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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

MARSHAL BUGEAUD, THE JULY MONARCHY AND THE QUESTION OF ALGERIA, 1841-1847: A STUDY IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

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
JACK BLAINE RIDLEY

NORMAN, OKLAHOMA

1970

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APPROVED BY



DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

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MARSHAL BUGEAUD, THE JULY MONARCHY AND THE QUESTION OF ALGERIA, 1841-1847: A STUDY IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

On 14 June 1830, a French expeditionary force made a successful landing on the coast of North Africa within a few miles of the city of Algiers. This marked the beginning of the French conquest of Algeria. The conquest and subsequent colonization of Algeria extended over several decades and a monarchy, a republic, and an empire continued the mission initiated by the last of the Bourbon kings of France, Charles X.[1]

Pirates of the Barbary Coast had long jeopardized shipping in the Mediterranean and the French hoped that the major powers of Europe would welcome the subjugation of a source of the piracy. Furthermore, the French had been engaged in a long-standing quarrel with the Dey of Algiers regarding commercial transactions between France and Algiers. The argument reached a peak in 1827 when the Dey struck the French consul with a "fly-flap" following a heated discussion over the refusal of the French government to pay the full amount demanded by the Dey in payment for shipments of

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[1]For an account of the decision to invade Algeria, see J. Lucas-Dubreton, La Restauration et la monarchie de Juillet (Paris: Hachette, 1926), pp. 155-58.

corn from Algiers. France declared war on the Dey in 1827 and established a blockade which proved to be ineffective.[2]

The decision to attack Algeria was the idea of the chief minister of Charles X; comte Jules-Armand de Polignac a mystical, ultra-royalist who believed a military expedition would distract the French people from increasing domestic disorders at home. Royalist supporters believed that a military victory would pacify the opposition, and of all the areas considered, it was believed that an expedition against the Dey of Algiers would less likely cause international repercussions.[3]

Three weeks after the invasion of Algeria, the city of Algiers fell. The French military commander, Marshal Louis de Bourmont, reflected the ignorance of Frenchmen about Algeria when he commented on the victory at Algiers: ". . . the whole kingdom of Algeria will probably surrender within fifteen days without our having to fire another shot."[4] Algerian natives proved to be no more willing to accept French domination than Turkish suzerainty, and began a holy war against France.[5]

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[2]Annual Register, LXXI (1829), pp. 172-73.

[3]James E. Swain, The Struggle for the Control of the Mediterranean Prior to 1848: A Study in Anglo-French Relations (Boston: Stratford Co., 1933), p. 57.

[4]Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), p. 17.

[5]The Ottoman Empire had a nominal suzerainty over Algeria since the Sixteenth Century.

The first ten years of the Algerian campaign was especially burdensome and frustrating for France. Traditional continental military tactics and strategy were ineffective against bands of Moslem warriors and the rigors of the North Africa climate, and the French expeditionary force stumbled from one blunder to another.[6]

In 1832, the divided Moslem tribesmen accepted the leadership of Abd el Kader ibn Muhyi al-Din, Emir of Mascara (1807-1883), a twenty-five year-old Arab who had already made his pilgrimage to Mecca. This young chieftain was destined to help lay the groundwork for modern Arab nationalism by urging his people to unify not only to expel the invader, but also to create a Moslem state on the southern shores of the Mediterranean.[7]

France made Algeria a possession in 1834, but in the same year, the inconsistent French government chose to cut short the conquest and made peace with Abd el Kader (February 26, 1834), Substantial differences appeared in the French and Arabic texts of the treaty, however, and the peace hardly lasted one year. With the renewal of the war, France appointed (June 1835) another in a long line of governor-generals, comte Bertrand Clauzel (1772-1842). Clauzel, who often exaggerated the importance of his

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[6]Behr, p. 17.

[7]For a satisfactory account of Abd el Kader see Joseph le Gras, Abd el Kader (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1929).

operations, won the support of Adolphe Thiers' ministry and received consent of the Chamber of Deputies for expansion of the war and French commitment to total occupation.[8]

Thiers' government fell in September 1836, and comte Louis Mathieu Molé (1781-1855), formed a government and cut back on troops and appropriations to Algeria. Clauzel, determined to make his point with the French government by expanding the theatre of war, hastened his demise by marching on Constantine without sufficient troops and was thoroughly defeated. Molé then appointed a new governor-general, Charles-Marie-Denys, comte Le Damrémont (1783-1837), and instructed him to make peace with Abd el Kader. Damremont chose General Thomas Bugeaud to negotiate the peace of Tafna with the Moslem leader.[9]

Thomas Robert Bugeaud de la Piconnerie, the duc d'Isly (1784-1849), played a crucial role in both the conquest and colonization of Algeria. During the reign of Louis Philippe, he was one of the few active soldiers with the distinction of having served in la grande armée of Napoleon Bonaparte. As a corporal, Bugeaud had participated in the Battle of Austerlitz and later served as a colonel in the Peninsular Campaign. After Waterloo and the return of the Bourbons to France, Bugeaud was forced into retirement. From 1815 to 1830, he lived on a small family estate, "La Durantie," in

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[8]Behr, pp. 19-20.

[9]Ibid.

Périgord. He enjoyed the life of a modest country squire and his closeness to the soil profoundly influenced his thinking throughout his career.[10]

After the July Revolution of 1830, Bugeaud left retirement for the active life. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1831 as a representative of his native Excideuil and remained in that capacity until his death in 1849. He was also recalled into the military and in 1833, Louis Philippe placed the Duchess de Berry (1798-1870), the niece of Louis Philippe's wife, under Bugeaud's supervision. She had been taken into custody for treasonous activity in the Vendee counter-revolution against the July Monarchy and confined to the castle of Blaye under the martial care of Bugeaud. The colonel did not enjoy the reputation he earned as jailer, but his acceptance of this unpleasant task convinced Louis Philippe of his loyalty to the government.[11]

By 1836, Bugeaud was a Lieutenant-General in command of a brigade in Algeria. The Algerian campaign had suffered

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[10]Henri Amédée le Lorgne, Comte d'Ideville (comp.), Memoirs of Marshal Bugeaud from his private correspondence and original documents, 1784-1849. Edited from the French by Charlotte M. Yonge (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1884), I, 189. Hereafter referred to as Ideville.

[11]For a complete account of Bugeaud's role as jailer see Prosper Ménière, La captivite de Madame la Duchesse de Berry à Blaye, 1833: Journal du docteur P. Ménière. . . publié par son fils le docteur E. Ménière avec deux lettres inedites de Balzac et du Maréchal Bugeaud (2 vols; Paris: C. Lévy, 1882).

from the lack of leadership until Bugeaud entered the arena and put to use his knowledge of guerilla warfare in Spain. The result was a revolution in French military tactics and strategy in North Africa. Good communication links with other units and troop mobility were Bugeaud's innovations. The general felt that the individual soldier should not be burdened with heavy equipment, for artillery and baggage were of little use in the Algerian terrain and only restricted troop movements. "Our soldiers, like the soldiers of Rome, should be free in their movements and unencumbered. . . . Our mules and horses must carry the food and ammunition, and the tents answer the purpose of pack-saddles and bags. . . ."[12] He requested mule brigades and young strong soldiers, commanded by young, energetic officers. Soldiers who previously had been loaded with provisions, ammunition, and clothing for eight days should carry provisions for only four days, while mules should carry ten day's provisions.[13] He also adopted the razzia, or scorched earth policy in dealing with the enemy. The razzias were denounced by many in France as barbaric, but they were highly effective. Bugeaud answered those who criticized the razzias by saying, "Messieurs, on ne fait pas la guerre avec la philanthropie."[14]

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[12] Ideville, I, 182-83.

[13] Bugeaud to Marshal Maison, Minister of War, 16 June 1836, Ideville, I, 218.

[14] Ibid., 211-12, and Paul Azan, L'armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852 (Paris: Plon, 1936), pp. 187-88.

In July 1836, Bugeaud, by now in command of the Tafna Division, won the first decisive victory of the campaign since the capture of Algiers in 1830. Abd el Kader pitted his force against Bugeaud's at Sickack in Oran province. Although the Algerian chieftain was not captured in the battle, his army was decisively defeated, and Abd el Kader decided to come to terms. In May 1837, the Treaty of Tafna was negotiated. Abd el Kader received the province (but not the town), of Oran and the coastal ports of Arzew and Mostaganem.[15]

The Treaty of Tafna was not favorably received in France for French troops were withdrawn from territory in Oran province which they had found difficult to capture, and in general, the treaty conformed too much to the desires of Abd el Kader. Bugeaud, who was responsible for the treaty, defended it because it limited the size of Abd el Kader's army, thus making it easier to defeat. Furthermore, if complete victory over the Arabs was desirable (and Bugeaud was not convinced at this point that it was), an army of 100,000 would be necessary to complete the task.[16]

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[15]Behr, p. 20.

[16]Azan, pp. 214-15, and Ideville, I, 297-98. In 1837, when the treaty was signed, there were only 42,600 French troops in Algeria. Paul Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet (7 vols; Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1884-1914), V, 345.

Western Algeria was temporarily pacified by the Treaty of Tafna and eventually, the unpopular aspects of the treaty were forgotten and Bugeaud rose in stature.

On 27 December 1840, Bugeaud was rewarded for his success and travelled to Paris to accept the appointment as Governor-General of Algeria. He arrived in Algiers from Paris 23 February 1841, to assume his post and remained Governor-General until 1847. During that period, the military conquest of Algeria was nearly completed and colonization was initiated. When Bugeaud, the twelfth Governor-General since 1830, took command of French forces in North Africa, the destiny of Algeria was uncertain. The early years of French presence in Algeria were painful and barren; leadership had been mediocre and French political leaders inconsistent. Opinion in France was hesitant as to total or partial occupation, peace or war, and conquest by arms or by ideas. Because authority was divided between civilian and military officials with no clear-cut role differentiation, the French administrative apparatus in Algeria was disorganized and inefficient.[17]

This study will trace the tenure of Thomas Robert Bugeaud as Governor-General of Algeria, evaluating the impact of his leadership on the conquest and development of

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[17] Le National, 8 juillet 1841; Ideville, I, 202-3; and, Thomas Robert Bugeaud, Simple Document sur l'Afrique par un Officier Attaché a l'Armée, sous le Premier Commandement de M. le Maréchal Clausel (Paris: Herhant et Bimont, 1838), pp. 3-13.

French Algeria and assessing the conflicting views of Bugeaud, his officers, major officials of the July Monarchy and their opponents in Paris as to the future of Algeria.

Chapter II

1841: BUGEAUD'S CRITICAL FIRST YEAR

When Thomas Bugeaud replaced Sylvain-Charles Valée as Governor-General of Algeria, he was fifty-six years old, tall and powerfully built with a plump face marked slightly by smallpox, his grey eyes small and piercing. His square chin and high forehead prevented a handsome appearance, although self assurance, remarkable energy, and an imperious will made him a striking individual, obviously accustomed to having his way. He spoke with strength and authority, but with the uncultivated, crude voice of a battle-hardened veteran with no formal education.[1]

His predecessor, Valée, had been a capable administrator, but a mediocre military leader, and officials of the July Monarchy hoped that Bugeaud possessed the necessary qualities to be both an able administrator and military commander.[2] To many, however, Bugeaud was a strange choice for he was a curious mixture of career soldier and yeoman

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[1]Ideville, I, 200-201; and Victor Demontés, La Colonisation Militaire sous Bugeaud (Paris: Larose, 1917), p. 82.

[2]Ideville, I, 442-43, and; Nicholas Anne Théodule Changarnier, Campagnes d'Afrique, 1830-1848: Memoirs du général Changarnier (Paris: Berger-Lavault, 1930), p. 182, and; E. Castellane, Campagnes d'Afrique, 1835-1848, Lettres adressées au maréchal de Castellane par les maréchaux Bugeaud, Clauzel, Valée, Canrobert, Forey, Bosquet, etc. (Paris: E. Plon, 1898), pp. 219-20.

farmer, possessing the solid soldierly qualities of loyalty, resoluteness and common-sense, but lacking any of the qualities of greatness. His subordinates admired him, but intellectual writers and politicians of the day despised him for his conservatism and narrow breadth of vision.[3]

General Nicholas Anne Théodule Changarnier (1793-1877), a veteran of the Algerian campaign and one of Bugeaud's rivals for the position of Governor-General, believed that Louis Philippe and his sons chose Bugeaud because he had championed their cause since his service at Blaye.[4] Certainly, Louis Philippe did believe Bugeaud to be unquestionably loyal, but he also felt him capable of carrying out the task of conquering Algeria. By 1841, Louis Philippe was convinced of the necessity to completely subjugate Algeria: "On the land that has now become, and will for ever [sic] remain French, our brave soldiers are carrying on their noble labours which I am glad my sons have had the honor of sharing. France will carry civilization into Algiers as a sequel to her glory."[5]

The king hoped that the Algerian conquest would provide some splendor to his regime and would later be pleased that Algeria became a showcase for his sons. Algeria proved to be difficult to subdue, however, and Louis Philippe

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[3]Behr, p. 22.

[4]Changarnier, p. 182.

[5]Ideville, II, 37. Official proclamation of Louis Philippe, 27 December 1841.

also had to be cautious in his public statements regarding his aspirations for Algeria because he did not wish to cultivate any more suspicion from the English, with whom he was seeking closer ties. Britain had been suspicious of French objectives in Algeria since 1830, for French presence in Algeria threatened English supremacy in the Mediterranean.[6]

There is strong evidence to suggest that Louis Philippe approved Bugeaud's appointment as Governor-General because he was the only general officer loyal to the Orleanists with a definite plan for conquering Algeria.[7] In December, 1840, Louis Philippe called Bugeaud to Paris to ask his advice regarding the future of Algeria. Bugeaud replied that if the conquest were not accelerated, the French should evacuate Algeria the next morning. The king then asked Bugeaud if he would accept the leadership of such an enterprise and the latter replied that he would accept if an army of 100,000 men and a budget of 100 millions were placed at his disposal. Shortly thereafter, Bugeaud was chosen to replace Valée.[8]

Another official intimately connected with Bugeaud's appointment was François Pierre Guillaume Guizot (1787-1874), Foreign Minister and actual head of the Ministry (the

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[6]James Swain, pp. 59-60.

[7]See below, pp. 14-15.

[8]Paul Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet (7 vols; Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1884-1914), V, 267.

titular head of the Ministry was Marshal Soult). Guizot was one of the most important public figures to support the July Monarchy in the 1840's, and was certainly among the most influential policy-makers. Guizot had initially been lukewarm to the Algerian conquest for he regarded it as a burden that would sap French strength for a half-century. The result at best would be another naval base, another Toulon. Algeria should be "... l'affaire de nos temps de loisir...."[9] or a concern when European affairs did not beckon. As the Algerian campaign continued, however, Guizot slowly came to recognize a potential value in Algeria. Although never as ardent as Bugeaud, he accepted the necessity of conquering Algeria, but only as a means of enhancing French strategic power in the Mediterranean and not for economic or imperial value. Therefore, Guizot believed that the conquest should progress slowly and deliberately since his primary diplomatic objective was to pull France and Britain closer together and Algeria could conceivably prevent this.[10]

Although Guizot and Bugeaud did not agree on objectives to be realized in North Africa, Guizot favored his

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[9]Guizot à Bugeaud, 20 septembre 1842, in François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, Mémoires pour servir a l'histoire de mon temps (8 vols; Paris: Michel Levy Freres, 1858-61), VII, 140-41, and; Douglas Johnson, Guizot: Aspects of French History, 1787-1874. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 273.

[10]François Guizot, Memoirs to Illustrate the History of My Times. Trans. J. W. Cole (London: R. Bentley, 1858-1861), VI, 383.

appointment as Governor-General, for he believed him to be the best qualified.[11] To Guizot, the general had illustrated his ability and influence, had the support and loyalty of the army, and because of the razzias, the Arabs feared him.[12]

The two men developed a friendship after Bugeaud's appointment and exchanged letters regularly from 1841 to 1847. This friendship is illustrated by a letter from Guizot to Bugeaud dated 21 September 1841, in which the minister assured the general of his confidence and friendship.[13] Guizot pledged his full support to Bugeaud in the council and tribune, and laid the groundwork for his views on colonization: two areas of colonization should be established--one for Europeans and the other, indirectly governed by France, for the Arabs. The details, such as the decision as to where to draw the boundary between colons (European colonists), and natives would be left to Bugeaud. The next step would be to determine how much territory should be colonized, and what type of colonization it should be. European colonists were a necessity because of their civilizing influence, and those colonists must be protected by the army.[14]

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., pp. 384-85.

[14] Ibid., pp. 386-87. By "indirect government" in the Arab Zone, Guizot meant that France should simply oversee the Arab administration and accept tribute from the natives.

Marshal Nicholas Jean de Dieu Soult, duc de Dalmatie (1769-1851), titular head of the cabinet when Bugeaud was appointed, and Minister of War until 1844, did not like Bugeaud, nor did he approve of the Algerian campaign, but he yielded to the desires of Louis Philippe and Guizot and did not protest the appointment.[15]

Because they were aware of Bugeaud's views vis-a-vis North Africa, Louis Philippe and Guizot must have been prepared for commitment to total occupation and colonization of Algeria when they made Bugeaud commander of the Army of Africa.

Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877), a constitutional monarchist politically to the left of Guizot, and a critic of the Soult-Guizot Ministry in the 1840's, considered making Bugeaud Governor-General when he formed a government in the spring of 1840. Thiers was more ardent in his support of conquest and colonization than Guizot, for he pressed for a more aggressive policy in the Mediterranean while Guizot was more cautious and concerned about British reactions. In the 1830's, Thiers had been the most ardent spokesman for state colonization in Algeria and held Bugeaud in high esteem, but the general's conservatism, his stubbornness and negative attitude in the Chamber of Deputies alienated the Left and Thiers decided not to make the appointment.[16]

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[15] Ibid., p. 400, and; Thureau-Dangin, V, 348-50.

[16] Louis Blanc, History of Ten Years (2 vols; London: Chapman and Hall, 1844), II, 483-84. Thiers' 1840 Ministry lasted from 1 March to 29 October.

To leftists in the Chamber of Deputies, Bugeaud, whether or not he intended to, personified the restless, proud military party which remembered with pride Napoleon's grand march across Europe in spite of the lesson of 1815 at Waterloo. The Left opposed Louis Philippe's policy in Algeria and was critical of Bugeaud.

Le National, a leading journal edited by the moderate republican Armand Marrast, commented extensively on the selection of Bugeaud. In a series of editorials, Le National argued that the real force behind the appointment of this "monarchist fanatic" as Governor-General was Guizot, who was anxious to withdraw from Algeria due to British pressure. The Treaty of Tafna was the major cause of French problems in Algeria and now its author, an adequate military subaltern, was Governor-General.[17]

To strengthen its case against the king and Bugeaud, Le National, on 25 January 1841, published a letter allegedly written by Louis Philippe in which he promised to abandon Algiers in order to improve relations with Britain. The Orléanist Journal des Débats challenged the authenticity of the letter and labeled Le National's charges as ridiculous.[18] Later, it was discovered that the letter was purchased by

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[17] Le National, 2-3 janvier 1841.

[18] Le Journal des Débats, 25 mai 1841.

journalists from a prostitute named Eseline de Jough and that it was not authentic.[19]

On 10 March 1841, Le National commented on Bugeaud's speech to French Algerians on the necessity of colonization. Although he admitted that this was a worthy endeavor, the editor expressed little hope that this could be realized because the July Monarchy was far too concerned with placating the English. Shortly afterwards, Le National attacked Bugeaud in an editorial on why deputies should not also exercise public functions, citing him as an example of an absentee deputy who could not attend to his legislative duties while in Algeria.[20] While the editors supported the conquest of Algeria against critics who felt it was folly, they criticized the government for its lack of direction. They were highly critical of Guizot who felt that direct or indirect domination could be decided upon once the conquest was complete, for the editor felt the government should already have plans for the future.[21]

Le National concluded that Bugeaud's appointment as Governor-General represented the continuation of a negative and chaotic policy. Too many officiers de boudoir were being sent to Africa which only demoralized troops. Bugeaud

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[19]T. E. B. Howarth, Citizen-King: The Life of Louis Philippe, King of the French (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1961), pp. 279-89.

[20]Le National, 19 mars 1841.

[21]Ibid., 16 avril 1841.

could hardly be described as an officier de boudoir, but he was the progenitor of the Treaty of Tafna and would likely deliver a mortal blow to France's efforts in Algeria. Le National argued that Guizot was much too intelligent to be ignorant of the ramifications of sending Bugeaud to Algeria, and concluded that the July Monarchy planned a complete withdrawal from North Africa. Because Bugeaud had already denounced the Treaty of Tafna as an illusion and obviously had no intention of withdrawing his forces from Algeria, one must conclude that the above was merely a flimsy attempt to discredit the Ministry.[22] This conclusion is supported by the reaction of Le National late in 1841 when there seemed to be a possibility that Bugeaud would be replaced by General de Rumigny. The editors believed this to be impolitic and heaped praise on Bugeaud for his conduct of the war and his efforts to colonize. When the above proved to be a mere rumor, the attack on Bugeaud resumed.[23]

The Ministry and Bugeaud did have support from some journals. For example, the Orleanist Journal des Débats argued that France should pursue an aggressive policy in Algeria and that a French population should be established there. Convinced that he was not appointed earlier only because of pressure on the War Ministry from leftist newspapers, this journal approved Bugeaud's appointment, depicting

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[22] Ibid., 8 juillet 1841. For Bugeaud's denunciation of the Treaty of Tafna, see below, p. 26.

[23] Ibid., 5 decembre 1841, 3 janvier 1842.

him as a fine general who would not stop until the final victory was achieved. The Journal des Débats denied the charge that Bugeaud had betrayed France at Tafna and supported Guizot's cautious policy against critical journalists and deputies in the Chamber. Guizot was right when he said that when one has been in Algeria for only ten years, one has no right to talk of finishing the task immediately, for this would be the work of a century. France would eventually find glory and profit there.[24]

Republicans and legitimists remained hostile to Bugeaud, and journalists reminded Frenchmen of Bugeaud's earlier statements on the necessity of abandoning North Africa.[25]

In the 1840 session of the Chamber of Deputies, M. Loynes expressed the views of many war critics in a speech on credits for Algeria. Loynes disapproved of continued French presence in Algeria for France had been asking for ten years whether or not she could preserve that possession. Although Loynes did not directly mention Bugeaud in his speech, he found fault with his policies, and at this early date in the history of the conquest, Loynes favored the replacement of military authority in Algeria by civilian authority. The army should concern itself with the conquest

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[24]Le Journal des Débats, 6 janvier 1841, 15 mai 1841.

[25]Ideville, I, 345.

while a civilian government, with adequate funds, concentrated on colonization.[26]

Another critic of total conquest in Algeria was T. Massot, an assistant military intendent who was a prisoner of Abd el Kader from October, 1840, to May, 1841. After his release, he wrote a memorandum of his views in which he advocated equal negotiations for peace and called for respect of the Arab nationality and the Muslim religion. By making peace with Abd el Kader, Massot believed France could exploit the mineral and commercial resources of Algeria. Massot was quite impressed with Abd el Kader's leadership and his desire for peace indicates that even Algerian administrators could not agree on the desirability of total conquest. Massot's views were seconded by Monseigneur Antoine-Adolphe Dupuch, the first Bishop of Algiers, who voiced the opinions of Catholic missionaries in Algeria. Clergymen were preoccupied with conversion rather than domination or colonization, and believed they could function more efficiently in a peaceful environment.[27] Thus, at the beginning of Bugeaud's term as

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[26]France, Chambre Des Députés. Session 1840. Impressions Diverses et Feiulletons. "Opinion de M. de Loynes, Depute du Loiret sur le paragraphe a du Projet d'Adresse au Roi concernant l'Algérie," X (1840), pp. 1, 4, 7, 22.

[27]Paul Fournier, "L'État d'Abd el Kader et sa puissance en 1841 d'apres le rapport du sous-intendant militaire Massot," Revue d'histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, XIV (avril-juin 1967), pp. 122-23. Fournier maintains that Massot's report is extremely valuable, because unlike many officers who gave their views, Massot was not interested in military glory or decorations.

governor-general, France was far from agreement on principles to be followed in Algeria.

When he was appointed Governor-General of Algeria, Bugeaud's objectives for this North African land, which he would steadfastly maintain until 1847, were well established. These objectives resulted from the evolution of his ideas over a period of several years. Complete conquest and military colonization, the core of his objectives, were the result of his dual interests in the military and agriculture. While he was a soldier, devoted to military discipline and the values of a soldier's way of life, he was also a conservative yeoman farmer, convinced that virtue was synonymous to agrarian principles.

His love for the soil emerged during the Bourbon restoration while he was in retirement on his estate "La Durantie." Struck by the wretchedness of the people in his district, he established the first agricultural society in France to improve local cultivation practices because he believed agriculture to be a science of local practice, and that clever men of a locality should select the processes most suitable to their own districts.[28]

Most of his public speeches can be reduced to three major themes: the encouragement of agriculture; maintaining the honor and strength of the army; and; tirades against rioters, republicans, secret societies, and opposition

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[28]Ideville, I, 108-9.

journalists (he called the latter the "aristocracy of the ink bottle").

In a speech before the Chamber of Deputies in 1832, he said:

> I am only a soldier labourer. Make agriculture flourish; turn in that direction a large proportion of the financial and intellectual power of the nation . . . . Make agriculture become a profession, an opening for abilities, that for want of a career, are used to the injury of the country in composing bad writings, Saint Simonism, and a thousand other follies.[29]

In the same speech, he admitted that Algeria might be colonized, but he preferred at that time to concentrate on the transformation of wasteland in Brittany and Bordeaux into cultivated land by using soldiers who could learn the art of war and cultivation at the same time. In that way, the army would not only contribute to the national prosperity, but would also bear a portion of its own financial burden.[30]

In 1834, he again lectured the deputies on the subject of agriculture by maintaining that if government subsidies could be granted for art, music, the theatre, and trade, support could also be given to a life-giving institution such as agriculture and a special ministry should be established for the encouragement of agriculture.[31]

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[29] Ibid., pp. 312-13.

[30] Ibid. Use of the Army in transforming wasteland into cultivated land is suggestive of a Napoleonic idea. See B. D. Goochm The Reign of Napoleon III (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1969), pp. 20-21.

[31] Ibid.

In 1839, he argued that improving the condition of French yeomen would improve morality, and the increased production of grain and cattle would decrease the "crime" of importing cattle and grain into France.[32]

Again in 1840, he told the deputies:

> It [agriculture] certainly is an admirable institution; there cannot be a better or more popular; it unites the poor with the rich; it compels the rich to draw near to the poor for the encouragement of agriculture. I do not hesitate to say that it is the most progressive of all our institutions; and that it alone is worth more than all the political reform so noisily demanded.[33]

Given his preoccupation with agriculture and his insistence upon using it as a near panacea for societal shortcomings, it should have come as no surprise that he gave agriculture an important position in his scheme for Algeria once he was committed to shaping the destiny of that land. As late as 1837, however, he had been opposed to colonization in Algeria, that ". . . great rock . . . unfit for cultivation."[34] Soon afterward, he decided that limited colonization would be possible by using the Spahis (native troops in the French service), in Oran province. These soldiers could marry, live with their families in a house, and serve the dual function of cultivator and warrior.

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[32] Ibid., pp. 315-16.

[33] Ibid., p. 314.

[34] Ibid., p. 345.

This was Bugeaud's first official pronouncement for military colonies in Algeria.[35]

After the Treaty of Tafna (1838), Bugeaud began to play an active role in the discussions about France's future in North Africa. Concerned that colonists should not be societal rejects, but good elements, he recommended military colonies, staffed by men who had finished their term of service.[36]

In a polemic written in 1838, Bugeaud demanded that France choose between civilian and military government in Algeria for the two could not exist side by side. He was very cautious about predicting the success of colonies in North Africa and even about the success of the military campaign. The obstacles to French suzerainty in Algeria were surmountable, but they would demand much attention and a successful government must be established before European colonization could succeed.[37]

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[35]Bugeaud à Ministere de la Guerre, 12 novembre 1837, in Paul Azan L'armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852 (Paris: Plon, 1936), p. 241.

[36]Bugeaud, Mémoire sur notre Etablissement dans la province d'Oran par suite de la paix (Paris: Gaultier-Laguionie, 1838). In the same memoir, Bugeaud expressed his dislike of Jews and advocated their expulsion from Algeria.

[37]Bugeaud, Simple Document sur l'Afrique par un officier attaché à L'armée d'Afrique, sous le premier commandement de maréchal Clausel (Paris: Herhan et Bimont, 1838), p. 3, and; Bugeaud, Quelques reflexions sur trois questions fondamentales de notre etablissement en Afrique (Paris: A Guyot et Scribe, 1846), p. 31.

Bugeaud's decision to press for military colonies in North Africa stemmed from earlier similar proposals for France.[38] In 1840, he published a pamphlet in which he proposed to establish cavalry farmers in France. France needed a large standing army for security. In peacetime, 45,000 cavalrymen should be maintained because they could not be trained as quickly as infantrymen in case of a national emergency. The most economical way of maintaining a large peacetime cavalry was to place them on farms where they could work four or five hours per day. An agricultural specialist could be placed with the soldiers to teach them the essentials of farming. A little farming would be no great burden for such troops, for as Benjamin Franklin had said, if everyone worked intelligently for two hours a day, they could produce everything necessary for life.[39]

Just as Bugeaud had not originally approved of colonization in Algeria, he likewise had not believed that complete subjugation was wise. By 1840, however, he was committed to total conquest. In a debate before the Chamber of Deputies, he argued that restricted occupation was chimerical: "While you stay in your little zone, you do not attack your enemy in the heart."[40]

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[38]See above, p. 22.

[39]Bugeaud, De l'etablissement des Troupes a Cheval, dans de grandes fermes (Paris: E. Briere 1840), pp. 5-7.

[40]Ideville, I, 298-99.

Bugeaud came to believe that France had three alternatives vis-a-vis Algeria: abandonment, maritime occupation, or total conquest. By presenting the above as the only alternatives, Bugeaud denounced his earlier policy of partial occupation which he favored at the time of the Treaty of Tafna. Partial occupation was now denounced as an "illusion." Abandonment was impossible because too much energy had already been spent; maritime occupation was unfeasible because there were no Gibraltars on the North African coast that could be guarded by a small number of men and supplied by sea. To seek mere maritime occupation would be to suffocate the European populations concentrated in coastal cities such as Algiers and Oran. The only feasible alternative, therefore, was absolute domination. "The possession of Algiers [sic] is a mistake; but as you choose to commit it, as it is impossible for you not to commit it, you must commit it grandly, for that is the only means of getting any profit out of it."[41]

He then outlined his proposals. In wartime, after the enemy army has been defeated, it is natural to seize population, trade, and industrial centers. As none of the above existed in Algeria, the only thing worth capturing was the agricultural interest and this, he concluded, was the only way to subdue the country. Powerful troop columns, seven thousand strong, could be established near the desert

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[41] Ibid.

to keep the natives from sowing, reaping their harvests, and pasturing their cattle, and as there was no corn or pasture in the desert, the Arabs would capitulate or starve.[42]

To secure the conquest, the next step was to establish colonies. It mattered little whether the choice would be military or civilian colonies, but they must be under military organization, for colonists must be great warriors in such a country. This proposal was a decisive factor in the ultimate decision to appoint Bugeaud Governor-General of Algeria, for although officials of the July Monarchy might not adhere to every aspect of his scheme, he was the only one of the generals in contention who was loyal to Louis Philippe and had publicized a definite plan of conquest.[43] Six months after this speech, he was governor-general.

When the new commander arrived in Algiers (February 1841), he stressed again that he had initially opposed the complete subjugation of Algeria, but since France was committed to conquest, he was willing to conform to the desires of the nation. Military victory, however, was insufficient:

> But the war now indispensable is not the object. The conquest will be barren without colonization. I shall therefore be an ardent colonizer, for I think there is less glory in gaining battles than in founding something of permanent utility for France.[44]

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[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., p. 301.

[44] Ibid., p. 348, and; Moniteur Algérien: Journal officiel de la colonie, 23 février 1841.

When asked why he moved from a lukewarm position to that of an ardent colonizer, he replied:

> Sir, it is very agreeable and very pleasant for a man to marry a woman, young, rich attractive, with whom he is desparately in love. Where is the wonder if he behaves well to her? But what would you say of a man compelled to marry an ugly woman, poor, and uncomely, whom he could not abide; what would you say of that man if he . . . was never forgetful of any duty or any respect towards her? Well, sir! I will be that husband to Algeria, this new kind of gallant, and I will treat her so well, surround her with so much attention and love, that she shall be compelled to become young, attractive, and beautiful.[45]

More interest in colonization for Algeria emerged in France in 1841 than ever before. On 13 August 1841, Soult wrote Bugeaud for advice on the subject of colonization, requesting the means of establishing a European population in Algeria with as many Frenchmen as possible, large enough to create economic interests and production which would compliment the security forces there. Soult then reviewed the various proposals which had already been made and reminded Bugeaud of the latter's opinion that military colonization could succeed and that it would prepare the way for true colonization. Soult was willing to agree to the advantages of this system, but dreaded the expense of such a project and warned Bugeaud against making commitments that the state could not keep. Soult then asked Bugeaud to write a detailed proposal for military colonies.[46]

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[45]Ideville, I, 345-46.

[46]Archives Nationales. Fond Colonial. Series F[80]. Soult MSS, "Sur le colonisation et l'assistance à lui preter par l'Administration," Soult à Bugeaud, 13 aout 1841, carton 2.

Bugeaud's memoir on this subject, Des Moyens de Conserver et d'utiliser Cette Conquête, included an argument for the use of both civilians and soldiers in colonies.[47] In the interior and along well-established lines of communication (such as the cities of Oran and Algiers), he would place civilian colonists. In frontier outpost areas (such as Tlemcen, Mascara, Constantine and Médéah), military colonists should be installed to establish an effective cordon which would make serious revolts almost impossible. The result would be an abundance of corn, fruit, oil, silk, fuels, and cattle for colonists, and an excess for exportation to France.[48]

Bugeaud prepared the way for his form of colonization through a propaganda campaign by writing pamphlets, journal articles, letters to influential people, and even proposing toasts at dinners on the benefits of his plan. The result of this campaign was a considerable interest in colonization. In 1841, a scientific expedition accompanied Bugeaud into the Medeah for the purpose of measuring the extent to which the natural resources of that area could be exploited. The expedition returned, praising the great forests, magnificant vineyards, and the richness of Algerian resources.[49] In the

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[47]Bugeaud, Des moyens de conserver et d'utiliser cette conquête (Paris: Dentu, 1842). This is a 128 page memoir.

[48]Guizot, Memoirs, VI, 396-97.

[49]Gory de Saint-Vincent, "Notice sur les travaux de la Commission scientifique de l'Algérie," Comptes Rendus hebdomandaires de l'académie des sciences de Paris, XII (juin-juillet, 1841), 1e, pp. 901-2.

same year, three deputies, Claude François Philibert Tircuir Corcelles, Alexis Charles Henri Maurice Clerel de Tocqueville, and Gustave de Beaumont de la Bonninière, went to Algeria on a fact-finding mission. Tocqueville became ill in Algiers and Beaumont stayed behind with him, but Corcelles accompanied Bugeaud on the first expedition against Mascara. The two men became friends during the expedition, and Corcelles became a useful intermediary between Bugeaud and the Chamber by notifying Bugeaud who his supporters and opponents were.[50] Tocqueville and Beaumont, however, remained critical of Bugeaud's policies throughout his tenure in Algeria.

To enact his proposals for colonization, Bugeaud issued a circular in November, 1841, making land available to soldiers whose term of service was about to expire. He appealed personally to 800 men who were about to be discharged, beseeching them to become colonists. Unfortunately for him, his plea was not very successful, for only 63 of the 800 asked to become colonists.[51] Bugeaud justified the above action by stating that his predecessor, Valée, had found no military colonists because he could promise them nothing. If a soldier had the opportunity to receive an untransferable estate and a family, the idea of becoming a soldier-farmer might be more appealing.[52]

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[50]Thureau-Dangin, V, 350-51.

[51]Ideville, II, 35-6.

[52]Bugeaud à Soult, 26 novembre 1841, in Demontés, p. 15.

Undaunted by the small response, Bugeaud proceeded to a new colony at Harrach to inaugurate as he put it, "the feast of husbandry." He dismounted long enough to plow a furrow to illustrate to the Arabs in attendance that this was not his first experience with a plow.[53]

As soon as additional areas were conquered, steps were taken to establish an administrative system, build roads, and colonize. One good example of this in 1841 was Orléansville (El Esnam), where soldiers built roads connecting it with other outposts. Orléansville was established as both a military and trading post. Natives in the area were contracted to build gardens, barracks, and the like, and soldiers cultivated the gardens.[54]

Bugeaud had been highly critical of the administrative apparatus his predecessors had installed in Algeria at the time he became governor-general. He believed it to be disorganized and anarchistic. Furthermore, an administration based on the French one, which served a highly civilized society, was wrong for Algeria. There were not enough administrators who spoke the native tongue or who understood Arab customs and laws. In the military administrative system, there were about thirty officers who were qualified, and in the civilian system, there were only four.[55]

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[53]Ideville, II, 35-6.

[54]Ibid., pp. 68-71.

[55]Bugeaud, Quelques reflexions sur trois questions . . ., p. 28.

In order to create a more effective administrative system, Bugeaud re-established the Arab Bureau in August, 1841. The Bureau had been created in 1837 by Governor-General Damrémont, but was abolished in 1839 when it proved to be ineffective.[56] Bugeaud looked upon the Arabs as a simple people to be treated kindly and equitably, forgetting that the conquered natives regarded Frenchmen as oppressors. Thus, the Arab Bureau would act in the native's interest to protect them from land-hungry colonists. Besides, a director was needed to coordinate relations among tribes and between the French and natives. Also, a hierarchy of command was needed for efficiency because an effective bureau would illustrate the proof of conquest to the natives.[57] The Arab Bureau was to be a hierarchical system under Bugeaud's command. Directly under the governor-general, a central Director of Arab affairs was appointed, then provincial directors, and on the local level, individual Arab bureaus, first and second class, depending on the size and importance of the district. A Code d'Indigenes was also to be drawn up to outline procedure and complete the bureaucratization of administration.[58]

By 1844, Bugeaud had established Arab Bureaus in each division under the immediate authority of the general in

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[56]Azan, p. 371.

[57]Ideville, II, 291, and; Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 534-35.

[58]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 534-35. The code was put into effect on 1 February 1844.

command. Duties of the bureau included settling tribal quarrels; the administration of French and native justice (with native judges for the Arabs); the assessment and collection of taxes; and, supervision of education. The army oriented bureaus were never popular with French colons who felt they were too arbitrary.[59]

Bugeaud's tactical and strategic objectives for Algeria were initiated in 1841 and completed by 1847. They included the establishment of three lines of outposts. First, coastal ports were established for use as bases of operation for the army where reserves could be quickly transported from one province to another by sea. Second, manned posts were to be established in a central line between the desert and the coast. Third, line posts would be created in or near the desert to serve as bases of advanced operations for colonists, to aid transport to these areas, and to keep natives obedient in the southern region.[60] By the end of 1841, Bugeaud, in keeping with the above objectives, had established bases of operation in the central line at Medeah and Milianah in Algiers province, and at Mostaganem in Oran province. Furthermore, he improved communication links between camps, requisitioned mules from France, and increased the meat ration for his soldiers.[61]

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[59]Azan, p. 371.

[60]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 518.

[61]Azan, pp. 212-13.

The serious rift between Bugeaud and the War Ministry which plagued him throughout his tenure in Algeria was developing by the fall of 1841. Bugeaud complained to Guizot that Governor-General Valée had obtained everything he requested, but that he had been unable to acquire anything. "People think that we have done little because we have not drawn up pompous reports of trifling engagements. But they ought to know that we cannot have battles of Austerlitz in Africa, and that the great merit of this war consists not in gaining victories, but in sustaining with patience and firmness, fatigue, inclemency of climate, and privations."[62] Although Bugeaud denied it, his bulletins about the progress of the war were as exaggerated as his predecessor's.

Bugeaud complained to Soult of poor planning and little understanding of the Algerian campaign on the part of the French government, and that he could not carry out the mission of conquest and colonization without sufficient troops and money. The lack of understanding toward the natives had resulted in the emergence of Arab nationalism which made the conquest even more difficult. To achieve his mission, Bugeaud believed he needed a permanent army with military posts, depots, money, a tax system, and a simply organized, but functioning government for Algeria.[63]

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[62] Bugeaud à Guizot, 6 novembre 1841, in Guizot, Memoirs, VI, 88-90.

[63] Bugeaud à Soult, 26 novembre 1841, in Demontés, p. 23.

Bugeaud and Soult often openly disagreed, and by 1842, Soult warned Bugeaud that he was considering the reduction of the Algerian force due to criticism from deputies and journalists on expenditures in Algeria. Bugeaud reacted by publishing a brochure arguing against the reduction of the Algerian force. This pamphlet only served to intensify the rift between Soult and Bugeaud, for the War Minister considered Bugeaud's action an act of insubordination.[64]

Despite the unfavorable reaction of many to his appointment, the lack of agreement as to long-range objectives between Bugeaud and officials such as Guizot, and the ever-widening gap between the governor-general and the war ministry, great progress was made in Bugeaud's first year of command. The French army had taken the offensive and robbed Abd el Kader of the initiative.

On 27 November, 1841, Bugeaud wrote to Guizot that the campaign was far from finished, but he believed the most difficult work was accomplished. Most of the Arab depots of war had been destroyed, their best, most fertile districts had been captured, and firm bases had been established by French troops in the interior. Bugeaud also believed that Abd el Kader, now on the defensive, had lost the respect of his countrymen. The French had proved false Abd el Kader's statement: ". . . they the French resemble fishes. They can only live by the sea; their war

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[64]Thureau-Dangin, V, 350.

has a short range and they cannot reach you."[65]

Bugeaud responded:

> We have this year penetrated to their most remote haunts, which has stricken the populations with consternation. We are also beginning to find allies. . . . We have reason to believe that the defection of the South will spread; the submission of that portion of the Douars and Smelas which had always remained faithful to the Emir, and was composed of the most fanatical families, is an important event, since in addition to four hundred horsemen which we have gained, it is an excellent symptom of the enfeeblement of the Arab chief.[66]

Tackdempt, Saida, Boghar, and Thaza, all important enemy holdings, were captured in 1841. Bugeaud had begun the year with sword in hand and ended it by driving a plow on the banks of the Harrach.[67] The old warrior realized the task was far from finished, but he believed the worst was over. In fact, his struggle had only begun, for although many French military victories would follow, Bugeaud's plans for colonization would encounter stiff resistance in France.

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[65]Guizot, Memoirs, VI, 393.

[66]Bugeaud à Guizot, 27 novembre 1841, ibid.

[67]Ideville, II, 35-6.

Chapter III

1842: A NEW IMPULSE TO COLONIZE

Eighteen Forty-Two was a year of considerable impulse for colonization as more work was done in that year in the interests of colonization than in the previous twelve years of French presence in Algeria. Nine new villages were completed in 1842 and many more initiated.[1] Moreover, Bugeaud presented his first formal proposal for agricultural colonies in 1842 by expanding his reply to Soult's request in the previous year for advice on colonization in Algeria. The result was the publication of l'Algérie: Des Moyens de Conserver et d'Utiliser cette Conquête (Paris: Dentu, 1842). It was also published due to a new source of concern for Bugeaud--the demand for the reduction of troop strength in Algeria. The feeling that the conquest was virtually over and that so many troops in North Africa were an unnecessary expense came from debates in the Chamber and was even evident in the correspondence of the Minister of War.[2]

Bugeaud's pamphlet caused considerable reaction and prompted many to express their views on the type of colonization to be used in the new French territory. Soult was outraged by the publication for he considered it an act of insubordination on Bugeaud's part. Guizot felt that Soult's

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[1] Ideville, II, 47.

[2] See, for example, Le National, 31 janvier, 14 fevrier 1842; Ideville, II, 90-91; Demontés, pp. 178-79.

anger was justified, but did not reprimand Bugeaud in any way until late in 1842.[3]

In l'Algérie: Des Moyens de Conserver et d'Utiliser cette Conquête, Bugeaud argued that the conquest had advanced to a point where it was essential to consider how best to profit from it. First, he argued with those who would reduce the size of the army after the conquest was completed, for the natives of Algeria understood only force and would be in constant rebellion without the presence of a large army. While the army was providing this preventive service, it could prepare the way for colonization by constructing roads, railroads, and bridges. Each batallion could be given the task of constructing a village and preparing land for cultivation which could be given to liberated soldiers who wished to remain in North Africa. He also hinted that infantrymen in France not indispensable to the protection of the fatherland could be sent to Algeria to serve as auxiliaries in the villages. They could be sent back to France quickly if they were needed there.[4]

Bugeaud then presented the case for military over civilian colonists because the former were much better disciplined, an essential factor in Algeria. He promised not to impose Prussian military discipline on his soldier-farmers,

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[3]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 140. See below, p. 48 for Guizot's reprimand.

[4]Thomas Robert Bugeaud, L'Algérie: Des moyens de conserver et d'utiliser cette conquête (Paris: Dentu, 1842).

but he did not feel it unreasonable in such a menacing land to place them under the command of an army officer, and to require them to be familiar with basic field tactics and be good marksmen. Moreover, military colonization need not be permanent, for by the time the original soldier-farmers retired, perhaps their offspring would not be threatened by the Arab. Algeria need not be colonized exclusively by the military, for civilians could settle in safe areas while military settlements could be located in areas most susceptible to Arab attack.[5]

The type of government and administration chosen would also have a considerable affect on French Algeria. Bugeaud argued that he would favor the creation of a civilian government if there were a half-million European settlers there, but only 40,000 Europeans resided in Algeria in 1842, and most of them were in Algiers and four other villages along the coast (Oran, Mostaganem, Philippeville, and Bône).[6] On the other hand, there were 75,000 soldiers in Algeria who functioned as warriors and laborers. Because the military was the only group capable of providing such services in the foreseeable future, it was logical to have a military government.[7]

A hostile native population was another reason for military government as such people could be controlled only

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[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

by military men. A military governor, familiar with civilian laws and needs could serve and protect civilian colonists as fairly and efficiently as a civilian governor.[8]

In order to prove that his arguments were rational, Bugeaud undertook the first practical attempts at military colonization in Algeria in 1842 with the founding of nine villages. With the excuse that he had no civilians at his disposal, Bugeaud filled the new villages with soldiers. Three of these villages were located near Algiers. Fouka was settled by soldiers whose service-term had expired while Mared and Mâelmâ were populated with soldiers who still had three years to serve and who would be completely free at the end of the three-year period. While they remained in active service, they would do their work on a collective basis, the land being held in common. After their term of service expired, the land would be divided among them. General Bugeaud stressed communal farming because he believed that only a combined group effort could assure success. Rugged individualism in Algeria was not sufficient to guarantee a successful colony.[9]

Each of the villages established in 1842 was to be self-sustaining. The ultimate objective was to cover the country with small villages since massive concentrations in any one place were unnecessary.[10]

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[8] Ibid.

[9] Demontés, p. 353.

[10] Ideville, I, 355.

As soon as additional areas were pacified, more settlements were established. Soldiers built roads connecting new villages with other outposts, and natives in the area were hired to clear land for gardens, build barracks and other essentials. Soldiers cultivated the gardens until the village was ready for the soldier-colonists.[11]

The Governor-General believed that a soldier-colonist with a family had the best potential for remaining on the land permanently. Therefore, while awaiting a general measure for putting his plan into effect, he created the military villages mentioned above. He then asked the mayor of Toulan to find wives for his colonists. Soldiers would be allowed to go to France to marry, and as soon as they were married, the government would pay the expenses for the return trip and provide the necessary household furnishings.[12]

Critics of Bugeaud's plan appeared immediately. They agreed that the family was paramount to the success of any colony, but hasty marriages were not conducive to family solidarity. Maréchal Soult and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies opposed Bugeaud's experiments, but among the most hostile opponents was the government loan commission (commission des crédits), which believed the plan to be financially unsound. Even Guizot, the Governor-General's chief supporter in the ministry, opposed the idea.[13]

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[11] Ibid., II, 68-71.

[12] Thureau-Dangin, VI, 368.

[13] Ibid., p. 369.

Bugeaud's experimental colonies put pressure on the Soult-Guizot Ministry to make a decision on colonization. The result was the creation, in the Spring of 1842, of a Commission of Colonization, named by the Minister of War to consider military colonies as a possibility for Algeria. The commission of six included four officers and two civilians.[14] This appeared to be a fair and competent group to study and evaluate Bugeaud's proposals, especially since military men dominated the committee and would not likely reject the idea of military colonies without serious consideration.

On 3 June 1842, the commission presented its first report, suggesting that Bugeaud's military colonization would have been fit for conditions the Romans might have confronted or for contemporary Russian social conditions, but this type of colonization was incompatable to French civilization. The commission admitted that it would be proper for the military to prepare the way for colonization by rendering land fit for cultivation, and that it would be appropriate to give such land to soldiers who had been released from active service as their military experience would help them to protect their colony. This however, declared the commission, was not the same as military colonization, and was as

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[14]Demontés, pp. 167-68. The officers on the Commission were Generals Schramm, de Berthois, Lyautey, and Bellonet. The civilians were Desmousseaux de Givré, a deputy, and M. Lingay, a maitre des requêtes.

far as they wished to progress toward it. Thus, the commission favored Bugeaud's suggestion of giving soldiers whose term of service was complete every opportunity to settle in Algeria, but they rejected Bugeaud's bid for military colonies by refusing to sanction the use of soldiers or to any militaristic organization in the colonies.[15]

The liberal press continued its barrage of criticism against governmental policy in Algeria throughout 1842. Le National called for a real plan of colonization to replace Bugeaud's speculative experimentation. There were many young, unemployed engineers and geographers in France who should be sent to Algeria to prepare the way for colonization.[16]

In February, two articles appeared in Le National by General Franciade-Fleurus Duvivier (1794-1848), who suggested that colonists should own the land and that the governor should be a civilian. The army could remain in Algeria to protect the colonist from the Arab because the latter would never keep the peace without the presence of force. The colonist should cooperate with the soldier to complete the conquest and to defend it afterwards.[17] In the following

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[15]"Rapport du 3 juin 1842, fair par le Sous-Commission a la Commission plenière," as cited in ibid., p. 168.

[16]Le National, 31 janvier 1842.

[17]Le National, 14, 18 fevrier 1842.

month, Le National chided Guizot for allegedly gaining the permission of the English to keep Algeria, and challenged his right to seek British approval of a project that concerned only the French.[18]

The editors of Le National rejected military colonization because of the problem of transferring ownership of the land to individual soldier-colonists once their term of service had expired, and even questioned the legality of taking land from the Arabs in order to establish colonies. These journalists concluded that other means of colonizing must be found.[19]

Several anonymous articles appeared in the reform-minded journal, Le Siècle, in 1842. The author asked why it was necessary to maintain an 80,000 man army in Algeria if it were true as Bugeaud maintained that the Arabs had been defeated. Now was the time to consider the question of colonization and colonists would only suffer from military rule since their civil rights were always cast aside under such regimes. Hence, military and arbitary rule should be withdrawn from Algeria.[20]

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[18]Le National, 6 mars 1842. Apparently this charge resulted from an article in Le Moniteur, January 20, 1842, in which Aberdeen was quoted as saying to Guizot: "I therefore look upon your position in Africa as a fait accompli, against which I have no further objection to make." Aberdeen to Guizot, as cited in Swain, pp. 126-27.

[19]Le National, 21 septembre 1842.

[20]Demontés, pp. 178-79. Le Siècle supported the idea of constitutional monarchy, but stood for liberal reforms such as the extension of the franchise.

Interest in colonization reached a point in 1842 where a number of men began openly to express their opinions about North Africa. For example, Lieutenant A. G. Rozey, an official of the Colonial Society and a member of the Algerian citizen militia, spoke to the Chamber of Deputies and blamed the failure of the French conquest on governmental instability and so many new governors, each having a different system. The Muslim would accept French suzerainty only when he became convinced of French determination to remain in Algeria. He then denounced as unsound Bugeaud's plans for military colonization.[21]

In July, Le National published a letter written by a civilian colon in Algeria, Michot de Vernoux. Claiming to represent a great number of colons, he complained of Bugeaud's arbitrary rule in Algeria. He claimed that Bugeaud threatened Rozey with deportation if he did not refrain from his critical remarks. He went on to accuse Bugeaud of violating orders, laws and court decisions. The angry colon charged that Bugeaud was not satisfied to work for the general domination of Algeria, but that he wanted to take complete possession of the country through his particular scheme of

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[21]A. G. Rozey, Mémoire aux Chambre Legislative: Esquisse rapide et historique sur l'administration de l'Algérie depuis 1830, et sur la direction qu'y donne le Général Bugeaud, etc. (Marseille, Marius Olive, 1842), 6-7. In Tracts Relating to Algeria, 1834-1848, British Museum.

cultivation and colonization and was willing to use arbitrary rule to achieve this.[22]

Bugeaud was not without supporters in 1842. Jean François Albert de Pouget, Marquis de Nadaillac, presenting his views on the subject, suggested that the chief responsibility for failure to achieve objectives in Algeria was not the fault of the military or the governor. The fault was the Chamber of Deputies because this body had not granted enough men or funds to assure the conquest.[23]

Adolph Thiers, a critic of the Soult-Guizot Ministry, but a champion of Algerian conquest, broke his silence of more than one year on the Algerian question, and spoke to the Chamber of Deputies on 4 April 1842. He favored complete conquest, the maintenance of existing troop strength, and colonization for he said he had always been convinced that the only way to seriously attack Arab nationalism was for France to become master of Africa. For the time being, Thiers chose not to become involved in the dispute over the type of settlements Algeria should have, and made no mention of military or civilian colonies. He was most concerned at the time with the necessity of constructing a port at Algiers. This, he believed, would help the conquest by providing easy access to arriving troops and colonists and

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[22]Michot de Vernoux à rédacteur de Le National, 18 juillet 1842.

[23]Jean François Albert de Pouget, Marquis de Nadaillac, Memoire sur l'Algérie presenté à la Conference d'Orsay, 18 janvier 1842 (Paris: H. Fournier et C^ie, n.d.). In Tracts Relating to Algeria, 1834-1848, British Museum.

would make Algiers easier to defend in case of attack from the sea. Thiers also used the occasion of his speech to condemn the ministry for its inertia in dealing with the war in Algeria.[24]

Bugeaud, encouraged by Thiers' speech, wrote to Thiers to convince him of the correctness of his campaign, and invited the politician to visit Algeria. The Governor-General assured Thiers that his mobile warfare had triumphed over the Arabs and that the serious war was over. To conserve and utilize the conquest, military government was the only way to control a people whose customs and religion were so different from French practices. The army was the only institution capable of the great work of dominating the country, opening commercial routes, and accelerating colonization. He sought Thiers' help in assuring that this work would be continued.[25]

The general also continued to seek the support of his mainstay in the cabinet, François Guizot. Guizot wrote to Bugeaud in September 1842, and pledged his continued confidence and support and stated his belief that the public was beginning to rely upon Bugeaud's skill in conducting the African campaign (there is little evidence to support this).

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[24]Adolph Thiers, "Discours sur le Port d'Alger Prononcee le 4 avril 1842 à la Chambre des Députés," Discours parlementaires de M. Thiers (Paris: Calmann, 1880), VI, 84-98.

[25]Bugeaud to Thiers, 27 juin 1842. Bibliotheque Nationale MSS. Nouv. Acq. fr. 20.616, folio 53.

Guizot's letter reveals some impatience with the General for he scolded Bugeaud for publishing Des Moyens de Conserver et d'Utiliser cette Conquête, and reminded him that deeds were more authoritative than words. Again, Guizot insisted that the work of securing and completing the military campaign should come first, then territorial establishments could be considered. He was convinced of the necessity of military action in Algeria while Europe remained at peace.[26]

Bugeaud responded to Guizot's letter, maintaining that he wrote not to glorify his deeds, but to prevent the reduction of the army in Africa, and argued that Soult's indignation over the publication of such material was unwarranted and that Soult had no right to admonish him publicly.[27]

To prevent the publication of subsequent polemics, Soult ordered military personnel to refrain from publishing their views in pamphlets or newspapers.[28] Bugeaud avoided the ban, however, by publishing articles anonymously. For example, an anonymous letter appeared in Le National in December which disclaimed the accusations made against the Bugeaud administration in Algeria, and complained of the

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[26]Guizot to Bugeaud, 20 septembre 1842, in Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 140-41.

[27]Bugeaud to Guizot, 18 october 1842, in Ideville, II, 50-51. Bugeaud's reference to Soult's public admonishments probably refers to an article in the Moniteur parisien accusing Bugeaud of being undisciplined and having little propriety.

[28]Le National, 28 decembre 1842.

prejudiced views of Le National's North African reporter. The arguments and style of this letter are unquestionably Bugeaud's.[29]

On another occasion, Bugeaud openly defied Soult's orders by writing a letter to the editor of the Siècle, accusing Alexis de Tocqueville of presenting an unfair assessment of the Algerian campaign. Since Tocqueville had appeared once only briefly on the coast of North Africa (twenty days), he was incompetent to make public statements about North Africa.[30] Bugeaud believed that Tocqueville had written a series of anonymous articles criticizing the Algerian campaign. In fact, it proved not to be Tocqueville, but his colleague, Gustave de Beaumont.[31]

As the debates over conduct of the war and the future of Algeria increased in intensity, Bugeaud lost an important supporter. More significantly, the security of the Orléanist dynasty was shaken by an unfortunate accident. The Crown Prince, Ferdinand-Philippe, duc d'Orléans (1810-1842), was killed in a carriage accident on 13 July on the road to Neuilly. The duc d'Orléans had been the most active and popular of Louis Philippe's children. A younger brother, Francois-Ferdinand-Philippe-Louis-Marie d'Orléans, Prince de Joinville (1818-1900), bemoaned the loss, suggesting that

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Bugeaud à rédacteur du Siècle, 14 decembre 1842.

[31] Demontés, p. 180. See above, p. 44 for the content of de Beaumont's letters.

the royal family had looked to Orléans for advice and hinted of the senility of his seventy-year-old father. The Crown Prince had been the chef de demain to all Orleanist supporters.[32]

The death of the duc d'Orléans was a loss to Bugeaud because the prince had championed the cause of the military. He believed the military was the vanguard of French civilization and colonization. The African army had seen him in action and regarded him highly.[33]

With the death of the king's eldest son, two younger brothers, Joinville and Henri-Eugene-Philippe-Louis d'Orléans, duc d'Aumale (1822-1897), partially filled the void, for both sought glory in battle. Joinville, an admiral in the French navy, would play a role in the bombardment of Tangiers in 1845, and Aumale saw considerable action in Algeria.[34] Both influenced the development of French Algeria, but they lacked the charismatic quality of their deceased brother and the royal family never regained the glitter d'Orléans had provided.

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[32]François-Ferdinand-Philippe-Louis-Marie d'Orléans, Prince de Joinville, Memoirs (Vieux souvenirs) of the Prince de Joinville. Trans. Lady Mary Loyd (New York and London: Macmillan, 1895), pp. 236-37.

[33]Ferdinand-Philippe, duc d'Orléans, cited in ibid., pp. 239-40.

[34]See below, Chapters Four and Five, for the role these men played in the development of Algeria.

Both Aumale and Joinville viewed Algeria as a place to win glory for themselves and their family, and thus to strengthen the foundations of the dynasty.[35]

Although Aumale had seen some action in Algeria prior to 1842, he played no important role until he returned there in October 1842 as a general. Aumale favored military colonies, for he believed that soldier-farmers, organized in legions and established in the heart of Algeria, could build roads, houses, and cultivate the land. The continued presence of such soldiers would maintain peace after civilian colonists came. Ultimately the best means of colonization would be to fuse military, civilian, and Arab colonists together.[36]

Aumale depended upon his old tutor, Alfred-Auguste Cuvillier-Fleury to keep him informed of important events and opinion at home while he was in Algeria. Cuvillier-Fleury wrote to Aumale in 1842 and hinted at the royal family's dissatisfaction with Bugeaud because he did not provide ample news of the campaign to the king or the ministry. Cuvillier-Fleury urged Aumale to provide good, objective news of the campaign and cautioned his pupil to be patient and to keep his ideas on colonization to himself

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[35]Henri Eugéne Philippe Louis d'Orléans, duc d'Aumale, Correspondance du Duc d'Aumale et de Cuvillier-Fleury (Paris: Plon, 1910), I, pp. v-vi. Alfred-Auguste Civillier-Fleury was Aumale's tutor and adviser.

[36]Ibid.

since he doubted the government had the force to accomplish such objectives, especially since the chances for success of such plans were so contestable.[37] He also warned Aumale that there was still a large opposition party to the grande occupation in the Chamber of Deputies.[38]

Aumale seemed anxious to get on well with Bugeaud and wanted to be treated as any other officer of his rank.[39] Considering their temperaments and Aumale's status as a member of the Royal Family, the two men got along quite well. Aumale, only twenty years old in 1842, realized that there was much to be learned from Bugeaud. He believed that Bugeaud had been the most successful of the governor-generals to date for he had accomplished more in his brief tenure than all of his predecessors. Aumale admitted that Bugeaud had his faults, that he lacked perspicacity and tact, but he was an active, energetic, serious man of integrity: ". . . j'ai pour lui [Bugeaud] une haute estime et une affection sincère."[40]

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[37]Cuvillier-Fleury à Aumale, 26 janvier 1843, ibid., pp. 198-104.

[38]Cuvillier-Fleury à Aumale 16 fevrier 1843, ibid., pp. 111-15.

[39]Aumale à Soult, 25 septembre 1842, Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult Maréchal Soult: Correspondance politique et familière avec Louis Philippe et la Famille Royale par Louis et Antoinette Saint Pierre (Paris: Plon, 1959), pp. 199-200.

[40]Aumale à Cuvillier-Fleury, 2 janvier et 4 fevrier 1843, Correspondance du Duc d'Aumale, I, 91-95; 109-11.

There was considerable friction between old and young officers in Algeria by 1842. The quarrel seemed to be based on age and experience, for while many of the elder officers had battle experience from previous campaigns, the young officers experienced their first combat in Algeria. One young officer, Colonel Francois-Joseph-Lucien de Montagnac, complained of these "famous relics" who were tormented by jealousy and would never consider following the advice of younger men such as Changarnier, Louis-Christophe-Leon Juchault de Lamoricière (1806-1865), and Marie-Alphonse Bedeau (1804-1863).[41]

The animosity between old and young officers intensified during Bugeaud's term as governor-general as the commander-in-chief was regarded as one of the "relics" while most of his subordinates were of the younger class. This hostility was more obvious by 1843 and must be taken into account in considering the destiny of Algeria.[42] The ill-will among the officers, instability of the Algerian military administration, and the fact that patronage was still in existence caused significant changes of command for the French army in the various provinces of Algeria. This lack of continuity hindered the campaign. The turnover was so

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[41]Montagnac à Elizé de Montagnac, 22 novembre 1842, in François Joseph Lucien de Montagnac, Lettres d'un soldat, neuf années de campagne en Afrique, correspondance inédités du colonal de Montagnac publiée par son neveu E. de Montagnac (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1885), pp. 274-75.

[42]See below, Chapter Four.

considerable it prompted Montagnac to comment: "L'Afrique est un veritable kaleïdoscope."[43]

Despite the growing flood of criticism and signs of unrest among the officer corps, progress was made in Algeria in 1842. By the end of the year, the province of Tittery as far as the desert was conquered. In the Kabyles as far as Tenez, tribes were organized under a chieftain loyal to France, and in the Atlas region, Oran, Tlemcen, Mascara, and Mostagenem were secured. Newly built bridges, roads, and the like insured lines of communication.[44]

Abd el Kader, the elusive Arab chieftain, had lost most of his strongholds by the end of the year, but he remained at bay and continued to harass and frustrate the French.

Also, by 1842, some feared the symptoms of an oft-repeated phenomenon in French history were present--the possibility that a man on horseback would rebel against civil authority. General Duvivier warned:

> Est-il d'un bon calcul politique de mettre une si grande armée à la disposition d'un général investi, en ce qui le concerne, de tous les pouvoirs de Gouverneur et de tous ceux que les lois donnent dans de certaines circonstances? Car ce n'est pas là une armée agissant près d'une frontière territoriale, c'est une armée isolée de nous, couverte pas la mer, ayant à sa disposition un royaume inabordable, muni de tout ce

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[43]Montagnac, as cited in Azan, L"Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 356.

[44]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 522-23.

qu'il nouvelles il pourrait répondre, quelles alliances il pourrait accepter?[45]

As the year came to an end, Bugeaud prepared for battle against what he considered the new enemy. The most formidable foes were no longer in Algeria, but in Paris. These opponents, in Bugeaud's mind, served no useful purpose and cast shadows on everything he tried to accomplish by alienating the public and even inspiring doubts in the minds of Louis Philippe and his ministers. "These speeches come to me, and I sometimes see traces of them in the official correspondence. I am in a rage; but what can be done? I console myself by thinking that generals have always been subject to such mortifications."[46]

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[45]Franciade-Fleurus Duvivier, Quatorze Observations sur le dernier mémoires du général Bugeaud (Paris; 1842), p. 82.

[46]Bugeaud to Gardère, 12 November 1842, in Ideville, II, 52.

Chapter IV

1843: THE ENEMY: ABD EL KADER OR LES BEDOUINS DE PARIS?

> Il [Bugeaud] ne pouvait pas supporter les piqures de la presse, et la presse, qui connaissait cette susceptibilité, en abusait. Que de fois l'ai-je vu, arrivant, le soit, sous la tente d'Yusuf, en froissant dans sa mains des coupures de journaux! La moindre attaque le mettait hors de lui. Ni prières, ni remonstrances, ni ordres formels du ministre ne pouvaient l'empêcher de sauter sur son encrier et de répondre aux journalistes avec leurs propres armes.[1]

Bugeaud had become so vexed with opposition journalists by 1843 that he was convinced his most formidable enemy was not Abd el Kader, but the liberal and republican press in Paris, which he referred to as les Bedouins de Paris. Such journalistic critics only rendered Bugeaud more uncompromising and more determined to see his objectives triumph.[2]

Despite mounting criticism from the opposition and signs of disaffection within the Ministry, Bugeaud continued to press for military colonies. In January 1843, he proposed that 6,000 soldier-farmers begin the general process of military colonization. One-half of these colonists would be sent to Oran province, the other half to Algiers

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[1]François Charles du Barail, Mes Souvenirs (Paris: Plon, 1894), I, 219.

[2]Maurice Andrieux, Le Pere Bugeaud, 1784-1849)(Paris: Plon 1951), pp. 218-21.

province. He estimated the cost per colonist and family for a three-year period to be 1500 francs.[3]

The military commission appointed by Marshal Soult[4] condemned the proposal as impractical and unrealistic. It would be too costly and was premature in 1843.[5] Bugeaud admitted that the members of the commission who rejected his proposal were men of spirit and talent, but none of them knew Africa as he did. He therefore denounced the committee, complaining that it was not enough that he had to struggle against material difficulties which dogged each step, he also had to struggle against superficial writers, orators and men such as the military commissioners who were not in a position to make realistic judgements on such vast and important questions.[6] In the same letter, he admitted that perhaps the expression of such ideas were not proper for a Governor-General of Algeria, but he assured Soult that his views were based on profound convictions and ardent patriotism.[7] He also warned Soult that he would continue the struggle despite all odds, for his convictions were so strong that he was prepared to make personal sacrifices and

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[3]Demontés, pp. 166-73.

[4]See above, Chapter Three.

[5]Demontés, pp. 166-73.

[6]Bugeaud à Soult, 1 avril 1843, Archives du ministere de la Guerre. Section outre-mer. Algérie. Correspondance, carton 89.

[7]Ibid.

endure a long struggle to achieve his objectives.[8] In effect, Bugeaud served notice that he intended to besiege the War Minister until the latter granted his wishes.

Undaunted by the rebuff of the military commission, Bugeaud continued the fight for military colonies. In the Spring of 1843, he boasted to Thiers that he had already founded three new settlements in that year, the most significant being Orléansville (El Esnam). He also tried to persuade Thiers that cutting back on troop strength in Algeria, a subject of much discussion in 1843, would be disastrous. Many advocated the reduction of troops for purposes of economy since so many troops were no longer needed for the military campaign, but Bugeaud argued that these troops could be used as soldier-farmers and would be the most economical form of colonizing and securing Algeria. In the past two years, he had carried out a successful military campaign, doubled the European population in North Africa, doubled colonial revenues, more than tripled trade and commerce, and built roads, bridges, and villages. To Bugeaud, this was ample proof of the efficacy of his system. He urged Thiers to speak out in favor of military colonization and against the reduction of troops: "Vous vous melez peu d'affaires publiques; vous écrivez. Si les affaires

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[8] Ibid.

sont privées de votre intelligence, la France aura du moins une bonne histoire de l'Empire."[9]

He also wrote a lengthy letter to Soult to persuade the Minister that saving money was an inadequate justification for the reduction of troops in North Africa. If the Algerian budget had been less, he argued, would the population and revenues of Algeria have doubled in the past two years? Would several thousand Arabs have been obedient to the laws of France, and could colonies have been created to extend from Algiers southward to the desert? Such accomplishments would not have been possible without adequate funds and troops.[10]

To critics who accused him of betraying public opinion by pressing for the unpopular military colonies, Bugeaud replied that it was he who had been betrayed many times for he knew Algeria a thousand times better than his critics and was much better qualified to plan the future of this French colony.[11] To the charges of despotism in Algeria under his administration, Bugeaud maintained that liberty in Algiers was more real and positive than in Paris, since men were relatively free to create their own existence in Algiers and

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[9]Bugeaud to Thiers, 5 avril 1843. Bibliotheque National MSS. Nouv. Acq. fr. 20.616, folios 151 à 153.

[10]Bugeaud à Soult, 1 avril 1843, Archives du Ministere de la Guerre, Section outre-mer. Algérie. Correspondance, carton 89.

[11]Demontés, p. 182.

there was no need for anyone to be concerned with politics, or be tormented by false ideas and absurd theories.[12]

In September 1843, Bugeaud informed Soult that soldiers should at least be used to prepare the way for civilian colonization. He requested that six batallions be placed at the disposal of a Director of the Interior for the purpose of constructing villages, as soldiers could do this work more cheaply and quickly than civilian workers.[13] Military colonies were essential because the Arab would not remain peaceful unless soldiers were present: "A warlike people cannot be influenced, or a portion of their land seized and kept, without keeping the sword in sight after it has been bravely used."[14]

In considering why Bugeaud was so assailed by the press, it is important to remember that most of his opponents were journalists who were liberal or republican in sentiment. Such men not only disapproved of Bugeaud's policies in Algeria, they opposed the July Monarchy (liberals or the "dynastic left" advocated reforms; the republicans wished to abolish the monarchy). Thus, much of the criticism heaped on Bugeaud by the opposition was because he belonged to the establishment, and as military commander of a campaign never supported in toto by the French people, he was especially

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Azan, l'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 367.

[14] Ideville, II, 90-91.

vulnerable to attack. Furthermore, Bugeaud's personality made him more susceptible to criticism. Barail maintained that one of Bugeaud's greatest weaknesses was his belief in his incontestable superiority over others.[15] Because of this, he could not tolerate criticism from peers or subordinates, much less from writers and politicians with whom he disagreed on ideological grounds. This intolerance led to a hatred of the liberal and republican press.

Bugeaud's fiery invectives to the press merely added fuel to the fire. When Le National charged him of writing brochures to justify his actions, Bugeaud wrote a letter to the editor of the Siècle denying that he ever responded to critics by writing brochures or by taking any other action, and that he was responsible only to the Ministry for his ideas for Algeria.[16] This letter was published by at least three newspapers. While Le National and Siècle interpreted the letter as the action of a childish old man, the Journal Des Débats supported Bugeaud and condemned the liberal press for its unfounded criticisms.[17]

Guizot believed the press attacked Bugeaud as a means of criticizing the Soult-Guizot Ministry. He was particularly

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[15]Barail, I, 219.

[16]Bugeaud à M. le Rédacteur en chef du Siècle, 10 janvier 1843; Le National 19 janvier 1843.

[17]Le Siècle, 10 janvier 1843; Le National, 19 janvier 1843; Journal des Dèbats, 19 janvier 1843.

vexed at the charge that Bugeaud's primary objectives were to declare his administration independent of the Ministry and to dismember the French Empire.[18]

Other common charges included: the campaign was taking too long; Bugeaud did not delegate enough authority to his subordinates; and so much time with the army on campaign resulted in an ineffective administration.[19]

Despite his infamous relationship with certain French journals, the Governor-General was occasionally praised for his actions in other journals. Two articles appeared in the Journal des Débats in 1843 supporting Bugeaud's military colonies and praising the general as an able administrator who combined a knowledge of war and agriculture.[20]

Bugeaud also used certain publications to his advantage. This was especially true of the official journal of Algeria, the Moniteur Algérien. In December 1843, a lengthy article bore only the signature, "Un Touriste," but is unquestionably Bugeaud's. Bugeaud used the Socratic method of asking questions and subjecting the answers to logical analysis. A tourist asked questions which were answered by an officer. When the tourist asked whether the war could not be won without the barbarous razzias, the officer replied

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[18]Guizot, Memoires, VII, 193-94.

[19]Andrieux, p. 220.

[20]Dureau de la Malle, "Sur la colonisation de l'Algérie," Journal des Débats, 15 janvier 1843.

that war did not merely involve the destruction of the opposing army, but always included an attack on the interests of the people. Because the Arabs were nomads, the French found nothing to destroy except their harvests. Thus the razzia was the most useful weapon the French possessed. The officer alleged that it was cruel to accuse the Army of Africa of barbarous actions after all it had contributed to Algeria (courage, suffering of privations and fatigue). Of course, the tourist went away convinced of the usefulness of the campaign, vowing henceforth to be a staunch defender of the French forces in North Africa.[21]

It was evident by 1843 that not only was Bugeaud opposed by many journalists, but also that many within the military were hostile to him. Bugeaud and Soult had not gotten on well. The old Marshal considered Bugeaud a soldier of fortune, and too stubborn and independent to fit his stereotype of the perfect soldier.[22] Bugeaud's resolute insistence upon independence of command and his polemics on the value of military colonies both alarmed and embarrassed Soult. When in a debate over the budget for Algeria in the Chamber of Deputies, a representative asked Soult why Bugeaud was allowed to continue to speak out in favor of military

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[21]Thomas Robert Bugeaud, Par l'Epée et par la Charrue, ecrits et discours, publiées par Paul Jean Louis Azan (Paris: Plon, 1947), pp. 161-63. Article from Moniteur Algérien, 25 decembre 1843 as cited in the above work.

[22]Andrieux, p. 217.

colonies, Soult could only reply that the government believed civilian colonization to be the best system to adopt. He assured the Assembly that Bugeaud had been informed of the wishes of the government and was certain the Governor-General would conform to those wishes.[23]

Bugeaud, in turn, regarded Soult as a senile soldier who had been swallowed up by the bureaucracy, and the Governor-General abhorred bureaucrats. He also believed that Soult was too concerned with the question of decreasing the role of the army in Algeria in order to accelerate civilian control. This, to Bugeaud, would be a fatal mistake because French control over Algeria could be attained only when a military government and administration extended its domination over all Arabs in Algeria. Concern for civilian colonization and the administration of Europeans could be dealt with later when the need arose.[24]

The Governor-General felt there were already too many civilian administrators in Algeria for such a small number of Europeans:

> On travaille tout juste comme en France, six heures souvent incomplètes ou mal employées, lorsqu'il faudrait travailler au moins 15 heures pour répondre à cette ebullition continuelle d'un monde qui se crée. Et tout cela pour administrer une population européene trente fois moins nombreuse que la population indigene et occupant un territoire quatre cents fois puls petit.[25]

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[23]Soult à Chambre des Députés, 23 mai 1843, cited in Le National, 24 mai 1843, and; Journal des Débats, 24 mai 1843.

[24]Andrieux, p. 217.

[25]Bugeaud, as cited in ibid., 217-18.

There is also evidence of considerable animosity between Bugeaud and his military subordinates in Algeria. One of the most hostile was General Changarnier, whose profound hatred of Bugeaud stemmed in part from jealousy. Although Changarnier had been in Algeria as long as Bugeaud, the latter had become his superior.[26]

The two became implaccable enemies while on a campaign near Milianah. Bugeaud was personally conducting the campaign; Changarnier was in charge of a brigade. In a confrontation with the enemy, Bugeaud was to give the signal for Changarnier to charge the Arab flank, but Changarnier charged before the signal was given. Although the maneuver succeeded in routing the Arabs, Bugeaud publicly reproached Changarnier for failure to follow orders, a shortcoming which the Governor-General condoned for himself, but would not tolerate from subordinates. Changarnier replied that six years of experience in North Africa made him qualified to judge the proper time for an attack and furthermore, he had never been reproached for his actions. Bugeaud replied: "Le mulet du Maréchal de Saxe avait fait la guerre vingt ans, et il était toujours un mulet."[27]

Changarnier also resented the rapid rise of the twenty-one-year-old duc d'Aumale to prominence in Algeria. Although

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[26]Nicholas Anne Théodule Changarnier, Campagnes d'Afrique, 1830-1848: Memoires du général Changarnier (Paris: Berger-Levault, 1930), p. 286.

[27]Bugeaud, as cited in Barail, I, 118-19.

he had little experience Aumale was a favorite of Bugeaud's.[28] Because Bugeaud's military feats did not merit promotion, the only reason Changarnier could find for his promotion to commander-in-chief of Algeria was that Louis Philippe and his sons saw in this opportunist a champion of the royal family.[29]

Louis Eugene Cavaignac (1802-1857), a colonel in the Army of Africa in 1843, was also hostile to Bugeaud. Cavaignac denounced Bugeaud as an ego-maniac who was jealous of his lieutenant's abilities.[30] On one occasion, Cavaignac complained to his uncle (General Jacques Cavaignac), that serving under Bugeaud made him detest his work and he would retire if his grade would permit it.[31]

Cavaignac's animosity toward Bugeaud can be attributed to the latter's haughtiness, the fact that Cavaignac believed his capacities to be fitted for greater tasks than Bugeaud had given him, and most of all, because Cavaignac, a republican, saw in Bugeaud the epitome of monarchical conservatism.[32]

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[28]Changarnier, Campagnes d'Afrique, p. 289.

[29]Ibid., p. 182.

[30]Eugene Cavaignac à général Jacques Cavaignac, 18 aout, 1843, in Jacques Marie Cavaignac, Les Deux généraux Cavaignac; souvenirs et correspondance, 1808-1848 (Paris: H. Charles-Lavauzelle 1898), p. 197-204.

[31]Eugene Cavaignac à général Jacques Cavaignac, 2 juillet 1843, ibid., 185-89.

[32]Ibid., 184. In the Summer of 1843, Cavaignac was assigned the task of overseeing the construction of Orleansville and policing the area around the villages. Cavaignac believed his talents could best be used in battle rather than in such a trivial activity.

There were also signs of disaffection between the Governor-General and his two most able generals, Lamoriciere and Bedeau.[33] These two men chose not to publicize their disgruntlement in 1843, although they later publicly disagreed with Bugeaud and by so doing, dealt a catastrophic blow to his plans for military colonization.[34]

It should also be mentioned that his subordinates held Bugeaud responsible for holding up their promotions. When, in July 1843, Lamoricière, Changarnier, and Bedeau were elevated to the rank of Lieutenant-General, they had only praise for their commander.[35]

Despite this resentment and hostility, Bugeaud continued to hold sway over his officers, partially because he was the only active soldier in Algeria by 1843 who had served in la grande armée. That he participated in the Battle of Austerlitz was a feat they could not overlook.[36]

While Bugeaud struggled with opponents, an event occurred in May 1843, which shortened Bugeaud's command in Algeria; Aumale proved himself on the field of battle. On 16 May 1843, Aumale's force of five hundred troops captured

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[33]Azan, l'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, pp. 320-21.

[34]See below, Chapter Five.

[35]Azan, p. 364.

[36]Jacques Stern, The French Colonies: Past and Future. Trans. Norbert Guterman (New York: Didier Publishing Co., 1944), p. 131.

the Smalah of Abd el Kader.[37] The Smalah, the Emir's private retinue consisting of his family and personal troops, had evaded the French for years and provided a rallying point for warring tribesmen. A combination of good fortune and skilfull manoeuvre enabled Aumale to take 5,000 prisoners. Although the Emir escaped, the loss of the Smalah seriously compromised his changes of victory, and French influence extended into the desert after this.[38]

Louis Philippe, feeling it would enhance the dynasty, expressed his delight at his son's victory. He likened Aumale's victory to Condé's in 1643 at Rocroy for the great Condé was only twenty-two years old when he won his great victory; Aumale was twenty-one.[39]

Meanwhile, Bugeaud finally received the honor he had long sought. On 31 July 1843, he was awarded a marshal's baton. The honor was tarnished somewhat, however, by the attachment of a condition to this promotion. In a letter from the Minister of War, Bugeaud received news of the promotion but was told that in order to receive it, he must agree to remain in Algeria as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief for one year.[40]

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[37]For Aumale's official report on the capture of the Smalah, see Ideville, II, 85-86.

[38]Ibid., 74-93.

[39]Louis Philippe à Soult, 30 mai 1843, in Soult, Correspondance, p. 205.

[40]Ideville, II, 94-95.

Guizot believed the offer to be poorly presented, and placed the blame for the faux pas on Soult. Guizot did approve of the condition, however, for he feared that Bugeaud would soon resign because of the opposition to his programs and if his resignation came within one year, Aumale would not have gained the experience necessary to merit the office of governor-general.[41]

The Journal des Débats accepted the official version of Bugeaud's promotion: he received the baton in recognition of military services rendered.[42] Le National, on the other hand, expressed the cynical and unrealistic view that he was promoted because of services rendered to the monarchy in 1834 when his troops quelled a riot in the rue Transnonain.[43]

A more realistic interpretation than either of the above is that Bugeaud received the baton partially in recognition of his accomplishments, but also to persuade him to remain at his post until Aumale was ready to replace him. If it had been merely a gesture of appreciation for services rendered, the promotion could easily have been granted earlier. It is highly unlikely that his promotion accidentally came on the heels of Aumale's capture of the Smalah.

Bugeaud had been told in January that he was being considered for promotion, but was passed over in favor of an

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[41]Guizot, Memoires, VII, 143.

[42]Journal des Débats, 9 aout 1843.

[43]Le National, 10 aout 1843.

associate stationed in France.[44] When he heard of the condition imposed on his promotion, he wanted to resign his post immediately and only the intervention of Guizot and Louis Philippe caused him to accept the conditional promotion. The king assured Bugeaud that he felt Algeria was in good hands and Bugeaud agreed to stay on.[45]

Smarting from the blow to his pride, Bugeaud grumbled that he could overlook the idea that his administration was being menaced by Aumale and that he was looking forward to the time when he would be free of hostile journalists, deputies and bureaucrats.[46] He soon recovered from the disappointment, rationalizing that at least he would be replaced by a member of royalty. He preferred a prince as his replacement, not because it might enhance the constitutional monarchy, but because such a man would have more status and respect in governmental circles and consequently might accomplish what Bugeaud could not. He also felt the capable young duke would become a very distinguished soldier.[47]

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[44]Bugeaud to Gardere, 9 January 1843, Ideville, II, 60.

[45]Louis Philippe to Bugeaud, ibid., 95.

[46]Bugeaud à Camille-Antoine Callier, 15 octobre 1843. Bibliotheque Nationale. Correspondance Bugeaud, Nouv. Acq. fr. 23.776, Folio 43. Callier (1804-1889), Bugeaud's friend, was Soult's aide de camp and a valuable source of information for Bugeaud.

[47]Bugeaud à Guizot, 23 octobre 1843, in Guizot, Memoires, VII, 236-37.

Knowing that his administration would soon end, the new Marshal was anxious to accomplish as much as possible while he remained at his post. His programs, however, continued to meet considerable resistance.

A major obstacle to the Algerian campaign was the control the Chamber of Deputies exercised over the budget. The discussion of the crédit extraordinaire for Algeria in 1843 was heated and long (February to May). Although the budget was trimmed somewhat, there was at least evidence that the Chamber had finally accepted the conquest, for no one demanded the withdrawal of French forces from North Africa as was the usual case when the budget was under discussion.[48] The Ministry was unhappy with the trimming of the budget, but was helpless to alter the decision. Louis Philippe could only denounce the reduction as "blindly deplorable" and called for a continued struggle so that the conquest would not be jeopardized.[49]

Despite budgetary problems, the troop reduction which Bugeaud had feared did not materialize. In fact, the number of troops steadily increased in Algeria from 1831 to 1844.[50]

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[48] Le National, 23 fevrier 1843. Even Gustave de Beaumont, one of the most outspoken critics of the campaign, approved the budget though he favored conquest and colonization on a smaller scale than that advocated by the Ministry. See also, Le National, 23 mai 1843.

[49] Louis Philippe à Soult, 26 juin 1843, in Soult, Correspondance, p. 211.

[50] Ideville, I, 354 and Thureau-Dangin, V, 345. In 1831, there were 17,900 French troops in Algeria and by 1843, there were 85,664. The number increased in 1844 to 90,562, dropped to 89,099 in 1845 and rose to a high of 107,688 in 1846.

Although no conclusive decisions were reached as to the type of colonies Algeria should have, some positive accomplishments accompanied the heated debates of 1843. Trade between the natives and the French increased to a point that Bugeaud happily announced at the end of 1843 that the natives of Algeria were beginning to prefer French cotton-goods to British goods (no doubt in part because of the restrictive tariff placed on British products in Algeria). More easily measured, obvious achievements included the capture of the Smalah, the creation of four new bases of operation, and twenty-two newly completed villages in addition to sixteen other villages under construction or in the planning stage. The construction of nineteen major roads improved communication and transportation links. Furthermore, 65,000 European _colons_ resided in Algeria by the end of 1843 as compared to 44,531 one year earlier.[51]

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[51]Guizot, _Memoires_, VII, 523-24.

Chapter V

1844: A MOROCCAN CRISIS, VICTORY AT ISLY, AND NEW PROJECTS FOR COLONIZATION

A Moroccan crisis in 1844 severely strained Franco-British relations and caused much concern in diplomatic circles. On the other hand, for Marshal Bugeaud, it must have been a year of considerable satisfaction for he succeeded in driving Abd el Kader out of Algeria and won the most significant battle of his career at Isly. As a result, his prestige reached an all-time high. Bolstered by this acclaim, Bugeaud decided to introduce another major scheme for military colonization.

The Moroccan crisis erupted in the spring of 1844, when Abd el Kader took refuge in Morocco, and from there with Moroccan aid, the Arab chieftain launched a series of border raids against the French in Oran Province.[1] Bugeaud personally conducted the campaign to defend this area, but was constantly frustrated by his inability to pursue the enemy into their Moroccan sanctuary. The French Ministry helped cause this situation by following an extremely cautious policy towards Morocco for fear of alienating the British.[2]

Britain had viewed the French occupation of Algeria with suspicion, but had gradually accepted the French fait

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[1]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 144-45.

[2]Joinville, Memoirs, p. 313.

accompli. They did wish, however, to prevent further French expansion into Tunis, Tripoli, and Morocco, for French domination of all of North Africa would threaten British strategic and commercial interests in the Mediterranean.[3] In addition to the desire to maintain her naval supremacy in the area, England considered her trade with Morocco to be crucial because the British stronghold at Gibraltar depended upon Tangier for many essential supplies, especially since British trade with Algeria had been effectively curbed by heavy duties placed on British products by the French.[4] What the British feared most was that a French punitive expedition against Morocco might result in yet another conquest. Their fears were not totally unfounded, for the French had assured the British in 1830 that their expedition against the Dey of Algiers was merely punitive.[5] In addition, by 1844, some Frenchmen openly advocated the annexation of Morocco because of the similarities and the geographic proximity to Algeria. Adolphe Thiers believed both states on the frontiers of Algeria, Tunis and Morocco, were natural enemies of French Algeria. Tunis was weak and posed no threat, but war with the fanatic and barbarous Moors was inevitable because the

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[3]C. J. Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power, 1815-1833 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 117.

[4]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 152; Joinville, Memoirs, p. 314; The (London) Times, 22 August 1844.

[5]Great Britain, Sessional Papers (Commons), L, n. 17 (1839), p. 45.

unlimited conquest of Algeria would not succeed until Morocco was forced to cease the extension of aid to Algerian rebels.[6]

After repeated border skirmishes in which Moroccan troops participated, Louis Philippe, acting on Guizot's advice, allowed his foreign minister to issue an ultimatum to the Emperor of Morocco, Abd el Rhaman. The ultimatum, issued 12 June 1844, demanded that Morocco cease sending her troops into Algeria, that she remove her troops from the Moroccan-Algerian border, and that Abd el Kader be banished from Morocco. Guizot assured the Emperor that France had no territorial designs on Morocco, but she would no longer tolerate such border raids.[7]

To indicate the French intent to stand by the ultimatum, the Prince de Joinville was given command of a fleet of twenty-eight warships and ordered to cruise off the Moroccan coast.[8] With Bugeaud's troops massed along the frontier and a French squadron en route to the coast of Morocco, some Englishmen viewed this as a prelude to an all-out attack.[9] The selection of the arrogant young prince to command the French squadron annoyed the British for Joinville had just

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[6]Rey, "Le Morac et la question d'Alger," Revue des Deux Mondes, (1840), III, p. 17. Adolphe Thiers, "Discours dans la discussions du projet d'adresse (Maroc, Taiti, Droit de Visite) prononcé le 21 janvier a la Chambre des Députés, in Thiers, Discours Parlementaires, VI, 574-77.

[7]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 151-52.

[8]Joinville, Memoirs, pp. 312-15.

[9]Howarth, p. 296.

published a pamphlet, Note sur les forces navales de la France, which favorably compared the strength of the French navy to the British.[10]

The Emperor of Morocco, believing the English would intervene to prevent a French invasion, chose to ignore Guizot's ultimatum. Morocco had earlier been guaranteed English support by Palmerston in case of encroachment by a European power.[11] De Nion, the French agent in Tangiers, warned Guizot of the Emperor's attitude: "A single watch-word circulates to-day throughout the whole [Moroccan] Empire. Disdain for the menaces of Spain, hate and vengeance against the French, confidence in the protection of England."[12] Thus, Abd el Khaman gambled on English support and ignored the ultimatum.

Britain, though alarmed at the prospect of a full-scale invasion, did not object to a French show of force. Sir Robert Peel called the Moroccan actions against the French ". . . a gross outrage coupled with gross indignity."[13] The British Foreign Minister, George Hamilton-Gordon, Fourth Earl of Aberdeen (1784-1860), wrote to the British representative in Tangier:

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[10]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 152-53.

[11]Francis Rosebro Flournoy, British Policy Towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston, 1830-1865 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), p. 90.

[12]De Nion to Guizot, 13 May 1844, as cited in ibid., p. 89.

[13]Howarth, p. 296.

> So long as Abd-el-Kader shall be permitted to take refuge in Morocco and there to recruit and organize his forces, the Emperor must not be surprised if he finds French troops are collected on the frontier and should the Emir use the Emperor's territory as grounds from which to attack the French, Her Majesty's government is not prepared to say that the latter would not be justified in pursuing their enemy beyond the boundary of Morocco.[14]

The British did dispatch a small naval contingent to Morocco to observe any action which might take place, but this could hardly be viewed as a show of force since only three ships were dispatched, including one ship of the line, a frigate, and a steamer. Moreover, Aberdeen ordered the commander in charge of the British contingent to make it clear to the Moors that Britain had no desire to prevent the French from achieving their "just and moderate demands."[15]

By early August, the French fleet lay at anchor near Tangier. The English made one last effort to mediate the dispute when their Consul in Tangier, John Drummond Hay, acting on orders from Aberdeen to establish personal contact with Abd el Rhaman and to use all means within his

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[14]Aberdeen to John Drummond Hay, 15 June 1844, as cited in Swain, p. 130. Swain maintains this was a more serious crisis than commonly believed because Aberdeen dispatched three ships to observe the action. In fact, sending only three ships seems to indicate merely a watchful attitude on the part of the British.

[15]The (London) Times, 15 August 1844; Aberdeen to officials of the British Admiralty (Lords Commissaires de l'Amirauté), 10 July 1844, as cited in Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 157-58.

power to prevent a war, attempted to extract a promise from the Emperor that he would meet the demands of the French ultimatum. The Emperor, however, was evasive, and on 6 August, Joinville began shelling the fortifications at Tangier.[16]

With the news that the bombardment of Tangier was underway, Bugeaud, poised on the frontier, led his troops across the border. The Marshal had been impatiently awaiting the results of Hay's mediation. Even before the ultimatum to Morocco, Bugeaud wanted to take action. Following an attack by Moroccan troops on a French force under Lamoriciere, Bugeaud had advocated immediate reprisals including an attack on Morocco. This alarmed Louis Philippe at the time and he ordered Soult to temper Bugeaud's ardor.[17] There was, however, some inconsistency in Bugeaud's thoughts about invading Morocco, for while he appeared anxious to undertake such an expedition, he seemed to dread the task, fearing the enemy's superior manpower would result in defeat for the French forces. Under such circumstances, he wondered how the Chambers could even consider the reduction of

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[16]The (London) Times, 20 August 1844; Joinville, Memoirs, p. 332; Sainte-Aulare à Guizot, Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 157-58.

[17]Louis Philippe à Soult, 24 juillet 1844, in Soult, Correspondance, pp. 234-36.

French forces in North Africa.[18] On the other hand, once the French fleet arrived off the coast of Morocco, Bugeaud constantly complained to Joinville of the prince's tergiversation.[19] Joinville replied to Bugeaud: "Well, General, [sic] fire off your guns! If you will begin the fighting I'll [sic] follow your example at once."[20] Until the bombardment of Tangier began, Bugeaud complained that his troops suffered from the heat and fretted because of the inaction. In the face of pressure from Paris, however, he was clearly unwilling to initiate hostilities. When the conflict began, Bugeaud quickly assured Joinville that the army would lose no time in taking decisive action.[21]

There are conflicting reports as to the degree of success of the French bombardment of Tangier. The (London) Times correspondent, on a British ship observing the shelling, described the French action as a "reckless and wicked connivance," maintaining that Joinville battered away for nine hours at the decaying walls of the Moorish fortress without quieting half a dozen guns and making only one

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[18]Bugeaud à Louis-Auguste Marcel d'Escliabes d'Hust, 24 mai 1844, in Bugeaud, Lettres inédites du maréchal Bugeaud, duc d'Isly, 1808-1849. Colligées et Annotées par M. le Capitaine Tattet et publiees par Mademoiselle Feray-Bugeaud d'Isly. Deuxième édition (Paris: Deslis, 1923), pp. 273-76.

[19]Joinville, Memoirs, p. 321.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Bugeaud to Joinville, 11 August 1844, in ibid., p. 322.

breach in the wall.[22] A British officer who observed the shelling proudly announced: "Though I am not a boaster, . . . one regiment from Gibraltar and one hundred artillerymen manning these forts would have sent Joinville and his gang to Davy's locker."[23]

In contrast to the British reports, Joinville recounts that his admirable artillerymen quickly silenced the fortress guns and that not a single shot went wide of the mark.[24] On the other hand, The (London) Times correspondent maintained that there was widespread damage within the city from stray shells and that only the American and Sardinian Embassies escaped damage.[25] The accuracy of Joinville's artillerymen is insignificant. The French had made their point. Moreover, Bugeaud's victory at Isly was the decisive event in the Franco-Moroccan conflict.

On 14 August, at Isly, Bugeaud's 9500 troops defeated a Moroccan force six times larger and captured eighteen flags, eleven guns, and the tent and personal papers of the Emperor's son.[26] After the Battle of Isly, Abd el Rhaman understood that the French were determined to see their

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[22]The (London) Times, 23 August 1844.

[23]"An Officer" to the editor of The (London) Times, 21 August 1844.

[24]Joinville, Memoirs, p. 322.

[25]The (London) Times, 21 August 1844.

[26]Guizot, Memoirs, VII. 162-63.

demands met and that he could expect no support from the British.

Guizot's friendship with Aberdeen helps to explain British inaction in the Moroccan crisis.[27] Guizot had continually promised Aberdeen that France had no interest in expanding her territorial holdings in North Africa beyond Algeria's borders.[28]

The Treaty of Tangier, 10 September 1844, ended the Franco-Moroccan conflict. The Moors agreed to remove their troops from the Algerian frontier, to punish troops guilty of aggression against France, and to outlaw Abd el Kader in Morocco.[29] France survived the crisis in excellent condition. Although Franco-British relations had been strained, no serious rupture resulted. After the crisis had passed, one British reporter rationalized that the bombardment of Tangier must have been accidental. He cited as evidence the official Gazette of Gibraltar, which maintained that captured correspondence proved the Moroccans sincerely wanted peace and that inadequate communication channels

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[27]This friendship is quite evident in George Hamilton-Gordon, Earl of Aberdeen, The Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Princess Lieven, 1832-1854. Edited for the Royal historical society by E. Jones Parry (London: Royal Historical Society, 1938-39), II.

[28]For example, see Swain, p. 129, and; Guizot à Sainte-Aulaire, 15 et 17 juin 1844, in Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 153-54.

[29]The (London) Times, 12 October 1844.

between Joinville and Abd el Rhaman resulted in the attack.[30]

After the Treaty of Tangier had been signed, Britain continued to view Morocco with concern, for Aberdeen believed the Emperor's authority had been shaken. British policy aimed at preventing the Emperor's fall and discouraging further French encroachments.[31] It is certain that the British restrained French actions during the Moroccan crisis, for both Bugeaud and Joinville wished to exact complete submission from the Moors.[32] In particular, Joinville felt the peace terms were too moderate. Bugeaud, aware of the British pressure for moderation, soothed Joinville by urging him to be content in knowing that Abd el Kader had been effectively curbed.[33]

Bugeaud later did express his dissatisfaction with the limited conflict against Morocco, maintaining that after Isly, his troops could have marched to the gates of Fez without a serious confrontation with the enemy. The victor of Isly was also angry because he was not allowed to participate in the peace negotiations. He advocated that Abd el Kader be taken into custody and that Morocco be forced to

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[30] Ibid., 18 October 1844.

[31] Swain, pp. 131-32.

[32] Bugeaud to Joinville, 3 September 1844, in Ideville, II, 134-35. Guizot also admits the British restrained the French. See Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 168-69.

[33] Bugeaud to Joinville, 3 September 1844, in Ideville, II, 134-35.

accept total responsibility for the conflict. The Treaty of Tangier, however, was negotiated by civilian diplomats, the comte de Nion and the duc de Glucksberg, and Bugeaud was not even consulted.[34]

The Moroccan crisis illustrates the complete commitment of the July Monarchy to the successful conquest of Algeria. Even Guizot, who once regarded Algeria as an "affair of one's leisure," risked the shaky entente cordiale with Britain in order to punish Morocco for her transgressions.[35] As mentioned above, because of the French Foreign Minister's friendship with his British counterpart, Guizot realized there was little chance of a Franco-British confrontation. Aberdeen believed Guizot when he promised that if war between France and Morocco should occur, the French had no expansionist intent vis-a-vis Morocco.[36]

The Moroccan crisis of 1844 proved to be the first real test of British willingness to recognize the French presence in North Africa. One British newspaper correspondent maintained that the British attempt to mediate the dispute was in fact a confirmation of the French possession of

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[34]Bugeaud à la Chambre des Députés, 24 janvier 1845, Le Moniteur Universal, 25 janvier 1845. Bugeaud did admit that the heat might have prevented a march to Fez even if the French government had permitted it.

[35]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 144-45.

[36]Ibid., 158-59.

Algeria.[37] The Peel Government begrudgingly accepted that presence on the condition that France remain content with no more African soil than she already possessed.

Meanwhile, in recognition of his great victory over the Moors, Bugeaud received the title, Duc d'Isly. His prestige reached its peak after the battle and he was praised, not only in military circles, but also by civilians. When he returned to Paris to accept his title, acclaim and praise accompanied him wherever he went, even in the legislative chambers.[38] Bugeaud became the most illustrious figure in French military annals since Napoleon.[39]

Ever mindful of the need to see his objectives realized, the hero decided to take advantage of his popularity to press for government approval of military colonies. He argued that his recent military victory resulted from the valor of his troops in spite of overwhelming odds. Here was a lesson for Frenchmen interested in the destiny of Algeria for only the brave, disciplined soldier could meet the challenges of colonization in North Africa.[40]

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[37] The (London) Times, 11 July 1844.

[38] Demontés, p. 199.

[39] Brison Dowling Gooch, The New Bonapartist Generals in the Crimean War: Distrust and Decision-making in the Anglo-French Alliance (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 6.

[40] Bugeaud à P. Ménière, 12 septembre 1844, in E. Ménière, II, 463-64.

Because previous plans had been criticized as experimental and poorly organized, the Marshal produced a scheme which he felt could not be denounced as easily as earlier ones. The new plan called for the establishment of 10,000 colonists in Algeria each year for ten years. By the end of the period, 100,000 colonists would be settled in Algeria. This proposal included civilian colonists, who would be allowed to settle in areas along the coast where the threat of Arab raids would be minimal, while frontier areas would be occupied by soldier-colonists. The cost of this project, including household goods, guns, bayonets, and gunpowder, would be 1500 francs per colonist-family for a three-year period. The total cost of this scheme for the first three years would be 350 million francs.[41]

During his visit to Paris to be honored for the victory at Isly, Bugeaud presented his scheme for military colonies to Soult. The War Minister reacted favorably to the principle of military colonies, but he thought the cost too great and the chances of success too questionable to give it his full support. Moreover, Soult believed the initiation of such a plan on his part would be unconstitutional since only the French legislature had the authority to remove so many soldiers from active duty to place them on farms and to appropriate the necessary funds.[42] Because he

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[41]Demontés, p. 193.

[42]Soult à Bugeaud, 13 janvier 1845, ibid., p. 205.

felt certain the Chambers would not approve this, Soult, with the assistance of his bureau chiefs in the Ministry of War, proposed a more cautious counter-plan, which utilized the principle of military colonies. Soult's project called for the establishment of three zones: (1) areas where civilian Europeans could settle; (2) mixed areas where natives outnumbered Europeans and where military colonists might best settle; (3) areas where all France could hope for was political dominance.[43]

As to the means of using soldier-farmers, Soult maintained that a soldier and his wife should not be assigned a plot of unimproved land as Bugeaud had suggested. Rather, the land should have been cleared and ready for cultivation and a house should have been constructed before assigning it to the soldier and his family. For the first three years, soldiers stationed in a given area could be required to construct buildings and clear the land. Once the land began to produce, the surplus capital from the products of the land could be placed in reserve to pay for subsequent expenses when the land was ready for the true soldier-farmer (at the end of the three-year period). Soult estimated the cost of his project for three years to be 162 million francs in contrast to Bugeaud's request for 350 million francs.[44]

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[43] Ibid., p. 200.

[44] Ibid., pp. 200-03.

Bugeaud, in his characteristically uncompromising way, rejected Soult's project, for he believed a sufficient number of partisans of military colonization would support his plan, including the king, a few ministers, and several peers and deputies.[45] Bugeaud's rejection widened the gulf between the Governor-General and the War Minister. Both plans were presented to the Chambers and both were rejected. There were not enough advocates of military colonization in the Chambers to carry through such expensive plans.[46] The victory at Isly proved to be insufficient to win over the opponents of military colonization.

Despite the rejection of his second project, the Governor-General continued to use soldiers to construct villages and cultivate land. Bugeaud was most proud of Orléansville and Ténès, where soldiers had constructed hundreds of homes, repaired Roman aqueducts, and planted scores of trees. Such improvements attracted civilians to these villages. By January 1844, five hundred civilians resided in Orléansville.[47] Bugeaud boasted of the rapport between civilians and soldiers in these villages, arguing that this was

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[45]Bugeaud à Soult, 14 decembre 1844, as cited in ibid., p. 204.

[46]Ibid., pp. 213-14.

[47]Bugeaud à Soult, 4 janvier 1844. Archives du ministere de la Guerre. Section outre-mer. Algérie. Correspondance, carton 89.

only natural since the soldiers had prepared the way for civilians.[48]

In contrast to the successful settlements at Orléansville and Ténès, Bugeaud pointed out that the disorganized, poorly directed civilian colony at Milanah had been in danger of extinction until the Governor-General sent soldiers there to aid in construction and to help with the harvest. Without military assistance, Bugeaud claimed Milanah would have been a deserted village within one year.[49]

In villages sponsored by the army, there was order and respect for the law and no need for police because the inhabitants respected authority. Such examples of cooperation made Bugeaud even more certain of the usefulness of military colonization. "Qu'on vienne voir nos villes de l'intérieur, on y trouvera l'ordre et la propreté, sans commissaires de police,...parce que chacun sait qu'il doit obeir. En un mot, il y a de l'autorité."[50]

Although Bugeaud failed to convince authorities in Paris that military colonization should officially be instituted in 1844, he did succeed in furthering the development of an apparatus designed to institutionalize French-Algerian

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[48] Ibid.

[49] Bugeaud à Soult, 15 juillet 1844. Archives du ministere de la Guerre. Section outre-mer. Algérie. Correspondance, carton 89.

[50] Ibid.

relations and relations among the natives. In 1841 he had re-established the Office of Arab Affairs and in 1844, he created the Arab Bureau.[51] Bugeaud assigned an official of the Arab Bureau to each military division in Algeria. These officials were responsible to the division military commander and to the Director of the Arab Bureau in Algiers, who in turn was responsible to the Governor-General. Duties of the Arab Bureau included translating and editing correspondence in Arabic, transmitting orders to the Arabs, and sending periodic reports to the Governor-General on native conditions.[52]

Bugeaud's interest in such an organization stemmed from his belief that the French should interfere as much as possible in Arab affairs. By quietly proceeding to substitute Frenchmen for native leaders, France would gradually achieve a moral authority over the natives. Thus, pacification would proceed more smoothly and would be more complete.[53] The Arab Bureau developed as one of Bugeaud's most significant accomplishments in Algeria.[54]

Although many Frenchmen rejected military colonization (at least a majority in the Chambers did), there was considerable

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[51]Azan, L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 371.

[52]Ibid., p. 372.

[53]Bugeaud to Aumale, January 1844, in Ideville, II, 105.

[54]Azan, L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 372.

interest in some form of colonies for Algeria. A number of reports in the Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires de l'Académie des Sciences de Paris of 1844 indicate an interest in colonization and agricultural development in Algeria. One such report discussed the great variety of agricultural products, including cotton, tobacco, opium, and grapes, which would thrive in Algeria.[55]

As usual, military campaigns in 1844 constantly hampered Bugeaud's efforts to convince the government of the merits of military colonization. Thus, he did not have the opportunity to devote his full time to colonization. The July Monarchy did take some initiative in 1844 to institute civilian colonies when Guizot issued a ministerial order of 18 April 1844, which connected the service of land allotments with the Department of the Interior. The unstable military situation, however, served to discourage potential colonists and colonists already there. Even by 1847 when Bugeaud resigned his post, of the 109,000 European civilians in Algeria, only 15,000 were rural colonists.[56]

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[55]"Rapport sur les travaux de M. Hardy, directeur de la pépinière centrale en Algérie," Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires de l'Académie des Sciences de Paris XVIII (1844), n. 2, pp. 887-904.

[56]Alphonse Juin et Amar Naroun, Histoire Parallel: La France en Algérie, 1830-1962 (Paris: Perrin [1963], p. 52; Thureau-Dangin, VI, 411. Although 15,000 rural colonists sounds relatively small, when compared to the 1,500 rural colonists there in 1840, it represented a significant increase.

Military victories and enhanced prestige for Bugeaud characterized his fourth year as Governor-General. Several Arab tribes, including some of the fierce Kabyles tribesmen, submitted to French rule, the invasion of Morocco robbed Abd el Kader of a sanctuary and prevented his acquiring a useful ally, thus rendering the Algerian Emir virtually useless as a rebel leader. By the end of the year, France possessed a solid line of fortified camps in Algeria which guaranteed their military dominance over that North African state.[57]

The rejection of Bugeaud's project for military colonization, however, overshadowed the military victories. Bugeaud's uncompromising attitude toward Soult's counter-project caused an already small group of advocates of military colonies to divide their loyalties.[58] This intransigeance made doubtful that a large-scale project for military colonies in Algeria would be approved.

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[57]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 525-26. The entire Kabylia, home of the Kabyles, finally submitted to French rule in 1857.

[58]Demontés, pp. 204-06.

Chapter VI

1845: THE TURNING POINT--PARTIAL ALIENATION FROM THE JULY MONARCHY AND COMPLETE RUPTURE WITH THE LEFT

On 24 January 1845, Bugeaud presented the most significant public address of his career to the Chamber of Deputies.[1] This speech contained the essence of his philosophy of war, colonial government, the military's role in a colonial society, and colonization. When the Marshal applied these views to Algeria, he saw no alternative to military colonization if France hoped to create a successful colony there.

As to his concept of war, Bugeaud reiterated the view that wars were not won merely on the battlefield, but by capturing or destroying the enemy's vital interests. In Europe, such interests might include capital, major cities, and communication links, but in Algeria, no such interests existed. Because agriculture was the only basic enterprise Algeria possessed, the razzia had been employed to destroy that interest. Furthermore, he rejected limited war and limited occupation as impractical, expensive follies which only resulted in frustration and failure. A nation should

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[1] "Discours du maréchal Bugeaud à la Chambre des Députés, 24 janvier 1845," Le Moniteur Universel, 25 janvier 1845.

wage war with all the energy necessary to achieve complete victory.[2]

Bugeaud's political philosophy revealed a preference for paternalistic, authoritative rule, especially for colonial societies such as Algeria. He believed the French could learn much by studying the political system of Abd el Kader, un homme de génie, whose government was simply organized but very effective. A colonial populace, endowed with civil and municipal rights and administered by civilians, behaved like badly-reared children, crying and complaining at the least annoyance. Beside, "Que pouves-vous demander à la population administrée civilement et jouissant de tous les droits civils et municipaux? Rien."[3] On the other hand, disciplined colonists under military rule respected and obeyed authority because they valued security more than civil liberties. Men did not fear a regime of the sword if it provided security to them and their families.[4]

The military had a special role to perform in colonial society, for not only should the army provide security and order, it should also perform public service functions such as constructing roads, bridges, and even villages. In turn, such improvements encouraged commercial development

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[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

and permanent settlements. Thus, the army could serve as a civilizing force.[5] Needless to say, Bugeaud wished to expand the functions of the Army of Africa to include colonizing and governing. He justified the special role of the army in Algeria because of the nearly four million Algerian natives, of which five or six hundred thousand were skilled warriors.[6]

Given the above, Bugeaud argued, the only rational form of colonies in Algeria would be a combination of civilians and soldiers. Civilian colonization might proceed in safe areas along the coast, and military colonization could be instituted in the more dangerous interior. To those who opposed military colonies because of the expense, Bugeaud maintained that although it would be expensive, in the long run the cost would be much greater without the soldier-farmer for if the latter were employed, the standing army in Algeria could be reduced by 40,000 men. Otherwise, a 100,000 man protective force would have to be maintained indefinitely at a cost far exceeding the expense of using soldier-farmers.[7] Civilian colonization would be just as

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[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid. Bugeaud's estimate of the cost of instituting military colonies (300 million francs), differed from earlier and later estimates ranging from 350 million francs to 500 million francs. He offered no explanation why this estimate differed from others. Also, he estimated the cost of maintaining 40,000 troops (unnecessary if soldier-farmers were employed), at 40 million francs per year.

expensive as his proposal since government aid would be required in both cases: "Je ne connais qu'un seul bon entrepreneur de colonisation, c'est le Gouvernement, parce qu'il a de l'argent qui lui donnent les Chambres, qu'il exige ni l'intérêt ni l'amortissement de ce capital, et qu'il à dans son armée des bras à bon marché."[8]

Bugeaud concluded his speech by stressing the fundamental necessity of military colonies. A force attached to the soil was essential for Algeria. A civilian populace would be insufficient for there must be a rural population obedient to military discipline. Such settlements would not automatically assure a successful future, but no other institution could meet such challenges as effectively. Because the conquest was all but complete, nothing remained but to plan for the future, and military colonization was the best formula for the creation of a prosperous French Algeria.[9]

This speech had a profound impression on the Chamber of Deputies. While many deputies expressed their approval of the speech, the deputies of the left, appalled by its authoritarianism, rejected it. Although the left had rarely approved of Bugeaud's actions, his speech represented a definitive and complete rupture between the Governor-General and the left.[10]

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[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Demontés, p. 208.

Though the oration stimulated discussions on the merits of military colonization, the Chamber took no steps to initiate such a plan and Bugeaud grew impatient with their inaction. He therefore decided to institute military colonies without official approval. This decision constituted the greatest mistake of his career. By a circular of 9 August 1845, the Marshal urged his generals to collect lists of soldiers who wished to volunteer for military colonies. The soldiers were to be informed at once of the advantages of volunteering. The completed list would be presented to the July Monarchy as proof of the efficacy of Bugeaud's proposals.[11]

According to the new project, non-commissioned officers and privates who volunteered would receive six months leave and could return to France to find wives. Travel expenses would be paid by the state, and a house, necessary tools, and private goods would also be provided. Each family would receive two oxen, two cows, ten sheep, a sow, two plows, a cart, trees, seeds "of all kinds." Colonists would receive food, wages, clothing, and all allowances for three years. Each colonist would receive ten hectares of land fit for cultivation. The soldier-farmer and his wife would provide only their labor. At the end of the three-year period, the family would be given full ownership of the land. Until then, the land would be cultivated collectively. Bugeaud estimated the total cost of establishing 100,000 colonists in this manner

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[11]Azan, L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, pp. 385-86.

to be 350,000,000 francs.[12]

In seasons when soldiers were not occupied with cultivation, they would be required to participate in public work projects. In case of war, they would defend their settlements. The Marshal believed this plan would solve the problem of military security and stimulate agricultural production as well.[13]

Officers responsible for directing the colonies would be compensated for their contributions according to their rank. Colonels and lieutenant-colonels would receive fifty hectares of land; captains, thirty hectares; lieutenants, twenty hectares. Officers would receive free housing, but no subsidy for agricultural implements or household goods.[14]

Bugeaud undertook this project without consulting the Ministry or the Chambers, and when the news of the scheme reached Paris, it caused an uproar in political circles.[15] The opposition press joined the fray, and Le National's headline read, the "Pasha Revolts," suggesting that Bugeaud had gone too far even for the July Monarchy this time.[16]

Le National had five major criticisms of the project: regiments in Algeria could not be kept up to full strength while men were on furlough seeking wives; a soldier's duties

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[12]The (London) Times, 30 August 1845; Thureau-Dangin, VI, 367.

[13]Thureau-Dangin, VI, 367.

[14]The (London) Times, 30 August 1845.

[15]Ideville, II, 178-79; Thureau-Dangin, VI, 370.

[16]Le National, 1 septembre 1845.

should not include building houses and planting gardens; unemployed carpenters and workers from France should be hired by the state to construct villages; the project was too expensive; and, Russia had made a similar attempt and failed.[17]

The rebellious undertaking of this project without prior consultation with government officials may be viewed as a move of desperation by Bugeaud, for his relationship with officials of the July Monarchy had steadily deteriorated during the year. By mid-1845, the Ministry and Chamber of Deputies had lost even the limited enthusiasm for military colonies which they had exhibited after Bugeaud's 24 January speech.[18] Opposition newspapers kept up a steady attack on military colonies, and many politicians agreed with the journalists that Bugeaud's proposals for Algeria were too authoritarian and militaristic.[19]

Bugeaud responded to Le National's charge that he had overstepped his authority by writing to Guizot. He said that everyone should be aware of the motives for his actions by now, for they were based on the conviction that he was rendering a great service to France. He believed all his actions

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[17] Ibid. The reference to Russia's attempt at military colonies no doubt referred to the experiment of Alexander I. There were some similarities between the two plans. For a study of Alexander's military colonies, see Richard E. Pipes, "The Russian Military Colonies, 1810-1831," Journal of Modern History, XXII (1950), pp. 205-19.

[18] Ideville, II, 178-79.

[19] Ibid.

had been in keeping with the prerogatives of military command.[20]

In June, Bugeaud had asked Soult's approval for a grant of 500,000 francs to be used for an experiment in military colonization and Soult flatly rejected the request.[21] Following this rebuff, the Governor-General sought Guizot's assistance. Expressing the fear that Soult wished to dismiss him while pouring out all his frustrations, Bugeaud complained that civilian administrators had more authority over colonial matters than the governor-general. He then delivered a vehement attack against his opponents:

> Dans tous les temps, les succès des généraux ont augmenté leur crédit; le mien a baissé dans la proportion du progres des affaires de l'Algérie. Je ne puis être l'artisan de la démolition de ce que je puis sans vanité appeler mon ouvrage. Je ne puis assister au triste spectacle de la marche dans laquelle on s'engage au pas accéleré. Extension intempestive, ridicule, insensée, de toutes les choses civiles; amputation successive de l'armée et des travaux publics pour couvrir de folles d'un personnel qui suffirait à une population dix fois plus forte; voila le systeme. Je suis fatigue de lutter sans succes contre tant d'idees fausses, contre des bureaux inspires par le journal l'Algérie. Je veux reprendre mon indépendance pour exposer mes propres idées au Gouvernement et au pays. Le patriotisme me le commande, puisque j'ai la conviction qu'on mène mal la plus grosse affaire de la France.[22]

Guizot, who had for years been patient with Bugeaud, felt the Governor-General had surpassed his authority by

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[20]Bugeaud à Guizot, as cited in Demontés, p. 222.

[21]Ideville, II, 181.

[22]Bugeaud à Guizot, 30 juin 1845, Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 183-84. The journal l'Algérie, staged a vigorous campaign against Bugeaud. L'Algérie, a liberal paper, hoped to see Bugeaud replaced by Lamoricière.

attempting to implement military colonization without ministerial approval. He ordered Bugeaud's scheme scrapped and wrote an article of reprimand for the Journal des Débats, reminding Bugeaud that he could not ignore the Ministry or the Chambers for these bodies possessed constitutional authority over such matters: "Il y a des juges à Berlin, il y a à Paris un gouvernement et des Chambres; et il ne s'agit de fonder en Afrique ni un nouveau royaume, ni une nouvelle dynastie."[23]

Guizot also wrote directly to Bugeaud to remind him that he must not forget the strong opposition to military colonization in the cabinet, the Chambers and the commission des crédits. Then the Foreign Minister expressed his own doubts as to the feasibility of military colonies because of the immensity of such an enterprise, the expense, and the uncertainty of results. Guizot accused Bugeaud of imposing his system, with all its obligations, upon the state, and warned him that arbitrary action would not be tolerated. He urged Bugeaud to write a public apology for his rash actions.[24]

Bugeaud reluctantly yielded to Guizot's demand and wrote an article for the Moniteur Algérien which he believed would diminish what the Foreign Minister called the bad effect of

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[23]Guizot in the Journal des Débats, 30 aout 1845; Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 193-94.

[24]Guizot à Bugeaud, 23 aout 1845, Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 194-96.

the circular. By changing verb tenses and using conditional verbs, he had made his project a mere statistical report.[25] The article, however, failed to repair the damage that had resulted from his August circular.

Earlier in the year, the affair of the Dahra caves had severely strained relations between the Ministry of War and the Governor-General. In June, a rebel band had taken refuge from the French in the Dahra caves in the Mostaganem region of Algeria. Colonel Jean Jacques Pelissier (1794-1862), in charge of the force in pursuit of the rebels, ordered a fire started at the mouth of the cave, assuming the smoke would force the enemy from the cave. After several hours, Pelissier ordered the fire extinguished and his men entered the cave, only to discover that the entire rebel band had been asphyxiated. This inhumane act (or unfortunate accident), aroused French public opinion, and the press demanded that Pelissier be punished. Bugeaud defended his subordinate and took the entire responsibility for the affair. He stated that he had given Pelissier permission to use such methods and that the Colonel used this option only as a last resort.[26]

Bugeaud scolded Soult for sympathizing with the press on this issue and supported Pelissier's actions, arguing that

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[25]Bugeaud to Guizot, 28 September 1845, Ideville, II, 181-82.

[26]Bugeaud, Par l'epée et par la charrue, footnote, p. 207; Bugeaud à Soult, 5 janvier 1846, in Canrobert, Le maréchal Canrobert, souvenirs d'un siècle (Huitième edition; Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1910), I, 444-45.

philanthropy only increased the enemy's will to revolt. If the enemy were treated kindly, the war would continue forever. The Arab population had to accept French law before they could be governed, civilized, or made colonial, and thousands of examples proved they only accepted French law when compelled to do so.[27] In the same letter, Bugeaud expressed his anger to Soult for neglecting to deny a charge made by Le National that the Governor-General had demanded a 500,000 franc salary for services rendered in Algeria. The request had been made only to carry out an experiment in military colonies. Neither the commander-in-chief nor the army should be exposed to such slanderous charges and if such lies were to be the only results of his work and sacrifice in North Africa, he could no longer serve his country as Governor-General.[28]

The Marshal also related his frustrations to a prominent figure who seemed to share his views on military colonies, Adolphe Thiers. Although Thiers had advocated total conquest and military colonization, he rarely spoke out publicly for them. His last public speech on Algeria had been in January.[29]

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[27]Bugeaud à Soult, 18 juillet 1845, Bugeaud, Par l'epée et par la charrue, pp. 207-10.

[28]Ibid. Bugeaud believed Soult was trying to force him to resign. See letter from Bugeaud to Guizot, 30 June 1845, in Ideville, II. 180-81.

[29]Thiers, "Discours dans la discussion du Projet d'Adresse pronounce le 21 janvier à la Chambre des Députés," in Thiers, Discours Parlementaires, VI, 574-77.

Bugeaud complained to Thiers that the government of Algeria had become so large and correspondence with Paris so dreadful that it would drain the energy of the most vigorous of men. Neither this nor the Arab threat frightened him, for he was certain he could meet these challenges. What did concern him was the growing opposition to his policies in the War Ministry. He accused certain officials within that bureau of attacking him daily in the newspapers, and although he did not believe Soult to be personally responsible for this, he noted some resentment in recent official correspondence from the Minister of War. Bugeaud took comfort in knowing that Thiers shared his objectives for Algeria and urged the politician to speak out more often in favor of these common objectives, despite the hostile atmosphere of the Chamber of Deputies.[30]

When Soult became aware of Bugeaud's circular of 9 August, the War Minister wrote to Louis Philippe, dismissing the circular as whimsical and suggesting that if the Governor-General could not be convinced of the folly of his plan and allow legitimate authority to make decisions, he should be retired. Soult then suggested that Lamoricière would be a good successor to Bugeaud until Aumale was ready for the position, since Lamoricière would consult the government before

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[30]Bugeaud à Thiers, 20 juillet 1844, in Bugeaud, Par l'epée et par la charrue, pp. 211-12.

taking action.[31] Subsequently, in a letter to Bugeaud, Soult warned his subordinate that the July Monarchy did not compel anyone to serve, but those who did serve were expected to obey orders.[32]

The July Monarchy responded to Bugeaud's independence of action by curbing his authority. He could no longer build a bridge, road, or village without the War Ministry's authorization. One of Bugeaud's admirers complained privately to his brother that his mentor could not even name a street without first consulting Soult.[33] Bugeaud also lost the arbitrary control he exercised over newspapers and journals in Algeria and was ordered to cease using the Moniteur Algérien for the publication of his personal views.[34]

Earlier in the year, an ordonnance of 15 April had established a Director-General of Civilian Affairs in Algeria to act in concert with the Governor-General in all civilian matters. In addition, the ordonnance divided Algeria into three administrative areas: Civilian territory, where Europeans were numerous enough to justify the organization of

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[31]Soult à Louis Philippe, 25 aout 1845, in Soult, Correspondance, pp. 281-86.

[32]Soult à Bugeaud, as cited in Le National, 6 aout 1845.

[33]Armand Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud à Leroy de Saint-Arnaud (brother), 18 aout 1845, in Saint-Arnaud, Lettres du Maréchal de Saint-Arnaud (Paris: Michel Levy Freres, 1855), II, 39-41.

[34]Soult à Bugeaud, 14 juin 1845. Archives du ministere de la Guerre. Section outre-mer. Algérie. Correspondance, carton 89.

civilian government; Mixed territory where natives outnumbered Europeans and thus would be administered by military chiefs, and; Arab territory with no European population. The ordonnance thus established a dual administrative network, and while the Governor-General maintained his hold over the interior, the Director-General of Civilian Affairs gradually took control of the coastal area.[35]

Bugeaud complained to Soult that such an ordonnance creating civilian administration would not consolidate French power in Algeria, but would only complicate things.[36] Some weeks later, he again criticized the partisans of the extension of civilian institutions:

> Si ces utopistes insensés pouvaient participer le sac au dos avec huit jours de vivres, soixante cartouches dans la giberne, à tout ce que nous faisons pour maintenir la securité,... ils ne pousseraient pas le Gouvernement avec tant d'ardeur à annuler le pouvoir militaire.[37]

After the rejection of his August circular and the resulting breach with the July Monarchy, Bugeaud's correspondence became more bitter and bellicose. He denounced newspapers such as Le National and l'Algérie as tools of the War Ministry.[38] He argued that nearly 10,000 young soldiers

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[35]Azan, l'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 388; Demontés, pp. 121-23.

[36]Bugeaud au Soult, 27 avril 1845, cited in Azan, l'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 388.

[37]Bugeaud au Soult, 6 juin 1845, ibid., p. 389.

[38]Bugeaud à Pierre Genty de Bussy, 30 aout 1845, in Bugeaud, Lettres inédite du maréchal Bugeaud, pp. 284-87.

wanted to become soldier-colonists: "If France was ill-advised enough not to take advantage of this disposition, so as to consolidate her conquest speedily and for ever [sic] her blindness cannot be too much deplored. . . ."[39] Shortly thereafter he wrote: "My heart is riven by . . . so much blindness, on the part of our rulers and of the press, which governs us much more than we are willing to allow."[40]

Bugeaud's bitterness extended not only to the opposition, but to the Orleans dynasty as well. The Governor-General's most ardent supporter within the army, Armand Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud (1789-1854), expressed his disillusionment with the July Monarchy:

> Et l'aveugle gouvernement, les Bourbons de la branche cadette, qui sont entrainés par la fatalité comme les Stuarts, laisseraient arracher de leurs mains la seule arme qui peut les défendre. Qui soutiendra la monarchie si on l'attaque à la mort du roi Louis-Philippe? Qui? Qui? J'en nommerais mille et je n'en connais qu'un. Il n'y a qu'une epée pour les sauver et c'est celle du duc d'Isly! Et on veut lui oter l'Afrique![41]

The Governor-General, though bitter and disillusioned, took comfort in a small group of supporters in Algiers. In September, a letter bearing three hundred signatures was presented to Bugeaud by the President of the Algerian Chamber of

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[39]Bugeaud to Guizot, 28 September 1845, Ideville, II, 182.

[40]Bugeaud to the Prefet of the Dordoyne, 6 October 1845, as cited in the Annual Register, LXXXVII (1845), p. 257.

[41]Saint Arnaud à M. Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 18 aout 1845, Saint-Arnaud, Lettres, II, 39-41.

Commerce. The address expressed continued confidence in the Governor-General:

> Restez au milieu de vos amis; ici, il n'y a pas de dissidence, ici tout le monde vous aime et vous admire; et si ailleurs on méconnaît les immenses services que vous rendez au pays, souvenez-vous Monsieur le Maréchal, que l'Algérie vous place au premier rang de ses bienfacteurs, et que votre nom est dans nos coeurs, comme il le sera dans l'histoire, inséparable de cette contrée.[42]

Although this address could by no means be interpreted as representing the views of the majority of Europeans living in Algeria (approximately 80,000), Bugeaud responded warmly to this gesture of confidence. He admitted that colonization had not proceeded as quickly as he had hoped for two reasons: obstruction in Paris and the continued Arab threat. The latter, however, could eventually be overcome, for colonization was the best means of achieving security. The real problem was how to convince officials in Paris of the necessity of colonization. He also complained that too much of his valuable time was spent handling minor administrative details: "Est-ce que, d'ailleurs, on n'administre, on ne colonize, on ne gouverne qu'a Alger?"[43]

In November 1845, an event took place which gave Bugeaud a glimmer of hope, Soult, the aging Minister of War, resigned

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[42]"Une adresse présentée par des Notables Civils à Alger," Moniteur Algérien, 4 septembre 1845.

[43]"Discours de Bugeaud en reponse a une adresse présentee par des Notables Civils à Alger, le 3 septembre 1845," Moniteur Algérien, 4 septembre 1845.

that position for health reasons.[44] Bugeaud hoped the new War Minister, General Alexandre-Pierre Moline de Saint-Yon (1786-1870), a less distinguished man, would have more respect for the veteran of Algeria and would be more sympathetic to military colonization. The Governor-General wrote a letter of congratulations to Saint-Yon and brought up the question of military colonies, charging that bureaucrats in Paris who knew nothing of Algerian affairs had negatively influenced Soult. He professed hope that Saint-Yon would not yield to such pressures.[45] Saint-Yon did prove to be more sympathetic to Bugeaud than Soult had been, but he had less prestige and influence in the Ministry than his predecessor. Saint-Yon had been chosen to succeed Soult only after Hubert Rohault de Fleury (1779-1866), refused the position because of his health and age. Fleury had been the choice of both the king and Soult.[46] The new Minister of War proved unable to assist Bugeaud in achieving his objectives.[47]

Contrasting schemes for Algerian settlement devised by other army officers also complicated matters and hindered

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[44]Bugeaud, Par l'epée et par la charrue, footnote, p. 245; Alphonse Marie Louis de Lamartine, "La retraite du maréchal Soult," in Lamartine's La France parlementaire (1834-1851): Oeuvre oratoire et ecrits politique (deuxième serie; Paris [etc.] A Lacroix, Verboeckhoven et C^ie, 1864-65), IV, 251-52. This is an especially interesting, though critical appraisal of Soult's career.

[45]Bugeaud au Saint-Yon, 21 novembre 1845, in Bugeaud, Par l'epée et par la charrue, pp. 245-46.

[46]Soult à Louis Philippe, 25 et 28 aout 1845, in Soult, Correspondance, pp. 281-88.

[47]See below, Chapter VIII.

Bugeaud's projects. General Lamoricière, a distinguished veteran of the Algerian campaign, felt that state or military colonization would be too expensive. Instead, wealthy capitalists should either be encouraged to purchase large tracts of land by auction or should be given land. Massive land confiscations would serve to drive the natives further into the interior or into mountain regions where they would not threaten the European settlers. Once a given area had been cleared of natives, private individuals or groups would be responsible for installing settlers on the land and handling the problems of administration.[48]

Although he did not publicly take part in the debate on military colonization, General Cavaignac also had a scheme for colonial settlements. Cavaignac made a fundamental distinction between industrial and agricultural colonies. Industrial colonies, such as factories and mines, could be organized by private capital through concessions from the state while agricultural colonies could be state-organized. Discharged soldiers and civilian farmers could be recruited and placed on agricultural settlements together. These quasi-military colonies would be especially effective in areas not completely pacified. The colonies at Orléansville and Tlemcen, populated by French peasants who were veterans of the Algerian campaign, pleased Cavaignac because of their good relationship

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[48]Pierre Emile Ibos, Le général Cavaignac: Un dictateur republicain (Paris: Hachette, 1930), p. 113; Thureau-Dangin, VI, 146.

with the natives and their service to the garrisons in times of crisis.[49] Although Cavaignac and Bugeaud might have agreed on the use of ex-soldiers in the settlements, they agreed on little else, for while Bugeaud's colonists would work communally for a few years, Cavaignac's settlers would be individual proprietors from the beginning. In addition, Bugeaud proposed to use men still on active duty, while Cavaignac opposed this.[50]

General Bedeau presented an eclectic plan for colonization. While Bugeaud's military colonies could be employed along the frontier, in other areas large plots could be sold to private investors and small plots could be reserved for individual settlers who wished to purchase land directly from the state.[51]

Although the above plans did not appear simultaneously, they were known by 1845, and manifested the dissatisfaction of some officers of the African Army with Bugeaud's scheme. As expected, Bugeaud denounced all of the alternate proposals as unsound and argued that confiscating large tracts of land, as Lamoriciere and Bedeau advocated, violated the rights of the Arab tribes and would cause a tremendous refugee problem.[52]

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[49] Ibos, p. 113. Ibos suggests that Cavaignac's ideas might have born fruit had not the February Revolution intervened.

[50] Ibid., p. 117.

[51] Demontés, pp. 86-92.

[52] Ibid., p. 24.

Furthermore, it would be in the best interests of France ". . . not to make large landowners but a great many little ones, to increase the population . . . [for] the best capital is a pair of arms fixed to the soil by right of ownership. Capital does not fix anyone; men pass over its property like the figures in a magic-lantern."[53]

Of all the alternate projects, Lamoriciere's had the greatest impact, in part because he had become a hero not only to his soldiers, but to many civilians in France. In addition, Lamoriciere's views received much publicity in the press.[54] Thus, he became Bugeaud's chief military rival. Saint-Arnaud, Bugeaud's admirer and subordinate, summarized the rivalry between Lamoricière and Bugeaud. He denied that the Army of Africa was divided into two camps, but admitted the presence of two dominant men with different points of view. While Bugeaud believed in continued military control over Algeria, Lamoricière believed civilian administration would and should eventually replace the military. Saint-Arnaud also admitted that several officers preferred Lamoriciere because they believed that the younger of the two rivals had a better future than "... un vieillard illustre

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[53]Bugeaud to Aumale, January 1844, Ideville, II, 105.

[54]Both Le National and L'Algérie supported Lamoricière and published a number of articles by the general on the subject of colonies.

dont la carrière ne peut plus être bien longue."[55]

Eighteen Forty-Five had been the most critical year of Bugeaud's tenure as Governor-General of Algeria. His eloquent plea to the Chamber of Deputies in January impressed some, but the speech did not leave a favorable lasting impression. During the spring and summer of 1845, relations between the victor of Isly and officials of the July Monarchy became more strained until the breaking point occurred with the issuance of the circular of 9 August. This action could well be interpreted as rebellious. Bugeaud's self-righteousness left him no alternative but to defy the French government. This rash action resulted not only in alienating former supporters such as Guizot, but it also caused Louis Philippe to have serious doubts about the loyalty of his commander-in-chief.[56] If anything, the circular rendered the adoption of military colonization in Algeria less likely, for the Governor-General's powers were curbed in 1845 and limited even more by 1847.[57]

The failure of small-scale military colony experiments in 1845 also made Bugeaud's argument less effective. Wretched conditions characterized the two military colonies in the Sahel, although the situation in nearby civilian villages was

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[55]Saint-Arnaud à Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 10 janvier 1846, Saint-Arnaud, Lettres, II, 71.

[56]Louis Philippe à Soult, 11 novembre 1845, Soult, Correspondence, pp. 292-93.

[57]See below, Chapter VIII.

no better. In 1845, only six hundred eighty-nine new colonists moved to villages Bugeaud had created, while seven hundred fifteen left because of the deplorable living conditions and the Arab menace.[58]

By the end of the year, the hostility between Bugeaud and his most illustrious general not only divided the officer corps into opposing groups, but also adversely affected the military campaign against the Arabs. Montagnac complained that if Bugeaud and Lamoriciere continued their ridiculous polemical debates, the enemy would regain the initiative while they quibbled.[59] In fact, Abd el Kader, who had been outlawed by the Treaty of Tangier in the preceeding year, reappeared in 1845 to lead a massive revolt which was repressed only with the greatest difficulty.[60]

The events of 1845 must be regarded as having resulted in a turning point in Bugeaud's career. Bugeaud was certain that his scheme of military colonization would be as successful as his military tactics had been. The years of popularity and acclaim were over, however, and after 1845, Bugeaud had little chance of implementing his project. Only bitterness and frustration lay ahead for the old soldier who now interpreted every rebuff as the ingratitude of a nation for which he had sacrificed much.

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[58]Thureau-Dangin, VI, 368, 411.

[59]Montagnac à Elizé de Montagnac, 22 juillet 1845, Montagnac, Lettres d'un soldat, p. 492.

[60]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 527-29.

Chapter VII

1846: J'AIMERAIS MIEUX COMMANDER L'ARMÉE DE XERXÈS

Mounting opposition to his colonization schemes, another insurrection led by Abd el Kader, and administrative complications made the sixth year of Bugeaud's leadership in Algeria his most disappointing and caused the Marshal seriously to contemplate retirement: "C'est un rude métier ... que de gouverner l'administration civile, j'aimerais mieux commander l'armée de Xerxès."[1]

Abd el Kader regrouped his forces and led another native insurrection in the winter of 1845-1846 stifling Bugeaud's efforts to work for military colonization. Coupled with the insurrection, which took until the spring to subdue, a "massacre" of French prisoners of war took place in Morocco. In the winter of 1846, French troops taken prisoner by Arab tribesmen were taken into Morocco and shot. Although a shroud of mystery surrounds the death of these prisoners -- it was not known whether Algerian natives or Moroccans actually carried out the executions -- Bugeaud believed that since his men were killed on Moroccan soil, an invasion of Morocco was justifiable. The desire to invade Morocco again was not merely a passing, passionate whim, for the evidence points to serious plans for such an expedition not only in Bugeaud's correspondence,

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[1]Bugeaud à Genty de Bussy, 8 fevrier 1847, Bugeaud, Par l'Epée et Par la Charrue, p. 285.

but also in that of his loyal subordinate, Saint-Arnaud.[2] Guizot finally convinced Bugeaud that such an action would be politically impossible because of pressures at home and the possibility of a confrontation with Britain. Bugeaud wrote to Guizot, reluctantly assuring him that no action would be taken to invade Morocco.[3]

During the native insurrection, rumors spread that another invasion of Morocco was imminent, and criticism of Bugeaud mounted. Opposition journals kept up their incessant attacks while distinguished deputies such as Tocqueville and Lamartine attacked the Marshal in the Chamber of Deputies, and generals Lamoricière and Bedeau publicized their discontent with Bugeaud and proposed counter-schemes for colonization.[4]

By April, the native rebellion had been curbed and the decision made that no punitive expedition would be sent to Morocco. At this point, Bugeaud took a brief repose to review in writing his accomplishments since becoming governor-general. In a letter to an old friend, Pierre Magne, he admitted that

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[2]Ideville, Memoirs of Bugeaud, II. 219-21; Saint-Arnaud a Leroy de Saint Aunaud, 17 janvier 1846, Lettres du Maréchal de Saint-Arnaud, II, 71-72.

[3]Bugeaud to Guizot, 30 April 1846, Ideville, II, 221.

[4]Lamoricière et Bedeau, Projets de colonisation pour les Provinces d'Oran et de Constantine, presentés par MM. les lieutenants-généraux Lamoricière et Bedeau (Paris, 1847).

future insurrections would be difficult to prevent, but believed that Abd el Kader's resources had gradually diminished. He expressed confidence that subsequent rebellions could be put down with ease, since all the Emir's regular troops had been captured or killed in the winter campaign and tribes which had supported Abd el Kader no longer had confidence in him. He was equally convinced that rebellions would continue until a rational means of colonizing Algeria could be put into effect.[5] The native populace could only be controlled and gradually assimilated into French society by military initiative. The use of native troops in the Armée d'Afrique provided an example of how the army had already achieved the above. Native cavalrymen in French service were better horsemen, better marksmen, and better warriors than the French, especially in the Algerian terrain. These native soldiers were treated with respect and in turn, were loyal to France.[6]

Bugeaud denied charges made by his opposition that European interests in Algeria had been adversely affected by the recent rebellion, for communication links had remained open and commercial transactions continued as always. Because he had earnestly worked to further European interests in Algeria, Bugeaud could not understand why the attacks against

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[5]Bugeaud à Pierre Magne, 3 avril 1846, as cited in André Lichtenberger, Bugeaud (Paris, Plon c1931), Appendix, pp. 255-60.

[6]Bugeaud à Saint-Yon, juin 1846, as cited in Azan, l'Armée de Afrique de 1830 à 1852, pp. 189-90.

him continued. He bitterly denounced the opposition press as "...parvenus à les faire croire dans les rangs les plus élevés de la societé."[7] Keenly irritated that several deputies had violently attacked him and accused him of being a poor administrator, he believed many opposition deputies were wrong in assigning first importance to the administration of 90,000 European civilians when 100,000 soldiers and millions of Arabs demanded attention. He challenged his opponents to find any military leader in the past who had better led an army in time of war and at the same time, handled such complicated administrative details.[8]

He had conquered Algeria twice, but could not, with such limited forces at his disposal, conquer a scornful and blind French public. Twice he had made France mistress of Algeria and had created respect for and fear of the French flag all over North Africa. He had made more progress toward a permanent settlement in his five and one-half years as governor-general than had been accomplished in the ten years before his rule. But, as long as politicians in Paris continued to entertain what he regarded as false ideas on colonization, the Arabs could never be completely conquered. If he were thirty years younger, he might complete his work, but at sixty-two, he wondered if time would allow it. He therefore expressed

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[7]Bugeaud à Pierre Magne, 3 avril 1846, as cited in Lichtenberger, Appendix, p. 256.

[8]Ibid.

his intention of retiring in July after the spring campaign so that he could freely speak and write on the question of Algeria. As a private citizen free from restraints, he might be more effective.[9] How, he rhetorically asked, could he be expected to vanquish the enemy in Algeria when journals in Paris such as l'Algérie provided such a bad example for discipline by their daily attacks on the leader of 100,000 troops?[10]

Expressing his plan to retire might have been a means of testing sympathies within influential circles, or it might be interpreted as an ultimatum to the July Monarchy to yield to his demands for military colonization. He did write lengthy letters to friends and men of influence in which he suggested that he might retire if his projects were not adopted.[11] In a letter to Guizot, he expressed his belief that his appointment should come to an end because the torrent of opposition had become too great. Because he did not wish to yield to the opposition, he preferred retirement. He mentioned having written to the Minister of War to request, because of bad health and age, that Saint-Yon suggest a replacement to the

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[9] Ibid., p. 258.

[10] Bugeaud au Ministere de la Guerre (Saint-Yon), 2 juillet 1846, Bugeaud, Par l'Epée et Par la Charrue, p. 275.

[11] Jean Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud, le Soldat--le député--le colonisateur; Portraits et documents inédits (Paris, A. Michel 1931), pp. 248-49. Lucas-Dubreton points out that by 1846, Bugeaud had become prudent enough not to voice his complaints in newspapers as often as before and complained in private to his friends.

king. He told Guizot, however, that the real reason for considering retirement was that public opinion so obviously opposed his objectives, and he refused to promote what he considered to be prevalent mistaken notions about the future of Algeria.[12]

Additional evidence that Bugeaud seriously considered retirement in 1846 is present in the correspondence of Saint-Arnaud, who mentioned in a letter to his brother that Bugeaud, tired of coping with journalists, civilians, and administrative work would likely take the advice of his friends (Saint-Arnaud included), and retire after the spring expedition.[13]

While Bugeaud prepared his last great offensive for military colonies, the mood of the Chamber of Deputies grew more intolerant of the governor-general. In 1846, Lamartine became an active spokesman of the opposition to Bugeaud's Algerian policies, and on 10 June, the poet-politician for the first time publicly summarized his convictions regarding Algeria in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies.[14] Lamartine believed that France had justifiably conquered Algeria and scoffed at those who advocated withdrawal, for if France were

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[12]Bugeaud à Guizot, 11 avril 1846, in Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 223-25.

[13]Saint-Arnaud au Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 17 janvier 1846, Lettres du Maréchal de Saint Arnaud, II, 71-72.

[14]Alphonse Marie Louis de Lamartine, "Sur l'Algérie," 10 juin 1846, in La France parlementaire (1834-1851): Oeuvre oratoire et écrits politique (Paris [etc.] A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven et Cie, 1864-65), IV, 402-39.

to play a purely defensive role within the power structure of Europe, she would soon be relegated to the status of a second-rate power. Therefore, the French conquest of Algeria had been desirable. Although he supported French presence in North Africa, he believed the official policy toward Algeria to be in error. For example, some would maintain that in time of war, the legislature should hold its criticisms of the army in order to prevent disruption of the military campaign. On the contrary, Lamartine argued that the legislature must continuously review military actions during war time to prevent the misuse of power and to condemn inhumane acts. The annals of British Parliament provided scores of examples whereby legislators had prevented unnecessary massacres of natives at the hands of British troops. The French parallel to such military atrocities was the use of the razzia in Algeria. Although Lamartine praised Bugeaud as a bold, courageous, and capable soldier, he denounced him as an arbitrary military dictator in dealing with the natives and in administrative procedures. Aside from cruel treatment of the natives, the military administration of the Arabs was poorly organized, for an elaborate, hierarchical administrative system could not be effectively directed toward a tribal population. If administrators, tax collectors, policemen, and military patrols were assigned to a certain area, what did one do when the natives gathered their tents and moved to another area as was their nature? A more practical form of

administration would be to establish contacts with tribal chieftains, win their confidence, and rule through them.[15]

In addition, Lamartine insisted that the military conquest had gone too far. No positive gains resulted from Bugeaud's victory at Isly, the only result being the acquisition of more useless desert. To continue to maintain a large army in North Africa and to allocate large sums of money for Algeria was a waste. Besides, directing so much attention and energy toward Africa might cause France to lose her influence in European affairs, a much more important concern. France could not remain secure from attack by one of the great powers if she persisted in expending all of her energies on a continent separated from Europe by the Mediterranean. Algerian desertland was being conquered at the expense, for example, of losing Italy to Austria. Lamartine believed there was considerable danger that France would become uniquely interested in Africa and abandon her European interests. As to the creation of military colonies, this would be feasible only given the existence of conditions dating from ancient civilization; that is, slavery, and France had only citizens.[16]

Perhaps Lamartine's fear that European interests would be entirely abandoned in favor of African interests was irrational, but his defense of legislative review of the military

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[15] Ibid., 403, 416-17.

[16] Ibid., 405, 417, 436.

even during wartime, his criticism of faulty administrative methods vis-a-vis the natives, and his criticism of the expense of maintaining a large army in Algeria when it was no longer needed, seemed to match the mood of French public opinion and a growing number of legislators.[17]

Lamoricière, another opponent of Bugeaud's, had recently been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. The new deputy added his voice to that of the rising opposition to the governor-general. Lamoricière, who joined the liberal opposition in the Chamber of Deputies with such men as Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont, was respected in the Chamber not only because of his fame as a military leader, but also because of his skill as an orator.[18] He had earlier proposed a counter-scheme to Bugeaud's, and after his election to the Chamber of Deputies, he formally presented a complete plan of settlement for Oran Province without consulting Bugeaud. He proposed to call the attention of wealthy capitalists to the potential development of Oran Province and to sell them large tracts of land there through auction. Thus, the state would play only the limited role of stimulating interests in the development of Algeria while the army would play no role at all.[19] Bugeaud, resentful that his subordinate

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[17]Demontés, pp. 230-31.

[18]Jacques Marie Cavaignac, Les deux généraux Cavaignac, f. n., p. 237.

[19]Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet, VI, 416-17.

had presented the scheme without consulting him, wrote a letter of protest to the Chamber of Deputies, maintaining that Lamoricière's "colonists in yellow gloves," would undermine all that he had achieved in Algeria and repeated his argument that soldier farmers would be the quickest, best, and least expensive means of colonizing Algeria.[20]

Outside the Chamber of Deputies, Eugene Cavaignac, recently promoted to the rank of general despite his consistent criticisms of the governor-general, lashed out at the Ministry for allowing Bugeaud to conduct the grosse affaire of pressing for military colonies while he ignored his proper role of conducting military campaigns. Cavaignac opposed the conduct of the war and complained that his superiors, Bugeaud and Lamoricière, spent more time in the Chamber of Deputies than on the battlefield, concluding that such men were opportunists who placed their own interests and hopes for personal gain above their sense of duty to the army or to France. He also complained that while he did the actual work, his immediate superior, Lamoricière, received all the praise. Bitter at the lack of recognition extended him, the general maintained that he had not been given leave to return home in five and one-half years while Bugeaud and Lamoricière spent much of their time in France involved in ridiculous debates.[21]

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[20] Ibid., 418.

[21] Eugene Cavaignac au général Jacques Cavaignac, 22 juillet 1846, Les Deux généraux Cavaignac, pp. 236-39.

Although Cavaignac did not publicize them, he also had views on colonization which he reported to his uncle. He argued that Algeria was large enough to experiment with several systems, depending on the region and the circumstances. He reproached Bugeaud for having a too systematic scheme and for insisting upon installing military colonists in areas where they were not needed. On the other hand, Lamoricière, by proposing the complete exclusion of the military, offered an unrealistic alternative.[22]

By 1846, Saint-Arnaud was virtually the only officer in North Africa willing to speak out on Bugeaud's behalf. He denounced the opposition journalists for their odious attacks on Bugeaud and suggested that the Marshal was justified in contemplating retirement, given the newspaper articles, administrative problems, and all the rest. Even Saint-Arnaud admitted, however, that all was not well in Algeria. At Orléansville, one of Bugeaud's model settlements, life was hard: "Le pays est mauvais, on manque de tout, on a l'air de ne rien faire."[23]

In June the annual discussion of appropriations for Algeria took place in the Chambers. As usual, the debates were heated, but for the first time, they attracted considerable

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[22]Eugene Cavaignac au Jacques Cavaignac, 26 mars 1847, ibid., pp. 239-55.

[23]Saint-Arnaud à Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 17, 24 janvier 1846, Lettres du Maréchal de Saint-Arnaud, II, 71-74.

public attention.[24] At the beginning of the session, the new War Minister, Moline Saint Yon, presented an optimistic account of conditions in Algeria, but Alexis de Tocqueville immediately challenged this cheerful report and accused Saint Yon of creating a parliamentary comedy. As Tocqueville saw it:

> Il y a dans ce moment-ci un parfait equilibre entre le Gouverneur général et le gouvernement de France; l'un veut la colonisation militaire et il faut reconnaître qu'il ne peut pas la faire; l'autre veut la colonisation civile; il ne peut pas non plus y réussir; de telle sorte que, comme je le disais tout à l'heure, les deux pouvoirs sentiennent en échec et on arrive paisiblement à l'impuissance.[25]

The Chamber had become less disposed to sympathize with heavy expenditures for Algeria, especially those which Bugeaud might use to establish more experimental colonies.

In discussing Bugeaud's position in Algeria, the Chamber lauded the Marshal for his military successes, but criticized his work in administration and colonization. One deputy, M. Dufaure, suggested that a civilian ministry should be established in Algeria in which the governor-general would merely be an agent. Tocqueville and Lamartine agreed with the suggestion.[26] Nor was the dissatisfaction limited to the Chamber of Deputies. In the Chamber of Peers, the Marquis de Boissy called military colonization a "fatally sterile"

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[24]Demontés, p. 230.

[25]Alexis de Tocqueville, as cited in ibid., p. 231.

[26]Thureau-Dangin, VI, 403.

alternative which could only result in racial and religious antagonism, inflexible discipline and the disorder and exactions of a fuedal administration.[27] Within the Ministry, even Guizot questioned whether or not military colonization might not be a waste of time.[28]

Bugeaud changed tactics slightly in 1846. Rather than continue to engage in journalistic polemics which had resulted in essentially negative reactions, he decided to accelerate his communiques with important personages and to invite them to visit Algeria to see for themselves the urgent need for military colonization. He drew a parallel between his letters and those of the Apostle Paul to the Romans. Paul had seen that his critics had formed false notions about his work in Macedonia and invited those critics to visit Macedonia to see for themselves what problems there were. He placed horses and soldiers at their disposal, declaring that he listened only to the council of professionals who knew by personal experience of what they spoke.[29]

One of Bugeaud's compatriots in France, Hippolyte Lamarche, sought the support of Thiers and Ferdinand Barrot in the quest for military colonies. Using strategic reasons as a basis for his arguments, Lamarche maintained that a

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[27]Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud, p. 244.

[28]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 190.

[29]Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud, p. 251.

French colony in Algeria would create a French bulwark in the Mediterranean against Britain: "L'Algérie, pour nous, c'est l'Ile de France, c'est le Canada, c'est l'Egypte, c'est la frontier du Rhin."[30] A firm foothold in Algeria would assure France of naval and political supremacy in the Mediterranean and the means of achieving this foothold was military colonization. Unfortunately for Bugeaud, Lamarche failed to convince Thiers and Barrot.[31]

Despite the ever-increasing hostility to Bugeaud in political and military circles, he persisted in his arguments and won a few converts. In July, the Minister of Public Instruction, the comte de Salvandy, went to Algeria on an official visit and was duly impressed with Bugeaud's work and convinced of the superiority of military colonization over other schemes. The Minister gave Bugeaud a glimmer of hope by stating his belief that the French government would eventually lend support to his plan.[32]

During Salvandy's visit, Bugeaud personally led the Minister on a tour of the interior, and when the Minister prepared to return to France, Bugeaud offered a banquet in his honor. In a speech at the banquet, Bugeaud solicited Salvandy's

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[30]Hippolyte Lamarche, A mm. Thiers et Barrot: L'Algérie, son influence sur les Destinées de la France et de l'Europe (Paris: Librairie Paulin, 1846), p. 18.

[31]Ibid., p. 38.

[32]Demontés, pp. 233-34.

aid in convincing Frenchmen of the necessity of military colonies. A vanquished people would not quietly accept domination. History was filled with examples of this, and he was certain that the "fierce, fanatic, bellicose Arab" in particular would never yield easily to French domination without the continued presence of the army. Colonization could only succeed with the support of the mother country and it was his duty and that of all who agreed with him to convince France that military colonization was needed. One had only to point to his experimental villages to view the success military colonies might enjoy:

> Partout où une fraction notable de l'armée s'etablit, on voit se grouper autour d'elle les marchands, les industriels de toute sorte, et voilà une ville; mais bientôt on s'étend dans la campagne, et les intervalles se remplissent. Telle est la marche naturelle et inevitable.[33]

The above argument was inconsistent with previous statements of Bugeaud on the subject for while he maintained that trade and commerce might flourish only if the military were in firm control of the area, he complained of conflicts which arose between army personnel and civilian merchants and industrialists in many Algerian settlements.[34]

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[33]Bugeaud, "Discours du maréchal Bugeaud dans un banquet offert par la population d'Alger au comte de Salvandy, ministre de l'Instruction publique, le 16 juillet 1846," Moniteur Algérien, 21 juillet 1846.

[34]Bugeaud au Ministere de la Guerre (Saint-Yon), 1 septembre 1846, in Bugeaud, Lettres Inédites, p. 294.

Bugeaud believed that the army by constructing villages, doing reclamation work, and building roads and bridges, had already begun the work of colonization and it was only logical that the army should continue its work by using soldier-colonists on a large scale.[35]

In answering those who preferred private initiative as a stimulus for colonization, Bugeaud maintained that only state-sponsored colonies could succeed since only the state possessed the capital to finance the operation and the army to carry it out, in addition to all the other resources essential for such an endeavor.[36]

In closing his banquet speech, Bugeaud again hinted that his official work in Algeria was coming to a close and expressed the hope that those at the banquet would complete his work. Although his official duties in Algeria might be terminated, he assured those present that as long as his health would permit, he would use "... toutes les forces de l'esprit et du corps..."[37] to continue in private life to work for the realization of his objectives.

Bugeaud's persistence, Lamoricière's counter-plan, and the public interest in Algeria, prompted the Chamber of

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[35]Bugeaud, "Discours du maréchal Bugeaud dans un banquet offert par la population d'Alger au comte de Salvandy, ministere de l'Instruction publique, le 16 juillet 1846," Moniteur Algérien, 21 juillet 1846.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Ibid.

Deputies to appoint a commission of four deputies to prepare a report on the principles of colonization. The Commission, consisting of MMs. Tocqueville, Lavergne, Plichon, and Béchamel, visited Algeria to study the problem first-hand.[38]

This was Tocqueville's third visit to Algeria since 1841, but all previous trips had been brief and Tocqueville had never ventured into the interior.

Bugeaud, hopeful of winning the commissioners' confidence, took them on a tour of model military colonies in the interior (Blidah, Médéah, Milianah, and Orléansville). He did not understand how to deal with politicians, however, and succeeded in little else than exhausting his companions. During the tour, he and subordinates committed many blunders which served further to alienate the already hostile commissioners. At Milianah, when a deputation of colonists requested the recall of a military justice of the peace and a military commission in charge of municipal administration and their replacement by civilians, Bugeaud denounced the deputation in the presence of his guests. Saint-Arnaud, traveling with the group at the time, attempted to illustrate how ungracious the group was by pointing out all that Bugeaud had done for them and imprudently added that even civilian leaders would be

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[38]Alexis de Tocqueville, Memoirs, Letters, and Remains of Alexis de Tocqueville. Trans. from the French by translator of Napoleon's correspondence with King Joseph (London: Macmillan, 1861), I, 53; Demontés, p. 235.

thrown into a pit at the least evidence of negligence on their part.[39]

One incident while in Orléansville no doubt left Tocqueville with a bad impression for he was stopped by a sergeant who threatened to force him to remain indoors if the deputy continued to roam about the village at will. Tocqueville and his friends only became more convinced that military colonization was too arbitrary and were more than ever sympathetic to Lamoricière's scheme.[40]

Tocqueville had definitely decided against military colonization before his trip to Algeria, and Bugeaud could have done nothing to change that attitude. Before leaving France, Tocqueville wrote to a friend that he wished only to spend about one month in Algeria and would spend all of his time in Algiers because of poor health. Although he maintained that he would go to Algeria perfectly unprejudiced, his earlier statements plus his resolve to spend only one month in North Africa and all that time in Algiers, causes serious doubts about his sincerity in claiming to be free of prejudice. Tocqueville also mentioned that he was certain Bugeaud was still anxious for war against Morocco.[41] By October when the visit was made, this was an unfair estimation, for although

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[39]Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud, p. 246.

[40]Thureau-Dangin, V, 412-14; Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud, p. 246.

[41]Tocqueville to M. de Corcelle, 11 October 1846, in Tocqueville, Memoirs, Letters, and Remains, II, 78-79.

Bugeaud had favored an invasion, he had taken no action to illustrate that he would defy orders and invade Morocco.

The tour had lasted eleven days. Mid-way through it, Colonel de Saint-Arnaud wrote of the rigorous journey::

> Now for five days my mind, my legs, and my horses have not been out of a harness. My body is less weary than my mind; but to hold one's own with a marshal, who likes talking, with four deputies and two journalists [from the Revue de deux mondes] who are always asking questions . . . is too much. . . . We . . . dined and camped together. . . . M. de Tocqueville went in for methodical, profound and analytical observation. . . . We had three Homeric repasts, each laid for eighteen, reception, and royal entry into Orléansville, guns, troops lining the road, illuminations, plays, etc.[42]

At the end of the tour, Bugeaud's failure to communicate with the commissioners in a positive manner was symbolized by Tocqueville's toast to better relations between civilians and the army.[43]

Bugeaud, anxious to win well-known allies from all walks of life, even sought the favor of Victor Hugo, He attempted to entice Hugo by comparing his plan of colonization to a lance. Civilian colonists were the handle; soldier-colonists were the shaft and the two complemented one another without intermingling. Unimpressed with Bugeaud's metaphor, Hugo remained silent on the issue.[44]

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[42]Saint-Arnaud to Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 29 November 1846, as cited in Ideville, II, 233.

[43]Demontés, pp. 236-37.

[44]Lucas-Dubreton, Bugeaud, p. 245.

Alexandre Dumas père, more responsive than Hugo, agreed to visit Algeria when Bugeaud offered to dispatch his official ship to Cadiz to carry the renowned author to North Africa. Dumas' visit proved to be a fiasco, however, for the Minister of Marine and the Minister of War reprimanded Bugeaud for using a ship of state to transport a "... romancier sans mandat."[45] Although Dumas returned to France to support Bugeaud, he merely amused, but did not convert, the adversaries of military colonization.[46]

Bugeaud also sought the aid of the new War Minister, Saint Yon. He found him to be more sympathetic to military colonies, but Soult's successor lacked prestige in government circles and proved to be of little value. In July, Bugeaud wrote to Saint Yon to solicit his aid in silencing l'Algérie, one of the more outspoken opposition journals. He accused Soult of having aided the editors of this journal and urged the new Minister of War to have nothing to do with them. He believed such journalists should be punished for their accusations.[47]

Saint Yon could not decide whether Bugeaud's plan for colonies was superior to Soult's counter-project. He concluded that it would be impossible to choose between them,

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[45] Ibid., p. 247.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Bugeaud au Saint-Yon, 2 juillet 1846, Bugeaud, Par l'Epée et Par la Charrue, p. 275.

for while he preferred Bugeaud's plan, the cost of instituting it would be so great that the legislature would never approve it. On the other hand, Soult's project had no real substance to it and relegated an insignificant role to the army in colonization. He therefore decided to postpone any decisions on the matter.[48]

Bugeaud hoped that Saint Yon would restore some of the governor-general's powers which Soult had taken away. Before leaving office, Soult wrote a memorandum to Louis Philippe, voicing his dissatisfaction with the War Ministry's lack of control over Algerian affairs. For too long, the War Department had had inadequate control over the government of Algeria. The Ministry was no longer adequately informed of Bugeaud's actions, and orders emanating from the Ministry to Algerian officials were often not carried out. Such conditions could not continue without dangerous repurcussions. Soult then called for the limiting of the governor-general's jurisdiction. The governor-general should carry out only those orders received from proper officials in Paris and in turn, these officials should always be notified in detail of the state and progress of the Algerian colony. Although the governor-general should be free to exercise some initiative in military operations, any matter affecting European colons should be beyond his jurisdiction. Colonization, to Soult, should be

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[48]Demontés, p. 224.

beyond the governor-general's domain. This memorandum had resulted in an ordonnance of 1845 which curtailed Bugeaud's powers before Soult left office.[49]

When Saint-Yon succeeded Soult, Bugeaud saw the opportunity to regain the authority he had lost, and traveled to France to make the new minister aware of the inconvenience of a highly centralized, Paris-based colonial administration. Any number of situations could best be handled by officials in Algiers rather than in the War Ministry. Consequently, valuable time could be saved and the chances of success and efficiency enhanced. Bugeaud admitted that it would be best to leave his successor with only the charge of keeping the Arabs under French domination and leave the problems of civilian administration and colonization to civilian officials. This, however, was not yet possible. The governor-general should remain in charge of all problems in Algeria until pacification had been completed and a scheme for colonization approved and initiated.[50]

Saint-Yon agreed that his department's control over Algerian affairs was too rigid. This explained why "...dans l'annee 1846 le seule Direction de l'Algérie [a division within the War Ministry] ait reçu plus de 24.000 dépêches et en ait expédié plus de 28.000."[51] Pressures from legislators

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[49] Ibid., pp. 92, 101-2.

[50] Ibid., p. 101-3.

[51] Saint-Yon, as cited in ibid., p. 104.

and bureau chiefs within his ministry, however, prevented Saint Yon from providing Bugeaud with the expanded powers he desired.[52]

Eighteen Forty-Six had been another frustrating year for Bugeaud. The new Minister of War proved unable to assist him in achieving his objectives, more army officers joined the ranks of the vocal opposition, and the legislature voiced its increasing displeasure with Bugeaud's political tactics and objectives for Algeria. Unable to achieve his objectives, Bugeaud seriously contemplated retirement, but he remained at his post throughout 1846.

At the end of the year, Bugeaud wrote to Aumale asking the young prince to intervene with his father to push through additional subsidies for Algeria. Specifically, he requested funds for more roads and communication links. Aumale approached the king as Bugeaud requested, but replied that although Louis Philippe sympathized with the appeal for more funds, the king's advisers believed that the financial situation would not permit the allocation of additional funds. Aumale seemed sincerely remorseful that he was unable to send good news to Bugeaud: "Marshal, I am very sorry I could not get any more; do not think it was my wish that was wanting if I was not a better advocate."[53]

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[52] Ibid., pp. 105-6.

[53] Aumale to Bugeaud, 31 December 1846, in Ideville, II, 233-34.

Meanwhile, Bugeaud wrote to Louis Philippe to remind him of an earlier conversation. In September, after an audience with the king, Bugeaud came away feeling that Louis Philippe shared his convictions regarding military colonization. Louis Philippe had promised to support Bugeaud's scheme and asked him to contact Guizot so that the latter might personally introduce the project to the Chamber of Deputies as a governmental proposal. Guizot had promised to do this if the cabinet approved it. After much deliberation in the council, the question had been deferred and Bugeaud wanted to know why. He beseeched the king to allow him a great and decisive role in colonization for after having completed the tasks of conquest and organizing a government for Algeria, he did not wish to be part of an impotent form of colonization that would satisfy no one.[54]

The year ended on this note. To be sure, certain objectives were realized in 1846, for Abd el Kader left Algeria in that year and several nomadic tribes in Oran Province were pacified.[55] These were military victories, however, and such accomplishments had been made every year of Bugeaud's command. For military colonization, however, which was now Bugeaud's overriding objective, it was a year of defeat.

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[54]Bugeaud à Louis-Philippe, 30 decembre 1846, Bugeaud, Par l'Epée et Par la Charrue, pp. 283-84.

[55]Guizot, Memoirs, IV, 529-31.

Chapter VIII

1847: DEFEAT AND RESIGNATION--A FRUSTRATED COLONIZER

Bugeaud's letter of appeal to Louis Philippe regarding the latter's promise to press for military colonies bore fruit. On 11 January 1847, Louis Philippe, in an address to the legislative chambers, remarked that the time had come to consider a form of colonization to be adopted for Algeria now that tranquility had been achieved in North Africa.[1] The following month, Guizot notified Bugeaud that a proposal was to be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies, calling for an appropriation of three million livres which would be used for an experiment in military colonization in Algeria. Guizot urged Bugeaud to return to France to be present for the formal presentation of the proposal, for while Guizot pledged his support, he suggested that Bugeaud could best answer any questions the legislators might have.[2]

If Bugeaud experienced a moment of encouragement from this news, it was shortlived, for he soon discovered that the project to be presented only partially resembled his own. The government proposal resulted from a carefully prepared study discussed in the cabinet two months before being submitted to the deputies.[3]

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[1]Louis Philippe aux Chambres, 11 janvier 1847, as cited in Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 227.

[2]Guizot à Bugeaud, 19 fevrier 1847, ibid., pp. 227-28.

[3]Demontés, p. 257.

Moline de Saint-Yon formally presented the proposal to the Chamber of Deputies on 27 February.[4] The Minister of War began by reviewing the various projects for colonization which had been formulated in the years since Bugeaud became governor-general. He then listed the work already achieved in colonization, suggesting that although it had been more significant than generally believed, it was insufficient to achieve a French Algeria. Since the conquest had begun, a total of 33 new centers of colonization had been established in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine provinces, 12 old villages had been reconstructed, and a total of 107,000 European colonists had settled in these villages.[5] Now that French domination over Algeria had been definitely established, there was a great need for establishing armed colonists in the heart of the country and on the frontiers. Such colonists could curb the fanatic Arabs who were so capable as warriors that civilian colonists would be helpless in the face of an Arab attack. The presence of armed colonists would encourage rapid exploitation of the Algerian soil by European civilians who up to 1847 had timidly concentrated in groups along the coast. Such colonies would also provide a sense of satisfaction to the Armée d'Afrique which had served France so effectively in North Africa. Saint-Yon then proposed to establish

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[4]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 228.

[5]Saint-Yon à Chambre des Députés, 27 fevrier 1847, as cited in Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 228-29.

experimental agricultural camps in Algeria and to place a total of one thousand soldiers in them. These agricultural camps were to be temporary and would serve until, by degree, Algeria could be colonized strictly by civilians.[6] Louis Philippe's ministers had decided to use the term "agricultural camps" rather than military colonies with the hope that it would not immediately prejudice the opponents of military colonies to the project.[7] The plan also allowed for initiative on the part of private capitalists in colonization, by allowing them to develop areas considered to be safe from enemy attack.

Following the proposal, a lengthy debate took place in which various alternatives were discussed. Léon Plee, a liberal republican politician, spoke in behalf of Lamoriciere, suggesting the superiority of colonization undertaken exclusively by private entrepreneurs. Such a scheme would result in more than mere colonization, but would also help to introduce French civilization to the shores of North Africa, thereby accelerating the process of assimilating the natives.[8]

Bugeaud denounced the government project because it offered military colonization on such a small scale and allowed private capitalists too great a role:

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[6] Ibid., pp. 229-30.

[7] Demontés, p. 246.

[8] Ideville, II, footnote, p. 239.

> Le projet me paraitrait bien malade; je n'ai rien vu de plus pâle, de plus timide, de plus incolere que ce discours du ministre de la guerre; on y a mêlé l'historique incomplet de la colonisation, le système du général Lamoricière, celui du général Bedeau; enfin, le mien arrive comme accessoire.[9]

Although Guizot had urged Bugeaud to return to France to be present during the legislative discussion of the government's project, Bugeaud refused to return to support the proposal, justifying his absence by insisting that he was too old and tired to appear before the Chamber for such an ordeal.[10]

Instead, he prepared an essay for the deputies, "De la Colonisation en Algérie."[11] In this essay, he presented his last formal appeal as governor-general for military colonies. A French Algeria could not be realized until a European populace, numerous enough to dominate the natives and productive enough to justify its existence, became firmly entrenched in North Africa. Such a society must always be prepared to use force to keep the natives under the yoke. Colonization undertaken by private individuals, or even state-sponsored civilian colonization, could not achieve the above. Only a highly organized and disciplined group, capable of employing force against the natives could succeed in creating a French

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[9]Bugeaud à Guizot, 9 mars 1847, as cited in Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 231.

[10]Ibid., pp. 231-32.

[11]Later published by Bugeaud as De la colonisation de l'Algérie (Signé: Maréchal duc d'Isly), (Paris: Impr. de A. Guyot, 1847).

Algeria. Thus, the state had an obligation to establish a powerful framework of colonization.[12]

Bugeaud did not altogether oppose civilian settlements, but felt they were not hardy enough to survive in the interior. Besides, civilian colonists always expected civil liberties. Such freedoms were appropriately granted in a highly developed society such as France, but in North Africa, the first liberty was security and it would be necessary to sacrifice other rights in order to achieve it. Only soldiers understood the need for the discipline and organization necessary to secure the colony.[13]

The Marshal's critics in the Chamber of Deputies, private financiers, and other opponents maintained that the cost of military colonies would be too great for a nation which had already sacrificed so much in the conquest of Algeria. Bugeaud admitted that the cost would be high and that continued sacrifices would be necessary after military colonies were established, but he reminded his readers that sacrifices did not cease simply because a conquest had been achieved. If France had been a first-rate naval power, if the Arabs had been exterminated, if the North African climate had not been so rigorous, and if the continuation of present policies would not necessitate the maintenance of 100,000 soldiers at a cost of 100,000,000 livres per year, Frenchmen could afford to

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[12] Ibid., pp. 7-18.

[13] Ibid., p. 13.

secure their conquest in a more leisurely fashion. The above, however, was not the case. Therefore, military colonies on a grand scale should at once be established.[14]

In addition to writing the essay on colonization, Bugeaud sought the assistance of several friends, including Adolphe Thiers. In a letter to Thiers, the Marshal cited three successful experiments in military colonization (Mered, Maehlma, and Fouka), already achieved in Algeria as an example of how large-scale military colonization could succeed. These settlements were populated by young, vigorous soldiers in contrast to civilian settlements where the old, the infirm, and an abundance of children, all unable to work, contributed to the overall misery of the settlement. Such were the fruits of idleness.[15]

In a letter to another friend, he stated that he had conducted the military campaign to a successful conclusion through tactics which he espoused as early as 1838 and was convinced that his system of colonization would work as well as his system of war.[16]

Two of Bugeaud's subordinates in Algeria also wrote essays in support of military colonies. Pellissier de Reynaud argued that it would be impossible to recruit enough civilian

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[14] Ibid.

[15] Bugeaud à Thiers, 11 mars 1847. Bibliotheque Nationale. Bib. Nat. MSS. Nouv. Acq. 20.617, folio 112.

[16] Bugeaud à Genty de Bussy, 8 fevrier 1847, in Bugeaud, Par l'epée et par la charrue, p. 287.

colonists to achieve the necessary assimilation of European culture in Algeria for another twenty years. Therefore, it was necessary to use soldiers until civilians had developed an interest in settling in Algeria.[17] Another subordinate, Fabar, published a pamphlet duplicating Bugeaud's arguments.[18]

The pamphlet campaign failed to impress Alexis de Tocqueville. This respected politician spoke often to his fellow deputies following the government's proposal for agricultural camps. He disagreed with the proposal and with Bugeaud's "De la Colonisation en Algérie," on many points. While Tocqueville praised Bugeaud as a capable soldier who had turned the tide in Algeria in France's favor, he criticized Bugeaud's objectives for permanent settlement. Rejecting military colonization in any form, he argued that such settlements might be conducive to Russian or German authoritarian traditions, but were not in keeping with the French way of life. Moreover, military colonies would be too expensive and probably would be ineffective. He also believed it unnecessary to maintain a large standing army in Algeria now that the conquest was all but complete. Furthermore, he objected to what he called the wholesale marriage of soldier-

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[17]Pellissier de Renaud, Quelques mots sur la colonisation militaire en Algérie (Paris, 1847), in Tracts Relating to Algeria, 1834-1848, British Museum.

[18]P. Fabar, Camps agricoles de l'Algérie ou colonisation civile par l'emploi de l'armée (Paris, 1847), in Tracts Relating to Algeria, 1834-1848, British Museum.

farmers as Bugeaud had suggested, for such marriages did not contribute to family solidarity, an essential characteristic of a successful pioneer settlement.[19]

Tocqueville also believed the size of the army in Algeria should be reduced and small, well-organized units, strategically located, could provide security and maintain order. Moreover, while Tocqueville praised Bugeaud for the creation of the Arab Bureau, calling it the most useful branch of the Algerian administration, he did not approve of the general character of the colonial government in Algeria, feeling that it should be more civilian in character and less complex in organization.[20]

After considerable debate, the governmental projet de loi regarding agricultural camps was referred to a committee. Those who supported the project must have been alarmed when they discovered that of the twelve men who comprised the committee, five publicly opposed military colonies while the other seven commissioners had little interest or knowledge of Algeria or colonization.[21]

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[19]France. Chambre des Députés. Session 1847. Impressions Diverse et Feuilletons. "Discours de M. de Tocqueville, dans la discussion relatives aux projet de loi sur l'Algérie (Séance du 24 mai 1847)," XVII(1847), pp. 12-36.

[20]Ibid., pp. 18, 32-55.

[21]Demontés, p. 262.

On 2 June, Tocqueville, spokesman for the committee, announced the unanimous rejection of the proposal. The committee believed a successful colony could best be assured by using civilians who enjoyed civil and religious freedoms, and individual independence. Such a system would best be regulated by a simple, efficient civilian administrative system which meted out rapid and impartial justice, levied light taxes, and adhered to the principles of free trade in commercial transactions. Complex formulas for colonizing were not needed.[22] In rejecting the proposal which would have allowed a predominant role for the military, the committee had adhered to nineteenth century liberal attitudes by suggesting that governments should do little else than protect private property from civil disorder. Any formula which involved government initiative and extensive use of the army conflicted with the view that the functions of government should be kept at a bare minimum. Thus, the watered-down version of Bugeaud's proposal was rejected before it left the committee.

The poor reception given the proposal can partially be explained by the lukewarm support offered by the King's council of ministers. Bugeaud complained to Guizot of the hostile nature of the committee appointed to study the

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[22]France. Chambre des Députés. Session 1847. Impressions Diverse et Feuilletons. "Discours de M. de Tocqueville, dans la discussion relatives aux projet de loi sur l'Algérie (Séance du 2 juin 1847)," XVII (1847), pp. 29-30. Also, for a discussion of the various committee members and their wives, see the Journal des Débats, 9 mars 1847.

proposal, wondering why the cabinet had not sought to have more favorably-inclined deputies appointed.[23] Guizot explained his reluctance to make the issue un question de cabinet: "C'était une de ces occasions dans lesquelles un gouvernement sense doit laisser à son propre parti une assez grande latitude, et si nous avions agi autrement, nos plus fidèles amis se seraient justement récriés."[24] There is evidence to suggest that a majority of the deputies, already hostile to the proposal, simply mirrored public opinion by rejecting it. Military settlements of any nature did not match the mood of the French pays legal. Even some colonists from Algeria had sent a delegation to Paris to prevent passage of the proposal and to demand Bugeaud's dismissal, thus illustrating that even the European inhabitants of Algeria could not agree upon a scheme of settlement.[25]

The overwhelming rejection of the proposal for agricultural camps made final Bugeaud's decision to retire, a decision he had seriously considered since early 1846.

Before retiring, however, the veteran of the Algerian campaign had another serious clash with the Chamber of Deputies. By the spring of 1847, only the Kabylia region of Algeria remained outside the French sphere of influence and

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[23]Bugeaud à Guizot, 9 mars 1847, in Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 231.

[24]Guizot, ibid., p. 233.

[25]Journal des Débats, 9 mars 1847.

Bugeaud, determined to complete the conquest before he retired, announced that he would lead an expedition into the Kabylia in the spring. Because Bugeaud had already announced his decision to retire,[26] some legislators felt it preferable to cancel the expedition into the Kabylia until his successor had taken office. The Chamber of Deputies forwarded orders to that effect to Bugeaud, but he chose to ignore them, and in a final act of defiance, he began the expedition, explaining to officials in Paris that his troops were already on the march when he received the order to cancel the expedition.[27]

Following the expedition, Bugeaud explained that he felt a campaign into the Kabylia to be necessary as a reminder to the rebel tribesmen in that area that France was in Algeria to stay and that continued resistance would be futile, He had no intention of bringing the entire area under French dominaton at the time for he believed only an extended expedition could accomplish this. His expedition, therefore, was intended merely to intimidate the Kabyles.[28]

On 21 March, Bugeaud announced to Guizot his decision to retire. Because of the hostile reception the Chamber of Deputies had given the proposal for agricultural camps,

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[26]See below, pp. 147-48.

[27]The (London) Times, 9 June 1847; Azan, L'Armée d'Afrique de Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 413.

[28]Bugeaud à Thiers, 14 juin 1847 . Bibliotheque Nationale. Bib. Nat. MSS. Nouv. Acq. fr. 20.617, folios 138-149.

Bugeaud preferred retirement rather than applying a system of colonization repugnant to his sense of reason and patriotism. He had finally succumbed to pressure from enemies and friends alike to resign.[29]

Later, Bugeaud officially proclaimed his departure in a statement to the colonists of Algeria. In this lengthy summary of his accomplishments, he asked his audience to recall the achievements in Algeria since he arrived there as governor-general slightly more than six years before. As he had announced in 1841, he had been an ardent colonizer, and had done more in the midst of an arduous war for colonization than anyone could have expected. Most of all, his army had provided security, "...ce qui est colonisateur et administratif au-dessus de tout...."[30]

The Marshal explained why he had been an arbitrary governor and why he had so fervently advocated military colonization. The European population of Algeria was forty times smaller than the Arab population. Immediate and complete reconciliation of the native populace to French civil and political institutions was impossible. Therefore, until such acclimation could take place in the distant future, military

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[29]Bugeaud to Guizot, 21 and 28 March 1847, Ideville, II, 240; Saint-Arnaud à Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, 26 et 28 mai 1846, Saint-Arnaud, Lettres, II, 150-51.

[30]Bugeaud, "Proclamation du maréchal Bugeaud (à son départ définitif de l'Algérie," 30 mai 1847, in Bugeaud, Par l'epée et par la charrue, p. 295.

discipline and order had to be imposed. He therefore urged the colons to demand that the mother country continue his policies by maintaining the army in Algeria and adopting a system of colonization which would include the military.[31]

Due to the services he had rendered to Algerian settlers and because of his experience as military leader, colonizer, and administrator, Bugeaud believed he had the right to give the colonists some advice. Scolding them for their impatience, he asked them to remember that Algeria could not be transformed into "un pays à l'image de la France" in a few years. This would be the work of centuries. Meanwhile, he asked the colonists to refrain from heaping injustices on their administrators, for such officials had to deal not only with a few thousand European settlers, but also with a native population forty times larger. Too often, critics of his administration had not taken into consideration the Arab problem, the climate, and all the miseries which accompanied pioneer agricultural settlements. Only when the above problems had been solved could the population justly demand institutions and liberties commensurate with an advanced society. The frustrated colonizer concluded his farewell speech by suggesting that his advice was not intended to offend:

> Vous savez que, pendant les six années et plus de mon gouvernement, j'ai mieux aimé bien server vos intérêts que de flatter vos passions

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[31] Ibid., pp. 296-97.

> et votre amour-propre. Pour que je fusse moins franc en vous quittant, il faudrait que mon affection pour vous eût diminué. Il n'en est rien; l'avenir vous le prouvera.[32]

In his farewell address to the Armée d'Afrique, Bugeaud praised his men for their work. Virtually every road in existence in Algeria had been constructed by the army, not to mention bridges, a multitude of military structures, and many villages and farms which had been provided for settlers. The African Army had served France well: "Vous avez montré, par là, que vous êtes dignes d'avoir une bonne part dans la sol conquis et que vous sauriez aussi bien le cultiver que le faire respecter de vos ennemis."[33]

Bugeaud departed from Algeria for the last time on 5 June 1847.[34] Guizot, reflecting upon Bugeaud's career, expressed sincere regrets at the Marshal's resignation, feeling he knew the true motive for the action. After having accomplished the conquest of Algeria, Bugeaud had wanted quickly to establish a population of French soldier-farmers. This was too much, too soon, and evoked the reaction of the Chamber of Deputies. This, according to Guizot, left Bugeaud only one honorable alternative, resignation: "...il se retirait dignement, car il emportait dans sa retraite la gloire de sa vie et l'indépendance de sa pensée."[35]

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[32] Ibid., pp. 297-98

[33] Bugeaud, "Proclamation à l'Armée d'Afrique," 30 mai 1847, ibid., pp. 299-300.

[34] Azan, L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 415.

[35] Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 234-35.

The Prince de Joinville witnessed Bugeaud's departure from Algiers and provides the following account:

> [The squadron reached Algiers] . . . just when Marshal Bugeaud was giving up his position as governor-general of the colony. We rendered him viceregal honours at his departure, and I can still see his grand white head, as he stood uncovered on the bridge of the ship which bore him away, and passed slowly between the lines of warships, with their cannon thundering, drums rolling, bands playing the Marseillaise, and crews cheering wildly. He left that Algerian territory, which he had so largely contributed to acquire to France, with a sad heart and for ever [sic].[36]

According to Joinville, a French military leader who inspired his men was half the battle, and Bugeaud had provided that inspiration to soldiers in Algeria. Unfortunately, the ". . . ruinous action of political forces. . ."[37] in Paris had deprived France of the full benefits of Bugeaud's leadership in North Africa.

During his voyage back to France, Bugeaud wrote two lengthy letters to his errant friend, Thiers, whose aid Bugeaud had constantly sought and rarely received. In these letters, Bugeaud carefully explained his reasons for retiring and his views of accomplishments made during his years of leadership. Thiers, upon hearing of Bugeaud's plan to retire, had accused him of succumbing to political pressure and urged him to remain at his post. Bugeaud explained why he could not. He could no longer tolerate the opposition press. Although

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[36]Prince de Joinville, Memoirs, p. 359.

[37]Ibid.

he did not personally fear the journalists, he believed they had prejudiced so many, especially in the Chamber of Deputies and in the bureaucracy, that continued resistance would be useless. He denied Thiers' allegation that the king and his cabinet had abandoned him, but admitted that they neglected to defend him, probably because of doubts and fears cultivated by the opposition press. So, Bugeaud argued, he did not resign because of weakness or fear, but because he was completely helpless to do more in the face of the opposition.[38]

Some, he feared, would accuse him of resigning his Algerian post in order to seek glory as a deputy. Bugeaud denied this, stating that he knew only a few special men could achieve everlasting fame in legislative halls and he realized that he was not among them. The Marshal believed, however, that he might best serve the interests of French Algeria by serving as a deputy now that his effectiveness as governor-general had terminated.[39]

A few days later, Bugeaud dispatched another letter to Thiers, listing his reasons for advocating military colonies. He believed many so-called false ideas as to the proper form of colonization in Algeria had been derived from brief visits by individuals who saw only coastal settlements and departed,

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[38]Bugeaud à Thiers, 11 juin 1847 . Bibliotheque Nationale. Bib. Nat. MSS. Nouv. Acq. fr. 20.617, folios 138-149.

[39]Ibid.

convinced that they knew Africa. Such "tourists" were the type who returned to France to support Lamoricière's project. Superficial visitations were insufficient, for how many had visited Saint-Denis-du-Sig, a settlement in Oran Province, sponsored by private entrepreneurs? Bugeaud had found only eleven families established there and ten more which had just arrived. This settlement lacked all the necessary facilities, and after talking with each settler, he discovered that most of them had only four or five hundred francs at their disposal to use in developing their settlements. Bugeaud doubted if this would sustain a family for even one year.[40]

On the other hand, how well his military colonies had succeeded. He denied the charges that military colonists left their farms as soon as their term of service expired: "Ils sont presque tous libérés aujourd'hui, ils sont presque tous mariés et non sont pas tentés d'aller se refaire prolétaires en France."[41] Also, most civilian colonists were not farmers by vocation, and consequently knew nothing about cultivating the land; nor were they accustomed to the Algerian climate. Colonists he met in Saint-Denis-du-Sig were librarians, bankrupt merchants and the like. In contrast, although his young, vigorous, acclimated soldier-farmers had little or no experience in cultivating the soil before they came to Algeria, they received training by preparing the soil

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[40] Bugeaud à Thiers, 14 juin 1847, ibid.

[41] Ibid.

for cultivation before they were allowed to settle on the land.[42]

Bugeaud expressed his bitterness over the opposition's belief that the army was incapable of quality administration. Instead, his opponents wished to assign administrators who were "...ni avocat, ni médicin, ni avoué, ni juge, ni notaire, ni négociant, ni industriel, ni agriculteur...."[43] Yet these men, skilled at nothing, were supposedly more capable administrators than officers in the army who were accustomed to leadership and decision-making. Moreover, civilian administrators cost the government a great deal, whereas the army could provide them at no additional cost.

These arguments, as usual, were those of a man blinded to alternative programs because he was too certain of the legitimacy of his own scheme. He did not take account of the cost of maintaining an army large enough to provide both security and personnel for administration; nor did he consider that men were not always willing to relinquish their civil liberties in favor of a disciplinary, arbitrary military regime.

No doubt, Bugeaud should be ranked among the most capable soldiers France had known since Napoleon, and he served well in this capacity in Algeria. He was also, however, an intolerant, self-righteous man who struggled against the current of

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[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

opinion held by French politicians and journalists who, rather than meekly submitting to a system they believed improper, insisted upon having their way in determining the destiny of Algeria. When it became obvious that he could not dam up the current, even by insubordination, Bugeaud prudently retired rather than apply what he considered to be absurd ideas about colonization.[44]

Although he neglected to list it among his specific reasons for retiring, the task of administering the civilian colonists must be regarded as an important factor in his decision to withdraw. As governor-general, Bugeaud complained that he presided over a council of administrators who acted like a miniature Chamber of Deputies, constantly involved in meaningless debates while precious time slipped away. Bugeaud believed the civilian administrative network to be too complicated. While he wrestled with this impossible task, officials in Paris constantly harangued him for reports, memoirs, and justifications for actions taken.[45] A veteran of many military campaigns, accustomed to the obedience of subordinates, he could not function well under such conditions. Bugeaud was not fitted for the position.

Meanwhile, an immediate problem facing the July Monarchy upon Bugeaud's departure was the choice of a successor.

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[44]Bugeaud à général Viola Charon, 8 juillet 1847, Bugeaud, Lettres inédites, p. 309.

[45]Bugeaud à Genty de Bussy, 8 fevrier 1847, Bugeaud, Par l'epée et par la charrue, pp. 285-86.

Several of his subordinates were possibilities, including Lamoricière, Bedeau, Changarnier, and Cavaignac.[46] As Guizot expressed it, however, none of the above men had achieved the universal acclaim or incontestable preponderance which would have rendered them the logical successor. Besides, since Bugeaud had accomplished the conquest, the new regime need not have been essentially military in character. Guizot argued that Aumale was the logical successor who could provide an administration with a dual character: "Le jour était venu ou le gouvernement de l'Algérie pouvait être politique et civil en meme temps que guerrier."[47] Guizot denied the charge that Louis Philippe forced his son's nomination on the cabinet, arguing that the choice of Aumale was made in the best interests of France, Algeria, and civilian and army administration.[48] It should also be remembered that when Aumale first set foot on Algerian soil, everyone, including Bugeaud, expected the prince to be the next governor-general. The only question was, when would he succeed Bugeaud?[49] Selecting Aumale as his successor must have pleased Bugeaud, for he earlier had said that if he could choose his successor, he would not hesitate to name Aumale since the young man

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[46]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 235.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Ibid.

[49]See above, Chapter IV.

possessed the qualities necessary to lead an army and to handle administrative affairs.[50]

In turn, Aumale was quite willing to acknowledge his debt to Bugeaud. He readily admitted that the task of conquering and pacifying Algeria had been virtually completed by the time Bugeaud left Algeria. To Aumale, Bugeaud had been indispensable to the conquest.[51]

The climax of the rejection of Bugeaud's schemes for Algeria came in August, when an ordonnance was issued which placed Algeria under a government more civilian in character than it had ever been. The ordonnance created a Directory of Civil Affairs for each of the Algerian provinces. Directors of Civil Affairs were to keep in touch with the governor-general, but were nominated by the king and were beyond the jurisdiction of the governor-general. Simulataneously, another government order prevented the governor-general from making land grants without the government's approval, thus further limiting the role of army personnel in creating settlements. Only the king could, upon the advice of the Council of State, make grants of one hundred hectares or more.[52]

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[50]Bugeaud, as cited in Azan, L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 415.

[51]Duc d'Aumale, Les Zouaves et les Chasseurs a Pied; esquisses historiques (Paris: M. Levy Frères, 1855), p. 75; Aumale à Cuvillier-Fleury, 12 novembre 1847, in Aumale, Correspondance du duc d'Aumale et de Cuvillier-Fleury, I, 395-96.

[52]Annual Register, LXXXIX (1847), 327-28.

In 1847, the military edifice in Algeria, largely constructed by Bugeaud, crumbled as Frenchmen decided upon a system of colonization and administration for her North African colony which was more civilian in nature. Bugeaud had envisaged a military order for North Africa, complete with army administrators, judges, and colonists, but the more progressive members of the Chamber of Deputies preferred development along the lines of nineteenth century liberalism--a laissez-faire government which guaranteed the rights of man to each settler.

Bugeaud left that alien land largely pacified. French authority had been accepted by fifty-five native tribes and a French administrative organization had been firmly entrenched in Algeria.[53] Proof that large-scale resistance had ended came when the great Emir of Algeria, Abd el Kader, finally surrendered to the new governor-general late in 1847. Few, including Aumale, believed the new governor-general had deserved the honor of accepting the Arab chieftain's surrender. Such a distinction rightfully belonged to Bugeaud.[54]

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[53]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 531-32.

[54]Aumale à Cuvillier-Fleury, 26 decembre 1847; 10 janvier 1848, in Aumale, Correspondance du duc d'Aumale et de Cuvillier-Fleury, I, 396-97.

Chapter IX

CONCLUSION

Despite his resignation as governor-general, Bugeaud remained active in French political circles until he died of cholera in 1849. He maintained a keen interest in Algerian affairs until the end, and was always eager to give advice to those who now would determine the destiny of that colony. In July 1848, following the revolutionary upheaval which overthrew the July Monarchy, Cavaignac, representing the new republican government, asked Colonel Henry Feray, Bugeaud's son-in-law, to consult Bugeaud as to who should be appointed Governor-General of Algeria. Interestingly enough, Bugeaud rejected his faithful subordinate Saint-Arnaud because his reputation for scandalous private conduct and his debts disqualified him for such an austere position. He also passed over Pellisier and MacMahon because he believed they lacked perspective. He offered Canrobert, Bosquet, and Barral as acceptable candidates. Then, never missing an opportunity to express his views, he turned to colonization in Algeria. Persistent in his belief that the army was the first element of colonization, he argued that it provided the most economical means of settlement while insuring the safety of the colony.[1]

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[1]Bugeaud to Feray, 23 July 1848, Ideville, Memoirs of Bugeaud, II, 331.

Although he stubbornly clung to the idea of military colonies as the only practical means of settling Algeria, he did alter his schemes somewhat after the February Revolution in France. Fearing the advance of socialism in Algeria, he decided against the collective ownership that he had earlier advocated. It will be remembered that Bugeaud had believed collective ownership to be preferable during the first few years of settlement until agricultural colonies had been firmly entrenched. By the summer of 1848, he had changed his mind and published a treatise in Lyons, Les socialistes et le travail en commun, in which he argued that men did not work in the fields unless driven to it by personal interests, and could not effectively produce in the absence of the profit motive.[2]

On another occasion, he revealed not only a distaste for socialism, but also for urban life. Instead of settling in the crowded cities, the peasantry should be taught the values and benefits of rural life and urged to remain in rural areas. At least the residents of the countryside would not go hungry, nor would they be tempted by socialists who stirred up idle and hungry townspeople.[3]

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[2]Thomas Robert Bugeaud, Les socialistes et le travail en commun, (Lyons, 1849).

[3]Thomas Robert Bugeaud, Veillées d'une Chaumiere de la Vendee, (Lyons, Guyot freres, 1849).

In June 1849, Bugeaud wrote to Viala Charon (1794-1880), a former commander of the corps of engineers in North Africa who had been appointed governor-general in September 1848. Officials of the Second Republic had disregarded Bugeaud's candidates for governor-general in favor of Charon because he was believed to be more republican in sentiment. The new commander of Algèria had asked Bugeaud's advice in exercising the duties of his new post. In his reply, Bugeaud expressed his dissatisfaction with the civilian colonists of Algeria, charging that they preferred constructing barricades in Paris to building homes in Africa. He also expressed alarm upon hearing that socialism had made considerable progress in the ranks of the army in North Africa. He admitted that halting the advance of socialism in the army through disciplinary measures would be difficult, if not impossible, but discipline and the distribution of anti-socialist propaganda might be effective. Bugeaud included a copy of an anti-socialist brochure he had just published, suggesting that copies might be distributed among the soldiers.[4]

The February Revolution had also forced Bugeaud to reconsider his opposition to the granting of civil liberties to colonists. Since the colonists, like most of their countrymen in France, believed civil liberties to be a panacea for

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[4]Bugeaud à Charon, 5 juin 1849, as cited in Par l'epée et par la charrue, 329-32. The brochure was entitled "Veillées d'une Chaumiere de la Vendee." See footnote three.

social evils, they should be granted them for moral satisfaction, even though they were worthless.[5]

Finally, the demise of the July Monarchy forced Bugeaud to modify his demand for army colonization, though he continued to insist it was the best of alternatives. The pressing need, however, was not how colonization should be achieved; rather the crowded cities of France must be cleared of proletariats. Such people would not likely be good colonists and their presence in North Africa would doubtless necessitate an increase in troop strength since the Arabs would resent the influx of such undesirables, but this was preferred to leaving such people in France. "We are condemned to rob in Africa, that we may not be robbed in France."[6]

Bugeaud had failed to impose his entire system of conquest and colonization upon the French because his plan lacked flexibility in execution, because of the open hostility of administrative bureaucrats and the Chamber of Deputies, and because even the cabinet of the July Monarchy had been lukewarm to his proposals. Perhaps the lack of true interest in colonialism contributed to the failure of Bugeaud's dreams, for a key official of the government such as Guizot could not focus his attention away from the traditional interest in European affairs. The rejection of centrifugal interests was also expressed by Lamartine whose Chamber of Deputies speech

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[5]Bugeaud to Feray, 23 July 1848, Ideville, II, 329-34.

[6]Ibid., 332.

in opposition to an Algerian policy in 1846 reflected the fear that a French Algeria meant the weakening of the French position in Europe.[7] Moreover, French officials were not prepared to accept an almost purely military solution to the question of Algeria. Guizot summarized Bugeaud's career by saying that although the Marshal's ideas were sound, they were often exaggerated, and his frankness of expression often worked against him. "His zeal and spirit of initiative frequently urged him to speak and act too quickly. His speeches to the Chamber and his pamphlets sometimes offended and embarrassed Marshal Soult in Paris."[8] Bugeaud had not only insulted Soult, his demands and actions had also outraged Guizot and other policy-making officials.

If it is useless to seek rational explanations for Bugeaud's tactless, high-spirited temperament, it is worthwhile to seek the origins of his convictions. These roots may be traced to his two vocational interests--agriculture and the army. Denied even the rudiments of a formal education, Bugeaud devoted his talents to the plow and the sword. This mixture of soldier and farmer drove him to attempt to combine his passions in military colonization. While the grand jardinier en chef from Périgord distrusted the new industrial age and its by-products, the career military veteran disliked

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[7]See above, Chapter VII, for Lamartine's speech.

[8]François Guizot, The History of France from the Earliest Times to 1848 (8 vols; New York: John B. Alden, 1884), VIII, 356.

the newly emergent and undisciplined masses whose demands for civil rights he could not comprehend. By envisaging a disciplined society of agrarian soldier laborers, he sought to combat both the Industrial Revolution and the liberal political revolution. His dream had been to implant soldiers, the sons of peasants, on the soil of North Africa. Such men, he believed, would have taken the plow with pleasure. The plow and the sword represented the best of two worlds. In this respect, Bugeaud belonged to an earlier age.

Despite his failures, Marshal Bugeaud had a lasting impact upon the development of Algeria during his tenure as governor-general. It is impossible to discount the contributions of the Army of Africa in creating and developing villages, roads, bridges, and preparing the land for cultivation. Thanks to careful military supervision, these construction projects were well-planned and successfully implemented.[9]

Furthermore, under Bugeaud, the African campaign had been an <u>école primaire</u> for French officers. Writing later in the century (1867), the Duke d'Aumale presented his views of the impact of the Algerian campaign upon the French military establishment. Aumale believed Algeria to be ". . . the great school of modern French arms. The loose formation and desultory warfare of Africa . . . have given to men and officers a high degree of individual resource and self-reliance, but have weakened that severe discipline and close connexion which is

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[9]Paul Azan, <u>L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852</u>, pp. 370, 459.

essential to regular movements against an enemy in line of battle."[10] Bugeaud had been responsible for this type of warfare. It should be noted that by suggesting the lack of highly disciplined troop movements in the field against an enemy,,Aumale anticipated one of the fatal weaknesses of the French army in the Franco-Prussian War. Bugeaud never maintained, however, that the African campaign could definitively ppepare troops for a European campaign, although he believed North Africa to be an excellent preparatory school for officers and men alike.[11]

Paul Azan, a specialist on the French conquest of Algeria, maintains that a comaraderie was established among the men who served under Bugeaud in North Africa which extended into the present century.[12] This comaraderie did not prevent individual rivalries, but French officers who served in Algeria gave up the gay life of France for an austere existence under "Father" Bugeaud's leadership and believed their combat experience placed them a mark above the officiers de boudoir who served in garrisons in France. Even Cavaignac, who rarely agreed with Bugeaud, acknowledged his debt to him: "C'est au maréchal Bugeaud qu'on doit la réussite de cette grande entreprise [the conquest of Algeria]. Nous avons tous

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[10]M. le Duc d'Aumale, "Les Institutions Militaires de la France," The Edinburgh Review, CXXVI (1867), 294.

[11]Paul Azan, L'Armée d'Afrique de 1830 à 1852, p. 362.

[12]Ibid.

été formés à son école, et nos services se recommandaient des siens."[13] Canrobert, another Algerian veteran destined to play a significant role in the subsequent military history of France also paid homage to Bugeaud's leadership by stating that the Marshal was the man most useful to France given the special circumstances of the Algerian campaign. Ascribing a powerful intellectual faculty and an elevated character to Bugeaud, Canrobert acknowledged his debt to his superior in North Africa.[14]

Bugeaud had wished to some day make the Mediterranean a French lake, and Algeria was a necessary step toward this objective.[15] He believed that complete conquest necessitated colonization, and he provided the first real impetus toward settlement. By proposing a military scheme for settlement, he stimulated interest in colonization and inspired a variety of experimental alternatives to his own. Despite its faults, his was the first genuine effort to solve the problem of Algerian colonization. Indeed, it was Bugeaud who first decided that Algeria should definitely be colonized.

Another of Bugeaud's legacies to Algeria was his policy of cooperating with the Arabs through the Arab Bureau. By

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[13]Cavaignac, as cited in Franchet d'Esperey, Bugeaud ([Paris]: Hachette [1938]), p. 59.

[14]Francois Certain Canrobert, Le Maréchal Canrobert, Souvenirs d'un Siècle, par Germain Bapst (Huitième édition; Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1910), I, 451-52.

[15]Génèral du Barail, Mes Souvenirs (Paris: Plon, 1894), I, 316.

1847, thirty Arab Bureaus had been established in the provinces of Algiers, Oran, and Constantine.[16] In the areas where colonization was to be stressed, an institutional framework existed for the enhancement of colon-native relations. By developing a system of dealing with the natives of Algeria which recognized and respected their traditions, Bugeaud anticipated the Algerian policy of Napoleon III.[17] Furthermore, Bugeaud's view that the new colony should be administered by the army prevailed until the collapse of the Second Empire. The concept of the French army as colonial administrator dates from Bugeaud.[18]

Because of his philosophy of conquest and colonization, Bugeaud had found it necessary to involve the French army in politics and to impose judgment upon the July Monarchy. Yet, he should not be totally condemned for his actions, and it is doubtful that he made the French army a political force as one

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[16]Guizot, Memoirs, VII, 538.

[17]Thomas Robert Bugeaud, Quelques Reflexions sur trois questions fondamentales de notre etablissement en Afrique (Paris: A Guyot et Scribe, 1846), 26. For a discussion of the attitudes of Napoleon III vis-a-vis the natives of Algeria, see Brison D. Gooch, The Reign of Napoleon III (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1969), pp. 47-48.

[18]For discussions of the Administrative role of the French army in Algeria, see Marcel Émerit, "La Conversion des Musulmans d'Algérie sous le Second Empire," Revue Historique, vol. 223 (1960), 63-84, and Annie Rey-Goldzeiguern, "Les Plebiscites en Algérie sous le Second Empire," Revue Historique, vol. 229 (1963), 123-58.

author has suggested.[19] An age-old problem of governments and French governments in particular has been, who determines military policy--the generals or the civilian government? It is to Bugeaud's credit that he stopped short of rebellion and sacrificed his convictions by resigning his post as commander of the Army of Africa. Admittedly, the Marshal was guilty of defying the orders of his superiors in Paris, although when it became apparent that he could not have his way, he stepped aside.

Despite the rejection of his plan of settlement for Algeria, Bugeaud brought attention to the need for colonization and this was his greatest contribution to the Algerian question. It is ironic that Bugeaud's military victories contributed to the failure of his scheme for colonization, for by 1847, the army had been so successful in pacifying Algeria that even if his had been a satisfactory solution, there was no need for military colonization.

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[19] Patrick Kessel, Moi, Maréchal Bugeaud, un soldat de l'ordre ([Paris: Éditeur français réunis, 1958]). Kessel's thesis is that Bugeaud is responsible for having made the French army a political force.

APPENDIX

SPEECH OF PROCLAMATION 23 FEBRUARY 1841, ON ARRIVING IN ALGIERS.[1]

INHABITANTS OF ALGERIA: In the tribune, as well as during my command in Africa, have I endeavoured to dissuade my country from attempting the entire conquest of Algeria. I considered that a numerous army and great sacrifices would be necessary for the attainment of this object; that her policy might be embarrassed and her internal prosperity retarded during the prosecution of this vast enterprise.

My voice was not sufficiently powerful to stop an impulse that is perhaps the work of destiny. The country has committed itself; I must follow it. I have accepted the grand and beautiful mission of assisting in the accomplishment of its work. . . .

But the war now indispensable is not the object. The conquest will be barren without colonisation.

I shall therefore be an ardent coloniser, for I think there is less glory in gaining battles than in founding something of permanent utility for France.

The experience gained in the Mitidjah has only too clearly proved the impossibility of protecting colonisation by isolated farms; and that is almost the only method hitherto tried; it has vanished at the first breath of war. . . .

Let us begin the colonisation by assemblies in defensible villages, convenient for agriculture, and . . . so tactically constituted. . . as to give time for a central force to come up to their assistance.

Agriculture and colonisation are one. It is useful and good no doubt to increase the population of towns, and to build edifices there; but that is not colonisation. . . . The cultivation of the open country is in the forefront of colonial necessity. The towns will be no less the subject of my care; but I shall induce them as much as is in my power to turn their industry and capital towards the fields; for with the towns alone we should have only the head of colonisation, and not the body. . . .

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[1]Ideville, I, 347-9.

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