attitudes, was in many cases part of a well-organized and much larger personality structure..." which "...tended to develop in persons who were subjected to very strict

¹Robert M. Goldenson, The Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1970), p. 134.

parental control early in life, and who had learned to bury their sentiments and adopt an attitude of acquiescence."² Because of these factors such persons continued to be submissive toward authority after becoming adults; at the same time they expressed covert hostility toward weak individuals or vulnerable groups which could be attacked with no involvement of risk.

Adorno's description of the authoritarian personality was quite like that of the ideal Nazi as described by Nazi psychologist E.R. Jaensch. Additionally, it was concluded that:

...acceptance or rejection of this cluster of prejudices was associated with the individual's over-all personality structure. In a word, people who were most apt to adopt anti-democratic attitudes were also found to exhibit an authoritarian personality structure.³

Since the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality*, the relationship of social class and authoritarianism has been of interest to political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists. Several studies have lent weight to the idea that authoritarianism is more prevalent in the lower social strata.⁴

The method used for determining the level of authoritarianism of a respondent was the same as that used in categorizing beliefs with

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Theodor W. Adorno et al, The Authoritarian Personality, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), p. 267; Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man, (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), Chapter 4; Arthur Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield, (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1969), Chapter 5; S.A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties, (New York: Science Editions, 1965), p. 139.

respect to civil liberties and racial attitudes. Students were instructed to record answers ranging from (1) Strongly disagree, to (5) Strongly agree to nine statements, eight of which are from Adorno's study. The other is from The Open and Closed Mind by Milton Rokeach.⁵

The statements are as follows:

1. The worst danger to real Americanism during the last fifty years has come from foreign ideas and agitators.
2. America is getting so far from the true American way of life that force may be necessary to restore it.
3. The sexual orgies of the old Greeks and Romans are nursery school stuff compared to some of the goings-on in this country today.
4. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
5. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped or worse.
6. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for his parents.
7. Most people don't realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places.
8. What our youth need most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.
9. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

As in previous cases (civil liberties and racial attitudes) the range

⁵Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960). This particular statement is from Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale, an instrument which measures open and closed belief systems.

of means was:

Mean of 1.00-2.75, Low Authoritarian

Mean of 2.76-3.25, Ambivalent

Mean of 3.26-5.00, High Authoritarian

Better than one-third of the students scored high on authoritarianism with almost exactly one-third scoring low and less than one-third falling into the ambivalent category. Distinct differences in

Table IV - 1

Social Class and Authoritarianism

Level of Authoritarianism	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	<u>Social Class</u>	
			Working	All Respondents
Low	48%	41%	29%	34%
Ambivalent	38	29	28	29
High	14	30	43	37
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(21)	(168)	(255)	(444)

$p < .01$

the level of authoritarianism appeared among the three classes with 48% of the upper middle, 41% of the lower middle and 29% of the working class falling into the low authoritarian grouping. The working class had 43% in the high authoritarian category compared with 30% for the lower middle class and 14% for the upper middle class. Interestingly, the upper middle class had the largest percentage in the ambivalent category (38%). The finding that those lower in social class tend to be more authoritarian is consistent with the conclusions of previously cited studies.

We now turn to an examination of student attitudes about the threat of domestic Communism and the influence of social class on such attitudes.

Beliefs About the Threat of Domestic Communism

America is a nation which has been not only mindful of the challenge of Communism but, some critics maintain, unreasonably and irrationally so. After WWI came the "Red Scare" period when the public and the national government, led by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, became obsessed with left wing radicals, both real and imagined. From 1950-1954, Senator Joseph McCarthy was the leading voice in what has been called a witch hunt which, while uncovering no crypto-Reds, did harm to basic constitutional guarantees. During the late sixties and early seventies there have been, according to some commentators, attempts by the Department of Justice under Attorney General Mitchell to suppress dissent and link most of the dissenters with Communism. Presumably, the silent majority has been sympathetic to all such measures and a considerable number of them evidently believe that unless certain elements in our society are suppressed, America will eventually fall prey to internal Communism, be subverted, taken over. What sort of people are more likely to believe this? Studies of authoritarianism have shown that high authoritarians are more likely to believe in the existence of conspiracies, and clandestine meetings in general, than are low authoritarians. Given this premise, we ask what groups are probably more likely to contain a significant percentage of high authoritarians? One answer would be that less educated or less informed groups seemingly would contain more of such people.

Those more likely to be less educated and uninformed would include religious fundamentalists, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, and the lower middle and working classes, comprising the great bulk of the silent majority, which we will now examine.

The statement used to determine views on the danger of domestic Communism and the importance of combatting it is from a study of student attitudes toward Communists by Schonbar.⁶ The statement is:

Combatting Communism in the United States is the most serious domestic task facing our country today.

As before, respondents were asked to select one of these answers:

(1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Not sure or neutral, (4) Agree, (5) Strongly agree. Slightly over half of the students disagreed with the statement, while about four in ten agreed. Eight percent were not sure.

When the student's views were examined by social class, differences became apparent. Twenty percent of the working class and 15% of the lower middle class answered with "Strongly agree." No upper middle class respondent gave that answer. Thirty-eight percent of the upper middle class strongly disagreed, while 20% of the lower middle and only 12% of the working class answered in this way.

The foregoing data lend support to the belief that an underlying preoccupation with subversion seems present in the thinking of a significant portion of lower middle and working class students. The fact that four in ten viewed combatting Communism as the most serious domestic

⁶Rosalea A. Schonbar, "Student Attitudes Toward Communists," Journal of Psychology, 27 (1949), 55-71.

Table IV - 2

Social Class and the Attitude Toward
the Danger of Domestic Communism

Combatting Communism is the most serious domestic task.	<u>Social Class</u>			
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working	All Respondents
Strongly disagree	38%	20%	12%	16%
Disagree	33	38	35	36
Not sure	10	5	10	9
Agree	19	22	23	22
Strongly agree	0	15	20	17
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(21)	(168)	(255)	(444)

$p < .05$

task reflects, perhaps, not only the reality of over twenty five years of Cold War and recent violence by the far left, but also some measure of success for the propaganda of the radical rightists, who have long maintained that Communists occupy high positions in government.

One aim of this chapter has been to discuss authoritarianism and to explore the relationship between authoritarianism and social class among college students. The data revealed that a positive relationship does exist with working class students showing stronger authoritarian tendencies than those in the lower middle class who, in turn, were more authoritarian than the students from upper middle class families.

Another aim was to examine beliefs about Communism in America. On this subject the lower middle and working class students exhibited

considerably more concern about the danger posed by home-grown Reds than did the upper middle class respondents. That the working class students showed greatest concern was not surprising since they also tested most authoritarian and least favorable toward civil liberties. Such persons would, no doubt, be greatly concerned with any sort of non-conformity and would have tendencies to relate unconventional behavior to Communism.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL CLASS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: WELFARISM AND POLITICAL INFORMATION

The terms liberal and conservative are often used loosely by Americans. If a person takes the position that combatting domestic Communism is a very important task he may be referred to by some as a "conservative." But what of the economic conservative who believes in taking a "hard line" with Russian and Chinese Communists, yet scoffs at the idea of any real danger from home-grown Reds? Is this person a liberal? These and related problems with ideological distinctions have led to the theory that there are different kinds of liberalism and conservatism. Indeed, there are at least four issue areas in which a given individual's liberalism or conservatism should be distinguished: domestic economic affairs, civil liberties, civil rights, and internationalism. A fifth area, the legislation of morality, could be considered under the heading of civil liberties, but was examined as a separate category in Lenski's Detroit study.

Free and Cantril have indicated that perhaps the best way to differentiate American liberals from conservatives lies with the issue of using the power of the national government to achieve social ends, i.e., the issue of welfarism.¹ An individual's attitude on the

¹Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans (New York: Clarion Books, 1968), Chapter 1.

question of welfarism would involve his reaction to such issues as medical care for the aged and the very young, federal aid to education, public housing, and perhaps even social security and the graduated income tax. If one opposed most such measures he could be considered conservative with respect to welfarism; if he favored most of them, he could be labeled a liberal in this area.

Free and Cantril also wanted to test the theory that what Americans say they believe and what they actually favor in practice in relation to welfarism are, to a substantial extent, in conflict. To test this assumption they devised two sets of statements. One set, which taps "ideological" or theoretical liberalism or conservatism, they named the "Ideological Spectrum." The other set of statements, which they called the "Operational Spectrum," was devised to reveal operational liberalism or conservatism, i.e., beliefs about welfarism in practice.² Thus, the two scales were devised to separate theory or ideology from practical or operational belief in matters of domestic economic issues.

In using Free and Cantril's two Spectrums, it was necessary to modify some of the wording slightly, since some of the issues referred to in their questions have become law. The five Ideological Spectrum questions are as follows:

1. The Federal Government is interfering too much in state and local matters.
2. The government has gone too far in regulating business and interfering with the free enterprise system.

²Free and Cantril, op. cit., Chapters 2 and 3.

3. Social problems here in this country could be solved more effectively if the government would only keep its hands off and let people in local communities handle their own problems in their own ways.
4. Generally speaking, any able-bodied person who really wants to work in this country can find a job and earn a living.
5. We should rely more on individual initiative and ability and not so much on governmental welfare programs.

Respondents were asked to answer in one of the five previously mentioned ways (Strongly disagree to Strongly agree). The range of means used in constructing categories was the same as previously utilized:

Mean of 1.00-2.75, Liberal

Mean of 2.76-3.25, Middle of the Road

Mean of 3.26-5.00, Conservative

Free and Cantril's study found that in 1964 in response to questions on the Ideological Spectrum 50% of the citizens of the United States were conservatives, 34% were middle of the roaders, and 16% were liberals. On the same scale students at the three Oklahoma colleges proved to be 45% conservative, 37% middle of the road, and 18% liberal. Notable differences existed among the three social classes. But, surprisingly, these differences were directly opposite those noted by Free and Cantril, Lenski, and Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee.³ Although there was virtually no difference between the lower

³Free and Cantril, op. cit., Chapters 2 and 3; Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, Chapter 4; Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld and William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 55-56.

middle and working classes, both together proved to be less liberal and thus more conservative in their theoretical economic philosophy than did the upper middle class. This result was not expected. Usually it is those higher in class who tend to be more sympathetic toward economic conservatism.⁴ Yet it should be noted that Free and Cantril found only small Ideological Spectrum differences in the

Table V - 1

Social Class and the Ideological Spectrum
(Theoretical Welfarism)

Social Class	Ideological Spectrum Position				(N)
	Liberal	Middle of the Road	Conser- vative	Total	
Upper Middle	29%	33%	38%	100%	(21)
Lower Middle	18	38	44	100	(168)
Working	18	36	46	100	(255)
All Respondents	18	37	45	100	(444)

Chi square non-significant at .05 level.

liberalism and conservatism of three income groupings: under \$5,000 per year, \$5,000-\$9,999 per year, and over \$10,000 per year. A table based on their findings follows.⁵

⁴Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner, Human Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), pp. 426-427; Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), Chapter 4.

⁵This table and the following are based on data from Free and Cantril, p. 221.

Table V - 2

Income and the Ideological Spectrum
(Free and Cantril)

Yearly Income	<u>Ideological Spectrum Position</u>		
	Liberal	Middle of the Road	Conservative
Under \$5,000	18%	33%	49%
\$5,000-\$9,999	14	37	49
\$10,000 and up	18	28	54

Still, when Free and Cantril applied class identification groupings to the Ideological Spectrum those identifying with the working class were clearly more liberal and less conservative than those identifying with the middle and propertied classes.

Table V - 3

Class Identification and the Ideological Spectrum
(Free and Cantril)

Class Identification	<u>Ideological Spectrum Position</u>		
	Liberal	Middle of the Road	Conservative
Working Class	21%	35%	44%
Middle Class	13	32	55
Propertied Class	4	33	63

The findings of the present study differ from those of Free and Cantril and Lenski. No explanation for this discrepancy seems readily available but it should be remembered that those studies dealt with a 1964 national sample and a 1958 Detroit cross-section, respectively,

while the current study surveyed only college students. Further, a considerable portion of the students identified with a higher class than the one in which an objective determination placed them. It was noted in Chapter Three that 41% of the working class students and 64% of the lower middle class students considered themselves to be upper middle class.

Turning our attention to the Operational Spectrum, we note the following statements (some slightly modified) which make up this instrument:

1. Federal aid to education includes grants to help pay for teachers' salaries. Are you:
 - (1) For this (2) Against this (3) Not sure
2. "Medicare" for the elderly is financed out of social security taxes. In general do you feel that you:
 - (1) Approve of this (2) Disapprove of this (3) Not sure
3. Under the federal housing program the Federal Government is making grants to help build low-rent public housing. Do you think the government spending for this purpose should be:
 - (1) Kept at least at the present level (2) Reduced
(3) Ended altogether
4. Under the urban renewal program, the Federal Government is making grants to help build run-down sections of our cities. Do you think government spending for this purpose should be:
 - (1) Kept at least at the present level (2) Reduced
(3) Ended altogether
5. The Federal Government has a responsibility to try to reduce unemployment and to try to do away with poverty in this country.
 - (1) Agree (2) Disagree (3) Not sure

The respondent was considered conservative if he was against at least three of the statements and agreed with no more than one. If against three and for two or vice-versa, he was considered middle of the road. He was also considered middle of the road if he was for or against no more than two. If he favored at least three statements and opposed no more than one, he was considered liberal.

Table V - 4

Social Class and the Operational Spectrum
(Practical Welfarism)

Social Class	Liberal	Middle of the Road	Conservative	Total	(N)
Upper Middle	81%	14%	5%	100%	(21)
Lower Middle	71	24	5	100	(168)
Working	74	22	4	100	(255)
All Respondents	73	23	4	100	(444)

Chi square non-significant at .05 level.

Utilizing the Operational Spectrum, Free and Cantril found that their national sample consisted of 65% liberals, 21% middle of the roaders, and only 14% conservatives. Social class had little effect on Operational Spectrum differences among the Oklahoma students. But as before, the small difference was toward the upper middle class being more liberal: eighty-one percent versus 71% for the lower middle and 74% for the working class.

Free and Cantril also found that 74% of those who identified with the interests of the working class, 57% of those who identified with the interests of the middle class, and 40% of those who identified with the propertied class were Operational liberals. Further, by utilizing annual income as a variable, they found that of those who made under \$5,000 per year 73% were operationally liberal; those in the salary ranges of \$5,000-\$9,999 and \$10,000 and over had liberal percentages of 62% and 53% respectively. The following table compares Free and Cantril's class identification and income groupings with the three classes used in the current study.

Table V - 5

Comparison of Free and Cantril's National Sample
with the Oklahoma Collegiate Sample

Social Strata	<u>Operational Spectrum Position</u>		
	Liberal	Middle of the Road	Conserv- ative
Upper Middle Class Students (Okla)	81%	14%	5%
Identify with Propertied Class (F & C)	40	34	26
Income over \$10,000/year (F & C)	53	25	22
Lower Middle Class Students (Okla)	71	24	5
Identify with Middle Class (F & C)	57	24	19
Income \$5,000-\$9,999/year (F & C)	62	24	14
Working Class Students (Okla)	74	22	4
Identify with Working Class (F & C)	74	17	9
Income under \$5,000/year (F & C)	73	16	11

A particularly interesting finding of Free and Cantril was that a considerable number of ideological conservatives and middle of the roaders were, at the same time, operational liberals: 46% of the

conservatives and 78% of the middle of the roaders. The investigation of the Oklahoma College students produced a similar pattern, except that an even greater percentage of ideological conservatives (60%) were operational liberals. A comparison of the findings of the two studies is illustrated in Table V - 6.

Table V - 6

Ideological Spectrum (Theoretical Welfarism) vs.
Operational Spectrum (Practical Welfarism)

Ideological Spectrum	<u>Operational Spectrum</u>		
	Liberal	Middle of the Road	Conservative
Liberal			
Free & Cantril	90%	9%	1%
Oklahoma students	90	10	0
Middle of the Road			
Free & Cantril	78	18	4
Oklahoma students	80	19	1
Conservative			
Free & Cantril	46	28	26
Oklahoma students	60	31	9

Free and Cantril concluded that although the welfare state does not have wide acceptance in theory, it is well accepted in practice. The data on the Oklahoma collegiate silent majority supports this. Although presumably imbued with ideas about "rugged individualism" and the "free enterprise system," Oklahoma students, in the manner of the majority of Americans, accept economically liberal policies in practice. The resulting lack of congruity between ideology and policy may be further illustrated by comparing the respondent's position on the Ideological and Operational Spectrums with his self identification

as a liberal, conservative, etc. Twenty-one percent identified themselves as liberal, 38% as middle of the road, 26% as conservative. Radical right, radical left and "other" were each chosen by 1%; twelve percent said they were non-political. Only 47% of those who were liberals on the Ideological Spectrum and 25% of the Operational Spectrum liberals identified themselves as such. In fact, 10% of the Ideological Spectrum liberals identified themselves as conservatives and 4% called themselves radical rightists.

Table V - 7

Self Identification of Political Ideology

Liberal		
Free and Cantril		26%
Oklahoma students		21
Middle of the Road		
Free and Cantril		34
Oklahoma students		38
Conservative		
Free and Cantril		30
Oklahoma students		26

Not even half of those who were liberal or middle of the road on either the Ideological or Operational Spectrum identified themselves in that manner. The same held true for Ideological conservatives; only 34% identified themselves as such. Fifty-three percent of the Operational conservatives, however, called themselves by that name. These results lend weight to the idea that most Americans are not ideologically oriented; words such as liberal, conservative, etc., while having some meaning for them, are not well understood in their implications.

As Free and Cantril indicated, the public is apt to think of the terms liberal and conservative in relation to welfarism. Yet much of the sample of Oklahoma college students, like the national sample of 1964, did not seem to understand with any great consistency what their beliefs entailed.

Level of Political Information

Using information questions that have been asked over the years by various polling organizations, the general political knowledge of the students was tested. Ten questions, eight multiple choice with five answers, one fill-in and one open ended, were used. One of the five possible answers to each multiple choice question was "I'm not sure," and this response was actually the correct answer to one of the questions, since it dealt with identifying a non-existent organization. The people, organizations and concepts the students were asked about included: U Thant, Mao Tse Tung, filibuster, the number of senators in Washington from their state, Lenin, the Stand Up for America League, the first amendment to the United States Constitution, the Mann Act, and the three branches of the national government. The ten questions may be found in the Appendix.

On the basis of the number of correct answers, students were categorized as "informed," "moderately informed," or "uninformed." Eight or more correct answers placed a respondent in the informed category. Seven or six correct answers placed him in the moderately informed, and five or less in the uninformed bracket.

The entire sample proved to be 34% informed, 37% moderately informed, and 29% uninformed. These findings are not overly different

from what many public opinion specialists have maintained about the total United States population. Also, the uninformed percentage might have been lower had not four of the questions dealt with international affairs. Most studies have shown that Americans know less about foreign than domestic issues, and Free and Cantril found fully two-fifths of the public to be uninformed with reference to international affairs. They cited polls which showed that in 1964 one-fourth of the public did not know that mainland China was controlled by a Communist regime. And while 71% could identify Charles de Gaulle (whose name had been in the news quite often in 1964), only 40% knew who U Thant was.⁶

Social class had a significant effect on the Oklahoma college sample. The upper middle class respondents were 53% informed compared to 35% for the lower middle and 31% for the working class. The lower middle class had the largest percentage who were moderately informed: 41%, compared with 34% for the working class, and 33% for the upper middle. Only 14% of the upper middle and 23% of the lower middle classes were uninformed, but 35% of the working class students fell into this category. Thus, while 86% of the upper middle and 77% of the lower middle classes were at least moderately informed politically by the criteria used in this investigation, less than two-thirds of the working class students achieved this standard.

⁶Free and Cantril, op. cit., pp. 59-60; see also Robert Lane and David Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964), Chapter 6.

Table V - 8

Social Class and Political Information

Social Class	Informed	Level of Information		Total	(N)
		Moderately Informed	Uninformed		
Upper Middle	53%	33%	14%	100%	(21)
Lower Middle	36	41	23	100	(168)
Working	31	34	35	100	(255)
All Respondents	34	37	29	100	(444)

$p < .05$

These results may be thought to confirm one writer's observation "...that differences in information held in a cross-section population are simply staggering, running from vast treasuries of well-organized information among elites interested in the particular subject to fragments that could virtually be measured as a few 'bits' in the technical sense."⁷

This chapter has been an attempt to examine the effect of social class on attitudes toward welfarism and level of political information among the collegiate silent majority. Utilizing Free and Cantril's Ideological Spectrum and Operational Spectrum it was found that social class had little effect on beliefs about welfarism either in theory or practice. While differences among the classes were not statistically significant, the upper middle class had the highest percentage of

⁷Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

liberals with respect to both theoretical welfarism (29% to 18%) and practical welfarism (81% to 74%). These results were unlike those of previous studies which found more support for economic conservatism in the higher social strata. We may speculate on this discrepancy by noting that the present study dealt with college students, a large number of which identified with a higher social class than their own.

The collegiate silent majority certainly could not be called economic conservatives in practice. The data reveal that they were even more liberal on the Operational Spectrum than a 1964 national sample.

Social class and level of political information showed a definite relationship with the upper middle class students being notably better informed than the rest of the sample. The working class respondents were the least informed group.

CHAPTER VI

RELIGION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND RACE

The effect of religious beliefs upon attitudes has been discussed by Balswick, Brannon, Glock and Stark, Hong, Lenski, and Rokeach among others.¹ It is the purpose of this chapter and the next two to explore the consequences of certain religious beliefs upon students' dispositions in relation to civil liberties, racial attitudes, authoritarianism, domestic Communism, welfarism, and the Indochina War. In addition, it was felt important to learn if religious beliefs have any effect on the individual's level of political information.

Religious preferences of the students were what might be expected in Oklahoma except for the over-representation of Church of Christ and Nazarene respondents due to the religious affiliations of two of the three colleges. (Recall that Bethany Nazarene College furnished 110 respondents and Oklahoma Christian College 118.) The denominational breakdown showed the following: 27% preferring the Church of Christ;

¹Jack Balswick, "Theology and Political Attitudes Among the Clergy," Sociological Quarterly, 11 (Summer, 1970), 397-405; R.C.L. Brannon, "Gimme That Old Time Racism," Psychology Today (April, 1970); Charles Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), Chapters 5 and 7; Lawrence Hong, "Religious Styles, Dogmatism and Orientation to Change," Sociological Analysis, 27 (1966), 239-242; Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963), Chapter 4; Milton Rokeach, "Faith, Hope and Bigotry," Psychology Today (April, 1970), and also "Value Systems

23.2% Nazarene; 18.5% Baptist; 6.3% Methodist; 5.4% "other;" 4.5% Catholic; 3% Lutheran and Episcopal; 2.4% Presbyterian; 1.8% Disciples of Christ and "none;" 1.5% Assembly of God; and 1% agnostic or athiest. Preferences of less than 1% included Church of God, Congregational, and Jewish. Included in the "other" category were such diverse groups as Christian Science, Free Methodist, Freewill Baptist, Independent Christian, Mormon, Religious Science, United Church of Christ, United Pentecostal, and Unitarian. Respondents from three groups -- Church of Christ, Nazarene and Baptist -- comprised better than two-thirds of the total sample and almost 80% of the fundamentalists.

Although the particular religious denomination (or sect) in which one was raised or with which one identifies no doubt can have a significant effect on his overall attitudes, it seems that the religious beliefs of each individual would be more important in shaping these attitudes. Two people who are Methodists may have diametrically opposed views on such issues as abortion, civil rights, the death penalty, foreign policy, etc. It is quite possible, perhaps even probable, that these same two Methodists will have divergent views regarding the divinity of Jesus, the inspiration of the Bible, belief in miracles, a literal hell, the necessity of being a Christian, etc. Thus it might be surmised that knowing whether or not a respondent is a religious fundamentalist would provide a better clue to his other beliefs than knowing what church he attends would provide. Our prime concern, then, is with

in Religion" and "Religion and Social Compassion," Review of Religious Research, 11 (Fall, 1969), 3-39; Rodney Stark et al, "Sounds of Silence," Psychology Today (April, 1970) and Wayward Shepherds: Prejudice and the Protestant Clergy (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

the individual's system of belief rather than his denominational preference.

Since the focal point of this chapter is to examine what effect the individual's religious philosophy has upon certain political attitudes, it was necessary to construct religious belief categories: "fundamentalist," "modernist," and "unbeliever." The students were placed in these categories based on the manner in which they responded to statements dealing with belief in the following: God, the divinity of Jesus, miracles as described in the Bible, hell as described in the Bible, the Devil, and the necessity of being of a particular religious faith in order to attain salvation. These statements follow. On the first two the five answers were (1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Not sure or neutral, (4) Agree, and (5) Strongly agree as described in Chapter Three. The other four had answers which involved varying degrees of acceptance or rejection of each concept. The first two statements dealing with religion are as follows:

All the miracles described in the Bible really happened.

Hell, as described in the Bible, actually exists.

The other four questions were prefaced with these instructions:

The following questions are multiple choice. Please pick the answer that most nearly expresses your opinion and place the number of that answer in the blank to the left of the question.

Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing what you believe about God?

5. I know God really exists and I haven't any doubts about it.
4. While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God.
3. I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at other times.
2. I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a higher power of some kind.
1. I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out.

The Devil actually exists.

1. Definitely not true
2. Probably not true
3. Possible, but doubtful
4. Probably true
5. Completely true

Do you think belief in Jesus Christ as Savior is...

5. Absolutely necessary for salvation
4. Probably necessary for salvation
3. Would possibly help
2. Probably has little influence
1. Probably has no influence

Do you think being a member of your particular religious faith is...

5. Absolutely necessary for salvation
4. Probably necessary for salvation
3. Would probably help
2. May have some influence
1. Probably has no influence

Such factors as belief in the Biblical hell, the Devil, miracles, and the necessity of accepting the divinity of Jesus were considered as denoting a fundamentalist. The lack of such beliefs coupled with affirmation of a supreme being placed the respondent in the modernist category. To be categorized as an unbeliever, the respondent, in addition to rejecting orthodox beliefs, had to answer the question about God with "I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out." To be categorized a fundamentalist the respondent had to give answer number 4 or 5 to at least four of the six statements dealing with religious belief.

Using these criteria, the sample turned out to be 82% fundamentalists, 8% modernists and 10% unbelievers. This is quite different from a national sample of college students taken by the Gallup organization in January of 1971. Thirty-nine percent of that sample stated that religion is old-fashioned and out of date. Among the reasons

given for this belief the students mentioned that religion cannot provide answers to today's problems; it is behind the times and too steeped in tradition to be effective; it has too many rules; it is used as a crutch to avoid facing reality; it places too much emphasis on money and is held back by its leaders. Another Gallup poll taken in late April and early May of 1970 found 58% of a national student sample answering "no" to the question "Is organized religion a relevant part of your life at the present time, or not?" This poll found that the higher a student's parents' income, the more likely he was to answer in the negative, with better than two-thirds of those whose family income was over \$15,000 per year saying that organized religion was not relevant in their lives.

In the present study, thirty of the unbelievers answered the question regarding religious preference by selecting names of denominations rather than by marking "none" or "agnostic or athiest." Many of these respondents no doubt chose the church in which they had been raised. Thirty percent, however, were still attending church with at least moderate regularity, which lends support to the old adage that a lot of unbelievers go to church.

No doubt one-third (probably more actually) of the people in this category are not unbelievers in the traditional sense of that term. Some are almost unquestionably mystics or doubters who want evidence before they will accept certain doctrines. Others include Unitarians, many of whom prefer not to be called unbelievers. Such persons generally adhere to the conviction that whether or not Jesus was divine, or whether or not a supreme being exists are not important (not even meaningful) questions. But, they affirm, the ethical teachings of religion

Table VI - 1

Religious Preference and Religious Belief

Religious Preference	% Fund.	Religious Belief Category			(N)
		% Mod.	% Unbeliever	% Total	
Assem. of God	1.6	0.0	0.0	1.5	(6)
Baptist	19.0	23.5	9.0	18.5	(82)
Catholic	2.7	11.8	14.0	4.5	(20)
Ch. of Christ	32.0	3.0	0.0	27.0	(119)
Ch. of God	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.7	(3)
Congregational	0.3	6.0	0.0	0.7	(3)
Disc. of Christ	1.6	0.0	4.7	1.8	(8)
Episcopal	1.0	3.0	16.0	2.7	(12)
Jewish	0.0	0.0	2.3	0.2	(1)
Lutheran	2.0	11.8	2.3	3.0	(13)
Methodist	4.0	26.5	9.0	6.3	(28)
Nazarene	27.8	0.0	2.3	23.2	(103)
Presbyterian	1.0	3.0	11.6	2.4	(10)
Other	4.9	11.8	4.7	5.4	(24)
None	0.5	0.0	14.0	1.8	(8)
Agnostic or Atheist	0.0	0.0	9.3	0.9	(4)
Total*	99.2	100.4	99.2	100.6	
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)	

* Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.

(all religions) are important and should be stressed at the expense of (and without the hinderance of) dogmatic creeds. No doubt many people with such beliefs consider themselves quite religious. If they have a concept of a supreme being, it is a highly personal concept; they do not accept the idea that God looks like a male caucasian with a beard. Most modernists, of course, also reject such a concept and a number probably hold a quasi-deistic view. This involves the belief in a supreme being who created, but who does not interfere in the affairs of humans.

At any rate, respondents in the unbeliever category should not be thought of in terms of the doctrinaire village atheist, doing verbal battle with theologians and writing nasty letters to the local newspaper denouncing Jesus as a first century snake oil salesman.

Although about two-thirds of the students stated that they attend church at least once a week, frequency of attendance differed with regard to both religious belief category and social class. Whereas 35% of the modernists and 30% of the unbelievers claimed to attend religious services at least two to three times per month, eighty-five percent of the fundamentalists asserted this frequency of attendance, with 76% stating that they attend at least once a week. Nearly one-third of the modernists and over half of the unbelievers stated that they had not attended church in the last year or that they attend "seldom." Only 5% of the fundamentalists gave comparable responses. The following table illustrates the relationship between religious belief category and church attendance.

Table VI - 2

Religious Belief and Church Attendance

Religious Belief Category	At least once a week	Two or three times a month	Occa- sionally	Seldom	Not in the last year	Total*	(N)
Fundamen- talist	76%	10%	9%	3%	2%	100%	(367)
Modernist	15	21	32	15	18	101	(34)
Unbeliever	19	11	19	19	33	101	(43)
All							8
Respondents	65	11	12	6	6	100	(444)

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

The relationship of social class and church attendance had a pattern similar in some respects to that of religious belief category and attendance. While attendance habits of the modernists (those in the middle religiously) more nearly resembled those of the unbelievers, the lower middle class students' (those in the middle class-wise) frequency of attendance was closer to that of the working class than the upper middle. The upper middle class, like the unbeliever group, had the greatest percentage of respondents reporting that they had not gone to church in the last year, or attend "seldom." These findings are at least partially consistent with Kahl's assertion that lower middle class people are the most regular church goers in America.² There was no significant difference, however, in the attendance patterns of the lower middle and working class students.

Another method was used to determine not only religious belief, but just how far some individuals would go in letting such beliefs overlap into other areas. The question, slightly modified but almost the same as one used by Lenski in his Detroit study, was:

In politics, would you prefer a candidate who bases his campaign on:

1. His belief in God and the American way of life

or

2. A discussion of political and economic problems

²Joseph Kahl, The American Class Structure (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1957), Chapter 7.

Table VI - 3

Social Class and Church Attendance

Social Class	At least once a week	Two or three times a month	Occasionally	Church Attendance		Total	(N)
				Seldom	Not in the last year		
Upper Middle	48%	5%	9%	14%	24%	100%	(21)
Lower Middle	67	11	11	5	6	100	(168)
Working	66	11	12	6	5	100	(255)

p < .05

Lenski found that fully 60% of his sample preferred the man who based his campaign on God and the American way of life.³ The Oklahoma students, being of higher average educational attainment than Lenski's Detroit respondents, would be expected to have a smaller percentage favor the man whose campaign was based on a glittering generality, and indeed they did. Still, virtually half (49%) preferred such a candidate, while 51% wanted campaigns based on a discussion of political and economic issues, as compared to only 23% of Lenski's sample. Thus, even though attending college, almost half the students reacted favorably, in a way which might even be described as a conditioned response, to the familiar symbols of "God" and "the American way of life."

Though this question divided the respondents in such a way that many fundamentalists were placed in the same grouping with the modernists and unbelievers, there is reason to believe that this method revealed the "hard core" of the fundamentalists. Interestingly, three modernists and two unbelievers joined this hard core, attracted perhaps by the phrase "the American way of life." As will be demonstrated, two categories of respondents demarcated by this one question on "campaign philosophy" tended to exhibit rather diverse views on other issues. This is especially true with regard to civil liberties, racial attitudes, position on both the Ideological and Operational Spectrums, acceptance of demonstrations, and attitude toward the war in Indochina.

³Lenski, op. cit., p. 177.

Table VI - 4

Preference for Campaign based on God
or Issues, and Religious Belief

Religious Belief Category	<u>Campaign Based on:</u>		Total	(N)
	God and the American way	Political and Economic Issues		
Fundamen- talist	58%	42%	100%	(367)
Modernist	9	91	100	(34)
Unbeliever	5	95	100	(43)

Civil Liberties

The findings of Balswick, Glock and Stark, Rokeach, and Stark et al, strongly suggest that religious fundamentalists tend to have less favorable attitudes toward civil liberties than do non-fundamentalists.⁴ Balswick's study of political attitudes among the clergy showed a significant difference in dispositions toward civil liberties between theological liberals and fundamentalists, with 60% of the fundamentalists and none of the liberals believing that all Communists in America should be put in jail.

Glock and Stark found that 57% of the Southern Baptists and 54% of the sect members in their sample believed that an atheist should not be allowed to teach in a public highschool, while only 33% of the

⁴Balswick, op. cit.; Glock and Stark, op. cit.; Rokeach, op. cit.; Stark et al, op. cit.

Congregationalists and Methodists believed this. Further, they found that while fewer than one Congregationalist in five would prevent an atheist from teaching in a private university, almost half the sect members would deny the unbeliever this right.⁵

Rokeach discussed findings which show the religiously devout to be "more bigoted, more authoritarian, more dogmatic and more anti-humanitarian than the less devout."⁶ Rokeach did not find himself in agreement with Allport and Ross that although churchgoers in general are more bigoted than nonchurchgoers, those who attend church occasionally are the most bigoted of all. In Rokeach's sample, frequency of church attendance made virtually no difference; regular churchgoers were just as intolerant as those whose attendance was irregular. Using his Value Survey, Rokeach also found that the unbelievers, Jews and Episcopalians in his sample had somewhat different values than did the Baptists. This supports the theory that modernists and unbelievers have different attitudes than do fundamentalists.

Lenski stated that he found no interrelation between religious liberalism and political liberalism except for a modest relationship between religious liberalism and support for freedom of speech.⁷ The

⁵Glock and Stark, op. cit., Chapter 5. Included among their list of sects are: Assembly of God, Church of God, Church of Christ, Church of the Nazarene, Seventh Day Adventists, Four Square Gospel and an independent tabernacle. The authors applied the term sect to this group of religious bodies "in conformity with common sociological usage." (p. 5). Since the Church of Christ has trained clergy, formalized services, and formal organization, they probably should not be considered a sect by Glock and Stark's criteria.

⁶Rokeach, "Faith, Hope and Bigotry," op. cit.

⁷Lenski, op. cit., p. 211.

findings of the current study are that a highly significant relationship exists with regard to civil liberties in general. The fundamentalists were less favorable toward civil liberties than were the modernists and unbelievers.

The method for categorizing respondents as favorable, ambivalent or unfavorable toward civil liberties utilized nine statements involving such concepts as freedom of speech and assembly, censorship of books and films, rights of the accused, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, private sex-related behavior, and women's rights in relation to abortion. (The statements and their origins are listed in Chapter Three.) Students were asked to respond to the statements with one of the following answers: (1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Not sure or neutral, (4) Agree, (5) Strongly agree. The range of means is the same as has been used throughout this study:

1.00-2.75, Favorable toward civil liberties

2.76-3.25, Ambivalent toward civil liberties

3.26-5.00, Unfavorable toward civil liberties

Sixty-two percent of the fundamentalists had favorable attitudes, but 97% of the modernists and 93% of the unbelievers were favorable. And although the fundamentalists were 26% ambivalent and 12% unfavorable, 3% of the modernists and 7% of the unbelievers, respectively, were ambivalent; none were among the unfavorable attitude group.

When social class was held constant, the results were quite similar. Although upper middle class fundamentalists tested more civil libertarian than lower middle and working class fundamentalists, they

Table VI - 5

Religious Belief and Civil Liberties

Attitude Toward Civil Liberties	Funda- mentalist	Modern- ist	Un- believer	All Respondents
Favorable	62%	97%	93%	68%
Ambivalent	26	3	7	22
Unfavorable	12	0	0	10
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

$p < .001$

were still less so than all modernists and unbelievers. While 77% of the upper middle class fundamentalists were favorable toward civil liberties, no class of modernists or unbelievers had less than 90% favorable and two classes had 100% favorable (excluding the upper middle class modernist category which had only two respondents). In this case it appears that religious belief is perhaps a more important factor than social class as an influence on civil liberties attitudes.

The relationship between religious belief and attitude toward civil liberties was also explored through use of the question from Lenski concerning whether respondents preferred a candidate whose campaign was based on God and the American way of life, or an a discussion of political and economic issues. As mentioned earlier, this question seemed to delineate the "hard core" of the fundamentalists. Whereas 62% of all fundamentalists exhibited a favorable attitude toward civil

Table VI - 6

Civil Liberties Attitude as a Function of
Social Class and Religion Belief

Civil Liberties Attitude	<u>Social Class</u>		
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working
<u>Fundamentalists</u>			
Favorable	77%	67%	58%
Ambivalent	15	23	28
Unfavorable	8	10	14
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(13)	(139)	(215)
<u>Modernists</u>			
Favorable	100%	91%	100%
Ambivalent	0	9	0
Unfavorable	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(2)	(11)	(21)
<u>Unbelievers</u>			
Favorable	100%	90%	95%
Ambivalent	0	10	5
Unfavorable	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(6)	(18)	(19)

liberties, only 49% of the "hard core" group did so.⁸ And while the latter group had 20% with unfavorable attitudes, the entire fundamentalist group had 12% unfavorable. In ambivalence the groups were similar with 31% and 26%, the higher percentage belonging to the "hard core."

⁸Recall that the "hard core" group includes three modernists and two unbelievers, in addition to 211 fundamentalists.

Comparing the "hard core" with the group preferring a candidate basing his campaign on issues, we note that only 2% of the latter group presented an unfavorable civil liberties attitude, while in the former 20% displayed this attitude. Additionally, while close to nine in ten of the issue-oriented cluster exhibited favorable attitudes, just under half of the God-and-American-way oriented group did so.

Also in the realm of civil liberties are attitudes toward protest demonstrations. Peaceful demonstrations are, of course, a medium of expression and thus protected by the First Amendment. Unfortunately, from the civil libertarian viewpoint, a majority of the American public disapproves of any sort of demonstrations, even peaceful ones.

Table VI - 7

Preference for Campaign based on God or Issues
and Civil Liberties Attitude

Attitude Toward Civil Liberties	Campaign Based on:	
	God and the American way	Political and Economic Issues
Favorable	49%	86%
Ambivalent	31	12
Unfavorable	20	2
Total	100	100
(N)	(216)	(228)
p < .01		

Converse and his associates found that in their national sample taken in 1968, only 20% approved of "taking part in protest meetings or

marches that are permitted by the local authorities."⁹ Further, this same study found that almost 40% of those who took a "dove" stand on the Vietnam war believed that the Chicago police had not used enough force in quelling the demonstrations at the 1968 Democratic convention; better than two-thirds rejected the idea that too much force had been used.

Two questions relating to demonstrations were used. The first of these was:

If a friend of yours informed you that he was going to take part in a non-violent demonstration to protest something he considered to be wrong, would you:

1. Strongly approve
2. Approve
3. Be unsure or neutral
4. Disapprove
5. Strongly disapprove

Fifty-four percent of the total sample approved of friends taking part in such a demonstration, 17% disapproved and 28% were unsure. Fundamentalists attitudes on this question differed noticeably from those of other students. No modernist or unbeliever disapproved of non-violent demonstrations, but one in five fundamentalists registered disapproval. And although nearly two-thirds of the modernists and 86% of the unbelievers gave approval to such demonstrations, only half the fundamentalists did so.

Holding social class constant produced comparable results. Although better than two-thirds of the upper middle class fundamentalists

⁹Philip Converse et al, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political Science Review, 63 (December 1969), 1083-1105.

Table VI - 8

Attitude Toward Non-violent Demonstrations
and Religious Belief

Attitude toward friend being involved in a non-violent demonstration	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>			
	Fundamen- talist	Modern- ist	Un- believer	All Respondents
Strongly approve	14%	18%	35%	16%
Approve	36	47	51	38
Unsure	29	35	14	28
Disapprove	16	0	0	13
Strongly disapprove	5	0	0	4
Total*	100	100	100	99
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

p < .01

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

approved of taking part in non-violent demonstrations, only about half of the lower middle and working class fundamentalists approved. This decline in approval concomitant with descent in social class also occurred among modernists, but did not hold true with respect to unbelievers. In fact, working class unbelievers approved of such demonstrations by a margin of 95% as compared with 83% of the upper middle class unbelievers. (No inference was made concerning the upper middle class modernists because of the small number of respondents.)

The other question concerning demonstrations was:

Please indicate with a check mark the statement or statements which are acceptable to you:

1. Violent demonstrations are acceptable in many situations.
2. Violent demonstrations are acceptable in some situations.
3. Non-violent demonstrations are acceptable in most situations.
4. Non-violent demonstrations are acceptable in some situations.
5. No demonstrations are acceptable to me; not even non-violent ones.

Better than half the respondents took a cautious pose with respect to demonstrations. Sixteen percent stated that no type was acceptable to them and 40% thought non-violent types to be acceptable

Table VI - 9

Attitude Toward Non-Violent Demonstrations as a
Function of Social Class and Religious Belief

Attitude Toward Demonstrations	<u>Social Class</u>		
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working
<u>Fundamentalist</u>			
Approve	69%	52%	47%
Disapprove	23	26	31
Not sure	8	22	22
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(13)	(139)	(215)
<u>Modernist</u>			
Approve	50%	82%	57%
Disapprove	50	18	43
Not sure	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(2)	(11)	(21)
<u>Unbeliever</u>			
Approve	83%	78%	95%
Disapprove	17	22	5
Not sure	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(6)	(18)	(19)

in some situations. The largest gap between the modernists and fundamentalists occurred on the issue of not accepting any demonstration. One fundamentalist in five opposed all types, while no modernist answered in this way. Interestingly, 6% of the unbelievers opposed all demonstrations.

Table VI - 10

Demonstration Acceptance and Religious Belief

Demonstration Acceptance	Fundamentalist	Religious Belief Category		
		Modernist	Unbeliever	All Respondents
None are acceptable	19%	0%	6%	16%
Non-violent acceptable in some situations	43	38	23	40
Non-violent acceptable in most situations	34	59	59	38
Violent acceptable in some situations	4	0	9	4
Violent acceptable in many situations	1	3	2	1
Total	100	100	99	99
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

$p < .01$

Dividing the sample through the use of Lenski's question concerning preference for a candidate who bases his campaign on God and the American way or on political and economic issues found the "hard core" of fundamentalists less favorably disposed toward demonstrations than the remainder of the sample. The largest attitude gaps occurred on the

statements "no demonstrations are acceptable," and "non-violent demonstrations are acceptable in most situations." Almost one-fourth of the "hard core" as compared with one-tenth of the issue-oriented group asserted that no demonstrations were acceptable to them. And although close to half of the issue-oriented respondents answered that non-violent demonstrations were acceptable in most situations, less than one-third of the hard core answered this way. There was virtually no difference in the attitude of the two groups with respect to the acceptance of violent protests. (Of course, there is no civil liberties question involved where violent demonstrations are concerned. The U.S. Constitution makes no provision for such protests, and it is generally accepted that he who employs violence should expect it in return.)

In contrast to these results, a mid-1970 poll of 7300 students, taken by Playboy magazine on nearly 200 campuses, found 14% believing "violence is the only way to make the establishment respond," and another 33% believing violence "justified only when provoked by authorities."¹⁰ Thus, 47% of a national college sample considered violent means legitimate under certain conditions. Only 5% of the Oklahoma students took such a position.

It may be seen, then, that the findings of this study strongly support the idea that religious fundamentalists tend to be anti-civil-

¹⁰Playboy, (September, 1970). A previous poll of 1542 college seniors taken in the spring of 1970 by the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at Berkeley found that 19% believed disruptive tactics and destruction of property are often necessary to change the status quo. Another 9% believed that physical confrontation and violence must be used at times. Fifty-two percent stated that non-violent mass protests are the only feasible way to bring change. Only 1% believed in no type of demonstration.

libertarian in comparison with modernists and unbelievers, though in this sample only 12% fell into the unfavorable category (see Table VI-5). Such findings conflict with Lenski's view that there is little, if any, correlation between religious liberalism and political liberalism in this regard. Of course, Lenski's findings applied to a Detroit cross-section in the late fifties, while the present findings apply to central Oklahoma college students in the early seventies.

Table VI - 11

Preference for Campaign Based on God or Issues,
and Acceptance of Demonstrations

Demonstration Acceptance	<u>Campaign Based on:</u>	
	God and the American way	Political and Economic Issues
None are acceptable	23%	10%
Non-violent acceptable in some situations	41	40
Non-violent acceptable in most situations	31	46
Violent acceptable in some situations	4	4
Violent acceptable in many situations	1	0
Total	100	100
(N)	(216)	(228)

$p < .01$

What explanation may be offered for fundamentalist views regarding civil liberties? A plausible interpretation is that persons who view religion in terms of right versus wrong with not much middle ground (or perhaps as Christ versus anti-Christ) are more likely to apply

similar thought patterns to other realms, i.e., the political. Such people feel they know what is right and judge accordingly. There is not much sympathy for the rights of those who deviate. Dissenters are evil and deserving of few, if any, rights. Women wanting abortions, to their way of thinking, should not indulge in sexual relations in the first place. Or, as one male fundamentalist put it, "If they don't want to get pregnant, they shouldn't be screwin'." In short, fundamentalists seem far more likely to believe that if a person does not conform within certain narrow limits of tolerable behavior, he deserves any unpleasant consequences he may suffer. (If someone is indulging in "immoral" behavior such as showing a sex movie in his own home and his constitutional rights are violated, so what?) Rights, to an alarming percentage of fundamentalists, are for those who "do right." As one female fundamentalist who strongly favored the death penalty put it: "Live right or don't live at all." Whether such thinking is carried over into the area of racial attitudes will be examined in the following section.

Racial Attitudes

The aforementioned poll by Playboy magazine (September, 1970) found the issue of racial conflict tied for second place along with the environmental issue in the minds of college students. (The war in Indochina headed the list.) Despite such student concern, many Americans, collegians included, are either indifferent to racial problems or express outright hostility to aspirations for equality by blacks and other minorities.

Studies by Stark and others have revealed that, unfortunately, the major portion of this indifference and hostility comes from the devoutly religious. In this regard Stark stated:

Recent studies by Milton Rokeach...strongly confirmed and extended our earlier findings that belief in Christian teachings is often incompatible with concern for Christian ethics. Many clergymen say in despair that their sermons seem to fall on deaf ears; that people are able to compartmentalize their lives so that prejudice, hatred, and selfishness remain unaffected by messages from the pulpit.¹¹

But messages from the pulpit are by no means necessarily balanced in favor of racial equality. Balswick's study of clergymen found that of those who held a conservative theological position, almost three-quarters were unfavorable toward civil rights, while only one-fifth of the theologically liberal had unfavorable attitudes. In addition, Stark and others found that fewer than one Southern Baptist or Missouri Synod Lutheran in ten had preached on a controversial subject five times in one year. The average among Protestant clergymen was three such sermons per year.¹²

Brannon has mentioned that attitude surveys have consistently shown churchgoers to be significantly more racially prejudiced than non-churchgoers. "This is true even among people of the same age, educational level and geographic region," according to Brannon, who

¹¹Stark et al, op. cit.

¹²Balswick, op. cit.; "Sermons Shun Controversy," Oklahoma Journal (May 25, 1971. This article summarized some of the findings of Stark et al in their new book, Wayward Shepherds: Prejudice and the Protestant Clergy, published by Harper and Row. The book itself was not available at the time of this writing.

also has stated:

The finding that church members are more prejudiced than other people is not without irony in view of the teachings of Jesus Christ about the brotherhood of man. Some critics of religion have gone so far as to charge that racial and ethnic intolerance is a natural extension of religious precepts. They cite the bias in such ideas as God's chosen people, infidel heresy, unsaved souls and Gott mit uns.¹³

Glock and Stark's San Francisco Bay Area study found that such fundamentalists as Southern Baptists, Missouri Synod Lutherans and sect members held more stereotyped and bigoted attitudes toward Negroes than did such modernists as Congregationalists, Episcopalians and Methodists, and were therefore more likely to favor racial segregation. Whereas fewer than one-fourth of the respondents who belonged to these three modernist groups felt it would be better if blacks and whites attended separate churches, over half of the sect members and two-thirds of the Southern Baptists believed in Sunday segregation. And while only 13% of the Methodists believed in segregation of schools, 46% of the Southern Baptists favored this measure. As to the Communists-in-the-civil-rights-movement bogey, seventy percent of the Southern Baptists and 61% of the sect members agreed that "The races would get along fine in this country if Communists and other radicals didn't stir up trouble." Comparatively, one-third of the Congregationalists, 36% of the Methodists and 45% of the Episcopalians believed this statement to be accurate.¹⁴

¹³Brannon, op. cit.

¹⁴Glock and Stark, op. cit., Chapter 10.

Racial attitudes of students in the three religious belief categories were obtained by utilizing four questions involving the following: the integration of schools and neighborhoods, dining with a person of another race and intermarriage (see Chapter Three).

Table VI - 12

Racial Attitude and Religious Belief

Racial Attitude	Fundamentalist	Religious Belief Category			All Respondents
		Modernist	Unbeliever		
Integrationist	57%	76%	75%		61%
Ambivalent	23	12	13		21
Segregationist	20	12	12		18
Total	100	100	100		100
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)		(444)

Chi square non-significant at .05 level.

The fundamentalists registered a higher percentage of segregationists (or racists) and a lower percentage of integrationists than the other two categories (which were essentially the same). Fifty-seven percent of the fundamentalists were integrationists, while three-quarters of the modernists and unbelievers held pro-integration attitudes. Twenty percent of the fundamentalists were segregationists and 23% were ambivalent, while among the modernists and unbelievers the segregationist and ambivalent respondents were just over one in ten.

Of special interest are the results obtained after the non-caucasians had been eliminated from the sample. Although very small percentage changes were noted in the fundamentalist and unbeliever

categories, the modernist pro-integration percentage rose from 76% to 84%, the ambivalent percentage dropped from twelve to six, and the segregationist from twelve to ten. The strong indication in this instance is that a number of the non-caucasians in this sample were modernists who held ambivalent racial attitudes.

Table VI - 13

Racial Attitude and Religious Belief (Caucasians only)

Racial Attitude	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>		
	Fundamentalist	Modernist	Unbeliever
Integrationist	57%	84%	74%
Ambivalent	22	6	13
Segregationist	21	10	13
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(345)	(31)	(39)

$p < .01$

Although not as strong as expected, a relationship exists between fundamentalism and segregationist attitudes. Why such a relationship is not so strong as that found by Balswick or Glock and Stark could possibly be related to the general integrationist attitude which prevails to some extent at Oklahoma Christian College. This school has had many black athletes, one of whom (Jeff Bennett) was among the top five decathlon men in the United States during the late sixties. He almost single-handedly put Oklahoma Christian "on the map." The data presented on the three colleges (Chapter Nine) supports this contention, as OCC tested considerably less "racist" than Bethany Nazarene.

While the fundamentalists exhibited more of a proclivity toward racism than the modernists or unbelievers, the "hard core" group exhibited still stronger tendencies in that direction. Those favoring a campaign based on God and the American way registered about one-half integrationists, one-fourth ambivalent and one-fourth segregationists. Those favoring a campaign based on a discussion of issues were almost three-quarters integrationists, 15% ambivalent and 14% segregationists.

Table VI - 14

Preference for Campaign Based on God or Issues,
and Racial Attitude

Racial Attitude	Campaign Based on:	
	God and the American way	Political and Economic Issues
Integrationist	51%	71%
Ambivalent	26	15
Segregationist	23	14
Total	100	100
(N)	(216)	(228)

$p < .01$

Holding social class constant produced results which were not so clear cut as those related to civil liberties. For instance, the categories containing the highest percentage of segregationists were upper middle class and lower middle class fundamentalists and lower middle class unbelievers. The highest percentage of integrationists occurred among working class unbelievers, working class modernists and lower middle class modernists in that order. The only group which contained

no segregationists was the upper middle class unbelievers, which, oddly, was 50% ambivalent.

Table VI - 15

Racial Attitude as a Function of Social Class
and Religious Belief

Racial Attitude	Upper Middle	<u>Social Class</u>	
		Lower Middle	Working
		<u>Fundamentalists</u>	
Integrationist	77%	58%	56%
Ambivalent	0	20	26
Segregationist	23	22	18
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(13)	(139)	(215)
		<u>Modernists</u>	
Integrationist	50%	82%	86%
Ambivalent	0	9	4
Segregationist	50	9	10
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(2)	(11)	(21)
		<u>Unbelievers</u>	
Integrationist	50%	67%	90%
Ambivalent	50	11	5
Segregationist	0	22	5
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(6)	(18)	(19)

Although fundamentalists seem more likely to hold views which might be described as racist, the "hard core" (preferring a campaign based on God and the American way) who seem to want all beliefs and actions related to their particular concept of a supreme being appear to have an even higher percentage of racists.¹⁵

¹⁵Some persons object to the term "racist" and maintain that the term "segregationist" is a more accurate description of their positions. This appears to be an exercise in semantic hair-splitting. Racism might be defined as the belief that there is an inherent difference

It seems fair to say that in this study just over one in ten unbelievers and one in ten modernists could be considered a racist, while two in ten fundamentalists and almost one-fourth of the "hard core" exhibit such tendencies. An explanation for fundamentalist attitudes in this regard might be found in a statement by Rodney Stark:

If a man believes that everyone controls his own destiny, he is likely to be intolerant of the weaknesses of others and to blame the disadvantaged for their own misery. The result is resistance to the civil rights movement and to large scale attempts to improve the lot of minority groups.¹⁶

And Milton Rokeach has added:

...it seems more accurate to say that it is a lack of compassion rather than political conservatism that would prompt a person to believe that blacks are basically less intelligent than whites, or that blacks have failed to achieve equality because they lack initiative, or that the poor remain poor because they are lazy.

The general picture that emerges...is that those who place a high value on salvation are...anxious to maintain the status quo and are unsympathetic to the black and the poor.¹⁷

among the races that cannot be accounted for by environment, coupled with the idea that one race is superior. If this definition is accepted, it seems likely that 99% of those who call themselves segregationists are racists and therefore the terms may be used interchangeably.

¹⁶Playboy, (June, 1968), p. 47. A more recent article by Melvin J. Lerner in Psychology Today (June, 1971) lends support to Stark's statement. The article, "All the World Loathes a Loser," discusses findings which strongly indicate that Americans tend to condemn those they feel they cannot help, on the ground that such people must deserve what they are receiving. "A religious person may view suffering as a test of faith in the will of God or as a clear sign that the victim is being punished for some sin. It doesn't matter whether the suffering is seen as a hidden blessing or as punishment; the sufferer will be rewarded later, or else he deserves to suffer."

¹⁷ Rokeach, "Faith, Hope and Bigotry," op. cit.

All points considered, this sample of the collegiate silent majority should not be described as primarily racist since only 18% are out-and-out segregationists and 61% definitely seem to favor integration. These findings no doubt contrast with the attitudes of the student's parents, the overwhelming majority of whom must have attended segregated schools, did not go to college, and had little social interaction with Negroes. What interaction most had was when blacks worked for them as domestics or yard keepers. Their offspring, having known blacks on a different basis -- classrooms, athletic fields, gymnasiums, etc. -- exhibit different attitudes from their parents.

This chapter has focused on the effects of religious belief on civil liberties and racial attitudes. Highly significant differences existed among the three belief categories' -- fundamentalist, modernist and unbeliever -- attitudes toward civil liberties with the fundamentalists being considerably less civil libertarian than the other two groups. Still, six fundamentalists in ten held favorable attitudes in this area. Even when social class was held constant, the fundamentalists tested as clearly less civil libertarian.

On racial questions the three religious belief categories showed smaller differences with three-quarters of the modernists and unbelievers and 57% of the fundamentalists taking an integrationist position. The fundamentalists also had about twice the number of ambivalent respondents and close to twice the number of segregationists as the other two groups. Most racist in outlook was the "hard core" category with about one-half integrationists, one-fourth ambivalent and one-fourth segregationists.

In sum, nearly seven in ten of this collegiate silent majority sample were favorable toward civil liberties and six in ten were integrationists.

CHAPTER VII

RELIGION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: AUTHORITARIANISM AND DOMESTIC COMMUNISM

The concept of authoritarianism involves rigidity in thinking, strong tendencies toward conformity, adherence to conventional values, high ethnocentrism and anti-democratic attitudes. Those individuals who cleave to religious fundamentalism, which evidently involves rigidity and conventional values, would seem on the face of it more likely to be high in authoritarianism than would modernists or unbelievers.

The findings of Glock and Stark and Rokeach appear to support this contention.¹ The sociologists, Glock and Stark, found that members of fundamentalist churches, such as Southern Baptist, Church of Christ and Nazarene, were more likely to have anti-democratic and anti-Semitic attitudes than members of such modernist churches as Congregational, Episcopal, Methodist and Presbyterian. The psychologist, Rokeach, found that Baptists ranked being "broadminded" lower as a value than did unbelievers and adherents of modernist groups.

The foregoing findings, then, suggest not only that fundamentalists would more likely be high in authoritarianism, but also that the

¹ Charles Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Milton Rokeach, "Faith, Hope and Bigotry," Psychology Today (April, 1970).

"hard core" group in the present study would be the most authoritarian of any category. Indirectly suggested also is a relationship between frequency of church attendance and authoritarianism. Fundamentalists attend more often than others, therefore, such an attendance-authoritarian relationship is suggested.

The Oklahoma collegiate silent majority claimed to attend church with great regularity. More than three-quarters of the sample stated that they attend at least two to three times per month and about two-thirds stated that they attend at least once a week. Only 6% said they attend "seldom" and another 6% affirmed that they had not been to church in the last year.

When the sample was divided into the three levels of authoritarianism, distinct differences in church attendance patterns became evident. The high authoritarians claimed to attend church considerably more frequently than the ambivalent group which in turn claimed to attend with only slightly more regularity than the low authoritarians. Fully 81% of the high authoritarians stated that they attend at least once a week, while 54% of the low authoritarians affirmed attendance at this same frequency. Conversely, while 7% of the low authoritarians attend seldom and 12% had not been to church in the last year, comparable figures for the high authoritarian groups were 4% "seldom" and 1% "not in the last year." The ambivalent group fell between the other two with 58% attending at least once a week and 6% not having been to religious services in the last year.

A similar pattern emerged among the three religious belief categories. Seven in ten unbelievers were low authoritarians and fewer than two in ten were high. The fundamentalists by contrast

Frequency of Church Attendance and Authoritarianism

Level of Authori- tarianism	<u>Church Attendance</u>					Total	(N)
	At least once a week	Two or three times a week	Occa- sionally	Seldom	Not in the last year		
Low	54%	12%	15%	7%	12%	100%	(153)
Ambivalent	58	15	14	7	6	100	(127) $\frac{8}{8}$
High	81	7	7	4	1	100	(164)

$p < .001$

had only three in ten low and better than four in ten high. The modernists, interestingly, had 41% low, 50% ambivalent and only 9% high authoritarians.

Table VII - 2

Religious Belief and Authoritarianism

Level of Authori- tarianism	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>			All Respond- ents
	Funda- mentalist	Modernist	Unbeliever	
Low	30%	41%	70%	34%
Ambivalent	28	50	14	29
High	42	9	16	37
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

$p < .001$

To check the speculation that the hard core group would have the greatest portion of authoritarians, the "God or Issues" question of Lenski was utilized. As suspected, those who preferred a campaign based on God and the American way of life proved higher in authoritarianism than any other category. Only 22% of this group tested low and 50% high as compared with 47% low and 24% high for the issue oriented group. Of course the additional fundamentalists joining the modernists and unbelievers in the issue-oriented group raised the percentage of high authoritarians in that category.

When social class was held constant, the results did not change significantly. Upper middle class fundamentalists not only tested more authoritarian than modernists and unbelievers of the same class, but

Table VII - 3

Preference for Campaign Based on God or Issues,
and Authoritarianism

Level of Authori- tarianism	<u>Campaign Based on:</u>	
	God and the American way	Political and Economic Issues
Low	22%	47%
Ambivalent	28	29
High	50	24
Total	100	100
(N)	(216)	(228)

$p < .01$

also more so than modernists and unbelievers of lower middle and working class origin. For example, only 31% of the upper middle class fundamentalists were low authoritarians, while among the unbelievers 83% of the upper middle, 72% of the lower middle and 63% of the working class tested low. And while 23% of the upper middle class fundamentalists were high in authoritarianism, only 5% of the working class modernists and none of the upper middle class unbelievers had this characteristic. True to the previous pattern, the upper middle class fundamentalists proved less authoritarian than other fundamentalists. (As previously mentioned, upper middle class modernists have not been discussed due to the insignificant number of respondents in that category.)

Authoritarian attitudes are strongly associated with religious fundamentalism among the collegiate silent majority. Even upper middle

Table VII - 4

Authoritarianism as a Function of
Social Class and Religious Belief

Level of Authori- tarianism	<u>Social Class</u>		
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working
<u>Fundamentalists</u>			
Low	31%	36%	26%
Ambivalent	46	31	26
High	23	33	48
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(13)	(139)	(215)
<u>Modernists</u>			
Low	50%	55%	33%
Ambivalent	50	27	62
High	0	18	5
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(2)	(11)	(21)
<u>Unbelievers</u>			
Low	83%	72%	63%
Ambivalent	17	11	16
High	0	17	21
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(6)	(18)	(19)

class fundamentalists tested more authoritarian than lower middle or working class modernists or unbelievers. We now turn from authoritarianism to the relationship between religious belief and attitude toward the importance of combatting domestic Communism.

Attitude Toward Domestic Communism

The attitude of the general American public and especially the silent majority with regard to domestic Communism has been mentioned in Chapter Four, where it was noted that the lower middle and working classes seem especially concerned by the threat of Communism within

the United States. It might be expected that religious fundamentalists would be most concerned with domestic Communism and that perhaps they would tend to view the challenge of that ideological movement in highly emotional terms -- such as Christ versus anti-Christ. This expectation was tested through the use of the previously used statement concerning the seriousness of the task of combatting Communism in America today.

As expected, the fundamentalists were considerably more concerned about internal Communism than were the other two groups. One in five strongly agreed and one in four agreed that combatting Communism is the most serious domestic task facing our nation today. By comparison, less than one modernist or unbeliever in ten strongly agreed and only slightly more than one believer in ten even agreed. Further, while only one-eighth of the fundamentalists strongly disagreed, one-fourth of the modernists and one-third of the unbelievers took this position. When the "Strongly agrees" and "Agrees" were combined and the same was done with the total "Disagrees" it was noted that three-quarters of the unbelievers disagreed that internal Communism is our most serious problem, but less than half of the fundamentalists disagreed. The modernists were much like the unbelievers with 70% disagreeing. And while only one modernist or unbeliever in five agreed with this statement, better than two fundamentalists in five agreed.

Interestingly, the agree and disagree responses of the fundamentalists matched those of the working class almost exactly, while those of the unbelievers had a striking similarity to those of the upper middle class. The modernists, however, saw domestic Communism as a less serious problem than did the lower middle class.

Table VII - 5

Religious Belief and Attitude Toward Domestic Communism

Combatting Communism is the most serious domestic task facing our country today.	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>			All Respond- ents
	Funda- mental- ist	Modern- ist	Un- believer	
Strongly disagree	13%	26%	33%	16%
Disagree	34	44	42	36
Not sure	9	9	7	9
Agree	24	17	12	22
Strongly agree	19	3	7	17
Total*	99	99	101	100
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

p < .01

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Table VII - 6

Religious Belief and Attitude Toward Domestic Communism

Combatting Communism is the most serious domestic task facing our country today.	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>			All Respond- ents
	Funda- mental- ist	Modern- ist	Un- believer	
Disagree	47%	70%	75%	52%
Not sure	9	9	7	9
Agree	43	20	19	39
Total*	99	99	101	100
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

p < .01

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Table VII - 7

Attitude Toward Domestic Communism,
Religious Belief and Social Class

<u>Combatting Communism is the most serious domestic task facing our country today.</u>					
Religious Belief Category and Social Class	Disagree	Not sure	Agree	Total*	(N)
Fundamentalist	47%	9%	43%	99%	(367)
Working Class	47	10	43	100	(255)
Modernist	70	9	20	99	(34)
Lower Middle Class	58	5	37	100	(168)
Unbelievers	75	7	19	101	(43)
Upper Middle Class	71	10	19	100	(21)

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

When social class was held constant and the religious belief categories were examined for attitudes toward domestic Communism, a definite pattern was evident. Within each category the upper middle class students were the least concerned about Reds in America and the working class respondents were the most concerned. There was virtually no difference in the attitudes of upper middle class fundamentalists and working class modernists. In both groups about three in ten agreed with the statement and about six in ten disagreed. The working class unbelievers were somewhat less concerned with nearly seven in ten disagreeing and about two in ten agreeing. The largest contrast was between the working class fundamentalists and the upper middle class unbelievers. Close to half of the former group agreed with the statement while in the latter group no one did so. (As previously noted,

Table VII - 8

Attitude Toward Domestic Communism as a Function
of Social Class and Religious Belief

Combatting Communism is the most serious domestic task facing our country today.	<u>Social Class</u>		
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working
		<u>Fundamentalists</u>	
Disagree	61%	53%	43%
Not sure	8	6	11
Agree	31	41	46
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(13)	(139)	(215)
		<u>Modernists</u>	
Disagree	100%	82%	61%
Not sure	0	9	10
Agree	0	9	29
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(2)	(11)	(21)
		<u>Unbelievers</u>	
Disagree	83	78	68
Not sure	17	0	11
Agree	0	22	21
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(6)	(18)	(19)

the upper middle class modernist group was too small for conclusions to be drawn about it.)

This chapter has examined the association between religious belief and authoritarianism, and between religious belief and attitudes toward domestic Communism. The data show that religious fundamentalism and authoritarianism are strongly related among the collegiate silent majority. Only three fundamentalists in ten were low in authoritarianism compared with seven in ten unbelievers. At the same time, only 9% of the modernists and 16% of the unbelievers were high

in authoritarianism, compared with 42% of the fundamentalists. The "hard core" group was even more authoritarian with half in the high category and only one in five in the low. Holding social class constant produced similar results: the fundamentalists were still the most authoritarian group.

As might have been anticipated, given the data on civil liberties and authoritarianism, the fundamentalists were considerably more concerned with the threat of domestic Communism than were the modernists and unbelievers. Better than four in ten fundamentalists, as compared with two in ten of the other two belief categories, saw combatting Communism as the most serious domestic task facing America today.

CHAPTER VIII

RELIGION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: WELFARISM, POLITICAL INFORMATION AND THE INDOCHINA WAR

Lenski found no relationship between religious liberalism and political liberalism with respect to ideas about welfarism.¹ Conversely, Balswick found definite differences in attitudes toward welfarism among theologically liberal and theologically conservative clergymen. Although the theological liberals were more likely to favor a liberal welfare policy by 56% to 24%, this relationship was not as strong as that between theological liberalism and favorable attitudes toward civil liberties or civil rights. Balswick attributed this weaker relationship to the possibility that "more of the theologically conservative pastors...minister to lower class congregations, and thus may be in personal contact with some families who have benefited from welfare programs...(which) may cause a slight altering of their generally conservative political views."²

On Free and Cantril's Ideological Spectrum, a device which measures theoretical liberalism or conservatism in relation to welfarism, segments of the Oklahoma collegiate silent majority showed

¹Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, pp. 208-211.

²Jack Balswick, "Theology and Political Attitudes Among the Clergy," Sociological Quarterly, 11 (Summer 1970), 397-405.

definite differences in attitude. The greatest percentage of conservatives occurred among the fundamentalists with the modernists having the smallest percentage and the unbelievers falling between these two. The unbelievers had the greatest percentage of liberals with 37%, while the fundamentalists had the least with 15%.

Table VIII - 1

Theoretical Welfarism (Ideological Spectrum)
and Religious Belief

Theoretical Welfarism Position	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>			All Respond- ents
	Funda- mentalist	Modern- ist	Un- believer	
Liberal	15%	30%	37%	18%
Middle of the Road	38	38	23	37
Conserva- tive	47	32	40	45
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

$p < .01$

Clearly the religious "liberals" in this study were also the most liberal on theoretical economic matters. Such findings parallel those of Balwick and directly conflict with those of Lenski. When attitudes toward welfarism in practice were considered, however, a different pattern emerged. Utilization of Free and Cantril's Operational Spectrum, a device which measures actual policy beliefs in relation to welfarism, revealed no significant differences in attitudes among the three religious belief categories. All were quite liberal, with no group having

even one in ten in the conservative camp. The unbelievers came closest to consistency, being the only category with even half as many theoretical liberals as practical liberals. The modernists had less than two-fifths the number of theoreticals as practicals, and the fundamentalists only about one-fifth. Thus the unbeliever group, which, it should be remembered, averaged highest in social class, turned out to be the most internally consistent with regard to ideas about welfarism. The fact has been stressed (in Chapter Five) that 60% of the theoretical economic conservatives in this study were at the same time operational liberals.

Table VIII - 2

Practical Welfarism (Operational Spectrum)
and Religious Belief

Practical Welfarism Position	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>			
	Fundamen- talist	Modernist	Un- believer	All Respondents
Liberal	72%	82%	75%	73%
Middle of the Road	24	12	16	23
Conserva- tive	4	6	9	4
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

Chi square non-significant at .05 level.

Although the fundamentalists tested more conservative and therefore less liberal in the area of theoretical welfarism than the modernists and unbelievers, the hard core group proved to be the most

conservative of all. Only 10% were liberals, but 55% were conservatives on the Ideological Spectrum. Their counterpart, the issue-oriented group tested 26% liberal and 35% conservative. Once again, the hard core proved most conservative.

Table VIII - 3

Preference for Campaign Based on God or Issues, and
Theoretical Welfarism (Ideological Spectrum)

Theoretical Welfarism Position	<u>Campaign Based on:</u>	
	God and the American way	Political and Economic Issues
Liberal	10%	26%
Middle of the Road	35	39
Conservative	55	35
Total	100	100
(N)	(216)	(228)

p < .01

Even in the area of operational welfarism the hard core group was less liberal than any other, but not significantly so.

An examination of attitudes about welfarism and religious belief with social class held constant produced interesting results. With respect to theoretical welfarism no consistent pattern was evident. Upper middle class fundamentalists and working class modernists were the least conservative groups and also had the greatest percentages of middle of the roaders. Upper middle class unbelievers and working class fundamentalists were the most conservative with the former group

Table VIII - 4

Preference for Campaign Based on God or Issues and
Practical Welfarism (Operational Spectrum)

Practical Welfarism Position	<u>Campaign Based on:</u>	
	God and the American way.	Political and Economic Issues
Liberal	68%	78%
Middle of the Road	27	19
Conservative	5	3
Total	100	100
(N)	(216)	(228)

Chi square non-significant at .05 level.

having no middle of the roaders. The most liberal group was the working class unbelievers with 42% followed by upper middle and lower middle class unbelievers and working class modernists. Each of these three groups had 33% liberals.

Attitudes toward welfarism in practice were equally muddled. The most liberal group was the upper middle class unbelievers who were 100% in the liberal category. They were followed by the lower middle class and working class modernists and lower middle class unbelievers. The working class unbelievers, who were the most liberal group in respect to theoretical welfarism with 42%, were the least liberal with regard to practical welfarism with 63%. This factor, however, made them the most nearly consistent group. That is, the relationship between their attitudes toward theoretical and operational welfarism were closer than that of any other group.

Table VIII - 5

Theoretical Welfarism (Ideological Spectrum) as a
Function of Social Class and Religious Belief

Theoretical Welfarism Position	<u>Social Class</u>		
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working
		<u>Fundamentalists</u>	
Liberal	31%	14%	14%
Middle of the Road	46	40	36
Conservative	23	46	50
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(13)	(139)	(215)
		<u>Modernist</u>	
Liberal	0%	27%	33%
Middle of the Road	50	27	43
Conservative	50	46	24
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(2)	(11)	(21)
		<u>Unbelievers</u>	
Liberal	33%	33%	42%
Middle of the Road	0	33	21
Conservative	67	33	37
Total*	100	99	100
(N)	(6)	(18)	(19)

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

The results of this study conflict with those of Lenski and are closer to those of Balswick, i.e., a relationship between religious and political liberalism in the area of welfarism does appear to exist. It should be stressed, however, that this is on the issue of welfarism in theory. The present study found no statistically significant differences among religious belief categories on the issue of practical welfarism. As in Free and Cantril's national sample, a considerable percentage of the respondents were theoretical economic conservatives, but very few (one in twenty) were practical conservatives.

Table VIII - 6

Practical Welfarism (Operational Spectrum) as a
Function of Social Class and Religious Belief

Practical Welfarism Position	<u>Social Class</u>		
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working
		<u>Fundamentalists</u>	
Liberal	69%	70%	74%
Middle of the Road	23	27	22
Conservative	8	3	4
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(13)	(139)	(215)
		<u>Modernists</u>	
Liberal	100%	82%	81%
Middle of the Road	0	9	14
Conservative	0	9	5
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(2)	(11)	(21)
		<u>Unbelievers</u>	
Liberal	100%	78%	63%
Middle of the Road	0	11	26
Conservative	0	11	11
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(6)	(18)	(19)

Level of Political Information

As discussed in Chapter Five, ten questions dealing with subjects such as NATO, Mao Tse Tung, U Thant, filibuster, senators, Lenin and the first amendment were used to test the general political knowledge of the Oklahoma college students. Eight or more correct answers categorized a respondent as "informed," six or seven as "moderately informed," and five or less as "uninformed." The data have already shown that political information is significantly related to social class (See Chapter Five). It was also suspected that political information would be related

to religious belief. Since fundamentalists have been found more likely to be from the lower social strata, they might tend to have less political information. This proved to be the case with one-third of the fundamentalists being informed, about one-third being moderately informed and about one-third being uninformed. The modernists were slightly more knowledgeable with 35% informed and 24% uninformed. The unbelievers, however, tested 44% informed, 47% moderately informed and only 9% uninformed.

Table VIII - 7

Political Information and Religious Belief

Level of Political Information	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>			All Respond- ents
	Funda- mentalist	Modern- ist	Un- Believer	
Informed	33%	35%	44%	34%
Moderately Informed	35	41	47	37
Uninformed	32	24	9	29
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

$p < .05$

When social class was held constant it was found that upper middle class fundamentalists were the second most knowledgeable group with 61% in the informed category and 16% uninformed. Only the lower middle class unbelievers had more political information: sixty-one percent informed and none uninformed.

Among the fundamentalists and modernists, social class made a definite difference in the level of political information with a larger proportion of uninformed concomitant with a descent in class. This did not hold true, however, with the unbelievers. When the percentage of uninformed were considered by religious belief and social class, the results were:

<u>Category</u>	<u>%Uninformed</u>	<u>Total N</u>
Upper Middle Class Fundamentalists	16	13
Lower Middle Class Fundamentalists	27	139
Working Class Fundamentalists	36	215
Upper Middle Class Modernists	0	2
Lower Middle Class Modernists	9	11
Working Class Modernists	33	21
Upper Middle Class Unbelievers	17	6
Lower Middle Class Unbelievers	0	18
Working Class Unbelievers	16	19

The results of examining the effects of religious beliefs on political knowledge raised the question as to whether the better informed politically would more likely be civil libertarians and integrationists than the less informed. An analysis of the data answered this question in the affirmative in both cases.

Three-quarters of the informed were favorable toward civil liberties, while only 7% were unfavorable. The uninformed, on the other hand, were 58% favorable and 12% unfavorable, while the moderately informed fell between these two.

With respect to racial attitudes, the informed were better than two-thirds integrationists, while the uninformed had slightly over half in the integrationist category. The uninformed had a considerable percentage who were ambivalent, and there was no significant difference among the three groups with respect to the segregationist category.

Table VIII - 8

Political Information and Attitude
Toward Civil Liberties

Level of Political Information	<u>Attitude Toward Civil Liberties</u>				(N)
	Favorable	Ambivalent	Unfavorable	Total	
Informed	76%	17%	7%	100%	(151)
Moderately Informed	68	20	12	100	(163)
Uninformed	58	30	12	100	(130)

$p < .05$

Table VIII - 9

Political Information and Racial Attitude

Level of Political Information	<u>Racial Attitude</u>			Total*	(N)
	Integra- tionist	Ambiva- lent	Segrega- tionist		
Informed	68%	13%	19%	100%	(151)
Moderately Informed	61	23	17	101	(163)
Uninformed	53	28	19	100	(130)

$p < .05$

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Attitude Toward the Indochina War

For ten years now American men have been fighting in Indochina. United States battle deaths are nearing the fifty-five thousand mark and over three hundred thousand South Vietnamese have supposedly been

killed. It is not surprising that the previously mentioned mid-1970 Playboy poll found the war in Indochina to be uppermost in the minds of a sample of 7300 American college students.³ Thirty-nine percent picked this military action as the single most important issue, and 65% of the total sample said that the United States should at least speed up the rate of withdrawal. In fact, 36% stated that we should pull out now. Twenty-six percent favored the Nixon Administration's timetable and only 9% believed that we should fight for a total victory no matter what.

But while a clear majority of college students in 1970 were impatient about the war, this feeling did not hold true for those in their twenties who had previously attended college. Converse and Schuman found that such people were more likely than their elders of grade school education both to justify the Indochina conflict and to support the intensification of it. Many of the college educated in this group were people who had been out of school for several years, and people who had not graduated from college or had only attended junior college. Less than one-quarter of the sample ever had any contact with a school where a strong anti-war feeling prevailed. Converse and Schuman also noted that most sentiment against the war was of the "we have not won and have little prospect of doing so" variety.⁴ With these facts in mind we turn our attention to the Oklahoma collegiate


³Playboy (September, 1970). The September 1971 issue of Playboy carried the results of a similar poll which showed that pollution had become the most vital issue with the war in second place, closely followed by overpopulation.

⁴Philip Converse and Howard Schuman, "Silent Majorities and the Viet Nam War," Scientific American, 222 (June, 1970) 17-25.


silent majority, a group attending three colleges in the fall of 1970 where little anti-war feeling existed.

The attitude of the Oklahoma sample was gleaned by using a slightly modified question from Converse and Schuman's study:

There is much talk about "hawks" and "doves" in connection with Vietnam, and considerable disagreement as to what action the U.S. should take in Vietnam. Some people think we should do everything necessary to win a complete military victory, no matter what the results. Some think we should withdraw completely from Vietnam right now, no matter what the results. Other people have opinions somewhere between those two extreme positions. On the scale below please place an X above the number which you feel indicates your opinion regarding Vietnam.



The results looked like this:



On balance, the total sample leaned in a hawkish direction. Virtually half chose numbers 5, 6 or 7, while 34% chose 1, 2 or 3, and 18% placed themselves in the center at 4. The largest difference occurred at the extreme ends of the spectrum with 7% choosing 1 on the Immediate Withdrawal end and 16% preferring 7 on the Complete Military Victory end.

When the sample was broken down into religious belief categories, the picture was somewhat different with the fundamentalists most hawkish and the unbelievers least so.

Table VIII - 10

Attitude Toward Indochina War and Religious Belief.

Attitude Toward Indochina War	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>				All Respond- ents
		Fundamen- talist	Modern- ist	Un- believer	
Complete	7	17%	15%	5%	16%
Military	6	12	9	12	12
Victory	5	22	23	12	21
	4	19	20	12	18
	3	15	9	14	15
	2	9	21	30	12
	1	6	3	16	7
Total*		100	100	101	101
(N)		(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

p < .01

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

From the table above, categories were created by combining numbers 7 and 6 into "hawk," 5, 4 and 3 into "ambivalent," and 2 and 1 into "dove." The resulting picture was that 29% of the fundamentalists were hawks compared with 24% of the modernists and 17% of the unbelievers. And while only 15% of the fundamentalists were doves, 24% of the modernists and 46% of the unbelievers fell into this grouping. The unbelievers, almost half of whom could rightly be called doves, were the only category in which the ambivalent group did not constitute the majority of the sample.

Table VIII - 11

Attitude Toward Indochina War and Religious Belief

Attitude Toward Indochina War	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>		
	Fundamentalists	Modernists	Unbelievers
Hawk	29%	24%	17%
Ambivalent	56	52	37
Dove	15	24	46
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)

$p < .01$

Given the fact that fundamentalists from the collegiate silent majority were more hawkish and thus less dovish than were modernists or unbelievers, what of the hard core group? True to the previously established pattern, this category turned out to be the most hawkish of all, but only slightly more so than the total fundamentalist group. One third favored complete military victory and 13% preferred dovish positions. The hard core's counterpart, the issue-oriented group, was about one-fifth hawk and one-fourth dove. Interestingly, both groups were 54% ambivalent.

When religious belief and war attitude were examined with social class held constant, unexpected results emerged. The upper middle class fundamentalists, the most "liberal" fundamentalist category on most issues, proved to be the most hawkish group with 46% favoring a complete military victory and only 8% on the dovish end of the spectrum. There was virtually no difference in the attitudes of the

Table VIII - 12

Attitude Toward Indochina War and Preference
for Campaign Based on God or Issues

Attitude Toward Indochina War	Campaign Based on:		
		God and the American way	Political and Economic Issues
Complete	7	21%	11%
Military			
Victory	6	12	11
	5	23	19
	4	17	19
	3	14	16
	2	7	16
Immediate			
Withdrawal	1	6	8
Total		100	100
(N)		(216)	(228)

p < .01

Collapsing the table above:

Table VIII - 13

Attitude Toward Indochina War and Preference
for Campaign Based on God or Issues

Attitude Toward Indochina War	<u>Campaign Based on:</u>	
	God and the American way	Political and Economic Issues
Hawk	33%	22%
Ambivalent	54	54
Dove	13	24
Total	100	100
(N)	(216)	(228)

lower middle and working class fundamentalists; about three in ten were hawks and fewer than two in ten were doves.

With respect to the modernists and unbelievers, social class had no effect on the proportion of hawks, and there was no significant difference in the hawkishness of these two groups. The working class unbelievers had the lowest hawk percentage with 16%, while the working class modernists had the highest with 19%. Dove attitudes, however, were another matter and social class had some effect in this area. The most dovish group was the upper middle class unbelievers with two-thirds favoring immediate withdrawal, while the working class unbelievers had six out of ten in this same category. Lower middle class modernists were 46% dovish and lower middle class unbelievers 28%. The working class modernists, like working class fundamentalists, were only 14% dovish but had two-thirds in the ambivalent category.

Summarizing this chapter we find that a definite relationship between religious and political liberalism exists among the Oklahoma collegiate silent majority in the area of welfarism. This is contrary to Lenski's findings in a Detroit sample, but in accord with Balwick's data on clergymen.

This religious belief-welfarism belief relationship was found to exist only on the question of theoretical welfarism, the instrument for measurement being Free and Cantril's Ideological Spectrum. The results of using Free and Cantril's Operational Spectrum to measure attitudes about welfarism in practice produced no significant differences among religious belief categories or, for that matter, among

social classes. The Oklahoma college students, like Free and Cantril's 1964 national sample, were overwhelmingly liberals (73%) and middle of the roaders (23%) in practice.

Table VIII - 14

Attitude Toward Indochina War as a Function
of Social Class and Religious Belief

Attitude Toward Indochina War	<u>Social Class</u>		
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working
<u>Fundamentalists</u>			
Hawk	46%	27%	30%
Ambivalent	46	57	56
Dove	8	16	14
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(13)	(139)	(215)
<u>Modernists</u>			
Hawk	100%	18%	19%
Ambivalent	0	36	67
Dove	0	46	14
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(2)	(11)	(21)
<u>Unbelievers</u>			
Hawk	17%	17%	16%
Ambivalent	17	55	26
Dove	67	28	58
Total*	101	100	100
(N)	(6)	(18)	(19)

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Testing the level of political information of the sample found the students split into three groups of similar size. About one-third were informed, slightly more than one-third were moderately informed, and slightly less than a third were uninformed. The best informed were the unbelievers; the least informed were the fundamentalists. Additionally, it was found that those respondents who were lower in

political information were less likely to have favorable attitudes toward civil liberties and integration.

Exploring attitudes toward the war in Indochina found the majority of students tending to be on the hawkish side. The fundamentalists had the largest proportion of hawk respondents and the smallest proportion of doves. The unbelievers were the exact opposite with the modernists occupying a position in between, though closer to the fundamentalist group in attitudes than to the unbelievers. Thus, it might be surmised that a relationship exists between religious fundamentalism and a tendency to support American military actions, no matter what those actions might be.

CHAPTER IX

COMPARISON OF THE THREE COLLEGES

The three colleges where sampling was done are located in the Greater Oklahoma City Area which is in Central Oklahoma and has a population of about 650,000. The size of each school and general social background of the students have been previously discussed (see Chapter One). What has not been mentioned is that these schools are reputed to draw the great majority of their students from the middle third of graduating highschool classes. (Those in the upper third who attend college within the state generally go to the University of Oklahoma or Oklahoma State University.) It is important to remember that two of the three schools are affiliated with fundamentalist churches. With these facts in mind, we now turn to a comparison of the student populations of each of the colleges as revealed by the samples.

Using Hollingshead's "Two Factor Analysis of Social Position" (which utilizes the variables of education and occupation in determining a respondent's class), it was found that the Central State sample was 6% upper middle class, Bethany Nazarene 4%, and Oklahoma Christian 3%. The Central and Oklahoma Christian samples had about the same percentage of lower middle class respondents (42% and 40%) and a

comparable portion of working class respondents (52% and 57%). Bethany Nazarene, however, had a significantly larger segment of working class students with seven out of ten falling into that category.

Table IX - 1

Social Class and the Three Colleges

Social Class	Bethany Nazarene	Central State	College	All Respondents
			Oklahoma Christian	
Upper Middle	4%	6%	3%	5%
Lower Middle	27	42	40	38
Working	69	52	57	57
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(110)	(216)	(118)	(444)

Religious Belief

Given the affiliations of two of the colleges with fundamentalist churches, it was expected that they would show a high percentage of fundamentalist respondents. This was indeed the case. Students in the Oklahoma Christian College sample were 100% fundamentalists, while those in the Bethany Nazarene sample were 97% fundamentalists and 3% unbelievers. The Central State sample was definitely more heterogeneous in composition. Although two-thirds of the respondents from that school fell into the fundamentalist grouping, sixteen percent were modernists and 18% were unbelievers. This finding represents a rather high proportion of fundamentalists for a college class,

especially in light of some other limited but suggestive findings from other Oklahoma colleges and universities. At the University of Oklahoma one American Government class of 53 was found to have about 50% who rejected the idea of a personal God. Another survey at a private college in Oklahoma found a low percentage of fundamentalists and about one-fourth who considered themselves unbelievers. The explanation for this high proportion of fundamentalists at a secular college is probably the fact that better than nine in ten attending Central State are of lower middle or working class backgrounds. It is well established that persons from these classes are considerably more likely to have a fundamentalist religious outlook.

Table IX - 2

Religious Belief and the Three Colleges

Religious Belief Category	<u>College</u>			All Respond- ents
	Bethany Nazarene	Central State	Oklahoma Christian	
Fundamentalist	97%	66%	100%	82%
Modernist	0	16	0	8
Unbeliever	3	18	0	10
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(110)	(216)	(118)	(444)

It is not at all surprising that church affiliated colleges would have a larger percentage of fundamentalists than a secular college. With this in mind, and remembering the finding that fundamentalists are less favorable toward civil liberties, we turn to that subject.

Civil Liberties

Some orthodox ministers have maintained that all freedom comes from God and that the church is the bastion and defender of liberty. If such claims had any validity it would seem plausible to expect students who attend church-affiliated colleges -- especially those colleges affiliated with churches whose ministers make such claims -- to be in the forefront of those who strongly support individual rights as enumerated in the United States Constitution. Historically, "true believers" of all varieties have supported repression. It is of interest to examine the attitudes of modern day fundamentalists in this regard.

Today in America students at fundamentalist church colleges are not generally noted for their libertarian outlook, and those in the current study are no exception when comparison is made with respondents from the secular college. Just over half of the students from the church-affiliated colleges had favorable attitudes toward civil-liberties, but better than four in five of the Central State students were in this category. Conversely, while seventeen and nineteen percent of the Oklahoma Christian and Bethany Nazarene respondents, respectively, had unfavorable attitudes, only 2% of the Central State sample had such ideas about civil liberties.

These findings are consistent with what has been previously mentioned in this study, and were expected. Some rather unexpected findings occurred on the subject of racial attitudes, which is the next topic.

Table IX - 3

Civil Liberties Attitudes and the Three Colleges

Attitude Toward Civil Liberties	<u>Colleges</u>		
	Bethany Nazarene	Central State	Oklahoma Christian
Favorable	55%	82%	53%
Ambivalent	26	16	30
Unfavorable	19	2	17
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(110)	(216)	(118)

p < .01

Racial Attitudes

One might well expect the two church-related colleges to evidence similar racial attitudes. But they did not. One of them was not significantly different from the secular college. About two-thirds of the Central State and Oklahoma Christian respondents held integrationist views, while one-half of the Bethany Nazarene students were integrationists. As for segregationist attitudes, there was not a great deal of difference among the three schools but Central State had the smallest proportion in this category with 15%. Bethany Nazarene was 23% segregationist and Oklahoma Christian 21%.

A possible explanation for the high proportion of integrationists at Oklahoma Christian College has been suggested in Chapter Six. The school is not large and there is a feeling of belonging. There have

been a number of black athletes at the school, the most prominent of which was the aforementioned outstanding decathlon man, Jeff Bennet, who won national renown for the school. There are reports that a pro-integration attitude is pushed at the school, and the data seem to support this. These factors probably contribute to the reason that a relatively high percentage of Oklahoma Christian College students fell into the integrationist category. Such attitudes, however, are evidently not related to a lack of authoritarianism as we shall note in the next section.

Table IX - 4

Racial Attitude and the Three Colleges

Racial Attitude	Bethany Nazarene	<u>College</u> Central State	Oklahoma Christian
Integrationist	50%	64%	65%
Ambivalent	27	21	14
Segregationist	23	15	21
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(110)	(216)	(118)
p < .05			

Authoritarianism

The "liberal" racial attitudes of the students at Oklahoma Christian College apparently have not carried over into other areas. That authoritarian attitudes are prevalent among the religiously orthodox or fundamentalist has been discussed in Chapter Seven. Thus, it was

expected that the church-affiliated-college students would be validated as more authoritarian than those from the state college.

Table IX - 5

Authoritarianism and the Three Colleges

Level of Authoritarianism	Bethany Nazarene	<u>College</u> Central State	Oklahoma Christian
Low	22%	47%	19%
Ambivalent	22	32	24
High	46	21	58
Total*	100	100	101
(N)	(110)	(216)	(118)

$p < .01$

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Oklahoma Christian College was the most authoritarian of the three schools with nearly six in ten falling into the high authoritarian grouping. Bethany Nazarene had 46% and Central State 21% in the high category. While about one in five of the Bethany Nazarene and Oklahoma Christian students were low authoritarians, almost one-half of the Central State respondents tested low. These results are further evidence that religious fundamentalism and the authoritarian personality are positively related.

Attitude Toward Domestic Communism

As might be expected, the importance of combatting domestic Communism was more likely to be foremost in the minds of students attending the church-affiliated colleges. In light of what has been shown

Table IX - 6

Attitude Toward Domestic Communism
and the Three Colleges

Combatting Communism is the most serious domestic task facing our country today.	<u>College</u>		
	Bethany Nazarene	Central State	Oklahoma Christian
Strongly disagree	16%	20%	11%
Disagree	27	42	32
Not sure	6	9	11
Agree	26	19	25
Strongly agree	25	10	21
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(110)	(216)	(118)

$p < .01$

Collapsing the table above we see the following:

Table IX - 7

Attitude Toward Domestic Communism
and the Three Colleges

Combatting Communism is the most serious task facing our country today.	<u>College</u>		
	Bethany Nazarene	Central State	Oklahoma Christian
Disagree	43%	62%	43%
Not sure	6	9	11
Agree	51	29	46
Total	100	100	100
(N)	(110)	(216)	(118)

about the relationship of authoritarianism, anti-civil-libertarian views, and the like to fundamentalism, it is only natural to suppose that a substantial number of students at the church colleges would view domestic Communism as a great threat and thus among their top priorities. The secular college students, being less religiously orthodox, would appear more likely to feel either that home-grown Reds were not a particularly great threat or that the F.B.I. could handle the job without the aid of the average citizen.

The statement by which attitudes toward Communism in America were tested was: "Combatting Communism is the most serious domestic task facing our country today."

As for the responses, one Bethany Nazarene in four and better than one Oklahoma Christian student in five strongly agreed with this statement. Only one in ten of the Central State students did so. In the total "Agree" category (Agree and Strongly agree taken together) Bethany Nazarene had half, Oklahoma Christian 46% and Central State 29%. In the disagree category each of the two church colleges had 43%, while Central State had 62%. Clearly the secular students were less concerned with the "menace" of American Communism than were the church college students.

Level of Political Information

In Chapter Eight it was noted that religious fundamentalists scored lower on political information than did modernists or unbelievers. It was also noted that those who were lower in political information were more likely to have unfavorable attitudes toward civil liberties and more likely to hold views which might be termed

racist. Given this data it might be surmised that the colleges which were more fundamentalist and less favorable toward civil liberties would also be lowest on political information.

Since the Central State sample was the least fundamentalist, most civil libertarian, a little more favorable toward integration than Oklahoma Christian and considerably more so than Bethany Nazarene, students at this school might have been expected to have the highest level of political information. This, however, was not the case. Central State had the lowest proportion in the informed group with just over one-fourth and the highest percentage in the uninformed category with 36%. There was only a small difference among the schools with respect to the moderately informed category with Central State having a slightly higher percentage than Bethany Nazarene, 37% to 32%, and a slightly lower one than Oklahoma Christian (40%).

We can only speculate as to the reason for these unexpected results. One factor may be that Central State is a large school with many students who hold full-time jobs and more who work part time. Three-quarters of the students commute and there is little feeling of camaraderie and a comparative lack of on-campus bull sessions about national and world affairs. It should also be remembered that the modernists and unbelievers in this study, 96% of whom were from Central State, were significantly better informed than the fundamentalists (see Chapter Eight). This leads to the conclusion that those fundamentalists who attended Bethany Nazarene College and Oklahoma Christian College in the fall of 1970 were better informed than those fundamentalists who attended Central State University during that same semester. Therefore, it might be surmised that the modernists

and unbelievers at Central State are more likely than the fundamentalists to seek information on their own.

Summarizing this chapter we find that the students attending Central State University were much less fundamentalist in religion, slightly higher in social class and considerably more favorable toward civil liberties than those attending the two church affiliated colleges. The secular college students were also notably less authoritarian and less concerned with the threat of domestic Communism.

Though more favorably disposed toward integration than Bethany Nazarene students, the Central State respondents were not significantly more so than those from Oklahoma Christian College.

A quite unexpected finding was that the students at the church-affiliated colleges were better informed politically than those at Central State. This is difficult to explain, but is possibly related to the nature of the schools. The church colleges have small, close-knit student bodies and the majority of the students live on or very near the campus. This facilitates informal discussion of political affairs. Central State has a large heterogeneous student body with only about 20% living on campus. This makes informal discussion more difficult.

CHAPTER X

PARTY, CANDIDATE, AND IDEOLOGY

The collegiate silent majority will be eligible to vote in the presidential election of 1972. Who will the Oklahoma lower middle and working class collegians support in the forthcoming election? What party do most currently favor? What are the ideologies of these young people? Does religious belief effect party and candidate preference? This chapter is an attempt to answer these questions and analyze the answers.

In responding to questions on party identification a plurality of the students chose the Republicans. Four in ten preferred the GOP, while three in ten claimed to be Democrats. Two in ten said they were Independents, 5% preferred the American Party (George Wallace), and 4% chose "Other."

Religious belief did not have a powerful effect on party choice. Still, one could conclude that fundamentalists tended to be Republicans, modernists and unbelievers leaned toward being Democrats and were as likely to be Independents as to be Republicans.

Religious belief did, however, have an effect on the collegiate silent majority's 1968 presidential preferences. All three religious belief categories preferred Nixon, but the fundamentalists and modernists favored him considerably more strongly than did the unbelievers.

Better than three-quarters of the former groups wanted Richard Nixon to win the election, while slightly over half of the latter group had preferred that outcome. Strangely, the unbelievers had the highest percentage for George Wallace, with 14%, followed by the fundamentalists with 11%. Only 3% of the modernists were for Wallace. Three in ten of the unbelievers wanted Hubert Humphrey to become president while 18% of the modernists and 13% of the fundamentalists wanted this. Considering the entire sample, three-quarters said that they had wanted Nixon, with Humphrey preferred by 15% and Wallace by 11%.

Table X - 1

Party Preference and Religious Belief

Party Preference	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>			All Respondents
	Fundamentalist	Modernist	Unbeliever	
American	5%	3%	2%	5%
Democrat	28	41	37	30
Republican	45	26	26	41
Independent	19	24	30	20
Other	3	6	5	4
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

Chi square non-significant at .05 level.

Although an overwhelming majority reported that they preferred the election of President Nixon in 1968, a great many of these students indicated that they would prefer a new face in the White House after the 1972 election. Nixon led all candidates in popularity, but only received 38% of the vote. Ted Kennedy was second in popularity with

10%, followed by Edmund Muskie and George Wallace with 5%, and John Lindsay with 4%. Eugene McCarthy and "other" received 3%, and Hubert Humphrey and George McGovern 1%. The "don't know" group comprised 30% of the sample. Thus, while Richard Nixon was overwhelmingly

Table X - 2

1968 Presidential Preference and Religious Belief

1968 Presidential Preference	<u>Religious Belief Category</u>			All Respond- ents
	Fundamen- talist	Modern- ist	Un- believer	
Humphrey	13%	18%	30%	15%
Nixon	76	79	56	74
Wallace	11	3	14	11
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)	(444)

$p < .05$

preferred over Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace in 1968, his support has apparently dwindled among silent majority students. Perhaps a Democrat with broad appeal could capture the support of a majority of this group.

Religious belief had a significant effect on presidential preference for 1972. The fundamentalists stuck with Nixon to a greater extent than did the other two groups but their support dropped from 76% to 42%. Unbeliever support for Nixon dropped from 56% to 21%, but the most drastic change of view was among the modernists: whereas 79% stated that they had desired Nixon's election in 1968, only 18%

wanted him to be re-elected in 1972.

Next to Nixon, Ted Kennedy was the most popular candidate with all three groups receiving 9% of the fundamentalist, 24% of the modernist and 12% of the unbeliever vote. George Wallace was third most popular among fundamentalists with 6%. Edmund Muskie held this position among modernists with 9%, and John Lindsay tied with Ted Kennedy among unbelievers with 12% followed by Muskie with 9%. Fundamentalists had the largest percentage of "don't know" with 31%; unbelievers the least with 19%.

Table X - 3

1972 Presidential Preference and Religious Belief

1972 Presidential Preference	Fundamen- talist	Religious Belief Category			All Respond- ents
		Modern- ist	Un- believer		
Nixon	42%	18%	21%		38%
Kennedy	9	24	12		10
Muskie	4	9	9		5
Wallace	6	3	4		5
Lindsay	3	0	12		4
McCarthy	2	6	7		3
Humphrey	1	6	2		1
McGovern	1	0	5		1
Other	2	6	9		3
Don't know	31	29	19		30
Total*	101	101	100		100
(N)	(367)	(34)	(43)		(444)

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

The preference for the Kennedy name was quite understandable. Somewhat puzzling, however, was the lack of popularity of Senator Muskie. In October, 1968, a poll taken at Central State found him quite acceptable as a vice-presidential candidate even though Humphrey,

his running mate, was well below both Nixon and Wallace in popularity. The answer may lie in the probability that this student population is rather poorly informed about potential presidential candidates when compared to the populations of large state universities. Many respondents may well have forgotten the name of "that eastern fellow" who impressed them two years before.

A comparison of student's 1968 presidential preference with their 1972 choices found half of Nixon's supporters sticking with him. Two in five of the Wallace supporters still wanted the same man, but only one in ten who had wanted Humphrey thought he should become president in 1972. The bulk of the remainder of his former supporters were almost evenly split between Ted Kennedy with 23%, and Edmund Muskie and "don't know" with 21%. The "don't know" category also drew about one-third of former Nixon and Wallace supporters, while Kennedy received 7% of the former Nixon votes and 13% of the former Wallace votes. This last switch was not as unusual as might be thought. During the 1968 campaign, a number of Central State students who had been for Robert Kennedy switched to Wallace after Kennedy's assassination.

The researchers at the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan have long stressed party identification as the most important indicator of how an individual will vote. This particular factor would be less likely to hold true in Oklahoma where many registered Democrats are "Democrats in name only." The apparent decline in importance of party identification as a predictor of voting behavior, which such commentators as Samuel Lubell¹ have stressed is

¹Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New York:

taking place on a national scale, was characteristic of Oklahoma politics throughout the 1960's. Although registration has always been heavily Democrat, the state voted heavily Republican in the 1960 and 1968 presidential elections. In addition, Oklahoma elected Republican governors in 1962 and 1966, and a Republican senator in 1968. The incumbent Republican governor was defeated by fewer than three thousand votes in 1970.

Table X - 4

1968 Presidential Preference vs. 1972 Presidential Preference

1972 Presidential Preference	<u>1968 Presidential Preference</u>			
	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace	Total
Humphrey	9%	0%	0%	1%
Kennedy	23	7	13	10
Lindsay	5	4	0	4
McCarthy	3	3	4	3
McGovern	3	1	0	1
Muskie	21	2	2	5
Nixon	6	49	6	38
Wallace	0	1	40	5
Other	9	2	0	3
Don't know	21	31	35	30
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(66)	(330)	(48)	(444)

The current student sample seems typical of Oklahoma. Sixty percent who identified themselves as Democrats were for Nixon in 1968.

Norton, 1970), pp. 32, 41-42. Lubell stresses that the main factors involved in causing the erosion of party loyalty include "...prosperity, the changed role of government, and the emergence of a new generation of voters. As a result, dramatic voter swings from one election to the next have become almost a regular occurrence; but that is very different from gaining the sustained voter support which is essential to build and hold a stable and lasting party majority." (p. 32).

One in three was for Humphrey and 7% were for Wallace. Party identification correlated strongly with support for Nixon among Republicans with 92% stating that they had wanted him in 1968. Only 2% of the Republicans said they had been for Humphrey and 6% had preferred Wallace. Independents also preferred Nixon with 70%, and 86% of the American Party respondents favored Wallace.

Table X - 5

Proportion of Each Party Favoring
Each 1968 Candidate

1968 Presidential Preference	<u>Party Preference</u>				
	Amer- ican	Demo- crat	Repub- lican	Indepen- dent	Other or Don't know
Humphrey	0%	33%	2%	21%	0%
Nixon	15	60	92	70	89
Wallace	85	7	6	10	11
Total*	100	100	100	101	100
(N)	(20)	(132)	(182)	(91)	(19)

$p < .01$

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Viewing the relationship between party and candidate preference from another angle we find that two-thirds of those who favored Humphrey were Democrats, while half of those for Nixon were Republicans; and 35% of those who wanted Wallace identified with the American Party.

Table X - 6

Proportion of Each 1968 Candidate's
Vote by Party

1968 Presidential Preference	Ameri- can	Demo- crat	Repub- lican	Inde- pendent	Don't know or Other	Total* (N)
Humphrey	0%	67%	5%	29%	0%	101% (66)
Nixon	1	24	51	19	5	100 (330)
Wallace	35	19	23	19	4	100 (48)

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Social class had a moderate effect on 1968 presidential preference. Forty-one percent of Nixon's vote came from the lower middle class as compared with 30% of Humphrey's and 27% of Wallace's vote. Conversely, 54% of Nixon's support came from the working class, while 65% of Humphrey's and 73% of Wallace's came from this class. None of Wallace's vote was upper middle class, while Humphrey and Nixon each had 5% of their total from this class.

Table X - 7

1968 Presidential Preference and Social Class

1968 Presidential Preference	<u>Social Class</u>			Total	(N)
	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Working		
Humphrey	5%	30%	65%	100%	(66)
Nixon	5	41	54	100	(330)
Wallace	0	27	73	100	(48)

Since the total middle class tested as more favorable toward civil liberties than did the working class and since a larger portion of Nixon's vote came from the middle class, those who preferred Nixon would seem likely to be more civil libertarian than those who favored Humphrey or Wallace. This, however, was not the case. Humphrey supporters were notably more civil libertarian than Nixon supporters who in turn had more favorable attitudes in this area than the Wallace supporters. While half the Wallace group and two-thirds of the Nixon group fell into the civil-libertarian category, better than four out of five Humphrey people were in this grouping and none were in the unfavorable category. Comparatively, 10% of the Nixon group and one-fourth of the Wallace supporters had unfavorable attitudes.

Table X - 8

1968 Presidential Preference and Civil Liberties

1968 Presidential Preference	<u>Attitude Toward Civil Liberties</u>				(N)
	Favor- able	Ambiv- alent	Un- favorable	Total	
Humphrey	83%	17%	0%	100%	(66)
Nixon	67	23	10	100	(330)
Wallace	50	25	25	100	(48)

This same pattern also held true with respect to racial attitudes. Better than four-fifths of the Humphrey preference group were integrationists, while 60% of the Nixon supporters and just over one-third of the Wallace group fell into this category. Conversely, only about one

Humphrey supporter in twenty was a segregationist, compared with one Nixon supporter in five and better than two in five of those who favored Wallace.

Table X - 9

1968 Presidential Preference and Racial Attitude

1968 Presidential Preference	<u>Racial Attitude</u>			Total	(N)
	Integra- tionist	Ambiva- lent	Segrega- tionist		
Humphrey	83%	11%	6%	100%	(66)
Nixon	60	22	18	100	(330)
Wallace	35	23	42	100	(48)

Note that the Wallace supporters were the only group in which segregationists outnumbered integrationists. Among those preferring Humphrey and Nixon integrationists far outnumbered others. Interestingly, the percentage of segregationists among Wallace supporters was about the same as that in a national sample in 1968. Converse found that 40% of those preferring Wallace and 10% of those preferring either Humphrey or Nixon were segregationists.²

The patterns noted regarding Humphrey, Nixon and Wallace supporters views on civil liberties and racial attitudes also held true in the area of authoritarianism. Humphrey supporters were the least authoritarian by a considerable margin, while those favoring Wallace were the most authoritarian by an even larger margin. Better than six Humphrey

²Philip Converse et al, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political Science Review, 63 (December, 1969), p. 1097.

people in ten were low authoritarians, while fewer than two in ten were high. Less than one-third of the Nixon people scored low, while better than a third scored high. A very strongly authoritarian trend emerged among Wallace supporters with only one in ten scoring low, while almost eight in ten were high in authoritarianism.

Table X - 10

1968 Presidential Preference and Authoritarianism

1968 Presidential Preference	Low	Ambivalent	High	Total	(N)
Humphrey	62%	21%	17%	100%	(66)
Nixon	32	32	36	100	(330)
Wallace	10	13	77	100	(48)

These results strongly suggest what George Wallace's detractors have always claimed and what he has always denied: a significant percentage of his supporters are racists who hold anti-civil-libertarian attitudes and are highly authoritarian. (Recall that the last concept includes rigidity in thinking, adherence to conventional values, and anti-democratic attitudes.) Since this holds true for the Wallacites among the collegiate silent majority, it must almost certainly be characteristic also of supporters of Wallace who have never attended college. Lipset and Raab have indicated that Wallace's greatest support occurred "among the less educated rural, small town, and working class population."³ These are precisely the elements in American

³ Seymour M. Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason,

society which tend to be more anti-libertarian, racist, and authoritarian.

Fathers and Sons and Daughters

Among students of political socialization there is much agreement that in the great majority of cases the offspring adhere to the same political party as their parents.⁴ This assertion was reinforced by the Oklahoma sample as eight in ten Democrats and two-thirds of the Republicans indicated that the party preference of their father was the same as their own. Only 30% of the American Party respondents

Table X - 11

Party Preference of Students and Their Fathers

Student's Party Preference	<u>Father's Party Preference</u>					Total*	(N)
	Amer- ican	Demo- crat	Repub- lican	Inde- pendent	Other or Don't know		
American	30%	35%	35%	0%	0%	100%	(20)
Democrat	2	79	8	1	11	101	(132)
Republican	1	17	66	1	16	101	(182)
Independent	2	30	29	21	19	101	(91)
Other or Don't know	0	47	21	0	32	100	(19)

p < .01

*Totals may not add to 100 due to rounding.

(New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 361. Chapters 9 and 10 in this book contain an outstanding analysis of the Wallace phenomenon.

⁴Hugh Bone and Austin Raney, Politics and Voters, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 32-33; William Flanigan, Political Behavior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 54-55; Kenneth Langton, Political Socialization (New York, London and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 23-29; Lubell, op. cit., p. 212.

made this claim; but of course the party is of quite recent origin. The fact that nearly a third of the collegiate offspring paralleled their parent's preference for this new party is surely not without significance. The majority of American Party students' fathers were evenly split between Democrat and Republican with 35% in each party.

The majority of students, then, preferred the same party as their fathers, and a similar relationship held true for their 1968 presidential preferences. Better than half favored the same candidate as their fathers. Those preferring Nixon were most like their fathers with three-quarters being in agreement about the Republican president. Those who preferred Wallace were 58% in agreement with their fathers, while those favoring Humphrey were 52% in agreement. One-third of the Wallacites' fathers wanted Nixon, as did one-fifth of the Humphreyites' fathers. Interestingly, 15% of the Humphrey students' fathers preferred Wallace.

Table X - 12

1968 Presidential Preferences of Students and Their Fathers

Student's 1968 Presidential Preference	Father's 1968 Presidential Preference					(N)
	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace	Don't know	Total*	
Humphrey	53%	21%	15%	12%	100%	(66)
Nixon	8	74	11	7	100	(330)
Wallace	6	33	58	2	99	(48)
Total	14	62	17	7	100	(444)

$p < .01$

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

This table illustrates the fact that of the three 1968 candidates Hubert Humphrey was by a small margin the least popular among respondents' fathers, with Richard Nixon the most popular by an overwhelming margin. Keeping in mind the students' 1972 choices, we may speculate that many fathers have also changed their minds about the advisability of keeping Mr. Nixon in the White House for another four years.

The Ideology Factor

Political behavior specialists at the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center have found that no more than 12% of the American public think in ideological terms.⁵ Thinking in ideological terms and being able to identify a given candidate or policy in such terms are, however, entirely different matters. Free and Cantril found that 90% of a 1964 national sample were willing to identify themselves in terms ranging from very liberal to very conservative. Another finding of this same study was that 91% were willing to classify Lyndon Johnson and 73% Barry Goldwater, and the majority performed this task with some accuracy. Forty-seven percent called Johnson liberal and 29% believed his position to be middle of the road. Goldwater was classified conservative by 50% and middle of the road by 16%. It is interesting to note that 11% saw Goldwater as a liberal and 15% saw Johnson as a conservative.⁶

⁵Angus Campbell et al, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 228-229.

⁶Free and Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans, Chapter 4.

Thus it may be stated that while most Americans do not generally think in ideological terms, they are able to give some meaning to these terms if they are suggested in specific questions. In this regard William Flanigan has stated:

As with other political ideas in the minds of Americans political ideologies are vague, superficial labels applied rather indifferently in their environment.

On the other hand when Americans are asked to identify themselves as liberals or conservatives, they are able to do so. The categories have some meaning for most Americans; the categories simply are not of overriding importance.⁷

Ideological self identification was obtained by asking the respondent the following:

Do you consider yourself to be:

1. Conservative
2. Middle of the road
3. Liberal
4. Radical Right
5. Radical Left
6. Other _____
7. Non-political

As indicated in Chapter Five, the students were 21% liberal, 38% middle of the road and 26% conservative. Twelve percent stated that they were non-political and 1% chose Radical Right, Radical Left and Other, respectively. The fact has also been mentioned that self identification did not have a strong relationship with the respondents' positions on either the Ideological or Operational Spectrum. The two most consistent

⁷Flanigan, op. cit., p. 87.

groups were the Operational (practical) conservatives, just over half of whom identified themselves as conservatives, and the Ideological (theoretical) liberals, 47% of whom called themselves liberals.

Although a broad range of thought exists in the two major parties, on the average the Republican is more conservative and the Democrat more liberal. The collegiate silent majority showed some understanding of this link between parties and ideological labels as 47% of those who called themselves liberals identified with the Democrat Party and 60% of the self identified conservatives preferred the Republicans. Twenty-one percent of the liberals and 11% of the conservatives

Table X - 13

Ideological (Theoretical) Spectrum and Self Identification

Self Identification	Liberal	Ideological Spectrum Position	
		Middle of the Road	Conservative
Liberal	47%	17%	14%
Middle of the Road	28	44	36
Conservative	10	24	34
Radical Right	4	0	1
Radical Left	2	1	1
Other	2	0	2
Non-political	6	14	13
Total*	99	100	101
(N)	(81)	(163)	(200)

$p < .01$

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

called themselves independents.

George Wallace's American party presents a special case. Some commentators have dubbed it "ultraconservative." Yet this tag is a misnomer, since Wallace himself has not been an economic conservative

Table X - 14

Operational (Practical) Spectrum and Self Identification

Self Identification	<u>Operational Spectrum Position</u>		
	Liberal	Middle of the Road	Conservative
Liberal	25%	8%	21%
Middle of the Road	37	43	16
Conservative	23	32	53
Radical Right	1	1	0
Radical Left	1	0	5
Other	1	1	0
Non-political	12	15	5
Total	100	100	100

p < .05

and many of his speeches have had overtones of populism. On the other hand, his movement has been a rallying point for right extremists of all varieties. The 1968 Wallace campaign was in the hands of John Birchers in over twenty states, while Ku Kluxers, Christian Nationalist Crusaders and members of the Citizens Councils (often referred to as White Citizens Councils) were prominent among the leaders in other states.⁸

⁸For documentation write to the Institute for American Democracy,

Table X - 15

Ideological Self Identification and Party Preference

Ideological Self Identification	<u>Party Preference</u>					Total	(N)
	American	Democrat	Republican	Independent	Other and No Response		
Conservative	6%	20%	60%	11%	3%	100%	(116)
Middle of the Road	3	29	42	20	6	100	(167)
Liberal	3	47	27	21	2	100	(92)
Radical Right	25	0	25	50	0	100	(4)
Radical Left	20	0	20	60	0	100	(5)
Other and Non-political	5	28	27	33	7	100	(60)

143

p < .01

Table X - 16

Ideological Self Identification of Respondents by Party

Party Preference	Conservative	Middle of the Road	Liberal	Radical Right	<u>Self Identification</u>		Total* (N)
					Radical Left	Other and Non-political	
American	34%	25%	15%	5%	5%	15%	100% (20)
Democrat	18	37	32	0	0	13	100 (132)
Republican	38	38	14	1	1	9	101 (182)
Independent	14	37	21	2	3	22	99 (91)
Other and no response	16	53	10	0	0	21	100 (19)

p < .01

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

In addition to the organized extremists of the right, the principal sources of Wallace's support according to Lipset and Raab were farmers and segments of a disgruntled industrial working class -- among the main elements mentioned by Victor Ferkiss as having comprised what he called the populist base of American fascism.⁹ Thus, it seems incorrect to refer to the Wallace movement as conservative; reactionary perhaps, but not conservative.

Those students who identified with Wallace's American party saw themselves as 34% conservative, 25% middle of the road, 15% liberal and 15% other or non-political. Viewing this ideology-party relationship in another way, only 6% of those who called themselves conservatives preferred the American party.

Candidate preference and ideological identification were definitely related among the collegiate silent majority. Almost four in ten of those who preferred Humphrey in 1968 said they were liberals and one-third said they were middle of the roaders, while only 13% claimed to be conservative. Conversely, three in ten Nixon supporters chose the conservative label and four in ten the middle of the road label, with only 18% preferring to be known as liberals. Three in ten Wallace supporters claimed the conservative position, one in four the middle of the road, and fewer than two in ten the liberal. One Wallacite in five claimed to be in the other or non-political category.

1330 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D.C., 20005. See also Lipset and Raab, op. cit., pp. 351-357.

⁹Lipset and Raab, op. cit., pp. 360-361, 379-383; Victor Ferkiss, "Populist Influences on American Fascism," Western Political Quarterly, 10 (June, 1957).

Consideration of each ideological self identification category separately revealed that as a 1968 candidate Nixon had majorities in all the larger categories (Radical Right and Left excluded). His smallest majority was among liberals (63%), while among middle of the roaders and conservatives he had the support of four out of five. Humphrey did best among the liberals with 27%. Wallace gained his greatest proportion among the "other and non-political" group with 21%.

Table X - 17

1968 Presidential Preference and Ideological Identification

Ideological Identification	<u>1968 Presidential Preference</u>		
	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace
Conservative	13%	29%	31%
Middle of the road	33	40	25
Liberal	38	18	19
Radical Right	0	1	2
Radical Left	3	1	2
Other and non-political	13	12	21
Total*	100	101	100
(N)	(66)	(330)	(48)

*Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Silent majority students of different ideologies had divergent ideas as to which man should become president in 1972. The conservatives gave Nixon a bare majority with 51%, and the middle of the roaders gave him a significant plurality with 41%. The liberals, however, gave

Table X - 18

Ideological Identification and 1968 Presidential Preference

Ideological Identification	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace	Total	(N)
Conservative	7%	80%	13%	100%	(116)
Middle of the road	13	80	7	100	(167)
Liberal	27	63	10	100	(92)
Other and non-political	15	68	17	100	(60)

"don't know" 28%, Nixon 22% and Kennedy 17%, Muskie 9%, McCarthy 8%, and Lindsay 7%. "Don't know" ran second among self-styled conservatives with 27% and also among middle of the roaders with 29%. But the highest percentage of "don't knows" occurred among the "other and non-political" group with 43% giving that answer. Nixon had 30% among this group and Wallace had 12% -- his highest.

Summarizing the data in this chapter we find that Richard Nixon was by far the most popular candidate in 1968 with about three quarters of the students preferring him. Only 38% stated that they want him again in 1972, but the rest of the respondents divided their preferences among several candidates, or were not sure who they wanted.

Religious belief had relatively little effect on party preference with a slight fundamentalist trend toward Republicanism. With respect to candidate preference, however, unbelievers were considerably less likely to choose Nixon. The relationship between party identification and 1968 candidate preference held strong with Republicans as 92%

stated they had preferred Nixon. This relationship was quite weak among Democrats, however, as only one third affirmed that they had desired the election of Hubert Humphrey. (Of those who did support Humphrey, two-thirds were Democrats and 29% were Independents.)

Social class affected candidate choice with Nixon supporters tending to be higher in the strata than Humphreyites who, in turn, were higher than the Wallace followers. This is consistent with a statement by Lipset and Raab that "In general, the better educated, the more well to do, and those in middle class occupations were less likely to vote for Wallace than voters in the lower echelons."¹⁰

Supporters of Humphrey were more civil libertarian, more pro-integration and less authoritarian than Nixon supporters, who in turn were more civil libertarian, more pro-integration and less authoritarian than Wallace supporters. This last group had a high percentage of segregationists and a very high percentage of authoritarians. Thus, a definite relationship existed between the foregoing attitudes and candidate preference.

The respondents' ideological positions affected both party and candidate choices, as did the preferences of the respondents' fathers.

¹⁰Lipset and Raab, op. cit. p. 387.

CHAPTER XI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has examined the political attitudes and the underlying factors influencing those attitudes in a sample of college students predominantly from lower middle and working class backgrounds. This group has been designated the "collegiate silent majority," since their origins are families of the type often referred to by President Richard Nixon in speeches as the "forgotten Americans," "middle Americans" or "silent majority." Such citizens are not elites or opinion leaders; they are neither rich nor poor, and they seldom voice their desires in letters to elected officials or by means of demonstrations. Those of this group who possess a consciousness of kind seem to view themselves as patriots who pay their taxes and keep their mouths shut. Some commentators have indicated, however, that the silent majority is not silent and certainly not forgotten, especially during election years.

The college attending offspring of the silent majority were considered an important segment of society for study due to several reasons. For one, they would be among the more articulate members of that group. For another, their opinions might be quite significant in the near future as they move into the political, economic and social systems as college educated representatives of the silent majority.

In addition, there is intrinsic value in exploring interrelationships among sets of attitudes that occur within such groups. Of particular interest in this regard is the relationship between political attitudes and social class and religious belief.

Data from previous studies suggested that the current investigation would find those lower in social class to be less civil libertarian, more favorable toward segregation, more authoritarian, more concerned with domestic Communism, and more liberal on the question of welfarism. In the areas of civil liberties, authoritarianism and disquietude about Communism in America, the present study is supportive of previous investigations. Working class respondents were indeed less favorable toward civil liberties than those in the lower middle class who, in turn held less favorable attitudes than the upper middle class respondents. Class differences were equally noticeable in regard to a concern with domestic Communism, with the working class students exhibiting the greatest concern. The most notable difference in attitudes, however, was evident in the area of authoritarianism with the previously established pattern obtaining: working class most authoritarian, upper middle class least so.

On questions of race and welfarism, however, the established pattern of this investigation broke down. In direct contradiction to previous studies, social class had no significant effect on racial attitudes among the students in this sample. The same was true of attitudes toward welfarism. The utilization of Free and Cantril's Ideological Spectrum and Operational Spectrum to gauge beliefs about welfarism in both theory and practice revealed no significant differences among the three social classes. Further, in direct opposition

to the idea that the working class is more liberal on economic matters, the upper middle class actually had a higher percentage of liberals on both Spectrums: 29% to 18% respectively, on the Ideological Spectrum and 81% to 74% respectively, on the Operational Spectrum.

These unexpected findings are not readily explained, but it is possible to speculate. Perhaps a higher education erodes class differences in racial attitudes. Since all respondents in this study were in college, the differences in beliefs about integration and segregation among the classes had therefore possibly narrowed. Perhaps a poll of these same people taken three or four years ago, prior to their college experience, would have shown significant variations by class in racial attitudes. Additionally, personal contact with individuals of other races may have a bearing on attitudes. People tend to fear or hate that which is unfamiliar, that which they do not understand. Two of the sampled colleges were well integrated. No questions in the survey explored this matter but perhaps personal interracial contact on campus eroded the "native" prejudice of the students' Oklahoma homes.

Accounting for the difference from previous studies with respect to attitudes about welfarism was even more difficult. A possible explanation is that a large percentage of the respondents in the current study identified with a higher social class than the one to which they objectively belonged. Being college students, many of them were on the verge of becoming upwardly mobile. We may surmise that in such instances a considerable number have changed their thinking to resemble that of the class to which they aspire.

A correlation between social class and level of political information was also noted. Upper middle class respondents were the best informed; working class respondents were the most poorly informed. This finding was expected and is consistent with previous assertions about class and political interest.

While the data reveal that social class is an important underlying factor influencing attitudes, there was an even stronger indication that among the respondents in this particular silent majority college sample, religious belief had a greater effect. A religious belief-social class interrelationship was evident in the sample with the unbelievers being higher in the strata on the average, than the fundamentalists or modernists, who were essentially the same.

Previous studies of the association between religious belief and attitudes would lead one to expect that fundamentalists (as opposed to non-fundamentalists) would tend to be less civil libertarian, more likely to be segregationists, more authoritarian, more concerned about domestic Communism, and more favorably disposed toward American military actions abroad, e.g., the war in Indochina. In the present study all of these expectations were fulfilled with the strongest relationships being between fundamentalism and anti-civil-libertarianism, and fundamentalism and authoritarianism. The other associations were not as strong, but were still statistically significant. Even when social class was held constant, the fundamentalists emerged as less favorable toward civil liberties and integration and as more authoritarian. The data indicate, therefore, that among silent majority students, the "religious factor" is the most significant underlying determinant

of political attitudes. That is, if a researcher desired to make predictions as to how a respondent stood with regard to views on civil liberties, race, authoritarianism, Communism and the war in Indochina, he would probably be more accurate in his forecast if he knew the respondent's religious belief rather than his social class or party identification.

In the areas of welfarism and level of political information we could not be sure what to expect. On the former subject previous studies had contradictory findings. Thus the question was whether or not a relationship exists between religious liberalism and political liberalism. Data from the present study answered this question in the affirmative. Testing with Free and Cantril's Ideological Spectrum found fundamentalists most conservative, modernists more liberal and unbelievers most liberal in regard to theoretical economic attitudes. No differences among social classes or religious belief categories occurred on the Operational Spectrum (practical welfarism).

No studies were encountered which had attempted to correlate religious belief with level of political information, but the following findings in the current study led us to speculate that fundamentalists would be less informed than those in the other two belief categories:

1. Fundamentalists tested as less favorable toward civil liberties. Respondents with less political information tested less favorable toward civil liberties.
2. Fundamentslists tested as less favorable toward integration. Respondents with less political information tested less favorable toward integration.

Given these facts it was logical to expect exactly what the data revealed. fundamentalists had a lower level of political information than modernists or unbelievers.

A comparison of the three colleges where sampling was done revealed that students at the secular state institution, Central State University, were more favorable toward civil liberties, less authoritarian, and less concerned with domestic Communism than those at the church-affiliated colleges. On racial attitudes, Oklahoma Christian College joined Central State in having fewer racist tendencies than Bethany Nazarene. At the same time Oklahoma Christian proved to be highest in authoritarianism of the three schools. Since the two church colleges were 97% and 100% fundamentalist, respectively, comparison became that of two sets of fundamentalists with a group (Central State) that was composed of two thirds fundamentalists, 16% modernists, and 18% unbelievers. Hence, the differences among the three schools in no small degree reflect the differences in religious belief prevalent at each institution.

At this point it would seem worthwhile to present a portrait of the average fundamentalist, modernist and unbeliever as they emerged from the data. The statements characterizing each type highlight their contrasts.

The average fundamentalist in this study is lower middle or working class in origin. He is considerably less favorable toward civil liberties, more authoritarian, more concerned with American Communism, and less favorable toward integration than his modernist and unbeliever counterparts. He is a theoretical conservative or middle of the roader,

but a practical liberal on welfarism. He has a low to moderate level of political information and tends to be hawkish on the subject of Vietnam.

The average modernist is also of lower middle or working class origin. He is quite favorable toward civil liberties and integration. He is either a low authoritarian or ambivalent on that count, and he does not view combatting Communism as a very important task. He is a theoretical middle of the roader, but a practical liberal on welfarism. He has a moderate level of political information and tends to be ambivalent about the war in Indochina.

The average unbeliever is of lower middle or upper middle class origin. He holds very favorable attitudes toward civil liberties and integration. He is low in authoritarianism and does not view domestic Communism as a very great threat. He is a theoretical middle of the roader and a practical liberal on welfarism. He has a moderate to high level of political information and tends to be a dove with regard to the Indochina conflict.

An examination of party and candidate preferences found a plurality choosing the Republicans. A clear majority favored Richard Nixon in 1968, and a plurality desired his re-election in 1972. The remainder of the choices for 1972 were divided among ten other candidates and "don't know." Senator Edward Kennedy was the second most popular candidate.

Although Richard Nixon emerged as the choice of three-quarters of the sample with regard to the 1968 presidential election, fewer than four in ten felt that he should be returned to the White House in 1972.

It might be surmised that this drop in Nixon's popularity two years later was due greatly to the economic situation which obtained in October of 1970, when the collegiate silent majority was sampled. Perhaps his popularity has dipped even lower with these students as it did in the nation during 1971. Certainly the state of the economy was something less than satisfactory, and these students, it will be recalled, were from families of the lower middle and working classes.

In the area of party preference, religious belief had little effect. Fundamentalists showed a slight tendency to be Republicans, while modernists and unbelievers displayed tendencies to be Democrats and were as likely to be Independents as Republicans. Two factors which did influence party preferences, however, were the respondent's father's party preference and the respondent's ideological identification as a liberal, conservative, etc. Eight in ten Democrats and two in three Republicans gave their father's party preference as their own. Additionally, about half of those who called themselves liberals were Democrats and three-fifths of those who called themselves conservatives were Republicans. This demonstrates at least some feeling for the general ideological positions of the two major parties, with the Democrats viewed as the more liberal group; the Republicans as more conservative.

Lending credence to the belief that party identification is eroding as a predictor of candidate preference is the fact that sixty percent of the Democrats stated that they had wanted Nixon to be elected president in 1968. Candidate preference was, however, affected

by social class, religious belief, ideological identification, and respondent's father's preference. Nixon received proportionally greater support from the lower middle class (41% of his vote), fundamentalists, and self proclaimed conservatives. The largest proportions of Humphrey's vote by group came from the working class, unbelievers, and liberals. Almost three quarters of the 1968 Wallacites were working class in origin. Better than half of the Humphrey and Wallace supporters and three-quarters of the Nixon supporters had the same candidate preferences as their fathers.

Perhaps the most interesting finding with respect to candidate preferences was that the students who preferred Hubert Humphrey, Richard Nixon or George Wallace in 1968 had very different attitudes with respect to civil liberties, racism and authoritarianism. The Humphreyites were the most civil libertarian, the most favorable toward integration and the least authoritarian, and the margin between this group and others was considerable. No Humphreyite held unfavorable attitudes toward civil liberties and only 6% favored segregation. The Nixonites, though significantly different in attitudes from the Humphreyites, were definitely more favorable toward civil liberties and integration and less authoritarian than the Wallacites. The latter were the only group containing more segregationists than integrationists. In addition, better than three-quarters of the Wallacites were high authoritarians. This last suggests that Wallace's followers have been looking for a leader of the man-on-horseback variety who will take charge and make it possible for them to "escape from freedom," with all its responsibilities.

As a final commentary on this study, two important questions may be raised:

1. Are Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew fitting spokesmen for the collegiate silent majority?
2. Do any of the data give the responsible citizen cause for concern? That is, are any of the results disturbing or worrisome?

The answer to the first question is yes in that both Nixon and Agnew use generalizations such as "forgotten Americans," "law and order," "coddling of criminals," "effete snobs," etc., which have considerable appeal to those who are not politically sophisticated and who, therefore, have little or no basis for analysis of such glittering generalities. Further, talk of fiscal responsibility and putting those on welfare to work appeals to the theoretical economic conservatism of the collegiate silent majority. Continued inflation and the concomitant high rate of unemployment, however, have cut into the popularity of the Nixon administration. If the situation does not change to a noticeable extent during the next year, America's urgent economic problems will override such "social issues" as crime in the streets. Richard Nixon may then turn out to be a one term president.

The answer to the second question is also yes. The data in this study give definite support to the view that the strongest underlying influence on political attitudes is religious belief. The "religious factor" is a greater influence than social class or party identification. In light of this, we should recall the differences in attitudes between religious fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists. What is

disturbing is that from the standpoint of concerned citizens who truly believe in a relatively democratic political system and all that such a system entails (civil liberties, equal opportunity, etc.), the growth of religious fundamentalism may be dysfunctional for American democracy. Even if this is not an accurate appraisal, it may be said that since fundamentalists appear more likely to hold anti-democratic attitudes, they are certainly less likely to contribute to the growth and spread of democratic beliefs and practices. Rokeach, Stark and other social scientists have viewed such findings about fundamentalists as enigmatic and alarming. Here it is hardly possible to begin to suggest solutions. Before any solution can be found there must be recognition of a problem. Hopefully, this study helps to focus attention on the problem.

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APPENDIX

The questionnaire used in this study consists of four sections. The first, numbered 1-23, involves general information about respondents and their parents as to age, occupation, education, religious preference, political preferences, etc.

The second section, numbered 1-31, involves the concepts of authoritarianism, civil liberties, race, welfarism, and religious beliefs.

The third section, numbered 1-14, involves statements about religious belief, welfarism, demonstrations, and the war in Indochina.

The last section, numbered 1-10, consists of political information questions which have been asked over the years by various polling organizations.

The statements on authoritarianism (1-9) are from The Authoritarian Personality by Adorno and his collaborators (1-8) and The Open and Closed Mind by Rokeach (9). Statement 10 on combatting Communism is from "Student Attitudes Toward Communism," by Schonbar.

The sources of statements on civil liberties (11-20) are as follows. Number 11 is an original. Numbers 12 thru 16 (13 and 15 slightly modified) are from "Measurement of Radicalism-Conservatism," by Comrey and Newmeyer. Statement 17 is a slight modification of a question used in a CBS News poll on the Bill of Rights, March 20, 1970. Statements 18 and 19 are from "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics" by McClosky. Statement 20 is from an undated mimeographed sheet distributed by the Citizens Committee for Humane Abortion Laws.

Statements 21-24 concern racial attitudes. Number 21 is a slight modification from Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism by Glock and Stark. The other three are modifications of questions used in "White Attitudes Toward the Negro" by Sheatsley.

Statements 25-29 are modifications of Free and Cantril's Ideological Spectrum used in The Political Beliefs of Americans.

Statement 30 is from Comrey and Newmeyer's previously mentioned study. Thirty-one is an original statement.

Also concerning religion are the first five questions in the section following statement 31. Questions 1 thru 4 are modifications of ones used by Glock and Stark in Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism. Number 5 is from The Religious Factor by Lenski.

Questions 6 through 10 are modifications of Free and Cantril's Operational Spectrum used in The Political Beliefs of Americans.

Questions 11 and 12 are originals, while 13 and 14 are from "Silent Majorities and the View Nam War" by Converse and Schuman.

STUDENT ATTITUDES QUESTIONNAIRE

Please fill in the blank or circle the number of the appropriate answer.

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Age _____ | 3. Major _____ |
| 2. Sex: 1. M
2. F | 4. Year in college: 1. Freshman
2. Sophomore
3. Junior
4. Senior
5. Graduate |
| 5. Racial Identification
1. American Indian
2. Caucasian (White)
3. Negro (Black)
4. Other _____ | 6. Party Preference:
1. American (Wallace)
2. Democrat
3. Republican
4. Independent
5. Other _____ |

7. Religious Preference

1. Assembly of God
2. Baptist
3. Catholic
4. Church of Christ
5. Church of God
6. Congregational
7. Disciples of Christ
8. Episcopal

9. Jewish
10. Lutheran
11. Methodist
12. Nazarene
13. Presbyterian
14. Other _____
15. Agnostic or atheist
16. None

8. Marital Status

1. Single
2. Married
3. Divorced
4. Widowed

9. How often do you attend religious services?

1. At least once a week
2. Two or three times a month
3. Occasionally
4. Seldom
5. Not in the last year

10. Father's occupation (If your father is deceased or retired please give his former occupation. Also, please be specific.)

11. Father's party preference:

1. American
2. Democrat
3. Republican
4. Independent
5. Other _____
6. Don't know

12. Please circle the number which represents the last year your father completed in school.

Grade School

- 1 3 5
- 2 4 6

High School

- 7 9 11
- 8 10 12

College

- 1 4 7
- 2 5 8 or more
- 3 6

13. Mother's occupation (If your mother is deceased or retired please give her former occupation.) _____

14. Mother's party preference:

- | | | |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|
| 1. American | 3. Republican | 5. Other _____ |
| 2. Democrat | 4. Independent | 6. Don't know |

15. Please circle the number which represents the last year your mother completed in school.

Grade School

1 3 5
2 4 6

High School

7 9 11
8 10 12

College

1 3 5 7
2 4 6 8 or more

16. Which 1968 presidential candidate did you find most acceptable?

1. Hubert Humphrey 2. Richard Nixon 3. George Wallace

17. Whom do you prefer in 1972?

1. Hubert Humphrey 4. Eugene McCarthy 7. Richard Nixon
2. Ted Kennedy 5. George McGovern 8. George Wallace
3. John Lindsay 6. Edmund Muskie 9. Other _____
10. Don't know

18. Which 1968 presidential candidate did your father find most acceptable?

1. Hubert Humphrey 2. Richard Nixon 3. George Wallace

19. Whom does your father prefer in 1972?

1. Hubert Humphrey 4. Eugene McCarthy 7. Richard Nixon
2. Ted Kennedy 5. George McGovern 8. George Wallace
3. John Lindsay 6. Edmund Muskie 9. Other _____
10. Don't know

20. Which 1968 presidential candidate did your mother find most acceptable?

1. Hubert Humphrey 2. Richard Nixon 3. George Wallace

21. Whom does your mother prefer in 1972?

1. Hubert Humphrey 4. Eugene McCarthy 7. Richard Nixon
2. Ted Kennedy 5. George McGovern 8. George Wallace
3. John Lindsay 6. Edmund Muskie 9. Other _____
10. Don't know

22. Do you consider yourself to be:

1. Conservative
2. Middle of the road
3. Liberal
4. Radical Right
5. Radical Left
6. Other _____
7. Non-political

23. Would you say that you belong to the:

1. Upper class
2. Upper middle class
3. Lower middle class
4. Working class
5. Lower class

Please choose the answer that comes nearest to expressing your opinion about each statement. Place the number of your answer in the blank at the left of each statement.

1. SD Strongly disagree
2. D Disagree
3. N Not sure or neutral
4. A Agree
5. SA Strongly agree

For example, if a statement was:

- _____ 1. There is more individual freedom in the U.S. than there is in Russia.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA

Most of you would probably strongly agree, therefore you would put a "5" in the blank.

- _____ 1. The worst danger to real Americanism during the last fifty years has come from foreign ideas and agitators.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 2. America is getting so far from the true American way of life that force may be necessary to restore it.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 3. The sexual orgies of the old Greeks and Romans are nursery school stuff compared to some of the goings-on in this country today.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 4. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 5. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 6. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 7. Most people don't realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA

- _____ 8. What our youth need most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 9. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 10. Combatting Communism in the United States is the most serious domestic task facing our country today.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 11. Constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly should not apply to American communists.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 12. More restrictions should be imposed to prevent young people from having sexual relations before marriage.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 13. Our laws give too much protection to suspected criminals.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 14. If a man is showing a sex movie to friends in his own home, the police should stop it.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 15. Every city should ban objectionable books and movies.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 16. The police should hunt down homosexuals and put them in jail.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 17. If police suspect that drugs or guns, or other criminal evidence is hidden in someone's house, they should be allowed to enter the house without first obtaining a search warrant.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 18. A book containing wrong political views should not be published, much less be put in our libraries.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 19. No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 20. It should be a woman's right to decide whether or not she should have an abortion.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA

- _____ 21. It would probably be better if black and white children attended separate schools.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 22. I would prefer to live in a segregated neighborhood.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 23. Two persons of different races should not marry.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 24. I would object if a member of my family brought a person of another race home to dinner.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 25. The Federal Government is interfering too much in state and local matters.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 26. The government has gone too far in regulating business and interfering with the free enterprise system.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 27. Social problems here in this country could be solved more effectively if the government would only keep its hands off and let people in local communities handle their own problems in their own ways.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 28. Generally speaking, any able-bodied person who really wants to work in this country can find a job and earn a living.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 29. We should rely more on individual initiative and ability and not so much on governmental welfare programs.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 30. All the miracles described in the Bible really happened.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA
- _____ 31. Hell, as described in the Bible, actually exists.
1. SD 2. D 3. N 4. A 5. SA

The following questions are multiple choice. Please pick the answer that most nearly expresses your opinion and place the number of that answer in the blank to the left of the question.

- _____ 1. Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing what you believe about God?
- 5. I know God really exists and I haven't any doubts about it.
 - 4. While I have my doubts, I feel that I do believe in God.
 - 3. I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not at other times.
 - 2. I don't believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a higher power of some kind.
 - 1. I don't know whether there is a God and I don't believe there is any way to find out.

- _____ 11. If a friend of yours informed you that he was going to take part in a non-violent demonstration to protest something he considered to be wrong, would you:
1. Strongly approve
 2. Approve
 3. Be unsure or neutral
 4. Disapprove
 5. Strongly disapprove
12. Please indicate with a check mark the statement or statements which are acceptable to you.
- _____ 1. Violent demonstrations are acceptable in many situations.
 - _____ 2. Violent demonstrations are acceptable in some situations.
 - _____ 3. Non-violent demonstrations are acceptable in most situations.
 - _____ 4. Non-violent demonstrations are acceptable in some situations.
 - _____ 5. No demonstrations are acceptable to me; not even non-violent ones.
13. There is much talk about "hawks" and "doves" in connection with Vietnam, and considerable disagreement as to what action the U.S. should take in Vietnam. Some people think we should do everything necessary to win a complete military victory, no matter what the results. Some think we should withdraw completely from Vietnam right now, no matter what the results. Other people have opinions somewhere between these two extreme positions. On the scale below please place an X above the number which you feel indicates your opinion regarding Vietnam.

Immediate WithdrawalComplete Military Victory

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

14. Where would you place President Nixon on this same scale? Please indicate by placing an X below.

Immediate WithdrawalComplete Military Victory

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The following are information questions.

- _____ 1. U Thant is:
1. President of South Vietnam
 2. Secretary-General of the United Nations
 3. President of Burma
 4. President of Cambodia
 5. I'm not sure

- _____ 2. NATO:
1. National Alliance Tactical Operation
 2. The Russian secret police
 3. A new drug similar to LSD
 4. The Atlantic Alliance of which the United States is a member.
 5. I'm not sure
- _____ 3. Mao Tse Tung is:
1. Chairman of the Communist Party of China
 2. Head of the Chinese government on Taiwan
 3. President of South Vietnam
 4. President of Cambodia
 5. I'm not sure
- _____ 4. Filibuster is:
1. A new atomic weapon
 2. An illegal method of passing legislation
 3. The oldest member of the United States Congress
 4. A method by which proposed legislation is "talked to death"
 5. I'm not sure
- _____ 5. How many senators are there in Washington from your state?
1. 2
 2. 3
 3. 5
 4. 8
 5. I'm not sure
- _____ 6. V.I. Lenin was:
1. A German philosopher
 2. A 19th century religious leader
 3. Hitler's propaganda minister
 4. The dictator of Russia from 1918 1924
 5. I'm not sure
- _____ 7. The "Stand up for America League" is:
1. A communist-front organization
 2. A patriotic, pro-American, action organization
 3. A musical group
 4. A publishing company
 5. I'm not sure
- _____ 8. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or the press..."
1. Declaration of Independence
 2. Communist Manifesto
 3. 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution
 4. 1933 Nazi Party Platform
 5. I'm not sure
 6. The Rights of Man by Thomas Paine

_____ 9. Do you feel that the Mann Act is an unfair burden on organized labor?

_____ 10. Can you name any of the three branches of the national government?

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.