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NEO-POPULIST PARTY EMERGENCE IN
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES:
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND

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in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

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By

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DEMOCRACIES:
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND

A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

NEO-POPULIST PARTY EMERGENCE IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND

*Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.*

W.B. Yeats – *The Second Coming*

PASSIONATE INTENSITY

On a hot summer Sunday in December of 2005, in the overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon beachside Sydney suburb of Cronulla, thousands of mostly young white Australians gathered to protest the assault of two surf life-savers by Lebanese-Australians on the previous weekend. As the day wore on the crowd became a mob, fueled by alcohol and racism, which took control of the beach and nearby streets. Violent members of the mob assaulted several Lebanese-Australians who appeared on the beach that day (Johnston 2005).

International commentators drew comparisons between the Cronulla Beach riots and the race riots in Paris the month before, emphasizing the issue of Muslim immigrants in a post-9/11 world. For Australians, however, the phenomenon was familiar – it had first reared its head almost a decade before when Pauline Hanson captured the seat of Oxley and became a Commonwealth Member of Parliament. All the same features were apparent: the blue-collar men, the virulent xenophobia, the

nationalism. Even some of the scenery was the same; Cronulla is in Sutherland Shire, a mostly white suburb of working class and middle class Australians. Called the “insular peninsula,” the Shire is a bastion of homogeneity in multicultural Sydney and is part of the same state electoral district as Sylvania Waters where Pauline Hanson ran for a seat in the New South Wales state parliament in 2003.

And here were the next generation of Hansonites; too young to vote in 1996 but activated by the same feelings of xenophobia, economic stress, and cultural disempowerment as Hanson supporters the decade before. Even some of the older protesters saw the connection to Pauline Hanson:

Paul Wilson, a local accountant who wants to start a political movement he’s called Sons of Anzacs, led the mob with a couple of megaphone chants, but said he was disgusted at the abuse of Lebanese immigrants. He said the protest was really just an extension of the sorts of things Pauline Hanson was warning about when she entered national life in 1996. “Nobody listened to her, and looks what’s happened” (Murphy 2005).

Hanson has retired from politics but the people she had represented, and whose viewpoint she had expressed, are still there.

The Commonwealth countries of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand are the oft-forgotten backwaters of advanced industrial nations. When international commentators discuss politics industrialized countries they look at Western Europe, the United States, and even the East Asian Tigers before Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are even considered. Historically, these three countries have been too politically stable to rouse much international attention. Yet in the past decade or two, each of these countries has endured significant social and political upheaval which has resulted in the creation of a neo-populist party. These parties were not able to form

governments, but each was a significant political force in their nation, and each has left a political and cultural legacy.

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Third parties are not unknown in Australia, Canada, or New Zealand; indeed minor parties hovered on the political horizon in all three countries throughout the latter part of the last century. The Australian Democrats became an electoral force in the upper chamber of the Australian Parliament from the 1970s onwards. The New Democratic Party of Canada, established in the 1960s, has succeeded in alternately harassing and supporting the Liberals on Canada's left wing. New Zealand claims one of the earliest green parties – the Values Party – instituted in 1972, which became the Green Party a decade later. But these minor parties seemed to be in keeping with the general political culture of each these countries: moderately progressive, pro-multiculturalism, and supportive of ethnic minorities as they functioned in the political systems of three of the four major migrant-destination nations of the world.

But by the 1990s a backlash against these values spawned a new sort of political party. This study is focused upon the emergence of neo-populist parties in advanced industrial democracies; specifically, the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party in Australia, the New Zealand First Party, and the Canadian Reform Party, in the decade of the 1990s. In the past these countries have had relatively stable political party systems, with each country's politics being dominated by two conventional type parties: one conservative and one social democratic in ideology, with a third often rural-based party doing its best to undermine the dominance of either.

The parties that emerged in the 1990s, however, were of a quite different

disposition. Virulently anti-immigrant, aggressively chauvinistic, and belligerently paranoid, these parties provoked horrified criticism and staunch support in seemingly equal measure.

What factors contributed to the emergence of these neo-populist parties within countries that seemed – at least superficially – ideologically moderate and tolerant of ethnic diversity, with fully developed stable parliamentary and party systems? Why did neo-populist parties emerge in party systems where new parties had not emerged in decades, where parliamentary democracy seemed to be functioning within well-established patterns, and where social protest seemed negligible? Are these parties anomalies on the political landscape, or do they represent merely one – rarely observed but continuously existing – facet of political culture? Was the emergence the work of a few determined individuals, or were there structural factors that contributed to the formation of the parties? Why did neo-populist parties emerge there? Why then?

Although the answers to these questions are inevitably complex and difficult to construe, in answering them it is possible to discern a model which explains neo-populist party emergence in these three advanced industrial democracies. This study recognizes that there were structural factors that existed within each country that were necessary but insufficient preconditions for the formation of a neo-populist party. Moreover, not only were these structural factors similar in each case, but so were the actions of the individuals which catalyzed the emergence of the parties in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in the 1990s.

DEFINING TERMS: WHAT IS NEO-POPULISM?

Like its companion term “charisma,” “populism” is a widely and probably over-

used term in political science. The history of the term dates back to the Populist Movement of the 1880s and 1890s in the Midwestern and Southern United States (Hofstadter 1955) but it is widely used by journalists and even political scientists to refer to a variety of different phenomena from Paul Wellstone and Bill Clinton to Pat Buchanan, as well as modern populist (or “neo-populist”) parties in Europe such as Le Pen’s National Front in France, or Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party in Austria, and even Latin American populists such as Juan Perón in Argentina and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.

Margaret Canovan (Canovan 1999) provides the seminal definition of populism almost universally quoted by contemporary scholars of populist and neo-populist movements. She argues that populism is too amorphous a concept to classify in terms of ideology and that it is more useful to describe it in terms of its structure. She defines populism, therefore, in terms of its form, rather than its function:

Populism in modern democratic societies is best seen as an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society. This structural feature in turn dictates populism’s characteristic legitimating framework, political style and mood (Canovan 1999).

Canovan points out that populism is fundamentally reactionary in that it mobilizes some section of the population against the establishment, so that a populist party in a welfare state might be economically neo-liberal, while a populist party in a neo-liberal state may demand protectionism. Since populism is a political style, not an ideology, populist parties can be either left- or right-populist (Canovan 1999). The insight that populism is a political style is a vital one that allows a much clearer understanding of neo-populist movements within a number of modern countries.

While this observation is extremely valuable, Canovan's definition is far too loose for our purposes, which is the study of specifically neo-populist parties. Hans Georg Betz, the pre-eminent scholar of European neo-populist movements, defines neo-populism in terms of three distinct attributes: *structure of argumentation*, *style*, and *ideology*. In terms of the first attribute, neo-populist argumentation is structured around “a pronounced faith in the common sense of the ordinary people; the belief that simple solutions exist for the most complex problems of the modern world; and the belief that the common people, despite possessing moral superiority and innate wisdom, have been denied the opportunity to make themselves heard” (Betz and Immerfall 1998, 3). Secondly, neo-populist strategy involves claiming to speak for the “unarticulated opinions, demands, and sentiments of the ordinary people.” Neo-populism is the “politics of resentment” – resentment against economic, political, and intellectual elites – which is attractive for formerly privileged and now alienated groups. Finally, neo-populist ideology is rooted in a “producer ethic” so that an individual's worth is based upon the perception of “hard work,” as well as a claim of democracy and egalitarianism based on a belief that, the “common people” – and by extension the nation itself – has a commonality of interest that can be represented by the movement (Betz and Immerfall 1998, 3).

Utilizing Betz's definition and the work of other scholars we can identify six core beliefs which define modern neo-populist movements and the parties formed from them:

1) Producerism: a neo-populist movement idealizes the (usually agrarian or blue collar) worker – as well as the work of materially productive labor. For populists the

ordinary man is the essence of the society, the foundation upon which society is built. Neo-populists believe in the ordinary person's ability to transform society, value "common sense" over other forms of intellectual or technical knowledge, and are convinced of the moral superiority of ordinary people (Berlet and Lyons 2000; Kazin 1995; Laycock 1990a) who must fight to regain the power that rightly belongs to them but which has been stolen by elites.

2) Anti-Elitism: the counterpoint to producerism is an intense distrust of elites. Neo-populist parties and leaders position themselves outside of the oppressive system of power, which they must overturn in the name of "the people." They oppose both the system itself, which they claim has been overtaken by powerful groups who act in their own interest, and the elite values entrenched by that system. Neo-populist leaders rail against "political correctness" as well as what are regarded as hegemonic commitments of the nation state, whether that be to multiculturalism, neo-liberal economic policies, or the welfare state. Because neo-populist movements are anti-system, a neo-populist party can be positioned at any point on the political spectrum. Indeed, considering the often confused platforms of neo-populist parties, they can be positioned at several points on the ideological spectrum at the same time.

3) Nativism: neo-populist parties are xenophobic in outlook (Berlet and Lyons 2000), although this is more than simple racism. Neo-populist leaders exploit and absorb existing cultural narratives which scapegoat visible minority groups such as immigrants, who are blamed for crime and the burdens on the welfare state. Neo-populists refrain, however, from proclaiming the superiority of the established inhabitants of a country or region, or the established culture. At least publicly, they

agree that all people and all cultures are equal. Instead, neo-populist parties argue against immigration on the basis that any nation has the right to protect its own cultural identity, and that migrants threaten that identity (see Zaslove 2004).

4) Conspiricism: Conspiracy theories constitute the basis of neo-populist foundational narratives, and are both a way of mobilizing resentment and a means of addressing structural inequalities from which previously advantaged groups now suffer (Berlet and Lyons 2000). Conspiracy theories avert blame away from affected individuals towards groups that are framed as a force for evil which has constructed a vast plot to control world power and dominate the (good) common man. For the most part, neo-populist party conspiricism is anti-elite in nature, and dwells on such themes as the perfidy of Jewish bankers who are at the center of a fantastic historical plot to “own” the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, or, in somewhat more sophisticated but nevertheless fantastical plots of the Trilateral Commission, the CIA, or the United Nations to create “One World Order” which would destroy nations and oppress the common people. These treacherous elites have effectively destroyed what was once a great, democratic, and egalitarian society, and part of the neo-populist narrative is the valorization of a golden age

5) Democracy: despite being anti-system, neo-populist parties frame themselves as democratic – what Betz would see as neo-populist argumentation. Even in liberal democratic societies neo-populists argue that the founding democratic charter of the nation has been perverted over time by political, economic, and intellectual elites who have shaped it in their own interests (Laycock 1990b). While political, economic, and social institutions had once worked in harmony to protect the interests of the people,

they have been corrupted (by the evil plots of elites) who have worked against the intent of the “Founding Fathers.” Common democratic themes for neo-populist parties include the failure of the existing political parties to represent the people through the professionalization and corruption of politicians, the failure of the media to tell the truth, and the failure of the government to protect the national culture. Neo-populist parties see themselves restoring the original intent of the national charter and the “golden age” of the past (Laycock 1990a).

6) Charismatic Leadership: A neo-populist movement involves a political style which is dependent upon charismatic leadership from above as part of its appeal. Charismatic leadership is essential to the appeal of the party because of the dire nature of the crisis which the party claims to be able to solve. Neo-populist movements also use charismatic leadership to mobilize that section of the population that is disenchanted with the *status quo* and resentful of the system because they perceive that the system no longer represents their interests, while the charismatic leader does. Charismatic leaders of neo-populist parties are typically tireless campaigners, often very good at face-to-face meetings with constituents (see Tismaneanu 2000) It is charismatic leadership, however, which causes most alarm among observers of neo-populist parties, since many equate charismatic leadership with demagoguery, and inevitably with fascism or other authoritarian regimes.

Each of the parties involved in this study – Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, the New Zealand First Party, and the Canadian Reform Party – clearly possess each of these six defining aspects. Hanson, Manning, and Peters emphasize the injustices of the *status quo*, and often speak of the powerful “special interests” which have

disadvantaged the ordinary person, the working man, the salt-of-the-earth Kiwi, or “the little Aussie battler,” who is valued as morally superior. Each had (or has) a party platform which is anti-system, so that in Canada, long committed to a generous welfare state and relatively high taxation, the Reform Party stood on a platform of neo-liberalism, tax reduction and welfare reform, while in New Zealand and Australia, where for two decades the major parties had been committed to a neo-liberal economic agenda, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party and the New Zealand First Party advocated the return of economic protectionism.

The rhetoric of all three parties hearkens back to a golden age destroyed by the influx of foreign cultures through immigration, globalization, and multiculturalism. These three parties are, to a greater or lesser extent, xenophobic, but they frame their objections to immigration and multiculturalism as non-racist by claiming that their policies are merely protecting their national culture. They object to multiculturalism and “hyphenated Canadians” or “hyphenated Australians” although they welcome immigrants as long as they want to forget their own culture and become Australians, Canadians, or New Zealanders like their Anglo forebears. Scapegoating narratives are common among ordinary members, and are occasionally even articulated by the leadership.

Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, the Reform Party of Canada, and the New Zealand First Party each claimed to be reestablishing a lost democratic tradition that had been subverted by the major political parties. Each of the new parties represented constituencies that were, or at least were perceived to be, abandoned by the traditional parties. Each was headed by a charismatic leader, and while many outsiders failed to see

the attraction, Hanson, Manning, and Peters are still hugely popular figures among their respective constituencies, constituencies that valued the ordinary man and long for a lost golden age.

While journalists and laymen have sometimes referred to these parties as “fascist” or “neo-Nazi” none of these parties is either truly fascist or Nazi. Although economic downturns may have contributed to the attractiveness and the emergence of both fascism in Europe in the 1930s, and neo-populism in both European and the Commonwealth countries in the 1990s, this can equally be said for almost every mass social movement throughout history. Even the class basis of Fascism is different from that of neo-populism; while fascism is the product of class alliances between the rural peasantry and the urban middle class (Luebbert 1991) whereas the class basis of neo-populism is much less defined, and centers on the petit bourgeoisies rather than a coalition of different classes.

Furthermore, fascists and neo-populists differ in terms of the coherence of their ideology. Naziism had an overarching racist ideology that helped cohere and drive the movement into power. While a substantial portion of the grassroots of the neo-populist parties in this study were undoubtedly xenophobic, it can hardly be described as a coherent ideology, and in fact by definition neo-populists are ideologically incoherent. The fascists of the 1930s saw that the wrong people were in power and moved to take over by force, while for the neo-populists of the 1990s power was antithetical to their self-identification, and when they had obtained power democratically and become “successful insiders,” they found they could no longer be populists.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CASES

AUSTRALIA: PAULINE HANSON'S ONE NATION PARTY

In Australia in 1996 Pauline Hanson, a 45-year-old single mother and owner of a fish-and-chip-shop, was the pre-selected Liberal Party candidate for Oxley, a safe Labor seat in suburban Ipswich, Queensland (Manne 1998, 72). In January of 1996 she wrote a letter which was published in the humble local newspaper:

I would be the first to admit that, not that many years ago the Aborigines were treated wrongly but in trying to correct this they have gone too far. I don't feel responsible for the treatment of Aboriginal people in the past because I had no say but my concern is now and for the future. How can we expect this race to help themselves when governments shower them with money, facilities, and opportunities that only these people can obtain no matter how minute the indigenous blood is that flows through their veins and that is what is causing racism (quoted in Richardson 1998, 154).

The response to this letter was a substantial showing of outrage and hand-wringing on the part of the Australian media, and the Liberal Party withdrew Hanson's pre-selection. Hanson ran as an independent, garnered 48.61% of the first-preference vote, and became the member for Oxley with 54.66% of the vote after distribution of preferences – a swing of 21% (Australian Electoral Commission 2004). The more the political establishment pointed in horror, the stronger, it seemed, Hanson's public support became.

In September 1996 Hanson made her maiden speech to the Australian House of Representatives, reaffirming her controversial comments about Aborigines and arguing that Australia was in danger of being “divided into black and white” and “swamped by Asians” (House Hansard 1996). The political pundits attacked, and the mainstream media criticized, but a sizeable segment of the Australian public seemed to concur with

many of her comments. One poll found that 48% of voters agreed with Hanson's views (Grattan and Dodson 1996, 15). Prime Minister John Howard – a savvy enough politician to have some sense of the electorate – remained silent regarding Hanson's speech, and denied that Hanson's supporters were racist (Grattan 1998, 81). Indeed, not all of Hanson's policies were race-oriented. Hanson's support seemed to emanate from that segment of the Australian electorate which had been left behind by the neo-liberal economic policies of the Hawke and Keating Labor governments of the 1980s and 1990s. This discontent fed eagerly on Hanson's criticism of free trade and promise of protectionism.

Within eight months of this maiden speech, and the media furor that followed, Hanson had formed Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party in April of 1997 (Newcastle Herald 2002). Many commentators assumed that Hanson would be a fly-by-night MP. Most believed that the party was simply a protest party and One Nation's support was therefore inherently fickle (Taylor 1998). Indeed, by early 1998 opinion polls showed support for Hanson declining, and the major parties seemed to drop their guard (Manne 1998, 4).

In 1998 the state of Queensland, in the mostly rural "deep north" of Australia, held a statewide election. While Hanson herself was not running in this election, her party stood candidates in many seats. The election, contested on June 13, showed that Hanson's support had by no means disappeared: One Nation received 22.68% of the vote, compared with the Liberal-National Coalition which received 31.26%, and the

Australian Labor Party ¹ (ALP) which won with 38.9% (Queensland Parliament 2001). One Nation won eleven seats in Queensland's unicameral parliament, and the Labor party was only able to form a government by negotiating with one of the two independent members.

New polls showed Hanson's support was strong nationwide – almost 13.5%, with particularly strong support in Queensland and Western Australia. And while a 13% showing would not enable One Nation to win seats in the single-member-districted lower house of the national parliament, it was more than enough to win seats in the multi-member-districted Senate. More importantly, while the “absolute majority by preferences” electoral system works to ensure two-party control of the House of Representatives, it also provides electoral clout to minority parties who can influence the major parties by directing preferences. Thus One Nation, with potential electoral support of 13%, could hold the Liberal-National Party Coalition government to ransom for its preferences.

One Nation entered the 1998 Federal Election Campaign with a swaggering attempt to become a truly national party. The Liberal and National Parties, however, had learned from the Queensland election and refused to trade preferences with One Nation. Thus while One Nation garnered 8.4% of the national first preference votes (Ward, Leach, and Stokes 2000, 4) it only scraped into a single Senate seat. Even Hanson failed to win the seat of Blair (her old seat of Oxley having been redistributed) and thus One Nation had no representation in the House at all (Roberts 1998a). Overall,

¹ Although Australians use the British spelling ‘labour,’ the Australian Labor Party has since its foundation in the 1930s spelled it in the American manner without the ‘u’ – possibly to emphasize the progressive nature of the party, or to distance the party from the British Empire.

the Queensland election of 1998 was a chastening experience for Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party, but the problems were only beginning. The internal structure of the One Nation Party came under serious legal as well as media scrutiny, particularly in its financial dealings (Charlton 1998).

In the following federal election held in November of 2001 Hanson ran for a Senate seat in Queensland, despite pending charges of electoral fraud (AAP 2001). While concern about illegal immigrants was a major issue in the campaign, the One Nation vote collapsed. Even in Queensland, which had been a One Nation stronghold, the vote was down almost 8 percent (Australian Electoral Commission 2001). This should have been the end of Hanson – a sound defeat in her state of origin, in the state which had always provided her base of support. Yet in 2003 Hanson moved from Queensland to the Sydney suburb of Sylvania Waters in order to run for the New South Wales Senate under her own banner. This effort, too, was unsuccessful, and Hanson returned to Queensland where the charges of electoral fraud that had been haunting her for two years at last caught up with her. Hanson and her close advisor, David Ettridge, were sentenced to three years in prison each for electoral fraud (Murphy 2003), but the backlash against what was perceived as a political persecution by the forces of political correctness ensured that the decision was reversed by the Queensland Supreme Court, and Hanson served only three months of her sentence (Strong 2003).

Thus Hanson's political career ended with as much controversy as it began, and Hanson seems unlikely to run again. Yet the party that Hanson founded sputters on in the background of Australian politics, and Hansonism is not a spent force: that ten percent of the Australian electorate which supported Pauline Hanson's One Nation

Party in the latter part of the 1990s has not disappeared.

CANADA: PRESTON MANNING’S REFORM PARTY

In the latter part of 1986, in a boardroom in Calgary, Alberta, five men met to discuss the possible creation of a western-based political party (Harrison 1995, 107). One of them, Preston Manning, was the son of the founder of an evangelical radio ministry who was also the former Social Credit Party premier of Alberta. Manning was to prove the lynchpin of the emergence of a new party. As the western provinces fumed at perceived injustices of Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government’s energy policy and perceived bias against western Canada, several more meetings would take place in the boardrooms of western Canada. In early May the group had organized a conference at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Vancouver to sow the seeds for the formation of a new right wing party in Canadian politics. A few months later – in October of 1987 – the group met in Winnipeg to found the Reform Party of Canada (Dabbs 1997, 126).

The party’s economic policies were distinctly free-enterprise, calling for free-trade with the United States, tax reform, and a balanced federal budget. The party proposed political reforms that were in keeping with populist principles and the party’s western roots, including citizen-initiated referenda and other constitutional reforms. The party’s new social policy were more contentious, attracting negative attention from the mainstream media; the party advocated significant restrictions on immigration, the cutting of funding to multicultural organizations, and a tougher stance on law and order (Harrison 1995, 120). Observers criticized what they perceived as an undertone of intolerance and even xenophobia within the party (Sutherland 1990).

Despite the fact that it was only a year old, the party contested the 1988 election

with relative success. Reform Candidates ran in only 72 ridings² in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, taking 275,767 votes – 7.3% of the votes cast in the western provinces (Harrison 1995, 134), and 15.3% of all votes cast in Alberta (Byfield 1991, 63). Manning ran as a candidate in the riding of Yellowhead against longtime Liberal MP – sixteen year veteran of parliament and former Prime Minister Joe Clarke. Unsurprisingly, Manning did not succeed in upsetting his Liberal Party opponent, although he managed an impressive 11,207 votes to Clarke’s 17,847 (Byfield 1991, 50).

In November, a week or so after the election, the MP elect of Beaver River – a rural riding north of Edmonton – died of cancer, forcing a by-election. The Reform candidate, a 36-year-old high school teacher, Deb Grey, had taken an unpromising fifth place in the general election, but stormed home to win with 11,154 votes while her Progressive Conservative rival did not get more than 7,000 (Howse 1989). Grey had done well among discontented conservatives – older voters who felt threatened by the progressive social policies that were accepted by both major parties.

Indeed, Grey’s victory in Beaver River would prove not to be an isolated incident. In October of 1989, the province of Alberta held a province-wide election for Senator.³ Debate over the Meech Lake Accords allowed Preston Manning to keep the

² A “riding” is the Canadian term for an electoral district for the House of Commons.

³ There was no constitutional basis for the election: under the terms of the Meech Lake Accord, premiers were required to submit a list of five names to the Prime Minister, who would customarily choose one as Senator. But Alberta had run an essentially extra-constitutional contest to determine a democratic choice of Senator. Almost 40 percent of registered voters turned up, despite the somewhat unorthodox nature of the election, and they chose Stan Waters, a retired Admiral and war hero and a Reform Party candidate. Brian Mulroney was backed into a corner: already unpopular in the west for his stance on the National Energy Policy, he deferred the decision until he could defer it no longer, and then appointed Waters (Byfield 1991, 72).

party's English-speaking support base simmering with discontent regarding bilingualism and multiculturalism, while a stagnant economy kept immigration on the front burner; the Reform Party entrenched itself in its power base.

The Reform Party ran in the 1993 Federal election under the banner of “The West Wants In” with the campaign fought on economic issues (particularly the debt and the deficit) and the issue of Quebec. The Progressive Conservative Party was suffering from the impact of the economic recession of the early 1990s, as well as Brian Mulroney's personal unpopularity, despite the fact that he had resigned months before the election was called (Harrison 1995, 241); the Tories were decimated, managing only 16% of the nationwide vote, and returning only two MPs. The Liberal Party under the soft-pedaled leadership of Jean Chrétien, received 41% of the vote, giving them 117 seats and a substantial governing majority. In Alberta, Reform received 52% of the popular vote – an astounding degree of support for such a new party (Alvarez-Rivera 2004). The Reform Party was set to become a major player in Canadian national politics.

Despite some internal problems, the Reform Party won sixty seats in the June 1997 election, and – with the decline of the Bloc Québécois to only 44 seats – Reform became Her Majesty's Official Opposition (Nevitte et al. 1998, 174). Yet Manning had failed to create a truly national party – Reform received 19% of the vote in Ontario and failed to win any ridings, in part because its policies on multiculturalism and immigration were regarded as xenophobic.

It was obvious that Reform would have to convince Ontarians that Reform was a kinder, gentler version of itself, and a determined re-branding effort was undertaken. A

series of major “United Alternative” conventions were set up to create a broad conservative coalition between the two right-wing Canadian parties (Wallace 2000). In March of 2000, the Reform Party of Canada and some provincial Tories merged to form the Canadian Conservative Reform Alliance. In the race to determine the leadership of the new party, Preston Manning lost to the younger and far more flamboyant Stockwell Day (Bergman 2000).

In 2002 Manning resigned from the party and was forced to watch the inevitable self-destruction of his successor and the accession of Stephen Harper, the “young Turk” who was credited with creating the Reform Party’s first election platform. Manning would witness the more complete merger of the Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives into the Conservative Party of Canada, but now he would be watching from the sidelines.

NEW ZEALAND: WINSTON PETERS’ NEW ZEALAND FIRST PARTY

In New Zealand in 1991, Winston Peters, former National Party Minister for Maori Affairs, was dismissed from his cabinet post because of his vocal condemnation of his own government’s neo-liberal economic policies (Miller 1998, 204). After the dismissal, the National Party blocked Peters’ nomination to the parliamentary seat of Tauranga. In March of 1993 Peters resigned from the party, triggering a by-election in which Peters ran as an independent, winning over ninety percent of the vote (New Zealand Parliamentary Library 2004). In July of 1993 Peters formed the New Zealand First Party and the party fielded 83 candidates in the general election campaign, running on a platform that was mildly anti-immigration and in favor of state ownership of strategic assets (James 1993). The party garnered 8.4% of the national vote. Peters had

aimed his rhetoric at government neo-liberal economic policies – the sale of the Bank of New Zealand and the national airport, among other things – and he framed this criticism in nationalistic terms. Peters was labeled as a xenophobe for his comments (Braddon-Mitchell 1996) by the national and international media (James 1993a).

In February of 1996 the party hardened its stance on immigration issues. Peters argued that New Zealand should only admit economic migrants, and put an immigration cap at 10,000 per year (Miller 1998, 205). National Party Prime Minister Jim Bolger raged that Peters had “raised racial intolerance to a new level that has not been seen in this country for fifty years” (Cohen 1996, 7). Nevertheless, Peters’ rhetoric evidently corresponded to concerns about immigration within the electorate, and his support rose accordingly. One poll recorded that Peters’ support was up to 30% – it was a constituency of “cranky, discontented and unforgiving people” (Jesson 1997, 15).

It was enough to turn the tide against the major parties. Because of the newly reformed “mixed-member-proportional” electoral system, New Zealand First was able to parlay its third place finish into a position of power because neither National nor Labour was able to muster the seats required to form a government. In his coalition agreement with the National Party, Peters was able to haggle for policy recognition and cabinet positions for his party members, as well as the deputy spot for himself (James 1996, 27). Prime Minister Bolger now had a deputy whom he had sacked a mere five years before.

Many observers, even during that first year in office, saw that Peters’ decision to form a coalition with National was disastrous for his own credibility and that of his newly formed party (James 1997b). At first Peters and Bolger appeared to have a

workable relationship, but tensions between the leaders gradually increased. When Jenny Shipley challenged Bolger's leadership the party's caucus backed her, probably because Bolger was seen as too close to Peters (Ingram 1998). As Peters took a more aggressive stance on financial issues, tensions increased still further. In August of 1998 Shipley sacked Peters from his cabinet post and the New Zealand First Party left the coalition. The unruly backbenchers, however, did not follow their leader out of government, allowing Shipley to continue on as a minority government until the 1999 elections (Knight 1998).

By the election campaign of 1999, however, New Zealand First had rebounded and a few commentators argued that Peters was poised to be “queen-maker” again (James 1999). But the New Zealand electorate had not forgiven Peters for choosing to side with National in 1996, and the party received only 4.3% of the national vote, down 9 per cent from 1996. Peters was almost ousted and held Tauranga by a only 62 votes on a recount (Catt 2000, 302). Nevertheless, Peters' party was still intact, and in parliament, and in a position to rebuild its support from its stance as an opposition party.

In the next three years New Zealand First wielded to much greater effect its three iconic issues: immigration, the problems caused by the Treaty of Waitangi (an indigenous rights issue) and “law and order” (Peters 1998). Because Peters is half-Maori, he had for the most part avoided the title “racist.” Peters has always underlined his race whenever he addresses the issue of immigration, arguing that Asian immigrants were “gatecrashers” who pushed indigenous New Zealanders to the bottom of the heap (Williams 2002). Yet Peters also called for “One Law for Everyone” in a heavy handed

criticism of “the Treaty Industry.”

The results of the July 2002 election proved that Peters had judged the electorate correctly. While some voters still regarded Peters’ coalition with Bolger as traitorous, he had managed to rebuild his reputation as a straight shooter with many voters (Mold 2002). New Zealand First rebounded to win 10.38% of the vote, and thus garnered twelve list MPs, in addition to Peters’ seat in his personal fiefdom of Tauranga. The election was a victory for New Zealand First, which had regained most of the ground lost in 1999, and which was positioned well for the next three years, but New Zealand First was not to play the pivotal role it had in 1996.

Winston Peters and the New Zealand First Party is still a viable player in New Zealand Politics. National cannot afford to ignore him, nor the policies he has fought for. While Hanson and Manning have retired from the limelight, Peters, a more natural politician than Manning and a more intelligent and thoughtful one than Hanson, and a more capable leader than either, is still center stage.

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

What do an Australian fish-and-chips shop owner in Queensland, an evangelical businessman from Calgary, and a Maori lawyer have in common? On the surface, it would seem – very little. Yet despite the differences in their personalities and backgrounds, the parties that they founded were similar in terms of policy platform and demographics. All three parties emerged within party systems that had undergone significant changes in the era of globalization. All three parties were criticized by media observers for their stance on immigration, multiculturalism, indigenous rights, and their conservative stances on social issues. All three leaders exhibited extraordinary

charismatic appeal for their followers and all three parties were influenced by conspiracy theories of one sort or another. These parties share a particular political style: they are parties with charismatic leaders, they are built on a foundation of nativist rhetoric and conspiracy theories, and they stem from a deep cultural divide within their respective nations, yet they are firmly rooted in cultural values of democracy and egalitarianism. Are these the same phenomenon? If so, is there a model which articulates the reasons that they emerged?

The first section of the study will examine the three cases in turn – the third chapter examining Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party in Australia, the fourth covering the Reform Party in Canada, and the fifth the New Zealand First Party in New Zealand – in terms of the structural pre-conditions for the emergence of the party. It will examine the parties’ respective demographics, which are based in rural areas and the urban periphery, and the ideological values held by that demographic. The chapter will also consider changes in the structural conditions within each nation in terms of immigration, multiculturalism, and indigenous people, as well as the ideological landscape of the party system in each country.

The second section of the study will examine the three cases in terms of the effects of the actions of individuals or groups upon the emergence of each of the parties. Each chapter will examine the influence of charismatic leaders, journalists from both the tabloid and mainstream media, and the epistemic communities of conspiracy theorists within the neo-populist parties.

The study is engaged in examining whether any or all of these factors are significant in the emergence of neo-populist parties in these three countries, whether

structures or agency effects are more important. While the study discovers that all of the above listed factors impact the formation of populist parties, it also finds that they are more or less significant depending on the case. The study brings into focus the interplay between all of these factors, and the importance of both individual actions and the environment in which these actions are taken.

CHAPTER TWO
EXPLAINING NEO-POPULIST PARTY EMERGENCE
LITERATURE REVIEW

In some ways, all three cases seem to be typical of extreme right parties that have emerged throughout the industrialized world since the Second World War. Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party has often been portrayed as a quasi-fascist organization, akin to Le Pen's National Front in France, or Jörg Haider's Freedom Party in Austria. Comparisons have also been made between the nativist, xenophobic rhetoric of the Reform Party of Canada, and the New Zealand First Party, and those of anti-immigrant right-wing parties in Europe (Betz and Immerfall 1998). Unlike Western Europe, however, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have no history of electorally successful fascist parties. Both Le Pen and Haider have antecedents but although there are skinhead and crypto-fascist parties in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, there is no true fascist precedent for Hanson, Manning, or Peters. The anti-liberal-democratic element which is apparent in the European right-wing, is all but non-existent in the Commonwealth countries.

Most scholars have assumed that the emergence of neo-populist parties in these three Commonwealth countries can be explained by models designed for the European cases, although this is not necessarily so. Certainly Le Pen's National Front and Haider's Austrian Freedom Party both bear striking similarities to Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party – as well as the New Zealand First Party and the Canadian Reform Party – most obviously in terms of the demographics of the parties' support and their platforms on immigration. Support for both European and Commonwealth neo-populist parties increases in times of economic crisis, particularly among blue collar workers and

workers with lower levels of education; that is, among those individuals who are least able to adapt quickly to economic changes.

There is, secondly, a link between increased support for neo-populist parties and increases in immigration within a country. Xenophobia, then, is an inherent trait in the rhetoric of neo-populist parties the world over. The anti-immigrant policy platforms of neo-populist parties attract groups who feel threatened both by competition from immigrant labor within their own countries, and by neo-liberal policies that potentially shift low-skilled jobs overseas.

Thirdly, the Commonwealth neo-populist parties share with their European counterparts a media savvy and charismatic leadership. Both in Europe and the Commonwealth, these “new radical right” parties have a leadership that is “among the most prominent representatives of a new political entrepreneurialism” (Betz and Immerfall 1998). The similarities in voter demographics, xenophobic responses to immigrants, and charismatic leadership underpin the models developed to explain radical right parties in Europe.

Despite these similarities, there are notable differences between the cultural conditions in European and those in the Commonwealth countries that make Euro-centric models of neo-populist party support unsuitable for the task of explaining neo-populist party emergence in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The most obvious difference between European and Commonwealth neo-populist parties is the historical legacy of fascism in particular, but also other extreme movements of the right and the left. Most advanced industrial democracies – Western European countries and Japan, but also the United States – have a long history of political extremism. Australia, New

Zealand, and Canada, on the other hand, share with the United Kingdom a history of political and ideological moderation in electoral politics. As Richard DeAngelis points out in reference to Pauline Hanson's One Nation party:

Australia is not France, or western Europe, to say the least. It enjoys one of the oldest and most stable party systems among liberal democracies; it has never been threatened by revolution, civil war, or major bursts of political violence or serious extremism of far left or far right. [...] A more apathetically contented population, isolated and protected from the world's cares, the 'lucky country,' could hardly be imagined, at least superficially (DeAngelis 1998).

While neo-populist political parties in European countries – including France, Austria, Denmark, Italy and Sweden – may provide valuable comparisons, they are not cases of neo-populist party *emergence*. In most cases these parties have their roots deep in their country's fascist past: Jörg Haider's Austrian Freedom Party, for example, traces its roots back to the inter-War period, with an unbroken line of existence through the War and the post-War period. Contemporary European neo-populist parties bear little similarity to traditional fascist parties in many respects, yet the tendency toward ideological extremism is apparent in the history of Europe in the twentieth century. In many ways, it is no surprise that extreme right wing parties exist in Western Europe, since they are ingrained in the history, political culture, and institutions of these countries.

THE PROBLEM WITH EXISTING MODELS

RATIONALISTS – SPATIAL MODELS OF PARTY EMERGENCE

The most fully developed model of right wing party support—and the only generalized model—was developed by Herbert Kitschelt (1998) who studied what he called “new radical right wing” parties in Europe in the 1980s. Kitschelt's model posits

that there are in fact two dimensions of ideological space within the electorate. The first of these dimensions is the traditional ideological spectrum with socialism on the left and capitalism on the right of a horizontal axis. The second dimension is social, with a libertarian to authoritarian vertical axis (see Appendix VII). Kitschelt argues that, during the Cold War, the Western European electorate has shifted in ideological space from a generally horizontal alignment on the socialist-to-capitalist axis, to a sloped alignment that includes authoritarian and libertarian elements. Subsequently, political party positions have shifted to include libertarian and authoritarian elements in order to better represent the electorate. Kitschelt uses this model to explain the emergence of extreme politicians and parties on both the right and left of the political spectrum.

Essentially, Kitschelt's construction is an application of Downsian social choice theory. Kitschelt assumes that voters will act rationally "in a Euclidean space" and vote for the party closest to their own ideological position. Parties will then move within that two dimensional ideological space to maximize their electoral support. Kitschelt's typology of New Radical Right (NRR) parties therefore consists of three categories:

- 1) Right Authoritarian parties – what Kitschelt refers to as the "master case" for the contemporary extreme right – lie in the authoritarian-capitalist quadrant, within the new area of electoral support. Right authoritarian party platforms are anti-tax and anti-immigrant; they are exclusionary in their definition of citizenship, and reject pluralism and participatory democracy. Right authoritarian support comes from segments of the working class based on the anti-immigrant appeal, and small business based on its anti-taxation appeal. Examples of right authoritarian parties are the French National Front and the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties.

2) Populist Anti-statist parties are, Kitschelt admits, difficult to map on any ideological spectrum, even one with two dimensions. Populist appeals are primarily directed against ‘big government’ in that it involves a call to market liberalism, and to a “much lesser extent against the libertarian themes of multiculturalism, environmentalism, gender liberation, and direct political participation” (Kitschelt 1998, 21-22). Kitschelt argues the populist anti-statism will occur in countries with large public industries, where a call to market liberalism would undercut the power of the established parties. Populist anti-statist support emerges quite broadly, even including white-collar professionals. Examples of populist anti-statism include the Italian Socialist Movement and the Austrian Freedom Party.

3) Welfare Chauvinist parties are located in the left-authoritarian quadrant of the two dimensional ideological space. This is the same quadrant occupied by fascism and Kitschelt claims that welfare chauvinist parties can occur anywhere from the moderate position all the way to the fascist position, where it has marginal electoral appeal. Welfare chauvinism is essentially xenophobic, relying on racist appeals and an emphasis upon national symbols and historical reminiscences. It defends the welfare state, but argues that it should be provided only for the “native-born” inhabitants of the country. Welfare Chauvinist parties either do not support or directly attack capitalism and free enterprise. Electoral support for these parties is most likely to come from blue-collar and low-skilled white collar workers, as well as from pensioners. Kitschelt argues that Welfare Chauvinist parties are doomed to fleeting electoral success. Examples of welfare chauvinism include the German National Democratic Party in the 1980s.

Kitschelt’s analysis is extremely attractive in its parsimony, and certainly

provides some insights into the nature of European (and perhaps into some non-European) right wing parties. However, it is difficult to fit the three Commonwealth parties into a spatial model. The Reform Party of Canada – with its support of market liberalization and support for lower taxes – seems to fit the first part of the definition of right authoritarian parties. But support for pluralism in the form of participatory democracy, far from being rejected, actually formed a major portion of the Reform Party’s platform, so that it also fits some of the attributes of the “Populist Anti-statist” category, although it certainly does not fit them all. Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party in Australia and the New Zealand First Party would seem to fit most clearly into the Welfare Chauvinist category – particularly in the appeals to racism, nationalistic symbols, and historical reminiscences. But Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party’s “Flat Tax” and pro-business policies fit the right authoritarian model. Furthermore, the New Zealand First Party, having survived for thirteen years and five electoral cycles, can hardly be described as having “fleeting electoral success” that Kitschelt insists all Welfare Chauvinist parties have.

Richard DeAngelis (1998) used a version of Kitschelt’s spatial model to examine the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, comparing One Nation with similar parties in Western Europe, particularly Le Pen’s National Front in France. DeAngelis agrees that while One Nation may appear to fit into these Western European categories, nevertheless Hansonism is in some ways unique. First, the party is led by a woman, secondly, its ideology is a “less subversive and violent and anti-Semitic” (DeAngelis 1998, 7) form of racism than that of the National Front, and, thirdly, unlike its Western European counterparts, it advocates liberal-democratic values. DeAngelis

places Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party, and her electoral support, across both of the lower quadrants in Kitschelt's spatial model. In essence, DeAngelis has to conflate Kitschelt's categories because Hansonism contains elements of both welfare chauvinism and populist anti-statism, and thus the party accurately fits neither category.

As well as the usual problems that attach to spatial and rational choice analyses – such as the assumption that voters will choose rationally and with full information – there are other difficulties with using any spatial model to study neo-populist parties. The essential problem with Kitschelt's analysis is that it imposes a coherence of belief upon the radical right where there is no coherence. He attempts to understand this phenomenon in terms of *ideology* rather than *political style*. His theory has to explain parties that exist at various points in ideological space, and in placing them in these disparate ideological categories, he makes distinctions between movements and parties which are fundamentally the same phenomenon, eliciting support from essentially the same demographic, and utilizing the same rhetorical style.

Geoffrey Brennan and Nicole Mitchell (1999) also use a spatial model to explain the 1998 Queensland State Election in Australia. Like Kitschelt, they use a two-dimensional model, with economic intervention on the horizontal axis and racial tolerance on the vertical axis. Their analysis is interesting in that it locates the Australian political parties in ideological space, thus enabling Brennan and Mitchell to ascertain which parties lost votes to the Pauline Hanson One Nation Party. Brennan and Mitchell's model has the same limitations as Kitschelt's – and indeed any other – spatial model, in its assumptions as well as in its ability to provide a depth of understanding of the phenomenon. Brennan and Mitchell's model does, however, illustrate the

importance of “race” in any analysis of neo-populist party emergence.

Despite these limitations, spatial models provide a clear and valuable insight into some aspects of neo-populist party positioning. Nevertheless, while some consideration of spatial party politics is useful, it misses the crucial, and certainly the most interesting, aspects of the phenomenon of neo-populist party emergence. Thus the new model must move beyond consideration of spatial modeling.

INSTITUTIONALISTS: ELECTORAL SYSTEM EXPLANATIONS
FOR NEO-POPULIST PARTY EMERGENCE

Much of the general literature on party emergence and minor parties has concentrated upon electoral system explanations and the effects of Duverger’s Law (Duverger 1954) which states that first-past-the-post systems encourage two-party dominance, while proportional systems encourage multiple party competition. In particular, the recent literature on New Zealand has explained the emergence of a New Zealand neo-populist party in terms of the electoral system reforms of the 1990s.⁴

Michael Gallagher’s (1998) study emphasizes the effects of Duverger’s law on the party system in New Zealand, and argues that the New Zealand First Party is a direct consequence of the reforms. Somewhat later and more detailed studies contradict this, however, pointing to a more muted effect, so that while proportional electoral system might make parties take more extreme positions (Karp and Banducci 2002) and while electoral system change made minor parties more powerful, “the continued existence of cabinet government; the constraints provided by a small legislature; voting

⁴ A referendum passed in 1993 meant that New Zealand radically reformed its electoral system from a simple plurality single-member-district system to a proportional list multi-member-district system similar to that used by Germany.

habits; and the historic character of the parties” were more important influences (Barker and McLeay 2000, 18). Moreover, since the emergence of the New Zealand First Party predates the first multi-member district election by three years, it is difficult to conclude that the electoral system is an independent variable in this case.

The Canadian electoral system, according to Duverger’s Law, should be entirely antipathetic to new party emergence, since it is a first-past-the-post system utilizing single member districts. Yet not one but two parties have managed to emerge in Canadian federal politics within the last fifteen years – the Reform Party of Canada, based in the western provinces, and the Bloc Québécois, based in Quebec. William Riker had predicted this event in his critique and reformulation of Duverger’s Law, where he pointed out that regional politics can result in successful third parties at the national level, even in plurality (ie: first-past-the-post) electoral systems (Riker 1982). Thus regional politics, rather than electoral system effects, are the independent variable.

For scholars of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party in Australia, the important electoral system effect is the “preferential voting” system.⁵ Preferential voting has two contradictory effects in terms of encouraging minor parties. While the distribution of preferences tends to result in the election of a candidate from a major party, just as in a first-past-the-post system, voters are not discouraged from voting for minor party candidates as their first preference because there is no “wasted vote.” For example, a voter in the U.S. might be disinclined to vote for Ralph Nader since Nader would never win outright and thus that vote would be wasted. In contrast, a voter in Australia might

⁵ There are many terms for this aspect of electoral systems, including Alternative Transferable Vote (ATV) Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), and Ranked Choice Voting (RCV). Since this type of voting was first used in Australia (in Queensland in 1893, even before federation, and was widely used at both state and federal levels after federation) I am using the term by which it is known there: “preferential voting.”

happily place a One Nation candidate first on the ballot knowing that even if that candidate has no chance of winning outright the voter's second preference candidate will get his or her vote. Despite the existence of this incentive to vote for minor parties, David Butler found that preferential voting actually provides extraordinarily stable party majorities – so much so that it diminishes the effects of the cube law – and ensures an effectively two-party system in the lower chamber (1997, 228).

The Australian preferential electoral system provides minor parties with other powers, also. A party's control over distribution of preferences (through party disseminated "how-to-vote" cards) gives minor parties influence and thus visibility in electoral campaigns. The distribution of preferences issue was significant in much of the early history of One Nation, when Hanson used them to gain political leverage over the Liberal-National Party (Doherty and Grattan 2001; Roberts 1998b; Roberts 2001) but preferences are a two edged sword, which can easily be used against a minor party if major parties so choose (Grattan 2001). For the most part, distribution of preferences only becomes important after the establishment of the party; it is thus a factor in party effectiveness, not party emergence. Indeed, Karvonen finds that preferential voting does not lead to party fragmentation or minority party power (2004). Thus the electoral system effects in the Australian case are very minor; while they are interesting, they cannot be regarded as an important catalyst.

In essence electoral system models seem entirely inadequate as explanations for emergence of neo-populist parties in these three cases. While the New Zealand First Party predates the electoral system reforms in New Zealand, there is no electoral system effect at all in the Canadian case, and the voting system effects in Australia provide as

many disincentives as incentives for party emergence. The electoral system is not good at explaining neo-populist party *emergence*, although electoral system effects may be a major factor in determining the *continuing success* of political parties over time.

STRUCTURALISTS: CLASS-BASED MODELS OF NEO-POPULIST EMERGENCE

Much of the older literature on populism, particularly studies of agrarian populism in Eastern Europe and economic populism in Latin America, examines the class basis of populist movements. Some Marxist theorists define populism in terms of class alliances between the petit-bourgeoisie and the peasantry, where the petit-bourgeoisie mobilizes the peasantry while ensuring the dominance of petit-bourgeois interests. Other Marxist theorists argue that populism emerges when there is a single class – the petit-bourgeois – who are dependent upon external capital and who thus fail to achieve “positive class consciousness” (Macpherson 1953). Still others see the industrial bourgeoisie as significant to the emergence of populism, particularly in Latin America (Mainwaring 1986). Cas Mudde, a prominent scholar of extreme movements, point out that the class support for a populist movement depends upon its type: agrarian populism relied upon the peasantry, economic populism relies upon the proletariat, but contemporary “political” populism merely acts in the name of the “people” and is not class-based at all (Mudde 2001).

While some observers of the neo-populist parties in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand do discuss the demographic in terms of class – particularly some journalistic observers such as Bruce Jesson in New Zealand (1996) and the sociologist Trevor Harrison in Canada (1995) – most observers argue that much of the appeal of these parties is *not* class-based. Class-based models fail to take into account other more

important cleavages that exist within these societies: cleavages of race, ethnicity, language, and culture, all of which are far more significant than class in determining political party identification.

Class explanations have ceded the floor to “culturalist” explanations which concentrate upon the impact of values and value cleavages, based upon the work of Inglehart (Inglehart 1971) and the World Values Survey which has examined the effect of sub-national cultures and value change. Materialist and post-materialist values, regionalism, and globalization have all become more important factors in the analysis of partisanship in general and neo-populist party support in particular (see Johnson 1995 in regards to Australia; see McAllister and Vowles 1994 in regards to New Zealand; and see Nevitte 1996 in regards to Canada). Class-based models, therefore, are not useful for explaining the emergence of neo-populist parties in advanced industrial democracies. Other cleavages, however, should be considered, particularly cleavages of values, regionalism, race, and ethnicity.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR NEO-POPULISM

One of the most influential scholars of neo-populism is Hans-Georg Betz (Betz 1994; Betz and Immerfall 1998). While Betz began by studying what he termed “radical right wing parties” in Western Europe, he has shifted his terminology to “neo-populist parties” and in doing so has become more aware of the effect of charismatic leadership and more sensitive to the centrality of “political style” for this phenomenon. In fact, Betz provides some of the most lucid cross-cultural understandings of modern populism, and his work constitutes much of the canon on neo-populist party emergence. Nevertheless, these studies are somewhat limited because, like Kitschelt’s studies, they

are Euro-centric. Furthermore, in Betz's edited volume on neo-populism in established democracies (Betz and Immerfall 1998), the focus is on case studies and the analysis is descriptive rather than theoretical.

Betz provides a very useful definition of neo-populist parties, but there is no coherent overarching theory. He points out that neo-populist parties will be successfully established in advanced industrial democracies under particular conditions:

The success of the radical populist right thus reflects to a large extent the psychological strain associated with uncertainties produced by large-scale socioeconomic and sociostructural change. The impact of a fundamental transformation of the global economy, rapid technological change, the challenge of overseas competition, and the rise of a global information society on advanced capitalist societies has given rise to anxieties and fears as well as resentment (Betz and Immerfall 1998, 8).

Thus Betz sees neo-populist party emergence primarily as the product of psychological strains induced by exogenous factors – namely globalization. This insight is extremely useful and is worthy of further theoretical consideration: globalization is an important factor in this study.

Nevertheless, not all advanced industrial countries facing the demands of globalization have electorally successful neo-populist parties: Japan and the United Kingdom are two examples. Globalization may be an important factor, but it cannot be the sole factor causing neo-populist emergence in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

IDIOSYNCRATIC EXPLANATIONS AND MORE COMPLEX MODELS

There are a few scholars who provide alternative possible explanations for the emergence of these types of parties in formerly stable systems which do not rely on spatial modeling, electoral system effects, or class analysis but much of this is idiosyncratic argument based on particular cases. These idiosyncratic studies might

highlight important elements that are worthy of further theoretical consideration.

Recently there has been one attempt to build a more complex “mid-range” theory. DeAngelis’ latest (2000) model of what he refers to as “xenophobic populist party” emergence moves away from his 1998 spatial model towards a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon. He tabulates “demand” and “supply” conditions for xenophobic parties. For DeAngelis, “supply” conditions include three factors: 1) facilitating conditions of rapid, stressful change, including such things as increased globalization; 2) the “mass-perception” of elites as untrustworthy or corrupt; and 3) exclusionary and ‘demagogic’ populist policies. Demand conditions include 1) a mass base of less-educated, socially and geographically marginalized voters; 2) a charismatic leadership style; and 3) the opening up of an ideological space by the established parties. Despite the difficulty in determining why “demagogic populist policies” are a “supply” condition, while “charismatic leadership style” is a “demand” condition, DeAngelis’ model is the most nuanced explanation of neo-populist party emergence, and is by far the most relevant to this study. He has certainly grasped more of the important factors than any of the competing explanations.

DeAngelis’ model, however, utterly and inexcusably fails to come to terms with the issue of indigenous rights even though negative reaction to such movements are central to the platforms of neo-populist parties in Commonwealth countries. The three former British colonies share a more or less troubled past in terms of their indigenous populations. The Aboriginal land rights issues that arose in the 1990s in Australia were unquestionably a factor in the support for Hansonism in the Outback and regional towns. Debate about the Treaty of Waitangi was and continues to be a crucial part of the

party platform for the New Zealand First Party. And while indigenous land and harvest rights are not usually cited as having had an important impact upon support for the Canadian Reform Party, there is another internal ethnic cleavage which is central to the emergence of the Reform Party – that between Anglo and French Canadians, which is equally new and virulently divisive.

None of the models, therefore, will work for the Commonwealth cases, or, more precisely, none explains what is really happening in these countries. And while there are more and less useful models, each of the models contains or highlights elements that are important in the development of a theory of neo-populist party emergence.

While spatial models such as Kitschelt's are not useful for these cases, it is evident that *spatial opportunity* might be an important factor in that emergence. And while electoral system effects can be discounted as a factor in neo-populist party emergence, they must nevertheless be considered as a factor in their longevity.

Although class is not an important indicator of party support in these cases, other cleavages may well be significant. The growing rural-urban cleavage which occurred throughout the 1980s and 90s, and the *materialist to post-materialist value change* which accompanied it, must be examined, particularly in light of the economic and cultural pressure exerted by *globalization* in these countries. Increasing *immigration* and the increased *activism of the indigenous populations* during this period are also factors which must be considered.

From DeAngelis' model we can also see the importance of *charismatic leadership* and the more difficult to define concept of *elite distrust*, and, more

importantly how this distrust and suspicion is perpetuated among the party's voters. Even DeAngelis has failed to identify one important factor – the *influence of the media* in the emergence of these political parties.

THE ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK – A MIXED METHOD APPROACH TO A THEORY OF NEO-POPULIST EMERGENCE

Each of the rejected model types discussed in the previous section fits into one of the three schools described by Lichbach and Zuckerman in their seminal work on methodology in comparative politics (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997). Spatial modeling is an important part of the rationalist approach to political science, class and cleavage-based approaches fit clearly into the structural approach, while social-psychological studies and studies of value change belong to the cultural approach to the study of comparative politics.

According to Weber, if social science is to be scientific, then it must distinguish between facts and values, and deal only with the former. Since the Enlightenment scientists have claimed that a true science is objective. Thus political science must only search for what *is*, not evaluate what *ought* to be, or else it is not a science at all. In the quest for a truly objective—and therefore more truly scientific—political science, political scholars have adopted what they claim, or perhaps merely assume, to be objective methods of designing social inquiry. Yet not one of the major research types within the discipline today, neither rational choice, nor structuralist, nor culturalist, is completely value neutral. The choice of research method affects the substantive outcome of social science research, revealing particular aspects of an issue while masking others. Even the unit of analysis focused upon by these different approaches – the individual in the case of rational choice, institutions in the case of structuralists, and

ideas and values in the case of culturalists – reveals what each approach values, and thus its normative bias.

In the concluding chapters of their edited volume on methodologies in comparative politics, Lichbach and Zuckerman point out that these three approaches also have significant lacunae which emanate from the presuppositions at their ontological bases (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997). Pure rationalist approaches have a thin version of intentionality, rationality, and interests, which leads to a depiction of human beings as robots and which ignores the power of ideas. Structural and institutionalist approaches are prone to “iron cage determinism” because they ignore the agency of individuals and the power of ideas. Pure culturalist approaches tend to be tautological and teleological, thus their ideas are “significant but non-falsifiable” (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997). This study hopes to avoid the lacunae of each of these pure schools by utilizing the triangulation of approaches suggested by Lichbach as a solution to the problems of the pure approaches.

The study will construct a theory based upon rational, structural, and cultural elements, utilizing aspects of all of the approaches in order to overcome the inadequacies of each. The study rejects the presuppositions that form the ontological basis of rational, structural, and cultural approaches, assuming, instead, that individual agency, institutions, and structures, as well as cultures, all have the potential to affect and effect outcomes.

In addition, the study specifically rejects any attempt to develop an “open-ended covering principle” or a generalizeable theory of neo-populist party emergence. As Zuckerman points out:

The effort to establish open-ended covering principles stands in the way of other kinds of explanations. It directs research to examine the accuracy, the reliability and the domain of general laws. It directs attention away from the analysis of more tractable problems. It is impossible to establish general laws and causal mechanisms with absolute certainty (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997).

Yet explanations require theory, because they provide rigor – without theory “the selection of explanatory variables is arbitrary”(Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997). Rejecting the search for “open-ended covering principles” does not mean rejecting a theoretical study. This study will not attempt to build a model which explains the emergence of extreme parties in all nations in all periods of time, but rather one that explicates only the emergence of neo-populist parties in stable democracies in the 1990s. This conforms to what Sartori called a “mid-range theory” – half way up the “ladder of abstraction” – which avoids the pitfalls of concept misinformation when comparing across cultures (Sartori 1970).

Methodologically, then, the study utilizes some tools from each of the three approaches. The basis of the study, however, is a detailed examination of three cases, using Alexander L. George's method of “Structured, Focused Comparison” to establish an explanatory model of neo-populist party emergence. George has an analytical inductive approach to theory development, using (historical) cases to build explanations of events. Using a “disciplined configurative” method of studying individual cases, he ensures that variables can be compared across cases (George and Bennet 2005). A detailed but structured comparative approach allows the examination of multiple cases with analytical rigor, while recognizing possible cultural variations and avoiding the problem of conceptual stretching.

THE VARIABLES TO BE STUDIED

What we have, then, are two possible independent variables which include rational, structural, and cultural factors and themes. The first variable involves the development of a cultural-structural basis for the emergence of the party. The second variable involves actions by individuals in encouraging party emergence.

Thus Independent Variable 1, the structural variable, would be made up of the following four factors which provide the four necessary (but by themselves insufficient) preconditions within the society for the emergence of the party:

- a) the materialist values concentrated in rural areas;
- b) increasing non-white immigration;
- c) increasing indigenous activism;
- d) the movement of existing right wing parties on the ideological spectrum.

Independent Variable 2 the agency variable would be made up of three factors, each factor involving the activities of individuals in the party's emergence:

- A. the charismatic leadership of the founder of the party;
- B. the influence of elite and tabloid journalists;
- C. the existence of an epistemic community of conspiracy theorists within the party itself.

Each of these independent variables constitutes a necessary but insufficient condition for the emergence of a neo-populist party in a previously stable democratic party system. These two variables together explain the emergence of neo-populist parties in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in the 1990s.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 1: THE STRUCTURAL FACTORS

There are four factors which make up the first independent variable – the *structural causes* of neo-populist party emergence: A) rural materialist values; B) increased non-white immigration; C) increased indigenous activism; and D) the movement of parties in ideological space. All of these factors are structural effects in that they are social structures which created a hospitable environment for the emergence of neo-populist parties in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. All of the factors are also in some way related to globalization – the opening up of the nations borders to immigrants and to ideas of indigenous sovereignty and rights, and to trade, and the cultural cleavages that this opening has produced.

FACTOR 1A: MATERIALISM AND URBAN-RURAL CLEAVAGE

While populist ideology is of most interest to those scholars using cultural approaches, the historical precedents for populist parties are mentioned by scholars from a variety of traditions. Some Australian commentators claimed that populism was an essential founding philosophy from colonial times; that populist sentiment remains extremely strong in rural areas, and thus Hansonism has a historical and cultural foundation (Jupp 1998). The Canadian Reform Party's origins have also been linked to the agrarian populism of the nineteenth century North American prairies and the Social Credit movement of the Depression era (Harrison, 1995). Thus a populist political culture should be examined as a possible causal factor, since if party rhetoric is to strike a chord, it must have something to strike on. But there is a problem here: if a populist political culture is a historical fact, then there has been no *change* in political culture, and thus “populist culture” should not be a potential independent variable explaining

party emergence in the 1990s.

Instead, culture may work as an independent variable because of the development of new ideological cleavages within a nation. Inglehart (1971) posited a generational shift in values, from “materialist” values of the pre-war generation, to the post-materialist values of the post-war generations. The potential cleavage here, however, is not generational but regional, and it is not formed by the great post-war economic prosperity, but rather by globalization which has so inequitably distributed its largesse. It may be that regional cleavages – which have existed historically as the struggle for power between the center and periphery – have either changed in nature or have been made more salient by globalization and thus are a factor in the emergence of neo-populist parties.

Hypothesis 1A is that these countries are experiencing a new political cultural cleavage where the more prosperous urban areas favored by globalization are shifting to post-materialist values, while the less prosperous rural areas remain “materialist” in political culture.

FACTOR 1B: INCREASING NON-WHITE IMMIGRATION

Perhaps the most often discussed factor in the rise of neo-populist parties is the influence of immigration and multiculturalism. Both Australia and Canada are major destinations for immigrants from all over the world. Although both countries were originally colonized by British immigrants, both countries began accepting non-Anglo Saxon immigrants – particularly refugees and migrants from Southeast Asia – in the latter part of the 1970s and 1980s. Although New Zealand is not a major migrant-accepting nation, it too saw an increase in Asian immigration, including Asian refugees

as well as property ownership by resident and non-resident Asian nationals, in the late 1980s. The introduction of non-white immigrants, particularly Asian and Muslim immigrants, fueled a strong racist response in all three countries.

No country is without ethnic, racial, and nativist tensions, particularly in times of economic downturn. The control of immigration and fear of immigrants is a major policy stance for the neo-populist parties of Western Europe, and the electoral success of these parties increases in times of recession.

Hypothesis 1B is that a sharp and discernable increase in the numbers of non-white immigrants throughout the 1980s and 1990s was a factor in the rise of populist parties in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada: advanced industrial democracies where policies of multiculturalism and racial tolerance had seemed to be almost universally accepted.

FACTOR 1C: INCREASING INDIGENOUS ACTIVISM

The most important shared factor in the Commonwealth cases – a factor which is obviously lacking in the Western European cases – is the development of indigenous rights movements within each country from the 1970s throughout the 1990s to the present. The colonial histories of the three Commonwealth countries left a legacy of three largely disempowered, often impoverished, and until recently even disenfranchised indigenous populations: the Australian Aborigines, the New Zealand Maoris, and the Canadian Native American and Inuit populations. Since the late 1970s, indigenous peoples in each of these countries (and, indeed, in former colonies the world over) have begun to push for recognition of land rights, civil rights, and some form of political sovereignty.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, these indigenous movements in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand began to push more forcefully for the recognition of native title (land rights) and achieved some success, particularly in Australia, with the 1993 Mabo Decision by the Supreme Court, and in New Zealand with the work of the Waitangi Tribunal. In Canada, although the fight for indigenous land rights became more visible, particularly in the Summer of 1990, the Supreme Court has been less amenable to the assertion of native title. More important in the Canadian case, however, was the push for sovereignty not by indigenous Canadians but by a linguistic minority – the Québécois.

Despite these differences, in each country there was a marked increase in the political activity, and political influence of indigenous or internal ethno-linguistic groups and an increase in the attention given to and sympathy for indigenous claims in the media.

Hypothesis 1C, then, is that the increased activism of the indigenous populations, as well as their increasing success in achieving native title, encouraged the mobilization, or even radicalization, of that segment of the non-native population who felt most threatened by the possible assertion of land rights and cultural sovereignty. This segment of the population was most threatened in economic terms, especially in rural areas where land rights claims threatened non-native property rights, or non-native property usage in the case of crown land. They were also threatened culturally, because an ethno-linguistic minority had rejected the hegemony of their own Anglo-Saxon culture.

FACTOR 1D: MOVEMENT OF MAINSTREAM PARTIES IN POLITICAL SPACE

The movement of mainstream parties on the ideological spectrum is the factor most studied by rational choice theorists. This factor is in some ways linked with the failure of a particular section of the population to evolve post-materialist values. In the past, this demographic was represented by mainstream conservative parties (including the National Parties of Australia and New Zealand, and the Tories in Canada). These mainstream parties, however, have followed the majority of the electorate in moving towards the center of the political spectrum, embracing neo-liberal economic policies and policies which protected civil rights. This movement of the mainstream political parties has been exacerbated by the need for modern governments (and thus political parties) to deal with globalization and ensure that the nation is not left behind in a fully integrated global economy.

Hypothesis 1D is that mainstream conservative political parties left a section of the usually rural, often blue-collar, and less educated population lacking representation. Neo-populist parties then emerged to represent this section of the electorate.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 2: INDIVIDUAL AGENCY AND NEO-POPULISM

There are three factors which make up the second independent variable which is the agency variable: A) charismatic leadership; B) media influence; and C) epistemic communities of conspiracy theorists. All of these factors are *agency effects* in that they are individual or group activities which encouraged the emergence of neo-populist parties in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. While these factors appear to be separate, they are in fact linked. Charismatic leadership in the era of mass-based political parties presupposes the ability to influence at least some aspect of the media,

but it also supposes some ability to relate to the grass roots of the movement that is activated by conspiracy theorists and their doctrine of elite distrust.

These factors are effects most often examined by scholars interested in culture, since they are fascinating but difficult to operationalize. As a result, these factors are best studied – or perhaps can only be studied – by ethnographic research techniques.

FACTOR 2A: POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS – THE INFLUENCE OF CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP

Hans Georg Betz posits charismatic leadership as one of the defining characteristics of neo-populist parties (Betz and Immerfall 1998). Charisma is a paradoxical term: both difficult to define and over-used, possibly because – at least in popular political culture – we have few if any criteria for designating a political leader as “charismatic” (Willner 1984). For those who study charisma, however, Ann Ruth Willner’s scholarship is seminal. Willner points out that, while events sometimes create a charismatic individual, often it is the charismatic leader him or herself who is the creator of his or her own charisma (Willner 1984).

Willner defines four ‘dimensions’ of charismatic leadership, all of which illuminate the nature and foundations of the leader-follower relationship in these three neo-populist parties. In each case, albeit to varying degrees, the leader-follower relationship involves *a leader-image*, an *idea-acceptance*, a *compliance*, and an *emotional* dimension. In each case the charismatic relationship was in some way precipitated by the charismatic leader – an agent in his or her own rise to power.

Charismatic appeal is important for leaders of neo-populist parties than for mainstream political parties because, in Weberian terms, neo-populist leaders have no institutional legitimacy. Without the charismatic appeal of these leaders, the

discontented mass of rural materialists in each country would have remained just that – an incoherent mass. Charisma allowed Hanson, Manning, and Peters to coalesce around themselves a tight knit group of intensely loyal supporters who formed the basis of the emerging neo-populist parties.

Hypothesis 2A is that the leadership of these three neo-populist parties was charismatic leadership that conforms to Willner’s model of charismatic authority, and that because of it these leaders were catalysts of neo-populist party emergence.

FACTOR 2B: THE MEDIA

In a modern democratic system the study of the effect of the media upon an emerging political party is absolutely necessary. Political Communication scholars have concentrated upon media “agenda setting effects” although there is also a significant literature on the effects of political advertising on vote choice and turnout. Scholars of political communication have only recently become interested in the study of the journalists and their biased or unbiased reaction to populism and extremism, but the scholars of “media populism” – how different media outlets have “framed” neo-populist parties and politicians in different countries – have begun to examine journalists as actors in this area (Mazzoleni 2004).

Horsfield and Stewart (2003), studying the media’s influence upon Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, make a distinction between the reaction of the “elite media” – both quality broadsheet newspapers and mainstream television and radio stations – and the “tabloid media” – such as radio talk shows and tabloid newspapers. They posit that both types of media, the elite media obsessively critical of the movement and its leaders, the tabloid media unwaveringly supportive of them, helped to

trigger the emergence of One Nation. While Horsfield and Stewart's precise three-phase model is not clearly applicable to Canada and New Zealand, the distinction between elite and tabloid media response is extremely useful.

Hypothesis 2B is that media journalists from both "elite" and "tabloid" outlets were catalysts in the emergence of neo-populist parties in these three countries.

FACTOR 2C: THE INFLUENCE OF EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES

The final factor to be studied is the ideas that lie at the foundation of the neo-populist movements and the parties that formed from them. But where, exactly, do these 'neo-populist' ideas come from? Social constructivist theory will prove the most useful tool for this analysis, since we have already rejected the notion that individual within these neo-populist movements are merely acting in their own (narrowly defined) self-interests (as rationalist would have it) but acknowledge that individual preferences and beliefs must be constituted in a social environment (Cox 2001).

For the purposes of the study, the most useful notion from the Social Constructivist approach is that of an "epistemic community" – a term which was originally used to explain the communication of policy ideas across national borders (Haas 1992). Haas defines an epistemic community as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain" who have (i) shared normative and principled beliefs, (ii) shared causal beliefs, (iii) shared notions of validity, and (iv) a common policy enterprise (Haas 1992). While neo-populist movements do not usually include "professionals" with "policy expertise," they do tend to include individuals who share these four aspects. These individuals are recognized within the neo-populist movement as experts not on policy areas but rather on those

foundation ideas that fuel neo-populist movements – that is, conspiracy theories.

Thus this study adapts the Haas' terminology quite significantly, transforming it so that it now describes not an elite activity but the behavior of relatively uneducated neo-populists. Furthermore, although in some cases these ideas are transferred across national borders, this is not necessary for the purposes of this study, which is more concerned with the circulation of narratives within the party.

Hypothesis 2C is that an epistemic community of conspiracy theorists exists and that this community is responsible for importing conspiracy theories and promulgating them within the movement.

LINKING IT ALL TOGETHER

There are, therefore, two different causal variables in this model of neo-populist party emergence. The first is a set of structural conditions which are the product of increased globalization throughout the 1990s. These structural effects are necessary but insufficient conditions for the emergence of neo-populist parties. The second variable is made up of the activities of individuals, all of which are necessary for the emergence of neo-populist parties in these three countries. Thus human agency provides the necessary catalyst for the formation of neo-populist parties, but that agency is framed by systemic and cultural conditions.

The following chapters will examine the structural factors involved in each of the three cases of neo-populist party emergence – Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

CHAPTER THREE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 1: THE STRUCTURAL FACTORS CAUSING NEO-POPULIST PARTY EMERGENCE IN AUSTRALIA

In the furor that surrounded Pauline Hanson's initial success and the formation of the One Nation party, observers pointed at individuals and groups that they felt were "to blame" for the emergence of this neo-populist party; it was only later that anyone paused to consider the social and economic conditions which underpinned the party's success. Australia in the 1990s was fertile soil for a neo-populist party, with a confluence of conditions that had been shaped by globalization – the opening up of national borders to foreign trade, immigrants, and ideas.

There are four factors which make up the first independent variable – the structural causes of neo-populist party emergence in Australia: A) rural materialist values; B) increased non-white immigration; C) increased indigenous activism; and D) the movement of parties in ideological space. Each factor is present in Australia, although it may be present to a different degree than it is in either of the other cases. As in the two other cases, globalization is the lynchpin of all four structural factors in the emergence of a neo-populist party in Australia in the 1990s.

FACTOR 1A: RURAL MATERIALIST VALUES – HANSON'S REGIONAL APPEAL

MATERIALIST VALUES IN THE BUSH

When scholars examine value change they often concentrate upon the changes wrought by the post-materialist generation – the materialists, after all, have not changed. Yet the neo-populist political shakeup of the Australian political arena came

not from the post-materialists but from the materialists, not from the powerful urban areas but from “out the back of Bourke.” Hanson’s “rural materialist” voters were forty years out-of-step with mainstream Australian politics in their rejection of both neo-liberal economic and progressive social policies.

Although the farmers’ support of Hanson was explained by some as a reaction to the Australian government’s removal of agricultural subsidies and the lowering of trade barriers with major agricultural nations such as Canada and the United States (Gottliebsen 1998), most commentators feel that Hanson’s appeal cannot be explained as simply economically egocentric voting (Kelly 1998; Perera 1998). The effect is more complex than this and involves the influence of globalization and urban economic affluence upon political values in the cities, and the consequent deepening of the economic and social cleavage between urban and rural areas. Hanson’s supporters were both economically and culturally conservative, and these rural materialist values were a structural factor in the emergence of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party in the 1990s.

REGIONAL CULTURE – QUEENSLAND

Hanson’s support was geographically varied. In terms of the rural-urban regional difference, this seems rational – farmers in all states would be equally affected by the neo-liberalism of Australia’s trade policies. But Hanson’s support also varied across states: while voters in Victoria were tepid in their support for Hanson, voters in Queensland and Western Australia voted for Hanson in surprising numbers (Perera 1998; Victorian Election Commission 1999). There is, therefore, a regional basis to the party.

Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party is in many ways the product of the distinct

political culture of rural Queensland. Queensland is often referred to as “the deep North,” because of its conservative culture. It is the least urbanized state – more than half the population lives outside the capital city and this makes “their conservatism much more powerful in State politics” (Kingston 1999, 12). Murray Goot points out that “Queensland has long had a political culture (partly constructed in opposition to Canberra) that makes a phenomenon like Hanson possible and which helps sustain her support” (Goot 1998, 73), and other observers agree (see Reynolds 1998).

Queensland has a history of giving birth to radical political parties, although none but One Nation was successful at the federal level. The Douglas Credit Party – based on the Social Credit economic theories of Major Cliff H. Douglas – won seats in the Queensland and other state parliaments in 1935 and 1938, and while social credit parties in the rest of Australia dissolved, they remained active in Queensland until the 1960s (Hughes and Graham 1968). The descendent of the social credit philosophy, the extreme right-wing and anti-Semitic Australian League of Rights, was founded in 1960 and still exists today in Queensland and the northern parts of rural New South Wales, although it has not been successful in national elections. Many League members supported Hanson and her party (Greason 1997b; University of New England 2002). The Citizens Electoral Council, closely associated with the American Lyndon LaRouche (Greason 1997a; Wear 2000), was established in 1990s and has been successful in Queensland state elections. The uniqueness of the Queensland political climate was commented upon by interviews from various parties:

You’ve got to remember that Queensland is an interesting state electorally. It is the only state to have elected someone from the Confederate Action Council or from the Citizens’ Electoral Councils. In fact, when Joh [Bjelke Petersen] retired, his seat was taken by a

candidate from the Citizens' Electoral Council (Australian Democrats Senator H 2000).

They grow parties up there every two or three years. Because for whatever reason, in Queensland they're looked at as more frontiers type – they don't sit back and let it happen unto them – they get up there and jump up and down (One Nation Member A 2000).

Thus the rise of One Nation was in some ways dependent upon a regional political culture that encouraged the emergence of far-right wing political parties, yet previous right-wing parties were not successful in contesting national elections. What explains the unprecedented nationwide appeal and electoral success?

THE BUSH VERSUS THE BIG SMOKE

Hanson's success outside of Queensland depended upon existence of a nationwide cohort of rural materialist voters who were becoming progressively more isolated from an increasingly internationally integrated Australian economy and culture. The bush was once the core of the Australian economy – Australia had “ridden on the sheep's back” for decades, with agriculture, particularly wool, providing most of Australia's export income. Outback Australians had formed the nucleus of Australian folklore, yet they were losing their grip on the cultural hegemony of a multi-ethnic nation. As this became ever more apparent, rural materialists felt increasingly threatened and resentful.

While urban Australians as a whole benefited enormously from globalization, a significant number of rural Australians did not. Amenities taken for granted in cities, such as access to communications technology and health and social services, were often absent in the bush, and rural dwellers were progressively more dissatisfied: “Life wasn't meant to be easy, but things in the bush weren't supposed to go backwards” (Eipper

1998, 12). The growing income gap between rural and city dwellers (McManus and Pritchard 2000, 383-384) created a seriously disaffected rural population which felt victimized by the economic restructuring of Australian primary industries in the 1980s and 1990s. While Australians living in the affluent urban centers⁶ received the full benefit of the global economy and thus developed post-materialist values, rural Australians did not.

Hanson's supporters were often rural Australians who had been "left behind" by the rapid economic change of the past two decades (Kapferer and Morris 2003). As the 1998 Australian National Election Study (ANES) shows, 21% of One Nation voters had a non-trade qualification after high school, and 35% of One Nation voters a trade qualification (Table 3.1 in Appendix IV). No other party had more voters with trade and non-trade qualifications – the badge of semi-skilled factory and blue-collar workers who were more likely than unskilled service workers to lose their jobs to global competition.

A cultural and economic divide between urban and rural Australia has existed since the nineteenth century, but the 1990s saw the division becoming more obvious. All of the interviewees commented on the problem of economic inequality between the city and the bush in the past decade. Many rural commentators were particularly bitter about twenty years of trade policies which they felt had disadvantaged small farmers.

Politicians don't listen to the ordinary person in primary industries.
Both parties have no import tariff policies: they use the farmer to
balance their books. Other countries subsidize their farmers, when you

⁶ Australia is one of the most urbanized countries in the world: about 63% of all Australians live in the major cities of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Hobart, and Perth (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2000).

send produce to England or the US or what have you, you get taxed! The government is not interested in primary producers. They wanted to go urban (One Nation Member D 2000).

The main one in my mind was the fact that we were selling our jobs overseas. You could see industries being decimated, Australian's lives being changed, the future of our children being dramatically diminished (One Nation Member A 2000).

Even elected politicians from the mainstream political parties whose demographic was heavily urbanized articulated a concern that this rural-urban divide was growing and becoming more rancorous and linked this phenomenon to the rise of Hansonism.

I think apart from the traditional political divide, you're dealing with a whole new regional versus urban spectrum, which we really haven't dealt with in Australia for a long time (Australian Democrats Senator J 2000).

The ultimate consequence of globalization was the creation of (or perhaps it would be more accurate to say *a growing gulf between*) two Australian cultures: a progressive urban post-materialist culture that benefited from globalization, and a conservative rural materialist culture that had not.

Hanson's appeal is an incredibly complex phenomenon. One leading Australian journalist referred to it at the time as the "manifestation of forces deep within our political culture" (Kelly 1998, 89) implying that while One Nation is a new political organization, the values that it represents are evident throughout Australia's history. Hansonism exploits foundational national narratives, incorporating Australian myths and evoking powerful national icons, many of which are central to the framing of the Australian national identity from colonial times to the present. This foundational Australian narrative is a combination of nineteenth century British imperialist notions of the racial superiority of Anglo-Saxons, with the Australian bush myths of "mateship"

and egalitarianism (Archer 1997, 88-89).

Hansonism draws upon these convergent narratives of egalitarianism and Anglo-Saxon superiority; it is not the product of Pauline Hanson and her minders, but rather the manifestation of an extant set of political beliefs among a subset of the population, made relevant by changing economic and social conditions under globalization. One Nation supporters voted for Hanson because she articulated their pre-existing values that they felt were threatened in this new Australia:

[The Aboriginal] issue was a taboo subject – you couldn't speak about it. I think they saw [Hanson] as a kind of person that wouldn't stand for it. "Hey, wait on a minute, she's only saying what I've been thinking, but she's had the guts to get up and say it" (One Nation Member B 2002).

No, One Nation isn't racist. Every other country in the world is racist. Hanson just articulated the views that lots of people have (National Party Member of Parliament M 2000).

What Pauline Hanson said was just a vocalization of what people were saying down the pub (Liberal Minister of Parliament L 2000).

Hansonism was very effective at mobilizing support through "a range of discourses and representations that resonate with Anglo-Australia's historical as well as current anxieties" (Perera 1998, 5).

Support for One Nation was thus not a *direct* response to the economic disadvantages of globalization by those voters involved in primary industry, but an *indirect* response to the perceived threat that globalization presented to the holders of rural materialist values. This is not a new subculture, in fact it preserves a more traditional set of values which are an important part of Anglo-Australian national history and cultural development (Partington 1998). Furthermore, this rural materialist

subculture is insular and nationalistic but also egalitarian; it is distrustful of foreigners but also suspicious of powerful fellow Australians.

ANTI-ELITE ATTITUDES: INTELLECTUALS, THE MEDIA, AND POLITICIANS AS THE ENEMY

Australians in general are remarkably mistrustful of success. Unlike Americans who herald the winners, Australians traditionally back the underdog against the favorite in any race. Some prominent Australians have claimed that Australian culture and society is hostile to accomplishment; that Australians have historically tended to “cut down the tall poppy” in ways that undermine achievement and halt progress and excellence. Others see this as merely a consequence of Australia’s rejection of aristocracy and part of the egalitarian nature of Australian culture (Peeters 2004, 4-8). The “Tall Poppy Syndrome” epitomizes the anti-elite nature of Australian popular culture; antagonistic towards those who wield power whether they are intellectuals, members of the media, or politicians.

Hansonism undoubtedly taps into a deep vein of anti-intellectualism within a portion of the Australian electorate. Some observers argue that this anti-intellectualism is new and, to some extent, a response to the emergence of a “cosmopolitan new class” (Watson 2000, 58) – the intellectual establishment that comprises the “intelligentsia” and who usually reside in cities. Hanson’s supporters challenge the “doctrine of political correctness” which they believe has been promulgated by cosmopolitan elites and that has silenced debate about issues involving race and sexual equality; they resent the “PC Brigade” whom they characterize as extremist and who they believe hold the cultural power while ordinary Australians are disempowered (Ahluwalia and McCarthy 1998). In many ways the debate about political correctness is an essential neo-populist

attitude, because to “speak plainly” and with “common sense” is to articulate the “authentic” truth which populists believe can be found in the ordinary beliefs of the common man (Hill 1998).

Emblematic of the anti-elite attitudes of many Hanson supporters is their valuation of Hanson as an ordinary – and therefore not over-educated – person. In October of 1996, Pauline was interviewed by Tracy Curro of the Australian newsmagazine program *Sixty Minutes*. Halfway through the interview, Curro asked Hanson “Are you xenophobic?” after a blank pause of several seconds, Pauline queried “Please explain?” and Curro was forced to define “xenophobic” for her (Curro 1996). While the media and political pundits crowed at the evidence of Hanson’s ignorance, Hanson’s supporters – and indeed many average Australians who, like Hanson, had no idea what xenophobic meant – saw the interview as an attack by intellectual and media elites on an ordinary Australian like themselves.

I think a lot of these people just are up themselves. A lot of them are ... I think they’re snobs in a lot of ways. I think they’re intellectual snobs. They’re elite. And how dare a person like Pauline Hanson come along who drops the odd ‘r’, and, god help us, work in a fish and chip shop? I mean the greatest example of new age snobbery was that exhibited by Janet Holmes A’Court when she made a sneering reference to that fish and chip shop woman from Queensland. I mean that again just sent Hanson’s appeal up again! (John Pasquarelli, advisor to Pauline Hanson, cited in Coulthart 1997).

Much of this antipathy towards intellectual elites can equally be ascribed to mainstream Australia, discernable in the number of epithets for the cosmopolitan elite: the “chardonnay set,” “champagne socialists,” and “limousine liberals” who are divided from the real world of the bush by what Liberal MP Tony Abbott referred to as a “sandstone curtain” between Sydney and western New South Wales. Nevertheless, the

attitude is much stronger among Hanson supporters than it is among most Australians. This is probably because many One Nation voters – particularly in rural areas – see themselves as the very opposite of the cosmopolitan elite: they are rural or at least suburban; they are less privileged and less educated; they are “Little Aussie Battlers.”

“The Little Aussie Battler” is a piece of national idiom which is difficult to translate adequately because it involves both the notion of the “ordinary Joe” and the underdog. It has deep cultural roots, conjuring up nationalistic historical images: “Billy Hughes, the little digger, ‘our boys in Gallipoli,’ national myths of sacrifice and struggle” (Scalmer 1999, 9). The Little Aussie Battler is the hardworking farmer in an outback cattle station struggling against the brutal Australian climate with nothing but an iconoclastic sense of humor. The battler represents an Australian form of *producerism* characteristic of neo-populism everywhere. The battler is the mythic persona of the Outback, he is the very essence of rural materialist values: anti-elite, anti-status quo, egalitarian, and anti-politician. Ironically, even successful politicians from both rural parties often define themselves as battlers.

Yeah, politicians are lower than a used car salesman on Parramatta Road. Listen, some of my staff say that I can’t go visiting all these small country towns, I have to concentrate on the big three centres. Well, that’s bullshit. If I can’t go as a Member and be in the bloody park, or the bloody pub, well that’s bullshit. You *can* make a difference, you have to, or you get out of the bloody game. The reason I’m in this is I love this nation, and that’s not bullshit! (National Party Member of Parliament M 2000).

The language is undoubtedly vulgar, yet it is authentic battler idiom.

While neo-populists are wary of elites in general, they are deeply suspicious of politicians in particular. Because of this, Hanson positions herself as an ordinary Australian: a David out to take on the Goliath of the insensitive government elites; an

“anti-politician.” This, indeed, is the keystone of her appeal and of her maiden speech to parliament:

I come here not as a polished politician but as a woman who has had her fair share of life's knocks. My view on issues is based on common sense, and my experience as a mother of four children, as a sole parent, and as a businesswoman running a fish and chip shop (Hanson – House Hansard 1996).

One of the strongest themes emerging in all the interviews with One Nation candidates was the emphasis that they were just ordinary Australians out to have their say against the odds. Almost all the One Nation candidates interviewed – with the possible exception of David Oldfield – were careful to define themselves as “not politicians.”

I would hate to be called a politician. Call me a people's representative, community representative, anything but politician. It's so distasteful, it really is distasteful. It's a disgusting word. I don't have any faith in them at all. They're all thieves; they're all there for their own benefits (One Nation Member F 2000).

One thing you need to know is I'm not a politician. I'm just an ordinary bloke having a go. I don't pick and choose my words (One Nation Member A 2000).

The distrust of politicians is part of a distrust of political institutions. As Table 3.2 in Appendix IV illustrates, 79% of One Nation voters in 1998 thought that Government was entirely or mostly run for the benefit of “Big Interests” compared with only 32% of Liberal voters, and 64% of Labor voters (Australian Election Study 1998).

And while One Nation supporters were suspicious of intellectual and political elites within Australia, they were doubly suspicious of foreign elites – the wielders of power on the global stage. Even mainstream party politicians and MPs list it as one of the most critical issues for their constituents:

Globalization – the fear that the national government is losing power to international bodies. We are pushed around by external authorities (Labor Member of Parliament K 2000).

One Nation candidates are even more distrustful, bordering on the paranoid:

I forgot to mention a big one that really, really gets up my nose. The globalization process and the big scam they've done on Australia, and the United Nations. A lot of things are like a jigsaw puzzle, they're intertwined. The GST, in my mind, is a UN instigated process (One Nation Member A 2000).

This paranoia in regards to international elites is a common theme among the One Nation rank-and-file at party meetings, but it is merely one part of the “anti-elite” – or “egalitarian” depending on your point of view – value in Australian political culture that is held most strongly by rural materialists.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 1A

Hanson's neo-populism is based upon old-fashioned Australian Outback attitudes: it is egalitarian, producerist, anti-elite, Anglo-chauvinistic, and xenophobic. Pauline Hanson and her party simply articulated the rural materialist values of a portion of the electorate that represented an older Australian political culture – a culture that once was, but is no longer, mainstream because of the disparate effects of globalization on city and country. The deepening cleavage between rural and urban, between materialist and post-materialists, that globalization produced, catalyzed rural materialists into action and provided a structural opening for the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party.

FACTOR 1B: NON-WHITE IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL POLICY IN AUSTRALIA

Xenophobia – specifically anti-immigrant attitudes – is a defining feature of

neo-populist movements in many advanced industrial nations. It follows, therefore, that neo-populist parties depend upon the existence of an immigrant community to react to, and the emergence of a neo-populist party depends upon some change in composition or size of that immigrant community. There was a significant change in both the actual numbers and country of origin of immigrants to Australia in the decades preceding the emergence of One Nation: a momentous opening of international borders to migrants from non-traditional sources. Non-white immigration is thus an important structural factor which explains neo-populist party emergence in Australia in the 1990s.

THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY AND ITS AFTERMATH

From the colonial era onwards, Australia was a white settler society with strong cultural ties to Great Britain. In 1947 Australia was 99% white, and thus one of the most mono-cultural countries in the world (Jones 1998). Following the Second World War, however, motivated by a profound fear of invasion by Asian nations (the ‘Yellow Peril’) to the north, the Australian government instituted a massive immigration program favoring European – mostly Italian and Greek – immigrants under the slogan “Populate or Perish.” This era was not immune from xenophobia, but was marked by a nation-building ethos and an enthusiasm for high levels of immigration (Wood 1997). An influx of non-European migrants occurred only after the abolition of the White Australia policy that existed between 1966 and 1972. The shift of immigrant composition from overwhelmingly European to dominantly Asian immigration occurred over the following decades (Jones 1998, 94-95). In the 1970s Australia saw a rapid increase in Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian refugees, so that by the 1990s the racial composition of new arrivals was vastly different from that of the 1960s. In 1990

alone there were 30,000 migrants from Southeast Asia, with a further 22,000 from northern Asia (Statistics Section Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 2002).

INCREASED NON-WHITE IMMIGRATION

This relatively rapid influx of non-white immigrants was a significant catalyst for the formation of an Australian neo-populist movement. Pauline Hanson's maiden speech to Parliament in September of 1996 horrified many ordinary Australians, although obviously others agreed with her:

I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians. ... A truly multicultural country can never be strong or united. The world is full of failed and tragic examples, ranging from Ireland to Bosnia to Africa and, closer to home, Papua New Guinea. America and Great Britain are currently paying the price (Hanson – House Hansard 1996).

The immigration debate was not created by Hanson,⁷ but mainstream concern over immigration both in the total numbers of migrants and, more importantly, in their country of origin, was certainly rising (Hage 1999); Hanson tapped into that concern.

While most outside observers viewed her speech, and thus Hanson and her followers, as fundamentally racist, insiders protest that they are not racist at all. At every party meeting I attended members were advised that there was a ban on racism

⁷ Hanson was neither the only nor even the first legislator to call for a reduction in immigration. Graeme Campbell, a maverick Australian Labor Party member for the massive electorate of Kalgoorlie in Western Australia – the largest electorate in the world in terms of land area – from 1980 to 1996, was outspoken in his opposition to high immigration levels. The group Australians Against Further Immigration was formed in 1989, arguing for tight restrictions on immigration numbers because of the impact on the environment, while even the Green Party had a low immigration policy in the 1980s. Geoffrey Blainey, a prominent and well-respected historian, started what has become known as “the history wars” when he argued that Australia should not become an Asian nation, and that “some sort of Asian takeover” of Australia was inevitable (Blainey 1993).

and discriminatory remarks (Meetings June 2000). It would be a mistake to assume that all One Nation members or supporters are racist (Bowring 2001) but there is no doubt that a large subset of Hanson's supporters are anti-immigrant. The ANES of 1998 found that 90% of One Nation voters thought that the number of migrants allowed into Australia had "gone too far" or "gone much too far," compared with only 42% of Liberal voters, 39% of Labor voters, and, despite a somewhat similar demographic, 44% of National Party voters (see Table 3.3 in Appendix IV). In the same study, 73% of One Nation voters agreed or strongly agreed that "immigrants take jobs from Australians" compared with 49% of National Party voters, 36% of Labor voters, and 32% of Liberal voters (see Table 3.4).

While candidates and members refer generically to the problems caused by immigration, they really mean non-white immigration. In particular, Asian and Middle Eastern immigrants cause a great deal of anxiety to many One Nation members, while white immigration does not.

[W]hen someone from England tries to come out and they can't get out for love or money, and yet someone from Asia or the Middle East gets out at the drop of a hat (One Nation Member A 2000).

Although the leadership rarely admitted that their immigration policies were xenophobic, and even outside observers were reluctant to accuse One Nation's constituents of being racists, several members, after the interview was well under way, relaxed enough to reveal explicitly racist attitudes and several were comfortable expressing racist attitudes almost immediately.

I've heard of what's happening around Sydney, with all those Asians there. We are going to have Asians here – the Viet Cong of Australia one day. There's no way you're going to contain that many of them!

(One Nation Member D 2000).

The fear of non-white immigrants was obvious at party meetings, although it was not so openly expressed.

While many One Nation rank-and-file members are quite willing to admit their fear of Asian immigrants openly, One Nation leadership and policy is more circumspect. Rather than calling for lower levels of non-white immigration, One Nation Policy argued that migrants needed to be skilled and English-speaking: “those people who are going to benefit Australia, not burden it” (One Nation Member G 2000). This, too, is a common neo-populist rhetorical ploy: by emphasizing the costs of immigrants to the country, One Nation could claim that the policy was not racist. Nevertheless, the overtones of xenophobia are clear:

The issue of the illegal immigrants that are currently swarming ashore in boats, you know, from Iraq and Iran and similar countries via Indonesia and similar countries. That and the costs that are being heaped upon Australians to support these peoples, many of whom are criminals, many of whom are not true refugees at all, they're people who just don't want to live where they're living any more, and they use refugee status as a way of trying to get somewhere else. They're not true refugees (One Nation Member G 2000).

The One Nation politicians know their constituency and play on their fears of the invading “swarms” of foreigners – not people Australians should feel sorry for, but criminals.

“CLOSE THE DOOR BEHIND ME” – IMMIGRANTS IN ONE NATION

It is logical to assume that if an increase in the number of immigrants into Australia caused an increase in neo-populist activity, then neo-populist activity must occur most frequently in areas that were host to high numbers of new settlers.

Hansonism, however, does not occur near immigrant populations: Hanson has little support in the inner city of Sydney. It is, rather, the product of the rural-urban periphery, the small country towns and even the outer suburbs of larger cities, which share with rural areas of Australia a working class, “producerist,” and mono-cultural population (Davis and Stimson 1998).

I thought that One Nation was particularly strong in high NESB [non-English speaking background] high “new arrival” areas, but they actually tend to be in high-bearing mono-cultural areas, high white areas, Anglo Saxon areas. That’s not a total picture, but [Labor MP] Roger Price’s area is far more Anglo than mine and they poll far stronger there (Labor Member of Parliament K 2000).

Hanson’s home town and base of support is Ipswich, which is essentially a suburb of Brisbane although many observers argue that has many of the characteristics of a country town (Eipper 1998, 12).

While support for Hanson is highest in Anglo-dominated areas, it is also evident among older migrant populations. There is what several legislators referred to as “a close the door behind me” mentality (Liberal Minister of Parliament L 2000) in many older immigrant communities – those who have assimilated well into Anglo-Australian culture (Perera 1999). Some immigrants from prior waves of immigration “see boat people and refugees as queue jumpers” (Australian Democrats Senator H 2000).

The business of migrants is very valid. [Hanson] was not a racist and people had that image about her. My mum and dad come over from Italy – he had to wait twelve years, the best part of his life, to bring his wife and two kids over. No one was going to assist you in them days, he spent his time grubbing out mallee roots (One Nation Member D 2000).

Several party members at meetings were not just children of immigrants, but first generation immigrants themselves, speaking with heavily accented English.

[One Nation is] anti-immigration, but smart enough on occasion to say that some migrants are good. I think it's a subliminal anti-Islamic, anti-people-who-are-too-left-field. They're not anti-Greek or Italian, anti-Yugoslav because they get some of their votes from those people who feel that they worked hard to build this country and now everyone get things for nothing (Labor Member of Parliament K 2000).

The 1998 AES shows that 16% of One Nation Voters were immigrants themselves, while 29% had immigrant fathers and 28% had mothers who were immigrants (see Appendix IV Tables 3.5 and 3.6). While not a strong indicator, this is a fascinating aspect of the One Nation vote.

THE FRAMING OF ONE NATION'S IMMIGRATION POLICIES

While the racism of the party's policies and member attitudes seem obvious to outsiders, Pauline Hanson and her minders avoid framing their anti-immigrant arguments in explicitly racist terms. Hanson herself never claimed the superiority of the Caucasian *race*, instead she posited the importance of protecting Australian *culture* from degradations by other cultures. Hanson and her party were engaged in a struggle for an "Australian way of life."

And I get annoyed when I see people lining in the streets on ANZAC Day and honor those who have died for us – for our freedom of speech and our way of life – and the 25th comes and goes and we take the war heroes and shut them out and we let a handful of bad people destroy all that is Australian. [...] What's changing in this country is that who we are as Australians and as a nation has been taken away from us. The push for multiculturalism and free trade and globalization means the breakdown of who we are (Hanson, interview with author 2002).

The destructiveness of non-white immigration is emphasized by many One Nation candidates and members. The rhetoric presents the problem as cultural, although the language itself is obviously racist, emphasizing the value of Anglo-Saxon culture.

[T]he mix has been selected in such a way as to dilute and diminish the

Anglo Saxon ... there's no one word for it. The Anglo Saxons are kind of, they can get pretty aggressive, they can get difficult to control, they do get up and speak their mind. And once you start to dilute that homogeneity, that *whatever*, with Muslims and Asians and Middle Easterns, what you do is breakdown not the *fabric* of society so much, you *fragment*. So rather than have this big mass out there that is hard to control, you have little groups all over the place they're a lot easier to control (One Nation Member A 2000).

The non-racist framing of an essentially racist discourse is common to many neo-populist parties. The framing of One Nation's anti-immigrant contention uses politically correct terminology to defend what One Nation members claim is a unique culture (the Anglo-Australian culture) which they feel threatened not by immigration itself, but by the presence of other cultures brought in by immigrants. The battle is not against the immigrants, it is against the government's policy of cultural inclusion – multiculturalism.

MULTICULTURALISM

After the breakdown of the White Australia Policy the Whitlam Labor Government instituted a multi-cultural policy which embraced cultural diversity by encouraging immigrants to form associations to maintain their cultures rather than attempting to assimilate immigrants as quickly as possible into Anglo-Australian culture (Jupp 1995, 209-210). Malcolm Fraser's Liberal government implemented multicultural policies, providing government programs and services to ethnic minorities (Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 2004). Both major political parties continued to support multiculturalism as a policy throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Castles 1999).

Hansonism also represents a backlash against the Hawke and Keating Governments' commitment, through the 1980s and early 1990s, to sever Australia's ties

to Great Britain and to forge new ties within Asia (Brunton 1998; Kelly 1998). The Keating government, in particular, was committed to multicultural policies which aimed at creating a hybrid Asian culture within Australia (Ahluwalia and McCarthy 1998, 84). The rejection of Australia's British heritage, and the emphasis upon multiculturalism, energized a materialist constituency that was both pro-British and mono-cultural.

Multiculturalism became a focal point for neo-populist discontent. One Nation's anti-multiculturalism platform was nominally not xenophobic because immigrants were welcome as long as they were prepared to fully assimilate into Anglo-Australian culture. In the 1998 election study, 86% of One Nation voters agreed or strongly agreed that "migrants should celebrate Australian heritage," compared with 73% of Liberal voters, 59% of Labor voters, and 74% of National Party voters (see Appendix IV Table 3.7).

In effect, however, "culture" was merely convenient shorthand for "race." It was not that all migrants failed to assimilate; it was that Asian and Middle Eastern migrants in particular find it difficult to assimilate into "mainstream" (white) Australian culture.

Between 1984 and 1995, 40 per cent of all migrants coming into this country were of Asian origin. They have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate. Of course, I will be called racist but, if I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country (Pauline Hanson - Maiden Speech 1996).

Some One Nation candidates and members assume that certain migrant groups can never assimilate. This is particularly true of Muslims, who are believed to have a diametrically opposed culture to Australian culture:

But for whatever reason, in the Muslim side of the... * the way their culture is, it's so much different. I haven't really thought this through, but for whatever reason, honesty and fair play, on that side of the spectrum, don't seem to exist. And what that does is that tends to corrupt. But I guess what I'm trying to say is that on one side you've got The Christian ethic and belief, and family values or whatever. And we'll strengthen that and make that the last stand. But on the other side you've got the Muslim community and the Middle East and you've got the Asian community and etc., and it's a losing battle because the more immigration you bring in there, the more you dilute (One Nation Member A 2000).

The notion that particular immigrant cultures can “corrupt” the Australian culture and its essentially Christian values is something that many other members attempted to articulate, albeit with little success. The theme of “corruption of culture” has replaced the theme of “corruption of bloodlines” in the neo-populist discourse of race.

Some of the more extreme aspects of multicultural policies have been seized by Hanson supporters and used to prove that multiculturalism unfairly targeted Australian culture in preference to ethnic and minority cultures.

This rubbish about not having Christmas Carols at school because you offend the minorities: that's absolutely rampant! How do you address that? I don't know! That's the politically correct agenda that that the elite have that's causing this destruction. How do you attack that? I don't know! (One Nation Member A 2000).

Multiculturalism, One Nation members argue, is a racist policy, because it emphasizes race and ethnicity and ensures that minorities are ghettoized so that differences persist over time, thus it actually *causes* racism. As one One Nation member said to me after a meeting I attended in June of 2000, “before this we were all Australians!”

* Ellipses without brackets indicate a natural pause made by the speaker him or herself; ellipses within square brackets [...] indicate that a portion of the transcript has been edited out either to protect the speaker's identity or for the sake of brevity.

I'm fourth generation Australian from Nepalese descent. I've never had a racial problem in this country, and the only reason it become [sic] an issue is when they started giving it a name: multiculturalism. Since they gave it a name, passed legislation about it. That was the start of it. No one ever tried to stop 'em doing what they wanted before. As long as they have the multicultural thing. It was never an issue. When they started using it for discrimination. It's killed what Australia is all about, as far as I was concerned. It's really destroyed it (One Nation Member F 2000).

This seems to be a common feeling among One Nation members, although there is little scholarly support for the notion that there was no “racial problem” in Australia before multiculturalism. Yet there is an obvious populist appeal here – a hearkening back to a golden age when everyone was just like everyone else, an egalitarian Australia where, in Australian idiom, everyone got “a fair go.”

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 1B

Almost all scholars and every interviewee viewed immigration and multiculturalism as a significant factor in the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation party. One Nation voters, most of whom are racially conservative, were activated by Hanson's calls for immigration controls and the abolition of the policy of multiculturalism. Non-white immigration was a significant mobilizing issue for the grassroots of the party: that is, it is one of the most important structural factors which explains the emergence of a neo-populist party.

FACTOR 1C: INCREASED INDIGENOUS ACTIVISM WIK, ATSIC, AND RECONCILIATION

INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS AND POLITICS

The Aboriginal peoples of Australia were possibly the least fortunate indigenous population of the three Commonwealth countries. Colonized under the seventeenth

century British legal doctrine of *terra nullius*, Australia was considered an “empty land” – devoid of civilized population and therefore available for settlement without treaty. Australia was the only Commonwealth country to be colonized without a treaty (Brennan 2004, 150). Pre-existing Aboriginal land and property rights (and, indeed, civil rights) were disregarded throughout the first 200 years of European settlement in Australia. Aborigines eventually won the right to vote in 1967. The 1970s saw the formation of indigenous organizations and the beginnings of indigenous activism on civil rights issues. As the international indigenous rights movement gained momentum, and an indigenous rights epistemic community was formed in the 1980s and early 1990s, Aboriginal rights groups began to push more forcefully for the recognition of native title (land rights) as well as for recognition of the problematic nature of British colonization.

In the early 1990s the Hawke government placed Aboriginal affairs on the political agenda as never before. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) was set up in 1990 to serve as both advocacy and administrative arm of the government’s indigenous programs and services (Pratt 2003, 3-4). In 1988, the bicentennial of British settlement, Prime Minister Hawke had announced that a treaty of reconciliation between Aborigines and settler Australians was necessary to redress the wrongs done to Australia’s indigenous inhabitants. Faced with considerable political opposition to a treaty, however, Hawke retreated, although the dialogue continued and a Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation was formed to promote the process and to bring into the open the oppression of Aborigines over the period of European settlement (Brennan 2004, 151). As a vehicle for improving race relations, however, the

reconciliation process proved erratic. Even some academics questioned the value of the process and defended Australia's colonial history against what they saw as "The Black Armband School" of history.⁸

The push for recognition of Native Title achieved some success in June of 1992 with the handing down of the historic Mabo Decision by the Australian High Court, which negated the assumption of *terra nullius* and established native title to land. In effect, the decision recognized that indigenous property rights pre-existed and survived the acquisition of British sovereignty. In 1996 the High Court's Wik decision established that native title could co-exist with pastoral leases – Crown land that is still used by pastoralists for grazing. The Wik decision caused a panic in Australian rural communities since it appeared to imply that graziers would lose their leases, and thus their livelihood. The Wik decision, however, merely gave Aboriginal groups that could prove ties to the land the right of access (Coltheart 1996, 16). Nevertheless, many farming groups were extremely vocal in their opposition.

ONE NATION AND ABORIGINES

The bicentennial celebration of British settlement of Australia stirred indigenous

⁸ In 1993 Geoffrey Blainey – Emeritus Professor of History at the University of Melbourne, prominent and much-respected in his field, gave the Latham Lecture entitled "Drawing Up a Balance Sheet of Our History." In it he decried the tendency of modern historians of Australia to condemn Australia's past – particularly its treatment of Aborigines and immigrants. This overly-critical approach to Australian history (the "Black Armband" school) was, in Blainey's opinion, just as inaccurate as the overly-laudatory approach that it replaced (Blainey 1993). Blainey argued that, while the colonist's treatment of Aborigines was not admirable by modern standards, it was nevertheless understandable by the standards of the eighteenth century. The Aborigines were not a unified culture – in fact there were over four hundred separate dialects, at least two in the area surrounding Sydney Harbour alone. The language barrier and the huge contrast between the indigenous society and the European settler society meant that a treaty would have been almost impossible to achieve. The stone-age culture was bound to lose in the face of advancing modernization, and while the treatment of Aborigines was "often lamentable" there have been attempts to address past wrongs (Blainey 1993, 14-15). Blainey's comments drew a firestorm of criticism both within and outside the academic community. In recent years, however, his comments have been reevaluated, particularly his argument that Aboriginal culture is not necessarily morally superior to Anglo-Australian culture.

rights activism to life, this in turn increased the awareness of Aboriginal issues among the general public. Not only did indigenous rights issues become more visible, Aboriginal leaders became more voluble and educated, and less deferential – and thus more likely to stir up some level of resentment among mainstream Australians (Brennan 2004, 149-150). The Wik decision and the reconciliation process, while well received in some circles, were regarded with a great deal of fear by a significant segment of the population, particularly in rural areas which were more likely to be affected by Native Title claims (Kingston 1999, 74). Furthermore, the Federal Government's attempt to alleviate the plight of Aborigines – who still constitute the most disadvantaged population in the country – through welfare programs seems to have fostered considerable resentment in some communities (Brunton 1998, 40).

Essentially, Hanson tapped into this vein of suspicion and resentment of Aboriginal welfare programs, so that to some extent she was elected on the basis of her views on race (Hill 1998, 92). The Australian Election Study of 1998 shows that the Aboriginal issue was even more pertinent to One Nation voters than the issue of increased Asian immigration. While 91.4% of One Nation voters agreed that “Aboriginal land rights had gone too far” or “much too far,” and 93% agreed that “government help for Aborigines had gone too far,” only 52% of non-One Nation voters agreed with either of those statements (see Appendix IV Table 3.8). The land rights issue was an extraordinarily important issue for One Nation voters.

Hanson's first appearance in the media was not a rant against immigration but a diatribe against Aboriginal welfare programs and Reconciliation:

I would be the first to admit that, not that many years ago the Aborigines were treated wrongly but in trying to correct this they have

gone too far. I don't feel responsible for the treatment of Aboriginal people in the past because I had no say but my concern is now and for the future. How can we expect this race to help themselves when governments shower them with money, facilities and opportunities that only these people can obtain no matter how minute the indigenous blood is that flows through their veins and that is what is causing the racism (Hanson, cited in Richardson 1998, 154).

It was this invective that forced the Liberal Party to dis-endorse her as a candidate, but there is no doubt that Hanson's rhetoric increased support for her candidacy as an independent. In regards to Aboriginal policy, particularly in regards to Native Title and Reconciliation, One Nation had a fairly solid handle on the views of their core constituents:

The majority of Australians still don't believe that we should be saying "we're sorry!" (One Nation Member G 2000).

The push for indigenous rights post a threat to the materialist values of many rural Australians, and Aboriginal Reconciliation threatened their view of Australian history and their place in it. It is not surprising that One Nation voters felt strongly about these issues.

THE "ABORIGINAL INDUSTRY"

Just as the party framed their anti-immigration policy in terms of culture rather than race, the party framed its indigenous affairs policy in terms of government fraud. Hanson attempted – albeit ineffectively – to avoid charges of racism by claiming that she was merely against the wastage inherent in the government's welfare programs: "I'm not down on Aborigines, I am down on the Aboriginal Industry" (Hanson, cited in Sutton 2001). The rhetorical notion of an "industry" which skimmed money from government coffers without actually helping indigenous people is common to all three

countries in the study. Many rural One Nation Members expressed concern that welfare payments to Aborigines kept them dependent on the government:

The government's very wrong giving handouts to people. I got nothing against the Aborigines, but I think the system is what's bringing them undone. There are so many of them unemployed (One Nation Member D 2000).

Undoubtedly a proportion of One Nation's suspicion of ATSIC seems justified. Ron Brunton – an anthropologist working on land rights issues, admits that by 1997 “there was a serious malaise in Aboriginal affairs” (Brunton 1998, 40) and political and media observers became apprehensive about ATSIC's lack of accountability and transparency. Indeed such was the concern about ATSIC that a governmental inquiry was set up to review the commission's activities, although no corruption was actually uncovered (Pratt 2003). Media coverage, however, highlighted the issue and increased the concern that the programs were wasting money.

The language of party documents is couched in the familiar neo-populist language of equality for all: it is unfair for this “pampered minority” to receive benefits that are not offered to all Australians (Reynolds 1998, 149). From the beginning Hanson argued that the politically correct elites were practicing a form of reverse racism so that the (white) majority suffered discrimination (Dick 2004). Hanson argued that all citizens should be treated equally and their needs should be assessed without consideration of their race or ethnicity (Brunton 1998, 40). One Nation supporters emphasize the divisiveness of Aboriginal affairs policy, claiming that it affected Australian culture.

What I'm saying is that twenty years ago, it was different – we was all one. There were Aborigines and Australians. There were no such thing as Aborigines we were all Australians, and suddenly there's "them and us!" And all in the name of reconciliation! I mean it's ... the more they say reconciliation the more apart it gets. It's crazy! (One Nation Member A 2000).

The resentment is obvious, but it is shrouded in the language of democracy and equality.

Until governments wake up to themselves and start looking at equality not color then we might start to work together as one (Hanson, cited in Richardson 1998). By emphasizing the need for unity and cultural integrity, rural materialist Australians hid their fear of losing their grip on their cultural hegemony.

Despite the rhetorical commitment equality and fairness, however, it remains obvious that at some level there is active racism within the party leadership, and the party's base is evidently motivated by xenophobia towards Aborigines. The devaluation of Aboriginal culture in the rhetoric of party leaders is even more obvious than the devaluation of immigrant cultures. Hanson's own rhetoric about the Aborigines seems fairly mild compared with that of her close advisor, David Oldfield, who claimed Aborigines had been "eating each other for 40,000 years" (cited in Roberts 1998).⁹

We don't think their culture has any value at all. It's of no consequence, really, in the sense of helping anybody – it doesn't even help them. ... I don't think it's up to us to preserve it. [...] Those who wish to live the traditional lifestyle should be afforded the opportunity to do so, and those who wish to integrate into Australian society should be assisted the same as any other person – not more (Oldfield cited in Pollard 1998, 58).

⁹ Oldfield's remarks are indisputably racist, but other interviewees saw him as more Machiavellian than xenophobic, and all the more repugnant for it (Australian Democrats Senator J 2000; Labor Member of Parliament K 2000). They claimed that he was "playing the race card" to keep media attention focused on the One Nation campaign.

Oldfield is a relatively astute politician, and his words reflect his assessment of his constituency's racial conservatism.

At a rally for Pauline Hanson in July of 2001, a fundraising auction was held to raise money for Hanson's legal bills. The final two lots at the auction were a signed, framed, limited edition poster of Mal Meninga (a great Aboriginal rugby player and the incumbent captain of the Australian squad) and a framed set of Pauline Hanson "vanity" stamps. As the poster of Mal Meninga went under the hammer, the auctioneer pointed out that, while the reserve was \$300, the poster was a limited edition and could be sold the next day for much more than that, probably around \$400. The poster received no bids and was passed in. The framed stamps, while probably of limited commercial appeal, started a bidding war that raised over \$4000. This anecdote illustrates not only that the majority of attendees did not want a picture of an Aboriginal footballer, however valuable it was, but that at least one party member (the one who donated the poster) either had a well developed sense of irony or was not racist and believed that attendees would see the poster as valuable.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR C

While not all supporters can be characterized as racist (Rothwell 1998, 163) and while statements about Aborigines are framed in the language of equality and fairness, One Nation's support base must at the very least be characterized as racially conservative. There is no doubt that a considerable portion of One Nation supporters voted for Pauline Hanson because of her stance on Aborigines (Bean 2000, 148-150; Leach 2000, 45) particularly dealing with Native Title, ATSIC, and Aboriginal Reconciliation. Racism against an increasingly activist Aboriginal community was a

structural factor which provided a fertile environment for the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party. Australian rural materialists, feeling their cultural hegemony slipping away, sought a means to stem the tide and found Hansonism.

FACTOR 1D: SPATIAL PARTY POLITICS IN AUSTRALIA

BACKGROUND TO THE AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

The Australian Constitution provides for a bicameral parliament, with a lower chamber – the House of Representatives – providing the executive branch and the upper chamber as the “states’ house.” The House of Representatives is elected through single member districts and preferential voting (elsewhere called “alternative vote” or “instant runoff voting”) system. The Senate is a multi-member system (with twelve senators per state and two each from the territories) that uses a proportional single transferable vote system. While the single-member-district majority system restrains the ability of third parties to win seats in the House of Representatives, the alternative vote system does shift some power back to minor parties because they can direct their voters to give preferences to one or other of the major parties. The Senate, with its proportional system, is usually host to several minor parties who often have some control over legislation passing through the chamber.

There are three major and several minor parties in Australian federal parliament. The oldest is the Australian Labor Party (ALP) is a social democratic party that has held seats in the Australian Parliament since 1901. The second major party, the Liberal Party of Australia, is regarded as a centre-right party which has traditionally advocated free-enterprise, and has usually formed governments in coalition with the Nationals. The National Party – the third major party – was formerly called the Country Party, and is a

rural-based conservative party traditionally to the right of the liberals. The Australian Democrats were formed in 1977 as a centrist party to “Keep the Bastards Honest” (Woodward 1998) – to balance the power between Labor and the Coalition. The Australian Democrats have at various times attracted a large protest vote against the major parties, and they have often held a significant number of seats in the Senate although have never managed to win a seat in the House. The Green Party, formed in the 1980s, currently has two representatives in the Senate, although its support is growing within state legislatures. Traditionally very progressive on most social issues, the Green party is regarded as occupying political space which is to the left of the ALP. Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party is the newest of these minor parties.

ONE NATION DEMOGRAPHICS – WHERE THE VOTE CAME FROM

The source of One Nation support in terms of prior party adherence was initially a source of some confusion. While the preliminary analysis of Pauline Hanson’s win as an independent focused on how many votes she took from the Liberal Party – of which she herself had been a member – or how many votes she took from the ALP – since she had won in a former Labor stronghold by a large margin – in fact in most cases One Nation drew support from the National Party (Catley 1997, 89-90). In his more sophisticated analysis of the 1996 election, Murray Goot points out that almost two thirds of One Nation’s initial support came at the Coalition’s expense, although the National Party lost more voters: 26% compared with 17% from the Liberal Party and 12% from Labor (Goot 1998, 55). The 1998 AES data shows that Hanson drew support from all of the parties, although more voters were former Liberal Party voters, almost a quarter of all One Nation voters had been Labor voters in the 1996 election (see

Appendix IV Table 3.10).

However, just as the National Party was not the only party to lose voters to Pauline Hanson, neither was the phenomenon a purely rural one. While much of the support came from the bush, some of it also came from the urban fringe (Davis and Stimson 1998, 76). Of the eleven seats won by One Nation in the Queensland state election of 1998, One Nation won five seats from the Nationals but six from the ALP (Brennan and Mitchell 1999, 382) many of them outer suburbs of Brisbane like Hanson's own seat of Oxley.

In many ways Hanson's vote was a protest vote over a "smorgasbord of grievances" against the major parties (Grattan 2000). Hanson herself conceived of her success as providing "someone to vote for other than the two major parties" (One Nation Member B 2002). As Table 3.9 illustrates, over half (54%) of One Nation voters thought that the parties were doing a bad or very bad job, compared with only 12% of Liberal voters, 24% of ALP voters, or, more significantly, only 35% of Democrats and 24% of Greens – both traditional protest parties (Bean, Gow, and McAllister 1998). The major parties had evidently shifted in ideological space, leaving a portion of their former constituents unrepresented. Importantly, all three major parties had moved in ideological space in terms of important economic policies, and all three major parties were in policy agreement, at least on the major focus of those policies. One Nation presented policy alternatives to policies that had been embraced by all the major parties; in this way One Nation also drew supporters from all the major parties.

NEO-LIBERALISM AND DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE MAJOR PARTIES

Even the most casual of observers agree that the Australian Labor Party, the

Liberal Party, and the National Party have repositioned themselves ideologically over the past ten to fifteen years, and most One Nation supporters regard *all* of the major parties as abandoning their former constituencies. “Back in the old days, the Labor party used to look after the workers and the Liberal Party used to look after business ... not any more” (One Nation Member A 2000).

Surprisingly, it was the Hawke and Keating Labor governments who first installed quite radical neo-liberal economic and trade policies in the 1980s and early 1990s. The Hawke government’s renunciation of Australia’s decades-old protectionism – breaking down tariff barriers and reducing subsidies, floating the exchange rate of the Australian dollar, deregulating financial markets, and selling off state-owned enterprises – represented not merely a new vision for the Labor Party but also for Australia itself (Kelly 1992, 19-33). In their attempt to retool the Australian economy for an era of increasingly global trade Prime Minister Bob Hawke and his treasurer and successor Paul Keating were a full decade ahead of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair’s “Third Way” progressivism. These neo-liberal policies involved a shift in focus from an emphasis upon cultural ties with Britain, and the perception that Australia was a European outpost in the Southern Hemisphere, to recognizing that the Australian economy was closely linked to the Asian region, and thus Australia should see itself as part of Asia. After the fall of the Keating government in 1996 – by no coincidence the year of Hanson’s election – John Howard enthusiastically continued much of these internationalist economic policies, although he shifted away from ties with Asia and concentrated on building a stronger relationship with the United States.

Although these neo-liberal policy initiatives were embraced by both the ALP

and the Liberals, the ALP's constituents were more obviously affected by industrial deregulation and by the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Many working class people, and indeed some Labor politicians, perceived that these measures were a betrayal of Labor's traditional platform (Watts 1997).

A lot of people don't understand that a lot of working class Anglo Saxon conservative Australians vote for Labor on economic issues. They no longer have faith in the party around those issues (Labor Member of Parliament K 2000).

Disaffected Labor voters know that Labor has reneged on its ideology. Labor had a "light on the hill" philosophy and ideology of the left. Keating's privatized it, sold it off – they've become prostitutes, they've sold out (One Nation Member C 2000).

The discourse among former Labor voters at One Nation meetings dwelt on fundamental notions of equity and fairness, but also on the notion that Labor had sold out to corporate campaign contributions.

When you sell your public utilities, there's nothing to keep the private in check. That's what we've got now. Unfortunately it's the big private companies that are funding the liberal and labor governments. If they don't appease their masters for the bucks ... Are you going to do the right thing by the people who don't pay you or the people who make huge contributions to you? (One Nation Member F 2000).

This comment resonates with traditional populist distrust of political and financial elites. The major parties are seen as selling off not merely state-owned enterprises but part of Australia for their own benefit and for the benefit of the wealthy while the battlers lose out. "The deserving are not getting their rightful share, the freeloaders their just deserts, and no-one's guarding the door" (Eipper 1998, 13).

It was not only the ALP that had to bear criticism from their constituents. The deregulation of primary industries as espoused the Liberal Party may have been viewed

as in the long-term interests of a significant proportion of their primarily urban constituents, but it left the National Party's rural constituency out in the cold. Yet because National could only hope to achieve influence by maintaining its close relationship to the Liberal Party in its role as minor coalition partner (Lloyd 1994, 122-125), the parliamentary wing of the National Party was in many ways hamstrung to do anything about primary industry deregulation. As one Democratic Senator put it:

And when you've got National party senators sneaking you notes in question time, and sneaking you notes during the debate saying, "Can you get this on the record, because we can't!" you know they are an emasculated legislative force. Things like recently, the common youth allowance, where we managed, finally, to get a discount when it came to farm assets, which even the National Farmers' Federation has been pushing for 10 years. And I couldn't get the Nationals to vote with us and [Senior National Party Senator] Ron Boswell was sitting there muttering "Don't call a division! Don't call a division!" So they don't want it exposed that they're letting down the bush, but they're limited in what they can do (Australian Democrats Senator J 2000).

Thus the National Party became, as one rural One Nation member put it "a mouthpiece for the Liberals – they never listened to anyone!" (One Nation Member D 2000). Rural disaffection with the major parties was of serious concern for the National Party candidates, too.

People are finally starting to come to terms with the fact that the National Party are really not doing anything for them at all, that they are under the thumb of their Liberal coalition partners (One Nation Member G 2000).

In essence, One Nation supporters were a sub-set of materialist voters from both the ALP and the coalition parties. Hanson supporters were simply long-established members of the major parties who had traditionally been – *but who were no longer* – represented by the policies of these parties.

The politics of globalization provided One Nation with a constituency of disenchanted voters who had been left behind by the major Australian parties. Just as the policies of deregulation involved a consensus between the major parties, the disillusionment with the major parties was fairly broad.

WHERE IS ONE NATION IN IDEOLOGICAL SPACE?

So if One Nation drew its voters from across the ideological spectrum, where could it be placed? Kitschelt would say that One Nation is “welfare chauvinist” in its policy appeal, and on the surface this makes sense. Many of One Nation’s policies – particularly its “2% EasyTax Plan” were not welfare chauvinist at all, but anti-statist. To place Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party on a political spectrum one would have to work policy by policy – and sometimes even that would not suffice. Like Pauline Hanson herself – a relatively wealthy small-business owner attempting to attract the Battlers, an ultra-feminine right wing leader, and an anti-politician politician – One Nation is a portrait in contrasts. One Nation’s policies were essentially incoherent – and they therefore can only be placed on an ideological spectrum with the greatest difficulty.

When asked about the movement of Australian parties on the ideological spectrum, however, One Nation members showed an interesting idiosyncrasy: while non-One Nation members all positioned Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party on the far right of the ideological spectrum, most One Nation members placed One Nation close to the perceived ideological position of their former party.

One candidate, a former member of the Liberal Party, claimed that because the Liberals have moved to the left, One Nation was on the right “where the liberals were

ten years ago” (One Nation Member A 2000). The One Nation candidate who was a former Labor Party voter, claimed that all the major parties, Liberal, National, Labor, and even the Australian Democrats, were “at eight, and One Nation’s at five” (One Nation Member F 2000). A member who came to up to chat after a party meeting described One Nation as occupying the ideological space between Labor on the Left and the Liberal Party on the right, exactly the space he thought his former party – the Australian Democrats – had occupied a decade ago when they were “keeping the bastards honest.”

One Nation’s ideological incoherence in this way serves it well, since it can be a wide variety of things to a wide variety of voters. A voter who feels abandoned by one of the major parties on one particular issue might feel that One Nation represents his or her views on that issue, and identify on that basis, despite having to deal with a fair degree of cognitive dissonance on other issues in One Nation’s platform.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 1D

The emergence of One Nation represents a serious and potentially enduring disaffection with the major parties in Australian politics. The movement of the major parties away from their traditional base can be seen in their revised stance on important political issues, particularly neo-liberal economic policies. The spatial opening was a clear structural factor in the emergence of One Nation.

CONCLUSIONS

Each of these factors is linked to the processes of globalization that have sharply increased in tempo over the past decades. It is globalization that created the deepening economic and social cleavages between rural materialists and urban post-materialists in

Australia in the 1980s and 90s. The neo-liberal policies of the mainstream Australian political parties during this period were a response to globalization and the need, perceived by leaders of both parties, to ensure Australia's global competitiveness in order to encourage economic growth. The increase in indigenous activism was supported by an epistemic community of indigenous activists which was only able to exist because of the increasing ease of international communication and travel. Even immigration – a process that has been going on for centuries, has increased as globalization has opened up international borders.

Essentially, neo-populist party emergence in the Australian case is driven by a confluence of factors that created a favorable environment for the party. While no single factor is sufficient to cause the emergence of an electorally successful party by itself, the interaction of all four factors created a suitable environment – a *structural opening* – for Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party.

Yet while all of the factors contribute to neo-populist party emergence in Australia, the most significant structural factor in this case is rural materialism. It is rural materialist values, and the rural materialists who hold those values, that provide ideological basis for the movement. It is the materialists who resent and feel threatened by increased non-white immigration and increased indigenous activism, and who feel abandoned by the major parties. Rural materialist values and norms shape the attitudes of One Nation voters and provide those voters with a coherent explanation for their plight and a plethora of scapegoats – non-white immigrants, Aborigines, and powerful elites – to blame.

While rural materialism is the strongest of the factors, all of the factors are

significant in the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party in Australia in the 1990s. Bound together by this common thread of globalization, these factors create the environment in which the neo-populist party can emerge: a structural independent variable. Together they represent a set of necessary but insufficient structural preconditions for the emergence of a neo-populist party in an advanced industrial democracy.

CHAPTER FOUR

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 1: THE STRUCTURAL FACTORS CAUSING NEO-POPULIST PARTY EMERGENCE IN CANADA

The emergence of the Reform Party of Canada was greeted with far less fear and loathing than the arrival of One Nation in Australia. At the time the Reform Party was regarded as part of the tradition of protest parties from the western provinces – it might be successful in provincial elections but few outsiders thought it would be successful on the national stage. Only after the Reform Party's electoral successes in the 1993 and 1997 elections did observers turn to examine the social and economic conditions that underpinned the party's success.

There are four factors which make up the first independent variable – the structural causes of neo-populist party emergence in Canada: A) rural materialist values; B) increased non-white immigration; C) increased indigenous activism; and D) the movement of parties in ideological space. As with Australia, each factor is present in Canada, although a particular may be present to a different degree. As in the two other cases, globalization is the lynchpin of all four structural factors which created a hospitable environment for the emergence of a neo-populist party in Canada in the 1990s.

FACTOR 1A: RURAL MATERIALIST VALUES AND THE CANADIAN WEST

While the political culture of rural Queensland was important to the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party, the political culture of the western provinces of Canada were absolutely crucial to the emergence of the Reform Party. Like Queensland in Australia, the western provinces – Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and

Manitoba – have been the cradle of third-party protest politics throughout Canada's history.¹⁰ Alberta and BC have been particularly prolific, producing, among others, the Social Credit Party, the socialist Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and the New Democratic Party (NDP), all of which influenced Canadian national politics even if they were not all successful beyond the provincial level.

“THE WEST WANTS IN” – WESTERN REGIONALISM AND THE RISE OF REFORM

There are important structural factors within the Canadian system which have prevented particular regions from achieving effective redress for their grievances. “[T]hey lack the demographic weight in the lower house, the upper house is ineffectual, and the tradition of party discipline in the House of Commons hinders the expression of regional protests” (Arseneau 1994, 101). Thus the lack of responsiveness of the major parties to particular regions fuels a sense of regional neglect.

[I]n Canada there's these two regions which tend to innovate politically by creating new parties: Quebec on the one hand and the West on the other. Atlantic Canada and Ontario go back and forth, back and forth between the traditional parties, but Quebec and the West have produced a stream of new parties. Like it's part of the political culture that one of the ways of changing the National agenda, one of the ways to advance your interest, is to create a new party that either (hopefully) succeeds in some way, by getting elected usually at the provincial level, or drains enough votes away from the more pragmatic Federal parties that they're forced to address the agenda. And really Reform is part of that – there's a whole tradition of that creating new parties, or pursuing change, particularly systemic change through the creation of new parties, in Quebec and in the West. And Reform was really – I always thought of it as part of that tradition (Reform Party Member B 2004).

The formation of regional protest parties is linked both to political institutional arrangements of Canadian federalism and its party system, as well as to the political

¹⁰ Quebec, too, has been the birthplace of regional parties, although most of these are aimed at the representation of an ethno-linguistic group, and thus emerge for somewhat different reasons.

culture of these two distinct regions.

The political culture of Western Canada has roots deep in the prairie populism of the nineteenth century – the Social Credit Party, the CCF, and NDP had populist and agrarian roots – and this continues to be a distinguishing feature of the region. The concerns that characterized the Populist and Social Credit movements can be seen in the culture of the modern Canadian West, *but on a regional, rather than an individual level*. It was not merely a single individual who felt marginalized and oppressed by elite power-holders; it was the whole region. University of Calgary historian David Bercuson argues that protest and alienation are the essence of Western Canadian political culture: “Westerners perceive themselves to be alienated even when they are not” (cited in Bergman 1990, 37). The sense of “western alienation” was palpable and one major study discovered that a majority of Westerners felt, unlike central and eastern Canadians, that their province was not treated with the respect it deserved (Parkin 2001, 2). Reform Party Members who were interviewed clearly felt that the West as an entire region had been disadvantaged within the federation, and that as a result the West felt alienated from the rest of Canada.

When you look at those things that [were] set up by Central Canada to benefit Central Canada, and those things have to change. The country has to treat everybody fairly and equally, or you’re going to have this chronic discontent (Reform Party Member E 2004).

The cultural divide between the western provinces and the rest of Canada was clearly articulated by many of the interviewees. There is obviously a cleavage (albeit not exclusively urban-rural) between the cosmopolitan post-materialists of Ontario and Quebec and the rural materialists of Alberta and BC, although most interviewees became defensive at the implication that Westerners were *not* “cosmopolitan.”

Nevertheless, all of the Reform interviewees painted a picture of the western provinces as a distinct political culture – one Reform Party member claimed that Alberta is “the Texas of Canada” (Reform Party Member G 2003) – which has been shaped by a frontier ethic similar to that of the American West, and where “everybody is within a generation of having a real connection to the land” (Reform Party Member E 2004). All interviewees described the culture of the West as being more democratic, and more egalitarian, than the rest of Canada:

[Y]ou always read about Athens and that, but actually the first, the *idea* of Greek democracy started in the frontier, in the Greek frontier settlements and was brought back to Athens. And there’s something like de Tocqueville’s thesis that the more egalitarian a society is, the more it values equality, that those are conditions that make democratic values and institutions and processes work better. And there’s something about the frontier: *it levels!* It doesn’t matter who your parents were, or where you came from, you’re judged on what you can do, you know! And so there’s something about the West (Reform Party Member B 2004).

While the above quote represents the clearest articulation of the egalitarian and democratic culture of the West, western Canada was described by all interviewees as being culturally distinct in a positive way. Almost all Reform members interviewed commented on the differences between eastern and western provincial cultures which correspond to an urban-post-materialist, rural-materialist cleavage. The East is socially progressive, while the West is socially conservative; the East is fast-paced, while the West down-to-earth and no-nonsense; the East has a more “aristocratic” culture, while the West is more democratic. This latter characteristic was the most heavily emphasized as positive, and it plainly conforms to the populist theme of the empowerment of the ordinary person.

Western prairie populist culture is evident in much of the party platform, and

while some members of the party – including its leader, Preston Manning – dislike the label of “populist,” much of the rhetoric of the leadership acknowledges the heritage:

I tend to use the word “democratic” rather than “populism” because populism has been given that negative connotation, particularly in the academic literature. But certainly there’s an element of the grass-roots, the bottom-up; that the ordinary person should have more say, not just selecting their leaders but directing them afterward.[...] I mean there is a dark side against every system and that is the dark side to grassroots movements. But there is definitely a “democratic” flavor to Western Canadian politics: a valuing of the bottom-up approach, and that the ordinary person ought to have more say (Reform Party Member B 2004).

The rhetorical connection between democracy and populism is consistent:

Well I think the populism is still there [in the party platform]. I think it’s an important part of our democratic package. And to me it means that the people really do have power to affect the legislative and government agenda. And right now they have very little power, and that’s why I think you see turnout at elections dropping. They don’t have the power, they know that. It’s very real, it’s not just a perception – it’s very real. So our party offers some true democratic reforms. No other party will ever put that in place, because no other party really believes it (Reform Party Member J 2003).

The Reform Party’s platform advocating citizen-initiated referenda and recall, like the Triple-E Senate,¹¹ is a consequence of the party’s western populist roots. The reforms suggested within the party platform were aimed at restructuring the institutions that Westerners believed marginalized the western provinces from power, but they had at their foundation a deep faith in the innate virtue and wisdom of the common folk, an abiding distrust of elites, and a materialist political culture.

¹¹ The Triple-E Senate was an early proposal of the Reform Association developed by Ted Byfield. The proposal called for a constitutional reform so that the Canadian upper chamber would be “elected, equal, and effective” – it would consist of elected senators, rather than party hacks appointed by the prime minister, each province would have an equal number of senators, and the Senate would be made effective by being given veto power over legislation regarding provincial matters. (Hughes 1996).

ANTI-ELITE FEELING IN THE WEST: “THE COMMON SENSE OF THE COMMON PEOPLE”

The importance of the ordinary person, the common man who is marginalized and alienated from power, is clearly evident in the rhetoric of the Reform Party’s leaders. The interviewees often mentioned the importance of listening to the ordinary person whose links to the land give them a grasp of simple truths; what Manning described as “the common sense of the common people” – a clearly populist maxim. The tradition of prairie populism is evident in the interviewee’s valorization of the grassroots of the party:

I think really the most people would relate to is grassroots – it seems like that refers to the blue collar worker, the rancher, and these people that kinda have ... Particularly in Western Canada, everybody is within a generation of having a real connection to the land, I guess, and that’s why that term seems to resonate (Reform Party Member E 2004).

This valuation of the grassroots – the ordinary folk on the farm – has as its corollary a deep and abiding distrust of elites, particularly political elites.

It is clear that the rural materialists who comprised much of the constituency of Reform Party voters, felt as marginalized from power as did their predecessors within the Populist movement of the late nineteenth century. Of the Reform Party voters in the Canadian Election Study of 1993, 48.3% agreed with the statement that “People like me do not have a say in what the government does” (Johnston et al. 1995). Of all respondents, Reform Party voters were most likely to agree with the statement – fourteen percentage points above the national average (see Appendix V Table 4:1).

Although not as well-known an idiom in Canada as it is in Australia and New Zealand, tall-poppy syndrome is occasionally mentioned as a “Canadian affliction” (Coxe 2004). As a nation the Canadians are far more suspicious of success than are

Americans. The anti-elite attitudes of the Reform Party grassroots are part of this tradition and that of prairie populism. The Reformers' distrust of politicians is evident in the coverage of the emergence of the party in the decidedly neo-populist *Alberta Report* newspaper (see Chapter 7).

In many interviews the anti-elite attitudes of the Reform Party were contrasted with the paternalistic attitudes of “eastern elites” from the other parties.

Yeah, it's the whole “Father knows best.” The best example I can think of: I was with a Tory MP in a debate in Grand Centre, Alberta, in Beaver River, and the big shots from the Tory party sent in one of their MPs to have a little debate with [me]. [...] They booked a room in one of the hotels that would hold 200 people, and there were 350 to 400 people there [...] and one of them asked another question (which was not answered) and said “That's not good enough, I want to know, you've got a blank there with an asterisk saying ‘we'll let you know.’ I want to know now before I vote on this!” And this MP just exploded, and he said “You people just don't understand!” And I thought “Yes! You just cooked your goose man!” And that's what it's all about. So there's elitism and cronyism and all of those things (Reform Party Member G 2003).

The difference between the Reform and other major parties lies not merely in the attitudes of the elected representatives, but within the structure of the parties themselves.

We're not an elite-driven party. If you look at the debate right now – yesterday night between Peter McCain and Stephen Harper, stuff that I've been involved with as one of the negotiators. There's a lot of self-interest stuff, but there is a philosophical difference. One group believes that you get as many people as you can on board and you try to ride herd on that, and the other group believes that you have a small elite, and people ought to defer to that elite, and that Toryism ultimately, whether it's of the small government variety or of the so-called Red Tory variety – is ultimately people ought to defer to their betters, and anyone who says this always thinks that they are one of the betters. There is a belief in that, and that is the belief we have to struggle with. That is the real cultural difference. And that is the belief that meant they couldn't win out in these areas in BC (Reform Party

Member F 2003).

Almost all the interviewees commented that the internal party culture of Reform was different from that of the other major parties. Liberal and Tory MPs were not really the democratic representatives of the people because they were political insiders:

[T]he sort of feeling of ordinary people that they had no control over elected members; that the traditional party system and the extreme party discipline in the parliament made the Member of Parliament Ottawa's representative to the constituent rather than the constituent's representative to Ottawa (Reform Party Member B 2004).

Reform MPs, in contrast, were true representatives of the people – they were Ottawa outsiders.

Outsider status within political systems is important to neo-populists, and while ordinarily the intellectual son of a long-serving Alberta premier would not automatically be given political-outsider status, Preston Manning was accorded it in part because he was a Westerner. And despite the fact that many Reform MPs were middle-class, all the original MPs interviewed described themselves as political outsiders.

The Reformers weren't business or political elites at all, and that was part of the resentment when we arrived in Ottawa. There is a political establishment in Ottawa and newcomers aren't particularly welcome, and we weren't part of that political elite, we were farmers, we were teachers, we were small business people (Reform Party Member E 2004).

The formulation of the “reluctant politician” has a long political history, but it is particularly resonant for populists, for whom insider status implies that the populist has become a member of the distrusted elite and has thus stopped representing the common folk.

Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s Manning had argued that perks such

as the MPs' Pension Plan and the Leader of the Oppositions' official residence, Stornoway, were a waste of taxpayer money – another example of powerful elites stealing from the common folk – and Manning claimed that Reform Party MPs would not accept these perks. When the Reform Party became the official Opposition in 1997, however, several MPs decided to “opt in” to the pension scheme, causing something of a split within the caucus (Geddes and Fisher 1998; Mulawka 1998). More serious, however, was Manning's decision to occupy Stornoway – a decision which certainly undermined his own credibility as outsider and may have damaged the party's credibility at the grassroots level (Pundit 2001). Yet the importance of the Reform MPs' outsider status is still apparent in the attitudes of most of the Reformers interviewed.

I didn't really want to be a politician ... most of us don't. That's the big difference between us and them ... not all of us I can't say. We've even got some politicians now. But most of us came here to change the place and get out. That was the aim: to get out of here after you'd fixed it. Get out of here and move on because we all had lives. There are a number of Liberals who ... this is their job. They want to be here forever: it's a career. So we're very different. Very, very different (Reform Party Member A 2003).

Almost all of the first-wave of Reformers insisted that they were still “outsiders” to the political system – ordinary people rather than politicians.

RURAL MATERIALISM IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES

While Reform MPs valorized the grassroots members of the Reform Party, the party's membership is not described with as many accolades by outside observers. Like the constituency of New Zealand First and One Nation, the Reform Party represented “the constituency of the old that had been attracted to right wing separatism and was now attracted to the Reform Party. It was fundamentally cranky and intolerant and

wanted to return to the stable 1950s” (Melnyk 1993, 56). Like the supporters of One Nation and New Zealand First, Reform members were materialists who were less able to adapt to the cultural and economic changes that were being forced on them in the information age.

The Reform Party’s core constituents are therefore alienated at the individual, as well as the provincial and regional level; like supporters of other neo-populist parties, they are those who have been left behind by globalization. The oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s had been followed by a severe recession which left many westerners less comfortable. Despite the Reform Platform’s commitment to free market economics, the grassroots of Manning’s party were clearly those Canadians who did not have the skills to keep up with global economic change: “Small business operators, middle managers, traditional professionals, self-employed and retired Canadians [...] have been largely unable to capitalize on the new opportunities presented by rapid technological change and the rise of an information-based, service economy” and these groups, along with western farmers and older blue collar workers, form the basis of Manning’s voting bloc (Sigurdson 1994, 263). Academic studies found that support for Reform was indeed strongest among older, blue collar workers and small businessmen and farmers (Harrison and Johnston 1996, 165-8), the precise demographic which comprised New Zealand First and One Nation’s support. Reform’s attractiveness to these rural materialists is explained by the party’s ability to incorporate “grievances about a rapidly changing society into its platform and rhetoric” (Harrison and Krahn 1995, 141).

Despite this materialism, Reformers were more concerned about social than economic issues (Harrison and Johnston 1996, 169). Concern for “family values” –

including the restriction of gay and ethnic rights¹² – and “law and order issues” were an integral part of the platform and were aimed at rural materialists concerned by the rapid shift in (post-materialist) values represented by the Canadian charter of rights and various other socially progressive policies and legislation.

Neil Nevitte has found increasing levels of post-materialism in Canada throughout the 1980s, but points out that Canadians with sub-national identifications – such as “I am an Albertan” or “I am a Westerner,” which are popular identifications among both Reform MPs and their voters – were much more likely to be materialist than post-materialist (Nevitte 1996, 64-70). It is clear that there was a significant constituency of materialists heavily concentrated within the rural western provinces of Canada. While the rest of Canada has experienced an attitudinal shift towards post-materialism, a values change which is more suited to adapting to rapid globalization, many Western Canadians remained firmly materialist in attitude. These rural materialists formed the foundation – the grassroots – of the Reform Party.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 1A

Anti-elite, parochial, and egalitarian attitudes are an important aspect of the culture of the Canadian West and of the rural materialists who reside there. The prairie populism that constitutes much of the region’s political culture, combined with the economic changes of the past decades which disadvantaged much of the region’s population, were an essential structural factor in the emergence of a neo-populist party

¹² “MP Dave Chatters on CFOK radio in Alberta said, ‘And when you go into the issue of homosexuals and lesbians I think it’s in the interest of society to have the right to discriminate against that group in areas of [...] schools is the one that comes to mind.’ [...] Around the same time Reform MP Bob Ringma remarked that gays and ‘ethnics’ could be fired or ‘moved to the back of the shop’ if the employer thought that would help business” (Flanagan 1983).

in Canada in the late 1980s and early 90s. It was these rural materialists, threatened by the rapid social and cultural changes wrought by globalization, who provided the wave of discontent from the prairies which Preston Manning rode to Ottawa.

FACTOR 1B: NON-WHITE IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM IN CANADA

A xenophobic response to non-white immigration was an important factor in the emergence of the Reform Party of Canada. Although the correlation is less obvious than it is in either Australia or New Zealand, it is apparent that increasing levels of non-white immigration triggered a response among a segment of the population that was to be the Reform Party's constituency. And while the leadership of the Reform Party exerted itself to ensure that the party's rhetoric and platform were not xenophobic, anti-immigrant feeling among the grassroots was nevertheless a significant issue, and increased non-white immigration was a structural factor in the emergence of a neo-populist party in the 1990s.

THE HISTORY OF NON-WHITE IMMIGRATION IN CANADA

Like Australia, Canada has historically been a major settler society, and immigration has played an important role in the formation of Canadian culture. Until 1900, however, almost all non-aboriginal Canadians were ethnically European, mostly of British (57%) or French (30.7%) descent. There was a small pocket of Asian immigrants in British Columbia, brought over to build the railways in the nineteenth century, but otherwise Canada was almost uniformly European (Knowles 2000, ch. 3). The first wave of mass immigration to Canada was the result of a deliberate policy of land settlement under the Dominion Lands Act of 1872, which gave 160 acres of land to any settler who would cultivate and live on the land for three years. The Canadian

Department of the Interior deliberately courted not only British immigrants, but immigrants from Europe, particularly Germans, Hungarians, Norwegians, Swedes, and Ukrainians. There were concerted efforts to bring in white prairie farmers from the American Midwest although the government was at pains to dissuade black farmers to emigrate (Timlin 1960, 517-25). From an early period immigration to the prairie provinces had been multi-ethnic but not racially diverse.

The turn of the century was marked by increasing opposition to immigration, and particularly vocal agitation from labor groups within Canada. The aims of Canadian immigration policy changed so that Britons and (white) Americans were courted instead of central European peasants. Canada's immigration policy became steadily more restrictive. Although some categories of immigrants (such as the crippled, indigent, and insane) were already excluded, the Immigration Act of 1906 increased the number of categories of "undesirable immigrants" and extended the government's powers to bar and even deport these "undesirables." The 1910 Immigration Act provided the government with authority to exclude "immigrants belonging to any race deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada" (Canada Parliament 1910). While no race was mentioned specifically, this legislation was clearly aimed at non-white immigrants, particularly Asian immigrants.

Chinese migrants had come to Canada during the late 1800s to work building the Canadian Pacific Railway, and after the completion of the railway the Canadian Parliament passed a series of Chinese Immigration Acts in 1885, 1900, and 1903. The 1885 Act restricted the numbers of Chinese migrants who could arrive in Canada on any particular ship, and each immigrant was required to pay a "head tax." The Chinese

Immigration Act of 1923, currently referred to as the Chinese Exclusion Act, barred most forms of Chinese immigration to Canada. Japanese migrants had also found their way to British Columbia in the 1880s, but Japanese immigration had been all but halted by the Hayashi-Lemieux Gentlemen's Agreement signed with the Japanese government in 1907 whereby Japan limited the number of men it allowed to leave for Canada to four hundred per year (Timlin 1960, 526). Non-white immigration slowed to a trickle.

Even after the easing of immigration restrictions after the Second World War, including the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1947, Canada's immigration policy still aimed at maintaining the ethnographic characteristics of the population at the time. Preference was given to immigrants from countries within the British Commonwealth, Europe, or the United States, and thus non-white immigration to Canada was extremely limited in the post-war period. It was not until 1960 that the government began to reform its immigration policy, and a completely racially and ethnically blind policy was not instituted until 1967. Immigrants were admitted under a points system which gave preference to those with education and fluency in English or French (Thompson and Weinfeld 1995, 189-190). In this way Canada was, to its credit, the first of the major settler nations to institute a completely racially blind immigration policy.

The abolition of Canada's racist immigration policy had a drastic effect upon the numbers of non-white immigrants coming to Canada. In 1966 only 1% of immigrants came from Asian countries, while Britons still comprised 37% of all immigrants to Canada that year (Department of Manpower and Immigration 1966). Only two years later, in 1968, Britons comprised only 20% of all immigrants, while China provided 4.5%. In all, 7.5% of Canadian immigrants in 1968 came from Asia, a staggering

increase considering that the reform of the immigration policy had been completed only the year before (Department of Manpower and Immigration 1968). In the 1970s Canadian immigrants were even less likely to be from traditional source countries, and they were much more likely to be Asian. By 1978, British immigrants comprised only 13% of the total, although European immigration was still 34%. Immigrants from the People's Republic of China had slowed, but immigrants from Hong Kong were 5.4% of all immigrants, and 27.8% of all immigrants came from Asian countries (Employment and Immigration Canada 1980, 5-6).

By 1991 more than half of all new immigrants (52%) came from Asian countries, with 9.6% of all immigrants arriving from Hong Kong, 6% from China, and 5% from the Philippines, and the top ten source nations for Canadian immigrants 1991 were, in order, Hong Kong, Poland, China, India, the Philippines, Lebanon, Vietnam, Great Britain, El Salvador, and Sri Lanka (Employment and Immigration Canada 1992, x). By 1997 “visible minorities” – Canada’s official term for non-white immigrants and citizens – made up 70% of new arrivals (Srebrnik 1997). As a result of this changing immigration pattern, by the early 1990s the demographics of Canada had altered significantly, and by 1996 visible minorities comprised 11.2% of the population, with Canadians of Asian ethnicity comprising 4.9% of all Canadians (Census of Canada 1996), a significant ethnographic shift over the course of twenty years.

What is interesting about immigration patterns throughout this period is the fact that immigrants tend to congregate in particular provinces. While Ontario is by far the most common destination for immigrants, Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta are also common destinations. The Maritime Provinces received almost no immigrants

throughout this period. Immigrants were concentrated, typically, in major cities in Ontario and Quebec, with francophone immigrants given preference for Quebec. Thus immigration was perceived quite differently in different regions of the country, a fact which helps to explain the regional nature of anti-immigrant sentiment that bolsters the Reform Party.

There was a clear shift in the ethnic composition of Canadian immigrant cohorts over the past three decades. While Canada had no explicitly stated “White Canada” policy, Canadian immigration policy throughout the twentieth century was, nevertheless, aimed at curtailing non-white immigration. After the reform of Canada’s immigration policy in the 1960s and 70s, non-white immigration to Canada grew exponentially, particularly in the 1980s. This rapid ethnographic shift was a necessary condition for the emergence of a neo-populist party in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

THE FRAMING OF THE REFORM PARTY’S IMMIGRATION POLICIES

During the early 1990s, public opinion in Canada as a whole was more clearly supportive of large scale immigration than it was in either Australia or New Zealand. While 73% of Australians favored reducing immigration, only 43% of Canadians thought that too many immigrants were being admitted (Freeman 1997, 51). Canada has always projected the image of a tolerant, successful multicultural society; while American immigration policy was founded on the metaphor of the melting pot, Canadians have always described themselves as a “cultural mosaic” of distinct cultures living together.

Despite this tradition of cultural tolerance and the apparent support for high levels of immigration, the 1993 Canadian Election Study found that 57% of Canadians

“strongly agreed” or “agreed” that “too many recent immigrants just don’t want to fit into Canadian society” (Johnston 1995). Thus while there may be cultural support for immigration as a perceived positive force in Canadian history, Canadians as a whole were concerned about how new immigrants were assimilated into “mainstream” Canadian society. More importantly, as Table 4:2 in Appendix V shows, Reform Party voters were significantly more concerned about the assimilation of immigrants than the national average – almost 70% of Reform Party voters agreed or strongly agreed that too many new immigrants did not wish to assimilate.

While Reform voters were concerned about the assimilation of immigrants into Canadian society, elite opinion within the Reform Party – like elite opinion anywhere – was, at least in its public expression, far more moderate on the issue. Even this moderate rhetoric, however, drew supporters who were less progressive on issues of race and ethnicity because “while the party leadership and the policy platform is not in itself racist, its positions may serve as cues or codes to those who harbor intolerant views” (Jenkins 2003, 153-155). While not all Reform Party voters or members held racist attitudes, there is no doubt that there was a fairly large subset of Reformers who were fearful of non-white immigration; the issue, according to several interviewees, was very important – “right under the surface” – although most people were too “browbeaten into believing that it is politically incorrect even to raise this issue” (Reform Party Member K 2004).

Notwithstanding the care taken to moderate the rhetoric surrounding immigration, some prominent Reform Party members, including some early members of the executive of the party in Alberta, occasionally tipped their hand to the media.

In 1990, Rex Welbourne, vice-president of the party's interim executive in Peterborough, told the *Toronto Star*, "A larger number of blacks and Asians are entering Canada; for the first generation, their birth rate is higher and you don't have to be an expert to understand what could happen. Canada as we know it could disappear (Hughes 1996).

Among the party leaders there was a determination to steer the party clear of extremism in regards to immigration policy and rhetoric about race. This determination by the elite, however, was at odds with one of the party's other objectives: intra-party democracy.

Grassroots input on matters of policy was an important part of Preston Manning's democratic reform package. Members of the party had the right to meet and vote in Constituent Assemblies and to submit policy resolutions. However, in 1989, after the assemblies had submitted resolutions regarding immigration policy, the Party Policy Committee was forced to withdraw all eighteen because they were "negative in orientation," including a resolution calling for maintaining the ethnic/cultural balance "as of September 1990," or one that called for the deportation of immigrants convicted of crimes or for the disallowance of dual citizenship (cited in Dobbin 1991, 135-169). Although the immigration policy stance maintained by the elite of the party seemed quite moderate, the policies suggested by these rank-and-file members of the party – Manning's much vaunted "grassroots" of the movement – paralleled the attitudes of the New Zealand First and One Nation constituencies.

The party elite had to navigate a fine line between developing an immigration policy which pleased its core supporters but which allowed the party's opponents to brand it as racist, or developing a policy which avoided the racist label but which alienated the party's core support. In its 1991 manifesto the party supported a "direct

democratic process” on moral issues and any matters which would “alter the basic social fabric such as immigration, language, and measurement” (cited in Arseneau 1994, 109) and opposed immigration criteria based upon anything other than the “neutral” consideration of “an immigrant’s ability to contribute to Canada’s economic development” (Srebrnik 1997, 10). Manning argued that, far from being racist, the party’s commitment was color blind since it judged each applicant equally, but critics charged that Reform’s policy – particularly its use of trigger phrases such as “immigrants who fit in” – was a fairly transparent attempt at restricting Third World immigration (Sharpe and Braid 1992, 127). Even requiring immigrants to have the “human capital necessary to adjust *quickly and independently* to the needs of Canadian society and the job market” implied that immigrants should be English speaking, and that restriction on the “Family Class” of immigrant would “in effect bar much non-European immigration into Canada” (Kirkham 1998, 252).

Notwithstanding the party elite’s attempt to moderate the rhetoric, the leadership continued to invite ultra-conservative pundit Bill Gairdner to party conventions where he received rapturous applause and excellent book sales. Gairdner argues that “non-traditional” immigration threatens the culture of English-Speaking Canada. He suggests that a return to a “traditional” immigration policy would ensure that Canadians spoke the same language, had the same Judeo-Christian religious traditions, and Graeco-Roman philosophical and legal traditions because it is reasonable to want to preserve “the same culture and environment that made the nation strong” (Gairdner 1990, 408). Expressing the neo-populists’ common fear of ethnic strife, Gairdner argues that immigration is dangerous to social cohesion:

Whenever an invading culture reaches about this percentage of the total, the majority gets restless. They intuitively feel threatened. It doesn't matter whether they are threatened or not. What matters is they feel threatened. [...] Once people start to *feel* their culture is threatened, racial strife increases, people relocate, and feelings of discrimination become common in those who have never before experienced such feelings (Gairdner 1990, 408).

Gairdner's rhetoric of "invasion" parallels Pauline Hanson's "swamped by Asians" language and is a clear indication that the core support of each party held similar attitudes on non-white immigration.

The party's stance on immigration and non-white immigrants meant that xenophobic individuals and groups were drawn to it. To his credit, Manning attempted to ensure that extremists were excluded from the ranks. In 1988 Manning personally prevented Doug Collins – an extreme right-wing and xenophobic tabloid journalist – from running in Vancouver (Collins 2000) and in 1992 the party dismissed four members of a Toronto constituency association because they were also members of the neo-Nazi Heritage Front group (Srebrnik 1997, 7-8). These incidents were well covered by the media, although Manning's response was not, and many observers accused the party of tolerating racists within its ranks. Many of the Reform MPs were well aware of the problems within the grass-roots.

It's extremely easy to take over so you get all these single issue people, or people with just extreme views that get attracted to that and take a run at it. [...] we used to joke that "A bright light attracts a lot of bugs!" and that "there are weeds in the grass roots" but it wasn't a joking matter! It was a real difficulty (Reform Party Member B 2004).

The leadership's struggle to keep the party from sliding into xenophobic extremism was self-interested, since the aim was to become a major, broad-based political party but the fact that there *was* a struggle illustrated that some Reform Party supporters did in fact

hold xenophobic attitudes towards non-white immigrants.

MULTICULTURALISM AND “HYPHENATED CANADIANS”

The xenophobia of the grassroots of the movement is naturally echoed in attitudes towards multiculturalism. Multiculturalism has been the official policy of both major Canadian political parties since it was introduced in 1971 by Pierre Trudeau, and it has been constitutionally recognized under the Charter of Rights since 1982. The Reform Party, in line with their One Canada policy, declared that it would abolish the Multiculturalism Department because “government sponsored” multiculturalism was “divisive, detrimental to the development of a sense of national unity, patronizing, and a collectivist affront to individual identity” (Srebrnik 1997, 4). Grassroots opinion within the Reform Party certainly appears to agree with the One Canada policy. When responding to the 1993 Canadian Election Study, 95.6% of Reform Party voters agreed that the government should “make no distinctions, we are all Canadians” compared with 91.6% of Conservative voters, and 89.9% of Liberal voters Reform members were far less supportive of multiculturalism policy than the nation as a whole (see Table 4:3 in Appendix V.)

The Reformers’ rhetoric regarding “hyphenated Canadians” bears an astonishing degree of similarity not merely to the attitudes but also the language of Winston Peters and Pauline Hanson. Not only is multiculturalism discriminatory and thus divisive, it threatens to “Balkanize” the nation.

It’s been said that the symbol of this country is no longer the Maple Leaf, the symbol of the new Canada is they hyphen. Its federal politicians insist on talking about English-Canadians, French-Canadians, aboriginal-Canadians, ethnic Canadians. No one talks much about Canadians, period. And it is becoming patently obvious, as it has in some other countries, that you cannot hold a country together with

hyphens (Manning, quoted in Kirkham 1998, 255).

Bill Gairdner's rhetoric in *The Trouble with Canada* also emphasized the divisive nature of multiculturalism. Gairdner claimed that the term itself was an oxymoron and the policy was "funding long-term social unrest by financially rewarding the development of cultural differences within Canada" (Gairdner 1990, 149). The "hyphenated citizens" theme is at the heart of all three neo-populist responses to multiculturalism. In each case, non-white immigrants and multicultural policies are viewed as problematic because they disrupt national unity and cause social problems. In reality, the response has more to do with the fear that the materialists have of losing their hegemonic influence over the culture.

Like neo-populists in Australia and New Zealand, Reformers argue that multicultural policies are actually discriminatory, while the One Canada policy of the Reform Party is "color blind" and thus does not discriminate because everyone is treated equally.

[W]hen my kid asks me, 'what's a Canadian?' I tell him that Canada is the land between the United States and the North Pole, and Canadians are the guys that live there. My definition is independent of culture, language and race (Manning, quoted in Hatfield et al. 1989, 31).

The framing of the Reform Party's anti-multiculturalism policy as truly democratic reflects the framing of such policies by One Nation and New Zealand First.

I just say that we are the real party that really believes in equality. That doesn't indicate racism to me. We are the caucus that has more visible minorities than any other caucus in the House of Commons – that's a pretty good indication. And as far as I know our membership is extremely diverse (Reform Party Member J 2003).

The emphasis upon Reform members who are visible minorities is also part of the

common rhetoric of neo-populist parties. As in the other cases, it is evidence of the level of threat that the rural materialists of the western provinces felt that their hegemonic grip on Canadian culture was slipping.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 1B

Although at first glance it might seem that non-white immigration is not as important a factor as it is in the Australian and New Zealand cases, there is a clear connection between increased non-white immigration and the emergence of the Reform Party of Canada in the 1990s. Despite Canada's perceived tolerance for high levels of immigration, and the apparent acceptance of the nation as a cultural mosaic of many different ethnic groups, there was a significant subset of Canadians who were concerned with the ability of newly arrived immigrants – specifically non-white immigrants – to assimilate into mainstream Canadian culture.

The materialists of the western provinces felt threatened by the influx of non-white immigrants and cultures, not merely economically but culturally. Once Anglo-Canadian culture had been synonymous with Canadian culture, but this was no longer true. The Reform Party leaders, despite their attempts to ensure that the party's platform rejected extremist positions, had positioned the party to attract Canadians who felt threatened by increased non-white immigration.

**FACTOR 1C: INCREASED INDIGENOUS ACTIVISM:
FIRST NATION AND QUÉBÉCOIS SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES**

Like Australia and New Zealand, and unlike Western Europe, Canada has an indigenous population which was deprived of civil rights – divested of effective citizenship, restricted in their ability to exercise self-determination, and dispossessed of their right to traditional lands – through colonization. Unlike New Zealand, Canadian governments have been slow to respond to increasing indigenous activism, lagging behind even Australia in the recognition of the treaty rights of First Nations, Inuit, and *Metis*¹³ peoples. Over the past twenty years the First Nations of Canada have become more organized and vocal, pushing for the recognition of treaty rights and native title as well as recognition of their right to sovereignty (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2003).

The Canadian case has an additional twist, however, for in Canada it is not only the indigenous people whose demands for sovereignty poses a threat to the rural materialists who form the base of the Reform movement; it is also the Québécois. At first glance, the francophone separatists and First Nation activists might seem part of quite different phenomena, but both were national groups existing within Canadian borders, in contradistinction to the (Anglo-Saxon, English-speaking) mainstream. At their core, each represents a cultural challenge to the majority culture with which Reform Party voters strongly identify. There were, therefore, two separate and increasingly vocal groups pushing for recognition of sovereignty within Canada.

¹³ The *Metis* in Canada are an ethnic group of mixed European and native ancestry, the product of marriages between French and English fur traders and Cree and Saulteaux women in the 19th Century. When not italicized, the term *metis* is sometimes used less specifically to refer to all individuals of mixed European and aboriginal ancestry who are not band members.

Together, the cultural threat that these two groups presented was an important structural factor in the emergence of the Reform Party in the 1990s.

FIRST NATIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The British Crown began signing treaties with the indigenous occupants of what is now Canada in 1701, and the process continued until Confederation in 1867. The most significant of these treaties were the Upper Canada and Vancouver Island treaties, in which the signatory Indian bands surrendered future interests in their lands in Ontario and British Columbia in exchange for reserves, annual payments, and hunting rights. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 provided that Indians should not be molested or disturbed, ensured aboriginal rights to all land not ceded to or purchased by the crown and restricted the purchase of First Nation lands to the Crown (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2004). The Royal Proclamation now forms the basis of many native land claims in Canada.

Despite the existence of the proclamation, which seemed to guarantee a certain level of rights to the First Nations of Canada, the native peoples were marginalized in terms of property rights and governmental recognition in much the same way as Australia's Aboriginal peoples who were never subject to treaty (Fisher 1991, 50-51). In the Twentieth Century, many indigenous Canadian children were often removed from their families and forced to attend residential schools in an attempt to assimilate them with European culture. From the 1970s – when the term “First Nation” began to replace the term “Indian” – an increasingly intense level of indigenous activism was evident, particularly in terms of land rights and tribal sovereignty. Pressure for self-governance also intensified, and guarantees of self-governance were discussed in Meech Lake and

Charlottetown and were written into the Canadian Charter of Rights, much to the distress of a substantial portion of the Reform constituency.

Much of the conflict surrounding treaty recognition has occurred at the provincial level, particularly in western Canada where Indian land claims conflict with the demands of the enormously powerful extraction industries. As in Australia, the indigenous population is a semi-sovereign entity which is the responsibility of the federal government and the federal government bureaucracy – the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs.

Although indigenous affairs bureaucracy did not play the central role it played in the emergence of the New Zealand First or One Nation parties, the language used by Reform Party leaders in reference to Canadian aboriginal issues is remarkably consistent with that of the other neo-populist parties. Catchphrases such as “accountability,” “democracy,” and “self-reliance” are used by politicians in all three countries.

I hoped it would result in an expression of willingness on the part of aboriginal people to accept responsibility for their own welfare and development, coupled with a call to do away with the Department of Indian Affairs and transfer its responsibilities to democratic and accountable aboriginal governments and agencies (Manning 1992, 248).

Calls for the dismantling of the federal bureaucracy in charge of indigenous affairs were a major plank in Pauline Hanson’s policy platform, and demands for the reform of the Waitangi Tribunal continue to be central to the New Zealand First manifesto.

There are explicit thematic similarities in the language of leaders in the three parties. Each of the parties emphasizes the undemocratic nature of government assistance given to indigenous people, claiming that waste and mismanagement are

endemic throughout the system, and that little of the money actually makes it through to those who need it most.

Oh, it's one of the biggest disgraces – it has set up an incentive structure that as long as you stay poor and in these remote regions we'll give you money, but if you get out you'll lose it. And we'll give it to your Chief who'll know best what to do with it. And I had a private dinner [...] with Paul Martin and four of his top advisors and his wife [...] and I said "Do you realize that the federal government spends \$10,000 per capita Native – for every native \$10,000! Now this is at a time when the average Canadian, working in manufacturing, earns \$25,000 per year. So a family of four among the natives would cost us \$40,000 more than the taxpaying average worker! And Paul Martin's face distorted and he said "Is this true?" and he looked at his officials and said "I can't believe this" and his officials said "Well, we don't have the figures in front of us, but it sounds about right!" Can you imagine? There's something very, very wrong (Reform Party Member K 2004).

In *The New Canada* Preston Manning argued that special status based on race that had been given to First Nations since before Confederation was an "unmitigated disaster" for the natives themselves (Manning 1992, 304) and that government funding provided to natives created perverse incentives and did not help individuals. While the official platform of the Reform Party recognized that the particular history of native peoples did merit special consideration (Srebrnik 1997, 9) Reform leaders claimed that waste was rampant in the Indian Affairs bureaucracy because neither major party was willing to cut spending to it because of the problem of "political correctness."

[A] lot of those issues now are discussed and debated, where before we arrived here, these things weren't. Aboriginal issues would come up and there would be a unanimous vote in the House of Commons because the issue was so sensitive that nobody was willing to stand up and take a position and argue on it (Reform Party Member E 2004).

They would go into an election and say "If you elect us we'll spend, we'll give 50 million dollars to the aboriginals," and the liberals would say "Well, that just shows you're conservative! If you elect us we'll

spend \$150 million on aboriginal affairs!” it became a bidding war for votes. When the Reform came along they said “If you elect us, we’ll give some darn good thought as to why we’re spending the money!” which the conservative movement should have been saying all along. And they said “What, you wouldn’t put more money into aboriginal affairs, you must be racist!” Well, no, it’s not going to the right places! (Reform Party Member H 2003).

The Reform platform argued that equal treatment – a “color-blind” policy – was the solution both to the waste within the bureaucracy and to the social and economic problems faced by indigenous peoples.

Preston Manning was on uncertain ground when he criticized economic assistance given to indigenous people because, unlike Winston Peters, Manning is white. Certainly the Reform platform did not challenge the legitimacy of aboriginal land claims (while Hanson had challenged the Wik decision and Peters argues that the Treaty of Waitangi had been misinterpreted) and many of Manning’s proposals in terms of aboriginal peoples seem, at least on the surface, to be progressive. Nevertheless Reform Party members were criticized as anti-native or outright racists, and one MP was excoriated by the mainstream media for his comments about Canadian Indians on reserves.

In trying to explain how Canada’s Indian policy has created a culture of dependence, Grubel said, “We have been misguided when in the past we have given in to the demands of the native community to give them more physical goods, to allow them to live on their South Sea island equivalent” and also compared Canada to a well-meaning parent giving “too much money to ... your teenagers” (Flanagan 1995, 169).

Preston Manning repudiated these remarks, claiming that they were not Reform Party policy, but while the words were ill-chosen they were nevertheless consonant with much of Manning’s own commentary in *The New Canada*.

It is also evident that Grubel's opinions were consonant with the attitudes of the grassroots of the movement, or at least with a majority of the Reform voters who responded to the 1993 Canadian Election Study. More than half of Reform respondents (52.3%) agreed with the statement "If Aboriginal peoples tried harder, they could be as well off as other Canadians" while 50.9% of Conservative voters, 41.1% of Liberal and 34% of NDP voters agreed with the statement (see Table 4.4 in Appendix V).

The Reform Party's rhetoric bears a striking similarity to the rhetoric of both New Zealand First and One Nation on this issue, and the attitudes of neo-populist voters in all three cases correspond. Yet while increased indigenous activism may have contributed to the emergence of the Reform Party, it was not the critical trigger that it was in Australia and New Zealand. The problem of First Nation peoples is, in comparison, peripheral to the Reform agenda; the issue of Quebec sovereignty and separation is axial to the emergence of the movement and the party.

TWO FOUNDING NATIONS – QUEBEC SEPARATISM AND THE RISE OF REFORM

When New Zealanders talk of two founding peoples they refer to the British and the Maori as signatory peoples to the nation's founding document, the Treaty of Waitangi. When Canadians talk of two founding peoples they refer to the British and the French, and the founding document – the *British North American Act* of 1867 – was a compromise not between indigenous and colonizing peoples, but between the two colonizing peoples (Fisher 1991, 49-50). The existence of a significant ethno-linguistic group agitating for recognition and sovereignty provided an alternative – and much more potent – source of discontent than aboriginal activism had provided.

The Quebec sovereignty association movement ¹⁴ has deep historical roots but its institutional beginnings can be traced to the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, and the founding of several Québécois independence groups. That decade ended with the creation of the *Parti Québécois* – a Quebec sovereigntist provincial party which first won control of the provincial assembly in 1976, and which has initiated two referenda on the question of Quebec separatism (Behiels 1985, 3-7). The first referendum on Quebec secession in 1980 was defeated by a 60% vote, although the issue continued to simmer throughout the 1980s as the federal government attempted to amend Canada's constitution through the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords.

Meetings between Brian Mulroney and the ten provincial premiers were held at Meech Lake, Quebec, in 1987, to persuade Quebec to sign the constitutional agreement that had been signed by the nine other provinces in 1982. The recognition of Quebec as a “distinct society” within Canada meant that the province would have the right to take action to protect this special status and identity (Meech Lake 1987). Although all premiers signed the Meech Lake Accord, it was not ratified by the provincial legislatures in Manitoba and Newfoundland. The failure of the ratification process triggered the formation of the separatist Bloc Québécois in Quebec, but the wording of the Accord itself intensified longstanding western resentment at what was perceived as special treatment for Quebec.

With the failure of Meech Lake, the Chrétien government convened a series of conferences which resulted in the Charlottetown Accord referendum of 1992. Like Meech Lake, the new Accord called for the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society

¹⁴ The sovereignty association movement has two aims – the creation of an independent state of Quebec and the development of ties between the new independent state and Canada.

but also for a reformed Senate. The national debate over the Charlottetown Accord provided Manning's fledgling party with a national stage. Although one faction within the party pushed for support of the Accord, Manning eventually came out against it, primarily because it gave too much power to Quebec and did not go far enough in the reform of the Senate. Evidently Manning had considered supporting the Accord until the party's pollsters had discovered that support for a "yes" vote was soft (Harrison 1995, 222-223). Canadians in the western provinces were manifestly opposed to the scale of the concessions made to Quebec, as media reports at the time clearly indicated.

Resentment of Quebec runs deep. "People think they're getting more than their fair deal out of Confederation," explains Adamson. "How many federal jobs do they get, how many contracts – and the illegality of English signs in Quebec sticks in people's craws (Nemeth 1992).

The Accord was put to a national referendum, and was defeated by 54% nationally but by much larger margins in the western provinces (Geddes 1992). Even in Ontario the referendum passed by the narrowest of margins.

The party's campaign against the Accord, and particularly Manning's leadership of the "no" faction, allowed Manning to present himself as a political leader on the national stage (Dabbs 1997, 169). The campaign consolidated the party's support in the western provinces among those who had resented the leaders of the major political parties as forces of "Quebec appeasement" (Reform Party Member C 2003).

Charlottetown gave a huge boost and Preston hesitated early on and then finally took the position against Charlottetown and probably led the charge that killed Charlottetown. And again he killed it because every elite group in the country supported it and Preston led the grassroots – the commoners if you will – against it. And that just cemented him as the leader – the spokesman for the ordinary Canadian up against this bureaucracy, this elite (Reform Party Member E 2004).

Thus western populists rallied around Manning who had presented himself as the democratic leader of the Common Man against the Eastern Elite.

They thought of it in terms of “These guys are selling out in terms of special status for Quebec” for example, but what they meant was “We don’t want this and the people that we’ve talked to don’t want this, but our MP is voting this way because someone from above is telling him to” (Reform Party Member F 2003).

The debate over the Charlottetown Accord gave Manning a chance to look like a political outsider since he was opposed to legislation with which all other major parties had agreed.

For Canadian politics as a whole, the Charlottetown Accord was important because it brought to crisis point the issue of Quebec sovereignty. The failure of the Charlottetown Accord led to the second provincial referendum within Quebec on the issue of sovereignty – a referendum which lost by a narrow margin. For the Reform Party, however, Charlottetown was critical because it activated those Anglophones in the western provinces who feared that Quebec and French speakers were becoming too dominant a force (Arseneau 1994, 113). An ascendant Quebec – as a distinct or as a separate society – posed a challenge to the cultural hegemony of English speakers, particularly those in the West.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 1C

Increased indigenous activism in Australia and New Zealand had meant that a visible minority challenged the cultural hegemony of the white culture. This was also true in Canada, but there the issue had been subordinated to one which posed a much more significant threat – “the historical presence of a sociologically distinct nation

(Quebec) straining within the borders of the Canadian state” (Harrison and Johnston 1996, 164). This substantial ethno-linguistic minority was challenging not merely the cultural hegemony of the Anglophone majority, but also the political structure of the nation. The demands of Québécois stirred to action the Westerners who had never had much sympathy with the demands of the Francophones, and felt increasingly threatened by them.

Thus the rural materialists of the western provinces of Canada felt their position at the center of Canadian culture threatened. Where once Anglophone Canadians had felt that they were the hegemonic culture, that position was being threatened by two groups living within Canadian borders. As Québécois and First Nation Peoples vied for cultural and political recognition, Anglophone materialists reacted to try to defend the mono-cultural environment in which they were most comfortable and which they felt was threatened.

FACTOR 1D: SPATIAL PARTY POLITICS IN CANADA

BACKGROUND TO THE MAJOR PARTIES

Historically, the Canadian party system conforms to the classic Western European model with three political parties – conservative, liberal, and socialist – being the major political players. The Liberal Party is descended from the pre-confederation Reform Party, which advocated for responsible government in the dominion, and the “Clear Grits” of Upper Canada. In the latter half of the nineteenth century the Liberal Party was the party of continental free-trade and anti-imperialism. Relegated to opposition status in the years following confederation, the party became representative of Quebec interests, moved to a more socially progressive platform, and eventually

became “Canada’s natural governing party” – it has formed the government throughout most of the twentieth century, and every liberal leader during that period served as prime minister (Brooks 1993, 185-187).

The Progressive Conservative party was formed in 1867 and existed until the formation of the Conservative Party of Canada, which occurred when the Canadian Alliance (nee Reform) Party merged with the Progressive Conservatives in 2003. Traditionally, Canadian conservatism has resembled English and European rather than American conservatism. During the last century, many of the Canadian Tories – those referred to as “Red Tories” – supported the welfare state on the principle of *noblesse oblige*, although they were socially conservative. While the Red Tories controlled much of the upper hierarchy of the party, there was a “Blue Tory” faction which was neo-liberal economically as well as socially conservative. The Tories were the natural party of opposition through most of the twentieth century (Brooks 1993, 188-190).

Although no socialist party has ever formed a national government, the New Democratic Party (NDP) won the third highest number of votes in the 2004 election, and has been effective in influencing the Canadian political agenda as a minority party since it was formed in 1961. The NDP is the descendent of the socialist Commonwealth Cooperative Federation (CCF) which was created from a coalition of farm and labor groups in the Great Depression and which also influenced Canadian politics as a minor party. The NDP thus has rural and populist as well as socialist roots. The other significant left wing minority party is the Bloc Québécois, whose platform includes sovereignty for Quebec as well as social democratic goals. Formed in 1990 from a loose coalition of Liberals and Tories, the Bloc won a narrow majority of seats in the House

in 1993 (mostly because the Reform Party had split the conservative vote in the West) and became the official opposition. The Bloc works with the provincial Parti Québécois in promoting the interests of Quebec and Québécois (The Council for Canadian Unity 2001).

There have been various other minor parties, and some provincial parties which have contested national elections, but Canada's single-member plurality electoral system has restricted access to the House of Commons¹⁵ and to some extent stabilized the political party system at the Federal level. While new federal-level parties have been formed, they have rarely broken the Grit-Tory stranglehold on political power in Canada. What, then, explains the emergence of the Reform Party in this very stable political party system?

WESTERN CANADIAN DISCONTENT – OIL AND AIRPLANES, DEFICITS AND DEBT

There is no doubt that the political culture of Western Canada was conducive to the formation of a political party, but the region's tradition of creating new parties does not explain why the Reform Party emerged at that particular juncture in Canadian history. Indeed, several people, including Preston Manning himself, had attempted to form a party a decade before, but had failed (Reform Party Member F 2003). Manning had identified periods in which a "wave" of political unrest would create the opportunity for the formation of a new party. According to Flanagan, Manning was "waiting for the wave" so that he could found a party modeled on his own conservative, democratic, and populist principles (Flanagan 1995, 38).

¹⁵ The Canadian Senate is an appointed body which reviews laws and functions like the British House of Lords.

Most interviewees agreed with Tom Flanagan that “In a broad sense, the rise of the Reform Party in western Canada was due to a loss of confidence in the two major parties” (Flanagan 1995, 51). To be more specific, however, western dissatisfaction with the traditional parties was due to three important events which created the conditions for party emergence: the National Energy Policy, the loss of the CF-18 Contract, and the burgeoning national deficit and debt.

One commonly cited source of western dissatisfaction was the National Energy Policy. In 1980 the Trudeau Liberal Government’s National Energy Program had imposed the “Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax” on oil and gas production; it was, essentially, a “well-head tax.” Albertan oil and gas producers were (not surprisingly) furious, and the other oil and gas provinces were equally incensed since the tax represented a shift of control over resources from the provincial to the federal level, and at a practical level it meant that 27% of oil revenues were transferred to federal coffers (Dabbs 1997, 96-101). Provincial officials complained loudly and western separatist groups, such as Western Canada Concept were established and gained some provincial-level support. In 1984 Brian Mulroney stumped in western Canada promising to roll back the NEP, although once in power it took him several years to actually end the program.

[The Mulroney Government] scrapped the National Energy Program, but they kept it around long enough to collect around \$2.6 Billion more, and they only really scrapped it when the price of oil fell and it wasn’t nearly as profitable as it was before. So you had this huge disillusionment with the one traditional Federal party and then the very quick falling off of support for the other alternative. Well those are the kind of conditions that create the good old Western alternative: “If you don’t like either then start something!” (Reform Party Member B 2004).

While this discontent can be explained in terms of traditional center-periphery tension over the locus of power within the nation, the spatial politics effect is very real. The emergence of a new party did not occur when Trudeau imposed the NEP, but rather when Mulroney failed to roll it back. It was not really discontent with the party that imposed the policy but rather a feeling that they had been abandoned by the party that had traditionally represented them; a feeling among a particular constituency that neither major party was representing their interests.

Another crucial event which triggered the emergence of the Reform party was the awarding of the CF-18 maintenance contracts to Montreal instead of Winnipeg. In the 1970s Quebec had lost out when the bid to build Canada's CF-18 fighters had gone to MacDonnell-Douglas since the company would locate work mostly outside Quebec. Under pressure, Mulroney had promised spin-off contracts to Quebec but these had not yet arrived by 1986 when the maintenance contracts for the CF-18s were bid out. There were two viable bidders on this lucrative contract: Canadair of Montreal and Bristol Aerospace of Winnipeg. The Bristol bid was the superior bid, since it was cheaper and technologically superior, but Quebec was more expert at exerting political pressure and had six more seats in the House of Commons; Montreal won the bid (Simpson 1993, 111-112). The west erupted in a howl of regional outrage. To this day, members of the Reform Party cite this incident as a decisive moment in the emergence of the party.

The CF-18 contracts; have you heard anything about that? But people in western Canada twenty years later say "That CF-18 contract! Man!" The CF-18 is our fighter jet, and Winnipeg, in Western Canada, won the maintenance contract on merit to do the maintaining of our CF-18 fighter jets. It was lifted and awarded to Montreal just like that, around the table. "Okay, sorry, you won but ..." *zip* it was awarded to Montreal. And that was another flashpoint of just symbolic but raw energy to say "Okay, wait a minute!" (Reform Party Member G 2003).

The CF-18 contract incident emphasized the stranglehold that Quebec held over the federation and the way that the Mulroney government bowed to the demands of Quebec and the other eastern provinces to the disadvantage of the western provinces. The loss of the contract provided the flashpoint of Western anger for the founding of the Reform Party – an anger that was focused not on separating from the Canadian federation as it had in the 1980s, but on the failures of the two major political parties, and particularly the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney.

Mulroney, who had promised to take western concerns into account, had failed to represent their interests, and the bitterness felt by westerners is apparent in their language almost twenty years later:

Brian Mulroney, who I supported in 1984, has abandoned us, lied to us, you know, like he said he would never let the debt grow any more, and it went from \$180 billion to \$489 billion in his tenure. So he lied to us. He was the conservative hope. He said he would listen to the West. He said he would appoint elected Senators, He said he would do all sorts of things and he didn't do any of it (Reform Party Member A 2003).

The third salient issue for the Reform constituency was the burgeoning deficits and the national debt. Reflecting the concerns of the constituency of Ross Perot's Reform Party south of the border, the constituency of the Reform Party of Canada was also activated by a perceived incipient fiscal crisis within the national government. Importantly, this anger was aimed not at the Liberals who had spent heavily on social programs, but at the Tories who had failed to roll back taxation.

I think the huge anger across the country at the betrayal of the Canadian taxpayer by the Brian Mulroney government in that they failed to get spending under control, and that was a mandate that was given to them in their first round, and in spite of repeated promises to do something they ran up the largest yearly deficit in history. And Canadians old and young could see that this huge debt – probably the second highest per

capita debt in the world – was going to destroy their social safety net systems, it was going to put a burden on the next generation that was going to be really hard for them to cope with, with this highest tax regime and this huge debt to pay and all the rest of it. So there was a lot of anger in Canada (Reform Party Member E 2004).

Mulroney's failure to reduce spending was seen as a betrayal of his supporters and also as a movement of the party in ideological space. Thus while the deficits and the debt were the focus of the debate, the real concern was with the ideological shift of the Progressive Conservative party.

The [Progressive] Conservative Party – I use the phrase “They campaign from the right and they govern from the Left” and I don't know if that's correct psychologically or what (Reform Party Member D 2003).

There was clearly a perception among western rural materialists that the Progressive Conservatives had moved to the left, both socially and fiscally, abandoning their traditional support base and leaving it without representation.

The party was born out of a genuine crisis – a crisis of the left ... a shift to the left. We had a long period of Trudeau shift to the left. Then we brought in Mulroney who was a great hope of the right. And while he did some important things that I mentioned – NAFTA and the GST – he did not cut back spending, he kept on spending, maybe slowed it down a bit and then he was ambushed by these recessions and ended up really a great disappointment to the conservative movement (Reform Party Member K 2004).

Like the neo-populists in Australia and New Zealand, all interviewees identified an ideological shift by the Progressive Conservatives over the past decades.

[T]he people who considered themselves conservative had no conservative voice left in the country. They felt the conservative party had left them, and felt they needed a place in the political spectrum. It was getting harder and harder to determine the differences between liberals and conservatives by those people who considered themselves socially and fiscally conservative and ah... That and the west was

feeling more and more alienated with policies like the national energy policy and so on and so forth. But for me and the people I represent, they just didn't feel that conservatives were conservative any more (Reform Party Member H 2003).

There was a belief that you could contest for the political centre while ignoring people who you thought were just locked in as your supporters. So, I could go through a number of issues and the same thing happened in each case (Reform Party Member F 2003).

Thus there was a gap in the ideological space of the party system which was ready to be filled by a neo-populist party. The rural materialists of the western provinces were angered by the abandonment of the major parties, providing Preston Manning with a wave of discontent upon which he could form his new party.

REFORM DEMOGRAPHICS – WHERE THE VOTE CAME FROM

The Reform demographic was typical of neo-populist parties. “They tended to be teachers, insurance agents, small businesspeople, retirees, middle managers and farmers for whom the exercise of power had always seemed one step removed from their personal experiences” (Simpson 1993, 120). An opinion poll conducted in the early 1990s showed that farmers were more likely than any other occupational class to vote for Reform (Harrison and Krahn 1995, 128) and the Canadian Election Study showed that those who identified themselves of Anglo-Celtic ethnicity were somewhat more likely to vote for Reform.

[O]ur demographic tends to be a little older and more male than female, because they were madder. You know, at the start ... it was a protest. Now today I think that's broadened out a lot (Reform Party Member A 2003).

Just as in Australia, the emerging neo-populist party originally attracted older citizens.

At first it was our senior generation: those who were in the latter part of

their 50s and in their 60s and 70s. In fact it was a stigma that was attached to us for a number of years, but these were the people, we have to remember, who were the foundation of the conservative movement in Canada, for 30 years, and they were the ones who recognized that the conservatism was leaving the conservative party (Reform Party Member H 2003).

Thus the Reform voters looked extremely similar to One Nation and New Zealand First voters: older, white, blue-collar workers and the petit-bourgeoisie – small businesspeople and small-time farmers – more often male than female. These were the rural materialists who were most threatened by globalization, and they felt that they were no longer represented by any of the major parties.

Like the other neo-populist parties in the study, the Reform Party, while obviously socially conservative in ideation, drew voters from the major parties of both left and right on the economic scale. Several interviewees mentioned a maxim they attributed to Preston Manning – that they were “Hard hearted fiscally so they can be soft-hearted socially” (Reform Party Member G 2003). In part, this is because populism does not conform to either left or right wing ideations – as Tom Flanagan, a political scientist and one of the party’s most important consultants pointed out: “populism is vague as a positioning strategy because it does not advise any particular location for the party” (Flanagan 1995, 48-49). Thus the party drew votes from a variety of different parties and political ideations.

A lot of them, in the early part, were disillusioned conservatives [...] but we had this plank in our platform of democratic reforms that ... You know democracy’s sort of neither left nor right, it’s a bigger concept. In fact I don’t like the left/right/center conceptualization. I just don’t think it explains much anymore, certainly here (Reform Party Member B 2004).

An examination of the National Election Study data shows that a majority of

Reform Party voters in 1993 had voted for the Progressive Conservatives in the previous federal election, but that around 10% of Reform voters had voted for the NDP, and 13% for the Liberal Party (see Table 4.5 in Appendix V). The NDP vote swing to Reform was particularly important in British Columbia, and many interviewees commented upon the significance of these votes in the 1993 election.

But the democratic reform part of Reform attracted a fair number of people who had voted for the Social Democrats or the Socialists before. Because...the West produced two new parties in the Depression, one of which was the CCF which became the NDP which became the sort of Social Democrat voice. And they were all for the little guy and the sort of Democratic Reforms that would give ordinary voters more control over the elected people: they supported recall and direct democracy measures and votes in the parliament (Reform Party Member B 2004).

In my case they're everything. They were everything, including Liberals including New Democrats, even. And probably the reason for that is the populism. It's pretty hard for a New Democrat to argue against that, so what do I believe in? I believe in the people. [...] Give the people the power (Reform Party Member A 2003).

The populist base of the Reform Party was important in attracting socialists to the party, despite the social conservatism of the party's platform and support base.

If you look at the electoral map of British Columbia for example you'll see that there are many former New Democrat held seats that the Conservatives could never break into, but the Canadian Alliance, and prior to that the Reform Party, was successful in winning. Vancouver Island, for example, was all New Democratic, and now it's all Canadian Alliance. The populist side of it – the grassroots cadre kind of organization – is much more there. We're not an elite driven party (Reform Party Member F 2003).

Like Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party, the Reform Party attracted blue collar workers who were themselves socially conservative, and who were therefore not represented by the post-materialist platforms of the socialist party.

Further examination of the 1993 election study data indicates that party identification was even more fragmented at the provincial level. Only 34% of Reform voters in the 1993 election identified with the provincial Progressive Conservative party, 11% identified with the Liberal Party, 8% for the NDP, and 7.5% for the Social Credit Party (see Table 4.6). Much of the Reform vote, it appears, came from other provincial-level parties – most probably western separatist parties such as Western Canada Concept and the Heritage Party (Melnik 1993, 56). There was, therefore, a distinct regional basis to the party's support.

The party's regional base did not necessarily exclude support in other geographical areas. As in Australia and New Zealand, Reform did well in the outer suburbs of the major cities in both western and central Canadian provinces.

[W]e got good representation, good votes, out of that ... they call it the belt, the 905 belt around Toronto, which is the suburb, the 905 area code around Toronto (you'd look at that and say, "What in the world does that mean?") Toronto's area code is 416, their telephone area code, so 905 is all that kinda, sorta rural part around it: small town. Yup, Small towns, small business, family oriented stuff. And we got a lot of votes there, and I think out of the 103, I think in 30 some seats, our votes plus the Tory votes would have won us. At least two to three dozen. So that's pretty huge (Reform Party Member G 2003).

Manning had already identified a cosmopolitan-rural cleavage in Ontario, seeing that "rural Ontario was just as alienated from the centres of power as western Canada" (Flanagan 1995, 120). The Reform Party and its successor, the Canadian Alliance, struggled to break its reputation as a regional protest party, and did indeed gain some small footholds in suburban and rural Ontario. The name change to the Canadian Alliance assisted somewhat, but true gains were only made when the party shifted away from its populist sympathy towards a more traditional conservative position, a process

that was completed in 2003 with the Canadian Alliance's merger with the rump of the Progressive Conservative Party.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 1D

The ideological movement of the major political parties was an important factor in the emergence of the Reform Party in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The ideological shift of the Progressive Conservative Party was perceived as abandoning the interests of western materialists, particularly over the three important catalytic issues: the National Energy Policy, the loss of the CF-18 contract, and the burgeoning budget deficits. Discontent with the major parties became a significant factor in the emergence of the Reform Party of Canada in the 1990s.

CONCLUSION

The emergence of the Reform Party of Canada in many ways parallels that of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party in Australia. There are, however, two particular differences between the Australian and the Canadian cases. The first difference is the relative significance of Factor 1B, increased non-white immigration. Although there was a strong anti-immigrant feeling in the Canadian case, particularly in the western provinces among the Reform Constituency, the reaction to increased non-white immigration was less significant than it was in Australia.

The second difference involves Factor 1C, increased indigenous activism, since the more significant effect is not from aboriginal peoples who are pressing for recognition of rights and sovereignty, but from the Québécois. While the sovereignty demands themselves are superficially dissimilar, the psychological effect upon the materialists in the western provinces was extraordinarily similar to the psychological

effect of the Native Title and Reconciliation demands of Aborigines in Australia and the Waitangi decision in New Zealand upon the rural materialists in those two countries.

Despite the differences in weight, the same four structural factors exist in each country and interact with each other to create a structural independent variable. Furthermore, it is a *confluence* of these factors that creates the hospitable environment which is a necessary but insufficient condition for the emergence of a neo-populist party in an advanced industrial democracy. There are, therefore, four significant structural factors which contribute to an explanation of the emergence of a neo-populist party in Canada in the 1990s.

CHAPTER FIVE

**INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 1: THE STRUCTURAL FACTORS
CAUSING NEO-POPULIST PARTY EMERGENCE IN NEW
ZEALAND**

Winston Peters did not burst onto the New Zealand political stage with the suddenness of Pauline Hanson. He was already a prominent and somewhat troublesome member of the National Party, and his sacking from the cabinet and subsequent quitting of the party was regarded as just another piece of bombast in Peter's long and bombastic career. But what happened next, with his founding of the New Zealand First Party, was a surprise: Peters' embrace of neo-populist policy positions, combined with the surge of support that he rallied behind him, forced many observers to take notice and question where his support was coming from. As in Australia, much of the initial focus was on the leader himself; it was only later that observers thought to question the social and economic issues that lay behind the success of Winston Peters and New Zealand First.

There are four factors which make up the first independent variable – the structural causes of neo-populist party emergence in New Zealand: A) rural materialist values; B) increased non-white immigration; C) increased indigenous activism; and D) the movement of parties in ideological space. As with Australia and Canada, each factor is present in New Zealand, although it may be present to a different degree than it is in either of the other cases, and all four factors interact together to form the structural basis for the emergence of the party. And as in the three other cases, globalization is the lynchpin of all four structural factors in the emergence of a neo-populist party in New

Zealand in the 1990s.

**FACTOR 1A: RURAL MATERIALIST VALUES
NEW ZEALAND FIRST AND THE FARM SECTOR**

MATERIALIST VALUES – NEW ZEALAND AND GLOBALIZATION

As in most countries, there have always been differences between the city and the country mouse in New Zealand. Farmers and residents of country towns had always been more socially conservative than residents of big cities, and they had always been more concerned with agricultural prices. In the 1990s, however, these differences became sharper and far more profound – they developed into a cleavage. The differences between urban and rural areas increased in salience because of the impact of globalization on a) the economy of the farm sector and b) the incomes and attitudes of city-dwelling Kiwis. The values cleavage in New Zealand Society provides spatial opportunity for the emergence of the New Zealand First Party in 1990s New Zealand.

BEER VERSUS LATTES – URBAN RURAL CLEAVAGE IN NEW ZEALAND

As in Australia, rural areas in New Zealand have been hard hit by globalization. Throughout its history New Zealand's economy has been based upon primary industries, particularly agriculture. With the advent of refrigeration in the post-War period New Zealand provided the British market with dairy products and meat such as lamb, and for many years New Zealand was Britain's "market garden" (New Zealand First Member D 2002). When the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community in 1973, developing closer economic ties with its near neighbors, New Zealand farmers suffered severe economic setbacks, and New Zealanders as a whole suffered a certain amount of cultural shock and some rethinking – at least among academics – of the country's historical and future ties to Britain (New Zealand First Member D 2002). This, coupled with the oil shocks in the 1970s, sent New Zealand

agriculture into a tailspin (New Zealand First Member B 2004).

But New Zealand farmers were to face worse economic pressures. From the early 1980s onwards, New Zealand governments from both sides of the political spectrum opened the nation's borders to trade, leaving New Zealand farmers more susceptible to downturns in the international economy. The New Zealand economy as a whole was shaken:

Sixty percent of our receipts are still from primary industry – it's still that much. And apart from the dairy industry, which has got long developed and acknowledged markets, we don't have the same ability as other countries to sort of ride that out, because we are basically a small country (New Zealand First Member B 2004).

Small farmers were deeply affected by downturns in trade and international currency fluctuations, but they were not alone. Blue collar workers, who had little education beyond high-school and who did not adapt easily to a rapidly changing global economic environment, suffered a significant loss in real income and job security.

At first glance, the cleavage between rural and city areas in New Zealand are not obvious, at least compared with the rural-urban cleavages in Australia and Canada, because agriculture is such an important portion of New Zealand's GDP, and because New Zealand is geographically quite small. Nevertheless there is evidence of a materialist/post-materialist cleavage between urban and rural areas in New Zealand which is similar, if not as strong, as the cleavages in Australia and Canada. Part of the urban-rural distinction in New Zealand is between the two main islands of the chain. The North Island is home to three quarters of the population, including Auckland, the nation's largest city with a population of 1.2 million. The South Island is less densely populated, with Christchurch – a city of only 300,000 people – being the only

metropolitan area (Mulgan 1994, 271-273). Residents of each island can be heard referring to the other island's residents as "Pig Islanders." Aucklanders are said to consider the rest of the country to be parochial, while the rest of the country considers Aucklanders as "rootless, fickle, and disloyal" parasites "spending the hard-earned cash produced by those working south of the Bombay Hills" (Laxon 2002). The materialist/post-materialist cleavage is obvious.

[The party's support] runs really from the North of Wanganui to the North Cape. [...] Not that we don't value Wellington, which is a civil servant's place – Wellington, you might be aware, has the highest income per household of any region. We don't enjoy the same support amongst these "poncey Civil Servants" – with their lattes and so on, but in the South Island we have some support and we really need to work hard upon that because the South Islanders do feel – apart from those in Christchurch and Dunedin – that they don't belong in the mainstream (New Zealand First Member B 2004).

Party members clearly recognize the existence of urban post-materialist values, and while they do not as clearly articulate the existence of materialist values within their own constituency, the comparison is clear: ordinary working New Zealanders with their "pies and pints" versus highly paid "poncey" civil servants with their lattes. There is a cultural divide which has sprung up between the urban post-materialists who have benefited from globalization, and the provincial materialists who have not, a change originating in what one New Zealand First member called "going from a national scene to an international scene" (New Zealand First Member B 2004).

Peter's base of support looks very similar to the grey-haired, blue-collared men and their busily knitting wives at One Nation meetings in Australia. Peters himself jokes that his critics called New Zealand First "the dinosaur party" supported by the "blue rinse brigade" (New Zealand First Member C 2004) and there is clear evidence that

Peters' support, at least initially, came disproportionately from the ranks of senior citizens. The New Zealand Election Study (NZES) shows that 28.6% of New Zealand First Party voters were over age 65, compared with 22% of Labour and 16% of National Party voters (Vowles et al. 1996). In part this may have been because of Peter's backing of pension policy while a National Party front bencher, but it is also an indication of a materialist cleavage.

Among the elderly, who remember a socially gentler, economically more protective New Zealand, in provincial areas where farming downturn is biting and the rise of urban liberal values is resented, and among Māori and other groups disadvantaged by 12 years of economic reform, Peters has found a potent if sometimes contradictory support base. "He should just rename it the Pissed Off Party" says one National Party strategist (Smellie 1996).

New Zealand First voters are therefore from disparate geographic areas but these voters – senior citizens and small time farmers as well as Māori, have similar values, triggered by the lowering of trade barriers.

Thus the emergence of the New Zealand First Party can be directly linked to the economic disparities between urban and rural centers, disparities which have been exacerbated by globalization. While there have always been cultural differences between city and country, these differences intensified during the 1990s, become more salient than they had been at any time since the Great Depression. Colin James, a long time observer of New Zealand politics, argues that New Zealand First voters bear an "eerie" similarity to the small-time farmers and small business owners who were the supporters of the Social Credit Party, a party which was founded on the economic principles of Major Douglas.

Salt of the earth small farmers and small business operators and their ilk. [...] There was the middle-of-the-road small operator with a simple nostrum for curing economic ills: cut down the number of foreigners coming here and the amount of foreign money buying up our businesses (James 1996).

Patrick Smellie described New Zealand First voters as the elderly and Māori, many of whom were clearly “straight from a lifetime spent of Struggle Street” (Smellie 1999). Bruce Jesson, writing somewhat prematurely of the demise of the New Zealand First phenomenon in 1997, described the party’s members in a less complimentary light:

[It was] a constituency of cranky, discontented, and unforgiving people. It was a constituency that has not accepted the economic and political changes of the last decade or so and that wishes to relitigate what has happened. It consisted of more than a quarter, perhaps as much as a third, of the electorate and it is still potentially there for some radical politician who wishes to create it again” (Jesson 1997).

Neo-populists from Poujade on have much the same support base – the petit bourgeois and small farmers, both of whom are most vulnerable to economic downturns. New Zealand First is a product not of the economic crisis of a Great Depression, as was the Social Credit Party. Instead, it is in part the product of the combined and dramatic social and economic changes that occurred as a result of globalization in the 1990s, which were beneficial for many urban New Zealanders but which left behind a significant proportion of the rural population.

As in Australia, where One Nation enjoyed considerable support in outer suburbs of Sydney, so New Zealand First enjoys its surest support in Tauranga – Winston Peter’s electorate, a fast-growing city on the Bay of Plenty south of Auckland. Tauranga has a somewhat higher than average percentage of people over 65 – 13.9% compared with 12.1% in New Zealand as a whole. Tauranga also has proportionately

fewer people with a post-high school qualification – 29.7% compared with 32.2% of New Zealand as a whole, while 32% of Tauranga's residents have no high-school qualification at all, compared with 27% of New Zealand overall. Tauranga is home to far more people earning between \$10-20,000, and far few people earning over \$100,000 (New Zealand Census Bureau 2003). Essentially, Tauranga is home to a higher proportion of people for whom a global economy has meant a decrease in economic security, and a much lower proportion of people for whom globalization has meant an increase in wealth and opportunity.

Considering that New Zealand is the home of the very first Green Party, and that in the 1980s New Zealand was at the forefront of nuclear protest, surprisingly few New Zealanders hold post-materialist values. McAllister and Vowles' examination of the 1990 New Zealand National Election Study indicated that there was some evidence of post-materialist values in New Zealand, with 9% of New Zealanders having post-materialist values, 30% having materialist values and 61% mixed, with National Party voters being far more likely to have materialist values than Labour Party voters, who were overwhelmingly post-materialist (McAllister and Vowles 1994). This set of cleavages, however, is consistent since the National Party has traditionally represented farmers and rural interests, and New Zealand First drew most of its initial support from former National Party voters (see Factor 1D in this chapter).

The materialism of New Zealand First voters is evident even at the elite level in the social conservatism of party policy and rhetoric. As city dwelling Kiwis have increased in income and economic security they have embraced post-materialist values, including environmentalism, women rights and gay rights, but New Zealanders from

rural areas have not. While the party's platform has concentrated upon immigration, Treaty issues, and "law and order" issues, social conservative elements are clearly present.

One of the other things that's happening over here is the fact that homosexuality and the gay movement are slowly appearing to be the norm, and people that have formerly been heterosexuals are seen really as a minority group. It's a social change (New Zealand First Member G 2004).

Materialist values are emphasized by the New Zealand First supporters, but there is also evidence of populist themes. The problem is not merely that social values are changing but also that "ordinary people" have had no say in the change. The implication is that these social changes are driven by elites. In a speech titled "The Forgotten People" Peters argued that these social changes represented "growing threats to our social fabric."

This current government has undertaken one of the most aggressive periods of social reform in living memory. From legalising prostitution, through to gay marriage and banning smoking in bars it has radically changed our social norms. But rather than consult and engage the public on these issues, it has chosen to do them in a paternalistic, we know best, way - with no consultation. Just ramming them through (Peters 2005b).

The argument that policy decisions have been made undemocratically – by elite power holders, without the consent of "ordinary New Zealanders" – is an obviously populist view. Here again is the materialist reaction to social change – rapid liberalization of values on a variety of issues which have been embraced by "cosmopolitan elites" the world over – couched in terms of anti-elite and (populist) democratic values.

ANTI-ELITE ATTITUDES: THE "GREAT KIWI CLOBBERING MACHINE"

While New Zealand culture is in many ways different from Australian culture,

they share several similar aspects. Both Australians and New Zealanders consider themselves more egalitarian than the British (or, indeed, the Americans,) emphasizing the importance of everybody having “a fair go.” Kiwis share with their trans-Tasman colonial siblings a resentment of successful elites. New Zealanders, too, are guilty of “cutting down the tall poppy” although their unique idiom for this phenomenon is “the Great Kiwi Clobbering Machine” which crushes ambitious over achievers. Many New Zealand observers think that this phenomenon contributes to the brain drain of talented New Zealanders who leave to follow their careers overseas (Jackson 2003). Distrust of elites is a historical cultural inclination, one which Peters happily tapped into.

But there is more than egalitarianism at work here. Like citizens of other developed nations, New Zealanders are becoming progressively more suspicious of their leaders. A 2002 New Zealand government survey found that “over 10% of New Zealanders believed that most, or almost all, public officials are engaged in bribe taking or corruption” (State Services Commission of New Zealand 2000, 18). Thus despite the fact that the New Zealand government is rated as one of the most transparent and least corrupt governments in the world, a subset of New Zealanders increasingly perceive their politicians to be corrupt and out of touch with ordinary New Zealanders. While the reasons for declining trust in government are complex, at least some of the problem in New Zealand’s case can be traced to increased globalization, as the country’s economic struggle to compete translates into lack of confidence in the government (State Services Commission of New Zealand 2000, 17).

The culture of cynicism is evident in the rhetoric of elite distrust that permeates the language of New Zealand First Party MPs – even the rhetoric of Winston Peters,

who is a highly educated and successful lawyer, but who has clearly placed himself as the champion of the ordinary New Zealander. The foundation of Peters' corruption-fighting persona is his interest in the Winebox Scandal; in itself a product of an increasingly global financial market. In 1994 Peters alleged that prominent New Zealand business people and Cook Island politicians were involved in elaborate tax-avoidance schemes, using the Cook Islands as a tax haven and thereby defrauding taxpayers in both New Zealand and the Cook Islands (Henderson 1994). Peter's argument that elites were enriching themselves at the expense of ordinary Kiwis reverberated with his constituents.

A clear populist theme runs through all Peters' rhetoric – the New Zealand government is run by elites for elites, and ignores the ordinary New Zealander – “the Forgotten People.” Peters rejected opponents' opinion that he has no evidence for all this fraudulent activity, arguing that this merely means that the elites have been too good at covering it all up.

He speaks of government for the few and the very few, derides his opponent repeatedly with the line that they who know least learn best. They are morally bankrupt, or glove puppets of an all powerful New Right Cabal whom Peters holds responsible for betraying the hopes of the hundreds of thousands of forgotten New Zealanders (Smellie 1996).

Many party members, including Peters himself, embrace the label “populist” and claim that “that's what democracy is all about” (Winston Peters, interview by Author 2004) while one MP laughed “If I was called populist I'd be pleased! It wouldn't worry me at all, because it would mean that some people out here were, in the American sense, rooting for me!” (New Zealand First Member B 2004). Peters is presented as the representative of these “forgotten New Zealanders” – a phrase he uses often in his

speeches. He is the defender of the ordinary bloke. Unlike Hanson, who presented herself both as the champion of the little Aussie battler and as a battler herself, Peters is not a forgotten New Zealander but a lawyer and a powerful politician. Nevertheless, he is clearly successful at positioning himself as the honest outsider in the political game (O'Sullivan 1999, 46).

Like neo-populists in Australia and Canada, Winston Peters decries the movement towards “political correctness” which is imposed by intellectual elites to silence dissent from the ordinary people, calling it “cultural Marxism” (Peters 2001) and argued that it lead to 1984 and the “Thought Police” (Peters 2003c) and that it fosters inequality among ordinary New Zealanders. Peters argues that the elite’s language of political correctness allows privileges to be extended on the basis of race, which he argues is in itself racist (Peters 2000b).

If Māoris want to find the real enemies hindering their progress, I say look no further than the political correctness fostered by white liberals and the lack of internal discipline of Māori themselves (Peters 2000a).

Peters claims that “political correctness is replacing commonsense” and that it stifles dissent and thus allows “all manner of abuses, rorts [corruption] and outrages” at the expense of “ordinary New Zealanders” (Peters 2003a).

Citizen-initiated referenda have become an important policy theme in the New Zealand First Party platform echoing the same themes in the rhetoric of Preston Manning almost two decades before.

We desperately need checks and balances and a system that makes politicians accountable. We simply have to trust the people and to rely on their good will and commonsense. In a democracy people have the right to govern themselves and take matters into their own hands when their MPs fail them. When people elect a government to safeguard their

society, their security, culture, their liberty and their future, their elected representatives must listen to them. Democracy is lost when that elected government and its officials fail to hear the voices of the people. It is then that ordinary people have a moral duty to rise up and restore democracy themselves (Peters 2003d).

Citizen initiated referenda were first developed in the United States during the Progressive Era as a response to a perceived lack of democracy during an era of deep economic uncertainty in rural areas. Peters' adoption of plebiscitary democracy as policy stance is a response to the populist and materialist uncertainty that faced the New Zealand electorate in an era of global competition.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 1A

Peters has essentially tapped into a deep vein of materialist values in the New Zealand electorate, a vein that lies in its suburban margins and rural heartland. These are values that have persisted across time; they are values that were present in the New Zealand culture from its colonial history – egalitarian, anti-elite, and chauvinistic. Yet with the onset of globalization, increased international trade, and the resulting economic uncertainty for a segment of the population, these values have become more salient for that increasingly marginalized constituency. Peters did not create these values, he simply exploited them by articulating the frustration that that constituency felt. While rural materialist values were the ingredients, globalization was the catalyst in the creation of a populist movement and the emergence of a populist party.

FACTOR 1-B: NON-WHITE IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM IN NEW ZEALAND

THE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION IN NEW ZEALAND

Unlike Australia and Canada, New Zealand has never been classed as a major

migrant destination although in reality it is a nation of immigrants. The islands were first settled by Polynesian oceanic voyagers between 1000 and 1300AD, although some historians argue that it might have been as early as 500 AD (Powell 2003, 26-27). These settlers became the Māori, who knew the islands as Aotearoa, “The Land of the Long White Cloud.” The first European to explore New Zealand was the Dutchman Abel Tasman in the 17th Century, and the Englishman James Cook made a more thorough survey in 1769-70. New Zealand was made a colony by Britain after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 (Bedford 2003).

From 1840 until 1870, immigration to New Zealand came solely from the British Isles. So determined was the New Zealand government to preserve the British racial heritage of the islands that they set up an Assisted Passages Scheme for British migrants, while at the same time imposing an immigration tax on “race aliens” and other “undesirable” prospective migrants (Peters, cited in Marotta 2000, 179). With some exceptions for Chinese immigrant workers on the goldfields and railways, successive New Zealand governments pursued a racially restrictive immigration policy, passing the Asiatic Restriction Bill of 1878 and the Chinese Immigration Act of 1881 (McKinnon 1996, 23-32). After the Second World War almost all migrants came from Britain and Ireland – of 90,082 assisted migrants between 1945 and 1971, 76,673 migrants came from the British Isles (Marotta 2000, 179). After WWII the New Zealand government did allow in Polynesian immigrants from Tonga, Samoa and other Pacific micro-states, many of which were New Zealand protectorates (Marotta 2000, 181). Only in 1986 did the New Zealand government introduce a non-discriminatory immigration policy allowing non-Caucasian immigration.

In contrast to Australian and Canadian immigration policies, both of which were based upon the notion that the countries must “populate or perish,” immigration policy in New Zealand has historically been based upon the assumption that the country could not absorb large numbers of migrants but merely needed to supplement its existing labor force (Farmer 1997; Rapson 1998). Even after the policy revisions of 1986 and 1991, immigration was always intended to serve New Zealand’s domestic and international economic interests, and the policy was discussed in terms of a “skills shortage.” Entrepreneurial and business immigration, particularly from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Koreas, was encouraged by New Zealand governments because it was perceived to be of economic benefit to New Zealand (Farmer 1996). Both major political parties have, within the past two decades, recognized an economic need for increased immigration. Unlike Australia and Canada, New Zealand faces a net population loss since so many young New Zealanders leave to train and live overseas (Morgan 2002) particularly in Australia, which has a reciprocal open door policy for New Zealand citizens. New Zealand’s 1998 immigration target was 38,000 was aimed at a net population gain of 10,000 (Rapson 1998, 52). Thus the New Zealand immigration question has some additional complexity, but as in Canada and Australia it is a problem of disparity between mass opinion and elite policy support.

INCREASED NON-WHITE IMMIGRATION

As a result of the 1986 and 1991 revisions, the number of Asian immigrants, both as a percentage and in real terms, increased rapidly while immigration from Britain and America was significantly reduced. Total migration approvals increased from 29,649 in 1992-93 to a peak of 54,453 in 1995-96, while net migration increased to a

peak of 26,880 in 1996-7 (Rapson 1998, 53). By the 1996 census people identifying their ethnicity as “Asian” made up ten percent of Auckland’s population and five percent of the total New Zealand population (Rapson 1998, 54). Since New Zealand has a very small population (only 4 million people) the impact of this sudden shift in settler ethnicity was amplified – in 1999 New Zealand planned on accepting 10.5 immigrants for every thousand residents, compared with Australia which only took in 4.5 per thousand residents (Rapson 1998, 52). With immigration flows in the tens of thousands, the proportion of overseas-born residents in New Zealand is extremely high – just under 20 percent compared with Australia’s 24 percent and the United States’ 10 percent. Many of these immigrants were from Britain and Australia, but many of them, more than ever before, were non-white immigrants, such that in 1996 Asian immigrants comprised 6% of the total population (Bedford 2003). Within a matter of twenty years, New Zealand has experienced a dramatic ethno-cultural shift; it is unsurprising that anti-immigrant sentiments were on the rise in New Zealand in the 1990s.

The New Zealand First Party ran its first campaign on a platform that was only mildly anti-immigration although it was fiercely opposed to foreign ownership of strategic assets (James 1993). New Zealand First’s anti-(Asian)-immigration policy did not become the focus of New Zealand First campaigns until 1996. As a result of New Zealand First anti-immigration stance the party was successful in engaging significant voter support – New Zealand First rose rapidly in the opinion polls from 10% to 22% in the first four months of 1996 (Economist 1996). Despite the fact that the New Zealand First Party had a much more moderate tone than Australia’s One Nation Party, Peters’ vocabulary was startlingly similar to Hanson’s when he argued that “[o]ut of control

immigration is swamping our limited capacity to absorb and integrate migrants” (New Zealand Herald 2002). The echoes of Hanson’s “swamped by Asians” comment in her Maiden Speech are apparent.

Indeed, the rhetoric of many New Zealand First members and MPs reiterates (in a milder form) the xenophobia of the other neo-populist parties, and just as in Australia and Canada this anti-immigrant rhetoric struck a very responsive chord with a significant number of New Zealanders. In a poll in early 1996, 41% of those polled agreed that “the current levels of immigration that we have are ruining this country” while in another poll the year before 40-50% of New Zealanders believed that there were too many Asians in the country” (Clifton 1996, A1). Thus while the leaders of the major parties – both government and opposition – insisted that Asian immigration was necessary and beneficial to New Zealand’s economic growth, it was evident that a significant number of New Zealander voters considered Asian immigration to be harmful. Opinion polls throughout the 1990s revealed that public opinion was remarkably consistent – New Zealanders felt that Asian immigration was too high, although it was generally supportive of the levels of white immigration (Ip 2001, 2).

THE FRAMING OF NZFP’S ANTI-IMMIGRATION POLICY

Both New Zealand First MPs and non-partisan commentators have pointed out that anti-immigrant sentiment was not created by Peters’ rhetoric, but that the party was able to tap into an already existing xenophobia within a significant proportion of the New Zealand population, and motivate that segment of the population to active support. New Zealand First’s immigration policy thus reflected a deep-seated, racially motivated concern about immigration within part of the New Zealand population, caused by the

rapid increase in Asian immigration within the 1990s.

I think one of the big issues, particularly for our party, is the issue of immigration. I mean the culture of New Zealand is changing really quite dramatically without so much as a by-your-leave, really, for New Zealanders. They haven't had any input into that. I think that's ... there's quite a major issue in it – it does have ramifications for all of us (New Zealand First Member G 2004).

But while New Zealand First's anti-immigration policies were obviously targeting Asian immigration levels, like Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party in Australia and the Reform Party of Canada, the New Zealand First Party denied that its immigration policies were racist. The party's concern, it claimed in all its literature, was the preservation of the cultural heritage of New Zealand that had been undermined by the influx of immigrants who were unlikely to (or who might refuse to) assimilate into the mainstream New Zealand culture. The parallels in terms of framing are very clear.

To be sure, the leadership of the New Zealand First Party, unlike that of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party in Australia, does seem moderate, well-educated, and much less strident in its tone, so that it is difficult to argue that New Zealand First leaders are racist in the explicit manner of Pauline Hanson; nevertheless, the rhetoric used by Peters does resonate with the same xenophobia present in other neo-populist party platforms.

For we are sick to death of people who come here and who immediately want to re-establish their culture in our society. Which begs the question: why did they leave home in the first place? (Peters, cited in Ralston 2001).

Like Preston Manning, Winston Peters has deplored the divisiveness of having so many "hyphenated citizens." "No longer are we all just New Zealanders but something else first, whether it be Indian-New Zealanders, Samoan-New Zealanders, Chinese-New Zealanders or Māori -New Zealanders" (Ralston 2001). Immigrants, it seems, are

welcome as long as they are willing to conform to mainstream (white) New Zealand culture.

The fear that major cities could become ethnic ghettos is common to neo-populist party members in many countries. This view has some basis in reality since new arrivals do tend to cluster in large cities: Sydney and Melbourne, in Australia's case, and Auckland in the case of New Zealand. Winston Peters argued that these large ethnic populations could become breeding grounds of ethnic violence in New Zealand.

The ultimate destination looks very much like the hotbeds of ethnic and religious conflict – places such as Kosovo, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland [...] We are witnessing the Balkanisation of our country (Peters quoted in New Zealand Herald 2001).

There is in fact some evidence of social strain caused by immigration in Auckland, but it was strain on service infrastructure such as overcrowding in public schools and on roadways (Espiner 2003). There is little evidence of ethnic or racial violence.

The need to ensure social cohesion in a country seems to be a reasonable motive for opposing large-scale immigration, and many of the leaders of New Zealand First who were interviewed were obviously highly informed and sincerely concerned about the issue. But close examination of the rhetoric used by Peters and other New Zealand First members reveals that the race of the immigrants is very much central to the New Zealand First Party's objections – and some members' actual views – regarding immigration. Non-assimilating British and Australian immigrants were never mentioned as possible problems in any interview. The problem is simply the ratio of Asian faces to white faces:

[I]t's rather different to walk down one of the main streets of the major cities and be in the minority – you'd think you were in anywhere else

but New Zealand. It's really different. Sometimes you can walk down there and you'd think you were in Hong Kong or Singapore or one of the other major countries, certainly not New Zealand (New Zealand First Member G 2004).

Asian and Muslim immigrants are more problematic than other immigrants because they are, according to many members, unlikely to assimilate into mainstream (white) culture.

They keep together, they don't really mix. They don't really always have to work – the females definitely don't work! Ummm ... they sort of keep their traditional ways – it almost looks as if we're transporting different cultures in to live in little groups or subgroups within our major culture. And we're seeing that even with different schools coming into being. I know for example that down in Christchurch they're having a Muslim school – I know that the Muslim Community has actually up the money for it but it's funny that schools are even reflecting that difference now (New Zealand First Member G 2004).

Since September 11, 2001, Muslim refugees in particular have been seen by the New Zealand First Party as a threat to New Zealand's national security "because of the political baggage they bring with them, and the 'unique' methods of dealing with political opposition to their cause" (Peters 2002a). As with much of the rhetoric surrounding non-white immigration, this language parallels that of the One Nation members who were concerned that Muslims in particular would not be able to assimilate into Australian culture.

FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, WELFARE CHAUVINISM, AND IMPORTED CRIME

From 2001 on, attention was directed away from Asian immigration and towards Muslim refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq. A distinct strain of welfare chauvinism appeared in New Zealand First immigration policy and rhetoric. In this new rhetoric

immigrants are problematic not only because of their race, but because they strain the welfare and social service systems; thus New Zealand First, like neo-populist parties the world over, claims that it is the high levels of immigration, rather than the race of the migrants, that is at issue. Nevertheless, the country of origin of prospective migrants is important, because immigrants from “third world” countries are more burdensome than those from advanced industrial nations. A pamphlet published by the New Zealand First Party in 2003 emphasized the impact upon the social welfare infrastructure of “hundreds of thousands of Third World immigrants [that] have arrived since 1999” and that the “Health, education, welfare, transport and housing facilities are collapsing under the weight” of immigrants from Third World countries (quoted in Espiner 2003). This fear was explicated by more than one New Zealand First Party member:

All Winston wants – we definitely like immigration, we’re not against immigration. All we want is a smaller number of people coming in so that they are able to be assimilated into the community and into the infrastructure that already exists. We have ... In the health system, for example, we know that Somali women, they come in and they’ve got a shortage of vitamin D and rickets, and they have these massive injections every month, and they’re on them for life, and they’re about \$1000 dollars a time. And really some of that money could be put into our own health system, which is ailing, unfortunately, with people not being able to get operations, or up and dying on the waiting list, or told to go back to their GP (New Zealand First Member G 2004).

In this way non-white immigrants are framed as an unnecessary burden for New Zealand taxpayers; not only do they take up more than their share of New Zealand’s resources, but they bring their (huge) families, including elderly people who cannot contribute to the economy, with them to “bludge” off ordinary New Zealanders.

This clearly highlights the reality that under this politically correct government and its open door immigration policies, one refugee never equals just one refugee – it almost always means ten or fifteen refugees,

most of whom go on the welfare system (Peters 2004).

The party also argues that “Third World” immigrants have brought with them serious diseases, particularly HIV and AIDS. The party’s 2003 anti-immigrant pamphlet proclaims that “[i]mported crime levels are soaring and so are the number of Third World diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS”. Yet while there are a few prominent cases of immigrants arriving with undetected HIV infections, in general there has been no epidemiological evidence linking increasing HIV rates to immigration. Peters has been very effective at pointing out that Third World refugees strain the healthcare system, while New Zealand-born citizens are denied services.

Let us not forget that these people are by any definition queue jumpers. Also let us not lose sight of the fact that a large number of New Zealanders are in the very same situation. Ask the mother or father of a child waiting for medical attention at Auckland StarShip hospital ... In essence, there is so much to be done here in New Zealand for New Zealanders.

While much of Peters’ rhetoric is exaggerated, there is enough truth in what he says that it is highly effective – Auckland’s social services are stressed, and there has been a housing boom there which has been exacerbated by increased immigration.

The New Zealand First Party also claims that immigrants have “imported” crime so that police resources are stretched to their limit. New Zealand First spokesperson Ron Mark claimed, in a 2003 press release, that Asian immigration is directly linked to increased crime.

The number of crimes committed by Asian offenders has risen by 77 percent in the last five years, with the average less than four percent for other groups. Why is the Government refusing to address this problem? Because they are more interested in the artificial economic boom created by importing Asian students (Mark 2003).

New Zealand First members argue that they are being silenced on this issue by the forces of political correctness, and that the government is not listening to ordinary New Zealanders who know what is happening on the streets. The party clearly understands the power of fear among their voters.

BICULTURAL XENOPHOBIA

The framing of New Zealand First Party's anti-immigration policy is significantly influenced by Winston Peter's own race. The fact that he is half-Māori himself, and is respected within the Māori community, blunts any criticism that he is racist. But some commentators argue that simply because Winston Peters is himself non-white it does not necessarily follow that he and his followers are not xenophobic.

During the 1990s a small segment of the Māori population began to raise concerns about New Zealand population policy. Māori have emphasized that the Treaty of Waitangi is New Zealand's original immigration document, allowing immigration of British citizens to New Zealand (McKinnon 1996, 26-28). Māori saw the Treaty as protecting the integrity of their distinct and separate culture. Immigration and multicultural policy is opposed by many Māori who feel it is "strategy to bypass the demands of tangata whenua (the people of the land, i.e. Māori)" (Williams 1996, 649).

But now Māori are starting to realize that this whole area of immigration impacts on them as well. Because they're now ... it's more difficult for them to acquire home ownership and access to employment. And so they're starting to realize that they're no longer ... if they don't watch out, they will lose their status of being Tangata Whenua or "people of the land." Because already in Auckland, the Asian community, which is one of the fastest growing ethnic groups in the country, let alone Auckland, are starting to exceed Māori numbers in that area (New Zealand First Member H 2004).

While both Pakeha and Māori New Zealanders are supportive of government funding

for Māori culture, the New Zealand First Party was hostile to multiculturalism – arguing that immigrants must integrate and learn to speak English (One News 2002).

David Braddon-Mitchell argues that New Zealanders are “bicultural xenophobic” (Braddon-Mitchell 1996). During the past two decades, Australia and Canada pursued a policy of multiculturalism, where plural ethnic identities were accepted, and the governments made a commitment to non-discrimination between individuals (McKinnon 1996, Appendix I). New Zealand, in contrast, had adopted a bicultural policy denoting its commitment to the relationship between two groups – Māori and Pakeha. There are thus two ways of being a New Zealander: white New Zealanders (Pakeha) and New Zealanders of Polynesian descent (Māori) are accepted, but other ethnicities are not (Braddon-Mitchell 1996, 16). The notion that New Zealanders are biculturally xenophobic helps to explain how New Zealand, once lauded for its racially tolerant society, could have a successful anti-immigration party.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 1B

There is a clear connection between increased non-white immigration and the emergence of the New Zealand First Party in the 1990s. In New Zealand biculturalism fed xenophobia against immigrants, because it broadened the base of anti-immigrant support to include Māori. At the core the issue was one of national identity, and which group, or which groups, were to be allowed to define that national identity. New Zealand First cannily positioned itself to take advantage of a newly awakened xenophobia caused by increased non-white immigration.

FACTOR 1C: INCREASED INDIGENOUS ACTIVISM THE TREATY OF WAITANGI

Of the three indigenous groups in these cases – the Australian Aborigines, the

Canadian Native Americans, and the New Zealand Māori – the Māori have been most fortunate, having been given British citizenship and land rights by the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 and having had these rights recognized in modern times. In terms of securing native title and political and civil rights, Māori have been one of the most successful and vocal indigenous groups of any nation. New Zealand has always been presented as a model of indigenous people's rights; a nation which recognized the value of the indigenous culture.

New Zealand was never, however, as free from racism as many would like to believe, and Māori control of land was steadily eroded so that by 1892 the tribes controlled less than 11 million acres (Franklin 1989). Although Māori were granted significant political rights under the Māori Representation Act of 1867, many aspects of the Treaty of Waitangi were ignored until Māori protest movements began to push for ratification of the Treaty – that is, its recognition in New Zealand Legislation – in the 1970s. In 1975 the Waitangi Tribunal was set up to hear grievances against the crown, and throughout the 1970s and 1980s a series of land rights protests – particularly the Bastion Point occupation and the Raglan Golf Course protest – until a landmark court case in 1987 recognized Māori land ownership under the Treaty. In 1992 there was a comprehensive Treaty settlement on fishing rights, and by the mid-1990s a new phase on land rights and treaty activism had been established (State Services Commission of New Zealand 2004).

While there was always some recognition of “Māori cultural distinctness” in mainstream Kiwi culture from the 1960s onwards, the official policy was still aimed at assimilating Māori into the mainstream white culture. Nevertheless, New Zealand

recognized indigenous rights relatively early in comparative international terms, and the adoption of a policy of biculturalism in the 1980s indicated a more clear understanding of the Treaty – the founding document of New Zealand – as an “agreement between two peoples” (Williams 1996, 636). Thus increased indigenous activism in the 1960s and 70s ensured a policy not of multiculturalism (as was the case in Australia and Canada) but of biculturalism.

Biculturalism as a model appears to involve recognition of and respect for the minority culture, and New Zealand elites have accepted the need to address the legacy of colonialism in New Zealand (Williams 1996, 638). Among a subset of the population, however, tensions surrounding Treaty issues increased steadily throughout the 1990s. Every interviewee regarded the Treaty as one of the three most important issues currently facing New Zealand.

The whole issue around race relations, and particularly the treaty of Waitangi, is without a doubt the most important thing. Right at the moment, we're in a situation over the foreshore and seabed and the laws surrounding that and access to it. [...] Waitangi's been going on essentially since 1840 when it was signed. But in 1975 – of course the Treaty is not a valid treaty unless it is put into law; there's been ongoing difficulties or issues around it. But I would have to say that in the last... I mean the last two or three election campaigns, the whole thing has certainly been an issue in the campaigns (New Zealand First Member C 2004).

There is a subset of the New Zealand population who feel very strongly that the Treaty of Waitangi is problematic. In the 1993 National Election Study, for example, 46.7% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the Treaty should not be part of New Zealand Law.

The point, which is lost in the warrior rhetoric, is that middle New Zealand – bewildered, fearful, and resentful – has reached the limit of

concessions, for this generation at least (James 2004).

This sentiment is not limited to New Zealand First voters, but National and New Zealand First voters were at least ten percentage points more likely to feel this way than Labour or Alliance voters.

The rise of Winston Peters and his New Zealand First Party, therefore, was connected with the increased indigenous activism associated with the Treaty of Waitangi protest movement. Winston benefited from the contrast between the “unkempt, unpresentable, radical fringe of the Māori protest movement” and his own well-groomed, conservative appearance (Laws 1998, 110). Peters was able to tap into the existing fear and resentment of the Treaty of Waitangi that was felt by conservative, materialist, New Zealanders and garner the support of this constituency (Ralston 2002, 89-90).

WINSTON PETERS AND THE “TREATY INDUSTRY”

The most important difference between the Australian and New Zealand cases in dealing with the issue of indigenous rights is the race of the leader. Winston Peters, a highly educated and successful lawyer, is half Māori, although he was “profoundly European in his background, education and social outlook” (Laws 1998) and neither spoke Māori nor was very familiar with Māori customs. Winston Peters’ race alone gave him the credibility and thus the leverage (and possibly the perspective) that Hanson lacked on this issue.

Peters – with some justification, no doubt – has pointed out that the political correctness enforced by “white liberals” means that no one can criticize Māori without being called racist. Peters argues that some responsibility for the plight of Māori must

be blamed on the lack of discipline of the indigenous people of New Zealand themselves because “colonization cannot be blamed for every ill facing Māori” (Peters 2000). Giving Māori special privileges on the basis of race, Peters argues, is detrimental. While Hanson was castigated for articulating some of the same arguments about Aboriginal affairs, Winston Peters is mostly insulated from criticism, and his candor on the issue actually increases his popularity not only with whites but also with some conservative Māori.

Māori quite like the idea of another Māori giving it to them – socking it to them and they still like it. Because see, in actual fact others can’t do it – most other Māori politicians down here, with the exception of Tariana Turia at the present time, maintain strict party lines (New Zealand First Member B 2004).

Peter’s popularity with the Māori reflects the concern that some Māori themselves have with the implementation of the Treaty and the problems this poses for “national unity” and cultural values of equality and “a fair go” (Feizkhah 2003, 94).

Peters’ language when he discusses the Treaty is clearly neo-populist in tone, evoking Hanson’s diatribes against ATSIC and “Aboriginal welfare.” Just as Hanson criticized the fraud and corruption of ATSIC, much of the criticism of the Treaty that is articulated by New Zealand First members is of the waste and fraud involved. There are “snouts in the brownocracy trough” so that the elites get the benefits while the ordinary Māori misses out (Clifton 2002).

I would say that for every Māori that’s engaged in proliferating this industry, there are 10 Europeans who are getting even more out of it. Consultants, lawyers, the PR industry in particular (Peters quoted in Clifton 2002).

The argument that the implementation of the Treaty was corrupt was a constant theme

in every interview with a New Zealand First member.

The treaty settlements were another issue – over 750 million of them. The average Māori is not getting the benefits. It's the fat cats at the top that are getting everything – lawyers, consultants, judges (New Zealand First Member E 2005).

I think Māori know for themselves for sure that this “Treaty Grievance Industry” that has grown up in our country is one of the best industries to be in, and that ordinary Māori aren't really getting what they should of their Treaty settlements. [...] It's quite surprising – Winston always says that the ordinary Māori person in the street is not even getting one snapper! So that's one of our first ... when it comes to the Treaty settlement. Whereas others are getting quite a lot – you see them in their four wheel drives (New Zealand First Member G 2004).

Thus while the rich are benefiting from the Treaty, low income Māori are not. The distrust of “rich elites” applies just as clearly to rich Māori elites.

The similarity in language between Hanson's “Aboriginal industry” and Peters' “Treaty Grievance Industry” reflects the populism that inspires both leaders, as well as the culture that underlies both parties.

I think most New Zealanders are comfortable with the Treaty, but they are unhappy with the industry that has arisen around the Treaty. The Treaty hasn't helped Māori, but it has helped 1) Lawyers, and 2) Māori s who have jobs talking about the problems but not working out the solutions! There is evidence that the solutions aren't coming quickly enough, and so a majority of New Zealanders are more concerned about the Treaty, now. It's really all about “multi-human ownership” of land and assets. So we have Māori corporations built up, but how do you ensure accountability? The same demands are not being made on Māori corporations that are made on non-Māori corporations, so there's a double standard (New Zealand First Member F 2002).

The same populist issues of elite corruption, democracy, and accountability are all evident.

And just as in the Australian case, there is evidence that indigenous affairs issues – in this case the implementation of the Treaty – has indeed been mishandled and

that there are problems in terms of Māori settlements and grants. One of the Māori members interviewed pointed out that promised benefits are not forthcoming over a decade after settlements were signed. As one indigenous New Zealand First Party member argued:

In terms of the Treaty, we're not against the Treaty of Waitangi, but we believe that there are very few people who are benefiting from the intent of the treaty, in terms of its claims settlements. And that there are some people who are quite happy to extend the process because they're getting well paid as part of it. And that's our gripe. Look, my particular sub-tribe, we're a sub-tribe of the biggest tribe in New Zealand, and since the signing of the Sea Lords deal, back in '92 ... or whenever it was signed, we've never seen one cent from that settlement. Yeah! And I might say we approximate to about 40% of the total tribal numbers for that particular tribe – that the Ngapuhi. At the last census it had a number of I think 101,000. And my sub-tribe Ngapi Hini, a sub-tribe based in the Bay of Islands, but our membership is worldwide, but we conservatively estimate our members to be around about 40,000. That's a very large group who, although they are beneficiaries of the Seal Lords deal, have yet to be able to claim that they have benefits from the deal (New Zealand First Member H 2004).

This is obviously not an isolated incident, as even New Zealand First's harshest critics agree that there are problems and a lack of accountability within the system. The evidence of mismanagement is enough for Peters to maintain support amongst those lower income New Zealanders, both Pakeha and Māori, who "the government targeted and missed, with the 'Closing the Gaps' strategy" (Ralston 2002). Here the similarity between the Australian and New Zealand cases ends, since Hanson could never expect to gain support from Aborigines, but Peters maintains support amongst Māori (a much larger portion of the population) by arguing that the Māori elite is stealing from the ordinary Māori, just as Pakeha elites are stealing from ordinary Pakeha.

The importance of Peters' own ethnicity in this strategy cannot be overstated. While Hanson was talking about many of the same issues she was derided as racist yet

Peters has credibility. Although he is accused of xenophobia in regards to non-white immigration, he cannot be accused of racism against Māori.

“ONE LAW FOR ALL”

Not only are Māori not getting the benefit of Treaty settlements, New Zealand First Members argue, but the Treaty is in itself divisive because it does not mesh with mainstream New Zealand cultural values of equality and “a fair go.”

This is a huge social issue because it is dividing the country. There’s been a huge account of public goodwill – the desire of New Zealanders to cleanse the nation of past injustice, but with the caveat that once the settlements were made they would be final and that low income New Zealanders would be the ones to benefit. The current situation has the potential to undermine the goodwill and divide people. The other thing that is true is that 70% of Māori aren’t part of this drive but whenever there is a backlash they’re the ones that cop it in the street! (New Zealand First Member E 2005).

The theme of “one law for all” is a mirror of Hanson’s theme of “one nation” and indeed of the emphasis upon “equality” that many neo-populist parties, including the Reform Party in Canada, use to justify their policies against indigenous (and immigrants) rights claims.

New Zealand First members argue that the current policy gives preferential treatment to Māori, that this is “reverse racism,” since these privileges provided by the treaty are based upon skin color rather than need, and that this runs counter to the egalitarian nature of New Zealand society (Peters 2003b).

The public have had enough of this sort of preferential treatment which is causing increasing resentment and division between Māori and non-Māori and harming the state of race relations in New Zealand (Peters 2000).

Winston Peters argues that the current interpretation of the Treaty, which relies upon the Māori language version, gives rights to the Māori tribes, while the English language version gave rights more generally to New Zealanders.¹⁶ Peters has consistently argued that racially based privileges are bad for Māori, arguing that the implementation of the Treaty is merely “sickly paternalism” which diverts attention (and money) away from the real issues of Māori development. The Treaty is a “security blanket” which prevents Māoris from adapting to the future (Peters 2002b). While some critics have argued that Peters is using the issue to manipulate support, Michael Laws, Peters former advisor and not one to pull punches, argues that upon race and Treaty issues Winston is acting from passionate conviction (Laws 1998).

Consistent with this rejection of racial preferences, New Zealand First refused to run candidates for Māori seats in the 2001 election, claiming that the separate mandate was just as detrimental. Instead Peters stacked the Party list with Māori, and managed to send six Māori members to parliament.

The fact that this is a party which stood no one in the Māori seats, where there are six members of parliament of Māori background in the mainstream is quite something else, because other parties didn't. The National Party has come out in this country with a racist policy in regards to Māori, with only one Māori MP in the team, and she's not part of the policy. So I think in a broad sense – in fact the more that I'm

¹⁶ Peters explained during his interview with the author in 2004: “[The Treaty] has been historically, mistakenly, interpreted to be the Māori language version, when in fact it's axiomatic, I think that the Māori language version was translated from the English version, and the English version of the Treaty says something else. The English version of the Treaty in my view has not found its way, some parts of it, into the Māori version, but the commitment of the Crown is to *all the peoples of New Zealand*. Those words are missing, but they are not missing from summit documentation and the preparatory work of the 3rd and 4th of February, two days before the document was signed. The fact that it was signed on the 6th of February is only because it was the final document which it dated the signatures to it, but the original documentation that I've seen has the 4th of February – the English version that is. And that to me is the only historic version that can, in a fair interpretation, stand up. So the Treaty that came to be recognized in 1975 in terms of statutory purposes, is wrong, and from then you've had a number of what you might call “highly activist jurists” making interpretations which simply cannot stack up.”

thinking about it as I'm talking to you – that has to be one of the salient issues: that this party has maintained a strong ratio of Māori members of parliament, and thereby a section of another Māori voice apart from that of Labour. And ours' is a moderate one and a call for equality and equality is demonstrated if you like by the membership of our team, who've all had some achievement in their personal life before they arrived in Parliament (New Zealand First Member B 2004).

The achievement of a significant degree of Māori representation within parliament solidifies Peter's credibility as a Māori as well as a populist leader.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 1C

Peters' message thus plays well to both economically disadvantaged and resentful Pakeha and socially conservative Māori. The former were at least in part activated by the increase in radical activism by young Māori, and their resentment of the settlement of the Treaty of Waitangi and the perception that Māori were unfairly advantaged. The latter were activated by the same set of circumstances, because they perceived Peters as a reputable leader and agreed that the Treaty was not achieving benefits for the Māori people. In essence, increased indigenous activism helped to catalyze the New Zealand First voters, whether Māori or Pakeha.

FACTOR 1D: SPATIAL PARTY POLITICS IN NEW ZEALAND

NEW ZEALAND FIRST AND MMP – ELECTORAL SYSTEM CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND

Since 1935 there have been two major parties in New Zealand politics: the New Zealand Labour Party – which has traditionally represented the working class and, since

the Second World War, the Māori¹⁷ – and the National Party – which has traditionally represented agricultural as well as small business interests. These parties enjoyed a duopoly of power in the New Zealand parliament until 1996 because New Zealand had a First Past the Post (FPP) electoral system. Despite this, several minor parties operated throughout the post-WWII era, particularly the Social Credit Party which got almost 20% of the national vote in the 1970s, although it never won a seat in parliament. In part as a result of this failure of popular parties such as Social Credit to win seats in the 1980s (New Zealand First Member B 2004), New Zealanders voted “yes” to a 1993 the referendum to reform New Zealand’s electoral system from an FPP system into a Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMPR) system. The referendum created sixty-nine “electorate” seats in the New Zealand parliament – sixty-two in general seats and seven in Māori seats – as well as fifty-one “party list” seats, depending on the proportion of votes won by a specified party (Network NZ Ltd. 2002, 255-256).

Many political scientists view New Zealand First’s emergence as a product of the proportional system, but the party was actually formed under the old electoral system since it was founded in July of 1993 and the party fielded eighty-three candidates in the general election. The new party garnered 8.4% of the national vote, although only one candidate, other than Peters himself, was successful in winning a seat; Tau Henare, the party’s deputy leader, managed to win the Northern Māori seat. Thus New Zealand First cannot be said to be merely a product of Duverger’s Law.

¹⁷ The connection of the Māori with the Labor Party dates to the Ratana movement of the 1920s. Tahupotiki Wiremu Ratana founded a church based upon Christian principles and Treaty ratification. Ratana candidates ran for office and Labour, realizing that it would need Māori support to win office, set out to represent Māori interests. The Labour-Ratana alliance lasted into the latter half of the 20th Century (cited in Franklin 1989).

While the MMP electoral reform has certainly added to the influence that New Zealand First has wielded over the past decade, and may have contributed to the party's parliamentary longevity (New Zealand First Member C 2004) the party's emergence was really the product of discontent with the major parties and their inability to represent certain ideological positions within the New Zealand electorate.

[B]ecause those two main parties suppressed or reduced, if you like, the impact of those strands of thinking in those broad-church ranks. And MMP, putting in the clearest sense, NZFP was able to use MMP as an opportunity, but we were there first, we were there before MMP, we were there before the Greens (New Zealand First Member B 2004).

In essence, the New Zealand First Party is the product of the failure of the established parties adequately to represent a portion of the New Zealand electorate. While this portion of the electorate had felt adequately represented in the past, the major parties had shifted in ideological space so that they no longer represented a portion of their respective constituencies.

NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE SALE OF STATE ASSETS

The representational problem in New Zealand can be traced back to the ruthlessly imposed economic reforms of the 1990s. New Zealand politics in the 1970s and early 1980s had been dominated by the National Party leader Robert Muldoon, a brash social conservative with a populist appeal to the middle and lower-middle class who were referred to as "Rob's Mob" (Nagel 1998, 237-8). While the National Party under Muldoon had instituted some market reforms, the party's reliance upon the support of "Rob's Mob" – and perhaps Muldoon's own personal history – curtailed the extent of these reforms and eventually caused a split in the party itself. A splinter party – the New Zealand Party (NZP) – which was led by a millionaire property developer

and which pushed for free market policies – ensured a Labour Party victory. National dumped Muldoon as leader and immediately set about repositioning itself on the political spectrum to its logical free-market position. The leaders of the Labour Party, seeing that the party might well lose the 1987 election, calculated that by leapfrogging over National and taking a free market stance the party might appeal to those NZP voters, while still holding seats in poor and working-class constituencies (Nagel 1998, 246-257).

Under Finance Minister Roger Douglas and his successors, Labour began a series of quite dramatic and far reaching economic reforms including rapid removal of foreign investment restrictions, import controls, subsidies for farmers (who were not part of the Labour Party's constituency) and most tariffs. The New Zealand Dollar was floated and the labor market was deregulated. These programs were implemented very quickly before opposition could be raised, so that by 1993 New Zealand led the world in the sale of state-owned assets, mostly to overseas investors (Choudry 2002). Dubbed "Rogernomics," these reforms were extremely unpopular with the traditional base of the Labor party, causing thousands of job losses in the manufacturing sector over the next few years. The economic impact of the imposition of neo-liberalism on the entire New Zealand economy was "unexpectedly long and costly" since there was no growth in gross domestic product for seven years from 1984 to 1991, although OECD nations averaged 20% (Nagel 1998, 258-265). The reforms were also detrimental to the National Party's agricultural base.

The problem with the reforms were that we have this strange mission in this country to be first. And when you're first you need to have followers. The problem with us was that none of the countries we traded with followed our liberal example. And so we've had an

unevenness in regards to the reaction of the rest of the world, and as a basically core agricultural and pastoral income producing country, we've had to compete with a world of tariffs and various in-costs on imported goods, and so in the economic sense, throughout part of our economy – it's important, although not quite so important today as it was – we've had a very difficult struggle (New Zealand First Member B 2004).

Thus it was not surprising that the Labour Party lost the 1990 election to the National Party led by Jim Bolger. The National Party quickly lost support, however, when it continued the neo-liberal reforms; indeed the finance minister, Ruth Richardson, claimed that Douglas, far from going too far with neo-liberal policies, had not gone far enough. This encouraged some wags to dub her position as “Ruthenasia” (Choudry 2002).

The fact that both of the major parties had bought into what has been described as “New Right” philosophies....They were “Rogernomics” or “Ruthernomics.” Rogernomics is basically they bought into very much the Milton Friedman Chicago School of user pays, cutting government expenditure, cutting taxes. Australia didn't go anywhere near as far as New Zealand; we took things a lot further (New Zealand First Member C 2004).

Essentially, the major parties had enthusiastically (and, some observers claimed, somewhat impetuously) embraced market liberalism, to the detriment of their traditional base of support.

It is obvious that elites from both parties actually supported these reforms, but why did the voters support the reforms through two elections, even in the midst of such disappointing economic growth and the exacerbation of economic insecurity and inequality? Several important New Zealand political scientists (McAllister and Vowles 1994) argue that a substantial portion of New Zealander Labour voters had become so concerned with post-materialist “green and anti-nuke” policies that they no longer paid

attention to economics, and thus allowed the economic reforms to be pushed through. Others (such as Nagel 1998) argue that Labour won initial support for its reform package by promising its core working class constituency an industrial relations policy that would support trade unions. In either case, during the early 1990s dissatisfaction with the policy began to harden among both the National Party and Labour Party supporters.

It was really a complete disillusionment with the major parties. Labour's "Rogernomics" policies – all this free trade stuff, and then National, having railed against these policies, picked up the ball and ran with it! New Zealanders were not happy with the two major parties despite the fact that the economy seemed to be improving (New Zealand First Member E 2005).

More salient than tariff and trade policies, however, was the privatization of various state services – including New Zealand Telecom, New Zealand Rail, and part of the electricity market – and the sell-off of state assets such as the Bank of New Zealand, which was sold to National Australia Bank in 1992 for \$1.48 billion (Peters 1999). New Zealand's neo-liberals were "out-Thatcherizing Margaret Thatcher." Over \$NZ14 billion in state owned assets were sold in the period 1987 to 1999, a massive sell-off considering the size of the NZ economy. Perhaps more than any other issue, the selling of state assets allowed Winston Peters to court voters with a nationalistic brand of conservative economic policy, which was even more effective in the context of the failure of these policies to improve the economic position of the country.

The Labour and National Governments sold our assets, often at fire sale prices, and the nation was told this was to reduce government debt. Yet, government debt increased nearly four-fold (New Zealand First Member J 2002).

In the 1993 New Zealand National Election Study, 34% of respondents thought that the

state should retain complete ownership of the Bank of New Zealand, 18.8% believed the state should retain partial ownership, while only 23% of respondents believed that the government should have no regulatory control (see Table 5.2 in Appedix VI).

NEW ZEALAND FIRST DEMOGRAPHICS – WHERE THE VOTE CAME FROM

There has been no published quantitative research completed on the source of the New Zealand First vote, thus there is less clarity about the prior partisanship than in the Australian and Canadian cases. An analysis of the New Zealand National Election Study, however, shows that in 1993 the party was drawing two thirds of its voters from the National Party. In responding to the question “Which party did you vote for in the 1990 election?” 55% of those respondents who voted for New Zealand First (all of whom were voting for the party for the first time, since the party had only been formed a few months before) claimed to have voted for the National Party in the previous election, compared to 18.3% from Labour (Vowles et al. 1993). The fact that Winston Peters and Tau Henare – the only prominent members of the party at the time – had both been National Party front benchers, goes a long way to explaining the results of the 1993 election, which was the last to be held under the first-past-the-post electoral system.

The 1996 New Zealand National Election Study, however, shows that the New Zealand First vote came from a number of different parties. Of the 746 respondents who claimed to have voted for New Zealand First in 1996, only 17% claimed to have voted for New Zealand First in 1993, while 25% claimed to have voted for National, and 30% of the New Zealand First Party vote came from respondents who had voted for the Labour Party in 1993 (see Table 5.1 in Appedix VI). This is a significant shift: of new

New Zealand First Party voters in 1996, 30% came from National and 36.5% came from Labour. Furthermore, when New Zealand First Party voters split their ticket between their party and their electorate vote, they voted more than twice as often for a Labour candidate (15%) than for a National candidate (6.5%).

Part of what is happening is party de-alignment – a weakening of partisan identification throughout the 1980s and 1990s so that first National Party supporters in 1993 and then National and Labour Party supporters in 1996 feel free to vote against their traditional party (McAllister and Vowles 1994, 395).

When I grew up, for example it would have been tantamount to suicide to fly a blue flag on your car on Election Day. It was a working class state housing area – you know, Redfern sort of stuff – and working class voted Labour. My father, for example, had quite an antagonism towards farmers, because farmers voted National and National looked after farmers with direct interventions. The farmers and the well-to-do voted National, the working class voted Labour. Simple, you never even bothered about what the policies of the parties were, you just voted along those lines (New Zealand First Member C 2004).

This de-aligning event, however, is clearly linked to a shift not in the ideological position of the voter, but in that of the major parties. In particular, the Labour Party's core demographic – the working class – had been severely affected by the neo-liberal economic reforms that had been implemented under the Labour government, and which the National Party had continued, with even fewer protections for the blue collar worker. In 1996 a significant portion of the working class was extremely dissatisfied with neo-liberal economic policies which were associated with both major parties, and particularly with the traditional party of the working class.

During the 1980s, for example, Labour, in some respects withdrew its support for the working class, and brought in economic policies that supported the very, very rich, believe it or not (New Zealand First

Member C 2004).

At one stage, prior to the 90s, I think that Labour looked after the working man, and had the working man's interests at heart. Now they have shifted further to the right, there, and they're often called the Chardonnay Socialists, now – more to the middle sort-of ground. Many of the people that are in that Labour Party have never been workers, and I think that has changed the philosophy of the Labour Party (New Zealand First Member G 2004).

As its defeat in the 1993 election indicated, the Labour Party had lost a considerable portion of its core supporter to other parties: among 1993 election study respondents who claimed they had voted for Labour in 1990, there was a significant swing to the social democratic coalition party the Alliance of 16%, although New Zealand First also garnered 4% of the former Labour vote (Vowles 1993).

Partisan dealignment may explain some of the shift to New Zealand First of both National Party and Labour Party, but it does not explain why National Party members shifted their vote in 1993, while Labour voters shifted in 1996. The split shift is an indication of a change not in the policies of the major parties (whose platforms had not significantly changed since they had adopted neo-liberalism in the late 1980s) but in the New Zealand First Party platform – a movement in ideological space so that New Zealand First appealed not only to disaffected National Party voters, as it had in 1993, but also to disaffected Labour Party voters.

A comparison of the 1993 and 1996 election studies illustrates this movement quite clearly. In the 1993 NZES 34% of all respondents thought that the government should fully own the Bank of New Zealand, but 45% of New Zealand First voters thought full ownership was necessary. In 1996, however, the New Zealand First voters were far more similar to voters in other parties, with 30% of NZFP voters supporting

full ownership, compared with 28% of Labour voters and 36% of Alliance voters (see Table 5.2). State asset ownership had softened as a party stance and as a NZF voter attitude.

The 1993 NZNES shows that New Zealand First voters were more likely than other voters to consider immigration as Very Important or Extremely Important, 31.3% of New Zealand First voters, compared with 25.3% of Labour Voters and 22.9% of National Party Voters and 25.9% of all voters in the study (see Table 5.3). This is a significant difference – a six percent divergence from voters as a whole. In the 1996 election study, however, this distinction became much more pronounced. While 33.5% of all voters in the study thought that immigration was a “very important” or “extremely important” issue, and 32.4% of Labour supporters considered the issue “very important” or “extremely’ important,” 58% of New Zealand First supporters thought that the issue was very or extremely important, and only three percent of them thought that the issue was not at all important.

These election study results reflect a change in policy emphasis by the New Zealand First Party from 1993 to 1996. Although Peters had made some noises about immigration, New Zealand First was not primarily an anti-immigrant party in 1993, although some hint of xenophobia was evident in Peter’s nationalistic protectionist stance. Instead, the fledgling party emphasized the need for state control of industries and social security protections for pensioners. In 1996, however, immigration had become a significant part of the party’s platform – the primary arm of a tripartite platform of immigration, Treaty of Waitangi, and law and order issues.

While New Zealand First voters appear to be most clearly activated by

immigration as an issue there were also significant differences between New Zealand First voter attitudes and the attitudes of voters from other parties in other policy areas such as Law and Order, Superannuation, and Race Relations. The 1993 NZNES found that 84% of New Zealand First voters thought that law and order was a very or extremely important issue, compared with 79% of voters overall, while in the 1996 study 83.7% of New Zealand First voters thought it was important, compared with 74.8% of voters overall (see Table 5.6 in Appendix VI). In the 1993 NZNES 66% of New Zealand First supporters thought that Superannuation was very or extremely important, 4% points more than the average voter. In 1996, 76% of New Zealand First voters considered Superannuation to be a very or extremely important issue, compared with 68.9% of Labour voters and 62% of voters overall (see Appendix VI, Table 5.5). In terms of race relations, 42% of 1993 New Zealand First voters considered it as very or extremely important, compared with 35% of all voters. In 1996 a greater percentage of New Zealand First voters considered race relations as an important issue, 48.7%, but so did a greater number of voters generally (see Appendix VI, Table 5.4). When examining these tables, notice that in each case, New Zealand First voter attitudes tracked more closely with Labour in 1996 than in 1993. This indicates that the New Zealand First vote drew mostly from the ranks of the National Party in 1993 but from both Labour and National in 1996. Furthermore, on the issues surrounding New Zealand First's major policy positions, New Zealand First voter attitudes tracked more closely with Labour voter attitudes, a fact which may explain the voter dissatisfaction with Peter's alliance with the National Party after the 1996 election.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 1D

The emergence of the New Zealand First Party can be explained by a dramatic change in economic policies by both of the major parties in the 1980s. This policy change represents a shift in ideological space by both major parties away from the ideology of a significant portion of the electorate who were their traditional base. The adoption of neo-liberal policies by both Labour and National parties left a representational gap for some small farmers and small business owners who felt that they were no longer represented by the National Party, and some working class voters who felt that they were no longer represented by the Labour Party. This spatial opening was a necessary precondition for the emergence of a neo-populist party in New Zealand in the 1990s.

CONCLUSIONS

There are clear similarities between the Australian and New Zealand cases of neo-populist party emergence, in part because of the cultural similarities and geographical proximity of these two Commonwealth countries. In each case the populist rhetoric feeds into the national narratives of egalitarianism and democracy – both important ideas in Australian and New Zealand culture. Neo-liberal economic policies have been whole-heartedly embraced by governments of the right *and* the left on both sides of the Tasman Sea, and these policies have affected rural materialists most intensely. Non-white immigration has increased dramatically over the past few decades, triggering a wave of xenophobia which both neo-populist leaders have been able to tap into. And in part because Australia and New Zealand share a colonial history, indigenous rights and native title have become important issues, threatening the cultural

hegemony of those same rural materialists.

The common thread that links all these structural factors together is globalization. It is globalization that creates the ever more significant and ever-more-obvious gulf between materialists and post-materialists in New Zealand. This gap has existed for many years but just as in both the Australian and Canadian cases, globalization – the opening up of national borders to trade, labor, and ideas – makes the cleavage deeper and therefore *salient*. Globalization brings dramatic and rapid economic, social, and cultural change for which materialists are unprepared.

The most important structural factor, however, is rural materialist values, since it is the materialists who form the basis of the party, and it is the materialists who react to the various threats that globalization presents to them. While neo-liberal economic policies have benefited professional and business elites in Auckland, they have often caused significant economic pain to small farmers and small business owners “south of the Bombay Hills.” While non-white immigration does not threaten the information technology workers and highly skilled professionals of the urban areas of New Zealand, it certainly threatens the unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the small towns. And while the Treaty of Waitangi has little impact upon city dwellers, it has far more impact of land use in rural areas.

While rural materialist values are central, however, they are only one factor, and all four factors must be present to create the hospitable environment necessary for the creation of a neo-populist party. Together, the factors create a necessary but insufficient precondition for the emergence of the New Zealand First Party.

CHAPTER SIX

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 2 – AGENCY FACTORS CAUSING NEO-POPULIST PARTY EMERGENCE IN AUSTRALIA

The social and economic environment in the 1990s may have been hospitable for a neo-populist party, but by itself it was insufficient to cause its emergence at the national level. What are the factors that, acting upon and within this hospitable environment, caused the emergence of a neo-populist party? If *structures* are necessary but insufficient, then what *actors* provided sufficient motivation for the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party?

There are three factors which make up the second independent variable – the agency causes of neo-populist party emergence in Australia: A) charismatic leadership; B) media influence; and C) epistemic communities of conspiracy theorists. This chapter examines the influence of individual agency on the emergence of One Nation as well as the interaction between structures and agency; between the environment and the individual choices that are made within it and which act upon it.

FACTOR 2A: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP – THE LITTLE AUSSIE BATTLE AXE

HANSON – VIRAGO AND VIAGRA

Pauline Hanson swept onto the Australian political stage in 1997, a red-haired, fish-and-chip-shop-owning single mother with a clenched-jawed Queensland accent and a xenophobic policy platform. Of the three neo-populist leaders in this study she seems the least likely to fit the charismatic category: she was female, politically inexperienced, and relatively uneducated. Yet Hanson's charisma enabled her to weld together a group

of voters from various political parties, to convince them that although she had no coherent policies or political experience, she had the solutions to their problems.

Unlike other neo-populists, Hanson was naturally charismatic. She did not consciously create a charismatic leadership persona, although after the first flush of success her political advisors did attempt to groom her. Hanson did not have to pretend to be “one of the people” because she *was* one of the people. This is not to say that she was unaware of her own appeal or unable to wield it purposively; she was very conscious of her ability to relate to people face-to-face and used that to great effect throughout her political career. But Hanson’s relationship with her followers flowed naturally from her ability to connect with and rally the rural materialists who became her strongest supporters. Because of her charismatic appeal, and the way she employed it, Hanson was an important agent in the emergence of One Nation in Australia.

Many people – both within and outside of Australia – were mystified by the intensity of Hanson’s support. They described Hanson as a “virago” and painted her as an uneducated rabble-rouser, but never thought of her as charismatic. They failed to recognize that a leader may exert charismatic authority over his or her disciples while affronting the majority electorate. It may be that some journalists were afraid of giving credence to Hanson’s xenophobia (Kingston 1999, xvi-xvii) and therefore restrained from giving her what they considered to be a positive label. A few insightful observers, however, did recognize the true nature of Hanson’s appeal:

The term “charisma” has been so overly, falsely, equated with likeability that we have forgotten what it is to face a politician who is the genuine charismatic article – that strange mixture of fascination, fear, enchantment and eros that marks it out as a kind of love (Rundle 2001, 15).

Hanson was undoubtedly a charismatic figure, and her appeal clearly fits into Wilner's (Willner 1984) four dimensions of charisma, although the leader-image and emotional dimensions are strongest in her case.

LEADER-IMAGE – HANSON AS THE SEXY AUSSIE BATTLER

The leader-image dimension of Hanson's charismatic appeal was astoundingly strong considering that Hanson did not in any way fit the traditional stereotype of a political leader. Yet Hanson had a strong leader-image since her followers undoubtedly believed that she possessed what Willner calls "an extraordinary degree the qualities highly esteemed in their culture" (Willner 1984). Hanson's charisma was inextricably tied to her constituency's egalitarian beliefs about the power and virtue of "ordinary Australians" and the image of "the Little Aussie Battler." Hanson was not charismatic *despite* the ordinariness of her background; she was charismatic *because* of it. Notwithstanding the fact that she was a woman, she attracted working class men because she was the "battler" with whom they identified (Rutherford 2001, 205). During many party meetings she was described as "just a lovely, friendly lady" and "warm and down-to-earth" and "gutsy." Like the traditional Aussie battler, Hanson was an ordinary person fighting against the odds. She was often described as an iconoclast (another popular Australian ideal) because she insisted on "saying what she thought" despite criticism. As one interviewee observed:

"People keep trying to say "she's a puppet for people." But when you talk to her [shakes head] I defy anyone to tell her what to do; what to say! (One Nation Member F 2000).

Hanson's leadership appeal extended to both men and women, thus she exerted a form of magnetism that went beyond simple sexual attraction for male voters. For

many women Hanson represented not the ideal of the battler but a role model of an ordinary woman who achieved celebrity status. She was the tough girl who ruled the back of the school bus: a run-of-the-mill girl whose popularity seemed inexplicable to outsiders, but who exerted a powerful influence on her followers.

She was every working class girl's dream. No wonder the press had failed to recognize her. I recognized her as the girl against whom I had counterposed myself all those years ago in the lavatories of Newcastle High ... Queen of the lavvy – the one that ruled the fagging in the toilets, the one with the legs, the peroxide bangs, the hitched tunic and the entourage of adoring boys – and girls (Rutherford 2001, 201).

While this suggests that charisma depends upon cultural context, it is nevertheless a real phenomenon. With her increasingly well-groomed presentation – coiffed hair, lacquered nails, designer outfits – Hanson was the ideal leader for that small but admiring crowd of both men and women.

IDEA ACCEPTANCE – HANSON'S TRUE BELIEVERS

The second dimension of Hanson's appeal – idea-acceptance – was also fairly strong, although this dimension was true of far fewer One Nation members than the leader-image dimension or the emotional dimension of Hanson's charismatic appeal. Only a limited number of Hanson's followers were willing to accept her ideas *simply because they were her ideas*. Many of Hanson's ideas – anti-Aboriginal and anti-immigrant sentiment, for example – were accepted by her followers not because of Hanson's charisma but because they were pre-existing beliefs of her constituency. The number of her followers who would believe whatever she said was small.

For a short time Hanson was forgiven for releasing ill-considered and sometimes contradictory policies, but the majority of voters did not accept this for very long

(Rundle 2001). Policies such as her Easy Tax proposal were dismissed by experienced politicians and mainstream voters as ludicrous (Kingston 1999, 51). Nevertheless, there were a small but significant number of One Nation members for whom Hanson's word was law. In particular, Hanson's charismatic appeal was apparent in One Nation members' attitudes towards Hanson during the electoral fraud scandals which dogged Hanson, her advisors, and the party itself from 1999 onwards. While her prosecution for electoral fraud may have driven off mainstream conservative voters, it actually hardened support from the core of true believers and party members (West 2001). At least four members at the party meetings I attended in June and July of 2000 expressed the opinion that Hanson's prosecution amounted to a political witch hunt by elites against an innocent political outsider – just as Hanson claimed they were. Only one member was willing to admit that the reports were troubling to him. Hanson managed to arouse such intense faith in her innocence that three hundred people turned out for a dinner in July of 2002 to raise funds for her legal bills. For these core supporters Hanson was innocent of all charges whatever the confounding evidence, simply because *she said* she was innocent.

COMPLIANCE DIMENSION – HANSON'S CHIVALROUS KNIGHTS

Compliance, the third dimension of Hanson's charisma, was also the weakest aspect of her appeal. In part this had to do with the nature of the political party system in which Hanson was operating, where her leadership was of a party, and thus involved only the promulgation of a platform, rather than the giving of orders.

A more important reason for Hanson's inability to exert the compliance aspect of her charismatic appeal, however, was her gender, and the way in which that gender

was emphasized as part of her appeal. While the discourse surrounding Hanson as a woman was often – and perhaps deliberately – ambiguous (was she a strong, independent businesswoman or a damsel in distress?) Hanson most frequently framed herself as a highly *feminine* woman; as a passive recipient of admiration, rather than the aggressive director of activity; it is difficult to give orders and be a victim. Thus the compliance dimension in Hanson's case is closely tied to her gender, and encouraged her (mostly male) followers not to *comply* with her orders but rather to serve and protect her.

EMOTIONAL DIMENSION – SEX AND MOTHERHOOD

The emotional dimension of the charismatic relationship was possibly the strongest aspect of Hanson's attraction. Hanson's allure was in many ways straightforwardly sexual, but there was an element of complexity that went beyond sexual appeal. The relationship between Hanson and her supporters had all the intensity of charismatic relationships, since they responded to her “with devotion, awe, reverence, and blind faith, in short, with emotions close to religious worship” (Willner 1984). The intense hero-worship of Hanson was evident in every party meeting, but it was hero-worship with distinctly sexual overtones.

The eroticization of Hanson was part of the official vocabulary of One Nation and her charisma, her status as leader, was tied up with her capacity to assume the position of a desired object in free circulation (Rutherford 2001, 202).

Part of Hanson's maturation as a politician involved becoming increasingly well-groomed. As Hanson swept into the dining room at the Rugby Leagues Club during the fundraising dinner in July of 2002, dressed to the nines in a tight white evening frock,

men and women both exclaimed how lovely she looked and the men ribbed each other about “having the hots for her.” The devotion of several of the men was obvious, and many of them bid heavily on auctioned items with her image on them.

In keeping with her anti-politician persona Hanson positioned herself not as a strong female leader of a political party, but as an ordinary and extremely feminine woman. “She is no power-dressing ball-crushing femocrat, but a fragile creature who appeals to men’s sense of protection” (Cotes 1998, 15). Hanson was deliberately anti-feminist – her femininity was attractive to men who felt “sexually disenfranchised” by feminism (Rutherford 2001, 204). In 1998 she had proclaimed:

I think the most downtrodden person in this country is the white Anglo-Saxon male, I think they’ve hit the bottom of the barrel. It’s got to the stage where I think the balance has gone too far [in favor of women] and men don’t know what to do (Hanson quoted in Probyn 1999, 166).

Hanson deliberately set herself up as sexually desirable, wearing skirts that showed off her legs and allowing men to embrace her, even sitting coyly on their laps. One candidate proudly displayed a photograph of himself on his motorbike, with Hanson perched behind him (One Nation Member F 2000). Commentators outside of the party have emphasized Hanson’s sexuality, referring to her as the “Viagra of the Bush” (Lake 1998) as a “working class Princess Diana” and as Marilyn Monroe (Stevenson cited in Perera 1999, 192). Her sexuality was even part of her appeal for women, since they saw in her a female role model. When a picture of Hanson stepping off a plane, her skirt revealingly lifted by the wind, was published on the front page of a Queensland paper, One Nation Senate candidate Heather Hill claimed “well if I had her legs, I’d show them too!” (Rutherford 2001, 202). Thus Hanson managed to be both an ordinary woman as well as an ideal – simultaneously attainable and inaccessible.

In counterpoint to her sexual appeal, Hanson also positioned herself as a mother-figure. In her maiden speech to parliament in 1996, Hanson described herself as primarily in terms of her motherhood: “My view on issues is based on commonsense, and my experience as a mother of four children” (Pauline Hanson, Member for Oxley - Indep, recorded in House Hansard 1996) As she campaigned through Queensland in 1998, she even referred to herself as the mother of all Australians.

I care so passionately about this country, it's like I'm a mother, Australia is my home, and the Australian people are my children, and I have to look after my home that's in the best interests of my children (Hanson cited in Kingston 1999, 57).

Hanson's dual persona as sex kitten and mother of the nation are both clearly linked to the emotional dimension of Hanson's charismatic leadership. The layers of meaning involved in the ubiquitous poster of a soft-focus Hanson swathed in the Australian flag become clearer in this light – she might be the mother of the nation, but she's a good looker too!

HANSON AND FEMINISM – NEO-POPULISM AND FEMALE LEADERSHIP

For many mainstream Australian feminists, Hanson presented something of a dilemma. As the female leader of a far-right party, they could not decide whether she represented something to be applauded, since she was a female leader in the overwhelmingly male lower chamber of the Australian Parliament, or to be decried, since she was the representative of an extreme conservative party with often retrograde views on the status of women (Ellison and Deutchman 1997; Lake 1998).

As a feminist I find her interesting because I can't find out to what extent that she is a victim and to what extent she's been used and manipulated, and to what extent she might actually represent an assertive, outspoken, “ockerish” rural mum (Australian Democrats

Senator J 2000).

This ambiguity was part of the Hanson persona cultivated by Hanson and her handlers. Indeed, this ambiguity is mirrored in her policy platform, which called for abortion rights and child care (Lake 1998, 122) while Hanson herself seems unsure of her own position in regards to the status of women:

I asked if she was a feminist. No, she said, because when married she had cooked a hot meal every night and had it on the table for her husband, regardless of what else she was doing. That was a woman's duty, she said. "But you have lived a feminist life, Pauline," I protested. "Single mother, started your own business on your own, pro-abortion, no wish to marry again, you believe men are just for sex, you *are* a feminist ..." She laughed and said nothing (Kingston 1999, 43).

Initially, some observers felt that Hanson could not possibly survive as a female leader of a male-dominated far right party (Ellison and Deutchman 1997, 142). While this analysis may have been somewhat too sympathetic towards Hanson – she was, after all, the originator of the party – she did end up being manipulated by her two advisors, David Oldfield and David Ettridge. Both these men attempted to control the party machinery, Hanson's message, and ultimately Hanson herself, but that was after Hanson had won her election to the House so it is difficult to see Hanson as a victim. She was an active participant in defining party policy and she was certainly the major player in defining her own persona.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 2A

Hanson was clearly a charismatic agent in the emergence of One Nation. Other leaders had attempted to use the same set of ideas to mobilize a large section of the electorate without success. Graeme Campbell had spent twenty years saying many of the same things as Hanson, but he had never caught the public imagination because he

lacked her charisma. Hanson managed to inspire all four dimensions of charismatic connection between herself and her followers, and this was the basis of her appeal.

Without Hanson's charisma there could have been no Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party; there would have been no phenomenon called Hansonism. Although all of the structural factors were there, creating a mood of discontent among Australian rural materialists who felt threatened by increased non-white immigration and indigenous activism, Hanson's charisma was what mobilized the movement, what gathered different groups – blue collar workers and farmers and small businessmen – together, and what kept them attached through thick and thin. Charisma was what gave Hanson the authority she otherwise lacked; it was what enabled an ill-educated, fish-and-chip-shop-owning divorcee the legitimacy to lead a political movement. While she may not have been the mother of Australia, she was certainly the mother of One Nation.

FACTOR 2B: MEDIA INFLUENCE

JOURNALISTS AS AGENTS IN THE EMERGENCE OF ONE NATION

THE MEDIA AND NEOPOPULISM

Pauline Hanson's appearance upon the Australian political scene was greeted with undisguised alarm by mainstream journalists. In the opinion of much of the elite media – quality broadsheet newspapers such as the *Sydney Morning Herald* and Melbourne's *The Age*, and news programs on the Australian Broadcasting Commission and the major private television networks – Hanson constituted a menace to Australian society and fingers were vigorously pointed in various directions in an attempt to apportion blame. The media itself has been held responsible for at least some of Hanson's success. Several observers even argued that Hanson's popularity was created by the media (Bainbridge 1997; Dellit 2001; Deutchman and Ellison 1999). Were the

media – both the elite and tabloid varieties – in some way responsible for the success of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party? Did journalists – as individual actors or in concert – act as agents in the emergence of a neo-populist party?

Horsfield and Stewart argue that the media’s reaction to Pauline Hanson can be seen in three phases. In the first phase the elite media – the broadsheet newspapers, the serious news shows on broadcast television and ABC (state-funded) radio – attempted to contain Hanson by either refusing to cover her or by criticizing Hanson’s ideas as racist, while the tabloid media – the tabloid newspapers and talk radio – expressed approbation. The second phase occurred during the 1998 Queensland election campaign when some elite media journalists followed Hanson on campaign and published somewhat softened images of Hanson with large and cheering crowds. During this phase media attitudes shifted towards investigating and reporting the underlying causes of Hanson’s support, since it seemed that this apparently inarticulate woman was actually expressing something important to many ordinary Australians. In the third phase Hanson coverage was limited to the period immediately prior to state election campaigns; Hanson and her disintegrating party were otherwise ignored (Horsfield and Stewart 2003, 128-132). Thus, while the media did not create Hanson, their obsession with her did help to trigger the emergence of One Nation.

The evidence clearly supports Horsfield and Stewart’s analysis and their argument that the media were a significant factor in the emergence of One Nation. The elite media inadvertently encouraged the emergence of the party because the segment of the electorate which was concerned about the issues raised by Hanson (including immigration and Aboriginal rights) felt that Hanson was being unfairly treated by media

elites. The tabloid media, on the other hand, deliberately encouraged the emergence of One Nation by providing Hanson and her party with a pre-existing approving audience.

ELITE MEDIA BIAS – ANTI-HANSON JOURNALISTS

Elite journalists covering Hanson were extremely critical and were wary of covering her at all. Margaret Kingston, chief of staff at the *Sydney Morning Herald's* Canberra bureau in 1996, had chosen to ignore Hanson's maiden speech. In her memoir about her coverage of Hanson's 1998 Queensland campaign, Kingston admitted that by ignoring Hanson the media were overlooking serious problems that faced large segments of the Australian public, and that a free press had an obligation to examine the phenomenon and its causes. After following Hanson on the campaign trail and reporting on Hansonism throughout the campaign, Kingston concluded that:

Hansonism was partly the media's fault for failing to act as the interface between the people and the powerful, and for turning our backs on the public to become just another part of a complacent establishment (Kingston 1999, xiv).

Kingston was belatedly recognizing the gap between the cosmopolitan elite values held by most journalists and the materialist values held by much of Hanson's heartland. At least two mainstream politicians whom I interviewed had already recognized this gap.

You know writers like Margaret Kingston, she's extreme multiculturalism – "We don't need detention centres, people can just walk in!" She's an extreme example of the Canberra gallery. The journalists are very progressive around these issues. Totally out of tune with the general public (Labor Member of Parliament K 2000).

Because elite journalists were oblivious to non-elite Australian attitudes towards multiculturalism, immigration, and economic policy, they did a poor job of gauging Hanson's support base (Mitchell 1999) and thus alienated it almost completely. The

ABC television journalist Maxine McKew conducted a stinging interview with Hanson in 1997 during which she attempted to pin Hanson with statistics proving that Hanson's ideas about privileged Aborigines were baseless.

I was a hero to my colleagues after that interview. It was splashed all over the paper – 'Maxine McKew takes on Hanson where politicians won't.' But it was quite the opposite (reaction) in the community. We had an immense reaction, it was an avalanche of mail. Even people who would normally never have a bar of Hanson's politics condemned me for the way I tackled her (McKew cited in Wilmoth 1998).

Hanson capitalized upon this disconnection between elite media and her own constituency very effectively. She claimed that the journalists covering her were biased, that they were controlled by their superiors, and had misrepresented her as a racist.

A lot of the journalists over the years, have been ... I've been very concerned ... they've been told what to write. I've actually had journalists that have done stories and they'll admit that there are things I couldn't have said, but the editor will change stuff and put a completely different spin on it. You have your ones out there that are your lefties – that's their views. You have the ones there who through jealousy, or the fact is they say "Oh, she's only got a fish and chip shop!" or "She's uneducated: I've been to university, I know more than she does." So therefore, it is this big thing. Women journalists? They've got to prove a point – that they're better than the men. It's been quite an interesting road, actually (Hanson, interview by author 2002).

To this day Hanson maintains this sense of victimization: the bias and lies of the media are responsible for any problematic part of her history. According to Hanson, she has never said anything racist, nor is she a divisive figure; she believes it is all media manipulation:

That was brought about by the media and their perceptions of me, and their biased opinions and by their editors and their chiefs and the owners of their newspapers (Hanson, interview by Denton 2004).

Since many of Hanson's supporters were already suspicious of the media, unfavorable coverage and commentary of Hanson merely increased her support. Hanson was perceived by her followers as being misrepresented, abused, and ill-treated by a biased and highly paid class of journalists, reinforcing many One Nation voters' feelings of alienation from the mainstream (Goot 1999, 9-12). In this way, attacks against Hanson by journalists actually encouraged the emergence of Hansonism.

We realized that our input only intensified her support; that the very fact that she was under attack by the media became an essential element of her appeal (Kingston 2000, 1).

Among many One Nation members at the party meetings I attended in 2000, the media were seen as being unfair in their treatment of Hanson and – because of the negative characterization of One Nation supporters as racist rednecks – members were very defensive about their own membership in the party and felt that, like their leader, they too had been misrepresented. Some One Nation members and candidates perceived that the mainstream media had been untrustworthy for years, and they had stopped paying attention to it because of previous bad experiences (One Nation Member F 2000). Still others believed that the mainstream media was manipulated by “an invisible government, an establishment” who used it to control “the apparatus of state” (One Nation Member A 2000; One Nation Member C 2000).

Thus elite media coverage of Hanson worked in two ways to bolster Hanson's support. The actual amount of coverage – what Murray Goot (1999) referred to as the “oxygen of publicity” – actually bolstered the numbers of voters who knew about and therefore would vote for Hanson. Secondly, the unfavorable coverage of Hanson paradoxically intensified the support among One Nation voters, many of whom felt the

coverage was biased against them as well as Hanson.

THE TABLOID MEDIA – SETTING THE HANSON AGENDA

Some observers claim that it is not the elite media's attention that caused Hanson's political capital to rise, but the attention of the "populist" or "tabloid" media, particularly radio talk-shows (Bainbridge 1997). Very early in Pauline Hanson's career, Macquarie University political scientist Murray Goot (1996) argued that the tabloid media – chiefly the talkback radio shows hosted by prominent personalities such as Stan Zemenek, Alan Jones, and Ron Casey – manipulated Hanson's polling numbers to exaggerate the extent of her support. More importantly, tabloid journalists reported extensively on Hanson in order to mobilize that support.

The circulation of her speech by those who are keen to see that Hanson's message gets through the voicing of support for her among various radio hosts and commentators in the tabloid press – not to mention the abuse of residents of Asian extraction which such actions have almost certainly encouraged – are not measures of opinion of the sort made familiar by opinion polls. They are something quite different – signs, and important ones, of opinions being mobilized (Goot 1996, 14).

At the 2002 fundraising dinner for Pauline Hanson, Ron Casey, a prominent tabloid celebrity and former radio talk show host gave an enthusiastically received speech railing about the problems of multiculturalism and immigration. The audience applauded when Casey claimed that "Multiculturalism is another word for giving your country away!" and argued that the ALP supported high levels of immigration because immigrants could be expected to vote Labor. He alleged that the left-wing media had tried to silence Hanson but they had not succeeded. The One Nation members I was sitting opposite to nodded emphatically in agreement: Ron Casey was speaking to his

fan base – the audience for his brand of right wing bombast. More importantly, this fan base was the One Nation Party’s demographic – white males over 45 years old.

Because Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party and these radio programs had the same demographic, radio talk shows were able to set a particular political agenda – an anti-immigrant, anti-multiculturalism, anti-Aboriginal agenda – for that constituency. The tabloid media were able to raise Hanson’s policy issues to a level of visibility that other right wing movements had failed to achieve. Tabloid media journalists were a factor in the rise of Pauline Hanson because they fixed the agenda on issues which Hanson was willing to raise, and thus mobilized an already discontented constituency by emphasizing the policy issues and national problems which they most feared. Talk radio made Hanson’s demographic more aware of Hanson’s issues and more willing to support her.

As a factor, talkback radio also fits the pattern of emergence of the party. Talkback radio programs are strong in New South Wales and Queensland, where broadcasts of radio shows by Jones, Laws, and Zemanek are received. There are lesser known radio hosts in Perth and Adelaide, but “in Melbourne ‘shock jocks’ of this kind are unknown” (Goot 1999, 220). Thus the presence of right wing talkback radio seems to correlate with the strength of Hanson support in these states: strong in Queensland and New South Wales, moderate in Western Australia and South Australia, and extremely weak in Victoria. Of course, correlation does not equal causation: a shared demographic might well explain this phenomenon. Nevertheless, the positive coverage of Hanson by these hugely popular shows almost certainly had a mobilizing effect among that demographic. Without the conduit provided by Casey and his fellow shock

jocks, Pauline Hanson's key demographic would never have been introduced to her as the embodiment of their political viewpoint. While the elite media were attempting to quash Hanson and her newly formed party, the tabloid media were, in effect, advertising Hanson and her policies for their own political ends.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 2B

While Pauline Hanson cannot said to be a media creation the media were certainly a factor in the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party. The tabloid media were a willing manipulator of her message, while the elite media inadvertently provided Hanson with attention and her supporters with a villain to resent. Elite media and tabloid media alike contributed to Hanson's support, both directly and through agenda setting effects. The Australian media were an agent of the rise of One Nation because they helped bring the issues of immigration, Aboriginal rights, multiculturalism, and the problems of regional Australia to light.

FACTOR 2C: THE DIFFUSION OF IDEAS – THE AGENCY OF EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES

CONSPIRACY THEORISTS AND ONE NATION

The final agent working in the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party is actually a network of individuals – an epistemic community of conspiracy theorists. Members of this epistemic community were essential to the emergence of the movement because they provided an explanatory narrative for the problems facing this disenfranchised group of potential Hanson supporters. The members of this epistemic community imported ideas from populist movements in other countries – particularly the United States and Canada – and circulated these ideas throughout the constituency of Hanson's supporters.

The Hanson conspiracy theorists did not conform to the first part of Peter Haas' strict definition of epistemic communities since they could not be said to be "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence" (Haas 1992) yet they were extremely well-versed in conspiracy lore – an unrecognized but very real expertise. Furthermore, they did conform to the second part of Haas' definition: they (i) shared normative and principled beliefs, (ii) shared causal beliefs, (iii) shared notions of validity, and (iv) a common policy enterprise (Haas 1992). The Hanson conspiracy theorists were (i) insular and nationalistic in principle; (ii) thought that globalization was being orchestrated by powerful political and economic elites; (iii) believed in the validity of the "common sense of the common people" and the fundamental truth of conspiracy theories as they were related through a variety of different media; and (iv) shared a common goal of turning the tide of globalization and re-empowering the common people. As the promulgator of the party's foundational narrative, the international epistemic community of conspiracy theorists was an important agent in the emergence of the party.

EXOGENOUS INFLUENCES – IMPORTED CONSPIRACIES

The impact of these epistemic communities on the Hanson phenomenon is evident in the commonality of the conspiracy theory narratives that were related, and in the commonality of the texts that were alluded to, by both elite and rank-and-file members of the party. While there is no doubt that One Nation has a particularly Australian flair, several authors have commented on the similarity in political style and thematic emphasis between Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party and extremists across the Pacific Ocean.

Pauline Hanson became the bag-lady of Australian politics. Behold the baggage [...] A duty-free bag full of rantings of the American jailbird, Lyndon LaRouche. Under her right arm a brown paper parcel, ominously ticking, thrust there by the US militia movement (Adams 1998, 20).

Other commentators have pointed out the similarity between some of the rhetoric of the American far right candidates Pat Buchanan and David Duke and the early speeches of Pauline Hanson, arguing that Hanson had borrowed several of her ill-fitting policies, especially the early policies addressing welfare mothers that she quickly retracted (Deutchman 1997). While many of her later policies were developed by Oldfield and Ettridge, and were not obviously borrowed from overseas, the similarities in rhetoric remained.

More important than the borrowing of policies in the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party was the borrowing of conspiracy theories as an explanatory narrative. Xenophobia is a common disease the world over, and it can certainly exist without the assistance of conspiracy theories, but racism – particularly anti-Semitism – and conspiracy narratives do appear to be very familiar bedfellows. One interview with a One Nation candidate took a quite unexpected turn when he began to explain the major problems facing Australia in terms of an orchestrated, international Jewish plot to control the world.

The most important issue is debt, usury, manipulation of the financial system, via a cartel of evil, manipulative people. They've been doing so for hundreds of years, and they're gaining more and more power now. I could give you lots of stuff. Do you know anything about banking? (One Nation Member C 2000)

The existence of "Jewish banker" conspiracies in a country where less than half a percent of the population is Jewish (compared to two percent of the U.S. population) is

perhaps the most obvious example of an imported idea: this particular conspiracy discourse is a replica of anti-Semitic discourse found the world over, because the conspiracy theory has been imported whole, complete with a layer of pseudo-academic language to disguise its inherent racism. Essentially this One Nation candidate was part of an epistemic community that sincerely believed that globalization was a coordinated scheme.

This conspiracy theory was also evident among rank-and-file members, although often without the veil of pseudo-academic language. As I discussed One Nation with a branch president after a meeting in July of 2000, a member interrupted exclaiming “You know who’s behind it? It’s the *Jews!*” The branch president was most embarrassed and steered me quickly away. The links between the One Nation candidate and this member, as well as other candidates, became obvious during a later meeting and interviews. There was a sharing of information – an education campaign – between party elites (the epistemic community) and rank-and-file members.

For members of the One Nation epistemic community the other villain is the United Nations, although many see the United Nations as a Jewish plot. Queensland Senator Len Harris – who, since Hanson lost her seat in the House, has been the only elected One Nation representative at the federal level – is well-known for his obsession with conspiracy theories, including anti-Semitic theories. Other high-level party leaders also expressed belief in these conspiracies and the fear that the UN is simply a plot to create “One World Government” run by foreigners:

And I do believe that this is the push for a one world government – and you’d be aware of that wouldn’t you? Oh, it’s quite well known. George Bush actually spoke of the one world government when he was here. Bob Hawke spoke about it. John Howard has mentioned it. Oh

yes, it's become quite common. Have you seen it written? I believe that September last year they had their first meeting of the One World Government. Probably Senator Len Harris could give you more information in regards to that. It's being spoken about more openly now, more commonly than what it was beforehand. And this is why the push for free trade—this is the lowering of tariffs, this is globalization—this is what it's virtually all about: one world government. You've got to break down the barriers, the way for it to happen is that you've got to break down the nationalism and pride that a country has within itself, that's why the immigration (One Nation Member B 2002).

Although conspiracies thus promulgated are not necessarily coherent, they provide some consistency to an otherwise loosely connected public policy platform. Thus economic protectionism, reducing immigration, reversing native title, and opposing the nation-wide consumption tax (the GST) were given a single rationale – the opposition to government policies which were really Jewish plots to control the world.

Other One Nation elites circulate similar anti-Semitic beliefs, implying that some outside power (whether Jewish financiers or merely a cabal of foreigners) was somehow controlling the government, in some way forcing formerly benevolent elected politicians into acts of malevolence.

[David Ettridge] made a comment to me that stuck in my mind. He doesn't understand why John Howard when he was in the background being treasurer, before he was Prime Minister, he was saying the right things, he was a pretty good bloke, down to earth, decent, easygoing, as I said, said the right things. As soon as he became Prime Minister it was as though someone had got hold of him and chucked out the old John Howard and stuck someone else in his body. And [Ettridge's] comment to me was that he doesn't know why that happens, he said "it's almost scary, because as soon as someone becomes Prime Minister they appear to have a complete and total change in what their values are. I'm afraid that if One Nation at the last election, was able to get into a position of influence, I'm afraid of what I might find." And I thought: that's an interesting comment. Because there is something there in power that's changing the way people feel, the way people think, once there are in there. Who is actually controlling them? (One Nation Member A 2000).

This narrative might seem very far-fetched, but it was related to me several times in some form or other. The shadowy force controlling things was typically international and menacing, the Australian politicians had changed when they got into power. Because of the diverse political party backgrounds of One Nation members, this narrative was important because it helped members resolve the cognitive dissonance of casting mainstream politicians, whom many One Nation members had voted for in the past, as villains.

EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES – THE STRUCTURE-AGENCY INTERACTION

The concept of an epistemic community is used in international relations scholarship to elucidate the relationship between institutional factors and choice, between structure and agency (Adler and Haas 1992) and the concept certainly helps to clarify the way in which epistemic communities worked to import ideas across national borders in this case. The conspiracy theories circulated by the epistemic community within Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party resonated with the materialist values held by a significant number of Hanson supporters, and the intense distrust they had for political and economic elites. In effect, the epistemic community had an extremely hospitable environment in which to act.

For many One Nation members it was not simply that they opposed free trade or the selling of public assets and utilities, it is that they could not believe that free trade and deregulation could be a logical or fiscally responsible course of action. Conspiracy theories thus provided a reason for the apparently illogical actions of Australian political leadership which had disempowered the common people.

Why would apparently sane politicians, in a very wealthy nation, the most resource rich continent in the world, populated by very

resourceful people, why should there be such debt? Why should we have to be selling everything off? I'll tell you what they're doing, they want to strip the assets out of everything, and consolidate power and wealth into the hands of a few people, go back to the days ... so we're reverting to a new dark age (One Nation Member C 2000).

The common man – the battler – was not to blame: power had been usurped by a cabal of evil and foreign elites.

All the current political issues were linked to this same conspiracy discourse – a coherent narrative which provided a clear account of what One Nation members were to fear and who they were to blame. The Howard government's imposition of a Goods and Services Tax in 2000, a policy vehemently opposed by One Nation, was simply another threat which could be integrated into the conspiracy theory.

The UN – it's got a few arms, WTO, the World Bank – wants deregulation of the labor market, tax system based on similar things. The blokes that control the UN, now I don't know who they are, but it's big money, it's the Rockefellers, the Rothschilds, through their international organizations and there's all this scenario happening in the background, globalization, the spoiling of jobs, that's just the process marching down the road (One Nation Member A 2000).

Thus the disparate aspects of Hansonism – an emphasis upon the economic plight of Outback Australia, as well as virulent opposition to non-white immigration, multiculturalism, and free trade policies – were made coherent through the conspiracy narrative. Even the problems of Aboriginal rights could be explained by the application of conspiracy theory.

Now, I don't mean for this to sound like a conspiracy theory but the Aboriginal movement is a small mosaic of the process, in other words land rights. You could just go through a scenario: for example the Aboriginal land rights movement. When the Aborigines get about half of the Australian continent, which they will do, and this is official, in fact much, much more, and nobody can't use it, so what's the point of it all? There is something in the background orchestrating for that to

happen. David [Oldfield] might have touched on it: the “debt for equity swap” and all those people in the background. There’s a reason for all that (One Nation Member A 2000).

The conspiracy theory provided an intangible but all-encompassing scapegoat for both real and perceived problems – a general theory which explained everything wrong with the lives of One Nation members. It served as an explanation for the problems faced by blue collar people of limited education who had worked hard all their lives only to be left behind in the maelstrom of globalization. And while conspiracy theories both explained the battler’s predicament and caused them to fear, they also provided a rationale for supporting Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, which would put power back in the hands of ‘ordinary Australians’ and ensure the rule of common sense.

CONSPIRACY NARRATIVES – IMPORTING EXTREMIST LITERATURE

The most convincing evidence for the existence of epistemic communities is the prevalence of references to influential texts by many members of One Nation in interviews and at party meetings. At the July 2002 fundraiser at least three people separately recommended that I read Paul Sheehan’s *Among the Barbarians* and Scott Balson’s *Murder by Media* – both journalistic accounts of the problematic media coverage of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party. During the course of interviews with party candidates, and in conversation with party members, four people recommended reading Ralston Saul’s *The Doubter’s Companion*. The latter is the most interesting recommendation as it is not Australian – Saul is a Canadian, and many Canadian Reform Party adherents are also enthusiasts.

The most important source of conspiracy theories was, ironically, the offspring of globalization and technological change – the Internet. During one interview, a

candidate described at length the evil organizations behind all of the world's problems – the Trilateral Commission, the Tavistock Institute, the Committee of 300, Bildaberg, the Russell Trust, the Skull and Bones, the Club of Rome – a catalog of conspiracy theory villains gleaned from extremist pamphlets and downloaded from the Internet. “It’s all there” he said, “Go ahead look!” (One Nation Member C 2000). And, indeed, it is all there: exactly the same villains, the same plots, with different country as a setting – a scene shift from the United States to Australia with barely another word changed.

Another interviewee spent an hour trying unsuccessfully to describe the Jewish banker conspiracy without saying anything anti-Semitic. He eventually drove home and brought back a copy of a video tape (*The Money Makers*) which he had ordered off the internet from its American producer. “You can have this one!” he said generously, “I’ve made copies and given it to lots of people. It will really help you understand everything that’s going on” (One Nation Member A 2000).

The international nature of these conspiracy theories points to one conclusion: the Pauline Hanson One Nation Party epistemic community was simply a part of a wider international epistemic community of conspiracy theorists. This international community was active in the distribution of texts which propagated conspiracy narratives through text based and internet based publication, and through the dissemination of other forms of media.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 2C

While recognizing the significance of the international aspect of these epistemic communities, it is important not to fall into the conspiracy theorists’ own trap and assume that there is a conspiracy of international neo-populists who are working to set

up a neo-populist party in Australia. Rather, this is a case of “policy borrowing” by particular members of the One Nation party, the searching for an explanation of their problems and the problems facing many rural materialist Australians; the adoption of a set of narratives which are, after all, glamorous and powerful (and to some extent inarguable) because they are mysterious and yet have extraordinary explanatory power.

Epistemic communities are an important factor in the emergence of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party. The epistemic community functioned to explain the charges against Hanson and her cronies as a conspiracy of political and media elites against One Nation, but most importantly it worked to import ideas from outside Australia to provide an explanatory system of belief for both elites and ordinary party members – a foundational narrative that explained the problems facing Hanson’s core constituency, both relieving the psychological distress of their own economic failure, and encouraging them to support Hanson who would fight for them against their oppressors.

CONCLUSIONS

At the foundation of the structural factors in the emergence of One Nation we can find the impact of globalization in the exacerbation of the rural-urban economic divide, the opening of Australia’s national borders to immigrants and trade, and the spread of post-materialist values. At the center of the agency factors in the emergence of One Nation we find Pauline Hanson herself, the center of media attention and even the epistemic community of conspiracy theorists. While she was not the omniscient architect of her career or the formation of the party, it was her charismatic appeal that drew her supporters to her and kept the media spotlight upon her.

It was Hanson who rallied the rural Australians with materialist values: those who were resentful of their economic plight, threatened by the rise in non-white immigration and by the legal recognition of Native Title, and who felt abandoned by the major parties. True, the resentments already existed: Hanson did not *create* the environment in which these resentments festered, nor did she even bring it to the attention of those materialists who felt such resentment. But it *was* Hanson who mobilized the forces and created a neo-populist movement. Other actors were saying many of the same things about non-white immigration and indigenous rights, but it was Hanson who succeeded in starting a nationwide movement.

Existing politicians and political groups such as Graeme Campbell, the Australian League of Rights, The Citizens Electoral Councils, Australians Against Further Immigration, and the other far-right parties were acting in the same environment as Hanson; in other words, all the structural variables were equal. What they lacked was some of the supporting factors that Hanson had: charisma, media attention that was in many ways linked to that charisma, and an epistemic community of conspiracy theorists who were working inside the party to propagate important explanatory narratives to the rural materialists who had been so affected by globalization.

While the most important of the three agency factors is undoubtedly the charismatic leadership of Pauline Hanson, without the media and epistemic communities of conspiracy theorists Hanson could not have formed One Nation. Without the attention of both tabloid and elite journalists Hanson could not have spread her message nationally to her target audience. Journalists provided the publicity that

was such a necessary spur to Hansonism and the emergence of One Nation. Without the media attention it is unlikely that she would have been able to make the leap to national politics; she would have stayed on the parochial Queensland political stage, probably as an independent as Campbell and others had done before her. Without the epistemic community of conspiracy theorists Hanson would have been without the discourse that helped her followers justify their problems as being beyond their control through providing scapegoats, while simultaneously attaching them to her more closely through fear-mongering. Just as journalists provided a spur, conspiracy theorists provided an explanatory narrative that lay at the heart of Hansonism.

Thus while Hanson's charismatic leadership was the most important factor, all three factors were necessary in the emergence of a neo-populist party in Australia in the 1990s.

CHAPTER SEVEN

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 2: THE AGENCY FACTORS CAUSING NEO-POPULIST PARTY EMERGENCE IN CANADA

Preston Manning had his own ideas about the emergence of prairie populist movements in Canada. He believed that prairie populist movements – such as Riel, the CCF, and Social Credit – occurred cyclically in Western Canada, arising during times of economic and social discontent (Flanagan 1995, 38). Thus Manning himself attributed the historical cycles of prairie populism to structural factors, to the social and economic environment which triggered the wave of discontent. Yet a close examination of the history of the emergence of the Reform Party itself makes plain the importance of strategic actors, particularly Manning himself as the founder of the party, who spent a more than two decades “waiting for the wave” of western discontent so that he could ride it to Ottawa.

As in the Australian case, there are three factors which make up the second independent variable – the agency causes of neo-populist party emergence in Canada: A) charismatic leadership; B) media influence; and C) epistemic communities of conspiracy theorists. This chapter examines the influence of individual agency on the emergence of the Reform Party.

FACTOR 2A: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP
PRESTON MANNING’S “REVERSE CHARISMA”

Of all the three leaders in the study, Preston Manning – the son of a successful and charismatic politician – would seem to be the obvious inheritor of charisma yet in many ways he was the least charismatic of the three. Intensely intellectual, mild mannered, and reserved, neatly dressed and with glasses that almost dwarfed his face, Manning was not made of the same material as the magnetic Peters or the captivating Hanson. Tom Flanagan – a close political associate (albeit not necessarily a close friend) – has referred to Manning’s style as “reverse charisma” (Howse 1991, 20) and Manning himself is modest enough to recognize it. Yet “reverse charisma” does not mean “no charisma” and Manning was charismatic in his own way, generating a loyal and intensely enthusiastic following among the grassroots of his party that was activated by his leadership appeal.

Tom Flanagan claims that to a large extent the Reform Party has been the project of one man – Preston Manning (1995, 7) – just as the New Zealand First Party is to a large extent the product of Winston Peters’ leadership and Pauline Hanson was crucial to the emergence of One Nation as a party. What is most remarkable about the emergence of the Reform Party, however, is not that it was the project of Preston Manning’s leadership, but that Preston Manning’s leadership was itself the project of Manning’s will. Unlike Hanson and Peters, Manning was not a naturally gifted politician; much of his charismatic appeal was painstakingly crafted. For Manning, the most conscientious and studious of men, leadership was an intellectual undertaking. The formation of a political party was not an opportunity that fell from out of the blue, but a prize that he had stalked for decades.

BACKGROUND

Manning's political lineage as a populist politician was impeccable. Earnest Preston Manning was born in 1942, the second son of Earnest Manning, the right-hand man of Alberta Premier William Aberhart. "Bible Bill" Aberhart was a self-taught biblical scholar and evangelical preacher: the founder of the Prophetic Bible Institute where Earnest Manning had found a spiritual home. In the midst of the Great Depression, Aberhart – the quintessential prairie populist – had been converted to the social credit theories of Major Douglas and, with the young Earnest Manning, had founded the Social Credit Party which swept to electoral victory in the provincial elections in 1935. In 1943, however, Aberhart died, and the leadership of both the party and the radio broadcast ministry was passed to the less explicitly populist Earnest Manning, who would remain as premier until 1968. Preston would grow to adulthood in the shadow of provincial political power, a sober and intellectual youth with a strong Christian faith (Dabbs 1997, 25-35).

After graduating from the University of Alberta with an honours degree in Economics in 1964, Manning was persuaded to run as a Social Credit candidate for the riding of East Edmonton in the 1965 Federal election, but he failed to win the seat. Thereafter Manning stayed out of the mainstream of electoral politics at either the federal or provincial level. Instead, he wrote several research papers for his father on social conservative issues and eventually became a management consultant in the booming Alberta oil and gas industry. He bided his time, studying the history of prairie politics and waiting for the wave (Manning 2002, 18-22).

LEADER IMAGE – PRESTON MANNING AS NATIVE SON

Manning's leader image is the most atypical aspect of his charismatic appeal. His unassuming appearance and quiet-spoken mien bear little resemblance to the well-groomed charm of Winston Peters, or the pop-star sex-appeal of Pauline Hanson. Manning is nevertheless a charismatic leader who has a charismatic relationship with his followers. For those followers, Manning's leader image is not that of the warrior leader or the statesman, but of a parson shepherding his flock through the dissemination of his wisdom; he is not a strikingly stylish politician but a trusted native son (Sharpe and Braid 1992, 15). In this way Manning's leader image is allied with his Christian faith and his father's evangelical ministry, as well as the populist culture of the Canadian prairies.

Manning's leader image was integrally connected with his followers' perception of his intelligence and his scholarly intellect. One interviewee fondly referred to Manning as "Mr. Brain" (Reform Party Member G 2003) and many others alluded to his erudition as being an important component of his leadership skills, skills that are still compared favorably with subsequent leaders of the party.

Preston is a close friend of mine, the smartest person I ever worked with, but had difficulty with some areas. Stockwell Day is just a wet suit, no charisma and no brains. Stephen [Harper] has a bit of a holdup, still doesn't like socializing as much as he should (Reform Party Member A 2003).

Preston Manning is the most intelligent and best-informed leader of all of the major parties. He is honest, sincere and works very hard. He treasures his privacy and keeps great personal distance at all times. During a two-hour dinner with him alone we did not have even a minute of small talk about families, health, or the weather. It was all business as we reviewed Reform's fiscal policies. Manning's understanding of complex economic and fiscal issues was outstanding

(Grubel 1997, 2).

Many commented on the intellectual abilities necessary for leadership and the importance of such leadership to a fledgling political party, admitting that few other people could have been as successful as Manning.

But of course the other thing was you had somebody who had that kind of depth. There have been people in the past who have attempted this in the past and failed. [...] In Canada, for example, you have what was referred to as the Confederation of Regents Party. They were poorly led, but they had basically the same roots, the timing may not have been quite right, but they were just not well led (Reform Party Member F 2003).

Manning's charismatic appeal was associated with his depth of knowledge about his subject and the subsequent strength of his convictions; he offered a comforting decisiveness to his followers in a period of cultural dislocation.

Like Hanson, part of Manning's appeal was his very ordinariness: he was the native son who was "just like us" and therefore could be trusted, as a better groomed and more dashing leader would not have been. Manning's intellectuality is integral even in his native son persona because his education was seen by his constituents as a powerful tool that he was willing to use for their defense against the elites in Ottawa.

There was a whole generation of people who settled the West, broke the ground, and had a deep fear of politicians, bureaucracy, and government. If they could manage it they sent a son away to school to be educated, hoping that the son would come back to protect them from the profiteers and politicians. In a symbolic way, Manning is that trustworthy son, the one who will protect everyone (Filmmaker David Cunningham cited in Sharpe and Braid 1992, 15).

Of course, Manning was in reality a very sophisticated and highly educated man, but he maintained his ability to connect with this roots. Manning's leader image, therefore, was one of shepherd and protector, and he was regarded as leader because of, rather

than despite, his physical appearance and bookish persona.

IDEA ACCEPTANCE – EVANGELICAL ORATORY AND REFORM CONVERTS

While Manning's looks may not conform to the typical image of a charismatic leader, his public speaking style is a different matter entirely, and it is his oratory technique that forms the basis of the idea acceptance dimension of his charismatic appeal. Even early political opponents of Manning, such as Alberta Liberal Party leader Laurance Decore, identified his rhetorical skill:

Preston's got a similar quality to his father – that evangelical mystique. There's something captivating about a preacher and the way a preacher can get his message across. His father had it and it's all wound up in a western twang. It's wound up in biblical images. It's very populist. And Preston's got it down to the kind of perfection that his father had. It makes him very appealing, and it makes him sound very honest and forthright (cited in Dobbin 1991, 2).

His oratory skill was central to his charismatic relationship with Reform constituents. Many interviewees saw Manning's speeches as being his strong suit, and commented that he could sway a crowd to tears with his rhetoric. Manning's Christian faith and his family heritage of evangelical ministry were central to this aspect of his charismatic appeal, but this skill was not a completely natural talent. Manning admitted that he disliked speaking in front of crowds and, particularly early in his career, became extremely nervous when he did so (Manning 2002, 53-55). His oratory was a dimension of his leadership appeal that he had to work on, and he did so with typical conscientiousness.

While it is true that Manning was preaching to, if not the converted, then at least to the very sympathetic, it is evident that his skills allowed him to influence his followers to accept the ideas he presented to them.

The bond of trust between Preston Manning and his party is unique in Canadian politics today. He proves this time and again by performing a feat of on-stage magic that shows how eager his followers are to trust him even against some of their own cherished beliefs. He actually convinces his audiences that they should support the Goods and Services Tax, while leaving them with the impression that it was their idea (Sharpe and Braid 1992, 15).

This ability to convince his followers to support a policy that they had opposed was based on more than trust between leaders and led, although trust was part of it. Manning was able to persuade his constituents because he had studied them so carefully. He knew how to express their ideas clearly and to do so with rhetoric that avoided extremism, so that he shaped their responses and tempered their anger while allowing an outlet for their discontent.

He has a flair for what Murray Dobbin has called “calculated ambiguity.” He is able to express politically incorrect sentiments, such as opposition to official bilingualism and multiculturalism, with carefully crafted statements that, while radically opposed to the conventional wisdom, steer clear of extremism (Flanagan 1995, 3).

Manning’s ability to sway his audience was in part the result of his public speaking skills, but it was also the result of careful preparation by Manning and the understanding that preparation gave him about his constituency. The strength of his opinions and his ability to express those opinions meant that the idea acceptance dimension of Manning’s charismatic appeal was surprisingly strong.

COMPLIANCE – CONTROL OF THE PARTY PLATFORM

Manning’s aim in founding the Reform Party was the creation of a political party that was deliberately unorthodox in its hierarchical structure: as unlike the traditional, elite driven political party as possible. The Reform Party was designed to keep control at the grassroots level, and most interviewees mentioned that they were

bound to respect the ideas that emerged from their constituency associations. But pure democracy is an extremely awkward and inefficient process and, despite Manning's idealist talk of "the common sense of the common people," he exerted a high degree of authority within the organization.

Despite its claims of being populist, in reality Manning dominates the Reform Party [...] The party, for the most part, was created by Manning and is still a reflection of him. [...] This was very evident at the party's 1991 convention: delegates were keenly aware of their leader's wishes and anxious to oblige him (Arseneau 1994, 117).

Thus the compliance dimension of Manning's charismatic leadership was quite strong.

Manning's control was evident even when he instituted procedures that, ostensibly, provided grassroots input into decisions. As part of his populist vision, Manning had created a procedure whereby he would use a group of people as sounding boards, revise his policy if necessary, and then return and ask them to ratify it. While this procedure did allow for input at the grassroots level, it nevertheless permitted Manning to maintain control of the process, and when he encountered too much resistance by one group, he would simply locate or create a more compliant group (Flanagan 1995, 166). As a team leader Manning also had significant flaws. Although he was hard working and paid attention to detail, his unwillingness to delegate tasks meant that a collegial team was never developed within the Reform Party's upper echelons (Flanagan 1995, 87). Thus while Manning gained compliance and a certain level of loyalty from many of the MPs, it was an enforced rather than a spontaneous loyalty.

This is not to say that Manning is a fully fledged demagogue in a democrat's clothing. While his charisma was strong enough to sway his constituents to his opinion,

there were indeed effective channels of communication between the leader and the led – Manning actually listened to people and paid attention to them. He had thought long and hard about the tension inherent in democratic leadership.

To me democratic leadership is the tension between the leader and the followers where of course you have your view of what would be best and what's the principled approach. And you argue it with your own people but you take into account their views and you let them say, and you've got to give them an impression – and it's got to be real to be a genuine impression – that you're prepared to defer to their judgment but you're going to try to influence that judgment. And that tension is a hard thing to achieve, but to me it's the essence of democratic leadership. If you can ever get it – where there's a back-and-forth between a large group of people and the leadership and one influences the other and both respect each other it can be a very powerful force because the policy that you ultimately get adopted is carrying their judgment and you're enthusiastic about it too because you've been a big part of it (Manning, interview with author 2004).

Thus Manning's control of his party platform was effective even though it sprang from the way in which he structured the party rather than from his ability to demand loyalty from his immediate followers. In reality the compliance dimension of his charismatic appeal was relatively weak – a product of the fact that his charisma was painstakingly constructed rather than instinctive. The compliance dimension of his leadership had no real foundation, and was quite easily swept away when Manning's leadership was challenged in 2000.

EMOTIONAL DIMENSION – A FAILURE TO CONNECT

Manning's one-on-one relationship with his followers is an extremely weak dimension of his charismatic appeal. Many observers describe him as uninterested in the usual political games of glad-handing potential supporters, of being uncomfortable in the spotlight, and suffering from extreme stage fright (Sharpe and Braid 1992, 4).

Even Manning admits that his is not an open personality, that he shuts people out (Manning 1992), even those who are closest to him. Unlike Winston Peters in New Zealand, Manning was not a particularly skilled campaigner and did not enjoy working a crowd. He did not revel in adulation and, unlike many politicians, did not gain psychological benefits from the hero worship of his followers.

While he understood his constituency well, his grasp of political essentials and his understanding of his constituency were not innate but were the result of many years of study, and this was apparent to many observers.

Manning has always had a strain of the political consultant in him. He even apologized for his appearance of cool detachment during a speech to the first UA convention in Ottawa last year, acknowledging he too often sees politics as a series of problems to be solved rather than an emotional connection with people (Wallace 2000, 23).

In many ways Manning's introversion, the fact that he was not driven to seek the adulation of his much-vaunted grassroots, was his Achilles heel.

Nevertheless there was an emotional dimension to Manning's appeal and he retains a loyal following among Reform supporters, a subset of whom still see him as a great leader. Many regard him as a visionary, albeit one who made mistakes.

Yeah, he was – there's a lot of water that's gone under the bridge since. But in those days I viewed him as a terrific visionary and statesman. Like he articulated a vision and I attended town hall meetings with large crowds where he brought tears to people's eyes, and he could grab their hearts, and he did a tremendous job of articulating what he saw as a future for Canada. Nobody since has been able to do that – in our party or in the Progressive Conservative party (Reform Party Member E 2004).

Manning had an emotional connection with his constituency, but he failed to build upon it. While Manning could and did hone his charismatic appeal in terms of his leader

image and his oratory, he was not able to intellectualize an emotional connection to the people whom he was supposed to represent. The emotional dimension of Manning's charismatic leadership was very weak.

LOSS OF THE LEADERSHIP

The weakness of Manning's charismatic appeal – particularly in the compliance and emotional dimensions – became apparent in the late 1990s. After Reform had failed to gain seats in Ontario it became obvious that to become a truly national party Reform would have to consider a new strategy and re-brand itself. Manning set up a series of “United Alternative” conferences to woo the Progressive Conservative Party into a coalition with Reform, but most of the PCs were not interested. In March of 2000, however, the Reform Party of Canada and some provincial Tories formed the Canadian Conservative Reform Alliance. In the metamorphosis of the party, however, Manning had failed to maintain his control of the organization that he had been instrumental in forming. In the race to determine the leadership of the new party Preston Manning lost to the younger and far more flamboyant Stockwell Day (Bergman 200).

Many observers trace the failure of Manning to maintain his leadership position to his own personal transformation. In the midst of the 1997 election campaign – when Manning had led his party to become the official opposition – he had undergone laser eye surgery so that he no longer needed glasses, and had updated his hair and wardrobe. Manning had always crafted his charismatic persona carefully and this metamorphosis would seem to be in keeping with that. But this persona was that of a modern politician, not the political outsider necessary for effective leadership of a populist party.

With new hair, a new look, and a more moderate tone on social issues, Preston Manning simply wasn't the same guy. And what he may not

have anticipated when he challenged the party to move forward or to stay true to its roots and forever languish in Opposition, was that they would choose the latter option (Thomas 2001).

While Winston Peters – as an ethnic minority and a naturally charismatic person – could be well-groomed and politically connected, Preston Manning could not.

A more important cause of Manning's failure to retain the leadership was his activity as official Leader of the Opposition. Despite the fact that Manning had repeatedly stated that he would not move into the official Opposition Leader's residence, he changed his mind a few weeks after the 1997 election, and accepted both the government funded house and the car and driver that went with it (Geddes 1998). Manning had always seemed above reproach on the issues of political cronyism, and his move to Stornoway damaged his image among his materialist constituents.

Preston made some serious mistakes. ... He compromised on a lot of his grassroots positions in an effort to move east into Ontario, and he paid the price for that. And silly things like moving into Stornoway and the pension issue. All of them are quite sensible, but the public really wasn't in the mood to listen to the defense. They viewed it as a breach of trust – with the trust of the grassroots people. And of course the Progressive Conservatives, who still to this day blame Preston Manning all by himself for destroying their party, latched onto every one of those little things and called him a hypocrite and all the rest of it, because it was the connection with the grassroots and those grassroots ideas that were so popular that helped to build that wave (Reform Party Member E 2004).

Manning's evolution from a sincere, but poorly groomed populist to a more sophisticated, spectacle-free politician with a moderated tone on social issues seemed like a betrayal to the party's base, and his charisma was not strong enough to survive it.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 2A

Manning's charismatic appeal was extremely strong in its own way –

particularly in terms of its leader appeal and idea acceptance dimensions. But because his charisma was not innate, because in many ways it was a product of Manning's intellect, it was not enough to allow him to retain the leadership of the party as it reached full maturity. Nevertheless, Manning's charismatic leadership was crucial to the emergence of the Reform Party – without his leadership it would never have emerged as a political force in Canadian politics.

FACTOR 2B: MEDIA INFLUENCE BYFIELD VERSUS THE ONTARIO PRESS CORPS

Despite Preston Manning's lack of natural charismatic talents, he was smart enough to be able to use the media far more prudently and beneficially than Pauline Hanson did in Australia. Manning was more wary of the potential antagonism of the Ottawa press corps to a populist party, and was quite effective at presenting a moderate message to them while at the same time allowing the tabloid media in the western provinces to give voice to the issues that concerned the Reform Party's major constituency. Thus both elite and tabloid media journalists were important agents in the emergence of the Reform Party of Canada.

Notwithstanding Manning's attempt at putting a moderate face on the party, the Canadian media's reaction to the emergence of the Reform Party on the national political scene was in many ways similar to the Australian media's reaction to Pauline Hanson. Richard Jenkins identifies a three-stage media response to the Reform Party of Canada which was similar to the Australian media's response to Pauline Hanson (Jenkins 2003, 150). During the first phase, journalists from the "elite" media responded with criticism of the party and its platform, demonizing its leaders and their ideas as

racist and homophobic, insular and reactionary. In the second phase, from the end of the election in 1993 until the beginning of the 1997 campaign, the party was treated as a significant force in Canadian politics, and the source of its support – discontent in the west and in the rural areas – was regarded as a serious issue. During this phase the party was regarded as a viable third party, although it was still heavily criticized for the perceived intolerance of its policies on certain issues. The third phase of media attention was the 1997 campaign and its aftermath until the party changed its name to become the Canadian Alliance. As with Pauline Hanson, however, the elite media's criticism of the Reform Party's ideology and policies backfired. Much of the Reform Party constituency regarded the disapproval of the party and of Preston Manning as unfair criticism by eastern elites.

Throughout these three phases, but of particular importance during the first phase, journalists from within the tabloid media acted as agents in the emergence of the party by giving publicity to the party and activating the party's supporters. Right wing radio talk show hosts such as Rafe Mair, tabloid newspaper columnist Doug Collins, and tabloid publisher Ted Byfield of the *Alberta Report*, all provided a responsive audience for the Reform Party's views and actively supported Reform Party candidates and events. Thus both elite and tabloid journalists – willingly or not – were agents in the emergence of the Reform Party of Canada.

DISMAY AND DISTRUST – PRESTON AND THE ESTABLISHMENT MEDIA

During the first phase of the party's emergence the elite media response was intensely critical, although it was not as acerbic as the media response to Pauline Hanson, who was less circumspect in her rhetoric and was not a well-educated man

with political connections. Manning's reasonable tone and professional credentials moderated some of the vitriol, at least initially. Nevertheless, the media response was deeply suspicious – many journalists quickly began to suspect that the party was “a sort of right wing wolf in sheep's clothing, apparently moderate and reasonable, but in reality the harbinger of extremist policies and ideas” and much of the media commentary was quite negative, even from reporters covering the earliest party assembly at Winnipeg in 1987.

With the exception of *Alberta Report*, journalists covering the assembly said that they did not, as a rule, much care for Preston Manning. His style was not telegenic; they regarded him as too intense, too certain of himself. He was the politically privileged blue blood; his followers were people who did not like the media and lived by different political and cultural values from those of most journalists (Dabbs 1997, 129).

As the party became more prominent in western Canada, and particularly as it campaigned for and began to poll well in the federal elections in 1993, media attention focused more fully on the party and upon its leaders, and journalists became more censorious. Even before the bad publicity surrounding the infiltration of a Reform Party constituency association by a neo-Nazi group in 1992, Manning had been forced to handle “an aggressively hostile press corps” (Sharpe and Braid 1992, 21). This negative coverage had two effects: the first was to label the party as extreme and intolerant, the second was to ensure that the Reform party's constituency of socially conservative materialists, who naturally distrusted the elite media, became entrenched as Reform voters.

Not all the media coverage was negative. Some elite media outlets began to cover the Reform movement, calling it a “stunning political development in Canada” albeit one which had received “scant attention in the press” (Financial Post 1992). One

Reform Party political consultant admits that there was a period in early 1991, just as the party was building up to move into Ontario, when “the party got a relatively easy ride in the media” (Flanagan 1995, 89-91) although he also claims that the scrutiny became closer, and harsher, soon afterwards. Flanagan, however, believes that much of the negative publicity in the first phase of media response was the result of bad handling by Manning and the rest of the party leadership, but this gives the party leadership too much blame, and the media too little responsibility.

Admittedly, some responsibility for the adverse media coverage of the Reform Party can be laid at the door of Reform MPs who seemed to suffer from uncontrollable foot-in-mouth disease. Alberta Senator Stan Waters’ comment that he was “very much against funding of special interests, whether it be for black lesbians or fluoridation” (Howse 1989, 34) was bound to raise hackles, and not merely those of black lesbians. Herb Grubel’s comparison of Indian Reservations to South Sea Island Resorts, and Native Peoples as “spoiled teenagers,” was inevitably construed as racist. Dave Chatters’ claiming that society had a right to discriminate against homosexuals could hardly be ignored by the media, nor could Bob Ringma’s comment about the right of employers to discriminate against gays and visible minorities (Hughes 1996). But all of these comments were relatively isolated instances which occurred over a period of more than a decade, and while they were much quoted by the media as examples of the party’s intolerance, there is evidence that journalists had a double standard, overemphasizing the intolerance of comments by Reform MPs even if Liberal and Progressive Conservative MPs expressed similar views (Jenkins 2003, 166).

It is also true that the party leadership’s response to these remarks was often

ineffectual. Manning was politically astute – he was, after all, Premier Manning’s son – and he was unquestionably extremely intelligent. Unlike Hanson, Manning was very aware of the functions of mass media in modern politics but, by his own admission, he was not a poster child for the media. He did not have the looks to be a dominant force on television and, despite his intelligence, he needed time to think through and craft his responses. In face-to-face encounters with westerners he could establish a connection and on the pulpit he was extremely effective, but on television he was merely adequate.

I was never that good on television; I tend to be more of a written person and public meeting sort of person, but not particularly good on television. Of course in today’s political world communication skills, particularly with the electronic media, are just so important (Manning, interview with author 2004).

Manning made several egregious errors in his handling of the media and of elite journalists. At times he would become impatient with criticism of the party and be brusque with reporters (Sharpe and Braid 1992, 21). At other times he would defend an MP’s intolerant remarks but then turn on them when it became an issue in the media, or he would immediately repudiate the comment and thus alienate some of the Reform Party’s base (Flanagan 1995, 171).

Mishandling of the media was a mistake but it does not diminish the essential truth that elite journalists, particularly in this first phase of the party’s emergence onto the political stage, were watching the Reform Party, its platform, and its supporters, with a critical and at times overtly disapproving eye. The response of journalists from the elite media to the initial policy blue book was quite negative, as was their response to the party’s core support. Jeffrey Simpson’s description of Reform voters at Saskatoon as not “the truly dispossessed, but of the psychologically dispossessed” (Simpson 1993,

121) was relatively typical and could not be described as an example of balanced or impartial journalism. Elite journalists' disparagement and dismissal of Reform voters and their grievances during the first phase of media response was, however, important to the emergence of the party because while this criticism may have prevented the Reform Party from attracting moderate voters it undoubtedly shored up the party's support among its populist base.

The second phase of mainstream media response to the Reform Party – from the 1993 election through the 1997 campaign – involved something of a rapprochement between elite journalists and the Reform Party. At this point opinion polls showed that support for Manning and the party was growing and it was impossible for the media to ignore the fact that Reform was a force to be reckoned with in Canadian politics (Grace 1997). Part of this new respect was due to the leadership that Preston Manning had shown during the Charlottetown Accords and his performance during debates, but the sheer number of seats won by Reform in the 1993 election made coverage of the party unavoidable.

Although media analysts and political scientists identified an easing of media criticism, Reform Party members did not. Reformers continued to accuse mainstream journalists of ignoring the party's message, or distorting it to make it seem racist or anti-Francophone. While Manning had argued in *The New Canada*, in 1992, that media bias

was due to markets and technology rather than ideology,¹⁸ as time went on Manning, too, became frustrated with the mainstream media and began to accuse journalists of bias. As the party prepared to move into the eastern provinces – particularly the rural areas of Quebec and northern Ontario – to contest the 1993 federal election, Manning accused the French language media of misrepresenting Reform in Quebec (Gunter 1993, 8) and at one point of the 1997 campaign accusing the media of being engaged in a “witch hunt” against Reform MPs (quoted in Jenkins 2003, 166). By 1995, Manning had identified five sources of media bias against the Reform Party:

1) the definition of news does not allow constructive proposals to be aired because short-term, negative, and emotive statements are more newsworthy than constructive ones; 2) journalists work with a conceptual framework that is out of touch with the movement (party); 3) a bias exists in favor of the status quo; 4) “journalist capture” [news gathering routines] operates against the party; and 5) regional biases in the national media allow the center to dominate the news (cited in Jenkins 2003, 157).

Thus even during this middle stage of response to Reform, media coverage was perceived by party members as biased against the party, even if some positive views had been published.

Even into the second decade of the party’s existence, and well into what outside observers regard as the “third phase” of journalistic response to the party, Reform MPs continued to regard the media as biased against the party. Stockwell Day complained of his treatment by the mainstream media during his relatively brief tenure as party leader,

¹⁸ In the modern communications business, particularly in the case of television, negative is more newsworthy than positive; short-term is more newsworthy than long-term; disagreement is more newsworthy than agreement; emotion-laden critiques are more newsworthy than well-reasoned proposals for constructive change. [...] Thus a reform movement’s criticisms of the existing order, particularly if these are expressed in vigorous and emotional language, will be amplified by the mass media, while its constructive proposals for change – the elements that distinguish a genuine reform movement from a mere protest movement – will be dampened and filtered by the same media (Manning 1992).

regarding them as hostile to him and to his message, which they possibly were.¹⁹

It was a journalist who put it best talking to a group of young Alliance activists about a year ago. He said “In Ottawa, here’s how we do it. We sit up in the gallery in Question Period. We watch to see who’s been wounded. And then when they come staggering out of the House, we circle around them with our spears and finish them off.” Coming from a journalist, I thought that was a reasonably fair estimation (Fotheringham 2001).

The media was also extremely disapproving after the 1997 election during the Stornoway affair and when questions were raised about Manning’s expense account as Leader of the Opposition. As criticism swirled around Manning, much of the caucus blamed media bias and argued that the Ottawa media were misrepresenting the issue (Gunter 1994, 6).

Even today many interviewees feel in some sense victimized by the Ottawa press corps, which they perceive as the media elite representatives of the establishment, even when the party has become part of that political establishment:

[Y]ou know, the media’s against [Stephen Harper] down here [in Ottawa] *and* the agenda of his core constituency (Reform Party Member A 2003).

Although the allegation of media prejudice did not rise to the level of paranoia it did within the New Zealand First Party (see Chapter Eight), most of the interviewees still regard the mainstream media as biased against the party and against its members.

In Ontario we have had more people every election, although you’d never know it listening to the media. I think it was a million and a half in Ontario last time [...] I’m not positive. But I think that’s right, it was a lot of voters. You’d never know it listening to the media – we’ve lost

¹⁹ Much to the delight of journalists, the Reform Party’s citizen initiated referenda proposal was satirized by a television comedy show. The show put a petition on their website proposing that Stockwell Day change his first name to “Doris.” More than a million Canadians signed the petition.

ground according to them, but we've actually got a lot more votes every time (Reform Party Member J 2003).

While most MPs were annoyed that the party was not receiving the recognition it deserved, they also cited media bias as evidence that the party was not part of the political establishment and that it had not sold out its political grass roots.

Whether or not journalists are biased against the Reform Party the publicity surrounding the party's emergence, its policies, and even the media's emphasis upon the intolerant remarks of Reform MPs, may merely have provided clearer ideological identification of the party for potential supporters. Certainly polls and even the 1993 Canadian National Election Study showed that Reform voters were much more likely to be intolerant of gays and members of visible minorities (Jenkins 2003, 154) and thus were unlikely to have been displeased by these remarks. Furthermore, since many of the Reform Party's natural supporters distrusted the mainstream media, criticism of the party by that mainstream media simply bolstered their support of the party. Intentionally or not, journalists were agents in the emergence of the party as a political force.

TABLOID JOURNALISTS – THE ADVOCACY OF ALBERTA REPORT

Tabloid journalists were as central to the rise of the Reform Party as they were to Pauline Hanson's One Nation in Australia, and were an even more significant a force than they were in the emergence of New Zealand First. While mainstream journalists provided the "oxygen of publicity" to the party and its policies, tabloid newspapers and right wing radio talk shows provided a ready and receptive audience as a base of support for the newly emerging party.

Perhaps the most important source of media support for the Reform Party was the *Alberta Report* and *BC Report* news magazines. These magazines, both published

by one of the founders of the Reform Party, Ted Byfield, were instrumental in the emergence of the Reform Party as a regional force. Byfield had published an editorial in August of 1986 calling for a moderate western-based political party. It was Byfield who formulated the “Triple E Senate” proposal, and he was willing to use his magazine’s editorial columns as a sounding board for the fledgling party (Dabbs 1997, 103-5, 120-22). The slogan “The West Wants In” was conceived by *Alberta Report* columnist Ralph Hedlin (Byfield 1991, 5). The *Alberta Report* and its sibling *BC Report*, were vital to the emergence of the party.

The main function of the Report news magazines, however, was agenda setting. The editorial pages of the Report provided a platform upon which the agenda of the Reform Party could be expressed. The magazine covered the Winnipeg and Saskatoon conventions in detail, highlighting the proposed policy platforms such as the Triple-E Senate and citizen initiated referenda schemes. With headlines such as “No More Pandering to Quebec” and “No Mere Prairie Fire: The Reform Party Seems Here to Stay” (Byfield 1991, 86).

Byfield’s editorials echoed the criticisms of the elite media made by tabloid journalists and right wing radio hosts in Australia and New Zealand. Byfield argues that journalists from the mainstream media are cut off from ordinary Canadians because of their lifestyles – they live in inner cities, do not attend church, and socialize only among themselves. Margo Kingston, the epitome of an Australian elite media journalist, has made a very similar argument in her book about Pauline Hanson’s 1998 election campaign in Queensland *Off the Rails* (see previous chapter). Ordinary Canadians, recognizing that journalists do not share their values, distrust the journalist’s views on

political topics. Byfield claimed, for example, that media criticism of Stockwell Day, combined with Manning's attempts to curry favor with the mainstream media, explained why Stockwell Day won the leadership race in 2001.

[Ordinary Canadians] see that the media, who reject them, also reject [Stockwell Day]. They find him “scary.” That’s reassuring. So the more the media pummel him, the harder they work for him. Every knock becomes a boost. That’s why Stockwell Day won Ontario (Byfield 2005).

Other than Byfield, the most important tabloid journalist in the emergence of the Reform Party, at least in the early years of the party, was Doug Collins, a columnist with the *North Shore News* in British Columbia. Despite the fact that Manning had been forced to rescind the Collins’ nomination for Reform Party candidacy in the 1988 elections in Vancouver, Collins – whose views were often described as racist and who had been accused of being a holocaust denier – was supportive of many Reform Party policies and rallied his audience around them. Most importantly, his audience was precisely the same demographic as that of the Reform Party – predominantly white, male, and over forty years old. Collins was well-placed to set the agenda among that demographic, and the agenda he set mirrored the Reform Party’s platform to a remarkable degree.

As in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, the influence of right-wing radio talk shows on Canadian politics increased dramatically throughout the 1990s. While not always adulatory, these “shock jocks” were nevertheless very supportive of many of the party’s policies, and they often presented the Reform Party as a viable alternative to the two major parties which were the target of much of the bombast during the show. Much of the rhetoric is obviously neo-populist in its appeal:

[The Reform Party] are the only party prepared to address the structural problems of our system of governance and by doing so head off an inevitable split. But they are pilloried by not only the establishment parties and the establishment itself – but by the establishment media as well (Mair 2000).

The disparagement of the “establishment media” is echoed in the rhetoric of many interviewees and bears a striking similarity to the rhetoric of Winston Peters in New Zealand and members of One Nation in Australia.

As in Australia and New Zealand, talk-show hosts and pundits on right wing radio provided a receptive audience to the Reform Party’s platform and set an anti-immigrant, anti-multiculturalism, anti-gay, anti-feminist agenda, at least among their own demographic, that enhanced the support for the party. In this way the tabloid media journalists were critical agents in the emergence of the Reform Party.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 2B

Although there was no media firestorm surrounding the emergence of the party as there was in Australia, the media played an enormous role in the emergence of the party. Journalists working in both tabloid news magazines and right-wing talk radio were important agents in the emergence of the Reform Party because they provided access to the party’s natural constituency who were loyal listeners and readers; they set the agenda and provided a natural audience for the party. Elite journalists, too, were agents in the emergence of Reform precisely because the Reform constituency was distrustful of them. As elite journalists criticized, they provided not only the oxygen of publicity but also a clear idea of the socially conservative ideological base of the Reform party. Thus despite Manning’s superior abilities to control aspects of his party’s public image, the Canadian media, although less vitriolic, nevertheless framed the

Reform Party in much the same way as the Australian media framed Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party.

FACTOR 2C: THE EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY OF CONSPIRACY THEORISTS IN CANADA

Conspiricism is a definitional principle of neo-populism, but it may appear at different levels within different neo-populist parties. In the New Zealand case, conspiricism was evident in the highest levels of the party hierarchy, and the party leadership acted as an epistemic community by propagating conspiracy theories to the party membership through stump speeches and press releases. In the Australian case, although conspiricism was also apparent at the highest levels of the party, the epistemic community was more thoroughly active at the lower levels of the party hierarchy, so that conspiracy theories were more likely to be circulated at district meetings by candidates and district leaders than by Hanson in her campaign speeches.

In Canada, however, the very highest levels of the party leadership – Manning, Harper, and their closest advisors – were not a part of this epistemic community of conspiracy theorists. Indeed, in their attempt to ensure that the party had broad appeal throughout Canada, the party elite were careful to avoid the label of 'fringe extremists.' Manning himself was very aware of extremism within the party's ranks and while he was always quick to respond and repudiate any extremist comments, he also deflected accusations of xenophobia in the party by arguing that "a bright light attracts bugs" a quote from his famous father, Earnest Manning (Dobbin 1991, 120). Nevertheless it was evident that Manning took the threat of extremism within the ranks very seriously and did his best to restrain these elements by expelling members who were members of neo-Nazi and hate groups.

Among the rank-and-file of the membership of the party, however, there was a high degree of conspiracism, and it was at this level that conspiracy theorists were able to disseminate conspiracy theories that were remarkably similar to those spread by neo-populists in Australia and New Zealand. Concerns regarding Jewish bankers, deep suspicions of the United Nations and its attempt to set up a One World Government, and links between the major political party's leaders and foreign crime syndicates were all articulated by Reformers at various levels of the party. The Reform Party conspiracy theorists conformed to Haas' definition of an epistemic community. They (i) shared normative and principled beliefs that were insular, nationalistic, xenophobic; (ii) shared causal beliefs in that they thought that immigration and multiculturalism was destroying the country; (iii) shared notions of validity in that they rejected political correctness; and (iv) shared a common goal of combating non-white immigration and the global conspiracy to form One World Government.

HISTORICAL CONTINUITY – THE SOCIAL CREDIT PARTY AND REFORM

All three of the nations in this study – Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – had at some point in their history developed more or less successful parties which had championed the Douglas philosophy, but the movement was most successful in the western provinces of Canada, and particularly in Alberta, where the provincial party was in government from 1935 to 1971. During much of this period the party was led by Preston Manning's father, Earnest Manning, who was premier of Alberta from 1943 until 1968. The nature of the Social Credit philosophy, its protestant roots and anti-elite predilections, mean that there is a predisposition among social credit adherents towards conspiracy theories.

Social Credit conspiracy theory [is] itself rooted in a complex mix of prophetic religion and Social Credit economics. There is a plot to take over world finances, the reasoning goes, so all centralized planning is susceptible to control by members of the conspiracy. The conspirator (often the “money lords” in collaboration with international Communism, both manifestations of the anti-Christ) caused the Depression and inspired plans for universal social programs after the Second World War (Sharpe and Braid 1992, 77).

Venomous opposition to communism and socialism, and a strong vein of conspiricism, is evident through Social Credit’s history and in the history of its successor, the Reform Party of Canada.

Major Douglas was himself a virulent anti-Semite, although the Canadian Social Credit Founders, Bible Bill Aberhart and Earnest Manning, both rejected anti-Semitism, and attempted to purge the party of anti-Semites whenever they became apparent. In her work on the Alberta Social Credit party, Janine Stingel argues that, despite purges, conspiracy theories – particularly “Jewish Banker” conspiracy theories, which themselves have a long international history – continued to circulate among party adherents.

Although Aberhart and Manning found anti-Semitism distasteful and worked to eliminate it within Social Credit, it took hold because they were saying virtually the same things as the party’s anti-Semites. The only real difference was the absence of anti-Semitic slurs in Aberhart’s and Manning rhetoric about the anti-Christian conspiracy they believed was trying to take over the world (Bob Hesketh, cited in Stingel 1999, 77).

In effect, Stingel argues that there is a predisposition towards conspiracy theories – particularly but not exclusively anti-Semitic ones – in the culture of the party, and that even if they are suppressed this conspiricism will express itself eventually; conspiracy narratives continue to circulate underground for years because the culture was

advantageous. The “moderate” populist narrative which spreads fear and suspicion of “Bay Street Bankers” is similar enough to the traditional “Jewish Banker” narrative that it reaffirmed, rather than negated that narrative.

Reform Party conspiracy theories are rooted in the Social Credit culture that is part of the movement’s heritage. The Reform Party inherited not only Earnest Manning’s son as its leader, it also inherited many of the provincial party’s voters in federal elections (Canadian National Election Study 1993). When Preston Manning and his MPs talked of the party’s prairie populist roots, they were talking of the Social Credit movement of the 1930s as much as they were the Populist movement of the 1890s. The predilection for conspiricism that was at the heart of the Social Credit party constituency is also at the heart of the Reform Party constituency. One defining characteristic of populism is, after all, the deep suspicion of those in power by those who perceive themselves as being without power.

Thus even some of the narratives remain consistent, and an awareness of the social credit heritage of Alberta reaffirms the validity of the theories.

The Supreme Court, from the time of Aberhart in the 1930s to the present, has always ruled in favour of Ottawa's power over banks, banking, and all major financial matters, to keep power on Bay Street where it belongs in Canada. Social Credit will never be allowed as long as we remain in Canada with the Bay Street bankers in control of it (Christie 2000, 5).

The continuity that exists between the Alberta Social Credit party and the Reform Party of Canada is in part due to an culture of conspiricism which was inherited from the former party by the latter. Despite the rejection of the anti-Semitic elements of these conspiracy narratives first by the Social Credit and then by the Reform Party leadership, the “Jewish Banker” conspiracy theories continued to circulate, and party members

continued to believe in them and fit them into the “sanitized” narratives promulgated by party leaders because there was so little dissonance between the two.

How, then, do these conspiracy theories continue to circulate if they are not circulated by party leaders? As in Australia, there exists an epistemic community of conspiracy theorist which is active in the dissemination of conspiracy theories to members of the party. Although the leadership of the Reform Party has attempted to purge the most extreme of these theorists, the community continued to act at the fringes and even made inroads into the hierarchy of the party. The epistemic community was an active agent in the emergence of the Reform Party.

AN EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY OF CONSPIRACY THEORISTS AND THE REFORM MOVEMENT

The tendency towards conspiricism is evident even among some relatively low ranking Reform Members of Parliament. In 1996, the Reform Party’s official Critic on Women’s Issues, Sharon Hayes, issued a news release asserting that the Chinese government had endorsed eating human fetuses. She called for the cancellation of the United Nations Conference on Women which was held in Beijing that year.

Hayes called on the Canadian government to condemn China for policies she claimed endorsed “the alleged consumption of human fetuses as health food” (Dobbin 1997).

It is easy to dismiss this as an isolated crackpot comment – and it certainly is a somewhat strange assertion for a well-educated and intelligent political leader to make – but the comment is not isolated. All of Hays’s sources could be traced back to a single story in a Hong Kong tabloid, and many of them relied on information provided by the US organization *Focus on the Family*. Hayes was part of an international epistemic community which was relating a conspiracist narrative as old as time – foreigners eat

babies!

Xenophobia of this type is evident in the Sidewinder conspiracy scandal of 1999. Project Sidewinder was an investigation by Canadian security and police forces into Chinese organized crime figures and wealthy Chinese individuals who had infiltrated Canadian political institutions by means of corruption and influence peddling. After the investigation was shut down, several Reform Party MPs, including Jim Abbott and John Reynolds, alleged that the shutdown was suspicious and indicated fraud.

Sidewinder was a two year investigation by a combined force of CSIS and the RCMP. [...] At the end of two years someone at CSIS decided to terminate the sidewinder investigation. That was not good enough. Instead of just terminating the investigation they terminated all the e-mails and all the written documentation. They made sure to the best of their ability that all information on electronic files was also terminated (Mr. Jim Abbott Kootenay—Columbia, Ref. recorded in Hansard No.31 1999).

The parallels with the Winebox Inquiry in New Zealand are clear, and the narrative is archetypically neo-populist: foreigners have infiltrated the country and committed crimes and enriched themselves at the expense of the ordinary citizen. The establishment – the government and the media – have engaged in a cover up to hide their own culpability and corruption.

The investigation was going along merrily, perhaps too well. Names were being amassed and the information was being assembled on Chinese espionage activities and triad-linked businesses in Canada. After a couple of years the probe was abruptly shut down, and following that CSIS destroyed documents pertaining to the investigation. Why? ... Many important names are surfacing in its investigation and many of these names are those of individuals with investments and interests in Canada. (John Reynolds West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast, Ref, recorded in Hansard No.31 1999)

At least some members of the parliamentary wing of the party were also members of an epistemic community which was both xenophobic and conspiracist in nature. Conspiracy theorists within this wing were few in number, and they stayed within the boundaries of the possible, but they were playing to an audience of Reformers who were less moderate, and much more inclined to hyperbole. Among the grassroots of the party, on internet sites and discussion lists, the shutdown of the Sidewinder investigation was reported as confirmation that “Canada is massively infiltrated by Red Chinese Criminals and Triads” (FreedomSite Announcements 2000).

The Reform conspiracist epistemic community, therefore, was concentrated in the fringes of the party because the party leadership was committed to repudiating their arguments and to eradicating the extremist element altogether and on several occasions had expelled members who expressed extreme comments, particularly comments regarding race. Nevertheless this community was active in the promulgation of conspiracy theories within the grassroots of the Reform Party. This epistemic community galvanized the party’s core constituency, many of whom had a predisposition toward accepting conspiracy theories.

One of the most prominent members of this epistemic community of conspiracy theorist was Doug Collins, a right wing pundit who published a vitriolic column in *The North Shore News* Vancouver, British Columbia. He had a reputation for intolerance of visible minorities, particularly immigrants of colour, gays, women, indigenous people, and Jews. In a series of articles 1994 Collins referred to the newly released Spielberg film as *Swindler’s List*, arguing that there was no order for extermination of the Jews and that the gas chambers never existed, and that the entire “Holocaust Industry” was an

enormous conspiracy by Zionists – “the longest lasting propaganda exercise ever.” Collins was brought in front of the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal and was found guilty of human rights violations (British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal 1998).

Collins’ connection with the Reform Party was longstanding – in 1988 he had campaigned for nomination as Reform Party candidate and had won that nomination in the West Vancouver riding of Capilano Sound. While his views were obviously accepted by the Reform constituency association in that riding, however, Manning moved quickly to dissociate the party from Collins’ perceived extremism. After Collins had refused to endorse parts of the party’s policy platform that repudiated extremism, Manning declined to sign his nomination papers, effectively throwing him out of the party (Dabbs 1997, 135). Despite his expulsion, Collins continued to write positively regarding the Reform Party’s policies on immigration and multiculturalism and defending Reform MPs who made what he terms “politically incorrect” statements (see Collins 2000). In 2000 he joined the party again when it transformed into the Canadian Alliance, but he was expelled along with other extremists just prior to the Federal election in 2000.

Many of the conspiracy theorists at the fringes of the Reform movement were also involved in other, more radical organizations. Paul Fromm formed the Canadian Association for the Freedom of Expression (CAFE) and its web site formed an important vector for the propagation of hate speech and conspiracy theories throughout the 1990s. Fromm’s rhetoric on this and other web sites reveals both xenophobia and paranoid conspiracism, particularly theories linking the United Nations, the Jews, and

One World Government.

There's no doubt that gentle genocide of Europeans is the long range plan of the New World Order planners behind the immigration/invasion policies of most Western nations. Lest there be any doubt, it is WE who are to be replaced (Fromm 2000aa).

Fromm's writing is as blatantly racist as it is paranoid, and the conspiracy narratives related by him are clearly consistent with those accepted by members of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party in Australia: – there is an enormous, complicated Zionist scheme to rule the world.

All of this is evidence that we are facing an internationally co-ordinated political conspiracy, a giant machine that uses law enforcement agencies against us (Fromm 2000bb).

And while these comments are made by individuals on the fringes of the Reform movement, there is evidence that conspiracy theorists were relaying information to the Reform Party parliamentary wing. Leon Benoit, Reform Member for Lakeland, admitted in 2001 that he had had meetings with Fromm starting in 1999 and that “some of the things [Fromm] said made a lot of sense. I think he offered some good suggestions for changing the immigration system” (cited in Lauder 2002, 6). Thus, unlike the New Zealand case where the leadership of the party was communicating the conspiracy theories to their supporters, in the case of Reform the epistemic community was effectively propagating *up* rather than *down* the party's hierarchy.

Wolfgang Droege, founder of the neo-Nazi organization the Heritage Front as well as its current leader Marc Lemire, were also linked to the Reform Party and its successor. Droege, a self-described white supremacist, had managed to infiltrate himself so far into the Reform Party that he was the party's policy chairman in Ontario.

Manning had only discovered the presence of Droege and his background in 1992, and he immediately moved to have him removed from the party (Dabbs 1997, 177). Manning argued that Droege's infiltration of the party indicated merely that extremists believed that they would be able to manipulate a new party better than they could an established one. But the fact that Droege was policy chairman gives some indication of the xenophobia of the grassroots, and their willingness to accept conspiracy theories and explanation for their own problems.

Doug Christie, a lawyer who is best known for defending neo-Nazis and those accused of racism and anti-Semitism, is the founder of the anti-immigrant, anti-bilingual, separatist Western Canada Concept party. Christie was also linked to the Reform Party and to its successor, the Canadian Alliance. The conspiracy theories propagated by Doug Christie are also part of traditional "Jewish Banker" and "One World Government" conspiracy narratives.

Regarding firearms, the planners in Ottawa obviously intend progressively and slowly to confiscate them all. The upper echelon apparently have plans of a new world order where our police force will be some foreign horde sent here to keep us in line while they tax us to pay our soldiers, sailors and airmen to be United Nations soldiers on some foreign soil where they will be used to enforce the orders of the UN elite on some other hapless population. They wouldn't want us with guns, would they? We might resist this scheme. They wouldn't want local troops to have to enforce their edicts, either: locals don't fire on locals. A different race might be more inclined to do so. Then, they could brand resisters as racist because they resisted, maybe even hated their alien oppressors. The UN plan of a new world order, one world government, and one world religion, multicultural nation, requires that Europeans be disarmed (Christie 2000).

Like Fromm, Collins, and Lemire, Christie was expelled from the Canadian Alliance in 2000. More significantly, these four xenophobic conspiracy theorists knew each other. Doug Christie had represented all three other men – for the most part defending them

against charges of hate speech – in front of various tribunals and courts of law. Collins' articles were available on Fromm's website, and the web sites of all three organizations – Christie's Western Canada Concept, Lemire's Heritage Front, and Fromm's the Canadian Association for the Freedom of Expression – contain links to the others' websites. This is a relatively close epistemic community which was enthusiastically propagating conspiracy narratives within the Reform Party's constituency. Although the party leadership had attempted to purge them from the party because of their extremism, this epistemic community continued to propagate conspiracy theories from the fringes of the party.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 2C

The epistemic community of conspiracy theorists acted from within the party to disseminate the narratives which had such strong roots in the party's populist heritage. Conspiracy theorists, while concentrated at the fringe of the movement, also existed within the parliamentary wing of the party, and even those at the fringes of the movement had close ties to the party and to the party leadership. For the most part, however, the epistemic community was focused on passing information up rather than down the party's hierarchy, propagating information among the grassroots of the movement.

This epistemic community of conspiracy theorists was an important agency factor in the emergence of the party, stirring up anti-immigrant feelings and discontent among those western rural materialists who formed the core constituency of the Reform Party. Alone they could accomplish very little, but ensconced within a party, and with ready access to a constituency of threatened and disenfranchised materialists, they could be a significant factor in the emergence of a neo-populist party.

CONCLUSION

Chapter 4 established that the structural factors formed a hospitable environment for the emergence of the Reform Party, but they did not by themselves trigger the emergence. If the structural factors alone could not create a neo-populist party that would be successful at the national level, what did? What changed a promising environment into the supporting stage for a new party on the western prairies of Canada?

The answer is multi-factorial: it was a combination of Manning's charismatic

appeal, the media response to the party, and the epistemic community of conspiracy theorists who worked on the fringes of the party – functioning within that hospitable social, economic, and cultural environment – that provided the necessary trigger for neo-populist party emergence in Canada.

Charismatic leadership seems less important in the Canadian case than it is in the Australian case because Manning was less naturally charismatic than Pauline Hanson, but charismatic leadership is still important to the emergence of the party. For the Reform Party the slightly more significant factor in the emergence of the party was the epistemic community of conspiracy theorists. These conspiracy theorists are somewhat more important in the emergence of the Reform Party because they provide a cultural link between the Canadian materialists (who were feeling their cultural hegemony slipping away from them) and their forebears, the populists of the Social Credit movement. The predilection towards conspiracy theories that was at the heart of the Social Credit movement was transferred to the constituency of the Reform Party by the conspiracy theorists at its fringes.

Importantly, however, this is only a matter of degree – conspiracy theorists were more organized and integrated and made better and more purposive use of media such as the internet in the Canadian case, but they were also important in the Australian case. Hanson was more charismatic and attracted more loyal followers than Manning, but the Reform Party was, as Tom Flanagan has pointed out, very much Manning's own project. Furthermore, all three factors are important: without Manning's careful planning the party would never have existed; without elite media opposition and tabloid media support, Manning would not have been able to spread his message throughout the

western provinces and become the Leader of the Opposition in the Canadian parliament; without the epistemic community of conspiracy theorists, much of the grassroots would not have been activated to join the movement, nor been as loyal to it over the long term.

In the Canadian case there exists the same confluence of factors – a combination of structure and agency variables – that interact to cause the emergence of a neo-populist party in the other cases. In and of itself, Preston Manning’s “wave of prairie discontent” was necessary but insufficient to trigger the formation of a neo-populist party; the wave needed a rider, too, and that rider was Preston Manning. And in order to convince others to follow him, he needed the media and the narratives that the conspiracy theorists provided.

CHAPTER EIGHT

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 2: THE AGENCY FACTORS CAUSING NEO-POPULIST PARTY EMERGENCE IN NEW ZEALAND

As in the Australian and Canadian cases, individual agency was vital to the emergence of the New Zealand First Party. Furthermore, as in the other cases, it was multiple actors – or more specifically a confluence of different actors – that provide the trigger for the formation of a neo-populist party in New Zealand.

There are three factors that make up the second independent variable – the agency causes of neo-populist party emergence in New Zealand: A) charismatic leadership; B) media influence; and C) epistemic communities of conspiracy theorists. This chapter examines the influence of individual agency on the emergence of the New Zealand First Party, as well as the interaction between structures and agency; between the individual actors and the setting in which they operate.

FACTOR 2A: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP: WINSTON, CHAMPION OF THE UNDERDOG

THE CHARISMATIC KIWI

Unlike Pauline Hanson, whose charisma often mystified observers because she did not fit traditional, masculine patterns of charismatic leadership, Peters clearly fits the archetype of a telegenic modern politician. He is highly educated, having graduated from the University of Auckland with a degree in history and political science and a law degree, and he fits the most important of the prerequisites for New Zealand politicians: he played rugby; indeed he was captain of the Auckland Māoris Rugby team. He was elected to parliament in 1978 and has been Member of Parliament for Tauranga since

1984, originally as a National Party candidate, and was a cabinet member in Jim Bolger's National government in the early 1990s. His charisma is recognized by supporters and opponents – everyone interviewed for this study agreed that Peters has charisma. Peters is, therefore, an articulate and experienced leader – the very antithesis of a fish and chip shop proprietor with a heavy provincial accent – and a shrewd agent in the creation of his own charismatic appeal.

LEADER IMAGE – THE RUGBY PLAYING MĀORI

What Willner would describe as the leader image dimension of Peter's appeal is unsurprisingly very strong, since Winston has been firmly entrenched as a political professional and an insider for more than twenty years. Nevertheless, a significant part of his appeal was as a political crusader against the elites – as an outsider and an “anti-politician.” This persona was created long before Winston Peters' founding of New Zealand First, during his years as a National Party front bencher while Michael Laws was still his researcher. Laws argued that the catalyst in the formation of Peters' outsider role was the issue of reform of the electoral system. Peters brought electoral system reform onto the political agenda in the late 1980s through his speeches which addressed the public mistrust of politicians and the political system of which, ironically, Peters was a part. To some extent the role of political-outsider was a well thought-out aspect of his appeal – part of his “personal brand” as Michael Laws would put it – but it was also something that came fairly naturally to Peters.

It suited his personality – that touch of the loner taking on the establishment on behalf of the small man. We were both loners, if for different reasons. And we were both champions of the underdog – it was our natural instinct. In this issue more than any other we invested our emotions. It was our crusade. Us against the political establishment (Laws 1998, 126).

Peters' leader image is quintessentially populist and thus, despite the apparent contrasts between the three leaders in this study, it bears a striking similarity to Pauline Hanson's leader image among her followers in One Nation, and Preston Manning's leader image among his followers in the Reform Party. Like Pauline Hanson, Peters presents himself as an ordinary person, yet he is an iconic New Zealand figure.

And part of it is – and I'll be the first to admit it – that there is a sort of iconic support for the leader that's so ... that charismatic ... Because everyone likes a fighter and our leader has really had to battle for his continued political existence. And I think the battles that he has had to fight a lot of people would never have survived. And I think people like that spirit (New Zealand First Member H 2004).

Considering his longstanding political career and his educational credentials, Peters would not seem to be a clear choice for political outsider, unlike either Hanson or Manning, but his family background was not particularly advantaged.

Mr Peters enjoys reminding us of his simple roots. Three times in the day he mentions he's a Whananaki boy, the sixth of 11 kids, a lad who milked cows before school (Calder 1999, A16).

Peters has carefully crafted his image as political outsider and Battler, an image which underpins his charismatic appeal in a culture which, like Australian culture, is suspicious of success.

Another important aspect of Peter's leader image is that of a moderate Māori leader, so that Peters' appeals to both Pakeha and Māori. In 1993, when New Zealand First was headed by Peters and Tau Henare, the party was attractive to Māori because it had a "boys' team look" to which Māori could relate (O'Sullivan 1999, 49). Māori are still attracted to this leadership image of Peters as an ordinary, rugby playing Māori and a political outsider.

Māori did gravitate to Winston Peters for a number of reasons. If you listened to the non-Māori, they'll still say he's a Māori basher but that is so far from the truth. When they look closely at what he's saying they recognize that he's not. Māori are looking for a leader, and you can see that is reflected in the party vote. It's reflected when he goes to a bar for a pie and a pint if there are Māori in the bar they'll come and say "Hello, how're you going?" (New Zealand First Member E 2005).

Peter's racial heritage was mentioned by all interviewees in the study as being important to his popularity, and polling data show that Peters does indeed do well among Māori. Labour is still regarded the traditional party that represents Māori interests, but of New Zealand First voters in the 1993 New Zealand National Election Study, 17.7% identify themselves as Māori, while 12.8% of Labour Party voters, and only 6.3% of National Party voters, identify themselves as Māori (Vowles 1993).

Well I think that he does appeal to Māori because I think that he's prepared to say exactly what should be said. In fact, I know he doesn't speak Māori, but he's highly respected amongst Māori. ... So I would say that the appeal there, for Māori, is quite high. I know he definitely has the respect of all the other Māori members in the house, especially the older Māori members (New Zealand First Member G 2004).

But Peters is not merely a Māori leader – his appeal extends to Pakeha as well. Just as Pauline Hanson attracted Australian men by being a particularly non-threatening and traditionally feminine female leader, so Winston Peters woos white voters by being a non-threatening and attitudinally European Māori leader.

I mean New Zealand First, partially its genesis was in a charismatic politician – the leadership of a charismatic politician and that person happens to be identifiably Māori – you know, Winston Peters! But he's also a Māori who is identifiably [...] He's a Māori who's not on the radical perspective or anything who calls for one nation type of things and so is able to harness support from the Māori population as well as the non-Māori population in an unbelievable fashion (New Zealand First Member C 2004).

This is the fascinating ambiguity of Winston Peters' personae – both Māori and Pakeha

– and it explains his attractiveness to segments of both communities. Peters presents himself as a “battler on the side of the ‘forgotten people’” (James 1997a) and these forgotten people are both Māori and European New Zealanders.

Winston’s role as political outsider was honed during the Winebox Inquiry in the early 1990s. Using parliamentary privilege, Peters accused several businessmen of criminal activities in relation to a tax evasion scheme, and argued that these “merchants of greed” were being protected by corrupt government elites in New Zealand at the expense of the taxpayer (Henderson 1994). While the inquiry ultimately led nowhere, Peters’ activities during the inquiry were “compelling political theatre” which helped to increase New Zealand First’s support in the 1996 election (Smellie 1996). While many observers criticized Peters for abusing parliamentary privilege to make accusations for which he had no evidence (Hames 1995, 227) the inquiry established Peters’ leader image as a political outsider fighting for the underdog – an important New Zealand cultural value. He is quintessentially populist in a characteristically New Zealand manner.

IDEA ACCEPTANCE – PETERS’ HYPNOTIC STYLE

The idea acceptance dimension of Peters’ appeal is also very strong although, like Hanson, this aspect of Peter’s charisma has a narrower foundation than his leader image. While a few supporters are completely unquestioning of Peters’ veracity, seeming to accept anything Peters says as unblemished truth, he does have some vociferous opponents. Nevertheless, the idea acceptance dimension of Peters’ charismatic appeal is stronger than Hanson’s; at least among the “relegated, denigrated and forgotten” (O’Sullivan 1999, 46) who are his primary constituency, Peters has

considerable credibility.

And people tend to believe him, they think that Winston is the only one you can really trust to tell you what's really going on. So I think as far as NZF goes, I think we've got a very important role to play (New Zealand First Member G 2004).

There is no doubt that Peters is sincere in his concern for “the people” and “the ordinary bloke.” His is a moral conviction that resonates strongly with New Zealand First's constituency.

That dark, familiar voice is charged with strength, sincerity, moral protest. He speaks the words his audiences feel instinctively to be true. A betrayal has taken place. A small elite has stolen New Zealand from its rightful owners, the people (Hames 1995, 1).

For those who attend New Zealand First Party gatherings, Peters is an honest broker, and the ideas that he promulgates are well accepted. His role as a political outsider adds credence to this, although some observers, even those within the party, think that, in regards to specific policy discussions, Peters is “not good on detail” (James 1997a), indeed Peters has several times been tripped up on questions about his suggested policy alternatives. But these are the issues for pundits, not for the ordinary Kiwi, particularly party supporters who are culturally predisposed to believe charges that the ordinary bloke has been disadvantaged and the elite are stealing the cream.

There are even those who believe that Peters has a “hypnotic style” of public speaking – a style which is very effective in convincing audiences of the truth of his statements. Dr. McCarthy of Victoria University points out that either because Peters has studied hypnotic techniques or merely because he “has a strong instinct for the art of persuasion,” Peters' communication skills are complex and highly developed, and that he is one of the best contemporary New Zealand orators (quoted in Bain 1998, 7).

Peters has recognized this ability and wielded it intentionally – his handling of the Winebox inquiry is one example. Rhetorical style is one of the most recognized hallmarks of charismatic leadership – Adolph Hitler’s mesmeric speechmaking is an oft-cited aspect of his charisma, for instance, as was Winston Churchill’s rousing World War II oratory. More than Pauline Hanson or even Preston Manning, who was himself no tyro in the art of speechmaking, Winston Peters has oratory skills and he uses them to particular effect in the idea acceptance dimension of his charismatic leadership.

COMPLIANCE – THE LOYAL LONER

The compliance dimension of Peter’s appeal reveals a most interesting intra-party dynamic. Peters is clearly a loner, but he is also loyal. He is an “empathetic listener” and a “kind” and “gentle” team leader (James 1997). With some well-publicized exceptions, including Michael Laws, Peters has been loyal to his team and, as all interviews with the New Zealand First List MPs made clear, his team is extraordinarily loyal to him. All the party list members interviewed for this study clearly saw Peters’ leadership as central to the success of the party and were extraordinarily unwilling to criticize him or analyze any potential problems with his leadership in the past, even disastrous mistakes such as his alliance with the National Party in 1996, that almost destroyed the party’s electoral base in the 1999 elections. This lack of criticism is based not in fear of reprisals or party discipline, but in respect and loyalty to the party leader.

Most of the List MPs recognized the central importance of Winston Peters to the party’s emergence. To a far greater extent than Pauline Hanson or Preston Manning, Peters is recognized as – and often referred to in interviews and casual conversation as –

“the leader.” Pauline Hanson’s leadership was complicated by her gender, and the fact that she shared real control of the party with Ettridge and Oldfield. Manning’s hold on the leadership position was also less durable – a fact undeniably established in 2001 when he lost the leadership position of the party to Stockwell Day. But Peters has had no such leadership competition. New Zealand First is unequivocally Winston Peters’ political party, and his followers are therefore more compliant than their Canadian or Australian counterparts.

The compliance dimension of Peters’ leadership is most obvious within the ranks of his Māori supporters – voters and List MPs alike – whose loyalty pertains not merely to Peters’ racial background, but also to his charismatic appeal.

Personal warmth; his perceived honesty and directness, and more recently, the view of some Māori that he manifests the Ratana like qualities of a prophet. These qualities have been ascribed to Peters in relation to his growing popularity with Māori Voters (Miller 1998).

The relationship between Peters and his Māori supporters should not be misinterpreted by either European New Zealanders or by foreigners as being superstitious. Māori tribal relationships and loyalty ties are complex – one Māori member’s description of his recruitment illustrated the strength of tribal loyalty and respect for the elders of that tribe (New Zealand First Member H 2004). Nevertheless, this reference to the Māori spiritual and religious leader Ratana is important and certainly reinforces the notion of Peters as a charismatic Māori leader.

As with the other cases in the study, the compliance dimension of Peters’ charismatic appeal is mitigated by the democratic nature of the political party systems within which the leader operates. The early defections from the party of Michael Laws, Tau Henare, and some of the Māori MPs, are emblematic of the limitations of

charismatic control within a democratic system. Despite this, of the three leaders in the study, Peters has the tightest control over the party platform and has to compete with fewer obvious challenges to his decisions. Thus the compliance dimension of his charismatic leadership is relatively strong.

EMOTIONAL DIMENSION – THE CHARMING GRIN

Beyond his ethnic identity, Peters' physical appearance is an important part of his leader image, particularly in the emotional dimension of his support. Peters' charm is undeniable; much of it ascribed to his suave appearance. While not tall in stature, he is always very well dressed and well spoken. Like Pauline Hanson, he has admirers who describe themselves as “fans,” and who talk of admiring him because of his personal qualities rather than his policies. Even among the List MPs of his own party Peters has admirers who think of themselves as fans.

One of the things that did make me join New Zealand First was because of the leader – Winston Peters. I was a fan of his when he was in the National Party, and when he left the National Party I sort of followed him across (New Zealand First Member G 2004).

Peters is very good looking and extremely well dressed, which has proven to be an asset among some female voters including the “Busloads of elderly fans” who came to watch Peters at the Winebox inquiry (Brockett 1999, 8).

Peter's smile is renowned – most newspaper articles describing his political style mention his “charming grin” or the “flash of a smile” that creases his face when he meets constituents. His smile is an essential part of the emotional dimension of his charismatic appeal for those who agree with him, and even those who do not.

Peters flashes a little-boy's smile and it enchants people, softens even some of the harder observers into making allowances [...] It is an

essential ingredient of the charisma ascribed by both friends and foes (James 1997).

There is no doubt that his appearance has contributed significantly to his popularity among particular segments of the population, but his smile is not the sum of his appeal. Peters is a talented politician, able to connect with his constituents and make them like him. He is very popular within his own electorate of Tauranga, as well as within the Māori community, but he also has a following within the Pakeha community and beyond.

[Y]eah, everybody likes our leader. He's got a nice smile. We've just had our national day, Waitangi Day, and we ... on that day I was with Winston and we all walked around the various stalls and around the Marae, and it was quite interesting to see how many Māori came out and wanted to shake his hand and have their photo taken with him, and all of that sort of thing (New Zealand First Member G 2004).

Winston Peters is a skilled campaigner and an experienced politician who appreciates the need to connect with voters. Peter's ability to work a crowd may in part be a natural talent, but it is also a skill that has been carefully honed and it is an important part of the emotional dimension of his charismatic appeal.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 2A

In many ways, New Zealand First is Winston Peter's own creation (as is Winston Peters himself.) Almost all List MPs interviewed pointed to the leadership of Peters as the important catalyzing factor in the emergence of the party.

The other factor has to be [...] that we happened to have had somebody who espoused the cause who had able political skills and presentation skills (New Zealand First Member B 2004).

Some early observers argued that New Zealand First was merely the product of the

charismatic personality of the leader, and that as the star of the leader faded, so too would the party (Laws 2002, 93). It is not difficult, when listening to Peters and his MPs talk, to believe that the fate of the party is indeed tied to Peters.

It takes an enormous amount of energy and sacrifice to start a party. I look back sometimes and say “Would I have ever thought of doing that if I’d known what it would take?” You’re up against the establishment, you’re up against huge funding from the business establishment, so you have to make one dollar go where other people are making 25 dollars go! (Peters, interview by author 2004).

More significantly, perhaps, is the fact that Peters has forged his own charismatic leadership relationship with his followers. On all four dimensions it was Peters’ own actions which created that relationship.

Pauline Hanson had good political instincts for meeting people face to face, but no experience in handling mass publics through the media. Preston Manning was not a natural people person, although he had the intellectual ability to attempt to redress the situation, albeit too late. Peters had both the experience and extraordinary political instincts to be a political leader. While there have been many other third parties in New Zealand Politics, few have caused as much stir or gained as much power so quickly. While other parties have become entrenched in New Zealand’s new electoral system, New Zealand First is in a better position to play an important role in the creation of a government in the next election, and much of this is due to Peter’s ability to forge a charismatic connection between himself and his followers. Peters is himself an important agent in the rise of the New Zealand First Party.

FACTOR 2B: MEDIA INFLUENCE – ACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW ZEALAND PRESS

Winston Peters was a far more skilled and intelligent politician than was Pauline

Hanson, and was much more competent at controlling media attention about himself and the party. Despite this, Peters faced a similar ambivalence in media attitudes towards many of his controversial positions, although the stages of media criticism and support were reversed. Hanson was initially vilified and her policies were ignored by the elite media, which later realized the significance of One Nation as a cultural phenomenon and became less dismissive of her. For Peters the reverse has been true – the elite media was initially interested in and relatively supportive of Winston Peters but, at least according to Peters and his supporters, have begun to ignore New Zealand First and is dismissive of its potential to influence New Zealand elections. The tabloid media, which had been an important conduit to a ready-made audience for Hanson, was also important to the career of Winston Peters and the emergence of the New Zealand First Party.

ELITE MEDIA ATTENTION – WINSTON AS TELEGENIC POLITICIAN

Undoubtedly Winston is the most media-savvy and politically capable party leader of the three neo-populists in this study. Winston has the looks and oratory skills to use the media – particularly television – to his advantage. Particularly in the early stages of his ascendancy, before he left the National Party, Peters was able to use the media to draw attention to himself and his controversial views.

Our various mini-scandals had attracted enough salacious media coverage to guarantee public awareness, and Peter's physical appearance and television image amplified the attraction. He was good looking, well groomed, serious [...] The camera loved him, he loved it, and with careful coaching the sound bites rolled off one after the other, no one could bumper sticker an issue better than Winston – I might have created, borrowed or stolen them but Winston could intone each with a gravitas that seemed to come direct from Mt Sinai (Laws 1998, 100-101).

Michael Laws' comments are drawn from his own kiss-and-tell memoir thus he is not aiming to flatter Peters, so it is interesting that even Laws admits that Peters' media skills were excellent. Winston Peters was aware of the need to package his policies so that they would be given airtime on the six o'clock news, and he had the appearance and charismatic image to attract the media attention in the first place.

Despite Laws resignation from the ranks of New Zealand First, Peters continued to be an extraordinarily powerful media figure throughout the 1990s and is still so today. Even list members of the New Zealand First Party are aware that charismatic leadership in the age of mass media often involves style rather than substance:

So Winston is very good on television. We've mentioned charisma, and he's certainly got it: he can flash a smile and win a hundred votes every time he flashes it. So those sort of things come through. So we are a party that has one big advantage and that is someone who can perform very well on television and gain people's support not necessarily with what he's saying, but with how he's presenting it (New Zealand First Member C 2004).

Journalistic attitudes towards Peters are therefore associated with Peters' political abilities as a charismatic leader. While journalists were acting as agents in the emergence of the party in that they gave Peters attention, it is difficult to say that they were particularly *free* agents. In many ways journalists were merely reporting on an interesting political leader, they were not – as they were in the case of Pauline Hanson – responding ideologically to a political ideology with which they disagreed.

At least in the early stages of Winston Peters' political career, much of the attention that Peters invited came from the media's natural interest in the controversy he agitated.

There was a time when Mr Peters was the darling of the media. His

stormy relationship with then prime minister Jim Bolger while a minister in the National Government of the early 1990s, his forced exit from the party and his setting up of NZ First created a blaze of headlines (Gamlin 2005).

Although the media attention given to Peters assisted in the emergence of the New Zealand First Party, journalists were not deliberately acting in Winston's or the party's interests. Journalists in the elite media were merely responding to what they deemed newsworthy in New Zealand politics; at this stage of Peters' career they were doing "normal" journalism.

Divisions within the government ranks will be particularly interesting to journalists and their editors. For this reason, the media will also usually give prominence to news items from disaffected members of the government who disagree with their own party's policies or express lack of confidence in the leadership. An outstanding recent example is the former National MP, and later leader of the New Zealand First Party, Winston Peters who skillfully exploited the media's interest in government disunity to gain publicity for himself and achieve high rankings in public opinion polls (Mulgan 1994, 278).

Notice that Winston Peters is regarded as a calculating manipulator of the intense media interest surrounding the emergence of the New Zealand First Party. It is apparent, however, that, whether consciously or not, journalists were agents in the emergence of the party.

During this first stage of Winston Peters rise to prominence – from the time his tenure on the front bench of the National Party government to the immediate aftermath of the founding of the party – the attitudes of elite journalists towards Peters were not antagonistic. In contrast to Hanson, elite media attitudes towards Peters were relatively neutral; unlike Hanson, Peters was by no means ignored by journalists. At this stage journalists were agents in Peters' rise to prominence and thus in the emergence of the

New Zealand First Party because they recognized Peters' activities as 'good news copy' and provided him with a prominent stage on which to present his views to a New Zealand public, and set the New Zealand Political agenda to Peters' advantage.

The attitude to Peters by the tabloid media, however, was very similar to Hanson's experience. The tabloid media, particularly talkback radio, provided Peters with a ready made audience that was amenable to his views; an existing support base to which he could advertise.

The Australian experience is duplicated here. Talkback radio gives Peters strong support but doesn't change any opinions because it preaches to the converted (Atkinson 2005).

The tabloid journalists were supportive of Peters – just as Australian tabloid journalists were supportive of Hanson – because he was articulating their audiences' experience, attitudes, and anxieties. The talk radio audience consisted of the same discontented socially conservative older folk and blue collar workers who comprised the New Zealand First demographic.

The difference in elite journalistic attitudes towards Peters and Hanson at this critical early stage of each party's emergence is explained by two factors. In the first place, Peters was accorded more coverage because of what he was – a politician from the major parties who was stirring up controversy. Secondly, Peters was given more positive coverage, or at least was accorded less negative coverage, than Hanson during this first phase because his policy positions at that time were not overtly xenophobic – he was not outspokenly anti-immigration during the 1993 campaign and his opposition to foreign ownership of strategic assets was nationalistic, but not obviously racially motivated.

THE MEDIA ESTABLISHMENT: WINSTON AND MEDIA BIAS

The honeymoon, however, would not last, and elite media attitudes would be less neutral in response to Peters' immigration policies in the 1996 campaign. The turning point in that campaign was the 1996 speech at the Auckland suburb of Howick in which Peters stated that immigration should be cut. The media reacted immediately. Peters' stance on immigration drew inevitable fire, and he was described as xenophobic and anti-immigrant, although Peters claimed that he had never mentioned Asian immigrants in particular and that the racial aspect of the issue had been raised by the media themselves (Munshi 1998). Even now Peters claims that he has been unjustifiably pilloried by the media as being "anti-Asian" (Peters, interview with author 2004) and since Peters' supporters agreed with him on the need to curb the numbers of immigrants, they rejected the media argument that his policies were xenophobic. Regardless of whether Peters' remarks referred to Asian immigrants or not, the media attention set Asian immigration squarely on the political agenda, inadvertently allowing Peters and his party to become the focus of the debate.

Unsurprisingly, Peters and the other members of his party often refers to the media in negative terms. The mainstream media are biased, "pack hunting" journalists who are out of touch with the feelings and sentiments of the people (New Zealand First Member A 2004).

The poll showed Tauranga residents would not be told by "big-city media" who to vote for. Mr Peters believes he was unfairly targeted by the media at the last election (Mold 2002, B1).

The populist themes are evident here – Peters is the victim of attacks by journalists who have either misquoted him or have taken him out of context. What's more it seems

evident that New Zealand First supporters, already naturally distrustful of the elite media, agree with him (Jesson 1996, 8-9). Elite media criticism fits neatly into Peters' role of populist political outsider fighting the corruption of the elites, so that media criticism of New Zealand First did not hurt the party, but rather confirmed its supporters' opinions that the media were biased against Peters and the party.

More recently Winston Peters has been arguing that the elite media are not merely more biased in their criticism of New Zealand First but that they are ignoring the political issues that Peters has raised because they disagree with him.

From day one they have taken the alternative view to ours. When you go back to the scandals of the Winebox and the BNZ, their view was that "the establishment was kosher and how dare we raise the question of the integrity of these people – they are New Zealand's leading citizens!" The fact that they were ripping the country off and breaking the law and would be, in any other country, behind bars, is neither here nor there. So they have maintained that view, not shared by investigative journalism, but investigative journalism in New Zealand has been killed off by lack of resources, space, time and encouragement. So hence the current circumstances you've got (New Zealand First Member A 2004).

According to Peters and many other members of his party – both the parliamentary wing and the grassroots membership – the mainstream media have been co-opted by the establishment and thus they are failing to fulfill their "watchdog" role in the democracy. Corruption is rife in all areas of government, yet the media is protecting the elite by not reporting on that corruption.

Not content with protecting the corrupt elites, the media fail in the democratic role by refusing to cover the New Zealand First Party's policies. Peters claims that the New Zealand public is being manipulated by the media because it cannot get fair information about all the parties in the system.

Some weeks ago a major weekly had a story lined up for its front page. It was a story that New Zealand First had worked very hard at uncovering. The research by an independent reporter vindicated the position we had taken and pointed at Government inaction. It got pulled. It never appeared on the front page. “Space” was the problem (Peters 2002c).

Peters argues that the New Zealand media is merely a tool of the establishment, that “editorial or publishing decisions are made in accordance with Company policy or politics” (Peters 2002). Peters contends that

There is a conspiracy within the media aimed at keeping the National party alive and well when in the natural course of events it would have withered and died (and presumably left the way clear for New Zealand First to step up as the natural replacement).

Even the use of the words “media conspiracy” indicates the populist nature of this accusation.

In early 2005 Peters spoke at a Commonwealth Press Union Conference in Sydney about the issue of media bias, arguing that there was a conspiracy in the New Zealand media to discriminate against the newly emerging party (Peters 2005a).

You won’t see it in Australia or the UK. But it’s seen most in New Zealand and the United States in which any emerging movement is instantly squashed by the establishment media. And given that the massive percentage – a majority percentage – of New Zealand’s media is in the hands of one group of shareholders Why are we not surprised? (New Zealand First Member A 2004).

There is, of course, a kernel of truth in all of these accusations. Many respected New Zealand political scientists have decried the journalistic coverage of the 2002 election. In particular, Joe Atkinson from the University of Auckland has noted a “focus on horse-race and strategy, episodes of ‘attack journalism’” although he argues that this sort of journalism actually benefited the minor parties by providing them with exposure

(Atkinson 2004, 48). But Peters' constituents, in the improbable event that they would read this university press publication, are unlikely to believe that the mainstream media advantages New Zealand First.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 2B

In a country as geographically compact as New Zealand, it is almost possible that a gifted charismatic leader could bypass conventional media outlets of both elite and tabloid forms and communicate directly with enough people that he could start a grassroots movement that eventually becomes a national party. But New Zealand is a modern mass democracy, and media are central to the function of that democracy, so media were an important factor in the emergence of the party.

Thus the media were a factor in the emergence of New Zealand First just as they were a factor in the emergence of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party and Preston Manning's Reform Party in Canada. Journalists were agents in the emergence of both parties and they acted in surprisingly similar ways. While the tabloid media provided Winston Peters with an unfettered access to a pre-disposed audience, the elite media provided Peters with a stage for his theatre of controversy – particularly Winebox and immigration. The elite media were essential in setting the political agenda – a political agenda that was Peters' agenda and the agenda of his core constituency.

Not only did journalists from both elite and tabloid media in New Zealand play a similar role to the media in Australia and Canada, all three leaders used similar language and argumentation styles to accuse the media of bias against their neo-populist parties. The elite media in particular was made a scapegoat to deflect attention from any deficits in the party's policies or accountability to their public.

**FACTOR 2C: THE DIFFUSION OF IDEAS – NEW ZEALAND FIRST,
CONSPIRACY THEORISTS, AND SOCIAL CREDIT**

The conspiricism that lies at the heart of neo-populism is also evident in background of the New Zealand First Party. The distrust of elites that defined the populist movement from its earliest history in the American midwest was very much apparent in New Zealand in the 1990s and is evident even today. The international influence upon the epistemic community of conspiracy theorists within New Zealand First is not as clear as it is in Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party. For the most part, the conspiracies that swirl around the party, although they have recognizable themes, seem to be indigenous to New Zealand rather than imported via the internet. Nevertheless, a culture of conspiricism underlies a great deal of the party's support.

The New Zealand First conspiracy theorists conformed, at least in part, to Haas' definition of an epistemic community. They (i) shared normative and principled beliefs in that they were insular and nationalistic; (ii) shared causal beliefs in that they thought that the entire New Zealand government as well as business and media elites were corrupt and not accountable to the New Zealand voters; (iii) shared notions of validity in that they valued the common sense of "ordinary New Zealanders;" and (iv) shared a common goal of rooting out corruption and ensuring the empowerment of the "forgotten New Zealanders." There existed an active epistemic community within the New Zealand First's leadership, voting constituency, and in New Zealand's historical background, which was an important agent in the emergence of the New Zealand First Party.

HISTORICAL CONTINUITY – THE SOCIAL CREDIT PARTY AND NEW ZEALAND FIRST

While the New Zealand First Party has seemed to steer clear of the active anti-

globalization and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories evident in the explanatory narrative of Pauline Hanson's One Nation, there is, nevertheless, evidence of a diffusion of ideas from historical and international sources. The international source most clearly influenced the emergence of the New Zealand First Party was the Social Credit movement of the 1920s and 30s, based on the economic and political philosophy of the Englishman Major C.H. Douglas.²⁰ Because Social Credit criticized existing financial and banking institutions, some of its most vehement proponents were anti-Semitic and prone to embrace "Jewish Banker" conspiracy theories (Sharpe and Braid 1992, 99-104). Even when anti-Semitic conspiracy theories were not in evidence, Social Credit's populist culture of distrust of elites was fertile soil for other conspiracy narratives.

Douglas's Social Credit theories were very popular in rural areas of the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, although the movement never coalesced into a successful political party in Britain. The movement itself was central to "an international discourse of reform" which existed in the 1920s and 30s (Bennett 1997, 312) so that it represented part of an epistemic community that was pushing for monetary system reform in various Anglo-Saxon cultures throughout the world, including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. In Australia, the fledgling party had some success in state parliamentary elections during the Great Depression, but now only exists as a fringe anti-Semitic organization, the Australian League of Rights, which is particularly active in rural Queensland and New South Wales, and which has ties to

²⁰ According to Douglas's "A plus B" theorem, if A is the amount of wages paid to employees, and B is the cost of overhead to the manufacturer, then all goods must be priced at "A plus B" – an unsustainable price since only A is available to spend. As a result, the system sustains itself only by consumer or government borrowing, businesses either borrowing or selling below cost and going bankrupt, the country must win a trade war, so that other countries are in debt to us, or there is a real war financed by government borrowing (Hattersley 1999, 177).

the New Zealand League of Rights and some of the right wing fringe groups in Canada. Social Credit philosophy had its greatest success in Canada, particularly Alberta, where it held power for decades.

In New Zealand, Douglas's ideas inspired a movement and, from that movement, several political parties emerged. Social Credit philosophy was embraced first by the short-lived Country Party, from 1928 to 1938, and then by the Social Credit Party from 1953 to 1985. At the party's 1985 conference, the party adopted the title New Zealand Democratic Party (Cookson 2003). The Democrats continue to subscribe to Social Credit philosophy, including reform of the monetary system "which is the major cause of war, poverty, inflation and many other social problems" (NZ Democratic Party 2005) although their policies are ideologically left of the former Social Credit Party. The Democrats joined the left wing Alliance coalition in 1996, and are currently part of the moderate left Progressive Coalition. The Democratic Party has, therefore, moved away from the traditional Social Credit support base of petit bourgeoisie and small farmers.

The New Zealand First Party, while not typically considered a direct descendent of the New Zealand Social Credit Party, may, therefore, be a more legitimate inheritor of the Social Credit Party's support than the Democrats. Colin James commented that there was a clear demographic correlation between the Social Credit and New Zealand First parties, pointing out the resemblance between attendees at Social Credit Party rallies in the 1950s through the 1980s, and attendees at the New Zealand First Party rallies in the 1990s.

Moreover, New Zealand First polled well in the countryside, just as Roberts' Social Credit Political League did, picking off some of the

disgruntled farmer vote – beleaguered by a high dollar (making farm-gate prices low) and high bank rates (James 1996).

Social Credit and New Zealand First attracted demographically similar support because of the shared aspects of their value systems.

There is a clear correspondence between Social Credit and New Zealand First attitudes towards, or more specifically distrust of, political and financial elites, as well as their trust in the moral superiority of the common people.

The Social Credit Party was knowledgeable, far more than was admitted to by the main political parties, in some of the ... deviant uses of money – I'll put it that way – which weren't acknowledged. For instance, they maintained in 1954 that banks created credit. The government of the day – the National government – set up a commission of inquiry to prove that banks didn't create credit. Well of course, any fool in 2004 knows that banks do create credit! You know what I mean? That's idea which was quite sound, they found it, the banks were aghast that their workings were going to be discovered, the government of the day was quite adamant that it wasn't going to be discovered: they talked about these simpletons and fools who didn't understand. Social Credit understood something of the way in which money works in the capitalist sense. Not all of it! (New Zealand First Member B 2004).

The continuity that exists between the ideas, support, and value systems of the Social Credit and the New Zealand First Party indicate that there is an epistemic community that has continued to promulgate these ideas within the New Zealand Community.

Just as the Reform Party of Canada's conspiracy theories were rooted in the Social Credit culture that was part of the movement's heritage, so the New Zealand First Party inherited the conspiricism which was central to the New Zealand Social Credit Party. The predilection toward conspiricism that was at the heart of the Social Credit party constituency is also at the heart of the Reform Party constituency, and an epistemic community of conspiracy theorists within the leadership of the party has

revised these theories for that constituency – providing them with a narrative that both explains their misfortunes by providing a scapegoat (the powerful elite) and scares them into supporting Winston Peters and his party who are the only politicians willing to protect them.

One defining characteristic of populism is, after all, the deep suspicion of those in power by those who perceive themselves as being without power. Thus Social Credit and New Zealand First share a culture of populism that centers on the distrust of elites who have control of the money supply, and the government that is supposed to protect the people, but which does not. According to this conspiricist narrative, banks act in a covert manner, with the assistance of the government, to ensure that the public does not know what is really going on. Not only are the elites acting in a corrupt and unaccountable manner, they dismiss ordinary people as “simpletons and fools” while attempting to hide their shady dealings. Despite the elites’ attempt at deception, the ordinary people have really understood what was going on all along, because common folk have the common sense knowledge that is most valued by populists. The MP went on to say

And many of our supporters understand, if you like, the unfair use of collective big money in our society. And that strand, by the way, is not going to go away, if NZF was to disappear in the next election, that strand will still be there. You can trace it back to Bryan and the Cross of Gold in your history. It’s here too. It always was here, and it’s still here, in a reduced form, but it’s still here (New Zealand First Member B 2004).

Social Credit and New Zealand First shared normative beliefs that were insular and nationalistic; shared causal beliefs that the political and financial elites were corrupt and unaccountable; shared notions of validity in that they valued the common sense of

ordinary New Zealanders; and shared a common goal of rooting out corruption and ensuring the empowerment of ordinary New Zealanders. The Social Credit impulse within the contemporary New Zealand polity is an example of the diffusion of ideas across international borders. At least some portion of the Social Credit value system, first introduced in the 1930s, has maintained itself over time and is reflected in the values of the New Zealand First voter.

CONSPIRACISM AND THE NEW ZEALAND FIRST VOTER

New Zealand First voters are not uniform, but the core of the party's support is that "cranky discontented and unforgiving" constituency which Bruce Jesson had described so well. There was, within this constituency, a deep vein of conspiricism rooted in the suspicion of elites that is part of Social Credit and rural materialist values. This constituency represented the nucleus of Winston Peters' support even during his tenure in the National Party.

[E]ven before I was assigned to be Peters' researcher there were a small number of misguided souls who saw Winston as their political Messiah and suspended rational judgment long enough to publicly assert this choice. This group also claimed alien abductee status and swore they had met Elvis on the mothership (Laws 1998, 99).

Although members of New Zealand First who were studied did not reveal the same acceptance of anti-Semitic conspiricism as the membership of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party, they were nevertheless very willing to believe that the problems faced by New Zealand were the product of an enormously corrupt system.

WINSTON AND WINEBOX

The clearest agent in the creation and perpetuation of conspiracy theories in the New Zealand case is Winston Peters himself. Peters' pursuit of the Winebox Inquiry is

an indication of his ability to frame commonplace fraud as elite conspiracy. Peters, with his inherent aptitude for reading his audience and catering to their cultural proclivities, sensationalized what was almost certainly a real (albeit minor) conspiracy into the realm of melodrama. As Chip Berlet points out “while conspiracy theorists often start with a grain of truth and ‘document’ their claims exhaustively, they make leaps of logic in analyzing evidence, such as seeing guilt by association or treating allegations as proven fact” (Berlet and Lyons 2000).

The scandal itself was framed as a quintessential populist conspiracy plot, with Peters alleging “that ‘merchants of greed’ had conspired with ‘crooked officials and politicians’ to defraud tax payers in both countries” (Henderson 1994). During general debate in the New Zealand parliament, under the umbrella of parliamentary privilege, Peters called for the immediate gaoling of various prominent businessmen and the investigation of several senior civil servants. The dramatic nature of the revelations was accentuated by the melodramatic way that Peters presented his accusations to the public – an admirable piece of political theatre, according to many observers. Peters claimed that the truth about these crimes was covered up by “The Establishment,” which protected elites from prosecution in a giant conspiracy that involved the New Zealand government, the bureaucracy, and the “Establishment Media.”

In New Zealand ... we're a non-accountable democracy. The cover-ups have been huge, in New Zealand, and that's why they have to be reminded of it. But no one got put behind bars in the BNZ or the Winebox! I mean, this was scandalous stuff. They were all nailed in the court – numerous court cases. But of course the establishment moved to shut it down every way they could. And they are actually an abject disgrace to the word “media” but it's not an easy battle tipping them over (New Zealand First Member A 2004).

Essentially, Winston Peters had turned what might otherwise be considered a

straightforward allegation of financial corruption into a conspiracy theory.²¹ Peters spent many years arguing for the prosecution of the people involved in the Winebox scandal. While he was ultimately unsuccessful in ensuring they were punished, Peters guaranteed that the media spotlight stayed firmly on his policies and himself, and that the populist issues of corruption, accountability, and elite conspiracy were absolutely on the agenda.

Throughout this stage of Peters' career many observers regarded his allegations as part of a premeditated campaign to raise his popularity in the polls. During the inquiry journalists compared Peters' activities in the Winebox affair to Joe McCarthy's witch hunts, although Peters was angry at the comparison and claimed that, unlike McCarthy, he had real evidence of conspiracy (McLoughlin 1994, 59). While allegations – often wild allegations – of fraud and conspiracy have always been part of Peters' political style, it is evident that in the Winebox affair Peters had indeed uncovered evidence of corruption, even if it was not of Watergate proportions. The Winebox affair, and Peters' conspiricist style, clearly resonated with a portion of the New Zealand First constituency that was prone to suspicion of political and economic elites. By promulgating conspiracy theories which undercut trust in the government and the major parties, the leadership of the party, particularly Peters himself, was engaged in building support by stirring up feelings of mistrust within certain segments of the population, but it is evident that they truly believe in their theories. The leadership of the party was acting as an epistemic community, sharing their knowledge with their supporters, who were willing to believe a conspiracy narrative which fit well with their

²¹ I make a distinction, here, between an allegation of conspiracy which is logically constructed, falsifiable, and which is backed up by some evidence, and conspiracy theories, which are not.

world view. The New Zealand First members and leaders were thus agents in the emergence of the party through their actions as an epistemic community.

Peters' paranoia was not limited to the general issue of government corruption and cover ups, nor was it always backed up by evidence; it extended to a paranoia about the government's actions in regards to Peters himself and to concerns about his own personal safety.

His evidence has also been marked by the moments of farce and intrigue which have so often been features of the Winebox saga. For example, tax and serious fraud office lawyers have quizzed Peters about "a man called Harry, you met in a pub" and a "mysterious Mr X". Underlying this tendency to allege conspiracy, Peters also this week confirmed that he had hired a posse of bodyguards, some of them SAS-trained, "to make sure that I am here tomorrow" (Smellie 1996).

Paranoia of this caliber is found among populists of all stripes the world over – witness Jesse Ventura's reactions to the September 11 attacks, which included refusing to release a schedule of his public appearances to the media and his insistence upon carrying a concealed firearm. Peters' actions in this case are reminiscent of Pauline Hanson's videoed "last will and testament" in which she somewhat histrionically declared "If you are seeing me now, I have been murdered" (Hanson shown on Denton 2004). In Peters' case this paranoia was in evidence even before the emergence of the New Zealand First Party:

Peters inhabits a world of theatre, mystery and intrigue. When he became Māori affairs minister in 1990, he engaged a security firm to sweep his Beehive office for bugs, which cost taxpayers \$7804. On March 22 this year he claimed someone close to him had been threatened with kidnapping, but he wouldn't say who (McLoughlin 1994).

Recently Peters' attention has focused upon what he sees as the media

conspiracy against him, particularly the failure of the media to take his accusations of fraud and corruption seriously.

Peters's great talent is stoking the fury which seems always to burn just below the surface of his big, cheesy grin and the winning wink which he flashes to reporters after a half-hour speech spent bagging them and their putative pay-masters: the corporate elite he sincerely believes plots against him. [...] Peters continues to stoke a deep anger over what he sees as an orchestrated campaign against him by the news media and the panoply of political enemies who seem to lurk everywhere in that slightly paranoid world he inhabits (Smellie 1999).

Even as recently as last year Peters claimed that the “establishment media” was deliberately undercutting his party's chances of winning seats by not covering New Zealand First's campaign activities, policy positions, and speeches. This, he claimed, was a conspiracy of silence which aimed at undercutting the party and thus democracy within New Zealand. The claim that the media is involved in a conspiracy against him is an explanatory narrative which deflects attention from the party's failure to make electoral headway in the last election. More importantly, it mobilizes the New Zealand First support base, providing them with a ready-made villain, one tied to elites of whom they are already suspicious. But this is not to say that Winston Peters was cynically manipulative since he is obviously sincerely concerned and believes, to some extent for good reason, in the truth of his accusations against the media.

The New Zealand First Party leadership also demonizes the major political parties, which they claim are being controlled by corporate interests. The mainstream parties are not looking out for the ordinary voter, they are merely interested in representing the establishment, corporate interests, and international organizations instead of ordinary New Zealanders. The major parties are willing to “sell out” the ordinary Kiwi. When asked if he thought that the New Zealand First Party fit the role of

the Australian Democratic Party in the Australian political system – to “keep the bastards honest!” – Peters laughed and replied:

Oh, I don’t say that. I say “Make the bastards honest, because they’re dishonest now!” You can’t keep them honest – they’re not honest, Mate! They never have been! He’s wrong in the assumption that they are honest – because they’re not (Winston Peters, interview by author 2004).

Minor parties the world over claim that the major parties fail to represent the ideology and interests of the ordinary voter. Peters, however, takes it further, claiming that the major parties are actually corrupt and beholden to corporate elites. There is enough evidence in this case, too, for Peters’ followers to believe his accusation of conspiracy.

SUMMARY OF FACTOR 2C

With the other leaders and the core membership of the New Zealand First Party, Peters shared normative and causal beliefs about the nature of elite activity within New Zealand, and they acted as an epistemic community to promulgate and promote those beliefs amongst their supporters. Furthermore, these ideas landed in fertile soil because they were allied to Social Credit values which had been imported seventy years before. The epistemic community within the party was an agency factor in the emergence of New Zealand First in the 1990s.

Unlike the Canadian case, where an epistemic community of conspiracy theorists was effectively propagating conspiracy theories *up* rather than *down* the party’s hierarchy – from the grassroots level to the parliamentary leadership – the New Zealand First Party conspiracy theorists were propagating down through the hierarchy from the highest levels. Nevertheless, while the epistemic community was active within the party, there is no doubt that it was far weaker than in either the Australian or the

Canadian case, possibly because the entire party – including the conspiracy narratives – was controlled by Winston Peters. This factor may be weak not because the conspiracies did not exist, but because there was not a community of theorists at all: there was really only one conspiracist, and that was Winston Peters.

CONCLUSIONS

After examining the formation of the New Zealand First Party it becomes evident that Peters' charismatic leadership is clearly the most important factor – structural or agency – in the emergence of the party. Stronger even than in the Australian and Canadian cases, the emergence New Zealand First Party is almost entirely a response to the charismatic leadership of New Zealand First. More than Pauline Hanson or Preston Manning, Winston Peters controlled almost every aspect of the party's existence.

Thus Peters himself is the central agent in the emergence of the party. Although the media do still act as agents in the New Zealand case, Peters has an incredibly powerful charismatic appeal, as well as extensive political experience and skill. Because of these assets he can control his media message, and mitigate his bad publicity, far more carefully than either Hanson or Manning ever could. And while the New Zealand First Party is just as much a repository of conspiracy theories as either Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party or the Reform Party of Canada, and while the New Zealand First constituency has a predilection towards accepting conspiracy theories, the *source* of most of the conspiracy theories is Winston Peters himself – he is not important them from anywhere.

Winston Peters is clearly the most important factor in the emergence of the New

Zealand First Party. Nevertheless Peters was not acting in a vacuum – there were important structural and even agency factors that he had to consider. Even a great charismatic leader must have followers, and those followers must be activated by environmental factors. In the New Zealand case, the New Zealand First supporters were materialists who were activated by the effects of globalization on their cultural, social, and economic future.

Thus without globalization there would be no constituency of materialists threatened by increasing non-white immigration and the impact of the Treaty of Waitangi and disillusioned by the abandonment of the major party. Because such a constituency existed, and because they were threatened by these rapid structural changes in the society and economy around them, they were able to be galvanized by the charismatic leadership of Winston Peters.

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS

SLOUCHING TOWARDS BETHLEHEM

NEO-POPULISTS ON CRONULLA BEACH

At the end of 2005, Sydney was enduring its hottest December on record. Beachgoers at Cronulla sunned themselves on the sand while a crowd gathered in what was to be a protest of the attack of two surf lifesavers by a group of Lebanese-Australians the previous weekend. Within hours racial tensions that had been on the rise for months boiled over.

A bare-chested youth in Quiksilver boardshorts tore the headscarf off the girl's head as she slithered down the Cronulla dune seeking safety on the beach from a thousand-strong baying mob. [...] It was one last act of cowardly violence on a sad and shameful day that began as a beach party celebrating a kind of perverted nationalism that was gatecrashed by racism (Murphy 2005).

The Cronulla Beach riots, like Pauline Hanson's xenophobic maiden speech a decade before, triggered a national debate about race, immigration, and multiculturalism. Although the Prime Minister refused to admit that there was any underlying racism – arguing that it was just a law and order issue (Gordon 2005) – some journalists saw the riots as evidence of the racism inherent in Australian culture and roundly condemned the mobs of white youths on the beach. Yet the days of retributive violence by Lebanese gangs made many ordinary Australians question whether the levels of immigration have been too high, or whether the multicultural policies of the past thirty five years might have undermined the nation's social cohesion.

But this debate is not a new debate, nor is this problem a new problem. The rhetoric, the setting, and even some of the players are eerily familiar. Indeed, reading

the newspaper reports of December 2005 any gives one acquainted with the history of Hansonism a sense of déjà vu.

Daniel MacPherson, a lifelong Cronulla resident, spoke passionately about his patch, and extolled the virtues of multiculturalism. But even he had to admit his home turf was, and always had been, racked with divisions, a “tension between cultures” [...]

The more rabid talkback radio shock jocks in Sydney kept talking up the divisions – Stan Zemanek, on 2GB, at one point, late at night, took a call from former One Nation identity John Pasquarelli, who called multiculturalism an “evil experiment.” Then Zemanek cut off a Lebanese Muslim caller with a pre-recorded volley of gunshots (Johnston 2005).

Undeniably, the phenomenon had precedents.

The days of unrest shown that there was a relatively large group of working class white Australians who felt threatened by the economic and cultural changes wrought in an era of globalization. Resentful because they have lost their grip on Australian cultural hegemony, left behind by rapid changes in the society and economy, they vented their frustration against the immigrants who were but the most visible of the transformations in Australian society. Thus while Pauline Hanson has left the political stage for the limelight of reality television, the phenomenon that underpinned her political party continues to influence Australian society and politics. Although Hanson has been relegated to appearances on *Dancing with the Stars*, Hansonism persists in undiminished relevance.

As Sydney simmered in the December heat, Canada was involved in a mid-winter election. Preston Manning’s acolyte, Stephen Harper, the young man who had helped draft the first Reform Party platforms in the late 1980s, was leading the two-year-old Conservative Party of Canada in a hotly contested campaign in which he hoped

to win enough seats to form a minority government. The party he leads is no longer the neo-populist one that Manning led out of the Western Canada in the late 1980s. Over the past few years the party has dropped the mantle of prairie populism, a process that began with the renaming of the party to the Canadian Alliance in 2000, and which was completed by the merger in 2003 between the Alliance and what remained of the Progressive Conservative Party. Preston Manning's great revolution is spent, and the wave has rolled back to the western prairies where it waits for another opportunity to shake the system. The prairie populists themselves, however – the rural materialists who formed the grassroots of Reform and the western separatists who were its radical flank – are still there. While they are less politically powerful than there were in 1993, they cannot be overlooked.

The September before the Cronulla riots, many hundreds of miles across the Tasman Sea from Sydney, Winston Peters had lost his long-held seat of Tauranga in the New Zealand general election. Saved from total ouster from parliament because he is leader of the New Zealand First Party, and thus first on the party's list, Peters became a List MP – now one of only seven New Zealand First MPs in the current parliament. In a testament to his political skill, Peters negotiated two ministerial portfolios for himself, including the portfolio of foreign affairs – the first time the foreign affairs minister has not been a member of the cabinet in any Westminster government. New Zealand First's poor showing in these elections might indicate that the ideas that underlay the party's emergence have disappeared, but they have not. The New Zealand National Party's improved electoral results have in part been ascribed to the party's absorption of Peters' neo-populist platform. While Peters may have lost power, the leaders of the mainstream

political parties have recognized the power of his ideas and the political importance his supporters.

Thus while the neo-populist parties have become less politically powerful, the structural factors that underpinned the emergence of the parties remain unchanged. Their grassroots supporters linger on; xenophobic, chauvinistic, and paranoid, they simmer with resentment on these nations respective political backburners. As the riots in Cronulla show, they need only a spark to set them in motion, and a leader to forge them into a more significant force.

THE OTHER APPROACHES

Most political scientists have tended to concentrate upon a single factor as the explanation for the emergence of neo-populist parties in these three countries. Many have focused upon structural factors, particularly increased non-white immigration, or the movement of the major political parties in ideological space, as explanations for the emergence of these new parties in relatively stable party systems. Other factors have been discussed in terms of individual cases – indigenous rights in the case of Australia and the reform of the electoral system in the case of New Zealand – but political scientists have, for the most part, been relatively unwilling to discuss the impact of individuals on this phenomenon.

Journalists have been more predisposed to examine agency effects, although naturally their observations have been less rigorously researched. Because of the newsworthy nature of neo-populists and the parties that they founded, journalists were close observers of these three leaders. Much of the initial discussion of the traits and charisma of these neo-populist leaders was undertaken by the journalists who

campaigned with them, and because journalists are aware of their own power, much of the initial examination of media influence was done by journalists themselves.

Neither journalists nor political scientists, however, have examined in any depth the importance of culture and ideas in the emergence of these neo-populist parties. Ideas, as Gabriel Almond and Stephen Genco would claim, are much more like clouds than clocks, and are thus impossible to measure and difficult to describe in anywhere near an objective manner (Almond and Genco 1977). Ideas provide little scope for those wishing to develop a deterministic theory. Yet ideas are at the foundation of culture – they are embedded in institutions and are a motivating force in individual behavior, and in this way culture interacts with both structures and agency.

This study examined the effect of both structures and individuals, as well as the motivating force of culture and ideas in the emergence of neo-populist parties in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. By looking at structures, cultures, and agency, and by employing qualitative and some quantitative approaches, I have attempted to create a model which avoids the problems of single-method approaches and the biases of scholarship which focuses more narrowly on either structures or agents.

THE EFFECT OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STRUCTURAL PRESSURES

There are several structural factors at play in this model, some of which are linked to *internal* pressures, and some of which can be described as *external* pressures, which act upon each of the societies in the study. The confluence of internal and external pressures – reminiscent of Theda Skocpol’s “internal and external shocks” in *States and Social Revolutions* – is significant. In all three cases the supporters of neo-populist parties feel threatened not only by the foreign cultures imported by non-white

immigrants, but also by an internal threat in the form of increased pressure for sovereignty by an indigenous (either racial or linguistic) group. While Western European neo-populists feel their culture threatened only by non-white immigrants, in the three Commonwealth countries the effect is exacerbated by internal threats to the mainstream (Anglo-Celtic, English speaking) culture. The combined internal and external threat to the cultural hegemony of the rural materialists in each of these countries is a trigger for their xenophobic response.

Although it does not in and of itself explain all aspects of the model's structural variable, globalization is an external event which shapes many of the structural factors that underlie the emergence of neo-populist parties in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. It is globalization that deepens the economic and social divide between urban and rural areas in each of the three countries, turning traditional center-periphery political tensions into a cleavage that creates a disempowered class – rural materialists. The rural materialists, once the locus of economic and social power in their respective nations, had lost their hold upon the cultural hegemony of the nation. Their anger and fear would manifest in xenophobia against immigrants and indigenous people, in the rejection of their traditional parties and their embracing of a charismatic leader who promised easy solutions to their problems.

The abandonment of traditional parties by the rural materialists in these three countries could be seen as a rational response to the movement of the traditional parties on the ideological spectrum away from representing the interests of rural materialists, but even this is related to the external pressures of globalization. The major parties' espousal of neo-liberal economic policies was clearly a response to the demands of

globalization. The traditional political parties from all three countries and from both left and right recognized the need to open national borders to new markets in order to ensure that the national economy was integrated into the international economy. By contrast, rural materialists in all three countries saw that globalization threatened their economic security and their way of life. For rural materialists in these three nations, globalization did not promise economic opportunities and cultural benefits; rural materialists lacked the ability to adapt to the challenge. Lowered trade barriers did not mean cheap consumer goods but increased competition for their crops and for their jobs.

Globalization is linked to other structural factors in the model, also. Globalization facilitated increased indigenous activism because it created international indigenous rights networks. These non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations have been active in developing educational networks and providing support for indigenous rights movements within nation states.

Thus globalization is the background drumbeat to neo-populist party emergence. Because it emphasizes internationalism, globalization feeds a reactionary nationalism within neo-populist movements. Globalization acts upon existing internal factors, exacerbating economic strains, deepening social cleavages, and highlighting cultural differences within the society. Perhaps most importantly, as globalization forces open national borders to trade in goods and services, it allows greater traffic in ideas, and ideas are central to the emergence of neo-populism in all three cases.

THE POWER OF CULTURE AND IDEAS

Of all the factors in this study, the transmission of ideas is the most interesting and, with charisma, the most powerful factor in the emergence of the parties. Because it

is so difficult to measure, most scholars of neo-populist parties have either avoided it completely or merely touched upon it. Yet political scientists working in other disciplinary sub-fields have attempted to deal with this difficult concept. International relations scholars studying global governance have used the concept of epistemic communities to explain the transmission of policy ideas through transnational networks of knowledge experts; they examine the way that elite behavior influences institutional decisions.

This study adapts the notion in a quite radical manner by overturning the elite aspect of the term and applying it to a distinctly non-elite group – conspiracy theorists. The neo-populist conspiracy theorists are not scientists or necessarily well educated but they are experts in this area, or at least are recognized as such by the members of the movement. Like members of elite epistemic communities of scientists, epistemic communities of conspiracy theorists share information, sometimes even across national borders. Their most important function of the conspiracy theorists, however, is the propagation of their *epistemes* – their own acknowledged truths – among the grassroots of the neo-populist movements.

Furthermore, instead of looking at the way in which new policy ideas and scientific knowledge are transferred across national borders, it looks at the way in which conspiracy theories and racist, scapegoating narratives are transferred to and circulated through a political movement or party. In each case these narratives had different source points. In Australia the conspiracy theorists formed the heart of the movement at the grassroots level. This is not to say that all One Nation members were conspiracy theorists, but many members of the epistemic community of conspiracy theorists were

candidates for lower level offices or occupied somewhat important positions at the district level of the parties and were vocal at local party meetings. These conspiracy theorists were respected by other members and they were thus able to circulate their conspiracy narratives from a central position in the grassroots of the party. Their influence was such that even the leadership of the party articulated the conspiracy narratives which had been so carefully circulated by the epistemic community at lower levels.

In Canada the epistemic community of conspiracy theorists existed only at the fringes of the movement and party. Although many Reform Party members were just as susceptible to conspiracy theories as One Nation members, the epistemic community itself did not operate from the district level, although there is evidence that there were ties between the epistemic community of conspiracy theorists at the margins, and the parliamentary wing of the party. Conspiracy narratives were circulated from the margins of the movement in towards the center and up into the hierarchy.

In New Zealand the epistemic community of conspiracy theorists was the leadership of the party itself. Conspiracy narratives were promulgated from the top down to the membership. This changed the nature of the conspiracies since the leadership had to ensure that the party did not marginalize itself, although it still needed to provide its supporters with self-exculpatory narratives. The conspiracies espoused by the New Zealand First Party leadership were not borrowed wholesale from the international canon of conspiracy theories as were those circulated by the One Nation conspiracy theorists. While the New Zealand conspiracies reflected the style of other neo-populist conspiracies – accusations of corruption by the “establishment” – they

were essentially original and, unlike their Australian and Canadian counterparts, were not fundamentally racist.

By whichever route these ideas were circulated and renewed, they served the same function in each case. In each of the three Commonwealth countries conspiracy narratives provide the grassroots of the party with an explanation for their situation; they alleviated the cognitive dissonance that many economically struggling rural materialists, who had thought that their hard work would be rewarded, that they were economically important, and that their culture was the real Australian, or Canadian, or New Zealand culture.

The other fascinating cultural issue raised by the study involves the transmission of ideas through history. The fact that all three countries and parties had a historical connection with the Douglas Social Credit movement highlights the persistence of ideas over time. It raises questions about how ideologies are institutionalized within political parties such as the social credit parties which exist at some level and in some form in each country. It may be that these three Commonwealth countries, with their shared cultural heritage, have a predilection for social credit style formulaic solutions to problems or are attracted to social credit type rhetoric. More probably, the ideas articulated by the Douglas Social Credit movement have become part of the political ideology of a segment of the population, transmitted by the processes of political socialization. It only takes an adroit leader who understands these predilections and uses them to mobilize a movement and found a party.

THE AGENCY OF CHARISMATIC LEADERS

In many ways this is a study of three charismatic leaders and their relationships

with their followers. The comparison across cases illustrates not only that charisma can be culturally dependent, but also that there are various types of charisma that might work in different situations. Most significantly, the study establishes that while the quality of leadership in an established political party is less important, charismatic leadership is absolutely central to the successful emergence of a new party, and a neo-populist party in particular.

Charismatic leaders are more necessary for neo-populist parties because of the neo-populist emphasis upon form over substance. Neo-populism is less a coherent ideology than a political style, so the political style of the leader is essential to the success of the party. This is why populism has been associated with demagoguery and why a truly charismatic leader is often synonymous with the party that he or she founded – witness New Zealand First, which could accurately be described as the institutional wing of Winston Peters.

The importance of charismatic leadership is illustrated in Hanson, Manning, and Peters' different abilities to keep control of their party and to keep the party from sliding into political obscurity. While each of these leaders had enough charisma to found the party, only one had enough charismatic authority to maintain control over the party beyond the third electoral cycle.

Pauline Hanson's undeniable charisma could not make up for her lack of political skills and she quickly lost control of the party to her co-founders, David Oldfield and David Ettridge. In addition, Hanson's gender was a dubious asset. As the female leader of a far right wing political party, she was in an ambiguous position from the first. Although her sexuality fed into her charismatic appeal to both men and

women, she was forced to struggle to achieve a persona somewhere between political leader and damsel in distress.

Nevertheless Hanson was very successful at influencing the political agenda at the time, and her influence remains. Male politicians with the same anti-immigrant, anti-indigenous rights, and anti-globalization agenda but who lacked her charismatic appeal – such as Graeme Campbell – failed to achieve anything like Hanson’s impact. The fact that Hanson survived so long, and is so firmly imprinted on the nation’s consciousness in its popular culture, is a testament to that charismatic appeal.

Preston Manning’s charisma – more muted in the first place – could not survive his party’s adolescence. Although Manning was a relatively savvy politician, much of his charisma was founded in his western roots, particularly in his follower’s perception of him as a “native son” and an honest broker. These perceptions were at the mercy of Manning’s own need to broaden his appeal so that the party could win seats outside of western Canada. As Manning adopted a more groomed image to suit a more mainstream audience, and as his campaigning involved more televised media and fewer town hall speeches, the charismatic relationship with the populist grassroots was broken.

Only Winston Peters had enough charisma to hold the reins of his party through successive electoral cycles. Peters had as much charismatic appeal as Hanson, and even more political skills than Manning. His survival is in part testament to the power of his remarkable charismatic leadership.

The importance of charismatic leadership does not mean that the other factors have no effect. The structural factors are essential in the creation of a hospitable environment for neo-populist party emergence. All of the factors are *necessary*, but by

themselves *insufficient* conditions. The confluence of all the factors provides the necessary motivation for the emergence of a neo-populist party in an advanced industrial democracy.

APPLYING THE MODEL TO OTHER CASES

While this model was intended as an explanation of neo-populist party emergence in Commonwealth countries, it raises several questions about other cases. It is possible, after all, that neo-populism in Europe has at its root the same structural preconditions and agency factors as existed in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. How important to European neo-populism is the charismatic leadership of Le Pen and Haider? What is the role of mass media – both tabloid and mainstream varieties – in encouraging support for these parties? Most scholars have recognized the xenophobic anti-immigrant response in these European cases, but is there an internal stressor that corresponds to the increased indigenous activism factor in Commonwealth countries? In other words, what internal cleavages exist within European nations that might encourage support for these parties?

It may be that the process of European integration might be an unrecognized factor in increasing support for neo-populists in various European countries. Despite holding seats on the E.U. Parliament, many neo-populist parties – including the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs and the Front National – are concerned with national sovereignty and are anti-European Union. The process of integration certainly presents a cultural threat to neo-populist constituencies, constituencies which had felt secure in their hegemonic control of their nation's culture. Yet the anti-E.U. policies of European neo-populist parties are often overshadowed by a focus on the parties' xenophobic

immigration policies.

Another interesting area of potential research is presented by the possibility of epistemic communities of conspiracy theorists within European neo-populist parties. To what extent is support for these parties encouraged by the proselytizing of conspiracy theorists? If so, do the conspiracies in Europe bear a similarity to those used in Commonwealth countries or are they culturally specific?

An even more interesting comparison might be possible with populists in Latin America. The difficulty that these neo-populists in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand faced when they had achieved success – the difficulty of professed political outsiders who become political insiders and lose the trust of their base of support – does not appear to trouble electorally successful populists such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or the Mayor of Mexico City, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. It may be that it is possible for these Latin American politicians to maintain themselves as “outsiders” by using the United States as a scapegoat. The political and financial hegemony of the United States provides these Latin American populists with a shield from insider status, so that as long as Chavez distances himself from the United States he proves that he is non-elite, one of the people.

More fruitful than either of these comparisons, however, are comparisons with the other major Anglo-Celtic migrant receiver nation – the United States. The United States provides a fascinating comparison because like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand it is a former British colony, but an expatriate rather than colonial society – that is, a society in which the majority of the population is white expatriates from Britain or Europe rather than colonized native peoples. Each of these countries has a population of

Anglo-Celtic peoples, descendants of Scottish, Irish, and Welsh immigrants, who are culturally conservative or “rural materialist,” – that is, those more colloquially referred to as “rednecks.” It is rednecks who form the grassroots of populist and neo-populist movements in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.

The United States has less recent ties but shares significant cultural and linguistic heritage with Britain. In particular, the liberal democratic underpinnings of the United States and the Commonwealth countries provides a more decentralized polity – which may explain the more moderate tone of neo-populists in these countries compared with those in Europe, and perhaps even the difference in survival of the parties over the long term. While many European neo-populists are in their sixth decade, neo-populists in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States have effervesced and then disappeared within a decade.

Examples of neo-populists in the United States include Kinky Friedman, the 2006 candidate for governor of Texas; Jesse Ventura, the former governor of Minnesota; and Ross Perot, the 1992 candidate for president. While the policies espoused by each of these (neo-)populist candidates are not strikingly similar, the rhetorical parallels are compelling. Unlike the religious populists such as Pat Robertson and Jessie Jackson, these three American politicians clearly fit the six part definition of neo-populism, with their emphasis upon the value of productive work, anti-elite rhetoric, nativism, paranoia, as well as their emphasis upon grassroots democracy and focus on the leader of the party.

Ross Perot’s candidacy for president 1992 was archetypically populist – based on a grassroots movement and focused on the leadership of one individual. While some

of the Reform Party's platform is dissimilar to the neo-populist platforms in the Commonwealth countries, this American-style populist party was stylistically recognizable. Perot's economic nationalism, as well as his denigration of "career politicians" and assertion of the power of the common people to take control and solve problems is classically populist. Perot's paranoia – exemplified in his (aborted) withdrawal from the 1992 race because of his fears that Republicans would disrupt his daughter's wedding, and his claim that a six-member Cuban hit squad had been sent to assassinate him – mirrors the paranoia of Hanson in Australia and Peters in New Zealand.

Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura's statements in his book *Ain't Got Time to Bleed* also bear a striking resemblance to the rhetoric of neo-populists in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

I am not a career politician. I'm not a Democrat. I'm not a Republican. I'm a working man with commonsense ideas and goals. I describe myself politically as fiscally conservative and socially moderate-to-liberal (Ventura 1999).

The familiar chords are all there: the rejection of the label of career politician and the claim of political outsider status, the rejection of major parties, the espousal of simple "commonsense" solutions to complex problems, and the ideological incoherence. Like Perot, Ventura was prone to the paranoia that is typical of many populists.

The populism in Friedman's rhetoric is obvious in website, which states that "Kinky is running with the people and for the people. You can't do that with the two current political parties, which are built and ruled by special interests" (Kinky Friedman for Governor 2005). The claims that the two major parties are controlled by special interests are also archetypically neo-populist, as is the call for government by the

people.

The model developed for neo-populist party emergence in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand is clearly appropriate for the examination of the emergence of these three U.S. neo-populists and it poses several questions. Is there an equivalent internal pressure or cultural threat in the United States – perhaps NAFTA in the case of Ross Perot, or Mexican immigration in the case of Friedman, or some other pressure which is not obvious but which may be unearthed by further investigation? Are there conspiracy theories or narratives which help activate and maintain support within the grassroots of the party, and are the epistemic communities of conspiracy theorists which help propagate these narratives? These questions can only be fully answered by further research, but this model clearly provides a useful basis for such studies.

REPRESENTING REDNECKS

The real importance of this study is not only that it uses multiple approaches or even that it attempts to build a theory of neo-populist party emergence which can be applied to other cases. Rather, it is important because it examines the issue of representation of formerly powerful constituencies within established democracies. The study highlights the problem of democratic representation of those with unpopular – and sometimes downright repugnant – beliefs, and the consequences of failing to do so.

At the heart of the study is a problem that faces many advanced industrial countries – the social pressures and discontent caused by immigration and existing ethnic divisions within societies, and the way in which globalization intensifies the pace of change and thus the social pressures. It is a clash of civilizations writ small and played out at a very local level in cities around the globe from Paris to Sydney. The

project for many modern democracies, particularly those with large immigrant population, is ensuring that all the nation's citizens have a voice while at the same time building bridging social capital within communities to ensure that the democracy remains stable.

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APPENDIX I

NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGIES

While it is possible to study many political phenomena quantitatively, some of the most important factors in this model are exceedingly difficult to measure. The obstacles to measurement are most obvious in the case of xenophobic response to non-white immigration; it is almost impossible to discover the real impact of racism on vote choice through public opinion surveys; most survey respondents will not be truthful about their racist attitudes. In fact, it is obvious that the Australian National Election Study of 1998 had considerable underreporting of voting for Hanson, since many voters were unwilling to admit to supporting Hanson or her positions. Still less are survey respondents willing to admit to explicitly racist attitudes, although these attitudes may become evident in longer free-form interviews – where the respondent may become confident that the interviewer is non-judgmental – and in phenomenological research.

It is also difficult to investigate the influence of ideas, and the propagation of these ideas within and between movements, through quantitative research. Ideas are “clouds” not “clocks” and so it is often only possible to see their effects through ethnographic research. The tracing of the propagation and impact is even more difficult.

Charismatic appeal is another problematic term for quantitative scientists who reject the term altogether and focus instead on such things as “popularity” and “approval ratings” (see Edwards 2002). Yet charisma is a concept that we as political observers want to use – we know charisma when we see it. Charisma, while it must be rigorously defined, is a valuable concept that is only possible to study with rigorous

qualitative methods.

Two major qualitative methodological approaches were used in this study. The first was elite interviewing of politicians – both candidates and elected officials – from the three neo-populist parties as well as some mainstream political parties. These interviews took place in three stages marked by visits to the three countries involved in the study. Face-to-face interviews of Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party politicians, as well as politicians from the other major Australian political parties, took place in and around Sydney, NSW, in July of 2000, and another set of face-to-face interviews were done on a separate visit in 2003. Face-to-face interviews of New Zealand First Party politicians took place in June of 2002 in Wellington. Face-to-face interviews of former Reform Party politicians were conducted in Ottawa in October of 2003. Telephone interviews were held with politicians who were too geographically dispersed to do a face-to-face interview. These interviews took place from 2000 through 2003 in the case of Australia, from 2003 to 2004 in the case of New Zealand and 2003 to the end of 2004 in the case of Canada.

The second qualitative methodology used was simple participant observation of local party meetings and other official public gatherings which took place in Australia in 2000 and 2003, in New Zealand in 2002 and in Canada in 2003.

ELITE INTERVIEWING – CONFIDENTIALITY AND SUBJECT ASSURANCES

INFORMED CONSENT

Because of the nature of the interviews, the subject's participation was voluntary. All subjects were selected because they were either an elected politician of one of the neo-populist parties or another political party, or a nominated candidate of one of the three neo-populist parties. A letter was sent to all potential interviewees via email or regular post (see Appendix II for the sample introductory letter or email requesting an interview from a neo-populist candidate or elected official.) The letter thus became an informed consent document because the interviewee knew the parameters of the interview before agreeing to the interview and contacted the researcher willingly to conduct the interview. At the time the interviewee consented to be interviewed he or she was sent a list of possible interview questions (see Appendix III).

CONFIDENTIALITY

Because of the often controversial nature of the topics, assuring the confidentiality of politicians involved in the study was essential. Throughout this study, therefore, quotes are almost exclusively identified only by party membership and a letter designation. The only exception to this rule are seven instances of quotations from the neo-populist leaders themselves – one by Pauline Hanson, two by Preston Manning, and four by Winston Peters – which were self-revelatory. These were identified because the quotes were non-controversial in nature and would not cause harm to the reputation of these political leaders if widely revealed. Furthermore, all three leaders were unconcerned with confidentiality issues, and brushed off assurances of confidentiality at

the beginning of their respective interviews.

All tapes of the interviews were transcribed and the tapes are stored with coded identifiers in a locked box. Transcriptions remain confidential.

AUDIO TAPING

At the beginning of each interview, the subject was again informed of the parameters of the study and provided with contact information for the University of Oklahoma's Institutional Review Board, as well as the Department of Political Science in case they had further questions. Whether the call was a phone interview or occurred face-to-face, the interviewee was asked to give verbal consent to the taping of the interview before the interview was commenced.

Appendix III is an oral script which lists the questions asked to each interviewer.

SUBJECT'S RIGHTS

Subjects were directed to the Office of Research Administration at the University of Oklahoma for inquiries regarding their rights at the start and at the conclusion of each interview.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH – PARTY MEETINGS AND PUBLIC GATHERINGS

The other form of qualitative data collected was ethnographic in nature and involved observation of party meetings and other public gatherings. No individual present at these meetings was identified in this dissertation, nor was any particular locality identified, in order to protect the privacy of ordinary party members.

APPENDIX II

SAMPLE INTRODUCTION LETTERS

The Honourable John Smith
Parliament House
Canberra, ACT

Dear Sir,

I am writing to ask if you might be willing to give me a brief interview at your convenience in the near future. I am an Australian, studying for a doctorate in political science at the University of Oklahoma in the United States. I am coming home to Sydney in the first half of July, and I was hoping to use this time to further my research.

I am currently engaged in writing my dissertation on social movements and political parties in Australia. I'm really interested in the social movement represented by the One Nation Party, and what influence it has had on the political agenda of the major parties. I am interested in your opinion of the One Nation agenda, I have discussed this with members of the other parties, but I would like to have the views of a (*One Nation*) Party politician to balance my research. This is academic research, and therefore anything you say will be confidential. If you consent to this interview, you will not be personally identified in any publications that result from my research.

Needless to say, I would be very grateful if you could allow me ten or fifteen minutes of your time to discuss your insights into Australian politics. I realize that you are very busy, particularly at this time, but I know that your comments would be valuable for my research. I would be happy to conduct a telephone interview if that would be most convenient.

You can contact me via email at chaeg@ou.edu or by phone on 0247 36 1723.

Sincerely,

Claire Haeg
Graduate Student
Department of Political Science
University of Oklahoma
Norman OK

APPENDIX III

ORAL SCRIPT – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

SAMPLE QUESTIONS – AUSTRALIA

1. In your opinion, what are currently the most important social issues in Australian politics? How has this changed in the past decade?
2. Why do you think Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party won seats in 1996?
3. What sort of person do you think voted for One Nation in 1996? Who is voting for One Nation now?
4. What affect has One Nation and Pauline Hanson had upon the policy agenda in Australia?
5. What affect has One Nation and Pauline Hanson had upon the Liberal Party/National Party/ALP?
6. Is Pauline Hanson's One Nation party an anomaly, or is there something deep within Australian culture/human nature which responds to the sort of issues the party tackles?
7. What do you think about the argument that "One Nation is racist" ?
8. Do you think the party will survive another electoral cycle?
9. If you were asked to put all the Australian political parties on a spectrum of one to ten, with one being the most left-wing, and ten being the most conservative or right wing, where would you place them?

APPENDIX IV AUSTRALIAN ELECTION STUDY TABLES

TABLE 3.1 - Data from Australian Election Study 1998*
Highest Qualification Since Leaving School
By Vote in the House of Representatives 1998

Highest Qualification Since Leaving School							
	No Qual	Post Grad Degree	Bachelors	Und'grad Diploma	Associate Diploma	Trade Qual	Non- Trade Qual
Liberal	31.7	9	13.3	3.4	7.4	21.1	11.6
Labor	35.4	6.3	9.7	4.7	7.3	21.6	14.7
National	42	3.6	6	3.6	4.8	18	21.6
Australian Democrats	25.7	8.2	18.5	5.1	8.2	21.6	12.3
Greens	17.6	11.7	17.6	5.8	14.7	23.5	8.8
One Nation	29.3	4.5	3.6	0	6.4	34.8	21.1

TABLE 3.2 - Data from Australian Election Study 1998*
Government Run by Big Interests
By Vote in the House of Representatives 1998

“Government Run by Big Interests”					
	Entirely Run for Big Interests	Mostly Run for Big Interests	Half and Half	Mostly Run for Benefit of All	Entirely Run for Benefit of All
Liberal	3.7	29.2	46.1	19.5	1.2
Labor	20.6	43.4	30.2	5.2	0.4
National	8.4	30.1	40.9	19.2	1.2
Australian Democrats	20	52.5	25.2	2	0
Greens	17.6	50	14.7	17.6	0
One Nation	35	43.5	18.8	2.5	0

TABLE 3.3 - Data from Australian Election Study 1998*
Response to “The Number of Migrants Allowed into Australia”
By Vote in the House of Representatives 1998

‘The number of migrants allowed into Australia’					
	Gone Much Too Far	Gone Too Far	About Right	Not Gone Far Enough	Not Nearly Far Enough
Liberal	15.6%	26.1%	49%	7.7%	1.3%
Labor	17.1%	21.3%	46.2%	11.3%	3.6%
National	21.1%	22.3%	54.1%	2.3%	0
Australian Democrats	14.4%	21.6%	52.5%	6.1%	5.1%
Greens	15.6%	18.7%	59.3%	6.2%	0
One Nation	63.1%	26.3%	10.5%	0	0

TABLE 3.4 - Data from Australian Election Study 1998*
Response to “Immigrants Take Jobs from Australians”
By Vote in the House of Representatives 1998

“Immigrants Take Jobs from Australians”					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Liberal	8.1%	24%	30%	32.5%	5.2%
Labor	14.3%	22%	22.5%	31.2%	9.7%
National	11.6%	37.2%	18.6%	27.9%	4.6%
Australian Democrats	2%	25%	32%	31%	10%
Greens	5.8%	41.1%	20.5	26.4%	5.8%
One Nation	35.3%	37.8%	15.5%	10.3%	1.7%

TABLE 3.5 - Data from Australian Election Study 1998*
Country of Birth
By Vote in the House of Representatives 1998

	Country of Birth					Total Immigrants
	Australia	NZ	UK/Ireland	Europe	Other	
Liberal	78%	1.5%	9%	4.8%	6.9%	22%
Labor	72%	0.6%	7.8%	5.3%	14%	27%
National	87%	1.3%	5.7%	3.4%	2.2%	12.6%
Australian Democrats	79%	0	10.8%	2.9%	6.9%	20.7%
Greens	82%	2.9%	8.8%	5.9%	0	17.6%
One Nation	84%	0	8.8%	3.5%	3.5%	15.8%

TABLE 3.6 - Data from Australian Election Study 1998*
Mother's and Father's Country of Birth
By Vote in the House of Representatives 1998

	Country of Birth											
	Australia		NZ		UK/Ireland		Europe		Other		Total Immigrants	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
Liberal	66%	68%	2%	1.7%	15%	14%	9.5%	9.5%	8%	7.3%	35%	32%
Labor	60%	62%	0.4%	0.8%	12%	12%	12%	10%	17%	15%	41%	38%
National	87%	87%	1.1%	1.1%	5%	6%	2.2%	2.3%	4.5%	3.4%	13%	13%
Australian Democrats	63%	65%	0	0	19%	16%	8%	10%	10%	9%	37%	35%
Greens	59%	68%	5.8%	5.8%	15%	9%	18%	12%	3%	6%	41%	32%
One Nation	71%	73%	0	0.9%	15%	12%	7%	6%	7%	8%	29%	27%

TABLE 3.7 - Data from Australian Election Study 1998*
Migrants Should Celebrate Australian Heritage
By Vote in the House of Representatives 1998

Migrants should Celebrate Australian Heritage					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Liberal	22.4	50.6	17.2	7.4	2.2
Labor	21.2	37.8	22.2	15.7	2.9
National	27.3	46.4	17.8	7.1	1.1
Australian Democrats	21	44	15	16	4
Greens	8.8	32.3	29.4	23.5	5.8
One Nation	43.9	42.2	10.3	1.7	1.7

TABLE 3.8 - Data from Australian Election Study 1998*
Attitude Towards Aboriginal Land Rights
By Vote in the House of Representatives 1998

Aboriginal Land Rights					
	Gone Much Too Far	Gone Too Far	About Right	Not Gone Far Enough	Not Nearly Far Enough
Liberal	26.8%	34.6%	25.6%	10%	2.7%
Labor	18.3%	24.3%	25.7%	21.1%	10.4%
National	34.5%	41.6%	15.4%	8.3%	0%
Australian Democrats	13.5%	26%	34.3%	15.6%	10.4%
Greens	15.1%	21.2%	33.3%	24.2%	6%
One Nation	64.9%	26.4%	4.2%	2.5%	1.7%

TABLE 3.9 - Data from Australian Election Study 1998*
Response to “Parties doing a good or bad job”
By Vote in the House of Representatives 1998

“Parties doing a good or bad job”					
	A Very Good Job	A Good Job	Neither Good nor Bad	A Bad Job	A Very Bad Job
Liberal	3.3	43.3	41.6	9.6	2
Labor	1.1	26.7	48.6	17.6	5.9
National	1.1	38.8	37.6	18.8	3.5
Australian Democrats	0	18.8	46.5	29.7	4.9
Greens	0	11.7	64.7	17.6	5.8
One Nation	.8	8.5	36.7	29.9	23.9

TABLE 3.10 - Data from Australian Election Study 1998
First Preference Party Vote in 1998
By First Preference Party Vote in 1996 Federal Election

1st Preference Party Vote in 1996 Election							
1st Preference Party Vote in 1998 Election		Liberal	Labor	National	Australian Democrats	Greens	Other
	Liberal	80%	11%	1.4%	2.6%	0.5%	3.7%
	Labor	11.7%	73.2%	0.6%	6.6%	0.5%	7%
	National	36.7%	6.8%	49.4%	2.2%	0	4.5%
	Australian Democrats	32%	28%	3%	30%	1%	6%
	Greens	20%	23.5%	0	14.7%	26.4%	14.7%
	One Nation	44%	23.5%	9.5%	3.4%	3.4%	15.6%

All data in the above tables calculated from Bean, Clive, Gow, David, and McAllister, Ian. Australian Election Study, 1998 [computer file]. 1998. Canberra, Australian Social Science Data Archive, The Australian National University

APPENDIX V

CANADIAN ELECTION STUDY TABLES

TABLE 4:1 - Data from the Canadian Election Study 1993
“People Like Me Do Not Have a Say in What the Government Does”

“PEOPLE LIKE ME DO NOT HAVE A SAY IN WHAT THE GOV'T DOES”			
PARTY VOTE IN 1993 ELECTION	Agree	Disagree	
	Conservative	32.2%	66.5%
	Liberal	38.7%	60%
	NDP	32.3%	37.6%
	Reform	48.3%	50%
	Bloc Quebecois	16.8%	83.1%
	All Respondents	34.6%	64.1%

TABLE 4:2- Data from the Canadian Election Study 1993
Attitudes towards Immigrants by Party Vote

“TOO MANY RECENT IMMIGRANTS DON’T WANT TO FIT IN”						
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Opinion	
PARTY VOTE IN 1993 ELECTION	Conservative	17.6%	39.3%	33%	3.3%	6.6%
	Liberal	17.4%	34.4%	32.9%	6%	8.9%
	NDP	17.8%	32.5%	27.9%	13.1%	8.5%
	Reform	26.7%	43.2%	20.5%	3.5%	5.9%
	Bloc Quebecois	20%	40.1%	26.8%	3%	9.8%
	All Respondents	19.6%	37.5%	29.5%	5.1%	8.1%

TABLE 4.3 - Data from the Canadian Election Study 1993
“We Are All Canadians” by Party Vote

“MAKE NO DISTINCTIONS - WE ARE ALL CANADIANS”			
PARTY VOTE IN 1993 ELECTION	Agree	Disagree	
	Conservative	91.6%	7.7%
	Liberal	89.9%	8.6%
	NDP	79.4%	17.6%
	Reform	95.6%	9.7%
	Bloc Quebecois	63.4%	33.7%
	ALL RESPONDENTS	84.9%	13.4%

TABLE 4.4 - Data from the Canadian Election Study 1993
“We Are All Canadians” by Party Vote

“MAKE NO DISTINCTIONS - WE ARE ALL CANADIANS”				
PARTY VOTE IN 1993 ELECTION		Agree	Disagree	Undecided
	Conservative	50.9%	36.2%	12.8%
	Liberal	41.1%	45.8%	12.9%
	NDP	34%	53.7%	12.1%
	Reform	52.3%	34.9%	12.7%
	Bloc Quebecois	70.8%	21.5%	7.5%
	ALL RESPONDENTS	47.7%	39.7%	12.4%

**TABLE 4.5 - Data from the Canadian Election Study 1993
Party Vote in Last Federal Election**

		Vote in 1988 Election				
		Liberal	Conservative	NDP	Reform	Other
Vote in 1993 Election	Conservative	10.8%	78.5%	5%	0	.2%
	Liberal	53.9%	26.7%	11.9%	.2%	.9%
	NDP	7.2%	12.7%	73.3%	0	1.2%
	Reform	13.5%	60.5%	10.6%	6%	6.3%
	Bloc Quebecois	11%	48.8%	9%	0	14.1%

NB: Table 4.5 percentages calculated based on N of voters for each party. Table does not show voters who could not recall or who did not vote.

**TABLE 4.6 - Data from the Canadian Election Study 1993
Federal Party Vote 1993 by Provincial Party Identification**

		Provincial Party Identification					
Vote in 1993 Election		Liberal	PC	NDP	Social Credit	Parti Quebecois	None of These
	PC	19.2%	48.8%	4.4%	2.8%	3.8%	15.8%
	Liberal	54.9%	9.9%	9.8%	1.7%	.8%	17.9%
	NDP	5.9%	4.8%	73.6%	0.5%	0.5%	13.9%
	Reform	11.7%	34.4%	8.1%	7.5%	-	33.9%
	Bloc Queb	12.8%	0.8%	-	-	64.5%	19.7%

Johnston, Richard, Brady, Henry, Blais, Andre, Gidengil, Elisabeth, and Nevitte, Neil. The 1993 Canadian Election Study incorporating the 1992 Referendum Survey on the Charlottetown Accord [Computer File]. [ICPSR]. 1995. Vancouver, British Columbia, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Canadian National Elections Study (CNES) Series.

APPENDIX VI

NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY TABLES

**TABLE 5.1 - Data from New Zealand Election Study 1993 and 1996
1993 Respondents - Vote in 1990**

Vote in 1990 Election											
Vote in 1993 Election		Non Vote		Labour		National		Socred		Other	
		Vote	%	Vote	%	Vote	%	Vote	%	Vote	%
	Nonvote	39	23%	32	19%	45	26.7%	4	2%	12	7
	Labour	31	4%	438	66%	83	12.6%	12	1.8%	32	4.8%
	National	20	2.6%	62	8.3%	594	79.7%	5	.07%	26	3%
	Alliance	24	5.9%	108	16%	115	28.6%	24	6%	86	21%
	NZFP	7	4%	31	18.3%	93	55%	7	4%	17	10%

NB: Table 1 percentages calculated based on N of voters for each party. Table does not show voters who could not recall or were ineligible to vote.

TABLE 5.2 – Data from New Zealand Election Study 1993 and 1996
State Ownership of Assets – Bank of New Zealand
Comparison of 1993 and 1996 Percentage Support by Party Vote

Ownership of Bank of New Zealand											
Vote in Election	Can't Say		Full Own		Partial Ownership		Regulate		Nothing		
	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	
Labour	7%	6%	37%	28%	19%	17%	16%	17%	20%		
National	6.7%	3%	27%	13%	17%	15%	17%	17%	32%		
Alliance	6.9%	4%	39%	31%	23%	17%	16%	16%	15%		
NZFP	2.6%	4.2%	45%	36%	19%	20%	16%		17%		
All Respond	7%	5%	34%	22%	19%	16%	17%		23%		

TABLE 5.3 – Data from New Zealand Election Study 1993 and 1996
Importance of Immigration
Comparison of 1996 and 1993 Percentage Support by Party Vote

“Importance of Immigration to You Personally”											
Vote in Election	Extreme		Very		Moderate		Not Very		Not At All		
	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	
Labour	13.4%	13.7%	11.9%	18.6%	31.6%	35.4%	27.8%	21.8%	15%	10.2%	
National	7.8%	9%	15.9%	17.2%	36.4%	38.2%	29.5%	25%	11%	10.3%	
Alliance	13.1%	14.7%	13.9%	18.8%	31%	36%	28.2%	20%	13.6%	3%	
NZFP	16.6%	27%	14.6%	31%	35.3%	24.1%	24.6%	14.1%	8.6%	9%	
All Respond	11.4%	13.7%	14.4%	22%	33.2%	35.5%	27.8%	21.4%	12.9%	9.4%	

TABLE 5.4 – Data from New Zealand Election Study 1993 and 1996
Importance of Race Relations
Comparison of 1996 and 1993 Percentage Support by Party Vote

“Importance of Race Relations to You Personally”										
	Extreme		Very		Moderate		Not Very		Not At All	
	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996
Vote in Election										
Labour	15.1%	19%	24.2%	31.6%	34.9%	30.9%	16.4%	13.7%	9%	4%
National	9.7%	10%	20%	29.4%	37%	35%	22.9%	17%	10%	7.8%
Alliance	11%	17.1%	25.2%	32.8%	36.2%	29.4%	18.8%	13%	8.5%	7%
NZFP	23.8%	15%	18.5%	33.6%	37.7%	33.6%	16.5%	12%	3%	5%
All Respond	13.2%	13.7%	22.6%	30%	35.6%	33%	19.3%	15%	9.1%	7%

TABLE 5.5 – Data from New Zealand Election Study 1993 and 1996
Importance of Law and Order
Comparison of 1996 and 1993 Percentage Support by Party Vote

“Importance of Law and Order to You Personally”										
	Extreme		Very		Moderate		Not Very		Not At All	
	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996
Vote in Election										
Labour	52.4%	50%	28.3%	26.6%	13%	15.9%	3.6%	4.5%	2.5%	2%
National	44.5%	41%	33.9%	31%	15.8%	18.2%	3.4%	6%	2.1%	2.7%
Alliance	48%	48%	28%	25.3%	14.8%	17.6%	5%	6.8%	2.4%	2.1%
NZFP	58%	60%	26%	23%	10.5%	11.5%	4.6%	3.3%	0%	1.4%
All Respond	49%	45%	30%	28.9%	13.8%	16.8%	4%	5.6%	2.4%	2.6%

TABLE 5.6 – Data from New Zealand Election Study 1993 and 1996*
Importance of Superannuation
Comparison of 1996 and 1993 Percentage Support by Party Vote

“Importance of Superannuation to You Personally”										
	Extreme		Very		Moderate		Not Very		Not At All	
	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996
	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996	1993	1996
Vote in Election										
Labour	43	40.3	27.2	28.6	17	19.5	7	7.8	4.3	3.7
National	26.6	21.6	27.7	33.8	29.5	27	12.4	11.2	3.5	6
Alliance	36	38.6	30.4	28.5	22.5	17.8	7.8	9	2.9	5.9
NZFP	37.2	40.8	28.7	32	23.5	14.6	7	6	3	3
All Respond	34.3	31.7	28.4	30.4	28.3	23.3	9	10	4	5.3

All data in the above tables calculated from:

Vowles, Jack, Aimer, Peter, Catt, Helena, Miller, Raymond, Banducci, Susan, Karp, Jeffrey, and Denmark, David. New Zealand National Election Study. 1996. Wellington, NZ, Waikato School of Social Sciences Research Committee, University of Waikato, University of Auckland Research Committees.

Vowles, Jack, Aimer, Peter, Catt, Helena, Miller, Raymond, and Lamare, James W. New Zealand National Election Study. 1993. Wellington, NZ, Waikato School of Social Sciences Research Committee, University of Waikato, University of Auckland Research Committees.

APPENDIX VII

KITSCHOLT'S SPATIAL MODEL OF RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES

