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NAPOLEON III AND THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO: A QUEST FOR SILVER.

The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1974
History, modern

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THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

GRADUATE COLLEGE

NAPOLEON III AND THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO: A QUEST FOR SILVER

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

SHIRLEY J. BLACK

Norman, Oklahoma

1974

NAPOLEON III AND THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO:

A QUEST FOR SILVER

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DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

To my daughters

Cheri Charlee

and

Jeani Charisse

and to the memory

of their father

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PREFACE

I am indebted to many people for their support and helpfulness. My research on the French intervention began seven years ago. With initial encouragement from Professor Brison D. Gooch, I became intrigued with the sometimes enigmatic foreign policy of Napoleon III. Professor Savoie Lottinville, an inspiring teacher, spent many hours reading manuscripts and providing guidance and friendship. Two friends, Professors Douglas Hale and Joe Stout at Oklahoma State University in Stillwater, unselfishly gave of their time as they read rough drafts and brought document collections to my attention.

I am grateful for the interest and aid of librarians and directors of special collections. Professor Duane Roller of the DeGolyer Collection and Mrs. Alice Timmons of the Frank Phillips Collection, both at the University of Oklahoma, were particularly helpful. Berta Ulloa at El Colegio de México donated many hours of her time in Mexico City. Professor R. John Rath supportively

opened to me the vast manuscript collections at Rice University. Others to whom I am indebted include Ms. Carolyn Sung of the Division of Manuscripts at the Library of Congress and librarians at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California, and at the several libraries of special sources at the University of Texas in Austin.

My committee--Professors Robert Nye, Gordon Drummond, Jonathan Spurgeon, and Dougald Calhoun--deserve an appreciative word of thanks. My dissertation director, Max L. Moorhead, is very special indeed. An exacting scholar and a patient guide, he unstintingly gave of his time, evaluating my work for five long years. I am most grateful for his continuous support.

"It has often been said that men are blind to their own times. To be generous, let us say that they are merely very short-sighted. Throughout history, there are many examples of individuals and of groups of people who totally failed to perceive the great events which were unfolding before their eyes. This phenomenon has become a commonplace. But perhaps we can define the process more clearly by noting that among the whole range of human activity there are certain areas in which blindness or myopia of contemporaries is particularly noticeable: at the head of the list come economic events."

--Marcel Blanchard*

*Marcel Blanchard, "The Railway Policy of the Second Empire," trans. by John Godfrey; F. Crouzet, W. H. Chaloner and W. M. Stern, eds., Essays in European Economic History, 1789-1914, The Economic History Society (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 98.

NAPOLEON III AND THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO: A QUEST FOR SILVER

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For over a century, historians have tried to determine the motivations for the French intervention in Mexico. Sara Yorke Stevenson, one of the few impartial observers of the Mexican Empire, admitted that she was unable to find any justification for its establishment by Napoleon III. To her, it was simply senseless.[1] Historians, however, never stopped asking why the French became involved there.

Contemporary evaluations, generally focusing on the Jecker bonds, were voluminous. Carleton Beals, in a foreword to the memoirs of José Blasío, Maximilian's secretary, wrote, "If every soldier of Napoleon I

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[1]Sara Yorke Stevenson, Maximilian in Mexico: A Woman's Reminiscences of the French Intervention, 1862-1867 (N.Y.: The Century Co., 1899).

carried a marshal's baton in his knapsack, apparently every literate soldier of Napoleon III carried an unpublished manuscript."[2] Emile de Kératry, an officer under Marshal Bazaine, commander of the French forces, echoed public opinion by assuming that the Jecker claims, though fraudulent, were the reason for the expedition.[3] Carl H. Bock, in his extensive study, eliminated them as the motive and, without finding an alternative cause, determined that the Jecker bonds were merely a pretext for intervention.[4] Both Kératry and Bock mentioned, but did not explore, Jecker's claim to one-third of silver-rich Sonora's public lands.

Dexter Perkins contended in 1933 that no further study of the cause of intervention was necessary, as Count Egon Caesar Corti had established that Napoleon's defense of monarchism in the western hemisphere was the

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[2]José Luis Blasío, Maximilian: Emperor of Mexico. Memoirs of His Private Secretary, ed. and trans. by Robert Hammond Murray, with a foreword by Carleton Beals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934).

[3]Emile de Kératry, La créance Jecker, les indemnités françaises et les emprunts Mexicains (Paris: Librairie internationale, 1868).

[4]Carl H. Bock, Prelude to Tragedy: The Negotiation and Breakdown of the Tripartite Convention of London, October 31, 1861 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966).

primary motive.[5] José Manuel Hidalgo, the major Mexican monarchist in Paris and Maximilian's minister to France, had exaggerated his importance in initiating the intervention,[6] and Corti accepted Hidalgo's assertions.[7] As an extension of the monarchist theory, Christian Schefer claimed that President James Buchanan's expansion proposals in 1859 provoked the intervention. Schefer mentioned, but did not explore the reasons that French diplomatic despatches reacted strongly against absorption of Sonora by the United States.[8] Nancy Nichols Barker, first investigating the role of Eugénie,[9] later regretted her emphasis on the importance of the Empress.[10] She recently examined the intrigues of the

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[5]Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826-1867 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), 357, 362.

[6]José Manuel Hidalgo, Proyectos de monarquía en México (México: F. Vázques, 1904).

[7]Count Egon Caesar Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte of Mexico, trans. by Catherine Alison Phillips (2 vols.; N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929).

[8]Christian Schefer, La grand pensée de Napoleon III: les origines de l'expédition du Mexique, 1858-1862 (Paris: M. Rivière, 1939).

[9]Nancy Nichols Barker, "The Empress Eugénie and the Origin of the Mexican Venture," The Historian, XXII, No. 1 (November, 1959), pp. 9-23.

[10]Idem., "Monarchy in Mexico: Hare-Brained Scheme or Well-Considered Prospect," (unpublished study).

French ministers in Mexico and concluded that their financial involvements with Jecker, which played a role in requests for French forces, were a contingent cause of the intervention.[11] Again, however, Jecker's land-holdings in Sonora were largely overlooked. Expanding both Corti and Schefer, Alfred Jackson and Kathryn Anna Hanna, on the basis of the Marquis de Radepont papers, asserted that Radepont was the "architect" of Napoleon's "Grand Design," an imperialistic Bonaparte plan to gain glory for France, change republics into monarchies, and stop the expansion and influence of the United States.[12] Although the Hannas mentioned the mines of Sonora, they failed to ask why Sonora seemed so important to France.

Economic motives have always been considered as a cause of the intervention. Perkins included, as subordinate motives, Napoleon's desire for commercial expansion, which needed both a source of raw materials--especially cotton--and a market for French manufactured

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[11] Idem., "The French Legation in Mexico: Nexus of Interventionists" (unpublished study).

[12] Alfred Jackson Hanna, and Kathryn Abbey Hanna, Napoleon III and Mexico (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).

goods.[13] Earl S. Pomeroy expanded Perkins' analysis by suggesting that the cotton of Mexico might be a primary cause.[14] However, neither Perkins nor Pomeroy examined the immediacy of the French need for large quantities of cotton. Napoleon's critics, both in France, in Mexico, and in the United States, believed that the major reason for the intervention was an economic one. Eugene Lefevre, a French journalist and liberal opponent of the Second Empire, concluded that Napoleon's intense interest in Sonora's mines was the major cause.[15] Francisco Zarco, a former Mexican minister of foreign affairs, also bitterly denounced Napoleon's greed for Mexico's mineral wealth, which he considered to be "the magnet of the expedition."[16] Neither Lefevre nor Zarco asked why the French persistently wanted Mexican silver. Senator James A. McDougall of California may have come closest to a

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[13]Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, p. 364.

[14]Earl S. Pomeroy, "French Substitutes for American Cotton: 1861-1865," Journal of Southern History, Vol. IX (November, 1943), 555-560.

[15]Eugène Lefêvre, ed., Documents officiels recueillis dans la secrétaire privée de Maximilien. Histoire de l'intervention française au Mexique (2 vols.; Brussels: n.p., 1869).

[16]Article by Francisco Zarco, published in La Acción, Saltillo, June 18, 1864, enclosed in a despatch from Romero to Seward, July 12, 1864, reprinted in U.S., Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Part III, p. 581.

contemporary understanding of Napoleon's aims. Pointing out that France had no "home supply" of precious metals, McDougall, like Lefêvre, believed that Napoleon wanted the reputedly rich silver state of Sonora.[17] The French poet-politician Alphonse Lamartine, foreign minister in the early months of the Second Republic and defeated in his bid for the presidency by Louis Napoleon in 1848, defended French interests in Mexico's mineral wealth. Lamartine, fearing further United States expansion towards the mines of Mexico, Peru, and Sonora--separating the latter, as if it were not an integral part of Mexico--believed that, unless stopped, the United States would obtain control of the major gold and silver deposits. If this happened, he predicted that the United States would then have monetary and economic control over France, as well as the rest of Europe. This menacing possibility, he claimed, was "the secret thought which inspired the Mexican expedition."[18] These contemporary assessments,

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[17]Speech of McDougall, February 3, 1863, reprinted in U.S., Congress, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d sess., Appendix, p. 97.

[18]Article by Alphonse Lamartine, published in Les Entretiens Littéraires, November, 1865, reprinted in Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Part III, p. 581.

however, never connected the need for silver to stabilizing the French monetary standard or as a means of paying for alternate cotton supplies.

There are no simplistic explanations to complex foreign policy motivations, and all of the above causes of the French intervention in Mexico are elements of varying importance. None of them alone, however, seem to sufficiently explain Napoleon's decision to send thousands of French troops to Mexico for five years. Although Bock thoroughly explored the diplomatic events leading up to the Tripartite Convention of October, 1861, he did not inter-relate them with concurrent monetary and economic events of immense importance to France. The question has remained: why would Napoleon spend millions of francs to establish a Habsburg on a remote throne?

This dissertation explores the French intervention in Mexico in the context of Napoleon's dire need for silver to relieve his pressing monetary and economic problems. Whatever other considerations there may have been, documents and statistics indicate that France's dearth of silver was an important reason for the intervention. Overlooked by previous historians, there were many

questions to ask. Where was the world's major supply of silver? What part did the legend of silver in Sonora play? What were the results of the unprecedented influx of gold from America and Australia? How severly did France's loss of silver affect its bimetallic monetary standard? What effect did the American Civil War have on France's source of cotton? Where could alternate supplies of raw cotton be obtained? Was silver, the very metal that the Emperor lacked, required for payment? How did the colorful exploits of Count Raoul de Raousset-Boulbon in Sonora fit in? What was the background of Jean Baptiste Jecker's claims to one-third of the public land of Sonora? What were William McKendree Gwin's plans for Sonora? Did Maximilian deny Sonora's mines to France? Did France obtain silver from Mexico during the intervention?

While some of these questions are not fully answerable, a correlation of monetary and economic conditions in France with its moves towards, and in, Mexico, indicates that Napoleon's need for silver had many ramifications. When one is deprived, he seeks a source of fulfillment. The legend of silver in Sonora, based on fanciful descriptions of easily obtained and prodigious wealth, appeared to be that source of fulfillment for France.

CHAPTER II

THE LEGEND OF SILVER IN SONORA

For centuries Mexico had been the world's major producer of silver, which amounted to an estimated 75 per cent of the total Mexican export value. In the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries, extravagant reports and rumors spread that the Mexican state of Sonora had rich but only partially mined argentiferous sources.[1] Regardless of the veracity of these alleged silver sources, Napoleon became convinced that the answer to his needs was in this desolate area of northwestern Mexico. Through his tenacious efforts to acquire the mines of Sonora, which were irresponsibly represented as possessing incredible silver supplies, the intensity of the French need for silver is revealed.

A portion of a country's wealth, however, can be covetously obtained only in proportion to its weakness. Envy of Mexican mines was not new. From the sixteenth-century Mexican conquest by Cortés, there had been daring attempts to

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[1]Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of California (7 vols.; San Francisco: The History Company, Publishers, 1884-1890), VI, 583.

capture annual Spanish treasure fleets from Vera Cruz to Seville and Cadiz, as ships under the flag of Castile were hunted by both pirates and princes. Even when Spanish kings lost other possessions, however, they tenaciously retained New World wealth. Then the early nineteenth century began its merciless attacks. Napoleon Bonaparte had almost succeeded, through the vulnerability of the King of Spain and the venality of his minister, Godoy, in diverting Mexican silver to Paris.[2] And when scarcity of coin forced the Bank of England to stop specie payments, the French émigré General Charles-François Dumouriez urged England to strike a blow at both Spain and Napoleon by seizing the resources of Mexico.[3] A more subtle menace came from the United States. Negotiating the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the Spanish Count de Aranda had

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[2]Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon, trans. by Henry F. Stockhold (2 vols.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), Vol. I: From 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, 1799-1807, pp. 232-237.

[3]Wellington Supplementary Dispatches, Vol. VI, cited in "Mexico, by Baron Humboldt," Catholic World, Vol. VII (1868), p. 330.

perspicaciously predicted that the United States would begin by taking Florida, thus becoming master of the Gulf of Mexico; then they would try to conquer the vast empire of New Spain.[4]

In the decade from 1851 to 1861, Mexico's ability to resist foreign aggression waned. During these same years the French search for silver began to center on Sonora, apparently in imminent danger of either conquest or secession. The purported silver in Sonora was a mirage in which Napoleon saw what he desperately wanted to see, but if real it could have led to monetary resusitation for France. By 1863, mining engineers believed that Sonora's mineral wealth was greater than that of any other Mexican state.[5]

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[4]Memoria secreta presentada al rey Carlos III, reprinted in José Manuel Hidalgo, Proyectos de monarquía en México (México: F. Vázquez, 1904), p. 281.

[5]S. W. Inge to Mowry, San Francisco, February 22, 1863, reprinted in Sylvester Mowry, Arizona and Sonora: The Geography, History, and Resources of the Silver Region of North America (3d ed. rev.; New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1864), pp. 197-198.

In the decades preceding the French intervention in Mexico, numerous books and articles gave fanciful but dramatic descriptions of Sonora's silver. In a study written as early as 1794, the German Jesuit, Ignaz Pfefferkorn, tried "to lift out of obscurity" this "very noteworthy" Mexican province; he claimed that Sonora's mines made it one of the most important areas in all Spanish America.[6] Dramatizing a mine at Cananea, he wrote, "Imagine a hall draped with tapestries interwoven with silver from top to bottom; so on all sides everything was streaked with pure silver."[7] Even that wealth was superceded in Primería Alta, which supposedly contained the most famous and richest silver mine yet discovered in Sonora or in all of New Spain since the

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[6]Ignaz Pfefferkorn, Sonora: A Description of the Province, trans. by Theodore E. Treutlein (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1949), Dedication Page; p. 21. First published in two volumes in 1794-95 as Beschreibung der landschaft Sonora, at Köln am Rheine. Pfefferkorn was quoted in 1861 by Charles P. Stone, who surveyed Sonora's public lands for Jean Baptiste Jecker. Charles P. Stone, "Notes on the State of Sonora," The Historical Magazine, V (June, 1861), 168.

[7]Pfefferkorn, Sonora, p. 89.

conquest. This mine, claimed by Frenchmen in the 1850's near the village of Arizona, contained "a block of the finest silver, so large it had to be broken up with hammers and axes so that it could be removed." In 1730, both Old and New Spain were astonished by its wealth of silver.[8]

Citing eyewitness participants as sources, Pfefferkorn wrote, "In short, such a quantity of pure silver was found together here that it was doubtful whether it should be considered a mine or a depository of hidden treasures." Pfefferkorn's allegations were substantiated by others in the 1760's. When Nicolás de Lafora made an inspection tour, fundamental to the Marqués de Rubí's survey of New Spain's frontiers, he reported, "Virgin metals crop out everywhere in the hills and valleys" of Sonora.[9] And as early as 1769, M.

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[8] Ibid., p. 90. Also see Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of the North Mexican States and Texas (2 vols.; San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Company, Publishers, 1884), I, 525 ff., and Eduardo W. Villa, Historia del Estado de Sonora (2d ed.; Hermosillo, Sonora: Editorial Sonora, 1951), p. 273.

[9] Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., The Frontiers of New Spain: Nicolás de Lafora's Description, 1766-1768 (Berkeley: The Quivira Society, 1958), pp. 126-127.

Ossun, the French Ambassador to Spain, had written to the Duc de Choiseul, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that areas in northern New Spain "abound in mines of gold and silver."[10] News of the silver, allegedly only two or three feet deep in the earth, spread rapidly and, although "everything in and out of Sonora that had legs ran to the spot hoping to get rich quickly," Apaches, Seris, and Pimas effectively terrorized the miners.[11] Accordingly, Sonora's mineral wealth, philosophically termed providential compensation for such "annoyances" as these frightening Indian attacks, was largely abandoned. Nearly one hundred years after Pfefferkorn's residence in Sonora, C. P. Stone, Jecker's surveyor, noted the "crumbling walls" which marked past prosperity,[12] and Sylvester Mowry referred to "Infelix Sonora--most unhappy."[13] However, the

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[10]A copy of this letter, sent to Sylvester Mowry by George Bancroft, is reprinted in Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, pp. 39-40.

[11]Pfefferkorn, Sonora, p. 91.

[12]Stone, "Notes on the State of Sonora," p. 167.

[13]Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, p. 31.

silver mining districts in southern Sonora, around Alamos, had some 6,280 permanent European settlers in the late eighteenth century.[14]

Although Pfefferkorn had spent eleven years in Sonora, from 1756 to 1767, his goal of lifting Sonora out of obscurity was frustrated by his timing.[15] The 1794 publication of his first volume coincided with startling European events: Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette and been executed the previous year, and revolutionary doctrines and war were spreading throughout the continent. In addition to Europe's preoccupation with problems far from Sonora, Pfefferkorn's expulsion from New Spain and imprisonment in Spain with other Jesuits limited late eighteenth-century reception of his writings. Ignaz Pfefferkorn's work, however, later termed simply a Jesuit document and cited extensively as proof of Sonoran silver wealth, was an important

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[14]Roger Dunbier, The Sonoran Desert: Its Geography, Economy, and People (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1968), p. 151.

[15]For mention of Pfefferkorn, see Bancroft, North Mexican States, I, pp. 564, 580.

publication on an area that another German wrote about in the early years of the nineteenth century.

Alexander von Humboldt's five volumes on Mexico served as a major point of departure for later authors and researchers. All quoted him extensively and he influenced well over a generation of nineteenth century readers who read with awe his account of Mexico's spectacular wealth. Humboldt's massive study was the product of tedious examination of the resources and records of Mexico.[16] His 1811 publication, like Pfefferkorn's, was encompassed by momentous events: the Mexican rebellion in 1810 against French control of Spain and Napoleon's 1812 invasion of Russia. The resultant decrease in revenue after the Mexican war of independence seemed to reflect peninsular Spanish poverty, until the need for silver and the suceptibility of Mexico revived interest in, and avarice for, the minerals of Spain's former

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[16]Humboldt arrived in Mexico in March, 1803, and spent one year there.

colony.[17] Then, Europeans turned to Humboldt, the major source of information of the previous exploitation and potential wealth.[18] Cited extensively, his works were the basis for interest in Mexico by both miners and ministers: "Humboldt in pieces has been dished up to suit all customers. An oyster could not be served in more varieties of style."[19]

The prolific statistics of Alexander von Humboldt showed that Mexico had provided two-thirds

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[17]"Mexico," Catholic World, VII (1868), 331. Also see Académie des sciences, Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des séances de l'académie des sciences, Vol. XXV (1847), pp. 160-163; Revue des cours scientifiques de la France et des l'étranger, Vols. II (1865), p. 374 ff., and Vol. III (1866), pp. 62, 138, 175, 228, 250, 395, 512, 681-86, 738, 809-18.

[18]"Review of Alexander de Humboldt's Travels," Quarterly Review, Vol. XXI (1819), p. 320. The reviewer wryly commented that Humboldt "never quits a subject till he has exhausted it." Humboldt's Atlas géographique et physique du royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne (Paris, 1811), was in Maximilian's personal library.

[19]"Mexico, by Baron Humboldt," (book review), Catholic World, Vol. VII (1868), p. 334.

of the world's silver and, instead of being depleted by three centuries of Spanish mining, productivity had significantly increased since 1746.[20] The northern intendancies of Sonora and Durango ranked second to central Mexico, the major mining area, in the German geographer's grouping of principle silver mines listed according to the quantity of money extracted.[21] Sonora's mines were particularly alluring as they contained rare white silver, although their location, in deserted and savage areas, would require colonists to provide better administration and a more industrious people to increase silver production.[22] Humboldt predicted

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[20]Alexander von Humboldt, Essai politique aur le royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne (5 vols.; Paris: Chez F. Schoell, 1811), III, 346; V, 15. Also see "Mines and Mining from 1500-1800" in Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Mexico (6 vols.; San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft & Company, Publishers, 1883-1888), III, 553-602.

[21]When Humboldt was writing his notes, the intendancy of Sonora included Sinaloa. Humboldt, Essai politique, III, 389, 345.

[22]Ibid., p. 12. These white silver mines were also rich in lead. Ibid., 357.

that if Mexico's mineral wealth were ever fully developed, "Europe would be again inundated, as in the sixteenth century, with silver"--language later read with keen interest when the French monetary system wavered from a dearth of silver during the Second Empire.[23] Sonora, with its sparse population,[24] appeared to be a neglected and rich area that could offer France financial stability.

The political problems of Mexico magnified its vulnerability.[25] The economy was shattered by years of guerilla warfare after the Grito de Dolores, and the productivity of the mines, Mexico's major source of revenue, decreased significantly. At Guanajuato, the area in which the independence movement began, mining production declined from 617,474 marks of silver in 1808 to 73,983 in 1821. Flooded mines and wrecked machinery were grim

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[23]"The Empire of Mexico," Quarterly Review, Vol. 115 (April, 1864), p. 356.

[24]Humboldt, Essai politique, II, 388-99.

[25]"The Empire of Mexico," Quarterly Review, Vol. 115 (April, 1864), p. 368.

debris, and the silver production center began to shift northward, from Guanajuato and Zacatecas to Chihuahua, Durango, and Sonora.[26] In an unrelenting cycle, Mexican prosperity demanded efficient mine productivity and the output of the mines commensurately depended on a stable political system. Europeans regarded Mexico as being economically paralyzed by short-term, high-interest loans which required as collateral either the customs duties or mortgages on government property.[27] Immigrants and foreign investors slowly reactivated some mines but when revolutions disrupted or endangered these enterprises, their appeals for intervention only heightened the instability.

Nineteenth-century capitalists almost succeeded in garnering Mexican mineral wealth where pirates, buccaneers and smugglers had failed in the previous three centuries. Concerned about the

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[26]Bancroft, History of Mexico, VI, 505.

[27]"The Empire of Mexico," Quarterly Review, Vol. 115 (April, 1864), p. 380.

faltering mining industry, Mexico in 1822 reduced duties on silver to one common tax of 3 per cent, and in 1823 the government allowed foreign capital to enter legally when Congress permitted foreigners to become partial owners of Mexican mines, although they were stringently regulated and still restricted from owning real property.[28] Lucas Alamán, Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, urgently tried to rehabilitate the mines in the 1820's by seeking first French capital to form a Franco-Mexican mining company and, when this amount was inadequate, by turning to British capital.[29] Although production of Mexican mines had declined sharply,

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[28]Gilberto Crespo y Martínez, México: La industria minería, estudio de su evolución (México: Oficina tip. de la Secretaría de Fomento, 1903), pp. 66-67; N. Ray Gilmore, "Henry George Ward, British Publicist for Mexican Mines," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XXXII (February, 1963), p. 38.

[29]Alamán, from a prominent Mexican mining family, studied minerology in Paris and travelled in England, Germany, and the Low Countries before becoming Mexican representative in the Spanish Cortes. Gilmore, "Henry George Ward," p. 38. Maximilian's personal library included Lucas Alamán, Historia de Méjico desde los primeros movimientos que prepararon su independencia en el año de 1808 hasta la época presente (5 vols.; Mexico, 1849).

Europeans recalled the legends of vast treasures discovered by Cortés and lucratively mined by Spaniards.

While Humboldt was accused of "exuberance" over "the most common occurrences,"[30] his writings seem restrained when compared to the 1828 publication by Henry George Ward, British Minister to Mexico.[31] Making an extensive survey of Mexico's economic resources, Ward spiritedly reported great potential mineral wealth, rekindling British interest in Mexican mines in the 1830's. In 1825 the speculative boom in British-Mexican mining companies had ended with the panic of 1826, which temporarily dampened British interest in Mexican

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[30]"Review of Alexander de Humboldt's Travels," Quarterly Review, Vol. XXI (1819), p. 320.

[31]H[enry] G[eorge] Ward, Mexico in 1827 (2 vols.; London: Henry Colburn, 1828). Ward arrived in Mexico on March 11, 1825, as minister plenipotentiary to recognize Mexican independence; after concluding the treaty, he was Britain's first chargé d'affaires in Mexico. Maximilian's library included an 1828 Leipzig edition of Ward's Gedrängtes Gemälde Zustandes von Mexiko im Jahre 1827.

mines.[32] Complaining that Humboldt's estimates on silver production were too conservative, Ward enabled Mexican mining stocks to find a responsive market in London.[33] Spending three months in Sonora, the minister-mining publicist endorsed reports of a fellow Englishman there who claimed that "almost every mountain and hill contains silver and gold."[34]

Ward noted the decrease of Mexican revenues since Humboldt's publication and estimated

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[32]Arthur D. Gayer, William W. Rostow, et al., The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy, 1790-1850 (2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), I, 188-189. In 1824 Benjamin Disraeli invested in the Anglo-Mexican Mining Association and subsequently wrote three pamphlets praising Mexican mines. Robert Blake, Disraeli (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 24-26.

[33]Ward, Mexico in 1827, I, 25; II, 167-168. Ward's volumes were almost verbatim his official despatches sent in answer to the British Foreign Office's 1826 request to accumulate information on Mexican mines. See Gilmore, "Henry George Ward," pp. 35, 41, 44, 46.

[34]Colonel Bourne, an English investor in a Sonoran mine near Arispe had prudently chosen as his partner Señor Escalante, Sonora's representative in the Mexican Senate. Ward, Mexico, II, p. 136; "Notes on the State of Sonora and Cinaloa," Appendix C, Ibid., I, p. 579.

that mine production had been reduced almost one-half since the Mexican insurrection of 1810.[35] Cognizant that Essai politique was the source of knowledge for most European enterprises in Mexico, he conscientiously pointed out to prospective investors new hazards that had emerged in the seventeen years since Humboldt's publication. Political disturbances, flooded mines, uncontrolled Indian depredations, and disrupted communications were primary reasons for decreased mining activity and major deterrents to investment capital.[36]

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[35] Ibid., I, pp. 361-63, 386, 428. The Medidas políticas, probably written by José María Morelos, had advocated the destruction of export products, such as tobacco crops, mines, and sugar plantations. Wilbert H. Timmons, Morelos: Priest, Soldier, Statesman of Mexico, illus. by Jose Cisneros (El Paso, Texas: Western College Press, 1963), pp. 191-202.

[36] Ward, Mexico, II, p. 75. The archives used by Humboldt were destroyed during the civil disturbances. Ward, Mexico, II, pp. 38, 8. Also see "Report of the United Mexican Mining Association, March, 1827," in Philosophical Magazine, Vol. II (July, 1827), p. 71.

These obstacles in Sonora, however, could be rationalized as manageable when weighed against the projected prodigious rewards. Ward's statement that the untapped mines of Durango, Sonora, Chihuahua and Sinaloa promised "riches superior to anything that Mexico has yet produced," was particularly seductive after Humboldt's descriptions of Mexican mineral wealth.[37] Not only were these riches in northern Mexico of a superior quality, but they were allegedly close to the surface, in contrast to greater depth and consequent production cost of the older mines in the southern districts.[38] These easily obtained and supposedly superior minerals, "virgin" mines as Ward frequently termed them, were complemented by other advantages. Guaymas, "undoubtedly the best port in the Republic," had only about two thousand inhabitants, "very hospitable to strangers" and "protected" by a garrison of only thirty men.[39] This vulnerability

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[37] Ibid., p. 127.

[38] Ibid., pp. 127-28; this corroborates Pfefferkorn, Sonora, p. 90.

[39] "Notes on the State of Sonora and Cinaloa," Appendix C, Ward, Mexico, I, p. 563.

of northern Mexico was frequently referred to by French writers. Apache attacks, however, were a major source of disquiet and decreased mining production.[40] Although Ward noted that they had caused the rich silver mine of Cobriza de San Felipe, eight leagues north of Babiacora, to be abandoned, this was tempered by the observation that the mine was owned by two mere women and, furthermore, the Apaches possessed no fire-arms.[41]

Ward adopted the generally held Mexican theory that the amount of silver increased towards the North, a supposition "confirmed by the superiority of all the Northern ores to those of the

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[40] Ibid., p. 569.

[41] Ward, Mexico, I, 572; Ibid., II, 602. Although two women might be unable to withstand Apache arrows, men with military backgrounds--such as two Emperors--could readily dismiss the hindrances described by Ward. This area of Babacanora [sic] is mentioned by Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, pp. 43-45, by Victor Adolphe Malte-Brun, La Sonora et ses mines (Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1864), p. 27. (as Barbicanora), and by Captain Jim Box who reported that the "very rich" mine of Babicanora [sic] "was taken in hand by a company of French" in 1852 who continued to work the mine in 1861 "with great profit." "The Mines of Northern Mexico," The Knickerbocker Magazine, Vol. LVII (June, 1861), p. 580.

richest districts in the South."[42] This belief, probably strengthened by the 1849 Californian discoveries, seemingly originated in the eighteenth-century discovery of Sonora's Bolas de Plata mine of Arizona, which Pfefferkorn had described so expressively and which Frenchmen later coveted so fruitlessly.[43] Mexicans themselves revived interest in the Arizona mine. A Mexican president's search of the viceregal archives for references to this mine had turned up Philip V's decree, dated Aranjuez, May 28, 1741, which mentioned a mass of "pure silver" weighing 180 arrobas.[44] From documents,

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[42]Ward, Mexico, II, 136.

[43]Ibid.; Bancroft, North Mexican States, I, 526; Pfefferkorn, Sonora, p. 90; Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, p. 174.

[44]Ward, Mexico, II, pp. 136-137. An arroba is 25.36 pounds. Ward obtained a "certified copy" of this decree. Thirty years after Ward's account, Stone wrote that one mass of silver from this mine weighed, "according to Jesuit records," 3500 pounds, while Mowry reported one weighed 3600 pounds. Stone, "Sonora," p. 168; Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, p. 174. Also see estimates of Malte-Brun, La Sonora et ses mines, p. 23; and Pfefferkorn, Sonora, pp. 90-91. Both mention this legendary mass of silver although assessment of the weight varies.

mining experts, and personal observation, Ward was convinced that great mineral potential lay in the northern areas of Sonora, Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua and that future mineral production there would "infinitely" exceed that of the southern mines.[45] Realizing that his statements might be considered exaggerated, Ward insisted, "They are not so; they will be confirmed by every future report."[46]

Ward's influence was substantial.[47] A French scientific expedition to northern Mexico

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[45]Ward, Mexico, II, pp. 160, 138.

[46]Ibid., p. 600. However, a disillusioned investor, writing of Ward's influence, "Lo were not the pages of Ward's History of Mexico unfolded to your gaze!"--bought $15,000 worth of stock in mines mentioned in Ward's Mexico. Relating the futility of investing in North Mexican mines, he amusingly concluded, "The first dollar I have ever received from any connection I have ever had with mines comes from this article narrating my experience." "My Mexican Mines," Harpers New Monthly Magazine, XXXV (September, 1867), pp. 457, 459, 462.

[47]See "Notice sur deux noveaux minéraux découverts à Culebras, au Mexique," Annales des sciences naturelles, Vol. XIV (December, 1827), pp. 371-374; "Produit du Mexique en or et en argent monnayés," Ibid., XVI (October, 1829), p. 113; "State and Prospects of Mexico, 1845," Eclectic, VI (December, 1845), 443.

during Maximilian's empire corroborated Ward's judgment and enthusiastically concluded that the "mother mountain" provided a "silver core" from which silver "radiated in all directions, growing less rich according to its distance from the centre." Such great wealth, according to the Frenchman, would compensate for both mining costs and army expenses as "five thousand men might dig, and pick, and blast away at it for a hundred years and at the end of that time the yield would be as rich, if not richer, than when they began."[48] Claiming that Sonora was the most interesting area in all of Mexico, Ward provocatively asserted that its mines could provide Europeans with more wealth than had yet been procured from the New World.[49]

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[48]"The Mines of Santa Eulalia, Chihuahua," Harpers New Monthly Magazine, XXXV (November, 1867), pp. 685-86.

[49]Ward, Mexico, II, 611. Ward persistently appealed to Europeans, as the United States also had aspirations. C. Harvey Gardiner, ed., Mexico, 1825-1828: The Journal and Correspondence of Edward Thornton Tayloe (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959), p. 134. Tayloe was a staff member of Joel R. Poinsett, United States minister to Mexico and a bitter antagonist of H. G. Ward. Also see J. Fred Rippy, Rivalry of the United

British, French and German capitalists, stimulated by the re-publication of Humboldt's work and challenged by Ward's volumes, invested heavily in Mexican mines. Such competition required these investors to submit to terms dictated by Mexican proprietors, and constant litigation over disputed titles and fictitious claims hindered the enforcement of contracts. Mexico's political problems added further complications, while the absence of transportation resulted in expensive mining machinery never reaching its destination.[50] Attracted by the great mineral wealth described by Humboldt and Ward, Europeans continued to believe that a stable and permissive Mexican government would reduce all these hindrances.

While European capital gradually revived the mines, Mexico continued to endure grave problems. In 1828 dissension again developed into

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States and Great Britain over Latin America, 1808-1830 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929).

[50]"The Empire of Mexico," Quarterly Review, Vol. 115 (April, 1864), pp. 361-62.

civil war. The fighting in Mexico City destroyed the major shopping district, the Parian market; foreign residents, the main victims, were incited. Ferdinand VII of Spain, financially insolvent after losing the American colonies, believed that intervention in Mexico would restore order and sovereignty and, in 1829, the Spaniards seized the Mexican port of Tampico. Although Mexico repelled this invasion, the pattern which emerged was clear: internal eruptions, damage to foreign investments, and attempted or threatened intervention.

With the secession of Texas, Mexico's weakness was abundantly apparent.[51] In 1838, only two years after Texas became independent, the Orleanist King of France, Louis Philippe, demanded reimbursement for damages suffered by Frenchmen.[52]

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[51]When captured by the Texans, Antonio López de Santa Anna reportedly exclaimed, "You may esteem yourself fortunate, in having conquered the Napoleon of the New World." "State and Prospects of Mexico, 1845," Eclectic, Vol. VI (December, 1845), p. 450. Ironically, the first President of Texas was named Mirabeau Bonaparte Lamar.

[52]The French were already a considerable number in Mexico. By 1854, nearly one-fourth of the 25,000 foreign residents were French. Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, Santa Anna: The Story of an Enigma Who

Bombarding the hitherto impregnable fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, Louis Philippe withdrew after securing a guarantee of claims valued at six hundred thousand pesos. This "Pastry War" was successful but had lingering repercussions.[53] For the first time Mexico had been invaded by Frenchmen, an interesting exception to Louis Philippe's cautious foreign policy which contributed to his fall from power ten years later.[54]

Once Was Mexico (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1936), 299.

[53]This incident is termed the Pastry War, as one of the French claimants was a baker at Tacubaya. For French accounts, see Pierre de la Gorce, Histoire du second empire (12th ed., 7 vols.; Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1912), IV, 8-11, and Taxile Delord, Histoire du second empire: 1848-1869 (6 vols.; Paris: Librarie Germer Baillière, 1869-1875), III, 278-79.

[54]Orleanists continued to be connected with Mexico. The Duc d'Aumale, fifth son of Louis Philippe was later considered for the Mexican throne, and rumors were that Louis Philippe himself had once coveted the Mexican throne. "The Empire of Mexico," Quarterly Review, Vol. 115 (April, 1864), p. 377. José Manuel Hidalgo, Notes secretes de M. Hidalgo a developer le jour ou il conviendra d'écrire l'histoire de la foundation de l'empire mexicain, Hausarchiv Kaiser Maximilians von Mexico, MSS in the Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Photostatic Facimiles, Library of Congress, Washington, Carton 19 (1865), No. 46 (Hereinafter cited as HHUSA, Maximilian).

Napoleon III, his successor, now had both a precedent for interference and a motivation for perseverance. Mexico had won a Pyrrhic victory in the Pastry War.

Throughout the 1840's and 1850's Mexico's troubles increased, as political and economic anarchy continued. Defying the central government, Yucatán boldly hired the navy of the new Texas Republic and, in 1848, offered sovereignty over Yucatan to Spain, Great Britain and the United States.[55] Restless Indians in Sonora and Chihuahua became more assertive, and their relentless raids provoked talk of secession in the northern states by liberals who despaired of government help.[56] Both Conservative and Liberal Mexicans, imitating Europe and denigrating Mexico, sporadically sent out appeals for Europeans to restore order.[57] In

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[55]Nelson Reed, The Caste War of Yucatan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 31, 85-86.

[56]Robert C. Stevens, "The Apache Menace in Sonora, 1831-1849," Arizona and the West, Vol. VI (Autumn, 1964), pp. 211-222; Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 671.

[57]Nettie Lee Benson, "Mexican Monarchists, 1823-1867," a paper read at the Southwest Social

1840 José María Gutiérrez de Estrada first appealed for a monarch, and in 1853 Santa Anna and Lucas Alamán, trying to secure a tripartite intervention of Great Britain, Spain and France in Mexico, endorsed Gutiérrez' interest in a Spanish prince.

The war with the United States was the most serious danger in Mexico's twenty-five years of independence. Desperation was apparent in 1846 when José María Luis Mora, the Liberal Mexican Minister to England, offered to sell Great Britain a portion of territory that would create a buffer between the United States and Mexico.[58] Rivalry between Europe and the United States for Northern Mexico was intense. Napoleon III knew of General Zachary Taylor's campaigns and of General Winfield Scott's rapid march on Mexico City: within a mere two years after hostilities began, the United States absorbed more than one-half of Mexico in

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Science Association, Dallas, Texas, March 23, 1973.

[58]Charles A. Hale, Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821-1853 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 15, 8, 211. Callcott, Santa Anna, p. 303.

exchange for $15 million and the cancellation of unpaid claims. Annexation by the United States of northern Mexico, "in the direct 'manifest destiny' line of acquisition," seemed an attainable possibility.[59]

The further vulnerability of Mexico was patently clear. In spite of earlier investment frustrations, during the 1850's--the period in which American and Australian gold was innundating Europe--European capital flooded into Mexican mining enterprises. A French adventurer, Hippolyte du Pasquier de Dommartin, arrived in Mexico shortly after its abject defeat in the war with the United States and sketched plans for French colonies, first in Chihuahua and then in Sonora. Delineating his objectives in a book published in 1852, Dommartin contributed to the developing rivalry of France and the United States for northern Mexico.[60] He

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[59]"The Mines of Northern Mexico," Knickerbocker, Vol. LVII (June, 1861), p. 577.

[60]Hippolyte du Pasquier de Dommartin, Les Etats-Unis et le Mexique: l'intérêt européen dans l'Amérique du nord (Paris: Guillaumin, 1852); for a contemporary evaluation of his plan, see Annuaire des Deux Mondes, 1850 (Paris, 1851), pp. 909-910; for

claimed that French hegemony in Sonora would curtail further expansion of the United States, restore Sonora's prosperity, implant European Catholic colonists to stop advancing Anglo-Saxon Protestants and, while accomplishing these goals, the French would be remunerated with metallic wealth equivalent to that of California.[61] Intrepidly requesting the cession of vast unoccupied lands "in order to offer it to my countrymen of France and of Europe," Dommartin cajoled, "A country calls us. . . . Let us go to her! And who knows but that in stretching out to her a hand of safety, we may, perhaps save ourselves."[62]

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sectional translation of Dommartin's book see New York Times, December 15, 22, 24, 1852; January 10, 1853. For congressional discussion of the Frenchman, see U. S. Congress, Congressional Globe, 32d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. XXVI, Appendix, 1853. Dommartin's book was reprinted in the New York Times after Napoleon III's coup d'état and after the French Count Raousset-Boulbon's occupation of Hermosillo in 1852.

[61]This is a recurring prediction. See also "Mines of Northern Mexico," Knickerbocker, LVII (June, 1861), p. 580; and Stone, "Sonora," p. 168.

[62]New York Times, December 15, 1852, p. 3.

Dommartin had substantial reasons for believing that Sonora would not only be receptive, but also grateful, to France. José de Aguilar, governor of Sonora, urgently contacted the French minister to Mexico, André Levasseur, to promote European immigration, and Sonora's 1850 colonization decree added substance to his sincerity.[63] Although Dommartin was discouraged that the central Mexican government rejected Sonora's colonization program, he was hopeful that "if its fruit must be lost to me, I do not wish that it should be for my country."[64] Ruminating on the riches of Mexico before 1810, the Frenchman

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[63]Colonization Decree of Sonora, May 6, 1850, ibid. The text of this Sonoran colonization decree is in the decree of the national congress that judged it unconstitutional, on the grounds that it asserted state powers reserved for the national government. See Patricia R. Herring, "A Plan for the Colonization of Sonora's Northern Frontier: The Paredes Proyectos of 1850," Journal of Arizona History, Vol. X (Summer, 1969), pp. 103-114; Odie B. Faulk, trans. and ed., "Projected Mexican Colonies in the Borderlands, 1852," Journal of Arizona History, Vol. X (Summer, 1969), pp. 115-128; Odie B. Faulk, trans. and ed., "Projected Mexican Military Colonies for the Borderlands, 1848," Journal of Arizona History, Vol. IX (Spring, 1968), pp. 39-47.

[64]New York Times, December 22, 1852, p. 2.

took samples of Sonora's mineral wealth back to France and explained that the major reason such silver had been neglected was the inability of Mexicans to work the mines and defend their country at the same time.[65] With great insistence--"As a European, as a Frenchman, I beseech Europe, I adjure my country"--Dommartin entreated for prompt and vigorous intervention in northern Mexico.[66] Interest was heightened by the Mexican display at the Universal Exposition of 1855 in Paris where five million visitors, including sovereigns from central and western Europe, viewed Mexican products and considered them the most remarkable, after those from the United States, of the Western Hemisphere.[67]

Dommartin's importunity was vindicated by United States interest in Sonora. In February,

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[65] Ibid., December 24, 1852, p. 2.

[66] Ibid., December 24, 1852, p. 2; January 10, 1853, p. 2.

[67] La Gorce, Histoire du second empire, IV, p. 14. In 1857, the French government sent scientific teams to Mexico. Désiré Charnay, Les anciennes villes du Nouveau Monde: voyages d'exploration au Mexique et dans L'Amerique Centrale, 1857-1882 (Paris, 1885), pp. 1, 152.

1859, Sylvester Mowry alerted Frenchmen to rival designs when he addressed the American Geographical and Statistical Society in New York on the importance of Arizona and Sonora.[68] Mowry advocated the acquisition of Sonora, probably because of his nearby investment property, by encouraging American emigration there. He asserted that Sonora's mineral wealth would equal or surpass that of the richest area in the world if it only had peace, capital, and a liberal government.[69]

In addition to Sylvester Mowry's enthusiastic appraisal, Captain Jim Box, a Texas ranger, accumulated mineral and agricultural data on the north Mexican states, and dismissed possible European protest, over the balance of power

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[68]The French scientist Malte-Brunn, who wrote La Sonora et ses mines in 1864, referred to this address. Mowry, a West Point graduate and an officer at Fort Yuma in 1855, was elected as a delegate to Congress from the territory of Arizona. By 1860 he obtained the Patagonia Mine ten miles from the boundary line between Sonora and Arizona. Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, pp. 235-237.

[69]Ibid., pp. 35, 48. Mowry was particularly interested in the port of Guaymas, Ibid., pp. 174-175.

principle, if the United States took this area.[70] He descriptively related the potential of Sonora's mines, sufficiently great to overcome any inconveniences. East of Arispe, a surface gold vein was visible more than three leagues away(!), while a silver mine nearby promised easy and rich profits. Box's article, virtually a miner's guidebook, contained page after page of detailed and colorful revelations of unexplored riches, silver mines that "run up for a mile," and gold that "exists upon all hands."[71]

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[70]"The Mines of Northern Mexico," Knickerbocker, LVII (June, 1861), p. 577. This article, written to entice United States colonists to northern Mexico by "revelations of its almost illimitable riches," was published four months before the tripartite convention for European intervention in Mexico. It is based on the 1856 United States Boundary Commission report and on data subsequently collected by Captain Jim Box. Other extravagant claims, citing Mexican mining records, purported that "the annual produce of a single silver mine exceeds a million of dollars." Report of Frederick Brunckow to a Committee of the Stockholders of the Sonora Exploring and Mining Co. upon the History, Resources, and Prospects of the Company in Arizona (Cincinnati: Railroad Record, 1859), p. 34.

[71]"The Mines of Northern Mexico," Knickerbocker, LVII (June, 1861), pp. 578-586. Writers from the United States concentrated on the gold mines of Sonora, while those from Europe emphasized the silver potential. See Bancroft, North Mexican States, I, pp. 667-68 for gold discoveries in the

Six months before this article's publication, Benito Juárez had entered Mexico City, causing Box to believe that with the liberals in power, emigrants would flock to Sonora, the "most auriferous portion of our continent."[72]

Such articles emanating from the United States threw most Europeans into the camp of

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1770's in Sonora. Although Humboldt generally depreciated Mexican gold, he emphasized that Sonora's gold "may be considered as the Choco of North America." Humboldt, Essai politique, III, 346-47. Also see Charles de Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora (Paris: Ledoyen, 1855); Alfred de Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon et l'expédition de la Sonore (Paris: E. Dentu, 1859 pp. 74 ff.; and Carl Sartorius, Mexico About 1850 (Stuttgart: F. A. Brockhaus Komm.-Gesch. G. M. B. H., Abt. Antiquarium, 1961), pp. 191-202, a reprint of the Darmstadt, 1858 edition. Maximilian had a personal copy of Sartorius, Mexiko und die Mexikaner (Darmstadt, 1852).

[72]"Mines of Northern Mexico," Knickerbocker, LVII (June, 1861), p. 587. This belief was probably stimulated by Juárez' acceptance of the December, 1859, McLane-Ocampo treaty, which made many concessions to the United States. Although the United States Senate rejected it, Mexican conservatives alleged that national territory had been sold, while the liberals viewed the treaty as an extension of 1831 and 1853 treaties. Bancroft, History of Mexico, V, pp. 773-776. Sylvester Mowry also believed that the prospects of Sonora greatly improved after 1859. Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, p. 92.

conservative Mexicans.[73] Lord Palmerston, the British Prime Minister, who had derisively scorned Mexico's disorders, stated that if Mexico "could be turned into a prosperous Monarchy I do not know of any arrangement that would be more advantageous for us. . . ."[74] As Maximilian was enroute to Mexico, some British journals reflected Palmerston's views and, quoting Humboldt, Ward, and Michel Chevalier, they lauded the prospective changes for Mexico: with European techniques, the annual Mexican silver production could perhaps be tripled, and the unexplored mineral resources of Soncra, referred to as Mexico's richest

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[73]Assertions were made that the mines of Sonora and Lower California needed either a Mexican fleet or "the assistance of a naval squadron from France" to avoid their conquest by the United States. Robert Hogarth Patterson, "The Napoleonic Idea in Mexico," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Vol. XCVI (July, 1864), p. 81.

[74]Palmerston to Lord John Russell, Foreign Secretary, January 19, 1862, reprinted in Harold Temperly and Lillian M. Penson, eds., Foundations of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902), (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd. 1966), p. 295.

mining district, would be developed.[75]

The French scientist, M. Victor Adolphe Malte-Brun, gullibly concurred that Sonora was one of the richest parts of the world in silver.[76] Asserting that no other area had such "extraordinary" mineral potential, equal to the placers of both California and Australia, he echoed evaluations of Sonora's rich veins of "virgin silver" that was acquired in "slabs."[77]

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[75]"The Empire of Mexico," Quarterly Review, Vol. 115 (April, 1864), pp. 349, 356, 364-365.

[76]Malte-Brun founded the journal Les nouvelles annales des voyages in 1808. La Sonora et ses mines was published in booklet form in 1864 after its inclusion as an article in Malte-Brun's journal the previous year. Victor Adolphe Malte-Brun, La Sonora et ses mines (Paris: Arthus Bertrand, 1864), pp. 5, 10-11, 22. References to Sonora as the "richest area of the world" are common in this period. See Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, p. 10.

[77]Malte-Brun, La Sonora, p. 11. Nearly seventy years after Malte-Brun's assessment, mining investors, claiming that one-third of the several thousand operating Mexican mines were in Sonora, continued the propaganda that the largest mines on the continent could be developed in northern Sonora. E. F. Schramm, Report on Artemisa Mines Ltd. Located in Sonora, Mexico, with a Description of the Ore Deposits (Bisbee, Arizona: Stockholders Report to President Oliver Kendall, Artemisa Mines, Ltd., 1932), pp. 6, 14.

Ironically, in the same year that Malte-Brun published his booklet, the Scientific Commission of Pachuca lamented "the exaggerated descriptions of Mexico that circulate throughout all of Europe."[78]

Malte-Brun estimated the annual mineral production in Sonora to be 5,082,500 francs, a figure more than three times the amount of silver francs coined in 1863.[79] Estimating the population

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[78] Comisión Científica de Pachuca, 1864 (México: J. M. Andrade y F. Escalante, 1865), p. 6. Others asserted that Sonoran silver could have "speedily" eliminated the national debt of France. "The Plot of the Mexican Drama," The Eclectic, VI (November, 1867), p. 533.

[79] Or 1,016,500 pesos, with 5 francs to the peso. Malte-Brun, La Sonora, p. 17. This was considerably lower than the average annual mineral production of 7,500,000 francs from 1835 to 1850, a figure that still exceeded the total silver francs coined in France in 1864, when silver coinage accelerated. Ibid., p. 26. However, Stone's estimation of 3 to 5 million pesos, based on his 1858-59 surveys, was substantially higher than Malte-Brun's. Stone, "Notes on the State of Sonora," p. 169. For French coinage figures, see Great Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., Vol. 6 (House of Commons), 1876, "Report on the Depreciation of the Price of Silver," Appendix, pp. 88-89. Adding agricultural and animal items, Malte-Brun estimated Sonora's annual productivity to be 2,708,000 pesos or 13,540,000 francs. Malte-Brun, La Sonora, p. 17.

of Sonora to be negligible, only one quarter of which was white, Malte-Brun pointedly noted that the principal Indian tribes were docile Yaquis and Mayos who provided necessary agricultural and mining labor. Although he lightly touched on the dangerous Pimas and Seris, the French scientist treated the "perfidious" 10,000 or 12,000 Apaches more seriously, as they had unfortunately acquired fire arms from the United States, contrary to Ward's report that they had only arrows.[80] However, Malte-Brun seemed encouraged by Sylvester Mowry's statement that the Apaches were not a serious obstacle to miners.[81]

Sonora's mineral wealth, especially the plaques d'argent of the Arizona mine that enticed two French Counts to their deaths in the 1850's was detailed by the French scientist.[82] The

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[80] Ibid., pp. 13-16.

[81] Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, p. 68. See Malte-Brun, La Sonora, pp. 3-6, for references to Mowry's address.

[82] Malte-Brun, La Sonora, p. 22. One hundred years later, in 1964, much wrought silver was found in a shaft of this group of mines by Wayne Winters, an American mining engineer. Lately

question of why so much potential wealth in Sonora had not been mined by impecunious Mexican governments was rather cursorily dismissed by Malte-Brun, Ward, and others by blaming neglect of the mines on political instability.[83] Malte-Brun also derided efforts of mining adventurers who had sporadically tried to resuscitate Sonoran mines, as they worked "without order and method." Citing statistics from Travaux apostoliques de la Société de Jésus, the French scientist related that the Arizona mine had produced pieces of silver weighing one or two arrobas, although one noted piece of silver from this mine weighed 140 arrobas, or 3,550 pounds. However, he asserted that the Arizona mine was merely representative, and that

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Thomas, Between Two Empires: The Life Story of California's First Senator, William McKendrdee Gwin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), p. 291.

[83] Ibid., pp. 22-23. This was also the opinion of Saint-Clair-Duport. De la production des métaux précieux au Mexique, considérée dans ses rapports avec la géologie, la métallurgie et l'économie politique (Paris: F. Didot frères, 1843), pp. 391-393. Also see Bancroft, North Mexican States, I, pp. 527-28 on the Arizona mine.

it would require a huge volume to describe all of the mines in detail, according to an "excellent" contemporary article on Sonora in the Bulletin de la Société de Géographie de Genève, which reinforced Malte-Brun's contentions.[84] Malte-Brun, as others, believed modern metallurgy and scientific innovations would significantly increase Sonora's mineral production, and "immense profits" could be made if transportation, security, and good management were provided.[85] Making long-range plans, he suggested that a railroad be built to connect Guaymas, Hermosillo, Ures, and Arispe for maximum production and efficiency.[86]

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[84]Malte-Brun, La Sonora, pp. 22-25.

[85]Ibid., pp. 26, 28. This, again, is also the contention of Humboldt and many other writers. See Patterson, "the Napoleonic Idea in Mexico," p. 82; Stone, "Sonora," p. 169, who estimated mineral production could be increased "at least ten times," and Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, pp. 123. 133-135. The French were world leaders in perfecting mining machinery, samples of which were displayed at the Paris Universal Exposition of 1867. U. S. Congress, House, Executive Documents, Doc. 207, "Mines and Mining," 41st Cong., 2d sess., 1869-70, pp. 525, 591 ff.

[86]Malte-Brun, La Sonora, p. 28. Also see Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, p. 93; for the Sonoran

Malte-Brun concluded with an eighteenth-century report to the viceroy of New Spain which had predicted that colonists in Sonora could produce mineral wealth that would astonish the world. Reminding Frenchmen that Spain had failed to develop these mines, the scientist rhetorically challenged, "Which will be the nation that will fulfill this prediction?"[87] Napoleon III provided the answer. "With a boldness which pays little regard to what ordinary men call impossibilities,"[88] he sent Frenchmen to Mexico, a country three times the size of France. The rumored wealth of Sonora and the vulnerability of Mexico were part of the context in which the Emperor, in 1861, desperately sought a solution to his acute need for silver.

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mines worked by Frenchmen in the 1850's, see "Mines of Northern Mexico," Knickerbocker (June, 1961), p. 580.

[87]Malte-Brun, La Sonora, pp. 28-29. Sylvester Mowry possessed a copy of a 1757 map, obtained by C. P. Stone, supposedly from the original in the Mexican archives. Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, p. 17. Also see article entitled, "Sonora--Its Immense Wealth" in Mexican Times, October 21, 1865, p. 2, and ibid., October 15, 1866, p. 2.

[88]Patterson, "The Napoleonic Idea in Mexico," p. 72.

CHAPTER III

THE FRENCH NEED FOR SILVER

Although the Second French Empire is generally acknowledged to have been a period of prosperity, with the most rapid economic growth during the entire nineteenth-century occurring in the decade after the *coup d'état*,[1] by 1861 Napoleon III faced a monetary crisis which required the acquisition of silver in substantial quantities. At the root of his problems was gold. In the twenty-five years between 1850 and 1875, the first twenty years coinciding with the Second Republic and Second Empire, the world's gold production equalled that of the previous 357 years, from 1493 to 1849.[2]

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[1] Rondo Cameron, *et al.*, *Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization: A Study in Comparative Economic History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 107.

[2] Adolf Soetbeer, *Edelmentall-Produktion und werthverhältniss zwischen gold und silber, seit der entdeckung Amerika's bis zur gegenwart* (Gotha: J. Perthes, 1879), pp. 107-111; Alexander Del Mar, *A History of the Precious Metals: From the Earliest Times to the Present* (London: Geo. Bell & Sons, 1880), p. 447; J. E. Cairnes, *Essays in Political*

The influx of gold from three corners of the earth--Siberia, California, and Australia--upset France's traditional silver-based monetary system; from 1853 to 1865, a revolution took place in the French currency.[3] Silver, increasing in comparative value throughout the 1850's as gold production soared, was hoarded, melted down, and exported. The French need for silver intensified during the cotton crisis of the 1860's. As ninety-three per cent of France's imports of raw cotton came from the American South, its cotton industry suffered grievously when the Civil War curtailed this supply.[4] Napoleon's timorous and sporadic quest for silver to restore monetary stability accelerated when alternate cotton suppliers in India demanded payment in silver.

Economy (London: Macmillan and Co., 1873), pp. 115-116; J. Laurence Laughlin, The History of Bimetallism in the United States (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1892), pp. 115-116.

[3]Laughlin, Bimetallism, p. 119.

[4]Claude Fohlen, L'industrie textile au temps du Second Empire (Paris: Plon, [1956]), p. 128; Frank Lawrence Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America (2d ed. rev.; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 14-15.

The mines of Mexico which Napoleon Bonaparte[5] had also coveted offered an obvious answer to the mounting economic problems of France. Thus Napoleon III, imitating his uncle, turned to Mexico as a source of that precious metal which would provide both the stabilization of the traditional French monetary standard and the medium to purchase raw cotton from India.

While economists later claimed that the Emperor could have solved one of these pressing problems by adopting the gold standard, the massive influx of gold in the 1850's had no precedent. His conservative economic advisors saw the crisis as one which would pass and, having faith in the old system, they urged him to retain the bimetallic standard. Great Britain was the only European country that had adopted, in 1861, a monometallic system, based on gold, before this avalanche began.[6] For centuries, the monetary

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[5]Lefebvre, Napoleon, I, 232-237.

[6]André Piettre, Monnaie et économie internationale du XIXe siècle à nos jours (Paris: Editions Cujas, [1967]), p. 58.

policies of France had reflected a traditional reliance on silver.

In the eighteenth century, while the English and Spanish mints favored gold, French currency was almost entirely silver throughout the century.[7] Temporary aberrations had occurred, but the retention of a silver standard, in spite of enormous short-run difficulties, had been vindicated by later shifts in mineral productivity. During the twenty years between 1740 and 1760, Brazilian mines added an estimated £40 million to the world's stock of gold, effecting Gresham's law that cheap money drives dearer money out of circulation.[8] The shortage of silver currency became so great in 1759 that the King and numbers of private individuals sent their plate to the mint.[9] However, after 1780 production

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[7]Henri Sée, Histoire économique de la France: Le moyen âge el l'ancien régime (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1948), pp. xx, 97, 166-171.

[8]J. H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914 (4th ed.: Cambridge: University Press, 1961), p. 376; Del Mar, Precious Metals, p. 255.

[9]W. A. Shaw, The History of Currency: 1252 to 1896 (2d ed.; London: Wilsons & Milne, 1896), p. 169.

of Mexican silver increased immensely.[10] In 1785 Calonne, comptroller-general of the finances under Louis XVI, executed the recoinage that established gold at 15½ times the value of silver (a ratio of 15½:1), but five years later, in 1790, the National Assembly severely criticised Calonne's policy.[11] During the First Republic and First Empire, the monetary problem demanded a major amount of Napoleon Bonaparte's attention. Hoarded metallic currency caused a great scarcity of coin, and he tried to acquire silver and gold by increasing French exports and by "simple conquest."[12] Turning to monetary methods of the Ancien Régime, by the Act of 7/17 germinal, An XI (March 20, 1803), Bonaparte re-enacted Calonne's edict of 1785.[13] With

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[10]Laughlin, Bimetallism, p. 151; Sée, Histoire économique, p. 401; Del Mar, Precious Metals, p. 180.

[11]Sée, Histoire économique, p. 170.

[12]Lefebvre, Napoleon, I, 166-167.

[13]André Piettre, Histoire économique: essai de synthèse faits et idées (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1969), pp. 96-101. See Horace White, "Bimetallism in France," Political Science Quarterly, VI (June, 1891), 313-317, for a concise resume. See Piettre, Monnaie,

knowledge of these previous monetary problems, Napoleon III presumed that the gold productivity of the 1850's was an unusual episode which would stabilize after a comparable influx of silver without a major change in the French system.

According to the law of 1803, which remained in effect for seventy years, the silver franc was the monetary unit of France.[14] Although gold coins, valued on a ratio of 15½ ounces of silver to one ounce of gold, were also struck, enabling both metals to be accepted as legal tender, the circulating medium was almost exclusively silver.[15] When this law was passed, the mint ratio

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pp. 35-37, for the differences between the laws of 1785 and 1803. See Cameron, Banking, p. 102, for the concurrent changes in the Bank of France.

[14]New discoveries of silver in Nevada and Colorado created a second monetary crisis in 1873. Piettre, Monnaie, p. 59; André Dargens and Fernand J. Tomiche, L'or et son avenir ([Paris]: Librairie Hachette, 1967), p. 63.

[15]Piettre, Monnaie, p. 35; Dargens and Tomiche, L'or, p. 63; Shaw, Currency, p. 176; Henry Parker Willis, A History of the Latin Monetary Union: A Study of International Monetary Action (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1901), p. 8. There was much debate, primarily during the 1890's, on whether or not a bimetallic system was pragmatically possible. The intricate discussion on this point is not germane to this study. Although White states, "When

of 15½:1 was nearly in accord with the relative market value of silver and gold.[16] From 1820 to 1851, however, until the American and Australian gold entered Europe, gold was more valuable in the market than at the French Mint. As a result of its scarcity, it was hoarded and exported, while large amounts of silver poured into France.[17] Comparatively little gold was coined during this period, and in 1848 only one million francs of the 53 millions possessed by the Bank of France was in

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people talk to me about the double standard I say there is no such thing," he admits, "The only time after the passage of the law of 1803 when a dispute could have arisen touching the legal tender faculty of gold would have been the brief period (about 15 years) when the influx of gold from California and Australia had depressed the market ratio somewhat below 15½." "Bimetallism in France," pp. 336, 329. Also see H. Parker Willis, "The Operation of Bimetallism in France," Journal of Political Economy, III (June, 1895), 356-362, and H. W. Stuart, "A Scarcity of Gold?," Journal of Political Economy, III (June, 1895), 362-365. However, Piettre refers to the French monetary system of this period as either "le système bimétalliste" or "le principe du double étalon," Monnaie, p. 36.

[16]Soetbeer, Edelmetall-Produktion, pp. 130-132; Laughlin, Bimetallism, p. 119.

[17]Michel Chevalier, De la baisse probable de l'or, des conséquences commerciales et sociales qu'elle peut avoir et des mesures qu'elle provoque (Paris: Capelle, 1859), p. 215.

gold.[18] Then, in 1851, the extraordinary production of gold resulted in a complete reversal. Gold deluged France, and silver, now more valuable in the market than at the French Mint, became the metal that was hoarded and exported.[19]

Although it was estimated in the 1840's that France possessed one-third, or even more, of all money metals in Europe,[20] Napoleon began his presidency of the Second French Republic in 1848 with a foretaste of the perplexities that the later gold discoveries would produce on the French monetary system. In 1840, while Louis Napoleon was failing in his attempt to overthrow Louis Philippe, miners were succeeding in their efforts to extract gold from the tundra of Siberia. By 1847 France began

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[18] Rapport de la commission chargée d'étudier la question de l'étalon monétaire (Paris: Ministère des finances, 1869), p. 32.

[19] White, "Bimetallism," p. 333; Enquête sur les principes et les faits généraux qui régissent la circulation monétaire et fiduciaire (6 vols.; Paris Conseil supérieur de l'agriculture, du commerce, et de l'industrie, 1867-1869), VI (1869), 534-535.

[20] The estimation of one-third was made by Léon Faucher who had close business connections with James de Rothschild. Cameron, Banking, p. 117.

to feel the effects of this new gold from Russia.[21] Negligible in comparison to the subsequent Placerville and Bendigo discoveries, the output from these alluvial deposits in the Urals and Siberia increased almost four-fold from 1840 to 1847 and permeated throughout Europe.[22]

During the first decade after Napoleon III came to power, the French coinage system completely reversed. Before 1851 gold formed less than one-fourth of the coinage, while more than three-fourths was silver. In the ensuing ten years, however, the coinage ratio inverted, and more than three-fourths of the coinage was gold, while less than one-fourth was silver.[23]

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[21]Willis, Monetary Union, p. 18.

[22]Del Mar, Precious Metals, p. 389; Cairnes, Political Economy, p. 115; R. G. Hawtrey, The Gold Standard in Theory and Practice (5th ed.; London: Longman's, Green and Co., 1947), p. 47; Clapham, Economic Development, p. 376.

[23]Relevé par année des espèces d'or et d'argent fabriquées en France, enclosures 2 and 3 from Decazes to Lyons, April 10, 1876, Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 3d ser., Vol. 6: Monetary Policy, Currency, "Report on the Depreciation of the Price of Silver," 1876, Appendix, pp. 88-89; Emile Levasseur,

FRENCH COINAGE, 1795-1872

	Gold	Silver
1795-1850	22.5%	77.5%
1851-1872	88.7%	11.3%

This disturbance in the relative production of silver and gold, resulting in a rapid coinage transition, created a startling revolution in French monetary habits.[24] Uncertain about methods to resolve the crisis of the complete change in France's stock of coins, in the early 1850's Adolphe Thiers headed the first government commission to

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La question de l'or (Paris: Guillaumin et c^ie, 1858), p. 105. England, too, was undergoing a monetary problem in 1857. J. R. McCulloch, A Select Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts and Other Publications, on Paper Currency and Banking (London: n.p., 1857), p. xviii; Sir Albert Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling: A History of English Money (2d ed. rev.; Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 292 ff.

[24]Willis, Monetary Union, p. 1. Although an evaluation of prices is superfluous to this study, prices increased after the gold discoveries. Laughlin, Bimetallism, p. 38 ff. An analysis of statistics, causes, and results vary. A summary of the conclusions of the German economists, Sauerbeck, Soetbeer, and Kral, is in Stuart, "Gold," pp. 362-365; and a comparative analysis of the French economists, Gustave Cassel, Charles Rist, and Robert Marjolin is in Piettre, Monnaie, pp. 70-71.

study the monetary situation.[25] By 1852, for the first time since the Restoration, exports of silver actually exceeded imports.[26] This continued through 1864, the year that Maximilian became Emperor of Mexico.

While French economists and financiers struggled with the severe monetary problem, the drain of silver continued. The average annual export of silver significantly increased from 31.3 million francs per year from 1815 to 1847 to 226.8 millions per year from 1848 to 1861, the year France signed the Tripartite Convention with England and Spain to intervene in Mexico. This loss of silver

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[25] Documents relatifs à la question monétaire, Procès-verbaux et rapport de la commission monétaire de 1867 relatifs à la question de l'étalon (Paris, 1868), p. 6.

[26] Enquête sur les principes et les faits généraux qui régissent la circulation monétaire et fiduciaire, VI (1869), 534-535. For the relationship between the monetary circulation and the financial and commercial panic of 1857, see Clément Juglar, Des crises commerciales et de leur retour périodique en France, en Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis (2d ed.; Paris, n.p., 1889).

FRENCH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF GOLD AND SILVER, 1815-1861[27]

(In Millions of Francs)

	Gold				Silver			
	Imports	Exports	Excess		Imports	Exports	Excess	
			Imports	Exports			Imports	Exports
Annual Average 1815-1847:	16.7	20.3	...	3.6	93.5	31.3	62.2	...
Annual Average 1848-1861:	321.6	91.5	230.1	...	23.6	226.8	...	203.2

[27] Enquête sur la circulation monétaire et fiduciaire, VI (1869), 534-535; Hansard's, "Report on the Depreciation of the Price of Silver," Appendix, pp. 86-87.

drastically changed French coinage.[28] In 1854 the Mint produced only 2,123,887 francs in silver, the smallest amount coined since 1795.[29] By 1855 the lack of silver caused great consternation and active discussion about the resultant problems and possible solutions.[30] In 1860, a year before the French intervened in Mexico, the monetary question in France was termed "an imperious dilemma."[31]

There were three alternatives for the French: 1) to retain the status quo, permitting the law of

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[28]From 1848 to 1867, France alone coined forty per cent of the total world production of gold. Cameron, Banking, p. 117. The figures quoted for French coinage in this paper include only the coinage for France.

[29]Hansard's, "Report on the Depreciation of the Price of Silver," Appendix, p. 89. Nine years later, in 1863, the year that the French marched into Mexico City, French silver coinage hit an astonishing low of merely 329,610 francs. Ibid.

[30]Henri Baudrillart, "Des crises monétaires et de la question de l'or," Journal des économistes, 2d series, Vol. VII (July-September, 1855), pp. 360-389.

[31]E. de Parieu, "La question monétaire francaise," Journal des économistes, 2d series, Vol. XXVI (April-June, 1860), 1: see also Rapport de la commission chargée d'étudier la question monétaire. Documents relatifs à la question monétaire (Paris: Ministère des Finances, Enquête de 1858), p. 8.

1803 to continue; 2) to demonetize silver; 3) to demonetize gold. For a variety of reasons, the study of which is outside the scope of this work, the French government chose the first alternative and attempted to maintain a bimetallic standard.[32] Adamant about maintaining a specie standard,[33] monetary authorities were reluctant to introduce a new system in France for fear of making a mistake in the selection of the metal to be demonetized.[34] Asserting that the traditional

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[32]Investigation of a change in the French monetary standard, only theoretically discussed until 1874, is presented by Willis, Latin Monetary Union. Retention of the bimetallic standard is generally explained on the basis of tradition or the belief that this would provide greater stability. See also Piettre, Monnaie, p. 36. Philip S. Bagwell and G. E. Mingay, Britain and America, 1850-1939: A Study of Economic Change (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 137.

[33]Cameron, Banking, p. 117. This continued into the twentieth century, as exhibited by Charles de Gaulle in the 1960's. The French economist Charles Rist scathingly condemned Lord Keynes' lack of respect for specie. Charles Rist, The Triumph of Gold, trans. from the French edition, entitled La defense de l'or, by Philip Cortney (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1961), p. 191.

[34]R. de Fontenay, "La question monetaire," Journal des economistes, 2d series, Vol. XXVI (April-June, 1860), 398 et seq.; Parieu, "La question monetaire francaise," ibid., 2 et seq.; Rapport de la commission chargee d'etudier la question monetaire, 1858, pp. 39 et seq.

monetary policy had rendered great service, they predicted that it would continue to meet future commercial needs.[35]

Both the Bank and the haute banque were important defenders of the monetary standard established in 1803 and, for both political and military reasons, there was obviously a strong entente cordiale between Napoleon III and the Bank of France.[36] For the only time from the Restoration to the end of the nineteenth century, the metallic reserve in the Bank decreased considerably, over 178 million francs from 1852 to 1861.[37] Trying

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[35] Conférence monétaire internationale entre la Belgique, la France, l'Italie, et la Suisse, Procès-verbaux, 1865, Séance I, pp. 22-23, cited by Willis, Monetary Union, p. 45.

[36] A. Soetbeer, Materialien zur Erklärung und Beurtheilung der wirthschaftlichen Edelmetallverhaltnisse und der währungsfrage, p. 29, cited by Willis, Monetary Union, p. 58; Laughlin, Bimetallism, p. 148. Also see Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, publiée par l'ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III (32 vols.; Paris, 1858-1870), XVII, pp. 497-500, on the Bank of France, reprinted in S. Pollard and C. Holmes, eds., Documents of European Economic History. Vol. I: The Process of Industrialization, 1750-1870, ([London]: Edward Arnold, [1968]), pp. 455-456.

[37] Rondo Cameron, France and the Economic Development of Europe, 1800-1914: Conquests of Peace

to retain specie reserves as a guarantee of note liabilities, the Bank desperately and publicly offered a premium for silver bullion over the Mint ratio.[38] In spite of these difficulties M. Rouland, governor of the Bank of France, insisted that both gold and silver were still necessary in the monetary circulation. The Bank's regents supported him. M. le Baron de Rothschild queried, "How would it be possible to demonetize a sum of 15 or 16 hundred millions of silver. . . . Could one find gold to fill the vacancy?"[39] As the government of Napoleon III labored with the violent changes then occurring in the international monetary system,[40] the Bank exerted

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and Seeds of War (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961

[38]White, "Bimetallism," p. 334. As the specie reserves of the Bank of France rarely fell below 80 per cent of its note liabilities, the Bank itself was the greatest "hoarder" of metal. Cameron, Banking, p. 119.

[39]Enquête sur la question monétaire Décembre 1869-Août 1871 (Paris: Conseil supérieur de l'agriculture, du commerce, et de l'industrie, 1872), pp. 68, 110-111, 124.

[40]Henri Baudrillart, "Chronique économique," Journal des économistes, 2d series, XII (October-December, 1856), pp. 474 et seq.

influence on commissions and decisions.[41] In consultations between French finance ministers and Bank officers, the Bank's recommendations were uniformly followed, activating animated debates.[42]

The scarcity of small silver coin, not the selection of a particular monetary standard, stimulated demands for government action. As silver was indispensable for daily transactions, its disappearance had a paralyzing effect on the economy. In 1858 a commission, one of many appointed to resolve the predicament, summarized the major problems: 1) the most important disadvantage to the treasury was the considerable expense of buying silver for additional coinage, 2) a reserve composed of gold

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[41] Willis, Monetary Union, p. 58. During the 1848 crisis the Bank, with government authorization, continued as the sole source of paper currency. After the establishment of the Second Empire, however, the Bank's "stranglehold" on some aspects of the French financial system was temporarily broken. Cameron, Banking, pp. 104-105, 109, 127.

[42] See Levasseur, La question de l'or, supportive of a gold standard; Chevalier, De la baisse probable de l'or, favorable to a silver standard; and Louis Lfrancois Michel Raymond Wolowski, L'or et l'argent (Paris: Guillaumin et cie, 1870), for continuation of bimetallism.

instead of silver constituted a danger to the Bank, as the greater portability of gold caused easier withdrawals that might result in serious fluctuations in the Bank's reserve and in the rate of discount, and 3) the disappearance of silver caused commercial difficulties because of the necessity of buying silver ingots at a premium for use in the trade with the East.[43] The commission ineffectively recommended that a high tariff be placed upon the export of silver and that money speculators be rigidly controlled. This failed to solve the French monetary problem which required more extreme action.[44] Obviously, additional silver in substantial amounts was necessary to maintain either a silver or a bimetallic standard which influential French economists and financiers preferred.

Both Belgium, whose King was Maximilian's father-in-law, and Switzerland, the homeland of J. B. Jecker, were peripherally involved in the Mexican

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[43] Rapport de la commission chargee d'etudier la question monetaire, 1858, pp. 23-28. Hawtrey, Gold Standard, p. 65.

[44] Enquete sur la question monetaire, I (1872), 12-13.

intervention; both of these countries had monetary crises similar to, and sometimes exceeding, those of France. In 1832, after acquiring independence from Holland, Belgium adopted the French coinage system.[45] Due to geographic position, conflicting monetary standards staggered Belgium, which lay between France, with its dilemma, England,

> where gold is in law and fact the sole standard, Holland where silver is in law and fact also the sole monetary metal, and Germany where silver is the sole legal standard, but where gold nevertheless obtains a very important effective circulation.[46]

For Belgium the lack of silver created agonizing hardships, as well as bitterness towards France. From 1854, when Belgian silver coinage ceased,

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[45]U. S. Congress, Senate, Senate Reports, Vol. 5, Part I, Report of the United States Monetary Commission, 1876, 44th Cong., 2d sess., Ser. Set 1738, Appendix, p. 144. From 1847 to 1850, Belgium tried to operate independently of France by attempting to secure a gold currency. Holland demonetized gold in 1847 and the Russian gold entering France that same year displaced silver. The subsequent reduction of French silver coinage forced Belgium, for three years, to rely on her own mint for subsidiary coin instead of on the French mint.

[46]Speech delivered by M. Kreglinger at the opening session of the first convention of the Latin Monetary Union, December 23, 1865, cited by Willis, Monetary Union, p. 24.

to 1865, Belgium relied totally on the French Mint for silver, as this was less costly than operating her own Mint.[47] In 1854, the first year that the Belgians minted no silver, the French minted only 2,123,887 francs,--as has been noted above,--the lowest amount of silver coined since 1795. Monetary problems mounted as silver was hoarded and exported by speculators who collected the newer, less worn coins.[48] Desperate for silver coins, Belgian imports of precious metals from France jumped from six million francs in 1850 to seventy-eight million

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[47]From 1854 to 1865 there was no Belgian silver coined except for the negligible total in 1858 of 263,560 francs: 90,510 five-franc pieces and 173,050 twenty centimes. Hansard's, "Report on the Depreciation of the Price of Silver," Appendix, pp. 86-91. See Hawtrey, Gold Standard, p. 80, on the high cost of coinage.

[48]The better part of the Belgian silver circulation was profitably exchanged for worn French coins, much of which had lost 8 per cent of its value by wear. The heavier Belgian coin was then melted and exported to the two major silver standard countries, Holland and Germany. M. J. Malou Documents relatifs a la question monetaire (Bruxelles, 1874), pp. 176-177; Rapport depose par M. le Ministre des Finances a la chambre des representants, Seance du 20 Aout, 1859, Question monetaire, No. 18.

francs in 1859.[49] In spite of this, the monetary situation became still more critical. The increasing premium on silver caused even the worn coins to disappear, and the severe lack of an adequate currency constituted an emergency. This touched off intense debates in Brussels over what compensating measures were required and finally the Belgian Minister of Finance, the liberal Frère-Orban, resigned on June 4, 1861.[50] This air of crisis also prevailed when the French Foreign Minister received the request for forces to be sent to silver-rich Mexico.[51]

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[49] 76.3 of the 78 millions were silver. Malou, Documents relatifs a la question monetaire, pp. 176-177.

[50] The scarcity of small coins was a serious impediment to business and trade; the reserves of the Banque Nationale were depleted, first of gold and then of silver and sometimes of both; and the rate of discount fluctuated between the extreme limits of 3 and 6 per cent from a normal rate of 2.5-3%. Hansard's, "Report on the Depreciation of the Price of Silver," Appendix, pp. 102-106.

[51] Alphonse Dubois de Saligny, French Minister to Mexico, to Antoine Edouard Thouvenel, Mexico City, April 28, 1861, reprinted in Carl H. Bock, Prelude to Tragedy: The Negotiation and Breakdown of the Tripartite Convention of London, October 31, 1861 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), pp. 123, 642. Thouvenel received Saligny's request on May 29, 1861.

Switzerland, homeland of the banker J. B. Jecker, who served as a pretext for French intervention in Mexico, had monetary difficulties similar to France and Belgium. By the Bundesverfassung of 1848, coinage was placed under the control of the central government, and in May, 1850, it instituted the French monetary system, as established by the law of 1803.[52] Then French gold began to replace Swiss silver, and by 1855 silver coins were extremely scarce. Public discussion became spirited, and in 1859 the Bundesrath acknowledged the "urgency of circumstances."[53] The fineness in silver coinage was decreased in January, 1860, but these coins were imported into France and Belgium, where they profitably displaced the old coins which were then melted and exported.[54] Despite attempted solutions,

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[52]Willis, Monetary Union, p. 26.

[53]A. E. Cherbuliez, "La question monétaire en Suisse," Journal des économistes, 2d series, XXV (January-March, 1860), pp. 40-42.

[54]J. E. Horn, "La crise monetaire," Journal des économistes (July-September, 1861), pp. 11-12; Laughlin, Bimetallism, pp. 147-160. From early 1860 to the end of 1863 a total of 10.5 million francs, in one-franc and two-franc pieces, were struck, the same

Switzerland, like France and Belgium, continued to suffer from a great lack of silver currency.

The scarcity of coins and the reduced bank reserves were only one facet of the French need for silver. Textiles were France's most important industry, and the shortage of cotton during the American Civil War caused serious repercussions.[55] Although there was some discussion of Mexican cotton,[56] France turned to India for speedy supplies. India, however, inconveniently demanded payment in silver.[57]

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in weight and appearance as the French and Belgian, although containing ten per cent less fine silver. Hansard's, "Report on the Depreciation of the Price of Silver," Appendix, pp. 102-106.

[55]Robert Lévy, Histoire économique de l'industrie cotonnière en Alsace: étude de sociologie descriptive (Paris: Alcan, 1912), p. 168; Louis Reybaud, Le coton: son régime, ses problèmes--son influence en Europe (Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1863), Appendix, pp. 412-438. Raw cotton consumption, increasing five-fold from 1815-1845, had expanded still more rapidly in the 1850's. Cameron, Banking, p. 113.

[56]Earl S. Pomeroy, "French Substitutes for American Cotton, 1861-1865," Journal of Southern History, IX (November, 1943), 557. Also see Owsley, Cotton Diplomacy, p. 529.

[57]Karl Ellstaetter, The Indian Silver Currency: An Historical and Economic Study, trans.

Napoleon acutely needed silver in 1861, as he then faced severe economic and employment problems in addition to the monetary distress. In addition to the impact of the American Civil War on the textile indsutry, the war virtually crippled the French export industry.[58] Suffering first from the loss of the American market, the export trade reeled further as other European countries, similarly affected by decreased exports and, subsequently, by the lack of cotton, also bought fewer luxury goods.[59] Even before "the American crisis"

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by J. Laurence Laughlin (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1895); Piettre, Monnaie, p. 59.

[58]For import-export statistics, see Henry Blumenthal, A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations, 1830-1871 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959), pp. 102-109; Historical Statistics of the United States, From Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 553. French imports from America were primarily cotton and tobacco. Clement Juglar, Des crises commerciales et de leur retour periodique en France, en Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis (2d ed.; Paris: Guillaumin et cie, 1889), pp. 17, 279.

[59]Lynn M. Case, French Opinion on the United States and Mexico, 1860-1867: Extracts from the Reports of the Procureurs Generaux (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company Incorporated, 1936), pp. 10-45, 101, 109, 111, 121,139.

exploded in April, 1861, France felt repercussions from the highly protective Morrill tariff and from the heightening tensions between the North and the South that resulted in reductions of French exports.[60]

The lack of cotton had a widening impact on the French economy: as factories and related industries closed down, both the price of cotton goods and unemployment increased.[61] The Emperor was particularly concerned about unemployment. In an audience with Richard Cobden in 1859, Napoleon expressed caution about commercial changes and cryptically observed that "Nous ne faisons pas de

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[60]The Morrill tariff was introduced by the United States in 1861. For French reaction, see J. E. Horn, "Bulletin financier de l'etranger," Journal des economistes, 2d ser., XXXV (July-September, 1862), p. 325. p. 325.

[61]Although estimates on unemployment vary from 275,000 to 400,000, imperial censorship forbade the press to mention unemployment and industrial discontent. London Times, January 8, 1863, p. 10; January 13, 1863, p. 6. Also see Claude Fohlen "Crise textile et troubles sociaux: le Nord a la fin du Second Empire," Revue du Nord (1953), 107-123; Fohlen, L'industrie textile au temps du Second Empire, pp. 151-249; Owsley, Cotton Diplomacy, p. 152; W. O. Henderson, The Lancashire Cotton Famine, 1861-1865 (Manchester: University Press, 1934), p. 196.

reformes en France; nous ne faisons que des revolutions."[62] Unfortunately, the Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of January, 1860, was untimely implemented in October, 1861, when the effects of the cotton famine were being felt in France.[63] Napoleon did not dare oppose organized cotton manufacturers, and he urgently wanted to minimize the distress to this important industry.[64]

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[62]Cobden to Lord Palmerston, October 29, 1859, Cobden Papers, cited by Arthur Louis Dunham, The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress of the Industrial Revolution in France (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1930), p. 58. See Case and Spencer, Civil War Diplomacy, p. 592 for an analysis of Napoleon's concern about revolution due to economic distress.

[63]To give the French cotton industry time to prepare for British competition, and also because the French Government, in 1856, promised not to remove prohibitions in the tariff for five years, the treaty's provisions on cotton did not take effect until October, 1861, according to clause five of article sicteen. Ibid., pp. 192-193; Napoleon III to Finance Minister Fould, January 5, 1860, reprinted in Pollard and Holmes, eds., Documents of European Economic History, I, 384-386; Frank Arnold Haight, A History of French Commercial Policies (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 32. For text of treaty, see either Dunham, Anglo-French Treaty, Appendix, pp. 369-371, or Pollard and Holmes, European Economic History, pp. 389-395. See also, Piettre, Monnaie, pp. 105-109.

[64]Reybaud, Le coton, p. 419; Dunham, Anglo-French Treaty, p. 185.

When the Northern blockade was proclaimed in April, 1861, Henri Mercier, French ambassador to the United States, expressed grave concern about France's winter supply of raw cotton.[65] Although a previous French surplus and the accelerated imports of American cotton from 1860 to the outbreak of the Civil War initially enabled most cotton manufacturers to continue operations, by the fall of 1861 the government was besieged with complaints and petitions from commercial centers.[66] Twenty-seven days before the Tripartite Treaty for intervention in Mexico, the French Foreign Minister, Edouard Thouvenel, expressed anxiety about France's cloth production,

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[65]Mercier to Thouvenel, Washington, May 6, 1861, cited by Lynn M. Case and Warren F. Spencer, The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), p. 135.

[66]Figures for 1860 and 1861 are somewhat deceptive due to abnormally large American crops in 1859 and 1860 that were purchased in anticipation of a disturbance of supply from America. London Economist, November 2, 1861; M. B. Hammond, The Cotton Industry, Publications of the American Economic Association (New York: Macmillan Co., 1897), p. 258; Dunham, Anglo-French Treaty, p. 194; Fohlen, L'industrie textile, pp. 284-286; Owsley, Cotton Diplomacy, 134-36.

"worth 700 million francs," which was seriously endangered by the lack of the "indispensable cotton."[67]

In 1861 the French need for silver became more grave as, in addition to monetary problems, exports markedly declined and an urgency for raw cotton demanded its importation from silver-consuming countries. During this same yeaar, France began taking more strident steps in Mexico, the world's major silver producer.

French economic and unemployment problems increased when both imports of cotton and cotton stock in warehouses fell alarmingly from 1861 to 1862.[68] While scattered areas showed some resiliency, others were confronted with serious unemployment by the end of 1861. In eastern Normandy, over forty per cent of the workers involved in spinning

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[67]Thouvenel to Mercier, Paris, Oct. 3, 1861, cited by Case and Spencer, Civil War Diplomacy, pp. 170-171; also see October 1861 reports of the procureurs general, Case, U. S. and Mexico, pp. 17-26.

[68]Imported cotton dropped from 624,600 bales in 1861 to 271,570 bales in 1862. Cotton stock decreased in the same period from 140,345 bales to 59,193 bales. Dunham, Anglo-French Treaty, p. 193. See Appendix.

and hand weaving in the important region of Rouen were unemployed.[69] The cotton crisis touched off a world-wide economic crisis. French export industries suffered distress as unemployment spread. By the winter of 1861-1862, fifty-five per cent of clock and watch workers in the Rouen area were out of work, while the Limoges china industry reduced production fifty per cent.[70]

Frantically trying to find relief for these problems, the Emperor, the Foreign Minister, and French bankers pressured Union diplomats. In March, 1862, Napoleon urged William L. Dayton, United States Minister to France, to do "something" to "relieve the difficulties here, growing out of the want of cotton."[71] Thouvenel instructed Mercier about the serious manufacturing problems due to the lack of cotton, and he then sternly told Henry Sanford, United States Minister in Brussels, "We are nearly out of cotton, and cotton we must

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[69]Reports of the procureurs generaux, January, 1862, reprinted in Case, United States and Mexico, pp. 26-45.

[70]July and October, 1861, and January, 1862, reports, reprinted in ibid., pp. 13-45.

[71]Dayton to Seward, Paris, March 25, 1862, cited by Case and Spencer, United States and France, p. 289.

have."[72] Baron Jacob Rothschild, directly confronting Sanford, stated that the lack of American cotton had caused a "convulsion" in France, and ambigously added, "When your patient is desperately sick, you try desperate remedies, even to blood-letting."[73] In Napoleon's July 3, 1862, letter to General Elie Frederic Forey, Commander of French forces in Mexico, the Emperor protested both United States domination of Latin America and the adverse effects on France of the United States' posture as "the sole distributor of the products of the New World." Plagued by gold and cotton problems emanating from the United States, Napoleon was protesting the dependency and helplessness of France.[74]

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[72]Thouvenel to Mercier, March 13, 1862, cited by Ephraim Douglass Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War (New York: Russell & Russell, 1958), p. 279. Sanford to Seward, April 10, 1862 (r. April 25), cited by Case and Spencer, United States and France, p. 290.

[73]Sanford to Seward, Paris, April 10, 1862 (r. April 25), cited by ibid.

[74]Napoleon III to General Forey, July 3, 1862, V, reprinted in Genaro Garcia, ed., Coleccion de documentos ineditos o muy raros para la historia de Mexico (30 vols.; Mexico: Libreria de la Vda. de Ch. Bouret, 1908-1910), XIV, 13-15.

From July to October, 1862, the impact of the American Civil War on French cotton and export industries became more intense.[75] The new Foreign Minister, Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys, who replaced Thouvenel in October, 1862, lamented the "crisis which is preventing the growth of one of the most fertile sources of public wealth and which is becoming, for the great centers of labor, the cause of a most painful situation."[76] The last months of 1862 and the first half of 1863 were the most severe period of the cotton crisis.[77] By 1862 the weekly average consumption of cotton dropped to about one-half of the 1861 amount, causing cotton prices to be often higher than wool and linen.[78]

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[75]Economic reports of the procureurs generaux, July-October, 1862, reprinted in Case, United States and Mexico, pp. 70-100.

[76]Drouyn de Lhuys to French ambassadors in St. Petersburg and London, Paris, October 30, 1862, printed in Le Moniteur, November 13, 1862.

[77]Fohlen, L'industrie textile, p. 255; Dunham, Anglo-French Treaty, p. 198.

[78]Consumption of cotton dropped from 11,114 bales in 1861 to 5,981 bales in 1862. The average weekly consumption then increased in 1863 to nearly 7,000 bales a week and, in 1864, French consumption

By April, 1863, the total number of unemployed Frenchmen was approximately 223,336, affecting the lives of an estimated 670,000 persons.[79] Aware of potential unrest, the Emperor instigated and accelerated public work projects to relieve unemployed workers.[80] It was clear, however, that France urgently needed silver to purchase cotton from India. At this time of greatest unemployment, the French Foreign Minister ambiguously told the United States Minister to France that Napoleon did not intend to take Sonora--permanently.[81]

Both England and France reluctantly turned to silver-standard India for cotton.[82] Although

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of cotton was nearly 8,000 bales weekly, about three-fourths of the 1861 amount. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, pp. 152-153; Fohlen, L'industrie textile, pp. 253-254.

[79]Fohlen, L'industrie textile, pp. 265-267.

[80]Ibid., p. 272; David H. Pinkney, Napoleon III and the Rebuilding of Paris (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 37; Dunham, Anglo-French Treaty, pp. 155-160.

[81]Dayton to Seward, Paris, April 24, 1863, excerpts reprinted in Case and Spencer, United States and France, pp. 519-520.

[82]For the conflict between England and India over India's troublesome silver standard, see Hawtry, Gold Standard, pp. 77-78.

French firms made substantial investments in Egypt, Algeria, West Africa, and Turkey before and during the cotton famine, India provided the major source of cotton.[83] However, a year's delay was necessary before the production of Indian cotton could be adequately increased, and raw cotton from India did not begin to arrive in France until 1862.[84] Even when it did arrive, there were many problems: in quality, Indian cotton had a shorter staple, many impurities, and produced yarn that caused threads to break more easily.[85] These complications forced cotton manufacturers, laboriously and expensively, to adapt their machinery to Indian cotton.[86]

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[83]Pomeroy, "French Substitutes for American Cotton," p. 557; Dunham, Anglo-French Treaty, p. 166.

[84]Although imports had increased from 271,570 bales in 1862 to 381,539 by the end of 1863, the total French stock fell from 59,193 bales in 1862 to 32,852 in 1863. Ibid., pp. 193, 198-199.

[85]Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, p. 5, citing The London Economist, April 13, 1861.

[86]Dunham, Anglo-French Treaty, pp. 155-156.

Although Michel Chevalier advocated, and the French government implemented, substantial loans to aid cotton manufacturers in this situation, the complicated change of machinery caused many small mills to go bankrupt.[87]

While Napoleon struggled with these monetary, manufacturing, and employment problems, French exports of silver continued.[88] India, having demonetized gold in 1850, absorbed vast quantities of silver.[89] From 1852 through 1864 France exported over 1½ billion francs of silver,[90] and the additional strain of a new cotton source placed the Emperor in a difficult position. In May, 1864, the Corps legislatif, in response to popular outcry against the lack of specie, passed a law to reduce the amount

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[87] Ibid., pp. 153 ff., 199, 201, 210; Clapham, Economic Development of France and Germany, p. 246.

[88] Enquete sur la circulation monetaire, VI, (1869), 534-535.

[89] Ellstaetter, Indian Silver Currency; Laughlin, History of Bimetallism, pp. 122-134, 218.

[90] 1,727 million francs, or over $345 million. Enquete sur la circulation monetaire, VI (1869), 534-535.

of silver in the 50-centimes and 20-centimes coins. Contrary to hopeful expectations, this failed to rectify the silver shortage. As soon as small coins were minted, speculators absorbed them and, evading the new restrictive laws, continued their profitable manipulations. In the earlier part of 1865 Belgium, more severely affected than the other three countries, due to her retention of the old silver fineness, proposed that a joint monetary conference be held. France, Switzerland and Italy readily accepted the invitation, and the Latin Monetary Union was formed. France considered the lack of silver subsidiary coinage the major issue, and it was this, not a change in the monetary standard, that was most heatedly debated.[91] French imports of Mexican bullion and specie more than doubled from 1861 to 1862, and doubled again from 1862 to 1863. Even with greatly augmented silver supplies, France's need was so great that its monetary problems did not lessen significantly until 1865. In that year, for the first time since Napoleon III became Emperor, France

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[91]Willis, Latin Monetary Union, pp. 41, 43, 47.

imported more silver than was exported.[92] Widely criticized for his policies in Mexico, he was supported by those who anticipated that the French would increase Mexican mining productivity, restore the balance between silver and gold, and stop the escalating price of silver.[93]

Mexico's wealth of silver and France's dearth of this metal coincided with a period of vulnerability for both countries. A major diplomatic and military decision, such as the French intervention in Mexico, is generally formulated over a period of years. Between 1852 and 1854 Napoleon

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[92] Hansard's, "Report on the Depreciation of Silver," Appendix, pp. 708, 86-87. The British did not regain their predominance of Mexican silver shipments to Europe until the end of the Second Empire. The United States, whose receipt of Mexican metals was reduced more than one-half during the French intervention, regained its preferential status in 1867.

[93] "The Empire of Mexico," Quarterly Review, Vol. 115 (April, 1864), p. 361; Patterson, "The Napoleonic Idea in Mexico," pp. 72, 82. For silver prices, see "Ratio of Silver to Gold," computed monthly from 1845 to 1880 by Dr. O. J. Broch, "French Report on Conference of 1881," reprinted in Laughlin, History of Bimetallism, Appendix II, p. 225.

was alerted to the silver of Sonora by the exploits of an adventurous French Count. Alexander von Humboldt had allegedly predicted that Sonora's mineral wealth would restore the world's balance between gold and silver.[94] Count Gaston Raoul de Raousset-Boulbon, with only two hundred Frenchmen, proved that Sonora was extremely vulnerable.

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[94]Mowry, Arizona and Sonora, p. 54. See La Gorce, Histoire du second empire, IV, p. 14, for Humboldt's influence on Napoleon III; also, Journal de la société des Americanistes de Paris, New Series (10 vols.; Paris: Au siège de la société, 1903-1913), X, pp. 285-286.

CHAPTER IV

FRENCH EXPEDITIONS TO SONORA, 1851-1854

During the early 1850's, while Napoleon III worried about both the Eastern Question and domestic problems, several Frenchmen led expeditions to obtain Mexican mineral wealth. After the discovery of gold in California, it seemed logical that the mountains yielding wealth there would do the same in their extension into Mexico.

The reported wealth of silver in Sonora and the French need for this metal were complemented by Sonora's perilous position.[1] Mexico's borders receded drastically as the United States acquired about half of Mexico's national domain when the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed on February 2,

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[1]One of the most isolated states of Mexico, Sonora's major towns, developed from missions and presidios, were Ures, the capital; Hermosillo, the largest town with a population in the 1850's of about 12,000; Arizpe, military headquarters and former capital; Guaymas, the only important port; and Alamos, the mining center of southern Sonora.

1848 in Querétaro. Less than two weeks earlier, gold had been discovered in California, and adventurous men rapidly descended on this area north-west of Sonora. For many, as dreams of wealth and power there disintegrated, frustration and hope turned them towards the fabled wealth of northern Mexico.[2] In the 1850's, Sonora resembled California in the 1840's: both had mineral wealth, factional governments, and lack of protection from the central government. Uneasy because of the recent metamorphosis of California from a province of Mexico to a possession of the United States, within five years after the arrival of

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[2]Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 673-75; 720-721. The heading, "Expected Invaders from California," a warning from Manuel Brenas, Prefect of Alamos, to José de Aguilar, Governor of Sonora, April 9, 1851, is typical of the alarms in Sonora during this era. El Sonorense, May 30, 1851; September 5, 1851; November 7, 1851, Alphonse Pinart, Documents for the History of Sonora: Extracts from Manuscripts and Printed Matter in the Collection of Mons. Alphonse Pinart (MSS, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California, Mexican MSS, Nos. 286-292), V, 312; 334; 342. The Pinart Collection will be cited hereinafter as Pinart Transcripts, Sonora.

the first group of settlers from the United States, Sonora braced itself.[3]

The first attempt to invade Sonora was led by Joseph C. Morehead, former quartermaster-general of California, who left San Francisco in April of 1851. Supposedly invited to Mexico by citizens in Sonora and Baja California who wanted to be either independent or annexed to the United States, these filibusters reached Mazatlan about the end of May. Although Morehead's goals remain obscure and his expedition simply dissolved, his activities alerted Mexicans, Americans and Frenchmen that further portions of Mexico might be available to those with sounder plans and greater perseverence.[4]

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[3]For a dramatic recitation of Sonora's problems during the early 1850's, see Governor Aguilar's "Proclamation to Sonora," Ures, July 11, 1856, Mexico City, Integridad Nacional, July 18, 1856, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 313-315; 318-319.

[4]Bancroft, History of California, VI, 584; Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 721; J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1931), pp. 87-88; "Monthly Record of Current Events," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, XIX (December, 1851), 124; Joseph Allen Stout, Jr., The Liberators: Filibustering Expeditions into

In addition to the presence of a massive collection of ambitious men just north of its border, the 1850's were grim years for Sonora. The Apaches were as restless as the Argonauts, and their sporadic thrusts occurred at a particularly inopportune time, as Mexicans were staggered by their defeat in the recent war with the United States.[5] Many citizens of Sonora, ironically ignoring their own land's wealth, were lured north by Californian gold, and this exodus drained the militia needed to check the Apache raids.[6] Quarrelsome political factions created destructive civil strife, and Sonora's distressed appeals for military aid from

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Mexico, 1848-1862 (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1973), p. 46.

[5]Bancroft, History of Mexico, 1824-1861, V, 576-580; John Russell Bartlett, Personal Narrative of Explorations and Incidents in Texas, New Mexico, California, Sonora, and Chihuahua (2 vols.: New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1854), II, 385; Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 670.

[6]Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 670-71; Bartlett, Personal Narrative, II, 302; Bancroft, California, VI, 113.

the national government, preoccupied with other problems, were largely ignored.[7]

Although officials in both Sonora and Mexico City viewed colonists favorably, provided they were not from the United States, they were financially unable to support Mexican military colonies that could have eased their problems. Using European colonists to stabilize Sonora's frontiers might ward off the two greatest threats: Apaches and Anglo-Americans. European immigrants were likely to be attracted by Sonora's mineral wealth rather than altruistic aims of safeguarding Mexico. This misunderstanding over basic objectives later caused countless disputes. Nevertheless, Mexico appealed to the nearest source of European immigrants, disillusioned gold-seekers in California.[8] The ones who responded were primarily French. Within

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[7]Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 655-664; 671-72.

[8]Mariano Paredes, Proyectos de leyes sobre colonizacion y comercio en el estado de Sonora, presentados a la Camara de Diputados, por el representante de aquel estado, en la sesion extraordinario del dia 16 de Agosto de 1850 (Mexico, D. F.: Imprenta de I. Cumplido, 1850), For a translation of Paredes, see Odie B. Faulk, ed., "A Colonization Plan

the six month period from November, 1851 , to May, 1852, coinciding with the transition in France from the Republic to the Empire, three separate French expeditions left San Francisco for Sonora.

Stimulated by the abortive Morehead attempt in 1851, the Mexican vice-consul at San Francisco, William Schleiden, enlisted Charles de Pindray, a thirty-five-year-old French nobleman, to establish a European frontier colony in Sonora.[9] Pindray had arrived in Massachusetts in 1846 and then had journeyed on three years later to California, where he unsuccessfully tried to find gold.[10] Patrice

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for Northern Sonora, 1850," New Mexico Historical Review, XLIV (October, 1969), pp. 293-314; Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 744; Bancroft, California, VI, 407.

[9]Pindray's title is given both as Count and Marquis; Mexican documents generally refer to him as Count. Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, pp. 207-209; Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon, pp. 52-55; Henri de la Madelene, Le comte Gaston de Raousset-Boulbon: sa vie et ses aventures d'apres ses papiers et sa correspondance (Paris: Charpentier, 1876), p. 53.

[10]Horacio Sobarzo, Cronica de la aventura de Raousset-Boulbon en Sonora (Mexico, D. F.: Libreria de Manuel Porrua, S. A., 1954), pp. 43-52; Maurice Soulie, The Wolf Cub: The Great Adventure of Count Gaston de Raousset-Boulbon in California and Sonora, 1850-1854, trans. by Ferrel Symons (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1927), pp. 80-89.

Dillon, the French counsul in San Francisco, encouraged his countrymen to join the expedition and, with promises of a favorable reception, Pindray and eighty-eight Frenchmen left California for Sonora on November 21, 1851, aboard the Cumberland.[11] During the same month that Louis Napoleon effected his coup d'état, December, 1851 they landed at Guaymas. Mexican officials granted them, and more than sixty others who later joined the group, three leagues of land near the deserted mission at Cocóspera in northern Sonora.[12] After a tedious trip, they reached their destination in March, 1852. Harrassed by Apaches, the French were annoyed by the lack of further Mexican support.[13] As disillusioned members of the

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[11]Rufus Kay Wyllys, The French in Sonora, 1850-1854: The Story of French Adventurers from California into Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932), p. 71; Lambertie, Le drame de la Sonora, pp. 207-210.

[12]Ibid., p. 209.

[13]Appeal to Sonoran government for help from Charles de Pindray, Chief of the French Colony of Cocóspera, April 4, 1852, Ures, El Sonorense, May 14, 1852, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 11. Blanco to the State and to the Governor of Sonora, Arispe,

expedition began to abandon Pindray and Mexico, the French nobleman despairingly went to Ures, more than half the way back to Guaymas, in a futile effort to get Mexican aid for his floundering colony.[14] On his return trip to Cocóspera, while spending the night at Rayón on June 5, 1852, Pindray was mysteriously shot--whether by himself, by his disgruntled compatriots or by disaffected Mexicans, it is not known.[15]

French diplomats in Mexico clearly vacillated in their support of Pindray. André Levasseur, the French Minister to Mexico, initially encouraged this first French expedition. In January, 1852, he and General Miguel Blanco, commandant general of Sonora, even talked of employing Pindray to explore the mineral resources of their mutual interest, the

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May, 1852, El Sonorense, June 11, 1852, ibid., V. 28.

[14]Sobarzo, Crónica de la aventura, pp. 52-53.

[15]Lachapelle believes by one of his own men, Vigneaux thinks by Mexican officials, Saint Amant concludes the death was a suicide, and Madelene simply states, "Un mystère." See Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 676, and Lachapelle, Raousset-Boulbon, pp. 64-65, for various theories.

Compañía Restauradora de la Mina de la Arizona.[16] The following month the French Minister indicated to José Calvo, the French vice-counsul at Guaymas, that Pindray could help explore and take possession of the Arizona mine. In this February letter Levasseur informed Calvo of dispatches he had received from Paris, instructing him to attract Frenchmen in California to Sonora.[17] However, this enthusiasm and support quickly waned after the arrival in Mexico City, in March, 1852, of Pindray's rival, Count Gaston Raoul de Raousset-Boulbon. In April Levasseur wrote Calvo that Pindray's reputation was questionable and that the expedition was "only a feeble advance guard . . . of a considerable body of French emigrants." Switching his support from Pindray to Raousset-Boulbon, he urged the French

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[16]Blanco to Raousset-Boulbon, September 24, 1852, El Sonorense, October 22, 1852, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V. 98.

[17]Levasseur to Calvo, February 28, 1852, reprinted in Wyllys, French in Sonora, Appendix B, pp. 249-250.

vice-counsul to do likewise.[18] Blanco, Levasseur's mining partner in Sonora, then withheld additional Mexican support for the struggling Pindray group.[19] In spite of the clash between the two French counts, Oliver de Lachapelle, Pindray's lieutenant and subsequent leader of the dwindling colonists, joined with Pindray's antagonist, Raousset-Boulbon, in September, 1852.[20]

A second French expedition to Sonora was arranged by Lepine de Sigondis, agent of a company promoted in Paris by Pierre Charles de Saint-Amant, the French consular agent at Sacramento. Little

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[18]Levasseur to Calvo, April 19, 1852, reprinted in ibid., pp. 250-253.

[19]Blanco to Raousset-Boulbon, Arispe, September 24, 1852, in El Sonorense, October 22, 1852, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 98. Blanco reminded Raousset-Boulbon that he was responsible for the unfavorable reports concerning Pindray.

[20]Luis Redondo, Prefect of Guadalupe, to Cubillas, September 18, 1852, Ures, El Sonorense, October 1, 1852, ibid., V, 71; Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon, p. 66. The author, Alfred Lachapelle, was the brother of the leader, Oliver, who joined Raousset-Boulbon in September, 1852.

is known of this French mining colony. Its sixty to eighty men left San Francisco in March, 1852, the same month that Pindray reached Cocospera and Raousset-Boulbon arrived in Mexico City, T. P. Sainte-Marie, later French vice-counsul at Acapulco, commanded this group. The colonists landed at Guaymas on April 5, but they, like the Pindray force, dwindled and either returned to California or joined the third French expedition.[21]

Raousset-Boulbon was particularly persistent and, organizing the third French group in 1852, he came very close to conquering Sonora. He had arrived in San Francisco on August 22, 1850. Failing to find wealth there, and encouraged by the French Consul, he left for Mexico less than eighteen months later.[22] Raousset-Boulbon differed

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[21]Wyllys, French in Sonora, pp. 64-67. Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico (San Francisco: The History Company, Publishers, 1889), p. 476, n.

[22]The name of the family is said to have been changed in 1793 from Bourbon to Boulbon, giving rise to the legend that Count Gaston was a natural son of a Bourbon prince. Wyllys, French in Sonora, pp. 68, 71.

significantly from Charles de Pindray and Lepine de Sigondis. Instead of striking out directly for Sonora, he first secured political, financial, and diplomatic backing. Leaving San Francisco on February 17, 1852, for Mexico City, he strategically obtained permission and grants in Sonora from the central government. With the help of the French Minister to Mexico he received a concession from President Mariano Arista for the silver mines of Arizona, the Famous Planchas de Plata (or Bolas de Plata), located on the northern border of Sonora.[23]

Returning to California, Raousset-Boulbon quickly collected about two hundred Frenchmen. Warmly welcomed at Guaymas on June 1, 1852, four days before the mysterious death of Pindray, he

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[23]These silver deposits, discovered about 1736 and claimed by local officials for the king of Spain, were closed to individual miners five years later by a royal decree. Bancroft, Texas and the North Mexican States, II, 525-28; Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon, p. 87; Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, pp. 14-17.

confidently began his march northward to the mines.[24] However, conflict soon became evident between the central government at Mexico City and the Sonoran government.[25] Officials were reluctant to permit more Frenchmen into their state until the question was resolved as to whether the central or local government had the power to make land and mine concessions.[26] Another complicating factor for the French Count was Barron, Forbes, and Company, the financial rival of Raousset-Boulbon's sponsor, the banking house of Jecker de la Torre. Disturbed by this French economic invasion, Eustaquio Barron, British consul at Mazatlán, and William Forbes, British counsul at Tepic, began pressuring Sonoran officials to oppose the Jecker enterprise.[27]

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[24] El Sonorense, June 25, 1852, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, pp. 31-33.

[25] El Sonorense, September 24, 1852, ibid., V, pp. 67-69; Fernando Cubillas, Governor of Sonora, to the State Congress of Sonora, Ures, September 23, 1852, El Sonorense, October 1, 1852, ibid., pp. 72-76.

[26] Annuaire des Deux Mondes, 1852, pp. 716-717.

[27] Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 77.

While Raousset-Boulbon had little control over these political and financial complexities, he indiscreetly flaunted the military appearance of his expedition. A veteran of the Algerian wars, the Count marched north to the mines with his sword drawn, leading the French column arrayed in full military formation, complete with fixed bayonets and artillery in the van. With more display than appeared necessary to confront Apaches, this third French group particularly disquieted Sonoran officials.[28]

Complicated disputes with Mexican officials ensued. The French Minister to Mexico earnestly appealed to both Blanco and Calvo, and then he persuaded President Arista to intervene in Raousset-Boulbon's behalf.[29] The French Count, however, became exasperated with the delays.[30] In October,

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[28]Ibid., p. 92.

[29]Madelène, Le comte Gaston de Raousset-Boulbon, pp. 99-100; Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, pp. 76-77.

[30]For sympathetic view, see Gonzalez, Prefect, to Count Raousset-Boulbon, San Ignacio, September 30, 1852, El Sonorense, October 8, 1852, Pinart

1852, the same month that the Prince-President of France assuringly stated, "The Empire means peace," Raousset-Boulbon proclaimed "Liberty to Sonora," inscribed on a tri-color banner, and proceeded to engage the Mexicans in battle, shouting, "En avant! Vivé la France!"[31] The startled Sonorans yielded, and the French force of two hundred men successfully occupied Hermosillo, the largest town in Sonora with a population of about twelve thousand.[32] Raousset-Boulbon became inconveniently and seriously ill and, within five months after arriving in Sonora, the French force retreated.[33] Returning to San

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Transcripts, Sonora, V, pp. 78-80. For demands, see Acting Governor Cubillas to Raousset-Boulbon, Ures, October 2, 1852, El Sonorense, October 15, 1852, ibid., pp. 84-93.

[31]Madelène, Le comte Gaston de Raousset-Boulbon, pp. 93, 96, 99-100; Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, pp. 72-74; 76-77.

[32]Manuel María Gándara, centralist governor of Sonora, to minister of war, Ures, October 26, 1853, El Nacional, March 17, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 206; Ures, La Voz del Pueblo, November 24, 1852, ibid., V, 103-104.

[33]Blanco to Governor of Sonora, Guaymas, November 5, 1852, El Sonorense, November 12, 1852, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 114. Raousset-Boulbon October 29, 1852, asking for interview with Calvo

Francisco in November, 1852, they were later feted as heroes in France.[34]

During Raousset-Boulbon's short time in Sonora, he did not neglect the silver mines. Sixteen days after the second French Empire was formally decreed on December 2, 1852, a rich specimen of silver from the Arizona mine was shown to the editor of the French newspaper in California, the Echo du Pacifique. Lauding the purity of the silver and the wealth of other neglected mines, the editor exulted, "The French expedition . . . has served to verify the opinion of the immense wealth of Sonora."[35]

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and Blanco, El Sonorense, November 12, 1852, ibid., V, 110-111; Blanco to Raousset-Boulbon, October 30, 1852, includes terms for French capitulation, ibid., V, 111-12; Capitulation of Count Gaston de Raousset-Boulbon, Guaymas, November 4, 1852, El Sonorense, November 19, 1852, ibid., V, 116-119.

[34]Raousset-Boulbon was permitted to remain in Mexico until early Spring of 1853 when he regained his health. Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 132. La Voz del Pueblo, critical of the lenient treatment given the French, conservatively estimated that the above events would "fill one or more pages in the world's history." Ures, La Voz del Pueblo, November 24, 1852, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 119A. For French evaluation, see Annuaire des Deux Mondes, 1852, p. 719.

[35]Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 141, citing the Daily Alta California, December 18, 1852;

This report intrigued the French government, as the scarcity of silver had become pronounced: in 1852, for the first time since the Restoration, France had exported more silver than they had imported.[36]

Raousset-Boulbon's dramatic actions in Sonora stimulated discussion in the United States Senate. Michigan's Senator Lewis Cass alleged that the expedition had been directed to acquire Sonora for France. Astutely noting Dommartin's advocacy of French colonization of Sonora, with the aid of the French Minister to Mexico, Cass correlated this with the Annuaire des Deux Mondes' commendation of Levasseur's recent efforts.[37]

It is in 1853 that continued aid to Raousset-Boulbon from the French Minister to Mexico became significant. Levasseur had twice obtained President Arista's support for his protégé before

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Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon, p. 143.

[36]Enquête sur les principes et les faits généraux qui régissent la circulation monétaire et fiduciaire, VI, pp. 534-536. See above p. 60.

[37]U. S. Congress, Congressional Globe, 32d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. XXVI, Appendix, p. 92.

his aggressiveness was discernable.[38] After the French occupation of Hermosillo in October, 1852, Mexicans in both Sonora and Mexico City were obviously and justifiably upset. The insurgent could easily have been disavowed, dismissed as an impetuous and incorrigible adventurer. However, Levasseur again urged Raousset-Boulbon to return to Mexico City, and he introduced him to yet another Mexican president, Antonio López de Santa Anna, who took office in March, 1853, two months after Arista's resignation.[39]

Raousset-Boulbon met with Santa Anna in June, 1853.[40] Although the Mexican president was

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[38]Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, pp. 12-17, 76-77; Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon, pp. 87, 91-98; Wyllys, French in Sonora, pp. 72, 256-257; Madelène, Le comte Gaston de Raousset-Boulbon, p. 65.

[39]Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 148, citing French Minister to Sainte-Maire, French vice-consul in Acapulco, Mexico, April 8, 1853; French Minister to Dillon, Mexico, April 6, 1853.

[40]Hypolite Coppey, El Conde Raousset-Boulbon en Sonora, trans. by Alberto Cubillas (México, D.F.: Librería de Manuel Porrua, S.A., 1862), p. 38; Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon, p. 143; Madelène, Le comte Gaston de Raousset-Boulbon, p. 111; Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, p. 99.

cordial and interested, the two men, admirable adversaries, came to an impasse over the division of the mines.[41] Again disgusted with Mexican politicians, Raousset-Boulbon returned to San Francisco in December, 1853, the same month that the signing of the Gadsden Treaty allotted even more Mexican territory to the United States. Throughout the first months of 1854, as France was pledging to guarantee Ottoman integrity and independence from Russian domination, Raousset-Boulbon recruited Europeans to take Sonora by force.[42]

He ran into unexpected opposition in California. As the French Count arrived in San Francisco after his unproductive talks with President Santa Anna, Major General John E. Wool became commander of the Pacific division of the

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[41] Raousset-Boulbon to Santa Anna, Mexico, July 21, 1853, cited by Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 150.

[42] As the French count made preparations to leave San Francisco, Mexico City newspapers published his intercepted correspondence, while Manuel María Gándara, governor of Sonora, heatedly referred to Raousset-Boulbon as "the French cabecilla." Ures, El Nacional, March 17, 1854, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 226. Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, p. 88.

United States army.[43] Even before leaving the East for his new post he had asked for clarification concerning filibustering activities. Unequivocably instructed to deter such expeditions, Wool took his assignment seriously.[44] Arriving in San Francisco on February 14, 1854, his first dispatch concerned filibusters.[45] Within two weeks he reported, "I am in hopes to be able to arrest Raousset, and prevent him from his lawless purpose."[46] Although Wool failed to stop the renewed French expedition that left San Francisco for Guaymas on April 1, his successful harassment of Raousset-Boulbon inconveniently, and perhaps fatally, delayed his departure for seven weeks.

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[43]Wool to Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, December 26, 1853, U. S., Congress, Senate. Ex. Doc. 16, 33d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. VI, pp. 3-4.

[44]Wool to Davis, January 10, 1854; Davis to Wool, January 12, 1854, ibid., p. 7.

[45]Wool to Major General Winfield Scott, Commanding U. S. Army, New York, February 14, 1854, ibid., pp. 9-10.

[46]Wool to Lieutenant Colonel L. Thomas, Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army, New York, February 28, 1854, U. S., Congress, House. Executive Document No. 88, 35th Cong., 1st sess., p. 9.

On April 20, the first shipload, of 480 men, arrived at Guaymas. Having only half that number to defend the port city, Sonora's commandant general, José María Yáñez, was understandably nervous; he helplessly watched the armed men, most of whom had served under the French flag, disembark.[47] In San Francisco, an additional contingent was preparing to embark for Sonora, supposedly for precious metals[48] but, actually, Yáñez feared, for Sonora itself. This danger of reinforcements alarmed both Mexican and United States authorities.[49]

Raousset-Boulbon, detained in San Francisco, did not leave until May 23 on the small and misnamed schooner Belle, carrying eight men, 180 rifles

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[47]For a dramatic portrayal of Yáñez' problems, see Ures, El Nacional, August 4, 1854, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 230-234.

[48]Wool to Thomas, June 14, 1854, U. S., Congress, Senate. Ex. Doc. 16, 33d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. VI, pp. 74-76.

[49]James Gadsden, U. S. Legation, Mexico, to Wool, August 2, 1854, ibid., p. 107.

and an assortment of ammunition.[50] Writing to both Dillon and Levasseur that he was going back to obtain freedom for Sonora, the irrepressible French Count arrived in Guaymas around the first of July.[51] Reluctant to display fear in front of the Frenchmen who boldly drilled daily just outside of Guaymas, Yanez urgently requested that his appeals for help from Mexico City be kept secret. Apprehensive about both the numerical superiority of the invaders, as well as the feared retaliation of Napoleon III if French citizens were attacked, the Mexicans hesitated to provoke an incident. Fighting began, however, on July 13, shortly after Raousset-Boulbon's arrival, and the French were surprisingly defeated.[52] A month

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[50]Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon, pp. 171-177.

[51]Ibid., pp. 175-176; Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 192, citing the Daily Alta California, September 24, 1854.

[52]El Nacional, July 15, 1854, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 236-240; Mexico City, Integridad Nacional, ibid., p. 341; Yanez to Minister of War, July 30, 1854, Ures, El Nacional, August 25, 1854, ibid., 241-246.

later, on August 11, 1854, the Mexicans executed Raousset-Boulbon, who had philosophically expressed his belief that he was always either "too early or too late," as a conspirator.[53]

The difference between a hero and a visionary is often success or failure. In the 1830's Sam Houston had detached Texas from Mexico's northeastern frontier and in the 1840's John C. Fremont had disengaged California from Mexico's northwestern territory. Both men were acclaimed as daring heroes. In the 1850's six expeditions, three of them associated with France, attempted in various degrees to wrest Sonora from Mexico. It is through Raousset-Boulbon that a link is established between a remote spot in Mexico and J. B. Jecker, the expedition's financier and the pretext for French intervention in Mexico ten years later.

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[53]Niceto de Zamacois, Historia de Méjico desde sus tiempos mas remotos hasta nuestros dias (18 vols.; México, D. F. and Barcelona, [1880-1882]), XII, 789; Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 690; General Yanez in circular of August 13, to Prefects, Ures, El Nacional, August 18, 1854, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 248; El Nacional, September 1, 1854, in ibid., pp. 249-250. Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon, p. 3.

Raousset-Boulbon's objectives in Mexico have puzzled scholars from Mexico, the United States, and France. He had made two trips to Mexico City and he had led two expeditions to Sonora. Ostensibly, his purpose was to reactivate Sonora's mines. For this privilege he was to encourage European colonization, benefitting Mexico by repulsing both Apaches and Anglo-Americans. It seemed a rather simple agreement that would profit both parties. But neither the French count nor the Mexican authorities trusted each other, and their justified suspicions led to animosity and hostility. While Raousset-Boulbon did not forthrightly claim the French government's official support, there is often the implied hint that he was fulfilling an important, and assigned, mission. His correspondence, intercepted in January, 1854, at Mazatlán, included an intriguing letter to a French sea captain in Sinaloa named Salar. Instructing him to dissuade Mexicans from feeling like dupes of French schemes, Raousset-Boulbon wrote, "The end does not vary, it remains the same; the means change with the circumstances. . . . In a word, by all means possible, at whatever price . . . see to it that I can get on Mexican soil. The rest

will take care of itself."[54] The Mexican Minister of war, Santiago Blanco, believed that Raousset-Boulbon's second trip to Sonora was an attempt to overthrow the authorities there and then to claim French protection on the basis of innocently defending himself. As skeptical as Blanco of Raousset-Boulbon's objectives, the United States consul in Guaymas, Major Richard Roman, had instructions to protest against the expected annexation of Sonora by France and to threaten United States intervention.[55]

Although allegations were made in the United States Congress that Raousset-Boulbon was an agent of Napoleon,[56] it is risky to claim a direct connection, a typical difficulty in Second Empire studies. It is on a secondary level, support from

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[54]Raousset-Boulbon to Salar, undated, but context of the letter indicates it was written in the latter part of 1853. Reprinted in Wyllys, French in Sonora, Appendix C, pp. 275-79.

[55]Blanco to Yáñez, Mexico, August 8, 1854; statement of Juan A. Robinson, Roman's predecessor as United States consul at Guaymas, Juan A. Robinson MSS; both cited by ibid., pp. 215, 220.

[56]U. S., Congress, Congressional Globe, 32d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. XXVI, Appendix, p. 92. Ibid.,

both the French consul in San Francisco and the French Minister to Mexico, that aid from France is more evident. Dillon furnished Raousset-Boulbon with letters of recommendations to Levasseur, helped recruit Frenchmen for Sonora, and intervened for them in May, 1852, when United States customs officials opposed the exporting of weapons.[57] Shortly after the capture of Sonora's largest town Raousset-Boulbon informed Dillon, "What has been done may be of great consequence to France and there should be neither negotiations, hesitation, diplomacy nor idle words. What is needed is action--and that must be energetic and swift."[58] Instead of tempering his fellow countryman, Dillon urged him to

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37th Cong., 3d sess., Appendix, pp. 94-100. Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 226.

[57]Madelene, Le comte Gaston de Raousset-Boulbon, pp. 64-70; Lampertie, Le drame de Sonora, p. 16.

[58]Raousset-Boulbon to Dillon, undated, reprinted in Soulie, Wolf Cub, pp. 168-70. The context of the letter places it between October 14 and 24, 1852, the period of time he was at Hermosillo.

prepare more thoroughly for yet another expedition to Sonora.[59]

The French Minister to Mexico also supported the Count. When Raousset-Boulbon made his first trip to Mexico City, in late February, 1852, Levasseur enthusiastically welcomed him. Opening doors to influential persons, the French Minister recommended him to President Arista and to the banking house of Jecker de la Torre, and Company, the financier of the Compañía Restauradora de la Mina de la Arizona.[60] An unsigned letter to Raousset-Boulbon, dated September 8, 1852, mentioned the "many favors" that Levasseur had done for him.[61] Although Sonorans realized that "some high-toned persons" were involved, El Sonorense stated,

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[59]Dillon to Calvo, San Francisco, May 4, 1853, reprinted in Soulie, Wolf Cub, p. 177; Madelène, Le comte Gaston de Raousset-Boulbon, p. 105; Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, pp. 85, 97.

[60]Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon, p. 87; Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, pp. 14-17.

[61]Ures, El Sonorense, September 24, 1852, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 64.

"Sonorans will not allow themselves to be easily subjugated."[62] The commandant general of Sonora emphatically related both the support and Levasseur's statement that it would be "a happy event" if Raousset-Boulbon commanded ten thousand men in Sonora instead of a mere two hundred.[63] In Levasseur's correspondence with Calvo, he repeatedly referred to "our national interest" in connection with the expedition. Urging Calvo to help Raousset-Boulbon, Levasseur asserted that the French foreign minister had instructed him to encourage the establishment of Frenchmen in Sonora, as France had a "vital interest" there.[64]

The crucial test of French support was after the "Liberty to Sonora" and "Vivé la France" episode of October, 1852. With the occupation of

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[62]Ures, El Sonorense, September 17, 1852, ibid., V, 60.

[63]Blanco to Raousset-Boulbon, Arispe, September 24, 1852, El Sonorense, October 22, 1852, ibid., V, 97.

[64]Levasseur to Calvo, April 19, 1852; May 10, 1852; July 21, 1852, reprinted in Wyllys, French in Sonora, Appendix B, pp. 250-257.

Hermosillo, the Mexican government was noticeably perturbed about French connections with the elusive Count.[65] After the establishment of the Empire, in December, 1852, ministers and government officials under Napoleon III did little, especially in matters pertaining to foreign policy, without either his direction or approval.

During the spring of 1853 French officials in the western hemisphere diligently denied any connection with or protection of Raousset-Boulbon. However, Levasseur sent word through Dillon that Raousset-Boulbon would be summoned back to Mexico "at the proper moment," and he covertly urged patience as plans for Sonora might be damaged by a premature arrival.[66] Levasseur assured Lucas Alamán, Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, that the French had no designs upon Sonora and that he had even requested a man-of-war from the French Pacific

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[65]Alamán to Minister of War, May 2, 1853; Alamán to Minister of War, May 9, 1853, cited by ibid., pp. 144-145.

[66]Levasseur to Dillon, Mexico, April 6, 1853, cited by ibid., pp. 144-145.

squadron to guard Mazatlán and Guaymas against any French expeditions from California. At this same time Luis Maneyro, the Mexican consul at Havre, believed that Raousset-Boulbon had the approval of French officials and that reinforcements were preparing to leave France, as success in Sonora was openly hoped for and anticipated in Paris.[67] Lucas Alamán might well have wondered about the actual purpose of the French man-of-war ordered by Lavesseur. Despite the French Minister's vehement denials of supporting Raousset-Boulbon in May, 1853, only a month earlier he had proposed that the French Count come to Mexico City for an interview with the new Mexican president, Santa Anna.[68] Although the power of Mexican officials wavered during this turbulent period, the French Minister showed perseverance in recommending Raousset-Boulbon to two Mexican presidents within a one-year period,

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[67]Levasseur to Alamán, Mexico, May 20, 1853; Luis Maneyro, Mexican consul at Havre, to Ministro de Relaciones, Havre, May 31, 1853, cited by ibid., p. 146.

[68]Coppey, El Conde, p. 38; Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon, p. 143; Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, p. 99.

especially after his notorious seizure of Hermosillo.

The fate of Sonora seemed to rest uncertainly in the hands of Santa Anna. During late 1853, James Gadsden, United States Minister to Mexico, negotiated the purchase of Mexican land adjacent to northern Sonora. Concurrently, the inimitable filibustering expedition of William Walker skirted diplomatic channels and in January, 1854, simply proclaimed into existence his Republic of Sonora.[69] Hindering Raousset-Boulbon's recruiting efforts, rumors in San Francisco during early 1854 indicated that the United States had already absorbed Sonora. The French were thus heartened in the spring of 1854 by the Revolution of Ayutla which, expressing dissatisfaction with the disposal of more national territory,

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[69]William O. Scroggs, Filibusters and Financiers: The Story of William Walker and His Associates (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916), p. 42; Captain Juan B. Navarro, Prefect, to Governor Comandante General, Guaymas, November 1, 1853, Ures, El Nacional, November 4, 1853, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, p. 207; ibid., December 30, 1953, January 27, 1854, in ibid., p. 215.

opposed and later deposed President Santa Anna.[70]

Officials in Sonora alarmingly protested that Raousset-Boulbon planned to take possession of Sonora "with an armed hand."[71] Despite this, the Mexican consul at San Francisco, Luis Del Valle, had received instructions from Santa Anna to recruit Europeans, primarily Frenchmen detached from the Count.[72] These were to be enlisted in the Mexican army in Sonora, after renouncing their French citizenship, and given land as colonists to provide security, obviously necessary after the Walker

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[70]On March 4, 1854, some sixty men of various nationalities went to Guaymas without passports as they supposed Sonora to be United States territory. Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 167; Bancroft, Mexico, V, 646-659.

[71]Manuel Diez de Bonilla, Mexican minister of foreign relations, to Alphonse Dano, French chargé d'affaires at Mexico City, January 17, 1854, reprinted in U. S., Congress, Senate, Ex. Doc. 16, 33d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. VI, pp. 43-44.

[72]Wool to Thomas, March 31, 1854; Del Valle to Dillon, undated; John S. Cripps, U. S. Legation in Mexico, to Wool, April 22, 1854, reprinted in ibid., pp. 28, 42, 93-94. Estimates on the number to be recruited vary from one to three thousand.

episode.[73] Del Valle duly chartered the British ship Challenge to transport them to Guaymas.[74] The vigilant and zealous Wool believed that Del Valle was "the dupe of the French consul" and that Raousset-Boulbon planned to seize Sonora "either as a revolutionist or in the name of the French government."[75] Arresting the Mexican consul on March 31, 1854, Wool charged him with violation of an 1818 law forbidding enlistment in United States territory for military service of a foreign government.[76]

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[73]The promises to the Frenchmen made by Del Valle are in El Nacional, August 4, 1854, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, pp. 230-34.

[74]Contract between Del Valle and Edward Cavailler and Hector Chauviteau, March 4, 1854, reprinted in U. S., Congress, Senate, Ex. Doc. 16, 33d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. VI, p. 33. Cavailler and Chauviteau turned out to be close friends and associates of Raousset. See Wyllys, French in Sonora, pp. 174, 216, and pp. 271-279, 284-286 for reprinted correspondence between Raousset-Boulbon, Chauviteau and Cavailler.

[75]Wool to Cripps, Chargé d'affaires, U. S. Legation, Mexico, July 29, 1854, Senate, Ex. Doc. 16, 33d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. VI, pp. 94-96.

[76]Wool to Thomas, March 31, 1854; San Francisco Herald Extra, March 31, 1854, reprinted in ibid., pp. 27-32. The Mexican

The dichotomy of Mexican expectations and French objectives are most explicitly seen in the spring of 1854. The Frenchmen were not easily detached from Raousset-Boulbon, they balked at renouncing their citizenship, and they had no intentions of merely farming and fighting Apaches. At the very least, they were after all the mineral wealth they could get; at most they were after Sonora itself. The contractors for the Challenge, the ship chartered by the Mexican consul Del Valle, were not disinterested in the outcome. They were close friends and supporters of Raousset-Boulbon. Wool had substantial reason to conjecture that Del Valle was either the collaborator with, or the dupe of, the French consul at San Francisco.

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consul was convicted, but Wool was reprimanded for Del Valle's arrest. See Wool to Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, April 14, 1854; Davis to Wool, April 14, 1854, reprinted in ibid., pp. 52-54. However, before Wool received the reprimand, he also arrested the French consul. Dillon was found not guilty as the jury stood ten for conviction and two for acquittal. Wool to Davis, May 15, 1854, reprinted in ibid., pp. 57-58; Wool to Davis, May 30, 1854, reprinted in ibid., pp. 66-69.

It is at this point, in April, 1854, that Raousset-Boulbon, insisting that his establishment of the French in Sonora would be the first step toward the occupation of "all this magnificent country," obviously hoped to attract the aid of France.[77] About this same time Del Valle belatedly became alarmed and began warning authorities in Sonora that the Count, supported by "many notables of this region," planned to attack Guaymas.[78] Four days later, he asked officials in San Francisco for help, as "good sources" had revealed that Raousset-Boulbon "resolved to carry out his criminal intent of invading the Mexican Coast."[79] Del Valle had

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[77]Pierre de la Gorce, Histoire du second empire (7 vols.; Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1874), IV, 15; Madelène, Le comte Gaston de Raousset-Boulbon, claims that Raousset-Boulbon maintained an agent in Paris to maintain close contact with the court of Napoleon III.

[78]Del Valle to Governor Comandante General of Sonora, San Francisco, April 20, 1854, in El Nacional, May 26, 1854, Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 228.

[79]Del Valle to Governor Comandante General of Sonora, San Francisco, April 24, 1854, enclosing letter from Del Valle to Collector of Customs at San Francisco, April 24, 1854, in El Nacional, May 26, 1854, ibid., p. 228.

reason for his gloomy forebodings. Using rhetoric that Napoleon repeated, Raousset-Boulbon proclaimed that the United States must be curtailed by "planting a new race in Sonora, if not by seizing all of Mexico." If this were not done, he asserted, in ten years there would not be a cannon shot in Europe without the permission of the United States.[80]

Official French help to Raousset-Boulbon in the latter half of 1853 and the first half of 1854 is difficult to analyze because of the contradictory activity of French diplomats. In Mexico City, Alphonse Dano replaced Levasseur as French chargé d'affaires in the summer of 1853. While continuing to support French mining projects in Sonora, Dano appeared steadfast in his disassociation with the French Count. His dislike of Raousset-Boulbon did not hinder his own efforts, however, to settle Frenchmen in Sonora. In the summer of 1854, Dano

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[80]This is almost identical to the statements of Lamartine, Napoleon III, and the Marquis de Radepont ten years later during the French intervention in Mexico. This statement of Raousset-Boulbon is reprinted in Soulié, Wolf Cub, pp. 190-193.

proposed that the four hundred Frenchmen accompanying the invading expedition be permitted to remain in Sonora. Aiding them financially, he sent twenty thousand pesos--cleverly appropriated by Mexican officials to pay the Frenchmen's expenses out of Mexico.[81]

Dillon denied association with Raousset-Boulbon only when it was expedient.[82] On March 18, 1854, he remonstrated that he had "the most positive orders," both from Paris and from the legation in Washington, that French filibustering expeditions "would be viewed by them with the utmost displeasure as an act of open and barefaced piracy."[83] He

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[81]Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 217, citing Yáñez to Minister of War, Guaymas, September 4, 1854. Dano reappeared as French minister to Mexico in 1865, again to soothe Mexican nationalism, after his predecessor, the Marquis de Montholon, failed to obtain Sonora's mines for France.

[82]Senator J. A. McDougall of California asserted that Dillon's denials of complicity were "carefully worded, which, while it would save the appearance of complicity on the part of the French Emperor, would not seriously injure the prospects of the enterprise." U. S., Congress, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d sess., Appendix, p. 97.

[83]Dillon to Wool, March 18, 1854, reprinted in U. S., Congress, Senate, Ex. Doc. 16, 33d Cong. 2d sess., Vol. VI, p. 34.

appeared indignant that Wool associated him with Raousset-Boulbon, claiming that he was "merely desirous of his welfare" as both he and the Count had "a common friend" in Paris.[84] Yet less than two weeks after these strongly-worded denials, he urged the vice-consul at Guaymas to intercede for the Frenchmen who would soon arrive. Instructing Calvo to assure Sonoran authorities of their "innocent motives," Dillon ambiguously added that French warships would soon be along the Pacific coast.[85] Aware of this letter, Wool realized that in spite of Dillon's previous denials, the French consul did indeed take "a deep interest" in the success of the expedition.[86] Although Wool's impetuous arrests of both the Mexican and French consuls in San Francisco caused confusion in the State Department,

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[84]Dillon to Wool, March 18, 1854, March 20, 1854, reprinted in ibid., pp. 43, 34.

[85]Dillon to Calvo, San Francisco, March 27, 1854, cited by Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 185.

[86]Wool to Cripps, July 29, 1854, Senate Ex. Doc. 16, 33d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. VI, pp. 94-96.

it was commonly believed that Dillon concealed the hidden motives of Raousset-Boulbon.[87]

While French diplomats unquestionably had an extraordinary interest in the mineral wealth of Sonora, Raousset-Boulbon was even more candidly encouraged by minor officials. Dr. Pigne Dupuytren, a former French consular agent at Marysville, was one of the close friends accompanying Raousset-Boulbon on his last and fatal trip to Sonora in May, 1854.[88] T. P. Sainte-Marie commanded the Sigondis expedition to Sonora in March, 1852, settled his men as colonis vecinos somewhere between Santa Cruz and Tucson, and then joined Raousset-Boulbon's first thrust into Sonora. After this 1852 failure, Sainte-Marie was appointed French vice-consul at Acapulco implying, if not French approval, at least no disapproval of his connection with Raousset-Boulbon. In July, 1854, while Raousset-Boulbon was in Guaymas, Sainte-Marie went

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[87]Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 180.

[88]Ibid., p. 192.

to Mexico City to discuss the future of Sonora with the French minister, and a month later he interceded forcefully to prevent the Count's death.[89]

Nine years after Raousset-Boulbon's execution, as the French were thwarted in their efforts to capture Puebla and before there were any military moves towards northern Mexico, Californian senator James A. McDougall warned of the dangers to Sonora. Recalling that French complicity with Raousset-Boulbon had been denied, he asserted that the intervention in Mexico in the 1860's stemmed from the Count's activities in Sonora during the 1850's.[90] Although the French government's connection with Raousset-Boulbon is largely based on circumstantial evidence, neither he nor his followers were forgotton. Napoleon received many petitions requesting compensation for services rendered to Raousset-Boulbon; "Accordé" was jotted on the margins of nearly all of

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[89] Ibid., pp. 64-65, 199.

[90] U. S., Congress, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 3d sess., Appendix, p. 97.

them.[91] Raousset-Boulbon emerged a hero through sympathetic writings which frequently referred to him as the French Cortés, and his remains, exhumed by French naval officers in 1866, were taken to France for final burial.[92]

Occupied with the opening phase of the Crimean war, Napoleon III's direct participation in the Raousset-Boulbon expedition was probably minimal. However, he undoubtedly would have taken advantage of any success, as France's need for silver was apparent. During the three years of Raousset-Boulbon's activities in Sonora, France had lost a total of 284 million silver francs in excess of imports.[93] In 1854, the year of Raousset-Boulbon's most serious invasion of Sonora, the intense lack

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[91] Delord, Histoire du second empire, III, 288-289.

[92] Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 224, citing an interview with José A. Marquez, Guaymas, November 30, 1928.

[93] Enquête sur la circulation monétaire, Vol. VI, pp. 534-535.

of silver caused the least amount of silver coinage in France since 1795.[94]

The primary legacy of Raousset-Boulbon was the stimulation of Napoleon's interest in Sonora, as well as the connection with his financier, Jean Baptiste Jecker, who provided the pretext for French intervention in Mexico in 1861. When Jecker needed French governmental support in the late 1850's, he stressed his association with Raousset-Boulbon, instead of ruefully criticizing the unfortunate expedition he had financially supported. And it was not easily forgotten in France that it had taken only two hundred Frenchmen to occupy a Sonora town with a population of twelve thousand.

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[94] Hansard's, "Report on the Depreciation of the Price of Silver," Appendix, pp. 86-91.

CHAPTER V

JEAN BAPTISTE JECKER: CATALYST FOR FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

During the years from Raousset-Boulbon's death in Sonora to the French intervention in Mexico, 1854 to 1861, more than two and one-half billion francs of silver flowed from France, considerably more than the French had lost in the entire first half of the nineteenth-century.[1] The need for silver became critical in 1861 when that very metal was necessary to pay for alternate cotton from India. Concurrent economic and diplomatic events indicate a causal relationship of the French monetary and cotton problems to the decision to intervene in Mexico.

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[1]From 1815 through 1853, 1,695,000,000 silver francs were exported. Yet during the eight years from 1854 through 1861, 2,514,000,000 silver francs were exported. See Appendix on silver imports and exports, taken from "Monvement des metaux precieux," Enclosure 1 in Decazes to Lyons, April 10, 1876, Hansard's, "Report on the Depreciation of the Price of Silver," 1876, Appendix, pp. 86-87.

The legend of silver and the exploits of Raousset-Boulbon had stimulated French curiosity and knowledge of Sonora's mines. During the Mexican civil war of 1858 to 1861, French diplomats showed increasing interest in Sonora. Regularly reporting both the vulnerability of Mexico and the fear that the United States would absorb this area, they sent dispatch after dispatch, which substantiates a continuing preoccupation with Sonora.

Historically, attention has focused on Jecker's bonds as a pretext for the intervention. These were of negligible value, however, in comparison to his claims to large portions of Sonora. By assuming protection of Jecker's contracts in Mexico, Napoleon obtained access to desperately needed silver mines. Faced with losing all of his assets as a result of Mexico's domestic turmoil, the Swiss financier agreed to sell his claims in Sonora to France, in exchange for support of his other investments. In addition, other participants in the Jecker surveying enterprise transferred their mining claims to France, also for protection of their other financial ventures in Mexico. Thus, by 1862 Napoleon had systematically laid claim to a sizeable portion of the land

surveyed in 1856 by Jean Baptiste Jecker.

After Raousset-Boulbon's death in 1854, a spate of books, romanticizing his adventures, was published. Frenchmen quickly purchased the first edition of Henri de la Madelène's Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon in 1856. A large part of the second edition in 1859 was significantly bought by J. B. Jecker, Raousset-Boulbon's Swiss financier.[2] In January, 1861, the Duc de Morny, president of the corps législatif, sent an agent to Mexico for information about his own personal investments in Jecker bonds and mines.[3] Jecker then went to Paris, distributed copies of Madelène's book, which glorified Raousset-Boulbon as a valiant French patriot, wronged by the Mexican government,

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[2]Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 692.

[3]J. B. Jecker to Conti, Chef du Cabinet de l'Empereur, December 8, 1869, reprinted in A. Poulet-Malassis, ed., Papiers secrets et correspondance du Second Empire. Reimpression complète de l'édition de l'imprimérie nationale, annotée et augmentée de nombreuses pièces publiées a l'étranger, et recueillies par A. Poulet-Malassis (3d ed.; Paris: Ghio et cie, 1873), pp. 1-3.

and emphasized his earlier financial association with the deceased French Count.[4] He then formally exchanged his claims in Sonora for a settlement of two million dollars from France.[5]

Jecker opportunistically sought French influence and power to protect his Mexican investments and projected financial ventures, which were complex and comprehensive. A number of his letters, intercepted and turned over to the United States government, referred to plans involving railroads, canal building, provisioning of the French army,

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[4]Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 692. Throughout the 1850's, two other books, in addition to Madelene's, were published about Raousset-Boulbon: Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon; and Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora. Also published in the 1850's, noteworthy for their later influence, are Gabriel Ferry, Impressions de voyages et aventures dans le Mexique, la haute Californie et les regions de l'or, Paris, 1851; and Mathieu de Fossey, Le Mexique, Paris, 1857. A second edition of Fossey's work, often quoted in Jecker's correspondence, was published in Paris in 1862.

[5]Jecker sold the French government his claims in Sonora for about 10,600,000 francs. Paul Gaulot, La verite sur l'expedition du Mexique, d'apres les documents inedits de Ernest Louet, payeur en chef du corps expeditionnaire (3 vols.; Paris: P. Ollendorff, 1890), I, 219-220.

and collecting of custom duties.[6] In addition to his mineral claims in Sonora, Jecker also owned mines, land, and concessions in other areas of Mexico.[7]

Jecker became financially involved with both the French and with the fabled mineral wealth of Sonora in 1852. Almost a year before Raousset-Boulbon's first trip to Mexico City, the French Minister to Mexico had made a denuncio at San Ignacio of a mine of Arizona in northern Sonora. He received the concession to this mine on January 17, 1852, a month before the French Count left San Francisco. When Raousset-Boulbon arrived, Levasseur recommended him to the banking house of Jecker, de la Torre and Company, which had expressed an interest in financing the French Minister's mining

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[6]These letters are reprinted in House Executive Documents, Doc. No. 23, 37th Cong., 3d sess., Ser. Set 1161, pp. 12-25.

[7]His holdings in Jalisco and Tehuantepec are noted in M. Maldonado-Koerdell, "La Obra de la commission scientifique du Mexique," Arturo Arnaiz y Freg and Claude Bataillon, eds., La intervención francesa y el imperio de Maximiliano: Cien anos después, 1862-1962 (México, D. F.: Asociación Mexicana de Historiadores; Instituto Francés de América Latina, 1965), p. 164. His claim to the Santa Anna mine is noted by the Comisión Científica de Pachuca, 1864, dirigida por el ingeniero Ramón Almaraz (México: J. M. Andrade y F. Escalante, 1865), p. 115.

concession.[8] Having formed the Compañía Restauradora de la Mina de la Arizona, a subsidiary of Jecker, de la Torre and Company, Jecker perceived Raousset-Boulbon as useful in exploring and exploiting mines in Sonora.[9]

According to the contract between Jecker and Raousset-Boulbon, the latter would receive one-half of the land, mines and placers that he located and described, and the other half would go to the Compañía Restauradora, whose members, in addition to Jecker, included important Frenchmen and Mexicans: Levasseur, the French Minister to Mexico; José Calvo, French vice-consul at Guaymas; Mariano Arista, president of Mexico; and José de Aguilar, governor

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[8]Lachapelle, Le comte de Raousset-Boulbon, p. 87; Lambertie, Le drame de Sonora, pp. 14-17.

[9]El Sonorense, September 24, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 67-68. Vigneaux claimed that Raousset-Boulbon actually formed the company, with Jecker & Company for nominal head. He is probably referring to the Compagnie de Sonore. Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 676. It was Jecker who paid for damages incurred by Raousset-Boulbon during his 1852 expedition to Sonora. El Sonorense, December 3, 1852, in Pinart Transcripts, Sonora, V, 128.

of Sonora. Other Mexicans in strategic positions of authority were also stockholders in the company.[10] Placing $35,000 at the disposal of Raousset-Boulbon in July, 1852, the Compañía Restauradora assured him of an additional $25,000 for his expedition.[11] Raousset-Boulbon then formed the Compagnie de Sonore in anticipation of obtaining his half of the land and mines as determined by his contract with Jecker.[12] This company, to exist until January 1, 1856, was formally dissolved under Mexican pressure in November, 1852.[13]

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[10] El Sonorense, September 17, 1852, ibid., V, 60. Villa, Historia del Estado de Sonora, (2d ed.; Hermosillo, Sonora: Editorial Sonora, 1951), p. 217; Coppey, El conde, p. 10. It is important to note that Levasseur withdrew from the enterprise before Raousset-Boulbon landed at Guaymas, but he continued to support the Frenchman, thus negating the charge that he supported Raousset-Boulbon only for his own financial gain. See Levasseur to Calvo, Mexico, April 19, 1852, cited by Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 761, and Wyllys' evaluation of Levasseur, ibid., pp. 227-228.

[11] Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 677 n.

[12] Ibid.; Wyllys, French in Sonora, p. 130.

[13] "Ultimos dias del gobierno de Mariano Arista. Diario de los acontecimientos que precedieron y siguieron a la caída de Arista," reprinted in Lilia Díaz, Version francesa de Mexico: Informes diplomáticos (4 vols.; México: El Colegio de Mexico, 1963-1967), I, p. 18. See supra, pp. 100-101.

Two years after Raousset-Boulbon's execution in 1854, Jecker obtained even more concessions. He arranged with the Mexican government to survey the public domain of Sonora in August, 1856; in return, he was to receive one-third of the land he surveyed.[14] In defiance of the central government, however, on May 17, 1859, Governor Pesqueira expelled the Jecker surveyors.[15] Jecker's contract with President Comonfort was then deemed null and void, but he persistently maintained claims to one-third of the public land he had surveyed, as reimbursement of expenses.[16]

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[14]The Jecker-Comonfort contract concerning the survey of Sonora was signed on December 19, 1856. Sobarzo, Crónica de la aventura de Raousset-Boulbon en Sonora, p. 13; Gaulot, La vérité sur l'expédition du Mexique, I, 219.

[15]Gaulot, La vérité sur l'expédition du Mexique, I, 219.

[16]Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, 676, 695. The participants and claims are intricately involved. For United States citizens involved in the Jecker claims, see "Claims Against Mexico Under the Convention of 1868" (201 envelopes and 5 vols.), Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, National Archives, RG 76. This includes the claim of the Lower California Company that operated under the concession granted to Jecker. The Lower California Company grant is in the Huntington Library, San Marino, California. For list of claimants and Nature of Claims, see Senate Executive Documents, Doc. No. 31, 44th Cong., 2d sess.

Even before the Jecker surveyors were expelled from Sonora, French diplomats revealed an interest in this northern state. In April, 1858, the French Minister, Alexis de Gabriac, informed French Foreign Minister Walewski about the "deplorable anarchy" there due to the political feuds in Sonora between the followers of Jesús Gándara and Ignacio Pesqueira. Gabriac, unlike his predecessor, Levasseur, or his successor, Saligny, had no personal financial involvements with Jecker. He did, however, deem Sonora of sufficient importance to the Quai d'Orsay to relate, regularly, the instability there. Also in this letter, he revealed an event of future significance. Manuel Escandón, a Mexican financier, who later supported Napoleon, had sublet--to American engineers--his contract for the proposed railroad from Veracruz to Mexico City. Gabriac noted that this would provide "an excellent opportunity . . . of preparing the way for an invasion," although he did not indicate by whom.[17] This Escandón contract, apparently renegotiated in 1861 with Juárez, was ceded to the French in

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[17]Gabriac to Walewski, April 11, 1858, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, II, 11-13.

1862.[18]

In the midst of the civil war, Gabriac consistently reported the "devastation" and vulnerability of Mexico.[19] He was particularly alarmed by President Buchanan's expansionist talk, which indicated that Mexico needed a "protector" and, at the same time, reiterated enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. This also upset Mexican conservatives and, in both December, 1858, and in April, 1859, a delegation appealed to Napoleon for help in ending Mexico's "immoral and disastrous revolution."[20] It appeared certain to Gabriac, as evidenced by his despatches throughout 1859, that the United States would soon absorb Sonora and Chihuahua.[21]

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[18]For further discussion and ramifications of this, see pp. 155-156.

[19]See, for example, Gabriac to Walewski, Mexico City, June 11 and July 2, 1858, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, II, pp. 20-22; 26-28.

[20]Comunicación del partido conservador mexicano a Napoleón III, Mexico City, December 15, 1858; Carta del partido conservador mexicano a Napoleón III, April 27, 1859, reprinted in ibid., 60-64; 79-82.

[21]See, for example, Gabriac to Walewski, Mexico City, January 1, May 1, November 27 and December 1, 1859, reprinted in ibid., 58-64; 88-89; 119-123.

Both the conservative and liberal Mexican factions needed money. On October 29, 1859, the Swiss financial house of J. B. Jecker and Company lent the conservative Miramón $1,500,000 in return for $15,000,000 in Mexican treasury bonds.[22] Juárez, equally needy, accepted the offer of the United States minister to Mexico, Robert MacLane, who proposed payment of four million dollars, in exchange for considerable privileges in Sonora and other portions of Mexico.[23] This MacLane-Ocampo treaty, signed December 14, 1859, was never ratified by the United States Senate. However, Saligny was extremely distressed over these pro-

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[22]Vicente Fuentes Díaz, La intervención europa en México, 1861-62 (México: n.p., 1962), p. 67. Bonds paying 6% interest were issued to the amount of 75,000,000 francs. In return, Miramón was given 3,094,640 francs in cash, 4,344,500 francs in various bonds, custom house orders, military supplies, and 33,000 francs in diverse credits and payments. In 1862 the franc stood at $0.1931. Bock, Tripartite Convention, p. 613. The October 29, 1859, contract between Jecker and Miramón is reprinted in Ernesto de la Torre Villar, et al., eds., Historia documental de México (2 vols.; México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1964), II, 312-313.

[23]Zamacois, Historia de Méjico, XV, 337-342.

posed concessions, which gave extended rights over Sonora to the United States.[24]

On March 15, 1860, Count Dubois de Saligny was designated Minister Plenipotentiary, but he did not arrive until December, 1860. Remaining in Mexico until July, Gabriac, contrasting the mines controlled by England, Russia, Spain and the United States to France's lack of precious metals, stated, "The disproportion which augments day by day between gold and silver influences our population to act in stopping the United States from acquiring the mines of New Spain."[25] Further stress developed when the Comte de la Londe, a French banker at Veracruz and later chargé ad interim, reported in May, 1860, that Jecker, bringing "general consternation" to the business community, had gone bankrupt.[26] In addition to French distress over the MacLane-Ocampo

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[24]Saligny to Thouvenel, December 31, 1859; January 11 and January 22, 1860, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, II, 123-128.

[25]Gabriac to Thouvenel, April 11, 1860, reprinted in ibid., 145-148.

[26]A. de la Londe to Thouvenel, May 21, 1860, reprinted in ibid., 163-164.

treaty and the Jecker bankruptcy, Juárez defeated his rivals and triumphantly entered Mexico City on January 11, 1861.[27]

Meanwhile, fraught with meaning for France's cotton supply, war tension, long a concern to French textile manufacturers, escalated in the United States with the secession of South Carolina in December, 1860. During that same month, Saligny arrived in Mexico City, a few weeks ahead of Juárez, and important economic and diplomatic events now coincided. He received a petition from one hundred and fifty anxious French, Swiss, and Belgian residents, urging him to protect their interests in the Jecker bonds. Needing intercession for his financial affairs, which included land claims in Sonora and the loan to Miramón, Jecker was told by the Swiss consul-general that the United States normally assumed diplomatic protection for Swiss citizens in Mexico. With initial competition between supporters, the United States Minister did intervene

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[27]George W. Mathew to Elger, private and confidential, Jalapa, February 1, 1861, reprinted in ibid., pp. 208-209.

briefly for him, although Count Dubois de Saligny, in the first move towards intervention, extended vigorous French protection to the Swiss banker.[28] At this very time, in addition to uneasiness about future raw cotton sources, France's lack of silver evoked strenuous demands for energetic action. The French press agitated for a solution to the serious export of small coin, and strident demands were made to the government for a remedy.[29]

Saligny had indicated an interest in Jecker's financial affairs even before he left France. After his appointment to Mexico, he had told Xavier Elsesser, Jecker's brother-in-law, that the claims would probably be respected.[30] This protection of a Swiss citizen by the new French Minister to Mexico aroused speculation (recently substantiated)

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[28]Accounts of Saligny's defense of Jecker are in Keratry, La creance Jecker, pp. 18-19; Bock, Tripartite Convention, pp. 97-100, 631-632, 613-614; House Executive Documents, Doc. No. 23, 37th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 1-11.

[29]Willis, Monetary Union, pp. 33-34.

[30]Xavier Elsesser to Montluc, Porrentruy, October 1, 1860, reprinted in Montluc, Correspondence de Juarez et de Montluc, I, 47-49.

about the Duc de Morny's connection with Jecker.[31] However, the supposition that the French government would send six thousand troops to Mexico in 1862 to recover Morny's alleged claim to thirty per cent of the Jecker bond profits, appears untenable. It is of interest, however, that Morny, the second most powerful person in France, encouraged development of Sonora's mines through both the Swiss Jean Baptiste Jecker and the American William McKendree Gwin, a later protégé of Napoleon III.[32]

The French Minister arrived in Mexico City with letters accrediting him to the defeated Miramón. Saligny failed in his attempt to withhold French recognition of the new government until it acknowledged the Jecker claims as a legitimate Mexican debt. Juárez desired French recognition, but not desperately enough to pay fifteen million dollars. Having been in Mexico more than three months without

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[31]Nancy N. Barker, "The Duke of Morny and the Affair of the Jecker Bonds," French Historical Studies, Vol. VI, No. 4 (Fall, 1970), pp. 555-561.

[32]Ibid., pp. 558, 560; Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (June, 1891), p. 606; Ibid., Vol. XVIII (August, 1891), pp. 204-206.

being formally received, Saligny capitulated, presenting his credentials on March 16, 1861. He was as yet unaware that ten days earlier the French foreign minister, Edouard Antoine Thouvenel, had unequivocably directed him to have the Jecker claims acknowledged.[33] The critical issues of cotton and silver perhaps influenced Thouvenel's dispatch since only one month earlier, in February, 1861, the Confederate States of America had been formed. A war between the States was imminent, and France defensively prepared to meet its effects.

Meanwhile, on the basis of previous instructions, Saligny diligently tried to secure Mexican recognition of the Jecker claims. While negotiations affecting other French claims were impeded because of the impasse over the Swiss banker's affairs, Saligny engaged in a diplomatic duel with Francisco Zarco, Juárez' Minister of Foreign Relations. Zarco was an admirable opponent. When the French Minister argued "loudly and firmly," Zarco finally agreed, orally, that he would accept "in

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[33]Thouvenel to Saligny, March 6, 1861, cited by Bock, Tripartite Convention, pp. 100-101, 123.

principle " Mexican responsibility for the bonds and that he would arrange "the basis of a nature to satisfy M. Jecker." The ambiguity of this did not escape Saligny, who pressed for a written guarantee. To this demand, however, Zarco deftly demurred that certain delays were necessary.[34] The Mexican Government would not ratify Zarco's agreement, and Saligny became more belligerent. Having recognized Juárez before he received Thouvenel's explicit instructions of March 6, Saligny had depleted his diplomatic resources. Six weeks after establishing French relations with the new liberal government, Saligny made his first official request for a French force, "sufficient in power no matter what happens, for the protection of our interests."[35] Sixteen days earlier, the American civil war had begun.

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[34]Saligny to Thouvenel, Mexico City, March 28, 1861, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa de México, II, 220-223. See Saligny-Zarco Convention, March 26, 1861, reprinted in Bock, Tripartite Convention, Appendix E, pp. 491-494.

[35]Saligny to Thouvenel, Mexico City, April 28, 1861, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa de México, II, pp. 231-235.

Shortly after his plea for French force, Saligny met with the Minister of Foreign Relations and with José María Mata, the Minister of Finance. Mata, as adept as Zarco at making oral promises, assured the French Minister that he would defend the Jecker claims in the Mexican Congress. Saligny then threatened the two Mexican Ministers that if the Jecker claims were not honored, France might sever diplomatic relations, with consequences that "would lead to the ruin of your Government and your country." Six days after his conference with Zarco and Mata, the French Minister again requested help from Paris. Asserting that if his government would send gunboats "armed with long-range cannons, . . . I would very well make the dignity and rights of France respected," Saligny proposed that he himself be authorized to employ this force, "according to the necessities of circumstances."[36] The Jeckers had substantial reason to remark that Saligny was

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[36]Saligny to Thouvenel, Mexico City, May 7 and May 9, 1861, cited by Bock, Tripartite Convention, pp. 101-102.

"so useful."[37] Concurrently with Saligny's demands, a monetary debate ensued in the French Senate in May, 1861, about the total lack of silver coin, and the Senate urged the Ministry of Finance to take "immediate action" to rectify the shortage.[38]

Franco-Mexican relations continued to deteriorate. Zarco resorted to his previously successful tactic, delay. The problem, he insisted, was that he lacked authority; recognition of French claims had to be approved by the Mexican Congress which had not yet convened. This failed to mollify Saligny who tenaciously demanded written guarantees. Zarco finally appeared to submit when he wrote to the French Minister that Mexico would adhere to "the principles of international law." In need of a diplomatic triumph, Saligny prematurely exulted over this "written recognition of the principle that

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[37]Louis Elsesser, nephew of J. B. Jecker, to J. B. Jecker, August, 31, 1862, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Doc. No. 23, 37th Cong., 3d sess., Ser. Set 1161, p. 12.

[38]Horn, "La crise monétaire," Journal des économistes, XXI, pp. 6-7.

we are defending."[39] His elation was short-lived. To his dismay, Mexican Foreign Ministers resigned with startling rapidity. Zarco, from whom he had finally extracted a written statement, resigned eight days later, on May 9, 1861.[40] His successor, León Guzmán, would not accept Zarco's concession, although he assured Saligny that he would also resign if unable to settle the Jecker claims. Guzmán duly resigned on June 17.[41] For almost a month, until July 13, there was no Mexican Foreign Minister; the chargé ad interim, Palacio y Magarola, skillfully maintained that he had no authority to decide anything concerning French affairs. Saligny, incensed at these disappearing Foreign Ministers who so adeptly abjured responsibility, complained

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[39]Saligny to Thouvenel, Mexico City, May 9, 1861, cited by Bock, Tripartite Convention, pp. 101-102, 633.

[40]Saligny to Thouvenel, Mexico City, May 18, 1861, Mexico, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa de México, II, pp. 238-241.

[41]Saligny to Thouvenel, Mexico City, June 22, 1861, reprinted in ibid., II, pp. 252-256.

that negotiation about French claims was a "bad joke that has lasted too long."[42]

Intermittently threatening Mexico with termination of French diplomatic relations, Saligny increasingly punctuated his despatches to Paris with appeals for force.[43] On July 17, 1861, the financially harassed Mexican Congress passed a law suspending interest payment on all foreign debts for two years. In the stormy period that followed, the French Minister claimed that the Mexican law was a "new insult, free and premeditated against France."[44] Abrasively demanding annulment of the law within twenty-four hours, Saligny severed diplomatic relations on July 25, 1861.[45]

Four days later, the United States Minister to Mexico, Thomas Corwin, suggested that his country

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[42]Saligny to Thouvenel, Mexico City, No. 32, June 29, 1861, reprinted in ibid., II, pp. 258-260.

[43]Saligny to Thouvenel, Mexico City, July 17, 1861, reprinted in ibid., II, pp. 260-262.

[44]Saligny to Thouvenel, Mexico City, July 27, 1861, reprinted in ibid., II, 262-267.

[45]William Spence Robertson, "The Tripartite Treaty of London," Hispanic American Historical Review, XX (May, 1940), p. 168.

lend money to Mexico for eradication of its foreign debts. The collateral Corwin recommended was all public lands and mineral rights in Sonora, Lower California, Chihuahua, and Sinaloa. He forthrightly wrote Seward, "This would probably end in the cession of the sovereignty to us. It would be certain to end thus if the money were not promptly paid as agreed on."[46] The goals of Raousset-Boulbon, Jecker, and Napoleon III thus resembled those of Corwin, who reminded his secretary of state of the recent discoveries of mineral wealth in Sonora.[47] Seward then told Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, that the United States would pay the two years interest on all Mexican foreign debts, in exchange for mortgages on certain Mexican territory. When Corwin related this to Juárez, however, the offer

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[46]Thomas Corwin to Secretary of State Seward, July 29, 1861, NA, State, Despatches from United States Ministers to Mexico (1823-1906), Vol. XXVIII (December 21, 1859-February 5, 1862), Microcopy 97, Roll 29.

[47]Corwin to Seward, August 28, 1861, ibid.

was declined.[48] Six months later, with French, Spanish and British troops actually on Mexican soil, Juárez changed his mind and signed a treaty with the United States on April 6, 1862. This further agitated the French, who heatedly protested--on the basis that they had claims to the land proposed as collateral.[49]

The Jecker claims and Mexico's suspension of international payments served as pretexts for French intervention. When Lord Cowley, British Minister to France, protested the exorbitant demands and Napoleon's protection of Jecker, the French Emperor admitted that he himself had insisted the claims be made excessive, to prohibit Juárez' acceptance of a settlement.[50] This is corroborated

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[48]Corwin received these instructions on September 27, 1861. Bancroft, History of Mexico, VI, pp. 22-23n.

[49]Romero to Seward, February 6, 1865, reminding Seward of the French protests of April 15, 1862, reprinted in U. S. House, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. I, Part III, No. 1, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Ser. Set 1246, pp. 500-502.

[50]Cowley-Napoleon III Conversation, March 8, 1862, in Bock, Tripartite Convention, p. 480. Also see Cowley to Russell, March 14, 1862, extract

by corollary French actions. More than a month before the Mexican Congress refused to honor the Jecker claims, the French Foreign Minister had investigated potential naval support.[51] The French Minister of Marine and Colonies assured Thouvenel on July 2, 1861, fifteen days before Mexico suspended international interest payments, that his request could be satisfied.[52]

The fate of J. B. Jecker and his claims, supported by the French government, stimulated great interest. When the Mexican government arrested the Swiss financier in 1862, ministers from Prussia to Peru protested. Even the United States Minister,

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reprinted in Lucía de Robina, Reconciliación de México y Francia, 1870-1880, Archivo Histórico Diplomatico Mexicano, (hereinafter cited as AHDM), 2d series, No. 16 (México: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1963), pp. 188-189; Russell to Wyke, London, March 15, 1862, reprinted in Montluc, Correspondance de Juárez et de Montluc, VI, 338-340.

[51]Thouvenel to Minister of Marine and Colonies, June 12, 1861, cited by Bock, Tripartite Convention, p. 123.

[52]Minister of Marine and Colonies to Thouvenel, Paris, July 2, 1861, cited by ibid., p. 128.

evoking a reprimand from both President Lincoln and the Congress, unexpectedly interceded in his behalf.[53] The allied invasion of Mexico, however, exposed Jecker's claims to discerning scrutiny. Spanish, British and French troops arrived in December, 1861, and in January, 1862.[54] At the first allied conference in Mexico, on January 9, it was decided that each minister should prepare a list of reparations. At the second conference, Saligny expressed the impossibility of setting a specific amount and, as the other ministers were in a similar predicament, a mixed commission was proposed. Saligny opposed this suggested arbitration, and at the third conference, on January 13, he set French claims at twelve million dollars, a figure that the British Minister agreed was probably

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[53]Corwin to Juan Antonio de la Fuente, Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 2, 1862, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Doc. No. 23, 37th Cong., 3d sess., Ser. Set 1161, p. 24. Letters on Jecker's behalf are in ibid., pp. 3-37.

[54]The Spanish fleet arrived December 14, 1861; the British and French fleets on January 6 and January 7, 1862. Zamacois, Historia de Méjico, XV, 820-824.

within a million or two, either way, of the correct amount.[55] When Saligny additionally demanded reimbursement of fifteen million dollars to J. B. Jecker, however, the Spanish and British commissioners declared this inadmissible.[56] At this time, in January, 1862, Jecker was still a Swiss citizen; it was not until two months later, on March 26, that he was naturalized, with great haste, as a French citizen.[57] Disgusted with France, the British and the Spanish prepared to leave Mexico on April 9. Ten days later, a pronunciamiento in Córdoba proclaimed the French-supported Juan Nepomuceno Almonte to be the supreme chief of Mexico. In

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[55]Matías Romero, Historia de las intrigas europeas que ocasionaron la intervención francesa en México (México: Imprenta del gobierno, J. M. Sandoval, 1868), pp. 92-100.

[56]Francisco de Paula de Arrangoiz [y Berzábal], Méjico desde 1808 hasta 1867 (4 vols.; Madrid: M. Rivadeneyra, 1871-1872), II, 361; III, pp. 20-21. Charles L. Wyke to Lord Russell, Veracruz, January 19, 1862, reprinted in Robina, Reconciliación de México y Francia, AHDM, pp. 141-146.

[57]Kératry, La créance Jecker, pp. 18-19.

support of Almonte against Juárez, six thousand Frenchmen then turned toward Puebla.[58]

Jecker had served the French well by providing them with both a pretext for intervention and a claim on a portion of Sonora. His 1856 surveying contract was of crucial importance to France. The Mexican government had granted one-half of its portion of Sonora's unclaimed land, as determined by the Jecker survey, to Antonio and Manuel Escandón, in exchange for construction of a railroad from Veracruz to Acapulco.[59] This contract of April 5, 1861, had stipulated that the Escandón brothers would receive the titles to Sonora property on completion of the

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[58]Arrangoiz, Méjico, III, 69-70.

[59]For the Escandóns' earlier connections with Jecker, Raousset-Boulbon, and Sonora, see Levasseur to Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 27 and April 30, 1853; Alphonse Dano to Minister of Fpreogm Affairs, July 18, 1853, September 1, 1853; Alexis de Gabriac to Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 31, 1854, June 26, 1857, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa de México, I, pp. 31-39; 40-45; 55-58; 64-65; 157-159; 421-423.

line from Mexico City to Puebla. According to this grant by Juárez' government, the Escandóns could freely cede their rights to a third party. When the French arrived in Mexico in 1862, they significantly modified the contract: the Escandóns, cooperating with Napoleon, exchanged their rights to land in Sonora for cash payments and long-term bonds.[60] Having now obtained substantial concessions, the Emperor encountered an American entrepreneur, William McKendree Gwin, who, he believed, could be extremely useful in the organization of silver-mining operations in Sonora.

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[60]Daniel Cosío Villegas, Historia moderna de México: La república restaurada (3 vols.), II: La vida económica (México: Editorial Hermes, 1955), pp. 619-622. The French agreement with the Escandóns was signed December 23, 1862. Subsequent concessions by the Empire to these brothers are in ibid., pp. 632-633.

CHAPTER VI

WILLIAM MC KENDREE GWIN: IMPERIAL ENTREPRENEUR FOR SONORA

William McKendree Gwin, a former senator from California, moved to Paris in September, 1863, because of the American Civil War.[1] Within a matter of weeks this colorful American was visiting the Tuileries at the invitation of the French Emperor. Gwin, an opportunist wanting wealth, then became a participant in Napoleon's plans for Sonora. What did he have to offer? What were his plans for Sonora?[2]

Gwin's entrance into the social, political, and economic life of the Second Empire had begun shortly after his arrival in France at the home of his friend and fellow exile, William W. Corcoran,

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[1]Gwin was California's first United States senator along with John Charles Fremont, and had served for twelve years.

[2]These were all collected and reprinted in Coleman, ed., "Senator Gwin's Plan for the Colonization of Sonora," Overland Monthly, XVII and XVIII (May-August, 1891). They will be analyzed here in an attempt to get a better understanding of Napoleon's plans for Sonora.

a prominent Washington banker who had established himself in Parisian society. As California's senator for over a decade, Gwin had previously met the Marquis de Montholon, former French consul in New York, and he now renewed this acquaintanceship at Corcoran's home.[3] When conversation turned to Mexico, Montholon, aware of Gwin's experience with Californian mining problems and intrigued by his knowledge of Sonora, realized that this American would be of interest to Napoleon.[4]

Recently appointed minister to Mexico, Montholon arranged to meet with Gwin the following day. During this private conference the French marquis and the California senator expanded their discussion of the previous evening to include

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[3]Gwin had, of course, been acutely involved with opposition to French activities in Sonora in the 1850's. For his protests, see Congressional Globe, 32d Cong., 2d sess., Appendix, pp. 100, 130-33, 146.

[4]Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, January 8, 1865, summarizing Napoleon's interest in and earlier instructions concerning Gwin, "whose projects of colonization the Emperor has recommended to Marshal Bazaine," reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, IV, 74-77. Also see Lately Thomas, Between Two Empires: The Life Story of California's First Senator, William McKendree Gwin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), p. 293.

potential development plans for northern Mexico's mineral resources.[5] Montholon then made influential contacts. Within a month after his arrival in Paris, Gwin received invitations from the two most powerful men in France: the Duc de Morny, president of the corps législatif, and the Emperor Napoleon III.[6] Before the year had ended, Napoleon had introduced Gwin to Achille Fould, his finance minister, and Drouyn de Lhuys, his minister of foreign affairs.[7]

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[5]Hallie Mae McPherson, "William McKendree Gwin: Expansionist" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1931), pp. 252-53. While imprisoned at Fort Jackson after the Civil War, Gwin alleged that Montholon, then French minister to the United States, was "entirely responsible" for Gwin's participation in Napoleon's enterprise. Gwin to Montholon, October 15, 1865, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVIII (August, 1891), 209.

[6]Morny to Gwin, September 17, 1863, reprinted in ibid., p. 205.

[7]Fould to Gwin, December 15, 1863; Drouyn de Lhuys to Gwin, December 29, 1863. Both reprinted in ibid., p. 212.

The French had been interested in Mexican silver in general and Sonora mines in particular before Gwin arrived in Paris.[8] On May 27, 1863, only ten days after the strategic capture of Puebla, the French General Elie Frédéric Forey prohibited all exportation of gold or silver from Mexico.[9] Shortly after this, Emile Ollivier reported that Alphonse Lamartine "talked extensively about the expedition to Mexico, which he greatly supported, because our intervention . . .would enable us to obtain incalculable riches with the exploitation of the mines of Sonora."[10] Even before the occupation of Mexico City

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[8]Gwin, "Memoirs of Hon. William M. Gwin," ed. by William Henry Ellison, California Historical Society Quarterly, XIX (June, 1940), 178. Also see pp. 155-156 for French moves to get Sonora's mineral rights in 1862.

[9]José Sebastián Segura, ed., Boletín de las leyes del Imperio mexicano ó sea Código de la restauración (4 vols.: México: Imprenta literaria, 1863-64), I, 28-29; 283-84. Forey made this announcement, in effect until September 7, 1863, on the advice of M. Budin, Intendent of Finances sent to Mexico by Napoleon.

[10]Emile Ollivier, La intervención francesa y el imperio de Maximiliano en México (2d ed.; México: Ediciones Centenario, 1963), p. 101. This conversation centered on French election results of May 30-31, 1863.

in June, 1863, the French ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works had sent M. Laur to Sonora for a detailed report of mineral wealth there.[11] Timing seemed important in the spring and summer of 1863. Before and during the months Laur was in Sonora, European ministries heard reports that President Juárez was willing to sell northern Mexican provinces to the United States.[12] Supplementing Laur's study, the French Minister of Public Instruction appointed another commission in 1863 to make a scientific expedition into Sonora. In

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[11]Charles Blanchot, Mémoires, L'Intervention Française au Mexique (3 vols.; Paris: Emile Nourry, 1911), II, 254. Laur stopped his explorations in October, 1863, because of Apache raids. Bazaine to Napoleon III, October 26, 1863, Bazaine Archives, 1862-1867 (26 vols.; 5,265 leaves), in the Latin American Library, University of Texas, Austin, I, f. 183.

[12]Juárez was particularly perturbed that this assertion was made by M. O'Donnell, president of the council of ministers of the Spanish government, in his reply to the speech of the crown. Juárez to the editor of the Diario, National Palace, México, February 22, 1863, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Vol. I, Part III, No. 1, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Ser. Set 1246, p. 496.

early 1864 this second commission reported, "The studies of gold and silver extracted from this region show that the metals there are comparable to the richest districts of central Mexico."[13]

These actions before Gwin arrived were coupled with indirect means to acquire the mineral rights of Sonora. In August, 1863, the French Foreign Minister delineated the "direct interest" France had in Mexican finances. Forthrightly stating, "We have the right to exercise an active fiscal influence upon the administration of the finances," Drouyn de Lhuys specified that special French agents, delegated by the Minister of Finance, would continue to facilitate the reorganization of finances. An "indisputable" commission, instituted

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[13]Article 4, Document from Minister of Finance, Paris, February 25, 1864, concerning Finances of Mexico, in Hausarchiv Kaiser Maximilians von Mexiko, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Box 33, Fasc. 17, Part II, Doc. 8 (hereinafter cited as HHUSA). This report is in Archives de la commission scientifique du Mexique (Paris, 1864-65), a copy of which was in Maximilian's personal library, according to Corti, Maximilian, II, 960. Also see "Informe del ingeniero de minas P. Laur sobre la riqueza minera de México," August 28, 1864, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, IV, 18-24. Laur reported, "This area contains the finest gold and silver. The existence of mines examined, which have never been exploited, in both Sonora and Sinaloa is most evident. . . .The gold and silver, as well as other metals, are abundant in Sonora, Sinaloa and Chihuahua. The greatest mineral deposits are in these areas."

under the French ministry of Foreign affairs, would settle all claims. Drouyn de Lhuys now mentioned a significant second set of claims, based on military expenses incurred by the expedition. These military costs, to be reimbursed by the French-sponsored Mexican government, constituted the basis for Napoleon's attempt to obtain mineral rights in Sonora.[14] By September, 1863, the French were prepared to invade Sonora.

Although specific dates are unfortunately missing from Gwin's memoirs and letters, he arrived in Paris "early" in September.[15] French moves before his arrival, his early reception by the Emperor, and the rapid events of September, 1863, indicate that Napoleon was ready to implement direct steps to obtain Sonora's silver wealth.[16]

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[14]Drouyn de Lhuys to Bazaine, August 17, 1863, reprinted in La Sociedad, n.d., pp. 1-2, enclosed in a despatch from Thomas Corwin to Seward, December 26, 1863, NA, State, Despatches from United States Ministers to Mexico, Vol. 30, Microcopy 97, Roll 32.

[15]Thomas, Between Two Empires, p. 279.

[16]Corti, Maximilian and Charlotte, I, pp. 326-27, erroneously states that Gwin drew Napoleon's attention to Sonora's mines. Napoleon's interest in the silver of Sonora antedated Gwin's arrival in Paris.

He had now found an experienced entrepreneur to organize the development of Sonora--hopefully to parallel or exceed the spectacular wealth of California.[17] Napoleon introduced Gwin to the French finance minister who, after two interviews, asked him to submit mining plans to the minister of foreign affairs. These proposals were then adopted at a meeting of the Council of State, over which the Emperor presided.[18] Napoleon then instructed Bazaine to have the Mexican government "cede to the French government rights . . .to all unclaimed mines in Sonora."[19]

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[17]Gustave Léon Niox, L'Expédition du Mexique, 1861-67. Récit politique et militaire (Paris: Librairie militaire de J. Dumoine, 1874), p. 503. Napoleon's judgment of Gwin's mining and business ability was later proven sound. In 1868 Gwin, returning to California from France, purchased and revitalized a neglected gold mine in Calaveras County. Within two years it yielded from $15,000 to $20,000 per month in gold bullion and, for some decades, it continued to be one of California's largest gold-producing mines. Thomas, Between Two Empires, 368-73.

[18]Lefèvre, Documents officiels, II, 91-95; McPherson, "William McKendree Gwin," p. 254, citing Gwin, Memoirs, 220.

[19]Napoleon to Bazaine, December 16, 1863, reprinted in García, ed., Documentos inéditos, XVII, 75-77. Thomas,

Gwin's mining plans for Sonora revealed audacity and practicality. While his frontier bluntness had appealed to a Bonaparte, his lack of finesse appalled a Habsburg. Gwin informed Maximilian that his interest in northern Mexico stemmed from his senatorial days when he was instrumental in creating the territory of Arizona and in framing the boundary portion of the Gadsden Treaty, which ceded Mexican territory to the United States. During these investigations he had discovered valuable, but idle, silver mines in Sonora and Chihuahua.[20]

Between Two Empires, p. 298. Maximilian was not in Paris until March, 1864, and Gwin's first interview with him was at that time. McPherson, "Gwin," p. 254.

[20]Gwin to Maximilian, September, 1863, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), 499-501. Ironically, Juan Nepumoceno Almonte, grand marshal of Maximilian's court and later his minister to France, had been the Mexican minister assigned the painful task of working with Gwin and Senator Rush of Texas in the severence of this land from Mexico. Almonte was understandably hostile to Gwin and his mining plans. Ibid., p. 514. Actually, Gwin had favored expansion southward since 1846. Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st sess., 206-210, 882; Gwin, "Memoirs," California Historical Society Quarterly, XIX (June, 1940), pp. 177-178.

Disregarding European wariness about the expansionist tendencies of the United States, Gwin related his involvement with a Sonoran surveying contract in the late 1850's between "certain parties" and the central Mexican government.[21] The link from Raousset-Boulbon to Jecker stretched on to William McKendree Gwin, as the "parties" he referred to included the surveyors employed by Captain Isham under the Jecker, Torre and Company contract of 1856: the Americans, Whiting and Stone.[22] When they were refused their portion of Sonora, they sought redress from the United States government and extravagantly claimed that Sonora's mineral wealth was superior to California. Ironically, in the context of the Jecker-Gwin connection in the 1860's, it was the California Senator, William McKendree Gwin, whom they asked to advance their cause with the President to enable them to complete their survey and recoup their expenditures.[23]

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[21] Ibid., 499.

[22] McPherson, "William McKendree Gwin," p. 252, citing the San Francisco Bulletin, November 19, 1859. See supra, pp. 136-137.

[23] Gwin to Maximilian, September, 1863, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), p. 500. For Gwin's cooperative

Gwin had presented them to President Buchanan, who, convinced that the rights of United States citizens had been violated, directed the Secretary of War to send General Winfield Scott to Sonora with one thousand dragoons and artillery. However, there was more involved than the mere fulfillment of a contract. Captain Stone recommended using this military contingent as the nucleus for a mining settlement to attract thousands of miners, subdue the Indians, and cause Sonora to increase in population as rapidly as California. The rationale was that the United States, bound under the Gadsden Treaty to protect Mexico against wild Indian tribes, could best meet this obligation by establishing a large population in Sonora.[24] However, twenty-four

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part in the resolution offered by Senator Sam Houston concerning the establishment of a protectorate over Mexico and Central American states, see Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 1st sess., 735-36, and Senate Journal, 35th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 198, 362, 583.

[24]Gwin to Maximilian, September, 1863, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), p. 500. Gwin is probably referring here to Article XI of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which was revoked by Article II of the Gadsden Treaty. For the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, see U. S., Statutes at Large, Vol. IX, pt. 2 (December, 1845-March, 1851), "Treaty of Peace,

hours after President Buchanan gave these orders, he revoked them, and Gwin denounced Buchanan's "vacillating policy." He was now enthusiastic about plans, which would, he claimed, "accomplish more important results . . . ."[25]

At this point, Maximilian must have been dubious as to any supportive role Gwin could play in Mexico. But Gwin hastily detailed the services he could render Maximilian and Mexico. The vulnerability of the northern Mexican border to marauding bands of Indians and "the more dangerous designs of an adjacent turbulent and aggressive government" could be ameliorated by populating this area with loyal imperialists who would create

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Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico," February 2, 1848, Art. 11, p. 930. For the Gadsden Treaty, see U. S., Statutes at Large, Vol. X, pt. 2 (December, 1851-March, 1855), "Treaty with Mexico," December 30, 1853, Art. 2, p. 1033.

[25]Gwin to Maximilian, September, 1863, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), 500; Evan J. Coleman, "Dr. Gwin and Judge Black on Buchanan," Overland Monthly (January, 1892), 87-92.

a secure frontier.[26] He claimed that Sonora's rich mineral deposits would attract thousands of miners if immigrants were assured of initial military protection. Gwin pointed out various mining bonanzas in the United States which, within a few months, had brought large numbers of miners to previously desolate areas. He particularly stressed California's population increase from 15,000 in 1849 to more than 500,000 by 1861, and the inference is clear that his political experience during those dramatic twelve years would be most valuable for the new Empire.[27]

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[26] Ibid., 501. Gwin had a valid argument. Two months later, on November 20, 1863, Seward inquired of Matías Romero, Juárez' minister to the United States, about the authority of General José Domingo Cortés, a Spaniard who presented himself to Seward as the representative of Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Durango. Cortés had solicited Seward for these states to be annexed to the United States, but Romero assured Seward that Cortés was an "intriguer" who had no authority to make such an offer. Romero to Seward, July 9, 1864, referring to his November 20, 1863, conference with Seward, with enclosures from Luis Terrazas, Chihuahua, January 11, 1864, and F. García Morales, Sinaloa, January 24, 1864; Seward to Romero, July 15, 1864, House Executive Documents, Vol. I, Part III, No. 1, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Ser. Set 1246, pp. 576-78.

[27] Gwin to Maximilian, September, 1863, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), 501.

Gwin requested no personal concessions in this memorandum. His objectives appear to have been three-fold: to relate his familiarity, as a former United States senator, with Mexico; to impress Maximilian of the latent mineral value of Sonora; and to emphasize the benefits, and necessity, of populating Mexico's northern frontier. However, to an Austrian archduke with European apprehensions concerning United States aggrandizement, Gwin's acknowledgment of his earlier participation in divesting Mexico of territory made him uncomfortable and alarmed. Maximilian "did not perceive the prime importance which Napoleon placed upon the matter" of obtaining the silver of Sonora's mines.[28] When José María Gutiérrez de Estrada, a Mexican monarchist in Rome, suggested that many Confederates were favorable to a monarchy, Maximilian noted in the margin of the letter, "They have always been, and will always be, the sworn adversaries of Mexico whatever the form of its government." When Gutiérrez commented that Gwin

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[28]Blumberg, Diplomacy of the Mexican Empire, p. 12. Also see Corti, Maximilian, I, 327, 341; II, 449.

was "a real pioneer," Maximilian countered, "Yes! A pioneer for the South."[29]

As the Mexican press editorialized, "The greed which not only our neighboring enemies but other foreigners have for Sonora is not new," the French Minister tried to acquire mineral rights to Sonora.[30] In February, 1864, the Marquis de Montholon, now French Minister to Mexico, concluded a convention with the Mexican Council of Regency which placed Sonora under the "direct and sovereign protection" of France for fifteen years. France was to be granted all rights of prospecting for metals and, in return, a ten-per-cent royalty on the net proceeds would be given to the Mexican Treasury.[31] This convention, ostensibly designed

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[29]Daniel Dawson, The Mexican Adventure (London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 1935), pp. 335-36, citing letters in the Wiener Staats Archiv., Archiv Kaiser Max., Gutiérrez to Baron de Pont, October 24, November 18, December 31, 1863; Gwin to Gutiérrez, memorandum, October, 1863.

[30]Hanna, "Immigration Movement," p. 238, quoting El cronista, January 22, 1864; Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, February 9, 1864, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, III, 325-29, referring to instructions given him in Paris.

[31]Convención de 1864, signed by the Marquis de Montholon, José Miguel Arroyo, and M. Castillo, February 17, 1864, HHUSA, Box 140. See Appendix. While the convention included only Sonora, there

to pay Mexico's debts to France, particularly stressed expenses incurred by the military expedition.[32] Although no territory was actually ceded, Maximilian adamantly opposed this action of the Regency.[33] He likewise unequivocably rejected a proposed Treaty of Miramar that included cession of Sonora's mineral rights to France.[34]

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were later plans to form companies between both empires that would also regenerate mines in Lower California, Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Durango to meet Mexico's obligations. Vela Leatrice Lynn, "The Political Career of Teodosio Lares, 1848-1867" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1951), 270-71.

[32]This is alluded to in the letter of August 17, 1863, from Drouyn de Lhuys to Bazaine before Gwin ever arrived in Paris. NA, State, Minister Despatches, Microcopy 97, Roll 31, Vol. 30.

[33]Shortly after Maximilian's arrival in Mexico, he dismissed José Miguel Arroyo, Undersecretary of State for the Regency, who had concluded the convention with Montholon. Corti, Maximilian, II, 426-27; Blanchot, L'Intervention Francaise, II, 255. Lefêvre, a political opponent of Napoleon and an adherent of the Mexican Republican Government, stated that Napoleon insisted on inclusion of an article in the Treaty of Miramar which would ratify all acts of the Regency, in order to guarantee French sovereignty over Sonora. Maximilian, declaring he would not accept the Mexican crown under such conditions, refused to accept this proposed clause. Lefevre, Documents officiels, II, 91-92.

[34]Projet de convention pour le maintien d'un corps auxiliaire francais au Mexique, February 10, 1864, HHUSA, Maximilian, Box 12. See Appendix.

Plans for Sonora continued in Paris. At the request of the French minister of foreign affairs, Gwin submitted a memorandum to Napoleon on January 5, 1864. Correctly surmising that the success of his mining project depended on the French Emperor's support, he emphasized the advantages to both France and Mexico if "one of the richest" mineral areas in America were developed. Referring to a previous interview with Napoleon, Gwin requested a small military force to protect early immigrants from Indian depredations.[35]

Gwin's plan required Maximilian's approval to enter Sonora and Napoleon's military aid to subdue the Indians. Consistently pointing to immense financial and commercial benefits, Gwin claimed that royalty from mining concessions and customs revenue from supplies for new settlers would enable Maximilian to pay the debt to France and to alleviate the entire indebtedness of the

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[35]Gwin to Napoleon III, January 5, 1864, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), 501-502.

Mexican Empire.[36] Later in 1864 he was more specific, as perhaps he was in personal conversation during these first months of negotiation, about his role in the unprecedented growth and wealth of California.[37] His former political stature there, he asserted, would provide confidence in the stability of Sonora's development which would attract miners from the United States.[38] While Gwin presented proposals, French engineers submitted mining surveys of Sonora that substantiated all claims of the great mineral wealth available there.[39]

In March of 1864, again at the request of the French minister of foreign affairs, Gwin prepared for Napoleon extended plans to develop western

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[36] Ibid., 502.

[37] Memorandum Accompanying the Project of a Treaty Giving a Concession of the Mines of North Mexico to France, reprinted in ibid., pp. 511-12.

[38] Gwin to Napoleon III, January 5, 1864, reprinted in ibid., 502.

[39] Article 4, Document from Minister of Finance, Paris, February 25, 1864, concerning Finances of Mexico, HHUSA, Box 33, Fasc. 17, Part II, Doc. 8.

Chihuahua in addition to Sonora.[40] Baron Henri Mercier, former French minister to the United States and Gwin's acquaintance since the 1850's when they were both in Washington, took these plans to Drouyn de Lhuys, who presented them to the French Emperor. They were next submitted, through the Mexican minister to France, José Manuel Hidalgo, to Maximilian, then in Paris working out details of the Treaty of Miramar with Napoleon.[41] Maximilian invited Gwin to the Tuileries and, according to Gwin, he approved and supported the proposals.[42]

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[40]"Note by Gwin," reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), 497, 503-505. At this same time, March, 1864, Roger Dubos, French Vice-consul in Chihuahua, made favorable reports on the great mineral wealth of Chihuahua. Roger Dubos, "Notice sur les Mines de l'Etat de Chihuahua," Doc. 19414, cited by Luis Weckmann, Las relaciones franco-mexicanas, with a preface by Daniel Cosío Villegas (2 vols.; México: Secretaría de relaciones exteriores, 1961-1962), II, 319-320.

[41]"Note by Gwin," reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), 497, 502; Doc. 19417, March, 1864, M. Gwin, "Exposé d'un plan de colonisation dans les Etats de Sonora et Chihuahua," cited by Weckmann, Las relaciones franco-mexicanas, II, 320-321.

[42]"Note by Gwin," reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), 497. This apparent duplicity should be considered

These new plans drawn up by Gwin would create a yet unnamed military department that would include the eastern portion of Sonora and the western portion of Chihuahua, with boundaries carefully drawn to avoid lands already occupied. This largely uninhabited area would be declared imperial domain, open to settlement, and all mining claims not occupied and worked at the date of the projected decree would be open to "the first comers."[43] The Mexican treasury would receive six per cent, paid in bullion, of the gross proceeds of all the gold and silver mines.[44] Drawing on his Californian experiences, Gwin assured honest reports and receipts by the establishment of military protection, government assay offices, and reduction works. He

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against Maximilian's refusal, at this very time, to include a cession of Sonora's mineral rights to France in the Treaty of Miramar.

[43]Gwin's "Plan of Colonization in Sonora and Chihuahua," and "Notes Explanatory of the Plan of Colonization in Sonora and Chihuahua," Paris, March, 1864, reprinted in ibid., pp. 502-503.

[44]Note the contrast here with the Montholon-Regency Treaty, mentioned above, which provided for ten per cent of the net proceeds for the Mexican Treasury. This change is noted, but not explained, in Hidalgo to Maximilian, April 30, 1864, which referred to Gwin's meeting with Maximilian in Paris. HHUSA, Box 19, Part II, 264-65.

proposed that a tribunal, appointed by Maximilian, be established to adjudicate previous mine claims which, if found valid, would be paid compensation from the imperial treasury, thus avoiding costly litigation for miners. Gwin interestingly concluded, "All grants of land or mining privileges which have been made within the boundaries of said Department since the landing at Vera Cruz of the joint 'Army of Occupation' of France, England, and Spain, to be declared null and void."[45]

Imitating Stone's 1859 request for United States military protection, Gwin suggested that the French army provide a thousand mounted men and a battery of mountain howitzers to protect miners against both Indian depredations and any "desperate characters" infiltrating among honest emigrants. He insisted that these French soldiers be the best in Mexico, and he proposed that the proceeds of

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[45]Gwin's "Plan of Colonization in Sonora and Chihuahua," and "Notes Explanatory of the Plan of Colonization in Sonora and Chihuahua," Paris, March, 1864, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), pp. 502-505.

mines assigned to the military be divided pro rata, according to rank. "They would all in that event come away rich at the end of their service." Gwin carefully weighed routes and months of military marches to coincide with the July rainy season, thus providing food and water for horses and men, and enabling engineers to build dams for mining operations during the dry season.

Aware of the vulnerability of Mexico, Gwin insisted that mining emigrants from Canada, France, Germany, Spain, South America, and the United States would furnish vital support for Maximilian.[46] Following an interview on March 12, 1864, with the former French minister to the United States, Gwin alluded to the uneasiness of Napoleon and Maximilian about American designs. He then admitted, "I do not deny that at present there is danger of Sonora being lost to the Mexican Crown. It is entirely destitute of protection,--a waif floating about, to be picked up by the first comers."[47] Juan N. Almonte, President

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Gwin to Mercier, March 12, 1864, ibid., 505.

of the Regency, had also reminded Maximilian about the susceptibility of this region.[48]

In March, 1864, both the French and the United States were aware that Sonora and other northern states were nominally controlled by Juárez.[49] Napoleon ordered French troops to Sonora, ostensibly to counter California emigrants reported to have landed at Guaymas to claim land grants made by the Mexican President. The French chargé d'affaires to the United States, Louis de Geoffroy, heatedly protested these concessions from Juarez. Seward replied that while he appreciated such "frankness," he had no knowledge of such an emigration, and he assured Geoffroy that the United States would maintain its neutrality.[50] Meanwhile, on

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[48]Almonte to Maximilian, November 27, 1863, Mexico, Almonte correspondence, 1862-1866, from HHUSA, copies in the Barker Library, University of Texas.

[49]Thomas Corwin to Seward, March 28, 1864, NA, State, Ministers' Despatches, Microcopy 97, Roll 31, Vol. 30.

[50]Louis de Geoffroy to Seward, Washington, April 3, 1864; Seward to Geoffroy, Washington, April 6, 1864. Both letters reprinted in House Executive Documents, Vol. I, Part III, No. 1, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Ser. Set 1246, pp. 723-724.

March 28, Napoleon sent General Charles Auguste de Frossard, his aide-de-camp and inspector-general of artillery, to Miramar to obtain Maximilian's acquiescence of French control in Sonora.[51] Maximilian refused to commit himself;[52] on April 14, 1864, his imperial ship left Trieste for Mexico. Two Emperors were now involved in the fate of Sonora's mineral wealth.

As the French moved towards Sonora, they pressed the Mexican Minister in Paris to obtain Maximilian's approval. José Manuel Hidalgo, the most influential Mexican in France, had been instrumental in both the encouragement of intervention and in the selection of Maximilian.[53] Now in the uncomfortable position of trying to placate

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[51] Corti, Maximilian, I, 327, 339-41; Suzanne Desternes and Henriette Chandet, Maximilien et Charlotte (Paris: Librairie Academique Perrin, 1964), p. 191.

[52] Maximilian to Napoleon III, April 8, 1864, reprinted in Corti, Maximilian, I, 402.

[53] José Manuel Hidalgo, Notes secrètes de M. Hidalgo à développer le jour où il conviendra d'écrire l'histoire de la fondation de l'empire mexicain, HHUSA, Box 19, No. 46.

two Emperors, Hidalgo wrote the Mexican foreign minister that he had pointed out to the French foreign minister the highly delicate nature of Gwin's plans for Sonora because of the precedent set by American colonists in Texas.[54] Then Hidalgo perfunctorily forwarded Gwin's French supported proposals to Maximilian.

Amidst the complex issues spinning off from the American civil war, Hidalgo feared Southern intrigues in Sonora, in spite of his sympathy for the Confederate cause.[55] His diplomatic colleague Francisco de Arrangoiz, aware of this letter from Hidalgo to Maximilian, mistakenly castigated Gwin as the "active agent" responsible for sundering California from Mexico.[56] He portrayed the sen-

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[54]Hidalgo to J. M. Arroyo, April 29, 1864, Doc. 19415, cited by Weckmann, Las relaciones franco-mexicanas, II, 320; Hidalgo to J. M. Arroyo, May 14, 1864, Doc. 19420, ibid., 321.

[55]Hidalgo to Maximilian, April 30, 1864, HHUSA, Box 19, Part II, 264-65.

[56]Arrangoiz to Maximilian, April 30, 1864, ibid., Box 18, Konvolut A, Docs. 18-19. The bitterness of Mexicans towards Californians is understandable, considering the filibustering attempts emanating from that state in the 1850's.

ator as a man of no principle who planned to unite Sonora, Sinaloa, California and Oregon in an independent republic.[57] Hidalgo was equally but more subtly alarmed. He informed his new Emperor that while Drouyn de Lhuys insisted on a "prompt resolution" of French plans for Sonora, he would dutifully await Maximilian's instructions.[58] Meanwhile, Drouyn de Lhuys told Montholon that his treaty concerning Sonora had "perfectly penetrated in this question the views of the Government of the Emperor."[59]

Six weeks later Hidalgo revealed intense French pressure for Mexican acceptance of Gwin's plans. Mercier, now reassigned to Madrid, and Drouyn de Lhuys continued their steady insistence that Maximilian reimburse French expenditures. Hidalgo, distressed that negotiations about Sonora

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Hidalgo to Maximilian, April 30, 1864, HHUSA, Box 19, Part II, 265. Also see Hidalgo to Arroyo, Paris, April 30, 1864, reprinted in Lefèvre, Documents officiels, p. 94.

[59] Hanna and Hanna, Napoleon III, p. 173, citing Drouyn de Lhuys to Montholon, March 31, 1864, CP, Mexique, LXI.

had escalated to occupy most of his time as Mexican minister to France, urged Maximilian to evaluate Gwin's proposals.[60] A year later the charge is made against Hidalgo that he represented French interests more than Mexican.[61] While there is certainly truth in this judgment, Hidalgo seems most of all to want the Sonoran issue resolved. He cynically repeated news from the United States that Gwin would supposedly become "the Duke of Sonora"--an emotional accusation that he realized would negatively influence the former Archduke of Austria. At the same time, Gwin's unfounded protests to the French foreign minister that Hidalgo had not forwarded his proposals on to the Mexican Emperor disturbed him. Almost plaintively, Hidalgo begged Maximilian to consider his previous dispatches on Sonora and to consult with M. Roger Dubos, French vice-consul in Chihuahua, whom he recommended as an "honorable and intelligent" man.[62]

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[60]Hidalgo to Maximilian, May 15, 1864, ibid., Box 19, Part II, 281-82.

[61]Corti, Maximilian, II, 518.

[62]Hidalgo to Maximilian, May 15, 1864, HHUSA, Box 19, Part II, 281-282.

Failing to please either the Mexican or French court, Hidalgo eventually incurred the wrath of both.

At this time, in the winter and spring of 1863-1864, Lincoln and Seward, uneasy about French supplies to the Confederate navy, assiduously avoided confrontations with France.[63] However, on April 4, 1864, the United States Congress passed a resolution protesting the "deplorable events transpiring in Mexico," causing Drouyn de Lhuys to ask Dayton bluntly, "Do you bring us peace or bring us war?"[64] Seward, aware that this was not the time for "idle menaces" to Napoleon, believed there was was no need to "gasconade about Mexico when we are in a struggle for our own life."[65] Thus the French were encouraged to continue their optimism about United States neutrality.

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[63]White, American Opinion of France, p. 157.

[64]Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1408, 2475.

[65]Seward to Bigelow, May 21, 1864, quoted by Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), VII, 107.

On June 1, 1864, a month and a half after Emperor Maximilian left Trieste for Mexico, William McKendree Gwin, buoyant with hope, left Southampton.[66] During the nine months since he had arrived in France, he had had frequent interviews with the Duc de Morny, two of them in the month before his departure.[67] Confessing that his former ambitions had been for political power, Gwin admitted that he was now seeking only personal wealth. Any hesitation he had concerning future obstacles, especially Mexican prejudice against Americans, was interspersed with confidence that two Emperors supported him. Gwin had recognized the nationalism that would, indeed, defeat him, and he erroneously believed that Maximilian favored his plan for Sonora.[68]

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[66]Blattner, "Political Career of Gwin," 112.

[67]Morny to Gwin, May 4, 1864; Morny to Gwin, May 26, 1864, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVIII (August, 1891), 205.

[68]Gwin to his brother, June 1, 1864, reprinted in ibid., 206. Gwin had been financially buffeted by the Civil War, as his investments and property were primarily in the war-torn South.

Gwin's departure for Mexico caused a flurry of diplomatic letters. John Slidell, Confederate commissioner to France, informed Judah P. Benjamin, Confederate secretary of state, that Napoleon had directed Bazaine to help Gwin.[69] The "most important movement . . . towards the mineral region of Sonora" was prepared and, "as instructed," Montholon assured Drouyn de Lhuys, "Gwin will accompany the General."[70] Slidell apparently thought Gwin's project, approved by the French Emperor, would help the Confederacy.[71] The Governor of California, Frederick F. Low, told Seward that Napoleon, requiring indemnity for military expenditures, would demand both Sonora

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[69]Slidell to Benjamin, Paris, June 2, 1864, reprinted in John Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life (3 vols.; New York: The Baker & Taylor Co., 1909), II, 190.

[70]Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, July 28, 1864, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, IV, 7-11.

[71]J. Fred Rippy, "Mexican Projects of the Confederates," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXII (April, 1919), p. 314; Slidell to Benjamin, June 2, 1864, reprinted in Bigelow, Retrospections, II, 190. Slidell had been at Corcoran's home when Gwin and Montholon first discussed Sonora.

and Sinaloa. Gwin had "been sent as an emissary to shape the public mind for such a state of things."[72] Continuing to act in accordance with his previous neutrality, Seward maintained that the spring campaigns "abate the interest with which we have been watching the commotions of Europe."[73]

William Corwin, United States' minister to Mexico, also knew about Gwin's impending arrival and the purpose of his mission. Recounting Maximilian's aloofness toward Gwin, Corwin interpreted the Mexican Emperor's reluctance to participate in the project as fear of alienating the United States over any demonstration of sympathy with Confederates.[74] On the same day that Corwin wrote to Seward, William Preston, Confederate envoy extraordinary to Mexico, wrote to Jefferson

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[72]Low to Seward, June 20, 1864; Seward to Dayton, August 18, 1864, reprinted in Senate Executive Documents, Doc. No. 11, 38th Cong., 2d sess., Ser. Set 1209, 136-137.

[73]Seward to James S. Pike, May 6, 1864, reprinted in ibid., Part III, p. 314.

[74]William Corwin to Seward, June 28, 1864 NA, State, Ministers' Despatches, Microcopy 97, Roll 31, Vol. 30.

Davis, president of the Confederacy. Revealing some interesting insights to events occurring in Paris, Preston related a dispute between Gwin and Fould, French minister of finance, concerning Sonora. Fould had proposed "large mining monopolies to great French corporations for their development and the colonization of the country." Gwin contested Fould and, "to the annoyance of M. Fould," Napoleon endorsed Gwin's plan of "founding colonization upon individual hopes and enterprise, instead of corporate wealth and privileges."[75] Mistakenly asserting that Maximilian "heartily approved" Gwin's project, Preston believed that Gwin would be appointed superintendent or governor of Sonora.[76]

Gwin arrived in Mexico on July 1, 1864.[77] He soon found himself embroiled in three sets of factional feuds: the Union vs. the Confederacy,

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[75]Preston to Davis, June 28, 1864, reprinted in Bigelow, Retrospections, II, 197-198.

[76]Ibid.

[77]Gwin to Montholon, October 15, 1865, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVIII (August, 1891), p. 209.

Juárez vs. Maximilian, and Mexico vs. France. Unfortunately for Gwin, he had cast his lot--in all three cases--with the losers. Even before Gwin arrived in Paris, French engineers had surveyed Sonora's mineral resources[78] and Napoleon wrote Bazaine, "I have read the report of the engineer Laur on the mines of Sonora. A company is formed here which will offer great advantages to the French government, and also to the Mexican government. . . .It is thus necessary to obtain from the provisional Mexican government the concession to the French government of all the unclaimed mines in Sonora. . . . Try to obtain this as soon as possible."[79]

Gwin's first problem was the inability to meet openly with General Bazaine, who, despite Napoleon's instructions, understood the animosity between Maximilian and the Mexicans.[80] Sara Yorke

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[78]See pp. 161-162.

[79]Napoleon to Bazaine, December 16, 1863, reprinted in García, ed., Documentos inéditos, XVII, 75-77.

[80]Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, July 28, 1864 and January 8, 1865, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, IV, 7-11; 74-77.

Stevenson, an observer of this initial Gwin-Bazaine interview related the delicate planning necessary to introduce them casually at Casa Amarilla, the house rented by Colonel Talcott of Virginia, where Gwin was a guest.[81] After a long talk with Gwin, Bazaine left in good spirits. The French general, aware that the Mexican ministry opposed the project, realized that a change in the imperial cabinet would be necessary before the plan could be implemented.[82] Gwin, however, felt reassured by his recurring talks with Bazaine, who told him that he would support the project despite Maximilian's opposition.[83]

Although Bazaine had advised Gwin not to call at the Palacio de Mexico, the American disregarded this advice and received audiences on July 25 and July 27, 1864, with T. Eloin, Maximilian's

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[81]Stevenson, Maximilian, p. 177. Casa Amarilla in Tacubaya is presently an annex for the Archivo General de la Nación. Charles Griffin, ed., Latin America: A Guide to the Historical Literature (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), 377.

[82]Stevenson, Maximilian, p. 177.

[83]Gwin to his son, July 27, 1864, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVIII (August, 1891), p. 204.

Belgian Chief of the Cabinet. Consistently antagonistic toward French-sponsored projects, Eloin intimated that Gwin should have applied for an interview with the Emperor before talking to Bazaine. Gwin, frustrated, concluded that the Belgian minister had adopted the prejudices of the Mexicans against the Americans.[84] To Eloin, however, the former California politician represented the threatening execution of Napoleon's plan to obtain Sonora's silver, an irritation to Belgians, who resented French control of their monetary policies. On the day following Gwin's meeting with Eloin, the French minister to Mexico wrote the French foreign minister that Maximilian stubbornly refused to implement the Sonoran proposals.[85]

Gwin was clearly involved in a delicate mission. On the same evening of the July 27 Eloin meeting, he met again with Bazaine at Casa Amarilla.

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[84]Eloin to Gwin, July 23, 1864; Gwin to his son, July 27, 1864, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVIII (August, 1891), 212, 204.

[85]Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, July 28, 1864, reprinted in Ollivier, La intervencion francesa, p. 137.

When Gwin relayed the results of his apparently fruitless interview with Eloin, Bazaine replied that Eloin was unreliable and "could be bought."[86] Frustrated, but wiser, Gwin relied on Bazaine for fulfillment of Napoleon's development of Sonora.

Gwin, like Montholon, believed that he would be allowed to accompany Bazaine to the Sonora mines. Nevertheless, the extensive circulation of the idea that the Americans, with Gwin as their leader, planned to detach this area from Mexico, troubled Gwin. Plainly uneasy about the Eloin interview, he told his son to convey a letter to Morny in order to insure that instructions countermanding the expedition were issued. With resilient optimism, and revealing previous plans in Paris, Gwin also directed his son to encourage Morny to send both his funds and his men to implement the plans for Sonora.[87] However, Gwin had reason to fear impending adversity. Joaquín

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[86]Gwin to his son, July 27, 1864, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVIII (August, 1891), 204.

[87]Ibid.; Morny to Gwin, Jr., September 17, 1864, reprinted in ibid., 205. Montholon also unequivocably stated, "Gwin will accompany the General." Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, July 28, 1864, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, IV, 7-11.

Velásquez de León, Minister-President of the Empire, wrote Gwin two weeks later, "The Emperor, who is unable to receive you, desires that this interesting negotiation be treated with necessary wisdom and circumspection; . . . handle it with brevity."[88]

During the same period that the Mexican court rejected Gwin, the French court applied more pressure on Maximilian. The three major French financial advisors on Mexican affairs--Germiny, Fould and Corta--alleged that the unresolved Sonora issue hindered further economic support to Mexico.[89] French military forces continued plans to press northward. The United States' minister to Mexico wrote Seward that two to four thousand French soldiers would be sent to Sonora in October to make the state into a French colony, in order to reimburse the military expenses. Unsure of privileges granted to Gwin, Corwin observed that Maximilian and the Mexicans deplored the possibility of Sonora

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[88]Velásquez de León, Minister of State, to Gwin, August 12, 1864, reprinted in ibid., 212.

[89]Hidalgo to Maximilian, July 15, 1864, HHUSA, Box 19, Part II, 333-334.

becoming more independent of the central government.[90] Seward received this news about his old friend Gwin with a revival of their former rivalry. The secretary of state wryly commented to Dayton that Gwin would turn out to be "even more of an inconvenience to whatever government may exist in Mexico than of ultimate harm to our own country." Notwithstanding, he instructed his minister to France to assertain Gwin's support from Napoleon.[91] The French Emperor substantially backed Gwin. It had been only one year since the senator had arrived in Paris, conferred with two Emperors, received encouragement that would enable him to recoup his financial fortunes, and had expectantly crossed back into the western hemisphere.

In September of 1864, referring to Napoleon's personal request for straightforward views of political and military affairs, Gwin lauded the

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[90]William Corwin to Seward, August 29, 1864, NA, State, Ministers' Despatches, Microcopy 97, Roll 31, Vol. 30.

[91]Seward to Dayton, September 15, 1864, reprinted in Senate Executive Documents, 38th Cong. 2d sess., Ser. Set 1209, p. 146.

French army's current successful campaign to take possession of Sinaloa and to advance towards Sonora and Chihuahua by October. Asking for continued military support, Gwin reinforced Napoleon's objective of obtaining Sonora's mineral wealth in exchange for Mexico's debts to France. The Mexican Empire would also benefit from the development of Sonora; with renewed wealth and population, it would thus be enabled to defend itself against foreign or domestic enemies.[92]

In this letter Gwin revealed none of his later animosity toward Bazaine, now a marshal, nor any difficulty in contacting him.[93] Bazaine had carefully examined the plan and had indicated it could be implemented when the French army entered Sonora. Although he discerningly suggested changing Gwin's projected system of land donation to one of pre-emption, as used in the United States, Gwin agreed with this revision and that it would

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[92]Gwin to Napoleon III, September 12, 1864, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), 506-508.

[93]Bazaine was promoted to Marshal of France on September 5, 1864. Jack Autrey Dabbs, The French Army in Mexico, 1861-1867: A Study in Military Government (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), p. 116.

increase the public revenue.[94] Throughout Gwin's letter to Napoleon, however, a wariness is unmistakable. Colonel Blanchot, a member of Bazaine's staff, observed, "I saw this venerable American and was a witness of his restlessness, of his disillusions, and of his anger" at the obstinacy of Maximilian. Claiming that Bazaine earnestly tried to help, Blanchot realized that fulfillment of Gwin's plans depended on Maximilian's acceptance of the February, 1864, treaty between Montholon and the Regency.[95]

Some two weeks after writing Napoleon, Gwin presented mining plans to the Empress through M. Corta, a member of the corps législatif and Maximilian's French financial advisor.[96] Maximilian "greatly insisted in knowing if the Emperor placed

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[94]Gwin to Napoleon III, September 12, 1864, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), p. 507. Thus the land laws of the United States and the Mexican mining code, adopted from the Spanish Ordinances of 1783, would be the legal provisions to develop the mineral resources of Sonora.

[95]Blanchot, L'Intervention française, II, 257.

[96]Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, September 27, 1864, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, IV, 30-36.

paramont importance to the concession, which was presented . . . before he left Paris."[97] Despite Maximilian's hesitation to take the cession of Sonora seriously, Montholon assured Drouyn de Lhuys that, regardless of the Corta conference, "the objectives previously discussed concerning the states of Sonora and Chihuahua will be achieved by the expected occupation of these territories by the French army."[98]

Ironically, Gwin now displayed his first dissatisfaction with Bazaine's support, although he unhesitatingly accepted Carlota's modifications which, he felt, Montholon would also approve. With his spirits restored by the Corta conference, Gwin looked forward to defending the treaty against Maximilian's objections, and he immediately began preparing a system of government for Sonora.[99]

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[97] Ibid., p. 36.

[98] Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, September 24, 1864, reprinted in ibid., pp. 36-44.

[99] Gwin to his wife, September 29, 1864; Gwin to his daughter, September 29, 1864, reprinted in Coleman, ed., "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), pp. 508-509.

Gwin's memorandum to accompany Montholon's treaty granting a concession of the mines of North Mexico to France was an intense effort to convince Maximilian and Carlota of the need to develop the mineral and agricultural resources there. He urged for an immediate decision, as this area was held by Juárez, who might induce soldiers from the United States to join his cause by offering them the mines of the North. Thus, Napoleon's army must occupy northern Mexico as even the United States would "pause before firing a shot at the French flag." Noting that Mexico was in the same condition as it had been in 1821, Gwin pointed out the policy of the first independent government, which had reduced silver duties drastically, enabling foreign investors to restore damaged mines.[100]

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[100]Memorandum Accompanying the Project of a Treaty Giving a Concession of the Mines of North Mexico to France, reprinted in ibid., pp. 509-510. This is the memorandum read to Carlota by M. Corta in September, 1864. See Appendix.

Brusquely reminding the new rulers that the government's power, merely "a shadow" in Sonora, had hitherto failed to subdue either rebellious governors or relentless Indians, Gwin deplored the fact that the richest mines of the entire Empire continued to be neglected.[101] Rich surface ores would need relatively little foreign capital and labor to produce great amounts of bullion. Strongly advocating laissez-faire policies, Gwin claimed that the settlement of Sonora would insure rapid development of its mineral and agricultural wealth, which he extravagantly insisted was unparalled in the history of the world. Crudely dismissing expected revenue from exported bullion, the point Carlota had insisted upon, he accentuated increased income from custom duties on imported goods and from internal taxation of immigrants. As northern Mexico was on the route to Europe from the East Indies, China, and Japan, both world trade and the developed mines would quickly restore public credit,

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[101] Ibid. Gwin had made similar statements while a senator. Gwin, "Memoirs," California Historical Society Quarterly, XIX (September, 1940), p. 275.

guarantee the permanency of the Empire and extinguish all of its liabilities.[102]

Rumors began circulating immediately that negotiations had already been concluded for French control over both Sonora and Lower California. Gwin, portrayed as fomenting intrigues among northerners as well as southerners, would supposedly develop Mexican mines that were either sold or mortgaged to the French for reimbursement of the imperial debts to F[illegible]ximilian, also perceiving Gwin[illegible]ctunist, refused to approve pl[illegible]Mexican territory. Irrita[illegible]monstrated that Gwin was[illegible] "It is obvious that these men[illegible]e money."[104]

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[102]Memorandum Accompanying the Project of a Treaty Giving a Concession of the Mines of North Mexico to France, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), pp. 510-512.

[103]Romero to Seward, December 3, 1864, enclosing synopsis of letter, dated November 22, 1864, from an undisclosed friend of Romero's in New York. House Executive Documents, Vol. I, Part III, No. 1, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Ser. Set 1246, pp. 498-499.

[104]Napoleon III to Maximilian, November 16, 1864, reprinted in Corti, Maximilian, II, 853. By

Napoleon pointedly encouraged Maximilian to be more flexible in his relationship with Gwin:

> . . . I venture to say that in labouring to found a new empire it is impossible to arrive at perfection all at once; the measures that one takes always offer certain advantages accompanied by certain disadvantages; the cleverness of the sovereign consists in seeing whether the former outweigh the latter.--The same is the case with regard to the question of Sonora. I know that Mr. Gwyn's projects have not met with favour in Mexico, and yet he is the man best able to be of service in that country.[105]

Using Gwin's arguments, Napoleon then sternly advised the Mexican Emperor to take a more positive position on plans for Sonora:

> It is feared in Mexico that Sonora may become an American province, but, believe me, even if nothing is done, it will become one by force of circumstances. Colonists and adventurers are already entering the province one by one, and as soon as a great number of them are there, without government organization and control, they will declare themselves independent. This will not happen if the Government places itself at the head of the immigration, plants its flag there, and organizes the country.[106]

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comparing this letter with Gwin's Memorandum to the French Emperor, September, 1864, Gwin's influence is evident.

[105] Ibid., pp. 853-854.

[106] Ibid., p. 854.

guarantee the permanency of the Empire and extinguish all of its liabilities.[102]

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[102]Memorandum Accompanying the Project of a Treaty Giving a Concession of the Mines of North Mexico to France, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (May, 1891), pp. 510-512.

[103]Romero to Seward, December 3, 1864, enclosing synopsis of letter, dated November 22, 1864, from an undisclosed friend of Romero's in New York. House Executive Documents, Vol. I, Part III, No. 1, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Ser. Set 1246, pp. 498-499.

[104]Napoleon III to Maximilian, November 16, 1864, reprinted in Corti, Maximilian, II, 853. By

Napoleon pointedly encouraged Maximilian to be more flexible in his relationship with Gwin:

> . . . I venture to say that in labouring to found a new empire it is impossible to arrive at perfection all at once; the measures that one takes always offer certain advantages accompanied by certain disadvantages; the cleverness of the sovereign consists in seeing whether the former outweigh the latter.--The same is the case with regard to the question of Sonora. I know that Mr. Gwyn's projects have not met with favour in Mexico, and yet he is the man best able to be of service in that country.[105]

Using Gwin's arguments, Napoleon then sternly advised the Mexican Emperor to take a more positive position on plans for Sonora:

> It is feared in Mexico that Sonora may become an American province, but, believe me, even if nothing is done, it will become one by force of circumstances. Colonists and adventurers are already entering the province one by one, and as soon as a great number of them are there, without government organization and control, they will declare themselves independent. This will not happen if the Government places itself at the head of the immigration, plants its flag there, and organizes the country.[106]

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comparing this letter with Gwin's Memorandum to the French Emperor, September, 1864, Gwin's influence is evident.

[105] Ibid., pp. 853-854.

[106] Ibid., p. 854.

Clearly under financial stress, Maximilian appeared to relent. He assured Napoleon that the establishment in Sonora of a government "under the simultaneous protection of the French and Mexican flags is the object of all my care, and will, I hope, enable me in a not too distant future to enhance the resources of this interesting portion of my vast empire." The Mexican Emperor's duplicity is revealed when he adds that he will then "be charmed to see Mr. Gwyn attract there the many American colonists who appear to be merely awaiting a sign from him to come and group themselves round him to seek their fortune."[107]

Maximilian was not "charmed" to see Gwin attract American colonists to Sonora; the support of the Mexican Emperor continued to elude the senator.[108] Uneasy about American colonists,

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[107]Maximilian to Napoleon III, December 27, 1864, reprinted in ibid., 861-62.

[108]According to Kathryn Abbey Hanna, "The Roles of the South in the French Intervention in Mexico," Journal of Southern History, XX (February, 1954), 15, the French abandoned the idea of developing Sonora's mines as early as November, 1864. However, the November and December correspondence between the two emperors in that year indicate animated interest.

Maximilian may have hoped that the convention between Austria and Mexico would provide him with European colonists.[109] His antagonism towards Gwin appears to be more open in November, 1864. As late as October, Gwin had been socially included in the marriage festivities for Montholon's daughter. Even in the latter part of October, Montholon wrote Drouyn de Lhuys, "The concession for the rights to the mines, the results of which M. Corta has already conveyed to Your Excellency, progresses satisfactorily, along with our insistence to settle the Jecker claims, and, finally, the adoption of a new system of finances, which will confer to our agents all the hopes expressed by Your Excellency."[110] Also in October, continued enthusiasm was manifest when Gwin sat next to Marshal Bazaine

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[109]This convention, ratified on April 14, 1865, provided Maximilian with military volunteers from Austria and contained specific provisions for Austrian emigration and colonization. Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich, Wien, Convention zwischen Oesterreich und Mexico, October 19, 1864, Articles 2, 4, 10; Rice University Collection, Houston, Texas.

[110]Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, October 29, 1864, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, IV, 53-55.

at another function, where Sonora was the main topic of conversation.[111]

Before Maximilian's arrival in Mexico, the French had been able to resolve most of their difficulties with the Regency in favor of France. By November, however, the Mexican Emperor had begun to assert his own authority. His new ministerial appointments, although Bazaine considered them esteemed by Mexican liberals and a wise tactical move to obtain support for the Empire, were all anti-French.[112] Another complicating factor was the political and military situation in the United States. Lincoln, expecting his administration to be repudiated in the November, 1864, election, was

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[111]Gwin to his daugher, Mexico, October, 1864, reprinted in ibid., XVIII (August, 1891), pp. 206-207.

[112]Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 53, Mexico, November 27, 1864, Bazaine Archives, XI, f. 2013-2015; also printed in García, ed., Colección de documentos inéditos, XXIV, Doc. viii, 33-43; Bazaine to the French Minister of War, No. 54, Mexico, December 10, 1864, in Bazaine Archives, XI, f. 2047-2049. José Fernando Ramírez, particularly hostile against France, became minister of foreign affairs. Desternes and Chandet, Maximilien et Charlotte, p. 234.

re-elected by a large majority. Thus, the Lincoln policies would be continued, and in December the end of the Civil War seemed very near.[113]

By the end of 1864, the Mexican government exhibited an independence and nationalism that eventually doomed the plans of Napoleon and Gwin for Sonora. Ironically, it is at this time that General Armand Alexandre Castagny finally entered Sonora, one of the last areas to hold out for Juárez.[114] Gwin was not with Castagny and, cognizant that his efforts were being frustrated by Maximilian, he again turned to Napoleon. Perhaps unaware of the November and December correspondence between the two Emperors concerning him, and hopeful that he could induce Napoleon to intercede more vigorously, he left Mexico on January 19, 1865, for France. Maximilian's self-reliance, already in evidence by late 1864, waxed during the first six months of 1865 and culminated in his total repudiation of the French Emperor's plans for Sonora.

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[113]Bemis, ed., American Secretaries of State, VII, pp. 102-103.

[114]Dabbs, French Army in Mexico, pp. 99, 241.

CHAPTER VII

THE LAST FRENCH THRUST TOWARD SONORA

French attempts to attain a lien on Sonora's silver increased during the first six months of 1865. Having failed in the previous year to obtain Maximilian's approval by diplomacy, Napoleon took advantage of military events in the United States to frighten the Mexican Emperor into acquiescence. This, too, ended in frustration.

Military threats from the United States in the first part of 1865, the end of the Civil War, surreptitious aid to Juárez, and the critical two-month loss of Seward's influence on American foreign policy alarmed Maximilian. By the latter part of June, however, encouraged by both Napoleon's assurances of continued support and by Seward's restored and restraining influence on military actions on the Rio Grande, the Mexican Emperor thwarted French attempts to obtain Sonora's mines.

As French troops marched toward Sonora in late 1864, leaving without William McKendree Gwin, apprehension spread about the success of Napoleon's

plans. Hostile editorials and unfavorable reports about Gwin began appearing in January, 1865.[1] El pájaro verde, the most conservative Mexican newspaper, protested that immigrants from the United States, if allowed to settle near the northern frontier, would be the ruin of Mexico.[2] Montholon wrote, "Gwin's disillusionment is great" and "he is thinking of leaving shortly for Paris to talk with the Emperor."[3]

On January 19, 1865, the same day that Gwin left for Paris, John Bigelow, United States minister to France after William L. Dayton's death the previous month, had an interview with the French foreign minister. Bigelow frankly asked Drouyn de Lhuys to

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[1]Luis de Arroyo, Imperial Mexican consul in New York, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, New York, January 3, and February 7, 1865, reprinted in Lefêvre, ed., Documents officiels, II, pp. 101-102.

[2]Alfred J. and Kathryn Abbey Hanna, "The Immigration Movement of the Intervention and Empire as Seen Through the Mexican Press," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXVII (May, 1947), p. 233, citing El parajo verde, February 14, 1865. Generally amenable to Confederate emigrants if they were not permitted close to Mexico's borders, El párajo verde balked at extension of religious toleration for foreigners. Ibid., pp. 224, 230.

[3]Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, January 8, 1865, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, IV, 74-77.

explain his perturbing remark that French relations with the United States were "friendly, though delicate--delicate." Drawing the conversation to Sonora, Bigelow inquired about reports circulating in newspapers and at clubs that Maximilian had ceded, or was about to cede, Sonora to France. In this first--and last--candid French discussion of Sonora, Drouyn de Lhuys responded that while no outright cession of territory was involved, negotiations were in process to obtain a lien on Sonora's mineral products in order to secure Mexican indebtedness to France.[4] Ten days later José Manuel Hidalgo, Maximilian's minister to France, complained that the rumored cession of Sonora had stirred up much controversy. Stunned about possible dismemberment of Mexico, Hidalgo, stating, "Sonora must be for us," emphatically denied the cession. Admitting that the formation of Franco-Mexican mining companies to develop Sonora's mines would be profitable and acceptable, Hidalgo was confused about talk of

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[4]Bigelow to Secretary of State Seward, January 20, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Vol. I, Part III, No. 1, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Ser. Set 1246, pp. 361-62.

complete cession which neither Maximilian or Drouyn de Lhuys had ever mentioned to him. The Mexican Minister was irritated by both Montholon's protection of Gwin and by the possibility of colonists from the United States settling in Sonora. Sympathetic with Napoleon's expectation that Mexican silver be sent to France and not to England, Hidalgo insisted that total cession was neither necessary nor advisable to satisfy French requests. Extremely uncomfortable, Hidalgo underscored his statement, "I do not even want to admit the discussion about this."[5]

Discussion, however, increased. Before Seward received Bigelow's January report of France's admitted interest in Sonora's mines, startling events were taking place in the United States. The Hampton Roads conference, proposing a joint expedition into Mexico by both Northern and Southern military leaders in alliance with Juárez, was offered as a method for ending the Civil War by uniting both factions against common enemies: the French and the Mexican Imperialists. Conceived in

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[5]Hidalgo to Maximilian, January 30, 1865, Paris, in Hausarchiv Kaiser Maximilians von Mexiko, HHUSA, Karton 19, Part III, Docs. 657-663.

December, 1864, by the journalist Francis Preston Blair, the plan appeared authentically ominous; Blair's two sons were Montgomery Blair, a member of President Lincoln's cabinet, and Francis P. Blair, Jr., a general in the Union army. Receiving permission from Lincoln to pass through army lines, Blair arrived in Richmond where he presented the proposal to the President of the Confederacy on January 12, 1865. Although Jefferson Davis, like Lincoln, was cautious about direct commitments, he presumably agreed. Events them moved swiftly. Only three weeks later, on February 3, President Lincoln and Secretary of State Seward met with Confederate delegates on the River Queen at Hampton Roads. After a four-hour conference, the project crumbled over whether an armistice or surrender should be concluded before beginning the joint invasion of Mexico.[6]

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[6]Case and Spencer, Civil War Diplomacy, pp. 560-566; Alfred Jackson Hanna and Kathryn Abbey Hanna, Napoleon III and Mexico (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 209-214.

Although later analysis suggests that the Hampton Roads conference was not taken seriously by any of the Civil War leaders,[7] the mere possibility of such a plan stunned both Napoleon and Maximilian.[8] Information about Blair's proposal may have reached Napoleon as early as February 3, the day of the Hampton Roads conference, for on that date Eugénie wrote Carlota, "The Emperor has just told me that for the moment there will be no reduction in the army."[9] Since rumors about Sonora had circulated throughout 1864, possibly they had some influence on the conception of Blair's plan. William Corwin, United States minister to Mexico, later stated "with positive certainty" that Maximilian had

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[7]Elizabeth Brett White, American Opinion of France: From Lafayette to Poincaré (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. 165.

[8]Napoleon to Maximilian, March 1, 1865, reprinted in Corti, Maximilian, II, 887-888; Comte Emile de Kératry, L'Empereur Maximilien: Son élévation et sa chute (Amsterdam: L. Van Bakkenes & Co., 1867), pp. 75-76.

[9]Eugénie to Carlota, February 3, 1865, reprinted in Corti, Maximilian, II, pp. 888-889.

acceded to the French demands in late 1864 or early 1865.[10] However, on December 28, 1864, Maximilian had obstinately referred to the development of Sonora as proceding "under the simultaneous protection of the French and Mexican flags."[11] The Blair project was a timely device for the French Emperor to use in persuading Maximilian otherwise.

The French chargé in Washington, Louis de Geoffroy, reported two detailed accounts of the pending conference ten days before it took place.[12] The Quai d'Orsay received this alarming correspondence on February 6. Interestingly, the French officially denied the cession of Sonora in the Moniteur two days later.[13] A week after learning of the proposed conference, however, for the first time during the Civil War, the French minister of

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[10]William Corwin to Seward, July 22, 1865, NA, State, Despatches from United States Ministers to Mexico, Vol. 30, Microcopy 97, Roll 32.

[11]Maximilian to Napoleon, December 27, 1865, reprinted in Corti, Maximilian, II, 860-862.

[12]Case and Spencer, Civil War Diplomacy, pp. 560-561, citing Geoffroy to Drouyn de Lhuys, Washington, January 24, 1865.

[13]Le Moniteur Universel, February 8, 1865.

finance intimated that the United States and France might go to war--over Mexico.[14] Talk and intrigues about Sonora increased. Hidalgo had been informed that Felix Eloin, Maximilian's Belgian advisor, accompanied by agents, was going to Sonora in disguise on a secret mission. This mission, its objectives unstated, may have concerned cession of Sonora's mines, but Hidalgo is most emphatic that Sonora itself had not been ceded. Citing the "absurd" news that not only Sonora but also Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Baja California, and Durango had been ceded to France, the whole to be administered by Gwin as Napoleon's Viceroy, Hidalgo planned to issue a public denial, with Drouyn de Lhuys' approval, in the Moniteur.[15] If Hidalgo is to be believed, and this is admittedly a precarious assumption, he apparently knew nothing of Napoleon's plans. A month later Napoleon proposed the expansion of French control over this same region of northern

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[14]Case and Spencer, Civil War Diplomacy, p. 563, citing Bigelow to Seward, Paris, February 14, 1865.

[15]Hidalgo to Maximilian, February 14, 1865, HHUSA, Karton 19, Part III, Docs. 690-691

Mexico, with the exception of Baja California.

Meanwhile, even before the results of the Union-Confederate talks were known in Paris, additional French troops were being prepared for shipment to Mexico on short notice.[16] Geoffroy's dispatch containing the results of the Hampton Roads conference was received in Paris on February 21. Accurately reporting the actual conversations exchanged on the River Queen, Geoffroy acknowledged that the conference had failed; however, some of his interpretations were misleading and created genuine fear of a coalition against Mexico and France. The ensuing tension between the United States and France was the most critical of the entire Civil War.[17]

While the Hampton Roads conference gravely alarmed the French and Mexican courts, it revived hope for help among Mexican Republicans. Matías Romero, Juárez' indefatigable minister to the

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[16]Bigelow to Seward, Paris, February 17, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, p. 366.

[17]Case and Spencer, Civil War Diplomacy, p. 560, citing Geoffroy to Drouyn de Lhuys, February 7, 1865.

United States, had approvingly heard of Blair's plan on January 10, 1865.[18] After learning of the proposal's failure, however, Romero again tried to arouse Seward's animosity against France by reporting detailed rumors of the cession of Sonora. Romero dismissed Maximilian's hostility to such a cession on the basis that the Mexican Emperor would not prevail against the wishes of Napoleon.[19] Romero's letter bristled with bitter disappointment over the Hampton Roads talks, and Seward perfunctorily replied that the letter would be placed in the archives as evidence of Romero's patriotism.[20]

After receiving Bigelow's report of his conversation with Drouyn de Lhuys on January 19, Seward officially protested against either a cession of or a lien on Sonora's mineral resources. However, the tone of his dispatch, written three days after he

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[18]Hanna and Hanna, Napoleon III and Mexico, citing Romero to Lerdo de Tejada, January 10, 1865.

[19]Romero to Seward, February 6, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, pp. 500-502.

[20]Seward to Romero, February 25, 1865, reprinted in ibid., p. 502.

himself had talked with Confederate leaders about concerted military action against Mexico, was decidedly conciliatory. Referring to the Hampton Roads conference, Seward urged Bigelow to assure French leaders that there was no danger of action against either France or Mexico.[21] Nevertheless, Maximilian's vice-consul at San Francisco reported, "Military reserves from Arizona and Colorado are preparing to invade Sonora because of its rumored cession to France . . . and because of Gwin's appointment by Napoleon as Viceroy."[22]

While Franco-American relations were deteriorating, Gwin was enroute to Paris where he arrived early in March, 1865. There he was encouraged when the Duc de Morny, now seriously ill, assured him of his continued interest in Sonora. Morny promised Gwin a conference at the earliest possible moment but, as Morny died only four days

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[21]Seward to Bigelow, February 7, 1865, reprinted in ibid., p. 363.

[22]Manuel Guillin (?), Vice-consul of the Mexican Empire in San Francisco, to the Mexican minister of foreign affairs, March 9, 1865, HHUSA, Karton 141, Docs. 3-4.

later, it never materialized.[23] Well-known for his encouragement of French investments in Mexico, Morny's death was unsettling to financiers and investors who had depended on his political influence for their enterprises.[24]

There now emerged, however, a force more powerful than even Morny's prestige. Napoleon had decided to expand French predominance to Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua, in addition to Sonora, and he had requested Gwin to prepare a plan for its undertaking. This proposed enlargement, in view of Maximilian's earlier reluctance, was received, with protests, by both Montholon and Bazaine, who pointed out, at great length, the military and diplomatic problems that this would create.[25]

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[23]McPherson, "William McKendree Gwin," p. 261, citing Egime, Chef du Cabinet, to Gwin, Paris, March 6, 1865.

[24]La France, (Réone financière), March 13, 1865 and Memorial Diplomatique, March 13, 1865, extracts of both reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, pp. 384-385.

[25]Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, March 27 and 28; April 18, 28; May 28; June 11, 1865, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, IV, 90-116.

Gwin, having previously been denied admission to Sonora, was understandably reserved about this new venture. He told the French Emperor that he was willing to return if assured of French military support. Echoing Napoleon's earlier predilections, Gwin reiterated that revenues from customs duties and mines would be applied to the interest and, if sufficient, to the principal of the debt Mexico owed France; then Napoleon could feel financially secure in making loans to Mexico. It seems evident in this letter that Maximilian's major objection had been fear of losing northern Mexico to an influx of adventurers. Gwin emphasized that immigrants must be required to take an oath of allegiance to the Imperial Government and that precautions should be taken to banish all enemies of the Empire.[26] Exhibiting some of his old resiliency, Gwin prepared his last "memorandum" for the French Emperor.[27] Along with plans for the subjugation of both Indian

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[26]Gwin to Napoleon, March 25, 1865, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan for the Colonization of Sonora," Vol. XVII (May, 1891), pp. 515-516.

[27]"Memorandum for Emperor Napoleon from William McKendree Gwin," Paris, March, 1865, reprinted in ibid., pp. 516-519.

tribes and Juaristas in Sonora, he pragmatically suggested that a concerted effort be made to execute these new proposals during the rainy season, starting in June, to enable crops to be planted. Still confident that colonization of Sonora, with its "richest mines in Mexico," would allow withdrawal of the French army, Gwin foresaw eventual French military aid as consisting only of a small number of troops to guard posts on the northern border. Without colonization he predicted that the French would probably either be forced to withdraw from Sonora or to maintain a large, expensive military force. Asserting that Bazaine had agreed with this assessment, Gwin insisted that Confederate emigrants would help support the Empire and make it unassailable from the United States.[28]

With Gwin again in Paris, rumors increased. Rufus King at the United States Legation at Rome asked the French ambassador, the Count de Sartiges, about the current talk in Europe that Maximilian had ceded certain provinces to Napoleon as security

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[28] Ibid., p. 519.

for material and financial aid. King had been informed that Gwin was forming a Confederate colony and would be Viceroy of Sonora. Adhering to the official statement in the Moniteur on February 8, the Count denied it.[29] At the very time that Gwin and Napoleon were preparing expansive plans for northern Mexico, Drouyn de Lhuys heatedly protested United States newspaper stories about Gwin and French interests in Sonora. Instructed by Seward to calm French fears, Bigelow replied that in the United States "everybody's most idle thought and casual impression" might appear in the press although such articles did not necessarily reflect government opinion.[30]

The French then began a counter-attack by claiming that Juárez had offered Sonora to the United States three times since its war with Mexico.

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[29]King to Seward, Rome, March 4, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, p. 153.

[30]Bigelow to Seward, Paris, March 17, 1865, reprinted in U. S., Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Part II, 1865-1866, pp. 246-247.

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[30]Bigelow to Seward, Paris, March 17, 1865, reprinted in U. S., Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Part II, 1865-1866, pp. 246-247.

With an oblique reference to the Hampton Roads conference, M. Corta, the French financial advisor to Maximilian, asserted that Juárez' most recent offer had been to President Lincoln in exchange for 75 million.[31] Although Gwin was still uneasy about obtaining Maximilian's approval, Juárez protested that Maximilian would undoubtedly obey Napoleon's demands to cede Sonora to France.[32] In March, 1865, Juárez apprehensively watched events from an unenviable position. While Gwin and Napoleon discussed plans for northern Mexico, French troops --"the successors of Raousset, . . . those who covet our territorial riches,"--subdued Guaymas and spread throughout Sonora.[33]

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[31]Speech of M. Corta in the Corps legislatif, April 10, 1865, reprinted in Le Moniteur Universel, April 11, 1865. Although francs, dollars or pesos are not specified, the stated sum probably referred to francs--or $15 million.

[32]Lerdo de Tejada, Foreign Minister of the Mexican Republic, National Palace at Chihuahua, to Matías Romero, March 23, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, pp. 602-603.

[33]Proclamation of Ignacio Pesquiera, Governor and Military Commander of the State of Sonora, Camp at Santa María, March 30, 1865, reprinted in ibid., p. 657.

In his last audience with the French Emperor, Gwin received a letter commending him to Marshal Bazaine. In it Napoleon stated, "The Emperor hopes that the Emperor Maximilian will favor your projects, and the Marshal is ordered to support them near him,"[34] presumably meaning to support Maximilian's French financial advisors. The Juarist Colonel Enrique A. Mejía, was inexplicably shown the original of this letter, which he interpreted as an attempt to form a barrier against the United States with Confederates who would create a hostile power on the border.[35]

Leaving Paris on April 1, 1865, Gwin arrived in Mexico City in early May, finding the Imperial Government upset over the end of the Civil War, President Lincoln's assassination, and Secretary of State Seward's injuries. Maximilian, away in one of

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[34]Conti, Secretary of the Emperor, Chief of H. M. Cabinet, to Gwin, Paris, March 31, 1865, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (June, 1891), p. 595.

[35]Mejía to Romero, July 1, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, p. 512.

his periodic assessments of various states, and Bazaine, preoccupied with his own wedding plans, were still unavailable, unwilling, or unable to help him.[36] The animosity between Maximilian and Bazaine was clearly evident in matters pertaining to Sonora. The Mexican press began criticizing the rumored cession of Mexican territory in April and May of 1865. In a move against French control, Maximilian released a number of editors who had been imprisoned for opposition to the military court and decreed freedom of the press on April 10.[37] Editorial comment against cession of Sonora or its mineral rights increased in nationalistic indignation, even though Bazaine fought back by fining and imprisoning several editors for joining in the outcry against alienation of Mexican territory.[38] Clinging

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[36]Gwin to his wife, Mexico, May 11, 1865, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (June, 1891), p. 593.

[37]Hanna, "The Immigration Movement," p. 224, citing Diario del Imperio.

[38]Bancroft, History of Mexico, VI, 174.

to hope of a rapprochement with the United States, and increasingly defying French policies, Maximilian took encouragement from Corwin, the United States minister to Mexico, when he praised the Mexican Emperor's liberal programs.[39] His Belgian advisor promoted this optimism. Eloin, opposing concessions to the French and Gwin's influx of Confederates in Sonora, assured Maximilian that the United States would not declare war on Mexico.[40] It was into this ambivalent atmosphere that Gwin, his confidence somewhat shaken, returned to Mexico.

Impatient with delays--"To think of our being kept here holding our hands, when those prodigious mines are inviting us to fortune"[41]--Gwin lost a major advocate when Montholon, reassigned as

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[39]Thomas Corwin to Ramírez, México, April 28, 1865, HHUSA, Karton 21, Konvolut G, Dipl. Agenten in Nordamerika, 3, Docs. 43-45.

[40]"Eloin Articulo," n.d., HHUSA, Karton 21, Konvolut G, Dipl. Agenten in Nordamerika, 3, Docs. 95-102; 1865 letters from Eloin, Director of the Cabinet, to Maximilian, ibid., Karton 15, Fasc. 8, Konvolut 4.

[41]Gwin, Jr., to his mother, May 16, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, p. 513.

French ambassador to the United States, left Mexico for his new post only a few hours before Gwin arrived.[42] Gwin was regarded as France's unofficial agent, a dubious attribute at this time, and Bazaine supposedly assured Gwin that he would support his claims "to the utmost."[43] The earlier hostility of Maximilian's minister, Juan N. Almonte, presumably had been assuaged; in mid-May Almonte allegedly told Gwin that he had strong support.[44] Rumors of another ministry change, expected to take place the latter part of May, spread quickly because of the sudden removal of Eloin, hostile to French interests, from his position as Maximilian's advisor.[45]

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[42]Gwin to Montholon, October 15, 1865, Fort Jackson, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVIII (August, 1891), 209.

[43]Stevenson, Maximilian in Mexico, p. 178.

[44]Gwin, Jr., to his mother, May 16, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, p. 513. Almonte was perhaps reconciled to Gwin by the efforts of Thomas E. Massey, a close friend of both Almonte and Gwin. Comision secreta del Sr. Massey, Confidential, Massey to Almonte, Mexico, August 29, 1865; Almonte to Massey letters, Dec. 20, 1865, March 4, 1866, March 18, 1866, HHUSA, Karton 137, Docs. 35-36, 39-40, 41, 58v.

[45]Gwin to his wife and daughters, May 16, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser.

Optimism balanced despair. The Jecker claims to one-third of Sonora's public lands presented another problem. General Charles P. Stone, an affiliate of Jecker's survey company a decade earlier, had taken the same steamer as Gwin from Havana to Mexico. Some of the Jecker claims had been settled on April 10, and Stone came to claim his own interests and to participate, independent of Gwin, in a project "of infinite importance" in the development of Sonora.[46] Gwin was distressed to learn that Jecker's claims in Sonora were still pending.[47] Bazaine urged him to see Jecker and thus avoid any future difficulty about land for Gwin's proposed

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Set 1246, pp. 513-514; Thomas C. Massey to Editor of New York Daily News, Mexico, May 19, 1865, reprinted in ibid., p. 515.

[46]Arnold Blumberg, The Diplomacy of the Mexican Empire, 1863-1867 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1971), p. 72; Thomas C. Massey to Editor of New York Daily News, Mexico, May 19, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, pp. 515-516.

[47]Gwin to his wife, n.d., but latter part of May, 1865, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVIII (August, 1891), 208.

colonists. Suggesting that he accumulate information about the authenticity of Jecker's claims and admonishing Gwin not to attract attention by indiscrete inquiries, the French Marshal directed Gwin to Stone.[48] Although Gwin and Stone were in daily contact, Gwin resisted the suggestion to make an arrangement with Jecker.[49] However, on the advice of a M. Soulé, he changed his mind. According to Gwin, the result of the meeting with Jecker was that Gwin almost became the owner of Jecker's claim. The contract, however, was never consummated.[50]

Maximilian was the ultimate, and most obstinate, obstacle to French plans for Northern Mexico. Although he had been away from the capital

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[48]L. de Noue, Bazaine's secretary, to Gwin, Mexico, May 16, 1865, reprinted in ibid., p. 208.

[49]Massey to Benjamin Wood, May 18, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set. 1246, p. 515.

[50]Gwin to his wife, n.d., circa late May, 1865, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVIII (August, 1891), p. 208.

since Gwin's return to Mexico in May, it was commonly believed that the mines of Sonora would be ceded to Napoleon.[51] When the Emperor returned to Mexico City, however, it became clear that neither cabinet changes, military threats from the United States, nor French pressure had dampened his determination to maintain the integrity of Mexican land. Maximilian had fulfilled Napoleon's insistence on Mexican remuneration for French forces--without having to cede Sonora's mineral rights. Great quantities of Mexican silver had been sent to France, enabling the French monetary problem to stabilize for the first time since American and Australian gold had upset their bimetallic standard in 1851.[52] By June, 1865, M. Chaix d'Est-Angé,

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[51]Correspondence of the New Orleans Times, Vera Cruz, June 1, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, p. 517.

[52]"Values of the Imports of Merchandise and Bullion into England, France, and the United States, from Mexico, 1857-1871," Hansard's, 1876, "Report on the Depreciation of the Price of Silver," Appendix, p. 708; Enquête sur les principes et les faits généraux qui régissent la circulation monétaire et fiduciaire, Vol. VI, pp. 534-535. See Appendix.

vice-president of the French council of state, admitted that Maximilian had carried out the Treaty of Miramar "with perfect exactness." He had reduced the Mexican debt to France, for all operations, from 39,458,000 francs to a negligible 500,000 to 600,000 francs. Mexican mining had been resumed with "extraordinary" results, while the customs duties at Tampico had quadrupled and those at Vera Cruz had doubled since Maximilian's arrival in Mexico.[53] The date of Chaix d'Est-Angé's speech, June 8, 1865, is significant. Less than twenty days later, on June 26, Maximilian publicly denied that Sonora had been ceded to France or that he had made any concessions to Napoleon's emissary, William McKendree Gwin.

Maximilian also had reason to feel more confident because of the French Emperor's military firmness after the Hampton Roads conference. Shortly after the French learned of the actual discussion between Seward and Confederate leaders,

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[53]Discussion in the Corps législatif, Thursday, June 8, 1865, published in Le Moniteur, June 9, 1865. This admission had also been made by M. Rouher, Secretary of State, on April 10, 1865, Le Moniteur, April 11, 1865.

Napoleon assured Maximilian that the United States would "think twice before declaring War" and that no more French troops would be recalled from Mexico.[54] Although Maximilian's fear of American intervention after the Civil War ended may have been behind his rejection of Napoleon's demands for Sonora, as the United States minister believed, French resistence to United States' aid for Juárez flared anew in May of 1865.[55] European diplomats excitedly discussed French reaction to reports that disbanded officers and men of the Union army were joining the Juaristas.[56] General Ulysses S. Grant, who looked on Juárez as the Lafayette or Garibaldi of Mexico, appeared particularly threatening during the absence of Seward's restraining influence.[57] The French

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[54]Napoleon to Maximilian, March 1, 1865, reprinted in Corti, Maximilian, II, pp. 887-888.

[55]William Corwin to Seward, July 22, 1865, NA, State, Despatches from U. S. Ministers to Mexico, Vol. 30, Microcopy 97, Roll 32.

[56]King to Seward, Rome, May 24, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, p. 159.

[57]Mariano Degollado, Imperial Mexican Minister in Washington, to Castillo, Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, HHUSA, Karton 141, Doc. 555.

decisively supported Maximilian, and by the latter part of May, 1865, Bigelow feared that Napoleon's hostility against aid to Juárez would explode into a war with the United States.[58]

As war possibilities increased, Maximilian's minister to the United States wrote that Californians, in support of both the Monroe Doctrine and the Juaristas, were preparing to invade Sonora. However, according to his sources close to Seward, the United States would not intervene if assured that Mexico's northern frontier would not be ceded to France.[59] This word of hope undoubtedly had great influence on Maximilian. He could avoid United States intervention and maintain Mexican territory, but only at the price of alienating France. Throughout May and early June, the threat of war increased. Alarmed by military actions of Generals Grant and Philip Sheridan toward Mexico, Seward feared actual confrontation

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[58]Seward to Bigelow, June 12, 1865, restating Bigelow's dispatch of late May, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, p. 393.

[59]Luis de Arroyo to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, New York, May 22, 1865, HHUSA, Karton 141, Docs. 41-43.

of American and French troops.[60] Resuming his duties in June after a two-month disability, Seward assured Napoleon that the United States would continue to observe neutrality. In his first letter since the April assassination attempt, Seward disavowed the "hasty language" of American newspapers and tried to calm escalating tensions between the two countries. Informing Bigelow of steps taken to prevent illicit armaments reaching Juárez, Seward earnestly hoped that if unavoidable incidents should occur, in spite of government restraints, these would be overlooked by France in order to maintain peace between the two countries.[61] Such incidents, as Seward had predicted, did indeed occur.[62] Throughout June of 1865, the United States pursued a conciliatory policy, and reports began to reach Maximilian that

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[60]Bemis, ed., American Secretaries of State, VII, p. 108.

[61]Drouyn de Lhuys to Montholon, July 6, 1865, referring to a letter from Seward to Bigelow, received by Bigelow June 29, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, p. 693.

[62]Correspondence between General E. B. Brown and General Tomás Mejía, about confrontations on the Rio Grande. HHUSA, Karton 24, Fasc. 13, No. 16.

the American people wanted peace and order in Mexico and the opportunity to invest in Mexican mining ventures.[63]

Seward's efforts for peace were timely. Contrary to earlier reports from Bigelow and Romero that the corps législatif was hostile to French military expenditures in Mexico, the debates of June 9 ended in a vote of 232 to a mere 13 for approval of maintaining French troops there.[64] Napoleon asked his Minister of the Navy for a report on the possibility of transporting 100,000 more troops to Mexico and on engaging in naval warfare, without British support, against the United States.[65]

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[63]Memoir to Maximilian from E. de Courcillon, June 28, 1865, Correspondenzen aus den Vereinigten Staaten, HHUSA, Karton 137, Docs. 75-78.

[64]Le Moniteur, June 10, 1865. Le Moniteur, June 9, 1965, set the number of French troops in Mexico in 1865 at approximately 22,000; Napoleon stated that the figure was 30,940. Napoleon to Maximilian, April 12, 1866, reprinted in Corti, Maximilian, II, 933.

[65]Captain Hore, British naval attaché in Paris, to Earl Russell, June 30, 1865, reporting a conversation with Admiral Page, president of the "Conseil des travaux de la Marine." The date of the conversation is not stated, although Hore noted it took place "some short time ago." Extracts reprinted in Case and Spencer, Civil War Diplomacy, p. 563.

Maximilian was relieved that French troops would remain, and might even be augmented. It was perhaps because of this assurance that he became increasingly assertive about his own control of Mexican affairs. Certainly after the spring of 1865 Maximilian was neither the "pawn" nor the "puppet" of France that historical tradition has made him.[66] His independence is particularly revealed in his denial of Sonora to France. Mexican nationalism, to Bazaine's distress, grew stronger--with the Mexican Emperor's encouragement.[67] After Maximilian established freedom of the press, in defiance of the French Marshal, in April of 1865, Mexican newspapers assumed a more nationalistic, anti-French posture. El pájaro verde reproduced a New York Express article, critically asserting that Gwin, accompanied

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[66]Dabbs, The French Army in Mexico, p. 134.

[67]This nationalism is interestingly portrayed in covers of Imperial sheet music. In 1864 both the Austrian and Mexican insignias are displayed, side by side, but by 1865 only the Mexican insignia is used. Music Sheets Z 33174 RBR, Maximilian and Carlota Collection, Rare Book Room, Rice University, Houston, Texas.

by French troops, was actually enroute to Sonora.[68] Public antagonism against French interests in Sonora increased daily.

Finally, on June 26, 1865, Maximilian publicly denied the cession of Sonora's mines to France. The official newspaper of the Mexican Empire, El Diario del Imperio, stating that the Emperor would "maintain and defend the integrity of the national territory with inflexible energy of will," disavowed any government connection with Napoleon's entrepreneur, William McKendree Gwin. The front-page newspaper article denounced projected plans to apply the entire production of Sonora to the debts owed the French government. Citing reports from American newspapers on the alleged cession of Sonora, El Diario del Imperio contemptuously stated, "Dr. Gwin figures in all of these stories, now as Governor, again as Viceroy and with the title of Duke, attributing power and authority derived from the Emperor of Mexico and France."[69]

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[68]McPherson, "William McKendree Gwin," p. 266.

[69]El Diario del Imperio, June 26, 1865, enclosed in a despatch from [William] Corwin to Seward, July 11, 1865, NA, State, Despatches from United States Ministers to Mexico, Vol. 30, Microcopy 97, Roll 31.

Realizing that the bitter attack was a direct confrontation with Napoleon, the French minister to Mexico was stunned and expected a retraction.[70] Although Montholon admitted that the proposed cession of Sonora's mines was the major source of strained diplomatic relations between France and the United States,[71] Dano composed a "counterproposition to the Project of M. Gwin" and pressed Maximilian on his financial obligations to France.[72] News of the Mexican Empire's refusal to cede Sonora's mines reached France on July 15. Angered, Napoleon immediately sent dispatches to both Bazaine and Dano, who defensively recounted both the reasons they could not implement his instructions and the economic and military pressures that they had already applied.[73]

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[70]Dano to Drouyn de Lhuys, June 29, 1865, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, IV, 135-138.

[71]Montholon to Drouyn de Lhuys, July 14, 1865, extracts reprinted in ibid., 148-149.

[72]Dano to Drouyn de Lhuys, August 29 and July 28, 1865, reprinted in ibid., 183-185; 149-154.

[73]Bazaine to the French Minister of War, August 27, 1865; Dano to Drouyn de Lhuys, August 29, 1865, reprinted in ibid., 175-176, 183-185. For the many French dispatches on this subject, see ibid.

Demoralized by Maximilian's official rejection,[74] Gwin wrote to Napoleon on the day before he left Mexico. Vainly appealing for justice, he complained that Bazaine had refused to protest Maximilian's repudiation because of the "confidential nature" of the subject which could not be publicized "without irreverence and danger."[75] Acknowledging failure, Gwin decided to leave immediately and asked for a military escort to Matamoros.[76] Abandoned by two Emperors and imprisoned by his native country at Fort Jackson for more than seven months, he continued to write the Marquis de Montholon.[77]

This reaction in itself--threats, bluffs, accusations and involved explanations to the French Emperor on the failure to obtain the cession of Sonora's mineral rights for France--would support a separate study.

[74]Gwin to his wife and children, June 29, 1865, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVII (June, 1891), p. 594.

[75]Gwin to Napoleon, July 3, 1865, reprinted in ibid., p. 597.

[76]Rippy, "Mexican Projects," p. 315; W. C. Nunn, Escape From Reconstruction (Fort Worth: Leo Potishman Foundation, Texas Christian University, 1956), p. 29.

[77]Gwin to Montholon, Fort Jackson, October 15, 1865, reprinted in Coleman, "Gwin's Plan," Overland Monthly, XVIII (August, 1891), p. 209. As

William McKendree Gwin's departure from Mexico on July 4, 1865, was accompanied by a spate of proclamations and correspondence. As Gwin dejectedly rode toward the Rio Grande, Antonio López de Santa Anna, patriotically condemning Maximilian for ceding Sonora to France, issued a proclamation against the Empire.[78] On the basis of Mejía's statement that French forces and Gwin had already left for Sonora, Matías Romero mistakenly concluded that Gwin was in the process of actually effecting his plans in Sonora.[79] Disclosing intercepted correspondence, dated May 16-19, 1865, which, although divulging French support for Gwin was innocuous as far as threats to the United States were concerned,

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late as February, 1867, Seward allegedly had spies or detectives following Gwin who, upon his release, returned to France. William V. Wells to Maximilian, New York, February 14, 1867, HHUSA, Karton 141 Docs. 13-14.

[78]Proclamation of Santa Anna, St. Thomas, July 8, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, p. 667.

[79]Mejía to Romero, Washington, July 1, 1865, reprinted in ibid., p. 512.

Romero felt obliged to theorize that Gwin had a "presentiment" that his letters would be intercepted. However, the Mexican minister skillfully inflamed the United States by pointing out that Gwin planned to amass discontented American citizens on the Mexican frontier. Irritated first by the failure of the Hampton Roads conference and then by the curtailment of recruits for Juárez, Romero tenaciously exploited all propaganda against Maximilian.[80]

On July 11, William Corwin wrote Seward, "The Sonora project of Dr. William M. Gwin has been suddenly and finally disposed of."[81] Before Corwin's letter reached Seward, however, he received Romero's correspondence and, on July 13, the Secretary of State sternly advised Bigelow that the United States would not tolerate either the French Emperor's sanction of the "disloyal" Gwin or the reorganization

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[80]Romero to Seward, July 8, 1865, reprinted in ibid., p. 511.

[81]William Corwin to Seward, July 11, 1865, NA, State, Despatches from United States Ministers to Mexico, Vol. 30, Microcopy 97, Roll 31.

of Confederates as military and political enemies in northern Mexico.[82] This was the first recrudescence of belligerence toward France since the events of May and June had caused Seward to be conciliatory.

Before this letter arrived in France, Drouyn de Lhuys, on the basis of Maximilian's refusal to cede the mineral rights of Sonora, informed his minister in Washington, "It is firmly resolved not to accept the cession of any portion of Mexican territory, and to decline all proposals for concession of mines in Sonora." Irritated by the Mexican Emperor's defiance of France, the French foreign minister exhibited no intimidation by the United States and belligerently continued to advocate settlement of Confederate emigrants in mining districts: "No matter about the details of the Emperor Maximilian's plans; this seems to us the proper time to carry them out."[83] An event unknown in

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[82]Seward to Bigelow, July 13, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, pp. 518-519.

[83]Drouyn de Lhuys to Montholon, Paris, July 20, 1865, reprinted in ibid., pp. 693-694.

either Washington or Paris, French troops took Hermosillo in July, 1865--without a shot being fired.[84]

It is implausible to argue that Maximilian simply bowed to Mexican antagonism toward Gwin as an American. During the same month that he disavowed Gwin, he openly and fully supported the Confederate Mathew Fontaine Maury, to whom he entrusted the development of his colonization program--without French control. When Maury was also attacked by the press, Maximilian vigorously defended him.

Mexican newspapers praised the Emperor's stand on Sonora. El pájaro verde, asserting the "sacred right" of Mexico to use Sonora's wealth for its own benefit, contended that the purported cession, creating a French buffer state, would have been viewed by the world as a sign of "impotence and weakness" in the possible confrontation with the United States.[85] Even L'ère nouvelle, the French newspaper in Mexico, admitted that the proposed cession had

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[84]Dabbs, French Army in Mexico, p. 100.

[85]Hanna, "Immigration Movement," p. 238, citing El pájaro verde, June 27, 1865.

stimulated dissension and had "put the Emperor in a bad light."[86]

Shifting his dependency on France to the nebulously proffered friendship of the United States, Maximilian hoped for recognition from Washington and less reliance on Paris. The French government began making plans to withdraw all their troops for the first time since they had received rumors of the impending Hampton Roads conference.[87] On July 30, 1865, two days before Seward's July 13 dispatch had been presented to the French government, Marshal Randon, the French minister of war, wrote Marshal Bazaine that Maximilian would be well advised to

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[86] Ibid., citing L'ère nouvelle, June 27, 1865. L'ère nouvelle had been established in August, 1864, by E. Masseras, former editor of the New York Courrier des Etats Unis. Ibid., p. 233. However, earlier in the debates about Gwin, even its editor had been imprisoned by Bazaine. McPherson, "William McKendree Gwin," 266.

[87] Although the French withdrawal from Mexico is outside the scope of this study, see the following dispatches for assurances that French troops would not be reduced: Eugénie to Carlota, February 3, 1865; Napoleon to Maximilian, March 1, 1865; Eugénie to Carlota, April 1 and May 31, 1865, relating orders from Napoleon; reprinted in Corti, Maximilian, II, pp. 888-889; 887-888; 895-896, 908-909; discussion in the corps législative, Thursday, June 8, 1865, published in Le Moniteur, June 9, 1865.

organize a Mexican army--"for we cannot stay eternally in Mexico."[88]

As the French made plans to withdraw, the Mexican Empire had no more inducements to offer the United States, and Seward spoke with increasing directness. Bigelow dutifully reported the intercepted Gwin letters and Seward's July 13 dispatch to Drouyn de Lhuys on August 1, 1865.[89] Six days later the French foreign minister heatedly responded that the French Emperor rejected such an arrogant and threatening communication.[90] Bigelow, thoroughly intimidated, wrote Seward, "The sensitiveness betrayed by his Excellency upon this subject has determined me to defer any rejoinder until I have had time to hear from you."[91] Bitterly

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[88]Randon to Bazaine, Paris, July 30, 1865, Bazaine Archives, XIII, f. 2551-2553.

[89]Bigelow to Drouyn de Lhuys, August 1, 1865, reprinted in Bigelow, Retrospections, III, 122-131.

[90]Drouyn de Lhuys to Bigelow, August 7, 1865, reprinted in ibid., p. 145.

[91]Bigelow to Seward, August 10, 1865, reprinted in ibid., p. 147.

informing Montholon of the offensive correspondence from Seward which he had answered "by the Emperor's command," Drouyn de Lhuys seethed at the supercilious attitude of the United States which, in its war with Mexico, had "exercised the rights of victory in all their plenitude by annexing a new State." He then admitted, "We yielded to a necessity of the same nature as that which had, at another epoch, conducted the American arms to the capital of Mexico."[92]

Franco-American diplomatic dispatches became more subdued. Confessing to Bigelow that Gwin had appeared to be an energetic man, Drouyn de Lhuys diplomatically denied that the Emperor had known him.[93] And Seward expressed regret that he had antagonized the French foreign minister.[94]

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[92]Drouyn de Lhuys to Montholon, August 17, 1865, reprinted in House Executive Documents, Ser. Set 1246, p. 694.

[93]Bigelow to Seward, August 31, 1865, reprinted in Bigelow, Retrospections, III, pp. 165-168.

[94]Seward to Bigelow, August 24, 1865, reprinted in ibid., pp. 182-183; Eugénie to Carlota, September 28, 1865, reprinted in Corti, Maximilian, II, 919-920.

Meanwhile, Franco-Mexican relations became more strained. Marshal Randon, demanding the return of French troops, impatiently wrote to Bazaine, "The Mexican Government must be thinking that we will sacrifice our own interests for theirs."[95] Maximilian had successfully defied the French, thereby losing their support. At his trial in 1867, he futilely reminded Mexicans that he had defended their territory and had retained Sonora and its mines for Mexico.[96]

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[95]Randon to Bazaine, Paris, August 31, 1865, in Bazaine Archives, XIV, f. 2608-2609.

[96]Samuel Siegfried Karl Basch, Erinnerungen aus Mexico (Leipzig: Verlag von Dunder & Humblot, 1868), p. 229. See Appendix of Basch for Maximilian's hand-written defense notes.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Count Egon Caesar Corti referred to the exploitation of Sonora's mines as "Napoleon's favourite idea,"[1] a point reinforced in many diplomatic dispatches.[2] In this study, the question asked was, why? The answer, well-known to most historians, was its silver, based on exaggerated accounts of alleged wealth there. This legend and the vulnerability of Mexico, examined in chapter two, supplied the background for the actions of the Emperor when, in 1861, he sought a solution to his acute need for silver.

The question, previously overlooked by historians, then asked was, why did France want or need this silver so desperately? This led to an examination of the French monetary system. France's bimetallic standard confronted critical problems caused by the influx of gold from America and Australia in the

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[1] Corti, Maximilian, I, p. 271.

[2] French diplomatic despatches, reprinted in Díaz, Versión francesa, I-IV, contain over a hundred references to Sonora. Blumberg, Diplomacy of the Mexican Empire, p. 76, also noted the "disproportionately large number of references" to Sonora.

1850's. The need for silver, as related in chapter three, intensified in the early 1860's with the lack of cotton during the American Civil War. A recent work examined the seriousness of the French need for cotton. The author concluded that Napoleon was "very much concerned over the possibilities of disorders and disaffection from his regime"--to the point that he and his ministers were "thrashing around and grasping at any and every straw to end the [American] war and its attendant economic depression."[3]

It was at this very time, as alternate cotton supplies in India required massive amounts of silver, that the French Minister to Mexico began his belligerent and tenacious defense of Jecker, who had financed Raousset-Boulbon's expedition to Sonora in the 1850's. This raised questions about the legacy and importance of Raousset-Boulbon. How, or did, he fit in? As discussed in chapter four, French adventurers had preposterously claimed that Sonora could be ceded to, or conquered by, either themselves or France. The irresponsible actions of Raousset-Boulbon provoked French Ministers to make many denials of

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[3]Case and Spencer, Civil War Diplomacy, 592.

connections with him, and there is no documentation of direct support from the Tuileries for his expedition. It is through Raousset-Boulbon, however, that the French government became acutely aware of the silver in, and the vulnerability of, Sonora, and this was perpetuated by romanticized accounts of the Count's adventures. During the three years of his activities in Sonora, 284 million silver francs flowed from France and in 1854, the year of Raousset-Boulbon's most serious invasion of Sonora, France coined its least amount of silver since 1795. The legacy of Raousset-Boulbon included his financier, Jecker, who provided the pretext for the French intervention in Mexico in 1861.

Then the question was, what was the background of Jecker's claims to one-third of the public lands in Sonora? This was explored in chapter five and, previously overlooked by historians, both the Jecker claims there, as well as concessions to others, based on Jecker's survey of Sonora, enabled the French to amass a large portion of the public land there by 1862.

The next question was, what were Gwin's plans for Sonora? Napoleon's attempts to obtain either a cession of, or a lien on, the mines of Sonora are

partially revealed by the activities of Gwin, who, as revealed in chapter six, was an adventurer. It is through two projected treaties, however, neither of which have been previously published, that French aims towards the silver of Sonora are most clearly demonstrated.[4]

The importance of Sonora's mines to the intervention in Mexico is not necessarily reflected by their productivity in the 1850's or 1860's; it is the exaggerated reports of potential production that are important, and this has been examined in chapter two. Thus, this study does not intend to claim that silver specifically from Sonora went directly to France. Data from Sonora, relatively free of government supervision, is generally considered questionable, "owing to the secrecy observed by owners, especially foreigners, for obvious reasons, and to the neglect of officials to collect information."[5] For this reason, official statistics on silver, either mined or minted, in Sonora for the years 1857 to 1867 are unknown, and this fact is pointedly noted in reports on Mexico's mineral production: "sin comprender las del Estado de Sonora, cuyos datos se ignoraban." An indication of Sonora's production for those years,

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[4]HHUSA, Dartons 12 and 140. See Appendices H, I.

[5]Bancroft, North Mexican States, II, p. 752.

however, can be surmised from the 1869 report. In that year, Sonora's mints at Alamos and Hermosillo recorded a total of 1,347,140 pesos of minted silver, placing Sonora fifth in Mexico's silver production.[6]

Despite Maximilian's denial of Sonora's mines to France, related in chapter seven, during the intervention large amounts of Mexican silver poured into the treasury. This helped alleviate the crises caused by the influx of gold in the 1850's and, by 1865, the alarming flow of silver from France had been stopped--for the first time since 1852. During the five years preceding the intervention in Mexico, from 1857 to 1861, the French had received an average of only 9,221 per year in Mexican bullion and specie. When the French were in Mexico, this amount increased dramatically: from 1862 to 1867, they obtained an average of 373,019 per year--more than forty times their previous annual amount.[7]

This study has not been a revision of pre-

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[6]Cosío Villegas, Historia moderna, II, 132-33.

[7]Hansard's, "Values of the Imports of Merchandise and Bullion into England, France, and the United States, from Mexico, 1857-1871," 1876, Appendix, p. 708.

vious works, but rather it is an expansion and amplification of them. It resulted from two major questions, why were there so many references to Sonora? and, were there basic monetary and economic reasons for French attempts to get its silver? The answers suggest that Napoleon's dire need for silver, hitherto unexplored, and examined here by a correlation of economic and diplomatic events, was an important reason for the French intervention in Mexico.

APPENDIX A

VALUES OF THE IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE AND BULLION INTO ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES FROM MEXICO, 1857-1871

Source: Great Britain Parliament. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 3d ser., Vol. 6: Monetary Policy, Currency, "Report on the Depreciation of Silver," 1876, Appendix, p. 708.

VALUES OF THE IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE AND BULLION INTO ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES FROM MEXICO

Years	Grand Total of Imports into England, France, and the United States, from Mexico
1857	£ 1,819,368
1858	1,736,414
1859	1,702,995
1860	2,147,076
1861	1,353,665
Average - -	£ 1,751,903
1862	£ 1,697,817
1863	3,743,224
1864	5,451,439
1865	5,562,713
1866	2,087,897
Average - -	£ 3,708,618
1867	£ 2,086,267
1868	2,393,679
1869	2,855,372
1870	4,407,236
1871	5,560,789
Average - -	£ 3,460,669

VALUES OF THE IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE INTO ENGLAND, FRANCE,

AND THE UNITED STATES, FROM MEXICO

Years	Imports of Merchandise			Total Imports of Merchandise
	England	France	United States	
1857	£ 342,383	£ 207,020	£ 213,932	£ 763,335
1858	317,568	230,174	230,938	778,680
1859	380,499	168,135	259,184	807,818
1860	491,221	174,534	396,548	1,062,303
1861	347,529	174,137	184,607	706,273
Average-- .	£ 375,840	£ 190,800	£ 257,042	£ 823,682
1862	£ 619,508	£ 157,432	£ 170,377	£ 947,317
1863	2,294,337	196,795	634,142	3,125,274
1864	3,129,334	244,436	1,276,759	4,650,529
1865	3,216,924	228,149	1,296,015	4,741,088
1866	313,478	153,396	359,603	826,477
Average-- .	£ 1,914,716	£ 196,042	£ 747,379	£ 2,858,137

VALUES OF THE IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE INTO ENGLAND, FRANCE,

AND THE UNITED STATES, FROM MEXICO (cont.)

Years	Imports of Merchandise			Total Imports of Merchandise
	England	France	United States	
1867	£ 315,168	£ 130,310	£ 223,320	£ 668,798
1868	350,664	226,431	331,389	908,484
1869	350,570	305,168	486,701	1,142,439
1870	299,813	240,298	565,763	1,105,874
1871	397,334	212,302	668,685	1,278,321
Average-- .	£ 342,710	£ 222,902	£ 455,172	£ 1,020,784

VALUES OF THE IMPORTS OF BULLION INTO ENGLAND, FRANCE,

AND THE UNITED STATES, FROM MEXICO

Years	Imports of Bullion and Specie			Total Imports of Bullion and Specie
	England	France	United States	
1857	----	£ 22,911	£ 1,033,122	£ 1,056,033
1858	£ 44,609	2,924	910,201	957,734
1859	33,505	8,361	853,311	895,177
1860	30,003	6,345	1,048,425	1,084,773
1861	57,851	5,562	583,979	647,392
Average-- .	£ 33,194	£ 9,221	£ 885,808	£ 928,223
1862	£ 349,102	£ 12,431	£ 388,967	£ 750,500
1863	283,209	25,220	309,521	617,950
1864	204,337	230,751	365,822	800,910
1865	122,585	462,936	236,104	821,625
1866	34,544	720,728	506,148	1,261,420
Average-- .	£ 198,755	£ 290,414	£ 361,312	£ 850,481

VALUES OF THE IMPORTS OF BULLION INTO ENGLAND, FRANCE,

AND THE UNITED STATES, FROM MEXICO (cont.)

Years	Imports of Bullion and Specie			Total Imports of Bullion and Specie
	England	France	United States	
1867	£ 37,874	£ 786,045	£ 593,550	£1,417,469
1868	3,702	538,732	942,761	1,485,195
1869	6,110	686,856	1,019,967	1,712,933
1870	600,635	537,526	2,163,201	3,301,362
1871	820,474	482,520	2,979,474	4,282,468
Average-- .	£ 293,759	£ 606,336	£ 1,539,790	£2,439,885

APPENDIX B

TOTAL IMPORTS OF BALES OF COTTON INTO FRANCE, WITH STOCKS AT THE END OF EACH YEAR

Source: U.S. Consular Reports, cited by Arthur Louis Dunham, The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress of the Industrial Revolution in France (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1930), pp. 193-194; Frank Lawrence Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations of the Confederate States of America (2d ed., rev., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 13.

TOTAL IMPORTS OF BALES OF COTTON INTO FRANCE,

WITH STOCKS AT THE END OF EACH YEAR

Year	From U.S.A.	From Brazil	From Egypt	From India	Total	Stock at End of Year
1857	392,734	7,615	21,018	59,734	481,101	92,795
1858	499,760	6,535	24,781	42,094	573,170	141,510
1859	376,760	2,374	25,812	27,685	432,631	46,750
1860	609,030	1,654	21,650	52,260	684,594	112,425
1861	520,730	922	39,760	63,188	624,600	140,345
1862	31,420	4,653	32,643	202,852	271,570	59,193
1863	4,169	9,642	50,058	317,670	381,539	32,852
1864	4,740	29,501	82,521	344,118	460,880	61,630
1865	26,361	31,222	65,063	387,159	509,805	40,239
1866	217,539	63,711	39,491	369,149	689,890	119,450

APPENDIX C

COTTON PRICES IN FRANCE, 1860-1869

Source: Robert Levy, Histoire économique de l'industrie cotonnière en Alsace: étude de sociologie descriptive (Paris: Alcan, 1912), p. 306.

COTTON PRICES IN FRANCE, 1860-1869

Year	Prices (average, in francs per kilogram)		
	Cotton	Yarn	Calico
1860	1.78	3.27	4.59
1861	2.39	3.33	4.44
1862	4.64	4.91	5.38
1863	6.07	6.40	7.07
1864	6.46	7.13	7.77
1865	4.66	5.34	6.41
1866	3.93	5.13	6.54
1867	2.82	3.83	4.59
1868	2.76	3.48	4.23
1869	3.10	3.70	4.45

APPENDIX D

MEMORANDUM ACCOMPANYING THE PROJECT OF A TREATY GIVING A CONCESSION OF THE MINES OF NORTH MEXICO TO FRANCE

Source: Evan J. Coleman, "Senator Gwin's Plan for the Colonization of Sonora," Overland Monthly, Second Series, Vol. XVII (May, 1891), pp. 509-514.

MEXICO, September, 1864

MEMORANDUM ACCOMPANYING THE PROJECT OF A TREATY GIVING A CONCESSION OF THE MINES OF NORTH MEXICO TO FRANCE

The question of establishing the Empire in the Northern States of Mexico, and developing the mineral and agricultural resources of the unoccupied portions of those States, is one of the gravest consequence for the Emperor (Maximilian) and the French authorities in Mexico.

Its importance is enhanced by the necessity of immediate decision and action, to protect the North from the hordes that will soon environ it. The last resting place of the Juárez party will be in these States, and if the civil strife ceases in North America, and Juárez invites the disbanded soldiers who have been engaged in that war to join his banner, offering as the reward of success the rich mines of the North, it cannot be doubted that he can hold that country against any force which can be sent against him. It is a question of occupation. If the French troops take possession of the North before Juárez's army is thus reunited, he can never form an army. The shadow of authority which would be given to these adventurers by joining Juárez's army on Mexican soil, would induce them to make the venture and fight for the mastery of the country.

But let the French flag, backed by the French Army, proclaim the Empire in these States, then the most reckless adventurers would pause before engaging in a contest, in which to be successful the French troops had to be driven out of the country. Without vaunting French power, it may be said that the most powerful nations of the earth, with large, well trained, and well equipped armies, pause before firing a shot at the French flag. How potent, then, must its presence be to men fighting in a hopeless cause, stimulated only by the prospect of gain, to acquire which French armies must be overcome and

French prowess humiliated.

For these reasons French occupancy is the only means of rescuing the Northern States of Mexico from the hands of the enemies of the Empire. But French occupancy is not all that is required. There is a limit to the time that French troops can remain in Mexico. As long as the French flag is planted in the North, the supremacy of the Empire will be acknowledged. But the question as to how the Northern States can be secured to the Empire without the aid of foreign troops, is what now presses itself upon the attention of the Emperor and the French authorities.

Mexico is now in much the same condition as it was in 1821, when it became an independent power. Long continued civil war had crushed out the vitals of prosperity from every portion of the country. The ruin was so great and universal that the most hopeful doubted whether the country could react from a desolation which had rolled like an avalanche over the land. Capital had been withdrawn, destroyed, or driven from the country; labor was without remuneration, and laborers out of employment, causing the population to abandon all productive pursuits to become bandits, or labor only enough to avert starvation.

One of the first acts of the new Government was to endeavor to introduce capital and labor into this country. Foreigners were invited to emigrate and invest in Mexico under the most favorable laws. Its mineral resources being the basis of Mexico's wealth, every inducement was held out to foreign capitalists to re-establish the mines which had been destroyed during the Civil War. The duties (17 per cent) imposed on the silver raised were reduced to about 5½ per cent, while quicksilver and powder, formerly Government monopolies, were admitted free of duty. This enlightened policy had the desired effect. Foreign capital and labor poured into the country, and there is no doubt that, but for the constant recurrence of civil war, Mexico would have been now a rich and powerful nation, and this originating mainly from the foregoing policy.

The adoption of a similar policy is necessary to build up the Imperial power and develop the resources of the North of Mexico. It is necessary to recur to the uniform weakness of the Central power in the States of the North, going back to the period of Independence. For the last few years the Federal power has scarcely been a shadow in the State of Sonora. The Governor was (and is) an autocrat, yielding to or revolting against (with impunity) the Federal Government, as his inclination or interest prompted. The wild Indians have held the richest mining portion of the State ever since the Republic has existed; and have devastated other sections to such an extent that there is scarcely any portion of the State safe from their raids.

To some extent the same may be said of Chihuahua. Every authority verifies the fact that the richest gold and silver mines of the entire Empire are perhaps located within the boundaries of these States. But few have been worked at all, and none to exhaustion. The rich ores are nearer the surface, and the placer gold deposits more extensive than farther South. Therefore much less capital is necessary to develop and make the mines productive. It is a well attested fact that if the same amount of foreign capital had been invested in 1824, '25, '26, and '27 in repairing the damages inflicted during the civil wars to mining establishments in the Central and Southern States, double the amount of bullion would have been produced, in a much shorter time, than the latter ever yielded.

The question, however, is: "How are labor and capital to be obtained to develop these mines in the North?" The answer is simple. Adopt the same policy as the Republic did in 1822,--invite both from abroad. The French flag and troops will be a guarantee of protection to both capital and labor. The richness of the mines, the rapidity with which they can be made productive, and the small amount of capital required for each mine, will induce an immense emigration from Europe and the mining districts of the United States, when there is shown to be security in the rights and possession of property. There is no country that can so well sustain a large population suddenly introduced. It

has mines of gold and silver as rich as ever were worked, rich lands capable of producing in abundance everything required for the sustenance of man, a delightful climate, and great facilities for commerce.

To secure and retain such a population requires the adoption of a system of laws never yet enacted by any government.

[A eulogy of the United States land system follows here.]

The mining code of Spain is the wisest ever matured by a nation. The Spanish people were more familiar with the subject of mining than any nation, ancient or modern. "Spain by a very singular fatality" (says the great historian Gibbon) "was the Peru or Mexico of the old world. The discovery of this rich western continent by the Phoenicians, and the oppression of the simpler natives who were compelled to labor in their own mines for the benefit of strangers, form an exact type of the more recent history of Spanish America. . ." But the Spanish system of mining was improved in the process of time, and arrived at perfection in the Ordinances of 1783. No better illustration can be offered of the estimation in which the mineral resources were held by Spain, than by referring to the remarkable fact that while the Spanish codes were filled with ordinances intended to stimulate the discovery of mines and the development of mineral wealth, yet with the exception of the laws relating to Pueblos, there is no legal provision for the distribution of the government land among her subjects, although Spain owned in the Americas vast unoccupied tracts of the finest land in the world. The mining laws were to Spain what the pre-emption laws were to the United States.

[Here Dr. Gwin repeats at length his statement, that in the absence of any United States code of mining law, the California miners adopted in substance the Spanish code, which "Congress quietly permits, and it has now been adopted in every mining district, sustained by State and Territorial legislation, and is the fixed policy of the country"; and this code and

the United States land system together "are the perfection of law to settle and develop rapidly" a mining and agricultural country.]

If these systems are combined in the settlement of North Mexico, and capital and labor encouraged to come from all countries, its settlement will be so certain, and the development of its mineral and agricultural wealth so rapid, as to be without parallel in the history of the world. The revenue to the government from the bullion will be important, but far from equal to that derived from customs and internal taxation. The consumption of all species of imported goods is enormous in mining countries. The wages of labor are large, the profits from the mines certain, in such a country as Sonora and Chihuahua, and the supplies will be drawn principally from foreign countries.

In California, when the population did not exceed 200,000, with an exceedingly low revenue tariff, the amount of customs paid at San Francisco was $2,300,000; and last year, under the war tariff of the United States, which is so heavy on many articles extensively consumed by the miners as to be almost prohibition, the amount received at the Port of San Francisco alone, not estimating other ports of entry, was $4,600,000.

The income to be derived from the tax upon bullion should be small, in order not to discourage emigration. Six per cent royalty is estimated as the proportion that should be paid upon all bullion taken from the earth; while export duties should be entirely abolished, and miners not be forced to have their bullion coined before exportation. This will yield a large revenue, but not equal to that from the customs dues on imports and from internal taxes. The greatest advantage to the Government from the development of the mines in North Mexico will be the foreign trade it can then command. The system of collecting the royalty should be such that every miner would be able to deposit his bullion directly with a Government Assayer, who, after determining its value and deducting the royalty, would give the miner a certificate of deposit for the remainder,

which would be equal to gold and silver to him. The Government would then ship off the gold and silver bullion in bars,--the gold to Europe and the silver to China and the Indies, accommodating the merchants by drawing bills upon the same. In this way an immense trade would speedily spring up, giving profit to the merchant, and increasing the wealth of the Empire.

The trade of China and the East Indies has for centuries been the source of wealth and power to the nations who could control it. The direct route from these countries and Japan to Europe is through North Mexico. A railroad from Mazatlán to the mouth of the Rio del Norte would be but 700 miles long, and much shorter to connect with the railroads of Texas, at a point higher up that river, which would open communication with all the great seaports of the South, and when peace is restored, with every port in the North. This would secure the monopoly of the transit for consumption of China, Japan, and East Indian products, not only to all North and South America on the Atlantic Coast; but most of these products which are consumed in Europe would passover this route as the cheapest, safest, and most rapid.

The increase in the wealth and power of the Empire, by the development of these mines, will be so rapid and certain that the public credit would be restored so as to gain a guarantee of the permanency of the Empire and the ultimate extinction of all its liabilities.

[He answers, as follows, the fear of repetition of the Texas experience.]

Texas was a vast waste of agricultural and grazing land with no navigation, the mouths of the rivers being so shallow as to prevent the entrance of any sea-going vessel. It was the refuge of all the outlaws of the United States. The murderer, robber, and swindler, if he could escape into Texas, was free from punishment for his crimes. In this way the first foreign settlement of Texas was from the refuse population of the United States, and from the banditti and desperadoes of all countries. But,

notwithstanding this bad element in the first emigration, Texas would never have attempted revolution when it did, but for Mexican maladministration. If history is to be believed, the inhabitants of Texas were thus forced into revolution by the determination of the Government to drive them out of the country which they had found a desert, or to exterminate them. A mere accident caused the success of the Texan revolt. If Santa Ana and his army had not been captured, as it never would have been with proper precaution and generalship, every emigrant would have been driven out of Texas, and the effort would have been made to supply their places by emigration from other portions of Mexico.

The Mexico of now and then is not the same. The country to be colonized is not similar, and the colonization would be entirely different. That of Texas was of the material first stated; it was slow, and the emigrants poor, as well as limited in numbers. For years after Texas became independent, it could not entice a population within its borders sufficient to defend it from Indian depredations, even by giving away its public lands to all settlers. The settlement of mining countries within recent years on this continent has been entirely different.

[Dr. Gwin here repeats, in substance, his statements of the rapid growth of the mining districts of the United States.]

There never was in any population a greater proportion of intelligent, honest, and practical men than might be found in the mining districts of the United States any time during the last ten years. They were, for the most part, in the vigor of life. The danger and expense attending their emigration prove that they must have been among the most resolute and active spirits of the age, whose previous success in life afforded them the means of further enterprise and adventure. They have subdued all the warlike tribes of Indians within their limits, and nearly destroyed the Apache tribe, the scourge of North Mexico for a century. They have adapted to each other two great systems of government that had never before been in contact. They have, in fact,

improved upon the mining code of Spain in the working of placer mines of gold.

[Dr. Gwin here repeats at length his eulogy of the mining code as adopted in California.]

Nor is it the mineral resources alone that have been developed. The progress of agriculture has been as rapid as in mining. San Francisco, which at first received grain from Chili, can and does now successfully compete with New York, Chicago, and the Black Sea, in the corn markets of Europe. And cattle and horses that were imported at vast expense have so improved and multiplied the original breed found in California, as to form an article of profitable export. It is the best portion of this population that would emigrate, and bring success to the colonization of North Mexico. They would come to the country, not as marauders, fugitives from justice, adventurers of desperate character and fortune, but as the founders of a system in the mining district of the United States that has never been equaled by the wisdom of man. They would come with all the experience and knowledge they have acquired in founding this system, putting it into operation, and improving its defects when its practical working pointed them out.

The colonization of such a country by such a class of men, where the system they have founded is to be put into operation,--a system they thoroughly understand, even to its most minute details, is a subject of grave consideration. In such a population sound principles may confidently be looked for, and its perfect adaptation to the actual circumstances of the country. Their system of labor is made for the masses, and secures equality. It gives no privilege where there is not corresponding merit.

They are the class of men who can, in a short time, make Mexico the richest mining country in the world. They will pave the way for emigration of the natives of Mexico, and from all the civilized nations of the earth. The Empire will not only be prosperous by their labor, but powerful and permanent.

If the peace of the Empire is threatened in the jostlings of a first settlement of the country, the French flag will deter from sedition or insubordination, or French troops will put them down. When the time comes for the withdrawal of these troops, the Emperor may rely upon this population as one of the main supports of his Empire. They are part of its founders; its fame and its glory is their fame and their glory; they will be prosperous and contented, and will be able and willing to put down all attempts to disturb the harmony of the Empire in their own midst, and to suppress insurrection, if it should occur elsewhere in the dominions of the Emperor Maximilian.

APPENDIX E

GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE BIMETALLIC EXPERIENCE OF FRANCE FROM 1803 TO THE CLOSING OF THE MINT TO THE FREE COINAGE OF SILVER IN 1875

Source: Enquête sur les principes et les faits généraux qui régissent la circulation monétaire et fiduciaire, 1869, Vol. VI, pp. 534-535.

GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE BIMETALLIC EXPERIENCE OF FRANCE FROM 1803 TO THE CLOSING OF THE MINT TO THE FREE COINAGE OF SILVER IN 1875.



X Y is the mean or legal ratio of 15½. Black line is the variation of the market ratio. Red line is the movement of Gold. Dotted line is the movement of Silver.

APPENDIX F

FRENCH SILVER COINAGE SINCE 1795

Source: Relevé par année des espèces d'or et d'argent fabriquées en France, enclosures 2 and 3 from Decazes to Lyons, April 10, 1876, Great Britain, Parliament, Hansards Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 3d ser., Vol. 6: Monetary Policy, Currency, "Report on the Depreciation of Silver," 1876, Appendix, pp. 88-89.

FRENCH SILVER COINAGE SINCE 1795
(in Francs)

Year	Total	Year	Total
IV and V	41,399,385.00	1836	43,242,399.25
VI	11,917,300.00	1837	111,858,697.75
VII	18,979,705.00	1838	88,489,324.25
VIII	13,852,230.00	1839	73,637,742.00
IX	3,816,595.00	1840	63,795,527.00
X	4,842,785.00	1841	77,517,941.00
XI	11,429,255.00	1842	68,391,170.25
1803	23,171,998.00	1843	74,148,998.25
1804	47,517,195.75	1844	69,134,980.00
1805	46,385,909.50	1845	89,967,609.50
1806	25,241,651.50	1846	47,886,145.50
1807	5,008,903.00	1847	78,285,157.00
1808	67,833,922.25	1848	119,731,095.25
1809	44,296,494.00	1849	206,458,663.90
1810	57,170,216.50	1850	86,458,485.20
1811	256,399,040.00	1851	59,327,308.90
1812	160,786,409.50	1852	71,918,445.50
1813	134,900,313.50	1853	20,099,488.20
1814	61,244,121.00	1854	2,123,887.20
1815	37,673,806.00	1855	25,500,305.50
1816	34,917,526.50	1856	54,422,214.00
1817	37,143,579.75	1857	3,809,611.30
1818	12,406,076.25	1858	8,663,568.70
1819	21,235,077.25	1859	8,401,813.80
1820	18,436,620.50	1860	8,084,198.60
1821	67,533,866.00	1861	2,518,049.50
1822	100,679,137.75	1862	2,519,397.70
1823	82,911,680.00	1863	329,610.50
1824	114,476,007.75	1864	7,296,609.90
1825	75,203,291.50	1865	9,222,394.50
1826	90,835,623.00	1866	44,821,409.00
1827	153,868,978.25	1867	113,758,539.70
1828	161,466,133.75	1868	129,445,268.00
1829	102,642,617.25	1869	68,175,897.00
1830	120,187,089.75	1870	69,051,256.00
1831	205,223,764.00	1871	23,878,499.50
1832	141,353,915.00	1872	26,838,369.50
1833	157,482,863.00		
1834	218,288,384.75		
1835	99,666,149.25		

APPENDIX G

FRENCH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF GOLD AND SILVER, 1815-1870

Source: Enquête sur les principes et les faits généraux qui régissent la circulation monétaire et fiduciaire, 1869, Vol. VI pp. 534-535.

FRENCH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF GOLD, 1815-1847
(In Millions of Francs)

Year	Imports			Exports			Excess	
	Bullion	Coin	Total	Bullion	Coin	Total	Import	Export
1815	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1816	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1817	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1818	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1819	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1820	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1821	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1822	...	...	43	...	...	39	4	...
1823	...	...	75	...	...	94	...	19
1824	...	...	102	...	...	65	37	...
1825	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1826	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1827	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1828	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1829	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1830	...	...	48	...	...	38	10	...
1831	...	...	24	...	...	14	10	...
1832	...	...	14	...	...	53	...	39
1833	...	...	36	...	...	12	24	...
1834	...	...	25	...	...	32	...	7
1835	...	...	5	...	...	25	...	20
1836	...	...	24	...	...	38	...	14
1837	6	23	29	22	13	35	...	6
1838	3	16	19	10	13	23	...	4
1839	7	36	43	...	19	19	24	...
1840	10	49	59	1	9	10	49	...
1841	4	11	15	7	13	20	...	5
1842	2	6	8	12	8	20	...	12
1843	3	7	10	26	25	51	...	41
1844	2	3	5	5	6	11	...	6
1845	3	2	5	13	6	19	...	14
1846	4	4	8	12	5	17	...	9
1847	5	16	21	9	25	34	...	13
TOTAL	49	173	618	117	142	669	158	209

FRENCH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF GOLD, 1848-1870
(In Millions of Francs)

Year	Imports			Exports			Excess	
	Bullion	Coin	Total	Bullion	Coin	Total	Import	Export
1848	5	39	44	3	3	6	38	...
1849	5	7	12	1	5	6	6	...
1850	30	31	61	32	12	44	17	...
1851	22	94	116	14	17	31	85	...
1852	19	40	59	11	31	42	17	...
1853	261	58	319	6	24	30	289	...
1854	368	113	481	9	56	65	416	...
1855	275	106	381	5	158	163	218	...
1856	273	192	465	1	89	90	375	...
1857	291	278	569	3	120	123	446	...
1858	253	301	554	1	65	66	488	...
1859	358	369	727	5	183	188	539	...
1860	279	191	470	32	127	159	311	...
1861	17	227	244	58	210	268	...	24
TOTAL*	2456	2046	4502	181	1100	1281	3245	24
1862	119	283	402	42	195	237	165	...
1863	83	287	370	86	272	358	12	...
1864	110	354	464	33	306	339	125	...
1865	96	323	419	56	213	269	150	...
1866	169	644	813	68	280	348	465	...
1867	225	369	594	43	142	185	409	...
1868	200	293	493	30	251	281	212	...
1869	157	298	455	36	144	180	275	...
1870	69	241	310	100	91	191	119	...
TOTAL	1228	3092	4320	494	1894	2388	1932	

*The above figures are totals from 1848 to the 1861 French Intervention in Mexico

FRENCH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF SILVER, 1815-1847
(In Millions of Francs)

Year	Imports			Exports			Excess	
	Bullion	Coin	Total	Bullion	Coin	Total	Import	Export
1815	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1816	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1817	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1818	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1819	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1820	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1821	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1822	...	...	143	...	...	18	125	...
1823	...	...	126	...	...	12	114	...
1824	...	...	142	...	...	18	124	...
1825	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1826	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1827	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1828	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1829	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
1830	...	...	172	...	...	21	151	...
1831	...	...	196	...	...	15	181	...
1832	...	...	118	...	...	58	60	...
1833	...	...	163	...	...	88	75	...
1834	...	...	167	...	...	66	101	...
1835	...	...	131	...	...	57	74	...
1836	...	...	92	...	...	65	27	...
1837	23	145	168	1	23	24	144	...
1838	23	131	154	2	32	34	120	...
1839	15	117	132	5	52	57	75	...
1840	21	139	160	27	37	64	96	...
1841	19	151	170	16	37	53	117	...
1842	29	109	138	11	35	46	92	...
1843	39	118	157	9	45	54	103	...
1844	44	107	151	18	51	69	82	...
1845	46	113	159	14	55	69	90	...
1846	26	81	107	14	46	60	47	...
1847	49	89	138	17	68	85	53	...
TOTAL	334	1300	3084	134	481	1033	2051	

FRENCH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF SILVER, 1848-1870
(In Millions of Francs)

Year	Imports			Exports			Excess	
	Bullion	Coin	Total	Bullion	Coin	Total	Import	Export
1848	39	194	233	1	18	19	214	...
1849	62	229	291	3	44	47	244	...
1850	25	130	155	10	72	82	73	...
1851	21	158	179	33	68	101	78	...
1852	22	158	180	28	155	183	...	3
1853	17	96	113	41	189	230	...	117
1854	12	88	100	73	191	264	...	164
1855	43	78	121	77	241	318	...	197
1856	12	98	110	139	255	394	...	284
1857	18	80	98	152	306	458	...	360
1858	15	146	161	98	78	176	...	15
1859	12	199	211	190	192	382	...	171
1860	12	119	131	146	142	288	...	157
1861	21	151	172	80	154	234	...	62
TOTAL*	331	1924	2255	1071	2105	3176	609	1530
1862	28	104	132	116	102	218	...	86
1863	28	133	161	126	103	229	...	68
1864	64	204	268	134	176	310	...	42
1865	94	142	236	93	71	164	72	...
1866	75	175	250	111	94	205	45	...
1867	70	184	254	46	19	65	189	...
1868	64	129	193	27	57	84	109	...
1869	64	129	193	37	44	81	112	...
1870	32	74	106	26	45	71	35	...
TOTAL	519	1274	1793	716	711	1427	562	196

*The above figures are totals from 1848 to the 1861 French Intervention in Mexico

FRENCH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF GOLD AND SILVER, 1815-1847
(In Millions of Francs)

Year	Total Import	Total Export	Diff. in Favor Of Imports	Diff. in Favor Of Exports
1815	31	7	24	...
1816	49	155	...	106
1817	112	53	59	...
1818	112	155	...	43
1819	88	89	...	1
1820	110	138	...	28
1821	126	177	...	51
1822	186	57	129	...
1823	201	106	95	...
1824	244	83	161	...
1825	251	135	116	...
1826	174	175	...	1
1827	187	40	147	...
1828	208	29	189	...
1829	148	59	89	...
1830	220	59	161	...
1831	220	29	191	...
1832	132	111	21	...
1833	199	100	99	...
1834	192	98	94	...
1835	136	82	54	...
1836	116	103	13	...
1837	197	59	138	...
1838	173	57	116	...
1839	175	76	99	...
1840	219	74	145	...
1841	185	73	112	...
1842	146	66	80	...
1843	167	105	62	...
1844	156	80	76	...
1845	164	88	76	...
1846	115	77	38	...
1847	159	119	40	...
TOTAL	5298	3014	2624	230

FRENCH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF GOLD AND SILVER,
1848-1870
(In Millions of Francs)

Year	Total Import	Total Export	Diff. in Favor Of Imports	Diff. in Favor Of Exports
1848	277	25	252	...
1849	203	53	250	...
1850	216	126	90	...
1851	295	132	163	...
1852	239	225	14	...
1853	432	260	172	...
1854	581	329	252	...
1855	502	481	21	...
1856	575	484	91	...
1857	667	581	86	...
1858	715	242	473	...
1859	938	570	368	...
1860	601	447	154	...
1861	416	502	...	86
TOTAL*	6657	4457	2386	86
1862	534	455	79	...
1863	531	587	...	56
1864	732	649	82	...
1865	655	433	222	...
1866	1063	553	510	...
1867	848	250	598	...
1868	686	365	321	...
1869	648	261	387	...
1870	416	262	154	...
TOTAL	6113	3915	2353	56

*The above figures are totals from 1848 to the 1861 French Intervention in Mexico

APPENDIX H

PROJET DE CONVENTION POUR LE MAINTIEN D'UN CORPS AUXILIAIRE FRANÇAIS AU MEXIQUE 10 FEVRIER 1864

Source: Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Wien. Hausarchiv. Archiv Kaiser Maximilians von Mexico, 1862-1865, Box 12.

Projet de convention pour le maintien d'un corps auxiliaire français au Mexique

10 février 1864

Le gouvernement de S. M. l'Empereur du Mexique ayant exprimé le désir qu'une partie des forces militaires françaises envoyées au Mexique restât encore dans ce pays pour y prêter son concours au rétablissement définitif de l'ordre et au maintien de la paix, et le gouvernement de S. M. l'Empereur des Français voulant, de son côté, donner au Mexique une nouvelle preuve de l'intérêt qu'il prend à la régénération de ce pays, ont décidé de conclure une convention propre à atteindre ce but, et ont nommé à ces effet comme Leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Lesquels

Art. 1er

Un corps auxiliaire français de 25 mille hommes continuera de stationner au Mexique dans les conditions réglées par les articles suivants.

Art. 2

Les troupes du corps auxiliaire évacueront le Mexique au fur et à mesure que les forces recrutées en Europe par le gouvernement mexicain seront arrivées dans le pays.

Art. 3

La légion étrangère au service de la France, qui sera portée à huit mille hommes, restera encore pendant six années au Mexique après que toutes les autres forces françaises auront été rappelées conformément à l'article 2. A dater de ce moment, la dite légion passera à la solde du gouvernement mexicain. Le gouvernement mexicain se réserve la faculté d'abréger la durée de l'emploi au Mexique de la légion étrangère.

Art. 4

Les points du territoire à occuper par les troupes françaises et les expéditions militaires de ces troupes, s'il y a lieu, seront déterminés de commun accord et directement entre S. M. l'Empereur du Mexique et le commandant en chef du corps auxiliaire.

Art. 5

Le commandement militaire, dans le rayon des places occupées par les troupes du corps auxiliaire, appartient au commandant en chef de ces troupes, lequel d'ailleurs n'aura à intervenir dans aucune branche de l'administration mexicaine.

Art. 6

Le gouvernement français entretiendra un service bimensuel de transports entre la France et le port de Vera Cruz pour le ravitaillement et le remplacement des troupes du corps auxiliaire. Les frais de ce service des transports, fixés à la somme de 200,000 francs par mois, seront supportés par le gouvernement mexicain.

Art. 7

Les frais de l'expédition française au Mexique, fixés à la somme de . . . [sic] millons pour tout le temps de sa durée jusqu'au 1er janvier 1864, seront remboursés à la France par le gouvernement mexicain en dix annuités égales, dont la première sera payée dans le délai d'un an à partir du jour de l'avènement de S. M. l'Empereur de Mexique.

Art. 8

L'indemnité à payer à la France par le gouvernement mexicain pour dépenses de solde, nourriture, équipement et entretien des troupes du corps auxiliaire à partir du 1er janvier 1864, ainsi que pour le service des transports mentionné à l'article 6, demeure fixée à la somme de . . . [sic] par mille hommes et par mois. Lorsque conformément à l'article 3, les troupes auxiliaires françaises se trouveront réduites à la légion étrangère soldée par le Mexique,

le montant total de cette indemnité sera exactement calculé et payé en cinq annuités égales qui commenceront à courir du jour où les dix annuités dont parle l'article précédent seront revolues.

Art. 9

Les stations navales que la France entretient dans les Antilles et dans l'Océan Pacifique enverront souvent des navires montrer le drapeau français dans les ports du Mexique.

Art. 10

La présente convention sera ratifiée dans le plus bref délai possible.

Plusieurs causes principales pèsent aujourd'hui sur le marché financier en Europe et en même temps plusieurs gouvernement européens font appel à des capitaux;

D'autre part, l'on ne possède encore qu'une connaissance fort imparfaite de la situation financière du Mexique, des besoins et des ressources de l'administration mexicaine et du pays.

Ces deux raisons majeures ont décidé l'Archiduc à ne conclure pour le moment qu'un emprunt provisoire pour les besoins présumés de son gouvernement pendant les premiers dix-huit mois.

Ce temps serait employé

1. à organiser l'administration des finances du pays: administrations centrales, cour des comptes, douanes, contributions directes et indirectes;

2. à faire les études indispensables de l'état des finances, des besoins et des ressources du pays; à cet effet des commissions spéciales devront élaborer sans la moindre perte de temps les premiers et plus pressants travaux:

   a. pour régulariser la perception des droits de douane, des contributions directes et indirectes, ainsi que pour adopter leurs réformes les plus essentielles;

b. pour préparer le reglement de la dette intérieure et de la dette extérieure; et

c. pour organiser l'administration des biens nationalisés du clergé ainsi que des autres biens qui forment le domaine de l'Etat, notamment des terrains vagues, forêts, mines, etc., et pour déterminer exactement les ressources de l'Etat sous ce rapport;

3. à fixer l'indemnité ou la dotation à payer au clergé;

4. à organiser l'administration des etablissements de bienfaisance: hôpitaux, orphelinats, etc., et à en arrêter les dépenses;

5. à établir les lois et règlements de colonisation et à déterminer les dépenses des encouragements et de la protection à assurer à l'immigration européenne qu'il est si essentiel d'organiser sur une large échelle;

6. à établir le système des finances de l'Etat: budget général, budgets séparés pour chaque Ministère, controle, perception des impôts, etc., etc.

7. à fonder une banque nationale ainsi que les entreprises les plus essentielles pour relever et favoriser l'industrie, l'agriculture et le commerce;

8. à élaborer et adopter des règlements sur l'exploitation des mines de la Sonora et à connaître les ressources de l'Etat sous ce rapport.

Dans l'etat de désorganisation où se trouve le pays, le gouvernement mexicain doit avant tout organiser les différentes branches de son administration et faire les études préalables et au moins les plus essentielles de chaque question principale avant de pouvoir engager, à son sujet, l'avenir. L'interêt bien entendu de la consolidation de l'oeuvre de l'auguste Empereur des Français, commande donc impérieusement à l'Archiduc de faire des réserves absolues pour toute question principale qui aurait été prématurément résolue par le Régence provisoire à Mexico.

L'Empereur peut compter sur la volonté et les efforts persévérants de l'Archiduc pour consolider l'oeuvre de Sa Majesté ainsi que pour maintenir la complete indépendance et l'intégrité du Mexique. C'est ainsi qu'il pourra s'y fonder un Empire puissant et prospère qui réponde à la politique haute et éclairée de l'Empereur, Empire avec lequel la France puisse resserer ses liens d'amitié et étendre ses relations de navigation, de commerce et d'émigration.

L'Archiduc espère que l'auguste Empereur des Français daignera approuver ces principes ainsi que la résolution de se borner aujourd'hui à conclure un emprunt restreint.

Cet emprunt serait d'un capital nominal de 250 millions de francs.

Il serait prélevé sur son produit la première des dix annuités de frais de guerre et d'occupation à payer à la France.

Les versements se feraient ensuite comme suit:

20% immédiatement après la signature,

20% trois mois plus tard, et successivement les trois autres 20% de trois mois en trois mois.

Le Mexique donnerait en garantie:

1. les biens nationaux formant le domaine de l'Etat; 2. le restant disponible de ses droits de douanes maritimes et 3. le produit des mines appartenant à l'Etat, sans entendre engager en aucune manière son droit de les exploiter ou faire exploiter de la maniere qu'il jugera convenable.

Le plus tôt possible et au plus tard en déans l'année de la date de la conclusion de l'emprunt seront nommés deux commissaires, l'un par le gouvernement mexicain et l'autre par le banquier contractant, pour déterminer les biens ou les revenus qui suffiront à la garantie spéciale de l'emprunt afin que le gouvernement puisse librement disposer de ses autres ressources. Cette garantie sera fixée à une somme

annuelle représentant l'intérêt et l'amortissement qui auront été convenus.

En cas de différend entre les deux commissaires, ceux-ci auront recours à l'arbitrage de S. M. l'Empereur des Français.

Miramar

APPENDIX I

CONVENCION DE 1864 SOBRE GARANT DE GUERRA DE LA FRANCIA
17 FEVRIER 1864

Source: Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Wien. Hausarchiv. Archiv Kaiser Maximilians von Mexico, 1862-1865, Box 140.

Convencion de 1864 Sobre garant de guerra de la Francia

17 février 1864

Le Gouvernement Français et le Gouvernement Mexicain desiront régler d'un commun accord la question des frais de guerre imposés à la France par la campagne du Méxique ont désigné à cet effect comme leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Pour la France: Son Excellence Monsieur le Marquis de Montholon, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français au Mexique, Commandeur de l'Ordre Imperial de la Légion d'honneur etc. etc.;

Pour le Mexique: Son Excellence Don José Miguel Arroyo, Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat, Charge du Département des Affaires Etrangères Chevalier de l'Ordre Imperial de Guadalupé etc. etc., et Don Martin de Castillo, Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat Chargé du Département des Finances; lesquels aprés avoir examiné et échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme sont convenus des articles suivants:

Article 1er

Le Gouvernement Mexicain reconnaissant les dépenses considerables qu'ont entrainees pour le Gouvernement français l'envoi de forces navales et militaires et leur séjour au Mexique pendant les années 1862 et 1863, se déclare debiteur--envers la France d'une somme de deux cent dix millons de francs (210,000,000) à titre de remboursement de tous les frais sus énoncés.

Cette somme portera intérêt à partir du 1^{r} Janvier 1864, à raison de cinq pour cent l'an jusqu' au paiement integral.

Article 2

Le mode de paiement de cette somme sera ultérie eurment déterminé.

Article 3

Le Gouvernement français déclare de son côte renoncer, moyennant le paiement de la somme ci-desseus énoncée à toutes répetitions pour dépenses de frais de guerre quel congrue se rattachant à la campagne effectuée au Méxique pendant les années 1862 et 1863.

Article 4

Il est entendu que cette renonciation n'implique pas l'abandon par le Gouvernement français des réclamations interessant jusqu' à ce jour ses nationaux et dont le réglement et la liquidation devront faire l'objet d'un arrangement spécial entre les deux gouvernements.

Article 5

Comme garantie de la bonne exécution de la présente convention et comme témoignage de gratitude envers le Gouvernement de S. M. l'Empereur des Français, le Gouvernement Méxicain concéde au Gouvernement français le droit d'exploitation conformément aux lois, de toutes les mines de l'Etat de Sonora qui se trouveraient être actuellement non exploitées au non dénoncées.

Article 6

A fin d'assurer à l'exploitation de ces mines toutes les garanties désirables, le Gouvernement français aura le droit d'entre tenir à ses frais dans le territoire du dit Etat de Sonora un corps de troupes régulières qui pourra être remplace plus tard par des forces que viendraient à organiser pour leur propre compte toutes compagnies auxquelles le Gouvernement français jugerait à propos d'accorder des concessions--pour l'exploitation des mines. Dans ce dernier cas, les dites forces seront soumises aux lois du pays.conformément aux réglements qu'adopteront les

dites compagnies avec l'approbation au Gouvernement Mexicain.

Article 7

Pour donner à la presente convention le caractère d'équité que recherchent les deux parties contractantes, il est stipulé qu'un dixième au moins du montant net que produira au Trésor français l'exploitation des mines concédées pourra être admis en remboursement des frais de guerre occasionnée à la France par la campagne de 1862 et 1863, comme compensation de la sus dite concession.

Article 8

Une convention ultérieure réglera entre les deux Gouvernements les conditions du maintien d'un corps d'occupation français au Mexique à dater du 1er Janvier 1864, si cette occupation est jugée nécessaire pour achever d'y rétablier l'ordre et la paix.

Article 9

La présente convention sera ratifiée dans le plus bref delai possible et les ratifications seront echangées à la ville de México dans l'espace de quatre mois.

En foi de quoi les Plenipotentiaires ci-dessus l'ont signé et y ont apposé leurs sceaux respectifs.

Fait à la ville de México en trois originaux dont deux, pour La Majesté l'Empereur des Français et un pour le Gouvernement Mexicain, le vingt sept jour du mois de Février l'an de grace, mil huit cent soixante quatre.

Le Marquis de Montholon

J. Miguel Arroyo

M. Castillo

APPENDIX J


ARIZONA
ÉTATS
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JALISCO
VALLADOLID
MICHOACAN
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GUERRERO
CARTE
DU
MEXIQUE
Territoire non occupé.
Parties du Territoire occupé par les Français
Echelle.
Kilomètres.


ÉTATS UNIS
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G. de Tehuantepec
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NOUVEAU MEXIQUE
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TAMAULIPAS
DURANGO
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Sierra de Tlascala
Sierra de Jalisco
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Sierra de Oaxaca
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